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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

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)fficial Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2130 



January 1988 




The Secretary / 3 
Human Rights / 39 
Terrorism / 44 
United Nations / 54 



^^^^»^» 



Dpparimeni of Staip 

bulletin 



Volume 88 / Number 2130 ; January 1988 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its pui-pose is to provide 
the public, the Congi-ess, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on 
developments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 
The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congr-essional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and 
treaties and other agi-eements to which 
the United States is or may become a 
party. Special features, articles, and 
other supportive material (such as maps, 
charts, photogrraphs, and graphs) are 
published fre(]uently to provide addi- 
tional information on cui-rent issues but 
should not necessarily be inteqireted as 
official U.S. policy statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 

Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
sary in the transaction of the public busi- 
ness required by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through 
September 30, 1988. 



Dep.'^rtment OK State Bulletin (ISSN 
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus am 
index) by the Department of State, 2201 
Street. NW, Washington. D.C. 20520. Se 
class postage paid at Washington. D.C, i 
additional mailing offices. POSTMASTEI 
Send address changes to Superintendent 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



NOTE; Most of the contents of this publica- 
tion are in the public domain and not 
copyrighted. Those items may be reprinted; 
citation of the Dep.artment ok St.ate 
Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. 
Permission to reproduce all copyrighted 
material (including photographs) must be ob- 
tained from the original source. The 
Bn.LETLN is indexed in the Readers' Guide 
to Periodical Literature and in the PAIS 
(Public Affairs Information Service, Inc.) 
Bulletin. 



Y^n• .-iale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, LI.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



INTENTS 



id President 

The Philippines and Nicaragua 
Xfws Conference of October 22 

I Excerpts) 

1 Secretary 
National Success and Interna- 
tional Stability in A Time of 
Change 
Interview on "Face the Nation" 
Meeting with Soviet Foreign 

Minister and NATO Officials 
The OAS, Democracy, and 
Nicaragua 

lea 

Visit of Zambia's President 

(Kenneth D. Kannda. 

President Reagan) 
South Africa Releases Political 

Prisoners (Department 

Slatente)it) 

^is Control 

I Hard Work Ahead in Arms 
Control (Edward L. Rowny) 

Soviets Tour Chemical Munitions 
Destruction Facility 
(Department Statement) 

U.S., Soviet Union Open Nu- 
clear Testing Talks (President 
Reagan. U.S. Statement) 

U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: 
A Status Report 

>t Asia 

U.S.-Lao POW/MIA Technical 

Meeting Concludes (Joint 

State)nent) 
U.S. -Japan Nuclear Cooperation 

Agreement (Message to the 

Congress) 
Semiconductor Ti"ade With Japan 

(Pres iden t Reaga n ) 



Economics 

29 Protectionism and Ti'ade 

Barriers (W. Allen Wallis) 

33 U.S. Ti-ade Policy at the 
Crossroads (John C. 
Whitehead) 

Energy 

35 U.S. -Japan Energy Cooperation 
(W. Allen Wallis) 

Europe 

38 NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
Supports INF Ti-eaty (Final 
Commmiique) 

38 Meat Product Sales to the EC 

(Wliite House Statement) 

Human Rights 

39 The Promise and the Limits of 

Glasnost (Richard Schifter) 

l\/liddle East 



41 



Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia 
(White House Statement) 



South Asia 

41 Visit of India's Prime Minister 

(Rajiv Gandhi. President 

Reagan) 
43 President Meets With Afghan 

Resistance Leaders (President 

Reaga )i ) 



Terrorism 

44 Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy 
and Proposed Legislation 
(L. Paul Bremer. Ill) 

47 Counterterrorism: Strategy and 
Tactics (L. Paul Bremer. Ill) 

49 French Seize Terrorist Weapons 

(Department Statement) 

50 Iran's Use of International 

Terrorism 



United Nations 

54 UN Calls on Soviet Union to 

Withdraw From Afghanistan 
(Herbert S. Okun. Text of 
Resolution) 

56 UN Consideration of the AIDS 
Pandemic (C . Everett Koop, 
Te.rf of Resolution, Depart- 
ment Statements) 

Western Hemisphere 

58 Visit of El Salvadoran President 
(Jose Napoleon Duarte, 
President Reagan) 

60 Ti-ade Sanctions Imposed Against 

Brazil (President Reagan, 
White House Fact Sheet) 

Treaties 

61 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

63 Department of State 

63 USUN 

Publications 

64 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 

65 Department of State 
65 Background Notes 

Index 



PRESIDENT 



^ Philippines and Nicaragua 



•eside)tt Reagan's radio address 
nation of November 7, 1987.^ 

,'eek news from the Philippines 
led us all of both the friendship 
i Filipino people and their strug- 
rhe gesture of friendship came 
Philippine President Corazon 
paid a visit to Clark Air Base 
e of Manila to attend a memorial 
8 for American airmen slain by 
ists. I have told President Aquino 
luch all Americans appreciate her 
[itfulness. These murders bring 
to all of us the troubles and 
,s that the new Philippine democ- 
iaces. 

wenty months ago, we applauded 
isident Corazon Aquino's peaceful 
tion began moving the Philippines 
oward popular rule. Since then 
lent Aquino has been more suc- 
il than many believed was possi- 
. Vithin this last year-and-a-half, 
! as led a successful campaign to 
i; a new, more democratic, constitu- 
nand she has overseen the first free 
Hessional elections in 15 years — 
cons in which an overwhelming ma- 
i of the people participated. Now 
r working with the newly elected 
rress to solve that nation's serious 
):imic problems. 

'resident Aquino believes, as I do, 
i'free enterprise is the most power- 
, igine of economic progress known 
1 manity. She has inaugurated an 
litious reform program that has 
dd a sharp recession and boosted 
ral economic growth to 5%. She has 
jn to reform the tax system, dis- 
a le monopolies, privatize or elimi- 
.t inefficient government-owned 
i-tries, and reduce barriers to inter- 
tinal trade and investment. These 
all ii-asons for optimism, but there 
6-easons for concern as well. 
The single most serious threat to 
urvival of democratic government 
le Philippines remains the commu- 
insurgency. As a result of the res- 
tion of democracy, that insurgency 
lost political momentum; still it 
inues, becoming more violent as it 
)mes more desperate. 
But even as she confronts the 
:at of communist guerrillas, Presi- 
t Aquino must also rebuild the Phil- 
ne Armed Forces. She has had to 
iSert the principle of civilian su- 



premacy over the military, while at the 
same time resolve honest differences 
over how best to defeat the communist 
insurgency. Not everyone in the mili- 
tary has been happy about the new ci- 
vilian role. President Aquino has faced 
five attempted coups since taking 
office. 

I've made it clear to all concerned 
that Filipino democracy and President 
Aquino have America's full support. We 
hope all elements in the Philippine Gov- 
ernment, both civilian and military, will 
work together to find common ground. 
Division between government and its 
armed forces can only help the commu- 
nist insurgents, who are bent on de- 
struction of fi'eedom and democracy in 
the Philippines. 

Few countries are as strategically 
important to the United States as the 
Philippines, and we have a moral obli- 
gation to help all democracies succeed. 
That's why I have recently underscored 
to American business leaders that the 
United States is committed to Philip- 
pine economic recovery. I told them 
that we believe there are great oppor- 
tunities for American investors in the 
Philippines, and I reminded them that, 
while building the economy, our men 
and women of enterprise will also be 
helping to build a stable and democratic 
future for that nation. 



I've also asked Congress to help. 
I've requested substantial economic and 
military assistance for the Philippines. 
While we'd like to do more, budgetary 
constraints may limit what we can do, 
but this is one area where we can't 
afford to cut corners. The people of the 
Philippines are counting on us. One 
way Congress could do a lot is to re- 
form our sugar program, as I proposed 
earlier this year. We will work with 
President Aquino to build a safer home 
for democracy in the Philippines. Most 
of the responsibility belongs to the peo- 
ple of the Philippines, but we can and 
will lend a hand. 

Let me turn for a moment to an- 
other area of the world where brave 
men and women are working for democ- 
racy. I mean Central America. This 
week the Guatemala peace accord went 
into effect. The world is waiting to see 
if the Sandinistas in Nicaragua keep 
the promises they made to the other 
Central American governments when 
they signed that agreement. Will they 
fulfill both the letter and spirit of the 
agreement? In particular will they in- 
stitute the steps necessai'y for the de- 
mocratization of Nicaragua? Will they 
allow freedom to prosper as the agree- 
ments demand? Will they begin the 
process of national reconciliation? And 
will they take full steps, not partial 
steps? The United States will be watch- 
ing to see if the Sandinistas were sin- 
cere when they signed the Guatemala 
accord or if their signature was just 
one more propaganda ploy. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. 



News Conference of October 22 
(Excerpts) 



President Reagan held a news con- 
ference on October 22, 1987} 



Q. Your Persian Gulf policies have 
caused widespread confusion and fear 
that reprisals on both sides will lead 
to wider hostilities, more terrorism. 
Did you miscalculate? And is there 
any limit to these policies? 

A. I don't think that we miscalcu- 
lated anything at all. We're not there to 
start a war. And we're there to protect 



neutral nations' shipping in interna- 
tional waters that under international 
law are supposed to be open to all 
traffic. 

They, on the other hand — the irra- 
tionality of the Iranians — they have 
taken to attacking, as they did with 
this most recent incident — that was 
Kuwait and an oil loading platform off- 
shore, which they fired, evidently, a 
Silkworm missile at and caused damage 
to it. We've said that if attacked, why, 
we're going to defend ourselves. And 



uary 1988 



THE PRESIDENT 



^ 



we're certainly going to continue this 
taslt. We've now been joined by a 
number of other nations in l<eeping the 
sealanes open. But I don't see it as 
leading to a war or anything else. And 
I don't think there's anything to panic 
about. I think we've done very well. 

Q. You've said you don't think 
the War Powers Act is constitutional. 
But do you think that you have the 
right to obey the laws that you pick 
and choose? 

A. Other Presidents have thought 
so too. As a matter of fact, we are 
complying with a part of that act, al- 
though we do not call it that, but we 
have been consulting with the Con- 
gress, reporting to them, and telling 
them what we're doing — and in ad- 
vance, as we did with this latest strike. 
But they have other things in there 
that we think would interfere so much 
with our rights and our strategv and so 
forth. 

Let me point out that since 1798, 
there have been a few more than 200 
military actions by the United States in 
foreign countries. We have only been in 
five declared wars in our entire history. 
About 62 of these more than 200, there 
was action by the Congress, either 
through appropriating funds for those 
acts or passing resolutions or Senate 
ratifying a treaty or something. But 
the bulk of them — somewhere around 
140 of them — were by American Presi- 
dents that, on their own, put American 
forces in action because they believed it 
was necessary to our national security 
and our welfare. 



Q. What kind of cooperation are 
you getting from the Soviets in restor- 
ing some stability in the gulf and in 
ending the Iran-Iraq war? 

A. The Soviet Union joined us in 
.598; that was, as you know, the UN 
resolution — the Security Council. They 
joined us in that and supporting that. 
Iran is the only one of the two that has 
refused to accept it as yet. We're still 
pushing on that before we move on to 
the followup, which was what do we do 
if they w^on't accept it. We're still hold- 
ing back on that because the Secretary 
General of the United Nations is still 
seeing if he cannot persuade Iran to 
cooperate. If they don't, then we will 
have to face, in the Security Council, 
the adoption of the second proviso, 
which is the arms embargo on Iran. 

But they have been cooperative, 
and they did go along on the resolution. 



Q. And what are the prospects for 
a peace conference under joint U.S.- 
Soviet sponsorship? 

A. We had thought, in going along 
for a long time with the others that 
believed that the Arab nations were 
still technically in a state of war with 
Israel, that they and Israel could get 
together and should get together. Some 
of them have, such as the great efforts 
that King Hussein of Jordan has — how 
far he has gone to try and bring this 
about. But it just hasn't worked. And 
more and more, the word has been 
uttered that we should form an interna- 
tional group to help them come to- 
gether and bring peace. We finally have 
gone over to e.xplore that. That's what 
the Secretary General has been doing 
in the Middle East. And so far, Israel 
prefers not to go that route. They — 

Q. Meaning Mr. Shultz. 
A. Yes. 

Q. Earlier this week, the United 
States attacked an Iranian oil plat- 
form in the gulf. But despite that, 
today Iran fired another Silkworm 
missile on Kuwait. Do you really 
think you can stop the Ayatollah? 

A. The Ayatollah is in a war, and if 
he's going to go on with provocative 
acts against us or anyone else, then he's 
running a great risk, because we're 
going to respond. We're not going to sit 
there. And we have to feel that, on the 
basis of everything he's said and every- 
thing he's done, that if we did not re- 
taliate as we did recently, he still would 
have done again w-hat he did the first 
time. We're going to ti'y to point out to 
him that it's a little too expensive if he's 
to keep that up. 

Q. When this whole operation 
started, the United States had five 
ships in the gulf. Now you have more 
than 30 in the area. Can you set any 
limits on the U.S. involvement in the 
Persian Gulf and tell us how long this 
escort operation is going to continue? 

A. No, I can't tell you how long 
that will, but I can tell you that I be- 
lieve we're just the same as — we have a 
fleet in the Mediterranean, and we have 
one in the Caribbean, other places of 
that kind. We've had naval forces there 
since 1949. And we have to have them 
as long as it is necessary to take action 
to keep international waters open to 
commerce and trade. No nation has a 
right to close those, particularly when 
it's not involved with their enemy that 
they're at war with, but when it's neu- 
tral nations. 



Q. Many economists think th 
one quick, sure-fire way to give ti 
economy a big boost would be to 
create, in effect, a common marki 
for North America. You initiated 
these talks with [Canadian] Primiii" 



lU 



1; 



Minister Mulroney. and ITreasury^ 
Secretary Baker recently completA 
the negotiations. But the Canada^ 
U.S. trade pact is being vigorouslj 
opposed, especially in Canada ano 
some parts of the United States. ¥ 
there any way that your office cam 
put behind this to give it the need< 
push? 

A. You bet that I'm behind it. ' 
problem is right now there's a Parli 
ment in Canada also that has to pas- 
it. And I understand they're somew» 
reluctant about a few points. I thini) 
the trade agreement that we reach( 
with them is one of the foremost th 
that has happened in this area in h^'' 
tory. Here we are these two great ] 
ners — and we're the greatest tradii 
partners in volume in the world, be 
tween us. And this would just be a 
mendous step forward for all of us. 

Q. Would you be willing to go 
back to Canada and try and get «■ 
of those Canadian legislators togi 
and talk to them, as you just hav( 
here? 

A. I'm not sure that I could do 
better with foreign legislators than 
doing with our own. [Laughter] 

Q. Now that an INF [interme 
ate-range nuclear forces] deal is t 
but wrapped up, the next step woi 
be strategic weapons. The Soviets 
have said that they are willing to 
you the big cuts in those missiles 
you've always wanted if you woul 
agree to some limits on strategic 
fense testing. A lot of experts havi 
said that that would not require si 
ing down the program for the fon 
seeable future. Why have you tol 
your negotiators that they cannot 
even discuss this issue with the 
Soviets? 

A. Because if you put it on the 
table as a bargaining chip, then it b 
comes a bargaining chip. And we h; 
said that this, a real defense agains 
nuclear weapons, can be the biggesi 
factor in hopefully one day making 
those weapons obsolete, because I 
heard my own words come back to i 
the other day from [Soviet Foreign 
Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze, when 1 
said to me what I've said a dozen ti 
in some of the parliaments and legis 
tures of the world: A nuclear war ca 



Department ot State Bui 



THE SECRETARY 



oe won and must never be 

. The best way to ever bring that 

s to perfect this plan, which we 
ian be perfected and then be able 
to the world, here is a defense 
t nuclear missiles. And we'll 
t available to the world in return 
; world giving up nuclear 

s. 

With the likelihood, then, at 
af a summit here in the United 
to sijjn the treaty on the me- 
ranjje missiles, what kind of 
it do you envision with Mikhail 
ichev? What would you like him 
: in this country, and where 
I you like to take him? And how 
u think that would affect super- 
relations? 
Ve don't have a word yet or a 
et as to whether he's coming. We 
I beUef that this is going to take 
and I want it to take place very 
But also I hope that when it 
•he's never been to this country 
5 — that he would have time to see 
it deal of America. I think it 
be good for him to see this and 
things that he couldn't accuse us 
ging them for him. Let him see it. 
es, I've thought about — knowing 
,hing about the quarters that they 
Ifor beach homes in the summer 
10 forth — I've thought it would be 
of nice to invite him up to our 
foot adobe shack that was built in 
land let him see how a capitalist 
lis his holidavs. 



Text from Weekly Compilation of 
dential Documents of Oct. 26, 1987. 



National Success and International 
Stability in a Time of Change 



Secretari/ Shnltz'ts address before 
the World Affairs Council of Wash- 
ington on. December A, 1987.' 

As I thought about what I wanted to 
say — as you can see, it may not be 30 
minutes. I felt, in order to say these 
things — ^just an effort to look ahead a 
little bit on my part — I had to have an 
audience that cai'ed enough to sit and 
listen and try to follow the argument. 
It's not a stemwinder So that's what 
led me to this organization, because I 
know you're thoughtful people and 
maybe you would stay with me through 
this paper. 

Americans, and people just about 
everywhere, now know that big changes 
are underway in the world — changes in 
virtually every subject from science to 
superpower relations. So understanding 
and managing change is crucial. The 
United States has been trying to do 
that in recent years. And we've had 
some success in doing so, because our 
society thrives on change. We are open 
to it, and we are ready for it. 

The summit which starts next 
week is one mark of our success. Arms 
control gets the most attention, but 
this summit will reflect hard work on 
human rights, in coping with conflicts 
around the world, and in trying for a 
more stable relation between the two 
superpowers. 

We have been doing pretty well. 
But we cannot be satisfied to rest on 
our accomplishments. This is a time to 
try to deepen our understanding of the 
changes taking place, to look ahead, 
and to assess what needs to be done if 
we are to keep control of our own 
future. 

The World Ahead 

Now, at this point in a speech about 
the world ahead, an audience can e.xpect 
to be inundated with a tide of vague 
generalities — words like "interdepen- 
dence," exhortations like "the challenge 
of the global change," and recitations of 
the "gee whiz" variety about artificial 
intelligence, genetic engineering, and 
robotics. 

Maybe it's impossible, but we have 
to ti-y to talk about the world ahead 
without getting bogged down in this 
stultifying vocabulary. In ancient China, 
when familiar words and ways of think- 
ing no longer accurately described the 



realities of the day, philosophers spoke 
of the need to "rectify names" so that 
concepts would correspond to the new 
order of things. 

This is one of those times. Develop- 
ments in science and social organization 
are altering the world profoundly — too 
profoundly for conventional habits of 
thinking to grasp. History suggests 
that mankind rarely understands revo- 
lutionary change at the time it is com- 
ing about. When concepts eventually 
catch up with the pace of change, new 
definitions and descriptions are applied: 
the Agricultural Age, the Bronze Age, 
the Industrial Revolution were named 
long after the fact. 

So if we are in such a time of 
transformation, what kind of age is it 
that we are entering? What do we need 
to know and do about it? 

I am not here to offer a definitive 
analysis of the global trends now under- 
way but to try to survey the present 
scene — in Emerson's words — from "an 
original relation to the universe." In 
this time of profound change, one of the 
hardest adjustments to make is intel- 
lectual adjustment. We must discard 
outdated habits of thinking and make 
room for new possibilities. 

First of all, just how different is 
this era we have entered? From one 
point of view, it was the 19th century's 
radical intellectual, ideological, spir- 
itual, moral, and social revolutions that 
shattered the "eternal verities." In a 
way, we have not fully adjusted yet to 
those epic events. 

Today's — and tomorrow's — revo- 
lutionary changes are of a different 
nature. They are characterized by 
greater size and speed; they are both 
centrifugal and centripetal in their im- 
pact, dispersing yet concentrating 
activities, influences, and decisions. 

First, the very material substances 
that surround us in everyday life are 
being transformed. Physically, syn- 
thetic materials make objects lighter, 
stronger, and more durable. But they 
are changing societies and economies, 
too, because their emergence affects 
supply and demand for natural raw ma- 
terials. One new material substance — 
ceramics — has led researchers around 
the world to superconductivity at new 
temperatures which in turn may pro- 
foundly alter one foundation stone of all 
human activity: energy. Another such 
foundation — food — no longer limits by 



uary 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



1 



its production the possibility of woi'ld 
population growth. Biotechnology in 
agriculture has stood Malthus on his 
head. 

The same scientific progress that 
has altered the nature of these basic 
substances has also accelerated the 
speed of human transactions. Titne and 
space are calculated in ever-smaller 
units. Success in every field depends 
increasingly upon how quickly ideas can 
be transformed into reality. The speed 
at which information flows has already 
created a global financial market. Mar- 
kets are no longer places, but elec- 
tronic networks. 

Along with these alterations in 
substance and speed have come changes 
in magnitude. Scientific, economic, and 
political matters are global in dimen- 
sion and enormous in e.xtent. They are 
outstripping the traditional means by 
which governments dealt with them. 
The amount of money that changes 
hands in the global financial market 
in 1 day e.xceeds $1 trillion — more than 
the entire budget of the U.S. Govern- 
ment for a year. Such flows transcend 
national boundaries and can overwhelm 
rigid economic policies. Manufacturing 
processes similarly are becoming global 
in scale. I recently saw a snapshot of a 
shipping label for some integrated cir- 
cuits produced by an American firm. It 
said, "Made in one or more of the fol- 
lowing countries: Korea, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, 
Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philip- 
pines. The exact country of origin is 
unknown." That label says a lot about 
where current trends are taking us. 

The thread that runs through all 
these things is knowledge: its discovery, 
its rapid transmission as information, 
and the education needed to use it. Ac- 
cess to ideas, no matter where they are 
developed, becomes the key to scientific 
and economic progress. For example, 
the growth sector for employment is 
the so-called service sector, particularly 
in finance, data processing, software, 
engineering, and management consulta- 
tion. "Services" is a misleading desig- 
nation. These activities are centered on 
ideas but have all the characteristics of 
the production of what we traditionally 
call "goods." So it is time, as the an- 
cient Chinese would have recognized, 
for "a rectification of names." 

Changes in materials, magnitudes, 
knowledge, and the speed of its dis- 
semination — the opportunities offered 
by these changes are immense — and 
America and other open societies are 
beautifully situated to make the most of 
this era ahead. But there are troubling 



implications of change to consider as 
well. Emerson would put it down to his 
principle of "compensation" — no aspect 
of progress comes free of some 
drawback. 

For many nations, the emerging 
era means new problems. Countries 
which cannot or will not compete in the 
global marketplace and interact with 
ideas from other societies will find 
themselves falling behind the advanced 
innovators and producers. Some of 
those countries may be able to absorb 
what the innovators develop and may 
register moderate gi'owth. But the 
quality and technological content of 
that growth will remain limited by the 
inability of such countries to adjust to 
rapid change. 

Other nations — single commodity 
countries and agricultural and indus- 
trial subsistence economies — are in 
danger of becoming marginal partici- 
pants in, let's call it the "Information 
Age" economy, living as in eras past. 
Some lack the human and physical in- 
frastructure to create and exploit eco- 
nomic opportunities. Others are held 
back by the inflexible nature of their 
political and social systems. 

Yet even those who fall further be- 
hind economically can partake of some 
of the fruits of the new age — fruits that 
unfortunately are not sufficiently for- 
bidden. Wars in the Third World are 
being fought with increasing sophistica- 
tion and firepower. The spread of mod- 
ern technical skill coincides with the 
modern resurgence of age-old ethnic, 
religious, and communal conflict. Be- 
yond the Iran-Iraq war, we see fighting 
in Sri Lanka, ethnic conflict in Fiji, the 
devastation of Lebanon, Sino-Indian 
border tensions, the New Caledonia 
and Cyprus disputes, and the continu- 
ing Arab-Israeli conflict. 

Such tensions have always been 
part of human history. What is new is 
the heightened possibility that they will 
become wider and more deadly con- 
flagrations through the misuse of rela- 
tively sophisticated weaponry. In the 
Iran-Iraq war, we see how readily avail- 
able on the world arms market are mis- 
siles such as the Exocet, the SCUD, 
and the Silkworm. And many develop- 
ing countries are becoming not just 
purchasers and users but adept manu- 
facturers of military hardware consid- 
ered highly advanced only a few years 
ago. 



We have long feared the dangi 
of nuclear proliferation. Now we fi 
worldwide diffusion and use of chei 
weapons — thus breaching the inte; 
tional moral consensus of more thai 
half a century. But this gi-owing caj 
ity to acquire or produce and empli 
such weapons unfortunately is not 
whole story. Violence itself is undej 
ing a qualitative change, as terrorii 
and narcotics traffickers spread ne' 
forms of destruction around the wo: 
We now recognize the long, tough bfl'''' 
tie we are fighting with these modew 
day barbarians, equipped with effecl ""' 
weaponry and uninhibited by tradi-< * 
tional norms of civilized conduct. 

In centuries past, advances in snl"-'; 
ence and technology and warfare ofM " 
far outstripped the abilities of states^ "'i 
men and politicians. Today political, 
economic, and social arrangements 
must be more closely harmonized wM^- 
change. Drawing from the example (I 
science, we must create a more just 
and decent social order from the ele- 
ments of our understanding. Human 
society has no unique or preordainec 
social pattern. Our God-given goal is 
fulfill ourselves through the social ai 
cultural institutions that we ourselvt 
create and to leave this world a bett ' 
place than when we entered. . 

Guidelines for Dealing 
With Today's Events 

As we face this phalanx of changing 
conditions, what principles stand out 
for us? I see three clear guidelines fi 
dealing with the size, speed, and cor 
plexity of events today. 

First, a society must be open to 
this new age of knowledge and infor- 
mation; to resist it deadens hope of 
progress. Today's transformations an 
products of our own system of openn^ 
and creativity. What we face are not 
vast impersonal "forces" or "trends" 
that sway us against our will; they ai 
challenges created by our own past 
achievements. They offer opportuniti 
for a better future, but only if they c 
be exploited. 

A subsidiary point: the 18th 
century idea of democracy, with its 
qualities of openness, freedom, indivi 
ual initiative, and innovation, remains 
the best way to deal with the stress 
and the opportunities of change. 

Second, for decisionmakers, the 
margins for error are diminishing as 
the consequences of error increase in 



Department of State Bulle! 



THE SECRETARY 



and gravity. Overeentralized 
and decisions increasingly will be 
Thus the free operation of the 
tplace — for goods and ideas — is 
• more efficient arbiter of 
Dns. 

nd so entrepreneurial initiative in 
ket environment is the engine of 
)pment and change. Global eco- 
problems will keep coming at us 
■J res; we must remain open as we 
hem or be swept away. 
hird, the global nature of changes 
jnce, in economics, in communica- 
tiust be matched by political devel- 
nts, particularly the strengthening 
loser association of like-minded 
IS. To a gi-eater degree than in 
.tionary eras of the past, there is 
ergistic interaction between scien- 
ind technological advances and po- 
, economic, and social develop- 
3, with each enhancing and accel- 
Hg the effect of change on the 
fs. 

■*5o, today, regional associations of 
itns are fast becoming an important 
id'ffective new milieu for political 
id'conomic interaction in the world. 

Ill Drive Toward Democracy 

do things stand in applying these 
-i 'iples? Not bad. The most stirring 
)lical response to the new temper of 
n ime has been the resurgence of 

3) jcracy and the demand for political 
)i ness and participation. 

Not so many years ago, democratic 
jlins were thought to be a dwindling 
i< embattled minority; today the idea 

jmocracy is among the most imper- 
ii political forces of our time. Elites 

1 le East and West recognize that 
iinced economic power comes from a 
i( level of education, an openness to 
t world, a rational distribution of de- 
finniaking power, emphasis on indi- 
(lal initiative, decentralization of 
Jiority, greater freedom of informa- 

( and association, and the right of 

1 people to have a say in their own 
ii'> and destiny. 
Aiound the globe we see a power- 

-ini])ulse toward democratic institu- 
:s and values. This recent phenom- 

1 11 was first evident in Spain and 
tuual a decade ago. Now, in Latin 
erica, this drive has changed the 
iplexiun of the entire continent, 
n Argentina to El Salvador. In the 
lippiiies, despite serious challenges, 
see how tenaciously people are 
king to effect a transition to a new 

nocratic way. In South Korea, there 



is a dramatic struggle to create new 
political institutions and achieve the 
peaceful transition of national lead- 
ership through open elections. And the 
Haitian people will not abide a return 
to the tyranny they so recently rejected. 

Elsewhere the struggle continues, 
as in South Africa where the structure 
of apartheid is under increasing siege, 
and in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, 
and Cambodia, where communist op- 
pression has spawned resistance move- 
ments fighting for the rights denied 
them. 

For the United States, these trends 
must be seen not only as an affirmation 
of the values we hold so firmly but also 
as a test. The transition to democracy 
is a difficult and fragile process. And it 
can be reversed. 

Confronted by daunting internal 
and external challenges, new democ- 
racies will look to us for ideas, as- 
sistance, and understanding. In 
response, we cannot shut our eyes or 
close our doors. If we do, the lamp of 
democracy will go out in many lands. 

Freedom — Turning to the Market 

With the new surge of democratic feel- 
ing, others have come to recognize 
what we have known all along — that de- 
mocracy and free markets go together. 
As our free political system looks out 
for basic justice and opportunity and 
provides a safety net in case of adver- 
sity, our free markets ensure that our 
economy will function effectively. 

Free markets cannot function in 
an environment of stifling political 
regulation or interference. Measures 
that would isolate an economy from the 
world or disengage it from the global 
community do enormous harm. The dis- 
integration of the trade and financial 
structures during the 1930s provides 
ample evidence on this score. 

All nations share a common respon- 
sibility, and must work together, to 
promote market forces and to ensure 
the maintenance of an open interna- 
tional economic system. The objective 
of cooperation is not to achieve a fixed, 
predetermined result but to ensure that 
the free market is allowed to function. 

Now there is real progress on all 
fronts here. The nations of Southeast 
and Northeast Asia were in the van- 
guard, but now with every passing year 
we see formerly socialist or command 
economies, in Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia, shucking off those rigid and 
limiting policies and relying more and 
more on open market practices and in- 
dividual incentives. 



There is progress as well in over- 
coming the lingering sentiment that 
governments can get together and 
somehow dictate economic results. In 
today's world that simply cannot be 
done. Markets, not governments, deter- 
mine economic results, and there is no 
way to overrule the market more than 
momentarily — especially given the vast 
quantities of goods, services, capital, 
information, and technology flowing 
across national boundaries today and 
everyday. 

However, governments can work 
together to promote procedures which 
allow markets to work more freely and 
efficiently — that's what we are doing, 
for example, in the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade 
talks in Geneva, in the annual economic 
summits, in the structural adjustment 
program of the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], and through the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, 
and other international financial 
institutions. 

The record of economic growth over 
the past four decades is one of amazing 
success. But at the same time, there 
are plenty of problems and challenges 
facing the world's free enterprise, mar- 
ket economies — just to name a few: 

• The size of government — whether 
measured by spending, or taxation, or 
regulatory influence, or income re- 
distribution, or price distortions — has 
become a real burden to the efficient 
functioning of the market. There are 
many stories to be told, from the un- 
conscionably expensive and distorting 
farm programs to the detailed regula- 
tion of opening and closing hours of 
retail stores. But our own recent expe- 
rience in trying to trim the budget defi- 
cit may bring it home most clearly to 
this audience. Once established, gov- 
ernment programs are virtually impos- 
sible to eliminate — they spawn their 
own interest groups and become en- 
trenched. Unless government is to 
grow without limits, we must find a 
way to make it shrink. 

• The trading imbalances in the 
global economy represent another 
problem and are most likely a symptom 
of more fundamental imbalances that 
need to be corrected. I suspect that we, 
in the United States, are farther along 
in facing up to our trade deficit than 
are many other countries whose eco- 
nomic growth has become all too de- 
pendent on an export surplus generally 
related to our deficit. Somehow, people 
need to realize that it's not possible for 



luary 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



every country in the world to have an 
export surplus at the same time. Our 
deficit has sort of the residual claimant 
of everybody else's surplus, and every- 
body says it must change. And I agree, 
and it will, and it is, and it could hap- 
pen relatively fast. And my question is, 
when it does, are the countries that 
have been dining out to lunch on it 
ready? 

Our challenge is to adopt policies 
at home that engender confidence in 
the strength of the U.S. economy and 
promote policies overseas that will 
strengthen the economies of our major 
trading partners. If we fail, the process 
of correction is likely to be acute and 
painful. 

• Another problem: the extraordi- 
nary cycle of inflation and disinflation 
over the past two decades has left a 
legacy of inflated debt, depressed com- 
modity prices, and stagnation in much 
of the developing world, especially in 
several countries close to home. The 
unpalatable mix of seeming political 
necessities and economic realities has 
made a debt workout hard slogging. 
Progress toward efficient, market- 
oriented solutions to the debt problem 
has been demonstrated in some key de- 
veloping countries. But the problem re- 
mains a serious one, calling for unusual 
political resolve in debtor countries and 
genuine ingenuity in the international 
community. 

Each country must pursue market- 
oriented policies and get its own house 
in order if the international economic 
system is to thrive. This is especially 
true for the United States as we are 
the largest player by far. The fact is 
that our size relative to that of other 
economies makes getting our house in 
order far more important for them than 
their housekeeping is for us. But we 
are not the only important player, and 
so others — -Japan, Germany, the other 
OECD countries, the newly industri- 
alized countries, indeed, all trading na- 
tions — must contribute to a stronger 
international system by strengthening 
their own economies. 

New Political Groupings 

A third emerging reality on the world 
scene is that political, technological, 
and economic power and influence have 
been dispersing horizontally. Ours is no 
longer a bipolar world — the U.S. and 
Soviet share of world economic output 
is decreasing as the growth rates of 
other countries have been more rapid. 



In the future, more nations will 
have the economic and human resources 
to contend for political, technological, 
and commercial influence. Already Bra- 
zil, Korea, China, India, Israel, and the 
countries of ASEAN [Association of 
South East Asian Nations], for exam- 
ple, have become movers and shakers 
in one or more commercial or tech- 
nological areas. The increasing number 
of students fi-om developing countries 
in advanced training programs — India 
alone has about W7i of the world's total 
eni-ollment in higher educational in- 
stitutions — will put these countries in 
a position to create and take advantage 
of technological change. 

In this new environment, the im- 
portance of regional country and func- 
tional groupings has been heightened. 
Regional, political, and religious blocs 
of nations — such as the Organization of 
American States, the Organization of 
African Unity, South Asian Association 
of Regional Cooperation, the Non- 
aligned Movement, and the Islamic 
Conference — now provide platforms for 
a number of countries to exercise in- 
fluence in global affairs. Not always 
the way we want, but, anyway, it's 
a vehicle. 

Other regional organizations are 
taking on growing economic and politi- 
cal importance — from the eastern Car- 
ibbean to southern Africa, from the 
Americas to South Asia, from the Per- 
sian Gulf to the South Pacific. For ex- 
ample, the Pacific Basin, a region of 
phenomenal economic growth, is devel- 
oping a web of cooperative realities. 
ASEAN is showing the way to regional 
cooperation and is taking on more and 
more of a political dimension beyond its 
initial focus on economic affairs. 

Just as with the new trends toward 
democratization and open economies, 
these developments in political coopera- 
tion are outgrowths of our efforts and 
aspirations for a better world. The 
United States led the way after World 
War II in advocating the importance of 
the regional approach to the recovery 
of a devastated Europe. 

Today the institutions that resulted 
are thriving; regional organizations 
such as the NATO alhance, the OECD, 
the European Economic Community, 
and the Western European Union; and 
functional organizations such as GATT, 
IMF, the World Bank, and regional 
development banks, and the effective 
functional organizations of the United 
Nations, such as those dealing with nu- 
clear energy, health, and civil aviation. 



letl 



This cooperation, which began! 
large measure by focusing on post-f ™ 
World War II reconstruction needs ^! 
Western Europe, is an inspiration 
model for regional and functional a] 
proaches to challenges around the 
world. It is vital to recall that thesel 
groupings originated in efforts to rA 
duce barriers. New associations mui 
stay true to that purpose rather tha 
evolve with protectionist enclaves wi "■' 
would spark devastating economic 
warfare. 

Based on the clear success of tB 
regional approach in advancing WesH 
ern security and economic well-bein^ 
we are intensifying our efforts to 
strengthen regional cooperative effo( 
everywhere in meeting the common* 
challenges we will face in the Infor- 
mation Age. 



The East-West Dimension 

What I have sketched out here is a 
picture of immense dynamism; of thil 
creative energies of free peoples gen 
ating challenges which they — and ins 
creasing numbers of those who wouK 
emulate them — are meeting with con 
siderable success. The West has no 
nopoly on clever people, and the woh 
centers of scientific creativity and en 
nomic power are proliferating. 

Where in this picture do we fine 
the nations of the communist world? 
The Soviet Union will remain our ce 
tral security concern for the foresee ' 
future. U.S. military strength, our 
framework of alliances, and our othe' 
security ties remain central to peace 
the world. But there is also emergin 
new dynamism in the East- West 
I'elationship. 

In this respect, the current fer- 
ment in the communist world is a 
remarkable political development. Pi 
haps nowhere is this more evident tl 
in China, which can be seen to be ur " 
dergoing a new era of "rectifying '' 
names." The opening of a long-closec 
society to market forces, trade, tech 
nology, and ideas is bringing signifies 
benefits for the Chinese people. 

Certainly, China and Western di 
mocracies are still divided over critic 
ideological issues. However, China hi 
realized that the future belongs to 
those who open themselves up to glo 
trends in the dissemination of knowl- 
edge, in the international economy, a 
in popular political participation. 

Similar rethinking of old concept 
and ways of doing things seems now 



Department of State Bullel 



THE SECRETARY 



«ei'way in the Soviet Union and 
n Europe. While the ultimate di- 
ns of this process remain to be 
ts potential importance is great, 
e the constraints of a rigidly cen- 
i society and economy, the So- 
men is a leading scientific force, 
imple, in space science, in vari- 
Ids of medical research, and in 
tical disciplines. Its massive 
ny, for all its inefficiency, gener- 
per capita GNP [gross national 
t] of about $8,000. 

ft now Soviet leaders are telling 
eople that that is not enough — 
e system they inherited essen- 
nchanged from Stalin must be 
ctured. As General Secretary 
chev stated in his June Party 
m speech, "command forms of 
^ing society put a brake on our 
nent." Whatever perestroyka may 
come to mean, the terms in 
it has been defined thus far sug- 
hat Mr. Gorbachev and his col- 
!S understand that a closed 
y is a dead-end for advanced de- 
nent. And implicit in the parallel 
pt of glasnost may be a recogni- 
hat the free flow of ideas and in- 
tion which will fuel growth in the 
requires greater intellectual and 
;al freedom. 

fhe most telling indicator will be 
oviet human rights situation. The 
is looking for results that bear 
lie rhetoric — not only for the sake 
individuals and families involved 
ecause human rights as practiced 
me ultimately are related to inter- 
nal security. For a government 
ioes not respect the rights it has 
inteed to its own people will not 
ct its international obligations 
he general norms of the world 
lunity. 

There is nothing in the "new politi- 
linking" to date which suggests 
the end of the adversarial struggle 
hand. What will "new thinking" 
for the people of Eastern Europe, 
continue to strive for greater au- 
ny in dealing with their daunting 
economic agenda? And what about 
anistan? Will Soviet leaders with- 
their troops and allow the Afghan 
le to decide by political means 
; kind of government, economy, and 
ical system they desire? Will the 
et Union play a constructive role in 
bodia, Korea, southern Africa, and 
Persian Gulf? 

The winds of change blowing from 
cow may prove as revolutionary as 



Mr. Gorbachev has declared. But in de- 
termining their ultimate impact, histo- 
rians will look to the answers to ques- 
tions such as those I've just raised. 

But as for us today, the continuing 
reality before us means that American 
political resolve must remain constant, 
our defense posture, robust. With those 
parameters, the challenge to us is to be 
sensitive to any opportunities which the 
changes now underway in the Soviet 
Union and other communist countries 
may hold. 

Conclusion 

In this time of global challenge and 
change, nations of the world look in- 
tensively and searchingly at the rela- 
tionship between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. That relationship today is 
meaty and substantial. A major reason 
for this is that we Americans stand up 
for our principles and our interests 
while remaining ready to test and to 
deal with changing realities in interna- 
tional life. This approach gets results, 
and we're going to stick with it. 

In a world of blurring national 
boundaries, dispersed power, and new 
players vying for influence in interna- 
tional affairs, there will be a contin- 
uing need for U.S. engagement and 
leadership. 

Our alliances and our friends, and 
the growing number of regional associa- 
tions around the world, provide a foun- 
dation for problemsolving on the scale 
demanded by the world ahead. 

We must not falter on the economic 
front. We can take great satisfaction 
knowing that the message of economic 
freedom is at last being heard and 
acted upon in country after country 
around the world. If we ourselves yield 
to the temptation to return to isolation, 
protection, and structural rigidities, we 
betray this movement — and general 
prosperity in the era ahead will be a 
lost cause. 

Economic progress and freedom go 
hand in hand. New democracies will re- 
quire continuous support and encour- 
agement. The United States has an 
immense stake in seeing that the demo- 
cratic idea works. And those who resist 
totalitarian governments must be able 
to know without doubt that they will be 
able to look to America to back their 
legitimate pursuit of liberty and justice. 

And finally, in this period of pro- 
found historical change, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union 



must make the most of opportunities to 
transform the adversarial character of 
the U.S. -Soviet relationship to one that 
is better for both our peoples and for 
the world at large. 

We will leave it to the future histo- 
rians to give our age a name. Our task 
is to try to throw off outmoded con- 
cepts of the past as well as cloudy gen- 
eralities about the future. What we 
need to see is the dynamism in the 
size, speed, and scope of global change. 
And most of all we need to see that this 
change is of our doing. We can manage 
it better than anyone. We have to have 
the courage to stand fast to our own 
principles: democracy, free enterprise, 
the cooperative association of responsi- 
ble nations. 

With this as our vision and guide, 
we face a bright future, indeed. 



iPress release 231 of Dec. 7, 1987, 
which includes a question-and-answer 
session. ■ 



Secretary's Interview 
on "Face the Nation" 



Secretary Sliultz was interviewed 
on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" by 
Lesley Stalil on November 29, 1987.^ 

Q. There is late word that in Haiti 
there has been so much violence over 
the election that was planned for to- 
day that they have called off the elec- 
tion. Have the officials in Haiti been 
in touch with our government, with 
you? Have they asked for any help? 

A. We've just heard about this de- 
velopment and, of course, it's a shame 
that the democratic process wasn't per- 
mitted to go on. So far as we know, this 
is violence caused by the supporters of 
the deposed dictator, Duvalier. People 
want to vote, people want to e.xpress 
themselves, people want freedom, and 
we'll continue to work for it. 

Q. But isn't it true that the peo- 
ple who had been affiliated with Mr. 
Duvalier had been denied a place on 
the ballot, and is that not part of the 
cause of this violence? 

A. No, there are quite a number of 
people who are running — I think 24 — so 
this was a balloting that would basically 
bring it down probably to three or four 
people and then there would be a sub- 
sequent ballot. That was the way it was 
conceived of 



uary 1988 



THE SECRETARY 



I 



Q. But you don't know of the sup- 
porters of Duvalier being denied by 
the government a place on the ballot? 
That's apparently in some of these 
late reports coming over the wires. 

A. Some think that. Thei'e have 
also been some who have been mur- 
dered by the Duvalierists, probably. So 
it is a violent-type situation. Nev- 
ertheless, people, as in El Salvador, 
have gone to the polls and voted, de- 
spite the communist efforts, in that 
case, to disrupt them and succeeded. I 
think in Haiti we'll see these desires for 
freedom and democracy wind up get- 
ting themselves expressed. 

Q. Do you know whether the situ- 
ation is under control, and do you 
know when the election will be 
resumed? 

A. I don't know. I've just barely 
heard about the postponement of the 
election as I walked into this studio, so 
I've told you what I know about it. 

Q. Let's turn to the summit and 
to the new INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] treaty. You've just 
heard [Senator] Steven Symms. You 
know that Jesse Helms and other con- 
servatives plan to oppose this treaty. 
What are you going to tell them to 
turn them around? They just don't 
trust the Soviets. They don't think we 
should be making agreements with 
"bandits," as Senator Symms called 
them. 

A. Of course, we have to look at 
what's taking place. And what we see 
here is a President who has had a strat- 
egy in place from the beginning of his 
Administration. 

In 1981 he called for a treaty that 
would have a zero result in these inter- 
mediate-range missiles. He has been 
working at it ever since. We deployed 
the missiles in conjunction with our al- 
lies beginning in 1983 as part of a nego- 
tiating process. We stood up to that, 
and our allies stood up to it. We 
worked it through. It has been a tough 
negotiation for everybody, and finally 
the President has succeeded in what he 
set out to get. And I think it's pretty 
good. 

Q. But is it true that you're still 
writing the details of this treaty and 
that you are working — continuing to 
work — under enormous deadline pres- 
sures, particularly on the verification 
system? 

A. No, that's not really accurate. 
When decisions are made, you have to 
reduce it to precise treaty language, 
and that's going on in a good way, and 



there isn't any particular problem 
about that that I know of 

Q. So you don't anticipate any 
last-minute hitches? It seems almost 
every time you get together with the 
Soviets, they throw monkey wrenches 
into the meetings. You had to leave 
Moscow without the summit agree- 
ment. Is there any chance that that 
could happen again if you still are 
writing the language for this treaty? 

A. No. I think there is no chance. 
It is all agreed and everybody wants to 
see it go forward, and there really is 
not a problem. It's just a question of 
doing things — continuing to do things — 
carefully and patiently; and that's what 
we're doing. 

Q. Let me ask you about the ver- 
ification problems that the conserv- 
atives have. Is it true that if you sus- 
pect a violation at a site that is not 
designated in the treaty, you turn 
over the complaint to a commission 
like the ABM Commission that your 
Administration and so many have 
complained have not really gone after 
the Soviets when they have cheated in 
the past? 

A. What you have in verification is 
successive sets of layers of being able to 
keep track of possible places where vio- 
lations might take place. It begins right 
now as both sides exchange data on 
what they have in these missiles. The 
data that we have from the Soviet 
Union are credible in the sense that 
they are very much in line with our 
own intelligence estimates. 

The next thing that happens is, 
when the treaty goes into effect each 
side examines that so-called baseline — 
that is, we go to the places where the 
missiles are deployed, where they are 
produced, where they are stored, 
where they are tested, and we observe 
that what they said was there is there. 

Then comes a 3-year process of de- 
stroying those missiles; and as they are 
destroyed, we literally see that process. 
When it's over, we go back to the places 
that we inspected when thei'e was a 
baseline, and we inspect to see, in a 
close-out sense, that there are no mis- 
siles there. 

In the meantime, there are 20 per 
year short-notice inspections that go in 
that first 3-year destruction cycle. Then 
after that, we have the right to go back 
to all of these places 15 times a year for 
the first 5 years and 10 times a year for 
the next 5 years. Beyond that — 

Q. It is endless. 

A. Yes. We observe the places 
where these missile.s were produced. 



and we can verify what is coming 
Beyond that, if any weapon systefl*' 
to be truly operative, you have toii^ 
it and train with it and work with : 
The SS-20, contrary to what was i 
does have a distinctive signature. 1| 
can observe that, and we can see il ' 
they are doing any testing. 

Beyond that, we do have our n - 
tional technical means in effect all 
time as we are photogi-aphing andiiw 
what's happening in their country.!! '-P 
of course, they're doing the same i 
here. 

Q. After all of that, though, 
can still cheat; right? 

A. It's possible, but I think if i 
occurs, it would be in very small ps 
portion. The incentives to cheat uir 
all these cii'cumstances are small. 1 
ertheless, it's possible. 

Q. I must ask you this becaui 
think a lot of people are real eon) 
about where the President stands 
Here he was, this major anti-Sovi «■ 
force in our country who was bui|f' 
ing up our nuclear arsenals, and 
denly — it seems overnight — he's 
become the major world champion 
denuclearization in the whole wo< 
We've obviously changed our polM "J 
here somehow, someway. He's 
changed. 

I feel that you're going to deii ' 
that he's changed, but obviously 'i 
have made a huge shift. When, hni ' 
did this happen? 

A. Do you define "sudden" as 
something that happens over a peri 
of 6 or 7 years? 

Q. The revelation is sudden; li , 
say that. 

A. No. The President set out ii 
early 1980s, early in his term, what 
was after. And as related to the IN 
treaty, it was precisely the outcome 
we're now getting. 

As related to strategic arms, it 
to get a 509c cut, and that's what w 
going to be working and have been 
working on. What's happening is th; 
the President has had a strategy, ai 
the fruits of that strategy are begin 
ning to come in. 

Q. Do you and the President v 
to get rid of all nuclear weapons? 
And, if you do, is that realistic? A 
we going to do that? Is that possib 

A. That's an entirely different s 
ject, and the President has — 



Q. It seems to be where we're 
headed now. 

A. Wait a minute. The Presiden 
has said it is a desirable goal. It's oi 



THE SECRETARY 



;he future, maybe. In the 
i,r, what we need to do — really, 
eel to do this — we need to get 
i I control over these nuclear weap- 
ki ^nd by eliminating this class of 
Hi ms, which the Soviets shouldn't 
e-, ieployed in the first place, and by, 
' can, cutting strategic arms down 
;:1 ' point where there will be 6,000 
c] ?ads — which is a lot on each side, 
it evertheless a lot less than now — 
;r ;gin to get this thing under con- 
119 And I think that's very desirable. 
I. To do that, there are hints that 
ire prepared to make a compro- 
on SDI [Strategic Defense Ini- 
e] or on the ABM [Antiballistic 
i ilej Treaty. 

i. We're not prepared. The Presi- 
1 will never compromise our ability 

irn how to defend ourselves 
I ist ballistic missiles, if we possibly 
H and have the capability of deploy- 
"i hat system if we can find it. 
if 

(, ^. Can you see, though, abiding 
,A tie strict language in the ABM 
,fl ty for 10 years? We've apparently 
Sed to do it for 7. The Soviets want 
,«> do it for 10. Isn't there any give 
Jin that 3-year period if arriving 
Jie 50% cut is so important to us? 
'A. One method of providing the 
a ictability and stability that both 
Mi want — not just them, but us — is 
Jive a period in which we agree not 
I ithdraw from the ABM Ti-eaty or 
<ercise our right of a 6-month 
:e or to deploy. That's just as 
)rtant for us as it is for them, be- 
e probably right at the moment 
r ability to field what we think of as 
nferior form of strategic defense is 
iter than ours. So we don't want to 
ace our offensive system unless we 
3 some notions of stability, just as 
don't. 

Q. Why do so many U.S. officials, 
ugh, talk about a START [strate- 
arms reduction talks] agreement 
this spring, or an outline of one by 
s spring? There must be some give 
our side for so many. We have Max 
pelman [head of the U.S. delega- 
n to the nuclear and space arms 
otiations and U.S. negotiator at 
! defense and space talks] coming 
t and talking about the spring; our 
ibassador in the Soviet Union [Jack 
itlock] talks about the springtime, 
must have some outline that we 
ow is moving, and it must involve 
me kind of a softening on our 
sition. 

A. We do. Undoubtedly the most 
oductive summit meeting ever held 



was the President's meeting with the 
General Secretary in Reykjavik, and 
basically — 

Q. Everyone doesn't agree with 
that. 

A. Basically, the fundamental ele- 
ments and difficulties in the INF treaty 
were worked out in Reykjavik. 

Q. But not SDI. 

A. That has nothing to do with the 
INF treaty. 

Q. Oh, INF. What about a START 
treatv? 

A. As far as the START treaty is 
concerned, the necessary fundamental 
numbers involved were achieved in 
R'^ykjavik, and we've been working off 
the President's achievements and adding 
to them and developing them; and that 
will happen again. 

Q. Is he going to negotiate again 
on the terms of the START treaty 
here? 

A. Of course. We have only — 

Q. But they say that's not a good 
thing for summiteers to do. 

A. There are different kinds of de- 
cisions involved, and there are broad, 
big, in a sense political decisions. The 
decision to come down to 6,000 war- 
heads on each side is the kind of deci- 
sion that the President and the General 
Secretary make. Decisions on the intri- 
cate details of these treaties are the 
sorts of things that negotiators work 
at. 



Q. Any give on SDI at all, in 
terms of going up to the 10 years to 
agree bv the strict interpretation of 
the ABM Treaty? 

A. Our position is clear. And, as 
I've said earlier, we will never compro- 
m.ise our ability to learn how to defend 
you against ballistic missiles if we can 
and to deploy those defenses if we can 
find them. 

Q. Perhaps there's compromise in 
there. 

We are coming to the end of our 
interview. But I would like to ask you 
about your interview today on the 
"NFL Today." Have you given them 
any secrets about your negotiating 
position? What have you told the 
"NFL Today" that you're not telling 
us on "Face the Nation?" 

A. They asked me if I played foot- 
ball, and I did when I was in college. 
They asked me if I thought I was glad I 
did, and I said, "Yes, I think it's a good 
thing. You learn to compete. A little 
rock-and-sock never hurts anybody." 

Q. What was your position? 

A. A nonexistent position now 
called "blocking back." I was the poor 
guy who had to go and take those big 
tackles out of the way so the stars 
could run through the holes. 

Q. Let's hope your experience 
helps you with the coming summit 
next week. Thank you for being our 
guest, Mr. Secretary. 



'Press release 227. 



Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign 
IVIinister and NATO Officials 



Secretary Shultz was in Geneva 
November 22-25, 1987, to meet with So- 
viet Foreign Minister Eduard Shev- 
ardnadze and at NATO headquarters 
in Brussels on November 25 to meet 
with the NATO foreign ministers. Fol- 
loiving are news conferences the Secre- 
tary had in those two cities. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, 

GENEVA, 

NOV. 24, 19871 

We have just completed 2 days of very 
productive work — completed the INF 
[intermediate-range nuclear forces] 
treaty, worked out all of the basic ar- 



rangements for the summit meeting, 
and, of course, reviewed the full range 
of issues that we always discuss: the 
human rights issues, the regional is- 
sues, and our own bilateral problems. 

Let me turn first to the INF 
treaty. This treaty, which is now basic- 
ally complete, will for the first time, by 
agreement, result in major reductions 
of nuclear arms. 

It is an important first step. The 
Soviet side will eliminate about 1,500 
deployed INF warheads. The U.S. side 
will eliminate about 350. The numbers 
of warheads is asymmetrical because 
the deployments have been asym- 
metrical. I think that is an important 
pi-inciple, right there, where you have 



THE SECRETARY 



asymmetrical deployments and you 
have a program of reductions, reduced 
to equal levels through an asymmetrical 
process. 

Let me address the question of how 
we will feel comfortable that what is 
agreed in this treaty will actually be 
carried out. First, each side has tabled 
data on its forces covered by the agree- 
ment. The United States has provided 
all of its data. The Soviet Union has 
provided most of its and will provide all 
of it by the end of the week. These data 
are broadly consistent with the esti- 
mates that we have made of what the 
Soviet side possesses, and we, of 
course, will take further read-outs on 
that as we get the complete detail. But 
basically this has come in in a reassur- 
ing way. 

Second, we will follow these de- 
clared missiles during the course of the 
3-year period during which they will be 
destroyed, and we will inspect the de- 
struction of the missiles, the launchers, 
and certain support facilities during the 
3-year period of their destruction. So 
we will know by personal observation 
that the declared weapons have been 
eliminated. 

Third, in order to assure ourselves 
that new ones aren't produced, we will 
monitor, through agreed procedures, 
the plant where the SS-20 missiles 
were assembled. This is a plant where 
the Soviet Union also produces the 
SS-25 strategic missile, and they 
intend to continue producing that mis- 
sile there. We will observe what comes 
out of the plant, and we have agreed on 
an inspection system that will allow us 
to assui'e ourselves that none of the 
missiles coming out are the missiles 
prohibited by this treaty. 

Fourth, should there, by some cir- 
cumstance, be any SS-20s remaining 
and not accounted for, we will know, of 
course, if those missiles are tested, be- 
cause they have a unique signature. We 
know that if a weapons system of this 
kind is to be operative over any period 
of time, it must be tested and trained 
with and worked with. The lack of any 
testing will once again be a form of 
reassurance. 

Fifth, in addition to monitoring the 
final assembly period, this treaty gives 
each side the right to inspect the sites 
where these missiles have been stored 
or deployed. We have on-site rights of 
inspection, as they do. Of course, that 
includes bases which will have been 
bases where the SS-20 was deployed 
and have been converted to bases 
where the SS-25, the strategic system, 
is deployed. 



There are other bases where the 
SS-25 is deployed, and we have agreed 
on a system to be in effect for 3 years 
following the coming into effect of the 
treaty for monitoring those bases as 
well by enhanced national technical 
means. 

To sum up, this agreement provides 
for a continuous monitoring of the plant 
that once produced the SS-20. It brings 
forth, and has brought forth already, a 
detailed e.xchange of data on the mis- 
siles covered by the treaty; it provides 
for baseline inspections of that data; it 
provides for inspections as we close out 
the presence of the missiles at a partic- 
ular base or facility and that gets elimi- 
nated; and it provides for short-notice 
inspections where INF missiles are or 
were, at a rate of 20 per year in the 
first 3 years — that is, the period dur- 
ing which the missile systems will be 
destroyed — 15 per year for the next 5 
years and 10 per year for the final 5 
years of the 10-year period, there being 
13 years in all in which this unprece- 
dented inspection period will take 
place. 

What this adds up to is a treaty of 
genuine significance. It is not the end 
of this process by a long shot, but it is 
a beginning — a good beginning. We see 
a significant reduction on an asym- 
metrical basis of nuclear armaments. 
We see this treaty accompanied by a 
system of verification which, of course, 
can't be 100'7f but which, I think, gives 
us a vei\y comfortable feeling that in 
the end the provisions of the treaty can 
be verified and will be carried out. 

I believe it is fair to say that this 
treaty — the coming into effect of it — is, 
first of all, a triumph for President 
Reagan, who put forward his concept of 
getting to zero in this class of weapons 
back in 1981, and he has kept at it. It 
was originally greeted with skepticism 
and cynicism, but he kept at it and 
kept at it and kept at it, and the Presi- 
dent has succeeded. 

Second, I think it is a tribute to 
the solidarity and the willpower of the 
NATO alliance, which took together the 
dual-track decision in 1979, worked at 
that on the negotiating track, stood up 
to the need for deployment, deployed 
these missiles, continued on in the ne- 
gotiating track jointly with us, and now 
we have succeeded in achieving the ob- 
jective that NATO set out to achieve. 

And third, I think it is fair to say 
it is also a tribute to a genuine effort to 
negotiate in this area on the part of the 
Soviet Union and ourselves, and in par- 
ticular on the part of General Secretary 
Gorbachev and President Reagan. 



idi 



Let me now say a few words 
the summit meeting. It will take 
as you know, from December 8 to 
Washington, and the purpose of t 
summit meeting is work — work on 
agenda that President Reagan and 
eral Secretary Gorbachev have set 
for themselves in the areas of hu: 
rights, of arms reductions, of regii 
issues, and the gradual evolution oi 
bilateral relations. 

The summit agenda is dominatet 
by a work program between the two 
leaders. There will be five substanti' 
working meetings. The first one will 
Tuesday morning [December 8], rigj 
after the official arrival ceremony; 
there will be another on Tuesday a: 
noon. There will be one on Wednes^ 
mid-morning [December 9]; there wi 
be another on Wednesday afternoon. 
Then thei-e'll be a final meeting begi 
ning in the morning on Thursday [D 
cember 10], going through a working 
lunch until the official end ceremony 
the White House. You can see that t 
meeting is planned as one in which \ 
will be all hard at work. 

In addition to the arrival ceremi 
there are a number of other official 
events that are scheduled. There wil 
be a state dinner at the White HouS' 
There will be a return dinner, hoste' 
by General Secretary Gorbachev, at 
Soviet Embassy. There will be a lun 
eon at which I'll have the privilege ( 
being the host for the General Seen 
tary and Mrs. Gorbachev. The Genei 
Secretary will host a breakfast for ti 
Vice President. There'll be a ceremd 
at the conclusion of the summit, and 
there'll be a signing ceremony of the 
INF treaty and some statements folli 
ing that by the President and by the '■ 
General Secretary. 

The General Secretary also wan 
to have a method of being in contact * 
with Members of the Congress. That 
will be done, but precisely how that 
will work has not yet been worked o 
but I am sure it will take place. In 
addition, the Soviet side is arranging 
program of meetings with individual 
the American academic and scientific 
communities. They are doing that 
themselves. They are also arranging 
meeting of American business leader 
and again they are working that out 
themselves. 

This is an outline of the summit 
events, and additional details will be 
available as we go along. 



10 



Department of State Bulk* 



THE SECRETARY 



■\niKl these matters, we did dis- 
^ iir subject of human rights, which 
prime importance to us; we never 
' put that at the top of our list of 
; 's of concern. And, of course, the 
'■.t on in that area, insofar as our 
ii ty to discuss effectively and con- 

■ u ively that subject, is much im- 

■ii i now from what it was, although 
lieve that there is a huge amount 
'A -k to be done in this area. 

fe also discussed regional issues. 
' I 'ticular we talked about the Iran- 
ii var, about Afghanistan, and a lit- 
' : about southern Africa, as well as 
i ed on other areas. 

■ 'hat's a rundown on the last 2 days' 
)i and I'll be glad to take your 

',( ions. 

, I. When you say verification 
«being 100%, do you mean there is 
iting that is 100% perfect in this 
••I, or has something been left out 
aiivou would have preferred be 
elded? 
L What I mean is that nothing is 
piTfect. You can't have something 
. - w ithout any conceivable prob- 
iluii I tried to outline the way in 
, 1 I he problem is bounded, so to 
e^, Ijy the provisions there. By the 
Ti you identify, as we see it, reason- 
! fully the missiles that now exist, 
.1 rity by being there and watching 
r inness of their destruction. You 
sre yourself that additional ones 
•e't being produced. You watch to 
■ef anything is tested, knowing that 
sything is tested, obviously you 
ii.' there is a violation. But if it is 
ii fstt'd, if there are no tests, before 
r the system becomes obsolete. And 
•; 11(1 that you have an extensive sys- 
I (if (insite inspection of sites where 
((Weapons systems were once de- 
ted (ir stored, and in this case some 
Itional sites for a while, where 
pons are deployed that have some- 
t similar characteristics insofar as 
ain aspects of how they work are 
:erned. 

