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Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  81  /  Nunnber  2046 


January  1981 


Bicentennial 
1781-1981 


1 


Dftpartment  of  Sinte 

bulletin 


Volume  81  /  Number  2046  /  January  1981 


Cover  art : 

Reproduction  of  official  poster 
commemorating  the  Bicentennial 
of  the  Department  of  State 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press 
releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission 
to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


EDMUND  S.  MUSKIE 

Secretar\  of  Slate 

WILLIAM  J.  DYESS 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

JOHN  CLARK  KIMBALL 

Chief.  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is 
necessary  in  the  transaction  of  the  public 
business  required  by  law  of  this 
Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget  through  January  31,  1981. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein 
may  be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the 
Departmknt  of  Statk  Bulletin  as  the 
source  will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is 
indexed  in  the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical 
Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of 

Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 

Office.  Washington,  D.C.  20402 

Price:  12  issues  plus  annua!  index — 

Sl'J.OO  (domesticl  $23.75  (foreignl 

Single  copy—  $3.25  (domestic)  $4.10  (foreign) 

Index,  single  copy—  $2.25  (domesticl  $2.85  (foreii 


CONTENTS 


SPECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 

A  Short  History  of  the  U.S.  Department  of  State,  1781-1981  (David  F.  Trask) 


The  Secretary 

1  Africa  and  U.S.  Policy 

3  Securing  a  Safer  Future 

5  Refugees:  The  U.S.  Response 


Africa 

8  Southern  Africa:  Four  Years 

Later  {Richard  M.  Moose) 


25 

U.S.  Hostage.s  in 

Iran 

(Secretary  Muskie) 

28 

Iran  Chronology, 
1980 

November 

Narcotics 

29 

International  Narcotics  Con- 

trol  in  the  1980s  (Mathea 
Falco) 


Department 

11  Foreign  Service  Act,  1980 

(President  Carter) 


East  Asia 

12  ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue  (/oiMf 

Press  Statement) 

13  U.S.-China  Sign  Grain  Agree- 

ment (White  House  State- 
metit ) 

14  U.S. -.Japanese  Relations  in  the 

1980s  (Richard  C. 
Holbrooke) 

Europe 

18         Strengthening  the  CSCE 
Process  (Griffin  B.  Bell) 

20         Poland  (President  Carter, 
White  House  Statement) 


Human  Rights 


21         Human  Rights  and  Interna- 
tional Law  (Patricia  M. 
Derian) 


Middle  East 

24 


United  Nations 

30 


U.S.-Israel  Oil  Agreement 
(President  Carter,  Yitzhak 
Modai,  Text  of  Agreement, 
Memorandum  of  Agreement, 
Department  Fact  Sheet) 

Boston  Public  Lib 
Superiulendezt  of  Do 


General  Assembly  Votes  on 
Afghanistan  Situation 
(Donald  F.  McHenry.  Text 
of  Resolution ) 


Western  Hemisphere 

33         10th  General  Assembly  of  the 
OAS  (President  Carter, 
Secretary  Muskie) 


Treaties 

36         Current  Actions 

Chronology 

40         November  1980 


Press  Releases 

41  Department  of  State 

41         U.S.U.N. 


Publications 

42         GPO  Sales 

Index 


rary 
cuments 


FEB  12 


DEPOSITORY 


*>A^^S    O^ 


Department  of  State  Bicentennial 

1781-1981 

To  commemorate  our  bicentennial,  we  are  pleased 
to  present  in  this  issue  (center  section)  a  short  history 
of  the  United  States  Department  of  State  by  David  F. 
Trask,  the  Historian. 

This  article  also  has  been  issued  as  a  separate 
pamphlet  by  the  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs;  copies  may 
be  purchased  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 
20402. 


The  Editors 


1 


■HE  SECRETARY 


Africa  and  U.S.  Policy 


Address  before  the  African- 
icon  Histoyical  and  Cidfiiral 
■II  and  the  World  Affairs  Council 
Sniihcrn  California  in  San  Fran- 
,'..  on  December  J,,  19S0.^ 

11  i:rateful  for  the  opportunity  to  ad- 
i>.-  this  distinguished  gathering.  As 
'  WW  aware — as  I  am  only  too  aware 

.  ai-e  in  a  period  of  transition.  I  am 
; ,  railed  a  "lame  duck"  Secretary  of 
uc.  1  don't  feel  lame.  And  my  voice  is 

;  \M  irking  just  fine.  I  intend  to  keep 

ij  It— now,  and  also  in  the  years  to 

II  ■. 
.W'Xt  month  we  will  have  a  new 

■  Ml  lent  in  Washington  and  a  new  Ad- 
M,-t  ration.  They  come  to  power  in 

i~  i)f  extraordinary  challenge,  both  at 
n  and  abroad.  They  deserve  the  en- 
raiifment  and  support  of  all  who  love 

r  cnuntry.  They  shall  have  mine. 
It  is  in  that  spirit  that  I  want  to  dis- 

:is  today  a  subject  that  will  be  vitally 

nortant  in  the  years  ahead — Ameri- 
piilicy  toward  the  nations  and  the 
|ili's  of  Africa.  It  is  an  appropriate 

-I  ject  to  discuss — indeed,  a  necessary 

■  --in  this  time  of  transition.  There 
1  \\  II  reasons  why  that  is  true. 

i'he  first  is  the  record  of  President 

tcr.  I  know  the  hazards  involved  in 

me  to  select  those  current  events  that 

Hi'  historians  will  find  to  have  been 

.  lul.  But  I  want  to  take  that  chance 

I  .  1  suggest  that  the  development  of 
V  policy  toward  Africa — especially 

steadfastness  which  helped  make  the 
'  iliabwe  settlement  possible — will 
I '  day  be  recorded  among  President 
trr's  finest  achievements  and  also 
iiiti  the  most  significant  international 

■  I  liipments  of  this  period. 

What  has  been  tested  in  our  policy 
tuard  Africa  might  be  called  the  prag- 
ntic  application  of  democratic  ideals, 
^d  it  has  received  a  ringing  vindication 

-  n  an  enduring  peace  in  Zimbabwe  and 
ii'al  improvement  in  our  relations 

I'lighout  the  continent.  So  the  first 
ison  why  I  want  to  discuss  Africa 

II  y  now  is  that  we  need  to  understand 

-  lutside  of  the  heat  of  a  campaign  when 
V  are  beyond  any  motive  either  to  belit- 

iif  to  exaggerate — that  something 
itiiundly  important  is  underway. 

.My  second  reason  for  discussing  this 
iji'ct  is  that  if  Africa  policy  has  been 
aiea  of  achievement  for  President  Car- 
■,  it  can  just  as  much  a  source  of  oppor- 
nity  for  President  Reagan. 


We  should  not  forget  that  the  impe- 
tus for  a  more  activist  southern  African 
policy,  in  assisting  the  independence  pro- 
cess, had  its  roots  in  a  Republican  Ad- 
ministration. It  was  during  the  incum- 
bency of  President  Ford  that  the  United 
States  first  considered  seriously  the  issue 
of  Southern  Rhodesia  and  judged  that 
our  energies  should  best  be  devoted  to 
convincing  an  unrecognized,  isolated  re- 
gime to  adhere  to  the  principles  of  free 
elections. 

As  I  will  develop  more  fully  in  a  few- 
minutes,  the  new  Administration  has  a 
special  capacity,  and  a  rare  chance,  to  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  justice  in  Africa  and 
build  our  relations  there. 

Before  defining  that  opportunity,  let 
me  describe  some  of  the  realities  which 
have  been  our  guideposts  in  Africa,  and 
then  outline  the  elements  of  the  policy 
now  in  place. 

Current  Realities 

It  is  dangei-ous  to  generalize  about 
Africa.  It  is  a  complex  of  diverse  cultures 
and  traditions,  countries  that  are  com- 
paratively wealthy  and  countries  that 
are  desperately  poor.  Experiences  under 
different  colonial  powers  have  left  a  vari- 
ety of  legacies — some  bitter,  some  of 
real  value.  But  despite  this  diversity, 
there  are  a  number  of  central  realities 
which  bear  on  our  policy. 

A  first  undeniable  reality  is  that  Af- 
rican nations  are  deeply  important  to  the 
United  States.  We  not  only  want,  we 
need  good  relations  with  them.  African 
nations  are  increasingly  important  to  us 
economically,  both  as  markets  and  as 
sources  of  critical  materials.  African  ac- 
tions are  important  politicall.v  The  50  Af- 
rican countries  make  up  nearly  one-third 
of  all  the  nations  in  the  world.  In  the  fu- 
ture they  will  play  a  growing  part  in  de- 
termining whether  humanity  will  be  suc- 
cessful in  addressing  central  challenges 
to  our  common  future — to  curb  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons,  to  curtail 
population  growth,  to  ease  hunger  and 
disease,  to  manage  the  world's  finite  re- 
sources and  guard  them  for  generations 
to  come. 

African  nations  have  another  impor- 
tance for  Americans — one  that  is  under- 
stood especially  well  by  the  African  Cul- 
tural Heritage  Society.  For  millions  of 
our  people,  the  tragedy  of  slavery  sev- 
ered the  thread  of  personal  history.  As 


those  bonds  are  gradually  restored — 
and  as  long,  proud  traditions  are  redis- 
covered— our  own  society,  and  all  races, 
are  the  richer.  So  let  us  be  absolutely 
clear  on  this  point.  Good  relations  with 
Africa  are  not  only  desirable;  they  are 
vital  to  our  well-being. 

A  second  reality  that  must  concern 
us  is  that  the  people  of  Africa  endure  far 
more  than  their  share  of  the  world's 
suffering. 

•  TWo-thirds  of  the  world's  most  im- 
poverished countries  are  in  Africa. 

•  Africa  has  more  refugees  than  any 
other  region — more  than  3  million  peo- 
ple without  homes,  with  little  hope. 

•  Average  nutritional  standards  in 
Africa  are  the  lowest  in  the  world,  and 
they  are  getting  worse. 

•  The  natural  resource  base  of 
Africa  is  threatened,  as  thousands  of 
acres  of  farmland  each  year  dry  to 
desert. 

The  implications  for  people  are  clear. 
As  they  take  a  dreadful  toll  in  human 
terms,  these  same  conditions  can  also 
breed  frustration  and  turmoil.  And  they 
make  African  societies  vulnerable  to 
pressures  from  outsiders  seeking  to 
exploit  the  suffering  of  Africans  for  ends 
of  their  own. 

A  third  broad  reality  in  Africa  is  a 
fierce  determination  to  remain  free  from 
outside  control.  NationaKsm,  more  than 
any  ideology,  shapes  the  dealings  of  Afri- 
can countries  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 
This  reality  has  a  number  of  results.  It 
means,  for  example,  that  while  African 
nations  need  and  seek  assistance  from 
outside,  they  are  not  likely  to  accept 
domination — from  either  West  or  East. 

Nationalism  also  means  we  will  see  Af- 
rican societies  evolving  in  their  own 
ways,  developing  institutions  appropri- 
ate to  their  own  circumstances.  They 
draw  from  their  own  histories  and  cul- 
tures, as  well  as  from  the  experiences  of 
both  the  West  and  the  East. 

These,  in  very  brief  summary,  are 
some  of  the  realities  a  sound  policy  to- 
ward Africa  must  accommodate — our 
own  growing  interests  in  Africa;  the  ter- 
rible poverty  in  many  parts  of  Africa  and 
the  turmoil  it  can  bring;  the  surpassing 
importance  of  nationahsm  in  the  policies 


The  Secretary 


of  African  nations.  How  do  we  address 
them? 

Elements  of  U.S.  Policy 

I  have  described  our  policy  as  the  prag- 
matic application  of  democratic  ideals,  lb 
some  that  might  sound  like  a  hopeless 
contradiction  in  terms — references  to 
pragmatism  and  to  idealism  in  a  single 
phra.se.  But  there  is  no  inconsistency 
here,  for  it  is  clearly  the  case  in  Africa 
that  we  advance  our  interests  by  giving 
concrete  meaning  and  e.xpression  to  our 
most  basic  values — the  commitment  to 
human  freedom  and  advancement  we 
share  with  the  peoples  of  Africa.  Our 
policy  has  been  firmly  grounded  in  that 
abiding  commitment  to  freedom. 

•  Our  policy  strongly  opposes  racial 
injustice.  In  southern  Africa  we  have 
given  practical  support  to  the  evolution 
to  majority  rule.  In  Rhodesia,  now  Zim- 
babwe, that  meant  resisting  a  prema- 
ture, unilateral  American  breach  of  inter- 
national sanctions  and  continuing  the 
pressure  for  a  true  peace.  In  South 
Africa,  it  has  meant  broadening  our  own 
voluntary  arms  embargo  and  support  for 
a  mandatory  U.N.  embargo.  Beyond 
that,  it  has  meant  a  clear  message  to 
South  Africa  that  our  relations  depend 
upon  achieving  racial  justice — that 
other  issues  will  not  dilute  our  commit- 
ment on  that  fundamental  cause. 

•  Our  policy  upholds  the  cause  of 
peace.  In  Zimbabwe,  in  Namibia,  on  the 
Angola/ Zaire  border  and  elsewhere,  the 
United  States  has  been  strongly  identi- 
fied with  efforts  to  heal  divisions  and 
achieve  peaceful  solutions. 

•  Our  policy  in  Africa  has  promoted 
respect  for  human  rights.  President  Car- 
ter's human  rights  policy  has  found  a  spe- 
cial resonance  in  Africa.  Human  rights 
dialogues  have  been  initiated  in  Dar  es 
Salaam,  Dakar,  Sierra  Leone,  Cape 
Tbwn,  and  Khartoum.  Last  year  the  Or- 
ganization of  African  Unity  adopted  an 
African  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  In 
the  broadest  sense,  the  trend  in  Africa  is 
clearly  in  the  direction  of  greater  democ- 
racy and  freedom.  Democracy  is  being 
restored  in  Nigeria  and  (Jhana.  Multi- 
party elections  have  resumed  in  Senegal 
and  are  e.xpected  in  Uganda.  And  in  some 
cases  where  there  is  only  one  party — as 
in  Tknzania  and  Ivory  Coast — there  are 
numerous  candidates  for  office,  a  grow- 
ing acceptance  of  dis.sent,  and  expanded 
protection  of  individual  [lolitical  rights. 

•  Our  policy  has  also  been  to  sup- 
port economic  development  in  Africa  and 


to  forge  new  economic  links.  Since  Presi- 
dent Carter  took  office,  American  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  Africa  has  doubled, 
to  more  than  $1  billion  each  year  Of 
course,  it  is  still  dwarfed  by  the  need, 
but  our  aid  has  helped.  And  it  has  been 
concentrated  on  meeting  the  most  urgent 
requirements  of  people,  on  easing  their 
suffering,  and  on  helping  them  become 
self-sufficient. 

•  And  finally  our  policy  supports  Af- 
rican nationalism  as  the  most  dependable 
foundation  for  stable  development  and 
the  strongest  bulwark  against  outside 
intervention.  Through  the  infusion  of 
outside  military  means,  the  Soviets,  the 
Cubans,  and  others  have  exploited  and 
exacerbated  a  number  of  local  and  re- 
gional African  conflicts.  We  have  been, 
and  must  continue  to  be,  responsive  to 
the  legitimate  defense  needs  of  African 
countries  threatened  by  external  pres- 
sures. Our  security  assistance  to  African 
nations  has  risen.  But  over  the  longer 
term,  we  will  most  effectively  counter 
Soviet  designs  by  holding  to  our  own  af- 
firmative course — seizing  the  moral  ini- 
tiative on  racial  justice,  working  for  the 
settlement  of  conflicts  others  might 
exploit,  helping  to  build  the  strength  and 
confidence  of  African  countries  so  they 
can  better  resist  external  pressures.  Be- 
cause we  have  done  so,  the  striking  dif- 
ference between  American  and  Soviet 
aims  has  become  increasingly  clear  to  the 
governments  and  people  of  Africa. 

The  approach  I  have  outlined — a 
strategy  grounded  in  principle  as  well  as 
in  interest — is  working.  We  have  been 
able  to  cement  our  ties  with  old  friends, 
such  as  Ghana.  And  we  have  found  meas- 
urable improvements  in  our  relations 
with  a  number  of  key  African  countries 
— with  Nigeria  and  Equatorial  Guinea 
and  Uganda,  with  Somalia,  Sudan,  and 
Guinea,  with  Mozambique.  Congo- 
Brazzaville,  the  Central  African  Repub- 
lic, and  others. 


Opportunities  for 

the  New  Administration 

With  this  foundation,  let  me  return  to 
my  earlier  assertion  that  Africa  policy  is 
an  area  of  great  opportunity  for  the  new 
Administration. 

In  Rhodesia,  before  1979,  it  was  pos- 
sible for  the  Ian  Smith  government  to 
cling  to  the  hope  that  a  conservative  gov- 
ernment in  Britain  might  lessen  the  pres- 
sure for  true  majority  rule.  Instead,  the 
Thatcher  government  upheld  that  princi- 
ple with  renewed  vigor  It  took  the  lead 


in  new  negotiations.  As  a  result,  a 
settlement  was  achieved. 

There  are  a  number  of  areas  where 
similar  leadership  by  a  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration could  have  similar  effects.  Let  ni' 
list  some  of  them,  not  to  second-guess 
the  new  President's  priorities,  but  as 
illustrations. 

In  Zimbabwe,  America  has  a  strong 
interest  in  seeing  the  settlement  succeed 
Thus  it  is  sound  policy  to  offer  the  assist 
ance  that  is  badly  needed  to  assure  last- 
ing peace  and  stability. 

After  a  long  and  bitter  conflict,  Zim 
babwe  faces  a  massive  task  of  recon- 
struction. Prime  Minister  Mugabe  has 
embarked  on  a  course  of  national  recon- 
struction and  reconciliation — to  build  a 
permanent  peace  by  bringing  the  eco- 
nomic and  social  benefits  of  peace  to  the 
lives  of  people,  black  and  white.  Yet  the 
strains  in  Zimbabwe  are  still  severe.  Ou 
aid  can  help  make  a  difference. 

Elsewhere  in  southern  Africa,  the 
conflict  in  Zimbabwe  devastated  the 
economies  of  surrounding  countries.  Th( 
nations  of  southern  Africa  are  now  com- 
bining to  restore  economic  health  to  the 
region.  They  have  asked  the  West  to  joii 
them  in  this  effort.  The  first  meeting 
among  western  and  southern  African  na 
tions  on  regional  development  took  placi 
last  week  in  Mozambique. 

American  and  Western  interests 
could  be  greatly  furthered  by  strong  an 
active  participation  in  southern  African 
regional  development  and  by  the  expan- 
sion of  our  trade  and  investment 
throughout  the  region. 

In  Namibia,  a  peaceful  set  tlementf 
a  long  and  tragic  conflict  is  now  within 
reach.  A  date  of  March  1  has  been  set  fc 
implementation  of  the  agreed  settlemer 
plan.  Next  month,  the  parties  will  meet 
to  discuss  final  arrangements. 

The  hour  of  decision  has  come  for 
South  Africa.  If  the  Namibia  settlement 
is  implemented,  it  will  bring  peace  and 
stability  to  South  Africa's  borders 
where  a  needless  conflict  is  now  costing 
South  African  lives  and  is  providing  eve 
greater  opportunities  for  outside 
intervention. 

A  new  Amei-ican  Administration  ca 
argue  with  special  force  that  it  is  in 
South  Africa's  own  interest  to  stay  on 
course  and  implement  a  settlement. 

A  Namibia  settlement  would  funda- 
mentally alter  South  African  relations 
with  neighboring  states  and  with  the  in- 
ternational community.  A  settlement 
would  prove  that  outside  nations  can 
work  constructively  with  South  Africa 
toward  peaceful  change  and  multiracial 


The  Secretary 


ation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  South 
refuses  to  allow  the  settlement  to 
ward,  its  isolation  in  the  world  will 
le  more  acute. 

outh  Africa  has  expressed  concern 
the  impartiality  of  a  U.N.  settle- 
,n  Namibia.  I  would  note,  however, 
outh  Africa's  own  administrators, 
ervants,  and  police  will  continue  to 
on  in  Namibia  during  the  elections. 
Tiportant  to  remember  also  the  fair- 
integrity,  and  understanding  with 
m  U.N.  representatives  have  con- 
^  recent  Namibian  negotiations,  as 
Us  the  standards  of  fairness  which 
■  riited  Nations  has  consistently  fol- 
(  ill  its  peacekeeping  around  the 
■    I'inally,  we  Western  nations  which 
-1(1  the  settlement  are  wholly  com- 
1  III  fair  elections.  Our  national 
as  well  as  our  national  interests 
\  nlved. 

.11(1  in  South  Africa  itself,  the  ques- 
•neniains  whether  change  will  come 
rtg-h  racial  conflict  or  through  negoti- 

,]■•  igress.  But  change  will  come.  It 
i,  jine  principally  because  mounting 
.e  lal  pressures  will  become  irre- 
-  (le. 

;  IS  in  the  interest  of  the  United 
a  s  to  encourage  early,  meaningful 
t  -e  in  South  Africa.  We  cannot  pro- 
ll  i  timetable  or  blueprint.  That  is  for 
i  3ople  of  South  Africa — all  the  peo- 
!i  .'orking  together — to  decide  for 
g  selves.  But  the  new  American  Ad- 
I  tration  can  be  effective  in  encourag- 
r  rogress  in  those  areas  where  South 
i  an  blacks  are  appealing  for  early 
i  ',e.  and  where  many  South  African 
I  'S  are  receptive.  We  must  find  con- 
»  ways  to  support  the  efforts  of  those 
I  ing  for  peaceful  change  through 
1  T  Africa's  churches,  community  or- 
I  :ations,  newspapers,  and  courts.  We 
.  i  assist  those  South  African  efforts 
.  cially  and  through  the  activities  of 
I  ompanies,  churches,  universities, 
I  inions. 

These  are  but  a  few  ideas,  concen- 
!'d  on  southern  Africa.  If  our  new 
I  inistration  were  to  embrace  the  es- 
lial  thrust  of  these  policies,  a  funda- 
Ital  continuity  in  our  policy  would  be 
I  red,  our  credibility  in  Africa  would 
lahanced,  and  our  bonds  of  friend- 
thi'oughout  Africa  would  be 
ngthened. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  stress  a  funda- 
tal  point.  As  it  affects  the  fate  of  the 
ons  of  Africa,  American  policy  in  the 
re  will  be  important,  but  it  will  not 
ecisive.  The  major  determinants  will 


Refugees:  The  U.S.  Response 


Address  before  a  conference  on 
world  hunger  and  refugees  at  the 
University  of  Southern  California  in 
Los  Angeles  on  December  5, 1980.^ 

During  my  brief,  but  intensely  rewarding 
tenure  as  Secretary  of  State,  I  was  con- 
stantly reminded  how  the  policymaking 
process — not  just  in  this  Administration, 
but  in  any  Administration — inevitably 
pulls  one  toward  the  short-term  perspec- 
tive. 

How  should  the  United  States  vote, 
tomoiTow,  on  a  critical  resolution  in  the 
United  Nations?  What  is  the  appropriate 
response  to  a  sudden  development  in 
Seoul,  or  in  Tehran,  or  on  Capitol  Hill? 
The  natural  tendency  is  to  address  to- 
day's problem  and  to  defer  tomorrow's. 
It's  one  I  have  struggled  against  over  the 
past  6  months.  I  find  it  difficult  to  know 
where  I'm  headed  if  my  eyes  are  fixed 
solely  on  the  ground  immediately  in  front 
of  me. 

Today,  I  want  to  pursue  with  you 
that  process  of  looking  ahead — beyond 
the  immediate  crises,  beyond  the  immi- 
nent transition  of  power. 

What  are  some  of  the  longer  term  so- 
cial, economic,  and  technological  forces  at 
work  in  our  world  that  will  help  define 
not  just  the  next  few  years  but  the  next 
decade  or  more?  What  do  they  mean  for 
our  own  long-term  security  and  well- 
being?  And  how  will  they  shape  the  polit- 
ical choices  we  will  face  in  the  years 
ahead?  To  engage  in  such  a  look  ahead  is 
not  to  escape  the  present  choices  we  face 
but  to  help  illuminate  them. 

Let  me  inject  a  cautionary  note  at 
the  outset.  I  suspect  that  most  of  you 
were  as  enthralled  as  I  by  the  photo- 
graphs recently  sent  back  from  our  Voy- 
ager space  satellite — by  our  abihty  to 
see,  clearly  and  almost  instantly,  across 
billions  of  miles  of  space. 

Unfortunately,  there  is  no  similar 
technology  that  enables  us  to  project  our- 
selves across  time — to  see  the  future  as 
clearly  as  we  can  see  the  rings  of  Saturn. 
National  behavior,  no  less  than  the  hu- 


man behavior  that  drives  it,  remains  un- 
predictable— capable  of  unexpected  new 
breakthroughs  or  of  dangerous  miscalcu- 
lations. 

Nonetheless,  there  are  some  trends 
we  can  identify — deeper,  sometimes  less 
visible  economic  and  social  currents  that 
will  shape  the  poHtical  landscape  over  the 
coming  years. 

Population  Explosion 

Each  day,  there  are  over  200,000  more 
mouths  to  feed  in  the  world,  each  year, 
75  million.  By  the  year  2000,  if  these 
present  patterns  continue,  the  world  will 
have  an  additional  1.5  billion  inhabitants 
— an  increase  in  the  final  quarter  of  this 
century  that  would  equal  all  of  the 
growth  in  the  world's  population  from  the 
birth  of  Christ  through  1950. 

Most  of  that  growth  will  take  place 
in  the  developing  world.  By  the  year 
2000,  developing  nations  will  encompass 
nearly  80%  of  the  world's  people.  They 
will  be  concentrated  in  increasingly 
crowded  urban  areas.  The  population  of 
Mexico  City  will  exceed  30  million,  Cal- 
cutta will  approach  20  million,  Cairo,  17 
million.  And  nearly  half  of  the  citizens  in 
developing  countries  will  be  under  the 
age  of  19. 

Our  current  estimates  are  that,  in 
the  aggregate,  world  food  supplies  will 
continue  to  grow.  But  in  some  poorer 
areas,  the  food  available  per  person  will 
decline,  and  food  will  be  more  expensive. 

Unless  we  reverse  existing  patterns, 
important  resources  that  are  needed  to 
feed  and  sustain  that  burgeoning  popula- 
tion will  continue  to  disappear.  About  1 
million  acres  of  prime  farmland  are  con- 
verted to  urban  use  each  year  in  the 
United  States.  Other  farmland  is  drying 
into  desert — a  quarter  million  acres 
each  year  in  northern  Africa  alone.  And 
critical  forests — which  provide  the  pri- 
mary fuel  for  nearly  2  billion  people — 
are  disappearing  at  the  rate  of  50  acres  a 
minute. 

None  of  these  trends  is  immutable  or 


be  internal — the  quality  of  leadership, 
their  economic  choices,  their  political 
will. 

Where  our  policy  will  be  decisive  is 
in  determining  the  kind  of  relations 
America  can  have  with  evolving  African 
societies.  In  short,  it  is  our  own  interests 
and  our  own  future  at  stake  in  the  qual- 
ity of  our  approach  to  Africa. 


As  we  change  Administrations,  I 
think  all  Americans  can  agree  on  this 
fundamental  premise — that  we  want  to 
sustain  constructive  relations  with  the 
countries  of  Africa;  relations  that  uphold 
our  interests  and  theirs  and  the  ideals 
that  draw  us  together 


1  Press  release  3.34. 


uarv  1QR1 


The  Secretary 


I 


irreversible.  But  they  loom  on  the  not- 
too-distant  horizon,  gathering  clouds  we 
must  seek  to  understand  and  move  to  ad- 
dress. 

Energy 

In  one  essential  aspect  of  reconciling  hu- 
man needs  and  global  resources,  we  have 
made  a  good  beginning  in  recent  years.  I 
speak  of  our  energy  future. 

It  is  just  a  beginning,  but  it  is 
grounded  in  an  emerging  international 
awareness  that  the  end  of  the  oil  era  is 
pressing  upon  us.  Here  at  home,  both  our 
use  and  our  imports  of  oil  are  finally 
going  down.  Domestic  energy  production 
is  now  going  up.  And  the  quest  for  new, 
renewable  fuels  is  underway. 

But  we  are  by  no  means  out  of  the 
woods.  The  trend  is  unmistakably  in  the 
direction  of  declining  world  oil  supplies 
and  increasing  costs.  The  entire  world 
faces  the  difficult  transition  out  of  the  era 
of  bountiful  and  ine.xpensive  oil. 

As  we  navigate  this  passage,  the 
strains  on  the  international  economy  will 
continue  to  be  severe.  Each  time  world 
oil  prices  rise  10%,  world  inflation  jumps 
1%,  and  overall  world  growth  falls  by  a 
half  percent.  As  world  growth  rates  lag 
— and  that  is  the  outlook  at  least  in  the 
near  term — the  flow  of  world  trade  suf- 
fers, and  competition  among  trading  na- 
tions grows  more  intense. 

The  economic  pressures  on  the  less 
developed  nations  during  this  period  of 
energy  transition  will  be  particularly  dif- 
ficult. Those  developing  nations  that  im- 
port oil  have  seen  their  overall  oil  bill  rise 
1,500%  in  the  1970s.  Many  have  had  to 
borrow  heavily.  Their  debt  now  totals 
$300  billion.  .Just  to  service  that  debt  and 
pay  for  their  oil  imports  now  costs  devel- 
oping countries  half  of  everything  they 
earn  from  their  exports. 

Thus  even  as  we  design  and  build  a 
new  energy  future — one  less  reliant  on 
petroleum — the  international  commu- 
nity, oil  exporting  nations  no  less  than 
the  importing  nations,  continue  to  face 
the  essential  task  of  bringing  greater  sta- 
bility to  the  pricing  and  the  financing  of 
our  energy  needs. 

Spread  of  Military  Technology 

With  the  gi-owing  international  access  to 
nuclear  power  has  come  a  greater  poten- 
tial access  to  the  technology  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Some  half-dozen  additional  na- 
tions have  the  capability  to  produce  a  nu- 
clear weapon  within  2  years  of  a  decision 
to  do  so.  That  is  a  chilling  fact.  Imagine 


how  much  more  dangerous  would  be  any 
of  the  smoldering  regional  disputes  we 
see  in  the  world  if  one  or  both  rivals  had 
nuclear  weapons. 

And  the  unmistakable  direction  is  to- 
ward gi-eater  and  greater  sophistication 
in  the  arsenals  of  the  two  nuclear  super- 
powers— the  United  States  and  the  So- 
viet Union.  Greater  accuracy  and  preci- 
sion in  our  weapons,  increased  reliance 
on  mobility  and  concealment,  new  mili- 
tary frontiers  outside  the  atmosphere  and 
inside  the  atom — these  new  technologi- 
cal vistas  will  be  explored  and  conquered 
in  the  years  ahead. 

Whether  the  results  of  these  new  de- 
velopments will  be  gi-eater  security  for 
our  people  or  less,  however,  depends  not 
on  the  genius  of  our  advanced  scientists 
but  on  the  wisdom  of  our  political  lead- 
ers. 

International  Cooperation 

Individually  and  together,  the  develop- 
ments I  have  mentioned  raise  a  central 
paradox  for  the  next  decade.  For  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  to  shape  their  own 
national  futures  will  require  an  unprece- 
dented degree  of  international  coopera- 
tion. But  the  very  challenges  and  strains 
which  make  that  cooperation  essential 
also  make  it  intensely  difficult. 

None  of  the  developments  I  have  de- 
scribed can  be  significantly  affected  un- 
less nations  act  together  to  do  so. 

•  Bringing  population  growth  under 
sensible  and  humane  control  will  require 
both  international  resources  and  national 
policies. 

•  Striking  a  decent  balance  between 
the  growing  demands  of  more  people  for 
a  better  life  and  the  single  planet  which 
must  sustain  all  life  is,  by  definition,  a 
global  enterprise. 

•  Managing  national  economies  in 
ways  that  strengthen  the  overall  health 
of  the  international  economy  rather  than 
undermine  it,  building  a  security  environ- 
ment and  an  enforceable  regulatory  re- 
gime that  restrain  the  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons,  bringing  the  strategic  arms 
race  under  sensible  control — all  of  these 
essential  efforts  require  a  commitment  to 
negotiation  and  to  compromise. 

Short-Term  Advantages  vs. 
Long-Term  Interests 

But  the  same  international  factors  that 
command  cooperation  also  conspire 
against  that  cooperation.  Hard  times  in- 
evitably drive  peoples  and  nations  toward 


preoccupations  inward.  The  natural  ten 
dency  is  to  invest  attention  and  effort  oi 
protecting  one's  short-term  advantage, 
even  at  the  expense  of  the  longer  term 
future. 

What  choice  does  the  subsistence 
farmer  have  but  to  cut  whatever  fire- 
wood is  available  to  cook  the  family's  fo 
regardless  of  the  long-term  ecologicalin 
pact?  What  incentive  is  there  for  parent 
in  an  impovershed  rural  village  to  limit 
the  number  of  their  children  when  a 
larger  family  can  be  insurance  against « 
uncertain  future? 

The  same  principle  applies  to  na- 
tions. We  have  already  seen  the  tempta 
tion  to  gain  short-term  national  advan- 
tages when  energy  markets  are  tight, 
even  if  it  drives  up  the  longer  term  pric 
And  when  growth  is  slow  and  unemplo\ 
ment  is  high — in  our  nation  or  in  others 
— pressures  mount  to  protect  domestic 
industries  from  outside  competition,  de 
spite  the  longer  term  costs  to  all  tradin 
nations  from  a  protectionist  spiral. 

By  the  same  token,  as  growing  de- 
mands for  visible  improvement  in  stan- 
dards of  living  press  in  on  fragile  new 
governments,  we  could  see  the  politics 
of  Third  World  nations  become  more 
tumultuous. 

As  these  internal  frustrations  are 
turned  outward,  the  potential  for  re- 
gional rivalries  and  conflicts  increases. 
And  unless  a  pattern  of  mutual  restraii 
is  established  on  the  part  of  outside  po 
ers,  these  internal  and  regional  tensior 
will  be  a  source  of  growing  tension  and 
danger  in  East-West  relations. 

In  short,  we  face  a  period  in  whici 
nationalistic  impulses  will  be  strong.  T 
gi-eat  challenge — for  us  and  for  others 
— will  be  to  resist  short-term  expedien 
that  only  mortgage  oin-  future  security 
and  well-being,  to  take  an  enlightened, 
longer  term  view  of  our  national 
interests. 

Future  Choices 

What  does  this  mean  for  our  own  futiu 
and  for  the  choices  we  face  in  the  yeari 
ahead? 

Certainly,  the  next  several  years 
must  be  a  time  for  building  America's 
strength — for  investing  wisely  in  a  mil 
tary  posture  for  the  remainder  of  this 
century  that  will  assure  the  balance  ar 
the  stability  upon  which  world  peace 
rests,  for  regaining  control  of  our  enerj 
future,  for  rejuvenating  the  productivi| 
and  competitiveness  of  the  American  j 
economy.  | 


nonartmont  nf  Qtafo  Rllllpl 


The  Secretary 


ut  in  the  process  of  building  our 
gth  we,  too,  must  resist  the  tenipta- 
to  turn  inward,  to  see  unilateral  solu- 
I  to  problems  that  can  only  be  solved 
igh  common  action,  to  place  barri- 
3  around  our  economy  and  ring  our 
macy  with  steel. 

We  must  be  deeply  conscious,  in  the 
s  ahead,  of  the  constant  need  to  bal- 
the  determined  pursuit  of  our  safety 
Drosperity  in  the  short  run  with  a 
gness  to  cooperate  and  compromise 
^irsuit  of  long-term  interests  we  share 
ii  others. 

There  is  no  question  that  we  face  a 
!i  )d  in  which  our  own  increased  de- 
r  '  efforts  are  required.  Soviet  military 
I'  T  has  inci-eased  steadily  and  signifi- 
ii  y  over  the  past  decade.  It  would  be 
g  ly  dangerous  for  us  to  permit  the 

0  il  military  balance  to  tilt  in  the  So- 
e '  favor. 

But  even  as  we  modernize  our  own 
iiary  capabilities,  even  as  we  maintain 
ij  ;taunch  opposition  to  Soviet  militai-y 

1  ntures  in  Afghanistan  and  else- 

^  'e.  we  must  continue  the  quest  for 
Kal,  achievable,  equitable  agree- 

.(r  ;s  that  restrain  the  arms  spiral. 
Military  technology  will  not  stand 

i  while  we  talk  about  ways  to  control 

.    will  move  ahead.  Achieving  bal- 

I  d  and  enforceable  restraints  will  be- 
)i '  more  difficult. 

If  we  are  to  keep  a  handle  on  this 
h  y  and  increasingly  dangerous  compe- 

I I  in  strategic  weaponry,  we  must 
a  I  on  the  progress  already  achieved 
ii  press  for  further  progress  with  a 

j:  e  of  urgency. 

A  balance  between  short-term  needs 
ti  longer  term  interests  must  also  be 
li  itained  in  the  area  of  trade.  We  must 
IS  t  that  the  rules  of  international  trade 
e  lir  for  American  workers  and  Ameri- 
jt  ndustries.  There  will  be  situations  in 
'1  h  temporary  assistance  to  distressed 
M  stries  will  be  necessary  and  appropri- 
ti  And  we  must  be  constantly  sensitive 
)  le  immediate  problems  faced  by 
■(  -cers  and  cwnmunities  and  companies 
il  apted  by  shifting  patterns  of  world 
":  e. 

But  if  our  response  to  a  generally 
11  e  competitive  trading  environment  is 
"  •cet  artificial  barriers  to  an  open 

■  iiig  system,  we  will  only  suffer  in  the 
M  run. 

We  are  a  nation  that  thrives  on 

■  Id  trade.  One  out  of  seven  jobs  in 

^  lufacturing  alone  depends  on  our  ex- 
<  s.  One  acre  of  U.S.  farmland  of  every 
I  'e  produces  for  exports. 

If  others  cannot  sell  to  us,  it  inevita- 
>'  becomes  more  difficult  for  us  to  sell  to 


others.  Protectionist  answers  drive  our 
economy  down  and  our  inflation  up.  For 
the  sake  of  our  future  prosperity,  we 
must  strive  to  make  our  own  economy 
more  competitive  while  keeping  the 
international  economy  open  to  fair 
competition. 

The  same  balance  between  short- 
and  long-run  interests  vnW  also  be  re- 
quired in  the  pursuit  of  a  more  stable  and 
peaceful  world. 

•  We  must  be  prepared  to  defend 
our  vital  interests  if  they  are  endan- 
gered. We  must  be  willing  and  able  to 
meet  the  legitimate  defense  needs  of 
friends  threatened  by  external  pressures. 
And  there  will  be  security  interests  that 
require  our  continued  relationship  with 
governments  that  are  unpopular  with 
their  own  people.  But  we  must  also  rec- 
ognize that  our  security  over  the  longer 
term  is  best  assured  if,  working  together 
with  others,  we  are  effective  in  ad- 
dressing the  conditions  that  breed  insta- 
bility and  conflict. 

•  We  must  continue  to  be  an  active 
force  for  the  peaceful  resolution  of  poten- 
tially explosive  regional  disputes — in 
the  Middle  East,  in  southern  Africa,  in 
Central  America,  and  elsewhere. 

•  We  must  invest  in  the  economic 
progress  of  developing  nations  because  it 
will  contribute  to  our  own  progress  and 
because  hopelessness  and  frustration  are 
the  combustible  ingi-edients  for  violence 
and  extremism. 

•  We  must  continue  to  press  for  pro- 
gi-ess  on  human  rights,  encouraging  the 
growth  of  political  and  economic  institu- 
tions that  can  accommodate  to  change 
peacefully  and  that  rest  on  the  solid  foun- 
dation of  popular  consent. 

Finally,  there  is  one  other  balanc- 
ing act  implicit  in  all  the  others — recon- 
ciling the  need  for  a  tightened  national 
budget  with  the  need  for  greater  re- 
sources to  advance  our  international  in- 
terests. 

The  United  States  now  ranks  15th 
among  the  17  major  industrial  countries 
in  the  amount  we  spend  per  capita  on  in- 
ternational assistance.  No  programs  have 
a  narrower  constituency  among  the 
American  people  and  in  Congress. 

But  we  must  come  to  recognize  that 
helping  to  plant  new  forests  in  Africa,  as- 
sisting small  farmers  in  the  Caribbean 
grow  more  food,  aiding  postwar  recon- 
struction and  reconciliation  in  Zimbabwe 
and  Nicaragua,  contributing  to  the  ability 
of  our  friends  in  Southeast  Asia  to  defend 
themselves  from  outside  threats — these 
efforts  are  not  "give-away"  programs; 
they  are  not  international  charity.  They 
are  investments  we  make  in  our  own  fu- 
ture no  less  than  the  futures  of  others. 


All  of  the  trends  I  have  spoken  of  to- 
day are  real,  whether  we  like  them  or 
not.  But  all  of  them  are  the  work  of  hu- 
man beings.  And  all  of  them  can  be  har- 
nessed and  controlled  by  human  beings,  if 
we  have  the  wall  and  the  skill  to  blend 
with  our  current  preoccupations  a  deter- 
mination to  secure  a  safer  future. 


1  Press  release  336. 


Securing  a  Safe 
Future 


Address  at  Kansas  State  Univer- 
sity in  Manhattan,  Kansas,  on 
December  Jf.  1980.'' 

I'm  grateful  to  Larry  Berg  and  to  the 
Institute  of  PoHtics  and  Government  for 
inviting  me  to  this  conference  and  for 
drawing  attention  to  the  related  prob- 
lems of  refugees  and  hunger  in  the  world. 
And  I  want  to  express  gratitude  also  to 
this  audience,  so  many  of  whom  have 
been  in  the  forefront  of  efforts  to  help 
refugees  here  in  California. 

America's  history  and  its  resources 
— what  we  are  and  what  we  have — make 
it  impossible  for  us  to  ignore  these  is- 
sues. Indeed,  our  historic  values  and  our 
unmatched  wealth  compel  us  not  just  to 
play  a  role  but  to  play  a  role  of  leadership 
in  deahng  with  them. 

Tbday  I  want  to  focus  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  refugees:  on  the  moral  and  practi- 
cal issues  that  come  to  us  in  the  human 
shape  of  up  to  15  million  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons  worldwide.  I  want  to 
sketch  for  you  the  dimensions  of  the  refu- 
gee problem  as  it  confronts  the  United 
States  and  the  world  community.  And  I 
want  to  discuss  what  will  be  required  of 
us — here  at  home  and  in  our  efforts 
abroad — if  we  are  to  deal  responsibly 
with  this  issue. 

If  my  remarks  have  any  central 
point,  it  is  this:  that  the  United  States 
and  the  world  community  must  deal  not 
only  with  the  pressing  outward  manifes- 
tations of  the  refugee  problem  but  with 
its  underlying  causes — war,  political  per- 
secution, and  other  oppressions  of  the  hu- 
man person. 

Dimensions  of  the  Problem 

One  picture,  as  the  old  saying  puts  it,  is 
worth  a  thousand  words.  And  surely  this 
is  true  when  we  see  the  photographs  of 


The  Secretary 


suffering  among  the  world's  refugees.  A 
year  ago  our  heails — and  our  consciences 
— ^were  touched  by  the  picture  of  a  Kam- 
puehean  refugee  mother  holding  her  dead 
child.  TVvo  weeks  ago,  newspapers  car- 
ried a  picture  of  a  refugee  woman  in 
Somalia,  crouching  with  her  nearly  naked 
child  in  a  flimsy  hut  made  of  sticks  and 
rags. 

In  recent  years,  such  tragic  scenes 
have  become  all  too  frequent  as  millions 
have  been  driven  from  their  homes  by 
wars,  civil  disturbances,  religious  or  ra- 
cial persecution,  or  repressive  govern- 
ment policies. 

•  In  West  Asia  and  Southeast  Asia 
there  are  4-5  million  refugees  and  dis- 
placed persons,  including  those  driven  to 
flight  and  near-starvation  by  Vietnam's 
drive  against  Laos  and  Kampuchea.  In 
the  past  year  alone,  more  than  a  million 
Afghans  have  become  refugees,  victims 
of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

•  About  4  million  Africans  have  fled 
their  homes;  there  are  3  million  refugees 
as  displaced  persons  in  the  Middle  East; 
tens  of  thousands  of  people  flee  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  each  year. 

•  In  our  own  hemisphei'e,  there  are 
now  hundreds  of  thousands  of  refugees — 
not  to  mention  the  136,000  Cuban  and 
Haitian  entrants  who  have  come  to  the 
United  States  over  the  past  7  months. 

These  figures  represent  a  sharp  up- 
surge in  the  numbers  of  refugees  woi-ld- 
wide.  Since  last  January,  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  men,  women,  and  children 
have  fled  their  homelands.  This  alarming 
situation  is  graphically  illustrated  by  re- 
cent increases  in  the  budget  for  the  U.N. 
High  Commissioner  for  refugees.  Last 
year,  the  UNHCR  spent  $234  million  for 
refugee  relief  This  year,  the  figure  will 
more  than  double,  to  .$568  million.  And  in 
spite  of  this  dramatic  increase,  the  need 
far  outstrips  the  resources  available  for 
helping  refugees. 

U.S.  Position 

Where  does  the  United  States  stand  in 
its  efforts  to  deal  with  the  problem? 

Generally,  we  can  be  proud  of  our  re- 
sponse. In  the  fiscal  year  that  ended  last 
September  30,  the  United  States  pro- 
vided more  than  $650  million  for  interna- 
tional refugee  relief  and  resettlement 
programs.  This  includes  our  donations  to 
international  organizations,  P'ood  for 
Peace  help  to  refugees,  transportation 


for  refugees  to  the  United  States,  and 
placement  aid  to  voluntary  agencies  here 
at  home.  We  admitted  well  over  200,000 
refugees  for  resettlement  in  the  United 
States.  We  received,  in  addition,  125,000 
Cubans  and  11,000  Haitians  who  have 
sought  asylum  in  the  United  States  but 
have  not  been  granted  refugee  status. 

Here  at  home,  the  Department  of 
Health  and  Human  Services  provided 
more  than  $600  million  for  refugee  assist- 
ance in  FY  1980.  And  the  generosity  of 
private  citizens  through  churches  and 
other  groups  is  beyond  all  counting. 

This  generous  response  by  the  Fed- 
eral Government,  by  the  States,  by 
churches,  voluntary  organizations,  and 
individuals  suggests  to  me  that  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States  remain  true  to 
their  traditions  of  concern  for  human 
rights  and  generosity  to  people  in  need. 
We  can  be  proud  also  that  the  Congress 
has  responded  to  the  world  refugee  crisis 
by  passing  an  enlightened  law — the  Refu- 
gee Act  of  1980.  This  act  has  several  im- 
portant, even  historic,  provisions. 

•  It  creates  a  uniform  standard  for 
defining  refugees. 

•  It  sets  at  .50,000  yearly  the  "nor- 
mal flow"  of  refugees  and  enables  the 
President,  in  consultation  with  Con- 
gress, to  adjust  that  number  if  refugee 
emergencies  require. 

•  It  defines  a  fairer,  more  compre- 
hensive system  of  Federal  assistance  for 
refugee  resettlement  within  the  United 
States.  This  is  aimed  at  helping  refugees 
become — as  soon  as  possible — self- 
sufficient,  contributing  members  of  our 
society. 

Having  said  all  this,  however,  let  me 
hasten  to  add:  We  are  a  long  way  from 
solving  all  the  domestic  problems  that 
ensue  from  the  world  refugee  crisis  and 
the  heavy  flow  of  refugees  to  the  United 
States.  For  the  moment,  let  me  touch  on 
some  of  the  issues  we  face.  They  are 
acute  now;  they  will  pose  enormous  chal- 
lenges to  those  in  the  future  who  seek  to 
deal  with  refugee  issues. 

Issues  to  be  Faced 

The  first  problem  is  the  problem  of  grow- 
ing impatience,  weariness,  and  even  re- 
sentment felt  by  our  people  about  the 
burdens  created  by  the  acceptance  of  ref- 
ugees and  emergency  entrants.  It  will  do 
no  good  to  deny  or  minimize  this  reality. 

lb  begin  with,  some  citizens  ques- 
tion whether  we  can  afford  to  spend  so 


much  on  refugees  while  other  pressing 
problems  demand  immediate  attention 
and  resources.  The  practical  burdens  of 
helping  refugees  establish  new  lives  in 
the  United  States  are,  as  you  know,  enor 
mous.  The  sheer  numbers  of  recent  year 
and  the  unpredictability  of  recent  refu- 
gee waves  have  made  careful  jjlanning 
difficult.  They  have  given  our  national 
refugee  programs  an  air  of  permanent 
emergency.  The  arrival  of  unorganized 
boat  flotillas  from  Cuba  over  a  short  spa 
of  weeks  last  spring  made  it  necessary, 
for  example,  to  press  widely  scattered 
military  facilities  into  sudden  service  as 
receiving  centers. 

Our  social  service  programs — na- 
tional. State,  and  local — have  been  hard 
pressed  by  this  sudden  surge  of  refugee; 
The  State  and  local  social  service  machii 
ery  of  Florida  has  been  severely  tested 
by  the  influ.x  of  Cuban  and  Haitian  en- 
trants— .just  as  California  has  extended 
itself  to  accommodate  the  influx  of  Indo- 
Chinese  refugees. 

You  who  have  served  in  refugee 
sponsorship  programs  know  the  chal- 
lenge of  finding  jobs  in  stressful  econom 
times  for  refugees  who  may  not  speak 
English;  whose  skills  may  not  be  readilj 
transferable  to  our  job  market;  who  ma; 
have  trouble  finding  adequate  housing 
when  such  housing  for  the  disadvantage 
is  already  scarce.  Perhaps  because  of 
such  problems,  public  opinion  is  not  al- 
ways recejjtive  to  large  waves  of  refu- 
gees and  immigrants.  How  shall  we  dei 
with  this  problem? 

Tb  begin  with,  I  would  suggest  tha  I 
we  put  it  in  proper  perspective.  The  i 
United  States — by  virtue  of  its  size,  its  \ 
wealth,  and  its  humanitarian  traditions  i 
is,  to  be  sure,  the  largest  contributor  tf  1 
international  refugee  relief  We  have  n 
ceived,  in  absolute  figures,  the  largest 
number  of  refugees  in  recent  years. 

But  our  contributions,  I  woukl  su^' 
gest,  are  by  no  means  disproportionate 
to  our  capacity.  Our  contribution  to  int 
national  refugee  relief  agencies  last  yea 
for  example,  amounted  to  nearly  $166 
million — an  impressive  sum.  Rut  at 
per  American  citizen,  our  contribution 
ranks  not  fir.st  but  seventh  in  the  worli 
Sweden,  Norway.  Denmark,  Switzer- 
land, the  Netherlands,  and  West  Ger- 
many all  contributed  more,  based  on 
poinilations,  than  we.   And  some  ntht 
countries  have  resettled  more  refuge 
as  a  proportion  of  their  total  populatioi 
than  we  have. 


The  Secretary 


eyond  reminding  ourselves  of  these 
tant  facts,  it  is  essential  that  the 

J'al  Government  generously  cushion 
ipact  of  refugee  resettlement  on 
and  local  budgets,  lb  slash  budgets 
3  area  would  not  only  press  States 
pcalities  toward — or  beyond — their 
limits,  it  would  create  new  hard- 
for  refugees  and  for  our  citizens, 
would  aggravate  the  danger  of  so- 
nsion  between  refugees  and  host 
unities.  That  is  a  danger  we  can — 
-lould — avoid. 

lecond,  how  shall  we  cope  with  sud- 
if luxes  like  that  from  Cuba  last 
•z,l  lb  ai'gue  that  we  should  be  open 
enerous  is  not  to  say  that  the 
d  States  can  accept — or  should  ac- 
-unlimited  numbers  of  entrants  or 
unlimited  burdens. 
"he  arrival  last  spring  of  thousands 
Dans  in  hastily  organized  boat  flotil- 
its  this  question  and  others  into 
relief:  What  limits  should  we  set, 
ow?  What  shall  we  do  about  the  re- 
problem  of  massive  unlawful  entry 

c  he  United  States?  How  can  we  as- 
h;it  our  refugee  and  immigration 
-  are  free  of  the  taint  of  racial 

i  national  commission  on  immigra- 
T  nd  refugee  policy,  chaired  by 
'  r  Theodore  Hesburgh  of  Notre 
i  iiiversity,  is  pondering  these 
e  ions  now.  But  these  questions 
J  d  also  be  the  focus  of  a  careful  na- 
il .  debate. 

^'hird,  what  shall  we  do  about  the 

0  ing  problem  of  "economic  refugees?" 
a  aw,  and  the  U.N.  convention  on  ref- 
t ;,  define  refugees  as  those  fleeing 

I'  cal  persecution,  not  poverty.  But 
n  times  the  line  between  the  two  is 
1 3  clear — as  the  plight  of  several 
3  .and  Haitians  seeking  asylum  in  the 
!  'd  States  makes  clear.  Hunger,  too, 
'.  es  refugees.  What  should  be  our 

1  >•  I'egarding  those  who  flee  both  au- 
:  tarian  rule  and  harsh,  unremitting 
c  )mic  deprivation?  There  is  no  easy 

s  er  to  this  question.  But  every  boat- 
k  of  hungry,  miserable  people  sailing 
E  'aribbean  toward  our  shores  sug- 
.' :  to  me  that  we  must  find  an  answer 
t  is  both  humane  and  practical. 
The  problems  I  have  discussed  are 
llems  we  Americans  feel  because  of 
j)wn  experiences  with  refugees  here 
jime.  We  Americans  must  work  to- 
)er  to  solve  them.  But  we  must  never 
l;t — and  other  countries  should  re- 
iber — that  what  America  does  takes 
3  in  a  broader  context.  The  refugee 
;  is  a  global  issue;  it  requires  a  global 
onse. 


So  let  me  turn  now  to  the  interna- 
tional dimension  of  the  problem.  What 
should  the  international  community  do  to 
help  solve  these  pressing  problems? 

International  Dimensions 

lb  begin  with,  all  nations  must  respond 
generously  to  help  suffering  people  in 
camps  and  holding  centers  around  the 
world.  The  funds  must  be  provided. 
When  necessary,  all  countries  should  be 
prepared  to  offer  first-asylum — and  many 
to  provide  permanent  resettlement.  This 
is  an  international  obligation  to  be  shared 
by  all. 

f\irthermore,  there  must  be  an  ef- 
fort to  establish  clear,  internationally  ac- 
ceptable principles  governing  the  status 
and  welfare  of  refugees,  as  well  as  the 
obligations  of  nations  toward  refugees. 
The  U.  N.  General  Assembly  is  now  con- 
sidering several  proposals  to  define  such 
principles.  We  believe  that  any  such  in- 
ternational agreement  must  include  cer- 
tain points. 

•  Large-scale  expulsions  of  persons 
should  be  discouraged  in  the  name  of  hu- 
manity and  international  order.  I  can  im- 
agine no  justification — political,  social, 
racial,  or  religious — for  a  government  to 
force  large  numbers  of  its  citizens  to  flee 
their  homeland.  Such  expulsions  are  hos- 
tile acts  directed  by  sending  countries  to- 
ward receiving  ones  and,  thus,  are  dou- 
bly unacceptable. 

•  Persons  displaced  from  their 
homelands  should  be  allowed  to  return 
home  voluntarily  as  promptly  as  condi- 
tions permit.  The  repatriation  of  persons 
following  the  end  of  the  fighting  in  Zim- 
babwe and  Nicaragua  demonstrates  that 
there  are  effective  and  humane  ways  to 
repatriate  refugees. 

•  Nations  guilty  of  mass  expulsions 
must  be  obliged  to  repatriate  immedi- 
ately all  criminals  they  have  forced 
abroad,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  protec- 
tion of  rights  extended  to  all  displaced 
persons.  We  can  no  longer  tolerate  any 
country's  attempt  to  rid  itself  of  its  crim- 
inal elements  by  cynically  exporting 
them  to  neighboring  nations. 

•  Our  efforts  must  be  focused  on  the 
fundamental  human  issues  involved — on 
the  human  rights  of  refugees.  Such  an 
emphasis  should  cover  not  only  the  rights 
of  refugees  once  they  have  left  their  na- 
tive lands  but  also  the  obligations  of  the 
governments  of  the  nations  they  are 
leaving — obligations  to  protect  would-be 


refugees  pending  their  departure,  rather 
than  to  harass  them  as  now  often  occurs. 

Even  if  the  community  of  nations  can 
agree  on  programs  based  on  these  princi- 
ples, other  questions  will  remain. 

Can  we,  without  scaling  down  our 
other  relief  programs,  increase  interna- 
tional aid  to  African  refugees?  A  rela- 
tively small  fraction  of  the  refugee  relief 
budget  has  gone  to  Aft-ica^-even  though 
refugees  in  Africa  constitute  almost  one- 
quarter  of  the  world  total. 

And  can  we  improve  conditions  for 
refugees  worldwide,  without  creating  a 
"pull"  which  actually  induces  people  to 
leave  their  homelands? 

If  by  raising  such  questions  I  seem 
to  imply  that  the  challenge  is  staggering 
I  make  no  apology:  It  is.  But  the  chal- 
lenge posed  by  the  global  tidal  wave  of 
refugees  is  one  we  cannot — must  not — 
duck.  The  response  of  the  United  States 
to  refugee  problems  must  go  beyond  refu- 
gee relief  It  must  include  strong  support 
for  human  rights.  It  must  include  gener- 
ous programs  for  foreign  assistance — to 
eliminate  some  of  the  hungei;  disease, 
and  misery  that  create  refugees. 

Ultimately,  we  and  the  world  can 
deal  with  the  human  tragedy  of  refugee 
migrations  only  by  working  to  remove 
their  root  causes — by  overcoming  pov- 
erty, by  working  to  alleviate  hunger,  by 
ending  abuses  of  human  rights  within  na- 
tions, by  opposing  military  aggression, 
and  by  encouraging  peaceful  settlements 
of  conflicts  around  the  world. 

We  are,  of  course,  unlikely  to  solve 
these  problems  in  a  short  time.  We  are  a 
long  way  from  having  a  world  that  is  so 
just,  so  humane,  so  prosperous  and  stable 
that  no  person  is  forced  to  flee  from 
home  and  country.  But  surely  the  effort 
to  build  such  a  world  deserves  the  work 
of  all  people  who  cherish  human  dignity 
and  the  sanctity  of  human  life.  And  while 
we  seek  to  build  such  a  world,  let  us  take 
every  practical  step  we  can  to  alleviate 
human  suffering — wherever  we  find 
it. 


1  Press  release  333. 


AFRICA 


Southern  Africa:  Four  Years  Later 


by  Richard  M.  Moose 

Statement  before  the  African 
Studies  Symposium  of  the  Black 
Studies  Program  at  FennsylMma 
State  University,  University  Park,  on 
October  13,  1080.  Mr.  Moose  is  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  African  Affairs. 


rights,  economic  opportunity,  and  the 
full  political  participation  for  all 
people.s  regardless  of  race.  We  con- 
cluded that  U.S.  political  and  strategic 
interests  required  progress  on  all  three 
southern  African  issues — Zimbabwe, 
Namibia,  and  South  Africa, 


During  the  last  4  years  Africa,  and 
southern  Africa  in  particular,  have 
received  increasing  attention  from 
your  government  and  from  the  Ameri- 
can people.  We  recognized,  at  the 
outset  of  the  Carter  Administration, 
that  American  values  and  American 
strategic  and  political  interests  dic- 
tated an  American  role— a  more  active 
American  role— in  southern  Africa.  1 
believe  that  we  have  good  reason  to  be 
satisfied  that  our  Africa  policy  has 
advanced  these  interests. 

The  pursuit  of  these  three  princi- 
ple.^—human  rights,  racial  equality, 
and  democratic  rule— has  been  the^ 
centerpiece  of  this  Administration's 
Africa  policy.  Our  forthright  position 
and  the  progress  we  have  made  in 
southern  Africa,  based  on  these  prin- 
ciples, have  been  the  key  to  strengthen- 
ing our  African  relations. 

Our  Africa  policy  is  defined  by  the 
concentric  relationships  between  South 
Africa  and  southern  Africa,  between 
southern  Africa  and  the  rest  of  Africa, 
and  Africa  and  the  United  States. 
These  relationships  are  substantively 
different  today  from  what  they  were  in 
1977.  This  evening,  therefore,  1  would 
like  to  review  the  southern  African 
situation  as  we  found  it  in  1977,  the 
basic  principles  underlying  this  Ad- 
minstration's  policy,  and  the  compo- 
nents of  the  policy  as  it  developed.  I 
would  like  to  compare  these  to  the 
situation  in  southern  Africa  today  and 
to  consider  the  implications  for  future 
policy  of  the  ongoing  processes  in 
southern  Africa. 

A  basic  theme  of  this  Administra- 
tion has  been  consistency  between 
what  we  see  as  fundamental  American 
principles  and  the  substance  of  our 
foreign  policy.  We  have  acted  in  the 
belief  that  American  principles  and 
American  interests  should  be  mutually 
reinforcing — ju.stice  at  home;  justice 
abroad.  In  southern  Africa  this  meant 
that  our  policies  should  be  directed  at 
progress  toward  the  respect  for  human 


U.S.  Policy 


In  the  early  months  of  President  Car- 
ter's Administration,  a  difficult  course 
was  set.  Vice  President  Mondale  met  in 
Vienna  with  then  South  African  Prime 
Minister  (.Johannes  Balthazar]  Vor- 
ster.  The  Anglo-American  eft'ort  on 
Rhodesia  got  underway,  and  the  con- 
tact group  began  negotiations  on 
Namibia. 

Forty-six  months  later  Zimbabwe 
is  independent,  the  Namibian  negotia- 
tions have  been  substantially  advanced, 
and  white  South  Africa  is  engaged  in 
an  agonizing  reappraisal  of  the  grand 
design  of  apartheid.  Meanwhile,  the 
United  States  has  developed  stronger 
relations  with  African  states  through- 
out the  continent. 

Our  initial  premise  with  regard  to 
South  Africa  was  that  the  system  of 
apartheid  is  morally  abhorrent  and 
that  our  own  traditions  and  principles 
required  us,  as  a  nation,  to  make  clear 
our  opposition.  In  addition,  it  was  our 
judgment  that  apartheid,  separate  de- 
velopment, and  racial  discrimination 
undermined  the  pursuit  of  all  of  our 
interests— strategic,  political,  and  eco- 
nomic. Our  position  was,  therefore, 
clearly  established  on  the  basis  of  both 
moral  principle  and  national  interests. 
On  this  basis  we  made  the  future 
course  of  our  relations  with  the  South 
African  Government  dependent  upon 
progress  toward  the  elimination  of 
apartheid.  And  let  me  emphasize  here 
that  while  this  statement  of  policy- 
while  it  invoked  .specific  political  prin- 
ciples—it did  not  include  explicit  i.o- 
litical  prescriptions.  Our  actions  and 
our  statements  over  the  last  4  years 
have  been  firmly  based  on  the  right 
and  the  need  for  full  political  partici- 
pation. Our  position  is  that  the  best 
political  system  for  South  Africa  is  one 
agreed  to  by  all  South  Africans  but  not 
dictated  by  any  one  party.  It  is  in  this 
light  that  our  policy  toward  South 


Africa  over  the  past  4  years  should] 
interpreted. 

Within  the  framework  of  our 
policy,  we  have  taken  a  series  of  ac- 
tions which  speak  to  the  seriousnes 
our  intent: 

•  The  United  States  fully  sup- 
ported the  U.N.  Security  Council  ma 
datory  arms  embargo  in  November  ^ 

1977; 

•  Suspended  all  nuclear  coopen 
tion  with  South  Africa  pending  Sout 
Africa's  adherence  to  the  NPT  |  Noii 
Proliferation  Treaty]  and  the  adopti 
of  full  scope  safeguards ; 

•  Unilaterally  expanded  the  U. 
arms  embargo  to  cut  off  any  and  all   ) 
exports  to  South  African  military  ar 
police  entities; 

•  Further  curtailed  all  official 

sp(n-ts  contact ; 

•  Limited  official  military  coopj 
eration  and  representation; 

•  Restricted  visas  for  high-rar 
ing  South  African  military  and  polii 

officers ; 

•  Limited  Eximbank  and  CCG 
I  Commodity  Credit  Corporation] 
credit  facilities; 

•  Supported  U.N.  resolutions  c 
demning  political  repression  by  the 
South  African  Government; 

•  Publicly  and  privately  we  ar 
protesting  bannings,  detentions,  am 
denials  of  passports  of  South  Africa 
leaders  and  citizens; 

•  Sent  observers  to  political 

trials;  . 

•  Redrew  our  international  vis 
tors  program  to  more  accurately  ref 
the  population  balance  in  South 
Africa; 

•  Endorsed  and  promoted  the  b 
livaii  code  of  fair  labor  practices; 

•  Gave  technical  support  to  bl 
union  leadership; 

•  Continued  to  recognize  the  s 
called  independent  homelands  of 
Transkei,  Venda,  Bophuthatswana, 
prospectively,  the  Ciskei;  and 

•  At  the  same  time,  have  sou? 
to  strengthen  our  official  and  nonofl 
cial  contacts  with  black  organizatic 
and  leaders. 

And  here  at  home  we  have  sou 
to  make  the  American  public  awar( 
the  moral,  political,  and  strategic  c 
sequences  of  apartheid  for  the  Uni 
States.  The  change  in  attitude  whi 


artmonf  nf  ??t3tp   Bl 


Africa 


e  measures  reflect  represents  a 
r  break  with  the  policy  of  previous 
linistrations. 

As  we  anticipated  these  measures 
^oked  strong  reactions  from  all 
its — from  those  who  say  that  what 
been  done  is  not  enough  to  those 
would  argue  that  these  measures 
5  only  served  to  stiffen  the  back  of 
ikaner  resistance  or  that  we  have 
■  demonstrated  that  the  United 
;es  is  irrelevant  to  South  Africa. 
re  are  elements  of  truth,  antago- 
1,  and  wishful  thinking  in  these 
ts  of  view. 

What  is  clear  is  that  the  ongoing 
ussions  of  Namibia  independence, 
hanged  U.S.  policy  toward  South 
ica,  and  the  fact  Zimbabwean  inde- 
^ence  have  together  produced  an 
nironment  for  South  Africa  which 

ikedly  different  from  that  which 
^  ir.l  in  1977. 

n  riial  Changes 

li  Africa  underwent  a  period  of 
ri'llowing  the  Soweto  riots  of  1976 
I  ho  murder  of  Steve  Biko.  By  1979 
'  u\v  South  African  Prime  Minis- 
e  P.  W.  I  Pieter  Willem  |  Botha 

0  'luded.  in  his  own  words,  that 

1  th  Africans  must  "adapt  or  die." 
■]  facts  appear  to  justify  the  Prime 
I  ister's  sense  of  urgency ;  the  pace 
f  vents  continues  to  accelerate. 

/k  at  what  is  occurring  inside 
■( th  Africa: 

•  Black  politics  have  taken  on  a 
e  dynamism.  Several  increasingly 
c  erful  and  articulate  black  groups, 
lading  particularly  the  ANC  |  Afri- 
Bi  National  Congress],  Inkatha,  the 
Sijimittee  of  Ten,  Black  Conscious- 
fe;,  AZAPO  [Azanian  People's  Orga- 
i{  tion],  the  PAC  |  Pan-African  Con- 
^is|,  the  Coloured  Labour  Party,  the 

ian  Reform  Party  are  all  actively 
noting  black  political  rights.  More- 
"ir,  these  groups  are  searching  for 
3  mon  ground  between  themselves. 
'I  haps  more  important,  however,  is 
h  rise  of  a  new  center  of  black  politi- 
Jower  in  the  trade  union  movement. 

•  The  increasing  strength  of  the 
■k  trade  union  movement  in  South 
ica  is  one  of  the  major  historical 
alopments  there  since  1948.  This  de- 
ipment,  no  doubt,  reflects  the  larger 
;  of  the  black  population  in  the 
lanized  industrial  sector. 


•  The  so-called  colored  community 
has  been  an  integral  part  of  these  de- 
\elopments  and  has  undergone  a  his- 
toric shift  of  self-identification  from 
almost  white  to  almost  black.  Students 
have  rejected  Bantu  education  and  the 
racial  status  quo  in  their  own  name 
and  in  the  name  of  the  entire  black 
population. 

•  This  black  political  and  social 
evolution  has  been  accompanied  by  in- 
creasing white  questioning  of  the 
homelands  premise — not  that  it  was 
ever  valid.  Numerous  recent  reports, 


as  unrealistic  in  today's  world  but  un- 
just, and  even  indefensible. 

The  business  community  is  appre- 
hensive that  the  perpetuation  of  apart- 
heid not  only  limits  prospects  for 
growth  but  actually  invites  revolution 
and  destruction.  Changes  within  Afri- 
kanerdom  have,  thus,  been  stimulated 
by  a  complex  of  domestic  economic, 
political,  and  social  developments. 
These  internal  developments  are  cast 
against  an  external  backdrop  where 
South  Africa's  buffer  states  have  dis- 
appeared, leaving  South  Africa  the 


Increasingly,  students,  editors,  uu-iteis,  academics  even.  South  Africa's 
military — we  are  told — now  speak  of  apartheid  not  only  as  unrealistic  in 
today's  world,  but  inijust,  and  evoi  indefensible. 


some  official,  have  documented  the  non- 
viability  of  economic  apartheid.  In- 
deed, it  has  even  been  suggested  in 
official  quarters  that  separate  economic 
development  be  abandoned  in  favor  of 
regional  economic  cooperation.  That  is 
to  say,  the  white  community  is  search- 
ing for  an  economic  alternative. 

•   Certainly,  the  desperate  search 
for  political  alternatives  to  the  grand 
design  of  Malan  and  Verwoerd,  short 
of  one-man,  one-vote,  is  clear  from  the 
plethora  of  constitutional  schemes  now 
being  considered.  In  the  process  the 
Westminster  political  model  is  being 
abandoned,  and  a  new  white  political 
system  is  taking  shape  in  the  form  of  a 
strong  executive  and  cabinet  decision- 
making. The  Senate  was  dispensed 
with,  with  few  notices  or  regrets,  and 
replaced  by  the  President's  Council, 
wh(}se  fate,  in  turn,  is  uncertain  with- 
out black  participation. 

The  search  for  a  new  political  dis- 
pensation for  a  political  alchemists' 
formula  has  seized  the  white  com- 
munity. The  most  significant  changes, 
to  date,  within  the  white  community 
are  in  their  expectations,  in  the  search 
by  the  ruling  minority  for  new  political 
structures,  its  movement  toward  an 
economic  policy  of  unfettered  economic 
growth,  as  well  as  its  increased  use  of 
the  language  and  style  of  reconcilia- 
tion. These  attitudinal  changes  reflect 
an  intellectual  ferment  within  the 
Afrikaner  community.  Increasingly, 
students,  editors,  writers,  academics 
even.  South  Africa's  military — we  are 
told — now  speak  of  apartheid  not  only 


world's  only  surviving  white  minority 
regime. 

In  the  face  of  this  reality,  the  ])oli- 
ticians  and  advisers  around  the  Prime 
Minister,  including  South  Africa's 
senior  military  officers,  have  come  to 
recognize  that  changes  must  be  made 
in  an  eflfort  to  control  both  domestic 
discontent  and  international  pressures. 
However,  it  is  not  yet  evident  that  the 
white  South  African  leadership  under- 
stands the  nature  and  the  depth  of 
black  grievance  nor  is  it  prepared  to 
enter  into  meaningful  consultations 
with  black  South  Africans. 

The  majority  of  black  South  Afri- 
cans are  clearly  unwilling  to  accept 
a  solution  dictated  by  whites  alone. 
They  insist  not  on  specific  formulas 
for  sharing  power  but  rather  on  a 
national  forum  to  discuss  such  formu- 
las. Black  political  leaders,  across  the 
spectrum,  appeal  for  black  political 
rights,  for  serious  negotiation  on 
pressing  problems,  and  for  cooperative 
planning  of  the  country's  future.  A  few 
— but  too  few — significant  meetings 
have  been  held.  And  frequently,  those 
who  call  for  dialogue  are  detained,  im- 
prisoned, or  banned.  The  voices  of  con- 
ciliation and  compromise  across  the 
country  warn  that  it  soon  will  be  too 
late  for  talk. 

We  acknowledge  that  the  situation 
in  South  Africa  has  changed  and  is 
changing,  and  it  would  be  a  mistake  to 
think  that  the  South  Africa  of  1980  is 
the  South  Africa  of  1977.  But  it  would 


Africa 


also  be  equally  a  mistake  to  interpret 
the  difference  as  evidence  of  progress. 

Apartheid  :  Policy  vs.  Theory 

In  considering  change  in  South  Africa 
in  a  historical  perspective,  we  should 
underscore  the  continuous  historical 
linkages  in  the  policy  of  racial  separa- 
tion from  the  Tribal' Authority  of  1924 
to  the  1980  "constellation  of  states." 
Under  whatever  scheme,  we  are  still 
dealing  with  a  government  that  is  pur- 
suing a  policy  of  separate  political 
development,  however  described. 

The  contradictions  between  the 
historical  continuity  of  apartheid  pol- 
icy and  the  collapse  of  apartheid  theory 
render  the  immediate  future  of  South 
Africa  highly  uncertain.  That  future 
rests  on  the  question  of  leadershi]).  If 
the  white  leadership  of  South  Africa 
accepts  the  ultimate  implications  of  the 
multiracial  character  of  that  country,  a 


Tlie  mujoritij  of  black  Soiitli 
AfriccDts  arc  clcarhj  iiitwilliiui  to 
accept  a  solution  dictated  by  wJiifcs 
alone. 


peaceful  transition  to  the  future  is  still 
possible.  However,  if  the  leadership 
cannot,  or  does  not,  rise  to  the  occasion, 
the  tragic  consequences  which  ensue 
will  be  visited  upon  all  South  Africans. 

It  would  be  even  more  tragic  if  it 
were  believed  that  the  existing  system 
could  be  preserved  by  force  of  arms.  It 
would  be  equally  mistaken  to  believe, 
as  some  are  theorizing  now,  that  the 
problems  of  apartheid  will  be  solved  by 
redefining  South  Africa's  political  ori- 
entation in  terms  of  "no  permanent 
alliances,  only  permanent  interests." 

What  must  be  confronted  is  South 
Africa's  permanent  identity  as  an 
African  country.  South  Africans  can- 
not ignore  southern  Africa  any  more 
than  the  rest  of  Africa  can  ignore 
South  Africa.  Indeed,  South  Africans 
cannot  detach  themselves  from  the 
West  any  more  than  the  conscience  of 
the  West  can  detach  itself  from  apart- 
heid. The  concentric  relationships  are 
the  permanent  reality  which  define 
South  Africa's  [jcrmanent  identity  and 
determine  both  its  alliances  and  its 
interests. 

South  Africa  can  no  more  ignore 
the  fact  that  it  is  in  Africa  than  its 


neighbors  can  ignore  the  various  im- 
plications of  its  presence.  South 
Africa's  leadership  has  a  choice  in 
dealing  with  its  neighbors  much  like 
that  choice  which  it  faces  domestically. 
Events  in  the  surrounding  states  pro- 
foundly affect  the  South  Africans  who 
are,  in  turn,  major  players  in  the 
future  of  their  neighbors.  The  nature 
of  South  Africa's  domestic  situation 
will  continue  to  be  a  key  determinant 
in  its  external  relations. 

External  Relations 

Similarly,  South  Africa  is  clearly 
linked  with  Western  civilization  and 
the  industrialized  world.  Out  of  their 
current  anxiety  and  frustration  and 
their  rejection  of  outside  criticism, 
some  Afrikaners  are  casting  about  for 
ways  to  deny  the  existence  of  links  to 
the  West  which  they  have  worked — 
and  continue  to  work — so  assiduously 
to  foster.  Visitors  are  told  that  the 
critics  and  their  governments  are  ir- 
i-elevant  and  that  they  do  not  matter  to 
South  Africa.  Certainly,  South 
Africa's  trade  statistics  do  not  supjHirt 
this  view,  and  neither  does  the  be- 
havior of  South  Africans  themselves. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  white 
South  Africans  ai'e  probably  more  at- 
tentive and  sensitive  to  what  is  said 
about  them  than  most  people. 

I  had  this  bi'ought  home  to  me  in  a 
I'ather  vivid  way  last  January.  I  was 
rei)eatedly  told  during  a  visit  that 
America  had  made  itself  irrelevant  to 
events  in  South  Africa.  A  few  months 
later  I  noted  in  a  press  roundup,  sent 
by  our  Embassy  in  Pretoria,  that  sev- 
eral South  African  papers  had  re- 
Iiorted  that  the  Legislature  of 
Nebraska  had  voted  to  require  state 
institutions  to  divest  themselves  of 
holdings  in  South  Africa.  Since  I  had 
not  heard  of  this,  I  made  further  in- 
quiry, and  I  found  that  it  appears  that 
Nebraska's  action  was  not  accorded 
immediate  newsworthiness  anyplace  in 
the  American  press  and,  yet,  it  made 
headlines  in  several  South  African 
newspapers. 

The  formula  for  our  own  relations 
with  South  Africa  and  with  southern 
Africa  must  reflect  the  set  of  concen- 
tric and  interlocking  relationships.  We 
must  stick  to  the  principles  which  have 
guided  our  Africa  policy  during  the 
p  1st  years.  But  we  must  adopt  the 
particulars  of  the  last  3  or  4  years 


api)roach  to  the  new  realities  of  the 
South  African  and  the  southern  Afr 
can  region. 


U.S.  Role 

Our  diplomacy  and  President  Carter 
determined  stand  on  the  Zimbabwe 
sanctions  question  helped  to  make  pi 
sible  Zimbabwe's  independence.  We 
must  now  do  our  utmost  again,  in  co 
cert  with  others,  to  enable  Prime  Mi 
ister  I  Robert]  Mugabe  to  translate 
independence  into  a  better  life  for  h 
people.  In  this  assessment,  we  find  oi 
selves  in  complete  agreement  not  onl 
with  our  European  allies  and  Zim- 
L'abwe's  black  neighbors  but  with 
South  Africa  itself.  What  has  and  w 
hajipen  in  Zimbabwe  will  continue  t( 
exert  a  powerful  influence  on  black  f 
white  attitudes  in  South  Africa.  Fui 
ther  assistance  for  Zimbabwe  will  b( 
one  of  the  important  questions  befoi 
the  Congress  when  it  returns.  Presi- 
dent Carter  has  pledged  increased 
assistance  to  Zimbabwe  on  our  part. 

As  Zimbabwe  hopefully  works  c 
its  in-oblems,  the  nine  Lusaka  natioi 
will  be  laying  plans  to  develop  South 
African  regional  economic  linkages 
common  benefit.  We  will  attend  the 
forthcoming  planning  conference  or 
this  subject  at  Maputo  in  November 
and,  the  Congress  willing,  we  will 
suiiiiort  its  work. 

Within  a  few  days  representati 
of  the  U.N.  Secretary  General  will 
travel  to  South  Africa  to  pursue 
agreement  on  the  implementation  ot 
Security  Council  Resolution  435  in 
Namibia.  South  Africa's  response  tc 
this  mission  will  be  a  key  indicator  ( 
its  willingness  to  live  and  work  in 
peace  with  its  neighbors.  .Just  as  eve 
nation's  interests  are  being  served  b 
Zimbabwe's  impressive  and  orderly 
transition  to  democratic  rule,  so  will 
an  end  to  the  conflict  in  Namibia  opt 
new  possibilities  for  economic  progr 
and  political  stability  in  southern 
Afi-ica.  It  is,  clearly,  the  intent  and 
within  the  ability  of  all  those  who  \\i 
supjiorted  Resolution  4.'?5  to  insure  t 
impartiality  of  an  internationally  su 
pervised  transition  process.  The  cre( 
bility  of  our  commitment  to  that 
endeavor  is  reinforced  by  ours  and 
everyone  else's  self-interest  in  an  or- 
derly and  just  outcome.  South  Afric! 
will  have  an  op])oi't  unity  to  establish 
its  own  good  faith  and  credibility 
beginning  a  week  from  now. 


DEPARTMENT 


Turning  to  South  Africa's  domes- 
c  scene,  one  hears  fears  expressed  by 
hite  South  Africans  about  something 
ilk'd  "momentum."  In  their  anxiety 
ifv  worry  that  since  Zimbabwe's  in- 
Itendence  is  a  fact,  if  Namibia  goes, 
u-n  South  Africa  will  be  next.  But 
,  ents  in  South  Africa  will  not  wait 
pun  events  in  Zimbabwe  or  in 
amibia.  Events  are  moving  at  their 
,vii  pace,  and,  as  we  observed  earlier, 
lat  i)ace  is  accelerating. 

In  this  confusing  and  often  am- 
jruous  situation,  we  must  not  fail  to 
'ciijfnize  change  which  is  real  and 
i.aiiinpful  enough  to  merit  our  atten- 
nii  and  our  praise.  We  must  also  rec- 
niize.  however,  that  we  have  lost 
■edibility  with  black  South  Africa's 
creasingly  diverse  leadership  ;  there- 
ire,  it  is  essential  that  we  search  for. 
id  find,  new  and  more  meaningful 
ays  to  express  our  commitment  to  the 
;i)i rations  of  all  South  Africans, 

Although  some  white  South  Afri- 
us  chai'ge  that  the  United  States 
ils  to  recognize  and  to  act  on  their 
iicerns,  we  are  acutely  aware  of 
cm.  We  consider  that  responding 
nstructively  to  their  legitimate  se- 
lity  concerns  is  one  of  the  essential 
et'irs  in  any  peaceful  dismantling  of 
e  aiiartheid  structure  and  the  insti- 
tidii  of  a  system  of  full  political 
irticipation. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  not 
li'w  ourselves  to  be  denied  a  mean- 
yf  ul  relationship  with  the  black 
iuth  African  majority.  Indeed,  we 
list,  in  any  event,  do  more  to  insure 
at  our  circle  of  contact  with  the 
'\\iy  emerging  leaders  continues  to 
;pand.  The  security  and  the  welfare 
the  black  majority  is  also  an  essen- 
:il  factor  in  the  conduct  of  our 
'lations. 

iinclusioii 

is  neither  our  choice  nor  our  wish 
lat  our  relations  with  South  Africa 
■teriorate  further.  We  would  like  for 
lose  relations  to  improve,  but  such 
ii|irovement  can  only  come  on  terms 
hiih  are  consistent  with  our  princi- 
es  and  acceptable  to  all  South  Afri- 
iiis.  But,  in  any  event,  even  at  the 
•.tremes  of  disassociation,  there  is  no 
ay  in  which  our  principles  or  our 
iterests  will  ever  permit  us  to  be 
isinterested  or  uninvolved  in  the  fate 
f  South  Africa. 

We  recognize  that  South  Africa  is 
't  a  historical  watershed:  poised  either 
ij  break  out  of  self-inflicted  shackles 


or  to  i)ull  back  from  necessary  eco- 
nomic, political,  and  social  changes. 
The  future  is  there  for  South  Africa's 
leaders — both  black  and  white — to 
seize.  The  critical  areas  of  change — in 
citizenship  and  constitutional  arrange- 
ments— have  been  repeatedly  enunci- 
ated by  prominent  South  African 
leaders. 

We  are  prepared  to  oppose,  and  to 
oppose  strongly,  the  preservation  of 
apartheid.  But.  we're  equally  willing 
to  take  the  steps  necessary  to  support 
a  farsighted  and  courageous  effort  by 
all  South  Africans  to  come  to  terms 
with  each  other  and  with  their 
neighbors.  ■ 


Foreign  Service 
Act,  1980 


I'HKSIDENTS   STATEMENT, 
OCTOBER    17,    1980' 

I  am  today  approving  H.R.  6790.  the 
Foreign  Service  Act  of  1980.  This  bill 
provides  the  first  comprehensive  revi- 
sion of  personnel  legislation  for  the 
U.S.  Foreign  Serice  in  .34  years.  It  is 
an  important  step  in  the  reform, 
simplification,  and  improvement  of 
personnel  administration  in  the 
Government,  a  top  priority  of  my 
Administration. 

Because  of  its  special  conditions 
of  employment,  including  the  require- 
ment of  availability  for  worldwide 
service,  the  Foreign  Service  was  ex- 
empted from  most  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Civil  Service  Reform  Act  of  1978. 
I  recognized  then,  however,  that  the 
Foreign  Service,  operating  under  a 
1946  act  designed  for  a  far  diff'erent 
world,  was  also  in  need  of  reform  and 
that  many  of  the  civil  service  reforms, 
appropriately  modified,  would  promote 
greater  productivity  and  improve  per- 
sonnel management  in  the  Foreign 
Service  as  well. 

The  Congress  agreed,  and  we 
worked  together  to  frame  legislation. 
The  Foreign  Service  Act  of  1980  is 
the  product  of  our  nonpartisan  col- 
laboration. 

While  this  bill  was  being  drafted, 
events  were  occurring  that  brought 
home,  vividly  to  all  of  us,  the  extraor- 
dinary demands  placed  on  our  Foreign 


Service  personnel.  They  play  an  essen- 
tial role  in  the  formulation  and  con- 
duct of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  and  their 
service  abroad  often  involves  depriva- 
tion and  danger.  They  are  exposed  to 
acts  of  terrorism  and,  in  some  places, 
to  open  hostility  toward  the  United 
States  and  its  representatives.  We 
owe  them  our  fullest  support. 

The  new  Foreign  Service  Act 
recognizes  the  professionalism  and 
dedication  required  by  today's  Foreign 
Service.  It  sets  high  performance 
standards,  provides  incentive  awards 
for  outstanding  service,  and  strength- 
ens career  development  programs.  It 
permits  the  President  to  promulgate 
a  pay  schedule  that  complies  fully  with 
the  requirements  of  the  Federal  Pay 
Comparability  Act.  The  Executive 
order  I  will  sign,  shortly,  will  achieve 
comparability  between  the  Foreign 
Service  and  General  Schedule  pay 
systems. 

When  I  signed  the  Civil  Service 
Reform  Act  just  2  years  ago,  on 
October  13,  i978,  I  said  that  it  would 
"bring  eflSciency  and  accountability 
and  competence  to  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment that  exceed  what  we  have  known 
in  the  past"  and  that  it  would  put 
"incentive  and  reward  back  into  the 
Federal  system."  Our  experience  since 
that  law  went  into  effect  indicates  that 
it  is  bringing  real  improvement  to  the 
Civil  Service — and  that  the  American 
taxpayers  are  getting  a  better  return 
on  their  tax  dollar. 

I  take  great  pride  in  signing  this 
bill  today.  It  is  a  modern  charter,  well 
designed  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  dedi- 
cated, able  men  and  women  of  the 
Foreign  Service  in  the  decades  ahead. 
I  congratulate  all  Members  of  Con- 
gress and  their  staff's  who  devoted  long 
hours  and  months  to  preparing  it  and 
who  worked  closely  with  my  Adminis- 
tration in  bringing  it  successfully  to 
enactment. 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  27, 
HI80.  ■ 


EAST  ASIA 


ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue 


The  third  Ministerial  meeting  of 
the  United  States  and  the  Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
I  ASEAN)  was  held  in  Manila,  Sep- 
tember 10-12, 1980.  Following  is  the 
fidl  text  of  the  joint  press  statement. 

The  Third  meeting  of  the  ASEAN- 
United  States  Dialogue  was  held  in 
Manila  on  September  10-12,  1980. 

The  Honorable  Anthony  C.  Albrecht, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary,  Bureau  of 
East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  led  the  United  States  dele- 
gation which  included  representatives 
from  the  Department  of  State,  Com- 
merce, Agriculture  and  Labor;  from  the 
Office  of  the  United  States  Trade  Repre- 
sentative; from  the  Agency  for  Interna- 
tional Development;  from  the  Interna- 
tional Communication  Agency;  and  from 
the  United  States  embassies  in  ASEAN. 

The  ASEAN  spokesman  was  Ambas- 
sador Sime  D.  Hidalgo,  Director  General 
of  ASEAN-Philippines.  The  ASEAN 
delegations  were  led  by  Mr.  Umarjadi 
Njotowijono,  Director  General,  ASEAN- 
Indonesia;  Mr.  M.  .lusof  Hitam,  Director 
General.  ASEAN-Malaysia ;  Mr.  Aziz 
Mahmoud,  Director  General,  ASEAN- 
Singapore;  and  Mr.  Vudhi  Chuchoni,  Act- 
ing Director  General,  ASEAN-Thailand. 
The  Secretary  General  of  the  ASEAN 
Secretariat,  Honorable  Narcisco  G.  Reyes, 
was  also  in  attendance. 

The  welcome  remarks  of  Foreign 
Minister  Carlos  P.  Romulo  as  the  chair- 
man of  the  ASEAN  Standing  Committee, 
were  read  by  Mr.  Hidalgo. 

Minister  Romulo  noted  that  the 
ASEAN-U.S.  partnership  has  succeeded 
in  moving  into  a  "commitment  stage" 
based  upon  "mutual  respect  and  mutual 
interest." 

He  stressed  that  ASEAN  and  the 
United  States  share  a  long-range  concern 
for  the  continued  stability  and  sustained 
economic  growth  of  the  region.  This  is 
manifested  by  their  common  position  in 
support  of  the  UN  Resolution  which  calls 
for  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Kampuchea. 

General  Romulo  expressed  optimism 
that  despite  the  political  tension,  ASEAN 
has  not  veered  from  the  course  leading  to 
its  goal  of  .self-reliance,  economic 
strength,  political  cohesivcness  and  mean- 
ingful cooperation  with  third  countries. 

Noting  the  progress  made  in  re- 
gional, cultural,  social,  and  agriculture 
projects  as  well  as  in  energy  cooperation, 
he  urged  the  delegates  to  pursue  the  ac- 
tivities in  energy-related  cooperation  as 
well  as  in  small-scale  industry  and 
shipping. 


Finally,  stressing  that  more  needs  to 
be  done  in  the  face  of  a  worsening  world 
economic  crisis,  he  specifically  endorsed 
several  of  the  strategies  set  forth  by  U.S. 
Secretary  of  State,  Edmund  Muskie,  for 
industrial  nations  to  follow.  He  suggested 
that  these  strategies  might  well  serve  as 
guidelines  in  broadening  the  base  of  this 
dialogue. 

The  two  sides  reviewed  with  satisfac- 
tion the  continuing  growth  of  ASEAN- 
U.S.  cooperation  which  complements  their 
close  bilateral  relationships.  During  the 
meeting,  they  reaffirmed  the  mutual  value 
of  the  ongoing  ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue  as 
the  forum  for  their  consultation  and  col- 
laboration in  support  of  peace  and  stabil- 
ity and  economic  development  in  South- 
east Asia.  The  meeting  examined  all 
aspects  of  ongoing  economic,  social,  and 
cultural  cooperation  between  ASEAN  and 
the  United  States;  and  exchanged  views 
on  ways  to  further  develop  these  rela- 
t'ons.  A  number  of  new  project  proposals 
were  introduced  and  discussed  and  they 
will  be  further  studied  by  ASE.^N  and 
the  United  States. 

The  discussion  also  covered  a  wide 
range  of  economic  areas  of  mutual  inter- 
est to  ASEAN  and  the  United  States. 
Both  sides  agreed  on  the  need  for  more 
intensive,  cooperative  eff'orts  to  counter 
developments  in  the  international  eco- 
nomic environment  which  posed  a  threat 
to  continuing  economic  growth.  At  the 
same  time,  they  recognized  the  opportuni- 
ties for  renewed  growth  associated  with 
expanded  U.S. -ASEAN  cooperation. 

ASEAN  and  the  United  States  ex- 
pressed satisfaction  that  the  ASEAN- 
U.S.  Dialogue  has  played  a  helpful  role  in 
the  successful  Common  Fund  negotiations 
completed  in  June  of  this  year  [1980]. 
The  meeting  also  agreed  to  cooperate  in 
the  work  of  the  forthcoming  preparatory 
commission  and  particularly  to  elaborate 
positively  operational  aspects  which  will 
ensure  a  viable  and  efi"ective  common 
fund.  ASEAN  urged  the  United  States  to 
support  the  Philippines'  bid  for  the  site  of 
the  Common  Fund  headquarters.  The 
United  States  expressed  appreciation  for 
being  informed  of  the  ASEAN  position 
and  agreed  to  give  it  early  consideration. 
The  meeting  also  discussed  other  meas- 
ures to  overcome  international  commodity 
problems.  These  included  the  early  estab- 
lishment of  international  commodity 
agreements  covering  commodities  of 
mutual  interest.  In  noting  the  successful 
conclusions  of  negotiations  on  the  Inter- 
national Rubber  Agreement  (INRA), 
.'\SEAN  expressed  its  appreciation  to  the 
United  States  for  its  support  for  Kuala 
Lumpur  as  the  headquarters  of  INRA. 
Both  sides  agreed  on  the  need  for  effective 
mechanisms  to  ameliorate  the  adverse 


effects  of  export  earnings  in  stability.  Thi 
meeting  also  exchanged  views  on  tin  with 
a  view  to  paving  the  way  for  successful 
negotiations  for  a  viable  and  effective 
sixth  international  tin  agreement. 

The  United  States  noted  that  bilat- 
eral agreements  reducing  tariff  and  non- 
tariff  barriers  have  been  concluded  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  each  of  the 
ASEAN  countries  within  the  framework 
of  the  multilateral  trade  negotiations. 
The  United  States  also  urged  the  ASEA> 
countries  to  accede  to  the  MTN  Codes  ani 
agreed  to  clarify  the  various  questions 
raised  by  ASEAN  regarding  the  codes 
and  certain  tariff'  concessions  made  by  th 
United  States  in  the  MTN  prior  to  the 
ASEAN  meeting  on  the  MTN,  scheduled 
in  Manila  on  September  24-26,  1980. 

The  United  States  also  agreed  to 
consider  ASEAN  request  for  additional 
product-specific  tariff  concessions,  includ 
ing  some  items  previously  discussed  in  th 
tropical  products  segment  of  the  MTN. 
These  discussions  would  take  place  in  thi 
context  of  bilateral  trade  negotiations 
which  the  United  States  is  willing  to 
undertake  prior  to  January  3,  1982. 

In  response  to  the  ASEAN  request 
for  accelerated  implementation  of  U.S. 
MTN  tariff  concessions,  the  United  Stati 
reported  that  it  had  already  made  a  max 
mum  effort  in  the  MTN  to  accelerate 
staging  of  its  tariff  concession  to 
ASEAN,  but  agreed  to  accept  for  reviev 
ASEAN  country  lists  of  those  items 
which  are  not  currentl.v  receiving  accele 
ated  implementation. 

Both  sides  expressed  concern  about 
growing  protectionist  pressures  and  the 
potential  adverse  impact  on  world  trade 
and,  in  particular  the  trade  of  developin 
countries.  The  United  States  reiterated 
its  resolve  to  resist  self-defeating  protec  ' 
tionist  pressures.  It  cited  Secretary  I 

Muskie's  speech  at  the  UN  Special  Ses- 
sion in  which  he  committed  the  United 
States  to  support  a  pledge  by  all  countri 
to  restrain  protectionism  and  facilitate 
adjustment. 

The  United  States  reported  that  it 
has  made  substantial  improvements  in 
the  U.S.  Generalized  Scheme  of  Prefer- 
ence since  the  last  Dialogue. 

ASEAN  expressed  its  appreciation 
to  the  United  States  for  the  inclusion  of  ^ 
Indonesia  as  a  beneficiary  of  the  U.S. 
(;SP  and -the  liberalization  of  the  cumu- 
lative rules  or  origin.  ASEAN  welcomec 
this  positive  contribution  to  improve  de- 
veloping country  access  to  the  V.S.  mar- 
ket. ASEAN  urged  further  improvemen 
in  cei'tain  features  of  the  program,  spe- 
cifically in  product  coverage,  competitiv 
need  limitations,  and  rules  of  origin.  Thi 
United  States  suggested  that  the  ASEA 
countries  submit  requests  during  the 


East  Asia 


lal  product  review  to  have  additional 
ucts  included  in  the  list  of  eligible 
s.  The  United  States  also  invited 
;AN  to  seek  designation  as  a  recog- 
d  regional  association  so  as  to  qualify 
;r  the  liberalized  cumulative  rules  of 
in.  The  United  States  also  noted  that 
AN's  GSP  benefits  continue  to  grow 
dly  and  indicated  its  willingness  to 
experts  to  the  ASEAN  countries  to 
ain  the  GSP  program. 
Both  sides  recognized  the  importance 
16  private  sector  in  expanding 
;AN-U.S.  economic  relations  and  ex- 
sed  satisfaction  with  the  formation 
le  ASEAN-U.S.  Business  Council. 
The  meeting  expressed  confidence 
the  Council's  proposed  program  will 
to  closer  cooperation  between  the 
ate  sectors  in  ASEAN  ami  the 
;ed  States. 

The  United  States  delegation  reaf- 
ed  the  deep  interest  of  the  Export- 
Ort  Bank  of  the  United  States  in  the 
SAN  countries,  and  its  commitment  to 
expansion  of  economic  and  trade  rela- 
s  in  support  of  ASEAN  objectives, 
y  indicated  the  bank  would  finance  at 
:  $2  billion  in  transactions  with  the 
;;AN  countries  over  the  next  five 
IS,  including  ASEAN  industrial 

!CtS. 

Recognizing  the  important  stimulus 
f]  -h  the  programs  of  the  Overseas  Pri- 
3   Investment  Corporation  afi'ord  to 
h  Sow  of  private  American  investment 
}  SEAN,  the  U.S.  side  noted  OPIC's 

0  idence  and  enthusiasm  for  assisting 
.!;AN  enterprises  in  locating  appro- 
r  te  U.S.  partners  and  in  supporting 
V  1  in  establishing  and  sustaining  in- 
e  ments  which  will  contribute  to 
.ijAN's  development  goals.  The  U.S. 
c  announced  that  a  high-level  delega- 

c  from  OPIC  would  visit  the  region  in 
c  ber,  1980. 

Both  sides  reviewed  the  status  of 
L  2AN-U.S.  development  cooperation, 

1  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  prog- 
e   since  the  last  Dialogue.  The  United 

■is  reiterated  its  strong  commitment 
Ljii'iial  development  projects  with 
.  ;.\N.  In  this  connection,  it  announced 
I- :  U.S.  review  of  the  ASEAN  plant 
I  rantine  project  has  been  completed 
I  the  United  States  is  now  ready  to 
i  1  the  formal  project  agreement.  The 
I  ted  States  also  expressed  its  comniit- 
1  it  to  continue  working  with  ASEAN 
r  hf  ASEAN  watershed  conservation 
I  management  research  program,  and 
I  "Unced  the  scheduled  arrival  of  a  U.S. 
(isory  team  on  September  14,  1980. 

.■XSEAN  and  the  United  States  noted 
■  h  satisfaction  the  signing  of  the  proj- 

a;.'  leement  on  August  28,  1980,  provid- 

fnr  U.S.  assistance  in  the  establish- 
I  nt  of  an  ASEAN  Agriculture  Develop- 
int  and  Planning  center  in  Bangkok, 
lailand. 

The  United  States  also  responded 

orably  to  a  new  proposal  presented  by 


ASEAN  for  an  ASEAN  scholarship  pro- 
gram for  applied  tropical  medicine  and 
public  health. 

Both  sides  noted  that  continued  in- 
creases in  the  world  oil  price  call  for 
greater  cooperation  among  industrial  and 
developing  countries  in  accelerating  the 
transition  to  non-oil  energy  sources.  Thus, 
the  recent  tour  of  ASEAN  energy  experts 
to  U.S.  energy  facilities  and  organiza- 
tions has  served  to  stimulate  ideas  for 
greater  collaboration  in  energy  matters 
between  ASEAN  and  the  United  States. 
As  a  first  step  in  energy  cooperation, 
ASEAN  and  the  United  States  have 
agreed  on  a  program  of  technical  assist- 
ance, professional  development,  and  for- 
mal exchange.  The  United  States  looks 
forward  to  working  with  ASEAN  to  de- 
velop the  next  phase  of  energy  coopera- 
tion program  over  the  next  few  months. 
The  United  States  also  proposed  estab- 
lishment of  an  ASEAN-U.S.  consultative 
group  on  energy  composed  of  senior  offi- 
cials and  ASEAN  agreed  to  look  into  this 
proposal. 

The  meeting  reviewed  the  useful 
joint  projects  concerning  drug  control  in 
the  fields  of  law  enforcement,  preventive 
education  and  treatment  and  rehabilita- 
tion undertaken  since  the  exchange  of 
notes  at  the  1979  Ministerial  meeting 
between  ASEAN  and  the  United  States 
in  Bali.  They  agreed  to  continue  eff"orts  to 
expand  and  improve  this  cooperation. 

In  order  to  continue  the  efi'ective 
dialogue  on  economic  matters  that  has 
characterized  the  ongoing  ASEAN-U.S. 
Dialogue,  both  sides  agreed  to  establish 
an  Economic  Coordination  Committee  as- 
sociated with  the  ASEAN  Washington 
Committee,  as  a  forum  for  discussing 
economic  issues  of  mutual  interest. 

Both  sides  were  pleased  that  agree- 
ment on  the  committee  had  been  reached, 
and  considered  its  establishment  a  major 
achievement  of  the  Third  ASEAN-U.S. 
Dialogue  and  a  positive  step  in  the 
strengthening  of  ASEAN-U.S. 
consultations. 

On  shipping,  both  sides  agreed  that 
ASEAN  and  the  other  non-Communist 
developing  countries'  shipping  lines  be 
exempted  from  the  constraints  of  the 
U.S.  Ocean  Shipping  Act  of  1980. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  Fourth 
ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue  would  be  held  in 
the  United  States  next  year  on  dates  to 
be  mutually  agreed  upon. 

The  ASEAN  and  United  States  dele- 
gations thanked  the  government  and 
people  of  the  Philippines  for  the  warm 
hospitality  extended  to  them  during  their 
stay  in  the  Philippines. 

"  The  Third  ASEAN-U.S.  Dialogue 
was  concluded  in  an  atmosphere  of 
mutual  understanding  and  friendship.  ■ 


U.S.-China  Sign 
Grain  Agreement 


WHITE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
OCTOBER  22,   1980 1 

Today,  we  .signed,  in  Beijing,  a  grain 
agreement  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China  which  accomplishes  two  im- 
portant things.  First,  it  will  promote 
the  sale  of  U.S.  grain  to  a  large  and 
growing  market.  Second,  it  will  fur- 
ther the  process  of  building  a  long- 
term  structure  for  U.S.-China  rela- 
tions. 

Under  the  terms  of  this  agree- 
ment, China  will  purchase  at  least 
6  million  metric  tons  (MMT)  of  U.S. 
wheat  and  corn  annually  for  a  4-year 
period  beginning  January  1,  1981. 
The  Chinese  may  purchase  up  to  9 
MMT  without  prior  notice. 

Since  the  establishment  of  diplo- 
matic relations  in  January  1979,  U.S. 
agricultural  exports  to  China  have 
expanded  rapidly  and  will  reach  a 
record  $2  billion  in  1980.  China  is  now 
our  most  important  customer  for 
cotton  and  one  of  the  most  important 
for  other  farm  products. 

The  agreement  grew  out  of  a 
dialogue  dating  back  to  Secretary 
I  Bob  I  Bergland's'visit  to  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  in  1978.  It  will  pro- 
vide important  benefits  for  both  U.S. 
farmers  and  consumers.  It  will  help 
to  moderate  the  wide  swing  in  grain 
prices  that  are  often  associated  with 
annual  fluctuations  in  agricultural 
exports.  The  agreement  will  also  pro- 
vide further  stimulus  to  our  dynamic 
agricultural  export  sector  and  con- 
tribute to  our  growing  surplus  in 
agricultural  trade,  which  will  reach 
$22  billion  in  1980. 

The  President  takes  great  per- 
sonal pride  in  the  fact  that,  in  his 
Administration,  he  was  able  to  take 
the  difficult  but  enormously  successful 
step  of  establishing  full  diplomatic 
relations  with  China,  the  largest 
country  in  the  world. 

The  establishment  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  China  almost  2  years 


East  Asia 


ago  made  it  possible  for  us  to  move 
ahead  to  build  a  new  relationship 
which  truly  enriches  us  in  knowledge, 
trade,  and  culture. 

•  Trade  more  than  doubled  from 
$1.1  billion  in  1978  to  $2.3  billion  in 
1979.  This  year  we  estimated  it  will 
almost  double  again  to  $4  billion. 

•  About  25  cultural  and  sports 
delegations  from  China  visit  our  coun- 
try every  6  months,  and  we  are  recip- 
rocating with  visits  by  orchestras 
and  other  cultural  groups  as  well  as 
our  Olympic  athletes. 

•  We  have  13  separate  working 
agreements  in  science  and  technology, 
which  not  only  give  us  current  and 
future  commercial  benefits  but  make  it 
possible  for  our  scientists  and  tech- 
nicians to  share  in  China's  research 

in  medicine,  earthquake  prediction, 
and  agriculture. 

Important  as  they  are,  there  is 
more  to  our  relationship  than  trade 
and  cultural  ties.  We  have  also  begun, 
carefully  and  deliberately,  to  build  a 
consultative  relationship  which  will 
enable  us  to  work  together  to  identify 
and  cooperate  on  issues  of  common 
interest,  such  as  the  Soviet  invasion 
of  Afghanistan. 

This  effort  to  construct  a  long- 
term  strategic  relationship  is  still  new 
and,  therefore,  fragile.  It  is  based  on 
carefully  written  and  painstakingly 
negotiated  understandings  set  down  in 
the  joint  communique  establishing  dip- 
lomatic relations  between  the  United 
States  and  China.  This  Administra- 
tion has  consistently  made  clear  its 
resolve  to  honor  those  understandings. 

We  have  come  a  long  way  since 
that  day  almost  2  years  ago  when  the 
President  announced  that  we  had 
reached  agreement  with  the  Chinese 
on  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
relations.  Thirty  years  of  mutual  iso- 
lation and  hostility  have  been  replaced 
with  a  deepening  consultative  relation- 
ship which  is  already  contributing 
significantly  to  American  security  and 
to  the  peace  and  stability  in  Ea.st  Asia 
and  the  world  beyond. 


U.S.-Japanese  Relations  in  the  1980s 


'  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  27, 
1080.  ■ 


/»>  Richard  ('..  Holbrooke 

Address  before  the  Japan  Sacict y 
in  Nem  York  on  November  21, 1980. 
Mr.  Holbrooke  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  East  A.iian  and  Pacific  Affairs. 

During  the  last  few  months,  I  have 
given  a  number  of  speeches  on  strate- 
gic issues  in  East  Asia,  the  continuing 
war  in  Indochina,  and  the  development 
of  our  new  relationship  with  China. 
Although  .Japan  has  figured  impor- 
tantly in  those  speeches,  as  the  corner- 
stone of  our  strategic  posture  and  our 
strategic  interests  in  the  area,  I  have 
not  yet  discussed,  in  any  detail,  how 
I  see  the  evolution  of  U.S.-Japanese 
relations  in  the  midst  of  these  other 
developments. 

In  less  than  2  months  I  shall  be 
leaving  my  present  position.  I  shall 
leave  with  a  sense  of  satisfaction  that 
our  relations  with  .Japan  have  matured 
into  a  full-fledged,  more  equal  and 
productive  partnership.  Nevertheless, 
challenges  remain  before  us  in  the 
1980s,  challenges  that  will  test  our 
ability  and  creativity  in  adapting  the 
U.S.-Japanese  alliance  to  an  increas- 
ingly uncertain  environment. 

Recent  Developments 

In  the  past  4  years,  Japan's  role  in  the 
world  has  begun  the  transformation 
from  one  of  caution,  with  almost  total 
attention  to  pragmatically  centered 
economic  activity,  to  political  activism, 
partnership,  and  leadership.  This 
change  was  first  evident  when  Prime 
Minister  |  Takeo]  Fukuda  traveled  to 
Southeast  Asia  in  1977,  declared  the 
"Fukuda  Doctrine."  and  opened  a  new 
relationship  for  Japan  with  the 
nations  of  ASEAN  |  Association  of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations].  Following 
that,  and  with  Foreign  Ministers 
ISunaol  Sonoda,  [Saburo]  Okita,  and 
I  Ma.sagoshi]  Ito  playing  leading  roles, 
the  sense  of  Japanese  responsibility 
grew,  not  only  within  the  government 
but  in  society  at  large.  Under 
Iformerl  Prime  Minister  |Masayoshil 
Ohira  and  now  Prime  Minister 
[Zenko]  Suzuki,  the  Government  of 
Japan  has  actively  reassessed  the 
meaning  of  alliance  and  partnership, 
and  the  results,  particularly  in  the 


last  year,  have  been  nothing  short  of 
astounding. 

•   While  hoping  to  improve  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union,  Japan 
has,  nonetheless,  taken  a  forthright 
stand  in  imposing  sanctions  on  Mos- 
cow, believing,  as  we  do,  that  the 
invasion  of  Afghanistan  cannot  go 
unanswered.  Japan  has  stood  second 
none  in  rejecting  Soviet  aggression, 
joined  the  Olympic  boycott — a  difticu  j 
step  for  both  the  government  and  th(: 
private  parties  involved.  It  has  main-| 
tained  economic  sanctions  even  in  thil 
face  of  less  principled  behavior  by      j 
others  who  have  moved  in  to  pick  up 
contracts  Japan  might  have  had.  It 
has  provided  massive  new  aid  to 
Pakistan  and  Turkey  not,  as  is  so 
often  alleged,  because  this  would  ope 
export  markets,  but  as  an  instrumen 
for  strategic  purposes. 

•  Japan  accepted  a  cutoff"  of  ov( 
10' ;  in  its  crucial  oil  shipments  whe 
it  refused  to  pay  higher  prices  de- 
manded by  Iran,  thus  aiding  signifi- 
cantly in  halting  the  .spiraling  price 
petroleum.  And  also  with  regard  to 
Iran,  despite  an  unfortunate  probler 
early  in  the  hostage  crisis,  since  thei 
Japan  has  been  second  to  none  in  its 
support  for  our  efforts  there,  as  well 

•  Jajian  has  greatly  expanded  i 
policy-level  contacts  with  Europe, 
working  closely  with  the  European 
Community,  as  well  as  with  the  Unit 
States,  not  only  on  Iranian  sanctions 
but  in  developing  a  dialogue  on  a 
broad  rage  of  issues.  This  global  ap- 
proach is  one  of  the  striking  feature 
of  the  new  Japanese  policy. 

•  The  relationship  with  ASEA 
has  deepened,  and  Japan  has  worked 
very  closely  with  those  nations,  pro- 
viding massive  refugee  assistance — 
second  only  to  the  United  States — ar 
playing  a  front-line  role  in  the  U.N. 
vote  on  Kampuchean  credentials.  Pe: 
haps  partially  in  recognition  of  the 
leadei-ship  role  Japan  played  on  the 
latter  question,  it  was  overwhelming 
voted  in  to  serve  on  the  Security 
Council  recently.  Only  a  year  ago 
Japan  had  to  withdraw  from  a  simili 
effort. 

•  Again,  in  Southeast  Asia,  no 
nation  has  been  more  eager  or  more 
active  in  attempting  to  use  its  good 
offices  and  diplomatic  resources  to 


LA-  ri..lll 


East  Asia 


;ve  a  solution  to  the  Kampuchean 
lem. 

And  finally.  Japan  has  adopted 
jportive  and  constructive  ap- 
ch  to  the  allied  effort  to  limit  the 
ige  of  the  Iran-Iraq  war. 

Speculation  that  these  steps  were 
ly  reactive  and  situational — that 
did  not  obey  any  larger  policy 
ept — was  dispelled  by  the  remark- 
language  in  the  Foreign  Minis- 
annual  policy  report  (the  Blue 
c)  issued  in  August. 

national  relations  are  no  longer  con- 
ed as  a  given  condition  for  Japan, 

ther  something  which  Japan  should 
form.  As  a  responsible  member  of  the 
national  community,  Japan  must  be 
,red  to  make  difficult  choices,  even 
sacrifices.  Such  an  attitude  is  to  be 
d  up  by  a  strong  conviction  that 
,pn  must  defend  its  basic  values,  that 
I'linm  and  democracy  .  .  .  and  fur- 
1 1  riigthen  solidarity  and  cooperation 

I  free  nations,  such  as  the  United 
a  ,<  and  the  Western  European 

u  ries. 

Few  countries  in  the  world  today 
Mated  their  basic  orientation  so 

I  nightly. 
Part  of  the  motivation  for  this 

■  approach  is  simply  greater  uncer- 

'  y  about  the  international  environ- 
aiid  a  desire  to  seek  safety  in 
1m  i-s.  But  I  think  a  careful  reading 
ijianese  political,  public,  and  press 
\<'\\  also  reveals  a  new  positive 

1 1'pt  of  Japanese  interests  and 
;.Miiisibilities.  No  longer  is  it  ade- 

II  e  in  Japanese  minds  to  be  econom- 
:8  V  strong  and  politically  neutral. 
e-e  in  the  Middle  East  and  Persian 

i^  vital  to  Japan's  interests. 
it  aggression  anywhere  is  a  po- 
I  lal  threat  to  security  everywhere. 
\  idual  willingness  to  accept  unrea- 
lile  demands  for  high  oil  prices 
p induce  short-term  supplies  but 
at  the  cost  of  long-term  disloca- 
ts  that  affect  us  all. 

Thus,  Japan  has  moved  firmly  in 
miirection  of  an  alliance  involving 
H'f  the  industrialized  democracies — 
0a  military  alliance,  for  that  would 
■ell  beyond  what  is  politically  fea- 
?  or  desirable  for  Japan,  but  a 
tical-economic  alliance  in  which  we 
vovk  together  to  achieve  our 
|mon  objective. 

Productive  Partnership"" 

I  very  real  sense,  I  would  argue, 
represents  the  first  stages  of  im- 
nentation  of  the  "productive  part- 


nership" for  the  1980s  to  which  Presi- 
dent Carter  and  Prime  Minister  Ohira 
dedicated  their  nations  in  May  1979. 
You  may  recall  that  such  partnership 
was  based  on  "shared  political  and 
economic  ideals"  and  reflected  our  re- 
spective responsibilities  in  world 
affairs. 

One  should  not  assume  that  this 
has  been  an  inevitable  evolution  or 
that  it  will  inevitably  be  sustained. 
The  Japanese  Government  has  had  to 
work  hard  with  all  areas  of  its  society 
and  body  politic  to  garner  the  broad 
support  that  the  policy  line  now  en- 
joys. And  the  success  is  all  the  more 
remarkable  in  light  of  the  severe 
strains  within  the  Japanese  domestic 
political  structure  in  recent  times. 

As  Japanese  leaders  frequently 
point  out,  the  starting  point  for  that 
policy  is  the  relationship  with  the 
United  States.  It  is,  thus,  incumbent 
upon  the  Japanese — and  upon  us — to 
assure  that  the  relationship  remains 
dynamic  and  that  its  essence  remains 
unaffected  by  the  specific  trade  prob- 
lems that  seem  to  plague  us  from  time 
to  time. 

Indeed,  it  is  important  to  remem- 
ber that  the  movement  in  Japanese 
policy  I  have  described,  and  the  in- 
creasing warmth  in  the  relationship 
with  the  United  States,  has  taken  place 
during  a  time  of  considerable  tension 
and  frequent  confrontation  on  the 
economic  front.  Given  problems  we 
have  had  in  the  past  such  as  the  textile 
issue,  one  hesitates  to  say  that  the 
level  of  problems  over  the  past  few 
years  has  been  unprecedented.  But  I 
think  it  wcuild  be  hard  to  find  an 
earlier  time  when  such  a  broad  range 
of  problems  has  existed  on  such  basic 
economic  issues  as  steel,  color  tele- 
visions, citrus  trade,  rice  disposals, 
tobacco  products,  government  procure- 
ment, nuclear  reprocessing,  and — most 
particularly — automobiles.  And  yet, 
as  a  recent  poll  by  Potomac  Associates 
and  the  Gallup  organization  showed, 
Americans  continue  to  have  an  in- 
creasingly favorable  view  of  Japan 
and  of  the  Japanese  people. 

Let  me  cite  some  of  the  figures. 
In  that  poll,  84 '"r  of  the  people  had  a 
favorable  opinion  of  Japan — higher 
than  West  Germany  (81^;  )  or  Israel 
(78',  )  or  17  other  countries  listed  in 
the  poll.  Only  12'^'r  had  an  unfavorable 
view. 

But  the  economic  problems  did 
not  escape  those  polled ;  over  three- 


quarters  (769^)  saw  Japanese  imports 
as  a  serious  threat  to  American  jobs 
today,  and  almost  two-thirds  (  62'7r  ) 
saw  such  a  serious  threat  5  or  10  years 
from  now.  The  number  of  Americans 
seeing  Japan  as  an  economic  threat 
over  the  longer  term  declines,  while 
those  seeing  China  as  an  economic 
threat  increase. 

Bilateral  Relationship 

Here  I  think  the  successes  have  also 
been  overwhelming,  but  I  am  con- 
cerned about  what  I  would  term  the 
"pathology"  of  our  trade  disputes — 
concerned  that  over  time  the  tendency 
both  sides  have  to  bring  such  disputes 
to  the  edge  of  political  calamity  may 
one  day  breach  the  firebreak  we  have 
all  worked  so  hard  to  create  between 
them  and  the  underlying  political, 
economic,  and  security  relationship. 

What  is  that  pathology  ?  The 
typical  scenario  is  for  the  United 
States  to  identify  a  specific  trade 
problem  and  raise  it  with  Japan.  The 
Japanese  respond  that  it  isn't  much  of 
a  problem  or  there  isn't  much  to  be 
done  about  it  or  they'll  try.  Time 
passes.  Nothing  happens.  Egged  on  by 
pressures  from  the  Hill  and  from  spe- 
cial interests  in  our  business  com- 
munity— and  one  must  say,  sometimes 
at  the  urging  of  some  Japanese — we 
escalate  it  to  the  very  brink  of  a 
political  breach.  An  agreement  is 
finally  struck  which  the  United  States 
views  as  inadequate  and  Japan  views 
as  the  result  of  totally  unjustified 
public  bullying  which  has  taken  place 
without  due  regard  for  its  concerns 
and  its  problems.  The  immediate  crisis 
passes,  but  scars  have  been  left.  The 
cycle  then  repeats  itself  on  some  other 
specific  issue. 

Some  people  have  argued  that 
such  pressures  and  confrontations  are 
necessary  to  move  both  sides  from 
extreme  positions  to  more  rational 
stances.  That  may  be  so,  but  it  is 
precisely  this  pathology  that  I  find 
deeply  troubling,  indeed,  destructive. 

What  can  we  do  about  it?  I  think 
on  the  American  side  we  must  resist 
more  vigorously  the  temptation  to 
"hype"  specific  problems.  We  have  not 
done  that  in  the  case  of  automobiles, 
however.  We  took  our  stand,  of 
course,  because  we  judged  it  in  our 
best  interest  to  do  so.  But  the  Japa- 
nese must  appreciate  that  in  addition 


East  Asia 


to  concerns  for  inflation  and  energy, 
part  of  our  calculation  has  been  one  of 
fair  play,  that  blaming  Japan — and 
punishing  it  for  something  not  en- 
tirely of  their  making— was  simply 
wrong. 

Accepting  the  political  burdens  of 
this  type  of  decision  must  be  reci- 
procal. Thus,  when  the  United  States 
calls  on  Japan  to  take  justifiable  steps 
to  open  its  markets  further — as  we 
are  now  doing  on  tobacco  products  and 
government  procurement  for  telecom- 
munications— I  believe  it  is  incumbent 
upon  Japan  to  respond  with  imagina- 
tive and  serious  proposals  which  re- 
flect the  totality  of  our  relationship. 
even  if  this  means  "taking  the  heat" 
from  some  special  interests.  Quite 
frankly,  I  think  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment has  done  just  that  in  many  ca.ses. 
So  my  appeal  is  not  only  to  Japanese 
officials  but  also  to  those  .special 
Japanese  interests  which  may  be  in- 
volved in  one  instance  or  another,  and 
to  the  Japanese  press,  which  is  ever 
vigilant  for  examples  of  U.S.  pressure, 
to  understand  that  we  want  to  be  rea- 
sonable, but  that  reason  is  a  two-way 
street. 

1  would  also  be  less  than  frank  if 
1  did  not  say  that  the  strength  of 
feeling  which  at  least  some  Americans 
have  tor  economic  problems  is,  in  part, 
a  function  of  percepiions  that  Japan 
Has  gotten  a  "tree  ride"  in  the  defense 
area.  1  do  not  happen  to  share  these 
perceptions. 

In  fact,  there  is  a  growing  myth 
in  the  United  States  tfiat  Japan 
doesn't  have  armed  forces,  'i  his  myth, 
which  the  Japanese  have  helped  to 
perpetuate,  creates  a  base  ol  misinfor- 
mation from  which  the  issue  is  falsely 
debated.  The  question  is  not  whether 
Japan  should  rearm.  Japan  already  has 
a  significant  detense  establishment. 
Consider  the  following  tacts:  The 
Japanese  Navy  includes  45  destroyers 
and  escorts  and  more  than  35  mine- 
sweepers ;  Japanese  air  power  counts 
more  than  370  combat  aircraft.  All  of 
these  figures  are  larger  than  the 
figures  tor  the  same  categories  in  the 
7th  l-leet  and  5th  Air  Force.  The  real 
question  is  how  much  and  how  fast 
should  Japan  build  its  existing  forces 
and  contribute  to  the  common  defense. 
With  a  defense  budget  which  has 
increased  at  almo.st  7'.o  annually  in 
real  terms  over  the  last  decade  and 
which  now  exceeds  $10  billion— includ- 
ing about  $1  billion  for  support  of 


U.S.  forces  in  Japan,  forbidden  from 
having  off'ensive  military  forces  by  a 
Constitution  shaped  with  U.S.  influ- 
ence— that  country  now  has  the 
seventh  or  eighth  largest  defense 
budget  in  the  world.  But  on  a  per 
capita  basis  the  burden  (  $82  )  is  about 
one-seventh  of  what  Americans  pay 
(  $550  ) ,  and  over  half  of  the  Ameri- 
can public  wants  Japan  to  increase  its 
defense  effort. 

There  is  no  question  that  the 
quality  of  the  so-called  "defense 
debate"  in  Japan  has  changed  mark- 
edly in  the  last  3  years,  even  in  the 
past  12  months.  Not  only  is  the 
Japanese  Government  considering  an 
almost  10^'  budget  increase  this  year, 
but  the  nature  of  the  debate  about 
Japan's  role  has  changed  dramatically. 
And  I  think,  over  time,  the  combina- 
tion of  increa.sed  military  spending 
and  other  contributions  to  our  com- 
mon security  such  as  economic  assist- 
ance will  ease  the  concerns  of  most 
Americans  about  any  "fi-ee  ride."  In 
our  view,  a  change  in  the  Japanese 
Constitution  is  not  necessary. 

The  Coming  Decade  and  Beyond 

Because  we  will  continue  to  provide 
the  strategic  umbrella  in  East  Asia 
and,  indeed,  throughout  the  world,  we 
will  doubtless  regain  some  elements  of 
the  "senior-junior"  relationship  we 
have  had  in  the  past.  But  true  part- 
nership, which  is  the  only  sustainable 
model  between  two  countries  such  as 
ours,  must  mean — if  not  an  end — at 
least,  a  major  change  in  the  "unequal" 
nature  of  our  relations.  Japan  is  now  a 
major  global  power,  and  both  of  us 
must  continue  adju.sting  to  this  fact. 
It  will  not  be  easy.  But  we  in  the 
United  States  must  respect  legitimate 
Japanese  concerns,  must  abandon  the 
idea  that  "consultation"  means  asking 
what  others  think  and  then  doing 
what  we  want  anyway,  must  be  willing 
to  accept  that  parallel  policies  are 
sometimes  as  good  as — if  not  better 
than — identical  approaches,  must  be 
willing  to  follow  as  well  as  lead. 

And  Japan  must  put  into  active 
practice  the  notions  with  which  it  is 
now  seized — that  while  protection  of 
national  interests  is  every  nation's 
first  priority,  the  interests  of  the 
major  powers  involve  responsibilities 
that  go  beyond  immediate  concerns, 


that  fairness  and  equity  and  partner 
ship  are  concepts  that  must  be  broad  1 
viewed.  ,( 


I 


Economies.  The  course  of  U.S.- 
Japanese relations  over  the  next 
decade  will  depend  more  on  what  we 
do  in  the  United  States  to  strengths 
our  own  economy  than  on  any  other 
single  factor.  We  must  increase  pro- 
ductivity and  stimulate  efficient,  con 
petitive  industries.  At  the  same  timt  I 
not  only  do  real  barriers  to  trade  sti^  i 
exist  in  Japan,  but  a  perception  re-    > 
mains  from  pa.st  experience  that  Jaj  I 
is  "unfair."  I  believe  Japan  has  a       f 
responsibility  to  go  beyond  simply 
eliminating  the  relatively  few  remai 
ing  barriers.  They  must  change  psy- 
chological attitudes  toward  foreign 
imports  nurtured  during  the  postwa 
reconstruction  period  and  actively 
facilitate  competition  from  abroad, 
they  are  to  maintain  that  kind  of 
access  to  the  American  market.  And 
they  must  take  care  that  their  dome: 
tic  and  foreign  economic  policies  do 
not — and  are  perceived  not  to — 
disrupt  competitive  markets  abroad 
Secnrity.  We  do  not  seek  a  rede 
fined  role  for  Japan.  We  recognize 
and  respect  their  constitutional  con- 
straints. But  the  challenges  are  gre: 
and  the  resources  increasingly  .scare 
We  are  augmenting  our  own  eff'orts 
to  counter  these  trends,  but  I  am  on 
stating  the  obvious  when  1  say  that 
the  Congress  and  the  American 
people  will  not  understand — and  wil 
not  tolerate — the  staggering  costs 
they  will  be  asked  to  bear  without 
significant  action  by  our  allies  as  we 
As  I  have  indicated,  I  think  in  both 
the  i)urely  military  field  and  in  for- 
eign aid.  the  trends  are  all  in  the  rig 
direction.  I  would  only  underscore  t 
importance  that  these  trends  contim 
— and  even  accelerate — and  that  we 
work  together  in  the  closest  possible 
way  in  support  of  oui-  shared  objec- 
tives. 

Energy.  Twice  in  the  last  4  yea 
we  have  faced  near  crises  with  Japa 
over  energy-related  issues.  The  first 
was  nuclear  reprocessing;  the  secon 
oil.  Both  of  these  problems  are  now 
well  understood  and.  indeed,  we  hav 
moved  to  a  new  stage  of  cooperation* 
in  research  and  development  of  new 
energy  sources.  But  the  eff'orts  to  da 
are,  in  my  personal  view,  grossly  in 
adequate  to  the  real  needs ;  the  poteil 
tial  for  controversy  is  tremendous 


East  Asia 


ink  we  can  make  the  accommoda- 
ns  necessary  to  avoid  the  pitfalls 
d,  working  together  with  other 
tions,  make  historic  contributions  to 
3  quality  of  life  not  only  of  our  own 
izens  but  of  all  mankind.  But  it  will 
luire  patience  and  vision  on  both 
les  greater  than  at  any  time  in  the 

St. 

Global  Perspective 

ir  fundamental  challenge  during  the 
80's  will  be  to  consolidate  and  inte- 
ate  our  major  alliances — with 
ATO,  with  Japan,  with  ANZUS 
Lustralia,  New  Zealand,  United 
ates  pact].  This  process  is  well 
iderway  in  the  Pacific,  but  there  is 
jrk  yet  to  be  done.  Our  strategic 
terests  in  remaining  a  vital  Asian 
iwer  are  more  apparent  today  than 
er.  But  there  cannot  be  a  strong 
nnerican  policy  in  the  Pacific  if  it 
lesn't  begin  with  a  strong  U.S.- 
panese  relationship. 

This  fact  seems  to  be  appreciated 
day  by  the  American  public,  as 
ustrated  by  the  Potomac  Associates 
)11 1  cited  earlier.  Although  the  poll 
owed  that  the  American  public  cor- 
ctly  identified  Japan  as  the  major 
urce  of  threat  to  American  jobs, 
'lere  was  a  very  significant  growth  in 
■ceptance  of  Japan  as  a  major  treaty 
ly  and  a  country  to  whom  the 
nited  States  should  commit  its  own 
itional  prestige  if  Japan's  security 
threatened.  Almost  70 '^r  believe  we 
lould  come  to  Japan's  defense  if  at- 
icked,  up  from  only  37' ,'  6  years  ago. 
his  suggests  to  me  that  the  American 
ublic  is  capable  of  making  the  seme- 
mes difficult  distinction  between 
rading  rivals  and  strategic  partners, 
'hat  distinction  is  essential  if  we  are 
3  continue  to  build  U.S.  Pacific  policy 
round  an  unbreakable  Tokyo-Wash- 
iigton  alliance. 

Over  the  next  several  years  we 
hall  be  facing  a  historic  opportunity 
10  draw  Tokyo  into  an  increasingly 
ictive  partnership  with  the  United 
itates  and  Western  Europe.  Japan's 
■ecognition  of  a  broader  context  for 
ts  own  security  concerns  has  been 
harked  over  the  past  year  and  will 
ncreasingly  contribute  to  coordination 


among  the  United  States,  Western 
Europe,  and  the  Pacific  allies,  particu- 
larly Japan. 

In  doing  this,  however,  we  must 
take  care  to  balance  the  defense 
aspect  of  our  alliance  with  its  political 
and  economic  dimensions.  The  issue 
of  sharing  the  defense  burden  must  be 
addressed  in  the  broader  context  of 
economic,  political,  and  security  coop- 
eration among  the  allies.  This  will 
make  it  possible  for  Japan  to  find 
alternate — perhaps  unique — ways  to 
carry  its  "fair  share"  without  feeling 
pressured  to  assume  an  uncomfortably 
high  military  profile.  By  the  same 
token,  it  can  help  reassure  Japan's 
neighbors  that  the  development  of 
more  impressive  Japanese  defense 
capabilities — or  a  rising  Japanese 
defense  budget — do  not  foreshadow 
independent  or  militaristic  policies. 

Clearly,  Japan  is  moving  gradu- 
ally, and  in  its  own  unique  way,  to- 
ward a  growing  defense  budget.  They 
will  never  move  as  fast  as  some 
Americans  want  them  to.  But  the 
trend,  it  seems  to  me,  is  unmistak- 
able. The  Japanese,  as  you  all  know, 
tend  to  do  the  opposite  of  what  we  do 
with  our  defense  budget.  We  try  to 
make  our  budget  as  big  as  possible  for 
domestic  purposes.  The  Japanese  try 
to  make  theirs  look  as  small  as  possi- 
ble— in  fact,  smaller  than  it  really  i.s — 
for  domestic  purposes.  So  there  is  a 
wide  misperception  among  Americans 
— even  many  in  the  government — 
about  how  much  the  Japanese  are 
already  doing. 

In  this  regard,  we  should  also 
keep  our  sights  on  what  we  want  in- 
creased defense  spending  to  accom- 
plish, and  how  the  burden  can  be  most 
equitably  and  rationally  shared.  This 
applies  not  only  to  Japan  but  to  our 
Western  European  allies,  as  well.  To 
the  extent  that  we  put  all  of  the 
emphasis  on  a  single  alliance  issue — 
defense  spending — we  could  create  an 
exaggerated  sense  of  disarray  and 
unnecessarily  encourage  domestic 
political  resistance  among  our  allies. 

Conclusion 

Finally,  we  must  take  pains  to  insure 
that  our  consultations  with  Japan 
about  strategic  issues  are  fully  de- 
veloped. Japan's  increasingly  active 
international  role  will  affect  our  in- 
terests and  policies ;  ours  will  affect 


theirs.  We  shall  both  want  to  be 
appropriately  involved  in  each  other's 
decisions.  For  example,  we  must  keep 
Japan's  concerns  and  views  fully  in 
mind  as  we  make  decisions  about  our 
future  security  relationship  with 
China.  It  is  a  strategic  issue  relating 
significantly  to  our  alliances. 

This  will  require,  above  all,  that 
the  President  must  personally  commit 
to  maintaining  the  relationship  and 
prevent  those  people  in  the  Congress 
or  in  the  domestic  agencies  who  see 
special  reasons  to  put  stress  on  the 
relationship  from  letting  that  stress 
destroy  it.  I  do  not  take  it  for  granted 
that  the  lip  service  which  we  all  pay  to 
U.S. -Japanese  relations  automatically 
converts  into  a  growing  and  improved 
relationship.  It  takes  real  determina- 
tion and  skill  at  every  level  of  the 
U.S.  Government. 

Earlier  this  week  I  had  breakfast 
with  Saburo  Okita,  the  former  Foreign 
Minister  of  Japan.  We  reflected  to- 
gether on  the  last  4  years,  and  we 
agreed  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
full  personal  commitment  of  three 
Prime  Ministers  and  four  Foreign 
Ministers,  and  for  the  efforts  of  Presi- 
dent Carter,  Vice  President  Mondale, 
Secretary  Vance,  Ambassador  Mans- 
field, Bob  Strauss,  Henry  Owen,  Secre- 
tary Muskie.  and  a  handful  of  other 
people,  we  might  not  have  gotten 
through  these  4  years  without  a  major 
shock  or  a  crisis.  But  I  am  proud  to  be 
able  to  say  that  we  did.  We  have  been 
particularly  privileged  to  have  Mike 
Mansfield  as  our  Ambassador  in  Tokyo. 
He's  the  most  extraordinary  Ambassa- 
dor I've  ever  worked  with,  and  his  con- 
tribution to  the  strength  of  the  U.S.- 
Japan relationship  today  exceeds  that 
of  anyone. 

A  firm  foundation  exists  today  for 
the  kind  of  relationship  with  Japan 
that  will  best  serve  both  our  interests 
and  the  interests  of  global  stability  in 
the  1980s.  It  is  essential  that  this 
relationship  be  understood  and 
preserved.  ■ 


EUROPE 


Strengthening  the  CSCE  Process 


by  Griffin  B.  Bell 

Opening  address  delivered  on 
November  13, 1980.  at  the  folloiriip 
meeting  of  the  Conference  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE ), 
which  opened  in  Madrid  on  November 
11,  1980.  Ambassador  Bell  is  chairman 
of  the  U.S.  delegation. 

It  is  appropriate  that  this  second  re- 
view meeting  of  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
should  be  held  in  Democratic  Spain. 
From  the  days  of  Queen  Isabella, 
Spain  has  played  a  major  role  in 
Europe,  and  the  explorations  of  Colum- 
bus— sailing  under  the  Spanish  Crown 
— established  the  link  between  the  Old 
World  and  the  New,  a  link  recognized 
at  our  Conference.  It  is  also  appropri- 
ate that  the  Spanish  delegation  should 
be  headed  by  Javier  Ruperez,  my  dis- 
tinguished colleague,  for  we  well 
remember  the  active  and  constructive 
role  he  played  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act.  In  expressing  my 
own  delegation's  view  of  that  historic 
document,  I  can  do  no  better  than  to 
quote  the  words  of  His  Majesty  Juan 
Carlos,  the  King  of  Spain.  He  said: 
"The  main  themes  of  international 
comity  are  reflected  in  the  basic  docu- 
ment of  this  Conference,  the  Helsinki 
Act  of  1975,  with  regard  to  security 
as  well  as  to  cooperation,  to  humani- 
tarian acts,  to  the  right  of  free  com- 
munication, and  to  the  overall  main- 
tenance of  individual  and  social 
rights." 

The  United  States  is  fully  com- 
mitted to  the  process  which  began  with 
the  signing  of  the  Final  Act  by  the 
heads  of  state  of  our  35  nations.  We 
are  committed  to  that  process  because 
we  believe  it  represents  the  soundest 
basis  on  which  we  can  develop  and 
strengthen  our  mutual  relations.  We 
support  that  process,  as  well,  because 
it  is  founded  on  principles  whose 
validity  and  truth  have  been  tested 
and  confirmed  in  our  own  experience 
throughout  our  own  history  as  an 
independent  nation.  Let  me  cite  a  few 
examples. 

•  The  Final  Act  demands  respect 
for  the  sovereign  equality  of  all 
nations.  This  principle  was  a  touch- 
stone of  our  early  history  as  a  nation, 


for  we  had  to  fight  to  establish  and 
then  to  maintain  our  sovereignty  and 
national  identity. 

•  The  Final  Act  proclaims  the 
principle  of  self-determination  of  peo- 
ples, a  principle  which  is  basic  to  our 
American  Revolution.  Indeed,  it  was 
fitting  that  a  visionary  American 
President,  Woodrow  Wilson,  should 
have  championed  that  principle  follow- 
ing World  War  I  and  that  his  efforts 
should  have  aided  the  emergence  of 
several  of  the  nations  represented  at 
this  Conference.  And  it  is  fitting  that, 
today,  my  country  should  be  in  the 
forefront  of  those  calling  for  self- 
determination  where  it  is  ignored  or 
denied. 

•  The  Final  Act  embodies,  at  its 
core,  the  great  principle  of  human 
rights  and  fundamental  freedoms,  a 
principle  born  during  the  European 
enlightenment,  nurtured  by  such  great 
thinkers  as  Locke  and  Voltaire,  and 
given  voice  by  Thomas  Jefferson  in 
these  words  from  our  Declaration  of 
Independence:  "We  hold  these  Truths 
to  be  self-evident,  that  all  Men  are 
created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed 
by  their  Creator  with  certain  inalien- 
able Rights,  that  among  these  are  Life, 
Liberty,  and  the  Pursuit  of  Happi- 
ness." 

Let  no  one  doubt,  therefore,  the 
fidelity  of  the  United  States  to  the 
commitments  we  undertook  at  Hel- 
sinki. We  could  no  more  turn  our  back 
on  those  commitments  than  we  could 
turn  our  back  on  our  own  heritage  as 
a  nation. 

CSCE  is  more  than  a  document. 
It  is  a  dynamic  and  positive  proces.s — 

•  A  process  which  is  slowly  but 
surely  breaking  down  the  barriers 
which  grew  up  at  the  height  of  the 
cold  war. 

•  A  process  which  is  bringing 
people  together  across  the  East-West 
divide. 

•  A  process  which  facilitiates  the- 
exchange  of  ideas  and  information  and 
the  growth  of  economic  contacts,  and 

•  A  process  which  calls  on  each  of 
us  to  carry  out  the  obligations  we 
assumed  at  Helsinki  and  which  calls  on 
all  of  us  to  examine  how  well  those 
obligations  are  being  carried  out. 


This  Madrid  meeting  is  the  sec- 
ond major  gathering  since  that  his- 
toric day  in  Helsinki.  The  Belgrade 
meeting  made  clear  that  CSCE  was  a 
continuing  process  because  it  con- 
firmed that  the  nations  which  signed 
the  Final  Act  could  come  together 
periodically  to  examine  how  their 
commitments  to  one  another  had  beer 
honored  and  implemented.  Such  peri- 
odic examinations  of  the  record  are 
necessary.  Without  them,  the  great 
undertaking  of  Helsinki  might  re- 
main a  static,  not  a  dynamic,  concept. 
It  was,  therefore,  encouraging  for  mj 
government  that,  although  the  discus 
sions  at  Belgrade  were  sometimes 
dirticult  and  always  frank,  the  Bel- 
grade gathering  provided — by  con- 
sensus— for  the  holding  of  a  similar 
meeting  at  Madrid  as  the  next  major 
step  in  the  Helsinki  process.  We  can 
hope  that  this  process  will  continue  a 
all  nations  come  to  recognize  the  trut 
that  strong  and  confident  governmen' 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  plain  speal 
ing,  from  whatever  source  it  might 
come. 

Because  of  our  conviction  that 
CSCE  is  a  positive  process,  indispen- 
sable to  the  advancement  of  security 
and  cooperation  in  Europe,  my  gover 
ment  will  be  second  to  none  in  workii 
to  insure  that  this  Madrid  meeting 
further  strengthens  the  CSCE  proce: 
We  are  not  here  to  confront  and  to 
polemicize;  we  are  here  to  cooperate 
and  to  construct. 

Human  Rights 

Those  gathered  around  this  table  wil 
hear  often  over  the  next  several  weel 
that  the  words  of  the  Final  Act  on 
human  rights  and  human  contacts  mu 
be  interpreted  in  different  ways  whei 
applied  in  different  social  systems. 
This  argument  is  untrue — and  pro- 
foundly harmful  to  the  spirit  of  our 
enterprise.  The  men  and  women  who 
are  citizens  of  our  countries  do  not 
possess  human  rights  because  they 
are  members  of  this  or  that  social 
system.   They  [lossess  human  rights 
because  they  are  human  beings.   Tho 
rights  derive,  in  the  words  of  the  Fir 
Act,  from  the  "inherent  dignity  of  th 
human  person  and  are  essential  for 
his  free  and  full  development." 

To  put  it  another  way,  I  would 
like  to  cite  a  story  involving  the 


Europe 


it  Russian  writer  Lev  Tolstoy  and 
American  President  Abraham 
:oln.  Tolstoy  was  an  admirer  of 
Eoln.  and  he  liked  to  explain  Lin- 
's greatness  to  the  simple  people 
lis  estate.  Lincoln,  Tolstoy  said. 
a  great  man  because  his  every  act 
rooted  in  humanity,  truth,  justice, 
ity.  That  description,  it  seems  to 
suggests  the  principles  on  which 
human  rights  in  the  Final  Act  are 
;d. 

The  Final  Act  itself  tells  us  what 
se  rights  are.  They  include  the 
idom  of  thought,  of  conscience,  and 
eligion  or  belief.  They  include  the 
idem  effectively  to  exeixise  civil, 
tical,  economic,  social,  cultural, 
other  rights  and  freedoms.  They 
de  the  right  not  only  to  practice 
also  to  profess  religious  belief  ac- 
iing  to  the  dictates  of  one's  own 
science.  And  they  are,  taken  to- 
er,  an  essential  factor  f(_)r  peace, 
justice,  and  for  friendly  relations 
cooperation  among  states.  Govern- 
ts  can  deny  them — but  they  can 
ther  change,  nor  reduce,  nor 
roy  them. 

The  principles  I  have  just  re- 
:ed  come  from  the  Final  Act,  but 
lonly  from  the  Final  Act.   They  are 
nciples  which  summarize  over  2.000 
rs  of  our  intellectual  and  political 
■;ory,  from  Aristotle's  charter  for  a 
;  state,  to  Tom  Paine's  fiery  defense 
lolitical  freedom,  to  the  eloquence 
)ag  Hanimarskjold  in  the  cause  of 
an  dignity.  Tht)se  principles  speak 
1  our  common  heritage.  They  speak 
he  voices  of  patriots  revered  by 
ti  of  our  nations.  They  speak  to  all 
lis  hei-e  and  to  all  of  the  citizens  of 
countries.  The  question  which  his- 
y  will  ask  about  our  endeavor  is 
well  we  lived  up  to  those  princi- 
— whether  we  advanced  or  set 
k  the  cause  of  human  rights  and  of 
nan  freedom. 

It  is  a  question  which,  in  the  first 
tance,  each  of  us  must  ask  himself 
lerself.  We  in  the  United  States 
e  done  so  and  will  continue  to  do  so. 
jlieve  the  U.S.  record  of  imple- 
ntation  is  something  we  can  be 
ud  of.  We  are  a  free  society — free 
lugh  to  admit  our  shortcomings  and 
icerned  enough  to  try  to  correct 
m.  The  degree  to  which  we  have 
filled  our  obligations  under  the 
Isinki  Final  Act  is  an  open  book  for 
to  read.  We  are  willing  to  profit 
m  examination,  suggestions,  and 


criticism.  And  this  should  come  as  no 
surprise,  for  the  very  first  document 
of  our  republic — our  Declaration  of 
Independence,  signed  on  July  4,  1776 
— states  that  we  owe  "a  decent  respect 
to  the  opinions  of  mankind." 

Violations  in  Other  Countries 

Just  as  the  obligations  undertaken 
under  the  Final  Act  require  each  of  us 
to  look  carefully  at  our  own  implemen- 
tation record,  so  they  require  each  of 
us  to  look  carefully  at  the  implementa- 
tion record  of  others.  The  record 
since  our  meeting  in  Belgrade  has  had 
some  bright  spots,  especially  in  the 
area  of  freer  movement  across  inter- 
national frontiers. 

•  A  number  of  countries — among 
them  Romania,  the  German  Democrat- 
ic Republic.  Czechoslovakia,  Poland, 
and  Bulgaria — have  made  important 
efforts  to  resolve  the  outstanding  cases 
of  their  citizens  who  wish  to  be  re- 
united with  their  families  elsewhere. 

•  In  several  countries — such  as 
Hungary,  the  German  Democratic 
Republic,  and  Poland — there  have  been 
efforts  to  explore  how  church  and  state 
can  better  live  with  each  other,  con- 
sistent with  the  commitment  in  the 
Final  Act  to  expand  religious  freedom. 

•  In  Eastern  Europe,  as  a  whole 
in  1979,  over  50,000  ethnic  Germans 
were  granted  permission  to  join  their 
relatives  in  the  West. 

•  There  has  been  encouraging 
progress  in  some  countries  toward 
creating  more  responsive  and  diverse 
social  and  economic  systems. 

•  Several  countries  have  under- 
taken studies  of  their  own  implementa- 
tion records  with  a  view  to  improving 
the  performance.  We  hope  this  trend 
will  continue. 

•  There  has  been  some  success  in 
the  security  area  of  CSCE,  where  con- 
fidence-building measures  have  been 
implemented.  Progress  in  economic, 
technical,  and  scientific  cooperation 
has  also  been  achieved,  notably  by  the 
signature  last  year  of  the  trans- 
boundary  air-pollution  agreement.  In 
both  the  economic  and  security  areas, 
progress  has  been  modest,  yet  the 
Final  Act  has  served  as  a  catalyst 

for  imaginative  thought  which  bodes 
well  for  more  ambitious  steps  when 
circumstances  permit. 

•  Finally,  the  situation  in  and 
around  the  divided  city  of  Berlin  has 
remained  relatively  calm.  It  is  of  fun- 
damental importance  to  European 


security  and  cooperation  that  Berlin 
continues  to  receive  the  full  benefits  of 
the  Final  Act  and  the  quadripartite 
agreement. 

As  encouraging  as  this  evidence 
of  progress  has  been,  there  is  a  darker 
side  of  the  i-ecord  of  implementation 
which  must  also  be  considered.  In  this 
regard,  I  must  mention,  first  of  all,  the 
invasion  of  the  independent  nation  of 
Afghanistan  by  armed  forces  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  forces  which  remain  in 
that  country  even  as  our  meeting  con- 
venes. I  shall  not  recite  all  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Final  Act — and  indeed, 
of  the  U.N.  Charter  and  other  solemn 
agreements — which  this  invasion  vio- 
lated. Nor  will  I  pause  to  refute  the 
transparent  explanations  which  Soviet 
leaders  have  offered  for  their  action. 
I  will  say  only  that  the  Soviet  invasion 
cast  a  dark  shadow  over  East-West 
relations  which  no  meeting,  no  pro- 
nouncement, nothing,  in  fact,  but  the 
total  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops,  can 
dispel. 

Were  this  the  only  instance  in 
which  the  obligations  of  the  Final  Act 
had  been  ignored  since  our  last  meet- 
ing, our  task  here  would  be  solemn 
enough.  But  this  is  not  the  case.  As  I 
have  cited  examples  of  progress,  so 
must  I  call  attention  to  a  lamentable 
record  of  continued  denial  of  human 
rights  written  over  the  past  3  years  by 
the  governments  of  some  signatory 
nations. 

•  In  the  Soviet  Union,  in  direct 
contravention  of  the  Final  Act,  West- 
ern radio  broadcast-^ — including  those 
of  BBC  I  British  Broadcasting 
Corporation],  Deutsche  Welle,  the 
Voice  of  America,  Radio  Free  Europe, 
and  Radio  Liberty — have  been  jammed. 

•  In  the  German  Democratic  Re- 
public, a  new  and  punitive  increase  in 
required  currency  exchanges  for 
Western  visitors  has  drastically  re- 
duced the  ability  of  West  Germans, 
particularly,  the  elderly  and  the  poor, 
to  visit  family  and  friends  in  the  East. 

•  In  the  Soviet  Union  the  Jewish 
emigration  rate,  which  encouragingly 
reached  a  record  high  in  1979,  has 
declined  in  1980  by  .50 ';  ,  while  at  the 
same  time,  harassment  and  denial  of 
exit  permits  continue  as  before. 

•  In  Czechoslovakia,  the  courage- 
ous members  of  the  Charter  77  group, 
created  to  monitor  compliance  with  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  have  suffered  con- 
tinued harassment  and  periodic  impris- 
onment. As  I  speak,  Vaclav  Havel,  a 


I'sn/  -tQDi 


1Q 


Europe 


spokesman  for  this  group,  is  serving 
out  his  4-year  term  under  harsh  condi- 
tions of  confinement,  and 

•   In  1976  eleven  men  and  women, 
citizens  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  long- 
time activists  in  the  Soviet  human 
rights  movement,  formed  the  Moscow 
Helsinki  watch  group  to  monitor  the 
implementation  of  human  rights  com- 
mitments under  Principle  VII  of  the 
Final  Act  and  under  Soviet  law. 
Similar  groups  appeared  in  the 
Ukraine,  Lithuania,  Georgia,  and 
Armenia.  The  reaction  of  the  Soviet 
authorities  was  to  subject  these  brave 
people  to  brutal  repression.  Of  the  71 
individuals  who  have  belonged  to  the 
Soviet  Helsinki  watch  groups,  24  have 
been  tried  and  found  guilty,  and  19  of 
them  are  currently  serving  a  total  of 
156  years  in  forced-labor  camps  and 
exile.  Eleven  more  have  been  placed 
under  investigative  arrest.  Nine  others 
were  already  serving  previous  sen- 
tences when  they  joined  the  Helsinki 
watch.  Seven  have  emigrated,  two 
were  stripped  of  their  citizenship 
while  traveling  abroad,  one  was  ex- 
changed for  a  Soviet  spy,  and  one  has 
died. 

I  will  name  only  a  few  members  of 
this  remarkable  group,  but  they  are 
representative  of  all  those  in  the 
Soviet  Union  who  strive  for  the  rights 
that  are  promised  them  in  the  Soviet 
constitution  and  in  the  Helsinki  Final 
Act.  All  the  world  knows  of  Professor 
Yuri  Orlov,  the  physicist,  a  coura- 
geous man  always  in  the  forefront, 
founder  of  the  Helsinki  group.  The 
world  also  knows  of  Anatoly  Shcharan- 
skiy,  falsely  accused  of  espionage  in  an 
attempt  to  intimidate  the  Jewish 
emigration  movement.  Orlov  was  sen- 
tenced on  May  18,  1978,  to  7  years  of 
strict-regimen  camp  and  5  years  of 
exile.  Shcharanskiy  was  sentenced  on 
July  14,  1978,  to  3  years  in  prison  and 
10  years  of  strict-regimen  labor  camp. 
Members  of  the  other  groups  I  have 
mentioned  met  similar  fates.  In  the 
Ukraine  and  Lithuania,  Mykola 
Rudenko  and  Viktoras  Petkus  were 
also  sentenced  to  long  prison  terms 
because  they  sought  fulfillment  of 
Final  Act  commitments.  All  those  who 
are  free  have  the  inescapable  duty  to 
speak  out  on  their  behalf  and  on 
behalf  of  the  many  others. 

Finally,  I  speak  now  of  a  gentle 


and  compassionate  humanist,  a  man 
who  has  devoted  his  life  to  helping  the 
poor  and  the  oppressed.  Listen  to  his 
words. 

Despite  all  that  has  happened,  I  feel  that 
the  questions  of  war  and  peace  and  dis- 
armament are  so  crucial  that  they  must 
be  given  absolute  priority  even  in  the 
most  difficult  circumstances.  It  is  impera- 
tive that  all  possible  means  be  used  to 
solve  these  questions  and  to  lay  the 
groundwork  for  further  progress.  Most 
urgent  of  all  are  steps  to  avert  a  nuclear 
war,  which  is  the  greatest  peril  confront- 
ing the  modern  world. 

Could  anyone  disagree  with  those 
words?  Can  we  not  all  unite  around 
the  thought  they  express  ?  Do  we  not 
all  recognize  that  this  thought  goes 
right  to  the  heart  of  the  deepest  needs 
and  yearnings  of  mankind?  On  Janu- 
ary 22  of  this  year  |  19801,  the  author 
of  those  words  was  exiled  to  the  closed 
city  of  Gorky  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
When  Andrei  Sakharov  was  banished, 
some  of  our  best  hopes  for  a  spirit  of 
security  and  cooperation  in  Europe 
were  banished  with  him. 

There  are  those  who  charge  that 
incidents  such  as  these  prove  the 
worthlessness  of  the  Final  Act.  My 
government  strongly  disagrees.  The 
fact  that  a  principle  has  been  violated 
does  not  make  that  principle  less  valid, 
or  reduce  our  obligation  to  seek  fuller 
implementation  of  the  Final  Act.  In 
that  spirit,  the  United  States  will 
make  every  effort,  within  the  context 
of  the  Final  Act,  to  help  create  a  more 
secure,  a  freer,  and  a  better  life  for 
the  1  billion  people  who  live  within 
the  borders  of  the  states  represented 
here.  But  CSCE  will  provide  the  means 
to  this  end  only  if  its  provisions  are 
taken  seriously  and  are  seen  to  be 
taken  seriously  by  our  citizens.  There- 
fore, my  country  will  continue  to  speak 
out,  in  specific  terms,  against  abuses 
of  human  rights.  We  call  on  all  of  you 
to  do  the  same  and  to  recognize  that 
we  cannot  expect  our  citizens  to  have 
faith  in  future  commitments  if  past 
commitments  are  ignored. 

Our  expectations  for  the  present 
meeting  are  modest.  The  events  I  have 
mentioned  have  created  an  interna- 
tional climate  which  is  not  conducive 
to  ambitious  steps  in  the  areas  covered 
bv  the  Final  Act.  It  would  be  idle  to 


pretend  that  CSCE  can  somehow  be 
insulated  from  the  overall  state  of 
East-West  relations.  Indeed,  such  a 
pretense  could  only  diminish  the  im- 
portance of  the  commitments  under- 
taken at  Helsinki. 

But  we  do  see  some  possibility  of 
progress.  For  example,  we  and  our 
allies  have  been  doing  intensive  work 
to  develop  confidence-building  meas- 
ures which  will  be  militarily  significan 
verifiable,  and  applicable  to  the  whole 
of  Europe.  We  hope  that  our  consid- 
eration of  such  measures  at  this  meet 
ing  will  point  the  way  toward  a  more 
secure  future  for  us  all.  We  are  fully 
prepared  to  join  with  you  in  seeking 
to  realize  the  full  potential  of  con- 
fidence-building measures — we  ask 
only  that  we  concentrate  on  concrete 
steps  and  avoid  empty  declarations. 

(lonclusioii 

President  Carter  has  a.sked  me  to  giv 
you  the  following  message — he  extem 
his  warmest  greetings  to  the  delegats 
to  this  historic  review  meeting.  For 
the  President,  CSCE  is  a  unique  and 
valuable  forum  which  unites  all  the 
nations  of  Europe,  the  United  States 
and  Canada,  in  a  common  effort  to  ri( 
the  world  of  artificial  barriers  to  the 
free  exercise  of  human  rights  and  to 
the  free  movement  of  people  and  idea 
across  international  boundaries.  It  is 
his  firm  conviction  that  it  must  be  ou 
common  goal  to  preserve  and  enhanci 
the  Helsinki  process  toward  the  day 
when  its  provisions  are  fully  imple- 
mented and  true  security  and  cooper; 
tion  among  our  nations  have  finally 
been  achieved.  ■ 


Poland 

PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  3,   19801 

The  United  States  is  watching  with 
growing  concern  the  unprecedented 
buildup  of  Soviet  forces  along  the 
Polish  border  and  the  closing  of  cer- 
tain frontier  regions  along  the  horde 
The  United  States  has  also  taken  not( 
of  Soviet  references  to  alleged  "anti- 
Socialist"  forces  within  Poland.  We 


nonartmpnt  nf  Rtatp  Rulle' 


SPECIAL 


A  Short  History  of  the 
U.S.  Department  of  State, 
1781-1981 


The  Early  Years,  1781-1823 


}avid  F.  Trask 
the  assistance  of 
rid  M.  Baehler 
Evan  M.  Duncan 


The  United  States  Department  of 
State  traces  its  origin  to  the  "Depart- 
ment of  Foreign  Affairs"  created  by 
Congress  on  January  10,  1781.  Six 
years  had  passed  since  the  13  seaboard 
Colonies — now  formed  into  the  United 
States — had  begun  their  rebellion 
against  the  authority  of  Great  Britain. 
Congress  believed  that  they  had  earned 
themselves  "a  place  among  the  rising 
potentates  of  Europe"  and  felt  the 
need  to  cultivate  "a  friendly  cor- 
respondence and  connection  with 
foreign  countries." 


The  need  for  diplomacy  was  ap- 
parent from  the  start.  Given  the  over- 
whelming military  strength  of  Great 
Britain,  the  United  States  could  hope 
to  gain  independence  only  if  it 
attracted  support  of  other  countries, 
especially  France  and  Spain.  In  1775 
Congress  established  the  Committee 
of  Secret  Correspondence  to  com- 
municate with  prospective  supporters 
abroad  and  sent  emissaries  to  other 
governments.  Benjamin  Franklin 


This  unfinished  sketch  by  Benjamin  West  of  the  signing  of  the  Preliminary  Articles  of  Peace 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  on  November  30,  1782,  in  Paris  ending  the 
American  Revolution  shows  (left  to  right)  John  Jay,  John  Adams,  Benjamin  F'ranklin,  Henry 
Laurens,  and  W.  Temple  F'ranklin  (grandson  of  Benjamin  Franklin  and  Secretary  of  the 
American  Commission).  The  British  Commissioner  and  his  secretary  never  appeared  at 
West's  studio.  This  sketch  now  hangs  in  the  John^Quincy  Admas  State  Drawing  Room  at  the 

Department  of  State.  (I)eparlment  of  State  photo) 


SI 


Special 


The  Livingston  Brothers 


13  South  Sixth  Street, 
Philadelphia 


Robert  R.  Livingston  (Uepartmenl  of  State  phnun 

Robert  R.  Livingston  was  born  in 
New  York  City  in  1746.  He  served  on 
several  committees  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  including  the  one  that 
drafted  the  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence. He  was  the  first  Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  serving  from  1781  to 
1783.  In  1789  he  administered  the  oath 
of  office  to  President  George  Washing- 
ton. As  Minister  to  France  (1801-04), 
he  helped  arrange  the  Louisiana 
Purchase. 

Edward  Livingston,  Robert's 
brother,  was  born  in  1764  at  "Cler- 
mont," New  York.  After  serving  as  a 


Edward  Livingston  (Department  of  State  photol 

Representative  from  New  York  and 
as  Mayor  of  New  York  City,  Living- 
ston moved  to  New  Orleans  in  1804. 
He  was  a  Representative  from 
Louisiana  (1823-29)  and  a  Senator 
(1829-31)  before  serving  as  Secretary 
of  State  under  President  Andrew 
Jackson  (1831-33).  He  then  served 
as  Minister  to  France  (1833-35). 
His  chief  concern  was  with  the  French 
spoliation  claims,  involving  compensa- 
tion for  damages  to  American  ship- 
ping during  the  wars  of  the  French 
Revolution. 


served  briefly  as  chairman  of  the 
committee,  which  in  1777  was  renamed 
the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Unfortunately,  this  committee's 
scope  was  strictly  limited.  As  one 
of  its  most  active  members,  James 
Lovell  said :  "There  is  really  no  such 
thing  as  a  Committee  for  Foreign 
Affairs  existing — no  secretary  or 
clerk  further  than  I  presume  to  be  one 
and  the  other.  The  books  and  papers  of 
that  distinguished  body  lay  yet  on  the 
table  of  Congress,  or  rather  are  locked 
up  in  the  Secretary's  [Secretary  of 
Congressl  private  box."  Franklin, 
sent  to  France  as  a  representative  of 
the  United  States,  recognized  the  need 
for  improved  administration  of 
foreign  policy.  Noting  that  Congress 
had  placed  the  finances  of  the  country 


in  the  hands  of  one  person,  he  wrote: 
"I  wish  they  would  do  the  same  with 
their  [foreign!  correspondence,  by 
appointing  a  single  secretary  for 
foreign  affairs."  The  first  constitution 
of  the  new  nation,  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  permitted  Congress  to 
select  "such  committees  and  civil 
officers  as  may  be  necessary  for 
managing  the  general  affairs  of  the 
United  States." 

Shortly  after  the  congressional 
resolution  of  January  10,  1781, 
Congress  selected  Robert  R. 
Livingston,  a  delegate  from  New  York, 
as  the  first  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  He  took  ofliice  on  October  20, 
1781,  and  served  until  June  4,  1783. 
Livingston  experienced  considerable 
frustration  in  oflfice.  One  historian 
notes  that  his  duties  were  not 
"clearlv  defined  and  he  was  never 


CopyriKht  by  Robert  Sivard  19hit 

Soon  after  taking  office  as  Secreta 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  Robert  R.  Li^ 
ingston  set  up  his  offices  in  a  smal 
plain,  brick  house  at  13  South  Six 
Street  in  Philadelphia.  This  build 
was  the  first  home  of  an  office  of 
foreign  affairs  as  an  entity  separa 
from  Congress. 

The  building  had  been  erectex 
1773.  It  consisted  of  three  stories 
an  attic,  with  two  rooms  to  each  .^^ 
it  had  a  gable  roof  which  sloped  t^ 
front  and  rear.  A  room  on  the  sec^ 
floor  overlooking  the  street  servet 
Livingston's  oflTice.  Various  "grea 
personages"  of  the  time  "frequen' 
clambered  up  the  dark  and  narrow 
winding  stairs"  to  transact  businf 
with  the  Secretary.  Livingston's  s 
consisted  of  two  Under  Secretarie 
translator  of  French,  and  a  clerk, 
two  Under  Secretaries  shared  a  b; 
room  on  the  second  floor  and  the 
translator  and  the  clerk  occupied  t 
ground  floor. 

The  building  ceased  to  be  the 
home  of  the  Department  of  Foreig 
Affairs  after  Livingston  resigned 
1783.  A  succession  of  tenants  then 
occupied  it,  using  it  at  different  ti 
as  a  residence,  a  shop,  and  a  board 
house. 


^nt    r\t    CtotA    Dl 


Special 


Mia  free  hand."  Later  he  served 
inister  to  France  and  in  1803 
tiated  the  Louisiana  Purchase. 
John  Jay,  another  New  Yorker, 
had  helped  Franklin  negotiate  the 
ty  of  Paris  (1783)  that  ended  the 
lutionary  War,  was  appointed 
itary  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  May 
'84,  and  he  remained  at  this  post 
1790.  Jay  became  a  severe  critic 
■s  own  organization,  whose  powers 
ill  defined  and  whose  leader  was 
r  granted  sufficient  freedom  of 
m.  During  the  national  debate  on 
;her  to  adopt  the  new  constitution 
ted  in  1787,  Jay  cogently  sum- 
zed  his  critique  of  congressional 
ign  policy  under  the  Articles  of 
ederation : 

rhey  may  make  war,  but  are  not 
■wered  to  raise  men  or  money  to 
r  it  on.  They  may  make  peace,  but 
/ithout  power  to  see  the  terms  of  it 
sed.  .  .  .  They  may  make  alliances, 
are]  without  ability  to  comply  with 
tipulations  on  their  part.  They  may 

into  treaties  of  commerce,  but 
I  without  power  to  enforce  them  at 
'  or  abroad. 

In  short.  Jay  concluded,  Members 
Dngress  "may  consult,  and  deliber- 
and  recommend,  and  make  requi- 
ns,  and  they  who  please  may 
rd  them,"  that  is,  obey.  He 
ght  that  few  would  do  so. 
le  Constitution  put  into  effect  in 
obviated  much  of  Jay's  criticism, 
cle  n,  section  2  makes  the  Presi- 
"Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
ly  and  Navy  of  the  United  States" 
also  gives  the  Chief  Executive  the 
sr,  "by  and  with  the  Advice  and 
5ent  of  the  Senate,  to  make 
ities,  provided  two  thirds  of  the 
itors  present  concur."  Finally,  the 
)ident  "shall  nominate,  and  by  and 
1  the  Advice  and  Consent  of  the 
ite,  shall  appoint  Ambassadors, 
:r  public  Ministers  and  Con- 
. .  . ."  These  provisions  placed  the 
luct  of  foreign  affairs  principally 
le  hands  of  the  executive  branch, 
certain  powers  conferred  upon  the 
slative  branch — especially  to 
are  war,  appropriate  funds,  and 
ise  and  consent  on  treaties  and 
ointments — gave  Congress  signifi- 
t  ability  to  influence  foreign  policy. 
The  Constitution  did  not  specify 
!xact  division  of  responsibilities 
A^een  the  President  and  Congress 
the  direction  of  foreign  relations, 
early  precedents  confirmed  execu- 
!  predominance.  Thomas  Jefferson 
irly  delineated  the  reasons  for  this 


development;  he  insisted  that  "the 
President  is  the  only  channel  of  com- 
munication between  this  country  and 
foreign  nations,  and  it  is  from  him 
alone  that  foreign  nations  or  their 
agents  are  to  learn  what  is  or  has  been 
the  will  of  the  nation."  He  concluded 
that  other  countries  should  not  be 
given  an  opportunity  to  play  off  the 
executive  against  any  other  branch. 
Ever  since  the  earliest  days  of  the 
Constitution,  Presidents  and  Secre- 
taries of  State  have  adopted  this  view, 
although  they  have  recognized  the 
important  role  of  Congress  in  the 
foreign  policy  process. 

On  May  19,  1789,  James  Madison 
of  Virginia,  then  sitting  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  began  the  process 
that  redefined  the  functions  of  the 
Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  under 
the  new  Constitution.  He  proposed  the 
creation  of  "an  Executive  Department 
to  be  denominated  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs."  At  its  head  would  be 
"an  officer,  to  be  called  the  Secretary 
to  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs." 
On  July  27  Washington  signed  legisla- 
tion to  this  effect.  Soon,  however,  a 
new  law  passed  Congress  giving  cer- 
tain domestic  responsibilities  to  the 
new  Department  as  well  as  foreign 
duties.  On  September  15,  President 
Washington  approved  this  substitute, 
which  set  up  a  Department  of  State 
with  a  Secretary  of  State  at  its  head. 
The  President  immediately  appointed 
Thomas  Jefferson  of  Virginia,  then 
Minister  to  France,  to  be  the  first 
Cabinet  member  under  the  Constitu- 
tion to  hold  the  position  of  Secretary 
of  State.  The  author  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence  took  up  his  new 
duties  on  March  22,  1790. 

The  small  executive  Department 
did  not  grow  rapidly  during  its  early 
years.  Jefferson's  initial  staff  con- 
sisted of  a  chief  clerk,  three  other 
clerks,  a  translator,  and  a  messenger. 
(The  title  "clerk"  refers  to  officers 
charged  with  the  composition  of  mes- 
sages to  overseas  missions  and  other 
correspondents.)  The  Department's 
domestic  budget  for  1790,  not  count- 
ing expenses  of  employees  overseas, 
amounted  to  a  mere  $7,961 — the  cost 
of  salaries,  rent,  and  supplies  such  as 
firewood  and  stationery.  The  Secre- 
tary of  State's  salary  was  $3,500.  Total 
expenditures  in  1791,  both  domestic 
and  foreign,  were  $56,600.  In  1807  the 
Department's  staff  included  only  a 


Domestic  Duties  of 
the  Department  of  State 

On  September  15,  1789,  Congress 
passed  "An  Act  to  provide  for  the  safe 
keeping  of  the  Acts,  Records,  and  Seal 
of  the  United  States,  and  for  other 
purposes."  This  legislation  changed 
the  name  of  the  Department  of  For- 
eign Affairs  to  the  Department  of 
State  because  certain  domestic  duties 
were  assigned  to  the  agency.  Among 
these  duties  were: 

•  Receipt,  publication,  distribu- 
tion, and  preservation  of  the  laws  of 
the  United  States; 

•  Preparation,  sealing,  and  re- 
cording of  commissions  given  to 
Presidential  appointees. 

•  Preparation  and  authentication 
of  copies  of  records  and  authentica- 
tion of  copies  under  the  Department's 
seal; 

•  Custody  of  the  Great  Seal  of  the 
United  States;  and 

•  Custody  of  books,  records,  and 
papers  of  the  former  Secretary  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  except  those  of 
the  Treasury  and  War  Departments. 

Many  comparable  functions  were 
added  at  various  times  since  1789, 
among  them  issuance  of  patents  on 
inventions,  publication  of  the  census 
returns,  management  of  the  mint, 
controls  of  copyrights,  and  regulation 
of  immigration. 

Most  domestic  functions  have 
been  transferred  to  other  agencies. 
Among  the  few  that  remain  in  the 
Department  are:  storage  and  use  of 
the  Great  Seal,  performance  of  pro- 
tocol functions  at  the  White  House, 
drafting  of  certain  Presidential  proc- 
lamations, and  replies  to  public  in- 
quiries. 


chief  clerk,  five  other  clerks,  and  some 
part-time  help,  along  with  a  few 
retainers.  The  Secretary  of  State's 
salary  had  been  raised  to  $5,000  per 
year.  In  1818  a  Presidential  order 
authorized  a  staff  that  included  a  chief 
clerk,  seven  other  clerks,  and  a  few 
others.  In  1820  expenditures  for 
domestic  operations  reached  $87,300; 
overseas  operations  totaled  $253,400. 
The  early  overseas  service  of  the 
United  States  was  as  unpretentious  as 


Special 


Thomas  Jefferson,  the  first  Secretary  of 
State,  began  the  distinction  between  the 
Diplomatic  and  Consular  Services.  He  estab- 
lished the  policy  of  neutrality  in  European 
conflicts.  When  he  took  office  in  1790,  the 
Department  included  H  domestic  employees, 
2  diplomatic  missions,  and  10  consular  posts. 

(Department  i)t  .State  phi)ti») 


Treasury  Department 
Building,  Washington,  D.C. 


The  first  home  of  the  Department  of 
State  in  Washington,  D.C,  was  in  the 
"Treasury  Department  Building" 
which  was  shared  with  other  govern- 
ment offices.  It  was  located  to  the  east 
of  the  White  House,  about  where  the 
center  wing  of  the  present  Treasury 
Department  building  stands. 

Completed  in  June  1800,  the  build- 
ing was  a  plain  two-story  structure  of 
brick  on  a  free-stone  foundation,  with 
a  basement  and  a  dormer-windowed 
attic.  There  were  14  rooms  on  the  first 
floor.  14  on  the  second  floor,  and  8  in 
the  attic.  After  approximately  3 
months  in  the  overcrowded  Treasury 
Department  building,  the  Department 
of  State  moved  into  one  of  a  block  of 
houses  on  the  north  side  of  Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue  between  21st  and  22nd 
Streets  Northwest. 


the  domestic  establishment.  Jefferson 
immediately  drew  a  troublesome  dis- 
tinction between  a  diplomatic  service, 
assigned  the  task  of  conducting  politi- 
cal relations  with  foreign  countries, 
and  a  consular  service,  which  dealt 
primarily  with  commercial  matters 
and  the  needs  of  American  citizens 
abroad. 

Benjamin  Franklin  had  become 
the  first  American  Minister  to  serve 
overseas  when,  on  March  23,  1779,  he 
presented  his  credentials  to  King 
Louis  XVI  of  France.  Other  leading 
statesmen  served  as  envoys  during  the 
1780s — among  them  John  Adams  in 
the  Netherlands,  John  Jay  in  Spain, 
and  Thomas  Jefferson  in  France.  By 
1791  diplomatic  missions  had  been 
established  in  five  European  countries 
— England,  Spain,  France,  Holland, 
and  Portugal.  Ministers  concentrated 
mostly  on  two  important  responsi- 
bilities; they  reported  on  significant 
activities  in  their  countries  of  resi- 
dence and  executed  formal  diplomatic 
instructions  transmitted  to  them  from 
the  Department  of  State. 

Thomas  Barclay  of  Pennsylvania 
was  the  first  American  actually  to 
take  up  consular  duties.  He  was  ap- 
pointed consul  in  France  on  October  2, 
1781,  replacing  William  Palfrey  who 
was  lost  at  sea  on  his  way  to  France. 
By  1792,  16  consulates  had  been 
created,  most  of  them  in  Europe.  In 
1790  Secretary  Jefferson  asked  consuls 
to  provide  "such  political  and  com- 
mercial intelligence  as  you  may  think 
interesting  to  the  United  States."  He 
mentioned  particularly  news  of  Ameri- 
can ships  and  also  "information  of  all 
military  preparations  and  other  indi- 
cations of  war  which  may  take  place  in 
your  ports." 

A  congressional  act  of  April  14, 
1792,  first  provided  legislative  pre- 
scriptions for  the  Consular  Service. 
Although  this  law  made  no  specific 
mention  of  commercial  reporting,  con- 
suls provided  commercial  information 
and  met  the  needs  of  American  citizens 
within  their  jurisdictions.  Consuls 
were  expected  to  maintain  themselves 
largely  by  charging  fees  for  their 
services,  not  always  a  bountiful  source 
of  income.  Unlike  their  counterparts 
of  today,  they  did  not  receive  salaries 
or  allowances  for  expenses.  Because  of 
the  uncertainty  of  adequate  compensa- 
tion, consuls  frequently  served  for 


First  American  Consuls 


William  Palfrey  dlepanmentol  state  photol 

William  Palfrey  of  Massachusetts 
not  only  the  first  American  consul; 
officer  but  was  also  the  first  memb 
the  diplomatic  service  to  lose  his  li 
in  the  line  of  duty.  A  lieutenant 
colonel  in  the  Continental  Army  a. 
former  Paymaster-General,  Palfr« 
was  appointed  consul  to  France  oi 
November  4,  1780.  He  was  lost  at 
en  route  to  his  post.  His  name  is  t 
first  on  the  plaque  in  the  lobby  of 
Department  of  State  listing  the 
martyrs  of  the  foreign  service. 

Thomas  Barclay  of  Pennsylva 
a  merchant  residing  in  France,  wf 
the  first  American  consular  officer 
.serve  abroad.  He  was  commissione 
"vice  consul  in  France"  on  July  10 
1781,  and  was  commissioned  as  coi 
on  October  5  to  replace  Palfrey.  Ir 
addition  to  his  consular  duties,  Ba 
served  as  commissioner  to  settle  f( 
eign  debts  of  the  United  States  in 
Europe  and  negotiated  a  treaty  of 
amity  and  commerce  with  Moroecc 
1786.  He  was  appointed  consul  in 
Morocco  in  1791  but  died  in  Lisboi 
1793  before  he  reached  his  post. 


rt»»n^f^ 


^f  c*^*^  C3. 


Special 


s  '.  First  American  Diplomat 


imin  Franklin,  dressed  in  "the  simple  costume  of  an  American  agriculturalist." 
I'ated  Parisian  society  and  laid  the  groundwork  for  French  recognition  of  American 

'Cndence.  I  Ut-panmem  of  State  pholoj 


amin  Franklin  was  no  stranger  to 
imacy  when  he  was  appointed  on 
'  ember  26,  1776,  to  a  three-man 
nission  charged  with  the  critical 
of  gaining  French  support  for 
rican  independence.  He  had  al- 
y  served  in  Great  Britain  as  an 
t  for  Pennsylvania  between  1757 
1762  and  again  from  1764  to 
.  His  scientific  and  literary  en- 
ors  had  made  him  the  most 
nguished  American  of  the  age. 
French  aristocrats  and  intellec- 
5  saw  Franklin  as  the  Enlighten- 
t  personified.  His  picture  soon 
;ared  on  medallions,  rings,  watches, 
snuff'boxes,  while  fashionable 
2s  adopted  the  coiffure  a  la 
nkiin  in  imitation  of  the  fur  cap 
:h  he  wore  instead  of  a  wig.  His 
ilarity  prepared  the  way  for 


France  to  recognize  American  inde- 
pendence and  to  conclude  treaties  of 
alliance  and  commerce  in  1778. 

Franklin  was  appointed  Minister 
to  France  on  September  14.  1778,  and 
presented  his  credentials  on  March  23, 
1779,  becoming  the  first  American 
Minister  to  be  received  by  a  foreign 
government.  His  home  in  Passy  be- 
came the  center  of  American  diplo- 
matic activity  in  Europe.  Franklin 
then  served  with  John  Adams  and 
.John  Jay  on  the  Plenipotentiary 
Commission  that  negotiated  the  peace 
treaty  with  Great  Britain. 

When  Thomas  Jefferson  succeeded 
Franklin  in  1785,  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  Vergennes,  said:  "It  is  you. 
Sir,  who  replace  Dr.  Franklin?" 
Jefferson  replied,  "No  one  can  replace 
him.  Sir  ;  I  am  only  his  successor." 


many  years  in  only  one  location,  and 
they  were  often  inactive.  In  1807  a 
consul  in  La  Guaira,  Venezuela,  was 
relieved  of  his  duties  because  "not  a 
single  communication"  had  been  re- 
ceived from  him  since  his  appoint- 
ment in  1800. 

Besides  working  through  the  reg- 
ular foreign  services.  Presidents  asked 
special  agents  to  carry  on  particularly 
important  negotiations.  The  first  such 
agent  was  Gouverneur  Morris  of  New 
York,  who  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  in  1790  to  arrange  British 
compliance  with  certain  provisions  in 
the  Paris  Peace  Treaty  of  1783.  The 
use  of  special  executive  agents  gave 
the  executive  branch  options  that 
otherwise  might  not  have  existed, 
given  the  small  size  of  the  Diplomatic 
Service. 

Representatives  of  the  United 
States  traditionally  wore  unpreten- 
tious clothing  and  adopted  simple 
manners,  a  departure  from  the  osten- 
tatious practice  at  European  courts. 
(For  a  notable  exception,  see  box  on 
"Consular  Uniforms.")  Americans 
deemed  this  policy  appropriate  for 
emissaries  of  a  young  republic  that 
had  repudiated  monarchical  tyranny. 
Thomas  Jefferson,  the  most  hospitable 
of  men,  was  particularly  opposed  to 
undue  ceremony  and  rigid  protocol. 
He  refused  to  recognize  formal  social 
distinctions  at  dinners  held  in  the 
White  House  during  his  Presidency, 
especially  the  order  of  precedence — 
seating  by  rank.  This  practice  greatly 
annoyed  the  foreign  diplomatic  corps. 

Even  if  the  democratic  ideology  of 
the  new  nation  had  not  imposed  repub- 
lican simplicity,  the  meager  salaries 
paid  to  American  ministers  would 
have  produced  the  same  effect.  In  1817 
President  James  Monroe,  a  former 
Minister  to  France  and  Secretary  of 
State,  complained  to  a  congressional 
committee  about  the  nation's  failure 
to  provide  suflicient  salaries  and  allow- 
ances for  members  of  the  Diplomatic 
Service.  He  insisted  that  an  American 
diplomat  could  accomplish  his  duties 
only  by  gaining  access  to  the  most 
important  social  circles.  "By  taking 
the  proper  [social]  ground  ...  he  will 
become  acquainted  with  all  that  passes 
and  from  the  highest  and  most 
authentic  sources.  .  .  .  Deprive  him  of 
the  necessary  means  to  sustain  this 
ground,  separate  him  from  the  circle 
to  which  he  belongs  and  he  is  reduced 
to  a  cipher."  Congress  did  not  respond 
to  such  importunings;  ministers  ap- 


■  A...  Ar\rn 


Special 


Diplomatic  Dress 

The  United  States  took  exception  to 
the  prevailing  custom  that  obliged 
diplomats  to  wear  elaborate  costumes. 
Secretary  of  State  William  L.  Marcy 
of  New  York,  who  served  during  the 
Administration  of  President  Franklin 
Pierce,  issued  a  dress  circular  order- 
ing American  diplomats  to  wear  "the 
simple  dress  of  an  American  citizen." 
This  term  meant  a  full-dress  suit.  The 
difficulty  was  that  American  repre- 
sentatives could  easily  be  confused 
with  entertainers,  undertakers,  or 
servants.  James  Buchanan,  Minister 
to  Great  Britain,  avoided  this  problem 
by  requesting  that  the  Department 
allow  him  to  wear  "a  very  plain  and 
black-hilted  dress  sword"  when  he 
appeared  at  court. 

During  the  Civil  War,  Charles 
Francis  Adams  reverted  to  a  costume 
that  included  breeches,  buckles,  and 
silk  stockings.  Queen  Victoria  is  said 
to  have  i-emarked,  "I  am  thankful  we 
shall  have  no  more  American  fu- 
nerals." In  1937  President  Franklin  D. 
Roosevelt  issued  an  Executive  order 
that  provided :  "No  person  in  the 
diplomatic  service  shall  wear  any  uni- 
form or  official  costume  not  previously 
authorized  by  Congress." 


pointed  to  the  most  important  posts, 
such  as  those  in  London  and  Paris, 
were  regularly  forced  to  draw  upon 
private  means.  This  circumstance 
sometimes  had  the  unfortunate  effect 
of  foreclosing  diplomatic  service  to 
people  without  personal  fortunes. 
At  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Department's  history,  certain  person- 
nel practices  were  adopted  that 
adversely  affected  American  foreign 
relations  for  many  years.  Little  or  no 
interchange  took  place  between  those 
serving  at  home  and  those  in  overseas 
posts.  Moreover,  no  provision  was  made 
to  encourage  transfers  between  the 
Diplomatic  Service  and  the  Consular 


Service.  These  circumstances  limited 
flexibility  and  interfered  with  the 
development  of  professionalism;  the 
basis  for  a  professional  career  in  the 
foreign  service  was  not  built  until  the 
20th  century.  This  situation  reflected 
the  general  suspicion  of  all  things  for- 
eign that  characterized  the  early 
history  of  the  United  States.  It  also 
mirrored  the  declining  importance 
attributed  to  foreign  affairs  after  the 
War  of  1812.  Thereafter  most  Ameri- 
cans concentrated  on  the  domestic 
activities  of  their  government  rather 
than  on  foreign  operations. 

The  early  Department  of  State  and 
its  foreign  missions  were  chronically 
overworked,  and  so  was  the  Secretary 
of  State.  John  Quincy  Adams,  one  of 
the  most  conscientious  of  men,  com- 
plained of  excessive  responsibilities 
shortly  after  assuming  his  duties  as 
Secretary  in  1817.  "Business  crowds 
upon  me  from  day  to  day  requiring 
instantaneous  attention,"  he  wrote  to 
his  wife  Louisa,  "in  such  variety  that 
unless  everything  is  disposed  of  just 
as  it  occurs,  it  escapes  from  the 
memory  and  runs  into  the  account  of 
arrears."  Despite  the  great  prestige  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  in  the  early 
days  of  the  nation.  Congress  remained 
extraordinarily  penurious  when  allo- 
cating funds  to  conduct  foreign  rela- 
tions, a  condition  that  endured 
throughout  the  19th  century. 

Only  the  most  strenuous  exertions 
of  those  who  served  in  the  Department 
or  in  the  overseas  missions  insured 
proper  attention  to  the  business  at 
hand.  The  unusual  abilities  of  the  early 
Secretaries  of  State  helped  to  counter 
financial  stress  and  to  reinforce  the 
prestige  of  the  Department.  John 
Quincy  Adams  summarized  this  cir- 
cumstance. Because  of  "the  superior 
real  and  inherent  importance  of  the 
Department  of  State  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  this  Government,  and  . .  .  the 
successive  transfer  of  two  Secretaries 
of  State  to  the  Presidency  [Madison 
and  Monroe],  a  general  impression  has 
pervaded  the  Union  of  a  higher  con- 
sideration due  to  that  Department, 
and  that  in  the  practice  of  the  Gov- 
ernment it  is  the  natural  introduction 
to  the  head  of  the  Executive." 

Despite  important  constraints  on 
the  Department  of  State,  the  United 
States  achieved  a  remarkable  number 
of  triumphs  in  foreign  affairs  during 
the  early  years.  During  the  1790s  the 
Jay  treaty  (1794)  and  the  Pinckney 
treaty  (1795)  regularized  relations 


Consular  Uniforms 

The  early  19th  century  American 
consul  was  a  dashing  fellow  in  go 
trimmed  uniform  with  cocked  hat 
a  sword.  This  was  on  ceremonial 
occasions  when,  it  is  just  possible 
liked  to  forget  that  he  received  n( 
allowances  for  "house  or  office  rei 
books,  stationery,  or  other  ordina 
expenses  of  office." 

A  42-page  booklet.  General 
Instructions  to  the  Consuls  and  C 
mercial  Agents  cf  the  Uvited  Sta 
1838  notes  that:  "The  Consular  u 
form  (as  prescribed  by  the  circul 
from  this  department,  dated  Aug 
1815,  hereto  annexed)  must  be  W( 
on  all  visits  of  ceremony  to  the  au 
ities  of  the  place,  and  on  all  prope 
occasions." 

The  uniform  was  described  a. 
follows : 

"Single  breast  coat  of  blue  cl 
with  standing  cape  or  collar,  and 
navy  buttons  in  front;  one  button 
each  side  of  the  cape;  four  on  eac 
cuff;  four  under  each  pocket  flap ; 
one  on  each  hip  and  in  the  folds ; 
on  each  side  in  the  centre;  and  on 
each  side  of  the  same,  at  the  lowe 
extremity  of  the  skirts. 

"The  font,  (from  the  cape  dc 
to  the  lower  extremity  of  the  skir 
cuffs,  cape,  and  pocket  flaps,  to  en 
broidered  in  gold,  representing  a 
composed  of  olive  leaves,  and  the 
button-holes  to  be  worked  with  gi 
thread ;  the  button-holes  to  corre? 
with  the  width  of  the  embroidery 
which  is  not  to  exceed  two  inches 
any  part. 

"Vest  and  small  clothes  of  wl 
and  navy  buttons ;  the  former  to  \ 
ten  in  front,  and  four  under  each 
pocket  flap.  With  this  dress,  a  cocl 
hat,  small  sword,  and  shoes  and 
buckles  are  to  be  worn.  The  hat  to 
furnished  with  gold  loop,  gold  tas: 
and  black  cockade,  with  gold  eagU 
the  centre;  added  to  which,  it  is  t( 
understood  that  the  mountings  of 
sword,  and  shoe  and  knee  buckles, 
to  be  gold  ;  otherwise  gilt." 


S6 


Department  of  State  Bi 


Special 


Burning  of  Washington, 
1814 

The  home  of  the  Department  of  State 
after  1801  was  known  merely  as  "the 
public  building  west  of  the  President's 
house"  and  stood  on  the  present  site 
of  the  Old  Executive  Office  Building 
at  17th  Street  and  Pennsylvania  Ave- 
nue, N.W.  When  British  forces  invaded 
Washington  on  August  24,  1814.  this 
building  was  burned,  along  with  the 
Capitol  and  the  White  House.  While 
the  Department's  library  was  lost. 
Chief  Clerk  John  Graham  had  already 
seen  to  the  removal  of  many  important 
records,  including  the  originals  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  and  the 
Constitution.  They  were  stored  in  a 
deserted  gristmill  on  the  Virginia  side 
of  the  Potomac  River,  2  miles  above 
Georgetown,  and  were  later  moved  to 
Leesburg,  Virginia,  until  after  the 
emergency. 


1  James  .Monroe  and  Robert  R.  Livingston  negotiated  the  purchase  of  the  Louisiana 
or>  from  France  in  1803,  they  made  the  greatest  real  estate  bargain  of  all  time  and  set  a 
•dent  for  the  acquisition  of  land.  For  $15  million,  the  United  States  gained  828,000 

re  miles,  thus  doubling  its  size.  (Library  of  Congress  photo) 


John  Quincy  Adams  became  the  youngest 
American  Chief  of  Mission  when  he  was  ap- 
pointed Minister  to  the  Netherlands  in  1794, 
at  the  age  of  27.  As  Secretary  of  State  (1817- 
25),  he  negotiated  a  boundary  settlement 
with  Great  Britain,  acquired  Florida  from 
Spain,  and  helped  formulate  the  Monroe 

Doctrine.  (Library  of  Congress  pholo) 


on,  -IQO-1 


S7 


Special 


with  England  and  Spain.  The  purchase 
of  Louisiana  in  1803  during  President 
Jefferson's  first  Administration  guar- 
anteed eventual  control  of  the  North 
American  Continent  between  Canada 
and  Mexico.  Extreme  dangers  to  the 
nation  materialized  during  the  War  of 
1812,  but  they  were  surmounted  dur- 
ing the  Administration  of  President 
Madison.  And  finally  President 
Monroe's  Administration  arranged  the 
Adams-Onis  treaty  with  Spain  (1819), 
which  added  Florida  to  the  national 
domain  and  settled  the  boundary  with 
Mexico  on  most  advantageous  terms. 

However  impressive,  these  accom- 
plishments were  not  equal  in  impor- 
tance to  the  formation  of  a  general 
foreign  policy  for  the  United  States 
that  was  to  endure  for  over  a  hundred 
years :  the  idea  that  the  United  States 
should  observe  political  isolation  from 
European  powers  during  time  of  peace 
and  maintain  strict  neutrality  during 
periods  of  warfare  in  Europe.  Franklin 
anticipated  this  posture  when  he  ob- 
served that  "a  virgin  state  should 
preserve  its  virgin  character  and  not  go 
suitoring  for  alliances,  but  wait  with 
decent  dignity  for  the  application  of 
others."  In  1796  President  Washington 
expressed  this  general  outlook  in 
classic  form,  arguing  in  his  Farewell 
Address :  "The  great  rule  of  conduct 
for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is 
...  to  have  with  them  as  little  political 
[as  distinct  from  commercial]  connec- 
tion as  possible."  Europe,  he  continued, 
had  its  own  set  of  interests,  and  these 
interests  were  very  different  from 
those  of  the  United  States.  Fortu- 
nately, the  state  of  international  rela- 
tions tended  to  confer  freedom  of 
action  upon  the  nation.  "Why  forego 
the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situa- 
tion? Why,  by  interweaving  our  des- 
tiny with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe, 
entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in 
the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rival- 
ship,  interest,  humor,  or  caprice?" 
Therefore,  concluded  Washington,  "it 
is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of 
permanent  alliances  with  any  portion 
of  the  foreign  world,  so  far,  I  mean, 


as  we  are  now  at  liberty  to  do  it." 
Thomas  Jefferson,  although  of  very 
different  political  views  from  Wash- 
ington, confirmed  the  national  con- 
sensus on  the  virtues  of  isolation  and 
neutrality,  restating  the  principle 
cogently  in  his  First  Inaugural  Ad- 
dress (1801)  :  ".  .  .  peace,  commerce 
and  honest  friendship  with  all  nations, 
entangling  alliances  with  none." 
If  it  was  appropriate  for  the 
United  States  to  avoid  intervention  in 
European  affairs,  it  seemed  equally 
logical  that  Europe  should  desist  from 
further  interference  in  the  affairs  of 
the  Americas.  Secretary  of  State  John 
Quincy  Adams  enunciated  this  prin- 


ciple in  1823.  He  was  the  real  auth; 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  stat 
simply:  "We  could  not  view  any  ini 
position  for  oppressing  [the  natior 
of  Latin  America],  or  controlling  i 
any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by 
any  European  power  in  any  other  1 
than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  un 
friendly  disposition  toward  the  Un 
States."  Although  the  young  count 
lacked  the  means  to  enforce  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  other  power: 
did  not  fully  accept  it  for  many  yes 
to  come,  its  presentation  in  1823 
marked  the  completion  of  the  proje 
that  had  begun  in  1775 — ^the  inde- 
pendence of  the  United  States. 


The  Monroe  Doctrine  extended  the  principles  of  neutrality  and  independence  from  Eui 
conflicts  to  the  entire  Western  Hemisphere.  (Library  of  Congress  photoi 


<;ft 


nr»m<-tn*    ^f    Ctiti-.    Di 


Special 


The  Expansionist  Years,  1823-1867 


During  the  44  years  between  the  birth 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  (1823)  and 
the  purchase  of  Alaska  from  Russia 
(1867 ) ,  the  Americans  devoted  their 
national  energies  to  extending  their 
dominion  across  North  America  and  to 
building  a  diversified  economy.  They 
were  permitted  to  concentrate  on  these 
endeavors  because  no  serious  external 
threats  arose  except  during  the  Civil 
War  (1861-65).  A  stable  balance  of 
power  materialized  in  Europe  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  the 
maintenance  of  which  deterred  possi- 
ble aggressors  from  interventions  in 
the  New  World.  Any  nation  that  at- 
tempted to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of 
the  Americas  would  have  exposed  itself 
to  considerable  difficulty  on  the  eastern 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  Therefore,  the 
United  States  enjoyed  a  long  period  of 
"free  security,"  that  is,  an  extended 
moratorium  on  serious  external  chal- 
lenges like  those  that  had  menaced  it 
before  1815. 

It  was  now  possible  for  the  am- 
bitious republic  to  practice  a  liberal 
form  of  nationalism,  one  that  stressed 
good  will  toward  other  nations  and 
emphasized  internal  development 
rather  than  active  foreign  policies. 
John  Quincy  Adams  set  the  tone  for 
nearly  a  century  of  foreign  policy  on 
July  4,  1821,  when,  speaking  of  his 
beloved  country,  he  said:  "Wherever 
the  standard  of  freedom  has  been  or 
shall  be  unfurled,  there  will  her  heart, 
her  benedictions,  and  her  prayers  be. 
But  she  does  not  go  abroad  in  search 
of  monsters  to  destroy."  The  republic 
would  influence  the  world  by  offering 
an  example  rather  than  by  exercising 
force.  Americans  would  be  "well- 
wishers  to  the  freedom  and  independ- 
ence of  all" ;  their  government  would 
be  "champion  and  vindicator  only  of 
her  own." 


These  sentiments  prevailed  in  the 
United  States  throughout  the  19th 
century.  In  1850,  for  example.  Presi- 
dent Millard  Fillmore  restated  the 
fundamental  premise  of  liberal  nation- 
alism when  he  insisted  that  the 
United  States  must  grant  to  others 
what  it  deemed  imperative  for  itself — 
the  right  to  establish  "that  form  of 
government  which  it  may  deem  most 
conducive  to  the  happiness  and  pros- 
perity of  its  own  citizens."  This  prin- 
ciple meant  that  "it  becomes  an  im- 
perative duty  not  to  interfere  in  the 
government  or  internal  policy  of  other 
nations."  Although  Americans  might 
"sympathize  with  the  unfortunate  or 
the  oppressed  everywhere  in  their  fight 
for  freedom,  our  principles  forbid  us 
from  taking  any  part  in  such  foreign 
contests." 

The  shift  toward  domestic  con- 
cerns and  the  practice  of  liberal 
nationalism  slowed  the  growth  of  the 
Department  of  State  throughout  the 
19th  century.  Secretaries  of  State 
after  1823  dedicated  themselves  more 
to  preserving  than  expanding  the 
influence  of  the  Department.  Presi- 
dents paid  more  attention  to  the 
Treasury  or  the  War  Department  than 
to  the  guardians  of  foreign  relations. 

The  low  priority  attached  to  for- 
eign relations  resulted  in  a  tendency 
to  depreciate  diplomacy  and  its  practi- 
tioners. Secretary  of  State  Edward 
Livingston  sorrowfully  summarized 
this  attitude  as  early  as  1833.  Ameri- 
cans thought  of  their  ministers  as 
privileged  characters  "selected  to  en- 
joy the  pleasures  of  foreign  travel  at 
the  expense  of  the  people ;  their  places 
as  sinecures;  and  their  residence 
abroad  as  a  continued  scene  of  luxuri- 
ous enjoyment."  Congress  frequently 
adopted  parallel  views.  In  1844  the 
House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
proposed  to  assign  ministers  to  a  cir- 
cuit of  legations,  for  example,  a  minis- 
ter resident  to  serve  Bolivia,  Chile, 
and  Peru.  In  1859  Representative 
Benjamin  W.  Stanton  of  Ohio  said  that 
he  knew  of  "no  area  of  the  public 


. .  ^/^n^ 


Special 


A  Most  Undiplomatic  Diplomat 


Pierre  Soule  of  Louisiana,  a  natural- 
ized citizen  of  French  extraction,  was 
sent  to  Spain  as  the  American  Min- 
ister in  1853.  The  principal  issue  in 
U.S.-Spanish  relations  at  the  time  was 
the  future  of  Cuba.  Soule  sympathized 
strongly  with  those  who  wished  to 
annex  Cuba,  a  course  of  action  that 
would  provide  territory  in  which 
slavery  could  prosper.  Before  Soule 
went  to  Spain,  he  made  a  strong  pro- 
annexationist  speech  in  New  York,  a 
serious  diplomatic  indiscretion  that 
prejudiced  his  mission  before  it  had 
begun.  To  add  insult  to  injury,  upon 
his  arrival  in  Spain,  he  made  an 
impertinent  speech  to  the  throne.  The 
Spanish  Government  requested  its 
revision  before  accepting  it. 

Soule  further  compromised  his 
mission  when,  to  avenge  an  alleged 


insult  to  his  wife,  he  fought  a  duel 
with  the  French  envoy  in  Madrid,  the 
Marquis  de  Turgot.  A  bullet  from 
Soule's  weapon  lamed  the  Marquis 
for  life. 

When  Spanish  authorities  seized 
an  American  steamer,  the  Black 
Warrior,  in  Cuban  waters,  Soule 
immediately  demanded  that  Spain  pay 
an  indemnity  of  $.300,000  and  dismiss 
the  responsible  officials  within  48 
hours.  The  Spanish  Government  re- 
buffed these  demands,  choosing  to  deal 
with  the  ship's  owners  rather  than 
the  U.S.  Government. 

Soule's  most  famous  diplomatic 
enterprise  was  the  drafting  of  the 
Ostend  Manifesto.  This  document 
stemmed  from  Soule's  meeting  with 
the  American  Ministers  to  Britain 
and  France  in  October  1854.  Soule's 
despatch  to  Secretary  of  State  William 
L.  Marcy  recommended  an  attempt  to 
purchase  Cuba  from  Spain  for  up  to 
$120  million.  What  if  Spain  refused 
to  sell?  "Then,"  the  message  stated, 
"by  every  law,  human  and  divine,  we 
shall  be  justified  in  wresting  it  from 
Spain  if  we  possess  the  power." 

When  this  bellicose  message  was 
made  public,  it  aroused  great  criticism 
in  Europe  and  the  United  States. 
Opponents  of  slavery  unequivocally 
opposed  acquiring  Cuba  under  any 
circumstances.  Marcy  then  rejected 
Soule's  message  and  instructed  him  to 
continue  negotiations  for  the  purchase 
of  Cuba.  Soule,  correctly  assuming 
that  his  usefulness  in  Spain  was  at  an 
end,  submitted  his  resignation,  bring- 
ing to  an  end  one  of  the  stormiest 
diplomatic  tours  in  the  annals  of  the 
Department  of  State. 


service  that  is  more  emphatically  use- 
less than  the  diplomatic  service — 
none  in  the  world." 

The  practice  of  the  "spoils  sys- 
tem"— the  award  of  government 
appointments  in  return  for  political 
support — reinforced  the  proclivity  to 
undervalue  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  foreign  services.  President 
Andrew  Jackson  believed  that  "the 
duties  of  public  officers  are  ...  so 
plain  and  simple  that  men  of  intelli- 
gence may  readily  qualify  themselves 


for  their  performance.  .  .  .  More  is  lost 
by  the  long  continuance  of  men  in 
office  than  is  generally  to  be  gained  by 
their  experience."  This  view  helped  to 
perpetuate  amateurism  in  all  aspects 
of  government.  The  egalitarian  cele- 
bration of  the  common  man  some- 
times worked  against  efforts  to  im- 
prove the  quality  and  status  of  those 
who  conducted  foreign  relations. 


The  growth  of  the  Departmer 
and  its  overseas  missions  during  tl 
years  from  1830  to  1860  roughly 
paralleled  the  increase  of  the  genei 
population.  The  Department  of  St; 
which  moved  to  the  District  of  Col 
bia  in  1800,  was  housed  from  1819 
1866  in  the  Northeast  Executive 
Building  located  near  the  White  H 
on  Pennsylvania  Avenue.  Only  fou 
regular  clerks  were  added  to  the  D 
partment  between  1818  and  1845  t' 
cope  with  an  expanded  workload.  I 
1856  the  Department  consisted  of  : 
officers  and  27  supporting  personm 
and  in  1860  the  foreign  services  en 
ployed  only  281  people.  Congress  d 
not  authorize  the  appointment  of  a 
assistant  secretary  of  state  until  1 
A  second  assistant  secretary  was  p 
mitted  in  1866.  The  strains  of  offid 
including  domestic  political  critici 
imposed  great  burdens  on  most  Sei 
taries  of  State.  One  of  them,  John 
Clayton  of  Delaware,  who  served 
President  Zachary  Taylor  in  1849- 
noted  the  consequences.  "The  situs 
I  have  filled  was  .  .  .  more  difficult, 
more  thorny  and  more  liable  to  mi; 
representation  and  calumny  than  a 
other  in  the  world,  as  I  verily  belie 

The  difficulties  of  those  who  ci 
ducted  the  nation's  foreign  relatio 
led  one  of  President  Jackson's  Seci 
taries  of  State,  Louis  McLane  of 
Delaware,  to  undertake  the  first  g{ 
eral  reorganization  of  the  Departn 
since  1789.  In  1833  McLane  conver 
the  Chief  Clerk  into  an  administra 
with  broad  responsibilities  for  the 
everyday  direction  of  the  Departm 
He  also  set  up  a  bureau  system  to 
permit  orderly  discharge  of  busine 
Seven  such  units  were  established, 
which  the  two  most  important  wer 
the  Diplomatic  Bureau  and  the  Cor 
ar  Bureau.  In  the  Diplomatic  Bure 
three  clerks  managed  corresponder 
with  the  overseas  missions.  One  to( 
responsibility  for  England,  France 
Russia,  and  the  Netherlands.  Anotl 
dealt  with  the  rest  of  Europe,  the 
Mediterranean,  Asia,  and  Africa.  / 
third  communicated  with  the  Amei 
cas.  The  five  other  bureaus  covered 
domestic  affairs — translation;  ar- 
chives, laws,  and  commissions;  par 
dons,  remissions,  copyrights,  and 
library;  disbursing;  and  superin- 
tending. 

The  number  of  overseas  missi( 
increased  from  15  in  1830  to  33  in 
1860.  Most  were  located  in  Europe 
Latin  America,  although  the  begin 


ncinortmont  nf  Qtato  Rl 


t)  i  U.S.  Passport 


ices  G.  Knight  was  Director  of  the  Passport  Office  from  1955  to  1977.  (Department  of  state  photo 


term  "passport"  derives  from  the 
nch  words  passer,  to  enter  or  leave, 
port,  a  port.  It  literally  means  a 
nit  to  leave  a  country.  Issuance  of 
iports  and  travel  documents  was 
mentioned  as  a  function  of  the 
artment  of  Foreign  Affairs  in 
I.  The  Department  of  State  did  not 
ive  exclusive  authority  to  issue 
;ports  until  1856.  Prior  to  that 
!,  governors,  mayors,  and  even 
tries  public  were  known  to  issue 
sports.  During  the  19th  century, 
U.S.  Government  only  required 
'elers  to  obtain  passports  in  war- 
e.  They  would  not  be  required  of 
ravelers  until  1914. 


The  earliest  surviving  U.S.  pass- 
port was  issued  in  France  by  Benja- 
min Franklin,  Arthur  Lee,  and  John 
Adams  to  W.  D.  Cheevert,  David 
Sears,  and  their  servants  on  Decem- 
ber 27,  1778,  for  travel  to  Holland. 
During  the  1790s  many  passports 
were  issued  collectively  to  merchant 
ships  and  their  crews. 

An  interesting  variation  of  this 
type  was  issued  in  1796  to  ships  bound 
for  the  Mediterranean.  The  top  por- 
tion was  detachable  in  a  scalloped 
pattern  and  was  forwarded  to  Algiers 
for  distribution  to  Algerian  captains. 
If  an  American  ship  was  stopped,  its 
captain  was  supposed  to  produce  the 


lower  section  of  the  passport  and 
match  it  with  the  upper  section.  The 
ship  would  then  be  allowed  to  proceed. 

The  passport  function  is  the 
activity  of  the  Department  that  the 
general  public  is  most  likely  to  en- 
counter. There  are  passport  agencies 
in  Washington  and  13  other  major 
cities  employing  649  persons.  During 
fiscal  year  1980,  3,045,041  passports 
were  issued,  and  over  14.6  million 
valid  passports  are  in  circulation 
today. 


Special 


Marine  Security  Guards 

During  the  19th  century,  the  U.S. 
Navy  was  frequently  called  upon  to 
protect  American  lives  and  property 
in  remote  parts  of  the  world.  Marine 
detachments  usually  took  part  in  these 
operations  and  on  occasion  were 
expected  to  protect  diplomatic  mis- 
sions. The  first  such  instance  took 
place  in  1835,  when  four  Marines  from 
the  U.S.S.  Brandywine  were  assigned 
to  protect  the  Consulate  in  Lima,  Peru. 
The  next  year,  one  Marine  was  de- 
tailed to  this  task.  Legation  guard 
detachments  were  stationed  at  various 
times  in  Tokyo,  Seoul,  and  Managua. 
A  Marine  detachment  helped  defend 
the  Legation  in  Peking  during  the 
Boxer  Rebellion,  and  a  Legation  Guard 
remained  in  China  until  World  War  IL 

Civilian  guards  were  unable  to 
maintain  adequate  security  at  overseas 
missions,  and  the  Department  accord- 
ingly turned  to  the  Armed  Forces.  The 
Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary 


of  the  Navy  signed  a  memorandum  of 
agreement  on  December  15,  1948, 
which  established  the  present  Marine 
Security  Guard  program.  The  first 
detachments  left  for  Bangkok  and 
Tangier  on  January  2,  1949.  Today 
1,112  Marines  are  assigned  to  119 
Foreign  Service  posts  throughout  the 
world.  Their  mission  is  the  mainten- 
ance of  internal  security.  In  an  emer- 
gency, their  basic  task  is  to  gain  time 
for  personnel  to  reach  safety  and  for 
the  host  government  to  fulfill  its 
obligations  to  protect  diplomatic 
missions. 

Five  Marine  Security  Guards 
have  been  killed  in  the  line  of  duty. 
The  most  recent  fatality  was  Corporal 
Steven  Crowley,  who  lost  his  life  in 
the  attack  on  the  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Islamabad  on  November  21,  1979. 
Nine  other  Marines  are  among  the 
hostages  in  Tehran. 


'Ibwn.send  Harris  was  the  first  .American 
diplomat  to  be  stationed  in  Japan.  .As  Consul 
(General  at  Shimoda.  he  neKotiated  a  com- 
mercial treaty  opening  Japanese  ports  to 
American  trade.  He  then  served  as  Minister 
Resident  (lS5iMJ2).  il.ibrao  uf  (■.iii),Ti>».s  phDU.) 


nings  of  American  interest  in  the 
Pacific  Ocean  and  East  Asia  led  to 
modest  representation  there.  Ministers 
were  sent  to  China  in  1843  and  Japan 
in  1859,  and  a  resident  commission 
was  stationed  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
in  1843. 

By  1860,  45  people  held  appoint- 
ments in  the  Diplomatic  Service,  a 
remarkably  small  number  for  33  mis- 
sions. Their  maintenance  cost  the 
United  States  about  $370,000,  an  in- 
crease from  about  $200,000  in  1833. 
Total  expenditures  overseas  rose  from 
$294,000  in  1830  to  $1.1  million  in 
1860.  Some  ministers  supplemented 
their  staffs  by  appointing  "unpaid 
attaches,"  usually  young  men  of  pri- 
vate means  who  performed  certain 
duties  in  return  for  admission  into 
local  society  and  opportunities  for 
personal  study  and  travel. 

Similar  growth  occurred  in  the 
Consular  Service.  The  number  of  posts 
increased  from  141  in  1830  to  282  in 
1860,  reflecting  the  considerable  ex- 
pansion of  foreign  trade  from  1840  to 
1860.  Consular  functions  enlarged,  but 
hardships  bedeviled  life  in  the  service. 
The  American  consul  at  Genoa  during 
the  1840s,  C.  Edwards  Lester,  sum- 
marized the  situation  :  "An  American 
consul  is  often  a  foreigner,  almost 


The  Hiiisemann-Webster 
Exchange 

In  1850  the  Austrian  charge  in  Wai 
ington,  the  Chevalier  Hulsemann, ' 
strenuously  objected  to  supposed 
American  interference  in  the  dome 
affairs  of  Hungary,  communicated 
insulting  message  to  the  Departmc 
of  State.  His  Government,  he  state 
had  "deemed  it  proper  to  preserve 
conciliatory  deportment  making  ar 
allowance  for  the  ignorance  of  the 
Cabinet  of  Washington  on  the  sub; 
of  Hungarian  affairs  and  its  dispo! 
tion  to  give  credence  to  the  mendac 
rumors  which  are  propagated  by  til 
American  press." 

To  this  statement  Secretary  o 
State  Daniel  Webster  replied  in  ki 
"Nothing  will  deter  either  the  Gov 
ment  or  the  people  of  the  United 
States  from  .  .  .  forming  and  expre 
ing  their  own  opinions  freely  and  ; 
all  times  upon  the  great  political 
events  which  may  transpire  among 
the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth. 
Their  own  institutions  stand  upon 
the  broadest  principles  of  civil  libt 
and  believing  those  principles  . .  .  1 
be  ...  in  fact  the  only  principles  ol 
government  which  meet  the  demai 
of  the  present  enlightened  age — tY 
President  has  perceived  v/ith  grea 
satisfaction  that  in  the  constitutio 
recently  introduced  into  the  Austr 
Empire  many  of  these  great  princ 
are  recognized  and  applied." 


always  a  merchant,  can't  live  on  hi 
fees,  nor  even  pay  the  necessary  e> 
penses  of  his  office;  [he]  is  scolded 
cursed  by  everybody  that  has  anytl 
to  do  with  him,  and  is  expected  to 
entertain  his  countrymen,  not  only 
with  hospitality  but  with  a  consid- 
erable degree  of  luxury." 

However  trying,  Genoa  was  si 
a  more  desirable  post  than  the  Bra 
ian  port  of  Pernambuco,  now  callet 
Recife.  In  1858  Consul  Walter  Staj 
reported  from  Pernambuco  that  on 
his  predecessors  had  resigned  befo 
taking  up  his  office  because  he  had 


r\Ar\'^rimnr>i   .-.4    Otot^..   Diil 


;il  'b  Cushing,  American  commissioner  to 
la,  negotiated  the  TVeaty  of  Wang-hsia  in 
,  gaining  most-favored-nation  commer- 
privileges  and  extraterritoriality  for 

'ricanS  in  China.  (Librao-  of  Congress  pholo) 


;ived  "such  mournful  accounts  of 
place  as  to  disgust  him  in  advance 
is  arrival."  Moreover,  he  continued, 
ur  others  have  left  their  bones  to 
e  in  these  fearfully  hot  sands,  with- 
a  slab  of  stone  or  a  stick  of  wood 
)oint  the  stranger  to  their  graves." 
Beset  by  difficult  climates  and  low 
iries,  consuls  rarely  received  much 
istance  from  their  government.  In 
3  Secretary  Edward  Livingston 
ed  that  officials  in  the  domestic 
vice  of  the  nation  were  "surrounded 
h  the  means  of  obtaining  informa- 
1  and  advice"  but  that  "abroad,  an 
er  is  entrusted  with  the  most 
jortant  function,  out  of  the  reach 
control  or  advice,  and  is  left  with, 
nparatively  speaking,  no  written 
es  for  his  guidance."  A  few  consuls 
)arently  succumbed  to  temptation, 
auditor  reported  in  1861  that  the 
isul  in  Liverpool  had  not  reported 
jenditures  of  public  money  for  3 
irs,  "contracting  public  and  private 
Dts,  which  .  . .  probably  exceed 
)0,000.  It  is  perhaps  some  consola- 
n  to  know  that  this  plunderer  no 
B  iger  disgraces  the  Government 
«i|road." 

Congress  delayed  action  to  im- 
3ve  the  situation  of  American  rep- 
sentatives  abroad  until  1856,  when 
enacted  a  reform  of  the  Diplomatic 
d  Consular  Services.  The  law  con- 


A  1 9th  Century  View 

"Consul,  n.  In  American  politics,  a 
person  who  having  failed  to  secure  an 
office  from  the  people  is  given  one  by 
the  Administration  on  condition  that 
he  leave  the  country." 

Ambrose  Bierce 

The  Devil's  Dictionary 


centrated  on  the  most  publicized  prob- 
lem— inadequate  compensation.  It 
prescribed  salaries  for  ministers  that 
ranged  from  $17,500  per  year  for 
London  and  Paris  to  $10,000  per  year 
for  most  other  places.  (The  ceiling  of 
$17,500  for  heads  of  mission  endured 
90  years,  until  1946.)  In  addition, 
consuls  were  given  regular  salaries. 
Fees  collected  at  consulates  were 
henceforth  to  be  sent  to  the  Treasury. 
Written  regulations  were  developed  to 
improve  the  performance  of  the  for- 
eign services. 

The  act  of  1856  represented  a 
step  forward,  but  it  fell  short  of 
providing  for  truly  professional  for- 
eign services.  Most  ministers  and 
consuls  gained  appointment  because  of 
personal  wealth,  political  services,  or 
social  position.  Many  lacked  qualifica- 
tions— even  the  most  elementary 
knowledge  of  diplomatic  etiquette.  For 
example,  John  Randolph  of  Virginia, 
when  presenting  his  credentials  at 
St.  Petersburg,  said  to  the  Czar, 
"Howya,  Emperor?  And  how's  the 
madam?"  One  of  the  few  talented 
diplomats  of  the  era  who  made  a  career 
in  the  foreign  service,  Henry  Wheaton, 
argued  in  vain  for  a  professional 
service  that  recognized  merit  and 
granted  tenure  to  the  deserving.  Those 
with  necessary  qualifications — linguis- 
tic skill,  awareness  of  diplomatic 
forms,  and  appropriate  experience — 
.should,  he  thought,  "be  employed 
where  they  can  do  most  service,  while 
incapable  men  should  be  turned  out 
without  fear  or  partiality.  Those  who 
have  served  the  country  faithfully  and 
well  ought  to  be  encouraged  and  trans- 
ferred from  one  court  to  another, 
which  is  the  only  advancement  that 
our  system  permits  of."  Wheaton 
joined  others  in  complaints  about  in- 
adequate compensation. 


Special 


Despite  the  U.S.  failure  to  create 
professional  foreign  services,  many 
were  the  accomplishments  of  the  ex- 
panding nation  in  foreign  affairs,  and 
the  Department  of  State  made  signifi- 
cant contributions  in  almost  every 
instance.  One  striking  achievement  of 
the  period  was  the  successful  resolu- 
tion of  many  disagreements  with  the 
one  nation — Great  Britain — that 
might  have  threatened  the  security  of 
the  United  States.  Peaceful  settle- 
ments regularly  resolved  Anglo- 
American  controversies  over  bound- 
aries, fisheries,  and  trade,  notably 
through  the  so-called  friendly  conven- 
tions of  1817-18,  the  Webster-Ash- 
burton  treaty  of  1842,  the  Oregon 
treaty  of  1846,  and  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  of  1850.  Of  comparable 
importance  were  successful  negotia- 
tions that  furthered  the  march  of  the 
United  States  across  the  continent, 
especially  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo  that  ended  the  Mexican  war 
with  the  annexation  of  New  Mexico 
and  California  in  1848  and  the  pur- 
chase of  Alaska  from  Russia  in  1867. 
In  all  these  situations,  the  United 
States  took  advantage  of  favorable 
bargaining  positions.  Despite  the 
handicap  of  amateur  diplomacy,  no 


Nicholas  TVist,  Chief  Clerk  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  followed  General  Winfield 
Scott's  army  to  Mexico  City  Ignoring  an 
order  recalling  him  to  the  United  States, 
TVist  negotiated  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo  with  Mexico  in  1848,  extending 
American  territory  to  the  southwest  from 
the  Nueces  River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

(Library  of  Congress  photo) 


ei9 


Special 


Seward's  Abortive 
Intiative 

At  the  beginning  of  President  Lincoln's 
Administration  in  April  1861,  the  new 
Secretarj'  of  State,  William  H.  Seward  of 
New  York,  proposed  to  end  domestic 
political  strife  over  the  all-consuming 
question  of  slavery  by  pursuing  an  active 
foreign  policy,  one  that  might  lead  to  dec- 
larations of  war  against  France  or  Spain, 
thus  uniting  domestic  factions  against  a 
foreign  threat.  Seward  even  volunteered 
himself  as  the  principal  prosecutor  of 
such  a  policy  The  President  tactfully  re- 
buffed this  extraordinary  proposal. 
Thereafter,  Seward,  whom  Henry  Adams 
described  as  having  "a  head  like  a  wise 
macaw;  a  beaked  nose;  shaggy  eyebrow^s; 
unorderly  hair  and  clothes;  hoarse  voice; 
off-hand  manner-free  talk;  and  perpetual 
cigar,"  subordinated  himself  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  served  him  loyally  and  effec- 
tively. 


serious  setbacks  marred  the  nation's 
foreign  affairs  between  1823  and  1867. 

The  most  dangerous  challenge  to 
the  nation's  security  during  the  19th 
century  occurred  during  the  Civil  War. 
That  tragic  struggle  between  the 
Union  and  the  Confederacy  created 
excellent  opportunities  for  European 
nations  to  meddle  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  either  by  violating  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  or  by  extending  aid 
to  the  rebellious  South.  In  this  in- 
stance the  remarkably  effective  collab- 
oration between  President  Abraham 
Lincoln  and  his  Secretary  of  State, 
William  H.  Seward  of  New  York, 
proved  equal  to  the  situation.  The 
Secretary's  success  in  fending  off 
serious  trouble  during  the  Civil  War 
proved  that  great  achievements  in 
foreign  relations  almost  always  de- 
pended on  close  relations  between  the 
President  and  the  Department  of 
State.  The  American  Minister  in 
London,  Charles  Francis  Adams,  third 
in  a  line  of  distinguished  statesmen 
from  Massachusetts,  established  him- 
self among  the  most  successful  diplo- 
mats of  his  time,  preserving  the  neu- 
trality of  Great  Britain  until  the 
Union  Army  finally  prevailed  over  its 
opponents.  If  the  Confederacy  had 
received  significant  assistance  from 
European  nations,  especially  Great 
Britain,  the  war  might  have  had  a 
much  different  outcome. 


The  triumph  of  the  Union  in 
prepared  the  way  for  still  another 
of  remarkable  national  progress, 
finally  ending  the  dispute  over  tht 
relative  merits  of  national  supreni 
and  states'  rights.  The  nation  em( 
from  the  Civil  War  more  powerfu 
secure  than  at  any  time  in  its  hist 
it  would  continue  to  enjoy  virtual 
immunity  from  international  danj 
— "free  security" — for  another  50 
years. 


n/^nortmcinl  r*f  Qtato  Rl 


Special 


The  Rise  to  World  Power,  1867-1913 


The  purchase  of  Alaska  from  Russia  on  March  30, 1867,  gave  the  United  States  its  first 

noncontiguous  territory.  lLibrar>  of  Congress  photo) 


The  30  years  after  the  Civil  War  are 
justly  considered  the  least  active  in 
the  history  of  American  foreign  rela- 
tions. Free  security,  that  fortunate 
byproduct  of  the  generally  stable  in- 
ternational balance  of  power,  lingered 
on,  permitting  Americans  to  devote 
themselves  to  their  prime  preoccupa- 
tion— internal  development.  During 
these  years,  the  westward  movement 
was  completed,  and  the  nation  experi- 
enced extensive  industrialization  and 
urbanization. 

The  absence  of  foreign  threats  to 
national  security  and  the  continuing 
national  stress  on  domestic  concerns 
during  the  latter  years  of  the  19th 
century  explain  why  the  conduct  of 
foreign  relations  did  not  deviate  much 
from  earlier  practice.  As  late  as  1894, 
an  observer  noted  that  the  public  was 
"less  familiar  with  the  duties  of  our 
diplomatic  and  consular  agents  than 
any  other  branch  of  the  public  serv- 
ice," a  logical  outcome  because  mem- 
bers of  the  foreign  services  lived 
abroad  and  could  not  be  observed  at 
work.  As  before  the  Civil  War,  xeno- 


phobic Americans  regularly  con- 
demned their  representatives  abroad 
as  subversive.  In  1885,  for  example. 
Senator  William  E.  Robinson  of  New 
York  insisted  that  "this  diplomatic 
service  is  working  our  ruin  by  creat- 
ing a  desire  for  foreign  customs  and 
foreign  follies.  The  disease  is  im- 
ported by  our  returning  diplomats  and 
by  the  foreign  ambassadors  sent  here 
by  monarchs  and  despots  to  corrupt 
and  destroy  our  American  ideals."  The 
Senator's  solution  was  to  quarantine 
entering  diplomats  "as  we  quarantine 
foreign  rags  through  fear  of  cholera." 
Another  familiar  pattern  endured 
beyond  the  Civil  War — meddlesome 
political  interference  with  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  In  1869,  for  example, 
President  Ulysses  S.  Grant  made 
Elihu  B.  Washburne,  a  friend  from 
Galena,  Illinois,  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  a  mere  12  days  so  that  he  could 
enjoy  the  prestige  of  having  held  that 
position  when  he  took  up  his  respon- 


Special 


sibilities  as  Minister  to  France.  Fortu- 
nately Washbiirne's  successor,  Hamil- 
ton Fish  of  New  York,  established 
close  relations  with  President  Grant 
and  managed  to  minimize  unwise 
appointments  and  policies. 

Like  previous  Secretaries,  Fish 
recognized  that  he  could  not  adminis- 
ter the  Department  efficiently  without 
the  President's  strong  support.  When 
General  Orville  Babcock,  another  one 
of  Grant's  friends,  attempted  to  inter- 
fere in  the  affairs  of  the  Department, 
Fish  bluntly  informed  the  President 
that  he  could  not  tolerate  such  activi- 
ties. If  the  President  showed  lack  of 
confidence  in  him,  he  wrote,  "or  when 
the  influence  of  the  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment in  the  administration  of  its 
affairs,  or  the  formation  of  its  policy, 
is  overshadowed  by  others,  a  sensible 
or  sensitive  man  will  appreciate  that 
the  time  for  his  retirement  has 
arrived." 

Political  appointments  remained 
the  order  of  the  day  despite  growing 
public  concern,  manifested  in  support 
for  creation  of  the  Civil  Service 
( 188.3 ) ,  which  did  not  cover  the  for- 
eign services.  In  1885,  when  the  Demo- 
cratic Party  gained  control  of  the 
executive  branch  for  the  first  time  in 
24  years.  Congressman  Jonathan 
Chace  of  Rhode  Island  contrasted 
American  and  British  practice  on  such 
occasions.  "Whenever  a  change  of  ad- 
ministration occurs  in  Great  Britain 
.  .  .  members  of  the  diplomatic  service 
know  that  no  change  will  take  place  in 
regard  to  their  positions,  but  all  over 
the  world  today  every  man  in  the  dip- 
lomatic and  consular  service  of  the 
United  States  is  packing  his  trunk  and 
engaging  his  passage  preparatory  to 
returning  home." 

Nevertheless,  certain  members  of 
the  foreign  services  developed  special 
competence  and  pursued  careers  in 
diplomatic  and  consular  assignments. 
Prominent  among  them  was  Eugene 
Schuyler,  who  first  served  as  consul  at 
Moscow  in  1867  and  later  held  other 
posts  in  Europe  before  ending  his 
service  as  the  American  representative 
in  Cairo  in  1889.  Another  was  William 
Lindsay  Scruggs,  who  began  his  career 
as  Minister  to  Colombia  in  1873  and 
moved  on  to  several  other  positions, 
including  service  as  Minister  to  Vene- 
zuela during  the  Administration  of 


Alvey  A.  Adee 

Alvey  A.  Adee  began  his  diplomati 
career  as  a  private  secretary  at  the 
Legation  in  Spain  in  1869.  He  beca 
a  clerk  in  the  Department  in  1876 
and  Chief  of  the  Diplomatic  Burea 
2  years  later.  Appointed  Third  Ass 
ant  Secretary  of  State  in  1882  and 
Second  Assistant  Secretary  in  188t 
he  became  First  Assistant  Secreta 
of  State  just  before  his  death  in  19 
Adee  approved  or  drafted  aim 
all  outgoing  correspondence  and  w 
a  stickler  for  correct  style  and  usai 
In  times  of  crisis  he  would  install ; 
cot  in  his  office.  Deaf,  reclusive,  an 
unmarried,  he  dedicated  his  life  to 
operation  of  the  Department,  advii 
Presidents  and  Secretaries  of  both 
parties  and  briefing  diplomatic  an 
consular  officers.  A  longtime  resid*' 
of  Washington  is  said  to  have  re- 
marked as  Adee  bicycled  past  him; 
"There  goes  our  State  Department 
now." 


President  Benjamin  Harrison  (1889- 
93).  Two  men  who  developed  impres- 
sive reputations  as  regional  specialists, 
Henry  White  (Europe)  and  William 
W.  Rockhill  (East  Asia),  extended 
their  activity  well  into  the  20th 
century. 

Abuses  in  the  Consular  Service 
persisted  into  the  late  19th  century 
despite  strenuous  efforts  to  correct 
them.  In  1872  a  representative  of  the 
Treasury,  DeB.  Randolph  Keim,  re- 
ported the  results  of  an  extensive 
investigation  of  the  Consular  Service. 
He  uncovered  many  irregularities, 
among  them  collection  of  illegal  fees, 
improper  exercise  of  judicial  powers, 
fraudulent  accounting,  faulty  admin- 
istration of  estates  left  by  Americans 
who  died  abroad,  issuance  of  illegal 
passports,  and  sale  of  the  American 
flag.  Keim  thought  that  the  most  im- 
portant feature  of  his  investigation 
was  the  "ingenuity  displayed  by  con- 
sular officers,  since  the  Act  of  1856 
particularly,  in  defrauding  the  Gov- 
ernment and  grasping  gains  from 
various  outside  sources  besides." 