I think it is far beyond anything 
; has ever been attempted before, 
I think in the end we will feel quite 
ifortable that what is being agreed 
vill be carried out. 

Q. I am unclear about the rate of 
truction that you mentioned. Are 
I saying that it will take place over 
3-year period? 

A. No. The destruction takes place 
ir a 3-year period. After the treaty is 
ified and put into effect, then there 
1 3-year period. During that period, 



all of the weapons systems involved will 
be destroyed, and we have agreed basic- 
ally on the schedule through which that 
will happen. Then there is a 10-year 
period beyond that in which the various 
inspection rights that I mentioned are 
in effect. And, of course, we constantly 
have our national technical means, and 
that goes on indefinitely. 

But by the time 10 years has gone 
by, if you have a weapons system that 
hasn't been seen, you know that it is 
gone, and it will be obsolete anyway. I 
think it is quite an adequate regime. 

Q. The numbers you mentioned 
earlier don't add up. You said 20 per 
year — 20 in the first year? 

A. No, 20 per year in the first — 
there's a 13-year period here. The first 
3 years is the period of destruction of 
the weapons. Dui-ing that period, hav- 
ing had them declared and identified as 
to where they are, we then, so to 
speak, keep track of them. And as they 
are destroyed, we are there onsite, 
watching that process. So during this 
first 3 years we have — there's more to 
look at, so we have more inspections. 
Now, during the first 5 years after the 
destruction has been completed, you 
naturally have more concern than you 
do as time goes on, because the system 
basically atrophies — becomes obsolete 
with time. We have a larger number of 
inspections in the first 5 years than in 
the second 5 years, but a goodly 
number in each case. 

Q. In the event of the SS-20 and 
cruise missiles being destroyed or got- 
ten rid of, if the Soviets then demand 
of you that they wish to inspect one 
of your bases, say, in Britain, where 
once the cruise missiles were de- 
ployed, have you told them that you 
will give them permission to visit 
those bases? 

A. They, of course, have the right 
to visit bases where our missiles were 
deployed, just as we have the right to 
visit bases where their missiles have 
been deployed. And we have worked 
very carefully with each of the coun- 
tries where our missiles have been 
based to work out carefully just how 
that will work — an exchange of notes 
that will ensure that, as any inspection 
takes place, the basic sovereignty and 
laws of the country involved will be 
fully respected, and this will go on in a 
proper way. All that has been done in a 
very cooperative spirit involving our- 
selves and the basing countries. 



Q. Does that mean they will be in 
full agreement? 

A. There will be an exchange of 
notes with each country, in which they 
will be assured that their laws will be 
fully respected. In other words, it rec- 
ognizes the sovereignty of those coun- 
tries in agreeing to that, since these 
bases are not in the United States; they 
are in other countries. We have to in- 
volve them to that extent, and that has 
been done, and done in a good, cooper- 
ative way. 

Q. As I heard you, you didn't re- 
fer to two verification concepts that 
American officials had spoken of pre- 
viously. One is the concept of Soviet 
inspectors maintaining a presence 
outside American facilities. Is that 
part of the agreement, and if so, 
where would that be? 

A. Yes, there is an agreement for 
Soviet inspectors at an American facil- 
ity that once produced one of our weap- 
ons systems, and there is an agreement 
for periodic onsite inspections involving 
another. So there is a I'eciprocal ar- 
rangement here, and we will be pre- 
pared to give the names of those sites 
very shortly, but we want to do certain 
things before we do that. But by tomor- 
row we will be ready to tell you the 
names. 

Q. The second part of my ques- 
tion is, there was a concept which Ad- 
ministration officials had talked of 
previously where there would be 
short-notice inspections of undeclared 
facilities, SS-2.5 bases where SS-20 
missiles have never been, which is 
part of our challenge inspection re- 
gime. I gather that's no longer part of 
this agreement, and something has 
been substituted in its place. 

A. No, that is part of this agree- 
ment, and again, the way that has been 
handled is that sites are identified, and 
it is agreed that there will be a system 
for the use of enhanced technical means 
to perform that inspection. And it has 
been agreed that during the first 3 
years after the treaty comes in force, 
these enhanced national technical 
means will be operative and there will 
be, I think it is six such inspections 
each year. So that is, I think, a very 
meaningful provision. 

Q. What does that mean in plain 
English? What are national technical 
means? 

A. National technical means involve 
the photography of the places that you 
point your camera at. And, of course, 
the person being photographed can do 



THE SECRETARY 



whatever he wants. If you have a spe- 
cial agreement to enhance those means, 
what that does is — you agree that when 
challenged, so to speak, then certain 
procedures will be taken to display 
what's there, and you will, of course, 
issue your challenge when you are pre- 
pared to take your pictures. So that is, 
so to speak, short-notice inspection by 
an effective means. Do I have that 
right — all you experts? 

Q. Can you say how many non- 
deployed missiles on both sides and 
warheads on both sides will also be 
eliminated? 

A. We have the data on deployed 
and nondeployed missiles. We know 
that. The nondeployed, obviously, as 
well as the deployed, will be eliminated, 
and the data that we have, as I said, is 
more or less in the ballpark of what we 
thought. I don't have the numbers right 
in my head. 

Q. But can you say whether the 
ratio is the six-to-one that has been 
discussed in terms of warheads? 

A. In deployed missiles, I gave the 
numbers I think there are. We estimate 
about 1,500 of theirs and about 350 of 
ours. Then there are in addition to that 
a substantial number of nondeployed 
missiles, and I don't happen to have 
that number in my head. 

Q. One subject you did not men- 
tion was the strategic arms agree- 
ment, which is more or less expected 
to be the centerpiece of the Wash- 
ington meeting as far as work is con- 
cerned. Were you able to make any 
progress on that score during your 
meetings here, and what is your out- 
look for some progress on strategic 
arms at the Washington summit? 

A. We made some progress, partic- 
ularly this afternoon after we had con- 
cluded the INF work. But it has been 
the case that, of course, the key people 
involved are preoccupied and spending 
their time on finishing the INF treaty, 
so they don't have the time to work on 
the strategic arms treaty. But we did 
spend 2 or 3 hours, I think, altogether, 
between myself and Mr. Shevardnadze 
and the working group chaired by 
Marshal Akhrameyov on their side and 
Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, spe- 
cial adviser to the President and the 
Secretary of State on arms control mat- 
ters] on ours, with all our experts, dis- 
cussing this. And I think it is fair to 
say, yes, we made some progress — no 
question about it. But we have a long 
way to go before we are able to lay out 
the parameters of that treaty. 



12 



Of course, the verification problems 
are going to be undoubtedly far more 
difficult in the case of strategic arms 
than they are in this treaty, where the 
most important verification fact is that 
you have eliminated these weapons en- 
tirely. You know that if you see one, 
there's a violation, and you can have 
measures such as the observation of 
testing that assures you that if they are 
simply dormant, they gradually become 
obsolete. It'll be much more difficult — 
we know that. But we have gotten a 
good start on the work, and we have 
made a plan for working on it at the 
Washington summit — perhaps even 
starting before the summit starts. And, 
we are in the process of evolving a 
work plan, a more intensive and sys- 
tematic work plan for what will take 
place after the Washington summit on 
this subject. 

Q. Did you obtain any progress 
on space weapons? 

A. Not beyond really stating per- 
haps a little more fully our respective 
views, but that is a subject that must 
be addressed, obviously. 

Q. What happens to challenge in- 
spections of suspect sites after the 
first 3 years? 

A. They continue. Yes. And as I 
said, in the first 3 years, when there 
are the most things to observe because 
there are still missiles deployed, the in- 
spections are permitted at the rate of 
20 per year. In the next 5 yeai's, they 
are permitted at the rate of 15 per year, 
and in the last 5 years, at the rate of 10 
per year — as is, we think, appropriate. 

Q. That is of declared sites, not of 
suspect sites? 

A. A site where a missile used to 
be but is not anymore because they 
have been destroyed is potentially a 
suspect site. So you declare your inter- 
est in seeing it. And a very explicit 
procedure has been worked out, de- 
signed to minimize the amount of 
time — that is literally hours — between 
when you announce your desire to see 
that site and when you are actually 
physically there. 

Q. Is there a time parameter or 
limit on the inspection process itself? 
Can an inspector stay completely 
through a process? 

A. The inspector is free to look and 
can't be constrained and can stay as 
long as it is necessary for him to do 
what he needs to do. 



Q. One of the areas you havi 
touched on yet is the ratification! 
sue back home. Some critics are 
ready saying that you had to do tl|r. 
negotiation under a deadline andf' 
you must have given something aw' 
in order to achieve a result in time • 
for the summit. Can you defend 
yourself? 

A. I don't have to defend niysell 1 
The critics have to defend themselve .■ 
The point is that this is a very sigi 
cant step in a good direction. We 
to get into process some reduction 
nuclear armaments, which have gn 
and grown and grown. And under 
vious agreements, those agreemen 
simply limited the rate of increase i» 
nuclear weapons. So it seemed to be 
endless. Now for the first time, that 
process is being turned around, and 
they are being reduced. That's a goo 
thing, and the critics have to stand i 
and say why they think we should h 
more nuclear weapons, as distinct fr 
less. 

And then, in terms of whether ( f 
not we know that the provisions of t 
treaty are actually being carried out 
have set forth here the basic means 1^ 
which we get at that. I don't want t 5 
claim perfection — there's nothing pe i. 
feet — but I think the arrangements 
made here bound the problem., and ; 
time goes on, we will feel very comf 
able that these weapons systems wi, ;. 
have been eliminated. i 

Q. Can you tell us how far you 
talks with the Soviets went in disc 
ing Afghanistan? 

A. We had a brief discussion of 
Afghanistan, and I don't have anyth , 
new to report to you as a i-esult of tl " 
discussion. 

Q. Another regional issue is th ■( 
Persian Gulf. Any talk there of the if 
Soviets backing the arms embargo 
that's necessary? 

A. We did discuss that subject 
rather extensively. It's up to them tc 
speak for themselves; I won't try to 
speak for them. But I will say from i 
standpoint of the United States, we 
think it's time to move on to the next 
resolution calling for mandatory sane 
tions. So far as we can see, Iran is 
playing a game of bluff against the L 
Security Council. They are saying th 
are coming to meetings, and then no 
showing up. And so I think it's time ' 
call that bluff We feel that it is now 
necessary, if the Secretary General i: 
to have any real chance of getting 
someplace in his negotiations, to give 



nsnarlmfint nt Statfi Bulk 



THE SECRETARY 



ttle more clout to work with. 

is in favor of that and very clear in 

ini ids about that necessity. It's 
lat the Soviets are not ready to 
1 us on that at this point, but 
)n't stop us from expressing our 
id working for it in the United 
s. 

ave a note here that says that I 
fulsome enough about the in- 
n regime. In the first 3 years, in 

!I1 ti to the 20 suspect-site inspec- 
lat I mentioned, there will also 
ailed baseline inspections — that 
look and see if the missiles that 
eclared to be in certain places in 
numbers are there, and then, at 

(( i when they have been destroyed 
sy are presumably not there any- 
you go to that base and you ver- 
h your eyes that they aren't 
We call that a close-out 
;ion. 

lere is a very e.xtensive set of in- 
ns — anybody want a job? 
.1 be a lot of new jobs created, 
iter] 



5 CONFERENCE, 

25, 19872 

Pierre Harmel, former Prime 
er and Foreign Minister of 
im, is receiving NATO's Atlantic 
•al on the 20th anniversary of the 

- f! report — a report which has 

I tlu' alliance's approach to East- 
■i-i'lations since 1967. In that re- 
I I'lci-re Harmel urged that the 
(1- nf frank and timely consulta- 
1m t ween allies be deepened and 

I \\ as in this report that the allies 
iiiuulated their commitment to an 
rdi-\-\ grounded on strong defense 

I'lii that basis, continued efforts to 
AC i-elations with the East. I per- 
l.\ find it very appropriate, there- 

► that Mr Harmel should receive 

; ii'i'-tigious award at a moment 

Ml till' alliance's commitment to a 
■K 'Intense and negotiations has 

3ght about a historic INF 

nement. 
This is an agreement which, I 

A, has proceeded very much from 

- raiiition, philosophy, and concept 
e Harmel report and which, from 

J-taiidpoint of the alliance — as every 
,tr.\- represented said — is the kind 
nci'ment that we have wanted. It 
gs us the result we sought, and it 



has in it a number of elements of ver- 
ifications that perhaps even Mr. Harmel 
wouldn't have thought possible 20 years 
ago, or even in 1979. 

I think it's a very well-timed mo- 
ment to make this award to him. I'd be 
glad to take your questions. 

Q. In reporting to the NATO offi- 
cials on the agreement with the Sovi- 
ets, did you encounter any qualms, 
any concern among them, about hav- 
ing Soviet monitors on their 
territorv? 

A. No. 

Q. Is it correct that [West Ger- 
man Foreign Minister] Mr. Genscher, 
and perhaps some other of your col- 
leagues, indicated that they would no 
longer deploy any of the outstanding 
cruise missiles after the agreement is 
signed? And are you satisfied with 
that position? 

A. We have said, and publicly, that 
we have felt it was important — and all 
of our allies agreed — that until the 
treaty is signed, we continue on with 
our schedule. Once the treaty is signed, 
it is our thought that at that point the 
deployments and activities associated 
with it would stop. There would be a 
period of time between the signing and 
the ratification when you would, so to 
speak, hold things constant. Once the 
treaty is ratified and put into effect, 
you start the process of taking the mis- 
siles out. That's a 3-year process, and it 
has been agreed to in some detail pre- 
cisely how it will work. That is the proc- 
ess we envisage, and I think that 
everybody agrees on and welcomes that 
process. 

Q. Are you convinced that the 
people of Europe will sleep more 
peacefully in their beds as a result of 
this agreement despite the vast supe- 
riority of the Soviet conventional 
forces? And have you given them an 
assurance of continued American 
presence in Europe? 

A. Of course, this treaty is impor- 
tant and significant for many reasons: 
first, because it has major reductions in 
nuclear arms for the first time; second, 
because the reductions are asym- 
metrical. Many more — four times as 
many or more — Soviet warheads come 
out than do U.S. warheads. That makes 
our situation better. There are impor- 
tant verification measures connected 
with it. All of these things have taken 
place, and they are important. 

Nevertheless, it is certainly the 
case that our security concerns, our 
need for deterrence, our need for 
strength, are of continuing importance. 



We need to keep working to develop 
our own strength, on the one hand, and 
to be ready for a continuation of the 
Harmel report advice, and to do that in 
the field of conventional weapons and in 
other fields like chemical weapons. Of 
course, from our standpoint, we will be 
working very hard on strategic arms. 
We continue basically in the same 
spirit. 

The real message here is that the 
alliance has had a philosophy, and it 
was challenged. It put that philosophy 
into operational terms in 1979, and then 
it carried through and was steadfast 
and cohesive. Now we have the result 
we sought. I think that's what should 
give people a sense of some satisfac- 
tion. Whether they sleep better or not 
I don't know. There are a lot of other 
factors that go into how well you sleep. 
At any rate, I think it's a good result, 
both as to its outcome and to the way 
in which it was conducted. 

Q. There has been some debate in 
the United Kingdom about the pos- 
sibility that, not withstanding the 
INF agreement, it might be possible 
to increase the deployment of sea 
and, indeed, airborne cruise missiles 
in the not-too-distant future. Would 
you think, in principle, that was com- 
patible with the spirit of INF or not? 
Secondly, how do you see the priority 
for battlefield nuclear weapons elim- 
ination in the order of the different 
issues that are now facing you? I ask 
it in the context of West German con- 
cerns that this priority is maintained. 

A. I think, on the latter part of 
your question, that was handled very 
well in the language that the alliance 
developed in reporting our meeting in 
Reykjavik last June. I see no reason 
why, or any pressures from any 
quarter, to alter that structure. 

As to the balance of forces in Eu- 
rope, this agreement that we have to- 
day deals with intermediate-range 
missiles that are identified clearly. We 
don't intend to make any agreement or 
do anything with respect to those, to 
any undertaking, that would violate 
this agreement. The agreement doesn't 
have anything to do with our aircraft. 
It doesn't have anything to do with the 
other weapons systems that you men- 
tioned. But, of course, we have to look 
at these in the overall context. 

Q. In the verification part of the 
treaty, what is agreed about the base 
facilities — on the bases where it has 
been deployed and on the bases where 
it has not been deployed? Is it correct 
that there will be a sort of frozen sit- 
uation for 3 years at those bases? 



jary 1988 



13 



THE SECRETARY 



A. What I described was, first, the 
process of deployment as ongoing ac- 
cording to the schedule that has been 
established for a long time. When the 
treaty is finally signed — that will take 
place on the 8th of December — at that 
point what we would expect is that 
whatever exists at that stage stays in 
place, but there are no further deploy- 
ments. And that stays constant, so to 
speak, until ratification takes place and 
the treaty goes into force. At that mo- 
ment in time, a well- worked out plan 
for how the missiles are taken out and 
destroyed takes over. How that affects 
the various bases varies, but it goes 
according to that agreed schedule. At 
the end of 3 years, everything will have 
been taken out and destroyed, and we 
will, among other things, then have an 
inspection to verify that that's so. 

Q. Did you seek the endorsement 
of NATO for the treaty, as it was com- 
pleted, and their help in the ratifica- 
tion process? And, if you did, did you 
get their support? 

A. All of the ministers or the per- 
manent representatives, of all the coun- 
tries, of course, were represented and 
are delighted with this treaty. They 
said so in our meeting today, and they 
have said so on other occasions. I think 
they feel, just as has been indicated 
here, that this isn't a U.S. treaty; this 
is their ti-eaty. This is an alliance 
ti-eaty. In a sense, the whole process 
came out of an alliance decision. All of 
the alliance, particularly basing coun- 
tries, are involved. This is something 
we have done together. I think there is 
an absolutely uniform and full sense of 
support. Anyone who says that Europe 
doesn't like this treaty just doesn't 
have a clue about European attitudes. 

Q. Did the alliance work out any 
contingency for a situation in which 
the treaty might not be ratified when 
the remaining cruise missiles have 
not been deployed? 

And secondly, could you indicate 
just what precise number of missiles 
we are now talking about that will 
not be deployed — the deployment the 
alliance will forego? 

A. I think everyone expects the 
treaty will be ratified, so we are not 
talking about contingencies. We will 
proceed on that basis because it is a 
good treaty. I think that as the Sen- 
ators examine it — and obviously they 
haven't had a chance to examine it, so 
they are not going to commit them- 
selves to something that they haven't 
had a chance to look at; that's only nat- 
ural — but as they examine it and think 



14 



about it, I believe that they will come 
to the same conclusion that I have. It is 
a good thing— good for the United 
States, good for the alliance. So it will 
be ratified. As far as the nondeployed 
are concerned — that is really your ques- 
tion, what is the number of warheads 
that have been produced in our hands 
but are not deployed? 

Q. Even approximately. 

A. Approximately. I think I have 
got that somewhere here. 

Q. While you are looking for 
that, does the Soviet Union agree to 
suspend deployment as well as the 
United States? 

A. The Soviet Union, of course, 
will be bound by the treaty when it 
goes into effect. They are not bound 
until it goes into effect. So whatever 
they do — there are no constraints on 
that until the treaty actually takes ef- 
fect. What I announced was what our 
view is and what our understanding is 
with our friends in the alliance as to 
what will take place between the sign- 
ing and the ratification. 

I might just say, as a side matter, 
that in this day and age of budget strin- 
gency, everything you do costs money. 
And once the treaty has been signed, 
with a presumption that it will go into 
effect — I have come to view everything 
I do in the State Department these 
days, and in the government, to see 
whether or not there is a dime here or 
a quarter there or a dollar that can be 
saved. So that is something to ponder. 

It is perhaps worth mentioning 
that the costs of implementing the 1979 
decision are considerable — that is, we 
took that decision as an alliance, and 
various countries had to do different 
things. Basing countries had to accept 
those bases and deploy the missiles and 
stand up politically, and as an alliance 
we had to work together. The United 
States had to develop, produce, and de- 
ploy these missiles. 

Then we will go through the proc- 
ess of removing them. Probably on the 
whole, that process will cost us, as I 
understand it, somewhere between 
$7,000 million to $9,000 miUion. It is a 
fairly substantial number. 

And then this verification regime — 
I don't know whether you have had a 
chance to examine the various ways in 
which inspections will be carried out 
and so on, but it will cost us some 
money to do that. That is all right; you 



make a hard decision, you work witii 
you bring it into effect, and you haw " 
be willing to put your resources behii 
it. We have been willing to put ourn 
sources behind it, and we are glad to 
see it succeed. 

Q. Is that $7,000 million to $9,4 
million for the costs to the basing i 
countries, the costs of developitii 
the costs of removing it — it is a 
figure, or does it apply to just oi 
part? 

A. It is a ballpark number, an' 
couldn't tell you exactly. But it repr« 
sents the fact that you have got som '■ 
missiles that have to be developed, p 
duced, and deployed and then taken 
of deployment. Aside from the cosl 
the basing countries themselves, j 
ourselves there is a fairly substani 
investment in bringing about this «•• 
suit. I think it is a good investment. 
But I just brought it up in response 
somebody asking about that sort of 
thing. 

Q. Can you give us a feel for h 
often Soviet inspectors are likely L 
be coming into the five NATO coiuij: 
tries and what their rights will " 
they inspect facilities in these N4 
countries? 

A. We have agreed on an inspec ' 
program that gives each side certaii 
rights. The numbers of inspections < 
20 per year in the first 3 years. Tha 
the period during which missiles wil 
still be deployed, but they will be in 
process of being taken out of deploy ~" 
ment. That is the period of time whi 
there are more things to see. Then I 
the next 5 years, each side will be p 
mitted 15 inspections per year; and I 
the second 5 years, 10 inspections pi 
year. 

Applying that to all the differen 
things that the Soviet side might wa 
to look at in the United States or in 
alliance, the agreement is that no mi 
than 50% of the inspections in any oi 
year will take place in any one count 
They can't just concentrate everythii 
in one counti-y. And second, there hi 
been worked out — and we and our 
friends have insisted upon this — that 
there be an exchange of notes with t 
basing countries that fully recognize 
their sovereignty and the fact that 
these inspections will take place in 
those countries and the people doing 
them will be fully respectful of the li 
of the countries where they go. 



npnartment nf Rtatp Riilfi 



m 



THE SECRETARY 



Following on that, will there 
,..iu' sort of protocol apart from 
. vc hange of letters, protocols be- 
e the United States and deploy- 
;lifd countries? 

. 1 don't know. 1 don't think that 
-i ■ any particular need for that. 
I this refers to, in response to the 

ifstion, is assurance to each of 
lisine countries that, as they per- 

(sc inspections to take place, 
will be done fully in accord with 
n-()\ereignty and in accord with 
i:la\\"s. 

;. What are the figures you 
n'd to give us? 

. There are about 1,500 deployed 
F.varheads on the Soviet side and 
ii :!•')(( deployed INF missiles on our 
e That is what is deployed and will 
t Mil out. So you see that is a little 
t ■ t ban the four-to-one ratio. Then 
I aif additional warheads on each 
t hat are spares or are inventory. 
r t-ase, we are getting ready to 
\ ip to the number we had 
I i and programmed. I believe 
\:i-. .')72 all together. You can sub- 
;'i.'iii from 572. I don't know what 
ii:-\\er to that is; you can work 
ml. However, we have an 
,at('. 

'hat is where we are. We are in 
e rocess of verifying and collecting 
e numbers on their side. I guess I 
iC)etter not just toss out a number 
■c ise it might not be right. 



The OAS, Democracy, and Nicaragua 



^ress release 223 of Nov. 25, 1987. 
^ress release 225 of Nov. 27. ■ 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
the Organization of American States 
(OAS) General Assembly on Novem- 
ber 10, 7957.1 

The Charter of this Organization of 
American States declares that "the his- 
toric mission of America is to offer man 
a land of liberty." 

The democratic transformation now 
underway in the hemisphere is giving 
new life to our common mission. Presi- 
dent Sarney of Brazil calls it the "most 
stunning and moving political fact of re- 
cent years." President Reagan speaks 
of it as "one of the proudest chapters in 
human history." Clearly, this demo- 
cratic transformation should also be a 
moment of triumph for our regional 
organization. 

It should be, but it is not — at least 
not yet. More of our member countries 
are more democratic than ever. But 
some remain undemocratic, a few sys- 
tematically so. And throughout the 
hemisphere, we must still grapple with 
the human problems caused by low 
rates of economic growth and unevenly 
distributed development. 

Both sets of problems — the political 
and the economic — are serious. Both 
contribute to tensions that affect hemi- 
spheric security. I would like to address 
both in my remarks today. 

Encouraging Economic 
Growth and Social Development 

I have great confidence in an improving 
economic future for Latin America. The 
efforts we have made together since 
1982 have strengthened my confidence. 
This is the fifth General Assembly that 
I have attended as Secretary of State. 
Over the years since the crisis days of 
1982, the economic figures have consis- 
tently improved. 

We have continued to make strong 
efforts under the Program for Sus- 
tained Growth launched at Seoul in 
1985. For the third year in a row, over- 
all growth has exceeded 3%— in 1986, it 
was almost 4%. The Inter-American 
Development Bank reports that 1986 
was a better year than 1985 for about 
two-thirds of this organization's mem- 
ber countries. Other indices are also 
good: export earnings continue to rise, 
imports are recovering, commodity 
prices are improving, per capita real 
income has risen, there are signs of im- 



provement in the capital flight picture, 
and inflation rates are down. 

New lending and support to the re- 
gion from international financial and 
development institutions totaled over $9 
billion in 1986. More than $9 billion in 
outstanding commercial debt has been 
rescheduled in the past 2 years. The 
U.S. trade deficit with Latin America 
and the Caribbean has continued to run 
at about $15 billion annually. This, too, 
has made a major contribution to 
growth prospects for Latin America as 
a whole. 

Responding to the special problems 
of the Caribbean Basin, the United 
States has provided more than $7 bil- 
lion in bilateral economic assistance 
since 1981. This is five times the $1.4- 
billion worth of military assistance we 
have extended to meet vital security 
needs. Even in these cases where we 
have concentrated available official aid, 
our commitment is to lasting develop- 
ment; this, we realize, can only be 
based on a strong private sector, not on 
long-term dependence on foreign aid. 
We have, accordingly, sought to stimu- 
late investment by freeing trade under 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). 
The gratifying result has been a growth 
of more than 30% in U.S. imports of 
nontraditional products from CBI coun- 
tries during the 3 years through 1986. 
Throughout the hemisphere, how- 
ever, per capita incomes are still typ- 
ically below levels reached before 
financial flows became a problem in 
1982. In addition, some current devel- 
opments cloud the economic picture. 
We must do everything we can to cor- 
rect them. Strong downward trends in 
interest rates had reduced Latin Amer- 
ica's service charges by some $5 billion 
annually, but interest rates have edged 
up again. We in the United States are 
making a concerted effort to bring our 
budget deficit under control, as I know 
only too well. Under President Rea- 
gan's leadership, we have vigorously re- 
sisted protectionist measures; but 
strong pressures for protectionism re- 
main. We are determined to maintain 
an open trading system. We will con- 
tinue to resist, and need your help. 

We believe the international finan- 
cial institutions of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund must 
play a key role in fostering growth. We 
have, therefore, agreed to participate in 
the negotiation for an increase in the 



iiuarv 1988 



15 



THE SECRETARY 



^ 



capital of the World Bank. In addition, 
we have proposed a new external con- 
tingency facility for the International 
Monetary F\ind to deal with unforeseen 
developments such as weaker com- 
modity prices, lower export volumes, 
and higher interest rates. 

A strong world economy will re- 
quire continued economic reform. As 
you know, we have been seeking 
stronger action from the major surplus 
countries. The markets suggest that 
the United States has, for too long, 
been the locomotive of global growth 
and may, in fact, have been trying a 
little too hard. Here, too, your active 
pai'ticipation is needed. You can help 
by seeking to persuade our trading 
partners of the importance of reducing 
their trade surpluses. You can also help 
by strengthening your own resolve to 
carry through the economic reforms 
needed for future growth. All of us in 
this hemisphere must work to increase 
our savings rates, levels of investment 
and, most importantly, our commitment 
to work together to create the neces- 
sary conditions for sustaining, into the 
1990s and beyond, the democratic 
growth which has been the hallmark of 
Latin America in the 1980s. 

The Guatemala Agreement 

I would like to turn now to the initia- 
tive taken by five of our members to 
bring peace through democracy in Cen- 
tral America. My government believes 
emphatically that the Guatemala agree- 
ment could lead to decisive progress. 
This organization should spare no effort 
to help the efforts of its Central Ameri- 
can members to achieve peace. 

The twin requirements of the 
Guatemala agreement — democracy and 
national reconciliation — add up to the 
only course that can end the bloodshed, 
promote full political participation, and 
remove East-West conflicts from the 
region. 

The award of this year's Nobel 
Prize for Peace to the president of one 
of our member states reflects this real- 
ity. We congratulate President Arias [of 
Costa Rica]; his award recognizes both 
his own continuing efforts to complete 
the region's democratic transformation 
and the years of struggle by Central 
America's peoples and democratic 
leaders. 

The implementation of the 
Guatemala agreement is proving rather 
complex, but its basic vision is really 
quite simple. It is a vision of regional 
peace based on freedom and democracy. 



Democratization is to include complete 
freedom of the press, full political plu- 
ralism and free elections, and the lift- 
ing of all states of emergency. As Pres- 
ident Reagan put it before the OAS 
Permanent Council, "democracy is the 
bottom line" of the Guatemala 
agreement. 

Parallel to this process of democra- 
tization is a process of national recon- 
ciliation. Each government must 
undertake all steps necessary to 
achieve an effective, negotiated cease- 
fire with armed opposition groups and 
to engage in a meaningful dialogue with 
its political opponents. To further pro- 
mote national reconciliation, each gov- 
ernment must also issue an amnesty 
law to — the words of the agreement — 
"guarantee the inviolability of life [and] 
freedom in all its forms." 

At the time the governments com- 
ply with these commitments to democ- 
ratization and national reconciliation, 
the signatories commit themselves to 
deny the use of their national territo- 
ries for military support to forces de- 
stabilizing other governments. As well, 
they will call upon third parties to 
cease assistance to irregular forces, ex- 
cept for that needed for the resettle- 
ment of combatants and the voluntary 
repatriation of refugees. 

Finally, and very importantly, the 
Guatemala agreement is not a set of 
isolated unilateral commitments: it is, 
as the agreement says, "a harmonious 
and indivisible whole." It is a whole 
that depends absolutely on the simul- 
taneous implementation of mutual obli- 
gations. For the agreement to work, all 
sides have to live up to their obliga- 
tions. Success will require serious time- 
tables for progress and an awareness of 
the costs of failure. 

Security Concerns 

The Guatemala agreement does not ex- 
plicitly deal with sti'ategic security con- 
cerns. Soviet and Cuban military ties to 
Nicaragua^military facilities, advisers, 
types of assistance, sophistication of 
weaponry — are issues of vital and di- 
rect interest to all of us. Peace requires 
that they be dealt with. A reasonable 
balance among armed forces in Central 
America is important to an enduring 
peace. 

These basic security objectives in 
Central America have strong bipartisan 
support in the United States. Our ma- 
jor parties both seek a democratic Nic- 
aragua that is neither a military threat 



irlit 



to its neighbors nor a platform for So*l'* 
viet and Cuban activities hostile to pf'' 
hemispheric security. t: 

Political democracy in Nicaragua t 
would, for the most part, deal with |b"'" 
these security concerns, for no truly liir'l 
democratic government would attacki >"'' 
neighbors or allow its territory to l| 
used militarily by the Soviet Union.! 

So we are back to the basic queS-lfc 
tion, which is explicitly addressed iin 
the Guatemala agreement: how can ^ 
mocracy be achieved in Nicaragua? 

Broken Promises 

The struggle for democracy in Nic- 
aragua is not new. In 1979, this Orgaiiil..^ 
zation of American States voted 
overwhelmingly — right here in this 
room — to seek the replacement of tl#)|r 
Somoza dictatorship, calling for "re 
spect for human rights of all Nic- 
araguans without exception" and "the *' 
holding of free elections as soon as po 
sible." Those are the words we used. 

That call was part of a lengthy ne 
gotiation between the governments of 
the hemisphere and the political coali- 
tion fighting the Somoza regime. In 
meetings, documents, and even in 
statements before this organization, ti 
coalition junta in exile and its represe - 
tatives affirmed a commitment to plu- 
ralist democracy, a mixed economy, ar 
a nonaligned foreign policy. 

Some of the leaders of today's gov 
ernment in Nicaragua helped negotiati 
that political understanding. Yet those 
same leaders now affirm their absolute 
right to create a Leninist party state 
that dominates the economy and is 
aligned with the Soviet bloc. 

Before the fall of the Somoza re- 
gime, the Sandinistas repeatedly as- 
sured Nicaraguans that they would 
protect the basic rights and liberties ol 
all Nicaraguans. The most important 
these assurances are contained in a 
document called the "Statute on the 
Rights and Guarantees of Nic- 
araguans," which was to be the "bill of 
rights" of the new Government of Nic- 
aragua. Distributed first while Somoza 
was still in power, then enacted into 
law as Decree 52 on August 21, 1979, 
the statute constituted a comprehensiv 
and solemn promise by the FSLN 
[Sandinista National Liberation Front] 
to the Nicaraguan people. 

Article 1 of the statute guaranteed 
to the people of Nicaragua the "right tc 
free and full self-determination to es- 
tablish their political condition." Articlt 
4 stated that: "Foreigners shall not be 



16 



Department of State Bulletirn 



THE SECRETARY 



1 1 intervene in the country's po- 

fairs." As it turned out, the 
-ystem that exists today has 
ermined by the small minority 
'iigs to the Sandinista party 
i and is run with the help of 

lis of Cubans and other East- 

-or foreigners. 

.rticles 22, 23, and 25 of the stat- 
■f (if particular relevance to pros- 
t fni- compliance with the 
itiiala agreement. They guai'anteed 
el Its of peaceful assembly and 
' iiii <if association: to organize and 
1 (ilitical parties: to participate in 
1 • activities: to petition for redress 
^e\ances: and to vote and run for 
(. As it turned out, the Sandinistas 
it allow an election for 5 years 
Si.moza was ousted, and then only 
r riinditions contrived to bring 
' a jireordained result. 
"his record is a major source of the 
e icism about whether the Govern- 
ei of Nicaragua intends to live up to 
^ iligations under the peace accords, 
fans that the performance of the 
n^nment of Nicaragua in meeting its 
t«, commitment to freedom cannot 
' easured just by what happens to a 
individuals, no matter how promi- 
T Far-reaching and lasting reforms 
a be undertaken to ensure that, this 
71 progress to democracy is genuine 
ic irreversible. 

BDnal Reconciliation 

; 5 lead editorial the day it was per- 
il 'd to resume publication, which 
1 October 1, La Prensa called for 
Oil amnesty, reconciliation through 
a gue with the armed rebels, and 
lig, without any restrictions, the 
a ' of emergency that has ruled the 
\ try since 1982." 
Tht'se three measures — a negoti- 
f cease-fire, a full amnesty, and the 
I ig iif the state of emergency — are 
intial if today's armed enemies are 
ittle their differences as political 
lis. These steps would probably con- 
e most Nicaraguans — refugees and 
;ical exiles, young men fighting in 
resistance and young men drafted 
the Sandinista army — that they 
I indeed, go home and join in their 
[itry's democratic politics. 
i Implemented fully and fairly, these 
lisures could alleviate some of the 
Ipticism about whether President Or- 
ja will, in fact, engage the resistance 
the opposition parties in a process 
lling to reconciliation and an irre- 
sible democratic opening. This is the 



basic test. The November 5 announce- 
ment by President Ortega that he will 
accept indirect talks with the resistance 
is welcome progress. We welcome any 
move by the Government of Nicaragua, 
no matter how tentative, to end the 
fighting and the grievances that have 
caused it. The more direct the negotia- 
tions, the greater is likely to be the 
progress. 

President Duarte and President 
Cerezo have already undertaken direct 
negotiations with leaders of the insur- 
gents in their respective countries. The 
mid-October discussions in Spain were 
the first official contacts between the 
Guatemalan Government and the guer- 
rillas in a generation or more. In El 
Salvador, dialogue has been more fre- 
quent, if still intermittent, and the 
government has formed two mixed 
commissions with the guerrillas. One 
is to negotiate a cease-fire, the other 
to discuss amnesty and national 
reconciliation. 

The results thus far suggest that 
the Marxist-Leninist forces may not yet 
be ready to make peace. At the open- 
ing meeting of the Salvadoran cease- 
fire commission, the guerrilla leaders 
refused to discuss conditions for a 
cease-fire. They later refused to partici- 
pate in reconciliation talks that had 
been scheduled for October 30 in Mex- 
ico City. Similarly, the Guatemalan 
insurgents rejected the Cerezo 
government's invitation to join in the 
political process. 

To implement the Guatemala agree- 
ment with deeds as well as with words. 
President Ortega and the resistance 
will have to negotiate in a way that 
deals directly with these issues. An ef- 
fective cease-fire cannot simply be de- 
clared by one side: those fighting on 
both sides must agree on what is to 
happen. This, in turn, would enable 
leaders to develop the confidence-build- 
ing measures to pave the way to full 
and peaceful political reintegration of 
all Nicaraguans into a free Nicaragua. 

A full amnesty is essential to any 
such process. In September, the Na- 
tional Conference of Roman Catholic 
Bishops of Nicaragua defined amnesty 
as a measure to help, in their words, 
"both sides . . . forget past offenses 
committed by brother against brother" 
Any such amnesty must apply to politi- 
cal prisoners, to active members of the 
resistance, and to those who have sim- 
ply fled their homeland rather than live 
under a totahtarian regime. The 
November 5 announcement by Presi- 
dent Ortega that the Sandinistas are 
willing to grant pardons to approxi- 



mately 1,000 political prisoners, while 
thousands more remain behind bars, is 
barely a beginning. 

The leaders of Nicaragua's demo- 
cratic resistance have w^elcomed the 
Guatemala agreement and taken steps 
to comply. They have proclaimed their 
willingness to negotiate a cease-fire, 
and they have welcomed the latest pro- 
posals from Managua as a useful start- 
ing point. We must all hope that 
President Ortega's latest offer will 
prove to be genuine and that it will lead 
to the logical next step, direct negotia- 
tions of precisely the sort that Presi- 
dent Cerezo and President Duarte have 
conducted. 

U.S. Support for Peace 

The Government of the United States is 
convinced that the military and political 
successes of the Nicaraguan resistance 
have helped to create the opportunity 
for peace. We are convinced that, with- 
out this pressure, the Sandinistas 
would not have taken the steps an- 
nounced on November 5. We also un- 
derstand that peace is a process. So 
when we were asked not to seek new 
aid for the resistance until Novem- 
ber 5 — to "give peace a chance" — we 
continued our active diplomatic efforts, 
but we heeded those requests. 

Today, I can tell you that we will 
seek no further military assistance for 
the resistance until next year This 
does not mean we will sit idly on the 
sidelines if the Sandinistas try to strike 
for a military victory. We will not aban- 
don the resistance fighters to face ad- 
vanced Soviet weaponry and Cuban 
advisers with their resources ex- 
hausted. We will not permit the peace 
process to become a shield for the 
physical elimination of the Nicaraguan 
resistance. It does mean that we will 
give peace every chance. 

As President Reagan informed the 
Permanent Council, U.S. assistance 
"will continue until the Sandinistas, ne- 
gotiating with the freedom fighters, 
conclude an agreement for a cease-fire, 
and full democracy is established in 
Nicaragua." The specific forms our aid 
will take will depend on what happens 
in the implementation of the Guatemala 
agreement. If it works as we all hope, 
it will be directed to the peaceful rein- 
tegration of the resistance into a free 
Nicaragua; if it does not, it will be used 
to enable the struggle for freedom to 
continue until it does succeed. 

In the weeks and months ahead, 
the United States will back the 



luary 1988 



17 



THE SECRETARY 



Guatemala agreement in other ways as 
well. President Reagan informed the 
heads of delegation to this assembly 
yesterday that when serious negotia- 
tions between the Sandinistas and the 
freedom fighters are underway undei- 
the mediation of Cardinal Obando, I 
will be ready to meet jointly with the 
foreign ministers of all five Central 
American nations, including the 
Sandinistas' representative. 

Before such a meeting and 
throughout this period, we will, of 
course, continue to consult closely with 
the Central American democracies and 
the Nicaraguan resistance on how such 
multinational negotiations can best con- 
tribute to national reconciliation in 
Nicaragua. 

The Role of the OAS 

The OAS and its members have a spe- 
cial responsibility with regard to 
Nicaragua. 

This time, unlike 1979, we must en- 
sure that commitments to democracy 
are kept. Central Americans must con- 
tinue to play the lead role. The 
Guatemala agreement is their creation. 
They are closer to the problem, more 
directly involved. But this organization, 
which has years of special expertise in 
the region, should be a major source of 
support. 

Keeping the peace requires re- 
gional involvement and e.xpertise. This 
principle of regional primacy is stated 
explicitly in Article 23 of the OAS 
Charter, which calls on member states 
to use regional procedures before refer- 
ring disputes to the United Nations. It 
is also recognized in Article 52 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which 
calls on all UN members to make every 
possible effort to resolve their disputes 
through regional organizations before 
submitting them to the attention of the 
Security Council. 

The Secretary General of this orga- 
nization is a member of the verification 
and followup commission established by 
the Guatemala agreement. Much effort 
and serious commitment from all the 
members of this organization as well as 
the Secretary General and his staff will 
be needed if that commission is to en- 
gage in a fair and structured process 
for analyzing progress under the 
agreement. 

I am aware that some observers 
have wondered whether multilateral or- 
ganizations are capable of playing a key 



I'ole on the highest priority issues in 
the hemisphere. We believe that the 
OAS proves that they are. The OAS has 
an outstanding record on monitoring 
human rights, most notably through 
the activities and impressive public re- 
ports of the Inter- American Human 
Rights Commission. It has undertaken 
major support for democratic processes 
through the observation of elections 
and other technical assistance. It has 
been trying to assist countries that 
want to improve their judicial systems. 
It has undertaken new obligations in 
the fight against drug abuse and illegal 
narcotics trafficking in this hemisphere, 
most notably the action program 
against drugs agreed upon at Rio de 
Janeiro just last year. And, of course, 
the OAS has a long record of successful 
peacekeeping activity, much of it in 
Central America. 

It is true that the financial health 
of the OAS has not been good. This is 
partly a reflection of broader economic 
and financial difficulties facing the 
member states. We discussed this issue 
when we met at Cartagena in 1985. 
After that meeting, I recommended to 
President Reagan that we obtain con- 
gi-essional approval for paying our full 
quota to the organization, which the 
United States had not done for several 
years. The President agreed. Then the 
Congress agreed, but did not find the 
money in a very restricted budget to do 
so. I pledge to you, we shall keep 
trying. 

The Department of State has had 
its budget severely cut for the past 3 
years. Last year we had to make diffi- 
cult adjustments that could well prove 
minor in comparison to what is before 
us now. In the coming year, we must 
make major ones. This drastic reduc- 
tion in financial support for foreign af- 
fairs forced us, among other things, to 
withdraw our offer to host this General 
Assembly. What I said to the Secretary 
General then, I repeat now. That deci-' 
sion does not change our firm commit- 
ment to the Organization of American 
States. As I said at Cartagena, we 
want this organization to be a vital 
force. In fact, I think it may very well 
be that canceling out on the planned 
San Francisco meeting and holding it 
here has provided something of a jolt in 
the Congress, and they're realizing that 
the financial situation is truly serious. 



The New Solidarity 

The growth of democracy in this heml 
sphere has created a new phenomeno 
a new solidarity among democratic 
counti-ies and among groups and indi! 
viduals who believe in democracy. 

The increase in the number of de 
ocratically elected leaders in South 
America, Central America, and the 
Caribbean has also increased commui 
cation and cooperation among them. 
When democracy is challenged in one i 
country, democratic leaders througho 
the hemisphere are now quick to rail, 
behind their democratic colleagues. 

This new democratic solidarity is 
also evident among ordinary citizens. 
Political party members, ti-ade union- 
ists, civic activists, and others are 
joining across boundaries to share 
experiences and support each other ii 
their quest for democratic governmer 
We have a solemn obligation to them 
pi-ovide the political and economic 
framework — responsible government 
accountable to the people and econon 
opportunity for all— that they demani 

In addition, the history of the lat 
quarter century has made clear that 
our security, and the security of all tl 
free countries of the Americas, is en- 
hanced by the consolidation of goverr 
ments that have a democratic mandat 
that recognize the responsibilities am 
hard choices that free and sovereign i 
tions must face, and that are free to 
pursue their own interests. As fellow 
democracies, our interests usually coi 
cide; when they do not, we believe we 
can find the maturity and the politica 
will and sophistication to resolve our 
differences satisfactorily. 

We value greatly the promise of a 
hemisphere linked by common demo- 
cratic beliefs and practices, and we w 
work tirelessly to realize it. We are ei 
couraged by what we see. More and 
more, the prime ministers of the Caril 
bean and the presidents of Latin Ame 
ica speak the same language, with eac 
other and with us in North America. 
is the language of democracy. We are 
all watching closely the elections in 
Haiti and Suriname later this month t 
see that they truly reflect the will of 
the people. And we will continue to 
watch efforts in Chile, Panama, and 
Paraguay to reconstruct a democratic 
order. 

Today Central America is at a par 
ticularly critical juncture. A regional 
framework for democracy has been de- 
veloped and agreed to by Central 



18 



Deoartmenf of Stats Riillfiti 



AFRICA 



u as own leaders. They do not be- 
ihc people of Nicaragua are con- 
cil to live under a totalitai-ian 
iiment. We agree. They see no 
n fur the people of the Central 
uaii democracies to accept a fu- 
• A' permanent insecurity. We agree. 
-ri' no reason for Central America 
. nt a future of large armies that 
irce resources; of permanent 
• along international bound- 
permanent fear, surveillance, 
lit. We agree. 
i, I he struggle that today divides 
rauuans who believe in democracy 
thnse who believe in total- 
iiiism or dictatorshi{D — not just in 
.ramia but as an ideal for this hemi- 
itre — we must stand wdth the demo- 
rd;. The security of Central 
nrica — and, ultimately, the security 
1 democracies — depends on it. 
We in the Organization of American 
.'s have a very special responsibil- 
\tter what happened in 1979, it 
il lie doubly irresponsible for us to 
riMipen the door of democratization 
ii:.ragua only to allow it to be 
iiiii-d shut again. We must put our 
dive power behind the diplomacy 
• i'niocracy in Nicaragua, for our se- 
uty interests, our moral values, and 
u political objectives all meet in that 
'Uome. 

' As we appi'oach the half millen- 
n (if the Old World's discovery of the 
.. wf have a historic opportunity to 
,(• a statement about the future of 
hemisphere, to issue a warning to 
_. aturs that they are unwelcome in 
h hemisphere and that they will be 
ny lonely, indeed. 

Only then will we be able to say 
it we have met our obligation as 
umbers of this great organization to 
)l'r man a land of liberty: liberty in 
I our lands for all our people. 



Visit of Zambia's President 



Press release 218 of Nov. 12, 1987. 




President Kenneth D. Kaunda of 
the Republic of Zambia made an offi- 
cial working visit to Washington, D.C., 
October 7-11, 1987, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagan and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks ynade by the 
two Presidents after their meeting on 
October S.i 

President Reagan 

It has been a real pleasure to welcome 
you once again to the White House and 
lo the United States. President Kaunda 
is a senior and highly respected states- 
man of Africa and the world. As chair- 
man of the front-line states, his counsel 
is especially valuable as we work to- 
gether for peace and economic develop- 
ment in southern Africa. President 
Kaunda's recent election for a second 
term as chairman of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) attests to the high 
esteem in which he is held throughout 
that vast continent. 

Our talks today covered the full 
range of international issues. We re- 
affirmed our shared determination to 
work for the earliest possible end of 
apartheid in South Africa and its re- 
placement by a truly democratic gov- 
ernment. The United States will 
continue to do everything in its power 
to bring about a negotiated settlement 



involving the independence of Namibia 
and the departure of all foreign forces 
from Angola. I told President Kaunda 
of my meetings this week with Presi- 
dent Chissano [of Mozambique] and of 
our support for his efforts to work for 
peace in Mozambique. I e.xpressed our 
appreciation for President Kaunda's 
efforts on behalf of peace in the Persian 
Gulf and North Africa and his support 
for efforts to achieve real arms reduc- 
tion agreements between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. 

Today also we reaffirmed the long 
tradition of warm and productive rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Zambia and the other states of south- 
ern Africa in their efforts to expand 
trade, pursue economic reform, and de- 
velop their transportation networks. 
The United States has a stake in Af- 
rican economic progress. We have set a 
goal of ending the hunger that now 
plagues sub-Saharan Africa and to do 
this by the year 2000. Accomplishing 
this will require growth-oriented re- 
form in Africa and assistance from the 
United States. We Americans are ready 
and willing to do our part, but setting 
things right will also require a commit- 
ment for tangible reform from African 
governments. 

We welcome the opportunity to join 
with you. President Kaunda, in helping 



muarv 1988 



19 



ARMS CONTROL 



to build a future of peace, prosperity, 
and freedom for Africa and for Zambia. 
It was a pleasure to have you as our 
guest, and we wish you a pleasant time 
in our country for the rest of your stay. 

President Kaunda 

May I once again thank you, your gov- 
ernment, and the people for receiving 
my delegation and myself so well. I 
have found our discussions particularly 
useful. I am taking back to Africa a 
message of hope and promise. I am tak- 
ing back to Africa a message of cooper- 
ation and not confrontation. I am 
taking back to Africa a message of love 
based on truth, social justice, and fair 
play from this country. 

We have our differences of ap- 
proach but not differences of principle. 
This is important in itself 

I can assure you that when I re- 
port back to the summit of the OAU 
November 30 and December 1, God 
willing, of this year, it will be a mes- 
sage which will lend more to coopera- 
tion and not confi-ontation. 

Once again, thank you for the ex- 
change of views, which have been very, 
very fruitful, indeed, and have helped 
me a lot to appreciate the stand taken 
by your country on many international 
issues. I can only end by saying I wish 
you God's blessings as you come to the 
end of the term of your very onerous 
job. I must once again emphasize our 
gratitude to you and General Secretary 



Gorbachev on the recently agreed new 
approach to the problems of nuclear 
weapons on this earth. 



'Made at the South Portico of the 
White House (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 
1987). ■ 



South Africa Releases 
Political Prisoners 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 5, 1987' 

We welcome the news that the South 
African Government has released Govan 
Mbeki and four other black political 
prisoners. We are especially pleased 
that their release was apparently un- 
conditional. We know this must "be a 
joyous day for their families. 

This action is limited to five peo- 
ple, and many others — including Nelson 
Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Zeph 
Mothopeng — remain in detention. Nev- 
ertheless, this is a positive move on the 
part of the South African Government, 
and we hope it will be seen in that light 
by all South Africans. 

We urge all parties to use this op- 
portunity to create a climate for dia- 
logue leading to a peaceful resolution of 
South Africa's political problems. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Hard Work Ahead in Arms Control 



by Edward L. Rowny 

Address before the National War 
College Alumni Association in Colo- 
rado Spririgs on October 16, 1987. Am- 
bassador Rowny is special adviser to 
the President and the Secretary of State 
on arms control matters. 

As we approach next week's meetings 
in Moscow between Secretary Shultz 
and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, it 
is a good time to take stock of where 
we are and what remains ahead in arms 
control. In my view, we've cleared the 
deck for a lot of hard work. 



American resolve, aided by allied 
solidarity, has put us within reach of an 
agreement on intermediate-range nu- 
clear forces (INF), which for the first 
time would not simply limit but would, 
in fact, eliminate an entire class of nu- 
clear weapons. When completed, this 
agreement will be a significant political 
and diplomatic accomplishment if we 
approach the end-game using the same 
realistic guiding principles that brought 
us to this point. 

Approaching the completion of an 
INF agreement allows us to concen- 
trate on both ends of the arms control 
spectrum. Even as we work on an INF 
agreement, we must redouble our 



efforts to redress the conventional in 
balance. And substantial reductions ' 
strategic offensive arms remain our 
highest priority. 

Heightened Focus 

on Conventional Imbalance 

The conventional imbalance remains , 
important underlying source of milit; 
instability between East and West. 1 
Central Europe, the Soviets have de- 
ployed in forward areas 30 divisions, 
heavy with tanks, artillery, and ar- 
mored vehicles, configured for offens: 
operations. The conventional imbalar, 
in Europe derives not only from largi 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact quantitative 
advantages in key areas of combat ca 
pability but also from geographic asy 
metries; the Warsaw Pact forces can 
easily reinforced by forces from the S " 
viet Union. ! 

There is no military or political ,, 
reason that can justify the massive h 
buildup of Soviet and Warsaw Pact ; 
forces which threaten Western Europ 
The Soviets claim that there is a stab 
East-West conventional balance. Hon i 
ever, in specific locations and weapon i 
systems, the Warsaw Pact enjoys as , 
much as a 3-to-l superiority over Wes 
ern conventional forces. 

No Soviet action would do more i 
convince a skeptical world of a change 
in Soviet strategic objectives than su! 
stantial reductions of these massive i 
forces and a serious effort by the Sov J 
ets to address our concerns on convei 
tional stability. 

In an effort to press for construe 
five negotiations on conventional forc( . 
NATO has recently called for establis | 
ing two distinct conventional security i 
negotiations to take place within the i, 
framework of the Conference on Se- ) 
curity and Cooperation in Europe | 
(CSCE). One negotiation, among all 3 j 
CSCE participating states, would con- 1 
tinue the work of the Stockholm con- 
ference on confidence- and security- 
building measures. The other, limited 
to the 23 members of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, would seek to create a 
more stable conventional balance be- ) 
tween the two alliances. It would seek | 
to end destabilizing military disparitie 
and to reduce the capability for sur- , 
prise attack and large-scale offensive 
operations. 

NATO's response to the challenge , 
of Soviet and Warsaw Pact convention; 
might must be to invigorate and im- 
prove its conventional defensive ca- 
pabilities. To this end, the alliance has 



20 



Department of State Bulleti 



ARMS CONTROL 



•taken a Conventional Defense Im- 
ment (GDI) initiative. If it is pur- 
vigorously, the GDI, like the U.S. 
egic Defense Initiative (SDI), 
result in substantial improve- 
s in defense capabilities through 
lological developments. 
The West has an unmatched advan- 
i( in its free exchange of ideas and 
nobility of capital and skilled labor 
ordinated, highly effective research 
n development effort could revolu- 

ze the effectiveness of NATO's con- 
's ional forces. Without having to add 
flcant manpower — the most expen- 
component of Western armed 
s — such an effort could help us 
ess the current conventional 
Ti ilance. 

1 Importance 

,f| START Agreement 

n le strategic arms reduction talks 
3'iRT), there is now an opportunity 

> It deeply into offensive, strategic 
1 ear arsenals. When they met last 

> th, Secretary Shultz and Foreign 
;! ster Shevardnadze once again re- 

i med their commitment to 50% cuts 

raiegic weapons. This issue is 
' iilfiit Reagan's highest priority and 

11' that Genei'al Secretary Gor- 
a lev has termed the "root problem" 
f rms control. 

If this reaffirmation is to be trans- 
aid into an effective START agree- 
-nit, the Soviets must be forthcoming 
TWO critical points. 

First is the issue of sublimits. 
' irment on deep reductions of stra- 
(■ iiFfensive arms to 50% — that is, 
III delivery systems and 6,000 war- 
< i] — will not alone guarantee a sta- 
ll sti-ategic relationship. Accordingly, 
t draft START treaty we have tabled 
r jeneva includes three sublimits in 
iilition to the overall count of 6,000 
v»rheads. These measures would limit 
tj total number of ballistic missile 
arheads to 4,800; IGBM [interconti- 
rtital ballistic missile] warheads to 
:J00; and 1,650 warheads on permitted 
BBMs except those on silo-based light 
ai medium ICBMs with six or fewer 
llrheads. 

r These sublimits would reduce the 
Sviets' current significant advantage 
if ballistic missile forces, especially 
llat of the large, MIRVed [multiple in- 
fipendently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
ffBMs which can be used effectively in 
tfirst strike. The sublimits would en- 
ijre equality in force capabilities after 



reductions. Moreover, they would pre- 
vent future adverse changes in force 
structures. 

Most important, sublimits are 
needed to ensure that strategic arms 
cuts are stabilizing, to prevent future 
arsenals from being concentrated in 
ballistic missiles. In response to our 
plan for sublimits, the Soviets have pro- 
posed to limit any one leg of the triad 
to 60% of the total. But without an 
additional cap on ballistic missile war- 
heads, this approach is highly inade- 
quate. It would permit the Soviets to 
retain a strategic force composed en- 
tirely of ballistic missiles following 
overall 50% START reductions. It 
would, moreover, permit the Soviet 
Union to retain a high concentration 
of IGBM warheads on highly MIRVed 
IGBMs. A treaty permitting such a 
composition of forces after reductions 
would not strengthen strategic sta- 
bility. Only sublimits along lines the 
United States has proposed will pro- 
mote such stability. 

Why SDI Must Not 
Be Traded Away 

A second area of Soviet intransigence 
against effective strategic arms reduc- 
tions is the Soviet insistence on link- 
age. They continue to insist on holding 
a prospective START accord hostage to 
U.S. agreement to constrain our re- 
search into how to defend against bal- 
listic missile attack. This linkage is 
unwarranted. It makes abandonment, 
or at least severe curtailment, of the 
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative a pre- 
condition for START limitations. How- 
ever, there is great benefit in a 50% 
START reductions agreement, properly 
formulated, for the Soviets as well as 
for us. Under 50% reductions, we 
would cut back on strategic nuclear 
forces of concern to the Soviets. They 
would be required to reduce their 
IGBM force, which is of particular con- 
cern to us. Since both sides would gain, 
there is no reason to hold a START 
agreement hostage to limits on our SDI 
program. 

At the September meeting, For- 
eign Minister Shevardnadze, purporting 
to show "flexibility," gave us a choice of 
two alternatives. We could, for 10 
years, either "strictly adhere" to the 
ABM Treaty, as "signed and ratified in 
1972," or agree to a list of devices 
which would not be put into space if 
they exceeded certain "performance pa- 
rameters." We are concerned that the 
Soviets may have only poured old wine 



into new bottles. Although we don't yet 
have a clear view of the Soviet pro- 
posal, we cannot accept an alternative 
that would restrict us to an SDI pro- 
gram on Soviet terms. Nor can we sub- 
ject our research to highly restrictive 
and unverifiable limitations more strin- 
gent than the ABM Treaty — a treaty 
which does not limit, or even mention, 
"research." 

On the issues of strategic offensive 
arms and ballistic missile defenses. 
President Reagan's policies are clear. 
We must continue to impress on the 
Soviets that deep cuts in strategic of- 
fensive weapons, especially those that 
are the most destabilizing, are bene- 
ficial in their own right. The Soviet 
Union would like to negotiate certain 
limits on SDI research in trade for a 
START agreement. Embarking on such 
an exercise with the Soviets runs the 
risk of crippling SDI. SDI is and must 
remain a purposeful program investi- 
gating the problem of ballistic missile 
defenses which could provide the basis 
for a cooperative transition to a more 
stable strategic relationship. We must 
disabuse the Soviets from believing 
they can achieve this aim. 

Let us not forget that, along with 
NATO firmness on INF, it was SDI 
that brought the Soviets back to the 
nuclear arms negotiating table in Janu- 
ary 1985, after their December 1983 
walkout. Let us be clear that SDI is 
not a bargaining chip but is a program 
we are firmly committed to pursue. As 
such, it provides the Soviets a strong 
incentive to agree to deep reductions 
in strategic arms. Even if the 50% 
cuts now on the table in START are 
achieved, SDI will remain essential as 
an incentive for the Soviets to under- 
take further reductions. Moreover, SDI 
would underwrite the integrity of new 
arms agreements by diminishing the 
Soviet incentive to cheat. 

Let us bear in mind, too, SDI's 
function as a hedge against the Soviets' 
own heavy involvement in strategic de- 
fense. Leaving them with a monopoly 
in defenses would threaten peace and 
Western freedom by undermining the 
credibility of our deterrent. Contrary 
to Soviet propaganda, it must be under- 
stood that the choice is not between a 
world with strategic defenses or one 
without such systems. The free world 
must decide whether the Soviets will 
be allowed to be the only power with 
ballistic missile defenses. 



L^inuarv 1988 



ARMS CONTROL 



Assuring Strict Verification 
for INF Elimination 

The Soviets are masters at llth-hour 
negotiating. During the next several 
weeks, they may exert enormous pres- 
sures trying to get us to dispense 
quickly with the remaining details of an 
INF treaty, particularly the important 
verification provisions. They will try to 
get us to compromise our standards in 
order to keep the "process" moving 
forward. 

This is an expectation we will not 
let them reaUze. One of the most con- 
sistent tenets of President Reagan's for- 
eign policy is that any arms control 
agreement must be effectively verifia- 
ble if it is to improve stability and to 
make a lasting contribution to peace and 
security. The President has made it 
clear he will not settle for anything less. 

The United States has three basic 
verification objectives for an INF arms 
reduction agreement: 

First, to ensure confidence in the 
agreement; 

Second, to deter Soviet violations 
of the treaty by increasing the like- 
lihood that such violations would be de- 
tected; and 

Third, to permit quick and unam- 
biguous detection of any Soviet vio- 
lations, thereby providing timely warn- 
ing of a potential or actual threat to 
U.S. and allied security. 

On September 14, we tabled in 
Geneva an inspection protocol detailing 
the procedures we consider necessary 
to verify compliance effectively for an 
INF treaty, an accord which provides 
for the elimination of all U.S. and So- 
viet INF missiles — the "global double 
zero" formula. Our verification proposal 
would bring about the most stringent 
regime to protect against cheating in 
arms control history. 

The Soviets have said they accept 
the broad outline of our verification 
plan, including unprecedented onsite in- 
spection. But "the devil is in the de- 
tails." As negotiations continue, we will 
insist that the Soviets commit them- 
selves to effective verification measures 
in detail and in writing. 

Even with an agreement for full 
global elimination of INF missiles, 
ensuring against cheating requires a 
demanding set of verification measures. 
Let me outline for you the key ele- 
ments of the plan we have presented in 
Geneva: 



• Requirement that all INF mis- 
siles and launchers would be fixed geo- 
graphically in agreed-upon areas or in 
announced transit between such areas 
during the reductions period; 

• Detailed exchange of data, up- 
dated as necessary, on the location of 
missile support facilities and missile 
operating bases and the number of 
missiles and launchers at those facilities 
and bases; 

• Notification of movement of mis- 
siles and launchers between declared 
facilities; 

• A baseline onsite inspection to 
verify the number of missiles and 
launchers at declared missile support 
facilities and missile operating bases; 

• Onsite inspection to verify the 
destruction of missiles and launchers; 

• Follow-on, short-notice inspection 
of declared facilities during the reduc- 
tions period to verify residual levels un- 
til all missiles are eliminated; 

• Short-notice, mandatory chal- 
lenge inspection of certain facilities in 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
at which illegal missile activity could be 
carried out; and 

• Requirement for a separate 
"close-out" inspection to ensure that 
when a site is deactivated and removed 



from the list of declared facilities, it 
has indeed ended activities associatt 
with INF missiles. sll 

Once the Soviets recognize thati 
American people stand firm for effd 
five verification, I believe we will se $ 
halt to any llth-hour delaying tactic I 
the Soviets. Verification is the final 
as to whether the Soviets are truly-] 
committed to a worthwhile INF 
agreement. 

Conclusion 

We approach the next critical episofl 
our relationship with the Soviet Unj 
with a clear grasp of our fundament 
objectives. We have gained an expei 
enced understanding of Soviet nego' 
ing practices and realize that we ne 
to weigh carefully both risks and oj 
tunities. We may, indeed, be able ti 
reach agreements leading to a mor 
stable, less dangerous world. But e 
if we meet with such success, our pi ' 
pie must understand that this will n 
be cause for euphoria. We cannot re 3 
on our oars with an almost-complett i^ 
INF agreement. We are only at the ■' 
ginning of the task of reducing the !■ 
viet military threat — we have a lot i 
work in front of us. ■ 



Soviets Tour Chemical IVIunitions 
Destruction Facility 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 17, 19871 

Today we welcome to Washington a So- 
viet delegation led by Ambassador Yuri 
Nazarkin, the Soviet representative to 
the Conference on Disarmament. The 
Soviet delegation will leave tomorrow 
to visit the U.S. Army's chemical muni- 
tions destruction facility at Tooele, 
Utah, on November 19 and 20. 

At the Tooele facility, we will brief 
the Soviets in detail on our state-of-the- 
art pilot plant for the destruction of 
chemical munitions and demonstrate its 
operation. We will also offer the Soviet 
delegation an opportunity to examine a 
display of current U.S. Army chemical 
munitions. Ambassador Max Frieders- 
dorf, the U.S. representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament, will ac- 
company the Soviet delegation. 



As you know, there are now und' I 
way intensive multilateral and bilatei I 
negotiations aimed at achieving an el ' 
fective, verifiable, and comprehensivt 
ban on chemical weapons. Openness ■ 
the part of all chemical weapons stati 
is essential to achieving such a 
convention. 

For the United States, this will I 
the second international visit to our 
chemical weapons destruction facility, 
In 1983 the United States hosted a 
group of representatives from the Co: 
ference on Disarmament. There were 
many participants, but the Soviets, 
who were invited, did not choose to a 
tend at that time back in 1983. 



'Read to news correspondents by De 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. I 



22 



Department of State Bulla 



ARMS CONTROL 



Soviet Union 
m Nuclear Testing Talks 



iIDENTS STATEMENT, 
9, 1987' 



in Geneva, the United States and 
»viet Union will begin formal, 
by-stage negotiations on nuclear 
',. I have long advocated a logical 
ich to nuclear testing limitations 
preserves our national security 
pi^ sts while achieving verifiable 
ments with the Soviet Union. I 
atified that we have now agreed 
s step-by-step approach, 
.s a first step, the United States 
le Soviet Union will negotiate im- 
d verification measures for two 
ig but unratified nuclear testing 
es— the Threshold Test Ban 
Y (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nu- 
Explosions Ti-eaty (PNET). Once 
srification concerns have been sat- 
and the treaties ratified, we will 
se that the United States and the 
t Union immediately enter into 
liations on ways to implement a 
jy-step program — in association 
a program to reduce and ulti- 
'y eliminate all nuclear weapons — 
Hiiting and ultimately ending nu- 
;a testing. 
t is important to recall at this 
1 that our nuclear deterrent has for 
- Ill years kept the peace. As suc- 
: il as this policy has been, I believe 
iniKit be content for the indefinite 
ii' with a deterrence relationship 
- 1 exclusively on the threat of offen- 
( 'etaliation. We must continue our 
ah, through our Strategic Defense 
iiitive (SDI), for a means of deter- 



ring aggression through increased re- 
liance on defenses that threaten no one. 
For as long as we must continue to 
rely on nuclear weapons for our se- 
curity, however, we must ensure that 
those weapons are safe, secure, reli- 
able, effective, and survivable; in other 
words, that our nuclear deterrent re- 
mains credible. This requires nuclear 
testing, as permitted by existing trea- 
ties. It is only within the context of 
decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons 
that we can look forward to a time 
when our needs for nuclear testing 
would also decrease. That is my objec- 
tive and one the United States is pre- 
pared to work energetically toward. 



U.S. STATEMENT, 
NOV. 20, 1987 

Today the United States and the Soviet 
Union ended the first round of their 
stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear 
testing. The U.S. delegation is headed 
by Ambassador Robert B. Barker; the 
Soviet delegation is headed by Mr. Igor 
N. Palenykh. We have completed 2 
weeks of intense and businesslike nego- 
tiations. Our discussions have produced 
important progress. 

Our most significant accomplish- 
ment has been agreement that the dele- 
gations will visit each other's nuclear 
test sites in January 1988 for the pur- 
pose of familiai'izing themselves with 
conditions and operations at those test 
sites. It should be remembered that 
President Reagan first proposed in Sep- 



tember 1984 that the sides exchange 
visits to each other's test sites for the 
purpose of starting the process of im- 
proving verification of the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty. These visits will en- 
hance prospects for designing and sub- 
sequently conducting a mutually 
acceptable and agreed joint verification 
experiment that Soviet Foreign Minis- 
ter Shevardnadze proposed in April of 
this year Following these visits, the 
delegations will resume their negotia- 
tions in Geneva. 

A key question at the outset of 
these negotiations was whether a joint 
verification experiment would be 
needed in order to make progress to- 
ward the priority goal; that of reaching 
agreement on effective verification 
measures which will make it possible to 
ratify the TTBT and PNET. That ques- 
tion has been settled; a joint verifica- 
tion experiment will be necessary for 
the sides to make progress on our pri- 
ority goal — effective verification of the 
TTBT and PNET. A part of that ques- 
tion was whether the Soviets could 
reach a decision on acceptability of the 
U.S.-proposed CORRTEX [continuous 
reflectrometry for radius vs. time ex- 
periment] technique before its use had 
been demonstrated at the Soviet test 
site. It has been decided that a demon- 
stration of the practicability and unob- 
trusiveness of the CORRTEX technique 
must take place at the Soviet test site 
before they will decide whether or not 
the CORRTEX technique can be ac- 
cepted and, if so, how it will be made a 
part of the verification mechanism of 
the TTBT and PNET. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. 



IS. Arms Control Initiatives: 
iStatus Report 



J miction with the ongoing mi- 
ni d space talks in Geneva be- 
lli c United States and the Soviet 
. I he Department of State re- 
"11 November 19, 1987, the fol- 
I ^iiminary of U.S. initiatives on 
arms control issues and a 
'<jy of U.S. -Soviet arms control 
/ons and expert-level meetings 



Arms reduction negotiations are a key 
element in the Administration's strat- 
egy to build a safer peace and ensure 
the security of the United States and 
its allies. Through arms reductions, we 
seek to enhance strategic stability at 
lower levels of military forces, thus re- 
ducing the risk of conflict. The United 
States seeks such reductions at the nu- 
clear and space talks (START, INF, and 
defense and space) in Geneva as well as 



at other negotiating forums where the 
United States has taken the initiative 
to reduce the risk of war. 

Strategic Offensive Forces 

The United States places highest pri- 
ority on its efforts to reach an equita- 
ble and effectively verifiable agreement 
with the Soviet Union for deep reduc- 
tions in strategic nuclear arms. As a 



KUary 1988 



23 



ARMS CONTROL 



concrete step toward this end, the 
United States presented a draft treaty 
at the strategic arms reduction talks 
(START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. The 
draft U.S. treaty reflects the basic 
areas of agreement on strategic arms 
reductions reached by President Rea- 
gan and General Secretary Gorbachev 
at Reykjavik in October 1986. The U.S. 
draft provides for aO% reductions in 
U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms 
to a maximum for each party of 1,600 
deployed ballistic missiles and heavy 
bombers with no more than 6,000 war- 
heads, with appropriate sublimits, over 
a period of 7 years after treaty entry 
into force. 

The U.S. draft treaty, in addition 
to the overall limits, provides for spe- 
cific restrictions on the most destabiliz- 
ing and dangerous nuclear systems — 
fast-flying ballistic missiles, particu- 
larly heavy intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs). To this end, we have 
proposed limits and sublimits on certain 
types of ballistic missile warheads: 
4,800 ballistic missile warheads; 3,300 
ICBM warheads; and 1,650 warheads on 
permitted ICBMs except those on silo- 
based light and medium ICBMs with 
six or fewer warheads. In addition, we 
have proposed a limit on ballistic mis- 
sile throw- weight. Our proposal also in- 
cludes detailed rules designed to 
eliminate any ambiguity as to what is 
agreed and extensive verification provi- 
sions — including onsite inspection — de- 
signed to ensure that each side can be 
confident that the other is complying 
fully with the agreement. 

On July 31, the Soviets presented a 
draft treaty which is similar in struc- 
ture to the U.S. draft text and contains 
some common language. This Soviet 
draft, however, offered no movement on 
the major outstanding issues, including 
sublimits on the most dangerous missile 
systems. It also continued to hold stra- 
tegic offensive arms reductions hostage 
to restrictions on strategic defense be- 
yond the existing limitations of the 1972 
Xnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; 
such restrictions are unacceptable to 
the United States. 

During their September meetings 
in Washington, Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed 
to intensify efforts at the Geneva talks 
to achieve agreement on 50% reductions 
in strategic offensive arms. During the 
ministerial — and since, at the Geneva 
negotiations — some progress has been 
made on outstanding issues. For exam- 
ple, the Soviets have proposed a limit 
of 1,540 warheads on heavv ICBMs, al- 



though this approach fails to constrain 
development of new, more threatening 
heavy ICBMs. 

During their October meetings (Oc- 
tober 22-23 in Moscow and October 30 
in Washington), Secretary Shultz and 
Foreign Minister Shevaixlnadze held in- 
tensive discussions on START. The So- 
viets proposed new sublimits as follows: 
3,000-3,300 warheads on interconti- 
nental ballistic missiles; 1,800-2,000 
warheads on sea-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs); and 800-900 war- 
heads on air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCMs). This proposal is unaccept- 
able because it does not provide the 
necessary freedom to mix toward more 
stabilizing systems and would require 
the United States to reduce its SLBMs 
and ALCMs by far more than 50% and 
build up its ICBMs. If, however, the 
numbers in the Soviet proposal indicate 
the structure the Soviets want for their 
own forces, they should be able to ac- 
cept the sublimits proposed by the 
United States. 

At the Washington meeting, the 
two sides agreed that General 
Secretary Gorbachev would visit the 
United States in December to sign an 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] agreement and that President 
Reagan would go to the Soviet Union in 
the first half of 1988 with the intention, 
among other things, of signing a 
START agreement. The two sides 
agreed to work intensively to achieve 
such a treaty. START will figure promi- 
nently among the issues to be ad- 
dressed during General Secretary 
Gorbachev's visit to the United States 
in December. 

Nevertheless, fundamental diffei'- 
ences remain, including sublimits on 
certain types of ballistic missile war- 
heads, a codified throw-weight limit, 
and a ban on mobile ICBMs. Also at 
issue is the continuing Soviet insistence 
that START reductions be linked to fur- 
ther limits on ballistic missile defenses. 
In this regard, the United States will 
not accept any measures which would 
cripple or kill the U.S. Strategic De- 
fense Initiative (SDI). Due to the pros- 
pect it holds for a safer means of 
deterring aggression through defenses 
which thi'eaten no one, SDI is vital to 
the future security of the United States 
and its allies. 

The United States believes that its 
draft START treaty provides a solid 
basis for the creation of a fair and dura- 
ble agreement to bring about — for the 
first time in history — deep reductions 



in the strategic nuclear arsenals o) 
United States and the U.S.S.R. Tl 
United States believes that a STA. 
treaty could be completed in short 
order, if the Soviets are now willin 
to apply themselves with equal 
seriousness. 



Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces 



During the October 30 meeting in 
Washington, the United States anC'i 
Soviet Union agreed that General 
retary Gorbachev would visit WasHlil 
ington beginning December 7, 1981 
sign a treaty which will eliminate t 
entire class of U.S. and Soviet IN] 
missiles (with a range of 500-5,500 
kilometers). 

The success of these negotiatic 
has been made possible by Westerr 
termination to adhere to NATO's 11 
"dual track" decision in response t( 
viet deployment of SS-20s. This de 
sion called for NATO to redress tht 
INF imbalance through deploymen " 
U.S. longer range INF missiles, w 
seeking to negotiate with the Sovii 
to reach an INF balance at the low 
possible level. NATO's resolve is n( , 
paying off 

The prospective INF agreemei 
consistent with the longheld U.S. i . 
tion in key areas of the negotiation » 
This success is a direct consequenc I! 
the President's steadfast commitme 
to real arms reductions and allied s 
darity in support of these objective i 

Longer range INF missiles [ 

(LRINF). Since the formal talks wi 
the Soviet Union began in Novembf 
1981, the United States has sought 
eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRIN 
missile systems. This was the Presi- 
dent's original "zero option" proposi 
first made in 1981. In July 1987, the 
Soviets finally agreed to eliminate 
these systems. 

Shorter range INF missiles 
(SRINF"). Since the negotiations beji 
the United States has insisted that ; 
INF agreement must constrain shor 
range INF missiles to prevent circui 
vention of an accord on LRINF miss 
by a Soviet buildup of the shorter 
range systems. The agreement to el 
nate all U.S. and Soviet SRINF mis 
siles as an integral part of an INF 
accord satisfies this U.S. requireniei 



24 



Department of State Bull 



ARMS CONTROL 



Chronology: January 1, 1986-November 19, 1987 



SOVIET ARMS 

TROL NEGOTIATIONS 

ear and Space Talks 

d IV: January 16-March 4, 1986 

d V: May 8-June 26, 1986 

d VI: September 18-November 13, 

■ i id VII: January 15-Mareh 6, 1987 

'■■'■ >JF continued to March 26) 

>fe id VIII: Began on April 23 (INF) 

" d May 5, 1987 (START and defense 

* d space talks) 

I) 

ference on Confidence- and 
irity-Building Measures and 
rmament in Europe 
Itilateral) 

id IX: January 28-March 15, 1986 
id X: April 15-Mav 23, 1986 
(id XI: June 10-July 18, 1986 
id XII: August 19-September 19, 
36 — agreement concluded 

ference on Security 
iCooperation in Europe 

t Round of FoUowup Conference: 
- nvember 4-December 20, 1986 
emd Round of Followup Conference: 
.nuary 27- April 11, 1987 
h d Round of Followup Conference: 

ay 4-July 31, 1987 
0-th Round of Followup Conference: 

■ptember 22-November 21, 1987 

reposed ending date) 

'( ference on Disarmament 
Xiltilateral) 

'1 mical Weapons Committee Rump 
'ssKjn: January 13-31, 1986 

jinu Session: February 4- April 25, 
i,s(; 

■inner Session: June 10-August 29, 
)86 

■mical Weapons Committee Chair- 
lan's Consultations: November 24- 
lecember 17, 1986 
smical Weapons Committee Rump 
ession: January 6-30, 1987 
ing Session: February 2-April 30, 

m 



Summer Session: June 8-August 26, 
1987 



Mutual and Balanced Force 
Reductions (Multilateral) 

Round 38: January 30-March 20, 1986 
Round 39: May 15-July 3, 1986 
Round 40: September 25-December 4, 

1986 
Round 41: January 29-March 19, 1987 
Round 42: May 14-July 2, 1987 
Round 43: September 24-December 3, 

1987 (proposed ending date) 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 

Round I: January 13, 1987 

Round II: May 3-4, 1987— agreement 

concluded, ad referendum; 

agreement signed in Washington on 

September 15, 1987 

Nuclear Testing 

Round I: November 9-20, 1987 (pro- 
posed ending date) 



U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL 
EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS 

Nuclear and Space Talks 

August 11-12, 1986, in Moscow 
September 5-6, 1986, in Washington 
December 2-5, 1986, in Geneva at the 
negotiator level 

Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions Talks 

August 6-7, 1986, in Moscow 
September 10-11, 1986, in Washington 

Conference on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe 

August 14-15, 1986, in Stockholm 

Chemical Weapons Treaty Talks 

January 28-February 3, 1986, in Geneva 
April 15-25, 1986, iii Geneva 
July 1-18, 1986, in Geneva 



October 28-November 18, 1986, in New 

York City 
February 16-March 5, 1987, in Geneva 
July 20-August 7, 1987, in Geneva 

Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention 

Experts Meeting: March 31-April 15, 
1987, in Geneva 

Chemical Weapons 
Nonproliferation Discussions 

March 5-6, 1986, in Bern 
September 4-5, 1986, in Bern 
October 7-8, 1987, in Bern 

Nuclear Testing 

First Session: July 25-August 1, 1986, 
in Geneva 

Second Session: September 4-18, 1986, 
in Geneva 

Third Session: November 13-25, 1986, 
in Geneva 

Fourth Session: January 22, 1987, re- 
cessed on February 9, resumed on 
March 16, concluded on March 20 in 
Geneva 

Fifth Session: May 18-29, 1987, in 
Geneva 

Sixth Session: July 13-20, 1987, in 
Geneva 



Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 

May 5-6, 1986, in Geneva 
August 25, 1986, in Geneva 



Nuclear Nonproliferation T^lks 

December 15-18, 1986, in Washington 
July 28-30, 1987, in Moscow ■ 



uary 1988 



25 



ARMS CONTROL 



Reductions on a global basis. The 

United States has long insisted that 
any limitations on INF missiles must 
be global to prevent the transfer of the 
threat from one region to another The 
Soviets have accepted this in the con- 
text of global elimination of both cate- 
gories of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, 
known as "global double zero." 

In reaching these and other agree- 
ments in principle with the Soviets, the 
United States made clear that bilateral 
agreements between the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. cannot constrain 
third-country forces or affect existing 
programs of cooperation with our allies. 

Although the United States and 
the Soviet Union have agreed to con- 
clude an INF agreement, some impor- 
tant issues remain to be resolved — 
above all, some important details of 
verification procedures. Effective ver- 
ification is essential to ensure that an 
INF agreement makes a lasting contri- 
bution to peace and stability. Accord- 
ingly, we have proposed the most 
stringent verification regime of any 
arms control agreement in history. We 
will not settle for anything less. The 
Geneva delegations of both sides are 
working hard to resolve remaining 
issues. 



Defense and Space Issues 

During their September and October 
1987 meetings in Washington and 
Moscow, Secretary Shultz and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze elabo- 
rated their respective positions on de- 
fense and space issues. There was no 
narrowing of differences. There was a 
change in the tone of the discussions, 
with the Soviets beginning to address 
the issue in terms of the impact of de- 
fenses on "strategic stability." The 
United States has long sought a discus- 
sion of the offense-defense relationship 
with the Soviets, who have an exten- 
sive strategic defense program of their 
own. If this is an indication of Soviet 
willingness to engage in a serious dis- 
cussion of this offense-defense rela- 
tionship, we welcome it. 

While the Soviets have presented 
what they call "new proposals," they 
have slowed the pace of the Geneva 
talks and refuse to clarify their views 
or give details on these so-called new 
proposals. Past Soviet efforts have been 
aimed at crippling the SDI program; it 
is clear that this remains their principal 
objective. 



During Secretary Shultz's April 
1987 meetings in Moscow and subse- 
quently at the nuclear and space talks 
in Geneva, the United States made a 
new proposal on defense and space is- 
sues. This new proposal incorporates 
the following elements. 

• The United States and Soviet 
Union would make a mutual commit- 
ment, through 1994, not to withdraw 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
for the purpose of deploying strategic 
defenses. 

• During this period, the United 
States and U.S.S.R. would observe 
strictly all ABM Treaty provisions 
while continuing research, develop- 
ment, and testing, which are permitted 
by the ABM Treaty. 

• This commitment would be con- 
tingent on implementation of 50% re- 
ductions to equal levels in strategic of- 
fensive arms over 7 years from entry 
into force of a START agreement. 

• The right is reserved to withdraw 
from the proposed treaty for reasons of 
supreme interests or material breach of 
this treaty, START, or the ABM 
Treaty. 

• Either side would have the right 
to deploy advanced strategic defenses 
after 1994, if it so chose, unless the 
parties agreed otherwise. 

In response to expressed Soviet 
concerns, the United States has also 
offered proposals to enhance confidence 
and predictability regarding each side's 
exploration of advanced strategic de- 
fense technologies. The United States 
has proposed that the United States 
and the Soviet Union annually ex- 
change data on their planned strategic 
defense activities. In addition, we seek 
to have the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. carry out reciprocal briefings 
on their respective strategic defense 
efforts and visits to associated research 
facilities, as we have proposed in our 
open laboratories initiative. Finally, we 
have proposed establishing mutually 
agreed procedures for reciprocal obser- 
vation of strategic defense testing. 

Nuclear Testing 

During the Washington ministerial in 
September 1987, the United States and 
the Soviet Union agreed to begin full- 
scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on 
nuclear testing. These negotiations be- 
gan November 9, 1987, in Geneva. As 
the first step in these talks, the sides 
seek agreement on effective verification 



measures which would make it possi' ; 
to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Tre 
and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty. Once these verification conce 
have been satisfied and the treaties 
ratified, the United States would imi 
diately propose negotiations on way? 
implement a step-by-step parallel pn 
gram — in association with a program 
reduce and ultimately eliminate all n 
clear weapons — of limiting and ulti- 
mately ending nuclear testing. 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 

On September 15, 1987, Secretary 
Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze signed an agreement 
establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Ci 
ters in their respective capitals. Thij 
agreement, which is the direct resul 
a U.S. initiative, is a practical measi 
that will strengthen international s& 
curity by reducing the risk of conflict 
between the United States and the 
Soviet Union that might result from 
accident, misinterpretation, or 
miscalculation. The centers will play i 
role in exchanging information and nc 
fications required under existing and 
possible future arms control and conf 
dence-building measures agreements. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation 

On July 28-30, 1987, the United Statt 
and the Soviet Union held the ninth 
round in an ongoing series of consults 
tions, which began in December 1982, 
on nuclear nonproliferation. These cm 
sultations have covered a wide range 
of issues, including prospects for 
strengthening the international non- 
proliferation regime, support for the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and 
the mutual desire of the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. to strengthen the Ir 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. 
These consultations are not negotia- 
tions but, rather, discussions to reviev 
various issues of common concern. Th( 
United States and the Soviet Union 
share a strong interest in preventing 
the dangerous spread of nuclear weap- 
ons and have agreed to use these con- 
sultations as a forum for discussion an^ 
exchange of views. The next round of 
discussions is tentatively scheduled for 
January 1988 in Washington. 



26 



Department of State Bullettj 



ARMS CONTROL 



nical Weapons (CW) 

pril 1984, the United States pre- 
;d at the 40-nation Conference on 
rmament (CD) in Geneva a compre- 
Lve draft treaty banning develop- 
,, production, use, transfer, and 
:piling of chemical weapons, to be 
ied by various means, including 
t-notice, mandatory onsite chal- 
; inspection. At the November 1985 
!va summit. President Reagan and 
'ral Secretary Gorbachev agreed to 
isify bilateral discussions on all as- 
. of a comprehensive, global chem- 
weapons ban, including verification. 
e then, we have held six rounds of 
eral talks on a chemical weapons 
y. A seventh round is scheduled 
December 1987. 

Bilateral treaty discussions have 
iiowed differences in a number of 
es, including early data exchange 
K challenge inspection. Until March 
i. the Soviets, who possess by far 
(ivdrld's largest CW stockpile, had 
) idmitted that they even possess 
inical weapons. In April, they 
a lied that they had stopped produc- 
jhem, had no chemical weapons 
) tioned outside their borders, and 
6^ building a facility to destroy exist- 
ij5tocks. They also hosted a visit by 
oference on Disarmament represent- 
;ijs to the Soviet CW facility at 
h;hany in October and have accepted 
hgstanding U.S. invitation to ob- 
»e the U.S. CW destruction facility 
looele, Utah. We see these moves as 
a'ul steps toward building confidence 
^1 :h will facilitate negotiation of an 
f ctively verifiable ban on chemical 
n pons. 

Nonetheless, differences remain on 
:imber of important issues, including 
r iring participation of all states 
ch could pose a chemical weapons 
1 -at ; strengthening verification in 
it <>i new technologies, the continu- 
1 ]irnliferation of CW, and the expan- 
.1 I it chemical industries capable of 
(li military and civilian production; 
1 ntaining security during the CW de- 
tietion phase under a convention; and 
Killing how to protect sensitive non- 
vipons-related information during in- 
let ions. During the October 
nistt'i'ial in Moscow, the two coun- 
's lield substantive discussion on the 
i i-ange of CW issues. They agreed 
I tlic need to place special focus on 
si issues as priority agenda items 
I liilateral talks. 

In addition to treaty discussions, 

' arc working with allies and other 

■mllv countries as well as with the 



Soviets on preventing the proliferation 
of chemical weapons. Primarily in re- 
sponse to the continuing use of chem- 
ical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the 
United States and 18 other Western in- 
dustrialized countries have been con- 
sulting since 1985 to harmonize export 
controls on CW-related commodities 
and to develop other mechanisms to 
curb the illegal use of chemical weapons 
and their dangerous spread to other 
countries. Also, in bilateral discussions 
with the Soviets on CW nonprolifera- 
tion, we have reviewed export controls 
and political steps to limit the spread 
and use of chemical weapons. 

Conference on Confidence- 
and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) 

Last September, after almost 3 years of 
negotiations, the 35-nation Stockholm 
Conference on Disarmament in Europe 
adopted a set of concrete measures de- 
signed to increase openness and pre- 
dictability of military activities in 
Europe. These measures, which are 
built around NATO proposals, provide 
for prior notification of certain military 
activities above a threshold of 13,000 
troops or 300 tanks, observation of cer- 
tain military activities above a thresh- 
old of 17,000 troops, and annual 
forecasts of upcoming notifiable mili- 
tary activities. The accord also contains 
provisions for onsite air and ground in- 
spections for verification. Although 
modest in scope, these provisions are 
the first time the Soviet Union has 
agreed to inspection on its own ter- 
ritory for verification of an interna- 
tional security accord. The United 
States is encouraged by the record of 
implementation to date, which gener- 
ally reflects both the letter and the 
spirit of the Stockholm document. 

On August 30, 1987, the United 
States— under the terms of the Stock- 
holm document— successfully completed 
the first-ever onsite inspection of a So- 
viet military exercise. The United 
States considers the successful con- 
clusion of this inspection a step in the 
process of improving openness and 
building confidence and security in 
Europe. In September, the United 
Kingdom inspected an exercise involv- 
ing Soviet and East German forces in 
the German Democratic Republic; in 
October, the Soviets conducted similar 
inspections of NATO exercises in Tur- 
key and the Federal Repubhc of Ger- 
many (F.R.G.) involving U.S. forces; 
and in November, the German Demo- 
cratic Republic inspected an F.R.G. 
military activity. 



Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reductions (MBFR) 

On December 5, 1985, NATO presented 
at the MBFR negotiations a major ini- 
tiative designed to meet Eastern con- 
cerns. The proposal deferred the 
Western demand for data agreement on 
current forces prior to treaty signature. 
The Soviets had claimed that this West- 
ern demand was the primary roadblock 
to agreement. The proposal also called 
for a time-limited, first-phase with- 
drawal from Central Europe of 5,000 
U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed 
by a 3-year, no-increase commitment by 
all parties with forces in this zone. 
During this time, residual force levels 
would be verified through national tech- 
nical means, agreed entry/exit points, 
data exchange, and 30 annual onsite in- 
spections. Thus far, the Soviets have 
not responded constructively to the 
Western initiative. 

NATO High-Level Task Force 
on Conventional Arms Control 

This task force presented its report on 
the direction of NATO's conventional 
arms control policy to the North Atlan- 
tic Council on December 11, 1986. At 
that meeting, NATO ministers issued 
the "Brussels declaration," which states 
NATO's readiness to enter into new ne- 
gotiations with the Warsaw Pact aimed 
at establishing a "verifiable, compre- 
hensive and stable balance of conven- 
tional forces at lower levels" in the 
whole of Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. NATO began discussions 
with the Warsaw Pact in February 1987 
to develop a mandate for new negotia- 
tions. In July, representatives of NATO 
presented a draft mandate for negotia- 
tions that would directly involve the 23 
nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
and would cover their conventional 
forces on land from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. These negotiations would take 
place within the framework of the 
CSCE [Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe] process but would 
be autonomous regarding subject mat- 
ter, participation, and procedures. ■ 



vJiuary 1988 



27 



EAST ASIA 



U.S.-Lao POW/MIA 
Technical Meeting Concludes 



JOINT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 20, 1987 

In following up the joint press release 
of August 12, 1987, adopted on the oc- 
casion of the visit to Vientiane by a 
U.S. delegation headed by Richard 
Childress, Director of Asian Affairs, 
National Security Council, and follow- 
ing the visit to Washington by His E.\- 
cellency Mr Soubanh Srithirath, Vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao 
Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) 
in October 1987, the first Lao-U.S. 
technical meeting was held in Vientiane 
on November 11-13, 1987. 

The Lao delegation was headed by 
Mr. Sombat Chounlamany, Director of 
Department Two of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, and included 
representatives of the Ministries 
of Defense and Health. The U.S. dele- 
gation was headed by Charge d'Affaires 
Harriet W. Isom of the American Em- 
bassy in Vientiane and included repre- 
sentatives of the Joint Casualty 
Resolution Center and the Central 
Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. 

Both sides reaffirmed their respect 
for the principles of independence, sov- 



ereignty, territorial integrity, and non- 
interference in each other's internal 
affairs. The U.S. side underlined its op- 
position to private, irresponsible efforts 
that interfere with government-to-gov- 
ernment cooperation. 

The Lao side is considering a uni- 
lateral excavation of a crash site of an 
American airplane in Savannakhet 
Province, is continuing its researches 
into three particular discrepancy cases, 
and confirmed its intention to provide 
the results as soon as possible. 

The U.S. side acknowledged the le- 
gitimate humanitarian problems of 
Laos, as e.xpressed in the August meet- 
ing and in this technical meeting. It 
confirmed its intention to respond to 
them within the limits of its ca- 
pabilities. In this regard, an American 
nongovernmental organization is consid- 
ering plans to erect a prefabricated 
clinic in the vicinity of the Lao Govern- 
ment's next excavation and to stock it 
with appropriate medicines. 

The talks have proceeded in a cor- 
dial and frank atmosphere. The Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs of the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic and the 
Embassy of the United States of Amer- 
ica will continue their discussion of 
these important issues. ■ 



U.S.-Japan Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreement 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 9, 19871 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, 
pursuant to sections 123 b. and 123 d. of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 21.53 (b), (d)), the te.xt 
of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation 
Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of 
Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy, including an implementing agree- 
ment pursuant to Article 11 of the pro- 
posed agreement. 1 am also pleased to 
transmit my written approval, authoriza- 
tion and determination concerning the 
agreement, and the Nuclear Proliferation 
Assessment Statement by the Director of 
the United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency concerning the agreement. 
The joint memorandum submitted to me by 
the Departments of State and Energy, 



which includes a summary of the provisions 
of the agreement, the views of the Director 
of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency and an analysis of 
the approvals and consents contained in 
the agreement, including the implementing 
agreement, and associated subsequent ar- 
rangements are also enclosed. 

I also enclose for your information the 
texts of a proposed subsequent arrange- 
ment under the United States-Norway Re- 
vised Agreement for Cooperation 
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear En- 
ergy and a proposed subsequent arrange- 
ment under the United States-EURATOM 
[European Atomic Energy Community] 
Additional Agreement for Cooperation 
Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic En- 
ergy. These subsequent arrangements are 
designed to give effect to certain provi- 
sions of the United States-.lapan imple- 
menting agreement and will enter into 
force only after the agreement enters into 



force. They are being processed by the I) 
partment of Energy in accordance with t: 
applicable provisions of the Atomic Ener. 
Act of 1954, as amended. 

The proposed agreement with .Japan, 
including the implementing agreement, h 
been negotiated in accordance with the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
(NNPA). In my judgment it meets all sta; 
utory requirements. It will supersede out 
1968 agreement with Japan and, given the 
magnitude of our long-standing cooperati^ 
with Japan in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, will represent the most significai 
achievement to date in our program initi- 
ated pursuant to section 404(a) of the 
NNPA to update all existing agreements 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation to inclui: 
the more stringent standards established 
by that Act. 

I believe that the new agreement wu 
strengthen the basis for continued close c 
operation between the United States and 
Japan in the peaceful nuclear area and th: 
it will further the non-proliferation and 
other foreign policy interests of the Units 
States. The implementing agreement pro- 
vides .Japan advance, long-term consents 
reprocessing, transfers, alteration and 
storage of nuclear material subject to the 
agreement, provided that the repmcessin 
and subsequent use of the recovered pluti 
nium meet and continue to meet the crite 
ria set out in U.S. law, including criteria 
relating to safeguards and physical protec 
tion. These arrangements should enable 
.Japan to plan for its long-term energy 
needs on a more assured, predictable 
basis, while at the same time embodying 
the most advanced concepts of physical s« 
curity and safeguards of any agreement. 
This step forward in our cooperative rela- 
tions with .Japan wdll be consistent with tl 
NNPA's injunction to take such actions as 
are required to confirm the reliability of 
the United States as a nuclear supplier 
consistent with non-proliferation goals. 

Japan is not only a close ally of the 
United States but is also a party to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuelea 
Weapons and has long been one of the 
strongest supporters of the international 
non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the 
United States and Japan have a substantii 
identity of views and intentions with re- 
gard to preventing nuclear proliferation 
and are prepared to work together on meas 
ures that will contribute to the prevention 
of proliferation consistent with the peace- 
ful uses of nuclear energy. An exchange ol 
letters between the United States and 
Japan, the text of which is included in the 
agreement package, sets forth in detail ou 
shared views on non-proliferation. 

1 have considered the views and rec- 
ommendations of the interested agencies ii 
reviewing the proposed agreement and 
have determined that its performance will 
promote, and will not constitute an unrea- 
sonable risk to, the common defense and 
security. Accordingly, 1 have approved the 



28 



Department of State Bulletn. 



ECONOMICS 



ment and authorized its execution 
rge that the Congress give it favor- 
consideration. 

have also found that this agreement 
all applicable requirements of the 
lie Energy Act, as amended, for 
4 ?ments for peaceful nuclear coopera- 
and, thei'efore, I am transmitting it 
e Congress without exempting it from 
n -equirement contained in section 123 a. 
at Act. This transmission shall con- 
te a submittal for purposes of both 
ons 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic 
•gy Act. The Administration is pre- 
d to begin immediately the consulta- 
, with the Senate Foreign Relations 
ii House Foreign Affairs Committees as 
n ided in section 123 b. Upon completion 
i( e 30-day continuous session period 
ided in section 123 b., the 60-day con- 
)US session period provided for in sec- 
123 d. shall commence. 

Ronald Reacan 



Text from Weekly Compilation of 
P lidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. 



Semiconductor Trade 
\Aith Japan 



agreement on fair trade in semiconduc- 
tors. When that agreement was not 
complied with, retaliation was used to 
bring about compliance. I hope Con- 
gress will i-emember that Section 301 
has been used effectively before making 
any changes in the law that would 
attempt to force the President to re- 
taliate at times when it would be 
counterproductive. 

Last June, when a review of the 
data showed that Japanese third- 
country dumping was declining on one 
semiconductor product, I ordered a 
proportional response and lifted sanc- 
tions on $51 million of the full $300 mil- 
lion in sanctions. Because the most 
recent review of the data shows that 
third-country dumping has ceased for 
both DRAMs and EPROMs— the two 
semiconductor products covered under 
this portion of the agreement — I am di- 
recting an additional suspension of 
sanctions amounting to $84 million. The 
remaining $165 million in sanctions will 
remain in effect because of the lack of 
sufficient progress to date on access to 
the Japanese market for foreign-based 
semiconductor makers. 



U.S. semiconductor producers and 
users were closely consulted during our 
discussions with the Japanese Govern- 
ment. Based on these discussions, they 
recommended the action I am taking 
today. 

The Japanese Government has 
given me assurances that this positive 
pattern with respect to third-country 
dumping will continue. If these as- 
sui'ances prove not to be the case, I 
will not hesitate to reimpose the partial 
sanctions that have been suspended. I 
have also been assured by the Govern- 
ment of Japan that no quantitative or 
other kinds of restrictions exist on the 
production, supply, or shipment of sem- 
iconductors and that it is not engaged 
in allocation schemes that might disad- 
vantage foreign purchasers of semicon- 
ductors from Japanese producers. In 
addition, the Japanese Government has 
reaffirmed its commitment to monitor 
company-by-company costs and export 
prices for certain semiconductors to 
prevent dumping. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 9, 1987. 



I :SII)ENTS STATEMENT, 

(,■. t, 19871 



Protectionism and Trade Barriers 



n espouse to improved Japanese com- 
ili ice with the 1986 U.S. -Japan semi- 
•oluctor agreement, I am today 
insuncing my intention to suspend a 
10 ion of the sanctions I placed on Jap- 
n-ie products last April when we de- 
e nined that Japan was not fully 
rlementing the agreement. 

I imposed these sanctions to dem- 
r.i-ate that we are serious about fair 
■ If and to make clear that we insist 
' III' full implementation of all our 
i§eeinents. I also made clear, however, 
I : we would remove the sanctions as 
M n as we had firm and continuing evi- 
\ ce that the dumping of Japanese 
i liconductors in third-country mar- 
as had stopped and that access to the 
iaanese market had improved. Japan 
■! n important trading partner and a 
'-(' ally, and we want to make every 
lit to resolve our differences as soon 
|Hi>sible. 
Tliis case serves as a reminder that 
judicious and proper use of Section 
' ran bring results. Retaliation ought 
tic used only as a last resort and 
' \ \\ hen it is likely to lead to a posi- 
• i-i'sult. In this case, we used the 
cat (if retaliation to achieve a sound 



by W. Allen Wallis 

Address before the 9th German- 
American Roundtable on NATO Issues 
on October 29, 1987. Mr. Wallis is Un- 
der Secretary for Economic Affairs and 
Agriculture. 

I am particularly pleased to be able to 
talk to you today on "Protectionism and 
Trade Barriers." Trade issues present a 
critical challenge to our economic pros- 
perity, to our political cohesion, and, 
therefore, to the strength of our al- 
liance. After talking briefly about trade 
issues from a broad perspective, with 
special attention to the problem of agri- 
culture, I propose to narrow my focus 
to talk about the way in which eco- 
nomic principles should be applied in 
our mutual defense. 

Preserving and Strengthening 
the International Trading System 

These days all our attention seems to 
be on the gyrations of financial markets 
and the possible implications of these 



gyrations for our prosperity. Headlines 
are focusing on one policy issue — our 
efforts to make greater progress in re- 
ducing the U.S. budget deficit. I do not 
want to minimize the importance of 
dealing adequately with that deficit. 
But we must not lose sight of other 
policy issues of great importance to our 
future prosperity. Chief among these, 
in my opinion, is the necessity to pre- 
serve and strengthen the international 
trading system. Let us not forget the 
key role that rising trade protec- 
tionism — in particular, the infamous 
Smoot-Hawley tariff in this country — 
played in dragging the world economy 
down into the Great Depression of the 
1930s. 

Here in the United States, we are 
engaged in a struggle against the 
forces of protectionism. Protectionist 
pressures normally arise because ad- 
justment to shifting patterns of inter- 
national specialization is a painful 
process, however beneficial to the eco- 
. nomic welfare of the society as a whole. 
Until now we have been able to contain 
these pressures fairly well. The U.S. 
market is still remarkably open. Mer- 
chandise imports as a percentage of 



^nuary 1988 



29 



ECONOMICS 



gross national product (GNP) are run- 
ning about a quarter larger than a dec- 
ade ago. Our openness to the exports of 
the developing world is particularly 
noteworthy: with less than 40% of in- 
dustrial country GNP, we account for 
over 60% of industrial country imports 
of manufactured goods from the devel- 
oping countries. (The European Com- 
munity, by comparison, with about one- 
third of industrial country GNP, ac- 
counts for less than a quarter of these 
imports.) 

But in the United States at pres- 
ent, two additional factors are making 
protectionist pressures extremely diffi- 
cult to contain. 

First is the persistent large trade 
deficit. 

Second, and even more important, 
is the widespread perception that this 
deficit results from unfair practices 
abroad — markets more closed than our 
own or unfair aid to foreign exporters. 

While informed people in the 
United States understand that such 
practices are not a main cause of our 
trade deficit, the need to fight protec- 
tionism means that we must be seen to 
be making progress toward a fairer, 
more truly open international trading 
system. A more liberal trading system 
is well worth striving for in its own 
right, but the current threat of protec- 
tionist legislation in the U.S. Congress 
makes our efforts to improve the inter- 
national trade system even more 
urgent. 

The United States, as I am sure 
you know, has also been urging its in- 
dustrial country trading partners to 
take action to increase their growth — 
which would assist the process of ad- 
justment in our trade balances. Ger- 
many has been a chief target of this 
effort, both because of its importance 
as the bellwether of the European econ- 
omy and also because its recent and 
prospective growth is particularly dis- 
appointing. We are not talking about 
promoting growth through inflationary 
policies; stronger growth can and 
should be sought through sound means. 
In particular, European nations, as well 
as Japan and the United States, need to 
make a break with past policies that 
have produced rigidities thwarting 
structural adjustment to changing tech- 
nologies and trade advantages. Such 
policies can simultaneously help keep 
inflation in check and promote stronger 
investment and economic growth. 
Rigidities in labor markets have been 
pointed out (for example, in a recent 
OECD [Organization for Economic 



Cooperation and Development] study) 
as a particularly important barrier 
to adjustment and employment 
gi'owth in Europe. 

Let me return to international 
trade policy. About a year ago, we 
launched a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations — the Uruguay 
Round. The successful launch of the 
round reflects the recognition that the 
economic health of all nations depends 
on the preservation of an open, liber- 
alized trading system in which trade 
based on comparative advantage will 
help us achieve our economic potentials. 

These negotiations — which will be 
far more comprehensive than those of 
any previous trade round — seek to 
strengthen the world trading system 
and adapt it to the realities of the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. In these 
negotiations, we will seek to establish 
effective trade rules for sectors outside 
the current reach of international disci- 
pline, such as services, intellectual 
property, investment, and agriculture. 

The Need for Agricultural 
Trade Policy Reform 

Let me focus for a moment on agri- 
culture, because it is here that one can 
now see the most egregious example of 
policies that are producing enormous 
waste. Indeed, the current situation is 
scandalous. Present agricultural sub- 
sidies and import barriers are costing 
OECD countries over $150 billion annu- 
ally. The costs to the vast majority of 
the people far, far exceed the benefits 
to farmers and those who provide goods 
and services to farmers. Not only do 
such policies waste resources that could 
be usefully devoted to other needs — 
including defense; they strain relations 
between allies. Each side tries to sus- 
tain, at the expense of others, policies 
that are intrinsically unsustainable. We 
are hurting ourselves, each other, and, 
in addition, the gi'owth prospects of de- 
veloping countries. 

The United States has proposed 
to phase out, over 10 years, all agri- 
cultural subsidies and import barriers; 
to reduce protective barriers by harmo- 
nizing health and sanitary regulations; 
to continue bona fide food aid pro- 
grams; and to provide needy farmers 
income support rather than subsidize 
them to produce surplus crops. 

The Commission of the European 
Communities has also put forward a 
proposal. We welcome the proposal as a 
means of starting the necessary nego- 
tiations. It includes a number of posi- 
tive elements, including a multilateral 



reduction of incentives to production 
and separation of farm income suppo >■ 
from production, but it would not le; 
to fundamental adjustment and a mc! 
efficient use of resources. Essentiall; 
an extension of the Community's hig 
managed agricultural system, it in- 
cludes maintenance of extensive expi 
subsidies and restrictive trade pract ijf 
and even appears to increase the roll"- 
governments in setting prices, contr 
ling production, and providing expor 
subsidies. We surely can do better tl 
this. 

Reducing agricultural capacity v 
be difficult and painful in some case.- 
This is precisely why we place such 
phasis on internationally coordinatec 
reform to spread the burden of adjui 
ment across all countries which now 
provide farm support. Such a proces ( 
global adjustment in agriculture woi 
result in a situation where patterns - 
production and trade would be baset 
on efficiency and productivity. 

We recognize that it is not likeh 
that most countries will want to aba 
don farm programs altogether. Man; 
countries wish to keep small farms f 
various reasons. All that we propose 
that such programs not lead to wast 
overproduction and do not distort tr 
at the expense of others. This is an 
achievable goal, and the time for act 



Innovation and Technology 
in Defense Industries 

In the defense area, just as in agri- 
culture, we need to deal with the co 
flict between desires to protect 
domestic industry and the goal of ec 
nomic efficiency. But in this area oui 
concern is not just with our prosper 
but with our very national security. 

Before examining the troublesoi 
contradictions, it is worth taking a r 
ment to consider the role of innovati 
and technology in defense industries 

Innovation based on advancing ' 
technology has become the engine ol 
progress in today's world. We have 
come to depend on technological inni ■• 
tion for the economic strength that i 
essential to the welfare of the allianc 
Without that progress, our societies 
would stagnate. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, we must constantly adapt t 
technological evolution. 

The high-technology revolution <^ 
emplifies some of the fundamental v; 
ues of the West. It is the product of ' 
centuries of free scientific inquiry ar| 
free interchange of scientific ideas 
across the Atlantic. The basic econoK 



30 



Department of State Bullf 



i 



ECONOMICS 



: (if life in the high-technology era 
nigh research costs and short prod- 
i\es. In this environment, business 
i.'ss is closely linked with open mar- 
. An expanding international mar- 
ilace is vital to our high-technology 
St lies. 

t )f course, it is not only our eco- 
ii- and social well-being that has 
e 1 affected by the high-technology 
e'lution. Technological leaders such 
s lermany and the United States, 
nmmercia! competitors world- 
are joined together in a military 
,1 nee. This ju.xtaposition of commer- 
i{ rivah'y and strategic partnership is 
..h basis of many of the specific issues 
;:hi crop up in our relationship. 

For NATO cannot expect the 
h at from the Warsaw Pact to remain 
Tiiely quantitative. Over the last 10 
•'•s. NATO's substantial technological 
• 111 such areas as sophisticated and 
ily maneuverable aircraft, tank ar- 
.n , submarine design, and electronic 
.'C itermeasures has eroded. Moreover, 
",h Warsaw Pact has often been swifter 
n eploying new technology in its 
w pons systems. Too often, NATO's 
te :nological edge over the Warsaw 
Pi ; has been in the laboratory, not 
w 1 its troops in the field. 

Modern technology is indispensable 
fo the security of the West. Our supe- 
ri technology endows us with impor- 
ts ; advantages over our potential 
a( ersaries. However, increasingly so- 
pl iticated technologies often come 
w 1 high price tags. Our defense ac- 
q ution costs tend to grow, while 
q ntities procured tend to shrink. 
N TO countries find themselves forced 
U nake do with ever-smaller incre- 
ir Its to their forces, even as they 
e er an era of rapid technological 
p gress. The smaller NATO countries 
e- n worry that technological progress 
n / be beyond their means. 

Exploitation of emerging technolo- 
gs has alw-ays been central to NATO's 
a iroach to maintaining deterrence. We 
he regarded our technological advan- 
t e as an important offset to the quan- 
t itive superiority of the Warsaw Pact. 
^LTO nations will continue to push 
b:k the boundaries of high technology 
i the years ahead. However, that is no 
1 ison for us to rest easy. 

Despite the apparent superiority of 
^rsaw Pact conventional forces, expe- 
i.nce shows that it would be optimistic 
t assume that NATO countries will 
' ike substantial increases soon in the 
sources they devote to defense. It fol- 
vs that the alliance must use its cur- 



rent resources more efficiently. One 
traditional obstacle to efficiency has 
been our mercantilistic approach to 
procuring arms and other defense- 
related goods. 

Economic Principles 
and Defense Policy 

The principles of economics apply as 
much to defense policy as they do to 
civilian policy. The drive to innovate 
and the advantages conferred upon the 
innovator over his rivals can be found 
equally in defense and in business. In- 
deed, the fundamental determinants 
ai'e identical in both cases. However, 
there is one characteristic of defense 
economic policy that, fortunately, does 
not apply in most of the rest of the 
economy: for defense equipment, gov- 
ernments are the only customers. This 
obvious difference sometimes blinds us 
to the fact that the same economic prin- 
ciples operate in both spheres. 

Our thinking about transatlantic 
arms procurement decisions has tradi- 
tionally been encapsulated in the term 
"two-way street." Fortunately, that con- 
cept of reciprocal arms purchases does 
not necessarily interfere with effi- 
ciency. One dramatic example of this 
was the recent U.S. decision to pur- 
chase from France a $4.5-billion mobile 
field communications system (the 
"RITA" system) because it was the 
most cost-effective system available. 
Yet it is unrealistic to expect that the 
"two-way street" would naturally result 
in precisely balanced arms trade be- 
tween the United States and each of 
the other 15 NATO members. Nor 
should it, considering that defense is 
one industry where the United States 
has made steady and substantial invest- 
ment and thus continues to enjoy a 
competitive advantage. 

What we should be striving for, in- 
stead, is a freer market for defense 
equipment within the aUiance. There 
are some encouraging trends. The 
United States has signed memoranda 
of understanding with several NATO 
countries, including the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, providing for re- 
ciprocal access to national defense 
markets. These agreements permit for- 
eign firms to compete for U.S. Depart- 
ment of Defense procurement and for 
contracts often free of "Buy American" 
restrictions and even tariffs. In this 
connection, I remind you that the 
Department of Defense accounts for 
some 80% of total U.S. Government 
procurement. 



However, we cannot rest on our 
laurels. In these days of stubbornly 
high trade deficits, my government has 
begun to notice that American defense 
manufacturers are often denied re- 
ciprocal access to foreign defense mar- 
kets. This is a situation that can easily 
lead to transatlantic disagreements, so 
it must not be ignored. 

Noneconomic Practices 

in Arms Procurement Procedures 

Potential causes for concern are various 
noneconomic, or perhaps I should say 
antieconomic, practices that have crept 
into our transatlantic arms procure- 
ment procedures. In recent years, for 
example, offset requirements have pro- 
liferated in defense procurement. (Off- 
sets include such industrial and 
commercial compensation practices as 
coproduction, subcontractor production, 
licensed production, overseas invest- 
ment, directed transfer of technology, 
and countertrade, imposed as condi- 
tions for purchase.) Offsets arose in the 
1950s in response to the legitimate need 
to rebuild the industrial base for de- 
fense in Western Europe and Japan. At 
that time, offset agreements may have 
been justifiable on grounds of reducing 
the impact of military equipment pur- 
chases on the budgets and trade ac- 
counts of those countries. Offsets also 
contributed to standardizing and mod- 
ernizing the arms of the alliance and to 
strengthening transatlantic ties in 
defense. 

Times and circumstances have 
changed. But offsets remain. America's 
allies have continued to raise their off- 
set requirements, despite dramatic im- 
provements in their economies. Indeed, 
the variety and magnitude of the offsets 
demanded has increased significantly in 
recent years. Between 1980 and 1984, 
U.S. exports of defense equipment to- 
taled some $48 billion. Nearly half of 
that amount involved offset require- 
ments. Moreover, 75% of these offset 
obligations were to our industrialized 
allies: Canada, Japan, and our Euro- 
pean NATO allies. 

This is an area that cries out for 
reform. The increase in costs caused by 
such uneconomic practices is obvious to 
any economically literate person. Such 
offset requirements undermine our col- 
lective security by weakening the com- 
petitive position of industries vital to 
our common defense. I believe the time 
has come to seek to develop multi- 
lateral understandings within the al- 
liance to limit the use of offsets. 



luary 1988 



31 



ECONOMICS 



The United States has been work- 
ing to improve transatlantic collabora- 
tion in defense procurement and to 
open American markets more widely 
to European defense equipment. We 
detect a movement in Europe itself to- 
ward technological coopei'ation — though 
sometimes to the exclusion of American 
firms and technologies. In European 
terms, this trend might well be per- 
fectly understandable. Europeans con- 
sider intra-European cooperation in the 
defense sphere without the United 
States to be both natural and neces- 
sary. Europeans sometimes contend 
that cooperation of this nature is not 
anti-American but, rather, is in the 
long-term interest of the alliance. Sup- 
porters of the European option in the 
Westland affair explained their position 
in exactly these terms. 

For its part, the United States has 
long urged that Europeans work to- 
gether more closely. We have, for ex- 
ample, applauded the more prominent 
role the Independent European Pro- 
gram Group has begun to play in foster- 
ing greater intra-European arms 
cooperation. We recognize that as such 
cooperation begins to bear fruit, the 
United States may find itself outside 
some important cooperative defense 
projects. In such cases, however, it 
should be demonstrable that this result 
does not reduce the cost-effectiveness 
of the system which emerges from the 
project. 

European cooperation is moving 
forward. Perhaps the most visible 
example is the effort by Britain, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain to develop 
a European fighter aircraft. Some com- 
mentators predict that the European 
fighter aircraft will be a bust. If it is 
successful, however, and there is every 
reason to believe the participants will 
do their utmost to make it so, a Euro- 
pean fighter replacing the F-16 could 
provide strong competition for the 
next-generation U.S. fighter. And the 
European fighter aircraft is only one of 
30 projects being launched or studied 
by European nations and European 
companies. 



Such efforts are laudable, to the 
extent that they promote free competi- 
tion, more open international arms mar- 
kets, and exploit economies of scale. 
However, arms cooperation projects 
marked by a priori inclusion or exclu- 
sion of individual companies based on 
nationality will undercut these potential 
advantages. And we must bear in mind 
that such cooperative efforts have their 
risks — political as well as technological. 

Our partners on the other side of 
the Atlantic must recognize today's po- 
litical and economic reahties in Wash- 
ington. In an atmosphere soured by 
persistent trade deficits and by 
what are pei'ceived to be European 
protectionist measures in other areas, 
reactions in some American circles — in- 
cluding some in Congress — to greater, 
exclusive intra-European armament 
cooperation may be quite sharp and 
harmful both to trade and Western 
security. We will all be the losers if 
we, the leaders of the alliance, allow 
matters to deteriorate to that point. 

European policymakers seek to 
achieve such important goals as safe- 
guarding Europe's technological compe- 
tence, in defense-related technologies 
and elsewhere, while simultaneously 
buying effective armaments at the best 
possible price. Obviously, the first of 
these goals will sometimes be in con- 
flict with the second. Superficially, 
advancing European technology may 
appear to be attainable by sacrificing 
price considerations. In many cases, 
however, the reality is that buying mili- 
tary systems off the shelf from the 
United States is the most cost-effective 
use of European resources. 

European efforts to develop high- 
technology weapons, even those involv- 
ing multinational cooperation, are likely 
to be both more expensive and less ef- 
fective than they would be if there were 
some U.S. involvement. When such 
weapons are undertaken, European 
policymakers probably will find 
themselves driven politically to keep 
impractical projects alive at great cost. 
They will feel enormous pressure to 
"protect their national technological 
base," even though a more effective, 
low-cost option is available. In such 



cases, the defense capabilities of the 
alliance as a whole are the real loser. 

NATO countries too often have 
squandered their technological lead 
over the Warsaw Pact by needlessly i 
veloping competing weapons systems 
perform the same mission or by pern 
ting wide gaps to develop in the rela- 
tive technological sophistication of th 
various national contingents within t 
NATO armed forces. Our preoccupat 
with high-technology, prestigious we; 
ons has caused too little attention to 
paid to less glamorous, low-technolo§ 
but still vital, military needs such as 
ammunition stocks and logistics in- 
frastructure. It is the resulting short 
ages that could well prove to be "war 
stoppers" — in the worst sense — for 
NATO. 

Conclusion 

I'm sui'e these arguments are familia ' 
to many of you. Often the compulsioi ' 
to pursue intra-European arms alter- 
natives is felt most acutely by countr i 
with the largest populations, most sc 
phisticated scientific establishments, 
and greatest gross national products 
Ironically, smaller NATO countries 
which lack the capability to develop 
weapons are freer to seek out the be 
combination of technology and price. 
The more widespread this sensible 
practice becomes in NATO, the easit 
it will be for the United States to ke 
its defense procurement open for all 
suppliers. 

The challenges posed by tech- 
nological change will remain high on 
the alliance agenda for years to com( 
Like the concept of security itself, t! 
challenge will have political and eco- 
nomic, as well as military, dimensioi 
We must not take leave of our econo : 
senses when we consider the securit f 
the transatlantic world. Our societie 
have achieved the affluence they cur 
rently enjoy precisely because they 
have been open to free trade in idea; 
products, and technologies. We must 
never abandon the openness that hat 
traiiitionally characterized transatlaib 
exchanges in all of these, for therein' 
lies our true security. ■ 



32 



Department of State Bull'* 



ECONOMICS 



>. Trade Policy at the Crossroads 



; ihn C. Whitehead 

ff('.s-.s before the Conference on Ititer- 
■ iiul trade in Wilmington, Dela- 
,, nil November 2, 1987. Mr 
. Iiiiid is Deputy Secretary of State. 

ilwing the devastation of the 

t Depression and World War II, 
. lilted States took the lead in es- 
,-hing an international economic 
■111 based squarely on the principle 
: freer trade benefits all countries. 
I h system we established has spurred 
, I narkable period of economic 
nth and innovation, not just for us 
u ilso for other nations prepared to 
ei' the opportunity. Nonetheless, a 
le te is raging — in the halls of Con- 
rr s and in the farms and factories of 
\r rica — as to whether free trade is 
■ti a relevant guiding principle in to- 
la '■ world. 

Free trade is not a spent force. 
"1 national debate over trade, and 
r iconomic policy, has intensified 
the last 2 weeks in the wake of the 
J loil in the stock market. 

The stock market developments 
.'i' lly demonstrated the interdepen- 
ie '6 of the major industrial economies 
an the importance of sound and co- 
ne nt economic policies. In his recent 
pr s conference, President Reagan re- 
af med our intention to work closely 
w I our allies to coordinate policies 
ar ensure stable growth. We all recog- 
ni our responsibility to follow sound 
p( :ies that will inspire public 
ec'idence. 

In particular, it is necessary that 
w avoid protectionist policies that 
w Id damage the prospects for eco- 
ni lie growth and global prosperity. 
T world community and financial 
iii'kets would see an outburst of pro- 
tt .ionism here as a sign that the 
U ted States no longer has the will to 
e: rcise responsible leadership on in- 
Uiational economic issues. But if we 
k p our markets open and maintain 
S! nd economic policies, the underlying 
s^ngth of our economy will carry us 
t ough. 

Against this backdrop of the na- 
t lal debate on trade policy and the 
iient financial market developments, 
iliericans should recall some basic 
Isons about trade. 



Economic and Political 
Benefits of Free Trade 

Free trade enriches our lives. Through 
free trade we obtain the widest possi- 
ble range of goods at the lowest possi- 
ble prices. Free trade raises the 
standard of living in all countries. Ulti- 
mately, it is the consumer who benefits 
from free trade — and w-ho pays when 
countries depart from it. 

Free trade promotes economic effi- 
ciency. It encourages capital, labor, and 
other resources in every country to 
flow to their most productive use. 
When markets are allowed to work 
freely, the principle of comparative ad- 
vantage assures a global division of la- 
bor that maximizes output. Today this 
division of labor has produced an e.xtra- 
ordinarily efficient, globally integrated 
pattern of production. The United 
States cannot have a comparative ad- 
vantage in all products, but through 
free trade, we can specialize in what we 
do best and avail ourselves of the best 
products available anywhere. 

By fostering efficient patterns of 
consumption and production, free trade 
maximizes income and spurs economic 
growth. International competition prods 
producers in every country to innovate. 
Free trade is the springboard for new 
products and processes that make our 
lives healthier, fuller, and more com- 
fortable. For example, the development 
of fiber optics will dramatically enhance 
global communications networks. Re- 
cent discoveries in superconductors 
pave the way for new and improved 
products in such areas as computers, 
electricity transmission, medical equip- 
ment, and fusion reactors. 

While the international mar- 
ketplace is incredibly competitive, free 
trade is not a contest in which the suc- 
cess of one country is a defeat for oth- 
ers. We share in the prosperity of 
others, because rising incomes abroad 
provide enhanced markets for us. Eu- 
rope and Japan obviously have become 
tougher economic competitors, but 
their economic advances also have been 
indispensable to our own growth. 

The benefits of free trade are not 
just theoretical. The experience of the 
last 40 years bears out their practical 
significance. Those countries that have 
embraced open markets have pros- 
pei"ed, while those that have followed 
inward-looking economic policies have 



stagnated. This lesson applies to devel- 
oped and developing countries aUke. 
For example, due in large part to the 
market-oriented, outward-looking eco- 
nomic policies, the rate of growth in 
Asian countries such as Korea and Sin- 
gapore has far outpaced the economic 
growth in developing countries with 
statist policies. 

The strong economy we now enjoy 
would be impossible without free trade. 
We are in our 59th month of economic 
growth, making the current recovery 
the longest peacetime recovery in U.S. 
history. Since the start of this expan- 
sion, roughly 240,000 Jobs a month have 
been created for American workers. A- 
higher percentage of Americans are 
working now than ever before. Our 
unemployment rate is 5.8%, the lowest 
level in 8 years. Inflation last year dip- 
ped to the low level of 2%. Economic 
growth this year has proceeded at a 
healthy 3.5% rate. It is important to 
remember that, despite the recent vol- 
atility in the stock market, the U.S. 
economy is fundamentally sound and 
strong. 

Our open market approach is not 
the only cause of our prosperity. A 
sound monetary policy, vigilant efforts 
to restrain growth in government 
spending, and deregulatory policies to 
spark competition and innovation also 
have been essential. But it is equally 
true that prosperity could not have 
been achieved in a woi'ld saddled with 
trade restrictions. 