Few  changes  in  basic  foreign 
policies  can  be  detected  during  the 
generation  after  the  Civil  War;  the 


Klihu  B.  Washburne  had  tht-  shortest  te 
of  office  of  any  Secretary  of  State — 
March  .VIB.  18«9.  .\s  .Minister  to  France 
(lSt>it-77),  he  witnessed  the  Franco-Pru; 
War,  the  Paris  Commune,  and  the  fall  o 
empire  and  the  birth  of  a  republic. 

(Di-parliiu-nt  of  StiU,-  ph<nu) 


<%1ft 


narAartmcknt  /-»f  Qtatci   Ri 


»derick  Douglass 


Special 


'The  Yankee  King  of  Spain" 


derick  Douglass  was  born  into 
ery  in  Maryland.  After  escaping 
dage,  he  became  a  leading  aboli- 
list.  Following  the  Civil  War  he 
!ived  two  diplomatic  assignments. 
871  he  served  as  secretary  of  a 
imission  sent  to  Santo  Domingo  to 
lore  the  possibility  of  annexing 
I  i.'sland.  More  important,  in  1889 
)eeame  Minister  to  Haiti  and 
rge  d'affaires  to  Santo  Domingo, 
his  capacity  he  became  involved 
n  unsuccessful  attempt  to  acquire 
Mole  St.  Nicolas  in  Haiti  as  a 
ling  station.  In  1891  Douglass  re- 
led  his  office  after  critics  alleged 
t  he  showed  undue  regard  for  the 
tian  point  of  view. 


The  appointment  of  Daniel  E.  Sickles 
as  Minister  to  Spain  in  1869  was  the 
culmination  of  a  flamboyant  public 
cai'eer.  As  Secretary  of  the  Legation 
in  London  (1853-55),  Sickles  had 
helped  to  arrange  the  conference  of 
ministers  that  produced  the  Ostend 
Manifesto.  He  also  had  his  mistress 
presented  to  Queen  Victoria.  As  a 
Democratic  Congressman  from  New 
York,  Sickles  gained  notoriety  for 
shooting  his  wife's  lover  in  Lafayette 
Square,  being  acquitted  of  murder, 
and  then  forgiving  his  wife. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War, 
Sickles  raised  a  brigade  of  volunteers 
in  New  York  City  and  maintained 
them  at  his  own  expense  until  they 
were  taken  into  the  Army.  He  led  the 
"Excelsior  Brigade"  into  battle  and 
rose  to  the  rank  of  Major  General  and 
to  the  command  of  the  Third  Corps  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  At  Gettys- 
burg, he  moved  his  corps  to  an  exposed 
position  and  lost  most  of  his  troops 
and  his  right  leg.  (The  bones  of  his 
leg  are  on  display  in  the  Army  Medical 
Museum.)  In  the  spring  of  1865, 
Sickles  conducted  a  diplomatic  mission 
to  Colombia  to  arrange  the  passage 
of  American  troops  through  Panama. 


Sickles  was  appointed  Minister 
to  Spain  as  a  reward  for  his  early 
support  of  Grant's  campaign  for  the 
Presidency.  He  was  instructed  to  offer 
help  to  Cuba  in  purchasing  inde- 
pendence from  Spain,  opening  the  way 
to  eventual  annexation.  Spanish 
opinion  was  outraged,  and  General 
Prim,  the  Spanish  Prime  Minister, 
was  assassinated  before  he  could 
reconsider.  After  King  Amadeo  I 
declined  the  offer  of  purchase,  Sickles 
plotted  with  Spanish  republicans  in 
the  vain  hope  that  they  would  be  more 
willing  to  sell  after  they  came 
to  power. 

Sickles  lived  lavishly  in  Madrid, 
renting  a  box  at  the  opera  and  having 
his  secretary,  Alvey  A.  Adee,  order  fine 
wines  and  luxury  goods  for  him  from 
London  and  Paris.  Sickles  frequently 
traveled  to  Paris,  where  he  had  an 
affair  with  Isabella  II.  formerly  the 
Queen  of  Spain.  Isabella  herself  was 
notorious  for  her  affairs,  and  there 
had  been  much  speculation  about  the 
paternity  of  her  children.  Parisian 
•society  promptly  dubbed  Sickles  "the 
Yankee  king  of  Spain."  Sickles  also 
married  Caroline  de  Creagh,  lady-in- 
waiting  to  the  former  Queen. 

On  October  21,  1873,  the  Spanish 
warships  captured  the  steamer 
Virginius,  as  it  carried  arms  to  in- 
surgents in  Cuba.  After  Spanish  au- 
thorities executed  the- captain  and 
most  of  the  crew,  many  of  whom  were 
American  citizens,  the  United  States 
demanded  the  release  of  the  ship  and 
the  remaining  prisoners.  Sickles  was 
instructed  to  close  the  Legation  and 
return  home  if  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment did  not  accept  these  demands 
within  12  days.  Sickles,  however,  was 
ready  to  close  the  Legation  after 
5  days.  The  crisis  was  averted  when 
the  Spanish  Government  offered  to 
negotiate  in  Washington  rather  than 
Madrid,  and  Sickles  then  resigned. 

Sickles  left  for  Paris  on  March  27, 
1874,  and  lived  there  for  5  years. 
After  his  return  to  the  United  States, 
he  devoted  the  rest  of  his  life  to  the 
I)reservation  of  the  Gettysburg  battle- 
field and  to  defending  his  conduct 
during  the  battle. 


inezer  Don  Carlos  Bassett,  -America's 
t  black  diplomat,  was  Minister  Resident 
I  Consul  General  in  Haiti  from  1869  to 

i,  (Department,  of  State  photo) 


Special 


James  Kussell  Lowell,  Minister  to  Spain  (1877-8U)  and  to  (jreat  Britain  (1880-85),  was  one  of 
many  distinguished  American  authors  who  held  diplomatic  or  consular  posts. 

(Library  of  Congress  photo) 


overarching  principles  of  isolation  and 
neutrality  remaineci  firmly  entrenche(i. 
In  1894  Secretary  of  State  Walter  Q. 
Gresham  of  Illinois  reaffirmed  Wash- 
ington's "great  rule  of  conduct"  in 
commenting  on  what  he  deemed  a  ques- 
tionable departure  from  the  policy  of 
"no  entangling  alliances" — an  agree- 
ment with  Germany  and  Great  Britain 
to  share  control  of  the  Samoan  Islands. 
"Every  nation,  and  especially  every 
strong  nation,  must  sometimes  be  con- 
scious of  an  impulse  to  rush  into  diffi- 
culties that  do  not  concern  it,  except  in 
a  highly  imaginary  way,"  he  noted.  To 
contain  this  tendency  Gresham  offered 
a  traditional  remedy:  "To  restrain  the 
indulgence  of  such  a  propensity  is  not 
only  the  part  of  wisdom,  but  a  duty  we 
owe  to  the  world  as  an  example  of  the 
strength,  the  moderation,  and  the 
beneficence  of  po])ular  government." 

Perhaps  the  most  notable  develop- 
ment in  foreign  policy  was  the  eleva- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  into  an 
unquestioned  article  of  faith  as  the 
nation  gave  increasing  attention  to 
Latin  America.  Secretary  of  State 
.lames  G.  Blaine  of  Maine  responded  to 
this  development;  he  inaugurated  the 
modern  Pan  American  movement  in 
1889,  although  it  did  not  prosper  until 
the  early  years  of  the  20th  century. 


George  H.  Butler,  nephew  of  a  prominent 
Massachusetts  Congressman,  was  appointed 
Consul  General  in  Alexandria,  Kgypt,  in 
1870.  He  dismissed  all  consular  agents, 
auctioned  off  their  commissions,  and  pur- 
chased dancing  girls.  Shortly  before  his  re- 
call in  1872,  he  was  involved  in  a  brawl  w  ith 
three  former  Confederate  officers. 

(Librar>'  of  Coiiki*»?ss  pholo) 


The  limited  importance  assign. 
to  foreign  relations  after  the  Civil 
War  was  reflected  in  the  modest 
growth  of  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  foreign  services.  In  1880  th 
Department  had  only  80  employees 
compared  with  42  in  1860,  and  the 
total  declined  to  76  in  1890.  The  nui 
ber  of  diplomatic  missions  increase^ 
only  41  in  1890,  up  from  3.3  in  1860 
while  the  number  of  consular  posts 
grew  during  the  same  period  from 
282  to  323.  Diplomats  numbered  45 
1860  and  63  in  1890.  The  Consular 
Service  expanded  much  more,  empl 
ing  1,042  people  in  1890  compared 
with  236  in  1860. 

Expenditures  on  domestic  and 
eign  operations  rose  from  $1.3  mill 
in  1860  to  only  $1.8  million  in  1890 
These  were  limited  increments,  ind 
when  compared  with  the  increase  o 
the  general  population,  which  appn 
mately  doublefd  between  1860  and  1 

In  1870  the  Department  under 
went  a  significant  reorganization  a 
the  initiative  of  Secretary  Fish.  Th 
principal  change  was  a  further  elal 
oration  of  the  bureau  system  that 
Secretary  McLane  had  inauguratec 
1833.  To  cope  with  the  growth  in  o\ 
seas  missions  and  consulates.  Fish 
established  two  diplomatic  bureaus 
and  two  consular  bureaus  with  geo- 
graphic responsibilities.  The  First 
Diplomatic  Bureau  and  the  First  Ci 
sular  Bureau  dealt  with  Europe, 
China,  and  Japan.  The  second  pair 
bureaus  managed  communications 
with  the  rest  of  the  world — Latin 
America,  the  Mediterranean  regior 
Russia,  Hawaii,  and  Liberia.  Five 
other  bureaus  were  created — the  C 
Clerk's  Bureau,  the  Law  Bureau,  tl 
Bureau  of  Accounts,  the  Statistical 
Bureau,  and  the  Passport  Bureau.  ' 
reorganization  of  1870  endured  for 
years,  undergoing  only  minor  adju: 
ments  during  that  period. 

In  1888  the  Department  of  Sta 
moved  into  an  imposing  new  home- 
the  State,  War,  and  Navy  Building 
located  at  17th  Street  and  Pennsyl- 
vania Avenue,  N.W.,  and  in  1893  th 
United  States  finally  upgraded  env< 
accredited  to  the  most  important  fc 
eign  powers  to  the  rank  of  ambassa 
Previously  all  missions  had  been  le; 
tions  headed  by  ministers.  Embassi 
were  established  in  Great  Britain, 


Special 


ate,  War,  and  Navy  Building 


0 1869  Congress  recognized  that  the 
Iding  housing  the  Department  of 
te  (the  Washington  City  Orphan 
•him)  was  inadequate  because  of 
high  rent,  shortage  of  space,  and 
severe  fire  hazard.  Consequently  a 
imission  was  appointed  to  recom- 
nd  a  site  and  submit  plans  for  a  new 
cutive  office  building  to  house  the 
Dartment  of  State.  By  February 
0,  it  was  agreed  to  construct  a 
Iding  on  a  site  west  of  the  White 
use,  a  site  which  was  then  partially 
upied  by  the  buildings  of  the  War 
I  Navy  Departments. 

The  construction  was  to  be  done 
;tages  beginning  with  the  south 
ig  in  order  to  avoid  interfering 
h  the  business  of  the  War  and 
vy  Departments.  This  would  allow 
se  two  departments  to  remain  in 
ir  buildings  until  later  when  those 
Idings  would  have  to  be  razed  to 
ke  way  for  the  other  wings.  Just 
ore  the  south  wing  was  completed 
Tune  1875,  the  Department  of  State 
an  moving  in.  The  War  and  Navy 
partments  moved  into  the  east  wing 
Tiediately  after  it  was  ready  for 
upancy  in  April  1879.  The  north 
ig  was  completed  in  late  1882  and 
War  Department  moved  into  it  in 
bruary  1883.  The  west  and  center 

■(  igs  were  occupied  in  early  1888. 
Upon  completion  it  was  reputed  to 

;aJthe  largest  and  finest  office  building 

e|  the  world.  Exclusive  of  basement 
i  sub-basement,  it  has  a  total  floor 


Mji»    _^vw*i:aL4ff" 


area  of  about  10  acres  and  contains 
nearly  1-%  miles  of  corridors  12  feet 
wide.  These  are  paved  with  black  slate 
and  white  marble.  The  eight  spiral 
stairways  with  steps  of  gray  granite 
are  unsupported  by  either  beams  or 
arches.  There  is  very  little  woodwork 
in  the  entire  building,  the  most  note- 
worthy being  the  doors. 

The  south  wing  had  been  planned 
and  built  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the 
Department  of  State.  The  Secretary 
had  his  office  on  the  second  floor  at  the 
southwest  corner  and  the  diplomatic 
reception  room — the  scene  of  the 
signing  of  many  historic  documents — 
adjoined  the  Secretary's  office. 

Because  of  the  pressure  of  space, 
the  Department  of  State  was  forced  to 
move  some  of  its  office  out  of  this 
building  and  into  rented  quarters  in 
other  parts  of  the  city.  In  1918  the 
Navy  Department  moved  to  new 
quarters  and  all  State  Department 
offices  were  reunited  in  this  building 
where  they  remained  until  1936. 
In  1930,  following  the  departure  of 
most  of  the  War  Department,  the 
name  of  the  building  was  changed  to 
the  Department  of  State  Building. 
Again,  however,  the  structure  grew 
overcrowded  and  another  exodus  to 
outlying  buildings  became  necessary. 
In  1947  the  Department  of  State 
moved  to  a  new  location  at  320  21st 
Street,  Northwest.  The  old  State,  War, 
and  Navy  Building  now  houses  the 
executive  offices  of  the  President. 


France,  Germany,  and  Italy  after 
those  nations  conferred  ambassadorial 
rank  on  their  representatives  in 
Washington. 

These  changes  did  not  mean  that 
the  Department  and  the  foreign  serv- 
ices had  altered  their  traditional  prac- 
tices. One  historian  described  the 
Department  of  1898  as  "an  antiquated 
feeble  organization,  enslaved  by  prece- 
dents and  routine  inherited  from 
another  century,  remote  from  the  pub- 
lic gaze  and  indifferent  to  it.  The 
typewriter  was  viewed  as  a  necessary 
evil  and  the  telephone  was  an  instru- 
ment of  last  resort."  Most  of  the  old 
problems  endured  into  the  20th  cen- 
tury. The  Department  and  the  foreign 
services  were  shorthanded ;  employees 
at  home  and  abroad  were  seriously 
underpaid.  Appointments  were  still 
subject  to  the  spoils  system,  Congress 
having  failed  to  legislate  a  system  of 
selection  and  promotion  by  merit  and 
job  protection  through  the  award  of 
tenure  to  the  deserving. 

Suddenly,  the  general  circum- 
stances that  had  influenced  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  since  1815  were  vastly 
altered  as  the  result  of  a  short  but 
important  war.  In  1898  the  United 
States  became  involved  in  a  struggle 
with  Spain  that  stemmed  from  popular 
support  for  the  independence  of  Cuba. 
The  decision  to  free  Cuba  was  a  star- 
tling departure  from  the  practice  of 
traditional  liberal  nationalism,  but  as 
a  surprise  it  did  not  compare  with  the 
results  of  the  war.  The  Treaty  of  Paris 
(1898)  provided  for  Cuban  independ- 
ence and  also  for  the  cession  of  impor- 
tant Spanish  possessions  to  the  United 
States — notably  the  island  of  Puerto 
Rico  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  the  entire 
Philippine  archipelago  in  the  western 
Pacific  Ocean,  and  the  small  island  of 
Guam  in  the  central  Pacific  Ocean. 

This  assumption  of  colonial  re- 
sponsibilities overseas  in  two  widely 
separated  regions,  a  stunning  aberra- 
tion from  liberal  nationalism,  reflected 
not  only  the  temporary  enthusiasms  of 
1898  but  a  basic  change  in  the  inter- 
national posture  of  the  United  States. 
The  old  foreign  policies  reflected  the 
circumstances  of  the  earlier  19th  cen- 
tury, but  by  the  1890s  the  situation 
had  changed  greatly.  The  nation  had 
acquired  almost  all  the  attributes  of  a 
great  power ;  it  stood  ahead  or  nearly 
ahead  of  almost  all  other  countries  in 
the  critical  measures  of  power,  such  as 
population,  geographic  size  and  loca- 
tion, economic  resources,  and  military 
potential. 


Special 


This  striking  rise  in  international 
status  portended  comparable  shifts  in 
foreign  policy.  President  William 
McKinley  drew  attention  to  the  new 
situation  in  the  instructions  he  gave 
to  the  delegation  of  American  states- 
men who  negotiated  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  with  Spain.  "We  cannot  be 
unmindful  that  without  any  desire  or 
design  on  our  part  the  war  has 
brought  us  new  duties  and  responsi- 
bilities which  we  must  meet  and  dis- 
charge as  becomes  a  great  nation  on 
whose  growth  and  career  from  the 
beginning  the  Ruler  of  Nations  has 
plainly  written  the  high  command  and 
jjledge  of  civilization."  Another  con- 
temporary observer,  George  L.  Rives, 
extended  this  interpretation.  "Whether 
we  like  it  or  not,"  he  wrote,  "it  is  plain 
that  the  country  is  now  entering  into 
a  period  in  its  history  in  which  it  will 
necessarily  be  brought  into  far  closer 
and  more  complex  relations  with  all 
the  other  great  Powers  of  the  world," 
an  outcome  that  would  outmode  estab- 


lished foreign  policy.  "We  shall  now 
and  henceforth  be  looked  upon  as  hav- 
ing cast  aside  our  traditional  attitude 
of  isolation." 

During  the  16  years  between  the 
brief  war  with  Spain  in  1898  and  the 
outbreak  of  the  First  World  War  in 
1914,  the  United  States  greatly  en- 
larged its  role  in  world  politics.  The 
nation  measurably  altered  its  posture 
toward  the  areas  that  it  had  pene- 
trated in  1898 — the  Caribbean-Latin 
American  and  Pacific-East  Asian  re- 
gions— and  thereby  added  significantly 
to  the  burdens  of  the  Department  of 
State. 

Latin  American  policy  involved  an 
imposing  revision  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. Throughout  the  19th  century  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  aimed  primarily 
at  European  powers,  which  were 
warned  to  avoid  further  colonization 
in  the  New  World.  It  did  not  imply 
the  right  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of 
Latin  American  nations.  President 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  reacting  to  con- 


cern that  certain  European  nations 
might  be  able  to  penetrate  Latin 
America  by  the  device  of  collecting 
debts  that  certain  nations  had  repu 
diated,  asserted  a  policy  in  1904  th; 
became  known  as  the  Roosevelt  Coi 
lary  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  No  La 
American  nation  that  adhered  to 
acceptable  international  standards 
behavior,  he  said,  need  fear  interve 
tion  by  the  United  States.  But  wha 
about  less  scrupulous  countries? 
"Chronic  wrongdoing,  or  an  impote 
which  results  in  a  general  loosenin) 
the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may  in 
America,  as  elsewhere,  require  int« 
vention  by  some  civilized  nation." 
Moreover,  he  continued,  "in  the  we 
ern  hemisphere  the  adherence  of  tl 
United  States  to  the  Monroe  Doctr 
may  force  the  United  States,  howe' 
reluctantly,  in  flagrant  cases  of  sue 
wrongdoing  or  impotence,  to  the  ex 
cise  of  an  international  police  powe 
This  pronouncement  led  to  a  series 
interventions  in  the  Caribbean-Lat 


OIney's  Fiat 

In  1895  Secretary  of  State  Richard 
Olney  addressed  a  diplomatic  despatch 
to  London  for  communication  to  the 
British  Government  concerning  a 
boundary  dispute  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela.  This  message 
gave  early  indication,  even  before  the 
war  with  Spain  in  1898,  that  the 
United  States  was  moving  toward  a 
new  assertiveness  in  international 
politics  on  the  basis  of  its  rise  to  great- 
power  status.  OIney's  note  offered  a 
stirring  defense  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. "Today  the  United  States  is 
practically  sovereign  on  this  continent, 
and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to 
which  it  confines  its  interposition. 
Why?  It  is  not  because  of  the  pure 
friendship  or  good  will  felt  for  it.  It  is 
not  simi)ly  by  reason  of  its  high  char- 
acter as  a  civilized  state,  nor  because 
wisdom  and  justice  and  equity  are  the 
invariable  characteristics  of  the  deal- 
ings of  the  United  States.  It  is  be- 
cause, in  addition  to  all  other  grounds, 
its  infinite  resources  combined  with 
its  isolated  position  render  it  master 
of  the  situation  and  practically  in- 
vulnerable as  against  any  or  all  other 
powers." 


Spanish  and  American  delegates  sign  the  TVeaty  of  Paris  on  December  1(1.  1H9.H.  The  Spai 
Kmpire  in  the  New  World  came  to  an  end.  and  the  United  States  acquired  an  overseas  er 
and  took  its  place  among  the  great  powers,  ii.ibrao  oi Conures.s  photo) 


Deoartment  of  State  Bu 


Special 


srican  region  that  greatly  enlarged 
U.S.  presence  there  and  added  to 
Imj  workload  of  the  Department  of 
'tai  ;e. 

Itk    Meanwhile,  the  acquisition  of  the 
Coi  lippines  triggered  the  development 
Li   new  American  policy  for  East 
u    a.  As  the  United  States  gained  a 
rili  ;hold  in  the  region,  European 
Tie  irsions  in  China  threatened  to  cut 
ina  iccess  to  that  vast  country,  just 
!n  Americans  hoped  to  create  a 
1 1(  at  trade  in  Chinese  markets.  Ac- 
iingly.  Secretary  of  State  John 
of  Ohio  proposed  in  1899  that 
nti  ions  interested  in  China  should 
joy  perfect  equality  of  treatment 
navigation,"  that  is,  maintain  the 
tljiciple  of  free  trade — the  "open 
!ri  r."  In  1900  Hay  extended  the  open- 
VH  r  policy  to  include  respect  for  the 
•itorial  and  administrative  integ- 
of  China.  This  commitment  to  the 
n-door  policy  led  the  United  States 
iegrees  into  much  expanded  par- 
pation  in  the  activities  of  East 
a,  another  source  of  additional 
ponsibilities  for  the  Department  of 
te. 
These  extraordinary  additions  to 
international  political  commit- 
its  of  the  United  States  ineluctably 
tered  many  internal  changes  in  the 
lartment  of  State  and  its  overseas 
iblishments.  The  foreign  policy 
amunity  grew  at  a  rapid  rate.  The 
lartment  was  thoroughly  reorga- 
ed  to  meet  its  new  responsibilities, 

important  steps  were  taken 
/ard  the  development  of  profes- 
nal,  democratic  foreign  services. 

The  Department  of  State  ex- 
ided  considerably  during  the  years 
ween  the  war  with  Spain  and  the 
I'st  World  War.  When  Hay  became 
:retary  of  State  in  1898  the  Depart- 
■nt  met  a  domestic  payroll  of  82 
jple;  by  1905,  when  Elihu  Root  of 
:w  York  succeeded  Hay,  the  number 
d  risen  only  to  119,  but  at  the  end 
1910,  during  the  Secretaryship  of 
lilander  C.  Knox  of  Pennsylvania, 
6  payroll  had  advanced  to  234.  The 
plomatic  Service  grew  modestly 
3m  93  people  in  1900  to  121  in  1910. 

Expansion  required  a  considerable 
crease  in  the  annual  budget.  The 
penditures  of  the  Department  at 
ime  and  overseas  increased  from 
;.4  million  in  1900  to  $4.9  million  in 
ilO.  The  Consular  Service  experi- 
iced  a  particularly  significant  addi- 
bn  to  its  workload.  The  annual  total 
'  fees  collected  rose  from  $533,000  in 


1898  to  1.6  million  in  1916.  This  three- 
fold jump  reflected  an  expansion  in  the 
nation's  foreign  trade  from  $1.8  billion 
to  $3  billion  during  the  same  period. 

The  growing  responsibilities  of 
the  Department  of  State  forced  a  thor- 
ough reorganization  in  1909.  The  re- 
former. Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
Francis  M.  Huntington  Wilson,  suc- 
ceeded in  enlarging  the  number  of 
leadership  positions  so  that  thereafter 
the  Department  had  three  Assistant 
Secretaries  cf  State,  a  Counselor  to 
undertake  special  assignments,  and  a 
Director  to  administer  the  Consular 
Service.  Lines  of  authority  were  clari- 
fied, permitting  senior  managers  to 
make  better  use  of  personnel.  Most 
important,  however,  was  the  creation 
of  bureaus  to  deal  with  four  distinct 
geographic  regions — Western  Europe, 
the  Near  East,  the  Far  East,  and 
Latin  America — a  move  that  fostered 
improved  communication  between  the 
Department  and  the  overseas  missions. 
Several  other  bureaus  and  divisions 
were  created  to  deal  with  various  new 
responsibilities,  notably  a  Bureau  of 
Trade  Relations  and  a  Division  of 
Information.  A  number  of  talented 
foreign  service  officers  were  brought 
to  Washington  to  staff  the  new  geo- 
graphic bureaus,  adding  a  much- 
needed  leaven  of  experience. 

Although  the  expansion  and  reor- 
ganization of  the  Department  consti- 
tuted striking  departures,  the  most 
distinctive  feature  of  the  early  20th 
century  was  a  strong  movement 
toward  fully  professionalized  and 
democratic  foreign  services.  The 
transformation  in  American  foreign 
relations  that  began  at  the  end  of  the 
19th  century  forced  the  nation  to  rec- 
ognize that  it  paid  dearly  for  amateur- 
ism in  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy. 
One  critic  summed  up  the  need  for 
expertise  in  an  article  published  in 
1897:  "As  we  would  not  put  a  ship 
into  the  hands  of  a  commander  igno- 
rant of  navigation,  an  army  under  the 
control  of  a  general  without  military 
training,  a  suit  at  law  into  the  hands 
of  a  counsel  who  never  opened  a  law 
book  ...  so  we  should  not  put  the  for- 
eign affairs  of  our  government  into 
the  hands  of  men  without  knowledge 
of  the  various  subjects  which  go  to 
make  up  the  diplomatic  science."  Given 
the  changed  circumstances.  President 
Theodore  Roosevelt  emphasized  the 
necessity  to  upgrade  performance: 
"The  trouble  with  our  ambassadors  in 
stations  of  real  importance,"  he  told  a 


"Father  of  the 
Foreign  Service" 


Wilbur  J.  Carr  (1870-1942)  was  born 
in  Ohio  and  entered  the  Department 
of  State  as  a  clerk  in  1892.  He  became 
Chief  of  the  Consular  Bureau  in  1902, 
Chief  Clerk  in  1907,  and  served  as 
Director  of  the  Consular  Service  from 
1909  to  1924.  A  believer  in  scientific 
management  and  administrative  effi- 
ciency, Carr  took  pride  in  having 
brought  Consular  Service  operations 
"as  near  to  perfection  as  possible." 
He  strove  to  extend  professionalism 
and  merit  to  all  aspects  of  the  Depart- 
ment, working  for  passage  of  the  1906 
Consular  Reorganization  Act  and 
helping  to  draft  the  Rogers  Act. 

Carr  served  as  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  from  1924  to  1937.  His 
duties  included  those  of  Chairman  of 
the  Board  of  Foreign  Service  Per- 
sonnel and  Budget  Officer  of  the 
Department,  a  combination  which 
allowed  him  to  administer  the  transi- 
tion from  separate  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Services  to  a  unified  profes- 
sional Foreign  Service.  His  last 
assignment  was  Ambassador  to 
Czechoslovakia  from  1937  until  the 
German  occupation  in  1939.  "The 
Father  of  the  Foreign  Service"  then 
retired  from  the  Department,  having 
served  for  45  years  under  17  Secre- 
taries of  State. 


anuary  1981 


S21 


Special 


President  Grover  Cleveland  signed  an 
Executive  order  on  September  20,  1895,  that 
instituted  examinations  for  consular  appoin- 
tees, a  significant  step  toward  professional i- 
zation  of  the  Consular  Service. 

( Ueparlinenl  ut  Stale  photo) 


Joining  the  Diplomatic  Service  in  19()S, 
Joseph  C.  Grew  served  as  Minister  to  Den- 
mark (1920),  Switzerland  (1921-24),  and  as 
Ambassador  to  TUrkey  (1927-.32)  and  to 
Japan  1932—11).  He  concluded  his  career  as 
Under  Secretary  of  State  (1944-45). 

(Department  of  Slate  phtdol 


frienii,  "i.s  that  they  totally  fail  to  give 
us  real  help  and  real  information,  an(i 
.seem  to  think  that  the  life  work  of  an 
ambassador  is  a  kind  of  glorified  pink 
tea  party." 

Various  means  of  insuring  profes- 
sional and  democratic  foreign  services 
were  available  to  the  Department. 
Among  them  were  abandonment  of  the 
spoils  system  in  favor  of  guaranteed 
tenure,  adoption  of  the  merit  system 
as  the  basis  for  award  of  pay  increases 
and  promotions,  selection  of  foreign 
service  officers  by  competitive  exami- 
nation, and  adequate  pay  and  allow- 
ances. All  of  these  practices  had  been 
widely  publicized  earlier  as  part  of  the 
campaign  that  culminated  in  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Civil  Service  Act  in  1883, 
applicable  only  to  domestic  servants  of 
the  government.  They  were  equally 
appropriate  for  the  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Services,  and  all  of  them  re- 
ceived attention  during  the  first  years 
of  the  20th  century. 

President  Grover  Cleveland  antic- 
ipated the  reform  movernent  in  1895, 
when  he  issued  an  Executive  order 
that  made  entrance  into  the  Consular 
Service  contingent  upon  competitive 
examination,  but  the  most  important 
steps  occurred  during  the  Administra- 
tions of  Presidents  Theodore  Roosevelt 
and  William  Howard  Taft. 

In  November  1905,  President 
Roosevelt  established  the  merit  system 
for  all  diplomatic  and  consular  posi- 
tions, except  those  of  minister  and 
ambassador,  along  with  competitive 
entrance  examinations.  In  1906  Secre- 
tary Root  shepherded  a  law  through 
Congress  that  created  a  grade  classifi- 
cation system  for  consular  positions 
and  also  to  conduct  annual  inspections 
of  consular  establishments.  However, 
this  statute  did  not  mention  President 
Roosevelt's  examination  system  or 
merit  promotion ;  President  Roose- 
velt remedied  these  omissions  by 
means  of  another  Executive  order 
issued  in  June  1906.  A  few  years  later, 
in  1909,  President  Taft  set  up  a  board 
of  examiners  to  administer  both  oral 
and  written  examinations  to  prospec- 
tive diplomats. 

In  1915  Congress  passed  the 
Stone-Flood  Act,  which  permitted  ap- 
pointment of  certain  diplomatic  and 
consular  officers  to  functional  posi- 
tions, rather  than  to  specific  posts  in 
the  field.  This  step  permitted  reassign- 
ment by  administrative  transfer 
rather  than  Presidential  appointment. 


This  sequence  of  events  vastly 
encouraged  the  proponents  of  techn 
competence  in  the  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Services,  although  more  r( 
mained  to  be  doi.e.  The  movement 
owed  something  to  the  earlier  agita- 
tion for  the  creation  of  a  civil  servic 
but  even  more  to  the  spirit  of  progn 
sivism  that  swept  the  nation  during 
the  first  two  decades  of  the  20th 
century.  The  Progressives  emphasi2 
administrative  measures  designed  ti 
enhance  efficiency  and  minimize  the 
baneful  influence  of  excessive  parti- 
sanship, especially  in  the  form  of 
political  appointments.  They  oppose 
undue  favoritism  to  the  wealthy  anc 
privileged.  President  Roosevelt  told 
friend  in  1908:  "I  am  anxious  to  ha^ 
it  understood  that  it  is  not  necessari 
to  be  a  multimillionaire  in  order  to 
reach  the  highest  positions  in  the 
American  diplomatic  services." 

This  concern  stimulated  passag 
of  the  Lowden  Act  ( 1911 1 ;  it  was  th 
first  legislation  to  provide  for  the  pu 
chase  of  buildings  to  house  overseas 
establishments.  The  author  of  this 
measure.  Representative  Frank  O. 
Lowden  of  Illinois,  hoped  to  open  ths 
way  to  the  most  important  diplomat 
positions  for  deserving  members  of 
foreign  services  regardless  of  their 
economic  circumstances.  "It  ought  b 
be  possible,"  he  said,  "for  the  lowest 
man  in  the  foreign  service  to  feel  th. 
it  is  within  his  power,  if  his  service 
justifies  it,  to  reach  the  highest  post 
This  sentiment  faithfully  reflected  t. 
Progressive  conviction  that  compe- 
tence should  be  the  only  basis  for 
advancement  in  the  public  service. 

The  new  assertiveness  of  the 
United  States  in  world  politics  not 
only  reflected  the  nation's  rise  to 
world  power ;  it  also  stemmed  from 
basic  changes  in  the  pattern  of  inter- 
national relations.  The  stable  inter- 
national balance  of  power  that  had 
endured  since  the  downfall  of  Napo- 
leon in  1815 — the  source  of  so  much 
national  advantage  in  the  form  of  fr< 
security  during  the  19th  century — 
showed  definite  signs  of  collapse  dur- 
ing the  first  years  of  the  20th  centur^ 
Its  final  dissolution  in  1914  precipi- 
tated the  first  European  general  war 
in  a  hundred  years.  Notable  expansio 
and  improvement  in  the  Department 
State  after  1898  helped  to  prepare  it 
for  the  unprecedented  challenges  thai 
it  encountered  during  the  First  Worl 
War  of  1914-18  and  after. 


S22 


Department  of  State  Buile 


Special 


The  Test  of  Total  War,  1913-1947 


The  First  World  War  marked  one  of 
the  great  turning  points  in  modern 
history.  It  signaled  an  end  to  the 
century  of  general  international 
stability  and  extensive  economic, 
social,  and  political  progress  that  had 
underwritten  the  security  of  the 
United  States  during  its  rise  from  a 
small  and  struggling  country  to  an 
honored  place  among  the  great  powers. 
The  conflict  of  1914-18  inaugurated 
an  age  of  international  disequilibrium 
that  endured  to  the  latter  decades  of 
the  20th  century,  generating  political 
turbulence  and  organized  violence  on 
an  hitherto  unimaginable  scale. 

The  First  World  War  vastly  af- 
fected the  position  of  the  United  States 
in  the  international  community  be- 
cause it  destroyed  the  general  stability 
that  had  nurtured  Washington's 
"great  rule  of  conduct"  during  more 
than  100  years  of  extraordinary  na- 
tional accomplishment.  It  drew  the 
nation  into  any  number  of  interna- 
tional entanglements  that  would  have 
seemed  inconceivable  a  few  scant 
years  earlier.  Political  isolation,  how- 
ever appropriate  during  the  19th 
century,  no  longer  served  the  national 
interest. 

When  genera]  warfare  began  in 
1914  between  the  Allied  Powers 
(Great  Britain,  France,  Russia, 
Japan,  and  later  Italy)  and  the  Central 
Powers  (Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
and  Turkey) ,  the  United  States  an- 
nounced strict  neutrality  in  keeping 
with  tradition,  but  this  course  ulti- 
mately proved  untenable.  During  the 
period  of  neutrality  (1914-17)  two 
prewar  trends  came  rapidly  to  a  tragic 
conclusion.  As  the  Americans  experi- 
mented with  their  newfound  power  in 
world  affairs  after  the  war  with  Spain, 
they  decided  that  their  national  in- 
terests and  aspirations  had  become 
complementary  with  those  of  the 
ancient  enemy,  Great  Britain,  and  com- 
petitive with  those  of  Germany, 
another  rising  power.  Developments 
after  1914,  which  led  to  an  ungovern- 
able conflict  with  Germany  over  the 
legality  of  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare against  neutral  shipping,  simply 
accelerated  a  political  process  that  had 
begun  some  years  earlier. 


Nevertheless  America's  entrance 
into  the  First  World  War  in  April 
1917  as  an  associate  of  the  Allies  re- 
flected the  vision  of  President  Wood- 
row  Wilson  more  than  the  outcome  of 
the  controversy  over  submarine  war- 
fare. By  1917  the  conflict  had  been 
transformed  into  a  quasi-global  con- 
flict that  verged  on  total  war.  Wilson 
came  to  believe  that  only  the  United 
States  could  shape  an  eff'ective  peace 
settlement,  given  the  political  and 
moral  debility  of  the  contending  bellig- 
erent coalitions.  The  fundamental  rea- 
son he  decided  on  the  intervention  of 
1917  was  to  insure  that  the  United 
States  would  play  a  decisive  part  in  the 
outcome  of  the  war.  Only  by  this 
course  could  he  hope  to  dominate  the 
postwar  peace  conference. 

The  President's  plan  for  the 
future,  outlined  in  the  14  points  of 
January  1918  and  augmented  by  later 
pronouncements  prior  to  the  end  of  the 
war  in  November  1918,  envisioned 
restoration  of  a  stable,  equitable,  and 
enduring  international  balance 
through  the  workings  of  a  beneficent 
arrangement  to  provide  collective 
security — the  League  of  Nations — 
based  on  a  consensus  of  the  great 
powers.  Wilson's  attempt  to  banish 
warfare  forever  culminated  the  con- 
version of  the  United  States  from 
isolation  to  engagement  in  a  mere 
generation. 

The  many  changes  that  accom- 
panied World  War  I  posed  great  chal- 
lenges for  the  Department  of  State.  As 
the  executive  agency  charged  with 
principal  responsibility  for  the  conduct 
of  foreign  relations,  it  was  forced  to 
assume  duties  undreamed  of  in  earlier 
years.  Even  before  the  United  States 
entered  the  war,  the  Department's 
workload  spurted  dramatically.  Both 
the  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Services 
expanded  their  reporting  functions  to 
provide  desperately  needed  informa- 
tion. They  also  augmented  their  sup- 
port activity  abroad.  American  citi- 
zens made  demands  for  help,  and 


S23 


Special 


"None  Is  Swifter  Than  These" 


The  earliest  American  diplomatic 
courier  was  Peter  Parker,  master  of 
the  brig  Dispatch,  who  was  commis- 
sioned by  the  Continental  Congress  on 
July  10,  1776,  to  deliver  messages  to 
J.H.  and  Samuel  Delap  in  Bordeaux. 
The  letters,  relating  to  obtaining  mili- 
tary supplies  from  France,  were 
weighted  so  that  they  could  be  thrown 
overboard  in  the  event  of  capture. 

The  Department  did  not  begin  to 
hire  couriers  on  a  regular  basis  until 
World  War  I.  Outgoing  despatches 
would  be  entrusted  to  shipmasters, 
junior  naval  officers,  or  private  citizens 
as  necessary.  "Bearers  of  despatches" 
were  entitled  to  $6  per  diem  plus  a 
travel  allowance,  payable  by  the  De- 
partment upon  completion  of  their 
mission.  They  also  carried  a  special 
passport  to  certify  their  official  char- 
acter. One  of  the  first  such  special 
couriers  was  a  Post  Office  employee 


named  Nat  Crane,  who  left  Savannah 
for  London  on  May  24,  1819. 

The  Embassies  in  London  and  Paris 
became  the  first  American  diplomatic 
posts  to  hire  full-time  couriers  in 
December  1914.  At  the  end  of  the  First 
World  War,  the  American  Commission 
to  Negotiate  Peace  asked  Major  Amos 
J.  Peaslee,  who  had  organized  a 
courier  system  for  the  Army,  to  per- 
form a  similar  service  for  the  Depart- 
ment. The  Diplomatic  Courier  Service 
began  operations  in  Paris  on  Decem- 
ber 2,  1918,  using  military  personnel. 
It  was  disbanded  the  next  year  when 
the  Peace  Commission  concluded  its 
activities,  but  11  Marines  and  one 
civilian  were  then  designated  as 
couriei's. 

The  Courier  Service  was  dis- 
banded again  on  July  30,  1933,  as  an 
economy  measure.  President  Franklin 
D.  Roosevelt  ordered  its  reestablish- 


ment  in  1934,  while  attending  the 
London  economic  conference.  The  s. 
tem  was  still  based  in  Paris  and  hat 
three  regular  couriers.  By  1941 
established  service  had  been  institu 
to  China,  Japan,  and  the  Americas. 
A  regular  system  of  worldwide  schf 
ules  came  into  being  after  World 
War  n. 

The  Diplomatic  Courier  Servic" 
reached  its  peak  strength  of  100  aft^ 
World  War  IL  There  are  presently  ' 
couriers.  Despite  the  hazards  of  wat 
revolutions,  shipwrecks,  and  plane 
crashes,  only  five  couriers  have  lost 
their  lives  in  the  line  of  duty.  No 
pouch  or  letter  has  ever  been  stolen 
from  a  diplomatic  courier.  The  emb 
of  the  Diplomatic  Courier  Service  i 
golden  eagle  in  flight.  Its  motto,  "m 
is  swifter  than  these,"  is  taken  fror 
Herodotus'  description  of  Persian 
couriers. 


The  TVeaty  of  Versaille.s  was  signed  on  .lune  2«,  1919.  At  the  close  of  World  War  I,  the  United 
States  briefly  abandoned  isolation  and  attempted  to  establish  not  only  a  lasting  peace  but  a 
new  international  order,  a.ji.iary  (jrcmunss  photo) 


American  missions  located  in  bellig 
erent  countries  often  acted  as  care- 
takers for  enemy  interests  in  these 
countries.  For  example,  the  Americ 
Embassy  in  Berlin  represented  Bri< 
ish,  Japanese,  and  Italian  interests 
Germany  until  the  United  States 
abandoned  neutrality. 

The  burgeoning  responsibilitie 
of  the  foreign  services  caused  an  in 
crease  in  personnel  and  expenditure 
Many  temporary  employees  were  as 
signed  to  duties  at  home  and  overse 
Resignations  and  retirements  were 
minimized  to  retain  experienced  offi 
cers.  Congress  authorized  a  signific 
number  of  new  permanent  positions 
including  27  in  the  Dijilomatic  Serv 
a  jump  from  70  to  97.  The  domestic 
payroll  grew  from  234  people  in  191 
to  708  in  1920.  Expenditures  jumpe 
from  $4.9  million  in  1910  to  $13.6 
million  in  1920. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  ear- 
liest years  of  the  nation,  the  Americ 
people  gave  sustained  attention  to 
foreign  affairs.  The  Department  ac- 
cordingly attracted  considerable  att 
tion  and  even  praise,  a  welcome  cha 
from  the  general  apathy  or  distrust 
that  characterized  the  heyday  of  isc 


S94 


Department  of  State  Bull 


Special 


Man  Behind  the  Throne 

a  time  Edward  M.  House  of  Texas 
rcised  much  more  influence  on 
sident  Woodrow  Wilson's  foreign 
cies  than  the  Secretary  of  State, 
lert  Lansing  of  New  York.  He  came 
i^ilson's  attention  during  the  cam- 
xn  of  1912  and  soon  became  the 

ident's  most  intimate  friend.  A 
it,  self-effacing  man,  but  one  of 
6  ambition,  House  established  close 
tions  with  important  European 
ers,  particularly  in  Great  Britain. 

The  President  sent  him  to  Europe 
.•e  during  the  period  of  neutrality 
14-17)  to  explore  the  possibility 
lediating  the  European  conflict, 
ise  later  served  as  a  special  execu- 

agent  during  the  period  of  Ameri- 
belligerency  (1917-18)  repre.sent- 
the  United  States  at  an  important 
r- Allied  conference  held  in  Paris 
ing  November  1917  and  at  the 
irmistice  negotiations  in  October- 
ember  1918.  During  the  war 
ise  also  headed  a  group  of  experts 
wn  as  the  "Inquiry"  who  prepared 
irmation  to  be  used  by  the  Ameri- 
delegation  to  the  postwar  peace 
ference. 

President  Wilson  made  House  one 
he  American  peace  commissioners 
919,  and  the  Texan  played  a  sig- 
:ant  role  in  the  negotiations  that 
<  place  in  Paris.  Unfortunately  for 
I,  he  betrayed  a  tendency  to  com- 
mise  some  of  Wilson's  positions, 
bably  the  reason  for  a  rapid  cooling 
heir  friendship.  When  House  re- 
ned  from  Europe  he  was  no  longer 
come  at  the  White  House. 


n.  The  rise  of  the  "new  diplomacy" 
I  term  used  to  describe  statecraft 
ponsive  to  the  desires  of  popular 
jorities — brought  international 
itics  and  its  practitioners  fully  into 
■  consciousness  of  people  who  had 
jer  before  concerned  themselves 
th  foreign  relations. 


And  yet,  despite  its  enlarged 
operational  responsibilities  and  re- 
spectability, the  Department  of  State 
lost  much  of  its  influence  on  the  mak- 
ing of  foreign  policy.  Almost  all  the 
significant  decisions  of  the  conflict — 
to  pursue  strict  neutrality  in  1914,  to 
intervene  on  behalf  of  the  Allies  in 
1917,  to  champion  the  League  of 
Nations  in  1918,  and  to  negotiate  a 
peace  treaty  on  American  terms  in 
1919 — emanated  from  the  White 
House  without  decisive  contributions 
from  the  Secretary  of  State  and  his 
subordinates. 

Several  factors  helped  displace 
the  Department  of  State  as  the  prin- 
cipal source  of  advice  concerning  the 
most  crucial  questions  of  war  and 
peace.  One  important  reason  was  that 
President  Wilson  and  his  several  Sec- 
retaries of  State  did  not  establish 
close  and  confidential  relations  with 
each  other,  almost  always  a  precondi- 
tion for  influential  leadership  from 
the  Department  of  State.  Wilson  re- 
lied primarily  on  others  for  advice, 
notably  an  intimate  friend,  Edward  M. 
House  of  Texas.  A  less  obvious  but 
equally  significant  reason  was  that  the 
Department  was  poorly  organized  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  wartime.  It 
tended  to  act  slowly,  and  it  lacked  ex- 
pertise in  treating  military  issues. 
Moreover,  the  exigencies  of  the  na- 
tional emergency  dictated  the  partici- 
pation of  many  agencies  in  decisions 
about  foreign  relations — notably  the 
War  Department,  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment, the  Treasury,  and  temporary 
organizations  such  as  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board — but  the  Department  of 
State  was  not  prepared  to  take  a  lead- 
ing role  in  coordinating  this  activity. 
Finally,  modern  communications 
rendered  the  President  less  dependent 
on  the  Department  for  information 
than  in  earlier  periods. 

The  experience  of  modern  war- 
fare revealed  that  the  Department  of 
State  would  have  to  undergo  major 
changes.  In  January  1920,  Secretary 
of  State  Robert  Lansing  of  New  York 
put  his  finger  squarely  on  the  reason, 
writing  to  a  sympathetic  Congress- 
man, John  Jacob  Rogers  of  Massa- 
chusetts :  "The  machinery  of  govern- 
ment provided  for  dealing  with  our 
foreign  relations  is  in  need  of  complete 
repair  and  reorganization.  As  ade- 
quate as  it  may  have  been  when  the 
old  order  prevailed  and  the  aff'airs  of 
the  world  were  free  from  the  present 
perplexities  it  has  ceased  to  be  re- 
sponsive to  present  needs."  Three 


Lucile  Atcherson  passed  the  examination  for 
the  diplomatic  service  in  1922  and  became 
the  first  woman  Foreign  Service  officer. 

(Photo  taken  in  1978)  (Department  of  state  photo) 


categories  of  reform  were  required 
to  revivify  the  Department.  The  for- 
eign services  must  be  fully  profes- 
sionalized and  democratized ;  the 
structure  of  the  Department  must  be 
modernized  to  deal  efl'ectively  with  a 
whole  new  range  of  policy  matters  in 
a  transformed  environment;  and  rela- 
tions between  the  Department  and 
other  participants  in  the  foreign  policy 
process  must  be  clarified  and  con- 
ducted in  a  new  institutional  context. 

Measurable  improvement  occurred 
in  the  first  of  these  dimensions  after 
the  First  World  War,  when  Congress 
completed  the  prewar  movement  to- 
ward a  fully  professional  and  demo- 
cratic foreign  service.  Representative 
Rogers,  who  led  the  congressional 
campaign,  stated  his  objective  in  1923 : 
"Let  us  strive  for  a  foreign  service 
which  will  be  flexible  and  democratic ; 
which  will  attract  and  retain  the  best 
men  we  have;  which  will  off'er  reason- 
able pay,  reasonable  prospects  for  pro- 
motion, reasonable  provision  against 
want  when  old  age  comes  to  a  faithful 
servant."  Hugh  Gibson,  a  respected 
diplomat  interested  in  reform,  sup- 
ported Rogers,  arguing  that  improve- 
ments in  the  Diplomatic  and  Consular 


lllfarif  iflO-1 


Special 


Services  would  attract  the  most  quali- 
fied candidates  so  that  "we  can  choose 
our  men  by  the  only  good  method — 
that  is,  by  keen  competition."  He 
hoped  for  creation  of  "a  real  diplo- 
matic career,  which  is  open  to  any 
American  citizen  who  has  the  neces- 
sai*y  qualifications." 

The  Rogers  Act,  which  became 
law  on  May  24,  1924,  codified  the  re- 
form of  the  foreign  services.  It  estab- 
lished a  career  organization  based  on 
competitive  examination  and  merit 
promotion.  To  eliminate  invidious 
distinctions  between  the  Consular  and 
Diplomatic  Services,  the  two  groups 
were  amalgamated  into  a  unified  orga- 
nization whose  members  were  made 
available  for  both  types  of  activities. 
Henceforth,  members  of  what  was 
now  called  the  "Foreign  Service  of  the 
United  States  of  America"  would  be 
commissioned  in  a  given  class  with 
specified  salaries  rather  than  to  over- 
seas missions  or  posts.  Salaries  would 
range  from  .$3,000  for  the  lowest  level. 
Class  9,  to  .$9,000  for  Class  1.  Officers 
would  be  placed  in  positions  for  3 
years  with  the  presumption  of  regular 
rotation  to  other  assignments.  The 
Rogers  Act  granted  regular  home 
leave  and  set  up  a  good  retirement 
system.  It  also  authorized  representa- 
tional expenses,  although  these  allow- 
ances were  not  granted  until  1931.  A 
special  reinstatement  provision  per- 
mitted career  officers  who  became 
chiefs  of  mission  to  remain  in  the 
Foreign  Service  after  completing  their 
tours  of  duty.  Earlier  they  had  been 
required  to  resign  without  assurance 
of  a  future  Presidential  appointment 
to  other  responsible  duties,  a  sure  way 
of  discarding  the  most  experienced  and 
competent  officers  at  the  height  of 
their  abilities. 

Related  actions  helped  support 
the  fundamental  objectives  of  the 
Rogers  Act.  In  1925  the  Foreign  Serv- 
ice School  was  founded  to  provide 
specialized  training  in  languages  and 
other  necessary  skills — recognition 
that  modern  complexities  of  function 
required  educational  updating  at  all 
stages  of  a  career  in  the  Foreign  Serv- 
ice. In  192C  Congress  passed  the  For- 
eign Service  Buildings  Act,  an  im- 
provement of  the  Lowden  Act.  It 
permitted  purchase  or  construction 
of  buildings  overseas  for  the  use  of 
missions  and  consulates.  This  measure 
further  lessened  the  need  to  possess 
independent  means  in  order  to  rise  to 
the  highest  levels  of  the  Foreign 
Service. 


Foreign  Relations 
of  the  United  States 

In  1861  Secretary  of  State  William  H. 
Seward  decided  to  publish  his  im- 
portant diplomatic  despatches.  This 
decision  established  the  policy  of 
jjublishing  the  record  of  American 
diplomacy.  The  documentary  publi- 
cation entitled  Foreign  Relatione  of 
the  United  States  is  the  oldest  and 
most  extensive  enterprise  of  its  kind. 

The  editors  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  series  include  in  volumes 
"all  documents  needed  to  give  a 
comprehensive  record  of  the  major 
foreign  policy  decisions  within  the 
range  of  the  Dei)artment  of  State's 
responsibilities,  together  with  ap- 
propriate materials  concerning  the 
facts  which  contributed  to  the  formu- 
lation of  policies."  The  editors  are 
enjoined  to  honor  "the  principles  of 
historical  objectivit.y."  They  may  not 
omit  information  "for  the  purpose  of 
concealing  or  glossing  over  what  might 
be  regai'ded  by  some  as  a  defect  of 
policy." 

In  addition  to  annual  volumes  for 
every  year  except  1869,  certain  special 
sets  have  been  prepared,  covering 
important  topics  such  as  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference  of  1919  and  the 
summit  meetings  of  the  Second  World 
War.  To  date  283  volumes  have  been 
published.  Volumes  covering  the  19.50s 
are  now  beginning  to  appear. 


Certain  defects  of  the  Rogers  Act 
became  apparent  after  a  few  years, 
especially  inequities  in  the  promotion 
of  people  serving  in  consular  assign- 
ments, and  Congress  moved  to  correct 
them  in  1931.  The  Moses-Linthicum 
Act  reorganized  the  Board  of  Foreign 
Service  Personnel  to  insure  impartial 
promotion  practices.  Other  sections 
of  the  law  improved  salaries,  author- 
ized paid  annual  leave  and  sick  leave, 
set  up  an  improved  retirement  system, 
and  confei'red  career  status  on  clerks 
in  the  Foreign  Service.  Unfortunately 
many  of  these  gains  proved  transient. 
Economies  in  government  that  ac- 
companied the  Great  Depression  led 


to  suspension  of  promotion,  a  reduc- 
tion of  IS^v  in  salaries,  abolition  of 
representational  and  living  allowanc 
elimination  of  paid  home  leaves,  and 
suspension  of  recruiting  for  4  years. 
The  result  was  a  10^  reduction  in  t 
size  of  the  service  between  July  193^ 
and  December  1934. 

The  Department  of  State  did  nc 
undergo  a  thorough  structural  reorg 
nization  after  the  First  World  War. 
In  1924  the  Secretary,  who  had  final 
responsibility  for  policy  and  admini: 
tration,  had  relatively  few  senior  of- 
ficials to  help  him.  The  Under  Secre- 
tary provided  support  on  policies  of 
special  import.  Three  Assistant  Seci 
taries  helped  with  certain  matters — 
the  First  Assistant  Secretary  with 
economic  and  financial  questions,  th 
Second  Assistant  Secretary  with  ini 
national  law  and  related  questions,  ; 
the  Third  Assistant  Secretary  with 
administration.  The  Chief  Clerk  su- 
pervised the  Department's  clerks  ai 
looked  after  its  property.  The  Direc 
of  the  Consular  Service  served  as 
budget  officer  for  the  Department  a; 
well  as  the  principal  consular  officia 
The  Solicitor  handled  legal  business 
and  the  Economic  Adviser  made 
recommendations  concerning  interi 
tional  trade  and  finance.  Five  geo- 
graphic bureaus  maintained  commi 
cations  between  Washington  and 
missions  abroad.  Various  other  org 
nizations,  such  as  the  Division  of 
Passport  Control  and  the  Bureau  oi 
Accounts,  provided  various  types  ti 
support. 

From  time  to  time  modificatioi 
were  made  in  the  basic  structure  cr 
ated  in  1909.  New  divisions  or  burc 
were  created  on  occasion  to  managi 
new  functions  or  to  improve  estab- 
lished ones.  For  example,  a  Divisioi' 
of  Publications  was  established  in 
1921  to  centralize  work  on  infornia 
tional  projects  such  as  the  documer 
tary  series  Foreign  Relations  of  tin 
United  States.  In  1929  a  Division  o 
International  Conferences  and  Pro 
tocol  was  formed  to  cope  with  a  con 
siderable  increase  in  the  number  of 
multilateral  negotiations  that  oc- 
curred during  the  postwar  decade 
after.  In  1938  a  Division  of  Cultun 
Relations  appeared  that  dealt  with 
new  form  of  activity — cultural  dipl 
macy — and  also  a  Division  of  Inter 
national  (^immunications  that  pro- 
vided modern  telecommunications. 


S26 


Deoartment  of  State  Bu 


Special 


In  the  absence  of  an  overall  re- 
nization,  these  changes,  however 
fill  in  themselves,  did  not  make 
'lent  impact.  The  failure  to  mod- 
le  the  Department  of  State  re- 
d  the  general  decline  in  the 
n's  commitment  to  an  energetic 
ign  policy  after  the  Senate  re- 
ated  the  Treaty  of  Versailles, 
ident  Wilson  was  the  first  Ameri- 
eader  to  develop  an  international 
■n  that  cast  the  United  States  in 
ole  of  global  leader,  but  the  nation 
not  yet  prepared  to  accept  perma- 
international  responsibilities 
nensurate  with  its  power.  Charles 
awes,  who  served  as  Ambassador 
reat  Britain  during  the  Adminis- 
on  of  President  Herbert  Hoover 
;9-33) ,  could  say  only  half  hu- 
>usly  that  being  an  ambassador 
hard  on  the  feet  and  easy  on  the 
1. 

During  the  1920s  Americans 
tly  resisted  international  com- 
lents  of  a  truly  binding  character, 
rely  because  of  leadership  from 
etary  of  State  Charles  Evans 
hes,  the  Administration  of  Presi- 
Warren  G.  Harding  sponsored 
'Vashington  Naval  Disarmament 
'erence  of  1921-22,  and  Secretary 
;ate  Frank  Kellogg,  who  served 
ident  Calvin  Coolidge,  played  a 
ng  role  in  the  creation  of  the 
s  Peace  Pact  ( 1928 ) ,  a  multi- 
•al  instrument  that  outlawed  of- 
ive  warfare.  But  these  accomplish- 
ts  did  not  alter  the  strongly  iso- 
nist  cast  of  American  foreign 
■y — a  reversion  that  stemmed  not 
from  disillusionment  after  the 
t  World  War  but  from  the  absence 
Dparent  challenges  to  national 
rity.  Clear  and  present  dangers 
srialized  after  1929  during  the 
it  Depression.  These  massive  eco- 
ic  shocks  reinforced  the  country's 
itionist  inclinations  during  the  rise 
)talitarianism. 

The  consequence  of  these  develop- 
ts  for  the  Department  of  State  and 
Foreign  Service  was  a  tendency  to 
pt  the  relatively  low  priority  at- 
ed  to  international  affairs  during 
"long  armistice"  from  1919  to 
).  In  the  1920s  the  Department  of 
imerce  rather  than  the  Department 
tate  provided  leadership  in  spon- 
ng  expanded  international  trade 
investment.  During  the  early 
I's  of  President  Franklin  D. 
sevelt's  New  Deal  in  the  1930s, 
Secretary  of  State,  Cordell  Hull 


/^IP*?!^' 


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SHOBOE 

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m 

Despite  rejection  of  the  Versailles  TVeaty  and  the  League  of  Nations,  the  United  States 
hosted  the  Washington  Naval  Disarmament  Conference  in  1921-22.  Representatives  of  nine 
nations  reached  agreements  to  limit  naval  construction  and  to  respect  each  other's  interests 

in  the  Far  East.  lUbrar>' "ft'onKress  photo) 


of  Tennessee,  strongly  supported  ef- 
forts to  reduce  barriers  to  interna- 
tional trade,  but  this  enterprise  was 
not  by  itself  sufficient  to  combat  the 
Depression  or  deter  German  aggres- 
sion in  Europe  and  Japanese  e.xpan- 
sion  in  East  Asia. 

The  Department  of  State  grew 
slowly  during  the  interwar  years. 
Between  1920  and  1930,  the  domestic 
work  force  increased  from  708  to  only 
714,  the  Foreign  Service  from  514  to 
633,  and  annual  expenditures  from 
$13.6  million  to  $14  million.  The  func- 
tions of  the  Foreign  Service  did  not 
change  materially.  Its  members  de- 
voted themselves  to  representation, 
negotiation,  reporting,  protection  of 
American  citizens  and  their  interests, 
trade  promotion,  and  consular  tasks. 
One  historian  has  described  the  gen- 
erally backward  state  of  the  organiza- 
tion when  Secretary  Hull  assumed 
control.  "In  1933  the  Department  was 
small,  placid,  comfortably  adjusted  to 
the  lethargic  diplomacy  of  the  pre- 
ceding decade,  and  suffused  with 


Charles  Evans  Hughes  served  as  Secretary 
of  State  from  1921  to  1925.  His  opening 
speech  to  the  Washington  conference  on  the 
limitation  of  armaments  proposed  naval 
restrictions  that  "sank"  more  ships  in  15 
minutes  "than  all  the  admirals  of  the  world 
have  sunk  in  a  cycle  of  centuries."  He  later 
became  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

(Deparlnient  uf  Stale  photo) 


S27 


Special 


Cartoonist  Clifford  K.  Berry  man  views  recognition  of  the  Soviet  Union.  (Library  mconKress  photo 


V^tciRi.  it's  a  case  or  TOO  Kany  cooKS. 


William  C.  Bullitt  sened  as  the  first  Am' 
fan  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet  Union  (19.V 
36);  he  was  also  Ambassador  to  France 

(1936—40).  (I)f{iartinent  of  State  photo) 


habits  of  thought  that  i-eached  back 
to  a  still  earlier  day."  Overseas  mis- 
sions were  in  a  comparable  state. 
"The  Foreign  Service — genteel,  sloi 
moving,  and  complacent — also  cher- 
ished its  ties  with  the  past."  Althou 
many  highly  qualified  people  served 
home  and  abroad,  their  presence  die 
not  in  itself  insure  effective  institu- 
tional performance:  "Individual  coi' 
petence  is  seldom  proof  against  out- 
moded procedures  and  relaxed  stanc 
ards  of  accomplishment."  The  Unit* 
States  still  lacked  an  apparatus  for 
the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  ap- 
propriate to  the  modern  era. 

The  neglect  of  foreign  relation; 
that  characterized  the  interwar  yea 
dissipated  rapidly  with  the  onset  of 
the  Second  World  War;  the  undenia 
menace  of  Hitler's  Germany  and  its 
partners,  Italy  and  Japan,  forced  thi 
U.S.  Government  to  increasingly  int 
ventionist  policy,  particularly  given 
the  Axis  victories  of  19,39-41,  when 
the  nation  again  adopted  neutrality. 
President  Franklin  Roosevelt  took  tl 
initiative:  He  launched  rearmament 
authorized  the  sale  of  destroyers  to 
Great  Britain  in  return  for  leases  or 
certain  bases  in  the  western  Atlantii 
and  eventually  provided  wholesale 
economic  assistance  to  the  anti- 


A  perennial  problem  in  American  foreign  policy,  ii-ibiary  of  Coiigrcs,s  photo) 


S28 


Deoartment  of  State  Bull 


Special 


1  Bryan  Owen,  daughter  of  William 
lings  Bryan,  was  America's  first  woman 
•f  of  Mission.  She  served  as  Minister  to 
mark  from  19.33  to  1936. 

rtment  of  State  photo) 


man  coalition  of  Great  Britain  and 
Soviet  Union  by  means  of  the 
d-Lease  Act  { 1941) .  Nevertheless, 
United  States  did  not  enter  the 

until  the  Japanese  air  raid 
inst  Pearl  Harbor  on  December  7, 
1. 

The  American  intervention  of 
1,  like  that  of  1917,  committed  the 
ted  States  to  another  period  of 
mse  international  activity,  an 
2ome  that  added  greatly  to  the 
<s  of  the  Department  of  State.  It 
apted  responsibility  for  evacuating 
ericans  from  combat  zones,  repre- 
ting  the  interests  of  belligerents 
inemy  countries,  assisting  prisoner- 
var  exchanges,  maintaining  liaison 
h  the  International  Red  Cross,  and 
ling  with  refugees. 

During  the  war  the  most  notable 
rease  in  business  within  the  De- 
tment  occurred  in  the  economic 
i.  Officials  of  the  Department 
ped  coordinate  the  activities  of 
ious  wartime  agencies  set  up  to 
bilize  the  nation  for  total  war  and 
issist  in  the  reconstruction  of 
Mated  territories.  The  Department 
J  created  a  complex  system  to  pro- 


vide efficient  international  communica- 
tions, a  vital  aspect  of  waging  global 
war. 

To  perform  its  tasks,  the  foreign 
policy  community  grew  at  an  un- 
equalled rate.  In  1940  the  Department 
had  1,128  domestic  employees,  and  it 
survived  on  total  expenditures  of 
$24  million,  of  which  less  than  $3 
million  was  spent  at  home.  By  1945  the 
staff  had  grown  to  3,767  people,  and 
the  budget  for  all  operations  had  risen 
to  about  $.50  million.  Recruiting  for 
the  career  Foreign  Service  was  sus- 
pended during  the  war,  but  a  Foreign 
Service  Auxiliary  was  created  to  pro- 
vide additional  assistance.  It  sought 
experienced  elders  with  necessary 
qualifications  and  young  people  with 
abilities  comparable  to  those  of 
successful  prewar  candidates  for  the 
Foreign  Service.  By  January  1946, 
the  Auxiliary  included  976  people. 

To  manage  international  tasks 
that  would  not  be  taken  on  by  the 
Department,  a  number  of  wartime 
agencies  came  into  existence.  Among 
them  were  the  Board  of  Economic 
Warfare,  the  Office  of  War  Informa- 
tion, the  Office  of  Strategic  Services, 
the  Lend-Lease  Administration,  and 
the  Office  of  the  Coordinator  of  Inter- 
American  Affairs. 

And  yet,  as  during  the  First 
World  War,  the  President  largely 
ignored  the  Secretary's  advice  on 
policy  ;  the  Department  of  State  con- 
fined itself  mostly  to  day-to-day  opera- 
tions. Secretary  Hull  proved  influential 
only  in  one  area — preparation  of  plans 
for  postwar  international  organiza- 
tion. This  situation  stemmed  from  the 
Department's  failure  to  organize  for 
fully  effective  performance  in  war- 
time. Wartime  decisions  required 
coordination  of  political  ends  and 
military  means,  but  the  Department 
of  State  lacked  the  means — expertise 
and  institutions — to  exert  dominant 
influence  on  the  shaping  of  grand 
strategy.  Like  President  Wilson  before 
him.  President  Roosevelt  turned  to  a 
coterie  of  trusted  advisers,  among 
them  Harry  Hopkins,  Vice  President 
rienry  A.  Wallace,  General  George  C. 
Marshall,  Under  Secretary  of  State 
Sumner  Welles,  and  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  Henry  Morgenthau,  Jr. 
Although  Secretary  Hull  was  usually 
informed  of  important  decisions,  he 
rarely  participated  in  the  great  war- 
time conferences  at  which  the  leaders 
of  the  grand  alliance  forged  the 
victory  of  1945.  His  inability  to  gain 
the  President's  full  confidence  kept 


Another  Man 
Behind  the  Throne 

Harry  Hopkins  spent  his  earlier  career 
as  a  social  worker.  He  came  to  Wash- 
ington in  1933  as  one  of  the  New 
Dealers.  His  first  assignment  was  to 
administer  employment  relief;  he 
headed  the  Work  Projects  Administra- 
tion. In  1938  he  became  President 
Roosevelt's  Secretary  of  Commerce. 

As  World  War  II  approached. 
President  Roosevelt  turned  increas- 
ingly to  Hopkins  for  crucial  assign- 
ments. He  first  served  as  the  administra- 
tor of  the  Lend-Lease  Act  in  1941  and 
then  moved  to  the  White  House  as 
a  special  assistant.  In  this  capacity  he 
was  sent  on  secret  missions  to  serve  as 
the  President's  eyes  and  ears.  In  July 
1941  he  went  to  Moscow  to  work  out 
cooperation  with  Stalin  after  Germany 
attacked  the  Soviet  Union.  He  attended 
all  of  the  great  wartime  .summit  con- 
ferences such  as  Casablanca  (19431 
:ind  Yalta  (1945)  held  to  coordinate 
the  strategy  and  policy  of  the  "grand 
alliance" — the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Clo.sely 
attuned  to  the  needs  and  desires  of 
the  President,  he  also  gained  the  con- 
fidence of  Prime  Minister  Winston 
Churchill  and  Premier  Joseph  Stalin. 
His  last  public  service,  after  the  death 
of  President  Roosevelt,  was  to  visit 
Moscow  in  a  successful  effort  to  obtain 
Russian  cooperation  in  creating  the 
United  Nations. 


the  Department  from  a  reasonable 
part  in  many  major  decisions.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  Secretary  Hull 
should  have  commented  bitterly  to- 
ward the  end  of  his  service:  "When 
I  accepted  this  office,  I  knew  that  I 
would  be  misrepresented,  lied  about, 
let  down,  and  that  there  would  be 
humiliations  that  no  man  in  private 
life  could  accept  and  keep  his  self- 
respect.  But  I  made  up  my  mind  in 
advance  that  I  would  accept  all  these 
things  and  just  do  my  job." 

In  1943  Edward  R.  Stettinius,  Jr. 
of  Virginia  became  Under  Secretary 
of  State  and  immediately  began  to 
plan  a  major  reorganization  of  the 
Department  of  State,  an  enterprise 
that  stemmed  directly  from  wartime 


S29 


Special 


embarrassments.  One  journalist  sum- 
marized the  situation  aptly:  "Not- 
withstanding the  personal  prestige  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  [Hull],  the 
organization  he  heads  has  only  to  be 
mentioned  in  almost  any  circle,  Amer- 
ican or  foreign,  to  arouse  either 
doubt,  despair,  or  derision."  Stettinius' 
reorganization  marked  the  dividing 
line  between  the  old  Department  of 
State  and  the  present  agency.  He 
began  the  process  of  making  adjust- 
ments to  insure  that  the  Department 
would  participate  effectively  in  shap- 
ing the  nation's  foreign  relations 
during  the  difficult  postwar  era  that 
lay  ahead. 

Stettinius  concentrated  on  certain 
key  deficiencies  of  the  Department, 
particularly  unsound  division  of  re- 
sponsibility for  certain  important 
functions,  inadequate  means  of  ob- 
taining and  disseminating  informa- 
tion, and  ineffective  long-range 
planning.  On  December  20,  1944, 
shortly  after  Stettinius  succeeded 
Hull  as  Secretary  of  State,  he  issued 
Department  Order  1,301,  which  con- 
centrated similar  functions  in  the 
same  office  and  related  offices  under 
a  senior  official,  either  the  Under  Sec- 
retary or  one  of  six  Assistant 
Secretaries. 

To  coordinate  the  work  of  the 
Department,  insure  follow-through, 
and  conduct  long-range  planning. 
Order  1301  created  several  new  orga- 
nizations. A  Staff  Committee  consist- 
ing of  the  Secretary  and  his  principal 
subordinates  became  the  chief  mana- 
gerial group.  The  task  of  making 
initial  investigations  of  policy  matters 
and  controlling  interoffice  projects  was 
given  to  a  Coordinating  Committee. 
A  Joint  Secretariat  was  charged  with 
monitoring  Department  activity  to 
insure  efficient  action  on  decisions. 
Finally  a  Policy  Committee  and  a 
Committee  on  Postwar  Problems  were 
created  to  undertake  long-range 
planning. 

Secretary  Stettinius  also  recog- 
nized the  need  to  improve  the  manage- 
ment of  functions  that  overlapped  the 
jurisdictions  of  the  traditional  geo- 
graphic bureaus.  New  bureaus  were 
set  up  to  deal  with  trade  relations, 
cultural  diplomacy,  and  public  infor- 
mation. Another  important  functional 
organization  came  into  being  in 
September  1945 — the  Interim  Re- 
search and  Intelligence  Service,  the 
forerunner  of  the  present-day  Bureau 
of  Intelligence  and  Research.  These 


innovations  minimized  fragmentation 
of  jurisdiction  that  so  frequently  im- 
mobilized the  Department  when  quick 
decisions  were  required  in  a  crisis. 

Certain  other  steps  that  continued 
the  modernization  of  the  Department 
were  taken  during  the  service  of 
Secretary  of  State  James  F.  Byrnes 
of  South  Carolina,  who  succeeded 
Stettinius  in  July  1945,  shortly  after 
Harry  S.  Truman  became  President. 
The  most  important  activity  was  to 
gather  several  temporary  wartime 
organizations  into  the  permanent 
structure  of  the  Department,  espe- 
cially those  that  dealt  with  interna- 
tional economic  affairs.  In  August 
1946  the  Department  created  an  Under 
Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs.  This 
official  teamed  with  an  existing  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs  to 
supervise  economic  activities  and  to 
establish  effective  relations  with 
certain  international  institutions  such 
as  the  International  Bank  for  Recon- 
struction and  Development,  the  Inter- 
national Monetary  Tund,  and  the  Food 
and  Agriculture  Organization. 

To  modernize  personnel  practices. 
Congress  passed  the  Foreign  Service 
Act  of  1946,  which  became  law  on 
August  13,  1946.  It  was  intended  to 
"improve,  strengthen,  and  expand  the 
Foreign  Service  .  .  .  and  to  consolidate 
and  revise  the  laws  relating  to  its 
administration."  To  improve  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  Foreign  Service, 
the  act  of  1946  established  a  Director 
General  and  a  Board  of  the  Foreign 


Service,  and  to  maintain  the  principl 
of  competitive  entrance  it  set  up  a 
Board  of  Examiners.  It  also  providet 
for  improvements  in  assignments 
policy,  promotion  procedures,  allow- 
ances and  benefits,  home  leave,  and 
the  retirement  system.  Recognizing 
the  growing  importance  of  expertise 
in  certain  critical  areas,  it  created  tl 
Foreign  Service  Reserve  for  people 
needed  in  specialist  categories  such } 
lawyers,  doctors,  economists,  and 
intelligence  analysts.  Finally  the  act 
converted  the  Foreign  Service  Schoc 
into  the  modern  Foreign  Service 
Institute  to  offer  advanced  training 
for  Foreign  Service  officers  in  subjec 
of  particular  importance  to  the 
Department. 

The  new  Department  of  State 
emerged  from  World  War  II  better 
prepared  to  play  a  leading  role  in  the- 
foreign  policy  process  and  fully  awai 
that  the  tasks  ahead  loomed  more 
difficult  than  any  encountered  in 
earlier  years.  In  July  1945,  Secretar; 
Byrnes  recognized  the  extent  of  the 
postwar  challenge.  "Today  there  is  n 
doubt  that  the  people  of  this  war- 
ravaged  Earth  want  to  live  in  a  free 
and  peaceful  world.  The  supreme  tas 
of  statesmanship  in  the  world  over  i; 
to  help  them  understand  that  they 
can  have  peace  and  freedom  only  if 
they  tolerate  and  respect  the  rights 
of  others  to  opinions,  feelings,  and 
way  of  life  which  they  do  not  and 
cannot  share." 


.As  President  Harry  S.  IVunian  watches.  Secretary  of  State  Kdward  K.  Stettinius,  Jr.,  signs 
the  United  Nations  Charter  in  San  Francisco  on  .liine  2H,  194.5.  iDei.arim.-m  of  siai.phoioi 


S30 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


Special 


The  Age  of  Global  Leadership, 
1 947-Present 


In  April  1947  the  Department  of 
State  occupied  new  quarters  located 
in  a  section  of  Washington,  D.C., 
known  as  Foggy  Bottom.  This  move 
coincided  with  one  of  the  most 
striking  departures  in  the  history  of 
American  foreign  relations.  The 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
allies  during  the  Second  World  War, 
had  emerged  from  that  conflict  as  the 
sole  world  powers.  By  1947  efforts  to 
maintain  cooperation  had  broken 
down.  President  Harry  S.  Truman, 
working  closely  with  two  Secretaries 
of  State,  George  C.  Marshall  of 
Pennsylvania  and  Dean  G.  Acheson 
of  Maryland,  took  decisive  steps  to 
preclude  Soviet  aggression  against 
regions  in  which  the  United  States 
had  vital  interests. 

A  leading  expert  on  Soviet  affairs 
in  the  Department  of  State,  George 
F.  Kennan  ( soon  to  become  head  of 
the  Policy  Planning  Staff),  developed 
the  intellectual  basis  for  what  became 
known  as  the  policy  of  "containment." 
Kennan  concluded  that  "the  main 
element  of  any  United  States  policy 
toward  the  Soviet  Union  must  be 
that  of  a  long-term  patient  but  firm 
and  vigilant  containment  of  Russian 
expansive  tendencies."  This  concept 
inspired  a  series  of  successful  ini- 
tiatives undertaken  from  1947  to 
1950  in  which  the  Department  of 
State  played  a  leading  role. 

The  first  step  was  the  "Truman 
Doctrine"  of  March  1947.  Reacting 
to  fear  that  Greece  and  Turkey  might 
fall  victim  to  subversion  for  lack  of 
support  from  friendly  nations. 
President  Truman  asked  Congress  to 
authorize  $400  million  in  emergency 
assistance  to  the  two  nations.  To 
justify  this  course  he  stated:  "I 
believe  we  must  assist  free  peoples 
to  work  out  their  destinies  in  their 
own  way."  The  key  to  preventing 
overthrow  of  free  nations  was  to 
attack  the  conditions  of  "misery  and 
want"  that  nurtured  totalitarianism. 
Very  soon  this  general  idea  was 
applied  to  Western  Europe.  In  June 
1947,  Secretary  Marshall  proposed 
the  extension  of  massive  economic 
assistance  to  the  devastated  nations 
of  Europe,  saying  that  the  policy 


Secretary  of  State  George  C.  Marshall 
(1947-49)  proposed  the  European  recovery 
program,  better  known  as  the  Marshall  plan. 

( Department  of  State  photo) 


of  the  United  States  was  not  directed 
"against  any  country  or  doctrine  but 
again.st  hunger,  poverty,  desperation, 
and  chaos.  Its  purpose  should  be  the 
revival  of  a  working  economy  in 
the  world  so  as  to  permit  the 
existence  of  political  and  social  con- 
ditions in  which  free  institutions 
can  exist."  Congress  later  authorized 
the  European  Recovery  Program, 
better  known  as  the  Marshall  plan. 
An  investment  of  about  $13  billion 
in  Europe  during  the  next  few  years 
resulted  in  an  extraordinarily  rapid 
and  durable  reconstruction  of 
Western  Europe. 

It  soon  became  apparent  that 
there  must  be  a  political-militai-y 
dimension  to  the  policy  of  contain- 
ment. In  June  1948,  Senator  Arthur 
H.  Vandenberg  of  Michigan,  a  strong 
l^roponent  of  bipartisan  foreign 
policy,  sponsored  a  resolution  in  the 
Senate  that  set  the  nation's  course. 
It  called  for  "progressive  develop- 
ment of  regional  and  other  collective 
arrangements  for  individual  and 


Special 


collective  self-defense  in  accordance 
with  the  purposes,  principles,  and 
provisions  of  the  |  United  Nations] 
Charter."  President  Truman  had 
already  applied  this  concept  to  Latin 
America.  The  Rio  pact,  signed  in 
Septemlser  1947,  provided  that  "an 
armed  attack  by  any  State  shall  be 
considered  as  an  attack  against  all 
the  American  States  and,  conse- 
quently, each  one  of  the  said  Con- 
tracting Parties  undertakes  to  assist 
in  meeting  the  attack."  Collective 
security  was  invoked  once  again  in 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty.  Signed  in 
Washington  in  April  1949,  it  created 
the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organi- 
zation (  NATO ) .  The  Rio  pact  and  the 
NATO  pact  ended  the  policy  of  no 
entangling  alliances.  Economic  assist- 
ance to  endangered  regions  and 
collective  defense  agreements  with 
likeminded  nations  became  the  prin- 
cipal means  of  insuring  containment 
of  the  Soviet  bloc. 


Dean  .Ai-heson  was  the  architect  of  postwar 
collective  security.  While  he  was  Secretary 
of  State  (1949-,S:i),  the  United  States  negoti- 
ated the  North  Atlantic  TVeaty,  signed 
treaties  of  peace  and  mutual  defense  with 
Japan,  and  committed  its  armed  forces  to 
the  defense  of  South  Korea. 

(Photo  by  Kabian  Bat-hrat-h) 


During  the  Presidency  of  Dwight 
D.  Eisenhower  (1953-61),  the  United 
States  ratified  a  number  of  bilateral 
and  multilateral  treaties  designed  to 
extend  the  wall  of  containment  around 
the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies. 
Among  these  arrangements  were  the 
Central  Treaty  Organization 
(CENTO)  ;  the  Southeast  Asia  Treaty 
Organization  (SEATO) ;  and  bilateral 
treaties  with  Japan,  South  Korea,  the 
Republic  of  China,  and  the  Philip- 
pine Republic. 

At  times  the  United  States  was 
forced  to  counter  unexpected  probes 
along  the  dividing  line  between  the 
free  nations  and  their  rivals.  In  1948 
the  United  States  and  its  European 
allies  fended  off  a  dangerous  threat 
to  the  western  zones  of  occupied 
Berlin.  When  the  Soviet  Union 
interdicted  land  access,  the  city 
received  supplies  by  means  of  a 
massive  airlift.  Eventually  the  Rus- 
sians were  forced  to  lift  the  blockade. 
When  North  Korea  invaded  South 
Korea  in  1950,  the  United  States 
sponsored  a  "police  action"  under  the 
auspices  of  the  United  Nations  to 
curb  the  aggressor.  After  a  long 
struggle  the  United  Nations  Com- 
mand preserved  the  independence 
of  South  Korea.  In  1954  the  United 
States  took  a  strong  stand  in  favor 
of  Taiwan  when  the  Chinese  People's 
Republic  bombarded  certain  islands 
off  the  Chinese  mainland.  In  1955 
assistance  began  to  flow  to  the  new- 
nation  of  South  Vietnam,  created 
after  the  withdrawal  of  France  from 
Indochina. 

The  evolution  of  containment  had 
remarkable  effects  on  the  agencies 
most  concerned  with  American  foreign 
relations.  Soon  after  the  Second 
World  War,  Congress  created  a  new 
institutional  structure  to  reach  sound 
decisions  relating  to  national  security 
and  to  put  those  decisions  into  effect. 
The  National  Security  Act  of  1947 
recognized  that  the  President  must 
have  the  ability  to  control  national 
security  policy  and  that  to  achieve 
this  object  there  must  be  "a  single, 
toji-ranking  body  to  form  and  cor- 
relate national  policy."  The  institution 
founded  to  perform  this  function  was 
the  National  Security  Council  (NSC). 


The  creation  of  the  NSC  did  not 
displace  the  Secretary  of  State  as 
the  President's  senior  adviser  on 
international  questions;  it  simply 
insured  that  all  concerned  agencies 
would  make  cooperative  contribution 
to  the  decisionmaking  process  in 
appropriate  measure.  The  principal 
participants  in  the  NSC,  acting  at 
the  direction  of  the  President,  are 
the  Vice  President  and  representativ 
of  the  Department  of  State,  the  De- 
partment of  Defense,  the  Joint  Chie: 
of  Staff,  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency,  and,  on  occasion,  interde- 
partmental groups  ranging  in  natun 
from  small  informal  committees  to 
large,  highly  organized  councils. 
Proliferation  of  interagency  organi- 
zations reflected  the  fact  that  few 
national-security  issues  could  be  dea^ 
with  by  only  one  agency. 

The  NSC  structure  for  making 
national  security  decisions  provided 
an  institutional  vehicle  through  whi 
the  Department  of  State  could  exert 
a  continuing  influence  on  the  nation' 
"grand  strategy,"  that  is,  the  sys- 
tematic design  for  insuring  national 
security  that  pulls  together  the  basi 
means  of  exercising  national  power- 
political,  economic,  psychological,  ar 
military  measures — something  that 
the  Department  had  found  difficult  t 
accomplish  during  the  troubled  yeai 
between  1914  and  1945. 

Nevertheless,  the  Department  c 
State  realizes  its  full  potential  in  th 
new  institutional  context  only  if  the 
Secretary  of  State  gains  the  confi- 
dence of  the  President.  The  Depart- 
ment's signal  contributions  to  the 
containment  policy  stemmed  from 
close  associations  between  Presiden' 
Truman  and  Secretaries  Marshall  ai 
Acheson.  Truman  was  always  anxio 
to  complete  action  on  important  que 
tions ;  he  wanted  to  make  his  de- 
cision as  soon  as  he  had  a  sound  basil 
Secretary  Acheson,  notes  his  biog- 
rapher, "could  always  provide  an 
adequate  basis,  or  its  appearance, 
before  any  rival  body.  ...  In  the 
race  with  time,  which  was  the  key 
to  influence  over  the  President, 
Acheson  was  unbeatable."  Secretary 
of  State  John  Foster  Dulles  estab- 
lished effective  communication  with 
President  Eisenhower  after  1953, 
thereby  insuring  that  the  Departme; 
of  State  continued  to  receive  a  heari 
at  the  White  House. 


S32 


Deparfment  of  State  Bull( 


Special 


1  Foster  Uulles  extended  American  al- 
ces  to  Southeast  Asia  and  the  Middle 
t.  As  Secretary  of  State  (1953-59),  he 
leled  half  a  million  miles  and  visited  KO 
ntries.  He  coined  such  colorful  de- 
Dtions  of  his  policies  as  "liberation." 
ing  to  the  brink,"  "agonizing  reap- 
sal,"  and  "massive  retaliation." 

^rtment  of  State  photo) 


The  revolution  in  American 
foreign  policy  that  occurred  after  the 
Second  World  War  greatly  affected 
the  po.sition  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 
Before  1941  domestic  political  con- 
siderations rather  than  the  need  for 
expertise  in  foreign  affairs  usually 
guided  the  President  in  his  choice  of 
the  senior  foreign  policy  adviser,  but 
after  1945  most  of  the  Secretaries 
were  selected  because  they  possessed 
broad  experience  and  technical  skills 
deemed  essential  to  effective  per- 
formance. Before  1941  Secretaries 
usually  remained  in  Washington, 
depending  on  ambassadors  or  execu- 
tive agents  to  conduct  negotiations 
overseas,  but  after  1945  Secretaries 
traveled  extensively.  Before  1941 
Secretaries  did  not  usually  concen- 
trate on  the  management  of  the 
Department  of  State,  but  after  1945 
they  had  to  give  large  amounts  of 
time  to  administration.  The  burdens 
of  office  have  greatly  increased,  but 
there  has  been  a  significant  com- 
pensation. Secretaries  have  gained  in 
prestige,  a  consequence  of  the  high 
priority  accorded  to  foreign  relations 
in  recent  years. 


fw  Department  of  State  Building 


e  present  home  of  the  Department 
State  is  at  2200  C  Street.  North- 
st.  On  January  5.  1957,  President 
senhower  joined  with  Secretary 
illes  in  laying  the  cornerstone.  The 
esident  used  the  same  trowel  that 
.s  used  by  George  Washington  to  lay 
i  cornerstone  of  the  U.S.  Capitol  in 
93.  A  sealed  metal  box  containing  a 
ection  of  historic  documents  was 
posited  in  the  cornerstone.  The 


building  was  completed  in  1961. 

This  structure  covers  four  square 
blocks  and  has  seven  floors  of  oflice 
space.  An  eighth  floor  is  used  for 
official  functions  such  as  diplomatic 
dinners  and  receptions.  These  rooms 
are  furnished  largely  with  a  growing 
collection  of  antiques  and  art  treasures 
provided  by  the  American  people  on 
loan  or  as  gifts. 


Extensive  international  activity 
after  the  Second  World  War  led  to 
great  changes  in  the  Department  of 
State.  Members  of  the  Foreign  Serv- 
ice performed  duties  that  went  far 
beyond  the  traditional  missions  of 
political  representation,  negotiation, 
and  reporting.  Knowledge  of  varied 
scientific,  economic,  cultural,  and 
social  issues  became  essential.  In 
1970  a  Department  publication, 
Diplomacy  for  the  70' s,  drew  attention 
to  this  development.  It  noted  that  the 
agency  now  had  to  conduct  "critically 
important  programs  for  promoting 
our  commercial  exports,  for  con- 
cessional sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, for  narcotics  control,  for 
military  and  development  aid,  for  the 
inspection  and  licensing  of  airline 
routes,  for  cooperation  in  the  peaceful 
applications  of  atomic  energy,  for 
scientific  and  technological  exchange, 
for  coordinating  international  mone- 
tary policy,  and  for  communicating 
directly  with  people  of  other  countries 
through  the  media  of  press,  radio, 
and  television." 

To  provide  an  adequate  institu- 
tional framework  for  its  varied 
responsibilities,  many  of  which  could 
not  be  accommodated  in  the  existing 
geographic  bureaus,  the  Department 
established  many  new  functional 
organizations.  As  of  1980  there  were 
14  such  units,  each  headed  by  an 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  or  an 
official  of  comparable  rank,  as 
against  five  geographic  bureaus. 
Functional  bureaus  created  since  the 
Second  World  War  cover  such  diverse 
concerns  as  Intelligence  and  Research, 
Congressional  Relations,  Politico- 
Military  Affairs,  Oceans  and  Inter- 
national Environmental  and  Scientific 
Affairs,  and  Human  Rights  and 
Humanitarian  Affairs. 

Certain  other  functions  earlier 
housed  in  the  Department  of  State 
are  now  the  responsibility  of  other 
organizations.  The  U.S.  International 
Communication  Agency  (USICA) 
manages  international  informational 
activities  and  cultural  relations. 
Foreign  economic  assistance  is  now 
in  the  hands  of  the  Agency  for 
International  Development  (AID). 
Another  vital  enterprise — arms  con- 
trol negotiations — is  the  principal 
task  of  the  Arms  Control  and  Dis- 
armament Agency  (ACDA). 


inuarv  1981 


S33 


Special 


To  assist  the  Secretary  of  State 
the  Department  now  has  a  large  team 
of  central  managers.  The  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State  serves  when  neces- 
sary as  the  Acting  Secretary  and, 
with  the  Counselor  of  the  Department, 
is  available  for  special  assignments. 
Four  Under  Secretaries  of  State 
oversee  important  functional  areas — 
political  affairs;  economic  affairs; 
management;  and  security  assistance, 
science,  and  technology.  Special  sup- 
port for  the  Secretary  comes  from 
the  Executive  Secretariat,  a  unit  set 
up  to  control  information  flow  and  to 
follow  up  decisions,  and  from  the 
Policy  Planning  Staff. 

Administrative  problems  also 
materialized  overseas  when  many 
agencies  of  the  U.S.  Government 
entered  the  foreign  field.  This  influx 
ultimately  caused  jurisdictional  dis- 
l)utes,  disorderly  management,  and 
widespread  inefficiency.  To  restore 
order  President  Eisenhower  issued  a 
series  of  Executive  orders  that 
established  the  Ambassador  as  the 
supervisor  for  all  operations  within 
his  country.  The  chief  of  mission 
became  the  leader  of  a  "country  team" 
that  included  representatives  of  all 
organizations  with  operational  re- 
sponsibilities, for  example,  the  De- 
partment of  Defense,  the  U.S. 
Information  Service  (the  precedessor 
agency  of  USICA  ),  the  Department  of 
Agriculture,  and  the  Peace  Corps. 
Further  improvement  occurred  in 
1966  when  President  Lyndon  B. 
.Johnson  and  Secretary  of  State  Dean 
Rusk  arranged  for  "country  directors" 
in  the  geographic  bureaus,  who  sup- 
ported chiefs  of  mission  ;  they  com- 
municated policy  guidance  and 
mobilized  operational  and  adminis- 
trative support  for  the  country 
team. 

The  revolution  in  foreign  policy 
pi-oduced  much  greater  growth  in 
the  Department  of  State  than  in  any 
previous  period.  A  few  statistics 
graphically  illustrate  this  pattern. 
The  domestic  work  force  enlarged 
from  1,128  in  1940  to  a  postwar  high 
of  8,609  in  1950.  The  total  declined  to 
6.98;i  in  1970,  but  ro.se  to  8,4.33  in 
1980,  still  below  the  level  of  1950. 
The  Foreign  Service  expanded  at  a 
similar  rate.  From  a  mere  840  in 


1940  it  jumped  to  a  high  of  7,710 
in  1950.  The  total  number  in  all 
categories  of  the  Foreign  Service  in 
1980  was  5,861.  The  budget  of  the 
Department  also  rose  spectacularly, 
even  if  inflation  is  taken  into  account. 
In  1940  the  total  expenditure  was 
$24  million  but  by  1950  it  reached 
$350.9  million.  After  a  decline  to 
$246.6  million  in  1960,  expenditures 
climbed  to  $447.8  million  in  1970 
and  to  $2,354,139,275.69  in  1980. 
Even  so  the  Department  of  State  has 
the  lowest  budget  of  all  Cabinet 
departments. 

After  the  accomplishments  of 
the  immediate  postwar  years,  the 
Department  of  State  suffered  a 
crippling  blow  when  it  became  the 
prime  target  of  Senator  Joseph 
McCarthy's  search  for  subversives 
in  the  U.S.  Government.  In  February 
1950,  shortly  after  the  Soviet  Union 
acquired  nuclear  weapons  and  Mao 
Zedong  seized  power  in  China,  the 
Wisconsin  Senator  launched  his  anti- 
Communist  crusade  with  a  speech  in 
Wheeling,  West  Virginia.  Depicting 
the  international  position  of  the 
United  States  in  the  most  dire  terms, 
he  insisted:  "How  can  we  account 
for  our  present  situation  unless  we 
believe  that  men  high  in  the  govern- 


ment are  concerting  to  deliver  us  to 
disaster?  This  must  be  the  product 
of  a  great  conspiracy  on  a  scale  so 
immense  as  to  dwarf  any  previous 
venture  in  the  history  of  man."  He 
announced  that  he  had  a  list  of  205 
subversives — "a  list  of  names  that 
were  made  known  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  as  being  members  of  the 
Communist  Party  and  who  never- 
theless are  still  working  and  shapini 
policy  in  the  State  Department." 
Senator  McCarthy  never  made  publi 
such  a  list.  A  number  of  the  most 
experienced  Foreign  Service  officers 
notably  the  Department's  corps  of 
Far  Eastern  experts — were  forced  c 
of  the  Department  or  their  reputatii 
were  otherwise  seriously  damaged. 
Senator  McCarthy  never  proved  anj 
of  his  irresponsible  allegations. 

McCarthy's  allegations  had  a 
lasting  effect  on  those  who  remainec 
in  the  Department.  John  W.  Ford,  a 
security  officer  at  the  time,  has  sinc« 
noted  that  "few  people  who  lived 
through  the  McCarthy  era  in  the 
Department  of  State  can  ever  forgel 
the  fear,  intimidation,  and  sense  of 
outrage  which  permeated  Foggy 
Bottom."  In  1978  the  Under  Secreta 
of  State  for  Political  Affairs,  David 
D.  Newsom,  said:  "I  can  recall  the 


Loy  W.  Henderson  heKan  his  diplomatic  career  as  Vice  Consul  in  Duhlin  in  1922.  His  'M  ye 
of  service  included  assignments  as  Minister  to  Iraq  (194:$— 15),  Ambassador  to  India  (194K-5 
and  to  Iran  (1951-54),  and  Deputy  Under  Secretary  for  Administration  (19.55).  The 
Department's  international  conference  room  was  dedicated  to  him  in  1976. 

I  Department  uf  State  phutu) 


npnartmpnt  of  State  Bull« 


Special 


:k  of  the  taunts  and  suspicions 
led  at  the  State  Department  and 
;e  who  served  in  it.  It  must  be 
sfying-,  but  not  full  recompense, 
those  who  suffered  in  that  period 
ave  our  nation  now  realize  that 
were  substantially  right." 
The  notion  that  the  Department 
ed  the  nation's  enemies  lingered 
or  many  years.  Senator  Henry 
lackson  of  Washington  put  his 
er  on  one  reason  for  the  tendency 
3vel  unjustified  criticism  at  the 
lartment.  "We  know  that  the  State 
lartment  has  been  a  target  for  all 
he  problems  of  the  cold  war 
luse  it  is  called  the  State  De- 
tment — it  is  the  Foreign  Office.  It 
very  popular  target — and  does  not 
e  any  constituents."  The  relative 
ence  of  powerful  and  assertive 
port  from  organized  interest 
ups,  especially  in  comparison  with 
it  other  major  agencies,  renders 
Department  of  State  vulnerable  to 
fsponsible  charges,  especially  in 
iods  of  international  stress.  It 
ally  can  be  attacked  without  fear 
lerious  retaliation. 

While  the  Department  struggled 
h  McCarthyism,  it  also  sought  to 
lernize  its  personnel  practices, 
twar  growth  produced  what  one 


Mpiomatic  and 

Consular  Posts 

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historian  described  as  "inertia,  inflex- 
ibility, and  loss  of  efficiency  in  the 
use  of  personnel."  Stanton  Griffis,  a 
businessman  who  served  as  Ambas- 
sador to  several  countries,  later 
satirized  the  confused  situation. 
Overseas  missions  constituted  "a 
fantastic  network  of  men,  women,  and 
typewriters,  who  report  [on]  .  .  . 
political,  economic,  labor,  and  agri- 
cultural conditions."  These  reports 
then  went  to  Washington,  where  they 
were  immediately  filed  away.  Then 
"the  home  team,  having  properly 
disposed  of  the  information  from  the 
field,  proceeds  to  write  its  own  endless 
reports  to  go  forward  to  the  same 
ultimate  fate  in  the  embassies 
throughout  the  world." 

The  personnel  problems  of  the  De- 
partment of  State  attracted  the 
attention  of  a  commission,  headed  by 
former  President  Hoover,  created  to 
investigate  all  aspects  of  government 
organization  after  World  War  II. 
In  1949  the  commission  called  for 
reforms  to  eliminate  one  important 
source  of  difficulty — invidious  distinc- 
tions between  the  Foreign  Service  and 
the  civil  servants  who  staffed  the 
Department's  headquarters  in 
Washington. 

Several  years  later,  in  1954,  Secre- 
tary of  State  John  Foster  Dulles 
asked  Henry  M.  Wriston,  the 
President  of  Brown  University,  to 
undertake  a  study  of  the  Department's 
personnel  practices.  Dulles  drew 
attention  to  a  number  of  concerns, 
among  them  poor  morale  because  of 
managerial  shortcomings,  low  intake 
into  the  Foreign  Service,  and  inequi- 
ties that  stemmed  from  differences  in 
the  treatment  of  different  categories 
of  employees.  After  examining  these 
matters.  President  Wriston  called  for 
integration  of  many  Civil  Service 
employees  into  the  Foreign  Service. 
There  followed  several  years  of 
"Wristonization"  ;  by  the  end  of 
1957  the  Foreign  Service  had  more 
than  doubled  in  size  to  3,436  officers. 
By  August  1959,  1,523  Foreign  Service 
officers  held  positions  in  the  Depart- 
ment, a  device  intended  to  improve 
communications  between  Washington 
and  the  missions  overseas  and  to  fulfill 
the  legal  requirement  that  Foreign 
Service  officers  spend  a  portion  of 
their  careers  at  home. 

Although  the  reforms  of  the 
early  postwar  years  served  the  De- 
partment well,  the  march  of  events 
during  the  1950s  and  especially  the 


1960s  posed  new  difficulties.  The 
innovative  concept  of  containment 
began  to  lose  some  of  its  utility  as 
a  rough  balance  of  power  was  estab- 
lished in  Europe  and  East  Asia.  As 
East- West  tensions  subsided  some- 
what, new  strains  developed  along  a 
North-South  axis.  After  the  Second 
World  War,  which  completed  the 
destruction  of  the  great  European 
colonial  powers,  ancient  peoples 
everywhere  in  Africa  and  Asia 
recaptured  their  sovereignty.  A 
"revolution  in  rising  expectations" 
throughout  the  Third  World  spawned 
new  international  issues  that  greatly 
complicated  the  task  of  statecraft. 

The  need  to  make  significant 
changes  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  became  fully  apparent 
during  the  war  in  South  Vietnam. 
The  modest  intervention  that  began 
in  1955  after  the  departure  of  France 
from  Indochina  turned  into  a  major 
enterprise  during  President  Johnson's 
Administration  (1963-69).  In  1968, 
after  3  years  of  warfare  that  led  to 
the  introduction  of  over  500,000 
American  troops  into  South  Vietnam, 
President  Johnson  decided  to  dis- 
engage from  a  struggle  that  had  lost 
popular  support  at  home. 

The  election  of  President  Richard 
M.  Nixon  in  1968  led  to  important 
changes  in  direction.  In  February 
1970.  acting  on  the  advice  of  Henry  A. 
Kissinger,  the  Assistant  to  the 
President  for  National  Security 
Affairs,  President  Nixon  presented 
a  report  to  Congress  entitled 
U.S.  Foyeigu  PoUcij  for  the  1970s, 
in  which  he  described  certain  basic 
changes  that  had  taken  place  in 
the  world  since  1945.  The  world,  he 
believed,  had  largely  recovered  from 
the  damage  of  the  Second  World  War ; 
many  new  nations  had  come  into 
existence  in  Africa  and  Asia;  the 
monolithic  structure  of  international 
communism  had  been  fractured 
because  of  developments  in  China  and 
Eastern  Europe;  the  United  States  no 
longer  possessed  a  monopoly  of 
nuclear  weapons;  and  a  significant 
moderation  had  occurred  in  inter- 
national ideological  conflict.  Given 
these  developments.  President  Nixon 
continued,  the  United  States  in  the 
future  should  rely  more  heavily  on 
partnership  with  likeminded  peoples; 
it  should  maintain  sufficient  military 


Special 


President  Carter 
and  Human  Rights 

President  Carter  made  human  rights 
one  of  the  cornerstones  of  his  foreign 
policy.  In  his  Inaugural  Address, 
delivered  on  January  20,  1977,  he  set 
the  tone  for  his  later  activity  in  this 
respect. 

"To  be  true  to  ourselves,  we  must 
be  true  to  others.  We  will  not  behave 
in  foreign  places  so  as  to  violate  our 
rules  and  standards  here  at  home,  for 
we  know  that  the  trust  which  our 
nation  earns  is  essential  to  our 
strength. 

"The  world  itself  is  now  domi- 
nated by  a  new  spirit.  Peoples  more 
numerous  and  more  politically  aware 
are  craving,  and  now  demanding,  their 
place  in  the  sun — not  just  for  the 
benefit  of  their  own  physical  condition 
but  for  basic  human  rights. 

"The  passion  for  freedom  is  on 
the  rise.  Tapping  this  new  spirit,  there 
can  be  no  nobler  nor  more  ambitious 
task  for  America  to  undertake  on  this 
day  of  a  new  beginning  than  to  help 
shape  a  just  and  peaceful  world  that 
is  truly  humane." 


strength  to  support  its  foreign  policy 
while  at  the  same  time  seeking  arms 
control  and  disarmament;  and  it 
should  constantly  manifest  "willing- 
ness to  negotiate,"  abandoning  the 
postwar  tendency  to  reject  the  likeli- 
hood of  successful  diplomatic  contacts 
with  Communist  nations. 

President  Nixon,  acting  on  these 
principles,  pursued  two  important 
enterprises  that  culminated  in  1972. 
In  February  he  visited  Peking,  setting 
in  motion  a  long-term  movement 
toward  normalization  of  relations 
with  the  Chinese  Peojile's  Republic. 
In  May  he  traveled  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  signed  agreements  that 
contained  the  results  of  the  first 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
(SALT  I).  New  negotiations  were 
begun  to  e.xtend  arms  control  and 
disarmament  measures  (SALT  II). 
These  developments  inaugurated  a 
pei-iod  of  "detente"  that  accorded 
with  a  general  tendency  among  the 
American  people  to  favor  a  lowered 
profile  in  world  affairs  after  the 
chastening  experience  in  Vietnam 
that  ended  in  1975  with  the  last 
withdrawal  of  American  personnel. 


Improvements  in  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Chinese  Peo- 
ple's Republic,  signaling  a  possible  end 
to  the  cold  war,  did  not  lead  to  general 
improvement  in  the  international 
climate.  The  international  economy 
experienced  considerable  instability, 
leading  to  a  significant  modification 
of  the  international  financial  system 
that  had  been  set  up  at  the  end  of 
World  War  II.  A  keystone  of  that 
system  was  a  stable  U.S.  dollar,  to 
which  other  nations  pegged  their 
currencies.  The  dollar  eventually 
came  under  severe  attack,  especially 
after  adverse  developments  in  the 
international  balance  of  payments. 
In  1971  the  dollar  was  devalued,  a 
decision  that  inaugurated  a  period  of 
unstable  currency  exchange  rates. 
Two  years  later  the  international 
economy  suffered  another  blow  when, 
after  Israel  and  Egypt  fought  a 
fourth  war.  the  Arab  oil-producing 
nations  instituted  a  boycott  of  oil 
shipments  to  important  consumers, 
particularly  in  Europe  and  East  Asia. 
Henry  A.  Kissinger,  appointed  Sec- 
retary of  State  in  October  1973, 
became  deeply  involved  in  eff'orts  to 
resolve  the  longstanding  dispute 
between  Israel  and  its  Arab  neighbors. 

After  President  Jimmy  Carter 
took  ofl^ce  in  1977.  he  and  his  Secre- 
taries of  State,  Cyrus  R.  Vance  of 
New  York  and  Edmund  S.  Muskie 
of  Maine,  continued  the  search  for 
further  arms  control  agreements  with 
the  Soviet  Union  and  for  restoration 
of  political  stability  in  the  turbulent 
Middle  East.  President  Carter's  most 
distinctive  modification  of  general 
foreign  policy  was  his  energetic  pro- 
motion of  international  human  rights. 

As  the  nation  passed  through  the 
1970s  the  Department  of  State  came 
to  grips  with  certain  new  challenges 
as  it  made  adjustments  to  the 
changing  pattern  of  world  politics. 
Among  these  challenges  four  deserve 
special  mention.  Continuing  attempts 
have  been  made  to  achieve  eflfective 
managerial  and  personnel  arrange- 
ments. The  Congress  has  asserted 
considerable  influence  in  the  foreign 
policy  process,  a  significant  departure 
from  prior  practice.  Efl'orts  have 
been  undertaken  to  meet  the  require- 
ments of  equal  employment  oppor- 
tunity. Finally,  an  outburst  of  inter- 
national terrorism  has  exposed  the 
Foreign  Service  to  great  danger  in 
many  parts  of  the  world. 


Growing  concern  about  the  eflS 
ciency  of  the  Department  of  State 
during  the  late  1960s  ultimately  led 
to  a  major  self-study  conducted  in 
1970.  Thirteen  task  forces  of  Forei; 
Service  and  Department  employees 
thoroughly  investigated  all  activitii 
and  produced  the  report,  Diplomaci 
for  the  70' s,  that  made  many 
recommendations.  The  task  forces 
traced  the  difficulties  of  the  Depart- 
ment to  "weakness  in  the  area  of 
management  capability."  The  agenc 
still  lacked  the  modern  managerial 
know-how  required  for  eflRcient 
operations  in  the  complex  environm 
of  the  modern  world.  "Because  of  tl 
diversity  and  complexity  of  our 
overseas  activities,  effective  coordi-^ 
nation  calls  for  a  wide  range  of 
management  skills  and  managemen 
tools.  The  traditional  reliance  of 
Foreign  Service  oflicers  on  experier 
and  tradition  is  no  longer  good 
enough."  What  was  required?  "Th( 
diplomacy  of  the  seventies  calls  for 
new  breed  of  diplomat-manager,  ju 
as  able  as  the  best  of  the  old  school, 
but  equipped  with  up-to-date  tech- 
niques and  backed  by  a  Department 
organized  on  modern  management 
principles." 

Members  of  the  Foreign  Servi' 
had  been  bombarded  ever  since  the 
Second  World  War  with  call  after  c 
for  change  in  their  professional 
attitudes  and  activities.  For  examp 
Senator  J.  William  Fulbright  of 
Arkansas,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Senate's  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations,  noted  in  1964  that  a 
contemporary  Foreign  Service  ofiic' 
"must  not  only  know  how  to  use  the 
traditional  tools  of  diplomacy,  but  . 
must  also  be  expert  in  the  new 
instruments  of  foreign  policy  such  , 
economic  aid  and  cultural  exchange 
To  maintain  professional  proficienc 
the  modern  diplomat  must  constant 
acquire  additional  education.  "If 
there  is  a  continuous  process  of 
improvement  in  the  people  involved 
implementing  foreign  policy,  the 
procedures  and  techniques  employee 
will  be  improved  as  a  natural  by- 
product." 

Diplomacy  for  the  70's  called  fc 
"a  new  spirit  in  the  Department." 
One  of  the  task  forces  insisted  that 
the  times  required  "a  tremendous 
eflfort  ...  to  shake  off  old  habits, 
old  ways  of  doing  things,  old  ways  o 
dealing  with  each  other.  What  we 
are  proposing  is  a  change  of  outlook 


ij  method."  The  report  concluded: 
e  traditional  mode  of  reflection 
detachment  cultivated  by  diplo- 
;s  trained  in  the  old  school  must 
■einforced  by  a  more  dynamic  and 
ressive  style  if  the  Department 
)  play  the  role  which  the  President 
ects  of  it." 

Not  everyone  welcomed  such 
vs.  One  historian  notes  that  some 
eign  Service  officers  opposed 
ical  change,  considering  them- 
es "an  embattled  and  misunder- 
)d  elite  who  functioned  as  political 
orters  and  policy  planners." 
her  than  retooling  for  changing 
Donsibilities,  these  officers  some- 
es  argued  through  their  profes- 
lal  organization,  the  American 
eign  Service  Association,  that  the 
eign  Service  should  be  given 
•eased  political  responsibility  by 
!ing  career  officers  in  high-level 
itions  at  home  and  abroad. 

The  conflict  between  those  who 
ended  the  older  model  and  those 

wanted  to  modernize  the  Foreign 
vice  found  expression  in  a  long- 
iding  dispute  over  whether 
eign  Service  officers  should  be 
eralists  or  specialists.  Those 
osed  to  change  argued  that  the 
lomat  should  continue  to  rely 
iiarily  on  general  experience  and 
lition.  Those  interested  in  reform 
med  that  the  future  belonged  to 
cialists  with  advanced  training, 
iry  Wriston  called  for  balance, 
cialized  skills  were  essential  in 
modern  era,  but  it  seemed  evident 
t  specialists  tended  "to  become  so 
row  as  to  lose  perspective ;  then 
h  specialism  conceives  of  its  own 
liwick  as  'most  vital.'"  Wriston 
eluded  that  "no  rule  of  thumb  can 
iblish  the  proper  balance"  between 
leral  and  special  skills.  He  believed 
t  the  best  specialists  would  "broad- 
rather  than  narrow  their  interests 
h  experience  and  on  becoming 
ior  officers  [would]  prove  to  be 
)d  generalists." 

This  outlook  is  reflected  in  the 
st  recent  attempt  to  resolve  the 
sonnel  problems  of  the  Department 
State — the  Foreign  Service  Act 
1980.  Its  principal  provisions 
)resent  a  turn  away  from  the 
3rt  to  establish  an  integrated 
reign  Service;  henceforth  em- 
yees  of  the  Department  of  State 
0  are  not  liable  for  overseas  service, 
hiding  specialists  formerly  placed 
the  Foreign  Service  Reserve,  will 


Expenditures 

1781- 

-1980 

1781 

$57,309* 

1791 

57, 619.23 

1800 

294,894.31 

1810 

118,782.07 

1820 

340,698.03 

1830 

432,200.69 

1840 

890,273.22 

1850 

716,521.03 

1860 

1,264,946.22 

1870 

1,681,174.53 

1880 

1,343,241.80 

1890 

1,773,066.75 

1900 

3,356,173.87 

1910 

4,909,557.77 

1920 

13,590,288.51 

1930 

13,986,172.82 

1940 

24,003,329.49 

19.50 

350,855,773.75 

1960 

246,625,626.92 

1970 

447,753,719.37 

1980 

2,354,139,275.69 
ontingencies." 

*  "E 

xclusive  of  C 

be  members  of  the  Civil  Service. 
When  the  act  is  put  into  effect,  it  will 
produce  a  Foreign  Service  of  6,850 
people  and  a  domestic  work  force  of 
3,800  people,  a  total  of  approximately 
10,650  employees.  The  act  seeks  to 
encourage  qualities  in  the  Foreign 
Service  that  are  essential  to  the 
modern  practice  of  diplomacy.  Under 
Secretary  of  State  David  D.  Newsom 
summarized  these  qualities  in  1978: 
"An  understanding  of  our  own  nation ; 
a  balanced  sensitivity  to  other  societies 
and  peoples ;  a  firm  grasp  of  the  sub- 
ject matter  of  international  relations; 
and  the  skill  to  bring  this  knowledge 
together  in  advancing  both  the 
interests  of  our  country  and  the 
establishment  of  working  under- 
standings with  others." 

The  principle  of  executive 
predominance  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  relations  was  not  seriously 
challenged  until  recent  times,  but  the 
need  to  finance  economic  assistance 
and  other  important  aspects  of  an 
active  foreign  policy  has  upgraded  the 
role  of  Congress  in  the  foreign  policy 
process.  Recognizing  this  develop- 
ment, the  Department  of  State  desig- 
nated an  Assistant  Secretary  for  Con- 
gressional Relations  in  1949  to  improve 


Special 


liaison  with  Capitol  Hill.  Bipartisan 
approaches  to  foreign  affairs  mini- 
mized executive-legislative  tensions 
during  the  earlier  postwar  years,  but 
burgeoning  public  opposition  to  the 
war  in  Vietnam  during  the  1960s 
caused  Congress  to  question  executive 
behavior  and  even  to  sponsor  inter- 
national activities  on  its  own. 

The  most  significant  initiative 
of  Congress  has  been  in  the  field  of 
international  human  rights.  Seeking 
to  stimulate  more  active  support  of 
oppressed  people.  Congress  enacted 
a  series  of  statutes  during  the  1970s 
that  placed  legislative  constraints  on 
various  types  of  economic  and  military 
assistance  to  governments  that 
consistently  violated  internationally 
accepted  human  rights.  Differences 
of  view  between  the  legislative  and 
executive  branches  narrowed  when 
President  Jimmy  Carter  expressed 
strong  support  for  an  active  human 
rights  policy. 

In  other  respects,  however, 
President  Carter  encountered  con- 
gressional resistance.  The  Senate 
manifested  considerable  reluctance 
to  accept  a  treaty  providing  for  the 
return  of  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  to 
Panama  before  finally  giving  its 
consent.  Even  greater  Senatorial 
doubts  about  the  SALT  II  Treaty, 
reinforced  by  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  in  December  1979, 
caused  the  President  to  postpone 
further  consideration  of  the 
agreement. 

During  the  1960s  the  activities  of 
the  civil  rights  movement  in  the 
United  States  led  to  the  passage  of 
legislation  designed  to  insure  equal 
employment  opportunity  in  the 
Federal  Government,  and  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  undertook  to  meet  its 
responsibilities  in  this  re.spect.  Much 
needed  to  be  done.  Although  women 
and  members  of  minorities  had  long 
formed  part  of  the  Department  of 
State,  they  were  seriously  under- 
represented,  particularly  in  the  higher 
ranks. 

The  Department  of  State  first 
appointed  women  to  full-time  positions 
in  1874,  but  they  were  deemed  unquali- 
fied for  other  than  clerical  duties. 
In  1905,  for  example,  A.ssistant  Secre- 
tary Frederick  Van  Dyne  said :  "The 
greatest  obstacle  to  the  employment  of 
women  as  diplomatic  agents  is  their 
well  known  inability  to  keep  a  .secret." 
The  first  woman  to  achieve  super- 
visory rank  was  Margaret  Hanna,  who 


GIT 


Special 


entered  the  Department  as  a  clerk  in 
1895  and  became  Chief  of  the  Corre- 
spondence Bureau  in  1918.  A  few  other 
women  rose  to  managerial  positions 
during  the  1920s,  including  Ruth 
Shipley,  who  assumed  the  leadership 
of  the  Passport  Division  in  1921. 
The  first  woman  to  enter  the 
Foreign  Service,  Lucile  Atcherson, 
was  not  appointed  until  1922,  after  the 
First  World  War.  The  first  entrant 
after  the  passage  of  the  Rogers  Act 
was  Pattie  H.  Field  in  1925.  Con- 
tinuing doubts  about  the  ability  of 
women  to  endure  the  trials  of  duty 
overseas  worked  against  acceptance 
of  women  in  the  Foreign  Service. 
After  Atcherson  and  Field  were 
appointed,  a  senior  diplomat  suggested 
that  "it  would  be  a  wise  thing  to 
refrain  from  taking  any  more  women 
until  we  can  form  an  idea  of  their 
usefulness  from  observation  of  those 
we  have  already  taken  in."  To  exclude 
women  who  scored  high  on  written 
examinations,  another  oflicial  observed 
that  examining  boards  might  award 
failing  grades  on  oral  examinations. 


'W 


EuKtnie  .M.  Anderson  wa.s  Ihe  first  woman 
Ambassador  (Denmark.  1919-.i;$)  and  the 
first  woman  to  sign  a  treaty  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States.  (Depanmem  of  Suit-  photo) 


The  first  women  given  political 
appointments  to  high-level  diplomatic 
positions  occurred  during  the  1930s. 
In  1933  President  Roosevelt  named 
Ruth  Bryan  Owen,  the  daughter  of 
former  Secretary  of  State  William 
Jennings  Bryan,  as  Minister  to  Den- 
mark, and  in  1937  Florence  Jaffray 
Harriman  was  appointed  Minister  to 
Norway.  Career  women  did  not  attain 
ambassadorial  rank  until  after  the 
Second  World  War.  The  third  woman 
to  enter  the  Foreign  Service,  Frances 
E.  Willis,  was  made  Ambassador  to 
Switzerland  (1953-57).  She  later 
served  in  Norway  and  Ceylon.  The  first 
woman  career  diplomat  to  become  an 
A.ssistant  Secretary  of  State  was 
Ambassador  Carol  C.  Laise,  who  be- 
came head  of  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs  in  1973.  She  later  served  as 
Director  General  of  the  Foreign 
Service. 

Blacks  were  similarly  under- 
represented  in  the  work  force  of  the 
Department.  As  in  the  case  of  women, 
blacks  sometimes  served  in  the  lower 
ranks  but  rarely  became  supervisors. 
The  first  black  appointed  to  the  rank 
of  Minister  was  Ebenezer  D.  Bassett, 
who  went  to  Haiti  in  1869.  James 
Milton  Turner  was  made  Minister  to 
Liberia  in  1871.  The  best  known  black 
abolitionist,  Frederick  Douglass, 
became  Minister  to  Haiti  and  Charge 
d' Affaires  to  Santo  Domingo  in  1889. 
It  became  common  practice  to  assign 
blacks  to  these  countries,  but  few 
were  sent  elsewhere. 

The  first  black  to  enter  the  For- 
eign Service  was  Clifford  R.  Wharton 
( 1925 ) ,  and  he  was  also  the  first 
career  diplomat  of  his  race  to  serve 
as  chief  of  mission,  becoming  Minister 
to  Romania  in  1958  and  Ambassador 
to  Norway  in  1961.  Like  the  women 
who  entered  the  Foreign  Service 
during  the  1920s,  Wharton  experienced 
discrimination.  When  he  decided  to 
take  the  competitive  examination  for 
the  Foreign  Service,  he  discovered 
that  his  prospective  associates 
"couldn't  care  less;  they  didn't  want 
me  in  the  Department  of  State." 
His  early  diplomatic  career  was  spent 
mostly  in  posts  traditionally  reserved 
for  blacks,  especially  Liberia.  Wharton 
remembers  having  commented  smil- 
ingly to  a  personnel  officer  after 
receiving  an  undesirable  assignment 
in  1946:  "You're  not  only  discrimi- 
nating against  us  fwithl  in  the 
Service,  but  you're  exporting  dis- 
crimination abroad.  . .  ." 


Frances  E.  Willis  was  the  first  woman  Fi 
eign  Ser>ice  officer  to  be  appointed  a  l!.S 
.Ambassador  (Switzerland,  1953-57),  the  f 
to  attain  the  rank  of  Career  .'Vlinister,  anc 
the  only  one  to  be  named  Career  .Ambas- 
sador She  served  as  .Ambassador  to  Norw" 
(1957-61)  and  to  Ceylon  (l%l-64). 

i  1  K'liarlmenl  (.1  Slali-  photo) 


Clifton  K.  Wharton  was  a  clerk  in  the  Cor 
sular  Commercial  Office  when  he  took  th« 
first  Foreign  Service  examination  (1925).  I 
became  Third  Secretary  at  the  U.S.  Embai 
in  Liberia  and  later  was  .Minister  to 
Romania  (195H)  and  .Ambassador  to  Norwa 
(19»)ll.  He  was  the  first  black  Foreign  Ser- 
vice officer  and  the  first  to  serve  as  Chief  ( 
Mission  to  a  European  country. 
(Department  of  Stale  photo) 


S38 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Special 


T.  Rowan,  with  his  family,  signs  his 
Tiission  as  Ambassador  to  Finland  in 

He  also  sened  as  Deputy  Assistant 
elary  of  State  for  Public  Affairs  (1961- 
nd  Director  of  the  U.S.  Information 

icy  (1964-65).  (Department  of  State  pholo) 


Hispanics  have  served  in  the 
artment  of  State  since  1820,  when 
ph  M.  Espada  of  New  York  be- 
e  a  consular  agent  in  Mexico,  but 
women  and  blacks  they  have  been 
errepresented  up  to  the  present, 
ion  Leon  Sanchez  of  Florida  was 
e  U.S.  consul  at  Cartagena,  Co- 
oia.  in  1840.  An  Hispanic,  James 
3ca  of  California,  and  his  son, 
es  Viosca,  Jr.,  served  successively 
jnsuls  at  La  Paz,  Mexico,  from 
I  to  1906. 

The  first  Hispanic  chief  of  mis- 
was  Romualdo  Pacheco  of  Cali- 
lia,  who  became  Minister  to  a 
ip  of  Central  American  states  in 
).  No  other  Hispanic  achieved 
parable  rank  until  William  E. 
zales  of  California  became 
ister  to  Cuba  in  1913  and  to  Peru 
919.  Twenty  others  have  since 
'ed  as  chief  of  mission,  four  of 
■m  were  career  Foreign  Service 
ers.  Horacio  Rivero,  Jr..  of  Cali- 
lia  was  the  first  Hispanic  to  be 
led  chief  of  mission  to  a  European 
ntry — Spain  in  1972.  Mari-Luci 
amillo  was  the  first  Hispanic 
nan  to  become  chief  of  mission, 
ig  to  Honduras  as  Ambassador 
977. 

Patterns  of  prejudice  and  dis- 
nination,  prevalent  elsewhere  as 
I  as  in  the  Department  of  State, 
Uy  attracted  extensive  critical 
intion  during  the  1960s,  and  im- 
tant  attempts  have  been  made  in 


recent  years  to  insure  equal  oppor- 
tunity through  the  workings  of 
energetic  aflSrmative  action  progralms. 
During  the  1970s  Secretaries  of  State 
William  P.  Rogers,  Henry  A. 
Kissinger,  and  Cyrus  R.  Vance  all 
devoted  considerable  attention  to 
this  effort. 

One  of  Secretary  Vance's  earliest 
acts  was  to  issue  a  statement  to  the 
Department  in  which  he  announced 
his  intention  to  "exercise  personal 
leadership  in  prohibiting  discrimi- 
nation because  of  race,  color,  religion, 
sex,  national  origin,  age,  or  handi- 
cap .  . .  [and]  in  carrying  out  a  con- 
tinuing affirmative  action  program 
designed  to  promote  equal  opportunity 
for  all  applicants  and  all  employees." 

True  to  his  pledge,  Secretary 
Vance  appointed  an  executive-level 
task  force  to  spur  affirmative  action, 
but  much  remains  to  be  accomplished 
before  the  Department  achieves  the 
goals  established  by  recent  Secre- 
taries. Presumably  there  should  be  a 
reasonable  relationship  between  the 
incidence  of  racial  and  ethnic  groups 
in  the  general  population  and  their 
representation  in  the  Department  of 
State.  A  look  at  the  profile  of  the 
Foreign  Service  reveals  great  dis- 
parities. Women  constitute  slightly 
more  than  half  of  the  general  popula- 
tion but  only  10.29^  of  the  Foreign 
Service.  About  12  ^'r  of  the  population 
is  black,  but  blacks  constitute  only 
3.5 "^f  of  the  Foreign  Service.  His- 


panics  make  up  more  than  5%  of  the 
population,  but  they  are  a  minuscule 
1.5"^^  of  the  Foreign  Service. 

No  development  of  recent  years 
has  been  more  troubling  than  the  rise 
of  terrorism  as  a  political  weapon 
aimed  at  Americans  representing  their 
country  abroad.  Numerous  attacks  on 
American  posts  overseas  and  frequent 
kidnappings  and  killings  of  Americans 
have  occurred  in  recent  years,  adding 
a  tragically  large  number  of  names  to 
the  list  of  those  who  have  given  their 
lives  in  the  line  of  duty.  In  August 
1968,  Ambassador  John  Gordon  Mein 
was  assassinated  in  Guatemala,  the 
first  chief  of  mission  to  be  murdered 
in  the  line  of  duty.  Since  then  other 
Ambassadors  have  been  killed  in 
Sudan,  Cyprus,  Lebanon,  and  Afghani- 
stan. Kidnappings  have  occurred  in 
places  as  widely  separated  as  Zaire, 
Brazil,  and  Jordan. 

The  most  serious  of  all  such 
episodes  was  the  seizure  of  the  Ameri- 
can Embassy  in  Tehran  on  Novem- 
ber 4,  1979,  and  the  subsequent  deten- 
tion of  more  than  50  hostages.  This 
event  brought  home  to  the  American 
people  once  again  the  extreme  dangers 
that  the  Foreign  Service  must  face  in 
many  assignments  outside  the  country. 
The  steadfast  courage  of  the  American 
hostages  in  Tehran  and  their  families 
at  home  reflected  the  best  traditions 
of  the  Department  of  State  and  the 
other  agencies  represented  among  the 
hostages. 


An  aerial  view  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  compound  in  Tehran  prior  to  its  seizure  and  occupation 

in  November  1979.  (Deiartmemof -StatephoUD 


Special 


In  the  Line  of  Duty 


r- 


LRECrED  BY  MEMBERS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  FOKFll'.N 
SERVICE  ASSOCIATION  IN  HONOR  OF  DIPLOMATIC 
AND  CONSULAR  OFFICERS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
W  HO  WHILE  ON  ACTIVE  DUTY  LOST  THEIR  IIVFS 
UNDER  HEROIC  OR  TRAGIC  CIRCUMSTANCES  ■ 


WILLIAM   tIMrRtY 


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Diplomatic  service  is  not  normally  con- 
sidered a  hazardous  profession. 
Nevertheless  over  100  Americans  have 
died  or  been  killed  while  on  active  duty 
with  the  Foreign  Service.  Some  fell 
victim  to  tropical  disease,  earthquakes, 
or  volcanic  eruptions;  many  others 
died  a  hero's  death  in  the  midst  of 
war,  while  saving  lives,  or  at  the  hands 
of  assassins. 

To  honor  those  who  lost  their 
lives  "under  heroic  or  tragic  circum- 
stances," the  American  Foreign  Serv- 
ice Association  in  1933  dedicated  a 
plaque.  Among  the  names  . . . 

William  Palfrey,  lost  at  sea,  1780 
Abraham  Hanson,  African  fever, 

Liberia,  1866 
John  F.  Flint,  drowned  saving  life, 

EI  Salvador.  187.5 


Victor  F.  W.  Stanwood,  murdered, 
Madagascar,  1888 

Maddin  Summers,  exhaustion, 
Moscow,  1918 

Dougla.ss  MacKiernan,  killed  by  gun- 
fire, Tibet,  1950 

Barbara  A.  Robbins,  killed  in  bombing 
of  Embassy,  Vietnam,  1965 

That  plaque,  and  a  second  one 
unveiled  in  1973,  are  in  the  diplomatic 
lobby  of  the  Department  of  State.  In 
recent  years,  the  names  of  those  who 
have  died  of  disease  contracted  at 
tropical  posts  have  not  been  added. 
Yet  the  list  continues  to  grow  .  . . 

Ambassador  John  Gordon  Mein,  assas- 
sinated, Guatemala.  1968 

John  Paul  Vann,  killed  in  a  helicopter 
in  a  night  battle,  Vietnam,  1972 


Ambassador  Cleo  A.  Noel,  Jr.,  and 
George  Curtis  Moore,  murdered 
while  held  hostage,  Sudan,  1973 

John  S.  Patterson,  murdered  while 
held  by  kidnappers,  Mexico,  1974 

Ambassador  Rodger  P.  Davies,  killt 
by  sniper  fire  during  mob  attack  • 
Embas.sy,  Cyprus,  1974 

Ambassador  Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr., 
and  Counselor  Robert  O.  Waring, 
murdered  en  route  to  an  appoint- 
ment with  the  President-elect, 
Lebanon,  1976 

Ambassador  Adolph  Dubs,  killed  wl 
being  held  hostage,  Afghanistan, 
1979 

CWO  Bryan  L.  Ellis  (U.S.  Army)  a 
Cpl.  Stephen  J.  Crowley  (USMC) 
killed  during  an  attempted  mob 
takeover  of  the  Embassy,  Pakista 
1979. 


Sdn 


Deoartmenf  of  State  Bull 


Special 


etary  of  State  Cyrus  R.  Vance  joins  members  of  the  Iran  Working  Group  in  the 
irtment's  Operations  Center  following  the  seizure  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Tthran. 

rlmeiu  of  Stale  phulo) 


After  two  centuries  the  Depart- 
ment of  State — its  offices  and  its  people 
— comprises  one  of  the  world's  nerve 
centers  of  human  affairs.  During 
the  earliest  days  of  the  Republic,  it 
made  indispensable  contributions  to 
the  preservation  of  our  independence. 
Throughout  the  19th  century,  as  the 
United  States  changed  gradually  into 
a  great  power,  the  Department  loyally 
supported  the  foreign  policies  associ- 
ated with  isolation,  neutrality,  and 
expansion.  Across  the  20th  century,  as 
Americans  came  to  accept  the  respon- 
sibilities of  leadership,  the  Depart- 
ment, like  the  nation  it  serves,  has 
experienced  remarkable  growth  in 
size,  influence,  and  function. 

Every  era  has  its  agenda  of  chal- 
lenge, danger,  and  opportunity. 
Entering  its  third  century,  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  must  struggle  with  the 
problems  of  nuclear  weapons,  popula- 
tion explosion,  depletion  of  natural 
resources,  and  the  seemingly  unman- 
ageable acceleration  of  technological, 
social,  and  political  change. 

For  two  centuries  the  men  and 
women  of  the  Department  have  chosen 
this  form  of  public  service  because 
they  are  deeply  committed  to  the 
search  for  solutions  to  the  problems 
of  tomorrow.  Throughout  the  world 
they  daily  face  the  threat  of  disease, 


rge  d'Affaires  L.  Bruce  Laingen  (right) 
ents  a  valor  award  for  "outstanding  per- 
nance  and  bravery  ...  in  support  of  U.S. 
rests  and  citizens,  December  1978  to 
ruary  1979"  to  Foreign  Service  officer 
hael  Metrinko  in  July  1979  in  Tehran, 
h  Laingen  and  Metrinko  are  among  the 
imericans  held  hostage  in  Iran  as  of  pub- 

tion  date.  (Uepanment  of  State  photo) 


terrorism,  war,  kidnapping,  and  death. 
Along  with  these  hazards  come  the 
normal  demands  of  day-to-day 
problemsolving,  decisionmaking,  and 
coping  with  life  at  home  or  abroad. 
All  things  considered  the  people  of 
the  United  States  have  been 
well  served. 


David  F.  Trask  was  born  in  Erie, 
Pennsylvania,  in  1929.  He  received  a  B.A. 
degree  from  Wesleyan  University  (1951) 
and  A.M.  and  Ph.D.  degrees  from  Har- 
vard in  1952  and  1958.  He  served  in  the 
U.S.  Army  (1952-54)  and  from  1955  to 
1966  was  an  instructor  or  assistant  pro- 
fessor at  Boston  University,  Wesleyan 
University,  and  the  University  of 
Nebraska.  Dr.  Trask  was  professor  of 
history  at  the  State  University  of  New 
York  from  196G  until  May  1976,  when  he 
became  Historian  of  the  Department  of 
State. 

Dr.  Trask  is  a  member  of  the  Ameri- 
can Historical  Association,  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  Historians,  the  Society 
for  Historians  of  American  Foreign  Rela- 
tions, the  National  Council  on  Public  His- 
tory, and  Phi  Beta  Kappa.  He  is  also  the 
Department  of  State's  representative  on 
the  National  Historical  Publications  and 
Records  Commission. 

His  major  publications  are  The 
United  States  in  the  Supreme  War 
Council:  American  War  Aims  and  Inter- 
Allied  Strategy,  1!)17-191S  (1961),  Gen- 
eral Tasker  Howard  Bliss  and  the  "Ses- 
sions of  the  World,"  1919  (1966),  Victory 
Without  Peace:  Americayi  Foreign  Rela- 
tions in  the  20th  Century  (1968),  World 
War  I  at  Home  (1970) ,  Captains  and 
Cabinets:  Anglo-American  Naval  Rela- 
tions, 1917-1918  (1972).  He  is  the  co- 
author of  The  Ordeal  of  World  Power 
(1975)  and  the  coeditor  of  A  Bibliog- 
raphy of  United  States-Latin  American 
Relations  Since  1810  (1970). 


iiiaru  1Qni 


Special 


Department 

Personnel 

1781- 

-1980 

Domestic 

Overseas 

Total 

1781 

4 

10 

14 

1790 

8 

20 

28 

1800 

10 

62 

72 

1810 

9 

56 

65 

1820 

16 

95 

111 

1830 

23 

153 

176 

1840 

38 

170 

208 

1850 

22 

218 

240 

1860 

42 

281 

323 

1870 

65 

804 

869 

1880 

80 

977 

1,057 

1890 

76 

1,105 

1,181 

1900 

91 

1,137 

1,228 

1910 

234 

1,043 

1,277 

1920 

708 

514 

1,222 

1930 

714 

633 

1,347 

1940 

1,128 

840 

1,968 

1950 

8,609 

7,710 

16,319 

1960 

7,116 

6,178 

13,294 

1970 

6,983 

5,865 

12,848 

1980 

Domestic 

8,433 
personnel  includes 

5,861 

both  Civil  Service  and  Foreign 

13,962 
Service. 

NOTES: 

Overseas 

personnel  int 

hides 

Foreign  Service  only. 

Note  on  Authorities 

Thi.s  hi.story  depends  heavily  on  ce 
authorities  who  have  written  abou 
the  U.S.  Department  of  State.  The 
best  histories  of  the  Department  a 
Gaillard  Hunt,  The  Department  of 
State  of  the  United  States:  Its  Hit 
and  Fnncfioris  (New  Haven,  1914  : 
and  Graham  H.  Stuart,  The  Depar 
ment  of  State:  A  History  of  Its 
Organization,  Procedure  and  Pers< 
(New  York,  1949) .  The  two  best 
works  on  the  Foreign  Service  are 
William  Barnes  and  John  Heath 
Morgan,  The  Foreign  Service  of  t) 
United  States:  Origins,  Developmi' 
and  Functions  CWashington,  1961 
and  Warren  F.  Ilchman,  Profession- 
Diplomacy  in  the  United  States 
1779-1939:  A  Study  in  Administn 
History  (Chicago,  1961). 

For  information  about  the  Se^ 
taries  of  State  consult  the  multi- 
volume  series  edited  by  Samuel  Fl; 
Bemis  and  Robert  F.  Ferrell, 
The  American  Secretaries  of  Sfat( 
and  Their  Diplomacy  (New  York, 
1927-     )  ;  Norman  A.  Graebner,  e 
An  Uncertain  Tradition:  America 
Secretaries  of  State  in  the  Tu-enti< 
Century  (New  York,  1961)  ;  Alex- 
ander DeConde.  The  American  Sec 
tary  of  State:  An  Interpretation 
(New  York,  1962).  For  a  useful 
reference  work  see  John  E.  Findlii 
Dictionary  of  American  Diplomati 
History  (Westport,  1980).  For  ex- 
amples of  recent  specialized  schola 
ship  see  Waldo  H.  Heinrichs,  Jr., 
"Bureaucracy  and  Prcfessionalisrr 
the  Development  of  American  Can 
Diplomacy,"  in  John  Braeman  et  a 
Twentieth-Century  American  Fori 
Policy  (Columbus,  1971) ;  Richard 
Werking,  The  Master  Architects: 
Building  the  United  States  Foreig. 
Service  1S90-1913  (Lexington,  19' 
Rachel  West,  The  Department  of  S 
on  the  Eve  of  the  First  World  War 
(Athens,  1978) ;  Robert  D.  Schul- 
zinger.  The  Making  of  the  Diploma 
Mind:  The  Training,  Outlook,  and 
Style  of  United  States  Foreign  Ser 
Officers,  190S-1931  (Middletown, 
1975). 

Other  references  published  by 
Department  of  State  are  The  Secre 
taries  of  State:  Portraits  and  Rio- 
graphical  Sketches,  Homes  of  the 
Department  of  State,  1774-1976,  ai 
United  States  Chiefs  of  Mission, 
177S-1973  and  its  supplement  for 
1973-74.  ■ 


nonartmont  nf  ^Ifatp  Rll 


retaries  for 
eign  Affairs 


Special 


Robert  R.  Livingston 
1781-83 


John  Jay 
1784-90 


(retaries 
>tate 


E :  Daniel  Webster  and  James 
ipie  Blaine  were  each  appointed  to 
onconsecutive  terms  as  Secretary  of 
.  Therefore,  they  are  counted  twice 
s  list. 


1.         Thomas  Jefferson 
1790-93 


Edmund  Randolph 
1794-95 


Timothy  Pickering 
1795-1800 


4. 


John  Marshall 
1800-01 


James  Madison 
1801-09 


Special 


6.         Robert  Smith 
1809-11 


7.         James  Monroe 
1811-17 


John  Quincy  Adams 
1817-25 


9.         Henry  Clay 
1825-29 


10.         Martin  Van  Buren 
1829-31 


11.         Edward  Livingston 
1831-33 


H 

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■1 

^^M 

^^H^-'^ 

^H 

}  '^<^' 

H 

K^ 

k.-J 

■ff 

^  "^  •     ^^S^^ 

BH 

1 

^^^^^^^^^1 

1 

12.         Louis  McLane 
1833-34 


13.         John  Forsyth 
1834-41 


14.         Daniel  Webster 
1841-43 


nonartmont  nf  *^t;itp  Ri , 


Abel  Parker  Upshur 
1843-44 


John  Middleton  Clayton 
1849-50 


William  Learned  Marcy 
1853-57 


16. 


John  Caldwell  Calhoun 
1844-45 


19. 


Daniel  Webster 
1850-52 


22. 


Lewis  Cass 
1857-60 


Special 


17. 


James  Buchanan 
1845-49 


20.         Edward  Everett 
1852-53 


23. 


Jeremiah  Sullivan  Black 
1860-61 


S4S 


Special 


24.         William  Henry  Seward 
1861-69 


25.         Elihu  Benjamin  Washburne 
1869 


26. 


Hamilton  Fish 
1869-77 


27.         William  Maxwell  Evarts 
1877-81 


28.         James  Gillespie  Blaine 
1881 


29.         Frederick  Theodore 

Frelinghuysen  1881-85 


30.         Thomas  Francis  Bayard 
1885-89 


31.         James  Gillespie  Blaine 
1889-92 


32.         John  Watson  Foster 
1892-93 


S46 


Department  of  State  Bui 


special 


William  Jennings  Bryan 
1913-15 


It'irxi   inO'1 


S47 


Special 


42.         Robert  Lansing 
1915-20 


43.         Bainbridge  Colby 
1920-21 


44.         Charles  Evans  Hughes 
1921-25 


45.         Frank  Billings  Kellogg 
1925-29 


Henry  Lewis  Stimson 
1929-33 


47.         Cordell  Hull 
1933-44 


Edward  Reilly  Stettinius,  Jr 
1944-45 


49.         James  Francis  Byrnes 
1945-47 


50. 


George  Catlett  Marshall 
1947-49 


S48 


DeDartment  of  State  Bl 


Special 


Dean  Gooderham  Acheson 
1949-53 


52.         John  Foster  Dulles 
1953-59 


53.         Christian  Archibald  Herter 
1959-61 


Dean  Rusk 
1961-69 


55.         William  Pierce  Rogers 
1969-73 


56.         Henry  Alfred  Kissinger 
1973-77 


Alexander  Meigs  Haig,  Jr.,  was 
designated  Secretary  of  State  on 
December  16, 1980,  by  President- 
elect Reagan. 


Cyrus  Roberts  Vance 
1977-80 


58.         Edmund  Sixtus  Muskie 
1980-81 


59.         Alexander  Meigs  Haig,  Jr. 
1981 


<SdQ 


Special 


Milestones  of 
American  Diplomacy 


1778 

Treaty  of  alliance  with  France,  en- 
gineered by  Benjamin  Franklin,  enabled 
the  fledgling  republic  to  continue  its 
struggle  for  independence. 

1783 

Treaty  of  Paris — Great  Britain  recog- 
nized American  independence  and  con- 
trol over  western  lands  as  far  as  the 
Mississippi. 

1783-86 

First  U.S.  treaties  of  friendship  and 
commerce — with  France,  Great  Britain, 
Netherlands,  Prussia,  and  Sweden — es- 
tablished U.S.  tradition  of  nondiscrimina- 
tion in  foreign  trade. 

1795 

Jay's  treaty  required  Great  Britain  to  re- 
move troops  from  northwestern  frontier; 
Pinckney's  treaty  with  Spain  opened 
mouth  of  Mississippi  River  to  Ij.S.  navi- 
gation. 

1800 

Treaty  of  Mortefontaine  settled  the 
2-year  undeclared  naval  war  with  France 
and  put  an  end  to  the  alliance. 

1801 

Jefferson,  in  first  inaugural  address, 
summarized  U.S.  policy  as  "peace,  com- 
merce, and  honest  friendship  with  all  na- 
tions, entangling  alliances  with  none." 

1803 

Louisiana  Purchase  removed  foreign  con- 
trol of  Mississippi's  mouth  and  doubled 
U.S.  territoiy. 

1814 

Ti'eaty  of  Ghent  ending  Wai-  of  1812  pro- 
vided means  to  settle  remaining  territo- 
rial disputes  with  Great  Britain. 

1819 

Adams-Onis  treaty  with  Spain,  transfer- 
ring Florida,  e.xtended  the  U.S.  to  pres- 
ent boundaries  in  southeast. 

1823 

Monroe  Doctrine  established  U.S.  policy 
of  opposing  European  intervention  or 
new  colonization  in  Western  Hemisphere. 


1842 

Webster- Ashburton  treaty  with  Grea 
Britain  delimited  northeastern  U.S. 
(Maine)  boundary. 

1844 

Treaty  of  Wang-hsia,  first  U.S.-Chin 
agreement,  granted  U.S.  commercia 
privileges  and  extraterritorial  jurisd 
tion  over  Americans. 

1846 

Oregon  treaty  with  Great  Britain  ex- 
tended U.S.  sole  dominion  to  the  Pac 

1848 

Treaty  of  Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  ending 
1846-48  war  with  Mexico,  confirmed 
claim  to  Texas  and  completed  U.S.  e 
pansion  to  Pacific. 

1858 

Harris  treaty  first  opened  Japan  to  i 

supervised  foreign  commerce. 

1867 

Alaska  purchase  ended  Russian  terr 
rial  presence  and  completed  U.S.  ex 
sion  on  North  American  mainland. 

1889 

P'irst  International  American  Congr 
initiated  system  of  collaboration  ami 
Western  Hemisphere  republics. 

1898 

Treaty  of  Paris,  at  end  of  Spanish- 
American  War,  gave  United  States 
Puerto  Rico,  Guam,  and  Philippines 
panding  U.S.  power  into  the  Pacific. 

1903 

Hay-Bunau-Varilla  treaty  conveyed 

the  U.S.  the  Panama  Canal  Zone. 

1918 

Allies  and  Germany  accepted  Wilsor 
points  as  basis  for  just  and  lasting  pt 
ending  World  War  I. 

1920 

U.S.  Senate  rejected  Treaty  of  Vers; 
with  Germany,  thus  keeping  the  U.S 
of  the  League  of  Nations. 


Special 


^  ?  Agreements  Act  launched  program 
iprocal  tariff  reduction  leading  to 
1  efforts  for  trade  liberalization  after 
]  War  II. 


"l  itic  Charter,  joint  declaration  by 
^  dent  Roosevelt  and  Prime  Minister 
chill  4  months  before  U.S.  entered 
\  War  II,  laid  down  principles  of 

later  adopted  by  United  Nations — 
letermination,  economic  cooperation, 
'*'  I  progress,  and  disarmament. 


"!  and  50  other  countries  founded  the 
■''  ?d  Nations. 


and  22  other  nations  established  the 
ral  Agi-eement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
"  T)  and  completed  first  round  of  talks 
ing  world  trade  barriers. 


an  Doctrine  asserted  U.S.  policy  of 
''fining  Soviet  e.xpansion  through  eco- 
;  and  military  aid  to  threatened 


■American  Ti-eaty  of  Reciprocal  As- 
ice  (Rio  treaty)  committed  the  U.S. 
..atin  American  republics  to  aid  one 
ler  to  resist  militaiy  aggression. 


hall  plan  of  aid  to  Europe  set  foun- 
n  for  economic  cooperation  among 
trial  democracies. 


1  International  Conference  of  Amer- 
5tates  created  the  Organization  of 

ican  States  (OAS)  to  intensify  U.S. 

atin  American  collaboration  in  all 


P*; 


1949 

NATO,  first  U.S.  alliance  concluded  in 
peacetime,  provided  integi-ated  force  for 
defense  of  Western  Europe  and  North 
America. 

1950 

U.N.  General  Assembly  Uniting  for 
Peace  Resolution,  presented  by  the  U.S., 
gave  basis  for  common  action  against  ag- 
gressor in  Korea. 

1963 

Limited  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty,  first 
major-power  agreement  regulating 
atomic  weapons  testing,  banned  explo- 
sions in  the  atmosphere,  in  outer  space, 
and  under  water. 

1967 

Non-Proliferation  Ti-eaty,  now  signed  by 
110  governments,  banned  spread  of 
atomic  weapons. 

1972 

Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks  (SALT) 
agreements  with  U.S.S.R.  prescribed 
mutual  limitations  on  defensive  and  of- 
fensive weapons  and  established  SALT  as 
a  continuing  process. 

1972 

President  Nixon's  February  visit  to 
China  followed  Secretary  Kissinger's  ear- 
lier negotiations  in  Peking,  marking  first 
important  step  in  process  of  normalizing 
relations  with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China. 

1973 

Paris  agi-eement  provided  for  withdrawal 

of  U.S.  troops  from  Vietnam. 

1974-75 

Middle  East  consultations  by  Secretary  of 
State  Kissinger  facilitated  military  disen- 
gagement in  Arab- Israeli  conflict  and 
prepared  ground  for  peace  talks  between 
Israel  and  Egypt. 


1979 

U.S.  established  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  People's  Republic  of  China  ending  30 
years  of  nonrecognition. 

1979 

Israel-Egypt  peace  treaty  ended  30  years 
of  conflict  between  the  two  countries  and 
provided  possible  framework  for  com- 
prehensive peace  in  Middle  East. 

1979 

Panama  Canal  Act  returned  Canal  Zone 
to  Panamanian  jurisdiction,  leaving  canal 
under  U.S.  operation  through  1999. 

1980 

Consular  convention  and  three  economic 
agreements  completed  process  of  nor- 
malizing relations  with  the  People's  Re- 
public China. 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


\v  from  postwar  history  that  such 
gations  have  sometimes  preceded 
itary  intervention. 
The  United  States  continues  to 
eve  that  the  Polish  people  and  au- 
rities  should  be  free  to  work  out 
ir  internal  difficulties  without  out- 
interference.  The  United  States, 
veil  as  some  Western  governments, 
also  the  Soviet  Union,  have 
iged  economic  assistance  to  Poland 
rder  to  alleviate  internal  Polish 
iculties.  The  United  States  has  no 
rest  in  exploiting,  in  any  fashion, 
Polish  difficulties  for  its  political 
s. 

Foreign  military  intervention  in 
and  would  have  the  most  negative 
sequences  for  East- West  relations 
reneral  and  U.S. -Soviet  relations  in 
ticular.  The  Charter  of  the  United 
tions  establishes  the  right  of  all 
tes,  both  large  and  small,  to  exist 
e  of  foreign  interference,  regard- 
;  of  ideology,  alliances,  or  geo- 
phic  location.  I  want  all  countries 
enow  that  the  attitude  and  future 
icies  of  the  United  States  toward 
Soviet  Union  would  be  directly  and 
y  adversely  affected  by  any  Soviet 
of  force  in  Poland. 


'  Text  from  White  House  press 
.>ase.  ■ 


UTE  HOUSE  STATEMENT, 
;C.  7,  1980^ 

jparations  for  possible  Soviet 
ervention  in  Poland  appear  to  have 
n  completed.   It  is  our  hope  that  no 
h  intervention  will  take  place.  The 
5.  Government  reiterates  its  state- 
nt  of  December  3  regarding  the 
■y  adverse  consequences  for  U.S.- 
I'iet  relations  of  Soviet  military 
ervention  in  Poland. 


Human  Rights  and  International  Law 


2  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
c.  15.   ■ 


by  Patricia  M.  Derian 

Statement  based  on  an  address 
prepared  for  the  National  Association 
of  Women  Judges  in  Washington,  D.C., 
on  October  3, 1980.  Ms.  Derian  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
and  Hnmanitarian  Affairs. 

It  is  rare  in  government  to  find  that 
one's  work  immerses  one  in  ideas  and 
concepts  which,  over  time,  can  have  a 
profound  and  lasting  impact  on  the 
course  of  our  country's  future.  But 
that  has  been  my  lot  for  the  past  3% 
years  as  I  and  others  have  sought  to 
integrate  the  international  concern  for 
human  rights  into  our  relations  and 
policies  with  other  nations. 

That  effort — making  human  rights 
a  central  part  of  U.S.  foreign  policy — 
is  perhaps  the  most  innovative  ap- 
proach that  the  United  States  has  ever 
taken  in  this  area.  It  is  an  attempt  to 
express  our  commitment  to  the  protec- 
tion and  enhancement  of  human  dig- 
nity throughout  the  world.  It  is  a 
reflection  of  the  values  and  traditions 
that  have  long  been  the  hallmark  of 
our  country.  With  human  rights  as  a 
major  component  of  our  foreign  policy, 
the  United  States  has  made  a  sustained 
commitment  to  a  world  free  from  gov- 
ernmental violations  of  the  integrity  of 
the  person ;  a  world  free  from  want  of 
food,  shelter,  health  care,  and  educa- 
tion ;  a  world  free  to  enjoy  civil  and 
political  liberties. 

While  the  philosophical  content  of 
our  human  rights  policy  may  seem 
largely  ethical,  ideological,  or  political, 
what  is  often  poorly  understood  is  the 
major  role  that  law  has  played  in 
establishing  a  framework  in  which 
human  rights  and  human  decency  can 
be  promoted  and  furthered. 

I  have  noted  with  some  curiosity 
that,  over  the  past  few  years,  many 
people  who  should  know  better  have 
been  surprised  to  learn  that  there  is  an 
emerging,  growing,  and,  indeed,  vigor- 
ous body  of  international  law  of  human 
rights.  This  lack  of  awareness  may  well 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  formal  international  judicial  system 
in  which  human  rights  laws  are  regu- 
larly adjudicated.  The  lack  of  such  a 


system  has  made  difficult  a  general 
apprehension  that  international  human 
rights  law  imposes  substantial  obliga- 
tions on  all  governments. 

Multilateral  Treaties 

While  human  rights  law  has  not  had 
the  advantage  of  such  a  judicial  sys- 
tem, which  would  aid  in  the  develop- 
ment of  a  cohesive  and  coherent  body 
of  law,  a  law  of  human  rights  has, 
nonetheless,  developed.  Broadly,  it  has 
emerged  as  a  result  of  international 
treaties  ;  international  customary  law 
and  practice ;  and  domestic  laws,  regu- 
lations, and  court  decisions  evidencing 
international  custom  or  acceptance  of 
general  principles. 

Of  these,  among  the  most  impor- 
tant are  the  U.N.  Charter  and  numer- 
ous international  treaties  and  other 
instruments  developed  in  an  effort  to 
promote  respect  for  human  rights. 

The  U.N.  Charter  is  probably  the 
first  and  certainly  the  most  important 
treaty  to  recognize  human  rights  and 
fundamental  freedoms  of  individual 
human  beings  as  matters  of  legitimate 
concern  to  the  entire  world  community. 
As  set  forth  in  Article  1  ( 3 )  of  the 
charter,  the  purpose  of  the  United  Na- 
tions, among  other  things,  is  "to 
achieve  international  co-operation  in 
solving  international  problems  of  an 
economic,  social,  cultural,  or  humani- 
tarian character,  and  in  promoting  and 
encouraging  respect  for  human  rights 
and  for  fundamental  freedoms  for  all 
without  distinction  as  to  race,  sex, 
language,  or  religion."  Article  55 
states  that  the  United  Nations  shall 
promote  "universal  respect  for,  and 
observance  of,  human  rights  and  fun- 
damental freedoms  for  all  without  dis- 
tinction as  to  race,  sex,  language,  or 
religion,"  while  under  Article  56  "all 
Members  pledge  themselves  to  take 
joint  and  separate  action  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  [United  Nations]  for  the 
achievement  of  the  purposes  set  forth 
in  Article  55." 

Shortly  after  the  founding  of  the 
United  Nations,  the  idea  of  an  inter- 
national bill  of  human  rights  was  ad- 
vanced. The  first  step  was  taken  on 
December  10,  1948,  when  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  adopted  and  pro- 
claimed the  Universal  Declaration  of 


Human  Rights 


Human  Rights.  The  purpose  of  the 
dechiration  is  to  be  "...  a  common 
.standard  of  achievement  for  all  peoples 
and  all  nations,  to  the  end  that  every 
individual  and  every  organ  of  society, 
keeping  this  Declaration  constantly  in 
mind,  shall  strive  by  teaching  and  edu- 
cation to  promote  respect  for  these 
rights  and  freedoms.  .  .  ." 

While  adopted  by  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly,  the  declaration  lacks  the 
binding  force  of  a  treaty.  It  has,  none- 
theless, proved  to  be  a  frequently  in- 
voked explanation  of  the  scope  of  the 
human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms recognized  by  treaty — that  is,  by 
the  U.N.  Charter.  It  has  also  been  con- 
tributing year  by  year  to  the  develop- 
ment of  a  customary  international  law 
of  human  rights. 

After  adopting  the  declaration, 
the  United  Nations  drafted,  adopted, 
and  opened  for  signature  two  major 
international  covenants  on  human 
rights — one  covering  civil  and  political 
rights  with  an  optional  protocol ;  the 
other  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
rights.  These  three  instruments  com- 
plete the  international  bill  of  human 
rights  begun  with  the  Universal  Dec- 
laration, providing  legal  as  well  as 
moral  force  to  international  human 
rights.  All  have  now  entered  into  force. 
The  two  covenants  have  been  signed 
but  not  yet  ratified  by  the  United 
States,  inasmuch  as  the  Senate  is  still 
considering  the  President's  recom- 
mendation to  the  Senate  for  its  advice 
and  consent. 

It  has  been  one  of  my  greatest 
personal  frustrations  that,  despite  the 
Carter  Administration's  commitment, 
the  work  of  many  nongovernmental 
organizations  and  legal  societies,  and 
my  own  efforts,  the  Senate  has  still  not 
voted  in  favor  of  ratifying  either  of 
these  extremely  important  instru- 
ments. They  are  cornerstones  of  the 
law  of  international  human  rights.  Our 
failure  to  ratify  these  treaties,  obvi- 
ously, makes  it  more  difficult  for  us  to 
argue  persuasively  for  the  need  to 
adhere  to  universal  standards  of 
human  rights. 


Because  of  their  importance  to 
human  rights  law,  I  would  urge  you  to 
acquaint  yourself  with  the  two  cove- 
nants and  other  pertinent  human 
rights  instruments.  The  State  Depart- 
ment has  prepared  a  compendium  of 
selected  human  rights  documents.  Your 
efforts  to  support  and  seek  the  ap- 
proval of  these  two  covenants  would  be 
a  major  contribution  in  advancing  the 
law  of  human  rights. 

The  charter  and  the  two  covenants 
are  by  no  means  the  only  multilateral 
effort  at  promoting  human  rights. 
There  are  over  20  treaties  now  in  place 
and  they  include,  inter  alia  :  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Prevention  and  Punish- 
ment of  the  Crime  of  Genocide,  the 
International  Conventi(^n  on  the  Elimi- 
nation of  All  Forms  of  Racial  Discrimi- 
nation, the  Convention  concerning  the 
Abolition  of  Forced  Labor,  the  Ameri- 
can Convention  on  Human  Rights,  the 
Convention  Relating  to  the  Status  of 
Refugees,  the  Covention  on  the  Reduc- 
tion of  Statelessness,  and  numerous 
treaties  for  the  promotion  and  ad- 
vancement of  women.  Of  these  there 
are  the  Convention  on  the  Political 
Rights  of  Women,  the  Convention  on 
the  Nationality  of  Married  Women, 
and  the  recent  Convention  on  the 
Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimi- 
nation Against  Women,  which  the 
United  States  signed  in  Copenhagen 
this  past  summer.   All  of  these  conven- 
tions create  binding  legal  obligations 
on  the  parties  to  them.  Currently  being 
drafted  at  the  United  Nations  is  a 
treaty  to  strengthen  legal  guarantees 
against,  and  procedui'es  to  eliminate 
torture,  a  practice  already  forbidden 
by  customary  international  law. 

Ref»it>iial  Arranfjenieiils 

It  is  not  only  on  the  global  level  that 
efforts  to  promote  human  rights  take 
place :  by  and  large,  some  of  the  most 
innovative  attempts  have  occurred  on 
regional  levels.  Indeed,  it  may  well  be 
that  regional  arrangements  will  most 
rapidly  advance  the  commitment  to 
human  rights  by  all  nations. 

Perhaps  the  most  highly  developed 
regional  achievement  is  the  European 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Free- 
doms. The  European  convention  estab- 
lished a  commission  and  a  court  for 


handling  both  state  and  individual 
c<imi)laints.  The  members  of  the  Oi 
nidation  of  American  States  have 
promulgated  the  American  Conven 
on  Human  Rights,  which  also  inclu 
both  a  commission  and  a  court.  Thi 
for  the  first  time  in  our  history,  a 
human  rights  court  has  been  estab- 
lished in  the  Americas,  headquarte 
in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica.  The  Leagu 
Arab  States  has  set  up  a  Permaner 
Arab  Commission  on  Human  Right 
The  Organization  of  African  Unit} 
reviewing  a  draft  on  an  African  ch 
ter  on  human  rights  and  the  possib 
of  establishing  a  commission  on  hu 
rights  for  Africa.  Under  the  Helsir 
Final  Act  of  1975,  Western  Europe 
United  States,  Canada,  and  Easter:! 
Europe — 35  nations — agreed  upon 
set  of  principles  to  reduce  tension  i 
political  conflicts  in  Europe,  includ 
among  them  "respect  for  human  riii 
and  fundamental  freedoms."  With 
exception  of  the  Helsinki  Final  Act 
which  was  made  expressly  nonbind 
each  of  these  regional  initiatives 
creates  or  contemplates  creating  leji 
obligations. 

In  some  instances  individuals  . 
able  to  assert  their  human  rights  ii 
courts  or  other  appropriate  forums 
For  example,  the  European  Conven 
on  Human  Rights  and  the  Optional 
Protocol  to  the  Covenant  on  Civil  a 
Political  Rights  establish  specific  p 
cedures  for  the  bringing  of  compla 
by  private  individuals  where  the  na 
concerned  has  agreed  to  such  a  pro- 
cedure. So,  too,  does  the  racial  dis- 
crimination convention  and  the  Am 
can  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 

Holf  (»f  Domestic  Courts 

Again  internationally  recognized 
human  rights  may  be  adjudicated  b 
domestic  courts  in  some  jurisdictioi 
A  case  in  point  is  the  recent  Pena  c: 
which  was  initially  heard  in  the  U.S 
Eastern  District  Court  of  New  Yorl 
The  case  involved  a  tort  claim  brous 
by  the  father  and  sister  of  a  teenag- 
Paraguayan  who  was  allegedly  tor- 
tured to  death  in  Asuncion  by  the  d 
fendant  Pcna-Irala,  a  Paraguayan 


22 


Deoartment  of  State  Bull 


Human  Rights 


ce  officer  who  was  found  and  served 

'^1  Tew  York.  The  suit  was  brought 
Hiant  to  a  1789  law,  now  codified  as 

''« J.S.C.  section  1350.  Section  1350 
ivs  an  alien  to  sue  in  Federal  Dis- 

"t  Courts  for  a  tort  in  violation  of 
law  of  nations  or  treaties  of  the 
ted  States. 
Thus  a  threshold  question  con- 

f^jiting  the  court  was  whether  torture 
violation  of  the  law  of  nations  in 

'"jsense  of  section  1350.  If  not,  the 
•t  would  lack  jurisdiction  to  hear 
case. 

The  district  court  considered 
,f  bound,  by  views  in  earlier  cases 
ded  by  the  Second  Circuit  Court  of 
eals,  to  reject  jurisdiction.  Those 
.'s  appeared  to  exclude  from  the 
h  of  the  law  of  nations  wrongs  in- 
ed  by  a  state  on  its  own  nationals. 
On  appeal,  the  second  circuit 
ht  an  opinion  from  the  State  De- 
ment. The  State  Department 
'ted.  and  the  Department  of  Justice 
,  a  brief  showing  that  the  inter- 
onal  law  of  human  rights  today 
extend  to  a  wrong  by  a  state 
nst  its  own  citizens  and  that  tor- 
is  such  a  universally  recognized 
ng.  The  court  of  appeals  adopted 
view  and  remanded  the  case  to 
district  court. 
Some  international  treaties,  such 

a  ne  Genocide  Convention,  provide 
the  prosecution  of  individuals  who 
2  allegedly  violated  the  human 

i;i  its  of  others. 

Frequently,  the  provisions  of  a 
icular  human  rights  treaty  are 
rporated  into  the  domestic  law  of  a 
e  in  such  a  manner  that  it  can  be 
ked  directly  by  individuals.  In 
e  states,  once  a  treaty  is  ratified,  it 
)matically  becomes  a  part  of  the 
estic  law;  in  others,  additional 
lementing  legislation  is  required, 
dless  to  say,  these  are  not  merely 

demic  concerns.  Domestic  courts  in 
United  States  are,  at  times,  faced 

rlji  the  question  of  whether  a  human 

ijits  treaty  is  self-executing,  thus 

pnitting  the  benefits  of  the  treaty  to 
pplied  directly  to  a  litigant.  I 
lid  note  that  in  transmitting  four 
lan  rights  treaties  to  the  Senate  in 
ruary  1978,  President  Carter  rec- 
nended  that  the  United  States  de- 
e  that  they  are  not  self-executing. 


During  the  early  1970s  numerous 
suits  were  brought  in  domestic  courts 
in  an  effort  to  "prevent  the  U.S.  Gov- 
eriir.ient  and  other  U.S.  interests  from 
aiding  the  forces  of  racial  repression 
in  southern  Africa."  While  the  suits 
did  not  succeed,  they  were  of  the  ut- 
most importance  in  raising  the  con- 
sciousness of  lawyers,  judges,  govern- 
ment officials,  and  the  general  public  to 
the  existence  of  human  rights  law  and 
its  potential  application  in  domestic 
courts. 

While  there  is,  in  my  view,  a 
clearly  recognizable  code  of  human 
rights  law  binding  on  states  and  ap- 
plicable to  individuals,  the  major  Haw 
in  the  development  of  human  rights 
law  is  one  of  enforcement.  The  im- 
l^lementation  of  human  rights  law 
l-irgely  depends  on  the  consent  of 
nations.  The  competence  of  various 
international  courts  to  render  a  judg- 
ment against  a  nation  which  has  vio- 
lated its  human  rights  obligations 
rests  on  that  nation's  consent  to  the 
c  jurt's  jurisdiction.  However,  even  if 
that  consent  is  forthcoming,  an  ad- 
verse judgment  against  a  consenting 
nation  may  or  may  not  be  effectively 
enforced.  Where  a  court  may,  as  is  the 
case  of  the  International  Court  of  Jus- 
tice, render  advisory  opinions,  those 
opinions,  while  deserving  great  re- 
spect, are,  by  definition,  not  binding, 
unless  by  virtue  of  some  special 
agreement. 

Currently,  the  implementation  and 
enforcement  of  human  rights  law  are 
largely  dependent  on  voluntary  compli- 
ance, moral  pressures,  and  other  forms 
of  influence.  Ideally,  and  perhaps  with 
time,  there  will  emerge  a  viable  court 
system  with  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  as  the  final  court  of  appeal. 
Already  many  of  the  regional  arrange- 
ments for  the  promotion  and  protec- 
tion of  human  rights  have  established 
Slime  form  of  juridical  mechanism  for 
lodging  complaints. 

What  I  have  sought  to  do  here 
today  is  to  show  in  a  rather  brief  form 
that  human  rights  is  something  more 
than  a  controversial,  ideological,  or 
political  concept.  Human  rights  is  law 
and,  as  such,  when  a  nation  violates 
individual  human  rights,  it  is  violating 
international  law.  The  efforts  of  the 
U.S.  Government  to  make  human 
rights  a  central  part  of  our  foreign 
policy  is,  in  effect,  an  effort  to  incor- 
porate within  our  foreign  policy  the 


international  law  which  establishes 
standards  of  human  decency  and 
human  dignity.  In  that  human  rights 
is  something  beyond  an  ethical,  ideo- 
logical, or  political  concept  and  is  also 
very  much  a  legal  concept. 

The  question  I  am  often  asked  is: 
"What  is  the  future  of  the  U.S.  human 
rights  policy  under  a  different  Admin- 
istration?" I  say  that  if  human  rights 
is  international  law,  and  I  believe  that 
it  is,  there  can  be  no  other  course  for 
the  U.S.  Government  but  to  apply  and 
enforce  that  law. 

What  I  have  attempted  to  do  here 
today  is  to  provide  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  role  that  the  law  plays 
in  enhancing  human  rights.  The  con- 
cept of  human  rights  is  a  concept  of 
world  order.  It  is  a  proposal  for  struc- 
turing the  world  so  that  every  indi- 
vidual's human  worth  is  realized,  every 
individual's  human  dignity  is  pro- 
tected. The  purpose  of  laws  is  to  create 
a  meaningful,  rational,  and  just  frame- 
work in  which  the  pursuit  of  personal 
and  societal  enjoyment  can  take  place. 
This  thought  has  never  been  expressed 
better  than  in  the  preamble  to  the  Uni- 
versal Declaration  of  Human  Rights. 
The  drafters  of  the  declaration  clearly 
understood  the  important  role  that  law 
must  play  if  the  goal  of  respect  for 
universal  human  rights  is  ever  to  be 
realized.  They  wrote: 

...  it  is  essential,  if  man  is  not  to 
be  compelled  to  have  recourse,  as  a  last 
resort,  to  rebellion  against  tyranny 
and  oppression,  that  human  rights 
should  be  protected  liy  the  rule  of 
law.  ■ 


MIDDLE  EAST 


U.S.-lsrael  Oil  Agreement 


In  a  crremnmj  at  the  White  House 
on  October  17.  1980.  President  Carter 
and  I.fraeli  Minister  Yitzhak  Modai 
.signed  the  Contingency  Implementing 
Arrangements  for  the  June  22, 1979, 
Memorandum  of  Agreement  between 
Israel  and  the  United  States. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
the  President  and  Minister  Modai  on 
that  occasion,  te.rts  of  the  agreement 
and  the  June  22.  1979.  Memorandum  of 
Agreement,  with  annex,  and  a 
Department  fact  sheet. 


REMARKS  AT  SIGNING 
CEREMONY! 


President  Carter 

I'm  very  pleased  to  announce  this 
morning  the  completion  of  our  con- 
tingency arrangements  for  assuring 
Israel's  oil-supply  security. 

These  arrangements  further  ful- 
fill a  promise  that  I  made  last  year  in 
connection  with  Israel's  withdrawal 
from  the  Gulf  of  Suez  oil  fields  and  its 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
Egypt.  In  making  peace,  Israel  com- 
mitted itself  to  dependence  solely  on 
imported  oil — a  very  bold  and  courage- 
ous and  generous  decision  in  this 
troubled  time.  At  the  time  of  Israel's 
withdrawal,  in  1975,  from  a  portion  of 
the  Egyptian  Sinai,  the  United  States 
gave  assurance  that  Israel  would  count 
on  our  help  and  could  depend  on  us  if 
it  could  not  attain  oil  during  its  own 
efforts. 

We  renewed  and  e.xtended  this 
duration  of  the  assurance  in  June  of 
1979,  so  that  the  establishment  of 
peace  with  Egypt  would  not  lessen 
Israel's  long-range  energy  security. 
Now  we  have  spelled  out  the  emergency 
conditions  under  which  the  1979  oil- 
supply  agreement  may  be  activated. 
This  contingency  plan  is  a  carefully 
defined  understanding  between  friends, 
designed  to  insure  that  all  relevant  con- 
cerns are  taken  into  account.  Both  our 
nations  hope  this  agreement  will  never 
have  to  be  activated,  but  if  it  should 
become  necessary,  the  United  States 
will  be  a  steadfast  and  dependable 
friend  of  Israel. 

This  agreement  is  one  aspect  of 
what  I  hope  will  be  a  broad  range  of 


cooperation  in  strengthening  Israel's 
energy  security.  We're  exploring  now 
how  we  might  work  together  further 
on  research  and  development  and  for 
new  energy  technologies,  especially 
shale  oil  extraction  and  the  use  of 
solar  power  for  energy. 

Our  cooperation  in  energy  and  in 
other  fields  is  for  the  cause  of  peace. 
It  is  against  no  nation.  It  is  for  the 
people  who  yearn  for  a  secure  future. 
It  is  in  this  spirit  that  I  congratulate 
the  negotiators  of  the  oil  supply  under- 
standings and  invite  now  Secretary 
Muskie,  representing  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  Minister  Modai,  rep- 
resenting the  great  nation  of  Israel,  to 
proceed  with  the  signing  of  the 
appropriate  documents. 

[At  this  point,  Secretary  of  State  Ed- 
niniid  S.  Muskie  and  Israeli  Minister  of 
Energy  and  Infrastructure  Yitzhak 
Modai  signed  the  "Contingency  Imple- 
menting Arrangements  for  the  Memoran- 
dum of  Agreement  of  June  22,  1!)79 
Between  Israel  and  the  United  States."] 

Minister  Modai 

The  peace  agreement  between  Israel 
and  Egypt  is  probably  the  most  im- 
portant event,  certainly  in  the  Middle 
East,  but  probably  also  in  the  entire 
world  in  this  generation. 

It  came  about  due  to  the  leader- 
ship of  Prime  Minister  Ben-Gurion 
(  Begin  )  -,  President  Sadat,  and 
through  the  devoted  efforts  and  active 
participation  of  yourself. 

The  State  of  Israel,  in  order  to 
achieve  this  peace  agreement,  has 
made  very  large  sacrifices.  A  major 
sacrifice  was  the  relinquishing  of  the 
Alma  oil  field,  which  we  discovered 
and  developed,  and  this,  in  addition  to 
giving  up  the  Abu  Rudeis  oil  field  as 
part  of  the  interim  agreement  in  1975. 

Now  you  and  the  Congress  under- 
stood the  big  risk  taken  by  the  State 
of  Israel  in  giving  up  its  opportunity 
for  oil  self-sufficiency  and,  therefore, 
an  agreement  that  guarantees  oil  sup- 
ply to  Israel  was  signed  in  .June  of 
1979.  Now,  that  agreement  did  not 
contain  the  specifications  of  the  condi- 
tions in  which  that  agreement  could 
have  been  activated  and,  therefore,  we 
felt — we  in  Israel  felt — that  we  need 
to  have  a  better  definition  of  which  are 
the  conditions  in  which  your  guaran- 
tee will  come  into  effect.  After  tedious, 


long  negotiations — over  a  year — v/e 
are  finally  signing,  here  today,  the 
specifications  under  which  that  agr 
ment  will  come  into  effect. 

That  is  certainly  the  completio 
of  a  promise,  I  may  say,  of  an  offer 
made  by  you  when  you  were  in  Israi 
I  believe  in  February  of  1979. 

Obviously,  nobody  can  foresee 
future  developments  in  the  next  15-^ 
now  it's  only  14 — years,  but  we  are 
very  happy  to  have  a  document  whii 
is  so  clear,  so  detailed,  and  which 
relates  to  such  a  vital  and  delicate 
issue.  I  would  like  to  thank  you, 
Mr.  President,  you  Mr.  Secretai-y,  a 
your  staffs  for  a  job  so  very  well  do 

President  Carter 

I'd  like  to  say  to  the  press  that  folio 
ing  this  ceremony,  or  perhaps  airea 
the  details  of  the  agreement  will  be 
described.  Has  that  been  done  yet? 
It  will  be  done.  So,  your  questions 
about  the  detailed  agreement  will  bi 
answered  after  this  meeting. 

I  would  like  to  say,  informally 
but  sincerely,  on  behalf  of  the  Amei 
can  people,  that  we  are  very  proud  t 
have  this  agreement.  The  proposal  ■> 
made  voluntarily  by  me,  on  my  own 
initiative,  when  I  was  in  Jerusalem 
the  time  when  we  were  trying  to  br 
to  a  conclusion  the  basic  elements  ol 
the  peace  treaty  between  Israel  and 
Egypt.  Israel  has  taken  a  courageoi 
step  in  bringing  peace  to  that  entir( 
area  by  voluntarily  giving  up  contrc 
of  and  the  use  of  these  oil  wells,  son 
of  which  they,  themselves,  discovere 
and  developed. 

We  anticipate  that  Israel  will  c 
tinue  to  receive  their  oil  from  presei 
sources,  but  if  those  supplies  should 
interrupted  or  if  exorbitant  prices 
should  be  imposed  upon  Israel,  abov 
and  beyond  normal  marketing  price: 
as  described  in  this  detailed  docume 
then  the  United  States  will  meet  thi; 
obligation  to  our  friend,  the  Govern 
ment  of  Israel. 

I  consider  this  to  be  not  only  an 
investment  iti  the  security  of  Israel 
but  also  a  very  sound  investment  in 
the  security  of  the  United  States  of 
America.  And  it's  a  further  demon- 
stration of  our  unfaltering  commit- 
ment and  steady  progress  toward  th 


Deoartment  of  State  Bull 


Middle  East 


prehensive  peace  in  the  Middle 
t,  which  all  of  us  so  deeply  desire, 
;d  upon  the  security  of  Israel,  in 
y  sense  and  meaning  of  that  word. 
Mr.  Minister,  thank  you  very 
h  for  your  coming  here  to  con- 
,e  this  document.  And  I  hope  you'll 
ind  my  best  wishes  to  Prime  Min- 
r  Begin  and  to  all  the  officials  of 
lel  who've  made  this  progress 
dble. 


CT  OF  AGREEMENT' 


3NTINGENCY  IMPLEMENTING 
ARRANGEMENTS  FOR  THE 
SMORANDUM  OF  AGREEMENT 
OF  JUNE  22,  1979 
BETWEEN 
AEL  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 


'his  agreement  is  to  specify  the  eon- 
)ns  for  the  activation  of  the  June  22, 
),  Memorandum  of  Agreement 
3A)  between  the  United  States  and 
el  on  oil  supply  and  the  means  by 
;h  the  MOA  would  be  implemented. 
2.  Pursuant  to  paragraph  1  of  the 
A,  Israel  may  give  notification  to  the 
ted  States  Departmen',  of  State 
ireau  of  Near  Eastern  and  South 
an  Affairs).  The  notification  is  to 

]  ude  the  information  Israel  deems 
jssary  to  substantiate  its  view  that 
;  unable  to  secure  its  needs,  or  some 
t  thereof,  through  normal  procedures, 
iporting  documentation  is  to  be  pro- 
!d  on  request.    Consultations  between 
United  States  and  Israel  would  then 
e  place  as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  no 

in  nt  later  than  two  weeks  following 
ification,  to  confirm  that  Israel  is 
.ble  to  supply  its  requirements  by 
mal  procedures.  Upon  this  confirma- 
1,  implementation  would  proceed, 
ael's  supply  right  and  allocation  right 
aid  be  established  and  the  United 
.tes  would  make  oil  available  to  Israel 
50on  as  practicable  after  notification, 
e  United  States  will  make  every  effort 
■nsure  that  this  period  is  less  than 
days. 

3.  Absent  a  shortfall  in  the  amount 
oil  physically  available  to  Israel  on  the 
rid  market,  the  MOA  could  be  acti- 
ted  when  Israel: 


(a)  is  paying  for  all  its  imported  oil 
average  price  higher  than  the  average 
it  of  the  most  expensive  20' ;  of  crude 
imported  into  the  United  States;  and 

(b)  has  to  buy  at  least  60 'y  of  its  oil 
rough  short-term,  indirect  purchases. 

16  time  period  for  measurement  of  these 
itors  would  be  the  90  days  preceding 
tification. 


4.   If  Israel  were  to  lose  one  of  its 
two  existing  main  sources  of  long-term 
supply  (or  a  replacement  source  pro- 
viding 22' ;  or  more  of  Israel's  oil 
imports),  notwithstanding  Israel's 
reasonable  efforts  to  retain  said  sources 
of  supply,  without  immediately  replac- 
ing it  with  an  equivalent  source,  the 
MOA  could  be  activated  immediately. 
Israel's  allocation  right  during  activa- 
tion pursuant  to  this  paragraph  would  be 
equal  to  120  days  of  supply  from  the  lost 
main  source,  following  which  the  MOA 
would  be  deactivated  unless  the  con- 
ditions of  paragraph  3  have  been  met. 
The  United  States  and  Israel  would  seek 
to  measure  the  factors  for  an  activation 
under  paragraph  3  without  including  oil 
which  may  be  made  available  from  the 
United  States  pursuant  to  this  para- 
graph. If  this  paragraph  is  activated 
under  section  1(b)  of  the  MOA,  Israel's 
allocation  right  would  be  adjusted  in 
accordance  with  paragraphs  6  and  7 
hereof. 

5.  Israel's  shortfall  and  supply  right 
under  section  1(a)  of  the  MOA  would  be 
determined  by  comparing  actual  and  ex- 
pected deliveries  of  oil  secured  through 
normal  procedures  with  current  normal 
co.iicstic  requirements.  The  allocation 
right  as  determined  pursuant  to  the  above 
should  include  such  oil  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  maintain  its  reserves  at  a  level 

of  six  months  of  consumption. 

6.  Under  section  1  (b) ,  if  the  lEA 
General  Trigger  emergency  procedures 
have  not  been  activated,  Israel  would 
sustain  from  its  consumption  a  reduction 
in  its  oil  supplies  up  to  a  level  of  TA  in 
accordance  with  applicable  lEA  Selective 
Trigger  Rules.  The  United  States  would 
thereafter  meet  any  shortfall  in  Israel's 
normal  requirements.  Should  the  TEA 
General  Trigger  emergency  procedures 
be  activated,  the  U.S.  Government  would 
make  oil  available  for  purchase  by  Israel 
in  accordance  with  the  lEA  General  Allo- 
cation formula.  The  formula  requires: 

(a)  demand  restraint  measures 
which  reduce  consumption  by  7',r  or  IC/o 
depending  on  the  loss  of  supplies  in  the 
lEA  area;  and 

( b )  a  proportional  drawdown  of 
stocks  after  imposition  of  the  demand 
restraint  measures. 

The  United  States  will  keep  Israel 
informed  of  any  changes  in  the  lEA 
emergency  measures  and  procedures 
relevant  to  the  MOA  and  any  interpre- 
tations thereof. 

7.  Once  the  Geneial  Trigger  is  acti- 
vated, demand  restraint  for  Israel  would 
be  calculated  using  the  same  base  period 
as  that  used  by  lEA  countries.  The 
Emergency  Reserve  Drawdown  Obliga- 
tion (ERDO)  for  Israel  would  be  calcu- 
lated using  the  lEA  formula  as  if  Israel 
has  the  same  reserve  obligation  as  a 


member  nation.  The  lEA  currently 
requires  an  emergency  reserve  commit- 
ment for  each  country  equivalent  to  90 
days  of  imports  for  domestic 
consumption. 

On  this  basis,  an  ERDO  would  be 
calculated  for  Israel  and,  in  turn,  a 
supply  right  derived.  Israel's  allocation 
right  would  be  calculated  by  subtracting 
available  supplies  from  its  supply  right. 
The  allocation  right  would  determine  the 
amount  of  oil  to  be  supplied  to  Israel 
under  the  MOA.  The  initial  supply 
right  would  be  calculated  as  of  the  date 
of  notification  under  the  MOA. 

8.  After  activation,  United  States 
and  'sraeli  experts  would  meet  every 
three  months,  or  more  often  on  request, 
to  review  Israel's  oil  supply  situation 
and  its  attempts  to  obtain  oil  and  to 
adjust  Israel's  allocation  right  accord- 
ingly. Israel's  allocation  right  would  be 
adjusted  to  the  extent  oil  is  available  to 
Israel  under  normal  procedures.  Israel 
would  continue  to  make  its  best  efforts  to 
secure  oil  independently  in  such  manner 
as  to  reduce  or  eliminate  its  dependency 
on  oil  made  available  by  the  United 
States  under  the  MOA.  When  Israel's 
allocation  right  is  reduced  or  eliminated, 
the  United  States  would  take  appropriate 
measures  to  adjust  or  end  its  arrange- 
ments for  oil  supply  to  Israel  in  an 
orderly  fashion. 

9.  Although  the  actual  sequence  and 
methods  of  supply  would  depend  on  the 
conditions  existing  at  the  time,  the 
United  States  affirms  that,  in  its  current 
judgment,  the  following  options  are  the 
most  practical  means  of  supplying  oil  to 
Israel  pursuant  to  sections  1(a)  and 
1(b)  of  the  MOA: 

(a)  The  United  States  would  first 
try  to  use  its  good  offices  with  other 
nations  and  with  private  companies  to 
arrange  for  alternative  foreign  sources 
of  supply  for  sales  to  Israel.  Price  and 
other  terms  would  be  worked  out  between 
the  supplier  and  Israel. 

(b)  If  option  A  is  not  sufficient,  the 
United  States  could  attempt  to  buy  oil  on 
the  world  market  for  resale  to  Israel  at 
cost.  The  United  States  would  seek  the 
most  reasonably  priced  oil  available. 

(c)  If  there  is  no  other  more  suit- 
able alternative,  the  United  States  cur- 
rently foresees  fulfilling  its  obligations 
under  the  MOA  by  making  oil  available 
to  Israel  through  swaps  or  direct  sale 
of  domestically  produced  oil. 

10.  In  any  of  these  arrangements  the 
United  States  will,  to  the  extent  possible, 
take  into  account  the  types  of  crude  oil 
most  suitable  to  meet  Israel's  require- 
ment as  well  as  commercial  and  logistic 
considerations.  It  is  recognized  that  the 
API  mix  of  the  oil  supplies  could  cause 
slight  variations  in  the  total  amount  of 
oil  required. 

11.  Under  the  terms  of  the  MOA, 


Middle  East 


the  price  paid  for  oil  supplied  by  the 
United  States  shall  be  comparable  to 
world  market  prices  current  at  the  time 
of  transfer.  Israel  will,  in  any  event, 
reimburse  the  United  States  for  the  costs 
incurred  by  the  United  States  in  provid- 
injc  oil  to  Israel  hereunder. 

If  the  United  States  provides 
domestic  oil  to  Israel,  the  price  charged 
would  be  acquisition  cost  or  the  replace- 
ment cost,  whichever  is  higher.  Replace- 
ment cost  means  the  actual  cost  to  the 
U.S.  refiners  of  replacing  oil  sold  to 
Israel ;  if  this  cani.ot  be  precisely 
determined,  replacement  cost  will  be  con- 
sidered to  be  equivalent  to  the  average 
cost  (C.I.F.)  to  U.S.  refiners  of  the  most 
expensive  10'/'  of  similar  quality  crude 
oil  imported  into  the  United  States. 

12.  The  U.S.  Government  would 
make  all  necessary  arrangements  with 
appropriate  U.S.  agencies  and  relevant 
suppliers  to  implement  fully  the  U.S. 
commitment  to  make  oil  available  for 
purchase  by  Israel. 

13.  The  United  States  would  keep 
Israel  informed  of  the  progress  toward 
making  oil  available  to  Israel.  The  United 
States  would  inform  Israel  of  the 
arrangements  it  has  made  as  soon  as 
possible  with  the  objective  of  enabling 
Israel  to  have  a  ship  or  ships  ready  to 
load  when  and  where  the  oil  becomes 
available. 

14.  Arrangements  would  be  made 
for  appropriate  participation  of  United 
States  flag  carriers  in  the  transportation 
of  oil  from  the  United  States  under  para- 
graph 9  (c)  above.  If  Israel  is  unable 

to  secure  the  necessary  means  to  trans- 
port to  Israel  oil  made  available  pursuant 
to  the  MOA,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment would  make  every  effoit  to  help 
Israel  secure  the  necessary  means  of 
trar.sport. 

15.  In  the  event  of  war  or  damage  to 
Israel's  refining  capacity  or  storage 
installations,  to  adjusu  for  variations  of 
API  gravity  crude  oil,  or  for  other  rea- 
sons, Israel  may  require  refined  petro- 
leum products.  In  that  event,  the  United 
States  and  Israeli  Governments  would 
promptly  consult  as  to  the  means  by 
which  Israel  might  acquire  and  transport 
such  products. 

16.  With  regard  to  security  arrange- 
ments, the  United  States  and  Israel  will 
be  prepared  to  take  security  precautions 
normal  in  such  circumstances  in  their 
own  ports  for  ships  controlled  by  the 
other.  It  is  assumed  that  Israel  will  work 
out  security  arrangements  with  third 
country  officials  to  the  extent  that  third 
country  ports  might  be  involved  in  the 
Israeli  supply  line. 

17.  Quarterly  or  more  f  reciuently 
upon  United  States  request,  Israel  shall 
inform  the  United  States  of  the  (luantity, 
t|uality,  price  and  other  relevant  condi- 
tions of  oil  imports  into  Israel,  Israel's 


U.S.  Hostages  in  Iran 

SEC.RETARYS  STATEMENT 

NOV.  3,  1980' 

We  have  seen,  during  the  past  12 
hour.s,  several  developments  in  the 
hostage  issue.  These  should  be  viewed 
as  initial  steps  in  a  process  which  will 
require  time,  patience,  and  diplomacy. 

Reports  from  Tehran  .state  that 
the  Ayatollah  Khomeini  has  agreed 
with  the  militants  that  the  hostages 
can  be  transferred  to  government 
control.  We  believe,  as  we  have  said 
previously,  it  i.s  in  our  interest  for  the 
government  to  assume  direct  responsi- 
bility for  the  well-being  and  security 
of  the  hostages. 

We  welcome  reports  that  the 
Algerian  Government  will  be  involved. 
Deputy  Secretary  |  Warren] 
Christopher  has  met  with  the  Algerian 
ambassador  and  discussed  their  role 
in  connection  with  the  actions  of  the 
Iranian  Parliament. 

Finally,  the  reports  from  Tehran 
that  the  Prime  Minister's  office  has 
established  a  working  group  in  con- 
nection with  implementation  of  the 
Parliament's  decision  are  also  welcome. 

The  President  said  yesterday  that 
we  cannot  predict  when  the  hostages 
will  be  home  with  us.  We  have  affirmed 
that  any  decisions  we  make  will  be 
consistent  with  two  fundamental 
objectives  stated  by  the  President — 
a  solution  must  protect  our  national 
honor  and  vital  interests  and  insure 
the  safe  return  of  the  hostages. 

There  has  been  progress ;  how- 
ever, much  remains  to  be  done.  We 
will  continue  to  pursue  our  goals  with 
patience,  diligence,  and  determination. 
Americans  are  united  in  their  desire 
to  see  their  fellow  citizens  come  home 
safely  with  honor  and  with  pride  in 
their  nation. 


'  Copies  made  available  to  news 
correspondents  by  Department  spokes- 
man John  Trattner.  ■ 


requirement  for  the  preceding  3-month 
period  and  its  forecast  for  imports  and 
requirements  for  the  next  (Vmonth  period. 
18.   United  States  and  Israeli  experts 
will  meet  annually  or  more  frequently  at 
the  request  of  either  party  to  review 
Israel's  oil  situation  in  light  of  prevailing 
market  conditions  and  to  review  and,  if 


necessary,  further  develop  or  modify 
these  contingency  implementing  arran 
ments  by  mutual  agreement. 

19.  These  arrangements  shall  be  : 
ject  to  and  interpreted  and  applied  in 
accordance  with  the  MOA,  including 
paragraph  4  thereof. 

20.  These  arrangements  shall  api 
for  an  initial  period  of  five  years  and 
shall  continue  to  apply  for  additional 
periods  of  three  years  for  the  duratior 
of  the  MOA,  unless  suspended  by  eith( 
party  at  the  expiry  of  any  period  upor 
written  notice  at  least  6  months  prior  j 
thereto.  , 

.Suspension  of  these  arrangement:' 
r'lall  in  no  way  affect  the  continued 
validity  of  the  MOA.   In  the  event  of  s 
pension,  both  parties  will  make  every 
effort  to  reach  renewed  agreement  on 
contingency  implementing  arrangemei 

DONE  in  duplicate,  at  Washingtu 
this  seventeenth  day  of  October,  1980. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF 
ISRAEL: 

Yitzhak  Modai 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  Tt 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA: 

Edmund  S.  Muskie 


MEMORANDUM  OF  AGREEMENT 


TEXT  OF  MEMORANDUM  OF 

AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  THI 

GOVERNMENT  OF  ISRAEL  AN. 

THE  UNITED  STATES, 

JUNE  22,  1979 


Pursuant  to  the  Memorandum  of  Agr 
ment  between  the  Governments  of  the' 
United  States  and  Israel  signed 
March  2(!,  1979,  Israel  and  the  United 
States  have  entered  into  the  Oil  Suppl 
Arrangement  set  forth  herein  as 
follows: 

1.  Israel  will  make  its  own  inde- 
pendent arrangements  for  oil  supply  t 
meet  its  requirements  through  normal 
procedures.  In  the  event  Israel  is  unat 
to  secure  its  needs  in  this  way,  the  Un 
States  Government,  upon  notification  ■ 
this  fact  by  the  Government  of  Israel 
will  act  as  follows: 

(a)  If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  nieei 
all  its  normal  domestic  requirements  i: 
unavailable  for  purchase  in  circum- 
stances where  no  quantitative  restric- 
tions exist  on  the  ability  of  the  United 
States  to  procure  oil  to  meet  its  norma 
requirements,  the  United  States  Govei 
ment  will  promptly  make  oil  available 
purchase  by  Israel  to  meet  the  shortfa 
in  the  aforementioned  normal  require- 
ments of  Israel.  Oil  will  be  made  avail 
able  to  Israel  as  soon  as  practicable  a 


Middle  East 


cation ;  the  United  States  will  make 

I'  effort  to  ensure  this  period  is  less 
(50  days, 
(b)    If  the  oil  Israel  needs  to  meet 
'  its  normal  requirements  for 

stic  consumption  is  unavailable  for 
hase  in  circumstances  where  quanti- 
e  restrictions  throuph  embargo  or 

wise  also  prevent  the  United  States 

procuring  oil  to  meet  its  normal 
irements,  the  United  States  Govern- 
,  will  promptly  make  oil  available 

urchase  by  Israel  in  accordance  with 
nternational  Energy  Agency  con- 

tion  and  allocation  formula  as 
ied  by  the  United  States  Government, 
der  to  meet  the  shortfall  in  Israel's 
itial  requirements.  Oil  will  be  made 
lable  to  Israel  as  soon  as  practicable 

notification;  the  United  States 
make  every  effort  to  ensure  this 
)d  is  less  than  60  days, 
(c)    If  Israel  is  unable  to  secure  the 

sary  means  to  transport  to  Israel  oil 
e  available  pursuant  to  this  Agree- 
,  the  United  States  Government  will 
'.  every  effort  to  help  Israel  secure 
lecessary  means  of  transport. 

2.  Prices  paid  by  Israel  for  oil  pro- 
i  by  the  United  States  hereunder 

be  comparable  to  world  market 
;s  current  at  the  time  of  transfer, 
al  will,  in  any  event,  reimburse  the 
ed  States  for  the  costs  incurred  by 
Jnited  States  in  providing  oil  to 
el  hereunder. 

3.  Israeli  and  United  States  experts 
imeet  annually  or  more  frequently  at 
•equest  of  either  party,  to  review 
tel's  continuing  oil  requirement  and 
!velop  and  review  any  necessary  con- 
lency  implementing  arrangements. 

4.  This  Memorandum  of  Agreement 
bject  to  applicable  United  States 
The  United  States  administration 
seek  additional  statutory  authoriza- 
that  may  be  necessary  for  full  imple- 
tation  of  this  Memorandum  of 

Ieement. 
5.  This  Memorandum  of  Agreement 

I  enter  into  force  on  November  25, 

)  and  shall  terminate  on  November  25, 
1.  The  oil  supply  arrangement  of 
tember  1,  1975  between  the  Govern- 
ts  of  Israel  and  the  United  States 

II  be  in  force  during  the  period  from 
date  of  this  Memorandum  of  Agree- 
it  to  November  25,  1994  and  shall  be 
formed  and  implemented  in  accord- 

e  with  the  provisions  of  this 
iiorandum  of  Agreement. 


ANNEX 

onnection  with  the  Memorandum  of 
reement  being  entered  into  on  this  date 
ween  the  Government  of  Israel  and  the 
/ernment  of  the  United  States,  Israel 
I  the  United  States  understand  that: 

Because  of  the  unique  security 


situation  of  Israel  its  oil  reserves  are 
and  should  be  at  the  level  equal  to  six 
months  of  Israel's  oil  consumption;  and 
in  this  connection  U.S.  oil  supplies 
should  be  at  such  levels  that  U.S.  ability 
to  meet  its  oil  requirements  will  not  be 
adversely  affected. 


DEPARTMENT  FACT  SHEET^ 

The  Memorandum  of  Agreement 
(  MOA  )  on  oil  supply,  concluded  by  the 
U.S.  and  Lsrael  on  June  22,  1979,  was 
an  integral  part  of  the  process  result- 
ing in  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  between  Egypt  and  Israel.  As 
part  of  that  treaty,  Israel  agreed  to 
give  back  to  Egypt  oil  fields  in  the 
Gulf  of  Suez.  The  MOA  contains  a 
commitment  by  the  U.S.  to  make  oil 
available  for  purchase  by  Israel  if 
Lsrael  could  not  find  enough  on  its  own, 
through  normal  procedures,  to  meet  its 
domestic  requirements.  (This  was 
very  similar  to  an  agreement  con- 
cluded with  Israel  in  1975  when  Israel 
returned  oil  fields  to  Egypt  as  part  of 
a  partial  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai. 
That  agreement  was  folded  into  the 
1979  MOA.) 

Section  three  of  the  Memorandum 
of  Agreement  provided  that  the  two 
nations  should  meet  to  develop  con- 
tingency implementing  arrangements. 
There  have  been  five  meetings  over  the 
course  of  the  past  year  and  an  agree- 
ment outlining  such  arrangements  has 
now  been  reached.  These  implementing 
arrangements  are  entirely  subject  to 
the  parent  MOA. 

The  implementing  arrangements 
provide  for  three  ways  in  which  the 
MOA  could  be  activated: 

•  The  first  occurs  when  Israel 
simply  cannot  obtain  enough  oil  to 
meet  its  needs,  no  matter  what  price 
or  terms  it  offers.  In  this  case,  the 
United  States  would  provide  Israel, 
directly  or  indirectly,  a  sufficient 
quantity  of  oil  to  make  up  the 
shortfall. 

•  A  much  more  comple.\  situation 
arises  when  Israel  can  physically 
obtain  oil  but  only  by  paying  an 
excessive  average  price  and  by  buying 
under  very  insecure  arrangements.  In 
the  case  of  oil,  as  with  any  commodity, 
if  a  country  is  willing  to  pay  enough 

it  may  be  able  to  find  modest  amounts 
even  during  times  of  severe  world 
shortage.  This  fact  was  taken  into 
account  in  the  formula  in  paragraph  3 
whereby  the  MOA  would  be  activated 


if  Israel  has  to  pay  an  average  price 
for  its  oil  greater  than  the  average 
cost  of  the  most  expensive  20' r  of 
crude  oil  imported  into  the  United 
States  and  has  to  buy  at  least  60% 
of  its  oil  through  short-term,  indirect 
purchases.  This  formula  reflects  the 
basic  purpose  of  the  1979  MOA  as  an 
emergency  supply  commitment  and, 
at  the  same  time,  recognizes  the 
market  reality  that  even  though  oil 
may  be  available,  it  cannot  be  obtained 
through  normal  procedures. 

•   Paragraph  4  provides  for  a 
special  emergency  activation  of  the 
commitment  when  Israel  loses  one  of 
its  main  sources  of  supply  despite  its 
efforts  to  maintain  that  source.  If 
Israel  cannot  immediately  replace  it 
with  an  equivalent  source,  the  United 
States  would  provide  oil,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  make  up  the  shortfall 
for  120  days.  If,  after  this  period, 
Israel  was  suffering  a  physical  short- 
fall or  qualified  under  paragraph  3, 
the  United  States  would  continue  to 
provide  oil. 

If  the  MOA  is  activated,  the 
United  States  would  first  try  to  find 
foreign  oil  for  Israel.  If  that  proves 
inadequate,  the  United  States  would 
provide  domestic  oil.  There  would  be 
no  subsidy  involved.  Israel  would  pay 
the  higher  of  the  acquisition  cost  or 
the  cost  to  U.S.  refiners  of  obtaining 
replacement  oil.  If  the  actual  replace- 
ment cost  could  not  be  determined, 
an  imputed  replacement  cost  equal  to 
the  average  of  the  most  expensive 
10';  of  U.S.  imports  of  similar  quality 
would  be  charged. 

Whenever  the  United  States  pro- 
vides oil  to  Israel,  Israel  would  have 
the  obligation  to  continue  to  look  for 
oil  on  the  world  market,  and  if  it  finds 
some,  the  U.S.  obligation  would  be 
reduced  accordingly. 

If  the  United  States  is  suffering 
a  shortfall  and  the  MOA  were  acti- 
vated, Israel,  under  paragraphs  6  and 
7  of  the  implem.enting  arrangements, 
would  be  treated  as  a  hypothetical 
participant  in  the  emergency  oil- 
sharing  system  of  the  International 
Energy  Agency  ( IE  A  ) .  It  would  have 
the  same  demand  restraint  and  stock 
drawdown  obligations  as  an  lEA 
member.  This  means  that  Israel  would 
receive  at  most  93%  of  its  normal 
requirements  for  domestic  consump- 
tion and  might  receive  less  depending 
on  the  shortfall  among  lEA  nations. 
Israel  is  not  a  member  of  the  lEA 


an,   HnOH 


Middle  East 


and  would  not  receive  an  oil  allocation 
from  the  TEA. 

The  implementing  arrangements 
will  apply  for  an  initial  period  of  5 
years  and  additional  periods  of  3 
years  for  the  duration  of  the  MO  A 
(1994  unless  extended  i .  Either  party 
could  suspend  the  implementing 
arrangements  at  the  expiry  of  any 
period.  This  would  in  no  way  affect, 
however,  the  continued  validity  of  the 
MOA. 

Israel's  oil  consumption  is  cur- 
rently about  160,000  barrels  per  day, 
less  than  1';',  of  U.S.  consumption. 
Since  the  initial  U.S.  oil-supply  com- 
mitment was  made  in  1975,  Israel  has 
been  able  to  obtain  sufficient  oil 
through  its  own  efforts  without  re- 
course to  the  United  States,  even 
during  periods  of  tight  oil  market 
conditions.  Israel  is  currently  meeting 
all  its  oil  needs,  and  it  is  expected  that 
it  will  continue  to  be  able  to  do  so, 
but  under  emergency  circumstances, 
Israel  could  turn  to  the  United  States 
under  the  MOA  and  these  implement- 
ing arrangements. 


1  Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Oct.  27,  1980. 

^  White  House  correction. 

•'  Made  available  to  news  corre- 
spondents by  Department  .spokesman 
John  Trattner.  ■ 


Iran  Chronology, 
November  1980 


November  1 

In  a  newspaper  editorial,  hard-line 
Islamic  Republican  Party  announces  it 
favors  release  of  the  hostages  before  U.S. 
elections  because  during  this  period,  the 
U.S.  is  "ready  to  give  more  concessions," 
and  a  new  U.S.  President  "would  see  no 
reason  to  submit  to  the  rights  of  our 
nation."  The  editorial  goes  on  to  warn, 
however,  that  if  conditions  are  not  met, 
the  hostages  would  remain  captive  and 
could  possibly  be  tried  for  espionage. 

November  2 

Hostages'  365th  day  of  captivity. 

Iran's  Parliament  approves  a  report 
by  the  seven-member  commission  endors- 
ing the  conditions  laid  down  earlier  by 
Khomeini  for  freeing  the  hostages.  The 
commission's  report  also  specifies  that 
the  U.S.  would  not  only  have  to  accept  the 
conditions  but  also  carry  them  out. 


November  3 

Military  captors,  with  Khomeini's 
approval,  turn  jurisdiction  of  hostages 
over  to  the  Iranian  Government  but  not 
the  hostages  themselves. 

November  4 

In  a  message  conveyed  to  the  Carter 
Administration  through  the  Algerian 
Embassy,  the  Iranian  Government  calls 
for  a  quick  reply  by  the  U.S.  to  its  con- 
ditions. U.S.  declines  the  request. 

Tens  of  thousands  of  Iranians 
demonstrate  in  Tehran  streets  cele- 
brating the  1-year  anniversary  of  the 
takeover  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  and 
capture  of  the  hostages. 

November  5 

Militant  captors  state  that  the 
hostage  crisis  is  prolonged  because  of 
Gov.  Reagan's  election,  but  there  will  be 
no  change  in  the  terms  for  freeing  them. 
The  government  also  states  that  the 
election  would  have  no  effect. 

Carter  Administration  officials 
suggest  that  the  President  will  agree  to 
conditions  if  Iranian  authorities  accept 
a  "narrow  interpretation"  of  the  Iranian 
Parliament's  "ambiguous  demands." 

November  7 

Former  Foreign  Minister  Ghotbza- 
deh  is  arrested  and  imprisoned  for 
criticizing  the  Government's  management 
of  the  broadcasting  system. 

Hostages  remain  in  Embassy;  Iran 
Government  makes  no  move  to  take 
custody  despite  earlier  announcement. 

November  10 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  and 
a  small  delegation  depart  Washing- 
ton, D.C.,  for  Algiers  carrying  the  U.S. 
response  to  the  Iranian  Parliament's 
terms  on  release  of  the  hostages.  While 
in  Algiers,  he  meets  with  Algerian 
Foreign  Affairs  Minister  Benyahia.  The 
Algerian  Government  agrees  to  serve  as 
intermediary  for  the  U.S.  response  and 
agrees  to  transmit  it  to  the  Iranian 
Government. 

After  Ghotbzadeh  spends  3  days  in 
prison,  Khomeini  orders  his  release. 

November  11 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher 
departs  Algiers  for  Washington,  D.C. 

November  13 

Iranian  official  committee  studies 
U.S.  reply  to  its  terms  but  makes  no 
public  comment. 

November  16 

Ayatollah  Hashemi  Rafsanjani  states 
that  the  Parliament  is  "too  busy"  to 
discuss  the  hostage  issue  further. 


November  19 

Rafsanjani  states  that  the  U.S.  ha 
accepted  "in  principle"  Iran's  conditio? 
but  release  of  the  hostages  will  be  dela 
until  the  demands  are  actually  met. 

November  20 

U.S.  confirms  it  has  accepted,  in 
principle,  the  four  conditions  Iran  set 
"as  a  Ijasis  for  resolution  of  the  crisis.' 

November  22 

Iran  states  it  wants  a  "yes  or  no" 
answer  from  the  U.S.  on  conditions  set 
Ahmad  Azizi,  public  relations  director 
Prime  Minister  Rajai,  reaffirms  that  Ii 
"cannot  accept  the  responses  with  roor 
for  compromise  or  negotiations  or 
anything  like  that." 

November  23 

Algerian  delegation  arrives  in 
Algiers  carrying  the  Iranian  response 
on  hostages. 

November  24 

Preoccupied  with  decisions  on 
whether  to  attend  the  Arab  League 
meeting  in  Amman,  Algiers  delays 
informing  U.S.  of  Iran's  latest  stand. 

November  2.'> 

Algerian  intermediaries  arrive  in 
Washington,  D.C,  carrying  Iran's  re- 
action to  U.S.  proposals.  Meanwhile, 
Iranians  remain  adamant  on  condition 
set. 

November  26 

At  the  State  Department,  Deputy 
Secretary  Christopher,  along  with  son 
of  the  members  of  the  delegation  who 
accompanied  him  to  Algiers,  meets  wi( 
the  Algerian  representatives  to  transn 
and  explain  the  Iranian  position  and  t 
U.S.  response  for  release  of  the  hostap 
While  in  Iran,  the  Algerian  delegation 
was  assured  that  the  hostages  are  in 
good  health. 

November  27 

Hostage  discussions  continue  betw 
Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  and  the 
Algerian  delegation. 

Militant  captors  report  that  hosta 
have  been  handed  over  to  the  govern- 
ment, but  a  spokesman  for  the  militant 
refuses  to  say  when  or  how  the  transff 
had  taken  place. 

November  28 

The  report  that  the  hostages  have 
been  handed  over  to  the  government  is 
denied  by  another  militant  captor.  An 
Iranian  official  states  he  cannot  confirr 
the  report  that  the  hostages  have  been 
transferred. 

November  29 

Militants  reassert  that  hostages  h 
been  handed  over.  ■ 


/RCOTICS 


vernational  Narcotics  Control 
:he  1980s 


^thea  Falco 

tatement  before  the  House  Select 
\nittee  on  Narcotics  on  Septcm- 
.?.  19S0.  Ms.  Falco  is  Assistant 

tanj  for  International  Narcotics 
ej's.i 

Role  of  Crop  Destruction 

joal  of  the  international  narcotics 
ol  program  since  its  inception 
een,  to  the  extent  possible,  to 
;nt  illicit  narcotics  crops  from 
ing  the  United  States.  The  ideal 
mstances  woidd  be  to  eliminate 
iwide  production  of  illicit  sub- 
es,  and  in  the  absence  of  such 
jntive  measures,  to  secure  the  de- 
tion  of  substances  grown  for  the 
:  drug  market.  In  our  ongoing 
ssions  with  other  countries,  the 
of  illicit  crop  destruction  is 
ys  a  factor.  Most  countries  with 
n  the  United  States  has  narcotics- 
ed  bilateral  programs  have  suc- 
ully  destroying  crops  to  some 
nt;  notably  Me.xico,  but  also 
Ha,  Thailand.  Pakistan,  and  Peru. 
The  key  questions  for  the  Depart- 
of  State  this  decade  will  remain 
tto  convince  more  governments  to 
rtake  crop  destruction  and  how 
ake  such  crop  destruction  more 
five.  Insofar  as  U.S.  foreign  policy 
respect  to  marijuana  is  con- 
ed, the  key  factor  will  be  consist- 
between  our  foreign  policy  and 
flomestic  policy.  Foreign  percep- 
of  internal  indecision  on  this 
tion,  as  on  any  foreign  policy 
i,  makes  effective  representation 
ad  more  difficult. 

Approaches  to  International 
cotics  Control 

rnational  Financial  Investi- 
ons.  While  illicit  crop  destruction 
lid  remain  a  primary  goal  of  our 
rnational  narcotics  policy,  we  must 

try,  in  the  1980s,  to  improve  inter- 
onal  cooperation  in  interdiction 
rts  and  drug  trafficker  judicial 
3eedings.  One  promising  area  for 


improving  our  ability  to  detect  and 
apijrehend  major  drug  traffickers  is 
through  narcotics  related  financial 
investigations.  International  coopera- 
tion on  criminal  money  handling  will 
not  only  facilitate  the  apprehension 
and  prosecution  of  drug  traffickers  but 
could  also  lead  to  legal  changes  which 
would  make  criminal  money  handling 
harder.  This  would  increase  the  costs 
and  reduce  the  incentives  to  partici- 
pate in  drug  trafficking. 

As  you  know,  taking  advantage 
of  existing  financial  techniques  has 
become  a  major  concern  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Justice  in  domestic  narcotics- 
related  investigations.  A  priority  for 
the  Department  of  State  during  the 
1980s  will  be  to  expand  international 
cooperation  in  applying  innovative 
financial  techniques  to  drug  cases 
where  the  money  involved  crosses 
national  borders. 

In  doing  so,  there  will  be  several 
issues  underlying  the  international 
discussion.  The  first  will  be  the  ques- 
tion of  access  to  foreign  records, 
whether  corporate,  banking,  or  tax 
records.  A  second  related  issue  for 
domestic  and  international  discussion 
will  be  the  question  of  privacy  ;  that  is, 
access  by  foreign  investigators  to 
U.S.  held  records.  A  third  area  will  be 
increased  cooperation  in  criminal  pro- 
ceedings, both  on  the  question  of 
informant  testimony  and  in  the  trans- 
mission of  evidence  between  countries. 

Potential  points  of  focus  for  dis- 
cussion and  cooperation  in  this  area 
are  numerous. 

First,  there  are  bilateral  mutual 
assistance  treaties,  such  as  those  we 
have  negotiated  with  the  Government 
of  Colombia  and  other  countries. 

Second,  we  can  work  toward  the 
establishment  of  international  guide- 
lines or  agreements,  such  as  those 
contemplated  in  the  resolution  on 
financial  transactions  that  the  United 
States  proposed  in  the  Commission 
on  Narcotics  Drugs  this  year. 

There  are  numerous  other  oppor- 
tunities for  constructive  international 
dialogue  on  improved  investigative 
and  judicial  cooperation  in  multi- 
lateral fora. 


Poppies  in  Tiiailand — a  source 

of  heroin  and  other  narcotic  drugs. 

Development  Assistance.  Devel- 
opment assistance  will  continue  to  be 
a  critical  dimension  to  international 
narcotics  control  in  the  1980s.  Increas- 
ingly, it  is  evident  that  a  foreign 
government's  ability  to  undertake 
effective  crop  destruction  programs  is 
related  to  the  availability  of  realistic 
economic  alternatives  to  growers. 
This  is  especially  the  case  where  illicit 
narcotics  production  makes  a  sub- 
stantial contribution  to  the  national 
economy  or  where  narcotics  produc- 
tion is  a  primary  means  of  support  for 
geographically  separated  ethnic 
minorities. 

Assisted  by  the  legislative  efforts 
of  the  members  of  this  committee,  we 
have  made  significant  progress  in 
focusing  U.S.  development  assistance 
in  ill. .it  narcotics  growing  regions. 
In  the  future,  multilateral  lending 
institutions  as  well  as  our  own  bilateral 
development  agencies  must  begin  to 
consider  the  deleterious  effects  of 
illicit  narcotics  production.  Lending 
policies  must  take  into  account  that  the 
problem  is  not  only  for  consuming 
countries  but  also  for  the  developing, 
producer  countries.  Public  health  and 
sound  economic  development  are  both 


uary  1981 


UNITED  NATIONS 


disrupted  in  illicit  producer  countries. 
Not  only  is  there  often  a  domestic 
drug  abuse  problem,  but  illicit  nar- 
cotics production  may  interfere  with 
critical  food  production,  as  well  as 
siphoning  away  resources  from  the 
legitimate  economy.  The  United  States 
mu.'it  continue  to  articulate  these 
problems  in  the  international  financial 
community  and  insist  to  the  greatest 
extent  possible  that  they  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  lending  policies  and 
development  projects. 

Metlia((iialone  and  Oflior 
Abused  Drugs 

While  most  abused  drugs  in  pill  form 
are  produced  in  the  United  States, 
international  traffic  in  methaqualone 
is  posing  a  severe  i)roblem  to  our 
country.  During  the  next  decade  sub- 
stances like  methaqualone  will  have  to 
be  the  focus  of  increased  international 
dialogue.  The  main  instrument  for 
international  cooperation  in  this  area 
is  the  Psychotropic  Substances  Con- 
vention. Issues  to  be  worked  out  will 
include  the  development  of  acceptable 
imiKirt-export  procedures  to  control 
the  movement  of  scheduled  substances, 
particularly  where  the  United  States 
is  seeking  stricter  controls  for  foreign 
manufacturers. 

Regulation  of  Licit 
iVareotics  Production 

A  very  critical  problem  will  continue 
to  be  the  regulation  of  the  production 
of  licit  narcotics  derived  from  opium 
poppies  for  the  medicinal  market.  The 
leadei-ship  role  of  the  United  States  in 
l)reventing  the  proliferation  of  sup- 
l)lies  of  licit  raw  materials  must  be 
continued.  Unless  new  suppliers  are 
efi'eetively  discouraged  from  increas- 
ing production,  there  will  be  a  sub- 
stantial oversupply  situation,  and 
diversion  of  opiates  to  the  heroin 
market  will  undoubtedly  occur.  A 
sei-ious  oversupply  situation  has 
already  been  predicted  by  the  Inter- 
national Narcotics  Control  Board,  and 
this  remains  of  grave  concern  to  the 
Department  of  State. 

Increased  Hesoiir«-es  in 
Drug-Related  Foreign  Programs 

U.S.  bilateral  programs  have  proved 
to  be  the  most  effective  means  of 


General  Assembly  Votes  on 
Afghanistan  Situation 


FoUou'ing  are  Ambassadar  Donald 
F.  McHenrt/s  statement  in  the  U.N. 
General  Assemhhj  on  November  19, 
1980,  and  the  resolution  adopted  by 
the  Assembly  on  November  20. 

AMBASSADOR  McHENRYi 

Less  than  a  year  ago  the  conscience  of 
the  world  was  shocked  by  the  grim 
events  in  Afghanistan:  a  massive  invasion 
by  Soviet  armed  forces;  the  overthrow  of 
the  [Hafizullah]  Amin  regime  and  the 
killing  of  its  leaders:  and  the  launching  of 
a  campaign  of  violence  and  terror  against 
the  Afghan  peo|)le  by  Soviet  forces  and 
their  Afghan  surrogates. 

There  is  nothing  new  in  the  Soviet 
Union's  use  of  force  to  maintain  its 
domination  of  other  nations.  The  pattern 
set  in  1953,  when  Soviet  troops  put  down 
the  East  German  workers'  uprising,  was 
repeated  in  195(i  in  the  bloody  sujipres- 
sion  of  the  Hungarian  involution  and,  in 
1968,  in  the  destruction  of  Czechoslo- 
vakia's experiment  in  liberalization. 
Now,  in  1980,  the  Soviet  Union  has  gone 
beyond  Eastern  Europe  to  assault  the  in- 
dependence of  a  nonaligned  and  Islamic 
nation — a  nation  intensely  proud  of  its 
culture  and  religion. 

Their  attack  and  cynical  demand  that 
client  states  recognize  the  reality  of  mili- 
tary occupation  are  in  blatant  violation  of 
the  most  important  principles  of  interna- 
tional law  and  the  U.N.  Charter: 

•  A  state  must  not  use  force  against 
the  territorial  and  political  independence 
of  another  state; 

•  A  state  must  settle  international 
disputes  by  peaceful  means; 

•  All  states  must  respect  the  princi- 
ple of  self-determination;  and 


•  Human  rights  must  be  respectf^ 
by  all  governments. 

The  Soviet  intervention  and  occuj 
tion  was  also — and  remains  today — a  i 
nous  threat  to  the  security  and  stabili 
of  an  important  and  strategic  region  o 
the  world. 

The  United  Nations  responded 
urgently  to  the  Afghanistan  crisis.  We 
joined  in  supporting  a  draft  Security 
Council  resolution  which  called  for  Sc 
withdrawal.  But  for  a  veto  by  the  Sov 
Union  it  would  have  been  adopted.  As- 
result,  an  overwhelming  majority  of  tl 
members  of  this  Assembly  swiftly 
adopted  a  resolution  in  an  emergency 
special  session  on  January  14  which 
called  for  immediate  withdrawal  of  foi 
eign  troops  and  restoration  of  freedon 
and  sovereignty  for  the  Afghan  peoph 

Since  then,  the  invasion  and  occuj 
tion  have  been  condemned  by  virtuall; 
major  international  bodies  including  tl 
Islamic  Conference  of  Foreign  Ministe 
on  January  29  and  again  on  May  21,  tl 
U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission  on 
February  14,  the  Foreign  Ministers  oi 
the  European  Common  Market  and  th 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Natii 
on  March  7,  and  the  Interparliamenta 
Union  Council  on  April  12  and  again  o 
September  24. 

Deepening  Crisis 

Notwithstanding  those  urgent  appeals 
the  crisis  has  deepened  in  Afghanistar 
The  Soviet  Union  has  ignored  the  mar 
date  of  January  14.  It  has  pursued  anc 
intensified  its  policy  of  military  interv^ 
tion  and  occupation  in  total  disregard  ■ 
world  oi)inion. 

In  the  face  of  this  Assembly's  de- 


reducing  the  amount  of  illicit  nar- 
cotics available  in  the  United  States. 
But  effective  bilateral  programs 
require  a  sustained  commitment  over 
a  period  of  years.  For  instance,  the 
United  States  has  contributed  approxi- 
mately $90  million  to  our  successful 
opium  eradication  program  with  the 
Government  of  Mexico,  Similar  levels 
of  effort  will  have  to  be  maintained 


elsewhere  if  we  are  to  achieve  a  wor 
wide  reduction  in  illicit  narcotic  pre 
duction.  While  we  expect  increasing 
contributions  from  other  countries  i 
narcotics  control  programs,  a  sub- 
stantial U.S.  eflfort  is  still  required. 


1  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
hearing.s  will  be  pul>lishcd  by  the  coni- 
niittoe  aiul  will  bo  available  from  the 
Supoi'intondcnt  of  Uocuments,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Oflice,  Washingti 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


nenartmpnt  nf  ^Itatp  Rulf 


United  Nations 


for  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops, 
ow  has  increased  its  force — which  it 
ibes  as  a  "limited  contingent" — from 
lO  in  early  January  to  85,000  today. 
more  than  30,000  troops  are  massed 
icross  the  border  of  the  Soviet  Un- 

In  defiance  of  this  Assembly's  appeal 
le  restoration  of  sovereignty  and 
letermination  for  Afghanistan,  the 
;t  Union  has  sought  to  tighten  its 
cal  and  military  grip  on  that  country 
igh  a  regime  which  is  entirely  de- 
ent  on  Soviet  armed  might  for  its 
val.  It  should  be  clear  to  all  that  this 
ne  does  not  and  cannot  represent  the 
le  of  Afghanistan. 

In  violation  of  the  Assembly's  appeal 
frain  from  coercion  and  constraint, 
Soviet  Union  and  its  Afghan  agents 
waged  a  brutal  campaign  of  violence 
error  in  an  effort  to  subdue  the 
an  people. 

But  the  Soviet  Union  has  failed  to 
ve  its  grim  objective  in  Afghanistan. 
Afghan  people  have  resisted  in  a 
gle  for  national  liberation.  And  for 
le  Soviet  Union's  divisions,  its  so- 
.icated  weaponry,  and  its  ruthless 
lods,  including  arbitrary  arrests  and 
isonment,  it  has  failed  to  crush  this 
;gle.  Soviet  forces  have  failed  en- 
f  to  pacify  the  countryside.  They  are 
ned  to  the  towns  and  cities,  which 
irmed  camps.  And  even  there,  guer- 
lattacks  on  Soviet  personnel  and 
tes  and  demonsti'ations  against  the 
der  are  commonplace, 
frhe  struggle  of  the  Afghan  people  to 
iver  their  freedom  and  independence 
inspiration  to  those  who  oppose 
my.  But  the  cost  of  their  struggle 
been  high.  Even  as  we  meet  today, 
'3  Afghan  freedom  fighters  are  dying, 
more  fields  and  villages  are  being 
waste  as  Soviet  forces  use  the  tactics 
irror  to  impose  a  Soviet  peace.  Their 
edy  is  unfolding  in  a  country  w^hich, 
its  independence  in  1921,  has  con- 
ntly  followed  a  policy  of  neutrality 
nonalignment. 

In  spite  of  the  cloak  of  Soviet  cen- 
hip,  these  facts  of  Soviet  aggi-ession 
fghanistan  speak  for  themselves.  The 
let  Union  stands  condemned  in  the 
of  the  world.  Yet  it  persists  in 
ng  to  mask  its  aggression  by  casting 
blame  on  others. 
Moscow  claims  it  intervened  in 
hanistan  at  the  request  of  a  former 
me  in  response  to  some  undefined  ex- 
lal  threat  to  that  country.  This  was,  of 
se,  the  same  regime  whose  leader 


was  murdered  when  Soviet  troops 
assaulted  and  subdued  the  Afghan  state 
on  December  29,  last  year.  In  the  dec- 
laration of  May  14,  issued  by  the  Soviet- 
controlled  authorities  in  Kabul,  Moscow 
argued  that  peace  can  be  restored  only 
through  agreements  between  the  Kabul 
regime  and  the  neighboring  states  of 
Pakistan  and  Iran  whei-eby  these  states 
and  others  would,  in  effect,  accept  the 
illegal  military  occupation  and  guarantee 
an  end  to  the  Afghan  resistance.  While 
continuing  to  support  these  unacceptable 
proposals,  the  Soviets  have  shown  no  in- 
terest in  the  initiative  of  the  Islamic  Con- 
ference or  other  proposals  for  a  just  poli- 
tical settlement  that  would  restore 
genuine  freedom  and  independence  to 
Afghanistan. 

Moscow's  claims  that  some  extei'nal 
threat  to  Afghanistan  justified  its  inva- 
sion and  that  an  independent  government 
requested  its  assistance  are  simply  un- 
acceptable. Moreover,  I  wish  to  empha- 
size that  the  charges  of  the  representa- 
tive of  the  Soviet  Union  [Oleg  A. 
Ti-oyanovsky]  and  Mr.  Dost  [Shah 
Mohammed  Dost,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Democratic  Republic  of  Afghan- 
istan] during  this  debate  that  the  Afghan 
resistance  is  dependent  on  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  are  cynical  fab- 
rications unworthy  of  further  comment. 
The  world  knows  that  the  Soviet  Union 
invaded  Afghanistan  to  suppress  an  in- 
digenous Islamic  insurgency  w^hich  had 
long  been  struggling  against  an  unpopu- 
lar regime.  The  world  also  knows  that 
this  resistance  movement  is  an  expres- 
sion of  the  powerful  nationalism  of  the 
Afghan  people,  and  that  the  Kabul  re- 
gime is  a  fiction  manufactured  in  Moscow 
and  marketed  by  force  of  Soviet  arms. 

The  real  threat  to  Afghanistan  is  the 
presence  of  85,000  Soviet  troops  who 
have  illegally  invaded  and  occupied  that 
country  in  gross  violation  of  international 
law.  The  Soviet  Union  is  locked  in  conflict 
with  the  Afghan  people.  The  cost  of  this 
conflict  is  mounting,  most  of  all  for  the 
Afghan  people,  but  for  others  as  well. 
F'or  the  Soviet  Union,  the  cost  is  heavy — 
international  condemnation,  increased 
isolation,  and  the  burden  of  a  futile  and 
seemingly  endless  war.  F^or  the  other  na- 
tions of  Southwest  Asia,  security  and 
well  being  are  endangered  while  Soviet 
forces  remain  in  Afghanistan.  The  use  of 


force  by  the  Soviet  Union  against  a  non- 
aligned  neighbor  with  whom  it  has  a 
treaty  of  friendship  means  that  every 
nation  is  less  secure. 

Yet  the  will  of  Afghans  to  resist  is 
legendary.  In  the  troubled  times  of  1941, 
the  Grand  National  Council  or  Loya  Jir- 
gah  met  to  reaffirm  Afghan  neutrality. 
The  council  adopted  these  concluding 
words  in  their  resolution  of  November  6, 
1941: 

The  Afghan  nation  has  at  no  time  been 
under  any  obligation  to  a  foreigti  government, 
nor  will  she  ever  be.  The  nation  has  always 
been  free,  and  will  also  in  the  future  maintain 
its  free  and  independent  existence.  By  the 
help  of  God,  the  people  of  Afghanistan  are 
unanimously  prepared  to  live  a  life  of  honor  by 
defending  their  rights  with  all  their  material 
and  spiritual  forces,  even  to  the  point  of  shed- 
ding the  last  drop  of  blood. 

These  words  ring  even  louder  today  than 
then,  for  we  are  now  witness  to  this  same 
stubborn  defense  of  honor  and  national 
rights. 


Need  For  Just  Settlement 

Members  of  the  United  Nations  have  an 
obligation  to  find  a  solution  to  this  im- 
passe in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
the  U.N.  Charter.  The  draft  resolution 
we  are  now  considering  offers  a  construc- 
tive approach.  Yet  some  delegations  have 
attempted  to  characterize  support  for 
this  resolution  as  an  "unfriendly  act." 
The  real  "unfriendly  act"  was  the  inva- 
sion of  Afghanistan.  This  i-esolution  de- 
serves the  support  of  every  member  of 
this  body.  It  has  three  elements  which 
are  essential  for  a  solution,  and  the 
United  States  is  firmly  committed  to 
them: 

•  The  immediate  withdrawal  of  for- 
eign troops  from  Afghanistan; 

•  The  right  of  the  Afghans  to  self- 
determination,  free  from  outside  inter- 
vention; and 

•  The  need  for  a  peaceful  solution  of 
the  problem  based  on  the  sovereignty, 
territorial  integrity,  and  the  nonahgned 
character  of  Afghanistan. 

The  resolution  also  addresses  the 
tragedy  of  the  Afghan  refugees  with  an 
appeal  for  continued  relief  aid  and  a  solu- 
tion that  w'ill  enable  them  to  return  to 
their  homes.  The  flood  of  refugees — now 
more  than  1.2  million  in  Pakistan  and 


United  Nations 


several  hundred  thousand  elsewhere — 
represents  one-tenth  of  the  population  of 
Afghanistan.  Their  flight  is  further 
dramatic  evidence  of  the  upheaval  and 
suffering  the  Soviet  invasion  has  caused. 

Finally,  this  draft  resolution  goes  a 
step  beyond  that  of  January  14  by  ex- 
pressing hope  that  the  Seci-etary  General 
will  appoint  a  special  representative  with 
a  view  to  pi-omoting  a  political  solution  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  re- 
solution. 