Despite this prosperity, concerns 
often are raised about the competitive 
position of the U.S. economy and about 
our persistent deficit with the rest of 
the world. As recently as 1981, we ran 
a surplus on our current account, the 
broadest measure of our overall trade 
in goods and services. In 1986, our cur- 
rent account deficit reached $141 billion, 
and it is likely to reach a similar level 
this year. 

Ironically, perhaps, our external 
deficit is, in large part, a result of the 
strength of the U.S. economy relative 
to the economies of our major partners. 
Economic growth in Europe, Japan, and 
many major developing countries has 
been sluggish during the past 6 years. 
Our economy has performed much bet- 
ter. As a consequence, investors have 
sought to put their capital in the 
United States; at the same time, our 
growth in demand has provided a ready 
market for the products of our trading 
partners. The trade deficit tells us 
nothing about the overall competitive 
position of the U.S. economy. 



"luary 1988 



33 



ECONOMICS 



We should clearly understand that 
our deficit was not caused by unfair 
trade practices abroad. As objection- 
able as such practices are, they have 
not increased so dramatically during 
the last 6 years that they can explain 
the shift from a small surplus to a 
large deficit. 

We also need to recognize that the 
benefits of free trade do not cease 
when we run a trade deficit. Trade re- 
strictions would deprive us of the bene- 
fits of trade but would not reduce the 
deficit unless they were so draconian as 
to devastate the economy. 

The United States has a choice to 
make. We can continue to embrace and 
strengthen the free trade system — a 
system that produces enormous bene- 
fits for our economy. Or we can retreat 
from the world economy and construct 
barriers to foreign trade an invest- 
ment — an isolationist approach that 
damages both our national and the 
global prosperity. 

These alternatives are posed stark- 
ly in two important issues currently 
before Congress: the free trade agree- 
ment with Canada and the omnibus 
trade bill. 

U.S. -Canada Free Trade Agreement 

The United States and Canada recently 
concluded an agreement establishing a 
bilateral free trade area. This historic 
agreement creates the world's largest 
free trade area. It will strengthen the 
economies of both Canada and the 
United States and, over time, create 
thousands of jobs in both countries. 
Some economists estimate that the 
agreement eventually will raise the 
level of economic well-being by as much 
as 5% in Canada and by a smaller, but 
still very significant, percentage in the 
United States. 

The centerpiece achievement of the 
free trade area is the total elimination 
within 10 years of all tariffs on bilateral 
trade between the United States and 
Canada, currently in e.xcess of $120 bil- 
lion. Since Canadian tariffs currently 
average 10% (as opposed to 4% in the 
United States) and sales to Canada 
account for one-fourth of our total 
exports, the elimination of tariffs will 
create significant new opportunities for 
U.S. businesses. Canada, for its part, 
gains duty-free access to the largest 
national economy in the world. 

Another landmark achievement is 
in the services area. The free trade 
agreement between Canada and the 
United States is the first international 



understanding to establish binding 
rules for all new measures affecting a 
comprehensive set of service sectors. 
Henceforth, neither country will dis- 
criminate against service providers 
from the other in some 150 service sec- 
tors. This element of the agreement, 
covering a large portion of our $ll-bil- 
lion bilateral trade in services, will pro- 
vide secure market access in important 
service sectors, such as the rapidly 
growing area of enhanced telecom- 
munications and computer services. 

In another important economic 
area, investment, Canada has agreed to 
limit its practice of screening, and pos- 
sible blocking, new U.S. investments in 
Canada. Under the agreement, Canada 
will make permanent its recent policy 
of not screening most new investments 
and will reduce significantly the screen- 
ing of direct acquisitions. 

The free trade agreement liber- 
alizes rules in many other areas, in- 
cluding agi'iculture, automotive trade, 
energy, government procurement, 
standards, and trade law remedies. 

The free trade agreement between 
Canada and the United States is inno- 
vative, far-reaching, and courageous. It 
is based squarely on the precepts of 
free trade. As it tears down barriers to 
trade, investment, and other economic 
activity, the agreement will raise the 
standard of living and promote growth 
in both countries. The agreement will 
make both the United States and Can- 
ada more prosperous. 

Furthermore, the success of this bi- 
lateral market-opening initiative will 
lend momentum to multilateral market- 
opening negotiations. We believe that in 
many areas the free trade agreement 
between Canada and the United States 
can serve as a model for the multi- 
lateral Uruguay Trade Round. 

The Trade Bill 

In contrast to the Canada free trade 
agreement, the omnibus trade bills 
pending before Congress would, if en- 
acted, severely damage the U.S. and 
global economies. The bills represent a 
retreat from the postwar free trade 
system that we built and under which 
we have prospered. Perhaps more 
important, they represent a retreat 
from U.S. leadership. 

Both the House and Senate trade 
bills are comprehensive, all-encompass- 
ing measures that affect trade, invest- 
ment, finance, and foreign policy. While 
the provisions are detailed and com- 
plex, there is a common — and very dis- 



turbing — thread throughout each bill 
Directly or indirectly, these bills see 
to replace consideration of the nation 
interest with the dictates of special 
interests. 

In the trade area, the bills cont: 
a myriad of "technical" changes in ou 
trade law. All of the changes head in 
one direction: toward increased barri 
to trade and gi'eater limitations on tl 
President's trade policy authority. 

The cumulative effect of the pro-i 
posed changes is "procedural protec- 
tionism." The provisions take our 
current trade statutes and twist thei 
in a way which would make import r 
strictions a surer bet for industries 
seeking protection. In many cases, t 
proposed provisions explicitly prohib '• 
the President or the Cabinet from ci 
sidering the national interest when c 
liberating whether to take a trade 
action to aid a specific industry. The i 
cost to consumers, job losses to othfri 
U.S. industries, the risk of retaliatic ! 
foreign policy considerations — none ( 
these factors would be given full wei i 
in the trade policy decisionmaking 
process. 

"Quick trigger" protectionist me 
sures would inflict economic damage 
both directly and indirectly. In and ( 
themselves, trade restrictions hurt i 
protected sectors of our economy. R 
strictions would divert resources to 
protected sectors of the economy am 
away from dynamic sectors left un- 
protected. As a result, the standard 
living for the country as a whole woi 
drop. 

Furthermore, new import restrii 
tions here would incite a dangerousl; 
escalating spiral of retaliation that 
easily could lead to a trade war U.S 
exporters would lose overseas markt 
as our trading partners erect their o 
barriers. 

The House and Senate omnibus 
trade bills represent an effort to sub 
vert international trade rules and re 
place them with our own. If others 
followed such an approach, we would i 
the first to protest. 

Outcome Being Watched Closely 

The debate over the course of U.S. 
trade policy is being watched closely 
financial markets and in foreign cap- 
itals. Our decisions will have serious 
consequences — ones that may be felt 
more quickly that many realize and i 
realms beyond the economic. The re- 
cent events in the stock market have 
demonstrated vividly the interdepen 



34 



Department of State Bull'i 



ENERGY 



r of the major industrial economies 
low closely economic developments 
V country are watched by other 
I nes. 

I'oivign investment flows have been 
it I'd to the United States by the 
ni'ity of our economy, and they 
niiitributed significantly to that 
urity. Foreign investors, however, 
mt interested in keeping their 
■\ in a country about to enmesh 
«;■ in protectionist trade restrictions. 
u:hermore, they fear, with good rea- 
)i that controls on capital movement 
rod soon follow imposition of major 
arictions on trade. Indeed, the pend- 
n§)mnibus trade bills already contain 
T( isions — in the form of screening 
:n( registration requirements — for con- 
re ing capital inflows. If investors 
vc to lose confidence in U.S. eco- 
10 ic policy, there could be a rapid 
.i| t of capital, leading, in turn, to 
xioil in foreign exchange markets. 
Ill would rekindle inflationary pres- 
■ us in the U.S. economy, drive up 
n1 'est rates, and put the economy in 
1 ■ Ispin. 

Foreign governments look to the 
L'l ed States for economic, political, 
in strategic leadership. If Congress 
33 es legislation to implement the free 
tr e legislation, the world community 
■A-i perceive that the United States 
:o inues to have the commitment and 
CO age to uphold our international 
re onsibilities. 

On the other hand, if we enact an 
>n ibus trade bill in its current form, 
;o: ign governments will conclude that 
•v( lave surrendered international eco- 
!K ic leadership. They will assume that 
•v( 10 longer have the will to compete 
3r D lead in the search for responsible 
so tions to global economic problems. 
iji m the recent turmoil in the finan- 
:ii markets, it is particularly dan- 
^«)us, at this point in time, for the 
U ted States to even consider adopting 
r sponsible, protectionist economic 



c iclusion 

Ii'onclusion, the United States is at a 
cissroads. Before us are two paths for 
ci ducting trade relations. The first 
Hh is based on recognition of the ben- 
e s of global competition and a will- 
II ness to confront its challenges. If we 
c tinue along this path, we uphold and 
3 ?ngthen the postwar free trade sys- 
t'l that has already produced two gen- 
e tions of unprecedented prosperity 
f us and others. We also remain true 



to a free trade tradition supported by 
every American President since Frank- 
lin Roosevelt. A premier example of 
this strong, forward-looking policy is 
the agreement establishing a free trade 
area with Canada. 

The second path entails a with- 
drawal from global competition and a 
retreat from global responsibilities. 
Barriers to trade and other economic 
interactions are constructed. This path 
leads to economic stagnation here and 
abroad and more fractious political rela- 



tions. A prime example of this weak, 
defensive approach is the omnibus 
trade bills before Congress. 

The rest of the world is watching 
our deliberations in these two areas. 
The stakes are high. I am confident 
that once the American people under- 
stand clearly the nature of the choices 
before them, they and their elected 
representatives will choose the path 
that will foster U.S. international lead- 
ership and global prosperity. ■ 



U.S.-Japan Energy Cooperation 



by W. Allen Wallia 

Address before the U.S.-Japan En- 
ergy Policy Conference sponsored by 
the Atlantic Council on November 12, 
1987. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs and Agriculture. 



It is a special pleasure for me to be 
here tonight for two reasons. 

First, I am pleased that the Atlan- 
tic Council recognizes that Japan is an 
"Atlantic" country. Japan is not literally 
on the Atlantic, but then, neither is 
Italy. As Prime Minister Nakasone 
made clear with eloquent simplicity at 
each of the five economic summits that 
he attended, Japan is part of the West, 
which often is called the "Atlantic com- 
munity"; its security is of a piece with 
that of the West, its political system is 
Western, and its respect for freedom 
and individual rights is like that of the 
West. So it is appropriate that the At- 
lantic Council embrace Japan within its 
field of interest. 

Second, I am pleased to be here 
tonight because of my long association 
with energy issues and with Japan. I 
serve, for example, as chairman of the 
U.S. delegation for semiannual sub- 
cabinet economic consultations with 
Japan. In conjunction with those meet- 
ings, I serve also as the U.S. Chairman 
of the U.S.-Japan Energy Working 
Group. This gives me an opportunity to 
meet twice a year with my colleagues 
in the Japanese Government to discuss 
the important topic of our bilateral en- 
ergy relationship. 

This is a time of transition in the 
Japanese Administration. Prime Minis- 
ter Tkkeshita took office last week, and 
we look forward to working with the 
new Japanese Administration in the 



same warm and cooperative fashion 
that we have enjoyed in the past. Here 
in the United States, our own presiden- 
tial election campaign is already 
underway. 

The transition of administrations is 
a time when we take note of the key 
issues in the U.S.-Japan economic rela- 
tionship; issues which transcend admin- 
istrations or political parties. I will 
take a moment, therefore, to highlight 
key facets of those relations between 
Japan and the United States as a back- 
drop to our discussions of energy 
issues. 

U.S.-Japan Economic 
Relationship 

The Reagan Administration devotes 
more attention to its economic relations 
with Japan, particularly trade, than to 
its economic relations with any other 
country. Japan's high propensity to 
export can be traced to domestic eco- 
nomic factors which have discouraged 
domestic investment and consumption 
in recent years and also to its need to 
export enough to pay for imports of 
energy and raw materials. Because of 
widespread inefficiencies in its domestic 
economy which discourage investment 
at home, Japan has proven much better 
at exporting than at importing. There 
are many official impediments to im- 
ports — for example, quotas on rice, 
beef, citrus, and other agricultural 
products. There also are many impor- 
tant unofficial barriers. Among the un- 
official barriers are cultural preferences 
for dealing with other Japanese firms; 
a certain prejudice against imports; 
concentration of industry; a layered 
distribution system; extensive and 
complicated government regulations 



^luary 1988 



35 



ENERGY 



administered by a bureaucracy that 
is powerful and competent but 
xenophobic; and a political system 
in which special interests too often 
override the national interest. 

As part of our overall strategy for 
reducing trade imbalances and for pro- 
moting growth in Japan, the United 
States, and the rest of the world, we 
are persistently, consistently, and insis- 
tently encouraging Japan to open its 
markets. There are si.x main elements 
of our policy. 

First, addressing the fundamental 
issues behind our trade imbalance by 
encouraging restructuring of the Jap- 
anese economy in ways that will make 
it more efficient and thus more attrac- 
tive to investors, both foreign and 
domestic; 

Second, encouraging further liber- 
alization of Japan's financial and capital 
markets; 

Third, requesting the removal of 
trade barriers to permit trade to be 
based on comparative advantage; 

Fourth, seeking liberalization of 
entire industrial sectors through the 
so-called MOSS process (MOSS means 
market-oriented, sector-selective); 
Fifth, taking action under our 
trade laws, when necessary, against un- 
fair trade practices; and 

Sixth, working to strengthen the 
world trading and monetary systems — 
in particular, to promote the success of 
the Uruguay trade round. 

I want to take this opportunity to 
recognize explicitly that in all six of 
these efforts, we receive strong support 
from within Japan. In the MOSS nego- 
tiations, for example, various groups 
in Japan are every bit as eager as we 
are to see markets opened — indeed, 
the substantial results that have been 
achieved in the MOSS negotiations 
bring even greater benefits to Japan 
than to the United States. 

Similarly, in strengthening the 
world trading system, Japan, in cooper- 
ation with us, has been a prime mover 
in launching the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations, and it has been will- 
ing to put all subjects on the negotiat- 
ing table, even those on which it is 
extremely sensitive and with which it 
will have great political problems. 



Energy Security 
and the Persian Gulf 

In energy, relations between Japan and 
the United States are generally harmo- 
nious, since we share global economic 
interests and have similar needs for im- 
porting energy. 

In the 1970s, we experienced great 
economic upheavals caused by the dis- 
ruption of a portion of the world's oil 
supplies. We have seen that the eco- 
nomic consequences of disruptions in 
oil supplies can be devastating for eco- 
nomic growth, employment, world 
trade, and Third World debt service. 
As the two largest consumers of energy 
in the free world, the United States 
and Japan have a common stake in 
secure, stable supplies of energy. 

Although in recent years we have 
been spared severe disruptions of oil 
supply, the present situation in the Per- 
sian Gulf is precarious. Japan gets over 
half of its oil through the Strait of Hor- 
muz, so obviously, it would be seriously 
affected by an interruption of the flow 
of oil from the gulf It is less obvious, 
but nevertheless true, that the United 
States, which gets only 5% of its oil 
through the strait, also would be seri- 
ously affected by an interruption: some 
of the oil we now import from else- 
where would be diverted to replace oil 
from the gulf, and we would be affected 
by the resulting price increases just as 
much as any other country. 

The United States is pursuing a 
two-pronged approach to the danger in 
the Persian Gulf To counter the imme- 
diate threat to freedom of navigation 
and the free flow of oil, we have in- 
creased significantly our naval presence 
in the gulf. But the long-term solution 
is to end hostilities between Iran and 
Iraq. Toward that goal, the United 
States, together with other members of 
the Security Council, including Japan, 
is making vigorous diplomatic efforts in 
the United Nations to obtain a cease- 
fire and to bring Iran and Iraq to the 
negotiating table. 

Japan recently announced that it 
will make substantial contributions to- 
ward peace and stability in the Persian 
Gulf by helping to install improved nav- 
igational aids. Saying that economic de- 
velopment is indispensable for peace in 
the region, Japan promised to expand 
its economic and technical cooperation 
with gulf states. Japan also will contrib- 
ute financially to the UN Secretary 
General's mediation efforts as well as 
continue to play an important role on 



the diplomatic front with both Iran 
Iraq in support of the Security Coun | 
cil's Resolution 598. We welcome th 
significant contributions by Japan. 
Last month the United States 
announced an embargo on imports 
Iranian goods and new controls on ei 
ports which expand the categories 
militarily useful items that may not 
sold to Iran. Our reasons for embar) 
ing Iranian goods are clear: Iran acti 
and repeatedly supports terrorism, 
it has unlawfully attacked ships of n 
belligerent nations engaged in peact 
commerce in international waters. T 
American people are no longer willii 
to be a source of revenue for Iran's ; 
of aggression and terrorism. These 
trade actions, however, in no way re ' 
duce our emphasis on the two-proni 
approach of ensuring freedom of na\ 
tion and furthering the United Nati 
peace efforts. 

We hope that our friends and al 
will cooperate with our sanctions. A 
Secretary Shultz has said, we hope 1 
"it will be catching — maybe other ci ■ 
tries will decide they don't want to i 
Iranian oil." In any event, we are c 
dent that, at a minimum, Japan am 
other friends will not countenance : 
increase in their imports of oil fron: 
Iran, since that would undercut oui 
action. 

Long-Term Strategy for 
Global Energy Security 

So far, I have discussed the immed: 
political situation and its implicatio 
for our energy security. But the Ui 
States and Japan also cooperate clo 
on a longer term strategy for globa 
energy security. 

The first aspect of this longer ' 
strategy is emergency preparednes 
For both the United States and Jaf 
the formation of the International 1 
ergy Agency (IE A), as the princip; 
ternational agency for achieving en 
security, was an important part of 
response of the industrialized natio 
to the 1973 disruption of oil trade. ' 
lEA's provisions for emergency oil 
stocks and its standby oil-sharing } 
gram today provide a safety net foi 
world oil market. As recently as la 
May, ministers at the lEA Governi 
Board reaffirmed the vital role of s 
tegic oil stocks. 

U.S. and Japanese views are ii 
harmony on the importance of oil 
stocks, and our two nations would 
key contributors to an early draw ( 



36 



ENERGY 



- 1 luring a crisis. In the United 
-. niir Strategic Petroleum Re- 
iSl'R) now holds 540 million bar- 
, i|uivalent to about 100 days of net 
iMii-ts. We are adding 75,000 bar- 
■I'l- (lay to the SPR, working to- 
A unal of 750 million barrels. 
also holds a sizable government- 
I nil stockpile, to which it is 
l; i'\ery day. There is no more 
laiit contribution the United 
> and Japan can make to our mu- 
U'ction against an energy emer- 
lan to have ample reserves and 

[ prepared to start using them 

■aptly, 
^he second aspect of our long-term 

aifor global energy security is free 

id'pen trade in energy. This is a goal 
'lieve worth pursuing with all our 
lu partners, but this evening, I 

1 (icus on our cooperation and trade 

: .Japan. 

t Japan Energy Trade 

ly, market forces should govern 
•lapan energy trade. Both coun- 
understand that. U.S. energy 
Ki.s must be competitively priced 
ler to penetrate Japan's market. 
t le same time, there is a security 
in nsion to energy trade that must be 
ihi into account. 

There is an obvious fit between the 
'r ?d States' abundant energy re- 
i'< and Japan's need for diversified, 
r sources of energy. The United 
< a stable and reliable supplier. 
(s, and oil from the United 
an help to reduce Japanese 
iiilt'iice on less secure energy 
I'-. Increased energy trade pro- 
■ the impetus for greater develop- 
nf resources, thus adding to total 
..able energy supplies. This security 
8] ct requires us to take a long-term 
i( of our energy trade. 

In 1983, the United States and 
t| n agreed on a basic framework for 
oiei'ative energy relations. This pol- 
•veflects the commitment of our two 
rnments to expanding trade in en- 
I" in ways that are mutually bene- 
rl. It emphasizes long-term 
I'l'ation, the central role of the pri- 
-i'ltor, and the balance between 
I'K-rations of economy and security, 
framework has been the basis for 
Work in the U.S. -Japan Energy 
Vking Group. It also has stimulated 
csideration of private projects. We 
■ fve, however, that there is substan- 
pDtential for e.xpanding trade in en- 
>■ between Japan and the United 



On the positive side, Japan is 
America's major partner in energy re- 
search and development. We have long 
had extensive cooperation in the nu- 
clear field, and we hope to speed the 
day when we can supply a larger share 
of our total energy needs from safe and 
secure nuclear fission and, ultimately, 
fusion. 

Recently, there was an important 
development in nuclear energy which 
deserves special mention. Last week, 
U.S. Ambassador Mansfield and Jap- 
anese Foreign Minister Kuranari signed 
an agreement for cooperation between 
our two governments concerning the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This 
new agreement, the text of which had 
been agreed on ad referendum last Jan- 
uary, took several years to negotiate 
and will supersede an existing agree- 
ment that entered into force in 1968. It 
establishes a comprehensive framework 
for peaceful nuclear cooperation be- 
tween the United States and Japan, 
based on shared objectives of prevent- 
ing nuclear proliferation and a shared 
desire to establish a predictable and 
reliable basis for mutually beneficial 
cooperation. The agreement is a signifi- 
cant achievement that should serve to 
enhance considerably the basis for con- 
tinued close and substantial nuclear co- 
operation between us in the years 
ahead. Before the new agreement can 
be brought into force, it must be ap- 
proved by Congress and by the Jap- 
anese Diet. We look forward to the day 
when the agreement enters into force. 

In oil, Japanese companies are un- 
dertaking more and more exploration 
and development joint ventures with 
U.S. oil firms. These are welcome in- 
vestments in expanding oil reserves. 
We in the Administration believe that 
allowing the export of Alaskan North 
Slope oil would benefit the United 
States, Japan, and other oil consumers 
and would be an incentive to further oil 
development. There is, however, con- 
tinuing strong opposition in the Con- 
gress to removing legislative restric- 
tions on oil exports, and we must await 
the opportunity to convince the Con- 
gress of the economic and security ben- 
efits to be obtained from freeing oil 
exports. 

Natural gas is an area where we 
think increased U.S. -Japan cooperation 
may be possible. The United States is 
Japan's oldest supplier of liquefied natu- 
ral gas; it comes from Alaska's Cook 
Inlet. But we are now supplying only a 
small portion of Japan's needs. Japanese 



and U.S. companies have this year com- 
pleted a prefeasibility study of a project 
to develop Alaskan North Slope gas for 
export to Japan. Although it appears 
that the Japanese market alone would 
not support the project, we hope that 
the interested parties on both sides will 
continue to explore ways to bring this 
gas to market. 

In our bilateral energy discussions, 
we spend a great deal of time on issues 
associated with the U.S. coal trade — 
the largest single item in our bilateral 
energy trade. Until 1983, coal demand 
was booming, and we had high hopes 
that Japan would continue to buy sub- 
stantial quantities of coal from us. Rec- 
ognizing the vital need to stay com- 
petitive in the world market, American 
firms have made substantial improve- 
ments in productivity and cost control. 
They have invested in new mines and 
transportation facilities designed to im- 
prove service and lower the costs to the 
export market. In return, we ask Japan 
to look on U.S. mines as long-term sup- 
pliers, not as the suppliers of last re- 
sort. We are confident that American 
coal can be sold competitively in Japan 
and make a major contribution to 
Japan's energy security. 

Conclusion 

Let me summarize by saying that I see 
a partnership between our governments 
and private sectors in the effort to 
achieve global energy security. The 
U.S. and Japanese Governments should 
continue to prepare for the possibility 
of an energy emergency. We should 
seek to remove barriers to free and 
open trade in energy. I call on you, as 
representatives of our private sectors, 
to pursue greater cooperation and in- 
creased trade in the energy resources 
vital to both our economies. ■ 



•uary 1988 



37 



EUROPE 



NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group 
Supports INF Treaty 



The Nuclear Planning Group of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) met in Monterey, California, 
November 3-i, 1987. The United States 
was represented by Secretary of De- 
fense Caspar W. Weinberger. Following 
is the final communique issued on 
November It. 

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
met in ministerial session in Monterey, 
California, on 3rd and 4th November 1987. 
Iceland attended as an observer. We dis- 
cussed a variety of security matters per- 
taining to NATO's nuclear forces, such as 
current arms control negotiations, the sta- 
tus of implementation of the December 
1979 dual-track and 1983 Montebello deci- 
sions, the work of several study groups, 
and future NPG work. 

The fundamental security objectives of 
the Alliance are to deter aggression and to 
provide an environment for peaceful and 
stable relationships between East and 
West on the basis of balanced forces at the 
lowest possible level. The maintenance of 
effective military forces and the pursuit of 
arms control are complementary elements 
of this security policy. 

We welcome and fully support the 
agreement in principle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union for the global 
elimination of land-based INF [intermedi- 
ate-range nuclear forces] missiles with a 
range between 500 and 5,500 kms. This has 



been made possible by the determination 
and solidarity of the Allied Governments 
over the years. We look forward to the 
prospect of a verifiable INF treaty being 
signed and ratified in the near future. 

With the prospect of Soviet agreement 
to long-standing Alliance INF arms control 
objectives, we now look forward to rapid 
progress in the START negotiations [stra- 
tegic arms reductions talks] and reaffirm 
our support for the ^Q% reduction in the 
strategic nuclear arsenals of the United 
States and the Soviet Union as proposed 
by the United States. In this connection, 
we emphasize the importance of a compre- 
hensive, integrated, and coherent approach 
to all elements of arms control and se- 
curity, nuclear and non-nuclear. 

Our strategy of fle.xible response will 
continue to be vital to the security of the 
Alliance. We remain concerned about the 
offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact 
arrayed against us. We are, therefore, de- 
termined, consistent with the framework of 
the Montebello decision and with our arms 
control obligations, to continue to imple- 
ment those measures required to maintain 
the effectiveness, responsiveness, and sur- 
vivability of our nuclear forces. In doing 
so, it is and will remain Alliance policy to 
possess only the minimum number of nu- 
clear weapons necessary for a credible de- 
terrent. In accordance with this policy, and 
in spite of the fact that Soviet nuclear 
forces have continued to increase during 
that period, the Alliance has already uni- 
laterally reduced its nuclear stockpile in 
Europe to the lowest level in over twenty 
years. 

We accepted with pleasure the invita- 
tion of the Danish Government to hold our 
next Nuclear Planning Group ministerial 
meeting in Denmark in the spring of 1988. 

Greece has expressed its views in a 
statement included in the minutes. ■ 



Meat Product Sales 
to the EC 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
NOV. 23, 19871 

TVie President has taken the first sti 
to ensure continued market access f 
approximately $100 million in U.S. 
meat product sales to the European 
Community (EC). He has instructed ! 
U.S. Trade Representative [Clayton 
Yeutter] to hold public hearings on 
products for inclusion in a retaliator 
action against the EC. 

In December 1985, the EC decii 
to ban the sales or import of meat p 
duced from animals treated with 
growth hormones, effective January 
1988. Recently, however, the EC Coi 
cil of Agriculture ministers voted to 
low meat imports to continue for an 
additional year. 

To ensure that U.S. access to tl 
EC does, in fact, remain unimpede; ' 
the President will raise tariffs on al 
.$100 miUion of EC exports to the 
United States effective soon after J • 
ary 1, 1988, but will then immediatt 
suspend the tariff increases so long 
U.S. meat e.xports to the European 
Community continue uninterrupted 

The President is optimistic thai i 
EC will permit dispute settlement ' 
proceed in the interim in order to r h 
a permanent agreement based on S( i- 
tific evidence. The EC contends tha s 
ban is motivated by health concern.' 
but the U.S. Food and Drug Admin 
istration (FDA) and a prestigious p il 
of international scientific experts hs 
concluded that use of such hormone ,, 
poses no health hazards. >. 

The President's action illustratf 
how his discretionary, flexible auth' : 
under Section 301 of our unfair trad 
laws protects American interests. C ■ 
gress may wish to review this and 
other effective uses of Section 301 b 
fore considering any changes in the i 
that would attempt to force the Pre 
dent to retaliate at times when it w I 
be counterproductive. 



•Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 30, 19!- 



38 



Department of State Bu'l 



■jSsMAN RIGHTS 



Cfe Promise and the Limits of Glasnost 



ichard Schifter 

hldress before the Leadership Cou- 

. 1 of the Washington Group on Oc- 

'. 1987. Ambassador Schifter is 

'lit Secretary for Human Rights 

li II nianitarian Affairs. 

■re is one Russian word that a 
many Americans have learned in 
ist year or so, it is "glasnost." 
ii is in connection with glasnost 
' lu' question is often asked: is it a 
, nr is it for real? To be able to 
*r that question, we need to ask 
hfs what the term really means. 
.... in fact, is glasnostl 
Let me tell you at this point with 
■h' conclusion I want to leave you. It 
tat it would be equally wrong to say 
la Soviet society under Gorbachev re- 
ia s unchanged or, conversely, to sug- 
es that "demokratizatsiya" under 
-o' achev really means democratiza- 
a.s we know it. The fact is that a 
many changes are occurring in 
■I life, some of which are exhilarat- 
lul e.xciting, but they all are taking 
- within a highly restrictive 

iKWt. 



'o paring Glasnost 

n Krushchev's "Thaw" 

parisons between Gorbachev's 
qnnost" and Khrushchev's "thaw" 
ft 1 come to mind. Some of the com- 
iBions are valid. But there are also 
ifificant differences. 

Let me suggest one very critical 
lil rence. The thaw of the 1950s was 
h' product of the utter revulsion of a 
if ificant number of Stalin's heirs 
^nst the sadism and mindless bru- 
a.y of Stalin's rule. Their concern 
*i, indeed, a deeply felt longing for at 
e:t some semblance of respect for hu- 
ni rights. They had themselves 
e:ed the knock on the door in the 
n die of the night, the possibility of 
■r;ng their lives in the basement of 
jiiyanka Prison. But none of them had 
ir. doubts about the validity of their 
•ciomic precepts, about the brighter 
oorrow that the collectivist, centrally 
-)lmed system would bring about. 
. When Nikita Khrushchev told us 
i: the Soviets would bury us, and it 
^ explained that he used this phrase 

1 iredict the Soviet Union's economic 
-iimph over capitalism, there was no 

^ stion that he truly believed what he 



said. Today, close to 30 years later, we 
can fairly say that there are not many 
such believers left in the Soviet 
Union — not among the general popula- 
tion, which continues to suffer short- 
ages, or, and that is critically 
significant, among the leaders. It was 
in the late 1970s that it became in- 
creasingly clear that the Soviet econ- 
omy had run aground and that no quick 
fix was available to get it to float again. 

This was the setting in which 
Mikhail Gorbachev attained power. 
There is no indication that he was con- 
cerned, as Nikita Khrushchev had 
been, about the men and women suffer- 
ing in the Gulag or that he was deeply 
interested in allowing freedom of ex- 
pression for its own sake. What he 
seemed to see, above all, was an econ- 
omy which was operating, year after 
year, ever more sluggishly and a society 
which, with apologies to President Car- 
ter, was suffering from a very serious 
malaise. He saw the problem and, as 
distinct from his immediate predeces- 
sor, was eager to do something about 
it. At first, he, too, tried a quick fix: a 
campaign against drinking. 

It was not long before Gorbachev 
realized that temperance alone was not 
going to cure the ills that beset the 
Soviet economy or Soviet society gener- 
ally. Though convinced that the basic 
theories on which the system rested 
were correct, Gorbachev and his col- 
leagues agreed that the system was fac- 
ing serious operational difficulties 
which had to be identified and dealt 
with. That is how glasnost was born. 

The Development of Glasnost 

What Mikhail Gorbachev and his col- 
leagues fully understood and recognized 
was that not even the vaunted KGB 
could be expected to unearth all the 
ineptitude, inefficiency, and corruption 
that so clearly plagued both public ad- 
ministration and the economy in the So- 
viet Union. They reached the logical 
conclusion that the only effective way in 
which these serious deficiencies could 
be dealt with was to have them fully 
exposed. That, in turn, meant that 
members of the public would not only 
have to be allowed to denounce the 
wrongs they observed but would have 
to be encouraged to do so. 

And so, the word went out all 
across the country: speak up. Tell us 
what's wrong. Let's all get together so 
that we can root out the bribe-takers, 
the alcoholics, the incompetents. And 



let's try thereby to improve the opera- 
tions of our economy and of the various 
public institutions that are in direct 
contact with the people. 

It is important to note that 
glasnost is, therefore, not derived from 
the precepts of the philosophers of the 
18th-century Enlightenment that free- 
dom of speech is a goal in itself, an 
essential element of a free society. 
That, we must understand, is not the 
way the new Soviet leadership seems to 
see it. Freedom of speech, in their 
view, is useful when it is exercised for 
a specific utilitarian purpose — namely, 
to expose, as I noted before, ineffi- 
ciency, ineptitude, and cori'uption in 
the lowest layers of the Soviet bureau- 
cracy where the leadership might oth- 
erwise not be able to identify existing 
problems. WTiat the leadership itself 
does, whether Soviet troops stay in or 
withdraw from Afghanistan, what 
weapons systems are built, who should 
be elected to the Politburo — none of 
these questions are appropriate sub- 
jects for public discussion. Glasnost, as 
you can see, has its limits. 

Just as certain wrongs of the pres- 
ent can now be exposed, so can wrongs 
of the past be subjected to public scru- 
tiny and criticism. In that case, it is 
even permissible to criticize person- 
alities at the highest level of govern- 
ment if they were also guilty of 
inefficiency, ineptitude, or corruption, 
such as Brezhnev's crew. Beyond that, 
going back to the Stalin era, one can 
expose irrationality, the punishment of 
loyal followers of the communist system 
who had been falsely denounced for dis- 
loyalty. There is nothing wrong, in the 
view of the present leaders, with the 
use of the force of the state to have 
suppressed dissent that might chal- 
lenge the system, as Lenin did. But it 
is certainly wrong and utterly irrational 
to have punished supporters of the sys- 
tem, as Stalin did. 

And then, more recently, the new 
Soviet leadership took another step in 
its emphasis on rationality: sanctions 
imposed by the state should be propor- 
tionate to the nature of the threat. Dis- 
senters who constitute danger must, 
indeed, be severely punished. But those 
who express dissenting views in a way 
which merely makes them a nuisance 
can be tolerated. The distribution of a 
few hundred copies of a samizdat 
publication such as the magazine called 
Glasnost need not land the authors in 
jail. Harassing the writers and other- 



luary 1988 



39 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



wise interfering with their work will 
do. Besides, tens of millions of readers 
of Western publications are informed of 
the new ])henomenon of the publication 
and distribution of a new magazine of 
dissent and, as a result, think more 
kindly of the Soviet Union. The small 
number of copies produced and the dif- 
ficulties encountered by the persons 
who publish them are overlooked. 
Glasnofst thus produces significant ben- 
efits, not only within the country but 
beyond its borders as well. 

And so, we get glasnost in liter- 
ature, in the theater, and even in the 
movies. Heretofore forbidden topics, 
forbidden thoughts, may now be freely 
expressed in print, on the stage, and on 
the screen. It is all new and exciting 
and enlists many members of the intel- 
ligentsia in support of the regime. 

The Limits of Glasnost 
and Demokratizatsiya 

That there are limits to this new open- 
ness is, at the same time, clear. These 
limits are of concern to some intellec- 
tuals in the Soviet Union. But a great 
many others are quite understandably 
excited about the difference between 
what was and what there is now. For 
them, the malaise is gone. They are 
fascinated by what they are now al- 
lowed to read, to hear, and to say. They 
are not, at this time, paying attention 
to what it is that they still may not 
read, hear, or say. 

But there are some members of So- 
viet society who are more aware of the 
limits oi glasnost than are many others. 
None are as aware of these limits as are 
those who consider the maintenance of 
a minority language or culture as cen- 
tral to their life. And these are the 
dissenters about whom the Soviet lead- 
ers prove to be most neuralgic, a neu- 
ralgia so clearly reflected in the 
extraordinarily severe prison sentences 
imposed on them: 7 years at hard labor 
followed by 5 years of internal exile. 
Let us keep in mind that there are per- 
sons in the Soviet Union who are now 
serving sentences of that length for 
writing poetry (in Ukrainian), for hav- 
ing translated and distributed George 
Orwell's 198J, (in Latvian), and similar 
heinous crimes. 



Just as glasnost does not mean 
free speech, demokratizatsiya is most 
assuredly not democratization in the 
Western sense. The Soviet leaders 
have, again and again, stated emphat- 
ically that they are devout Leninists 
and that their democratization is, as 
they put it, of the socialist variety 
rather than the Western bourgeois 
kind. On this issue there is no reason 
why we should not believe that they 
mean what they say. 

Lenin, we must keep in mind, 
would speak disdainfully of bourgeois 
liberalism but would appropriate the 
word "democratic" for his own semantic 
use. Thus, "democratic centralism" be- 
came the term used to describe the dic- 
tatorship of a small circle of all- 
powerful leaders. Demokratizatsiya, as 
the term is used today, means allowing 
citizens some say in the operations of 
the lowest level of government, but 
most assuredly not allowing them to in- 
fluence the policies adoptecl by the top 
leadership of the party. 

Making Glasnost Irreversible 

And how can it all be held together; 
how can people be made to obey the 
orders of the leadership? The answer 
is, of course, clear: by continuing to 
concentrate control of all the levers of 
power in the hands of that leadership. 
It is with that leadership that the ulti- 
mate power of appointment of all offi- 
cials rests. It is that leadership which 
determines the political line to be re- 
flected in all the country's media on any 
issue which it chooses. It is that lead- 
ership which decides what is taught in 
the schools and how it is taught. It is 
that leadership which, through the op- 
erations of the secret police, can listen 
in on any telephone conversation, on 
many other private conversations, and 
which can read anyone's mail. And, fi- 
nally, it is that leadership which can 
cause persons whom it deems a threat 
to the system to be carted off to prison. 

My point is that the basic system 
of repression remains in place. The 
shackles have been loosened, in some 
respects substantially so. But they re- 
main in place. They can be tightened 
again at the will of the leadership. 

When I was in the Soviet Union 
last April, I had the opportunity of be- 
ing present at a meeting between Sec- 
retary Shultz and a group of Soviet 



intellectuals. They all were telling u 
that the new openness was "irrever 
ble." They were making the point S( 
frequently and so fervently that it s 
became clear that this was really an 
incantation. By saying it often enou 
they hoped they would make it com' 
true. 

We, too, should hope that the p 
ent changes are not reversed. We 
should be interested in an end to re 
pression in the Soviet Union, both 1 
the sake of the Soviet citizens direc > 
affected and because an open, demc 
cratic Soviet Union would most cer- 
tainly be less inclined to engage in 
military adventurism than one whic 
continually makes war on its own 
people. 

While we should be hopeful, w( 
must also be realistic. Thirty years 
we witnessed, as I noted earlier, th 
thaw under Khrushchev. Some of Ui 
thought then that the genie of free( 
was out of the bottle and couldn't b 
stuffed back into it. But we were 
wrong. It was. 

What would it take to make th' 
process truly irreversible? In the 1! 
the preceding leadership — that of S 
lin — was clearly repudiated, the gn 
inhumanities perpetrated in the na 
of the state were exposed, and regi 
was expressed for them. The secre' i- 
lice was removed from the center o 
power. And yet, after Khrushchev I 
been deposed, a good many feature t 
Stalinism crept back into the Sovie 
system of government. 

It is obvious that if there is to a 
chance of making the progress of tl 
last year irreversible, more will ha^ ^ 
happen in the way of basic change • 
the system than happened in 
Khrushchev's times. What would bt ■■ 
quired, in the first instance, is a fa 
more significant reduction in the pi r 
of the secret police than occurred u e 
Khrushchev. And with the relaxati( J 
police control, there would have to 
come an acceptance of true pluralis u 
all aspects of societal interaction: p i 
cal pluralism, religious pluralism, c 
tural and ethnic pluralism, the 
presentation of divergent views in i 
media and in education, and so on. 

Will it come to that? Only time il 
tell. All that we can say at this tim' 3 
that only if such basic changes occl 
will demokratizatsiya really be the 
equivalent of democratization. ■ 



40 



Department of State Bu ti 



iODLE EAST 



SOUTH ASIA 



AiTis Sales to 
siudi Arabia 



[ TK HOUSE STATEMENT, 

. S, 1987' 

Administration is making advance 
i cat ions to the Senate Foreign Re- 
us t'ommittee and the House For- 
, Affairs Committee of four separate 
sale cases for Saudi Arabia. The 
are 12 F-15C/D aircraft to be de- 
I'll on a one-for-one basis to replace 
^ iif aircraft sold under previous 
I'liients, 93 artillery ammunition 
rrs, and upgrade and moderniza- 
I'aekages to keep Saudi Arabian 
> and M-60 tanks at an adequate 
I if operating effectiveness compati- 
itvith U.S. equipment of the same 
icel. 

Today's advance notifications inform 
ogress that these sales are under con- 
ic :-ation and initiate a 20-day period 
" Iditional consultations and discus- 
-. At the conclusion of this 20-day 
111, the Administration will formally 
y Congress of the systems it plans 
Ter for sale to Saudi Arabia. 
Having taken the situation in the 
"e on into account and after e.xtensive 
'O.ultations with Congress, the Presi- 
1e, at this time has decided to with- 
10 notification of a proposed sale of 
W erick air-to-ground missiles. The 
\ninistration will keep the issue of 
■i li need for Maverick missiles under 
close review in the light of threats 
o>audi security and will maintain 
Ji<e contact with Congress. The Presi- 



dent has personally assured the Saudi 
Government that in the event of an 
emergency, the United States would 
provide Mavericks from American 
stocks with appropriate notifications to 
the Congress. 

These sales are an essential part of 
the U.S. strategy of protecting U.S. 
interests, as well as those of our 
friends in the gulf region, through se- 
curity cooperation. The sales support 
Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs 
at a time of heightened threats to Saudi 
and U.S. military and economic inter- 
ests in the gulf They follow other sales 
to Saudi Arabia approved earlier this 
year of armed helicopters, electronic 
countermeasures systems, and Bradley 
fighting vehicles. They do not upset the 
basic military balance in the Middle 
East. However, they come at a time 
when there is greater demand placed 
upon Saudi Arabian Armed Forces and 
at a point of unprecedented U.S. -Saudi 
security cooperation. If we fail to meet 
these legitimate needs, our willingness 
to support friends — who are in need 
and who are helping us in the face of 
very real threats — will come under seri- 
ous question in the gulf and elsewhere 
around the world. 

The Administration has made a de- 
tailed case for these sales during e.xten- 
sive consultations with the Congress 
over a period of 5 weeks prior to the 
advance notifications. The Administra- 
tion will continue to consult on the 
overall situation in the gulf and on the 
arms sales. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 1987. 



Visit of India's Prime 
Minister 



Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of 
the Republic of India made an official 
working visit to Washington, D.C., Oc- 
tober 19-JO, 19S7, to meet with Presi- 
dent Reagaji and other government 
officials. 

Following are remarks made by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister 
Gandhi after their meeting on October 
20. ^ 

President Reagan 

I am delighted to welcome once again 
Prime Minister Gandhi to the White 
House. The Prime Minister and I have 
had useful discussions on the status of 
U.S. -Indian relations. We noted that in 
the years since our meeting in 1985 
substantial progress has been made. Bi- 
lateral trade has expanded. Collabora- 
tion between our private sectors has 
intensified. We've enjoyed cooperation 
in defense production, notably the In- 
dian light combat aircraft. The memo- 
randum of understanding on technology 
transfer has been implemented. The 
United States is working with India to 
launch its satellites. The U.S.-India 
Fund for Cultural, Educational, and 
Scientific Cooperation has been inaugu- 
rated. And we're working together to 
combat terrorism. 

Beyond such concrete achieve- 
ments, there are powerful political, eco- 
nomic, and cultural currents that are 
drawing our two societies into closer 
collaboration. Our shared dedication to 
democracy is paramount among these 
currents. 

We're also building on a strong 
foundation of cooperation in the fields 
of science, technology, and space, which 
permits us with confidence to set am- 
bitious new goals. 

In this connection, the Prime Min- 
ister and I have agreed to the follow- 
ing: to renew the Ronald Reagan-Indira 
Gandhi Science and Technology Initia- 
tive for an additional 3 years beyond 
1988; we agreed to take steps to sub- 
stantially expand two-way trade and 
recognize the need to reduce barriers 
to free trade; to consult regularly to 
ensure that U.S. supercomputer ex- 
•ports to India reflect the rapid pace of 
scientific advances while at the same 



nuary 1988 



41 



SOUTH ASIA 



time safeguarding U.S. technology; to 
work even more closely together to 
stem drug trafficking and abuse; to ex- 
pand defense cooperation in technology 
and other military areas; to undertake 
joint research projects to explore the 
enhancement of arid zone agriculture, 
water mangement, and evolution of 
ground water resources; to increase the 
educational resources about our coun- 
tries, as appropriate, using the U.S.- 
India Fund for Cultural, Educational, 
and Scientific Cooperation; to establish 
a program in research institutions in 
both countries for short-term exchange 
fellowships in development-related 
subjects. 

Expanding on our leadership ex- 
changes, the Speaker of our House of 
Representatives will visit India this 
year, and his Indian counterpart will 
visit the United States next year. 

Today the Prime Minister and I 
also discussed East-West relations and 
the prospects for a historic treaty elim- 
inating an entire class of intermediate- 
range nuclear missiles of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. And the 
Prime Minister emphasized India's long- 
standing encouragement of such efforts 
to reduce and eliminate nuclear weap- 
ons. In this context, I urged that India 
and Pakistan intensify their dialogue to 
build greater mutual confidence, to re- 
solve outstanding issues, and to deal 
with the threat of nuclear proliferation 
in the region. 

We also discussed the tragic situa- 
tion in Afghanistan and strongly en- 
dorsed movement toward a political 
settlement — a settlement that would 
remove all foreign troops from that 
country and permit its people to live in 
peace, as citizens of a neutral country 
and free from outside intervention. 

On the subject of U.S. security as- 
sistance to Pakistan, I assured Mr. 
Gandhi that our objective is stability 
and reduced tensions in South Asia and 
that our assistance is not directed at 
India. 



And finally, let me acknowledge 
the statesmanship and courage demon- 
strated by Prime Minister Gandhi and 
the President of Sri Lanka in their 
efforts to end the ethnic strife in that 
troubled island nation. I have pledged 
to both leaders our full support. 

It has been a pleasure to have had 
this opportunity to discuss these issues 
with Prime Minister Gandhi and to re- 
new a very real friendship. 

Prime Minister Gandhi 

It's always a pleasure to be at the 
White House. Thank you, Mr. Presi- 
dent, for your invitation and for your 
warm words. May I, at the outset, wish 
Mrs. Reagan the speediest recovery. 
We know what a source of strength she 
is to you, Mr. President, in your work 
for your country and the world. 

I also take this opportunity to con- 
gratulate the people of the United 
States on the 200th anniversary of the 
Constitution. It is one of history's mo- 
mentous documents that has made the 
United States grow to greatness. Your 
Constitution has been an inspiration to 
us in our struggle for freedom and 
liberty. 

As the President informed you, we 
have had good and most useful meet- 
ings. We spoke of world peace and our 
concern for the well-being of humanity, 
and we spoke of the relations between 
our countries. We agreed upon further 
methods of strengthening our mutual 
friendship. The relations between our 
two countries have always held much 
promise. In recent years, we have made 
notable progress toward realizing that 
promise. Your personal attention and 
interest, Mr President, have contrib- 
uted greatly to our expanding 
partnership. 

We have agreed to collaborate at 
the frontiers of technology. We have re- 
affirmed the tradition of scientific inter- 
action, which has been the hallmark of 
our relationship. The growth in high 
technology, trade, and transfers has 



been a source of considerable satisfac 
tion. I hope that the United States 
would recognize India not just as a 
market but as a partner in tech- 
nological progress. 

In the field of bilateral trade an( 
investment, we have agreed that mui 
can be done to expand the present h 
of activity. We will encourage increar 
interaction between our trading en- ,, 
titles. Having successfully launched > 
cooperation for the light combat air- 
craft project, we have now agreed to 
explore other avenues in the field of 
defense. This is yet another step 
forward. 

I am confident that after our tal 
today we will be able to place our re ; 
tionship on a more enduring basis. V 
share not only aspirations and value: 
we sometimes face common threats, 
have each recognized the dangers to 
our societies posed by terrorism and 
narcotics. I mentioned to you today 
determination to fight these problen 
I'm aware of your personal concern 
about narcotics, the price they extr; 
in the form of blighted youth and 
wasted resources. I would like to re 
rate once again our commitment to i 
operate with you to this end. 

Turning to international issues, 
should first like to applaud the statt 
manship demonstrated by you, Mr. 
President, and by General Secretar; 
Gorbachev in pursuing the vexing a 
complex issues of nuclear disarmam 
Your endeavors have given a glimmi 
hope to a world threatened by immi 
nent nuclear holocaust. An INF [int 
mediate-range nuclear forces] 
agreement will be a historic step. F( 
the first time, an operational nuclea 
weapon system will be withdrawn a 
dismantled. We hope that this will t 
the beginning of the elimination of i 
clear weapons altogether, an objecti 
to which you are dedicated. I sincer 
wish you, Mr. President, and Gener* 
Secretary Gorbachev, every success 
these endeavors. All humankind is v 
you. 



42 



Department of State Bu' in 



SOUTH ASIA 



ui- deliberations today also cov- 
hc situation in Afghanistan. We 

I I in the need for an early political 
lU'iit there and support the 

'f the UN Secretary General. I 
iiat a just solution must ensure 
lixn, independent, and non- 
i\ Afghanistan. Foreign interven- 
•nl interference must cease. The 

II lefugees must be allowed to re- 
" their homes in honor, dignity, 

'ii-ity. We would welcome any 
ll'orts in this direction. 
had a frank discussion on the 
. 1 ■^ (if nuclear proliferation, both 
iiital and vertical. My country has 
triitly recognized that a secure 
iiiler cannot be built on nuclear 
n>. Our actions have spoken 
I tlian any words in e.xpressing 
immitment. We do not have nu- 
Ai apons. We do not want nuclear 
ii-. .-^nd we certainly do not want 
1,1 weapons in our neighborhood. 
V have watched with concern de- 
nciits in our immediate vicinity. 
;ir stockpiles have multiplied. Yet 
r country now seems on the 
re lold of fulfilling a long-time goal 
ai uiring nuclear weapons. On our 
rtet me assure you, Mr. President 
d le people of your country, that we 
;W 10 intention of producing nuclear 
;a ins unless constrained to do so. 
'U nd I have discussed these matters 
'] ^pressed our mutual concerns. 

IS nut on our side. We are faced 
i ritical decisions on issues which 
•e to be addressed urgently. 

/e appi-eciate your support to the 
fo s to end the ethnic conflict in Sri 
ira, Mr President, in particular to 
e ily 29th agreement, which I 
?id with President Jayewardene. We 
■e etermined to ensure the full imple- 
eiation of its provisions as it repre- 
n the best hope for peace in the 

thank you once again for your 
;s tality. Our discussions have been 

productive, and I leave Wash- 
n ciinfident and optimistic about 
i-uture of our relationship. 



President Meets 

With Afghan Resistance Leaders 



Hade at the South Portico of the 

3i House (text from Weekly Compila- 
)f Presidential Documents" of Oct. 26, 




PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 12, 19871 

We have just held a very useful — and, I 
might say, brief but also, I'll add, a 
very moving — discussion with Chair- 
man Yunis Khalis of the Islamic Union 
of Mujahidin of Afghanistan and other 
members of his distinguished delega- 
tion. I expressed our nation's continued 
strong support for the resistance and 
our satisfaction with the large step the 
Afghan resistance took toward unity in 
choosing a chairman for the first time. 
This new political milestone demon- 
strates that the people of Afghanistan 
speak with one voice in their opposition 
to the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
their homeland. 

This increasing unity has already 
made itself felt on the battlefield. Dur- 
ing the past 18 months, the mujahidin 
fighting inside the country have im- 
proved their weapons, tactics, and coor- 
dination. The result has been a string 
of serious defeats for the Soviet elite 
units, as well as many divisions from 
the Kabul army. 

Chairman Khalis and his delegation 
are visiting Washington following the 
November 10 UN General Assembly 



vote which, with a record vote, once 
again called overwhelmingly for the 
withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
Afghanistan. This is the eighth time 
since the December 1979 invasion that 
the General Assembly has decisively 
called upon the Soviet Union to pull its 
forces out of Afghanistan. And let 
there be no mistake about it; the with- 
drawal of Soviet forces is the key to 
resolving the Afghan crisis. Other is- 
sues that have been raised to divert 
attention from this fact only extend the 
combat and prolong the suffering of the 
Afghan people. 

General Secretary Gorbachev has 
publicly stated a Soviet readiness to 
withdraw. Both in April and September 
of 1987, I asked the Soviet Union to set 
a date this year when that withdrawal 
would begin. I also stated that when 
the Soviet Union showed convincingly 
that it was ready for a genuine political 
settlement, the United States would be 
helpful. After all, the Soviet presence 
in Afghanistan is a major impediment 
to improved U.S. -Soviet relations, and 
we would like to remove it. The Soviets 
should want to do so as well. 



wry 1988 



43 



TERRORISM 



Unfortunately the Soviet answer 
on a date for rapid withdrawal has been 
silence. Instead we have seen the Kabul 
regime announce a phantom cease-fire 
and propose a transitional government, 
one that would leave this discredited 
and doomed group in control. These 
gambits have been rejected by the only 
voice that really counts, that of the 
Afghan people, speaking through their 
resistance representatives. Any pro- 
posal unacceptable to the resistance is 
destined to fail. And as the resistance 
continues the fight, we and other re- 
sponsible governments will stand by it. 
The suppoi't that the United States has 
been providing the resistance will be 
strengthened, rather than diminished, 
so that it can continue to fight effec- 
tively for freedom. The just struggle 
against foreign tyranny can count upon 
worldwide support, both political and 
material. 

The goal of the United States re- 
mains a genuinely independent 
Afghanistan, free from external inter- 
ference; an Afghanistan whose people 
choose the type of government they 
wish; an Afghanistan to which the 4 
million refugees from Soviet aggression 
may return in safety and, yes, in honor. 

On behalf of the American people, 
I salute Chairman Khalis, his delega- 
tion, and the people of Afghanistan 
themselves. You are a nation of heroes. 



Counterterrorism: 

U.S. Policy and Proposed Legislation 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. 



by L. Paul Bremer, III 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Terrorism, Narcotics, and Interna- 
tional Operations of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on October 15, 
1987. Mr. Bremer is Ambassador at 
Large for Counter-Terrorism-^ 

It is a pleasure to discuss with this 
committee a topic which a recent Roper 
poll showed more American citizens — 
some 69% — desired government action 
on than any other foreign policy issue. 

I am happy to report to you that 
the Administration's counterterrorism 
policy is showing results. The fact is 
that, although terrorism continues 
ai'ound the world, one is much more 
likely these days to read news stories 
about terrorist arrests than about sen- 
sational hijackings. And gripping news 
accounts of terrorist atrocities have 
quietly given way to brief reports from 
Western capitals on the successful ap- 
prehension, prosecution, and punish- 
ment of terrorists. 

Progress Against Terrorism 

Over the last 18 months, there has been 
a measurable drop in international 
terrorism. 

• From 1981 through 1985, interna- 
tional terrorism grew from some 500 
incidents per year to about 800 
incidents. 

• But in 1986, terrorism dropped 
6%. So far in 1987, it is down another 
10%. The decline would be greater but 
for Afghan-sponsored terrorism in 
Pakistan. 

• Contrary to the impression many 
Americans have, terrorism in Europe 
dropped dramatically last year — over 
33%. 

• And in 1986, there were only two 
airline hijackings, the lowest number 
since we began keeping track over 20 
years ago. 

While these numbers are encourag- 
ing, they do not convey the full sense of 
what is happening. Terrorism can 
strain and has strained relations among 
even the friendliest states, but there is, 
I believe, a growing consensus about 
the response to terrorism. This is the 
key change in our counterterrorism 
fight. 



Ten years ago, the terrorists 
seemed to have the initiative. Thej 
tacked or hijacked seemingly at w 
Their grievances were, if not respt 
often heard sympathetically. The 1 
was on the defensive. A number o:i 
countries reached de facto agreem; 
with foreign terrorists, saying, in 
feet: "Do not attack our interests, 
not conduct operations on our soil, 
in return, we will grant you free t 
and domicile within our borders." 

In the mid-1980s, there has bi 
important shift in emphasis in the 
West's fight against terrorism. Nc 
fellow democracies are banding to 
gether and cooperating. The dyna 
of the situation have shifted, with 
of the initiative now on our side, 
over time, it has become clear th; 
terrorists never keep their end of 
bargain. Sooner or later, accomm 
tion leads to blood on your own 
doorstep. 

The United States has worke 
like-minded nations to develop mi 
lateral agreements and declarati( 
about terrorist attacks on civil a\ 
internationally protected persons 
senger liners, and hostage-takin;. 
These documents reflect an impo 
degi'ee of agreement in principle 
there was none a decade ago. In 
many contacts at the policy and \ 
ing levels around the world, I fin 
new sense of resolve about terroi 
sense of resolve which is saying: 
let the professionals — the police, 
gration and customs and intellige |( 
services — do their jobs." 

Networking is a popular wor 
these days. But networking is no 
something for yuppie stockbroke 
Among the interior ministers in 
rope, within Interpol, within mil: r 
organizations and intelligence ag ,ci 
the professionals are meeting eac 
other and sharing tactics, intellii 
and ideas. There is, today, a coui 
terrorism network, and we are al 
fiting from it. 

The United States has been i!\ 
forefront of the counterterrorism ' 
battle. 

• On the eve of the Venice si Int 
Attorney General Meese traveled o 
Paris for an unprecedented minis rii 
level meeting on terrorism with ipn 
sentatives of the European Comrinil 
and the summit seven. 



44 



nonartmont nf .<?tato 'HH 



TERRORISM 



i Bilaterally, we are working to 
"Xtradition treaties. We provide 
lism assistance to some 40 na- 
ich have the will but not the 
I resist terrorism. Our govern- 
iS made firm diplomatic repre- 
ns to a number of countries 
ifir relations with terrorist or- 
.,a.;nns, and we have seen results. 
We also act unilaterally when we 
1 it secure cooperation or when eir- 
1 tallies make it infeasible to coordi- 
■ Mill- actions. A Lebanese terrorist 
I'awaz Younis, accused of direct- 
lijacking of a Jordanian airliner 
' S. nationals aboard, was re- 
i\ arrested in international waters 
e FBI [Federal Bureau of Investi- 
. n). He is jailed near here, awaiting 
; This is a direct result of a vig- 
i., imaginative, unilateral U.S. 
'.1 n. 
itl 

Counterterrorism Policy 

Jnited States follows a three-part 

iiiilegy for dealing with terrorism. 

The first element is a policy of 
less toward terrorists. Giving in to 
*rist demands will only breed fu- 
demands, demands which are 
' to be greater than those of today, 
father, I learned long ago that 
v'ior rewarded is behavior 
ited. 

rVhile the Iran-contra affair may 
» caused some to doubt our stead- 
ess in resisting terrorist demands, 
assure you that there is no sense 
e counterterrorism community that 
nould change our policy. No coun- 
10 terrorist should believe that 
'. is anything to be gained by 
atening the United States with ter- 
t action. We will not make conces- 
.. We will not deal. 
The second element of our strat- 
3onsists of practical measures to 
J terrorists to justice. By practical 
tures, I mean the identification, 
, apprehension, prosecution, 
punishment of terrorists. In the 
•: 18 months, more and more ter- 
I ts have been tried and jailed 
nd the world, usually after receiv- 
he kind of stiff sentences which 
' unheard of only a few years ago. 
ie third element of our policy, 
>ure on terror-supporting states, 
e.s directly to the committee's cur- 
interest, so I would like to address 
more detail. 



State Support for Terrorism 

In the Administration's view, state-sup- 
ported terrorists are substantially more 
dangerous than those operating inde- 
pendently. State sponsorship gives 
clear advantages to the terrorist. For 
e.xample: 

• When a terrorist obtains legiti- 
mate travel and identification docu- 
ments from a patron state, it becomes 
harder to identify and track him. When 
Nezar Hindawi went to London to blow 
up an El Al flight last year, he carried 
an authentic Syrian service passport. 

• A state-supported terrorist has a 
ready source of weapons and a ready 
means to transport them. Embassies 
are exempt from search by interna- 
tional convention, and the baggage han- 
dlers at state-owned airlines don't 
interfere when directed not to examine 
a particular parcel. Once again, the 
Hindawi case is instructive. His bomb 
came into the United Kingdom on 
Syria's official airline. 

• Countries like Libya, Syria, and 
Iran make a terrorist's work easier by 
providing a place to train. A terrorist 
operating alone, especially if a fugitive, 
has a hard time finding an isolated loca- 
tion to fire automatic weapons or as- 
semble and detonate explosives. 

• Similarly, simple refuge supplied 
by patron states constitutes important 
support. Being able to live without fear 
of immediate arrest and punishment is 
of enormous psychological value to a 
terrorist. 

• Finally, financial support from 
state sponsors allows terrorists to 
spend more time on operations because 
they need not rob banks or traffic in 
drugs to raise money. 

Benefits to the State Sponsor 

The sponsoring state receives benefits 
as well. 

• Terrorism can be an inexpensive 
form of warfare. A small group of ter- 
rorists costs less per year than a com- 
pany of regular soldiers and can cause 
far more havoc in an enemy state than 
could that company of soldiers. 

• Using terrorist surrogates makes 
it easier for the sponsoring state to 
deny responsibility for actions which, 

if taken overtly, could lead to war. 
Shortly after the Abu Nidal Organiza- 
tion (ANO) moved to Syria in 1983, it 
staged a series of attacks on Jordanian 
interests. I think it no coincidence that 
these attacks ceased following a Syrian- 
Jordanian rapprochement. 



• A state can also use terrorists to 
murder dissidents abroad. Qadhafi, for 

example, has hired terrorists to kill 
Libyan opponents in many countries, 
including the United States. In May, 
two Libyans tried to kill the former 
Libyan ambassador in Vienna. After 
their attempt failed, they fled into the 
Libyan People's Bureau there. We be- 
lieve this incident shows why European 
governments should take particular 
care to monitor the size and activities 
of Libyan embassies in their countries. 

U.S. Responses 

to State-Supported Terrorism 

So our policy recognizes the need to 
deal with state-supported terrorism. 
Our response should be carefully tai- 
lored to each individual case in order to 
use the leverage that works best with 
that particular country. 