In  the  past,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
shown  no  willingness  to  discuss  a  political 
settlement  except  on  the  basis  of  formu- 
las of  its  own  which  ignore  the  need  for 
prompt  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops. 
Such  formulations  which  essentially  seek 
to  preserve  the  present  Kabul  regime  are 
no  solution  to  the  plight  of  Afghanistan. 
They  offer  neither  peace  nor  freedom  for 
the  Afghan  people.  Nor  do  they  offer  any 
prospect  for  meeting  the  security  in- 
terests of  that  region  or  the  rest  of  the 
world,  or  indeed,  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  contrast,  the  approach  of  the 
draft  resolution  we  are  now  considering 
offers  a  new  opportunity  for  Moscow  to 
change  its  course  and  meet  its  interna- 
tional obligations.  It  points  the  way  to- 
ward a  genuinely  independent  nonaligned 
and  neutral  Afghanistan,  free  of  foreign 
troops  and  foreign  intervention  and  with 
a  government  acceptable  to  the  Afghan 
people.  Such  an  outcome  would  deliver 
Afghanistan  from  its  ordeal.  And  it 
would  pose  no  threat  to  the  legitimate  in- 
terests of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  secu- 
rity of  its  border.  The  United  States  sup- 
ports a  political  settlement  based  on 
these  principles. 

None  of  us  can  rest  until  a  just  peace 
in  Afghanistan  is  achieved.  The  Afghan- 
istan crisis  must  remain  at  the  top  of 
this  organization's  agenda  until  this 
gi'ave  source  of  international  tension  is 
removed.  If  all  of  us,  including  the  Soviet 
Union,  can  summon  the  necessary  will 
and  courage,  such  a  settlement  for 
Afghanistan  can  be  accomplished  on  the 
basis  of  the  principles  of  the  draft  resolu- 
tion we  are  now  considering.  We  must — 
all  of  us— commit  ourselves  to  this  goal. 


GENERAL  ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION  35/372 

The  General  Assemblii. 

Having  considered  the  item  entitled  "The 
."situation  in  Afghanistan  and  its  implications 
for  international  peace  and  security". 

Recalling  its  resolution  ES-6/2  of  14  Janu- 
ary 1980  adopted  at  the  si.xth  emergency  spe- 
cial session. 

Reaffirming  the  purposes  and  principles 
of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations  and  the 
obligation  of  all  States  to  refrain  in  their  inter- 
national relations  from  the  threat  or  use  of 
force  against  the  sovereignty,  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  political  independence  of  any 
State," 

Reaffirming  further  the  inalienable  right 
of  all  peoples  to  determine  their  own  form  of 
government  and  to  choose  their  own  economic, 
political  and  social  system  free  from  outside  in- 
tervention, subversion,  coercion  or  constraint 
of  any  kind  whatsoever. 

Gravely  concerned  at  the  continuing  for- 
eign armed  intervention  in  Afghanistan,  in 
contravention  of  the  above  principles,  and  its 
serious  implications  for  international  peace  and 
security, 

Deeply  concerned  at  the  increasing  out- 
flow of  refugees  from  Afghanistan, 

Deeply  conscious  of  the  urgent  need  for  a 
political  solution  of  the  gi-ave  situation  in  re- 
spect of  Afghanistan, 

Recognizing  the  importance  of  the  con- 
tinuing efforts  and  initiatives  of  the  Organiza- 
tion of  the  Islamic  Conference  for  a  political 
solution  of  the  situation  in  respect  of  Afghanis- 
tan, 

1.  Reiterates  that  the  preservation  of  the 
sovereignty,  territorial  integi'ity.  political  in- 
dependence and  non-aligned  character  of 
Afghanistan  is  essential  for  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  problem; 

2.  Reaffirms  the  right  of  the  Afghan  peo- 
ple to  determine  their  own  form  of  govern- 
ment and  to  choose  their  economic,  political 
and  social  system  free  from  outside  interven- 
tion, subversion,  coercion  or  constraint  of  any 
kind  whatsoever; 

3.  Calls  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
the  foreign  troops  from  Afghanistan; 

4.  Also  calls  }ipon  all  parties  concerned  to 
work  for  the  urgent  achievement  of  a  political 
solution  and  the  creation  of  the  necessary  con- 
ditions which  would  enable  the  Afghan  ref- 
ugees to  return  voluntarily  to  their  homes  in 
safety  and  honour; 

5.  Appeals  to  all  States  and  national  and 
international  organizations  to  extend  human- 
itarian relief  assistance,  with  a  view  to  alle- 
viating the  hardship  of  the  Afghan  refugees,  in 


co-ordination  with  the  United  Nations  Higl 
Commissioner  for  Refugees; 

6.  Expresses  its  appreciation  of  the 
efforts  of  the  Secretary-General  in  the  sear 
f(ir  a  solution  to  the  problem  and  hopes  thai 
will  continue  to  extend  assistance,  includinj 
the  appointment  of  a  special  repre-sentative 
with  a  view  to  promoting  a  political  solutioi 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  prese 
re.'iolution  and  the  exploration  of  .securing 
ajjpropriate  guarantees  for  non-use  of  force 
threat  of  use  of  force  against  the  political  in 
pendence,  sovereignty,  territorial  integi'ity 
and  security  of  all  neighbouring  States,  on 
basis  of  mutual  guarantees  and  strict  non- 
interference in  each  other's  internal  affairs 
with  full  regard  for  the  principles  of  the  Ch; 
ter  of  the  United  Nations; 

7.  Requests  the  Secretary-General  to 
keep  Member  States  and  the  Security  Coui'i 
concurrently  informed  on  the  progress  to- 
wards the  implementation  of  the  present  re" 
lution  and  to  submit  to  Member  States  a 
report  on  the  situation  at  the  earliest  apprc< 
ate  opportunity; 

8.  Decides  to  include  in  the  provi.s;iona 
agenda  of  its  thirty-sixth  session  the  item  t 
tied  "The  situation  in  Afghanistan  and  its  ii 
plications  for  international  peace  and 
securitv." 


1  USUN  press  release  150. 

2  Adopted  on  November  20  by  a  vt 
of  111  to  22,  with  12  abstentions.  ■ 


^.STERN  HEMISPHERE 


th  General  Assembly  of  the  OAS 


Following  are  the  President's  and 
'ecretary's  addresses  on  Novem- 
9. 19S0.  before  the  10th  General 
nibhj  of  the  Organization  of 
rican  States  (OAS)  held  in 
'lington,  D.C.,  November  19-26. 

SIDENT  CARTER  1 


ak  to  you  today  for  the  fifth  time  in 
iportant  forum  in  this  hall  and,  de- 
considerable  efforts  to  the  contrary, 
fraid  also  for  the  last  time  as  Presi- 
of  the  United  States.  I  want  to  say 
grateful  I  am  for  the  privilege  of 
ing  with  all  of  you  and  the  leaders  of 
nations.  And  I  want  to  take  a  few 
tes  to  assess  what  we  have  done 
ther  and  to  describe  my  own  hopes 
16  future. 

On  my  first  visit  to  the  Organization 
nerican  States,  in  April  of  1977,  I 
that  no  single  policy,  no  single  slogan 
1  encompass  a  region  as  diverse  as 
I  spoke  instead  of  certain  princi- 
a  belief  in  nonintervention  and  in 
lovei'eignty  of  nations,  a  determina- 
to  work  for  human  rights  and  for 
ocracy,  a  common  commitment  to 
with  global  economic  issues  and  to 
Ive  regional  political  disputes.  These 
:iples  have  helped  the  United  States 
B  its  contribution  to  the  new  and 
5  balanced  relationships  that  are 
rging  in  our  hemisphere. 
After  4  years  of  practical  experience, 
more  convinced  than  ever  that  the  fu- 
we  desire  lies  in  recognizing  yearn- 
that  are  common  to  individuals  and 
itions  alike.  As  individuals  the  peo- 
of  the  Americas  yearn  for  basic  hu- 
rights.  They  desire  personal  liberty 
e  free  from  torture  and  arbitrary 
st;  to  participate  in  making  the  basic 
sions  that  shape  their  own  future;  to 

adequate  food,  health  care,  and 
nation.  And  as  part  of  the  global 
munity,  every  nation  of  the  Americas 
a  desire  and  a  right  to  help  shape  the 
re,  not  only  of  our  own  hemisphere 
indeed,  the  entire  world. 
Some  would  ignore  or  resist  these 
isured  rights — the  rights  of  indi-     . 
lals  and  the  rights  of  nations.  But  the 
ire  hes  with  those  who  cherish  them 
who  are  willing  to  defend  them.  Let 
speak  briefly  of  the  last  4  years. 
Many  here  assisted  in  the  negotia- 
and  the  ratification  of  the  Panama 


Canal  treaties.  These  treaties  and  their 
far-reaching  impact  will  endure.  They 
will  endure  because  they  are  based  on 
the  mutual  trust  and  the  mutual  respect 
that  have  been  carefully,  and  sometimes 
painfully,  forged  by  the  people  of  a  small 
nation  and  the  people  of  a  large  nation. 
They  will  endure  because  they  serve  the 
interests  of  all  who  rely  on  the  Panama 
Canal.  They  will  endure  because  they 
epitomize  the  broadest  possible  commit- 
ment of  my  country  to  a  new  and  a  better 
relationship  with  the  developing  nations 
of  the  world.  They  will  endure  because 
the  treaties  serve  the  cause  of  peace. 

Last  month  El  Salvador  and  Hon- 
duras served  the  cause  of  harmony  and 
progress  resolving  their  decades-old  bor- 
der dispute.  These  two  countries,  work- 
ing with  former  President  Bustamante  of 
Peru  and  with  their  own  Secretary 
General,  have  earned  the  admiration  and 
respect  of  all  those  who  love  peace. 

The  treaty  of  Tlatelolco,  when  com- 
pleted, will  foi'ever  ban  nuclear  weapons 
from  Latin  America.  I'm  proud  to  have 
signed  protocol  one  of  this  treaty  on  be- 
half of  the  United  States  of  America.  It's 
imperative  that  the  remaining  nations  of 
our  hemisphere  put  aside  their  hesitation 
and  join  in  this  vital  commitment  to  ban 
the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  and  to  set 
an  example  for  other  nations  in  other  re- 
gions of  the  world. 

In  Nicaragua  many  of  us  have  been 
working  together  to  help  that  country 
heal  its  wounds.  It's  in  the  interest  of  all 
who  care  about  freedom  to  help  the 
Nicaraguan  people  chart  a  plurahstic 
course  that  ends  bloodshed,  respects  hu- 
man rights,  and  furthers  democracy. 

El  Salvador  continues  to  struggle 
against  terrorists  on  the  right  who  seek 
to  restore  an  old  tyi'anny  and  terrorists 
on  the  left  who  seek  to  create  a  new  one. 
That  struggle  of  theirs  is  ours  as  well. 
Their  path,  the  peaceful  path  of  stability 
and  moderation,  is  precarious,  but  it's 
the  only  path  that  can  lead  to  both  liberty 
and  justice.  We  must  insist  upon  a  strict 
policy  of  nonintervention  as  the  people 
of  these  two  nations  design  their  own 
future. 

For  too  long,  the  United  States 
seemed  wedded  to  the  status  quo — even 
when  that  meant  a  continuation  of  pov- 
erty, social  injustice,  and  even  political 
repression.  That  attitude  betrayed  my 


nation's  dynamism  and  our  faith  and  con- 
fidence in  the  future  and  that,  thank  God, 
has  now  been  changed.  We  understand 
and  support  the  necessity  of  peaceful  and 
moderate  political  progi-ess  in  Central 
America  and  elsewhere  in  this  hemis- 
phere. 

Your  governments,  thi'oughout  the 
hemisphere,  have  also  lyorked  to  improve 
the  prospects  for  economic  development. 
We've  strengthened  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank  and  the  World  Bank. 
We've  reduced  trade  barriers  by  exjiand- 
ing  generalized  tariff  preferences  and 
eliminating  the  discriminatory  provision 
against  Venezuela  and  Ecuador.  We've 
worked  to  stablize  commodity  prices  by  a 
Common  Fund  and  individual  commodity 
agreements  on  sugar  and  coffee  and 
cocoa.  Regional  cooperation  has  been  in- 
vigorated— in  the  Andean  pact,  with  the 
Caribbean  group,  and,  most  dramatically, 
with  Venezuelan-Mexican  assistance  for 
the  Caribbean  basin.  Through  my  own 
personal  participation,  and  through  the 
influence  of  my  country,  we  have  worked 
to  strengthen  and  to  expand  the  benefi- 
cial influence  of  this  Organization  of 
American  States. 

Progress  on  Human  Rights 

As  all  of  you  know,  the  cause  that  has 
been  closest  to  my  own  heart  is  the  cause 
of  human  rights.  I'm  convinced  that  a 
new  conscience  has  been  awakened.  That 
conscience  serves  a  concept  of  human 
rights  that  is  not  unique  to  any  country, 
nor  even  just  to  this  hemisphere,  but  is 
universal.  In  this  hemisphere,  since  1977, 
13  countries  have  ratified  the  embodi- 
ment of  that  concept — the  American  Con- 
vention on  Human  Rights.  This  has 
brought  the  convention  into  force  and  has 
created  an  inter-American  court  to  judge 
human  rights  violations.  In  addition,  the 
Inter-American  Commission  on  Human 
Rights  is  more  effective  today  than  it 
was  4  years  ago.  It  deserves  our 
strongest  continuing  moral  and  financial 
support. 

Ibday,  no  government  in  this  hemis- 
phere can  expect  silent  assent  from  its 
neighbors  if  it  tramples  the  rights  of  its 
own  citizens.  The  costs  of  repression 
have  increased  but  so  have  the  benefits 
of  respecting  human  rights.  I  pray  that 
this  progress  will  continue,  although  I 


Western  Hemisphere 


know  from  experience  that  progress  is 
not  always  easy  as  we  defend  human 
rights. 

Some  claim  that  Jimmy  Carter  ele- 
vated human  rights  and  democracy  on 
the  inter- American  agenda  and  that  the 
agenda  will  change  when  I  leave  my 
office.  They  are  wrong.  Hemispheric  sup- 
port for  human  rights  is  a  historic  move- 
ment— a  movement  that  has  been  recog- 
nized this  year  in  the  Nobel  peace  prize. 
I  take  pride  in  being  part  of  that  move- 
ment. The  cause  of  human  rights  will  be 
all  the  stronger  if  it  remains  at  the 
service  of  humanity,  rather  than  at  the 
service  of  ideological  or  partisan  ends, 
and  if  it  condemns  both  terrorism  and 
repression. 

In  the  phrase  "human  rights,"  the 
"rights"  are  important.  The  "human"  is 
very  important.  As  a  citizen  of  the  Amer- 
icas, I'm  deeply  encouraged  by  the  trend 
toward  greater  democratization.  I'm 
heartened  that  in  many  countries, 
thousands  of  people  who  were  political 
prisoners  just  4  years  ago  are  now  free. 
Those  who  see  a  contradiction  between 
our  security  and  our  humanitarian  in- 
terests forget  that  the  basis  for  a  secure 
and  a  stable  society  is  the  bond  of  trust 
between  a  government  and  its  own 
people. 

The  future  of  our  hemisphere  is  not 
to  be  found  in  authoritarianism  that 
wears  the  mask  of  common  consent  nor 
totalitarianism  that  wears  the  mask  of 
justice.  Instead,  let  us  find  our  future  in 
the  human  face  of  democracy — the  hu- 
man voice  of  individual  liberty  and  the 
human  hand  of  economic  development.  If 
we  build  on  the  best  of  what  we  have  be- 
gun, we  can  see  a  better  time  at  the  end 
of  this  decade.  We  can  see  a  time  when 
longstanding  disputes  like  Belize,  Bo- 
livian access  to  the  sea,  and  the  Beagle 
Channel  dispute  between  Argentina  and 
Chile  have  been  settled  in  a  spirit  of 
cooperation  and  justice.  We  can  see  a 
time  when-the  treaty  of  Tlatelolco  has 
come  into  force  and  other  regions  have 
followed  the  lead  of  Latin  America  in 
banning  nuclear  weapons.  We  can  see  a 
time  when  human  rights  are  no  longer 
threatened  by  the  violence  of  either  gov- 
ernments or  terrorists  and  when  every 
government  responds  to  the  will  of  its 
people,  expressed  through  democratic  in- 
stitutions. We  can  see  a  time  when  na- 
tions have  cooperated,  in  the  OAS  and 
elsewhere,  to  develop  just  and  fair  ways 


of  dealing  with  the  migration  of  people,  a 
time  when  no  nation  disregards  the  im- 
migration laws  of  its  neighbor  and  many 
nations  offer  a  haven  to  the  few  who  still 
need  such  a  place  to  dwell.  And  we  can 
see  a  time  when  today's  aspirations  for 
greater  economic  development  and  coop- 
eration have  become  living  realities 
through  common  action  inspired  by  this 
body  and  its  experts. 

Let  me  conclude  on  a  personal  note. 
My  interest  in  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  and  in  human  rights  and  in 
democracy  did  not  begin  4  years  ago. 
And  my  interest  will  not  end  on  .January 
the  20th,  next  year.  I  will  continue  to 
speak  out  for  the  universal  ideals  which 
are  embodied  in  our  hearts  and  in  the 
American  Convention  on  Human  Rights. 
I  will  continue  to  work  with  you — my 
friends —  to  make  this  hemisphere  and 
the  world  more  just,  more  secure,  and 
more  free. 


SECRETARY  MUSKIE^ 

I'm  delighted  to  join  you  in  this  historic 
forum — the  world's  first  and  oldest  con- 
tinuing regional  association — and  to 
underscore  the  remarks  which  President 
Carter  made  this  moi-ning.  About  one 
fact,  I  have  no  illusions:  My  country's  re- 
cent election  changes  greatly  the  atmos- 
phere in  which  you  and  I  meet.  We  in  the 
United  States  have  an  unpleasant 
metaphor  for  political  officials  who  are  on 
their  way  out  of  office:  We  call  them 
"lame  ducks."  And  I  have  observed,  in 
more  than  two  decades  of  political  life, 
that  people  find  it  difficult  to  hear  the  call 
of  the  lame  duck. 

I  do  not  intend  to  let  this  deter  me 
today.  Two  decades  in  public  life  have 
taught  me  another  lesson  as  well:  that 
certain  issues,  certain  realities,  persist 
no  matter  what  Administration  is  in 
office.  The  agenda  that  confronts  you  and 
me  and  our  fellow  citizens  in  this  hemis- 
phere is  chosen  by  us  only  in  part;  for  the 
most  part,  it  is  determined  by  a  combina- 
tion of  long-term  national  interests  and 
pressing  current  events. 

Taday  I  want  to  talk  with  you  about 
certain  gi-eat  issues  that  were  with  us  be- 
fore this  Administration  took  office  and 
that  will  just  as  certainly  shape  the 
course  of  our  relations  in  the  future.  I 
want  to  stress — as  President  Carter 
stressed  this  morning — the  essential  con- 
tinuing U.S.  policy. 


The  Changed  Environment 

What  is  most  obvious  as  we  gather  tod 
is  the  profoundly  changed  environment 
which  our  relations  are  conducted.  Pre 
dent  Carter  touched  this  morning  upoi 
many  of  the  significant  and  welcome 
changes  which  have  marked  the  past  4 
years:  the  Panama  Canal  treaties,  the 
Latin  American  nuclear-weapons-free 
zone,  the  work  of  the  Inter- American 
Human  Rights  Commission.  I  would  a( 
to  that  list  the  emergence  of  independ( 
states  in  the  Caribbean,  the  vigorous 
spread  of  industrialization,  the  rise  of 
several  Spanish-speaking  republics  am 
Brazil  as  major  world  forces. 

All  these  developments  have  intrc 
duced  new  balance  into  inter-Americai 
affairs.  They  underscore  that  your  cou 
tries  are  gaining  real  power  to  contribi 
to  regional  development  and  that  we  r 
spect  and  welcome  your  contributions. 
And  these  developments,  taken  togeth 
can  be  the  foundation  for  improved  cot 
eration  among  us  all  in  the  future.  Sev 
eral  hopeful  trends  are  already  visible. 

•  Subregional  integration  has  be- 
come a  key  focus  for  both  growth  and 
broader  cooperation — from  Central 
America  to  the  Andean  group  and  fror 
the  Caribbean  to  the  River  Plate  Basil 

•  Important  initiatives  have  been 
launched  by  Mexico  and  Venezuela  joii 
ly,  and  separately  by  Ti'inidad  and 
Tbbago,  to  supply  energy  to  their  neig 
bors. 

Yet  this  is  only  the  beginning.  Du 
ing  the  next  two  decades — the  last  ye; 
of  the  20th  century — our  successors  w 
face  changes  even  more  sweeping  thar 
those  we  have  witnessed  over  the  past 
years.  The  economic  growth  of  Latin 
America  over  the  past  two  decades  ha; 
been  impressive,  and  this  is  only  the  b 
ginning.  The  potential  for  the  rest  of  tl 
century  is  ju.st  as  promising.  In  fact,  tl 
Global  2000  Repo)i  to  the  Fresidetit.  n 
cently  prepared  under  the  auspices  of  < 
government,  projects  that  Latin  Amer 
will  be  the  fastest  growing  part  of  the 
world  as  we  near  the  year  2000.  This  S' 
gests  that  better  regional  approaches  t 
development  will  be  particularly  impor 
tant  to  our  future  cooperation. 

TV)day,  I  want  to  emphasize  the 
thought  that  better  cooperation  for  de- 
velopment will  depend  largely  on  our 
ability  to  live  by  three  fundamental  pri 
ciples  that  strongly  infiuence  the  climai 
for  cooperation:  the  prinicples  of  suppo 


Western  Hemisphere 


iman  rights;  of  nonintervention  and 
tive  security;  and  of  peaceful  settle- 
of  disputes. 

an  Rights 

le  emphasize,  as  strongly  as  I  know 
what  President  Carter  said  this 
ing:  Support  for  human  rights — eco- 
!  and  political,  as  well  as  individual, 
i — is  not  a  matter  of  transitory  poli- 
mphasis  for  the  United  States;  it  is 
ined  in  our  national  life.  The  most 
tent  thread  of  belief  in  our  history 
belief  that  governments  should  be 
eoples'  servant,  not  their  master, 
lis  simple  but  fundamental  reason,  I 
it  is  safe  to  assert  that  the  United 
s  will  continue  to  work  to  strengthen 
icrease  respect  for  human  rights  as 
damental  norm  of  international 
iration. 

Ul  of  us  can  be  justifiably  proud  of 
emisphere's  recent  progress  in  this 
Those  who  would  ignore,  deny,  or 
;  individual  rights  are  in  retreat. 
nter-American  Human  Rights  Com- 
on  deserves  our  special  salute.  Its 
nents  and  studies  have  begun  to 
de  an  invaluable  and  dispassionate 
for  our  joint  consideration. 
The  collective  rededication  of  the 
ricas  to  human  I'ights  is  a  major 
in  I  look  to  the  future  of  our  region 
optimism.  Societies  where  basic  hu- 
rights  are  respected  are  more  stable 
nore  productive,  more  confident  and 
creative.  They  make  better  friends 
stronger  allies.  So  I  would  assert 
support  for  human  rights  is  both  a 
Bquisite  for  future  cooperation  and 
ress  between  us  and  a  motive  force 
rd  success  in  all  our  mutual  efforts. 

intervention 

second  fundamental  principle  for 
eration  in  the  hemisphere  is  the  prin- 
of  nonintervention.  Effective  inter- 
mal  cooperation,  particularly  among 
s  as  richly  varied  as  those  of  this 
sphere,  is  possible  only  if  the  rights 
ates  are  recognized.  The  very  exist- 
of  this  organization  is  due  to  men 
Baltasar  Brum  and  Carlos  Saavedra 
as,  jurists  whose  wisdom  helped  de- 
p  the  principle  of  nonintervention  by 
state  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
her. 

This  principle  is  fundamental.  As  our 
isphere  has  become  more  politically 
rse,  differences  of  outlook  have 


sometimes  contributed  to  tensions  among 
states.  But  our  growing  acceptance  of 
political  pluralism,  both  within  and 
among  countries,  has  proved  important 
toward  reducing  such  tensions. 

We  have  explicitly  committed  ourselves 
through  the  Rio  treaty  to  undertake  col- 
lective action  against  the  most  blatant 
form  of  intervention — armed  aggression. 
Other  forms  of  intervention,  however, 
can  be  just  as  damaging  to  national  inde- 
pendence. The  external  provision  of 
weapons,  mihtary  training,  or  safehavens 
to  armed  insurgents  is  an  insidious  form 
of  intervention — one  all  the  more  trou- 
bling for  its  indirection.  Our  regional 
organization  needs  to  e.xamine  this  press- 
ing problem  and  devise  ways  to  help  the 
member  states  stop  it. 

Peaceful  Settlement 

Development  has  few  enemies  gi'eater 
than  fratricidal  conflict.  Peacemaking 
efforts  are  the  third  key  to  the  future  de- 
velopment of  our  countries.  For  our  part, 
the  United  States  is  irrevocably  commit- 
ted to  the  peaceful  settlement  of  dis- 
putes. Over  the  last  2  years,  the  Panama 
Canal  treaties  have  become  a  symbol  of 
that  commitment.  The  United  States  has 
made  clear  its  willingness  to  deal  with  all 
nations,  large  and  small,  on  a  basis  of 
mutual  respect.  Yesterday,  in  this  hall, 
we  honored  a  similar  contribution  to 
peace  and  development — the  treaty  of 
peace  between  El  Salvador  and  Hon- 
duras. In  both  cases,  this  organization 
deserves  major  credit  for  helping  to 
bring  the  concerned  parties  together  in 
negotiations. 

But  even  as  we  celebrate  these  for- 
ward steps,  many  other  potentially  dis- 
ruptive territorial  disputes  remain  unset- 
tled in  the  hemisphere.  Settling  them 
peacefully  must  be  a  high  priority  con- 
cern for  us  all  and  for  this  organization  in 
particular. 

The  principle  of  peaceful  settlement 
of  disputes  could  also  be  applied  to  cer- 
tain other  problems.  President  Carter 
this  morning  reaffirmed  our  country's 
commitment  to  the  goal  of  the  treaty  of 
Tlatelolco,  which  calls  for  Latin  America 
to  be  kept  free  of  nuclear  weapons.  This 
treaty  could  serve  as  a  precedent  for 
similar  arrangements  to  limit  the  dangers 
of  conventional  military  technology. 


We  are  convinced  that  balanced  re- 
straints on  conventional  weapons, 
whether  negotiated  regionally  or 
subregionally,  could  reduce  tensions,  en- 
hance the  security  of  nations,  and  reaf- 
firm our  mutual  commitment  to  peaceful 
development. 

Cooperation  for  Development 

Can  we  build  a  future  of  regional  coop- 
eration for  economic  development,  based 
on  fidelity  to  these  fundamental  princi- 
ples? Let  us  be  candid:  The  only  honest 
answer  possible  is  "perhaps."  The  dream 
of  cooperative  economic  development  is 
at  once  our  hemisphere's  brightest  prom- 
ise and  the  area  of  our  greatest  dis- 
appointment. 

The  OAS  has  contributed  signifi- 
cantly to  international  law.  to  the 
Western  Hemisphere's  unique  record  of 
peacekeeping,  and  to  our  recent  progi'ess 
in  strengthening  support  for  human 
rights.  But  the  plain  truth  is  that  we 
have  done  far  too  Kttle  through  the  OAS 
to  capitahze  on  our  joint  potential  for  eco- 
nomic progress. 

The  moral  imperative  for  action  is 
clear,  for  ours  is  a  hemisphere  still 
marked  by  major  inequalities  among  and 
within  countries.  Our  basic  principles 
simply  cannot  be  fulfilled  without  more 
effective  cooperation  for  economic  de- 
velopment. And  the  practical  imperative 
is  as  compelling  as  the  moral  one:  Our 
combined  efforts  could  dramatically  im- 
prove the  lives  of  all  our  citizens. 

Yet  too  often,  we  have  allowed  our 
economic  debates  to  focus  almost  exclu- 
sively on  questions  that  divide  us,  losing 
sight  of  those  vast  and  equally  vital  areas 
in  which  we  are  in  agreement.  The  pro- 
posed special  general  assembly  on  de- 
velopment offers  an  opportunity  to  re- 
direct regional  thinking  along  construc- 
tive Hues.  This  assembly  should  be  held 
as  soon  as  adequate  preparations  can  be 
made.  The  "wise  men's  report,"  prepared 
for  the  joint  working  group,  identifies 
many  key  areas  where  our  cooperation 
can  be  strengthened. 

We  believe  it  is  a  good  starting  point. 
We  are  prepared  to  help  wholeheartedly 
in  developing  and  pursuing  specific  pro- 
grams for  the  good  of  all  our  peoples.  We 


TREATIES 


also  hope  that,  by  concentrating  on  ques- 
tions where  early  progress  is  possible, 
the  special  general  assembly  will  build  a 
foundation  for  cooperation  on  more  diffi- 
cult issues  as  well. 


Conclusion 

I  would  like  to  touch  on  a  house- 
keeping item  which  ties  into  my 
opening  remarks  about  the  changed  en- 
vironment. I  refer  to  the  need  to  mod- 
ernize the  system  of  financing  that  was 
developed  for  this  organization  more  than 
30  years  ago.  The  system  should  reflect 
the  emerging  new  balances  in  the  hemis- 
phere. As  a  former  legislator,  I  know  the 
difficulties  of  negotiating  financing 
aiTangements.  I  know  all  too  well  the 
disputes  and  delays  that  can  come  with 
the  process.  The  differences  that  sepa- 
rate on  this  issue  are  not  so  gi'eat.  F"or 
the  good  of  our  organization,  I  urge  that 
we  delay  no  longer  in  reaching  agree- 
ment on  this  issue. 

In  a  valedictory  statement  like  this 
one,  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  advance 
concrete  new  proposals.  But  I  am  freer 
to  speak  frankly.  The  days  when  one 
counti-y  could  pretend  to  lead  alone  are 
gone;  no  country  is  now  so  strong  that  it 
can  either  dominate  or  ignore  its  neigh- 
bors. But  if  dominance  by  one  power  is 
undesirable,  so  is  confusion  among  many. 
We  have  learned,  sometimes  painfully, 
how  to  coexist.  Let  us  now  learn  how  to 
cooperate  more  broadly  and 
effectively. 


1  Text  from  White  House  press 
release  of  Nov.  19,  1980. 

2  Press  release  32.5  of  Nov.  19, 
1980.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation,  Civil 

Protocol  relating  to  an  amendment  to  the 
Convention  on  International  Civil  Avi- 
ation (TIAS  1591)  [concerning  lease, 
charter  and  interchange].  Done  at 
Montreal  Oct.  G,  1980.  Enters  into  force 
on  the  date  on  which  the  98th  instrument 
of  ratification  is  deposited  by  a  party 
to  ICAO. 

Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlaw- 
ful acts  against  the  safety  of  civil  avi- 
ation. Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  2G,  1973. 
TIAS  7570. 

Accession  deposited:  Democratic  People's 
Republic  of  Korea,  Aug.  13,  1980.1 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the 
development,  production,  and  stockpiling 
of  bacteriological  (biological)  and  toxin 
weapons  and  on  their  destruction.  Done 
at  Washington,  London  and  Moscow 
Apr.  10,  1972.     Entered  into  force 
Mar.  26,  1975.     TIAS  8062. 
Accession  deposited :  Socialist  Republic 
of  Vietnam,  June  20,  1980. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1976,  with 

annexes.  Done  at  London  Dec.  3,  1975. 

Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  1, 

1976,  definitively  Aug.  1,  1977. 

TIAS  8683. 

Accession  deposited:  Philippines,  Oct.  14, 

T980: 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common 
Fund  for  Commodities,  with  schedule. 
Done  at  Geneva  June  27,  1980.  Open  for 
signature  at  U.N.  Headquarters  in 
New  York  Oct.  1,  1980,  until  1  year  after 
the  date  of  its  entry  into  force.  Enters 
into  force  upon  receipt  by  the  depository 
of  instruments  of  ratification,  accept- 
ance or  approval  from  at  least  90  states, 
providing  certain  requirements  have 
been  fulfilled. 

Signatures:  Ecuador,  Oct.  3,  1980;  U.S., 
Nov.  5,  1980. 

Conservation 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS 
8249) .  Done  at  Bonn  June  22,  1979.2 
Acceptance  deposited :  U.S.,  Oct.  23,  1980. 


Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  con- 
tainers (CSC) ,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Geneva  Dec.  2,  1972.  Entered  into  fore 
Sept.  6,  1977;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979 
TIAS  9037. 
Accession  deposited  :  China,  Sept.  23, 

imr. 

Cultural  Relation.s 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Educational, 
Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organization. 
Concluded  at  London  Nov.  16,  1945. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  4,  1946. 
TIAS  1580. 

Signatures:  Maldives,  Mar.  23,  1979; 
St.  Lucia,  Mar.  6,  1980;  Tonga,  Sept.! 
1980;  Zimbabwe,  Sept.  22,  1980. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Maldives,  July 
1980;  St.  Lucia,  Mar.  6,  1980;  Tonga, 
Sept.  29,  1980;  Zimbabwe,  Sept.  22,  19 

Agreement  on  the  importation  of  edu- 
cational, scientific,  and  cultural  materi 
with  protocol.  Done  at  Lake  Success 
Nov.  22,  1950;  entered  into  force  May 
1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  2,  1966. 
TIAS  6129. 

Ratification  deposited:  Syria,  Sept.  16 
1980. 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  internation 

transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIE 

carnets,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 

Nov.  14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 

1978." 

Accession  deposited:  Canada,  Oct.  21, 

1980. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  1 
U.S.  Dec.  13,  1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Accession  deposited :  Democratic  Peop 
Republic  of  Korea,  Oct.  29,  1980. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  militi 
or  any  other  hostile  use  of  environmen 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  D 
at  Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  5,  1978.3 

Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guin 
Oct.  28,  1980. 

Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  Internatio 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development. 
Done  at  Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:  Saint  Lucia,  Oct. 
1980 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic, 
social,  and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at 


Treaties 


fork  Dec.  16,  196G.  Entered  into 

Jan.  3,  1976.'' 

ture:  Kampuchea.  Oct.  17,  1980. 

lational  covenant  on  civil  and 
:al  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 
6,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  23, 

ture:  Kampuchea,  Oct.  17,  1980. 

al  protocol  to  the  international 
nt  on  civil  and  political  rights. 

;ed  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 

ed  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976." 

sion  deposited:  Trinidad  and 

:o,  Nov'  14,  1980. 

al  Procedure 

ntion  on  the  taking  of  evidence 
d  in  civil  or  commercial  matters. 
at  The  Hague  Mar.  18,  1970. 
ed  into  force  Oct.  7,  1972.  TIAS 

ded  to:  Cayman  Islands,  Sept.  16, 


II  Lines 

lidments  to  the  international  con- 

!  n  nn  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331). 
.■,1  at  London  Nov.  1.5,  1979.2 
lances  deposited:  China,  Aug.  1, 

'  Fiance,  May  12,  1980;  Denmark, 
J,  1980:  Morocco,  Sept.  2.5,  1980; 

■  .lies,  Oct.  1,  1980;  U.K.,  Sept.  22, 

II  dments  to  the  international  con- 
ll.n  on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331), 
aig  to  amendments  io  the  conven- 
ft\dopted  at  London  Nov.  12,  197.5.- 
^  t  a  rices  deposited:  China,  Aug.  1, 
'  S -ychelles,  Oct.  1,  1980. 

i»i  dments  to  the  international  con- 
[»im  onload  lines,  1966  (TIAS  (;331). 
flat  London  Oct.  12,  1971.2 
c  itances  deposited :  China,  Aug.  1, 
H  Seychelles,  Oct.  1,  1980. 

II  inie  Matters 

^  'Inients  to  the  convention  on  the 

.1  rnmental  Maritime  Consultative 
ation,  as  amended,  (TIAS  4044, 
'  i:i0,  8606).  Adopted  at  London 
I  .,  1979.2 

'lances  deposited:  Australia,  Nov. 
Ml;  Bulgaria,  Oct.  21,  1980. 

I'linents  to  the  convention  on  the 
j'vcrnmental  Maritime  Consultative 

I, /ation,  as  amended,  (TIAS  4044, 

'i  190,  8606).  Adopted  at  London 

IT,  1977.2 

lance  deposited:  Egypt,  Nov.  18, 

ntion  on  facilitation  of  inter- 
nal maritime  traffic,  with  annex. 
at  London  Apr.  9,  1965.  Entered 
n,,e  Mar.  5,  1967;  for  the  U.S. 
111.  1967.  TIAS  6251. 
plance  deposited:  Senegal,  Oct.  17, 

national  convention  on  standards  of 


training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping 
for  seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London 
July  7,  1978.2 

Accessions  deposited:  Egypt,  Sept.  22, 
1980;  Spain,  Oct.  21,  1980. 

International  convention  on  maritime 
search  and  rescue,  1979,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Hamburg  Apr.  27,  1979.2 
Signature:  China,  Sept.  11,  1980.'' 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Convention  for  limiting  the  manufacture 
and  regulating  the  distribution  of  nar- 
cotic drugs,  with  protocol  of  signature. 
Done  at  Geneva  July  13,  1931.  Entered 
into  force  July  9,  1933.  48  Stat.  1543. 

Protocol  amending  the  agreements,  con- 
ventions, and  protocols  on  narcotic  drugs 
concluded  at  The  Hague  on  Jan.  23,  1912, 
at  Geneva  on  Feb.  11,  1925,  and  Feb.  19, 
1925,  and  July  13,  1931,  at  Bangkok  on 
Nov.  27,  1931,  and  at  Geneva  June  26, 
1936,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lake  Success, 
New  York  Dec.  11,  1946.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  11,  1946;  for  the  U.S.  Aug.  12, 

1947.  TIAS  1671. 

Protocol  bringing  under  international 
control  drugs  outside  the  scope  of  the 
convention  of  July  13,  1931,  for  limiting 
the  manufacture  and  regulating  the  dis- 
tribution of  narcotic  drugs,  as  amended 
by  the  protocol  signed  at  Lake  Success 
on  Dec.  11,  1946.  Done  at  Paris  Nov.  19, 

1948.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  1,  1949; 
for  the  U.S.  Sept.  11,  1950.  TIAS  2308. 

Protocol  for  limiting  and  regulating  the 
cultivation  of  the  poppy  plant,  the  pro- 
duction of,  international  and  wholesale 
trade  in,  and  use  of  opium.  Done  at 
New  York  June  23,  1953.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  8,  1963.  TIAS  5273. 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs,  1961. 
Done  at  New  York  Mar.  30,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  13,  1964;  for  the 
U.S.  June  24,  1967.  TIAS  6298. 
Notification  of  succession  :  Papua  New 
Guinea,  Oct.  28,  1980. 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention 
on  narcotic  drugs,  1961  (TIAS  6298). 
Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  25,  1972.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  8,  1975.  TIAS  8118. 

Convention  on  psychotropic  substances. 
Done  at  Vienna  Feb.  21,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  Aug.  16,  1976;  for  the  U.S. 
July  15,  1980.  TIAS  9725. 
Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 
Oct.  28,  1980. 

Nuclear  Material — Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 

nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

Vienna  Oct.  26,  1979.2 

Ratification  deposited  :  Sweden,  Aug.  1 

1980 

Signatures :  Canada,  Sept.  23,  1980; 

Morocco,  July  25,  1980;  Poland,  Aug.  6, 

1980. 


Patents,  Microorganisms 

Budapest  treaty  on  the  international 
recognition  of  the  deposit  of  micro- 
organisms for  the  purposes  of  patent 
procedure,  with  regulations.  Done  at 
Budapest,  Apr.  28,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Aug.  19,  1980.  TIAS  9768. 
Ratifications  deposited:  F.R.G.,  Oct.  20, 
1980;  U.K.,  Sept.  29,  1980. 

Pollution 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  inter- 
national convention  for  tlie  prevention  of 
pollution  from  ships,  1973.  Done  at 
London  Feb.  17,  1978.2 
Ratification  deposited:  Liberia,  Oct.  28, 
1980. 

Accession  deposited :  Tunisia,  Oct.  10, 
1980. 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  the 
high  seas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  sub- 
stances other  than  oil.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  2,  1973.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands, 
Sept.  10,  1980.0 

Convention  on  the  prevention  of  marine 
pollution  by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other 
matter,  with  annexes.  Done  at  London, 
Mexico  City,  Moscow,  and  Washington 
Dec.  29,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  30, 
1975.  TIAS  8165. 

Accession  deposited :  Suriname,  Nov.  12, 
1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Dec.  29, 
1972  on  the  prevention  of  marine  pollu- 
tion by  dumping  of  wastes  and  other 
matter  (TIAS  8165).  Adopted  at  London 
Oct.  12,  1978.2 

Acceptances  deposited:  Japan,  Oct.  15, 
1980;  Sweden,  May  16,  1980;  U.S., 
Oct.  24,  1980. 

Oil  Pollution 

International  convention  on  civil  liability 
for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done  at  Brus- 
sels, Nov.  29,  1969.  Entered  into  force 
June  19,  1975.- 

Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Oct.  1980. 
International  convention  on  the  establish- 
ment of  an  international  fund  for  com- 
pensation for  oil  pollution  damage.  Done 
at  Brussels  Dec.  18,  1971.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  16,  1978.-' 

Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Oct.  10, 
1980. 

International  convention  for  the  preven- 
tion of  pollution  of  the  sea  by  oil,  with 
annexes,  as  amended  (TIAS  6109,  8505). 
Done  at  London  May  12,  1954.  TIAS  4900. 
Extended  to :  Bermuda  as  from  Dec.  1, 
1980. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  Aug.  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the 
protection  of  victims  of  international 


Treaties 


armed  conflicts  (Protocol  I) ,  with  an- 
nexes. Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978. •■ 
Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Aug.  7, 
T9807 

Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Sept.  8, 
TWT. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conven- 
tions of  Aug.  12,  1949,  and  relating  to  the 
protection  of  victims  of  noninternational 
armed  conflicts  (Protocol  II).  Adopted  at 
Geneva  June  8,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  7,  1978.'> 
Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Aug.  7, 

TTJMj 

Accession  deposited:  Bangladesh,  Sept.  8, 
TWT. 

Refugees 

Protocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refu- 
gees. Done  at  New  York  Jan.  31,  1967. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  4,  1967;  for  the 
U.S.  Nov.  1,  1968.  TIAS  6577. 
Accession  deposited:  Jamaica,  Oct.  30, 
1980 

Rubber 

International  natural  rubber  agreement, 
1979.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Oct.  23, 
1980. 

Approval  deposited:  Czechoslovakia, 
Sept.  17,  1980. 

Notification  of  provisional  application  : 
Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Oct.  3,  1980; 
Brazil,  Oct.  1,  1980;  Canada,  Nov.  7, 
1980;  EEC,  Sept.  29,  1980;  Finland, 
Nov.  11,  1980;  France,  F.R.G.,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Sept.  30,  1980;  U.S.S.R., 
Nov.  5,  1980;  U.K.,  Sept.  26,  1980;  U.S., 
Oct.  23,  1980. 

Ratification  deposited  :  China,  .Sept.  15, 
1980;  Denmark,  Sweden,  Sept.  30,  1980; 
Ireland,  Sept  29,  1980. 

Seabed  Disarmament 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  emplace- 
ment of  nuclear  weapons  and  other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  on  the 
seabed  and  the  ocean  floor,  and  in  the 
subsoil  thereof.  Don3  at  Washington,  Lon- 
don, and  Moscow  Feb.  11,  1971.  Entered 
into  force  May  18,  1972.  TIAS  7337. 
Accession  deposited:  Socialist  Republic  of 
Vietnam,  June  20,  1980.' 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activi- 
ties of  states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of 
outer  space,  including  the  Moon  and  other 
celestial  bodies.  Done  at  Washington, 
London,  and  Moscow  Jan.  27,  1967.  En- 
tered into  force  Oct.  10,  19G7.  TIAS  6347. 
Accession  deposited :  Socialist  Republic  of 
Vietnam,  June  20,  1980. 


Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  provisionally 
Jan.  1,  1978;  definitively  Jan.  2,  1980. 
TIAS  9664. 

Accession  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Oct.  20, 
TME 

Telecommunications 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations 
(Geneva,  1959),  as  revised,  relating  to  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with 
annexes  and  final  protocol.  Done  at 
Geneva  Mar.  5,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  1,  1979;  for  the  U.S.  Oct.  22,  1980, 
except  for  the  frequency  allotment  plan 
for  the  aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service 
which  shall  come  into  force  on  Feb.  1, 
1983. 

Approval  deposited:  Denmark,  Sept.  1, 
1980. 

Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  tak- 
ing of  hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York 
Dec.  17,  1979.2 

Signatures:  Finland,  Oct.  29,  1980; 
Uganda,  Nov.  10,  1980. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Lesotho,  Nov.  5, 
1980;  Mauritius,  Oct.  17,  1980. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  technical  barriers  to  trade. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9616. 
Acceptances:  Hungary,  Apr.  23,  1980; 
Japan  Apr.  25,  1980;  Republic  of  Korea, 
Sept.  3,  1980;  Singapore,  June  3,  1980; 
Spain,  May  9,  1980  >*;  Yugoslavia, 
Sept.  16,  1980.-^ 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  May  28, 
1980. 

Agreement  on  tiade  in  civil  aircraft.  Done 

at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 

force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9620. 

Acceptances:  Japan,  Apr.  25,  1980; 

Romania,  June  25,  1980. 

Ratification  deposited  :  Austria,  June  23, 

1980. 

International  dairy  arrangement.  Done  at 
(ieneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9623. 
Acceptance:  Uruguay,  July  18,  1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  May  28, 
1980. 

Arrangement  regarding  bovine  meat. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9701. 
Acceptances:  Romania,  June  25,  1980; 
Uruguay,  June  16,  1980;  Yugoslavia, 
Sept.  Ig",  1980.'' 

Ratification  deposited:  Austria,  May  28, 
1980. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  arti- 
cle VII  of  the  General  Agreement  on 


Tariffs  and  Trade  (customs  valuation) 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Enters 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1981. 
Acceptances:  Austria,  Dec.  17,  1979; 
Canada,  Dec.  17,  1979^  EEC,  Dec.  17, 
1979;  Finland,  Dec.  17,  1979'';  Hungar 
July  18,  1980;  India,  July  11,  1980'. i"; 
Japan,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Norway,  Dec.  17, 
1979-';  Romania,  June  25,  1980;  Spain, 
May  9,  1980».i";  Sweden,  Dec.  17,  1979 
Switzerland,  Dec.  17,  1979;  U.K.,  Dec. 
1979'!;  U.S.,  Dec.  17,  1979». 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  Apr.  25, 
T9M 

Protocol  to  the  agreement  on  implemer 
tion  of  article  VII  o'  the  General  Agre 
ment  on  Tarifl's  and  Trade.  Done  at 
Geneva  Nov.  1,  1979.  Entered  into  fore 
Jan.  1,  1981. 

Acceptances:  Austria,  May  17,  1980"; 
EEC,  July  29,  1980;  Finland,  Dec.  17, 
1979";  Hungary,  July  18,  1980;  India, 
July  11,  19807.1";  Japan,  Apr.  25,  1980 
Norway,  Dec.  17,  1979'';  Romania, 
June  25,  1980;  Spain,  May  9,  1980''; 
Sweden,  Dec.  17,  1979'-';  Switzerland, 
Dec.  17,  1979-';  U.K.,  Sept.  17,  1980ii.i 
U.S.,  May  28,  19809. 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  arti- 
cle VI  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariff's  and  Trade  (antidumping  code) 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entere( 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9650. 
Acceptances:  Austria,  Dec.  17,  1979'-'. 
Brazil,  Dec.  28,  1979;  Canada,  Dec.  17. 
1979;  Czechoslovakia,  July  29,  1980; 
EEC,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Finland,  Dec.  17, 
1979;  Hungary,  Apr.  23,  1980;  India, 
July  11,  19801";  Japan,  Dec.  17,  1979; 
Norway,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Romania,  Juni 
1980;  Spain,  May  9,  1980-';  Sweden, 
Dec.  17,  1979;  Switzerland,  Dec.  17,  1£ 
U.K.,  Dec.  17,  1979111-;  U.S.,  Dec.  17, 
1979;  Yugoslavia,  Sept.  16,  1980.'-' 
■Acceptances  deposited :  Brazil,  May  5, 
1980;  Japan.  Apr.  25,  1980;  Norway, 
Dec.  28,  1979. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Austria,  May 
1980;  Finland.  Mar.  13,  1980;  Sweden 
Dec.  20,  1979. 

Agreement  on  interpretation  and  appl 
tion  of  articles  VI,  XVI,  and  XXIII  of 
General  Agieement  on  Tariffs  and  Tri 
(subsidies  and  countervailing  duties). 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Enterei 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9619. 
Acceptances :  Austria,  Dec.  17,  1979; 
Brazil,  Dec.  28,  1979'";  Canada,  Dec. 
1979;  Chile,  Oct.  25,  1979";  EEC, 
Dec.  17,  1979;  Finland,  Dec.  17,  1979; 
India,  July  11,  1980;  Japan,  Dec.  17, 
1979;  Republic  of  Korea,  June  10,  198i 
Norway,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Pakistan,  Apr 
1980;  Sweden,  Dec.  17,  1979;  SwitzerlM 
Dec.  17,  1979;  U.K.,  Dec.  17,  1979  "13 
U.S.,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Uruguay,  Dec.  31, 
1979";  Yugoslavia,  Sept.  16,  1980." 
Acceptances  deposited:  Japan,  Apr.  2^ 
1980;  Norway,  Dec.  28,  1979. 


^<     Otr^*^     D..II 


Treaties 


_ations  deposited:  Austria,  May  28, 
Finland,  Mar.  13,  1980;  Sweden, 
),  1979. 

nent  on  import  licensing  proce- 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979. 
id  into  force  Jan.  1,  1980. 
9788. 

;ances :  Argentina,  Dec.  17,  1979"; 
IiaTTeb.  25,  1980;  Austria,  Dec.  17, 
lanada,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Chile,  Oct.  25, 
;  EEC,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Finland, 
,  1979;  Hungary,  Jan.  21,  1980; 
July  11,  1980;  Japan,  Dec.  17, 
New  Zealand,  Dec.  17,  1979;  Nor- 
>ec.  17,  1979 ;  Romania,  June  25, 
Jouth  Africa,  Dec.  18,  1979;  Swe- 
ec.  17,  1979;  Switzerland,  Dec.  17, 
U.K.,  Dec.  17,  1979111-!;  U.S., 
;,  1979 ;  Yugoslavia,  Sept.  16,  1980''. 
:ances  deposited :  Japan,  Apr.  25, 
Norway,  Dec.  28,  1979. 
:ations  deposited:  Austria,  May  28, 
Finland,  Mar.  13,  1980;  Sweden, 
I,  1979. 

I  Nations 

ntion  on  the  privileges  and  immuni- 

the  U.N.  Done  at  New  York 

i,  1946.  Entered  into  force  for  the 

.pr.  29,  1970.  TIAS  6900. 

iion  deposited :  F.R.G.,  Nov.  5,  1980. 

O 

iHtution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  Devel- 
'Mganization,  with  annexes. 
:,t  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.- 
£:  Iran,  Nov.  12,  1980. 
i.ns  deposited:  Bangladesh, 
,  r.i80;  Indonesia,  Nov.  10,  1980. 


lid  convention,  1980  (part  of  the 
utional  wheat  agreement,  1971,  as 
\,;\  (TIAS  7144)).  Done  at  Wash- 
Mar.  11,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
loiially  July  1,  1980;  entered  into 
l.tinitively  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  11, 


rut  of  ratification  signed  bv  the 
_-2it;  Nov.  11,  1980. 
I  uin  deposited:  U.S.,  Nov.  11, 

.1  modifying  and  further  extending 
Mat  trade  convention  (part  of  the 
ational  wheat  agreement) ,  1971 
^  7144) .  Done  at  Washington 
'■1.  1979.  Entered  into  force  provi- 

y  for  the  U.S.  with  respect  to  cer- 
ai  ts  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to 
I 'arts  July  1,  1979;  entered  into 
■  l.tinitively  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  11, 

inu-nt  of  ratification  signed  by  the 
'luiit:  Nov.  11,  1980. 
ration  deposited:  U.S.,  Nov.  11, 


Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all 
forms  of  discrimination  against  women. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.2 
Ratifications  deposited:  Barbados, 
Oct.  16,  1980;  China,  Nov.  4,  1980. 
Signatures:  El  Salvador,  Nov.  14,  1980; 
Kampuchea,  Oct.  17, 1980. 

Convention  on  the  political  rights  of 
v.-omen.  Done  at  New  York  Mar.  31,  1953. 
Entered  into  force  July  7,  1954;  for  the 
U.S.  July  7,  1976.  TIAS  8289. 
Ratification  deposited:  Nigeria,  Nov.  17, 

WHO 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organi- 
zation. Done  at  New  York  July  22,  1946. 
Entered  into  force  Apr.  7,  1948;  for  the 
U.S.  June  21,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Saint  Lucia, 
Nov.  11,  1980. 


BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double 
taxation  and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  eva- 
sion with  respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with 
exchange  of  notes.  Signed  at  Dacca  Oct.  6, 
1980.  Enters  into  force  upon  the  exchange 
of  instruments  of  ratification. 

Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  17,  1977,  relating  to  equal  access  to 
ocean  carriage  of  government-controlled 
cargoes  (TIAS  8981) ,  with  agreed  min- 
utes. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  and  Rio  de  Janiero  Oct.  30, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  30,  1980. 

Canada 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
May  14,  1971,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  7125,  8247) ,  regarding  a  joint 
program  in  the  field  of  experimental  re- 
mote sensing  from  satellites  and  aircraft. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Wash- 
ington Oct.  20  and  Nov.  6,  1980.  Entered 
into  force  Nov.  6,  1980;  effective  May  14, 
1980. 

Protocol  amending  the  convention  of 
Mar.  2,  1953,  for  t!ie  preservation  of  the 
halibut  fishery  of  the  Northern  Pacific 
Ocean  and  Bering  Sea  (TIAS  2900). 
Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  29,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  15,  1980. 
TIAS  9855. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Nov.  11, 
1980. 

Protocol  to  amend  the  convention  for  the 
protection,  preservation,  and  extension  of 
the  sockeye  salmon  fisheries  in  the  Eraser 
River  System  of  May  26,  1930,  as 
amended  (50  Stat.  1355,  TIAS  3867). 


Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  24,  1977.  En- 
tared  into  force  Oct.  15,  1980.  TIAS  9854. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Nov.  11, 
1980. 

China 

Agreement  on  grain  trade,  with  ex- 
changes of  letters.  Signed  at  Beijing 
Oct.  22,  1980.  Enters  into  force  Jan.  1, 
1981. 

Parcel  post  agreement,  with  detailed 
regulations.  Signed  at  Washington,  Oct.  9, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  8,  1980. 

International  express  mail  agreement, 
with  detailed  regulations.  Signed  at 
Washington  Oct.  9,  1980.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  9,  1980. 

Denmark 

Naturalization  convention.  Signed  at 
Copenhagen  July  20,  1872.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  14,  1873.  17  Stat.  941. 
Notification  of  termination:  U.S.,  Oct.  3, 
1980;  effective  Oct.  3,  1981. 

Finland 

Protocol  relating  to  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Mar.  29,  1949  (TIAS  1945), 
with  exchange  of  letters.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington May  12,  1980. 
Entered  into  force:  Dec.  7,  1980. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  for  the 
development  of  a  cooperative  program  in 
the  sciences,  with  annex.  Signed  at  Hel- 
sinki Aug.  27,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  27,  1980.  TIAS  9848. 

France 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double 

t.^xation  and  the  prevention  of  evasion  in 

the  cases  of  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances, 

and  income.  Signed  at  Paris  Oct.  18,  1946. 

Entered  into  force  Oct.  17,  1949.  TIAS 

1982. 

Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1980. 

Protocol  modifying  the  convention  of 
Oct.  18,  1946  (TIAS  1982),  for  the  avoid- 
ance of  double  taxation  and  the  preven- 
tion of  evasion  in  the  cases  of  taxes  on 
estates  and  inheritances.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington May  17,  1948.  TIAS  1982. 
Terminated  :  Oct.  1,  1980. 

Convention  supplementing  the  convention 
of  July  25,  1939  (59  Stat.  893)  and 
Oct.  18,  1946  (TIAS  1982) ,  relating  to  the 
avoidance  of  double  taxation  as  modified 
and  supplemented  by  the  protocol  of 
May  17,  1948  (TIAS  1982).  Signed  at 
Washington  June  22,  1956.  Entered  into 
force  June  13,  1957.  TIAS  3844. 
Terminated:  Oct.  1,  1980. 

Agreement  relating  to  cooperation  with 
respect  to  research  and  development  ac- 
tivities in  the  field  of  civil  aviation.  Signed 


Treaties 


CHRONOLOGY 


at  Washington  and  Paris  July  10,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  July  10,  1980. 

(ieriiianj  ,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  relating:  to  the  taking  of  evi- 
dence. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Bonn  Oct.  17,  1979,  and  Feb.  1,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  1,  1980. 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  coal  lique- 
faction using  the  SRC-II  process.  Signed 
Oct.  5,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  5, 
1979. 

Protocol  relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Oct.  5,  1979,  on  cooperation  in  coal  lique- 
faction using  the  SRC-II  process.  Signed 
at  Washington  July  31,  1980.  Entered 
into  force  July  31,  1980. 

Indone.sia 

Agreement  extending  certain  provisions 
of  the  agreement  of  June  8,  1960,  as 
amended  and  extended  (TIAS  4.5.57,  0124, 
7001)  for  cooperation  concerning  civil 
uses  of  atomic  energy,  and  requiring 
IAEA  safeguards  with  respect  to  all 
peaceful  nuclear  activities  in  Indonesia. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Jakarta 
Sept.  1C>  and  19,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  19,  1980. 

International  Hydrographic  Bureau 

Agreement  relating  to  a  procedure  for 
United  States  income  tax  reimbursement. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Wash- 
ington and  Monaco  Aug.  27  and  Oct.  10, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  16,  1980. 

.lapan 

Agreement  on  cooperation  in  coal  lique- 
faction using  the  SRC-II  process.  Signed 
at  Washington  July  31,  1980.  Entered 
into  force  July  31,  1980. 

Memorandum  of  consultations  on  provi- 
sional measures  relating  to  air  transport 
services.  Signed  at  Tokyo  Sept.  20,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  20,  1980. 

Mexico 

Cooperative  agreement  to  assist  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Mexico  in  combating  the  Medi- 
terranean fruit  fly  (MEDFLY).  Signed 
at  Mexico  and  Washington  Aug.  2()  and 
Sept.  17,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  17,  1980. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  25,  1980  (TIAS  9772)  relating  to 
additional  cooperative  arrangements  to 
curb  the  illegal  tratTic  in  narcotics.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico 
Oct.  10,  1980,  Entered  into  force  Oct.  10, 
1980. 


Morocco 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  July  17,  1979  (TIAS  9G18), 
establishing  a  Provisional  Conunission  on 
Educational  and  Cultural  Exchange.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Rabat 
Sept.  24,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  24,  1980. 

Nicaragua 

Loan  agreement  for  the  reconstruction 
program  loan.  Signed  at  Managua 
Oct.  17,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  17, 
1980. 

Nigeria 

Agreement  for  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation.  Signed  at  Lagos  Sept.  22, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  22,  1980. 
Memorandum  of  understanding  on  envi- 
ronmental protection.  Signed  at  Lagos 
Sept.  22,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  22,  1980. 

Panama 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore 
Oil  Port.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Washington  Mar.  21  and  24,  1980.  En- 
tered into  force  Mar.  24,  1980. 
Superseded  by  agieement  of  Aug.  15  and 
Oct.  10,  1980. 

Senegal 

Agreement  for  scientific  and  technical 
cooperation.  Signed  at  Dakar  Sept.  30, 
1980.  Enters  into  force  upon  notification 
of  each  government  to  the  other  that  the 
constitutional  formalities  in  force  in  each 
country  have  been  accomplished. 

Sweden 

Naturalization  convention  and  protocol. 
Signed  at  Stockholm  May  26,  1869.  En- 
tered into  force  June  14,  1871.  17  Stat. 
809. 

Notification  of  termination:  United 
States,  Oct.  3,  1980;  effective  Oct.  3,  1981. 

World  Intellectual  Property  Organization 

Agreement  with  the  U.S.  relating  to  coop- 
eration in  the  promotion  of  industrial 
property  protection.  Signed  at  Geneva 
Sept.  26,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  26,  1980. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal 
granting  of  authorization  to  permit 
licensed  amateur  radio  operators  who  are 
citizens  of  either  country  to  operate  their 
stations  in  the  other  country.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Belgrade  Oct.  31  and 
Nov.  11,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  11, 
1980. 


Zimbabwe 

Memorandum  of  understanding  on  coo: 
eration  in  the  field  of  agricultural  scit, 
and  technology.  Signed  at  Salisbury 
Sept.  25.  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  25,  1980. 

Agreement  for  scientific  and  technical 
cooperation.  Signed  at  Salisbury  Sept 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  25,  1980 


1  With  statement. 

2  Not  in  force. 

■'  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

■•  Effective  in  respect  of  Bermuda 
Hong  Kong. 

•'■  Subject  to  approval. 

'•  Effective  in  respect  of  the  Nethe 
lands  Antilles. 

'  With  reservation (s). 

■''  Subject  to  ratification  or  approv 

•'  Subject  to  ratification,  acceptan 
or  approval. 

'"  With  declaration  (s). 

' '  In  respect  of  the  territories  for 
which  it  has  international  responsibili 
except  for:  Antigua,  Bermuda,  Brune 
Cayman  Islands,  Montserrat,  St.  Kitti 
Nevis,  Sovereign  Base  Areas,  Cyprus. 

'-'  Accepted  in  respect  to  Hong  Ki 
May  12,  1980. 

'■'  Exception  extended  to  British 
Virgin  Islands. 

' '  Ad  referendum.  ■ 


November  1980 

Events  pertaining  to  Iran  may  be 
found  on  page  28. 

November  4 

U.S.  holds  national  elections.  Rep 
lican  Party  candidate  Ronald  W.  Rea( 
wins  the  Presidential  election,  replacii 
Jimmy  Carter  of  the  Democratic  Part 

November  5 

U.S.  contributes  $250,000  to  U.N. 
World  Assembly  on  the  Elderly  which 
to  be  held  August  1982. 

Ambassador  McHenry  signs  the  C 
mon  Fund  for  Commodities  Agreemen 
behalf  of  the  U.S. 

November  11 

The  Madrid  followup  meeting  of  ti 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperati  i 
in  Europe  (CSCE)  opens  in  Madrid  w. 
former  Attorney  General  (Jriflin  B.  Be 
as  chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation  anc 
Max  M.  Kampelman  as  cochairnian. 

November  14 

Government  of  Guinea-Bissau  is 
overthrown  in  a  coup  d'etat  led  by  its 
Prime  Minister  Joao  Bernardo  Vieira. 

Iran  lifts  restrictions  on  foreign  r 


PRESS  RELEASES 


5  who  wish  to  cover  the  Iran-Iraq  DGOdrtnTlGnt  Of  StdtG 


■'326       11/21 


iberlT 

imiannual  U.S. -European  Coni- 
(EC)  hig-h-level  consultations  are 

;  Department  of  State  Noveni- 
18.  Under  Secretary  for  Economic 

i  Richard  N.  Cooper  and  Director 

1  for  External  Relations  of  the 

ission  of  the  European  Communi- 
Roy  Denman  lead  U.S.  and  EC 

tions,  respectively. 

eposit  of  Honduras-El  Salvador 

Treaty  in  OAS  ceremony. 

iber  19 

Ith  General  Assembly  of  the  Orga- 
in  of  American  States  (OAS)  is 
I  Washington,  D.C.  Novem- 

■26. 

y  a  vote  of  111  to  22,  with  12  ab- 
ins,  U.N.  General  Assembly  repeats 

for  the  Soviet  Union  to  withdraw 

from  Afghanistan. 

iber23 

iami  Conference  on  Caribbean 
.6  Investment,  and  Development  is 

■  ivember  23-2.5  in  Florida.   U.S. 

I'^cnted  by  Assistant  Secretary 

1  r-.\merican  Affairs,  William  G. 

I  r,  and  Counselor  Rozanne  L. 
I?  ay. 

ijrh-level  foreign  participation  is 

ciited  by  Costa  Rican  President 
;  i;  Prime  Ministers  Seaga,  of 
nca;  Adams,  of  Barbados;  Charles, 
Dninica;  Vice  President  Alfara,  of 
jt  Rica;  and  a  number  of  Minister- 
el  epresentatives  from  the  Caribbean 
-i 

vnber  24 

.S. -Venezuela  exchange  instru- 
n  of  ratification  of  the  Maritime 
alary  Treaty. 

vnber  25 

111.'  Government  of  Upper  Volta  is 
■  ir  "wn  in  a  military  coup  d'etat  led 
I.  Saye  Zerbo,  a  former  foreign 
111  and  the  commander  of  armed 
in  Ouagadougou. 

i  nber  29 

ecretary  Muskie  makes  official  visit 
\  xico,  November  29-December  1  to 
■i,v  work  of  U.S. -Mexico  Consultative 
■canism. 

unber  30 

'ruguay  holds  plebiscite  on  new 
itution  proposed  by  ruling  military. 
i.  -ised  count  was  rejected  by 
jDximately  55 'a  of  voters.  ■ 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Depart- 
ment of  State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.  Date 

310  11/1 

*311  10/31 

'312  10/31 


313       11/2 
*314       11/3 


'315       11/3 


*316       10/29 


'317       11/5 


"318       11/7 


'319       11/17 


*320  11/17 

321  11/17 

*322  11/17 

*323  11/17 

'-324  11/18 

325  11/19 


Subject 

Muskie:  news  conference 
U.S. -Gabon  sign  Inter- 
country  Agreement. 

Oceans  and  Interna- 
tional, Environmental 
and  Scientific  Affairs 
Advisory  Committee, 
Nov.  10. 

Muskie:  interview  on 
"Issues  and  Answers." 

Shipping  Coordinating 
Committee  (SCC), 
Subcommittee  on 
Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working 
group  on  radioconi- 
munication,  Nov.  20. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  ship  design 
and  equipment, 
Nov.  20. 

Muskie:  question-and- 
answer  session  with 
radio  station  WOR. 

Thomas  D.  Boyatt  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Colombia  (biographic 
data). 

Muskie:  interview  for 
National  Public 
Radio,  Oct.  31. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and 
Development,  working 
group  on  international 
data  flows,  Dec.  3. 

U.S. -Socialist  Republic 
of  Romania  sign  tex- 
tile agreement,  Sept.  3 
and  Nov.  3. 

U.S.-Micronesia  initial  a 
compact  of  free  asso- 
ciation. 

International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group 
1,  Dec.  10. 

CCIR,  study  group  4, 
Dec.  17. 

U.S.-Socialist  Republic 
of  Romania  amend 
bilateral  textile 
agreement. 

Muskie:  remarks  before 
the  General  Assembly 
of  the  OAS. 


*327       11/21 


328 
'329 


11/25 


11/25 


330       11/25 


t331       11/26 


Jamaican  Prime  Minis- 
ter Edward  Seaga 
gives  keynote  address 
at  the  Miami  Confer- 
ence on  Caribbean 
Trade,  Investment, 
and  Development,  Key 
Biscayne,  Nov.  23-25. 

U.S.-Venezuela  exchange 
instruments  of  ratifi- 
cation of  Maritime 
Boundary  Treaty. 

CCIR,  study  group  2, 
Dec.  12. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and 
Development,  working 
group  on  accounting 
standards  and  U.N./ 
OECD  investment 
undertakings,  Dec.  15. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and 
Developn.ent,  working 
group  on  transborder 
data  flows,  Dec.  2. 

Status  of  the  World's 
Nations,  1980,  Depart- 
ment of  State  publica- 
tion 8735,  released. 


■■'  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 
t  Held  for  a  later  issue.  ■ 


U.S.U.N. 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Public  Aflfairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations,  799  United  Nations 
Plaza,  New  York  N.Y.  10017. 


No.  Date 

*87  8/12 

*88  8/18 

89  8/20 

*90  8/25 

*91  8/25 


Subject 

Ambassador  McCall  re- 
turns from  the  Carib- 
bean. 

Statement  on  Puerto 
Rico. 

Muskie:  Jerusalem.  Secu- 
rity Council. 

U.S.  delegation  to  11th 
Special  Session  on  De- 
velopment. 

McHenry:  Zimbabwe 
mbership.  General  As- 
sembly. 


PUBLICATIONS 


92  8/25 

*93  9/8 

94  9/9 

*95  9/12 

*96  9/15 

*97  9/15 

*98  9/16 

*99  9/17 

100  9/22 

101  9/28 
*102  10/3 

*103  10/3 

*104  10/8 

*105  10/10 

*106  10/10 


Muskie:  statement  at  11th 
special  session. 

McCall:  statement  at  the 
Crossroads  Sym])()sium. 
Honolulu. 

McHenry:  Namibia,  U.S. 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Subcommit- 
tee on  Africa. 

McHenry:  statement  is- 
sued following  assassi- 
nation of  a  member  of 
the  Cuban  mission  to 
the  U.N. 

McHenry:  statement  at 
the  commemoration 
ceremony  for  the  Ralph 
Bunche  memorial. 

McHenry:  statement  at 
the  close  of  the  11th 
special  session. 

McHenry:  St.  Vincent  and 
the  Grenadines  mem- 
bership. General  As- 
sembly. 

Petree:  decolonization 
resolution.  General 
Committee. 

Muskie:  statement  to  the 
35th  UNGA. 

McHenry:  Iran-Iraq  con- 
flict. Security  Council. 

McCall:  foreign  economic 
interests.  Committee 
IV. 

Newsom:  foreign  eco- 
nomic interests.  Com- 
mittee IV. 

Palmieri:  refugees, 
UNHCR,  Geneva. 

Atkins:  apartheid.  Com- 
mittee III. 

McHenry:  apartheid.  ■ 


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grams.  Agreement  with  Japan.  TIASS 
24pp.  $1.75.  (Cat.  No.  89.10:9615.)  ■ 


rt*    f\4     Of'lin    Qll, 


SEX 


Muary  1981 
K  81,  No.  2046 


t  nistan.  General  Assembly 
.itis  on  Afghanistan  Situation 
M.llenrv,  text  of  resolu- 
nn)      ..". 30 

,   and  U.S.  Policy   (Muskie)    .  .        1 
ul,,j;y,  November  1980 40 

N  U.S.   Dialogue    (.joint  press 

:ati'nient)      12 

apanese       Relations      in      the 

sos  (Holbrooke)   14 

U.S. -China        Sign       Grain 
Liiiement  (White  House  state- 

rnt)      13 

mdities.  U.S. -China  Sign  Grain 
mi'ement  (White  House  state- 

i-ntl     13 

.;'ss.      International      Narcotics 
(intiol  in  the  1980s  (Falco)   ...     29 
I  nicnt    and    ForeiKn   Service 
Ml   Service  Act,  1980   (Carter)      11 
hrt  History  of  the  U.S.  Depart- 

lent  of  Stkte,  1781-1981   Si 

1  nios 

.   and  U.S.  Policy  (Muskie)    ..        1 
X  U.S.   Dialogue    (joint  press 

itcnient)     12 

I'j    a   Safer   Future    (Muskie).       3 
ipane.se       Relations      in      the 

Mis  (Holbrooke)   14 

r  •■ 

u  ntr  a  Safer  Future  (Muskie)   .        3 
I  ael    Oil   Agreement    (Carter, 
(iilai,       text      of       agreement, 
lenioranduni  of  agreement,  De- 

lirtment  fact  sheet)    24 

.-•ipanese  Relations  in  the  1980s 

lolbrooke)    14 

o? 

-l-uv,  November  1980   40 

thening     the    CSCE     Process 

Jell)      18 

mi  Rights 

and  U.S.  Policy  (Mu.skie)    ..        1 
il  Assembly  Votes  on  Afghan- 
an   Situation    ( McHenry,  text 

resolution )    30 

n     Rights     and     International 

iw    (Derian)    21 

res:  The  U.S.  Response  (Mus- 

e)      5 

t.rn  Africa:  Four  Years  Later 
Moose)     8 


Strengthening    the     CSCE     Process 

(Bell)     18 

10th  General  As.seniblv  of  the  OAS 

(Carter,   Muskie)     33 

Indonesia.      ASEAN-U.S.     Dialogue 

(ioint  press   statement)     12 

International       Organizations       and 

Conferences 

Chronology,  November  1980 40 

Strengthening     the     CSCE     Process 

(Bell)    18 

Iran 

Iran  Chronology,  November  1980   .  .      28 

U.S.  Hostages  in  Iran   (Muskie)    ...      2.5 

Israel.  U.S. -Israel  Oil  Agreement 
(Carter,  Modai,  text  of  agree- 
ment, memorandum  of  agree- 
ment. Department  fact  sheet) .  .      24 

Japan.     U.S. -Japanese    Relations    in 

the  1980s   (Holbrooke)    14 

Latin     America    and    the    Caribbean 

Chronology,  November  1980 40 

10th  General   Assembly  of  the  OAS 

(Carter,   Muskie)     33 

Madrid.     Strengthening     the     CSCE 

Process   (Bell)    18 

Malaysia.      ASEAN-U.S.      Dialogue 

(joint  press  statement)    12 

Middle  East.  Chronology,  Novem- 
ber   1980    ■ 40 

Narcotics.      International     Narcotics 

Control  in  the  1980s  (Falco)   ...     29 

Namibia 

Africa  and  U.S.  Policy   (Muskie)    ..        1 

Southern  Africa:   Four  Years  Later 

(Moose)     8 

Nuclear    Policy.     .Securing    a    Safer 

Future     ( Muskie )     3 

Organization  of  American  States. 
10th  General  Assembly  of  the 
OAS    (Carter,    Mu,skie)     33 

Petroleum.  U.S. -Israel  Oil  Agreement 
(Carter,  Modai,  text  of  agree- 
ment, memorandum  of  agree- 
ment. Department  fact  sheet)..      24 

Philippines.    ASEAN-U.S.   Dialogue 

(joint   press   statement)     12 

Poland.       Poland      (Carter,      White 

House  statement)    20 

Population.    Securing  a  Safer  Future 

(Muskie)      3 

Presidential  Documents 

Foreign  Service  Act,  1980   11 


Poland  (Carter,  White  House  state- 
ment)            20 

U.S. -China    Sign    Grain    Agreement 

(White   House   statement)     ....      13 

U.S. -Israel  Oil  Agreement  (Carter, 
Modai,  text  of  agreement, 
memorandum  of  agreement,  De- 
partment  fact   sheet)     24 

Publications 42 

Refugees.  Refugees:  The  U.S.  Re- 
sponse   (Muskie)    5 

Security  Assistance 

Securing  a   Safer   Future    (Muskie)        3 

U.S. -Japanese       Relations      in      the 

1980s  (Holbrooke)   14 

Singapore.     ASEAN-U.S.    Dialogue 

(joint  press  statement)    12 

South      Africa.       Southern     Africa: 

Foui-  Years  Later  (Moose)    ....        8 

Thailand.       ASEAN-U.S.      Dialogue 

(joint   press   statement)     12 

Treaties 

Current    Actions    3(5 

Human     Rights     and     International 

Law     (Derian )     21 

U.S.-China    Sign    Grain    Agreement 

(White   House  statement)     ....      13 

U.S. -Israel  Oil  Agreement  (Carter, 
Modai,  text  of  agreement, 
memorandum  of  agreement.  De- 
partment  fact   sheet)     24 

LInited  Nations.  General  Assembly 
Votes  on  Afghanistan  Situation 
(McHenry,    text   of    resolution).     30 

Zimbabwe 

Africa  and  U.S.  Policy   (Muskie)    ..        1 

Southern  Africa:   Four  Years  Later 

(Moose)     8 


Name  Index 

Bell,   Griffin   B    18 

Carter,    President    11,20,24,33 

Derian,  Patricia  M   21 

Falco,    Mathea    29 

Holbrooke,   Richard   C    14 

McHenry,    Donald    F    30 

Modai,   Yitzhak    24 

Moose,  Richard  M   8 

Muskie,  Secretary    5.  13,  2.5,  33 

Trask,  David   F    SI 


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Volume  81  /  Number  2047  /  February  1981 


Cover  Photo: 

Ronald  Wilson  Reagan  takes  the  oath 
of  office  as  the  40th  President  of 
the  United  States  on  January  20,  1981. 
Chief  Justice  Warren  Burger  (right) 
administers  the  oath  while 
Mrs.  Reagan  and 
Senator  Mark  Hatfield 
witness  the  event. 

(White  House  photo  by  Bill  Fitz  Patrick) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
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States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


ALEXANDER  M.  HAIG,  JR. 

Secretary  of  State 

WILLIAM  J.  DYESS 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs | 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


5 
9 

21 


Agreement  on  the  Release  of  the  American  Hostages  IRemarks  by  U.S. 

ficials.  Documentation  on  the  Commitments  and  the  Settlement  of 

Claims} 
Iran  Chronology,  December  1980 
Iran  Chronology,  January  1981 
List  of  American  Hostages 


Of- 


\i  President 


I 


President  Carter's  Farewell 
Address  to  the  Nation 


h  Secretary 
■ 

Resources  for  a  Credible  For- 
eign Policy  (Secretary  Muskiel 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed 
on  "Meet  the  Press"  (Ex- 
cerpts) 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed 
on  the  "MacNeil/Lehrer 
Report" 


4iica 


1  Proposed  Chad-Libya  Merger 

(Department  Statement) 

Pineda 

2  U.S. -Canada  Technical  Meeting 

on  Dioxin  (Joint  Statement) 

3  Air  Pollution  Legislation 

-3t  Asia 

Two  Years  of  U.S.-China  Rela- 
tions (Chronology) 
i      Orderly  Departure  Program  for 
Vietnamese  (Department 
Statement) 

ionomics 

4  U.S.  Trade  and  Foreign  Policy  in 

the  Western  Hemisphere 
(Ernest  B.  Johnston,  Jr.) 

5  Trade  With  the  Soviet  Union 

(President  Carter's  Letter  to 
Senator  Jackson) 


-lergy 


Energy:  Continuing  Crisis 
(Deane  R.  Hinton) 


Europe 

50        North  Atlantic  Council  Meets  in 
Brussels  (Final  Communique, 
Declaration,  Minutes  Extracts) 

52  22d  Report  on  Cyprus  (Message 

to  the  Congress) 

53  President  Meets  With  Chan- 

cellor Schmidt  (White  House 
Statement) 

Human  Rights 

53  Convention  on  Elimination  of 

Discrimination  Against 
Women  Sent  to  Senate 
(Message  to  the  Senate) 

54  Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human 

Rights  Day  and  Week,  1980 
(Proclamation) 

IVIiddle  East 

54  Western  Sahara  Dispute  (Harold 

H.  Saunders) 

55  U.S.,  Israel  Settle  Claim  on 

U.S.S.  Liberty  (Department 
Announcement) 

Oceans 

56  Law  of  the  Sea  (George  H. 

Aldrich) 


South  Asia 

59  Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan 

(President  Carter) 

United  Nations 

60  The  United  Nations  and  U.S. 

Policy  (Richard  L.  McCaW 
62        U.S.  Participation  in  the  U.N., 
1979  (Message  to  the  Con- 
gress) 
64        World  Court  Hears  U.S.  Argu- 
ment on  Transfer  of  WHO 
Regional  Office  (Stephen  M. 
Schwebel) 

Western  Hemisphere 

68         El  Salvador  (Department 
Statements) 

Treaties 

70        Current  Actions 

Chronology 

72         December  1980 

Press  Releases 

72        Department  of  State 

Index 


SPECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 


The  Inaugural  Address  of  President  Reagan 

Secretary-Designate  Haig  Appears  Before  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 

Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference  of  January  28 


BoBtm  WH':?  y^*>^^ 

fupetinterc':- 


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Botton  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documecto 

APR  2  3 1981 

DEPOSITORY 


At  a  ceremony  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White  House  on  January  27,  1981,  President  Reagan 
officially  welcomes  53  Americans  who  had  been  held  hostage  in  Iran. 


I 


lATURE 


Agreement  on  the  Release 
(if  the  American  Hostages 


Following  are  announcements  by  President  Carter  and  Secretary  Muskie  on 
release  of  the  52  American  hostages  from  Iran;  two  declarations  of  the 
erian  Government  initialed  in  Algiers  by  Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  con- 
ling  the  commitments  made  by  the  Governments  of  Iran  and  the  United  States 
the  settlement  of  claims;  undertakings  of  the  Governments  of  Iran  and  the 
ed  States  with  respect  to  the  declaration^-  the  escrow  agreement;  two 
ements  of  adherence  by  President  Carter;  ten  Executive  orders;  President 
er's  message  to  the  Congress;  the  technical  arrangement  between  the  Central 
k  of  Algeria  and  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
k;  a  special  briefing  by  former  Secretary  Muskie,  former  Treasury  Secretary 
.  Villiam  Miller,  and  former  Attorney  General  Benjamin  Civiletti;  and  remarks 
^resident  Reagan  and  L.  Bruce  Laingen. 


SffiENT  CARTER'S 
OUNCEMENT, 

19,  1981,  4:56  AM  (EST), 

WHITE  HOUSE' 

h  President:  I  know  you've  been  up  all 
t  with  me  and  I  appreciate  that  very 

We  have  now  reached  an  agreement 
i)  Iran  which  will  result,  I  believe,  in 
Kreedom  of  our  American  hostages, 
hlast  documents  have  now  been  signed 
:  .Igiers  following  the  signing  of  the 
o»  ments  in  Iran  which  will  result  in 
iiiagreement.  We  still  have  a  few 
o«  ments  to  sign  before  the  money  is  ac- 
jjy  transferred  and  the  hostages  are 
ehsed. 

The  essence  of  the  agreement  is  that 
iLwing  the  release  of  our  hostages  then 
enU  unfreeze  and  transfer  to  the  Ira- 
ias  a  major  part  of  the  assets  which 
6'  frozen  by  me  when  the  Iranians 
ii'd  our  embassy  compound  and  took 
uiiostages. 

We  have  also  reached  complete 
Element  on  the  arbitration  procedures 
el'een  ourselves  and  Iran  with  the  help 
fie  Algerians  which  will  resolve  the 

IS  that  exist  between  residents  of  our 

)ii  and  Iran  and  vice-versa. 

I  particularly  want  to  express  my 
ulic  thanks,  as  I  have  already  done  pri- 
ally,  to  the  Algerians,  to  their  Presi- 
'?!,  their  Foreign  Minister,  Ben  Yahia, 

tn  the  three-man  negotiating  teams 
i  have  done  such  a  superb  job  in  fair 
mequitable  arbitration  between  our- 

?s  and  the  officials  of  Iran.  We  don't 

\now  exactly  how  fast  this  procedure 
heo.  We  are  prepared  to  move  as 


rapidly  as  possible.  All  the  preparations 
have  been  completed  pending  the  final 
documents  being  signed. 

I  will  have  more  to  say  to  you  when 
our  American  hostages  are  actually  free. 
In  the  meantime,  Jody  Powell  will  stay  in 
close  touch  with  developments,  working 
with  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  my  legal  counsel, 
Lloyd  Cutler;  I'm  talking  frequently  with 
Warren  Christopher  in  Algiers  and  Jody 
Powell  will  keep  you  informed  about  de- 
velopments. Thank  you  very  much. 

Q.  How  do  you  feel  personally 
about  having  the  hostages  out  before 
you  leave  office? 

The  President:  I'll  wait  until  the 
hostages  are  released  and  then  I'll  have 
another  statement  to  make. 

SECRETARY  MUSKIE'S 
ANNOUNCEMENT, 
JAN.  19,  198P 

Tb  My  Colleagues  iyi  the  Foreign  Service 

The  long  and  anguishing  ordeal  of  our  col- 
leagues held  captive  in  Iran  is  almost 
over. 

They  will  soon  be  free.  They  will 
soon  be  home. 

They  will  be  released  on  terms  en- 
tirely consistent  with  our  national  honor. 

But  our  celebration  of  their  release  is 
muted  by  the  suffering  that  has  been  so 
bravely  endured. 

This  has  been  a  time  of  terrible  trial 
— not  only  for  our  people  held  captive  and 
their  famiUes,  but  for  their  friends  and 
colleagues  throughout  this  building  and 
government. 


The  unrelenting  and  selfless  efforts 
of  so  many  of  you  have  finally  achieved 
success.  I  congratulate  and  thank  you  for 
these  efforts.  And  I  commend  the  For- 
eign Service  as  a  whole  for  its  dedication 
and  discipline  throughout  this  period. 
Your  caring,  your  efforts,  your  wise  ad- 
vice have  once  again  demonstrated  the 
high  standards  of  professionalism  in  a 
Service  the  nation  is  so  fortunate  to  have. 

Edmund  S.  Muskie 


DECLARATIONS, 
JAN.  19,  198r 

DECLARATION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  AND  POPULAR 
REPUBLIC  OF  ALGERIA 


The  Government  of  the  Democratic  and 
Popular  Republic  of  Algeria,  having  been  re- 
quested by  the  Governments  of  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  and  the  United  States  of 
America  to  serve  as  an  intermediary  in  seek- 
ing a  mutually  acceptable  resolution  of  the 
crisis  in  their  relations  arising  out  of  the  de- 
tention of  the  52  United  States  nationals  in 
Iran,  has  consulted  extensively  with  the  two 
governments  as  to  the  commitments  which 
each  is  willing  to  make  in  order  to  resolve  the 
crisis  within  the  framework  of  the  four  points 
stated  in  the  resolution  of  November  2,  1980, 
of  the  Islamic  Consultative  Assembly  of  Iran. 
On  the  basis  of  formal  adherences  received 
from  Iran  and  the  United  States,  the  Govern- 
ment of  Algeria  now  declares  that  the  follow- 
ing interdependent  commitments  have  been 
made  by  the  two  governments: 


1' 


uary  1981 


Feature 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 

The  undertakings  reflected  in  this  Decla- 
ration are  based  on  the  following  general  prin- 
ciples: 

A.  Within  the  framework  of  and  pursuant 
to  the  provisions  of  the  two  Declarations  of  the 
Government  of  the  Democratic  and  Popular 
Republic  of  Algeria,  the  United  States  will 
restore  the  financial  position  of  Iran,  in  so  far 
as  possible,  to  that  which  existed  prior  to 
November  14,  1979.  In  this  context,  the  United 
States  commits  itself  to  ensure  the  mobility 
and  free  transfer  of  all  Iranian  assets  within  its 
jurisdiction,  as  set  forth  in  Paragraphs  4-9. 

B.  It  is  the  purpose  of  both  parties, 
within  the  framework  of  and  pursuant  to  the 
provisions  of  the  two  Declarations  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Re- 
public of  Algeria,  to  terminate  all  litigation  as 
between  the  Government  of  each  party  and 
the  nationals  of  the  other,  and  to  bring  about 
the  settlement  and  termination  of  all  such 
claims  through  binding  arbitration.  Through 
the  procedures  provided  in  the  Declaration,  re- 
lating to  the  Claims  Settlement  Agreement, 
the  United  States  agrees  to  terminate  all  legal 
proceedings  in  United  States  courts  involving 
claims  of  United  States  persons  and  insti- 
tutions against  Iran  and  its  state  enterprises, 
to  nullify  all  attachments  and  judgments  ob- 
tained therein,  to  prohibit  all  further  litigation 
based  on  such  claims,  and  to  bring  about  the 
termination  of  such  claims  through  binding 
arbitration. 

Point  I:  Non-intervention  in  Iranian  Affairs 

1.  The  United  States  pledges  that  it  is  and 
from  now  on  will  be  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  not  to  intervene,  directly  or  indirectly, 
politically  or  militarily,  in  Iran's  internal  af- 
fairs. 


Points  II  and  III:  Return  of  Iranian  Assets 
and  Settlement^  of  U.S.  Claims 

2.  Iran  and  the  United  States  (hereinafter 
"the  parties")  will  immediately  select  a  mutu- 
ally agreeable  central  bank  (hereinafter  "the 
Central  Bank")  to  act,  under  the  instructions 
of  the  Government  of  Algeria  and  the  Central 
Bank  of  Algeria  (hereinafter  "the  Algerian 
Central  Bank")  as  depositary  of  the  escrow  and 
security  funds  hereinafter  prescribed  and  will 
promptly  enter  into  depositary  arrangements 
vdth  the  Central  Bank  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  declaration.  All  funds  placed  in 
escrow  with  the  Central  Bank  pursuant  to  this 
declaration  shall  be  held  in  an  account  in  the 
name  of  the  Algerian  Central  Bank.  Certain 
procedures  for  implementing  the  obligations 
set  forth  in  this  Declaration  and  in  the  Decla- 
ration of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Repubhc 
of  Algeria  concerning  the  settlement  of  claims 
by  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and 
the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of 
Iran  (hereinafter  "the  Claims  Settlement 
Agreement")  are  separately  set  forth  in  cei^ 
tain  Undertakings  of  the  Government  of  the 


United  States  of  America  and  the  Government 
of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  with  respect  to 
the  Declaration  of  the  Democratic  and  Popular 
Republic  of  Algeria. 

3.  The  depositary  arrangements  shall 
provide  that,  in  the  event  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Algeria  certifies  to  the  Algerian  Cen- 
tral Bank  that  the  52  U.S.  nationals  have 
safely  departed  from  Iran,  the  Algerian  Cen- 
tral Bank  will  thereupon  instruct  the  Central 
Bank  to  transfer  immediately  all  monies  or 
other  assets  in  escrow  with  the  Central  Bank 
pursuant  to  this  declaration,  provided  that  at 
any  time  prior  to  the  making  of  such  certifica- 
tion by  the  Government  of  Algeria,  each  of  the 
two  parties,  Iran  and  the  United  States,  shall 
have  the  right  on  seventy-two  hours  notice  to 
terminate  its  commitments  under  this  declara- 
tion. 

If  such  notice  is  given  by  the  United 
States  and  the  foregoing  certification  is  made 
by  the  Government  of  Algeria  within  the 
seventy- two  hour  period  of  notice,  the  Alge- 
rian Central  Bank  will  thereupon  instruct  the 
Central  Bank  to  transfer  such  monies  and  as- 
sets. If  the  seventy-two  hour  period  of  notice 
by  the  United  States  expires  without  such  a 
certification  having  been  made,  or  if  the  notice 
of  termination  is  delivered  by  Iran,  the  Alge- 
rian Central  Bank  will  thereupon  instruct  the 
Central  Bank  to  return  all  such  monies  and  as- 
sets to  the  United  States,  and  thereafter  the 
commitments  reflected  in  this  declaration  shall 
be  of  no  further  force  and  effect. 

ASSETS  IN  THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE 
BANK 

4.  Commencing  upon  completion  of  the 
requisite  escrow  arrangements  with  the  Cen- 
tral Bank,  the  United  States  will  bring  about 
the  transfer  to  the  Central  Bank  of  all  gold 
bullion  which  is  owned  by  Iran  and  which  is  in 
the  custody  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York,  together  with  all  other  Iranian  as- 
sets (or  the  cash  equivalent  thereof)  in  the 
custody  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
York,  to  be  held  by  the  Central  Bank  in  escrow 
until  such  time  as  their  transfer  or  return  is 
required  by  Paragraph  3  above. 


ASSETS  IN  FOREIGN  BRANCHES  OF 
U.S.  BANKS 

5.  Commencing  upon  the  completion  of  the 
requisite  escrow  arrangements  with  the  Cen- 
tral Bank,  the  United  States  will  bring  about 
the  transfer  to  the  Central  Bank,  to  the  ac- 
count of  the  Algerian  Central  Bank,  of  all  Ira- 
nian deposits  and  securities  which  on  or  after 
November  14,  1979,  stood  upon  the  books  of 
overseas  banking  offices  of  U.S.  banks,  to- 
gether with  interest  thereon  through  Decem- 
ber 31,  1980,  to  be  held  by  the  Central  Bank,  to 
the  account  of  the  Algerian  Central  Bank,  in 
escrow  until  such  time  as  their  transfer  or  re- 
turn is  required  in  accordance  with  Paragraph 
3  of  this  Declaration. 


ASSETS  IN  U.S.  BRANCHES  OF  U.S. 
BANKS 

6.  Commencing  with  the  adherence  by 
Iran  and  the  United  States  to  this  declaratio 
and  the  claims  settlement  agreement  attache 
hereto,  and  following  the  conclusion  of  ai^ 
rangements  with  the  Central  Bank  for  the  es 
tablishment  of  the  interest-bearing  security 
account  specified  in  that  agreement  and  Par, 
graph  7  below,  which  arrangements  will  be 
concluded  within  30  days  from  the  date  of  th 
Declaration,  the  United  States  will  act  to 
bring  about  the  transfer  to  the  Central  Banl 
within  six  months  from  such  date,  of  all  Ira- 
nian deposits  and  securities  in  U.S.  banking 
institutions  in  the  United  States,  together 
with  interest  thereon,  to  be  held  by  the  Cen 
tral  Bank  in  escrow  until  such  time  as  their 
transfer  or  return  is  required  by  Paragraph 
7.  As  funds  are  received  by  the  Central 
Bank  pursuant  to  Paragraph  6  above,  the 
Algerian  Central  Bank  shall  direct  the  Cent 
Bank  to  (1)  transfer  one-half  of  each  such  re 
ceipt  to  Iran  and  (2)  place  the  other  half  in  i 
special  interest-bearing  security  account  in 
Central  Bank,  until  the  balance  in  the  secur 
account  has  reached  the  level  of  $1  bilhon. 
After  the  $1  billion  balance  has  been  achiev 
the  Algerian  Central  Bank  shall  direct  all 
funds  received  pursuant  to  Paragraph  6  to  1 
transferred  to  Iran.  All  funds  in  the  securit 
account  are  to  be  used  for  the  sole  purpose 
securing  the  payment  of,  and  paying,  claim 
against  Iran  in  accordance  with  the  claims 
settlement  agreement.  Whenever  the  Cent 
Bank  shall  thereafter  notify  Iran  that  the  l 
ance  in  the  security  account  has  fallen  belo 
$500  million,  Iran  shall  promptly  make  nev 
deposits  sufficient  to  maintain  a  minimum  1 
ance  of  $500  million  in  the  account.  The  ac- 
count shall  be  so  maintained  until  the  Pres: 
dent  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  established  p 
suant  to  the  claims  settlement  agreement  1 
certified  to  the  Central  Bank  of  Algeria  th. 
all  arbitral  awards  against  Iran  have  been 
satisfied  in  accordance  with  the  claims  sett 
ment  agreement,  at  which  point  any  amoui 
remaining  in  the  security  account  shall  be 
transferred  to  Iran. 

OTHER  ASSETS  IN  THE  U.S.  AND 
ABROAD 

8.  Commencing  with  the  adherence  of 
and  the  United  States  to  this  declaration  a 
the  attached  claims  settlement  agreement 
the  conclusion  of  arrangements  for  the  est; 
Ushment  of  the  security  account,  which  ar- 
rangements will  be  concluded  within  30  da, 
from  the  date  of  this  Declaration,  the  Unit 
States  will  act  to  bring  about  the  transfer  i 
the  Central  Bank  of  all  Iranian  financial  as 
(meaning  funds  or  securities)  which  are  loc 
in  the  United  States  and  abroad,  apart  froi 
those  assets  referred  to  in  Paragraph  5  an( 
above,  to  be  held  by  the  Central  Bank  in  e; 
crow  until  their  transfer  or  return  is  requu 
by  Paragraph  3  above. 


Department  of  State  Bull 


Feature 


•  rommencing  with  the  adherence  by 

and  the  United  States  to  this  declaration 

lu  attached  claims  settlement  agreement 

hi  making  by  the  Government  of  Algeria 

>  fi-tification  described  in  Paragraph  3 

r.  the  United  States  will  arrange,  subject 

e  provisions  of  U.S.  law  applicable  prior 

ivi-mber  14,  1979,  for  the  transfer  to  Iran 

I  ranian  properties  which  are  located  in 

lilted  States  and  abroad  and  which  are 

>  II  hin  the  scope  of  the  preceding  para- 


ILIFICATION  OF  SANCTIONS  AND 
IMS 

[0.  Upon  the  making  by  the  Government 
igeria  of  the  certification  described  in 
itn'aph  3  above,  the  United  States  vnll  re- 

aU  trade  sanctions  which  were  directed 
.i.^t  Iran  in  the  period  November  4,  1979, 
ite. 

11.  Upon  the  making  by  the  Government 
yueria  of  the  certification  described  in 
i_Taph  3  above,  the  United  States  will 

I  Illy  withdraw  all  claims  now  pending 

•it  Iran  before  the  International  Court  of 

■I  and  will  thereafter  bar  and  preclude 
.  ru.-^ecution  against  Iran  of  any  pending  or 
tie  claim  of  the  United  States  or  a  United 
t  «  national  arising  out  of  events  occurring 

('  I  he  date  of  this  declaration  related  to 

1.  .-seizure  of  the  52  United  States  nation- 
1  November  4,  1979,  (B)  their  subsequent 
It  inn,  (C)  injury  to  United  States  prop- 

ii-  |3roperty  of  the  United  States  nationals 
ii,ii  the  United  States  Embassy  compound 
Ihran  after  November  3,  1979,  and  (D)  in- 
-'(I  the  United  States  nationals  or  their 

■1 1  y  as  a  result  of  popular  movements  in 
ur.se  of  the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran 

1  were  not  an  act  of  the  Government  of 

The  United  States  will  also  bar  and  pre- 
'  I  he  prosecution  against  Iran  in  the 
J .-,  I  if  the  United  States  of  any  pending  or 

t-  claim  asserted  by  persons  other  than 
-   iiited  States  nationals  arising  out  of  the 
f  >  specified  in  the  preceding  sentence. 

)it  IV:  Return  of  the  Assets  of  the  Family 
te  Former  Shah 

2.  Upon  the  making  by  the  Government 
igeria  of  the  certification  described  in 
■Trraph  3  above,  the  United  States  will 

and  prohibit  any  transfer  of,  property 
.-,<t'ts  in  the  United  States  within  the  con- 
1  the  estate  of  the  former  Shah  or  of  any 
Illative  of  the  former  Shah  served  as  a 
I'iaiit  in  U.S.  litigation  brought  by  Iran  to 
c  er  such  property  and  assets  as  belonging 
hn.  As  to  any  such  defendant,  including 
"ftate  of  the  former  Shah,  the  freeze  order 

tinain  in  effect  until  such  litigation  is  fi- 
J;  terminated.  Violation  of  the  freeze  order 
SI  be  subject  to  the  civil  and  criminal  penal- 
"jrescribed  by  U.S.  law. 
lo.  Upon  the  making  by  the  Government 
sreria  of  the  certification  described  in 
praph  3  above,  the  United  Slates  will 


order  all  persons  within  U.S.  jurisdiction  to 
report  to  the  U.S.  Treasury  within  30  days,  for 
transmission  to  Iran,  all  information  known  to 
them,  as  of  November  3,  1979,  and  as  of  the 
date  of  the  order,  with  respect  to  the  property 
and  assets  referred  to  in  Paragraph  12.  Viola- 
tion of  the  requirement  will  be  subject  to  the 
civil  and  criminal  penalties  prescribed  by  U.S. 
law. 

14.  Upon  the  making  by  the  Government 
of  Algeria  of  the  certification  described  in 
Paragraph  3  above,  the  United  States  will 
make  known,  to  all  appropriate  U.S.  courts, 
that  in  any  litigation  of  the  kind  described  in 
Paragraph  12  above  the  claims  of  Iran  should 
not  be  considered  legally  barred  either  by 
sovereign  immunity  principles  or  by  the  act  of 
state  doctrine  and  that  Iranian  decrees  and 
judgments  relating  to  such  assets  should  be 
enforced  by  such  courts  in  accordance  with 
United  States  law. 

15.  As  to  any  judgment  of  a  U.S.  court 
which  calls  for  the  transfer  of  any  property  or 
assets  to  Iran,  the  United  States  hereby 
guarantees  the  enforcement  of  the  final  judg- 
ment to  the  extent  that  the  property  or  assets 
exist  within  the  United  States. 

16.  If  any  dispute  arises  between  the  par- 
ties as  to  whether  the  United  States  has  ful- 
filled any  obligation  imposed  upon  it  by  Para- 
graphs 12-15,  inclusive,  Iran  may  submit  the 
dispute  to  binding  arbitration  by  the  tribunal 
established  by,  and  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of,  the  claims  settlement  agreement.  If 
the  tribunal  determines  that  Iran  has  suffered 
a  loss  as  a  result  of  a  failure  by  the  United 
States  to  fulfill  such  obligation,  it  shall  make 
an  appropriate  award  in  favor  of  Iran  which 
may  be  enforced  by  Iran  in  the  courts  of  any 
nation  in  accordance  with  its  laws. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  DISPUTES 

17.  If  any  other  dispute  arises  between 
the  parties  as  to  the  interpretation  or  per- 
formance of  any  provision  of  this  declaration, 
either  party  may  submit  the  dispute  to  binding 
arbitration  by  the  tribunal  established  by,  and 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of,  the  claims 
settlement  agreement.  Any  decision  of  the  tri- 
bunal with  respect  to  such  dispute,  including 
any  award  of  damages  to  compensate  for  a  loss 
resulting  from  a  breach  of  this  declaration  or 
the  claims  settlement  agreement,  may  be  en- 
forced by  the  prevailing  party  in  the  courts  of 
any  nation  in  accordance  with  its  laws. 

Initialed  on  January  19,  1981 

by  Warren  M.  Christopher 

Deputy  Secretary  of  State 

of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 

By  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  him  by  his 

Government  as  deposited  with  the 

Government  of  Algeria 


DECLARATION  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
OF  THE  DEMOCRATIC  AND  POPULAR 
REPUBLIC  OF  ALGERIA  CONCERNING 
THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  CLAIMS  BY  THE 
GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
OF  AMERICA  AND  THE  GOVERNMENT 
OF  THE  ISLAMIC  REPUBLIC  OF  IRAN 


The  Government  of  the  Democratic  and 
Popular  Republic  of  Algeria,  on  the  basis  of 
formal  notice  of  adherence  received  from  the 
Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran 
and  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  now  declares  that  Iran  and  the 
United  States  have  agreed  as  follows: 


ARTICLE  I 

Iran  and  the  United  States  will  promote 
the  settlement  of  the  claims  described  in  Arti- 
cle II  by  the  parties  directly  concerned.  Any 
such  claims  not  settled  within  six  months  from 
the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  this  agreement 
shall  be  submitted  to  binding  third-party  arbi- 
tration in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this 
agreement.  The  aforementioned  six  months' 
period  may  be  extended  once  by  three  months 
at  the  request  of  either  party. 


ARTICLE  II 

1.  An  International  Arbitral  Tribunal  (the 
Iran-United  States  Claims  Tribunal)  is  hereby 
established  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  claims 
of  nationals  of  the  United  States  against  Iran 
and  claims  of  nationals  of  Iran  against  the 
United  States,  and  any  counterclaim  which 
arises  out  of  the  same  contract,  transaction  or 
occurrence  that  constitutes  the  subject  matter 
of  that  national's  claim,  if  such  claims  and 
counterclaims  are  outstanding  on  the  date  of 
this  agreement,  whether  or  not  filed  vdth  any 
court,  and  arise  out  of  debts,  contracts  (includ- 
ing transactions  which  are  the  subject  of  let- 
ters of  credit  or  bank  guarantees),  expropria- 
tions or  other  measures  affecting  property 
rights,  excluding  claims  described  in  Para- 
graph 11  of  the  Declaration  of  the  Government 
of  Algeria  of  January  19,  1981,  and  claims  aris- 
ing out  of  the  actions  of  the  United  States  in 
response  to  the  conduct  described  in  such 
paragraph,  and  excluding  claims  arising  under 
a  binding  contract  between  the  parties  specifi- 
cally providing  that  any  disputes  thereunder 
shall  be  within  the  sole  jurisdiction  of  the  com- 
petent Iranian  courts  in  response  to  the  Majhs 
position. 

2.  The  Tribunal  shall  also  have  jurisdic- 
tion over  official  claims  of  the  United  States 
and  Iran  against  each  other  arising  out  of  con- 
tractual arrangements  between  them  for  the 
purchase  and  sale  of  goods  and  services. 

3.  The  Tribunal  shall  have  jurisdiction,  as 
specified  in  Paragraphs  16-17  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  Government  of  Algeria  of  January 
19,  1981  over  any  dispute  as  to  the  interpreta- 
tion or  performance  of  any  provision  of  that 
declaration. 


Sruarv  1QR1 


Feature 


ARTICLE  III 

1.  The  Tribunal  shall  consist  of  nine  mem- 
bers or  such  larger  multiple  of  three  as  Iran 
and  the  United  States  may  agree  are  neces- 
sary to  conduct  its  business  expeditiously. 
Within  ninety  days  after  the  entry  into  force  of 
this  agreement,  each  government  shall  appoint 
one-third  of  the  members.  Within  thirty  days 
after  their  appointment,  the  members  so  ap- 
pointed shall  by  mutual  agreement  select  the 
remaining  third  of  the  members  and  appoint 
one  of  the  remaining  third  President  of  the 
Tribunal.  Claims  may  be  decided  by  the  full 
Tribunal  or  by  a  panel  of  three  members  of  the 
Tribunal  as  the  President  shall  determine. 
Each  such  panel  shall  be  composed  by  the 
President  and  shall  consist  of  one  member  ap- 
pointed by  each  of  the  three  methods  set  forth 
above. 

2.  Members  of  the  Tribunal  shall  be  ap- 
pointed and  the  Tribunal  shall  conduct  its 
business  in  accordance  with  the  arbitration 
rules  of  the  United  Nations  Commission  on  In- 
ternational Trade  Law  (UNCITRAL)  e.xcept 
to  the  extent  modified  by  the  parties  or  by  the 
Tribunal  to  ensure  that  this  agreement  can  be 
carried  out.  The  UNCITRAL  rules  for  ap- 
pointing members  of  three-member  Tribunals 
shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  Tribunal. 

3.  Claims  of  nationals  of  the  United 
States  and  Iran  that  are  within  the  scope  of 
this  agreement  shall  be  presented  to  the  Tri- 
bunal either  by  claimants  themselves,  or,  in 
the  case  of  claims  of  less  than  $250,000,  by  the 
Government  of  such  national. 

4.  No  claim  may  be  filed  with  the  Tribu- 
nal more  than  one  year  after  the  entry  into 
force  of  this  agreement  or  six  months  after  the 
date  the  President  is  appointed,  whichever  is 
later  These  deadlines  do  not  apply  to  the  pro- 
cedures contemplated  by  Paragraphs  16  and  17 
of  the  Declaration  of  the  Government  of 
Algeria  of  January  19,  1981. 


ARTICLE  IV 

1.  All  decisions  and  awards  of  the  Tribu- 
nal shall  be  final  and  binding. 

2.  The  President  of  the  Tribunal  shall  cer- 
tify,  as  prescribed  in  Paragraph  7  of  the  Decla- 
ration of  the  Government  of  Algeria  of  January 
19,  1981,  when  all  arbitral  awards  under  this 
agreement  have  been  satisfied. 

3.  Any  award  which  the  Tribunal  may 
render  against  either  government  shall  be  en- 
forceable against  such  government  in  the 
courts  of  any  nation  in  accordance  with  its 
laws. 


ARTICLE  V 

The  Tribunal  shall  decide  all  cases  on  the 
basis  of  respect  for  law,  applying  such  choice  of 
law  rules  and  principles  of  commercial  and  in- 
ternational law  as  the  Tribunal  determines  to 
be  applicable,  taking  into  account  relevant 


usages  of  the  trade,  contract  provisions  and 
changed  circumstances. 


ARTICLE  VI 

1.  The  seat  of  the  Tribunal  shall  be  The 
Hague,  The  Netherlands,  or  any  other  place 
agreed  by  Iran  and  the  United  States. 

2.  Each  government  shall  designate  an 
agent  at  the  seat  of  the  Tribunal  to  represent 
it  to  the  Tribunal  and  to  receive  notices  or 
other  communications  directed  to  it  or  to  its 
nationals,  agencies,  instrumentalities,  or  en- 
tities in  connection  with  proceedings  before  the 
Tribunal. 

3.  The  expenses  of  the  Tribunal  shall  be 
borne  equally  by  the  two  governments. 

4.  Any  question  concerning  the  interpre- 
tation or  application  of  this  agreement  shall  be 
decided  by  the  Tribunal  upon  the  request  of 
either  Iran  or  the  United  States. 


ARTICLE  VII 

For  the  purposes  of  this  agreement: 

1.  A  "national"  of  Iran  or  of  the  United 
States,  as  the  case  may  be,  means  (a)  a  natural 
person  who  is  a  citizen  of  Iran  or  the  United 
States;  and  (b)  a  corporation  or  other  legal  en- 
tity which  is  organized  under  the  laws  of  Iran 
or  the  United  States  or  any  of  its  states  or  ter- 
ritories, the  District  of  Columbia  or  the  Com- 
monwealth of  Puerto  Rico,  if,  collectively,  nat- 
ural persons  who  are  citizens  of  such  country 
hold,  directly  or  indirectly,  an  interest  in  such 
corporation  or  entity  equivalent  to  fifty  per 
cent  or  more  of  its  capital  stock. 

2.  "Claims  of  nationals"  of  Iran  or  the 
United  States,  as  the  case  may  be,  means 
claims  owned  continuously,  from  the  date  on 
which  the  claim  arose  to  the  date  on  which  this 
agreement  enters  into  force,  by  nationals  of 
that  state,  including  claims  that  are  owned  in- 
directly by  such  nationals  through  ownership 
of  capital  stock  or  other  proprietary  interests 
in  juridical  persons,  provided  that  the  owner- 
ship interests  of  such  nationals,  collectively, 
were  sufficient  at  the  time  the  claim  arose  to 
control  the  corporation  or  other  entity,  and 
provided,  further,  that  the  corporation  or 
other  entity  is  not  itself  entitled  to  bring  a 
claim  under  the  terms  of  this  agreement. 
Claims  referred  to  the  Arbitral  Tribunal  shall, 
as  of  the  date  of  filing  of  such  claims  with  the 
Tribunal,  be  considered  excluded  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  Iran,  or  of  the 
United  States,  or  of  any  other  court. 

3.  "Iran"  means  the  Government  of  Iran, 
any  political  subdivision  of  Iran,  and  any 
agency,  instrumentahty,  or  entity  controlled  by 
the  Government  of  Iran  or  any  political  sub- 
division thereof 

4.  The  "United  States"  means  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  any  political 
subdivision  of  the  United  States,  any  agency, 
instrumentality  or  entity  controlled  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  or  any  politi- 
cal subdivision  thereof 


ARTICLE  VIII 

This  agreement  shall  enter  into  force 
when  the  Government  of  Algeria  has  receivei 
from  both  Iran  and  the  United  States  a  notifi 
cation  of  adherence  to  the  agreement. 

Initialed  on  January  19,  1981 

by  Warren  M.  Christopher 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
By  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  him  by  his 
Government  as  deposited  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Algeria 

UNDERTAKINGS 
JAN.  19,  1981-' 

UNDERTAKINGS  OF  THE  GOVERNMEl 

OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
OF  AMERICA  AND  THE  GOVERNMEN 

OF  THE  ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC  OF  IRAN  WITH  RESPECT! 

THE 

DECLARATION  OF  THE  GOVERNMEN 

OF  THE 

DEMOCRATIC  AND  POPULAR 

REPUBLIC  OF  ALGERIA 

1.  At  such  time  as  the  Algerian  Central  Ban 
notifies  the  Governments  of  Algeria,  Iran,  a 
the  United  States  that  it  has  been  notified  b; 
the  Central  Bank  that  the  Central  Bank  has 
received  for  deposit  in  dollar,  gold  bullion,  ai 
securities  accounts  in  the  name  of  the  Algeri 
Central  Bank,  as  escrow  agent,  cash  and  otb 
funds,  1,632,917.779  ounces  of  gold  (valued  b 
the  parties  for  this  purpose  at  $0.9397  billioi 
and  securities  (at  face  value)  in  the  aggregal 
amount  of  $7,955  billion,  Iran  shall  immedi- 
ately bring  about  the  safe  departure  of  the  S 
U.S.  nationals  detained  in  Iran.  Upon  the  m 
ing  by  the  Government  of  Algeria  of  the  cer- 
tification described  in  Paragraph  3  of  the  De  ■ 
laration,  the  Algerian  Central  Bank  will  issu 
the  instructions  required  by  the  following 
paragraph. 

2.  Iran  having  affirmed  its  intention  to 
pay  all  its  debts  and  those  of  its  controlled  in 
stitutions,  the  Algerian  Central  Bank  acting 
pursuant  to  Paragraph  1  above  will  issue  the 
following  instructions  to  the  Central  Bank: 

(A)  To  transfer  $3,667  billion  to  the  Fee 
eral  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  to  pay  the  u 
paid  principal  of  and  interest  through  Decern 
ber  31,  1980  on  (1)  all  loans  and  credits  made 
a  syndicate  of  banking  institutions,  of  which 
U.S.  banking  institution  is  a  member,  to  the  ■ 
Government  of  Iran,  its  agencies,  instrumen  , 
talities  or  controlled  entities,  and  (2)  all  loam 
and  credits  made  by  such  a  syndicate  which 
are  guaranteed  by  the  Government  of  Iran  o 
any  of  its  agencies,  instrumentalities  or  con- 
trolled entities. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Feature 


;)  To  retain  $1,418  billion  in  the  escrow 

t  for  the  purpose  of  paying  the  unpaid 
pal  of  the  interest  owing,  if  any,  on  the 
and  credits  referred  to  in  Paragi-aph  (A) 

.pplication  of  the  $3,667  biUion  and  on  all 
indebtedness  held  by  United  States 
ig  institutions  of.  or  guai-anteed  by,  the 
nment  of  Iran,  its  agencies,  instrumen- 
s  or  controlled  entities  not  previously 
nd  for  the  pui-pose  of  paying  disputed 

ts  of  deposits,  assets,  and  interests,  if 
wing  on  Iranian  deposits  in  U.S.  banking 
jtions.  Bank  Markazi  and  the  appropriate 
d  States  banking  institutions  shall 
itly  meet  in  an  effort  to  agree  upon  the 
its  owing. 

the  event  of  such  agreement,  the  Bank 
m  and  the  appropriate  banking  institu- 
liall  certify  the  amount  owing  to  the  Cen- 
ank  of  Algeria  which  shall  instruct  the 


Bank  of  England  to  credit  such  amount  to  the 
account,  as  appropriate,  of  the  Bank  Markazi 
or  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York 
in  order  to  permit  payment  to  the  appropriate 
banking  institution.  In  the  event  that  within  30 
days  any  U.S.  banking  institution  and  the 
Bank  Markazi  are  unable  to  agi-ee  upon  the 
amounts  owed,  either  party  may  refer  such 
dispute  to  binding  arbitration  by  such  interna- 
tional arbitration  panel  as  the  parties  may 
agi'ee,  oi-  failing  such  agreement  within  30  ad- 
ditional days  after  such  reference,  by  the 
Iran-United  States  Claims  Tribunal.  The  pre- 
siding officer  of  such  panel  or  tribunal  shall 
certify  to  the  Central  Bank  of  Algeria  the 
amount,  if  any,  determined  by  it  to  be  owed, 
whereupon  the  Central  Bank  of  Algeria  shall 
instruct  the  Bank  of  England  to  credit  such 
amount  to  the  account  of  the  Bank  Markazi  or 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  in 


order  to  permit  payment  to  the  appropriate 
banking  institution.  After  all  disputes  are  re- 
solved either  by  agreement  or  by  arbitration 
award  and  appropriate  payment  has  been 
made,  the  balance  of  the  funds  referred  to  in 
this  Paragraph  (B)  shall  be  paid  to  Bank 
Markazi. 

(C)  To  transfer  immediately  to,  or  upon 
the  order  of,  the  Bank  Markazi  all  assets  in  the 
escrow  account  in  excess  of  the  amounts  re- 
ferred to  in  Paragraphs  (A)  and  (B). 

Initialed  on  January  19,  1981 

by  Warren  M.  Christopher 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
By  virtue  of  the  powers  vested  in  him  by  his 
Government  as  deposited  with  the  Govern- 
ment of  Algeria 


n  Chronology, 
c;ember  1980 


c- liber  1 

)eputy  Secretary  Christopher,  accom- 
Bii  by  the  same  delegation  that  went  to 
grs  with  him  on  Nov.  10-11,  departs  for 
grs  to  meet  with  Foreign  Minister 
turned  Benyahia  and  to  brief  Algerian  in- 
t  diaries  thoroughly  on  the  "clarifications" 
if  ran  requested  on  the  original  U.S. 
tnse  to  its  conditions  for  release  of 
^i^es. 

«iiber  2 

I.S.  reply  to  Iran  clarifying  U.S.  posi- 
in  n  release  of  the  hostages  is  delivered 
t  jerian  intermediaries. 

■ctiber  4 

'hrough  Algerian  intermediaries,  U.S. 
khran  to  speed  up  discussions  on  releas- 
?  jstages  to  avoid  delays  if  the  crisis  is 
t^solved  before  the  inauguration.  The 
Silso  emphasizes  to  Iranian  officials  that 
e dent-elect  Reagan  supports  the  U.S. 
■SI  on,  and  the  Iranians  must  understand 
ai  f  the  issue  is  not  settled  by  January  20, 
(M  time  will  be  needed  to  resolve  the 
is  because  the  new  Administration  will 
iV  to  select  new  negotiators  and  review 

nt  policy. 

Imber  11 

,a  Beirut,  a  leftist  newspaper,  As  Safir, 
l^ts  that  the  hostages  would  be  released 
iristmas  day;  however,  the  head  of  the 
in  hostage  commission  denies  the 

Kt. 

e<mber  13 

In  Alexandria,  Virginia,  State  Depart- 
e  officials  brief  hostages'  families  on 

liations  with  Iran.  Deputy  Secretary 
.  ilopher  informs  them  that  negotiations, 
iWgh  the  intermediaries,  are  hampered  by 
niage  problems. 


December  15 

Bani-Sadr  emphasizes  that  the  fate  of 
the  hostages  rests  on  the  U.S.  unfreezing 
Iranian  assets  held  in  U.S.  banks. 

December  16 

Khomeini  approves  Iran's  "final  answer" 
on  conditions  for  releasing  hostages.  In 
Washington,  U.S.  officials  caution  against  ex- 
pecting any  quick  solution  to  the  problem. 

December  18 

Iran's  new  terms  for  release  of  hostages 
are  delivered  to  Algerian  intermediaries. 

December  19 

In  exchange  for  freeing  the  hostages 
Iran's  new  terms  demand  that  the  U.S.: 

•  Deposit  Iranian  funds  frozen  by 
President  Carter  in  the  Algerian  Central 
Bank;  and 

•  Return  property  owned  by  the  late 
Shah  and  his  family. 

December  20 

U.S.  views  Iran's  conditions  as  unaccept- 
able. 

December  21 

Iran  demands  $24  billion  in  "guarantees" 
from  the  U.S.  for  recovery  of  its  frozen 
assets  and  the  late  Shah's  wealth. 

December  22 

Speaker  of  Iran's  Parliament  states 
hostages  will  be  put  on  trial  if  the  $24  billion 
demand  is  not  met. 

December  25 

For  the  second  year,  the  hostages  at- 
tend makeshift  Christmas  services.  Mon- 
signor  Annibale  Bungnini,  the  Papal  Nuncio 
in  Iran,  helps  officiate  at  the  services. 

Iranian  TV  broadcasts  a  brief  film  of  the 
services  but  plans  to  release  a  longer  film  to 
distribute  by  satellite  to  American  TV  net- 
works on  which  hostages  are  said  to  send 
greetings  to  families  and  messages  to  U.S. 
Government. 


December  26 

Algerian  Ambassador  to  Tehran,  Abdel- 
karim  Gheraieb,  visits  the  52  hostages  and 
finds  them  "all  in  good  health  and  the  condi- 
tions of  their  present  existence  satisfactory." 

CBS  and  Cable  News  Network  televise 
remarks  of  20  of  the  52  hostages  made  on 
Christmas  day  in  Iran. 

Iranian  authorities  release  film  of  15 
more  hostages  raising  the  number  shown  to 
41.  Iranian  officials  state  that  the  remaining 
11  not  appearing  chose  not  to  do  so. 

Algerian  delegation  arrives  in 
Washington. 

Secretary  Muskie  meets  with  Algerian 
intermediaries  to  discuss  keeping  the  in- 
direct negotiations  with  Iran  open.  Inter- 
mediaries encourage  Carter  Administration 
to  keep  negotiations  going. 

December  28 

After  Iran  publicizes  portions  of  recent 
exchanges,  the  U.S.  publicizes  formal  pro- 
posals sent  to  Iran  over  the  last  2  months. 
Proposals  and  supporting  material  contained 
in  three  separate  documents  — one  on 
November  11  and  two  on  December  3  — are 
issued. 

December  29 

U.S.  releases  response  to  Iranian  Nov.  2 
resolution. 

U.S.  tells  Iran  that  its  "basic  position" 
will  not  change  despite  Iran's  demand  for 
financial  guarantees  in  advance  of  freeing 
the  hostages. 

December  30 

U.S.  gives  Algerians  a  "reformulation" 
of  proposals  giving  Iran  an  opportunity  to 
end  the  crisis  during  the  Carter  Administra- 
tion. 

December  31 

Algerian  intermediaries  depart  U.S.  for 
Algiers.  ■ 


^  _. .    .*  rtnA 


Feature 


ESCROW  AGREEMENT 
JAN.  19,  1981' 

This  Escrow  Agreement  is  among  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  of  America,  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  (the 
"FED")  acting  as  fiscal  agent  of  the  United 
States,  Bank  Markazi  Iran,  as  an  interested 
party,  and  the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie  act- 
ing as  Escrow  Agent. 

This  Agreement  is  made  to  implement  the 
relevant  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  the 
Government  of  Algeria  of  January  19,  1981  (the 
"Declaration").  These  provisions  concern  the 
establishment  of  escrow  arrangements  for  Ira- 
nian property  tied  to  the  release  of  United 
States  nationals  being  held  in  Iran. 

1.  In  accordance  with  the  obligations  set 
forth  in  paragraph  4  of  the  Declaration,  and 
commencing  upon  the  entry  into  force  of  this 
Agreement,  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  vdll  cause  the  FED  to: 

(A)  Sell,  at  a  price  which  is  the  average 
for  the  middle  of  the  market,  bid  and  ask 
prices  for  the  three  business  days  prior  to  the 
sale,  all  U.S.  Govemment  securities  in  its 
custody  or  control  as  of  the  date  of  sale,  which 
are  owned  by  the  Government  of  Iran,  or  its 
agencies,  instrumentalities  or  controlled  en- 
tities; and 

(B)  Transfer  to  the  Bank  of  England  as 
depositary  for  credit  to  accounts  on  its  books  in 
the  name  of  the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie,  as 
Escrow  Agent  under  this  Agreement,  all  secu- 
rities (other  than  the  aforementioned  U.S. 
Govemment  securities),  funds  (including  the 
proceeds  from  the  sale  of  the  aforementioned 
U.S.  Government  securities),  and  gold  bullion 
of  not  less  than  the  same  fineness  and  quality 
as  that  originally  deposited  by  the  Govem- 
ment of  Iran,  or  its  agencies,  instrumentalities 
or  controlled  entities,  which  are  in  the  custody 
or  control  of  the  FED  and  owned  by  the  Gov- 
emment of  Iran,  or  its  agencies,  instrumen- 
talities or  controlled  entities  as  of  the  date  of 
such  transfer. 

When  the  FED  transfers  the  above  Ira- 
nian property  to  the  Bank  of  England,  the 
FED  will  promptly  send  to  the  Banque  Cen- 
trale d'Algerie  a  document  containing  all  in- 
formation necessary  to  identify  that  Iranian 
property  (type,  source,  character  as  principal 
or  interest). 

Specific  details  relating  to  securities, 
funds  and  gold  bullion  to  be  transferred  by  the 
FED  under  this  paragraph  1  are  attached  as 
Appendix  A. 

2.  Pursuant  to  the  obligations  set  forth  in 
paragraphs  5,  6  and  8  of  the  Declaration,  the 
Govemment  of  the  United  States  will  cause 
Iranian  deposits  and  securities  in  foreign 
branches  and  offices  of  United  States  banks, 
Iranian  deposits  and  securities  in  domestic 
branches  and  offices  of  United  States  banks, 
and  other  Iranian  assets  (meaning  funds  or  se- 
curities) held  by  persons  or  institutions  subject 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  to  be 
transferred  to  the  FED,  as  fiscal  agent  of  the 
United  States,  and  then  by  the  FED  to  the 
Bank  of  England  for  credit  to  the  account  on 


its  books  opened  in  the  name  of  the  Banque 
Centrale  d'Algerie  as  Escrow  Agent  under  this 
Agreement  (the  Iranian  securities,  funds  and 
gold  bullion  mentioned  in  paragraph  1  above 
and  deposits,  securities  and  funds  mentioned 
in  this  paragi-aph  2  are  referred  to  collectively 
as  "Iranian  property"). 

3.  Insofar  as  Iranian  property  is  received 
by  the  Bank  of  England  from  the  FED  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  Agreement,  the  Iranian 
property  will  be  held  by  the  Bank  of  England 
in  the  name  of  the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie 
as  Escrow  Agent  as  follows: 

•  The  securities  will  be  held  in  one  or 
more  securities  custody  accounts  at  the  Bank 
of  England  in  the  name  of  the  Banque  Centrale 
d'Algerie  as  Escrow  Agent  under  this  Agree- 
ment. 

•  The  deposits  and  funds  will  be  held  in 
one  or  more  dollar  accounts  opened  at  the 
Bank  of  England  in  the  name  of  Banque  Cen- 
trale d'Algerie  as  Escrow  Agent  under  this 
Agreement.  These  deposits  and  funds  will  bear 
interest  at  rates  prevailing  in  money  markets 
outside  the  United  States. 

•  The  gold  bullion  will  be  held  in  a  gold 
bullion  custody  account  at  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land, in  the  name  of  the  Banque  Centrale 
d'Algerie  as  Escrow  Agent  under  this  Agree- 
ment. 

•  It  will  be  understood  that  the  Banque 
Centrale  d'Algerie  shall  have  no  liability  for 
any  reduction  in  the  value  of  the  securities, 
bullion,  and  monies  held  in  its  name  as  Escrow 
Agent  at  the  Bank  of  England  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Agreement. 

4.  (a)  As  soon  as  the  Algerian  Govem- 
ment certifies  in  writing  to  the  Banque  Cen- 
trale d'Algerie  that  all  52  United  States  na- 
tionals identified  in  the  list  given  by  the 
United  States  Government  to  the  Algerian 
Government  in  November,  1980,  now  being 
held  in  Iran,  have  safely  departed  from  Iran, 
the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie  will  immedi- 
ately give  the  instructions  to  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land specifically  contemplated  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Declaration  and  the  Undertak- 
ings of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Government  of  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  with  respect  to  the  Declara- 
tion of  the  Government  of  the  Democratic  and 
Popular  Republic  of  Algeria,  which  are  made 
part  of  this  Agreement.  The  contracting  par- 
ties resolve  to  work  in  good  faith  to  resolve 
any  difficulty  that  could  arise  in  the  course  of 
implementing  this  Agreement. 

(b)  In  the  event  that 

(i)  either  the  Government  of  Iran  or 
the  Govemment  of  the  United  States  notifies 
the  Government  of  Algeria  in  writing  that  it 
has  given  notice  to  terminate  its  commitments 
under  the  Declaration  referred  to  above,  and 

(ii)  a  period  of  72  hours  eUqjses  after 
the  receipt  by  the  Govemment  of  Algeria  of 
such  notice,  during  which  period  the  Banque 
Centrale  d'Algerie  has  not  given  the  Bank  of 
England  the  instruction  described  in  subpara- 
graph (a)  above,  the  Banque  Centrale 


d'Algerie  will  immediately  give  the  instruc 
tions  to  the  Bank  of  England  specifically  cc 
templated  by  the  provisions  of  the  Declara! 
and  the  Undertakings  of  the  Govemment  o 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  wil 
respect  to  the  Declaration  of  the  Governme 
of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
Algeria. 

(c)  If  the  certificate  by  the  Governn 
of  Algeria  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (a)  1 
been  given  before  the  United  States  Cover 
ment  has  effectively  terminated  its  commit 
ment  under  the  Declaration,  the  Iranian  pr 
erty  shall  be  transferred  as  provided  in  sub 
paragraph  (a)  of  this  jjaragraph  4. 

(d)  The  funds  and  deposits  held  by  t 
Bank  of  England  under  this  Agreement  wil 
earn  interest  at  rates  prevailing  in  money 
markets  outside  the  United  States  after  th( 
transfer  to  the  account  of  the  Banque  Cent; 
d'Algerie,  as  Escrow  Agent,  with  the  Bank 
England,  and  such  interest  will  be  included 
pail  of  the  Iranian  property  for  the  purposes 
subparagraphs  (a)  and  (b)  of  this  paragraph  4. 

5.  On  the  date  of  the  signing  of  this 
Agreement  by  the  four  parties  hereto,  the 
Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie  and  the  FED  wi 
enter  into  a  Technical  Arrangement  with  tk 
Bank  of  England  to  implement  the  provisio 
of  this  Agreement. 

Pursuant  to  that  Technical  Arrangeme 
between  the  FED,  the  Bank  of  England  am 
the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie,  the  FED  si 
reimburse  the  Bank  of  England  for  losses  a 
expenses  as  provided  in  paragraph  10  there 
The  FED  will  not  charge  the  Banque  Centi 
d'Algerie  for  any  expenses  or  disbursemeni 
related  to  the  implementation  of  this  Agree 
ment. 

6.  This  Agreement  will  become  effecti' 
as  soon  as  it  has  been  signed  by  the  four  pa 
ties  to  it  and  the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerii 
and  the  FED  have  entered  into  the  Technic 
Arrangement  with  the  Bank  of  England  re- 
ferred to  in  paragraph  5  of  this  Agreement. 

7.  Throughout  its  duration,  this  Agree 
ment  may  be  amended,  canceled,  or  revoke^ 
only  with  the  written  concurrence  of  all  foit 
the  signatoi-y  parties. 

8.  Nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  be 
considered  as  constituting,  in  whole  or  in  pa 
a  waiver  of  any  immunity  to  which  the  Bam 
Centrale  d'Algerie  is  entitled. 

9.  A  French  language  version  of  this 
Agreement  will  be  prepared  as  soon  as  prac 
ticable.  The  English  and  French  versions  w 
be  equally  authentic  and  of  equal  value. 

10.  This  Agreement  may  be  executed  il 
counterparts,  each  of  which  con.stitutes  an 
original. 

In  Wit.ness  Whereof,  the  parties  here 
have  signed  this  Agreement  on  January  20, 
1981. 

FOR  THE  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 

Warren  M.  Christopher 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


Feature 


THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF 
?YORK 

ISCAL  AGENT  OF  THE  UNITED 
^ES 

iSTT.  Patrikis 

THE  BANK  MARKAZI  IRAN 

THE  BANQUE  CENTRALE 
,GERIE 

iMED  BeSSEKHOUAD 
IDAR  BENOUATAF 

•ENDIX  A 

•ities,  Gold  Bullion,  and  Funds  to  be  trans- 
a  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 

national  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
lopment  Securities  $35  million  (face  value) 
3\  Bullion  1,632,917.746  fine  ounces  of  gold, 
good  delivery,  London  bars  of  a 
fineness  of  995  parts  per  1,000  or 
better 
1  s  Approximately  $1.38  billion 


r  FEMENTS  OF  ADHERENCE, 
11  19.  1981* 

/  e  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
'  e  Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United 
il  s,  I  hereby  agree  and  adhere,  on  behalf 

t !  United  States  of  America,  to  the  pro- 
si  IS  of  two  Declarations  that  are  being 
}i  d  today  by  the  Government  of  the 
ei  )cratie  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 
1)  ng  to  (1)  the  resolution  of  the  current 
is  between  the  United  States  and  Iran 
■J!  ig  out  of  the  detention  of  the  fifty-two 
n,  d  States  nationals,  and  (2)  the  settle- 
e:  of  claims  between  the  United  States 
ic  ran.  The  two  Declarations  shall  consti- 
it  nternational  agreements  legally  binding 
K  the  United  States  and  Iran  upon  the 
ce  ition  of  an  equivalent  statement  of 
^•ment  and  adherence  by  the  Islamic 
e)  blic  of  Iran  and  the  delivery  of  both 
at  ments  to  the  Government  of  the  Demo- 

a:  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria. 

Jimmy  Carter 


ly  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  Presi- 
Iby  the  Constitution  and  laws  of  the 
sd  States,  I  hereby  agree  and  adhere,  on 
If  of  the  United  States  of  America,  to 
irovisions  of  the  Undertakings  of  the 
irnment  of  the  United  States  of  America 
;he  Government  of  the  Islamic  Republic 
an  with  respect  to  the  Declaration  of  the 
ttrnment  of  the  Democratic  and  Popular 
eliblic  of  Algeria.  These  Undertakings 
m  constitute  an  international  agreement 


legally  binding  upon  the  United  States  and 
Iran  upon  the  execution  of  an  equivalent 
statement  of  agreement  and  adherence  by 
the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  and  the  delivery 
of  both  statements  to  the  Government  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria. 

Jimmy  Carter 


EXECUTIVE  ORDERS, 
JAN.  19,  1981' 

Direction  Relating  to  Establishment  of 
Escrow  Accounts 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702).  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing  unu- 
sual and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  national 
security,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of  the 
United  States  upon  which  I  based  my  decla- 
rations of  national  emergency  in  Executive 
Order  12170,  issued  November  14,  1979,  and 
in  Executive   Order  12211,  issued  April  17, 
1980,  in  order  to  implement  agreements  with 
the  Government  of  Iran,  as  reflected  in 
Declarations  of  the  Government  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 
dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to  the 
release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals  being 
held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution  of 
claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
effective  date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
authorized  to  enter  into,  and  to  license, 
authorize,  direct,  and  compel  any  appro- 
priate official  and/or  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  New  York,  as  fiscal  agent  of  the 
United  States,  to  enter  into  escrow  or 
related  agreements  with  a  foreign  central 
bank  and  with  the  Central  Bank  of  Algeria 
under  which  certain  money  and  other  assets, 
as  and  when  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  shall  be  credited  by  the  foreign 
central  bank  to  an  escrow  account  on  its 
books  in  the  name  of  the  Central  Bank  of 
Algeria,  for  transfer  to  the  Government  of 
Iran  if  and  when  the  Central  Bank  of  Algeria 
receives  from  the  Government  of  Algeria  a 
certification  that  the  52  U.S.  diplomats  and 
nationals  being  held  hostage  in  Iran  have 
safely  departed  from  Iran.  Such  agreements 
shall  include  other  parties  and  terms  as 
determined  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  be  appropriate  to  carry  out  the  purposes 
of  this  Order. 

1-102.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
authorized  to  license,  authorize,  direct,  and 
compel  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
York,  as  fiscal  agent  of  the  United  States,  to 


receive  certain  money  and  other  assets  in 
which  Iran  or  its  agencies,  instrumentalities, 
or  controlled  entities  have  an  interest  and  to 
hold  or  transfer  such  money  and  other 
assets,  and  any  interest  earned  thereon,  in 
such  a  manner  as  he  deems  necessary  to  ful- 
fill the  rights  and  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  the  Declaration  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Repub- 
lic of  Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981,  and 
the  escrow  and  related  agreements  described 
in  paragraph  1-101  of  this  Order.  Such 
money  and  other  assets  may  be  held  in  inter- 
est-bearing form  and  where  possible  shall  be 
invested  with  or  through  the  entity  holding 
the  money  or  asset  on  the  effective  date  of 
this  Order. 

1-103.  Compliance  with  this  Executive 
Order,  any  other  Executive  Order  licensing, 
authorizing,  directing  or  compelling  the 
transfer  of  the  assets  referred  to  in  para- 
graphs 1-101  and  1-102  of  this  Order,  or  any 
regulations,  instructions,  or  directions  issued 
thereunder  shall  to  the  extent  thereof  be  a 
full  acquittance  and  discharge  for  all  pur- 
poses of  the  obligation  of  the  person  making 
the  same.  No  person  shall  be  held  liable  in 
any  court  for  or  with  respect  to  anything 
done  or  omitted  in  good  faith  in  connection 
with  the  administration  of,  or  pursuant  to 
and  in  reliance  on,  such  orders,  regulations, 
instructions,  or  directions. 

1-104.  The  Attorney  General  shall  seek 
to  intervene  in  any  litigation  within  the 
United  States  which  arises  out  of  this  Order 
and  shall,  among  other  things,  defend  the 
legality  of,  and  all  actions  taken  pursuant  to, 
each  of  its  provisions. 

1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
poses of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

Direction  to  Transfer  Iranian  Government 

Assets 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing  unu- 
sual and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  national 
security,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of  the 
United  States  upon  which  I  based  by  decla- 
rations of  national  emergency  in  Executive 
Order  12170,  issued  November  14,  1979,  and 
in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued  April  17, 
1980,  in  order  to  implement  agreements  with 
the  Government  of  Iran,  as  reflected  in 
Declarations  of  the  Government  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 


Feature 


dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to  the 
release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals  being 
held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution  of 
claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran  and  in  which  Iran  and  the  United 
States  instruct  and  require  that  the  assets 
described  in  this  order  shall  be  transferred 
as  set  forth  below  by  the  holders  of  such 
assets,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the  ef- 
fective date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  is  licensed,  authorized,  directed, 
and  compelled  to  transfer  to  accounts  at  the 
Bank  of  England,  and  subsequently  to  trans- 
fer to  accounts  at  the  Bank  of  England  estab- 
lished pursuant  to  an  escrow  agreement  ap- 
proved by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  all 
gold  bullion,  and  other  assets  (or  the  equiva- 
lent thereof)  in  its  custody,  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran,  or  its  agencies,  instrumental- 
ities or  controlled  entities.  Such  transfers 
shall  be  executed  when  and  in  the  manner 
directed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is  also  author- 
ized to  license,  authorize,  direct,  and  compel 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  to 
engage  in  whatever  further  transactions  he 
deems  appropriate  and  consistent  with  the 
purposes  of  this  Order,  including  any  trans- 
actions related  to  the  return  of  such  bullion 
and  other  assets  pursuant  to  the  escrow 
agreement. 

1-102.  (a)  All  licenses  and  authorizations 
tor  acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power, 
or  privilege,  by  court  order,  attachment,  or 
otherwise,  including  the  license  contained  in 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  with  respect  to  the  properties 
described  in  Section  1-101  of  this  Order  are 
revoked  and  withdrawn. 

(b)  All  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
relating  to  the  properties  described  in  Sec- 
tion 1-101  of  this  Order  and  which  derive 
from  any  attachment,  injunction,  other  like 
proceedings  or  process,  or  other  action  in 
any  litigation  after  November  14,  1979,  at 
8:10  a.m.  EST,  including  those  derived  from 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  other  than  rights,  powers,  and 
privileges  of  the  Government  of  Iran  and  its 
agencies,  instrumentalities,  and  controlled 
entities,  whether  acquired  by  court  order  or 
otherwise,  are  nullified,  and  all  persons 
claiming  any  such  right,  power,  or  privilege 
are  hereafter  barred  from  exercising  the  same. 

(c)  All  persons  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States  are  prohibited  from 
acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power,  or 
privilege,  whether  by  court  order  or  other- 
wise, with  respect  to  the  properties  (and  any 
income  earned  thereon)  referred  to  in  Sec- 
tion 1-101  of  this  Order. 

1-103.  Compliance  with  this  Order,  any 
other  Executive  Order  licensing,  authorizing, 
directing,  or  compelling  the  transfer  of  the 
assets  described  in  section  1-101  of  this 
Order,  or  any  regulations,  instructions,  or 
directions  issued  thereunder  shall  to  the  ex 


tent  thereof  be  a  full  acquittance  and  dis- 
charge for  all  purposes  of  the  obligation  of 
the  person  making  the  same.  No  person  shall 
be  held  liable  in  any  court  for  or  with  respect 
to  anything  done  or  omitted  in  good  faith  in 
connection  with  the  administration  of,  or 
pursuant  to  and  in  reliance  on,  such  orders, 
regulations,  instructions,  or  directions. 

1-104.  The  Attorney  General  shall  seek 
to  intervene  in  any  litigation  within  the 
United  States  which  arises  out  of  this  Order 
and  shall,  among  other  things,  defend  the 
legality  of,  and  all  actions  taken  pursuant  to, 
each  of  its  provisions. 

1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
poses of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

Direction  to  Transfer  Iranian  Government 
Assets  Overseas 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing  unu- 
sual and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  national 
security,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of  the 
United  States  upon  which  I  based  my  decla- 
rations of  national  emergency  in  Executive 
Order  12170,  issued  November  14,  1979,  and 
in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued  April  17, 
1980,  in  order  to  implement  agreements  with 
the  Government  of  Iran,  as  reflected  in 
Declarations  of  the  Government  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 
dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to  the 
release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals  being 
held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution  of 
claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran  and  in  which  Iran  and  the  United 
States  instruct  and  require  that  the  assets 
described  in  this  Order  shall  be  transferred 
as  set  forth  below  by  the  holders  of  such 
assets,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
effective  date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  Any  branch  or  office  of  a  United 
States  bank  or  subsidiary  thereof,  which 
branch  or  office  is  located  outside  the  terri- 
tory of  the  United  States  and  which  on  or 
after  8:10  a.m.  E.S.T.  on  November  14,  1979 

(a)  has  been  or  is  in  possession  of  funds  or 
securities  legally  or  beneficially  owned  by 
the  Government  of  Iran  or  its  agencies, 
instrumentalities,  or  controlled  entities,  or 

(b)  has  carried  or  is  carrying  on  its  books 
deposits  standing  to  the  credit  of  or  bene- 
ficially owned  by  such  Government,  agen- 


cies, instrumentalities,  or  controlled  entit 
is  licensed,  authorized,  directed,  and  com- 
pelled to  transfer  such  funds,  securities,  ; 
deposits,  including  interest  from  Novemb 
14,  1979,  at  commercially  reasonable  rate 
to  the  account  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Ba 
of  New  York  at  the  Bank  of  England,  to  t 
held  or  transferred  as  directed  by  the  Sei 
tary  of  the  Treasury.  The  Secretary  of  th 
Treasury  shall  determine  when  the  trans 
required  by  this  section  shall  take  place, 
funds,  securities  and  deposits  described  ii 
this  section  shall  be  further  transferred  a 
provided  for  in  the  Declaration  of  the  Go' 
ernment  of  the  Democratic  and  Popular 
Republic  of  Algeria  and  its  Annex. 

1-102.  Any  banking  institution  subje 
to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  tl 
has  executed  a  set-off  on  or  after  Noveml 
14,  1979,  at  8:10  a.m.  E.S.T  against  Irania 
funds,  securities,  or  deposits  referred  to  i 
section  1-101  is  hereby  licensed,  authoriz; 
directed,  and  compelled  to  cancel  such  se 
and  to  transfer  all  funds,  securities,  and 
deposits  which  have  been  subject  to  such 
set-off,  including  interest  from  November 
1979,  at  commercially  reasonable  rates,  p 
suant  to  the  provisions  of  section  1-101  o 
this  Order. 

1-103.  If  the  funds,  securities,  and 
deposits  described  in  section  1-101  are  ni 
promptly  transferred  to  the  control  of  thi 
Government  of  Iran,  such  funds,  securitif 
and  deposits  shall  be  returned  to  the  ban 
ing  institutions  holding  them  on  the  effec 
date  of  this  Order  and  the  set-offs  descril 
in  section  1-102  shall  be  in  force  as  if  thi: 
Order  had  not  been  issued  and  the  status 
all  such  funds,  securities,  deposits  and  se 
offs  shall  be  status  quo  ante. 

1-104.  (a)  All  licenses  and  authorizat 
for  acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  pov- 
or  privilege,  by  court  order,  attachment, 
otherwise,  including  the  license  containet 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Cor 
Regulations,  with  respect  to  the  properti 
described  in  sections  1-101  and  1-102  of  i 
Order  are  revoked  and  withdrawn. 

(b)  All  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
relating  to  the  properties  described  in  se 
tions  1-101  and  1-102  of  this  Order  and 
which  derive  from  any  attachment,  injun( 
tion,  other  like  proceedings  or  process,  oi 
other  action  in  any  litigation  after  Noven- 
14,  1979,  at  8:10  a.m.  E.S.T.,  including  the 
derived  from  Section  535.504  of  the  Irani! 
Assets  Control  Regulations,  other  than 
rights,  powers,  and  privileges  of  the  Govt 
ment  of  Iran  and  its  agencies,  instrumen- 
talities, and  controlled  entities,  whether 
acquired  by  court  order  or  otherwise,  are^ 
nullified,  and  all  persons  claiming  any  sue 
right,  power,  or  privilege  are  hereafter 
barred  from  exercising  the  same. 

(c)  All  persons  subject  to  the  jurisdic 
of  the  United  States  are  prohibited  from  i 
quiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power,  or 
privilege,  whether  by  court  order  or  othei 
wise,  with  respect  to  the  properties  (and  ! 
income  earned  thereon)  referred  to  in  sec 
tions  1-101  and  1-102  of  this  Order. 


Department  of  State  Bulk 


Feature 


10").  Compliance  with  this  Order,  any 
jtExocutive  Order  licensing,  authorizing, 
'^ng.  or  compelling  the  transfer  of  the 
-  described  in  sections  1-101  and  1-102 
I  irder,  or  any  regulations,  instruc- 
■  directions  issued  thereunder  shall 
int  thereof  be  a  full  acquittance 
^rii.irge  for  all  purposes  of  the  obliga- 
tlu-  person  making  the  same.  No  per- 
il II  he  held  liable  in  any  court  for  or 
i^iH'Ct  to  anything  done  or  omitted  in 
iaiih  in  connection  with  the  administra- 

,  or  pursuant  to  and  in  reliance  on, 
irders,  regulations,  instructions,  or 
cons. 

106.  The  Attorney  General  shall  seek 
-[  rvi-ne  in  any  litigation  within  the 

tl  States  which  arises  out  of  this  Order 
:dl,  among  other  things,  defend  the 
ly  of,  and  all  actions  taken  pursuant  to, 
1  f  Its  provisions. 

107.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
(ted  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
s  ested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
cil  Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 

'  ^.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
if  this  Order. 

108.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
U  lately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

(in  to  Transfer  Iranian  Government 
Held  by  Domestic  Banks 

authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
.1  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
t    States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
gitional  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
1 )  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
r.ited  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
»)he  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
{ the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
r.i  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing  unusu- 
B  extraordinary  threat  to  the  national 
J  y,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of  the 
t   States  upon  which  I  based  my  decla- 
c;  of  national  emergency  in  Executive 

12170,  issued  November  14,  1979,  and 
.  lutive  Order  12211,  issued  April  17, 
ftn  order  to  implement  agreements  with 
(vernment  of  Iran,  as  reflected  in 
1  ations  of  the  Government  of  the 
n  ratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 

January  19,  1981,  relating  to  the 
.  ■  iif  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals 
i:held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution 
\;r\s  of  United  States  nationals  against 

nd  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 

iflations  between  the  United  States 

an  and  in  which  Iran  and  the  United 

b  instruct  and  require  that  the  assets 

c  ^ed  in  this  Order  shall  be  transferred 

f  forth  below  by  the  holders  of  such 

it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 

ve  date  of  this  Order: 

101.  Any  branch  or  office  of  a  banking 
ition  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 


Iran  Chronology, 
January  1981 


January  2 

After  4  days  of  talks  in  Washington, 
Algerians  deliver  latest  U.S.  proposals  to 
Iran. 

January  3 

In  Tehran,  Algerian  delegation  meets 
with  Iranian  officials  to  discuss  latest  U.S. 
proposal. 

January  4 

A  report  out  of  Tehran  states  that  three 
of  the  hostages  — L.  Bruce  Laingen,  Charge 
d'Affaires,  Victor  L.  Tomseth,  a  political  of- 
ficer, and  Michael  Howland,  a  State  Depart- 
ment security  officer  — have  been  transferred 
from  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  Tehran  to  a 
secret  location. 

January  6 

Khomeini  gives  approval  of  Algerian 
assistance  in  efforts  to  release  hostages. 

January  7 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  departs 
for  Algiers  to  discuss  the  status  of  the  nego- 
tiations with  the  Algerian  delegation. 

January  8 

President-elect  Reagan  states  that  he 
could  honor  any  agreement  with  Iran  made 
by  President  Carter  but  also  says  he 
reserves  the  right  to  draw  up  new  proposals 
if  the  crisis  is  not  settled  by  Jan.  20. 

January  9 

Deputy  Secretary  Christopher  extends 
his  stay  in  Algeria  because  of  questions 
raised  by  Iranians  about  U.S.  proposals. 

January  12 

Two  bills  are  introduced  by  the  Iranian 
Parliament  as  "emergency"  legislation  to 
speed  up  an  agreement  with  the  U.S.  One 
bill  would  authorize  third-party  arbitration 
of  claims  against  Iranian  assets  and  the 
other  would  "nationalize"  the  late  Shah's 
wealth. 

January  13 

Parliament  postpones  voting  on  two 
bills. 

January  14 

Parliament  approves  the  bill  permitting 
third-party  arbitration  of  claims  on  Iranian 
assets. 

January  15 

Chief  Iranian  negotiator,  Behzad 
Nabavi,  Iran's  Minister  of  State  for  Execu- 
tive Affairs,  warns  the  U.S.  that  if  Iran's 
"unencumbered  frozen  assets"  are  not 
deposited  in  Algerian  banks  by  Friday,  close 
of  business,  negotiations  would  stop. 


January  16 

In  the  event  an  agreement  is  made. 
President  Carter  takes  two  major  steps: 

•  He  orders  an  exchange  transaction 
of  over  $900  millon  worth  of  gold  with  Brit- 
ain for  eventual  transfer  to  Iran;  and 

•  He  orders  the  sale  of  Iranian-owned 
treasury  securities  in  the  New  York  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  so  that  the  money  can  be 
transferred  to  Iran. 

Nabavi  withdraws  his  earlier  statement 
and  declares  that  there  is  "no  obstacle"  to 
concluding  an  agreement. 

A  team  of  legal  and  financial  experts  — 
five  Americans  and  three  British  — meet  in 
Algiers  in  an  effort  to  resolve  remaining 
problems. 

January  17 

Twelve  major  U.S.  banks  reportedly 
agree  that  if  Tehran  agrees  to  repay  a  por- 
tion of  the  debts  owed  them  immediately  and 
to  settle  the  rest  later,  they  would  drop 
lawsuits. 

At  Iran's  request,  Algeria  sends  a  team 
of  physicians  to  visit  hostages  to  confirm 
their  good  health. 

January  18 

U.S.  and  Iran  sign  final  documents 
agreeing  on  central  issues  and  issue  a  final 
declaration  for  release  of  the  hostages. 

January  19 

Freedom  of  hostages  is  delayed  by 
objections  raised  by  Iranians  over  an  "appen- 
dix" that  U.S.  bankers  reportedly  added  to 
the  hostage  release  agreement. 

January  20 

After  444  days  in  captivity,  hostages  are 
freed! 

Two  Algerian  airliners  take  them  to 
Algiers  where  they  are  met  by  Deputy 
Secretary  Christopher,  Algerian  Foreign 
Minister  Benyahia,  and  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Algeria  Ulric  Haynes,  Jr.  After  a  welcoming 
ceremony,  the  hostages  are  transferred  to 
U.S.  Air  Force  planes  which  take  them  to 
Frankfurt,  West  Germany,  where  they  board 
busses  which  take  them  to  a  military 
hospital  in  Weisbaden. 

January  25 

Air  Force  plane  — "Freedom  One"  — ar- 
rives at  Stewart  International  Airport,  New- 
burgh,  New  York,  carrying  the  52  former 
hostages.  The  Americans  are  greeted  by 
their  families  and,  after  a  70-minute  bus  ride, 
arrive  at  West  Point  Military  Academy. 

January  27 

The  53  former  hostages,  including 
Richard  Queen  who  was  released  by  the  Ira- 
nian revolutionaries  in  July  1980,  arrive  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  where  they  are  greeted, 
in  an  official  ceremony,  by  President  Reagan, 
other  U.S.  officials,  and  government  em- 
ployees on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House.  ■ 


tiiarv  1P81 


Feature 


United  States,  which  branch  or  office  is 
located  within  the  United  States  and  is,  on 
the  effective  date,  either  (a)  in  possession  of 
funds  or  securities  legally  or  beneficially 
owned  by  the  Government  of  Iran  or  its 
agencies,  instrumentalities,  or  controlled 
entities,  or  (b)  carrying  on  its  books  deposits 
standing  to  the  credit  of  or  beneficially  owned 
by  such  Government,  agencies,  instrumental- 
ities, or  controlled  entities,  is  licensed, 
authorized,  directed  and  compelled  to 
transfer  such  funds,  securities,  and  deposits, 
including  interest  from  November  14,  1979, 
at  commercially  reasonable  rates,  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  to  be 
held  or  transferred  as  directed  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

1-102.  (a)  All  licenses  and  authorizations 
for  acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power, 
or  privilege,  by  court  order,  attachment,  or 
otherwise,  including  the  license  contained  in 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  with  respect  to  the  properties 
described  in  Section  1-101  of  this  Order  are 
revoked  and  withdrawn. 

(b)  All  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
relating  to  the  properties  described  in  Sec- 
tion 1-101  of  this  Order  and  which  derive 
from  any  attachment,  injunction,  other  like 
proceedings  or  process,  or  other  action  in 
any  litigation  after  November  14,  1979,  at 
8:10  a.m.  EST,  including  those  derived  from 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  other  than  rights,  powers,  and 
privileges  of  the  Government  of  Iran  and  its 
agencies,  instrumentalities,  and  controlled 
entities,  whether  acquired  by  court  order  or 
otherwise,  are  nullified,  and  all  persons 
claiming  any  such  right,  power,  or  privilege 
are  hereafter  barred  from  exercising  the  same. 

(c)  All  persons  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States  are  prohibited  from 
acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power,  or 
privilege  whether  by  court  order  or  other- 
wise, with  respect  to  the  properties  (and  any 
income  earned  thereon)  referred  to  in  Sec- 
tion 1-101  of  this  Order. 

1-103.  Compliance  with  this  Order,  any 
other  Executive  Order  licensing,  authorizing, 
directing  or  compelling  the  transfer  of  the 
assets  described  in  Section  1-101  of  this 
Order,  or  any  regulations,  instructions,  or 
directions  issued  thereunder  shall  to  the  ex- 
tent thereof  be  a  full  acquittance  and  dis- 
charge for  all  purposes  of  the  obligation  of 
the  person  making  the  same.  No  person  shall 
be  held  liable  in  any  court  for  or  with 
respect  to  anything  done  or  omitted  in  good 
faith  in  connection  with  the  administration 
of,  or  pursuant  to  and  in  reliance  on,  such 
orders,  regulations,  instructions,  or  directions. 

1-104.  The  Attorney  General  shall  seek 
to  intervene  in  any  litigation  within  the 
United  States  which  arises  out  of  this  Order 
and  shall,  among  other  things,  defend  the 
legality  of,  and  all  actions  taken  pursuant  to, 
each  of  its  provisions. 

1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 


national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
poses of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

Direction  to  Transfer  Iranian  Government 
Financial  Assets  Held  by  Non-Banking 
Institutions 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing 
unusual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  the 
national  security,  foreign  policy  and  economy 
of  the  United  States  upon  which  I  based  my 
declarations  of  national  emergency  in  Exec- 
utive Order  12170,  issued  November  14, 
1979,  and  in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued 
April  17,  1980,  in  order  to  implement 
agreements  with  the  Government  of  Iran,  as 
reflected  in  Declarations  of  the  Government 
of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to 
the  release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals 
being  held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution 
of  claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran  and  in  which  Iran  and  the  United 
States  instruct  and  require  that  the  assets 
described  in  this  Order  shall  be  transferred 
as  set  forth  below  by  the  holders  of  such 
assets,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
effective  date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  Any  person  subject  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States  which  is  not  a 
banking  institution  and  is  on  the  effective 
date  in  possession  or  control  of  funds  or 
securities  of  Iran  or  its  agencies,  instrumen- 
talities, or  controlled  entities  is  licensed, 
authorized,  directed  and  compelled  to  trans- 
fer such  funds  or  securities  to  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  to  be  held  or 
transferred  as  directed  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury. 

1-102.  (a)  All  licenses  and  authorizations 
for  acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power, 
or  privilege,  by  court  order,  attachment,  or 
otherwise,  including  the  license  contained  in 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  with  respect  to  the  properties 
described  in  Section  1-101  of  this  Order  are 
revoked  and  withdrawn. 

(b)  All  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
relating  to  the  properties  described  in  sec- 
tion 1-101  of  this  Order  and  which  derive 
from  any  attachment,  injunction,  other  like 
proceedings  or  process,  or  other  action  in 
any  litigation  after  November  14,  1979,  at 
8:10  a.m.  EST,  including  those  derived  from 
Section  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
Regulations,  other  than  rights,  powers,  and 
privileges  of  the  Government  of  Iran  and  its 


agencies,  instrumentalities,  and  controj 
entities,  whether  acquired  by  court  ore 
otherwise,  are  nullified,  and  all  person; 
claiming  any  such  right,  power,  or  priv 
are  hereafter  barred  from  exercising  th 

(c)  All  persons  subject  to  the  jurisi 
of  the  United  States  are  prohibited  fro 
acquiring  or  exercising  any  right,  powe 
privilege,  whether  by  court  order  or  ot 
wise,  with  respect  to  the  properties  (ar 
income  earned  thereon)  referred  to  in  ' 
tion  1-101  of  this  Order. 

1-103.  Compliance  with  this  ExecL 
Order,  any  other  Executive  Order  licer 
authorizing,  directing  or  compelling  tht 
transfer  of  the  assets  described  in  para 
1-101  of  this  Order,  or  any  regulations, 
instructions,  or  directions  issued  therei 
shall  to  the  extent  thereof  be  a  full  acq 
tance  and  discharge  for  all  purposes  of 
obligation  of  the  person  making  the  sai 
No  person  shall  be  held  liable  in  any  cc 
for  or  with  respect  to  anything  done  oi 
omitted  in  good  faith  in  connection  wit 
administration  of,  or  pursuant  to  and  ii 
ance  on,  such  orders,  regulations,  instr 
tions,  or  directions. 

1-104.  The  Attorney  General  shall 
to  intervene  in  any  litigation  within  th' 
United  States  which  arises  out  of  this  i 
and  shall,  among  other  things,  defend  t 
legality  of  and  all  actions  taken  pursua 
each  of  its  provisions. 

1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treas 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  a 
tions  vested  in  the  President  by  the  In 
national  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  thi 
poses  of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effectiv 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Cai 


Direction  to  Transfer  Certain  Iranian 
Government  Assets 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  Presi> 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of 
International  Emergency  Economic  Po' 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Tit 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  o 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Sect 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (£ 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing 
unusual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  th 
tional  security,  foreign  policy  and  ecom 
of  the  United  States  upon  which  I  base 
declarations  of  national  emergency  in  E 
utive  Order  12170.  issued  November  14 
1979,  and  in  Executive  Order  12211,  iss 
April  17,  1980.  in  order  to  implement  a 
ments  with  the  Government  of  Iran,  as 
reflected  in  Declarations  of  the  Govern 
of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Republi' 
Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981,  relatin 
the  release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  natioi 
being  held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resol 
of  claims  of  United  States  nationals  aga 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  norma 
tion  of  relations  between  the  United  St 
and  Iran  and  in  which  Iran  and  the  Uni 


Department  of  State  Bu 


instruct  and  require  that  the  assets 
bed  in  this  Order  shall  be  transferred 
forth  below  by  the  holders  of  such 
.  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
ve  date  of  this  Order: 

-101.  All  persons  subject  to  the  juris- 
n  of  the  United  States  in  possession  or 
ol  of  properties,  not  including  funds  and 
ities,  owned  by  Iran  or  its  agencies, 
imentalities,  or  controlled  entities  are 
ed,  authorized,  directed  and  compelled 
nsfer  such  properties,  as  directed  after 
tfective  date  of  this  Order  by  the  Gov- 
3nt  of  Iran,  acting  through  its  authorized 
.  Except  where  specifically  stated,  this 
e,  authorization,  and  direction  does  not 
e  persons  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
nited  States  from  existing  legal  require- 
1  other  than  those  based  upon  the  Inter- 
lal  Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act. 
-102.  (a)  All  licenses  and  authorizations 
quiring  or  exercising  any  right,  power, 
vilege,  by  court  order,  attachment,  or 
wise,  including  the  license  contained  in 
>n  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
ations,  with  respect  to  the  properties 
bed  in  Section  1-101  of  this  Order  are 
Jed  and  withdrawn. 
I  })  All  rights,  powers,  and  privileges 
,1  ng  to  the  properties  described  in  sec- 
J  -101  of  this  Order  and  which  derive 
!  iny  attachment,  injunction,  other  like 
I,)  sdings  or  process,  or  other  action  in 
ji  ligation  after  November  14,  1979,  at 
,j  .m.  EST,  including  those  derived  from 
jl  m  535.504  of  the  Iranian  Assets  Control 
y  ations,  other  than  rights,  powers,  and 
liges  of  the  Government  of  Iran  and  its 
,j  ies,  instrumentalities,  and  controlled 
1  is,  whether  acquired  by  court  order  or 
I  f/ise,  are  nullified,  and  all  persons 
't  ng  any  such  right,  power,  or  privilege 
ireafter  barred  from  exercising  the  same. 
■ :)  All  persons  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
United  States  are  prohibited  from 
ing  or  exercising  any  right,  power,  or 
;ge,  whether  by  court  order  or  other- 
with  respect  to  the  properties  (and  any 
e  earned  thereon)  referred  to  in  Sec- 
101  of  this  Order. 

103.  Compliance  with  this  Executive 
any  other  Executive  Order  licensing, 
rizing,  directing  or  compelling  the 
:'er  of  the  assets  described  in  paragraph 
of  this  Order,  or  any  regulations, 
ctions,  or  directions  issued  thereunder 
to  the  extent  thereof  be  a  full  acquit- 
and  discharge  for  all  purposes  of  the 
ition  of  the  person  making  the  same, 
irson  shall  be  held  liable  in  any  court 
with  respect  to  anything  done  or 
ed  in  good  faith  in  connection  with  the 
listration  of,  or  pursuant  to  and  in  reli- 
on,  such  orders,  regulations,  instruc- 
or  directions. 

-104. The  Attorney  General  shall  seek 
ervene  in  any  litigation  within  the 
d  States  which  arises  out  of  this  Order 
hall,  among  other  things,  defend  the 
ty  of,  and  all  actions  taken  pursuant  to, 
of  its  provisions. 


1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
poses of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

Revocation  of  Prohibitions  Against 
Transactions  Involving  Iran 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing 
unusual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  the 
national  security,  foreign  policy  and  economy 
of  the  United  States  upon  which  I  based  my 
declarations  of  national  emergency  in  Exec- 
utive Order  12170,  issued  November  14, 
1979,  and  in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued 
April  17,  1980,  in  order  to  implement  agree- 
ments with  the  Government  of  Iran,  as 
reflected  in  Declarations  of  the  Government 
of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to 
the  release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals 
being  held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution 
of  claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
effective  date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  The  prohibitions  contained  in 
Executive  Order  12205  of  April  7,  1980,  and 
Executive  Order  12211  of  April  17,  1980,  and 
Proclamation  4702  of  November  12,  1979,  are 
hereby  revoked. 

1-102.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
pose of  this  Order. 

1-103.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 


Non-Prosecution  of  Claims  of  Hostages 

and  for  Actions  at  the  United  States  Embassy 

and  Elsewhere 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing 
unusual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  na- 
tional security,  foreign  policy  and  economy 


Feature 


of  the  United  States  upon  which  I  based  my 
declarations  of  national  emergency  in  Ex- 
ecutive Order  12170,  issued  November  14, 
1979,  and  in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued 
April  17,  1980,  in  order  to  implement 
agreements  with  the  Government  of  Iran,  as 
reflected  in  Declarations  of  the  Government 
of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of 
Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981,  relating  to 
the  release  of  U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals 
being  held  as  hostages  and  to  the  resolution 
of  claims  of  United  States  nationals  against 
Iran,  and  to  begin  the  process  of  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Iran,  it  is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the 
effective  date  of  this  Order: 

1-101.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
shall  promulgate  regulations:  (a)  prohibiting 
any  person  subject  to  U.S.  jurisdiction  from 
prosecuting  in  any  court  within  the  United 
States  or  elsewhere  any  claim  against  the 
Government  of  Iran  arising  out  of  events 
occurring  before  the  date  of  this  Order 
relating  to  (1)  the  seizure  of  the  hostages  on 
November  4,  1979,  (2)  their  subsequent 
detention,  (3)  injury  to  United  States  prop- 
erty or  property  of  United  States  nationals 
within  the  United  States  Embassy  compound 
in  Tehran  after  November  3,  1979,  or  (4)  in- 
jury to  United  States  nationals  or  their  prop- 
erty as  a  result  of  popular  movements  in  the 
course  of  the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran 
which  were  not  an  act  of  the  Government  of 
Iran;  (b)  prohibiting  any  person  not  a  U.S. 
national  from  prosecuting  any  such  claim  in 
any  court  within  the  United  States;  (c)  order- 
ing the  termination  of  any  previously  insti- 
tuted judicial  proceedings  based  upon  such 
claims;  and  (d)  prohibiting  the  enforcement 
of  any  judicial  order  issued  in  the  course  of 
such  proceedings. 

1-102.  The  Attorney  General  of  the 
United  States  is  authorized  and  directed, 
immediately  upon  the  issuance  of  regulations 
in  accordance  with  Section  1-101,  to  take  all 
appropriate  measures  to  notify  all  appro- 
priate courts  of  the  existence  of  this  Order 
and  implementing  regulations  and  the  result- 
ing termination  of  litigation. 

1-103.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
pose of  this  Order. 

1-104.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 

Restrictions  on  the  Transfer  of  Property  of 
the  Former  Shah  of  Iran 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3  of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of  Title 
22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Section 
301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing  unu- 


Feature 


sual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  national 
security,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of  the 
United  States  upon  which  I  based  my  decla- 
rations of  national  emergency  in  Executive 
Order  12170,  issued  November  14,  1979,  and 
in  Executive  Order  12211,  issued  April  17, 
1980,  in  order  to  implement  agreements  with 
the  Government  of  Iran,  as  reflected  in 
Declarations  of  the  Government  of  Demo- 
cratic and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria  dated 
January  19,  1981,  relating  to  the  release  of 
U.S.  diplomats  and  nationals  being  held  as 
hostages  and  to  the  resolution  of  claims  of 
United  States  nationals  against  Iran,  and  to 
begin  the  process  of  normalization  of  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Iran,  it 
is  hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the  effective 
date  of  this  Order- 

1-101.  For  the  purpose  of  protecting  the 
rights  of  litigants  in  courts  within  the  United 
States,  all  property  and  assets  located  in  the 
United  States  within  the  control  of  the  es- 
tate of  Mohammad  Reza  Pahlavi,  the  former 
Shah  of  Iran,  or  any  close  relative  of  the 
former  Shah  served  as  a  defendant  in  litiga- 
tion in  such  courts  brought  by  Iran  seeking 
the  return  of  property  alleged  to  belong  to 
Iran,  is  hereby  blocked  as  to  each  such 
estate  or  person  until  all  such  litigation 
against  such  estate  or  person  is  finally 
terminated. 

1-102.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
authorized  and  directed  (a)  to  promulgate 
regulations  requiring  all  persons  who  are 
subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  and  who,  as  of  November  3,  1979,  or 
as  of  this  date,  have  actual  or  constructive 
possession  of  property  of  the  kind  described 
in  Section  1-101,  or  knowledge  of  such  pos- 
session by  others,  to  report  such  possession 
or  knowledge  thereof,  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  in  accordance  with  such  regula- 
tions and  (b)  to  make  available  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  or  its  designated  agents  all 
identifying  information  derived  from  such 
reports  to  the  fullest  extent  permitted  by 
law.  Such  reports  shall  be  required  as  to  all 
individuals  described  in  1-101  and  shall  be 
required  to  be  filed  within  30  days  after 
publication  of  a  notice  in  the  Federal 
Register. 

1-103.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
authorized  and  directed  (a)  to  require  all 
agencies  within  the  Executive  Branch  of  the 
United  States  Government  to  deliver  to  the 
Secretary  all  official  financial  books  and 
records  which  serve  to  identify  any  property 
of  the  kind  described  in  Section  1-101  of  this 
Order,  and  (b)  to  make  available  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Iran  or  its  designated  agents  all 
identifying  information  derived  from  such 
books  and  records  to  the  fullest  extent  per- 
mitted by  law. 

1-104.  The  Attorney  General  of  the 
United  States  having  advised  the  President 
of  his  opinion  that  no  claim  on  behalf  of  the 
Government  of  Iran  for  the  recovery  of  prop- 
erty of  the  kind  described  in  Section  1-101 
of  this  Order  should  be  considered  legally 
barred  either  by  sovereign  immunity  prin- 
ciples or  by  the  act  of  state  doctrine,  the 


Attorney  General  is  authorized  and  directed 
to  prepare,  and  upon  the  request  of  counsel 
representing  the  Government  of  Iran  to  pre- 
sent to  the  appropriate  court  or  courts 
within  the  United  States,  suggestions  of 
interest  reflecting  that  such  is  the  position 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  it  is  also  the 
position  of  the  United  States  that  Iranian  de- 
crees and  judgments  relating  to  the  assets  of 
the  former  Shah  and  the  persons  described 
in  Section  1-101  should  be  enforced  by  such 
courts  in  accordance  with  United  States  law. 

1-105.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
delegated  and  authorized  to  exercise  all  func- 
tions vested  in  the  President  by  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
(50  U.S.C.  1701  et  seq.)  to  carry  out  the  pur- 
poses of  this  Order. 

1-106.  This  Order  shall  be  effective 
immediately. 

Jimmy  Carter 


President's  Commission  on 
Hostage  Compensation 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  by  the  Consti- 
tution and  statutes  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  as  President  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  accordance  with  the 
Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act,  as 
amended  (5  U.S.C.  App.  I),  it  is  hereby 
ordered  as  follows: 

1-1.  Establishment. 

1-101.  There  is  established  the  Presi- 
dent's Commission  on  Hostage  Compensa- 
tion, hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  Commis- 
sion, which  shall  be  composed  of  not  more 
than  nine  members  who  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  President. 

1-102.  The  President  shall  designate  a 
Chairman  from  among  the  members. 

1-2.  Functions. 

1-201.  The  Commission  shall  study  and 
analyze,  and  make  recommendations  to  the 
President  on,  the  question  whether  the 
United  States  should  provide  financial  com- 
pensation to  United  States  nationals  who 
have  been  held  in  captivity  outside  the 
United  States,  either  (1)  by  or  with  the 
approval  of  a  foreign  government,  or  (2)  by 
reason  of  their  status  as  employees  of  the 
United  States  Government  or  as  dependents 
of  such  employees. 

1-202.  The  Commission  shall  submit  a 
report  to  the  President  ninety  days  after  the 
date  of  this  Order.  The  report  shall  contain 
the  Commission's  recommendations  as  to 
whether  legislation  to  deal  with  the  fore- 
going compensation  issue  is  appropriate  and, 
if  so,  as  to  what  such  legislation  should  pro- 
vide. The  report  shall  specifically  contain  the 
Commission's  recommendations  concerning 
the  compensation  of  United  States  nationals 
held  hostage  in  Iran  on  and  after  November 
4,  1979. 

1-203.  In  analyzing  the  foregoing  issues 
the  Commission  shall  consider  all  factors 
which  it  may  consider  relevant,  including  the 


prior  practice  with  respect  to  governmer 
compensation,  both  by  the  United  States 
Government  and  by  foreign  government? 
persons  held  in  captivity  abroad. 

1-204.  In  the  performance  of  its  fun( 
tions  the  Commission  shall  specifically  ac 
dress  the  following  issues: 

(a)  whether  any  legislation  authorizii 
compensation  should  set  forth  specific  lei 
lative  standards,  or  whether  the  standard 
by  which  to  award  compensation  should  1 
administratively  developed; 

(b)  whether  any  standards  developec 
either  legislatively  or  administratively 
should  be  applied  uniformly  to  civilian  ar 
military  government  employees,  dependt 
of  such  employees,  and  private  citizens,  ( 
whether  separate  criteria  should  be  deved 
oped  for  these  or  other  categories;  i 

(c)  whether  an  existing  administratis^ 
body  should  determine  amounts  of  compi 
tion,  or  whether  a  new  body  should  be  e: 
lished  for  this  purpose;  and 

(d)  whether  compensation  should  be 
for  injuries  suffered  by  members  of  fami 
of  persons  who  have  been  held  in  captivi 

1-3.  Administrative  Provisions. 

1-301.  In  performing  its  functions  tl 
Commission  shall  conduct  such  studies, 
reviews,  and  inquiries  as  may  be  necessi 
In  addition  to  conducting  open  meetings 
accordance  with  the  Federal  Advisory  C 
mittee  Act,  the  Commission  shall  conduc 
public  hearings  to  identify  critical  issues 
possible  solutions  related  to  compensatic 

1-302.  The  Commission  is  authorize^ 
request  from  any  Executive  agency  such 
information  that  may  be  deemed  necesst 
to  carry  out  its  functions  under  this  Ord 
Each  Executive  agency  shall,  to  the  extt 
permitted  by  law,  furnish  such  informati 
to  the  Commission  in  the  performance  ol 
functions  under  this  Order. 

1-303.  Each  member  of  the  Commis 
who  is  not  otherwise  employed  in  the  Fe 
eral  Government  may  receive,  to  the  exi 
permitted  by  law.  compensation  for  each 
he  or  she  is  engaged  in  the  work  of  the  ( 
mission  at  a  rate  not  to  exceed  the  maxii 
daily  rate  now  or  hereafter  prescribed  b 
law  for  GS-18  of  the  General  Schedule,  i 
may  also  receive  transportation  and  trav 
expenses,  including  per  diem  in  lieu  of  si 
sistance,  as  authorized  by  law  (5  U.S.C.  J 
and  5703). 

1-304.  All  necessary  administrative 
services,  support,  facilities,  and  expenses 
the  Commission  shall,  to  the  extent  per- 
mitted by  law,  be  furnished  by  the  Depa 
ment  of  State. 

1-4.  General  Provisions. 

1-401.  Notwithstanding  the  provisio 
of  any  other  Executive  Order,  the  functi 
of  the  President  under  the  Federal  Advi 
Committee  Act.  as  amended  (5  U.S.C.  Ap 
except  that  of  reporting  annually  to  the 
gress,  which  are  applicable  to  the  Comm 
sion,  shall  be  performed  by  the  Secretar 


Department  of  State  Bui 


I  in  accordance  with  guidelines  and  pro- 
-es  established  by  the  Administrator  of 
ral  Services. 

1-402.  The  Commission  shall  terminate 
ic  y  days  after  submitting  its  report. 

Jimmy  Carter 


e$SAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 

19.  1981' 

uant  to  Section  204(b)  of  the  Interna- 
Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act,  50 
.  1703,  I  hereby  report  to  the  Congress 
I  have  today  exercised  the  authority 
ted  by  this  Act  to  take  certain  measures 
respect  to  property  of  the  Government 
an  and  its  controlled  entities  and  instru- 
alities. 

1.  On  November  14,  1979,  I  took  the 
of  blocking  certain  property  and  inter- 
in  property  of  the  Government  of  Iran 
ts  controlled  entities  and  instrumental- 
This  action  was  taken  in  response  to  a 
s  of  aggressive  actions  by  Iran,  includ- 
he  attack  on  the  United  States  Embassy 
hran,  the  holding  of  U.S.  citizens  and 
mats  as  hostages,  and  threats  to  with- 
assets  from  United  States  banks,  and 
pwise  seek  to  harm  the  economic  and 
ical  interests  of  the  United  States.  Sub- 
ently,  on  April  7.  1980,  and  April  17, 
,  I  took  further  action  restricting 
)us  kinds  of  transactions  with  Iran  by 
ons  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
ed  States. 

m  2.  Agreement  has  now  been  reached 
Iran  concerning  the  release  of  the  hos- 
;  and  the  settlement  of  claims  of  U.S. 
i(  mals  against  Iran.  Among  other  things 
agreement  involves  the  payment  by  Iran 
iproximately  $3.67  billion  to  pay  off  prin- 
and  interest  outstanding  on  syndicated 
agreements  in  which  a  U.S.  bank  is  a 

lis  y.  This  includes  making  all  necessary 

Ftjients  to  the  foreign  members  of  these 
icates.  An  additional  $1,418  billion  shall 
lin  available  to  pay  all  other  loans  as 
as  any  disputes  as  to  the  amounts  in- 

iiiijed  are  settled  and  to  pay  additional 
est  to  banks  upon  agreement  or  arbitra- 
with  Iran.  In  addition,  there  will  be 
blished  an  international  tribunal  to 
dicate  various  disputed  claims  by  U.S. 
mals  against  Iran;  and  the  deposit  of  $1 
)n  by  Iran  from  previously  blocked 
ts  as  released,  which  will  be  available 
)ayments  of  awards  against  Iran.  Iran 
committed  itself  to  replenish  this  fund  as 

pa  ssary.  This  tribunal,  among  other  things, 
also  hear  certain  disputes  between 
ian  nationals  and  the  United  States  Gov- 
nent  and  contractual  disputes  between 
and  the  United  States. 
In  connection  with  this  agreement,  and 

Ivis  egin  the  process  of  normalization  of  rela- 
between  the  two  countries,  I  have 

!,;(  ed  and  will  issue,  a  series  of  Orders. 
3.  First,  I  have  signed  an  Executive 
sr  authorizing  the  Secretary  of  the 
isury  to  enter  into  or  to  direct  the  Fed- 


eral Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  to  enter  into 
escrow  and  depositary  agreements  with  the 
Bank  of  England. 

Under  these  agreements,  assets  in  the 
escrow  account  will  be  returned  to  the  con- 
trol of  Iran  upon  the  safe  departure  of  the 
United  States  hostages  from  Iran.  I  have 
also  by  this  Order  instructed  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Bank  of  New  York,  as  fiscal  agent  of 
the  United  States,  to  receive  other  blocked 
Iranian  assets,  and,  as  further  directed  by 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  transfer 
these  assets  to  the  escrow  account. 

4.  Second,  I  have  signed  an  Executive 
Order  directing  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  to  transfer  to  its  account  at  the 
Bank  of  England  and  then  to  the  escrow  ac- 
count referred  to  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph, the  assets  of  the  Governm.ent  of  Iran, 
both  transfers  to  take  place  as  and  when 
directed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

In  order  to  assure  that  this  transaction 
can  be  executed,  and  having  considered  the 
claims  settlement  agreement  described  above, 
I  have  exercised  my  authority  to  nullify,  and 
barred  the  exercise  of,  all  rights,  powers  or 
privileges  acquired  by  anyone;  I  have  revoked 
all  licenses  and  authorizations  for  acquiring 
any  rights,  powers,  or  privileges;  and  I  have 
prohibited  anyone  from  acquiring  or  exercis- 
ing any  right,  power,  or  privileges,  all  with 
respect  to  these  properties  of  Iran.  These 
prohibitions  and  nullifications  apply  to 
rights,  powers,  or  privileges  whether  ac- 
quired by  court  order,  attachment,  or  other- 
wise. I  have  also  prohibited  any  attachment 
or  other  like  proceeding  or  process  affecting 
these  properties. 

5.  Third,  I  have  signed  an  Executive 
Order  which  directs  branches  and  offices  of 
United  States  banks  located  outside  the 
United  States  to  transfer  all  Iranian  govern- 
ment funds,  deposits  and  securities  held  by 
them  on  their  books  on  or  after  November 
14.  1979  at  8:10  a.m.  EST  to  the  account  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  at 
the  Bank  of  England  in  London.  These  assets 
will  be  transferred  to  the  account  of  the  Cen- 
tral Bank  of  Algeria,  as  escrow  agent.  The 
transfer  is  to  include  interest  from  the  date 
of  the  blocking  order  at  commercially  reason- 
able rates.  In  addition,  any  banking  institu- 
tion that  has  executed  a  set-off  subsequent  to 
the  date  of  the  blocking  order  against  Iranian 
deposits  covered  by  this  order  is  directed  to 
cancel  the  set-off  and  to  transfer  the  funds 
that  had  been  subject  to  the  set-off  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  other  overseas  deposits. 
This  Order  also  provides  for  the  revoca- 
tion of  licenses  and  the  nullifications  and 
bars  described  in  paragraph  4  of  this  report. 
6.  Fourth,  I  will  have  signed  an  Execu- 
tive Order  directing  American  banks  located 
within  the  United  States  which  hold  Iranian 
deposits  to  transfer  those  deposits,  including 
interest  from  the  date  of  entry  of  the  block- 
ing order  at  commercially  reasonable  rates, 
to  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York, 
to  be  held  or  transferred  as  directed  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  Half  of  these 
funds  will  be  transferred  to  Iran  and  the 
other  half  (up  to  a  maximum  of  $1  billion) 


^,.. ,  nnoi 


Feature 


will  be  placed  in  a  security  account  as  pro- 
vided in  the  Declaration  and  the  Claims  Set- 
tlement Agreement  that  are  part  of  the 
agreement  we  have  reached  with  Iran.  This 
fund  will  be  maintained  at  a  $500  million 
level  until  the  claims  program  is  concluded. 
While  these  transfers  should  take  place  as 
soon  as  possible,  I  have  been  advised  that 
court  actions  may  delay  it.  This  Order  also 
provides  for  the  revocation  of  licenses  and 
the  nullifications  and  bars  described  in  para- 
graph 4  of  this  report. 

7.  Fifth,  I  have  signed  an  Executive 
Order  directing  the  transfer  to  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  by  non-banking 
institutions  of  funds  and  securities  held  by 
them  for  the  Government  of  Iran,  to  be  held 
or  transferred  as  directed  by  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury.  This  transfer  will  be  accom- 
plished at  approximately  the  same  time  as 
that  described  in  paragraph  6. 

This  Order  also  provides  for  the  revoca- 
tion of  licenses  and  the  nullifications  and 
bars  described  in  paragraph  4  of  this  report. 

8.  Sixth,  I  will  sign,  upon  release  of  the 
hostages,  an  Executive  Order  directing  any 
person  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States  who  is  in  possession  or  control 
of  properties  owned  by  Iran,  not  including 
funds  and  securities,  to  transfer  the  prop- 
erty as  directed  by  the  Government  of  Iran 
acting  through  its  authorized  agent.  The 
Order  recites  that  it  does  not  relieve  persons 
subject  to  it  from  existing  legal  require- 
ments other  than  those  based  on  the  Interna- 
tional Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act.  This 
Order  does  not  apply  to  contingent  liabil- 
ities. This  Order  also  provides  for  the  revo- 
cation of  licenses  and  the  nullifications  and 
bars  described  in  paragraph  4  of  this  report. 

9.  Seventh,  I  will  sign,  upon  release  of 
the  hostages,  an  Executive  Order  revoking 
prohibitions  previously  imposed  against 
transactions  involving  Iran.  The  Executive 
Order  revokes  prohibitions  contained  in 
Executive  Order  No.  12205  of  April  7,  1980; 
and  Executive  Order  No.  12211  of  April  17, 
1980;  and  the  amendments  contained  in  Proc- 
lamation No.  4702  of  November  12,  1979.  The 
two  Executive  Orders  limited  trade  and 
financial  transactions  involving  Iran  and 
travel  to  Iran.  The  proclamation  restricted 
oil  imports.  In  revoking  these  sanctions  I 
have  no  intention  of  superseding  other  exist- 
ing controls  relating  to  exports  including  the 
Arms  Export  Control  Act  and  the  Export 
Administration  Act. 

10.  Eighth,  I  will  sign,  upon  release  of 
the  hostages,  an  Executive  Order  providing 
for  the  waiver  of  certain  claims  against  Iran. 
The  Order  directs  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  shall  promulgate  regulations:  (a) 
prohibiting  any  person  subject  to  U.S.  juris- 
diction from  prosecuting  in  any  court  within 
the  United  States  or  elsewhere  any  claim 
against  the  Government  of  Iran  arising  out 
of  events  occurring  before  the  date  of  this 
Order  arising  out:  (1)  the  seizure  of  the  hos- 
tages on  November  4,  1979;  (2)  their  subse- 
quent detention;  (3)  injury  to  the  United 
States  property  or  property  of  United  States 
nationals  within  the  United  States  Embassy 


13 


Feature 


compound  in  Tehran  after  November  1979; 
(4)  or  injury  to  United  States  nationals  or 
their  property  as  a  result  of  popular  move- 
ments in  the  course  of  the  Islamic  Revolu- 
tion in  Iran  which  were  not  an  act  of  the 
Government  of  Iran;  (b)  prohibiting  any  per- 
son not  a  U.S.  national  from  prosecuting  any 
such  claim  in  any  court  within  the  United 
States;  (c)  ordering  the  termination  of  any 
previously  instituted  judicial  proceedings 
based  upon  such  claims;  and  (d)  prohibiting 
the  enforcement  of  any  judicial  order  issued 
in  the  course  of  such  proceedings. 

The  Order  also  authorizes  and  directs 
the  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States 
immediately  upon  the  issuance  of  such  a 
Treasury  regulation  to  notify  all  appropriate 
courts  of  the  existence  of  the  Executive 
Order  and  implementing  regulations  and  the 
resulting  termination  of  relevant  litigation. 
At  the  same  time,  I  will  create  a  commission 
to  make  recommendations  on  the  issue  of 
compensation  for  those  who  have  been  held 
as  hostages. 

11.  Finally,  I  will  sign,  upon  release  of 
the  hostages,  an  Executive  Order  invoking 
the  blocking  powers  of  the  International 
Emergency  Economic  Powers  Act  to  prevent 
the  transfer  of  property  located  in  the 
United  States  and  controlled  by  the  estate  of 
Mohammed  Reza  Pahlavi,  the  former  Shah 
or  Iran,  or  by  any  close  relative  of  the 
former  Shah  served  as  a  defendant  in  litiga- 
tion in  the  United  States  courts  brought  by 
Iran  seeking  the  return  of  property  alleged 
to  belong  to  Iran.  This  Order  will  remain 
effective  as  to  each  person  until  litigation 
concerning  such  person  or  estate  is  termi- 
nated. The  Order  also  requires  reports  from 
private  citizens  and  Federal  agencies  con- 
cerning this  property  so  that  information  can 
be  made  available  to  the  Government  of  Iran 
about  this  property. 

The  Order  would  further  direct  the  At- 
torney General  to  assert  in  appropriate  courts 
that  claims  of  Iran  for  recovery  of  this  prop- 
erty are  not  barred  by  principles  of  sovereign 
immunity  or  the  act  of  state  doctrine. 

12.  In  addition  to  these  actions  taken 
pursuant  to  the  International  Economic 
Emergency  Powers  Act,  other  relevant  stat- 
utes, and  my  powers  under  the  Constitution, 
I  will  take  the  steps  necessary  to  withdraw 
all  claims  now  pending  against  Iran  before 
the  International  Court  of  Justice.  Copies  of 
the  Executive  Orders  are  attached. 

Jimmy  Carter 


TECHNICAL  ARRANGEMENT 
JAN.  20, 1981^ 

TECHNICAL  ARRANGEMENT 

BETWEEN 

BANQUE  CENTRALE  D'ALGERIE 

AS  ESCROW  AGENT 

AND 

THE  GOVERNOR  AND  COMPANY 

OF  THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND 

AND 

THE  FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK 

OF  NEW  YORK  AS  FISCAL 
AGENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

This  Technical  Arrangement  is  made  between 
the  Banque  Centrale  d'Algerie  (hereinafter  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "Escrow  Agent")  as  Escrow 
Agent,  the  Governor  and  Company  of  the 
Bank  of  England  (hereinafter  referred  to  as 
the  "Bank"),  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  as  fiscal  agent  of  the  United  States 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the"FED"). 

1.  The  Bank  is  hereby  appointed  to  hold, 
invest  and  distribute,  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  Technical  Arrangement,  such  of 
the  funds  and  other  property  (as  identified  by 
the  FED  on  its  sole  responsibility  at  the  time 
of  transfer)  as  may  be  transferred  to  them  by 
the  FED  and  such  other  funds  or  property 
representing  such  funds  and  other  property  as 
may  from  time  to  time  be  held  by  the  Bank  on 
such  accounts  or  invested  by  the  Bank  pur- 
suant to  paragraph  4  hereof  (all  of  which  funds 
and  property  are  collectively  referred  to  as  the 
"Escrow  Fund").  The  Bank  shall  act  as  a  de- 
positary and  shall  hold  and  invest  the  Escrow 
Fund  in  accordance  with  the  arrangements  de- 
scribed herein  until  such  time  as  the  Escrow 
F'und  shall  have  been  distributed  as  provided 
in  paragraph  7  below. 

2.  The  Bank  will  open  in  the  name  of  the 
Escrow  Agent  the  following  accounts: 

(A)  Two  securities  custody  accounts, 
Securities  Custody  Account  No.  1  and  Securi- 
ties Custody  Account  No.  2  (the  "Securities 
Custody  Accounts"); 

(B)  Three  accounts  denominated  in  US 
dollars,  "Dollar  Account  No.  1",  "Dollar  Ac- 
count No.  2"  and  "Dollar  Account  No.  3"  (the 
"Dollar  Accounts"); 

(C)  A  gold  bullion  custody  account  (the 
"Bullion  Account")  and  shall  credit  the  securi- 
ties to  Securities  Custody  Account  No.  1,  the 
dollar  deposits  to  Dollar  Account  No.  1  and  the 
gold  bullion  to  the  Bullion  Account  when  trans- 
ferred to  the  Bank  by  the  FED  for  deposit  on 
such  accounts,  and  shall  provide  the  Escrow 
Agent  with  a  general  description  of  the  funds 
and  other  property  so  transferred. 

3.  The  Bank  shall 

(A)  Hold  the  securities  for  the  time 
being  in  the  Securities  Custody  Accounts  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Ar- 
rangement; 

(B)  Hold  the  gold  bullion  for  the  tim.e 
being  in  the  Bullion  Account  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  Arrangement;  and 


(C)  Hold  the  funds  for  the  time  bein 
the  Dollar  Accounts  on  a  call  basis,  so  as  tc 
ensure  the  liquidity  of  those  funds,  and  in  ; 
cordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  Arranj 
ment. 

4.  (a)  The  Bank  shall  make  a  good  fait 
effort  under  the  circumstances  to  invest  an 
reinvest  outside  the  United  States  the  func 
on  the  Dollar  Accounts  at  market  rates  wit 
such  banks  and  in  such  manner  as  the  Ban! 
may  determine  and  will  pay  by  way  of  inte 
on  the  funds  on  those  Dollar  Accounts  sum 
equivalent  to  those  received  by  them,  subji 
nevertheless  to  the  deduction  from  Dollar  ^ 
count  No.  2  of  sums  equivalent  to  the  amoi 
of  their  reasonable  costs,  charges  and  expe 
in  respect  to  the  maintenance  and  operation 
Dollar  Account  No.  2. 

(b)  Any  interest  received  on  the  seer 
ties  in  the  Securities  Custody  Account  No. 
shall  be  credited  to  Dollar  Account  No.  1  ar 
any  interest  received  on  the  Securities 
Custody  Account  No.  2  shall  be  credited  to 
Dollar  Account  No.  3. 

5.  The  Bank  shall  invest  all  monies  repi 
senting  interest  paid  in  respect  of  any  part 
the  Escrow  Fund  in  the  same  manner  as  ar 
funds  for  the  time  being  on  deposit  on  the  I 
lar  Accounts. 

6.  The  Bank  shall  not  have  or  incur  an 
liability  by  reason  of  any  diminution  in  valu 
the  securities  or  gold  bullion  for  the  time  bi- 
held  by  them  in  the  name  of  the  Escrow  Ag 
on  the  Securities  Custody  Accounts  and  thi 
BulHon  Account,  respectively. 

Similarly,  the  Escrow  Agent  shall  not 
have  or  incur  any  liability  by  reason  of  any 
minution  in  value  of  the  securities  or  gold  t 
lion  for  the  time  being  held  in  its  name  by  t 
Bank  on  the  Securities  Custody  Accounts  a 
the  Bullion  Account  respectively.  Moreover 
the  Escrow  Agent  shall  not  have  or  incur  a 
liability  for  any  loss  arising  from  investmer 
the  funds  held  for  the  Escrow  Agent  on  the 
Dollar  Accounts. 

In  addition,  the  Escrow  Agent  shall  no 
bear  nor  be  liable  for  any  expenses,  charge: 
costs  or  fees  of  any  kind  incurred  by  the  Ba 
or  the  FED  in  performance  of  their  duties 
under  this  Arrangement. 

7.  In  the  performance  of  their  duties 
under  this  Arrangement,  the  Bank  shall  no 
exercise  any  discretion  de.signed  to  favour  c 
of  the  parties  to  this  Arrangement  and  shal 
act  only  on  the  instructions  of  the  Escrow 
Agent. 

(a)  Provided  that  no  previous  instruc 
tion  has  been  received  under  subparagi'aph 
below,  upon  receipt  of  instructions  from  the 
Escrow  Agent  to  do  so,  in  the  form  provide 
paragraph  8  below,  the  Bank  shall  immedial 
transfer  the  funds  then  held  on  Dollar  Acco 
No.  1  as  follows: 

(i)  U.S.  Dollars  3,667,000,000  to  th 
FED,  .subject  to  the  FED's  sole  direction; 

(ii)  U.S.  Dollars  1,418,000,000  to  D 
lar  Account  No.  2;  and 

(ill)  the  balance  to  an  account  of  Bi 
Markazi  Iran  opened  at  the  Bank,  subject  ti 
Bank  Markazi  Iran's  sole  direction 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


"tnsfer  the  securities  and  bullion  then 
the  Securities  Custody  Account  No.  1 
e  Bullion  Account  respectively  to  the  ac- 

"^f  Bank  Markazi  Iran  at  the  Bank,  sub- 
Bank  Markazi  Iran's  sole  direction. 

(b)  Provided  that  no  previous  instruc- 

III  s  been  received  under  subparagraph  (a) 
upon  receipt  of  instructions  from  the 
V  Agent  to  do  so,  in  the  form  provided  in 

j|  aph  8  below,  the  Bank  shall  immediately 

fi  !r  the  Escrow  Fund  to  the  account  of  the 
t  the  Bank,  subject  to  the  FED's  sole 
on,  and  close  all  the  Accounts  opened 

f'^  paragraph  2  of  this  Arrangement. 

(c)  Any  funds  or  securities  received  by 
nk  from  the  FED  for  deposit  on  any  of 
ounts  described  in  paragraph  2  of  this 
jement,  other  than  Dollar  Account  No. 
r  receipt  and  execution  by  the  Bank  of 
tructions  referred  to  in  subparagraph 
ve,  shall  be  credited  in  accordance  with 

4tructions  of  the  Escrow  Agent  in  the 
rovided  in  paragraph  8  below,  to  the  ac- 
)f  Bank  Markazi  Iran  at  the  Bank,  sub- 
Bank  Markazi  Iran's  sole  direction,  and 
ar  Account  No.  3  and  Securities 
ly  Account  No.  2  at  the  Bank  in  the 
if  the  Escrow  Agent. 
Not  later  than  30  days  after  the  date 
the  Escrow  Agent  shall  instruct  the 
0  transfer  the  funds  and  securities  in 
iccounts  to  such  bank  as  the  Escrow 
shall  direct,  for  the  account  of  the  Ban- 
intrale  d'Algerie. 

(d)  Upon  receipt  by  the  Bank  of  instruc- 
rom  the  Escrow  Agent  to  do  so  in  the 
rovided  in  paragraph  8  below,  the  Bank 
as  soon  as  practicable  thereafter 

(i)  transfer  such  amount  as  may  be 
ed  in  the  instructions  from  Dollar  Ac- 
No.  2  to  the  FED,  subject  to  the  FED's 
•J  rection,  if  sufficient  funds  then  remain 
liar  Account  No.  2  to  make  such  transfer; 

(ii)  transfer  the  remaining  funds  on 
Account  No.  2  to  the  account  of  Bank 
zi  Iran  at  the  Bank,  subject  to  Bank 
,zi  Iran's  sole  direction,  and  close  Dollar 
nt  No.  2. 

(e)  The  Escrow  Agent  shall  not  be  en- 
,0  give  the  Bank  any  instiTiction  other 
escribed  in  this  paragraph  7,  and  the 
hall  be  entitled  and  bound  to  rely  on  any 

ction  falling  within  this  paragi'aph  7 
it  further  inquiry,  and  any  transfer  by 
ink  in  accordance  with  any  instructions 
to  them  under  this  paragraph  7  shall 
tute  a  good  discharge  to  the  Bank. 

(a)  The  Bank  and  the  Escrow  Agent 
ichange  telegraphic  keys  which  will  per- 
e  reciprocal  validation  of  messages  and 
mt  and  transfer  orders;  however,  the  in- 
ions  set  forth  in  paragraphs  7(a)  and  7(b) 
)e  in  writing,  shall  be  transmitted  by 
dther 


(i)  to  the  Bank  or 

(ii)  to  the  Deputy  Governor  of  the 
for  and  on  behalf  of  the  Bank  at  the 
h  Embassy  at  Algiers 


and  shall  be  authenticated  as  provided  in  sub- 
paragraph (b)  below.  In  the  event  that  a  tele- 
graphic test  is  challenged,  the  Bank  and  the 
Escrow  Agent  agree  to  contact  each  other  by 
telex  or  other  appropriate  means  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  in  order  to  obtain  confirmation  of  the 
authenticity  of  the  transmission. 

(b)  The  Bank  and  the  Escrow  Agent 
shall  provide  each  other  with  a  list,  which  will 
be  revised  whenever  necessary,  of  the  names 
of  the  persons  authorised  to  execute  any  writ- 
ten notice  or  instruction  required  or  permitted 
under  this  Arrangement  and  identify  the 
signatures  of  such  designated  persons;  all  such 
notices  or  instructions  to  the  Bank  shall  be  ef- 
fective on  receipt  by  the  Bank;  the  Bank  shall 
not  be  obliged  to  act  on  any  such  notice  or  in- 
struction unless  properly  so  authorised,  au- 
thenticated and  delivered  in  the  manner  re- 
quired by  this  paragraph. 

9.  Except  as  provided  in  paragi-aph  8  (a) 
above,  any  advices,  written  notices,  or  in- 
structions permitted  or  required  by  this  Ar- 
rangement shall  be  given  to  the  parties  hereto 
at  the  respective  addresses  shown  below: 

(i)  To  the  Bank  at: 

Threadneedle  Street 
London  EC2R  8AH 

ATTENTION:  D.H.R  Somerset 
J.G.  Drake 
W.B.  Moule 

(ii)  To  the  FED  at; 

33  Liberty  Street 
New-York,  New-York  10045 

ATTENTION:  H.  David  Willey 
George  Ryan 

(iii)  To  the  Escrow  Agent  at: 

8  Boulevard  Zirout  Youcef 
Algiers,  Algeria 

ATTENTION:  Mr.  Mohamed 
Bessekhouad 
Mr  Bachir  Sail 
Mr.  Mohand  Kirat 
Mr.  Lakhdar 
Benouataf 

10.  The  FED  shall  indemnify  and  hold  the 
Bank  harmless  against  and  shall  reimburse  the 
Bank  for  any  loss  or  expense  that  they  may 
incur  by  reason  of  their  acts  or  omissions 
under  or  in  connection  with  this  Arrangement, 
except  for 

(A)  Any  loss  or  expense  resulting  from 
their  own  negligence  or  wilful  misconduct  and 

(B)  Any  loss  arising  from  investment  of 
the  funds  held  for  the  Escrow  Agent  on  Dollar 
Accounts  No.  1,  No.  2  and  No.  3. 

11.  The  Bank  may  rely  and  shall  be  pro- 
tected in  acting  on  any  instrument,  instruc- 
tion, notice  or  direction  given  by  the  Escrow 
Agent  in  accordance  with  paragraph  7  reason- 
ably believed  by  them  to  be  genuine  and  to 
have  been  signed  or  dispatched  by  the  appro- 
priate person  or  persons. 


Feature 


12.  The  Bank  shall  not  be  liable  for  any  act 
or  omission  unless  such  act  or  omission  in- 
volves negligence  or  wilful  misconduct  on  the 
part  of  the  Bank.  This  paragraph  12  does  not 
apply  to  any  loss  arising  from  investment  of 
the  funds  held  for  the  Escrow  Agent  on  the 
Dollar  Accounts. 

13.  (a)  The  Bank  shall  advise  the  Escrow 
Agent  by  telex  as  soon  as  reasonably  practica- 
ble thereafter  of  all  changes  in  balances,  de- 
posits, interest  earned  and  withdrawals  on  the 
six  accounts  opened  and  maintained  by  the 
Bank  for  the  Escrow  Agent  as  provided  in 
paragraph  2  of  this  Arrangement. 

(b)  The  Bank  shall  provide  the  FED  by 
telex  with  a  list  of  all  debits  and  credits  to  the 
six  accounts  referred  to  in  subparagraph  (a) 
above. 

14.  The  Bank  and  the  FED  accept  that  the 
Escrow  Agent  is  a  central  bank,  whose  prop- 
erty is  normally  entitled  to  the  full  immunities 
of  a  central  bank  under  the  State  Immunity 
Act  of  1978  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Nothing  in 
this  Arrangement  shall  be  considered  as  con- 
stituting, in  whole  or  in  part,  a  waiver  of  any 
immunity  to  which  they  are  entitled. 

15.  Nothing  herein  shall  require  the  Bank 
to  violate  the  laws  of  England  or  any  court 
order  thereunder;  the  Bank  confirms  that  none 
of  the  provisions  of  this  Arrangement  is  in  vio- 
lation of  the  laws  of  England. 

16.  The  provisions  hereof  may  not  be 
modified  or  changed  except  by  an  instrument 
in  writing  duly  executed  by  or  on  behalf  of  the 
Escrow  Agent,  the  Bank  and  the  FED. 

17.  This  Arrangement  is  written  in  Eng- 
lish and  French  texts  but,  in  the  event  of  any 
conflict  between  the  two  texts,  the  EngUsh 
text  shall  prevail. 

18.  The  arrangements  described  herein 
shall  be  governed  by  and  construed  in  accord- 
ance with  the  laws  of  England. 

Dated  20th  of  January  1981 

BANQUE  CENTRALE  D'ALGERIE 

by  Mohamed  Bessekhouad 
Lakhdar  Benouataf 


THE  GOVERNOR  AND  COMPANY  OF 
THE  BANK  OF  ENGLAND 

by  C.  W.  McMahon 
D.H.F.  Somerset 


FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF 

NEW  YORK 

AS  FISCAL  AGENT  OF  THE  UNITED 

STATES 

by  Ernest  T.  Patrikis 


Feature 


SPECIAL  BRIEFING, 
JAN.  20,  1981 

Mr.  Muskie.  Now  that  the  principal  ob- 
ject of  the  efforts  that  have  been  under- 
way for  the  last  14  months  has  been 
achieved  and  consummated,  it  is  impor- 
tant that  you  and,  through  you,  the 
American  people  understand  the  agree- 
ments which  have  made  that  possible.  I 
know  you've  all  been  curious  about  the 
facts  that  we  hope  we  can  make  available 
to  you  this  afternoon.  I  have  appreciated 
your  patience  when  I  and  others  have  re- 
sisted giving  you  some  of  this  informa- 
tion, but  now  is  the  time  for  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  get  the  whole  story  and  this 
briefing  this  afternoon  is  designed  to 
move  us  toward  that  objective  as  well. 

And  so  if  I  may,  I  will  briefly  outline 
the  nature  of  the  agi-eements  which  led  to 
the  release  of  the  hostages  today.  We  and 
the  Iranian  Government  have  given  the 
Algerian  Government  interdependent 
commitments  for  a  resolution  of  the  hos- 
tage crisis.  These  commitments  are  in  ac- 
cord with  the  objectives  we  stated  at  the 
outset  of  this  crisis — the  safe  return  of 
our  people  on  terms  consistent  with  our 
national  honor  and  interests. 

A  guiding  principle  in  negotiating 
the  agreement  has  been  to  return  matters 
insofar  as  possible  to  where  they  stood 
before  the  hostages  were  seized — that  is, 
to  return  property  owned  by  Iran  at  the 
same  time  that  our  people  are  released, 
while  protecting  legitimate  U.S.  claim- 
ants. 

Let  me  emphasize  that  the  assets 
that  will  be  returned  are  Iranian  property 
in  the  custody  of  persons  subject  to  U.S. 
jurisdiction  here  and  abroad.  These  as- 
sets were  blocked  by  the  President  on 
November  14,  1979,  shortly  after  the 
takeover  of  our  Embassy.  After  careful 
and  thorough  evaluation  of  all  relevant 
factors,  the  terms  of  the  arrangement 
were  determined  to  be  fair  and  techni- 
cally feasible. 

The  first  step  in  the  implementation 
process  called  for  a  number  of  categories 
of  Iranian  assets  to  be  transferred  to  an 
escrow  account  with  the  Bank  of  England 
in  the  name  of  the  Algerian  Central 
Bank. 

The  Government  of  Iran  then  had  to 
certify  to  the  Algerian  Central  Bank  that 
the  52  hostages  had  safely  departed  Iran. 
Only  when  it  had  been  done  so  could  the 
Algerian  Central  Bank  release  a  certain 
portion  of  these  assets  to  Iran.  These 
steps  have  now  been  taken. 


One  category  of  the  assets  of  which  I 
am  speaking  included  those  Iranian  secu- 
rities in  the  custody  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Bank  in  New  York. 

Another  category  of  Iranian  assets 
comprised  those  assets  in  foreign 
branches  of  U.S.  banks.  These  funds  with 
interest,  including  more  than  1.6  million 
ounces  of  gold,  total  just  under  .$8  billion. 

Of  these  funds,  $3.7  billion  will  be 
used  to  prepay  the  bank  loans,  and  $1.4 
billion  will  remain  in  escrow  until  any 
disputed  bank  loans  and  interest  are 
sorted  out.  Most  of  the  claims  of  these 
American  banks  are  thus  immediately 
settled,  and  other  claims  are  100%  pro- 
tected with  the  amounts  in  escrow. 

Finally,  Iranian  assets  in  domestic 
branches  of  U.S.  banks  and  all  other  Ira- 
nian assets  located  in  the  U.S.  or  abroad 
in  the  custody  of  persons  subject  to  U.S. 
jurisdiction  will  be  transferred  to  the  se- 
curity account. 

Mr.  Miller.  Will  be  unblocked. 

Mr.  Muskie.  Yes.  They'll  be  un- 
blocked. 

Mr.  Miller.  They'll  be  unblocked  and 
used  partially  for  Iran  and  partially  for  a 
security  account. 

Mr.  Muskie.  There  may  be  an  addi- 
tional $1  to  $2  billion  or  so  in  other  assets. 
In  the  context  of  the  release  of  these  as- 
sets, Iran  is  committed  to  resolve  certain 
claims  by  U.S.  nationals  under  an  agi'eed 
claims  settlement  procedure  involving  an 
international  arbitration  tribunal  estab- 
lished by  the  agreement. 

By  Executive  order,  the  President 
ordered  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
license  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
York  to  effect  the  transfer  of  those  assets 
in  the  Fed's  custody.  That  transfer  had  to 
be  completed  before  the  hostages  could 
be  released. 

The  United  States  will  lift  import 
and  export  sanctions  under  the  agree- 
ment once  the  hostages  are  released. 
These  sanctions  have  imposed  real  costs 
on  Iran  in  terms  of  greatly  curtailed  eco- 
nomic activity  and  substantial  diplomatic 
isolation.  The  sanctions  weighed  increas- 
ingly heavily  on  Iran  the  longer  the  hos- 
tages were  held. 

An  additional  aspect  of  the  agree- 
ment concerns  the  assets  that  may  be  lo- 
cated here  of  the  former  Shah  and  his 
family.  The  initial  Iranian  demand  for  the 
immediate  return  of  the  Shah's  property 
was  unacceptable  as  a  matter  of  principle 
and  law,  and  we've  consistently  rejected 
that  demand. 


We  have,  however,  undertaken  tr 
block  the  transfer  from  the  United  St; 
of  any  properties  belonging  to  the  Sh; 
estate  that  may  be  located  here,  and  t 
inform  the  U.S.  courts  of  the  U.S.  Go 
ernment  position  that  claims  by  Iran 
seeking  recovery  of  the  Shah's  assets 
not  legally  barred  here  by  sovereign  i 
munity  or  by  the  act  of  state  doctrine 

I  would  like  to  reiterate  our  deep 
preciation  for  the  assistance  of  the  Al; 
rian  intermediaries  throughout  these 
ficult  weeks.  They  have  carried  out  tl 
responsibilities  in  a  comprehensive  an 
thoroughly  professional  manner  We  a 
in  Algeria's  debt,  and  its  assistance  w 
be  long  remembered  by  those  of  us  wl 
have  been  associated  with  their  effort 
and  by  the  American  people. 

I  would  like  to  go  to  Bill  Miller  m 
and  Ben  Civiletti,  both  of  whom,  wit! 
their  people,  have  been  of  enormous  i 
sistance  with  the  legal  and  technical  a 
pects  of  these  agreements. 

Mr.  Miller.  Thank  you,  Secretai-j 
Muskie.  Let  me  just  call  attention  ag; 
to  the  principles  that  Secretary  Musk 
outlined.  I  won't  repeat  them,  but  th( 
important  to  remember — not  only  th* 
lease  of  the  assets,  but  insofar  as  pos; 
ble,  getting  back  to  the  condition  that 
existed  before  the  taking  of  hostages 
the  freezing  of  assets. 

Now,  with  the  principles  in  mind 
would  like  to  just  explain  a  little  mon 
how  this  works  so  that  you  will  have 
little  better  understanding. 

Secretary  Muskie  mentioned  the 
categories  of  assets  that  have  been 
blocked,  and  I  will  just  call  again  to  y 
attention  that  there  were  three  main 
categories  from  our  point  of  planning. 

•  One  were  the  assets  that  were 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
York.  That,  of  course,  is  the  central  b 
of  the  United  States  and,  therefore,  t 
assets  really  are  under  government  c( 
trol  and  have  a  different  category  of  ii 
portance  than  one  held  by  private  par 
ties. 

•  The  second  category  would  be  I 
deposits  held  in  branches  of  U.S.  banl- 
outside  the  United  States.  These  fund 
are  held  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Fran 
and  Germany  and  are  subject  to  the  la 
and  circumstances  of  those  countries, 
they  again  can  be  treated  differently  f 
other  assets. 

•  The  third  general  category  wou 
be  all  the  other  assets  held  by  or  unde 
the  control  of  U.S.  nationals  or  persor 
the  United  States  itself.  This  not  only 


16 


Department  of  State  Bull 


ed  bank  deposits  but  it  would  also  in- 
li  e  other  financial  assets — other  prop- 
ii  ;s — that  were  the  properties  of  the 
t  ernment  of  Iran  or  its  instrumen- 

ies. 

The  two  that  we  could  deal  with  in 
principle  of  ti-ying  to  unblock  the  as- 
at  the  time  the  hostages  were  re- 
;d,  the  two  we  could  deal  with  most 
ily  were  the  first  two — the  assets 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  and  those  lo- 
d  overseas.  So,  for  that  reason,  we 
itually  arrived  at  the  solution  setting 
n  arrangement  to  transfer  those  as- 
into  escrow  in  the  Bank  of  England 
le  account  of  the  Central  Bank  of 
;ria  so  that  they  would  be  marshaled 
ready  to  be  used  and  released  for  the 
)oses  intended  at  such  time  as  the 
ages  were  out  of  Iran. 
If  the  hostages  were  not  released, 
those  funds  would  be  turned  back  to 
re  they  came  from  and  we'd  be  back 
e  we  were,  so  no  harm  would  have 
1  done.  We  would  not  have,  in  any 
gi  lost  control.  We  were  protected  in 
ti  regard.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the 
iielages  were  certified  to  be  free,  then 
ost  control  and  the  distribution  of  the 
3w  fund  was  agreed  to.  Of  course, 
happy  event  did  in  fact  come  about. 
And  so  today,  having  marshaled  the 
ts  in  the  escrow  account  last  night, 
vere  able  to  have  a  certificate  from 
entral  Bank  of  Algeria  that  the  hos- 
s  were  free,  and  so  the  funds  were 
iirsed. 

Let  me  again  run  over  the  figures  of 
Funds  going  into  escrow,  and  what 
yi  oens  to  them  when  they  come  out  so 
will  understand  that  a  little  better 
etary  Muskie  used  the  figure  of  about 
illion.  Let  me  be  a  little  more  precise, 
escrow  became  effective  only  if  it 
d  be  certified  that  not  less  than 
55  billion  were  in  escrow.  That  was 
lired  for  the  transaction  to  work.  Ac- 
ly,  this  morning  the  Bank  of  England 
able  to  certify  that  $7,977  billion  of 
ts  were  in  the  account,  and  so  it  ob- 
sly  met  the  condition. 
The  assets  in  the  account  consisted 
Dout  $5.5  billion  of  deposits  and  inter- 
m  deposits  in  U.S.  bank  branches 
ad.  Those  were,  in  a  very  comph- 
d  transaction,  moved  into  the  Federal 
(j  erve  Bank  of  New  York  account  and 
1  moved  into  an  account  of  the  Fed- 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  in  the 
k  of  England,  and  then  moved  into 
ow. 

In  addition,  the  Federal  Reserve  it- 
had  held,  as  I  mentioned,  assets  of 
1.  Those  that  were  represented  by  se- 


liilll  riiaru  1Qft1 


ink 


■an 


curities  and  cash  items  came  to  about  $1.4 
billion.  In  addition,  the  Federal  Reserve 
held  gold  that  belonged  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran,  and  as  Secretary  Muskie 
pointed  out,  that  was  something  over  1.6 
"lillion  ounces  of  gold,  which  were  valued 
lur  this  purpose,  on  a  fixed  valuation 
date,  at  about  $940  million. 

Then  there  were  miscellaneous  as- 
sets coming  from  custody  accounts  and 
securities  that  added  up  to  the  balance 
and  the  total  came  to  $7,977  billion.  Once 
that  was  certified  and  that  certification 
was  passed  in  Algiers  by  the  Deputy 
Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  to  the 
Deputy  Governor  of  the  Central  Bank  of 
Algeria,  the  process  started  whereby  all 
of  the  governments  involved  were 
notified  of  that,  and  the  Iranian  Govern- 
ment undertook  then  to  start  the  process 
of  releasing  the  hostages. 

When  the  announcement  was  made 
that  the  hostages  had  crossed  the  frontier 
and  were  out  of  Iranian  territory,  then 
the  distribution  of  these  assets  began. 
That  is  under  way — I  think  is  actually 
substantially  completed. 

The  first  fund  I  mentioned,  to  re- 
peat, is  that  about  $3.7  billion  was  re- 
turned to  the  Federal  Reserve  to  be 
applied  to  pay  off  syndicated  loans  in 
which  U.S.  banks  were  participating,  in- 
cluding interest  up  to  a  settlement  date. 
That,  we  understand  and  we  expect,  will 
pay  off  all  those  syndicated  loans,  so  they 
will  be  completely  paid  off. 

The  $1.4  biUion  will  remain  in  the  es- 
crow account,  and  it  will  be  used,  under 
binding  arbitration,  first  under  opportu- 
nities to  negotiate  bilaterally  and  to  come 
to  settlement  but,  if  not  settled  under 
binding  arbitration,  to  pay  for  any  addi- 
tional bank  loans  that  are  not  syndicated, 
or  any  disputes  on  the  amounts  of  them, 
or  any  disputes  on  the  amount  of  interest 
due.  The  balance  in  the  fund,  if  you  take 
the  $3.7  and  $1.4 — whatever  is  left  over 
— has  been  transferred  to  Iran  free  and 
clear.  It  is  now  in  their  hands. 

Let's  turn  to  the  third  category  of 
assets,  those  in  the  United  States.  These 
will  be  unblocked,  and  in  due  course  on  a 
much  slower  process,  because  they  are 
much  more  complicated  to  gain  control 
and  transfer  of  those  assets — at  a  much 
slower  pace — they,  too,  will  be  handled 
under  explicit  instructions.  As  they  are 
made  available,  they  will,  through  bank- 
ing arrangements,  end  up  in  going  50%  to 
the  Government  of  Iran  and  50%  into  a 
security  account  until  that  security  ac- 
count reaches  $1  billion.  Once  it  reaches 
$1  billion,  all  other  released  assets  go  to 
the  Government  of  Iran. 


Feature 


Then  there  is  an  international  claims 
settlement  agreement,  which  will  provide 
for  binding  arbitration  under  an  interna- 
tional tribunal,  the  settlement  claims  of 
American  interests  against  Iran,  and  that 
$1  billion  will  be  used  to  pay  those  claims. 
And  the  Government  of  Iran  has  a  com- 
mitment to  maintain  that  security  ac- 
count at  a  minimum  balance  of  $500  mil- 
lion, so  as  claims  are  paid,  if  a  claim 
should  reduce  the  balance  below  $500  mil- 
lion, the  Government  of  Iran  will  re- 
plenish it,  so  that  there  will  be  security 
for  those  claims. 

That,  I  think,  gives  you  a  little  bet- 
ter understanding  of  the  mechanism  by 
which  this  works.  Obviously,  this  was  a 
complicated  transaction — perhaps  the 
largest  transfer  of  funds  of  private  inter- 
ests ever  accomplished — and  therefore 
did  have  its  complications  and  its  periods 
of  perilous  exposure  to  the  fragility  of  the 
whole  mechanism  of  marshaling  and 
transferring  assets. 

I  would  be  happy,  of  course,  to  ex- 
pand upon  this  and  other  aspects,  but  I 
want  merely,  before  I  end  my  remarks,  to 
express  my  particular  appreciation — not 
only  to  Secretary  Muskie  and  Warren 
Christopher,  who  have  done  such  a  mag- 
nificent job,  the  whole  Department  of 
State,  and  all  the  other  departments  of 
the  government.  But  in  my  own  Depart- 
ment of  the  Treasuiy,  I  have  to  say  that  I 
don't  believe  this  transaction  could  have 
been  completed  without  the  dedicated 
work  over  endless  time  by  Deputy  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  Robert  Carswell  and 
by  Assistant  Secretary  Richard  Davis. 
They  have  just  worked  so  intensely  on 
this.  I  could  name  many  others. 

We  also  appreciate  the  tremendous 
cooperation  we  have  received  from  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  in  New  York  and 
the  Federal  Reserve  system  and  from  all 
the  banks  and  their  attorneys  and  repre- 
sentatives. You  may  have  heard  during 
the  process  of  this  that  there  was  per- 
ceived to  be  some  difficulty  with  U.S. 
banks.  Let  me  assure  you  that  was  not 
true.  We  did  not  comment  at  the  time  be- 
cause it  was  too  delicate  a  matter  for  us 
to  try  to  intervene. 

The  banks  have  participated  and 
rendered  full  cooperation.  They  tried  for 
a  long  time  to  work  out,  in  secret  negoti- 
ations, a  settlement  of  their  overseas  de- 
posits and  claims  with  the  Iranians 
through  the  use  of  both  U.S.  attorneys 
and  European  attorneys.  We  tried  to 
combine  that  negotiation  at  one  time  with 
a  program  to  release  the  hostages.  That 
did  not  succeed.  We  eventually  came  to 
this  scheme;  and  once  we  moved  to  this 
scheme,  their  cooperation  was  absolute. 


17 


Feature 


Not  only  in  weeks  and  months  be- 
fore, but  starting  last  Friday,  there  was 
around-the-clock — and  I  mean  continu- 
ously around-the-clock — involvement 
with  banks  and  attorneys  in  Algiers,  in 
London,  in  New  York,  and  in  Washington 
working  this  very  complicated  transac- 
tion. The  only  people  who  benefited  most 
perhaps  was  AT&T  [American  Telephone 
&  Telegraph  Co.]  because  we  had  open 
telephone  lines  that  ran  up  some  bills. 

I  do  want  to  say  that  it  was  a  mag- 
nificent performance  by  everyone  on  our 
side,  and  I'm  indeed  very  proud  to  have 
been  even  a  small  part  of  it. 

Mr.  Muskie.  Thank  you.  Bill.  I 
A^ould  like  to  add  my  words  of  commen- 
dation to  all  of  those  who  participated, 
not  only  everyone  at  this  table  but  almost 
countless  others  on  both  sides  of  the  At- 
lantic who  contributed  to  this.  It  is  an  in- 
credible picture  of  the  stamina,  determi- 
nation, patience,  and  ingenuity  that  can 
be  applied  to  a  problem  of  this  complex- 
ity. I've  been  proud  to  be  part  of  it,  and  I 
thank  all  of  my  colleagues. 

Q.  Mr.  Muskie,  you  talk  of  the 
basic  principle  of  returning  the  situa- 
tion to  the  status  as  it  was  when  the 
hostages  were  seized.  At  that  time  we 
had  diplomatic  relations  with  Iran,  we 
had  a  limited  military  supply  relation- 
ship, we  gave  visas  fairly  freely,  and 
Americans  were  allowed  to  travel  in 
Iran.  The  President,  under  certain  acts, 
changed  all  that  in  the  course  of  the 
past  14  months.  Are  any  of  those  ac- 
tions going  to  be  undone? 

Mr.  Muskie.  I  suspect  that  those 
matters  will  have  to  be  dealt  with  as  time 
unfolds.  The  principle  to  which  I  referred 
applied  to  the  release  of  the  hostages  and 
restoring  our  financial  arrangements  to 
what  they  were  before  the  hostages  were 
seized,  not  to  all  of  the  aspects  of  diplo- 
matic recognition  and  normal  trade  and 
so  on.  Obviously,  the  nonintervention 
agreement  which  the  Iranian  side  insisted 
upon  will  impact  upon  some  of  those 
points  that  you  raised.  That's  there  wish, 
and  as  far  as  we're  concerned,  we  were 
willing  to  sign  that.  Our  relationship  will 
have  to  develop  in  the  future  as  both 
countries  may  see  it  in  their  interest  to 
pursue. 

Mr.  Miller.  I  hope  you  will  note  in 
the  Secretai-y's  comments,  though,  that 
the  sanctions,  the  explicit  sanctions  were 
raised. 

Mr.  Muskie.  Yes. 


Q.  Mr.  Civiletti,  could  you  explain 
how,  legally,  the  United  States  goes 
about  blocking  all  claims  like  actions 
and  so  forth  against  Iran,  and  how  it 
goes  about  freezing  all  the  assets  of  the 
Shah,  his  estate,  and  so  forth,  and 
whether  there  are  potential  constitu- 
tional problems  to  that? 

Mr.  Civiletti.  There  undoubtedly  will 
be  litigation  about  those  issues.  We  ex- 
pect to  file  papers  in  some  of  the  out- 
standing cases  either  late  tonight  or  to- 
morrow morning  indicating  a  statement 
of  interest,  laying  out  before  the  court 
the  actions  that  have  been  taken  and  the 
legal  authorities  under  which  those  ac- 
tions have  been  taken. 

Essentially,  the  authority  for  all  the 
actions  that  have  been  taken  arise  both 
from  the  Constitution  and  the  President's 
powers  under  the  Constitution  and  from 
statutory  sources,  particularly  the  Inter- 
national Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act,  the  Hostage  Act,  and  the  President's 
constitutional  powers  with  regard  to  the 
conduct  of  foreign  affairs,  with  regard  to 
recognition  of  foreign  powers,  and  with 
regard  to  the  exercise  of  these  powers 
under  these  statutes. 

Each  of  the  Executive  orders  that 
have  been  issued — and  there  are  about  10 
of  them  altogether — are  exercised  under 
these  acts.  It's  the  circumstance  where 
there  is  a  confluence,  where  the  Presi- 
dent's powers  are  at  their  greatest  when 
he  is  exercising  power  under  both  the 
Constitution  and  under  specific  statutes. 
What  we've  done  in  effect  is,  in  most  in- 
stances, with  a  few  rare  exceptions,  pro- 
vide by  this  settlement  for  an  alternative 
means  by  which  the  interests  of  claimants 
have  either  been  taken  care  of,  as  have 
been  indicated  by  some  payments  which 
are  already  being  made,  or  by  the  U.S.- 
Iran claims  tribunal  procedure  with 
agreements  with  regard  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  fund  of  $500  million.  I  hope 
that  partially  answers  your  question. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  that  under  this 
International  Emergency  Powers  Act 
the  President  has  the  power  to  block 
any  suits  and  so  forth? 

Mr.  Civiletti.  Yes.  When  he  blocked 
the  assets,  a  subsequent  Executive  order 
allowed  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to 
promulgate  regulations  permitting  the  fil- 
ing of  suits,  reserving  the  power  to  with- 
draw that  authorization;  and  the  statute 
itself  gives  the  President  the  power  to 
make  null  and  void  any  interests  in  prop- 
erty which  are  subject  to  the  emergency 
which  gave  rise  to  the  exercise  of  the 
power  And,  as  I  mentioned,  the  Presi- 
dent has  acted  here  under  the  confluence 


of  not  only  that  statute  but  the  Hostaj 
Act,  as  well  as  his  constitutional  powe 
with  regard  to  the  settlement  of  interi 
tional  claims  and  disputes. 

Q.  In  the  question  of  other  asset 
how  much  in  military  spares  is  left? 
How  much  has  been  subsumed  by  th 
U.S.  military  forces? 

Mr.  Muskie.  I  don't  have  an  invei 
tory  available  to  me  of  that  material.  ' 
issue  of  military  equipment  and  suppli 
in  the  pipeline  before  November  4,  19'i 
was  not  directly  addressed  in  the  negc 
ations.  You  will  not  see  it  in  any  of  the 
documents,  and  so  it  is  not  a  current 
issue. 

Q.  Mr.  Miller,  can  you  tell  us  wh 
the  certain  undertakings  of  the  Gov- 
ernments of  the  United  States  and  Ii 
are  that  are  referred  to  in  the  declar 
tion  that  was  issued  yesterday. 

Mr.  Miller.  Those  are  mainly  the 
nancial  aspects  that  I've  described. 

Mr.  Muskie.  Yes. 

Mr.  Miller.  The  undertakings  to  I 
we  accomplished  all  this  in  the  financii 
area. 

Q.  Mr.  Secretary,  can  you  tell  us 
how  the  shape  of  this  deal  emerged- 
when,  what  were  the  initiatives?  Wh 
were  the  final  points  that  had  to  be  i 
solved  and  when  were  they  resolved?' 

Mr.  Muskie.  Well,  that's  a  long  st 
and  I  will  try  to  give  you  a  brief  outliii: 

It  all  started,  I  gather,  when  I  ad*- 
dressed  a  letter  to  the  then  newly 
selected  Prime  Minister— Mr  Rajai— 
which  I  indicated  the  need  from  our  p^ 
spective  of  undertaking  in  some  way  t 
resolve  our  differences  and,  as  I  think 
used  the  phrase,  "mutually  perceived 
grievances."  I  think  that  was  in  late  A 
gust. 

In  September,  Khomeini  laid  dowi 
four  points  as  a  basis  for  settlement.  I) 
the  same  four  points  basically  that  this 
agreement  is  built  upon.  We  did  not  kn 
how  authoritative  it  was  or  whether  it 
was  the  totality,  and  those  four  points 
eluded  some  points  that  Iranians  had  ii 
sisted  upon  prior  to  that  time.  We  wer 
curious  about  that  and  we  undertook  t 
pursue  those  questions  through  the  va 
ous  channels  that  we  were  using  at  tha 
time  and  since.  And  we  began  to  addrt 
ourselves  to  the  possibilities  of  meetin] 
the  four  points. 

When  one  reads  the  four  points  lit 
ally,  they  obviously  called,  in  light  of  tl 
facts  we've  given  you  here  today,  upon 
to  do  things  that  we  were  not  in  a  posi 
tion  to  do. 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


o  we  undertook,  with  the  help  of  so 
people,  to  shape  any  response  that 
be  within  the  framework  of  the 
oints  laid  down  by  him  at  that  time, 
irsued  those  through  channels  in- 
g  Iranians,  and  not  those  who  were 
itely  the  decision-makers  in  Iran 
hers  who  were  also,  so  far  as  we 
see,  in  a  position  to  evaluate  the 
jn  of  Iran  in  this  situation.  Secre- 
liller  has  already  indicated  one  of 
•preaches  to  this  problem  that  we 
ed  until,  I  think  it  was,  last  week, 
•an's  final  proposal  in  the  last  week 
lays  changed  the  framework.  We 
most  immediately  that  it  was  a  bet- 
e,  and  we  proceeded  to  pick  it  up. 
;  not  inconsistent  with  what  we  had 
place  in  terms  of  the  resources  or 
sets  that  we  could  transfer;  it 
i  the  method  for  handling  it,  and 
how  we  came  down. 
.'s  much  more  complicated  than 
couldn't  possibly  give  you  every 

d  like  to  pay  some  tributes  to  some 
ic  people  who  haven't  been  men- 
,  if  I  might.  Lloyd  Cutler,  General 
tel  to  the  White  House,  who  was 
aperb  in  the  quality  of  the  legal  ad- 
nd  the  practical  judgment  which  he 
nt  to  this.  Warren  Christopher — 
he  whole  country  knows  his  abili- 
iid  his  qualities  of  leadership  in  ne- 
ion.  He  was  the  team  leader  and  did 
lendous  job  of  putting  all  these 
together. 
Ihere  are  so  many  others — I  know 
aving  out  names.  I'd  like  to  attest 
)  Carswell's  contribution  and  Rich 
and  everybody  else  here.  It's  been 
iiendous  effort. 

nd  when  the  full  story  is  told — and 
t  know  that  you  want  it  all  at  once 
line  was  a  pretty  straight  one  from 
mber  down  to  today,  pretty 
ht.  The  framework  was  there.  The 
3  were  difficult  to  put  together — 
I  g  ways  of  freeing  assets,  dealing 
■laims,  finding  ways  to  put  in  Iran's 
sufficient  assets  to  make  the 
ment  proposal  attractive. 
lU  of  the  prospects  for  doing  this 
ved  with  the  onset  of  the  Iran-Iraq 
or  obvious  reasons:  the  pressures 
liat  generated  for  Iran  economically 
II  other  ways.  So,  although  we  found 

Iny  obstacles  along  the  way  that 
3een  frustrating,  including  the  last 
hours,  at  the  same  time  events  and 
ures  of  one  kind  or  another  also  fell 
•ay  to  enable  us  to  move  to  this 


Thank  you  all  very  much  for  your  pa- 
tience through  this  ordeal.  I've  been 
amazed,  may  I  say,  at  the  quality  and  the 
accuracy  of  the  press  coverage  of  the  last 
48  hours  in  terms  of  facts  that  we  thought 
•  e  had  pretty  much  excluded  you  from. 
[Laughter.]  You  have  a  way.  Thank  you. 

WELCOMING  CEREMONY, 
THE  WHITE  HOUSE, 
JAN.  27,  198P 

President  Reagan 

Welcome  to  the  Ambassadors  of  our 
friends  in  neighboring  countries  who  are 
here  today.  And  I  can  think  of  no  better 
way  to  let  you  know  how  Nancy  and  I 
feel  about  your  presence  here  today  than 
to  say  on  behalf  of  us,  of  the  Vice  Presi- 
dent and  Barbara,  the  Senators,  the 
Members  of  Congress,  the  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  and  all  of  our  fellow  citizens, 
these  simple  words:  Welcome  home. 

You  are  home,  and  believe  me,  you're 
welcome.  If  my  remarks  were  a  sermon, 
my  text  would  be  lines  from  the  126th 
Psalm,  "We  were  like  those  who  dreamed. 
Now  our  mouth  is  filled  with  laughter 
and  our  tongue  with  shouts  of  joy.  The 
Lord  has  done  great  things  for  us.  We  are 
glad."  You've  come  home  to  a  people  who 
for  444  days  suffered  the  pain  of  your  im- 
prisonment, prayed  for  your  safety,  and 
most  importantly,  shared  your  determina- 
tion that  the  spirit  of  free  men  and 
women  is  not  a  fit  subject  for  barter 

You've  represented  under  great 
stress  the  highest  traditions  of  public 
service.  Your  conduct  is  symbolic  of  the 
millions  of  professional  diplomats,  mili- 
tary personnel,  and  others  who  have  ren- 
dered service  to  their  countiy 

We're  now  aware  of  the  conditions 
under  which  you  were  imprisoned. 
Though  now  is  not  the  time  to  review 
evei-y  abhorrent  detail  of  your  cruel  con- 
finement, believe  me,  we  know  what 
happened.  Ti'uth  may  be  a  rare  commod- 
ity today  in  Iran;  it's  alive  and  well  in 
America. 

By  no  choice  of  your  own,  you've  en- 
tered the  ranks  of  those  who  throughout 
our  histoiy  have  undergone  the  ordeal  of 
imprisonment:  the  crew  of  the  Pueblo, 
the  prisoners  in  two  World  Wars  and  in 
Korea  and  Vietnam.  And  like  those 
others,  you  are  special  to  us.  You  fulfilled 
your  duty  as  you  saw  it,  and  now  like  the 
others,  thank  God  you're  home,  and  our 
hearts  are  full  of  gratitude. 


Feature 


I'm  told  that  Sergeant  Lopez  here 
put  up  a  sign  in  his  cell,  a  sign  that  nor- 
mally would  have  been  torn  down  by 
those  guards.  But  this  one  was  written  in 
Spanish,  and  his  guards  didn't  know  that 
"Viva  la  roja,  bianco,  y  azul"  means 
"Long  hve  the  red,  white,  and  blue." 
They  may  not  understand  what  that 
means  in  Iran,  but  we  do.  Sergeant 
Lopez,  and  you've  filled  our  hearts  with 
pride.  Muchas  Gracias. 

Two  days  ago,  Nancy  and  I  met  with 
your  families  here  at  the  White  House. 
We  know  that  you  were  lonely  during 
that  dreadful  period  of  captivity,  but  you 
were  never  alone.  Your  wives  and  chil- 
dren, your  mothers  and  dads,  your 
brothers  and  sisters  were  so  full  of 
prayers  and  love  for  you  that  whether 
you  were  conscious  of  it  or  not,  it  must 
have  sustained  you  during  some  of  the 
worst  times.  No  power  on  Earth  could 
prevent  them  from  doing  that.  Their 
courage,  endurance,  and  strength  were  of 
heroic  measure,  and  they're  admired  by 
all  of  us. 

But  to  get  down  now  to  more  mun- 
dane things,  in  case  you  have  a  question 
about  your  personal  futures,  you'll  prob- 
ably have  less  time  to  rest  than  you'd 
like.  While  you  were  on  your  way  to 
Germany,  I  signed  a  hiring  freeze  in  the 
Federal  Government.  In  other  words,  we 
need  you,  your  country  needs  you,  and 
your  bosses  are  panting  to  have  you  back 
on  the  job. 

Now,  I'll  not  be  so  fooUsh  as  to  say 
forget  what  you've  been  through;  you 
never  will.  But  turn  the  page  and  look 
ahead,  and  do  so  knowing  that  for  all  who 
served  their  countiy,  whether  in  the  For- 
eign Service,  the  military,  or  as  private 
citizens,  freedom  is  indivisible.  Your  free- 
dom and  your  individual  dignity  are  much 
cherished.  Those  henceforth  in  the  repre- 
sentation of  this  Nation  will  be  accorded 
evei-y  means  of  protection  that  America 
can  offer. 

Let  terrorists  be  aware  that  when 
the  rules  of  international  behavior  are 
violated,  our  policy  will  be  one  of  swift 
and  effective  retribution.  We  hear  it  said 
that  we  live  in  an  era  of  limit  to  our  pow- 
ers. Well,  let  it  also  be  understood,  there 
are  limits  to  our  patience. 

Now,  I'm  sure  that  you'll  want  to 
know  that  with  us  here  today  are  families 
of  the  eight  heroic  men  who  gave  their 
lives  in  the  attempt  to  effect  your  rescue. 
"Greater  glory  hath  no  man  than  that  he 
lay  down  his  life  for  another."  And  with 
us  also  are  Colonel  Beckwith  and  some  of 
the  men  who  did  return  from  that  mis- 


Feature 


sion.  We  ask  God's  special  healing  for 
those  who  suffered  wounds  and  His  com- 
fort to  those  who  lost  loved  ones.  To 
them,  to  you,  and  to  your  families,  again, 
welcome  from  all  America  and  thank  you 
for  making  us  proud  to  be  Americans. 

And  now,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  I  call 
on,  to  speak  for  this  wonderful  group  of 
returnees,  Bruce  Laingen,  Charge  d' Af- 
faires in  Tehran.  Mr.  Laingen. 

Mr.  Laingen 

Mr.  President,  Mrs.  Reagan,  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  Vice  President  and  Mrs. 
Bush— I  think  I've  got  that  out  of  order 
of  priority  in  protocol  tenns— members 
of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  who  are  here, 
and  all  you  beautiful  people  out  there: 

I'm  not  sure  I'm  capable  of  this  after 
that  emotionally  draining  but  beautiful 
experience  that  all  of  us  have  just  had  on 
the  streets  of  this  magnificent  city,  Mr. 
President.  I  hope  you  were  watching  TV, 
because  I  don't  think  any  of  us  Americans 
have  ever  seen  anything  quite  like  it, 
quite  so  spontaneous,  quite  so  beautiful  in 
terms  of  the  best  qualities  of  our  people. 
And  we  are  deeply  gi-ateful  for  it. 

Mr  President,  our  flight  to  freedom 
is  now  complete:  thanks  to  the  prayers 
and  good-will  of  countless  millions  of 
people,  not  just  in  this  country  but  all 
around  the  world;  the  assistance  of  those 
many  countries  and  governments  who 
understood  the  values  and  principles  that 
were  at  stake  in  this  crisis;  and  the  love 
and  affection  of  our  countrymen  from  all 
those  tens  of  thousands  out  there  on  the 
streets  today,  to  that  lady  that  we  saw 
standing  on  a  hillside  as  we  came  in  from 
Andrews,  all  alone,  with  no  sign,  no  one 
around  her,  holding  her  hand  to  her  heart 
— the  enveloping  love  and  affection  of 
smalltown  America  of  the  kind  we  wit- 
nessed in  that  wonderful  2-day  stop  in 
New  York  State,  West  Point  and  its  envi- 
rons; and  last,  but  not  least,  on  this  flight 
to  freedom,  the  United  States  Air  Force 
on  Freedom  I. 

Mr.  President,  I  give  you  now  52 
Americans,  supplemented  by  a  53d  today, 
Richard  Queen  sitting  over  here,  over- 
joyed in  reunion  with  our  families,  the 
real  heroes  in  this  crisis;  53  Americans, 
proud  to  rejoin  their  professional  col- 
leagues who  had  made  their  flight  to 
freedom  earlier — our  6  colleagues  who 
came  here  with  the  great  cooperation  and 
friendship  of  our  Canadian  friends,  and 
our  13  who  came  earlier  I  give  you  now 
53  Americans,  proud,  as  I  said  earlier  to- 
day, to  record  their  undying  respect  and 
affection  for  the  families  of  those  brave 
eight  men  who  gave  their  lives  so  that  we 


L.  Bruce  Laingen,  the  senior  U.S.  diplomat  released  from  Iran,  is  welcomed  to  the  White  H( 
by  Mrs.  Reagan  while  President  Reagan  and  Vice  President  Bush  look  on.  Thomas  L.  Aherii 
another  released  American,  is  behind  Mr.  Laingen. 


might  be  free,  53  of  us  proud  today,  this 
afternoon,  and  also  to  see  and  to  meet 
with  some  of  those  families  and  Colonel 
Beckwith  and  some  of  those  who  came 
back.  Fifty-three  Americans  who  will  al- 
ways have  a  love  affair  vdth  this  country 
and  who  join  with  you  in  a  prayer  of 
thanksgiving  for  the  way  in  which  this 
crisis  has  strengthened  the  spirit  and  re- 
silience and  strength  that  is  the  mark  of  a 
truly  free  society. 

Mr.  President,  we've  seen  a  lot  of 
signs  along  the  road,  here  and  up  in  New 
York.  They  are  marvelous  signs,  as  is  the 
spirit  and  enthusiasm  that  accompanies 
this,  what  we've  been  calling  "a  celebra- 
tion of  freedom."  They  are  signs  that 
have  not  been  ordered.  They  are  spon- 
taneous, sincere  signs  that  reflect  the 
true  feelings  of  the  hearts  of  those  who 
hold  them,  even  those,  I  suppose,  like 
"IRS  welcomes  you"  [laughter]  which  we 
saw  today  as  we  came  into  town,  and  an- 
other one  that  said,  "Government  work- 
ers welcome  you  back  to  woi-k."  Well, 
we're  ready. 

There  was  another  sign  that  said, 
and  I  think  that  says  it  as  well  as  any  as 
far  as  we're  concerned:  "The  best  things 
in  life  are  free."  But  even  better  than 
that  was  a  sign  that  we  saw  as  we  left 
West  Point  today  along  a  superhighway 
up  there  that  someone  had  hastily  put 
out:  "And  the  world  will  be  better  for 


this."  We  pray,  Mr.  President,  that  thi 
will  be  so. 

Mr.  President,  in  very  simple  wor 
that  come  from  the  hearts  of  all  of  us; 
good  to  be  back.  Thank  you,  America, 
and  God  bless  all  of  you.  Thank  you  v«« 
much. 

President  Reagan 

Thank  you.  This  is  a  flag  in  this  case 
bearing  your  name,  and  it  is  a  symbol 
will  give  to  you  now,  becau.se  all  the 
others,  you  will  each  receive  one  when 
we  get  inside  the  building.  Each  one  o 
you  will  have  a  flag  symbolic  of  the  53 
that  are  here  in  your  honor. 

And  now — I  think  now  a  fit  endin 
for  all  of  this  would  be  for  all  of  us  to  [: 
ticipate  in  singing  "God  Bless  America 
[The  audience  sang  "God  Bless  Ameri- 
ca.'] 


'  Text  from  White  House  press  relea 
of  Jan.  19,  1981. 

2  Made  available  to  the  press  by  Dep 
ment  spokesman  John  Trattner. 

'  Made  available  to  the  press  by  acti 
Department  spokesman  William  J.  Dyess 
Feb.  2. 

'  Text  from  White  House  press  relea 

of  Jan.  20. 

5  Remarks  from  White  House  press 
release  of  Jan.  27.   ■ 


20 


Department  of  State  Bulh 


Feature 


lerican  Hostages  in 


ollowing  is  a  list  of  the  Americans 
were  held  hostage  in  Iran.  Fifty- 
were  held  from  November  4,  1979, 
nuary  20,  1981  (U4  days);  the 
's  were  released  as  noted. 


homas  L.  Ahern 
olitical  Section 
lair  Barnes 

ommunications  Section 
'illiam  F.  Belk 
ommunications  Section 
obert  Blucker 
ommercial  Section 
onald  J.  Cooke 
onsular  Section 
'^illiam  J.  Daugherty 
olitical  Section 
obert  A.  Engelmann 
CDR.  U.S.  Navy 
efense  Liaison  Office 
'iUiam  A.  Gallegos 

USMC 
arine  Security  Guard 
iruce  W.  German 
dministrative  Section 
uane  L.  Gillette 
01,  U.S.  Navy 
efense  Attache  Office 
Ian  B.  Golacinski 
ecurity  Section 
jhn  E.  Graves 

:a 

athy  J.  Gross* 
ecretary 
aseph  M.  Hall 
'01,  U.S.  Army 
efense  Attache  Office 
evin  J.  Hermening 
gt.,  USMC 

[arine  Security  Guard 
onald  R.  Hohman 
p.  6,  U.S.  Army 
ledical  Corpsman 
eland  J.  Holland 
OL,  U.S.  Army 
lefense  Attache  Office 
lichael  H.  Howland 
ecurity  Section 
.  ames  0.  Hughes* 
VSgt.,  U.S.  Air  Force 
administrative  Specialist 
iillian  Johnson* 
iecretary 
Iharles  Jones,  Jr. 
'ommunications  Section 
ilalcolm  Kalp 

economic/Commercial  Section 
Villiam  Keough 
ichool  Superintendent 
>loorhead  Kennedy 
economic  Section 


25.  Steven  W.  Kirtley 
Sgt..  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

26.  Kathryn  L.  Koob 
ICA 

27.  Frederick  Kupke 
Communications  Section 

28.  L.  Bruce  Laingen 
Charge  d'Affaires 

29.  Steven  M.  Lauterbach 
General  Services  Officer 

30.  Gary  E.  Lee 

General  Services  Officer 

31.  Paul  E.  Lewis 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

32.  John  W.  Limbert 
Political  Section 

33.  James  M.  Lopez 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

34.  Ladell  Maples* 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

35.  John  D.  McKeel 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

36.  Michael  J.  Metrinko 
PoUtical  Section 

37.  Jerry  J.  Miele 
Communications  Section 

38.  Michael  E.  Moeller 
S/Sgt.,  USMC 

NCO  in  charge  of  Marine  Security 
Detachment 

39.  Elisabeth  Montagne* 
Secretary 

40.  Bert  C.  Moore 
Administrative  Section 

41.  Richard  H.  Morefield 
Consular  Section 

42.  Paul  M.  Needham 
CAPT,  U.S.  Air  Force 

Logistics  Plans  and  Programs  Officer 

43.  Robert  Ode 
Consular  Section 

44.  Gregory  A.  Persinger 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

45.  Jerry  Plotkin 
Businessman 

46.  William  E.  Quarles* 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

47.  Richard  I.  Queen** 
Consular  Section 

48.  Regis  Magan 
MSG,  U.S.  Army 
Military  Liaison  Office 

49.  Neal  T.  Robinson* 
CAPT,  U.S.  Air  Force 
Plans  Officer 

50.  David  M.  Roeder 
LTC,  U.S.  Air  Force 
Defense  Attache  Office 

51.  Lloyd  A.  RoUins* 
General  Services  Officer 

52.  Barry  M.  Rosen 
ICA 


53.  William  B.  Royer,  Jr. 
ICA 

54.  Thomas  E.  Schaefer 
COL,  U.S.  Air  Force 
Defense  and  Air  Attache 

55.  Charles  W.  Scott 
COL,  U.S.  Army 

Chief,  Military  Liaison  Office 

56.  Don  A.  Sharer 
CDR,  U.S.  Navy 
Defense  Liaison  Office 

57.  Rodney  V.  Sickman 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

58.  Joseph  Subic 
SSG.  U.S.  Army 
Defense  Attache  Office 

59.  Elizabeth  A.  Swift 
Political  Section 

60.  Terri  L.  Tedford* 
Secretary 

61.  Victor  L.  Tomseth 
Political  Section 

62.  Joseph  E.  Vincent* 
MSG,  U.S.  Air  Force 

U.S.  Military  Assistance  Group 

63.  David  R.  Walker* 
Sgt.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 

64.  Joan  Walsh* 
Secretary 

65.  Philip  R.  Ward 
Communications  Section 

66.  Wesley  Williams* 
Cpl.,  USMC 

Marine  Security  Guard 


*Released  Nov.  18  -  20,  1979. 
**Released  July  10,  1980. 

Note:  When  Iranian  militants  took  over  the 
U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran  on  November  4, 
1979,  six  Americans  managed  to  elude  cap- 
ture; they  sought  and  were  granted  refuge  in 
the  Canadian  Embassy.  They  left  Iran  on 
January  29,  1980,  posing  as  Canadian  diplo- 
mats and  carrying  Canadian  passports  with 
forged  Iranian  visas.  Those  Americans  were 
Robert  G.  Anders,  Mark  J.  Lijek,  Cora 
Amburn  Lijek,  Joseph  D.  Stafford,  and 
Kathleen  F.  Stafford,  all  consular  officers, 
and  H.  Lee  Schatz,  an  agricultural 
specialist.  ■ 


21 


THE  PRESIDENT 


President  Carter's  Farewell 
Address  to  the  Nation 


President  Carter's  farewell  ad- 
dress was  broadcast  live  on  January  li, 
1981.^ 

In  a  few  days  I  will  lay  down  my  official 
responsibilities  in  this  office  to  take  up 
once  more  the  only  title  in  our  democ- 
racy superior  to  that  of  President  — the 
title  of  citizen.  Of  Vice  President  Mon- 
dale,  my  Cabinet,  and  the  hundreds  of 
others  who  have  served  with  me  during 
the  last  4  years,  I  wish  to  say  now 
publicly  what  I  have  said  in  private:  I 
thank  them  for  the  dedication  and  com- 
petence they  have  brought  to  the  serv- 
ice of  our  country. 

But  I  owe  my  deepest  thanks  to 
you  — to  the  American  people  — because 
you  gave  me  this  extraordinary  oppor- 
tunity to  serve.  We've  faced  gjreat 
challenges  together,  and  we  know  that 
future  problems  will  also  be  difficult, 
but  I  am  now  more  convinced  than  ever 
that  the  United  States,  better  than  any 
other  country,  can  meet  successfully 
whatever  the  future  might  bring.  These 
last  4  years  have  made  me  more  certain 
than  ever  of  the  inner  strength  of  our 
country,  the  unchanging  value  of  our 
principles  and  ideals,  the  stability  of 
our  political  system,  the  ingenuity  and 
the  decency  of  our  people. 

Tonight  I  would  like  first  to  say  a 
few  words  about  this  most  special  of- 
fice—the Presidency  of  the  United 
States.  This  is  at  once  the  most  power- 
ful office  in  the  world  and  among  the 
most  severely  constrained  by  law  and 
custom.  The  President  is  given  a  broad 
responsibility  to  lead  but  cannot  do  so 
without  the  support  and  consent  of  the 
people,  expressed  formally  through  the 
Congress  and  informally  in  many  ways 
through  a  whole  range  of  public  and 
private  institutions.  This  is  as  it  should 
be. 

Within  our  system  of  government 
every  American  has  a  right  and  a  duty 
to  help  shape  the  future  course  of  the 
United  States.  Thoughtful  criticism  and 
close  scrutiny  of  all  government  offi- 
cials by  the  press  and  the  public  are  an 
important  part  of  our  democratic  soci- 
ety. Now,  as  in  the  past,  only  the 
understanding  and  involvement  of  the 
people  through  full  and  open  debate  can 


help  to  avoid  serious  mistakes  and 
assure  the  continued  dignity  and  safety 
of  the  nation. 

Today  we  are  asking  our  political 
system  to  do  things  of  which  the  Found- 
ing Fathers  never  dreamed.  The  govern- 
ment they  designed  for  a  few  hundred 
thousand  people  now  serves  a  nation  of 
almost  230  million  people.  Their  small 
coastal  republic  now  spans  beyond  a 
continent,  and  we  also  now  have  the 
responsibility  to  help  lead  much  of  the 
world  through  difficult  times  to  a 
secure  and  prosperous  future. 

Today,  as  people  have  become  ever 
more  doubtful  of  the  ability  of  the 
government  to  deal  with  our  problems, 
we  are  increasingly  drawn  to  single- 
issue  groups  and  special  interest  orga- 
nizations to  insure  that  whatever  else 
happens,  our  own  personal  views  and 
our  own  private  interests  are  pro- 
tected. This  is  a  disturbing  factor  in 
American  political  life.  It  tends  to 
distort  our  purposes,  because  the  na- 
tional interest  is  not  always  the  sum  of 
all  our  single  or  special  interests.  We 
are  all  Americans  together,  and  we 
must  not  forget  that  the  common  good 
is  our  common  interest  and  our  indi- 
vidual responsibility. 

Because  of  the  fragmented  pres- 
sures of  these  special  interests,  it's 
very  important  that  the  office  of  the 
President  be  a  strong  one  and  that  its 
constitutional  authority  be  preserved. 
The  President  is  the  only  elected  of- 
ficial charged  with  the  primary  respon 
sibility  of  representing  all  the  people. 
In  the  moments  of  decision,  after  the 
different  and  conflicting  views  have  all 
been  aired,  it's  the  President  who  then 
must  speak  to  the  nation  and  for  the 
nation. 

I  understand  after  4  years  in  this 
office,  as  few  others  can,  how  formida- 
ble is  the  task  the  new  President-elect 
is  about  to  undertake,  and  to  the  very 
limits  of  conscience  and  conviction,  I 
pledge  to  support  him  in  that  task.  I 
wish  him  success  and  Godspeed.  I  know 
from  experience  that  Presidents  have 
to  face  major  issues  that  are  controver- 
sial, broad  in  scope,  and  which  do  not 
arouse  the  natural  support  of  a  political 
majority. 


For  a  few  minutes  now,  I  want  t<  | 
lay  aside  my  role  as  leader  of  one  na- 
tion, and  speak  to  you  as  a  fellow 
citizen  of  the  world  about  three 
issues  — three  difficult  issues  — the 
threat  of  nuclear  destruction,  our 
stewardship  of  the  physical  resources 
our  planet,  and  the  preeminence  of  th 
basic  rights  of  human  beings. 

Threat  of  Nuclear  Destruction 

It's  now  been  35  years  since  the  first 
atomic  bomb  fell  on  Hiroshima.  The 
great  majority  of  the  world's  people 
cannot  remember  a  time  when  the 
nuclear  shadow  did  not  hang  over  the 
Earth.  Our  minds  have  adjusted  to  it. 
as  after  a  time  our  eyes  adjust  to  the 
dark. 

Yet  the  risk  of  a  nuclear  conflagi 
tion  has  not  lessened.  It  has  not 
happened  yet,  thank  God,  but  that  ca 
give  us  little  comfort  for  it  only  has  t 
happen  once. 

The  danger  is  becoming  greater. 
As  the  arsenals  of  the  superpowers 
grow  in  size  and  sophistication  and  as 
other  governments  — perhaps  even  in 
the  future  dozens  of  governments  — 
acquire  these  weapons,  it  may  only  b« 
matter  of  time  before  madness, 
desperation,  greed,  or  miscalculation 
loose  this  terrible  force. 

In  an  all-out  nuclear  war,  more 
destructive  power  than  in  all  of  Worl 
War  II  would  be  unleashed  every 
second  during  the  long  afternoon  it 
would  take  for  all  the  bombs  and 
missiles  to  fall.  A  World  War  II  ever 
second  — more  people  killed  in  the  fir 
few  hours  than  in  all  the  wars  of 
history  together.  The  survivors,  if  an 
would  live  in  despair  amid  the  poison 
ruins  of  a  civilization  that  had  commi 
ted  suicide. 

National  weakness,  real  or  per- 
ceived, can  tempt  aggression  and  thu 
cause  war.  That's  why  the  United 
States  can  never  neglect  its  military 
strength.  We  must  and  we  will  remai 
strong.  But  with  equal  determination 
the  United  States  and  all  countries 
must  find  ways  to  control  and  to  redi 
the  horrifying  danger  that  is  posed  b 
the  enormous  world  stockpiles  of 
nuclear  arms. 

This  has  been  a  concern  of  every 
American  president  since  the  momen 
we  first  saw  what  these  weapons  cou 
do.  Our  leaders  will  require  our  unde 
standing  and  our  support  as  they  gra 
pie  with  this  difficult  but  crucial 
challenge.  There  is  no  disagreement  i 
the  goals  or  the  basic  approach  to  coi 


92 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


The  President 


g  this  enormous  force.  The 
r  lies  not  just  in  the  attitudes  or 
tions  of  world  leaders  but  in  the 
jtn  and  the  demands  of  all  of  us  as 
ftitinue  our  struggle  to  preserve 
ace. 
uclear  weapons  are  an  expression 

side  of  our  human  character.  But 
is  another  side.  The  same  rocket 
)logy  that  delivers  nuclear  war- 
has  also  taken  us  peacefully  into 

From  that  perspective,  we  see 
irth  as  it  really  is  — a  small, 
s,  and  beautiful  blue  globe,  the 
ome  we  have.  We  see  no  barriers 
e  or  religion  or  country.  We  see 
sential  unity  of  our  species  and 
anet.  And  with  faith  and  common 

that  bright  vision  will  ultimately 


;ting  the  Earth's  Resources 

ler  major  challenge,  therefore,  is 
tect  the  quality  of  this  world 
1  which  we  live.  The  shadows  that 
iross  the  future  are  cast  not  only 
■!  kinds  of  weapons  we  have  built 
'  the  kind  of  world  we  will  either 
h  or  neglect.  There  are  real  and 
mg  dangers  to  our  simple  and 
precious  possessions  — the  air  we 
he,  the  water  we  drink,  and  the 
nfhich  sustains  us.  The  rapid  deple- 
(f  irreplaceable  minerals,  the 
n  of  topsoil,  the  destruction  of 
y,  the  blight  of  pollution,  the 
lads  of  increasing  billions  of  peo- 
lil  combine  to  create  problems 
are  easy  to  observe  and  predict 
fficult  to  resolve.  If  we  do  not  act, 
lorld  of  the  year  2000  will  be  much 
Ible  to  sustain  life  than  it  is  now. 
Kut  there  is  no  reason  for  despair, 
owledging  the  physical  realities  of 
lanet  does  not  mean  a  dismal 
of  endless  sacrifice.  In  fact, 
wledging  these  realities  is  the 
;tep  in  dealing  with  them.  We  can 
the  resource  problems  of  the 
—  water,  food,  minerals,  farm- 
forests,  overpopulation,  pollu- 
if  we  tackle  them  with  courage 
jresight. 

cting  Basic  Human  Rights 

ust  been  talking  about  forces  of 
tial  destruction  that  mankind  has 
oped  and  how  we  might  control 
.  It's  equally  important  that  we 
mber  the  beneficial  forces  that  we 
evolved  over  the  ages  and  how  to 
fast  to  them.  One  of  those  con- 
tive  forces  is  the  enhancement  of 


individual  human  freedoms  through  the 
strengthening  of  democracy  and  the 
fight  against  deprivation,  torture,  ter- 
rorism, and  the  persecution  of  people 
throughout  the  world.  The  struggle  for 
human  rights  overrides  all  differences 
of  color  or  nation  or  language.  Those 
who  hunger  for  freedom,  who  thirst  for 
human  dignity,  and  who  suffer  for  the 
sake  of  justice,  they  are  the  patriots  of 
this  cause. 

I  believe  with  all  my  heart  that 
America  must  always  stand  for  these 
basic  human  rights  at  home  and  abroad. 
That  is  both  our  history  and  our 
destiny. 

America  did  not  invent  human 
rights.  In  a  very  real  sense,  it's  the 
other  way  around.  Human  rights  in- 
vented America.  Ours  was  the  first  na- 
tion in  the  history  of  the  world  to  be 
founded  explicitly  on  such  an  idea.  Our 
social  and  political  progress  has  been 
based  on  one  fundamental  principle  — 
the  value  and  importance  of  the  indi- 
vidual. The  fundamental  force  that 
unites  us  is  not  kinship  or  place  of 
origin  or  religious  preference.  The  love 
of  liberty  is  the  common  blood  that 
flows  in  our  American  veins. 

The  battle  for  human  rights,  at 
home  and  abroad,  is  far  from  over.  We 
should  never  be  surprised  nor  dis- 
couraged because  the  impact  of  our  ef- 
forts has  had  and  will  always  have 
varied  results.  Rather  we  should  take 
pride  that  the  ideals  which  gave  birth 
to  our  nation  still  inspire  the  hopes  of 
oppressed  people  around  the  world.  We 
have  no  cause  for  self-righteousness  or 
complacency,  but  we  have  every  reason 
to  persevere,  both  within  our  own  coun- 
try and  beyond  our  borders. 

If  we  are  to  serve  as  a  beacon  for 
human  rights,  we  must  continue  to 
perfect  here  at  home  the  rights  and  the 
values  which  we  espouse  around  the 
world  — a  decent  education  for  our  chil- 
dren, adequate  medical  care  for  all 
Americans,  an  end  to  discrimination 
against  minorities  and  women,  a  job  for 
all  those  able  to  work,  and  freedom 
from  injustice  and  religious  intolerance. 

We  live  in  a  time  of  transition,  an 
uneasy  era  which  is  likely  to  endure  for 
the  rest  of  this  century.  It  will  be  a 
period  of  tensions,  both  within  nations 
and  between  nations;  of  competition  for 
scarce  resources;  of  social,  political,  and 
economic  stresses  and  strains.  During 
this  period  we  may  be  tempted  to  aban- 
don some  of  the  time-honored  principles 
and  commitments  which  have  been 
proven  during  the  difficult  times  of  past 
generations.  We  must  never  yield  to 


this  temptation.  Our  American  values 
are  not  luxuries  but  necessities  —  not 
the  salt  in  our  bread  but  the  bread 
itself.  Our  common  vision  of  a  free  and 
just  society  is  our  greatest  source  of 
cohesion  at  home  and  strength  abroad 
—  greater  even  than  the  bounty  of  our 
material  blessings. 

Remember  these  words:  "We  hold 
these  truths  to  be  self-evident;  that  all 
men  are  created  equal;  that  they  are 
endowed  by  their  creator  with  certain 
unalienable  rights;  that  among  these 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness. . . ." 

This  vision  still  grips  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  world.  But  we  know  that 
democracy  is  always  an  unfinished  crea- 
tion. Each  generation  must  renew  its 
foundations.  Each  generation  must 
rediscover  the  meaning  of  this  hallowed 
vision  in  the  light  of  its  own  modern 
challenges.  For  this  generation  — ours  — 
life  is  nuclear  survival;  liberty  is  human 
rights;  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  a 
planet  whose  resources  are  devoted  to 
the  physical  and  spiritual  nourishment 
of  its  inhabitants. 

During  the  next  few  days  I  will 
work  hard  to  make  sure  that  the  transi- 
tion from  myself  to  the  next  President 
is  a  good  one,  that  the  American  people 
are  served  well.  And  I  will  continue  as 
I  have  the  last  14  months  to  work  hard 
and  to  pray  for  the  lives  and  the  well- 
being  of  the  American  hostages  held  in 
Iran.  I  can't  predict  yet  what  will 
happen,  but  I  hope  you  will  join  me  in 
my  constant  prayer  for  their  freedom. 

As  I  return  home  to  the  South 
where  I  was  born  and  raised,  I  look  for- 
ward to  the  opportunity  to  reflect  and 
further  to  assess,  I  hope  with  accuracy, 
the  circumstances  of  our  times.  I  intend 
to  give  our  new  President  my  support, 
and  I  intend  to  work  as  a  citizen,  as  I 
have  worked  here  in  this  office  as 
President,  for  the  values  this  nation 
was  founded  to  secure.  Again,  from  the 
bottom  of  my  heart,  I  want  to  express 
to  you  the  gratitude  I  feel.  Thank  you, 
fellow  citizens,  and  farewell. 


^Text  from  White  House  press 
release.  ■ 


President  Carter  submitted  his  last 
State  of  the  Union  message  to  the  Con- 
gress on  January  16,  1981,  the  text  of 
which  is  printed  in  the  Weekly  Com- 
pilation of  Presidential  Documents  of 
January  20,  1981. 


23 


THE  SECRETARY 


Resources  for  a  Credible 
Foreign  Policy 


Address  before  the  American 
Foreign  Policy  Association  and  the 
World  Affairs  Council  on  January  15, 
1980 

I  am  departing  an  office  I  received  with 
surprise,  held  with  satisfaction,  and  re- 
hnquish  with  regret.  I  have  been  privi- 
leged to  serve  a  nation  I  love,  under  a 
President  for  whom  I  have  the  deepest 
respect.  He  has  labored  with  extraordi- 
nary effort  and  caring  for  our  nation  and 
for  our  ideals.  I  think  history  will  look 
kindly  upon  his  legacy  and  such 
achievements  as  the  Camp  David  ac- 
cords, the  normalization  of  relations  with 
China,  peace  in  Zimbabwe,  the 
strengthening  of  American  defenses. 

And  one  of  my  central  concerns  is  an 
issue  on  which  I  worked  as  a  member  of 
the  Senate,  but  which  has  been  with  me 
literally  every  single  day,  indeed  every 
hour,  of  my  time  as  Secretary  of  State. 

The  issue  is  this:  Will  America  sup- 
port the  foreign  policy  this  country  needs 
with  the  resources  a  credible  policy  re- 
quires? Will  we  provide  the  funds  neces- 
sai-y  to  support  our  diplomacy  and  our 
vital  interests  in  the  world,  or  will  we 
shortchange  them? 

To  people  with  an  interest  in  foreign 
policy  this  is  a  perennial  problem.  The 
Department  of  State  and  the  foreign  as- 
sistance agencies  face  special  obstacles. 
We  can  never  match  the  domestic  con- 
stituencies of  other  parts  of  the  govern- 
ment in  the  competition  for  Federal 
funds. 

But  I  suggest  that  the  foreign  policy 
resource  problem  is  now  passing  beyond 
that  condition  of  routine  annual  struggle. 
It  is  steadily  worsening.  It  is,  in  my  view, 
a  gathering  crisis.  And  it  is  a  threat  not 
only  to  the  global  influence  of  the  United 
States  but  to  the  security  and  well-being 
of  all  the  American  people.  The  crisis 
ahead  lies  at  the  intersection  of  several 
critical  trends . 


Diffusion  of  Power 

A  first  trend  is  the  diffusion  of  authority 
— of  power — in  the  world.  Principally  as 
a  result  of  decolonialization,  the  Earth 
now  holds  nearly  three  times  as  many 
sovereign  nations  as  it  did  at  the  end  of 
the  Second  World  War.  There  are  more 
than  100  new  countries. 


As  a  statistic  that  is  easy  enough  to 
grasp.  We  have  a  much  harder  time 
grasping  the  new  realities  it  entails.  For 
example,  in  the  United  Nations,  and  in 
many  of  its  related  bodies,  the  majority 
of  votes  now  are  cast  by  countries  that 
didn't  exist  when  the  institution  was 
formed.  The  balance  of  power  in  global 
institutions  has  shifted — not  toward  any 
competing  superpower  but  toward  the 
developing  world. 

For  all  of  their  diversity,  nearly  all  of 
those  new  nations  share  at  least  one  pas- 
sion— for  their  sovereignty  and  national 
integrity.  They  are  uniquely  wary  of  out- 
side manipulation  or  control.  We  have 
seen  the  dark  side  of  this  reality  in  the 
lawless  behavior  of  Iran.  But  there  are 
also  positive  manifestations  of  the  same 
trend — the  resistance  of  the  nationalists 
in  Afghanistan,  for  example,  and  the 
overwhelming  vote  in  the  United  Nations 
to  condemn  the  Soviet  invasion  of  that 
country. 

But  whatever  the  effect  in  individual 
cases,  the  broad  international  truth  is 
that  power  has  been  widely  dispersed. 
An  American  diplomacy  that  can  effec- 
tively protect  and  advance  our  interests 
in  such  a  world  requires,  more  than  ever 
before,  a  diverse  and  skilled  Foreign  Ser- 
vice as  well  as  a  fully  funded  foreign  as- 
sistance program. 

U.S.  Stake  in  Developing  Countries 

A  second  trend  is  our  own  growing  stake 
in  those  developing  countries.  Today  they 
are  the  fastest  growing  markets  for 
American  exports.  Already  they  buy 
more  from  us  than  Japan  and  the  Euro- 
pean Common  Market  combined.  Those 
sales  to  developing  countries  account  for 
more  than  2  million  American  jobs.  They 
supply  us  with  materials  we  cannot  do 
without — not  only  oil  but  tin,  bauxite, 
rubber,  and  a  long  list  of  others. 

We  also  need  their  cooperation. 
World  institutions  control  hundreds  of 
matters  affecting  our  lives — from  the  al- 
location of  radio  frequencies  to  proce- 
dures for  harvesting  the  seas  and  mining 
their  floors.  Such  global  issues  as  popula- 
tion growth  and  nuclear  proliferation 
touch  our  own  daily  lives  in  profound  and 
persistent  ways.  And  we  have  growing 
security  interests  in  developing  coun- 
tries. For  example,  an  effective  response 
to  Soviet  ambitions  in  the  Indian  Ocean/ 


Persian  Gulf  region  requires  access 
military  facilities  on  the  scene. 

So  for  all  of  these  reasons — ecc 
nomic,  political,  security — good  rel; 
with  developing  countries  are  not  s( 
thing  we  concede;  they  are  somethii 
need. 

Soviet  Ambition 

A  third  trend  is  one  I  have  alluded  1 
ready — the  ambition  of  the  Soviet  I 
to  extend  its  influence  in  the  develo 
world.  It  is,  of  course,  no  revelation 
the  Soviets  believe  their  system  she 
be  installed  elsewhere  and  ultimatel 
everywhere.  That  aspiration  increas- 
is  backed  up  with  a  growing  capacit. 
project  military  power  far  beyond  tl' 
borders.  A  little  over  a  year  ago  we 
grim  new  step  in  Afghanistan — a  di 
Soviet  invasion  designed  to  transfor 
nonaligned  country  into  a  new  satell 
state. 

Obviously  we  must  never  negle 
direct  Soviet  threat  to  the  United  S 
and  the  other  industrial  democracies- 
the  Soviets'  most  promising  opporti 
lie  in  the  developing  world  through  • 
ploitation  of  disorder.  Our  diplomacy 
it  is  wise — and  our  resources — if  the 
generous — can  promote  order  by  he 
other  governments  meet  the  aspirat 
of  their  people  for  economic,  politica 
social  justice. 

Worsening  Economy  of  Third  Worl 

Unfortunately,  a  fourth  trend  bright 
Soviet  prospects  there — and  that  is 
worsening  economic  plight  of  most  T 
World  nations.  The  barriers  to  devel 
ment  have  grown  steadily  higher  in  i 
cent  years.  Populations  have  multipl 
debts  have  swollen;  energy  prices  ha 
soared;  available  resources  have  dwii 
died.  And  the  future  looks  worse.  In 
past  year  a  series  of  authoritative  re 
— by  the  World  Bank,  by  the  Brandt 
Commission,  by  the  President's  worh 
hunger  commission,  by  agencies  of  oi 
own  government  in  the  "Global  2000" 
port — have  all  foreseen  in  the  cominj 
cades  a  world  with  huge  concentratio 
desperate  people. 

Right  now  by  far  the  greatest  di 
ing  factor  is  oil.  It  is  a  stunning  fact  t 
oil  prices  have  roughly  tripled  in  just 
years — from  $12.80  per  barrel  at  the 


24 


Department  of  State  Bu 


The  Secretary 


)78  to  some  $35  now.  Those  increases 
e  inflicted  real  pain  here.  Each  round 
igher  costs  further  shocks  our  econ- 
'  and  fuels  our  inflation. 
But  if  they  have  harmed  us,  those 
e  hikes  have  ripped  through  Third 
Id  economies  like  a  tornado,  leaving 
ss  lomic  devastation  in  their  wake.  Na- 
al  treasuries  are  draining  di-y.  In  the 
J  r  just  past,  the  bills  to  be  paid  by 

OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum 
;i(  )orting  Countries]  developing  coun- 
iii]  s  for  imported  oil  and  interest  and  ex- 
lal  debt  alone  have  been  some  three 
3S  what  they  received  in  aid. 
The  poorest  lands  are  the  hardest 
Countries  like  Bangladesh,  Liberia, 
Sudan,  and  Uganda  have  little  access 
redit,  so  the  trade-off  is  direct:  Every 
ar  more  paid  for  oil  immediately 
ms  a  dollar  less  to  invest  in  productive 
rprise.  In  the  resulting  economic 
ich,  funds  reserved  for  investment 
n  must  be  diverted  on  a  crisis  basis 
such  necessities  as  food. 
In  any  nation,  these  are  precisely 
conditions  that  invite  turmoil.  It  is 
only  the  lesson,  it  is  the  litany  of  his- 
y  that  human  misery  is  the  enemy  of 
er.  Driven  by  the  energy  emergency, 
ay  governments  are  forced  toward 
nomic  decisions  that  could  mean  their 
vnfall.  As  this  process  continues,  the 
2  of  radicalism  will  become  stronger; 
h  day  those  who  preach  violence  and 
red  of  the  West  will  find  more 
lerents  in  the  developing  world. 
The  OPEC  countries  have  yet  to  rec- 
ize  the  profound  dangers  they  create 
themselves  in  pressing  this  trend.  If 
)Jir  wealth  is  to  have  practical  value, 
y  have  a  stake  in  the  economic  health 
I  stability  of  others.  And  obviously 
y,  too,  depend  upon  a  stable  world. 

'inkage  in  U.S.  Response 

ally,  there  is  a  fifth  trend — not  only  a 
gnation  but  a  shrinkage  in  our  af- 
native  response  to  these  dangers, 
jre  are  those  who  see  these  first  four 
nds  and  see  only  theu*  military  implica- 
is.  Certainly  we  need  to  help  our 

nds  build  their  strength.  And  we  must 
sufficiently  armed  ourselves  to  help 

er  and  defeat  aggression.  That  is  why 

current  Administration  has  sponsored 
jor  real  increases  in  military  outlays. 

But  arms  alone  are  an  insufficient 
swer  to  the  challenges  I  have  de- 
•ibed.  In  a  world  of  crushing  human 
eds — among  nations  stirred  by 
tionalism  with  global  problems  deman- 
ig  cooperative  answers — we  need  still 
)re  than  a  mighty  arsenal. 


And  what  has  been  our  response?  We 
begin  with  a  national  indifference  to  our 
diplomatic  structure.  The  quality  and  ca- 
pacity of  our  professional  Foreign  Service 
is  a  decisive  factor  in  our  relations  with 
other  countries.  Evei-yone  knows  and 
sympathizes  with  the  plight  of  our  hos- 
tages in  Tehran  and  most  people  have  not 
forgotten  the  other  terrorist  and  mob  at- 
tacks to  which  our  diplomats  have  been 
subject  in  recent  years.  What  is  not  so 
well  known  is  our  failure  to  maintain  and 
sustain  our  essential  diplomatic  re- 
sources. 

As  we  move  further  into  the  1980s,  it 
is  clear  that  all  elements  of  our  national 
security  need  full  support,  and  diplomacy 
is  the  front  line  of  any  lasting  security. 
We  must  be  well  prepared  militarily,  but 
we  must  also  do  all  we  can  to  achieve  our 
national  goals  without  resort  to  force,  and 
that,  in  a  word,  is  the  business  of  diplo- 
macy. 

Given  the  complexities  of  the  world 
of  the  1980s  and  1990s,  it  is  also  clear  that 
we  need  to  understand  still  better  the  as- 
pirations and  interests  of  people  in  the 
rest  of  the  world  and  other  people  need  to 
understand  still  better  our  aspirations 
and  interests.  The  consequences  of  mis- 
understanding are  much  greater  than 
they  were  in  the  past.  Making  sure  gov- 
ernments interpret  each  other's  actions 
and  words  correctly  is  also  the  essential 
business  of  diplomacy. 

If  diplomacy  is  to  be  effective,  then 
we  must  continue  to  have  individuals  who 
represent  the  best  in  America  serving  in 
our  professional  Foreign  Service.  Yet,  the 
Department  of  State  has  the  same 
number  of  people  as  it  had  in  1960  when 
we  dealt  with  66  fewer  nations  and  prob- 
lems that  were  significantly  less  complex. 
Despite  mounting  needs  to  understand 
this  world  still  better,  we  have  18%  fewer 
political  officer  positions  than  in  1960. 
That  is  not  only  a  sorry  picture,  but  a 
scary  one,  in  the  light  of  our  global  re- 
quirements. 

The  same  short-sighted,  stingy  ap- 
proach has  limited  also  our  foreign  assist- 
ance programs.  These  are  the  programs 
that  provide  backing  for  our  daily  diplo- 
macy even  as  they  address  the  longer 
term  economic  and  social  sources  of 
human  suffering  and  political  instability. 
Foreign  aid,  and  particularly  economic 
development  aid,  can  be  a  favorite  target 
on  Capitol  Hill.  Often,  those  who  are 
most  vocal  against  aid  programs  are  also 
the  loudest  in  declaring  their  opposition 
to  communism.  They  insist  upon  a  goal 
we  share  even  as  they  dismantle  the 
means  we  need  to  pursue  it. 


The  Congress  has  failed,  for  2  years 
straight,  to  even  pass  our  foreign  aid 
legislation.  We  operate  year  to  year  on 
continuing  resolutions,  with  funding 
based  on  levels  of  prior  years.  And  in  real 
terms  the  amounts  are  shrinking.  We 
rank  14th  among  the  world's  major 
donors  of  assistance.  For  assistance  pro- 
grams that  are  directly  related  to  our 
own  security  and  prosperity,  we  provide 
roughly  one-fifth  of  1%  of  our  gi'oss  na- 
tional product.  In  real  terms  our  eco- 
nomic aid  today  is  actually  less  than  it 
was  10  years  ago.  Our  security  assistance 
is  nearly  one-fourth  less  than  it  was  in 
1960. 

But  all  of  this  still  is  only  prologue. 
Budget  trends  suggest  that  a  tighter 
pinch  could  be  coming.  The  relatively 
"uncontrollable"  parts  of  the  Federal 
budget — social  security,  trust  funds,  and 
the  like — are  taking  up  even  higher  pro- 
portions of  government  spending.  The 
remainder,  now  less  than  one-fourth  of 
the  budget,  must  cover  national  defense, 
all  other  international  programs  including 
foreign  aid,  and  all  the  discretionary 
domestic  programs  as  well. 

Now  if  we  project  past  trends  into 
the  future — and  factor  in  the  increases  in 
defense  already  planned,  let  alone  any 
further  growth  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion might  want — we  find  this:  By  1985 
the  total  of  funds  left  for  international  af- 
fairs and  these  domestic  programs  will  be 
slashed  nearly  in  half.  It  takes  little  imag- 
ination to  forecast  the  resultant  pressures 
on  the  State  Department  and  foreign  as- 
sistance budgets.  That  is  why  I  say  what 
we  know  now  as  an  annual  struggle  is,  in 
fact,  a  gathering  crisis.  If  unmet,  it  could 
dramatically  alter  our  role  in  the  world. 

That  crisis  can  be  averted.  But  it  will 
require  political  will  on  the  part  of  our 
leaders  and  a  new  awareness  on  the  part 
of  the  American  people.  It  must  begin 
with  a  recognition  of  this  central  reality: 
We  can  no  longer  afford  to  act  as  if  for- 
eign aid  were  charity  and  as  if  diplomacy 
were  a  diversion.  They  are  as  vital  to  our 
long-run  security  as  defense — as  essen- 
tial to  the  well-being  of  the  American 
people. 

In  short,  we  have  a  fundamental 
choice  we  can  no  longer  postpone.  We 
must  either  raise  our  investments  signifi- 
cantly or  lower  our  expectations  for  the 
future.  We  cannot  produce  the  foreign 
policy  results  our  people  expect  with  the 
dwindling  resources  we  seem  prepared  to 
apply.  If  we  continue  to  address  surging 
international  challenges  with  a  shrinking 
commitment,  then  we  ought  to  begin 
planning  for  an  ineffectual,  defensive,  and 
perilous  future. 


ibruary  1981 


25 


The  Secretary 


America's  Potential 

I  have  great  confidence  in  America's  po- 
tential. Our  values  are  more  relevant  to 
the  world  than  ever  before.  Our  military 
strength  is  growing.  Our  dedication  to 
the  sovereignty  of  nations  is  squarely  in 
line  with  the  aspirations  of  developing 
countries.  Despite  all  the  setbacks,  our 
economic  system — our  technology,  the 
miracle  of  our  agriculture,  our  innovation 
— remain  a  source  of  international 
strength,  in  contrast  to  the  faltering  of 
state-managed  systems. 

And  I  have  confidence  in  the  Ameri- 
can people — in  their  capacity  to  grasp 
what  is  at  stake  when  they  are  told  the 
truth  about  what  must  be  done  to  sup- 
port forward-looking  foreign  policies. 

The  response  of  our  people  and  our 
political  leadership  to  this  challenge  will 
importantly  determine  the  kind  of  world 
our  children  wall  inherit — whether  it  is 
hospitable  or  hostile  to  our  values; 
whether  we  are  fully  engaged  in  the  in- 
ternational system  or  excluding  our- 
selves from  it;  whether  Americans  feel 
secure  or  surrounded.  In  the  next  few 
years,  the  choice  must  be  made.  For  all  of 
our  sakes,  I  hope  we  choose  wisely. 


^Press  release  12. 


Secretary  Muskie 
Interviewed  on 
''Meet  the  Press" 
(Excerpts) 


Secretary  Muskie  was  interviewed 
on  NBC's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  Decem- 
ber 21,  1980,  by  Bill  Monroe,  NBC 
News  (moderator  and  executive  pro- 
ducer); Karen  Elliot  House,  Wall  Street 
Journal;  Carl  Rowan,  Chicago  Sun 
Times;  and  Marvin  Kalb,  NBC  News.' 

Q.  What  is  your  assessment  of  the  latest 
conditions  trom  Iran  for  the  return  of 
the  32  American  hostages  and  the  options 
they  make  available  to  this  country? 

A.  We  regard  the  response  as 
unreasonable  and  as  requiring  of  us 
actions  beyond  the  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  take. 

Expecting,  on  the  basis  of  this 
morning's  news,  that  I'd  be  asked  to 
react  to  what  they  have  done,  I  would 
like  to  make  clear  that  what  I  say 
about  the  subject  on  this  program  is 
not  an  official  response;  it's  an  official 
reaction  to  the  extent  that  I'm  in  a 
position  to  respond  to  your  questions. 
The  second  point  I'd  like  to  make  is 
that  it  is  official  in  the  sense  that  I've 
discussed  this  subject  with  the  Presi- 
dent today,  and  what  I  have  to  say 
represents  the  reaction  of  the  Admin- 
istration. 

Finally,  in  order  to  put  this  whole 
subject  of  negotiations  between  Iran 
and  the  United  States  in  the  proper 
context,  what  we  are  discussing  is  not 
the  usual  kind  of  negotiation  between 
mutually  agreed  parties.  What  we  are 
talking  about  is  negotiating  the  release 
of  hostages  that  were  illegally  taken 
over  a  year  ago,  who  are  being  illegally 
held  today  — a  taking  that  has  been  con- 
demned by  the  World  Court,  condemned 
by  the  United  Nations,  and  condemned 
by  nations  all  over  this  planet.  It's  that 
illegal  holding  that  we  are  seeking  to 
correct.  I  think  that  these  points  are 
important  points  to  be  reminded  of  as 
we  begin  whatever  discussions  we  may 
have  today. 

Q.  Are  the  difficulties  now  posed  by 
Iran  so  severe,  in  your  judgment,  that 
the  Administration  would  consider,  in 
effect,  suspending  negotiations  at  this 


point  and  leaving  the  resolution  of  the 
matter  up  to  the  incoming  Reagan 
Administration? 

A.  No,  indeed.  We  continue  to 
work  at  what  we  think  is  a  high-prior- 
ity goal,  and  that  is  the  release  of  the 
hostages.  The  Iranians  previously  havi 
made  requests  that  we  could  not  meet 
Nevertheless,  we  continue  to  use  the 
private  channel,  through  the  Algerian 
Government,  in  an  attempt  to  persuad 
them  to  our  position. 

What  we  have  tried  to  do  is  makf 
a  goodwill  effort,  a  good  faith  effort,  t 
examine  what  we  can  do  to  restore 
their  frozen  assets  within  the  legal 
authority  of  the  President  of  the  Unit' 
States.  And  we  will  continue  to  do  th; 

Q.  Are  you  saying  that  the  Admin 
tration  will  present  a  detailed  response 
to  Iran's  latest  terms? 

A.  The  nature  of  the  response  is, 
course,  still  under  study.  We've  had 
this  response  which,  as  you  now  know 
from  the  public  prints,  is  quite  long, 
extensive,  and  complicated,  and  which 
also  requires  an  understanding  of  the 
Iranian  use  of  concepts  before  we  can 
respond.  So  the  nature  of  our  respons 
is  not  yet  decided,  but  the  nature  of 
this  reaction  is  clear. 

Q.  You  seem  to  be  implying  that 
you  will  respond  again  in  some  fashion 
whatever  the  details,  and  that  you  wom 
simply  say,  "This  is  as  tar  as  we  can  g- 
You  know  what  it  is.  Take  it  or  leave  i 
If  you  don't  like  it,  deal  with  the  next 
Administration."  Is  that  what  you  mes 
to  imply? 

A.  What  I  mean  to  say  is  that  a 
part  of  this  frustrating  and,  at  times, 
agonizing  effort  is  to  make  clear  to  th 
Iranians  through  a  third  party  — whic 
complicates  the  task  — the  limits  beyo 
which  the  President  cannot  legally  go 
It  is  not  always  clear  whether  that  m 
sage  has  gotten  through  or  whether 
they  accept  it. 

This  is  not  the  first  time  that  the 
have  suggested  items  that  would  re- 
quire us  to  go  beyond  the  President's 
legal  authority.  This  comes  at  a  time 
when  we  were  under  the  impression 
that  they  understood  those  limits. 

Q.  How  do  you  expect  them  to  re- 
lease the  hostages  if  they  are  not  givei 
something  of  a  nature  that  they  can  p: 
off  politically  to  their  own  people?  I 
mean,  we're  saying  we  want  the  hosta; 
back  because  they  were  illegally  taken 
and  you  can't  have  the  money  until  thi 
hostages  are  back. 


26 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


The  Secretary 


\.  They  have  a  responsibility  for 
!rship  and  accountability  in  their 
political  system  just  as  I  do  in  our 
!m,  and  just  as  our  President  does 
T  system.  The  President  cannot 
ically,  let  alone  legally,  exceed  his 
powers  in  dealing  with  their  re- 
ts. They  must  understand  that.  So 
have  to  decide  first,  are  they  go- 

0  respond  to  world  opinion,  which 
udged  that  they  have  taken  an  ille- 
ct  and  which  has  had  an  impact 

their  own  country  economically  in 
s  of  isolation  from  the  world  com- 
ity, in  terms  of  denial  of  access  to 
:ets  that  they  would  find  useful 

in  terms  of  impacting  on  an  un- 
e  political  situation  in  their  own 
try,  and  in  terms  of  threats  on 

own  borders. 
They've  paid  a  cost  for  this  illegal 
ig,  and  an  increasing  number  of 

1  have  made  it  clear  that  they 
Tstand  that  their  own  national 
ests  would  be  better  served  if  the 

age  issue  were  behind  them.  They 
said  that  publicly.  So  if  it  is  in 
country's  interest  to  solve  this 

ilem,  then  they  have  an  obligation, 

aders  in  that  country,  to  take  the 

ssary  decision. 

P'Q.  But  they  have,  for  a  year,  thumbed 
i'  noses  at  world  opinion.  We  have 
ill  o  Tehran  saying  that,  if  you  don't 
U  pt  what  you  have  called  unreason- 
:\    the  Christmas  trees  here  will  be 
i    next  year,  meaning  the  hostages 
^till  be  there.  Would  you  give  me 
J    candid  assessment  as  to  whether 
I  think  there  can  be,  ever,  a  nego- 
a  d  settlement? 

A.  There  will  have  to  be  a  nego- 
I'd  settlement  unless  they  take  the 
\  r  step  — which  they  have  given  no 
« 'ation  at  all  they  are  willing  to  take 

release  the  hostages  without  condi- 
..  That  is  what  they  ought  to  do, 
•n  the  fact  that  they  did  an  illegal 
over  a  year  ago. 

With  respect  to  their  public  rhet- 
,  I  have  found  that,  like  politicians 
rywhere,  their  public  statements 
le  for  domestic  consumption  may 
necessarily  disclose  what  may  be 
sible  through  appropriate  negotia- 
iS.  It  requires  patience,  it  involves 
itration,  but  you  have  to  press  it. 
1  have  to  press  it  because  I  don't 
eve  that  country  or  any  other  coun- 
can  persist  in  the  kind  of  illegal 
on  they  have  taken  and  not  pay  a 
alty  as  a  member  of  the  community 
lations. 


Q.  A  lot  of  us  sitting  on  the  outside 
see  a  situation  where  it  appears  you've 
done  everything  that  you  can  possibly 
do,  and  you're  still  left  with  a  situation 
where  the  United  States  has  to  accept 
something  close  to  abject  capitulation  to 
kidnappers  and  that  we  may  be  at  the 
point  where  nothing  is  left  but  military 
action.  Are  we  close  to  that  point? 

A.  No,  I  would  not  say  so.  We've 
had  a  previous  experience  in  the  case  of 
North  Korea,  a  hostage  situation,  in- 
volving roughly  the  same  number  of 
people.  They  were  held  for  11  months 
and  were  eventually  released.  I  think 
that  these  hostages  will  eventually  be 
released.  I  don't  believe  that  the  Ira- 
nians can  escape  the  costs  that  they  are 
now  paying  for  holding  the  hostages. 
Inevitably,  at  some  point,  they  will 
make  the  decision  that  they  must  make. 

Q.  You  are  aware  that  there  are 
some  mumblings  out  there  in  America 
that  the  honor  of  the  United  States  is 
more  important  than  the  lives  of  52  hos- 
tages and  that,  at  some  time,  this  gov- 
ernment is  going  to  have  to  say,  "The  52 
don't  matter  that  much.  We're  going  to 
have  to  do  what  we  have  to  do."  Do  you 
think,  having  given  priority  to  saving  the 
hostages  all  these  months,  that  the  United 
States  can  ever  make  that  hard  decision? 

A.  I  don't  think  the  two  are  that 
separable.  I  think  that  to  permit  them 
to  jeopardize  the  safety  and  the  lives  of 
the  hostages  would  be  counter  to  our 
national  interest  and  our  national 
honor.  I  don't  think  you  can  separate 
the  two.  They  are  one  problem. 

Q.  Are  you  ruling  out  the  use  of 
American  military  force  by  this  Adminis- 
tration to  resolve  this  problem? 

A.  We  tried  a  form  of  that  in  the 
rescue  effort  which  failed.  That  effort 
did  not  succeed  and,  in  addition,  making 
the  effort,  I  think,  prolonged  the  agony 
of  the  problem. 

It  is  not  easy,  if  one  looks  at  a  map 
of  Iran,  to  consider  military  options 
unless  one  were  to  consider  options 
with  consequences  that  need  to  be  care- 
fully weighed  for  our  other  national 
interests  before  making  it.  An  auto- 
matic military  response  is  not  an  easy 
thing  to  devise  or  an  easy  thing  to  exe- 
cute or  one  that  one  easily  contem- 
plates when  one  considers  other  national 
interests  that  might  be  impacted.  But 
the  President  has  made  clear  for  a  year 
that  we  will  hold  Iran  accountable  for 
the  safety  of  the  hostages,  whatever 
that  implies  in  the  circumstances  that 
may  arise. 


I  don't  think  it  is  helpful  to  try  to 
hypothesize  what  circumstances  may 
arise.  At  this  point,  in  our  negotiations 
with  Iran,  we  are  within  reach,  if  they 
could  but  see  it,  of  a  solution  to  the 
problem  which  would  eliminate  any 
such  possibility,  which  would  make  pos- 
sible the  return  of  the  hostages,  and 
which  would  make  possible  the  begin- 
nings of  a  meaningful  process  of  bring- 
ing Iran  back  into  the  community  of  na- 
tions in  a  dignified,  responsible  way. 
They've  got  to  do  that;  they've  got  to 
face  it  at  some  point. 

Q.  You  just  said  "within  reach."  If  you 
had  to  project  now  "within  reach"  mean- 
ing weeks,  months,  do  we  have  to  wait 
for  the  next  Administration  to  come  in? 

A.  When  I  say  "within  reach,"  I 
don't  mean  on  the  basis  of  the  most  re- 
cent exchange  between  us  that  I  see  it 
happening.  It's  certainly  not  going  to 
happen  by  Christmas,  and  it  would  be 
very  difficult  to  make  it  happen  within 
the  time  left  to  this  Administration. 

Q.  Difficult? 

A.  Very  difficult.  It  all  depends  on 
the  extent  to  which  the  Iranian  reply  is 
a  negotiating  tactic  or  whether  it  is  in 
fact  a  "take-it-or-leave-it"  proposal. 

Q.  Are  you  beginning  to  suspect 
that  it  might  be  a  case  of  old-fashioned 
ransom  being  asked  of  the  United  States? 

A.  What  they've  asked  for  is  unrea- 
sonable, and  it  would  require  us  to  do 
things  that  we  cannot  do  legally.  That 
is  the  best  way  to  describe  it  at  this 
point.  You  know,  they  do  some  of  these 
things  that  they  are  asking  of  us  by 
just  a  flick  of  their  fingers. 

Q.  Would  the  United  States  consider 
sending  billions  of  dollars  to  Algeria — 
one  figure  mentioned  today  is  $23  or  $24 
billion — as  a  guarantee  against  the  even- 
tual return  of  the  Iranian  assets  frozen 
in  this  country  and  the  Shah's  wealth? 

A.  No.  The  President  does  not 
have  the  power  to  do  that  or  the 
authority  to  do  it.  And  let  me  put  that 
in  perspective,  if  I  may.  Iran  placed  in 
the  hands  of  persons  and  institutions  in 
the  United  States  and  other  countries 
deposits  totaling  billions  of  dollars. 
They  did  that  long  before  the  hostages 
were  taken.  They  took  the  risks  attend- 
ant upon  that.  The  U.S.  Government 
had  no  responsibility  with  respect  to 
those  deposits.  We  don't  guarantee 
those  deposits.  When  they  did  that, 
they  assumed  certain  risks. 


The  Secretary 


As  a  result  of  their  taking  of  the 
hostages,  their  business  arrangements 
with  the  various  institutions  involved  in 
those  deposits  were  interrupted.  The 
result  of  all  that  was  to  produce  a  lot  of 
litigation,  a  lot  of  claims,  a  lot  of  suits; 
but  they  took  those  risks.  Now  they  ask 
us  to  make  cash  guarantees  for  the  pur- 
pose of  assuring  them  against  loss 
resulting  from  those  risks,  if  they  mate- 
rialize in  the  form  of  losses.  That's  not 
our  responsibility. 

May  I  say,  also,  that  at  the  begin- 
ning of  these  negotiations,  we  pursued, 
apparently  with  their  understanding 
and  their  agreement,  two  principles: 
One,  that  we  would  do  everything  we 
could,  insofar  as  we  could  legally,  to 
restore  our  financial  arrangements  to 
their  status  prior  to  November  14,  a 
year  ago.  Two  principles  are  involved: 
the  status  quo  as  of  that  time  and  what 
we  could  do  legally.  The  status  quo  as 
of  that  time  was,  with  respect  to  these 
frozen  assets,  that  they  had  placed 
these  assets  on  deposit  in  Western 
institutions  and  with  persons  in  the 
West  and  in  the  United  States. 

We  are  willing  and  have  offered 
ways  to  do  that.  There  are  some  assets 
that  could  be  made  available  to  them 
almost  immediately.  Others  are  subject 
to  claims  that  have  to  be  resolved  in 
one  way  or  another.  We  have  offered  to 
join  with  them  in  establishing  an  inter- 
national claims  settling  procedure  and 
offered  to  pursue  that  procedure  with 
them  in  every  way  possible  that  we  could 
legally  in  order  to  resolve  those  claims. 

It  would  require  actions  on  their 
part,  reestablishing  their  banking  rela- 
tions, for  example,  and  others.  There 
are  precedents  for  this  sort  of  approach 
to  it.  Now,  because  that  process  couldn't 
conceivably  be  completed  before  the 
end  of  the  President's  term  and  before 
the  return  of  the  hostages,  they  ask  us 
for  these  cash  guarantees.  Well,  that  is 
asking  for  something  different  than  the 
status  quo  in  November  of  1979. 

Q.  Two  weeks  ago  we  were  told  that 
a  Soviet  invasion  of  Poland  was  immi- 
nent, or  virtually  imminent.  Has  that 
problem  eased  up? 

A.  There  has  been  a  certain  stabil- 
ity, I  think,  which  has  developed  as  a 
result  of  the  ceremonial  activities  in 
Gdansk  and  the  other  Baltic  cities. 
There  was  some  fear  that  those  might 
produce  instability,  even  violence,  but 
they  were  conducted  with  calm  and 
with  dignity.  The  church,  the  unions, 
and  the  government  were  all  repre- 
sented, and  every  effort  was  made  by 


those  three  institutions  in  the  Polish 
community  to  insure  that  those  activ- 
ities would  be  conducted  in  a  way  that 
was  dignified  and  calm. 

Having  passed  that  potential  explo- 
sive point,  there  has  been  a  certain 
stability.  But  the  Polish  situation  is  still 
difficult;  the  economic  situation  is  still 
difficult  and,  to  some  extent,  inhibits 
the  liberalization  movement,  or  the  "re- 
newal process,"  as  the  Poles  call  it,  that 
has  been  taking  place  with  respect  to 
the  unions.  So  in  those  terms,  the  situa- 
tion is  somewhat  easier  than  it  seemed 
to  be  a  couple  of  weeks  ago. 

Q.  But  there  is  no  sign  that  the 
Soviets  are  withdrawing  their  troops  or 
are  stepping  down  their  readiness? 

A.  Their  readiness  is  still  there. 

Q.  The  Peoples  Republic  of  China 
has  issued  a  state-of-the-world  review  in 
which  they  warn  that  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  had  better  get  together 
to  halt  Soviet  military  expansion  or  face 
the  choice  of  either  abject  surrender  or 
world  war.  Do  you  share  this  grim  out- 
look with  regard  to  Soviet  intentions? 

A.  The  Soviet  Union  has  posed 
serious  problems  for  us,  for  themselves, 
for  the  West,  including  China.  Never- 
theless, I  think  the  situation  is  not  irre- 
mediable. It  all  depends  on  where  the 
Soviets  go  from  here  to  there.  I  put  it 
this  way:  One  of  the  most  serious  chal- 
lenges facing  us  is  the  continuing  chal- 
lenge of  reading  Soviet  intentions. 

With  respect  to  Afghanistan,  they 
have  paid  some  heavy  costs,  costs  that 
have,  in  visible  ways,  restrained  them. 
With  respect  to  Poland,  they  have  per- 
mitted the  situation  there  to  go  beyond 
limits  which  they  previously  considered 
tolerable  so,  obviously,  they  have  exer- 
cised restraint  there. 

Q.  What  about  Iran,  can  you  tell  us 
what  Soviet  behavior  has  been  there? 
Have  they  done  anything  to  try  to  help 
bring  the  Iranian  leaders  to  their  senses, 
as  you  might  put  it? 

A.  With  respect  to  the  hostage 
question? 

Q.  That's  correct. 

A.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Q.  Have  you  seen  any  evidence  that 
they've  tried  to  keep  this  dispute  going? 

A.  I  don't  think,  recently.  There 
was  a  time  when  their  propaganda  broad- 
casts, radio  broadcasts,  we  thought,  had 
the  effect  of  inflaming  opinion  in  Iran 
against  the  United  States. 


Q.  You  seemed  to  be  suggesting 
earlier  that  the  hostages  may  not  be 
released  until  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion comes  in.  Would  you  recommend 
that  President  Reagan  continue  to  neg 
tiate  for  the  release  of  the  hostages- 
effect,  two  Administrations  being  held 
hostage  to  the  same  problem? 

A.  What  he  does  with  respect  to 
the  problem  will  depend  upon,  I  sup- 
pose, what  the  situation  is  on  Januar; 
20.  We  try  to  keep  him  and  his  advist 
informed,  and  now  that  we  have  a  Se 
retary  of  State-designate,  we  are  in  a 
better  position  to  keep  him  informed. 

We  are  trying  to  solve  the  probh 
before  he  comes  on  so  that  he  won't 
have  this  on  his  plate  with  other 
problems  that  will  be  on  his  plate.  Bu 
whatever  he  may  find  expedient  to  di 
at  that  time  will  depend  upon  the 
circumstances. 


'  Press  release  352. 


28 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


The  Secretary 


terview  on  the 
llacNeil/Lehrer 
jport" 


Secretary  Muskie's  interview  for 
'ublic  Broadcasting  System's 
Neil/Lehrer  Report"  with  Robert 
Weil  and  Jim  Lehrer  on  January  6. 


■an's  Prime  Minister  Mohammed  Ali 
i  today  consulted  the  AyatoUah 
Tieini  on  the  latest  stage  in  the 
ige  negotiations,  but  what  precisely 
spired  is  unclear.  Afterward  Rajai 
e  to  Iranian  television,  and  there  are 
versions  of  what  he  said. 
According  to  one,  the  Ayatollah  said 
fovernment  could  accept  guarantees 
le  Algerian  intermediaries  to  solve 
lostage  problem.  The  other  version 
the  word  "undertakings"  instead  of 
antees.  Before  the  Algerians  return- 
Iran  last  week  with  the  latest 
rican  counterproposals,  some  Ira- 
i  said  they  would  accept  whatever 
antees  satisfied  the  Algerians. 
Meanwhile,  the  whereabouts  of  the 
,iges  themselves  are  again  in  doubt. 
i  aturday.  the  three  hostages  held 
J  long  at  the  Iranian  Foreign  Ministry 
\  forced  to  move  to  an  unknown 
i  nation.  Today,  an  unidentified  Ad- 
jstration  official  in  Washington  said 
j-  of  them  may  be  in  jail.  Tonight, 
(Vdministration  view  of  the  hostage 
Jition  and  other  matters.  Secretary 

!ate  Edmund  Muskie  is  with  Jim 
er  in  Washington. 

Q.  First,  on  the  hostages  them- 
s.  Do  we  know  now  that  some  of 
I  are  in  jail? 

A.  No,  we  do  not.  I  don't  know  the 
ce  of  the  report  to  which  Robert 
referred.  We  don't  know  where  the 
e  are.  The  Government  of  Iran 
.fied  the  move  on  the  grounds  that 
he  hostages  are  now  under  govern- 
t  control;  that  they  wanted  to  bring 
n  all  together,  wherever  they  are- 

is,  an  appropriate  place.  This  is  the 

explanation  we  have. 

Q.  There  had  even  been  state- 
ts— oh,  10  days  ago,  I  think— from 
)artment  of  State  spokesman]  John 
ttner  about  the  possibility  that 
e  of  the  hostages  were  now  in  jail, 
re's  no  new  development  on  it?  We 
e  no  new  information  about  that, 
jgh,  is  that  correct? 


-ruarv  1981 


A.  No.  The  latest  information  we 
have  about  the  other  49  is  the  news 
that  we  were  given  by  the  Algerian 
delegation.  And  that  was  all  very  posi- 
tive. They  saw  all  52  hostages,  spent 
some  7V2  hours  with  them,  talking  to 
groups  of  them  in  their  rooms  or 
quarters;  accepting  letters  from  them 
to  the  people  back  here,  and  to  the 
families  back  here,  in  the  States;  and 
taking  pictures  of  all  of  those  who  were 
interested  in  having  pictures  taken.  I 
think  there's  only  one  who  did  not.  So 
they  had  that  much  time  to  observe  the 
hostages,  and  their  impression  was  that 
they  were  in  good  physical  health. 

Q.  The  explanation,  you  said,  that 
the  Iranians  had  given  for  taking  the 
three  out  of  the  Foreign  Ministry 
was — do  you  buy  that  explanation — 
that  the  government  has  now  taken 
control  of  the  hostages? 

A.  In  dealing  with  Iranians,  I'm 
always  interested  in  as  many  facts  as  I 
can  get.  One  does  not  necessarily  get  a 
consistent  version  of  what  has  hap- 
pened or  why.  Our  access  to  informa- 
tion is  not  perfect.  The  Swiss,  of 
course,  are  our  protective  government 
in  Tehran,  representing  our  interests, 
and  they  are  in  almost  daily  contact 
with  the  Government  of  Iran.  They  give 
us  the  best  information  they  can,  and 
we  rely  on  them  to  give  us  information. 
And  there  are  other  governments  that 
are  useful  channels  to  information.  But 
at  this  point  we  don't  know  where  the 
three  have  been  taken,  but  we  are  pur- 
suing that  question. 

Q.  Is  there  anything  important  in 
these  reported  remarks  of  the  Ayatollah 
to  the  Prime  Minister  today  that  I  just 
quoted?  Is  there  some  significance  that 
you  can  read  into  that? 

A.  There  is  an  additional  report 
that  you  ought  to  have.  Ambassador 
Gheraib,  one  of  the  Algerian  delegation, 
also  had  a  press  conference  subsequent 
to  the  ones  to  which  you  refer  and 
made  it  clear  that  Algeria's  only  role  is 
as  intermediary.  So  whatever  Khomeini 
said,  it  was  not  an  accurate  description 
of  the  Algerian  role  and  certainly  not  a 
description  that  satisfied  the  Algerians. 

Q.  So  that  speculation  that  the 
Algerians  might  be  performing  some- 
thing like  the  Camp  David  role  of  try- 
ing to  come  up  with  a  parcel,  a 
package,  that  brings  both  sides 
together,  they  are  not  doing  that. 


A.  I  think  the  most  accurate  way 
to  describe  their  role  — and  I've  used 
this  description  before  — is  that  of  a 
positive  intermediary.  Now,  what  do  I 
mean  by  the  word  "positive"? 

When  they  come  to  the  United 
States  to  get  our  response,  they  do 
more  than  accept  the  document.  They 
also  ask  questions  about  the  document, 
undertaking  to  anticipate  the  questions 
that  Iranians  may  put  to  them  so  that 
they  can  deliver  the  document  with  a 
rather  full  understanding  on  their  own 
part  of  the  document's  significance  and 
meaning.  And  they  do  that  in  reverse 
when  they  receive  the  Iranian  response 
to  our  documents. 

So  they  have  been  very  helpful  and 
very  impressive  in  that  respect,  but 
they  are  no  more  than  intermediaries. 

Q.  Last  week,  before  they  went 
back,  one  of  the  spokesmen  in  Iran— 
the  man  who's  in  charge  of  negotia- 
tions, Mr.  Nabavi— said  that  they  were 
prepared  to  hear  a  U.S.  counter  offer. 
Are  you  hopeful  that  what  you  have 
now  sent  back  with  the  Algerians  will 
produce  a  positive  response  in  Iran?  Do 
you  have  some  hope  of  that? 

A.  Long  ago  I  dismissed  hope  as  a 
useful  emotion  in  these  frustrating 
talks.  I  don't  even  describe  them  as 
"negotiations."  But  one  never  knows, 
given  the  political  power  struggle  that 
is  going  on  in  Iran  today  — and  it  seems 
to  have  developed  into  one  of  those 
more  abrasive  kinds  of  struggles,  more 
public  than  it  has  been  for  some  time  — 
one  never  knows  when  someone  in  Iran 
is  in  a  position  to  make  a  decision  and 
to  make  a  decision  favorable  to  our  pro- 
posals and  to  the  hostages. 

And  the  second  point  I  would  make 
is  that,  notwithstanding  the  positive 
role  that  the  Algerians  have  played  in 
conveying  not  only  our  documents  but 
an  explanation  of  them,  it  has  been 
very  difficult  to  convey  to  the  Iranians 
precisely  what  the  limitations  are  on 
our  authority,  on  the  President's 
authority,  in  a  way  that's  credible  to 
them.  They're  suspicious  of  us  anyway. 
So  we  think  that  by  patiently  and  per- 
sistently making  our  points,  our  limita- 
tions, reformulating  our  proposals  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  questions  that  they 
raise,  that  we  might  at  some  point 
strike  a  formulation  that  gets  a  favor- 
able response.  Time  is  obviously  run- 
ning out;  we're  aware  of  that,  and  we 
hope  they  are. 


29 


The  Secretary 


Q.  Have  you  asked  the  Algerians 
to  emphasize  that  point  to  the  Iranians, 
that  time  is  running  out? 

A.  Oh,  indeed,  and  it  wasn't 
necessary  for  us  to  emphasize  it. 
They're  quite  aware  of  it,  too. 

Q.  They  can  look  at  the  calendar 
as  well. 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Is  there  any  indication  at  this 
point  as  to  when  this  next  Iranian 
response  to  our  counterproposals  is  go- 
ing to  be  received  here  in  the  United 
States? 

A.  No,  there  isn't.  I  think  that  Ra- 
jai  is  scheduled  to  hold  another  press 
conference  tomorrow.  He  had  one  today 
and  gave  us  no  response. 

Q.  It  must  be  terribly  frustrating 
for  you  to  have  to  get  information  from 
a  press  conference  every  day  or  so. 

A.  Now  it  doesn't  seem  to  me  that 
you  take  your  profession  seriously 
enough.  Aren't  press  conferences  sup- 
posed to  be  informative? 

Q.  [Laughing]  All  right.  Yes,  sir. 

A.  But  you're  absolutely  right. 
And,  like  so  many  politicians  in  this 
country,  as  well  as  in  Iran,  they  often 
say  things  in  public  that  are  not  neces- 
sarily a  clue  to  what  their  thinking  is  or 
what  they  may  be  planning  to  do. 

Q.  Have  the  statements  by  Presi- 
dent-elect Reagan,  particularly  those 
characterizing  the  Iranians  as  bar- 
barians, have  they  been  helpful  or  hurt- 
ful to  the  negotiations  or  the  discus- 
sions— whatever  you  want  to  call  them? 

A.  That's  hard  to  measure.  Cer- 
tainly it  struck  a  chord  over  in  Iran  and 
some  very  vigorous  reactions.  But  he 
has,  of  course,  made  it  clear  to  them 
that  they  can't  expect  a  better  deal  in  a 
Reagan  Administration  than  they  can 
get  from  the  Carter  Administration, 
and  to  that  extent  perhaps  it's  useful. 

Q.  What  do  you  make  of  all  this 
talk  in  the  last  several  days — and  it's 
just  talk,  as  I  understand  it— but  the 
suggestion  that  some  people  are  going 
to  make  to  President-elect  Reagan  that 
what  he  ought  to  do  is  ask  the  Con- 
gress to  declare  war  on  Iran.  Does  that 
sound  like  a  good  idea  to  you? 

A.  If  we  do  that,  we  risk  turning 
away  from  one  of  our  two  objectives. 
Our  two  objectives  from  the  beginning 
of  this  Administration  have  been,  first. 


the  hostages'  safety  and  speedy 
return  — the  word  "speedy"  has  to  be 
dropped  now  — and,  secondly,  to  do  so 
consistent  with  national  honor. 

Once  we  go  to  these  other  alter- 
natives, there  is  a  risk.  There  are  risks 
even  in  our  present  strategy,  so  it  may 
be  that  another  look  at  those  options 
would  be  in  order.  But  the  fact  that  one 
looks  at  options  doesn't  necessarily 
mean  that  one  is  looking  seriously  at 
one  option  or  another.  And  I  think  a 
new  administration  would,  as  I  think 
Vice  President-elect  Bush  put  it,  ex- 
amine the  problem  from  ground  zero. 

When  you  do  that,  you  look  at  a  lot 
of  options  that  you  won't  necessarily 
consider  seriously,  and  I  don't  think  it 
would  be  useful  for  me  to  prejudge 
options  that  may  not  be  considered 
seriously. 

Q.  Why  is  it  in  the  Iranian  interest 
to  solve  this  before  the  Carter  Adminis- 
tration leaves? 

A.  It  seems  logical  to  me,  even  in 
terms  of  their  own  interest,  that  they 
should  have  solved  it  long  ago.  But  our 
logic  doesn't  seem  to  run  parallel  with 
Iranian  logic. 

Q.  You  mentioned  national  honor  a 
moment  ago.  We've  rejected  the  $24 
billion  deposit  demand.  We  have  of- 
fered, as  I  understand,  something  like 
$6  billion.  Why  is  our  offer  of  $6  billion 
consistent  with  national  honor  and  their 
demand  for  $24  billion  not  acceptable  as 
consistent  with  national  honor? 

A.  The  principles  on  which  we 
have  been  negotiating— two  important 
principles;  one,  if  they  will  undo  what 
they  did  — that  is,  seize  the  hostages  — 
we  would  do  everything  we  can  within 
the  limits  of  the  President's  authority 
to  undo  what  we  did  in  retaliation.  The 
$6  billion  figure,  which  doesn't  come 
from  the  State  Department  or  any  offi- 
cial source  — and  I'm  not  going  to  use 
any  numbers— but  the  number  that  has 
been  used  is  that  the  assets  frozen  at 
the  time  the  hostages  were  seized 
amounted  to  about  $8  billion.  Any  sum 
in  excess  of  that  would  do  more  than 
restore  our  financial  relationship  to  the 
status  quo  ante.  That's  the  first  princi- 
ple. 

The  second  principle  is  that  if  and 
when  this  exchange  of  actions  is  taken, 
they  must  be  taken  simultaneously  — 
that  is,  so  that  we  are  sure  of  getting 
the  hostages  back  for  taking  our  action 
and  so  that  they  are  sure  of  getting 
their  assets  back. 


The  complicating  factor  in  all  of 
this  is  that  subsequent  to  the  freezinj 
of  the  assets,  a  great  number  of  suits 
arising  out  of  business  and  banking  ai 
rangements  that  the  Iranians  had 
entered  into  before  the  seizure  of  the 
hostages  changed.  Banks  offset  loans 
against  assets;  people  with  claims 
against  Iran  filed  suit  and  made  attac 
ments.  That's  the  complicating  factor. 

One  cannot  just  arbitrarily  wipe 
out  the  rights  of  those  people  to  a 
judicial  settlement  of  their  claims. 
That's  the  complicating  factor;  and  it 
the  amount  of  those  claims,  which  is 
very  hard  to  measure,  that  complicati 
the  net  numbers  to  which  you  referre 
There's  nothing  like  $24  billion  in  Ira 
nian  assets  involved  in  all  of  this. 

Q.  So  is  it  wrong  to  think  of  this 
as  a  negotiation  like  a  labor  negotiati( 
where  they  start  with  a  high  demand 
and  then  there's  a  lower  offer  and 
gradually  the  two  sides  come  together 
monetarily? 

A.  I  don't  see  it  in  that  fashion  ai 
all.  Recall  that  I  said  the  principle  is  i 
restore  each  other's  position  to  what 
was.  Given  the  fact  that  a  year  irre- 
vocably changes  those  positions  to  soi 
extent,  you  can't  give  the  hostages  bi 
that  wasted  year;  and,  in  the  case  of 
the  assets,  these  attachments  have  cc 
plicated  the  Iranians'  claim  to  their 
assets.  So  you  can't  put  them  back. 

And  so  you're  dealing  with  fixed 
items.  You  can't  negotiate  down  the 
claims.  What  we've  offered  to  do  is  t( 
create  an  international  claims  settle- 
ment procedure- which  would  substi- 
tute for  the  judicial  process  — to  make 
judgments  as  to  the  validity  of  claims 
and  to  arrange  for  their  settlement. 

In  order  to  wipe  the  slate  clean  a 
some  point,  Iran  has  said  that  it  is  wi! 
ing  to  pay  its  just  debts.  But,  beyond 
that,  it  is  not  willing  to  concede  again 
its  own  assets.  So  the  numbers  are  no 
really  that  flexible. 

Q.  It  sounds  as  though  there's  not 
much  more  room  for  maneuver. 

A.  To  answer  that  question  ade- 
quately would  require  that  I  go  into  t! 
matter  more  extensively  than  I  think 
would  be  helpful. 

Q.  On  a  scale  of  1  to  10,  what  do 
you  think  the  chances  are  of  the 
hostage  situation  being  resolved  by  the 
deadline,  January  16? 

A.  That  method  of  measuring  is 
useful  in  the  United  States  but  not  in 
Iran. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


ERICA 


>ioposed  Chad- 
ibya  Merger 

VRTMENT  STATEMENT, 

:  ;i.  1981' 

aire  very  concerned  about  reports 
r<ng  from  Tripoli  that  Libya  and 

I  plan  to  work  toward  a  merger  of 
two  states.  Without  trying  to  in- 

jne  in  Chad's  internal  affairs,  we 
note  that  it  appears  the  entire 

nal  Union  Transition  Government 

JT)  has  not  been  consulted  about 

proposal. 

Our  policy  has  been  clear  from  the 
gining.  We  support  the  provisions  of 
ftjagos  accord  and  the  Lagos  com- 
uique.  The  United  States  has  also 
mbeen  attached  to  the  principle  of 
interference  by  one  state  in  the  in- 
ril  affairs  of  another. 

Most  of  Africa  has  expressed  a 
e;  concern  in  recent  days  over 
ba's  blatant  behavior.  We  share  this 
n;rn  and  want  to  work  with  the  Af- 
a  states  to  assure  Chad's  national 

V  reign ty  and  territorial  integrity. 

Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
3j  -tment  spokesman  John  Trattner.  ■ 

Q.  You  won't  play  my  game,  then? 

A.  No. 

Q.  [Laughing]  Okay.  Moving  on  to 
Mier  major  problem  of  Iran,  which  is 
i  ar  with  Iraq.  Yesterday  Iran  an- 
M  ced  that  it  had  launched  a  major 
)i  teroffensive  against  Iraq.  Is  that 
a  as  best  you  can  tell? 

A.  I  know  what  Iranian  reports  say 
)( t  it.  What  they  claim  to  have  been 

V  ved  in  is  Iraqi  casualties  in  the 
jilreds.  In  terms  of  World  War  II, 
la  s  not  a  major  offensive,  but  in 

■r  s  of  this  war,  that  is  a  sizable  loss. 

0  they  claim  this  victory. 
Reports  out  of  Iraq  these  days,  or 

1  morning— and  I've  been  caught  up 
her  things  all  day  — made  no  refer- 

II  to  such  an  offensive.  So  all  we 
is  the  Iranian  report,  and  Bani- 
,  who's  in  charge  of  the  military 
nation,  made  that  report  to  Kho- 
eii  and  received  a  note  of  congratu- 
Jns.  That's  the  evidence  that  there 
I  such  an  offensive. 
IjThe  war  has  bogged  down  — it's  the 
aly  season  there  now  — into  sort  of  a 
fl  of  attrition  at  a  very  low  pace.  At 

V  point  neither  country  seems  to  be 


in  a  position  to  achieve  a  quick  victory 
over  the  other.  It  looks  like  a  long, 
dragged  out  process  which  is  taking  its 
toll  on  both  countries  economically. 
They've  lost  a  sizable  portion  of  their 
oil  revenues. 

In  the  case  of  Iran,  the  sanctions, 
which  were  imposed  as  a  result  of  the 
hostage  issue,  are  denying  it  access  to 
markets  that  otherwise  would  enable  it 
to  improve  its  ability  to  sustain  the  war 
effort.  But  Iraq,  also,  is  suffering 
economic  damage.  So  it  looks  now  as 
though  the  war  has  settled  down  for 
the  long  term. 

Whether  or  not  at  some  point  both 
parties  will  be  receptive  to  the  termina- 
tion of  hostilities,  a  cease-fire, 
withdrawal  from  territories,  negotia- 
tions, I  think  that  is  the  objective 
toward  which  we  ought  to  address  our 
efforts  with  other  countries  in  the 
Security  Council. 

Q.  But  it  doesn't  look  like  that's  on 
the  immediate  horizon,  right? 

A.  No,  it  does  not. 

Q.  Let  me  move  on  to  another  part 
of  the  world — Poland.  Is  the  immediate 
threat  of  Soviet  intervention  there  pretty 
well  subsided  for  now? 

A.  Let  me  describe  it  as  accurately 
as  I  can  on  the  basis  of  the  information 
that  we  have.  There  has  been  some 
reduction  in  Soviet  military  activity, 
but  their  state  of  readiness  is  still  at 
the  high  level  that  it  achieved  in 
December.  So  they're  in  a  position, 
militarily,  to  move  on  fairly  short 
notice. 

Internally,  the  tension  level  seems 
to  have  been  reduced  somewhat,  but 
there  are  some  difficult  points  ahead  of 
us.  There's  the  question  of  work-free 
Saturdays,  for  example.  There's  the 
question  of  the  union  for  the  farmers. 
And  down  the  road  further  there's  a 
scheduled  congress  of  the  party  in 
Poland. 

There  is  a  very  difficult  economic 
situation  which  could  trigger  political 
reactions  and  then  counterreactions 
from  the  government  and  maybe  con- 
ceivably from  the  Soviet  Union.  So  it's 
going  to  be  a  very  delicate,  sensitive, 
and  potentially  volatile  situation  for 
some  time. 

Q.  In  El  Salvador  as  of  last  week, 
six  Americans  have  recently  been  killed 
there — Americans  who  were  working 
there,  privately  or  under  government 
auspices.  Is  there  anything  that  requires 


changing  American  policy  or  that  can  be 
done  to  stop  this  loss  of  American  life 
there? 

A.  First  of  all,  one  must  under- 
stand the  basic  situation.  We  have  two 
forces  contending  for  control  in  El  Sal- 
vador: the  right,  made  up  of  those  who 
occupy  the  privileged  position  in  the 
economy  of  the  country  traditionally; 
and  the  disadvantaged  and  dispossessed 
who  seek  to  achieve  a  government 
that's  more  sensitive  to  their  needs  and 
their  aspirations.  There  are  those  in 
both  groups  inclined  to  violence,  and 
they  both  succeeded  to  the  extent  that 
last  year  there  were  9,000  lives  lost 
altogether. 

The  government  is  made  up  of  a 
junta  with  military  representation;  a 
president,  who  is  a  civilian  and  a 
member  of  the  Christian  Democratic 
Party  which  is  seeking  to  establish  a 
moderate  government  and  has  pledged 
itself  to  reforms,  land  reform,  which  is 
perhaps  the  most  important  and  signifi- 
cant and  key  reform  proposal  and  which 
led  to  the  deaths  of  the  two  Americans 
who  were  just  killed  and  a  very  signifi- 
cant El  Salvadoran  political  figure,  Mr. 
Viera  [Jose  Rodolfo  Viera,  President  of 
El  Salvador's  Institute  for  Agrarian 
Transformation],  who  was  sensitive  to 
the  needs  of  the  poor  and  the  disad- 
vantaged. 

The  land  reform  program  is  the  ob- 
ject of  the  displeasure  of  both  the  left 
and  the  right.  The  privileged  people 
who  have  owned  the  land  and,  in  effect, 
dominated  the  economy  see  land  reform 
as  a  threat  to  their  privileged  position. 
The  left  sees  land  reform  as  a  reform 
which  frustrates  the  kind  of  change 
that  they  would  like  to  initiate  through 
violence  and  overthrow.  So  land  reform 
and  reforms  of  this  kind  that  are  spon- 
sored by  the  government  are  attacked 
and  resisted  from  both  ends  of  the  spec- 
trum. 

Mr.  Hammer,  who  was  one  of  the 
Americans  killed,  regrettably,  in  this 
recently  was  in  charge  of  the  land 
reform  program.  He  had  enemies  on 
both  sides.  The  question  is,  from  which 
side  of  the  political  spectrum  did  the  at- 
tack come?  President  Duarte  and  the 
Defense  Minister  responded  quickly  to 
protests  of  our  charge  [d'affaires],  and 
they're  pressing  for  an  investigation. 

But  the  problem  is  how  to  get  the 
moderate  center  established  and  credi- 
ble and  how  to  build  support  for  them, 
given  these  pressures  from  the  left  and 
the  right.  And  people  get  caught  in  the 


i 


CANADA 


middle,  whether  they're  Americans  or 
anyone  else,  treading  on  dangerous 
ground. 

Q.  Finally,  to  your  favorite  subject, 
Zbigniew  Brzezinski.  As  you  know,  in 
the  past  week  both  U.N.  Ambassador 
Donald  McHenry  and  former  State 
Department  spokesman  Hodding  Carter 
have  gone  after  him.  McHenry  said,  for 
instance,  that  Brzezinski  spoke  out  pub- 
licly when  he  shouldn't  have  and  has 
been  sending  mixed  signals  around  the 
world  on  U.S.  foreign  policy.  Is  that 
true? 

A.  Let  me  put  it  this  way.  This 
subject  has  been  discussed  now  in  just 
about  every  — well,  I  won't  say  every 
but  many  interview  programs  which 
I've  been  on. 

Q.  We're  looking  for  something 
fresh.  [Laughter] 

A.  I  have  nothing  fresh  to  say.  I've 
tackled  the  subject  from  the  institu- 
tional point  of  view  — the  respective 
role  of  the  National  Security  Council 
and  the  State  Department  — and  I've 
made  those  views  known  and  clear.  I 
don't  think  it's  useful,  nor  am  I  inclined, 
to  get  involved  in  a  personality  contest 
with  Zbig.  Zbig  and  I  are  good  friends, 
we  get  along  fine,  I  find  him  congenial, 
and  I  see  no  reason  at  this  point  to 
comment. 

Q.  But  McHenry  wasn't  a  personal- 
ity thing.  McHenry  was  talking  about— 
he's  the  U.N.  Ambassador  of  the  United 
States— sending  mixed  signals  on  foreign 
policy.  He  didn't  attack  him  personally. 
Hodding  Carter's  statement  is  a  little  dif- 
ferent. 

A.  Let  me  put  it  in  institutional 
terms.  What  Don  McHenry  had  to  say 
could  have  been  said  when  Henry  Kis- 
singer was  National  Security  Adviser; 
it  could  have  been  said  in  previous  Ad- 
ministrations when  the  National  Secu- 
rity Adviser  was  given  a  public  voice. 
That's  a  problem.  It's  the  President's 
choice  as  to  whether  or  not  that's  what 
he  wants. 

Q.  And  President  Carter  clearly 
made  that  choice. 

A.  He  clearly  did,  and  he  saw  ad- 
vantages in  it  for  him.  Zbig  says  that 
an  activist  President— that  is,  a  foreign 
policy  activist  President  — will  give  his 
National  Security  Adviser  automati- 
cally more  visibility,  which  is  a  legiti- 
mate point  of  view. 


Q.  David  Broder,  in  a  column  in  The 
Washington  Post  recently  said  that  you 
offered  your  successor-designate,  Alex- 
ander Haig,  four  rules. 

A.  Don't  call  them  rules;  I  don't. 

Q.  No  press  secretary  for  the  Secu- 
rity Adviser;  no  press  briefings  or  TV  ap- 
pearances; no  contacts  with  foreign 
governments;  and  for  him  to  do  his  job 
and  not  the  State  Department's.  Is  that 
an  accurate  reflection  of  what  you  think 
the  rules  ought  to  be? 

A.  That  wasn't  put  in  the  diplo- 
matic way  that  I've  learned  to  say 
things,  or  tried  to,  in  the  last  6  months. 

Q.  But  structurally  you  think  that 
would  help. 

A.  I  think  that  those  four  points 
highlight  the  point  that  I  made  a  mo- 
ment ago.  The  President,  under  the 
Constitution,  makes  foreign  policy;  he's 
got  greater  powers  there  than  he  does 
in  domestic  policy. 

Secondly,  he  ought  to  have  a 
Secretary  of  State  in  whom  he  has  con- 
fidence as  his  delegated  voice. 

That's  the  arrangement,  and  that 
should  be  the  arrangement.  To  the  ex- 
tent that  someone  else  — whether  it's 
the  National  Security  Adviser  or  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  — articulates 
foreign  policy,  then  to  that  extent  you 
send  mixed  signals,  or  at  least  risk  it. 


^Press  release  2  of  Jan.  7,  1981. 


U.S.-Canada 
Technical  Meetin< 
on  Dioxin 


JOINT  STATEMENT 
DEC.  19,  1980' 

At  the  invitation  of  the  Department  o 
State,  U.S.  and  Canadian  officials  and 
health  and  environmental  scientists  m 
in  Washing^ton  December  19,  1980,  to 
discuss  recent  findings  regarding 
2,3,7,8-TCDD  (dioxin)  in  the  Great 
Lakes  and  to  develop  an  effective  re- 
sponse to  the  problem.  The  Canadian 
delegation  was  led  by  the  Department 
of  External  Affairs  and  included  ex- 
perts from  the  Ministries  of  Health  an 
Welfare,  Environment  Canada,  Fisher 
ies  and  Oceans,  and  the  Province  of 
Ontario.  The  U.S.  delegation,  led  by  tl 
Department  of  State,  included  experts 
from  the  Environmental  Protection 
Agency,  the  Departments  of  Health  ar 
Human  Services,  Interior,  and  the  Vet 
erans  Administration.  Government  spt 
cialists  from  the  States  of  New  York 
and  Michigan  also  took  part. 

Canadian  scientists  presented  the 
results  of  a  recent  Environment  Canac 
study  which  revealed  the  presence  of 
2,3,7,8-TCDD  in  Great  Lakes  herring 
gull  eggs.  The  discovery  of  2,3,7,8- 
TCDD  in  the  Great  Lakes  Basin, 
through  recent  advances  in  analytical 
technology,  shows  that  the  compound 
has  been  present  in  declining  quantitie 
in  the  eggs  over  the  past  decade.  Othe 
scientific  findings  from  both  govern- 
ments on  2,3,7,8-TCDD  and  concerns 
related  to  health  and  environment  wer 
compared  and  discussed. 

As  a  result,  Canada  and  the  Unite 
States  will  be  exchanging  information 
and  cooperating  in  an  effort  to: 

•  Identify  sources  of  2,3,7,8-TCDE 
in  the  Great  Lakes,  with  particular 
attention  being  paid  to  sources  related 
to  2,4,5-trichlorophenol  production;  it 
was  reported  that  this  material  is  no 
longer  being  produced  in  the  Great 
Lakes  Basin; 

•  Review  the  presence  of  2,3,7,8- 
TCDD  in  fish,  with  emphasis  on  analyt- 
ical methodology,  human  exposure,  and 
evaluation  of  potential  health  hazards, 
and  establish  mechanisms  to  deal  with 
these  issues; 

•  Investigate  the  way  that  2,3,7,8- 
TCDD  is  transported  through  and  af- 
fects the  environment;  and 


32 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


EAST  ASIA 


Formulate  plans  for  coordinated 

I  addition  to  these  immediate  ac- 
he governments  also  plan  to  pre- 
an  international  conference  on 
,  tentatively  scheduled  in  Wash- 
in  October  1981,  the  results  of 

)rk  accomplished. 

gencies  of  the  governments  will 

ue  to  forward  information  on 
TCDD  to  the  International  Joint 

ission  which,  through  its  Great 
Water  Quality  Board  and  Science 

3ry  Board,  is  already  considering 

sue. 


ress  release  351  of  Dec.  19,  1980. 


II  Pollution 
sjislation 


.  ederal  agencies  are  examining 
irms  of  recent  Canadian  legislation 
lig  with  air  pollution  which  may  af- 
;  le  United  States.  By  unanimous 
ic  on  December  16  the  Canadian 
J:  of  Commons  adopted  a  measure 
i«  would  enable  the  Canadian  Fed- 
i  overnment  to  take  action  in  in- 
a  s  where  there  is  reason  to 
Li  e  that  Canadian  emission  sources 
,t  bute  to  air  pollution  in  another 
ir-y-  The  Canadian  law  is  similar  in 
Tse  to  Section  115  of  the  U.S. 
a  Air  Act.  That  section  provides 
jtion  by  the  U.S.  Federal  Govern- 
D  to  initiate  revision  of  State  imple- 
n  ition  plans  on  air  quality  in  those 
e  where  there  is  reason  to  believe 
itiollution  from  U.S.  sources  endan- 
•!  )ublic  health  or  welfare  in  a  for- 
X  country,  so  long  as  that  country 
)'des  "essentially  the  same  rights" 
t '  United  States. 

n  the  coming  period  the  U.S.  Gov- 
uent  will  consider  whether  the 
alian  legislation  provides  the  reci- 
iiiy  required  under  Section  115. 
■  da's  action,  taken  in  the  context  of 
slemorandum  of  Intent  on  trans- 
ulary  air  pollution  signed  by  Secre- 
■jMuskie  and  the  Canadian  Environ- 
.  Minister  on  August  5,  1980,  is  a 
aive  step  toward  closer  cooperation 
•aling  with  transboundary  air  poUu- 
iissues. 


release  355  of  Dec.  4,  1980. 


Two  Years  of 
U.S. -China 
Relations 


The  United  States  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  established  diplomatic 
relations  on  January  1,  1979.  Since  then, 
the  U.S.  and  Chinese  Governments  have 
cooperated  in  the  rapid  reconstruction  of 
normal  relations  in  virtually  every  field. 
The  Office  of  Chinese  Affairs  in  the 
Bureau  of  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Af- 
fairs has  compiled  the  folloumig  chronol- 
ogy for  the  benefit  of  students,  scholars, 
and  the  interested  public. 

1979 

January  1 

On  the  basis  of  the  joint  communique  and 
separate  statements  issued  on  December 
15, 1978,  the  U.S.  and  the  People's  Re- 
public of  China  (P.R.C.)  extend  mutual 
recognition  and  establish  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. U.S.  simultaneously  withdraws 
recognition  and  breaks  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Taipei.  U.S.  gives  notice  to  the 
Taiwan  authorities  that  it  is  exercising  its 
right  under  Article  X  of  the  March  3, 
1955,  "Mutual  Defense  Treaty  between 
the  United  States  of  America  and  the 
Republic  of  China"  to  terminate  that 
treaty  effective  January  1,  1980.  While 
the  treaty  remains  in  force,  the  U.S.  will 
impose  a  1-year  moratorium  on  new 
commitments  for  U.S.  arms  sales  to 
Taiwan,  although  previous  commitments 
for  arms  deliveries  will  be  honored. 

Chinese  officials  attending  the  third  ses- 
sion of  the  fifth  National  People's  Con- 
gress (NPC)  declare  that  China  will  re- 
spect the  "status  quo  on  Taiwan  ...  in 
settling  the  question  of  reunification"; 
that  "all  military  confrontation  should  be 
ended"  between  the  government  of  China 
and  the  Taiwan  authorities;  that  both 
sides  should  reestablish  postal  and  trans- 
portation links  and  develop  bilateral 
trade. 

January  2 

Vice  Premier  Deng  Xiaoping  tells  U.S. 
congressional  group,  led  by  Representa- 
tive Thomas  L.  Ashley  (Ohio),  that 
reunification  of  Taiwan  with  the  rest  of 
China  will  be  peaceful. 

January  3-14 

Senator  Sam  Nunn  (Georgia)  leads  a  del- 
egation of  the  Pacific  Study  Group  of  the 
Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  to 
China. 


January  9 

In  conversation  with  Senator  Nunn  and 
Senate  group,  Vice  Premier  Deng  tells 
delegation  that  Taiwan  need  not  disarm 
after  reunification;  calls  for  bigger  U.S. 
naval  presence  in  Pacific  and  greater 
Southeast  Asian  defense  cooperation. 

January  11 

Chinese  Government  drops  tariffs  on  im- 
ports from  Taiwan. 

January  16 

American  Institute  in  Taiwan  (AIT)  is 
registered  as  a  private,  nonprofit  corpo- 
ration in  the  District  of  Columbia. 


January  22-26 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
International  Trade  Affairs  William  Bar- 
raclough,  chief  U.S.  textile  negotiator 
Michael  Smith,  and  chief  of  China  Tex- 
tiles Import-Export  Corporation  Han 
Fangyu  lead  preliminary  consultations  on 
textile  trade  in  Washington. 

January  26 

President  Carter  formally  transmits  to 
Congress  a  draft  bill  to  implement  the 
U.S. -China  joint  communique  and  to  em- 
power the  AIT  to  manage  unofficial  rela- 
tions with  the  people  on  Taiwan. 

January  28- 
February  5 

Vice  Premier  Deng,  Vice  Premier  Fang 
Yi,  and  Foreign  Minister  Huang  Hua 
visit  the  U.S.  In  Washington  they  meet 
for  talks  with  President  Carter,  Secretary 
of  State  Cyrus  R.  Vance,  and  leading 
members  of  the  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives.  Vice  Premier  Deng  and 
entourage  then  visit  Atlanta,  where  they 
tour  Ford  Motor  Company;  Houston, 
where  they  visit  NASA  facilities  and 
Hughes  Tool  Company;  and  Seattle, 
where  they  tour  Boeing's  747  plant. 

January  31 

Vice  Premier  Deng  reiterates,  in  a  U.S. 
television  interview,  that  China  will  make 
all  attempts  to  bring  about  reunification 
with  Taiwan  by  peaceful  means. 

President  Carter  and  Vice  Premier  Deng 
preside  at  a  ceremony  at  which  a  series  of 
agreements  are  signed.  These  agree- 
ments commit  both  sides  to  facilitate  the 
reunification  of  families  and  establish 


luarv  19R1 


33 


East  Asia 


rules  to  govern  problems  of  those  who 
claim  dual  nationality,  establish  a  Joint 
Commission  on  Scientific  and  Technologi- 
cal Cooperation,  promote  collaboration  in 
the  field  of  high  energy  physics,  and  en- 
courage cultural  exchange  and  coopera- 
tion between  the  two  countries.  Sepa- 
rately, the  two  sides  agree  to  establish  a 
Joint  Economic  Committee. 

February  1 

"Joint  press  communique"  issued  in  which 
the  U.S.  and  China  agree  to  facilitate  the 
accreditation  of  resident  journalists  and 
undertake  to  conclude  trade,  aviation, 
and  shipping  agreements. 

February  12-24 

Representative  Les  AuCoin  (Oregon) 
leads  State  trade  delegation  to  China. 

February  15 

Taiwan  agrees  to  the  establishment  of  a 
nongovernmental  organization,  the  Coor- 
dination Council  for  North  American  Af- 
fairs (CCNAA),  to  carry  out  unofficial  re- 
lations with  the  people  of  the  U.S. 

February  17 

Representative  AuCoin  and  his  delega- 
tion meet  with  Bank  of  China  Deputy 
Manager  Jin  Deqin  and  other  Bank  of 
China  officials;  discuss  the  claims  settle- 
ment question  and  the  possibility  of 
Export-Import  Bank  loans  to  China. 

State  Department  responds  to  Chinese 
intervention  in  Vietnam  by  calling  for 
"immediate  withdrawal  of  Vietnamese 
troops  from  Cambodia  (Kampuchea)  and 
Chinese  troops  from  Vietnam." 


February  24-28 

Governor  Jay  Hammond  (Alaska)  leads 
trade  mission  to  China;  Hammond  is  the 
first  U.S.  governor  to  visit  China  follow- 
ing normalization. 

February  24- 
March  4 

Secretary  of  the  Treasury  W.  Michael 
Blumenthal  visits  China  and  meets  with 
Premier  Hua  Guofeng,  Vice  Premier 
Deng,  and  other  senior  Chinese  officials. 

February  26 

Following  hearings  before  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee,  the  Senate 
(82  to  9)  confirms  U.S.  Liaison  Office 
chief  Leonard  Woodcock  as  the  first  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  the  P.R.C. 


February  26- 
March  2 

Minister  of  Metallurgical  Industries  Tang 
Ke  visits  U.S.;  meets  with  Secretary  of 
Commerce  Juanita  Kreps. 

February  28 

Embassy  of  the  formerly  recognized 
Chinese  Government  (Taipei)  officially 
closes  in  Washington,  as  does  the  Ameri- 
can Embassy  at  Taipei. 

March  1 

U.S.  and  China  formally  establish  diplo- 
matic relations  at  the  ambassadorial  level 
as  Embassies  open  at  Beijing  and  Wash- 
ington. Chinese  Ambassador  Chai  Zemin 
presents  his  credentials  to  President 
Carter  in  Washington. 

March  2 

Secretary  Blumenthal  and  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance Zhang  Jingfu  initial  a  claims 
settlement  agreement  which  provides  for 
payment  by  China  of  $80.5  million  in 
settlement  of  $196  million  in  property 
claims  of  U.S.  nationals  and  the  release 
by  the  U.S.,  by  October  1,  1979,  of  ap- 
proximately $80.5  million  in  Chinese  as- 
sets frozen  during  the  Korean  war. 

March  7 

Ambassador  Woodcock  presents  his  cre- 
dentials to  Ulanhu,  Vice  Chairman  of  the 
Standing  Committee  of  the  NPC,  in  Bei- 
jing, thus  completing  the  establishment 
of  ambassadorial  relations  between  the 
U.S.  and  China. 

March  8-18 

Governor  Richard  Thornburg  (Pennsyl- 
vania) leads  trade  mission  to  China. 

March  13 

U.S.  Senate  and  House  of  Representa- 
tives pass  separate  bills  on  U.S.  non- 
governmental relations  with  Taiwan. 

March  15-24 

Deputy  Secretary  of  Agriculture  Dale 
Hathaway  leads  a  U.S.  Department  of 
Agriculture  delegation  to  China.  Repre- 
sentative Bill  Alexander  (Arkansas)  ac- 
companies the  delegation. 

March  16 

Chinese  Government  formally  protests 
congressional  amendments  to  the  Taiwan 
Relations  Act,  charging  that  the  legisla- 
tion contravenes  the  principles  of  nor- 
malization recorded  in  the  joint  com- 
munique. 


March  24-31 

House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  de 
gation,  led  by  Representative  Al  Ullnr 
(Oregon),  visits  China;  meets  with  Vic 
Premier  Deng. 

March  27 

House  backs  Senate-House  compromii 
on  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act  (339  to  5( 

March  28 

Senate  approves  Taiwan  Relations  Ac 

(85  to  4). 

April  3 

China  delays  signing  the  "claims-asset 
settlement  in  protest  of  legislative  act 
on  Taiwan  Relations  Act. 

April  10 

President  Carter  signs  the  Taiwan  Re 
tions  Act  (Public  Law  96-8),  stating  t 
he  will  implement  it  in  a  manner  consi 
ent  with  U.S.  commitments  under  the 
joint  communique. 

AIT  formally  opens  in  Taipei. 

April  12-20 

Textile  negotiator  Smith,  and  chief  of 
China  Textiles  Import-Export  Corpoi 
tion  Han  Fangyu,  lead  the  first  round 
textile  negotiations  in  Beijing. 

April  13-19 

Representative  Jack  Brooks  (Texas), 
Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Gover 
ment  Operations,  leads  a  congression, 
delegation  to  China. 

April  14-17 

Representative  William  Nichols  (Ala- 
bama) visits  Beijing  in  connection  wit 
U.S. -China  textile  negotiations. 

April  14-21 

Representative  Melvin  Price  (Illinois] 
Chairman  of  the  House  Armed  Servic 
Committee,  leads  congressional  deleg 
tion  to  China;  meets  with  Vice  Premi< 
Deng  and  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Genera 
Staff  of  the  People's  Liberation  Army 
(PLA)  Wu  Xiuquan. 

April  15-20 

Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
egation,  headed  by  Senators  Frank 
Church  (Idaho)  and  Jacob  Javits  (Nev 
York),  visits  China.  A  group  of  north- 
western business  representatives  acc( 
panies  delegation. 

April  16 

Vice  President  of  the  Academy  of  Soc 
Sciences  Huan  Xiang  leads  delegation 


1A 


Department  of  State  Bull 


^ing:ton  for  meetings  with  the  U.S. 
flnittee  on  Scholarly  Communication 
ilu'P.R.C. 


1 17-28 

Minister  of  Communications  Peng 
ng  leads  delegation  to  Seattle  to  at- 
ceremonies  marking  the  first  call  of 
inese  ship  at  a  U.S.  seaport. 

118 

esentative  Brooks'  delegation  meets 

Vice  Premier  Deng. 

119 

Premier  Deng  tells  Senator  Church 
lis  delegation  that  the  Taiwan  Rela- 
Act  undermines  the  normalization  of 
China  relations  and  comes  close  to 
ying  it. 

I  21-24 

«sentative  Augustus  Hawkins  (Cali- 
a)  leads  delegation  of  the  House 
ation  and  Labor  Committee  to 


KII22 

')  e.sentative  Hawkins  and  his  delega- 
r  neet  with  Vice  Premier  Li  Xiannian; 
:i  sses  China's  major  economic  prob- 
i:  and  the  importance  of  good  relations 
Uig  China,  Japan,  and  the  Western  al- 
r?  in  preventing  world  war. 

(il2.3 

•)  t'sentative  Hawkins  and  his  delega- 
!  iK'tt  with  Deputy  Director  of  the 
I  •  Bureau  of  Labor  Wang  Jiong. 

til  24- 

19 

rtor  of  the  National  Bureau  of  Stand- 

:i  International  Affairs  Division  Ed- 

i:  Brady  leads  delegation  to  China. 

HI  30 

f'.S.  forces  and  military  installations 
iihdrawn  from  Taiwan. 

4-15 

3tary  of  Commerce  Kreps  leads  dele- 
in  to  China;  first  round  of  U.S. -China 
tiations  on  a  maritime  agreement  is 
in  Beijing. 


etary  Kreps  and  Minister  of  Foreign 
e  Li  Qiang  attend  ceremonies  in  Bei- 
for  the  signing  of  four  protocols 
ring  atmospheric  sciences,  marine 
fisheries  sciences  metrology  and 
dards,  and  the  management  of  scien- 
and  technological  information. 


May  7 

Secretary  Kreps  and  Minister  of  Finance 
Zhang  Jingfu  formally  sign  the  long- 
sought  "claims-assets"  agreement  ini- 
tialed during  Secretary  Blumenthal's 
March  visit. 

May  10 

Secretary  Kreps  and  Minister  Li  sign 
agreement  designed  to  facilitate  trade 
exhibitions  for  American  and  Chinese 
goods. 

May  14 

Secretary  Kreps  and  Minister  Li  initial 
bilateral  trade  agreement. 

May  19- 
June  3 

U.S.  National  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Administration  (NASA)  delegation,  led 
by  Administrator  Robert  Frosch,  arrives 
in  Beijing  to  implement  the  Sino-U.S. 
scientific  and  technical  cooperation 
agreement. 

May  21 

NASA  delegation  meets  Vice  Premier  Yu 
Qiuli. 

May  21-30 

Textile  negotiator  Smith  and  chief  of 
China  Textiles  Import-Export  Corpora- 
tion Han  Fangyu  lead  the  second  round 
of  U.S. -China  textile  negotiations  in 
Beijing. 

May  22-29 

U.S.  postal  delegation,  led  by  Postmaster 
General  William  Bolger,  visits  China. 

May  25 

U.S.  postal  delegation  and  Chinese 
Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunica- 
tions sign  a  memorandum  of  understand- 
ing which  provides  for  direct  exchange  of 
letters  and  post  items,  establishment  of 
an  express  mail  service  between  U.S.  and 
Chinese  cities,  exchange  of  information 
on  postal  technology,  and  settlement  of 
outstanding  postal  accounts  dating  back 
to  1949. 

May  26- 
June2 

U.S.  Special  Trade  Representative 
Robert  S.  Strauss  leads  governmental 
and  business  delegation  to  China;  holds 
textile  negotiations  with  the  Chinese  in 
attempt  to  reach  a  compromise  agree- 
ment; promotes  U.S. -China  business  con- 
tact. 


East  Asia 


May  28- 
June  10 

Vice  Premier  in  charge  of  the  State  Eco- 
nomic Commission  Kang  Shien  visits 
U.S.  and  meets  in  Washington  with  Pres- 
ident Carter,  Secretary  of  Energy  James 
Schlesinger,  and  other  senior  U.S.  offi- 
cials to  discuss  energy  cooperation  and  oil 
exploration. 

May  30 

Special  Trade  Representative  Strauss 
ends  textile  talks  with  the  Chinese  with- 
out agreement. 

May  31 

U.S.  quotas  are  unilaterally  imposed  on 
five  categories  of  Chinese  textile  im- 
ports. 

June  1 

Chinese  officials  accompanying  Vice 
Premier  Kang  in  the  U.S.  announce  the 
beginning  of  negotiations  with  nine  of  the 
largest  U.S. -based  oil  companies  for 
seismic  surveys  in  the  South  China  Sea, 
which  could  lead  to  major  U.S.  involve- 
ment in  Chinese  offshore  oil  exploration. 

June  3-7 

Governor  John  Dalton  (Virginia)  leads 
delegation  to  China. 

June  4- 
Julyl 

Chief  of  the  Office  of  Energy  Resources 
of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  (USGS),  C. 
D.  Masters,  leads  USGS  petroleum  (June 
4-July  1)  and  remote  sensing  (June  4-28) 
delegations  to  China;  groups  visit  China's 
Scientific  Research  Institute  for  Petro- 
leum Exploration  and  Development. 

June  5-6 

M.  J.  Terman  of  the  USGS  Office  of  In- 
ternational Geography  and  Director  of 
China's  State  Bureau  "of  Geology  (SBG) 
Sun  Daguang  meet  in  Beijing  to  discuss 
future  USGS-SBG  scientific  cooperation. 

June  6 

Senate  passes  a  nonbinding  resolution 
that  "approval  of  the  U.S.  Senate  is  re- 
quired to  terminate  any  Mutual  Defense 
"Treaty  between  the  United  States  and 
another  nation."  The  resolution  is  related 
to  a  Federal  judge's  decision  earlier  that 
day  to  dismiss  a  suit  brought  by  25  mem- 
bers of  Congress  against  the  President's 
decision  to  terminate  the  U.S.  Mutual 
Defense  Treaty  with  Taiwan. 

June  6-9 

Five  American  USGS  remote  sensing 
delegation  geologists  visit  the  Chaidamu 


35 


East  Asia 


Basin  in  western  China.  They  are  the 
first  known  foreigners  to  learn  the  cur- 
rent status  of  geological  research  and 
petroleum  exploration  in  this  area. 

June  11-25 

Office  of  Earthquake  Studies  chief 
Robert  Wesson  leads  USGS  delegation  to 
China  as  part  of  the  U.S. -China  coopera- 
tive earthquake  program;  group  meets 
with  China's  State  Seismological  Bureau 
officials. 

June  16-29 

National  Committee  for  U.S. -China  Rela- 
tions sponsors  U.S.  Conference  of 
Mayors  delegation  to  China. 

June  19 

Mayoral  delegation  meets  with  Vice 
Premier  Li;  discuss  Sino-American  eco- 
nomic relations. 

June  22-30 

Secretary  of  Health,  Education  and  Wel- 
fare Joseph  Califano  visits  China. 

June  22 

Secretary  Califano  and  Chinese  Minister 
of  Health  Qian  Xinzhong  sign  protocol  on 
Cooperation  in  the  Science  and  Technol- 
ogy of  Medicine  and  Public  Health. 

Secretary  Califano  meets  with  Vice  Pre- 
miers Fang  Yi  and  Chen  Muhua. 

June  23 

Secretary  Califano  signs  a  memorandum 
of  understanding  covering  U.S. -China 
educational  exchange  programs,  provid- 
ing for  the  exchange  of  about  50  persons 
from  both  countries. 

June  23- 
July  13 

Ambassador  to  the  U.N.  Conference  on 
Science  and  Technology  for  Development 
(UNCSTD)  Theodore  Hesburgh  leads 
delegation  to  China;  delegation  studies 
the  role  of  traditional  and  modem  science 
and  technology  in  China's  development. 

June  24 

Secretary  Califano  discusses  U.S. -China 
educational  exchange  with  Vice  Premier 
Li  Xiannian. 

June  25 

UNCSTD  delegation  meets  with  Vice 
Minister  in  Charge  of  the  State  Commis- 
sion for  Science  and  Technology  Jiang 
Ming  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Huang  Hua. 


June  26 

UNCSTD  delegation  meets  with  State 
Economic  Commission  Deputy  Director 
Guo  Futao  and  Vice  Premier  Fang  Yi. 

June  28 

Mayoral  delegation  meets  with 
Guangdong  Revolutionary  Committee 
Chairman  Yang  Shangkun. 

July  2-13 

Ohio  State  trade  delegation,  headed  by 
Governor  James  Rhodes,  visits  China. 

July  6 

Governor  Rhodes  and  delegation  meet 
with  Vice  Premier  Yu  Qiuli. 

July? 

Ambassador  Woodcock  and  Minister  of 
Foreign  Trade  Li  Qiang  sign  3-year 
U.S. -China  trade  agreement  in  Beijing, 
by  which  the  two  countries  accord  each 
other  most-favored-nation  (MFN)  tariff 
treatment  and  agree  to  other  measures  to 
promote  bilateral  trade  and  economic  in- 
teraction. 

July  10-24 

Minister  of  Finance  Zhang  Jingfu  visits 
U.S. 

July  11 

Minister  Zhang  and  Treasury  Secretary 
Blumenthal  open  talks  in  Washington. 

August  7 

Senator  Henry  Jackson  (Washington)  ar- 
rives in  China  for  18-day  visit. 

August  10-28 

Governor  John  Carlin  (Kansas)  leads 

State  trade  mission  to  China. 

Aug:ust  14 

Chinese  officials  and  Pan  American  World 
Airways  sign  agreement  concerning  char- 
ter flights  between  San  Francisco  and 
Shanghai. 

U.S.  determines  that  China  is  a  "friendly 
country"  for  the  purposes  of  Section  607a 
of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961, 
thus  permitting  U.S.  Government  agen- 
cies to  furnish  services  and  commodities 
to  China  on  a  reimbursement  basis. 

August  15-22 

Representative  Harley  0.  Staggers  (West 
Virginia)  leads  a  House  Interstate  and 
Foreign  Commerce  Committee  delegation 
to  China. 

August  24 

Senator  Jackson  tells  the  press  in  Beijing 
that  Chinese  leaders  told  him  further 


delay  in  MFN  status  would  adversely  i 
feet  U.S. -China  relations. 

August  25- 
September  1 

Vice  President  Mondale  leads  delegatio 
to  China. 

August  26 

Vice  President  Mondale  says  U.S.-Chir 
trade  agreement  will  be  submitted  to 
Congress  by  November  1. 

August  27 

In  a  nationally  televised  address  to  the 
students  and  faculty  of  Beijing  Univer- 
sity, Vice  President  Mondale  says  the 
U.S.  is  ready  to  grant  China  $2  billion  i 
Export-Import  Bank  trade  credits  over 
the  next  2-5  years  and  states  that  a 
weakened  or  isolated  China  would  not  1 
in  U.S.  interest. 

August  28 

Vice  President  Mondale  signs  agreemer 
with  China  to  expand  cultural  relations 
and  promote  cooperation  in  hydroelectr 
power  and  related  water  resource  man- 
agement. 

Augrust  31 

Vice  President  Mondale  formally  opens 
the  American  Consulate  General  at 
Guangzhou,  capital  of  Guangdong  Prov- 
ince. 

Chinese  Government  agrees  to  negotiat 
a  civil  aviation  agreement  with  the  U.S 
Vice  President  Mondale  indicates  that  t 
Carter  Administration  will  terminate  ai 
replace  with  an  unofficial  arrangement 
the  Nanking  agreement  of  1946,  which 
regulates  civil  air  transport  between  thi 
U.S.  and  Taiwan,  but  purports  to  grant 
U.S.  carriers  landing  rights  on  the  Chir 
mainland. 

Treasury  Department  allows  the  first 
U.S.  Government  checks  to  be  sent  to 
China  since  1949. 

September  9-21 

Governor  of  Anhui  Province,  Wan  Li,  vi 
its  U.S.  as  guest  of  (jovemor  Harry 
Hughes  (Maryland). 

September  15- 
October  5 

Minister  of  Agricultural  Machinery  Yang 
Ligong  leads  delegation  to  U.S. 

September  16-23 

Governor  Dixy  Lee  Ray  (Washington) 
leads  delegation  to  China;  meets  with 
Vice  Premier  Deng  and  other  senior 
Chinese  officials. 


36 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


;rECIAL 


re  Inaugural  Address 
President  Reagan 


Ronald  Reagan  was  sworn  in  as 
'fOth  President  of  the  United  States 
ie  west  side  of  the  Capitol  on 
ary  20,  1981.  Following  is  the  text 
s  inaugural  address} 

ievf  of  us  here  today,  this  is  a 

nn  and  most  momentous  occasion, 
yet  in  the  history  of  our  nation,  it 

commonplace  occurrence.  The  or- 
i  y  transfer  of  authority,  as  called  for 

le  Constitution,  routinely  takes 
I  e  as  it  has  for  almost  two  centuries, 
■few  of  us  stop  to  think  how  unique 
^'eally  are.  In  the  eyes  of  many  in 
liworld,  this  every-4-year  ceremony 
(jiccept  as  normal  is  nothing  less 
1^  a  miracle.  Mr.  President,  I  want 
afellow  citizens  to  know  how  much 
jjdid  to  carry  on  this  tradition.  By 
jl'  gracious  cooperation  in  the  transi- 
(X  process,  you  have  shown  a  watch- 
fAforld  that  we  are  a  united  people, 
eged  to  maintaining  a  political  sys- 
!f  which  guarantees  individual  liberty 
►  greater  degree  than  any  other. 
r  I  thank  you  and  your  people  for  all 
I  ■  help  in  maintaining  the  continuity 
b.-.h  is  the  bulwark  of  our  republic. 

The  business  of  our  nation  goes 
H'ard.  These  United  States  are  con- 
oted  with  an  economic  affliction  of 
Jit  proportions.  We  suffer  from  the 
r  est,  and  one  of  the  worst,  sustained 
if  tions  in  our  national  history.  It 
isirts  our  economic  decisions,  penal- 
B  thrift,  and  crushes  the  struggling 
■y  ig  and  the  fixed-income  elderly 
ii.  It  threatens  to  shatter  the  lives 

lillions  of  our  people.  Idle  industries 
4  3  cast  workers  into  unemployment, 
u.an  misery,  and  personal  indignity. 
^se  who  do  work  are  denied  a  fair 

rn  for  their  labor  by  a  tax  system 
t:h  penalizes  successful  achievement 
1  keeps  us  from  maintaining  full  pro- 
jjvity. 

But  great  as  our  tax  burden  is,  it 
a  not  kept  pace  with  public  spending, 
fl  decades  we  have  piled  deficit  upon 
acit,  mortgaging  our  future  and  our 
tdren's  future  for  the  temporary  con- 
aience  of  the  present.  To  continue 

long  trend  is  to  guarantee  tremend- 


ous social,  cultural,  political,  and 
economic  upheavals.  You  and  I  as  indi- 
viduals can,  by  following,  live  beyond 
our  means  but  for  only  a  limited  period 
of  time.  Why  then  should  we  think  that 
collectively,  as  a  nation,  we're  not 
bound  by  that  same  limitation?  We 
must  act  today  in  order  to  preserve 
tomorrow.  And  let  there  be  no  mis- 
understanding—we're going  to  begin  to 
act  beginning  today. 

The  economic  ills  we  suffer  have 
come  upon  us  over  several  decades. 
They  will  not  go  away  in  days,  weeks, 
or  months,  but  they  will  go  away.  They 
will  go  away  because  we,  as  Americans, 
have  the  capacity  now,  as  we've  had  in 
the  past,  to  do  whatever  needs  to  be 
done  to  preserve  this  last  and  greatest 
bastion  of  freedom.  In  this  present 
crisis,  government  is  not  the  solution  to 
our  problem;  government  is  the  prob- 
lem. 

From  time  to  time  we've  been 
tempted  to  believe  that  society  has 
become  too  complex  to  be  managed  by 
self-rule,  that  government  by  an  elite 


we're  sick;  professionals,  industrialists, 
shopkeepers,  clerks,  cabbies,  and  truck 
drivers.  They  are,  in  short,  we  the 
people  — this  breed  called  Americans. 

For  this  Administration's  objective 
will  be  a  healthy,  vigorous,  growing 
economy  that  provides  equal  opportuni- 
ties for  all  Americans  with  no  barriers 
born  of  bigotry  or  discrimination.  Put- 
ting America  back  to  work  means  put- 
ting all  Americans  back  to  work;  ending 
inflation  means  freeing  all  Americans 
from  the  terror  of  runaway  living  costs. 
All  must  share  in  the  productive  work 
of  this  new  beginning,  and  all  must 
share  in  the  bounty  of  a  revived 
economy.  With  the  idealism  and  fair 
play,  which  are  the  core  of  our  system 
and  our  strength,  we  can  have  a  strong 
and  prosperous  America  at  peace  with 
itself  and  the  world. 

So  as  we  begin,  let  us  take  inven- 
tory. We  are  a  nation  that  has  a 
government,  not  the  other  way  around. 
And  this  makes  us  special  among  the 
nations  of  the  Earth.  Our  government 
has  no  power  except  that  granted  it  by 


To  those  neighbors  and  allies  who  share  our  freedom,  we  will  strengthen  our 
historic  ties  and  assure  them  of  our  support  and  firm  commitment.  We  will 
match  logalty  with  loyalty. 


group  is  superior  — the  government  for, 
by,  and  of  the  people.  But  if  no  one 
among  us  is  capable  of  governing  him- 
self, then  who  among  us  has  the  capac- 
ity to  govern  someone  else?  All  of  us 
together,  in  and  out  of  government, 
must  bear  the  burden.  The  solutions  we 
seek  must  be  equitable  with  no  one 
group  singled  out  to  pay  a  higher  price. 
We  hear  much  of  special-interest 
groups.  But  our  concern  must  be  for  a 
special-interest  group  that  has  been  too 
long  neglected.  It  knows  no  sectional 
boundaries  or  ethnic  or  racial  divisions, 
and  it  crosses  political  party  lines.  It  is 
made  up  of  men  and  women  who  raise 
our  food,  patrol  our  streets,  man  our 
mines  and  factories,  teach  our  children, 
keep  our  homes,  and  heal  us  when 


the  people.  It  is  time  to  check  and 
reverse  the  growth  of  government 
which  shows  signs  of  having  g^own 
beyond  the  consent  of  the  governed.  It 
is  my  intention  to  curb  the  size  and  in- 
fluence of  the  Federal  establishment 
and  to  demand  recognition  of  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  powers  granted  to 
the  Federal  Government  and  those 
reserved  to  the  States  or  to  the  people. 
All  of  us  need  to  be  reminded  that  the 
Federal  Government  did  not  create  the 
States;  the  States  created  the  Federal 
Government. 

Now  so  there  will  be  no  misunder- 
standing, it's  not  my  intention  to  do 
away  with  government.  It  is,  rather,  to 
make  it  work  — work  with  us,  not  over 
us;  to  stand  by  our  side,  not  ride  on  our 


iruary  1981 


Special 


backs.  Government  can  and  must  pro- 
vide opportunity,  not  smother  it;  foster 
productivity,  not  stifle  it.  If  we  look  to 
the  answer  as  to  why,  for  so  many 
years,  we  achieved  so  much,  prospered 
as  no  other  people  on  Earth,  it  was 
because  here,  in  this  land,  we  unleashed 
the  energy  and  individual  genius  of 
man  to  a  greater  extent  than  has  ever 
been  done  before.  Freedom  and  the 
dignity  of  the  individual  have  been 
more  available  and  assured  here  than  in 
any  other  place  on  Earth.  The  price  for 
this  freedom  at  times  has  been  high, 
but  we  have  never  been  unwilling  to 
pay  that  price. 

It  is  no  coincidence  that  our 
present  troubles  parallel,  and  are  pro- 
portionate to,  the  intervention  and 
intrusion  in  our  lives  that  result  from 
unnecessary  and  excessive  growth  of 
government.  It  is  time  for  us  to  realize 
that  we  are  too  great  a  nation  to  limit 


land.  Your  dreams,  your  hopes,  your 
goals  are  going  to  be  the  dreams,  the 
hopes,  and  the  goals  of  this  Adminis- 
tration, so  help  me  God. 

We  shall  reflect  the  compassion 
that  is  so  much  a  part  of  your  makeup. 
How  can  we  love  our  country  and  not 
love  our  countrymen?  And  loving  them, 
reach  out  a  hand  when  they  fall,  heal 
them  when  they're  sick,  and  provide  op- 
portunity to  make  them  self-sufficient 
so  they  will  be  equal  in  fact  and  not 
just  in  theory. 

Can  we  solve  the  problems  con- 
fronting us?  Well,  the  answer  is  an 
unequivocal  and  emphatic  yes.  To  para- 
phrase Winston  Churchill:  I  did  not 
take  the  oath  I've  just  taken  with  the 
intention  of  presiding  over  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  world's  strongest  economy. 
In  the  days  ahead,  I  will  propose 
removing  the  roadblocks  which  have 
slowed  our  economy  and  reduced  pro- 


. . .  peace  is  the  highest  aspiration  of  the  American  people.  We  will  negotiate 
for  it,  sacrifice  for  it;  ice  will  not  surrender  for  it,  now  or  ever. 


ourselves  to  small  dreams.  We're  not, 
as  some  would  have  us  believe,  doomed 
to  an  inevitable  decline.  I  do  not  believe 
in  a  fate  that  will  fall  on  us  no  matter 
what  we  do.  I  do  believe  in  a  fate  that 
will  fall  on  us  if  we  do  nothing. 

So  with  all  the  creative  energy  at 
our  command,  let  us  begin  an  era  of 
national  renewal.  Let  us  renew  our 
determination,  our  courage,  and  our 
strength,  and  let  us  renew  our  faith  and 
our  hope.  We  have  earned  every  right 
to  dream  heroic  dreams.  Those  who  say 
that  we're  in  a  time  when  there  are  no 
heroes,  they  just  don't  know  where  to 
look.  You  can  see  heroes  every  day  go- 
ing in  and  out  of  factory  gates;  others, 
a  handful  in  number,  produce  enough 
food  to  feed  all  of  us  and  then  the  world 
beyond.  You  meet  heroes  across  a 
counter  and  on  both  sides  of  that 
counter.  They  are  entrepreneurs,  with 
faith  in  themselves  and  faith  in  an  idea, 
who  create  new  jobs,  new  wealth,  and 
opportunity.  They  are  individuals  and 
families  who  pay  taxes,  support  the 
government,  and  whose  voluntary  gifts 
support  church,  charity,  culture,  art, 
and  education.  Their  patriotism  is  quiet 
but  deep;  their  values  sustain  our  na- 
tional life. 

Now  I  have  used  the  words  "they" 
and  "their"  in  speaking  of  those  heroes; 
I  could  say  "you"  and  "your"  because 
I'm  addressing  the  heroes  of  whom  I 
speak  — you,  the  citizens  of  this  blessed 


ductivity.  Steps  will  be  taken  aimed  at 
restoring  the  balance  between  the 
various  levels  of  government.  Progress 
may  be  slow  — measured  in  inches  and 
feet,  not  miles  — but  we  will  progress. 
It  is  time  to  reawaken  this  industrial 
giant,  to  get  government  back  within 
its  means,  and  to  lighten  our  punitive 
tax  burden.  And  these  will  be  our  first 
priorities,  and  on  these  principles  there 
will  be  no  compromise. 

On  the  eve  of  our  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, a  man  who  might  have  been 
one  of  the  greatest  among  the  Founding 
Fathers,  Dr.  Joseph  Warren,  president 
of  the  Massachusetts  Congress,  said  to 
his  fellow  Americans:  "Our  country  is  in 
danger,  but  not  to  be  despaired  of. . . . 
On  you  depend  the  fortunes  of  America. 
You  are  to  decide  the  important  ques- 
tions on  which  rest  the  happiness  and 
liberty  of  millions  yet  unborn.  Act  wor- 
thy of  yourselves."  Well,  I  believe  we, 
the  Americans  of  today,  are  ready  to 
act  worthy  of  ourselves,  ready  to  do 
what  must  be  done  to  insure  happiness 
and  liberty  for  ourselves,  our  children, 
and  our  children's  children. 

And  as  we  renew  ourselves,  here 
in  our  own  land,  we  will  be  seen  as  hav- 
ing greater  strength  throughout  the 
world.  We  will  again  be  the  exemplar  of 
freedom  and  the  beacon  of  hope  for 
those  who  do  not  now  have  freedom.  To 
those  neighbors  and  allies  who  share 


our  freedom,  we  will  strengthen  ou; 
historic  ties  and  assure  them  of  our 
support  and  firm  commitment.  We  ' 
match  loyalty  with  loyalty.  We  will 
strive  for  mutually  beneficial  relati( 
We  will  not  use  our  friendship  to  in 
pose  on  their  sovereignty,  for  our  o 
sovereignty  is  not  for  sale. 

As  for  the  enemies  of  freedom, 
those  who  are  potential  adversaries 
they  will  be  reminded  that  peace  is 
highest  aspiration  of  the  American  | 
pie.  We  will  negotiate  for  it,  sacrifie 
for  it;  we  will  not  surrender  for  it,  r 
or  ever.  Our  forbearance  should  nev 
be  misunderstood.  Our  reluctance  fc 
conflict  should  not  be  misjudged  as 
failure  of  will.  But  if  action  is  requir 
to  preserve  our  national  security,  w 
will  act.  We  will  maintain  sufficient 
strength  to  prevail,  if  need  be.  Knov 
that  if  we  do  so,  we  have  the  best 
chance  of  never  having  to  use  that 
strength.  Above  all,  we  must  realize 
that  no  arsenal  or  no  weapon  in  the 
arsenals  of  the  world  is  so  formidaU 
as  the  will  and  moral  courage  of  frei 
men  and  women.  It  is  a  weapon  our 
adversaries  in  today's  world  do  not 
have.  It  is  a  weapon  that  we  as  Anii 
cans  do  have.  Let  that  be  understoo 
by  those  who  practice  terrorism  and 
prey  upon  their  neighbors. 

I'm  told  that  tens  of  thousands 
prayer  meetings  are  being  held  on  t 
day.  For  that  I'm  deeply  grateful.  W 
are  a  nation  under  God.  And  I  belie- 
God  intended  for  us  to  be  free.  It  wi 
be  fitting  and  good,  I  think,  if  on  ea< 
inaugural  day  in  future  years,  it  sho 
be  declared  a  day  of  prayer. 

This  is  the  first  time  in  our  hist 
that  this  ceremony  has  been  held,  as 
you've  been  told,  on  this  west  front 
the  Capitol.  Standing  here,  one  face; 
magnificent  vista,  opening  up  on  this 
city's  special  beauty  and  history.  At 
end  of  this  open  mall,  are  those  shrii 
to  the  giants  on  whose  shoulders  we 
stand.  Directly  in  front  of  me,  the 
monument  to  a  monumental  man, 
George  Washington,  father  of  our  co 
try,  a  man  of  humility  who  came  to 
greatness  reluctantly.  He  led  Ameri( 
out  of  revolutionary  victory  into  infa 
nationhood.  Off  to  one  side,  the  state 
memorial  to  Thomas  Jefferson.  The 
Declaration  of  Independence  flames 
with  his  eloquence.  And  then,  beyon^ 
the  Reflecting  Pool,  the  dignified  col 
umns  of  the  Lincoln  Memorial.  Who- 
ever would  understand  in  his  heart  t 
meaning  of  America  will  find  it  in  th 
life  of  Abraham  Lincoln. 


Department  of  State  Bulli 


'i 


*  Beyond  those  monuments  to 

■"  )ism  is  the  Potomac  River  and  on 
far  shore,  the  sloping  hills  of 
ng^on  National  Cemetery,  with  its 
upon  row  of  simple  white  markers 
"  -ing  crosses  or  Stars  of  David.  They 
up  to  only  a  tiny  fraction  of  the 
e  that  has  been  paid  for  our 
dom.  Each  one  of  those  markers  is 
*  snument  to  the  kind  of  hero  I  spoke 
irlier.  Their  lives  ended  in  places 
d  Belleau  Wood,  the  Argonne, 
iha  Beach,  Salerno,  and  halfway 
ind  the  world  on  Guadalcanal, 
jwa.  Pork  Chop  Hill,  the  Chosin 
rvoir,  and  in  100  rice  paddies  and 
;les  of  a  place  called  Vietnam. 
Under  one  such  marker,  lies  a 
ig  man,  Martin  Treptow,  who  left 
ob  in  a  small-town  barber  shop  in 
to  go  to  France  with  the  famed 
ibow  Division.  There  on  the  west- 
front,  he  was  killed  trying  to  carry 
!ssage  between  battalions  under 
y  artillery  fire.  We're  told  that  on 
"Ijody  was  found  a  diary.  On  the  fly- 
1  under  the  heading  "My  Pledge,"  he 
J  written  these  words:  "America 
'  t  win  this  war.  Therefore,  I  will 
"'  c,  I  will  save,  I  will  sacrifice,  I  will 

*  ire,  I  will  fight  cheerfully  and  do 

I  itmost  as  if  the  issue  of  the  whole 
jggle  depended  on  me  alone." 
'    The  crisis  we  are  facing  today  does 
!  require  of  us  the  kind  of  sacrifice 

Martin  Treptow  and  so  many  thou- 
■'  is  of  others  were  called  upon  to 
"  e.  It  does  require,  however,  our 
effort  and  our  willingness  to 
!ve  in  ourselves  and  to  believe  in 
capacity  to  perform  great  deeds.  To 
!ve  that  together,  with  God's  help, 
:an  and  will  resolve  the  problems 
h  now  confront  us.  And  after  all, 
shouldn't  we  believe  that?  We  are 
ricans.  God  bless  you. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
idential  Documents  of  Jan.  26,  1981. 


Special 

Secretary-Designate  Haig 

Appears  Before 

Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 


Opening  statement  by  Secretary- 
designate  Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr., 
before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  January  9,  1981.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  this  distin- 
guished committee  as  the  nominee  of 
President-elect  Ronald  Reagan  to  be  Sec- 
retary of  State.  I  am  prepared  to  answer 
any  questions  you  may  have  concerning 
my  qualifications  for  this  office,  my  views 
on  foreign  policy,  and  my  service  to  my 
country  during  the  past  three  decades. 

There  could  be  no  more  critical  time 
at  which  to  assume  the  post  of  Secretary 
of  State,  and  I  am  honored  that  the 
President-elect  has  chosen  me  as  his  des- 
ignate. Over  the  past  200  years,  the 
United  States  has  stood  as  a  beacon  of 
liberty  for  the  world.  We  have  demon- 
strated that  freedom  and  justice  can 
thrive  in  a  democratic  society.  We  have,  in 
this  century,  been  often  called  to  shed  our 
blood  for  the  nations  of  the  free  world; 
and  in  an  ingenious  and  generous  plan  de- 
signed by  a  great  Army  general  and  Sec- 
retary of  State,  George  C.  Marshall,  we 
helped,  after  the  most  devastating  war  in 
history,  rebuild  Europe  and  strengthen 
civilization. 

Our  record  in  this  century  is  not  per- 
fect, but  it  should  be  a  source  of  great 
pride.  Our  successes  were  founded  on  a 
firm  commitment  to  our  ideals  combined 
with  a  sense  of  the  realities  of  human  na- 
ture and  international  politics.  It  is  that 
combination  that  we  must  bring  to  bear 
in  the  decade  ahead.  If  we  do,  I  believe 
that  America  and  its  people  will  stand 
once  again  as  an  example  for  the  peoples 
of  the  world  and  merit  the  highest  judg- 
ment of  history. 

Our  ideals  must  be  reconciled  with 
the  reality  we  face.  The  United  States 
must  pursue  its  vision  of  justice  in  an  im- 
perfect and  constantly  changing  world — 
full  of  peril  but  also  full  of  opportunity. 
The  world  does  not  stand  still  for  our 
elections,  important  as  they  are.  Complex 
issues  already  crowd  our  foreign  policy 
agenda.  The  earlier  the  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration articulates  its  approach  to  these 
issues,  the  better  served  the  nations  of 
the  world  and  the  people  of  our  own  na- 
tion will  be. 

It  would  be  premature  here  to  set 
forth  definitive  policies  or  offer  detailed 


programs.  Both  tasks  require  analysis 
and  thoughtful  consideration  by  the 
President-elect  and  his  advisers.  But 
President-elect  Reagan  and  I  firmly  be- 
lieve that  American  foreign  policy  should 
have  some  permanent  bedrock.  The 
United  States  has  been  most  effective  in 
the  world  arena  when  the  solid  founda- 
tions of  its  foreign  policy  have  been  rec- 
ognized and  understood — by  our  own 
people  and  by  the  nations  with  which  we 
must  deal. 


The  Present  Global  Environment 

Every  generation  views  its  own  perils  as 
unprecedented.  Even  so,  there  is  now 
widespread  agreement  that  the  years 
immediately  ahead  will  be  unusually 
dangerous.  Evidence  of  that  danger  is 
everywhere. 

•  In  Europe,  still  the  fulcrum  of  the 
East- West  balance,  Soviet  military  power 
once  again  casts  an  ominous  shadow  over 
the  efforts  of  an  East  European  people  to 
assert  fundamental  freedoms  of  associa- 
tion and  expression. 

•  In  the  Middle  East,  an  uneasy 
peace  continues  to  be  punctuated  by  raid 
and  reprisal,  with  each  such  sequence 
threatening  renewed  and  wider  conflict. 

•  At  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 
war  between  Iran  and  Iraq  threatens  the 
very  lifeblood  of  many  national 
economies.  Iran  itself,  once  a  major  force 
for  regional  stability,  lurches  fi-om  dem- 
onstration to  demonstration  in  a  state  of 
near  anarchy.  Meanwhile,  not  far  to  the 
east,  85,000  Soviet  troops  brutalize  Af- 
ghanistan in  the  first  major  post- World 
War  II  employment  of  Soviet  troops  out- 
side the  area  the  Soviets  have  heretofore 
considered  their  sphere  of  influence. 

•  In  Asia,  sworn  enemies  face  one 
another  along  a  5,000-mile  arc  from  Thai- 
land to  the  Manchurian  frontier.  On  the 
Korean  Peninsula,  only  a  fragile  truce 
persists  nearly  30  years  after  the  formal 
cessation  of  Korean  hostilities. 

•  In  Africa,  Southeast  Asia,  Central 
America,  and  the  Caribbean,  turmoil  and 
violence  stunt  national  development  and 
invite  terrorism  from  within  and  adven- 
turism from  without,  as  millions  of  human 
beings  starve  and  thousands  of  new  refu- 
gees seek  shelter  each  day. 


Special 


It  is  no  wonder  the  1980s  have  been 
called  a  decade  of  crisis.  Yet  it  is  precisely 
that  sort  of  appraisal  which  I  believe  we 
must  reject.  The  very  term  "crisis"  im- 
plies that  events  are  out  of  control  and 
that  our  nation  can  only  react. 

But  the  task  of  statesmanship  is  not 
simply  to  react  to  events.  Those  I  just 
described  are  merely  the  current 
symptoms  of  more  fundamental  world 
problems.  The  task  of  statesmanship  is  to 
master  these  problems  and  thus  minimize 
the  necessity  for  ricocheting  from  crisis 
to  crisis. 

Today  we  face  a  world  in  which 
power  in  a  variety  of  forms  has  become 
diffused  among  over  150  nations.  Adjust- 
ment of  relations  with  and  among  so 
many  separate  governments  would  be  dif- 
ficult enough,  even  were  all  equally  re- 
sponsible and  equally  committed  to  stabil- 
ity and  peace.  But  many  are  willing  to 
foment  instability  and  violence  to  achieve 
their  objectives.  That  reality  alone  should 
argue  for  better  coordination  of  policies 
among  the  free  nations.  As  I  have  under- 
scored more  than  once  to  our  allies  in 
Europe,  artificial  operating  boundaries 
self-imposed  in  a  simpler  era  are  increas- 
ingly irrelevant  to  today's  needs  to  formu- 
late and  pursue  policies  together. 

But  the  diffusion  of  power  and  its  re- 
sulting instability  are  not  the  only  argu- 
ments for  concerted  allied  action.  Our  col- 
lective vulnerability  to  international  un- 
rest is  matched  by  a  socioeconomic  chal- 
lenge that  we  all  share.  The  growing  in- 
terdependence of  our  economies  and  our 
continued  reliance  on  foreign  sources  for 
energy  and  raw  materials  have  stripped 
the  West  of  the  independent  and  collec- 
tive resilience  which  once  allowed  one  na- 
tion's economic  strength  to  bolster  an- 
other's momentary  weakness. 

The  significance  of  the  economic  chal- 
lenges we  face  cannot  be  overempha- 
sized. The  potential  for  worldwide 
boom-or-bust  is  not  unrelated  to  the  dif- 
fusion of  power  among  so  many  nations. 
Indeed,  the  decline  in  world  oil  supplies 
resulting  from  the  war  between  Iran  and 
Iraq  is  stark  testimony  that  instability 
may  be  most  likely  precisely  where  its  ef- 
fect on  world  economies  promises  to  be 
most  debilitating. 

Much  of  the  fragmentation  of  power 
has  occurred  in  the  so-called  Third  World 
— a  misleading  term  if  ever  there  was 
one.  If  one  thing  has  become  abundantly 
clear  in  the  last  decade  or  so,  it  is  that 
the  commonality  of  condition,  purpose — 
and  by  extension,  U.S.  foreign  policy — 
implied  by  the  term  "Third  World"  is  a 
myth,  and  a  dangerous  one  at  that. 


Recent  American  foreign  policy  has 
suffered  from  the  misperception  which 
lumps  together  nations  as  diverse  as 
Brazil  and  Libya,  Indonesia  and  South 
Yemen,  Cuba  and  Kuwait;  and  which  has 
too  frequently  produced  attempts  to  cut 
the  national  pattern  to  fit  the  foreign  pol- 
icy cloth.  This  failure  to  tailor  policy  to 
the  individual  circumstances  of  develop- 
ing nations  has  frequently  aggravated  the 
very  internal  stresses  which  Western  pol- 
icy should  seek  instead  to  diminish.  Our 
difficulties  in  this  regard  have  hardly 
been  lessened  by  our  propensity  to  apply 
to  these  emerging  states  Western  stand- 
ards which  resolutely  ignore  vast  differ- 
ences in  their  social  cultures,  political  de- 
velopment, economic  vitality,  and  internal 
and  external  security. 

These  fundamental  problems — the 
diffusion  of  power,  the  interdependence  of 
the  allied  community,  and  the  failure  to 
recognize  the  variety  among  the  so-called 
Third  World  nations — are  made  the  more 
intractable  by  what  is  perhaps  the  central 
strategic  phenomenon  of  the  post-World 
War  II  era:  the  transformation  of  Soviet 
military  power  from  a  continental  and 
largely  defensive  land  army  to  a  global  of- 
fensive army,  navy,  and  air  force  fully  ca- 
pable of  supporting  an  imperial  foreign 
policy.  Considered  in  conjunction  with  the 
episodic  nature  of  the  West's  military  re- 
sponse, this  tremendous  accumulation  of 
armed  might  has  produced  perhaps  the 
most  complete  reversal  of  global  power 
relationships  ever  seen  in  a  period  of  rel- 
ative peace.  Today  the  threat  of  Soviet 
military  intervention  colors  attempts  to 
achieve  international  civility.  Unchecked, 
the  growth  of  Soviet  military  power  must 
eventually  paralyze  Western  policy  al- 
together. 

These,  then,  are  fundamental  prob- 
lems which  challenge  American  foreign 
policy  and  the  future  of  the  democracies 
generally.  To  say  that  is  not  to  diminish 
the  importance  of  other  Western  goals — 
the  eradication  of  hunger,  poverty,  and 
disease;  the  expansion  of  the  free  flow  of 
people,  goods,  and  ideas;  the  spread  of 
social  justice;  and  through  these  and  simi- 
lar efforts,  the  improvement  of  the 
human  condition.  It  is  simply  to  recognize 
that  these  desirable  and  critical  objec- 
tives are  impossible  to  achieve  in  an  in- 
ternational environment  dominated  by 
violence,  terrorism,  and  threat. 

The  United  States  has  a  clear  choice. 
We  can  continue,  if  we  wish,  to  react  to 
events  as  they  occur — serially,  unselec- 
tively,  and,  increasingly  in  the  final  anal- 
ysis, unilaterally  One  lesson  of  Afghani- 
stan is  certainly  that  few  symptomatic 
crises  are  capable  of  effectively  rallying 


the  collective  energies  of  the  free  wor! 
We  may  wish  it  were  otherwise,  but  w 
ing  will  not  make  it  so. 

Alternatively,  we  can  confront  the 
fundamental  issues  I  have  discussed. '' 
can  seek  actively  to  shape  events  and, 
the  process,  attempt  to  forge  consensi 
among  like-minded  peoples.  Such  a  co 
sensus  will  enable  us  to  deal  with  the 
more  fundamental  tasks  I  have  outlim 
— the  management  of  Soviet  power;  tl 
reestablishment  of  an  orderly  interna- 
tional economic  climate;  the  economic 
political  maturation  of  developing  nati 
to  the  benefit  of  their  peoples;  and  th< 
achievement  of  a  reasonable  standard 
international  civility.  Acting  alone,  ea 
of  these  tasks  is  beyond  even  our  pow 
acting  together,  all  are  within  the  cap: 
ity  of  free  nations. 

I  do  not  mean  to  belittle  the  diffi- 
culties. They  are  formidable.  But  our 
lective  capacity  to  meet  them  is  also  f 
midable.  The  challenge  of  American  f 
eign  policy  in  the  1980s  is  to  marshal  1 
capacity. 

America's  Challenges  for  the  1980s 

If  we  are  to  succeed  in  this  effort,  the 
conduct  of  American  foreign  policy  m 
be  characterized  above  all  by  three  qi. 
ities. 

First,  we  must  act  with  consistei 
Specific  issues  may  furnish  the  occasi 
for  action,  but  they  cannot  constitute 
sole  basis  for  policy.  Once  we  accept  t 
the  specific  issues  facing  us  today  are 
merely  surface  manifestations  of  mor 
fundamental  problems,  it  must  also  b 
clear  that  effective  policy  cannot  be 
created  anew  daily,  informed  solely  b 
the  immediate  need.  To  do  so  risks  m 
perception  by  our  adversaries,  loss  ol 
confidence  by  our  allies,  and  confusio 
among  our  own  people.  U.S.  policy  h; 
been  most  effective — in  Europe  and  t 
Middle  East,  for  example — where  coi 
sistent  U.S.  interests  have  been  cons 
ently  pursued. 

Second,  we  must  behave  reliably. 
American  power  and  prestige  should 
be  lightly  committed;  but  once  made, 
commitment  must  be  honored.  Our 
friends  cannot  be  expected  to  share  if 
burdens  and  risks  of  collective  action 
they  cannot  count  on  the  word  of  the 
United  States.  Our  adversaries  canm 
expected  to  exercise  prudence  if  they 
perceive  our  resolve  to  be  hostage  to 
exigencies  of  the  moment.  Those  who 
posture  toward  us  remains  to  be  dete 
mined  cannot  be  expected  to  decide  ii 
favor  of  friendship  if  they  cannot  con) 
dently  assess  the  benefits  of  associati 


Department  of  State  Bui 


Special 


'1 1  us.  To  be  perceived  as  unreliable  is, 
•efore,  to  become  virtually  irrelevant 
n  influence  for  stability  and  peace  and 

I!  ;ave  the  international  arena  to  the 

I  ■cy  of  those  who  do  not  share  our 
mitment  to  either. 

Finally,  and  in  some  ways  most  im- 
otant,  American  foreign  policy  must 

lonstrate  balance,  both  in  our  ap- 
«f  ich  to  individual  issues  and  in  the  or- 

II  ;tration  of  policy  generally.  By  bal- 

,  I  mean  recognizing  that  complex  is- 
c^  invariably  require  us  to  weigh,  and 

ehow  reconcile,  a  variety  of 
nsjssures,  often  competing. 

•  I  believe  that  equitable  and  verifi- 
arms  control  contributes  to  security, 
restraint  in  the  growth  and  prolifera- 
of  armaments  will  not  be  achieved  by 
;ies  which  increase  the  very  insecuri- 
that  promote  arms  competition. 

•  Domestic  economic  stability  will 
be  enhanced  by  the  establishment  of 
•t-sighted,  economic  barriers  which 
srmine  the  multilateral  cooperation 
ntial  to  the  prosperity  of  all. 

•  The  assurance  of  basic  human 
-ties  will  not  be  improved  by  replac- 
^iendly  governments  which  incom- 
ely  satisfy  our  standards  of  democ- 

with  hostile  ones  which  are  even  less 
gn. 

•  And  our  commitment  to  peace  will 
be  furthered  by  abdicating  the  right 
icercise  military  power  to  only  the 

t  ruthless  members  of  the  intema- 
al  community. 

Balance  must  also  be  struck  in  the 
estration  of  policy  generally:  in  our 
etion  of  the  issues  we  choose  to  ad- 
s;  in  the  priority  we  accord  them;  and 
nderstanding  the  relationship  of  in- 
iual  issues,  one  to  another,  and  each 
or  broad  policy  objectives.  This  form 
ilance  has  become  known  as  linkage, 
the  President-elect  has  publicly 
ed  his  commitment  to  it. 
No  mystical  profession  of  faith  is  in- 
ed  here.  In  a  system  ever  more  in- 
ependent  in  every  sense,  issues  and 
policies  which  attempt  to  deal  with 
n  are  linked,  whatever  our  prefer- 
!S.  That  does  not  mean  that  every  ne- 
ation  must  be  a  prisoner  of  the  daily 
ilines;  it  does  mean  that  specific  rela- 
ships  cannot  be  established  in  isola- 
from  the  climate  in  which  they  must 
naintained. 


Establishing  a  Foreign  Policy 
Consensus 

Consistency,  reliability,  balance.  These 
three  attributes  are  essential,  not  be- 
cause they  guarantee  a  successful  foreign 
policy — nothing  can  do  that — but  because 
their  absence  guarantees  an  unsuccessful 
one.  Unfortunately,  as  De  Tocqueville 
pointed  out  long  ago,  these  are  precisely 
the  qualities  which  a  democracy  finds 
most  difficult  to  muster  This  inherent  dif- 
ficulty has  been  complicated  in  the  past 
decade  by  the  breakdown  of  foreign  pol- 
icy bipartisanship  and  by  the  develop- 
ment of  unnecessary  division  between 
Congress  and  the  executive  branch,  and 
among  the  executive  departments 
themselves. 

Our  urgent  task  is  to  reestablish  an 
effective  foreign  policy  consensus.  To  do 
so,  I  believe  three  conditions  must  be 
met. 

First,  the  constitutional  and  tradi- 
tional responsibility  of  the  President  for 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  must  be 
reaffirmed.  The  U.S.  Government  must 
speak  to  other  nations  with  a  single  voice. 
To  say  that  is  in  no  sense  to  argue  for 
curtailing  discussion  or  debate.  On  the 
contrary,  I  believe  both  are  essential.  But 
the  authoritative  voice  must  be  the  Pres- 
ident's. The  President  needs  a  single  in- 
dividual to  serve  as  the  general  manager 
of  American  diplomacy.  President-elect 
Reagan  believes  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  should  play  this  role.  As  Secretary 
of  State,  I  would  function  as  a  member  of 
the  President's  team  but  one  with  clear 
responsibility  for  formulating  and  con- 
ducting foreign  policy  and  for  explaining 
it  to  the  Congress,  the  public,  and  the 
world  at  large.  The  Assistant  to  the  Pres- 
ident for  National  Security  Affairs  would 
fill  a  staff  role  for  the  President. 

Second,  an  effective  partnership 
must  be  restored  with  the  Congress.  By 
partnership,  I  do  not  mean  occasional 
retrospective  reporting.  I  mean  active 
consultation,  exchange  of  ideas  and  pro- 
posals in  a  timely  manner,  in  an  atmos- 
phere of  mutual  respect,  trust,  and  confi- 
dence, recognizing  the  special  role  of  the 
Senate.  The  Congress  can  hardly  be  ex- 
pected to  allow  the  President  the  discre- 
tion he  requires  unless  it  is  comfortable 
with  the  purposes  toward  which,  and  lim- 
its within  which,  that  discretion  will  be 
exercised.  The  Constitution  demands  it, 
and  good  sense  urges  it.  In  turn.  Con- 
gress must  do  its  part.  In  a  partnership, 
both  sides  must  behave  responsibly. 

Finally,  the  most  consistent  articula- 
tion of  policy  is  wasted  if  the  profession- 
als who  must  execute  it  are  divorced  from 


its  formulation  and  if  their  experience 
and  skill  are  usurped  in  the  name  of  con- 
fidentiality, haste,  or  political  sensitivity. 
The  career  personnel  of  the  State  De- 
partment and  the  Foreign  Service  are  an 
unmatched  intellectual  resource,  and  they 
will  be  around  long  after  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  are  gone.  If 
the  United  States  is  to  act  consistently 
and  reliably  in  the  world  arena,  it  must 
use  its  career  professionals.  Their  effec- 
tive participation  in  policymaking  is 
imperative. 

I  have  outlined  what  I  consider  to  be 
the  essential  challenges,  qualities,  and 
requirements  of  a  sound  American  for- 
eign policy.  In  closing,  let  me  speak  to  our 
resources,  which  are  considerable. 

Although  we  have  economic  prob- 
lems, we  still  possess  the  largest  and 
strongest  economy  on  Earth.  It  is  within 
our  power  to  revitalize  our  productive 
base,  maintain  and  expand  our  agricul- 
tural strength,  regain  commercial  com- 
petitiveness, and  reduce  our  dependency 
on  foreign  sources  of  energy  and  other 
raw  materials.  No  American  foreign  pol- 
icy can  succeed  from  a  base  of  economic 
weakness. 

Our  alliances  enable  us  to  draw  on 
the  strengths  and  the  wisdom  of  some  of 
the  world's  greatest  nations.  Yet  our  al- 
liances must  be  tended  and  adapted  to 
new  problems  not  visualized  by  their 
creators.  In  the  process,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  essence  of  any  alliance  is  its 
core  of  shared  commitment  and  endeavor. 
In  the  1980s,  we  should  not  let  ourselves 
become  preoccupied  with  debates  over 
who  is  doing  more;  the  challenges  we  face 
will  require  more  from  all  of  us. 

We  possess  a  full  range  of  the  in- 
struments of  effective  statecraft:  a  diplo- 
matic corps  second  to  none;  economic  and 
military  assistance  programs;  a  variety  of 
sophisticated  cultural  and  informational 
resources;  and,  of  course,  military  power 
which  no  potential  adversary  can  afford 
to  ignore.  These  instruments  provide  the 
United  States  with  unrivaled  capacity  to 
influence  the  course  of  international 
events.  Their  maintenance  or  neglect  will 
declare  American  intentions  far  more 
clearly  than  any  rhetoric. 

But  I  believe  our  greatest  strength  is 
the  strength  of  our  values  and  political 
institutions.  These  have  been  tested  in 
recent  years.  But  they  have  survived.  As 
we  survey  the  world,  reflect  on  its  prob- 
lems, and  recognize  its  dangers,  we  must 
accept  the  fact  that,  Uke  it  or  not,  we  are 
a  nation  of  trustees — trustees  for  the 
values  of  freedom  and  justice  that  have 
inspired  mankind  for  thousands  of  years. 


ruary  1981 


Special 


Alexander  M.  Haig.  Jr.,  lakes  the  oath  of  of- 
fice as  Secretary  of  State  on  January  22, 
1981,  at  the  White  House  while  Mrs.  Haig 
holds  the  Bible.  Robert  Linder  (right),  acting 
director  of  White  House  operations  and  a 
notary  public,  administers  the  oath. 

The  Secretary  of 
State 


Following  his  election  on  November  4, 
1980,  President-elect  Ronald  Reagan 
nominated  Mr.  Haig  to  be  his  Secretary 
of  State.  He  was  subsequently  con- 
firmed by  the  Senate  and  was  sworn  in 
as  the  59th  Secretary  of  State  on 
January  22,  1981. 

Secretary  Haig  graduated  from  the 
U.S.  Military  Academy  in  1947,  was 
commissioned  a  second  lieutenant  in  the 
Army,  and  advanced  through  a  variety 
of  military  assignments,  including  ser- 


The  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States  has  a  responsibility  second  only  to 
that  of  the  President  himself  to  insure 
that  this  trusteeship  is  managed  wisely 
and  well.  I  approach  this  responsibility  in 
full  recognition  of  the  gravity  of  our  task, 
with  confidence  that  we  will  succeed,  and 
with  the  knowledge  that  working  closely 
with  this  committee  and  the  Congress  is  a 
key  to  our  success. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  be 
available  from  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


vice  in  Japan,  Korea,  Europe,  and  Viet- 
nam. He  pursued  graduate  studies  in 
business  administration  at  Columbia 
University  (1954-55)  and  received  a 
Master's  degree  in  international  rela- 
tions from  Georgetown  University 
(1962). 

He  served  in  the  Pentagon  from 
1962  to  1965,  where  his  positions  in- 
cluded Military  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Army  and  Deputy 
Special  Assistant  to  the  Secretary  of 
Defense.  He  served  in  Vietnam  in  1966 
and  1967,  receiving  the  Distinguished 
Service  Cross. 

In  January  1969,  he  was  assigned 
as  senior  military  adviser  to  Dr.  Henry 
Kissinger,  then  Assistant  to  the  Presi- 
dent for  National  Security  Affairs,  and 
18  months  later  he  became  the  Deputy 
Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs.  He  was  promoted  to 
full  general  in  1972.  During  his  4  years 
in  the  White  House  ending  in  1973,  he 
made  14  trips  to  Southeast  Asia  as  the 
personal  emissary  of  the  President,  in- 
cluding negotiating  the  Vietnam  cease- 
fire and  the  return  of  U.S.  prisoners  of 
war.  In  addition,  he  coordinated  prepa- 
rations for  President  Nixon's  historic 
visit  to  China. 

Mr.  Haig  was  serving  as  Army 
Vice  Chief  of  Staff  when  President 
Nixon  appointed  him  in  May  1973  to 
rebuild  the  White  House  staff. 
Although  this  was  to  be  a  temporary 
position,  the  President  subsequently 
named  him  White  House  chief  of  staff, 
and  he  retired  from  the  military  after 
26  years  of  active  service. 

He  served  in  the  White  House  un- 
til October  1974,  when  President  Ford 


recalled  him  to  active  duty  as  Com- 
mander in  Chief,  U.S.  European  Com- 
mand. Two  months  later,  Mr.  Haig  wj 
also  appointed  Supreme  Military  Com 
mander  in  Europe.  In  that  position,  hi 
was  responsible  for  the  integrated 
military  forces  of  the  13  member  na- 
tions of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization  (NATO).  He  resigned  his 
post  effective  June  30,  1979,  and  retir 
from  the  Army. 

Secretary  Haig  was  elected  presi 
dent  and  chief  operating  officer  of 
United  Technologies  and  a  member  of 
its  board  of  directors  on  December  21 
1979,  where  he  served  until  assuming 
his  present  position. 

He  is  a  life  member  of  the  Navy 
League  and  the  Veterans  of  Foreign 
Wars  of  the  United  States.  Secretary 
Haig  is  a  recipient  of  an  honorary  law 
degree  from  Niagara  University  and 
honorary  doctor  of  laws  degrees  from 
Boston  College,  St.  Anselm's  College, 
the  University  of  Utah,  Western  Stat 
School  of  Law,  and  Loyola  College, 
Baltimore. 

He  was  born  December  2,  1924,  ii 
Philadelphia,  attended  St.  Joseph's 
Preparatory  School  there,  and  gradu- 
ated from  Lower  Merion  High  School 
Ardmore,  Pennsylvania. 

Secretary  Haig  is  the  recipient  o! 
the  following  honors:  Charles  Evans 
Hughes  Gold  Medal  Award  of  the  Na- 
tional Conference  of  Christians  and 
Jews;  Dwight  D.  Eisenhower  Distin- 
guished Service  Award  and  Citation  < 
the  Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars  of  the 
United  States;  Hap  Arnold  Award  of 
the  U.S.  Air  Force  Association;  James 
Forrestal  Award  of  the  National  Secu 
ty  Industrial  Association;  David  Sarm 
Award  of  the  Armed  Forces  Commun 
cations  and  Electronics  Association; 
William  Penn  Award  of  the  Penn  Clul 
of  Philadelphia;  Hall  of  Heroes  Gold 
Medallion  of  the  Chapel  of  the  Four 
Chaplains;  and  the  Bob  Hope  Four-Sta 
Civilian  Award  from  Valley  Forge 
Military  Academy  and  Junior  College. 

Among  his  many  military  decora- 
tions. Secretary  Haig  holds  the  Dis- 
tinguished Service  Cross;  the  Defense 
Distinguished  Service  Medal  with  Oak 
Leaf  Cluster;  the  Silver  Star  with  Oak 
Leaf  Cluster;  the  Distinguished  Flying 
Cross  with  Oak  Leaf  Clusters;  and  the 
Purple  Heart.  He  has  received  the 
highest  awards  from  the  Governments 
of  Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
the  Netherlands,  and  Portugal. 


Press  release  28  of  Feb.  1,  1981. 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


^cretary  Haig's  News  Conference 
January  28 


Special 


ik  it's  the  Judaeo-Christian  Bible 
says  the  universe  was  created  in  7 
and  that  even  provided  a  day  of 
I  tell  you,  it's  been  a  very  humbling 
;  for  me,  and  I  feel  very,  very  human. 
As  you  know,  this  is  the  end  of  our 
week  in  this  Administration.  It's 
an  extremely  busy  one.  It's  involved 
le  those  all-too-short  confirmation 
ings  on  the  Hill  [laughter];  it's  in- 
d  efforts  to  put  in  place  a  number  of 
cey  team  players  down  through  and 
ding  assistant-secretary  level.  I  want 
;o  know  I've  done  that  in  all  but  two 
tant-secretary  billets  of  about  30  in- 
id,  to  say  something  or  nothing 
t  my  personal  staff  and  the  Secre- 
t  of  the  Department  of  State  itself  on 
th  floor. 

It's  been  somewhat  of  an  experience 
scover  firsthand  the  delays  in  bu- 
cratie  obstacles  associated  with  the 
■ance  process,  but  I  want  you  to 
/  that  I  anticipate  that  each  and 
y  one  of  my  nominees — my  nominees 
111  ultimately  be  approved  and  hope- 
confirmed  in  consultation  with  the 
jress  where  appropriate. 
It's  also  been  a  veiy  busy  week  in  a 
aucratic  sense  and  I  think  I  leave  the 
?'s  experience  again  with  an  even  en- 
ed  appreciation  for  the  role  of  the 
issional  in  this  Department,  because 
're  the  ones  that  have  to  carry  the 
en  during  periods  of  transition,  our 
ace  pros.  They're  the  ones  who  have 
led  me  this  week  to  establish  inter- 
rtmental  working  groups  in  every 
m  of  departmental  activity  and  in  a 
bar  of  key  and  urgent  functional 
s.  I'm  very  pleased  that  this  has  been 
mplished,  primarily  as  a  result  of  the 

I  that  was  in  place,  when  I  came 

,  of  professionals,  with  the  help  of  an 
tional  number  of  augmentees  that  I 
ght  with  me  from  the  transition 
1. 

It  has  been  a  busy  week  also  be- 
e,  as  you  know,  today  we  have  our 
official  state  visitor.  Prime  Minister 
ja  from  Jamaica.  We  have  meetings 
duled  next  week  with  the  President 
orea,  to  be  followed  by  King  Juan 
los  of  Spain,  and,  of  course,  the  Prime 
ister  of  Great  Britain,  Mrs.  Thatcher 

II  be  meeting  Friday  with  the  Cana- 


dian Foreign  Minister  here  in  the  De- 
partment, and  there  are  a  number  of 
other  meetings  scheduled  with  European 
foreign  ministers.  The  first,  of  course,  is 
Foreign  Minister  Francois-Poncet  of 
France. 

In  addition  to  that,  we  found  our- 
selves engrossed  immediately  and  instan- 
taneously vidth  the  problem  of  the  return 
of  our  hostages,  and  I'm  happy  to  say  in 
hindsight,  reflecting  upon  the  events  of 
this  past  weekend  and  this  week  and  yes- 
terday especially,  that  those  events  were 
carried  out  vnth  what  I  consider  to  be  the 
ultimate  of  appropriateness. 

There  has  been  some  controversy 
this  week  about  the  so-called  "agree- 
ments" which  brought  our  hostages  back 
to  our  shores  at  long  last.  I  think  it's  im- 
portant that  those  who  analyze  and  as- 
sess the  pros  and  cons  of  these  agree- 
ments, which  were  arrived  at  under  the 
most  unprecedented  and  unusual  condi- 
tions in  our  history,  be  recognized  to  be 
perhaps  the  most  complex  series  of  inter- 
national agreements  that  I  have  been  ex- 
posed to:  four  agreements,  ten  Execu- 
tive orders,  all  requiring  a  host  and  array 
of  regulations  to  implement. 

I'm  not  an  international  lawyer,  and 
I'm  not  even  a  domestic  lawyer — al- 
though I've  had  a  great  deal  of  recent  ex- 
perience— and  I  can  tell  you  that  analyz- 
ing and  assessing  the  obligations  of  both 
sides  wdth  respect  to  these  accords, 
agreements,  Executive  orders,  is  going 
to  take  a  great  deal  of  time  and  effort  by 
the  most  experienced  of  legal  minds. 

I  would  anticipate,  and  I  reiterate, 
that  the  U.S.  Government  will  fulfill  its 
obligations  in  accordance  with  both  inter- 
national law  and  the  accepted  norms  of 
domestic  legal  practice.  The  process  is 
underway  and  has  been  underway  vrithin 
the  executive  branch  by  those  depart- 
ments which  are  particularly  expert  in 
reviewing  all  of  these  obligations.  And 
ultimately,  of  course,  there  will  be 
assessments  made  with  respect  to  how 
the  other  side  also  adheres  to  the 
obligations  it  has  incurred  in  these 
accords. 

I  would  like  to  get  out  front  with  re- 
spect to  one  or  two  issues  in  these  ac- 
cords. There  has  been  speculation  as  to 
whether  or  not  these  accords  provide  for 
the  resumption  of  the  provision  of  mili- 


tary equipment  to  the  Government  of 
Iran,  either  that  equipment  previously 
purchased  and  contracted  for,  or  perhaps 
additional  equipment.  Let  me  state 
categorically  today,  there  will  be  no  mili- 
tary equipment  provided  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Iran,  either  under  earlier  obliga- 
tions and  contractual  arrangements  or  as 
yet  unstated  requests.  There  were  no 
discussions  about  the  provision  of  arma- 
ments by  the  previous  Administration  as 
it  completed  the  accords  in  those  anguish- 
ing last  hours. 

Secondly,  as  you  know,  one  of  the 
Executive  orders  signed  by  President 
Carter  relieved  the  obligation  for  the 
sanctions  in  trade.  We  have,  in  that  re- 
gard, issued  a  warning  or  an  advisory,  if 
you  will,  about  the  undesirability  of 
travel  of  American  citizens  to  Iran;  and, 
until  further  deliberations  are  made  with 
respect  to  future  commercial  arrange- 
ments, it's  my  view  that  the  most  careful 
caution  should  be  apphed  by  American 
firms,  large  and  small. 

Having  said  all  of  these  things,  it's 
your  turn  to  have  at  me.  I  want  to  con- 
clude by  emphasizing  that  I  hope  in  the 
period  ahead  to  meet  regularly  here  with 
this  diplomatic  press  corps.  It's  a  press 
corps  that  enjoys  the  reputation  of  being 
the  sharpest  and  the  meanest  I  know,  and 
I  welcome  that  because  I  think  the  kind 
of  dialogue  we  will  have  here  should  be 
both  enlightened  and  specific  and  perti- 
nent. I  welcome  your  questions. 

Q.  Can  you  tell  us  whether  the 
Reagan  Administration  is  considering 
taking  retaliation  against  Iran  for  tak- 
ing of  the  hostages  and  its  treatment  of 
them?  And,  if  so,  what  measures  are 
being  considered,  such  as  the  reimposi- 
tion  of  the  trade  embargo? 

A.  First,  let  me,  early  on  in  our 
dialogue,  suggest  that  experience  has 
taught  me  that  speculation  about  future 
actions  of  that  kind — contingency  plan- 
ning— in  a  public  forum  is  frequently 
self-defeating  because  it  ends  up  creating 
the  kind  of  controversies  that  deprive  one 
of  the  ability  to  do  anything  in  the  second 
place.  So  I'm  going  to  avoid  it. 

I  would  emphasize  again  that  the 
period  ahead  is  going  to  clearly  demon- 
strate the  nature  and  character  of  the 
Iranian  regime's  post-hostage  return  at- 


iriior\/  1QR1 


special 


titude,  there  are  additional  American 
hostages  in  Iran — one  with  a  clear  citi- 
zenship connotation — and  a  host  of  other 
incurred  obligations  which  make  that 
question  a  little  premature  in  the  context 
of  my  answer. 

Q.  Along  that  same  line,  however, 
but  on  a  more  general  scale.  Yesterday 
the  President,  in  welcoming  the  hos- 
tages, talked  of  swift  and  effective 
retribution  in  case  of  future  incidents 
involving  terrorism.  Can  you  supply  us 
with  any  idea  of  the  guidelines  on  that 
retribution?  For  example,  will  there  be 
retribution  in  cases  which  do  not  in- 
volve another  government?  In  other 
words,  a  free-lance  terrorist,  if  you 
will. 

A.  I  said,  I  think  to  somebody  last 
night,  that  was  consciously  ambiguous, 
that  statement.  Consciously  ambiguous  in 
the  sense  that  any  terrorist  government 
or  terrorist  movement  that  is  contemplat- 
ing such  actions  I  think  knows  clearly 
what  we  are  speaking  of. 

As  you  parse  it  out  in  the  context  of 
individuals  or  separatist  movements  or 
independence  movements,  of  course,  the 
problem  is  substantially  different  and  the 
restraints  and  the  ability  to  apply  re- 
taliatory action  is  sometimes  not  only 
constrained  but  uncertain.  So  I  caveat  it 
that  way. 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  your  criteria 
for  resuming  arms  control  negotiations 
with  the  Soviet  Union? 

A.  This  is  a  question  upon  which 
there's  been  a  great  deal  of  speculation 
and  some  questions  to  me  in  my  confir- 
mation hearings.  I  think  President  Rea- 
gan has  stated  repeatedly  that  the 
United  States  cannot  contemplate  negoti- 
ations or  ratifications  of  arms  control 
agreements  exclusive  of  consideration  of 
the  conduct  and  the  activities  of  the 
Soviet  Union  outside  the  sphere  of  arms 
control.  That's  the  shorthand  for  linkage. 

I  don't  think  it  would  be  appropriate 
for  me  today,  in  the  context  of  future 
strategic  arms  limitations  talks,  to  clarify 
further  precisely  how  that  principle  will 
be  applied.  But  clearly,  that  principle  will 
be  applied. 

Q.  Perhaps  in  relation  to  that, 
could  you  give  us  your  judgment  of  de- 
velopments within  the  past  week  or  so 
in  Poland — whether  Soviet  forces  re- 
main in  the  state  of  readiness  that  were 
described  a  month  ago  by  the  Carter 
Administration — and  what  your  sense 
is  at  this  point  of  the  immediate  future 
and  Soviet  action  perhaps? 


A.  First  let  me  clarify  one  prospect 
of  your  premised  question.  I  think,  fol- 
lowing those  early  days  in  December 
when  the  state  of  readiness  was  some- 
what heightened,  there  has  been  some- 
what of  a  decline.  That  is  not  to  suggest 
that  Soviet  forces  and  other  Eastern 
European  forces  are  not  postured  in  such 
a  way  that  they  could  react  very,  very 
quickly  in  Poland. 

As  you  know,  in  early  December,  the 
North  Atlantic  Council  of  the  NATO  al- 
liance suggested  in  very  clear  language 
that  any  Soviet  intervention  in  Poland 
would  have  the  gravest  consequence  in 
the  context  of  ongoing  East-West  rela- 
tions and  that  those  consequences  would 
be  longstanding  in  time.  I  know  of  noth- 
ing today  that  would  cause  this  Adminis- 
tration or  this  State  Department  to  de- 
part from  the  strong  affirmation  of  that 
view. 

Q.  On  Poland.  I  understand  that 
the  Polish  Government  has  indicated, 
at  some  level  at  least  informally,  that 
they  do  still  wish  to  request  a  massive 
aid  progrram  from  the  United  States. 
What  is  your  inclination  in  terms  of 
economic  assistance? 

A.  As  you  know,  substantial  assist- 
ance has  already  been  provided  in  terms 
of  loans  for  foodstuffs.  I  think  it's  impor- 
tant that  we  all  recognize  that  the  pro- 
vision of  either  credits  or  cash  or  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  Poland  today  is  not 
the  answer  to  the  problem. 

We  find  a  situation  in  which  just  debt 
servicing  alone  consumes  half  of  the 
available  assets.  The  problem  involves 
internal  reform  within  the  Polish  State, 
and  it  is  up  to  the  Polish  Government  and 
Polish  authorities  to  work  this  out.  That 
notwithstanding,  we  continue  to  feel  a 
very  important  and  sensitive  sympathy 
for  the  people  of  Poland  and  their  current 
plight,  and  we  are  considering  what  fur- 
ther steps  could  be  taken. 

Q.  There  has  been  a  number  of 
press  reports  this  week  about  steps,  or 
alleged  steps,  that  you've  taken  to  as- 
sert your  predominance  over  the  for- 
eign policy  bureaucracy.  Could  you — 

A.  I  was  discussing  that  just  the 
other  day  as  the  President  was  taking  his 
first  shower  in  the  White  House. 
I  Laughter] 


Q.  Could  you  give  us  your  concept 
or  what  the  agreed  concept  is,  between 
yourself  and  the  President  of  how  the  ' 
National  Security  Council  [NSC]  will 
operate  vis-a-vis  the  State  Depart- 
ment so  there  is  some  clear  sense  of 
over  what  it  is  you  are  asserting 
predominance? 

A.  I  noticed  there  has  been  a 
number  of  dope  stories  along  the  airways 
on  this  subject.  Let  me  assure  you,  most 
of  those  I  have  read,  including  the  most 
recent,  are  totally  without  basis  in  fact. 
Early  on  I  brought  some  drafts  which  I 
had  discussed  and  coordinated  with 
Richard  Allen  to  Mr.  Meese  [Richard  V. 
Allen,  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs;  Edwin  Meese, 
III,  Counselor  to  the  President],  with  Mr 
Allen,  with  a  view  toward  starting  out 
with  a  straw  man.  This  is  not  an  experi- 
ence I  haven't  been  through  before,  and 
we  have  been  in  the  process  of  coordinat- 
ing this  draft  with  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense, who  has  a  very  keen  interest,  of 
course,  and  I  would  anticipate  very 
shortly  those  drafts  will  be  published  in 
the  form  of  Presidential  directives  which 
will  implement  a  framework,  if  you  will, 
in  general  for  the  conduct  of  national  se- 
curity policymaking  plus  day-to-day  op- 
erational matters. 

In  that  context,  when  I  accepted  this 
position,  I  was  assured  by  President 
Reagan  personally  that  I  will  be  his  chief 
administrator,  if  you  will,  and  I  use  the 
term  "vicar" — and  those  of  you  who  want 
to  go  back  to  the  1948  through  1951  Jack- 
son subcommittee  hearings  on  this  sub- 
ject will  discover  what  that  term  "vicar" 
meant — for  the  formulation,  the  conduct 
and  the  articulation  of  American  foreign 
poHcy. 

I  intend  that  the  President's  mandatf 
to  me  be  carried  out,  and  I  am  confident 
that  it  will  be. 

Q.  Let  me  just  follow  that  up.  Ho» 
do  you  perceive  the  NSC,  then,  operat- 
ing? As  primarily  resolving  disputes  be- 
tween this  building  and  the  Pentagon? 

A.  I  perceive  that  the  inter- 
departmental mechanisms  will  prepare 
for  the  National  Security  Council,  as  con- 
stituted by  the  act  and  the  amendments 
of  1949  and  whatever  changes  President 
Reagan  may  care  to  apply  to  that  compo- 
sition, to  pre.sent  options  for  decisions  by 
the  President  within  the  forum  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council. 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Special 


a 


Q.  I  wonder  what  your  plans  are 
Dpening  up  contact,  not  only  with 
Soviet  Union  but  with  the  key  coun- 
^  in  the  Middle  East.  Do  you  have 
travel  plans  to  go  either  to  Moscow 
)  Israel  or  Egypt  or  to  Saudi 

,  I  think  it's  a  little  too  soon  for  me 
respect  to  East-West,  the  U.S.- 
let,  to  predict  when  there  will  be 
er  meetings  by  myself  or,  more  im- 
antly,  by  President  Reagan.  There 

number  of  issues  extant  on  the  hori- 
today  which  I  think  need  clarification 
re  a  constructive  high-level  dialogue 
Id  be  justified. 

On  the  other  hand,  having  said  that, 
issential  that  we  maintain  day-to-day 
hourly  communications  with  the 
let  Union.  We're  doing  that  through 
regularly  established  diplomatic 
inels,  and  I  intend  to  continue  to 
■cise  it.  I've  already  on  several  key  is- 

With  respect  to  the  Middle  East  in 
ral,  I  have  no  finite  plans  for  my  own 
■9i\  there,  but  I  do  anticipate — as  you 
1»i',  we  have  a  spring  round  in  Europe; 
i  ave  a  number  of  watch  pots,  not  the 
i  of  which  was  already  touched  upon 
Poland,  which  could  justify  earlier 


ji  I  look  forward  to  visiting  this  hemis- 
*e,  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and,  of 
ifie,  Asia  and  Europe  as  well. 

.  Q.  A  few  moments  ago  you  talked 
ijiit  the  President's  statement  yester- 
a;  at  the  White  House,  being  framed 
(M  picuously  ambiguous,  and  then  you 
eton  to  talk — 

A.  No.  Consciously. 

Q.  Consciously  ambiguous. 

A.  It  was  conspicuously  appropriate. 

A  ghter] 

Q.  And  you  went  on  to  say,  so  that, 
n^ords  you  used  "terrorist  organiza- 
flis  or  terrorist  governments  would 
4  heed."  The  phrase  "terrorist  gov- 

3nent"  I  don't  think  has  any  prece- 
,  does  it?  And  my  question  is,  has 
"lie  been  discussion  in  the  State  De- 
al ment  and  the  top  level  of  the  Ad- 
i^istration  of  being  able  to  brand 
"Tnments  like  Iran  terrorist  gov- 
nents  with  both  diplomatic  and 
lomic  consequences  that  would  flow 
1  that  branding? 

j,  A.  Of  course,  there  have  been  such 
ilassions,  and  they  go  on  right  now. 


Q.  Could  you  amplify  it? 

A.  I  think  that  is  the  criteria  for  a 
government  that  sponsors  or  undertakes 
or  participates  in  terrorist  activities. 
That  is  a  nice  handle  to  put  on  it — a  ter- 
rorist government.  And,  as  you  know, 
there  are  public  laws  today  passed  by  the 
Congress  which  prohibit  the  provision  of 
armaments  to  terrorist  governments. 

So  this  is  not  a  new  term  in  Washing- 
ton, and  I  think  it's  been  applied  some- 
times in  a  very  generous  way  and  some- 
times perhaps  a  less  than  generous  way. 

Q.  In  terms  of  your  reference  ear- 
lier to  your  policy  toward  the  shipment 
of  arms  to  Iran,  my  recollection  is  that 
the  earlier  Administration  had  taken 
the  position  that  that  which  was  in  the 
pipeline,  that  which  Iran  had  bought 
and  paid  for  before  the  seizure  of  the 
hostages,  would  be  considered  part  of 
the  frozen  assets;  and,  therefore,  would 
be  released. 

Now  you  seem  to  be  deliberately 
changing  that  policy.  Do  I  understand 
that  correctly?  How  much  do  you 
understand  is  involved? 

A.  The  figures  are  not  really  quite 
clear,  if  you're  talking  FMS  [foreign  mili- 
tary sales]  cases,  and  we're  trying  to  dig 
that  out,  and  it's  taking  some  work.  But 
it  does  not  mean  that  the  arms  them- 
selves have  to  be  provided.  If,  in  the  ul- 
timate conclusion  of  this  thing,  we  feel 
the  obligations  incurred  should  be  ful- 
filled, they  will  be  fulfilled  in  my  book  by 
selling  those  arms  and  providing  the  cash 
to  Iran.  Selling  them  elsewhere.  Some  of 
them  have  already  been  sold,  incidentally. 

Q.  The  Carter  Administration  had 
the  policy  of  abiding  by  the  conditions 
and  terms  of  SALT  II  even  though  it 
was  not  ratified  and  said — and  he  said 
he  hoped  and  expected  the  Soviet  Union 
would  do  the  same  thing.  Is  that  the 
policy  of  the  Reagan  Administration  as 
well? 

A.  We  are  in  the  process  of  review- 
ing this  obligation  which  President  Car- 
ter assumed  in  the  context  of  our  new  re- 
sponsibilities and  ongoing  Soviet  ac- 
tivities around  the  globe.  We  would  cer- 
tainly hope  that,  in  the  period  between 
now  and  the  time  a  decision  is  made  or  a 
policy  is  adopted — and  this  involves  not 
only  Soviet  conduct  worldwide,  it  in- 
volves the  national  security  interests  of 
the  American  people  as  we  look  at  SALT 
II  and  SALT  I  and  the  potential  future 
defense  needs  of  this  country.  But  I 


would  hope  that  in  the  meantime,  the 
Soviets  would  do  nothing  to  exacerbate 
the  kind  of  mutual  restraint  both  sides 
should  pursue. 

Q.  Including  SALT  II? 

A.  The  Soviets,  I  leave  that  up  to 
the  Soviets  to  talk  to,  and  they  have  re- 
cently, as  I  think  you  know. 

Q.  As  you  know,  there  has  been 
talk  this  week  about  the  Middle  East 
policy.  First  of  all,  how  much  can  you 
tell  us  about  that?  How  do  you  recon- 
cile the  State  Department's  definition 
of  the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization] with  President  Reagan's 
definition?  Do  you  expect  to  see  the 
time  when  the  Reagan  Administration 
might  talk  to  the  PLO,  and  do  you  ex- 
pect the  Reagan  Administration  to  ever 
recognize  Jerusalem  as  the  capital  of 
Israel? 

A.  Let  me  take  that  mind-bogglingly 
extensive  sermon,  which  it  would  take, 
and  compress  it  into  several  responses. 
First,  President  Reagan  has  stated — 
every  American  President  since  1975  has 
stated — that  we  will  neither  recognize 
nor  negotiate  with  the  PLO  for  so  long  as 
they  refuse  to  recognize  the  right  of  the 
State  of  Israel  to  exist,  for  so  long  as 
they  refuse  to  accept  the  provisions  of 
242  and  the  other  U.N.  resolution.  And 
having  said  that,  I  think  that's  a  suffi- 
cient answer  for  a  large  portion  of  it. 

With  respect  to  Jerusalem  as  an  en- 
tity, for  30  years,  I  think,  the  United 
States  has  felt  that  this  is  a  matter  that 
has  international  implications,  and  it 
should  be  a  city  that  is  not  divided  by 
barbed  wire  or  imposed  unilateral 
restraints.  We  don't  welcome  unilateral 
action  that  would  make  this  kind  of  an  in- 
ternational consensus  impossible.  It  is  the 
seat,  after  all,  of  three  of  our  world's 
greatest  religions — Islam,  Christianity, 
and  Judaism — and  we  would  hope  that 
ultimately,  those  hopes  that  we  have  had 
for  Jerusalem  will  be  realized  with  pa- 
tient participation  by  all  the  parties  in- 
volved. 

Q.  On  Afghanistan,  [French  Presi- 
dent] Giscard  d'Estaing  has  suggested  a 
conference  to  discuss  nonintervention 
in  Afghanistan  as  opposed  to  the  status 
of  Afghanistan.  Do  you  regard  this  as  a 
promising  approach? 

My  second  question  concerns  the 
grain  embargo.  Mr.  Block  [John  R. 
Block,  Secretary  of  Agriculture]  today 
said  he  urged  and  desired  it  be  lifted 
immediately.  I  wonder  what  your  views 
are  on  that. 


Sruary  1981 


Special 


A.  First,  with  respect  to  yesterday's 
initiative  by  President  Giseard,  of  course, 
we  welcome  any  proposal  that  would  bear 
fruit  and  result  in  the  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  forces  in  Afghanistan.  We  were  in- 
formed of  the  French  initiative  before  the 
fact.  We  have  gone  back  with  a  number  of 
questions  seeking  broadening  and  en- 
lightening information  about  how  this 
would  be  handled,  especially  in  the  con- 
text of  other  intitiatives  that  are  under 
way  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  Na- 
tions. But  in  general,  this  is  the  kind  of 
thing  that  we  do  welcome,  and  we  would 
hope  that  it  could  proceed  as  a  unifying, 
allied  effort,  and  would  also,  as  President 
Giseard  suggested,  include  the  views  of 
the  Islamic  countries,  who  have  taken 
some  initiatives  in  this  area. 

Your  second  question  was — 

Q.  — concerning  the  grain  em- 
bargo. 

A.  The  grain  embargo.  That  was 
Freudian — I  didn't  want  to  answer.  We 
have  an  interdepartmental  review  under 
way  on  this  subject,  the  results  of  which 
have  not  been  arrived  at.  In  general,  I 
would  hope  that  in  the  future,  we  would 
not  adopt  sanctions  against  the  Soviet 
Union  or  anyone  else  that  would  selec- 
tively punish  one  segment  of  the  Ameri- 
can domestic  economy.  But  we  are  there 
today,  and  it's  not  so  simple  as  it  might 
sound  if  you  are  a  representative  of  our 
agricultural  sector. 

Q.  Would  you  please  give  us  your 
comment  on  the  meeting  between  Pres- 
ident Reagan  and  President  Chun  Doo 
Hwan  of  South  Korea,  and  also  give  us 
your  general  policy  toward  North 
Korea.  I  understand  that  the  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment proposed  three-way  talks  with 
North  Korea  in  1979. 

A.  I  have  not  proposed  any  talks.  I 
do  not  anticipate  any  until  there  has  been 
a  thorough  review  of  the  desirability  of 
such  talks,  and  they  will  be  conducted 
against  a  backdrop  of  North  Korean  per- 
formance, conduct,  and  demeanor  with 
respect  to  the  desirability  of  and  the  hope 
for  progress. 

As  you  know,  the  Korean  President 
will  be  visiting  Washington  next  week. 
He  has  already,  I  believe,  arrived  on  the 
West  Coast.  Somebody  suggested,  "Was 
this  a  deal  for  Mr  Kim?"  [Mr.  Kim  Da 
Jung,  political  opposition  leader]  There 
were  no  deals — no  deals — despite  again 
some  press  speculation  to  the  contrary. 
But  we  are  very  pleased  to  have  the  Ko- 
rean President  visit  the  United  States  as 
one  of  our  first  official  visitors.  It  is  not  a 
state  visit,  but  it  is  an  official  visit. 


Q.  What  is  the  significance  of  the 
meeting? 

A.  I  think  it  is  vitally  important.  For 
the  period  since  the  end  of  World  War  II, 
with  the  enhanced  rejuvenation  in  the 
early  1950s,  Korea  has  been  a  friend, 
partner,  and  intimate  participant  in 
Western  security  relationships.  Because 
of  some  static  in  a  recent  period,  it's  im- 
portant that  we  clarify  the  air.  I  would 
not  want  anyone  to  suggest,  as  some 
have,  that  this  is  politically  motivated  be- 
cause of  upcoming  elections  in  South 
Korea.  Not  at  all.  The  American  tie,  if 
you  will,  is  not  an  issue  in  these  elections. 

Q.  TVaditionally,  it  has  been  con- 
sidered that  you.  North  America,  and 
the  Soviet  Union  keep  their  own  areas 
of  influence  all  over  the  world.  How 
can  this  be  understood  now  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  extended  its  presence 
to  Latin  America  and  Afghanistan? 
What  element  would  North  America 
consider  to  maintain  the  strategic 
interests  of  your  country  in  Latin 
America? 

A.  I'm  glad  I  asked  you.  I  don't 
think  my  own  past  expressions  on  this 
subject  need  too  much  clarification  before 
this  group.  I  think  it's  clear  that  we  have 
been  witnessing  an  unprecedented — at 
least  in  character  and  scope — risk-taking 
mode  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union,  not 
just  in  this  hemisphere  but  in  Africa  as 
well.  We  have  seen  in  that  process  the 
exploitation  of  the  Cuban  proxy,  and  I  can 
assure  you  that  this  is  the  subject  of  ut- 
most concern  to  this  Administration,  it  is 
a  subject  which  will  be  high  on  the  prior- 
ity of  our  national  security  and  foreign 
policy  agenda. 

I  would  suggest  also  that  an  addi- 
tional subject  related  intimately  to  this, 
in  the  conduct  of  Soviet  activity  and  in 
terms  of  training,  funding,  and  equip- 
ping, is  international  terrorism.  Interna- 
tional terrorism  will  take  the  place  of 
human  rights,  our  concern,  because  it  is 
the  ultimate  of  abuse  of  human  rights. 
And  it's  time  that  it  be  addressed  with 
greater  clarity  and  greater  effectiveness 
by  Western  nations  and  the  United  States 
as  well. 

Q.  May  I  follow  that  up?  In  that 
context,  we  have  just  had  the  Libyans 
move  into  Chad,  and  now  apparently 
beyond  doubt,  Cuban  activity  in  El  Sal- 
vador. What  does  your  Administration 
intend  to  do  about  either  of  those? 

A.  We're  looking  very,  very  carefully 
at  the  recent  Libyan  incursion  into  Chad 
and  the  implications  of  that  incursion,  not 


only  to  Chad  and  the  people  of  Chad,  bi* 
to  the  surrounding  states  as  well.  We  \ 
view  it  as  a  grave  turn  of  events.  I'll  | 
leave  it  there.  j 

Q.  Can  I  follow  that  up?  Did  you 
mean  to  say  that  you  were  not  in- 
terested in  human  rightsper.se  in  noa 
Communist  areas?  I'm  not  sure  what 
you  meant  by  terrorism  by  Communis! 
countries  should  replace  concern  abou 
human  rights. 

A.  I'm  talking  about  in  functional, 
priority  areas.  It's  been  my  view  that 
human  rights  is  an  essential  and  funda- 
mental aspect  of  American  foreign  polio; 
and  domestic  policy,  and  as  such,  w'hen 
you  remove  it  from  the  main  stream  of 
fundamental  policymaking  and  give  it  ar 
extraordinary  role  in  organizational 
terms,  you  fi-equently  result  in  distor- 
tions that  probably  put  in  jeopardy  the 
well-meaning  objective  you  seek  to 
achieve.  So  I  would  like  to  see  some  or- 
ganizational change  in  the  period  ahead- 
no  deemphasis,  a  change  in  priorities. 

The  greatest  problem  to  me  in  the 
human  rights  area  today  is  the  area  of 
rampant  international  terrorism — on 
both  sides  of  the  Iron  Curtain.  And  as 
one  looks  at  the  menu  of  those  who  havi 
been  most  disturbed  by  it,  it's  surprisin 
that  the  Soviet  Union  itself  has  been  vit 
timized  by  it.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  the; 
today  are  involved  in  conscious  policies, 
in  programs,  if  you  will,  which  foster, 
support,  and  expand  this  activity,  whicl 
is  hemorrhaging  in  many  respects 
throughout  the  world  today. 

Q.  Can  I  just  follow  my  own  qucs 
tion?  Does  that  mean  organizationally 
you  will  be  trying  to  drop  the  kind  of 
human  rights  input  that  went  into  for 
eign  military  sales? 

A.  I  would  anticipate  that  each  and 
every  regional  policy  director  in  this  De 
partment  will  have  human  rights  high  o 
his  agenda  in  his  across-the-board  assini 
lation  and  assessment  of  what  is  in  the 
vital  interests  of  the  American  people 
and  this  country. 

Q.  This  country  has  just  gone 
through  a  great  celebration  of  the  re- 
turn of  the  hostages  from  Iran.  I  reail 
have  two  questions  about  it:  First,  do 
you  yourself  have  any  lessons  which 
you  have  drawn  from  this  14-month- 
long  ordeal  of  this  government  and 
people?  And  secondly,  is  it  a  proper  in- 
ference, as  some  have  drawn,  that  the 
swift  and  effective  retribution  would 
necessarily  mean  some  downgrading 
for  the  concern  of  the  personal  safety 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Special 


those  who  may  be  involved  in  some 
Jure  hostage-taking  episode? 

A.  No,  not  at  all,  to  answer  the  last 
t  of  your  question  first.  Not  at  all — 
cisely  the  opposite.  And  I  would  sug- 
t  that  you  talk  to  the  hostages  about 

some  of  our  former  prisoners  of  war 
0  have  been,  let's  say,  caught  up  in  this 
aate. 

With  respect  to  my  own  observa- 
ns,  I've  been  here  a  week.  I,  of  course, 
:  as  a  private  citizen  in  the  private  sec- 
•,  and  anguished  as  I  think  all  of  us  did 
th  this  situation.  I  would  have  some 
mediate  observations  of  a  general  na- 
•e,  but  I  prefer  to  hold  up  on  those, 
i've  got  a  number  of  people  worried 
out  the  issue.  There  is  some  congres- 
nal  interest  in  it.  We're  going  to  partic- 
ite  with  them  to  the  degree  they  wish 
explore  it.  But  I  prefer  to  defer  on  that 
this  time. 

Q.  In  view  of  your  decision  yester- 
y  to  recall  Ambassador  White  from 
Salvador,  can  you  tell  us  whether  or 

!"  t  you  made  a  decision  that  he  is  to  be 
tained?  And  secondly,  also  in  view  of 
ur  commitment  to  human  rights, 
blether  or  not  you  will  be  considering 
8  andoning  aid  to  El  Salvador? 

A.  You  mean  the  aid  that  was  re- 
c'ltly  just  modified  by  the  Carter  Ad- 

I  iiistration? 

Q.  Yes. 

A.  No,  I  don't  anticipate  any  termi- 
1  tion  in  the  aid  to  El  Salvador  based  on 
I  e  recommendations  of  our  Ambassador 
1  d  our  own  assessement  of  the  reforms 
lat  have  been  under  way  by  the  gov- 
nirnent  there.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
lay  go  just  the  other  way. 

I  have  asked  Ambassador  White 
1  ck  for  consultation — and  I  don't  make 
i  a  habit  of  consulting  with  preconceived 
nclusions. 

Q.  When  and  how  do  you  intend  to 
•oceed  with  peace  talks  between  Israel 
id  Egypt,  and  does  the  Administration 
itend  to  invite  to  the  United  States 
resident  Sadat  and  Prime  Minister 
egin,  and  when? 

A.  I  don't  think  I  would  want  to  in- 
ct  any  sense  of  urgency  in  our  view  of 
lis  matter.  We  have  and  continue  to  sup- 
art  the  Camp  David  accords  and  the 
Bace  process  that  was  launched  under 
lose  accords,  and  we  vdll  continue  to 
bide  by  that  in  consultation  with  the 
arties,  not  only  the  signatories  but  those 
— ith  a  direct  interest  in  the  outcome.  And 
think  that's  enough  for  now.  We're  in 


the  process  of  reviewing  the  situation.  In 
that  process,  we  perhaps  will  come  up 
with  a  timetable  that  makes  some  sense, 
but  I  need  to  have  some  discussions  with 
the  parties  concerned  first. 

Q.  Returning  to  Latin  America  for 
a  moment,  the  Carter  Administration 
was  talking  to  the  Cubans  pursuing  an 
idea  whereby  the  Cubans  would  take 
some  of  the  criminal  and  mentally  ill 
people  who  came  over  on  the  boatlift 
back  in  return  for  our  agreement  to  ac- 
cept 100,000  people  over  the  next  3 
years.  Senator  Childs  has  sent  you  a 
letter  opposing  that.  Could  you  com- 
ment on  that  concept,  on  what  you 
think  our  relations  with  Cuba  ought  to 
be  and  what  we  should  talk  to  them 
about  on  this  issue? 

A.  I  would  not  like  to  break  any  new 
ground  on  that  subject  today  other  than 
to  remind  you  that  the  previous  Adminis- 
tration undertook  some  efforts  to  get 
agreement  with  the  Cuban  Government 
on  this  subject  of  the  return  of  ill  and 
other  kinds  of  refugees  who  came  here. 
Those  talks  collapsed;  they  were  a  total 
failure  due  to  the  lack  of  cooperation  of 
the  Cuban  Government,  and  that's  just 
another  issue  that  is  going  to  be  put  into 
the  calculator  which  will  ultimately  lead 
to  a  reassessment  of  our  policies  toward 
Cuba. 

Q.  Could  you  comment  on  that 
concept,  on  taking  noncriminal  and 
nonmentally  ill  people  in  exchange  for 
their  taking  back  people  who  are — 

A.  This  is  an  extremely  delicate  sub- 
ject, as  you  know,  with  strong  views  held 
on  both  sides  of  that  issue  by  well- 
meaning  people.  And  this  is  the  kind  of 
an  issue  that  before  I  break  new  ground 
on  it  or  express  my  views,  I'd  like  to  con- 
sult with  the  appropriate  committees  of 
the  Senate  and  the  House  and  to  be  sure 
I  am  espousing  the  views  of  the  new  Ad- 
ministration and  President  Reagan,  and 
that's  not  so  today. 

Q.  How  do  you  anticipate  that  the 
severe  spending  constraints  on  this 
Administration  will  play  out  on  the  for- 
eign policy,  and  particularly  the  foreign 
aid  area? 

A.  I'm  very  concerned  about  it;  I'm 
concerned  about  it  from  two  points  of 
view.  First,  I'm  concerned  about  the  eco- 
nomic situation  that  has  brought  the 
necessity  for  even  greater  austerity  upon 
us.  And  I  leave  that  to  other  members  of 
the  Administration  and  the  President 


himself  to  address,  and  I  know  he  will; 
but  we  are  in  a  serious  situation  requiring 
austerity. 

Secondly,  I've  been  concerned — and 
we  are  in  the  process  now  of  consulting 
with  Mr.  Stockman  in  0MB  [David  Alan 
Stockman,  Director  of  the  Office  of  Man- 
agement and  Budget]  on  this  subject,  and 
I'm  talking  about  A.I.D.  [Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development],  our  own  se- 
curity assistance,  and  I  hope  that  we  are 
going  to  be  able  to  get  a  recognition  that 
both  foreign  assistance  and  foreign  secu- 
rity assistance  is  sometimes  a  very  cost- 
effective  vehicle  for  insuring  that  the 
ideals  and  interests  of  this  country  are 
carried  out  effectively  abroad. 

Q.  As  a  strategist  and  a  politician, 
how  do  you  see  the  defense  cooperation 
between  the  United  States  and  Europe, 
especially  from  the  viewpoint  of  bur- 
densharing  in  the  light  of  the  increas- 
ing threats  in  today's  world? 

A.  Again,  I  have  a  long  litany  of 
comments  on  this  over  5  years,  and  I 
don't  like  to  depart  from  it,  and  that  is 
that  I  would  like  to  see  all  of  us  do  more. 
But  I  would  also  like  to  see  an  en- 
lightened appreciation  here  in  the  United 
States  and  among  our  own  people  for  the 
great  contribution  that  our  effective  par- 
ticipation in  the  alliance  brings  to  our  se- 
curity. 

I  think  it  was  Jim  Schlesinger  some 
years  ago  who  had  a  study  done  that  sug- 
gested that  if  we  did  not  have  the  NATO 
alliance  and  the  security  assets  it  brings 
to  the  American  people,  we  would  have 
to  double  the  gross  allocation  of  our  na- 
tional product  for  defense  to  provide  a 
comparable  security  capability.  I  don't 
know  whether  that's  correct  or  wrong.  I 
suspect  it  is  a  very  modest  assessment. 

I  have  also  suggested  that  if  you  go 
back  to  1970  to  date,  cutting  out  last 
year's  increases,  largely  legislatively 
mandated  by  the  American  Congress, 
European  contributions  in  the  gross  have 
been  going  up  about  22%  since  1970; 
American  contributions  for  defense  in 
NATO  have  gone  down  by  about  13%. 
The  point  of  departure  in  1970  was  very 
bad.  The  United  States  was  carrying  far 
more  of  the  overall  share,  but  that  was  a 
legacy  of  the  birth  of  the  alliance  itself.  I 
think  sometimes  we  get  too  impatient  and 
get  bludgeoning  people  who  are  doing  the 
best  they  can  in  very  austere  economic 
circumstances,  too.  What  we  have  to  find 
is  a  way  for  everyone  to  do  more;  and  I 
include  Japan  in  that. 


Press  release  25. 


sburary  1981 


East  Asia 


;ember  18- 
)ber  15 

uty  Director  of  Space  Science  and 
inology  division  of  the  Chinese  Acad- 
of  Sciences  Ji  Bo  leads  a  delegation 
le  U.S.  Delegation  meets  with  NASA 
ials  in  Washington  to  discuss  future 
Jtutional  arrangements  for  the 
^DSAT  ground  recieving  station.  The 
ip  also  tours  NASA's  Goddard  Space 
ht  Center  in  the  Washington  area, 
L.B.J.  Space  Center  in  Houston,  and 
Jet  Propulsion  Laboratory  in  Los 
eles. 

tember  20- 
ober  28 

_  Minister  of  Metallurgical  Industry 
ng  Fan  leads  a  delegation  to  the  U.S. 
iie  invitation  of  Reynolds  Interna- 
al  Inc. ;  group  tours  Reynolds  plants 
ted  throughout  the  U.S. 

i«tember  22- 
)iober  6 

.  rnor  Cliff  Finch  (Mississippi)  leads 
stry  delegation  to  China. 

M  tember  30 

iihua  News  Agency  reports  that  the 
Jl.  and  China  have  decided  to  postpone 
h  unblocking  of  Chinese  assets  to  Janu- 
?.l,  1980. 

)<ober  1 

''H  installment  of  $30  million  is  paid  to 

hy  China  under  U.S. -China 
.•  ims-assets"  agreement. 

)iober8- 
iiember  9 

'isident  of  the  China  International 
List  and  Investment  Corporation 
CnC)  Rong  Yiren  visits  U.S.  to  en- 
orage  U.S.  equity  investment  in  China. 

>  ober 10 

U(ir  Jim  Conway  (St.  Louis)  announces 
^  ihlishment  of  sister  city  ties  with  Nan- 


I  ober 15-27 

icnal  Committee  for  U.S.-China  Rela- 
is  sponsors  a  gubernatorial  delegation 
hnia;  George  Ariyoshi  (Hawaii), 
mias  Judge  (Montana),  Richard  Lamm 
(ilorado),  William  Milliken  (Michigan), 
^lert  Quie  (Minnesota),  Robert  Ray 
■  a),  and  Richard  Snelling  (Vermont) 
ticipate. 

tober 16 

hernatorial  delegation  meets  with  Vice 
\  Ulster  of  Foreign  Affairs  Han  Nian- 


long,  Vice  Minister  of  Agriculture  He 
Rang,  and  President  of  the  China  Council 
for  the  Promotion  of  International  Trade 
Wang  Yaoting. 

October  17 

U.S.  District  Judge  Oliver  Gasch  rules 
that  termination  of  the  U.S.-Taiwan 
Mutual  Defense  Treaty  requires  the  ap- 
proval of  either  two-thirds  of  the  Senate 
or  a  majority  of  both  Houses  of  Congress. 

Gubernatorial  delegation  meets  with  Vice 
Premier  Deng;  they  discuss  the  Kampu- 
chean  refugee  problem  and  China's  eco- 
nomic modernization. 

October  20-30 

Governor  Tom  McCall  (Oregon)  leads  an 
Oregon  State  trade  delegation  to  China. 

October  22- 
November  1 

Minister  of  Foreign  Trade  Li  Qiang  visits 
U.S.  to  discuss  the  U.S.-China  trade 
agreement  and  textile  quotas.  Minister  Li 
holds  meetings  with  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce Kreps,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
William  Miller,  Secretary  of  Agriculture 
Robert  Bergland,  Export-Import  Bank 
President  John  Moore,  and  leaders  of  the 
House  and  Senate. 

October  23 

President  Carter  sends  the  U.S.-China 
trade  agreement  to  Congress  and  signs  a 
proclamation  establishing  China's  qualifi- 
cation for  MFN  treatment  under  the 
Jackson- Vanik  amendment  to  the  Trade 
Act  of  1974. 

October  31 

U.S.  announces  expansion  of  the  May  31 
quotas  to  cover  a  total  of  seven  catego- 
ries of  Chinese  textile  imports. 

November  1-5 

Governor  James  Hunt  (North  Carolina) 
leads  tobacco  delegation  to  China. 

November  1-6 

Mayor  Jim  Conway  (St.  Louis)  leads  del- 
egation to  China. 

November  2 

Sister  city  relations  formally  established 
between  St.  Louis  and  Nanjing. 

November  5- 
December  7 

Vice  Minister  Yuan  Baohua  leads  State 
Economic  Commission  delegation  to  the 
U.S. 


November  6 

Vice  Minister  Yuan  meets  with  Treasury 
Secretary  Miller,  Joint  Economic  Com- 
mittee members,  and  Department  of 
Transportation  officials. 

November  7 

Vice  Minister  Yuan  meets  with  Com- 
merce Department  officials  and  members 
of  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers. 

November  8 

Vice  Minister  Yuan  meets  with  Deputy 
Under  Secretary  of  Energy  Robert 
Hanfling. 

November  8-16 

Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Consular 
Affairs  Barbara  Watson  visits  China;  in- 
spects U.S.  consular  operations  in 
Guangzhou  and  Beijing  and  discusses 
progress  on  negotiations  for  a  bilateral 
consular  convention. 

November  14 

Governor  James  Rhodes  (Ohio)  and  Gov- 
ernor Han  Ningfu  (Hubei  Province)  es- 
tablish sister  state  relations  in  Hubei. 

November  15 

Testimony  before  the  Senate  Finance 
Committee  provokes  disagreement 
among  Senators  over  the  granting  of 
MFN  status  to  China. 

November  19- 
December  19 

Director  of  the  Ministry  of  Geology's 
Marine  Division  Tian  Shao  leads  delega- 
tion of  marine  geologists  to  U.S.;  group 
tours  USGS  facilities  and  visits  east  and 
west  coast  universities. 

November  20 

Ceremonies  mark  the  formal  opening  of 
the  Consulate  General  of  the  PR.C.  at 
Houston. 

November  21- 
December  3 

Chief  Economist  of  the  Department  of 
Commerce  Courtenay  Slater  leads  U.S. 
statistical  delegation  to  China. 

November  26- 
December  9 

Vice  Minister  of  Textile  Industry  Hao 
Jianxiu  and  All  China  Youth  Federation 
President  Hu  Qili  lead  delegation  to  U.S.; 
group  meets  with  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  Richard  Holbrooke,  Congressman 
Al  UUman,  and  National  Security  Council 
staff  member  Michel  Oskenberg  in  Wash- 
ington, and  with  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
U.N.  Donald  F  McHenry  in  New  York. 


37 


East  Asia 


November  26-28 

U.S.  statistical  delegation  holds  talks 
with  the  Chinese  State  Statistical  Bureau 
(SSB)  on  bilateral  statistical  cooperation 
and  Chinese  statistical  methodology. 

November  28- 
December  5 

National  Committee  for  U.S.-China  Rela- 
tions sponsors  city  planners'  delegation  to 
China;  meets  with  a  broad  range  of 
municipal  officials  in  Beijing,  Guangzhou, 
Nanjing,  Shanghai,  and  Suzhou. 

November  29- 
December  17 

U.S.  National  Oceanic  and  Atmospheric 
Administration  marine  sedimentation 
delegation  visits  China;  tours  Chinese 
State  Bureau  of  Oceanography  Insti- 
tutions. 

November  29- 
December  30 

Vice  Minister  of  the  Fourth  Ministry  of 
Machine  Building  Li  Rui  heads  telecom- 
munications delegation  to  U.S.  at  the  in- 
vitation of  Honeywell  Information  Sys- 
tems. 

November  30 

U.S.  Court  of  Appeals  overturns  the  Dis- 
trict Court  decision  of  October  17  and 
rules  that  President  Carter  is  constitu- 
tionally empowered  to  give  notice  of  ter- 
mination under  the  U.S.-Taiwan  Mutual 
Defense  Treaty  without  congressional  ac- 
tion. 

December  13 

Ceremonies  mark  the  formal  opening  of 
the  Consulate  General  of  the  RR.C.  at 
San  Francisco. 

December  14 

U.S.  Supreme  Court  upholds  the 
November  30  decision  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals  on  the  U.S.-Taiwan  Mutual  De- 
fense Treaty. 

December  29- 
January 1 

Chinese  Academy  of  Medical  Sciences 
President  Huang  Jiasi  leads  delegation  to 
U.S.;  group  visits  the  California  Acad- 
emy of  Sciences  in  San  Francisco,  the 
University  of  California  at  Berkeley, 
Stanford  University,  and  Hewlett- 
Packard  Company. 

December  31 

U.S.  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  with  Taiwan 
expires. 


1980 

January  2 

U.S.  announces  new  arms  sales  to 
Taiwan.  Chinese  Government  immedi- 
ately protests,  arguing  that  such  sales 
and  deliveries  are  contrary  to  the  joint 
communique  on  Sino-American  normali- 
zation. 

January  5-13 

Defense  Secretary  Harold  Brown  visits 
China;  meets  with  Premier  Hua,  Vice 
Premier  Deng,  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Huang,  Vice  Premier  Geng  Biao, 
and  Minister  of  Defense  Xu  Xiangqian. 
Secretary  Brown  affirms  that  "increased 
cooperation  between  China  and  the  U.S. 
is  a  needed  element  in  the  maintenance  of 
global  tranquility"  Secretary  Brown's 
visit  results  in  liberalization  of  controls  on 
exports  of  U.S.  high  technology  items, 
authorization  on  a  case-by-case  basis  for 
sales  of  nonlethal  military  support 
equipment  to  China,  and  plans  for  regular 
consultations  between  the  U.S.  and 
China  on  Southwest  Asian  developments 
and  other  broad  international  issues  (in- 
stitutionalized in  spring  1980  so  as  to  take 
place  several  times  yearly). 

January  16-19 

Representative  Lester  Wolff  (New  York), 
Chairman  of  the  House  Subcommittee  on 
Asian-Pacific  Affairs,  leads  congressional 
delegation  to  China;  meets  with  Vice 
Premier  Ji  Pengfei. 

January  17-23 

Senator  David  Boren  (Oklahoma)  leads 
delegation  of  the  Senate  Agriculture 
Committee  to  China;  meets  with  agricul- 
ture and  trade  officials  to  discuss  trade 
possibilities. 

January  19- 
February  2 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Consular  Affairs  Hume  Horan  and  Dep- 
uty Director  of  the  Consular  Affairs  Divi- 
sion of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Nie  Gongcheng  cochair  negotiations  on 
the  U.S.-China  consular  convention  in 
Beijing. 

January  20-24 

U.S.  delegation,  led  by  the  President's 
science  adviser  Frank  Press,  travels  to 
China  to  attend  first  meeting  of  the 
Sino-U.S.  Joint  Commission  on  Coopera- 
tion in  Science  and  Technology  (Jan.  22- 
24);  meeting  is  eochaired  by  Press  and 
Vice  Premier  Fang  Yi.  Press  signs  an  ac- 
cord providing  for  the  establishment  of  a 
LANDSAr  satellite  ground-receiving  sta- 


tion in  China,  as  well  as  protocols  for    - 
cooperation  in  earth  sciences  and  earth- 
quake studies,  and  concludes  a  memoraiii 
dum  of  understanding  for  cooperation  be- 
tween the  National  Science  Foundation 
and  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Science. 
Both  sides  judge  the  meeting  a  "completi 
success." 

January  24 

U.S.  Department  of  Defense  formally 
announces  that  U.S.  will  consider  issuin| 
licenses  for  export  to  China  of  military 
support  equipment  (but  not  weapons) 
selected  from  the  Munitions  Control  List 

U.S.-China  trade  agreement,  granting 
MFN  tariff  status  to  China,  passes  by  a 
294  to  88  vote  in  the  House  and  by  74  to: 
in  the  Senate. 

January  31 

U.S.  Treasury  Department  releases 
Chinese  assets  frozen  since  the  Korean 
war  (worth  an  estimated  $80.5  million). 

February  1 

U.S.-China  trade  agreement  takes  effect 
provides  for  MFN  treatment  for  China; 
the  establishment  of  business  and  trade 
offices;  reciprocal  and  equivalent  protec- 
tion of  patents,  trademarks  and 
copyrights;  and  consultations  on  bilatera 
trade  problems. 

February  2-6 

Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA 
Administrator  Douglas  Costel  leads  dele 
gation  to  China;  meets  with  Director  of 
China's  Office  of  Environmental  Protec- 
tion Li  Chaobo  to  discuss  cooperation  in 
the  field  of  environmental  protection. 

February  4-9 

U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce  President 
Richard  Lesher  leads  delegation  to 
China;  meets  with  Vice  Premier  Kang 
Shien. 

February  5 

Sister  city  relations  established  between 
San  Francisco  and  Shanghai. 

EPA  and  the  Office  of  the  Environments 
Protection  Leading  Group  of  the  State 
Council  of  China  sign  protocol  for  cooper 
ation  in  the  field  of  environmental  protec 
tion. 

February  8- 
March  24 

Deputy  Director  of  the  China  Research 
Institute  of  Aeronautics  Liu  Zhenghui 
leads  delegation  to  U.S.;  group  tours 


38 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


)oration  in  Fort  Washington,  and 
sA's  Lewis  Research  center  in  Cleve- 


uary  23- 
ch4 

or  Edward  Koch  (New  York  City) 
delegation  to  China. 

ruary  28 

r  city  relations  established  between 
I  York  and  Beijing. 

raary  29 

.or  officials  from  four  U.S.  Govem- 
t  hydroelectric  power  administrations 
representatives  from  the  Agency  for 
mational  Development  (AID)  arrive 
eijing  to  attend  the  first  official  meet- 
Dn  cooperation  in  hydroelectric  power 
related  water  resource  management 
veen  the  U.S.  and  China. 

Dch  13-23 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Zhang 
.;.jin  visits  U.S.  for  consultations;  talks 
liate  a  dialogue  on  foreign  policy  mat- 

■  at  the  senior  foreign  ministry  level. 

:  ^'ushington,  Zhang  consults  with  Sec- 
e  ry  of  State  Vance,  Deputy  Secretary 
if  late  Warren  Christopher,  Assistant 
>6  -etary  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Af- 
Xi  Richard  Holbrooke,  and  other  senior 
>f  'iais  on  the  Afghanistan  issue  and 
it  T  matters  of  international  concern. 
/i ;  Minister  Zhang  also  meets  with 
^  .  Trade  Representative  Reubin  As- 


4rchl8 

Minister  Zhang  calls  on  National  Se- 
.  ty  Adviser  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  in 
Aiihington. 