Libya. Libya was on the U.S. Gov- 
ernment's list of terror-supporting 
states when it was first published in 
1979 and remains on the list today. 
Over the years, the United States has 
responded to Libyan actions with a 
mixture of policy tools. 

• We closed our embassy there and 
later ordered the Libyan Embassy here 
closed. 

• We imposed economic sanctions 
and exhorted our friends to do the 
same. 

• And, eventually, we used military 
force. 

After that, the Europeans, too, im- 
posed political, diplomatic, and eco- 
nomic measures on Libya. 

This policy has worked. While 
other nations have been slower to re- 
spond, today Libya is politically iso- 
lated. During the past year, Libyan- 
supported terrorist opei'ations have de- 
clined, although Qadhafi still appears 
ready to use terrorism as a policy tool. 

Syria. Syria, too, is a "charter 
member" of the list of terror-supporting 
states and, in spite of some encouraging 
signs, remains on the list. While Syria 
has long been involved in terrorism, it 
was particularly active from 1983 to 
1986. As I mentioned earlier, Syria be- 
gan using the Abu Nidal Organization 
as a surrogate in 1983 in a series of 
attacks on Jordan. These attacks 
stopped following a Syrian-Jordanian 
rapprochement. 



fljarv 1988 



TERRORISM 



While the Jordanian attacks 
ceased, other ANO attacks — generally 
planned and trained for in Syria or in 
Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon — 
continued. While based in Syria, the 
ANO was responsible for many attacks, 
including the Rome and Vienna airport 
massacres of December 27, 1985, and 
the September 6, 1986, murder of 22 
worshipers at a synagogue in Istanbul. 
And Syria continues to play host to a 
number of other terrorist groups. 

Syrian officials have also been di- 
rectly involved in terrorist activities. 
Sworn court testimony in London impli- 
cated a Deputy Chief of Syrian Air 
Foi-ce Intelligence, Lt. Col. Haithem 
Said, in the attempt to place a suitcase 
bomb aboard an El Al flight. Testimony 
in Berlin led a court there to issue an 
arrest warrant for Said because of his 
role in the bombing of the German- 
Arab Friendship Society on March 29, 
1986. 

Revelation of Syria's direct role in 
these terrorist activities led to a series 
of actions last November by the United 
Kingdom, the European Community, 
and the United States to distance 
themselves from Syria. The United 
Kingdom broke diplomatic relations. 
We withdrew our ambassador. Eco- 
nomic sanctions were also imposed, , 
though U.S. bilateral trade with Syria 
is insignificant and its other trading 
partners have not imposed major eco- 
nomic sanctions. 

However, Syria proved most sen- 
sitive to the political and diplomatic iso- 
lation. In June, Syria e.xpelled most of 
the Abu Nidal Organization, and we 
have not seen evidence i-ecently of Syr- 
ian involvement in terrorism. These are 
encouraging signs. Still, we intend to 
keep our remaining sanctions in place 
and to leave Syria on the list of terror- 
supporting states until we see evidence 
of a fundamental change in Syrian pol- 
icy toward terrorism. 

Iran. Virtually since it came to 
power, the current Iranian regime has 
used terrorism. Over the years, it has 
attacked U.S. targets, European inter- 
ests, moderate Arabs, and its own 
dissidents. 

The United States has taken an in- 
creasingly tough position toward Iran 
in response to its continuing support 
for terrorism and its refusal to cease 
hostilities in the Iran-Iraq wai'. Follow- 
ing the bombings of the U.S. Embassy 
buildings and the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon, we placed Iran on the list of 
countries supporting international 
terrorism. 



When a country is placed on that 
list, export controls are imposed on se- 
lected "dual use" items. We have specif- 
ically banned the export to Iran of a 
variety of items and equipment which 
could support terrorist and/or military 
operations, including helicopters, air- 
craft, outboard engines, chemical 
weapon precursors, and several other 
national-security-controlled items. 

We currently are considering other 
measures which we can take against 
Iran, including cutting off the import of 
Iranian oil. This is an extremely com- 
plex issue, but let me emphasize here 
that the Administration is completely 
supportive of the objectives of the re- 
cently proposed legislation on the sub- 
ject. We want to craft our policy so 
that these objectives are best met. 

Iran has been under little con- 
certed international pressure until re- 
cently but is now increasingly isolated. 
Other countries have been reluctant to 
sever profitable commercial dealings, 
particularly in the absence of interna- 
tional cooperation. However, Iran's con- 
tinued outrageous behavior is beginning 
to exact a toll with other countries. For 
example, relations with France have 
chilled with the onset of the so-called 
embassies war, which began when a 
French magistrate demanded the right 
to question a nondiplomatic employee of 
the Iranian Embassy in Paris about ter- 
rorist activities in France. 

The Lautenberg Bill 

As you can see from the foregoing re- 
view, we agree with the underlying as- 
sumption of Senator Lautenberg's bill: 
economic pressures can be useful 
against countries supporting terrorism. 
However, we oppose the bill in its cur- 
rent form for four reasons. 

It is seldom desirable to impose 
all possible economic sanctions at one 
time. Seldom is a state which sponsors 
terrorism solely, or even heavily, de- 
pendent on economic relations with the 
United States. That is why we need to 
consider most sanctions as having an 
impact which is as much or more psy- 
chological and political than economic. 
And we must keep in mind that the 
purpose of sanctions is to bring about a 
change in behavior on the part of the 
target state. 

We believe it prudent to avoid the 
automatic linking of economic measures 
to a political determination. Remember- 
ing that it is political effect we seek, we 



are more likely to succeed if we ha\ 
available a range of sanctions which |i 
be applied over time than if we are 
quired to impose an entire package 
at once. 

For example, had we used all i- 
economic sanctions against Syria v. 
it was put on the terrorist list in 19 
we would have had nothing left to i 
force the political steps taken last 
November. Of course, there may al; 
times when we would want to impo 
all the available sanctions at once. 

The bill could force the Presii 
to send a contrary signal. Senatoi 
Lautenberg's bill, it might be argui' 
gives the President needed flexibil 
by permitting him to waive the im] 
tion of certain sanctions. However, 
amendment would, in effect, force 
to send a mixed signal by requiriin 
public explanation of why he is not 
posing certain sanctions. 

By simultaneously declaring a 
to be a supporter of terrorism and 
plaining publicly why he is not imj ■ 
ing certain sanctions, the Presider 
invites confusion in the target cou j 
Since he must cite "national intere 
to avoid imposing the sanction, he 
would weaken the deterrent effect 
the unimposed sanction or sanctio 
Beyond that, the target country i^ 
likely to take the President's refus 
impose a particular sanction as U. 
recognition of some "mitigating 
circumstance." 

There are times when we cam 
avoid sending mixed signals. But ' 
should avoid requiring them in U.^ 
law. 

The bill's provision for congr 
sional override sets the stage for 
potentially divisive debate at a ti ; 
when we should show unity. Shoi 
Congress choose to exercise its op i 
to attempt to override the Preside > 
decision to withhold a given sanct , 
the target state will enjoy the spe ic 
of watching the Administration an 
Congress debate just what we she 1 
do to it. Such a display would sun 
undermine the effects accomplisht b; 
placing the nation on the list in th 
first place. Sometimes the executi 
and legislative branches see thing: o 
differently that such a debate canif. 
avoided. But again, we think it un.s 
to build the potential for such a cc li 
into our laws. 

The bill can reduce our chariS 
of operating in concert with othc n 
lions. By tilting the playing field ■ 
ward early economic sanctions, ou 
ability to act in concert with othei la 



46 



Department of State ES 



TERRORISM 



i.~ diminished. If the President fol- 
tlii' path of least resistance and 
M - all sanctions at once, we could 

r ihe chances of sanctions by 
■ nations which might be reluctant 

-irn as "bowing to U.S. pres- 
Also, if we have already imposed 
a I ut ions, we will have nothing left 
M rve to use to complement the 
n> of other nations, as we did with 

«l(i not want to suggest that the 
ii~tration is uninterested in eco- 
~ auctions or even in future legis- 
i 111 support of sanctions. On the 
aiv, within the Administration, 
itKe has been instrumental in lead- 
: iliscussion about new measures 
; 1, after appropriate executive 
a h review, we may ask for legisla- 
ji.ij support. 

lusion 

wf the recent progress in counter- 
11- 111 has been made possible by 
v>sional action. Our Anti-Ter- 
11 Assistance Program depends on 
r:/:ations and funding from the 
■ ,^s, Younis was arrested under 
!' ~ passed in 1984 by a Congress 

n assist the Administration in 
aiing terrorism. 

The funds and authorities we have 
Ml ved have been used to good effect. 
h will continue to be the case. 
.r nd the world, there is a cooper- 
ti spirit which we have not seen be- 
>r After nearly 20 years of disarray 

1 e face of terrorism, the West is 
s} ming to unite to confront ter- 
ats as criminals. 

'. do not want to leave the impres- 
othat our problems are solved, that 
16 ' are not disagreements among 
lis, or that we will not suffer re- 
■> ill the months ahead. I do be- 
tliat the progress we are making 
il. substantive, and permanent. We 
-lut going to eliminate terrorism, 
V'Ne are making the world a more 
ai:erous place for terrorists and safer 
) he rest of us. 



Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics 



The complete transcript of the hear- 
■viU be published by the committee 
Aill be available from the Superintend- 
t' Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
iftice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 



by L. Paul Bremer, III 

Address before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations in Tampa on 
Xorember i, 1987. Mr. Bremer is Am- 
bassador at Large for Counter- 
Terrorism. 

It's a pleasure for me to appear before 
such a distinguished group. You have 
done much to promote public under- 
standing of the foreign policy issues 
facing our country, and you are to be 
commended for your efforts. 

A recent Roper poll asked Ameri- 
cans to name topics on which they 
wished the government to take action. 
Terrorism was named more often than 
nuclear arms reductions or Middle East 
peace. It has become the number one 
foreign policy issue for many 
Americans. 

Clearly, the people are demanding 
action. And in the finest American tra- 
dition, they want action right now. 
Today I want to describe how our 
government is responding to the ter- 
rorist threat. 

Dealing With Terrorism 
Is a Long-Term Problem 

In spite of the impression that many of 
us have, terrorism is not something 
new. Yes, within the past 20 years we 
have e.xperienced many different kinds 
of terrorism, and we have seen ter- 
rorism live and in color in our living 
rooms. But terrorism has been around 
for centuries. 

The group whose name gives us 
our word for assassin arose in Persia 
about 900 years ago and later flour- 
ished in Syria. The Assassins recog- 
nized that a tiny group of men prepared 
to die during their attack could para- 
lyze a larger foe and that the fear of 
such attacks could give them power be- 
yond their size. 

During the Napoleonic wars, par- 
tisan forces pushed carts laden with ex- 
plosives into the ranks of soldiers, 
causing significant damage. By the late 
19th century, the telegraph, news- 
papers, and rising literacy led Russian 
anarchists to recognize the shock value 
of violence. They referred to their ter- 
rorist attacks as "propaganda by the 
deed." 



Given the persistence of terrorism 
over centuries, it is unreasonable to 
think we can eliminate it. But we can, 
and must, take vigorous action to limit 
terrorism. And the signs are that, after 
an initial period of uncertainty, the 
West is finally getting its antiterrorist 
act together. 

1970s: On the Defensive 

When modern terrorism burst on the 
scene 20 years ago, the international 
community, especially in the United 
Nations, reacted in a befuddled fashion. 
The West lacked a strategy and was on 
the defensive against both domestic and 
international terrorism. 

There are a number of reasons for 
this passivity. 

• Many of the world's nations had 
recently emerged from colonialism; in 
some cases, they considered terrorists 
as fellow revolutionaries who would 
soon join them in the community of 
nations. 

• The Vietnam war increased anti- 
American sentiment around the world 
and led to an intellectual environment 
in which anti-U.S. activism was easier 
to justify. 

• In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the prevailing political and intellectual 
climate in many Western countries pro- 
moted an extraordinary tolerance of vi- 
olent political action. 'This allowed 
terrorists to demand and receive public 
attention not just for their acts but for 
their "causes." Terrorist acts — includ- 
ing kidnaping, kneecapping, and 
murder — acquired an aura of romance 
and adventure. 

• In the Middle East, Israel's stun- 
ning success in a preemptive strike in 
response to threats of war by Egypt, 
Syria, and Jordan altered the percep- 
tion of Israel as a microstate struggling 
against the odds. It also shattered the 
hopes, nourished by some Palestinians, 
that the front-line Arab states would 
destroy Israel and, by military force, 
create a Palestinian state. 

• Finally, the tremendous growth 
in air travel and television in the 1960s 
gave terrorists increased mobility, more 
vulnerable targets, and a readymade 
worldwide audience for the acts. 



:j|jary 1988 



TERRORISM 



The West Develops 

a Counterterrorist Strategy 

By the end of the 1970s, the outrage at 
terrorist acts slowly began to turn the 
tide of opinion in the West. In- 
creasingly, people realized that nothing 
justified what they were seeing. 

Perhaps more than anything, the 
ever-expanding circle of targets for ter- 
rorist attack brought about change. 
People and governments began to real- 
ize that terrorists could and would at- 
tack anyone, including erstwhile 
sympathizers. Here in America, the 
taking of our Tehran embassy catalyzed 
public opinion and led to demands for 
effective government action. 

As a result of these changes, the 
West began to develop a clear, overall 
strategy to deal with terrorism and the 



French Seize 
Terrorist Weapons 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 6, 19871 

We congratulate the French Govern- 
ment for its seizure last weekend of a 
sizable quantity of arms bound for the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA). This 
shipment, which originated in Tripoli, 
involved more than 150 tons of lethal 
arms and was the largest terrorist 
arms shipment ever intercepted. 

We condemn, in the strongest 
terms, this latest example of state-sup- 
ported terrorism by Libya. This ship- 
ment was destined to support further 
terrorist violence by the IRA. We can 
only deplore again this latest in a long 
line of examples of Libya's disregard for 
accepted international values and 
norms. Libya's behavior should be con- 
demned by all civilized nations. We 
note that at the same time Libya is 
engaging is such blatant terrorist ac- 
tivities, the Qadhafi regime seeks to 
promote a resolution at the United Na- 
tions calling for an international confer- 
ence to define terrorism. 

We call on all foes of terrorism to 
make clear their outrage for this latest 
example of state-supported terrorism 
and work to deny Libya the means to 
pursue its policies. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman, ■ 



supporting tactics necessary to imple- 
ment that strategy. Action on two lev- 
els was needed: the development of 
political will to counter terrorism and 
the allocation of more resources to the 
fight. 

Political Vision 
and Political Will 

We must avoid the temptation of taking 
the total elimination of terrorism as our 
goal. We can no more eradicate ter- 
rorism than we can eradicate crime. 

The West's strategic objective must 
be to reduce terrorism to a level at 
which it no longer dominates world pol- 
icy. We can achieve this objective with 
a firm, concerted counterterrorism 
effort sustained over 5-7 years. How? 
By making the general political, eco- 
nomic, and psychological climate in 
which terrorists operate more hostile. 
The targets of any counterterrorist 
measure, therefore, are not particular 
terrorists or groups but the community 
of nations and the overall political 
environment. 

The key element in developing a 
counterterrorist strategy is the devel- 
opment of political vision and the politi- 
cal will to carry out the fight. And to 
nurture the development of political 
will, the West had to change the whole 
dynamic of the international discussion 
of terrorism. We had to get away from 
the defensive, muddled reaction to ter- 
rorist violence of the early 1970s and 
reassert, clearly and decisively, democ- 
racy's willingness to fight terrorism. 
We had to shift the public debate on 
terrorism from understanding "root 
causes" to condemning the crimes ter- 
rorists commit. 

Specific Measures 

The West has adopted a number of spe- 
cific measures to pursue our strategic 
objective. For example, until recently, 
the international political environment 
made it relatively easy for terror- 
supporting states like Libya, Syria, and 
Iran to operate against the West. A 
major element of our counterterrorism 
policy, therefore, is to put pressure on 
states that support terrorism. If the 
West can make it clear that supporting 
terrorists is unacceptable international 
behavior, then terrorists will be denied 
important financial, military, and other 
support from state supporters. 

Another important measure we 
have developed in our overall strategy 
is applying the rule of law to terrorists. 



Terrorists are criminals. They commi 
criminal actions like murder, kidnapi 
and arson, and countries have laws t- 
punish criminals. So a major elemeir 
our strategy has been to delegitimizi 
terrorists, to get society to see them 
for what they are — criminals — and tt 
use democracy's most potent tool, th 
rule of law, against them. 

A third measure is expanded ini 
national discussion of terrorism. The 
United States has made terrorism ai 
important issue in our overall bilatei 
relations, including with the Soviet 
Union, and in multilateral forums lil< 
the United Nations. By repeatedly 
pressing the issue with non-Western 
nations, we seek a truly global front 
against terrorism. 

Counterterrorist 
Measures Succeeding 

These counterterrorist measures ar( 
beginning to succeed. In a major sh 
of collective political will last year, t 
nations of Western Europe took a st 
of concerted actions to close down L 
ya's terrorist infrastructure of embj 
sies, "businessmen," and "students. 
These actions, combined with the L' 
military strike against terrorist faci 
ties in Libya, led to a decline in Lit 
yan-supported terrorism. Indeed, v 
have detected Libyan involvement i 
only five terrorist incidents in 1987. 
Qadhafi no longer openly brags abo 
his use of terrorism. Most importar 
the political environment was shifti 
The Europeans at long last had tak 
decisive action against a terrorist s 
That was a major breakthrough in i 
development of a Western counterti 
rorist strategy. 

In a similar way, last Novembe 
we and the European Community ( 
imposed sanctions on Syria after S; 
officials were proven to have suppoi 
specific terrorist operations. These 
steps were possible only because th 
countries of Europe had set the pat i 
of responding to state terrorism wi 
their earlier measures against Lib) 
Again, the political environment h; 
shifted. Again, we had success. Syi 
in June expelled Abu Nidal, a note ' 
Palestinian terrorist. 

As a result of concerted Weste 
pressures, terrorists are finding it 
harder to get refuge and overt sup 
The Abu Nidal Organization was e 
pelled from Iraq in 1983 and from U 
in 1987. In Eastern Europe, effort; 
have been made to disrupt a netwcc 
enterprises of the Abu Nidal Orga:; 



48 



Department of State Bt i^ 



I 



TERRORISM 



s'lwspaper stories about the ter- 
liiiks of a Syrian family named 
r. notorious for arms trafficking 
ernirists, have led to action 
I them by several European 
k's in 1987, notably in Spain 
they maintained a political head- 
rs in Marbella. 

(irt'over, during the past decade, 
est has elaborated an interna- 
ni legal structure grounded in bilat- 
.1 nd multilateral agreements to 
lite or prosecute terrorists for 
rimes. The first steps in an inter- 
li'.al legal framework were taken in 
e irly 1970s with the Hague conven- 
in n airline hijacking. Since then, 
:-t n- agi'eements have been reached 
y nti*eal and at summit meetings of 
\eii leading industrialized nations 
. ,\(i, Bonn, and Venice. 

1 spite of Lenin's insistence that 
e volutionary must never abandon 
•rism. the Soviet Union now says 
' riiiposes "all terrorism." While 
iviet definition of terrorism can 
t ivoluted from our point of view, 
ejiave specifically condemned some 
c( : acts of terrorism, including the 
m .merican Flight 073 takeover in 
ar hi and a grenade attack last year 
I ] -aeli soldiers near the Western 
al n Jerusalem. And the Soviets 
iv played a helpful role in drafting 
?w ounterterrorist conventions on 
a} ime and airport safety. 

'inally, where earlier attempts to 
'P with terrorism in the United Na- 
or deteriorated into endless apolo- 
6! or terrorists, in 1985 and 1986 
le 'nited Nations passed important 
'8' itions condemning terrorism and 
« ge-taking. 

io we have made a real start this 
scle in changing the overall environ- 
" in which the terrorists must act. 

iinsible countries have joined a 
' joii.-^ensus against terror and have 
aki concrete steps. 

^0 one of these measures by itself 
il solve the problem or reduce ter- 
)iim to a tolerable level. However, 
i£! and other measures, relentlessly 
uued over time, will achieve our 
Jiegic objective. 

'eilopment of Tactics: 
' :■ Resources 

a,-- the West had to fortify its col- 
>e i.olitical will before it could de- 
i a c(jherent counterterrorist 
egy, so it had to dedicate greatly 
'ased resources to antiterrorism 



before our tactics could succeed. The 
strategy demands will; the tactics de- 
mand money. 

Our tactical objective is to con- 
found and thwart terrorists — to reduce 
their options and make their operations 
more complicated and perilous. 

For the most part, antiterrorist 
tactics are measures that better protect 
the most likely targets from terrorist 
attacks. How do they work? In much 
the same way as you protect your home 
from burglars. Putting heavy dead-bolt 
locks on your doors, a bar on sliding 
glass doors, and keeping a dog or in- 
stalling a burglar alarm will not stop a 
truly professional thief willing to run 
substantial risks. But each of them re- 
duces the likelihood of a break-in at 
your home. Tkken together, they can 
achieve your purpose — protecting your 
property, lowering your insurance 
rates, and increasing your peace of 
mind. 

In contrast to counterterrorist 
measures, antiterrorist steps are 
largely defensive in nature and can be 
unilateral or taken in concert with oth- 
ers. The difference, if I may extend my 
analogy, is between stronger locks and 
an aggressive policy of pursuing and 
jailing burglars. 

More Resources 
Contribute to Success 

One of the most important develop- 
ments in the 1980s has been the public 
outrage throughout the world with ter- 
rorist violence. This strong public reac- 
tion has pressured politicians to make 
more money available to the antiter- 
rorist fight here and abroad. These new 
resources form the hard core of our re- 
vitalized antiterrorist tactics. 

Not surprisingly, the police and in- 
telligence agencies first dedicated these 
new resources to the fight against do- 
mestic terrorists. So not surprisingly, 
the first successes of antiterrorist mea- 
sures were seen at home. In Italy, an- 
ger at the kidnaping and murder of 
Aldo Moro led to actions which shat- 
tered the old Red Brigades. In Ger- 
many, the Baader-Meinhof gang was 
broken through aggi'essive intelligence 
collection and vigorous law enforce- 
ment. The same has happened in 
French efforts to counter Actioti Di- 
recte and in Belgium with the Fighting 
Communist Cells. Just 2 weeks ago, 
Spanish and French officials, acting to- 
gether, dealt an important blow to the 
Spanish terrorist group ETA [Basque 
Fatherland and Freedom]. 



As nations developed better tactics 
for dealing with their homegrown ter- 
rorists, they have recently turned their 
attention to international cooperation. 
For example, the countries of the Euro- 
pean Community have established the 
so-called Trevi Group made up of minis- 
ters of justice and interior. The Trevi 
Group has considerably expanded police 
and intelligence cooperation among the 
12 EC members. For example, the min- 
isters now regularly produce an agreed 
assessment of the terrorist threat fac- 
ing the EC countries. And they have 
developed a mechanism to exchange 
specific information on the movements 
and operating methods of terrorists. 
INTERPOL [International Criminal 
Police Organization], which had resisted 
dealing with terrorism because of its 
political overtones, finally began coordi- 
nating information on terrorism in 1985 
at U.S. request. Our FBI [Federal Bu- 
reau of Investigation], for instance, can 
now notify the INTERPOL secretariat 
of arrest warrants we have out on ter- 
rorists. INTERPOL then sends the 
names by alert to all of its member 
countries. 

Specific antiterrorist measures de- 
veloped by the West include: 

• Near universal screening of all 
airline passengers for metallic objects, 
so that terrorists can no longer stroll 
aboard a flight with a pistol or bomb in 
their pockets; 

• Tighter security at diplomatic in- 
stallations so that an attack on an em- 
bassy is likely to require the attackers 
to absorb casualties, thereby making an 
attack less likely; 

• "Watch lists" of terrorists for 
border police to stop terrorists entering 
countries; and 

• Measures to sow dissension 
within terrorist groups through black 
and gray covert operations. 

Tactical Measures Succeeding 

As we have had success in developing 
and implementing a counterterrorist 
strategy, now our tactical measures are 
showing signs of working. 

T^ke, for example, the question of 
air travel. Over the past 15 years, the 
international community has developed 
an extensive set of antiterrorist, defen- 
sive measures to protect air travelers. 
Before these steps, there were 18-20 



|:ary 1988 



49 



TERRORISM 



hijackings each year, with substantial 
casualties and damage. Last year, there 
were only two hijackings — the fewest 
since we started recording figures 20 
years ago. Similarly, there has been a 
significant decline in terrorist attacks 
on our diplomatic establishments. 

The "watch lists" we have devel- 
oped are in the hands of border police 
in many countries. Border police are 
becoming much more attentive to sus- 
picious travelers, too. As a result, ter- 
rorists r.un considerable risks crossing 
international borders. In January, two 
Lebanese terrorists were arrested on 
successive days trying to smuggle ex- 
plosives into Italy and Germany. 

Finally, because of increased atten- 
tion to antiterrorism by Western gov- 
ernments, terrorist gi'oups can no 
longer be sure they have not been pen- 
etrated by Western intelligence 
agencies. 

And as countries dedicate more re- 
sources to the fight against terrorism., 
they are catching and prosecuting in- 
creasing numbers of international 
terrorists. 

• In London, Nezar Hindawi re- 
ceived a life sentence for his attempt to 
blow up an El Al plane. 

• In Paris, Georges Ibrahim Ab- 
dallah received a life sentence for his 
role in the murders of a U.S. Army 
attache and an Israeli diplomat. 

• In Germany, a Lebanese terrorist 
named Hamadei faces air piracy and 
murder charges for his role in the TWA 
847 hijacking. 

• In New York City, Mohammed 
Atta, an Abu Nidal terrorist, awaits 
extradition to Israel to face murder 
charges arising from fire bombing and 
machinegunning of a bus. 

• In Washington, D.C., a Lebanese 
terrorist named Fawaz Younis awaits 
trial on hostage-taking charges arising 
from the hijacking of Jordanian Airlines 
Flight 401 in June 1985. 

• Just 2 weeks ago in Madrid, a 
Palestinian terrorist was sentenced to 
47 years in prison for directing the 
June 1986 bombing attempt against an 
El Al airliner. 

As with the strategic steps men- 
tioned earlier, no single tactical mea- 
sure, or even grou]) of measures, will 
solve the problem. But the cumulative 
effect of the measures helps achieve our 
strategic purpose. 



Conclusion 

Terrorism has by no means disappeared 
from the world scene. It is an ancient 
problem that will be with us for the 
forseeable future as terrorists con- 
stantly revise and adapt their methods 
of attack. 

However, newspaper headlines 
about spectacular terrorist attacks are 
gradually being replaced by brief press 
reports on terrorist trials. This is at- 
tributable to the important gains the 
West has made in recent years. We 
have developed a coherent strategy to 
reduce terrorism. With a fortified polit- 
ical will, we are changing the overall 
political environment, making it less 
benign to terrorism. We have succeeded 
in pressuring states that sponsor it, 
and we have strengthened the legal 



framework for punishing terrorists 
have also developed effective tacticat 
measures to supplement our overall 
strategy, such as tightening securit] 
obvious targets. 

Our counterterrorism policy is 
showing signs of success. If it is pu] 
sued over time, I am confident wee 
usher in an era when international 1 
rorism is no longer a dominant sub; 
on the international agenda. 



'The complete transcript of the he 
ings will be published by the eommitti 
and will be available from the Superin 
dent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 204 | 



Iran's Use of International Terrorism 



The following paper and chronology 
were prepared by the Office of the Am- 
bassador at Large for Counter-Ter- 
rorism and made available October 27, 
1987, in connectio7i with the announce- 
ment of U.S. sanctions against Iran. 
The chronology of selected terrorist in- 
cidents is not intended to be all-in- 
clusive but is illustrative of Iran's 
involvement in and support for ter- 
rorism and terrorist groups. The 
groups cited in this chronology have 
links with Iran. 

Iran is currently one of the the world's 
most active states supporting interna- 
tional terrorism and subversion against 
other countries. The revolutionaries 
who came to power in Iran with the 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini first at- 
tracted public attention to their use of 
terrorism with the takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 
1979. Their activities have continued 
since then in a variety of forms and 
places. The Government of Iran regards 
terrorism as an integral tool of its for- 
eign policy, to be used when the oppor- 
tunity seems propitious. 

An official explanation of the use of 
terrorism was made as early as May 
1979 by Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali who 
supported killing: 

. . .those who enter into a war against God 
and His prophets and who try to spread 
corruption on earth. No one who kills any 
of these persons can be arrested as a ter- 
rorist by a foreign government inasmuch as 



he will have carried out the orders of 
Islamic Revolutionary Court of Iran. 

Iran has shown exceptional re 
iness to use terrorism and subvers 
other governments as a policy tool 
Government of Iran or groups ovei 
which it has strong influence have 
tacked civilians, government offiei 
peacekeeping forces, Iranian dissi( 
at home and abroad, and the econ( 
assets of neighboring states. Kidn; 
ping, car bombing, suicide attacks 
jacking, and assassination have be^ 
used in these attacks. While Irani: 
Government personnel have been i 
directly in terrorist operations, pa 
larly those against Iranian disside 
the Iranian Government prefers tn 
surrogates such as the Lebanese-b 
Hizballah gi-oup. 

The Iranian Government's use 
terrorism and subversion of other 
tries is wide ranging. The major ^i 
of Iranian-backed terrorism and si 
sion include spreading its Shi'a fui 
mentalist revolution to other Islan 
states, creating a copy of an Irani: 
Islamic Republic in Lebanon, and 
ing Western influence — especially 
of the United States— from the Mi 
East. Iran also uses terrorism as ; 
of a broader strategy to deter Ku\ 
Saudi Arabia, and other Arab stat 
from supporting Iraq in the gulf v 

Iran recruits disgruntled Shi'; 
from the gulf states and elsewhert' 
gives them paramilitary and terro ! 
training, and returns them home. ' 
of the Iranian-backed terrorist act 



50 



Department of State Eeli 



TERRORISM 



ull are conducted by Iranian-in- 
1 ami sponsored Shi'a radicals. 
Iranian-inspired Kuwaiti Shi'a 
convicted of a number of sabotage 
k> at Kuwaiti oil facilities since 
liisii. Groups in the gulf area pro- 
1 liv Iran include the Supreme As- 
1\ for the Islamic Revolution in 
till' Islamic Front for the Libera- 
if Bahrain, the Islamic Dawa Party 
h has local branches in Kuwait, 
am, and Lebanon), and the Organi- 
I iiir the Islamic Revolution in the 
. ;.ian Peninsula. 

But Iranian terrorist-related ac- 
•ries reach well beyond the gulf 
^itian officials announced in July 
lathey apprehended members of 
h they described as a new Iranian- 
ic ;d terrorist ring with explosives in 
ne possession. In March 1987, 
unia broke relations with Iran, 
rij dng it was supporting fundamen- 
ib groups trying to undermine the 
o\ -nment. 

:n Lebanon, Hizballah operates un- 
einultiple cover names, including 
Ismic Jihad," "Right Against 
V'rig," and "Revolutionary Justice Or 
ai;ation." In Iraq and Kuwait, the 
Ja i Party has been used. Iran has 
u jred these groups with financial 
Si tance, arms, and training. In 
.einon, Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
0( linate closely with Hizballah lead- 
ri ind maintain co-located headquar- 
ei Iran has made clear its ability to 
HE pulate Hizballah's foi-eign hostages. 
-Ti pattern of support, combined with 

V ;nce of direct Iranian involvement 
n me Shi'a terrorist operations (e.g., 
hi i985-86 Paris bombings and the 

9! "Dawa 17" attacks on U.S., 
'r ich, and Kuwaiti targets in 

VI ait), demonstrates Iran's culpability 
a any, if not all, of its radical Shi'a 

u ogates' terrorist operations. Hiz- 
ih's involvement in hostage-takings, 
kings, and bombings is well 
\n. 

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
)s, formed in the early stages of 
n Iranian revolution, has served to 
.U3ort Iranian terroi'ism abroad, espe- 
•: y in Lebanon. A contingent of Rev- 
innary Guards went to Lebanon's 
ka Valley in the summer of 1982 and 
lemained there since. One of their 
eipal functions is liaison with and 
r ning of Hizballah. 

Iran also has shown a disregard for 
r rnationally accepted conventions 
norms, including those applying to 
"mats. On November 4, 1979, the 
■. Embassy in Tehran was seized 



and its personnel held hostage for 444 
days. More recently, a British diplomat 
in Tehran was abducted and beaten in 
May of this year. The French Embassy 
in 'Tehran was surrounded as part of 
the "embassy war" with France when 
French officials attempted to question a 
suspected terrorist who took refuge in 
the Iranian Embassy in Paris. 



Examples of Iranian 
Terrorism and Subversion 

We have good reason to believe that 
Iran or its surrogates are responsible 
for the following acts. For more specific 
information, see the detailed chro- 
nology (pp. 52-53). 



Kidnappings in Lebanon 

Although the Iranian-supported 
Hizballah is responsible for almost all of 
the kidnapings of westerners in 
Lebanon, Iran exercises strong influ- 
ence over all hostage-related decisions. 
For example, we believe Iran ordered 
the June 1967 kidnapping of journalist 
Charles Glass, who was held for 2 
months before he escaped in August. 

Assassinations of Anti-Khomeini 
Iranian Dissidents 

October 1987— Two murdered in 

London 
August 1987— One murdered in 

Istanbul 

August 1987— One murdered in Geneva 
July 1987— Failed assassination attempt 

in London 
July 1987— Three murdered in Karachi 
January 1987 — One murdered in 

Hamburg 

Attacks Against Arab 
and Islamic Interests 

July 1987— Disruption of the pil- 
grimages to Mecca, Saudi Arabia; 
at least 400 killed 

January 1987— Attempt to disrupt the 
Organization of Islamic Countries 
meeting in Kuwait by a series of 
bombings 

1986— Bombing of Saudia airline offices 
in New Delhi, Vienna, and Karachi 

August 1986— Arrest of 113 Iranian pil- 
grims trying to smuggle 51 kilos of 
plastic explosives into Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia 



June 1986-May 1987— Bombings at oil 

installations in Kuwait 
May 1985 — Attempt to assassinate 

Amir Sabah of Kuwait 
December 1983— Bombings of Kuwaiti 

Government buildings along with 

bombings of U.S. and French 

Embassies 

Attacks on Peacekeeping Forces 

October 1983— Suicide bombings of the 
French and U.S. Marine barracks 
in Beirut 

Embassy Bombings 

September 1984— Bombing of U.S. Em- 
bassy annex in Lebanon 

December 1983— Attacks on the U.S. 
and French Embassies in Kuwait 

April 1983— U.S. Embassy in Lebanon 
destroyed by suicide bomber 

Airline Hijackings 

July 1987— Hijacker of Air Afrique 
flight from Rome to Paris claimed 
Hizballah affiliation 

December 1986— Hijacking of Iraqi air- 
liner en route to Jordan; over 60 
killed when the plane crashed in 
Saudi Arabia 

June 1985— TWA 847 hijackers had and 
have strong ties to Iran 

December 1984— Kuwait Airlines flight 
221 hijacked to Tehran; two U.S. 
Government auditors, Charles 
Hegna and William Stanford, killed 



Bombings in Europe 

December 1985-September 1986— Se- 
ries of bombings in Paris 
August 1986 — Bookstore in London 
July 1985— Northwest Airlines office in 
Copenhagen 



Responses to Iranian 
Terrorism 

Several countries have responded to 
Iranian terrorism. 

Tunisia broke diplomatic relations 
with Iran earlier this year, charging 
Iran was stirring up fundamentalist un- 
rest. After a Tunisian court in Sep- 
tember passed sentences on 90 Tunisian 
nationals accused of fundamentalist 
subversive activities, several pro-Ira- 
nian groups held demonstrations and 
threatened retaliation. 



.ftiuary 1988 



TERRORISM 



The French Government in 1983 
closed down the Iranian cultural center 
in Paris because of concern it was being 
used by potential terrorists. In July 
1987, France broke diplomatic relations 
with Iran as part of the so-called em- 
bassy war, which started when an Ira- 
nian translator without diplomatic 
immunity fled to the Iranian Embassy 
to avoid questioning about his role in a 
series of terrorist bombings in France. 
Subsequently, French officials in Iran 
were ordered to appear before Iranian 
courts on trumped-up charges. Each 
country's embassy continues to be sur- 
rounded by the security forces of the 
other. 

The United Kingdom, France, 
and the United States, e.xercising their 
special responsibilities in West Berlin, 
ordered the e.xpulsion in August 1987 of 
Iranian consular officials following 
Iran's renewed threats of terrorist 
activities. 

The United States broke diplo- 
matic relations and imposed a series of 
trade and financial sanctions against 
Iran after official government com- 
plicity in the seizure of our embassy 
became clear. After the hostages were 
released in January 1981, the trade and 
financial restrictions were lifted. Iran 
was formally placed on the U.S. Gov- 
ernment's list of countries repeatedly 
supporting acts of international ter- 
rorism in January 1984. (Other coun- 
tries now on the list are Libya, Syria, 
Cuba, and the People's Democratic Re- 
public of Yemen.) A number of mea- 
sures, including a ban on Iranian 
imports, have been taken because of 
Iran's support for terrorism and its re- 
fusal to end the war with Iraq, which 
has threatened international shipping. 
E.xport controls and other economic 
measures have been taken against Iran 
in the past and, coupled with these 
more recent additional steps, are part 
of a process of trying to contain Iran's 
support for terrorism and subversion. ■ 



Chronology of Selected Terrorist Incidents 
by Iranian-Supported Groups, 1980-87 



The following is an illustrative list of 
terrorist incidents attributed to Iran or 
Iranian surrogates. 

1987 

October 2: London. An anti-Khomeini 
activist and his son were shot and 
killed in their home. A group called 
"The Guardians of the Islamic Revolu- 
tion and Soldiers of Imam Khomeini" 
claimed responsibility. 

August 10: Geneva. A former Ira- 
nian Air Force pilot who had defected 
in February was shot by two unknown 
assailants. Iran is suspected. 

July 24: Geneva. An Air Afrique 
airliner was hijacked en route from 
Rome to Paris and diverted to Geneva. 
One French passenger was killed. The 
Lebanese hijacker was subdued, and 
Swiss police took control of the air- 
craft. The flight originated in Braz- 
zaville with an intermediate stop in 
Bangui. The hijacker said he was affili- 
ated with Hizballah. 

June 17: Beirut. American Charles 
Glass was kidnapped. Iran reportedly 
approved the operation, which was car- 
ried out by elements of Hizballah. Glass 
escaped on August 17. 

January 24: Beirut. Four Beirut 
University College professors were kid- 
napped (three American citizens and 
one Indian U.S. permanent resident). 
Responsibility claimed by "Islamic 
Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine." 

January 20: Beirut. Church of 
England envoy Terry Waite disap- 
peared. Hizballah is suspected. 

January 19: Kuwait. Several e.xplo- 
sions damaged several oil installations 
south of Kuwait City. Iranian involve- 
ment is suspected. 

January 17: Beirut. German busi- 
nessman Rudolph Cordes was kid- 
napped. Three days later, another Ger- 
man businessman, Alfred Schmidt, was 
kidnapped. "Organization of the Op- 
pressed on Earth" claimed responsibil- 
ity. Hizballah is suspected. 

1986 

December 25: Saudi Arabia. An Iraqi 
airliner en route from Baghdad to Am- 
man crashed in Saudi Arabia following 
a hijacking attempt; at least 62 of the 



107 persons on board were killed, in- 
cluding two of the four hijackers. Se 
eral groups claimed responsibility, b 
Iranian-backed terrorists probably 
were responsible. 

October 26: Istanbul. A promin 
Iranian dissident was killed. Iran is i 
suspected. i 

October 21: Beirut. Edward Au 
tin Tracy was kidnapped. The Revel i 
tionary Justice Organization, a covei ; 
name used by Hizballah, claimed 
responsibility. 

September: Paris. A series of i 
bombings was claimed by "Committ^ 
in Solidarity with Arab Political Pri^ 
oners." The French have arrested 
Hizballah members involved and bel 
this network was connected to Iran. 
(See December 1985 entry.) 

September: Beirut. The Frencl 
military attache was assassinated in | 
September by a Hizballah member, t 

September 12: Beirut. America I 
citizen Joseph Cicippio was kidnapp i 
Revolutionary Justice Organization I 
claimed responsibility. . 

September 9: Beirut. Americai i 
citizen Frank Reed was kidnapped. ( 
Hizballah is suspected. 

August 8: Mecca. 113 Iranian p 
grims were arrested with 51 kilos o: 
plastic explosives. 

August: New Delhi. Saudia air 
office was bombed. Other airline ofi 
were bombed in Vienna in April am 
Karachi in May. Iran is suspected. 

August 19: London. A video si 
owned by an Iranian dissident was 
bombed; one person died. Iran is 
suspected. 

June: Kuwait. Five explosions ■ 
curred at Kuwaiti oil installations. 1 1 
backed Kuwaiti Shi'a are suspected 

April 28: Beirut. Two Greek 
Cypriots were kidnapped. The Islai : 
Liberation Organization, a name us 
by Hizballah, claimed responsibility 

April 7: Stockholm. The Nortl 
west Airlines office was bombed. 
Hizballah is suspected. 

March 8: Beirut. A four-man 
French TV crew was kidnapped, pi '■ 
bly by elements of Hizballah. 

February: Beirut. Seven Iraqi 
Ba'ath officials were killed. Dawa P : 
is suspected. 



52 



Department of State Bt 



I 



TERRORISM 



■CMber: Paris. A series of bombings 
; aimed by "Committee in Soli- 
with Arab Political Prisoners." 
iiiich have arrested Hizballah 
ers involved and believe this net- 
v\as connected to Iran. (See Sep- 

1 1- i;)86 entry.) 

ecember 25: Istanbul. A promi- 
■nt ranian dissident was 
-ainated. 

ovember 24: Frankfurt. A car 
n exploded in a parking lot adja- 
1 a U.S. military shopping center. 

I m authorities have issued an ar- 
>t arrant for an Iranian identified 
h ing placed the bomb. 

ily 12: Copenhagen. 
ni;aneous bombings damaged the 
T west Orient Airlines office and a 
naogue; one person was killed and 
iured. Islamic Jihad took responsi- 
it Hizballah is suspected. 

ine 14: Lebanon. TWA 847 was 
a^ed by two Lebanese Shi'a 
m; ;n en route to Athens from Rome 
[d reed to land in Beirut after two 
ui trips from Beirut to Algiers. The 
13' ers demanded the release of Shi'a 
iS lers. U.S. Navy diver Robert 
et ?m was murdered aboard the air- 
af Hizballah gave support to the hi- 
ck 's, holding 39 Americans hostage 
i rut for 17 days. 

une 10: Beirut. American citizen 
"10 as Sutherland was kidnapped. Is- 
m Jihad claimed responsibility. 

lay 28: Beirut. American citizen 
av Jacobsen was kidnapped. Islamic 
m claimed responsibility. Jacobsen 
iseleased November 2, 1986. 

lay 2.5: Kuwait. Members of the 
ai in-backed Dawa Party carried out 
a bombing on the motorcade of the 
m of Kuwait. Six people died in the 
;psion and ensuing melee, and 12 
ai injured. The Amir suffered minor 
ji es. Islamic Jihad claimed 
•SI nsibility. 

day 22: Beirut. French citizens 
■•a Paul Kaufmann and Michel Seurat 
ei kidnapped. 

Harch 16: Beirut. Terry Anderson 
aiddnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed 
•s insibility. 

Warch 22: Beirut. Marcel Carton, 

el Fontaine, and Danielle Perez of 

"rench Embassy in Lebanon were 

tpped. Ms. Perez was released 9 

later. 



January 8: Lebanon. An American 
priest. Rev. Lawrence Jenco, was kid- 
napped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsi- 
bility. Rev. Jenco was released July 26, 
1986. 



1984 

December 4: Tehran. Kuwaiti Airways 
Flight 221, carrying 166 people includ- 
ing six Americans, was hijacked to 
Tehran. The hijackers demanded the 
release of prisoners held in Kuwait. 
Two U.S. AID officials were murdered. 
U.S. and Kuwaiti hostages were set 
apart and tortured. The Iranian Gov- 
ernment assisted the hijackers. 

November: Ladispoli, Italy. Seven 
pro-Iranian Shi'a were arrested for 
planning a car attack against the U.S. 
Embassy in Rome. 

September 20: Beirut. The U.S. 
Embassy annex in East Beirut was se- 
verely damaged by a suicide car 
bomber. Twenty-three persons, includ- 
ing two Americans, were killed and at 
least 60 injured. Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility. 

July 31: Tehran. An Air France 
airliner en route from Frankfurt to 
Paris was hijacked to Iran by three 
Lebanese Shi'a. 

July 14: Pakistan. Police arrested 
eight Iranians suspected of planning at- 
tacks against a Pan Am office and three 
Saudi Arabian airlines offices. Iran is 
thought to have been responsible. 

May 8: Beirut. Rev. Benjamin 
Weir, an American clergyman, was kid- 
napped. He was released September 14, 
1985. 

March 7: Beirut. Jeremy Levin, 
an American journalist, was kidnapped. 
He escaped February 14, 1985. 

March 16: Beirut. William Buck- 
ley, an American Embassy officer, was 
kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed he 
was "executed" in October 1985, but 
other evidence indicates he died from 
wounds inflicted during beatings while 
in captivity. 

February 10: Beirut. Frank Re- 
gier, an American professor at the 
American University of Beirut, was 
kidnapped. He was rescued on April 15, 
1984. 

January 18: Beirut. Malcolm Kerr, 
president of the American University of 
Beirut, was assassinated. Islamic Jihad 
claimed responsibility. 



1983 

October 23: Beirut. U.S. Marine bar- 
racks were bombed, killing 240 and 
wounding 70. Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility. 

October 23: Beirut. Another truck 
filled with explosives crashed into a 
French MNF [Multinational Peacekeep- 
ing Force] barracks, killing 56 and 
wounding 15. Islamic Jihad claimed 
responsibility. 

December 12: Kuwait. Simul- 
taneous bombings of U.S. and French 
Embassies. 

April 18: Beirut. Five U.S. Ma- 
rines, part of the Multinational Peace- 
keeping Force, were attacked. 

April 18: Beirut. A car bomb de- 
stroyed the U.S. Embassy, killing 49 
and wounding 120. 

1982 

March 22: Beirut. Third Secretary Ali 
Hajim Sultan of the Iraqi Embassy was 
assassinated. Iranian involvement is 
suspected. 

1981 

September 4: Beirut. French Ambas- 
sador Louis Delamare was assassinated 
by four gunmen. Iranian-backed 
Lebanese Red Brigades claimed 
responsibility. 

1980 

September 26: Beirut. The U.S. Em- 
bassy was struck by three rocket-pro- 
pelled grenades. Iranian-sponsored 
"Forces of Mujahedeen" claimed 
responsibility. 

July 22: Washington, D.C. Exiled 
Iranian diplomat Ali Akbur Tkbatabai 
was assassinated in his suburban Beth- 
esda home. The assassin was identified 
as Daoud Salahuddin of the "Islamic 
Guerrillas in America." 

July 18: Paris. Attempted as- 
sassination of former Iranian Prime 
Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar by Anis 
Naccache, who is serving a life sen- 
tence for the crime. 

July 7: Rome. Explosions occurred 
at multinational corporation Snia-Tech- 
int's office. On August 8, an explosion 
occurred at Snia-Techint's director's 
home. No injuries were reported as a 
result of either blast. "The Guardians of 
the Islamic Revolution" claimed respon- 
sibilitv. ■ 






1988 



53 



UNITED NATIONS 



UN Calls on Soviet Union 

to Withdraw From Afghanistan 



•It 



Folloiving are a statement by Her- 
bert S. Okun, U.S. Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, 
in a plenary session of the General As- 
sembly on November 10, 1987, and the 
text of the UN General Assembly reso- 
lution adopted that day. 



AMBASSADOR OKUNS 
STATEMENT' 

Almost 8 years after the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan, we again must 
debate the situation in that tragic na- 
tion. In spite of the fact that eight Gen- 
eral Assemblies have overwhelmingly 
approved resolutions criticizing the So- 
viet occupation of Afghanistan, the So- 
viet Union continues to attempt to 
subjugate the Afghan people. 

Even while this debate is going on, 
the Soviet Union is waging war against 
the Afghan people. This policy of mili- 
tary conquest and disregard of the 
rights of a sovereign people has not 
succeeded. It has been resisted by the 
fierce attachment to freedom of the 
Afghan people. The Soviet leadership 
should know better than to challenge 
the sovei-eignty and independence of a 
proud people. Their own brave people 
courageously resisted the Nazi German 
attempt to subjugate them during the 
Second World War This war of con- 
quest in Afghanistan has lasted 4 years 
and 21 days longer than the Soviet 
struggle against the Nazis in World 
War II. 

The resolution before us today out- 
lines a fair and comprehensive solution 
to a problem which has outraged people 
everywhere. It calls for the complete 
withdrawal of foreign troops, the right 
of the Afghan people to choose their 
own form of government, restoration of 
Afghanistan's independence and non- 
aligned status, and the right of the ref- 
ugees to return in safety and honor. 

My government supports these fun- 
damental principles. It supports as well 
the search for a negotiated political set- 
tlement to end the agony the Afghan 
people have so long endured. The policy 
of the U.S. Government toward the 
Afghanistan situation is clear and 
consistent. 



• The United States seeks an early 
settlement which provides for the 
prompt withdrawal of the invading 
forces and for restoration to the Afghan 
people of freedom to choose their own 
political course. 

• The United States firmly believes 
that a peaceful settlement is possible. 

• The United States strongly sup- 
ports the efforts of the Secretary Gen- 
eral and of his personal representative 
to find such a solution. 

This year the Soviet Union has at- 
tempted to persuade the international 
community that Moscow genuinely 
wants a negotiated political settlement 
and that it has decided to withdraw its 
troops in order to accomplish this. Its 
campaign has been accompanied by 
high-sounding initiatives from Kabul 
calling for "national reconciliation" 
among the opposing Afghan parties. 
Let us review the record. Let us com- 
pare these assertions of peaceful inten- 
tions with what actually has occurred 
over the past yean 

What did they say? In January 
1987, the Kabul regime announced a 
"cease-fire." It subsequently claimed to 
have extended this "cease-fire" until 
January 1988. What did they do? They 
stepped up their military efforts, and in 
the summer of 1987, the Soviets and 
the Kabul regime army mounted the 
largest offensive engagements of the 
war against the resistance in Qandahar 
and Paktia Provinces. 

The Soviet Union has repeatedly 
stated that it has "made the decision to 
withdraw." This is a welcome commit- 
ment—if it is sincere. Here again the 
Soviet Union's deeds do not correspond 
to its words. The Soviet military con- 
tinues to construct an elaborate and 
permanent logistical infrastructure in 
Afghanistan. Hundreds of Soviet ad- 
visers are in Afghanistan to try to prop 
up an increasingly weakened client 
regime. 

Soviet assertions of peaceful intent 
are further contradicted by Soviet ac- 
tions on the ground. For several 
months earlier this year, the Soviets 
sought to intimidate Pakistan through 
repeated air attacks against Pakistani 
border villages. During the height of 
these raids in March and April, hun- 
dreds of Pakistani civilians were killed. 



The Afghan secret police has steppi 
up a campaign of terrorist bombing 
side Pakistan, which already has co 
hundreds of lives this year These r 
less acts internationalize an alreadj 
tragic and dangerous conflict. 

The Kabul regime tried to appt 
flexible and willing to compromise. 
January 1987, it put forward a so-ci 
policy of national reconciliation pur 
ing to offer the opposition an oppor 
ity to share power The reality is qi 
different. Following the pattern ust 
prevent the emergence of popularly 
elected governments in Eastern Eu 
immediately after the end of World 
II, the tiny Afghan Communist Pai 
insists on retaining control of the k 
portfolios of government in order t 
continue to dominate the political 1 
Afghanistan. All significant opposii 
figures in Afghanistan have ignore 
this offer, and the Afghan resistam 
has totally rejected it. 

Moscow's hand-chosen satrap i 
Kabul, NajibuUah, is a former heai 
the Afghan secret police and a ere; i 
of the Soviet KGB [Committee for 
State Security]. The tiny and spHr t 
Afghan communist movement, whi 
accounts for less than 1% of the po ! 
tion, is despised by the Afghan pe ( 
Lacking popular support, the regii 
attempts to exert control through 
ror. The Afghan secret police, kno 
KHAD, is modeled after the KGB i 
is the most pervasive and systema 
violator of human rights in areas i f 
regime control. Through surveillai 
arrest, imprisonment, and torture 
KHAD has instilled an atmosphen 
suspicion and fear Amnesty Inter J 
tional recently reported that tortu i 
used systematically by KHAD. 

As opposition to the Kabul re n 
has grown, and as party fractious ia 
increases, the Soviet Union has bi . 
forced to exercise a more direct r( \i 
propping up its clients. Soviet mil i 
and civilian advisers sit in almost 
ministries and make or approve di 
sions in the name of the regime. 1- 
weak is the Soviet client regime t 
tenuous control extends only over i 
of major cities. The Afghan Army n 
tinues to frustrate Soviet and reu 
efforts to make it an effective mil 
force. Plagued by desertions and • 
morale, the army remains at half 
pre-1979 level, despite use of pres 
gangs to conscript youths as youn i^ 
15. This summer Afghan troops dt 
fected to the resistance by the hu 
dreds. Meanwhile resistance strer I 
grows. 



54 



Depa rtment of State EJg 



f 



UNITED NATIONS 



le Kabul regime claims that tens 
h'lsands of refugees have returned 
. haiiistan in response to its call 
iiiniial reconciliation." In fact 
i> devastation and Kabul I'egime 
11 have forced an exodus of 
:roni their homes. Almost 5 
ri:hans have fled their country. 
lure are displaced within 
,-ian itself The net population 
\ continues to e.xceed the number 
1 iiees. As host to the largest ref- 
•iopulation in the world — over 3 
I Afghans — Pakistan has earned 
I sal admiration for the truly gen- 
manner in which it has borne this 
;: uluus burden. 

ijoying widespread support 
I the Afghan populace, the heroic 
I iiliii for 8 years has held a great 
I at bay in a tenacious defense of 
d lent way of life. The might of the 
m ically and technologically supe- 
■ )viet Army has not been able to 

this genuinely nationalist I'e- 
. e movement of the Afghan peo- 
. illy three-quarters of the Afghan 
dv yside remains under resistance 
lit 1. Parado.xically Soviet efforts to 
ati' Afghanistan have fostered a 
•use of Afghan nationhood based 
a jmmon opposition to the Soviet 
.■u ition. 

the Soviet Union genuinely de- 
•ei do so, it can easily and rapidly 
id le means to solve this ti'agic con- 
2t Jnder the leadership of the UN 
ei ary General and his personal rep- 
se ative for Afghanistan, a frame- 
ir! or a settlement has emerged. 
le: is still no agreement, however, on 
e ucial element of this framework — 
"h t timetable for the withdrawal of 
troops. The Soviet Union ada- 
^ I'efuses to commit itself to a 
1* ible and a date certain to begin 
e ithdrawal of its troops. Without 
s immitment from the Soviet 
, the war goes on. 
ifiterate today my government's 
til assurances to the Soviet 
that the United States is pre- 
to jjlay a helpful role in bringing 
a negotiated settlement. The 
il States has assured the Secre- 
ifiieral of its willingness to serve 
Liuarantor" of an appropriate set- 
' nt involving the withdrawal of So- 
rooijs. My government recognizes 
■eil for a settlement which is just, 
1 11(1 satisfactory to all the con- 
il parties, including the Soviet 



I recall a statement made by the 
Soviet Union's Foreign Minister to the 
League of Nations half a century ago. 
Ma.xim Litvinov stated that "peace is 
indivisible." He asserted that, and I 
quote, "It has now become clear to the 
whole world that each war is the crea- 
tion of a preceding war and the gener- 
ator of new present or future wars. . . . 
We must tell ourselves that sooner or 
later any war will bring misfortune to 
all countries, whether belligerents or 
neutrals." 

Shortly after his release from in- 
ternal exile, Andrey Sakharov, reflect- 
ing the growing popular Soviet 
consciousness of the war, termed his 
country's intervention in Afghanistan 
"uncommonly cruel and distressing." 
He called for "the immediate with- 
drawal of Soviet troops ... so that the 
Afghan people can solve their own do- 
mestic problems." 

In this light, I join with the vast 
majority of delegates in this hall today 
in appealing to the Soviet Union to 
commit itself to the path of peace and 
to permit the Afghan people to choose 
their own destiny free of outside inter- 
ference. We ask the Soviet Union to 
accept a negotiated formula to end this 
conflict which would permit it to live in 
harmony with a small neighbor that 
would be neutral and nonaligned and 
which would not constitute a threat to 
any other nation. 

Later today this body will vote 
overwhelmingly to request the Soviet 
Union to match its words with deeds. 
We will know true Soviet intentions 
when we meet a year from now. If at 
that time, Soviet troops remain on 
Afghan soil, the whole world will know 
that the Soviet Union's goal is not 
peace but conquest. If, however, the 
Soviet Union agrees to the elements of 
a fair and just settlement which are 
already on the table, the whole world 
will welcome its contribution to the es- 
tablishment of a free, neutral, non- 
aligned, and peaceful Afghanistan. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 42/152 

The General Assembly. 

Having considered the item entitled 
"The situation in Afghanistan and its im- 
plications for international peace and 
security". 



Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 
January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 
36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 
November 1982, 38/29 of 23 November 
1983, 39/13 of 15 November 1984, 40/12 of 13 
November 1985 and 41/33 of 5 November 
1986, 

Reaffirming the purposes and princi- 
ples of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the obligation of all States to refrain in 
their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the sov- 
ereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of any State, 

Reaffirming fu rther the inalienable 
right of all peoples to determine their own 
form of government and to choose their 
own economic, political and social system 
free from outside intervention, subversion, 
coercion or constraint of any kind 
whatsoever. 

Gravely concerned at the continuing 
foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, 
in contravention of the above principles, 
and its serious implications for interna- 
tional peace and security. 

Noting the increasing concern of the 
international community over the con- 
tinued and serious sufferings of the Afghan 
people and over the magnitude of social 
and economic problems posed to Pakistan 
and Iran by the presence on their soil of 
millions of Afghan refugees, and the con- 
tinuing increase in their numbers. 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need 
for a political solution of the grave situa- 
tion in respect of Afghanistan, 

Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General [UN Document 
A/42/600-S/19160], and the status of the 
diplomatic process initiated by him, 

Recognizing the importance of the ini- 
tiatives of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and the efforts of the Move- 
ment of Non-Aligned Countries for a politi- 
cal solution of the situation in respect of 
Afghanistan, 

1. Reiterates that the preservation of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, politi- 
cal independence and non-aligned character 
of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful 
solution of the problem; 

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan 
people to determine their own form of gov- 
ernment and to choose their economic, po- 
litical and social system free from outside 
intervention, subversion, coercion or con- 
straint of any kind whatsoever; 

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal 
of the foreign troops from Afghanistan; 

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to 
work for the urgent achievement of a polit- 
ical solution, in accordance with the provi- 
sions of the present resolution, and the 
creation of the necessary conditions which 
would enable the Afghan refugees to re- 
turn voluntarily to their homes in safety 
and honour; 



Sary 1988 



55 



UNITED NATIONS 



5. Reiieivs its appeal to all States and 
national and international organizations to 
continue to extend humanitarian relief as- 
sistance with a view to alleviating the 
hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-or- 
dination with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees; 

6. Expresses its appreciation and sup- 
port for the efforts and constructive steps 
taken by the Secretary-General, especially 
the diplomatic process initiated by him, in 
the search for a solution to the problem; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to 
continue those efforts with a view to pro- 
moting a political solution, in accordance 
with the provisions of the present resolu- 
tion, and the exploration of securing appro- 
priate guarantees for the non-use of force, 
or threat of force, against the political in- 
dependence, sovereignty, territorial integ- 
rity and security of all neighbouring 
States, on the basis of mutual guarantees 
and strict non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs and with full regard for the 
principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to 
keep Member States and the Security 
Council concurrently informed of progress 
towards the implementation of the present 
resolution and to submit to Member States 
a report on the situation at the earliest 
appropriate opportunity; 

9. Decides to include in the provisional 
agenda of its forty-third session the item 
entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and 
its implications for international peace and 
security". 



UN Consideration of tlie AIDS Pandemic 



'USUN press release 92. 
-Adopted by a vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, 
with 11 abstentions. ■ 



Following are statements by Dr. C. 
Everett Koop, a member of the U.S. 
delegation to the UN General Asse>nbly 
and Surgeon General of the United 
States, made in plenary session; the 
text of General Assembly Resolution 
42/8 adopted by consensus; and two De- 
partment statements. 



DR. KOOP'S STATEMENT, 
OCT. 20, 19871 

The United Nations was created with 
hope and promise following a period of 
despair and devastation. And, in a way, 
that is what I want to talk about to- 
day — hope amid despair, promise amid 
devastation. I am referring, of course, 
to a disease this entire planet faces — 
the disease known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). This is a 
disease that most often cuts down those 
in the prime of their lives. It kills the 
poor, and it kills the affluent; it is a 
disease that knows no geographic 
boundaries. Populations of all countries 
are vulnerable to attack. 

I welcome the General Assembly's 
decision to discuss this frightening dis- 
ease, and I welcome the resolution 
placed before vou, commending the 
World Health Organization (WHO) for 
its impressive efforts to coordinate the 
attack on this awesome threat and urg- 
ing action by governments in all coun- 
tries to initiate where necessary and 
improve where possible their individual 
and collective efforts. My delegation 
sincerely hopes this resolution is 
adopted by consensus. 

I come to this chamber today not 
as a diplomat but as a physician. And I 
come to you with a physician's plea. My 
plea is for greater compassion and for 
intensified international cooperation un- 
der the WHO. It is a plea for all the 
nations of the world and all their com- 
ponent parts — in the health community, 
the educational community, the social 
services community, industry, non- 
governmental organizations — to mobi- 
Hze their energies and their resources 
and to escalate their common fight 
against AIDS. 

In each of our countries, we must 
start with an understanding of the dis- 
ease and an acceptance that it is a risk 
to the entire society and not just to one 
or more narrow groups. I recognize 
that the political and public health lead- 
ers in some countries may not have 



wanted, at the start, to collect and |v 
lish data on an epidemic such as th 
But we cannot truly understand a ( 
ease, much less stop it, if we do no 
know where it is and how it acts. I i 
believe that the underreporting of t 
AIDS could be retarding our progr 
in the fight against it, and I am pl( i 
to learn that WHO has made advai | 
in stimulating more openness and r | 
honesty about the impact of this pi i 
lem. I sincerely hope that all delej: 
tions here will urge that this grow: 
openness continues. 

We also need to recognize that 
while AIDS is a global problem, it 
potentially more destructive to the t 
veloping world than it is to the ind I 
trialized world. 

In developing nations, the pec 
stricken with AIDS are primarily i 
we look to for support of the child) 
the aged, and the sick. Deaths ann 
these breadwinners cause both fan j ,, 
income and nutrition to decline, w j, 
poverty and disease increase, mak 
AIDS a major threat to family life i. 
there is more. 

Because AIDS strikes the he< 
and usually the young productive 
in the prime of life, AIDS is also i 
hindrance to development. Develo] j 
nations will be losing workers in a 
culture, industry, and many other 
economic areas, not to mention te; 
ers, engineers, physicians, health 
ers, government officials, and mar 
other professionals. These are tale K 
people that no country — and espec 1) 
not a developing country — can aff( l 
lose. 

And beyond that, there are th n 
nocent victims — the children, the 
ture of our world — who are and w 
continue to be afflicted with AIDS.l 
sad fact is that AIDS can roll bacl,i( 
global child survival efforts of botl 
UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] ai 
WHO and undermine all of the hai 
won victories in reducing infant 
mortality. 

There are many other unplea.' t 
scenarios. Tourism may suffer due i 
unreasonable fears about how All i 
contracted; foreign investment ma 
falter, as well, because AIDS may ; 
leading to reduced local markets ; ' 
reduced skilled labor, not to ment; 
rising health care costs. 



56 



Department of State BeH 

III 



UNITED NATIONS 



jrther the expenses associated 
hlealing with AIDS will inevitably 
-iinds and pei-sonnel from other 
mis in health, education, and 
\ ital sectors and thus jeopardize 
already made in those areas. 
can defeat the purposes of for- 
n ssistance that international banks 
1 idustrialized countries have 
vied. 

0, it is not fair that those whose 
e:ial losses are so threatening may 
h the hardest. But the reality is 
.itilDS can defeat a developing na- 
" hopes for the future. Altogether 

- are very sad possibilities to 

- er. 

1 the industrialized world, the 
ns^uences are also very great. We 
► ili-eady seen this in the United 
' . My country is not the most af- 
:■ country in per capita terms but, 
y 1 all know, has more cases than 
v ;her nation. What we have seen is 

Forty-three thousand AIDS cases 
\'( )een reported in the United 
ati, with 25,000 deaths. We estimate 
at .5 million additional Americans 
'9 fected by the AIDS virus and can 
rf i it to others even though they 
ay urrently show no signs of illness, 
•ei nt data'indicate that 30%-50<7<: of 
:e ed individuals can be expected to 
VI ip AIDS within 7 years of first 
•ci ling infected. 

We now know that the costs are 
■tx lomical, even for a country with 
r ny resources as the United 
au. Treatment can cost $50,000— 
id erhaps more — for a single patient. 
e .timate that by 1991, the costs of 
esng AIDS in the United States will 
iv reached between $8 billion and $16 
Hi 1 a year 

At the same time, we are making 
•ul remarkable strides in research. 
e ave learned more about AIDS in 6 
than we did about polio in 40 
or about whooping cough in sev- 
i fenerations. But there are limits 
l.s knowledge. President Reagan 
.is ointed out that "science is clearly 
ip)le of breathtaking advances, but 
s Dt capable of miracles." He's right; 

- if we are able to identify a vac- 
beeause of the long incubation 

---, d of AIDS, it will take years to 
ad- if that vaccine is effective. 

^ne thing that can be done in the 
term, however, that will help pre- 
' tourism, business, and foreign in- 
e*|nent is to resolve to make the 



world's blood supply safe for transfu- 
sion. Could we do this, all of us work- 
ing together, say by 1991? We have the 
technology and resources to do it. This 
is an area where the nations of the 
world could come together and do 
something that is for everyone's benefit. 
Victory over this one small facet of the 
AIDS pandemic will help bind us to- 
gether in our struggle to contain the 
source of AIDS. We call upon WHO to 
give this high priority. 

AIDS is such a devastating disease 
that the cultural, social, economic, and 
ethical aftershocks will last longer than 
the disease itself. My own country is 
suffering, and, in many cases, my fel- 
low citizens are confused and angry. 

With this background in the United 
States, we have declared AIDS to be 
our priority public health problem. A 
massive reseach effort is underway. We 
have undertaken education campaigns 
to inform the public about AIDS and 
means to prevent it and to try to dispel 
the myths and fears that can lead to 
discrimination against the victims of 
AIDS. Of course, we are also support- 
ing bilateral cooperative efforts in de- 
veloping nations though our Agency for 
International Development, and we are 
cooperating fully with the efforts of the 
World Health Organization. WHO has 
developed highly sensible and im- 
pressive guidelines for action by indi- 
vidual governments, and I believe it 
imperative that all countries make their 
AIDS control programs consistent with 
the WHO guidelines. 

One reason I came here today was 
to endorse WHO's leadership role in the 
battle against AIDS. WHO's global 
AIDS program emphasizes prevention 
through education, the exchange of in- 
formation, and the need for national 
program efforts developed in coopera- 
tion with WHO. It is clear to me that 
no country can fight AIDS on its own 
and that the international coordinating 
authority of WHO is absolutely essen- 
tial. My government has provided 
money and equipment and manpower to 
assist the WHO program and will con- 
tinue to do so. 

I have been a surgeon for almost 50 
years, and I have never seen such a 
threat as AIDS. I am proud to be a 
part of a tradition of care that goes 
back more than two millenia, a tradi- 
tion that will not abandon the sick and 
disabled, whoever they are. But now, in 
this epidemic, reports are trickling in 
that some doctors, nurses, and other 
health care workers, through un- 
founded fear concerning the transmis- 
sion of AIDS, are refusing to care for 



patients with AIDS or who they think 
have AIDS. This behavior on the part 
of a misinformed and fearful minority 
could destroy the fabric of traditional 
Hippocratic medicine. We must not let 
that happen. 

We must not abandon those who 
need our help. Just as important, we 
must not abandon hope or abandon our 
countries and their economies to the 
devastating impact of this pandemic. 
Certainly there are and will be those 
we cannot save. But I do believe that 
our scientific efforts, together with 
knowledge and education, will eventu- 
ally stop this terrible disease. 

As we speak, progress is being 
made in the laboratory; progress is be- 
ing made in education; and, as this dis- 
cussion illustrates, progress is being 
made in international cooperation. 

Let us continue to move forward 
with good sense and good science and, 
together, let us give the world some- 
thing every bit as precious as a vaccine 
against AIDS. Let us show the world 
how compassion and enlightenment can 
triumph over disease. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 42/8, OCT. 26, 1987 

The Getieral Assembly, 

Deeply concerned that acquired im- 
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), caused 
by one or more naturally occurring retro- 
viruses of undetermined origin, has as- 
sumed pandemic proportions affecting all 
regions of the world and represents a 
threat to the attainment of health for all, 

Having considered World Health As- 
sembly resolution WHA40.2G of 15 May 
1987 on the Global Strategy for the preven- 
tion and control of AIDS and Economic and 
Social Council resolution 1987/75 of 8 July 
1987 on prevention and control of AIDS, 

Recognizing the established leadership 
and the essential global directing and co- 
ordinating role of the World Health Orga- 
nization in AIDS prevention, control and 
education, and related research and public 
information and, in this context, the 
vital importance of the World Health Orga- 
nization Special Programme on AIDS, 

1. Commends the World Health Orga- 
nization for its efforts towards global 
AIDS prevention and control and, in par- 
ticular, for its support for national AIDS 
programmes and regional activities, includ- 
ing the meeting of Ministers of Asian and 
Pacific Governments at Sydney, and the 
forthcoming World Summit of Ministers of 
Health on Programmes for AIDS Preven- 
tion to be held in London; 

2. Confirms that the World Health Or- 
ganization should continue to direct and co- 
ordinate the urgent global battle against 
AIDS; 



*ary 1988 



57 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



3. CoDimeiids those Governments 
which have initiated action to establish na- 
tional programmes for the prevention and 
control of AIDS in line with the Global 
Strategy of the World Health Organization, 
and urges other Governments to take sim- 
ilar action; 

4. Calls upon all States, in addressing 
the AIDS problem, to take into account 
the legitimate concerns of other countries 
and the interests of inter-State relations; 

5. Invites the World Health Organiza- 
tion to facilitate the exchange of informa- 
tion on and promotion of national and 
international research for the prevention 
and control of AIDS through the further 
development of Collaborating Centres of 
the World Health Organization and similar 
existing mechanisms; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General, 
in view of all aspects of the problem, to 
ensure, in close co-operation with the 
Director-General of the World Health Or- 
ganization and through the appropriate ex- 
isting mechanisms, a co-ordinated response 
by the United Nations system to the AIDS 
pandemic, and urges all appropriate orga- 
nizations of the United Nations system, 
including the specialized agencies, bilat- 
eral and multilateral agencies and non- 
government and voluntary organizations, 

in conformity with the Global Strategy, to 
support the world-wide struggle against 
AIDS; 

7. Invites the Director-General of the 
World Health Organization to report to the 
General Assembly at its forty-third ses- 
sion, through the Economic and Social 
Council, on new developments in the global 
AIDS pandemic, and requests the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council to consider the 
report in accordance with its mandate. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 28, 1987^ 

On Monday, the 42d UN General As- 
sembly passed a historic resolution 
which unites all countries in a con- 
certed effort to prevent and control 
AIDS. Recognizing that AIDS is a 
global pandemic, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and many other countries 
cosponsored this resolution. 

In the resolution, the General As- 
sembly endorses the special program 
on AIDS of WHO and calls on all na- 
tions to initiate strong national efforts 
within WHO guidelines. Furthermore, 
it clearly recognizes one or more natu- 
rally occurring retroviruses of undeter- 
mined origin as the causes of the 
syndrome. 

From our point of view, all ele- 
ments of the resolution are an impor- 
tant key. It moves beyond disinfor- 
mation and a lack of coordination 
toward the achievement of positive 



global action. We welcome the action of 
the UN General Assembly, and we are 
committed to implementation of this 
resolution through cooperation with 
others and firm support of the WHO 
special program. 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 2, 1987^ 

From this podium on October 28, I 
commended the UN General Assembly 
resolution which unites all countries in 
a concerted effort to prevent and con- 
trol AIDS. The resolution, sponsored 
inter alia by the United States and the 
Soviet Union, recognizes one or more 
naturally occurring retroviruses of un- 
determined oi-igin as the cause of the 
syndrome. 

Today I would like to acknowledge 
a related development. On October 30, 
Izi'estia, the official Soviet Government 



newspaper, published a disavow^al of 
AIDS disinformation campaign by t 
authoritative Soviet scientists, Roal 
Sagdeyev and Vitally Goldanskiy. li 
Izvestia article, the scientists publii 
distanced the U.S.S.R. Academy of 
Sciences from claims that the AIDS 
virus was artificially cultivated at .':( 
cret U.S military bases and stated \ , 
they had protested the appearances , 
Soviet media of articles which repe; | 
those claims. | 

The United States welcomes th 
authoritative Soviet disavowal of th( 
false charges that the United State, 
responsible for creation of the AID, 
virus. We note in particular that th 
disavowal appeared in the official Si 
press. 



'USUN press release 65. 
-Read to news correspondents by 
partment spokesman Charles Redman 



Visit of El Salvadoran President 



President Jose Napoleon Duarte of 
the Republic of El Salvador made a 
state visit to the United States October 
13-18, 1987, to meet with President Rea- 
gan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made by the 
two Presidents at the arrival ceremony 
on October i^.' 

President Reagan 

It is with great pride and unreserved 
admiration that I welcome President 
Duarte to Washington. He comes as the 
elected representative of a courageous 
people, people who have struggled long 
and risked much in order to live in a 
free and democratic country. 

El Salvador, under President 
Duarte's leadership, has proven wrong 
the cynics, pessimists, and detractors 
of democracy. The Salvadoran people 
have proven that those who love free- 
dom can prevail over great odds — can 
defeat the forces of tyranny, both left 
and right — if they have the courage, 
commitment, and stand together. 

It was not that long ago that El 
Salvador was all but written off by 
many in this city's circles of power. The 
communist guerrillas, it was said, were 
an irresistible force, and the cruel tac- 
tics of the right could not be thwarted. 



The cause of democracy was dooms 
they said. Well, the U.S. Congress 
came within a few votes of making 
predictions of doom a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Our request for military 
to El Salvador was nearly defeatec: 
That would have left you, Presiden 
Duarte, and others who were strui 
gling for democracy unarmed and ^ 
fenseless against communist guerr 
who were receiving arms and amm 
tion through Nicaragua. 

Those of us who have stood in 
port of the democratic peoples of I 
Salvador are especially proud of w 
has been achieved in recent years, 
der the most trying of circumstanc 
with your steady hand at the helm 
President Duarte, democratic con\ 
tions and ideals have been transfoi 
into institutions, laws, and pi'actici 
a relatively short time, you've broi 
the military under civilian control 
helped turn it into a professional a 
respected force for both national S' 
curity and democratic government 
You've reformed the police and set 
about to improve the system of jus ■ 
You have created a climate of respi 
for human rights and the rule of la 

While you were putting in plat 
these fundamental reforms, the co i 
nist guerrillas, who would impose 
form of dictatorship on El Salvadoi 



58 



Department of State B'M 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



■aten back. Your brave military 
j-ertainly deserve much credit, 
power of democracy itself de- 
iiilit, as well. Democracy is a 
tliat offers a peaceful method of 
ilifferences. It is a system 
an incorporate a wide spectrum 
^ while at the same time protect 
it> of the individual. Our own 
III Lincoln once said: "The ballot 
-rr than the bullet." Well, that 
mral foundation on which the 
i-liiving people of Central Amer- 
, • to build a lasting peace. 
Tlay the prospects for attaining 
pice, although still far from cer- 
(' better than at any time in this 
The United States remains 
it'd to exploring any opportunity 
. fcild end the violence that plagues 
r«ion and permit the people of 
iti America to live their lives in 
oe Silencing the guns is no easy 
id. President Duarte, we both 
cace and democracy are inex- 
11 liked. 

I jeace is to prevail, so must de- 
:r: y. The people of El Salvador 
iw lis, having been victimized by 
;n rgency armed, trained, and 

.d( artered in a nearby country. 
'.y ave firsthand experience that a 
ei Tient that does not respect the 
lit 3f its own citizens cannot be ex- 
t£ to respect the rights of its 
^1- }rs. And that is why all of us 
.cl ?o closely the reform process set 
n( on by the Guatemala peace plan. 
''. is process, which ties democra- 
iti I to the end of armed conflict, is 
-i pnt with a proposal made by 
1- Wright [Speaker of the House 
v~ontative Jim Wright] and my- 
(■ want to see the peace process 
I. That success is dependent on 

II e democratic reform, on respect 
hnan rights, and on open and free 
•t ns. It depends on respect for the 

I11S of speech, religion, and as- 
. It depends on honest dialogue 

wn those who are now engaged in 

id combat, 
■esident Duarte, you have already 

lehe extra mile, literally and figur- 

■"f ', to bring fundamental change to 
"untry and to end the cycle of 
I . Those who are engaged in 
struggle against your govern- 
lave been invited to join in the 
ratic process. You have negoti- 
iivftly with the leaders of insur- 
iirees, sincerely trying to find the 
la that will bring peace and se- 
rt't'dom in your troubled land. 




Others in the region can do no less if 
they expect to end the strife that rav- 
ages their countries. The choice is 
theirs. 

As we face the future and deter- 
mine our next steps, let us recognize 
that the hope in Central America today 
has come about because those who be- 
lieve in democracy have faced reality, 
made the tough choices, and stood to- 
gether. In these last 6V2 years, through 
the strength of purpose of brave and 
farsighted individuals like President 
Duarte, a crisis has been averted and 
admirable progress has been made, es- 
pecially in creating and consolidating 
democratic institutions. 

President Duarte's visit permits us 
the opportunity to take account of the 
progress that has been made; to discuss 
our vision of a fi'ee, prosperous, and 
peaceful hemisphere; and to declare our 
solidarity with all those who share that 
vision. President Duarte, again, it is an 
honor to welcome you. 



President Duarte 

This is the first time in many years 
that a head of state of a Central Ameri- 
can nation has been received by the 
U.S. President on a state visit. 

I receive this honor with great 
modesty, knowing full well that this 
ceremony is an acknowledgment to the 
democratic commitment of the great 
people of El Salvador. Only last week, 
in your speech to the Organization of 
American States (OAS), you remem- 
bered the heroic behavior of Sal- 
vadorans in the voting booths. The 
same lines of conduct have remained 
steadfast through all these years and 
have served to build a strong democ- 
racy which, although not yet perfect, is 
modeled after your own. 

Your constant and unswerving sup- 
port for our undertaking has helped us 
overcome obstacles which at times 
seem invincible. Your Congress, too, 
has worked with us on the difficult 
roads we have had to travel. For that 
we thank you. And today peace is a 
step closer with the signing of the 
peace agreement in Guatemala early 
last month. 



Sry 1988 



59 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



In your speech at the OAS, you 
had stated that the Central American 
plan "contains many of the elements 
necessary to bring both lasting peace 
and enduring democracy for the re- 
gion." You went on to say that there is 
also a reason for caution; I agree. For 
this reason, I have insisted that the 
compliance with our peace plan must be 
fully verified by the appointed commis- 
sions. Here we will hope that the OAS 
and its member nations, especially 
those like yours with the technical ca- 
pacity, will take an active role. 

I am convinced that there cannot 
be peace in Central America without 
freedom and democracy, which in turn 
will only be attained through compre- 
hensive dialogue and negotiated cease- 
fire. I also insist that each Central 
American president has the responsibil- 
ity to comply fully within his own coun- 
try with all the obligations contracted, 
and that no government be permitted 
to take only cosmetic or half-measures 
or to e.xcuse his government's lack of 
total compliance because of difference 
with another government not party to 
the Esquipulas accord [Guatemala 
peace plan]. 

We need to continue to work to 
bring democracy to all [of] Central 
America. I know that the United States 
has been engaged in this effort, but we 
still have a long way to go. I encourage 
you to do what needs to be done in 
order to assure that the democratic 
gains are enduring and that the people 
of Central America are free from total- 
itarian oppression. You can count on me 
and my courageous people to be faithful 
and effective partners in this historical 
and noble enterprise. 

And now, President Reagan, let me 
break the protocol. I've seen through 
my life many times in which people 
with hate in their heart have put fire to 
the American flag. This time, permit 
me to go to your flag and, in the name 
of my people, to give it a kiss. 



Trade Sanctions Imposed Against Brazil 



'Made at the South Portico of the 
White House where President Duarte was 
accorded a formal welcome with full mili- 
tary honors (te.xt from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents of Oct. 19 
1987, ■ 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 13, 1987' 

I am today announcing my intention to 
raise tariffs on Brazilian e.xports to the 
United States and to prohibit imports 
from Brazil of certain computer prod- 
ucts in response to the maintenance by 
Brazil of unfair trade practices in the 
area of computer products. 

Brazil's national informatics pol- 
icies, in place since the 1970s, severely 
restrict foreign participation in Brazil's 
computer and computer-related market. 
The United States has unsuccessfully 
raised its concerns with Brazil in bilat- 
eral and multilateral consultations since 
1983. In September 1985, I initiated an 
investigation of these practices under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and 
in October 1986 determined that Brazil's 
informatics policies were unreasonable 
and a burden and restriction on U.S. 
commerce. I suspended parts of this in- 
vestigation after Brazil made commit- 
ments to implement its "informatics" 
law in a more flexible, reasonable, and 
just manner. 

Recent developments in Brazil 
make it clear that these commitments 
are not being kept. In particular, the 
Brazilian Government has rejected 
efforts by an American software com- 
pany to license its product in Brazil, 
asserting that a domestic company 
makes a product that is "functionally 
equivalent." This decision establishes a 
precedent which effectively bans U.S. 
companies from the Brazilian software 
market. It is also likely to increase pi- 
racy of foreign software since demand 
for the prohibited product will 
continue. 

In response to these developments, 
I intend to raise tariffs to offset the 
lost sales opportunities for U.S. com- 
panies, estimated at $105 million and to 
prohibit imports of Brazilian infor- 
matics products covered under Brazil's 
"market reserve" policy. Should Brazil 
reverse its action and live up to its 
commitments to the United States, I 
will be prepared to lift these sanctions. 

Brazil is a good friend of the 
United States, and we support the 
steps it is taking to restore its demo- 
cratic institutions. But Brazil is also a 
major beneficiary of the global trading 
system, the openness of which cannot 
be maintained if markets are deliber- 
ately closed and policies incompatible 
with a more free and open trading sys- 
tem are established. 



60 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, 
NOV. 13, 19872 



Background 

In September 1985, President Rea 
instructed the U.S. Trade Represt 
tative to initiate an investigation ii 
Brazil's informatics policy under Si 
301 of the Ti-ade Act of 1974. The I ' 
dent cited Brazil's market reserve '' 
icy administrative burdens on imp( - 
prohibition of foreign investment, - 
lack of copyright protection for coi 
puter software as major grounds f I 
the complaint. In October 1986, th ' 
President determined that Brazil'.'; 
formatics policies were unreasonal 
and a burden and restriction on U 
commerce. 

In December 1986, the Presid 
suspended the market reserve ani 
ministrative portions of the Sectio 
case in response to Brazil's commi ; 
to implement its law in a clearer r 
ner and not to extend market res( 
requirements to new areas, nor bf i 
1992, when the market reserve po 
scheduled to expire. He also instr s 
U.S. Trade Representative Clayte 
Yeutter to monitor the relevant 
commitments. 

In June 1987, the President si 
pended the intellectual property r t 
part of the Section 301 investigati' 
after Brazil's Chamber of Deputie 
passed legislation that would prov 
copyright protection for software, 
he instructed Ambassador Yeuttei 
monitor the bill's passage through 
zil's Senate. He also instructed th' 
Trade Representative to continue f 
gotiate the investment parts of th 
investigation. 

In September 1987, Brazil's S' 
tariat for Informatics (SEI) reject 
agreements negotiated between a - 
software company and six Brazilia it 
formatics companies for licensing ^ 
the world's leading operating syst • 
SEI based the rejection on its det • 
mination that a Brazilian-made 
"functionally equivalent" operatini 
tem already exists. 

Even though the United Statt li 
demonstrated that the two operat ; 
systems are not similar, the Brazi n 
Government contends that the Br; Hi 
product is adequate for its domes! ' 
market. On this basis, any softwa 
program or operating system coul oe 
considered "equivalent" to the Bnlii 



Department of State B|| 



TREATIES 



. SEI's decision specifically vio- 
nkTstandings reached with the 
111 Covernment that SEI's inter- 
m I if "functional equivalent" 
■r wduld be objective, and the 
1 establishes a precedent which 
L L'ly bans U.S. companies from 
Bizilian software market. Except 
nnframes, U.S. companies are al- 
jorohibited from participating in 
Bizilian hardware market. 
Fiizil's recent action is also likely 
a~i' end-user piracy of foreign 
•f since the prohibited product is 
itally available, and demand for 
!-e state-of-the-art software will 
:ii e. End-user piracy is perhaps 
nst difficult kind of piracy to mon- 
c enforce. Brazil's recent decision 
n^ t copyright protection for corn- 
el oftware will have little effect un- 
t se circumstances. 



esident's Action 

(esident has decided to impose 
: ns on certain Brazilian e.xports 
United States. A notice will be 
in the Federal Register next 
sting possible products upon 
^anctions could be imposed. 
)ublic hearings are held, the Ad- 
■ation will select a retaliatory list 
ucts. The size of the retaliation 
^ect the average annual lost 
pportunities by the U.S. soft- 
idustry in Brazil, estimated at 
illion. In addition, the Admin- 
in will restrict imports of infor- 
products from Brazil which are 
i under the Brazilian market re- 
jolicy. Although Brazil does not 

these products to the United 
at this time, this action will pre- 
le Brazilian informatics industry 
ntering the U.S. market as long 
nposes a market reserve on corn- 
software. 

lese actions will not deprive U.S. 
ners of the products against 
retaliatory action will be taken, 
oducts on the list can be supplied 
nestic or other foreign producers, 
gher tariffs, which will only be 

on imports from Brazil of these 
'ts, will be removed when it has 
letermined that these unfair prac- 
lave been eliminated. 



^xt from Weekly Compilation of 
e^ential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. 
lext from White House press 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into 
force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 

1970. TIAS 6997. 

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Oct. 26, 
1987. 

Aviation 

International air services transit agree- 
ment. Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. En- 
tered into force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S. 
Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Notice of termination: Canada, Nov. 10, 
1987, effective Nov. 10, 1988' 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague 
Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 

1971. TIAS 7192. 

Accession deposited: Antigua and Bar- 
buda, July 22, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: Rwanda, Nov. 3, 
1987. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. 
Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered 
into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited: Antigua and Bar- 
buda, July 22, 1985. 

Ratification deposited: Rwanda, Nov. 3, 
1987. 

Commodities — Common Fund 

Agreement establishing the common fund 

for commodities, with schedules. Done at 

Geneva June 27, 1980.2 

Ratification deposited: Congo, Nov. 4, 

1987. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Entered into force Mar 19, 1967; for the 
U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6920. 
Accession deposited: Western Samoa, 
Oct. 26, 1987. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 

1972. TIAS 7502 

Accession deposited: Western Samoa, 
Oct. 26, 1987. 

Fisheries 

Pacific Island regional fisheries treaty, 
with annexes and agreed statement. Done 
at Port Moresby Apr 2, 1987. (Senate) 
Treaty Doc. 100-5.2 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 6, 1987. 

Ratifications deposited: Fed. States of Mi- 
cronesia, Nov. 11, 1978; Solomon Islands, 
Sept. 9, 1987. 



Marine Pollution 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna- 
tional convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution from ships, 1973. Done at London 
Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 
1983. 

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct, 5, 
1987. 

Ratification deposited: Australia, Oct. 14, 
1987.3 

Annex V to the international convention 
for the prevention of pollution from ships, 
1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. (Sen- 
ate) Treaty Doc. 100-3.2 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: 
Nov. 5, 1987.^ 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention 

on narcotic drugs (TIAS 6298). Done at 

Geneva Mar 25, 1972. Entered into force 

Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 

Accession deposited: Hungary, Nov. 12, 

1987. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow Julv 1, 1968. Entered into 
force Mar 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Accession deposited: Spain, Nov. 5, 1987. 

Pollution 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 

transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 

1979 (TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring 

and evaluation of long-range transmission 

of air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with 

annex. Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. 

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, Oct. 28, 

1987. 

Ratification deposited: France, Oct. 30, 

1987. 

Enters into force: Jan. 28, 1988. 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced 
persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar 21, 1983. 
Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 
10824. 

Territorial application: Extended by U.K. 
to Hong Kong, Nov. 5, 1987. ^ 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, 
Oct. 8, 1987.5 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 
1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 
20, 1987.2 (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-9. 
Signature: Netherlands, Nov. 6, 1987. 
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Nov. 2, 
1987. 

Terrorism 

International convention against the taking 
of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17, 
1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
Accession deposited: Ghana, Nov. 10, 1987. 



kry 1988 



61 



TREATIES 



UNIDO 

Constitution of the UN Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization (UNIDO), with an- 
nexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. 
Entered into force June 21, 1985. 
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Oct. 26 
1987. 



BILATERAL 

Brazil 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of May 8, 1984, concerning 
the Landsat system. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Brasilia Oct. 9 and 17, 1987. 
Entered into force Oct. 17, 1987; effective 
May 8, 1987. 

Canada 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Nov. 22, 1978, as amended, on Great Lakes 
water quality (TIAS 9257, 10798). Signed 
at Toledo Nov. 18, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 18, 1987. 

Memorandum of understanding for cooper- 
ation in the field of magnetic fusion en- 
ergy. Signed at Washington Nov. 19, 1987. 
Entered into force Nov. 19, 1987. 

Colombia 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Aug. 1, 1961 (TIAS 4916) for relief from 
double taxation on earnings from opera- 
tions of ships and aircraft. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Bogota Oct. 16, 1987. 
Entered into foi-ce Oct. 16, 1987. 

Denmark 

Agreement extending the agreement 
of Mar. 25, 1985 concerning a Danish- 
American fund for the exchange of tech- 
nology. ■> Effected by exchange of notes at 
Copenhagen Sept. 11 and 25, 1987. Entered 
into force Sept. 25, 1987; effective Mar. 25 
1987. 

Equatorial Guinea 

Agreement relating to the establishment of 
a Peace Corps program in Equatorial 
Guinea. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Malabo Nov. 18, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 18, 1987. 

France 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 23, 1987, on mutual logistic support. 
Signed at Casteau Oct. 15. 1987. Entered 
into force Oct. 15, 1987. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Memorandum of understanding for an ex- 
change of energy-related information. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1987. En- 
tered into force Nov. 20, 1987. 

Grenada 

Agreement relating to employment of de- 
pendents of official government employees, 
with addendum. Effected by exchange of 
notes at St. George's Sept. "l5. 1987. En- 
tered into force Sept. 15, 1987. 



62 



Agreement concerning establishment of a 
radio relay station of the U.S. Information 
Agency (Voice of America) on the island of 
Grenada. Signed at St. George's Sept. 29, 
1987. Enters into force upon completed 
conveyance of land to the U.S. 
Government. 

Honduras 

Agreement governing cooperation in map- 
ping, charting, and geodesy. Signed at 
Tegucigalpa and Washington Sept. 21 and 
Oct. 21, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 21 
1987. 

India 

Agreement amending agreement of Feb. 6, 
1987, as amended, relating to trade in tex- 
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington Sept. 15, 
Oct. 2 and 16, 1987. Entered into force 
Oct. 16, 1987. 

Indonesia 

Project loan agreement for rural roads 
maintenance systems. Signed at Jakarta 
Aug. 31, 1987. Entered into force Aug 31 
1987. 

Program grant agreement for agriculture 
and rural sector support. Signed at .Jakarta 
Aug. 31, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 31 
1987. 

Iraq 

Commercial, economic and technical coop- 
eration agreement. Signed at Washington 
Aug. 26, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 27 
1987. 

Israel 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the operation of the INTELPOST service, 
with details of implementation. Signed at 
Jerusalem and Washington July 20 and 
Nov. 5, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 5, 
1987; effective Sept. 1, 1987. 

Italy 

General administrative agreement relating 
to participation in the U.S. Nuclear Reg- 
ulatory Commission (USNRC) program of 
severe accident, source term, and contain- 
ment research. Signed at Rome and Be- 
thesda May 11 and June 5, 1987. Entered 
into force June 5, 1987. 

Japan 

Agreement for cooperation concerning 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with an- 
nexes, agreed minutes, implementing 
agreement, and exchanges of notes. Signed 
at Tokyo Nov. 4, 1987. Enters into force on 
the 30th day after the exchange of diplo- 
matic notes that respective internal legal 
procedures have been completed. 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Sept. 10, 1982 (TIAS 10480), 
concerning fisheries off the coasts of the ' 
U.S., with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Washington Nov. 10, 1987. Enters into 



force on the date diplomatic notes are 
changed indicating approval of the tw, 
governments. 

Korea 

Record of understanding on intellectu 
property rights, with related letter. .~^ 
at Washington Aug. 28, 1986. Entere., 
force Aug. 28, 1986. 

Agreement relating to the agreemeiv 
Aug. 28, 1986, on access of U.S. firm 
Korea's insurance market. Effected b 
change of letters at Washington Sept. [ 
1987. Entered into force Sept. 10, 198' f 
fective Jan. 1, 1988. [ 

Liberia [ 

Agreement for the sale of agriculture 
modities. Signed at Monrovia June 2:' 
1987. Entered into force June 22, 198' , 

Mexico 

Agreement in the area of nuclear reac 
safety research. Signed at Bethesda ; 
Mexico May 27 and June 2, 1987. Enf 
into force June 2, 1987. 

Agreement amending agreement of F 
26, 1979 (TIAS 9419), as amended, rel 
to trade in cotton, wool, and manmad 
fiber textiles and textile products. El 
fected by exchange of notes at Mexici 
Washington Sept. 15 and 24, 1987. Ei 
into force Sept. 24, 1987. 

Netherlands 

Air transport agreement relating to : 
transportation between the U.S. and 
Aruba, with annexes. Signed at Wasl 
ington Nov. 7, 1986. 
Entered into force: Aug. 17, 1987. 

.Nigeria 

Agreement on procedures for mutual 
sistance in law enforcement matters. 
Signed at Washington Nov. 2, 1987. hI 
tered into force Nov. 2, 1987. 

NATO 

Memorandum of understanding conce I 
the interconnection of the NA'TO Init ( 
Voice Switched Network (IVSN) and 
the U.S. Automatic Voice Network 
(AUTOVON), with annex. Signed at 
gart and Brussels Aug. 31 and Sejit. 
1987. Entered into force Sept. 16, 19*- j 

Pakistan 

Agreement for sale of agricultural co 
modities. Signed at Islamabad June 2; 
1987. Entered into force June 25, 198>| 

Grant agreement for the project com | 
nent of the agricultural sector suppoi 
program (ASSP). Signed at Islamaba 
Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force 
Sept. 24, 1987. 

Seventh amendatory agreement to th, 
commodity import grant and loan agr 
ment of Apr. 13, 1982 (TIAS 10378), f 
agricultural commodities and equipmi 
Signed at Islamabad Sept. 29, 1987. I 
tered into force Sept. 29, 1987. 



Department of State Bjji';; 



PRESS RELEASES 



ndum of agreement regarding co- 
in, study and exchange of archival 
tion and materials on the Nazi oc- 
1 of Poland, the Holocaust, and re- 
bjects. Signed at Belzec Aug. 26, 
itered into force Aug. 26, 1987. 



d 



r Leone 

ent regarding the consolidation and 

uling of certain debts owed to, 
J eed by, or insured by the U.S. Gov- 

t and its agencies, with annexes. 
n at Freetown Aug. 21, 1987. Entered 

ce Nov, 5, 1987. 



ent relating to the agreement of 
, 1973, concerning air transport 
'725). Effected by exchange of notes 
fid Mar 31 and A"pr. 7, 1987. En- 
Ito force Apr. 7, 1987. 



«ent amending the agreement of 

1987, for sales of agricultural com- 
B. Effected by exchange of notes at 
jim June 18, 1987. Entered into 
ane 18, 1987. 

iti'land 

re lent relating to the treaty of May 
l{ ! (TIAS 8302), on mutual assistance 
ri .nal matters. Effected by exchange 

; at Washington Nov. 10, 1987. En- 

itn force Nov. 10, 1987. 

rk 

oil jndum of understanding on multiple 
nc rocket system. Signed at Wash- 
to Oct. 2, 1987. Enters into force on 
d e of exchange of letters in aceord- 
th respective legal procedures. 

it Kingdom 

renent amending the agreement of 
c. ), 1966, as amended (TIAS 6196, 
'6 ;oncerning the availability of certain 
ti Indian Ocean Territory Islands for 
ei; purposes. Effected by exchange of 
• t Washington Nov. 16, 1987. Entered 
■o Nov. 16, 1987. 

U|ay 

Mnent amending agreement of Dec. 
1'3, and Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, 
at g to trade in wool and cotton tex- 
■•* ad textile products. Effected by ex- 
• "f notes at Montevideo Sept. 10 and 
7. i-hitered into force Sept. 30, 1987. 

eplaces notification of Nov. 12, 1986, 
ii' would have been effective Nov. 12, 

"t in force. 

'iis not accept optional annexes III, 
■dV. 

V'ith an understanding. 
Vith declaration. ■ 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*214 11/5 Shultz: statement on 

departure of Defense 
Secretary Weinberger. 

*215 11/6 Program for the state visit 
to the United States of 
Israeli President 
Herzog, Nov. 9-15. 

*216 11/9 Shultz: statement and 
question-and-answer 
session, OAS General 
Assembly. 

*217 11/9 Shultz: luncheon remarks, 
OAS General Assembly. 
218 11/12 Shultz: address, OAS Gen- 
eral Assembly, Nov. 10. 

*219 11/18 David H. Shinn sworn in 
as Ambassador to Bur- 
kina Faso, Nov. 16 (bio- 
graphic data). 

*220 11/18 Department of State and 
World Affairs Council 
cosponsor town meeting, 
Riverside, California, 
Dec. 9. 



USUN 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 

Subject 

Rashkow: space, Legal 
Subcommittee, 
COPUOS, June 9. 

Walters: statement, 
ECOSOC, Geneva. 

Bernstein: information. 
Committee on 
Information. 

Shultz: Iran-Iraq conflict. 
Security Council. 

Reagan: Iran-Iraq 
conflict, July 20. 

Byrne: Khmer refugees. 
Meeting of Donors to 
the Program of 
Humanitarian Assistance 
to the Kampuchean 
People. 

U.S. response to Libyan 
letter, Sept. 12. 

Okun: Libya, UN 
General Assembly. 

Reagan: address before 
42d session of the UN 
General Assembly. 

Okun: Iran, UN General 
Assembly. 



No. 


Date 


*34 


6/10 


*35 


6/24 


*36 


7/2 


37 


7/20 


*38 


7/21 


*39 


9/10 



*40 


9/14 


*41 


9/16 


42 


9/21 



*221 11/20 



*222 11/20 



223 

*224 



225 
226 



11/25 



Richard C. Allison ap- 
pointed as member of 
Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal. 

Robert Maxwell Pringle 
sworn in as Ambassador 
to Mali, Nov. 18 (bio- 
graphic data). 

Shultz: news conference, 
Geneva, Nov. 24. 

James B. Moran sworn in 
as Ambassador to the 
Seychelles (biographic 
data). 

Shultz: news conference, 
Brussels, Nov. 25. 

Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 
1952-1954, Vol. XII, 
Part 2, East Asia and 
the Pacific, released. 

Shultz: interview on 
CBS-TV's "Face the 
Nation." 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



*44 


10/2 


*45 


10/1 


*46 


10/5 


*47 


10/7 


*48 


10/7 


*49 


10/8 



51 


10/12 


52 


10/13 


53 


10/14 


54 


10/14 


55 


10/14 


56 


10/15 



*43 



Nygard: audit report. 
Committee V. 

Bailey: Zimbabwe, UN 
General Assembly, 
Oct. 2. 

Korn: world economy. 
Committee II. 

Byrne: racial discrimina- 
tion. Committee III. 

Piedra: Central America, 
UN General Assembly. 

Walters: statement made 
upon leaving the UN 
General Assembly dur- 
ing the speech of 
Nicaraguan President 
Daniel Ortega. 

U.S. Delegation to the 42d 
session of the UN 
General Assembly. 

Rosenstock: non-use of 
force. Committee VI. 

Walters: Kampuchea, UN 
General Assembly. 

Korn: debt crisis, 
Committee II. 

Treat: self-determination. 
Committee III. 

Shearouse: pattern of con- 
ferences. Committee V. 

Byrne: atomic radiation. 
Special Political 
Committee. 



lary 1988 



63 



PUBLICATIONS 



*57 


10/16 


*58 


10/16 


*59 


10/16 


*60 


10/16 


*61 


10/19 


*62 


10/20 


*63 


10/20 


*64 


10/20 


65 


10/20 


*66 


10/21 


*67 


10/22 


*68 


10/22 


*69 


10/23 


*70 


10/23 


*71 


10/26 


*72 


10/26 


*73 


10/27 


*74 


10/28 


*75 


10/28 


*76 


10/28 


*77 


10/28 


*78 


10/29 


*79 


10/30 


*80 


10/30 


*81 


11/2 


*82 


11/2 


*83 


11/2 



Okun: arms control, 

Committee I. 
Michalski: scale of assess- 
ments, Committee V. 
Korn: World Food Day, 

ECOSOC. 
Hoh: management inspec- 
tions. Committee V. 
Hill: environment, UN 

General Assembly. 
Okun: atomic energy, UN 

General Assembly. 
Montgomery: peace- 
keeping operations. 

Special Political 

Committee. 
Cahill: report on ECOSOC, 

Committee II. 
Koop: acquired immune 

deficiency syndrome, 

UN General Assembly. 
Rosenstock: report on 
United Nations, 
Committee VI. 
Emery: arms control. 

Committee I. 
Byrne: social issues. 

Committee III. 
Coker: development and 

economic cooperation, 

Committee II. 
Byrne: decolonization, 

Committee IV. 
Stirling: self- 
determination. 

Committee III. 
Crockett: terrorism, 

Committee VI. 
Korn: economic situation in 

Africa, UN General 

Assembly. 
Byrne: Western Sahara, 

Committee IV. 
Reagan: women. 

Committee III. 
Friedersdorf: chemical 

weapons. Committee I. 
Byrne: Namibia, Security 

Council. 
Amselem: apartheid and 

mercenaries. Committee 

III, Oct. 28. 
Friedersdorf: disarmament 

compliance. Committee I. 
Okun: Namibia, Security 

Council. 
Wrobleski: narcotics, 

Committee III. 
Bereuter; budget. 

Committee V. 
Okun: U.S.-U.S.S.R. 

ministerial discussions. 

Committee I. 
Stevenson: UNRWA [UN 

Relief and Works 

Agency], Special 

Political Committee. 



85 
86 


11/4 
11/6 


87 


11/6 


88 


11/8 


89 


11/6 


90 


11/9 


91 


11/10 


92 


11/10 


93 


11/10 


94 


11/10 


95 


11/12 


96 


11/12 


97 


11/12 


98 


11/12 


99 


11/13 


100 


11/12 


101 


11/13 


102 


11/13 


103 


11/13 


104 


11/17 


105 


11/18 


106 


11/18 



Bailey: UNRWA, Special 
Political Committee. 

Byrne: human rights. 
Committee III. 

Friedersdorf: disarma- 
ment. Committee I. 

Okun: Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan Relief 
Committee. 

Byrne: Namibia, UN 
General Assembly. 

Friedersdorf: chemical 
weapons. Committee I. 

Coker: development. 
Committee II. 

Okun: Afghanistan, UN 
General Assembly. 

Montgomery: space. Spe- 
cial Political Committee. 

Siljander: South Atlantic, 
UN General Assembly. 

Nygard: personnel. 
Committee V. 

Walters: Nicaragua, UN 
General Assembly. 

Cahill: Palestinian people. 
Committee II, Nov. 9. 

Korn: trade and develop- 
ment. Committee II. 

Piedra: Nicaragua, UN 
General Assembly, 
Nov. 12. 

Piedra: Nicaragua, UN 
General Assembly. 

Byrne: refugees. 
Committee III. 

Bvrne: religion, Committee 
"ill. 

Cahill: trade and develop- 
ment, Committee II. 

MacArthur: front-line 
states, Committee II. 

Siljander: law of the sea, 
UN General Assembly. 

Saddler: training and 
research. Committee II. 



n08 11/20 



10 


11/20 


11 


11/23 


12 


11/24 


13 


11/24 


14 


11/25 



Montgomery: informi 

tion. Special Politit 

Committee. 
Shearouse: UN salari 

and benefits, Comn 

V. 
Byrne: contributions. 

Hoc Committee for 

Voluntary Contribi 

to the UNHCR. 
Byrne; apartheid, U^ 

General Assembly, 
Walters: human right 

Committee III. 
Thayer: terrorist atti 

Committee I. 
Immerman: peace an 

security, Committe 
Walters: South Afric. 

aggression against 

Angola, Security 

Council. 
Bernstein: informatii 

Special Political 

Committee. 
Stevenson: human ri; 

the occupied terril 

Special Political 

Committee. 
Immerman: peace an 

security, Committf i|i 
Okun: peaceful uses 

nuclear energy, Ul 

General Assembly 
Immerman: world pe 

Committee I. 
Immerman: peace ar 

security, Committ> 
Immerman: strengtl r 

security and coopc 

tion. Committee I 
Rosenstock: terroris 

Committee VI. 
Boeker: Palestine, I 

General Assembly 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. I j, 



"116 11/25 



*117 


11/27 


*118 


11/27 


*119 


11/27 


*120 


11/27 


*121 


11/27 


*122 


12/1 


*123 


12/2 



Foreign Relations Volume Released 



The Department of State released, on 
November 30, 1987, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume 
XII, Part 2. This volume contains docu- 
ments on U.S. relations with Burma, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. Part 1, released in 1984, docu- 
ments general U.S. policies in East 
Asia, including the establishment of the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO). 



These four Southeast Asian c 
tries presented dramatic challenge 
American policymakers in a perio 
whose events determined the sha) 
international relations for decades 
come. Each posed for the United 
the problem of dealing with the st 
of new and sensitive nationalism. 
Truman and Eisenhower Administ 
tions saw the menace of communi: 
the framework of the cold war. Tl 



64 



Department of State f H^ 



PUBLICATIONS 



n] ig nations perceived entirely dif- 
langers and opportunities that 
the way for them toward Third 
lonalignment. 

major irritant in U.S.-Bur- 
ilations was the presence in 
of Chinese Nationalist troops 
nd fled China during the revolu- 
'le documentation focuses on 
iforts, in part successful, to per- 
le^^hiang Kai-shek to evacuate 
-e "oops despite the Burmese Gov- 
Kt's unfounded belief that U.S. 
e-e with Generalissimo Chiang 
u imited. In Indonesia, the 
:e States went to e.xtraordinary 
tl to formulate an agreement that 
■liable the intensely nationalist 
iieiit to participate in U.S. aid 
.jns. The United States also be- 
lereoccupied with the twin prob- 
5 dealing with domestic 
jriian communism and Indonesia's 
'ni desire to absorb West Irian 
■:b 'lands New Guinea). 
V;h the Philippines and Thailand, 
•. lations were close and growing 
■eiFhe United States provided mili- 
V- i 1 to the Philippines to contain 
H .-c (communist) insurgency, but 
ec and reform as a more permanent 
iti 1. During the 1953 Philippine 
:ti I campaign, the United States 
•n Ramon Magsaysay in private 
n intained a neutral stance in pub- 
ffl.le the Embassy in Manila 



pushed hard for free elections as the 
best route to a Magsaysay victory. 
Mounting communist success in Viet- 
nam stimulated closer relations be- 
tween the United States and Thailand. 
Ambassador William J. Donovan, the 
former head of the Office of Strategic 
Services (America's World War II intel- 
ligence organization), worked success- 
fully for across-the-board increases in 
U.S. military, economic, and informa- 
tion programs. Thailand became an 
early supporter of SEATO. 

Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Vol- 
ume XII, Part 2, comprising some 750 
pages of previously classified foreign af- 
fairs records, was prepared in the Of- 
fice of the Historian, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. This offi- 
cial record is based upon the files of the 
White House, the Department of State, 
and other government agencies. 

Copies of Volume XII, Part 2 (De- 
partment of State Publication No. 9550, 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02193-5) may 
be purchased for $23.00 from the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders 
should be made payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents. 



Press release 226 of Nov. 30, 1987. 



Health 

Foreign Policy Implications of AIDS, Dep- 
uty Secretary Whitehead, OES Advisory 
Committee, Oct. 28, 1987 (Current Policy 
#1026). 

Human Rights 

The Promise and the Limits of Glasnost, 
Assistant Secretary Schifter, leadership 
conference of the Washington Group, 
Oct. 10, 1987 (Current PoUcy #1017). 

Nuclear Policy 

Nonproliferation As a Fundamental Policy 
Goal, Ambassador Kennedy, Subcommit- 
tees on Arms Control, International Se- 
curity and Science, on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, and on International Economic 
Policy and Trade, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Oct. 22, 1987 (Current Policy 
#1020). 

Terrorism 

Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy and Pro- 
posed Legislation, Ambassador Bremer, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, 
and International Operations, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Oct. 15, 
1987 (Current Policy #1019). 

Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics, 
Ambassador Bremer, Committee on For- 
eign Relations, Tampa, Nov. 4, 1987 
(Current Policy #1023). 

Iran's Use of International Terrorism, Oct. 
1987 (Special Report #170). 

Western Hemisphere 

Central America: U.S. Policy (GIST, Nov. 
1987). ■ 



iprtment of State 



; igle copies of the following Depart- 
it State publications are available 
n e Correspondence Management Di- 
or Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
rtr State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

si nt Reagan 

■ ienda of U.S. -Soviet Relations, 
015 of Cadets of the U.S. Military 
-Ciemy, West Point, Oct. 28, 1987 (Cur- 
eh Policy #1021). 

«iry Shultz 

T <.S, Democracy, and Nicaragua, OAS 
' 1 Assembly, Nov. 10, 1987 (Current 
y #1024). 



\fnca: U.S. Policy (GIST, Nov. 

rn African Development Coordina- 
Conference (GIST, Nov. 1987). 

nsControl 

"■Work Ahead in Arms Control, Am- 
: adoi- Rowney, National War College 



Alumni Asso., Colorado Springs, Oct. 16, 

1987 (Current Policy #1014). 
U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: A Status 

Report, Nov. 1987 (Special Report #171). 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (GIST, 

Nov. 1987). 

East Asia 

U.S. -Japan Energy Cooperation, Under 
Secretary Wallis, U.S. -Japan Energy 
Policy Conference sponsored by the At- 
lantic Council, Nov. 12, 1987 (Current 
Policy #1025). 

Economics 

U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads, Dep- 
uty Secretary Whitehead, Conference on 
International Trade, Wilmington. Nov. 2, 
1987 (Current Policv #1022). 

Third World Debt (GIST, Nov 1987). 

International Monetary Fund (GIST, Nov. 
1987). 

Environment 

State Department Perspectives on Envi- 
ronment, Assistant Secretary Negro- 
ponte. International Environment 
Forum, Sept. 18, 1987 (Current Policy 
#1008). 



Background Notes 



This series provides brief, factual summa- 
ries of the people, history, government, 
economy, and foreign relations of about 170 
countries (excluding the United States) 
and of selected international organizations. 
Recent revisions are: 

Iraq (Oct. 1987) 
Macau (Nov. 1987) 
Mauritania (Oct. 1987) 
Nepal (Sept. 1987) 
Qatar (Nov 1987) 

A free copy of the index only may be 
obtained from the Correspondence Man- 
agement Division, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. 

For about 60 Background Notes a year, 
a subscription is available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, 
for $14.00 (domestic) and $17.50 (foreign). 
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wnry 1988 



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-rary 1988 
ji«me 88, No. 2130 



list an 

lit Meets With Afghan Resistance 

,,rs 43 

lis on Soviet Union to Withdraw 
1 Afghanistan (Okun, text of 

ution) 54 

■ an Principles. National Success 
nternational Stability in a Time of 

n .ge (Shultz) 3 

msriontrol 
■H'nrk Ahead in Arms Control 

ny) 20 

Nuclear Planning Group Supports 

Treaty (final communique) 38 

■Ill's New Conference of October 22 

rpts) 1 

ii-v Meets With Soviet Foreign 

1 ^tiT and NATO Officials 9 

i iry's Interview on "Face the 

Ns on" 7 

vii 5 Tour Chemical Munitions 
D< ruction Facility (Department 

-t; 'ment) 22 

S. irms Control Initiatives; A Status 

:i( )rt 23 

S Soviet Union Open Nuclear Testing 

Ta s (Reagan, U.S. statement) 23 

■a . Trade Sanctions Imposed Against 
Bi Lil (Reagan, White House fact 

ih t) 60 

in la. President's News Conference of 

0, iber 22 (e.xcerpts) 1 

in ess 

lU erterrorism: U.S. Policy and 

Pi josed Legislation (Bremer) 44 

S fapan Nuclear Cooperation 
A eement (message to the 

C gress) 28 

:c jmics 

it nal Success and International 

S oility in a Time of Change 

(i ultz) 3 

•0 ctionism and Trade Barriers 

V His) 29 

.'Japan Energy Cooperation 

(Mlis) 35 

.' Trade Policy at the Crossroads 

(' litehead) 33 

I ilvador. Visit of El Salvadoran 

F'sident (Duarte. Reagan) 58 

n gy. U.S. -Japan Energy Cooperation 

( allis) ■ 35 

U)pe. Hard Work Ahead in Arms 

( ntrol (Rowny) 20 

uipean Communities. Meat Product 
Mes to the EC (White House 

■ itement) 38 

'>i. Secretary's Interview on "Face the 

ition" 7 

'4th. UN Consideration of the AIDS 
ndemic (Koop, text of resolution, 

'partment statements) 56 

lan Rights. The Promise and the 

mits of Glasnost (Schifter) 39 

>',a. Visit of India's Prime Minister 
andhi, Reagan) 41 



Iran. Iran's Use of International 

Terrorism 50 

Japan 

Semiconductor Trade With Japan 

(Reagan) 29 

U.S. -Japan Energy Cooperation 

(Wallis) 35 

U.S. -Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agree- 
ment (message to the Congress) .... 28 
Laos. U.S. -Lao POW/MIA Technical 

Meeting Concludes (joint statement) . 28 
Middle East. President's News Conference 

of October 22 (excerpts) 1 

Military Affairs. Protectionism and Trade 

Barriers (Wallis) 29 

Nicaragua. The Philippines and Nicaragua 

(Reagan) 1 

NATO 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Supports 

INF Treaty (final communique) 38 

Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign 

Minister and NATO Officials 9 

U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: A Status 

Report 23 

Nuclear Policy. U.S. -Japan Nuclear 

Cooperation Agreement (message to the 

Congress) 28 

Organization of American States. The 

OAS, Democracy, and Nicaragua 

(Shultz) .' 15 

Philippines. The Philippines and 

Nicaragua (Reagan) 1 

Presidential Documents 

The Philippines and Nicaragua 1 

President Meets With Afghan Resistance 

Leaders 43 

Semiconductor Trade With Japan 29 

U.S. -Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agree- 
ment (message to the Congress) .... 28 
U.S., Soviet Union Open Nuclear Testing 

Talks (Reagan, U.S. statement) 23 

Visit of El Salvadoran President (Duarte, 

Reagan) 58 

Visit of India's Prime Minister (Gandhi, 

Reagan) 41 

Visit of Zambia's President (Kaunda, 

Reagan) 19 

Publications 

Background Notes 65 

Department of State 65 

Foreign Relations Volume Released ... 64 
Saudi Arabia. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia 

(White House statement) 41 

Security Assistant. Arms Sales to Saudi 

Arabia (White House statement) .... 41 
South Africa. South Africa Releases 

Political Prisoners (Department 

statement) 20 

Terrorism 

Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics 

(Bremer) 47 

Counterterrorism; U.S. Policy and 

Proposed Legislation (Bremer) 44 

French Seize Terrorist Weapons 

(Department statement) 49 

Iran's Use of International Terrorism . 50 



Trade 

Meat Product Sales to the EC (White 

House statement) 38 

Protectionism and Trade Barriers 

(Wallis) 29 

Semiconductor Trade With Japan 

(Reagan) 29 

Trade Sanctions Imposed Against Brazil 

(Reagan, White House fact sheet) ... 60 
U.S. -Japan Energy Cooperation 

(Wallis) 35 

U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads 

(Whitehead) .' 33 

Treaties 

Current Actions 61 

U.S. -Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agree- 
ment (message to the Congress) .... 28 
U.S.S.R. 
Hard Work Ahead in Arms Control 

(Rowny) 20 

National Success and International 

Stability in a Time of Change 

(Shultz) 3 

President's News Conference of October 22 

(excerpts) 1 

The Promise and the Limits of Glasnost 

(Schifter) 39 

Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign 

Minister and NATO Officials 9 

Secretary's Interview on "Face the 

Nation" 7 

Soviets Tour Chemical Munitions 

Destruction Facility (Department 

statement) 22 

U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: A Status 

Report 23 

U.S., Soviet Union Open Nuclear Testing 

Talks (Reagan, U.S. statement) 23 

United Nations 

UN Calls on Soviet Union to Withdraw 

From Afghanistan (Okun, text of 

resolution) 54 

UN Consideration of the AIDS Pandemic 

(Koop, text of resolution, Department 

statements) 56 

Western Hemisphere. The OAS, 

Democracy, and Nicaragua (Shultz) . 15 
Zambia. Visit of Zambia's President 

(Kaunda, Reagan) 19 

Name Index 

Bremer, L. Paul III 44,47 

Duarte, Jose Napoleon 58 

Gandhi, Rajiv 41 

Kaunda, Kenneth D 19 

Koop, C. Everett 56 

Okun, Herbert S 54 

Reagan, President 1,19,23,28,29, 

41,43,58,60 

Rowny, Edward L 20 

Schifter, Richard 39 

Shultz, Secretary 3,7,9,15 

Wallis, W. Allen 29,35 

Whitehead, John C 33 



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he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2131 



February 1988 




^^'^OUu- 



The Washington Summit 't^2c>]o-,i 

and I '-^ '-. 

the INF Treaty jeilS^lig^^-, 



Departntpni of Siaie 

bulletin 



Volume 88 / Number 2131 / February 1988 



Coven 



General Secretary Gorbachev and Presi- 
dent Reasan at the White House. 



(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
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CONTENTS 



FEATURE 

1 Visit of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union 



{Mikhail S. Gorbachev, President Reagan, Eduard A. 
Shevardnadze, Secretary Shultz, Joiyit Statemients) 



Arms Control 

22 The INF Treaty {Mikhail S. 

Gorbachev, President Reagan, 
Text of the Treaty, Memoran- 
dum of Understanding, and 
Protocols) 

78 U.S., European Allies Sign INF 
Basing Agreement (Text of 
Agreement) 

81 Beyond the Summit: Next Steps 
in Arms Control (Paul H. 
Nitze) 

84 INF Treaty: A Success Story 



Europe 

85 



86 



NATO Defense Planning Com- 
mittee Meets in Brussels {Fi- 
nal Comntunique) 

34th Report on Cyprus {Message 
to the Congress) 



Western Hemiphere 

87 Policies for Economic Develop- 
ment in Latin America {Peter 
D. Whitney) 



Treaties 

91 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

Publications 

93 Department of State 

94 Current Documents Volumes 

Released 

Index 



^ FEB 20^933 \ 



■GO^K 




General Secretary Gorbachev arrives at Andrews Air Force Base on Dei emhtr 7. 



(Department of State ph-i 



-J^ 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



Visit of General Secretary Gorbachev 
of the Soviet Union 

General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

made an official working visit 

to Washington, D.C., December 7-10, 1987, 

to meet with President Reagan 

and other government officials. 



Arrival Remarks, 
)ec. 8, 1987 i 

"resident Reagan 

have welcomed a good number of for- 
ign leaders to the White House in 
hese last 7 years, and today marks a 
isit that is perhaps more momentous 
han many which have preceded it be- 
ause it represents a coming together, 
lot of allies, but of adversaries. And 
'et I think you'll find during your stay 
hat the American people believe that a 
itranger is a friend they have yet to 
neet, and that there is still a well- 
spring of good will here. 

Indeed, I know that many of our 
;itizens have written to you and Mrs. 
jorbachev and have even sent to you 
;he keys to their homes. That honest 
gesture certainly reflects the feelings of 
^any Americans toward you and Mrs. 
aorbachev and toward your people. I 
have often felt that our peoples should 
have been better friends long ago. 

But let us have the courage to rec- 
ognize that there are weighty differ- 
ences between our governments and 
systems — differences that will not go 
away by wishful thinking or expressions 
of good will, no matter how sincerely 
delivered. This uncomfortable reality 



need not be reason for pessimism, how- 
ever It should provide us with a chal- 
lenge — an opportunity to move from 
confrontation toward cooperation. 

There is a saying in your country 
that a poor peace is better than a good 
quarrel. Well, its up to us with hard 
work, commitment, and a heavy dose of 
realism to change the poor peace that 
has existed between our countries and 
make it into a good one. Today we will 
take a giant step in that direction by 
signing a historic treaty that will rid 
the world of an entire class of U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear weapons. Mr. Gor- 
bachev: mir na nas smatret — the world 
is watching and we've got something to 
show them, and over the next few days, 
it is my hope that progress will be 
made toward achieving another agree- 
ment which will lead to the cutting in 
half of our strategic nuclear arsenals. 

During the Second World War, So- 
viet General, later Marshall Chuikov, a 
front-line commander liked to tell the 
story of a soldier who said he had cap- 
tured a bear, and he was asked to bring 
it along. "I can't," replied the soldier, 
"the bear won't let me." 

General Secretary Gorbachev, like 
the soldier in Marshall Chuikov's story, 
our peoples for too long have been both 
the masters and the captives of a 
deadly arms race. This situation is not 



preordained and not part of some inev- 
itable course of history. We make his- 
tory. Changing its direction is within 
our power. However, such change is not 
easy and can be accomplished only 
when leaders of both sides have no illu- 
sions, talk with candor, and meet differ- 
ences head on. Such, I hope, will be 
the spirit of our upcoming meetings. 

On the table will be not only arms 
reduction, but also human rights issues 
about which the American people and 
their government are deeply commit- 
ted. These are fundamental issues of 
political morality that touch on the 
most basic of human concerns. 

I would hope we will also candidly 
discuss regional conflicts. The parties 
to these conflicts should negotiate solu- 
tions that restore the peace and ad- 
vance the rights and freedom of the 
peoples involved. We cannot afford to 
view these as far away brush fires. 
Even small flames risk larger con- 
flagrations and undermine positive de- 
velopments between our two countries. 

Let us also consider ways to ex- 
pand the contact between our own cit- 
izens. The Soviet and American peoples 
can and should know more about each 
other. The barriers between them 
should be taken down, restrictions on 
travel and communications lifted, per- 
sonal relations between our young peo- 
ple fostered. Let disagreement between 



^l^ohmaru 1QRR 



our governments not get in the way of 
friendships between our peoples. 

Mr. Gorbachev, I hope that during 
your short time here you will see that 
we Americans are a dynamic and ener- 
getic lot, people of enterprise, and an 
abiding love of freedom. We believe in 
God and care about others who are in 
need. We are proud and independent. 
Like the peoples of your country, we 
believe our country should be strong, 
but we desire peace. Have no doubt 
about that. The longing for peace runs 
deep here, second only to our fervency 
for the preservation of our liberty. 
Americans believe people should be 
able to disagree and still respect one 
another, still live in peace with one an- 
other. That is the spirit, the democratic 
spirit, that I will bring to our 
meetings. 

So on behalf of myself and Mrs. 
Reagan, and on behalf of all the citizens 
of the United States, General Secretary 
Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, welcome. 

General Secretary Gorbachev ^ 

Thank you very much for the cordial 
welcome and kind words of greeting. 

History has charged the govern- 
ments of our countries and the two of 
us, Mr. President, with a solemn duty 
to justify the hopes of Americans and 
Soviet people, and of people the world 
over to undo the logic of the arms race 
by working together in good faith. 

In the world's development much 
will depend upon the choice that we are 
to make — upon what is to triumph — 
fears and prejudice inherited from the 
cold war and leading to confrontation, 
or commonsense which calls for action 
to ensure the survival of civilization. 