Vlrch  19 

■J  e  Minister  Zhang  meets  with  Vice 
'  sident  Mondale  to  discuss  U.S.-China 
•eitions  and  international  issues. 

M  rch  24 

J  5.  Department  of  Labor  delegation 
rets  with  Director  of  China's  State 
-lor  Bureau  Kang  Yonghe. 

V  rch  25 

Ji»artment  of  State  issues  Munitions 

■  itrol  Letter  No.  81  specifying  the 

:  t-uories  of  military  support  equipment 

■  ,nl)le  for  sale  to  China. 

tirch  31- 
ril3 

sistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  for 
.  iiitime  Affairs  Samuel  Nemirow  and 


East  Asia 


Director  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Bureau  of 
the  Ministry  of  Communications  Dong 
Huamin  cochair  second  round  of  the 
U.S.-China  maritime  negotiations  in  Beij- 
ing. Substantial  progress  is  made,  but 
final  agreement  is  not  achieved. 

April  2 

President  Carter  signs  a  determination 
authorizing  Export-Import  Bank  financ- 
ing of  exports  to  China. 

April  2- 
Mayl2 

Vice  Minister  Mao  Lin,  Managing  Di- 
rector of  Jiangxi  Copper  Company,  leads 
a  company  delegation  to  U.S.;  group 
meets  with  officers  of  Fluor  Mining  and 
Metals,  Inc.  to  review  progress  of  phase  I 
of  the  Dexing  copper  project. 

April  4-12 

Representative  Jonathan  Bingham  (New 
York)  leads  delegation  of  the  Interna- 
tional Economic  Policy  and  Trade  Sub- 
committee of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  to  China. 

April  4-25 

Governor  of  Hubei  Province  Han  Ningfu 
leads  economic  study  group  to  Ohio  at  the 
invitation  of  Governor  James  Rhodes. 

April  10 

Representative  Bingham  and  his  delega- 
tion meet  with  Vice  Premier  Gu  Mu. 

April  11 

Representative  Bingham  and  his  delega- 
tion meet  with  Director  of  the  General 
Bureau  of  Taxation  Liu  Zhicheng  and 
Foreign  Investment  Commission  Vice 
Chairman  Wang  Daohan  on  the  issues  of 
taxation  and  joint  ventures. 

April  15-21 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Transportation  and  Telecommunications 
Affairs  Boyd  Hight  and  Deputy  Director 
of  the  International  Affairs  division  of  the 
Civil  Aviation  Administration  of  China 
(CAAC)  Li  Shufan  lead  the  first  round  of 
civil  aviation  negotiations  in  Beijing;  U.S. 
and  Chinese  teams  begin  discussion  wdth 
fundamentally  different  positions. 

April  17 

Chinese  Academy  of  Sciences  delegation 
leaves  Beijing  for  the  annual  meeting  of 
the  U.S.  National  Academy  of  Sciences  in 
Washington;  discussions  are  to  be  held  on 
academic  exchanges  and  cooperation  pro- 
grams. 


April  20- 
May  3 

U.S.  National  Telecommunications  and 
Information  Administration  (NTIA)  dele- 
gation, led  by  Director  Henry  Geller,  vis- 
its China;  meets  with  Ministry  of  Posts 
and  Telecommunications  officials. 

April  24- 
Mayl8 

Minister  of  Forestry  Luo  Yuchuan  visits 
U.S. 

April  25 

U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  estab- 
lishes a  new  category  (category  "P")  for 
China  under  the  U.S.  commodity  control 
export  regulations. 

April  28 

U.S.  Consulate  General  is  officially  inau- 
gurated at  Shanghai. 

April  28- 
May  14 

Chief  U.S.  Textile  Negotiator  H.  Reiter 
Webb  and  General  Manager  of  China  Na- 
tional Textiles  Import-Export  Corpora- 
tion Wang  Mingjun  lead  U.S.-China  tex- 
tile negotiations  in  Beijing;  negotiations 
conclude  without  agreement. 

April  28- 
May28 

Bank  of  China  President  Li  Baohua  leads 
delegation  to  U.S.;  group  meets  with 
Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
Paul  Volker  and  Treasury  Secretary  Mil- 
ler in  Washington;  tours  New  York, 
Houston,  and  San  Francisco. 

May  5- 
June 18 

Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  People's  Lib- 
eration Army  (PLA)  Liu  Huaqing  leads 
delegation  to  U.S.  at  the  invitation  of 
Secretary  of  Defense  Brown;  group  dis- 
cusses technology  transfers  with  De- 
partment of  Defense  officials,  tours  IBM, 
AM  General,  General  Motors,  and  Hon- 
eywell and  visits  several  military  installa- 
tions, including  NORAD. 

May  10- 
June  30 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Transportation  and  Telecommunications 
Affairs  Hight  and  Deputy  Director  of  the 
International  Affairs  division  of  the  Civil 
Aviation  Administration  of  China 
(CAAC)  Li  Shufan  lead  the  second  round 
of  civil  aviation  negotiations  in  Washing- 
ton. 


East  Asia 


May  14-15 

Secretary  of  the  Interior  Cecil  Andrus 
and  Secretary  of  Agriculture  Bergland 
meet  with  Minister  of  Forestry  Luo  Yu- 
chuan  and  his  delegation. 

May  22- 
June  22 

Vice  Minister  of  Water  Conservancy  Li 
Huayi  leads  delegation  to  U.S.,  returning 
Secretary  Brown's  January  visit;  group 
meets  with  Department  of  Agriculture  of- 
ficials in  Washington;  tours  water  conser- 
vatories, flood  control  facilities,  and  soil 
erosion  and  irrigation  projects  around 
U.S. 

May  24- 
June  8 

Vice  Premier  Geng  Biao  and  a  high  level 
entourage  from  the  PLA  visit  U.S.  Visit 
is  marked  by  talks  with  President  Carter, 
Vice  President  Mondale,  Secretary  of 
State  Edmund  S.  Muskie,  National  Secu- 
rity Adviser  Brzezinski,  and  Secretary  of 
Defense  Brown;  tours  U.S.  military  in- 
stallations. 

June  4-16 

Governor  Brendan  Byrne  (New  Jersey) 
leads  delegation  to  China  to  explore 
sister-state  relations  with  Zhejiang  Prov- 
ince and  to  enhance  cultural  and  educa- 
tional exchanges  between  the  two  re- 
gions' universities. 

June  4-19 

Governor  Harry  Hughes  (Maryland) 
leads  delegation  to  China;  meets  with 
Vice  Premier  Wan  Li,  Anhui  Province 
Governor  Zhang  Jingfu,  and  other  Anhui 
Province  officials.  Governor  Hughes  and 
Governor  Zhang  agree  to  establish  sister- 
state  relations. 

June  4-20 

Minister  of  Education  Jiang  Nanxiang 
visits  universities  and  meets  with  Secre- 
tary of  Education  Shirley  Hufstedler  and 
senior  American  education  officials. 

June  5-26 

Minister  of  Public  Health  Qian  Xinzhong 
and  his  delegation  visit  U.S.;  tour  several 
U.S.  medical  schools,  meet  with  health 
professionals,  and  study  emergency  pro- 
cedures and  primary  health  care. 

June  6- 
July  6 

Chairman  and  President  of  the  Bank  of 
China  Bu  Ming  leads  delegation  to  U.S.; 
group  visits  the  International  Monetary 
Fund,  the  Export-Import  Bank,  and  the 
World  Bank  in  Washington,  and  several 
banks  in  New  York. 


June  10- 
July3 

Vice  Minister  of  Light  Industry  Han 
Peixin  leads  delegation  to  U.S.  at  the  in- 
vitation of  Bobbin  Publications;  group 
discusses  trade  and  joint  venture  possibil- 
ities with  several  U.S.  companies. 

June  12 

Senator  Richard  Stone  (Florida)  an- 
nounces that  the  Department  of  State  has 
approved  sales  presentations  for  the  FX 
fighter  aircraft  to  Taiwan.  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment subsequently  protests  the  deci- 
sion. 

June  14 

In  response  to  press  reports  that  U.S. 
Presidential  candidate  Ronald  Reagan  fa- 
vored restoring  official  relations  with 
Taiwan,  an  authorative  People's  Daily 
press  commentary  condemns  the  restora- 
tion of  such  ties. 

June  15 

NASA  delegation,  led  by  Deputy  Admin- 
istrator Alan  Lovelace,  arrives  in  Bei- 
jing; meets  with  Vice  Premier  Bo  Yibo. 

June  15-23 

Chairman  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board 
Volker  leads  delegation  to  China  to  study 
the  structure  and  functions  of  China's  fi- 
nancial system,  economic  planning,  and 
external  financial  relations. 

June  16 

Minister  Qian  meets  with  Secretary  of 
Health  and  Human  Services  Patricia 
Harris  in  Washington. 

June  17 

Minister  Qian  meets  with  National  Insti- 
tutes of  Health  Director  Donald  Fred- 
rickson  in  Washington  and  tours  NIH 
clinical  center. 

June  19 

Minister  Qian  meets  with  Presidential 
science  adviser  Press  in  Washington. 

June  23- 
July2 

Executive  Secretary  of  the  Department 
of  State  Peter  Tamoff  and  Assistant  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  International  Narco- 
tics Matters  Mathea  Falco  visit  China. 

June  25 

Assistant  Secretary  Falco  meets  with 
Vice  Director  of  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Security  Xie  Heng  to  discuss  drug  abuse 
problems  and  with  Vice  Minister  of  Pub- 
lic Health  Wu  Zhaoheng  to  discuss  narco- 
tics matters. 


Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Zhang    jf 
Wenjin  hosts  dinner  for  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Falco  and  Executive  Secretary  Tar-  j 
noff.  I 

Executive  Secretary  Tamoff  speaks  with 
Director  of  the  Political  Department  of 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  Lin 
Zhong  and  other  Foreign  Ministry  offi- 
cials about  the  organization,  personnel 
structure,  and  training  of  the  U.S.  For- 
eign Service. 

June  30- 
July3 

Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  Holbrooke  holds  series  of 
consultations  in  Beijing  with  Vice  Minis- 
ter Zhang  Wenjin  and  other  key  Chinese 
officials. 

July  3-19 

Senior  Vice  Minister  of  Culture,  Liu 
Fuzhi,  leads  delegation  to  U.S.  at  the  in- 
vitation of  the  International  Communica 
tion  Agency;  delegation  visits  several 
cities  and  small  towns  for  broad  overview 
of  American  society  and  culture. 

July  5- 
Aug.  5 

Minister  of  Agriculture  Huo  Shilian  visit 
U.S.;  meets  with  with  Secretary  of  Ag- 
riculture Bergland. 

July  6-14 

Senate  Majority  leader  Robert  Byrd 
(West  Virginia)  visits  China  at  the  invita 
tion  of  the  Standing  Committee  of  the 
NPC;  meets  with  Vice  Chairman  of  the 
Standing  Committee  Ulanhu,  Premier 
Hua,  and  Vice  Premier  Zhao  Ziyang. 

July  9 

President  Carter  and  Premier  Hua  meet 
in  Tokyo  while  there  for  the  memorial 
services  for  the  late  Japanese  Prime  Min 
ister  Ohira.  Talks  center  on  global  issues 
of  mutual  concern  and  on  Indochina. 

July  12- 
Aug.  11 

Vice  Minister  of  China's  State  Construc- 
tion Committee  Lu  Kebai  leads  a  delega- 
tion to  U.S.;  group  meets  with  Commerce 
Department  and  Housing  and  Urban  De- 
velopment Department  officials  and 
makes  a  general  survey  of  urban  planning 
and  high  rise  construction  in  U.S. 

July  17 

U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  approves 
and  implements  new,  liberalized  export 
control  guidelines  for  China. 


40 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


East  Asia 


ler. 


k  12-21 

\  esentative  Stephen  J.  Solarz  (New 

h  leads  delegation  of  the  Asian  and 

i  ic  Affairs  Subcommittee  of  the 

•(  e  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  to 

;■''  1- 

20 

esentative  Solarz  meets  with  Vice 
ign  Minister  Zhang  Wenjin  in  Beij- 
liscusses  Chinese  views  on  North 
an  and  Kampuchean  matters. 

31 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  He  Ying 
s  in  Washington  with  Under  Secre- 
of  State  David  Newsom,  Assistant 
jtary  of  State  for  International  Or- 
ations Richard  McCall,  Assistant 
stary  of  State  for  African  Affairs 
ard  Moose,  and  other  senior  U.S.  of- 
s  for  consultations  on  multilateral 
■egional  diplomatic  issues. 

56  and  Senate  approve  legislation  au- 
izing  activation  of  Overseas  Private 

tstment  Corporation  (OPIC)  pro- 
is  in  China  and  send  it  to  President 
e, 

uust  8 

n  ident  Carter  signs  legislation  au- 
Ttizing  the  operation  of  OPIC  programs 
1  'hina  and  a  Presidential  determination 
M  OPIC  programs  are  in  the  national 
t'-est. 

xust  16-21 

•ictor  of  the  Bureau  of  Politico- 
[itary  Affairs  of  the  Department  of 
t  e,  Reginald  Bartholomew,  visits 
;ha. 

.i:ust  20-23 

ioublican  Vice  Presidential  candidate 
rtrge  Bush  visits  China  and  meets  with 
'h  Premier  Deng  and  other  high- 
a<ing  Chinese  officials. 

Inese  Government  attacks  the  Taiwan 
Nations  Act  following  the  emergence  of 
n  Taiwan  issue  in  the  U.S.  Presidential 
I'tion  campaign. 

Lfust  25- 
<)tember  7 

,;t  of  three  rounds  of  civil  aviation  ne- 
(iations  are  held  in  Beijing.  Deputy 
distant  Secretary  of  State  for  Trans- 
lation and  Telecommunications  Affairs 
?5ht  and  Deputy  Director  General  of 
ana's  Civil  Aviation  Administration 
i\AC)  Lin  Zheng  cochair  the  talks. 


August  30- 

September  8 

Governor  Robert  Ray  (Iowa)  leads  a 

State  delegation  to  China. 

August  31- 
September  4 

Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  for 
Maritime  Affairs  Samuel  Nemirow  and 
Director  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Bureau  of 
the  Ministry  of  Communications  Dong 
Huamin  cochair  third  and  final  round  of 
the  U.S. -China  maritime  negotiations  in 
Beijing. 

August  31- 
September  28 

Vice  Premier  Bo  Yibo  leads  high-ranking 
delegation,  which  includes  seven  minis- 
terial level  officials,  on  a  tour  of  U.S. 

September  4 

Assistant  Secretary  Nemirow  and  Di- 
rector Dong  initial  the  proposed  U.S.- 
China maritime  agreement  in  Beijing. 

September  6-19 

Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Research 
and  Engineering  William  Perry  visits 
China  to  continue  technology  transfer 
talks;  meets  with  Vice  Premier  Li  Xian- 
nian  and  Deputy  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the 
PLA  Zhang  Aiping  and  Liu  Huaqing; 
delegation  tours  Chinese  defense  re- 
search institutes,  factories,  and  other  fa- 
cilities. 

September  8 

Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for 
Transportation  and  Telecommunications 
Affairs  Hight  and  Deputy  Director  Gen- 
eral of  China's  Civil  Aviation  Administra- 
tion (CAAC)  Lin  Zheng  initial  U.S.- 
China aviation  agreement  in  Beijing. 

September  9- 
October  15 

Vice  Minister  of  Forestry  Yong  Wentao 
leads  delegation  to  U.S.  at  the  invitation 
of  the  Department  of  Agriculture;  tours 
forestry  research  laboratories  and  uni- 
versity forestry  facilities  throughout  U.S. 

September  10 

Director  General  of  the  State  Bureau  of 
Labor  Kang  Yonghe  meets  with  Secre- 
tary of  Labor  Ray  Marshall  in  Washing- 
ton for  discussion  of  the  U.S.  labor 
movement. 

September  13-28 

China  holds  its  first  official  trade  ex- 
hibition in  the  U.S.  in  San  Francisco. 


September  16-18 

First  annual  meeting  of  the  U.S. -China 
Joint  Economic  Committee  is  held  in 
Washington;  cochaired  by  Treasury  Sec- 
retary Miller  and  Chinese  Vice  Premier 
Bo  Yibo;  committee  predicts  bilateral 
trade  in  1980  will  total  about  $4  billion,  up 
about  75%  from  1979. 

September  17 

President  Carter  and  Vice  Premier  Bo 
Yibo  sign  agreements  covering  civil  avia- 
tion and  maritime  links  and  regulating 
bilateral  trade  in  textiles.  They  also  sign 
a  Consular  Convention,  the  first  formal 
treaty  concluded  between  the  two  gov- 
ernments. China  announces  its  decision  to 
open  consulates  in  New  York,  Chicago, 
and  Honolulu,  as  U.S.  announces  its  in- 
tention to  open  three  additional  consu- 
lates in  China. 

September  21- 
October  6 

PLA  delegation  visits  U.S.  to  study  the 
U.S.  military  logistics  management  sys- 
tem. 

September  28- 
October  23 

Chinese  Minister  of  Building  Materials 
Song  Yangchu  leaves  Beijing  for  a  visit  to 
U.S.  at  the  invitation  of  the  National 
Council  for  U.S.-China  Trade. 

October  1 

Second  installment  of  $10.1  million  paid  to 
the  U.S.  by  China  under  the  U.S.-China 
"claims-assets"  agreement. 

Mayor  Kevin  White  (Boston)  and  Mayor 
Zhou  Feng  (Hangzhou)  agree  to  establish 

sister  city  relations. 

October  2-18 

Minister  of  Posts  and  Telecommunica- 
tions Wang  Zigang  visits  U.S.;  meets 
with  U.S.  Postal  Service  officials. 

October  7 

Agreement  covering  procedures  for  the 

operation  of  OPIC  in  China  initialed  in 

Beijing.  OPIC  will  provide  political  risk 

insurance  to  U.S.  companies  investing  in 

China. 

October  9 

Postmaster  General  Bolger  and  Minister 
of  Posts  and  Telecommunications  Wang 
Zigang  sign  agreements  in  Washington 
covering  parcel  post  and  international 
express  mail  services  between  U.S.  and 
China. 


bruary  1981 


41 


East  Asia 


October  10 

Los  Angeles  City  Council  proclaims  Oc- 
tober 10  "Republic  of  China  Day."  (Proc- 
lamation formally  approved  by  the  City 
Council  October  13.) 

October  11-28 

Vice  Minister  of  National  Defense  Xiao 
Ke  leads  a  delegation  representing  the 
PL  A  military  academies  to  U.S.  to  tour 
military  education  facilities. 

October  14 

Chairman  of  the  Guangzhou  Revolution- 
ary Committee  Yang  Shangkun  notifies 
Los  Angeles  Mayor  Thomas  Bradley  of 
the  nullification  of  preliminary  agree- 
ments for  establishing  sister  city  ties  in 
protest  of  the  October  10  proclamation. 

October  15 

Vice  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Zhang 
Wenjin  formally  protests  October  2  unof- 
ficial agreement  on  privileges  and  im- 
munities between  the  AIT  and  Taiwan's 
CCNAA. 

October  16 

Vice  Minister  Xiao  meets  with  Secretary 
of  Defense  Brown  in  Washington. 

October  17-22 

U.S.  Trade  Representative  Askew 
travels  to  China  to  consult  with  the 
Chinese  on  U.S.  trade  policy  and  invest- 
ment issues. 

October  18- 
November  7 

PL  A  marksman  team  visits  U.S.  to  com- 
pete in  bilateral  and  international  shoot- 
ing matches. 

October  20 

Trade  Representative  Askew  meets  with 
Minister  of  Foreign  Trade  Li  Qiang  in 
Beijing. 

October  20- 
November  6 

A  gubernatorial  delegation,  led  by 
Guangdong  Governor  Xi  Zhongxun,  visits 
U.S.;  delegation  members  include  Gov- 
ernors Lu  Dadong  (Sichuan  Province), 
Ma  Xingyuan  (Fujian  Province),  Chen 
Puru  (Liaoning  Province),  and  Song  Ping 
(First  Secretary  of  Gansu  Provincial 
Party  Committee). 

October  21 

Trade  Representative  Askew  meets  with 
Vice  Premier  Gu  Mu  in  Beijing. 


October  22 

Ambassador  Woodcock  and  Minister  of 
Foreign  Trade  Li  Qiang  sign  long-term 
U.S. -China  grain  trade  agreement  in  Bei- 
jing. 

October  23 

Governor  Xi  Zhongxun  and  delegation 
meet  with  National  Security  Adviser 
Brzezinski  in  Washington  to  discuss  stra- 
tegic issues  and  Asian  regional  questions; 
group  also  meets  with  Assistant  to  the 
President  for  Intergovernmental  Affairs 
Eugene  Eidenburg. 

October  24 

Governor  Xi  Zhongxun  and  his  delegation 
meet  with  Assistant  Secretary  of  State 
for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  Hol- 
brooke and  Deputy  Secretary  of  State 
Christopher  in  Washington  to  discuss 
U.S. -China  relations. 

October  25- 
November  3 

Senator  Larry  Pressler  (South  Dakota) 
leads  delegation  of  businessmen  to  China. 

October  25- 

November  9 

China  holds  national  trade  exhibition  in 

Chicago. 

October  27- 
November  4 

Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  De- 
partment Donald  Lubick  leads  delegation 
from  the  Departments  of  Treasury,  En- 
ergy, and  Commerce  to  China. 

October  30 

Ambassador  Woodcock  and  Chinese  Vice 
Foreign  Minister  Zhang  Wenjin  sign 
OPIC  agreement  in  Beijing. 

October  31 

Assistant  Secretary  Lubick  and  his  dele- 
gation meet  with  Minister  in  Charge  of 
the  State  Energy  Commission  Yu  Qiuli  to 
discuss  Chinese  energy  situation. 

November  5 

Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  issues  a 
statement  "on  the  occasion  of  Mr 
Reagan's  election  as  President  of  the 
United  States,"  saying  "we  hope  and  ex- 
pect that  the  new  United  States  Adminis- 
tration will  adhere  to  the  principles  set 
forth  in  the  Shanghai  communique  and 
the  communique  on  the  establishment  of 
diplomatic  relations  between  China  and 
the  United  States  so  that  Sino- American 
relations  may  continue  to  progress  and 
grow  stronger." 


November  8-27  ^ 

Deputy  Director  of  Civil  Aeronautics 
Administration  of  China  (CAAC)  Li  Shu, 
fan  leads  delegation  to  U.S.;  group  meet- 
with  State  Department,  Federal  Aviatidt 
Administration,  and  Civil  Aeronautics 
Board  officials  to  discuss  administrative 
and  technical  arrangements  for  im- 
plementing the  U.S. -China  civil  aviation 
agreement.  . 

November  9-23  " 

Commissioner  of  Patents  and  Trademart 
of  the  Department  of  Commerce  Sidney 
Diamond  leads  a  delegation  to  China  to 
study  China's  new  patent  law  and  to  as- 
sist in  China's  efforts  to  develop  a  new 
patent  system. 


I 


November  11-26 

Director  of  the  American  and  Oceania! 
Affairs  Department  of  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  Han  Xu  visits  U.S.  to  at 
tend  the  Williamsburg  X  conference  (No' 
13-16),  to  consult  with  State  Department 
officials,  and  to  meet  with  prominent 
American  public  figures. 

November  12-19 

State  trade  mission,  led  by  Governor 
James  Rhodes  (Ohio),  visits  Guangzhoi 
Shanghai,  and  Wiihan. 

November  15-21 

Under  Secretary  of  Commerce  Robert 
Herzstein  leads  delegation  to  Beijing  t 
open  U.S.  National  Trade  Exhibition 
(Nov.  17-28). 

November  17 

Director  Han  Xu  holds  discussions  wit 
Under  Secretary  of  State  Newsom,  As 
sistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs  Holbrooke,  Assistant  Sec- 
retary for  Inter- American  Afl'airs  Williar 
Bowdler,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  East  and  South  Asian  Affairs  Petei 
Constable,  and  other  senior  officials  of 
the  Department  of  State. 

November  21- 
December  16 

Minister  of  the  Fifth  Ministry  of  Machine 
Building  Zhang  Zhen  leads  a  China  Ncrtl 
Industries  Corporation  (NORINCO)  del- 
egation to  U.S.;  delegation  tours  major 
U.S.  cities  and  visits  factories. 

December  1-13 

Assistant  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Man- 
power, Reserve  Affairs,  and  Logistics 
Robin  Pirie  leads  Department  of  Defense 
delegation  to  China,  returning  the  visit  o 
the  PLA  logistics  delegation. 


42 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


. 


East  Asia 


«  mber6-28 

I  holds  national  trade  exhibition  in 
York. 

•fi  mber  7 

(3  American  airways  inaugural  flight 
in  Beijing. 

mber  9-20 

nse  Mapping  Agency  delegation, 
;d  by  Deputy  Director  for  Manage- 
and  Technology  Owen  Williams,  vis- 
,aftiina. 

n  mber  10 

President  of  the  Chinese  Academy 
iences  Qian  Sanqiang,  Vice  Presi- 
of  the  Chinese  Academy  of  Social 
ices  Mei  Yi,  and  Assistant  Director 
ntemational  Programs  of  the  Na- 
1  Science  Foundation  Harvey  Averch 
basic  sciences  protocol  in  Washing- 
provides  for  cooperative  research  be- 
in  U.S.  and  China  in  several  fields  of 
;  science  encompassing  both  natural 
social  sciences. 


December  15-17 

Chief  Textile  Negotiator  H.  Reiter  Webb 
and  Deputy  Director  of  the  Export  De- 
partment of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Trade  Dai  Jie  lead  the  first  round  of  con- 
sultations under  the  U.S. -China  Textile 
Agreement  in  Washington.  Teams  fail  to 
agree  upon  a  level  for  Chinese  wool  swea- 
ter exports  to  the  U.S. 

December  15-19 

Secretary  of  Labor  Ray  Marshall  leads  a 
delegation  to  China;  meets  with  Director 
General  of  the  State  Bureau  of  Labor 
Kang  Yonghe;  Vice  Premier  J.  Pengfei. 

December  27-30 

Representative  Stephen  J.  Solarz  (New 
York)  of  the  Asian  and  Pacific  Subcom- 
mittee of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  leads  delegation  to  Beijing. 
Representative  Joel  Pritchard  (Washing- 
ton) accompanies  the  delegation.  ■ 


]rderly  Departure  Program 
'or  Vietnamese 


E'ARTMENT  STATEMENT, 

E:.  8,  1980  ' 

0  a  number  of  months,  on  behalf  of 
nU.S.  Government,  the  U.N.  High 
oimissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR) 
jibeen  negotiating  with  S.R.V. 
piialist  Republic  of  Vietnam]  authori- 
«  on  an  orderly  departure  program 
athose  persons  in  Vietnam  who  wish 
oave  Vietnam  legally  for  the  United 
ttes  and  who  meet  the  provisions  of 
J  immigration  and  refugee  law.  Those 
Botiations  have  resulted  in  an  agree- 
it,  and  departures  are  expected  to 
in  December  11. 

Under  its  provisions,  the  UNHCR's 
.  representative  went  to  Ho  Chi 
ih  City  in  early  November  to  begin 
;rviewing  these  persons.  A  consid- 
ble  amount  of  preprocessing  by  mail 
jm  people  in  Vietnam  and  their  rela- 
Es  and  sponsors  in  the  United  States 
It  already  been  carried  out  by  the 
flerly  Departure  Program  Office  of 
\  American  Embassy  in  Bangkok  so 


that  we  and  the  Vietnamese  authorities 
had  agreed  on  a  list  of  over  1,500  per- 
sons to  be  interviewed  in  Ho  Chi  Minh 
City.  Following  this  interview  and  a 
medical  examination,  and  then  a  final 
interview  with  an  American  consular 
officer,  we  would  expect  most  and  pos- 
sibly all  these  1,500  persons  to  be 
authorized  entry  into  the  United  States. 

The  UNHCR  is  utilizing  existing  week- 
ly international  flights  between  Ho  Chi 
Minh  City  and  Bangkok  for  their  trans- 
portation. Approximately  1,000  persons 
could  leave  Vietnam  each  month  under 
this  program,  assuming  the  list  of 
names  of  those  who  are  permitted  to 
leave  Vietnam  and  meet  our  program 
critera  can  be  enlarged. 

The  U.S.  views  the  Orderly  Depar- 
ture Program  as  a  humanitarian  issue 
which  is  unrelated  to  the  political  ques- 
tion of  normalization  of  relations  be- 
tween our  two  countries. 


^Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  John  Trattner. 


bruary  1981 


43 


ECONOMICS 


II 


U.S.  Trade  and  Foreign  Policy  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere 


by  Ernest  B.  Johnston,  Jr. 

Address  before  the  Southern 
Governor's  Conference  in  Williamsburg, 
Virginia,  on  September  16,  1980.  Mr. 
Johnston  is  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs. 

From  well  before  the  time  any  of  us 
were  born,  the  Southern  States  have 
been  leaders  in  recognizing  the  impor- 
tance of  international  trade  to  the  coun- 
try and  to  the  region.  Starting  with 
rice,  indigo,  naval  supplies,  tobacco,  and 
king  cotton  before  the  Civil  War,  the 
South  argued  strongly  for  a  policy  of 
trade.  Senator  [Oscar  Wilder]  Under- 
wood of  Alabama,  then  Chairman  of  the 
Ways  and  Means  Committee,  put  the 
Underwood  tariff  act  into  effect  in  1912 
to  take  duties  down  to  a  level  that  had 
not  been  seen  after  the  war  and  were 
not  to  be  seen  again  until  the  end  of 
World  War  II.  It  was  Cordell  Hull  [U.S. 
Secretary  of  State,  1933-44]  of  Ten- 
nessee who,  in  1934,  inaugurated  the 
radical  U.S.  policy  of  tariff-lowering  in 
trade  through  reciprocal  trade  agree- 
ments. And  it  was  Congressman  [Wil- 
bur D.]  Mills  of  Arkansas  who  for  years 
was  the  guardian  of  an  open  U.S.  trade 
policy. 

But  this  is  not  just  history;  this 
relationship  between  the  South  and 
trade  is  still  true  now.  Forest  products 
and  paper  from  Alabama,  Georgia, 
Florida,  and  Mississippi;  tobacco  from 
North  Carolina  and  Virginia;  soybeans, 
grains,  and  cotton  throughout  the  whole 
region;  rice  in  Arkansas  and  Louisiana; 
planes  from  Texas,  Virginia,  and 
Georgia;  electronics  from  Maryland  and 
Texas;  coal  from  West  Virginia,  Ala- 
bama, and  Tennessee;  textiles  from 
Georgia  and  the  Carolinas;  machinery 
from  Oklahoma,  Missouri,  Maryland, 
South  Carolina,  and  Texas;  transport 
equipment  from  Kentucky,  Delaware, 
Georgia,  Missouri,  and  Mississippi;  and 
chemicals  and  plastics  from  Alabama, 
Florida,  Louisiana,  South  Carolina,  Ten- 
nessee, Texas,  Virginia,  and  West 
Virginia  all  owe  a  large  part  of  their 
prosperity  to  foreign  markets.  The 
basic  interest  of  the  South  is  still  in 
trade. 


I  think  it  is  also  appropriate  to 
recognize  the  particularly  strong  in- 
terest by  the  South  in  the  countries  of 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  One 
aspect  of  this  is  the  bridge  furnished  by 
Puerto  Rico.  Another  manifestation  in 
the  distant  past  was  the  interest,  at 
one  point,  in  seeing  Cuba  join  the 
United  States,  the  influence  of  south- 
erners in  the  filibusters  in  Nicaragua 
and  Central  American  countries,  par- 
ticipation by  southerners  in  the  con- 
struction of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  an 
interest  in  Mexico  that  finally  relieved 
it  of  half  its  territory.  Needless  to  say, 
this  is  not  an  interest  that  has  always 
been  appreciated  by  its  recipients,  and 
I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  South 
harbors,  in  its  bosom,  imperial  designs 
toward  Latin  America. 

We  are  now  in  another  century 
that  has,  in  many  ways,  transformed 
the  South  more  than  the  rest  of  the 
country  — in  urbanization,  race  rela- 
tions, industrialization,  and  making  it 
by  far  the  major  source  of  energy  for 
the  United  States.  But  the  interest  of 
the  South  in  Latin  America  remains 
because  the  South  is  closer  and  more 
affected  by  what  goes  on  across  the 
Caribbean.  Ask  the  Governors  of  Texas 
and  Florida  who  keep  as  keen  an  eye  on 
segments  of  Latin  America  as  does  the 
Secretary  of  State. 

Public  Interest 

Public  interest  has  heightened  in  the 
United  States  on  trade  as  a  result  of  re- 
cent large  trade  deficits,  economic 
downturns,  and  rising  unemployment. 
There  has  been  an  increased  demand 
for  return  to  high-tariff  or  new-tariff 
barriers  to  shield  domestic  industries 
from  import  competition.  This  height- 
ened interest  has  often  looked  at  trade 
not  as  an  opportunity  but  as  a  threat  to 
the  American  economy.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  government  has  a  re- 
sponsibility to  slow  down  excessively 
rapid  changes  caused  by  bursts  of  im- 
ports when  domestic  workers  and  capi- 
talists are  materially  damaged,  and  we 
have  provisions  in  the  law  that  allow 
that.  But  the  country  does  not  benefit 
from  keeping  people  in  jobs  where  the 
United  States  is  not  most  productive. 


and,  if  we  did,  the  consumers  and  our 
own  industry  would  suffer.  The  govern- 
ment's job  is  to  keep  the  economy 
growing  so  that  economic  shifts  can  be 
digested.  After  all,  within  our  own 
borders  we  have  seen  a  shift  of  rice 
production  from  South  Carolina  to 
Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas.  We 
have  seen  much  cotton  production  shift 
from  the  old  South  to  the  Southwest; 
textiles  have  moved  from  New  England 
to  the  Carolinas;  petroleum  production 
has  moved  from  Pennsylvania  to  Texas, 
Oklahoma,  and  Louisiana.  The  true 
vibrancy  of  the  United  States  comes 
from  taking  advantage  of  change 


World  Trade  Growth 


i 


The  facts  on  world  trade  are  moving 
faster,  sometimes  it  appears,  than  our 
realizations  of  them.  During  a  long  por 
tion  of  our  history  in  this  country  we 
adapted  ourselves  to  trade.  But  in  the 
period  from  1930  to  the  Second  World 
War  we  had  a  policy  of  high  tariffs,  and 
the  U.S.  interest  in  trade  languished.  It 
was  not  the  most  vibrant  of  our  eco- 
nomic periods.  By  1950  only  7%  of  our 
production  of  goods  was  exported  — 
about  half  the  figure  of  1913.  Not  until 
the  late  1960s  or  early  1970s  did  we 
reach  the  1913  figure  again.  But  con- 
stantly since  1950,  the  trend,  not  only 
in  this  country  but  throughout  the 
world,  has  been  toward  greater  and 
greater  dependence  on  trade  to  such  a 
point  that  now  one  out  of  every  five  of 
the  goods  that  we  produce  is  sent 
abroad.  This,  of  course,  excludes  serv- 
ices. In  most  years  the  rate  of  growth 
in  world  trade  is  twice  the  rate  of       fl 
growth  in  world  production.  " 

Over  two-thirds  of  our  imports  are 
of  raw  materials  and  fuels  essential  to 
the  economy.  Petroleum,  now  about 
35%,  will  cost  about  $90  billion  this 
year.  To  help  pay  for  this  bill  we  havei 
surplus  in  trade  of  both  manufactures 
and  agriculture.  One  thing  to  keep  in 
mind  is  that  with  the  dramatic  wrench 
caused  by  spiraling  oil  prices,  members 
of  the  Organization  of  Petroleum  Ex- 
porting Countries  (OPEC)  will  have  a 
balance-of-payments  surplus  this  year  of 
about  $120  billion  — a  surplus  equal  to 
10%  of  world  trade.  This  surplus  will 
be  mirrored  by  deficits  for  the  rest  of 
the  world.  If  that  deficit  was  spread 
around  evenly  it  would  account  for  a 
U.S.  deficit  of  about  $20  billion,  and        ' 
other  nonexporters  of  oil  face  the  same  , 
phenomenon.  i 


44 


Dfinartmpnt  nf  .c;tatp  Riilletini 


Economics 


!^s  the  President  has  emphasized, 
lajor  economic  change  facing  the 
;d  States  is  to  adapt  to  the  change 
ergy.  We  must  both  slow  down  our 
energy  consumption,  and  we  must 
lew  sources  and  new  methods, 
it  half  of  our  merchandise  imports 
st  of  products  which  are  non- 
etitive  with  domestic  products 
r  because  they  are  not  available 
or  not  available  in  sufficient  sup- 
!]ompetitive  products  serve  as  a 
to  keep  down  the  inflation  rate  in 
lountry.  Between  2  and  2V2  million 
istic  manufacturing  jobs  depend 
tly  on  exports;  one  in  nine  U.S. 
ifacturing  jobs  and  one  in  three  of 
arm  acres  produce  for  sales 
d. 

i|)rtance  of  Trade  to  the  South 

iiimportance  of  trade  to  the 

^  bers  of  the  Southern  Governors 

■  ciation  is  clear.  Total  exports  from 
6.7  continental  States  this  year 
lold  be  about  $60  billion  and,  in  this 
g)n  alone,  we  are  talking  about  well 
t  half  a  million  jobs  attributable  to 
:[rts.  Texas  will  send  about  $14 
llm  in  goods  abroad,  Missouri  about 
)  llion,  Louisiana  close  to  $4  billion, 
a  h  Carolina  more  than  $5  billion.  I 
n  to  admit  that  some  of  these  fig- 
-«  are  "hip-pocket"  estimates  since 
leatest  accurate  figures  go  back  to 
)1  and  our  trade  has  about  doubled 
Q!  then.  Between  1973  and  1980.  our 
cjrts  and  imports  will  have  about 
i)ed,  a  compound  rate  of  growth  of 
il<  a  year. 

Our  trade  with  the  Western 
e  isphere  has  grown  even  more,  and 
i:ludes  two  of  our  four  largest 
aing  partners,  Canada  and  Mexico. 
U  trade  with  the  developing  Western 
Biisphere  nations  exceeds  that  of  any 
Ir  block  of  developing  nations  in- 
ling  the  Middle  Eastern  oil  ex- 

ers.  In  1979  we  sent  over  $26 
I  )n  of  goods  to  the  Latin  American 
liblics,  and  we  had  a  surplus  of 
Hit  $4  billion.  That  same  year  we 
}|j  $33  billion  to  Canada  and  had  a 
eiMt  of  about  $5  billion.  Mexico  takes 
Ubillion  of  our  exports,  and 
eezuela  and  Brazil  each  take  about 
4  illion. 

lets  of  Foreign  Policy  on  Trade 

r«'ernor  [of  Virginia,  John  N.]  Dalton 
sed  me  to  discuss  how  foreign  policy 
Acts  our  trade  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
piere.  The  relationship  is,  in  fact,  a 


circular  one.  These  enormous  figures 
are  of  great  importance  to  the  U.S. 
economy  and  to  the  economy  of  our 
neighbors,  thus  an  important  element  in 
our  foreign  policy  interest  in  this  hemi- 
sphere. After  all,  what  is  foreign  policy 
but  a  compilation  of  the  important  in- 
terests that  we  have  abroad?  Pursuit  of 
our  trade  interest  should  ultimately 
lead  us  in  the  same  direction  as  pursuit 
of  our  political  interest  — toward  a  close 
relationship  with  the  countries  of  North 
and  South  America,  in  which  all  recog- 
nize a  shared  interest  in  the  security, 
stability,  and  economic  well-being  of  the 
region. 

The  Caribbean  and  Central  Amer- 
ica are  a  case  in  point.  Political 
deterioration  and  economic  decline  in 
this  area  are  of  great  concern,  though 
we  are  trying,  in  a  time  of  tight  budg- 
ets, to  respond  to  these  problems  with 
increased  aid  aimed  especially  at 
strengthening  the  private  sector  in 
these  countries.  Aid  alone  cannot  han- 
dle the  job.  Economic  development  de- 
pends primarily  on  actions  which  coun- 
tries themselves  take  to  increase  the 
productivity  of  their  people  and,  thus, 
their  standard  of  living.  Despite  aid  to 
this  region,  trade  prospects  have  a 
more  important  bearing  on  long-term 
economic  development  of  these  coun- 
tries. 

Many  are  small  and  depend  on  min- 
erals or  farm  crops  for  most  of  their  ex- 
ports. Some  have  unemployment  rates 
of  40%.  Many  that  have  begun  to  de- 
velop have  done  so  on  the  basis  of  an 
economy  geared  to  low  priced  energy. 
Now  they  must  reorient  their  econ- 
omies to  pay  for  oil  which  has  multi- 
plied its  price  by  10  times  in  less  than  a 
decade. 

The  United  States  is  their  most  im- 
portant market.  Our  security  interst 
would  be  well  served  if  the  Caribbean 
countries  could  take  better  advantage 
of  our  market.  All  of  Latin  America, 
with  the  obvious  exception  of  Cuba, 
benefits  from  duty-free  treatment  for 
certain  goods  under  our  generalized 
system  of  preferences,  and  some  of 
them  among  the  poorest,  such  as  Haiti, 
are  taking  the  most  advantage  of  the 
scheme. 

Making  our  political  and  economic 
interests  mesh,  however,  is  not  always 
a  smooth  process.  The  United  States  is 
a  global  power  with  many  objectives, 
some  of  which  conflict  in  particular  sit- 
uations. As  a  global  power  our  reach  is 
far.  The  world  looks  to  us  for  con- 


stancy. Our  concern  with  human  rights 
goes  back  to  the  Revolution  and  is  an 
old  element  in  American  policy,  but  it 
is  occasionally  cited  as  a  foreign  policy 
concern  that  interferes  improperly  with 
our  trade  interest.  Human  rights  is  a 
serious  concern  and,  over  the  long  haul 
in  many  countries,  has  an  intricate 
bearing  on  political  stability  and  eco- 
nomic progress.  But  I  would  like  to 
point  out  that  U.S.  exports  to  Chile  and 
Argentina,  two  of  the  prime  focuses  of 
our  human  rights  efforts,  increased  in 
1979  by  over  60%  in  Chile  and  125%  in 
Argentina.  Governor  [of  Georgia, 
George  D.]  Busbee,  in  his  work  with 
you  and  in  the  President's  Export 
Council,  has  been  doing  valiant  work  to 
keep  these  different  aspects  of  our 
policy  in  perspective. 

The  most  typical  case  is  one  where 
economic  differences  lead  to  political 
problems.  Sensitive  imports  from  Mex- 
ico have  caused  problems  for  U.S.  pro- 
ducers and  spilled  out  into  the  political 
relationship.  The  choice  of  actions  in 
such  a  situation  is  unattractive  and  in- 
volves tradeoffs  among  different  domes- 
tic economic  goals  and  with  our  exter- 
nal trade  relationships.  Likewise, 
energy  imports,  both  gas  and  petro- 
leum, which  the  United  States  seeks 
from  both  Canada  and  Mexico  at  rea- 
sonable prices,  have  from  time  to  time 
been  sources  of  political  contention. 

Other  Latin  exports  to  the  United 
States  are  sensitive  not  because  of  low 
prices  but  because  producers  are  seek- 
ing higher  prices.  I  refer  to  primary 
commodities  such  as  coffee,  tin,  and 
sugar.  In  the  last  3  or  4  years,  the 
United  States  has  sought  commodity 
agreements  to  dampen  wild  gyrations 
in  commodity  prices  for  about  five  com- 
modities. We  wish,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
avoid  excessive  peaks  in  the  pricing 
that  ratchet  up  the  cost  for  our  con- 
sumers. It  is  also,  however,  in  our  in- 
terest to  avoid  excessive  valleys  in 
prices  which  would  discourage  invest- 
ment in  these  commodities  and,  over 
the  long  haul,  diminish  supplies  and 
thus  exacerbate  future  price  rises  when 
the  supply-demand  situation  changes. 

It  is  hard  for  us  to  realize  how  im- 
portant single  commodities  are  to  some 
of  the  Latin  American  countries.  Over 
half  of  Bolivia's  exports  consist  of  the 
single  commodity  — tin;  one-fifth  of  the 
exports  of  Barbados  and  the  Dominican 
Republic  are  sugar;  El  Salvador  and 
Guatemala  get  half  their  export  re- 
ceipts from  coffee,  and  Haiti,  Honduras, 


sruarv  1981 


45 


Economics 


and  Nicaragua  get  one-third.  For  Ja- 
maica, alumina  and  bauxite  represent 
nearly  three-fourths  of  the  sales  abroad. 

Economic  Development  and  Foreign  Aid 

The  interaction  between  economic 
development  in  Latin  America  and 
foreign  trade  is  complex.  In  the  past, 
some  of  these  countries  have  adopted 
highly  protectionist  strategies  to  en- 
courage infant  industry,  but  the  policy 
has  most  often  been  self-defeating.  The 
infant,  without  the  winds  of  competi- 
tion, could  not  seem  to  grow  up.  Chile 
and  Argentina  followed  this  strategy 
for  many  years.  In  the  1920s  these 
countries'  per  capita  product  was 
equivalent  to  that  of  many  European 
states.  But  by  following  this  strategy 
their  economies  fell  behind.  The  agri- 
cultural sector  suffered.  They  have  now 
abandoned  these  policies.  Several  other 
Latin  American  countries  have  sought 
to  encourage  new  industry  by  requiring 
foreign  investors  to  meet  minimum  lo- 
cal content  and  export  criteria.  The 
motivation  behind  these  rules  is  under- 
standable, but  if  all  countries  followed 
this  pattern,  the  results  would  be  frus- 
trating. One  country's  local  content  re- 
quirement could  block  another's  export 
requirements. 

Markets  would  be  fragmented  not 
only  for  the  United  States  but  for  the 
developing  Latin  American  countries, 
and  the  results  would  be  self-defeating 
for  the  countries  that  try  these 
methods  since  they  would  be  encour- 
aging industry  that  does  not  know  the 
discipline  of  competition. 

U.S.  and  Canada 

The  intimate  interaction  between 
Canada  and  the  U.S.  economy  presents 
different  challenges.  Most  important, 
Canada  is  usually  our  largest  single 
trading  partner  and  the  principal  locus 
of  U.S.  foreign  investment.  In  1979 
total  U.S.-Canadian  trade  was  about  3% 
of  our  gross  national  product  but  27% 
of  Canada's.  Canada  took  20%  of  our 
exports.  Trade  in  both  directions  is  es- 
pecially heavy  in  machine  and  transpor- 
tation equipment  — about  27%  of  our 
exports  and  26%  of  our  imports.  Trade 
in  automobiles  and  parts  is  even  more 
concentrated  because  of  the  U.S.-Cana- 
dian auto  agreement. 

The  closeness  of  the  two  economies 
inevitably  leads  to  contentious  issues  in 
the  trade  and  investment  fields.  Canada 


has  a  population  one-tenth  of  ours, 
though  it  is  the  second  largest  country 
in  the  world.  The  majority  of  its  popula- 
tion lives  within  60  miles  of  the  U.S. 
border.  The  Canadians  worry  about  our 
exports  of  fruits  and  vegetables,  which 
get  ripe  in  the  United  States  before 
they  do  in  Canada  and  which  drive 
down  Canadian  prices  before  the  items 
are  picked.  Canada  is  much  concerned 
that  its  economy  not  be  dominated  by 
U.S.  interests  and,  in  1974,  instituted  a 
foreign  investment  revenue  agency  to 
screen  foreign  investments  and  approve 
them  when  they  are  of  "significant 
benefit"  to  Canada.  We  are  concerned 
about  possible  trade  and  investment 
distortion  resulting  from  the  perfor- 
mance requirements  by  that  agency. 
We  make  these  concerns  known  to 


Canada  in  an  effort  to  continue  the 
favorable  investment  and  trade  climatf- 
so  important  to  both  our  economies. 

The  1979  Trade  Act  suggests  that 
we  take  the  links  that  bind  our  econ- 
omy to  that  of  our  North  American 
neighbors  one  step  further  and  explore 
the  prospect  of  setting  up  a  North 
American  free  trade  area.  The  Adminis 
tration  will  make  that  study,  but  we 
should  keep  in  mind  that  the  prospect 
of  such  a  free  trade  area  does  not  seen 
the  same  from  here  as  it  does  from  the 
viewpoint  of  Canada  or  Mexico.  Both  o: 
these  countries  have  expressed  seriouj 
reservations  about  the  idea.  Both  are' 
much  smaller,  they  have  a  smaller  in- 
dustrial base  and  less  rich  agriculture. 
They  are  concerned  that  their  econ- 
omies not  be  overwhelmed  by  the  muc 


Trade  With  the 
Soviet  Union 


PRESIDENT'S  LETTER 
TO  SENATOR  JACKSON, 
OCT.  25,  1980' 

You  wrote  to  ask  my  views  about  section  402 
of  the  Trade  Act  of  1974,  the  Jackson-Vanik 
amendment. 

From  the  beginning  of  my  Presidency  I 
emphasized  our  commitment  as  a  nation  to 
human  rights  as  a  fundamental  tenet  on 
which  our  foreign  policy  would  be  based. 
That  commitment  of  mine  is  as  deep  and  as 
important  to  me  today  as  it  was  then. 

You  have  always  been  a  pioneer  in  the 
area  of  human  rights  and  your  leadership 
and  support  have  been  instrumental  in  our 
success.  I  am  sure  that  the  record  will  show 
that  American  words  and  actions  in  the  last 
period  have  left  their  mark  on  the  rest  of 
the  world.  Because  of  our  leadership  the 
defense  of  human  rights  has  its  rightful 
place  on  the  world  agenda  for  everyone  to 
see. 

The  Jackson-Vanik  amendment,  which  you 
authored,  represents  an  important  statement 
of  our  nation's  commitment  to  the  free 
emigration  of  Soviet  Jewry.  As  you  well 
know,  I,  along  with  you,  have  been  specifi- 
cally concerned  about  Jewish  emigration 
from  the  Soviet  Union.  The  year  before  I 
became  President,  Jewish  emigration  was 


about  14,000.  Last  year  it  was  up  to 
50,000  — the  highest  level  in  more  than  10 
years.  The  lower  rate  this  year  in  the  wake 
of  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  is  of 
great  concern.  We  will  continue  to  register 
our  strong  concern  about  this  low  level  of 
emigration  at  the  Review  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  which  will  meet  il 
Madrid  next  month.  The  Soviet  Union  hasii 
obligation  to  honor  its  Helsinki  commitment 

After  the  Afghanistan  invasion,  I  tooki 
number  of  steps,  including  the  suspension  o( 
grain  sales  and  the  restriction  of  high- 
technology  exports  to  the  Soviet  Union,  to 
make  quite  clear  to  the  Soviets  that  we  can- 
not conduct  business-as-usual  with  them 
while  their  troops  are  occupying  another 
country. 

With  the  Soviet  troops  still  in  Afghani- 
stan and  with  unacceptable  denials  of  free 
emigration,  it  is  totally  inappropriate  to  con- 
sider any  changes  to  section  402  of  the 
Trade  Act  of  1974,  and  I  have  no  intention  »! 
doing  so.  Furthermore,  I  can  assure  you  thsl 
the  U.S.  delegation  under  the  leadership  of 
Ambassadors  Griffin  Bell  and  Max  Kampel- 
man  at  the  CSCE  Conference  in  Madrid  will 
take  every  opportunity  to  make  clear  to  the 
Soviet  Union  that  their  record  of  emigration 
is  a  violation  of  the  Helsinki  accords. 

I  value  your  views  on  this  subject  and  I 
look  forward  to  working  closely  with  you  on 
these  very  vital  issues. 

Sincerely. 

Jimmy  Carter 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  3,  1980. 


46 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


■  U.S.  industrial  and  agricultural 
ne.  Both  are  eager  to  develop 
energy  resources  to  the  maximum 
their  own  development  point  of 
They  are  reluctant  to  mortgage 
energy  supplies  to  one  market, 
feel  that  their  energy  en- 
ents  are  among  the  most  precious 
mic  assets  they  have.  Though 
recognize  that  proximity  means 
ve  are  likely  to  be  the  principal 
aser  of  whatever  they  eventually 
!  to  export,  they  wish  full  freedom 
ide  their  production,  price,  and 
t  policy.  They  are  both  fiercely 
of  their  political  independence.  In 
circumstances,  I  am  dubious  that 
'th  American  free  trade  area  is 
to  become  a  reality  in  the  near 
I.  We  will  continue  to  develop  our 
relations  but  probably  by  other 


ENERGY 


usion 


site  the  problems  I  have  mentioned, 
?  utlook  for  expanding  trade  rela- 
n  with  other  countries  in  this 
nsphere  is  basically  bright.  We 
;aly  face  a  challenge  in  adjusting  to 
eiore  complex  and  sophisticated 
0))mies  emerging  in  much  of  Latin 
Ti'ica  and  in  adapting  to  the  great 
"Jis  of  the  new  world  energy  situa- 
iibut  economic  expansion  in  the 
g  n  clearly  presents  opportunities 
r  merican  exporters.  In  addition, 
eiyproduct  of  greater  economic 
r<  gth  in  the  Latin  American  coun- 
le  should  be  a  lessening  of  the 
ilj  cal  sensitivity  that  now  affects 
ay  economic  issues.  Finally,  I  believe 
a  our  neighbors  in  this  hemisphere 
a?  our  view  that  trade  and  political 
liions  among  us  must  be  strength- 
it  in  the  interest  of  us  all.  ■ 


Energy: 
Continuing  Crisis 


by  Deane  R.  Hinton 

Address  before  the  Mid-America 
Committee  in  Chicago  on  November  18, 
1980.  Mr.  Hinton  is  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Economic  and  Business  Affairs. 

Generals  are  said  to  study  warfare  and 
often  learn  the  wrong  lessons.  Politicians, 
businessmen,  and  even  bureaucrats  may 
also  become  adept  at  winning  yesterday's 
battles,  not  tomorrow's. 

But  history  still  instructs.  Being 
wedded  to  the  past  is  a  mistake,  but  the 
past  teaches  us  as  well — if  only  to  avoid 
repeating  errors.  In  this  vein,  I  suggest 
that  lessons  from  the  two  oil  crises  of  the 
1970s— the  1973-74  embargo  and  the  1979 
inten-uption  of  supplies  from  Iran — if 
applied  to  the  future,  can  prevent  the 
current  oil  supply  inteiTuption  from  seri- 
ously damaging  our  own  and  the  rest  of 
the  world's  economies. 

The  current  situation  is  serious,  and 
the  longer  term  crisis  continues.  We  need 
to  act  in  the  short  term  due  to  the  Iran- 
Iraq  war  and  in  the  longer  term  due  to 
the  industrialized  world's  dependence  on 
imported  oil  to  supply  its  energy  needs. 
Our  efforts  to  combat  these  threats  must 
be  vigorous  and  informed  by  experience, 
often  painfully  acquired. 

The  Right  Lessons 

Our  government,  under  both  Democratic 
and  Republican  administrations,  has 
learned  the  right  lessons  at  times  in  the 
past.  The  1973  oil  embargo  and  the  ac- 
companying cut  in  production  were 
shocks  to  the  system.  Both  our  economic 
well-being  and  our  security  were  put  at 
jeopardy.  We  analyzed  the  problem  and 
saw  that  there  were  two  components — a 
need  to  protect  ourselves  against  short- 
term  supply  interruptions  and  a  realiza- 
tion that  energy  price  and  supply  had  be- 
come a  long-term  problem  requiring  on- 
going, concerted  action  in  order  to  avoid 
continuing  vulnerability. 

The  establishment  of  the  Interna- 
tional Energy  Agency  (lEA)  in  1974  was 
a  response  to  both.  This  was  an  instru- 
ment to  protect  us  against  future  embar- 
goes or  other  major  supply  interruptions 
and  to  help  nations  work  together  to  re- 
duce our  dependence  on  imported  oil 
through  conservation  and  acceleration  of 


the  development  of  alternative  supplies. 
We  realized  then  that  the  energy  problem 
had  the  potential  to  divide  us  from  our 
principal  economic  partners  and  security 
allies.  Accordingly,  we  designed  the  lEA 
as  an  energy  collective  security  arrange- 
ment. Its  centerpiece  is  an  emergency 
oil-sharing  system  which  can  be  triggered 
when  needed.  The  trigger  mechanism  can 
be  called  into  operation  if  the  IE  A,  as  a 
whole,  is  suffering  a  shortfall  greater 
than  7%.  In  addition,  any  nation  suffering 
a  7%  shortfall  can  activate  the  system 
and  call  upon  the  other  nations  to  make 
up  continuing  additional  shortfalls  beyond 
the  7%  mark. 

This  sharing  system  has  a  number  of 
strengths.  It  is  capable  of  being  im- 
plemented quickly  and  makes  use  of  a 
previously  agreed  mechanism  and  for- 
mula. Ti'iggering  the  system  would  give 
the  United  States  and  other  lEA  gov- 
ernments legal  authority  to  implement 
strong  domestic  measures  if  necessary. 
Also,  sharing  would  make  oil  available  to 
hard-hit  lEA  countries  and  to  oil-short 
companies  in  such  countries,  reducing  the 
tendency  to  resort  to  the  spot  market 
where  small  quantities  of  petroleum 
products  and  crude  oil  are  traded  to  clear 
the  market,  which  is  overwhelmingly 
dominated  by  long-term  contracts.  Price 
rises  in  the  thin  spot  market  create  a 
psychology  which  encoui'ages  hikes  in  of- 
ficial prices — which  consequently  boost 
the  overall  oil  bill. 

The  long-term  lesson  from  1973  was 
that  the  era  of  cheap  and  accessible  en- 
ergy had  passed  and  that  a  continuing 
energy  crisis  was  in  train.  Recognizing 
this,  we  embarked  upon  a  vital  journey, 
which  is  far  from  finished — a  journey  de- 
signed to  improve  our  national  approach 
to  energy  and  to  stimulate  other  coun- 
tries to  do  the  same.  We  have  made  much 
progress.  At  home,  we  are  reducing  our 
dependence  on  imported  oil.  For  exam- 
ple, U.S.  oil  imports  were  below  7  million 
b/d  [barrels  per  day]  in  the  first  6  months 
of  1980  compared  to  8.6  million  b/d  in 
1977.  In  addition,  increased  energy  effi- 
ciency has  enabled  us  partially  to  de- 
couple GNP  growth  from  gi'owth  in  oil 
consumption  so  our  economy  can  expand 
without  increasing  our  dependence  on 
imports. 

I  won't  review  here  the  evolution 
and  the  vicissitudes  of  our  national  en- 
ergy policy,  but  I  think  it  can  honestly  be 
said  that  we  have  more  than  begun  on  the 
long  road  toward  increasing  our  energy 
suppUes  and  making  better  use  of  what 
we  have.  While  we  must  concentrate  first 
on  putting  our  own  house  in  order,  we 


ruarv  1981 


47 


Energy 


also  must  continue  to  cooperate  actively 
in  pursuit  of  these  same  goals  with  our 
allies  in  the  lEA  and  at  the  annual  eco- 
nomic summits  of  the  industrial  de- 
mocracies. 

The  Second  Crisis 

After  the  shocks  of  1973  and  1974,  we 
were  making  headway  throughout  the 
mid-  and  late-1970s.  lEA  efforts  and  our 
national  policies  were  moving  in  the 
same,  positive  direction,  although  we 
were  slower  in  starting  than  our  lEA 
counterparts. 

Unfortunately,  in  1979,  Iranian 
supplies  were  interrupted,  and  we  wei'e 
taught  another  lesson.  This  was  a  clear 
example  of  vulnerability  to  attack  from 
an  unexpected  direction.  The  lEA  system 
was  designed  to  meet  a  recurrence  of  the 
1973  experience — a  major  shortfall 
(above  7%)  or  an  embargo.  But  histoiy 
did  not  repeat  itself.  The  interruption  in 
1979  was  considerably  less  than  7%.  We 
did  not  have  an  lEA  mechanism  on  the 
shelf  to  deal  with  it. 

We  soon  learned  a  painful  lesson  that 
even  a  small  interruption,  under  condi- 
tions of  uncertainty,  could  have  devastat- 
ing economic  consequences.  Although  the 
decline  in  Iranian  production  was  only  4% 
of  world  production,  market  dislocations 
and  price  increases  buffeted  a  world 
economy  which  had  still  not  fully  recov- 
ered from  the  1973  oil  price  shock.  These 
blows  helped  push  the  United  States  into 
recession  and  slowed  economic  growth  in 
the  other  industrial  nations.  In  the 
United  States  our  total  inflation  grew  to 
double  digits.  For  the  industrialized  na- 
tions as  a  whole,  it  is  estimated  that  the 
price  hikes  of  1979  will  ultimately  cause  a 
loss  of  about  $300  billion  in  GNP.  And  the 
fragile  economies  of  the  developing  na- 
tions have  been  scarred  even  more  se- 
verely by  these  higher  oil  pj-ices. 

The  lEA  developed  a  response  to  the 
1979  crisis.  Its  members  made  a  commit- 
ment— albeit  a  loose  one — to  reduce  the 
group's  demand  for  imported  oil  by  2  mil- 
lion b/d.  Each  nation's  share  of  the  reduc- 
tion, as  well  as  the  time  within  which 
action  had  to  be  taken,  was  unspecified. 
Although  significant  savings  of  about  1.5 
million  b/d,  or  6%  of  1978  IE  A  imports, 
were  achieved  by  the  end  of  1979,  this 
was  too  late  to  forestall  sharp  price  in- 
creases. lEA  governments,  focusing  on 
the  modest  quantity  of  the  shortfall,  had 
underestimated  the  psychological  impact 
of  the  crisis  on  the  market.  Midway 
through  the  year  the  United  States  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  lEA  response 
to  the  1979  crisis  was  inadequate. 


Another  Lesson:  The  Need  for  Better 
Tools 

The  United  States,  therefore,  took  the 
lead  in  giving  the  IE  A  and  the  world 
community  better  tools  to  meet  a  short- 
fall. The  most  important  of  these  is  na- 
tional ceilings  on  oil  imports.  At  the 
Tokyo  summit  in  June  1979,  the  seven 
largest  industrial  democracies  adopted 
1985  oil-import  targets.  The  lEA  subse- 
quently refined  and  expanded  these  into 
national  import  ceilings  for  1980  and  na- 
tional import  goals  for  1985  for  all  its 
members.  This  process  has  been  insti- 
tutionalized by  the  establishment  of  a 
system  within  the  IE  A  in  which  ceilings 
would  be  imposed  to  counteract  a  market 
shortfall.  Each  nation  would  be  responsi- 
ble for  determining  the  measures  neces- 
saiy  to  achieve  its  ceiling. 

Thus,  we  are  not  without  I'esources 
to  face  supply  interruptions.  In  fact,  our 
experience  in  the  IE  A  has  expanded  our 
options  beyond  those  which  I  have  dis- 
cussed. And  we  have  established  prac- 
tices of  consultation  and  cooperation 
which  will  permit  us  to  tailor  our  re- 
sponses directly  to  any  concrete  situation. 

Dimensions  of  the  Present  Situation 

In  this  way,  we  have  refined,  through 
chastening  experience,  our  abilities  to 
deal  with  oil-supply  interruptions.  Now 
we  are  faced  with  another  novel  and 
threatening  situation — the  Iran-Ii-aq  war. 
The  energy  effects  of  war  between  the 
two  oil  producers  are  serious,  although 
they  have  been  manageable  thus  far.  The 
war  has  taken  3.8  milHon  b/d  of  oil  ex- 
ports off  the  woi-ld  market,  over  8%  of  oil 
produced  in  non-Communist  countries. 
Since  world  consumption  has  declined,  we 
can  simply  do  without  some  of  this  oil — 
about  1  million  b/d  of  it.  Another  1-1.5 
million  b/d  can  be  made  up  thi'ough  in- 
creased production  from  the  Saudis  and 
other  OPEC  [Organization  of  Petroleum 
Exporting  Countries]  nations.  This 
leaves  a  shortfall  of  over  1  million  b/d, 
which  is  now  being  met  by  drawdowns  of 
above  normal  stocks  in  some  nations  and 
by  some  belt  tightening  in  nations  with- 
out adequate  stocks. 

The  extent  of  any  possible  continuing 
shortfall  will  depend  on  a  number  of  fac- 
tors, including  how  much  additional  sup- 
ply is  made  available  by  other  OPEC  na- 
tions, whethei-  companies  and  individuals 
begin  to  hoard  oil  supplies  and  whether 
the  war  expands  to  other  nations  or  inter- 
feres with  gulf  shipping. 


Since  world  stocks  are  at  an  all-tin;  l 
high,  we  should,  in  principle,  be  able  t«  I 
manage  the  current  shortfall  for  at  leaj; 
the  next  6  months.  However,  there  are  I 
complicating  factors.  The  current  short 
fall  is  not  distributed  evenly  among  cou 
tries  and  companies.  The  United  State 
lost  a  vei-y  small  percentage  of  its  oil. 
Some  lEA  members — Italy  and  Japan- 
lost  15%  and  8%  respectively,  while 
others — Turkey  and  Portugal — were  hi 
more  severely.  France  lost  30%,  and 
Brazil  and  India  have  been  cut  by  more 
than  40%  each.  In  addition,  many  devel 
oping  nations  depended  on  Iraq  for  mos 
of  their  oil  and  received  it  at  much 
needed  concessional  terms. 

Even  in  countries  which  have  Idst 
little  overall,  certain  companies  have  su 
fered  substantial  losses,  "rhis  means  tha 
even  though  world  stocks  are  high,  som 
nations  and  companies  are  hurting  now. 
and  others  will  be  in  the  near  futui-e.  If 
they  are  unable  to  secure  adequate 
supplies  elsewhere,  they  may  turn  to  th 
spot  market  to  make  up  their  shortfall. 

If  they  do  so,  spot  market  prices  w 
increase,  perhaps  rapidly.  OPEC  minis- 
ters who  meet  in  Bali  on  December  15 
will  be  veiy  attentive  to  price  ti'ends  on 
the  spot  market.  If  histoi-y  repeats  itsel 
official  price  increases  would  follow  and 
be  reflected  in  long-term  contracts  for 
1981  which  will  be  negotiated  next  mont 
Some  producers,  in  response  to  rising 
spot  prices,  may  also  impose  surcharges 
on  their  official  prices.  Because  of  this 
price  effect  of  a  shortfall,  all  buyers 
would  suffer.  Even  countries  which  lost 
few  supplies — such  as  the  United  State: 
— would  bear  a  heavy  burden. 

In  trying  to  plot  our  course  of  actioi 
during  the  next  months,  we  must  begin 
with  a  premise:  It  is  unacceptable  to 
permit  oil  prices  to  skyi'ocket  as  they  di( 
in  1979.  Several  key  elements  in  the  197S 
price  escalator  must  be  attacked — the 
leading  role  of  spot  prices,  excess  stock 
building,  and  fear  of  uncertainty  in  oil 
markets.  If  we  focus  on  these  factors  am 
have  learned  our  lessons  well,  we  can  de 
fend  ourselves  adequately  against  an- 
other body  blow  to  the  world's  economy. 

Peace  Efforts  and  TEA  Cooperation 

The  first  step  is  to  reduce  war-linked  un- 
certainty in  the  oil  market  by  encourag- 
ing those  forces  working  for  peace  be- 
tween Iraq  and  Iran. 

•  We  are  actively  working  through 
the  U.N.  Security  Council  toward  a  reso- 
lution of  the  conflict  which  does  justice  tc 


48 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


- 


Energy 


legitimate  concerns  on  both  sides  and 
)ws  the  principles  of  international  law. 

•  The  U.S.  position  from  the  begin- 

^  of  this  conflict  has  been  clear.  We  are 
artial  but  not  uninterested.  The  polit- 
economic,  and  human  consequences 
continuing  conflict  are  of  vital  im- 
tance  to  us  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 

•  We  are  concerned  that  the  conflict 
be  expanded  and  have  taken  steps  to 

t  vent  that.  We  believe,  strongly,  that 
re  must  be  no  infi'ingement  of  the  in- 
nationally  recognized  freedom  and 
ety  of  navigation  in  the  Persian  Gulf 
1  welcome  assurances  given  by  both 
n  and  Iraq  in  this  regard. 

•  We  believe,  as  well,  that  countries 
luld  be  protected  against  interference 
;heir  internal  affairs  and  that  interna- 
lal  disputes  should  be  settled  by 
iceful  means  rather  than  by  force. 

Beyond  peace  efforts,  our  principal 
1  is  to  keep  the  world  supplied  with  oil 

way  that  reduces  pressure  on  oil 
ces.  On  the  supply  side,  certain  giilf 
ntries  such  as  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait, 

the  U.A.E.  [United  Arab  Emirates] 
e  increased  production  to  ti-y  to  make 
some  of  the  shortfall  suffered  by 
Citomers  of  Iraq.  Exports  may  also  in- 
case from  nations  such  as  Nigeria, 
v.ich  were  producing  at  less  than  normal 
li  els  due  to  slack  demand.  The  most  we 
Ci  hope  for  from  these  countries  is  an 
etra  1-2  million  b/d,  wath  the  lower  end 
cthe  range  more  likely. 

On  the  demand  side,  we  are  cooper- 
s  ng  wdth  the  20  other  industrialized  na- 
t  ns  which  are  members  of  the  IE  A  and 
■\th  France  to  calm  the  market.  There 
£2  two  related  aspects  to  this  effort. 
Irst,  we  can  ease  spot  market  pressure 
I  using  existing  stocks.  Second,  we  have 
f  reduce  overall  demand  for  imported  oil 
f  compensate  for  reduced  supply. 

IE  A  nations  agi'eed  on  October  1  to 
:  oid  abnormal  purchases  on  the  spot 
laiket  and  to  meet  any  shortfall  through 
lock  draws.  This  has  had  a  useful  effect 
1  us  far.  The  IE  A  policy  is  based  on 
nnsultation  and  persuasion,  and  we  ai'e 
'Pending  in  the  last  instance  on  the 
'loperation  of  oil  companies.  We  must 
•cognize  that  companies  may  become  re- 
ctant  to  draw  down  stocks  even  at  nor- 
lal  rates  if  they  foresee  a  continuing 
lortfall.  If  this  proves  to  be  the  case, 
16  buffer  of  high  stocks,  lacking  in  1979, 
it  which  has  furnished  a  cushion  for  us 
1 1980,  will  comfort  us  less  and  less  in 
le  future. 

What  we  do  further  depends  on  our 
nd  the  market's  continuing  assessment 


of  prospects  for  resumption  of  something 
approaching  normal  levels  of  production 
from  Iraq  and  Iran.  This  requii'es  judg- 
ments about  the  length  of  the  war  and 
the  likely  pace  at  which  their  exports 
could  be  restored  to  more  normal  levels. 
Based  on  the  limited  information  avail- 
able, damage  to  oil  production  and  export 
facilities  in  both  countries,  to  date,  is  not 
excessive,  and  exports  will  be  likely  to 
rise,  to  some  extent,  soon  after  hostilities 
cease.  It  may  be  some  months,  however, 
before  exports  would  approach  prewar 
levels.  Any  new  or,  as  yet,  unreported 
damage  to  oil  facilities  could  extend  this 
period,  as  would  any  difficulties  in  or- 
ganizing repair  efforts. 

What  Should  Be  Done  Now? 

While  we  cannot  foresee  the  outcome  of 
the  conflict,  we  can  act  to  mitigate  its  ef- 
fect. We  will  be  continuing  discussions 
with  our  friends  and  allies  in  the  next  few 
weeks  and  will  concert  our  responses  to 
the  oil  markets  in  light  of  the  situation  in 
the  Middle  East.  The  adoption  of  import 
ceilings,  activation  of  the  sharing  system, 
or  other  responses  could  require  strong 
domestic  measures.  To  handle  short-term 
emergencies,  nations  have  proposed 
measures  such  as  fuel  switching, 
emergency  taxes  or  tariffs,  temperatui'e 
control  standards,  leaving  cars  home  one 
day  a  week,  and  others.  In  1979,  we  re- 
lied on  fuel  switching,  temperature  con- 
trols, and  inci'easing  production,  where 
possible.  We  might  need  some  additional 
mechanisms  in  1981. 

Whether  any  of  these  actions  is  ever 
used,  the  point  remains:  In  order  to  re- 
duce short-term  price  pressure,  we  need 
to  reduce  demand  for  oil.  The  choice  is 
quite  simple.  We  can  cut  back  a  bit  now 
or  risk  paying  the  price.  In  this  case,  the 
price  could  be  $30-$90  billion  additional 
per  year  for  our  oil,  resulting  in  reduction 
of  growth,  higher  inflation,  and  diminu- 
tion of  our  strength  and  international 
position.  This  was  the  real  choice  facing 
IE  A  countries  in  1979,  though  we  did  not 
know  it  at  the  time. 

Better  Mechanisms  and  Expanded 
Supplies 

We  still  need  to  learn,  for  the  next  time. 
The  public  needs  to  understand  that  the 
energy  problem  is  not  going  to  go  away. 
We  need  to  act  consciously  to  manage  it. 
We  need  to  have  popularly  supported 
mechanisms  to  minimize  upward  price 
pressure  during  short-term  interruptions 
and,  for  the  longer  term,  to  reduce  more 


rapidly  the  dependence  of  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  on  imported  oil 
and  speed  the  transition  to  other  energy 
sources.  We  need  to  spur  production. 

Some  of  these  mechanisms  we  can 
adopt  ourselves;  others  require  coopera- 
tion from  other  industrialized  nations  as 
well  as  the  producing  nations.  Short-term 
demand  restraint  pos.sibilities  have  al- 
ready been  mentioned.  Longer  term 
measures  to  increase  available  supply  in- 
clude increasing  production  from  domes- 
tic energy  resources — coal,  oil,  gas,  and 
nuclear;  hastening  the  development  and 
commercialization  of  new  energy  technol- 
ogies— solar,  biomass,  shale  oil,  liquids, 
and  gas  from  coal;  emphasizing  conserva- 
tion and  efficiency;  and  expanding  cogen- 
eration  of  heat  and  power. 

Considerable  effort  should  be  de- 
voted to  expanding  secure  energy 
supplies.  We  are  taking  the  lead  ourselves 
in  coal.  We  are  in  the  early  stages  of  a 
substantial  long-term  coal  export  strat- 
egy by  which  we  will  increase  our  eco- 
nomic strength  and  also  help  our 
energy-deficient  trading  partners  by  pro- 
viding them  with  reliable  long-term  en- 
ergy supplies. 

Other  nations  with  abundant  energy 
resources  should  respond  to  the  needs  of 
their  friends  and  the  world  economy. 
Under  foreseeable  circumstances,  it  pays 
no  nation  to  limit  energy  production  for 
short-term  national  interests.  This  pre- 
scription applies  across  the  board,  since 
the  political  and  economic  security  of 
every  nation  would  be  threatened  by  a 
chaotic  and  crippled  energy-short  world 
economy. 

•In  our  relations  ■with  key  OPEC  na- 
tions, we  have  emphasized  their  stake  in 
a  sound  world  economy  and  the  im- 
portance of  adequate,  reasonably  priced 
oil  supplies  to  world  economic  health. 
Some  nations,  particularly  those  of  the 
Arabian  Peninsula,  see  the  merits  of  a 
long-term  perspective  and  are  producing 
at  levels  far  above  those  required  for 
their  domestic  economies. 

But  the  industrialized  nations  cannot 
ask  OPEC  to  produce  energy  to  respond 
to  the  needs  of  the  world  economy  if  they, 
themselves,  will  not.  In  this  regard, 
Canada's  recent  announcement  of  a  new 
national  energy  policy,  which  appears 
likely  to  result  in  limiting  Canadian  pro- 
duction, seems  to  be  out  of  step  with  the 
rest  of  the  world.  We  hope  that,  as  details 
of  Canada's  new  program  are  worked  out, 
the  Canadian  Government  will  recognize 
its  more  general  responsibilities  to  create 
incentives — including  price  increases — 
rather  than  disincentives  to  energy  pro- 


■ebruary  1981 


49 


EUROPE 


duction.  We  also  hope  that  nations  such 
as  the  United  Kingdom  and  Norway  will 
produce  at  maximum  efficiency  in  order 
to  provide  more  secure  sources  of  energy 
supply. 

We  are  doing  our  part.  Energy 
policies  now  in  place  are  having  an  ap- 
preciable effect  on  our  energy  balance 
sheet.  We  have  reduced  our  oil  imports 
by  25%  since  the  peak  year  of  1977,  and 
we  are  well  on  the  road  to  increased  en- 
ergy production.  We  can  now  exercise 
greater  leadership,  internationally,  in 
confronting  the  world's  energy  problems 
since  we  have  turned  from  a  nation  with 
one  of  the  weakest  energy  programs  into 
a  nation  with  one  of  the  strongest. 
Policies  and  legislation  have  been  effec- 
tive in  reducing  demand  and  increasing 
supply,  especially  through  gradual  oil  and 
gas  price  decontrol,  incentives  for  greater 
energy  efficiency  in  homes  and  busi- 
nesses, fuel  efficiency  standards,  building 
temperature  controls,  the  synfuels  pro- 
gram, and  related  measures. 

But  we  cannot  rest  on  our  laurels. 
We  have  a  long  way  yet  to  go.  The  war 
between  Iraq  and  Iran  is  a  telling  re- 
minder that  the  unpredictable  and  irra- 
tional do  occur.  We  must  strengthen  our 
ability  to  react  even  to  extreme  cases. 
Ultimately,  we  will  have  learned  the  right 
lessons  when  the  American  people  under- 
stand that  our  well-being  and  security  are 
at  stake  in  our  response  to  the  continuing 
energy  crisis.  ■ 


North  Atlantic  Council 
Meets  in  Brussels 


Secretary  Muskie  departed 
Washington,  D.C.,  December  9,  1980,  to 
attend  the  regular  semiannual  session 
of  the  North  A  tlantic  Council  minis- 
terial meeting  in  Brussels  December 
11-12.  Before  returning  to  the  United 
States,  he  stopped  in  London  December 
12- H  to  consult  with  British  officials. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  the  final 
communique,  the  declaration  approved 
by  the  15  Foreign  Ministers,  and  the 
minutes  extracts  made  available  to  the 
press  of  December  12. 


FINAL  COMMUNIQUE, 
NORTH  ATLANTIC  COUNCIL' 

The  North  Atlantic  Council  met  in 
ministerial  session  in  Brussels  on  11th  and 
12th  December,  1980,  against  a  background 
of  growing  uncertainty  and  tension  in  inter- 
national relations.  Ministers  agreed  on  the 
following: 

1.  The  continuing  military  buildup  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  its  clear  willingness,  as 
seen  in  Afghanistan  to  use  force  in  disregard 
of  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter,  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  Interna- 
tional Law  and  the  Soviet  menace  which 
hangs  over  Poland  give  cause  for  grave  con- 
cern to  the  members  of  the  Alliance  and  to 
the  entire  international  community. 

Allied  strength  and  cohesion  are  thus 
essential  to  the  maintenance  of  stability  and 
peace.  United  in  purpose,  the  Allies  are 
determined  to  meet  any  challenge  to  the 
freedom  and  well-being  of  their  peoples  and 
to  make  the  efforts  and  sacrifices  required 
for  deterrence  and  defense.  In  this  way  they 
do  their  part  to  preserve  the  basis  for 
detente. 

Genuine  detente  must  be  worldwide  in 
scope  and  indivisible.  It  can  succeed  only  if 
the  Soviet  Union  strictly  abides,  in  Europe 
and  elsewhere,  by  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  in 
their  entirety.  Allied  efforts  to  persuade  the 
Soviet  Union  to  change  its  policy  from  one  of 
intervention  in  the  affairs  of  other  states  to 
one  of  respect  for  their  sovereignty  serve 
the  general  interest  of  the  international  com- 
munity. The  Allies  will  keep  open  channels 
of  communication  and  be  ready  to  respond 
positively  to  concrete  steps  by  the  Soviet 
Union  to  cease  aggressive  activities  and  to 
restore  the  basis  for  constructive  East-West 
relations.  In  this  connection,  the  Allies  re- 
main committed  to  the  pursuit  of  effective, 
balanced  and  verifiable  measures  of  disarma- 
ment and  arms  control. 


2.  Detente  has  brought  appreciable 
benefits  in  the  field  of  East-West  cooperation 
and  exchange.  But  it  has  been  seriously 
damaged  by  Soviet  actions.  It  could  not  sur- 
vive it  the  Soviet  Union  were  again  to  vio- 
late the  basic  rights  of  any  state  to  ter- 
ritorial integrity  and  independence.  Poland 
should  be  free  to  decide  its  own  future.  The 
Allies  will  respect  the  principle  of  non-inter 
vention  and  strongly  urge  others  to  do  like- 
wise. Any  intervention  would  fundamentally 
alter  the  entire  international  situation.  The 
Allies  would  be  compelled  to  react  in  the 
manner  which  the  gravity  of  this  devel- 
opment would  require.  Therefore  the  Council 
will  keep  the  situation  under  close  and  con- 
tinuous review.  At  the  same  time,  genuine 
Soviet  efforts  to  restore  the  confidence 
necessary  for  detente  will  meet  with  a  ready 
response  from  the  Allies. 

3.  It  is  important,  particularly  in  the 
present  circumstances,  that  the  calm  situa- 
tion in  and  around  Berlin  should  be  main- 
tained and  that  the  positive  effects  of  the 
Quadripartite  Agreement  of  3rd  September, 
1971.  should  not  be  impaired  by  unilateral 
measures.  The  international  situation  as  a 
whole  cannot  fail  to  be  affected  by  the  situa- 
tion in  Berlin. 

Recent  measures  introduced  by  the  Ger- 
man Democratic  Republic  have  substantially 
reduced  inner-German  travel  and  visits  of 
Berliners.  This  development  constitutes  a 
setback  in  the  relationship  between  the  two 
German  states.  The  Allies  support  the  ef- 
forts of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  to 
achieve  the  withdrawal  of  these  measures  so 
that  relations  between  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  the  German  Democratic 
Republic  could  develop  further  in  the  in- 
terest of  stability  and  co-operation  in  Europe 
and  of  those  affected. 

4.  The  Soviet  occupation  of  Afghanistan 
is  unacceptable.  One  year  after  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion, the  Afghan  people  still  suffer  from 
repression  by  foreign  troops  on  their  soil. 
The  use  of  military  force  by  the  Soviet 
government  to  impose  its  will  on  the  people     ^ 
of  a  neutral  and  non-aligned  country  belies      , 
its  oft-repeated  professions  of  friendship  for 
the  nations  of  the  Third  World,  creating         I 
distrust  about  its  future  intentions.  An  ove^  j 
whelming  majority  of  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  has  again  called  for  the 
immediate  removal  of  the  foreign  troops 
from  Afghanistan.  Despite  the  efforts  of  the 
Islamic  Conference,  the  quest  for  a  political 
settlement  has  made  no  progress  because  of 
Soviet  intransigence.  Such  a  settlement  must 
provide  for  the  total  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
troops  and  enable  the  Afghan  people  to  exe^  L 
cise  fully  their  rights  of  independence  and       | 
self-determination. 

More  than  one  million  Afghans  have 
been  forced  by  the  Soviet  occupation  to  flee 


50 


Department  of  State  Bulletin 


Europe 


omeland,  causing  great  human  suffer- 
d  placing  a  heavy  burden  on  neigh- 
g  countries.  In  the  spirit  of  the  United 
IS  Resolutions,  Allied  governments,  in 
in   )n  with  a  number  of  neutral  and  non- 
ic   d  countries,  are  contributing  to 
ir   litarian  aid  to  alleviate  the  plight  of 
e   refugees. 

The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan 
ijor  implications  for  the  whole  of 
West  Asia,  an  area  of  paramount  in- 
to the  international  community  and 
curity  of  the  Allies.  Members  of  the 
ce  are  prepared  to  work  for  the  reduc- 
:  tension  in  the  area  and,  individually, 
tribute  to  peace  and  stability  for  the 

while  protecting  their  vital  economic 
irategic  interests. 

he  Allies  deplore  the  war  between 
nd  Iran,  which  causes  further  concern 
5  stability  of  the  affected  region.  In 
mnection,  they  underline  the  impor- 
of  maintaining  freedom  of  navigation, 
lecalling  positions  previously  taken  by 
)uncil,  the  Allies  reaffirm  the  need  for 
rl;  achievement  of  a  just,  lasting  and  com- 
Hsive  settlement  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
I. 

The  enormous  growth  over  a  number 
IS  of  Warsaw  Pact  and  in  particular 
military  power  gives  rise  to 
ate  concern  in  Europe  and  through- 
I,  e  world.  This  build-up  contradicts  the 
2q  'nt  assurances  by  the  Warsaw  Pact 
iii  'ies  that  their  aim  is  not  military 
pi  ority. 

nder  present  circumstances  there  is 
r1  ular  need  to  look  to  deterrence  and 
U  '.e.  The  Allies  will  therefore  take,  in- 
n  ally  or  collectively,  the  defensive 
>^  ires  to  meet  the  growth  of  Warsaw 
ic  apabilities  and  to  deter  any  aggres- 
)n 

.  The  strength  of  the  Alliance  lies  not 
ij  n  its  defensive  capability  but  also  in  its 
hi  on  and  the  readiness  of  its  members  to 
vi  ine  another  political  and  economic  sup- 
■r  [n  particular  they  have  greatly  bene- 
&  from  the  practice  of  frank  and  timely 
ni  Itations  on  a  broad  range  of  issues. 
i€  will  vigorously  pursue  this  practice 
it  he  object  of  underscoring  their 
li  rity  on  all  matters  affecting  their  com- 
(H  nterests.  They  will  continue  Allied  pro- 
a?  to  strengthen  the  economies  of  the 
JS  dvanced  member  countries,  undertaken 
t'  spirit  of  article  2  of  the  North  Atlantic 
'e  y,  which  have  gained  additional  sig- 
fi  nee  and  urgency. 

The  deterioration  of  the  situation  in 
>li-West  Asia  underlines  the  necessity 
idirgency  of  enhancing  the  defence 
"re  of  the  South-Eastern  flank  and  of 
1  Uiining  stability  and  a  balance  of  power 
■  Mediterranean  region  as  a  whole. 
The  cohesion  of  the  South-Eastern  flank 
•  leen  strongly  reinforced  by  recent 

ivi-  decisions  regarding  this  area,  and 
itapability  of  the  alliance  for  deterrence 
Wiefence  has  thereby  considerably  im- 
•I  ed.  These  developments  may,  at  the 


same  time,  be  considered  as  a  welcome  step 
to  the  restoration  of  mutual  confidence  be- 
tween Greece  and  Turkey,  and  they  enhance 
the  prospects  for  success  of  the  bilateral  ef- 
forts of  the  two  governments. 

8.  The  Allies  attach  importance  to  the 
process  initiated  by  the  Conference  on 
Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (CSCE) 
as  a  valuable  framework  for  improving 
security  and  developing  co-operation  in 
Europe  on  the  basis  of  full  implementation  of 
the  commitments  entered  into  at  Helsinki. 
They  remain  committed  to  the  continuation 
of  the  CSCE  process  beyond  the  present 
follow-up  meeting  in  Madrid.  This  meeting  is 
taking  place  in  the  shadow  of  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan  and  the  continuing 
suppression  of  human  rights  in  the  Soviet 
Union  proclaimed  on  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 
In  condemning  these  violations,  as  during 
the  thorough  discussion  of  implementations, 
the  Allies  are  seeking  to  preserve  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Final  Act,  to  which  they  re- 
main dedicated. 

In  the  same  spirit,  they  are  presenting 
important  new  proposals  in  all  areas  covered 
by  the  Final  Act,  including  human  rights, 
human  contacts  and  information.  In  the 
security  area  the  allies  strongly  support  ex- 
panding and  strengthening  confidence 
building  measures  within  a  framework  that 
ensures  they  will  be  militarily  significant, 
verifiable  and  applicable  to  the  entire  conti- 
nent of  Europe,  including  all  of  the  European 
territory  of  the  Soviet  Union.  In  this  regard, 
recalling  their  previous  declaration  in 
Ankara,  the  Allies  took  note  that  the  pro- 
posal of  the  Government  of  France  concern- 
ing a  mandate  for  a  conference  on  Disarma- 
ment in  Europe,  under  the  aegis  of  the 
CSCE,  has  been  tabled  in  Madrid  where  it 
has  been  welcomed  by  many  delegations. 

9.  Sharing  the  widespread  international 
concern  at  the  continuing  increase  in  armed 
forces  and  armaments  throughout  the  world. 
Allied  governments  have  put  forward  pro- 
posals in  various  form  in  which  arms  control 
and  disarmament  are  discussed.  These  ef- 
forts are  made  more  difficult  if  agreements 
already  in  force  are  not  fully  observed.  In 
this  connection,  the  Allies  welcome  all  con- 
structive efforts  by  the  contracting  parties 
aimed  at  ensuring  the  effectiveness  of  ex- 
isting accords.  The  negotiation  of  new  agree- 
ments must  provide  for  adequate  verifi- 
cation. The  Allies  will  continue  to  seek 
agreements  establishing  greater  security  for 
all  nations  at  lower  levels  of  forces  and  arm- 
aments within  the  United  Nations  frame- 
work and  elsewhere. 

10.  The  Allies  engaged  in  the  negotia- 
tions on  Mutual  and  Balanced  Force  Reduc- 
tions remain  determined  to  achieve  a  more 
stable  and  equitable  balance  of  forces  in 
Central  Europe  through  reductions  in  two 
phases  leading  to  genuine  parity  in  military 
manpower  in  the  form  of  a  common  collec- 
tive ceiling,  based  on  agreed  data.  The 
Western  proposal  of  December  1979  pro- 
vides a  realistic  framework  for  a  mutually 
beneficial  phase  1  agreement  involving 


United  States  and  Soviet  reductions  and 
associated  measures.  Although  the  Eastern 
countries  have  recently  made  some  limited 
moves  towards  an  interim  phase  1  agree- 
ment, as  proposed  by  the  West,  they  have 
regrettably  still  not  provided  the  informa- 
tion necessary  to  reach  agreement  on  the 
size  of  the  forces  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  Cen- 
tral Europe,  which  is  an  essential  prereq- 
uisite to  a  phase  1  agreement.  Nor  have  the 
Eastern  countries  responded  adequately  to 
Western  proposals  concerning  associated 
measures  which  are  designed  to  ensure 
verification  of  force  reductions  and  limita- 
tions and  to  enhance  stability. 

11.  Assuring  strategic  balance  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is 
central  to  the  security  of  the  Alliance.  The 
Alliance  supports  further  negotiations  and 
remains  deeply  committed  to  the  SALT 
process  as  a  way  of  achieving  meaningful 
mutual  limitations  on  United  States  and 
Soviet  strategic  nuclear  forces  that  will  help 
enhance  Western  security  and  preserve 
East- West  stability. 

12.  The  Allies  who  participated  in  the 
decision  of  12th  December,  1979  on  Theatre 
Nuclear  Forces  (TNF),  having  received  a 
second  report  from  the  Special  Consultative 
Group  on  Progress  in  Arms  Control  involv- 
ing TNF,  expressed  their  satisfaction  with 
the  close  and  fruitful  consultations  which 
have  taken  place  within  the  Group.  They 
noted  with  satisfaction  the  serious  and 
substantive  character  of  the  recent  discus- 
sions between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Those  Allies  expressed  their 
support  for  the  United  States  negotiating  ap- 
proach, elaborated  in  intensive  consultations 
among  them  on  the  basis  of  the  December 
1979  decision.  A  date  for  resumption  of  US- 
Soviet  exchanges  next  year  will  be  set 
through  mutual  consultations. 

The  continuing  implementation  of  the 
modernization  element  of  the  December  1979 
decision  was  noted.  The  Soviet  preponder- 
ance in  Long-Range  TNF  (LRTNF)  deploy- 
ments remains  cause  for  serious  concern. 
The  SS-20  bases  already  identified  would 
alone  support  more  warheads  than  are  plan- 
ned for  their  entire  modernization  program. 
Allied  solidarity  in  support  of  both  moderni- 
zation and  arms  control  involving  TNF  re- 
mains key  to  achieving  progress  toward 
agreed  limitation.  The  scale  of  NATO'S 
Long-Range  TNF  requirements  will  be  ex- 
amined in  the  light  of  concrete  results 
achieved  through  negotiations. 

The  withdrawal  of  1,000  United  States 
nuclear  warheads  from  Europe  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  LRTNF  modernization  and  arms 
control  decision  has  been  completed. 


DECLARATION 

The  Foreign  Ministers  and  representatives 
of  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark,  France,  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Greece, 
Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands, 
Norway,  Portugal,  Turkey,  the  United  King- 


ruary  1981 


51 


Europe 


dom  and  the  United  States  of  America 
recalled  previous  declarations  regarding  acts 
of  violence  and  terrorism  including  those 
committed  against  diplomats  and  diplomatic 
missions.  They  noted  with  grave  concern  the 
suffering  inflicted  on  innocent  people,  as  well 
as  the  negative  impact  of  the  continuation 
and  spread  of  such  acts  on  the  social  struc- 
ture and  democratic  institutions  of  individual 
countries  and  on  international  relations. 
They  vigorously  condemned  these  terrorist 
acts  as  particularly  odious,  regardless  of 
their  causes  or  objectives.  They  ag^reed 
unanimously  on  the  necessity,  in  accordance 
with  the  legislation  of  each  country,  for  close 
inter-governmental  cooperation  and  effective 
measures  to  prevent  and  combat  terrorism. 
With  particular  reference  to  Iran,  they 
expressed  their  continued  deep  concern  over 
the  flagrantly  illegal  holding  of  United 
States  diplomatic  personnel  and  property 
and  repeated  their  call  upon  the  Iranian 
authorities  to  release  immediately  and 
unharmed  the  American  hostages. 


MINUTES  EXTRACTS 


Economic  Cooperation  and  Assistance 
Within  the  Alliance 

Reaffirming  their  attachment  to  the  spirit  of 
article  2  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty, 
Ministers  reviewed  the  particular  problems 
faced  by  the  economically  less  advanced 
member  countries  in  the  light  of  the  difficult 
world  conditions  currently  being  experi- 
enced. They  noted  a  report  by  the  Secretary 
General  on  the  progress  so  far  achieved 
through  appropriate  bilateral  and  multilateral 
channels  in  improving  the  economic  situation 
in  those  member  countries.  Following  the 
political  initiatives  taken  since  1978,  sub- 
stantial results  have  been  obtained,  but 
Ministers  underlined  that  continued  political 
support  was  essential  for  solving  the  longer 
term  economic  problems  of  these  countries, 
which  would  contribute  to  the  consolidation 
of  Alliance  strength  and  sohdarity. 


"Science  for  Stability" 

Ministers  noted  that  concrete  proposals  had 
now  been  developed  to  implement  the 
"Science  for  Stability"  programme,  whose 
establishment  they  endorsed  last  June,  to 
strengthen  the  scientific  and  technological 
capabilities  of  the  less  developed  member 
countries,  and  that  these  proposals  would  re- 
quire the  provision  of  adequate  funding  over 
the  next  five  years. 


The  Situation  in 
the  Mediterranean 

Ministers  noted  the  report  on  the  situation 
in  the  Mediterranean  prepared  on  their  in- 
structions and  underlined  again  the  necessity 
of  maintaining  the  balance  of  forces  in  the 


whole  area.  They  requested  the  Council  in 
permanent  session  to  continue  to  consult  on 
the  question  and  submit  a  further  report  at 
their  next  meeting. 

Equipment  Cooperation 

Ministers  examined  a  report  by  the  Con- 
ference of  National  Armaments  Directors 
and  noted  the  encouraging  progress  being 
made  both  in  periodic  armaments  planning 
and  in  cooperative  projects  for  the  develop- 
ment and  production  of  defence  equipment. 
They  welcomed  the  efforts  being  undertaken 
under  the  transatlantic  dialogue  to  initiate 
dual  production  projects  and  promote  the 
study  and  introduction  of  families  of 
weapons.  Such  a  transatlantic  dialogue  pre- 
supposes the  development  of  cooperation 
between  European  countries  of  the  Alliance. 
Emphasizing  the  important  contribution 
which  standardization  can  make  both  to  mili- 
tary effectiveness  and  a  better  use  of 
resources,  they  welcomed  the  standardiza- 
tion achieved  in  respect  of  the  calibres  for 
infantry  small  arms. 

Noting  the  emphasis  being  placed  on  us- 
ing the  technological  potential  of  Alliance 
members  to  the  best  advantage  for  the 
development  of  defence  equipment,  Ministers 
urged  that  continuing  attention  be  paid  to 
assisting  the  less  industrialized  member  na- 
tions. In  this  context  they  welcomed  the  re- 
cent leasing  by  the  United  States  to  Turkey 
of  military  industrial  equipment. 

Recognizing  the  importance  of  a  coor- 
dinated air  defence  programme  to  the  defen- 
sive posture  of  the  Alliance,  Ministers 


welcomed  with  satisfaction  the  establishm' 
for  this  purpose  of  a  NATO  Air  Defence 
Committee  under  the  Council. 


Civil  Emergency  Planning — Commitment     ■ 
of  Merchant  Ships  and  Civil  Aircraft 
by  Memhir  Countries 

Ministers  took  note  of  progress  made  in  tl 
field  and  endorsed  the  action  being  taken 
improve  the  state  of  contingency  planning 

Committee  on  the  Challenges 
of  Modern  Society 

Ministers  noted  the  annual  progress  repoi 
by  the  Secretary  General  on  the  work  of  t 
Committee  on  the  Challenges  of  Modern 
Society  (CCMS).  They  received  a  report  o 
the  high-level  meeting  held  in  Brussels  on 
24th  November  1980  when  seven  Minister 
of  the  Environment  and  other  senior  offic 
exchanged  views  on  the  environment  and 
tional  planning,  the  problems  posed  by  th» 
utilization  of  diversified  energy  sources  ar 
the  environmental  management  of  chemic 
Ministers  took  note  of  the  completior 
a  major  pilot  project  concerned  with  redu 
ing  the  scale  of  emissions  of  sulfur  oxide 
gases  into  the  atmosphere.  They  under- 
scored the  necessity  for  wide  diffusion  of 
Committee's  project  reports  and  expressi 
the  hope  that  recommendations  be  rapidi; 
integrated  into  national  environmental 
policies.  In  addition,  they  noted  with  inte: 
the  decisions  to  hold  symposia  next  fall  o 
technology  assessment  and  hazardous  wa 


22d  Report 
on  Cyprus 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
NOV.  20,  19801 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following 
report  on  progress  made  during  the  past  60 
days  toward  a  negotiated  settlement  of  the 
Cyprus  problem. 

As  was  noted  in  my  last  report,  inter- 
communal  talks  between  representatives  of 
the  Greek  and  Turkish  Cypriots  resumed  on 
August  9  under  the  aegis  of  United  Nations 
Special  Representative  Ambassador  Hugo 
Gobbi.  Systematic  substantive  examination 
of  the  essential  problems  dividing  the  com- 
munities began  on  September  16.  The  par- 
ties have  been  examining  the  following 
general  subjects,  on  the  basis  of  one  topic 
each  meeting: 

(Al  Resettlement  of  Varosha  under 
United  Nations  auspices; 

(B)  Promotion  of  goodwill,  mutual  con- 
fidence and  normal  conditions; 


(C)  Constitutional  problems; 

(D)  Territorial  divisions. 

Meetings  were  held  on  September  24 
October  1,  8,  15.  and  31  and  November  5  ■ 
12.  We  are  encouraged  by  the  fact  that  tV 
negotiators  at  these  sessions  have  engage 
in  serious  examinations  of  their  differenct 
and  are  seeking  mutually  acceptable  solu 
tions.  The  negotiating  atmosphere  betwet^i 
the  parties  has  remained  congenial. 

I  am  hopeful  that  the  good  start 
achieved  by  these  meetings  will  develop  i 
sustained  negotiations  leading  to  a  compr 
hensive  solution.  Serious,  sustained  talks 
provide  the  best  opportunity  for  reaching 
just  and  lasting  settlement  of  the  issues  t 
face  Cyprus. 

Sincerely, 

Jimmy  Carte 


'Idential  letters  addressed  to  Thomas 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repr 
sentatives,  and  Frank  Church,  Chairman  ( 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Preside 
tial  Documents  of  Nov.  24,  1980).  ■ 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulle 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


■11  as  strengthening  the  CCMS  fellow- 
irogramme. 

ilinisters  noted  that  the  recent  plenary 
n  of  the  Committee  in  the  context  of  a 
al  review  of  projects  currently  in  prog- 
li'voted  particular  attention  to 
nlogy  and  earthquake  loss  reduction. 
UTS  agreed  that  recent  tragic  events  in 
.1  ijave  additional  importance  to  this 


Convention  on  Elimination 
of  Discrimination  Against 
Women  Sent  to  Senate 


IPress  release  348  of  Dec.  16,  1980. 


'esident  IVIeets 
litli  Cliancellor 
K^hmidt 


Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  of  the 
e  ral  Republic  of  Germany  visited 
"nited  States  November  18-21, 

Following  is  the  text  of  a  White 
,(  statement  released  at  the  conclu- 
of  the  Chancellor's  meeting  with 
ident  Carter  on  November  20.^ 

T  ident  Carter  and  the  Chancellor  of 
"ederal  Republic  of  Germany, 
lut  Schmidt,  held  a  thorough  con- 
e  ation  in  Washington,  November  20, 
-  u  ng  the  Chancellor's  visit  to  the 
h  ed  States,  November  18  through 
1  The  President  hosted  a  White 
I«se  luncheon  for  the  Chancellor  and 
~'c  iign  Minister  Hans-Dietrich 
j«  scher  on  November  20  in  which 
>e  etary  of  State  Muskie,  National 
>«  irity  Adviser  Brzezinski,  and  senior 
£  ials  also  participated. 
The  conversation  between  the 
ident  and  the  Chancellor  covered  a 
range  of  political,  security,  and 
iimic  issues  of  mutual  interest  to 
ii'  ,wo  countries.  The  President  and 
hi  Chancellor  agreed  on  the  necessity 
'  mtinuing  these  close  consultations, 
iding  during  the  transition  period, 
a  -der  to  assure  continuing  full  coor- 
lii  tion  of  the  policies  followed  by  the 
■»  countries  on  major  international 
s^es. 

In  their  conversation  the  President 
tn  the  Chancellor  agreed  on  the  con- 
-ii  ed  importance  of  improving  NATO's 
kmse  posture  and  of  efforts  aimed  at 
"•fhing  arms  control  agreements  with 
Soviet  Union  and  its  Warsaw  Pact 
s  in  order  to  insure  a  stable  mili- 
6 '  balance. 

In  their  discussion  of  East-West 

I  tions,  both  sides  welcomed  the  con- 

'ation  of  the  CSCE  [Conference  on 

urity  and  Cooperation  in  Europe] 

cess  at  the  Madrid  review  con- 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  SENATE, 
NOV.  12,  19801 

With  a  view  to  receiving  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  to  ratification  (subject  to 
certain  qualifications  and  possibly  to  appro- 
priate implementing  legislation),  I  transmit 
herewith  a  copy  of  the  Convention  on  the 
Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination 
against  Women.  The  Convention  was 
adopted  by  the  United  Nations  General 
Assembly  on  December  18,  1979  and  signed 
on  behalf  of  the  United  States  of  America  on 
July  17,  1980.  The  report  of  the  Department 
of  State  with  respect  to  the  Convention  is 
also  transmitted  for  the  information  of  the 
Senate. 

Adoption  of  this  Convention  by  the 
General  Assembly  at  the  conclusion  of  its 
34th  Session  in  December,  1979,  was  the 
culmination  of  a  negotiating  process  that 
lasted  several  years.  Throughout  this 
process,  the  United  States  was  an  active  par- 
ticipant and  a  vigorous  supporter  of  a 
comprehensive  and  effective  international 
instrument  to  achieve  the  elimination  of 
discrimination  against  women.  Although  cer- 
tain earUer  human  rights  treaties  relate  to 
the  rights  of  women,  none  of  these  previous 
instruments  attempted  to  deal  with  women's 


ference,  to  which  both  governments  re- 
main committed.  In  this  context  they 
stressed  the  right  of  each  country,  ir- 
respective of  its  political  or  social  sys- 
tem, to  resolve  its  problems  in  free  ex- 
ercise of  its  sovereignty  and  without 
intervention  from  any  quarter.  More- 
over, they  reiterated,  with  reference  to 
the  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly 
of  the  United  Nations,  their  regret  that 
there  is  no  evidence  of  Soviet  readiness 
to  withdraw  its  forces  from  Afghanistan 
and  to  seek  a  political  solution  of  the 
Afghanistan  crisis. 

The  President  and  the  Chancellor 
discussed  the  latest  developments  in 
the  Middle  East.  They  reviewed  the 
ongoing  negotiations  in  the  Camp  David 
framework  and  stressed  the  urgent 
need  for  progress  toward  a  comprehen- 
sive peace  settlement. 

Secretary  Muskie  and  Foreign 
Minister  Genscher  also  held  a  separate 
meeting  earlier  in  the  day. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  24,  1980, 
which  also  contains  the  President's  and 
Chancellor's  remarks  to  reporters  on  the 
South  Lawn  of  the  White  House  following 
their  meeting.  ■ 


rights  in  as  comprehensive  a  manner  as  this 
Convention.  The  wide  scope  of  the  Conven- 
tion is  particularly  noteworthy  and 
commendable  in  that  it  calls  upon  States 
Parties  to  take  "all  appropriate  measures"  to 
eliminate  discrimination  against  women  in 
such  diverse  fields  of  human  endeavor  as 
politics,  law,  employment,  education,  health 
care,  commercial  transactions,  and  domestic 
relations.  Moreover,  the  Convention  estab- 
lishes a  Committee  on  the  Elimination  of 
Discrimination  against  Women  to  review 
periodically  the  progress  being  made  by 
States  Parties. 

Ratification  of  the  Convention  on  the 
Political  Rights  of  Women  in  1976  was  a  re- 
cent express  affirmation  by  the  Executive 
and  Legislative  branches  of  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment that  human  rights  in  general  and 
women's  rights  in  particular  are  matters  of 
legitimate  concern  to  the  international  com- 
munity and  are  not  subjects  with  exclusively 
domestic  ramifications.  U.S.  ratification  of 
the  Convention  at  hand,  the  newest  of  the 
international  human  rights  instruments, 
would  be  consistent  with  this  affirmation  and 
would  make  clear  at  home  and  abroad  the 
commitment  of  the  United  States  to  eliminte 
discrimination  against  women. 

The  great  majority  of  the  substantive 
provisions  of  the  Convention  are  consistent 
with  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  United 
States  Constitution  and  existing  laws.  How- 
ever, certain  provisions  of  the  Convention 
raise  questions  of  conformity  to  current 
United  States  law.  Nevertheless,  the  Depart- 
ments of  State  and  Justice  and  other  inter- 
ested agencies  of  the  Federal  Government 
concur  in  the  judgment  that,  with  the  adop- 
tion of  certain  qualifications  and,  possibly, 
appropriate  implementing  legislation,  there 
are  no  constitutional  or  other  legal  obstacles 
to  United  States  ratification.  The  report  of 
the  Department  of  State  on  the  Convention 
and  an  attached  legal  memorandum  describe 
the  provisions  of  the  Convention  and  identify 
those  areas  of  concern  that  will  require  fur- 
ther discussion  and  treatment. 

This  Convention  is  a  significant  new  ele- 
ment in  the  development  of  the  international 
law  of  human  rights.  By  giving  its  advice 
and  consent  to  ratification  of  the  Convention, 
the  Senate  will  confirm  our  country's  tradi- 
tional commitment  to  the  promotion  and  pro- 
tection of  human  rights  and  will  enhance  our 
nation's  ability  to  achieve  progress  through- 
out the  world.  I  hope  that  all  States  will 
become  Parties  to  the  Convention,  and  that 
it  will  be  applied  universally.  I  recommend 
that  the  Senate  give  early  and  favorable  con- 
sideration to  this  Convention. 

Jimmy  Carter 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Nov.  17,  1980. 


F  iruary  1981 


53 


MIDDLE  EAST 


I 


Western  Sahara  Dispute 


by  Harold  H.  Saunders 

Statement  before  the  Subcommit- 
tee on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Af 
fairs  Committee  on  December  4,  1980. 
Mr.  Saunders  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Near  Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs.^ 

There  have  been  some  modest  develop- 
ments in  the  western  Sahara  dispute 
over  the  past  6  months  which  improve 
prospects  for  the  negotiating  process 
necessary  to  develop  the  terms  of  a 
settlement. 

As  you  are  well  aware,  the  Ameri- 
can Government  has  sought  to  encour- 
age all  of  the  interested  parties  to  turn 
their  energies  from  the  battlefield  to 
the  peace  table.  While  we  are  neutral 
on  the  final  outcome,  we  are  deeply 
committed  to  bringing  this  war  to  an 
end  so  that  our  friendly  relations  with 
all  of  the  countries  of  North  Africa  can 
continue  to  develop  unclouded  by  the 
present  distractions  and  complications 
of  the  war  in  the  Sahara. 


In  the  deliberations  of  the  Organi- 
zation of  African  Unity  (OAU)  in  the 
past  few  months  and  the  current  U.N. 
General  Assembly,  tentative  steps  have 
been  taken  that  may  begin  to  lead  the 
protagonists  out  of  their  current  im- 
passe. Over  the  past  6  months,  we  have 
seen  a  gradual  change  in  attitudes  on 
all  sides  which  has  created  an  atmos- 
phere and  an  opportunity  increasingly 
focusing  the  attention  of  the  interested 
parties  on  those  successive  steps  that 
must  be  taken  if  a  compromise  resolu- 
tion of  this  conflict  is  to  emerge. 

I  emphasize  that  the  process  is  still 
highly  tenuous  and  requires  careful  nur- 
turing. There  is  no  quick  and  easy  solu- 
tion. The  road  toward  peace  — in  the 
western  Sahara  and  elsewhere  — will 
take  the  parties  over  some  rough  ter- 
rain as  they  maneuver  to  defend  what 
they  perceive  to  be  their  vital  interests. 


U.S.  Relations  With  the  Parties 


10 


Our  relations  with  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  bear  directly  on  our  ability  to 
work  with  them  toward  a  solution. 
Today,  partly  as  a  result  of  our  decisuj. 
to  sell  certain  types  of  arms  to  Morooli 
our  measure  of  influence  with  Morocci 
is  increased  to  the  point  where  we  cai 
cooperate  in  constructive  steps,  most 
recently  the  Moroccan-sponsored  reso 
lution  at  the  United  Nations. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  in- 
creased the  intensity  of  our  contacts 
with  Algeria,  especially  on  the  questic 
of  our  hostages  in  Iran.  We  believe 
such  cooperation  in  one  field  will  mak' 
it  easier  for  us  to  work  together  in 
others.  Also,  we  have  established  con- 
tacts with  the  Polisario,  first  in  a  mee 
ing  in  Washington  last  spring,  then  bj 
a  visit  to  Polisario  refugee  camps  in 
Algeria  within  the  past  week. 

Establishing  a  Negotiating  Process 

As  you  know,  the  OAU  has  played  an 
important  role  in  trying  to  work  out  a 
compromise  solution.  Arising  out  of  a 
decision  taken  by  the  OAU  summit 


Bill  of  Rights  Day, 
Human  Rights 
Day  and  Week, 
1980 


A  PROCLAMATION' 

On  December  15.  1791,  the  Bill  of  Rights 
became  part  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  On  December  10.  1948,  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly  adopted 
the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Bights. 
Marking  these  anniversaries  together  gives 
us  an  opportunity  to  renew  our  dedication 
both  to  our  own  liberties  and  to  the  promo- 
tion of  human  rights  everywhere. 

The  Bill  of  Rights  carries  with  it  an  im- 
plied responsibility  for  the  governed  as  well 
as  for  the  governing.  No  American  citizen 
can  rest  satisfied  until  the  Bill  of  Rights  is  a 
living  reality  for  every  person  in  the  United 
States,  irrespective  of  race,  religion,  sex,  na- 
tional or  ethnic  origin.  We  cannot  simply 
rely  on  the  decency  of  government  or  the 
alertness  of  an  active  tree  press.  Each  indi- 
vidual must  shoulder  his  or  her  share  of  the 
responsibility  for  seeing  that  our  freedoms 
will  survive. 

The  Universal  Declaration  of  Human 
Rights  is  the  cornerstone  of  a  developing 


international  consensus  on  human  rights. 
Through  it,  the  members  of  the  United  Na- 
tions undertake  to  promote,  respect  and 
observe  human  rights  and  fundamental  free- 
doms for  all  without  discrimination.  We  must 
continuously  monitor  the  progress  of  this 
effort  and  the  records  of  governments 
around  the  world. 

The  promise  of  the  Declaration  is 
remote  to  all  those  who  suffer  summary 
executions  and  torture,  acts  of  genocide, 
arbitrary  arrest  and  imprisonment,  banish- 
ment, internal  exile,  forced  labor  and 
confinement  for  political  cause.  It  is  remote 
to  the  countless  refugees  who  flee  their 
lands  in  response  to  the  elimination  of  their 
human  rights.  It  is  remote  to  those  subjected 
to  armed  invasions  or  to  military  coups  that 
destroy  democratic  processes.  The  Declara- 
tion will  ring  hollow  to  that  segment  of  a 
population  discriminated  against  by  laws  of 
apartheid  or  by  restrictions  on  religious 
freedom.  It  will  ring  hollow  to  those  threat- 
ened by  violations  of  freedom  of  assembly, 
association,  expression  and  movement,  and 
by  the  suppression  of  trade  unions. 

The  Declaration  must  also  ring  hollow 
to  the  members  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  staff 
who  have  been  held  captive  for  more  than  a 
year  by  the  Government  of  Iran. 

The  cause  of  human  rights  is  embattled 
throughout  the  world.  Recent  events  make  it 
imperative  that  we,  as  Americans,  stand 
firm  in  our  insistence  that  the  values  em- 
bodied in  the  Bill  of  Rights,  and  contained  in 
the  Universal  Declaration,  be  enjoyed  by  all. 


I  urge  all  Americans  to  support  ratifi( 
tion  of  the  Genocide  Convention,  the  Con- 
vention on  the  Elimination  of  all  Forms  of 
Racial  Discrimination,  the  Covenant  on 
Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights,  the 
Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  and 
the  American  Convention  on  Human  Righl 
I  renew  my  request  to  the  Senate  to  give 
advice  and  consent  to  these  important 
treaties. 

Now.  Therefore,  I,  Jimmy  Carter. 
President  of  the  United  States  of  America 
do  hereby  proclaim  December  10,  1980.  as 
Human  Rights  Day  and  December  15,  198( 
as  Bill  of  Rights  Day.  and  call  on  all  Amer 
cans  to  observe  Human  Rights  Week  begii 
ning  December  10,  1980.  It  should  be  a  tim 
set  apart  for  the  study  of  our  own  rights, ! 
basic  to  the  working  of  our  society,  and  foi 
renewal  of  our  efforts  on  behalf  of  the 
human  rights  of  all  peoples  everywhere. 

In  Witness  Whereof.  I  have  hereunti 
set  my  hand  this  fourteenth  day  of  Noveui 
ber,  in  the  year  of  our  Lord  nineteen 
hundred  and  eighty,  and  of  the  Independer 
of  the  United  States  of  America  the  two 
hundred  and  fifth. 

Jimmy  Carter 


'No.  4804  of  Nov.  14,  1980  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential  Docu- 
ments of  Nov.  17).  ■ 


54 


Department  of  State  Bulle* 


Middle  East 


*  g  last  July,  the  OAU's  ad  hoc 
ion  committee  on  the  western 
(more  commonly  referred  to  as 
semen  Committee)  met  in 
liber  and  approved  a  peace  plan 
:  for  an  immediate  cease-fire  by 
her  15,  return  of  the  Moroccan 
lisario  forces  to  their  base 
a  U.N.  peacekeeping  force  to 
-lise  the  cease-fire,  and  an  OAU 
nidum  assisted  by  the  United  Na- 
s  n  the  issue  of  the  future  political 
uof  the  western  Sahara.  For  the 
:  Tie,  all  of  the  interested  par- 
-  Algeria,  Mauritania,  Polisario, 
rjresentatives  of  Saharan 
ir  -.ations  in  the  western  Sahara,  in- 
Morocco— attended  this  session 
i(  vVisemen  Committee  even  though 
iKotiations  took  place  among 
iisrested  parties. 
]  jrocco,  which  regards  itself  as 
a  n"ieved  party  to  Polisario  attacks 
iij  Morocco  proper,  readily  accepted 
C  U  call  for  an  immediate  cease- 
'  1 1  expressed  reservations  about 
t  erendum,  while  the  Polisario  sup- 
'f  a  referendum  but  refused  to  ac- 

eease-fire  until  Morocco  agrees 
m  T  into  direct  negotiations. 
re  I,  for  its  part,  maintained  its 
T  that  it  was  not  a  party  to  the 
•  even  though  the  Polisario  is 
n;  i  assistance  and  asylum  by  the 
re  ins.  It  is  widely  anticipated  that 
tu  urrent  OAU  initiative  does  not 
d    substantial  progress  toward  a 
ro  ited  settlement  by  next  June  — 
ei  he  1981  OAU  summit  will  take 
(X  the  Polisario  will  be  admitted  to 
(  U.  This  may  lead  to  increased 
te  al  assistance  to  the  Polisario  and 
■-U  her  isolation  of  Morocco. 

'.  irther  developments  occurred 
•n  consideration  of  the  western 
'3   issue  by  the  U.N.  General 
^  bly's  Fourth  Committee  last 
it   The  resolution  supported  by 
e  1  passed  easily,  criticizing  Moroc- 
.  c;upation  of  the  western  Sahara 
i  filing  for  direct  negotiation 
n  the  Polisario  and  Morocco 
;  to  self-determination  and  "in- 
36  lence."  By  referring  to  "independ- 
»  ind  to  the  Polisario  as  "repre- 

ive  of  the  people  of  the  western 
i<  I,"  it  seemed  to  us  that  this 
iOition  prejudged  the  issue  and  to 
iegree  contradicted  the  Wisemen 
mendation  for  a  referendum 
(  would  allow  the  inhabitants  of 
istern  Sahara  to  express  their 
nireferences. 
he  Moroccans  offered  a  resolution 
supported  the  initiatives  of  the 


U.S.,  Israel 
Settle  Claim  on 
U.S.S.  Liberty 

DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
DEC.  17,  1980' 

The  U.S.  Government  has  accepted  the 
proposal  by  the  Government  of  Israel 
to  pay  $6  million  in  three  annual  install- 
ments of  $2  million  each,  beginning  on 
January  15,  1981,  as  final  settlement  of 
the  U.S.  claim  for  compensation  for 
damage  to  the  U.S.S.  Liberty  as  a 
result  of  actions  of  the  Israeli  Armed 
Forces  on  June  8,  1967. 

The  Government  of  Israel  paid  in 
full  in  1968  the  U.S.  claim  for  $3,323,500 
on  behalf  of  the  families  of  the  crew- 
men who  were  killed  in  the  incident, 
and  in  1969  the  Government  of  Israel 
paid  in  full  the  U.S.  claim  for  $3,452,275 
for  injuries  sustained  by  the  members 
of  the  Liberty's  crew. 


^Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  John  Trattner.  ■ 

Wisemen  Committee.  We  would  have 
liked  to  have  seen  specific  reference  to 
the  core  elements  of  the  Wisemen's  rec- 
ommendations. However,  in  a  statement 
the  Moroccan  delegate  said:  "Morocco  is 
cooperating  and  will  continue  to  coop- 
erate diligently  with  the  ad  hoc  commit- 
tee to  implement  its  mandate  of  Free- 
town, particularly  as  it  relates  to  the 
free  choice  of  the  population."  We  con- 
sidered this  statement  a  significant 
step  forward  and,  on  the  basis  of  it, 
supported  the  Moroccan  draft  resolu- 
tion. 

Future  Prospects  for  Negotiation 

Although  the  Moroccan  draft  resolution 
was  defeated  by  one  vote,  we  followed 
up  with  bilateral  discussions  with  both 
the  Moroccans  and  Algerians  to  explore 
how  the  recommendations  of  the  Wise- 
men  Committee  could  be  implemented. 
We  have  also  sought  to  elicit  from 
various  members  of  the  OAU  their  sug- 
gestions for  maintaining  the  momentum 
set  in  train  by  the  September  resolu- 
tions of  the  OAU  Wisemen  Committee. 
There  are  a  number  of  questions  which 
might  be  usefully  addressed  in  this 
regard.  How  would  a  referendum  be 
carried  out?  How  would  one  establish 
voting  eligibility?  Which  institutions 


would  be  best  equipped  to  carry  out  a 
referendum?  Would  it  be  useful  for  the 
OAU  to  establish  a  subcommittee  of 
experts  to  work  out  some  of  these 
details? 

We  do  not  embrace  any  particular 
solution  to  the  conflict,  although  the 
OAU  call  for  a  cease-fire  and  a  referen- 
dum does  appear  to  us  as  a  useful  basis 
upon  which  to  move  forward.  As  a 
result  of  my  discussions  with  interested 
and  concerned  parties,  I  note  a  height- 
ened interest  in  accelerating  the  peace 
process.  Compared  with  the  situation  a 
year  ago,  I  believe  that  we  can  take 
some  satisfaction  in  the  progress  that 
has  been  made. 

•  The  interested  parties  have 
met  with  the  OAU  subcommittee. 

•  The  complexities  involved  in 
reaching  a  peaceful  solution  have  been 
brought  out  more  clearly. 

•  The  OAU  has  laid  down  general 
principles  which  could  serve  as  the 
basis  for  a  settlement. 

•  And  most  important,  the  inter- 
ested parties  seem  to  have  come  to  an 
awareness  of  the  urgency  of  embarking 
on  negotiations  as  the  only  way  out  of  a 
stalemate  on  the  battlefield. 

Nevertheless,  the  principal  parties 
remain  far  apart  on  their  demands.  We 
believe  a  process  of  peace  is  required  to 
bring  about  a  convergence  of  views. 

Military  Situation 

While  the  military  situation  in  the  past 
year  has  improved  for  the  Moroccans 
and  they  appear  able  to  hold  their  con- 
trol of  the  principal  towns  in  the  west- 
ern Sahara,  Polisario  attacks  continue. 
Thus  the  war  of  attrition  continues 
without  any  indication  that  either  side 
has  reason  to  hope  for  a  military  vic- 
tory. 

We  have  been  particularly  con- 
cerned about  Polisario  attacks  deep  into 
Morocco's  southern  provinces  which  in 
some  instances  could  have  shifted  the 
locus  of  the  fighting  toward  the 
Moroccan-Algerian  border.  In  talks 
with  both  Algeria  and  the  Polisario,  we 
have  attempted  to  discourage  especially 
attacks  outside  of  the  disputed  terri- 
tory. There  are  some  indications  that 
our  concern  has  been  fruitful.  Reports 
of  increased  Polisario  movement  in 
Mauritania  and  the  role  of  Libya  are 
also  of  concern  to  us.  We  do  not  believe 
that  either  Morocco  or  the  Polisario  has 
won  — or  can  win  — a  decisive  advantage 
on  the  battlefield.  Therefore,  our 


iry  1981 


55 


OCEANS 


original  premise  that  the  war  is  unwin- 
able  in  any  ultimate  sense  is  still 
valid.  That  fact,  of  course,  should  be  an 
added  incentive  for  encouraging  the 
interested  parties  to  reach  a  compro- 
mise settlement. 

Status  of  U.S.  Arms  Sales  to  Morocco 

I  would  like  to  end  my  remarks  with  a 
few  comments  on  the  status  of  U.S. 
arms  deliveries  to  Morocco.  With 
regard  to  the  arms  package  which  was 
approved  earlier  this  year,  consisting  of 
6  OV-10  reconnaissance  aircraft,  20 
F5-E  fighter  aircraft,  and  24  heli- 
copters, none  of  these  items  has  yet 
been  delivered  to  Morocco.  There  is 
some  question  whether  the  Moroccans 
are  still  interested  in  the  purchase  of 
the  helicopters,  and  a  delivery  schedule 
is  still  pending.  The  first  fighter  air- 
craft deliveries  should  commence  in 
mid-1982.  Morocco  has  made  a  request 
for  the  sale  of  108  M-60  tanks,  and  it  is 
under  review  in  the  Department. 

Conclusion 

The  western  Sahara  conflict  is  a  com- 
plex issue  in  which  our  North  African 
friends  are  themselves  divided.  It  is  our 
hope  that  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue its  role  of  encouraging  the  inter- 
ested parties  to  concentrate  on  the 
negotiating  process  itself  and  that  out 
of  the  give  and  take  which  such  a  proc- 
ess involves,  a  compromise  settlement 
will  emerge. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Law  of  the  Sea 


by  George  H.  Aldrich 

Address  before  the  National  Asso- 
ciation of  Manufacturers  in  San  Fran- 
cisco on  December  9,  1980.  Mr.  Aldrich 
is  Acting  Special  Representative  of  the 
President  for  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Con- 
ference. 

In  the  course  of  my  present  assignment, 
I  have  met  many  Americans  who  are 
involved  in  one  way  or  another  with  our 
mineral  industry  or  are  concerned 
about  our  future  access  to  minerals. 
These  have  not  all  been  the  most 
friendly  of  encounters,  despite  the  fact 
that  I  share  many  of  these  concerns. 
Often  I  find  myself  facing  questions  as 
to  why  we  have  permitted  our  future 
access  to  the  mineral  resources  of  the 
deep  seabeds  to  become  hostage  to  a 
U.N.  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea. 
The  clear  implication  of  many  of  these 
questions  and  the  comments  that  often 
accompany  them  is  that  our  govern- 
ment, either  through  naivete  or  duplic- 
ity, is  playing  fast  and  loose  with  our 
economic  security  in  order  to  curry  fa- 
vor with  the  Third  World.  While  I  am 
sure  that  none  of  you  share  any  of 
these  delusions,  the  purpose  of  my  re- 
marks today  is  to  explain  why  they  are 
delusions— just  in  case. 

To  understand  the  effort  in  which 
we  are  engaged  in  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference  and  our  goals  with  respect 
to  deep  seabed  mining,  it  is  necessary 
to  review,  at  least  briefly,  both  the  his- 
tory of  the  efforts  since  the  Second 
World  War  to  codify  and  develop  the 
international  law  governing  uses  of  the 
oceans  and  the  legal  problems  and  re- 
quirements of  a  pioneer  industry  facing 
up  to  the  task  of  exploiting  the  mineral 
resources  of  one  of  the  world's  common 
areas,  the  seabeds  beyond  the  limits  of 
national  jurisdiction.  In  a  very  real 
sense,  it  is  the  interaction  of  these  two 
lines  of  development  and  their  not  eas- 
ily compatible  imperatives  that  defines 
our  present  struggle  to  obtain  assured 
access  to  seabed  resources  as  part  of  a 
comprehensive  treaty  on  the  law  of  the 
sea. 

Historical  Background 

Postwar  efforts  to  develop  and  codify 
the  international  law  of  the  sea  have 
resulted  in  three  U.N.  conferences.  The 
first  produced  four  conventions  adopted 


in  1958— one  concerning  the  high  sea8;|:i' 
another  the  Continental  Shelf;  a  third. f* 
the  territorial  sea  and  contiguous  zom:: 
and  the  fourth,  fishing  and  the  conser , 
vation  of  the  living  resources  of  the    pi 
high  seas.  The  second  U.N.  conference  C' 
failed,  in  1960,  to  reach  agreement  on 
the  major  question  before  it — the  ma): 
imum  permissible  breadth  of  the  terri 
torial  sea.  The  third  conference  is  no»|ii( 
in  its  eighth  year  and,  if  successful,  wi in 
establish  a  new  and  comprehensive  le-fcli 
gal  regime  for  the  oceans.  u; 

Let  us  pause  a  moment  to  conside 
why  the  nations  of  the  world  have 
needed  three  successive  conferences  ai  •: 
why,  even  after  all  this  effort,  success, 
although  likely,  is  still  in  the  future. 

The  1958  conventions  were  desigmjtj, 
in  part  to  bring  an  end  to  "creeping  jt ftl 
risdiction,"  the  steady  expansion  of 
claims  by  coastal  states  to  exercise  ju  ; 
risdiction  off  their  coasts.  To  be  sue-   At 
cessful,  they  would  have  to  have  been  iifc| 
generally  accepted  or  at  least  complia  i/t. 
with  by  most,  if  not  all,  coastal  states  '- 
and  they  would  have  to  have  imposed 
limits  on  the  breadth  of  the  territoria 
sea  and  on  the  extent  of  the  jurisdicti 
that  could  be  exercised  by  coastal 
states.  Unfortunately,  they  failed  on  a 
counts,  and  the  years  since  1958  have 
seen  a  steady  growth  of  coastal  state 
claims  of  sovereign  rights,  particular! 
over  offshore  resources. 

The  High  Seas  Convention,  which 
was  the  most  widely  accepted  of  the 
four  1958  conventions,  has  only  56 
states  party  to  it,  whereas  there  are  1 
states  participating  in  the  third  U.N. 
conference.  Almost  all  of  the  major 
maritime  powers  became  party  to  tha 
convention,  but  most  of  the  coastal 
states  stayed  out  and  led  the  fight  for 
expanded  jurisdiction. 

For  the  United  States,  maritime 
freedoms  have  historically  been  more 
important  than  offshore  resources.  In 
the  past  35  years,  however,  the  United 
States  has  become  increasingly  aware 
of  the  importance  of  the  natural  re- 
sources off  its  coasts:  first,  of  the  oil 
and  gas  under  the  Continental  Shelf 
and,  more  recently,  of  the  coastal 
fisheries.  Nevertheless,  despite  these  ii 
creasing  concerns  with  our  offshore 
resources,  the  United  States  remained  , 
very  much  aware  of  its  dependence  on  j 
the  unimpeded  passage  of  ocean  com- 


56 


Department  of  State  Bullet. 


hI 


Oceans 


and  of  its  security  needs  for  free- 
f  naval  navigation  and  overflight 
jhout  the  oceans,  including  the 
t  of  straits.  Our  increasing  and 
iunate  dependence  on  imports  of 
a  oil  have  reinforced  these  needs, 
the  late  1960s,  the  United  States 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  some 
emajor  maritime  powers  to  pro- 
■{•enewed  efforts  by  the  United  Na- 
is  0  develop  and  codify  the  law  of 
J  a  in  ways  that  would  be  univer- 
'yiccepted  and  would  effectively 

to  an  end  the  rapid  expansion  of 
_.  1  state  jurisdiction.  Simulta- 
ou  y,  other  voices  in  the  United 
)tiis  were  calling  for  international- 
iti  1  of  ocean  space  beyond  national 
siction.  These  separate  efforts  re- 
(  in  the  establishment,  first,  of  a 
.■J.  leabed  Committee  and,  subse- 
er  y,  of  the  Third  U.N.  Conference 
ti  Law  of  the  Sea. 

lis  third  conference  quickly  de- 
j&  :hat  the  convention  it  hoped  to 
■jc  ;e  would  be  comprehensive — 
eai  ig  all  aspects  of  the  law  of  the 
ea  I.  Unlike  the  conventions  of  1958, 
^i<  divided  the  subject  into  discrete 
te  ries,  the  new  law  was  to  be  a 
icige  deal"  dealing  with  navigation, 
so  ces,  pollution,  and  international 
.ej  ons.  While  this  made  the  nego- 
iti ;  task  harder  by  requiring  success 
1  a  fronts,  it  tended  to  insure  that 
e  suits  would  be  accepted  univer- 
.!1;  The  coastal  states  would  agree  to 
le  .vigational  protections  and  the 
Tii  tion  of  territorial  seas  to  12  miles 
b  adth  in  return  for  the  recognition 
s  other  states  of  200-mile  economic 
iw  and  all  states  would  feel  com- 
?ll  to  become  parties  in  order  to 
iri  ipate  in  the  new  international  or- 
ini  ition  created  to  manage  the  re- 
u]  is  of  the  deep  seabeds,  which  were 
^vi  d  the  national  jurisdiction  and 
'    had  been  declared  by  the  U.N. 

al  Assembly  in  December  1970,  by 
a  mous  resolution,  to  be  "the  com- 
01  leritage  of  mankind."  This  is  how 
e  larch  began  for  the  comprehensive 
ai  age  deal." 

-!a  ;d  Mining's  Special  Problems 

let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the 
i\  problems  of  resource  recovery 
-II  an  area  beyond  national  jurisdic- 
uind  the  alternatives  available  to  us 
( iling  with  such  an  area,  which  we 
as  refer  to  as  a  part  of  the  commons 
■  1 ;  world— that  is,  those  areas  be- 
r  the  jurisdiction  of  any  nation 
i  available  for  the  use  of  all. 


These  commons  are:  first,  the 
oceans,  including  the  bottom  of  the 
oceans— that  is  the  seabeds— beyond 
the  limit  of  national  jurisdiction;  sec- 
ond, outer  space,  above  the  limits  of  na- 
tional jurisdiction  (wherever  that  may 
be);  and  third,  Antarctica,  although  one 
must  note  that  some  states  have  still 
preserved  their  territorial  claims  to 
parts  of  Antarctica  under  the  Antarctic 
Treaty  regime  which  has  made  it  possi- 
ble to  continue  scientific  activity  in 
Antarctica  without  resolving  disputes 
over  the  legal  status  of  that  territory. 
These  common  areas,  particularly  the 
oceans  and  outer  space,  have  been  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "common 
heritage  of  mankind,"  but  there  is 
nothing  magic  in  the  name;  it  is  their 
location  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  any 
nation  that  gives  them  their  special 
characteristics. 

There  are,  in  my  judgment,  only 
two  ways  of  treating  these  common  ar- 
eas for  legal  purposes:  Either  we  can 
consider  them  available  for  national  ap- 
propriation, like  North  and  South 
America  in  the  15th  to  18th  centuries, 
and  Africa  in  the  19th  century,  or  we 
must  consider  them  not  available  for 
national  appropriation,  like  the  high 
seas  since  at  least  the  days  of  Hugo 
Grotius. 

The  United  States,  along  with  vir- 
tually all  other  states,  has  given  consis- 
tent support  to  the  second  of  these  legal 
approaches  during  all  the  years  since 
the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.  We 
have  done  this,  it  is  fair  to  say,  because 
we  were  convinced  that  this  was  the 
better  approach  in  our  own  interests 
and  in  the  interests  of  world  order  and 
the  avoidance  of  unnecessary  conflict. 

Difficulties  in  the  use  of  the  world's 
commons  are  likely  to  arise  only  when 
some  states  want  to  exploit  some  of  the 
resources  of  these  common  areas.  There 
has  been  exploitation  of  the  living  re- 
sources of  the  high  seas  for  many  years 
without  major  difficulty,  although  it  has 
been  found  necessary  to  create  a  num- 
ber of  international  organizations  to  co- 
ordinate conservation  efforts  such  as 
the  protection  of  marine  mammals. 
Significant  problems,  however,  arise 
wherever  exclusivity  of  access  to  a  par- 
ticular site  becomes  necessary.  By 
definition,  an  area  beyond  national  ju- 
risdiction is  one  to  which  no  national 
authority  can  accord  such  exclusive 
rights.  With  respect  to  the  resources  of 
the  seabeds,  although  in  our  view  they 
are  available,  like  fish,  to  all  states  on  a 
first-come,  first-served  basis,  as  a  prac- 
tical, economic  matter,  that  simply  isn't 


good  enough  for  seabed  miners.  Miners 
the  world  over  and  their  bankers  re- 
quire an  exclusive  right  to  an  ore  body 
before  investing  in  the  recovery  and 
processing  of  the  ore.  It  seems  clear 
that  considerations  of  this  type  would 
force  the  deferral  of  mining  activities 
in  these  seabed  areas  until  exclusive  ac- 
cess to  particular  sites  could  be  ac- 
corded. I  think  it  is  self-evident  that 
where  exclusivity  of  access  is  essential 
in  areas  beyond  national  jurisdiction  it 
can  only  be  conferred  by  international 
agreement  among  at  least  most  of  the 
interested  states. 

This  fundamental  point  may  have 
been  somewhat  obscured  by  the  con- 
gressional debates  of  recent  years  on 
seabed  mining  legislation;  and  there 
may  be  some,  particularly  in  the  Con- 
gress, who  really  believe  that  the  en- 
actment of  the  legislation  in  June  of 
this  year  will  result,  without  more,  in  a 
rush  of  investment  and  the  early  ex- 
ploitation of  deep  seabed  resources. 
Certainly  the  enactment  of  the  legis- 
lation gave  an  important  psychological 
boost  to  the  fledgling  industry,  and  we 
are  hopeful  it  will  encourage  the  con- 
tinuation of  further  necessary  research 
and  development  efforts.  But  I  have 
seen  nothing  to  indicate  that  this 
legislation — even  when  supplemented 
by  similar  and  reciprocal  legislation  by 
other  states  with  the  greatest  present 
interest  in  seabed  mining— would  pro- 
vide a  sufficient  legal  framework  to  per- 
mit the  industry  to  move  forward 
quickly  to  commercial  production.  This 
is  not  to  suggest  that  commercial  recov- 
ery of  deep  seabed  mineral  resources 
will  never  occur  if  an  international  re- 
gime capable  of  granting  exclusive  li- 
censes is  not  created.  Never  is  a  long 
time.  But  it  does  seem  almost  certain  to 
me  that  the  failure  to  create  such  an 
international  regime  would  long  delay 
seabed  mining,  perhaps  by  a  quarter 
century  or  more.  If  there  is  a  substan- 
tial risk  that  this  judgment  is  correct, 
then  there  should  be  no  doubt  about  the 
urgent  need  for  an  acceptable  inter- 
national legal  regime  for  the  ex- 
ploitation of  deep  seabed  minerals. 

Seabeds  and  the  "Package  Deal" 

Since  1970,  a  key  part  of  the  search  for 
the  "package  deal"  in  the  Seabed  Com- 
mittee and  in  the  conference  itself  has 
been  the  terribly  complex  effort  to  cre- 
ate a  new  international  organization — 
the  International  Seabed  Authority— to 
regulate  access  to  seabed  mineral  re- 


jary  1981 


57 


Oceans 


sources  and  to  provide  the  exclusive  le- 
gal right  that  prospective  miners  need. 
In  fact,  this  turned  out  to  be  the  most 
elusive  of  the  necessary  elements  of  an 
acceptable  "package  deal."  The  vital 
freedoms  of  navigation  and  overflight  in 
straits,  exclusive  economic  zones,  and 
archipelagic  waters  have  been  agreed 
for  years.  The  final  compromises  on  the 
nature  and  limits  of  coastal  state  juris- 
diction over  the  resources  of  the 
200-mile  economic  zone  and  the  Con- 
tinental Shelf  and  the  control  of  marine 
pollution  were  hammered  out  sometime 
ago.  However,  only  last  summer  were 
the  last  major  issues  settled  with  re- 
spect to  the  seabed  mining  regime.  Only 
now  is  it  possible  to  reach  meaningful 
conclusions  about  the  emerging  seabed 
regime. 

The  time  available  today  does  not 
permit  me  to  summarize  all  of  the  ele- 
ments of  the  seabed  regime  as  found  in 
the  new  draft  convention.  I  have  de- 
cided to  concentrate  on  those  provisions 
dealing  with  access  to  seabed  mineral 
resources— the  provisions  that  tell  the 
potential  investor  what  steps  he  would 
have  to  take,  and  the  provisions  he 
must  analyze  to  determine  what  risks 
he  would  run  and  what  are  the  chances 
of  something  going  wrong  with  his 
access. 

There  is  one  point  I  must  empha- 
size at  the  outset  of  this  summary.  It  is 
patently  impossible  to  negotiate  at  a 
conference  of  some  150  countries  and  to 
include  in  a  treaty  all  the  detailed  rules 
and  regulations  necessary  to  insure  the 
proper  functioning  of  the  International 
Seabed  Authority.  The  preparation  of 
these  rules,  regulations,  and  procedures 
will  be  the  task  of  a  Preparatory  Com- 
mission, to  be  established  soon  after 
the  treaty  is  signed  and  to  work  full 
time  for  several  years.  Industry  will 
have  to  be  intimately  involved  in  this 
process,  and  the  work  done  by  industry 
and  the  Department  of  Commerce  dur- 
ing the  coming  year  under  our  recently 
enacted  Deep  Seabed  Hard  Minerals 
Act  should  give  us  a  great  advantage  in 
that  Preparatory  Commission.  The 
rules  developed  there  can  be  changed  by 
the  Authority  later  only  if  there  is  a 
consensus  in  the  36-nation  Council.  Any 
final  judgments  by  the  United  States  on 
the  acceptability  and  viability  of  the 
treaty's  mining  regime  must  await 
these  rules. 


Assured  Access 

To  be  assured  of  access  to  the  oppor- 
tunity to  engage  in  deep  seabed  mining, 
a  prospective  miner  who  has  the  neces- 
sary capital  and  know-how  must  be  as- 
sured that  the  International  Seabed 
Authority's  contract  approval  process  is 
fair,  clear,  and  well-nigh  automatic. 
The  criteria  spelled  out  in  Annex  III  of 
the  treaty  satisfy  this  requirement.  An 
applicant  has  only  to  be  sponsored  by  a 
state  party  and  to  satisfy  the  financial 
and  technical  qualifications  spelled  out 
in  the  regulations.  His  plan  of  work 
must  fulfill  the  specifications  with  re- 
spect to  such  matters  as  size  of  area, 
diligence  requirements,  and  mining 
standards  and  practices,  including  those 
relevant  to  protection  of  the  marine  en- 
vironment, that  will  also  be  set  forth  in 
the  regulations.  If  these  requirements 
are  met,  his  plan  of  work  miist  be  ap- 
proved; there  is  no  discretionary  basis 
for  its  rejection. 

The  determination  that  the  appli- 
cant and  his  plan  of  work  do  in  fact 
comply  with  these  criteria  is  the  job  of 
the  Legal  and  Technical  Commission. 
The  Commission  will  have  15  members 
elected  to  5-year  terms  by  a  three- 
fourths  vote  of  the  36-member  Council 
from  among  candidates  nominated  by 
states  parties  who  meet  the  "highest 
standard  of  competence  and  integrity 
with  qualifications  in  relevant  fields." 
The  Commission  is  obligated  to  base  its 
recommendations  solely  on  the  pro- 
visions of  Annex  III  and  to  report  fully 
to  the  Council.  The  majority  required 
for  decisions  by  the  Commission  is  to 
be  established  in  the  rules,  regulations, 
and  procedures  of  the  Authority,  and 
I  expect  our  representatives  on  the 
Preparatory  Commission  to  insist  that 
this  must  be  no  more  than  a  simple 
majority. 

Any  plan  of  work  which  the  Com- 
mission finds  consistent  with  the  re- 
quirements of  Annex  III  will  be  deemed 
approved  by  the  Council  within  a  fixed 
time  unless  the  Council  decides— by 
consensus— to  disapprove  it.  While  we 
would  have  preferred  the  "deeming"  de- 
vice to  apply  regardless  of  the  Commis- 
sion's findings,  the  Conference— 
understandably,  I  think— felt  that  some 
organ  of  the  Authority  would  have  to 
attest  to  conformity  with  the  applicable 
standards  of  Annex  III.  Doubtless  this 
would  also  have  been  true  of  the  simple 
licensing  system  originally  advocated 
by  the  industrial  countries.  The  auto- 
maticity  of  the  system  could  only  be 


frustrated  if  three-fourths  of  the  men 
bers  of  the  Council  make  a  conscious 
and  determined  effort  to  elect  unsuit- 
able Commission  members  who  will  i( 
nore  the  requirements  of  the  treaty. 

The  Production  Ceiling 

Although  we  were  able  to  get  agree- 
ment in  Geneva  that  approval  of  a  pi 
of  work  should  no  longer  be  tied  to  th 
availability  of  a  nickel  production  all( 
ment,  the  timing  of  access  still  depen 
on  the  authorization  of  production  un 
der  the  ceiling.  Certainly  from  an  eco 
nomic  point  of  view  it  makes  no  sens( 
to  limit  arbitrarily  production  of  a  m 
eral  from  one  source  and  not  from  otl 
ers.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  thai 
seabed  resources  will  be  cheaper  to  re 
cover  and  refine  than  land-based 
resources— quite  the  opposite,  at  leasi 
during  the  first  several  decades  in 
which  the  seabed  minerals  industry  is* 
developing.  But  even  if  they  were 
cheaper,  why  shouldn't  we  let  them 
take  over  markets  from  the  more  ex- 
pensive competition?  Consumers  de- 
serve a  break;  they  seem  to  get  few 
enough  these  days. 

Unfortunately,  however,  we  are 
trying  to  produce  a  universal  treaty- 
one  that  will  be  accepted  by  virtually 
all  coastal  and  maritime  nations,  and 
that  large  group  includes  a  number  o; 
countries  that  produce  either  nickel, 
copper,  cobalt,  or  manganese,  and  an 
additional  number  that  think  they 
might  become  producers  in  the  not-to 
distant  future.  Those  countries  must, 
they  are  to  accept  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Convention,  be  able  to  show  that  thei: 
producer  interests  are  protected,  at 
least  for  an  interim  period.  Moreover, 
the  interest  of  most  developing  coun- 
tries as  consumers  is  minimal,  for  the 
do  not  yet  have  the  industry  to  be  ma 
jor  consumers.  Most  developing  coun- 
tries tend  to  sympathize  with  and  be 
protective  of  raw  material  producers, 
tendency  that  has  been  encouraged  ar 
fully  by  Canada,  the  leading  nickel  pr 
ducer.  Thus,  it  has  long  been  clear  ths 
there  could  not  be  a  generally  accepte 
Law  of  the  Sea  Convention  that  does 
not  contain  an  interim  production  ceil 
ing.  As  now  formulated,  the  productio 
ceiling  is  not  likely  to  bar  access  for    . 
any  qualified  miner.  The  amount  of  pe 
mitted  production  is  substantial,  a 
"floor"  has  been  added,  and  the  con- 
straint on  seabed  production  is  limitec 
in  duration. 


58 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


SOUTH  ASIA 


Because  the  formula  in  the  text  is 
ad  on  a  projection  forward  of  past 
lids,  it  is  impossible  to  predict  ex- 
;r'  what  level  of  production  will  be 
Ived  during  the  15  years  the  limit 
in  effect,  apply.  But  on  the  basis  of 
Bureau  of  Mines'  mid-range 
action  of  the  growth  in  nickel  con- 
ntion  during  the  balance  of  this 
•iry  (3.4%)  and  the  earliest  prac- 
ile  start-up  date  for  commercial 
■fuction  (1988),  the  first  group  of 
i  Ts  to  apply  for  production  author- 
lans  could  produce  annually  an  ag- 
nate of  about  200,000  tons  of  nickel, 
eafter,  the  limit  for  the  industry  as 
ole  would  increase  so  that  after  5 
.  in  1992,  320,000  tons  could  be 
jced;  after  10  years,  490,000  tons; 
i  ifter  15  years,  590,000. 
n  fact,  the  15-year  trend  line 
th  rate  for  nickel  consumption  is 
rntly  about  3.9%,  and  if  that  rate 
»:  extended  into  the  future,  the  ton- 
i  allowed  to  seabed  mining  would  be 
-  derably  higher.  If  future  growth 
d  turn  out  to  be  lower  than  antici- 
I,  the  full  effect  of  the  drop  would 
e  felt  because  of  the  "floor"  pro- 
1  in  the  formula.  This  substitutes  a 
num  3%  growth  rate  for  any  act- 
i  ite  lower  than  3%.  Even  if  the 
■  0  th  rate  fell  as  low  as  2.2%,  seabed 
i  !i  rs  could— if  they  thought  they 
u  make  money  in  the  kind  of  eco- 
r :  climate  implied  by  such  a  dis- 
iU  ging  trend— still  supply  up  to  18% 
.  t ;  nickel  market  in  the  first  year  of 
ii'o  iction  and  up  to  36%  by  the  15th 
!>  a  Notwithstanding  the  share  of 
iction  taken  up  by  the  Enterprise, 
I  alone  or  in  joint  ventures,  there 
iiHi  still  be  sufficient  tonnage  under 
iji  easonable  set  of  assumptions  to 
*i  e  that  private  miners  would  get 
e  authorizations  when  they  need 
e  .  It  is  thus  probable  that  market 
■I  3,  not  the  production  limitation 
1  ala,  will  determine  how  much 
:i  1  and,  therefore,  how  much  copper, 
o:t,  and  manganese,  will  be  produced 
'e  first  generation  of  seabed  mining 

t    eabed  mining  is  a  pioneering  ven- 
(  «So  too  is  the  effort  of  the  world 
miunity  to  base  the  structure  of  a 
"  nternational  seabed  regime  on  the 
sition  that  the  global  commons 
u  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
tate.  It  has  been  a  difficult  under- 
i  g,  the  building  of  this  structure, 


Soviet  Invasion 
of  Afghanistan 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  24,  1980  ' 

One  year  has  passed  since  the  Soviet 
Union  launched  its  brutal  assault  on  its 
small,  nonaligned  neighbor,  Afghani- 
stan. On  December  27,  1979,  Soviet 
paratroopers  seized  key  Afghan  institu- 
tions in  Kabul,  including  the  Presiden- 
tial Palace,  where  President  Amin  was 
then  killed.  The  Soviets  installed  a  pup- 
pet government  under  the  nominal 
leadership  of  Babrak  Karmal,  who  was 
in  the  Soviet  Union  at  the  time. 

The  tragedy  that  has  continued  to 
unfold  in  Afghanistan  over  the  past  12 
months  weighs  heavily  on  all  Ameri- 
cans. We  have  watched  the  Soviet 
Armed  Forces  employ  massive  fire- 
power and  increasingly  brutal  tactics. 
We  have  seen  the  ranks  of  Afghan 
refugees  fleeing  devastation  and 
political  and  religious  oppression  at 
home  swell  to  more  than  1.2  million  in 
Pakistan  alone.  And  amid  this  g^im 
spectacle,  we  have  been  heartened  to 
witness  the  brave  resistance  of  the 
Afghan  people,  who  have  continued 
their  struggle  for  independence  and  the 
right  to  determine  their  own  political 
future. 

The  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan 
and  attempted  forceful  occupation  of 
that  fiercely  independent,  nonaligned, 


Muslim  nation  has  had  a  profoundly 
negative  impact  on  the  international 
community.  An  overwhelming  majority 
of  member  states  of  the  United  Nations 
demanded  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
foreign  troops  from  Afghanistan  in  a 
special  General  Assembly  session  in 
January  1980.  An  increased  majority 
reiterated  this  demand  following  care- 
ful General  Assembly  consideration  of 
the  Afghanistan  issue  last  month.  The 
40-member  Islamic  conference  has  been 
particularly  forceful  in  condemning 
Soviet  actions  and  in  seeking  an  appro- 
priate political  solution.  If  the  Soviet 
leaders  expected  that  the  world  would 
avert  its  eyes  and  quickly  forget  their 
aggression  in  Afghanistan,  they  have 
been  disappointed. 

We  urge  the  Soviet  Union  to  re- 
spond to  those  nations  urging  with- 
drawal of  Soviet  military  forces  and 
inviting  Soviet  cooperation  in  the 
search  for  a  political  solution  to  the 
Afghan  crisis.  For  our  part,  we  have  of- 
fered to  join  in  the  effort  to  find  a 
political  solution  involving  a  Soviet 
withdrawal,  and  we  repeat  that  offer 
today.  The  suffering  of  the  Afghan  peo- 
ple must  be  brought  to  an  end. 

The  Afghan  people  and  their  strug- 
gle have  not  been  forgotten  and  will 
not  be  forgotten  by  the  rest  of  the 
world.  We  call  on  the  Soviet  Union  to 
work  with  us  and  others  in  finding  a 
way  to  bring  peace  to  that  tormented 
nation. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Dec.  29,  1980. 


the  most  difficult  I  have  ever  been  a 
part  of.  But  the  same  pioneering  spirit 
and  the  same  confidence  in  the  future 
that  have  brought  seabed  mining  and 
the  seabed  mining  regime  so  close  to 
reality  can  also  assure  a  harmonious 
relationship  between  the  two.  And  we 
must  not  forget  that  the  recovery  of 
seabed  mineral  resources  is  not  only 
important  as  a  potential  source  of  min- 
erals; it  is  also  the  remaining  linchpin 
in  the  whole  Law  of  the  Sea 
Convention— the  last  major  item  in  the 
long  sought  "package  deal."  Given  the 


distance  we  have  come  and  the  inter- 
ests at  stake  in  the  success  of  this  vast 
undertaking,  we  cannot  fail  to  finish 
the  job.  Pioneering  ventures  are 
difficult  enough  in  a  stable  legal  order. 
Without  law— without  this  new  compre- 
hensive legal  system  for  the  oceans- 
seabed  mining  will  be  only  one  of  the 
victims  of  the  more  chaotic  and  danger- 
ous world  that  would  result.  This  we 
cannot  permit.  ■ 


Jary  1981 


59 


UNITED  NATIONS 


The  United  Nations  and  U.S.  Policy 


by  Richard  L.  McCaU 

Address  before  the  Harvard  Model 
United  Nations  in  Cambridge,  Massa- 
chusetts, on  December  i,  1980.  Mr. 
McCallis  Assistant  Secretary  for  Inter- 
national Organization  Affairs. 

Pollsters  have  taken  a  pretty  bad 
shellacking  lately — they,  therefore, 
may  not  be  the  most  authoritative 
source  to  establish  my  basic  premise 
for  this  discussion.  The  point  is,  how- 
ever, that  contrary  to  conventional 
wisdom,  public  perception  does  support 
the  notion  that  there  is  room  for  the 
United  Nations  in  American  foreign 
policy.  According  to  recent  polls  by 
Gallup  and  Roper,  Americans  by  a 
two-to-one  margin  want  to  increase 
U.S.  participation  in  the  U.N.  system. 

Nonetheless,  the  consumers  of 
conventional  wisdom  continue  to  pur- 
port that  American  public  support  for 
the  United  Nations  is  on  the  decline 
and,  accordingly,  we  ought  to  be 
reducing  our  financial  assistance  to 
the  U.N.  family.  In  dollars  and  cents 
terms,  these  advocates  of  retrench- 
ment have  succeeded  to  a  considerable 
extent.  Thirty  years  ago,  the  United 
States  contributed  almost  one-half 
(47.5%)  of  the  United  Nations' 
budget.  Today,  our  share  is  only 
25.6%,  a  little  over  $1  billion,  about 
$4  for  each  American — less  than  what 
each  of  us  spent  to  see  the  movie 
"Apocalypse  Now." 

Along  with  this  less  than  adequate 
performance,  outlays  for  programs, 
such  as  foreign  aid,  which  are  critical 
in  creating  a  more  harmonious  inter- 
national community,  have  also  declined 
over  time  and  in  comparison  with 
other  countries.  For  example,  in  the 
past  15  years,  the  net  U.S.  official 
development  assistance  decreased 
from  0.49%  of  our  GNP  to  0.17%.  In 
contrast,  the  total  development  as- 
sistance effort  of  other  traditional  aid- 
giving  countries  has  increased  five- 
fold during  the  same  period. 

Why  the  discrepancy  between  our 
professed  beliefs  and  our  willingness 
to  provide  adequate  financial  resources 
which  would  reinforce  these  beliefs? 

There  are  probably  lists  of  rea- 
sons for  it,  none  of  them  fully  explana- 
tory but  each  of  them  sufficient  to 
raise  doubts.  Perhaps  in  its  genesis, 


we  have  ascribed  greater  hopes  to  the 
United  Nations  than  it  could  possibly 
fulfill  in  our  lifetimes.  Idealistic  meas- 
uring sticks  are  bad  bases  for  judg- 
ment. 

The  U.N.'8  Record 

Almost  30  years  ago  when  the  United 
Nations  was  created,  it  was  seen  as 
the  great  global  instrument  that  would 
banish  forever  the  scourge  of  war. 
Since  then,  there  have  been  at  least 
five  major  military  conflicts  on  the 
average  every  year.  As  we  celebrate 
the  35th  anniversary  of  the  United 
Nations'  founding,  a  war  is  going  on 
unabated  between  Iraq  and  Iran,  vio- 
lent conflicts  continue  in  at  least  four 
areas  in  Africa,  direct  Soviet,  or 
Soviet-backed,  military  interventions 
violate  the  sovereignty  of  three  coun- 
tries in  Asia,  and  civil  strife  has 
taken  8,000  lives  in  El  Salvador  this 
year  alone.  Annually,  the  woi-ld  spends 
over  $400  billion  on  armaments  and 
as  many  as  35  countries  (and  even 
terrorist  groups)  could  have  nuclear 
weapons  by  the  end  of  this  century. 

Thirty  years  ago  nations  pledged 
to  adhere  to  the  Universal  Declaration 
of  Human  Rights.  Today  there  are 
some  16  million  refugees,  one-fourth 
of  this  Earth's  population  is  mal- 
nourished, and  millions  face  starva- 
tion. Torture  and  imprisonment  have 
remained  convenient  tools  of  govern- 
ance irrespective  of  race,  religion,  or 
sex. 

The  United  Nations  has  had  a 
checkered  history  in  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  conflicts.  It  was  either 
impotent  to  act,  as  in  the  cases  of  re- 
peated Soviet  aggression  in  Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia,  and  Afghanistan,  or 
fearing  impotency  did  not  even  get 
involved,  as  in  the  case  of  recent 
African  wars.  It  has  become  bogged 
down  in  negotiations  on  the  global 
economy,  and  its  impact  on  global  arms 
control  is  more  exhortatory  than  real. 
For  a  country  that  has  placed  so 
much  faith  in  the  imperatives  of 
world  order,  that  has  spent  so  much 
effort  and  sacrificed  so  much  for  it — 
these  are  indeed  legitimate  causes  for 
disappointment.  It  is  not  surprising 
then  that  the  majority  of  Americans 
are  critical  of  the  United  Nations — 


53%  according  to  the  polls — for  fall 
short  of  their  hopes  and  expectation 
about  resolving  international 
problems. 

Falling  short,  however,  is  not  tl 
same  as  failure.  As  we  acknowledge,! 
shortcomings — serious  shortcomin] 
— let  us  also  be  mindful  of  certain 
facts  and  salient  achievements. 

The  United  Nations  has  becomi 
truly  universal  organization.  Its  me 
bership,  tripling  since  its  founding, 
now  numbers  154  nations.  Its  budgi 
has  increased  16  times;  its  agenda  \ 
grown  by  leaps  and  bounds  to  encoir 
pass  practically  all  aspects  of  inter- 
national behavior.  The  General  As- 
sembly, which  was  once  an  annual 
affair,  has  become  for  all  practical 
purposes — counting  all  the  special  ai 
emergency  sessions  and  full  membei 
ship  conferences — a  year-round 
meeting.  The  Security  Council,  whic 
had  fallen  into  such  disuse  in  the 
1950s,  meeting  5  or  10  times  a  year, 
now  meets  on  the  average  of  100  tiir^ 
a  year. 

The  United  Nations  has  become 
the  source  of  innovative  measures  tt 
reduce  international  tensions.  Peace 
keeping  forces — not  even  envisionec 
the  original  charter — are  in  place  in 
Cyprus  and  the  Middle  East.  These 
forces  have  prevented  local  conflicts 
from  festering  into  major  wars  and 
have  been  some  of  the  United  Natior 
least  heralded  success  stories. 

The  United  Nations  has  had  a 
steady,  calming,  and  steering  presen- 
in  the  greatest  transformation  of  thi 
political  geography  of  this  Earth — 
aiding  formerly  colonialized  people  t 
achieve  independence  without  major 
conflicts  and  in  a  relatively  orderly 
fashion. 

The  United  Nations'  purview  ov 
what  constitutes  threats  to  collective 
security  has  expanded  to  include  glob 
economic  security.  At  the  present,  al- 
most 90%  of  its  resources  are  devotei 
to  this  task — to  development,  to 
environmental  protection,  to  interna- 
tional trade,  finance,  investment,  and 
to  other  measures  of  economic,  social, 
cultural,  and  scientific  cooperation. 
Through  its  specialized  agencies  and 
programs,  the  United  Nations  has  in- 
creased concessional  assistance  to 
developing  countries  in  the  past  decac 


60 


Department  of  State  Bullet: 


United  Nations 


t 

fiii 


less  than  $500  million  to  over 
illion.  Together  with  the  multi- 
al  development  banks  (such  as  the 
Id  Bank  and  the  regional  banks) 
s  been  the  channel  for  the  growth 
it  flow  of  resources  to  the  Third 
d  from  less  than  $1  billion  to 
Fillion  annually  in  that  same  period. 
The  United  Nations  has  had  a 
■ering  role  in  setting  standards 
A  ules  that  make  the  life  of  all  of 
ore  secure,  healthier  and  better — 
iternational  aviation;  in  communi- 
tns;  in  the  protection  of  the  envi- 
ent ;  in  the  husbandry  of  our 
rees  in  the  deep  seas  and  in 
space;  in  the  promotion  of  health 
lards  ;  and  in  the  entire  range  of 
ction  of  civil,  political,  social, 
:  ral,  and  economic  rights. 

The  list  is  almost  endless,  and 
:  ^uch  selective  illustrations  I  have 
bly  failed  to  mention  some  very 
tant  ones.  There  is  little  question 
he  United  Nations  has  become 
■ntral  forum  for  diplomatic 
tives  of  many  small  countries; 
hrough  its  direct  and  joint  over- 
development efforts  it  has  trans- 
•d  formerly  "basket  case"  coun- 
le  into  food  sufficient  states.  It  has 
:ei  I  major  facilitator  for  American 
I  ment  and  export,  and  its  net- 
'>f  solidarity  among  labor 
■  gave  birth  to  concrete  meas- 
i2!  0  make  life  better  for  the 
">r  Ts.  And  perhaps  more  than  any 
international  institution  it  has 
sf  ully  promoted  women's  rights, 
uch  is  not  a  record  of  failure. 
J  ot,  however,  want  to  dwell  too 
?  n  what  the  United  Nations  has 
ni  )r  failed  to  do  in  making  my 
ir  about  the  challenges  we  must 
mt  today  and  in  the  future.  The 

I  Nations  will  certainly  remain 
a  !na  of  conflict  between  East  and 
^sas  it  has  also  come  center  stage 
:1  continuing  dialogue  between 

"   and  South.  Yet  it  must  also 
I'  a  springboard  for  our  collec- 
I'orts  to  address  the  common 
■ms  which  this  entire  planet 
in  the  decades  ahead.  Permit  me 

II  focus  on  the  critical  role  of  the 
'1  Nations  in  the  context  of  the 
West  rivalry,  the  North-South 

inships,  and  in  light  of  the 
!'■  ects  we  hold  for  the  future. 


East-West  Relations 

The  past  year  bore  witness  to  porten- 
tous events  in  world  affairs,  events  that 
have  neither  run  their  full  course  nor 
are  they  as  yet  fully  predictable  in 
their  outcome.  We  see  the  flagrant 
violation  of  the  most  elementary  norms 
of  international  diplomatic  practice 
and  decency  in  Tehran;  the  naked 
aggression  against  the  people  of 
Afghanistan,  Kampuchea,  and  Laos; 
the  unceasing  armed  conflicts  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa;  war  and  renewed 
threats  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East; 
and  the  current  crisis  in  Poland.  Each 
of  these  events  has  posed  and  will  con- 
tinue to  pose  major  obstacles  in  the 
path  of  reasoned  relationships  between 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States. 

Each  event  in  direct  or  in  subtle 
ways  affects  or  is  affected  by  the  state 
of  relationships  between  the  two  giant 
nuclear  powers.  We  need  not  be  so 
Pollyannaish  as  to  presume  that  global 
interests  always  coincide  with  ours, 
but  we  need  not  be  so  simple-minded, 
either,  as  to  assert  that  every  threat  to 
our  interest  is  automatically  a  net  gain 
for  the  Soviets. 

The  recent  Soviet  globetrotting 
from  Angola  to  Grenada  does  not 
exactly  reveal  great  success  for  their 
brand  of  adventurism.  Nor  does  the 
emergence  of  numerous  and  busy 
Russian  advisers  in  the  area,  now 
called  the  are  of  crisis,  suggest  the  tip 
of  the  iceberg  of  some  grand  plan  of 
world  domination.  It  does,  however, 
point  to  the  Soviet  propensity  of 
opportunism :  to  take  advantage  of  the 
opportunities  created  by  the  correla- 
tion of  forces  and  to  extend  their 
sphere  of  influence. 

In  the  coming  years,  I  am  sure, 
there  will  be  a  lot  of  rethinking  and 
debate  about  the  appropriate  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  stance  toward  such 
Soviet  behavior.  One  thing  is,  how- 
ever, certain;  we  will  either  have  to 
confront  them  at  a  point  or  place  of 
their  own  choosing — once  they  are 
already  on  the  move — or,  alternately, 
work  for  a  world  order  in  which  the 
correlation  of  forces  does  not  favor 
them. 

Which  appi'oach  is  more  expen- 
sive, more  risky,  I  leave  to  your  imag- 
ination and  common  sense.  Today  we 
spend  about  5%  of  our  GNP  on  de- 
fense purposes  and  there  are  persua- 
sive arguments  to  increase  this  to 


7%.  At  the  same  time,  we  devote  less 
than  0.05%  of  our  GNP  to  the  United 
Nations,  and  there  are  some  who 
consider  even  this  little  amount  to  be 
too  much.  But  the  arguments  about 
the  appropriate  level  of  defense  spend- 
ing is  not  my  issue  here.  My  point  is 
that  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  a 
stronger  United  Nations  would  be 
more  capable  of  dealing  with  political 
upheavals  and  tensions. 

In  several  recent  instances,  the 
United  Nations  has  proven  to  be  the 
preferred  instrument  with  sufficient 
international  support  to  lead  the 
search  for  political  solutions  to  inter- 
national problems.  In  each  case,  this 
approach  also  closed  the  door  on  Soviet 
mischief. 

•  The  United  Nations  provided 
the  mechanism  through  which  a  peace- 
ful resolution  was  found  to  the  chal- 
lenge of  majority  rule  and  independ- 
ence for  Zimbabwe. 

•  The  Security  Council  resolu- 
tions laid  the  basis  for  the  successful 
Camp  David  negotiations  leading  to- 
ward greater  peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel. 

•  Continuing  efforts  for  the 
peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  in 
southern  Africa,  specifically  Namibia, 
could  not  go  forward  without  the 
leading  role  of  the  United  Nations. 

I  do  not  intend  to  suggest  that  the 
United  Nations  can  always  act  as  a 
great  buffer  against  Soviet  designs. 
Realism  dictates  that  we  accept  the 
limits  imposed  on  the  United  Nations' 
ability  to  act  in  every  case.  But  I  do 
suggest  that  the  United  Nations  can 
have  a  tempering  influence  on  Soviet 
behavior  and  can  serve,  as  it  has 
served  in  the  past,  as  a  forum  of 
diplomatic  initiative  to  avoid  direct 
East- West  confrontations. 


North-South  Dialogue 

In  1945,  the  United  States  emerged 
indisputably  as  the  most  powerful  and 
influential  nation  on  Earth.  We  shaped 
the  United  Nations  in  our  own  image 
and  likeness  and  provided  for  it  the 
necessary  economic  muscle.  Over  time, 
we  were  the  principal  architect  of  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  to  in- 
sure monetary  order  and  stability;  of 
the  World  Bank  to  promote  the  recon- 
struction of  Europe  and  economic 
growth  all  over  the  world ;  and  of  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade  to  stimulate  world  trade. 


Iiaru  1Qft1 


United  Nations 


For  a  while  these  worked  ideally. 
We  commanded  the  primary  influence 
because  the  United  States  accounted 
for  60%  of  the  world's  industrial  pro- 
duction and  50%  of  its  monetary 
reserves.  But  this  is  no  longer  the 
case.  Only  30%  of  the  world's  indus- 
trial production  and  less  than  7%  of 
its  monetary  reserves  are  ours  today. 
Western  Europe  and  Japan  have 
emerged  as  major  and  competitive 
economic  powers.  Cartels,  such  as  the 
Organization  of  Petroleum  Exporting 
Countries  (OPEC),  drastically  re- 
wrote the  rules  of  global  economy. 
And  a  new  bloc  of  nations,  the  Third 
World,  emerged  demanding  a  fairer 
share  and  a  greater  voice  in  the  world 
economy. 

It  is  this  new  bloc,  comprised  of 
the  developing  countries,  that  com- 
mands majorities  in  the  United  Na- 
tions and  demands  attention  to  its 
own  priority  — a  new  international 

economic  order.  It  wants  systemic 
changes  in  the  world  monetary  sys- 
tem, greater  resource  transfers  from 
the  industrialized  countries,  better 
access  to  technology,  and  a  greater 
voice  in  international  economic  deci- 
sion making. 

The  developing  countries'  de- 
mands do  not  always  make  economic 
sense,  but  there  is  a  ring  of  justice  in 
their  call.  After  all,  they  comprise  a 
substantial  majority  of  the  world's 
population  but  receive  only  15%  of 
the  global  income.  Yet  they  are  vitally 
important  to  the  industrialized  coun- 
tries. The  dependence  of  the  North  on 
the  oil  supplies  from  the  South  only 
dramatizes  but  does  not  complete  the 
picture  of  how  mutually  dependent — 
indeed  interdependent — we  have  be- 
come. And  the  dynamics  of  this  inter- 
dependence also  imply  a  condition  of 
mutual  vulnerability  which  begs  for 
intensive  search  and  drastic  resolution 
of  the  outstanding  differences. 

The  welfare,  progress,  and  eco- 
nomic stability  of  these  developing 
countries  have  become  critically  im- 
portant to  the  West  and  to  the  United 
States.  Our  trade  with  the  Third 
World  surpasses  that  with  Western 
Europe,  Japan,  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  United  States  sells  one-third  of 
its  exports  to  developing  nations,  and 
they  supply  42%  of  our  imports. 
Approximately  1  million  American 
jobs  depend  on  U.S.  exports  to  these 
countries,  as  does  one  quarter  of  our 


agricultural  productivity.  We  have 
more  than  $40  billion  in  investment 
riding  on  the  fortunes  of  the  develop- 
ing world. 

This  is  why  we  press  continu- 
ously, in  a  spirit  of  compromise,  for 
agreement  in  the  current  round  of  glo- 
bal negotiations.  And  this  is  again 
why  the  United  Nations  has  become  an 
indispensable  forum  for  the  rich  as 
well  as  the  poor  countries  to  fashion 
international  institutions  that  are 
capable  of  responding  to  the  growing 
global  economic  crises. 


Global  2000  Report 

This  year  saw  the  publication  of  two 
important  studies  dealing  with  our 
future.  These  studies,  the  Brandt 
Commission's  Programme  for  Survival 


and  the  Global  2000  Report  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  are 
not  for  the  faint-hearted.  They  both 
diagnose  the  current  state  of  global 
economy  and  ecology  as  dismal.  The 
prognoses  are  identical — the  worst  i 
yet  to  come. 

I  could  cite  dozens  of  other 
studies.  They  all  point  to  the  same 
conclusion,  and  they  all  urge  unprec 
edented  global  cooperation  as  the  on 
way  to  avoid  global  catastrophe.  Yet 
am  struck  by  the  fact  of  how  the 
glaringly  obvious  has  failed  to  pene 
trate  our  collective  psyche,  how  obli 
ous  we  continue  to  remain  in  the  fac 
of  the  clear  and  present  danger  that 
world  hunger  and  poverty  present  t 
our  countries,  to  our  economic  pros- 
perity, and  to  our  freedoms. 

We  are  hurtling  toward  a  futui 
world  population  of  2^/2  billion  mon 


U.S.  Participation 
intheU.N.,  1979 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JAN.  7,  19811 


I  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  the  Congress 
this  report  of  the  activities  of  the  United 
States  Government  in  the  United  Nations 
and  its  affiliated  agencies  during  calendar 
year  1979. 

The  international  crisis  created  by  the 
seizure  of  the  American  Embassy  in  Tehran 
and  the  taking  of  Americans  hostage  over- 
shadowed much  of  the  34th  General 
Assembly.  In  this  atmosphere,  the  United 
States  directed  its  efforts  in  the  United 
Nations  toward  supporting  the  work  of  the 
Secretary  General  and  the  Security  Council 
to  resolve  this  breach  of  international  law. 
The  Secretary  General  brought  the  issue  to 
the  Council  which  unanimously  called  upon 
the  Government  of  Iran  to  release  the 
hostages.  Ironically,  after  three  years  of 
negotiations,  the  Assembly  adopted  by  con- 
sensus the  Convention  Against  the  Taking  of 
Hostages.  This  Convention  affirms  that 
there  is  no  valid  excuse  for  the  taking  of 
hostages  and  that  there  are  no  circumstances 
under  which  the  seizure  of  hostages  can  be 
condoned. 

Both  the  Security  Council  and  the 
General  Assembly  focused  international 
attention  on  the  continued  military  occupa- 
tion of  Kampuchea  by  Vietnam.  Of  particular 
note  during  1979  was  the  Security  Council's 
termination  of  sanctions  against  Southern 
Rhodesia,  a  result  of  the  agreement  by  the 
Lancaster  House  Conference. 

On  economic  issues,  UN  actions  ranged 
from  highly  technical  meetings  such  as  those 


on  commodities,  to  continuing  the  work  ol 
the  International  Monetary  Fund  and  to 
political  discussions  in  the  General  Assem 
on  the  future  of  international  economy  an 
development. 

These  discussions,  attended  by  almos 
all  UN  members,  saw  a  continuous,  intern 
and  sometimes  acrimonious  series  of  ex-    ^ 
changes  between  the  developed  and  devem 
ing  countries  on  the  organization  of  the     ' 
international  economic  relations,  and  the 
effects  of  both  on  economic  development. 
This  resulted  in  the  decision  by  the  34tb 
General  Assembly  to  hold  further  meetini  ^ 
on  these  issues.  We  believe  that  negotiati 
of  this  kind  and  at  this  level  are  importao 
and  necessary  to  relations  between  devel- 
oped and  developing  countries.  However, 
whether  the  U.S.  participates  in  these  glo 
negotiations  will  depend  on  how  effective! 
we  use  but  do  not  intrude  upon  the  agenc 
of  the  UN  and  other  international  organiz 
tions. 

The  United  States  continues  to  monit 
closely  UN  expenditures  and  programs  an 
supports  the  Secretary  General's  efforts  t 
limit  budget  growth. 

Our  participation  in  the  United  Natio 
and  its  related  agencies  and  programs  is » 
integral  part  of  our  foreign  policy.  As  this 
report  makes  clear,  the  United  Nations 
system  of  organizations  is  important  and 
sometimes  indispensable  to  the  achieveme 
of  many  of  our  central  foreign  policy  objec 
tives.  This  report  should  contribute  to 
American  understanding  of  and  support  fo 
the  United  Nations  and  to  the  continuing 
active  and  constructive  role  of  the  United 
States. 

Jimmy  Cabtis 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Jan.  12,  1981. 1 


62 


Department  of  State  Bullet| 


United  Nations 


pie  than  inhabit  the  Earth  today, 
t  of  them  destined  to  live  in  the 
rest  countries,  with  per  capita  in- 
les  hovering  at  a  level  of  abject 
erty,  with  arable  land  running  out, 
1  forests  receding,  fresh  waters 
lii.ppearing,  and  deserts  expanding. 

Today,  one-third  of  humanity 
its  in  the  absence  of  adequate 
hter  or  food,  ill  and  idle,  with  no 
liipse  of  a  better  future  and  enraged 
■yhe  injustice  of  it  all.  This  creates 
( ngerous  global  climate — a  climate 
•]  re  oceans  of  suffering  breed  hur- 
i(nes  of  hate,  lashing  out  with 
le  ructive  force  not  only  where  they 
r  spawned  but  wherever  they  reach 
s  ell. 

In  this  shrinking  world  of  ours, 
liiince  no  longer  guarantees  safety. 
1"  crises  we  face  do  not  respect 
;aonal  boundaries  or  ideological 
r(  tiers.  Let  me  select  a  few  pertinent 
r  ections  of  the  future. 

•  In  the  next  20  years  there  will 
e  '/•!  billion  more  people. 

•  The  food  deficit  for  the  Third 
Vi  Id  alone  will  hover  around  75  mil- 
10  metric  tons  by  the  year  1990, 

*ri  nng  down  global  food  reserves  and 
38  ng  to  worldwide  competition  for 
■K  and  to  a  rapid  rise  of  price 

•  The  search  for  alternative 

i>\  :es  of  food  will  cause  drastic  de- 
'l€  on  of  fishery  resources. 

•  Increased  fossil  fuel  consmp- 
10  and  the  greater  use  of  fluorocar- 
01  for  this  growing  population  will 
01  jspondingly  raise  atmospheric 

ai  on  dioxide  and  will  cause  ozone 
^e]  ;tion,  both  of  which  entail  serious 

ii  fitic  changes — in  turn  affecting 

i;  ibility  to  produce  food. 

•  The  inability  of  the  developing 
tries  to  meet  the  growing  de- 
ls— for  food  and  energy  alone — of 

growing  populations  will  deplete 
foreign  exchange  reserves,  raise 
'  ■  debts,  in  turn  lead  to  defaults 
ni global  monetary  instability. 

•  Growing  scarcities  as  well  as 
It  growing  demands  of  more  and 
iC3  people  will  place  unacceptable 
:rins  on  the  stability  of  many  devel- 

g  countries,  leading  to  frequent 
ical  upheavals  threatening  every 
i  in's  security. 

In  a  world  where  billions  are  sub- 
acid to  the  degradation  of  poverty — 
b^  ct  poverty — the  struggle  for  sur- 


vival will  become  the  paramount 
human  endeavor.  Abject  poverty  de- 
humanizes because  it  subjects  life  to 
the  exigencies  of  mere  existence.  It  is 
a  condition  in  which  people  exhaust 
their  energies  at  the  grueling  task  of 
just  being,  with  never  a  chance  of 
becoming.  It  is  a  condition  in  which 
people  squander  their  energies  in  the 
fight  for  mere  physical  survival,  with 
their  talents  unchallenged,  their 
human  potential  unfulfilled. 

Where  the  basic  human  needs  of 
food,  health,  and  shelter  remain  the 
sole  object  of  unfulfilled  wants,  no 
desire  can  emerge  for  liberty  and  no 
strength  is  left  to  protect  rights. 
Where  the  struggle  for  liberation 
from  daily  necessities  overwhelms 
the  necessity  for  freedom,  neither 
basic  human  needs  nor  human  rights 
will  ever  be  satisfied.  And  in  a  world 
where  tyranny  becomes  the  order  of 
things,  no  nation,  however  prosperous 
and  free,  can  long  remain  an  island  of 
virtue. 

To  confront  these  growing  threats 
to  global  security,  each  nation,  each 
government  must  do  its  share.  None  of 
the  problems  can  be  tackled  by  one 
country  alone,  and  no  country  alone 
can  long  endure  to  carry  the  principal 
burden. 

It  is  clear  that  the  followup  to  the 
Global  2000  Report  will  require  an  ex- 
tended program  of  cooperative  inter- 
action within  the  worldwide  system  of 
international  organizations.  The 
United  Nations  is  the  ideal  focal  point 
for  strategists  in  formulating  an 
agenda  which  could  deflect  projected 
ecological,  economic,  and  social  catas- 
trophes in  the  coming  millennium.  The 
very  nature  of  the  entity  that  is  the 
United  Nations  lends  it  to  the  creative 
long-range  effort  which  could  bring 
to  fruition  the  massive  economic 
development  that  the  current  world 
environment  demands.  Yet  we  can  no 
longer  attack  problems  in  a  piecemeal 
fashion. 

It  will  not  be  enough  merely  to 
ask  for  increased  funding  from  the 
world's  financial  institutions.  We  must 
evolve  a  precise  strategy  that  will 
coalesce  hardware  with  human  re- 
sources, that  points  toward  a  conver- 
gence of  intellectual  and  technological 
tools  which  concentrate  our  collective 
efforts  in  problem  solving  for  both 
developed  and  developing  nations. 


The  Challenges  of  Change 

East  and  West,  North  and  South,  our 
present  and  our  future — they  are 
symbols  of  our  concerns.  Pitted 
against  each  other  in  dynamic  tension, 
they  reveal  the  promise  and  possibili- 
ties of  change. 

Will  we  control  this  change  or  will 
we  permit  events  to  control  our  lives? 
Can  we  allow  the  prognoses  of  the 
Global  2000  Report  to  come  true?  Can 
we  resign  ourselves  to  an  unbridled 
East- West  conflict  and  prepare  to  live 
in  a  world  where  the  structures  of 
global  cooperation  will  have  been  re- 
placed by  the  worst  kind  of  inter- 
national struggle  for  the  survival  of 
the  unfittest?  I  need  not  posit  the 
answer. 

We  Americans  have  never  feared 
change.  To  the  contrary,  I  sincerely 
feel  that  most  of  the  change  for  the 
better  that  is  taking  place  today  has 
been  prompted  by  our  very  presence 
in  the  world,  our  ideals,  our  ways,  and 
our  responses.  We  created  the  United 
Nations  not  to  put  the  brakes  on 
change  but  to  design  our  future. 

In  a  month  jr  so,  I  will  be  leaving 
my  post  as  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  in  charge  of  U.N.  affairs.  I  am 
proud  to  have  been  associated  with  an 
American  foreign  policy  that  has 
steadfastly  supported  the  United  Na- 
tions. To  be  sure  we  saw  changes 
coming,  yet  we  did  not  fear  them.  We 
understood  the  changes  taking  place 
in  the  United  Nations,  and  we  tried  to 
steer  them  in  a  direction  consistent 
with  our  values  and  beliefs.  So  as 
I  leave  office,  I  am  confident  that  the 
seeds  of  our  ideals  that  we  planted 
with  the  United  Nations  35  years  ago 
will  grow  into  a  bountiful  harvest — as 
long  as  we  have  the  will  and  foresight 
to  cultivate  with  care  and  compassion 
this  fragile  structure  of  global 
cooperation.  ■ 


f  uary  1981 


63 


United  Nations 


World  Court  Hears  U.S.  Argument  on 
Transfer  of  WHO  Regional  Office 


In  the  33d  World  Health  assembly,  held 
in  Geneva  in  May  1980,  several  Arab 
states  introduced  a  proposal  to  transfer 
the  World  Health  Organization's  (WHO) 
Eastern  Mediterranean  Regional  Office 
(EMROI  from  Alexandria,  Egypt,  to 
Amman,  Jordan.  The  reason  given  for 
the  proposal  was  that  most  of  the  coun- 
tries in  the  region  had  decided  to  break 
diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt  and  did 
not  wish  to  conduct  their  WHO  busi- 
ness through  the  Alexandria  office.  The 
motive  for  the  move  was  acknowledged 
to  be  political  The  United  States  and 
maiiy  other  countries  opposed  transfer 
as  an  improper  and  costly  political 
interference  in  the  highly  successful 
workings  of  a  technical  and  nonpolitical 
specialized  agency. 

Apart  from  the  merits  and 
demerits  of  moving  the  office,  Egypt 
and  the  United  States  maintained  dur- 
ing the  assembly's  discussion  of  the 
resolution  to  transfer  the  office  that  the 
WHO  could  not  move  EMRO  from 
Egypt  without  regard  to  the  2-year 
notice  provision  in  the  WHO's  host 
agreement  with  Egypt  regarding  the 
regional  office.  Some  other  states 
argued  that  this  notice  provision  ap- 
plied only  to  negotiations  over  a  change 
in  the  privileges  and  immunities  of 
WHO  officials  in  Egypt  and  that  it 
would  not  apply  to  a  decision  by  the 
WHO  to  move  the  regional  office. 

In  order  to  resolve  this  dispute, 
the  United  States  introduced  a  resolu- 
tion deferring  any  decision  on  removal 
of  the  regional  office  until  the  Inter- 
national Court  of  Justice  IICJ)  could 
give  an  advisory  opinion  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  applicability  of  the  host 
agreement  to  removal  of  the  office.  On 
May  20,  1980,  the  World  Health  Assem- 
bly approved  the  U.S.  resolution,  which 
referred  the  following  questions  to  the 
Court: 

1.  Are  the  negotiation  and  notice 
provisions  of  section  37  of  the  agree- 
ment of  March  25,  1951,  between  the 
World  Health  Organization  and  Egypt 
applicable  in  the  event  that  either 
party  to  the  agreement  wishes  to  have 
the  regional  office  transferred  from  the 
territory  of  Egypt? 

2.  If  so,  what  would  be  the  legal 
responsibilities  of  both  the  World 
Health  Organization  and  Egypt,  with 


regard  to  the  regional  office  in  Alexan- 
dria, during  the  2-year  period  between 
notice  and  termination  of  the  agree- 
ment? 

The  Court  invited  all  states  parties 
to  its  statute  that  also  belonged  to  the 
WHO  to  submit  written  statements  and 
to  participate  in  oral  argument.  Writ- 
ten statements  were  filed  by  Bolivia, 
Jordan,  the  United  Arab  Emirates, 
Iraq,  Kuwait,  Egypt,  Syria,  and  the 
United  States.  On  October  21,  22,  and 
23,  1980,  the  Court  met  in  The  Hague 
to  hear  oral  argument.  Presentations 
were  made  by  the  United  Arab 
Emirates,  Tunisia,  the  United  States, 
Syria,  Egypt,  and  the  World  Health 
Organization. 

Representing  the  United  States  in 
the  case  were  Stephen  M.  Schwebel 
Deputy  Legal  Adviser  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State;  Stephen  R.  Bond,  Legal 
Adviser  to  the  U.S.  Mission  to  Inter- 
national Organizations,  Geneva;  Ralph 
Drury  Martin,  Attorney-Adviser, 
Department  of  State;  and  Lori  Fisler 
Damrosch,  Special  Assistant  to  the 
Legal  Adviser,  Department  of  State. 

Following  are  excerpts  from  the 
U.S.  oral  argument  made  to  the  Court 
by  Mr.  Schwebel 

1.  The  argument  that  the  host  agree- 
ment is  not  a  headquarters  agreement 
but  merely  an  agreement  on  privileges 
and  immunities. 

. .  .  [L]et  us  consider  what  the  signifi- 
cance is  of  the  contention  that  the  host 
agreement  is  no  more  than  an  agree- 
ment on  privileges  and  immunities.  It 
raises  the  complementary  question  of 
the  significance  of  the  contrasting  con- 
tention of  Egypt  and  the  United  States 
that  the  host  agreement  is  a  head- 
quarters agreement.  The  distinction 
between  a  headquarters  agreement  and 
an  agreement  on  privileges  and  immuni- 
ties is  not  semantic.  We  are  concerned 
with  the  fundamental  question  of  the 
role  and  the  content  of  the  host  agree- 
ment of  1951. 

It  is  the  contention  of  the  United 
States  that  the  host  agreement  of  1951 
provides  the  full  and  comprehensive 
legal  basis  for  the  continuing  presence 
and  operation  of  the  regional  office  in 


tlo 

gilti 
IB  I 


ill  J 
lllli 


II 


Alexandria.  This  is  not  a  situation  in 
which  the  1951  host  agreement  regu- 
lates an  ancillary  aspect  of  a  preexist 
ing  and  independent  legal  relationshii 
The  function  of  the  host  agreement  ii 
to  place  on  a  proper  and  enduring  leg 
footing  the  establishment,  maintenan 
and  operation  of  the  regional  office 
Mutatis  mutandis,  the  host  agreemer 
is  the  particular  international  conven 
tion  which,  in  the  words  of  article  38 
the  statute  of  this  Court,  establishes 
the  "rules  expressly  recognized  by  th 
Contesting  States."  When  we  speak  ( 
the  host  agreement  as  a  headquarter     . 
agreement,  we  use  a  kind  of  legal  she   ' ! 
hand  which  expresses  the  essence  of 
our  argument.  Similarly,  when  the 
states  that  seek  a  negative  answer  fr 
the  Court  speak  of  an  agreement  on 
privileges  and  immunities,  they  use  a 
kind  of  legal  shorthand  which  expresi 
the  essence  of  their  argument. 

Now,  if  the  characterizations  oft 
host  agreement  as  an  agreement  on 
privileges  and  immunities  were  corre 
there  would  have  been  no  need  for  i\ 
host  agreement.  At  the  time  the  host 
agreement  was  signed,  the  Conventic 
on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities  oft 
Specialized  Agencies  of  the  United  N 
tions  was  in  force.  Egypt  was  asked  I 
the  2d  World  Health  Assembly  provi- 
sionally to  apply  it  and  apparently  dii 
pending  its  accession  [to  the 
convention].  Moreover,  the  Organizati 
and  Egypt  had  already  entered  into  a 
bilateral  privileges  and  immunities 
agreement  in  connection  with  the  Orf 
nization's  provision  of  services  in 
Egypt.  That  agreement  was  conclude( 
on  25  August  1950.  Thus  if  the  only 
purpose  of  the  1951  host  agreement 
was  to  regulate  privileges  and  immun 
ties,  it  would  have  been  superfluous. . 

The  host  agreement  is  undeniably 
concerned  with  privileges  and  immuni 
ties,  but  clearly  it  goes  beyond  that 
concern.  The  fact  is  that  Egypt  and  th 
Organization  decided,  before  the  estaf 
lishment  of  the  regional  office,  to  con- 
clude an  agreement  governing  its  estal 
lishment  and  maintenance.  That  agre 
ment  is  a  headquarters  agreement  in 
form  and  content.  To  be  sure,  the  host 
agreement  of  1951  is  not  entitled  "he; 
quarters  agreement."  It  does  not  ex- 
pressly provide  that  the  Organization's 


64 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


United  Nations 


g|nal  office  "shall  be  established  and 
Mtained  in  Alexandria."  Neverthe- 
itiit  is  clear  that  the  parties,  in 
oiLiding  the  host  agreement,  con- 
nlated  maintenance  of  a  permanent 
1  )f  the  Organization  for  and  in  its 
rn  Mediterranean  region.  They 
>t  have  in  mind  a  legal  regime  of 
tges  and  immunities  for  officials 
.  •  Organization  passing  through  or 
■nirarily  assigned  to  Egypt.  The 
:riization  and  Egypt  assumed, 
stood,  and  expressed  their  mutual 
i  that  this  seat  would  be  physi- 
located  in  Egypt,  specifically  in 
e:  ndria. 

'hus  in  the  agpreement  the  parties 
;'e  to  "the  Regional  Office  in  Alexan- 
Ji  (section  1,  para.  V),  "the  premises 
tl  Organization  in  Egypt"  (section 
ai  "the  seat  of  the  Organization" 
jon  30).  These  are  references  to  a 
y:;al  location  of  the  Eastern  Medi- 
Tiean  Regional  Office  at  its  Alex- 
1  headquarters.  They  are  refer- 
to  a  permanent  location  contained 
a  agreement  of  indefinite  duration. 
)r  iver,  under  the  host  agreement, 
8' 'ligations  of  the  parties  embrace 
e  tablishment,  operation,  and  main- 
na  ;e  of  physical  facilities  in  Alexan- 
la  ''or  example,  section  30  provides 
<•  I  'ctricity,  gas  and  water  supply, 
removal,  and  police  protection. 
are  the  earmarks  of  a  head- 
;ai  ;rs  agreement,  not  a  privileges 
id  imunities  ag^reement.  If  this  host 
Tcnent  is  compared  with  other 
ac  uarters  agreements,  their  essen- 
il  entity  of  content  is  manifest,  as 
■itten  statements  of  the  United 
.    and  Egypt  demonstrate. 

he  intentions  of  the  parties  ac- 
d  gly  are  clear  from  the  terms  of 
e  ,  Teement  itself.  But  further 
dice  of  the  parties'  intentions  is 

antly  available.  The  negotiating 
uiy  of  the  agreement,  including  the 
•v»ipment  of  the  models  on  which  it 
IS  ised,  suggest  that  there  was 
^'(  any  doubt  in  the  minds  of 

;  gotiators  that  a  permanent 
ic  uarters  regime  was  being  estab- 


T'  claim  that  the  Alexandria  office 
tablished  by  an  agreement  other 
nd  anterior  to  the  1951  host 

<  nent. 

^  tiere  we  differ  with  our  distin- 
s'id  colleagues  from  the  United 
Emirates  and  Kuwait  is  in  this: 
)  not  agree  that  the  governing 


headquarters  agreement  is  anything 
else  but  the  host  agreement  between 
the  Organization  and  Egypt  of  25 
March  1951. 

We  cannot  agree  that  the  1949 
decision  of  the  Executive  Board  of  the 
Organization  to  locate  EMRO  in  Alex- 
andria and  its  acceptance  by  Egypt  con- 
stitute the  governing  international 
headquarters  agreement.  If  this  be  the 
governing  international  agreement, 
where  is  it  to  be  found?  It  is  not 
printed  in  the  United  Nations  Treaty 
Series  or  in  the  publications  of  the 
World  Health  Organization.  It  has  not 
been  presented  to  the  Court.  There  ap- 
pears to  be  no  written  record  of  such 
an  agrreement  anywhere,  even  in  an  ex- 
change of  letters  between  the  Organiza- 
tion and  the  Egyptian  Government.  The 
terms  of  any  such  agreement  are 
unknown.  And  most  importantly  for 
these  proceedings  and  for  this  Court, 
this  alleged  agreement  has  not  been 
registered  with  the  Secretariat  of  the 
United  Nations  pursuant  to  Article  102 
of  the  U.N.  Charter.  Consequently,  it 
cannot  be  invoked  before  the  Court  by 
any  party  to  it,  nor  presumably,  by  a 
third  state  on  behalf  of  any  such  party. 

It  cannot  be  believed  that  any 
government  would  permit  the  indefinite 
establishment  on  its  territory  of  a 
regional  headquarters  of  an  interna- 
tional organization  on  the  basis  of  so 
simple  a  simplified  agreement.  Still  less 
can  it  be  believed  that  Egypt  would  so 
agree.  The  sensitivity  of  Egypt  to 
several  legal  problems  dealt  with  in  the 
negotiations  between  Egypt  and  the 
Organization  over  the  terms  of  the  1951 
agreement  demonstrates  that  Egypt 
was  not  prepared  lightly  to  agree  to 
the  indefinite  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  an  international  organization 
on  its  territory.  The  parliamentary 
debates  to  which  I  have  referred  and 
their  preoccupation  with  capitulations, 
as  well  as  the  history  of  the  Alexandria 
Sanitary  Bureau  and  its  predecessors, 
graphically  show  that  Egypt  did  not 
ever  treat  the  emplacement  of  an  inter- 
national organization  on  its  territory 
casually,  as,  for  example,  a  matter  to  be 
dealt  with  in  a  summary  resolution  of 
an  international  organization  to  which 
Egypt  would  manifest  unwritten 
consent. 

On  the  contrary,  beginning  early  in 
1949,  Egypt  carefully  considered  the 
host  agreement  and  meticulously 
negotiated  it.  And,  for  the  reasons 
which  I  have  earlier  described,  both 
Egypt  and  the  Organization  plainly 


regarded  the  host  agreement  as  the 
governing  headquarters  ag^reement  for 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  Regional 
Office  at  Alexandria. . . . 

...  To  be  sure,  the  regional  office 
was  actually  installed  in  1949,  before 
the  host  agreement  came  into  force  in 
1951.  But  the  fact  that  the  host  agree- 
ment was  ratified  in  1951  by  no  means 
proves  that  the  host  agreement  is  not 
the  governing  headquarters  agrreement. 
All  it  shows  is  that,  in  1949,  Egypt  per- 
mitted the  conversion  of  the  long- 
established  Alexandria  Sanitary  Bureau 
into  the  regional  office  of  the  World 
Health  Organization  in  view  of  the  con- 
tinuing negotiation  of  a  host  agreement 
based  on  the  existing  model  host  agree- 
ment. That  is  to  say,  Egypt  was 
prepared  to  agree  to  the  selection  of 
Alexandria  as  the  site  of  the  regional 
office  for  the  Eastern  Mediteranean 
area  which  the  Executive  Board  had 
conditionally  approved,  and  to  integrate 
the  functions  of  the  Alexandria  Sani- 
tary Bureau  into,  and  to  transfer  that 
bureau's  files  to  the  regional  office  upon 
the  commencement  of  its  operations. 

But,  both  Egypt  and  the  Organiza- 
tion well  knew  that  the  preliminary 
measure  of  agreement  indicated  by  the 
Organization's  resolution  and  Egypt's 
actions  was  reached  in  contemplation  of 
the  parties  completing  negotiations  for 
a  host  agreement  — as,  in  fact,  they  did. 
And  when  they  concluded  that  host 
agreement,  the  preliminary  understand- 
ings evidenced  by  the  Executive 
Board's  resolution  and  Egypt's  acts 
were  merged  and  integrated  into  the 
host  agreement.  That  integration  is 
definitive.  It  alone,  in  the  terms  of  the 
host  agreement,  fully  and  adequately 
expresses  the  intention  of  the  parties 
concerning  the  location  and  regulation 
of  the  seat  of  the  regional  office.  The 
host  agreement  of  1951  is  a  complete 
and  formal  headquarters  agreement 
which  contains  a  denunciation  clause. 
Accordingly,  that  clause  rather  than  a 
nonexistent  clause  in  a  nonexistent 
agpreement  governs  any  disestablish- 
ment of  the  Alexandria  office. . . . 

3.  The  alleged  legal  effect  of  the  breach 
of  diplomatic  relations  with  Egypt. 

. . .  [T]he  political  attitudes  of  some  of 
the  Organization's  members  can  have 
no  effect  on  the  legal  relationship 
entered  into  between  the  Organization 
and  Egypt  in  the  host  agreement  of 
1951. 


iry  1981 


65 


United  Nations 


It  has  and  will  often  be  the  case 
that  the  government  acting  as  host  to 
an  international  organization  will  not 
have  diplomatic  relations  with  some  of 
the  members  of  the  organization.  It  is  a 
commonplace  that  delegations  of  states 
members  of  the  United  Nations  that  do 
not  enjoy  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
United  States  take  part  in  U.N.  meet- 
ings at  its  New  York  headquarters. 
Some  of  the  very  states  that  now  argue 
against  the  applicability  of  section  37 
chose  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with 
the  United  States  in  1967  but  never  for 
a  moment  did  they  cease  to  send  dele- 
gations to  U.N.  headquarters  in  New 
York. 

Thus  the  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations  among  a  few,  or  even  many,  of 
the  members  of  an  international  organi- 
zation cannot  change  the  legal  relation- 
ship between  the  host  government  and 
the  organization.  In  fact,  one  of  the 
principal  purposes  of  a  host  agreement, 
such  as  that  between  Egypt  and  the 
World  Health  Organization,  is  to  insure 
that  the  legal  regime  remains  stable 
regardless  of  political  wi^.ds  affecting 
the  character  of  intergovernmental 
relations. 

There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that 
the  Alexandria  regional  office  cannot 
function  in  the  absence  of  diplomatic 
relations  between  Egypt  and  most 
states  of  the  region.  And  it  is  these 
states  which  have  caused  the  very 
situation  which  they  now  invoke  as  a 
justification  for  removal  of  the  office.  If 
there  be  any  problem,  it  is  caused  by 
their  political  decision  to  refrain  from 
performance  of  their  own  obligation  to 
the  Organization,  under  article  50  of  its 
constitution,  to  "supervise  the  activities 
of  the  regional  office."  But  no  legal  or 
practical  obstacle  prevents  them  from 
sending  delegations  to  Alexandria  and 
performing  that  supervisory  task. 
There  is  no  legal  or  practical  obstacle 
to  the  regional  committee  meeting  in 
Alexandria  or,  as  it  frequently  has,  at 
other  cities  in  the  region.  Only  the 
political  objectives  of  these  states, 
which  are  extraneous  to  those  of  the 
Organization,  stand  in  their  way.  In 
fact,  they  have  created  this  difficult 
situation  for  reasons  unrelated  to  any 
limitations  on  their  actual  ability  to 
operate  in  Alexandria,  or  to  any  pur- 
pose of  the  World  Health  Organization. 

Moreover,  it  is  established  inter- 
national law  reflected  in  Article  63  of 
the  Vienna  Convention  on  the  Law  of 
Treaties  that  severance  of  diplomatic 


relations  does  not  affect  treaty  rela- 
tions "except  in  so  far  as  the  existence 
of  diplomatic  or  consular  relations  is  in- 
dispensable for  the  application  of  the 
treaty."  The  absence  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  some  states  and  a  host 
government  may  make  day-to-day  deal- 
ing more  cumbersome,  but  it  can  hardly 
be  said  that  the  existence  of  diplomatic 
relations  is  "indispensable"  to  the  ongo- 
ing functioning  of  the  Organization  in 
the  territory  of  the  host. 

Nor  is  a  changed  circumstance  ra- 
tionale for  invalidating  the  agreement's 
notice  provision  applicable  here.  As  our 
written  statement  establishes  in  some 
detail  at  pages  60  to  61,  the  doctrine  of 
rebus  sic  stantibus  has  little  relevance 
to  treaties  containing  provision  for  ter- 
mination upon  relatively  short  notice, 
such  as  2  years.  The  purpose  of  the  doc- 
trine is  to  provide  an  implied  escape 
clause  for  treaties  of  indefinite  or 
lengthy  duration  that  do  not  otherwise 
establish  a  mechanism  for  revision  or 
termination  as  circumstances  change. 
Since  section  37  of  the  1951  host  agree- 
ment is  exactly  such  a  mechanism,  it 
must  be  followed  if  either  party  wants 
the  office  to  relocate. 

Furthermore,  the  doctrine  of 
changed  circumstances  can  only  be  in- 
voked in  the  event  of  an  unforeseeable 
change  that  "radically"  transforms 
obligations  under  the  treaty.  For  the 
reasons  discussed  in  our  written  state- 
ment, these  requirements  cannot  be 
established  in  the  present  case.  As  the 
Court  well  appreciates,  the  burden  of 
establishing  invalidity  of  a  treaty  obli- 
gation on  these  or  any  other  grounds, 
must  be  on  the  party  seeking  to  be  ex- 
cused from  performance  under  the 
treaty.  I  respectfully  suggest  that  it 
has  not  been  established  that  the  Orga- 
nization can  carry  this  burden. . .  . 

Summary  of  the  argument  in  favor  of 
the  applicability  of  section  37. 

I  have  concluded  the  presentation  of 
the  substantive  sections  of  the  submis- 
sions of  the  United  States.  I  should  now 
like  to  recapitulate  in  the  most  sum- 
mary terms  the  essential  elements  of 
our  position. .  . . 

First,  the  host  agreement  of  1951 
between  Egypt  and  the  Organization  is 
not  solely  a  privileges  and  immunities 
agreement  but  is  a  typical  headquarters 
agreement,  imposing  mutual  obligations 
on  the  parties  concerning  the  location, 
maintenance,  and  operation  of  a  specific 
office  in  a  specific  place  — that  is,  the 


!«.■ 


it'. 


Eastern  Mediterranean  Regional  Of  ffi 
of  the  World  Health  Organization  in 
Alexandria. 

Second,  the  host  agreement  is  t 
only  international  instrument  definii^te 
the  obligations  of  the  parties  with 
respect  to  that  regional  office.  The 
historical  evidence  submitted  to  theiEj 
Court  has  shown  that  from  the  outs4 
the  Organization  and  Egypt  viewed 
host  agreement  as  the  definitive  ex- 
pression of  the  decision  to  locate  theftii 
office  in  Egypt.  It  has  shown  that, 
although  for  reasons  of  convenience 
office  was  actually  installed  before  t 
host  agreement  was  concluded,  the 
ties  intended  to  express  their  long- 
rights  and  obligations  in  the  host  a] 
ment  and  through  the  host  agreeme: 
alone. 

Third,  the  host  agreement  does 
make  sense  if  it  is  interpreted  as  m; 
colleagues  from  Syria,  Kuwait,  Tuni: 
the  United  Arab  Emirates,  Iraq,  anc 
Jordan  would  wish,  because  its  term . 
would  not  be  effective. 

Article  31  of  the  Vienna  Conver 
tion  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  codifies 
fundamental  principle  of  general  inti 
national  law  that  treaties  shall  be  in 
preted  in  good  faith.  This  paramount 
principle  embraces  the  principle  of  e 
fectiveness,  which  the  Vienna  conve 
tion  encompasses  in  the  following 
magisterial  formula:  "A  treaty  shall 
interpreted  in  good  faith  in  accordar 
with  the  ordinary  meaning  to  be  giv 
to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  in  their  cc 
text  and  in  light  of  its  object  and  pu 
pose." 

In  deciding  this  case,  this  Court 
must  choose  between  two  conflicting 
terpretations  of  the  host  agreement 
between  Egypt  and  the  Organization 
One  of  the  those  interpretations  wou 
allow  the  parties  to  terminate  the  ef 
tiveness  of  virtually  all  provisions  of 
the  agreement  without  observing  tht 
notice  requirement  of  section  37.  The 
other  would  give  full  effect  to  that  n 
quirement.  One  interpretation  would 
allow  either  party  to  disrupt  any 
orderly  transition  during  removal  of 
office;  the  other  interpretation  would 
require  that  a  prescribed  transition 
period  remain  in  effect. 

In  such  circumstances,  the  Inter 
national  Law  Commission  has  forth- 
rightly  stated  which  is  the  choice  to  1 
made.  "Where  a  treaty  is  open  to  tw( 
interpretations,  one  of  which  does  ami 
the  other  does  not  enable  the  treaty  I 
have  appropriate  effects,  good  faith  a 


I 


66 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


United  Nations 


eibject  and  purpose  of  the  treaty 
■rind  that  the  former  interpretation 
d  be  adopted." 

t  is  incontestable  that  the  object 
'  host  agreement  is  the  regional 
in  Alexandria.  The  purpose  of 
reaty  is  to  set  out  the  terms  by 
I  Egypt  and  the  Organization 
il  to  establish,  maintain,  and 
J  ate  the  Office, 
^ny  interpretation  of  the  agree- 
I  which  would  allow  the  object  and 
ise  of  the  treaty  to  be  vitiated 
ut  regard  to  the  2-year  transition 
I  specified  by  section  37  renders 
n  37  illusory.  Since  there  is 
!g  in  the  language  or  history  of 
)St  agreement  to  suggest  that  the 
■  s  intended  such  a  result,  it  must 
jesumed  that  they  intended  the 
vary  — that  is,  intended  section  37 

I  treaty  to  be  effective, 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that 

rO'  al  of  a  major  regional  office  of  a 
-g'  international  organization  is  not  a 

II  matter.  The  cost  of  moving 

s  the  millions  of  dollars.  Removal 
^.  office  would  remove  several  addi- 
)ni  millions  from  the  economy  of  the 
ist  tate.  It  simply  does  not  make 
IS  to  conclude  that  the  parties  to 
e    st  agreement  could  have  intended 
at  le  same  language  which  provides 
r  I  l-year  notice  period  to  deal  with 
\n  )lved  differences  over  privileges 
'd  imunities  would  simultaneously 
ioi  the  object  of  the  agreement  to  be 
nil  ed,  at  a  large  cost,  without  notice 
ai 

iternational  organizations  and 
st  tates  have  generally  undertaken, 
a  eement,  to  provide  for  the 
':  y  disestablishment  of  any  head- 
I  Ts  which  is  removed  from  a  host 
!ti  The  terms  of  the  host  agreement 
H'Aa.Tch  1951,  its  history,  and  the 
ai  ible  principles  of  treaty  inter- 
■'■t  ion  all  indicate  that  the  host 
-enent  of  25  March  1951  is  such  an 
"enent. 

inally,  I  would  like  to  make  one 
t  )int.  It  is  important  to  note  that 
"3ireting  this  agreement  as  its 
,'  ige  and  history  indicate  that  it 
I  i  be  interpreted  — to  apply  to 
al  of  the  office  — imposes  no  ex- 
inary  burden  on  the  parties  to 
reement. 

imply  as  a  practical  matter, 
al  of  an  office  is  not  something 
an  be  successfully  accomplished 
I  ight.  It  took  a  year  for  the  Orga- 


nization's working  group  merely  to 
study  the  question.  It  could  easily  take 
as  long  or  longer  for  the  actual  move  to 
be  accomplished. 

It  is  believed  that  the  only  legal 
obligations  imposed  by  section  37  are 
those  discussed  in  the  written  state- 
ment of  the  United  States.  Namely,  the 
parties  would  have  to  keep  the  existing 
legal  regime  in  effect  for  2  years;  they 
would  have  to  negotiate  in  good  faith 
for  the  gradual  disestablishment  of  the 
office  over  the  2-year  period.  These  are 
not  onerous  burdens.  They  are,  in  fact, 
probably  nothing  more  than  what 
would,  as  a  practical  matter,  in  any 
event  be  required  in  order  to  secure  an 
orderly  removal  of  the  office.  This  fact 
apparently  is  recognized  by  our  distin- 
guished colleagues  from  the  Syrian 
Arab  Republic,  whose  written  state- 
ment contains  the  following  sentence 
concerning  transfer  of  the  regional 
office. 

Of  course,  for  reasons  of  expediency  and 
convenience  and  once  the  decision  to  trans- 
fer the  Office  is  taken,  the  provisions  of  the 
Agreement .  .  .  can  continue  to  be  applied  un- 
til a  date  to  be  agreed  between  the  two  par- 
ties for  its  termination,  (p.  69.) 

Where,  it  is  submitted,  this  state- 
ment misses  the  mark  is  in  its  failure  to 


appreciate  that  the  parties  have  already 
arranged  for  these  provisions  to  con- 
tinue until  an  agreed  date,  and  that 
date  is  2  years  from  the  official  notifica- 
tion of  the  decision  to  move  the  office. 
Why  does  it  surprise  our  colleagues 
from  Syria  that  Egypt  and  the  Organi- 
zation could  have  perceived  in  1951,  as 
Syria  perceives  in  1980,  that  when  a 
regional  office  is  moved,  expediency 
and  convenience  require  continuation  of 
the  existing  legal  regime  for  a  period  of 
time?  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that 
Egypt  and  the  Organization  assumed,  in 
1951,  that  it  was  in  the  interest  of  both 
to  provide  for  binding  legal  obligations 
which  would  assure  an  orderly  removal 
of  the  office,  rather  than  to  leave  such 
an  important  matter  to  whatever  good- 
will the  parties  might  summon  in  the 
midst  of  the  tensions  which  undoubtedly 
surround  any  unilateral  removal. 

There  is  no  question  that  an  abrupt 
and  arbitrary  removal  of  the  regional 
office  from  Egypt  would  work  hardship 
on  Egypt  and,  therefore,  serve  the 
political  purpose  of  those  states  which 
press  for  removal.  I  submit,  however, 
that  it  has  been  demonstrated  to  the 
Court  that  it  was  just  this  type  of  hard- 
ship—the precipitous  removal  of  an 
office  without  time  to  prepare  for 
cushioning  its  effects  — that  the  Organi- 


MR.  SCHWEBEL  ELECTED 
A  JUDGE  OF  THE  ICJ 

On  January  15,  1981,  Stephen  M. 
Schwebel,  Deputy  Legal  Adviser  of  the 
Department  of  State,  was  elected  a 
judge  of  the  International  Court  of 
Justice  by  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
and  Security  Council.  He  succeeds  the 
late  Judge  Richard  R.  Baxter. 

Mr.  Schwebel  has  served  since 
1977  as  a  member  of  the  U.N.  Inter- 
national Law  Commission,  the  U.N.'s 
principal  treaty  drafting  body  on  which 
the  large  majority  of  the  Court's  cur- 
rent judges  sat  prior  to  their  election  to 
the  Court.  At  51  years  of  age,  he  is  the 
youngest  U.S.  national  ever  elected  to 
the  Court. 

Mr.  Schwebel  has  been  U.S. 
counsel  in  two  recent  cases  before  the 
ICJ.  He  played  a  leading  role  in  the 
U.S.  decision  to  take  the  case  of  the 
American  hostages  in  Iran  to  the  Court 
and  participated  in  the  oral  argument 
of  it.  In  October  1980,  he  presented  the 
U.S.  argument  to  the  Court  in  advisory 
proceedings  brought  by  the  World 


Health  Organization  in  response  to  ef- 
forts by  anti-Camp  David  Arab  states 
to  require  WHO  peremptorily  to 
remove  its  regional  office  from  Alexan- 
dria, Egypt. 

Deputy  Legal  Adviser  of  the  State 
Department  since  1974,  Mr.  Schwebel 
has  also  served  as  the  Department's 
Counselor  on  International  Law 
(1973-74)  and  Assistant  Legal  Adviser 
for  United  Nations  Affairs  (1961-66).  He 
was  Executive  Director  of  the 
American  Society  of  International  Law 
(1967-73).  Since  1967  he  has  been  pro- 
fessor of  international  law  at  the  School 
of  Advanced  International  Studies  of 
The  Johns  Hopkins  University,  serving 
as  Edward  B.  Burling  Professor  of 
International  Law  and  Organization 
since  1973.  Mr.  Schwebel  was  assistant 
professor  of  law  at  Harvard  Law  School 
(1959-61)  and  has  been  a  visiting  faculty 
member  at  Cambridge  University,  the 
Australian  National  University,  and 
The  Hague  Academy  of  International 
Law.  He  is  the  author  of  two  books  and 
some  60  articles  in  the  field  of  interna- 
tional law. 


»ary  1981 


67 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


zation  and  Egypt  agreed  to  avoid 
almost  30  years  ago. 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  submits  that 
the  answer  to  the  primary  question  put 
by  the  World  Health  Assembly  to  the 
Court  must  be  in  the  affirmative. . . . 


WORLD  COURT  ISSUES 
ADVISORY  OPINION 

An  advisory  opinion  issued  December 
20,  1980,  in  The  Hague  by  the  Interna- 
tional Court  of  Justice  was  hailed  by 
State  Department  Legal  Adviser 
Roberts  Owen  as  "a  victory  for  the  rule 
of  law  in  the  relations  between  states 
and  international  organizations." 

The  opinion  holds  that,  should  the 
World  Health  Organization  decide  to 
remove  its  eastern  Mediterranean 
regional  office  from  Alexandria,  Egypt, 
the  WHO  and  Egypt  will  be  legally 
obliged  "to  consult  together  in  good 
faith  as  to  the  question  under  what  con- 
ditions and  in  accordance  with  what 
modalities  a  transfer  of  the  regional  of- 
fice from  Egypt  may  be  effected."  The 
Court  held  that  the  mutual  obligations 
of  the  WHO  and  Egypt  "place  a  duty 
upon  the  party  which  wishes  to  effect 
the  transfer  to  give  a  reasonable  period 
of  notice  to  the  other  party  for  the  ter- 
mination of  the  existing  situation. .  . ." 

Arab  states  opposed  to  the  Camp 
David  agreements  have  sought  to 
ostracize  Egypt  by  requiring  interna- 
tional organizations  with  offices  in 
Egypt  to  remove  them.  Attempts  in  the 
World  Health  Assembly  to  require 
removal  of  the  WHO  regional  office 
from  Alexandria  have  been  frustrated, 
most  lately  by  a  resolution  sponsored 
by  the  United  States  which  requested 
the  International  Court  of  Justice  to 
give  an  advisory  opinion  on  the  legal 
principles  which  would  govern  any  such 
move. 

Egypt  and  the  United  States,  both 
of  which  oppose  any  move,  argued  to 
the  Court  that,  should  the  WHO  decide 
to  remove  the  Alexandria  office,  2 
years'  notice  would  have  to  be  given 
under  the  Egyptian-WHO  host  agree- 
ment or  that,  in  any  event,  reasonable 
notice  would  have  to  be  given.  The 
Court's  opinion,  by  a  vote  of  12-1,  sus- 
tains the  latter  argument.  Only  the 
member  of  the  Court  of  Soviet  na- 


El  Salvador 

Following  are  a  statement  of 
December  12,  1980,  on  the  special 
Presidential  mission  to  El  Salvador 
(December  6-9,  1980,  and  Department 
statements  of  January  U  and  17,  1981 
on  resumption  of  military  assistance  to 
El  Salvador. 

DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  12,  1980 

William  D.  Rogers,  former  Under  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  Economic  Affairs 
and  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  under 
President  Ford,  and  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  State  William  G.  Bowdler  met 
with  the  President  yesterday  to  report 
on  their  special  mission  to  El  Salvador. 
Today  they  are  briefing  members  of  the 
Congress  on  their  mission.  They  are 
also  submitting  a  confidential  written 
report  to  the  President. 

During  their  December  6  through  9 
stay  in  El  Salvador,  the  special  mission 
members  held  a  series  of  meetings  with 
Ambassador  White  and  the  Embassy 
staff,  the  governing  Junta,  and  Arch- 
bishop, the  Chief  of  Police,  the  special 
Salvadoran  Investigating  Commission, 
nuns  from  the  same  order  as  two  of  the 
murdered  women,  and  others.  They  told 
those  with  whom  they  met  that  the 
murder  of  the  four  American  church- 
women  had  shocked  the  conscience  of 
the  American  people.  They  expressed 
our  g^ave  concern  that  the  increased 
incidence  of  violence  in  El  Salvador 
raised  a  fundamental  question  about 
the  ability  of  the  government  to  main- 
tain a  minimal  degree  of  civil  order. 
They  urged  prompt  and  effective  action 
not  only  to  apprehend  and  punish  the 
murderers  but  also  to  control  the  vio- 
lence and  prevent  such  tragic  incidents 
from  recurring. 

The  special  mission  reported  that, 
thus  far,  there  was  no  direct  evidence 
of  who  committed  the  crime.  Especially 
because  of  circumstantial  evidence  of 
possible  security  force  involvement  in 


tionality.  Judge  Platon  Morosov, 
dissented. 

Mr.  Owen  described  the  Court's 
opinion  as  "the  second  excellent  deci- 
sion which  it  has  issued  this  year."  He 
stated  that  it  "more  than  satisfactorily 
upholds"  the  U.S.  position  and  "demon- 
strates that  international  organizations, 
no  less  than  states,  must  adhere  to  the 
rule  of  law  in  international 
relations."  ■ 


ill 

ii 
fi 

n 
iiif 
u\ 

sri 
M 


fail 

iili 

ae 

M 

all 


the  case,  the  mission  urged  the  autln 
ties  of  El  Salvador  to  conduct  a  comi 
plete,  thorough,  and  professional  inv« 
tigation  of  these  murders  so  that  the 
questions  can  be  answered  and  those 
responsible  be  brought  to  justice 

The  governing  Junta  requested  t 
the  mission  communicate  to  the  Pres 
dent,  the  government,  and  people  of 
United  States  El  Salvador's  profouno 
regret  with  respect  to  the  crime.  Th( 
told  our  mission  that  the  investigatic 
would  be  pursued  wherever  it  led,  ai 
where  in  the  country,  at  any  level. 

To  this  end,  the  Junta  has  appoii 
an  official  four-man  ad  hoc  investigat 
commission.  The  commission,  which  i 
actively  pursuing  its  task,  has  request 
our  technical  and  professional  invest 
tive  support.  Several  agents  of  the  F  '"J 
are  already  in  El  Salvador  providing, 
technical  assistance  to  the  commissio.  ^^ 
We  will  continue  to  cooperate  fully  * 
with  this  investigation.  Jj 

Our  special  emissaries  also  dis- 
cussed  the  desirability  of  permitting'  ™ 
outside  observers  of  the  investigatioHf" 
The  commission  has  welcomed  this.  \ 
expect  that  organizations  such  as  the 
Inter-American  Human  Rights  Comnj(|*' 
sion  will  be  able  to  play  such  a  role.   "" 
Our  Embassy  will  also  be  closely  moi 
toring  the  prog:ress  of  the  investigati 

We  consider  the  appointment  of 
the  investigative  commission,  its  effo 
to  date,  its  desire  to  have  U.S.  invest 
gative  experts  assit  in  its  work,  and  i 
willingness  to  permit  outside  observe 
to  monitor  the  investigation  as  positi  ' 
responses  to  our  mission. 

In  the  course  of  the  mission's  dis 
cussions  with  the  governing  Junta  an 
others,  it  was  pleased  to  note  that 
there  appears  to  be  a  consensus  on  tl 
need  to  act  quickly  and  effectively  to 
investigate,  thoroughly,  the  killings  o 
our  citizens,  to  gain  greater  control 
over  the  widespread  violence,  to  unde 
take  a  reform  and  restructuring  of  tbi 
government  and  to  make  it  more  effei 
tive,  to  make  the  military  high  comma 
more  responsive  to  duly  constituted 
authorities,  to  implement  the  reform 
program,  and  to  open  a  dialogue  with 
democratic  leaders  of  the  opposition  t 
end  the  terrible  internal  conflict  that 
costing  so  many  lives. 

Negotiations  are  going  on  in  El 
Salvador  between  the  Christian  Demo 
crats  and  the  military  toward  these 
ends.  Statements  by  Salvadoran  offi- 
cials involved  indicate  that  some  sigi 
leant  restructuring  of  the  government 
and  shifts  in  military  personnel  are 


68 


Deoartment  of  State  Bulleti 


Western  Hemisphere 


iated.  The  United  States  is  ready 
lime  its  assistance  to  El  Salvador 
.  ^uch  progress. 

^e  will  be  following  these  develop- 
-   and  carefully  assessing  the  way 
eh  they  improve  the  effectiveness 
Ljovernment  pursuing  its  reform 
im,  in  controlling  violence,  and  in 
jiting  human  rights.  Progress 
ai  these  objectives  is  essential  to 
icfurther  polarization,  either  to  the 
-ne  right  or  to  the  radical  left. 

•  {TMENT  STATEMENT 

I,  1981' 

^ministration  has  decided  to 
ji!  its  Fiscal  Year  1981  military 
since  to  El  Salvador,  which  was 
ip-arily  suspended  on  December  5. 
Cically,  we  will  continue  with  our 
ift  ing  $420,000  international  mili- 
/  lucation  and  training  (IMET)  pro- 
m  nd  proceed  with  implementation 
iu55  million  foreign  military  sales 
!&  credit  program.  Within  the  FMS 
5)m  we  will  proceed,  immediately, 
h  le  sale  of  approximately  $2.3  mil- 
a  i  nonlethal  equipment.  We  will 
o  oceed  with  the  loan  of  two 

1   (Huey)  transport  helicopters,  fi- 
'XI  ?  related  costs  from  the  FMS 
di  This  helicopter  loan  program  has 
^n  nder  consideration  for  several 
It  ■.. 

'  hen  we  announced  resumption  of 
•  e  inomic  assistance  to  El  Salvador 
D(  ember  17,  we  stated  that  our 
iti  y  assistance  would  continue  to  be 
np  arily  suspended.  We  indicated 
'  would  be  following  develop- 
n  El  Salvador  with  regard  to 
a  areas  of  concern,  especially  con- 
ue  progress  in  the  investigation  of 
n  rders  of  the  four  American 
fc  vvomen. 

e  investigation  of  the  murders 
"  Government  of  El  Salvador's 

investigation  commission  is  pro- 
i ',.  The  commission  has  questioned 
yiersons  in  El  Salvador  and  devel- 
i  )me  leads.  Our  FBI  has  furnished 
n  al  assistance  to  the  commission 
vil,  this  week,  deliver  to  the  com- 
i  1  its  assessment  of  the  evidence 
■d  from  the  two  autopsies  per- 
in  the  United  States  and  from 
it  of  FBI  technicians  to  El  Sal- 
y  The  Salvadoran  Attorney  Gen- 
proceeding  with  arrangements 
opsies  on  the  two  women  buried 
alvador.  The  Salvadoran  Em- 
n  Ottawa  is  to  interview  the 
)f  Canadian  missionaries  who 
with  the  women  at  the  airport. 


The  Government  of  El  Salvador 
has  invited  the  Inter-American  Human 
Rights  Commission  to  observe  the  work 
of  the  investigating  commission.  We  are 
supporting  this  invitation. 

Our  decisions  regarding  military 
assistance  have  also  taken  account  of 
the  current  military  situation  in  El  Sal- 
vador. A  major  military  offensive  was 
conducted  by  the  leftist  guerrillas  over 
the  past  weekend  in  which  they  demon- 
strated that  they  are  better  armed  and 
constitute  a  military  threat.  Captured 
documents  and  weapons  confirmed  that 
the  guerillas  have  received  a  substan- 
tial supply  of  arms  from  abroad. 

Although  the  government  forces 
contained  the  guerrilla  offensive,  they 
expended  considerable  materiel  and  lost 
their  last  transport  helicopter.  As  a  re- 
sult, their  need  for  military  assistance 
has  become  greater  and  more  urgent. 

Taking  full  account  of  the  progress 
in  areas  of  concern  to  us,  especially  the 
investigation  of  the  murders  of  the  four 
American  churchwomen,  and  considering 
the  overall  military  situation,  the  Admin- 
istration has  decided  to  resume  its  mod- 
est military  assistance  to  El  Salvador. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT 
JAN.  17,  1981' 

For  the  past  15  months,  we  have 
assisted  the  moderate  military/civilian 
Government  of  El  Salvador  in  its  efforts: 

•  To  implement  its  agrarian 
reform  and  electoral  program; 

•  To  put  a  stop  to  the  violence  of 
right-wing  terrorists;  and 

•  To  defeat  the  Marxist  guerrillas. 

We  are  encouraged  that  there  has 
been  progress  in  these  areas. 

To  assist  the  government  to  imple- 
ment the  reforms  which  were  so  essen- 
tial to  give  the  underprivileged  of  El 
Salvador  a  greater  stake  in  that  society, 
we  have  provided  approximately  $82 
million  of  economic  aid.  We  have  also 
provided  military  aid,  both  as  a  means 
of  encouraging  progress  in  areas  of 
common  concern  and  of  supporting  such 
steps  when  they  occur.  We  believe  that 
continued  progress  with  the  agrarian 
reform  and  electoral  program  and  a 
readiness  to  negotiate  are  just  as 
important  to  the  long-term  success  of 
the  government  in  ending  the  violence 
and  defeating  the  guerrillas  as  its  mili- 
tary efforts. 

On  January  10,  Marxist  guerrillas 
launched  a  major  offensive  in  El  Sal- 
vador. Evidence  emerging  from  this 


offensive  and  intelligence  reports  con- 
firmed that  the  guerrillas  have  obtained, 
from  abroad,  a  substantial  quantity  of 
lethal  weapons,  including  grenades, 
recoilless  rifles,  and  mortars.  The  evi- 
dence also  indicates  that  a  number  of 
countries  are  supporting  the  Marxist 
guerrillas  and  are  continuing  to  supply 
them  arms  and  ammunition.  Up  until 
this  offensive,  the  United  States  pro- 
vided limited  military  assistance  to  help 
meet  the  Salvadoran  Government's 
legitimate  defense  needs.  (This  included 
$5.7  million  FMS  credits  and  $250,000 
IMET  in  fiscal  year  1980  and  $5  million 
FMS  credits  and  $500,000  IMET  for  fis- 
cal year  1981.) 

The  Government  of  El  Salvador  is 
in  control  of  the  country  despite 
repeated  outbreaks  of  terrorism  and 
scattered  guerrilla  attacks.  However,  in 
dealing  with  the  current  offensive,  the 
Salvadoran  armed  forces  have  had  to 
draw  down  their  stocks  to  levels  where 
replacement  is  essential  of  some  of 
their  equipment,  especially,  ammuni- 
tion. The  Salvadoran  Government  needs 
to  offset  increases  in  the  guerrillas' 
firepower  and  to  replace  their  own 
losses.  The  Government  of  El  Salvador 
has,  therefore,  requested  that  we  pro- 
vide, on  an  emergency  basis,  the  mili- 
tary items  which  they  require.  We  are 
responding  for  essentially  two  reasons: 

First,  the  government  continues  to 
take  positive  steps  in  the  areas  of 
mutual  concern  to  our  two  nations  — the 
investigations,  implementation  of  the 
reforms,  and  improvement  of  the  gov- 
ernment's ability  to  deal  with  repres- 
sion and  terrorism. 

Secondly,  we  must  support  the  Sal- 
vadoran Government  in  its  struggle 
against  left-wing  terrorism  supported 
covertly  with  arms,  ammunition,  train- 
ing, and  political  and  military  advice  by 
Cuba  and  other  Communist  nations. 

The  United  States  is,  therefore, 
providing  $5  million  in  equipment  and 
services,  including  some  urgently  need- 
ed arms  and  ammunition,  under  Section 
506A  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act. 
We  are  also  loaning  the  remaining  4 
Huey  transport  helicopters,  with  related 
costs  financed  under  the  fiscal  year 
1981  FMS  credit.  We  believe  these  sup- 
plies will  be  important  in  helping  the 
government  maintain  control  and  con- 
tinue the  process  of  moderate  reform. 


Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  John  Trattner. 


riry  1981 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Coopera- 
tion Council,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  4, 
1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  Philippines,  Oct.  1, 
1980. 

Health 

Amendment  to  Article  74  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  World  Health  Organization,  as 
amended.  Adopted  at  Geneva  May  18,  1978.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  U.S.,  Dec.  10,  1980; 
San  Marino,  Oct.  28,  1980;  France,  Oct.  6, 
1980. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  abolishing  the  requirement  of 
legalisation  for  foreign  public  documents, 
with  annex.  Done  at  The  Hague  Oct.  5,  1961. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  24,  1965.^ 
Accession  deposited:  U.S.,  Dec.  24,  1980.^ 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 

on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331).  Adopted  at 

London  Oct.  12,  1971.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Australia,  Nov.  10, 

1980 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720), 
relating  to  amendments  to  the  convention. 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  12,  1975.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Australia,  Nov.  10, 
1980. 

Maritime  Matters 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  14,  1975.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Mexico,  Dec.  19, 
1980;  Uruguay,  Dec.  17,  1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948.  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  17,  1977.' 

Acceptance  deposited:  Uruguay,  Dec.  17, 
TMT. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  15,  1979.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  New  Zealand,  Dec. 
15,  1980;  Poland,  Nov.  20,  1980;  Sweden, 
Nov.  25,  1980. 


Patents— Plant  Varieties 

International  convention  for  the  protection 

of  new  varieties  of  plants  of  Dec.  2,  1961,  as 

revised.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  23,  1978.' 

Ratification  deposited:  New  Zealand,  Nov.  3, 

1980. 

Acceptance  deposited:  U.S.,  Nov.  12,  1980. 

Rubber 

International  natural  rubber  agreement, 

1979.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  6,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Oct.  23,  1980. 
Accepance  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 
Oct.  28,  1980. 

Notification  of  provisional  application:  Italy, 
Nov.  17,  1980;  Thailand,  Nov.  21,  1980. 
Accession  deposited:  Sri  Lanka,  Nov.  17, 
1980. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 

1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Approval  deposited:  Czechoslovakia,  Aug. 

18,  1980. 

Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  Oct.  31,  1980. 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  sea,  1974 
(TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17,  1978. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Liberia,  Aug.  28, 
1980;  Yogoslavia,  Oct.  31,  1980. 
Accession  deposited:  Colombia,  Oct.  31,  1980. 
Enters  into  force:  May  1,  1981. 

South  Pacific  Commission 

Agreement  establishing  the  South  Pacific 
Commission.  Signed  at  Canberra  Feb.  6, 
1947.  Entered  into  force  July  29,  1948.  TIAS 
2317,  2458,  2952,  5845,  8120. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cook  Islands,  Oct.  14, 
1980;  Niue,  Oct.  13,  1980. 

Space 

Agreement  governing  the  activities  of  states 
on  the  Moon  and  other  celestial  bodies. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  5,  1979.' 
Signature:  Guatemala,  Nov.  20,  1980. 

Telecommunications 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations 
(Geneva,  1959),  as  revised,  relating  to  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with  annexes 
and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  5, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1979;  for 
the  U.S.  Oct.  22,  1980. 

Approval  deposited:  Republic  of  Korea,  Sept. 
22.  1980. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  crimes  against  internationally  pro- 
tected persons,  including  diplomatic  agents. 
Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Accession  deposited:  Burundi,  Dec.  17,  1980. 

International  convention  against  the  taking 
of  hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 
1979.' 


Ratification  deposited:  F.R.G.,  Dec.  15,  19J,nj| 
Signatures:  Israel,  Nov.  19,  1980;  Egypt,  f 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Dec.  18,  1980;  Japaj, 
Dec.  22,  1980. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  .  ^^ 

measurement  of  ships,  1969,  with  annexesr  ' 
Done  at  London  June  23,  1969.  Enters  inti 
force  July  18,  1982. 
Acceptance  deposited:  France,  Oct.  31,  19 


Trade 

International  dairy  arrangement.  Done  at 
Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  forced' 
Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9623.  ■' 

Acceptance:  Romania,  Oct.  27,  1980. 

Agreement  of  government  procurement. 

Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  infil 

force  Jan.  1,  1981.^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  Japan,  Apr.  25,  Hi  )£ 

Norway,  Oct.  24,  1980. 

Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Oct.  24,  li 


ml 


Nf 


U.N.  Industrial  Development  Organization 
Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  Devek 
ment  Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopte 
at  Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Nigeria,  Dec.  19,  1! 
Signatures:  U.S.S.R.,  Dec.  8,  1980;  Byelori 
sian  Soviet  Socialist  Republic,  Dec.  10,  191.! 
Mongolia,  Dec.  22,  1980. 


i 


Wheat 

Food  aid  convention,  1980  (part  of  the  inti 
national  wheat  agreement,  1971,  as  exten' 
(TIAS  7144)).  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  i: 
1980.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1980. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Dec.  5,  1980 
Acceptance  deposited:  Japan,  Nov.  26,  19( 
Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending 
the  food  aid  convention  (part  of  the  intern, 
tional  wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144i 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entere 
into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  ci 
tain  provisions,  July  1,  1979,  with  respect 
other  provisions.  TIAS  9878. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Dec.  5,  1980. 
Accessions  deposited:  Netherlands,  Dec.  9. 
1980;5  Argentina,  Dec.  11,  1980. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  \^ 
the  wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  in-   ^|. 
ternational  wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS    j,. 
7144).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.    l' 
Entered  into  force  June  23,  1979,  with 
respect  to  certain  provisions.  TIAS  9878. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Dec.  5,  1980. 
Accessions  deposited:  Netherlands,  Dec.  9, 
1980;''  Argentina,  Dec.  11,  1980. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  i 

discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 

New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.'  i 

Accession  deposited:  Cape  Verde,  Dec.  5, 

1980. 

Ratification  deposited:  Hungary,  Dec.  22, 

1980. 


70 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Treaties 


ERAL 


iient  relating  to  air  transport  services, 
nded  (TIAS  1515,  8923,  9207).  Signed 
^sels  Apr.  5,  1946.  Entered  into  force 
.,  1946. 
-Biated:  Oct.  23,  1980. 

ffia 

r  m  of  cultural,  educational,  scientific 
hnological  exchanges  for  1981  and 
>  ith  final  protocol.  Signed  at  Washing- 
\ .  21,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Nov. 

.  0;  effective  Jan.  1,  1981. 


renent  relating  to  investment  guaran- 
3,  ith  related  notes  and  statement.  Ef- 

eby  exchange  of  notes  at  Beijing  Oct. 

10.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  30,  1980. 

;cl  Slovakia 

Tsnent  amending  and  extending  the  air 
)rt  agreement  of  Feb.  28,  1969,  as 
■d  and  extended  (TIAS  6644,  7356, 
s68).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
May  12  and  Nov.  7,  1980.  Entered 
ce  Nov.  7,  1980;  effective  Dec.  31, 


■9t  Tiendment  to  the  grant  agreement  of 
jg.  5,  1978  (TIAS  9494),  relating  to  hous- 
:  a   community  upgrading  for  low  income 
.'^i:  ins.  Signed  at  Cairo  Sept.  28,  1980. 
e  d  into  force  Sept.  28,  1980.  TIAS 

oj«   grant  agreement,  with  annex,  re- 
rdl ;  university  linkages.  Signed  at  Cairo 
pt  B,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  28, 
0.  IAS  9875. 

e  lent  extending  privileges  and  im- 
ni  ^s  to  U.S.  military  personnel  in  Egypt 
"o:  ection  with  joint  Egyptian-U.S.  Army 
'  Force  training  exercises.  Effected 
lange  of  notes  at  Cairo  Nov.  3,  and  5, 
ntered  into  force  Nov.  5,  1980. 


al 

a  andum  of  understanding  for  coopera- 
:  i  energy  research  and  development. 
M  at  Washington  Nov.  6,  1980.  Entered 
i  ce  Nov.  6,  1980. 

y.  Federal  Republic  of 
tion  for  the  avoidance  of  double  tax- 
a  ith  respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheri- 
■eind  gifts.  Signed  at  Bonn  Dec.  3, 
" ).  nters  into  force  upon  the  exchange  of 
rfients  of  ratification. 

eStional  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

renent  for  the  application  of  safeguards 
Kj.S.,  with  protocol.  Signed  at  Vienna 

..  1977. 
^  1  into  force:  Dec.  9,  1980. 


Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Feb. 
26,  1979  (TIAS  9419),  as  amended,  relating  to 
trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber, 
textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  Washington  Nov.  13  and 
17  and  Dec.  11,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 
11,  1980. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June 
2,  1977  (TIAS  8952),  relating  to  additional 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Mexico  Nov.  6,  1980.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  6,  1980. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  amending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  June  24,  1964  (TIAS  5605), 
with  exchange  of  letters.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Wellington  Nov.  25,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  25,  1980. 

Romania 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and 
manmade  fiber,  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
Sept.  3  and  Nov.  3,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  3,  1980;  effective  Apr.  1,  1981. 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  June  17,  1977,  as  amended 
(TIAS  8833,  8924,  9167,  9211,  9646,  9796), 
relating  to  trade  in  wool  and  manmade  fiber 
textiles.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Bucharest  July  22  and  Oct.  31,  1980.  Entered 
into  force  Oct.  31,  1980. 

Switzerland 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of 
understanding  of  July  2  and  9,  1975  (TIAS 
9032)  concerning  the  purchase  of  F-5E  and 
F-5F  aircraft  by  Switzerland.  Signed  at 
Washington  and  Bern  Oct.  7  and  29,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Oct.  29,  1980. 

Agreement  establishing  rights,  privileges, 
and  immunities  of  the  delegation  to  the 
negotiations  concerning  theater  nuclear 
forces  (TNF).  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters 
at  Bern  Oct.  17.  1980.  Entered  into  force  Oct. 
17,  1980. 

Turkey 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  agreed  minute 
and  annexes.  Signed  at  Ankara  Oct.  24,  1980. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  24,  1980. 

Treaty  on  the  enforcement  of  penal  judg- 
ments. Signed  at  Ankara  June  7,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Dec. 
2,  1980. 


Treaty  on  extradition  and  mutual  assistance 
in  criminal  matters.  Signed  at  Ankara  June 
7,  1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981. 
Instruments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Dec. 
2,  1980. 

Extradition  treaty.  Signed  at  Lausanne  Aug. 
6,  1923.  Entered  into  force  Aug.  18,  1934.  49 
Stat.  2692. 
Terminated:  Jan.  1,  1981. 

Agreement  for  cooperation  on  defense  and 
economy  in  accordance  with  articles  II  and 
III  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty,  with 
related  note.  Supplementary  agreement 
number  1  on  defense  support;  supplementary 
agreement  number  2  on  defense  industrial 
cooperation;  supplementary  agreement 
number  3  on  installations,  with  implementing 
agreements  (annexes).  Signed  at  Ankara 
Mar.  29,  1980. 

Entered  into  force:  Definitively,  Nov.  18, 
1980. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  July 

23,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  8641,  8965, 
9722),  concerning  air  services.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Dec.  4, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  4,  1980;  effec- 
tive Apr.  1,  1980,  except  that  annex  5  is  ef- 
fective Jan.  1,  1980. 

Venezuela 

Maritime  boundary  treaty.  Signed  at 

Caracas  Mar.  28,  1978. 

Ratifications  exchanged:  Washington  Nov. 

24,  1980. 

Entered  into  force:  Nov.  24,  1980. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Oct. 
26  and  27,  1978  (TIAS  9447),  concerning  the 
trade  in  men's  and  boys'  wool  and  manmade 
fiber  suits.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Belgrade  July  15  and  Sept.  12,  1980.  Enters 
into  force  after  approval  by  the  competent 
authorities  of  both  parties. 

Zaire 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for 
sales  of  agricultural  commodities  of  May  30, 
1980.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kin- 
shasa Oct.  10  and  31,  1980.  Entered  into 
force  Oct.  31,  1980. 


'  Not  in  force. 
^  Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 
'  With  a  statement. 
■*  With  reservation. 
'  Applicable  to  the  Kingdom  in 
Europe.  ■ 


iry  1981 


71 


CHRONOLOGY 


PRESS  RELEASES 


December  1980 

Events  pertaining  to  Iran  may  be  found 
on  pages  5  and  9. 

December  3 

Secretary  Muskie  transmits  ninth  semi- 
annual report  on  Implementation  of  the  Hel- 
sinki Final  Act  covering  the  period  June  1 
through  November  30,  1980,  to  Chairman 
Dante  Fascell  of  the  Commission  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE). 

December  5 

Pending  clarification  of  the  role  of  Sal- 
vadoran  security  forces  in  the  killing  of 
three  U.S.  nuns,  U.S.  suspends  new  military 
and  economic  aid  to  El  Salvador. 

A  factfinding  mission,  led  by  William  D. 
Rogers,  former  Assistant  Secretary  for 
Inter-American  Affairs,  departs  for  El  Sal- 
vador to  investigate  the  killings. 

December  9 

U.S.-International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  treaty  permitting  IAEA  to 
safeguard  civil  nuclear  facilities  in  the  U.S. 
enters  into  force. 

Secretary  Muskie  departs  for  Brussels 
for  NATO  ministerial  meeting  (Dec.  11-12) 
and  departs  for  London  on  Dec.  12  for  talks 
with  senior  British  officials  Dec.  12-14. 

December  11 

The  following  newly  appointed  Ambassa- 
dors presented  their  credentials  to  President 
Carter:  Jorge  Mario  Eastman  of  Colombia; 
Col.  Federico  Edmundo  Poujol  of  Honduras; 
Dr.  Moteane  John  Melamu  of  Botswana;  Fer- 
nando SCHWALB  Lopez  Aldana  of  Peru; 
and  Kubulan  Los  of  Papua  New  Guinea. 

Semiannual  NATO  ministerial  meeting 
held  in  Brussels  Dec.  11-12. 

December  17 

U.S.  and  Israel  reach  final  settlement  on 
U.S.S.  Liberty  claim. 

December  18 

Former  Soviet  Prime  Minister  Aleksei 
N.  Kosygin  dies. 

December  19 

U.N.  Security  Council  unanimously 
votes  to  call  upon  Israel  to  adhere  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Geneva  convention  in  its 
conduct  in  territories  occupied  in  1967  and  to 
allow  the  expelled  West  Bank  officials  to 
return  to  their  homes.  ■ 


Department  of  State 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from 
the  Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

*332       12/1        Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCO,  Subcom- 
mittee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS)  working 
group  on  safety  of  navi- 
gation, Dec.  17. 

333  12/4        Muskie:  address  before  Lan- 

don  lecture  series,  Kansas 
State  University,  Manhat- 
tan, Kan. 
♦333A     12/8        Muskie:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Kansas 
address. 

334  12/4        Muskie:  address  before  Af- 

rican-American Historical 
and  Cultural  Society's 
25th  Anniversary,  San 
Francisco. 
*335       12/4        Muskie:  remarks  to  Over- 
seas Writers  Club,  Dec.  3. 

336  12/5        Muskie:  address  before  Uni- 

versity of  Southern  Cali- 
fornia's Conference  on 
World  Hunger  and  Refu- 
gees, Los  Angeles. 
*336A     12/9        Muskie:  question-and-answer 
session  following  Los 
Angeles  address. 

337  12/5        Muskie:  address  and  ques- 

tion-and-answer session  at 
student  union,  Kansas 
State  University,  Manhat- 
tan, Dec.  4. 
•338        12/8        U.S.-U.K.  air  agreement  ex- 
panded, Dec.  4. 
•339       12/9        Muskie:  news  conference  at 
Davidson  Conference 
Center,  University  of 
Southern  California,  Los 
Angeles,  Dec.  5. 
•340        12/10      Muskie:  interview  with 

European  correspondents 
at  ICA,  Dec.  9. 
sec  subcommittee  on  ocean 

dumping,  Jan.  14. 
Muskie:  remarks  with  re- 
porters, Brussels,  Dec.  10. 
Muskie:  remarks  to  re- 
porters, Brussels,  Dec.  11. 
Muskie:  remarks  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  North 
Atlantic  Council  Meeting, 
Brussels,  Dec.  12. 
•345       12/15      U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  5, 
Jan.  15. 
•346        12/15      CCIR,  study  group  6, 

Jan.  16. 
•347        12/15      U.S.,  Yugoslavia  amend  tex- 
tile agreement,  July  15 
and  Sept.  12. 


341 

12/11 

342 

12/11 

■343 

12/12 

'344 

12/15 

348 

12/16 

Final  communique,  Nort 
Atlantic  Council,  Dec. 
11-12. 

349 

12/17 

Muskie:  interview  for  B 
radio,  London,  Dec.  13 

350 

12/17 

Muskie:  interview  on  N! 
TV's  "Today  Show." 

351 

12/19 

U.S.,  Canada  joint  statei 
on  the  technical  meeti 
on  dioxin. 

352 

12/22 

Muskie:  interview  on  N 
TV's  "Meet  the  Press 
Dec.  21. 

►353 

12/22 

Dept.  of  State  celebrate 
200th  anniversary. 

•354 

12/24 

Muskie:  statement  on  A 
TV's  "Good  Morning 
America." 

355 

12/24 

U.S.  examines  Canadian 
pollution  legislation 

•356 

(Not  issued.] 

•357 

12/31 

Advisory  Committee  on 
Oceans  and  Internatic 

id 


•358       12/31 


•359       12/31 


•360       12/31 


n 


•361       12/31 


•362 
•363 


12/31 


12/31 


•364       12/31 


•365       12/31 


Environmental  and  Si 
tific  Affairs  — Antarct 
section  (partially  close 
meeting). 

Henry  L.  Kimelman  sw(  JilJ 
in  as  Ambassador  to  1 
(biographic  data). 

sec,  SOLAS,  working 
group  on  radiocommu 
tions,  Jan.  15. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  InvestraA, 
Technology,  and  Devi» 
ment,  working  group  ^ 
preparations  for  the  1 
Conference  on  New  a 
Renewable  Sources  o 
Energy  (UNCNRSE)., 
14. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investffl  '  ' 
Technology,  and  Devt   _ 
ment,  working  group 
international  data  flc 
Jan.  18. 

CCIR,  study  group  9, 
Jan.  15. 

Jack  Robert  Binns  swor 
as  Ambassador  to  Ho 
duras  (biographic  dati   ' 

Harry  W.  Shlaudeman  s 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Argentina  (biographic 
data). 

Edwin  Gharst  Corr  swoi 
as  Ambassador  to  Per 
(biographic  data). 


a 


9j 


•Not  printed  in  the  BULLETIN. 


72 


Department  of  State  Bull 


Nigeria 


Argentina 


ickground  Notes 


icjround  Notes  are  concise,  authoritative  pamphlets — 160  in 
-lescribing  the  countries  of  the  world,  as  well  as  selected 
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Xty.  government,  economy,  and  political  conditions. 
:;  ground  Notes  also  include  a  reading  list,  travel  notes,  and 


-  iround  Notes  generally  contain  data  more  current  than  the 
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iblished  each  year;  six  to  eight  are  distributed  to 
ibers  monthly  Price:  $16.00  per  year,  domestic;  $20.00, 


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DEX 


^bruary  1981 
l»i.  81,  No.  2047 

fianistan 

e  etary  Haig's  News  Conference  of 
:  January  28 G 

eietary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  "Meet 
the  Press"  (excerpts) 26 

olet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter) ....  59 

Jiria 

.g'ement  on  the  Release  of  the  Amer- 
ican Hostages  (Carter,  Civiletti, 
Laingen,  Miller,  Muskie,  Reagan, 
declarations,  undertakings,  escrow 
agreement,  statements  of  adherence. 
Executive  orders,  message  to  the 

'nngress,  technical  arrangement) 1 

n  Sahara  Dispute  (Saunders) 54 

.     Control 

n  dent  Carter's  Farewell  Address  to 
;he  Nation 22 

wrtary  Haig's  News  Conference  of 
January  28 G 

aida 

ii  ollution  Legislation 33 

i  Canada  Technical  Meeting  on 
Dioxin  (joint  statement)   32 

i;   Proposed  Chad-Libya  Merger 

■partment  statement) 31 

e«  tary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  "Meet 
he  Press"  (excerpts) 26 

w  if  ears  of  U.S.-China  Relations 33 

ot -ess 

.g  iment  on  the  Release  of  the  Amer- 
:an  Hostages  (Carter,  Civiletti, 
-aingen.  Miller,  Muskie,  Reagan, 
eciarations,  undertakings,  escrow 
greement,  statements  of  adherence, 
Executive  orders,  message  to  the 
longress,  technical  arrangement)  1 

01  mtion  on  Elimination  of  Discrimina- 
ion  Against  Women  Sent  to  Senate 
nessage  to  the  Senate) 53 

ee  tary-Designate  Haig  Appears  Before 
enate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
laig) C 

ra  With  the  Soviet  Union  (President's 
Mer  to  Senator  Jackson) 46 

id  eport  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

ongress)  52 

S  'articipation  in  the  U.N.,  1979 

nessage  to  the  Congress)  62 

''ei  !rn  Sahara  Dispute  (Saunders) 54 

;d  sport  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

ongress)  52 

t-p  tment  and  Foreign  Service 

>•  can  Hostages  in  Iran  (a  list) 21 

ping  Countries 

rces  for  a  Credible  Foreign  Policy 

iuskie) 24 

-cf  ary-Designate  Haig  Appears  Before 
enate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 

laig) C 

e  nited  Nations  and  U.S.  Policy 

VicCall) 60 

Jtiacy.  Resources  for  a  Credible 

oreign  Policy  (Muskie)  24 

1  mics 
ary-Designate  Haig  Appears  Before 
enate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 

,Iaig) C 

rW  With  the  Soviet  Union  (President's 

ptter  to  Senator  Jackson) 46 

Sii'rade  and  Foreign  Policy  in  the 
'estern  Hemisphere  (Johnston) 44 


El  Salvador 

El  Salvador  (Statement  on  special  Presi- 
dential mission.  Department  state- 
ments)   68 

Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference  of 

January  28 G 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  the 

"MacNeil/Lehrer  Report" 29 

Energy 

Energy:  Continuing  Crisis  (Hinton) 47 

Environment 

President  Carter's  Farewell  Address  to 

the  Nation 22 

Europe 

Secretary-Designate  Haig  Appears  Before 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
(Haig) C 

Foreign  Aid 

El  Salvador  (Statement  on  special  Presi- 
dential mission,  Department  state- 
ments)   68 

Germany.  President  Meets  With  Chancellor 
Schmidt  (White  House  statement) 53 

Human  Rights 

Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights  Day  and 
Week,  1980  (proclamation) 54 

Convention  on  Elimination  of  Discrimina- 
tion Against  Women  Sent  to  Senate 
(message  to  the  Senate) 53 

President  Carter's  Farewell  Address  to 

the  Nation 22 

International  Law 

World  Court  Hears  U.S.  Argument  on 
Transfer  of  WHO  Regional  Office 
(Schwebel) 64 

International  Organizations  and  Conferences 

Law  of  the  Sea  (Aldrich) 56 

Iran 

Agreement  on  the  Release  of  the  Amer- 
ican Hostages  (Carter,  Civiletti, 
Laingen,  Miller,  Muskie,  Reagan, 
declarations,  undertakings,  escrow 
agreement,  statements  of  adherence. 
Executive  orders,  message  to  the 
Congress,  technical  arrangement) 1 

Iran  Chronology,  December  1980   5 

Iran  Chronology,  January  1981 9 

Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference  of 

January  28 G 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  the 

"MacNeil/Lehrer  Report" 29 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  "Meet 

the  Press"  (excerpts) 26 

Israel.  U.S.,  Israel  Settle  Claim  on  U.S.S. 

Z/iber-*?/ (Department  announcement)  .  .55 

Korea.  Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference 
of  January  28 G 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  U.S.  Trade 
and  Foreign  Policy  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  (Johnston) 44 

Law  of  the  Sea.  Law  of  the  Sea  (Aldrich) ....  56 

Libya.  Proposed  Chad-Libya  Mer3;er 

(Department  statement) 31 

Mauritania.  Western  Sahara  Dispute 

(Saunders) 54 

Middle  East.  Secretary  Haig's  News 

Conference  of  January  28   G 

Morocco.  Western  Sahara  Dispute 

(Saunders) 54 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization.  North 
Atlantic  Council  Meets  in  Brussels 
(final  communique,  declaration, 
minutes  extracts) 50 

Poland.  Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  the 
"MacNeil/Lehrer  Report" 29 


Presidential  Documents 

Agreement  on  the  Release  of  the  Amer- 
ican Hostages  (Carter,  Civiletti, 
Laingen,  Miller,  Muskie,  Reagan, 
declarations,  undertakings,  escrow 
agreement,  statements  of  adherence. 
Executive  orders,  message  to  the 
Congress,  technical  arrangement) 1 

Bill  of  Rights  Day,  Human  Rights  Day 

and  Week,  1980  (proclamation)  54 

Convention  on  Elimination  of  Discrimina- 
tion Against  Women  Sent  to  Senate 
(message  to  the  Senate) 53 

The  Inaugural  Address  of  President 

Reagan A 

President  Carter's  Farewell  Address  to 

the  Nation 22 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter)        .59 

Trade  With  the  Soviet  Union  (President's 
letter  to  Senator  Jackson) 46 

22d  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 

Congress)   52 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  U.N.,  1979 

(message  to  the  Congress)   62 

Refugees.  Orderly  Departure  Program  for 
Vietnamese  (Department  statement)  .    43 

Terrorism.  Secretary  Haig's  News 

Conferenceof  January  28   G 

Trade.  U.S.  Trade  and  Foreign  Policy  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  (Johnston) 44 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 70 

U.S.S.R. 

Resources  for  a  Credible  Foreign  Policy 

(Muskie) 24 

Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference  of 

January  28 G 

Secretary  Muskie  Interviewed  on  "Meet 

the  Press"  (excerpts) 26 

Soviet  Invasion  of  Afghanistan  (Carter) ....  59 

Trade  With  the  Soviet  Union  (President's 
letter  to  Senator  Jackson) 46 

United  Nations 

The  United  Nations  and  U.S.  Policy 

(McCall) 60 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  U.N.,  1979 

(message  to  the  Congress)   62 

World  Court  Hears  U.S.  Argument  on 
Transfer  of  WHO  Regional  Office 
(Schwebel) 64 

Vietnam.  Orderly  Departure  Program  for 

Vietnamese  (Department  statement)  .  .43 


Name  Index 

Aldrich,  George  H 56 

Carter,  President       .1,  22, 46, 52,  53,  54,  59, 62 

Christopher,  Warren 1 

Civiletti,  Benjamin 1 

Haig,  Secretary C,  G,  5 

Hinton,  Deane  R 47 

Johnston,  Ernest  B.,  Jr 44 

Laingen,  L.  Bruce 1 

McCall,  Richard  L 60 

Miller,  G.  William 1 

Muskie,  Secretary  1. 24,  26,  29 

Saunders,  Harold  H 54 

Schwebel,  Stephen  M 64 

Reagan,  President A,  1 


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buUetMU 


19  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /Volume  81  /  Number  2048 


f   MEXICO      ( 

»•  — ^^^^— ^^■^— ^^^j 


March  1981 


GUATEMALA 


% 


HONDURAS 


EL  SALVADOR 


NICARAGUA 


Pacific  Ocean 


Dvpnrttnvni  of  Sttitp 

bulletin 


I 


Volume  81  /  Number  2048  /  March  1981 


Cover  Art: 

Map  by  Tommy  Fuell 

(Visual  Services  I 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  PubUc 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
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relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

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senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
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to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


ALEXANDER  M.  MAIG,  JR. 

Secreiar)  of  Slate 

WILLIAM  J.  DYESS 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director. 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Acting  Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


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CONTENTS 


FEATURE 


1  Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador  {Department  Report) 

8         El  Salvador:  A  Brief  Background 


The  President 

12         News  Conference  of 
January  29  (Ex- 
cerpts) 

East  Asia 


Western  Hemisphere 


14 


15 
16 


Visit  of  Korean  Presi- 
dent Chun  Doo  Hwan 
(Joint  Communique) 
Khmer  Relief  Efforts 
U.S. -Thai  Antipiracy 
Program 


l\/liddle  East 


17 


17 


Implementation  of  Hostage 
Agreements  [Department 
Statement) 

Travel  to  Iran  (Department 
Statement) 


South  Asia 

18         Afghanistan:  A  Year  of  Occupa- 
tion (Eliza  Van  Hollen) 

Terrorism 

23         Hostage  Incidents:  Examples  in 
Modern  History  (Evan  M.  Dun- 
can, William  Z.  Slany,  and 
David  F.  Trask) 


29 


30 
31 

32 


Visit  of  Jamaican  Prime  Minister 

(President Reagan,  Edward 

Seaga) 
Jamaica- A  Profile 
U.S. -Mexico  Terminate  Fishing 

Agreements 
U.S. -Mexico  Sign  Convention  on 

Recovery  and  Return  of  Stolen 

Vehicles  and  Aircraft 


Treaties 

33         Current  Actions 

Chronology 

35  January  1981 

Press  Releases 

36  Department  of  State 

36  U. S.U.N. 

Publications 

37  Department  of  State 

38  GPO  Sales 

Index 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superinteodent  of  Document3 


APR  2  1 1981 


DEPOSITORY 


MEXICO 


BELIZE 


GUATEMALA 


HONDURAS 


EL  SALVADOR 


Tegucigalpa 


San  Salvador 


Primary  overland  route 
Primary  air  route 


I     I 
t    1 


NICARAGUA 


Managua 


COSTA  RICA 


Arms  flow  into  El  Salvador. 


lEATURE 


l^ommunist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 


Following  is  a  reprint  of  a  State 
partment  special  report  on  Commu- 
t  involvement  in  the  insurrection  in 
Salvador. 

■nmary 

s  special  report  presents  definitive 
ience  of  the  clandestine  military  sup- 
t  given  by  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba, 
their  Communist  allies  to  Marxist- 
linist  guerrillas  now  fighting  to  over- 
)W  the  established  Government  of  El 
/ador.  The  evidence,  drawn  from  cap- 
!d  guerrilla  documents  and  war 
eriel  and  corroborated  by  intelligence 
jrts,  underscores  the  central  role 
'ed  by  Cuba  and  other  Communist 
itries  beginning  in  1979  in  the  pohtical 
ication,  military  direction,  and  arming 
isurgent  forces  in  El  Salvador. 
From  the  documents  it  is  possible  to 
nstruct  chronologically  the  key  stages 
le  growth  of  the  Communist  involve- 
t: 

•  The  direct  tutelai-y  role  played  by 
;1  Castro  and  the  Cuban  Government 
te  1979  and  early  1980  in  bringing  the 

•T  rse  Salvadoran  guei-rilla  factions  into 
I  ified  front; 

•  The  assistance  and  advice  given 
ih  guerrillas  in  planning  their  military 
ip  ations; 

•  The  series  of  contacts  between 
■^a  adoran  Communist  leaders  and  key 

fl  ials  of  several  Communist  states  that 
es  Ited  in  commitments  to  supply  the  in- 
-u  ents  nearly  800  tons  of  the  most 
ine  em  weapons  and  equipment; 

'•  The  covert  delivery  to  El  Salvador 
'f  'arly  200  tons  of  those  arms,  mostly 
h]  jgh  Cuba  and  Nicaragua,  in  prepara- 
ofor  the  guerrillas'  failed  "general  of- 
ve"  of  January  1981; 

•  The  major  Communist  effort  to 
r"  their  involvement  by  providing 

>>.  ly  arms  of  Western  manufacture. 

It  is  clear  that  over  the  past  year  the 
is-gency  in  El  Salvador  has  been  pro- 
-wsively  transformed  into  another  case 
f  direct  armed  aggression  against  a 
T"  1  Third  World  country  by  Communist 
■rs  acting  through  Cuba. 
The  United  States  considers  it  of 
Mt  importance  that  the  American 
e>  le  and  the  world  community  be 
W'-e  of  the  gravity  of  the  actions  of 
t  i,  the  Soviet  Union,  and  other  Com- 
i  ist  states  who  are  carrying  out  what 
'  'arly  shown  to  be  a  well-coordinated. 


covert  effort  to  bring  about  the  over- 
throw of  El  Salvador's  established  gov- 
ernment and  to  impose  in  its  place  a 
Communist  regime  with  no  popular 
support. 

I.    A  Case  of  Communist  Military 
Involvement  in  the  Third  World 

The  situation  in  El  Salvador  presents  a 
strikingly  familiar  case  of  Soviet,  Cuban, 
and  other  Communist  military  involve- 
ment in  a  politically  troubled  Third  World 
country.  By  providing  arms,  training,  and 
direction  to  a  local  insurgency  and  by 
supporting  it  with  a  global  propaganda 
campaign,  the  Communists  have  inten- 
sified and  widened  the  conflict,  greatly 
increased  the  suffering  of  the  Salvadoran 
people,  and  deceived  much  of  the  world 
about  the  trae  nature  of  the  revolution. 
Their  objective  in  El  Salvador  as  else- 
where is  to  bring  about — at  little  cost  to 
themselves — the  overthrow  of  the  estab- 
lished government  and  the  imposition  of  a 
Communist  regime  in  defiance  of  the  will 
of  the  Salvadoran  people. 

The  Guerrillas:  Their  Tactics  and 
Propaganda.  El  Salvador's  extreme  left, 
which  includes  the  long-established 
Communist  Party  of  El  Salvador  (PCES) 
and  several  armed  groups  of  more  recent 
origin,  has  become  increasingly  commit- 
ted since  1976  to  a  mihtai-y  solution.  A 
campaign  of  terrorism — bombings,  assas- 
sinations, kidnappings,  and  seizures  of 
embassies — has  disrupted  national  life 
and  claimed  the  lives  of  many  innocent 
people. 

During  1980,  previously  fragmented 
factions  of  the  extreme  left  agreed  to 
coordinate  their  actions  in  support  of  a 
joint  military  battle  plan  developed  with 
Cuban  assistance.  As  a  precondition  for 
large-scale  Cuban  aid,  Salvadoran  guer- 
rilla leaders,  meeting  in  Havana  in  May, 
formed  first  the  Unified  Revolutionary 
Directorate  (DRU)  as  their  central  exec- 
utive arm  for  pohtical  and  military  plan- 
ning and,  in  late  1980,  the  Farabundo 
Marti  People's  Liberation  Front  (FMLN), 
as  the  coordinating  body  of  the  guerrilla 
organizations.  A  front  organization,  the 
Revolutionary  Democratic  Front  (FDR), 
was  also  created  to  disseminate  prop- 
aganda abroad.  For  appearances  sake, 
three  small  non-Marxist-Leninist  pohtical 
parties  were  brought  into  the  front, 
though  they  have  no  representation  in  the 
DRU. 


The  Salvadoran  guerrillas,  speaking 
through  the  FDR,  have  managed  to  de- 
ceive many  about  what  is  happening  in  El 
Salvador.  They  have  been  aided  by 
Nicaragua  and  by  the  worldwide  prop- 
aganda networks  of  Cuba,  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  other  Communist  countries. 

The  guerrillas'  propaganda  aims  at 
legitimizing  their  violence  and  concealing 
the  Communist  aid  that  makes  it  possi- 
ble. Other  key  aims  are  to  discredit  the 
Salvadoran  Government,  to  misrepresent 
U.S.  policies  and  actions,  and  to  foster 
the  impression  of  ovei-whelming  popular 
support  for  the  revolutionai-y  movement. 

Examples  of  the  more  extreme 
claims  of  their  propaganda  apparatus — 
echoed  by  Cuban,  Soviet,  and  Nicara- 
guan  media — are: 

•  That  the  United  States  has  mili- 
tai-y  bases  and  several  hundred  troops  in 
El  Salvador  (in  fact,  the  United  States 
has  no  bases  and  fewer  than  50  military 
personnel  there); 

•  That  the  government's  security 
forces  were  responsible  for  most  of  the 
10,000  killings  that  occurred  in  1980  (in 
their  own  reports  in  1980,  the  guerrillas 
themselves  claimed  the  killings  of  nearly 
6,000  persons,  including  noncombatant 
"informers"  as  well  as  government  au- 
thorities and  military). 

In  addition  to  media  propaganda, 
Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union  promote  the 
insurgent  cause  at  international  forums, 
with  individual  governments,  and  among 
foreign  opinion  leaders.  Cuba  has  an  effi- 
cient network  for  introducing  and  promot- 
ing representatives  of  the  Salvadoran  left 
all  over  the  world.  Havana  and  Moscow 
also  bring  indirect  pressure  on  some  gov- 
ernments to  support  the  Salvadoran  revo- 
lutionaries by  mobilizing  local  Communist 
groups. 

II.     Communist  Military  Intervention: 
A  Chronology 

Before  September  1980  the  diverse  guer- 
rilla gi-oups  in  El  Salvador  were  ill- 
coordinated  and  ill-equipped,  armed  with 
pistols  and  a  varied  assortment  of  hunt- 
ing rifles  and  shotguns.  At  that  time  the 
insurgents  acquired  weapons  predomi- 
nantly through  purchases  on  the  interna- 


:h  1981 


Feature 


tioiial  market  and  from  dealers  who  par- 
ticipated in  the  supply  of  arms  to  the 
Sandinistas  in  Nicaragua. 

By  Januai7  1981  when  the  guerrillas 
launched  their  "general  offensive,"  they 
had  acquired  an  impressive  array  of 
modern  weapons  and  supporting  equip- 
ment never  before  used  in  El  Salvador  by 
either  the  insurgents  or  the  military  Bel- 
gian FAL  rifles,  German  G-3  rifles,  U.S. 
M-1,  M-16,  and  AR-15  semiautomatic 
and  automatic  rifles,  and  the  Israeli  UZI 
submachinegun  and  Galil  assault  rifle 
have  all  been  confirmed  in  the  guerrilla 
inventory.  In  addition,  they  are  known  to 
possess  .30  to  .50  caliber  machineguns, 
the  U.S.  M-60  machinegun,  U.S.  and 
Russian  hand  gi-enades,  the  U.S.  M-79 
and  Chinese  RPG  grenade  launchers,  and 
the  U.S.  M-72  light  antitank  weapon  and 
81mm  mortars.  Captured  ammunition  in- 
dicates the  guerrillas  probably  possess 
60mm  and  82mm  mortars  and  57mm  and 
75mm  recoilless  rifles. 

Recently  acquired  evidence  has  ena- 
bled us  to  reconstruct  the  central  role 
played  by  Cuba,  other  Communist  coun- 
tries, and  several  radical  states  in  the 
political  unification  and  militaiy  direction 
of  insurgent  forces  in  El  Salvador  and  in 
equipping  them  in  less  than  6  months 
with  a  panoply  of  modern  weapons  that 
enabled  the  guerrillas  to  launch  a  well- 
aiTned  offensive. 

This  information,  which  we  consider 
incontrovertible,  has  been  acquired  over 
the  past  year  Many  key  details,  however, 
have  fallen  into  place  as  the  result  of  the 
guerrillas'  own  records.  Two  particularly 
important  document  caches  were  recov- 
ered from  the  Communist  Party  of  El 
Salvador  in  November  1980  and  from  the 
Peoples'  Revolutionary  Army  (ERP)  in 
January  1981.  This  mass  of  captured 
documents  includes  battle  plans,  letters, 
and  reports  of  meetings  and  travels, 
some  written  in  cryptic  language  and 
using  code  words. 

When  deciphered  and  verified 
against  evidence  from  other  intelligence 
sources,  the  documents  bring  to  light  the 
chain  of  events  leading  to  the  guerrillas' 
Januai-y  1981  offensive.  What  emerges  is 
a  highly  disturbing  pattern  of  parallel  and 
coordinated  action  by  a  number  of  Com- 
munist and  some  radical  countries  bent 
on  imposing  a  military  solution. 

The  Cuban  and  (4)mmunist  role  in 
preparing  for  and  helping  to  organize  the 
abortive  "general  offensive"  early  this 
year  is  spelled  out  in  the  following 
chronology  based  on  the  contents  of  cap- 
tured documents  and  other  sources. 


Initial  Steps.  The  chronology  of  ex- 
ternal support  begins  at  the  end  of  1979. 
With  salutations  of  "brothei-ly  and  revolu- 
tionai-y  greetings"  on  December  10,  1979, 
members  of  the  Communist  Party  of  El 
Salvador  (PCES),  National  Resistance 
(EARN),  and  Popular  Liberation  Forces 
(FPL)  thank  Fidel  Castro  in  a  letter  for 
his  help  and  "the  help  of  your  party  com- 
rades ...  by  signing  an  agreement  which 
establishes  very  solid  bases  upon  which 
we  begin  building  coordination  and  unity 
of  our  organizations."  The  letter,  written 
in  Havana,  was  signed  by  leaders  of  these 
three  revolutionary  or-ganizations. 

At  an  April  1980  meeting  at  the 
Hungarian  Embassy  in  Mexico  City, 
guerrilla  leader's  made  cer-tain  "requests" 
(possibly  for  ar'ms).  Pr-esent  at  this  meet- 
ing wer-e  r-epr-esentatives  of  the  German 
Democi-atic  Republic,  Bulgaria,  Poland, 
Vietnam,  Hungary,  Cuba,  and  the  Soviet 
Union. 

In  notes  taken  during  an  Apr'il  28, 
1980  meeting  of  the  Salvadoran  Com- 
munist Party,  party  leader  Shafik  Handal 
mentions  the  need  to  "speed  up  reorgani- 
zation and  put  the  Party  on  a  war  foot- 
ing." He  added,  "I'm  in  agreement  with 
taking  advantage  of  the  possibilities  of 
assistance  from  the  socialist  camp.  I  think 
that  their  attitude  is  magnificent.  We  are 
not  yet  taking  advantage  of  it."  In  r-efer- 
ence  to  a  unification  of  the  armed  move- 
ment, he  asserts  that  "the  idea  of  involv- 
ing everyone  in  the  ar'ea  has  alr-eady  been 
suggested  to  Fidel  himself."  Handal  al- 
ludes to  the  concept  of  unification  and 
notes,  "Fidel  thought  well  of  the  idea." 

Guerrilla  Contacts  in  Havana. 

Fr-om  May  5  to  June  8,  1980,  Salvador-an 
guerr-illa  leaders  r-eport  on  meetings  in 
Honduras,  Guatemala,  Costa  Rica,  and 
Nicar-agua.  They  pr-oceed  to  Havana  and 
meet  sever-al  times  with  Fidel  Castr'o;  the 
documents  also  note  an  interview  with 
the  German  Democratic  Republic 
(G.D.R.)  Chairman  Er-ich  Honecker  in 
Havana.  Dur-ing  the  Havana  portion  of 
their  tr-avels,  the  Salvador-an  guerrilla 
leader-ship  meets  twice  with  the  Cuban 
Dir-ector-ate  of  Special  Oper-ations  (DOE, 
the  clandestine  oper-ations/special  for-ces 
unit  of  the  Cuban  Ministry  of  Interior)  to 
discuss  guerrilla  military  plans.  In  addi- 
tion, they  meet  with  the  Cuban  "Chief  of 
Communications." 

During  this  per-iod  (late  May  1980), 
the  Popular  Revolutionary  Army  (ERP) 
is  admitted  into  the  guerrilla  coalition 
after  negotiations  in  Havana.  The  coali- 
tion then  assumes  the  name  of  the  Un- 
ified Revolutionary  Directorate  (l)RU) 


VIETNAM  PROMISES  WEAPONS 

Quantity  TVpe 

192      9mm  pistols 

1,620     AR-15  (M-16)  semiautomi 
rifles 

162     30-caliber  machineguns 

36     7.62mm  M-60  machinegur 

12     12.7-caliberM-50antiair 
machineguns 

36     62mm  mortars 

12     81mm  mortars 

12     DKZ -57  antitank  rocket 
launchers 

15,000  9mm  rounds 

1,500,000  AR-15  rounds  (5.56mm) 

240,000  7.62mm  M-60  r-ounds 

240,000  30-caliber  r-ounds 

130,000  12.7-cahber  M-50  r-ounds 

9,000  62mm  mortar  rounds 

4,000  81mm  mortar  rounds 

1,500     DKZ-57  antitank  rocket 
gr-enades 


and  meets  with  Fidel  Castro  on  three 
occasions. 

After  the  Havana  meetings,  Shafii 
Handal  leaves  Havana  on  May  30,  19801 
for  Moscow.  The  other  Salvadoran  gue? 
rilla  leader-s  in  Havana  leave  for  Man- 
agua. During  the  visit  of  ear-ly  June,  til 
DRU  leader-s  meet  with  Nicar-aguan  re 
lutionary  leaders  (Sandinistas)  and  dis- 
cuss: (1)  a  headquar-ters  with  "all  meas- 
ur-es  of  secur-ity";  (2)  an  "inter-national 
field  of  operations,  which  they  (Sandini 
tas)  control";  and  (3)  the  willingness  of 
the  Sandinistas  to  "contribute  in  mater 
tenns"  and  to  adopt  "the  cause  of  El  Sa 
vador  as  its  own."  The  meeting  culmi- 
nated with  "dinner  at  Humberto's  hous' 
(pr-esumably  Sandinista  leader  Humber- 
Or-tega). 

Salvadoran  Communist  Party 
Leader's  TVavels  in  the  East.  From  Ju  | 
2  to  July  22,  1980,  Shafik  Handal  visits  ' 
the  U.S.S.R.,  Vietnam,  the  German 
Democr-atic  Republic,  Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria,  Hungary,  and  Ethiopia  to  pro 
cur-e  arms  and  seek  support  for  the 
movement. 

On  June  2,  1980,  Handal  meets  in 
Moscow  with  Mikhail  Kudachkin,  Deput 
Chief  of  the  Latin  American  Section  of 


^r^ortrr-,ftr,t   r\f    Ctato    RllllP* 


Feature 


ODERN  WEAPONS  NOW  IN 
JERRILLA  INVENTORY 


Igian  FAL  semiautomatic  rifle 

rman  G-3  rifle 

"ifS.  M-1,  M-16,  and  AR-15 

semiautomatic  and  automatic  rifles 


aeli  UZI  submachinegun  and  Galil 
assault  rifle 

and  50  caliber  machineguns 

5.  M-60  machinegun 

5.  and  Soviet  hand  grenades 

5.  and  Chinese  grenade  launchers 

5.  M-72  light  antitank  weapon 

.  81mm  mortars 


Photos  display  captured  weapons 
and  munitions. 


11981 


Feature 


the  Foreign  Relations  Department  of  the 
CPSU  Central  Committee.  Kudachkin 
suggests  that  Handal  travel  to  Vietnam 
to  seek  arms  and  offers  to  pay  for  Han- 
dal's  trip. 

Continuing  his  travels  between  June 
9  and  15,  Handal  visits  Vietnam  where  he 
is  received  by  Le  Duan,  Secretaiy  Gen- 
eral of  the  Vietnamese  Communist  Party; 
Xuan  Thuy,  member  of  the  Communist 
Party  Central  Committee  Secretariat; 
and  Vice  Minister  of  National  Defense 
Tran  Van  Quang.  The  Vietnamese,  as  a 
"first  contribution,"  agi'ee  to  provide  60 
tons  of  arms.  Handal  adds  that  "the  com- 
rade requested  air  transport  from  the 
USSR." 

From  June  19  to  June  24,  1980, 
Handal  visits  the  German  Democratic 
Republic  (G.D.R.),  where  he  is  received 
by  Hermann  Axen,  member  of  the 
G.D.R.  Politburo.  Axen  states  that  the 
G.D.R.  has  already  sent  1.9  tons  of 
supplies  to  Managua.  On  July  21,  G.D.R. 
leader  Honecker  writes  the  G.D.R.  Em- 
bassy in  Moscow  that  additional  supplies 
will  be  sent  and  that  the  German  Demo- 
cratic Republic  will  provide  military 
training,  particularly  in  clandestine  oper- 
ations. The  G.D.R.  telegram  adds  that 
although  Berlin  possesses  no  Western- 
manufactured  weapons — which  the  Sal- 
vadoran  guerrillas  are  seeking — efforts 
will  be  undertaken  to  find  a  "solution  to 
this  problem."  (NOTE:  The  emphasis  on 
Western  arms  reflects  the  desire  to  main- 
tain plausible  denial.) 

From  June  24-27, 1980,  Handal  visits 
Czechoslovakia  where  he  is  received  by 
Vasil  Bilak,  Second  Secretary  of  the 
Czech  Communist  Party.  Bilak  says  that 
some  Czech  arms  circulating  in  the  world 
market  will  be  provided  so  that  these 
aiTns  will  not  be  traced  back  to  Czechos- 
lovakia as  the  donor  country.  Transporta- 
tion will  be  coordinated  with  the  German 
Democratic  Republic. 

Handal  proceeds  to  Bulgaria  from 
June  27  to  June  30,  1980.  He  is  received 
by  Dimitir  Stanichev,  member  of  the  Cen- 
tral Committee  Secretariat.  The  Bulga- 
rians agree  ito  supply  German-origin 
weapons  and  other  supplies,  again  in  an 
apparent  effort  to  conceal  their  sources. 

In  Hungary,  from  June  30  to  July  3, 
1980,  Handal  is  received  by  Communist 
Party  General  Secretary  Janos  Kadar  and 
"Guesel"  (probably  Central  Committee 
Secretai7  for  Foreign  Affairs  Andras 
Gyenes).  The  latter  offers  radios  and 


other  supplies  and  indicates  Hungarian 
willingness  to  trade  arms  with  Ethiopia 
or  Angola  in  order  to  obtain  Western- 
origin  arms  for  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas. 
"Guesel"  promises  to  resolve  the  trade 
with  the  Ethiopians  and  Angolans  him- 
self, "since  we  want  to  be  a  pai't  of  pro- 
viding this  aid."  Additionally,  Handal  se- 
cures the  promise  of  10,000  uniforms  to  be 
made  by  the  Hungarians  according  to 
Handal's  specifications. 

Handal  then  travels  to  Ethiopia, 
July  3  to  July  (5.  He  meets  Chairman 
Mengistu  and  receives  "a  warm  recep- 
tion." Mengistu  offers  "several  thousand 
weapons,"  including:  150  Thompson  sub- 
machineguns  with  300  cartridge  clips, 
1,500  M-1  rifles,  1,000  M-14  rifles,  and 
ammunition  for  these  weapons.  In  addi- 
tion, the  Ethiopians  agree  to  supply  all 
necessary  spare  parts  for  these  arms. 

Handal  returns  to  Moscow  on 
July  22,  1980  and  is  received  again  by 
Mikhail  Kudachkin.  The  Soviet  official 
asks  if  30  Communist  youth  currently 
studying  in  the  U.S.S.R.  could  take  part 
in  the  war  in  El  Salvadoi:  Before  leaving 
Moscow,  Handal  receives  assurances  that 
the  Soviets  agree  in  principle  to  trans- 
port the  Vietnamese  arms. 

Further  Contacts  in  Nicaragua.  On 

July  13,  representatives  of  the  DRU  ar- 
rive in  Managua  amidst  preparations  for 
the  first  anniversary  celebration  of  Somo- 
za's  overthrow.  The  DRU  leaders  wait 
until  July  23  to  meet  with  "Comrade 
Bayardo"  (presumably  Bayardo  Arce, 
member  of  the  Sandinista  Directorate). 
They  complain  that  the  Sandinistas  ap- 
pear to  be  restricting  their  access  to  visit- 
ing world  dignitaries  and  demanding  that 
all  contacts  be  cleared  through  them. 
During  the  meeting,  Arce  promises  am- 
munition to  the  guerrillas  and  arranges  a 
meeting  for  them  with  the  Sandinista 
"Militai-y  Commission."  Arce  indicates 
that,  since  the  guerrillas  will  receive 
some  arms  manufactured  by  the  Com- 
munist countries,  the  Sandinista  Army 
(EPS)  will  consider  absorbing  some  of 
these  weapons  and  providing  to  the  Sal- 
vadorans  Western-manufactured  arms 
held  by  the  EPS  in  e.xchange.  (In  Januaiy 
1981  the  Popular  Sandinista  Army  indeed 
switched  from  using  U.S. -made  weapons 
to  those  of  Soviet  and  East  European 
origin.) 

The  DRU  representatives  also  meet 
with  visiting  Palestine  Liberation  Or- 
ganization (PLO)  leader  Yasir  Arafat  in 
Managua  on  July  22,  1980.  Arafat  prom- 
ises military  equipment,  including  arms 


and  aircraft.  (A  Salvadoran  guerrilla 
leader  met  with  F^ATAH  leaders  in  B( 
in  August  and  November,  and  the  PL 
has  trained  selected  Salvadorans  in  tl 
Near  East  and  in  Nicaragua.) 

On  July  27,  the  guerrilla  General 
Staff  delegation  departs  from  Managi 
for  Havana,  where  Cuban  "specialists 
add  final  touches  to  the  military  plan; 
fonnulated  during  the  May  meetings 
Havana. 

Arms  Deliveries  Begin.  In  mid- 
August  1980,  Shafik  Handal's  arms- 
shopping  expedition  begins  to  bear  fr 
On  August  15,  1980,  Ethiopian  arms  c 
part  for  Cuba.  Three  weeks  later  the 
tons  of  captured  U.S.  arms  sent  from 
Vietnam  are  scheduled  to  arrive  in  C 

As  a  result  of  a  Salvadoran  dele- 
gation's trip  to  Iraq  earlier  in  the  yea 
the  guerrillas  receive  a  $500,000  logis 
donation.  The  funds  are  distributed  t 
Sandinistas  in  Nicaragua  and  within  '. 
Salvador. 

By  mid-September,  substantial  q 
titles  of  the  arms  promised  to  Handal 
well  on  the  way  to  Cuba  and  Nicarag 
The  guerrilla  logistics  coordinator  in 
Nicaragua  informs  his  Joint  General ! 
on  September  26  that  130  tons  of  arm 
and  other  mihtary  material  supplied  ' 
the  Communist  countries  have  arrivt 
Nicaragua  for  shipment  to  El  Salvadi 
According  to  the  captured  documents 
this  represents  one-sixth  of  the  comn 
ments  to  the  guerrillas  by  the  Comm 
countries.  (NOTE:  To  get  an  idea  of  i 
magnitude  of  this  commitment,  the  V 
namese  offer  of  only  60  tons  included 
million  rifle  and  machinegun  bullets, 
14,500  mortar  shells,  1,620  rifles,  210 
chineguns,  48  mortars,  12  rocket  laun 
ers,  and  192  pistols.) 

In  September  and  October,  the 
number  of  flights  to  Nicaragua  from  ( 
increased  sharply.  These  flights  had  t 
capacity  to  transport  several  hundrec 
tons  of  cargo. 

At  the  end  of  September,  despite 
peals  from  the  guerrillas,  the  Sandini 
suspend  their  weapons  deliveries  to  I 
Salvador  for  1  month,  after  the  U.S. 
Government  lodges  a  protest  to  Nicai 
gua  on  the  arms  trafficking. 

When  the  shipments  resume  in  0 
ber,  as  much  as  120  tons  of  weapons  a 
materiel  are  still  in  Nicaragua  and  soi 
300-400  tons  are  in  Cuba.  Because  of 
difficulty  of  moving  such  large  quantil 
overland,  Nicaragua — with  Cuban  su 
port — begins  airlifting  arms  from 
Nicaragua  into  El  Salvador.  In  Noven 
ber,  about  2.5  tons  of  arms  are  deliver 


111 


DeDartment  of  State  But 


I. 


air  before  accidents  force  a  brief  halt 

Belthe  airlift. 

PL     In  December,  Salvadoran  guerrillas, 
couraged  by  Cuba,  begin  plans  for  a 
neral  offensive  in  early  1981.  To  provide 

\i  i  increased  support  necessary,  the  San- 

ifuiistas  revive  the  airlift  into  El  Sal- 
dor.  Salvadoran  insurgents  protest  that 
y  cannot  absorb  the  increased  flow  of 
ns,  but  guerrilla  liaison  members  in 
inagua  urge  them  to  increase  their  ef- 
ts as  several  East  European  nations 
•  providing  unprecedented  assistance. 

A  revolutionary  radio  station — 
dio  Liberacion — operating  in 
laragua  begins  broadcasting  to  El  Sai- 
lor on  December  15,  1980.  It  exhorts 
populace  to  mount  a  massive  insur- 
tion  against  the  government.  (Refer- 
es  to  the  Sandinistas  sharing  the  ex- 
ises  of  a  revolutionary  radio  station 
pear  in  the  captured  documents.) 

On  Januaiy  24,  1981,  a  Cessna  from 
■aragua  crashes  on  takeoff  in  El  Sal- 
or  after  unloading  passengers  and 
sibly  weapons.  A  second  plane  is 
ifed  by  the  Salvadoran  Air  Force,  and 
pilot  and  numerous  weapons  are  cap- 
id.  The  pilot  admits  to  being  an  em- 
ee  of  the  Nicaraguan  national  airline 
concedes  that  the  flight  originated 


T. 

an 

y 

rriil 

y  lite  January,  Honduran  authorities  seized 

frigerated  trailer  trucl<  which  was  being 

to  smuggle  arms  to  the  Salvadoran 
rrillas.  Approximately  100  M-16  rifles 
e  of  which  were  traceable  to  Vietnam, 
with  a  large  cache  of  ammunition  and 

:ar  rounds,  were  discovered  in  the 
ttwed-out  insulation  on  the  top  of  the 
K.  The  truck  also  contained  extra  sets  of 
ise  plates  from  the  Central  American 

as  well  as  quantities  of  Communist 

aganda  materials. 

It;  View  of  truck  from  rear. 

i 

■jj   tc:  View  of  truck  from  above. 


a  of 
:lif 


from  Sandino  International  Airport  in 
Managua.  He  further  admits  to  flying 
two  earlier  arms  deliveries. 

Air  supply  is  playing  a  key  role,  but 
infiltration  by  land  and  sea  also  con- 
tinues. Small  launches  operating  out  of 
several  Nicaraguan  Pacific  ports  traverse 
the  Gulf  of  Fonseca  at  night,  carrying 
arms,  ammunition,  and  personnel.  Dur- 
ing the  general  offensive  on  January  13, 
several  dozen  well-armed  guerrillas 
landed  on  El  Salvador's  southeastern 
coast  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  adjacent  to 
Nicaragua. 

Overland  arms  shipments  also  con- 
tinue through  Honduras  from  Nicaragua 
and  Costa  Rica.  In  late  January,  Hondu- 
ran security  forces  uncover  an  arms  infil- 
tration operation  run  by  Salvadorans 
working  through  Nicaragua  and  directed 
by  Cubans.  In  this  operation,  a  ti'ailer 
truck  is  discovered  carrying  weapons  and 


Feature 


ammunition  destined  for  Salvadoran 
guerrillas.  Weapons  include  100  U.S. 
M-16  rifles  and  81mm  mortar  ammuni- 
tion. These  arms  are  a  portion  of  the 
Vietnamese  shipment:  A  trace  of  the 
M-16s  reveals  that  several  of  them  were 
shipped  to  U.S.  units  in  Vietnam  where 
they  were  captured  or  left  behind.  Using 
this  network,  perhaps  five  truckloads  of 
amis  may  have  reached  the  Salvadoran 
guerrillas. 

The  availability  of  weapons  and 
materiel  significantly  increases  the  mili- 
tary capabilities  of  the  Salvadoran  insur- 
gents. While  attacks  raged  throughout 
the  country  during  the  "general  offen- 
sive" that  began  on  Januaiy  10,  it  soon 
became  clear  that  the  DRU  could  not  sus- 
tain the  level  of  violence  without  suffer- 
ing costly  losses  in  personnel.  By  the  end 
of  January,  DRU  leaders  apparently  de- 
cided to  avoid  direct  confrontation  with 


vul 


■sAfm 


¥Mflfi. 


iAA 


Feature 


-7- 

n-^-r-».rT:cmlento«.dapY«if"-t  j^am    (5   de   septieirvbre   sstarSn   en   Esmeralda) 

J,i2k  pistolas    9   inm. 
iff«2;0i  AR    15 

fC52i ametralladoras   M    30 
«-E?  "  pes  a  das    .M  =  *^ 

1^2!  "  M^O    calibre    12.7 

BS)  morteros    de    6  2    ram. 
6-2.'  morteros    de    81    nm. 
gr2j  lanzacohetes    an    ri-tnague    d:vZ-57 
y---:-fhnn^  cartuchos   de    9   mm. 
ff^'^UL.'.k'OJD  ?  de   AS   15 

g^J!;^ao  "  para    ametralladcra   M    30 

^"rpf^TTTTr  "  "  "  M    6  0     ( 7 . 6  2 ) 

dfipsp OW  ametralladora   M   5  0     (12.7) 

t>3aoi)JObuses   para   morteros    de    61mm. 
gTnh"?         "  "  "  "      SI   mm. 

gr^nn'  "  "      anti-tanques    DK:-=7 

^P^t-^opla  60  Toneladas 

.  J30  suhametralladoras  Tompson  con  300  cargadores. 
ffEJS^dJ  fusiles  M, 
.To  00?    "    ir"14 


fOOO^tlros  caJ-ibre  45  para  las  Topipson 
p dn.-^nn  d  m-'"14  con  200  cargadores. 


Piezas  de  repuesto  * 

Zl  IS  de  agosto  salla  este  cargamento  para  Habana. 

dnUsubametralladoras  de  fabricaci6n  alemana  con  200.000 

Mw^tlros. 

^TJ^cometo    calibre    30    con    50.000    tiros 

Ipi^lOOj'uni  formes 
rf^O-^otlquines   ixidividuales   para   combatientes 

Estos   dos   tiltiaios   rubros   serSn   enviados   cuando   se   le   propor- 
cione   modelos. 

^■caecoes  lo  vaqpxa  -■■  f 

Envlarfin   armas   checas.    No  pueden   cambiar   en   occidentales. 
No  precisarcn'.cantidad  en  armas. 

gH%KgrIar?-  j 

Radio-comunicadores   de   ondas    cortas   y   ultra   corta . 

(TO  'cortas   y    12    ultracortas 
]JJL5D00— aaif ormes-  confonce   modelos   y   taila   que   se   envlen 


This  sample  page  is  part  of  two  large  caches  of  guerrilla  documents  that  have  been  captured 
in  recent  months,  providing  substantiating  evidence  of  the  full  involvement  of  several 
Communist  countries  in  the  arming  of  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas. 


Department  of  State  Bull> 


overiiment  forces  and  reverted  to 
poradic  guerrilla  terrorist  tactics  that 
■ould  reduce  the  possibility  of  suffering 
eavv  casualties. 


[I.    The  Government:  The  Search  for 
rder  and  Democracy 

antral  America's  smallest  and  most 
nsely  populated  countiy  is  El  Salvador 
nee  its  independence  in  1821,  the  coun- 
has  experienced  chronic  political  in- 

d 
Al- 


)STON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 
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tvithin  the  building  only. 


Seat  No. 


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t  on  shelf. 

le  librarian  at  the  Research  Cata- 

lu    need    additional    information 

3IN    


ism 
and 

aSo- 
uer- 


Ra  organizations  and  their  political 
its  through  the  Democratic  Revolu- 
lai-y  Front  (FDR),  most  of  whose  ac- 
ties  take  place  outside  El  Salvador. 
The  Government  of  El  Salvador — 
(led  since  last  December  by  Jose 
|)oleon  Duarte,  the  respected  Christ- 
Democrat  denied  office  by  the  mili- 
',■  in  the  Presidential  elections  of  1972 
aces  armed  opposition  from  the  ex- 
ile right  as  well  as  from  the  left.  Ex- 
iting their  traditional  ties  to  the  secu- 
■  forces  and  the  tendency  of  some 


members  of  the  security  forces  to  abuse 
their  authority,  some  wealthy  Salvador- 
ans  affected  by  the  Duarte  government's 
reforms  have  sponsored  terrorist  ac- 
tivities against  supporters  of  the  agi'arian 
and  banking  reforms  and  against  the  gov- 
ernment itself. 

A  symbiotic  relationship  has  devel- 
oped between  the  terrorism  practised  by 
extremists  of  both  left  and  right.  Thou- 
sands have  died  without  regard  to  class, 
creed,  nationality,  or  politics.  Brutal  and 
still  unexplained  murders  in  December  of 
four  American  churchwomen — and  in 
January  of  two  American  trade  unionists 
— added  U.S.  citizens  to  the  toll  of  this 
tragic  violence.  The  United  States  has 
made  clear  its  interest  in  a  complete  in- 
vestigation of  these  killings  and  the  pun- 
ishment of  those  responsible. 

Despite  bitter  resistance  from  right 
and  left,  the  Duarte  government  has 
stuck  to  its  reform  programs  and  has 
adopted  emergency  measures  to  ease  the 
lot  of  the  poor  through  public  works, 
housing  projects,  and  aid  to  marginal 
communities.  On  the  political  front,  it  has 
offered  amnesty  to  its  opponents,  sched- 
uled elections  for  a  constituent  assembly 
in  1982,  and  pledged  to  hand  power  over 
to  a  popularly  elected  government  no 
later  than  mid-1983. 

The  government's  pursuit  of  progress 
with  order  has  been  further  hampered  by 
the  virtual  breakdown  of  the  law  en- 
forcement and  judicial  system  and  by  the 
lack  of  an  effective  civil  service. 

The  introduction  of  the  reforms — 
some  of  which  are  now  clearly  irreversi- 
ble— has  reduced  popular  support  for 
those  who  argue  that  change  can  only 
come  about  through  violence.  Few  Sal- 
vadorans  pai'ticipate  in  antigovernment 
demonstrations.  Repeated  calls  by  the 
guerrillas  for  general  strikes  in  mid-  and 
late  1980  went  unheeded.  The  Duarte 
government,  moreover,  has  made  clear  its 
willingness  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  fu- 
ture political  processes  with  democratic 
members  of  all  opposition  forces — most 
notably,  by  accepting  the  offer  of  El  Sal- 
vador's Council  of  Bishops  to  mediate  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  Demo- 
cratic Revolutionai-y  Front. 

In  sum,  the  Duarte  government  is 
working  hard  and  with  some  success  to 
deal  with  the  serious  political,  social,  and 
economic  problems  that  most  concern  the 
people  of  El  Salvador 

U.S.  Support.  In  its  commitment  to 
reform  and  democracy,  the  Government 
of  El  Salvador  has  had  the  political  sup- 
port of  the  United  States  ever  since  the 


Feature 


October  1979  revolution.  Because  we  give 
primaiy  emphasis  to  helping  the  people  of 
El  Salvador,  most  of  our  assistance  has 
been  economic.  In  1980,  the  United 
States  provided  nearly  $56  million  in  aid, 
aimed  at  easing  the  conditions  that  under- 
lie unrest  and  extremism.  This  assistance 
has  helped  create  jobs,  feed  the  hungry, 
improve  health  and  housing  and  educa- 
tion, and  support  the  reforms  that  are 
opening  and  modernizing  El  Salvador's 
economy.  The  United  States  will  continue 
to  work  with  the  Salvadoran  Government 
toward  economic  betterment,  social  jus- 
tice, and  peace. 

Because  the  solution  in  El  Salvador 
should  be  of  the  Salvadorans'  own  making 
and  nonviolent,  the  United  States  has 
carefully  limited  its  military  support.  In 
Januaiy,  mounting  evidence  of  Com- 
munist involvement  compelled  President 
Carter  to  authorize  a  resupply  of 
weapons  and  ammunition  to  El  Salvador 
— the  first  provision  of  lethal  items  since 
1977. 

IV.    Some  Conclusions 

The  foregoing  record  leaves  little  doubt 
that  the  Salvadoran  insurgency  has  be- 
come the  object  of  a  large-scale  commit- 
ment by  Communist  states  outside  Latin 
America. 

•  The  political  direction,  organiza- 
tion, and  anning  of  the  insurgency  is 
coordinated  and  heavily  influenced  by 
Cuba — with  active  support  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  East  Germany,  Vietnam,  and 
other  Communist  states. 

•  The  massing  and  delivery  of  arms 
to  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas  by  those 
states  must  be  judged  against  the  fact 
that  from  1977  until  Januaiy  1981  the 
United  States  provided  no  weapons  or 
ammunition  to  the  Salvadoran  Armed 
Forces. 

•  A  major  effort  has  been  made  to 
provide  "cover"  for  this  operation  by 
supplying  arms  of  Western  manufacture 
and  by  supporting  a  front  organization 
known  as  the  Democratic  Revolutionary 
Front  to  seek  non-Communist  political 
support  through  propaganda. 

•  Although  some  non-Communist 
states  have  also  provided  material  sup- 
port, the  organization  and  deUvery  of  this 
assistance,  like  the  ovei-whelming  mass  of 
amis,  are  in  the  hands  of  Communist- 
controlled  networks. 

In  short,  over  the  past  year,  the  in- 
surgency in  El  Salvador  has  been  pro- 
gressively transformed  into  a  textbook 
case  of  indirect  armed  aggression  by 
Communist  powers  through  Cuba.   ■ 


xh  1981 


Feature 


-7- 

IX   -     «»rty!«r?iTSSJa£2ZSecrpT?fTrrZnen>  rn  niH&lIB::::. 

nf--r-»trgm±ento«^^,»iVJip-t  j^am  (5  de  septiembre  estarSn  en  Esmeralda) 

JJl2»  pistolas    9    mm. 
^garS.O;  AR   15 

fTT?j  ametralladoras   M    30 


pesadas  M 


5  0 


M^O  calibre  12.7 


CSj  mcrtsros   de    6  2   ram. 
£L2'  morteros    de    81    nun. 
gr2^  lanzacohetes    an    -::i-tjiague    DK2-57 
^SSJlDj  cartuchos   de    9   mm. 
;^^5jp  ?  de    AB    15 

—       ^QQ  "  para   amerralladcra    -M    30 

^^SIEr  "  "  "  M    60     (7. 

djiljgX} 0"0T  ametralladora   M   5  0     (12.7) 

soSttOlijiobuses   para  morteros    de    61mm. 
C^nhn?        H  «  „  ,.      g2   ran. 

SZafla'  "  "      anti-tanaues    DKZ-'=7 


SS^cgra 


60  Toneladas 


jSl 


,_C50    subametralladoras   Tompson   con    300    car 
gCSS^dJ  fusiles   M, 

J"^oa'        "         I<ri4 
JOOO  satires   ca-Lihre   45   para    las   Toppson 
.•boo^M- 

CI535J0  a  M^14   con   200   cargadores. 
Plezas   de   repuesto 
£1   IS   de   agosto   salla   este   cargamento 

tB-m?aLr3X7 

fann>Jsxibametralladoras   de    faJDricacifin   alen 
ly  tiros. 
nrD-cometo    calibre    30    con    50.000    tiros 

Ipi.p.OOj'uni  forties 
z^W)0-l3Otlquliies   individuales   para   combatie 

Estos   dos   tUtinos   rubros    serin   enviados   cuan 
clone  modelos. 

^■diecoeslovacpTia--'i 

Enviarfin   armas   checas.    No  pueden   can±ilar   en   occidentales. 
No  precisaxcn'.cantidad   en   annas. 

Radio-comunlcadores   de   ondas   cortas   y   ultra   corta . 

^  fTD'^cortaa   y    12    ultracortas 
lSLU)00*Tinlf ormes-  confonce   modelos   y   talla   que   se   envien 


This  sample  page  is  part  of  two  large  caches  of  guerrilla  documents  that  have  been  captured 
in  recent  months,  providing  substantiating  evidence  of  the  full  involvement  of  several 
Communist  countries  in  the  arming  of  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas. 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


Feature 


overiiment  foi'ces  and  reverted  to 
poradic  guerrilla  terrorist  tactics  that 
.'ould  reduce  the  possibility  of  suffering 
eavv  casualties. 


[I.     The  Government:  The  Search  for 
irder  and  Democracy 

antral  America's  smallest  and  most 
gnsely  populated  countiy  is  El  Salvador, 
ince  its  independence  in  1821,  the  coun- 
y  has  e.xperienced  chronic  political  in- 
ability and  repression,  widespread  pov- 
•ty,  and  concentration  of  wealth  and 
nver  in  the  hands  of  a  few  families.  Al- 
lough  considerable  economic  progress 
ok  place  in  the  1960s,  the  political  sys- 
m  remained  in  the  hands  of  a  traditional 
'onomic  elite  backed  by  the  militai-y. 
.ui'ing  the  1970s,  both  the  legitimate 
I'ievances  of  the  poor  and  landless  and 
ie  gi'owing  aspirations  of  the  e.xpanding 
liddle  classes  met  increasingly  with  re- 
jession.  El  Salvador  has  long  been  a  vio- 
lit  country  with  political,  economic,  and 
1  rsonal  disputes  often  resulting  in 
lirders. 

The  Present  Government.  Aware  of 

need  for  change  and  alarmed  by  the 
jjspect  of  Nicaragua-like  chaos,  pro- 
|3ssive  Salvadoran  military  officers  and 
cilians  overthrew  the  authoritarian  re- 
fne  of  General  Carlos  Humberto  Rom- 
i  in  October  1979  and  ousted  nearly  100 
;  iservative  senior  officers. 

After  an  initial  period  of  instability, 
t'  new  government  stabilized  around  a 
Cilition  that  includes  military  partici- 
pits  in  the  October  1979  coup,  the 
Cristian  Democratic  Party,  and  inde- 
pident  civilians.  Since  March  1980,  this 
Cilition  has  begun  broad  social  changes: 
civersion  of  large  estates  into  peasant 
Ciperatives,  distribution  of  land  to  ten- 
a  farmers,  and  nationalization  of  for- 
e  n  trade  and  banking. 

Four  Marxist-Leninist  guerrilla 
gpups  are  using  violence  and  terrorism 
a.iinst  the  Salvadoran  Government  and 
itreforms.  Three  small  non-Marxist- 
Lninist  political  parties — including  a  So- 
dl  Democratic  Party — work  with  guer- 
ria  organizations  and  their  political 
feiits  through  the  Democratic  Revolu- 
tiiary  Front  (FDR),  most  of  whose  ac- 
uities take  place  outside  El  Salvador. 

The  Government  of  El  Salvador — 
hided  since  last  December  by  Jose 
N-poleon  Duarte,  the  respected  Christ- 
it'  Democrat  denied  office  by  the  mili- 
tsy  in  the  Presidential  elections  of  1972 
-faces  armed  opposition  from  the  ex- 
tJhie  right  as  well  as  from  the  left.  Ex- 
piting  their  traditional  ties  to  the  secu- 
.'  forces  and  the  tendency  of  some 


members  of  the  security  forces  to  abuse 
their  authority,  some  wealthy  Salvador- 
ans  affected  by  the  Duarte  government's 
reforms  have  sponsored  terrorist  ac- 
tivities against  supporters  of  the  agrarian 
and  banking  reforms  and  against  the  gov- 
ernment itself. 

A  symbiotic  relationship  has  devel- 
oped between  the  terrorism  practised  by 
extremists  of  both  left  and  right.  Thou- 
sands have  died  without  regard  to  class, 
creed,  nationality,  or  politics.  Brutal  and 
still  unexplained  murders  in  December  of 
four  American  churchwomen — and  in 
January  of  two  American  trade  unionists 
— added  U.S.  citizens  to  the  toll  of  this 
tragic  violence.  The  United  States  has 
made  clear  its  interest  in  a  complete  in- 
vestigation of  these  killings  and  the  pun- 
ishment of  those  responsible. 

Despite  bitter  resistance  from  right 
and  left,  the  Duarte  government  has 
stuck  to  its  reform  progi'ams  and  has 
adopted  emergency  measures  to  ease  the 
lot  of  the  poor  through  public  works, 
housing  projects,  and  aid  to  marginal 
communities.  On  the  political  front,  it  has 
offered  amnesty  to  its  opponents,  sched- 
uled elections  for  a  constituent  assembly 
in  1982,  and  pledged  to  hand  power  over 
to  a  popularly  elected  government  no 
later  than  mi'd-1983. 

The  government's  pursuit  of  progress 
with  order  has  been  further  hampered  by 
the  virtual  breakdown  of  the  law  en- 
forcement and  judicial  system  and  by  the 
lack  of  an  effective  civil  service. 

The  introduction  of  the  reforms — 
some  of  which  are  now  clearly  irreversi- 
ble— has  reduced  popular'  support  for 
those  who  ar-gue  that  change  can  only 
come  about  thi-ough  violence.  Few  Sal- 
vadorans  par-ticipate  in  antigovernment 
demonstrations.  Repeated  calls  by  the 
guerrillas  for  general  strikes  in  mid-  and 
late  1980  went  unheeded.  The  Duarte 
government,  moreover,  has  made  clear  its 
willingness  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  fu- 
ture political  processes  with  democratic 
members  of  all  opposition  forces — most 
notably,  by  accepting  the  offer  of  El  Sal- 
vador's Council  of  Bishops  to  mediate  be- 
tween the  government  and  the  Demo- 
cr-atic  Revolutionary  Front. 

In  sum,  the  Duarte  gover-nment  is 
wor-king  hard  and  with  some  success  to 
deal  with  the  serious  political,  social,  and 
economic  problems  that  riiost  concern  the 
people  of  El  Salvador 

U.S.  Support.  In  its  commitment  to 
I'eform  and  democracy,  the  Government 
of  El  Salvador  has  had  the  political  sup- 
port of  the  United  States  ever  since  the 


October  1979  revolution.  Because  we  give 
primai-y  emphasis  to  helping  the  people  of 
El  Salvador-,  most  of  our  assistance  has 
been  economic.  In  1980,  the  United 
States  pi-ovided  nearly  $56  million  in  aid, 
aimed  at  easing  the  conditions  that  under- 
lie uni'est  and  extr-emism.  This  assistance 
has  helped  create  jobs,  feed  the  hungry, 
impr'ove  health  and  housing  and  educa- 
tion, and  support  the  reforms  that  are 
opening  and  moder-nizing  El  Salvador's 
economy.  The  United  States  will  continue 
to  work  with  the  Salvadoran  Government 
toward  economic  betterment,  social  jus- 
tice, and  peace. 

Because  the  solution  in  El  Salvador 
should  be  of  the  Salvadorans'  own  making 
and  nonviolent,  the  United  States  has 
cai-efuUy  limited  its  military  support.  In 
January,  mounting  evidence  of  Com- 
munist involvement  compelled  President 
Carter  to  authorize  a  resupply  of 
weapons  and  ammunition  to  El  Salvador 
— the  first  provision  of  lethal  items  since 
1977. 

IV.     Some  Conclusions 

The  foregoing  record  leaves  little  doubt 
that  the  Salvadoran  insur-gency  has  be- 
come the  object  of  a  large-scale  commit- 
ment by  Communist  states  outside  Latin 
America. 

•  The  political  direction,  organiza- 
tion, and  ar-ming  of  the  insurgency  is 
coordinated  and  heavily  influenced  by 
Cuba — with  active  support  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  East  Germany,  Vietnam,  and 
other  Communist  states. 

•  The  massing  and  delivery  of  arms 
to  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas  by  those 
states  must  be  judged  against  the  fact 
that  from  1977  until  January  1981  the 
United  States  provided  no  weapons  or 
ammunition  to  the  Salvadoran  Ar-med 
Foi-ces. 

•  A  major  effort  has  been  made  to 
provide  "cover"  for  this  operation  by 
supplying  arms  of  Western  manufacture 
and  by  supporting  a  fi'ont  or-ganization 
known  as  the  Democratic  Revolutionary 
Front  to  seek  non-Communist  political 
support  thr'ough  propaganda. 

•  Although  some  non-Communist 
states  have  also  provided  material  sup- 
port, the  organization  and  delivery  of  this 
assistance,  like  the  overwhelming  mass  of 
anns,  are  in  the  hands  of  Communist- 
controlled  networks. 

In  short,  over  the  past  year,  the  in- 
sur-gency  in  El  Salvador  has  been  pro- 
gressively transformed  into  a  textbook 
case  of  indirect  armed  aggression  by 
Communist  powers  through  Cuba.   ■ 


1. 


Feature 


El  Salvador:  A  Brief  Background 


Following  is  a  reprint  of  the  El 
Salvador  Background  Notes. 

PEOPLE  AND  HISTORY 

The  population  of  El  Salvador  is  re- 
markably homogeneous,  with  almost 
90%  of  mixed  Indian  and  Spanish  ex- 
traction. El  Salvador  has  no  significant 
minorities.  An  estimated  60%  of  the 
population  live  in  rural  areas. 

While  a  few  Indians  have  retained 
many  of  their  old  customs  and  tradi- 
tions, the  majority  have  adopted  the 
Spanish  language  and  culture. 

Prior  to  the  Spanish  conquest,  the 
area  which  is  now  El  Salvador  was  made 
up  of  two  large  Indian  states  and  several 
principalities.  The  indigenous  inhab- 
itants were  the  Pipils,  a  tribe  of 
nomadic  Nahua  people  long  established 
in  Mexico.  Early  in  their  history  they 


were  one  of  the  few  Indian  groups  to 
abolish  human  sacrifice.  Their  civiliza- 
tion was  similar  to  that  of  their  Aztec 
cousins.  Remains  of  Nahua  culture  may 
be  found  today  at  ruins  such  as  Tazumal 
(near  Chalchuapa)  and  San  Andres 
( northeast  of  Armenia). 

The  first  Spanish  attempt  to  subju- 
gate this  area  failed  in  1524  when  Pedro 
de  Alvarado  was  forced  to  retreat  by 
Pipil  forces.  In  1525  he  returned  and 
succeeded  in  bringing  the  district  under 
control  of  the  Captaincy  General  of 
Guatemala,  where  it  remained  until 
1821,  despite  an  abortive  revolutionary 
attempt  in  1811. 

In  1821  El  Salvador  and  the  other 
Central  American  provinces  declared 
their  independence  from  Spain.  When 
these  provinces  joined  together  with 
Mexico  in  early  1822,  El  Salvador  re- 
sisted, insisting  on  autonomy  for  the 


Central  American  countries.  Gua- 
temalan troops  sent  down  to  enforce  t 
union  were  driven  out  of  El  Salvador  i 
June  of  1822.  In  early  1823  General 
ManuelJose  Arce's  army  was  defeate  1 
by  the  Mexicans,  and  it  was  before  th; 
contest  was  decided  that  El  Salvador, 
fearing  incorporation  into  Mexico,  pel 
tioned  the  U.S.  Government  for  state 
hood.  In  February  1823,  however,  a 
revolution  in  Mexico  ousted  the 
Emperor  Iturbide,  and  a  new  Mexicai 
Congress  voted  to  allow  the  Central 
American  provinces  to  decide  their  oi 
fate.  In  1823  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Central  America  was  formed  indepen 
dently  by  the  five  Central  American 
states  under  Arce.  When  this  federat 
was  dissolved  in  1838,  El  Salvador  be 
its  existence  as  an  independent 
Republic. 

As  elsewhere  in  Central  America 


People 

NATIONALITY:  Noun  and  adjective— 
Salvadoran(s).  POPLLATION  (mid-1979): 
4.67  million.  ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATK 
(1968-78):  37f.  DENSITY:  218  per  sq.  km. 
(.570  per  sq.  mi.).  ETHNIC  GROUPS:  Mes- 
tizo 89'7<  ,  Indian  \»7, .  Caucasian  1  7< .  RE- 
LIGION: Largely  Roman  Catholic,  with 
activity  by  Protestant  groups  throughout 
the  country.  LANGUAGE:  Spanish.  EDI  - 
CATION:  Years  compulsory — 10.  Atten- 
dance— 6.5 7t.  Literacy — urban  areas  .507f , 
rural  areas  .'507  .  HEALTH:  Infant  mor- 
tality rate— 60/1,000  (US-  i:!.8/ 1,000). 
Life  expectancy — males  56.7  yrs.,  females 
.'59.7.  WORK  FORCE  (l..i  million):  Agri- 
culture—  177t.  Industry — 87f .  Services — 
147<.  Government  and  other — 97t. 

Geography 

ARE.A:  21,476  sq.  km.  (8.260  sq.  mi.); 
about  the  size  of  Mass.  CITIES:  Capital 
San  .Salvador  (pop.  400,000).  TERRAIN: 
Mountains  separate  country  into  three 
distinct  regions:  southern  coastal  belt; 
central  valleys  and  plateaus;  and  northern 
mountains.  CLIMATE:  Semitropical,  dis- 
tinct wet  and  dry  seasons. 


Government 

TYPE:  Republic.  CONSTITITION:  Jan- 
uary 8,  1962.  INDEPENDENCE:  1821. 

BRANCHES:  EArecufrue— 5-member 
civilian-military  council.  Legislative — 
suspended.  Judicial — independent 
(.Supreme  Court). 

ADMINISTRATIVE  SUBDIVISIONS: 
14  Departments. 

POLITICAL  PARTIES:  Christian 
Democratic  Party  (PDC),  National  Revo- 
lutionary Movement  (MNR),  Party  of  Na- 
tional Conciliation  'PNC),  Communist 
Party  of  El  Salvador  (PCS),  Democratic 
Popular  Union  (UDP).  SUKFRAtJE:  I'ni- 
versal  over  18. 

CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  BUD- 
GET (1980  est.):  S4(MI  million. 

DEFENSE  (1979):  12.6'/;   of  total  ex- 
penditures. 

NATIONAL  HOLIDAY:  Indepen- 
dence Day,  .September  If). 

FLAG:  Two  dark  blue  horizontal 
stripes  and  a  white  middle  band:  in  the 
center,  a  coat  of  arms  inscribed  "1821," 
the  year  of  independence  from  Spain. 

Economy 

GDP  (1978):  S:!.l  billion.  ANNUAL 
GROWTH  RATE  (1970-78):  .57,.  PER 
CAPITA  INCOME  (1978):  $6!>0.  AVG. 
RATE  OF  INFL.ATION  1980:  307r. 


AGRICULTURE:  Products— coffe« 
(157f  of  GNP),  livestock,  cotton,  corn, 
poultry,  sugar,  sorghum.  Land — 67 7r 
arable;  cultivated  or  pasture. 

INDl  STRY  (157   OF  GNP):  Type 
food  and  beverages,  textiles,  footwear 
clothing,  chemical  products,  pelroleun> 
products. 

TRADE  (1980  est.):  Exports— (f.o.l*ie 
$1  billion:  coffee  ($.589  million),  sugar  m 
million),  cotton  ($86  million),  shrimp  ( 
million);  $250  million  to  Central  .Amer' 
Common  Market  (C.\CM);  $56  million 
rest  of  world.  Partners:  CACM  227;  I 
.•t2'7r;  EC  :i:i'/;.  /mports— (c.i.f.)  $960  mi 
lion:  machinery,  autos,  petroleum.  Par  fell 
ners:  US  297r,  CACM  22%,  EC  157,  Ji|le[ 
pan  11%. 

OFFICIAL  EXCHANGE  RATE:  2.#tili 
colones     I'SSl. 

FISCAL  YEAR:  Calendar  year. 

ECONOMIC  AID  RF.CEIVED:  VS^\ 
$6.'t  million  I  I- >     198r)    IFI  assistance— 
$.16  million  (1980  disbursement  est.). 

DEBT  SERVICE  CHARliES  AS  ^ 
OF  EXPORTS:  HtlH—i.t,'/,:  /9.v«— .■i.57.||lilt 


ifvi 


U 


iy.sl—i.h7,   (World  Bank  figures). 

MEMBERSHIP  IN  INTERNA- 
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:  UN,  OAlJlllisi 
G-77,  CACM,  INTELSAT.  ttr; 