We, in the Soviet Union, have 
made our choice. We realize that we are 
divided not only by the oceans, but also 
by profound historical, ideological, so- 
cioeconomic, and cultural differences. 
But the wisdom of politics today lies in 
not using those differences as a pretext 
for confrontation, enmity, and the arms 
race. 

We are beginning our visit 46 years 
after the days when the United States 
entered the Second World War, and it 




President Reagan and (Jeneral Secretary Gorbachev at arrival 
ceremony. 



was in those same says in 1941 that the 
route of Nazi forces began near 
Moscow — that is symbolic. Those days 
mark the beginning our our common 
path to victory over the forces of evil, 
in a war which we fought as allies. 



History is thus reminding us hot 
of our opportunities, and of our respc 
sibilty. Indeed, the very fact that we 
are about to sign a treaty eliminating 
Soviet and U.S. intermediate and 
shorter range nuclear missiles, whicf; 



k^^^ 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



now going to be scrapped, shows 
t at crucial phases in history, our 

nations are capable of shouldering 
ir high responsibility. 

This will, of course, be the first 
p down the road leading to a nu- 
ir-free world whose construction 
1, Mr President, and I discussed at 
^kjavik. Yet it is a great step into 

future — the future to which our two 
iples and the peoples of all countries 
■ire. 

I have come to Washington with 

intention of advancing the next and 
re important goal of reaching agree- 
nt to reduce, by half, strategic offen- 
e arms in the context of a firm 
irantee of strategic stability. We are 

looking forward to a most serious 

1 frank dialogue on other issues of 
I'iet-American relations. 

Soviet foreign policy today is most 
imately linked with perestroika — the 
•nestic restructuring of Soviet soci- 
'. The Soviet people have boldly 
[en the path of radical reform and 
relopment in all spheres — economic, 
:ial, political, and intellectual. 

Democratization and glasnost are 
3 decisive prerequisites for the suc- 
3S of those reforms. They also pro- 
le the guarantee that we shall go a 
ig way, and that the course we are 
rsuing is irreversible. Such is the 
11 of our people. 

In charting these ambitious plans, 
e Soviet people have a vital stake in 
eserving and strengthening peace 
erywhere on earth. 

May I express the hope that the 
Jviet tfnion and the United States, 
orking together with all nations, will 
ke their place in the history of the 
itgoing 20th century, not only as allies 
the battle against Nazism, but also 
1 nations that have paved mankind's 
ay to a safe world, free from the 
ireat of nuclear annihilation. 

On behalf of the Soviet people, I 
;clare that we are prepared to go all 
le way along our part of the road with 
16 sincerity and responsibility that be- 
; a great and peaceful power. 



Remarks at INF Treaty 
Signing Ceremony, 
Dec. 8, 1987 3 

President Reagan 

This ceremony and the treaty we are 
signing today are both excellent exam- 
ples of the rewards of patience. It was 
over 6 years ago, November 18, 1981, 
that I first proposed what would come 
to be called the zero option. It was a 
simple proposal — one might say, 
disarmingly simple. Unlike treaties in 
the past, it didn't simply codify the 
status quo or a new arms buildup; it 
didn't simply talk of controlling an arms 
race. For the first time in history, the 
language of arms control was replaced 
by arms reduction — in this case, the 
complete elimination of an entire class 
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles. 

Of course, this required a dramatic 
shift in thinking, and it took conven- 
tional wisdom some time to catch up. 
Reaction, to say the least, was mixed. 
To some, the zero option was impossi- 
bly visionary and unrealistic; to others, 
merely a propaganda ploy. Well, with 
patience, determination, and commit- 
ment, we've made this impossible vision 
a reality. 

General Secretary Gorbachev, I'm 
sure you're familiar with Ivan Krylov's 
famous tale about the swan, the 
crawfish, and the pike. It seems that 
once upon a time these three were try- 
ing to move a wagonload together They 
hitched and harnessed themselves to 
the wagon. It wasn't very heavy, but no 
matter how hard they worked the 
wagon just wouldn't move. You see, the 
swan was flying upward, the crawfish 
kept crawling backward, the pike kept 
making for the water The end result 
was that they got nowhere, and the 
wagon is still there to this day. 

Strong and fundamental moral dif- 
ferences continue to exist between our 
nations, but today, on this vital issue, 
at least, we've seen what can be accom- 
plished when we pull together 

The numbers alone demonstrate 
the value of this agreement. On the So- 
viet side, over 1,500 deployed warheads 



will be removed and all ground- 
launched intermediate-range missiles, 
including the SS-20s, will be destroyed. 
On our side, our entire complement of 
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise 
missiles, with some 400 deployed war- 
heads, will all be destroyed. Additional 
backup missiles on both sides will also 
be destroyed. 

But the importance of this treaty 
transcends numbers. We have listened 
to the wisdom in an old Russian 
maxim. And I'm sure you're familiar 
with it, Mr General Secretary, though 
my pronunciation may give you diffi- 
culty. The maxim is: doveryai, no 
proveryai — trust, but verify. 

General Secretary Gorbachev. 

You repeat that at every meeting. 
[Laughter and applause.] 

President Reagan. I like to. 
[Laughter] 

This agreement contains the most 
stringent verification regime in history, 
including provisions for inspection 
teams actually residing in each other's 
territory and several other forms of on- 
site inspection as well. This treaty pro- 
tects the interests of America's friends 
and allies. It also embodies another 
important principle, the need for 
glasnost, a greater openness — in mili- 
tary programs and forces. 

We can only hope that this history- 
making agreement will not be an end in 
itself, but the beginning of a working 
relationship that will enable us to 
tackle the other issues — urgent issues 
before us — strategic offensive nuclear 
weapons; the balance of conventional 
forces in Europe; the destructive and 
tragic regional conflicts that beset so 
many parts of our globe; and respect 
for the human and natural rights God 
has granted to all men. 

To all here who have worked so 
hard to make this vision a reality, 
thank you and congratulations, above 
all to Ambassadors Glitman and 
Obukhov. To quote another Russian 
proverb — as you can see, I'm becoming 
quite an expert — [laughter] — in Russian 
proverbs — "The harvest comes more 
from sweat than from the dew." 



ebruary 1988 




General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan sign the INF Treaty. 



So I'm going to propose to General 
Secretary Gorbachev that we issue one 
last instruction to you — get some well- 
deserved rest. [Laughter.] 

General Secretary Gorbachev. 

We're not going to do that. [Laughter.] 

President Reagan. Now, Mr. Gen- 
eral Secretary, would you like to say a 
few words before we sign the treaty? 
[Applause.] 

General Secretary Gorbachev 2 

Succeeding generations will hand down 
their verdict on the importance of the 
event which we are about to witness. 
But I will venture to say that what we 
are going to do — the signing of the 
first-ever agreement eliminating nu- 
clear weapons, has a universal signifi- 
cance for mankind, both from the 
standpoint of world politics, and from 
the standpoint of humanism. 

For everyone, and above all, for our 
two great powers, the treaty whose 
te.xt is on this table offers a big chance 
at last to get on to the road leading 
away from the threat of catastrophe. It 



is our duty to take full advantage of 
that chance, and move together toward 
a nuclear-free world which holds out for 
our children and grandchildren, and for 
their children and grandchildren, the 
promise of a fulfilling and happy life 
without fear and without a senseless 
waste of resources on weapons of 
destruction. 

We can be proud of planting this 
sapling which may one day grow into a 
mighty tree of peace. But it is probably 
still too early to bestow laurels upon 
each other. As the great American poet 
and philospher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
said, "The reward of a thing well done 
is to have done it." 

So let us reward oui-selves by get- 
ting down to business. We have covered 
a 7-year-long road replete with intense 
work and debate. One last step toward 
this table, and the treaty will be 
signed. 

May December 8, 1987, become a 
date which will be inscribed in the his- 
tory books, a date which will make the 
watershed separating the era of a 
mounting risk of nuclear war from the 
era of a demilitarization of human life. 
[Applause.] 



TV Messages to the 
American and Soviet 
People, 

Dec. 8, 19873 

President Reagan 

General Secretary Gorbachev, and dis 
tinguished guests, my fellow Ameri- 
cans, and citizens of the Soviet Unioni 
The American philosopher, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, once wrote that "thei 
is properly no history; only biography 
He meant by this that it is not enougl 
to talk about history as simply forces 
and factors. History is ultimately a re 
ord of human will, human spirit, hum; 
aspirations of earth's men and women 
each with the precious soul and free 
will that the Lord bestows. 

Today, I, for the United States, 
and the General Secretary, for the SO' 
viet Union, have signed the first agre< 
ment ever to eliminate an entire class 
of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. \ 
have made history. And yet many so- , 
called wise men once predicted that 
this agreement would be impossible U 
achieve — too many forces and factms 



Department of State Bulleti 



^i r-'l 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



3d against it. Well, still we per- 
ered. We kept at it. And I hope the 
lerai Secretary will forgive me if I 
eal that in some of the bleakest 
es, when it did truly seem that an 
eement would prove impossible, I 
•ked myself up with the words of a 
at Russian, Leo Tolstoy, who wrote, 
16 strongest of all warriors are these 
) — time and patience." 

In the next few days we will dis- 
s further arms reductions and other 
aes — and again it will take time and 
ience to reach agreements. But as 
begin these talks, let us remember 
t genuine international confidence 
i security are inconceivable without 
;n societies with freedom of informa- 
n, freedom of conscience, the right 
publish, and the right to travel. So, 
, we will address human rights and 
jional conflicts, for surely the salva- 
n of all mankind lies only in making 
;rything the concern of all. With 
»ie, patience, and willpower I believe 
will resolve these issues. We must if 
are to achieve a true, secure, and 
during peace. 

As different as our systems are, 
are is a great bond that draws the 
nerican and Soviet peoples together, 
is the common dream of peace. More 
an 40 years ago we fought in a great 
ir as allies. On the day that news of 
e enemy's surrender reached Moscow, 
owds gathered in front of the Ameri- 
n Embassy. There they cheered the 
iendship of a nation that had opened a 
cond front and sent food, munitions, 
id trucks to the Soviet peoples as 
ey displayed awesome courage and 
ill in turning the invader back. A 
lUng American diplomat later told of a 
)viet soldier in the crowds who 
outed over and over, "Now it is time 
live." 

Too often in the decades since then 
e soldier's dream — a time to live — has 
!en put off, at least as far as it con- 
rned genuine peace between our two 
untries. Yet we Americans have 
iver stopped praying for peace. In 
ery part of the world we want this to 
: a time to live. 

Only those who don't know us be- 
ive that America is a materialistic 



land. But the true America is not su- 
permarkets filled with meats, milk, and 
goods of all descriptions. It is not high- 
ways filled with cars. No, true America 
is a land of faith and family. You can 
find it in our churches, synagogues, 
and mosques — in our homes and 
schools. As one of our great writers put 
it: America is a willingness of the 
heart — the universal, human heart, for 
Americans come from every part of 
earth, including the Soviet Union. We 
want a peace that fulfills the dream of 
all peoples to raise their families in 
freedom and safety. And I believe that 
if both of our countries have courage 
and the patience, we will build such a 
peace. 

In the next 2 months, people 
throughout the world will take part in 
two great festivals of faith — Hanukkah 
and Christmas. One is a celebration of 
freedom, the other of peace on earth, 
good will toward men. My great hope is 
that the biographies of our times will 
record that we had the will to make 
this the right season for this summit. 

Thank you and God bless you. 

General Secretary Gorbachev^ 

I am addressing my fellow contrymen, 
the citizens of the Soviet Union; I am 
addressing the American people. Presi- 
dent Reagan and I have just signed a 
treaty which, for the first time in his- 
tory, requires the most stringently ver- 
ified destruction of two whole classes of 
nuclear arms. The treaty on the total 
elimination of Soviet and U.S. interme- 
diate and shorter range missiles will, I 
am sure, become a historic milestone in 
the chronicle of man's eternal quest for 
a world without wars. 

On this occasion, may I be allowed 
to refer for a moment to history. Not 
all Americans may know that at the 
height of a world war, the very first 
steps taken by the Soviet republic born 
in Russia in 1917 was to promulgate a 
decree by its author, Vladimir Lenin. 
The founder of our state said, "We are 
willing to consider any proposal leading 
to peace on a just and solid basis." This 
has been the cornerstone of Soviet for- 
eign policy ever since. 



We also remember another concept 
of his, disarmament. A world without 
arms or violence, that is our ideal. 

Today, regrettably, the risk of a nu- 
clear catastrophe persists. It is still for- 
midable. But we believe in man's ability 
to get rid of the threat of self-annihila- 
tion. We are encouraged by the grow- 
ing awareness in the world of the 
nature of the existent peril which has 
confronted humankind with the ques- 
tion of its very survival. The sacred hu- 
man right to live has now taken on a 
new global dimension, and this is what 
must always be in the minds of, above 
all, political and government leaders in- 
vested with power by the will of their 
peoples. 

"The people" is not an abstract no- 
tion. It is made up of individuals, and 
each one of them has the right to life 
and the pursuit of happiness. The 
treaty just signed in Washington is a 
major watershed in international devel- 
opment. Its significance and implica- 
tions go far beyond what has actually 
been agreed upon. Our passage to this 
watershed was typical; it took us 
through lengthy and intense arguments 
and debate, overcoming long-held emo- 
tions and ingrained stereotypes. What 
has been accomplished is only a begin- 
ning. It is only the start of nuclear dis- 
armament, although as we know, even 
the longest journey begins with a first 
step. 

Moving ahead from this start will 
require further intensive intellectual 
endeavor and honest effort, the aban- 
donment of some concepts of security 
which seem indisputable today, and of 
all that fuels the arms race. In 
November 1985, President Reagan and 
I said in Geneva that nuclear war could 
never be won and should never be 
fought. We also said that neither the 
Soviet Union nor the United States 
sought nuclear superiority. 

This enabled us to take the first 
step up toward a platform of common 
endeavor. Geneva was followed by 
Reykjavik, where a fundamental break- 
through was made in our perception of 
the process of nuclear disarmament. 
That is what made possible both this 
treaty and a substantive consideration 



bruary 1988 



of other issues related to the nuclear 
confrontation. 

We give credit to our American 
partners. Together, we gained the e,\- 
perience that will help seek solutions to 
even more challenging problems of 
equal and universal security. Most 
important of all is to translate into real- 
ity as early as possible agreements on 
radical cuts in strategic offensive arms 
subject to preserving the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty, on the elimina- 
tion of chemical weapons, and on 
reductions in conventional armaments. 

On each of these problems, the So- 
viet Union has put forward specific pro- 
posals. We believe that agreements on 
them are within reach. We are hopeful 
that during ne.xt year's return visit of 
the U.S. President to the Soviet Union, 
we will achieve a treaty eliminating 
practically one-half of all e.xisting stra- 
tegic nuclear arms. There is also a pos- 
sibility of agreeing on substantial cuts 
in conventional forces and arms in Eu- 
rope, whose buildup and upgrading 
caused justified concern. 

Once all this is accomplished, we 
shall be able to say with confidence 
progress toward a secure world has be- 
come irreversible. The abolition of 
weapons of mass destruction, disarma- 
ment for development, that is the prin- 
ciple, and in fact, the sole effective way 
to resolve other problems that mankind 
is having to face as the 20th century 
draws to a close, and — problems — the 
implications of the new technological 
revolution — energy, mass poverty, hun- 
ger and disease, huge foreign debts, 
failure to balance the diverse interests 
and these of scores of peoples and coun- 
tries. To cope with them, there have to 
be above all fresh approaches to prob- 
lems of national and universal security. 

I know that with the signing of the 
treaty on intermediate and shorter 
range missiles, some politicians and 
journalists are already speculating as to 
who has won. I reject this approach. It 
is a throwback to old thinking. Com- 
monsense has won, reason has won. 
True enough, it is not yet the greatest 
victory. But politically and psychologi- 
cally, it is very important. It meets the 
aspirations and the interests of hun- 
dreds of millions of people throughout 



the world. People want to live in a 
world in which they would not be 
haunted by the fear of nuclear catastro- 
phe. People want to live in a world in 
which American and Soviet spacecrafts 
would come together for dockings and 
joint voyages, not for Star Wars. Peo- 
ple want to live in a world in which 
they would not have to spend millions 
of dollars a day on weapons they could 
only use against themselves. 

People want to live in a world in 
which everyone would enjoy the right 
to life, freedom, and happiness, and, of 
course, other human rights which must 
be guaranteed and practiced for any de- 
veloped society to e.xist normally — a 
world in which the prosperity of a few 
would not be achieved at the cost of the 
poverty and suffering of others. People 
want to have not only military, but also 
economic security. People want to live 
in a world which is democratic and 
free, with equality for all and with 
every nation enjoying the right to its 
own social choice without outside 
interference. 

People want to know the truth 
about each other and to feel at long last 
the great universal kinship of nations, 
ethnic groups, languages, and cultures. 
Can such a world be built? We in the 
Soviet Union are convinced that it can. 
Yes, it can. But this requires a most 
radical restructuring of international 
relations. To move toward such a world, 
there has to be creative courage, new 
thinking, and a correct assessment of — 
and regard for — the interests of other 
nations as well as one's own economic 
capabilities and interests. There has to 
be political will and a high sense of 
responsibility. 

We in the Soviet Union have initi- 
ated a process of reassessing what has 
been achieved and of developing a new 
program of action, and we are imple- 
menting it. This is what we call 
perestroika. We have undertaken it 
without hesitation, for we realize that 
this is what our time demands. We have 
undertaken it because we want to ele- 
vate our society, speed up its develop- 
ment, make it even more democratic 
and open, and release all of its potential 



iiit 



so as to improve materially and spir- 
itually the life of our people. Our con 
dence in the future of our country am 
our conviction that a secure and civi 
hzed world can be built are organicall 
interrelated. 

On behalf of the Soviet leadershi] 
and of our entire people, I declare in 
international affairs, we are active an 
will continue to act responsibly and si 
riously. We know what our interests 
are, but we seek to accommodate the; 
to the interests of others, and we are- 
ready to meet each other halfway as 
equals. 

The President and I have 3 days 
intensive and important work ahead c 
us. Our talks are already underway. B 
our part, we will try to do all we can 
achieve results. Substantial results. 
Thank you. 



Dinner Toasts, 
Dec. 8, 1987 3 

President Reagan 

In our public statements and in our 
meetings together, we've always paid 
each other the compliment of candor. 
So let us continue to do so. 

By now you may have concluded 
that, while we have fundamental dis- 
agreements about how human commu- 
nities should govern themselves, it's 
possible, all the same, for us to work 
together. 

As we complete the first full day 
this historic meeting, let us look back 
together at the developments of the 
past 2 years and the significance of 
what is taking place. For we find our- 
selves involved in a dramatic march of 
events that has captured the attention 
of our two peoples and the entire 
world. 

Since you and I first met in Gene^ 
in November 1985, our two countries 
have moved toward a new period in th( 
history of our relations. 

The highlight of your visit is the 
signing of the first U.S. -Soviet arms 
control agreement in nearly a decade— 



IDf 



zM 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



; first ever to mandate actual reduc- 
ns in our arsenals of nuclear weap- 
5. We're making significant progress 
other important areas of arms reduc- 
n, and have the opportunity, with 
itual commitment and hard work, to 
lieve much more in the coming 
mths. 

But our relationship — the United 
ites and the Soviet Union — is not 
mded just on arms control, but 
iches across a broad spectrum of is- 
5s. A relationship that addresses the 
sic problems of self-determination in 
> areas of regional conflicts and hu- 
in rights. There are differences here, 
t ones that require frankness and 
idor. In bilateral matters, we also 
ed hard and honest debate. 

A century-and-a-half ago, the bril- 
nt French observer, De Tocqueville, 
•esaw that our two countries would 
the major countries of the world, 
story, geography, the blessings of re- 
arces, and the hard work of our peo- 
;s have made it so. And between us, 
are has also been a profound competi- 
■n of political and economic philoso- 
y, making us the protagonists in a 
ama with the greatest importance for 
e future of all mankind. Man's most 
ndamental beliefs about the rela- 
inship of the citizen to the state, and 
man to his Creator, lie at the core of 
e competition between our two coun- 
les. History has indeed endowed our 
lationship with a profound meeting. 

Certainly we will not settle those 
sues this week. But the tasks before 
■ require a full awareness of those is- 
es, and of a responsibility that is 
nding on us both. I speak of a respon- 
bility we dare not compromise or 
lirk. I speak of the responsibility to 
■ttle our differences — in peace. 

Already, by virtue of liard work 
id hard bargaining, we've accom- 
ished much and our negotiators de- 
irve great credit. But we cannot 
ford to rest. There is more work to be 
me. And time and history are march- 
gon. 

So I offer a toast — a commitment 
1 behalf of the American people, of 



seriousness, good will, and hope for the 
future. General Secretary and Mrs. 
Gorbachev, to your health. Za vashy 
zdorovie. 

General Secretary Gorbachev 2 

I take power into my hands now while 
the President is busy. [Laughter.] 

Last summer it took a daring 
American girl by the name of Lynn Cox 
a mere 2 hours to swim the distance 
separating our two countries. On televi- 
sion we saw how sincere and cordial the 
meeting was between the people — be- 
tween our people and the Americans 
when she stepped onto the Soviet 
shore. By her courage she showed how 
close to each other our two peoples 
live. 

Without minimizing the great polit- 
ical and ideological distances between 
us, we want to seek and find avenues of 
rapprochement in areas where this is of 



vital importance for our two countries 
and for all humankind. That is precisely 
what we are here for. In my 1986 New 
Year's Eve address on American televi- 
sion, I spoke of our hopes for a better 
future. By that time, Mr. President, 
you and I had already had 2 days of 
face-to-face talks in Geneva. This en- 
abled me to tell Americans in my New 
Year's address that the winter of our 
discontent may one day come to an end. 
Today, following Reykjavik and the e.x- 
tensive preparatory work that has 
made our meeting in Washington possi- 
ble, it can be said that the winter is on 
the wane. 

A boundless world stretches far 
and wide beyond the walls of this 
house, and you and I, if you will, are 
accountable to it and to the peoples of 
our two countries, to our allies and 
friends, and to all our contemporaries. 
The Russian word, perestroika, can be 
applied to the process now underway all 




President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meet in the Oval Office Study 
on December 9. U.S. interpreter Dimitry Zarechnak (left) and Soviet interpreter 
Pavel Palazhchenko (right) attend the meeting. 



ebruary 1988 



over the world of rethinking the real- 
ities of a nuclear and space age. It 
must now be clear to all that the prob- 
lems of today's world will not be solved 
through old approaches. 

The goal we are setting today is to 
build a nuclear-free world. The road 
leading to it is difficult and thorny. But 
with new thinking it is attainable. As 
you can see, here, too, changes are nec- 
essary. Changes in the minds and 
changes in actions. 

The great age of geographical dis- 
coveries amounted to more than one 
caravel or one newly found continent. 
Our journey toward a nuclear-free 
world cannot amount to reaching one or 
two islands named INF [intermediate- 
range nuclear forces] and shorter range 
INF. It is my hope that we shall 
promptly move further ahead toward 
the goal of reducing and then eliminat- 
ing strategic offensive arms which make 
up the main and decisive portion of the 
nuclear arsenal. 

As the clock of life brings us closer 
and closer to the 21st century, we are 
duty-bound to remember that each one 
of us, within the limits of our capability 
and ability, personifies the link between 
the transient and the eternal. As our 
famous poet, Afanasiy Svet, said, 
"Although man is not eternal, what is 
human is eternal." It is in the name of 
eternal humanity that we have today 
performed our momentous deed. And 
my first salute is to that event. 

It will be cherished by our two 
peoples. So I address these words of 
congratulation to the Soviet and Ameri- 
can people whose will is embodied in 
the agreement. I want to emphasize 
that this is the fruit of the efforts not 
only of us both, but also of our allies 
and representatives of all countries and 
all public movements whose effort and 
contribution rightfully make them par- 
ties to this historic effort. 

It would be fair today to pay trib- 
ute to the efforts of those who were 
directly involved in preparing the 
treaty. May I wish good health to you, 
Mr. President, and to Mrs. Reagan: 
happiness and well-being to all those 
present here tonight; peace and pros- 
perity to the peoples of our two 
countries. 



Luncheon Toasts, 
Dec. 9, 1987" 

Secretary Shultz 

I think all of our friends from the So- 
viet Union will find a text translated in 
front of them, which will save us a little 
time. 

Benjamin Franklin, the father of 
American diplomacy, who exchanged 
correspondence with Catherine the 
Great — and for whom this room is 
named — would be fascinated to be with 
us today. For this is the first time the 
leader of the Soviet Union has visited 
the Department of State. Welcome. 

Your visit here, Mr. General Secre- 
tary, and the prospect of a visit by 
President Reagan to Moscow, should 
cause us to think about guidelines for 
managing our relations. What should 
we both be keeping in mind? 

First, ours is a relationship as 
important as it is unique. It is impor- 
tant because we each bear an immense 
burden of leadership in the world. It is 
unique because the nuclear era de- 
mands that we engage each other de- 
spite our profound differences. As you 
said in your book, Mr General Secre- 
tary, "There is no getting away from 
each other." 

Second, our relationship will con- 
tinue to be a difficult one to manage. 
We have contrasting philosophies, polit- 
ical systems, and national interests. 
Our basic values, systems and interests 
will persist, even as the necessity to 
work together increases. 

Third, we must be realistic, avoid- 
ing extremes, either of hostility or eu- 
phoria, through the ups and downs of 
our relations. The best approach to 
dealing with one another is one Ben 
Franklin might have suggested: be 
down-to-earth, pragmatic, and busi- 
nesslike in seeking to solve concrete 
problems. 

Fourth, we must speak with clarity 
and candor to one another about our 
differences. That is why at this sum- 
mit, we have stressed the fundamental 
importance we attach to human rights, 
as set forth in the Universal Declara- 



tion and the Helsinki Final Act. As tl | 
European Community heads of goveri 
ment stated December 5, "Respect fo 
human rights and freedom is a prerec 
uisite for confidence, understanding 
and cooperation." 

We have spoken with candor aboi 
regional issues, as well. You have not 
hesitated to speak your mind to us. 
And we have made some progress. A; 
President Reagan has said, we owe 
each other the tribute of candor, and 
candor will help us get results. 

Fifth, we must look to the future 
without neglecting the lessons of the 
past. Too often, we face the past and 
back into the future. In 5 to 10 years 
our world will be vastly different fron 
the one we know today, and from the: 
postwar world of the past 40 years, 
which has conditioned so much of our 
thinking. Franklin — and Lomonosov, 
his contemporary — were ready and ei 
ger for the future. So should we be. 
The material substances of daily life ; 
being transformed. The speed of hum 
transactions is accelerating. Scientific 
economic, and political matters are m 
global in dimension. And through all 
these changes, runs the thread of 
knowledge: its discovery, its rapid 
transmission as information, and the 
education needed to use it. 

This leads to a sixth point: the re 
ognition that openness to ideas, infor- 
mation, and contacts is the key to 
future success. The conceptual break- 
throughs embodied in the INF [inter- 
mediate-range nuclear forces] Ti'eaty'i 
provisions for verification and onsite i 
spection are but one example of the 
powerful pull which openness is alreai 
exerting in a key area of our relations 

We must seek steady progress to 
ward a more open, more predictable, 
more stable, and constructive rela- 
tionship. In this time of change, a cor 
plicated interplay of international 
relationships complicates the manage- 
ment of our bilateral affairs. But new 
patterns of interaction also offer new 
opportunities for cooperation and proj 
ress. Let us grasp those opportunitie; 



}ta 



j-fi 



= ^ 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gor- 
ehev, to your health, to the health of 
3 President and Mrs. Reagan, and to 

Soviet and American peoples, 
pplause.] 

^neral Secretary Gorbachev 2 

ly I express my gratitude for your 
itation to the U.S. Department of 
ate, a highly authoritative body. In 
ernational politics, much depends on 
; people who work here. At any rate, 
thout their participation, what we 
tnessed and took part in yesterday 
uld not have happened. 

Yesterday, the President of your 
jntry and I signed a treaty eliminat- 
5 a whole class — to be more precise, 
classes — of nuclear arms. As a re- 
It, the world will be rid of a total of 
me 2,000 deadly warheads. The 
mber is not all that big, but the 
iaty significance goes far beyond its 
ecific content. 

We regard it as a start in imple- 
jnting the program of building a nu- 
;ar-free world, which I proposed on 
half of the Soviet leadership and the 
'Viet people almost 2 years ago, on 
nuary 15, 1986. Since then, I have 
:en asked many times whether I con- 
lue to believe in the feasibility of that 
ogram. My answer is, "Yes, I most 
rtainly do." 

The signing of the treaty on inter- 
ediate and shorter range missiles 
imonstrates that the road toward that 
)al is not at all easy. Yet it also 
lows that we have chosen the right 
lad, and that the goal can be reached. 

Urging us on is the will of hun- 
"eds of millions of people, who are be- 
nning to understand that as the 20th 
!ntury draws to a close, civilization 
as approached a dividing line, not so 
lueh between different systems and 
leologies, but between commonsense 
nd mankind's feelings of self-preserva- 
on, on the one hand, and irrespon- 
bility, national selfishness, 
rejudice — to put it briefly, old think- 
ig — on the other 

Mankind is beginning to realize it 
as had enough of wars, that an end 
mst be put to wars, for good. 



The two world wars, and the gruel- 
ing cold war, along with minor wars 
which cost and continue to cost millions 
of lives, are too exorbitant a price to 
pay for adventurism, ambition, dis- 
regard for the interests and i-ights of 
others, the unwillingness or inability to 
reckon with reality, and with the legiti- 
mate right of all nations to make their 
own choice and seek their own place 
under the Sun. 

This implies that the lofty ideals 
advanced by humanists throughout the 
ages — the ideals of peace and liberty, 
awareness of the value of each human 
life — must underlie practical politics. 

Each new step in international life, 
given a sensible and responsible ap- 
proach to it, not only gives us a deeper 
insight into the problems, but also pro- 
vides additional opportunities for their 
solution. 

What matters now is that we can- 
not let those opportunities pass, and 
must use them as fully as possible to 
build a safer and more democratic 
world, free from the trappings and the 
psychology of mihtarism. 

The step we have taken in signing 
the treaty and preparations for it were, 
without exaggeration, truly instructive. 
This has enriched our two countries in 
world politics, with the recognition of 
the significance of several difficult, yet 
simple truths. It is appropriate to men- 
tion some of them here. 

First of all, while moving closer to 
each other, we have come to appreciate 
even more the role and importance of 
Soviet-American relations in the cur- 
rent development of international af- 
fairs, together with our enormous 
responsibility, not only to our own peo- 
ple, but also to the world community. 

Secondly, we have felt how impor- 
tant is our allies' support for our 
efforts. On top of that, we have felt the 
substantial potential carried by their 
ideas and advice, by their concerned 
and genuine involvement, and by the 
coordination of our actions with them. 

Thirdly, we have seen in practice 
how important is the understanding of 
one's intentions, proposals, and plans 
by the allies of one's partners, and of 



course, the sympathy and even soli- 
darity and simply the wishes of suc- 
cess, coming from many nations, big 
and small, from the developing world, 
from nonaligned nations. 

All of this has confirmed per- 
suasively a simple yet very important 
truth: peace in the world today cannot 
be a monopoly of one country or a 
gi'oup of countries, however powerful. 

Peace is the concern and preoc- 
cupation of many, and increasingly of all 
of us together. And where many inter- 
act, reciprocity and compromise are 
inevitable. 

Peace from a position of strength is 
inherently unstable, whatever anyone 
might claim. By its very nature, it is 
based on confrontation, whether covert 
or overt. It is based on the permanent 
risk of flare-ups, on the temptation to 
try and use force. 

For ages, mankind had to put up 
with such a bad peace. This can no 
longer be tolerated. 

Some believe, that in the process of 
preparing the treaty, the Soviet side 
has conceded too much. Others, that it 
was the United States that made too 
many concessions. I think neither of 
you is correct. Each side has conceded 
as much as was necessary to balance 
their interests in this particular sphere. 

In building an atmosphere of con- 
tacts and lively communication, of bet- 
ter knowledge of each other — 
something without which the treaty 
would have been difficult to achieve — 
we and, hopefully, you too have come to 
feel much more strongly that for us to 
remain different, to live as each of us 
wants to, to be able to argue with each 
other and uphold one's own view, it is 
imperative above all to preserve peace. 

Yesterday, a fundamentally new 
and important, albeit modest, step was 
taken toward a more equitable and a 
more humane order in international re- 
lations. We would like to hope that sub- 
sequent steps will not be too long in 
coming. It is, after all, always easier to 
pursue a good cause based on the expe- 
rience of what has already been done. 

Today, all of us are making the pas- 
sage from knowledge as dogma to 
knowledge as thinking. We have begun 



ebruary 1988 



to reestablish the peacemaking vocation 
of politics. It can no longer remain, as 
it happened in the 20th century after 
two world wars, a continuation of war 
by different means. 

Also changing with politics is the 
vocation of diplomacy, which is de- 
signed to identify the seeds of accord, 
even in a sea of discord, and to trans- 
late the possible into reality. 

Over the past few years, our coun- 
tries' diplomatic services have done a 
great deal of woi'k. And while pointing 
to yesterday's truly historymaking 
event — the signing of the treaty — one 
cannot but, particularly here in this 
building of the State Department, pay 
tribute to the many who dedicated to it 
their intellect, energy, patience, per- 
severance, knowledge, and a sense of 
duty to their nation and to the interna- 
tional community. 

And first of all, I would like to 
mention Comrade Eduard Shev- 
ardnadze and Mr. George Shultz. 

I would also like to say a few kind 
words about the diplomats working out- 
side their own countries. They were not 
just negotiating with each other. Work- 
ing in the capitals of their host coun- 
tries, they were helping us to 
understand what is attainable and what 
is not, what is promising and what, as 
yet, cannot be done. 

I like an idea I read in a recent 
article published in an American news- 
paper: "Diplomacy is a country's first 
line of defense, and a front line in the 
battle for peace." 

But foreign policy has ceased to be 
a domain of professionals alone. The 
practice of secret collusions and agree- 
ments, which deceive nations and doom 
them to actions and sacrifices that are 
contrary to their vital interests, is also 
being consigned to the past. One way 
or another, any falsehood, any untruth, 
will be uncovered. 

I regard this distinctive feature of 
our time as a guarantee of a genuine 
democratization of relations among 
states. In the powerful gravity field of 
universal scrutiny, attention and the 
very high demands placed on people 
vested with the authority of represent- 



10 



ing their country in others, they must 
permanently be accountable. They must 
explain and elucidate. 

Besides, they stand on the delicate 
line of contact between cultures. A lot 
depends on them, in how one nation 
understands the life of another And to- 
day, this is something badly needed in 
making policy, too. 

The presence in this room of promi- 
nent representatives of the United 
States and of the Soviet Union is not 
merely a tribute to protocol or eti- 
quette. It is also evidence to the fact 
that the policy of seeking better mutual 
understanding between our countries 
enjoys authoritative support. 

Such support has inspired us on 
the long and arduous road to the agi-ee- 
ment that starts real nuclear disarma- 
ment. But since we have no intention of 
stopping in the early stages, that sup- 
port will also be needed tomorrow, 
when we continue our joint effort to 
eliminate the largest, and also the most 
dangerous, portion of our nuclear 
arsenals. 

In this conte.xt, I would like to 
mention the potential for developing re- 
lations between our countries inherent 
in contacts among our academic and 
cultural communities. To a substantial 
degree, it is they who shape a nation's 
consciousness and its attitudes toward 
other nations, and precisely for that 
reason, they find a common language 
more easily, providing a necessary 
background for policymaking, too. The 
role that our two countries' intellectuals 
are playing in relations between our 
peoples and countries is big and 
important. 

In the language of simple human 
communication, both in Russian and in 
English, what we have achieved here 
means hope reborn. Force is a variable 
and unstable category, but truth ar- 
rived at through honest efforts is a con- 
stant, for it is human. 

Today we are closer to the truth 
than we were yesterday. I congratulate 
you. 



Remarks, 

Diplomatic Notes Ceremon 

Dec. 9, 19875 

Secretary Shultz 

We have three items here and they il- 
lustrate that our leaders sign big thin| 
like the INF [intermediate-range nu- 
clear forces] agreement, but that theij 
are also other things that represent t [ 
life between us. 

• Here we have signed an amend- 
ment to our civil aviation agreement 
that authorizes more flights and joint 
use of Pan Am 747s by Pan Am and 
Aeroflot, and will be mutually bene- 
ficial to commerce between us. 

• A note extending the world ocei 
agreement that allows U.S. and Sovi( 
officials and scientists to revive coope 
ative activity under a longstanding bi 
dormant agreement. 

• Then a statement recording our 
agreement on the nuclear testing joinij 
verification experiment that makes pi 
sible improved verification measures 1 
test explosions between 100 and 150 
kilotons. 

These all represent constructive 
steps in our joint endeavors and I tak 
pleasure in doing this in company wit 
my friend the Foreign Minister, Mr. 
[Eduard] Shevardnadze. [Applause.] 

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze •* 

I want to take advantage of this oppo! 
tunity to once again congratulate you 
and all those present here on the his- 
toric event having to do with signing 
an INF agreement, which was signed 
yesterday by President Reagan and b; 
the General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of our party, Mikhail Ser- 
geyevich Gorbachev. 

Today we have signed three more 
documents, also very important docU' 
ments. I should say that the two grea 



k 



Department of State Bullet 



I 



: 



HI 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 




1 December 9, President Reagan and General Secretary 
)rbachev meet in the Oval Office with staff members 
lockwise): General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign 
inister Shevardnadze, Secretaries of the CPSU Central 
•mmittee Alexander N. Yakovlev and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 



Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Chief of Staff 
Howard Baker, national security adviser Lt. Gen. Colin 
Powell, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, U.S. inter- 
preter Dimitry Zarechnak, and President Reagan. 



iwers cannot possibly sign some insig- 
ficant documents. All of them are 
iry significant and this is something 
ve done with the greatest of pleasure. 

Bcretary Shultz 

hank you, very much. [Applause and 
cchange of pens.] We will exchange 
3ns the same way the President and 
18 General Secretary did. [Laughter] 
^e'll follow their example. [Applause.] 

Now, we have another tradition, 
ight after we sign something, we go 
ack to work. 



Joint Statement 

on Nuclear Testing, 
Dec. 9, 1987 7 

In accordance with the joint statement 
on the problems relating to nuclear 
testing, adopted in Washington on Sep- 
tember 17, 1987, the U.S. and the 
U.S.S.R. are proceeding to design a 
joint verification experiment. This ex- 
periment would be conducted as soon as 
possible at the test sites of each other 
(respectively in Semipaltinsk and Ne- 
vada) for the purpose of the elaboration 
of improved verification measures for 
the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and 



the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty. These verification measures 
will, to the extent appropriate, be used 
in further nuclear test limitation agree- 
ments which may subsequently be 
reached. 

For the purpose of the joint ver- 
ification experiment, each side will pro- 
vide the other side with an opportunity 
to measure the yield of one or two ex- 
plosions at each side's test site with 
yields not less than 100 kilotons and 
approaching 150 kilotons. 

For the purpose of the joint ver- 
ification experiment, each side will have 
the opportunity, on the basis of com- 
plete reciprocity, to measure the yields 



ebruarv 19RR 



of the explosions for verification pur- 
poses, using: teleseismic methods, and, 
at the other side's test site, hydro- 
dynamic yield measurement methods in 
a satellite hole. As a yield standard, 
the experiment will include yield meas- 
urement by means of a hydrodynamic 
method in the emplacement hole. 

The joint verification experiment 
will not be designed to produce statis- 
tically significant results, but will be 
conducted in such a way as to address 
all other concerns identified by either 
side regarding methods proposed by 
the other side for verification of the 
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 
1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
Treaty. The sides have also agreed that 
the experiment will give sufficient in- 
formation to resolve these concerns by 
providing an example of the effective- 
ness of the verification methods used in 
the joint verification experiment and by 
demonstrating their practicability and 
nonintrusiveness. The experiment will 
thus provide the basis for agreeing on 
those verification measures which could 
be used by either side to verify com- 
pliance by the other side with the 
provisions of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. 
The understanding has been reached 
that in the future each side will be en- 
titled to apply any or all of these 
agreed verification measures. 

In order to develop and reach 
agreement on specific technical and or- 
ganizational parameters of the joint 
verification experiment, the sides have 
agreed to establish ad hoc working 
groups at their negotiations. 

In order to help prepare them- 
selves to design and conduct the joint 
verification experiment, the sides have 
agreed to exchange visits of delegations 
to the two sides' nuclear test sites. 
These visits, to the U.S.S.R. Semi- 
palatinsk test site and the U.S. Nevada 
test site, will take place in January 1988 
as the preliminary work of the next ne- 
gotiating round in Geneva. 



Joint Summit Statement, 
Dec. 10, 19873 

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the 
United States of America, and Mikhail 
S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), met 
in Washington on December 7-10, 1987. 

Attending the meeting on the U.S. 
side were Vice President George Bush; 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz; 
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Car- 
lucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, 
Jr; acting assistant to the President 
[for national security] Lt. Gen. Colin L. 
Powell; Counselor of the Department of 
State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; 
Ambassador at Large and special ad- 
viser to the President and Secretary of 
State on arms control matters Paul H. 
Nitze; special adviser to the President 
and Secretary of State on arms control 
matters Ambassador Edward L. 
Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr; Am- 
bassador of the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. 
Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for European and Cana- 
dian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway 

Attending on the Soviet side were 
Member of the Politburo of the CPSU 
Central Committee, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Eduard A. 
Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo 
of the CPSU Central Committee, Sec- 
retary of the CPSU Central Committee 
Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of 
the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly 
F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the 
U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Vladimir 
M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General 
Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces 
and First Deputy Minister of Defense 
of the U.S.S.R., Marshal of the Soviet 
Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant 
to the General Secretary of the CPSU 
Central Committee Anatoly S. Chern- 
yaev; Head of the General Department 
of the CPSU Central Committee Val- 
eriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Alexsandr 
A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the 
U.S.S.R. to the United States of Amer- 
ica Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the 



jini 



sit 



5((i 



12 



Collegium of the U.S.S.R., Ministry ( 
Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and 
Ambassador at Large Aleksey A. 
Obukhov. 

During the course of the official 
visit, which had been agreed during t 
two leaders' November 1985 meeting i 
Geneva, the President and the Gener; 
Secretary held comprehensive and de 
tailed discussions of the full range of 
issues between the two countries, in- 
cluding arms reductions, human right 
and humanitarian issues, settlement ( 
regional conflicts, and bilateral rela- 
tions. The talks were candid and con- 
structive, reflecting both the continui 
differences between the two sides, an 
their understanding that these differ- 
ences are not insurmountable obstacli- 
to progress in areas of mutual interes- 

They reaffirmed their strong com 
mitment to a vigorous dialogue encon< 
passing the whole of the relationship. 

The leaders reviewed progress to 
date in fulfilling the broad agenda the 
agreed at Geneva and advanced at 
Reykjavik. They took particular satis- 
faction in the conclusion over the last 
years of important agreements in som 
areas of this agenda. 

The President and the General S( 
retary affirmed the fundamental impo 
tance of their meetings in Geneva and 
Reykjavik, which laid the basis for coi 
Crete steps in a process intended to in 
prove strategic stability and reduce th 
risk of conflict. They will continue to 
guided by their solemn conviction tha' 
a nuclear war cannot be won and mus' 
never be fought. They are determined 
to prevent any war between the Unite 
States and the Soviet Union, whether 
nuclear or conventional. They will not 
seek to achieve military superiority. 

The two leaders recognized the 
special responsibility of the United 
States and the Soviet Union to search 
for realistic ways to prevent confronta 
tion and to promote a more sustainabl 
and stable relationship between their 
countries. To this end, they agreed to 
intensify dialogue and to encourage 
emerging trends toward constructive 
cooperation in all areas of their rela- 
tions. They are convinced that in so 
doing they will also contribute, with , 



nonartrr,/^r.t ^f Cl^trs D,,I1^H 



If 
It 



= ;5i 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



her nations, to the building of a safer 
)rld as humanity enters the third 
iUennium. 

ARMS CONTROL 

le INF Treaty 

le two leaders signed the Treaty Be- 
'een the United States of America 
id the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
iblics on the Elimination of Their In- 
rmediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
issiles. This treaty is historic both for 
i objective — the complete elimination 
an entire class of U.S. and Soviet 
iclear arms — and for the innovative 
laracter and scope of its verification 
I 'ovisions. This mutual accomplishment 
akes a vital contribution to greater 
)ility 

uclear and Space Talks 

tie President and the General Secre- 
.ry discussed the negotiations on re- 
actions in strategic offensive arms, 
hey noted the considerable progress 
hich has been made toward conclusion 

■ a treaty implementing the principle 

■ 50% reductions. They agreed to in- 
-ruct their negotiators in Geneva to 
■ork toward the completion of the 
reaty on the Reduction and Limitation 
f Strategic Offensive Arms and all in- 
jgral documents at the earliest possi- 
le date, preferable in time for 
ignature of the treaty during the next 
leeting of leaders of state in the first 
alf of 1988. Recognizing that areas of 
greement and disagreement are re- 
orded in detail in the joint draft treaty 
ext, they agreed to instruct their ne- 
jotiators to accelerate resolution of is- 
■ues within the joint draft treaty text 
ncluding early agreement on provisions 
or effective verification. 

In so doing, the negotiators should 
Juild upon the agreements on 50% re- 
luctions achieved at Reykjavik as sub- 
sequently developed and now reflected 
n the agreed portions of the joint draft 
START [strategic arms reductions 
;alks] treaty text being developed in 
Seneva, including agi'eement on ceil- 
ings of no more than 1,600 strategic of- 



fensive delivery systems, 6,000 
warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy 
missiles; the agreed rules of account for 
heavy bombers and their nuclear arma- 
ment; and an agreement that as a re- 
sult of the reductions the aggregate 
throw-weight of the Soviet Union's 
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles] and SLBMs [submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles] will be reduced to a 
level approximately 50% below the ex- 
isting level, and this level will not be 
exceeded by either side. Such an agree- 
ment will be recorded in a mutually 
satisfactory manner. 

As priority tasks, they should focus 
on the following issues: 

(a) The additional steps necessary 
to ensure that the reductions enhance 
strategic stability. This will include a 
ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate 
number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads 
within the 6,000 total. 

(b) The counting rules governing 
the number of long-range, nuclear- 
armed, air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCMs) to be attributed to each type 
of heavy bomber. The delegations shall 
define concrete rules in this area. 

(c) The counting rules with respect 
to existing ballistic missiles. The sides 
proceed from the assumption that exist- 
ing types of baUistic missiles are de- 
ployed with the following numbers of 
warheads. In the United States: Peace- 
keeper (MX):10, Minuteman 111:3, Min- 
uteman 11:1, Trident 1:8. Ti-ident 11:8, 
Poseidon:10. In the Soviet Union: 
SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, 
SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, 
SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, 
SS-N-20:10, and SS-N-23:4. Pro- 
cedures will be developed that enable 
verification of the number of warheads 
on deployed ballistic missiles of each 
specific type. In the event either side 
changes the number of warheads de- 
clared for a type of deployed ballistic 
missile, the sides shall notify each 
other in advance. There shall also be 
agreement on how to account for war- 
heads on future types of ballistic mis- 
siles covered by the Treaty on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms. 



(d) The sides shall find a mutually 
acceptable solution to the question of 
limiting the deployment of long-range, 
nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations 
will not involve counting long-range, 
nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 
warheads and 1,600 strategic offensive 
delivery systems limits. The sides com- 
mitted themselves to establish ceilings 
on such missiles, and to seek mutually 
acceptable and effective methods of ver- 
ification of such limitations, which could 
include the employment of national 
technical means, cooperative measures, 
and onsite inspection. 

(e) Building upon the provisions of 
the Ti-eaty on the Elimination of Their 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles, the measures by which the 
provisions of the Ti-eaty on the Reduc- 
tion and Limitation of Strategic Offen- 
sive Arms can be verified will, at a 
minimum, include: 

1. Data exchanges, to include dec- 
larations by each side of the number 
and location of weapon systems limited 
by the treaty and of facilities at which 
such systems are located and appropri- 
ate notifications. These facilities will 
include locations and facilities for pro- 
duction and final assembly, storage, 
testing, and deployment of systems cov- 
ered by this treaty. Such declarations 
will be exchanged between the sides 
before the treaty is signed and updated 
periodically after entry into force. 

2. Baseline inspection to verify the 
accuracy of these declarations promptly 
after entry into force of the treaty. 

3. Onsite observation of the elim- 
ination of strategic systems necessary 
to achieve the agreed limits. 

4. Continuous onsite monitoring of 
the perimeter and portals of critical 
production and support facilities to con- 
firm the output of these facilities. 

5. Short-notice onsite inspection of: 

(i) Declared locations during the 
process of reducing to agreed limits; 



ink ^noo 



13 



(ii) Locations where systems 
covered by this treaty remain after 
achieving the agreed limits; and 

(iii) Locations where such sys- 
tems have been located (formerly de- 
clared facilities). 

6. The right to implement, in ac- 
cordance with agreed-upon procedures, 
short-notice inspections at locations 
where either side considers covert de- 
ployment, production, storage, or re- 
pair of strategic offensive arms could be 
occuring. 

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of 
concealment or other activities which 
impede verification by national tech- 
nical means. Such provisions would in- 
clude a ban on telemetry encryption 
and would allow for full access to all 
telemetric information broadcast during 
missile flight. 

8. Measures designed to enhance 
observation of activities related to re- 
duction and limitation of strategic offen- 
sive arms by national technical means. 
These would include open displays of 
treaty-limited items at missile bases, 
bomber bases, and submarine ports at 
locations and times chosen by the in- 
specting party. 

Tkking into account the preparation 
of the treaty on strategic offensive 
arms, the leaders of the two countries 
also instructed their delegations in 
Geneva to work out an agreement that 
would commit the sides to observe the 
ABM [Antiballistic MissileJ Treaty, as 
signed in 1972, while conducting their 
research, development, and testing as 
required, which are permitted by the 
ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from 
the ABM Treaty for a specified period 
of time. Intensive discussions of strate- 
gic stability shall begin not later than 3 
years before the end of the specified 
period, after which, in the event the 
sides have not agreed otherwise, each 
side will be free to decide its course of 
action. Such an agreement must have 
the same legal status as the treaty on 



strategic offensive arms, the ABM 
Treaty, and other similar, legally bind- 
ing agreements. This agreement will be 
recorded in a mutually satisfactory 
manner Therefore, they direct their 
delegations to address these issues on a 
priority basis. 

The sides shall discuss ways to en- 
sure predictability in the development 
of the U.S. -Soviet strategic rela- 
tionship, under conditions of strategic 
stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear 



Other Arms Control Issues 

The President and the General Secre- 
tary reviewed a broad range of other 
issues concerning arms limitation and 
reduction. The sides emphasized the 
importance of productive negotiations 
on security matters and advancing in 
the main areas of arms limitation and 
reduction through equitable, verifiable 
agreements that enhance security and 
stability. 



Nuclear Testing 

The two leaders welcomed the opening 
on November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step- 
by-step negotiations, in accordance 
with the joint statement adopted in 
Washington on September 17, 1987, by 
the Secretary of State of the United 
States and the Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the U.S.S.R.: 

The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed 
to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale 
stage-by-stage negotiations which will be 
conducted in a single forum. In these nego- 
tiations the sides as the first step will 
agree upon effective verification measures 
which will make it possible to ratify the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban" 
Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to 
negotiating further intermediate limita- 
tions on nuclear testing leading to the ulti- 
mate objective of the complete cessation of 
nuclear testing as part of an effective dis- 
armament process. This process, among 
other things, would pursue, as the first 
priority, the goal of the reduction of nu- 
clear weapons and, ultimately, their elim- 
ination. For the purpose of the elaboration 
of improved verification measures for the 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaties of 1974 and 1976 
the sides intend to design and conduct 
joint verification experiments at each 
other's test sites. These verification mea- 
sures will, to the extent appropriate, be 
used in further nuclear test limitation 
agreements which may subsequently be 
reached. 

The leaders also welcomed the 
prompt agreement by the sides to ex- 
change e.xperts' visits to each other's 
nuclear testing sites in January 1988 
and to design and subsequently to con- 
duct a joint verification e.xperiment at 
each other's test site. The terms of ref- 
erence for the experiment are set forth 
in the statement issued on December 9* 
1987, by the foreign ministers of the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
The leaders noted the value of these 
agreements for developing more effec- 
tive measures to verify compliance witll 
the provisions of the 1974 Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty. 



Nuclear Nonproliferation 

The President and the General Secre- 
tary reaffirmed the continued commit- 
ment of the United States and the 
Soviet Union to the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and in particular to 
strengthening the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The 
two leaders expressed satisfaction at 
the adherence since their intent to 
make, together with other states, addi- 
tional efforts to achieve universal ad- 
herence to the treaty. 

The President and the General Sec 
retary expressed support for interna- 
tional cooperation in nuclear safety and 
for efforts to promote the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy, under further 
strengthened IAEA [International 
Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards anc 
appropriate export controls for nuclear 
materials, equipment, and technology. 
The leaders agreed that bilateral con- 
sultations on nonproliferation were con- 
structive and useful, and should 
continue. 



14 



^ 



^ 



^ 



"I 



npnartmpnt nf Qtato R. iMotin 



= ;5i 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



iclear Risk Reduction Centers 

18 leaders welcomed the signing on 
ptember 15, 1987, in Washington of 
2 agreement to establish Nuclear 
sk Reduction Centers in their cap- 
.Is. The agreement will be imple- 
mted promptly. 

'lemical Weapons 

8 leaders expressed their commit- 
mt to negotiation of a verifiable, com- 
jhensive, and effective international 
ivention on the prohibition and de- 
•uction of chemical weapons. They 
■Icomed progress to date and re- 
Irmed the need for intensified nego- 
tions toward conclusion of a truly 
)bal and verifiable convention encom- 
ssing all chemical weapons-capable 
ites. The United States and Soviet 
lion are in favor of greater openness 
d intensified confidence building with 
spect to chemical weapons both on a 
ateral and a multilateral basis. They 
reed to continue periodic discussions 
expei'ts on the growing problem of 
emical weapons proliferation and use. 

mventional Forces 

le President and General Secretary 
jcussed the importance of the task of 
ducing the level of military confronta- 
m in Europe in the area of armed 
Tes and conventional armaments, 
le two leaders spoke in favor of early 
mpletion of the work in Vienna on the 
indate for negotiations on this issue, 
that substantive negotiations may be 
irted at the earliest time with a view 
elaborating concrete measures. They 
, 50 noted that the implementation of 
e provisions of the Stockholm Confer- 
I ce on Confidence- and Security-Build- 
ig Measures and Disarmament in 
arope is an important factor in 
rengthening mutual understanding 
id enhancing stability and spoke in 
vor of continuing and consolidating 
is process. The President and the 
Jneral Secretary agi-eed to instruct 
eir appropriate representatives to in- 
nsify efforts to achieve solutions to 
itstanding issues. 



They also discussed the Vienna 
(Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) 
negotiations. 

Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE 

They expressed their determination, to- 
gether with the other 33 participants in 
the Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe (CSCE), to bring the 
Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to 
a successful conclusion, based on bal- 
anced progress in all principal areas of 
the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Con- 
cluding Document. 

II. HUMAN RIGHTS 

AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS 

The leaders held a thorough and candid 
discussion of human rights and human- 
itarian questions and their place in the 
U.S. -Soviet dialogue. 

III. REGIONAL ISSUES 

The President and the General Secre- 
tary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank, 
and businesslike discussion of regional 
questions, including Afghanistan, the 
Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Cam- 
bodia, southern Africa, Central Amer- 
ica, and other issues. They 
acknowledged serious differences but 
agreed on the importance of their reg- 
ular exchange of views. The two lead- 
ers noted the increasing importance of 
settling regional conflicts to reduce in- 
ternational tensions and to improve 
East- West relations. They agi-eed that 
the goal of the dialogue between the 
United States and the Soviet Union on 
these issues should be to help the par- 
ties to regional conflicts find peaceful 
solutions that advance their indepen- 
dence, freedom, and security. Both 
leaders emphasized the importance of 
enhancing the capacity of the United 
Nations and other international institu- 
tions to contribute to the resolution of 
regional conflicts. 



IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS 

The President and the General Secre- 
tary reviewed in detail the state of 
U.S. -Soviet bilateral relations. They 
recognized the utility of further ex- 
panding and strengthening bilateral 
contacts, exchanges, and cooperation. 

Bilateral Negotiations 

Having reviewed the state of ongoing 
U.S. -Soviet negotiations on a number 
of specific bilateral issues, the two lead- 
ers called for intensified efforts by 
their representatives, aimed at reach- 
ing mutually advantageous agreements 
on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; 
marine search and rescue; radio naviga- 
tional systems; the U.S.-U.S.S.R. mar- 
itime boundary; and cooperation in the 
field of transportation and other areas. 
They noted with satisfaction agree- 
ment on the expansion, within the 
framework of the U.S. -Soviet air trans- 
port agreement, of direct air passenger 
service, including joint operation of the 
New York-Moscow route by Pan Ameri- 
can Airways and Aeroflot, and on the 
renewal of the U.S. -Soviet world ocean 
agreement. 

People-to-People 
Contacts and Exchanges 

The two leaders took note of progress 
in implementing the U.S. -Soviet gen- 
eral exchanges agreement in the areas 
of education, science, culture, and 
sports, signed at their November 1985 
Geneva meeting, and agreed to con- 
tinue efforts to eliminate obstacles to 
further progress in these areas. They 
expressed satisfaction with plans to cel- 
ebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of 
the first exchanges agreement in Janu- 
ary 1988. 

The two leaders reaffirmed the im- 
portance of contacts and exchanges in 
broadening understanding between 
their peoples. They noted with particu- 
lar satisfaction the progress made in 
the development of people-to-people 
contacts under the initiative they 



^bruary 1988 



15 



launched at their 1985 meeting in Ge- 
neva — a process which has involved 
tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet 
citizens over the past 2 years. The lead- 
ers reaffirmed their strong commitment 
further to expand such contacts, includ- 
ing among the young. 

Global Climate and Environmental 
Change Initiative 

With reference to their November 1985 
agreement in Geneva to cooperate in 
the preservation of the environment, 
the two leaders approved a bilateral ini- 
tiative to pursue joint studies in global 
climate and environmental change 
through cooperation in areas of mutual 
concern, such as protection and conser- 
vation of stratospheric ozone, and 
through increased data exchanges pur- 
suant to the U.S. -Soviet environmental 
protection agreement and the Agree- 
ment Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics Concerning Coopera- 
tion in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In 
this context, there will be a detailed 
study on the climate of the future. The 
two sides will continue to promote 
broad international and bilateral coop- 
eration in the increasingly important 
area of global climate and environ- 
mental change. 

Cooperative Activities 

The President and the General Secre- 
tary supported further cooperation 
among scientists of the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and other countries 
in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fu- 
sion for peaceful purposes. They af- 
firmed the intention of the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. to cooperate with the Eu- 
ropean Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) and Japan, under the aus- 
pices of the International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency, in the quadipartite 
conceptual design of a fusion test 
reactor. 

The two leaders noted with satis- 
faction progress under the bilateral 
agreement on peaceful uses of atomic 



energy toward establishing a perma- 
nent working group in the field of 
nulcear reactor safety, and expressed 
their readiness to develop further coop- 
eration in this area. 

The President and the General Sec- 
retary agreed to develop bilateral coop- 
eration in combatting international 
narcotics trafficking. They agreed that 
appropriate initial consultations would 
be held for these purposes in early 
1988. 

They also agreed to build on recent 
contacts to develop more effective coop- 
eration in ensuring the security of air 
and maritime transportation. 

The two leaders exchanged views 
on means of encouraging expanded con- 
tacts and cooperation on issues relating 
to the Arctic. They expressed support 
for the development of bilateral and re- 
gional cooperation among the Arctic 
countries on these matters, including 
coordination of scientific research and 
protection of the regions environment. 

The two leaders welcomed the con- 
clusion of negotiations to institu- 
tionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space- 
based global search and rescue system, 
operated jointly by the United States, 
the Soviet Union, France, and Canada. 

Trade 

The two sides stated their strong sup- 
port for the expansion of mutually ben- 
eficial trade and economic relations. 
They instructed their trade ministers to 
convene the U.S. -U.S.S.R. Joint Com- 
mercial Commission in order to develop 
concrete proposals to achieve that ob- 
jective, including within the framework 
of the Long-Term Agreement Between 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and 
Technical Cooperation. They agreed 
that commercially viable joint ventures 
complying with the laws and regula- 
tions of both countries could play a role 
in the further development of commer- 
cial relations. 

Diplomatic Missions 

Both sides agreed on the importance of 
adequate, secure facilities for their re- 



spective diplomatic and consular estal 
lishments, and emphasized the need t 
approach problems relating to the fun 
tioning of embassies and consulates 
general constructively and on the bas 
of reciprocity. 

V. FURTHER MEETINGS 



spi( 



fcfiii 



it 



The President and the General Secre 
tary agreed that official contacts at ai 
levels should be further expanded an< 
intensified, with the goal of achieving 
practical and concrete results in all 
areas of the U.S. -Soviet relationship. 
General Secretary Gorbachev re- 
newed the invitation he extended dur 
ing the Geneva summit for President 
Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. Th 
President accepted with pleasure. Th 
visit will take place in the first half O' '" 
1988. 



Departure Remarks, 
Dec. 10, 19873 



President Reagan 

These last few days have been excitir 
indeed, for both of us and for our fell 
countrymen who followed the course 
our discussions. I am pleased to repo 
that upon the completion of our busi 
ness that this summit has been a cles 
success. [Applause.] Like the star on 
the top of the national Christmas tre- 
which was lit the evening you arrived 
Mr General Secretary, this summit h 
lit the sky with hope for all people of 
good will. And as we leave, it is up t 
both sides to ensure that the luster 
does not wear off and to follow throu 
on our commitments as we move for- 
ward to the next steps in improving 1 
relations between our countries and 
peoples. 

I believe both the General Secre 
tary and I can walk away from our 
meetings with a sense of accomplish-" 
ment. We have proven that adversarivt 
even with the most basic philosophic: 
differences, can talk candidly and re- 
spectfully with one another and, wit! 
perseverance, find common ground. V? 



Isf 
J la 
sat 



H\i 



Oil! 



m 



16 



Department of State Build 



-Jik 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



d not hide from the weighty differ- 
ices that separate us; many of them, 
course, remain. One of my predeces- 
rs. President Franklin Roosevelt, 
ice said, "History cannot be rewritten 
' wishful thinking." Our discussions, 
that spirit, were straightforward and 
isigned to open a thoughtful commu- 
cation between our governments on 
8 critical issues that confront us. 