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Feature 


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HONDURAS 


EL  SALVADOR 

~~~^  International  boundary 

®  National  capMal 

- — ■ — -  Railroad 

^  Road 

't'  International  airport 

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San  Salvador 


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NICARAfitoiK    . 


j[i    (uent  revolutions  have  marked  El 
p  Vador's  history  as  an  independent 
te,  although  relative  stability  was 
ju,  lieved  in  the  period  1900-30  and  in 
11950s.  Since  the  1931  election  of 
eral  Maximilian  Hernandez  Mar- 
(1  A»z,  every  succeeding  President  has 
t\  an  army  officer  with  the  exception 
,e  provisional  executive  who  served 
onths.  In  late  summer  of  1960  the 
ititutional  government  of  Lieuten- 
tColonel  Jose  Maria  Lemus  alienated 
It  of  its  popular  support  in  a  series 
Q I   lashes  with  demonstrating  univer- 
students,  and  on  October  26, 1960, 
las  overthrown  in  a  bloodless  coup. 
In  July  1969,  El  Salvador  and  Hon- 
as  fought  a  brief  but  bloody  war,  as 
esult  of  unresolved  differences  over 
puted  border,  heightened  by  na- 
alistic  feelings  following  a  series  of 
er  games  between  the  two  coun- 
.  At  some  points  Salvadoran  troops 
trated  up  to 29  kilometers  (18  mi.) 
Honduras.  After  5  days,  the  Or- 
lization  of  American  States  (OAS) 
eved  a  cease-fire,  and  effected  a 


subsequent  Salvadoran  withdrawal.  A 
"pacification  zone"  along  the  border 
was  agreed  upon  by  both  countries.  The 
two  countries  formally  signed  a  peace 
treaty  on  October  30, 1980,  which  es- 
tablishes the  basis  for  resolving  the 
border  dispute.  Full  diplomatic  and 
trade  relations  will  be  restored. 

The  peace  agreement  was  achieved 
following  initiatives  taken  by  the  Revo- 
lutionary Government  that  ousted  Pres- 
ident Carlos  Romero  on  October  15, 
1979.  Reform-minded  army  officers  at 
that  time  carried  out  a  bloodless  coup 
d'etat  and  installed  a  five-member  gov- 
erning council. 


GEOGRAPHY 

El  Salvador  is  located  in  Central  Amer- 
ica and  is  bordered  by  Guatemala, 
Honduras,  and  Nicaragua,  from  which 
it  is  separated  by  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca. 
The  country  faces  the  Pacific  Ocean  to 
the  south. 

The  country  is  separated  by  moun- 
tain ranges  running  east  to  west,  form- 
ing three  distinct  regions:  a  hot,  nar- 


row Pacific  coastal  belt  on  the  south; 
a  subtropical  central  region  of  valleys 
and  plateaus,  where  most  of  the  popu- 
lation lives;  and  a  mountainous  north- 
ern region.  Ninety  percent  of  the  land 
is  of  volcanic  origin.  Almost  all  of  the 
arable  land  is  under  cultivation,  and 
coffee  is  planted  high  on  the  mountains. 
The  average  temperature  in  San  Sal- 
vador for  the  last  20  years  was  22°C 
(73°F),  and  the  average  at  the  beach 
was26°C(80°F). 


GOVERNMENT 

On  October  15, 1979,  young  military 
officers  ousted  President  Carlos 
Humberto  Romero  and  joined  with 
moderate  civilian  leaders  to  undertake 
a  peaceful  and  democratic  revolution. 
Progressive  civilians  joined  them  to 
form  the  Revolutionary  Junta  of  Gov- 
ernment (JRG)  committed  to  profound 


i\ 


;h  1981 


social  and  economic  reforms,  respect  for 
human  rights,  and  democracy. 

The  present  Revolutionary  Govern- 
ment Council  includes  three  civilians 
(two  Christian  Democrats  and  one  inde- 
pendent) and  one  military  officer. 

The  governing  Council  has  assumed 
the  functions  formerly  held  by  the  exec- 
utive and  legislative  branches  under  the 
Romero  regime  while  the  judicial 
branch  remains  fully  functional  and  in- 
dependent. The  formation  of  a  Council 
of  State  which  will  include  representa- 
tives from  a  wide  variety  of  labor,  pro 
fessional.  and  business  organizations 
was  announced  in  December  1980. 

Principal  Government  Officials 

Members  of  the  Governing  Council 
President- Jose  Napoleon  Duarte 

Fuentes  . 

Vice  President.  Commander-in-Chiet- 

Col.  Jaime  Abdul  Gutierrez 
Dr.  Jose  Ramon  Avalos  Navarette 
Jose  Antonio  Morales  Ehrlich 

Ministers 

Foreign  Affairs- Dr.  Fidel  Chavez 

Mena 
Justice-  Mario  Antonio  Solano 
Economy-  Guillermo  Diaz  Salazar 
Education-  Carlos  Aquillino  Duarte 
Security- Jose  Garcia  Marino 
Labor- Julio  Alfredo  Samayoa 
Public  Health- Dr.  Rodolfo  Giron 

Flores 
Planning- AtilioVieytez 
Agriculture-  Octavio  Orellana  Solis 
Public  Works- Jorge  Alberto  Morales 

Guillen 
Ambassador  to  the  United  States- 
Francisco  Aquino 
Representative  to  the  O.A.S.- Ernesto 

Arrieta  Peralta 
Ambassador  to  the  U.N.-Mauricio 
Rosales 

El  Salvador  maintains  an  Embassy 
in  the  United  States  at  2308  California 
Street  NW..  Washington.  D.C.  20008 
(tel.  202/265-3480). 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS 

After  the  overthrow  of  President  Carlos 
Humberto  Romero  in  October  1979, 
both  left  and  right  were  caught  by  sur- 
prise. The  far  left  accused  the  new 
civilian-military  government  of  being  a 
puppet  of  the  U  nited  States  and  of  the 
far  right,  and  it  moved  to  provoke  open 


confrontation.  The  far  right  attempted 
to  block  the  reform  measures,  and. 
when  those  pressures  failed,  it  too  at- 
tempted  to  overthrow  the  government. 
In  January  1980  the  first  junta  dis- 
solved because  it  could  neither  impl^ 
ment  reforms  nor  deal  with  increasing 
violence.  The  young  officers  responsible 
for  the  October  15  movement  did  not 
waver  in  their  commitment  and  suc- 
ceeded in  pursuading  the  Christian 
Democrats  to  join  them  in  an  interim 
coalition  until  a  new  government  could 
be  freely  elected.  In  March  1980  a  series 
of  sweeping  economic  reforms  was  an- 
nounced including:  1)  an  agrarian  re- 
form which  expropriated  all  estates 
larger  than  1.250  acres,  and  set  the 
stage  for  granting  90o/o  of  all  other  ara- 
ble land  to  peasant  cooperatives  or 
sharecroppers.  2)  financial  reforms,  pri- 
marily through  the  nationalization  ot 
banks,  and  3)  nationalization  of  export 
marketing  of  primary  products  (coffee, 
sugar,  and  cotton).  These  moves  effec- 
tively broke  the  control  of  the  country 
by  a  privileged  economic  elite  and 
confirmed  the  Revolutionary  Govern- 
ment's credentials  through  concrete 

action.  ... 

In  May  1980  the  leftist  opposition 
to  the  government  formed  the  Unified 
Revolutionary  Directorate  (DRU)  which 
in  its  manifesto  is  dedicated  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  Marxist  totalitarian 
government  in  El  Salvador.  In  late  1980 
the  DRU  and  its  largest  organized  com- 
ponent, the  Democratic  Revolutionary 
Front  (FDR),  refused  overtures  from 
the  government  to  participate  in  a 
peaceful  dialog  and  political  process 
and  rejected  an  offer  from  the  Catholic 
Church  to  mediate  an  end  to  the 

violence. 

On  October  15. 1980.  the  govern- 
ment announced  an  amnesty  for  all  its 
opponents  willing  to  lay  down  their 
arms  and  to  end  the  violence.  Some  in- 
dividual guerrillas  (about  260  during 
the  first  month)  surrendered  their  arms 
and  accepted  the  amnesty.  The  gove-n- 
ment  also  announced  the  formation  of 
an  electoral  commission,  elections  lor  a 
constituent  assembly  in  1982.  and  free 
elections  leading  to  the  installation  of  a 
new  government  by  mid-1983.  Never- 
theless, terrorist  violence  and  associ- 
ated guerrilla  activity  have  continued 
throughout  the  country. 


ECONOMY 


Fundamental  characteristics  of  the  Sal- 
vadoran  economy  include  the  highest 
population  density  in  mainland  Latin 
America.  4.67  million  people  in  an  area 
the  size  of  Massachusetts,  and  a  popu- 
lation growth  rate  greater  than  3% . 
Severe  pressure  exists  on  limited  arable 
land  and  exploitable  natural  resources.  I 
High  illiteracy,  unemployment,  and  un- 
deremployment reduce  opportunities  in 
both  agriculture  and  industry  for  the 
highly  regarded  and  productive  bal- 
vadoran  workers.  . 

The  small  industrial  sector,  mostly^ 
related  to  the  processing  or  production 
of  light  consumer  goods,  has  developed 
significantly  in  the  last  two  decades. 
The  economic  infrastructure  such  as 
roads,  electric  power,  and  commercial 
banking  facilities,  is  fairly  well  devel- 
oped The  economy  is  still  primarily 
agricultural,  with  coffee  representing 
more  than  50%  of  total  exports,  fol- 
lowed in  value  by  cotton  and  sugar. 
Corn,  beans,  and  sorghum  are  the  chiell 
subsistence  crops.  In  1979.  coffee  con- 
tributed about  15%  to  GNP.  about 
the  same  as  the  value  added  by  the 
industrial  sector.  .    „,  o  i     ^„r'c 

The  United  States  is  El  Salvador  s 
principal  trading  partner,  taking  about 
32%  of  its  exports  (mostly  coffee,  suga 
and  shrimp)  and  providing  29%  of  its 
imports  ( mainly  manufactured  goods, 
vehicles,  and  machinery.)  Although  tht 
U  S.  market  share  dropped  during  the 
1960s  as  U.S.  products  were  displaced 
by  imports  from  other  Central  Ameri- 
can countries  in  the  new-formed  Cen- 
tral American  Common  Market,  the 
U  S  market  share  has  risen  in  recent 
years,  partly  as  a  result  of  changes  in 
parity  among  major  currencies  which 
have  made  U.S.  goods  more  competitiv 
Private  U.S.  investment  in  bl  Sal- 
vador is  estimated  at  $100  million, 
primarily  in  banking,  refining,  oil  im-     ^ 
Dorting.  and  manufacturing. 

The  GNP  throughout  the  1960s  and 

1970s  increased  at  annual  rates  aver-     I 
aging  more  than  5%.  Like  most  other 
developing  countries.  El  Salvador  reca 
ered  from  the  1973-74  oil  crisis  only  to 
again  face  another  sharp  jump  in  its  oU. 
bill,  beginning  with  the  cutback  in  Ira- 
nian production  in  late  1978. 

Since  late  1978,  the  economy  has 
been  in  a  state  of  continual  decline. 
GNP  decreased  1.5%  in  1979  and  a  de^ 
crease  of  near  10%  in  1980  is  expected. 
Growing  violence  has  caused  a  decline 


Department  ot  State  Bulle 


Feature 


private  investment.  Industrial  output 
id  construction  activity  have  also 
!clined. 

The  socioeconomic  reforms  an- 
imnced  by  the  government  in  1980  are 
«pected  to  have  a  positive  long-term 
iipact.  The  land  reform  announced  in 
larch  1980  is  being  implemented  in 
tree  stages.  In  the  first  stage  all  land- 
Hdings  over  1,250  acres— largely  es- 
ttes  producing  sugar  and  cotton—  have 
ben  converted  into  cooperatives.  A  sec- 
od  stage  ( land- to-the- tiller)  seeks  to 
t-n  over  7-hectare  ( 17-acre)  family 
(•ms  to  tenants  who  had  sharecropped 
0  smaller  holdings  of  less  than  100 
b;tares  (250  acres).  The  final  stage, 
»  ich  may  be  implemented  in  1981,  will 
aect  landholdings  between  100  and  500 
h;tares  (250-1,250  acres).  The  land  re- 
f«m  program  has  been  bitterly  op- 
p;ed  by  extremists  of  both  the  left  and 
.  tl  right  employing  terrorist  violence. 
Is  left  has  stepped  up  violence  to  pre- 
V  it  full  implementation  of  the  re- 
.  f(  tns.  Some  of  the  largest  landowners 
»  3  have  lost  part  of  their  power  base 
ir  he  country  as  a  result  of  the  re- 
fcTis  have  also  opposed  the  program. 
The  government  has  also  initiated 
king  reforms  in  which  it  has  as- 
,  iued  51%  of  the  ownership  of  all  local 
bi  ks  and  savings  institutions.  The 
isure  is  aimed  at  redirecting  credit 
n  traditional  users  to  new  land- 
i  oners,  cooperatives,  and  small  busi- 
■■Mes.  Export  sector  reforms  have 
onalized  the  marketing  of  El  Sal- 
li  or's  three  most  important  export 
CDS— coffee,  cotton,  and  sugar. 

As  of  late  1980  the  Salvadoran 
c  lomy  faced  a  difficult  short-term 
)i]  ook.  Earnings  from  coffee  exports 
vt  e  declining  due  to  the  fall  in  world 

0  ee  prices,  inflation  averaged  over 
0 1 ,  and  unemployment  was  on  the 

ii.  The  country's  deteriorating  foreign 

X  lange  position  poses  a  crucial  im- 

u  iate  problem  with  credits  for  es- 

ial  imports  in  short  supply.  El 

ador  seeks  foreign  credits  to  fi- 

1  -e  necessary  imports  of  raw  materi- 
,  1  nd  intermediate  goods  until  such 

il! 
it 
.1 


time  as  the  political  and  economic  situ- 
ation becomes  more  stable. 

International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)  resources  of  over  $40  million  en- 
tered the  economy  in  1980  and  further 
assistance  is  expected  in  1981.  The 
Inter-American  Development  Bank  is 
proceeding  with  $65  million  in  new 
loans  and  the  World  Bank  will  add  to 
its  present  programs  which  amount  to 
$126.7  million.  The  U.S.  Agency  for  In- 
ternational Development  extended  $63 
million  in  assistance  during  FY  1981 
and  plans  further  substantial  assistance 
in  FY  1982.  Other  U.S.  assistance  in 
economic  support  funds  and  PL  480 
(Food  for  Peace)  adds  to  these  figures. 


FOREIGN  RELATIONS 

El  Salvador  is  a  member  of  the  United 
Nations  and  several  of  its  specialized 
agencies  and  the  Organization  of  Ameri- 
can States  (OAS).  It  has  aligned  itself 
with  non-Communist  Western  demo- 
cratic countries.  It  has  no  relations 
with  Cuba  but  has  trade  relations  with 
a  few  of  the  Communist-bloc  countries. 

San  Salvador  is  the  site  of  the 
headquarters  of  the  Organization  of 
Central  American  States  (ODECA),  and 
El  Salvador  is  a  member  of  the  various 
organizations  and  treaties  which  make 
up  the  Central  American  Common 
Market  (CACM). 

The  conflict  between  El  Salvador 
and  Honduras  in  1969  was  a  major  con- 
cern of  the  Salvadoran  Government 
until  recently.  Normal  relations  were 
reestablished  with  Honduras  following 
the  signing  of  a  peace  agreement  on 
October  30, 1980.  Difficulties  inherent  in 
the  CACM  were  becoming  evident  even 
before  the  1969  Honduran  conflict.  The 
primary  concern  was  that  certain  of  the 
members  were  drawing  less  benefit 
from  the  CACM  than  others.  Talks  held 
during  1970  in  an  effort  to  arrive  at  a 
new  agreement  for  the  operation  of  the 
CACM  to  resolve  these  problems  were 
not  successful.  Efforts  to  restructure 
and  revitalize  the  CACM  are  expected 
to  intensify  in  1981. 


U.S.-SALVADORAN  RELATIONS 

Traditionally,  U.S. -Salvadoran  relations 
have  been  cordial  and  close.  Under  the 
Romero  government,  though,  highly 
publicized  human  rights  violations  in 


El  Salvador  strained  the  relationship. 
The  current  government  has  pledged  to 
respect  human  rights. 

The  U.S.  Government  wishes  to:  1) 
maintain  friendly  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial relations  with  El  Salvador;  2)  en- 
courage and  assist  the  Revolutionary 
Government  to  continue  and  increase 
its  efforts  to  secure  political  stability 
founded  on  democratic  institutions,  im- 
plement its  basic  socioeconomic  re- 
forms, and  improve  the  living  stand- 
ards and  general  welfare  of  the  Sal- 
vadoran people;  3)  cooperate  with  the 
OAS  to  realize  El  Salvador's  objective 
in  assisting  the  success  of  the  October 
30  peace  treaty;  4)  encourage  El  Sal- 
vador to  join  its  Central  American 
neighbors  in  continued  efforts  to  reju- 
venate the  CACM  for  the  mutual  eco- 
nomic benefit  of  the  countries  of  the 
region;  and  5)  encourage  El  Salvador's 
continued  support  of  the  international 
principles  and  policies  such  as  human 
rights  and  nonintervention  to  which  the 
United  States  and  other  free  nations 
subscribe. 

The  U.S.  Embassy  in  El  Salvador  is 
located  at  25  Avenida  Norte  No.  1230, 
San  Salvador  (tel.  26-7100,  25-9984).  ■ 


Single  copies  of  the  Notes  and  Notes  on 
over  160  other  countries  are  on  sale  for  $1.00 
($1.25  foreign)  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu- 
ments, U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Subscription  price 
is  $16.00  per  year;  $20.00  for  foreign  mailing. 


L.. 


11 


THE  PRESIDENT 


News  Conference  of  January  29 
(Excerpts) 


t 


Q.  Will  your  policy  toward  Iran  be  one 
of  revenge  or  reconciliation?  And  will 
the  United  States  honor  the  recent  com- 
mitments to  Iran,  especially  since  you 
approved  of  most  of  them  during  the 
campaign? 

A.  I'm  certainly  not  thinking  of 
revenge,  and  I  don't  know  whether  rec- 
onciliation would  be  possible  with  the 
present  government,  or  absence  of  a 
government,  in  Iran. 

I  think  that  the  United  States  will 
honor  the  obligations.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  most  important  of  those  were 
already  put  into  effect  by  the  preceding 
Administration  in  negotiating  the  re- 
lease. We  are,  however,  studying,  be- 
cause there  were  four  major  agreements 
and  there  were  ten  Executive  orders, 
and  we  are  studying,  thoroughly,  what 
is  a  pretty  complex  matter,  we've  dis- 
covered, with  regard  to  whether  they 
are  keeping  with  international  and  our 
own  national  laws.  And  so,  I  won't  be 
able  to  really  answer  your  questions  on 
specifics  until  we've  completed  that 
study. 


Q.  In  your  welcoming  address  to 
the  freed  Americans,  you  sounded  a 
warning  of  swift  and  effective  retribu- 
tion in  future  terrorist  situations.  What 
kind  of  action  are  you  prepared  to  take 
to  back  up  this  hard  rhetoric? 

A.  That's  a  question  that  I  don't 
think  you  can  or  should  answer  as  to 
specifics.  This  is  a  big  and  it's  a  powerful 
nation.  It  has  a  lot  of  options  open  to  it, 
and  to  try  and  specify  now  just  particu- 
larly what  you  should  do,  I  think,  is  one 
of  the  things  that's  been  wrong. 

People  have  gone  to  bed  in  some  of 
these  countries  that  have  done  these 
things  to  us  in  the  past  confident  that 
they  can  go  to  sleep,  wake  up  in  the 
morning,  and  the  United  States  wouldn't 
have  taken  any  action.  What  I  meant  by 
that  phrase  was  that  anyone  who  does 


these  things,  violates  our  rights  in  the 
future,  is  not  going  to  be  able  to  go  to 
bed  with  that  confidence. 

Q.  You  campaigned  rather  vocif- 
erously against  the  SALT  II  Treaty, 
saying  it  was  slightly  toward  the  Soviet 
Union.  Yet  I  noticed  your  Secretary  of 
State,  Mr.  Haig,  now  seems  to  suggest 
that  for  the  time  being,  at  least,  the 
United  States  will  abide  by  the  limits  of 
the  SALT  II  Treaty,  and  he  hopes  the 
Soviet  Union  will,  too.  How  long  do  you 
intend  that  the  United  States  should 
abide  by  the  terms  of  a  SALT  agreement 
which  you  consider  inequitable,  and  what 
do  you  consider  its  greatest  inequities  to 
be? 

A.  The  SALT  Treaty,  first  of  all,  I 
think,  permits  a  continued  buildup  on 
both  sides  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons 
but,  in  the  main  thing,  authorizes  an 
immediate  increase  in  large  numbers  of 
Soviet  warheads.  There  is  no  verifica- 
tion as  to  the  number  of  warheads  on  the 
missile,  no  method  for  us  to  do  this. 

I  don't  think  that  a  treaty—  SALT 
means  strategic  arms  limitation—  that 
actually  permits  a  buildup,  on  both 
sides,  of  strategic  nuclear  weapons  can 
properly  be  called  that.  And  I  have  said 
that  when  we  can—  and  I  am  willing  for 
our  people  to  go  in  to  negotiate  or,  let  me 
say,  discussions  leading  to  nego- 
tiations—that we  should  start  nego- 
tiating on  the  basis  of  trying  to  effect  an 
actual  reduction  in  the  numbers  of 
nuclear  weapons.  That  would  then  be 
real  strategic  arms  limitation. 

And  I  happen  to  believe,  also,  that 
you  can't  sit  down  at  a  table  and  just 
negotiate  unless  you  take  into  account, 
in  consideration,  all  the  other  things  that 
are  going  on.  In  other  words,  I  believe  in 
linkage. 

Q.  What  do  you  see  as  the  long- 
range  intentions  of  the  Soviet  Union?  Do 
you  think,  for  instance,  the  Kremlin  is 
bent  on  world  domination  that  might 
lead  to  a  continuation  of  the  cold  war,  or 
do  you  think  that  under  other  circum- 
stances detente  is  possible? 


A.  So  far  detente's  been  a  one-way 
street  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  used  to 
pursue  its  own  aims.  I  don't  have  to 
think  of  an  answer  as  to  what  I  think 
their  intentions  are;  they  have  repeated 
it.  I  know  of  no  leader  of  the  Soviet 
Union  since  the  revolution,  and  includ- 
ing the  present  leadership,  who  has  not, 
more  than  once,  repeated  in  the  various 
Communist  congresses  they  hold  their 
determination  that  their  goal  must  be 
the  promotion  of  world  revolution  and  a 
one-world  Socialist  or  Communist  state, 
whichever  word  you  want  to  use. 

Now  as  long  as  they  do  that  and  as 
long  as  they,  at  the  same  time,  have 
openly  and  publicly  declared  that  the 
only  morality  they  recognize  is  what  wi; 
further  their  cause—  meaning  they 
reserve  unto  themselves  the  right  to 
commit  any  crime,  to  lie,  to  cheat,  in 
order  to  attain  that,  and  that  is  moral, 
not  immoral,  and  we  operate  on  a  dif- 
ferent set  of  standards—  I  think,  when 
you  do  business  with  them,  even  at  a 
detente,  you  keep  that  in  mind. 

Q.  What  is  your  opinion  of  Ameri- 
can companies  that  now  want  to  resume 
business  with  Iran? 

A.  I  hope  they're  going  to  do  it  by 
longdistance.  [Laughter]  We 
wouldn't  want  to  go  back  to  having  just' 
different  cast  of  characters,  but  the 
same  show  going  on.  [Laughter] 

I  can  understand  that,  particularly 
in  the  field  of  energy,  their  wanting  to 
do  that,  but  we  are  urging  the  people  to 
think  long  and  hard  before  they  travel  t 
Iran,  because  we  don't  think  their  safet; 
can  be  guaranteed  there. 

Q.  Three  Americans  are  still  incar- 
cerated in  Iran.  Can  you  tell  us  the  statiUi|!i.|( 
of  their  cases  and  whether  the  Admin- 
istration is  doing  anything  to  get  them 
back? 


A.  I  have  told  our  people  about 
those  three.  They  knew  about  them,  of 
course,  but  I've  told  them  that,  yes,  we 
continue,  and  we  want  to  get  them  back 
also. 


Q.  During  the  campaign  you  re- 
peatedly talked  about  the  unfairness  of 


k 
k 

till, 


J 


The  President 


f  grain  embargo,  as  you  saw  it  Do  you 
li  e  second  thoughts  now,  or  will  you 
i  the  grain  embargo? 

A.  My  quarrel  with  it  from  the  first 
.  that  I  thought  it  was  asking  only  one 
up  of  Americans  to  participate— the 
ners. 

You  only  have  two  choices  with  an 
'  large:  You  either  lift  it,  or  you 
iden  it.  And  we  have  not  made  a  de- 
1  3n  except  that  at  the  request  of  Sec- 
e  iry  of  Agriculture  John  Block,  I  have 
a  jn  the  matter  of  the  embargo  out  of, 
(  might  say,  the  discussions  of  the  Na- 
al  Security  Council,  and  it,  next 
k,  is  on  the  agenda  for  a  full  Cabinet 
i  ting  as  to  what  our  course  will  be. 
c  I  can't  answer  what  we  do  about  it 
n  1  next  week. 
As  I  say,  it  was  asking  one  group  of 
ericans  to  bear  the  burden,  and  I 
e  always  thought  it  was  more  of  a 
I  of  gesture  than  it  was  something 


I  Q.  When  the  Jamaican  Prime  Min- 
•  was  here  yesterday,  Mr.  Seaga,  he 
Rested,  publicly,  that  now  might  be  a 


good  time  for  you,  as  the  new  President, 
to  have  a  foreign  policy  initiative  for 
Latin  America  and  for  the  Caribbean. 
Do  you  intend  to  follow  that  suggestion, 
and  if  so,  how  would  your  policies  differ 
from  those  of  former  President  Carter? 

A.  I  think  we've  seen  a  great 
reverse  in  the  Caribbean  situation,  and 
it  came  about  through  Prime  Minister 
Seaga's  election.  It  was  the  turn-over,  or 
turn-around,  of  a  nation  that  had  gone, 
certainly,  in  the  direction  of  the  Com- 
munist movement;  it  was  a  protege  of 
Castro.  And  his  election  was  greeted  by 
me  with  great  enthusiasm,  because  it 
represented  the  people  by  their  vote, 
having  experienced  that  kind  of  govern- 
ment, turned  another  direction. 

And  I  think  this  opens  the  door  for 
us  to  have  a  policy  in  the  Caribbean  of 
bringing  them  back  in—  those  countries 
that  might  have  started  in  that  direc- 
tion- or  keeping  them  in  the  Western 
World,  in  the  free  world.  And  so,  we  are 
looking  forward  to  cooperation  with 
Prime  Minister  Seaga. 


Q.  I  know  you  said  earlier  that  you 
were  not  thinking  of  revenge  toward 
Iran.  But  does  that  preclude  any  punish- 
ment whatsoever  for  what  they've  done? 

A.  Again,  I  have  to  ask  your 
forbearance  and  wait  until  we've  fin- 
ished our  study  of  this  whole  situation  as 
to  what  we're  going  to  do.  I  don't  think 
any  of  us  have  a  friendly  feeling  toward 
the  people  who  have  done  what  they 
have  done.  But  I  think  it's  too  complex 
for  me  to  answer  until  we've  had  time  to 
really  study  this. 

Q.  Would  you  go  so  far  as  to  en- 
courage American  businesses  to  resume 
commercial  trade  with  Iran? 

A.  At  this  point,  no. 


Q.  Iran  and  the  Soviet  Union  share 
a  long  border  in  a  region  vital  to  the  fu- 
ture stability  of  the  world.  Given  the 
anti-U.S.  sentiment  there,  how  do  you 
best  think  the  United  States  can  insure 
the  stability  of  the  region,  the  Persian 
Gulf  region? 

A.  I  think  one  of  the  first  things 
that  has  to  happen  for  stability,  has  got 
to  be,  in  Iran  itself,  to  establish  a  gov- 
ernment that  can  speak  as  a  government 
for  Iran.  And  part  of  our  problem  in  all 
these  long  444  days  has  been  the  inabili- 
ty of  anyone,  seemingly,  to  speak  for 
that  nation,  to  have  a  government.  Now, 
I  think  that  any  country  would  want  to 
help  another  if  it  really  showed  an  intent 
to  have  a  government  that  would  abide 
by  international  law  and  do  what  it  could 
to  help  it  in  that  regard.  But  until  such  a 
thing  is  apparent  there,  I  don't  know 
that  there's  anything  we  can  do. 

Q.  If  it's  your  intention  to  signal 
the  world  that  this  country  will  respond 
with  swift  retribution  in  cases  of  inter- 
national terrorism  in  the  future,  why  is 
it  your  policy  not  to  retaliate  against 
Iran? 

A.  What  good  would  just  revenge 
do,  and  what  form  would  that  take?  I 
don't  think  revenge  is  worthy  of  us.  On 
the  other  hand,  I  don't  think  we  act  as  if 
this  never  happened.  And  I'd  rather 
wait  until,  as  I  say,  we  complete  this 
study. 


Full  text  can  be  found  in  the  Weekly  Compila- 
tion of  Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  2, 
1981.  ■ 


Dh  1981 


13 


EAST  ASIA 


Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  Doo  Hwan 


President  Chun  Doo  Hwan  of  the 
Republic  of  Korea  made  an  official  visit 
to  Washington,  D.  C,  February  1-3, 
1981,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan. 
Following  is  the  full  text  of  the  joint 
communique  issued  following  their 
mee  ting  on  February  2. ' 

1 .  At  the  invitation  of  President  Ronald  W. 
Reagan,  the  President  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  and  Mrs.  Chun  Doo  Hwan  made  an  offi- 
cial visit  to  Washington.  D.C.  from  Febraury  1 
to  3, 1981. 

2.  The  two  Presidents  met  at  the  White 
House  on  February  2  to  exchange  views  on  the 
current  international  situation  and  to  discuss 
matters  of  mutual  interest  in  an  atmosphere  of 
friendship  and  cordial  respect.  Among  those 
present  at  the  meeting  were  Vice  President 
George  Bush,  Secretary  of  State  Alexander 
Haig,  Secretary  of  Defense  Caspar  Wein- 
berger, United  States  Trade  Representative 
William  E.  Brock,  Jr.,  Counsellor  to  the  Presi- 
dent Edwin  Meese  HI,  Chief  of  Staff  James 
Baker  HI,  Assistant  to  the  President  for  Na- 
tional Security  Affairs  Richard  Allen,  Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff  Michael  K.  Deaver,  and  Ambas- 
sador William  Gleysteen  from  the  American 
side;  and  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Shin  Byong 
Hyun,  Foreign  Minister  Lho  Shin  Yong,  Min- 
ister of  National  Defense  Choo  Yong  Bock, 
Ambassador  Kim  Yong  Shik,  and  Secretary 
General  to  the  President  Kim  Kyong  Won 
from  the  Korean  side. 

3.  The  two  Presidents  reviewed  the 
world  situation  and  reaffirmed  the  critical  im- 
portance of  maintaining  peace  on  the  Korean 
peninsula  and  in  Northeast  Asia.  President 
Reagan  and  President  Chun  pledged  to  uphold 
the  mutual  obligations  embodied  in  the  United 
States-Korea  Mutual  Defense  Treaty  of  1954. 
President  Reagan  affirmed  that  the  United 
States,  as  a  Pacific  Power,  will  seek  to  ensure 
the  peace  and  security  of  the  region.  President 
Chun  expressed  his  full  support  for  United 
States  policies  directed  toward  these  ends  and 
emphasized  his  view  that  the  United  States 
should  continue  to  exercise  firm  leadership  in 
world  affairs. 

4.  President  Reagan  and  President  Chun 
reviewed  the  security  situation  on  the  Korean 
peninsula  and  the  continuing  threats  to  peace 
in  the  area.  President  Reagan  assured  Presi- 
dent Chun  that  the  United  States  has  no  plans 
to  withdraw  U.S.  ground  combat  forces  from 
the  Korean  peninsula.  The  two  Presidents 
pledged  to  seek  to  strengthen  U.S. -Korean  co- 
operation in  deterring  and  defending  against 
aggression  as  an  indispensable  contribution  to 
peace  and  stability  in  Northeast  Asia. 

5.  President  Chun  outlined  the  continu- 
ing efforts  of  the  Republic  of  Korea  to  enhance 
its  self-reliant  defense  capabilities  through  the 
modernization  of  its  armed  forces.  President 


Reagan  commended  the  Republic  of  Korea  for 
its  significant  continuing  efforts  and  con- 
firmed that  the  United  States  will  make  avail- 
able for  sale  appropriate  weapons  systems  and 
defense  industry  technology  necessary  for 
enhancing  Korea's  capabilities  to  deter  ag- 
gression. 

6.  President  Chun  was  assured  of  United 
States  support  for  the  efforts  of  the  Republic 
of  Korea  to  resume  a  constructive  dialogue 
with  North  Korea  in  order  to  ease  tensions 
and  build  the  framework  for  peaceful  reuni 
fication  of  the  peninsula.  President  Reagan 
commended  President  Chun  for  the  far- 
reaching  proposal  made  on  January  12, 1981 
calling  for  an  exchange  of  visits  by  the 
Presidents  of  the  South  and  North  of  Korea. 
President  Reagan  reaffirmed  that  the  Repub- 
lic of  Korea  must  be  a  full  participant  in  any 
United  States  negotiation  with  North  Korea. 
The  two  Presidents  shared  the  view  that  any 
unilateral  steps  toward  North  Korea 

which  are  not  reciprocated  toward  South 
Korea  by  North  Korea's  principal  allies  would 
not  be  conducive  to  promoting  stability  or 
peace  in  the  area. 

7.  Noting  the  strong  ties  of  traditional 


friendship,  alliance,  and  cooperation  which 
have  existed  between  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  Republic  of  Korea,  the  two 
Presidents  announced  that  they  would  resum 
immediately  the  full  range  of  consultations  be 
tween  the  two  governments. 

•  U.S.-ROK  Security  Consultative  Meet 
ings  will  be  resumed  promptly  at  a  mutually 
convenient  time  later  this  spring. 

•  Annual  U.S.  Korean  economic  consul- 
tations covering  the  entire  range  of  our  eco- 
nomic relations  will  resume.  The  Under  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  Economic  Affairs  will  lead 
a  U.S.  delegation  to  Korea  to  initiate  these 
consultations  before  mid-year. 

•  Annual  U.S. -Korea  policy  planning 
talks  will  be  resumed  at  a  mutually  conveniei 
time  this  year. 

8.  President  Reagan  and  President  Chu;^ 
expressed  their  satisfaction  at  the  continuing^ 
expansion  in  the  scope  of  economic  relations 
between  the  two  countries,  and  agreed  to  set  i 
to  foster  a  freer  international  trading  system 

9.  Presidents  Reagan  and  Chun  noted 
with  satisfaction  that  mutually  profitable 
U.S.-Korea  trade  had  g^own  dramatically 


President  Reagan  and  President  Chun  Doo  Hwan  with  U.S.  Ambassador  to  Korea  William 
Gleysteen,  Jr.  (center). 


\ 


East  Asia 


i  .m  $531  million  in  1970  to  $10  billion  in  1980, 
1  d  that  the  Republic  of  Korea  is  now  the 
iiited  States'  twelfth  largest  trading  part- 
ir.  President  Reagan  emphasized  in  particu- 
the  importance  of  Korea  as  the  fifth  largest 
rkot  for  American  agricultural  exports, 
lesident  Chun  welcomed  the  positive  re- 
stase  of  the  United  States  in  meeting 
Rrea's  special  needs  this  year  for  rice  im- 
p-ts. 

10.  The  two  Presidents  reaffirmed  the 
if  cooperation  of  the  two  countries  on 

s'Tgy  issues.  The  United  States  will  seek  to 
»:ist  Korea  to  obtain  energy  supplies  in  the 
e-nt  of  an  emergency  affecting  our  mutual 
Murity  interests.  Korea  will  explore  long 

11  arrangements  for  importing  American 
1  President  Reagan  promised  that  the 

J  ted  States  would  remain  a  reliable  sup- 
pi  r  of  nuclear  fuel,  generation  equipment 
ai  power  technology. 

11.  The  two  Presidents  recognized  that 
Ve  remains  a  need  for  further  promotion  of 

ual  understanding  and  exchanges  between 
n  two  peoples  both  through  private  and 
a\  lie  channels,  and  they  agreed  to  an  early 
'  i  ation  of  the  Korean-American  Cultural 
hange  Committee  to  be  funded  jointly  by 
^  wo  Governments. 

12.  President  Reagan  expressed  special 

••  eciation  for  the  significant  contribution  to 

Smithsonian  Institution  which  President 

1  presented  on  behalf  of  the  Korean  peo- 

ir  the  construction  of  a  new  Museum  of 

..  ern  Art  on  the  Mall  in  Washington.  This 

:i  »um  will  further  enhance  inter-cultural 

::  r-standing  and  appreciation  between  the 

le  of  America  and  the  peoples  of  Asia. 

1 3.  Pledging  their  mutual  efforts  to  ex- 
international  cooperation  throughout  the 
If  Basin,  the  two  Presidents  expressed 
intent  to  maintain  close  communication 

ach  other  and  with  other  friends  and  al- 
Asia.  President  Chun  invited  President 
.c  an  to  visit  the  Republic  of  Korea  at  a  time 
<f  li  convenience,  and  President  Reagan  ac- 
ej  id  the  invitation  with  pleasure. 

1 14.  President  and  Mrs.  Chun,  on  behalf  of 
(n4  selves  and  the  members  of  their  party, 
•)qjssed  their  deep  appreciation  to  Presi- 
lal  and  Mrs.  Reagan  and  also  to  the  people  of 
W'nited  States  for  the  warmth  of  their 
"Mdly  reception  and  the  many  courtesies  ex- 
id  to  them  both  during  the  official  visit  to 
lington  and  during  their  visits  to  other 
during  their  trip  to  the  United  States. 


White  House  press  release. 


Khmer  Relief 
Efforts 


After  5  years  of  involvement  in  the  Vietnam 
war  and  four  more  of  brutal  rule  by  the  Pol 
Pot  regime,  under  which  perhaps  2  million 
Khmer  lost  their  lives,  Kampuchea  suffered 
further  disaster  in  the  Vietnamese  invasion  in 
December  1978  and  subsequent  occupation  of 
the  country.  The  invasion  came  during  the 
primary  harvest,  and  the  fighting  and  disloca- 
tion resulted  in  the  loss  of  most  of  the  rice 
crop.  By  the  fall  of  1979,  widespread  famine  in- 
side Kampuchea  had  sent  thousands  of  star- 
ving Khmer  to  the  Thai  border  in  a  desperate 
search  for  food. 

The  massive  response  from  the  interna- 
tional community  and  from  Thailand,  in  its 
provision  of  refuge  for  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  Khmer,  have  been  essential  elements  in  the 
survival  of  the  Khmer  people.  From  late  1979 
through  the  end  of  1980,  Western  donor  na- 
tions contributed  to  the  Kampuchea  relief  ef- 
fort over  $450  million,  of  which  the  U.S.  share 
was  about  $130  million.  Private  Western  dona- 
tions through  voluntary  agencies  amounted  to 
well  over  $100  million.  The  Soviet  Union  and 
other  Eastern  bloc  countries  made  bilateral 
donations  of  as  much  as  $200  million  more, 
though  the  exact  amount  is  impossible  to 
verify. 

Although  starvation  has  ended  and  inter- 
nationally donated  rice  seed  has  allowed  a  bet- 
ter-than-expected  winter  1980  harvest,  Kam- 
puchea has  not  attained  full  recovery.  The 
country  will  be  dependent  on  international 
relief  food  at  least  through  1981  and  needs 
emergency  aid  in  other  areas  as  well,  particu- 
larly in  health  care  and  elementary  agricul- 
tural rehabilitation.  Failure  to  continue  sup- 
port of  the  relief  could  result  in  new  calamities 
and  a  return  to  the  terrible  days  of  1979. 
Moreover,  some  200,000  displaced  Khmer  re- 
main in  Thailand-  in  UNHCR  [U.N.  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees]  holding  centers 
and  in  makeshift  camps  along  the  Thai-Khmer 
border—  and  these  unfortunate  people  are 
totally  dependent  upon  international  assis- 
tance until  some  more  lasting  solution  is  found 
for  them.  The  United  States  plans  to  continue 
to  make  significant  contributions  toward  the 
basic  humanitarian  needs  of  the  Khmer  people 
in  1981  and  is  encouraging  other  donors  to  do 
so  as  well. 


U.S.  CONTRIBUTIONS 

The  U.S.  Government  contributed 
$128,861,700  to  the  relief  effort  in  FY  1980,  all 
but  a  small  fraction  of  which  went  to  interna- 
tional organizations.  In  the  breakdown  that 
follows,  figures  are  rounded  to  the  nearest 
hundred  dollars,  with  grants  listed  individual- 
ly by  receiving  agency  and  date  of  donation. 


Amount 

Reason/Date 

UNICEF 

$2,500,000 

Startup  costs  for  Khmer  relief 

program  (10/79) 

2,000,000 

Rice  purchases  in  Thailand  for 

distribution  in  Kampuchea 

(11/79) 

448,000 

(In  kind)  Airlift  of  cranes  from 

Japan  to  Singapore  for 

onward  shipment  to  Kam- 

puchea (11/79) 

44,600 

(In  kind)  Incremental  air 

transportation  cost  of  Ar- 

cher, Daniels,  Midland- 

donated  food  ( 12/79) 

6,500,000 

Relief  of  cash  shortage  ( 12/79) 

2,500,000 

Cash  for  ongoing  relief 

program  (5/80) 

2,000,000 

Cash  for  rice  purchases  for 

World  Food  Program  (6/80) 

3,815.000 

Cash  for  rice  purchases  (8/80) 

500,000 

Cash  for  seed  purchases 

(8/80) 

$20,307,600 

International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 

$2,500,000      Startup  costs  for  Khmer  relief 
program  (10/79) 
27,000      (In  kind)  Two  field  labs  (11/79) 
20,000       (In  kind)  Medical  survey  team 
for  contingency  planning 
(11/79) 
2,500,000      Relief  of  cash  shortage  ( 12/79) 
1,008,000      (In  kind)  40-day  lease  of 

Hercules  for  shuttle  flights 
toPhnomPenh(12/79, 
1/80) 
5,500       (In  kind)  Airlift  of  a  field  hospi- 
tal donated  by  SAWS  (1/80) 
714,400      (In  kind)  Lease  of  Hercules 
for  shuttle  flights  to 
Phnom  Penh  (4/80) 
1,785,600      Cash  for  ongoing  relief 
program  (5/80) 

$8,560,500 


World  Food  Program 

$55,422,000      Food  for  Peace  commodities 
including  shipping  costs 
($40  million  directly  to 
Kampuchea;  $14  million 
in  and  through  Thailand 
(11/79,3/80,5/80, 
8/80) 

490,000      Lease  of  trucks  in  Thailand 
(11/79,8/80) 

150,000      (In  kind)  Airlift  and  instant 
corn  soy  milk  (11/79) 
1 ,026,000      Food  processing  in  Thailand 
and  Singapore  ( 11/79, 
12/79) 

891,600      Food  management  in 
Thailand  (12/79) 
3,000,000      Rice  purchases  in  Thailand 
for  border  and  holding 
center  feeding  (12/79) 


L,. 


15 


East  Asia 


7,500 


4,000,000 


$64,987,100 


(In  kind)  Air  transport  cost 

for  soy- fortified  bulgur 

(2/80) 
Cash  for  cross  border  seed 

rice  program  (3/80, 

5/80) 


The  U.N.  High  Commissoner  for  Refugees 


$384,400 


9,000,000 


5,615,600 


6,000 


6,400,000 


29,500 


$21,435,500 


(In  kind)  Airlift  and  800 
tents  and  tent  flies 
(10/79) 

Care  and  maintenance  of 
Khmer  in  holding  centers 
and  center  construction 
(11/79) 

Care  and  maintenance  of 
Khmer  in  holding  centers 
and  center  construction 
(balance  of  U.S.  Govern- 
ment pledge  to  UNHCR) 
(1/80) 

(In  kind)  Four  hand  pumps 
(5/80) 

Care  and  maintenance  of 
Khmer  in  holding  centers 
(6/80) 

Communications  equipment 
(6/80) 


Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 

$3,000,000      Agricultural  rehabilitation 
program  in  Kampuchea 
(3/80) 
2,000,000      Seed  rice  (9/80) 


$5,000,000 


National  Council  for  International  Health 

$87,200      Medical  assistance 

clearinghouse  ( 12/79, 
5/80) 


Cambodia  Crisis  Center 

$80,900      Startup  costs  ( 1/80) 

Church  World  Service/ 
Action  for  Relief  and 
Rehabilitation  in  Kampuchea 


$1,250,000 


1,150,000 


$2,400,000 


Emergency  delivery  of 
medicines,  relief  supplies, 
and  seeds  for  agricultural 
rehabilitation  in  Kam- 
puchea (1/80) 

Delivery  of  seed  rice  in 
Kampuchea  (8/80) 


World  Vision  Relief  Organization 

$3,103,300      Rice  seed  and  other 

agriculture  inputs;  as- 
sistance to  small  animal 
breeding,  orphanages, 
and  a  youth  hostel  in 
Kampuchea  (3/80) 


American  Friends  Service  Committee 


CARE 

$55,800 

100,000 
$155,800 


Ocean  freight 

reimbursement  for  baby 

food  and  relief  supplies 

(3/80) 
Cash  for  crossborder  seed 

rice  program  (3/80) 


U.S. -Thai 
Antipiracy  Program 


American  Ambassador  to  Thailand  Mor- 
ton I.  Abramowitz,  Friday,  January  2, 
1981,  in  Bangkok,  presented  to  the  Royal 
Thai  Navy  the  first  installment  of  a  $2 
million  U.S.  grant  to  help  combat  pirate 
attacks  in  the  Gulf  of  Thailand.  Pirates 
have  been  attacking  refugee  boats  flee- 
ing from  Vietnam  for  Thai  and  Malay- 
sian shores. 

Royal  Thai  Navy  Commander  in 
Chief  Admiral  Samut  Sahanawin 
accepted  the  initial  funds  as  part  of  a 
U.S.  commitment  to  support  the  Thai 
Navy  in  increased  air  and  sea  search  and 
surveillance  efforts. 

The  first  installment  of  the  U.S. 
grant  follows  a  series  of  bilateral  con- 
sultations between  the  American  and 
Royal  Thai  Governments  on  measures  to 
be  taken  to  augment  the  Royal  Thai 
Navy's  sea-surveillance  capabilities.  The 
United  States  will  provide  two  0-2 
patrol  aircraft,  assist  in  refurbishing  a 
Thai  Navy  cutter  for  maritime  patrols, 
and  provide  operating  funds  for  a  6- 
month  period.  The  Thai  Government 
will  establish  a  task  unit  to  carry  out  the 
antipiracy  program  and  patrol  activities. 

An  exchange  of  letters  on  Septem- 
ber 30  between  the  U.S.  Embassy  and 
the  Thai  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  ap- 
proved the  present  grant,  subject  to 
later  detailed  agreement  which  has  now 
been  reached. 


Press  release  1  of  Jan.  2, 1981. 


$558,300 


31,000 


$589,300 


Agricultural  rehabilitation 
in  Kampuchea  (3/80) 

Ocean  freight 

reimbursement  for 
medical  supplies  and 
vegetable  seed  (4/80, 
8/80) 


World  Relief 

$1,000,000  Subsistence  agricultural 
packages  ( farming  im- 
plements) (6/80) 

Office  of  the  U.N.  Secretary  General's  Special 
Representative  for  Kampuchean 
Humanitarian  Relief 

$150,000      Startup  costs  for 

Coordinator's  Office 
(3/80) 


Embassy  Bangkok 

$69,000      Emergency  (contingency) 
funds  for  Khmer  relief 
(e.g.,  purchase  of  com- 
munications equipment) 
(11/79) 


Thai  Red  Cross 
$100,000 


25,000 


Relief  supplies  presented 

by  Mrs.  Carter  (11/79) 
Assistance  to  Thai  victims 
of  Vietnamese  incursion 
(6/80) 


$125,000 


Task  Force  80  (Thai  Supreme  Command) 


$13,000 


Unattributed 

$382,500 


550,000 


Office  supplies  for  Thai 
Coordinator (3/80) 


Special  airlift  of  medical 
and  other  relief  sup- 
plies in  response  to 
the  President's 
11/13  decision 
(11/79) 

(Estimated)  Travel  and 
administrative  ex- 
penses for  Embassy- 
associated  persons  in 
Thailand  (10/79, 
9/80) 


DM 


Hi 


lis, 

illl 


$932,500 


$128,861,700     (Grand  Total) 


t 


Press  release  81  of  Jan.  23, 1981. 


li 


IIDDLE  EAST 


hriplementation  of  Hostage  Agreements 


EPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
:3B.  18,  1981' 

Or  position  up  until  now  has  been  that 
te  United  States,  of  course,  will  honor 
i;  obligations  under  international  law. 
iKiause  of  the  complexity  of  the  agree- 
nnts  and  the  extraordinary  conditions 
ider  which  they  were  negotiated,  we 
hve  undertaken  a  review  to  determine 
pecisely  what  our  obligations  are  under 
t?m. 

That  review  has  been  completed, 
i  ving  considered  all  the  circumstances 
cefully,  we  have  decided  to  approve 
iiplementation  of  the  agreements  in 
s  ict  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the 
a'eements.  The  review  considered  the 
inact  of  implementing  or  not  imple- 
nnting  on  these  points: 

•  The  rights  of  U.S.  claimants; 

•  U.S.  terrorist  policy; 

•  U.S.  international  interests,  in- 

,  cliingU.S.  obligations  to  third  parties, 
pf  ticularly  Algeria,  which  had  itself 
"  ^e  commitments  during  the  course  of 
negotiations;  and 

•  Long-term  U.S.  interests  in  the 
-"  sian  Gulf,  including  Iran. 

The  review  did  not  consider  several 
1  stions  of  great  potential  interest  to 
orians  and  of  possible  value  for 
ai  wing  lessons  with  respect  to  future 
o«  cy  but  of  no  practical  bearing  on  the 
iniediate  question  of  whether  or  not  to 
'  in  lement  the  agreements. 

The  review  just  completed  then  did 
i(  consider  the  following:  How  could 
tb  whole  crisis  have  been  handled  bet- 
=  Could  a  better  set  of  agreements 
e  been  negotiated?  And  we  did  not 
odder  whether  these  agreements 
^hjld  have  been  signed. 

We  are  confronted  with  an  accom- 
!  hed  fact.  We  have  an  agreement 
ed  by  a  President  of  the  United 
es,  and  the  question  is  whether, 
■n  the  existence  of  this  agreement 
n  the  consequences— legal,  financial, 
n  political—  of  implementing  it  or  not, 
:ner  those  circumstances,  what  should 
tk  country  do? 


The  conclusion  of  the  agreements 
was  a  legal  exercise  of  Presidential  au- 
thority. This  authority  will  be  subject  to 
challenge  in  our  courts,  and  the  execu- 
tive branch  will,  of  course,  abide  by  the 
determination  of  our  judicial  system.  We 
did  not  find  it  necessary  to  reach  a  con- 
clusion as  to  the  legally  binding  charac- 
ter of  these  agreements  under  inter- 
national law.  We  are  proceeding  because 
we  believe  it  is  in  the  overall  interests  of 
the  United  States  to  carry  out  the 
agreement. 

The  decision  represents  a  practical 
judgment  that  implementation  provides 
the  surest  resolution  of  the  issue  con- 
sistent with  the  best  interests  of  the 
United  States  in  the  gulf  region  and 
throughout  the  world.  Iran  has  not  prof- 
ited from  these  agreements.  It  was 
ultimately  forced  to  settle  on  terms  that 
simply  restored  the  status  quo  ante 
because  the  advent  of  the  new  Adminis- 
tration finally  confronted  it  with  a  seri- 
ous deadline.  The  funds  already 
returned  to  Iran  and  those  which  may 
be  returned  following  the  implementa- 
tion of  these  agreements  and  the  settle- 
ment of  commercial  and  legal  claims- 
all  these  funds  thus  involved  are  funds 
which  belonged  to  Iran  before  the 
seizure  of  the  American  hostages. 

It  should  be  well  understood  that 
the  decision  to  faithfully  implement  the 
agreements  does  not  represent  a  prece- 
dent for  future  actions  by  the  U.S. 
Government  in  similar  situations.  The 
present  Administration  would  not  have 
negotiated  with  Iran  for  the  release  of 
the  hostages.  Future  acts  of  state-spon- 
sored terrorism  against  the  United 
States  will  meet  swift  and  sure  punish- 
ment. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  William  J.  Dyess.   ■ 


Travel  to  Iran 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 

JAN.  27, 1981' 

All  American  citizens  contemplating 
travel  to  Iran  are  advised  that  they 
should  avoid  such  travel.  Travel  to  Iran 
is  extremely  hazardous  because  of  the 
continued  anti- American  atmosphere, 
the  virulent  anti- American  stance  of  the 
Iranian  Government,  and  the  present 
conflict  between  Iran  and  Iraq.  The 
possibility  exists  that  American  citizens 
traveling  to  Iran  could  be  detained 
without  charge  or  taken  hostage. 

American  interests  in  Iran  are  cur- 
rently served  by  the  Swiss  Government 
acting  through  its  Embassy  in  Tehran, 
but  protective  services  are  severely 
limited  by  present  conditions.  Under 
these  circumstances,  the  Department  of 
State  strongly  urges  United  States 
citizens  to  avoid  any  travel  to  Iran. 

This  warning  supersedes  the  formal 
restriction  on  travel  to  Iran  which  was 
effective  on  April  23, 1980. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  William  J.  Dyess  on 
Jan.  27, 1981.  ■ 


:h1981 


17 


SOUTH  ASIA 


Afghanistan:  A  Year  of  Occupation 


The  fulluiving  paper  was  ivritten  by  Eliza 
Van  Hollen  of  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence 
and  Research.  It  was  prepared  in 
December  1980  as  a  review  of  conditions 
existing  in  Afghanistan  1  year  after  the 
Soviet  invasion.  Mrs.  Van  Hollen  has 
added  a  concluding  section  to  bring  the 
situation  up  to  date  as  of  mid-February 
1981. 

A  year  after  the  Soviets  invaded  Af- 
ghanistan and  replaced  President  Amin 
with  their  puppet  Babrak  Karmal,  Af- 
ghanistan is  still  in  turmoil.  While  the 
Soviets  may  have  prevented  the  collapse 
of  a  pro-Soviet  Marxist  government,  they 
have  had  little  success  in  building  support 
for  the  Babrak  regime. 

In  some  respects,  the  situation  in 
Afghanistan  today  is  no  better,  from  a 
Soviet  point  of  view,  than  that  which  pre- 
ceded the  December  1979  invasion.  The 
government  faces  widespread  and  grow- 
ing alienation  and  resistance,  virulent 
factionalism  within  the  ruling  party,  and 
an  acute  shortage  of  militaiy  manpower. 
Almost  universal  Afghan  hostility  to  the 
Soviet  presence  has  intensified  these 
problems. 

The  nationalist  movement,  while  still 
fraginented  and  lacking  coordination,  is 
better  organized  and  equipped  than  it 
was  a  year  ago.  Furthei-more,  there  is 
evidence  of  more  cooperation,  in  some 
areas,  between  nationalist  guerrilla 
groups  which  are  increasingly  organized 
along  tribal  lines.  These  forces,  however, 
have  not  been  able  to  turn  their  improved 
capability  into  victory  over  the  Babrak 
regime — principally  because  of  the  pres- 
ence of  85,000  Soviet  troops  inside  the 
country. 

The  Soviet  invasion  in  December 
1979  transformed  the  Afghan  conflict, 
which  up  to  that  time  could  be  described 
as  a  civil  war,  into  a  case  of  international 
aggi-ession.  Soviet  troops  have  taken 
over  the  primary  effort  to  suppress  the 
nationalists  and  Soviet  officials  have  as- 
sumed virtual  control  of  both  militai->'  and 
civilian  government  departments.  While 
the  resistance  movement  is  still  directed 
against  the  Marxists  in  nominal  control  of 
the  Kabul  government  and  particularly 
against  Afghan  Government  security  or- 
gans, it  is  now  focused  primarily  against 
the  Soviet  intruders. 


By  invading  Afghanistan,  the 
Soviets  damaged  their  relations  both  with 
the  West  and  with  the  nonaligned  Third 
World,  in  particular  with  Islamic  coun- 
tries. The  recent  November  20,  1980  vote 
in  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  where  111 
nations  supported  a  resolution  calling  for 
the  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops  from  Af- 
ghanistan, underscores  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  action  is  still  rejected.  The  plight 
of  the  more  than  1.2  million  Afghan  refu- 
gees in  Pakistan  has  aroused  interna- 
tional concern  and  keeps  the  Afghan 
question  in  the  public  view. 

Efforts  over  the  past  year  by  various 
elements  of  the  international  community 
to  persuade  the  Soviets  to  join  in  serious 
discussions  for  a  political  settlement  have 
come  to  nought.  There  is  no  indication 


standoff  after  a  year  of  punishing  Soviet 
military  operations  is  in  itself  a  psycho- 
logical victory  for  the  nationalists. 

The  Situation  in  December  1979 

In  December  1979,  it  was  clear  that  the    I 
Government  of  the  Democratic  Republic  ! 
of  Afghanistan  (DRA)  was  in  serious 
trouble.  Insurgent  groups  were  operatin, 
in  many  parts  of  the  countiy  and  were 
exerting  pressure  on  certain  provincial 
capitals  and  militai-y  outposts.  Their  re- 
silience was  demonstrated  by  their  abilit 
to  move  back  into  Paktia  Province  in  the 
wake  of  a  major  government  militar>' 
sweep  in  October  1979.  At  the  same  tim( 
the  Afghan  Army  was  being  eroded  by 
large-scale  defections,  desertions,  casual>l 


The  Soviets  seem  to  have  consistently  miscalculated  in  Afghanistan. 
If  they  believe  that  the  resistance  is  losing  its  momentum,  then  they  are 
still  misjudging  the  Afghan  equation.  ^Li^ 


that  the  Soviets  are  prepared  to  agree  to 
any  solution  which  entails  the  prompt 
withdrawal  of  their  troops.  Their  con- 
tinued insistence  on  basing  negotiations 
on  the  May  14,  1980  proposals  of  the  Bab- 
rak Karmal  government  rules  out  any 
meaningful  discussion.  These  proposals 
would  legitimize  the  present  government 
in  Kabul  and,  by  implication,  the  Soviet 
role  as  well  and  would  require  the  cessa- 
tion of  all  resistance  as  a  precondition  for 
the  withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops. 

In  this  situation,  all  indications  are 
that  the  Soviets  are  digging  in  for  a  long 
stay.  Publicly,  they  maintain  that  things 
are  going  well  in  Afghanistan.  While  the 
prolonged  nature  of  the  conflict  inevitably 
raises  questions  in  Moscow,  those  in  the 
Soviet  hierarchy  who  opted  for  the  inva- 
sion probably  still  believe  that  it  will 
eventually  accomplish  its  objectives. 

The  Soviets  seem  to  have  consist- 
ently miscalculated  in  Afghanistan.  If 
they  believe  that  the  resistance  is  losing 
its  momentum,  then  they  are  still  mis- 
judging the  Afghan  e(iuation.  The  fact 
that  the  situation  in  Afghanistan  is  a 


ties,  and  the  inability  to  obtain  fresh  coi 
scripts  from  the  many  areas  of  the  coun 
try  which  were  already  out  of  effective 
government  control.  Estimates  of  the  .\ 
ghan  Army  size  at  that  time  range  froir, 
50,000-70,000  as  opposed  to  90,000- 
100,000  before  the  insurgency  began. 

In  addition,  then  President  Hafizul- 
lah  Amin  was  feuding  with  the  Soviets. 
Moscow  had  become  deeply  involved  in 
Afghanistan's  affairs  soon  after  the 
People's  Democratic  Party  of  AfghanistJ 
(PDPA),  headed  by  Nur  Mohammad 
Taraki,  seized  power  in  April  1978.  Both 
Amin  and  Moscow  were  aware  that  the 
Soviets  had  conspired  with  Taraki  to 
eliminate  Amin.  It  was  only  apparently 
by  a  stroke  of  luck  that  Amin,  following 
September  14,  1979  shootout,  had  ended 
up  as  President  while  Taraki  went  to  his 
grave. 

If  Amin  had  shown  promise  of  endii 
the  resistance,  Moscow  would  probably 
have  tried  to  continue  to  work  with  him. 
But  the  Soviets  were  well  aware  that 
Amin  was  generally  considered  by  the 
Afghan  people  to  be  the  man  most  re- 
sponsible for  the  bitterly  resented  Marx 
ist  "reforms"  and  for  the  continuing  wav 


South  Asia 


1  arrests  and  executions  which  had 
i  liuii  soon  after  the  Marxists  came  to 
j  wer. 

The  Soviets  had  been  searching  since 
'  early  summer  of  1979  for  a  way  to 
i|i  the  swelUng  resistance  to  DRA  au- 
iiity.  They  had  evidently  concluded  by 
ii'iiiber  1979  that  a  second  attempt  at 
iistic  action  was  necessai-y.  They  may 
.i\e  been  influenced  by  the  fact  that 
gv'ernment  forces  had  recently  suffered 
'1  umber  of  setbacks  in  areas  surround- 
<  Kabul  and  in  northeastern  Badakh- 
111  Province  on  the  Soviet  border. 

( )bservers  of  the  Afghan  scene,  at 
1  lime,  saw  the  return  of  Babrak 
I mal,  leader  of  the  PDPA's  Parcham 
inn,  as  a  Soviet  option  but  not  one 
ich  promised  a  solution  to  the  problem. 
Birak,  together  with  key  supporters, 
'<  I  been  forced  into  exile  by  the  domi- 
t  Khalq  faction  leadership  in  July 
^. '  In  the  eyes  of  the  Afghan  people, 
I'ak  was  just  as  much  of  a  Communist 
lis  predecessors.  Furthermore,  by 
t-mber  1979  the  Soviet  advisory  per- 
nel  in  the  country  not  only  had  in- 
ised  numerically  but  also  had  begun  to 
line  control  to  the  point  where  the 
lets  themselves  were  becoming  a 
( ir  focus  of  resentment.  No  one  who 
.  to  power  under  Soviet  sponsorship 
!  have  won  the  support  of  the  people. 

ri'  Soviet  Invasion  and 
Ciitinuing  Military  Role 

'  December  27,  1979,  following  a  mas- 
2-day  airlift  of  troops  and  equipment, 
ecial  Soviet  assault  unit  surrounded 
Tajbek  Palace  in  the  Darulaman 
Iilex,  where  President  Amin  was  liv- 
Afghan  forces  loyal  to  Amin  de- 
led the  palace  but  were  overcome 
1  r  several  hours  of  fighting.  Amin  and 
1  libers  of  his  family  were  executed. 
At  the  same  time,  Soviet  forces 
.aed  quickly  to  secure  Radio  Afghani- 
3  I,  where  Afghan  troops  put  up  resist- 
a  ;,  and  other  key  civilian  and  militai-y 
ij  allations  in  the  Kabul  area.  Two 
iet  motorized  rifle  divisions  promptly 
red  Afghanistan  by  land,  and  by  Jan- 
f  1,  1980  there  were  at  least  30,000- 
iQC  combat  troops  in  the  countiy.  By 
*J   iary  20  that  number  had  gi-own  to 
"^    00,  and  it  subsequently  leveled  off  at 
Hire  of  approximately  85,000  in  Af- 
nistan  and  another  30,000  supplemen- 
forces  just  over  the  Soviet  border. 
On  June  22,  the  Soviets  announced 
withdrawal  of  some  of  their  troops 
1  Afghanistan.  These  troops,  number- 
pproximately  5,000,  turned  out  to  be 


forces  unsuited  to  Afghan  terrain  or  to 
fighting  against  hit-and-run  guerrilla  op- 
erations. The  withdrawal,  which  occurred 
during  the  allied  summit  conference  in 
Venice  and  several  weeks  before  the 
Moscow  Olympics,  was  clearly  for  prop- 
aganda purposes.  Even  as  the  unwanted 
forces  were  being  withdrawn,  new  and 
more  useful  units  were  being  introduced, 
and  the  total  figure  was  soon  back  up  to 
85,000. 

While  the  force  level  has  remained 
stable  throughout  most  of  the  year,  the 
Soviets  have  made  a  number  of  changes 
to  improve  their  militai-y  capability.  They 
have  substituted  seasoned  troops  for  re- 
servists and  reorganized  the  command 
and  control  structure  to  permit  a  moi'e 
flexible  response  to  the  insurgency.  The 
most  striking  change  has  been  in  the  in- 
creasing size  of  the  helicopter  force. 
Helicopter  gunships  have  proved  to  be 
the  most  formidable  weapon  in  the  Soviet 
arsenal,  and  over  the  year  their  number 
in  Afghanistan  has  quadrupled  to  a  cur- 
rent force  of  about  240. 

These  changes  have  become  neces- 
saiy  as  the  Soviet  foi'ces  have  had  to  as- 
sume the  major  burden  of  military  opera- 
tions against  the  resistance.  Moscow's 
initial  intention  appears  to  have  been  to 
secure  major  cities  and  towns  and  the 
Hnes  of  communication,  while  stiffening 
the  spine  of  the  Afghan  forces  who  would 
be  ft-ee  to  pacify  the  counti-yside.  From 
the  beginning,  however,  it  was  clear  that 
the  Soviets  had  misjudged  their  ability  to 
keep  the  Afghan  forces  in  line.  In  fact, 
the  Soviets'  first  combat  experience  in 
Afghanistan  was  against  rebelling  Afghan 
troops. 

Since  the  first  winter  push  into 
troubled  Badakhshan  Province,  Soviet 
forces  have  been  continuously  engaged  in 
counterinsurgency  operations.  At  some 
time  or  another  over  the  course  of  the 
spring,  summer,  and  fall  of  1980  they 
have  operated  in  virtually  eveiy  province 
of  the  country.  Certain  strategic  regions 
have  been  subjected  to  repeated  Soviet 
offensive  operations.  Among  these  are 
the  eastern  provinces,  where  the  Soviets 
have  tried,  unsuccessfully,  to  seal  the 
Pakistan  border. 

Soviet  mihtaiy  operations  were  sig- 
nificantly stepped  up  in  the  fall  months, 
probably  an  effort  to  enter  winter  in  as 
strong  a  position  as  possible.  Winter 
weather  will  force  the  muhajidin  to  come 
down  from  the  hills  but  will  also  reduce 
the  mobility  of  the  Soviets. 


j ,,.., 


Soviet  troops  have  reportedly  re- 
taliated brutally  against  villages  sus- 
pected of  harboring  nationalists.  Homes 
have  been  leveled,  crops  destroyed,  and 
grain  stocks  burned.  There  have  been  re- 
ports of  Soviet  troops  massacring  the  in- 
habitants of  villages  in  their  rage  at  not 
finding  the  elusive  resistance  forces. 
There  is  convincing  evidence  that  the 
Soviets  have  used  both  irritants  and  in- 
capacitating chemical  agents  against  the 
insurgents.  Reports  of  the  use  of  lethal 
chemicals  are  under  investigation. 

There  are  some  indications  that 
Soviet  troops  have  suffered  from  poor 
morale  in  Afghanistan.  Soviet  casualties 
have  outnumbered  those  of  their  Afghan 
Army  counterparts.  There  are  also  many 
reports  of  undisciplined  behavior,  includ- 
ing black  market  operations,  rape,  and 
looting  of  shops  and  homes. 

Weaknesses  of  the  Babrak  Regime 

Babrak  Kannal  returned  to  Kabul  with  a 
tough  assignment:  to  persuade  the  people 
of  Afghanistan  to  reduce  their  hostility  to 
the  Marxist  government  and  accept  the 
Soviet  militaiy  presence.  He  was  to  effect 
a  reconciliation  between  the  estranged 
Khalq  and  Parcham  factions  of  the 
People's  Democratic  Party,  in  order  to  es- 
tablish as  broad  a  base  as  possible  despite 
the  fact  that  his  Soviet  sponsors  had 
killed  the  Khalqi  leader,  Hafizullah  Amin. 
Nonparty  people  were  to  be  brought  into 
the  government  to  produce  the  image  of  a 
national  front.  Finally,  he  envisaged  con- 
ciliatory policies  to  persuade  the  people 
that  the  new  government  was  not  anti- 
Islamic  and  that  it  was  genuinely  pre- 
pared to  roll  back  widely  resented  social 
and  economic  measures  dating  from  the 
early  days  of  the  DRA. 

Babrak  has  not  thus  far  succeeded  in 
his  program.  He  has  failed  to  heal  the 
Khalq-Parcham  split  despite  the  im- 
portance which  the  Soviets  attached  to 
this  goal.  The  new  government  was  a 
carefully  contrived  coalition  of  Babrak's 
Parcham  gi-oup  and  those  Khalqis  who 
had  been  opposed  to  Amin.  Because 
many  Parchamis  had  been  imprisoned 
and  tortured  by  Taraki's  secret  police 
chief,  AssaduUah  Sarwari,  who  became  a 
Deputy  Prime  Minister,  there  were  bitter 
personal  scores  to  be  settled  at  all  levels 
of  the  party  organization. 

The  feuding  broke  out  almost  imme- 
diately. Throughout  the  winter,  spring, 
and  early  summer  of  1980  reports  of  vio- 
lent confrontations  between  the  factions 
continued,  and  each  faction  appeared  to 
be  plotting  to  overthrow  the  other.  The 
resented  Soviet  presence  exacerbated  the 


19 


South  Asia 


conflict,  as  the  Khalqis  blamed  the  Par- 
chaniis  for  bringing  in  the  Soviets. 

The  conflict  between  the  Khalqis  and 
Parchamis  came  to  a  climax  in  June  in  a 
high-level  confrontation,  the  details  of 
which  are  not  known.  The  eventual  result 
was  the  diplomatic  exile  (as  Ambassador 
to  Mongolia)  of  Khalqi  Deputy  Prime 
Minister  Assadullah  Sarwari  and  his  re- 
placement by  a  less  tainted  figure.  This 
move  deprived  the  Khalqis  of  one  of  their 
most  aggressive  leaders. 

The  Khalq-Parcham  conflict,  how- 
ever, has  continued  to  boil.  There  have 
been  credible  reports  of  three  major  mili- 
tary coup  plots  involving  Khalqi  officers 
— in  June,  July,  and  mid-October.  Khalqis 
are  alarmed  by  the  fact  that  the  Par- 
chamis are  gradually  removing  middle- 
level  and  upper-middle-level  Khalqi  offi- 
cials from  their  positions.  Khalqis  are 
reportedly  preparing  for  an  open  armed 
struggle.  Furthermore,  it  appears  that 
some  lower-  and  middle-level  Khalqis 
have  joined  forces  with  the  insurgents. 

The  strength  of  the  Khalqis  in  the 
militaiy  justifies  Soviet  efforts  to  keep 
the  Parchamis  from  provoking  open  party 
warfare.  So  while  Babrak's  speeches  to 
the  Third  PDPA  Plenum  in  July  and  to 
the  Fourth  Plenum  in  mid-November 
both  obliquely  threatened  purges  of 
prominent  Khalqi  leaders,  no  dramatic 
cabinet-level  changes  followed.  At  the 
Fourth  Plenum,  Babrak  established  loy- 
alty to  Moscow  as  a  new  criterion  for 
party  membership  and  announced  inves- 
tigations of  high-level  officials  who  have 
abused  their  positions. 

The  Soviets  are  clearly  concerned 
about  the  current  paralysis  in  Afghani- 
stan's Government  and  party  operations, 
which  can  be  attributed  in  large  measure 
to  the  intraparty  feuding.  Since  his  re- 
turn from  his  October  1980  trip  to 
Moscow,  Babrak  has  made  two  important 
speeches  criticizing  the  lack  of  effective 
government  and  party  leadership  and 
calling  for  a  fundamental  change  in  at- 
titudes. It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  he 
will  receive  the  cooperation  that  he 
wants,  even  from  all  elements  of  his  own 
faction. 

While  Babrak's  base  of  support  is  ac- 
tually shrinking  as  a  result  of  the  continu- 
ing Khalq-Pai'cham  struggle,  he  con- 
tinues to  ti-y  to  appeal  to  all  elements  of 
society  to  join  in  a  National  Fatherland 
Front.  After  a  year  of  endless  speeches 
and  conferences  designed  both  to  attract 
followers  and  to  create  the  impression  of 
broad  support,  there  is  no  indication  that 
the  regime  has  made  any  progress  along 


these  lines.  Indeed,  many  prominent  in- 
dividuals have  fled  the  country  precisely 
because  they  feared  they  would  be  ap- 
proached to  join  the  government. 

Nor  have  the  policies  to  nullify  the 
unpopular  "reform"  decrees  of  the  previ- 
ous regimes  been  particularly  fruitful. 
The  Babrak  government  has  offered  to 
return  land  to  former  owners,  but  most 
have  left  the  country;  it  has  offered  am- 
nesty to  refugees,  but  few  have  returned. 
A  particular  effort  has  been  mounted  to 
convince  the  people  and  religious  leaders 
that  this  regime  is  dedicated  to  the  ideals 
of  Islam  and  is  willing  to  return  to  the 
religious  leaders  their  previous  role  in  the 
countryside.  A  deal  has  not  been  struck. 


The  Babrak  government  has 
offered  to  return  land  to  former 
owners,  but  most  have  left  the  coun- 
try; it  has  offered  amnesty  to  refu- 
gees, but  few  have  returned. 


however,  as  the  price  for  this  concession 
is  support  of  the  government. 

The  most  striking  example  of  the  re- 
gime's failure  has  been  in  the  crucial  area 
of  military  manpower.  The  Afghan  Army, 
demoralized  by  the  purges  of  its  pre-1978 
leadership  and  by  its  assignment  to  fight 
against  brother  Afghans  and  Muslims, 
was  already  rapidly  disintegrating  before 
the  Soviet  invasion.  The  invasion  pro- 
voked a  further  massive  exodus,  and  re- 
bellion, defection,  and  desertion  have 
continued  throughout  1980.  By  mid- 
summer 1980  the  army  was  probably 
down  to  30,000-40,000,  and  the  figure 
now  may  be  closer  to  25,000. 

In  view  of  this  trend,  the  regime  has 
taken  draconian  measures  to  obtain  new 
recruits.  House-to-house  searches  by  im- 
pressment gangs  started  in  Kabul  in  the 
spring  and  have  been  repeated  periodi- 
cally in  the  capital.  There  are  many  re- 
ports of  boys  age  14  and  even  younger 
being  taken  off  in  the  night.  Press  gangs 
have  also  operated  in  other  cities,  and  a 
prime  objective  of  the  Soviet  and  Afghan 
military  offensives  in  the  provinces  dur- 
ing the  summer  and  fall  was  to  round  up 
conscripts.  It  is  clear,  however,  from  a  re- 
cent (December  3,  1980)  speech  by  Bab- 
rak that  these  efforts  and  the  new  Sep- 
tember 6,  1980  draft  law  have  failed  to  al- 
leviate the  crisis. 

To  offset  the  dwindling  size  of  the 


army,  the  regime  has  offered  special  in- 
centives (high  pay)  to  young  people  to 
join  local  militia  units  called  Defense  of 
the  Revolution  battalions.  Like  the  arm; 
however,  these  units  remain  critically 
undermanned  and  are  plagued  by  fre- 
quent defections. 

Failure  to  build  up  the  Afghan  Armjjji 
and  other  security  forces  poses  a  special 
problem  for  the  Soviets  as  it  obliges  the;  i 
to  continue  to  assume  the  main  combat 
burden  in  anti-insurgency  operations.  If 
they  fail  to  rebuild  the  Afghan  Army  an( 
if  the  resistance  persists  at  its  current 
level,  they  may  eventually  have  to  intrO' 
duce  more  forces  to  cope  with  the  con- 
tinuing resistance.  At  the  moment,  how- 
ever, there  are  no  indications  that  they 
are  planning  such  a  move. 


» 

Tt 
.pel 
isei 


■1 


The  Resistance 


let 
It 


In  contrast  to  the  Babrak  government's 
failure  to  gain  support  over  the  past  yea4te 
is  the  dramatic  growth  in  the  number  oft  ^l 
organized  resistance  units  actively  fight- 
ing the  regime  and  Soviet  forces.  It  is 
impossible  to  ascertain  the  number  in  tY^ 
field,  but  the  Soviet  invasion  has  involve 
the  entire  population  in  the  conflict,  and 
there  remains  a  large  reserve  of  untap- 
ped, potential  insurgent  manpower. 

As  much  as  75%  of  the  countryside 
may  be  out  of  the  effective  control  of  thf  ' 
government.  There  have  been  major  civ 
disturbances  in  the  important  cities  of 
Qandahar,  Herat,  and  Jalalabad  through  fci,. 
out  the  year.  Soviet  forces  have  engagec  fl 
in  active  fighting  inside  these  cities,  but 
they  remain  in  turmoil.  Even  Kabul  has  I; 
had  its  share  of  violence.  hj, 

Nationalist  bands  have  been  veiy  el  |n. 
fective  at  ambushing  convoys  and  even    i 
Soviet  and  Afghan  militaiy  columns. 
They  carry  out  frequent  acts  of  sabotagt ; 
In  some  instances,  they  have  been  able  t 
deny  Soviet  forces  access  to  their  strong  ;, 
holds,  such  as  the  Panjshir  Valley  and  th. 
Hazarajat.  Their  activities  have  forced 
government  officials  to  abandon  many 
district-level  offices  and  police  stations  ii: 
the  provinces.  On  the  other  hand,  whJle 
they  have  seriously  threatened  various 
provincial  capitals,  they  have  not  been 
able  to  capture  one.  When  Soviet  troops 
arrive  in  force,  accompanied  by  assault 
helicopters,  the  resistance  forces  have  to 
disperse.  When  the  Soviets  leave,  how- 
ever, they  return. 

The  two  major  problems  confronting 
the  nationalists,  as  they  seek  to  do  battk' 
with  the  formidable  Soviet  military  ma- 
chine, are  the  lack  of  coordination  and  a 


ill 
« 
If 
ID 

nli 


20 


Marr-h  1  OR 


South  Asia 


iitage  of  weapons  and  ammunition, 
licularly  anti-tank  and  anti-aircraft 
apons. 

rhe  early  emergence  in  Pakistan  of 
iipeting  exile  political  organizations 

served  to  create  an  impression  of  dis- 
a\  in  the  overall  resistance  movement. 
Ilk'  Afghanistan,  however,  the 
uiiialists  have,  from  the  beginning, 
111  organized  under  local  leadership 

lu  tribal  lines.  There  is  a  growing 
i  1(1  toward  cooperation  between  tribal 
nups  in  some  areas.  While  it  would  be  a 

■  take  to  overrate  the  present  organiza- 
lal  achievement  of  the  new  regional  al- 

■s,  they  may  represent  an  important 
step  toward  countiywide  coordina- 
III.  In  any  event,  in  many  ways  the 
fiitaneous  and  countrywide  nature  of 
h  resistance  is  one  of  its  great  strengths 
I  makes  it  exceedingly  difficult  for  the 
iet  Army  to  suppress  it. 
The  Babrak  regime  and  the  Soviets 
r  well  aware  of  the  inherent  dangers  of 
r  al  cooperation.  They  have  worked  to 
r  te  discord  by  playing  on  traditional 
il  rivalries,  offering  large  bribes  to 
IS  who  will  agree  to  support  the  gov- 
1  iient  and  even  in  some  cases  to  serve 
-  lercenaries.  While  the  government 
had  some  success  along  these  lines, 
fU-publicized  murder  in  September 
if  the  Minister  of  Tinbal  and  Border 
ir.s,  who  was  responsible  for  imple- 
tiiig  this  policy,  was  a  major  setback. 
The  dramatic  increase  in  the  number 
>i  ential  freedom  fighters  over  the 
has  created  a  demand  for  more 
pons,  and  the  challenge  of  Soviet 
I  ipter  gunships  and  tanks  requires  a 
'  '  sophisticated  arsenal.  From  the  be- 
:'.  ing,  resistance  weapons  have  come 

■  larily  from  Afghan  Army  stocks 
ugh  raids  and  from  defectors.  In  Au- 

the  Soviets  took  all  anti-tank  and 
aircraft  weapons  away  from  the  Af- 
n  1  forces,  a  clear  sign  that  they  were 
'  ig  into  the  hands  of  the  resistance 
.iLso  an  indication  that  the  Soviets 
:  a!  tightened  up  weapon  security. 

K 

L  ger  Term  Soviet  Programs 

(id   cow's  present  intention  is  clearly  to 
I*    snt  Afghanistan  firmly  into  the 
jC    et  orbit,  at  the  same  time  establish- 
jia   ,he  fiction  of  a  legitimate,  independ- 
l»e    and  nonaligned  government.  The  ex- 
:;   rdinary  reception  which  the  Soviets 
ijg    !  Babrak  during  his  mid-October  visit 
'tt>    oscow  represented  a  major  effort  to 
ey  an  aura  of  legitimacy. 
The  Soviets  are  taking  steps  to  se- 
their  position  over  the  longer  term. 


Large  numbers  of  Afghan  students  have 
been  sent  to  the  Soviet  Union  for  their 
education  over  the  past  year;  an  August 
12,  1980  protocol  called  for  the  enrollment 
of  1,500  students  in  Soviet  institutions  of 
higher  education  by  early  October.  The 
Afghan  party,  government,  and  educa- 
tional institutions  are  being  reorganized 
in  the  Soviet  mold.  Economic  ties  be- 
tween the  two  countries  have  been  fur- 
ther strengthened  as  more  and  more  of 
Afghanistan's  trade  is  oriented  toward 
the  U.S.S.R.  According  to  Babrak  Kar- 
mal,  the  Soviet  Union  is  now  supplying 
80%  of  Afghanistan's  foreign  aid.  In  addi- 
tion to  building  permanent  facilities  for 
their  militai-y  forces  in  Afghanistan,  the 
Soviets  are  creating  a  basic  cross- 
boundary  infrastructure;  they  have  built 
three  bridges  across  the  Amu  Darya 
River,  and  railroad  connections  between 
the  two  countries  are  projected. 

Cost  to  the  Soviet  Union 

The  Afghan  adventure  has  been  costly  for 
the  Soviet  Union  both  in  monetary  terms 
and  in  terms  of  its  relations  with  the  rest 
of  the  world.  The  financial  burden  of 
maintaining  its  military  presence  and  un- 
derwriting Afghanistan's  rapidly  dete- 
riorating economy  may  be  tolerable  in  the 
short  term.  As  a  long-term  proposition,  it 
may  not  be  so  attractive.  Economic  as- 
sets and  development  projects  have  been 


the  Islamic  Conference  of  Foreign  Minis- 
ters on  January  29  and  again  on  May  21; 
by  the  U.N.  Human  Rights  Commission 
on  February  14;  by  the  Foreign  Ministers 
of  the  European  Common  Market  and  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
on  March  7;  and  by  the  Interparlia- 
mentary Union  Council  on  April  12  and 
again  on  September  24. 

The  United  States  and  some  other 
countries  have  restricted  gi-ain  shipments 
to  the  U.S.S.R.  The  United  States  has 
also  tightened  controls  on  the  sale  of 
high  technology  items,  embargoed 
phosphates — a  source  of  fertilizer  and 
animal  feed  supplements — sharply  cur- 
tailed Soviet  fishing  rights  in  U.S. 
waters,  and  restricted  scheduled  com- 
mercial airline  service  between  the  two 
countries.  In  July,  the  international 
Olympics,  held  in  Moscow,  were  boy- 
cotted by  some  80  countries. 

Deflecting  international  attention 
from  Afghanistan  is  a  prime  goal  of 
Soviet  diplomacy.  But  the  frequent  defec- 
tions of  prominent  Afghans  and  govern- 
ment officials  and  the  steady  stream  of 
refugees  pouring  into  Pakistan  keep  the 
issue  very  much  alive. 

Well-publicized  defections  during  the 
course  of  the  year  have  included  those  of 
Ahmad  Hakim  Tabibi,  the  Deputy  Per- 
manent Representative  at  the  United 
Nations  in  January  1980;  Abdul  Rahim 
Ghafourzai,  a  diplomat  who  had  been  sent 


Deflecting  international  attention  from  Afghanistan  is  a  prime  goal  of 
Soviet  diplomacy.  But  the  frequent  defections  of  prominent  Afghans  and 
government  officials  and  the  steady  stream  of  refugees  pouring  into  Paki- 
stan keep  the  issue  very  much  alive. 


a  prime  target  of  nationalist  attacks,  and 
Babrak's  recent  speeches  have  underiined 
major  dislocations  in  the  economy. 

More  immediately  significant,  how- 
ever, has  been  the  damage  to  the  Soviet 
Union's  international  image.  Virtually  all 
major  international  bodies  have  called  for 
the  immediate  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
troops.  The  first  instance  was  the  over- 
whelming vote  of  104-18  in  the  special 
session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
convened  in  January  1980;  in  the  recent 
November  20  General  Assembly  vote  on 
the  Afghan  question  the  margin  was  in- 
creased to  111-22.  In  the  intervening 
period,  the  Soviet  invasion  and  occupa- 
tion of  Afghanistan  was  condemned  by 


to  defend  the  Afghan  position  at  a  meet- 
ing of  the  nonaligned  group  at  the  United 
Nations  in  Februai-y;  eight  members  of 
the  Afghan  national  football  team  in 
March;  11  members  of  the  Afghan  Olym- 
pic wresthng  team  in  July;  an  Ariana  Air- 
lines crew  in  Frankfurt  in  September; 
and,  most  recently,  the  dramatic  defec- 
tion in  October  of  Akhtar  Mohammed 
Paktiawal,  Afghanistan's  delegate  to  the 
UNESCO  [United  Nations  Educational, 
Scientific,  and  Cultural  Organization] 
conference  in  Belgrade. 

The  presence  of  over  1.2  million  refu- 
gees in  Pakistan  (up  from  400,000  a  year 
ago),  with  more  arriving  every  day  (as  of 
mid-October  the  flow  had  averaged 
80,000  a  month  since  January  1980),  has 


:h1981 


21 


South  Asia 


put  an  enormous  burden  on  Pakistan  and 
presented  the  entire  world  with  a  major 
humanitarian  responsibility.  In  June,  the 
U.N.  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
was  forced  to  double  its  1980  budget  from 
$55  million  to  $100  million  (the  United 
States  contributed  $44  million  in  1980  or 
almost  half  the  total).  The  refugee  popu- 
lation in  Pakistan  in  the  coming  year  may 
well  be  the  gi-eatest  in  any  single  countiy 
in  the  world.  In  addition,  there  may  be 
over  a  quarter  of  a  million  refugees  in 
Iran. 

Recent  Developments 

There  have  been  some  significant  devel- 
opments in  the  past  2  months.  Fighting 
continues  at  a  high  level  in  many  areas  as 
the  nationalists  push  to  e.xpand  their  area 
of  control  and  the  Soviet  and  government 
forces  tiy  to  contain  them  and  regain  lost 
districts.  Winter  snows  in  some  regions 
probably  account  for  an  influ.x  of  insur- 
gents into  the  cities,  where  violence  in- 
creased markedly.  The  Soviets  took 
strong  measures  in  Kabul  and  other  cities 
in  early  February  1981  to  round  up 
mujahidiii  and  to  reestablish  order. 

A  shortage  of  manpower  for  Afghan 
militaiy  and  security  forces  remains  a 
critical  problem.  The  government  prom- 
ulgated a  new  draft  law  in  early  Januaiy 
which  extended  the  length  of  service  by  6 
months  to  'ZVz  years.  This  unpopular 
move  provoked  pohce  riots  in  Kabul  and 
isolated  instances  of  rebellion  by  troops. 
Thousands  of  soldiers  will  have  served 
the  extra  (5  months  by  mid-March  1981. 
Since  the  government  apparently  has 
failed  to  obtain  sufficient  replacements, 
another  extension  and  further  disorders 
seem  inevitable. 

There  are  also  new  reports  of  Soviet 
brutalities  in  the  countiyside,  where  they 
are  attempting  to  terrorize  the  villagers 
into  persuading  the  young  men  to  report 


for  the  draft.  It  is  a  futile  effort  as  the 
young  men  are  already  fighting  with  the 
nationahsts  or  have  escaped  to  Pakistan. 

In  spite  of  official  efforts  to  gloss 
over  the  Khalq-Parcham  feud,  the  inter- 
necine struggle  continues.  Another  Khalq 
plot  and  ensuing  widescale  arrests  of 
Khalqis  were  reported  in  early  February. 

The  gap  between  the  Afghan  reality 
and  the  image  portrayed  by  Soviet  and 
Afghan  media  has  been  further  widened 
by  official  claims  regarding  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  National  Fatherland 
Front,  which  Babrak  announced  in  late 
December  1980.  The  regime  is  tiding  to 
create  the  impression  that  the  "con- 
stituent congress"  for  the  front  will  be  an 
elected  body  and  will  constitute  a  Loija 
Jirga,  i.e.,  a  traditional  Afghan  assembly. 
In  fact,  attendance  at  the  preparatoiy 
meetings  has  been  coerced,  and  there  has 
been  no  opportunity  for  choice  or  dissent. 
Any  endorsement  of  Babrak  Karmal  and 
his  policies  by  this  artifical  gathering 
could  not  be  interpreted  to  imply  either 
legitimacy  or  popular  support. 

The  nationalists'  continuing  struggle 
and  the  latest  refugee  figures  are  also  in- 
dicative of  the  unabated  hostility  of  the 
majority  of  Afghans  toward  Babrak  and 
the  Soviets.  More  than  143,000  refugees 


crossed  into  Pakistan  in  January  1981 — bBlfli 
far  the  largest  monthly  influx  to  date — 
bringing  the  total  number  in  Pakistan  to 
over  1.5  million.  High  rates  of  refugee 
exodus  in  both  December  and  January 
can  be  attributed  to  gi-owing  food  short- 
ages in  Afghanistan  and  continuing 
Soviet  militaiy  activity.  The  refugee 
population  in  Iran  also  seems  to  have 
gi-own  dramatically,  but  reliable  figures 
are  not  available. 

Efforts  to  legitimize  the  Babrak  gov 
ernment  on  the  home  front  have  been 
closely  related  to  developments  on  the  in 
ternational  scene.  The  Afghans  and  the 
Soviets  have  tried  throughout  the  year  ti 
proinote  negotiations  with  Pakistan 
which  would  sanction  Babrak  and  his 
May  14  proposals.  In  recent  weeks,  they 
have  consistently  attempted  to  shape 
various  initiatives  by  the  United  Nations' 
and  the  Pakistanis  to  conform  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  Babrak  proposals. 

Meanwhile,  these  diplomatic  devel- 
opments and  others,  such  as  France's 
proposal  for  a  conference  on  noninterfer- 
ence in  Afghanistan  and  resolutions  take 
recently  at  the  Islamic  Conference  meet- 
ing in  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Nonaligned 
Conference  in  New  Delhi,  have  all  servei 
to  keep  the  spotlight  focused  on  the  con- 
tinuing Soviet  occupation  of  Afghani- 
stan. 


r 


ft 

'at 

«f 
m 
m 
l« 

V 

m 

I 

It] 
m 
i 
k 


'See  Department  of  State  Special  Reporl 
No.  72,  June  1980,  for  further  details  of  the 
feud  between  the  Khalq  and  Parcham  factions 
of  the  People's  Democratic  Party.    ■ 


f 


r\ _*_ 


:  ot.„t.„   n. 


■xtirHI-4^ 


ERRORISM 


Hostage  Incidents: 
Ixamples  in  IVIodern  History 


This  study  incorporates  most  of  the 
lormation  contained  in  Research  Proj- 
Xo.  705,  "Hostages  Seized  and 
,r  Death,  Release  or  Rescue:  Ex- 
nU's  in  Modem  History,  "prepared  by 
Office  of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of 
hlic  Affairs,  in  December  1964.  In- 

I  nts  cited  for  the  period  since  1964 
limited  to  those  involving  U.S.  and 
ign  diplomatic  personnel  Assassi- 

Kins  or  instances  of  mob  violence 
inst  diplomats  have  been  included 

II  when  the  perpetrators  demanded 
M'ment  of  ransom,  release  of  "political 
■nioners,  "  or  similar  actions. 

Evan  M.  Duncan  drafted  the  por- 
I  of  this  project  dealing  with  the 
ird  since  1964.  William  Z.  Slany  and 

,  id  F.  Trask  revised  and  edited  the 

tiy. 

VI  iers.  1785-96 

n  785  the  Dey  of  Algiers  captured  two 
'  .  ships,  theMon'a  and  the  Dauphin, 

demanded  $6,000  in  ransom  for  each 
)t  le  three  captains  aboard  the  ships, 
i4  00  each  for  the  two  mates  and  the 
I VI  passengers,  and  $1,400  for  each  of 
■hl4  seamen.  Ensuing  negotiations  col- 
ed  because  the  American  emissary 
authorized  to  pay  only  $200  for  each 
.  These  prisoners  and  others  were 
u  freed  until  1796. 

Action  came  under  the  terms  of  a 

-■  ty  between  the  United  States  and 

!  ers  and  in  accordance  with  an  oral 

■ement  providing  that  the  United 

es  pay  $585,000  for  the  treaty  and 

I'-ansom  of  the  American  captives. 

'  U.S.  Treasury  estimated  the  price 

and  payable  for  this  treaty  at 
.  :,463.25. 

roli,  1802 

1  ^02  Tripolitanians  captured  an 
rsrican  merchantman,  the  Franklin, 
its  crew  of  nine.  They  were  freed  a 
months  later  upon  payment  of  $6,500 
leBey  of  Tripoli. 

oil,  1805 

^05  the  peace  treaty  that  ended  the 
between  Tripoli  and  the  United 
es  called  for  the  United  States  to 


ransom  about  300  American  prisoners  at 
a  price  of  $60,000  in  return  for  about  100 
Tripolitanians  in  American  hands. 

Algeria,  1814 

In  1814  the  United  States  paid  $8,000  to 
the  Dey  of  Algeria  for  the  ransom  of  six 
Americans  captured  the  previous  year 
aboard  the  Edwin. 

Ethiopia,  1868 

When  the  British  Government  failed  to 
reply  to  a  letter  of  friendship  that  the 
Emperor  Theodore  had  sent  to  Queen 
Victoria,  the  Emperor  held  as  hostages 
the  British  consul,  Capt.  Charles  Duncan 
Cameron,  and  Hormuzd  Rassam,  a  natu- 
ralized British  subject  who  attempted  to 
obtain  Cameron's  release.  Theodore  also 
held  about  30  other  adults  ( British, 
French,  German,  and  Swiss  nationals 
and  their  Ethiopian  wives)  and  23 
children.  Among  those  held  were  ar- 
tisans in  Theodore's  employ  and  mis- 
sionaries. 

After  prolonged  negotiations,  the 
Emperor  finally  sent  one  of  the  mission- 
aries to  England  to  ask  for  skilled 
workmen  to  help  him  modernize  his 
country.  He  said  he  would  release  all  of 
the  hostages,  except  Rassam,  in  return 
for  the  workmen.  However,  he  refused 
the  British  Government's  terms  for 
effecting  the  exchange,  and,  in  conse- 
quence, the  British  despatched  an  ex- 
pedition, led  by  Lt.  Gen.  R.  Napier  (later 
Field  Marshal  Lord  Napier),  who  stated 
on  his  arrival  in  Ethiopia  that  his  sole  ob- 
ject was  to  liberate  the  captives.  As  soon 
as  this  purpose  had  been  achieved  the 
force  would  be  withdra-wn.  Napier 
stated  further  that  he  did  not  intend  to 
occupy  Abyssinian  territory  or  to  in- 
terfere with  the  government.  At  the  bat- 
tle of  Magdala  in  April  1868,  Napier 
defeated  the  Ethiopians.  Theodore  com- 
mitted suicide,  and  the  hostages  were 
rescued. 

Franco-Prussian  War,  1870 

In  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Germans 
seized  prominent  enemy  citizens  and  put 
them  on  troop  trains  to  preclude  acts  of 
sabotage  by  unknown  persons.  Also,  dur- 
ing the  war,  Bismarck  ordered  French 
notables  to  be  seized  and  taken  into  cap- 
tivity in  retaliation  for  France's  refusal 


to  liberate  the  crews  of  40  captured  mer- 
chant ships.  This  German  action  is  con- 
sidered a  reprisal  because  the  captives 
were  not  held  as  hostages. 

Bulgaria,  1901-02 

On  September  3, 1901,  Bulgarian  brig- 
ands abducted  Miss  Ellen  M.  Stone,  an 
American  missionary,  while  she  was 
traveling  to  Djumabala  in  Turkish  Euro- 
pean territory.  She  was  released  on 
February  23, 1902,  upon  payment  of 
$66,000  raised  by  private  subscription. 
The  Department  of  State  cooperated  in 
the  efforts  to  obtain  Miss  Stone's 
release. 

Morocco,  1904 

In  1904  a  Moroccan  chieftain  named 
Raisuli  seized  Ion  Perdicaris,  who 
claimed  to  be  an  American  citizen,  and 
his  stepson,  a  British  subject,  and  held 
them  for  ransom.  Naval  vessels  were 
sent  to  the  area.  Although  arrange- 
ments had  already  been  made  to  release 
the  two  men,  President  Theodore 
Roosevelt  consulted  with  Secretary  of 
State  John  Hay,  who  instructed  the 
.  American  consul  general  at  Tangier  to 
say  that  the  United  States  must  have 
"Perdicaris  alive  or  Raisuli  dead,"  but  he 
was  not  authorized  to  use  force  in  the 
absence  of  instructions  to  that  effect. 

Nicaragua,  1912 

During  a  civil  war  in  Nicaragua  in  1912, 
Lt.  E.  H.  Conger  was  held  temporarily 
as  a  hostage  while  on  a  mission  for  the 
American  Minister.  The  latter  sent  a 
note  requesting  that  Lt.  Conger  be 
allowed  to  proceed  to  his  destination  or 
else  start  on  his  return  to  the  legation. 
Before  any  more  action  became  neces- 
sary. Conger  returned  to  Managua,  hav- 
ing successfully  delivered  his  message 
to  the  rebel  general. 

World  War  I 

In  World  War  I,  Germany  took  promi- 
nent Belgian  citizens  as  hostages  to 
forestall  obstruction  of  its  advance. 
Some  hostages  were  killed  in  reprisal, 
and  some  towns  were  damaged.  The 
German  concept  of  holding  whole  com- 
munities reponsible  for  individual  acts 
culminated  in  the  burning  and  sacking  of 
Louvain,  a  policy  that  aroused  interna- 
tional protests. 

China,  1923 

Bandits  kidnapped  19  foreign  travelers, 
including  12  Americans,  from  an  express 


bh1981 


23 


Terrorism 


train  in  Shantung  Province  early  in  May 
1923.  After  prolonged  negotiations,  the 
last  prisoners  were  released  on  June  12. 
The  terms  included  incorporation  of  the 
bandits  into  the  Chinese  military  forces, 
with  guaranteed  pay  of  3  years.  An 
American,  Roy  Anderson,  assisted  in  ar- 
ranging the  release  of  prisoners.  Others 
taking  part  in  the  negotiations  were 
American  diplomatic  officials,  officials  of 
the  Chinese  Government,  and  members 
of  the  diplomatic  corps  in  Peking.  This 
case  further  revealed  the  weakness  of 
the  central  government  and  resulted  in 
demands  on  the  part  of  the  foreign 
powers  for  an  agreement  on  compensa- 
tion, guarantees,  and  sanctions. 

China,  1932 

Bandits  described  as  "Communists"  kid- 
napped an  American  riverboat  master 
on  the  Yangtze,  in  Hupeh  Province,  on 
January  16, 1932.  He  was  released  on 
May  31  after  ransom  was  paid.  A  British 
subject  conducted  the  negotiations;  pay- 
ment was  made  in  cash  and  American 
wheat  from  famine-relief  supplies  of  the 
National  Flood  Relief  Commission, 
China.  The  Department  of  State  favored 
payment  of  ransom  by  the  Chinese 
Government  as  the  best  means  of  effect- 
ing prompt  and  safe  release. 

Germany,  World  War  II 

The  Germans  resorted  to  the  practice  of 
keeping  hostages  to  prevent  and  punish 
any  form  of  civil  disorder  during  World 
War  II.  Gen.  Keitel  on  September  16, 
1941,  for  example,  spoke  in  terms  of  50 
or  100  lives  from  the  occupied  areas  of 
the  Soviet  Union  for  one  German  life 
taken.  The  Germans  also  had  a  general 
"scheme  of  terror  and  intimidation";  it 
included  orders  for  the  execution  of  100 
"hostages"  in  retaliation  for  each  Ger- 
man soldier  killed,  50  "hostages"  for 
each  German  soldier  wounded,  10  "hos- 
tages" for  each  person  under  German 
protection  wounded,  and  up  to  100  "hos- 
tages" in  retaliation  for  each  attack  upon 
any  "object"  under  German  protections. 
These  acts  were  in  violation  of  interna- 
tional conventions,  including  The  Hague 
regulations  of  1907. 

A  Keitel  order  of  September  28, 
1941,  stated  that  "because  of  the  attacks 
on  members  of  the  armed  forces,  which 
have  taken  place  lately  in  the  occupied 
territories,  it  is  pointed  out  that  it  is  op- 
portune for  military  commanders  always 
to  have  at  their  disposal  a  number  of 
hostages  of  different  political  persuasion 


' 


. . .  among  these  there  should  be  leading 
personalities  or  members  of  the  families 
of  leading  personalities."  He  said  that 
their  names  should  be  published  and 
that,  in  case  of  attack,  hostages  cor- 
responding to  the  culprit  were  to  be 
shot. 

Another  example  is  Gen.  Boehme's 
order  of  October  10, 1941,  which 
directed  the  shooting  of  50  and  100 
prisoners  or  hostages  for  each  German 
or  ethnic  German  soldier  wounded  or 
killed  in  Serbia  and  provided  that  these 
orders  should  be  carried  out  in  the  most 
severe  form  in  order  to  suppress  Ser- 
bian resistance  ruthlessly. 

Britain,  Vichy  France,  and  Brazil, 
World  War  II 

The  British  in  Syria  held  six  French  civil 
servants  loyal  to  Vichy  as  hostages  for 
the  return  of  GauUists  captured  by  the 
French.  Vichy  responded  by  holding  as 
hostages  14  British  subjects  at  Valles- 
Bains.  After  negotiations,  both  groups 
of  hostages  were  released. 

To  safeguard  Brazilians  who,  with 
Americans  and  others,  were  being  held 
at  Compiegne,  Brazil  seized  as  hostages 
the  German  nationals  aboard  two  repa- 
triation ships  then  in  a  Brazilian  harbor. 

Cuba,  1958 

On  orders  from  Raul  Castro,  brother  of 
Fidel  Castro,  Cuban  rebels  in  June  1958 
kidnapped  50  persons  (43  Americans  and 
7  others).  Raul  Castro  demanded,  as  con- 
ditions for  their  release,  that,  among 
other  things,  the  United  States  make  no 
more  arms  shipments  to  Cuba  and  give 
assurances  that  the  naval  base  at  Guan- 
tanamo  Bay  would  not  be  used  for  sup- 
plying fuel  or  arms.  The  United  States 
replied,  publicly  and  through  Derek 
Wellam  ( American  consul  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba  who  had  established  contact  with 
Raul  Castro),  that  its  decision  of  March 
1958  not  to  ship  arms  to  Cuba  was  un- 
changed and  that  the  Guantanamo  Base 
was  not  being  used  to  supply  fuel  or 
arms.  Meanwhile,  the  first  of  the  prison- 
ers had  been  released. 

Raul  Castro  tried  to  delay  releasing 
the  remainder  of  the  prisoners  until  he 
had  received  further  public  assurances 
from  the  United  States.  After  a  further 
meeting  between  Wellam  and  Raul 
Castro,  the  remaining  prisoners  were 
released;  all  were  returned  by  July  16. 
It  was  subsequently  confirmed  that  Raul 
Castro  had  seized  the  Americans  with- 
out the  knowledge  of  Fidel  Castro,  who 
probably  was  responsible  for  allowing 
the  prisoners  to  be  returned  without 
pressing  the  rebel  demands. 


Bolivia,  1963 


ilor^ 


On  December  7, 1963,  Bolivian  tin 
miners,  who  were  antagonists  of  the 
Bolivian  Government,  seized  four  Amer 
leans  and  other  foreigners  as  hostages!: 
an  attempt  to  obtain  the  release  of  im- 
prisoned union  leaders.  The  lives  of  thei 
captives  were  in  danger  for  several        ^^ 
days.  Bolivian  troops  ringed  their  place-  J" 
of  detention  while  U.S.  officials  vainly 
offered  their  assistance  to  the  Bolivian 
Government.  The  captives  finally  were  , 
freed  after  9  days,  primarily  through  tbf™ 
efforts  of  Bolivian  Vice  President  Juan 
Lechin. 


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Brazil,  1970 

On  March  11, 1970,  members  of  the 
Popular  Revolutionary  Vanguard  kid- 
napped the  Japanese  Consul  General, 
Nobuo  Okuchi.  He  was  released  4  days 
later,  after  the  Brazilian  Government 
agreed  to  release  five  political  prisoner.'*"" 
and  fly  them  to  Mexico.  ^ 

On  June  11, 1970,  the  Popular  Rev( 
lutionary  Vanguard  ( PRV)  kidnapped 
West  German  Ambassador  Ehrenfried 
von  HoUeben.  A  Brazilian  security 
guard  was  killed  and  two  other  persons 
were  wounded.  Von  HoUeben's  captors 
demanded  the  release  of  40  political 
prisoners  and  an  end  to  torture.  He  was 
released  on  June  16,  after  the  Brazilian 
Government  flew  the  political  prisoner: 
to  Algeria  and  published  the  text  of  a 
revolutionary  manifesto  prepared  by  tl 
PRV.  In  April  1972  a  military  court  sen 
tenced  nine  persons  to  life  imprisonmei 
for  their  involvement  in  the  kidnapping 

On  December  7, 1970,  members  of 
the  National  Liberation  Alliance  ( ALNI 
kidnapped  the  Swiss  Ambassador, 
Giovanni  Enrico  Bucher,  and  mortally 
wounded  his  bodyguard.  The  ALN  de- 
manded the  release  of  70  political  pris- 
oners and,  after  the  prisoners  were 
sent  to  Chile,  released  Bucher  on  Jan- 
uary 14, 1971.  In  August  1972,  three 
persons  were  sentenced  to  life  imprison 
ment  for  involvement  in  this  episode. 

Dominican  Republic,  1970 

0 n  March  24, 1970,  terrorists  kidnappe( 
Lt.  Col.  Donald  J.  Crowley,  the  U.S.  Aii 
Attache.  He  was  released  2  days  later, 
after  the  Dominican  Government  freed 
20  political  prisoners  and  flew  them  to 
Mexico. 

Guatemala,  1970 

On  March  6, 1970,  members  of  the  Rebe 
Armed  Forces  (FAR)  kidnapped  the  U.' 


rtrr-,e.nt  .~,f  Qtato  Rllllftt' 


Terrorism 


.  bor  Attache,  Sean  M.  Holly.  He  was 
rieased  2  days  later  after  the  govern- 
i^nt  freed  three  political  prisoners. 

On  March  31,  the  FAR  kidnapped 
'=st  German  Ambassador  Count  Karl 
n  Spreti  and  demanded  the  release  of 
political  prisoners.  They  later  in- 
■ased  their  demands  to  22  prisoners 
ad  a  ransom  of  $700,000.  The  govern- 
nnt  declined  to  release  prisoners  who 
hd  already  been  convicted  and  sen- 
tiiced,  and  von  Spreti  was  killed  on 
A  ril  5.  West  German  Chancellor  Willy 
Bandt  blamed  the  Guatemalan  Govern- 
nnt  for  not  providing  adequate  secu- 
^v  to  foreign  diplomats.  He  indicated 
t  his  government  would  have  been 
w  ling  to  pay  the  ransom.  Most  West 
Grman  diplomatic  personnel  in  Guate- 
rr  la  were  recalled. 

1  dan,  1970 

mbers  of  the  Popular  Front  for  the 
^  eration  of  Palestine  ( PFLP)  captured 
U  rris  Draper,  head  of  the  Political  Sec- 
Ciiof  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Jordan,  on 
J  le  7, 1970.  His  captors  reportedly 
d'  nanded  the  release  of  comrades  who 
h,  been  captured  by  the  Jordanian 
A  ny  the  day  before.  Draper  was 
n  !ased  after  22  hours.  Maj.  Robert 
P  ry,  a  U.S.  military  attache,  was 
k:  ed  in  a  separate  incident. 

The  PFLP  also  seized  60  hostages, 
.r  uding  American,  British,  Canadian, 
ai  West  German  citizens  at  the  Inter- 
C  itinental  and  Philadelphia  Hotels  in 
A  man,  to  protest  the  bombardment  of 
P  estinian  refugee  camps  by  the  Jorda- 
nii  Army.  The  hostages  were  released 
01  fune  12,  the  day  after  a  cease-fire  was 
ai  inged  in  Amman  between  the  Jorda- 
nii  Army  and  the  Palestinian  guerril- 
la The  hostages  then  joined  500  for- 
eiiers  who  were  evacuated  to  Beirut  in 
iiiirlift  organized  by  the  International 
C  nmittee  of  the  Red  Cross. 

3i  in,  1970 

Wst  German  Honorary  Consul  Eugen 
3ihl  was  kidnapped  on  December  1, 
LiO,  near  San  Sebastian  by  members  of 
'  Basque  separatist  organization, 
\.  His  captors  demanded  the  release 
1!  ETA  members  imprisoned  in 
in,  including  16  Basque  separatists 
*»  were  on  trial  in  Burgos  for  killing  a 
"  ce  chief.  Beihl  was  freed  on  Christ- 
i  day,  but  six  separatists  received 
"th  sentences,  nine  more  were  sen- 
■*ced  to  terms  of  12-70  years'  im- 
'  ^onment,  and  only  one  was  acquitted, 
death  sentences  were  commuted  to 
I  ears'  imprisonment. 


Uruguay,  1970 

AID  official  Dan  A.  Mitrione  was  kid- 
napped on  July  31, 1970,  by  Tupamaro 
guerrillas  who  demanded  the  release  of 
all  political  prisoners  in  Uruguay.  The 
government  refused  to  negotiate,  and 
Mitrione  was  found  dead  in  Montevideo 
on  August  10. 

Brazilian  Consul  Aloysio  Dias  Go- 
mide  was  also  kidnapped  on  July  31.  He 
was  released  on  February  21, 1971,  after 
his  wife  paid  a  ransom  of  at  least 
$250,000. 

On  August  7,  Claude  L.  Fly,  an 
AID  agricultural  expert,  was  kidnapped 
by  Tupamaros.  The  Uruguayan  Govern- 
ment refused  demands  to  publish  the 
text  of  a  revolutionary  manifesto,  but 
Fly  was  released  March  2, 1971,  after 
suffering  a  heart  attack. 

Sweden,  1971 

On  February  10, 1971,  two  Croatian 
emigres  seized  the  Yugoslav  consulate 
in  Goteborg,  took  three  staff  members 
hostage,  and  demanded  the  release  of  a 
Croatian  terrorist  imprisoned  in  Yugo- 
slavia. The  Yugoslav  Government  re- 
fused to  meet  their  demands,  and  the 
terrorists  surrendered  the  next  day  to 
Swedish  authorities.  They  were  tried 
and  sentenced  to  3'/2  years  imprisonment, 
but  on  September  16, 1972,  they  were 
released  and  flown  to  Madrid  after  three 
Croatians  hijacked  a  Scandinavian  air- 
liner and  demanded  their  freedom,  along 
with  the  release  of  five  Croatians  in- 
volved in  the  assassination  of  the 
Yugoslav  Ambassador  on  April  7, 1971. 

Uruguay,  1971 

On  January  8, 1971,  Tupamaros  kid- 
napped British  Ambassador  Geoffrey 
Jackson  in  Montevideo.  The  Uruguayan 
Government  refused  to  negotiate  and  in- 
tensified its  campaign  against  terrorists. 
Jackson  was  released  on  September  8 
after  106  Tupamaros  had  escaped  from 
prison  2  days  earlier. 

Algeria,  1972 

On  October  6, 1972,  Palestinian  students 
invaded  the  West  German  consulate  in 
Algiers  and  demanded  that  West  Ger- 
many release  three  participants  in  the 
massacre  of  Israeli  athletes  at  the  Mu- 
nich Olympics.  The  students  left  the  con- 
sulate and  freed  their  hostages  an  hour 
later. 

Thailand,  1972 

On  December  28, 1972,  four  members  of 
"Black  September"  seized  the  Israeli 


Embassy  in  Bangkok  and  took  12  hos- 
tages, one  of  whom  was  the  Israeli  Am- 
bassador to  Cambodia.  They  demanded 
the  release  of  36  terrorists  imprisoned 
in  Israel.  The  Israeli  Government  did 
not  comply,  but  Thai  authorities  and  the 
Egyptian  Ambassador  persuaded  the 
terrorists,  after  18  hours,  to  free  their 
hostages  in  return  for  safe  conduct  to 
Cairo. 

Cuba.  1973 

On  October  15, 1973,  an  anti-Castro 
Cuban  kidnapped  the  Belgian  Ambas- 
sador while  both  were  visiting  the 
French  Embassy  in  Havana.  The  French 
Ambassador  voluntarily  joined  his  col- 
league. The  Cuban  Government  rejected 
the  gunman's  demand  that  he  be  allowed 
to  leave  Cuba.  Security  forces  entered 
the  Embassy,  killed  him,  and  freed  the 
two  Ambassadors. 

France,  1973 

On  September  5, 1973,  five  Palestinians 
seized  the  Saudi  Embassy  in  Paris,  took 
13  hostages,  and  demanded  that  Jordan 
release  imprisoned  AI  Fatah  leader 
Abu  Daoud.  The  Jordanian  Government 
did  not  meet  this  demand,  and  the  ter- 
rorists were  allowed  to  leave  France 
with  four  of  their  hostages.  They  sur- 
rendered to  authorities  and  released 
their  hostages  in  Kuwait  on  September 
8,  after  stops  in  Cairo,  Kuwait,  and 
Saudi  Arabia.  In  October  the  terrorists 
were  allowed  to  go  to  Syria. 

Haiti,  1973 

On  January  23, 1973,  three  Haitians  kid- 
napped U.S.  Ambassador  Clinton  E. 
Knox.  Their  initial  demands  were  for  the 
release  of  31  political  prisoners  and  a 
$500,000  ransom.  Consul  General  Ward 
L.  Christensen  voluntarily  joined  Knox 
in  captivity  during  the  negotiations.  The 
next  day  the  terrorists  reduced  their 
demands  to  the  release  of  16  political 
prisoners,  a  ransom  of  $70,000,  and  safe 
conduct  to  Mexico.  Knox  and  Christen- 
sen were  released  after  the  Haitian 
Government  met  the  reduced  demands. 
The  terrorists  and  the  released  pris- 
oners, accompanied  by  the  Mexican 
Ambassador,  were  flown  to  Mexico, 
where  the  ransom  money  was  taken 
from  them  and  returned  to  Haiti.  Mexico 
refused  to  accept  the  political  prisoners, 
who  then  proceeded  to  Chile. 

Mexico,  1973 

Members  of  the  Peoples  Revolutionary 
Armed  Forces  kidnapped  Terrence  G. 


Mdchigsi 


25 


Terrorism 


Leonhardy,  the  American  consul  general 
in  Guadalajara,  on  May  4, 1973.  They 
demanded  freedom  for  30  political  pris- 
oners, passage  to  Cuba,  publication  of  a 
communique,  and  suspension  of  a  police 
search  for  them.  Leonhardy  was  freed 
on  May  7  after  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment met  the  demands.  Five  persons 
were  later  arrested  in  connection  with 
the  case. 

Sudan,  1973 

On  March  1, 1973,  eight  members  of  the 
Palestinian  terrorist  group  "Black  Sep- 
tember" seized  the  Saudi  Embassy  in 
Khartoum  during  a  farewell  reception 
for  American  charge  d'affaires  George 
Curtis  Moore.  They  took  10  hostages,  in- 
cluding Moore,  incoming  U.S.  Ambas- 
sador Cleo  A.  Noel,  Jr.,  the  Saudi  Am- 
bassador and  his  family,  and  the  Belgian 
and  Jordanian  charges.  They  demanded 
the  release  of  Al  Fatah  leader  Abu 
Daoud,  other  Palestinians  held  by  Jor- 
dan and  Israel,  Sirhan  Sirhan,  and  mem- 
bers of  the  Baader-Meinhof  gang  im- 
prisoned in  Germany.  All  the  hostages 
except  Noel,  Moore,  and  the  Belgian 
charge,  Guy  Eid,  were  released,  and  the 
terrorists  reduced  their  demands  to  the 
release  of  Abu  Daoud  and  16  Palestin- 
ians held  by  Jordan.  The  Government 
of  Sudan  refused  to  negotiate,  and  all 
the  remaining  hostages  were  killed.  The 
terrorists  surrendered  on  March  6. 

President  Nimeiri  denounced  the 
incident  as  "a  criminal  act  devoid  of  any 
reason  or  bravery,"  and  the  Sudanese 
Government  banned  further  operations 
by  Palestinian  organizations.  The  trial 
of  the  terrorists  began  on  June  1, 1974. 
They  were  convicted  on  June  24  and 
sentenced  to  life  imprisonment,  but 
President  Nimeiri  commuted  their  sen- 
tences to  7  years  and  released  them  to 
the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
the  next  day.  The  terrorists  were  then 
flown  to  Cairo,  where  Egyptian  author- 
ities imprisoned  them. 

United  Kingdom,  1973 

On  February  20. 1973,  three  Pakistanis 
invaded  the  Indian  High  Commission 
Office  in  London  and  took  several  mem- 
bers of  the  staff  as  hostages.  They  de- 
manded the  release  of  Pakistani  pris- 
oners of  war  held  by  India.  British  police 
killed  two  of  the  terrorists  and  captured 
the  third. 

Venezuela,  1973 

Red  Flag  guerrillas  kidnapped  West 
German  Honorary  Consul  Kurt  Nagel  in 


Maracaibo  on  November  20, 1973.  Before 
his  captors  could  make  any  demands, 
Nagel  was  freed  and  two  guerrillas  were 
captured  in  a  clash  with  four  farmers  on 
November  22. 

Argentina,  1974 

Members  of  the  Peoples'  Revolutionary 
Army  ( ERP)  kidnapped  USIA  Director 
Alfred  A.  Laun  in  Cordoba  on  April  12, 
1974.  Laun,  who  was  wounded  when  cap- 
tured, was  released  several  hours  later. 

Dominican  Republic,  1974 

On  September  27, 1974,  members  of  the 
January  12  Liberation  Movement  kid- 
napped USIA  Director  Barbara  Hutchi- 
son and  then  seized  the  Venezuelan  con- 
sulate in  Santo  Domingo,  capturing  the 
consul,  the  vice  consul,  a  Spanish  priest, 
and  four  local  employees.  The  terrorists 
demanded  the  release  of  38  political  pris- 
oners and  a  ransom  of  $1  million.  When 
they  demanded  the  release  of  32  more 
prisoners,  10  of  the  prisoners  joined 
most  of  the  Dominican  left  in  condemn- 
ing the  affair.  The  Dominican  Govern- 
ment refused  to  comply  with  the  ter- 
rorists' demands,  and  the  hostages  were 
freed  on  October  9  in  return  for  safe 
conduct  to  Panama. 

Kuwait,  1974 

On  February  6, 1974,  five  members  of 
the  Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of 
Palestine  ( PFLP)  seized  the  Japanese 
Embassy  and  took  12  hostages,  includ- 
ing the  Ambassador.  They  demanded 
that  Japan  arrange  to  fly  two  of  their 
comrades  and  two  members  of  the  Japa- 
nese Red  Army  to  Kuwait  from  Sing- 
apore, where  they  were  imprisoned. 
Japan  complied,  the  hostages  were 
freed,  and  the  terrorists  were  granted 
safe  passage  to  South  Yemen. 

Mexico,  1974 

Members  of  the  Peoples'  Liberation 
Army  kidnapped  American  vice  consul 
John  Patterson  near  Hermosillo  on 
March  22.  They  demanded  a  ransom  of 
$500,000.  Mrs.  Patterson  claimed  that 
all  attempts  she  made  to  deliver  the  ran- 
som were  unsuccessful.  Patterson  was 
found  dead  in  the  desert  on  July  8. 

On  December  5, 1974,  a  lone  gun- 
man, claiming  to  be  a  member  of  the 
"September  23"  guerrilla  group,  seized 
two  diplomats  at  the  French  Embassy 
and  demanded  political  asylum  and 
passage  to  France.  Mexican  authorities 
agreed  to  meet  his  demands  after  4 
hours  but  arrested  the  gunman  at  the 
airport. 


The  Netherlands,  1974 

On  September  13, 1974,  four  members 
of  the  Japanese  Red  Army  seized  the 
French  Embassy  in  The  Hague  and  tool 
11  hostages,  including  the  French  Am- 
bassador, Jacques  Senard.  They  de- 
manded a  ransom  of  $1  million,  an  air- 
craft, and  the  release  of  a  comrade  im- 
prisoned in  France.  The  French  and 
Dutch  Governments  met  most  of  their 
demands;  all  hostages  were  released 
on  September  16  and  17,  and  all  four 
terrorists  were  flown  to  Syria. 

United  States,  1974 

On  November  18, 1974,  a  lone  gunman 
entered  the  Philippine  Embassy,  woun 
ed  a  staff  member,  and  held  the  Am- 
bassador hostage.  He  demanded  thatti 
Philippine  Government  allow  his  son  tc 
join  him  in  the  United  States.  His  de- 
mand was  met,  after  which  he  freed  the 
Ambassador  and  surrendered. 

Argentina,  1975 

On  February  26, 1975,  Montoneros  gue 
rillas  kidnapped  John  P.  Egan,  a  retire 
businessman  serving  as  the  American 
Honorary  Consul  in  Cordoba.  They  de- 
manded that  4  captured  guerrillas  be 
shown  on  national  television  or  else 
Egan  would  be  killed.  Egan  was  found 
dead  the  next  day. 

Austria,  1975 

On  December  21, 1975,  six  pro-Palestii 
ian  guerrillas  attacked  the  OPEC  Con- 
ference in  Vienna,  killing  three  person 
wounding  seven  others,  and  taking  81 
hostages.  The  hostages  included  11 
OPEC  oil  ministers,  among  them  Saud 
Arabia's  Sheik  Ahmed  Zaki  Yamani. 
The  terrorists  reportedly  were  two 
Palestinians,  one  Lebanese,  two  West 
Germans,  and  a  Venezuelan,  allegedly 
Ilich  Ramirez  Sanchez,  also  known  as 
"Carlos  Martinez."  Their  communique 
denounced  Iran  as  an  "imperialist  tool'  | 
called  Egyptian  President  Sadat  a  "lea 
ing  traitor"  for  signing  the  Sinai  aceon . 
with  Israel;  praised  Iraq,  Syria,  and  th 
Palestinians  as  "progressives";  and  de , 
manded  that  the  Arab  people  have  full 
sovereignty  over  their  oil  resources. 

Austrian  Chancellor  Kreisky  and  ' 
Algerian  Foreign  Minister  Bouteflika  | 
negotiated  an  agreement  granting  the 
terrorists  safe  conduct  to  Algeria  in 
return  for  the  release  of  41  Austrian  h( 
tages  and  a  declaration  by  the  other  ho 
tages  stating  that  they  were  voluntaril 
accompanying  the  terrorists.  The  ter- 
rorists left  Vienna  aboard  an  Austrian 


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Terrorism 


iner  on  December  22  and  released 
remaining  hostages  in  Algiers  and 

poli  before  surrendering  to  Algerian 

ihorities  on  December  23. 

*aysia,  1975 

)iAugust  4, 1975,  five  members  of  the 
aanese  Red  Army  seized  the  consular 
e;ions  of  the  American  and  Swedish 
'ibassies  in  Kuala  Lumpur  and  took 

ostages,  including  the  Swedish 
.irge  d'  affaires  and  the  American  con- 
uRobert  S.  Stebbins.  The  hostages 

e  freed  after  Japan  agreed  to  release 

other  members  of  the  Red  Army. 

10  departed  for  Libya  on  August  8. 

ri  Netherlands,  1975 

»i3ecember  4, 1975,  six  South  Moluc- 
a:;  seized  the  Indonesian  consulate  in 
viiterdam,  taking  47  hostages.  They 
e  anded  independence  for  the  South 

jccan  Islands.  Another  group,  which 
a  seized  a  passenger  train  2  days 

.^aiier,  also  demanded  that  the  Dutch 
■oernment  free  five  Moluccans,  rec- 

;  «f  ze  a  Moluccan  government  in  exile, 
1  provide  safe  conduct  to  an  undis- 

d  destination.  The  Dutch  Govern- 
•  t  rejected  all  these  demands.  The 
!  iccans  holding  the  train  surren- 

le:  d  on  December  12,  and  those  in  the 
11  ulate  did  so  on  December  18. 

pn,  1975 

in  eptember  15, 1975,  four  Arab  ter- 
■01  ts  seized  the  Egyptian  Embassy 
im  threatened  to  kill  the  Ambassador 
in»;wo  aides  unless  Egypt  renounced 
n«;inai  agreement  with  Israel.  The 
'^Dassadors  of  Iraq,  Kuwait,  Algeria, 
ntfordan  negotiated  with  the  terror- 
stiind  joined  the  Egyptian  Ambas- 
n  r  in  signing  a  document  denouncing 
liigreement.  (The  Egyptian  Govern- 
tie;  later  dismissed  this  statement  as 
■  orthless  piece  of  paper.")  The  ter- 
ts,  accompanied  by  the  Iraqi  and 
ij  rian  Ambassadors,  flew  to  Algiers 
n  ;ptember  16  and  released  their  hos- 
es there. 

en,  1975 

1  pril  24, 1975,  six  West  German 
•(»als  seized  the  West  German  Em- 
>'  in  Stockholm,  taking  12  hostages, 
ding  Ambassador  Dietrich 
■ker.  The  military  attache,  Lt.  Col. 
eas  von  Mirbach,  was  killed  by  the 
irists  when  Swedish  police  tried  to 
•  the  building.  The  terrorists  de- 
led $20,000  and  the  release  of  26 
ades  imprisoned  in  West  Germany. 


Although  the  West  German  Govern- 
ment had  freed  five  terrorists  earlier  in 
the  year  after  the  kidnapping  of  a  West 
Berlin  mayoral  candidate,  Peter  Lorenz, 
this  time  it  refused  to  meet  the  terror- 
ists' demands. 

The  terrorists  then  threatened  to 
kill  a  hostage  every  hour  until  their  de- 
mands were  met,  and  economic  attache 
Heinz  Hillegaart  was  the  first  to  die.  An 
explosion  took  place  in  the  Embassy  just 
before  midnight,  killing  one  terrorist. 
The  Swedish  police  captured  others  as 
they  fled  the  building.  The  Swedish 
Government  extradited  all  five  terror- 
ists to  West  Germany.  One  died  of  in- 
juries received  in  the  explosion,  the 
other  four  were  tried  in  Duesseldorf  be- 
tween May  6, 1976,  and  July  20, 1977. 
They  were  convicted  and  sentenced  to 
two  terms  of  life  imprisonment. 

Tanzania,  1975 

On  May  19, 1975,  members  of  the  Zaire 
People's  Revolution  Party  (PRP)  kid- 
napped a  Dutch  student  and  three 
American  students  from  Stanford  Uni- 
versity from  Gombe  Stream  Research 
Center  in  Tanzania.  One  student  was 
released  on  May  26  to  deliver  the  PRP's 
demand  for  $500,000,  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  the  release  of  two  comrades 
held  in  Tanzania.  The  Tanzanian  Gov- 
ernment refused  to  meet  the  terrorists' 
demands,  and  efforts  by  American  dip- 
lomats and  the  families  of  the  hostages 
to  contact  them  were  unsuccessful.  Two 
hostages  were  released  on  June  28  and 
the  last  on  July  27  after  their  families 
and  Stanford  University  reportedly  paid 
a  ransom  of  $40,000. 

Italy.  1976 

On  October  11, 1976,  three  Palestinians 
seized  the  Syrian  Embassy  and  took 
five  hostages  to  protest  the  Syrian 
intervention  in  Lebanon.  They  surren- 
dered to  Italian  authorities  2  hours  later. 

Brazil,  1978 

On  May  24, 1978,  a  lone  gunman  entered 
the  Mexican  consulate  in  Recife,  where 
he  captured  the  honorary  consul  and 
four  other  persons.  He  demanded  safe 
passage  to  Cuba,  Mexico,  Sweden,  or 
Eastern  Europe.  He  released  the  hos- 
tages when  he  believed  his  demands 
would  be  met  and  was  then  placed  under 
arrest. 

France,  1978 

On  July  31, 1978,  two  Arab  terrorists 
seized  the  Iraqi  Embassy  in  Paris.  One 
terrorist  fled,  but  the  other  took  nine 


hostages  and  demanded  that  Britain  re- 
lease an  Arab  woman  who  had  tried  to 
kill  the  Iraqi  Ambassador  there.  After 
8  hours  of  negotiation,  the  lone  terrorist 
surrendered  to  French  police  and  freed 
the  hostages.  Iraqi  security  guards  then 
opened  fire,  wounding  him  and  killing  a 
policeman.  The  French  police  returned 
the  fire,  killing  one  Iraqi  and  wounding 
three  others. 

United  States,  1978 

Two  Puerto  Ricans  occupied  the  Chilean 
consulate  in  San  Juan  on  July  3, 1978. 
They  took  four  hostages,  including  the 
consul,  and  demanded  the  release  of  four 
Puerto  Ricans  who  had  been  imprisoned 
for  the  1950  attempt  to  assassinate  Pres- 
ident Truman  and  the  1954  attack  on 
the  House  of  Representatives.  The  two 
surrendered  and  released  their  hostages 
after  17  hours  of  negotiations. 

On  August  17,  two  Croatians  seized 
eight  hostages  in  the  West  German  con- 
sulate in  Chicago  and  demanded  that 
West  Germany  release  a  Croatian  im- 
prisoned in  Cologne.  After  10  hours  of 
negotiations,  the  Croatians  released 
their  hostages  and  surrendered. 

Afghanistan,  1979 

On  February  14, 1979,  four  Afghans  kid- 
napped U.S.  Ambassador  Adolph  Dubs 
in  Kabul  and  demanded  the  release  of 
various  "religious  figures"  held  by  the 
Afghan  Government.  Dubs  was  killed 
when  Afghan  police  stormed  the  hotel 
room  where  he  was  being  held.  The  U.S. 
Government  protested  to  the  Afghan 
Government  for  not  having  tried  to 
secure  Dubs'  release  peacefully  and 
drastically  reduced  its  foreign  aid  pro- 
grams there.  As  of  early  1981,  no  Am- 
bassador has  been  appointed  to  replace 
Dubs. 

El  Salvador,  1979 

0  n  January  16, 1979, 30  members  of  the 
United  Popular  Action  Front  seized  the 
Mexican  Embassy  and  the  offices  of  the 
OAS  and  the  Red  Cross,  taking  between 
120  and  156  hostages.  They  demanded 
freedom  for  all  political  prisoners  in  El 
Salvador  but  settled  for  safe  passage  to 
Mexico  after  2  days  of  negotiations. 
On  January  17  members  of  the 
Armed  Forces  of  National  Resistance 
(FARN)  kidnapped  Ernesto  Liebes,  a 
local  businessman  serving  as  Israel's 
honorary  consul.  They  demanded  that 
the  government  release  five  "missing 
persons,"  publish  a  revolutionary  mani- 
festo, and  pay  a  substantial  ransom.  The 


;h1981 


27 


Terrorism 


W 


Salvadorean  Government  released  22 
political  prisoners  on  March  21,  but 
Liebes  was  found  dead  the  next  day. 

FARN  had  also  kidnapped  six  for- 
eign businessmen  during  November  and 
December  of  1978.  A  Japanese  was 
killed,  but  the  others  were  released 
after  their  employers  paid  substantial 
ransoms. 

On  May  4  members  of  the  Popular 
Revolutionary  Bloc  (BRP)  seized  the 
Costa  Rican  and  French  Embassies,  tak- 
ing 11  hostages,  including  both  Ambas- 
sadors, and  demanding  the  release  of 
5  of  their  imprisoned  leaders.  On  May 
8  the  Costa  Rican  Ambassador  and  his 
four  companions  escaped,  and  their  cap- 
tors agreed  to  accept  safe  conduct  to 
Costa  Rica.  The  French  Government 
sent  a  special  envoy  to  help  negotiate 
the  release  of  its  Ambassador  and  his 
five  companions. 

On  May  1 1  the  Salvadoran  Govern- 
ment released  two  BRP  leaders  but 
denied  that  it  held  the  other  three.  Nine 
members  of  the  BRP  then  seized  the 
Venezuelan  Embassy,  capturing  the  Am- 
bassador and  seven  other  persons. 
These  hostages  escaped  on  May  20.  The 
government  then  cut  off  food,  water, 
and  electricity  to  the  Embassy.  Security 
forces  dispersed  a  demonstration  calling 
for  resumption  of  food  supplies  to  the  oc- 
cupants, and  the  government  declared  a 
state  of  siege  on  May  23.  Venezuela 
ordered  the  evacuation  of  its  nationals 
from  El  Salvador.  On  June  1  the  ter- 
rorists at  both  Embassies  freed  their 
hostages  in  return  for  safe  conduct  to 
Panama.  They  were  later  granted 
asylum  in  Cuba. 

Iran,  1979 

0  n  November  4, 1979,  a  mob  of  Iranian 
students  occupied  the  American  Em- 
bassy in  Tehran  and  captured  66  Ameri- 
cans, all  but  2  of  them  Embassy  per- 
sonnel. On  November  7,  the  Iranians 
demanded  the  return  of  the  deposed 
Shah,  who  had  been  admitted  to  the 
United  States  for  medical  treatment,  as 
a  precondition  for  release  of  the 
hostages.  The  United  States  stopped 
delivery  of  military  supplies  ( November 
9),  suspended  imports  of  Iranian  oil 
(November  12),  froze  Iranian  assets 
(November  14),  and  began  to  assemble 
naval  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 

Iran  released  one  woman  and  two 
black  Marine  Security  Guards  on 
November  19,  and  four  women  and  six 
blacks  the  next  day.  The  remaining 
hostages  were  threatened  at  various 
times  with  trial  as  spies.  Six  members  of 
the  Embassy  staff  had  escaped  from  the 


Consular  Section  during  the  takeover 
and  found  shelter  at  the  Canadian  Em- 
bassy. Canada  closed  its  Embassy  on 
January  28, 1980,  and  brought  the  six 
Americans  out  the  next  day. 

Despite  support  from  the  United 
Nations  and  two  favorable  rulings  by  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  the 
United  States  was  unable  to  secure  the 
release  of  the  hostages  until  minutes 
before  President  Carter  left  office  on 
January  20, 1981.  The  United  States 
broke  relations  with  Iran  on  April  7  and 
banned  travel  to  Iran  on  April  20.  An  at- 
tempt to  rescue  the  hostages  failed  on 
April  25,  resulting  in  the  deaths  of  eight 
American  military  personnel.  Secretary 
of  State  Cyrus  Vance  resigned  shortly 
thereafter.  Richard  Queen,  a  consular  of- 
ficer, was  released  on  July  10  due  to  ill 
health. 

Following  the  death  of  the  former 
Shah  on  June  27,  Iran  modified  its  de- 
mands to  include  the  return  of  the 
Shah's  wealth,  cancellation  of  American 
claims  against  Iran,  unfreezing  of  assets, 
and  a  promise  of  noninterference  in 
Iranian  affairs.  On  November  3  the 
Iranian  militants  turned  the  hostages 
over  to  the  government.  Negotiations 
leading  to  the  release  of  the  hostages  be- 
gan in  Algiers  on  November  10. 

Turkey.  1979 

On  July  13, 1979,  four  Palestinian  ter- 
rorists stormed  the  Egyptian  Embassy, 
killing  a  policeman  and  2  security  guards 
and  taking  20  hostages,  including  the 
Egyptian  Ambassador.  They  demand- 
ed that  Egypt  free  two  Palestinians 
and  that  Turkey  break  relations  with 
Egypt,  recognize  Palestine,  and 
grant  them  safe  conduct  to  an  undis- 
closed destination.  One  hostage  was 
freed  during  the  negotiations  and  four 
others  escaped.  The  rest  were  freed 
when  the  terrorists  surrendered  2  days 
later. 

Colombia,  1980 

On  February  27, 1980,  Colombian  ter- 
rorists seized  the  Embassy  of  the 
Dominican  Republic  in  Bogota,  captur- 
ing 30  diplomats  from  17  countries,  in- 
cluding 15  chiefs  of  missions.  Ambas- 
sador Diego  Asencio  was  the  only 
American  among  them.  The  terrorists 
initially  demanded  the  release  of  31 1 
political  prisoners,  a  $50  million  ransom, 
and  government  publication  of  their 
manifesto.  They  gradually  reduced  their 
demands  and  released  all  but  18  of  their 
hostages.  The  remaining  hostages,  in- 


L. 

eluding  Ambassador  Asencio,  were      l|SI 
freed  on  April  27  in  return  for  a  $2.5 

million  ransom  and  passage  to  Cuba. 

Pn'i 

El  Salvador.  1980  "W 

On  January  11, 1980,  50  members  of  tht^,^, 
28  February  Popular  League  seized  tht 
Panamanian  Embassy  and  took  seven 
hostages,  including  the  Ambassadorso 
Panama  and  Costa  Rica.  They  demande 
the  release  of  several  members  of  their 
group  who  had  been  arrested  a  month 
earlier.  The  Salvadorean  Government 
complied,  and  the  hostages  were  re-  ■ 
leased  on  January  14. 

On  February  4,  members  of  the 
Popular  League  seized  the  Spanish  Em 
bassy  and  took  11  hostages,  including 
the  Ambassador.  They  demanded  that 
five  political  prisoners  be  released  and 
that  Spain  break  relations  with  El 
Salvador.  They  gradually  released  the!  ^.^, 
hostages  freeing  the  last  two  Spanish   ^^ 
diplomats  on  February  18,  after  the 
Salvadoran  Government  freed  the  last 
of  the  prisoners  in  question. 

On  February  13,  a  group  of  leftists  J 
briefly  occupied  the  Panamanian  Era-  |,ji] 
bassy,  took  the  Ambassador  and  two  i^j, 
other  persons  hostage,  and  demanded 
the  release  of  political  prisoners.  They  ^^^ 
departed  the  Embassy  after  the  Amba.'|jj 
sador  promised  to  present  their  de-  , 
mands  to  the  Salvadoran  Government 


(lii'i 

ftW 


;iitei 


SCE 


ipli 


pat 


United  Kingdon\.  1980  '^,. 

On  April  30,  six  Iranian  Arabs  seized! 
Iranian  Embassy  in  London,  took  26 
hostages,  and  demanded  that  Iran 
release  91  political  prisoners  and  grant 
more  rights  to  its  Arab  minority.  Five 
hostages  were  released  over  the  next  5 
days.  On  May  5  two  hostages  were  kille 
and  the  remainder  threatened  with  exe 
cution.  A  Special  Air  Services  team 
stormed  the  Embassy,  rescued  the  re- 
maining 19  hostages,  and  killed  five  of  '^. 
the  six  terrorists.  Much  of  the  Embass)[" 
was  destroyed  by  fire. 

Lebanon,  1981 

On  February  6, 1981,  pro-Syrian  ter 
rorists,  calling  themselves  "The  Eagles 
of  the  Revolution,"  kidnapped  Jordania 
charge  d'affaires.  Hisham  Moheissen  in , 
Beirut.  Three  security  guards  were       | 
killed.  The  terrorists  have  threatened! 
kill  Moheissen  unless  seven  defecting 
Syrian  Air  Force  pilots  are  returned, 
two  from  Jordan  and  five  from  Iraq.  A 
February  9  deadline  for  compliance 
passed,  but  Moheissen's  whereabouts 
remain  unknown.  Jordan  has  recalled  it 
Ambassador  to  Syria.  ■ 


Deoartment  of  State  Bullet' 


/ESTERN   HEMISPHERE 


isit  of  Jamaican  Prime  IViinister 


Prime  Minister  Edward  Seaga  of 
aica  made  an  official  visit  to  Wash- 
ton,  D.C.,  January  27-29,  1981,  to 
',t  with  President  Reagan.  Following 
remarks  exchanged  at  a  luncheon  at 
White  House  on  January  28,  and  an 
xhange  of  remarks  at  the  Prime 
f  ister's  departure  on  January  29. 


Iv'CHEON  REMARKS 

V.  28, 1981» 

riident  Reagan 

1  pleasure  for  Nancy  and  me  to  wel- 
■  e  all  of  you  here  today.  It's  an  honor 

eat  significance  to  be  host  to  the 
a  er  of  a  nation  that  is  not  only  a  close 
^rid  and  a  good  neighbor  of  the  United 
es  but,  with  recent  struggles  to  re- 
1 1  free  of  foreign  interference,  is  an 
iration  to  the  world. 
You  are  the  first  head  of  state  to  be 
juest  since  I  have  taken  office,  and 
tells  me  a  great  deal,  because  it 
ks  to  the  bond  between  our  two 
tries.  We  share  the  commitment  of 
people  around  the  world.  We  also 
p  a  personal  bond,  because  we  have 
'  to  office  at  nearly  the  same  mo- 
t  in  history.  We  are  both  faced  with 
lems,  and  we  both  perceive  great 
rtunities  for  our  countries. 
Discussing  some  of  our  natural  con- 
3  during  the  meeting  this  morning 
;  me  even  more  mindful  of  the  mat- 
that  bring  us  together.  The  times  in 
h  we  find  ourselves,  the  world  in 
h  our  countries  and  the  people  exist 
ire  great  courage.  The  trust  given 
ery  free  individual,  and  particularly 
:  u  and  me,  is  to  protect  and  insure 
<■  ur  children  and  our  children's  chil- 
f  liberty. 

It's  a  special  pleasure,  to  welcome  a 
a  ;r  of  such  unique  and  personal  cour- 
^TiThat  courage  and  the  bold  message 
layour  people  sent  the  world  in  elect- 
;  ou  to  lead  them  is  testimony  to  the 
\  r  of  one  man's  dedication  of  the  af- 
i  ition  of  free  people,  a  democracy, 
it  ree  enterprise.  I  pledge  to  you  the 
T*  will,  the  cooperation,  and  the  moral 
(  naterial  assistance  of  the  United 
i  >s  as  you  are  to  meet  the  many 
uenges  you  will  face  in  the  months 
t«  d.  Some  of  these  challenges  will 
r  from  forces  hostile  to  our  shared 


transitions  and  mutual  interests.  I'm 
confident  that  you  will  fulfill  the  trust 
that  is  placed  in  you  by  your  country  and 
embody  the  hope  of  all  free  people,  not 
only  in  the  Caribbean  but  in  this  hemi- 
sphere and  around  the  world. 

Those  here,  today,  who  believe  in 
free  enterprise  have  a  great  opportunity 
to  put  that  belief  into  action.  The  Prime 
Minister  shares  that  belief,  and  his  coun- 
try's greatest  need  is  the  development 
of  business  and  industry  to  provide  a 
sound  private-sector  economic  base  in 
his  country. 

I  would  ask  that  you  join  me  in  a 
toast  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  Jamaica 
and  Mrs.  Seaga  and  to  the  friendship 
and  alliance  that  we've  renewed  here 
today  and  to  the  common  endeavor  to 
preserve  the  peace,  independence,  and 
the  freedom  of  his  country. 

Prime  Minister  Seaga 

It  has  been  a  great  honor  for  my  wife 
and  myself  and  my  delegation  to  have 
been  the  first  invitees  of  your  new  Ad- 
ministration to  Washington  on  an  official 
visit.  This  honor  has,  in  fact,  caused 
some  degree  of  speculation  as  to  why  we 
have  been  selected  as  the  first  of  many. 
And  in  pondering  the  many  possibilities 
as  to  the  reason  for  this  honor  on  my 
country  and  on  ourselves,  I'm  reminded 
of  the  story  of  a  centipede  that  was 
suffering  from  arthritis.  [Laughter] 

The  centipede  decided  to  consult 
with  a  doctor  who  was  a  stork.  The  stork 
made  the  obvious  observation  that  he 
didn't  have  as  much  a  problem  in  arthri- 
tis as  the  centipede  did  because  he  had 
only  two  legs,  and,  therefore,  the  solu- 
tion to  the  problem  was  to  reduce  the 
centipede  to  two  legs.  The  centipede 
considered  this  and  realizing  that 
there  would  be  a  98%  improvement 
immediately—  [Laughter]  —  decided 
that  it  would  be  worthwhile.  But  out  of 
the  caution  of  all  those  creatures  that 
move  slowly,  he  was  prompted  to  ask, 
"Tell  me,  how  are  you  going  to  make  this 
transformation?"  to  which  the  stork 
replies,  "I  don't  know.  That's  policy." 
[Laughter] 

We  don't  know  whether  we  are  here 
for  reasons  of  policy,  but  we  would  like 
to  think  that  there  are  policies  being 
evolved  surrounding  our  presence.  We 


know  that  we,  too,  suffer  from  the  prob- 
lems of  the  centipede.  As  a  nation,  eco- 
nomically and  politically,  we  are  arthrit- 
ic. We  have  inherited  the  malady,  and 
it  is  a  malady  that  is  going  to  take  time 
to  cure.  We  know  that  you  have  poli- 
cies that  can  assist  us  in  curing  them, 
and  if  there  is  one  policy  that  ought  to 
predominate  in  our  thinking  at  this 
stage,  it  is  the  common  outlook  that  we 
have  in  regard  to  how  to  deal  with  the 
difficult  situations. 

I  say  it  here  and  now  that  although 
we  are  your  guests,  we  are  not  guests 
who  are  here  to  take  advantage  of  a 
situation  by  making  enormous  requests 
for  assistance  and  for  aid.  That  is  not  the 
purpose  of  our  visit.  Indeed,  of  the  many 
issues  that  we  are  raising  for  discussion 
between  the  two  Administrations,  aid 
plays  a  very  minor  role.  Our  concept  of 
policy  in  this  matter  is  one  which  directs 
to  the  possibility  of  developing  greater 
flows  in  trade  and  in  finance,  the  flows 
that  will  move  capital  and  technology 
across  the  border  to  the  economic  devel- 
opment and  betterment  and  mutual  bet- 
terment of  our  people.  This  being  our 
policy  outlook,  therefore,  we  hope  that 
our  arthritic  problem  may  have  the  nec- 
essary injections,  which  won't  be  by 


President  and  Mrs.  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
and  Mrs.  Seaga 


11981 


29 


Western  Hemisphere 


surgical  means  but  by  medicinal  doses 
which  will  assist  in  helping  us  to  over- 
come the  problems  we  have  inherited. 

I  would  like  to  think,  also,  that  our 
presence  here  is  not  only  connected  with 
the  question  of  the  transfusions  between 
financial  and  trading  movements  of  capi- 
tal and  goods.  I  would  like  to  think  that 
the  signal  that  has  been  sent  is  a  signal 
of  the  resumption  of  the  great  friendship 
that  used  to  exist  between  the  peoples  of 
Jamaica  and  of  the  United  States. 

That  great  friendship  had  blossomed 
over  many  decades,  cemented  by  bonds 
of  migration,  by  bonds  of  investment, 
and  by  bonds  of  a  commonality  of  inter- 
est among  our  people  which  have 
created  a  degree  of  inseparableness  over 
which  years  we  came  to  look  at  things 
together  in  like  mind  and  in  like  manner. 
Over  the  past  few  years  that  bond  was 
tested,  tested  severely  and,  indeed,  rup- 
tured in  many  instances  when  this  coun- 
try and  its  people  were  being  made  the 
maligned  butt  and  reason  for  the  failures 
of  the  policies  of  the  regime  which  ruled 


in  Jamaica  at  that  time.  We  hope  that 
our  being  selected  as  your  first  visitors 
is  a  sign  and  a  signal  that  we  can  resume 
the  friendship  in  the  strength  of  bonds 
that  we  used  to  know  between  the 
American  and  Jamaican  people. 

And  as  a  token  of  that  resumption,  I 
would  like  to  make  reference  to  a  matter 
of  human  compassion,  something  that 
has  nothing  to  do,  whatsoever,  with  our 
reception  here,  for  which  we  have  had 
the  greatest  expressions  of  warmth  on 
both  sides.  We  are  cognizant  of  the  fact 
that  the  American  people  have  suffered 
through  444  days  of  captivity  of  52  of 
their  citizens  as  hostages  in  Iran.  And  at 
times  you  wondered  who  your  friends 
were.  Well,  some  of  your  friends  were 
sitting  by  and  waiting  for  the  day  when 
they  would  be  able  to  assist  and  to  share 
in  any  manner  in  which  they  could  find 
possible  toward  the  solution  and  toward 
all  the  recovery  programs  that  must  pro- 
ceed after  the  solution. 

On  behalf  of  my  government,  I  have 
the  greatest  pleasure  in  offering,  toward 


Jamaica — A  Profile 


Geography 

Area:  4,411  sq.  mi.  Capital:  Kingston  (pop. 
600,000). 

People 

Population:  2.2  million  (1978  est.).  Annual 
Growth  Rate:  1.4%.  Ethnic  Groups:  African 
(76.3%),  Afro-European  (15.1%),  East  Indian 
and  Afro-East  Indian  (3.4%),  European 
(3.2%).  Chinese  and  Afro-Chinese  (1.2%).  Re- 
ligions: Anglican,  Pentecostal,  and  other  Prot- 
estant; Roman  Catholic.  Languages:  English, 
Creole. 

Government 

Type:  Constitutional  monarchy.  Date  of  In- 
dependence: Aug. 6, 1962.  Constitution: 
Aug.  6, 1962.  Branches:  Executive—  GovernoT 
GeneraKChief  of  State,  represents  Queen  of 
England),  Prime  Minister.  Cabinet.  Legisla- 
tive—hicamersd  Parliament  (21  Senators,  60 
Representatives).  Judicial—  Court  of  Appeal. 
Political  Parties:  People's  National  Party 
(PNP),  Jamaica  Labour  Party  (JLP).  Suf- 
frage: Universal  over  18. 

Economy 

GNP:  $2.4  billion  (1978  est. ).  Real  Growth 
Rate:  1.7%  ( 1978).  Per  Capita  Income: 
$1,143  (1978).  Average  Rate  of  Inflation:  45% 
(1978).  Agriculture:  Producfs— sugar,  bana- 
nas, citrus  fruits,  coffee,  pimento,  allspice. 


coconuts.  Labor  Force— 2S.1%.  Industries: 
Bauxite,  textiles,  processed  foods,  sugar,  rum, 
molasses,  cement,  metal,  paper,  chemical 
products,  tourism.  Trade  (1978):  E'xpor-fs— 
$738  million:  alumina,  bauxite,  sugar,  bananas, 
citrus  fruits  and  products,  rum,  cocoa.  Part- 
ners-U.S.  (37%),  U.K.  (24%).  Canada  (8%), 
Norway  (7.5%),  CARICOM  (6.6%),  U.S.S.R. 
(1.7%).  /»ipo7-(s— $865  million:  machinery, 
transportation  and  electrical  equipment,  food, 
fuels,  fertilizer.  Partners-V.S.  (38%), 
Venezuela  ( 16% ),  U.K.  ( 10.5% ),  Canada 
(5.7%),  Netherlands  Antilles  (5.4%), 
CARICOM  (5%).  Official  Exchange  Rate: 
1.55  Jamaican  dollars  =  US$1.00.  Economic 
Aid  Received:  i7.S.-$160.4  million  (FY 
1962-78).  International  organizations— iSi^.S 
million  (FY  1962-78).  Other  Western  coun- 
mes-$176.6  million  (FY  1969-78). 


Membership  in 
International  Organizations 

U.N.,  GAS,  IBRD,  International  Development 
Bank,  Caribbean  Development  Bank,  Carib- 
bean Common  Market,  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade,  International  Bauxite 
Association. 


Principal  Government  Officials 

Jamaica:  Governor  General— Florizel  Glass- 
pole;  Prime  Minister— Edward  Seaga;  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs— Hugh  Shearer;  Am- 
bassador to  the  U.S.— Keith  Johnson;  United 
States:  Ambassador  to  Jamaica—  Loren  E. 
Lawrence.  ■ 


that  recuperation  and  recovery,  some  i 
our  sunshine,  some  of  our  beaches,  soni 
of  our  climate,  by  offering  1  week's 
private  vacation  to  each  of  the  hostage 
and  their  families  at  any  time  that  thej 
may  wish  to  take  this  up  in  the  course  < 
this  year. 

We  have  had  your  great  friendshi) 
and  your  hospitality.  We  have  had  the 
warmth  of  your  Cabinet  ministers  and 
great  deal  of  cordiality  from  all  with 
whom  we  have  met.  It  has  been  a  de- 
lightful occasion,  and  one  which  we  ho| 
will  set  the  base  for  our  future  relatior 

We  congratulate  you  on  your  mag 
nificent  victory,  and  we  look  forward  t 
your  party  taking  up  the  enormous  tas 
that  it  has  on  its  shoulders  of  world  an 
domestic  leadership  and  responding  tc 
the  cause  of  world  needs,  responding  t 
the  cause  of  domestic  needs  in  a  bal- 
anced manner  which  will  enhance  youi 
victory  as  a  considerable  achievement 
the  American  people. 

We  thank  you  for  the  hospitality 
that  you  have  offered,  and  we  wish  yoi 
the  greatest  success  in  your  regime. 

May  I  ask  you  all  to  rise  and  toast 
President  and  Mrs.  Reagan,  the  Govei 
ment  and  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 


DEPARTURE  REMARKS 

JAN.  29. 1981' 

President  Reagan 

Prime  Minister  Seaga  and  I  have  founi 
today  that  we  have  much  in  common, 
frankly,  because  we  both  came  into  of- 
fice about  the  same  time.  We've  been  i 
changing  stories  about  how  similar  oui 
problems  are,  but  I  also  think  we  shan 
the  view  that  our  peoples  are  also  stro 
enough  to  solve  those  problems.  I  foun 
our  discussions  to  be  very  helpful,  and 
I'm  convinced  that  this  meeting  will  h( 
strengthen  the  ties  of  friendship  be- 
tween Jamaica  and  the  United  States. 
I  told  Prime  Seaga  that  our  count: 
noted  with  great  pride  his  accomplish- 
ments at  his  election.  The  people  of  thi 
United  States  take  great  hope  from 
Prime  Minister  Seaga's  election,  and  I 
am  confident  that  we'll  find  ways  to 
strongly  support  Jamaica.  We  are  unn 
laxed  about  the  status  of  events  in  the 
Caribbean  and  the  instability  being  in- 


30 


Department  of  State  Bulle, 


Western  Hemisphere 


Icted  on  some  countries  in  the  Carib- 
tsa.n  and  in  other  places  in  the  hemi- 
fhere  from  outside. 

His  election  is  a  most  hopeful  event 
«th  which  Americans  can  identify,  and 
la  delighted  to  start  off  my  Presidency 
sth  this  first  visit.  I  can  assure  him  and, 
iileed,  all  countries  that  the  United 
Sites  will  continue  to  respect  peaceful 
p  itical  change,  change  that,  in  this  in- 
31  nee,  offers  great  hope  for  freedom.  I 
»s  impressed  by  the  Prime  Minister's 
slong  commitment  to  rebuilding  the 
J.naican  economy.  I  assured  the  Prime 
lister  that  he  could  count  on  Ameri- 
support  for  his  objectives,  especially 
tiis  efforts  to  expand  his  country's 
ivate  sector. 

We  are  honored  to  have  you  as 
iierica's  first  foreign  visitor  in  our  Ad- 
rtiistration,  and  let  me  express  my  per- 
s(  al  hope  that  the  first  shall  not  be  the 


'  me  Minister  Seaga 

\  are  very  pleased  to  have  been 
It  ored  to  be  the  first  visitor  in  an  of- 
fi(  il  visit  to  the  United  States  under 
yi  r  Administration.  This  signal  has 
ra  ly  interpretations,  but  to  our  minds 
01  of  the  interpretations  which  we 
v  lid  like  to  place  on  it  is  a  new  em- 
al  sis  that  may  be  developing  in  respect 
u).atin  America  and  the  Caribbean. 

We  have  taken  note  of  the  fact  that 
ii  er  the  regime  of  former  President 
Von  there  was  a  foreign  policy  thrust 
m  le  Far  East,  and  that  under  Presi- 
if  t  Carter  there  was  a  foreign  policy 
:h  ist  in  Africa.  We  are  hopeful  that  my 
'it  here  is  a  signal  that  there  will  be  a 
:a  ign  policy  thrust  in  Latin  America 
n  the  Caribbean. 

This  does  not  mean  that  in  making 
e  thrusts  all  responsibilities  in  our 
iiid  are  being  abandoned.  It  simply 
Til  ns  that  new  areas  are  being  ex- 
ili  ed.  And  if  that  is  so,  then  the  policy 
if  Dod  neighbors  once  again  comes  to 
h'front.  And  we  can  promise  that  we 
'i  be  an  effective  part  of  any  program 
f  3od  neighbors,  because  there  is  a 
-Tit  deal  of  commonality  of  interests 
leveen  our  peoples  and  the  objectives 
f  ar  leadership. 

We  have  taken  great  interest  in  the 
ai  er  of  President  Reagan  and  in  his 
!U:ess  and  in  the  timeliness  of  his 
>i«ess  which  has  coincided  with  similar 
•vits  taking  place  in  the  Caribbean 
•  the  last  year.  Six  Caribbean  coun- 
i  have  all  unilaterally  decided  to 
—  indeed,  to  revolt— from  the  left  to 
enter.  This  has  presented  a  timely 


U.S. -Mexico  Terminate 
Fishing  Agreements 


On  December  29, 1980,  the  Government 
of  Mexico  formally  notified  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  of  its  intention 
to  terminate  the  two  fishing  agreements 
currently  in  force  for  the  two  countries. 
The  U.S. -Mexico  bilateral  fisheries 
agreement  signed  on  November  24, 
1976,  will  expire  on  December  29, 1981, 
1  year  after  the  Mexican  notification. 
The  U.S. -Mexico  Governing  Interna- 
tional Fisheries  Agreement  ( GIFA), 
signed  on  August  26, 1977,  will  termi- 
nate on  June  29,  6  months  after  the  Mex- 
ican notification. 

In  1976  both  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  were  on  the  eve  of  enforcing 
200-mile  zones  in  which  each  would  con- 
trol fisheries.  At  that  point,  we  nego- 
tiated the  first  of  two  companion  agree- 
ments designed  to  describe  a  mutually 
beneficial  fisheries  relationship  between 
our  countries.  In  1977  the  second  agree- 
ment was  negotiated.  At  the  time,  it  was 
the  hope  and  expectation  of  both  govern- 
ments that  the  two  fishing  agreements 
would  establish  the  framework  in  which 
a  mutually  beneficial  fisheries  relation- 
ship could  develop.  It  is  now  evident 


that  our  expectations  that  a  positive 
fisheries  relationship  would  result  have 
not  been  realized. 

The  U.S.  Government  regrets  that 
the  Government  of  Mexico  no  longer 
believes  that  these  two  documents  can 
provide  the  framework  for  achieving 
their  objectives.  We  believe  the  ter- 
mination of  the  agreements,  unless  they 
are  replaced  by  a  new  mechanism,  will 
severely  hurt  fishermen  of  both  coun- 
tries, not  only  those  who  now  depend  on 
fishing  for  their  livelihood  but  also  those 
who  looked  to  the  potential  of  the  seas 
off  the  coasts  of  the  two  countries  to 
create  new  opportunities. 

With  specific  reference  to  the  mean- 
ing for  the  United  States  of  the  termina- 
tion of  the  1976  agreement,  the  vessels 
involved  in  these  fisheries  off  the  coast 
of  Mexico  are  small,  individually-owned, 
mostly  older  boats  that  have  a  long  his- 
tory of  small-scale  fishing  off  that  coast. 
After  December  29, 1981,  with  the  ter- 
mination of  this  agreement,  76  small 
U.S.  tuna  vessels  now  permitted  to  fish 
inside  12  miles  of  the  Pacific  coast  of 
Mexico  and  some  50  U.S.  vessels  fishing 


moment  and  one  which  a  new  Adminis- 
tration coming  in  to  Washington  at  that 
time  has  an  opportunity  to  capture  in 
terms  of  a  universality  of  thinking  and  of 
action. 

We  hope  that  we  may  be  a  part  of 
the  development  process  of  this  coun- 
try's interest  in  the  Caribbean  and  that 
you  may  be  a  part  of  our  process  in 
thinking  out  our  own  problems.  In  short, 
this  means  consultations.  It  means  shar- 
ing our  thinking  as  to  what  problems 
will  arise  in  my  country  and  in  the  Carib- 
bean with  you  and  seeking  answers  that 
can  be  effective  and  practical  and  mutu- 
ally of  interest.  It  means  when  your 
problems  are  sticky  that  we  may  be 
available  for  consultation.  It  is  on  the 
basis  of  this  mutuality  that  we  see  a  for- 
ward program;  we  see  a  position  of 
mutual  interest  developing  into  policies 
of  good  neighborliness,  policies  which 
can  help  in  the  rebirth  of  influence  and 
position  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  in  the  spectrum  of  the  world. 

We  have  had  an  excellent  visit,  and 
we  have  had  discussions  with  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  team  which  are  far-reaching 
and  are  of  great  interest.  We  sincerely 
hope  that  in  the  days  to  come  that  these 


will  be  renewed  at  other  levels  in  a  more 
practical  sense.  We  thank  you  for  the 
warm,  cordial  hospitality  that  you  have 
offered  us  and  for  the  sunshine.  It  only 
remains  as  to  whose  credit  the  sunshine 
is  due,  Jamaica's  or  California's. 
[Laughter] 

President  Reagan 

Normally,  I  don't  put  a  postscript  on  a 
tribute  such  as  you've  just  paid,  but  I 
feel  that  all  our  people  should  know  that 
one  of  the  most  gracious  invitations  has 
been  extended  by  the  Prime  Minister. 
Those  whom  we  honored  here  on  the 
lawn  yesterday— our  returned,  freed 
Americans  and  their  families— have 
been  invited,  at  any  time  that  is  suitable 
to  them,  to  come  as  his  guests  on  a  visit 
to  Jamaica.  It  was  a  most  gracious  ges- 
ture, and  I  think  all  Americans  owe  him 
a  thank  you  for  that.  It  will  be  a  private 
vacation  for  them.  They  will  be  his 
guests  only  to  the  extent  that  he  has 
made  it  available. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  2, 
1981.  ■ 


:h  1981 


31 


Western  Hemisphere 


snappers  and  groupers  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  beyond  12  miles  from  the  Mexi- 
can coast  will  no  longer  be  able  to  con- 
tinue these  fisheries. 

Termination  of  the  1977  GIFA  will 
end  the  right  of  Mexico  to  apply  to  fish 
for  U.S.  fisheries  resources  determined 
to  be  in  surplus  of  the  needs  of  U.S. 
fishermen.  Mexican  vessels  have  been 
fishing  pollock  off  Alaska  and  squid  off 
New  England.  Mexican  vessels  do  not 
have  a  long  history  of  fishing  off  the  U.S. 
coasts,  but  in  the  last  few  years  the 
squid  fishery  has  been  especially  suc- 
cessful and  valuable  for  them.  The 
potential  for  fishing  by  Mexico  off  the 
U.S.  coast  is  very  great  because  there 
are  substantial  surpluses  that  the  U.S. 
could  make  available  to  Mexican  fisher- 
men. This,  of  course,  would  be  difficult 
to  justify  without  clearly  reciprocal 
treatment  of  U.S.  fishermen  in  fisheries 
off  Mexico. 

Although  it  has  been  noted  by  the 
Government  of  Mexico  that  the  failure 
to  receive  allocations  of  squid  from  the 
United  States  in  recent  months  was  one 
of  the  major  reasons  for  the  decision  by 
the  Mexican  Government  to  terminate 
the  agreements,  the  United  States  has 
been  willing  to  continue  allocations  of 
squid  to  Mexico.  We  recently  made  this 
clear  to  the  Government  of  Mexico.  The 
United  States,  however,  has  insisted 
that,  in  return,  Mexico  live  up  to  both 
the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  1976  bilateral 
fisheries  agreement. 

In  expressing  its  regret  over  the 
Mexican  decision  and  in  voicing  its  will- 
ingness to  continue  consultations  toward 
a  new  framework  for  a  positive  fisheries 
relationship,  the  United  States  must, 
nonetheless,  express  that  it,  too,  has 
been  disappointed  with  the  results  of  the 
relationship  initiated  with  such  bright 
hopes  in  1976.  For  the  United  States,  the 
fisheries  relationship  has  been  found  not 
only  dissatisfying,  but  frustrating. 

The  U.S.  Government  is  pleased  to 
note  the  willingness  of  the  Mexican 
Government  to  continue  consultations 
on  fisheries  matters  of  mutual  concern 
and  is,  of  course,  prepared  to  engage  in 
such  consultations.  The  United  States 
looks  forward  to  an  indication  of  an  ap- 
propriate moment  for  embarking  upon  a 
new  effort  toward  a  successful  and  mean- 
ingful fisheries  relationship  with  Mexico. 


U.S. -Mexico  Sign  Convention  on 
Recovery  and  Return  of  Stolen 
Vehicles  and  Aircraft 


U.S.  Ambassador  at  Large,  Robert 
Krueger,  and  Mexican  Ambassador  to 
the  United  States,  Hugo  B.  Margain, 
signed  on  January  16, 1981,  a  new  Con- 
vention for  the  Recovery  and  Return  of 
Stolen  or  Embezzled  Vehicles  and  Air- 
craft, which,  when  ratified  by  both  coun- 
tries, will  supersede  a  1936  convention 
on  the  same  subject  matter.  The  new 
convention  is  the  result  of  negotiations 
over  the  last  year  and  a  half  within  the 
Legal  Affairs  Working  Group  of  the 
U.S. -Mexico  Consultative  Mechanism,  a 
bilateral  framework  for  the  discussion 
and  negotiation  of  issues  of  mutual  con- 
cern established  in  early  1977.  Repre- 
sentatives of  both  countries  in  that 
forum  felt  that  the  1936  convention  was 
no  longer  an  adequate  instrument  for 
responding  to  the  transborder  problems 
stemming  from  the  theft  or  embezzle- 
ment of  vehicles  and  aircraft. 

Today  the  estimated  value  of  air- 
craft and  vehicles  stolen  in  the  United 
States  and  taken  into  Mexico  each  year 
exceeds  $100  million.  At  the  same  time, 
aircraft—  many  of  them  allegedly  stolen 
or  embezzled—  have  become  the  princi- 
ple means  of  transporting  contraband 
into  Mexico.  Electronic  goods,  appli- 
ances, and  firearms  valued  at  more  than 
$1  billion  are  now  taken  from  the  United 
States  each  year  into  Mexico  in  violation 


IW 


of  that  country's  laws.  The  new  converj" 
tion  has  been  drafted  with  these  two 
problems  in  mind.  It  is  expected  to 
result  in  the  return  of  a  significantly 
larger  number  of  U.S. -registered  vehi- 
cles and  aircraft  from  Mexico  and  in  be 
ter  law  enforcement  along  the  border. 
In  signing  the  convention,  Ambas 
sador  Krueger  commented  that  it  ex- 
emplified the  reasoned  approach  that 
the  United  States  and  Mexico  have 
taken  toward  resolving  mutual  prob- 
lems. He  continued: 


In  the  last  year  and  a  half,  both  govern--'  « 
ments  have  worked  hard  through  the  Consul  '] 
ative  Mechanism  to  arrive  at  agreements  or 
the  sale  of  natural  gas,  the  sale  of  grains, 
mutual  assistance  in  the  event  of  natural 
disasters,  and  a  joint  marine  pollution  con- 
tingency plan.  Today,  the  citizens  of  both 
countries,  particularly  those  in  the  border     ' 
states,  can  look  forward  to  better  law  enfor 
ment  and  the  protection  of  personal  proper! 
With  this  spirit  in  mind,  I  anticipate  contini 
coordination  with  our  good  neighbor  to  the 
south. 

The  new  convention  will  come  int 
force  upon  the  exchange  of  instrument 
of  ratification,  which  will  require  the 
prior  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate 
each  country. 


Press  release  14  of  Jan.  16, 1981. 


Made  available  to  news  correspondents  by 
acting  Department  Spokesman  William  Dyess 
on  Jan.  2, 1981.  ■ 


32 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


REATIES 


(lirrent  Actions 


^LTILATERAL 

At'iculture 

bernational  agreement  for  the  creation  at 
P'is  of  an  International  Office  for  Epizootics, 
*h  annex.  Done  at  Paris  Jan.  25, 1924. 

ered  into  force  Jan.  17, 1925;  for  the  U.S. 

V29, 1975.  TIAS  8141. 

■ession  deposited:  U.A.E.,  Apr.  14, 1980. 

ivention  on  the  Inter-American  Institute 
oCooperation  on  Agriculture.  Done  at 
^hingtonMar.6, 1979. 
uiture:  Grenada,  Nov.  21, 1980. 
■iifications  deposited:  Brazil,  Oct.  2, 1980; 
i^ita  Rica,  Dec.  8, 1980;  Grenada,  Dec.  22, 
"1;  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Dec.  5, 1980. 
ered  into  force:  Dec.  8, 1980. 

Aiitration 

Ci  vention  on  the  recognition  and  enforce- 
out  of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Done  at  New 
fik  JunelO,  1958.  Entered  into  force  June  7, 
i9);  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29, 1970.  TIAS  6997. 

pssion  deposited:  Cyprus,  Dec.  29, 1980. 

■nded  to:  Cayman  Islands  and  Belize,  Nov. 

980.1 

Ai  onauts 

A  eement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the 
re  rn  of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  objects 
a  ched  into  outer  space.  Done  at  Washing- 
London  and  Moscow  Apr.  22, 1968. 
■red  into  force  Dec.  3, 1968.  TIAS  6599. 
ssion  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 
13, 1980. 

Intion,  Civil 

J(  vention  on  offenses  and  certain  other  acts 
■■0  mitted  on  board  aircraft.  Done  at  Tokyo 
Se ..  14, 1963.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  4, 1969. 
ri  S  6768. 

Aiissions  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  12, 
9;Syria,  July  31, 1980.2 
'  fication  of  succession  deposited: 
name,  Sept.  10, 1979. 

/ention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
■  against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation.  Done 

.t  ontreal  Sept.  23, 1971.  Entered  into  force 
a  26, 1973.  TIAS  7570. 

Amission  deposited:  China,  Sept.  10, 1980.23 

l^cvention  for  the  suppression  on  unlawful 
•e  ire  of  aircraft.  Done  at  The  Hague  Dec. 
;  8  970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  14, 1971 . 
riS7192. 
■ssion deposited:  China,  Sept.  10, 1980.23 

■I  ogical  Weapons 

-ovention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
'  t,  production,  and  stockpiling  of 

eriological  ( biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
n  on  their  destruction.  Done  at  Washington, 
-<  don,  and  Moscow  Apr.  10, 1972.  Entered 

force  Mar.  26, 1975.  TIAS  8062. 

■ssion  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 

.  13, 1980. 


Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27, 1980.'' 

Signatures:  Japan,  Nov.  28, 1980;  Venezuela, 
Dec.  5, 1980;2  Canada,  Jan.  15, 1981;  Haiti, 
Jan.  19, 1981;  Sri  Lanka,  Jan.  21, 1981. 

Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  containers 

(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  2, 

1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6, 1977;  for  the 

U.S.Jan.3, 1979.  TIAS  9037. 

Accession  deposited:  Luxembourg,  Nov.  13, 

1980. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  revised. 
Doneat  Paris  July  24, 1971.  Entered  into  force 
JulylO,  1974.  TIAS  7868. 
Accession  deposited:  G.D.R.,  Sept.  10, 1980.' 

Customs 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR  carnets, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  14, 1975. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  20, 1978.^ 
Accessions  deposited:  Poland,  Dec.  23, 1980; 
Uruguay,  Dec.  24, 1980. 

Defense 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  EURO-NATO  Joint  Jet  Pilot  Training 
(ENJJPT)  Program.  Signed  at  Brussels  Dec. 
9, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  9, 1980. 
Signatures:  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
F.R.G.,  Greece,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Turkey,  U.K.,  and  U.S. 

Finance — African  Development  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Fund,  with  schedules.  Done  at  Abidjan 
Nov.  29, 1972.  Entered  into  force  June  30, 
1973;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  18, 1976.  TIAS  8605. 
Accession  deposited:  Angola,  Jan.  9, 1981. 

Inter-American  Development  Bank 

Agreement  establishing  the  Inter-American 

Development  Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at 

Washington  Apr.  8, 1959.  Entered  into  force 

Dec.  30, 1959.  TIAS  4397. 

Ratification  deposited:  Suriname,  Dec.  12, 

1980. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial 
and  extrajudicial  documents  in  civil  or  com- 
mercial matters.  Done  at  The  Hague  Nov.  15, 
1965.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  10, 1969.  TIAS 
6638. 

Accession  deposited:  Seychelles,  Nov.  18, 
1980. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  for  the  unification  of  certain  rules 
with  respect  to  assistance  and  salvage  at  sea. 
Signed  at  Brussels  Sept.  23, 1910.  Entered  in- 
to force  Mar.  1, 1913.  37  Stat.  1658. 


Notification  that  it  continues  to  be  bound: 
Papua  New  Guinea,  Oct.  14, 1980  as  from 
Sept.  16, 1975. 

Inter-American  convention  on  facilitation  of 
international  waterborne  transportation,  with 
annex.  Signed  at  Mar  del  Plata  June  7, 1963.'' 
Accession  deposited:  Guatemala,  Dec.  12, 
1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044, 6285,  6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  17, 1977.^ 
Acceptance  deposited:  Panama,  Dec.  23, 1980. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 6490, 
8606),  on  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
Consultative  Organization.  Adopted  at  Lon- 
don Nov.  15, 1979.^ 

Acceptances  deposited:  Belgfium,  Dec.  23, 
1980;Liberia,  Jan.  8, 1981. 

Meteorology 

Convention  of  the  World  Meteorological 

Organization.  Done  at  Washington  Oct.  11, 

1947.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  23, 1950.  TIAS 

2052. 

Accession  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Jan.  12, 

1981. 

Narcotic  Drugs 

Single  convention  on  narcotic  drugs.  Done  at 

New  York  Mar.  30, 1961.  Entered  into  force 

Dec.  13, 1964;  for  the  U.S.  June  24, 1967.  TIAS 

6298. 

Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  Dec.  16, 1980. 

Protocol  amending  the  single  convention  on 
narcotic  drugs,  1961.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  25, 
1972.  Entered  force  Aug.  8, 1975.  TIAS  8118. 
Accession  deposited:  Ireland,  Dec.  16, 1980. 

Patents — Microorganisms 
Budapest  treaty  on  the  international  recogni- 
tion of  the  deposit  of  microorganisms  for  the 
purposes  of  patent  procedure,  with  regula- 
tions. Done  at  Budapest  Apr.  28, 1977. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  19, 1980.  TIAS  9768. 
Ratification  deposited:  Spain,  Dec.  19, 1980. 

Postal 

Additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution  of  the 

Universal  Postal  Union  with  final  protocol 

signed  at  Vienna  July  10, 1964.  Done  at  Tokyo 

Nov.  14, 1969.  Entered  into  force  July  1, 1971, 

except  for  Article  V  of  the  additional  protocol 

which  entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1971.  TIAS 

7150. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Czechoslovakia,  July 

3, 1980;  Qatar,  Nov.  13, 1980. 

Second  additional  protocol  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  Universal  Postal  Union  of  July  10, 1964, 
general  regulations  with  final  protocol  and  an- 
nex, and  the  universal  postal  convention  with 
final  protocol  and  detailed  regulations.  Done 
at  Lausanne  July  5, 1974.  Entered  into  force 


ch 1981 


33 


Treaties 


Jan.  1,  1976;  for  the  U.S.,  Jan.  1,  1976  provi- 
sionally; Apr.  1976,  definitively.  TIAS8231. 
Accession  deposited:  Guyana,  Sept.  19, 1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Qatar,  Nov.  13, 1980. 

Money  orders  and  postal  travellers'  checks 
ag^reement,  with  detailed  regulations.  Done  at 
Lausanne  July  5, 1974.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
1, 1976;  for  the  U.S.,  Jan.  1, 1976,  provisional- 
ly; Apr.  14, 1976,  definitively.  TIAS  8232. 
Ratification  deposited:  Qatar,  Nov.  13, 1980. 

Publications 

Statutes  of  the  international  center  for  the 
registration  of  serial  publications.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  14, 1974,  and  amended  Oct.  11  and 
12, 1976.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  21,  1976;  for 
»heU.S.,  Mar.  31, 1978  (provisionally). 
Accession  deposited:  Denmark,  Nov.  5, 1980. 

Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Adopted  at 
New  York  Dec.  21, 1965.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  4, 1969.5 
Accession  deposited:  Uganda,  Nov.  21, 1980. 

Seals 

Protocol  amending  the  interim  convention  of 

Feb.  9, 1957,  as  amended  and  extended  (TIAS 

3948,  5558, 6744,  8368),  on  conservation  of 

North  Pacific  fur  seals.  Done  at  Washington 

Oct.  14, 1980.^ 

Declaration  of  provisional  application 

deposited:  Canada,  Jan.  27, 1981. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for 

damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 

Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29, 

1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1, 1972;  for  the 

U.S.  Oct.  9, 1973.  TIAS  7762. 

Succession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 

Nov.  13, 1980. 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7, 1977.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978; 
definitively  Jan.  2, 1980.  TIAS  9664. 
Notification  of  withdrawal  deposited:  Por- 
tugal, Oct.  7, 1980;  effective  Nov.  6, 1980. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punishment 

of  crimes  against  internationally  protected 

persons,  including  diplomatic  agents.  Adopted 

at  New  York  Dec.  14, 1973.  Entered  into  force 

Feb.20, 1977.  TIAS  8532. 

Accession  deposited:  Togo,  Dec.  30, 1980. 

International  convention  against  the  taking  of 

hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 

1979.'' 

Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  Jan.  15, 1981. 

Signatures:  New  Zealand,  Dec.  24, 1980; 

Yugoslavia,  Dec.  29, 1980. 

Trade 

Agreement  on  technical  barriers  to  trade. 


Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12, 1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1, 1980.  TIAS  9616. 
Acceptance:  Romania,  Oct.  27, 1980. 

Agreement  on  government  procurement. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12, 1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,1981. 
Acceptance  deposited:  U.S.,  Dec.  30, 1980. 

Geneva  ( 1979)  protocol  to  the  General  Agree- 
ment on  Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva 
June  30, 1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1980. 
TIAS  9629. 
Ratification  deposited:  F.R.G.,  Nov.  7, 1980.'^ 

Agreement  on  implementation  of  article  VII  of 

the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 

(customs  valuation).  Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12, 

1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1981. 

Acceptances:  Argentina,  Sept.  30,  IdSO;^-^-'' 

Yugoslavia,  Nov.  3, 1980.'' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Norway,  Oct.  24, 

1980;  U.S.,  Dec.  30, 1980. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Finland,  Oct.  24, 

1980;Sweden,  Oct.  1,1980. 

Protocol  to  the  Agreement  on  implementation 

of  article  VII  of  the  General  Agreement  on 

Tariffs  and  Trade.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  1, 

1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1981. 

Acceptances:  Argentina,  Sept.  30, 1980;'-2'' 

Yugoslavia,  Nov.  3, 1980.'' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Norway,  Oct.  24, 

1980:U.S.,  Dec.30, 1980. 

Ratifications:  Finland,  Oct.  24, 1980;  Sweden, 

Oct.  1, 1980. 

U.N.  Industrial  Development  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8, 1979.'' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Bolivia,  Egypt,  Jan.  9, 
1981;  Korea,  Dec.  30, 1980;  Romania,  Nov.  28, 
1980;  Uruguay,  Dec.  24, 1980. 
Signatures:  Bulgaria,  Jan.  6, 1981;  Czecho- 
slovakia, Nov.  26, 1980;  Kuwait,  Jan.  7, 1981. 

Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  and  sched- 
ule of  whaling  regulations.  Done  at  Washing- 
ton Dec.  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  10, 
1948.  TIAS  1849. 

Notification  of  adherence:  China,  Sept.  24, 
1980.1 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  ( part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement)  1971  (TIAS  71441 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25, 1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23, 1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions,  July  1, 1979,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions.  TIAS  9878. 
Ratification  deposited:  Brazil,  Jan.  15, 1981. 

Food  aid  convention,  1980  ( part  of  the  Interna- 
tional Wheat  Agreement,  1971,  as  extended 
(TIAS  7144,  9878)).  Done  at  Washington  Mar. 
11, 1980.  Entered  into  force  provisionally  for 
the  U.S.  July  1, 1980;  definitively  Nov.  11, 
1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Finland,  Dec.  31, 1980. 


Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  ol 

discrimination  against  women.  Adopted  at 

New  York  Dec.  18,  1979.-' 

Signature:  Jordan,  Dec.  3,  1980. 


ijti 

rill' 
»[ 
lit)' 


World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  thei 

world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at  I' 

Paris  Nov.  23, 1972.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 

17, 1975.  TIAS  8226. 

Acceptances  deposited:  Portugal,  Sept.  30, 

1980;  Democratic  Yemen,  Oct.  7, 1980. 


BILATERAL 


nil 
-S  (III 

■m 


34 


Algeria 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  May 
22, 1980,  (TIAS  9780)  for  mutual  assistance! , 
connection  with  the  investigation  of  activitif  j.— 
of  International  Systems  and  Controls  Cor-  1 
poration  and  International  Telephone  and     " 
Telegraph  Company,  their  affiliates  and  sub 
sidiaries,  to  include  Inforex,  Inc.,  and  its  sut  ^^ 
sidiaries  and  affiliates.  Effected  by  exchangidr 
of  letters  at  Washington  Dec.  18, 1980.  I 

Entered  into  force  Dec.  18. 1980.  [  ] 

Australia 

Ag^reement  concerning  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy,  with  annex  and  agreed  min- 
ute. Signed  at  Canberra  July  5, 1979. 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  16, 1981. 

Agreement  for  cooperation  concerning  civil 
uses  of  atomic  energy,  as  amended  (TIAS 
3820,  4687, 6250).  Signed  at  Washington  Jur 
22, 1956.  Entered  into  force  May  28, 1957. 
Terminated:  Jan.  16. 1981. 

Botswana 

Agreement  concerning  the  establishment  ai 
operation  of  a  space  vehicle  communications 
facility  in  connection  with  the  space  shuttle. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Houston  D 
4, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  4, 1980. 

Brazil 

Interim  agreement  on  salted  cattlehides, 

manufactured  leather  products,  and  other 

trade  matters,  with  record  of  discussion. 

Signed  at  Brasilia  Mar.  14, 1980.  Entered  int 

force  Apr.  17, 1980. 

Terminated:  Oct.  1, 1980. 

Canada 

Agreement  relating  to  coordination  betweei 
the  U.S.  and  Canadian  Coast  Guards  of  ice- 
breaking  operations  in  the  Great  Lakes  and 
St.  Lawrence  Seaway  system.  Effected  bye: 
change  of  notes  at  Ottawa  Oct.  28  and  Dec.  5, 
1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  5, 1980. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  Mar. 
29, 1977,  (TIAS  8560)  relating  to  the  estabfe 
ment  of  an  experimental  Loran-C  power  chai' 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  St.  Marys  River,  Ontari 
and  Michigan.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Ottawa  Oct.  28  and  Dec.  5. 1980.  Entered  i 
to  force  Dec.  5, 1980.  ) 

Colombia 

Agreement  for  cooperation  concerning  civil 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


CHRONOLOGY 


of  nuclear  energy,  with  annex  and  ex- 
ii;e  of  notes.  Signed  at  Bogota  Jan.  8. 1981. 
■rs  into  force  on  the  date  of  receipt  of  let- 
i  ith  written  notification  that  each  party 
(implied  with  its  applicable  requirements 
ntry  into  force. 

o'pment  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
irs.  relating  to  the  agreement  of  June?, 
I  TIAS  7855)  with  agreed  minutes. 
id  at  Cairo  Dec.  14,  1980.  Entered  into 
Dec.  14,  1980. 

•jnan  Democratic  Republic 

ojular  convention,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
e^d  at  Berlin  Sept.  4, 1979. 
uments  of  ratification  exchanged:  Jan. 

'XI. 

rt'd  into  force:  Feb.  19,  1981. 


ig;  ement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept. 
■i,  180,  as  amended,  relating  to  fertilizer  pro- 
0  in.  Signed  Dec.  15, 1980. 

d lesia 
•nient  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
ies,  with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 

ik  ta  Dec.  2, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 

10. 

iit<  lational  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
-ffl  ;ment  for  the  application  of  safeguards 
t  U.S.,  with  protocol.  Signed  at  Vienna 

1 3, 1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  9, 1980. 

limed  by  the  President:  Dec.  31, 1980.* 


sgl;ment  to  support  the  economic  and 
oli  !al  stability  of  Israel  by  providing  a 
ra:  in  the  amount  of  $395,000,000.  Signed  at 
a:  ington  Dec.  3, 1980.  Entered  into  force 
.  1980. 


1  'ment  relating  to  space  shuttle  con- 
ey landing  sites.  Effected  by  exchange 
Hs  at  Tokyo  Jan.  28, 1980.  Entered  into 

clan  28, 1980. 

JJ  'ment  relating  to  space  launch 
stance,  with  exchange  of  letters.  Effected 
e  :hange  of  notes  at  Washington  Dec.  3, 
*  Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1980. 

ment  relating  to  government  proeure- 

n  the  field  of  telecommunications,  with 

n  tatement.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 

n  Washington  Dec.  19, 1980.  Entered  in- 

e  Dec.  19, 1980;  effective  Jan.  1, 1981. 


ment  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
les,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Aug. 
iO  (TIAS  9841).  Signed  at  Monrovia  Jan. 
!  I.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  8, 1981. 


■ment  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
les,  with  agreed  minutes.  Signed  at 
re  Dec.  30, 1980.  Entered  into  force 
0, 1980. 


January  1981 


January  4 

In  El  Salvador,  two  Americans,  working 
as  advisers  to  the  Government  of  El  Salvador, 
are  slain. 

January  7 

In  Geneva,  U.N.  Conference  on  Namibia 
convenes.  The  conference  stems  from  a  diplo- 
matic initiative  begun  more  than  3  years  ago 
by  the  United  States,  Britain,  France,  West 
Germany,  and  Canada  which  undertook  to 
seek  an  internationally  acceptable  resolution 
on  the  status  of  Namibia. 

January  14 

U.S.  resumes  military  assistance  to  El 


Salvador  which  was  temporarily  suspended  on 
Dec.  5, 1980.* 

January  15 

Efforts  to  obtain  an  agreement  on  a  date 
for  a  ceasefire  in  Namibia  come  to  an  in- 
conclusive end. 

Stephen  M.  Schwebel,  State  Department 
Deputy  Legal  Adviser,  is  elected  by  the  U.N. 
General  Assembly  to  the  International  Court 
of  Justice. 

January  17 

Philippines  President  Ferdinand  E.  Mar- 
cos lifts  martial  law  which  he  declared  8  years 
ago. 

U.S.  announces  provision  to  El  Salvador 
of  $5  million  in  emergency  military  equipment 
including  arms  and  ammunition  and  services 
under  section  506A  of  the  Foreign  Assistance 
Act. 


Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  July 
25, 1980,  (TIAS  9822)  relating  to  additional 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Mexico  Dec.  2,  1980.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  2, 1980. 

Minute  264  of  the  International  Boundary 
and  Water  Commission:  Recommendations 
for  solution  of  the  New  River  border  sanita- 
tion problem  at  Calexico,  California,  Mexi- 
cali,  Baja  California  Norte.  Signed  at  Ciudad 
Juarez  Aug.  26, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec. 
4, 1980. 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 

of  the  U.S.  Signed  at  Washington  Aug.  26, 

1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  29, 1977.  TIAS 

8852. 

Notice  of  termination:  Mexico,  Dec.  29, 1980; 

effective  June  29,  1981. 

Fisheries  agreement,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  Mexico  Nov.  24, 1976.  Entered  into 
force  Nov.  24, 1976.  TIAS  8853. 
Notice  of  termination:  Mexico,  Dec.  29, 1980; 
effective  Dec.  29, 1980. 

Netherlands 

Memorandum  of  understanding  between  the 
U.S.  and  the  Netherlands  relating  to  coopera- 
tion in  the  field  of  environmental  protection. 
Signed  at  Leidschendam  Nov.  25, 1980. 
Entered  into  force  Nov.  25, 1980. 

Norway 

Memorandum  of  understanding  governing 
prestockage  and  reinforcement  of  Norway. 
Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  16, 1981.  Entered 
intoforceJan.  16, 1981. 

Panama 

Agreement  concerning  the  transfer  of  the 
Gamboa  Penitentiary  from  the  U.S.  to  Pan- 


ama. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Panama 
Dec.  30, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  30, 1980. 

Singapore 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Sept. 
21  and22, 1978  (TIAS  9214),  as  amended, 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  letters  at  Washington  Nov.  24 
and  Dec.  12, 1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  12, 
1980. 

Turkey 

Treaty  on  extradition  and  mutual  assistance 
in  criminal  matters.  Signed  at  Ankara  June  7, 
1979.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  1, 1981. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Dec.  31, 1980. 

Treaty  on  the  enforcement  of  penal  judg- 
ments. Signedat  Ankara  June  7,  1979.  En- 
tered intoforceJan.  1. 1981.  Proclaimed  by 
the  President:  Dec.  31, 1980. 

Turks  and  Caicos  Islands 

Agreement  relating  to  the  establishment  of  a 
Peace  Corps  program  in  the  Turks  and  Caicos 
Islands.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  Apr.  17  and  Dec.  5, 1980.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  5, 1980. 

Venezuela 

Maritime  boundary  treaty.  Signed  at  Caracas 

Mar.  28, 1978.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  24, 

1980. 

Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Jan.  3, 1981. 


'With  declaration. 

■■With  reservation(s). 

^With  statement. 

''Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

^Applicable  to  Berlin  (West). 

'Subject  to  approval  or  ratification. 

*With  understandings.   ■ 


h  1981 


35 


PRESS  RELEASES 


January  20 

Ronald  W.  Reagan  is  inaugurated  40th 
President  of  the  United  States. 

January  22 

Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr.,  is  sworn  in  as  the 
59th  Secretary  of  State. 

January  24 

South  Korean  President  Chun  Doo  Hwan 
lifts  martial  law  imposed  after  the  assassina- 
tion of  President  Park  Chung  Hee  in  October 
of  1979. 

January  27 

Jamaican  Prime  Minister  Edward  Seaga 
makes  official  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  Jan. 
27-29. 

January  28 

South  Korean  President  Chun  Doo  Hwan 
visits  U.S.,  Jan.  28-Feb.  6,  and  makes  official 
visit  to  Washington,  D.C.,  Feb.  1-3. 

January  29 

Spanish  Prime  Minister  Adolfo  Suarez 
resigns. 

January  30 

Deputy  Prime  Minister  of  Spain,  Leo- 
poldo  Calvo  Sotelo,  is  designated  successor  to 
Prime  Minister  Suarez. 


*U.S.  resumed  economic  aid  to  El  Salva- 
dor on  Dec.  17, 1980.   ■ 


Department  of  State 

Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20502. 


No.  Date 

1  1/2 

2  1/7 


1/7 


1/8 


1/8 


♦6 

1/8 

•7 

1/8 

*8 

1/9 

•9 

1/9 

•10 

1/14 

•11 

1/15 

12 

1/15 

•12A 

1/15 

13 

1/16 

14 

1/16 

•15         1/21 


•16         1/21 


Subject 

U.S. -Thai  Antipiracy 
Program. 

Muskie;  interview  on  the 
"MacNeil/Lehrer  Re- 
port," Public  Broad- 
casting Service. 

U.S.,  Singapore  establish 
textile  visa  system,  Oct. 
20, 1980. 

U.S.,  Malaysia  establish 
administrative  arrange- 
ment under  terms  of  bi- 
lateral textile  agreement, 
Oct.  29  and  31, 1980. 

U.S.,  Mexico  amend 
bilateral  textile  agree- 
ment, Nov.  13  and  17,  and 
Dec.  11,1980. 

U.S.,  Singapore  amend 
textile  agreement,  Nov. 
24  and  Dec.  12, 1980. 

Dept.  of  State  and  Dept.  of 
Commerce  determine 
foreign  fishing  allocations 
for  1981. 

Muskie:  interview  by 
Andrea  Stroud  of  CCN. 

Muskie:  remarks  at  funeral 
services  for  Michael  P. 
Hammer,  Ft.  Myer,  Va. 

Muskie:  address  before  a 
joint  session  of  the  Maine 
legislature,  Augusta. 

Muskie:  address  at  Colby 
College,  Waterville, 
Maine,  Jan.  14. 

Muskie:  statement  at  the 
National  Theater. 

Muskie:  questionand- 
answer  session  following 
statement  at  National 
Theater. 

Stephen  M.  Schwebel 
elected  to  International 
Court  of  Justice. 

U.S.,  Mexico  sign 

Convention  on  the  Re- 
covery and  Return  of 
Stolen  Vehicles  and  Air 
craft. 

International  Radio 
Consultative  Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  5, 
Feb.  10. 

Shipping  Coordinating 
Committee  (SCO,  sub- 
committee on  safety  of 
life  at  sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on  the  car- 
riage of  dangerous  goods, 
Feb.  10. 


•17 

1/22 

Haig:  statement  to      H 
employees.                S 

18 

1/23 

International  effort  iorU 
Khmer  relief.                | 

•19 

1/26 

U.S.  Organization  forthl 
International  Telegraf 
and  Telephone  Consul  ■ 
five  Committee  (CCIT 
study  group  D,  Feb.  12 

♦20 

1/27 

Program  for  Jamaican     i 
Prime  Minister  Seaga' 
official  visit  to  Washin 
ton,  D.C,  Jan.  27-29,  J 
1981.                             1 

•21 

1/27 

U.S.,  Norway  sign  new 
fisheries  agreement,  Ji 
26. 

•22 

1/28 

CCIR,  study  group  5, 
Mar.  3. 

•23 

1/28 

Advisory  Committee  on  ' 
International  Invest- 
ment, Technology,  and 
Development,  Feb.  11. 

•24 

1/28 

U.S.,  Yugoslavia  extend 
textile  agreement,  JulJ 
15, 1980,  and  Sept.  12,  1 
1980. 

25 

1/28 

Haig:  news  conference. 

•26 

1/30 

U.S.,  Hong  Kong  establis 
specified  limits  on  sevi^ 
textile  categories. 

•27 

1/30 

Program  for  Korean 
President  Chun's  offid-t 
visit  to  Washington,     j 
D.C,  Feb.  1-3.             j 

•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


U.S. U.N. 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  fromtb 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
NewYork,N.Y.  10017. 


Date 


•107         10/13 


•108       10/12 


•109       10/13 


Subject 

Spero:  operational 
activities  for  develop- 
ment. Committee  II. 

McHenry:  bombing  of 
Turkish  mission  to  the  I 
U.N. 

McHenry:  credentials  of  t 
representative  of  Kam 
puchea,  UNGA. 


■Nnf  r^f   CtntQ   Rl  lllPU 


PUBLICATIONS 


10/15        Haft:  right  of  reply,  ♦132       11/3 

Committee  III,  Oct.  14. 
10/16        Vanden  Heuvel: 

Kampuchea,  UNGA. 
10/17        Spero:  training  and 

research.  Committee  II, 

Oct.  16. 
10/17        McHenry:  situation 

between  Iran  and  Iraq,  •133        11/5 

Security  Council. 
10/20        Petree:  UNRWA,  Special  '134        11/5 

Political  Committee,  Oct. 

17. 
10/21        McCall:  American  Samoa,  *135       11/5 

Guam,  and  U.S.  Virgin 

Islands,  Committee  IV. 
Haft:  right  of  reply.  Com-  *136       11/5 

mittee  III. 
Ambassador  McHenry 

presents  a  check  to  New         *137       11/6 

York  City  Mayor  Koch  'ISS       11/6 

for  $3.1  million  for  pro- 
viding protection  to  dip-         *139       11/10 

lomatic  missions  and 

personnel  assigned  to  the 

U.N. 
10/23        McHenry:  situation  *U0       U/11 

between  Iran  and  Iraq, 

Security  Council.  'HI        11/12 

Petree:  outer  space. 

Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. *142       11/12 
Horbal:  women, 

Committee  III. 
Spero:  development  and 

international  economic  '143       11/13 

cooperation,  Committee 

n.  ♦144        11/13 

McCall:  narcotics, 

roundtable  discussion  ^145       11/14 

held  at  USUN. 
Vanden  Heuvel:  ^146        11/14 

disarmament.  Committee 

I.  ^147       11/17 

Newsom:  Belize, 

Committee  IV. 
Newsom:  western  Sahara,         *li8       11/19 

Committee  IV. 
Shestack:  human  rights  ^149       11/19 

covenants.  Committee 

III. 
11/3  McHenry:  address  in  150       11/19 

Chicago  on  the  "Chal- 
lenge of  the  1980s,"  Oct.  ♦ISl       11/20 

29. 
11/3  McHenry:  address  in 

Cleveland  on  the  "U.N.'s 

35th  Anniversary,"  Oct. 

24. 
11/3  McHenry:  address  in  Los 

Angeles  on  refugees,  Oct. 

30. 
11/3  McHenry:  address  in  Los 

Angeles  on  the  "New  Na- 
tionalism," Oct.  31. 
11/3  Shestack:  elimination  of  all 

forms  of  religious  in- 
tolerance. Committee  III. 


Atkins:  International 
Youth  Year,  cultural  val- 
ues, problems  of  the  el- 
derly. International  Year 
of  Disabled  Persons,  pol- 
icies and  programs  relat- 
ing to  youth.  Committee 
III. 

U.S.  signs  common  fund 
agreement. 

Spero:  UNDRO  and  special 
assistance  programs. 
Committee  II. 

Petree:  peacekeeping. 
Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 

U.S.  contributes  $250,000 
to  the  U.N.  World  As- 
sembly on  the  Elderly. 

Petree:  IAEA,  UNGA. 

Spero:  U.N.  Decade  for 
Women,  Committee  III. 

Ehrlich:  International 
Drinking  Water  Supply 
and  Sanitation  Decade, 
UNGA. 

Spero:  refugees. 
Committee  III. 

Spero:  international 
development  strategy. 
Committee  II. 

McHenry:  statement  on  the 
deathoflCJ  Judge 
Richard  R.  Baxter, 
Security  Council. 

Shestack:  human  rights. 
Committee  III. 

McHenry:  apartheid, 
UNGA. 

Petree:  UNHCR  pledging 
conference. 

Atkins:  refugees  in  Africa, 
UNGA. 

Petree:  information, 
Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 

Petree:  Indian  Ocean, 
Committee  I. 

Falkner:  restrictive  busi- 
ness practices.  Com- 
mittee II. 

McHenry:  Afghanistan, 
UNGA. 

Morgenthau:  social 

development.  Committee 
HI. 


•152  11/21 

♦153  11/28 

♦154  12/4 

♦155  12/4 

•156  12/4 

•157  12/4 

♦158  12/5 

•159  12/5 

•160  12/9 

•161  12/9 

•162  12/9 


•163 

12/10 

•164 

12/11 

•165 

12/12 

•166 
•167 

12/15 
12/16 

•168 

12/16 

•169 
♦170 

12/17 
12/18 

•171 


12/19 


Petree:  Golan  Heights, 
Special  Political  Com- 
mittee. 

Petree:  refugees.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

Atkins:  El  Salvador, 
Committee  III,  Dec.  3. 

Shestack:  Bolivia, 
Committee  III,  Dec.  3. 

Flood:  Chile,  Committee 
III,  Dec.  3. 

McHenry:  Security  Council 
membership,  UNGA. 

Cardwell:  drug  abuse  con- 
trol. Committee  II,  Dec.  4. 

Shestack:  totalitarian 
ideologies,  UNGA. 

Davison:  crime  prevention 
and  control.  Committee 
III,  Dec.  5 

Petree:  information.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

U.S.  Mission  to  the  U.N. 
commemorates  genocide 
convention  anniversary 
with  unveiling  of  the 
Raphael  Lemkin  bust. 

Loy:  relief  to  Kampuchean 
people,  donors  meeting. 

Newsom:  decolonization 
resolutions,  UNGA. 

Petree:  West  Bank  mayors, 
Security  Council,  Dec.  11. 

Petree:  Palestine,  UNGA. 

Newsom:  apartheid, 
UNGA. 

Atkins:  El  Salvador, 
UNGA. 

McHenry:  news  conference. 

McHenry:  UNIFIL,  Secu- 
rity Council. 

McHenry:  deportation  of 
mayors.  Security  Council. 


♦Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 

Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Haig 

Opening  statement  at  confirmation  hearings 
before  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee, Jan.  9, 1981  (Current  Policy  #257). 

News  conference,  Jan.  28, 1981  (Current 
Policy  #258). 


1981 


37 


Publications 


East  Asia 

Two  Years  of  U.S. -China  Relations,  January  1, 

1979-December29, 1980  (Bulletin 

Reprint). 
Indochinese  Refugees  (GIST,  Nov.  1980). 

Economics 

Trade  Patterns  of  the  West- 1979  (Special 
Report  #74). 

Indicators  of  East- West  Economic 
Strength- 1979  (Special  Report  #75). 

Trade  of  NATO  and  Communist  Coun- 
tries-1976- 1979  (Special  Report  #76). 

Foreign  Investment  in  the  United  States 
(GIST,  Dec.  1980). 

Europe 

The  Baltic  Republics:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST,  Feb. 

1981). 
Madrid  CSCE  Followup  Meeting  (GIST,  Jan. 

1981). 

Department  of  State 
Bicentennial 

A  Short  History  of  the  U.S.  Department  of 

State,  1781-1981  (Bulletin  Reprint). 
Bicentennial  Note  #1:  Department  of  State 

Completes  200  Years  (Dec.  1980 ). 
Bicentennial  Note  #2:  The  Department  of 

State  Today  (Dec.  1980). 
Bicentennial  Note  #3:  Bicentennial  Reception 

and  Awards  Ceremony  (Jan.  1981).  ■ 


GPO  Sales 


Publications  may  be  ordered  by  catalog  or 
stock  number  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  B.C.  20A02.  A  25%  dis- 
count is  made  on  orders  for  100  or  more 
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Superintendent  of  Documents,  must  ac- 
company orders.  Prices  shown  here,  which 
include  domestic  postage,  are  subject  to 
change. 

1 980  Edition  of  Status 
of  the  World's  Nations 
Released 


The  Office  of  The  Geographer,  Bureau  of 
Intelligence  and  Research,  has  released 
the  1980  edition  ol  Status  of  the  World's 
Nations,  Department  of  State  publica- 
tion 8735.  This  biennial  publication  con- 
tains an  up-to-date  official  listing  of  the 
world's  nations,  dependencies,  and  areas 
of  special  sovereignty  including  official 
country  name,  capital,  population,  and 
area.  The  text  includes  a  survey  and  a 
checklist  of  newly  independent  nations. 
Countries  are  shown  on  a40V2-  by  22V4- 
inch,  full-color  map. 

Status  of  the  World's  Nations  is  on 
sale  for  $1.75  by  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.,  20402.  Copies 
also  are  sold  at  the  GPO  Bookstore  in  the 
Department  of  State,  Room  2817,  North 
Lobby,  21st  and  C  Sts.  NW,  Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20520. 


Press  release  331  of  Nov.  26, 1980. 


38 


!  U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE:  1981  —  341-412/79 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


INDEX 


March  1981 
Vol.  81,  No.  2048 

Afghanistan.  Afghanistan:  A  Year  of  Occupa- 
tion (Van  Hollen) 18 

Arms  Control 

Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  report) 1 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  Jan- 
uary 29   12 

Cuba.  Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  report) 1 

El  Salvador 

Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  report) 1 

El  Salvador:  A  Brief  Background   8 

Energy.  Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  Doo 
Hwan  (joint  communique)   14 

Fisheries.  U.S. -Mexico  Terminate  Fishing 
Agreements 31 

Foreign  Aid.  U.S. -Thai  Antipiracy  Pro- 
gram   16 

Honduras.  Communist  Interference  in  El 
Salvador  (Department  report) 1 

Iran 

Implementation  of  Hostage  Agreements 
(Department  statement)   17 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  Jan- 
uary 29   12 

Travel  to  Iran  (Department  statement)   ...  17 

Jamaica 

Jamaica— A  Profile   30 

Visit  of  Jamaican  Prime  Minister  (Reagan, 
Seaga) 29 

Kampuchea.  Khmer  Relief  Efforts   15 

Korea.  Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  Doo 
Hwan  (joint  communique)   14 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  report) 1 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  Jan- 
uary 29   12 

Visit  of  Jamaican  Prime  Minister  (Reagan, 
Seaga) 29 

Mexico 

U.S. -Mexico  Sign  Convention  on  Recovery 
and  Return  of  Stolen  Vehicles  and  Air- 
craft    32 

U.S. -Mexico  Terminate  Fishing  Agree- 
ments   31 


Military  Affairs.  Communist  Interference  in 
El  Salvador  (Department  report) 1 

Nicaragua.  Communist  Interference  in  El 
Salvador  (special  report)   1 

Presidential  Documents.  Visit  of  Jamaican 
Prime  Minister  (Reagan,  Seaga) 29 

Publications 

Department  of  State   37 

GPO  Sales    38 

Refugees.  Khmer  Relief  Efforts 15 

Security  Assistance.  Communist  Interference 
in  El  Salvador  ( Department  report) ...    1 

Terrorism 

Hostage  Incidents:  Examples  in  Modern 
History  (Duncan,  Slany,  Trask) 23 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  Jan- 
uary 29   12 

Thailand.  U.S. -Thai  Antipiracy  Program  .  .  16 

Trade.  Visit  of  Korean  President  Chun  Doo 
Hwan  (joint  communique)   14 

Travel.  Travel  to  Iran  (Department  state- 
ment)     17 

Treaties 

Current  Actions 33 

U.S. -Mexico  Sign  Convention  on  Recovery 
and  Return  of  Stolen  Vehicles  and  Air- 
craft    32 

U.S. -Mexico  Terminate  Fishing  Agree- 
ments    31 

U.S.S.R. 

Afghanistan:  A  Year  of  Occupation  (Van 
Hollen) 18 

Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador 
(Department  report) 1 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  Jan- 
uary 29   12 

Vietnam.  Communist  Interference  in  El 
Salvador  (Department  report) 1 

Name  Index 

Duncan,  Evan  M 23 

Reagan,  President 12,  29 

Seaga,  Edward 29 

Slany,  William  Z 23 

Trask,  David  F 23 

Van  Hollen,  Eliza 18 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
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I 


Departmvn  t 


JO  ^9 


buUetBn 


H  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volunne  81  /  Number  2049 


April  1981 


Cover  Photo: 

The  Peace  Tower  of  Canada's 

Parliament  building  where  President 

Reagan  is  welcomed 

by  Prime  Minister  Trudeau. 

I  White  House  photo  by  Michael  Evans ) 


Df*partinvni  ot  Siaie 

bulletin 


Volume  81  /  Number  2049  /  April  1981 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin  , 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide 
the  public,  the  Congress,  and 
government  agencies  with  information 
on  developments  in  U.S.  foreign 
relations  and  the  work  of  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials; 
special  features  and  articles  on 
international  affairs;  selected  press 
releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission 
to  the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and 
other  agreements  to  which  the  United 
States  is  or  may  become  a  party. 


ALEXANDER  M.  HAIG,  JR. 

Secretary  of  State 

WILLIAM  J.  DYESS 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Acting  Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that 
the  publication  of  this  periodical  is 
necessary  in  the  transaction  of  the  public 
business  required  by  law  of  this 
Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the 
Director  of  the  Office  of  Management  and 
Budget  through  January  31,  1986. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not 
copyrighted  and  items  contained  herein 
may  be  reprinted.  Citation  of  the 
Department  of  State  Bulletin  as  the 
source  will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is 
indexed  in  the  Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical 
Literature. 


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Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office.  Washington.  D.C.  20402 

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CONTENTS 


« 


FEATURE 

1         President  Reagan  Visits  Canada  {Remarks  at  Welcoming  Ceremony,  Address 
Before  Canadian  Parliament,  and  Remarks  to  Reporters) 


ePresident 

Interview  With  Walter  Cronkite 
(Excerpt  n) 

News  Conference  of  March  6  (Ex- 
cerpts) 

eSecretary 

Interview  for  French  Television 
News  Conference  With  British 

Press 
Discussion  on  Foreign  Assistance 

oiomics 

J.S.  Strategic  Minerals 
Dependency  (Michael  Cal- 
ingaert) 

i^orth  Atlantic  Aviation  Situation 


I 


npe 

/isit  of  British  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  (President  Reagan. 
Margaret  Thatcher) 

Secretary  Haig  Meets  With  West 
German  Foreign  Minister  (Joint 
Statement) 

Spanish  Coup  Attempt  (Depart- 
ment Statement) 

'SCE  Addresses  Subject  of  Ter- 
rorism (Max  M.  Kampelman) 


Middle  East 

30  Implementation  of  the  Hostage 

Agreements  With  Iran  (Walter 
J.  Stoessel,  Jr.) 

31  U.S.  To  Sell  Military  Equipment 

to  Saudi  Arabia  (Department 
Announcement) 

32  Suspension  of  Litigation  Against 

Iran  (Executive  Order,  Message 
to  the  Congress) 

33  U.S. -European  Initiative 

(Department  Statement) 

Nuclear  Policy 

33  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 

EURATOM  (Executive  Order. 
Letter  to  the  Congress) 

Terrorism 

34  Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official 

Personnel  Abroad  (Evan  Dun- 
can) 

Western  Hemisphere 

38        Review  of  El  Salvador  (Wiilter  J. 

Stoessel.  Jr.) 
40       Central  American  Review  (John 

A.  Bushnell) 

43  El  Salvador  (Department 

Statements) 

44  The  United  States  and  Chile  (John 

A.  Bushnell) 

45  U.S.  Lifts  Prohibition  on  Ex-Im 

Financing  for  Chile  (Department 
Announcement) 


Treaties 

46       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

49        February  1981 

Press  Releases 

49  Department  of  State 

Publications 

50  Department  of  State 

Index 


SPECIAL  (See  Center  Section) 

Security  and  Development  Assistance  (Secretary  Haig) 


FEATURE 


The  Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police. 


Mrs.  Keaf^an  signs  the  distinguished  guest 
book  at  the  Canadian  Forces  Base.  Behind 
her  are  (iovernor  General  and  Mrs. 
Schreyer,  President  Reagan,  and  Col.  Ron 
Bell,  base  commander.  (White  House  photo  hv 

Michael  Kvans) 


President  Keagan  and  Governor  Genen  ' 
Schreyer  at  the  state  dinner  at  Rideau 

Hall.  (White  House  photo  bj  Michael  Evans) 


Prime  Minister  Trudeau  escorts  President 
and  Mrs.  Reagan  at  the  National  Arts  Cen- 
tre. (White  House  photo  by  Karl  H.  Schumacher) 


Feature 


resident  Reagan  Visits  Canada 


/  esident  Reagan  made  a  state  visit 
■ira  March  10-11,  1981.  Follouring 

narks  made  at  the  welcoming  cere- 
•  n  March  10,  the  President's  ad- 
efore  a  joint  session  of  the  Cana- 
arliament  on  March  11,  and  re- 

K  made  to  reporters  on  March  11.'^ 


LOMING  CEREMONY^ 


I 


'lor  General  Schreyer 

\  th  great  pleasure  and  warmth  of 
;n  that  we  greet  you  and  Mrs. 
"i  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 

1  come  to  us  representing  the 
that  is  both  our  nearest  neigh- 
ajl  also  which  the  history  of  this 
intury  has  made  our  closest  ally. 
.  h  the  long  years  of  our  associa- 
..  imada  and  the  United  States  of 
lOTa  have  met  and  overcome  many 
ale  res  and  problems  together.  We 
•i,  believe,  acted  effectively  as  part- 
's, infident  that  our  differences 
.<e  or  combined  efforts  that  much 
re  fective. 

Mv,  in  a  period  of  uncertainty  in 
Id,  Canada  remains  committed  to 
:  with  the  United  States  to  fur- 
fundamental  ideals  and  values 
'  om  and  of  equality  before  the 
''  ch  we  both  share, 
i  confident  that  your  visit  to 
will  serve  to  strengthen  the  firm 
■mal  ties  of  friendship  and  prac- 
';  leration  which  exists  firmly  and 
illy  between  our  two  countries. 
ere,  I  hope  that  beyond  the 
les  formal  aspects  of  state  occa- 
;it  you  will  also  encounter  some- 
'  the  human,  kindred  dimension 
ives  relations  between  Canada 
United  States,  and  as  between 
.'  ons  of  individual  Americans  and 
1  ns,  their  deeper  meaning  and 
lique  character. 
iv^ieur  le  President,  aw  worn  de 
•  IsCanadiens,  je  vous  souhaite  la 
"w  dans  notre  pays  qui,  comme  le 
>mpte  parmi  ces  citoyens  des  per- 
'e  souche  ethniqtce  et  linguistique 
fit  variee.  [Mr.  President,  on 
t  all  Canadians,  I  welcome  you 
juntry  which,  as  yours,  has 


among  its  citizens  people  of  multiple  and 
diverse  ethnic  and  linguistic  origins.] 

If  this  is  the  era  of  the  global 
village,  then  welcome  to  the  house  next 
door;  welcome  to  Canada. 


President  Reagan 

Nancy  and  I  are  happy  to  be  here.  One 
can  receive  no  warmer  greeting  than  the 
heartfelt  welcome  of  a  trusted  friend. 
And  yes,  we,  the  people  of  the  United 
States  and  of  Canada  are  more  than 
good  neighbors;  we're  good  friends.  We 
citizens  of  North  America,  while  respect- 
ing the  sovereignty  and  independence  of 
our  respective  national  identities,  are 
vidthout  question  friends  that  can  be 
counted  upon.  Whether  in  times  of  trial 
and  insecurity  or  in  times  of  peace  and 
commerce,  our  relationship  has  never 
weakened.  The  faith  between  us  has 
never  wavered. 

We  each  play  a  separate  and  impor- 
tant role  in  international  affairs.  We 
have  economic  interests  that  bind  us  in 
cooperation  and,  in  some  cases,  put  us 
into  competition.  But  these  separate 
roles  are  respected  by  our  two  peoples 
and  have  never  diminished  the  harmony 
between  us. 

I  hope  this  visit  will  make  clear  my 
commitment  as  President  of  the  United 
States  to  work  in  close  cooperation  with 
the  Government  of  Canada.  Whether  in 
trade  or  defense  or  protection  of  our  en- 
vironment and  natural  resources,  our 
two  nations  shall  continue  the  unique  re- 
lationship that  has  been  the  envy  of  the 
world,  a  relationship  that  has  enhanced 
the  standard  of  living  and  the  freedom 
of  our  people.  Let  us  continue  and  let  us 
move  forward. 

It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  be  here  with 
you.  Merci. 


ADDRESS  BEFORE  PARLIAMENT  ^ 


Prime  Minister  Trudeau 

Yesterday  I  welcomed  you  to  Canada.  I 
repeat  that  welcome  now  because  in  this 
chamber  Canada's  democracy  finds  its 
ultimate  expression.  Here  in  a  special 
way,  we  speak  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
Canada.  And  here,  the  people  of  Canada 
are  honored  to  receive  you. 

Nations  do  not  choose  their  neigh- 
bors; geography  does  that.  The  sense  of 
neighborhood,  however,  is  more  than  a 
product  of  geography;  it  is  a  creation  of 
people  who  may  live  as  far  apart  as 
California  and  Quebec.  It  is  what  makes 
neighbors  of  Canada  and  Mexico,  for  in- 
stance. Canadians  have  noted  this  sense 
in  you,  Mr.  President,  and  they  know 
that  it  gives  a  particular  meaning  to 
your  visit  to  Ottawa. 

[In  Fremh:]  Our  neighborhood  is  not 
only  a  place  but  a  state  of  mind,  not 
only  North  America  but  the  New  World. 
We  share  the  dreams  that  have  made 
this  continent  a  beacon,  a  hope,  and  a 
haven  for  people  everywhere.  We  share 
the  courage  and  joy  in  hard  work  that 
enabled  us  to  build  two  great  federal 
states  side  by  side,  from  our  first  land- 
falls on  the  Atlantic  to  our  last  frontiers 
on  the  Pacific.  We  cherish  what  we  have 
made.  We  are  determined  to  preserve  it, 
but  at  the  same  time  we  have  been  glad 
to  admit  others  to  the  bounty  and 
freedom  we  have  found  here. 

[In  English:]  It  is  right  that  we 
should  celebrate  what  we  hold  in  com- 
mon. At  the  same  time,  it  is  necessary 
that  we  remember  and  respect  what 
makes  us  different.  More  than  200  years 
ago  our  paths  diverged  although  our 
goals  remained  the  same.  You  created  a 
great  republic  with  a  presidential  sys- 
tem. We  evolved  as  a  constitutional 
monarchy  under  a  parliamentary  sys- 
tem. You  placed  yourselves  from  the 
outset  under  a  written  constitution  that 
you  continue  to  revere  today.  We  are 
only  now  finishing  the  work  of  writing 
ours  and  bringing  it  home.  You  fought  a 


,^1 


Feature 


tragic  civil  war.  We  have  recently  under- 
gone the  experience  of  a  referendum 
that  involved  no  violence  but,  nonethe- 
less, touched  the  very  fiber  of  this  coun- 
try. The  differences  of  history  affect  our 
relations  today  because  they  affect  our 
perceptions,  our  approaches,  our 
priorities. 

You  would  perhaps  agree  with 
Thoreau  where  he  says  of  the  U.S. 
Government,  and  I  quote:  "...  this 
government  of  itself  never  furthered  any 
enterprise,  but  by  the  alacrity  with 
which  it  got  out  of  its  way.  It  does  not 
settle  the  West.  It  does  not  educate.  The 
character  inherent  in  the  American  peo- 
ple has  done  all  that  has  been  ac- 
complished. ..." 

The  character  of  the  Canadian  peo- 
ple has  also  made  Canada.  But  here  in 
Canada,  our  own  realities  have 
sometimes  made  it  necessary  for  govern- 
ments to  "further  enterprise."  Those 
realities  and  that  necessity  are  still  with 
us  today. 

[In  French:]  You  have  come  to 
Canada  at  a  busy  moment  in  our  history. 
We  are  still  engaged  in  the  task  of  na- 
tionmaking.  As  an  American  you  will 
understand  the  challenge  before  us.  We 
are  seeking  to  perfect  our  democracy 
and  strengthen  our  unity.  Sometimes, 
the  noise  we  make  will  reach  your  ears. 
I  can  assure  you,  however,  that  out  of 
the  tumult  and  heat  of  creation  we  are 
forging  a  stronger  Canada.  To  borrow 
someone's  definition  of  a  megalopolis, 
we  are  determined  that  we  will  not 
emerge  from  our  present  debate  as  a 
"loose  confederation  of  shopping 
centers." 

In  the  years  ahead,  the  United 
States  will  face  a  dynamic  neighbor  to 
the  north.  As  we  put  our  house  in  order, 
we  in  Canada  will  grow  in  self-confi- 
dence. We  will  see  our  interests  more 
clearly  and  pursue  them  more  vigorous- 
ly. What  will  not  change,  however,  is 
our  deep  friendship  with  the  United 
States.  Indeed,  the  relationship  between 
our  two  countries  will  grow  as  Canada 
grows.  Certainly,  we  will  have  some  live- 
ly discussions  over  the  back  fence.  But 
we  have  always  spoken  plainly  to  each 
other -plainly  but  with  mutual  respect, 
because  that  is  the  way  sovereign  equals 
and  close  friends  should  speak  to  each 
other. 

[In  English:]  You  take  on  your 
awesome  responsibilities  at  a  time  of 
stress  and  crisis  in  international  affairs. 
The  world  badly  needs  the  courage  and 


Mr.s.  Reagan  and  Mrs.  Schreyer  during  welcoming  ceremonies  at  the  Canadian  Forces 
Ba.se  (Ottawa). 


wisdom  of  the  United  States- that 
courage  that  it  can  provide  under  your 
leadership.  I  speak  for  all  Canadians 
when  I  say  we  are  ready  to  work  with 
you  in  the  cause  of  stabihty,  security, 
and  humanity. 

Your  task -our  joint  task -will  not 
be  an  easy  one.  Many  people  fear  that 
the  world  has  become  too  complicated, 
that  events  have  spiraled  beyond  the 
control  of  individuals  or  governments. 
They're  tempted  to  give  up,  to  opt  out, 
and  to  hide  from  reality  and  responsibili- 
ty. That  way  lies  oblivion. 

I  believe  that  we  must  neither  cower 
before  reality  nor  oversimplify  it.  Yet 
complexity  should  not  obscure  plain 
truth.  On  this  most  favored  of  conti- 
nents, we  cannot  simply  turn  our  gaze 
inward  and  ignore  poverty,  ignorance, 
and  injustice  elsewhere. 

To  the  East,  we  face  a  system  that 
seems  ill-designed  to  respond  to  change 
and  growth.  Nevertheless,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  Eastern  European  states 
may  come  to  accommodate  themselves 
at  least  to  the  dynamics  of  their  own 
region.  If,  for  example,  the  Polish  people 
are  able  to  work  out  their  own  destiny 
within  a  framework  accepted  by  their 


neighbors,  then  they  will  have  match  1 
revolution  with  a  no  less  remarkable, j| 
evolution.  Through  courage  and  re- 
straint, they  will  have  begun  the  pro  i 
of  making  their  reality  more  Polish  i  | 
their  system  more  responsive,  more 
adaptable,  and,  ultimately,  more  stal^ 

In  the  West,  we  have  a  long  fam  j 
arity  with  the  pressures  of  change.  1 1 
the  past  decade  our  economies  have 
undergone  a  severe  test,  as  trusted  i  j 
sumptions  have  been  found  wanting, 
the  i970s  we  were  buffetted  by  the  i  »j^ 
shock  of  rapid  energy  price  increase! 
We  were  forced  to  recognize  that  tb 
monopoly  of  economic  power  was  co 
ing  to  an  end.  And  yet  for  all  the  stily^ 
upon  us,  our  political  and  economic   i  .^ 
framework  has  survived  -survived  a  j  jj, 
least  as  well  as  the  chicken  and  the  1 1 
to  which  Winston  Churchill  once  re- 
ferred in  this  chamber. 

Each  of  the  Western  countries  b 
met  the  challenge  of  change  in  its  ov 
way.  Since  all  of  us  have  our  own  j 
distinctive  economic  strengths  and 
weaknesses,  our  solutions  have  hadi 
be  diverse.  We  have  found  no  simple 
answers.  We've  fashioned  no  single 'jf.'" 
With  cooperation  and  consultation, 


Feature 


e  T,  we've  been  able  to  complement 
■ious  approaches. 

another  level,  though,  we  do  have 
approach.  Let  there  be  no  doubt 
)ur  unity  in  the  defense  of  our 
recious  heritage -that  democracy 
s  envied  by  those  who  rightly 
;  and  feared  by  those  who  wrong- 
its  force, 
to  North  and  South,  we  are  not 
ed  by  the  complexity  of  the  prob- 
he  poverty  of  the  developing 
es  does  not  have  to  be  perma- 
3r  is  it  unalloyed.  The  gap  be- 
he  two  groups  is  neither  racial 
iridgeable.  In  the  growth  of  the 
ucing  states,  in  the  vigor  of  the 
■  idustrialized  countries,  there  is 
I  tig  evidence  of  the  dynamism 
intial  of  the  developing  world.  In 
.  y  of  the  South  there's  not  so 
1  identity  of  circumstances  as  an 
"lint  of  view,  a  shared  sense  of 
The  poorer  peoples  are  at  the 
1  circumstances  that  leave  them 
dance,  often  out  of  hope,  and 
vulnerable  to  opportunists  who 
iL'hing  in  troubled  waters.  The 
ilized  democracies  have  not  only 
<  duty  but  a  strategic  obligation 
i.^veloping  countries  in  their 
.  ,  their  survival,  and  their  suc- 

■  inanity  will  prevail.  We  in  the 
V  irld  can  never  be  pessimists,  for 
in  a  very  real  sense,  the  custo- 
the  future.  You  have  reminded 
r  s  on  both  sides  of  the  49th 
.€  You've  done  so  by  evoking  a 
iBvhich  both  our  peoples  have 
••l  architects  of  change,  not  its 

I  wish  you  well  in  your  task  and 
■•  in  your  burden.  May  part  of 
c  ifort  come  from  the  assurance  of 
^ii;  abiding  friendship  for  your 
rjand  for  your  people. 

si  at  Reagan 

m  0  this  great  capital  of  this  great 
01  y  crossing  a  border  not  which 
le  IS  but  a  border  which  joins  us. 
i^3  noics  sommes  souvent  serre  la 
r  dessus  cette  frontiere  et  nous  le 
mefois  encore  aujourd'hui.  For 
my  own  party  who  accompanied 
ve  said  we've  often  shaken 
TOSS  this  border  and  we're  doing 
nc  gain  today. 

;y  and  I  have  arrived  for  this, 
state  visit  of  my  Presidency,  in 
t  expressed  so  well  by  a  Calgary 
.ie    nd  publisher  some  60  years  ago. 


He  said:  "The  difference  between  a 
friend  and  an  acquaintance  is  that  a 
friend  helps  where  an  acquaintance 
merely  advises."  [Laughter]  We  come 
here  not  to  advise,  not  to  lecture;  we  are 
here  to  listen  and  to  work  with  you. 
We're  here  as  friends,  not  as  acquain- 
tances. 

Some  years  ago,  Nancy  and  I  both 
belonged  to  a  very  honorable  profession 
in  California.  And  as  I  prepared  for 
these  remarks  today,  I  learned  that 
among  those  in  the  motion  picture  in- 
dustry in  Hollywood,  it  has  been  esti- 
mated that  perhaps  as  many  as  one  out 
of  five  are  of  Canadian  origin.  Many  of 
those  whom  I  counted  as  close  profes- 
sional colleagues  and,  indeed,  close  per- 
sonal friends,  did  not  come  from  Ameri- 
ca's heartland  as  I  did,  but  from  the 
heart  of  Canada,  as  did  most  of  you  in 
this  historic  chamber.  Art  Linkletter, 
Glenn  Ford,  Raymond  Massey,  Walter 
Pidgeon,  Raymond  Burr  are  but  a  few 
of  your  countrymen  who  are  celebrated 
in  our  entertainment  industry. 

I  believe  I  know  the  very  special 
relationship  between  Canada  and  the 
United  States,  but  with  all  respect  to 
those  few  that  I  have  mentioned,  I  can 
do  better  than  that.  A  young  lady  once 
came  to  Hollywood  from  Toronto,  and 
before  long  little  Gladys  Smith  was  em- 
braced by  our  entire  nation.  Gladys 
Smith  of  Toronto  became  Mary  Pick- 
ford.  And  I  know  that  you'll  forgive  us 
for  adopting  her  so  thoroughly  that  she 
became  known  the  world  over  as 
"America's  sweetheart."  [Laughter]  But 
"America's  sweetheart"  was  Canadian. 
[Laughter] 

Affinity,  heritage,  common  borders, 
mutual  interests -these  have  all  built  the 
foundation  for  our  strong  bilateral  rela- 
tionship. This  relationship  has  grown  to 
include  some  of  the  strongest  economic 
links  among  the  nations  of  this  Earth. 
Some  16%  of  America's  total  world 
trade  is  done  with  Canada.  Our  joint 
trade  amounts  to  about  90  billion  Cana- 
dian dollars  annually.  This  is  greater 
than  the  gross  national  product  of  some 
150  countries.  It's  estimated  that  three- 
quarters  of  a  million  U.S.  workers  are 
employed  in  exports  to  Canada,  and,  in 
turn,  Canadian  exports  to  the  United 
States  account  for  one-sixth  of  your 
gross  national  product.  Not  only  is  the 
vast  bulk  of  this  trade  conducted  be- 
tween private  traders  in  two  free 
economic  systems,  but  more  than  half 
crosses  our  borders  duty-free.  Our 
seaways,  highways,  airways,  and  rails 


are  the  arteries  of  a  massive,  intercon- 
necting trade  network  which  has  been 
critically  important  to  both  of  us. 

Thus,  while  America  counts  many 
friends  across  the  globe,  surely  we  have 
no  better  friend  than  Canada.  And 
though  we  share  bilateral  interests  with 
countries  throughout  the  world,  none  ex- 
ceeds the  economic,  cultural,  and  securi- 
ty interests  that  we  share  with  you. 

These  strong  and  significant  mutual 
interests  are  among  the  reasons  for  my 
visit  here.  Already,  I  have  shared  with 
Prime  Minister  Trudeau  very  helpful 
discussions  across  a  range  of  issues— to 
listen  and  to  insure  that  these  important 
ties  shall  not  loosen. 

I'm  happy  to  say  that  in  the  recent 
past  we've  made  progress  on  matters  of 
great  mutual  importance.  Our  govern- 
m.ents  have  already  discussed  one  of  the 
largest  joint  private  projects  ever  under- 
taken by  two  nations -the  pipeline  to 
bring  Alaskan  gas  to  the  continental 
United  States.  We  strongly  favor 
prompt  completion  of  this  project  based 
on  private  funds. 

We  have  agreed  to  an  historic  liber- 
alization of  our  trade  in  the  Tokyo 
Round  of  the  multilateral  trade  negotia- 
tions. We've  continued  our  efforts, 
begun  with  the  Great  Lakes  Water 
Quality  Agreement  of  1972,  to  protect 
our  joint  heritage  in  the  Great  Lakes. 
We  want  to  continue  to  work  coopera- 
tively to  understand  and  control  the  air 
and  water  pollution  that  respects  no 
borders. 

During  my  visit  here,  I've  had  the 
pleasure  of  participating  in  the  conclu- 
sion of  two  other  important  agreements. 
We  are  renewing  the  North  American 
Aerospace  Defense  Command  Agree- 
ment for  5  more  years.  For  more  than 
two  decades  now,  NORAD  has  bound  us 
together  in  our  common  defense  with  an 
integrated  command  structure  symboliz- 
ing our  interdependence.  This  agree- 
ment represents  continued  progress  in 
our  relations  and  mutual  security. 

And  second,  we  have  concluded  an 
agreement  regarding  social  security 
benefits  between  those  of  our  citizens 
who  combine  work  in  both  nations.  And 
with  this  new  agreement,  these  people 
who  are  employed  in  both  countries, 
they  can  then  be  eligible  for  the  com- 
bined benefits.  And  the  workers  will  be 
eligible  for  those  benefits  in  whichever 
country  they  choose  to  live. 


Feature 


Our  deep  and  longtime  bilateral 
economic  interests  lead  me  to  depart 
from  the  norm  today  and  to  give  to  you 
a  report  on  America's  progress  toward 
economic  recovery. 

Five  weeks  ago,  I  reported  to  the 
American  people  that  the  U.S.  economy 
faced  the  worst  economic  mess  since  the 
great  worldwide  depression.  We're  a 
proud  people,  but  we're  also  realists. 
The  time  has  come  for  us  to  face  up  to 
what  I  described  as  a  potential  economic 
calamity. 

I  raise  this  issue  today  because 
America  holds  a  genuine  belief  in  its 
obligation  to  consult  with  its  friends  and 
neighbors.  The  economic  actions  that  we 
take  affect  not  just  us  alone  but  the  rela- 
tionships across  our  borders  as  well. 

As  we  examined  America's  economic 
illness,  we  isolated  a  number  of  con- 
tributing factors.  Our  Federal  Govern- 
ment has  grown  explosively  in  a  very 
short  period  of  time.  We  found  that 
there  had  grown  up  a  maze  of  stifling 
regulations  which  began  to  crush  ini- 
tiative and  deaden  the  dynamic  in- 
dustrial innovation  which  brought  us  to 
where  we  are.  We  saw  unbelievable 
deficits -this  year  alone  reaching  up  to 
nearly  $80  billion,  including  off-budget 
items.  And  we  found  that  these  deficits 
got  in  no  one's  way,  because  the  govern- 
ment found  it  easy  to  fuel  inflation  by 
printing  more  money  just  to  make  up 
the  difference. 

The  American  taxing  structure,  the 
purpose  of  which  was  to  serve  the  peo- 
ple, began  instead  to  serve  the  insatiable 
appetite  of  government.  If  you  will 
forgive  me,  you  know  someone  has  once 
likened  government  to  a  baby.  It  is  an 
alimentary  canal  with  an  appetite  at  one 
end  and  no  sense  of  responsibility  at  the 
other.  [Laughter]  But  our  citizens  were 
being  thrown  into  higher  tax  brackets 
for  simply  trying  to  keep  pace  with  infla- 
tion. In  just  the  last  5  years.  Federal 
personal  taxes  for  the  average  American 
household  have  increased  58%.  The  re- 
sults: crippling  inflation,  interest  rates 
which  went  above  20%,  a  national  debt 
approaching  a  trillion  dollars,  nearly  8 
million  people  out  of  work,  and  a  steady 
3-year  decline  in  productivity. 

We  decided  not  just  to  complain  but 
to  act.  In  a  series  of  messages  and  ac- 
tions, we  have  begun  the  slow  process  of 
stopping  the  assault  on  the  American 
economy  and  returning  to  the  strong 
and  steady  prosperity  that  we  once  en- 
joyed. It's  very  important  for  us  to  have 


friends  and  partners  know  and  under- 
stand what  we're  doing.  Let  me  be  blunt 
and  honest.  The  United  States  in  the 
last  few  years  has  not  been  as  solid  and 
stable  an  ally  and  trading  partner  as  it 
should  be.  How  can  we  expect  certain 
things  of  our  friends  if  we  don't  have 
our  own  house  in  order? 

Americans  are  uniting  now  as  they 
always  have  in  times  of  adversity.  I  have 
found  there  is  a  wellspring  of  spirit  and 
faith  in  my  country  which  will  drive  us 
forward  to  gain  control  of  our  lives  and 
restore  strength  and  vitality  to  our 
economic  system.  But  we  act  not  just 
for  ourselves  but  to  enhance  our  rela- 
tionships with  those  we  respect. 

First,  we're  taking  near  revolu- 
tionary steps  to  cut  back  the  growth  in 
Federal  spending  in  the  United  States. 
We're  proposing  that  instead  of  having 
our  national  budget  grow  at  the  unac- 
ceptable rate  of  14%  per  year,  it  should 
rise  at  a  more  sensible  6%.  This  enables 
us  to  maintain  the  kind  of  growth  we 
need  to  protect  those  in  our  society  who 
are  truly  dependent  on  government 
services. 

Just  yesterday,  I  submitted  our  pro- 
posed budget  for  the  coming  year -and 
then  immediately  crossed  the  border. 
[Laughter] 

With  extraordinary  effort,  we've  iso- 
lated some  83  items  for  major  savings 
and  hundreds  more  for  smaller  savings, 
which  together  amount  to  $48.6  billion 
in  the  coming  fiscal  year.  Our  second 
proposal  is  a  10%  cut  across-the-board 
every  year  for  3  years  in  the  tax  rates 
for  all  individual  income  taxpayers,  mak- 
ing a  total  cut  in  tax  rates  of  30%.  This 
will  leave  our  taxpayers  with  $500 
billion  more  in  their  pockets  over  the 
next  5  years  and  create  dramatic  new 
incentives  to  boost  productivity  and  fight 
inflation.  When  these  personal  cuts  are 
combined  with  tax  cuts  to  provide  our 
business  and  industry  with  new  capital 
for  innovation  and  growth,  we  will  be 
creating  millions  of  new  jobs,  many  of 
them  ultimately  on  your  side  of  the 
border. 

Our  third  proposal  is  to  eliminate 
those  unproductive  and  unnecessary 
regulations  which  have  slowed  down  our 
growth  and  added  to  our  inflationary 
burdens.  We  shall  do  this  with  care, 
while  still  safeguarding  the  health  and 
safety  of  the  American  people  and,  I 
might  add,  while  mindful  of  our  respon- 
sibility to  have  equal  regard  for  the 
health  and  safety  of  our  neighbors. 


Finally,  we'll  be  working  closely 
our  Federal  Reserve  System  to  achi 
stable  and  moderate  growth  pattern 
our  money  supply. 

As  I  said,  America's  program  fc 
economic  recovery  is  designed  not  n 
ly  to  solve  an  internal  problem;  it  is 
viewed  by  my  Administration  as  pai 
an  essential  effort  to  restore  the  coi 
fidence  of  our  friends  and  allies  in  v 
we're  doing.  When  we  gain  control 
our  inflation,  we  can  once  again  con 
tribute  more  helpfully  to  the  health 
the  world  economy.  We  believe  that 
fidence  will  rise,  interest  rates  will  i 
cline,  and  investment  will  increase, 
our  inflation  is  reduced,  your  citizer 
and  other  world  citizens  will  have  tr 
port  less  inflation  from  us. 

As  we  begin  to  expand  our  ecoi 
once  again  and  as  our  people  begin 
keep  more  control  of  their  own  mor- 
we'll  be  better  trading  partners.  Ou. 
growth  will  help  fuel  the  steady  prcf" 
ity  of  our  friends.  The  control  we  re 
over  our  tax  and  regulator^'  structu. 
will  have  the  effect  of  restoring  stea  * 
growth  in  U.S.  productivity.  Our  got  IJ* 
will  go  into  markets  not  laden  dowji  ^' 
with  the  drag  of  regulatory  baggagi  ^ 
punitive  levies  but  with  a  competitiv  '-* 
edge  that  helps  us  and  those  who  t:   ^f 
with  us.  Ifl 

Such  new,  sustained  prosperityr  ^ 
era  of  reduced  inflation  will  also  sei  « 
worldwide  to  help  all  of  us  resist  pi  ire 
tionist  impulses.  We  want  open  ma  tf 
We  want  to  promote  lower  costs  gl  tji 
ly.  We  want  to  increase  living  stant  .to 
throughout  the  world.  And  that's  W  K 
we're  working  so  hard  to  bring  aboi  t'si 
this  economic  renewal.  M 

There  are,  of  course,  other  vei^  * 
portant  reasons  for  us  to  restore  oi<|l»t 
economic  vitality.  Beyond  our  shon 
and  across  this  troubled  globe,  the , 
word  of  the  United  States  and  its  a 
to  remain  stable  and  dependable  n 
good  part  on  our  having  a  stable 
pendable  economy.  Projecting  solid 
ternal  strengths  is  essential  to  the 
West's  ability  to  maintain  peace  an( 
curity  in  the  world.  Thus,  our  natio 
interests,  our  bilateral  interests,  am 
hemispheric  interests  are  profoum 
volved  in  truly  international  questii 
That's  why  we  must  act  now,  why 
can  no  longer  be  complacent  about 
consequences  of  economic  deterioi 
We've  entered  an  era  which  com 
the  alliance  to  restore  its  leadership' 
the  world.  And  before  we  can  be  st)' 
in  the  world,  we  must  be  once  agaiii 
strong  at  home. 


eat 

ilo 


y 


ely  r  friend,  our  ally,  our  partner, 
neighbor,  Canada,  and  the 
States  have  always  worked  to- 
to  build  a  world  with  peace  and 

a  world  of  freedom  and  dignity 
people. 

th  our  other  friends,  we  must  em- 
ith  great  spirit  and  commitment 
path  toward  unity  and  strength, 
side  of  the  Atlantic,  we  must 
ogether  for  the  integrity  of  our 
.ere,  for  the  inviolability  of  its 
for  its  defense  against  imported 
m,  and  for  the  rights  of  all  our 
to  be  free  from  the  provocations 
d  from  outside  our  sphere  for 
iiJlent  purposes.  Across  the  oceans, 
te  id  together  against  the  unaccept- 

viet  invasion  into  Afghanistan 
et(  linst  continued  Soviet  adventur- 
;gi  OSS  the  Earth.  And  toward  the 
ii(  led  and  dispirited  people  of  all  na- 
'e  stand  together  as  friends 
a  extend  a  helping  hand. 
ce   y  to  you,  our  Canadian  friends, 
ill  nations  which  will  stand  with 
iie  cause  of  freedom:  Our  mission 
than  simply  making  do  in  an  un- 
rld.  Our  mission  is  what  it  has 
m    Deen -to  lift  the  world's  dreams 
(tj    the  short  limits  of  our  sights  and 
ftr  edges  of  our  best  hopes, 
will  not  be  an  era  of  losing  lib- 
Bhall  be  one  of  gaining  it.  This 
be  an  era  of  economic  pessi- 
ist|!f  restraint,  and  retrenchment;  it 
me  of  restoration,  growth,  and 
ng  opportunities  for  all  men  and 
And  we  will  not  be  here  merely 
ve,  we  will  be  here,  in  William 
it's  words,  to  prevail,  to  regain 
,ny  and  our  mutual  honor. 
,j  letimes  it  seems  that  because  of 
for  table  relationship,  we  dwell 
a  bit  too  much  on  our 
:es.  I,  too,  have  referred  to  the 
;  we  do  not  agree  on  all  issues. 
e  so  many  things  with  each 
5t,  for  good  reasons,  we  insist 
;  different  to  retain  our  separate 


iili 


s. 

captured  the  imagination  of 
■lemingway  when  he  worked  as 
for  the  Toronto  Star  Weekly  in 
;Jj,   Bmingway  was  traveling  in 
and,  and  he  noted  that  the 
ade  no  distinction  between 
ns  and  citizens  of  the  United 
d  he  wondered  about  this,  and 
,  Jl  a  hotelkeeper  if  he  didn't  notice 
ijftrence  between  the  people  from 


the  two  countries.  "Monsieur,"  he  said  to 
Hemingway,  "Canadians  speak  English 
and  always  stay  2  days  longer  at  any 
place  than  Americans  do."  [Laughter]  As 
you  know,  I  shall  be  returning  to  Ottawa 
in  July,  and  if  you  don't  mind,  I'll  plan  to 
stay  as  long  as  everyone  else.  [Applause] 

I'm  not  here  today  to  dwell  on  our 
differences.  When  President  Eisenhower 
spoke  from  this  spot  in  1953,  he  noted 
his  gratitude  as  Allied  Commander  in 
World  War  II  for  the  Canadian  contribu- 
tion to  the  liberation  of  the  Mediterra- 
nean. This  touched  my  curiosity,  and 
even  though  I'd  participated  in  that  war 
myself,  I  did  a  little  research. 

In  the  Second  World  War,  there  was 
something  called  the  1st  Special  Service 
Force,  a  unique  international  undertak- 
ing at  the  time.  This  force  was  com- 
posed of  Canadians  and  Americans,  dis- 
tributed equally  throughout  its  ranks, 
carrying  the  flags  of  both  nations.  They 
served  under  a  joint  command,  were 
taught  a  hybrid  close-order  drill,  and 
trained  together  as  paratroopers, 
demolition  experts,  ski  troops,  and  then 
as  an  amphibious  unit. 


Feature 


The  1st  Special  Service  Force  be- 
came famous  for  its  high  morale,  its  rug- 
ged abilities,  and  tough  fighting  in  situa- 
tions where  such  reputations  were  hard- 
earned.  Alerted  to  their  availability. 
Gen.  Eisenhower  requested  them  for 
special  reconnaissance  and  raiding 
operations  during  the  winter  advance  up 
the  Italian  Peninsula.  They  were  in- 
volved in  the  Anzio  beachhead  campaign 
in  Italy  and  were  at  the  spearhead  of 
the  forces  that  captured  Rome.  The  1st 
Special  Service  Force  made  no  distinc- 
tions when  it  went  into  battle.  Its  men 
had  the  common  cause  of  freedom  at 
their  side  and  the  common  denominator 
of  courage  in  their  hearts.  They  were 
neither  Canadian  nor  American.  They 
were,  in  Gen.  Eisenhower's  term, 
liberators. 

Let's  speak  no  more  of  differences 
today.  Certainly,  your  Ambassador,  Ken 
Taylor,  didn't  when  he  first  sheltered 
and  then  spirited  six  Americans  out  of 
the  center  of  Tehran  and  brought  them 
to  their  freedom.  Their  daring  escape 
worked  not  because  of  our  differences 
but  because  of  our  shared  likenesses. 


President  Reagan  addresses  a  joint  session  of  the  Canadian  Parliament.  Seated  in  the 
front  row  are  Secretary  Haig,  Secretary  of  State  for  External  Affairs  MacGuigan,  Mrs. 
Reagan,  and  Prime  Minister  Trudeau. 


Feature 


A  final  word  to  the  people  of 
Canada:  We're  happy  to  be  your 
neighbor.  We  want  to  remain  your 
friend.  We're  determined  to  be  your 
partner,  and  we're  intent  on  working 
closely  with  you  in  a  spirit  of  coopera- 
tion. We  are  much  more  than  an  ac- 
quaintance. Merci.  Thank  you. 


REMARKS  TO  REPORTERS^ 


Prime  Minister  Trudeau 

The  point  has  been  made  many  times 
that  we  are  happy  to  have  received 
President  Reagan  and  his  ministers  and 
officials.  We  want  to  report  briefly  this 
morning  on  the  conversations  and  dis- 
cussions that  took  place  between  us.  I 
would  merely  preface  them  by  saying 
that  at  the  beginning  of  a  new  ad- 
ministration we  were  surprised  and 
delighted  that  so  much  ground  could  be 
covered  in  such  a  positive  way.  There's 
no  subject  and  no  grievance,  if  I  could 
use  the  word,  which  the  United  States 
wasn't  prepared  to  discuss  and  indicate 
a  will  to  settle. 

We  discussed  yesterday  morning 
mainly  the  area  of  international  affairs, 
and  we  had  a  very  wide-ranging  tour 
d'horizon.  No'us  avons  parle  de 
I'Afghanistan,  de  la  Pologne,  du  Proche- 
Orient.  [We  discussed  Afghanistan, 
Poland,  the  Near  East.]  We  talked  a  fair 
amount  of  the  Caribbean  and  Central 
America.  And  on  El  Salvador  in  par- 
ticular there  was  agreement,  as  I  could 
sense  it,  that  the  solution  there  should 
be  a  political  solution  and  that  we  would 
work  in  whatever  way  we  could  to  in- 
sure that  the  moderates  were  those  who 
took  over  and  not  the  extremists  of  the 
right  or  of  the  left. 

We,  as  you  know,  reached  an  agree- 
ment on  NORAD,  which  will  be  signed 
imminently.  We  reached  an  agreement 
on  social  security  also.  Much  of  the  work 
in  these  two  areas  had  been  done  before 
we  even  sat  down  to  talk,  because  you 
realize  as  we  do  that  every  day  of  the 
week  there  are  contacts  between  officials 
of  both  governments  on  a  multitude  of 
subjects.  And   what  we  concentrated  on 
in  our  brief  meetings  was  mainly  in  the 
area  of  disagreement  or  a  need  to  clarify 
our  respective  positions,  and  I  would  say 
that  on  the  two  main  areas  of  bilateral 
concern  we  were  very  pleased  with  the 
ultimate  response  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 


It  began,  of  course,  with  an  expres- 
sion of  our  deep  disappointment  at  the 
fact  that  the  fisheries  treaty  had  been 
withdravra  from  the  United  States  from 
ratification,  because  from  the  outset  we 
had  argued,  when  these  discussions 
began  several  years  ago,  that  linkage 
between  the  boundaries  settlement  and 
the  fisheries  was  not  only  necessary,  but 
it  was  obvious  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  two  agreements.  And  we  are  disap- 
pointed at  the  delinkage,  and  that  has 
been  expressed  very  clearly  to  the 
United  States.  But  as  I  said  in  the 
House  of  Commons  a  few  days  ago,  I 
think  it's  fair  to  put  the  best  possible 
light  on  this,  and  that  is  certainly  in 
keeping  with  the  attitude  that  the  dis- 
cussions assumed. 

The  fisheries  treaty  was  bogged 
down  for  a  couple  of  years  in  the 
Senate,  and  we  view  the  U.S.  gesture  of 
withdrawing  that  treaty  as  an  indication 
of  their  determination  to  solve  the  prob- 
lem in  other  ways,  because  we  made  it 
quite  clear  that  the  two  problems  have 
to  be  solved.  It  is  not  just  a  matter  of 
having  the  courts  determine  the  bound- 
aries; it  is  a  matter  of  making  sure  that 
though  there  will  be  no  fish  war -we 
gave  each  other  the  assurance  of  that, 
and  we  will  take  measures  to  make  sure 
it  doesn't  happen -no  one  would  benefit 
if  the  fish  ultimately  were  fished  out  by 
the  extraordinary  capacities  of  the  Cana- 
dian fishermen  to  go  ahead  and  fish  if 
they  see  that  there  are  no  limits  and 
that  the  Americans  are  not  respecting 
them.  In  this  sense,  we  are  very  happy 
that  the  U.S.  Administration  has  under- 
taken to  assure  fish  conservation  meas- 
ures in  that  area.  And  we  are  hopeful 
that  the  problem  will  be  settled  in  that 
way.  Indeed,  we're  more  than  hopeful; 
we  are  confident  that  it  will. 

The  other  area,  of  course,  of  great 
concern  to  Canada  was  cross-boundary 
pollution,  either  through  acid  rain.  Great 
Lakes  water  pollution,  or  the  particular 
case  of  the  Garrison  diversion.  And  on 
all  these  matters  I  think  it's  fair  to  say 
that  the  United  States,  as  the  President 
had  occasion  to  repeat  in  the  House  of 
Commons  a  few  moments  ago -we  have 
the  assurances  that  the  United  States 
has  the  will  and  the  determination  to 
cooperate  with  us  in  preserving  the  en- 
vironment for  ourselves  and  for 
posterity. 


$ 


Sti 


111 


We  talked  about  the  pipeline -tl 
northern  gas  pipeline -and  you  heai 
the  President  of  the  United  States  ) 
us  the  assurance  that  they  were  det 
mined  to  see  it  to  its  successful  conr 
tion  and,  therefore,  to  carry  on  the 
undertakings  we'd  had  from  the  pre 
vious  Administration. 

We  talked  about  many  other  bil 
al  subjects  in  the  area  of  trade.  We 
that  the  auto  pact  discussions  shoul 
pursued  and  continued.  In  the  area 
mass  transit  transportation,  the  Ur 
States  has  agreed  to  consider  ways 
which  agreement  and  the  buy-Amei 
provisions  can  be  made  to  operate  i 
fair  way  to  Canada. 

We  discussed  other  economic  si 
jects.  But  I  think  it's  important,  in 
elusion,  to  remind  you  that  the  imp 
sion  that  I  got  from  our  discussions 
the  American  President  and  minist 
was  that  we  were  doing  this  in  the 
possible  of  spirits  and  attitudes.  Wi 
didn't  approach  this  as  a  zero-sum  ] 
We  think  that  there  can  be  benefici  ^ 
on  both  sides  in  all  these  areas,  whi  ^i 
it  be  from  the  environment  or  trad'  ^ 

We  don't  see  the  negotiations  £  ,[, 
minating  in  a  victory  for  one  and  si 
losses  for  the  other.  On  the  contrai  ^ 
the  spirit  and  reality  of  these  discui  jj 
and,  I  am  convinced,  of  the  future  >  ,j 
relations  with  President  Reagan  an  j. 
Administration,  will  be  that  both  sj  J  ] 
can  come  out  the  gainers  if  we  solv  ;^, 
problems  of  the  environment,  probi  ,^ 
of  boundaries  or  of  fisheries,  probi*  ^j, 
of  trade,  problems  of  social  securit"  jjj 
that  both  sides  have  it  to  their  adv*)  ^^ 
tage  to  look  at  international  probla  ^^ 
that  same  light,  too,  because  we  sH 
the  main  objectives  of  liberty  and 
justice. 

I  expressed  for  my  part  that  th  h 
might  be  some  future  meetings  heV  ii.i 
the  President  of  the  United  States    ^ 
the  President  of  Mexico  and  the  Pi 
Minister  of  Canada,  if  we  could  ha' 
such  meetings  to  try  and  share  con 
views  of  people  who  inhabit  the  Ne 
World,  particularly  as  we  regard  ir 
national  developments. 

We  will  be  meeting  again,  the  li 
dent  and  I  and  the  other  summiteeC 
July.  And  I  think  that  we  have  shoj 
least  by  our  meeting  in  this  past  ds  I 
a  half  that  we  intend  to  continue  oi  I 
consultations.  I  did  make  the  point  [ 
I  think  the  President  agreed -that 
reaction  to  tensions  in  Poland,  as 


i 


from  our  reaction  to  events  in 
Stan  more  than  a  year  ago,  show 
had  learned  from,  the  lesson  of 
3tan  and  that  we  understood 
of  the  most  important  things 

achieve  as  likeminded  countries 
onsult  in  order  that  we  not 
disarray  to  crises  or  possible 
in  other  parts  of  the  world,  but 
act,  in  fact  as  we  are  in  spirit, 
5on  and  with  dedication  to  the 
freedom. 

s  about  all  I  think  I  have  to 
President,  and  it's  up  to  you 
ry  and  satisfy  those  who  were 
fled  by  me.  [Laughter] 


liiii 


iJ 


it  Reagan 

they  are.  You  gave  certainly  a 
•ough  summing-up  of  the  won- 

™  ratings  we've  held.  I  would  like 
'ever,  to  remark  on  the  kind  of 
that  I  have  received  here.  That 
went  beyond  careful  planning 
nd  a  sincere  and  warm  recep- 
lie  Governor  General  and  the 

^  inister.  It  was  truly  a  welcome, 
l  between  neighbor  and 

*  liscussion  showed  that  the 
"'Icates  and  Canada  stand 

on  many  world  issues.  Under- 
,  on  some  issues,  we  see  things 
lyf.  Each  country  has  its  own  na- 
•*  Brests  and  objectives.  Each 
P  irings  to  international  issues  a 
™  :oint  of  view.  But  what  has  im- 

ne  is  the  degree  to  which  we 
'2'  reement  and,  where  we  have 
™  that  we  have  discussed  our 
m 


differences  with  the  kind  of  openness 
and  understanding  that  exists  between 
neighbors. 

We  discussed  the  major  areas  of  in- 
stabilty  in  the  world,  as  the  Prime 
Minister  told  you,  including  Eastern 
Europe,  the  Middle  East,  Latin  Ameri- 
ca. We  considered  carefully  the  Ottawa 
summit,  which  will  be  held  here  in  July. 
That  meeting  will  be  a  very  useful  op- 
portunity to  share  views  on  relationships 
between  the  industrialized  democracies 
and  the  Soviet  Union  on  energy  coopera- 
tion and  on  economic  relations  within 
the  developing  nations. 

In  addition  to  discussing  these  world 
issues,  we  carefully  considered  the  bilat- 
eral U.S.-Canadian  relationship.  We 
agreed  wholeheartedly  that  consultation 
is  vitally  important  to  our  close  and  co- 
operative relationship,  and  we  agreed  to 
foster  frank  and  informal  consultation  at 
all  levels  and  at  all  times.  Our  bilateral 
discussions  took  us  into  areas  where  our 
two  nations  are  closest.  We  discussed 
matters  affecting  the  environment,  fish- 
eries, as  you've  been  told,  energy,  trade, 
and  defense.  In  each  of  these  areas  we 
were,  I  believe,  able  to  deal  with  the 
issue  squarely  in  an  atmosphere  of 
frankness  and  understanding,  and  we 
did,  yes,  discuss  the  pipeline,  the  Cana- 
dian national  energy  program,  took  up 
the  continuing  problems,  as  the  Prime 
Minister  told  you,  of  east  coast  boundary 
and  fisheries  treaties. 

On  the  environment  we  addressed 
the  Garrison  project  and  continued  joint 
efl!'orts  to  deal  with  both  transboundary 
air  pollution  and  the  cleanup  of  the 
Great  Lakes.  We  agreed  to  continue 


Feature 


consultations  on  the  auto  industry  and 
on  reciprocal  opportunities  for  urban 
mass  transit  trade.  We  discussed  our 
defense  production  sharing  agreements. 
We've  had,  in  short,  a  busy  time. 

I  look  forward  to  continued  contacts 
between  us  at  the  Prime  Minister- 
President  level,  at  the  level  of  Cabinet 
officers,  and  at  all  levels  below.  To  sum 
it  up,  our  meetings  have  been,  as  he 
said,  frank  and  constructive,  and  I  in- 
tend to  do  all  in  my  power  to  see  that 
we  continue  to  deal  with  each  other  in 
the  same  way  in  the  years  ahead.  And  I 
would  like  to  close  by  expressing  my 
thanks  to  Governor  General  Schreyer,  to 
Prime  Minister  Trudeau,  and  through 
them  to  the  people  of  Canada  for  the 
warm  welcome  that  I  and  my  associates 
have  received  here  this  week.  I  can 
assure  you  we  will  not  forget  it.  We  will 
remember  it  with  great  warmth  and 
pleasure. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  16,  1981, 
which  also  includes  the  President's  and  Prime 
Minister's  remarks  outside  the  Centre  Block 
on  Parliament  Hill  and  the  exchange  of 
remarks  between  the  President  and  the 
Governor  General  following  a  dinner  at 
Rideau  Hall,  the  Governor  General's 
residence,  on  Mar.  10. 

^Made  at  Hangar  1 1  at  the  Canadian 
Forces  Base. 

'Made  in  the  House  of  Commons 
Chamber  at  the  Centre  Block. 

■•Made  in  the  Railway  Committee  Room 
at  the  Centre  Block.  ■ 


Reagan  and  Prime  Minister  Trudeau  in  the  Prime  Minister's  office  at  Centre  Block,  Parliament  Hill. 

photo  bv  Michael  Kvans) 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Interview  With  Walter  Cronkite 
(Excerpts) 


Follovring  are  excerpts  from  an  ivr 
terview  President  Reagan  held  with 
Walter  Cronkite  for  CBS  News  which 
was  broadcast  on  March  3,  1981.^ 

Q.  With  your  Administration  barely  6 
weeks  old,  you're  involved  now  in, 
perhaps,  the  first  foreign  policy  crisis, 
if  it  can  be  called  a  crisis  yet— it  prob- 
ably cannot  be,  but  it's  being  much 
discussed,  of  course  — much  concern 
about  El  Salvador  and  our  commit- 
ment there.  Do  you  see  any  parallel  in 
our  committing  military  advisers  and 
military  assistance  to  El  Salvador  and 
the  early  stages  of  our  involvement  in 
Vietnam? 

A.  No,  I  don't.  I  know  that  that 
parallel  is  iDeing  drawn  by  many  people. 
But  the  difference  is  so  profound.  What 
we're  actually  doing  is  at  the  request  of 
a  government  in  one  of  our  neighboring 
countries  helping-offering  some  help 
against  the  import  or  the  export  into  the 
Western  Hemisphere  of  terrorism,  of 
disruption,  and  it  isn't  just  El  Salvador. 
That  happens  to  be  the  target  at  the 
moment. 

Our  problem  is  this  whole  hemi- 
sphere and  keeping  this  sort  of  thing 
out.  We  have  sent  briefing  teams  to 
Europe,  down  to  our  Latin  American 
neighbors  with  what  we've  learned  of 
the  actual  involvement  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  of  Cuba,  of  the  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  of  even 
Qadhafi  in  Libya,  and  others  in  the  Com- 
munist bloc  nations  to  bring  about  this 
terrorism  down  there. 

You  used  the  term  military  advisers. 
You  know,  there's  a  sort  of  a  techni- 
cality there.  You  could  say  they  are  ad- 
visers in  that  they're  training,  but  when 
it's  used  as  adviser,  that  means  military 
men  who  go  in  and  accompany  the 
forces  into  combat,  advise  on  strategy 
and  tactics.  We  have  no  one  of  that 
kind.  We're  sending  and  have  sent 
teams  down  there  to  train.  They  do  not 
accompany  them  into  combat.  They  train 
recruits  in  the  garrison  area.  And  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  we  have  such  training 
teams  in  more  than  30  countries  today, 
and  we've  always  done  that;  the  officers 
of  the  military  in  friendly  countries  and 
in  our  neighboring  countries  have  come 
to  our  service  schools -West  Point,  An- 
napolis, and  so  forth.  So  I  don't  see  any 
parallel  at  all. 


And  I  think  it  is  significant  that  the 
terrorists -the  guerrilla  activity -in  El 
Salvador  was  supposed  to  cause  an  up- 
rising that  the  government  would  fall 
because  the  people  would  join  this  ag- 
gressive force  and  support  them.  The 
people  are  totally  against  that  and  have 
not  reacted  in  that  way. 

Q.  That's  one  of  the  questions 
that's  brought  up  about  the  wisdom  of 
our  policy  right  at  the  moment.  Some 
Latin  Americans  feel  that  President 
Duarte  [of  El  Salvador]  has  control  of 
the  situation.  The  people  have  not 
risen.  This  last  offensive  of  the  guer- 
rillas did  not  work,  and,  therefore, 
aren't  we  likely  to  exacerbate  the 
situation  by  American  presence  there 
now,  therefore  sort  of  promoting  a 
self-fulfilling  prophecy  by  coming 
down  there  and  getting  the  guerrillas 
and  people  themselves  upset  about 
"big  brother"  intervention,  and  there- 
fore losing  the  game  instead  of  win- 
ning it? 

A.  No,  and  we  realize  that  our 
southern  friends  down  there  do  have 
memories  of  the  great  colossus  of  the 
north  and  so  forth -but  no,  his  govern- 
ment has  asked  for  this  because  of  the 
need  for  training  against  terrorist  and 
guerrilla  activities,  has  asked  for 
materiel  such  as  helicopters  and  so  forth 
that  can  be  better  at  interdicting  the 
supply  lines  where  these  illicit  weapons 
are  being  brought  in  to  the  guerrillas. 
This  is  what  we've  provided  and  some  of 
these  teams  that  have  been  provided  are 
also  to  help  keep  those  machines  in  the 
air  and  on  the  water -patrol  boats  and 
so  forth -to  try  to  interdict  the  supply 
by  water  of  weapons  and  ammunition. 
They  need  help  in  repair.  They  get  laid 
up  for  repairs,  and  they  don't  have  the 
qualified  technicians. 

Q.  What  really  philosophically  is 
dififerent  from  our  going  down  to  help 
a  democratic  government  sustain  itself 
against  guerrilla  activity  promoted 
from  the  outside  or  Soviet  and  Cuban 
aid,  as  we  believe  it  to  be— your  Ad- 
ministration says  it  is  — and  Afghani- 
stan? El  Salvador  is  in  our  sort  of 
political  sphere  of  influence.  Afghani- 
stan, on  the  border  of  the  Soviet 
Union  is  certainly  in  their  geopolitical 
sphere  of  influence.  They  went  in  with 
troops  to  support  a  Marxist  govern- 
ment friendly  to  them.  Why  isn't  that 
a  parallel  situation? 


A.  I  don't  think  there  can  be  a 
parallel  there,  because  I  was  in  Irai 
1978  when  the  first  coup  came  aboi 
and  it  was  the  Soviet  Union  that  pi 
their  man  as  President  of  Afghanis 
and  then  their  man  didn't  work  out 
their  satisfaction.  So  they  came  in  ; 
got  rid  of  him  and  brought  another 
that  they'd  been  training  in  Moscov 
put  him  in  as  their  president  and  tl 
with  their  armed  forces,  they  are  ti 
to  subdue  the  people  of  Afghanista 
do  not  want  this  pro-Soviet  govern: 
that  has  been  installed  by  an  outsid 
force. 

The  parallel  would  be  that  with 
actually  using  Soviet  troops,  in  effe 
Soviets  are,  you  might  say,  trying  i 
the  same  thing  in  El  Salvador  that 
did  in  Afghanistan,  but  by  using  pr 
troops  through  Cuba  and  guerrillas 
they  had  hoped  for,  as  I  said,  an  u} 
ing  of  the  people  that  would  then  g 
them  some  legitimacy  in  the  goveri 
that  would  be  installed -the  Comm 
government.  But  the  people  didn't 
up.  The  people  have  evidenced  thei 
desire  to  have  the  government  thej 
and  not  be  ruled  by  these  guerrilla; 

Q.  Secretary  of  State  Haig  ha 
said  that  we'll  not  have  a  Vietnar 
El  Salvador  because  the  United  S 
will  direct  its  action  toward  Cub; 
which  is  the  main  source  of  the  i  " 
vention,  in  his  words.  But  Cuba  i 
client  state  of  the  Soviet  Union.  1 
not  likely  to  stand  by  and  let  us  t 
direct  action  against  Cuba,  is  it? 

A.  A  term  "direct  action,"  ther 
a  lot  of  things  open:  diplomacy,  tra 
number  of  things  and  Secretary  Hj 
has  explained  the  use  of  the  term.  ' 
source  with  regard  to  Cuba  means 
intercepting  and  stopping  of  the  su 
coming  into  these  countries -the  e> 
from  Cuba  of  those  arms,  the  train 
the  guerrillas  as  they've  done  there 
I  don't  think  in  any  way  that  he  wai  |, 
suggesting  an  assault  on  Cuba. 

Q.  An  intercepting  and  stoppi 
means  blockade.  And  isn't  that  ar 
of  war? 


lo 

I." 

null 
lis! 


ili 


SI 

re 

IB 

a 


In 

»i 

111 


A.  This  depends.  If  you  interce 
them  when  they're  landing  at  the  o  '^ 
end  or  find  them  where  they're  in  t  *» 
locale,  such  as,  for  example,  Nicarai  * 
and  informing  Nicaragua  that  we're  "l 
aware  of  the  part  that  they  have  pi  j' 
in  this  using  diplomacy  to  see  that  •  *i 
country  decides  they're  not  going  t(  " 
allow  themselves  to  be  used  anymoJ  * 
there's  been  a  great  slow  down.  We 


ii 


The  President 


ng  it  very  carefully- Nicaragua- 
ai  transfer  of  arms  to  El  Salvador. 
nil  Desn't  mean  that  they're  not  com- 

from  other  guerrilla  bases  in  other 

ies  there. 

You've  said  that  we  could  ex- 
'^  ourselves  easily  from  El 
or  if  that  were  required  at  any 
joint  in  this  proceeding.  I 
J  you  mean  at  any  given  point. 
■^  Duld  we  possibly  extricate 
vesl  Even  now,  from  this  initial 
how  could  we  extricate  our- 
■'"  without  a  severe  loss  of  face? 

I  don't  think  we're  planning  on 
think,  to  extricate  ourselves  from 
But  the  only  thing  that  I  could 
t  could  have  brought  that  about 
:  guerrillas  had  been  correct  in 
sessment  and  there  had  been  the 
I  disturbance,  well,  then  it  would 
ie  of  we're  there  at  the  bequest 
resent  government.  If  that 
nent  is  no  longer  there,  we're  not 
iiere  without  an  invitation.  We're 
ing  ourselves  upon  them,  and 
mply  leave  and  there  aren't  that 


fjjljj  eopie  to  be  extricated. 

,1,,  ilven  if  the  Duarte  forces  begin 
(„„  iwith  whatever  military 
jjS  II  assistance  we  give  them, 
[jIj  er  training  advisers  we  give 
lijj  re  you  pledging  that  we  will 
jIijI  in  with  fighting  forces? 

»"■'  '.  certainly  don't  see  any  likeli- 
is'  '.us  going  in  with  fighting  forces. 
sit.    our  continued  work  in  the  field 
,i,j,  nacy  with  neighboring  countries 
r  ,^   interested  in  Central  America 
j.'  I],  th  America  to  bring  this  violence 
'^,^,   ■  and  to  make  sure  that  we  do 
J.  sit  passively  by  and  let  this 
\i~  ere  be  invaded  by  outside  forces. 

Jif6  our  hard  line  toward  the 
trail  Jnion  is  in  keeping  with  your 
te  rn  statements,  your  promises, 
re  are  some  who,  while  ap- 
j  that  stance,  feel  that  you 
j_ave  overdone  the  rhetoric  a  lit- 
',  li  (I  laying  into  the  Soviet  leader- 
being  liars  and  thieves,  etc. 

jet's  recap.  I  am  aware  that 
aid  received  a  great  deal  of 
ention,  and  I  can't  criticize  the 
idia  for  that.  I  said  it.  But  the 
it  seems  to  have  been  ignored, 
)  things:  one,  I  did  not  volunteer 
ement.  This  was  not  a  state- 
it  I  went  in  and  called  a  press 
ce  and  said:  "Here,  I  want  to 
dlowing."  I  was  asked  a  ques- 


t* 


tion.  And  the  question  was:  What  did  I 
think  were  Soviet  aims?  Where  did  I 
think  the  Soviet  Union  was  going?  And  I 
had  made  it  clear  to  them,  I  said:  "I 
don't  have  to  offer  my  opinion.  They 
have  told  us  where  they're  going  over 
and  over  again.  They  have  told  us  that 
their  goal  is  the  Marxian  philosophy  of 
world  revolution  and  a  single  one-world 
Communist  state  and  that  they're 
dedicated  to  that."  And  then  I  said: 
"We're  naive  if  we  don't  recognize  in 
their  performance  of  that,  that  they  also 
have  said  the  only  morality"-remember 
their  ideology  is  without  God,  without 
our  idea  of  morality  in  the  religious 
sense.  "Their  statement  about  morality 
is  that  nothing  is  immoral  if  it  furthers 
their  cause,  which  means  they  can  resort 
to  lying  or  stealing  or  cheating  or  even 
murder  if  it  furthers  their  cause  and 
that  is  not  immoral.  Now,  if  we're  going 
to  deal  with  them,  then  we  have  to  keep 
that  in  mind  when  we  deal  with  them." 
And  I've  noticed  that  with  their  own 
statements  about  me  and  their  attacks 
on  me  since  I  answered  that  question 
that  way- it  is  the  only  statement  I  have 
made- they  have  never  denied  the  truth 
of  what  I  said. 

Q.  You  don't  think  that  name- 
calling,  if  you  could  call  it  that,  makes 
it  more  difficult  when  you  do  finally, 
whenever  that  is,  sit  down  across  the 
table  from  Mr.  Brezhnev  and  his 
cohorts? 

A.  No,  I've  been  interested  to  see 
that  he  has  suggested  having  a  summit 
meeting  since  I  said  that. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  another  question 
about  being  tough  with  the  Russians. 
When  Ambassador  Dobrynin  of  the 
Soviet  Union  drove  over  to  the  State 
Department  for  the  first  time  after  the 
Administration  came  in,  his  car  was 
turned  away  at  the  entrance  to  the 
basement  garage  which  he  had  been 
using,  told  that  he  had  to  use  the 
street  door  like  all  the  other  diplomats 
had  been  doing.  It  was  obviously 
tipped  to  the  press  that  this  was  going 
to  happen.  What  advantage  is  there  in 
embarrassing  the  Soviet  Ambassador 
like  that?  A  phone  call  would  have 
said:  "Hey,  you  can't  use  that  door  any 
longer."  Was  that  just  a  macho  thing 
for  domestic  consumption  or— 

A.  I  have  to  tell  you,  I  didn't  know 
anything  about  it  until  I  read  it  in  the 
paper,  saw  it  on  television  myself.  I 
don't  know  actually  how  that  came  about 
or  what  the  decision  was,  whether  it 
was  just  one  of  those  bureaucratic 
things  in  the- 


Q.  You  didn't  ask  Secretary  Haig 
about  it? 

A.  No,  and  I  just  don't  know- 

Q.  Don't  you  think  the  Russians 
kind  of  think  we're  childish  when  we 
pull  one  like  that? 

A.  I  don't  know.  I  don't  know,  or 
maybe  they  got  a  message. 

Q.  What  conditions  do  have  to  be 
satisfied  before  you  would  agree  to  a 
summit  meeting  with  Brezhnev? 

A.  There  are  some  things  that  I 
think  would  help  bring  that  about.  The 
main  thing  is  you  don't  just  call  up  and 
say:  "Yes,  let's  get  together  and  have 
lunch."  A  summit  meeting  of  that  kind 
takes  a  lot  of  preparation,  and  the  first 
preparation  from  our  standpoint  is  the 
pledge  that  we've  made  to  our  allies, 
that  we  won't  take  unilateral  steps.  We'll 
only  do  things  after  full  consultation 
with  them  because  they're  involved  also. 

And,  I've  had  an  opportunity  to  talk 
a  little  bit  about  it  just- it  only  came  to 
light,  his  statement- a  short  time  ago 
with  Prime  Minister  Thatcher  when  she 
was  here.  So  we  haven't  had  the  oppor- 
tunity for  the  consultations  about  that 
that  would  be  necessary. 

I  have  said  that  I  will  sit  and  nego- 
tiate with  them  for  a  reduction  in  strate- 
gic nuclear  weapons  to  lower  the 
threshold  of  danger  that  exists  in  the 
world  today.  One  of  the  things-you  say 
conditions -I  think  one  of  them  would  be 
some  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet 
Union  that  they  are  willing  to  discuss 
that.  So  far,  previous  Presidents,  in- 
cluding my  predecessor,  tried  to  bring 
negotiations  to  the  point  of  actual  reduc- 
tion and  the  Soviet  Union  refused.  They 
refused  to  discuss  that.  I  think  that  we 
would  have  to  know  that  they're  willing 
to  do  that. 

I  think  it  would  help  bring  about 
such  a  meeting  if  the  Soviet  Union 
revealed  that  it  is  willing  to  moderate  its 
imperialism;  its  aggression  of  Afghani- 
stan would  be  an  example.  We  could  talk 
a  lot  better  if  there  was  some  indication 
that  they  truly  wanted  to  be  a  member 
of  the  peace-loving  nations  of  the  world, 
the  free  world. 

Q.  Isn't  that  really  what  you  have 
to  negotiate?  I  mean,  is  it  really  con- 
ceivable that  you're  going  to  get  such 
a  change  of  heart,  a  change  of  state- 
ment, that  you  could  believe  on  the 
part  of  the  Soviet  Union  before  you 
ever  sit  down  to  talk  with  President 
Brezhnev? 


The  President 


A.  Is  that  subject  a  negotiation?  If 
you  sit  at  a  table  and  say:  "We  want  you 
to  get  out  of  Afghanistan,"  and  they're 
going  to  say  "no,"  what  do  you  do?  Offer 
them -let  them  go  in  someplace  else  if 
they'll  get  out  of  there? 

I  remember  when  Hitler  was  arming 
and  had  built  himself  up -no  one  has 
created  quite  the  military  power  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has,  but  comparatively  he 
was  in  that  way.  Franklin  Delano 
Roosevelt  made  a  speech  in  Chicago  at 
the  dedication  of  a  bridge  over  the 
Chicago  River.  And  in  that  speech  he 
called  on  the  free  world  to  quarantine 
Nazi  Germany,  to  stop  all  communica- 
tion, all  trade,  all  relations  with  them 
until  they  gave  up  that  militaristic 
course  and  agreed  to  join  with  the  free 
nations  of  the  world  in  a  search  for 
peace. 

Q.  That  did  a  whale  of  a  lot  of 
good. 

A.  But  the  funny  thing  was  he  was 
attacked  so  here  in  our  own  country  for 
having  said  such  a  thing.  Can  we  honest- 
ly look  back  now  and  say  that  World 
War  II  would  have  taken  place  if  we  had 
done  what  he  wanted  us  to  do  back  in 
1938?  I  think  there's  a  very  good  chance 
it  wouldn't  have  taken  place.  But  again, 
as  I  say,  some  evidence  from  the  Soviet 
Union,  I  think,  would  be  very  helpful  in 
bringing  about  a  meeting. 

Q.  It  sounds  as  if  you're  saying 
that  there  isn't  going  to  be  any  sum- 
mit meeting  with  Brezhnev. 

A.  No,  I  haven't  put  that  as  a  hard 
and  fast  condition.  I'm  just  saying  that 
in  discussing  with  our  allies,  it  would 
make  it  a  lot  easier  if  we  were  able  to 
say:  "Well,  now  look,  they've  shown 
some  signs  of  moderating  their  real  im- 
perialistic course."  When  we  look  at 
where  we  are  and  with  their  surrogates, 
Qadhafi  in  Chad,  Cuba  in  Angola,  Cuba 
and  East  Germans  in  Ethiopia,  in  South 
Yemen,  and,  of  course,  now  the  attempt 
here  in  our  own  Western  Hemisphere  - 

Q.  I  hate  to  belabor  this,  but  since 
the  whole  world  is  looking  forward,  I 
think,  to  eventually  some  negotiations 
to  stop  the  arms  race,  to  get  off  of  this 
danger  point,  it  is  an  important  thing, 
and  I  gather  that  the  Soviet  Union  has 
to  make  a  unilateral  move  — to  their 
point,  it  would  be  backwards.  They'd 
have  to,  let's  say,  get  out  of  Afghani- 
stan. Do  they  have  to  get  out  of  Af- 
ghanistan before  you'd  meet? 


A.  No,  I  haven't  said  that,  and  I 
can't  really  say  a  specific  answer  to  any 
of  these  things  unless  and  until  I  have 
met  with  and  discussed  this  whole  prob- 
lem with  allies  who,  you  know,  are  only 
a  bus  ride  away  from  Russia. 

Q.  They  seem  to  be  saying,  as  near 
as  we  can  tell,  in  their  press  and  else- 
where, that  they're  saying  they're  anx- 
ious for  you  to  meet  on  arms  control. 
They're  anxious  to  get  arms  control 
discussions  going.  They're  terribly 
concerned  about  that.  'They're  fearful 
that  you're  not  going  to  want  to  nego- 
tiate until  such  time  as  you  get  your 
defense  program  and  your  economic 
program  through  Congfress  and  feel 
that  you're  negotiating  from  strength 
and  that  they're  fearful  that  that's  go- 
ing to  be  some  time.  And  too  late. 

A.  Too  late  for  what  is  the  question. 
No,  I  don't  know,  but  I  do  believe  this: 
that  it  is  rather  foolish  to  have  unilater- 
ally disarmed,  you  might  say,  as  we  did 
by  letting  our  defensive -our  margin  of 
safety  deteriorate  and  then  you  sit  with 
the  fellow  who's  got  all  the  arms,  what 
do  you  have  to  negotiate  with?  You're 
asking  him  to  come  down  to  where  you 
are  or  you  to  build  up  to  where  he  is, 
but  you  don't  have  anything  to  trade. 
So,  maybe  realistic  negotiations  could 
take  place.  When?  We  can  say:  "Well,  all 
right.  This  thing  that  we're  building  we'll 
stop  if  you'll  stop  doing  whatever  it  is 
you're  really  doing." 

Q.  You  campaigned  on  lifting  the 
grain  embargo  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
You  delayed  in  doing  that  so  far 
because  you,  I  gather,  feel  it  would 
send  the  Russians  the  wrong  message, 
perhaps,  if  you  did.  Senator  Helms  has 
suggested  perhaps  if  the  embargo  — 
grain  embargo— should  be  extended  to 
a  general  boycott  of  all  U.S.  trade 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  Is  that  an  op- 
tion that  you're  studying? 

A.  I  don't  think  you  rule  out  any- 
thing. Actually,  my  campaigning  was 
more  on  my  criticism  that  the  embargo 
shouldn't  have  taken  place  the  way  it  did 
in  the  first  place -that  if  we  were  going 
to  go  that  route,  then  it  should  have 
been  a  general  embargo.  We  shouldn't 
have  asked  just  one  segment  of  our 
society  and  not  even  agriculture,  just  the 
grain  farmers,  to  bear  the  burden  of 
this,  when  at  the  same  time  we  knew  we 
could  not  enforce  or  persuade  friendly 
nations  to  us  who  would  be  tempted  to 
take  over  that  market  and  many  of  them 
did  start  supplying  the  grain  that  we 


(Its 


weren't  supplying.  So  the  question  v  ^ 
Were  we  hurting  ourselves  worse  th 
we  were  hurting  them? 

Certainly  it  didn't  stop  the  invas 
of  Afghanistan.  And  I  criticize  this, 
the  same  time -and  we  have  made  i 
decision  now  on  it -I  would  like  to  1: 
the  embargo.  I  think  all  of  us  would 
at  the  same  time,  now  and  with  Pol: 
added -the  situation  in  Poland  to 
Afghanistan  and  all -we  have  to  thi 
very  hard  as  to  whether  we  can  just 
forward  unilaterally  and  do  this. 

Q.  Because,  in  effect,  it  has  b«  'I 
effective.  They  are  having  problem 
with  gfrain  supply  there,  aren't  the 

A.  I  think  they'll  always  have  p  | 
lems  with  supply  because  they  insist 
that  collective  farm  business  which 
never  has  worked  and  isn't  going  to 
work  in  the  future. 

You  know,  this  is  something  tha 
I've  never  been  able  to  understand  i 
the  Russian  leaders.  Wouldn't  you  tl 
some  time  they  would  take  a  look  at 
their  system  and  say:  "We  can't  pro 
enough  food  to  feed  our  people" -to 
nothing  of  other  consumer  items  th; 
are  still  rationed  and  scarce  in  supp 
under  that  system -"and  yet,  we  cai 
look  at  these  other  countries  in  the 
world,  all  the  countries  that  chose  t 
way,  not  only  the  United  States,  bu' 
South  Korea,  Taiwan,  all  the  countr 
that  choose  the  free  marketplace,  tH 
standard  of  living  goes  up  and  up.  /I  '' 
we  have -our  problem  isn't  one  of  ni  '•• 
raising  enough  food,  it's  not  finding    ''- 
enough  places  to  sell  it."  1  * 

!  'i 

Q.  What  place  do  you  think  hu^  mi 

rights  should  have  in  our  foreign     u 

policy?  I  sta 

A.  I  think  human  rights  is  very  .;( 
much  a  part  of  our  American  idealisi  ^ 
think  they  do  play  an  important  part  jj 
My  criticism  of  them,  in  the  last  few  i^i, 
years,  was  that  we  were  selective  ^Lj, 
regard  to  human  rights.  ^  Jf 

We  took  countries  that  were  pro  ^ 
Western,  that  were  maybe  authorita  j 
in  government,  but  not  totalitarian-  ))| 
more  authoritarian  than  we  would  (,j 
like -did  not  meet  all  of  our  principk  ^ 
what  constitutes  human  rights  and  « 
punished  them,  at  the  same  time  tha<  '*i 
were  claiming  detente  with  countrieJ  '^ 
where  there  are  no  human  rights.  Tli  * 
Soviet  Union  is  the  greatest  violator'  '" 
day  of  human  rights  in  all  the  world'  ''I' 
Cuba  goes  along  with  it,  and  yet,  *' 
previously,  while  we  were  enforcing  |™ 
human  rights  with  others,  we  were  6 


ler 


i(« 


lei 


m 


tk: 


The  President 


ut  bettering  relations  with 
5  Cuba.  I  think  that  we  ought  to 
;  sincere  about  our  position  on 
rights. 

[)o  you  believe  that  our  re- 
ents  for  military  allies  and 
hould  take  precedence  over 
rights  considerations? 

'    No,  I  think  what  I'm  saying  is 
''"jere  we  have  an  alliance  with  a 
that,  as  I  say,  does  not  meet  all 
-we  should  look  at  it  that  we're 
«r  position  remaining  friends,  to 
e  them  of  the  rightness  of  our 
human  rights  than  to  suddenly, 
ive  done  in  some  places,  pull  the 
from  under  them  and  then  let  a 
^ly  totalitarian  takeover  that 
hat  human  rights  the  people 


([  Doesn't  that  put  us  in  the  posi- 
„j  tier  of  abetting  the  suppression 
jj  n  rights  for  our  own  selfish 
,|(.    least  temporarily,  until  such 
pj  It  we  can  make  those  per- 
.j  changes? 

ill  UTiat  has  the  choice  turned  out 
"P  lie  choice  has  turned  out  to  be 
■  (     all  human  rights  because 
tl*    totalitarian  takeover. 
se 

J  OUT  appointment  to  the  head 
[u  unan  rights  section  over  at 
J    B  Department  is  Mr.  Ernest 

of  course.  He  testified  to  the 
s  abcommittee  in  1979:  "In  my 
t !  United  States  should  remove 
ll  statute  books  all  clauses  that 
I!  a  human  rights  standard  or 
ci  I  that  must  be  met  by  another 
pai  nation."  Do  you  agree  with 
la  statement? 

.  /e  never  had  a  chance  to 
^  ith  him  just  how  he  views  that 
it  le  believes  the  course  would 
I',  however,  believe  that  con- 
Q  ome  of  the  attacks  against 
Tl  he's  as  concerned  about  human 
ajthe  rest  of  us.  But  I  think  what 
^  is  that  basic  human  rights  and 
'ijion  of  them  are  being  ignored 
re  they  take  place  in  the  Com- 
oc  nations. 

J  says  also  that  we  should  not 
•ned  with  South  Africa's 
icies  but  should  make  the 
I  full-fledged  partner  of  the 
c  tates  in  the  struggle  against 
st  expansion.  Should  we  drop 
concerns  about  human  rights 
Africa? 


News  Conference  of  March  6 
(Excerpts) 


Q.  Your  Secretary  of  State  has  said 
that  you  would  strongly  oppose  a 
right-wing  takeover  of  the  government 
in  El  Salvador,  while  your  own  White 
House  spokesman  has  been  less 
definite.  Just  how  strongly  would  you 
oppose  such  a  coup,  and  would  it 
result  in  a  complete  cutoff  of 
American  aid,  both  economic  and 
military? 

A.  I  think  what  we're  all  intending 
to  say  is  that  we  would  have  to  view 
very  seriously  such  an  attempt  and  such 
a  coup.  We're  there  at  the  request  of  the 
government.  We're  supporting  a  govern- 
ment which  we  believe  has  an  intention 
of  improving  the  society  there  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people,  and  we're  opposed 
to  terrorism  of  the  right  or  left.  And  so, 
we  would  have  to  view  very  seriously -I 
can't  answer  the  last  part  of  your  ques- 
tion as  to  exactly  what  we  would  do,  but 
it  would  be  of  the  gravest  concern  to  us 
if  there  were  such  a  thing. 


Q.  I'd  like  to  ask  you  a  two-part 
question  on  El  Salvador.  First,  is  a 
naval  blockade  an  option  you  are  con- 
sidering? And  second,  given  the  fact 
that  several  Americans  have  been 
murdered  in  El  Salvador  in  the  last 
several  weeks  and  the  advisers  you're 
sending  there  could  well  be  a  special 


A.  No,  no,  and  I  think,  though,  that 
there's  been  a  failure,  maybe  for  political 
reasons  in  this  country,  to  recognize 
how  many  people-black  and  white -in 
South  Africa  are  trying  to  remove  apar- 
theid and  the  steps  that  they've  taken 
and  the  gains  that  they've  made.  As  long 
as  there's  a  sincere  and  honest  effort  be- 
ing made,  based  on  our  own  experience 
in  our  own  land,  it  would  seem  to  me 
that  we  should  be  trying  to  be  helpful. 
And  can  we  again  take  that  other 
course?  Can  we  abandon  a  country  that 
has  stood  beside  us  in  every  war  we've 
ever  fought,  a  country  that  strategically 
is  essential  to  the  free  world?  It  has  pro- 
duction of  minerals  we  all  must  have 
and  so  forth. 

I  just  feel  that,  myself,  that  here,  if 
we're  going  to  sit  down  at  a  table  and 
negotiate  with  the  Russians,'  surely  we 
can  keep  the  door  open  and  continue  to 


target  for  terrorists,  how  do  you  in- 
tend to  provide  for  the  personal  safety 
of  those  advisers?  And  do  you  envision 
the  need  for  American  troops  as  any 
sort  of  a  security  force  for  those  ad- 
visers? 

A.  There  almost  were  three  parts  to 
your  question,  so  let  me  say  the  first 
part  is,  I  won't  comment  on  anything  we 
might  be  considering  in  the  line  of  an  ac- 
tion with  regard  to  the  safety  of  our 
personnel.  We're  taking  every  precau- 
tion we  can.  We  realize  that  there  is  a 
risk  and  a  danger.  None  of  them  will  be 
going  into  combat.  None  of  them  will  be 
accompanying  El  Salvadoran  troops  on 
missions  of  that  kind.  They  will  be  in 
what  has  to  be  considered  as  reasonably 
safe  a  place  as  there  can  be  in  that  coun- 
try in  garrison. 

They  are  there  for  training  of  the  El 
Salvador  personnel.  We  can't,  I'm  sorry 
to  say,  make  it  risk-free,  but  we  shall  do 
our  utmost  to  provide  for  their  safety. 

Q.  Do  you  not  see  the  need  for 
American  troops  as  security  forces,  in 
other  words? 

A.  No,  that  is  not  in  our  reckoning 
at  all.  We  think  we're  abiding  by  what 
is -nor  has  it  been  requested.  We've  had 
requested  the  people  that  we  have  sent 
there  already,  and  we  don't  foresee  the 
need  of  any  American  troops. 


negotiate  with  a  friendly  nation  like 
South  Africa. 

Q.  The  Argentinian  Government 
has  just  arrested  internationally  re- 
spected heads  of  the  principal  human 
rights  organization  there,  seized  their 
list  of  6,000  persons  who've  disap- 
peared under  this  government.  Is  the 
United  States  going  to  protest  that? 

A.  That  just  happened,  as  you 
know,  and  I  haven't  had  an  opportunity 
to  meet  with  Secretary  Haig  on  this.  In 
fact,  the  only  information  that  so  far  has 
been  presented  to  me  is  that  it  did  hap- 
pen. 


'  Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


• 


The  President 


Q.  The  United  States  role  [in  El 
Salvador]  is  being  compared  with  its 
role  in  Vietnam  15-20  years  ago.  Do 
you  think  that's  a  valid  comparison? 
And  also,  how  do  you  intend  to  avoid 
having  El  Salvador  turn  into  a  Viet- 
nam for  this  country? 

A.  I  don't  believe  it  is  a  valid 
parallel.  I  know  that  many  people  have 
been  suggesting  that.  The  situation  here 
is,  you  might  say,  our  front  yard;  it  isn't 
just  El  Salvador.  What  we're  doing,  in 
going  to  the  aid  of  a  government  that 
asked  that  aid  of  a  neighboring  country 
and  a  friendly  country  in  our  hemi- 
sphere, is  try  to  halt  the  infiltration  into 
the  Americas  by  terrorists,  by  outside 
interference  and  those  who  aren't  just 
aiming  at  El  Salvador  but,  I  think,  are 
aiming  at  the  whole  of  Central  and  pos- 
sibly later  South  America -and,  I'm 
sure,  eventually  North  America.  But  this 
is  what  we're  doing,  is  trying  to  stop 
this  destabilizing  force  of  terrorism  and 
guerrilla  warfare  and  revolution  from 
being  exported  in  here,  backed  by  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Cuba  and  those  others 
that  we've  named.  And  we  have  taken 
that  evidence  to  some  of  our  allies.  So,  I 
think  the  situation  is  entirely  different. 

We  do  not  foresee  the  need  of 
American  troops,  as  I  said  earlier,  in 
this,  and  we're  sending,  what,  some 
50-odd  personnel  for  training.  We  have 
such  training  squads  in  more  than  30 
countries  today,  so  this  isn't  an  unusual 
thing  that  we  are  doing. 


Q.  There  appears  to  be  a  debate 
within  your  Administration  over 
whether  to  have  mandatory  or  volun- 
tary limits  on  Japanese  auto  imports. 
Have  you  decided  which  you  would 
recommend  going  with? 

A.  We  haven't  reached  a  decision  on 
this.  We  have  a  task  force  under 
Secretary  of  Transportation  Drew 
Lewis.  We've  had  one  meeting  with  the 
task  force -a  Cabinet  meeting -and  the 
second  meeting  is  scheduled  for  next 
week,  and  until  then,  no  decisions  have 
been  made.  Such  things  are  part  of  the 
considerations  as  well  as  whatever 
special  things  we  can  do,  mainly  in  the 
lifting  of  regulations  that  have  made  it 
more  costly  to  build  American  cars  and 
so  forth.  All  of  this  is  going  to  be 
discussed  and  a  decision  made  when  we 
have  the  final  report  in  from  the  task 
force. 

I  think  also  that,  again,  we  get  back 
to  our  economic  program.  I  think  that  in 


itself  is  one  of  the  first  steps  in  helping 
not  only  that  industry  but  other  indus- 
tries. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  ask  this  question  in 
context  of  the  campaign.  One  of  the 
major  issues  was  what  was  called  the 
"war  issue"  at  that  time,  in  fact  the 
question  of  whether  you  would  be 
more  toward  war  than  Mr.  Carter. 
And  in  fact,  exit  polls  showed  that 
some  of  those  who  voted  did  feel  that 
you  might  get  us  into  one  faster.  The 
first  major  issue  in  foreign  policy  has 
been  El  Salvador,  which  has  been 
called  risky  and  reckless  by  some,  and 
which  the  allies— who  you  have  shown 
in  your  many  times  that  are  very  im- 
portant and  key  to  any  question  — have 
not  jumped  on  the  bandwagon  sup- 
porting you  in  El  Salvador.  In  fact,  in 
Canada  there's  some  controversy. 
Aren't  you  worried  about  that  fact, 
especially  since  you  go  to  Canada  this 
week? 

A.  Not  really,  when  you  stop  to 
think  that  I  didn't  start  the  El  Salvador 
thing.  I  inherited  it.  And  the  previous 
Administration,  which  probably  was  as 
vociferous  as  anyone  in  talking  about  my 
threat  to  peace,  they  were  doing  what 
we're  doing -sending  aid  to  El  Salvador 
of  the  same  kind  of  aid  that  we're  send- 
ing. I  don't  think  that  I'm  doing 
anything  that  warrants  that  charge, 
while  I  didn't  think  I  warranted  it 
before.  And  I've  been  here  more  than  6 
weeks  now  and  haven't  fired  a  shot. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  In  addition  to  your  decision  to 
send  military  aid  and  advisers  to  El 
Salvador,  what  specific  steps  have  you 
taken  to  insure  that  human  rights 
violations  there  are  not  repeated? 

A.  What  steps  to  be  sure  that 
human  rights  violations  will  not  be  re- 
peated? As  you  know,  an  investigation 
was  going  forward  with  regard  to  an 
episode  that  happened  before  I  took 
office.  But  in  addition  to  the  military  aid, 
we  are  also  supplying  general  aid,  and 
they  know  our  position  with  regard  to 
the  reforms  that  the  Duarte  government 
has  been  trying  to  implement -the  land 
reform,  creating  of  farms  for  the  former 
tenants -and  we  support  all  of  that.  And 
one  of  our  reasons  for  the  support  of 
this  government  is  because  we  believe 
that  they  do  hold  out  the  best  hope  for 
improving  the  conditions  of  the  people  of 
El  Salvador. 

We're  mindful  of  that,  and  we  think 
that  the -when  the  terrorists  them- 
selves, the  guerrillas,  boast  of  having 


killed -and  they  give  a  number  son" 
where  above  6,000  people  in  the  las 
year -and  that's  their  own  claim  of 
they've  accomplished,  we  think  we 
helping  the  forces  that  are  support! 
human  rights  in  El  Salvador. 


pi 

ii'ii 
iitf 
gitl 


\s' 


ii 


Q.  In  advance  of  your  trip  to 
tawa  next  week,  the  most  serious 
bilateral  tension  between  Canada 
the  United  States  remains  the  un- 
ratified east  coast  fishing  and  bounce 
aries  treaty.  Are  you  committed  t 
finding  a  solution  acceptable  to  tl 
Canadians,  or  are  you  prepared  t( 
the  fishing  portions  of  the  treaty, 
least,  put  into  diplomatic  limbo? 

A.  No,  I  don't  want  to  see  ther 
diplomatic  limbo,  and  I  want  to  see 
settlement  of  this  whole  issue  and  " 
so  informed  our  people  on  the  Hill 
that.  But  this  meeting -this  is  goin;^ 
be  the  first  meeting,  and  it's  going 
one  of  kind  of  establishing  a  base  fif-t 
future  negotiations.  I  don't  know 
whether  we  will  get  down  to  hard  i 
and  make  any  settlements  in  a  first 
meeting  of  this  kind,  but  we'll  certj^ . 
lay  the  groundwork  for  trying  to  e\i  ,, 
nate  anything  that  could  divide  us  it  ■, 
main  a  stumbling  block  to  better  ref^' 
tions.  This  is  part  of  what  I  talked 
all  during  the  campaign,  from  my  t 
announcement  on,  and  that  is  to  si 
here  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
building  an  accord  between  the  tl 
great  countries  of  North  America 
Canada,  the   United  States,  and  M( 

I'm  sure  that  all  of  these  thin: 
be  out  on  the  table  when  we  get  thi  i: 
but  we'll  set  an  agenda  for  trying  t( 
resolve  them.  ; 


« 


lyi 


111 


Q.  The  Canadian  Government 
an  energy  plan  calling  for  50%  Ca 
dianization  of  oil  interests  in  thiM 
country  and  also  added  taxation  0>  . 
their  production.  It's  a  plan  that! 
caused  some  shift  of  exportation  i 
Canada  to  the  United  States.  Whii 
will  you  be  advising  Mr.  Trudeau 
week  when  you  visit  with  him  on 
plan?  And  how  is  it  going  to  affecl 
U.S.  investments  in  that  country? 

A.  I  wish  you  were  asking  mef  e! 
after  we'd  had  the  meeting.  Thin] 
this  kind  I  would  rather  not  state 
in  advance.  These  are  things  I  woi 
want  to  take  up  when  I  get  there 
see  how  we  can,  as  I  say,  set  an 
for  getting  them  resolved. 

With  regard  to  energy,  I  am 
mined  that  the  proper  goal  for  us  |W 
be  energy  independence  in  the  Unite 


h 


THE  SECRETARY 


til 


not  that  we  would  take  advan- 
either  of  our  neighbors  there 
jard  to  energy  supplies. 

Would  you  advise  Mr.  Trudeau 
w  in  your  footsteps  and  speed 
introl  of  oil  and  gasoline  in 
uitry  as  you  have  done  here? 

lo  There's  a  little  touchy  ground  in 
oil  leeting  to  try  and  advise  some- 
nil  w  to  run  their  country.  I  don't 
M  at  I'll  do  that.  I  might  talk  about 
bji've  done. 

o|  •       •       .       . 

dl  As  you  well  know,  Turkey  has 
it;  t  hard  during  the  SVz  years' 
«!  nbargo  from  the  United  States. 
iconsider  to  increase  aid  to 
on  or  above  the  amount  Presi- 
Crter  suggested  for  fiscal  1982, 
IS  S700  million?  And  also, 
1  ou  favor  a  military  grant  to 


L.  -this  is  an  awful  thing  to  con- 
!  an't  really  out  of  all  the  pro- 
'  member  where  that  figure 


5.  'he  $400  million  is  the  military 
mthe  $300  million  is  the  eco- 

:  d. 

L.  'es,  but  I  mean  I  can't  recall 

ir  figures  stand  in  comparison 
.  lut  I  know  that  basically  our 
0  ly  is  one  of  continued  aid.  And 
r  the  problems  that  have  existed 
Turkey  and  another  friend  and 
irs,  Greece,  we  are  hopeful  that 
we  can  do  in  resolving  any  of 
d  ences  there  we  want  to  do.  But 

0  itries  are  vital  to  us.  I  consider 

1  southern  plank  of  the  NATO 

;  ,  yes,  I  think  there  will  be  im- 
i  'lations. 


.  t  your  first  press  conference 
vfi!  asked  about  the  Soviet  grain 
"g ,  and  you  said  there  were 

(ly  two  options  — either  to 

"If 


it  or  to  broaden  it.  Can  you 

hich  it's  going  to  be,  and  if 

^  n't  reached  a  decision  yet,  can 

IS  what  factors  are  still  at 
,? 


A.  'e  haven't  reached  a  decision 
Df  us  would  like  to  lift  the  em- 
still  think  that  it  has  been  as 
II  0  the  American  farmer  as  it 
fef  to  the  Soviet  Union.  But  the 
has  changed  from  the  time 
^as  first  installed. 


Secretary  Haig  Interviewed  for 
French  Television 


Secretary  Haig  was  interviewed  for 
French  television,  Antenne  2,  at  the 
Department  of  State  on  Februa'ry  23, 
1981.^ 

Q.  Leonid  Brezhnev,  just  today,  said 
that  he  wishes  to  resume  a  dialogue 
with  the  United  States  despite  the 
bellicose  words  of  the  Americans. 
What  is  your  first  reaction  to  that? 

A.  First,  you  catch  me  at  some  dis- 
advantage because  we  have  not  had  the 
opportunity  to  either  read  the  full  text 
of  Mr.  Brezhnev's  speech  nor  to  analyze 
it  with  the  care  that  we  would  like -and 
even  more  importantly,  to  discuss  its  im- 
plications with  our  European  and  Atlan- 
tic community  partners.  I  think  this  is 
an  essential  aspect  of  our  approach.  But 
I  must  say  that  we  are  very  interested 
in  what  Mr.  Brezhnev  did  have  to  say. 

Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  "in- 
terested"? What  meaning  do  you  give 
to  the  word  "interested"  as  it  relates 
to  American  policy? 

A.  I  think  the  first  glance  at  some 
of  the  excerpts  I've  seen  suggest  there 
are  some  new  overtones  in  Mr. 
Brezhnev's  pronouncements,  but  these 
clearly  have  to  be  clarified  and  analyzed 
with  great  care.  And  I  think  it  is  some- 
times counterproductive  to  be  too  eager 
to  cast  value  judgments  until  we've  had 
a  chance  to  analyze,  study,  and  consult 
with  our  partners  on  this  subject. 


I  was  against  it  at  the  time.  I  didn't 
think  it  should  have  been  used  as  it  was, 
that  if  we  were  going  to  follow  that 
road,  we  should  have  gone  across-the- 
board  and  had  a  kind  of  quarantine.  We 
didn't.  But  now  we  have  to  look  at  the 
international  situation,  the  way  it  is,  and 
see  what  would  be  the  effect,  not  just  on 
the  use  of  grain  but  the  whole  effect  and 
what  would  it  say  to  the  world  now  for 
us  to  just  unilaterally  move. 

We're  hopeful  that  we  can  arrive  at 
a  settlement  and  a  decision  on  this  and 
one  that  will  benefit  our  farmers. 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  ol  Mar.  9,  1981.  ■ 


Needless  to  say,  we  welcome  a 
dialogue  with  the  Soviet  Union  on  a  host 
of  differences  that  divide  us,  and  as  you 
yourself  pointed  out,  we  have  had 
already  some  comments  to  make  with 
respect  to  the  nature  of  Soviet  inter- 
national behavior  as  we  perceive  it  over 
the  last  5  years. 

Q.  Do  you  have  the  impression  that 
the  fact  of  having  spoken  loudly, 
strongly  since  the  new  Administration 
started  has  had  a  positive  eflfect  on  the 
Soviet  Union? 

A.  I  think  it's  much  too  early  to  tell, 
but  clearly  this  Administration -Presi- 
dent Reagan -has  felt  that  it  is  vitally 
important  that  the  United  States  enter 
into  a  period  of  greater  consistency  in 
the  conduct  of  our  affairs  abroad  with 
both  our  friends  and  allies,  members  of 
the  nonaligned  states,  as  well  as  those  of 
the  Soviet  bloc. 

He  also  feels  that  the  United  States 
must  project  an  image  of  relevancy. 
There  has  been  at  least  the  appearance 
of  what  I've  referred  to  as  the  "Vietnam 
syndrome"  where  many  of  our  friends 
have  been  confused,  befuddled,  and  fear- 
ful that  we  have,  in  that  post- Vietnam 
experience,  tended  to  withdraw  from  the 
world.  And  we've  also  talked  about 
balance.  By  balance  I  mean  a  clear 
recognition  of  the  great  number  of  con- 
tradictions that  involve  solutions  to  any 
particular  problem  area -the  need  to  in- 
tegrate political,  economic,  and  security 
aspects  of  these  problems. 

Q.  In  the  text  that  perhaps  you 
have  read,  Mr.  Brezhnev  also  proposes 
a  summit— a  Reagan-Brezhnev  sum- 
mit. Do  you  think  this  is  achievable, 
or  from  the  point  of  view  of  principle, 
would  you  find  it  desirable?  Or  do  you 
think  it's  too  soon? 

A.  I  think,  clearly— I've  already 
made  myself  clear  on  this  subject -that 
summitry  should  result  in  achievements. 
That  means  they  must  be  carefully 
prepared.  It  means  that  the  number  of 
difi"erences  that  exist  between  the  par- 
ties to  summitry  should  be  on  the  verge 
of  some  kind  of  negotiated  consumma- 
tion. Consequently,  I  think,  clearly,  we 
have  a  lot  of  preliminary  work  to  do  in 
the  areas  of  East- West  differences 
before  summitry  itself  would  be  in 
order. 


The  Secretary 


Q.  What  does  that  mean?  Does 
that  mean  that  you  are  not  ready  or 
you  are  not  in  a  hurry? 

A.  It  means  we  are  not  in  a  hurry 
for  summitry,  per  se.  We  do  anticipate 
and  would  strongly  encourage  a  dialogue 
between  ourselves  and  the  Soviet  Union 
which  I  hope  will  be  rapidly  forth- 
coming. 

Q.  Is  it  possible  that  it  will  take 
place  before  the  end  of  the  year? 

A.  I  think  it's  inevitably  self- 
defeating  to  set  deadlines  for  such  im- 
portant and  momentous  occasions.  I  do 
not  have  any  particular  set  of  deadlines; 
I  do  not  believe  Mr.  Reagan  would  have 
any.  We  feel  that  there  are  many  impor- 
tant differences.  As  you  mentioned,  we 
have  touched  upon  some  of  those 
differences  in  the  first  3  weeks  of  this 
Administration. 

Q.  Would  this  come  down  to  a 
tete-a-tete  between  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  United  States  or  do  you  think 
other  world  leaders  might  join  in? 

A.  Again,  I  don't  want  to  prejudge 
the  venues,  the  structure  of  future  talks. 
I  do  believe  these  are  matters  that 
should  be  discussed  between  alliance 
partners,  Atlantic  community  partners, 
those  of  us  who  share  common  values. 
And  that  is  another  aspect  of  this  Ad- 
ministration's foreign  policy,  and  I  think 
it  is  vitally  important.  We  intend  and 
will  proceed  with  very  detailed  and  in- 
timate consultations  with  our  partners. 

Q.  Let's  come  to  Poland.  Do  you 
fear  military  intervention  on  the  part 
of  the  U.S.S.R.,  and  what  might  you 
be  able  to  do  concretely  to  prevent 
such  military  intervention? 

A.  Here  again,  it's  been  my  ex- 
perience that  too  much  public  airing  of 
contingency  action  sometimes  precludes 
one's  ability  to  execute  those  actions  if 
confronted  with  the  fact. 

I  would  like  to  say  that  I  neither 
think  that  Soviet  interventionism  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Poland  is  imminent 
nor  inevitable,  not  at  all.  I  think  it  is 
vitally  important  that  this  difficult  and 
anguishing  situation  be  left  for  the 
Polish  people  themselves  to  work  out 
and,  hopefully,  that  process  will  be 
through  peaceful  due  process. 

Q.  That  would  be  in  the  best  of  all 
possible  cases  that  the  Poles  would  be 
able  to  solve  their  own  problems.  But 
what  we  have  understood  from  Mr. 
Brezhnev's  text  today  is  how  impor- 
tant the  Soviet  Union  considers 


Poland  to  be.  Therefore,  the  Poles 
will  not  solve  their  problems  all  by 
themselves. 

A.  I  think,  clearly,  this  is  an  an- 
guishing problem  for  the  Soviet  leader- 
ship, an  extremely  important  one.  If  you 
care  to  have  me  reiterate  the  proclama- 
tions made  by  the  NATO  family  of  na- 
tions or  other  proclamations  that  have 
been  made  unilaterally  by  all  our  mem- 
ber states  and  to  underline  the  gravity 
with  which  we  would  view  a  Soviet  in- 
terventionism, or  an  indirect  interven- 
tionism, into  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Polish  people,  I'm  happy  to  do  so.  It 
would  have  very,  very  significant  and 
very  lasting  consequences  for  whatever 
hopes  we  may  have  for  an  improving 
East- West  dialogue. 

Q.  If  that  did  happen,  what 
reprisals  would  the  United  States 
take? 

A.  I  think  this,  again,  is  a  matter 
not  for  public  rhetoric.  It  is  a  matter  for 
coordinated  consultation  among  all  of 
the  Western  states  which  I  would  hope 
would  be  in  total  concert  with  respect  to 
reaction  to  Soviet  interventionism.  And 
I'm  happy  to  say  that  consultation  has 
occurred  in  the  NATO  family  and  also  in 
a  bilateral  and  multilateral  sense. 

Q.  Do  you  think  it  will  have  to  be 
a  simultaneous  reaction  or  a  collective 
reaction  on  the  part  of  the  West  if 
such  military  intervention  were  to 
take  place  in  Poland? 

A.  I  think  both.  We  would  hope  for 
simultaneity  in  certain  Western  reac- 
tions, but  we  also  benefit  from  the  in- 
dividual character  of  each  of  our  mem- 
ber states'  own  national  contributions  to 
any  international  problem.  So  I  would 
say  the  answer  is  both. 

Q.  How  do  you  define  the  present 
situation?  Do  you  think  it  is  just  one 
more  crisis  — a  simple  crisis  between 
East  and  West  — or  do  you  think  it  is 
the  end  of  the  period  we  have  come  to 
call  detente  as  far  as  you  are  con- 
cerned? 

A.  I  don't  like  to  characterize  this 
particular  event,  which  was  not  neces- 
sarily a  set  of  circumstances  wished  for 
by  either  the  East  or  the  West.  That's 
clear.  I  do  not  like  to  indulge  in  value 
judgments  on  detente  per  se.  It's  clear 
that  recent  history  suggests  that  the  in- 
terpretation of  detente  between  the  two 
sides  has  left  some  profound  differences. 
So  I  like  to  talk  about  a  new  era  in 


Isti 


itco 


tit! 


fpr 

V 
isli 

iin 

ttrt 

Ike 


al 


which  we  seek  an  East- West  relatic 
ship  which  is  premised  and  built  arc 
reciprocity,  restraint,  and  a  clear  ui 
pinning  on  the  part  of  the  West  of  ; 
background  of  appropriate  military 
capability  to  underline  this  relations 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  detente  1 
really  rebounded  to  the  benefit  of 
Soviets  over  the  last  few  years? 

A.  There  again,  I  think  it  isn't 
question  of  maintaining  a  tactical 
scoreboard.  I  do  think  that  the  dual 
responsibility  encompassed  in  the  p 
detente  would  suggest  that  the  Sov 
Union  has  been  engaged  in  a  perioc 
excess  and  dangerous  risk-taking  tc 
precedented  historic  interventionisr 
areas  outside  the  normal  sphere  of 
Soviet  influence -in  Africa,  the  two 
Yemens,  in  Afghanistan,  clearly  in 
Southeast  Asia,  in  Kampuchea.  Ant 
you  know,  we  are  today  gravely  co) 
cerned  about  at  least  Soviet  supporjito 
Cuban  interventionism  in  this 
hemisphere. 

Q.  Do  you  have  proof  which  y 
consider  to  be  irrefutable  regardii 
Communist  military  assistance  to 
leftist  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador? 

A.  There  can  be  no  question  ahi^i?. 
this.  We  have  today  released  some 
the  documented  evidence  which  suj 
the  characterization  that  you  yours) 
gave  it -irrefutable.  There  is  no  qu< 
about  that. 

Q.  If  this  aid  continues -if  w«  *' 
understand  correctly  what  we  ha^'  lit 
been  hearing  from  the  United  Stw  ij 
you  are  ready  to  go  as  far  as  in^ 
stituting  a  blockade  against  Cubail! 
That  has  been  said.  „ 


A.  I  think  again -and  I'm  sure  - 
are  referring  to  Mr.  Meese's  [Edwii « 
Meese  III,  Counselor  to  the  PresideAits 
interview  yesterday  -  iliin 

Q.  Yes,  yes.  W 

A.  -in  which  he  did  not  preclj   « 
that  action,  together  with  a  whole  i  bS 
of  other  political,  economical,  and     a 
security-related  steps  which  the  Uni  ^ 
States  could  take.  I  don't  want  to  0  In 
tribute  to  any  premature  raising  of  ij, 
sions  with  respect  to  this  but  to  mffl  u 
underline  the  fact  that  the  United  S  n 
considers  this  an  unacceptable  code 
conduct  in  this  hemisphere  as  we  do  * 
Africa  and  elsewhere,  and  that  cleai 
the  time  has  come  for  a  better  unde 
standing  of  what  the  acceptable  sti 
ards  of  international  behavior  are  i 
in  the  period  ahead  if  we  are  to  < 


"I 


The  Secretary 


s  between  East  and  West  and 
a  desirable  atmosphere  of  inter- 

*  stability, 
i  belief-the  increasing  belief- 
sirable  and  social  historic  change 

Hi  accomplished  by  rule  of  force 
eternal  sources  is  clearly  not  com- 
with  the  kind  of  world  that  I 
[r.  Reagan  and  I  know  our  West- 
•opean  partners  so  earnestly 
r. 

Do  you  think  that  all  of  these 
f  problems  reflecting  situations 
ig  inequalities  and  a  lack  of 
ustice,  all  of  these  might  be 

iiy  force?  And  don't  you  think 
kind  of  policy  you  are  precipi- 
ertain  countries  into  despair 
}  the  arms  of  those  you  wish  to 


m 


el 


no 


li 


i[» 


; 


Ai  There  are  two  questions  here, 
think  it  is  clear  that  the  era  of 
colonialism  or  imperialism, 
associated  with  the  language 
forth,  is  over.  And  I  know  that 
ricans  are  at  the  forefront -the 
■  d,  if  you  will -of  those  who  are 
.  |to  promote  social  justice  in  a 
',,  hg  world.  But  I  do  not  believe 
lal  justice  can  be  achieved  by  ex- 
ttervention  and  by,  perhaps,  the 
ion  of  totalitarian,  Marxist 
for  undesirable  authoritarian 
for  example.  That  neither 
101  Be  purpose  of  social  justice  nor 
neet  the  vital  objectives  of  the 
world. 


m 


\i 

(l   lut,  concretely,  doesn't  this 

JS   fg  lead  you  to  supporting  dic- 

regimes  in  Central  and  South 

Ci 

think  clearly  that  has  not  and 
be  the  case.  But  you  know,  one 

Ei^es  a  dialogue  with  historic 
utside  the  glare  of  public 
ing,  if  you  will,  in  an  at- 
e  of  normal  relationships,  not  by 
ion  of  paranoia  or  the  substitu- 
ormal  relationships  for  public 

i'lit^  lation  and  criticism,  which 
cumbent  leaders  less  able  to 
itructively  with  the  movement 
luralistic  structures  that  we  all 
the  achievements  in  the  human 
ea,  which  is  so  vitally  important 
us. 

'*'t   OT  you.  El  Salvador  is  the  test, 
the  good  conduct  of  the  Com- 
' 'i    ountries.  Is  that  it? 


tlf 


lo,  I  wouldn't  portray  it  as  a 
1.  I  would  portray  it  as  another 


manifestation  in  a  very  critical  area  at 
the  doorstep  of  the  United  States.  The 
situation  itself,  the  dynamics  of  that 
situation,  are  such  that  it  makes  it  very 
fragile  and,  therefore,  very  time  - 
urgent. 

But  I  would  view  the  illegal  in- 
terventionism  of  the  Soviet  Union  or 
their  proxies -forces  that  they  have 
funded,  trained,  and  transported  to 
target  areas,  whether  it  be  in  Africa  or 
Southeast  Asia  or  in  Europe  proper -to 
be  unacceptable  to  the  standards  we 
hope  to  achieve  in  a  peaceful,  stabilized, 
thriving  world. 

Q.  You  are  denouncing  interven- 
tionism  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  their 
interference  in  certain  countries. 
Aren't  you  about  to  do  the  same  thing 
as  you  undertake  to  prevent  attempts 
to  take  power  in  El  Salvador?  Aren't 
you  promising  to  engage  in  your  own 
kind  of  interventionism? 

A.  I  think  this  is  an  important  ques- 
tion, and  again,  I  think  the  facts  have  to 
be  maintained  in  the  vision  of  your 
viewers. 

As  you  know,  there  has  just  recently 
been  concluded  a  major  offensive  by  the 
so-called  liberation  forces  in  El  Salvador. 
Prior  to  that  time,  and  only  in  the  last 
days  of  the  Carter  Administration,  did 
the  United  States  provide  any  military 
equipment  to  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador,  and  that  occurred  at  a  time 
when  they  were  racked  in  the  final 
phases  of  the  Cuban-sponsored  and 
-supported  offensive.  So  I  do  not  believe 
that  such  a  charge  is  either  appropriate 
or  correct. 

I  would  also  like  to  emphasize  that  it 
is  not  our  intention  in  El  Salvador  to 
engage  ourselves  along  the  model  of 
Southeast  Asia.  As  we  have  said 
repeatedly,  the  problem  must  be  dealt 
with  at  the  source,  and  in  this  instance, 
clearly  it's  Cuba. 

Q.  What  do  you  intend  to  do  to  see 
to  it  that  the  present  situation  in  Af- 
ghanistan does  not  become  a  fait  ac- 
compli! 

A.  This  is  a  very  important 
challenge  facing  the  Western  world,  and 
probably  the  Soviet  leadership  as  well. 
As  you  know,  this  was  an  unprecedented 
extension  of  direct  Soviet  military  in- 
volvement outside  their  historic  sphere 
of  influence.  It  is  unacceptable,  and  it 
would  be  my  hope  that  the  Soviet  lead- 
ership would  soon  disengage  itself  from 
its  involvement  and  return  Afghanistan 
to  a  neutral  or  nonaligned  status. 


Q.  Would  they  suddenly  become  a 
lot  nicer? 

A.  Do  you  mean,  do  I  anticipate  a 
Soviet  leadership  that  has,  by  philo- 
sophic conviction,  engaged  in  these  ac- 
tivities historically,  although  usually 
within  a  far  more  constrained  set  of  tac- 
tics, that  we  are  going  to  recreate  the 
Soviet  Union  in  our  own  image?  No,  I 
don't  expect  so,  and  I  don't  believe  that's 
necessary  for  East  and  West  to  manage 
their  affairs  in  more  constructive  ways. 

Q.  But  you  are  not  making  Af- 
ghanistan a  prior  condition  for  im- 
proving relations  with  the  U.S.S.R.? 
What  do  you  ask  of  Moscow,  concrete- 
ly, in  addition  to  renouncing  what  it  is 
doing  in  Afghanistan? 

A.  I  don't  make  it  a  habit  of  con- 
ducting my  diplomacy  through  third  par- 
ties, and  I'm  not  going  to  do  it  this 
afternoon.  But  I  think  the  rigid  score- 
keeping  chart  for  improving  East- West 
relations  is  not  what  the  concept  of 
linkage  is  all  about.  On  the  other  hand, 
it's  clear  that  overall  East- West  relation- 
ships, progress  in  various  functional 
areas,  including  arms  control,  credits, 
trade,  technology  transfer,  must  be 
governed  by  the  overall  conduct  of  the 
Soviet  Union  in  the  international  family 
of  nations.  And  I  would  say  that  there  is 
room  for  substantial  improvement  in 
that  overall  conduct,  not  with  specific 
ultimata  on  one  or  another  area,  but  I 
think  this  is  a  complex  matter  that 
statesmen  can  judge  with  clarity  and, 
hopefully,  with  a  constructive  outcome. 

Q.  Leonid  Brezhnev,  in  connection 
with  the  intermediate  range  missiles 
in  Europe,  the  ones  with  which  the 
U.S.S.R.  can  reach  Europe,  he  is  sug- 
gesting a  moratorium.  They  would 
stop  the  deployment  of  the  SS-20s, 
and  you  would  not  deploy  the  Per- 
shing lis.  Is  that  an  acceptable  idea  to 
you? 

A.  I  noted  that,  and  that  is  part  of 
the  interest  that  I  expressed  earlier.  It's 
rather  remarkable  that  such  a  proposal 
would  be  put  forward  after  the  Soviet 
Union  has  deployed  literally  hundreds  of 
SS-20s  in  an  unprecedented  buildup  and 
one  that  threatens  the  very  fiber  of 
Western  European  vitality,  while  we 
have  yet  to  take  the  corrective  actions 
that  are  called  for  in  our  own  defense. 

Q.  Upon  what  condition  are  you 
prepared  to  resume  strategic  arms 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union? 


1R 


The  Secretary 


A.  I'm  not  going  to  again  lay  out 
conditions.  We  have  made  it  clear  that 
we  are  anxious  to  have  constructive 
arms  control  talks,  that  we  would  hope 
that  such  talks  would  result  in  a  reduc- 
tion of  the  level  of  nuclear  armaments 
which  is  of  such  concern  to  us  all  today, 
and  that  we  would  hope  also  and  an- 
ticipate that  the  concept  of  linkage 
would  be  applied  to  assure  that  we  have 
corrected  the  difficulties  we  are  ex- 
periencing with  respect  to  Soviet  global 
interventionism. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has  a  nuclear  advantage  at  the 
present  time,  today? 

A.  I  think  it  is  very  hard  for  any, 
even  the  most  qualified  of  objective 
observers,  to  make  the  kind  of  value 
judgments  your  question  anticipates.  I 
think,  basically,  most  of  the  experts  ac- 
cept that  we  are  at  a  point  of  relative 
balance  and  equivalence.  But  these  same 
experts  are  gravely  concerned  that  the 
momentum  in  the  Soviet  nuclear  build- 
ing program  is  such  that  in  a  very  brief 
period,  perhaps  by  the  middle  of  this 
coming  decade,  that  equality  will  shift 
rapidly  to  Soviet  superiority.  This  is  a 
matter  of  grave  concern  to  all  of  us  and 
certainly  to  President  Reagan,  who  as 
you  know,  has  dedicated  himself  to  a 
substantial  buildup  in  American  capabili- 
ties, not  exclusively  in  the  nuclear  area, 
of  course. 

Q.  But  the  United  States,  are  you 
seeking  nuclear  parity  or  do  you  want 
to  recover  superiority? 

A.  I  think  these  terms,  superiority, 
number  one,  equality,  generate  emotion- 
al responses  from  well-meaning  people 
that  suggest  to  me  that  they  can  be 
counterproductive.  They  are  much  like 
the  term  "domino  theory"  of  a  few  years 
ago,  as  we  refer  to  the  events  in  South- 
east Asia. 

I  think  what  we  need  is  adequacy  in 
the  context  of  Western  capabilities.  Ade- 
quacy means  that  we  can  effectively 
counterbalance  Soviet  existing  inven- 
tories and,  above  all,  that  we  make  it 
clear  that  a  preemptive  first-strike  on 
the  part  of  the  Soviet  Union  would 
result  in  unacceptable  risks  to  their 
leadership  so  they  would  never  consider 
the  advantages  of  such  a  strike. 

Q.  Just  today,  you  had  talks  with 
the  French  Foreign  Minister,  Mr.  Jean 
Francois-Poncet.  How  do  you  judge 
France  as  an  ally  and  as  a  partner  of 
the  United  States? 


A.  As  you  probably  know,  I  have 
always  viewed  the  contributions  of 
France  to  Western,  and  allied,  security 
as  irreplaceable,  fundamental.  I  have 
always  viewed  American-French  bilater- 
al relationships  as  vitally  important  in 
the  broader  sense  of  international  stabil- 
ity. I  have  also  always  said  that  we 
Americans,  and  the  allies  as  a  whole,  to- 
day derive  some  benefit  from  the  inde- 
pendent character  of  the  French  con- 
tribution. 

I  have  commented  recently  on  the 
French  strategic  view,  which  has  been 
somewhat  more  foresighted  in  the 
African  Continent  in  the  developments 
in  the  Third  World,  and  I  would  hope 
that  we  would  all  learn  some  lessons  and 
attempt  to  emulate  that  French  concern. 

Q.  So  you  find  that  French  efforts 
in  the  defense  area  are  satisfactory,  at 
least  in  your  view? 

A.  I  have  been  encouraged  in  recent 
years,  as  I  watched  first-hand,  at  con- 
siderable sacrifice  to  the  French  people, 
the  determination  of  the  Government  of 
France  to  improve  its  defense  capabili- 
ties at  a  time  when  Soviet  capabilities 
are  growing  dramatically. 

I  think  it  is  important  and  significant 
that  today  France  and  the  United  States 
view  certain  key  areas  with  a  commonal- 
ity of  concern -Afghanistan,  potential 
difficulties  in  Poland,  even  the  diplomatic 
conduct  of  the  conference  in  Madrid.  All 
of  this  is  very  encouraging  to  me.  And  it 
was  clear  from  my  discussions  today 
with  your  Foreign  Minister  that  this  is 
so. 

Q.  Questions  like  Afghanistan, 
Poland  — do  you  feel  that  the  French 
positions  and  the  U.S.  positions  are 
very  close  together  in  these  areas? 

A.  Yes,  I  do.  I  think  they  are  com- 
pletely in  concert. 

Q.  At  the  same  time,  you  do  accept 
that  the  French  insist  on  being  part- 
ners, who  insist  on  equality  and  in- 
dependence? 

A.  Yes,  I  do,  and  I  recognize  that 
this  affords  a  degree  of  benefit  through 
an  alliance  that  is  made  up  of  sovereign 
nations.  We  are  not  a  monolith.  It  is  one 
of  the  great  strengths,  even  though  at 
times  it  is  a  vexing  reality  as  well.  But  I 
think  it  is  far  more  of  a  strength  than  it 
is  a  disadvantage. 

Q.  As  for  example,  France,  while 
condemning  certain  Soviet  initiatives, 
wishes  to  continue  having  direct 
dialogue  with  Moscow.  This  does  not 
bother  you,  from  your  standpoint? 


A.  No,  not  at  all.  I  think  it's  vit 
important  that  not  only  France  but 
other  powers  of  Europe,  as  well  as  i 
United  States,  maintain  a  dialogue  \ 
the  East.  On  the  other  hand,  I  wouli 
hope  that  as  a  result  of  improving  ci 
sulfations,  that  that  dialogue  would 
a  consistency  or  at  least  not  create  ( 
tradictions  in  our  overall  ability  to  d 
with  this  very  dangerous  situation.  1 
optimistic  about  that. 

Q.  Aren't  you  presenting  relat 
between  France  and  the  United  St 
a  little  bit  like  something  out  of  A' 
in  Wonderland? 


ITi'f 
lift 


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leri 

isit 


A.  I'm  not  so  sure.  The  Alice-in 
Wonderland  label  would  apply  perha 
to  East- West  relations  on  occasion, 
have  never  found  them  to  be  charac 
istic  of  French-American  relationship  jj 
You  could  cite  differences  that  exist 
tween  our  two  governments  in  the  Ilpj 
die  East,  for  example.  It's  natural  til 
our  perceptions  and  sometimes  our  > 
uations  will  differ.  But  in  that  contei 
would  hope  those  differences  would 
result  in  complicating  the  peace  proi' 
in  the  Middle  East.  I'm  optimistic  ti£^ 
they  will  not  if  we  stay  in  close  con&(  ^ 
tion. 


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Gr 


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Q.  But,  for  example,  in  a  case 
serious  tension,  do  you  have  fears 
doubts  as  far  as  France's  behavior 
concerned? 

A.  None  whatsoever.  I  have  be« 
through  sufficient  international  crisei  ~ 
during  my  tenure  in  Europe,  and  I  i 
enough  of  a  student  of  history  to  un  t' 
stand  that  France,  first  and  foremot*^ 
willing  to  bear  the  burdens  of  its  nam^^, 
hood  and  will  defend  its  national  in-  f 
terests  with  all  the  vigor  one  could  \ 

Q.  There  is  nothing  special  thW  ii 
needs  improvement  in  the  relatioM  U 
between  France  and  the  United 
States? 


iitii 
pin 


I 


A.  I  think  we  have  many  areas' 
desired  improvement.  For  example, 
mentioned  one,  that  our  perceptio 
the  Middle  East  differ  somewhat, 
think  both  of  us  would  benefit  fro: 
more  intense  dialogue. 

Q.  Should  the  United  States  1 
as  an  idea  in  its  foreign  policy  — in  < 
other  words,  since  a  general  is  at  I) 
head  of  the  State  Department,  are  (liii 
going  to  have  a  "big  stick"  type  of'  iilii 
policy?  This  is  at  least  the  image  ol  lati 
U.S.  foreign  policy  now  that  many  Jiar 
people  in  Europe  seem  to  have.        lat 


H 


The  Secretary 


vs  Conference  With  British 


H 


retary  Haig  held  a  news  con- 
with  members  of  the  British  press 
)epartmerLt  of  State  on  February 


pleased  to  have  this  opportuni- 
eak  to  what  is  essentially  our 
press  corps,  I  assume, 
ink,  first,  I  should  make  some 
aeral  comments  about  the  nature 
isit  of  the  Prime  Minister  and 
sign  Minister  to  reaffirm  what 
ady  been  said -that  these  were 
ly  productive  meetings,  both  at 
ne  Minister  and  Presidential 
nd  this  morning,  at  considerable 
our  discussions  with  Foreign 
Peter  Carrington.  I  want  you 
that  these  meetings  leave  the 
i,  at  least,  with  the  feeling  that 
ial  relationship  of  generations 
Great  Britain  and  the  United 
in  very  good,  sound  health. 
16  major  strategic  issues  that 
lus  of  a  multilateral  and  bilateral 
we  are  in  essential  agreement 
Dect  to  objectives,  although 
(.y  be,  as  one  would  expect  and 
B  and  welcome,  differences  in 
I  in  some  narrow  areas  on  some 


h( 


el 


understand  that  one  of  my 
ind  might  bring  forth  those 
»ns,  but  I  think  also  that  one 
iparticipated  personally  in  two 
my  lifetime  recognizes  the  great 
*   ii  that  anguishing  human  conse- 
Of  conflict  bring  to  the  mix  of 
It  a  heightened  concern  and  a 

itive  feel  for  the  need  for 
iping  efforts  and  international 

but  they  also  bring  forth  a 
isitivity  to  the  consequences  of 

edness  and  weakness,  vacilla- 
inconsistency.  If  that  is  "big 
n  afraid  the  arsenal  is  out. 

9  you're  not  a  hawk?" 

think  these  labels  are  some- 
ileading.  I  have  no  doubt  that 
1  you  be  a  hawk  or  a  dove,  you 
3  :  the  same  thing-peace.  The 
is  how  best  to  achieve  it.  And  I 
lat  our  strength  is  the  most  im- 
Jr  :uarantee  of  our  ability  to  main- 
'ninational  peace  and  stability. 

15  release  51  of  Feb.  24,  1981.  ■ 


narrow  issues.  We  would  expect  this  be- 
tween sovereign  nations  whose  inde- 
pendence is  inherent  in  their  nationhood. 
Having  said  that,  I  say  it  really  to 
underline  the  fact  rather  than  to  em- 
phasize the  reality. 

The  discussions  this  morning  were 
very  broadranging,  involving  every 
region  of  the  globe -the  special  alliances 
that  exist  globally  with  a  strong  focus, 
of  course,  on  NATO;  discussions  on  the 
recent  problems  in  this  hemisphere;  dis- 
cussions focused  on  Africa,  the  Middle 
East,  Southeast  Asia,  China,  Pacific  - 
you  name  it;  some  other  functional  areas 
of  bilateral  interest  between  us. 

Clearly,  the  issue  in  Poland,  Afghan- 
istan, and  East- West  relations  in  general 
were  topics  of  major  discussion  and  ex- 
change. In  these  areas  I  can  assure  you 
that  there  was  complete  and  total  ac- 
cord. 

I  think  it's  important  that  this  meet- 
ing took  place  very  early  on  in  this  Ad- 
ministration. As  you  know,  we  have  had 
some  attention  to  our  hemispheric  north- 
ern neighbors  and  southern  neighbors. 
But  the  first  European  discussions  of 
this  character  have  taken  place  with 
Great  Britain,  with  the  Head  of  State  or 
Head  of  Government.  That's  as  it  should 
be,  and  it's  traditional. 

Having  said  all  this,  now  I  welcome 
your  questions  on  any  topic  that  you 
would  care  to  raise,  recognizing  that  I 
wOl  be  my  usual,  specious  self. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  You  mentioned  that  there  were 
some  specific  areas  of  disagreement.  I 
wonder  if  you  can  tell  us  what  meet- 
ing of  minds  there  was  on  the  Middle 
East,  and  particularly  on  the  Euro- 
pean initiative  there. 

A.  I  don't  even  like  to  use  the  term 
"European  initiative."  I  would  prefer  to 
approach  the  subject  with  the  recogni- 
tion that  clearly  our  European  partners 
have  a  vital  interest  in  the  Middle  East 
situation,  the  Arab-Israeli  dispute,  and 
other  ongoing  problem  areas.  And  it  is 
natural  and  to  be  anticipated  that  they 
would  have  a  view. 

I  think  the  discussions  today  clearly 
indicated  that  the  objectives  of  Euro- 
pean involvement  in  this  area  of  the 
world  coincide  with  our  own  objectives 
in  the  broad  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  our 
hope,  of  course,  that  whatever  our  Euro- 


pean partners  do  in  this  area  not  com- 
plicate nor  necessarily  put  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  what  has  been  ongoing  dis- 
cussions for  a  period  of  years. 

I'm  not  a  novice  on  this.  I  started 
out  with  the  period  before  shuttle 
diplomacy,  lived  through  it,  witnessed 
events  leading  up  to  the  peace  treaty 
here  under  the  Carter  Administration  — 
referred  to  as  the  Camp  David  accords. 
We  continue  to  be  vitally  interested  and 
intend  to  be  active  in  this  process  in  ac- 
cordance with  U.N.  Resolutions  242  and 
338.  We  would  hope  that  what  our 
European  partners  feel  they  contribute 
to  this -and,  clearly,  they  can— not 
result  in  complicating  this  process. 
These  things  were  discussed  in  some 
detail  this  morning,  and  I  don't  an- 
ticipate a  problem. 

Q.  Your  allies  are  known  to  be 
concerned  about  the  possibility  of 
America  embroiling  itself  more  deeply 
in  El  Salvador.  Do  you  think  that  the 
Europeans,  in  your  view,  understand 
the  seriousness  of  the  situation  there? 

A.  Yes,  but  I  think  there  is  a  level 
of  communication  that  has  not  been 
achieved  to  the  point  where  they  share 
our  views  completely.  The  reasons  for 
that  are  simply  that  we  have  not 
brought  this  matter  to  our  partners'  at- 
tention through  the  consultative  process. 
We  have  begun.  It  had  not  occurred 
before  the  trip  of  Ambassador  Eagle- 
burger  [U.S.  Ambassador  to  Yugoslavia 
Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger]  on  my  behalf 
starting  2  weeks  ago. 

As  a  consequence  of  those  consulta- 
tions, both  bilateral  and  in  the  NATO 
forum  and  other  fora,  we  have,  I  think, 
generally  received  a  full  level  and  a  full 
measure  of  support  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  problem -that  there  is,  indeed,  ir- 
refutable evidence  of  sizable  Cuban  and 
Eastern  intervention  in  this  hemisphere 
through  the  provision  of  arms,  training, 
and  other  guerrilla-type,  guerrilla- 
supporting  activity. 

I  don't  think  we've  had  any  difficulty 
in  achieving  the  consensus  there.  There 
may  be  some  exception.  But  in  general 
those  powers  wdth  which  we  consulted 
were  understanding  and  agreed. 

There  is  a  different  level  of  percep- 
tion. I  find  most  of  it  in  the  case  of  proc- 
lamations by  those  who  were  not  in- 
volved in  the  consultations,  suggesting 
that  perhaps  there's  a  difference  in  our 
objectives  in  El  Salvador  proper  with 
respect  to  the  regime  -the  El  Salvador- 
an  junta  or  whatever  you  want  to  refer 
to  it  as— the  Duarte  government.  And  I 
think  this  is  also  a  problem  of  lagging 
communication. 


The  Secretary 


I  wouldn't  want  anyone  here  to 
think  that  we  are  not  very,  very  con- 
cerned about,  if  you  will,  the  improve- 
ments that  are  necessary  in  the  Saiva- 
doran  regime.  That  means  we  expect  to 
see  progress  toward  pluralization,  to- 
ward the  achievement  and  preservation 
of  human  rights,  toward  the  rejection  of 
excesses  by  the  right  as  well  as  the  left. 
This  has  been  the  focal  point  of  Ameri- 
can policy  in  this  El  Salvadoran  situa- 
tion for  the  past  year. 

We  had  no  reason  to  expect  that  our 
European  partners  would  be  as  attuned 
to  our  concerns  in  this  area  as  I  feel  the 
facts  would  justify.  And  that's  a  problem 
of  communications  on  which  we're  going 
to  have  to  work  and  we're  continuing  to 
work. 

But  in  general  I'm  extremely  pleased 
with  the  results  of  the  first  round  of 
consultation,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  we  could  fill  the  gap  in  this 
other  area. 

I  don't  want  you  ladies  and  gentle- 
men to  feel  that  we're  wedded  to  any 
particular  outcome,  as  long  as  it's  the 
consequence  of  the  free,  independent 
decision  of  the  people  of  El  Salvador. 
The  first  order  of  business  must  be  to  in- 
sist that  the  wholesale  provision  of  ex- 
ternal influence  on  this  situation  be  ter- 
minated. 

Q.  But  to  achieve  that  goal,  how 
far  is  America  prepared  to  go? 

A.  That's  a  very  good  question.  I 
think  it  suffices  to  say  that  we  consider 
Cuban  interventionism  in  this  hemi- 
sphere on  our  own  doorstep  as  no  longer 
tolerable,  no  longer  acceptable.  Beyond 
that  I  think  there  are  a  host  of  vehicles 
available  to  us  to  bring  that  point  for- 
ward and,  in  fact,  to  insure  that  it  is 
realized  ultimately.  I'm  not  trying  to 
turn  your  knuckles  white.  [Laughter] 

Q.  Do  you  think  your  allies  have  a 
clear  understanding  of  what  your 
policy  is  and  what  you  are  likely  to  do 
if  pressed? 

A.  I  think  they  have  a  clear  under- 
standing that  the  actions  underway  and 
undertaken  by  Cuba  are  unacceptable. 
We're  in  the  process  of  considering  the 
number  of  options  through  which  to  deal 
with  that  problem.  So,  of  course,  they 
don't  know  because  we  haven't  arrived 
at  any  decisions  on  our  own  part. 

Q.  Are  you  asking  the  allies  to  do 
anything  beyond  give  verbal  support 
to  the  U.S.  position  at  this  point? 


A.  No,  we're  not  asking  it.  We  have 
reminded  them  that  what  is  occurring 
here  in  this  hemisphere  is  of  vital  in- 
terest to  them  as  well  as  to  us.  We  have 
seen  this  kind  of  activity  take  place 
wholesale  in  the  continent  of  Africa, 
which  many  of  our  European  partners 
can  feel  somewhat  more  concerned 
about  perhaps.  But  I  would  suggest  that 
this  is  a  global  level  of  unacceptable  con- 
duct, managed  in  general  by  the  Soviet 
Union  and  applied  in  specific  cases  by 
their  proxies. 

Q.  One  of  your  predecessors  used 
the  term  "no  longer  acceptable"  or 
"unacceptable,"  speaking  about  the 
Russian  presence  in  Cuba.  Are  you 
worried  at  all  that  using  this  kind  of 
wording  puts  you  in  a  problem  of  hav- 
ing to  do  something  about  it  now? 

A.  I  think  ultimately  that,  of  course, 
remains  to  be  seen.  If  one  uses  that 
language,  it  clearly  is  a  manifestation  of 
a  decision  to  deal  with  the  problem;  and 
we  intend  to. 

Q.  There  seemed  to  be  a  slight 
difference  in  the  language  employed  by 
the  Prime  Minister  this  morning  in 
her  interview  with  CBS  in  which,  in- 
stead of  speaking  generally  about  the 
statement  which  had  been  issued  by 
the  Foreign  Commonwealth  OflBce  be- 
fore she  left  London,  she  did  speak 
about  the  importance  of  allowing  the 
citizens  of  El  Salvador  to  sort  out 
their  own  problems  without  interven- 
tion from  outside.  Then  she  went  on 
to  specify  arms  supplies  to  the  guer- 
rillas. But  it  seemed  that  the  use  of 
the  words  "intervention  from  outside" 
might  very  well  apply  to  the  U.S.  ad- 
visers—or whatever  you  might  have  in 
mind.  Did  you  feel  that  was  her  mean- 
ing? 

A.  No.  I  would  not  have  anticipated 
that  was  her  meaning.  I  wouldn't  pre- 
sume to  speak  for  the  Prime  Minister; 
she's  more  than  capable  of  speaking  for 
herself.  I've  known  that  for  a  number  of 
years,  and  I  admire  her  ability  to  do  so. 
But  I  think  it's  important  that  we  keep 
in  mind  that  there  was  no  decision, 
there  was  no  military  assistance  to  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador  by  the 
American  Government  until  the  final 
stages  of  the  Carter  Administration,  and 
in  the  wake  of  the  major  guerrilla  offen- 
sive during  which  the  Cuban  arms  in- 
volvement, Soviet  and  Eastern  Euro- 
pean involvement,  began  to  surface. 

It  would  hardly  be  appropriate  to 
describe  American  activity  thus  far  as 
"intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  El 


Yf 

ID,! 

in 
iffl 
b( 
(So 


M 
Ki 


Salvador" -precisely  the  opposite, 
matter  of  fact,  many  of  you  ladies 
gentlemen,  many  of  the  critics  of  ai 
Salvadoran  policy,  are  insisting  tha 
be  somewhat  more  hyperactive  in  o 
volvement. 

So  I  don't  think  that  was  the  in 
tion  of  the  Prime  Minister  this  mor 
because  we  have  not  added  but  one 
to  the  presence  down  there  in  the  c 
text  of  increased  involvement  since  s, 
Carter  period. 

We  are  considering  now  a  numl 
options  which  are  designed  to  be  su 
that  the  regime  can  survive  to  appl; 
democratic  reforms  we  are  seeking, 
realize  the  will  of  the  El  Salvadorar  Ian 
pie  free  from  external  intimidation 
pressure.  Sov 

Q.  I  think  the  interpretation  1 
some  people  were  placing  on  her 
words  was  not  a  criticism  of  wha^ 
going  on  now  but  the  possibility  t 
you  might  be  going  to  introduce  l)^,or 
numbers  of  advisers. 

A.  There  was  absolutely  nothisBtk 
the  discussions  held  over  the  past  2|liiii 
that  would  suggest  that  that  was  tlfttr 
tent  of  the  Prime  Minister's  remark  t 
but  she  will  have  to  speak  for  herse  ^ 

Q.  To  what  extent  would  you 
a  back-off  by  the  Soviet  Union  anci , 
Cuba  from  supplying  El  Salvador  ' 
arms  to  the  holding  of  a  summit  v<  ™ 
Mr.  Brezhnev  or  possible  talks  ab(  '" 
talks  starting  the  SALT  process  a  ° 
or  resuming  the  theater  nuclear  di  ' 
cussions?  „ 

A.  I  think  it's  very  important  U  ^ 
when  we  surface  the  term  "linkage"*;*! 
and  you're  referring  to  linkage -tha 
not  misread  the  American  view  of  til,, 
phenomenon  which  we  consider  to  H  « 
reality,  whether  we  claim  it  to  be  on  :eii 
We  have  to  be  consistent  in  the  seni  i 
we  believe  it  is  a  reality.  Therefore^  lisi 
insist  that  it  exists.  |  m 

Whenever  in  the  history  of  relai  ai 
between  states  has  there  been  a  voii  a 
linkage?  It  must  be  there;  it  is  thertj  !ti 
is  a  fact  of  life.  « 

Having  said  that  and  espousing*  sej 
selves  as  advocates  of  linkage,  or  ha  si 
portrayed  ourselves  as  advocates  of  J  . 
age,  I  would  not  want  to  suggest  thS  ' 
what  we're  talking  about  is  a  mechai  " 
tic  scorekeeping,  day-to-day  rundowil'i' 
explicit  reciprocity.  r 

What  we  are  talking  about  is  a  Mi) 
eral  Soviet  demeanor  in  the  internaHJrii 
al  environment  which  clearly  is  devdlji 
the  kind  of  excess  illegal  activity  we^''^ 


The  Secretary 


led  in  recent  months  and  years 
f  in  Africa,  Angola,  Ethiopia, 
n  Yemen,  northern  Yemen,  cer- 

i  Kampuchea,  unquestionably  Af- 
an,  and  now,  more  recently,  here 
)wn  hemisphere. 
;  our  view  that  you  cannot  pro- 
functional  areas  of  relationships 
Soviet  Union  across  the  broad 
m  of  functional  areas -trade, 
technology  transfer,  agricultural 

*fs,  or  arms  limitations -until  a 
of  greater  reciprocity  and 
t  is  evident.  That's  without  put- 
coreboard  up  or  suggesting  arms 

■PI  talks.  More  importantly,  negotia- 
nnot  proceed  without  an  abso- 
ean  slate.  What  we're  talking 
modifica':ions  in  the  current  con- 
Soviet  activity  abroad. 

'ould  you  just  be  a  little  bit 
iti  lecise  about  the  summit? 
«li  ?ou  want  to  see  this  change  in 
demeanor  discussed  at  the 
or  would  it  have  to  take  place 


think  what  is  important  is  not 
timata  on  the  table  with  respect 
itry.  I  think  it's  more  important 
e  what  our  approach  to  sum- 
)uld  be.  What  President  Reagan 
id  and  reiterated  on  several  oc- 
ire  his  views  with  respect  to  it. 
,,  we  clearly  expect,  anticipate, 
ome  talks  between  ourselves 
Soviet  Union  in  the  number  of 
:tional  and  important  difference 
e  touched  upon. 

n  it  comes  to  summitry,  I  think 
President's  view— and  I  think 
ng  him  accurately,  and  it  hap- 
oincide  with  my  own  personal 
at  summitry  is  a  very  special 
liplomacy.  It  requires  detailed, 
reparation.  It  should  not  be 
en  unless  the  prospects  for  suc- 
the  outcome  of  such  summitry 
rising  because  of  that  detailed 
erely  to  have  heads  of  state  and 
ent  meet  just  to  be  meeting  or 
ad  such  meetings  resulting  in 
oiition  is  clearly— and  we've  had 
:es  with  this  in  the  past  - 
;elf-def eating  in  the  extreme, 
itend  to  avoid  it. 

}  iould  it  be  fair  then  to  say 
summit  cannot  take  place  un- 

e  )viets  show  this  pattern  of 
ihavior  around  the  world? 

would  be  fair  to  suggest  that 
•ican  contemplation  of  future 
:ii  'is  going  to  be  materially  in- 
by  our  assessment  of  corre- 


iil 


11 


sponding  Soviet  global  activity  and  that 
that  assessment  will  clearly  precede  the 
summitry. 

Q.  Did  anything  helpful  emerge  in 
these  discussions  in  the  way  of  Euro- 
pean help  with  the  American  desire  to 
strengfthen  the  ability  to  influence  and 
protect  the  areas  in  the  Middle  East 
and  Persian  Gulf  where  the  oil  comes 
from? 

A.  I  think  it's  important  that  I  por- 
tray our  discussions  accurately.  Clearly, 
we've  discussed  in  detail  the  Middle 
East,  its  strategic  importance  to  the 
West  at  large,  and,  from  the  standpoint 
of  our  mutual  interests,  we  discussed  it 
from  the  standpoint  of  Arab-Israeli  dif- 
ferences; we  discussed  it  from  the  stand- 
point of  energy  needs  of  the  West;  and 
we  discussed  it,  perhaps  even  more  im- 
portantly, from  the  standpoint  of  broad 
strategic  concerns -and  that  involves 
the  activities  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
Afghanistan,  potential  involvement 
elsewhere,  and  increased  capability  to 
project  their  power  into  that  area.  All  of 
these  things  are  interrelated  and,  I 
think,  require  a  very  careful  degree  of 
synchronization. 

Someone  said,  "Are  you  putting  one 
in  priority  over  the  other?"  The  answer 
to  that  is  "No,  but  they  must  be  dealt 
with  in  tandem  and  in  parallel  and  with 
coherence,  one  with  the  other." 

Q.  Did  the  subject  of  these  guns 
of  Northern  Ireland  come  up  in  your 
discussions  with  Lord  Carrington? 

A.  Of  guns? 

Q.  There's  an  outstanding  British 
request  for  some  handguns  for  the 
Northern  Ireland  police  which  were 
held  up. 

A.  I'm  aware  of  that  issue.  There 
was  no  specific  discussion  that  I  partici- 
pated in,  but  it  does  not  mean  to  sug- 
gest there  will  not  be. 

Q.  What  broadly  did  you  tell  Lord 
Carrington  about  the  likely  course  of 
U.S.  policy  toward  Namibia?  Will  you 
pursue  the  five-power  initiative  which 
is  currently  languishing? 

A.  There  were  discussions  held  both 
between  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
President  and  Mr.  Carrington  and 
myself.  Clearly,  we  are  in  the  process 
now  in  this  Administration,  which  has 
been  here  a  very  brief  period  of  time,  of 
assessing  our  overall  future  policies  in 
southern  Africa  and  on  the  African  Con- 
tinent as  a  whole.  I  don't  think  we're  far 


enough  along  in  that  assessment  to  go 
beyond  that  simple  statement.  Clearly, 
we're  very  much  aware  of  the  ongoing 
events  there  —the  Geneva  conference 
that  took  place  recently  and  upcoming 
discussions  in  the  United  Nations.  We 
would  hope  that  all  parties  concerned, 
including  our  British  partners,  would 
give  us  an  opportunity  to  conclude  our 
assessments. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  cost- 
effectiveness  of  NATO,  especially  in 
Europe,  and  could  you  say  what  kind 
of  reaction  you  got  to  recent  sugges- 
tions that  America  would  like  the 
European  countries  to  increase  their 
spending  on  NATO? 

A.  I  would  be  misleading  you  were  I 
to  suggest  that  we  got  into  detailed 
discussions  on  cost-effectiveness  with 
respect  to  NATO.  I  also  want  to  em- 
phasize that  our  concerns -this  Ad- 
ministration's concerns -do  not  involve 
or  are  not  focused  exclusively  and  do 
not  involve  preoccupation  with  the 
burden-sharing  issue  and  the  failure  of 
our  Western  European  partners  to  do 
enough. 

Our  concern  is  that  none  of  us  is 
doing  enough.  I  left  Europe  with  that 
fundamental  impression,  despite  the  fact 
that  there  have  been  some  improve- 
ments. I  was  encouraged  by  those  im- 
provements. 

I  think  any  assessment  of  East- West 
balances  today,  both  within  the  NATO 
framework  and  globally,  suggest  that 
each  of  us  is  going  to  have  to  continue 
to  bear  what  is  an  extremely  onerous 
burden  of  high  defense  spending.  All  of 
the  other  objectives  that  we  are  seeking 
to  achieve  today,  together  and  unilater- 
ally, are  going  to  be  influenced  by  our 
willingness  and  ability  to  keep  an  accept- 
able balance  between  East  and  West  in 
military  capability.  That  balance  has 
been  trending  in  a  worrisome  direction— 
or  that  lack  of  balance,  depending  on 
how  precise  you  want  to  be. 

You  see,  I  have  been  "safforized" 
and  "time-a-sized"  [laughter]  and 
"London-sized,"  and  so  I  have  to  be 
very,  very  careful  about  my  ingenuity 
with  the  mother  tongue.  [Laughter] 

Q.  Are  you  looking  for  a  wider 
role  for  NATO  outside  present 
geographical  limits? 

A.  I've  discussed  this  issue  at 
length.  As  recently  as  I  think  a  year 
ago,  I  submitted  a  paper  to  the  con- 
ference that  our  Strategic  Studies  In- 
stitute had  in  Brussels.  I  pointed  out  the 
following:  Whether  we  in  the  West  like 


19 


The  Secretary 


it  or  not,  NATO  is  going  to  be  increas- 
ingly influenced  by  events  occurring  out- 
side its  geographic  borders.  Whether  we 
like  it  or  not,  that  is  a  fact  of  life.  I  said 
that  some  6  years  ago  to  the  horror  of 
some  of  my  NATO  compatriots,  and  I've 
said  it  repeatedly  ever  since.  I  think 
historic  events  would  underline  that  it 
was  a  correct  statement. 

Now,  did  I  mean  by  that  that  I'm 
suggesting  and  have  I  ever  suggested  or 
does  this  Administration  propose  that 
the  formal  borders  of  the  alliance -and 
I'm  not  including  in  that  the  minor  ad- 
justments in  the  naval  areas,  which  I 
think  are  far  more  manageable  if  we'd 
get  to  it,  but  I'm  talking  in  a  broader 
sense -that  we  should  be  seeking  the  ob- 
jective of  dramatically  broadening  the 
perspective  of  the  alliance? 

My  answer  to  that  is  it  is  not  politi- 
cally feasible.  And  I  do  not  anticipate  it 
in  the  near  term.  But  I  do  welcome,  and 
I  do  believe,  that  the  NATO  Secretary 
General's  overwatch  brief  should  be  ex- 
panded, that  consultations  should  occur 
throughout  on  troubled  areas  throughout 
the  globe.  And  I'm  pleased  to  say  that 
this  is  increasingly  the  case. 

I've  also  suggested  that  when  NATO 
is  unwilling  or  unable  to  conduct  these 
discussions  and  these  consultations 
within  the  15,  they  must  not  and  cannot 
be  expected  to  have  a  right  to  complain 
when  others  use  other  fora  to  do  that. 

Q.  You  say  it's  not  politically 
feasible.  Are  you  talking  about  ex- 
panding the  membership  of  the  allies 
or  are  you  saying  that  it  is  not 
politically  feasible  at  all  now  or  a  lit- 
tle bit  later? 

A.  No.  I  meant  not  in  the  member- 
ship area  at  all.  Clearly,  we  have  some 
expansion  objectives  there  that  we'd  like 
to  see. 

I'm  talking  about  the  geographic 
planning  and  military  coordination 
responsibilities  for  the  alliance  and 
political  consultation,  formal  respon- 
sibilities beyond  the  borders  of  NATO 
into  perhaps  the  Persian  Gulf  or  the 
Middle  East  or  Africa  or  wherever  else 
you  may  be  concerned. 

Q.  Have  you  had  time  to  consider 
the  point  that  Mr.  Geoffrey  Pattie 
made  at  the  Munich  conference  recent- 
ly where  he  suggested  that  some  form 
of  NATO  presence  shall  be  stationed 
outside  the  geographical  area? 

A.  As  I  say,  I  am  not  horrified  nor 
am  I  chagrined.  In  fact,  I  welcome  such 
innovative  suggestions  because  I  think 
it's  vitally  important  that  NATO  recog- 


nize that  we  cannot  take  an  ostrich  at- 
titude with  respect  to  events  occurring - 
and  especially  illegal  Soviet  interven- 
tionisms  outside  the  confines  of  the  for- 
mal borders  of  the  alliance. 

Q.  There  is  nothing,  of  course,  to 
stop  individual  NATO  nations  taking 
initiatives  in  that  direction. 

A.  Not  at  all. 

Q.  Are  you  more  hopeful  about  the 
possibilities  of  that? 

A.  Yes.  I  would  anticipate,  if  the 
fact  from  the  current  state  of  affairs  is 
clear,  that  we  have  experienced  in  the 
West  a  number  of  setbacks  recently  of 
some  consequence  to  our  vital  interests. 
I  would  anticipate  discussions  and  I 
would  hope  concerted  action  by  nations 
immediately  threatened  and  those  West- 
ern European  and  North  American— and 
perhaps  Asian -powers  which  have  a 
vital  interest  as  well. 

One  of  the  great  problems  with  the 
NATO  forum  is  that  each  of  our  nations 
has  a  different  stake  in  the  outcome  of 
one  of  these  Third  World  crisis  areas. 
And  so  the  problem  of  developing  a  con- 
sensus is  always  an  anguishing  one  and 
sometimes  an  impossible  one. 

Q.  With  Lord  Carrington,  was  any 
concern  raised  about  possible  cuts  in 
U.S.  foreign  aid  to  Third  World  coun- 
tries? 

A.  We  did  not  discuss  this,  but  I'm 
happy  to  do  so  because  I  had  a  press 
conference  this  morning  in  the  White 
House  on  this  subject  that  seemed  to 
range  far  and  wide  from  that  topic.  But 
we've  just  completed  a  very  detailed 
assessment  in  compliance  with  our  re- 
sponsibilities for  the  President's 
economic  program.  It's  resulted  in  some 
sharp  retrenchments -about  $1.8  billion 
retrenchment  in  the  fiscal  year  1982  pro- 
gram. And  that  would  be  about  a  26% 
cut  overall.  We've  done  this  because  we 
feel  that  we  have  got  to  be  participants 
in  this  vitally  important  objective  of 
President  Reagan.  We've  done  it  be- 
cause we  believe  we  cannot  exercise  ade- 
quately and  appropriately  American 
leadership  and  influence  abroad  if  we 
are  perceived  to  be  unable  to  manage 
our  internal  economy. 

I've  spent  4V2  years  in  Europe,  and  I 
can  assure  you  that  the  declining  value 
of  the  American  dollar  was  not  driven 
exclusively  by  fiscal  imperatives.  It  re- 
flected a  number  of  other  influences,  one 
of  which  was  the  perception  abroad  and 


'e 


:l!f 


the  declining  level  in  confidence  that  [ 
Americans  had  enough  discipline  left 
pull  up  our  socks  and  get  our  runaw 
double-digit  inflation  under  control, 
get  our  productivity  back  on  the  tra( 
to  become  competitive  with  our  gooc 
abroad  to  the  degree  that  we're  caps  f 
with  our  high  levels  of  technology,  a 
to  manage  our  energy  problem  both 
through  conservation  and  alternate 
sources  effectively. 

I  think  this  is  a  fundamental  asp 
for  America,  just  as  it  is  for  Great  E 
tain,  if  we  intend  to  be  major  partici 
pants  in  the  world  scene  and  to  hav( 
influence  felt.  And  so  we  are  partici] 
ing  in  that. 

But  having  said  that,  I  can  assu) 
you  we're  going  to  meet  all  of  our  c( 
mitments  to  both  the  multinational 
banks  and  all  of  our  commitments  t(  W 
bilateral  partners.  In  fact,  in  the  art  '^ 
bilateral  aid  I  would  anticipate  some 
crease  in  the  period  ahead  while  we 
experiencing  some  retrenchment,  re 
ing  primarily  from  stretch-out  of  pa 
ments,  while  meeting  those  paymen 
ultimately  in  the  multinational  oblig 
tions  we  have.  I  hope  I've  answered  5^' 
your  question  without  hoisting  mysc  "'' 
my  own  petard. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  the  Middli 
East  soon? 

A.  I  hope  to  make  a  visit  in  the 
near  future.  ^^ 

Q.  This  year?  |  ,^ 

A.  Yes. 

Iilf 
tilt 


w 


m 


'  Press  release  54. 


h 
to« 
»e 
itki 
Ail 
inkii 
am 


pre 
ttla 
to. 


The  Secretary 


iretary  Haig  Discusses 
eign  Assistance 


:o  ••etary  Haig  made  the  following 

s  to  reporters  at  the  Old  Ex- 
iii  Office  Building  on  February  27, 


P 


nei 


lidi 


nt  to  take  just  a  few  minutes  to 
ord  about  the  overall  subject  of 
ti(  assistance  and  our  approach  to 
ticipation  in  the  President's 
economic  program  which  we  con- 
be  vital. 

jsJ^ou  know,  foreign  assistance  is  a 
lor  budgetary  item  on  our 
government  budget.  But  it  is  a 
nportant  one,  important  in  the 
of  our  objectives  abroad -hu- 
an  and  developmental -and  the 
of  vital  U.S.  interests  as  well, 
lave  in  the  Department  of 
very,  very  close  consultation 
Stockman  [David  Stockman, 
of  the  Office  of  Management 
>re  IS^'-l  ^"^"^  1^'^  team,  attempted  to 
a  effort  which  we  think  is  vital 

that  our  reductions  in  the 
ire  across-the-board.  That's 
the  way  we  have  moved,  with 
ition  that  I'll  touch  upon. 
jl,  nappy  to  note  that  the  Depart- 
State  is  carrying  its  share  of  the 
a  burden.  For  example,  for  1982 
3  will  achieve  a  reduction  of 
.8  billion,  or  a  26%  reduction  in 
all  foreign  aid  allocation;  the 
cuts  that  are  of  such  current 
and  the  focus  of  such  attention. 
B  going  to  be  able  to  do  that  as 
')f  an  intense  effort  in  the  De- 
over  the  last  4  weeks  in  such  a 
we  will  honor  all  of  the  com- 
that  the  United  States  has 
th  in  our  multinational  or  multi- 
mking  arrangements  and  in  our 
arrangements  with  a  number  of 
governments. 

re  going  to  be  able,  we  are  con- 
preserve  the  humanitarian  and 
ental  objectives  of  our  overall 
am.  And  most  importantly  of 
insider  that  we'll  be  able  to 
strategic  objectives  of  the 
bates  for  which  the  aid  program 
onducted,  on  behalf  of  which, 
nticipate  that  this  is  going  to 
16  reductions  that  I've  talked 
iproved  management  of  our 
Bsistance  programs,  the  eiimi- 
a  number  of  "nice  to  have"  but 
tial  items,  and  in  some  instan- 


1 


ces  the  stretching  out  of  obligatory 

payments  within  overall  commitments 
that  we  found  existed  at  the  time  we 
assumed  responsibility. 

With  respect  to  the  last  point - 
stretching  out  - 1  want  to  emphasize  that 
we  are  in  an  evolutionary  way  tending 
toward  greater  emphasis  on  bilateral 
rather  than  multilateral  assistance.  Now 
we  hope  to  do  that,  I  emphasize  again, 
in  an  evolutionary  not  a  revolutionary 
way.  That  doesn't  mean  we're  turning 
our  backs  on  multilateral  lending  institu- 
tions and  assistance  institutions,  hardly 
at  all. 

But  it's  been  our  experience  that  we 
achieve  greater  precision  and  greater 
value  to  the  American  taxpayers  if  we 
emphasize  bilateral  assistance. 

This  happens  also  to  be  very  consist- 
ent with  the  Republican  Party  platform 
adopted  and  voted  for  by  the  American 
people.  Why  have  we  accepted  this  re- 
duced burden,  recognizing  that  foreign 
assistance  has  been  the  focal  point  of 
reductions  for  the  previous  administra- 
tion, recognizing  that  in  a  post- Vietnam 
America  there  has  been  great  reluctance 
to  indulge  in  the  kind  of  hyperactivity 
assistance  programs  that  we  had  wit- 
nessed since  the  end  of  the  Second 
World  War? 

We're  doing  this  first  and  foremost 
because  it's  our  conviction  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  that  the  overall  effec- 
tiveness of  the  American  foreign  policy 
is  intimately  related   to  this  nation's 
ability  to  manage  its  internal  domestic 
economic  affairs  with  discipline  and  with 
effectiveness.  As  one  who  sat  abroad  for 
5  years  and  watched  the  growing  mal- 
aise in  our  economy  begin  to  influence 
the  effectiveness  of  our  international 
leadership -and  I'm  talking  about  such 
issues  as  runaway  double-digit  inflation, 
declining  productivity,  declining  com- 
petitiveness of  American  goods  abroad, 
and  what  was  perceived  to  be  by  our 
foreign  friends  as  an  inability  to  manage 
effectively  our  energy  program.  All  had 
a  severe  impact  on  America's  ability  to 
influence  vital  national  interests  abroad, 
certainly  were  a  contributory  to  the 
declining  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar,  and, 
in  some  instances,  foreign  nations  per- 
ceived for  one  reason  or  another  that  we 
were  literally  managing  some  of  these 
problems  to  result  in  placing  the  burden 
in  energy  and  inflation  on  their 
shoulders. 


And  so  I  consider  that  the  American 
program  and  President  Reagan's  pro- 
gram to  get  our  economy  back  on  the 
track  once  again  is  not  only  of  vital  in- 
terest to  domestic  American  interests, 
but  it  has  a  profound  impact  on  Ameri- 
ca's effectiveness  abroad. 

Q.  You  didn't  mention  the  elimina- 
tion or  cutting  of  embassy  personnel 
as  part  of  your  budget-cutting  pro- 
cedure, and  yet  there  were  20  people 
removed  from  the  embassy  in 
Nicaragua  yesterday  or  Wednesday.  Is 
this  part  of  a  budget  cut,  or  is  this 
part  of  your  attempt  to  put  pressure 
on  the  Government  of  Nicaragua  to 
stop  the  flow  of  arms  to  El  Salvador? 

A.  It's  neither.  I  don't  have  to  tell 
you  that  we  have  made  it  very  clear  to 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  that  the 
current  level  of  aid   to  that  government 
and  the  residual  aid  left  that  might  be 
available  to  them  is  going  to  be  subject 
to  their  adherence  to  American  law,  and 
that  law  provides  that  we  cannot  pro- 
vide such  assistance  to  governments 
that  are  actively  involved  in  the  exporta- 
tion of  terrorism  and  the  support  of  ag- 
gression abroad.  And  that  is  an  issue 
which  we  know  today  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua  is,  indeed,  in  viola- 
tion of.  We've  been  in  a  studied  dialogue 
with  them  with  respect  to  it,  ana  we're 
watching  the  situation  very,  very 
carefully.  In  the  meantime,  we're  mak- 
ing appropriate  adjustments  that  might 
be  necessary  should  such  a  decision  to 
terminate  aid  to  Nicaragua  be  called  for. 

Q.  How  does  that  affect  the  aid 
levels  for  El  Salvador,  the  budget  cut? 

A.  Now,  you  know,  there's  been  a 
lot  of  talk  about  El  Salvador.  I  some- 
times get  up  in  the  morning  and  read 
the  press  and  wonder  if  I'm  living  in  the 
same  world  that's  being  reported  on. 
There  has  been  no  additional  assistance 
provided  to  the  Government  of  El  Salva- 
dor. None.  We  merely  are  presiding 
over  distribution  of  additional  military 
assistance  decided  by  President  Carter's 
Administration  before  he  left  town.  And 
I  think  it's  awfully  important  that  we 
understand  that  as  we  start  to  speculate 
about  what  is  on  the  agenda  of 
American  activity  in  El  Salvador. 

First  and  foremost,  let  me  empha- 
size to  you  that  our  problem  with  El  Sal- 
vador is  external  intervention  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  a  sovereign  nation  in 
this  hemisphere -nothing  more,  nothing 
less.  That  is  the  essential  problem  we're 
dealing  with. 


21 


The  Secretary 


INI 


In  dealing  with  that  problem,  we're 
going  to  continue  with  levels  of  assist- 
ance determined  as  absolutely  essential 
by  the  Carter  Administration  and  our 
country  team.  And  I  recognize  there  are 
some  differences  with  respect  to  assess- 
ments on  the  ground  by  various  Ameri- 
can representatives.  That's  to  be  ex- 
pected and,  indeed,  is  welcomed. 

Secondly,  our  first  priority  for  El 
Salvador  itself  is  the  pluralization,  if  you 
will,  of  that  society  but  its  own  internal 
devices  and  reflective  of  the  will  of  the 
people  of  El  Salvador,  not  by  some  ex- 
ternal vision  of  how  they  should  best 
align  themselves. 

We  have  moved  to  help  them  in  eco- 
nomic support.  The  current  regime  in  El 
Salvador  has  moved  on  land  reform  and 
a  number  of  other  reforms.  It  has  prom- 
ised an  election  in  1983,  all  of  which  we 
welcome.  That  does  not  mean  that  we 
are  comfortable  with  the  current  level  of 
social  reform  in  that  government,  not  at 
all.  It  does  not  mean  that  we  have  aban- 
doned our  desire  to  assist  in  whatever 
way  we  can  in  assuring  such  social 
reform  occurs  within  the  overall  environ- 
ment in  which  a  country  is  now  being 
plagued  by  externally  supported  subver- 
sion through  the  provision  of  arms, 
assistance,  communications,  and  a  host 
of  other  illegal  activities  being  conducted 
through  Nicaragua,  some  other  Central 
American  countries,  managed  essentially 
by  the  Government  of  Cuba,  similar  to 
the  activities  we've  seen  in  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  Southern  Yemen,  Northern 
Yemen.  And  it  seems  that  we  have 
created  a  misinterpretation  of  the  - 

Q.  I'm  going  to  continue  with  — 

A.  First  I  see  no  definitive  evidence 
of  a  real  cessation  in  Cuban  activity  in 
the  hemisphere.  We  have  seen  some 
shifting  of  the  tempo  that  was  very  evi- 
dent 3  to  4  weeks  ago  before  we  raised 
the  issue.  That's  a  question  yet  to  be 
resolved  by  our  own  assessments  and 
evidence  that  we  can  pick  up. 

With  respect  to  El  Salvador,  and  I 
didn't  hit  upon  that  in  my  comment,  we 
are  now  considering  whether  or  not  a 
modest  increase  to  the  Carter  program 
is  called  for.  It  has  been  recommended 
by  our  country  team.  It  has  been  asked 
for  by  the  Government  of  El  Salvador. 

With  respect  to  Cuban  arm  ship- 
ments, there  is  still  conflicting  evidence. 
There  is  evidence  to  suggest  there  are 
still  vast  amounts  yet  to  be  moved,  and 
there's  a  great  deal  of  activity  designed 
to  move  it.  There's  great  concern  about 
the  so-called  wet  season  - 1  guess  we've 


heard  that  term  before -and  the  need  to 
get  arms  that  have  been  provided  in 
country  or  into  neighboring  countries. 
And  there  are  reports  of  even  larger 
shipments  yet  underway.  All  of  this  is 
being  very,  very  carefully  watched. 

Q.  Can  you  just  stand  by  and  let 
those  shipments  be  moved,  or  do  you 
have  to  take  action  against  the  Cubans 
to  prevent  it? 

A.  I  think  we  have  made  it  very 
clear  from  the  outset  that  this  is  a  prob- 
lem emanating,  first  and  foremost,  from 
Cuba  and  that  it  is  our  intention  to  deal 
with  this  matter  at  its  source. 

Q.  But  the  evidence  suggests  that 
the  government  forces  are  rather 
handily  putting  down  the  rebel  opposi- 
tion and  have  since  the  rebel  Decem- 
ber offensive  failed.  And  if  that  is  cor- 
rect, is  there  any  need  to  send  Ameri- 
can advisers,  in  any  number,  to  El 
Salvador? 

A.  The  question  is  first,  has  the 
offensive  of  January -was  it  a  defensive 
defeat  for  the  rebels? 

Q.  Is  it  correct  that  government 
forces  have  been  and  are  now  effec- 
tively winning  or  putting  down  the 
rebellion? 

A.  I  think  that  question  is  highly 
speculative,  in  some  instances  subjective 
to  the  extreme.  Evidence  does  not  sug- 
gest that  the  insurgency  is  under  con- 
trol. Evidence  does  suggest  that  the  all- 
out  attack,  which  the  rebels  executed  in 
January,  was,  in  essence,  a  failure. 

It  was  a  failure  first  and  foremost 
because,  contrary  to  their  hopes,  the 
Salvadoran  people  did  not  rally  around 
the  rebels,  and  they  remained  rather,  I 
would  say,  disinterested  in  the  so-called 
revolution.  It  doesn't  mean  they're  com- 
fortable with  their  current  plight,  hardly 
at  all. 

Q.  Are  American  military  advisers, 
in  any  number,  necessary  to  be  sent  to 
El  Salvador? 

A.  Let's  be  very  careful  there  too, 
because  I've  seen  reports  that  there  is 
some  consideration  of  providing  military 
advisers;  and  there  is  no  intention  - 
there's  been  no  discussion  of  it,  and 
there's  been  no  consideration  of  it. 

There  have  been  considerations  of 
whether  or  not  our  military  training 
teams  in  specific  functional  areas  are 
adequate  to  the  needs  of  the  security 
forces  of  E^l  Salvador.  The  government 
there  would  like  some  assistance,  and 
we  are  considering  the  pros  and  cons  of 
providing  that  kind  of  assistance.  But 
we  are  not  talking  about  advisers. 


Q.  What  is  the  difference? 

A.  I  would  view  an  adviser  as  soi 
one  who  operates  with  forces,  who  ar 
engaged  or  in  potential  engagement, 
distinct  from  technical  teams  that  tea 
people  how  to  fly  helicopters,  how  to 
conduct  surveillance,  and  other  relate 
activities. 

I  think  you're  going  to  have  to  gei 
back  to  the  budget.  I'd  hoped  and 
prayed  that  someone  might  ask  me  a. 
budget  question  this  morning. 


■kt 


1! 


Q.  Can  I  miss  the  budget  once  ^ 
more  around?  You  talk  about  our  idlj 
tention  to  deal  with  this  problem  at  lee 
the  source.  So  far  there's  been  no 
more  than  a  rhetorical  offensive 
against  Cuba.  What  else  do  you  ha\^oni 
in  mind? 

A.  If  I've  ever  learned  anything,  ' 
the  sterility  of  standing  in  front  of  th 
American  press  and  laying  out  what;  ^' 
intend  to  do  in  contingencies.  It  imm(  '" 
diately  launches  a  domestic  debate  w  '^' 
prohibits  you  from  even  considering  1  * 
options  you  might  have  been  considei  ^ 
ing,  and  I'm  not  going  to  do  that  tod     ' 

Q.  Could  we  clear  up  one  point  He 
mentioned,  because  it  seems  to  coi  op 
flict  with  what  was  said  yesterday?  jo 
You  suggested  that  other  assessmei 
of  the  situation  in  El  Salvador  wer«  era 
expectable  and  welcome.  That  seen) 
to  suggest  that  you  feel  much  more  b 
comfortable  with  the  testimony  of 
bassador  White  [Robert  E.  White, 
former  U.S.  Ambassador  to  El  SalW|lie 
dor]  than  the  State  Department's 
spokesman  and  others  in  the  Ad- 
ministration. 

A.  Hardly  at  all.  We  think  the     • 
testimony  of  Ambassador  White  andjj''! 
consulted  advice  to  us  for  an  extendaf"^ 
period  does  not  jive  with  our  own       • 
assessments  and  the  assessments  of 
other  specialists  we've  had  in  the  an 
don't  mean  to  portray  that  as  some 
of  a  dramatic  departure  of  difference, 
but  there  are  differences  in  nuance  th 
made  it  necessary  for  us  to  make  a 
change  down  there,  and  I  think  you 
know  this  has  been  a  longstanding  p^ 
lem.  I'm  very  happy  with  the  conse- 
quences. I'm  also  delighted  that  thoaft 
who  have  differing  views  express  thS 
views.  I 

Q.  You're  not  concerned  that  hei 
spoke  out  as  he  did  before  CongreM  "9 

A.  I  don't  know  what  you  meank 
concerned. 


oni 
epr 


le 


I 


iNOMICS 



I.  Strategic  Minerals  Dependency 


hael  Calingaert 

tement  before  the  Subcommittee 
nee,  Technology,  and  Space  of  the 
Committee  on  Commerce,  Science, 
ansportation  on  March  2,  1981. 
lingaert  is  Deputy  Assistant 
ryfor  Economic  and  Business 


ased  to  testify  before  this  sub- 
tee  on  the  impact  of  possible  in- 
ions  of  strategic  materials  and 
iS  supplies  and  the  implications  of 
iional  Materials  and  Minerals 
Research  and  Development  Act 

(PL  96-479). 

moting  the  continued  availability 
pn  raw  materials  at  reasonable 
Dr  domestic  industry  and  defense 

portant  objective  of  our  foreign 
~^he  Department  of  State  is  cur- 

irticipating  in  a  National  Securi- 
dl-directed  study  of  U.S.  depen- 

1  foreign  sources  of  minerals 

rhe  results  of  that  effort  are  ex- 
K)  provide  useful  inputs  to  the  ac- 
Df  other  agencies  related  to  im- 
Btion  of  the  National  Materials 
erals  Policy,  Research  and  De- 
nt Act  of  1980.  In  addition,  the 
Bent  of  State  plays  a  central  role 
(oring  foreign  minerals  develop- 

epresenting  the  minerals  inter- 

[le  United  States  abroad,  assess- 
titial  mineral  problems,  and 

to  any  problems  which  might 


Department  of  State  was  as- 
)  specific  responsibilities  under 
onal  Materials  and  Minerals 
.esearch  and  Development  Act 
Nevertheless,  we  are  participat- 
3  interagency  Mineral  Informa- 
"dinating  Committee,  which  was 
ed  by  Presidential  directive  and 
ised  by  the  Department  of  the 


i   he  spokesman  yesterday  ex- 
;<  a  great  deal  of  concern  about 
t    State  Department. 

V    think  the  individual  concerned 
right  to  express  his  views,  and 
every  right  to  assess  those 
we  have  and  to  take  appro- 
tion  with  respect  to  them  which 


release  55  of  Mar.  3,  1981. 


Interior  to  perform  some  of  the  actions 
required  of  it  by  the  act.  Through  its 
membership  on  the  Committee  on  Ma- 
terials (COMAT),  State  participated  in 
the  Department  of  Commerce  decision 
to  select  the  aerospace  industry  as  a 
specific  case  for  examination  under  the 
act.  The  Department  of  Defense  has  in- 
vited us  to  participate  informally  in  its 
activities  in  response  to  the  act,  and  we 
are  prepared  to  provide  support  to  the 
Executive  Office  of  the  President  if  it  is 
requested. 

U.S.  Minerals  Position 

Before  discussing  the  implications  of  de- 
pendence, I  would  like  to  place  our  min- 
erals situation  in  perspective.  According 
to  recent  estimates  by  the  Bureau  of 
Mines,  in  1980  the  United  States  im- 
ported $5  billion  worth  of  mineral  raw 
materials,  while  domestic  mineral  raw 
materials  production  was  valued  at  $25 
billion  and  exports  were  valued  at  $6 
billion.  Thus  we  imported  21%  of  our 
basic  raw  material  requirements  in  value 
terms  and  were  net  exporters.  Our 
European  allies  imported  about  80%  of 
their  needs,  and  Japan  imported  around 
95%  of  its  requirements. 

Domestic  and  imported  mineral  raw 
materials  plus  reclaimed  materials  were 
used  to  produce  processed  materials  of 
mineral  origin  valued  at  $240  billion.  In 
addition,  the  United  States  imported  $25 
billion  worth  of  processed  materials.  On 
the  other  hand,  exports  of  processed 
materials  of  mineral  origin  were  valued 
at  $23  billion.  Thus,  the  United  States 
had  a  trade  deficit  of  about  $1  billion 
overall  in  the  mineral  and  mineral 
materials  area  in  1980. 

Dependence  and  Vulnerability 

While  the  aggregate  situation  is  quite 
favorable,  there  are  some  materials 
where  dependence  is  very  high.  The 
Bureau  of  Mines  reported  19  minerals 
and  metals  with  import-consumption 
ratios  of  50%  or  more  in  1979,  and  for 
10  of  those  materials  the  ratio  was  90% 
or  higher.  Nevertheless,  this  dependence 
does  not  necessarily  translate  into 
vulnerability. 

Given  current  materials  use  patterns 
and  the  geological  occurrence  of  miner- 
als, autarky  in  minerals  supply  is  clearly 
unachievable  for  the  United  States. 


However,  there  are  means  of  reducing 
the  risks  of  dependency,  even  when  the 
degree  of  dependency  is  high. 

One  means  of  risk  reduction  is  de- 
pendence on  a  stable  source  of  supply. 
Here  the  United  States  is  fortunate  in 
that  Canada  is  our  largest  supplier  of 
mineral  raw  materials  and  processed 
materials  of  mineral  origin,  accounting 
for  nearly  25%  of  total  imports.  Canada 
is  our  major  import  source  for  asbestos, 
gold,  iron  ore,  nickel,  potash,  tungsten, 
and  zinc.  Except  for  iron  ore,  our  import 
dependence  for  these  materials  exceeds 
50%.  Australia  and  Mexico  are  also  sig- 
nificant supply  sources  for  the  United 
States. 

Another  method  is  to  spread  the 
risks  through  diversification  of  supply 
sources.  Some  examples  in  this  category 
are  bauxite  and  alumina,  cadmium,  mer- 
cury, and  tungsten.  In  1979  we  imported 
bauxite  and  alumina  from  more  than  10 
countries,  cadmium  from  19  countries, 
mercury  from  9  countries,  and  our  tung- 
sten imports  came  from  20  countries. 

The  U.S.  Government  holds  excess 
stocks  of  some  materials  which  could 
provide  alternative  supplies  should  nor- 
mal supplies  be  disrupted.  For  example, 
the  national  defense  stockpile  contains 
inventories  exceeding  the  established 
goals  for  industrial  diamonds,  mica, 
quartz,  silver,  tin,  and  tungsten.  There 
are  also  materials  that  are  excess  to  pro- 
grams of  U.S.  Government  agencies 
which  may  be  sold  by  the  General  Serv- 
ices Administration,  such  as  mercury 
and  lithium  hydroxide  from  Department 
of  Energy  stocks. 

Minerals  Supply 

I  would  like  to  discuss  two  separate 
issues  in  the  context  of  minerals  sup- 
ply—supply disruptions  and  adequate  in- 
vestment to  insure  future  supplies.  In 
relation  to  this  second  issue  I  would  also 
like  to  comment  briefly  on  the  seabed  as 
a  future  source  of  minerals  supply. 

Situations  that  might  cause  interrup- 
tions in  supply  include  civil  disorder, 
strikes,  unilateral  political  actions, 
regional  hostilities,  and  natural 
disasters.  A  supply  disruption  is  most 
serious  when  it  affects  a  major  supplier 
of  a  mineral  for  which  we  are  vulnerable 
due  to  high  import  dependence  and  a 
small  number  of  suppliers. 


Economics 


U.S.  Minerals  Dependency,  1979 


MINERALS  AND  METALS 


%  OF  APPARENT  CONSUMPTION 

0%  25%  50% 


Columbium 

100 

Mica  (sheet) 

100 

Strontium 

100 

Titanium  (Rutile) 

100 

Manganese 

98 

Tantalum 

96 

Cobalt 

94 

Bauxite  &  Alumina 

93 

Platinum— Group  Metals 

91 

Chromium 

90 

Tin 

81 

Asbestos 

77 

Nickel 

73 

Potassium 

68 

Cadmium 

63 

Zinc 

63 

Tungsten 

58 

Mercury 

55 

Gold 

50 

Silver 

49 

Antimony 

48 

Bahum 

40 

Titanium  (ilmenite) 

39 

Gypsum 

33 

Selenium 

28 

Vanadium 

28 

Iron  Ore 

25 

Copper 

19 

Iron  &  Steel  Products 

12 

Cement 

11 

Sulfur 

11 

Salt 

6 

Aluminum 

4 

Lead 

4 

75% 


0% 


25% 


50»/ 


75% 


MAJOR  FOREIGN  SOURCES'  (1975-78) 


c 


jito 


100% 

-J 


«( 


Brazil,  Canada,  Thailand 

India,  Brazil,  Madagascar  ^ 

Mexico,  Fed.  Rep.  of  Germany,  Canada 

Australia,  Japan,  India 

South  Afnca,  Gabon,  France,  Brazil 

Thailand,  Canada,  Malaysia,  Brazil 

Zaire,  Belg.-Lux.,  Zambia,  Finland 

Jamaica,  Australia,  Guinea,  Suriname 

South  Afnca,  US.S.R.,  U.K. 

South  Africa,  U.S.S.R.,  Philippines,  Turkey,  Zimtt 

Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  Bolivia 

Canada,  South  Africa 

Canada,  Norway,  New  Caledonia,  Domin.  Rep. 

Canada 

Canada,  Australia,  Mexico,  Belg.-Lux. 

Canada.  Mexico,  Fed.  Rep.  of  Germany 

Canada,  Bolivia,  Korea 

Algeria,  Spam,  Italy,  Canada,  Yugoslavia 

Canada,  U.S.S.R.,  Switzerland 

Canada,  Mexico,  Peru,  U.K. 

South  Africa,  Canada,  U.K.,  Mexico,  China 

Peru,  Ireland,  Mexico.  Morocco 

Australia,  Canada 

Canada,  Mexico,  Jamaica,  Domin.  Rep. 

Canada,  Japan,  Yugoslavia,  France 

South  Africa,  Chile,  U.S.S.R. 

Canada,  Venezuela,  Brazil,  Liberia 

Canada,  Chile,  Zambia,  Peru 

Japan,  E.E.C.,  Canada 

Canada,  Japan,  UK.,  Spain 

Canada,  Mexico 

Canada,  Bahamas,  Mexico 

Canada 

Canada,  Mexico,  Peru,  Honduras,  Australia 


jeri 

m 
ite- 

jril 


for 
iti 
ill 
iie 


100% 


'  Sources  are  points  of  shipmeni  to  the  U.S.  and  are  not  necessarily  the  initial  sources  of  the  matenal. 
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  the  Intenor. 


;CIAL 


curity  and  Development  Assistance 


retary  Haig 

'.tement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
ns  Committee  on  March  19,  1981.^ 

^reat  honor  to  appear  before  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  as 
iry  of  State.  As  members  of  this 
tee,  you  are  aware  that  the  con- 
foreign  policy  and  exercise  of 
;e  requires  many  tools.  It  is  the 
i  purpose  of  one  of  these 
lecurity  and  development 
ice-  that  is  the  subject  for  discus- 
lay. 

urity  and  development  assistance 
oe  seen  in  the  context  of  the  in- 
»nal  challenges  that  confront  us 
foreign  policy  we  have  devised 
l;ome  them.  Today's  world 
!i5  the  United  States  with  three 
lii-nt  trends.  First,  power  is  dif- 
I  idely  among  many  nations  and 

e  prepared  to  use  violence  to  ad- 
■  leir  ends.  Second,  we  and  our 
i  e  now  more  vulnerable  to  inter- 
n  unrest  and  violent  change. 
1  id  most  dangerous,  the  growth 
IV  t  military  power  is  now  capable 
p  )rting  an  imperial  foreign  policy. 
'I.  last  trend  is  most  alarming. 
;t  dventurism  in  the  Horn,  in 

I  sia,  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  in 

II  !st  Africa  appears  to  conform  to 
icind  ominous  objective:  to  strike 
■1!  ries  on  or  near  the  vital 

r   lines  of  the  West. 
n  depressed  world  economic  con- 
equally  familiar  to  you.  The 
lii :  cost  of  oil  has  been  a  punishing 
t»  ill  nations.  It  has  been  par- 
'  crippling  to  the  developing  na- 

is  estimated  that  developing 
r5  paid  $50  to  $60  billion  in  1980 
e  oil  imports.  Adding  to  this 
ns  another  $50  to  $60  billion  in 
cficits.  All  of  this  comes  at  a  time 
\  irld  population  will  increase  by 
ist  the  next  20  years-  from  4.4 
1979  to  over  6.3  billion  by  the 
16  century,  with  90%  of  this  in- 
the  poorest  countries. 
c  dislocations  of  this  mag^tude 
mditions  for  violent  disruptions, 
gerous  political  consequences. 


U.S.  Response 

Our  response  to  these  challenges  must 
incorporate  several  elements  if  we  are  to 
advance  our  international  objectives.  We 
require: 

•  A  strong,  prosperous,  and  produc- 
tive American  economy,  because  we  can 
do  little  to  help  others  if  we  are  disabled 
ourselves; 

•  An  American  defense  posture  that 
restores  the  confidence  and  determina- 
tion of  friends  and  that  deters  adver- 
saries from  pursuing  adventures;  and 

•  The  resources  to  protect  our  inter- 
national security  interests  and  to  pro- 
mote peace  and  prosperity  abroad. 

The  President  has  proposed  a  far- 
reaching  and  dynamic  program  to 
restore  the  health  of  the  American 
economy.  I  fully  support  his  proposals. 
The  revised  defense  budget  which  the 
Congress  will  review  in  a  short  time  is 
designed  to  revitalize  our  Armed  Forces 
and  rebuild  our  capacity  to  defend  our 
vital  interests. 

The  third  element,  resources  to  pro- 
mote our  security  and  economic  in- 


system.  This  will  include  efforts  to 
engage  the  U.S.  private  sector  more 
fully  in  the  economic  development 
process. 

Third,  the  United  States  will  not 
forsake  its  traditional  assistance  to  the 
needy  of  this  world:  the  undernourished, 
the  sick,  the  desperate  refugee. 

Fourth,  there  will  be  neither  abrupt 
nor  radical  redirection  of  our  inter- 
national economic  policies.  Where 
necessary,  policy  will  be  changed  in  an 
evolutionary  fashion,  with  minimal 
disruption  and  uncertainty. 

Fifth,  the  United  States  will  not 
abandon  institutions  and  agreements 
devoted  to  global  economic  and  political 
stability.  The  United  States  will  continue 
to  bear  a  fair  share  of  the  cost  to  main- 
tain and  operate  international  organiza- 
tions. 

I  have  asked  Jim  Buckley  [James  L. 
Buckley,  Under  Secretary  for  Security 
Assistance,  Science  and  Technology]  to 
coordinate  the  allocations  of  all  types  of 
foreign  assistance  in  which  the  Depart- 
ment is  involved.  Let  me  give  you  an  ex- 
ample of  what  Jim  undertook  for  me  in 


...in  the  formulation  of  economic  policy,  in  the  allocation  of  resources, 
in  decisions  on  international  economic  issues,  a  major  determinant 
will  be  the  need  to  protect  and  advance  our  security. 


terests,  is  the  reason  for  my  appearance 
before  this  committee  today.  Before  go- 
ing into  the  details  of  the  Administra- 
tion's foreign  assistance  request,  let  me 
say  a  few  words  about  the  general  direc- 
tions of  our  economic  policy  and  how  we 
will  shape  assistance  programs  to  com- 
plement these  policies. 

First,  in  the  formulation  of 
economic  policy,  in  the  allocation  of  our 
resources,  in  decisions  on  international 
economic  issues,  a  major  determinant 
will  be  the  need  to  protect  and  advance 
our  security. 

Second,  we  shall  continue  to  work 
with  other  countries  to  maintain  an  open 
and  accessibLe  international  economic 


recent  days.  We  wanted  to  allocate  addi- 
tional assistance  to  El  Salvador,  and  Jim 
worked  with  the  various  offices  to  put 
together  the  package  of  economic  sup- 
port funds,  development  assistance,  PL 
480,  etc.  I  see  this  as  entirely  consistent 
with  my  responsibility,  under  the  Presi- 
dent, for  overall  supervision  and  direc- 
tion of  our  foreign  assistance  effort. 

Security  Assistance 

I  referred  a  moment  ago  to  the  Presi- 
dent's proposals  for  reconstituting 
America's  defense  capabilities.  Our 
security  assistance  program  goes  hand- 
in-hand  with  this  effort  and  must  enjoy 
equal  priority.  This  is  because  the  friend- 


Special 


ly  states  we  support  can  themselves  help 
us  assure  our  most  vital  national  in- 
terests. 

For  example,  many  of  our  security 
assistance  partners  enjoy  a  geographic 
proximity  to  the  resources  our  economy 
demands.  Others  possess  timely 
knowledge  of  complex  regional  events 
and  are  best  suited  to  understand  these 
events  and  assure  that  they  do  not  slip 
beyond  responsible  control.  Finally, 
many  of  our  partners  have  military 
forces  trained  and  experienced  in 
operating  in  different  areas. 

As  we  strengthen  these  states,  we 
strengthen  ourselves  and,  for  the 
reasons  just  mentioned,  we  do  so  more 
effectively  and  at  less  cost.  Friendly 
states  can  help  to  deter  threats  before 
they  escalate  into  world-shaking  crises. 
The  issue  is  not  whether  a  local  state 
can  singlehandedly  resist  a  Soviet 
assault.  Rather,  it  is  whether  it  can 
make  that  assault  more  costly,  more 
complicated,  and,  therefore,  potentially 
less  likely  to  occur. 

In  practical  terms,  this  means  that 
the  air  defense  system  we  help  a  friend- 
ly state  develop  could  one  day  serve  as  a 
prepositioned  shield  under  which 
Western  relief  forces  would  move.  We 
hope  that  day  never  comes,  and  all  of 
our  efforts  are  aimed  at  preventing  it. 
However,  in  judging  the  economic  value 
of  these  programs  it  is  necessary  to 
recognize  the  connection  that  frequently 
exists  between  today's  assistance  and 
tomorrow's  needs. 

In  examining  our  overall  security 
and  defense  needs,  we  have  tried  to 
balance  the  requirement  for  budgetary 
stringency  with  the  need  to  revitalize 
our  international  position.  From  this 
review  we  concluded  that  our  national 
interests  demand  a  significant  funding 
increase  for  our  security  assistance  pro- 
grams and  at  increased  levels  above 
fiscal  year  1981.  The  President  is  re- 
questing that  the  Congress  approve 
$4.27  billion  in  budget  authority  to 
finance  a  total  $6.87  billion  security 
assistance  program  for  FY  1982. 

Middle  East.  Almost  70%  of  the 
program  for  FY  1982  is  for  the  Middle 
East,  with  Israel  and  Egypt  as  the 
largest  recipients. 

Let  me  say  something  about  the  im- 
portance of  these  two  countries.  The 
security  of  Israel  remains  a  major  U.S. 
concern  and  a  binding  U.S.  commitment. 
We  are  determined  that  Israel  retiiin  the 


military  capability  to  deter  threats  from 
hostile  forces.  Moreover  we  recognize 
the  importance  of  Israel  to  our  develop- 
ing regional  strategy.  Israel  constitutes 
an  important  deterrent  in  the  region 
and,  indeed,  can  play  a  major  role  in 
countering  the  more  serious  threats  in- 
volving the  Soviet  Union. 

Egypt  occupies  a  unique  position  in 
the  Arab  world.  Egypt's  population,  its 
strategic  significance  and  cultural 
eminence  give  it  that  place.  It  was  an 
event  of  extraordinary  import  for  the 
United  States  when  President  Sadat 
decided  to  turn  away  from  the  Soviet 
Union  and  become  our  friend.  President 
Sadat  has  had  the  vision  not  only  to  see 
and  deal  with  the  larger  Soviet  threat 
but  also  to  join  the  peace  process  with 
Israel.  There  is  no  alternative  to  a 
strong,  Western-oriented  Egypt. 

Adequate  defense  capability  for 
Israel,  Egypt,  and  other  responsible 
Arab  states  will  not  only  help  deal  with 
outside  pressures  but  will  support  our 
objective  of  a  lasting  Middle  East  peace. 
Individual  and  regional  insecurity  under- 
mines every  prospect  for  peace.  Our  pro- 
grams in  the  Middle  East  and  Persian 
Gulf  area,  working  with  such  states  as 
Oman,  are  designed  to  deter  threats  to 
both  regional  security  and  Western 
energy  interests. 

Europe.  Our  foreign  military  sales 
(FMS)  assistance  to  Europe  will  focus  on 
four  European  nations:  Greece,  Por- 
tugal, and  Turkey  in  support  of  their 
NATO  roles,  and  Spain  in  connection 
with  our  defense  agreement  and  our  use 
of  Spanish  bases.  A  sizeable  economic 
support  funds  program  is  planned  for 
Turkey  as  we  continue  to  respond  to 
that  country's  economic  needs  in 
cooperation  with  other  donors.  Turkey 
and  Greece  are  two  of  our  most  impor- 
tant allies.  Greece  and  Turkey  are  im- 
portant to  each  other's  defense  and  as 
allies  and  friends  both  are  indispensable 
to  us. 

East  Asia.  In  East  Asia,  Korea  will 
receive  a  large  amount  of  FMS  financing 
for  force  modernization,  with  significant 
programs  also  scheduled  for  Indonesia, 
the  Philippines,  and  Thailand. 

Africa.  In  Africa,  our  equipment, 
training,  and/or  economic  support  will 
help  to  enhance  the  security  of  a 
selected  number  of  stales  friendly  to  the 
United  States.  It  is  clearly  in  our  in- 
terest, for  example,  to  help  Sudan  and 
Tunisia  withstand  pressures  from  Libya. 


(Jtl 

erm 
id' 
lileii 
ice 
llier 


tss 


ifll 
itri 
of 

ijir 

15^ 


This  is  important  in  its  own  right  an( 
vital  to  our  larger  interest.  For  as  th 
threat  to  these  important  states  mou 
so  too,  indirectly,  does  the  pressure  ( 
Egypt,  with  all  that  means  for  the 
prospects  for  peace  and  for  our  broai 
regional  strategy.  This  suggests  a  ce 
tral  point:  the  interrelationship  betw( 
threats  and  events  in  different  theate 
If  we  are  to  act  with  coherence  and  ( 
sistency,  these  interrelationships  mus 
be  reflected  in  our  own  policies. 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbe^ilel 

F'or  t'entral  America,  the  Caribbean, 
and  South  America,  we  are  recom- 
mending a  total  program  of  $212.6 
million.  Especially  noteworthy  are  oti  li 
efforts  to  support  the  Duarte  govern-i)  icf 
ment  in  El  Salvador,  which  we  belie\<  us 
offers  the  best  chance  for  a  resolutio^aliv 
that  country's  conflicts. 

The  benefits  of  our  security 
assistance  program  will  be  limited  un 
we  have  the  necessary  llexiliility  to  u  !* 
these  resources  effectively  and  etficia 
ly.  This  includes  being  responsive  to 
foreseen  and  rapidly  changing  event!  h 
is  impossible,  in  March  1981,  to  pred  If 
with  certainty  where  crises  may  eruj  ik 
the  coming  months.  We  are,  therefoi  '^l 
proposing  special  requirements  funds  ■ 
the  economic  support  funds  and  milil 
assistance  program  and  a  number  of 
amendments  to  legislation  that  woul 
facilitate  the  achievement  of  our  poJ' 
objectives.  If  we  have  the  capability 
respond  quickly  and  adequately  in  th 
cases  where  security  assistance  woul 
make  the  difference,  the  need  for  U.l 
direct  involvement  might  be  reduced 
eliminated. 

I  want  to  stress  that  givitig  us 
capability  to  deal  with  contingenciei 
not  a  vehicle  for  denying  Congress 
proper  and  necessary  role  regardin] 
policy  oversight  of  security  assistani 
programs.  Rather,  both  branches  si 
address  seriously  the  relationship  o: 
these  programs  to  our  policy  objecti' 
and,  working  together,  insure  that 
vant  legislation  and  funding  authoril 
facilitate  rather  than  constrain  achi^ 
ment  of  these  objectives. 


illi 


Special 


tpment  Assistance 

security  assistance  is  specifically 
d  to  shape  events  and  address 
erm  prolilems  in  countries  and 
5  of  major  political  importance  to 
ited  States,  development 
nee  provides  the  United  States 
her  opportunities  to  influence 
lie,  social,  and   political  change 

■  remain  committed  to  a  strong 
3ment  assistance  program  as  an 
.1  element  of  our  overall  policy 

our  international  economic  and 
y  objectives.  U.S.  foreign  policy 
ts  should  guide  our  allocation  of 

aid.  But  the  humanitarian 

of  the  development  assistance 
m  should  not  be  overlooked.  As  a 
itive  partner  helping  to  meet  the 

f  the  developing  countries  we 
itribute  to  the  achievement  of  a 

of  key  U.S.  foreign  and  economic 
joals. 

jur  budget  submission  to  Con- 
d  $1.9  billion  Agency  for  Interna- 
)evelopment  program  is  re- 
ll.  Over  50%  of  the  proposed 
iiment  assistance  program  will  be 

alleviate  malnutrition  and 


Itilateral  Development  Banks. 

lie  past  two  decades,  a  growing 
age  of  U.S.  official  aid  has  gone 
ort  multilateral  development 
We  intend  to  meet  our  existing 
ons  to  these  institutions  as  we 
in  an  evolutionary  way,  toward  a 

emphasis  on  bilateral  rather 
iultilateral  assistance.  In  this  pro- 
e  shall  keep  in  mind  that 

eral  institutions  carry  out  two 
unctions. 

^irst,  they  mobilize  additional 
from  other  donors  for  economic 
6S  in  developing  nations,  nations 
;  important  to  U.S.  security  and 
ic  interests. 

iecond,  they  foster  increasing 
?y  in  the  international  economic 
by  encouraging  developing  coun- 
adopt  Western,  market-oriented 
ment  policies  that  improve  pro- 
y. 


The  President  is,  therefore,  re- 
questing appropriation  of  $1.48  billion 
for  multilateral  development  bank  sub- 
scriptions and  contributions  for  FY 
1982.  Because  this  request  has  been  held 
to  the  minimum,  it  is  essential  to  have 
yoiu-  support  for  the  full  amount 
specified. 

International  Organizations  and 
Programs.  Voluntary  U.S.  contributions 
to  international  organizations  and  pro- 
grams are  another  important  element  of 
our  foreign  development  assistance 
strategy.  Among  the  important  efforts 
in  this  area  are  the  U.N.  Development 
Program  (UNDP)  and  the  U.N. 
Children's  Fund  (UNICEF).  These  ac- 
tivities provide  basic  technical,  health, 
and  educational  assistance  to  developing 
countries. 

State  Department  Budget 

Before  concluding  my  statement  today,  I 
would  call  your  attention  to  a  crucial 
tool  for  the  execution  of  our  foreign 
policy:  the  budget  of  the  Department  of 
State.  The  FY  1982  request  for  the 
Department  reflects  our  commitment  to 
economize.  The  entire  $2.5  billion  pro- 
posed budget  is  essential  if  we  are  to 
discharge  our  global  foreign  affairs 
responsibilities. 

Conclusion 

The  program  presented  to  you  today 
represents  our  best  judgment  of  the 
resources  required  to  carry  out  our  ac- 
tivities in  these  austere  times.  Cuts  were 
made  in  the  development  assistance  pro- 
grams totaling  over  $1  billion,  a  26% 
reduction  from  the  previous  budget  - 
equaling  if  not  exceeding  reductions  pro- 
posed for  the  domestic  agencies. 

For  the  past  2  years  Congress  has 
failed  to  enact  a  foreign  aid  appropria- 
tions bill.  This  has  caused  us  substantial 
difficulties.  We  have  been  forced  to 
neglect  vital  aspects  of  our  assistance 
programs;  U.S.  foreign  policy  interests 


have  been  undermined.  We  should  work 
together  in  the  authorization  and  ap- 
propriation of  these  FY  1982  foreign  aid 
requests  to  assure  a  U.S.  partnership 
with  the  nations  that  strengthen  our 
common  economic  and  security  in- 
terests. 


'  Press  release  69.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Economics 


the  nonfuel  minerals  policy  re- 
;oncern  with  dependency  focused 
;w  minerals  for  which  we  are 
dependent  upon  southern  or  cen- 
'rica- cobalt  and  chrome,  and  to  a 
extent  manganese  and  platinum- 
metals.  Even  in  this  highest  risk 
here  is  a  mitigating  factor  which 
s  the  disruption  potential.  That  is 
portance  of  the  minerals  indus- 
)  the  economies  of  the  producing 
ies  and  the  value  of  the  world's 
;  market -the  United  States -to 
ndustries. 

the  event  of  a  supply  disruption 
Lnnot  be  accommodated  by  normal 
t  reactions,  we  have  two  lines  of 
s.  First  is  the  priorities  and 
ions  system  provided  by  Title  I  of 
fense  Production  Act.  Actions 
Title  I  require  that  defense  rated 
receive  priority  as  necessary  to 
tefense  production  schedules.  If 
tsponse  proved  to  be  too  disruptive 
•j  lian  production,  further  alloca- 

luld  be  invoked. 
:  -ondly,  at  some  point  during  a 
)i  situation  recourse  to  the  national 
'■  ^  stockpile  might  be  required. 

am  not  advocating  use  of  this 
i^  ic  stockpile  for  economic  pur- 
a  the  President  has  the  option  of 
3i  ig  stockpile  material  when  the 
•t  re  of  a  particular  mineral  adverse- 
ff  ts  our  defense  preparedness. 
:\  ile  planning  is  based  on  an  ex- 
it wartime  scenario.  Although 
»j  if  the  stockpile  inventories  do  not 
't  leir  goals,  the  U.S.  stockpile  is, 
ei  leless,  the  free  world's  largest 
eils  stockpile  and  provides  a  means 
di  .ling  with  supply  problems  affect- 
tl  national  security. 
A  onger  term  supply  consideration 
.3  -ing  adequate  investment  today  to 
"i  >  the  additional  supplies  that  will 
■'  led  tomorrow.  Growing  world 

ion  and  increasing  industrializa- 
:  developing  countries  will  increase 
r  demand  for  minerals,  and  at  the 
ime  some  deposits  currently  being 
will  be  depleted.  One  factor  that 
sed  concern  regarding  the  future 
ility  of  supplies  is  the  relative 
in  expenditures  on  minerals  ex- 
-  -in  in  developing  nations  as  com- 
■(  vvith  developed  producers  during 
t/Os.  While  this  has  not  yet 
•  d  minerals  output  in  developing 
PS,  as  capacity  expansions  have 
led  on  the  basis  of  past  explora- 
tivities,  it  may  affect  future  pro- 
1.  We  are  pursuing  a  number  of 
ches  both  bilaterally  and  multilat- 


erally  to  address  this  problem.  In  1978 
the  Overseas  Private  Investment  Cor- 
poration (OPIC)  modified  its  operating 
guidelines  in  the  mining  and  energy 
area,  permitting  greater  flexibility  in  its 
coverage  and  lengthening  of  the  cover- 
age period.  The  international  programs 
of  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  can  make 
important  contributions  in  the  explora- 
tion area.  The  World  Bank  has  allocated 
increased  funding  to  its  Mining  and  Non- 
Ferrous  Metals  Division,  and  the  U.N. 
Revolving  Resource  Fund  supports  feasi- 
bility studies  and  preinvestment  work  in 
fuels  and  hard  minerals. 

Supplies  From  tlie  Sea 

Mining  of  nodules  on  the  seabed  prom- 
ises to  be  a  significant  future  supply 
source  for  two  of  the  minerals  for  which 
our  current  dependence  is  a  cause  of 
concern -cobalt  and  manganese -and 
could  also  provide  alternative  long-term 
supplies  of  nickel  and  cooper.  The 
Department  of  State  supported  the  Deep 
Seabed  Hard  Minerals  Resources  Act  to 
provide  a  legal  regime  for  U.S.  mining 
of  the  deep  sea  as  an  interim  measure 
until  a  broadly  accepted  law  of  the  sea 
treaty  enters  into  force.  In  the  treaty 
negotiations  a  central  goal  of  the  United 
States  has  been  the  achievement  of  as- 
sured nondiscriminatory  access  to  sea- 
bed minerals  under  reasonable  terms 
and  conditions.  The  United  States  made 
considerable  progress  toward  that  goal 
at  the  last  negotiating  session,  but  fur- 
ther talks  will  be  necessary  to  enhance 
the  automaticity  of  access  to  seabed 
minerals  within  the  law  of  the  sea 
regime. 

Conclusion 

In  November  1980,  the  Department  of 
State  raised  the  question  of  nonfuel  min- 
erals availability  and  security  of  supply 
with  its  Advisory  Committee  on  Oceans 
and  International  Environmental  and 
Scientific  Affairs.  In  closing,  I  would  like 
to  summarize  the  conclusions  of  that  dis- 
tinguished group. 

•  The  United  States  should  be  ready 
for  conservation  and  substitution  meas- 
ures in  the  event  of  a  cut-back  of  sup- 
plies. This  requires  planning,  including 
the  application  of  science  and  technology 
toward  solving  these  problems.  Systema- 
tic readiness  is  an  important  policy,  and 
government  will  have  to  stimulate  it. 

•  Readiness  implies  a  combination 
of  stockpiling -both  materials  and  tech- 
nology -and  exploration-assessment. 


These  activities  also  involve  a  science 
and  technology  component.  An  example 
is  the  use  of  U.S.  space  satellite  imagery 
to  locate  alternative  sources  of  supply. 

•  There  is  no  broad  materials  policy 
which  can  cover  all  contingencies. 
Rather,  different  sectors  will  require 
different  plans  appropriate  to  specific 
materials'  availabilities. 

It  was  recommended,  therefore,  that 
what  is  needed  for  a  few  commodities  is 
a  coordinated  policy  to  deal  with  the 
problem  of  dependency  in  the  short, 
medium,  and  long  term. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


North  Atlantic  Aviation 
Situation 

Representatives  of  the  United  States, 
Canada,  and  states  members  of  the 
European  Civil  Aviation  Conference 
(ECAC)  discussed  a  number  of  issues 
concerning  North  Atlantic  air  services 
during  a  3-day  meeting  in  Washington, 
D.C,  February  24-26,  1981.  Chairmen 
of  the  respective  delegations  were  B. 
Boyd  Hight,  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary 
for  Transportation  and  Telecommunica- 
tions, U.S.  Department  of  State;  Ralph 
Azzie,  Commissioner,  Canadian  Trans- 
port Commission;  and  Erik  Willoch, 
President  of  ECAC  and  Director  Gener- 
al of  Civil  Aviation  of  Norway. 

The  traffic  statistics  on  North  Atlan- 
tic air  services  which  had  been  ex- 
changed indicated  that  for  the  U.S.- 
Europe market  in  1980  there  was  an  in- 
crease in  total  passenger  traffic, 
although  at  a  lower  rate  than  in  pre- 
vious years.  There  also  was  a  change  in 
the  composition  of  that  traffic  with 
European-origin  traffic  increasing  and 
U.S. -origin  traffic  declining  and  a  con- 
tinuing shift  from  charter  to  scheduled 
services.  The  Canada-Europe  market 
was  characterized  in  1980  by  a  small 
decrease  in  both  scheduled  and  charter 
traffic  over  the  previous  year. 

In  1980  generally,  capacity  in- 
creases on  the  North  Atlantic  were 
greater  than  scheduled  traffic  growth, 
leading  to  lower  load  factors.  Scheduled 
unit  costs,  spurred  by  rising  fuel  costs 
and  other  factors,  exceeded  unit  reve- 


:l*j)81 


25 


EUROPE 


nues.  These  two  factors  were  reflected 
in  a  significant  aggregate  loss  for  the 
total  North  Atlantic  scheduled  opera- 
tions. It  was  agreed  that  caution  was  ad- 
visable with  respect  to  the  interpreta- 
tions which  might  be  drawn  from  the 
financial  data,  given  the  variation  in  air- 
line performance  in  diflferent  markets, 
the  lack  of  uniform  methods  of  cost 
allocation,  and  the  effect  of  external  fac- 
tors such  as  inflation,  exchange  rates, 
and  depressed  economic  conditions  on 
North  Atlantic  air  services  markets  and 
costs. 

The  U.S.  delegation  raised  the  issue 
of  free  access  by  international  carriers 
to  rapidly  developing  computerized 
reservations  and  ticketing  systems  in 
Europe.  The  ECAC  delegation  noted 
that  the  issue  of  market  access  was  a 
broad  one,  which  also  included,  for  ex- 
ample, the  question  of  access  by  Euro- 
pean carriers  to  the  travel  agency  net- 
work in  the  United  States.  The  Cana- 
dian delegation  noted  the  desirability  of 
combining  suitable  bilateral  and  multilat- 
eral approaches  to  problems  relating  to 
market  access  and  other  obstacles  ham- 
pering an  orderly  and  economically 
sound  development  of  air  transport  on 
the  North  Atlantic. 

There  was  also  informal  discussion 
of  the  possibilities  for  some  form  of  mul- 
tilateral approach  to  fare  problems 
which  have  tended  to  arise  in  a  bilateral 
context  in  North  Atlantic  markets. 
However,  the  three  delegations  held 
different  views  as  to  the  desirability  and 
workability  of  such  an  approach. 

The  U.S.  representatives  reported 
on  the  status  of  various  regulatory  pro- 
ceedings regarding  the  allocation  of  air- 
port slots. 

On  the  subject  of  the  Canadian  com- 
pensation recovery  charge  on  aviation 
fuel  used  in  international  operations,  the 
ECAC  and  U.S.  delegations  expressed 
their  concern,  and  the  ECAC  delegation 
asked  that  the  measure  be  reconsidered. 
The  Canadian  delegation  explained  the 
intent  of  this  compensation  recovery 
charge  and  emphasized  that  it  would  be 
nondiscriminatory  in  character. 

The  delegations  agreed  that  the  ex- 
change of  views  on  the  agenda  issues 
had  been  useful.  The  future  exchange  of 
data  would  be  reviewed  and  the  parties 
would  decide  later  when  another  tripar- 
tite meeting,  to  take  place  in  Ottawa, 
might  be  scheduled. 


Press  release  53  of  Feb.  26,  1981. 


Visit  of  British 

Prime  iVlinister  Tliatcher 


linii 

BO 

m 
Id 


Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 
of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Northern  Ireland  made  an  official 
visit  to  the  United  States  February 
25-28,  1981,  to  meet  with  President 
Reagan  and  other  government  officials. 
Following  are  the  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Thatcher  at  the  welcoming  ceremony  and 
their  remarks  following  a  meeting  on 
February  26. ' 


WELCOMING  CEREMONY, 
FEB.  26,  19812 


President  Reagan 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  on  behalf  of 
the  American  people,  Nancy  and  I  ex- 
tend to  you  and  your  family  a  warm  wel- 
come to  the  United  States.  Your  visit 
here  renews  the  personal  friendship  we 
began  in  your  country  just  before  you 
took  office,  and  today  as  we  meet  in 
Washington  at  the  start  of  my  Adminis- 
tration we  also  renew  the  friendship  and 
alliance  of  our  people. 

Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
are  kindred  nations  of  like-minded  peo- 
ple and  must  face  their  tests  together. 
We  are  bound  by  common  language  and 
linked  in  history.  We  share  laws  and  lit- 
erature, blood,  and  moral  fiber.  The 
responsibility  for  freedom  is  ours  to 
share. 

When  we  talked  in  London  just  over 
2  years  ago -when  neither  of  us  was  in 
office -I  was  impressed  by  the  similar 
challenges  our  countries  faced  and  by 
our  determination  to  meet  those 
challenges.  You  have  said  that  we  enter 
into  a  decade  fraught  with  danger,  and 
so  we  have.  But  the  decade  will  be  lass 
dangerous  if  the  West  maintains  the 
strength  required  for  peace,  and  in 
achieving  that  goal,  there  is  one  element 
that  goes  without  question:  Britain  and 
America  will  stand  side  by  side. 

Outside  Cambridge  curving  rows  of 
simple  white  markers  testify  to  a  time 
when  peace  was  lost  and  Britons  and 
Americans  united  to  turn  back  threats 
to  freedom.  Our  challenge  today  is  to  in- 
sure that  belligerence  is  not  attempted 
again  by  the  false  perceptions  of  weak- 
ness. So  long  as  our  adversaries  con- 


at 


tinue  to  arm  themselves  at  a  pace  fai  '"■ 
beyond  the  needs  of  defense,  so  the  f  ^, 
world  must  do  whatever  is  necessary 
safeguard  its  own  security.  A  strong*  jtl 
more  vigilant  NATO  must  be  the  bac 
ground  of  that  security  and  of  our  efll| 
for  equitable  arms  control.  ^ 

The  Atlantic  alliance  will  continue  ^ 
be  the  steadfast  center  of  our  mutual,  j[ 
security.  But  we're  also  both  concerm 
with  the  totality  of  the  East- West  rel 
tionship.  The  Soviet  invasion  in  Afghi.  jjj 
stan  was  a  brutal  invasion,  and  you 
Prime  Minister,  took  a  lead  in  rallyinyfie 
world  opinion  against  it,  and  for  that 
commend  you.  The  tension  in  Poland 
commands  the  attention  of  the  world. 
Clearly,  the  Polish  people  must  be  [ 
allowed  to  work  out  their  own  solutio4ft, 
to  their  problems.  Outside  interventioi  ^ 
there  would  aff"ect  profoundly  and  in  I  ,[j 
long  term  the  entire  range  of  East-Wi  [H, 
ties.  There  are  problems  in  other  parti  >^ 
of  the  world  such  as  regions  of  Africa  u, 
and  Central  America  where  Anglo-  ,,j 
American  cooperation  is  key  to  the  sc  jf, 
cess  of  Western  efforts  to  find  solutia  ,j| 

Americans  are  grateful  for  Britisl  ,f, 
eflforts  to  bring  the  American  prisonei  („ 
home  from  Iran.  We  remember  and  a  jj 
grateful  for  the  support  you  gave  us  |t 
when  you  visited  here  a  little  more  thi  („ 
a  year  ago.  We  remember  your  words  .. 
encouragement.  They  gave  us  heart.  , 
And  together  we  will  work  to  continuiifj, 
to  confront  the  scourge  of  internatiomitj 
terrorism.  \ 

Finally,  our  two  nations  know  thai  ( 
there  is  no  true  security  unless  there  i , 
economic  stability.  We  have  both  , 

sufi^ered  from  substantial  economic       | 
difficulties.  They  might  be  different  in  L 
their  complexities  and  require  ap-       jlji 
propriately  different  solutions,  but  we  \ 
know  that  we  share  one  basic  commit  . 
ment:  We  believe  that  our  solutions  lie^-^j 
within  the  people  and  not  the  state.  W  ,^ 
are  committed  to  unleashing  the  natuB  j^, 
power  of  the  individual  to  produce  mM  ^^ 
and  to  make  a  better  life  for  all.  We  be  ^^^ 
lieve  that  people  will  stay  free  when      ^ 
enterprise  remains  free,  and  we  belieW  j^ 
that  there  are  no  insurmountable  prob- 
lems when  we  let  individuals  make  deci  ^ 
sions  outside  the  restricting  confines  ol  p 
government.  , 

Prime  Minister  Thateher,  I  look  for 
ward  to  our  discussions,  to  the  pleasutt 
of  renewing  our  friendship,  and  to  the 


I 


ltd 


:unity  to  fortify  the  commitment 
n  our  countries.  On  behalf  of  all 

cans  I  welcome  you  and  your 
to  the  United  States. 


Europe 


Minister  Thatcher 


; 


■esident,  I  count  it  a  double  joy 
m  once  again  in  the  United  States 
at  I'm  being  greeted  here  by  you, 
in  office,  after  a  splendid  victory 
ig  since  for  me  a  trusted  friend, 
varm  welcome  in  this  deeply  mov- 
•emony  will  strike  a  chord  in  the 
of  British  people  everywhere, 
ese  are  not  easy  times  in  which  to 

and  to  bear  the  responsibilities 
onal  and  international  leadership, 
oblems  are  many,  the  dangers 
!ie  decisions  difficult.  Indeed, 

spirits  might  even  be  tempted  to 
ay  to  gloom.  But  others  like  you 

■ed  by  the  challenge.  And  that's 
value  so  greatly  the  opportunity 
18  to  Washington  to  talk  with  you 

discuss  the  way  ahead  on  so 
»f  the  problems  of  which  you've 

this  morning. 
)  start  from  a  common  basis  of 
landing.  For  generations  our  two 

es  have  cherished  the  same 
'We've  defended  the  same  causes, 
valued  the  same  friendships,  and 
er  we've  faced  the  same  dangers. 

once  again,  our  sense  of  common 
and  common  resolution  is  being 

It  Vvdll  not  be  found  wanting, 
message  I  have  brought  across 

,ntic  is  that  we  in  Britain  stand 

iU.  America's  successes  will  be 

cesses.  Your  problems  will  be  our 
s,  and  when  you  look  for  friends 

be  there. 

i  natural  bond  of  interest  be- 

Dur  two  countries  is  strengthened 

common  approach  which  you  and 
to  our  national  problems.  You 

entioned  some  of  the  relevant 

We  are  both  trying  to  set  free 

rgies  of  our  people.  We  are  both 

ined  to  sweep  away  the  restric- 
i3|iat  hold  back  enterprise.  We  both 

ur  faith  not  so  much  in  economic 

but  in  the  resourcefulness  and 

ency  of  ordinary  people. 

a've  spoken  of  a  time  for  renewal. 

re  to  succeed  in  the  battle  of 
■I  f  we  are  to  hold  fast  and  extend 

ntiers  of  freedom,  we  must  first 
incftn  the  truth  that  makes  men  free. 

st  have  the  courage  to  reassert 

ditional  values  and  the  resolve  to 
'V    against  those  who  deny  our 

md  threaten  our  way  of  life. 


You  have  understood  the  challenge. 
You've  understood  the  need  for  leader- 
ship. In  Britain  you  will  find  a  ready 
response,  an  ally -valiant,  staunch,  and 
true. 


REMARKS  FOLLOWING  MEETING, 
FEB.  26,  19813 

President  Reagan 

I  just  have  a  few  words  here -both  of 
us— but  I  also  want  to  say  that  due  to 
the  schedule  that  has  been  arranged  and 
the  meetings  of  the  Prime  Minister  yet 
to  go  to,  there'll  be  no  time  for  any 
questions. 

It's  both  appropriate  and  timely,  I 
think,  that  Prime  Minister  Thatcher 
should  be  the  first  West  European 
leader  to  visit  here  in  the  new  Adminis- 
tration. Our  deep  ties  and  perceptions 
we  share  give  us  much  to  talk  about.  To- 
gether we're  confronting  an  extremely 
grave  international  situation.  We  do  so 
with  determination  and  optimism.  We're 
both  committed  to  safeguarding  fun- 
damental Western  interests  worldwide, 
including  Europe,  the  Persian  Gulf, 
Southwest  Asia,  and  Central  America. 

Our  partnership  in  NATO  is  a  vital 
part  of  that  effort.  We're  determined  to 
consult  closely  with  each  other  and  with 
the  rest  of  our  allies  on  all  matters  in- 
volving our  common  security.  In  that 
connection,  we  affirmed  our  support  for 
the  alliance's  decision  of  December  1979 
to  modernize  long-range  theater  nuclear 
forces  and  to  pursue  arms  control  eff'orts 
at  the  same  time,  in  parallel. 

We've  also  noted  the  Soviet  proposal 
for  a  summit  meeting.  We  believe  this 
proposal  needs  to  be  carefully  studied, 
and  we  will  be  consulting  closely  on  this 
matter.  For  our  part,  we  certainly  have 
an  interest  in  pursuing  serious,  construc- 
tive dialogue  with  the  Soviets  on  those 
issues  which  divide  us. 

And  again,  let  me  say,  Madam 
Prime  Minister,  we're  just  delighted  to 
have  you  here  with  us. 

Prime  Minister  Thatcher 

Thank  you.  Mr.  President,  friends,  may 
I  just  add  one  or  two  things  to  what  tiie 
President  has  said? 

We're  very  sensible  in  Britain  of  the 
honor  you  do  us  by  asking  us  to  make 
the  first  official  visit  of  head  of  govern- 
ment to  see  you  here,  and  we  have,  in- 
deed, taken  advantage  of  the  opportuni- 
ty afforded  us  to  discuss  many  things 
which  will  be  extremely  important  in  the 


coming  months.  The  President  and  I  had 
a  tete-a-tete  for  some  time,  and  then 
were  joined  by  the  Vice  President  and 
the  foreign  secretaries,  when  we  dis- 
cussed many  of  the  wider  issues  the 
world  over. 

Of  course,  we  take  the  same  view  in 
the  United  States  and  Britain  that  our 
first  duty  to  freedom  is  to  defend  our 
own.  And  our  second  duty  is  to  try 
somehow  to  enlarge  the  frontiers  of 
freedom  so  that  other  nations  might 
have  the  right  to  choose  it.  It  is,  indeed, 
a  very  difficult  time  the  world  over,  and 
we  have,  of  course,  discussed  the  many 
problems,  as  the  President  said,  in- 
cluding President  Brezhnev's  recent 
speech,  the  problems  in  Africa,  the  prob- 
lems in  the  Middle  East,  and  the  prob- 
lems in  Central  and  South  America. 

I  really  regard  it  as  the  beginning  of 
a  process  of  consultation.  We  shall  both 
of  us  be  going  to  a  number  of  summit 
meetings  this  year.  It  is  absolutely  vital 
that  we  coordinate  our  efforts  and 
decide  upon  a  common  line  for  the  many 
problems  that  will  face  us. 

Thank  you  very  much  for  the  won- 
derful welcome  you've  given  us.  Thank 
you  for  giving  us  so  much  time  and  for 
talking  in  so  much  detail  about  the 
things  which  concern  us  both,  which  con- 
cern our  peoples,  and  which  concern  the 
peoples  in  the  world  everywhere.  And  I 
think,  if  I  may -can  I  just  end  on  a  note 
of  optimism?  Yes,  there  are  enormous 
problems.  Yes,  there  have  always  been 
enormous  problems,  but  I  believe, 
together,  we  have  the  capacity  to  solve 
some  of  them.  And  those  which  we  do 
not  solve,  I  believe  we  can  improve  so 
that  we  can  set  them  on  their  way  to  a 
solution  in  the  end. 


'  Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  2,  1981, 
which  also  contains  the  toasts  made  at  a  state 
dinner  at  the  White  House  on  Feb.  26  and 
toasts  made  at  a  dinner  at  the  British  Em- 
bassy on  Feb.  27. 

^  Made  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  White 
House. 

^  Made  to  reporters  on  the  South 
Grounds  of  the  White  House.  ■ 


27 


Europe 

Secretary  Haig  Meets  With 
West  German  Foreign  iViinister 


JOINT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  9,  1981 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher  and 
Secretary  of  State  Haig  met  on  March 
9,  1981,  in  Washington  for  extensive 
talks  on  questions  of  common  interest. 

In  the  evaluation  of  the  international 
situation,  their  talks  revealed  full  agree- 
ment on  the  key  issues  which  their  coun- 
tries jointly  face.  They  underlined  the 
common  destiny  of  the  European  and 
American  democracies.  The  United 
States  continues  to  support  the  process 
of  European  unification.  They  agreed  on 
the  need  of  intensive  and  enhanced 
allied  consultations  on  a  bilateral  and 
multilateral  basis. 

Secretary  Haig  and  Foreign  Minister 
Genscher  agreed  that  the  close  and 
trusting  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many is  an  essential  and  reliable  factor 
in  international  stability  and  in  Western 
security.  They  consider  the  North  Atlan- 
tic alliance  as  the  basis  of  the  common 
security  of  their  countries.  The  stabiliza- 
tion of  East- West  relations,  the  preser- 
vation of  peace,  the  maintenance  and 
restoration,  where  necessary,  of  the  mil- 
itary balance  depend  on  alliance  cohe- 
sion. The  Government  of  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  appreciates  the 
great  efforts  undertaken  by  the  Ameri- 
can Administration  for  the  common 
security  and  common  interest. 

Secretary  Haig  recognized  the 
crucial  German  contribution  to  Western 
defense,  including  the  continuing  Ger- 
man role  in  mobilizing  essential  interna- 
tional support  for  Turkey. 

NATO  security  must  be  based  on  an 
equitable  sharing  of  the  defense  burden. 
Economic  stability  and  social  justice  are 
preconditions  enabling  allied  countries  to 
maintain  their  defense  capability. 

Foreign  Minister  Genscher  stated 
that  the  Government  of  the  Federal  Re- 
public of  Germany  takes  a  positive  view 
of  the  host-nation-support  concept.  For- 
eign Minister  Genscher  expressed  appre- 
ciation for  the  U.S.  contribution  to  the 
safeguarding  of  Western  interests. 

Both  ministers  agreed  that  meaning- 
ful and  verifiable  arms  control  agree- 
ments are  an  important  element  of  se- 
curity policy.  The  United  States  and  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  support 
both  tracks  of  the  December  12,  1979, 


NATO  decision  on  theater  nuclear  forces 
(TNF).  Minister  Genscher  welcomed  Sec- 
retary Haig's  assurances  that  the  United 
States  intended  to  continue  close  con- 
sultations with  its  allies  on  the  imple- 
mentation of  both  tracks  of  the  Decem- 
ber 1979  decision.  Foreign  Minister 
Genscher  welcomed  the  intention  of  the 
United  States  to  propose  an  early  meet- 
ing of  the  special  consultative  group. 

Both  governments  agree  that  the 
U.S. -Soviet  talks  on  the  limitation  of 
TNF  should  be  continued.  Soviet  su- 
periority in  the  long-range  TNF  area 
continues  to  grow  and  thereby  creates  a 
great  obstacle  to  arms  control  agree- 
ment; Soviet  proposals  for  a  moratorium 
which  would  serve  to  legitimize  this 
superiority  are  totally  unacceptable. 

Soviet  acceptance  of  the  view  that  a 
Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Europe 
must  consider  confidence-building 
measures  covering  all  of  Europe  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Urals,  in  line  with 
the  French  proposal  for  such  a  confer- 
ence, is  a  positive  development  and  may 
lead  to  progress  in  the  discussions  in 
Madrid. 

The  two  ministers  support  a  bal- 
anced outcome  of  the  current  CSCE 
[Conference  on  Security  and  Coopera- 
tion in  Europe]  review  conference,  in- 
cluding progress  on  the  important 
humanitarian  aspects  of  East- West 
relations. 

Secretary  Haig  explained  the  on- 
going review  of  U.S.  policy  on  SALT. 
Minister  Genscher  expressed  again  the 
Federal  Government's  support  for  the 
SALT  process  as  a  contribution  to  the 
military  balance  and  Western  security. 

Relations  with  the  Soviet  Union 
must  be  based  on  realism  and,  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  U.S. -Soviet  declaration  of 
1972,  on  mutual  restraint.  Soviet  efforts 
at  expanding  their  influence  and  de- 
stabilizing other  areas  have  cast  a  deep 
shadow  on  East- West  relations  in 
Europe.  The  indivisibility  of  interna- 
tional peace  and  security  requires 
respect  for  the  principle  of  non-use  of 
force,  of  the  political  independence  of 
states,  and  self-determination  of  peoples. 
These  principles  are  laid  down  in  the 
U.N.  Charter  and  the  Final  Act  of 
Helsinki. 

The  two  ministers  had  an  exchange 
of  views  on  the  recent  message  of 
General  Secretary  Brezhnev.  Foreign 
Minister  Genscher  expressed  a  positive 


|(iii 


IBSl 


lilt 
tlen 
lis 

i: 
f, 

m 
ni 

tt. 
m 
w 


■Jli 


view  on  the  idea  of  properly  preparei 
U.S. -Soviet  summit  trusting  that,  un 
such  a  meeting  will  come  about,  no 
events  will  occur  that  might  impair  il|liiie: 
purpose. 

Poland  must  be  allowed  to  solve 
problems  peacefully  and  without  exte 
nal  pressure.  Any  intervention  would 
fundamentally  change  the  entire  inte 
tional  situation.  The  United  States  ai 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  wil 
with  other  Western  countries,  consid 
further  contributions  to  Poland's 
economic  and  financial  stability. 

Both  ministers  agreed  that  it  is  c 
particular  importance  that  the  calm 
situation  in  and  around  Berlin,  which 
of  crucial  significance  for  European 
security,  East- West  relations,  and  tb 
international  situation  as  a  whole,  be 
maintained.  Secretary  Haig  reaffirme 
the  indissoluble  U.S.  commitment  to 
security  and  welfare  of  Berlin. 

Both  ministers  agreed  that  recen 
events  in  Spain  demonstrate  the 
strength  of  Spain's  democratic  institi 
tions  and  expressed  their  full  confide 
in  Spain's  future  course. 

Both  ministers  support  genuine 
nonalignment  and  self-determination 
Strengthening  the  economies  of  the 
developing  countries  plays  an  import  | 
role  in  increasing  stability  and  presei- 
ing  their  independence.  Effective  intw 
national  discussions  can  also  make  a 
valuable  contribution  to  these  goals. 
Foreign  Minister  Genscher  referred 
the  Vienna  meeting  of  Foreign  Minis  I 
to  prepare  the  North-South  summit  i  i 
Mexico. 

Both  ministers  condemn  external 
tervention  in  the  affairs  of  nonalignec 
countries,  in  particular  Afghanistan, 
where  the  decisions  of  the  26th  Sovie 
Party  Congress  gave  no  hints  of  a  wil 
ingness  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  to 
that  crisis  based  on  the  withdrawal  o;l 
Soviet  troops  in  conformity  with  U.N^i  « 
and  nonaligned  resolutions. 

Political  and  economic  stability  ofl  k 
countries  in  the  region  immediately 
affected  by  the  Soviet  occupation  of 
Afghanistan  is  of  great  importance  im  tt 
order  to  allow  them  to  continue  to  pla 
their  role  in  solving  the  crisis.  SecretJi  ^ 
Haig  recognized  in  particular  the  imp' 
tance  of  German  economic  aid  to  Pakll 
Stan.  The  American  contribution  is  st; 
under  review. 

On  the  Middle  East,  the  United 
States  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  G< 
many,  within  the  framework  of  Euro- 


n 


t* 


«f 


li 


Europe 


'"■*  political  cooperation,  will  continue 
-"  rk  for  a  peaceful  settlement.  The 
ers  agreed  that  their  efforts  are 
ementary. 

1  internationally  acceptable  peace- 
;tlement  in  Namibia  is  in  the  in- 
of  stability  in  southern  Africa, 
lolicy  in  this  area  is  still  under 
r. 

'- ''  irrent  developments  in  Central 
ca  are  a  cause  of  great  concern, 

'*'4e  two  ministers  condemn  the  in- 
nce  by  Communist  countries  in 
^rnal  affairs  of  El  Salvador,  in 
ilar  through  the  clandestine  sup- 
arms. 

'fie  decision  of  President  Duarte  to 

te  a  process  leading  toward  elec- 

ind  a  continuation  of  reforms  es- 

ing  political  stability  through 

justice  in  that  country  should  be 

ted.  Both  ministers  appealed  to 

mocratic  forces  in  El  Salvador  to 

tate  to  achieve  these  goals.  ■ 


;M 


CSCE  Addresses 
Subject  of  Terrorism 


janish  Coup 
;|empt 

poi 
■esi 
iti  IRTMENT  STATEMENT, 

lei  B4,  1981' 

als, 

red  he  past  24  hours,  we  have  fol- 
iiii  the  events  in  Spain  with  great  in- 
iiii  and  attention.  We  note  that  the 

ige  to  Spanish  democracy  was 
irii     to  a  small  number  of  people.  The 
ip  Qelming  majority  of  the  armed 

land  the  Spanish  people  remained 

0  the  King  and  to  the  constitution. 

1  friends  of  that  country,  we  join 
■essing  our  congratulations  on  the 
sful  resolution  of  the  crisis  and  on 
ength  shown  by  the  institutions 
iders  of  Spain's  new  democracy, 
le  and  leadership  of  King  Juan 
were  clearly  instrumental  in  end- 
!  crisis  and  deserve  particular  ad- 


ad  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Tient  spokesman  William  J.  Dyess.  ■ 


3n. 


by  Max  M.  Kampelman 

Statement  made  in  a  plenary  session 
of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Coop- 
eration in  Europe  (CSCE)  in  Madrid  on 
February  9,  1981.  Ambassador 
Kampelman  is  chairman  of  the  U.S. 
delegation. 

On  Friday  I  stated  our  delegation's  sup- 
port for  RM.  14,  the  proposal  on  ter- 
rorism submitted  by  the  Spanish  delega- 
tion, and  I  stated  our  intent  to  discuss 
the  subject  in  greater  detail  as  an  indica- 
tion of  my  government's  serious  concern 
about  the  problem  it  addresses. 

Terrorism  as  a  political  instrument 
is  a  blight  on  our  standards  of  civilized 
political  behavior.  Its  immorality  cannot 
be  justified.  It  has  become  a  serious 
phenomenon  and  is  a  threat  to  the  very 
basis  of  individual  and  institutional 
security  in  modern  life.  It  has  become  a 
tool  for  irresponsible  fanatical  groups 
whose  object  is  to  use  cruelty  and 
violence  to  impose  their  will  upon  in- 
dividuals, institutions,  and  societies 
whom  they  could  not  otherwise  influence 
or  persuade. 

There  was  a  time  when  terrorism 
was  limited  to  individual  acts  by 
desperate  and  frequently  depraved 
minds.  The  terrorist  was  sometimes 
looked  upon  as  a  person  in  the  grip  of 
passion.  It  was  all  too  common  to  think 
of  him  as  a  romantic  individualist,  acting 
alone.  And  there  was  a  time  when  we 
could  properly  seek  to  contain  terrorism 
within  national  borders.  It  has  become 
increasingly  clear,  however,  that  most 
terrorists  today  belong  to  disciplined 
groups,  cynically  employing  terrorism  as 
an  instrument  of  policy.  Today  it  is  well 
organized  and  well  financed.  And  the 
terrorist  is  not  confined  by  national 
boundaries;  indeed,  all  too  often  he  is 
able  to  flee  across  borders  for  refuge. 
Terrorism  has  become  international  in 
scope.  As  such  it  is  real  and  terrifying 
and  dangerous  to  us  all,  and  there  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  its  most  ex- 
treme manifestations  are  yet  to  be  ex- 
perienced. 

We  must  all  recognize  that  the 
danger  of  international  terrorism  is 
among  the  most  serious  of  all  the  prob- 
lems on  the  international  agenda  facing 


981 


us  here  at  Madrid.  None  of  us  is  safe 
from  it.  No  social,  economic,  or  political 
system  and  no  nationality  group  is  im- 
mune from  its  destructive  impact.  Few 
of  us  have  not  been  aflfected  by  its 
violence  and  cruelty.  It  undermines  na- 
tional and  international  stability,  and 
stability  is  the  basis  for  peace  and 
understanding  among  us. 

Terrorism  does  not  favor  a  particu- 
lar ideology.  It  is  not  a  friend  of  one 
side  or  another.  It  knows  no  boundaries, 
and  it  respects  no  values.  No  nation  is 
sacrosanct.  It  can  be  practiced,  and  ra- 
tionalized, by  all  races,  creeds,  and 
faiths.  It  is  self-perpetuating,  with  inci- 
dent breeding  incident  and  violence 
breeding  violence.  Indeed,  terrorists 
often  seek  to  provoke  a  response  in  the 
hope  that  the  response  itself  vrill  under- 
mine the  stability  they  seek  to  destroy. 

Terrorism  is  a  tactic  of  those  who 
have  neither  the  humanity  nor  the  toler- 
ance nor  the  understanding  to  seek  solu- 
tions through  the  established  institutions 
which  form  the  basis  for  stable  civilized 
relations  among  nations  and  among 
peoples. 

Terrorism  must  be  opposed  by  na- 
tions and  by  peoples  if  they  have  any 
commitment  to  decency  and  certainly  if 
they  have  any  concern  for  the  stability 
of  their  own  societies.  The  task  of  de- 
feating international  terrorism  requires 
an  international  effort.  RM.  14  is  an  im- 
portant step  in  that  direction.  It  calls  for 
our  support. 

Today's  advocate  of  terrorism,  I 
respectfully  warn,  can  easily  become 
tomorrow's  victim.  It  is  gruesomely  im- 
partial in  effect,  striking  its  victims  in- 
discriminately. It  most  often  strikes  at 
the  innocent-the  bus  filled  with  tour- 
ists, the  passerby  in  the  park,  the  shop- 
per in  the  market.  It  seeks  to  intimidate 
and  brutalize,  and  all  of  us,  literally  and 
figuratively,  are  its  potential  victims. 

The  terrorist  feeds  on  silence,  ignor- 
ance, psychological  indulgence,  expedien- 
cy, and  the  cynicism  of  those  who  would 
foolishly  and  for  shortsighted  purposes 
look  the  other  way.  No  apologies  or  ex- 
cuses for  terrorism  can  make  less  abhor- 
rent the  facts  which  they  ultimately  en- 
courage. No  justification  can  be  accepted 
for  policies  which,  for  whatever  reason - 
"national  liberation"  or  any  other 
political  rationalization -provide  encour- 


29 


MIDDLE  EAST 


agement,  weapons,  instruction,  or 
refuge  to  those  who  spread  terror 
through  random  violence  for  political 
ends.  Terrorist  groups  may  profess 
different  ideologies  and  attack  different 
human  targets,  but  it  is  what  they  have 
in  common  that  is  a  danger  to  us  all. 
Terrorist  bands  must  be  treated  as  such. 
We  must  not  tolerate  the  death,  may- 
hem, and  instability  which  is  the  trade- 
mark of  the  terrorist. 

It  is  tragic  and  reprehensible  when 
governments,  within  their  own  borders 
and  elsewhere,  support  such  groups  by 
providing  financial  assistance,  explosive 
sophistication,  sabotage  instruction, 
other  training,  arms,  and  even  targets. 
It  is  unconscionable  when  they  use  their 
media  to  support  groups  which  employ 
terrorism  as  an  instrument  of  policy. 
Surely  it  must  be  clear  that  such  activity 
can  only  fan  the  flames  of  terrorism  in 
the  world  and  thus  endanger  the  lives  of 
still  more  innocent  people  as  well  as  the 
stability  of  all  governments,  including 
those  whose  support  or  equivocal  at- 
titude fosters  the  atmosphere  on  which 
it  thrives. 

You  are  aware  that  my  government 
has  within  the  past  few  days  in  Wash- 
ington expressed  its  concern  over  terror- 
ism. Those  statements  speak  for  them- 
selves. Secretary  Haig  placed  the  prob- 
lem well  within  the  scope  of  our  agenda 
when  he  described  terrorism  as  the  ulti- 
mate abuse  of  human  rights  as  well  as  a 
threat  to  our  security  as  it  tears  at  the 
very  fabric  of  our  society  and  stability. 

There  is  understandably  a  widened 
consciousness  in  my  country  today  be- 
cause of  the  recent  holding  of  52  Ameri- 
can diplomats  as  hostages  in  Iran.  We 
have  also  had  five  of  our  Ambassadors 
killed  by  international  terrorists  since 
1968.  Other  diplomats  and  citizens  have 
been  victims  of  these  attacks.  But  we  all 
know  that  other  governments  have  had 
similar  experiences.  The  Spanish  and 
Turkish  statements  to  this  effect  here 
have  been  eloquent. 

A  number  of  international  measures 
have  already  been  taken  to  deal  with  the 
problem  of  terrorism.  More  measures 
are  needed.  Here  in  this  meeting  we  can 
play  a  vital  role  in  mobilizing  public  and 
governmental  consciousness  against  this 
outrage.  We  have  a  fundamental  and 
common  interest  in  cooperating  to  face 
this  challenge. 

RM.  14,   introduced  by  Spain  and 
supported  by  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,  Italy,  Portugal,  Turkey,  the 
United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and  the 
United  States,  merits  the  unanimous  en- 


30 


Implementation  of  the 
Hostage  Agreements  With  Iran 


(tmi 


by  Walter  J.  Stoessel 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Forvign 
Relatione  Committee  on  March  J,.  1981. 
Ambassador  Stoessel  is  Under  Serretarii 
for  Political  Ajfa  irs. ' 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
the  Administration's  decision  to  imple- 
ment the  agreements  with  Iran  for  the 
hostages'  release.  I  will  address  my  com- 
ments to  why  we  believe  it  is  in  the  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  to  imple- 
ment the  agreements.  I  will  also  talk 
about  the  legal  basis  for  proceeding  with 
the  agreements  and  the  practical  steps 
we  plan  to  take  in  this  regard. 

Our  decision  to  implement  the  agree- 
ments must  be  considered  in  the  context 
of  both  our  international  interests  and 
domestic  concerns.  Given  Iran's  strate- 
gic location,  its  oil  resources,  and  the 
possibilities  for  Soviet  influence  there, 
movement  toward  improved  relations 
may  at  some  point  be  in  the  interest  of 
the  United  States.  However,  it  is  also  in 
our  interest  to  take  care  that  any  such 
movement  is  consistent  with  our  strong 
opposition  to  terrorism  and  the  stake 


dorsement  of  this  body.  I  congratulate 
Ambassador  Ruperez  and  his  colleagues 
on  their  constructive  effort  in  putting 
together  this  valuable  and  important 
proposal.  It  notes  the  need  for  improv- 
ing international  cooperation  in  order  to 
meet  the  threat  of  terrorism.  It  calls  on 
us  to  commit  ourselves  openly  and 
resolutely  to  this  present  task.  My 
government  welcomes  this  call. 

I  can  see  no  reason  for  standing 
apart  from  such  an  urgent  task.  Agree- 
ment here  will  serve  as  an  important 
symbol  to  our  peoples  and  to  the  world. 
It  will  send  a  message  that  the  nations 
represented  in  Madrid  have  confirmed 
their  resolute  opposition  to  the  tactics  of 
barbarism  and  terror,  as  well  as  their 
determination  to  cooperate  in  overcom- 
ing the  terrorist  challenge  to  peace, 
security,  and  cooperation  among  all  of 
our  peoples.  RM.  14  provides  us  an  op- 
portunity to  reaffirm  that  terrorism  can- 
not and  will  not  be  condoned.  ■ 


Heir 
listr; 


ISti 
lefoi 
idti 


which  we,  and  all  law-abiding  nations, 
have  in  the  system  of  international  law 
and  custom. 

I  want  to  stress  that,  by  itself,  oup^d 
decision  to  implement  the  Algerian 
agreements  does  not  constitute  a  deci' 
sion  to  normalize  relations  with  Iran. 
However,  a  benefit  of  implementing  thl 
agreements  is  that  this  option  is  left 
open. 

U.S.  regional  interests  also  favor 
plementation  of  the  agreements.  Frien  ^ 
ly  governments  in  the  area,  and  most)  ^ik 
our  allies,  believe  we  must  honor  these  Ja 
obligations.  Certainly,  for  a  number  oi  .^f 
countries,  the  agreements  represent  a  ffj 
satisfactory  conclusion  to  the  freeze  wj  m, 
placed  on  Iranian  assets  -  a  step  whicl^  ^ 
caused  important  investors  considerab  j,j 
anxiety.  In  addition,  had  we  decided 
to  implement  the  agreements,  we  woi 
have  been  seen  by  other  countries  -  ei 
pecially  Algeria  -  as  failing  to  honor  a 
commitment  made  to  them.  As  you 
know,  we  have  pursued  a  careful  pol: 
of  gradual  improvement  in  our  relatioj 
with  Algeria,  and  we  appreciate 
Algeria's  role  in  ending  this  national 
trauma. 

In  short,  in  completing  a  very  thoj 
ough  review  of  our  obligations  under 
agreements,  we  have  considered  our 
strategic  concerns  -  and  the  extraordi 
nary  circumstances  under  which  the 
agreements  were  negotiated  -  very  ci 
fully.  Our  decision  to  approve  implem^P 
tation,  strictly  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  the  agreements,  also  takes  i 
account  the  legitimate  rights  of  U.S. 
claimants  and  our  policies  for  dealing 
with  terrorism. 

We  did  not  in  our  review  of  the 
agreements  address  whether  the  crisii 
could  have  been  better  handled  or       I 
whether  a  better  set  of  agreements    | 
could  have  been  negotiated.  However, 
the  agreements  are  an  accomplished 
fact,  authorized  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  acting  within  the  authori- 
ty of  his  office.  We  are  satisfied  that  our 
obligations  under  them  do  not  violate 
U.S.  law.  We  did  not  see  it  as  necessa^f 
to  reach  a  conclusion  as  to  the  agree- 
ments' legally  binding  character  under 
international  law.  We  are  proceeding 
with  implementation  because  it  appears 
to  be  clearly  in  the  overall  interests 
the  United  States  to  do  so. 


W 


ill 


loL 


nonartmont   nf  C:tatp   RulletiW 


Middle  East 


it  me  say  that  Iran  has  not 
;d  from  these  agreements  and  in 
aid  a  considerable  economic  price 
;he  sanctions  and  political  isolation 
ed  upon  it.  Faced  with  the  serious 
ne  imposed  by  the  advent  of  a  new 
listration  which  was  not  commit- 
continue  the  negotiations  under- 
ran  had  to  settle  for  terms  that 
ed  financial  relations  with  the 
States  roughly  to  where  they 
»efore  the  hostages  were  seized 
id  to  give  up  many  of  their  de- 
,  including  the  return  of  the  Shah 
8  return  of  his  assets.  The  funds 
y  returned  to  Iran  and  those 
may  be  returned  as  the  agree- 
are  implemented  and  commercial 
lancial  claims  are  settled  are 
that  belonged  to  Iran  before  the 
'  of  the  hostages.  No  U.S.  funds 
een  sent  to  Iran  as  the  result  of 
agreements. 

Iree  actions  required  under  the 
lents  have  already  taken  place. 

•  The  United  States  has  pledged 
it^rference  in  Iran's  internal  affairs. 
-.    in  accordance  with  our  policy  and 
.'■  itional  law. 

•■^7.9  billion  was  transferred  to  an 
riccount  with  the  Bank  of 
:il.  Of  this,  $3.7  billion  was  then 
li  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
I  irk  to  pay  off  syndicated  bank 
3  nd  credits,  and  $1.4  billion  was 
ii  d  in  the  account  to  pay  nonsyndi- 
d  )ans  and  credits  of  banks  and  dis- 
c  nterest  owing  on  Iran  deposits  in 
inks. 

•  Ve  have  revoked  economic  sanc- 

s  iiposed  on  Iran  in  response  to  the 
a  '  taking.  Normal  controls  under 

IIS  Export  Control  Act  continue 
to  Iran  and  a  Department 

iiivisory  points  out  the  dangers  of 
c  ig  there. 

Hvvever,  a  number  of  additional 
If  required  to  complete  imple- 
^lon  of  the  agreements.  The  execu- 
omch  published  regulations  last 
:  I  implement  Executive  orders 
ihy  President  Carter  on  Jan- 
'.  and  a  new  Executive  order 
iiy  President  Reagan  on  Febru- 
:  1981.  These  regulations  explain 
*'  "insibilities  of  U.S.  holders  of 
assets.  We  have  discussed  these 
inns  in  detail  with  U.S.  claimants; 
t'ws  have  been  fully  considered  in 
t'ting  process. 
are  working  to  conclude  a 
account  arrangement  with  a 


foreign  central  bank  into  which  to  place 
a  portion  of  the  $2.2  billion  in  Iranian 
assets  now  in  U.S.  branches  of  U.S. 
banks.  One-half  of  these  assets,  as  they 
are  transferred,  are  to  go  into  such  an 
interest-bearing  account  for  payment  of 
arbitration  awards  to  U.S.  claimants. 
When  $1  billion  has  been  placed  in  the 
security  account,  the  additional  funds 
will  be  transferred  to  Iran.  However, 
whenever  the  balance  in  the  security  ac- 
count should  drop  below  $500  million  as 
a  result  of  payment  of  claims,  Iran  is 
obligated  to  make  new  deposits  sufficient 
to  maintain  the  $500  million  balance.  We 
must  also  transfer  to  Iran  $1-1.5  billion 
of  other  Iranian  assets  subject  to  U.S. 
jurisdiction. 

Claims  not  settled  within  6  months 
by  direct  negotiation  between  the  par- 
ties may  be  submitted  to  the  arbitration 
tribunal.  We  are  seeking  a  site  for  the 
tribunal  and  will  shortly  begin  to  make 
other  arrangements  as  well,  including 
the  selection  of  arbitrators. 

The  new  Executive  order  signed  by 
President  Reagan  suspends  the  claims  in 


U.S.  courts  that  may  be  presented  to 
the  arbitration  tribunal.  These  claims 
will  be  discharged  only  after  the  tribunal 
takes  jurisdiction  and  makes  a  judgment 
on  the  merits.  We  will  also  lift  the  legal 
attachments  by  U.S.  claimants  on  Ira- 
nian assets.  These  attachments  must  be 
removed  before  the  transfers  can  begin 
that  will-  in  addition  to  returning  some 
Iranian  property  to  Iran- fill  the  securi- 
ty account  from  which  arbitration 
awards  will  be  paid.  We  will  also,  in  due 
course,  withdraw  U.S.  claims  against 
Iran  before  the  International  Court  of 
Justice.  (We  will,  however,  continue  to 
press  our  claim  for  the  return  of  our 
Embassy  and  other  properties  in  Iran.) 
A  category  of  obligations  of  which  I 
have  not  spoken  concerns  the  Shah's 
wealth.  The  regulations  that  I  have  men- 
tioned will  require  that  whenever  the 
Shah's  estate  or  any  close  relative  is 
served  as  a  defendent  in  U.S.  courts  by 
Iran,  pursuant  to  an  effort  to  recover 
Iranian  property,  the  assets  involved 
will  be  frozen  and  information  regarding 
them  will  be  made  available  to  Iran. 


U.S.  To  Sell  Military  Equipment 
to  Saudi  Arabia 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
MAR.  6.  1981' 

We  have  consulted  closely  with  the  Con- 
gress during  the  past  week  regarding 
the  serious  deterioration  in  security  con- 
ditions in  the  Middle  East-Persian  Gulf 
region  and  also  regarding  the  growing 
threat  to  our  friends  there  from  Soviet 
and  other  pressures.  We  have  benefited 
from  the  congressional  views  expressed, 
and  we  plan  to  continue  to  work  closely 
with  the  Congress  on  steps  to  protect 
our  interests  in  that  vital  region.  The 
first  step  is  to  help  our  friends  defend 
themselves  and  to  rebuild  their  con- 
fidence in  our  reliability. 

The  Administration  will  shortly  give 
notification  to  Congress  of  our  intention 
to  sell  military  equipment  to  Saudi 
Arabia.  We  propose  to  sell  to  the  Saudis 
conformal  fuel  tanks  and  AIM-9L  air-to- 
air  missiles  which  will  augment  the 
defensive  role  of  their  F-15  aircraft.  We 
have  agreed  also  to  sell  to  Saudi  Arabia 
aerial  surveillance  aircraft,  subject  to 
further  determination  of  their  specific 
requirements.  We  have  agreed  to  be 


responsive  on  providing  a  refueling 
capability.  We  will  also  conduct  a 
technical  study  with  the  Saudis  to  deter- 
mine their  air-to-ground  requirements 
for  our  defending  against  the  threat  of 
invasion. 

We  are  aware,  of  course,  of  the 
assurances  the  previous  Administration 
gave  to  the  Congress  in  1978  regarding 
these  items.  The  critical  fact  today  is 
that  the  circumstances  in  the  region 
have  changed  dramatically.  The  Soviet 
invasion  of  Afghanistan,  the  turmoil  of 
the  Iranian  revolution,  the  Iran-Iraq 
war,  and  the  Soviet  presence  in  South 
Yemen  and  Ethiopia  underscore  the  in- 
stability in  the  region  and  the  dangers  of 
Soviet  penetration  and  exploitation. 

These  proposals  for  military  sales 
are  a  sign  of  our  determination  that  the 
United  States  will  move  decisively  and 
quickly  to  protect  its  interests  and  those 
of  its  friends  and  allies  when  they  are 
threatened. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  William  .1.  Dyess.  ■ 


Middle  East 


Whether,  in  fact,  the  assets  are 
ultimately  returned  to  Iran  will  be  for 
the  courts  to  decide,  as  the  agreements 
made  clear.  Moreover,  the  regulations 
will  expressly  permit  those  family 
members  whose  assets  are  frozen  as 
much  money  as  they  need  for  personal 
expenses. 

The  banks  seem  to  be  satisfied  with 
the  agreements  and  stand  to  be  paid  in 
full  -  something  that  was  by  no  means 
assured  previously.  The  principal  con- 
cern of  the  contract  claimants  is  that 
Iran  may  not  pay  awards  made  by  the 
arbitration  tribunal.  However,  under  the 
terms  of  the  agreement,  arbitral  awards 
against  Iran  would  be  enforceable 
against  its  assets  in  any  country.  Iran 
has  waived  its  sovereign  immunity 
defense  with  respect  to  awards  made  by 
the  arbitration  tribunal.  Because  of  its 
dependence  on  oil  sales,  Iranian  assets 
would  be  available  in  a  number  of  coun- 
tries for  satisfaction  of  arbitral  awards. 
Access  to  Iranian  assets  and  satisfaction 
of  the  American  contract  claims  were  by 
no  means  legally  assured  prior  to  the 
taking  of  the  hostages,  either. 


U.S. -European 
Initiative 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  4,  19811 

We  have  made  plain  that  this  Ad- 
ministration supports  the  ongoing  peace 
process  and  intends  to  build  on  it  in 
seeking  a  comprehensive  settlement  of 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 

We  feel  that  the  talks  over  the  past 
days  here  with  our  European  allies  have 
confirmed  that  all  of  us  have  a  major  in- 
terest in  achieving  peace  in  the  Middle 
East  and  strengthening  security  against 
the  Soviet  threat  there.  We  are  confi- 
dent that  they  understand  the  impor- 
tance of  taking  no  action  that  would 
undercut  the  peace  process. 

We  particularly  welcome  Prime 
Minister  Thatcher's  public  remarks  here 
that  the  efforts  of  the  P^uropean 
Economic  Community  10  are  meant  to 
be  complementary  to  efforts  being  made 
by  the  United  States  to  move  toward  the 
comprehensive  settlement  we  all  seek. 


Suspension  of  Litigation 
Against  Iran 


EXECUTIVE  ORDER  12294, 
FEB.  24,  1981' 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States,  including  Section  203  of  the 
International  Emergency  Economic  Powers 
Act  (50  U.S.C.  1702),  Section  301  of  Title  3 
of  the  United  States  Code,  Section  1732  of 
Title  22  of  the  United  States  Code,  and  Sec- 
tion 301  of  the  National  Emergencies  Act  (50 
U.S.C.  1631),  in  view  of  the  continuing 
unusual  and  extraordinary  threat  to  the  na- 
tional security,  foreign  policy  and  economy  of 
the  United  States  upon  which  were  based  the 
declarations  of  national  emergency  in  Execu- 
tive Order  No.  12170,  issued  November  14, 
1979,  and  in  Executive  Order  No.  12211, 


Most  of  those  with  claims  upon  Ira- 
nian assets  now  understand  and  are 
reasonably  satisfied  with  these  ar- 
rangements. Others  may  have  a 
different  view,  however,  and  some  will 
go  to  court  to  try  to  keep  Iranian  assets 
here  or  to  delay  the  transfer  of  the 
funds.  In  general,  we  believe  the 
agreements  provide  for  more  certain 
protection  of  claimants'  interests  than 
was  enjoyed  previously. 

On  the  question  of  hostage  claims, 
we  have  concluded  that  given  our 
sovereign  immunities  law,  the  former 
hostages  stand  little  chance  of  successful 
litigation  against  Iran.  Thus,  our  obliga- 
tion under  the  agreements  to  block 
hostage  claims  against  Iran  will  have  lit- 
tle practical  effect.  When  the  agree- 
ments were  being  negotiated  the 
hostage  families  themselves  made  clear 
that  they  did  not  want  the  claims  issue 
to  impede  the  earliest  possible  release  of 
the  hostages.  Nevertheless,  the  Ad- 
ministration believes  that  the  question  of 
compensation  should  be  considered  in 
the  context  of  compensation  given  other 
government  servants  who  have  endured 
similar  hardships,  such  as  prisoners  of 
war  and  other  ex-hostages.  President 
Carter  created  a  commission  to  make 
recommendations  on  the  issue  of 
hostage  compensation  by  the  United 
States  -  the  Administration  now  has  the 
question  of  this  commission  and  its  man- 
date under  active  review. 


process  of  normalization  of  relations  bi  ;"' 
?en  the  United  States  and  Iran,  it  is      i  **^ 


On 


idf 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  William  .1.  Dyess.  ■ 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearirigs 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office. 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


issued  April  17.  1980,  in  light  of  the  agreejiijty 
ment  with  the  Government  of  Iran,  as 
reflected  in  the  Declarations  of  the  Goven 
ment  of  the  Democratic  and  Popular  Repu 
of  Algeria  dated  January  19,  1981.  relatin) 
to  the  release  of  United  States  diplomats  i 
nationals  being  held  as  hostages  and  to  thl|itilii 
resolution  of  claims  of  United  States  na- 
tionals against  Iran,  in  order  to  implementl|i21 
Article  II  of  the  Declaration  of  Algeria  d 
cerning  the  settlement  of  claims  and  to 
the 
tween 

hereby  ordered  that  as  of  the  effective  da| 
of  this  Order: 

Skction  1.  All  claims  which  may  be 
presented  to  the  Iran-United  States  Clai; 
Tribunal  under  the  terms  of  Article  II  of 
Declaration  of  the  Government  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algi 
Concerning  the  Settlement  of  Claims  by  t 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  Ame     w 
and  the  Government  of  the  Islamic  Repuk     15' 
of  Iran,  and  all  claims  for  equitable  or  otl 
judicial  relief  in  connection  with  such  claii 
are  hereby  suspended,  except  as  they  ma 
presented  to  the  Tribunal.  During  the  pel 
of  this  suspension,  all  such  claims  shall  ha 
no  legal  effect  in  any  action  now  pending 
any  court  of  the  United  States,  including 
courts  of  any  state  or  any  locality  thereof 
the  District  of  Columbia  and  Puerto  Rico, 
in  any  action  commenced  in  any  such  coul 
after  the  effective  date  of  this  Order.  Not 
in  this  action  precludes  the  commencemeffll 
an  action  after  the  effective  date  of  this 
Order  for  the  purpose  of  tolling  the  period 
limitations  for  commencement  of  such  actio 

Sec,  2.  Nothing  in  this  Order  shall  ri 
dismissal  of  any  action  for  want  of  prosi 
tion. 

Skc  3.  Suspension  under  this  Order  Ml 
claim  or  a  portion  thereof  submitted  to  the  n 
Iran-United  States  Claims  Tribunal  for  ad- 
judication shall  terminate  upon  a  determina 
tion  by  the  Tribunal  that  it  does  not  have 
jurisdiction  over  such  claim  or  such  portion 
thereof. 

Skc  4.  A  determination  by  the  Iran- 
United  States  Claims  Tribunal  on  the  merilt  si 
that  a  claimant  is  not  entitled  to  recover  on  i 
claim  shall  operate  as  a  final  resolution  and 
discharge  of  the  claim  for  all  purposes.  A 
determination  by  the  Tribunal  that  a  claifflW 
shall  have  recovery  on  a  claim  in  a  specifisl 
amount  shall  operate  as  a  final  resolution  aW 
discharge  of  the  claim  for  all  purposes  upon 
payment  to  the  claimant  of  the  full  amount* 
the  award,  including  any  interest  awarded  I? 
the  Tribunal. 

Skc  5.  Nothing  in  this  Order  shall  apply 
to  any  claim  concerning  the  validity  or  pay- 
ment of  a  standby  letter  of  credit,  perforin- 
ance  or  payment  bond  or  other  similar  in#«' 
ment 


iii 


It 
f" 

1 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


(i.  Niitliiiit;  in  this  Onier  shall  pm 
e  assertion  of  a  counterclaim  or  set-off 
lited  States  national  in  any  judicial 
ing  pending  or  hereafter  commenced 
jovernment  of  Iran,  any  political  suli- 

of  Iran,  or  any  agency,  instrunientali- 
ntity  controlled  by  the  Government  of 
;iny  political  subdivision  thereof. 

7.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  is 
;ed  to  employ  all  powers  granted  to 
lie  International  p]mergency  Econom- 
rs  Act  and  by  22  U.S.C.  5  1732  to 

it  the  purposes  of  this  Order. 

8.  Executive  Order  Nos.  12276 
1228.5  of  January  19,  1981,  are 


i 


Order  shall  be  effective  immediately 
ies  shall  be  transmitted  to  the  Con- 


Ko.SAl.li  Rk,\(;,\n 


\GE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 

:4.  1981' 

t  to  Section  204(b)  of  the  Interna- 
mergency  Economic  Powers  Act 
),  .50  U.S.C.  1703(b),  I  have  today  ex- 
he  authority  granted  by  this  Act  to 
certain  litigation  against  Iran. 
e  circumstance  necessitating  the  ex- 
this  authority  is  the  implementation 
aims  Settlement  Agreement  between 
:d  States  and  Iran.  After  a  complete 
If  the  agreements  with  Iran  leading 
lease  of  the  hostages  held  by  Iran  I 
ided  to  implement  them, 
order  is  part  of  a  series  of  actions 
y  to  resolve  the  national  emergencies 
in  Executive  Order  12170  of 
?r  14,  1979  and  in  Executive  Order 
April  17.  1980  and  described  in 
;ubmitted  to  Congress  under  the 
)y  President  Carter  on  November  14, 
iril  7,  1980;  April  17,  1980;  and 
19,  1981. 

though  the  hostages  have  been 
financial  and  diplomatic  aspects  of 
;  have  not  yet  been  resolved  and  con- 
present  an  unusual  and  extraor- 
ireat  to  the  national  security,  foreign 
d  economy  of  the  United  States, 
lus  claims  which  may  be  presented  to 
United  States  Claims  Tribunal  are 
•d  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of 
hed  Executive  Order  pursuant  to  the 
the  Claims  Settlement  Agreement, 
towers  under  Article  II  of  the  Con- 
Section  1732  of  Title  22,  known  as 
age  Act,  and  Section  203  of  lEEPA. 
also  ratifying  earlier  Executive 
igned  by  President  Carter  on 
19,  1981  to  remove  any  doubt  as  to 
•ct,  an  issue  that  has  been  raised  in 
igation  challenging  them.  In  this 
>n  I  note  that  Executive  Orders 
rough  12285  were  all  signed  by 
t  Carter  and  made  effective  while  he 
in  office.  The  Report  to  Congress  re- 


■  \ 


Nuclear  Cooperation 
With  EURATOIVi 


EXECUTIVE  ORDER  12295, 
FEB.  24,  1981' 

By  the  authority  vested  in  me  as  President 
by  the  Constitution  and  statutes  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  including  Section 
126a(2)  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954,  as 
amended  (42  U.S.C.  21.5.5(aK2)),  and  having 
determined  that,  upon  the  expiration  of  the 
period  specified  in  the  first  proviso  to  Section 
126a(2)  of  such  Act  and  extended  liy  Ex- 
ecutive Order  12193,  failure  to  continue 
peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  with  the  Euro- 
pean Atomic  Energy  Community  would  be 
seriously  prejudicial  to  the  achievement  of 
United  States  non-proliferation  objectives  and 
would  otherwise  jeopardize  the  common 
defense  and  security  of  the  United  States, 
and  having  notified  the  Congress  of  this 
determination,  I  hereby  extend  the  duration 
of  that  period  to  March  10,  1982. 

RdNAIJl  Rt^^CA.N 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  24,  1981- 

The  United  States  has  been  engaged  in 
nuclear  cooperation  with  the  European  Com- 
munity for  many  years.  This  cooperation  was 
initiated  under  agreements  concluded  over 
two  decades  ago  between  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Communi- 
ty (EURATOM)  and  extends  until  December 
31,  1995.  Since  the  inception  of  this  coopera- 


quired  by  lEEPA  dated  .lanuary  19,  1981  in- 
dicates that  some  of  the  Executive  Orders 
were  not  signed  until  the  release  of  the 
hostages,  an  event  that  did  not  occur  until 
after  the  end  of  his  term.  The  report,  which 
was  prepared  in  advance,  did  not,  because  of 
the  press  of  circumstances,  reflect  events 
precisely  as  they  occurred  and  to  that  extent 
it  stands  corrected. 

4.  The  present  Executive  Order  is 
necessary  for  the  United  States  to  meet  its 
obligations  under  the  Claims  Settlement 
Agreement  to  peacefully  arbitrate  certain 
claims. 

5.  The  action  is  taken  with  respect  to 
Iran  for  the  reasons  outlined  above. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  2,  1981. 


tion,  the  Community  has  adhered  to  all  its 
obligations. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of 
1978  amended  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  to 
establish  nuclear  export  criteria,  including  a 
requirement  that  the  United  States  have  a 
right  to  consent  to  the  reprocessing  of  fuel 
exported  from  the  United  States.  (3ur  present 
agreements  for  cooperation  with  EURAT(.)M 
do  not  contain  such  a  right.  To  avoid  disrupt- 
ing cooperation  with  EURAT(_)M,  a  proviso 
was  included  in  the  law  to  enable  continued 
cooperation  until  March  10,  1980,  and  pro- 
vide for  negotiations  concerning  our  coopera- 
tion agreements. 

The  law  also  provides  that  nuclear 
cooperation  with  EURATOM  can  be  extended 
on  an  annual  basis  after  March  10,  1980, 
upon  determination  by  the  President  that 
failure  to  cooperate  would  seriously  prejudice 
the  achievement  of  United  States  non- 
proliferation  objectives  or  otherwise  jeopar- 
dize the  common  defense  and  security  and 
after  notification  to  the  Congress.  President 
Carter  made  such  a  determination  last  year 
and  signed  Executive  Order  12193,  permit- 
ting continued  nuclear  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  until  March  10,  1981. 

The  United  States  has  engaged  in  three 
rounds  of  talks  with  EURAT(_)M  regarding 
the  renegotiation  of  the  US-EURATOM 
agreements  for  cooperation.  These  were  con- 
ducted in  November  1978.  September  1979, 
and  April  1980.  Progress  has  been  made 
toward  clarifying  the  issues  relating  to  these 
agreements,  and  the  talks  will  be  continuing. 

I  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the  Com- 
munity continue  and  likewise  that  we  work 
closely  with  our  Allies  to  counter  the  threat 
of  nuclear  explosives  proliferati(m.  Accord- 
ingly, I  have  determined  that  failure  to  con- 
tinue peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  would  be  seriously  prejudicial  to 
the  achievement  of  United  States  non- 
proliferation  objectives  and  would  jeopardize 
the  common  defense  and  security  of  the 
United  States.  1  intend  to  sign  an  Executive 
Order  to  extend  the  waiver  of  the  application 
of  the  relevant  export  criterion  of  the  NNPA 
for  an  additional  twelve  months  from  March 
10,  1981. 

Sincerely, 

R(iNAi.i)  Rkacan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  2,  1981. 

'-'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  .Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weekly  Compilation 
of  Mar.  2).  ■ 


l»1 


TERRORISM 


Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S. 
Official  Personnel  Abroad 


by  Evan  Duncan 

This  study  cites  incidents  inrolring 
pre7m'dit(ited  finlitical  terrorism  directed 
against  official  represent  at  ires  of  the 
United  States.  Excluded  from  considera- 
tion are  episodes  that  occurred  during 
wartiyne  situations  or  that  resulted  from 
random  disorder  and  mob  action.  At- 
tacks on  private  citizens  are  not  listed. 

The  study  draws  upon  information 
contained  i)i  Re.'iearch  Project  No.  12JiH. 
"Hostage  Incidents:  Examples  in  Modern 
History."  prepared  in  the  Office  of  the 
Historian  in  February  19S1  and 
published  in  the  March  1981  Biij.tyns: 
Research  Project  782.  "Assaults  and 
Other  Acts  Against  United  States  Per- 
sonnel and  Installations  Abroad. 
19(10-1965." February  1967;  and  carious 
published  sources  and  monographs. 

Ecan  Duncan,  the  author  of  this 
study,  is  a  Research  and  Reference 
Historian.  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 
Neat  H.  Peterson  .'iupernsed  and  re- 
ceived this  report,  and  James  C.  Grant 
provided  clerical-editing  support. 


AFGHANISTAN 

February  14,  1979 

Four  Afghans  kidnapped  U.S.  Am- 
bassador Adolph  Dubs  in  Kabul  and 
demanded  the  release  of  various 
"religious  figures"  held  by  the  Afghan 
Government.  Dubs  was  killed  when 
Afghan  police  stormed  the  hotel  room 
where  he  was  being  held.  The  bodies  of 
four  alleged  terrorists  were  shown  to 
Embassy  personnel. 

The  U.S.  Government  protested  to 
the  Afghan  Government  for  not  having 
tried  to  secure  Dubs'  release  peacefully 
and  drastically  reduced  its  foreign  aid 
programs  there.  No  American  Am- 
bassador has  been  appointed  to  replace 
Dubs. 


ARGENTINA 


April  12,  1974 

Members  of  the  Peoples  Revolutionary 
Army  (ERP)  kidnapped  Alfred  A.  Laun, 
the  director  of  the  U.S.  Information 


Agency  (USIA),  in  Cordoba.  Laun,  who 
was  seriously  wounded  when  captured, 
was  released  several  hours  later. 


February  26,  1975 

Montoneros  guerrillas  kidnapped  John 
P.  Egan,  a  retired  businessman  serving 
as  the  American  Honorary  Consul  in 
Cordoba.  They  demanded  that  four  cap- 
tured guerrillas  be  shown  on  national 
television  or  else  Egan  would  be  killed. 
Egan  was  found  dead  the  next  day. 


June  7,  1965 

Allison  Temple  Wanamaker,  American 
Consul  in  Cordoba,  was  wounded  when  a 
passing  car  machinegunned  his 
automobile.  His  assailants  were  never 
identified. 


BELGIUM 

June  25,  1979 

A  bomb  exploded  under  a  bridge  near 
Obourg,  Belgium,  seconds  after  Gen. 
Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr.,  then  Supreme 
Commander  of  Allied  Forces  in  Europe, 
drove  across  it.  Haig's  car  was  damaged, 
and  one  American  and  two  Belgian 
security  guards  in  another  car  were  in- 
jured. Although  various  extremist 
groups  claimed  credit,  the  perpetrators 
were  never  identified.  Gen.  Haig,  who 
was  scheduled  to  retire  from  the  Army  5 
days  later,  remarked:  "I  thought  I 
should  go  out  with  a  bang,  but  this  is 
too  much." 


BRAZIL 


September  4,  1969 

Leftist  urban  guerrillas  kidnapped  U.S. 
Ambassador  C.  Burke  Elbrick  in  Rio  de 
Janeiro  and  demanded  that  the  Brazilian 
Government  release  15  political 
prisoners  and  broadcast  a  revolutionary- 
manifesto.  The  Brazilian  Government 
met  the  demands,  and  Elbrick  was  freed 
on  September  7  after  the  political 
prisoners  had  been  flown  to  Mexico.  The 
Department  of  State  encouraged  Brazil 
to  meet  the  terrorists'  demands.  After 
Elbrick  was  released.  Secretary  of  State 


Rogers  expressed  his  gratitude  to  Br  it  IS 
for  placing  Elbrick's  safety  "above  all 
other  considerations." 


0\ 


April  5,  1970 


Five  armed  men  attempted  to  kidnap: 
Consul  Curtis  S.  Cutter  from  his  car 
Porto  Alegre.  Cutter  swerved  to  avoi 
the  gunmen,  ran  down  one  of  them,  £ 
drove  away  at  top  speed.  He  was  slig  i 
ly  wounded  when  the  others  fired  at  '^ 
car.  Three  members  of  the  Popular 
Revolutionary  Vanguard  were  later  a^ 
rested  in  connection  with  the  incident 


S.E 
teE 


COLOMBIA 


»' 
ffiri 
nip 


February  14,  1977 

Guerrillas  belonging  to  the  Colombia! 
Revolutionary  Armed  Forces  (FARGj 
raided  the  town  of  La  Macarena  and 
kidnapped  Peace  Corpsman  Richard 
Starr,  whom  they  accused  of  being  a 
CIA  agent. 

Starr  was  released  on  February 
1980,  after  the  American  journalist, 
Jack  Mitchell,  paid  a  ransom  of  * 

$250,000.  Mr.  Mitchell  worked  for  c( 
umnist  Jack  Anderson. 


February  27,  1980 

Colombian  terrorists  belonging  to  thJ 
M-19  guerrilla  group  seized  the  Em-jW' 
bassy  of  the  Dominican  Republic  in  ■*' 
Bogota,  capturing  30  diplomats  fron 
countries,  including  15  Chiefs  of 
Mission.  Ambassador  Diego  Ascenci^!' 
was  the  only  American  among  them,H .' 
The  terrorists  initially  demanded  th^*"' 
release  of  311  political  prisoners,  a  I 
million  ransom,  and  government  pub 
tion  of  their  manifesto.  They  graduaL 
reduced  their  demands  and  released^' 
but  18  of  the  hostages.  The  remainin 
hostages,  including  Ascencio,  were 
released  on  April  27  in  return  for  a  I 
million  ransom  and  passage  to  Cuba 


CYPRUS 

June  16,  1956 

William  P.  Boteler,  Vice  Consul  in 
Nicosia,  was  fatally  injured  when  Grf** 
Cj-priot  terrorists  threw  a  bomb  intoi 
restaurant  where  he  was  dining.  Jai 
Dace,  a  Foreign  Service  staff  mem 
and  two  other  U.S.  Government 
employees  were  injured  in  the  bombing 


Terrorism 


it  19,  1974 

)  of  Greek  Cypriots,  protesting 
can  policy  toward  the  Greek- 
ih  dispute  over  Cyprus,  attacked 
S.  Embassy  in  Nicosia.  Am- 
lor  Rodger  P.  Davies  and  his 
Cypriot  secretary  were  killed  by 
fire  from  a  nearby  building. 
I  February  4,  1977,  the  Govern- 
)f  Cyprus  arrested  six  members  of 
)KA-B  organization  and  charged 
vith  manslaughter.  Charges  were 
sed  against  two  suspects,  and  two- 
vere  acquitted.  The  remaining  two 

e  onvicted  in  June  of  illegal  posses- 
'  firearms  and  rioting.  They 

.  d  prison  sentences  of  5  and  7 


jNICAN  REPUBLIC 


24,  1970 

_.sts  kidnapped  Lt.  Col.  Donald  J. 
W^'  ^^^  U-^-  ^^^  Attache.  He  was 
*d  2  days  later,  after  the 
nj  .can  Government  freed  20  political 
0  -rs  and  flew  them  to  Mexico. 


ifenber  27,  1974 

cector  of  the  U.S.  Information 
■n^  (USIA),  Barbara  Hutchison,  was 
)ii  eight  hostages  taken  when 
Til  rs  of  the  January  12  Liberation 
re  lent  seized  the  Venezuelan  Con- 
iti  n  Santo  Domingo.  The  terrorists 
la  led  the  release  of  38  political 
>oi!rs  and  a  ransom  of  $1  million. 
■•  hey  demanded  the  release  of  32 

risoners,  10  of  the  prisoners 
iimost  of  the  Dominican  left  in  con- 
■n  .g  the  affair.  The  Dominican 
'  ment  refused  to  comply  with  the 
>  ^ts'  demands,  and  the  hostages 
•  eed  on  October  9  in  return  for 
induct  to  Panama. 

1  »PIA 

iber  9,  1969 

irs  of  the  Eritrean  Liberation 
ELF)  kidnapped  Consul  General 
Jackson  while  he  was  driving 
n  Agordat  and  Keren.  He  was 
d  2  hours  later,  after  his  captors 
n  sign  a  statement  that  he  had 

-«   i  to  their  views  and  had  not  been 

si   ited. 


31 

II    rE. 


April  21,  1970 

Members  of  the  ELF  removed  Peace 
Corpsman  Jack  Fry  and  his  wife  from  a 
train.  They  were  released  on  April  26. 
There  was  no  ransom  demand. 

September  12,  1975 

Members  of  the  ELF  kidnapped  Army 
Specialist  5  David  Strickland  and  Navy 
Electronics  Technician  Thomas 
Bowodowicz  near  Asmara.  Both  were 
released  in  the  Sudan  on  January  9, 
1976. 


GREECE 

December  23,  1975 

Three  gunmen  shot  and  killed  Richard 
S.  Welch,  the  First  Secretary  of  the 
American  Embassy  and  Chief  of  the 
CIA's  Athens  station,  outside  his  home 
in  Athens.  Various  groups  claimed  re- 
sponsibility, but  Welch's  assassins  re- 
main unidentified. 

The  Athens  News  had  identified 
Welch  and  six  other  Embassy  personnel 
as  CIA  agents  on  November  25. 


GUATEMALA 


January  16,  1968 

U.S.  Naval  Attache  Lt.  Cmdr.  Ernest  A. 
Munro  and  Col.  John  D.  Webber,  head 
of  the  U.S.  Military  Assistance  Advisory 
Group,  were  ambushed  and  killed  in  a 
suburb  of  Guatemala  City.  Two  other 
members  of  the  U.S.  military  mission 
were  wounded. 

The  leftist  guerrilla  group,  FAR 
[Rebel  Armed  Forces]  claimed  respon- 
sibility, stating  that  the  two  advisers 
were  marked  for  "execution"  because 
they  had  assisted  the  Guatemalan 
Armed  Forces. 


August  28,  1968 

Terrorists  killed  U.S.  Ambasssador  John 
Gordon  Mein.  They  forced  his  car  to  the 
side  of  a  street,  and  shot  him  as  he  tried 
to  flee.  FAR  guerrillas  claimed  responsi- 
bility, stating  that  they  had  intended  to 
kidnap  Mein  and  demand  the  release  of 
imprisoned  leftist  leader  Camilo  San- 
chez. Mein  was  the  first  American  Am- 
bassador to  fall  victim  to  terrorists. 

March  6,  1970 

Members  of  FAR  kidnapped  U.S.  Labor 
Attache  Sean  M.  Holly.  They  released 


m98^ 


him  2  days  later  after  the  Guatemalan 
Government  freed  three  political 
prisoners. 

The  U.S.  Government  encouraged 
Guatemala  to  accept  FAR's  demands. 


HAITI 

January  23,  1973 

Three  Haitians  kidnapped  U.S.  Am- 
bassador Clinton  E.  Knox  and  demanded 
the  release  of  31  political  prisoners  and 
a  $500,000  ransom.  Consul  General 
Ward  L.  Christensen  voluntarily  joined 
Knox  in  captivity  during  the  negotia- 
tions. The  next  day,  the  terrorists  re- 
duced their  demands  to  the  release  of  16 
political  prisoners,  a  $70,000  ransom, 
and  safe  conduct  to  Mexico.  Knox  and 
Christensen  were  released  after  the  Hai- 
tian Government  met  these  demands. 
The  terrorists  and  the  released  prison- 
ers, accompanied  by  the  Mexican  Am- 
bassador, were  flown  to  Mexico,  where 
the  ransom  money  was  taken  from  them 
and  returned  to  Haiti.  Mexico  refused  to 
accept  the  political  prisoners,  who  then 
proceeded  to  Chile. 


IRAN 

November  30,  1971 

Ambassador  Douglas  MacArthur  II 
escaped  a  kidnap  attempt  in  Tehran. 
Two  cars  attempted  to  stop  the  Am- 
bassador's car,  but  his  driver  avoided 
them.  At  least  one  shot  was  fired,  and  a 
hand  axe  was  thrown  through  the  rear 
window.  Ambassador  MacArthur  and  his 
wife  were  unharmed. 

June  2,  1973 

An  Iranian  terrorist  shot  and  killed  Lt. 
Col.  Lewis  L.  Hawkins,  an  American 
military  adviser  in  Tehran.  Iranian 
police  killed  the  suspected  assassin  on 
June  15. 

May  21,  1975 

Five  Iranian  terrorists  shot  and  killed 
Air  Force  Col.  Paul  R.  Shaffer,  Jr.,  and 
Lt.  Col.  John  H.  Turner  in  Tehran,  Both 
officers  belonged  to  the  U.S.  Military 
Assistance  Advisory  Group. 

Iranian  police  arrested  two  of  the 
terrorists  on  July  29.  They  were  among 
10  terrorists  who  were  condemned  to 
death  at  the  end  of  the  year  by  a 
military  tribunal.  Nine  of  the  terrorists 
were  executed  on  January  24,  1976. 


35 


Terrorism 


February  14,  1979 

Two  hundred  Iranian  militants  occupied 
the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Tehran  for  2  hours 
before  Iranian  Government  forces  per- 
suaded them  to  leave.  An  Iranian 
employee  of  the  Embassy  and  the  son  of 
another  local  employee  were  killed. 
Marine  Sgt.  Kenneth  Kraus,  who  had 
been  wounded  and  captured  during  the 
takeover,  was  not  released  until 
February  22. 

November  4,  1979 

A  mob  of  Iranian  students  occupied  the 
American  Embassy  in  Tehran  and  cap- 
tured 66  Americans,  all  but  two  of  them 
Embassy  personnel.  On  November  7,  the 
Iranians  demanded  the  return  of  the 
deposed  Shah,  who  had  been  admitted  to 
the  United  States  for  medical  treatment, 
as  a  precondition  for  release  of  the 
hostages.  The  United  States  stopped 
delivery  of  military  supplies  (November 
9),  suspended  imports  of  Iranian  oil 
(November  12),  froze  Iranian  assets 
(November  14),  and  began  to  assemble 
naval  forces  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 

Iran  released  one  woman  and  two 
black  Marine  Security  Guards  on 
November  19,  and  four  women  and  six 
blacks  the  next  day.  The  remaining 
hostages  were  threatened  at  various 
times  with  trial  as  spies.  Six  members  of 
the  Embassy  staff  escaped  from  the 
Consular  Section  during  the  takeover 
and  found  shelter  at  the  Canadian  Em- 
bassy. Canada  closed  its  Embassy  on 
January  28,  1980,  and  brought  out  the 
six  Americans  the  next  day. 

Despite  support  from  the  United  Na- 
tions and  two  favorable  rulings  by  the 
International  Court  of  Justice,  the 
United  States  was  unable  to  secure  the 
release  of  the  hostages  until  minutes 
before  President  Carter  left  office  on 
January  20,  1981.  The  United  States 
broke  relations  with  Iran  on  April  7, 
1980,  and  banned  travel  to  Iran  on  April 
20.  An  attempt  to  rescue  the  hostages 
failed  on  April  25,  resulting  in  the 
deaths  of  eight  American  military  per- 
sonnel. Secretary  of  State  Vance  re- 
signed shortly  thereafter.  Richard 
Queen,  a  consular  officer,  was  released 
on  July  10  because  of  ill  health. 

After  the  death  of  the  former  Shah 
on  June  27,  Iran  modified  its  demands 
to  include  the  return  of  the  Shah's 
wealth,  cancellation  of  American  claims 
against  Iran,  unfreezing  of  American 
assets,  and  a  promise  of  noninterference 
in  Iranian  affairs.  On  November  3,  the 
Iranian  militants  turned  the  hostages 
over  to  the  government.  Negotiations 


36 


leading  to  the  release  of  the  hostages 
began  in  Algiers  on  November  10,  1980. 


JORDAN 

June  7,  1970 

Members  of  the  Popular  Front  for  the 
Liberation  of  Palestine  (PFLP)  captured 
Morris  Draper,  head  of  the  Political  Sec- 
tion of  the  U.S.  Embassy.  They  report- 
edly demanded  the  release  of  comrades 
who  had  been  captured  by  the  Jordanian 
Army  the  day  before.  Draper  was  re- 
leased after  22  hours. 

On  the  same  day.  Army  Capt. 
Robert  Potts  and  his  wife  were  wounded 
when  Palestinian  commandos  fired  on 
their  car  at  a  roadblock.  Potts  was 
assigned  to  the  Defense  Attache's  office 
in  Amman. 

June  10,  1970 

Maj.  Robert  Perry,  a  U.S.  military  at- 
tache, was  killed  when  a  band  of  Palesti- 
nians tried  to  break  into  his  house. 

In  a  separate  incident,  two  fedayeen 
ransacked  the  homes  of  two  U.S.  offi- 
cials and  raped  their  wives.  Yasir 
Arafat,  leader  of  the  Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization  (PLO),  later  an- 
nounced that  the  fedayeen  did  not 
belong  to  either  Al  Fatah  or  the  PFLP 
and  that  the  two  had  been  executed  on 
June  13. 

September  9,  1970 

The  PLO  held  Staff  Sgt.  Ervin  Graham 
of  the  Defense  Attache's  office  in  Am- 
man for  8  days.  There  was  no  ransom 
demand. 

September  11,  1970 

The  PLO  kidnapped  Jon  Stewart,  a 
cultural  affairs  officer  with  the  U.S.  In- 
formation Agency  (USIA),  and  inter- 
rogated him.  He  was  released  the  next 
day.  There  was  no  ransom  demand. 


LEBANON 


March  13,  1975 

Three  Palestinians  kidnapped  Michael 
Konner,  a  Foreign  Service  officer,  in  a 
Beirut  marketplace.  They  released  him 
14  hours  later  after  questioning  and 
beating  him.  Konner  was  not  seriously 
injured. 


It!: 


April  16,  1975 

John  McKay  of  the  Drug  Enforcemei 
Administration  (DEA)  was  held  for  2 
days  at  the  Sabra  refugee  camp  near 
Beirut.  His  Palestinian  captors  made 
ransom  demand  and  released  him  aft 
interrogation. 

June  29,  1975 


Palestinian  guerrillas  captured  Army  (jj. 
Col.  Ernest  R.  Morgan  in  Beirut  as  I  '^ 
returned  to  Turkey  from  CENTO  ex«  »t 
cises  in  Pakistan.  They  demanded  tha  [j, 
the  U.S.  Embassy  donate  food,  clothi 
and  building  materials  to  a  Muslim  di 
trict  of  Beirut  that  had  been  heavily 
damaged  in  the  Lebanese  civil  war. 

Both  the  Palestine  Liberation  Orfi 
nization  (PLO)  and  th    Popular  Fronli  ^^> 
for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine  (PFLIl 
denied  responsibility  for  the  kidnappii 
Col.  Morgan  was  released  on  July  12 
after  the  Lebanese  Government  distrr 
uted  free  rice  and  sugar  in  the  Al 
Masklakh  quarter  of  Beirut. 


October  22,  1975 

Members  of  the  PFLP  captured  Chaw 
Gallagher  and  William  Dykes,  the  diP' 
tor  and  assistant  director  of  the  regie 
service  of  the  U.S.  Information  Agen 
(USIA)  in  Beirut.  They  were  released 
February  25,  1976,  at  the  home  of 
Kamal  Jumblatt,  a  Lebanese  leftist 
leader. 

Their  captors'  demands  ranged  fn< 
a  ransom  to  the  release  of  Palestinians ,' 
guerrillas  held  in  Israel  or  in  Lebanon^  u 
Lebanese  sources  claimed  that  Israel    | 
had  released  two  Palestinians  in  ex-     ' 
change  for  Gallagher  and  Dykes,  but 
U.S.  and  Israeli  sources  denied  that 
there  was  any  connection  between  the< 
two  releases. 


lis 


ffl 
id 
m 
to 


IS 


CO 


ii( 


June  16,  1976 


ionl 
Htrs( 


Ambassador  Francis  E.  Meloy,  Jr.,  am 
Economic  Counselor  Robert  0.  Waring 
were  kidnapped  in  Beirut  while  on  th»  II 
way  to  meet  with  President-elect  Sarid 
Meloy,  Waring,  and  their  Lebanese 
chauffeur  were  found  dead  near  a  bead' 
several  hours  later.  No  demands  were 
made,  and  the  assassins  remain 
unknown. 

The  U.S.  Government  urged  its 
citizens  to  leave  Lebanon  on  June  18. 
Twenty  of  the  32  remaining  Embassy 
personnel  were  evacuated  by  sea  on  Jul, 
27. 


liif 


lie 
ifiil 


Id 

M 


5t  27,  1980 

)wn  assailants  in  Beirut  fired  on 
ssador  John  Gunther  Dean's  car. 
d  his  party  escaped  unharmed. 


10,  1981 


identified  sniper  fired  a  shot  into  a 
a  car  carrying  security  guards  es- 
Ambassador  John  Gunther  Dean, 
cident  took  place  as  the  Ambassa- 
larty  crossed  the  "green  line" 
ig  the  Christian  and  Muslim  sec- 
Beirut.  No  one  was  injured. 


' 


.YSIA 

It  4,  1975 

lembers  of  the  Japanese  Red  Ar- 
eed  the  Consular  Sections  of  the 
an  and  Swedish  Embassies  in 
Lumpur.  Among  the  52  hostages 
merican  Consul  Robert  S.  Steb- 
Ihe  hostages  were  freed  after 
at  agreed  to  release  five  other  mem- 
5    the  Red  Army.  All  10  Red  Army 
rs  departed  for  Libya  on 


\M 


1973 

rs  of  the  Peoples  Revolutionary 
at  Forces  kidnapped  Consul  Gener- 
"^  ence  G.  Leonhardy  near  Guadala- 

ley  demanded  freedom  for  30 
II 1  prisoners,  passage  to  Cuba, 
K  tion  of  a  communique,  and  sus- 
^'1  of  a  police  search  for  them.  The 
i<  n  Government  met  these  de- 
'  Mrs.  Leonhiardy  borrowed 

»  from  a  local  bank  as  a  ransom, 
Lonhardy  was  released  on  May  7. 

■rsons  were  later  arrested  in  con- 

with  the  case. 


^22,  1974 

msul  John  S.  Patterson  was  kid- 
near  Hermosillo.  The  "Peoples' 
•eiaon  Army"  (PLA)  claimed  credit 
•nanded  a  $500,000  ransom.  Mrs. 
itterson  claimed  that  all  attempts 
de  to  deliver  the  ransom  were  un- 
ful.  Patterson  was  found  dead  in 
ert  on  July  8. 

;  "PLA"  turned  out  to  be  a  hoax. 
Joe  Keesee  of  San  Diego,  who 
icked  a  small  plane  from 
id  to  North  Vietnam  in  Septem- 
'0,  was  arrested  and  charged  with 
g  the  kidnapping.  Greg  Curtis 

981 


n 


Fielden  was  named  as  an  unindicted 
coconspirator.  Keesee  was  sentenced  to 
20  years  in  1975  for  conspiracy  to  kid- 
nap a  diplomat. 


SUDAN 

March  1,  1973 

Eight  members  of  the  Palestinian  ter- 
rorist group  "Black  September"  seized 
the  Saudi  Arabian  Embassy  in  Khar- 
toum during  a  farewell  reception  for 
American  Charge  d'Affaires  George  Cur- 
tis Moore.  They  took  10  hostages,  in- 
cluding Moore,  the  incoming  U.S.  Am- 
bassador Cleo  A.  Noel,  Jr.,  the  Saudi 
Ambassador  and  his  family,  and  the 
Belgian  and  Jordanian  Charges.  They 
demanded  the  release  of  an  Al  Fatah 
leader  (Abu  Daoud),  other  Palestinians 
held  by  Jordan  and  Israel,  Sirhan 
Sirhan,  and  members  of  the  Baader- 
Meinhof  gang  imprisoned  in  West  Ger- 
many. 

The  terrorists  released  all  their 
hostages  except  Noel,  Moore,  and 
Belgian  Charge  Guy  Eid  and  reduced 
their  demands  to  the  release  of  Abu 
Daoud  and  16  Palestinians  held  by  Jor- 
dan. The  Government  of  the  Sudan 
refused  to  negotiate,  and  the  three 
hostages  were  killed.  The  terrorists  sur- 
rendered on  March  6. 

Sudanese  President  Nimeiri  de- 
nounced the  act  and  banned  further 
operations  of  Palestinian  groups  in  the 
Sudan.  The  terrorists  went  on  trial  on 
June  1,  1974,  and  were  sentenced  to  life 
imprisonment  on  June  24.  President 
Nimeiri  reduced  their  sentences  to  7 
years  and  released  them  to  the  PLO  the 
next  day.  The  terrorists  were  then  flown 
to  Cairo,  where  Egyptian  authorities  im- 
prisoned them. 


TURKEY 


February  15,  1971 

Members  of  the  Turkish  Peoples'  Libera- 
tion Army  held  Air  Force  Sgt.  James  R. 
Finley  for  17  hours.  He  had  reportedly 
come  upon  them  as  they  tried  to  steal 
arms  from  a  U.S.  Air  Force  base  outside 
Ankara. 


March  4,  1971 

Five  members  of  the  Turkish  Peoples' 
Liberation  Army  kidnapped  four  Air 
Force  personnel  shortly  after  they  left  a 
radar  station  outside  Ankara.  They 
demanded  a  $400,000  ransom  and  the 
release  of  all  political  prisoners  in 
Tiu-key. 


Terrorism 


The  Turkish  Government  refused  to 
negotiate,  and  Turkish  police  arrested  a 
suspect  on  March  4.  The  four  Ameri- 
cans, Sgt.  James  J.  Sexton  and  Airmen 
Larry  J.  Heavner,  Richard  Caraszi,  and 
James  M.  Gholson  were  released  un- 
harmed on  March  8. 


URUGUAY 


July  31,  1970 

Tupamaro  guerrillas  tried  to  kidnap 
Michael  G.  Jones,  Second  Secretary  of 
the  U.S.  Embassy,  and  Cultural  Attache 
Nathan  Rosenfeld.  Rosenfeld  escaped 
while  Jones  was  being  tied  up  and  load- 
ed into  the  back  of  a  pickup  truck.  Jones 
later  escaped  when  the  truck  stopped 
for  a  red  light. 

Daniel  A.  Mitrione,  an  Agency  for 
International  Development  (AID)  official 
working  as  a  public  safety  adviser  with 
the  Uruguayan  police,  was  less  for- 
tunate. Tupamaro  guerrillas  kidnapped 
him  on  July  31  and  demanded  the 
release  of  all  political  prisoners  in 
Uruguay.  The  government  refused  to 
negotiate,  and  Mitrione  was  found  dead 
in  Montevideo  on  August  10. 

August  7,  1970 

Tupamaro  guerrillas  kidnapped  Claude 
L.  Fry,  an  agricultural  expert  who  rep- 
resented AID.  Although  the  Uruguayan 
Government  refused  demands  to  publish 
the  text  of  a  revolutionary  manifesto. 
Fly  was  released  March  2,  1971,  after 
suffering  a  heart  attack. 


VENEZUELA 


November  27,  1963 

Members  of  the  Army  of  National 
Liberation  (FALN)  kidnapped  Col. 
James  K.  Chenault,  deputy  chief  of  the 
U.S.  military  mission  in  Venezuela,  in 
Caracas.  FALN  made  no  demands, 
claiming  that  it  merely  wanted  publicity. 
Col.  Chenault  reported  that  his  captors 
tried  to  indoctrinate  him. 


October  3,  1964 

Members  of  FALN  kidnapped  Col. 
Michael  Smalen,  deputy  chief  of  the  U.S. 
Air  Force  mission  in  Venezuela.  Col. 
Smalen  was  released  on  October  12.  His 
captors  again  made  no  demands  on  the 
Venezuelan  Government,  claiming  to 
want  only  publicity.  Five  members  of 
FALN  were  later  arrested  in  connection 
with  the  case.  ■ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Review  of  El  Salvador 


by  Walter  J.  Stoessel,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  March  19,  1981. 
Ambassador  Stoessel  is  Under  Secretary 
for  Political  Affairs. ' 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  review 
and  discuss  with  you  the  measures  this 
Administration  is  taking  with  regard  to 
El  Salvador.  I  will  summarize  their  main 
elements  and  the  rationale  for  them. 

Our  actions  with  regard  to  El 
Salvador  have  as  their  goal  the  reduc- 
tion of  violence  and  instability  in  order 
to  facilitate  a  peaceful  transition  to  an 
elected  government.  This  is  the  goal  of 
the  Salvadoran  people  and  of  their  cur- 
rent government,  headed  by  Christian 
Democratic  President  Jose  Napoleon 
Duarte,  which  we  strongly  support.  Hav- 
ing already  promulgated  a  far-reaching 
agrarian  reform  and  changes  in  the 
banking  system  and  export  trade,  the 
government  last  week  moved  the  coun- 
try closer  to  elections  when  President 
Duarte  appointed  an  electoral  commis- 
sion. 

These  important  reforms  will  con- 
tribute to  the  reduction  of  violence  and 
political  instability  in  the  longer  term.  In 
the  short  term,  however,  some  land- 
owners availed  themselves  of  traditional 
ties  to  local  security  forces,  while 
Cuban-supported  guerrillas  attempted  to 
exploit  popular  resentment  of  past 
authorities.  Both  these  extremes  sought 
to  undermine  the  reforms  through 
violence  but  for  different  reasons.  The 
landowners  wished  to  restore  the  status 
quo  ante;  the  guerrillas  saw  that 
reforms  were  winning  away  their 
popular  support  and  recruitment  base. 

In  recent  months,  our  understanding 
of  the  situation  in  El  Salvador  has 
changed  with  the  discovery  that  large 
quantities  of  arms  and  munitions  were 
being  supplied  to  the  guerrillas.  Last 
summer  and  fall,  far  away  Vietnam, 
Ethiopia,  and  some  Eastern  European 
countries  joined  Cuba  to  take  the  in- 
itiative to  transform  an  essentially 
domestic  conflict  in  Central  America  into 
an  international  confrontation.  These 
outside  efforts  to  impose  an  unpopular 
military  solution  proved  unacceptable  to 
the  Salvadoran  people,  who  rejected  the 


guerrillas'  appeals  for  support.  The 
Carter  Administration  acted  once  it  ac- 
quired the  evidence.  We  have  done 
likewise. 

The  United  States  cannot  stand  idly 
by  while  a  reformist  government  comes 
under  attack  by  externally  advised  and 
armed  guerrilla  groups  that  lack  popular 
support.  If  we  fail  to  make  clear  that 
the  external  encouragement  of  violence 
and  instability  in  El  Salvador  will  have 
serious  costs,  we  insure  that  other  coun- 
tries seeking  domestic  solutions  to 
domestic  problems  will  find  their  efforts 
thwarted  by  guerrilla  groups  advised 
and  armed  from  abroad.  In  turn,  our 
failure  to  respond  adequately  to  exter- 
nally supported  attempts  to  overthrow 
governments  committed  to  reforms  and 
to  electoral  solutions  would  cause  other 
friendly  countries  to  doubt  our  ability  to 
help  them  resist  assaults  on  their 
sovereignty. 

Economic  Aid 

While  the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador  are 
externally  supported,  they  also  feed  on 
domestic  ills.  These  include  years  of 
repressive  and  unresponsive  govern- 
ments and  inequitable  distribution  of 
resources  and  life  opportunities.  For  this 
reason,  the  major  emphasis  of  our 
assistance  program  for  El  Salvador  is 
economic  rather  than  military.  The 
Government  of  El  Salvador  welcomes 
this  emphasis.  Since  October  1979, 
Salvadoran  authorities  have  been  com- 
mitted to  leading  their  country  to 
democracy.  To  that  end,  the  Duarte 
government  is  today  working  to  carry 
out  basic  economic  reforms. 

We  strongly  support  these  efforts, 
financially  as  well  as  morally.  On  the 
economic  front,  we  provided  roughly 
$58.8  million  in  FY  1980  for  the  govern- 
ment's reforms  and  its  programs  for  the 
most  needy.  The  Carter  Administration 
had  planned  to  provide  about  $63  million 
in  FY  1981  to  create  jobs  through  public 
works,  to  feed  the  hungry,  and  to  im- 
prove health,  education,  and  housing. 

An  intensive  interagency  study  has 
now  concluded  that  additional  economic 
aid  to  El  Salvador  will  be  necessary.  We 
will  be  consulting  further  with  the  Con- 
gress on  this.  At  this  point,  it  appears 


ill 
din 
Kdl 

likely  that  additional  assistance  in  tht  "" 
range  of  $60  million  will  be  needed  tl 
year.  At  that  level,  economic  assistar 
would  be  more  than  three  times  largi 
than  our  military  assistance.  For  FY 
1982,  we  will  request  the  Congress  t( 
make  available  between  $80-$  100 
million  in  economic  assistance  to  insuf""' 
the  continued  viability  of  the  reform 
process. 

Our  aid  is  designed  to  help  the 
Duarte  government  eradicate  the 
chronic  social  and  economic  ills  that 
have  fostered  unrest.  El  Salvador's 
needs  are  enormous  and  pressing.  W 
hope  that  our  allies  and  other  friendl;, 
countries -many  of  which  have  '"' 

themselves  urged  that  socioeconomic^ 
needs  not  be  neglected-  will  go  beyoj|  **■ 
exhortations  and  join  us  in  providing  * 
economic  assistance  to  El  Salvador.  1  "'' 
general  climate  of  violence  and  the  g\  ™ 
rillas'  purposeful  destruction  of  .^ 

foodstuffs,  electrical  installations,  cow'^' 
munications  lines,  vehicles,  and  roads^* 
have  cut  deeply  into  El  Salvador's  pr  ' 
duction  and  growth.  The  suffering  of 
Salvadoran  people  in  this  chaotic  situ   "' 
tion  requires  a  compassionate  responi 
from  us  and  from  all  civilized  nations 


jta 
itioi 
I  till 
Fori 
itC 

'K 


Jtl 

an 


Security  Assistance 

Now  let  me  address  our  security 
assistance  efforts.  We  are  providing 
necessary  military  assistance  to  the 
Duarte  government  in  its  battle  agai 
the  externally  supported  guerrillas.  I 
me  assure  you  that  we  are  doing  this    ''^i 
with  the  greatest  prudence  and  caut 
and  with  the  lessons  of  the  past  ver 
much  in  mind.  El  Salvador  is  not 
another  Vietnam.  Our  objectives  are     " 
limited:  to  help  the  government  withf  "t 
problems  of  training,  equipment  re 
and  maintenance,  mobility,  and  re- 
supply.  Let  me  quickly  review  our 
assistance  effort  to  date. 

Prior  to  January  16  of  this  year,  i 
Carter  Administration  had  confined  ' 
defense  aid  to  El  Salvador  to  nonlethal  " 
equipment  like  trucks  and  radios.  It  tk 
had  provided  training  for  selected 
Salvadoran  officers  and  had  sent  a 
number  of  training  teams  to  El 
Salvador.  On  January  16,  after  a  week 
of  hard  fighting  initiated  by  the  guef' 


telf 


tie 


Western  Hemisphere 


th  the  aid  of  externally  supplied 
d  munitions,  President  Carter 
,ed  the  provision  to  El  Salvador 
arms  and  munitions-  the  first 
>.  shipments  since  1977- to 
ita  some  of  the  stocks  depleted  dur- 
^errilla  offensive.  President 
ilso  provided  six  helicopters  and 
ozen  U.S.  military  technicians  to 
Ivadoran  helicopter  pilots  and 
ance  specialists. 
e  taking  office,  the  Reagan  Ad- 
tion  has  carefully  reviewed  and 
the  needs  of  the  Salvadoran 
orces  in  consultation  with 
it  Duarte  and  his  government. 
•■  made  a  grant  of  articles  and 
valued  at  $20  million  and  have 
Congress  of  our  intent  to 
im  $5  million  in  additional 
military  sales  (FMS)  loan 
ses.  This  additional  assistance  in- 
nding  a  small  number  of  per- 
n  temporary  duty  to  help  train 
adoran  Army  and  Navy.  One 
SHteam  will  help  with  repair  of 
a  i  ship-board  equipment  for 
il  atrols;  five  men  have  been 
i    an  operations-planning 
a  e  team  in  El  Salvador  since 

■  five  will  supplement  the  U.S. 
:,Toup  in  its  largely  ad- 

a  ;ive  duties;  and  three  teams  of 
M  each  will  help  provide  in- 
>o  training  for  the  Salvadorans' 
"1  k  reaction  force. 

'  e  additional  training  specialists 
rij  the  total  number  of  U.S. 
r  personnel  working  with 
in  forces  to  54.  Although  in  a 
1  irn  by  violence  no  place  is 
it.  all  U.S.  trainers  will  work 
.•.  >f  the  safest  places  in  El 
i< ;  military  garrisons  and 
••  command  centers.  For  FY 
are  requesting  $25  million  in 
ncing  for  purchase  of  weapons 
iry  equipment  and  $1  million 
ternational  military  education 
mg  program.  Additional  grant 
issistance  is  not  contemplated 
lie. 
e-elieve  that  the  level  of  security 
■e  we  are  providing  is  commen- 
ith  the  need;  it  responds  in 
tance  to  the  Duarte  govern- 
■ijuests.  While  the  January 
was  successfully  repelled,  the 
-  continued  to  pose  a  serious 
hreat.  Estimates  of  the  number 

■  lias  are  around  4,000  with  ap- 
1  ely  5,000  irregulars.  The 

'  ialvadoran  Armed  Forces- the 
•^  of  our  security  assis- 


tance- total  about  9,000.  Various  police 
or  constabulary  forces  have  a  similar 
combined  strength. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  our  support 
goes  beyond  minimum  requirements, 
that  the  armed  forces  of  President 
Duarte  are  successfully  defeating  the 
guerrillas  and  hence  that  no  further 
U.S.  assistance  is  called  for.  Experience 
has  shown,  however,  that  for  our  sup- 
port to  be  credible,  it  must  respond  not 
only  to  the  present  situation  but  to  the 
potential  of  the  other  side  to  create  fur- 
ther violence.  It  takes  time  for  new 
equipment  to  be  absorbed  and  training 
to  take  effect.  We  must  anticipate  future 
needs  rather  than  being  merely  reactive. 
There  is,  thus,  an  element  of  deterrence 
built  into  the  level  of  our  total  support. 

In  giving  military  help  to  El 
Salvador,  we  are  most  mindful  of  our 
obligations  to  you  under  the  terms  of 
the  war  powers  resolution.  The  activities 
assigned  to  our  military  personnel  in  El 
Salvador  do  not  call  for  them  to  "com- 
mand, coordinate,  participate  in  the 
movement  of,  or  accompany"  Salvadoran 
forces  at  any  time  or  place  where  in- 
volvement in  hostilities  is  imminent.  The 
U.S.  personnel  are  specifically  instructed 
to  avoid  situations  of  potential 
hostilities,  and  our  assessment  of  the 
risk  at  the  locations  where  they  will  be 
assigned  is  that  there  is  no  imminent 
likelihood  of  hostilities  involving  these 
U.S.  personnel.  The  assignment  of  our 
training  personnel  to  El  Salvador  is  not, 
in  our  view,  an  introduction  of  "United 
States  Armed  Forces  into  hostilities  or 
into  situations  where  imminent  involve- 
ment in  hostilities  is  clearly  indicated  by 
the  circumstances"-  the  standard  of  the 
war  powers  resolution.  We  will  seek  to 
keep  the  Congress  fully  informed  of  the 
circumstances  in  El  Salvador  affecting 
the  safety  of  U.S.  personnel,  and,  I 
repeat,  we  will  always  consult  with  you 
on  U.S.  assistance  to  El  Salvador. 

Commitment  to  a 
Peaceful  Outcome 

Our  economic  and  military  assistance 
are  both  important  for  an  eventual 
political  resolution  of  the  conflict  in  El 
Salvador.  A  peaceful  outcome  will  re- 
quire both  greater  social  justice  and 
greater  stability  under  the  law.  To  this 
end,  we  continue  to  impress  upon  the 
government  the  importance  of  finding 
and  bringing  to  justice  the  murderers  of 
the  four  American  church  women  and 
two  AIFLD  [American  Institute  of  Free 
Labor  Development]  agrarian  reform 
specialists. 


We  also  support  President  Duarte's 
offers  to  discuss  with  opposition  leaders 
and  with  business,  labor,  and  church 
groups  within  El  Salvador  what  struc- 
tures and  guarantees  will  best  insure 
open  elections  next  year.  We  cannot,  of 
course,  participate  directly  in  any 
negotiation  process  that  would  com- 
promise the  sovereignty  of  El  Salvador 
and  the  right  of  its  government  to 
negotiate  on  its  own  behalf.  We  are 
strongly  committed,  however,  to  a 
peaceful  transition  to  an  elected  govern- 
ment and  oppose  any  and  all  attempts  to 
deprive  the  Salvadoran  people  of  their 
right  to  elect  a  government  of  their  own 
choosing.  We  firmly  oppose  any  kind  of 
coup  against  the  centrist  government. 

In  our  view,  the  Duarte  government 
provides  the  best  opportunity  for  a  tran- 
sition to  a  political  system  that  will  offer 
the  Salvadoran  people  some  measure  of 
control  over  the  decisions  that  affect 
their  lives.  We  support  it  for  that 
reason.  In  El  Salvador,  as  in  any  coun- 
try, we  have  to  deal  with  the  political 
possibilities  as  they  exist  now.  There  are 
three  alternatives  in  El  Salvador 
today- the  forces  of  the  extreme  right, 
the  forces  of  the  extreme  left,  and  the 
present  government.  Of  these,  the 
Duarte  government  is  the  only  one  that 
promises  to  lead  a  transition  to  full  con- 
stitutional order. 

Should  it  come  to  power,  the  ex- 
treme left  would  probably  create  a 
government  modeled,  like  Cuba's,  on 
that  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Such  govern- 
ments can  vary  among  themselves,  but 
we  do  know  from  history  that  they  have 
an  unusual  ability  to  establish  a  rigid 
grip.  To  passively  accept  a  Cuban- 
coordinated  attempt  to  impose  their  kind 
of  political  order  by  force  of  arms  would 
be  to  close  off  all  but  one  narrow  path 
for  the  future  development  of  the 
Salvadoran  people.  This  is  what  we  want 
to  help  prevent. 

In  summary,  we  believe  the 
measured  steps  we  have  taken  and  have 
proposed  are  reasonable  and  responsible. 
They  are  carefully  designed  to  con- 
tribute to  a  lessening  of  the  violence  and 
instability  that  threaten  the  social  and 
political  reforms  the  Duarte  government 
has  courageously  undertaken.  I  hope 
that  we  will  have  the  support  of  the 
Congress,  and  of  this  committee,  as  we 
proceed  to  develop  U.S.  policy  toward 
El  Salvador  and  the  region. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washin^on,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


39 


Western  Hemisphere 


Central  American  Review 


by  John  A.  Bushnell 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
for  Inter-American  Affairs  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  March  5, 
1981.  Mr.  Bushnell  is  Acting  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs.^ 

Central  America's  recent  history  of 
Communist-supported  civil  violence  in 
Nicaragua,  El  Salvador,  and -to  a  lesser 
degree -Guatemala  has  attracted  con- 
siderable international  attention. 
Although  the  region  is  no  longer  ig- 
nored, what  has  been  happening  there 
has  more  often  than  not  been  described 
in  overly  simplistic  terms.  Our  intentions 
and  motivations  have  become  the  prime 
target  of  a  worldwide  propaganda  cam- 
paign by  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba,  and 
other  Communist  countries  seeking  to 
advance  their  own  interests  in  the 
region  at  its  and  our  expense.  In  our 
own  country,  highly  complex  issues  are 
often  reduced  to  slogans;  catchphrases 
substitute  for  analysis.  The  situations  in 
each  country  are  different;  U.S.  policy 
must  deal  with  the  complex  realities. 

Guatemala 

Guatemala,  the  richest  of  Central 
American  countries  in  resources  and 
largest  in  size  and  population,  is  faced 
concurrently  with  troubled  borders,  ex- 
ternally supported  subversion,  and  inter- 
nal rebellion.  Endemic  violence  is  on  the 
upswing,  spawned  in  considerable  meas- 
ure by  Communist  exploitation  of  tradi- 
tional social  and  political  inequities. 
While  a  number  of  social  and  economic 
programs  are  underway,  growing  Marx- 
ist guerrilla  insurgency  has  riveted  the 
attention  of  the  government  firnily  upon 
internal  security  issues.  As  it  has  in  El 
Salvador,  Cuba  has  played  a  role  toward 
unifying  the  diverse  Marxist  guerrilla 
groups  and  in  assisting  them  to  obtain 
arms  and  training. 

In  addition  to  the  internal  problems, 
two  of  Guatemala's  neighbors  are  in- 
volved in  dramatic  change,  adding  fur- 
ther security  worries  to  Guatemala's 
leadership.  Developments  in  El  Salvador 
are  a  continuous  source  of  concern,  and 
the  British  Colony  of  Belize,  which  is 
claimed  by  Guatemala,  is  moving  toward 
independence  this  year.  Guatemala  is 


concerned  that  Belize  could  become  a 
safehaven  for  Marxist  guerrillas  or  a 
supply  and  infiltration  route  for  these  in- 
surgents, with  or  without  the  permission 
of  the  Government  of  Belize.  Guatemala 
also  is  concerned  that  it  may  lose  access 
to  the  Caribbean  by  surrendering  its 
claim  to  Belize.  We  hope  that  good  faith 
negotiations  by  all  sides  will  bring  about 
an  acceptable  solution  that  will  con- 
tribute to  regional  stability. 

Economically,  Guatemala's  recent  oil 
discoveries  will  help  it  weather  a 
serious  economic  slump  brought  about 
by  high  world  energy  prices,  interna- 
tional market  conditions,  and  a  fall-off  in 
tourism  because  of  internal  violence. 


Honduras 

Honduras  is  well  on  the  way  to  conver- 
sion from  a  military  government  to  an 
elected  civilian  government.  An  election 
in  April  1980,  in  which  over  80%  of  the 
electorate  participated  with  enthusiasm, 
produced  a  constituent  assembly  which 
is  now  redrafting  the  constitution  and 
writing  electoral  laws.  General  elections 
for  the  legislature  and  presidency  are 
expected  later  this  year,  with  the  new 
government  to  be  installed  by  early 
1982.  We  are  pleased  with  Honduras' 
commitment  to  and  progress  toward 
democracy  in  the  face  of  events  on  its 
borders  and  its  own  economic  problems. 

However,  Honduras  faces  some 
economic  difficulties.  It  has  embarked  on 
a  heavy  campaign  of  investment  in  proj- 
ects to  improve  its  economic  infrastruc- 
ture that  will  offer  dividends  in  the 
medium  term.  But  for  the  immediate 
future,  a  deteriorating  terms  of  trade, 
especially  caused  by  falling  coffee  prices, 
have  left  Honduras  with  economic  prob- 
lems which  have  been  exacerbated  by 
the  region's  political  problems.  We  are 
reviewing  our  aid  programs  to  Hon- 
duras, including  the  military  assistance 
we  have  given  (mostly  leased  helicopters 
and  a  small  amount  of  military  training) 
and  are  considering  what  more  might  be 
done  to  enhance  Honduran  economic 
and  military  security. 


Costa  Rica 

Costa  Rica,  the  democratic  model  for 
Central  America,  is  no  longer  immune  to 


«a 


its  problems  either.  A  burgeoning  fu 
import  bill,  an  ever-growing  public  s 
tor  combined  with  a  declining  econoijol 
growth  rate,  a  severe  balance-of- 
payments  problem,  and  increasing 
charges  of  corruption  in  governmenti  BH 
creating  a  sense  of  unease  heretofor 
absent  from  that  country.  Hopes  for  je 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
gram  to  help  with  foreign  exchange 
budget  gaps  are  now  dependent  upoi|iia 
the  government's  willingness  to  cut  i 
budget  deficit  and  to  establish  some 
discipline  in  the  public  sector.  MeetirfW 
between  the  IMF  and  Costa  Rican 
Government  officials  lead  us  to  belie\ 
that  an  IMF  agreement  will  be  concl  1 
ed.  The  government  seeks  some  U.S.J 
assistance,  including  development      I 
assistance  and  a  PL  480  (Food  for     F 
Peace)  program,  and  we  believe  thayL^ 
now  is  the  time  to  help  our  friends  s    j,' 
least  in  small  amounts. 

Recent  indictments  of  officials 
allegedly  involved  in  the  illegal  trani    m 
of  Cubans  to  the  United  States  and 


m 


jipl 


L't 


eti 
I'an 
tra 


ii( 


allegations  of  corruption  caused  by  ( 
munist  gunrunning  networks  are  as 
disturbing  as  the  economic  picture. 
Costa  Rica  is  now  being  tested  in  its 
ability  to  deal  forcefully  with  the 
economic  and  social  problems  now  6 
it.  The  country  has  the  resiliency  chj 
acteristic  of  established  democracies. 
may  need  some  support -both  econos 
and  moral  -  if  it  is  to  avoid  problems 
the  magnitude  that  has  afflicted  othM 
countries  in  the  region. 

Nicaragua 

The  overthrow  of  Anastasio  Somozaj 
Nicaragua,  which  was  completed  in  ■ 
of  1979,  brought  the  region  both  mo 
international  attention  and  a  serious 
new  destabilizing  factor.  The  National  j 
Directorate  of  the  Sandinista  Liberati 
F>ont,  which  has  held  power  in  Nica 
agua  since  the  fall  of  Somoza,  is  he 
influenced  by  Marx  and  Castro.  Some"-^ 
members  of  the  directorate  have  sougl , 
to  lead  Nicaragua  toward  a  totalitariai , 
society.  That  thrust  has  been  contesto  , 
by  Nicaraguan  moderates  in  independ6l|u 
political  parties,  the  private  business*  ^ 
tor,  the  church,  and  some  of  the  rnedB  jjj 
best  represented  by  La  Prensa,  the       , 
popular,  independent  daily  newspaptf.  jji 
Since  the  Sandinista  victory  of  Jofc  j^ 
1979,  the  United  States  has  obligated    ^| 
over  $100  million  in  economic  assistant    ' 
to  Nicaragua,  $60  million  of  that  cornir  ^ 
from  the  FY  1980  supplemental  act.  0  ^ 
aid  has  been  designed  not  only  to  feed  \ 
hungry  people  but  also  to  strengthen  tf' 


ttx 


Western  Hemisphere 


■  t  sector  and  deny  the  Sandinistas 
rican  foreign  devil  to  blame  for 
oblems.  The  Congress  required 
aid  to  Nicaragua  be  stopped 
ts  government  support  violence 
rism  in  other  countries  or  deny 
"ights  to  its  populace.  Evidence 
re  amounts  of  Communist- 
weapons  destined  for  the  gxier- 
El  Salvador  were  transitting 
ua  has  caused  us  to  suspend  aid 
overnment  of  Nicaragua  tem- 
.  A  decision  on  whether  to  hold 
finitely  will  not  be  made  until  we 
Tipleted  a  thorough  review  of 
uan  compliance  related  to  exten- 
ud  as  provided  for  in  U.S.  law. 

idor 

.ary  10,  1981,  the  Marxist  guer- 
;es  in  El  Salvador  under  the 
d  of  the  Cuban-organized 
Revolutionary  Directorate,  the 
Bgan  their  so-called  final  offen- 
lopple  the  Duarte  government. 
J  called  for  a  popular  insurrec- 
weep  the  government  from 
Mst  as  the  Sandinista  Front  had 
e  to  do  in  Nicaragua.  The  DRU 
fanted  to  present  the  Reagan 
Itration  with  a  "fait  accompli," 
ralutionary  government  in  place, 
d  not  be  dislodged.  But  the 
in  El  Salvador  was  different 
it  of  Somoza's  Nicaragua.  The 
an  people  rejected  the  DRU's 
,n  insurrection  in  El  Salvador. 
Nicaragua,  the  government 
iiere  not  faced  with  entire  cities 
1)  and  workers  striking  in  sup- 
Ihe  Marxists.  Instead  the  people 
vador  chose  to  go  to  work, 

t  lly  turning  their  backs  on  the 
groups  who  claimed  to  lead 
Dvernment  forces  were  able  to 
2  guerrilla  offensive,  thus  win- 
east  a  symbolic  victory  over 
onally  supplied  Marxist  forces 
Ivador. 

iuld  like  to  submit  for  the  record 
f  the  special  report  on  "Com- 

i^terference  in  El  Salvador"  that 
made  public-  Much  of  it  is 
captured  DRU  documents.  I 

itjld  that  much  of  the  information 
captured  documents  has  been 

irftd  by  other  information  and  in- 

;:(   e  in  our  possession  and,  above 

5;   16  fact  that  the  guerrillas  in  El 

a   •  are  well-armed. 

■e  has  been  a  massive  influx  of 
■m  Soviet  and  other  Communist 


sources.  Radical  Arab  states,  the 
Palestine  Liberation  Organization  (PLO) 
and  the  terrorist  Popular  Front  for  the 
Liberation  of  Palestine  (PFLP)  have  fur- 
nished funds,  arms,  and  training.  There 
is  also  clear  evidence  that  the  Cubans 
were  directly  involved  in  forming  the 
guerrillas'  unified  command,  in  organiz- 
ing the  arms  supply  network,  and  in 
developing  combat  plans.  This  outside 
interference  dramatically  changed  the 
nature  of  the  struggle  in  El  Salvador 
from  an  internal  conflict  to  an  inter- 
national one  with  East- West  dimensions. 
Prior  to  January  17,  1981,  I  should  point 
out,  the  United  States  had  not  sent  any 
arms  to  El  Salvador  since  1977. 

The  crucial  question  is  why  there 
was  no  popular  uprising  in  response  to 
the  DRU's  appeal.  Where  was  the  popu- 
lar support  that  the  Salvadoran  left  and 
its  supporters  here  and  in  Europe 
claimed  and  apparently  believed  that 
they  had?  The  explanation  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  revolutionary  civilian- 
military  Government  of  El  Salvador, 
headed  by  Christian  Democrat  Jose 
Napoleon  Duarte,  has  given  El  Salvador 
the  hope  for  peaceful  change,  while  the 
guerrillas  have  revealed  themselves  to 
be  terrorists,  interested  only  in  obtain- 
ing power  through  brute  force. 

In  March  1980,  the  government  an- 
nounced a  far-reaching  reform  program. 
Although  it  has  been  implemented  halt- 
ingly, it  has  taken  from  the  small  tradi- 
tionally ruling  oligarchy  control  of  the 
major  estates,  the  banking  institutions, 
and  the  export  businesses.  Small  farmer 
cooperatives  have  become  the  owners  of 
the  major  estates,  bank  employees  are 
sharing  in  the  control  of  the  banks,  and 
the  government  controls  the  vital  export 
of  major  commodities.  The  former  land- 
owners are  to  be  reimbursed  with  a 
combination  of  cash  and  long-term 
bonds.  Small  parcels  of  less  than  17 
acres  once  farmed  by  sharecroppers  are 
now  to  be  owned  by  the  tenants.  In  spite 
of  considerable  technical  difficulties,  the 
government  has  begun  to  issue  titles  to 
the  new  owners.  Accomplishing  such  a 
complex  reform  in  the  midst  of  a 
foreign-supplied  guerrilla  insurgency  is  a 
remarkable  achievement. 

The  United  States  has  offered  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  support  the  Salva- 
doran Government's  reforms  and  to  pro- 
vide help  for  El  Salvador's  most  needy. 
Roughly  $56  million  was  made  available 
in  FY  1980  and  about  $63  million  is 
already  planned  in  FY  1981  to  create 
jobs  through  public  works,  to  feed  the 
hungry,  and  to  improve  health,  educa- 


Jkl 


tion,  and  housing.  Our  aid  is  designed  to 
help  eradicate  the  conditions  which  have 
fostered  unrest.  The  success  of  the 
government's  reforms  and  our  help  can 
perhaps  best  be  measured  by  the  ex- 
treme changes  they  have  caused  in  the 
behavior  of  the  government's  opposition. 
The  agrarian  reform  has  attracted  the 
most  attention.  It  is  under  attack  by  the 
extremes  of  both  right  and  left,  the  lat- 
ter because  the  reform  undercut  its  ap- 
peal to  the  rural  population. 

In  addition  to  progress  on  economic 
and  structural  reforms,  the  government 
has  begun  a  process  to  fulfill  its  commit- 
ment to  democracy.  On  the  October  15, 
1980,  anniversary  of  the  revolution,  the 
government  announced  a  number  of 
measures,  including: 

•  A  schedule  for  popular  elections 
beginning  with  election  of  a  constituent 
assembly  in  1982  and  culminating  with 
presidential  elections  in  1983.  We  under- 
stand that  an  election  commission  will  be 
established  during  the  next  few  weeks  to 
carry  forward  this  process; 

•  A  full  amnesty  for  all  guerrillas 
who  lay  down  their  arms;  and 

•  Promulgation  of  a  code  of  conduct 
for  the  military. 

Indicative  of  the  government's  desire 
to  end  the  violence,  it  accepted  an  offer 
by  the  Salvadoran  Council  of  Bishops  to 
serve  as  mediators  between  the  govern- 
ment and  the  guerrilla  organizations. 
The  DRU,  speaking  through  its  front 
organization,  the  Revolutionary  Demo- 
cratic Front  (FDR),  publicly  rejected  the 
offer.  In  December,  in  a  move  which 
strengthened  the  civilian  role  in  the 
Christian  Democratic-military  coalition, 
Jose  Napoleon  Duarte  was  made  Presi- 
dent and  Chief  Executive  of  the  junta. 

The  left  has  found  itself  increasingly 
unable  to  demonstrate  popular  strength. 
It  called  three  general  strikes  in  June, 
July,  and  August  of  1980.  In  June  they 
met  with  partial,  but  disappointing,  suc- 
cess. In  July  they  realized  they  could  not 
succeed  and  canceled  the  strike.  In 
August  they  went  ahead  with  the 
planned  strike,  but  in  spite  of  their 
efforts  to  keep  workers  from  their  jobs 
by  burning  buses  and  bombing  work- 
places, attendance  was  above  normal. 
The  strikes  were  failures.  The  people  of 
El  Salvador,  if  they  were  not  actively 
supporting  the  government,  were  at 
least  asking  to  be  let  alone,  to  work,  and 
to  go  about  their  lives  in  some  safety 
and  to  enjoy  the  benefits  of  the  reforms. 
The  judgment  that  the  guerrillas  lack 
popular  support  is  not  ours  alone.  The 
following  quote  from  Apostolic  Adminis- 


41 


Western  Hemisphere 


trator,  Bishop  Arluro  Rivera  y  Damas' 
February  7  homily  brings  home  the 
same  point:  "We  cannot  atHrm  that 
civilian  population  is  with  the  govern- 
ment, but  it  is  a  fact  that  the  people  are 
accepting  it  at  least  as  the  lesser  of  two 
evils." 

Following  the  failure  of  the  strike  in 
August  1980,  the  left  realized  that  it  had 
little  popular  support  and  turned  in- 
creasingly from  political  action  to  out- 
right terrorism.  Under  Cuban  counseling 
and  assistance,  they  burned  crops, 
businesses,  and  buses  and  murdered 
hundreds  of  people  while  they  prepared 
themselves  for  a  military  campaign  to 
topple  the  government.  From  Com- 
munist sources  a  massive  supply  of  arms 
was  shipped  via  Cuba  to  Nicaragua  for 
delivery  to  El  Salvador.  But  even  with 
their  stockpile  of  military  materiel,  the 
guerrillas'  so-called  final  offensive  failed. 
Their  greatest  failure,  however,  was  not 
military,  it  was  political -they  did  not 
have  popular  support. 

Nevertheless  the  offensive  still 
inflicted  losses  upon  the  government, 
causing  it  to  draw  down  its  stocks  of 
arms,  ammunition,  rations,  uniforms, 
and  transport  vehicles  to  dangerous 
levels.  On  January  17,  for  the  first  time 
since  1977,  the  United  States  began  to 
ship  lethal  military  items  to  El  Salvador, 
including  arms  and  munitions,  C-rations, 
uniforms,  and  six  leased  helicopters  to 
increase  the  mobility  of  Salvadoran 
troops.  Our  January  17  emergency  in- 
crease in  FY  1981  military  assistance 
(equipment  and  training)  from  $5.4 
million  to  $10.4  million  was  not  sufficient 
to  permit  the  government  to  meet  the 
threat  of  the  foreign-supplied  guerrillas 
for  the  remainder  of  the  year. 

We  are  now  in  the  process  of  in- 
creasing the  amount  by  $2,5  million  to 
provide  additional  helicopters,  to  equip 
new  quick-reaction  forces,  and  to  in- 
crease mobility  and  communications  as 
well  as  provide  needed  spares  and  am- 
munition. The  current  FY  1981  $63 
million  for  economic  assistance  will  also 
require  substantial  upward  adjustment. 
The  additional  amount  needed  will  de- 
pend on  the  level  of  fighting  and 


violence  during  the  rest  of  the  year  and 
the  response  to  the  Salvadoran  Govern- 
ment's requests  for  funds  from  the  inter- 
national financial  community  to 
reconstruct  its  economy. 

Obviously,  El  Salvador  continues  to 
face  significant  problems.  Some  try  to 
present  the  complex  issues  as  a  choice 
between  a  "political  solution"  or  a 
"military  solution."  There  cannot  be  a 
simple  "military  solution"  for  the  Duarte 
government.  That  government  is 
political.  Its  program  is  political.  But  it 
is  faced,  in  addition  to  serious  political, 
social,  and  economic  dislocations,  with  a 
major  military  confrontation  which  could 
be  decisive  in  determining  the  future  of 
the  country.  If  the  Duarte  government 
cannot  make  judicious  use  of  sufficient 
forces  to  make  it  possible  to  hold  its  pro- 
grammed elections  and  complete  its  pro- 
jected reforms,  there  will  be  a  military 
solution -one  imposed  by  the  armed  left, 
which  will  create  in  El  Salvador  a 
totalitarian  state  hostile  to  both  its 
neighbors  and  the  United  States. 

We  agree  with  President  Duarte 
that  his  government  is  not  a  permanent 
repository  of  power  in  El  Salvador.  We 
look  upon  it  as  a  transition  to  democ- 
racy. We  believe  the  future  of  El  Salva- 
dor should  be  determined  at  the  ballot 
box  not  at  the  end  of  a  gun. 

We  are  now  engaged  in  a  detailed 
study  of  our  policy  options  in  El  Salva- 
dor and  the  region,  taking  into  account 
the  critical  situation  there  and  the  threat 
posed  by  international  communism.  We 
are  consulting  widely  among  our  allies  in 
Europe  and  Latin  America.  We  shall 
also  be  consulting  regularly  with  the 
Congress. 

In  addition  to  the  $.5  million  in 
foreign  military  sales  credits  as  well  as 
$20  million  in  grants  which  have  been 
determined  essential  to  assisting  the  Sal- 
vadoran Armed  Forces  to  meet  the 
threat  posed  by  the  Cuban-armed  leftist 
guerrillas,  we  are  deploying  a  small 
number  of  additional  military  trainiiig 
teams.  These  five-man  teams  will  train 
the  new  reaction  forces;  one  six-man 
team  will  help  get  the  small-boat  Navy 
functioning;  five  men  will  be  added  to 
the  operations  planning  team,  and  five 
will  supplement  the  Milgroup  |military 
group]  in  its  much  larger  logistics  duties. 


Additional  economic  assistance  will  be 
needed  to  help  the  Salvadoran  Govern 
ment  weather  this  crisis  and  begin  the 
process  of  reconstruction.  We  would  ai 
preciate  any  views  you  may  have  on  tl! 
best  ways  to  finance  additional  requirei 
ments.  We  are  prepared  to  answer  yo* 
questions  concerning  recent  events  in  '. 
Salvador  and  listen  to  your  views  re- 
garding what  approaches  we  might  coii 
sider  to  meet  the  problem. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearim  i 

will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will  ;io 

be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of  l,| 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  OfS 

Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ^ 

^  Text  of  the  report  was  printed  in  the  >  lis 
Bulletin  of  March  1981,  p.  1.  ■ 


Western  Hemisphere 


Salvador 


RTMENT  STATEMENT, 
18,  19811 

licy  toward  El  Salvador  has  both 
iry  and  political  component.  El 
or  is  in  the  middle  of  a  major 
e  to  preserve  its  very  existence 
le  threat  of  a  terrorist  insurgency 
ted  from  the  outside.  The  govern- 
most  immediate  priority,  there- 
to insure  the  stability  and  securi- 
le  country.  Our  focus  on  the 
Y  issue  in  recent  weeks  stems 
lis  objective  reality. 

Government  of  El  Salvador  re- 
jommitted  to  carrying  out  basic 
lie  and  political  reforms,  including 
IS  in  1982-83.  The  United  States 
.es  to  support  strongly  these 
3,  which  include  agrarian  and 
r  reforms,  promotion  of  employ- 
ind  encouragement  of  the  private 
In  FY  1980  and  FY  1981,  the 
States  provided  over  $123  million 
:x!omic  assistance,  primarily  to  help 
•.ernment  of  El  Salvador  imple- 
K'se  reform  programs. 
■  successful  implementation  of 
■fi  irms  would  provide  the  Govern- 
f  El  Salvador  with  broad  popular 
•j:  and  facilitate  a  transition  to  an 
«  government.  Until  the  violence  is 
It'll,  however,  such  a  transition  is 
to  make.  That  is  why  the  Gov- 
!(it  of  El  Salvador  is  concentrating 
:r-ts  on  countering  the  terrorist 

/  lence  is  the  enemy  of  all  demo- 
ichange,  of  individual  rights,  and 
•comic  progress.  Those  who  are 
);ible  for  the  violence  and  ter- 
r  with  arms  support  from  Cuba 
oier  countries,  are  the  real 
lie  to  negotiations.  We  continue  to 
65  upon  the  Government  of  El  Sal- 
irhe  importance  of  controlling 
m,  whatever  its  source. 
rEl  Salvador,  an  end  to  the  pres- 
itfering  and  violence  would  permit 
rtion  to  get  on  with  the  task  of 
lie  reconstruction  and  progress. 
uted  States,  with  its  long  tradi- 
liemocratic  change,  recognizes 
<i  for  and  supports  peaceful  and 
atic  change  in  El  Salvador. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  2,  1981' 

The  Government  of  El  Salvador  has  suc- 
cessfully resisted  the  major  offensive 
that  was  launched  against  it  in  January 
using  the  massive  influx  of  arms  that 
have  been  provided  from  Cuba  and  other 
sources.  However,  the  insurgents  are  re- 
grouping, and  massive  quantities  of 
arms  remain  in  their  hands  either  inside 
El  Salvador  or  they  have  reason  to  ex- 
pect that  additional  arms  are  waiting  to 
be  smuggled  in. 

We  want  to  improve  as  much  as  pos- 
sible the  government's  ability  to  deal 
with  this  problem.  The  original  U.S. 
assistance  program  for  El  Salvador  was 
not  designed  to  cope  with  the  level  of 
external  arms  assistance  that  now  con- 
fronts the  government  of  that  war-torn 
country.  The  Administration  of  Presi- 
dent Carter,  in  its  final  weeks,  began 
emergency  measures  to  increase  the 
level  of  arms  assistance  available  to  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador,  including 
the  first  shipments  of  lethal  U.S.  arms 
to  that  country. 

As  part  of  our  on-going  review  of 
the  situation  there,  we  have  decided  to 
provide  an  additional  $25  million  of 
security  assistance  for  fiscal  year  1981. 
This  assistance  will  permit  the  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  to  acquire  addi- 
tional helicopters,  vehicles,  radar  and 
surveillance  equipment,  and  small  arms. 
In  addition  to  this  materiel  assistance, 
we  will  be  augmenting  our  present  train- 
ing and  assistance  teams  with  the  addi- 
tion of  four  five-man  training  teams. 
These  four  teams  will  train  Salvadoran 
personnel  in  communications,  intelli- 
gence, logistics,  and  in  other  profes- 
sional skills  designed  to  improve  their 
capabilities  to  interdict  infiltration  and 
to  respond  to  terrorist  attacks.  U.S.  per- 
sonnel will  not  accompany  Salvadoran 
units  outside  their  garrison  areas.  Nor 
will  U.S.  personnel  participate  in  any 
combat  operations.  Because  training  and 
the  absorption  of  new  equipment  takes 
considerable  time,  we  are  proceeding 
now  with  these  immediate  steps  while 
we  continue  our  broad  review  of  the  full 
range  of  Central  American  policy  issues. 

The  immediate  focus  on  these  securi- 
ty-related measures  do  not  and  should 
not  distract  attention  from  the  fact  that 
the  fundamental  problem  that  we  face  in 
El  Salvador  is  to  maintain  the  pace  of 
economic  and  political  progress  in  the 


face  of  deliberate  eff'orts  by  the  left-wing 
insurgents  to  disrupt  that  progress  and 
to  force  the  government  into  a  preoc- 
cupation with  security  concerns.  With 
the  Government  of  El  Salvador,  we  are 
examining  that  country's  economic 
needs.  We  anticipate  that  increases  of 
the  present  assistance  level  of  $63 
million  for  fiscal  year  1981  may  be 
necessary  in  order  to  assist  the  govern- 
ment in  stabilizing  the  economy  and 
maintaining  basic  economic  reforms. 

Violence  is  the  enemy  of  all  demo- 
cratic change,  of  individual  rights,  and 
of  economic  progress.  Those  who  are 
responsible  for  violence  and  terrorism 
with  arms  support  from  Cuba  and  other 
Communist  countries  are  the  real  ob- 
stacle to  peace  and  progress.  In  El  Sal- 
vador an  end  to  the  present  suffering 
and  violence  would  permit  that  nation  to 
get  on  vdth  the  task  of  economic  recon- 
struction and  progress. 

The  United  States,  with  our  long 
tradition  of  democratic  change,  recog- 
nizes the  need  for  and  supports  peaceful 
and  democratic  evolution  in  El  Salvador. 
The  Government  of  El  Salvador  has  al- 
ready stated  its  commitment  to  fair  and 
credible  elections.  The  military,  as  well 
as  the  private  sector,  labor,  and  peasant 
groups,  support  honest  elections.  We 
strongly  support  elections  as  the  most 
plausible  long-term  political  solution  to 
the  crisis. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  6,  1981' 

Yesterday  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador  took  a  major  step  in  initiating 
the  electoral  process,  which  is  an  in- 
tegral and  key  element  of  its  program  to 
lead  the  country  to  peaceful  democratic 
rule.  A  national  electoral  commission,  in- 
stalled yesterday,  will  begin  immediately 
to  prepare  for  the  elections  scheduled 
next  year.  We  strongly  support  this 
progress  toward  elections.  We  believe 
these  elections  will  permit  the  people  of 
El  Salvador  to  choose  their  leaders  and 
determine  the  future  of  their  country. 


'  Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  William  J.  Dyess.  ■ 


981 


43 


Western  Hemisphere 


The  United  States  and  Chile 


by  John  A.  Bushnell 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Latin  American  Affairs  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  March  10, 
1981.  Mr.  Bushnell  is  Acting  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter-American  Affairs.'^ 

The  United  States  and  Chile  have  a  long 
history  of  close  and  friendly  relations. 
Over  the  years,  Chile  has  been  one  of 
the  largest  recipients  of  U.S.  economic 
and  technical  assistance  within  the 
hemisphere.  Relations  deteriorated 
sharply  after  the  election  of  Salvador 
Allende  in  1970  because  of  the  deter- 
mination of  many  leftists  within  Chile  to 
follow  the  example  of  Fidel  Castro  and 
create  a  Marxist-totalitarian  state.  As 
the  result  of  severe  economic  dislocation 
and  increasing  violence,  the  Chilean 
military  overthrew  the  Allende  govern- 
ment in  1973.  They  had  broad  popular 
support  for  that  action.  Chile's  new 
military  rulers  believed  they  had  saved 
Chile  from  becoming  a  Soviet  satellite, 
and  they  looked  to  the  United  States  for 
support. 

The  new  government  settled  expro- 
priations of  U.S.  firms  on  an  equitable 
basis.  It  has  supported  U.S.  positions  on 
many  hemispheric  and  global  issues,  in- 
cluding, more  recently,  the  Olympic 
boycott,  instituted  as  the  result  of  the 
Russian  invasion  of  Afghanistan. 

Human  Rights 

However,  by  the  mid-1970s,  the  extent 
of  human  rights  abuses  brought  about  a 
cooling  of  relations.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment called  attention  to  violations  in 
Chile  and  took  and  supported  efforts  to 
improve  respect  for  human  rights  in 
Chile.  In  1976  the  Congress  passed  an 
amendment  to  the  International  Security 
Assistance  and  Arms  Export  Control 
Act  which  terminated  new  military 
assistance  and  sales  for  Chile. 

In  late  1976  and  1977  the  human 
rights  situation  in  Chile  began  to  im- 
prove significantly.  In  late  1976  the 
government  released  all  political 
prisoners  being  held  without  charges, 
and  an  amnesty  in  1978  allowed  most  re- 
maining prisoners  to  be  released  or  go 
into  exile.  There  were  no  reported  disap- 
pearances after  October  of  1977.  In  July 


1978  Chile  allowed  a  special  ad  hoc 
working  group  of  the  U.N.  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  to  visit  all  parts  of 
Chile  and  meet  with  anyone  they 
wished,  including  groups  active  in  Chile 
in  defending  human  rights.  No  other 
country  has  yet  permitted  a  similar  visit. 
Despite  significant  improvements  in 
the  Chilean  Government's  human  rights 
performance  that  have  occurred  over  the 
past  4  years,  many  countries  are  reluc- 
tant to  acknowledge  them. This  is  in  part 
because  some  violations  do  continue.  It 
is  due  even  more  to  the  political  emo- 
tions aroused  by  the  Chilean  experience. 
There  are  few  countries  in  the  world 
where  the  double  standard  on  human 
rights  is  more  blatant.  Michael  Novak, 
our  delegate  to  the  U.S.  Human  Rights 
Commission  meeting  in  Geneva,  noted 
on  February  25:  "...  the  abuses  of 
human  rights  in  Chile  are  by  no  means 
unique,  either  in  Latin  America,  among 
nations  in  other  continents,  or  in 
totalitarian  states."  What  is  often  ig- 
nored is  that  there  are  a  great  many 
Chileans  who  believe  in  democracy  and 
human  rights  and  who  support  the  cur- 
rent government. 


Letelier-Moffitt  Case 

Had  the  Letelier-Moffitt  assassinations 
not  occurred  in  1976  and  had  there  not 
been  three  Chilean  ex-intelligence 
officers  indicted  in  Washington  for  in- 
volvement in  the  crime,  it  would  have 
been  logical  for  the  United  States  to 
begin  to  take  positive  steps  in  1978  to 
improve  relations,  and  in  the  process  to 
follow  an  evenhanded  policy  respecting 
Chile  relative  to  other  countries.^ 

But  on  September  21,  1976,  the 
Letelier-Moffitt  assassinations  did  occur 
and  had  a  necessarily  negative  effect  on 
U.S. -Chile  relations.  In  August  1978  a 
Federal  grand  jury  handed  down  indict- 
ments for  three  Chilean  ex-intelligence 
officers,  American  citizen  Michael 
Townley-who  was  a  member  of  the 
Chilean  intelligence  service -and  five 
Cubans  living  in  the  United  States.  The 
United  States  sought  the  extradition 
from  Chile  of  the  three  Chilean  officials. 
As  required  under  Chilean  law,  the  re- 
quest was  considered  by  the  Chilean 
Supreme  Court,  first  by  the  President  of 
the  court  and  then  by  a  special  review 
panel.  The  court  rejected  our  request 


iiii 


principally  on  the  grounds  that  mostii 
the  evidence  came  from  the  plea- 
bargained  testimony  of  Michael  Towi 
and  that  under  Chilean  law  such 
evidence  is  inadmissible.  While  we  wd  '^ 
extremely  disappointed  by  the  court's  ji, 
decision,  we  had  exhausted  our  legal 
remedies. 

I  want  to  emphasize  at  this  point 
that  our  subsequent  actions  related  t( 
Letelier-Moffitt  were  not  taken  as  ths 
result  of  the  decision  of  the  Chilean 
Supreme  Court  not  to  grant  extraditiC 
of  the  three  Chilean  officers.  Under  t}  ^ 
bilateral  treaty  of  extradition  betweal  ,| 
Chile  and  the  United  States,  we  recof  \^ 
nize  the  right  of  either  party  to  refua 
extradition  of  its  own  nationals,  eveni 
cases  where  evidence  is  ruled  admissw 
and  conclusive.  Rather  our  actions  w* 
taken  as  the  result  of  Chilean  failure  ^  1 
pursue  vigorous  mvestigation  and  pro 
cution  of  those  in  Chile  we  believed 
have  committed  crimes  connected 
the  assassinations. 

When  the  Supreme  Court  rejectef 
our  request  for  extradition  in  October 
1979,  a  Chilean-originated  investigatii 
related  to  the  same  case  had  been  uni 
way  for  20  months  without  real  prog- 
ress. We  were  determined  to  make  cli 
that  we  could  not  condone  the  Goverr 
ment  of  Chile's  failure  to  make  a  seri( 
effort  to  investigate  or  prosecute  on  i1 
own  a  case  of  international  terrorism.' 
As  a  result,  the  U.S.  Government  an- 
nounced in  November  1979  a  series 
measures  including:  (1)  reducing  thes 
of  our  mission  in  Chile  by  about  one- 
fourth,  (2)  terminating  the  foreign       L 
military  sales  "pipeline"  to  Chile  and    L. 
thereby  terminating  all  deliveries  of    R 
military  equipment  to  the  Government* 
of  Chile  by  the  U.S.  Government,  (3) 
eliminating  our  military  group  statiom 
at  the  Embassy  in  Santiago,  (4)  pro- 
hibiting new  Export-Import  Bank  pro- 
grams in  Chile,  and  (5)  not  approving 
any  new  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corp.  guarantees  or  activities  in  Chile. 

Subsequent  to  this  announcement  i 
early  1980,  we  decided  not  to  invite  thi| 
Chilean  Navy  to  participate  in  the  intei 
American  naval  exercises  known  as 
UNITAS,  because  it  would  have  been  i 
appropriate  to  do  so  following  the  im- 
position of  the  sanctions.  This  was  the 
first  time  in  21  years  any  of  the  norma 
participants  had  been  so  excluded. 


s 


Western  Hemisphere 


sc  actions  taken  vis-a-vis  the 
imnt  of  Chile,  as  well  as  all  the 
ailing  up  to  them,  demonstrate  a 
S,  position  on  countering  ter- 
W  o  are  a  country  which  seeks 
'  '•{  law.  For  many  months  the 
ovornment  investigated  and  pros- 
cthf  case  in  Washington,  D.C., 
iceloped  and  presented  our  case 
cadition  in  Chile.  During  this 
<j:he  Government  of  Chile  turned 
t  us  American  citizen  Michael 
dv.  who  provided  a  substantial 
>  iif  the  key  evidence  in  the  case 
[liea  bargain;  he,  five  Cubans, 
t  l'c  Chilean  intelligence  officers 
idicted  in  Washington,  D.C.;  the 
a  officers  were  removed  from 
J  IS  and  placed  under  detention; 
.h  press  in  Chile  and  other  coun- 
Cv'ered  the  case  in  great  detail,  in- 
the  actions  we  took  in  late  1979. 
■;  many  Chileans  are  very  aware 
e  asic  facts  of  the  case  and  of  the 
•■Mtion  on  probable  guilt.  There 
I"  doubt  in  the  minds  of  Chilean 
and  those  elsewhere,  that  com- 
1  a  terrorist  act  in  the  United 
arries  a  high  cost  in  terms  of 
^  with  us.  We  believe  these 
iU  steps  have  made  an  important 
ilition  to  deterring  terrorism. 
V  le  the  Government  of  Chile  has 
1  >  fully  investigate  or  prosecute 
implicated  for  the  assassination 
jv  le  we  will  continue  to  urge  that 
Xir,  we  should  note  that  the 
■  ncnt  of  Chile  did  provide  a  meas- 
loperation  in  the  case,  the  most 
rxample  being  turning  over 
.    to  U.S.  authorities.  We  do  not 
t  overemphasize  this  point,  but 
is  do  not  want  to  overlook  it  in  at- 
tis;  to  take  a  broad  and  balanced 
ethe  case  as  we  are  doing  today. 
|rn  now  to  the  Department  of 
3|innouncement  on  February  20 
United  States  was  lifting  the 
ion  on  Ex-Im  financing  and 
lees  for  Chile  and  that  the  Chile- 
f  would  be  invited  to  participate 
l2d  annual  UNITAS  exercise. 


m  Import  Bank  Financing 

'  (i  the  Ex-Im  sanction  because  it 

•ping  with  the  intent  of  the  legis- 

Pfcifically  section  2(b)  (1)  (B)- 

iwn  as  the  Chafee  amendment - 

•  Ixport-Import  Bank  Act  of  1945 

I  ided.  In  enacting  this  statute, 

t;s  set  a  high  threshold  for  deter- 


mining when  Ex-Im  credits  could  be 
denied  for  nonfinancial  or  noncommer- 
cial reasons. 

Despite  the  clear  wording  of  the  law 
aimed  at  limiting  the  use  of  section  2(b) 
(1)  (B),  we  believed  that  the  special 
situation  extant  in  November  1979 -an 
incomplete  investigation  in  Chile  —justi- 
fied at  least  the  temporary  use  of  this 
sanction,  the  only  time  the  Chafee 
amendment  has  ever  been  invoked.  We 
belieVed  this  set  of  circumstances  re- 
quired a  strong  statement  of  condemna- 
tion by  the  United  States  and  appropri- 
ate policy  measures  to  demonstrate  our 
concern.  Our  willingness  to  take  steps 
which  affected  U.S.  interests,  as  well  as 
those  of  the  Government  of  Chile,  dem- 
onstrated the  seriousness  with  which  we 
viewed  the  matter. 

The  burden  of  the  1979  determina- 
tion has  fallen,  however,  on  U.S.  export- 
ers, and  thus  on  U.S.  trade  and  jobs. 
The  United  States  has  no  monopoly  in 
supplying  goods  and  services  and  has 
been  placed  at  a  competitive  disadvan- 
tage in  the  rapidly  growing  market  in 
Chile.  We  saw  no  purpose  to  the  exten- 
sion of  this  policy,  which,  while  initiated 
to  underline  the  seriousness  of  our  views 
on  Letelier-Moffitt,  was  serving  primari- 
ly to  penalize  U.S.  citizens  and  com- 
panies. Section  2(b)  (1)  (B)  was  enacted 
precisely  to  avoid  such  a  result.  The 
onus  of  proof  rests  with  the  Secretary  of 


State  to  show  that  continued  restrictions 
of  Ex-Im  lending  clearly  and  importantly 
advance  U.S.  policy  in  "such  areas  as  in- 
ternational terrorism."  The  Secretary 
has  determined  that  this  cannot  be  dem- 
onstrated and  thus  revoked  the  1979 
determination. 


Inter-American  Naval  Exercises 

Concerning  the  UNITAS  exercises,  the 
fact  that  Chile  was  not  invited  last  year 
does  not  determine  policy  for  this  year. 
Chile  has  an  important  navy  in  South 
America,  and  its  participation  enhances 
the  value  of  the  UNITAS  exercise  and 
strengthens  overall  hemispheric  defense. 
In  addition,  Chile  is  important  in  our 
ability  to  maintain  control  of  the  south- 
ern sea  lanes  of  communication. 

Before  concluding  I  want  to  say  a 
word  about  the  future  course  of  our  re- 
lations with  Chile.  I  have  already  re- 
ferred to  the  double  standard  as  it  has 
been  applied  to  Chile.  I  would  like  to 
quote  again  from  a  statement  by  Michael 
Novak  in  Geneva:  "In  nontotalitarian 
societies,  information  on  abuses  is  usual- 
ly quite  readily  available.  In  closed 
totalitarian  societies,  such  information  is 
much  more  difficult  to  obtain.  The  unfor- 
tunate result  is  that  we  tend  to  spend 
more  time  criticizing  those  countries 
that  are  partly  free,  and  making  prog- 


U.S.  Lifts  Prohibition  on 
Ex-Im  Financing  for  Chile 


DEPARTMENT  ANNOUNCEMENT, 
FEB.  20,  1981' 

In  keeping  with  the  intent  of  legislation 
that  Export-Import  Bank  financing  not 
be  restricted  except  when  denial  would 
"clearly  and  importantly  advance  U.S. 
policy,"  the  prohibition  on  Ex-Im  financ- 
ing for  U.S.  exports  to  Chile  has  been 
lifted.  As  a  result,  American  businesses 
will  be  able  to  compete  more  effectively 
with  other  exporters  in  Chile's  rapidly 
expanding  market. 

Chile  also  is  being  invited  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  UNITAS  exercise  (inter- 
American  naval  exercise)  this  year.  It 
was  not  invited  last  year.  Ex-Im  financ- 
ing was  suspended,  and  other  actions 
were  taken  on  November  30,  1979, 
because  of  the  failure  of  the  Government 
of  Chile  to  make  a  serious  eff'ort  to  in- 


vestigate and  prosecute  three  Chilean 
ex-intelligence  officers  indicted  by  a  U.S. 
court  for  the  assassinations  of  Orlando 
Letelier  and  Ronni  Moffitt.  Our  will- 
ingness to  take  steps,  which  affected 
U.S.  interests  as  well  as  those  of  the 
Government  of  Chile,  demonstrated  the 
seriousness  with  which  we  viewed  this 
matter.  The  actions  taken  were  not  in- 
tended to  be  permanent. 

We  continue  to  hope  the  Govern- 
ment of  Chile  will  move  to  prosecute 
those  implicated  in  the  Letelier-Moffitt 
case,  but  unlike  the  1978-79  request  for 
extradition,  we  are  not  an  active  party 
to  the  investigation  in  Chile. 


'  Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  acting  department  spokesman  William  J. 
Dyess.  ■ 


45 


TREATIES 


ress  toward  more  freedom,  than  those 
where  little  freedom  exists." 

In  the  case  of  Chile,  we  believe  that 
our  interests,  including  human  rights, 
are  best  served  by  a  less  confrontational 
approach  than  has  characterized  policy 
in  recent  years.  In  the  months  ahead  I 
expect  there  will  be  further  steps  to  ac- 
cord Chile  equitable  and  evenhanded 
treatment. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  avaifeble  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

2  Orlando  Letelier  was  Chilean  Am- 
bassador to  the  U.S.  during  the  Allende 
period.  He  and  his  coworker,  Ronni  Moffitt  (a 
U.S.  citizen),  were  killed  in  Washington, 
D.C.,  by  a  bomb  attached  to  their  car.  ■ 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Canberra 
July  24,  1961.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  30, 

1962.  TIAS  5094. 

Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Buenos  Aires 
July  28,  1962.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  11, 

1963.  TIAS  5274. 

Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981. 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Santiago 
Nov.  18,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  30, 
1968  for  IV  6  and  20-28.  TIAS  6668. 
Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981.1 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  purposes  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty.  Done  at  Paris  Nov.  29,  1968. 
Entered  into  force  May  26,  1972  for  V  1-4 
and  9;  July  31,  1972  for  V  7  and  8.  TIAS 
7692. 

Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981.2 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Tokyo  Oct. 


30,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  10,  1973, 
for  VI  1-7  and  11-15.  TIAS  7796. 
Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981.3 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Wellington 
Nov.  10,  1972.  Entered  into  force  May  29, 
1975,  for  VII  1-3  and  6-8.  TIAS  8500. 
Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G,,  Feb.  17, 
1981. ■• 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  Oslo  June  20, 
1975.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  16,  1978,  for 
VIII  6-8  and  10-14;  Sept.  1,  1980,  for  VIII 
3-4. 

Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981.^ 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Done  at  London  Oct. 
7,  1977.« 

Notification  of  approval:  Poland,  Feb.  12, 
1981. 

Recommendations,  including  agreed  measures 
for  conservation  of  Antarctic  fauna  and  flora. 
Done  at  Brussels  June  2-13,  1964.  Entered 
into  force  July  27,  1966;  except  for  III  7,  8, 
and  9;  Sept.  1,  1966,  for  III  9;  Dec.  22,  1978, 
for  III  8.  TIAS  6058. 
Notification  of  approval:  F.R.G.,  Feb.  17, 
1981.' 

Astronauts 

Agreement  on  the  rescue  of  astronauts,  the 
return  of  astronauts,  and  the  return  of  ob- 
jects launched  into  outer  space.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Apr.  22, 
1968.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  3,  1968.  TIAS 
6599. 
Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands,  Feb.  17, 

1981.8 

Atomic  Energy 

Protocol  prolonging  the  agreement  of  Mar. 
27,  1968,  (TIAS  6433)  between  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency,  Venezuela, 
and  the  U.S.  for  the  application  of  safe- 
guards. Done  at  Vienna  Feb.  18,  1981. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  18,  1981. 

Automotive  TraflSc 

Convention  on  road  traffic,  with  annexes  and 

protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Sept.  19,  1949. 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1952.  TIAS 

2487. 

Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 

Feb.  12,  1981. 

Aviation,  Civil 

Convention  on  international  civil  aviation. 
Done  at  Chicago  Dec.  7,  1944.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  4,  1947.  TIAS  1591. 
Adherence  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Feb.  11, 
1981. 


Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  1976,  wit 
nexes.  Done  at  London  Dec.  3,  1975.  En 
into  force  Oct.  1,  1976,  provisionally,  Au 
1977,  definitively.  TIAS  8683. 
Accession  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Jan.  22, 

1981. 


SID 


0 


A 


Collisions 

Convention  on  the  international  regulatic 
for  preventing  collisions  at  sea,  1972,  wi' 
regulations.  Done  at  London  Oct.  20,  19' 
Entered  into  force  July  15,  1977.  TIAS  i 
Accessions  deposited:  Cyprus,  Nov.  4,  19 
Malaysia,  Dec.  23,  1980. 

Commodities— Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fui 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  a 
Geneva  June  27,  1980." 
Signatures:  Morocco,  Jan.  22,  1981;  Port 
Jan.  30,  1981;  Zambia,  Feb.  3,  1981. 


Containers 

International  convention  for  safe  contaiiw  f 
(CSC),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  D& 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  6,  1977;  f  f 
the  U.S.  Jan.  3,  1979.  TIAS  9037.  i 

Accession  deposited:  Guinea,  Jan.  19,  19!*, 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relation 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  i 
force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13 
1972.  TIAS  7502. 
Accession  deposited:  Saudi  Arabia,  Feb. 

1981. 


» 


Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International! 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development.  DoiM 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force '. 
30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:  Zimbabwe,  Jan.  22,   ' 

1981. 


Gas,  Warfare 

Protocol  for  the  prohibition  of  the  use  in 
of  asphyxiating,  poisonous,  or  other 
and  of  bacteriological  methods  of  warfare" 
Done  at  Geneva  June  17,  1925.  Entered  ii 
force  Feb.  8,  1928;  for  the  U.S.  Apr.  10. 
1975.  TIAS  8061. 

Accessions  deposited:  Vietnam,  Sept.  23, 
1980;9'»  Sudan,  Dec.  17,  1980. 
Succession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea,  i 

Sept.  2,  1980.9 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social 

and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 

1976." 

Ratification  deposited:  Honduras,  Feb.  17, 

1981. 

Load  Lines 

International  convention  on  load  lines,  196 
Done  at  London  Apr.  5,  1966.  Entered  int  | 
force  July  21,  1968.  TIAS  6331,  6629. 
Accession  deposited:  Guinea,  Jan.  19,  1981 


Treaties 


iments  to  the  international  convention 
1  lines,  1966,  (TIAS  6331)  relating  to 
ments  to  the  convention.  Adopted  at 
n  Nov.  12,  1975.« 
ance  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  Jan.  6,  1981. 

me  Matters 

ition  on  the  Intergovernmental 

Tie  Consultative  Organization.  Done  at 

Mar.  6,  1948.  Entered  into  force 
7,  1958.  TIAS  4044. 
ance  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  12, 

Iments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 

amended,  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
m  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
tative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
,  1975.« 

ances  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  12, 
'akistan,  Jan.  23,  1981. 

ments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
IS  amended,  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
in  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
tative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
,  1977.« 

ances  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  12, 
'akistan,  Jan.  23,  1981. 

ments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 

amended,  (TIAS  4044,  6285,  6490, 
n  the  Intergovernmental  Maritime 
ative  Organization.  Done  at  London 
,  1979.« 
mce  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  Jan.  23, 


tional  convention  on  standards  of 
f,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 
rs,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 

■tions  deposited:  Denmark,  Jan.  20, 
"  Liberia,  Oct.  28,  1980;  Sweden, 
11981;  U.K.,  Nov.  28,  1980.« 


■  Material  — Physical  Protection 

tion  on  the  physical  protection  of 
material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 
26,  1979.1^ 

re:  Romania,  Jan.  15,  1981.9'» 

r  Test  Ban 

banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
here,  in  outer  space,  and  under  water. 

Moscow  Aug.  5,  1963.  Entered  into 
ct.  10,  1963.  TIAS  5433. 
ition  of  succession:  Papua  New 

Nov.  13,  1980. 


tional  convention  for  the  prevention 
tion  of  the  sea  by  oil,  with  annexes. 

London  May  12,  1954.  Entered  into 
ily  26,  1958;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  8, 
IAS  4900. 
mce  deposited:  Guinea,  Jan.  19,  1981. 

)I  relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 
cases  of  pollution  by  substance?  other 
,  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973.« 
on  deposited:  Yugoslavia,  Oct.  31, 


Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  international 

convention  for  the  prevention  of  pollution 

from  ships,  1973.  Done  at  London  Feb.  17, 

1978.« 

Accessions  deposited:  Denmark,  Nov.  27, 

1980;«'i°  Yugoslavia,  Oct.  31,  1980. 

Red  Cross 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949,  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365)  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  international  armed  conflicts  (protocol 
I),  with  annexes.  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8, 
1977.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978." 
Ratification  deposited:  Laos,  Nov.  18,  1980. 

Protocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
of  Aug.  12,  1949,  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
3365)  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
tims of  noninternational  armed  conflicts  (pro- 
tocol II).  Adopted  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978." 
Ratification  deposited:  Laos,  Nov.  18,  1980. 

Rubber 

International  natural  rubber  agreement, 

1979.  Done  at  (Geneva  Oct.  6,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  provisionally  Oct.  23,  1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Norway,  Feb.  4,  1981. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safety  of  life 
at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  London 
Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May  25, 

1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Accessions  deposited:  Finland,  Nov.  21,  1980; 
Guinea,  Jan.  19,  1981;  Maldives,  Jan.  14, 
1981;  Papua  New  Guinea,  Nov.  12,  1980; 
Qatar,  Dec.  22,  1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Republic  of  Korea, 

Dec.  31,  1980. 

Satellite  Communications  System 

Convention  on  the  international  maritime 
satellite  organization  (INMARSAT),  with  an- 
nex. Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976.  Entered 
into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
Accession  deposited:  Oman,  Dec.  30,  1980. 
Ratification  deposited:  Liberia,  Nov.  14, 
1980. 

Operating  agreement  on  the  international 
maritime  satellite  organization  (INMARSAT), 
with  annex.  Done  at  London  Sept.  3,  1976. 
Entered  into  force  July  16,  1979.  TIAS  9605. 
Signatures:  Liberia,  Nov.  14,  1980;  Oman, 
Dec.  30,  1980. 

Space 

Treaty  on  principles  governing  the  activities 
of  states  in  the  exploration  and  use  of  outer 
space,  including  the  Moon  and  other  celestial 
bodies.  Done  at  Washington,  London,  and 
Moscow  Jan.  27,  1967.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  10,  1967.  TIAS  6347. 
Succession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guinea, 
Oct.  27,  1980. 

Convention  on  international  liability  for 
damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29, 


1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for 
the  U.S.  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession  deposited:  Netherlands,  Feb.  17, 
1981.8 

Sugar 

International  sugar  agreement,  1977,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  7,  1977. 
Entered  into  force  provisionally  Jan.  1,  1978; 
definitively,  Jan.  2,  1980.  TIAS  9664. 
Accession  deposited:  Ivory  Coast,  Jan.  23, 
1981. 

Telecommunications 

Final  Acts  of  the  World  Administrative  Radio 
Conference  for  the  planning  of  the  broadcast- 
ing-satellite service  in  frequency  bands 
11.7-12.2  GHz  (in  Regions  2  and  3)  and 
11.7-12.5  GHz  (in  Region  1),  with  annexes. 
Done  at  Geneva  Feb.  13,  1977.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1979." 
Approval  deposited:  Finland,  Nov.  19,  1980. 

Partial  revision  of  the  radio  regulations 
(Geneva,  1959),  as  revised,  relating  to  the 
aeronautical  mobile  (R)  service,  with  annexes 
and  final  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  5, 
1978.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1979,  for 
the  U.S.  Oct.  22,  1980,  except  for  the  fre- 
quency allotment  plan  for  the  aeronautical 
mobile  (R)  service  which  shall  come  into  force 
on  Feb.  1,  1983. 

Approvals  deposited:  Finland,  Nov.  19,  1980; 
Singapore,  Nov.  3,  1980. 

Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  taking  of 

hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 

1979.<^ 

Ratification  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Feb.  12, 

1981. 

Tonnage  Measurement 

International  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
ment of  ships,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
London  June  23,  1969."* 
Accession  deposited:  Guinea,  Jan.  19,  1981. 
Extended  to:  Hong  Kong,  Jan.  16,  1981. 

Trade 

Arrangement  regarding  bovine  meat.  Done  at 
Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9701. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Tunisia,  Oct.  21,  1980. 

UNIDO 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.« 
Ratifications  deposited:  Libya,  Thailand, 
Jan.  29,  1981;  Tunisia,  Feb.  2,  1981;  Switzer- 
land, Feb.  10,  1981;  Norway,  Feb.  13,  1981. 
Signature:  Ethiopia,  Feb.  18,  1981. 

Wheat 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  26,  1978.  Entered 
into  force  June  24,  1978,  with  respect  to  cer- 


47 


Treaties 


tain  provisions,  July  1,  1978,  with  respect  to 

other  provisions.  TIAS  9459. 

Accession  deposited:  Morocco,  Feb.  5,  1981. 

Protocol  modifying  and  further  extending  the 
wheat  trade  convention  (part  of  the  interna- 
tional wheat  agreement),  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Done  at  Washington  Apr.  25,  1979.  Entered 
into  force  June  23,  1979,  with  respect  to  cer- 
tain provisions,  July  1,  1979,  with  respect  to 
other  provisions.  TIAS  9878. 
Accession  deposited:  Morocco,  Feb.  5,  1981. 

Food  aid  convention,  1980  (part  of  the  inter- 
national wheat  agreement),  1971,  as  extended 
(TIAS  7144,  9878).  Done  at  Washington  Mar. 
11,  1980.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1980. 
Accession  deposited:  Spain,  Feb.  24,  1981. 


BILATERAL 

British  Virgin  Islands 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  income,  with  related  let- 
ter. Signed  at  Washington  Feb.  18,  1981. 
Enters  into  force  upon  the  exchange  of  in- 
struments of  ratification. 

Bulgaria 

Agreement  on  maritime  transport,  with  ex- 
changes of  letters.  Signed  at  Sofia  Feb.  19, 
1981.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  19,  1981. 

China 

Agreement  relating  to  the  reciprocal  issuance 
of  visas  to  crew  members  of  aircraft  and 
vessels.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bei- 
jing Jan.  7,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  7, 
1981. 

Agreement  modifying  the  consular  conven- 
tion of  Sept.  17,  1980.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Beijing  Jan.  17,  1981.  Enters  into 
force  at  the  same  time  as  the  consular  con- 
vention. 

Egypt 

Agreement  relating  to  cooperation  in  the 
areas  of  science  and  technology.  Signed  at 
Cairo  Jan.  11,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
11,  1981. 

Agreement  on  health  cooperation.  Signed  at 
Washington  Jan.  13,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  13,  1981. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  San  Salvador  Jan.  22, 
1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  22,  1981. 

Germany,  Federal  Republic  of 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the  tech- 
nical exchange  and  cooperative  arrangement 
of  Dec.  20,  1974,  (TIAS  9067)  in  the  field  of 
management  of  radioactive  wastes.  Signed  at 
Bonn  Mar.  19,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Mar. 
19,  1980. 


Guyana 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
International  Military  Education  and  Train- 
ing (IMET)  Program.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Georgetown  Jan.  13  and  22,  1981. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  22,  1981. 

Hungary 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  May  30,  1972,  as  amended  and 
extended  (TIAS  7577,  8096,  8617,  9789). 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Budapest 
Dec.  31,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  31, 
1980;  effective  Jan.  1,  1981. 

India 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
30,  1977,  as  amended  (TIAS  9036,  9232), 
relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool,  and  man- 
made  fiber  textiles  and  textile  products. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at  Washing- 
ton Dec.  12  and  22,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  22,  1980. 

Iran 

Declarations  of  the  (iovernment  of  the 
Democratic  and  Popular  Republic  of  Algeria 
concerning  commitments  and  settlement  of 
claims  by  the  U.S.  and  Iran  with  respect  to 
resolution  of  the  crisis  arising  out  of  the 
detention  of  52  United  States  nationals  in 
Iran,  with  undertakings  and  escrow  agree- 
ment. Initialed  at  Algiers  Jan.  19,  1981. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  19,  1981. 

Israel 

Agreement  concerning  claims  arising  from 
damage  to  the  U.S.S.  Liberty.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Washington  Dec.  15  and 
17,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  17,  1980. 

Japan 

Technical  exchange  arrangement  in  the  field 
of  regulatory  matters,  with  memorandum  of 
intent.  Signed  at  Washington  and  Tokyo 
Sept.  12  and  29,  1980.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  29,  1980. 

Kenya 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities. Signed  at  Nairobi  Dec.  31,  1980, 
and  Jan.  7,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  31, 
1980. 

Malaysia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
17  and  June  8,  1978,  as  amended  (TIAS 
9180,  9602),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Washington  and  New  York  Dec.  30,  1980  and 
Jan.  20,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  20, 
1981. 

Mexico 

Cooperative  agreement  relating  to  construc- 
tion of  a  laboratory  to  assist  the  Government 
of  Mexico  in  combatting  the  Mediterranean 
fruit  fly  (MEDFLY).  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Mexico  Aug.  17,  1978.  Entered  into  force 
Aug.  17,  1978. 


Agreement  amending  the  cooperative  an  ^' 
ment  of  Aug.  17,  1978,  relating  to  const 
tion  of  a  laboratory  to  assist  the  Govern 
of  Mexico  in  combatting  the  Mediterran^ 
fruit  fly  (MEDFLY).  Signed  at  Washing 
and  Mexico  Nov.  12,  1980.  Entered  into 
Nov.  12,  1980. 


imlii 

iiElC 


all 

,1S' 


Bl) 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
2,  1977,  (TIAS  8952)  relating  to  additior 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  ill 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchangi 
letters  at  Mexico  Jan.  2,  1981.  Entered 
force  Jan.  2,  1981. 


Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooper  if 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  i 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  lettei 
Mexico  Jan.  3,  1981.  Entered  into  force 
3,  1981. 


ia 

fit 


11,: 
s 


Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
22,  1978,  (TIAS  9248)  relating  to  additio 
cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the  illi 
traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  exchan) 
letters  at  Mexico  Jan.  27,  1981.  Enteri 
force  Jan.  27,  1981.  uj 

Convention  for  the  recovery  and  return    ilei 
stolen  or  embezzled  vehicles  and  aircraft 
Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  15,  1981.  El»  (it 
into  force  on  the  date  of  the  exchange  (A 
struments  of  ratification 


International  express  mail  agreement,  \ 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Mexico  1 
13,  1981.  Enters  into  force  on  the  date 
mutually  agreed  upon. 

New  Zealand 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concemi] 
cooperation  to  assure  the  sanitary  qualit; 
bivalve  mulluscs  exported  to  the  U.S.  Sij 
at  Washington  and  Wellington  Oct.  14  a 
30,  1980.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  30,  191 

Treaty  on  the  delimitation  of  the  maritj* 
boundary  between  Tokelau  and  the  U.S.  " 
Signed  at  Atafu  Dec.  2,  1980.  Enters  int  l\i 
force  on  the  date  of  exchange  of  instnunii|fp 
of  ratification. 

Nigeria 

Agreement  for  the  provision  of  technical 
services  in  the  preparation  of  a  compreht 
sive  soil  survey  of  Nigeria.  Signed  at  Lag  si 
Sept.  22,  1980.  Enters  into  force  after 
signature  by  representatives  of  the  partii 
and  after  the  deposit  by  the  Nigerian  "" 
try  of  Agriculture  in  the  account  of  the 
sum  agreed  upon  or  the  issuance  of  an 
revocable  letter  of  credit. 

Norway 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  ( 
of  the  U.S.,  with  annex  and  agreed  minud 
Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  26,  1981.  Entf 
into  force  on  a  date  to  be  mutually  agreed 
exchange  of  notes,  upon  the  completion  oi  -j 
ternal  procedures  of  both  governments. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agncultural  conCT  ill 
modities,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Api 


I 


CHRONOLOGY 


PRESS  RELEASES 


J,  (TIAS  9604)  with  memorandum  of 
anding.  Signed  at  Lima  Feb.  5,  1981. 
I  into  force  Feb.  5,  1981. 


ent  extending  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
as  renewed  and  amended,  (TIAS 
31)  relating  to  civil  air  transport. 
I  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bucharest 
and  30,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 


ent  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
I,  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Mar. 
(TIAS  9222).  Signed  at  Mogadishu 
1981.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  12, 


»ka 

rut  amending  the  agreement  of  May 
4,  1951,  as  amended  and  extended 
^.V.t,  4436,  5037,  7126,  8414),  relating 
eihties  of  Radio  Ceylon.  Effected  by 
re  (if  letters  at  Colombo  Nov.  28, 
,  d  Jan.  22,  1981.  Enters  into  force 
t '  legal  requirements  for  the  approval 
i  ri  ivernment  have  been  satisfied  and  a 

III  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  to 
.,  1  has  taken  place. 


■lit  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
.  relating  to  the  agreement  of  Dec. 
(TIAS  9157).  Signed  at  Khartoum 
11'81.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  19, 


;c  Cingdom 

eimt  between  the  Lords  Commis- 
rs  'f  Her  Majesty's  Treasury  and  the 
T  asury  relating  to  gold  exchange, 
tdt  London  Jan.  16,  1981.  Entered  into 
i\.  16,  1981. 

id'jations 

Jpplemental  agreement  regarding  the 
vters  of  the  U.N.,  with  annexes. 
1 1  .\'ew  York  Dec.  10,  1980.  Entered 
^e  Dec.  10,  1980. 

y  jh  Commissioner  for  Refugees 

lit  relating  to  assistance  with  Cuban 
.t.  Done  at  Geneva  May  16  and  21, 
litered  into  force  May  21,  1980. 


>es  not  include  IV  1-19. 

'es  not  include  V  5-6. 

les  not  include  VI  8,  9,  10. 

lies  not  include  VII  4,  5,  9. 

les  not  include  VIII  1,  2,  5,  9. 

>t  in  force. 

)es  not  include  III  8. 

"ipiicable  to  the  Kingdom  in  Europe 

Netherlands  Antilles. 

itli  reservation. 

ith  declaration. 

-it  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

?servation  as  to  the  application  to  the 

lands  and  Greenland. 

ith  a  statement.  ■ 


February  1981 


February  1 

Robert  E.  White  is  dismissed  as  U.S.  Am- 
bassador to  El  Salvador  by  Secretary  Haig. 

February  10 

Cynthia  Dwyer,  American  freelance  jour- 
nalist, departs  Tehran  after  being  held  for  9 
months  on  charges  of  espionage. 

February  20 

Reagan  Administration  lifts  the  restric- 
tion on  Export-Import  Bank  financing  for 
trade  with  Chile  because  it  was  inconsistent 
with  provisions  of  the  Chafee  amendment  to 
the  Export-Import  Bank  Act. 

February  23 

State  Department  releases  report  on 
Communist  support  for  insurgent  forces  in  El 
Salvador. 

February  24 

The  following  newly  appointed  Am- 
bassadors presented  their  credentials  to 
President  Reagan:  Charles  A.  T.  Skeete  of 
Barbados,  Keith  Johnson  of  Jamaica,  and 
Saud  Al-Sabah  of  Kuwait. 

February  25 

British  Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatch- 
er visits  U.S.  and  makes  official  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  Feb.  25-28. 

February  28 

State  Department  announces  that  the 
U.S.  is  assigning  a  6-man  naval  training  team 
to  El  Salvador  to  assist  the  Salvadoran  navy 
in  maintaining  its  patrol  boats.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Department  of 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Subject 

Alexander  M.  Haig,  Jr.,  sworn 
in  as  the  59th  Secretary  of 
State  (biographic  data). 

L.  Paul  Bremer  III  named 
Executive  Secretary  of  the 
Department  (biographic 
data). 

Robert  Lyle  Brown  named  In- 
spector General  of  the 
Department  (biographic 
data). 

Richard  R.  Burt  named  Direc- 
tor of  Politico-Military 
Affairs  (biographic  data). 

Joan  M.  Clark  named  Direc- 
tor General  of  the  Foreign 
Service  (biographic  data). 

Paul  D.  Wolfowitz  named 
Director  of  Policy  Planning 
(biographic  data). 

Sherwood  D.  Goldberg  named 
Executive  Assistant  to  the 
Secretary  (biographic  data). 

U.S.,  Malaysia  amend  textile 
agreement,  Dec.  30  and  Jan. 
20. 

U.S.,  Thailand  amend  textile 
agreement,  Nov.  13  and  17. 

U.S.,  India  amend  textile 
agreement,  Dec.  12  and  22. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee  (CCIR), 
study  group  6,  Feb.  26. 

CCIR,  study  group  1,  Mar.  4. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 
ternational Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative  Com- 
mittee (CCITT),  study  group 
A,  Feb.  25. 

CCITT,  national  committee, 
Feb.  24. 

Advisory  committee  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea,  Feb.  18 
(closed). 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCC),  Subcommittee 
on  Safety  of  Life  at  Sea 
(SOLAS),  working  group  on 
radiocommunications,  Feb. 
19. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  working  group 
on  radiocommunications, 
Feb.  19. 

Haig:  remarks  at  the  presen- 
tation of  the  Charles  Evans 
Hughes  gold  medal  to  Walter 
Cronkite  by  National  Con- 
ference of  Christians  and 
Jews,  New  York,  Feb.  9. 

CCIR,  study  group  CMTT, 
Mar.  11. 


No. 

Date 

28 

2/1 

•29 

2/2 

•30 

2/3 

•31 

2/3 

♦32 

2/3 

•33 

2/3 

•34 

2/3 

•35 

2/6 

•36 

2/6 

♦37 

2/6 

•38 

2/10 

•39 

2/10 

•40 

2/10 

♦41      2/10 
•42      2/10 

•43      2/10 


♦44      2/10 
•45      2/11 

•46      2/19 


)«1 


49 


PUBLICATIONS 


CCIR,  study  group  7,  Mar.  12. 
sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  fire  protection.  Mar.  12. 
Fine  arts  committee. 

Mar.  14. 
Program  for  the  visit  of  Brit- 
ish Prime  Minister  Thatcher, 

Feb.  25-28. 
Haig:  interview  for  French 

television,  Feb.  23. 
sec,  SOLAS,  working  group 

on  subdivision,  stability,  and 

load  lines.  Mar.  11. 
U.S.,  Canada,  and  European 

states  discuss  North  Atlantic 

aviation  situation. 
Haig:  news  conference  for 

British  press. 


•  Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


•47 

2/19 

•48 

2/19 

•49 

2/19 

•50 

2/20 

51 

2/24 

•52 

2/24 

53 

2/26 

54 

2/27 

Department  of  State 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

Secretary  Haig 

News  conference  of  Jan.  28,  1981  (Current 
Policy  #258). 

Africa 

Somali  Refugees  (GIST,  Mar.  1981). 
Background  Note  on  Somalia  (Jan.  1981). 

East  Asia 

U.S.-China  Exchanges  (GIST,  Mar.  1981). 

Economics 

Multinational  Corporations  (GIST, 
Mar.  1981). 

Europe 

Ninth  Semiannual  Report:  Implementation  of 
Helsinki  Accord,  June  1,  1980-November 
30,  1980  (Special  Report  #77). 

The  Baltic  Republics:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST, 
Feb.  1981). 

Background  Note  on  Hungary  (Dec.  1980). 


» 


itr 

'Ib 
fip 

IS 


Middle  East 

Chronology  of  Events  in  Iran,  November  4, 
1979-January  27,  1981  (Bulletin  Reprint). 

Science  &  Technology 

New  Science  and  Technology  Roles  in  For- 
eign Policy,  Assistant  Secretary  Pickering, 
Jan.  29,  1981  (Current  Policy  #260). 

South  Asia 

Afghanistan:  A  Year  of  Occupation,  by  Eliza 
Van  Hollen,  Feb.  1981  (Special  Report 
#79). 

Western  Hemisphere 

Central  American  Review,  Acting  Assistant 
Secretary  Bushnell,  Mar.  5  (Current  Policy 
#26). 

Communist  Interference  in  El  Salvador,  De- 
partment of  State  report,  Feb.  23  (Special 
Report  #80). 

U.S.  Policy  Toward  El  Salvador,  Department 
statement  (Public  Information  Series). 

Background  Note  on  El  Salvador  (Feb.  1981). 

Background  Note  on  Netherlands  Antilles 
(Dec.  1980).  ■ 


li  U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTiNG  OFFICE:  1981  - 


1981 
^1,  No.  2049 


tan.  Secretary  Haig  Interviewed  for 
h  Television 13 

rrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Per- 

Abroad  (Duncan) 34 

itrol 

Reagan's   Interview   With   Walter 

ite  (excerpts) 8 

Haig  Interviewed  for  French  Televi- 

13 

Haig's    News    Conference    With 

1  Press 17 

rorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Per- 

Abroad  (Duncan) 34 

North    Atlantic    Aviation    Situa- 

25 

intic  Aviation  Situation 25 

Reagan    Visits    Canada    (Reagan, 

rer,  Trudeau) 1 

Reagan's  News  Conference  of  March 
Jrpts) 11 

1  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell) 44 

Prohibition  on  Ex-Im  Financing  for 
Department  announcement)  ....  45 
ties.  U.S.  Strategic  Minerals 
iency  (Calingaert) 23 

nerican  Review  (Bushnell) 40 

tation  of  the  Hostage  Agreements ; 

ran  (Stoessel) 30  ' 

looperation  With  EURATOM  (Ex- 
;  order,  letter  to  the  Congress)  .  .  33 

<  El  Salvador  (Stoessel) 38 

f  and    Development    Assistance 

A 

'  ■'{  Litigation  Against  Iran  (Exec- 
ri  ItT,  message  to  the  Congress)  . .  32 
I  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell)  ....  44 
ii%nc    Minerals    Dependency    (Cal- 

)   23 

ca.  Central  American  Review 
:<ll|    40 

jiierican  Review  (Bushnell) 40 

n  Reagan's   Interview   With   Walter 

n  te  (excerpts) 8 

Haig    Discusses    Foreign    Assis- 
21 

.;1  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell) 44 

CEI  Salvador  (Stoessel) 38 

f'  Prohibition  on  Ex-Im  Financing  for 
I>i'[>artment  announcement)  ...  .45 
i3r 

.nerican  Review  (Bushnell) 40 

anr  (Department  statements) 43 

r.  Reagan's   Interview   With  Walter 

'■  te  (excerpts) 8 

'uagan's  News  Conference  of  March 

■rpts) 11 

Haig    Discusses    Foreign    Assis- 

21 

ll.iig  Interviewed  for  French  Televi- 

13 

Haig's    News    Conference    With 
Press 17 


Europe 

CSCE     Addresses    Subject    of    Terrorism 

(Kampelnian) 29 

North  Atlantic  Aviation  Situation 25 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 

Abroad  (Duncan) 34 

European  Communities.  Nuclear  Cooperation 
With  EURATOM  (Executive  order,  letter 

to  the  Congress) 33 

Foreign  Aid 

El  Salvador  (Department  statements) 43 

Review  of  El  Salvador  (Stoessel) 38 

Security    and    Development    Assistance 

(Haig)   A 

Secretary  Haig  Discusses  Foreign  Assis- 
tance    21 

France.  Secretary  Haig  Interviewed  for 
French  Television 13 

Germany.  Secretary  Haig  Meets  With  West 
German  Foreign  Minister  (joint  state- 
ment)   28 

Guatemala.  Central  American  Review 
(Bushnell)    40 

Honduras.  Central  American  Review 
(Bushnell)    40 

Human  Rights 

President  Reagan's  Interview  With  Walter 
Cronkite  (excerpts) 8 

The  United  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell) 44 

International  Law 

Implementation  of  the  Hostage  Agreements 
With  Iran  (Stoessel) 30 

Suspension  of  Litigation  Against  Iran  (Ex- 
ecutive order,  message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   32 

Iran 

Implementation  of  the  Hostage  Agreements 
With  Iran  (Stoessel) 30 

Suspension  of  Litigation  Against  Iran  (Ex- 
ecutive order,  message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   32 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean.  Terrorist 
Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel  Abroad 
(Duncan)   34 

Middle  East 

Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference  With 
British  Press 17 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 
Abroad  (Duncan) 34 

The  United  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell)  ...  .42 

U.S. -European  Initiative  (Department  state- 
ment)   33 

Military  Affairs.  The  United  States  and  Chile 
(Bushnell)    44 

Namibia.  Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference 
With  British  Press 17 

Nicaragua 

Central  American  Review  (Bushnell) 40 

President  Reagan's  Interview  With  Walter 
Cronkite  (excerpts) 8 

Secretary  Haig  Discusses  Foreign  Assis- 
tance   21 

NATO.  Secretary  Haig's  News  Conference 
With  British  Press 17 

Nuclear  Policy.  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 
EURATOM  (Executive  order,  letter  to  the 
Congress)    33 

Oceans.  U.S.  Strategic  Minerals  Dependency 
(Calingaert) 23 

Poland.  Secretary  Haig  Interviewed  for 
French  Television 13 


Presidential  Documents 

Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM  (Ex- 
ecutive order,  letter  to  the  Congress)  .  .  33 
President    Reagan    Visits    Canada   (Reagan, 

Schreyer,  Trudeau) 1 

President   Reagan's   Interview   With   Walter 

Cronkite  (excerpts) 8 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  March 

6  (excerpts) 1 1 

Suspension  of  Litigation  Against  Iran  (Ex- 
ecutive order,  message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   32 

Visit    of   British    Prime    Minister   Thateher 

(Reagan,  Thatcher) 26 

Publications.  Department  of  State  Publica- 
tions   50 

Saudi  Arabia.  U.S.  To  Sell  Military  Equip- 
ment to  Saudi  Arabia  (Department  an- 
nouncement)   31 

Security  Assistance 

El  Salvador  (Department  statements) 43 

Review  of  El  Salvador  (Stoessel) 38 

Security  and  Development  Assistance  (Haig)  A 

U.S.   To   Sell   Military   Equipment   to   Saudi 

Arabia  (Department  announcement)  .  .  .31 

South  Africa.  President  Reagan's  Interview 

With  Walter  Cronkite  (excerpts) 8 

Spain.   Spanish  Coup  Attempt  (Department 

statement) 29 

Terrorism 

CSCE     Addresses    Subject    of    Terrorism 

(Kampelman) 29 

El  Salvador  (Department  statements) 43 

Terrorist  Attacks  on  U.S.  Official  Personnel 

Abroad  (Duncan) 34 

The  United  States  and  Chile  (Bushnell) 44 

Trade.  President  Reagan's  News  Conference 

of  March  6  (excerpts) 11 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 36 

Turkey.  President  Reagan's  News  Conference 

of  March  6  (excerpts) 11 

U.S.S.R. 

President   Reagan's   Interview   With   Walter 

Cronkite  (excerpts) 8 

President  Reagan's  News  Conference  of  March 

6  (excerpts) n 

Secretary  Haig  Interviewed  for  French  Televi- 
sion    13 

Secretary    Haig's    News    Conference    With 

British  Press 17 

United  Kingdom 

Secretary     Haig's    News    Conference    With 

British  Press 17 

Visit  of  British  Prime  Minister  Thatcher 
(Reagan,  Thateher) 26 


Name  Index 

Bushnell,  John  A 40,  44 

Calingaert,  Michael 23 

Duncan,  Evan 34 

Haig,  Secretary A,  13,  17,  21 

Kampelman,  Max  M  29 

Reagan,  President 1,  8, 11,  26,  32,  33 

Schreyer,  Edward  R 1 

Stoessel,  Walter  J,  Jr 30,  38 

Thateher,  Margaret 26 

Trudeau,  Pierre-Elliott 1 


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