Our exchange on the subject of hu- 
an rights underscored the priority we 
the Western democracies place on re- 
ect for fundamental freedoms. I am 
eased that during this summit we ad- 
essed this area of heartfelt impor- 
nce and have ensured a continuing 
alogue on human rights at the highest 
rels of our governments. 

Our discussions on regional con- 
cts were no less to the point. These 
nflicts continue to take a heavy toll in 
'Bs and impose a heavy burden on 
ast-West relations. The General Sec- 
tary and I expressed different points 
view — we did so bluntly — and for 
at reason alone, our talks have been 
eful in this area. Moreover, we agree 
at it is necessary to search for real 
ilitical solutions to these conflicts, 
it so far we cannot be satisfied with 
hat has been achieved. We must now 
•ess ahead in the search for political 
•lutions that advance the cause of 
!ace and freedom for the people suf- 
ring in these wars. The door has been 
)ened and it will stay open to serious 
scussion of ending these regional 
inflicts. 

And as far as open doors, Mr. Gor- 
ichev and I both agree on the desir- 
jility of freer and more extensive 
jrsonal contact and the breaking down 
■ artificial barriers between the peo- 
.es of the Soviet Union and the United 
tates. As I said in my welcoming re- 
larks, the fact that our governments 
ave disagreements should not prevent 
ar peoples from being friends. 

Of course, the greatest accomplish- 
lent of these 3 days was the signing of 
treaty to eliminate a whole class of 
'.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. An- 
ther one of my predecessors, a Presi- 
ent I have admired since my youth, 
alvin Coolidge, once said, "History is 



only made by action." Well, it took 
enormous effort and almost super- 
human tenacity on the part of the nego- 
tiators on both sides, but the end- 
product is a treaty that does indeed 
make history. It is in the interest of 
both our peoples, yet I cannot help but 
believe that mankind is the biggest 
winner. At long last, we have begun the 
task of actually reducing these deadly 
weapons, rather than simply putting 
limits on their growth. 

The INF Treaty, as proud of it as 
we are, should be viewed as a begin- 
ning, not an end. Further arms reduc- 
tion is now possible. I am pleased some 
progress has been made toward a stra- 
tegic arms reduction treaty over the 
last 3 days. 

Individual agreements will not, in 
and of themselves, result in sustained 
progress. We need a realistic under- 
standing of each other's intentions and 
objectives, a process for dealing with 
differences in a practical and straight- 
forward manner, and we need patience, 
creativity, and persistence in achieving 
what we set out to do. As a result of 
this summit, the framework for build- 
ing such a relationship has been 
strengthened. 

I am determined to use this frame- 
work. My goal — which I believe you 
share, Mr. General Secretary — is a 
more constructive relationship between 
our governments — long-lasting rather 
than transitory improvements. To- 
gether, we can bring about a more se- 
cure and prosperous future for our 
peoples and a more peaceful world. 
Both of us are aware of the difficult 
challenges and special responsibilities 
inherent in this task. 

During World War II, when so 
many young Russians served at the 
front, the poem "Wait For Me" became 
a prayer spoken on the lips of Russian 
families who dreamed one day of the 
happiness that their reunion would 
bring. The cause of world peace and 
world freedom is still waiting, Mr. Gen- 
eral Secretary. It has waited long 
enough. 

General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. 
Gorbachev, it is good that you came to 
America, and Nancy and I are pleased 



to have welcomed you here. Your visit 
was short, yet I hope you will take 
with you a better sense of the spirit 
and soul of the United States of Amer- 
ica, and when you get back to Moscow, 
please pass on to the Soviet people the 
best wishes of the American people for 
a peaceful and prosperous new year. 
Thank you, and Godspeed on your jour- 
ney. [Applause.] 

General Secretary Gorbachev^ 

In these last hours before our depar- 
ture for home, we note with satisfaction 
that the visit to Washington has, on the 
whole, justified our hopes. We have had 
3 days of hard work, of business-like 
and frank discussions on the pivotal 
problems of Soviet-American relations 
and on important aspects of the current 
world situation. 

A good deal has been accom- 
plished. I would like to emphasize in 
particular an unprecedented step in the 
history of the nuclear age: the signing 
of the treaty under which the two mili- 
tarily and strategically greatest powers 
have assumed an obligation to actually 
destroy a portion of their nuclear weap- 
ons, thus, we hope, setting in motion 
the process of nuclear disarmament. 

In our talks with President Ronald 
Reagan, some headway has been made 
on the central issue of that process, 
achieving substantial reductions of stra- 
tegic offensive arms which are the most 
potent weapons in the world, although 
we still have a lot of work to do. We 
have had a useful exchange of views 
which has clarified each other's posi- 
tions concerning regional conflicts, the 
development of our bilateral ties, and 
human rights. On some of these as- 
pects, it seems likely that we can soon 
identify specific solutions satisfactory 
both to us and to other countries. A 
useful result of the Washington talks is 
that we have been able to formulate a 
kind of agenda for joint efforts in the 
future. This puts the dialogue between 
our two countries on a more predictable 
footing and is undoubtedly 
constructive. 



17 



While this visit has centered on our 
talks with the President of the United 
States, I have no intention of minimiz- 
ing the importance of meetings with 
Members of Congress, with other polit- 
ical leaders, public figures, members of 
the business and academic commu- 
nities, cultural figures, and media exec- 
utives. Such contacts enable us to gain 
a better and more profound knowledge 
of each other and provide a wealth of 
opportunities for checking one's views, 
assessments, and even established 
stereotypes. 

All this is important, both for pol- 
icymaking and for bringing peoples and 
countries closer together These meet- 
ings have confirmed the impression that 
there is a growing desire in American 
society for improved Soviet-Amei-ican 
relations. In short, what we have seen 
here is a movement matching the mood 
that has long been prevalent among So- 
viet people. 

In bidding farewell to America, I 
am looking forward to a new encounter 
with it in the hope that I will then be 
able to see not only its capital, but also 
to meet face-to-face with its great peo- 
ple, to chat and to have some lively 
exchanges with ordinary Americans. 
[Applause.] 

I believe that what we have accom- 
plished during the meeting and the dis- 
cussions will, with time, help 
considerably to improve the atmosphere 
in the world at large and in America 
itself in terms of its more correct and 
tolerant perception of my country, the 
Soviet Union. 

Today, the Soviet Union and the 
United States are closer to the common 
goal of strengthening international se- 
curity. But this goal is yet to be 
reached. There is still much work to be 
done, and we must get down to it with- 
out delay. 

Mr. President, esteemed citizens of 
the United States, we are grateful for 
your hospitality and we wish success, 
well-being, and peace to all Americans. 
Thank you and goodbye. 



President Reagan's 

Address to the Nation, 
Dec. 10, 19873 

As I am speaking to you now. General 
Secretary Gorbachev is leaving on his 
return trip to the Soviet Union. His 
departure marks the end of 3 historic 
days here in Washington, in which Mr. 
Gorbachev and I continued to build a 
foundation for better relations between 
our governments and our peoples. 

During these 3 days, we took a 
step — only a first step, but still a criti- 
cal one — toward building a more dura- 
ble peace; indeed, a step that may be 
the most important taken since World 
War II to slow down the arms buildup. 
I'm referring to the treaty that we 
signed Tuesday afternoon in the East 
Room of the White House. I believe 
this treaty represents a landmark in 
postwar history, because it is not just 
an arms control but an arms reduction 
agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, 
this agreement does not simply estab- 
lish ceilings for new weapons; it actu- 
ally reduces the number of such 
weapons. In fact, it altogether abol- 
ishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet 
nuclear missiles. 

The verification measures in this 
treaty are also something new, with far- 
reaching implications. Onsite inspec- 
tions and short-notice inspections will 
be permitted within the Soviet Union. 
Again, this is a first-time event, a 
breakthrough. 

And that's why I believe this treaty 
will not only lessen the threat of war; it 
can also speed along a process that may 
someday remove that threat entirely. 
Indeed, this treaty— and all that we've 
achieved during this summit — signals a 
broader understanding between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. It 
is an understanding that will help keep 
the peace as we work toward the ulti- 
mate goal of our foi-eign policy: a world 
where the people of every land can de- 
cide for themselves their form of gov- 
ernment and way of life. 



A Broader Agenda 

in U.S. -Soviet Relations 



SOI 

(spl 



Yet, as important as the INF [intermi 
diate-range nuclear forces] Treaty is, 
there is a further and even more cruc 
point about the last 3 days and the er 
tire summit process: Soviet-American 
relations are no longer focused only o 
arms control issues; they now cover a 
far broader agenda — one that has, at 
its root, realism and candor. 

Let me explain this with a saying 
I've often repeated: nations do not di& 
trust each other because they are 
armed; they are armed because they 
distrust each other And, just as real 
peace means the presence of freedom; 
and justice as well as the absence of 
war, so, too, summits must be discus- 
sions not just about arms but about t. 
fundamental differences that cause na 
tions to be armed. 

Dealing, then, with the deeper 
sources of conflict between nations ai( 
systems of government is a practical 
and moral imperative. And that's whj 
was vital to establish a broader sumn 
agenda — one that dealt not only with 
arms reductions but also people-to- 
people contacts between our nations 
and, most important, the issues of hu 
man rights and regional conflicts 

This is the summit agenda we've 
adopted. By doing so, we've dealt not 
just with arms control issues but alsc 
with fundamental problems such as 
Soviet expansionism, human rights vi 
olations, as well as our own moral op- 
position to the ideology that justifies 
such practices. In this way, we have p 
Soviet-American relations on a far m( 
candid and far more realistic footing 
It also means that while there's 
movement — indeed, dramatic move- 
ment — in the arms reduction area, 
much remains to be done in that area 
as well as in these critical areas that 
I've mentioned, especially — and this 
goes without saying — in advancing ou 
goal of a world open to the expansion 
of human freedom and the growth of 
democratic government. 



ii| 



18 



Departmen^^tat^ulle 



-J^ 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



So much work lies ahead. Let 
i explain: on the matter of regional 
nflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. 
)rbachev on the issues of Afghanistan, 
an-Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, and Nic- 
agua. I continue to have high hopes — 
d he assured me that he did, too — 
at we can have real cooperation in 
solving regional conflicts on terms 
at promote peace and freedom. This 
essential to a lasting improvement in 
r relations. 

So, too, on human rights there was 
me very limited movement — resolu- 
m of a number of individual cases, in 
lich prisoners will be released or exit 
sas granted. There were assurances 
future, more substantial movement, 
lich we hope to see become a reality. 

And, finally, with regard to the 
5t item on our agenda — scientific, 
ucational, cultural, and economic 
changes — we agreed to expand coop- 
ation in ways that will break down 
me of the artificial barriers between 
r nations. For example, agreement 
is reached to expand and improve 
n\ air service between our two 
untries. 

:knowledging the Support 
the American People 

Jt let me point out here that while 
uch work is ahead of us, the progress 
e have made, especially in arms re- 
iction, does reflect a better under- 
anding between ourselves and the 
jviets. It also reflects something 
ieper You see, since my first meeting 
ith General Secretary Gorbachev in 
'85, I have always regarded you, the 
merican people, as full participants in 
ir discussions. Though it may surprise 
r. Gorbachev to discover that all this 
me there has been a third party in the 
)om with us, I do firmly beheve the 
rincipal credit for the patience and 
Brsistence that brought success this 
3ar belongs to you, the American 
aople. 

Your support over these last 7 
3ars has laid the basis for these nego- 
ations. Your support made it possible 
ir us to rebuild our military strength, 



to liberate Grenada, to strike hard 
against terrorism in Libya, and, more 
recently, to protect our strategic inter- 
ests and bolster our friends in the Per- 
sian Gulf Your support made possible 
our policy of helping freedom fighters 
like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, 
Angola, Cambodia, and other places 
around the globe. And when, last year 
at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands 
that we trade away SDI — our Strategic 
Defense Initiative that could erect a 
space shield against ballistic missiles — 
your overwhelming support made it 
clear to the Soviet leaders that the 
American people prefer no deal to a 
bad deal and will back their President 
on matters of national security. In 
short, your support for our foreign pol- 
icy goals — building a safer peace as we 
advance the cause of world freedom — 
has helped bring the Soviets to the bar- 
gaining table. It makes it possible now 
to hope for a real, fundamental im- 
provement in our relations. 

You know, the question has often 
been asked whether democratic leaders 
who are accountable to their people 
aren't at a grave disadvantage in nego- 
tiating with leaders of totalitarian 
states who bear no such burden. Well, 
believe me, I think I can answer that 
question; I can speak from personal ex- 
perience. Over the long run, no leader 
at the bargaining table can enjoy any 
greater advantage that the knowledge 
that he has behind him a people who 
are strong and free and alert and re- 
solved to remain that way — people like 
you. 

And it's this kind of informed and 
enlightened support, this hidden 
strength of democratic government, 
that enabled us to do what we did this 
week at the Washington summit. 

Background on Arms 
Reduction Efforts 

Now that the treaty's been signed, it 
will be submitted to the Senate for the 
next step, the ratification process. I 
will meet with the leadership of Con- 
gress here tomorrow morning, and I'm 
confident that the Senate will now act 
in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty 
under our Constitution. 



To this end, let me explain the 
background in the mid- and late 1970s. 
The Soviets began to deploy hundreds 
of new, mobile intermediate-range mis- 
siles, capable of destroying major cities 
and military installations in Europe and 
Asia. This action was an unprovoked, 
new dimension of the threat against our 
friends and allies on both continents, a 
new threat to which the democratic 
nations had no comparable counter. 

Despite intense pressure from the 
Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we 
called a "two-track policy." First, we 
would deploy a limited number of our 
own INF missiles as a deterrent but, at 
the same time, push hard in negotia- 
tions to do away with this entirely new 
nuclear threat. And we set out to do 
this with a formula I first put forward 
in 1981 — it was called the zero-option. 
It meant the complete elimination of 
these missiles on both sides. 

Well, at first, many called this a 
mere propaganda ploy, some even here 
in this country. But we were persistent, 
our allies steadfast, and eventually, the 
Soviets returned to the bargaining 
table. The result is our INF Treaty. 

As you can see from the map on 
the screen now, the Soviet missiles, 
which will be removed and eliminated 
under the treaty, have been a major 
threat to the security of our friends and 
allies on two continents, Europe and 
Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, 
we will be eliminating 400 deployed 
warheads, while the Soviet Union elimi- 
nates 1,600, or four times as many. 

Now, let me also point out that this 
does not, however, leave NATO un- 
protected. In fact, we will maintain a 
substantial deterrent force on the 
ground, in the air, and at sea. Our com- 
mitment to NATO's strategy of being 
able to respond, as necessary, to any 
form of aggression remains steadfast. 

And with regard to verification, as 
I've mentioned, we have the break- 
throughs of onsite inspections and 
short-notice inspections, not only at po- 
tential missile deployment sites but at 
the facility where the Soviets' SS-20 
missiles and their components have 
been assembled. We have a verification 



iBhriiarv 1QRR 



19 



procedure that assures each side that 
the missiles of the other side have been 
destroyed and that new ones aren't 
built. 

Here, then, is a treaty that shows 
how persistence and consistency even- 
tually can pay off in arms negotiations. 
And let me assure you, too, that this 
treaty has been accomplished with un- 
precedented consultation with our allies 
and friends. I have spoken personally 
with the leaders of the major democ- 
racies, as have Secretary Shultz and 
our diplomats. This treaty has full 
allied support. 

But if persistence is paying off in 
our arms reduction efforts, the ques- 
tions of human rights and regional con- 
flicts are still problems in our relations. 
But I am pleased that some progress 
has been made in these areas also. 

Future Efforts 

Now, in addition to these candid ex- 
changes on our four-part agenda, Mr. 
Gorbachev and I did do some important 
planning for a Moscow summit next 
year. We agreed that we must redouble 
our efforts to reach agreements on re- 
ducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet 
long-range or strategic nuclear arms, 
as I have proposed in the START [stra- 
tegic arms reduction talks] negotia- 
tions. He and I made real progress 
toward our goal, first agreed to at Gen- 
eva, to achieve deep, 50% cuts in our 
arsenals of those powerful weapons. We 
agreed that we should build on our 
efforts to achieve agreement on a 
START treaty at the earliest possible 
date; and we've instructed our delega- 
tions in Geneva accordingly. 

Now, I believe deep reductions in 
these offensive weapons — along with 
the development of SDI — would do 
much to make the world safer. For that 
reason, I made it clear that our SDI 
program will continue and that when 
we have a defense ready to deploy, we 
will do so. 



About the future, Mr. Gorbachev 
and I also agreed that, as nuclear 
weapons are reduced, it becomes all the 
more important to redress the dis- 
parities in conventional and chemical 
weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy 
significant advantages over the United 
States and our allies. 

I think, then, from all of this, you 
can see not only the direction of Soviet- 
American relations but the larger 
framework of American foreign policy. 
As I told the British Parliament in 
1982, we seek to rid the world of the 
two great nightmares of the postwar 
era — the threat of nuclear war and the 
threat of totalitarianism. And that's 
why, by pursuing SDI, which is a de- 
fense against offensive missiles, and by 
going for arms reduction rather than 
just arms control, we are moving away 
from the so-called policy of mutual as- 
sured destruction by which nations hold 
each other hostage to nuclear terror 
and destruction. So, too, we are saying 
that the postwar policy of containment 
is no longer enough; that the goal of 
American foreign policy is both world 
peace and world freedom; that as a peo- 
ple, we hope and will work for a day 
when all of God's children will enjoy the 
human dignity that their Creator 
intended. I believe we gained some 
ground with regard to that cause in 
these last few days. 

A Dream of Freedom and Peace 

Since my first days in office, I've ar- 
gued that the future belongs not to re- 
pressive or totalitarian ways of life but 
to the cause of freedom — freedom of 
the marketplace; freedom to speak, as- 
semble, and vote. And when we see the 
progress of democracy in these last 
years — from Latin America to Asia — 
we must be optimistic about the future 
of our children. 

When we were together in Iceland, 
Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of 



talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet 
Union as a threat, but I told him theii|i 
and I've said since then, that this is n 
threat at all, but only a dream — the 
American dream. 

And it's a dream that's meant so 
much to so many — a dream that still 
shines out to the world. You know, a 
couple of years ago, Nancy and I were 
deeply moved by a story told by formi Jrel 
New York Times reporter and Greek 
immigrant Nicholas Gage. It's the stoj 
of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught 
one of the terrible struggles of the 
postwar era — the Greek civil war at tl | 
end of World War II; a mother who w '" 
tried and executed because she smug- , 
gled her children out to safety in 
America. 

It is also the story of how her sor 
secretly vowed to return to Greece 
someday to take vengence on the mar 
who sent his mother to her death. Bu ' 
at the end of the story, Nicholas Gage , 
finds he cannot extract the vengence 1 ; 
promised himself Mr. Gage writes, it I 
would have relieved the pain that had j 
filled him for so many years, but it i 
would also have broken the one bridge 
still connecting him to his mother, tha|. 
part of him most like her. As he tells 
"And her final cry was not a curse on I; 
her killers, but an invocation of what 
she'd died for — a declaration of love." 
These simple last words of Mr. Gage's b 
mother — of Eleni — were: "My children * 

How that cry echoes down throug > 
the centuries, a cry for all children of I 
the world, a cry for peace, for a work 
of love and understanding. And it is tl 
hope of heeding such words — the call 
for freedom and peace spoken by a 
chosen people in a promised land, the 
call spoken by the Nazarene carpente 
standing at the Sea of Galilee, the car 
penter whose birth into the poverty oj 
a stable we celebrate. It is these won 
that we remember as the holiday sea- 
son approaches and we reflect on the 
events of this week here in Washingto 



20 



= ^ 



FEATURE 
The Washington Summit 



So, let us remember the children 
,d the future we want for them. And 
; us never forget that this promise of 
^ace and freedom — the gift that is 
rs as Americans, the gift that we 
ek to share with all the world — de- 
■nds for its strength on the spiritual 
urce from which it comes. 

So during this holy season, let us 
50 reflect that in the prayers of sim- 
e people, there is more power and 
ight than that possessed by all the 
eat statesmen or armies of the earth. 



Let us then thank God for all His bless- 
ings to this nation and ask Him for His 
help and guidance so that we might 
continue the work of peace and foster 
the hope of a world where human free- 
dom is enshrined. 

To sum up then: this summit was a 
clear success. We made progress on 
each item in our four-part agenda. Mr. 
Gorbachev and I have agreed to meet in 
several months in Moscow to continue 
what we've achieved during these past 
3 days. I believe there is reason for 
both hope and optimism. 



'Made on the South Lawn of the White 
House where General Secretary Gorbachev 
was accorded a formal welcome (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments of Dec. 14, 1987). 

^General Secretary Gorbachev spoke in 
Russian, and his remarks were translated 
by an interpreter. 

^Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 14, 1987. 

'Press release 235 of Dec. 10, 1987. 

sPress release 237 of Dec. 10. 

•"Foreign Minister Shevardnadze spoke 
in Russian, and his remarks were inter- 
preted by a translator 

'Joint statement made by Secretary 
Shultz and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze. ■ 



21 



ARMS CONTROL 







^^■l 


The INF Treaty 

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev 

signed the Intermediate -range Nuclear Forces Treaty 

on December 8, 1987. 

Following are the text of the treaty, 

memorandum of understanding 

regarding the establishment of the data base 

for the treaty, and 
the protocols on elimination and inspections. 





noi^ortrnQrit r,f gt-.)^ P,ill.-,ti . 



ARMS CONTROL 



Corrigendum 

The Treaty printed herein appears as it was signed on December 8, 1987. In the 
course of review, the U.S. Government has identified certain technical errors in 
the text. These will be corrected through an e.xchange of diplomatic notes with the 
Soviet Union. As of January 15, 1988, the following corrections were to be made: 

(1) In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), section II, paragraph 2, 
page 32, concerning shorter range missiles and launchers, for the United States, 
the number of nondeployed missiles should read 178. Also, the aggregate number 
of deployed and nondeployed missiles should read 178. The aggregate number of 
second stages should read 182. 

(2) In the MOU, section III, paragraph l(a)(ii), page 34, for Wueschheim, the 
geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 007 25 40 E. Also, the 
number of launchers should read 21. 

(3) In the MOU, section III, paragraph 2(a)(i), page 48, for training facilities: 
Ft. Sill, Ft Sill, Oklahoma, the number of launchers should read 38. 

(4) In the MOU, section IV, paragraph 2(a)(i), page 55, for the Longhorn 
Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas, the number of missiles should read 8, 
and the number of training missile stages should read 1. 

(5) In the Protocol regarding Inspections, section XI, paragraph 1, lines 17-18, 
page 76, the reference should read "paragi-aph 11 of section VI of this Protocol." 



sbruarv 1988 ^^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



Treaty 

Between the United States of America and 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 

the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

and Shorter-Range Missiles 



The United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 

Conscious that nuclear war would 
have devastating consequences for all 
mankind, 

Guided by the objective of 
strengthening strategic stability, 

Convinced that the measures set 
forth in this Treaty will help to reduce 
the risk of outbreak of war and 
strengthen international peace and 
security, and 

Mindful of their obligations under 
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

In accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty which includes the 
Memorandum of Understanding and 
Protocols which form an integral part 
thereof, each Party shall eliminate its 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, not have such systems 
thereafter, and carry out the other 
obligations set forth in this Treaty. 

Article II 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

1. The term "ballistic missile" 
means a missile that has a ballistic 
trajectory over most of its flight path. 
The term "ground-launched ballistic 
missile (GLBM)" means a ground- 
launched ballistic missile that is a 
weapon-delivery vehicle. 

2. The term "cruise missile" means 
an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle 
that sustains flight through the use of 
aerodynamic lift over most of its flight 
path. The term "ground-launched 
cruise missile (GLCM)" means a 
ground-launched cruise missile that is 
a weapon-delivery vehicle. 



3. The term "GLBM launcher" 
means a fixed launcher or a mobile 
land-based transporter-erector-launcher 
mechanism for launching a GLBM. 

4. The term "GLCM launcher" 
means a fixed launcher or a mobile 
land-based transporter-erector-launcher 
mechanism for launching a GLCM. 

5. The term "intermediate-range 
missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM 
having a range capability in excess of 
1000 kilometers but not in excess of 
5500 kilometers. 

6. The term "shorter-range 
missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM 
having a range capability equal to or in 
excess of 500 kilometers but not in 
excess of 1000 kilometers. 

7. The term "deployment area" 
means a designated area within which 
intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles may operate 
and within which one or more missile 
operating bases are located. 

8. The term "missile operating 
base" means: 

(a) in the case of intermediate- 
range missiles, a complex of facilities 
located within a deployment area at 
which intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles normally 
operate, in which support structures 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers are also located and in which 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers is 
normally located; and 

(b) in the case of shorter-range 
missiles, a complex of facilities located 
any place at which shorter-range 
missiles and launchers of such missiles 
normally operate and in which support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers is normally 
located. 

9. The term "missile support 
facility," as regards intermediate-range 



iiisa 
iteso 

MtS 

litor 



or shorter-range missiles and launch 
of such missiles, means a missile 
production facility or a launcher 
production facility, a missile repair 
facility or a launcher repair facility, 
training facility, a missile storage 
facility or a launcher storage facility 
test range, or an elimination facility 
those terms are defined in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

10. The term "transit" means 
movement, notified in accordance wiv 
paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this 
Treaty, of an intermediate-range 
missile or a launcher of such a missi 
between missile support facilities, 
between such a facility and a 
deployment area or between 
deployment areas, or of a shorter-rar> 
missile or a launcher of such a missil 
from a missile support facility or 
missile operating base to an 
elimination facility. 

11. The term "deployed missile" 
means an intermediate-range missile 
located within a deployment area or 
shorter-range missile located at a 
missile operating base. 

12. The term "non-deployed 
missile" means an intermediate-rangi 
missile located outside a deployment 
area or a shorter-range missile locate" 
outside a missile operating base. 

13. The term "deployed launcher 
means a launcher of an intermediate- 
range missile located within a 
deployment area or a launcher of a 
shorter-range missile located at a 
missile operating base. 

14. The term "non-deployed 
launcher" means a launcher of an 
intermediate-range missile located 
outside a deployment area or a 
launcher of a shorter-range missile 
located outside a missile operating 
base. 



ji 



24 



Department of State Bulle 



ARMS CONTROL 



15. The term "basing country" 
leans a country other than the United 
oates of America or the Union of 
)viet Sociahst Republics on whose 
rritory intermediate-range or shorter- 
inge missiles of the Parties, launchers 
' such missiles or support structures 
isociated with such missiles and 
unchers were located at any time 
"ter November 1, 1987. Missiles or 
unchers in transit are not considered 
■ be "located." 

Article III 

For the purposes of this Treaty, 
asting types of intermediate-range 
issiles are: 

(a) for the United States of 
merica, missiles of the types 
isignated by the United States of 
merica as the Pershing II and the 

rM-109G, which are known to the 
nion of Soviet Socialist Republics by 
iS same designations; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet 
)cialist Republics, missiles of the 

pes designated by the Union of Soviet 
x;ialist Republics as the RSD-10, the 
■12 and the R-14, which are known to 
le United States of America as the 
5-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, 
«pectively. 

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
cisting types of shorter-range missiles 
•e: 

(a) for the United States of 
merica, missiles of the type 
jsignated by the United States of 
merica as the Pershing lA, which is 
lown to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
epublics by the same designation; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet 
ocialist Republics, missiles of the 

•pes designated by the Union of Soviet 
ocialist Republics as the OTR-22 and 
le OTR-23, which are known to the 
nited States of America as the SS-12 
nd the SS-23, respectively. 

Article IV 

. Each Party shall eliminate all its 
itermediate-range missiles and 
mnchers of such missiles, and all 
iipport structures and support 
quipment of the categories listed in 
tie Memorandum of Understanding 
ssociated with such missiles and 
iunchers, so that no later than three 
ears after entry into force of this 



Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, 
launchers, support structures or 
support equipment shall be possessed 
by either Party. 

2. To implement paragraph 1 of 
this Article, upon entry into force of 
this Treaty, both Parties shall begin 
and continue throughout the duration 
of each phase, the reduction of all 
types of their deployed and non- 
deployed intermediate-range missiles 
and deployed and non-deployed 
launchers of such missiles and support 
structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers in accordance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. These 
reductions shall be implemented in two 
phases so that: 

(a) by the end of the first phase, 
that is, no later than 29 months after 
entry into force of this Treaty: 

(i) the number of deployed 
launchers of intermediate-range 
missiles for each Party shall not exceed 
the number of launchers that are 
capable of carrying or containing at 
one time missiles considered by the 
Parties to carry 171 warheads; 

(ii) the number of deployed 
intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
such missiles considered by the Parties 
to carry 180 warheads; 

(iii) the aggregate number of 
deployed and non-deployed launchers 
of intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
launchers that are capable of carrying 
or containing at one time missiles 
considered by the Parties to carry 200 
warheads; 

(iv) the aggregate number of 
deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range missiles for each 
Party shall not exceed the number of 
such missiles considered by the Parties 
to carry 200 warheads; and 

(v) the ratio of the aggregate 
number of deployed and non^deployed 
intermediate-range GLBMs of existing 
types for each Party to the aggregate 
number of deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range missiles of existing 
types possessed by that Party shall not 
exceed the ratio of such intermediate- 
range GLBMs to such intermediate- 
range missiles for that Party as of 
November 1, 1987, as set forth in the 
Memorandum of Understanding; and 



(b) by the end of the second 
phase, that is, no later than three 
years after entry into force of this 
Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles 
of each Party, launchers of such 
missiles and all support structures and 
support equipment of the categories 
listed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding associated with such 
missiles and launchers, shall be 
eliminated. 

Article V 

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles, and all support 
equipment of the categories listed in 
the Memorandum of Understanding 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, so that no later than 18 
months after entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, 
launchers or support equipment shall 
be possessed by either Party. 

2. No later than 90 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty, each 
Party shall complete the removal of all 
its deployed shorter-range missiles and 
deployed and non-deployed launchers 
of such missiles to elimination facilities 
and shall retain them at those 
locations until they are eliminated in 
accordance with the procedures set 
forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 
No later than 12 months after entry 
into force of this Treaty, each Party 
shall complete the removal of all its 
non-deployed shorter-range missiles to 
elimination facilities and shall retain 
them at those locations until they are 
eliminated in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol on 
Elimination. 

3. Shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall not be 
located at the same elimination 
facility. Such facilities shall be 
separated by no less than 1000 
kilometers. 

Article VI 

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty 
and thereafter, neither Party shall: 

(a) produce or flight-test any 
intermediate-range missiles or produce 
any stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles; or 

(b) produce, flight-test or launch 
any shorter-range missiles or produce 



t-ebruary 1988 



25 



ARMS CONTROL 



any stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles. 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of 
this Article, each Party shall have the 
right to produce a type of GLBM not 
limited by this Treaty which uses a 
stage which is outwardly similar to, but 
not interchangeable with, a stage of an 
existing type of intermediate-range 
GLBM having more than one stage, 
providing that that Party shall not 
produce any other stage which is 
outwardly similar to, but not 
interchangeable with, any other stage 
of an existing type of intermediate- 
range GLBM. 

Article VII 

For the purposes of this Treaty: 

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise 
missile has been flight-tested or 
deployed for weapon delivery, all 
missiles of that type shall be 
considered to be weapon-delivery 
vehicles. 

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an 
intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs 
or GLCMs of that type shall be 
considered to be intermediate-range 
missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a 
shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or 
GLCMs of that type shall be considered 
to be shorter-range missiles. 

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed 
and tested solely to intercept and 
counter objects not located on the 
surface of the earth, it shall not be 
considered to be a missile to which the 
limitations of this Treaty apply. 

4. The range capability of a GLBM 
not listed in Article III of this Treaty 
shall be considered to be the maximum 
range to which it has been tested. The 
range capability of a GLCM not listed 
in Article III of this Treaty shall be 
considered to be the maximum distance 
which can be covered by the missile in 
its standard design mode flying until 
fuel exhaustion, determined by 
projecting its flight path onto the 
earth's sphere from the point of launch 
to the point of impact. GLBMs or 
GLCMs that have a range capability 
equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers 
but not in excess of 1000 kilometers 
shall be considered to be shorter-range 
missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a 
range capability in excess of 1000 
kilometers but not in excess of 5500 



kilometers shall be considered to be 
intermediate-range missiles. 

5. The maximum number of 
warheads an existing type of 
intermediate-range missile or shorter- 
range missile carries shall be 
considered to be the number listed for 
missiles of that type in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be 
considered to carry the maximum 
number of warheads listed for a GLBM 
or GLCM of that type in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

7. If a launcher has been tested for 
launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all 
launchers of that type shall be 
considered to have been tested for 
launching GLBMs or GLCMs. 

8. If a launcher has contained or 
launched a particular type of GLBM or 
GLCM, all launchers of that type shall 
be considered to be launchers of that 
type of GLBM or GLCM. 

9. The number of missiles each 
launcher of an existing type of 
intermediate-range missile or shorter- 
range missile shall be considered to be 
capable of carrying or containing at 
one time is the number listed for 
launchers of missiles of that type in 
the Memorandum of Understanding. 

10. Except in the CEise of 
elimination in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol on 
Elimination, the following shall apply: 

(a) for GLBMs which are stored 
or moved in separate stages, the 
longest stage of an intermediate-range 
or shorter-range GLBM shall be 
counted as a complete missile; 

(b) for GLBMs which are not 
stored or moved in separate stages, a 
canister of the type used in the launch 
of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless 
a Party proves to the satisfaction of the 
other Party that it does not contain 
such a missile, or an assembled 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLBM, shall be counted as a complete 
missile; and 

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of 
an intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLCM shall be counted as a complete 
missile. 

11. A ballistic missile which is not 
a missile to be used in a ground-based 
mode shall not be considered to be a 
GLBM if it is test-launched at a test 
site from a fixed land-based launcher 



jiiia 



iii 



which is used solely for test purposes 
and which is distinguishable from 
GLBM launchers. A cruise missile 
which is not a missile to be used in a 
ground-based mode shall not be 
considered to be a GLCM if it is test- 
launched at a test site from a fixed 
land-based launcher which is used 
solely for test purposes and which is 
distinguishable from GLCM launchersj^ied 

12. Each Party shall have the rig] 
to produce and use for booster system; 
which might otherwise be considered 
be intermediate-range or shorter-rangi 
missiles, only existing types of boosten 
stages for such booster systems. 
Launches of such booster systems sha 
not be considered to be flight-testing c 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles provided that: 

(a) stages used in such booster 
systems are different from stages useo 
in those missiles listed as existing typ 
of intermediate-range or shorter-rang« 
missiles in Article III of this Treaty; 

(b) such booster systems are us« 
only for research and development 
purposes to test objects other than th<i 
booster systems themselves; 

(c) the aggregate number of 
launchers for such booster systems 
shall not exceed 35 for each Party at 
any one time; and 

(d) the launchers for such boostii 
systems are fixed, emplaced above 
ground and located only at research 
and development launch sites which 
are specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 



Research and development launch site 
shall not be subject to inspection 
pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty. 

Article VIII 

1. All intermediate-range missiles and) 
launchers of such missiles shall be 
located in deployment areas, at missi! 
support facilities or shall be in transiti 
Intermediate-range missiles or 
launchers of such missiles shall not be 
located elsewhere. 

2. Stages of intermediate-range 
missiles shall be located in deploymeni 
areas, at missile support facilities or 
moving between deployment areas, 
between missile support facilities or 
between missile support facilities and 
deployment areas. 



iltt 



ilti 



di 



It 



26 



Department of State Bullei' 



ARMS CONTROL 



3. Until their removal to 
imination facilities as required by 
iragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, 
1 shorter-range missiles and 
unchers of such missiles shall be 
Gated at missile operating bases, at 
lissile support facilities or shall be in 
lansit. Shorter-range missiles or 
unchers of such missiles shall not be 
Gated elsewhere. 

4. Transit of a missile or launcher 
Ibject to the provisions of this Treaty 
iiall be completed within 25 days. 

5. All deployment areas, missile 
aerating bases and missile support 
cilities are specified in the 
emorandum of Understanding or in 
ibsequent updates of data pursuant to 
iragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX 

this Treaty. Neither Party shall 
crease the number of, or change the 
cation or boundaries of, deployment 
•eas, missile operating bases or 
issile support facilities, except for 

I imination facilities, from those set 

II rth in the Memorandum of 
nderstanding. A missile support 
cility shall not be considered to be 
irt of a deployment area even though 

may be located within the geographic 
)undaries of a deployment area. 

6. Beginning 30 days after entry 
ito force of this Treaty, neither Party 

1 lall locate intermediate-range or 
lorter-range missiles, including stages 
' such missiles, or launchers of such 
lissiles at missile production facilities, 
luncher production facilities or test 
inges listed in the Memorandum of 
nderstanding. 

7. Neither Party shall locate any 
itermediate-range or shorter-range 
lissiles at training facilities. 

8. A non-deployed intermediate- 

I ange or shorter-range missile shall not 
e carried on or contained within a 
iuncher of such a type of missile, 
xcept as required for maintenance 
onducted at repair facilities or for 
limination by means of launching 
onducted at elimination facilities. 

9. Training missiles and training 
aunchers for intermediate-range or 
horter-range missiles shall be subject 
the same locational restrictions eis 
ire set forth for intermediate-range 
ind shorter-range missiles and 
aunchers of such missiles in 
laragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article. 



Article IX 

1. The Memorandum of Understanding 
contains categories of data relevant to 
obligations undertaken with regard to 
this Treaty and lists all intermediate- 
range and shorter-range missiles, 
launchers of such missiles, and support 
structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, possessed by the Parties as 
of November 1, 1987. Updates of that 
data and notifications required by this 
Article shall be provided according to 
the categories of data contained in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

2. The Parties shall update that 
data and provide the notifications 
required by this Treaty through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 
established pursuant to the Agreement 
Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Establishment of 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 
September 15, 1987. 

3. No later than 30 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty, each 
Party shall provide the other Party 
with updated data, as of the date of 
entry into force of this Treaty, for all 
categories of data contained in the 
Memorandum of Understanding. 

4. No later than 30 days after the 
end of each six-month interval 
following the entry into force of this 
Treaty, each Party shall provide 
updated data for all categories of data 
contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding by informing the other 
Party of all changes, completed and in 
process, in that data, which have 
occurred during the six-month interval 
since the preceding data exchange, and 
the net effect of those changes. 

5. Upon entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall 
provide the following notifications to 
the other Party: 

(a) notification, no less than 30 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
of the elimination of a specific 
deployment area, missile operating 
base or missile support facility; 

(b) notification, no less than 30 
days in advance, of changes in the 
number or location of elimination 
facilities, including the location and 
scheduled date of a change; 

(c) notification, except with 
respect to launches of intermediate- 



range missiles for the purpose of their 
elimination, no less than 30 days in 
advance, of the scheduled date of the 
initiation of the elimination of 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, and stages of such missiles, 
and launchers of such missiles and 
support structures and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers, including: 

(i) the number and type of 
items of missile systems to be 
eliminated; 

(ii) the elimination site; 

(iii) for intermediate-range 
missiles, the location from which such 
missiles, launchers of such missiles and 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers are moved 
to the elimination facility; and 

(iv) except in the case of 
support structures, the point of entry 
to be used by an inspection team 
conducting an inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 7 of Article XI of this 
Treaty and the estimated time of 
departure of an inspection team from 
the point of entry to the elimination 
facility; 

(d) notification, no less than ten 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
of the launch, or the scheduled date of 
the initiation of a series of launches, of 
intermediate-range missiles for the 
purpose of their elimination, including: 

(i) the type of missiles to be 
eliminated; 

(ii) location of the launch, or, if 
elimination is by a series of launches, 
the location of such launches and 
number of launches in the series; 

(iii) the point of entry to be 
used by an inspection team conducting 
an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 
of Article XI of this Treaty; and 

(iv) the estimated time of 
departure of an inspection team from 
the point of entry to the elimination 
facility; 

(e) notification, no later than 48 
hours after they occur, of changes in 
the number of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, launchers of 
such missiles and support structures 
and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers resulting 
from elimination as described in the 
Protocol on Elimination, including: 



rflhriiaru IQftfi 



27 



ARMS CONTROL 



(i) the number and type of 
items of a missile system which were 
eliminated; and 

(ii) the date and location of 
such elimination; and 

(f) notification of transit of 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles or launchers of such missiles, 
or the movement of training missiles or 
training launchers for such 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, no later than 48 hours after it 
has been completed, including: 

(i) the number of missiles or 
launchers; 

(ii) the points, dates and times 
of departure and arrival; 

(iii) the mode of transport; and 

(iv) the location and time at 
that location at least once every four 
days during the period of transit. 

6. Upon entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall 
notify the other Party, no less than ten 
days in advance, of the scheduled date 
and location of the launch of a 
research and development booster 
system as described in paragraph 12 of 
Article VII of this Treaty. 

Article X 

1. Each Party shall eliminate its 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles and launchers of such missiles 
and support structures and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in the 
Protocol on Elimination. 

2. Verification by on-site inspection 
of the elimination of items of missile 
systems specified in the Protocol on 
Elimination shall be carried out in 
accordance with Article XI of this 
Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination 
and the Protocol on Inspection. 

3. When a Party removes its 
intermediate-range missiles, launchers 
of such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers from deployment areas to 
elimination facilities for the purpose of 
their elimination, it shall do so in 
complete deployed organizational units. 
For the United States of America, 
these units shall be Pershing II 
batteries and BGM-109G flights. For 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 



these units shall be SS-20 regiments 
composed of two or three battalions. 

4. Elimination of intermediate- 
range and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles and support 
equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers shall be carried 
out at the facilities that are specified in 
the Memorandum of Understanding or 
notified in accordance with paragraph 
5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless 
eliminated in accordance with Sections 
IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. 
Support structures, associated with the 
missiles and launchers subject to this 
Treaty, that are subject to elimination 
shall be eliminated in situ. 

5. Each Party shall have the right, 
during the first six months after entry 
into force of this Treaty, to eliminate 
by means of launching no more than 
100 of its intermediate-range missiles. 

6. Intermediate-range and shorter- 
range missiles which have been tested 
prior to entry into force of this Treaty, 
but never deployed, and which are not 
existing types of intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles listed in Article 
III of this Treaty, and launchers of 
such missiles, shall be eliminated 
within six months after entry into 
force of this Treaty in accordance with 
the procedures set forth in the Protocol 
on Elimination. Such missiles are: 

(a) for the United States of 
America, missiles of the type 
designated by the United States of 
America as the Pershing IB, which is 
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics by the same designation; and 

(h) for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, missiles of the type 
designated by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics as the RK-55, 
which is known to the United States of 
America as the SSC-X-4. 

7. Intermediate-range and shorter- 
range missiles and launchers of such 
missiles and support structures and 
support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers shall be 
considered to be eliminated after 
completion of the procedures set forth 
in the Protocol on Elimination and 
upon the notification provided for in 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this 
Treaty. 

8. Each Party shall eliminate its 
deployment areas, missile operating 
bases and missile support facilities. A 



Party shall notify the other Party 
pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article 
IX of this Treaty once the condition 
set forth below are fulfilled: 

(a) all intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers located there have been 
removed; 

(b) all support structures ,i 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers located there have been 
eliminated; and 

(c) all activity related to 
production, fiight-testing, training, 
repair, storage or deployment of sucb 
missiles and launchers has ceased 
there. 



lilj 



Such deployment areas, missile 
operating bases and missile support 
facilities shall be considered to be 
eliminated either when they have bei 
inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of) 
Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 
days have elapsed since the date of ttt 
scheduled elimination which was 
notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) o> 
Article IX of this Treaty. A deployina 
area, missile operating base or missih 
support facility listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding that 
met the above conditions prior to ent: 
into force of this Treaty, and is not 
included in the initial data exchange 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article D* 
of this Treaty, shall be considered to 
eliminated. 

9. If a Party intends to convert a 
missile operating base listed in the 
Memorandum of Understanding for u 
as a base associated with GLBM or 
GLCM systems not subject to this 
Treaty, then that Party shall notify tl 
other Party, no less than 30 days in 
advance of the scheduled date of the 
initiation of the conversion, of the 
scheduled date and the purpose for 
which the base will be converted. 

Article XI 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall have the right to conduct on-site 
inspections. The Parties shall 
implement on-site inspections in 
accordance with this Article, the 
Protocol on Inspection and the Protoc 
on Elimination. 



I 



28 



_QaaactiaaaL^^£teteAdai 



I 



ARMS CONTROL 



2. Each Party shall have the right 
I conduct inspections provided for by 
lis Article both within the territory of 
18 other Party and within the 
irritories of basing countries. 

3. Beginning 30 days after entry 
ito force of this Treaty, each Party 
lall have the right to conduct 

iispections at all missile operating 
ases and missile support facilities 

jjecified in the Memorandum of 
nderstanding other than missile 
roduction facilities, and at all 
imination facilities included in the 
litial data update required by 
aragraph 3 of Article IX of this 
reaty. These inspections shall be 
)mpleted no later than 90 days after 
itry into force of this Treaty. The 
arpose of these inspections shall be to 
jrify the number of missiles, 
lunchers, support structures and 
ipport equipment and other data, as 
" the date of entry into force of this 
reaty, provided pursuant to 
aragraph 3 of Article IX of this 
reaty. 

4. Each Party shall have the right 
I conduct inspections to verify the 
dmination, notified pursuant to 
aragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this 
reaty, of missile operating bases and 
lissile support facilities other than 
lissile production facilities, which are 
lus no longer subject to inspections 
arsuant to paragraph 5(a) of this 

j rticle. Such an inspection shall be 
irried out within 60 days after the 
;heduled date of the elimination of 
lat facility. If a Party conducts an 
ispection at a particular facility 
ursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article 
fter the scheduled date of the 
limination of that facility, then no 
dditional inspection of that facility 
ursuant to this paragraph shall be 
ermitted. 

5. Each Party shall have the right 
3 conduct inspections pursuant to this 
aragraph for 13 years after entry into 
Dree of this Treaty. Each Party shall 
ave the right to conduct 20 such 
ispections per calendar year during 
he first three years after entry into 
Dree of this Treaty, 15 such inspections 
«r calendar year during the 
ubsequent five years, and ten such 
nspections per calendar year during 
he last five years. Neither Party shall 
ise more than half of its total number 



of these inspections per calendar year 
within the territory of any one basing 
country. Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct: 

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days 
after entry into force of this Treaty, of 
missile operating bases, and missile 
support facilities other than 
elimination facilities and missile 
production facilities, to ascertain, 
according to the categories of data 
specified in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, the numbers of 
missiles, launchers, support structures 
and support equipment located at each 
missile operating base or missile 
support facility at the time of the 
inspection; and 

(b) inspections of former missile 
operating bases and former missile 
support facilities eliminated pursuant 
to paragraph 8 of Article X of this 
Treaty other than former missile 
production facilities. 

6. Beginning 30 days after entry 
into force of this Treaty, each Party 
shall have the right, for 13 years after 
entry into force of this Treaty, to 
inspect by means of continuous 
monitoring: 

(a) the portals of any facility of 
the other Party at which the final 
assembly of a GLBM using stages, any 
of which is outwardly similar to a stage 
of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in 
Article III of this Treaty, is 
accomplished; or 

(h) if a Party has no such facility, 
the portals of an agreed former missile 
production facility at which existing 
types of intermediate-range or shorter- 
range GLBMs were produced. 

The Party whose facility is to be 
inspected pursuant to this paragraph 
shall ensure that the other Party is 
able to establish a permanent 
continuous monitoring system at that 
facility within six months after entry 
into force of this Treaty or within six 
months of initiation of the process of 
final assembly described in 
subparagraph (a). If, after the end of 
the second year after entry into force 
of this Treaty, neither Party conducts 
the process of final assembly described 
in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 
consecutive months, then neither Party 
shall have the right to inspect by 
means of continuous monitoring any 
missile production facility of the other 



Party unless the process of final 
assembly as described in subparagraph 
(a) is initiated again. Upon entry into 
force of this Treaty, the facilities to be 
inspected by continuous monitoring 
shall be: in accordance with 
subparagraph (b), for the United States 
of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, 
at Magna, Utah; in accordance with 
subparagraph (a), for the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk 
Machine Building Plant, Udmurt 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic. 

7. Each Party shall conduct 
inspections of the process of 
elimination, including elimination of 
intermediate-range missiles by means 
of launching, of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers carried out at elimination 
facilities in accordance with Article X 
of this Treaty and the Protocol on 
Elimination. Inspectors conducting 
inspections provided for in this 
paragraph shall determine that the 
processes specified for the elimination 
of the missiles, launchers and support 
equipment have been completed. 

8. Each Party shall have the right 
to conduct inspections to confirm the 
completion of the process of 
elimination of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers eliminated pursuant to 
Section V of the Protocol on 
Elimination, and of training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers 
eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV 
and V of the Protocol on Elimination. 

Article XII 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Party 
shall use national technical means of 
verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law. 
2. Neither Party shall: 

(a) interfere with national 
technical means of verification of the 



29 



ARMS CONTROL 



other Party operating in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article; or 
(b) use concealment measures 
which impede verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this 
Treaty by national technical means of 
verification carried out in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article. This 
obligation does not apply to cover or 
concealment practices, within a 
deployment area, associated with 
normal training, maintenance and 
operations, including the use of 
environmental shelters to protect 
missiles and launchers. 

3. To enhance observation by 
national technical means of 
verification, each Party shall have the 
right until a treaty between the Parties 
reducing and limiting strategic 
offensive arms enters into force, but in 
any event for no more than three years 
after entry into force of this Treaty, to 
request the implementation of 
cooperative measures at deployment 
bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a 
range capability in excess of 5500 
kilometers, which are not former 
missile operating bases eliminated 
pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of 
this Treaty. The Party making such a 
request shall inform the other Party of 
the deployment base at which 
cooperative measures shall be 
implemented. The Party whose base is 
to be observed shall carry out the 
following cooperative measures: 

(a) No later than six hours after 
such a request, the Party shall have 
opened the roofs of all fixed structures 
for launchers located at the base, 
removed completely all missiles on 
launchers from such fixed structures 
for launchers and displayed such 
missiles on launchers in the open 
without using concealment measures; 
and 

(b) The Party shall leave the 
roofs open and the missiles on 
launchers in place until twelve hours 
have elapsed from the time of the 
receipt of a request for such an 
observation. 

Each Party shall have the right to 
make six such requests per calendar 
year. Only one deployment base shall 
be subject to these cooperative 
measures at any one time. 



Article XIII 

1. To promote the objectives and 
implementation of the provisions of 
this Treaty, the Parties hereby 
establish the Special Verification 
Commission. The Parties agree that, if 
either Party so requests, they shall 
meet within the framework of the 
Special Verification Commission to: 

(a) resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the obligations 
assumed; and 

(b) agree upon such measures as 
may be necessary to improve the 
viability and effectiveness of this 
Treaty. 

2. The Parties shall use the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which 
provide for continuous communication 
between the Parties, to: 

(a) exchange data and provide 
notifications as required by paragraphs 
3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty 
and the Protocol on Elimination; 

(b) provide and receive the 
information required by paragraph 9 of 
Article X of this Treaty; 

(c) provide and receive 
notifications of inspections as required 
by Article XI of this Treaty and the 
Protocol on Inspection; and 

(d) provide and receive requests 
for cooperative measures as provided 
for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this 
Treaty. 



Article XIV 

The Parties shall comply with this 
Treaty and shall not assume any 
international obligations or 
undertakings which would conflict with 
its provisions. 



Article XV 

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited 
duration. 

2. Each Party shall, in exercising 
its national sovereignty, have the rig! 
to withdraw from this Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. It shall give notice of its 
decision to withdraw to the other Par" 
six months prior to withdrawal from 
this Treaty. Such notice shall include 
statement of the extraordinary event 
the notifying Party regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 

Article XVI 

Each Party may propose amendments 
to this Treaty. Agreed amendments 
shall enter into force in accordance 
with the procedures set forth in Artie 
XVII governing the entry into force c 
this Treaty. 

Article XVII 

1. This Treaty, including the 
Memorandum of Understanding and 
Protocols, which form an integral par 
thereof, shall be subject to ratificatioi 
in accordance with the constitutional 
procedures of each Party. This Treaty 
shall enter into force on the date of tl 
exchange of instruments of ratificatio 
2. This Ti'eaty shall be regi.stered 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Chartei 
of the United Nations. 

DONE at Washington on December 
8, 1987, in two copies, each in the 
English and Russian languages, both 
texts being equally authentic. 



FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 

Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 
of America 



FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

M. Gorbachev 

General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 



30 



n^^^^^tm^r^^ ^< Oot^ D,,ll^t;i 



ARMS CONTROL 



Memorandum of Understanding 

Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base 

for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics 

and the United States of America 

on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

and Shorter-Range Missiles 



Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter 
referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of 
November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and launchers. 

I. Definitions 

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol 
on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection; 

1. The term "missile production facility" means a facility for the assembly or 
production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or 
existing types of GLCMs. 

2. The term "missile repair facility" means a facility at which repair or 
maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other 
than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. 

3. The term "launcher production facility" means a facility for final assembly of 
launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. 

4. The term "launcher repair facility" means a facility at which repair or 
maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes 
place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating 
base. 

5. The term "test range" means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate- 
range or shorter-range missiles takes place. 

6. The term "training facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, 
at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are 
located. 

7. The term "missile storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile 
operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of 
such missiles are stored. 

8. The term "launcher storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile 
operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles are stored. 

9. The term "elimination facility" means a facility at which intermediate-range 
or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support 
equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. 

10. The term "support equipment" means unique vehicles and mobile or 
transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter- 
range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include 
full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale 
inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a 
missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of 
missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is 
contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding. 



Jruarv 1988 



31 



ARMS CONTROL 



USA 


USSR 


429 


470 


260 


356 


689 


826 


236 


650 


214 


484 


68 


124 


282 


608 



11. The term "support structure" means a unique fixed structure used to 
support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A 
listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, 
and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in 
Section VI of this Memorandum of Onderstanding. 

12. The term "research and development launch site" means a facility at which 
research and development booster systems are launched. 

II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range 
Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the 
Treaty 

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for 
each Party are as follow: 



Deployed missiles 

Non-deployed missiles 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles 

Aggregate number of second stages 

Deployed launchers 

Non-deployed launchers 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers 



2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each 
Party are as follow: 



Deployed missiles 

Non-deployed missiles 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles 

Aggregate number of second stages 

Deployed launchers 

Non-deployed launchers 

Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers 



III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles 
and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

1. Deployed 

The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations 
and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed 
as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the 
support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and 
launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each 
listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of 
Understanding. ' The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying 
geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to 
include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways. 



USA 


USSR 





387 


170 


539 


170 


926 


175 


726 





197 


1 


40 


1 


237 



'For information on the availability of site diagrams and accompanying photographs, call 
or write: Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520 (202-647-6575). « 

32 Department of State Buiti 



ARMS CONTROL 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



Launchers 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



i) Pershing II 

Deployment Area One 

The Federal Republic of Germany 

Boundaries: 
The territory of The Federal Republic of Germa- 
ny bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east 
by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east 
longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 min- 
utes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the 
national boundaries of The Federal Republic 
of Germany. 

Missile Operating Bases 

Schwaebisch-Gmuend 
48 48 54 N 009 48 29 E 

Neu Ulm 

48 22 40 N 010 00 45 E 

Waldheide-Neckarsulm 

49 07 45 N 009 16 31 E 



40 
(includes 
4 spares) 


36 


Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 




24 


40 
(includes 
4 spares) 


43 
(includes 
7 spares) 


Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



24 


40 
(includes 
4 spares) 


36 


Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



24 



(ii) BGM-109G 



Deployment Area One 

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland 

Boundaries: 
The territory of The United Kingdom bounded 
on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 
degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; 
on the south by the English Channel; and on 
the east by the English Channel and the 
North Sea. 

Missile Operating Base 

Greenham Common 
51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W 



101 

with launch 

canister 

(includes 

5 spares) 



29 Training Missile 

(includes Training Launch Canister 7 

5 spares) 



Deployment Area Two 

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and North- 
ern Ireland 

Boundaries: 
The territory of The United Kingdom bounded 
on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 
degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; 
on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 
seconds north latitude; and on the east by the 
English Channel and the North Sea. 



ebruarv 1988 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missile Operating Base 

Molesworth 
52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W 



Missiles 



18' 

with launch 

canister 



Launchers 



6* 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



Deployment Area 

The Republic of Italy 
Boundaries; 
The territory of The Republic of Italy within the 
boundaries of the Island of Sicily. 

Missile Operating Base 

Comiso 
36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E 



Deployment Area 

The Kingdom of Belgium 
Boundaries: 
The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium. 

Missile Operating Base 

Florennes 
50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E 



Deployment Area Two 

The Federal Republic of Germany 

Boundaries: 
The territory of The Federal Republic of Germa- 
ny bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east 
by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east 
longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 min- 
utes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the 
west by the national boundaries of The Feder- 
al Republic of Germany. 

Missile Operating Base 

Wueschheim 
50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E 



Deployment Area 

The Kingdom of the Netherlands 

Boundaries: 
The territory of The Kingdom of the Nether- 
lands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 
minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within 
the national boundaries of The Kingdom of 
the Netherlands. 

Missile Operating Base 

Woensdrecht 
51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E 



108 


31 


Training Missile 


with launch 


(includes 


Training Launch Canister 


canister 


7 spares) 




(includes 






12 spares) 







20 


12 


Training Missile 


with launch 


(includes 


Training Launch Canister 


canister 


8 spares) 




(includes 






4 spares! 







62 


31 


Training Missile 


with launch 


(includes 


Training Launch Canister 


canister 


9 spares) 




(includes 






14 spares) 







with launch 
canister 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



|«p 



•In preparation for operational status. 



34 



Department of Stats Bullri; 



ARMS CONTROL 



UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 



Support Structures and 
F^quipment 



i) SS-20 

Deployment Area 

Postavy 
55 12 13 N 
54 52 47 

54 43 58 

55 01 13 



027 00 00 
026 41 18 
026 04 07 
026 08 43 



Missile Operating Base 
Postavy 

55 09 47 N 026 54 21 E 



Deployment Area 

Vetrino 

55 28 44 N 028 42 29 E 

55 01 03 028 15 03 

55 01 16 027 48 46 

55 16 22 027 49 05 

Missile Operating Base 

Vetrino 

55 24 19 N 028 33 29 E 



Deployment Area 

Polotsk 
55 37 36 N 
55 28 07 
54 32 15 
54 39 32 



028 23 49 

029 20 25 
029 09 47 
028 10 40 



Missile Operating Base 

Polotsk 

55 22 34 N 028 44 17 E 



Deployment Area 

Smorgon' 

54 37 43 N 
54 22 37 
54 37 18 
54 45 21 



026 52 34 E 
026 52 37 

025 41 58 

026 15 13 



Missile Operating Base 

Smorgon' 

54 36 16 N 026 23 05 E 



Deployment Area 

Smorgon' 

54 29 01 N 
54 05 04 
54 24 14 
54 35 27 



026 26 40 E 
025 53 59 

025 31 18 

026 19 10 



Missile Operating Base 

Smorgon' 
54 31 36 N 026 17 20 E 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



ybruary 1988 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



■^ 



Deployment Area 






Lida 






53 45 24 N 


025 29 02 


E 


53 34 00 


024 49 35 




53 42 25 


024 38 15 




53 58 05 


025 10 17 




Missile Operating Base 




Lida 






53 47 39 N 


025 20 27 


E 


Deployment Area 






Gezgaly 






53 38 53 N 


025 25 38 


E 


53 23 48 


025 26 12 




53 12 46 


025 08 38 




53 22 57 


024 35 43 





Missile Operating Base 

Gezgaly 
53 32 50 N 025 16 48 E 



Deployment Area 

Slonim 

52 58 15 N 025 55 42 E 

52 45 02 025 31 08 

53 04 08 025 09 00 
53 08 45 025 30 20 

Missile Operating Base 

Slonim 

52 55 54 N 025 21 59 E 



Deployment A rea 

Ruzhany 

52 55 21 N 024 58 40 E 
52 46 32 024 48 25 

52 45 52 024 16 26 

53 07 34 024 22 14 

Missile Operating Base 

Ruzhany 
52 49 29 N 024 45 45 E 



Deployment Area 

Zasimovichi 

52 37 55 N 024 48 50 E 

52 22 00 024 10 52 

52 32 36 023 56 54 

52 45 52 024 16 26 

Missile Operating Base 

Zasimovichi 

52 30 38 N 024 08 43 E 



Missiles 



Launchers 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister i 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 3 

Fixed Structure for Launcher i 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 5 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 3 

Training Missile ) 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



36 



Department of State Bull n 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Launchers 



Deployment Area 

Mozyr' 
52 05 31 N 
51 39 05 
51 42 00 
51 52 57 



029 13 04 
029 39 31 
029 01 30 
028 51 32 



Missile Operating Base 

Mozyr' 

52 02 27 N 029 11 15 E 



Deployment Area 

Petrikov 
52 16 29 N 
52 08 06 
52 08 33 
52 27 47 



029 03 04 E 

028 48 40 
028 13 37 
028 28 17 



Missile Operating Base 

Petrikov 

52 10 29 N 028 34 52 E 



Deployment Area 

Zhitkovichi 
52 23 40 N 
52 08 35 
52 08 55 
52 24 01 



028 10 31 E 
028 10 07 
027 14 01 
027 14 06 



Missile Operating Base 

Zhitkovichi 
52 11 36 N 027 48 07 E 



Deployment Area 



Rechitsa 




52 26 34 N 


030 21 10 E 


52 05 27 


030 43 26 


51 47 47 


030 23 27 


52 13 08 


030 00 53 


Missile Operating Base 


Rechitsa 




52 11 58 N 


030 07 11 E 


Deployment Area 




Slutsk 




53 28 29 N 


027 57 50 E 


53 02 31 


028 07 59 


53 13 35 


027 25 09 


53 28 40 


027 28 55 



Missile Operating Base 

Slutsk 
53 14 20 N 027 42 15 E 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



ebruary 1988 



37 



ARMS CONTROL 










Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Deployment A rea 








Lutsk 








51 08 14 N 025 54 51 E 








50 50 45 025 34 49 








51 16 24 025 16 49 








51 20 51 025 26 59 








Missile Operating Base 








Lutsk 


9 


9 


Launch Canister i 


50 56 07 N 025 36 26 E 






Missile Transporter Vehicle ^ 
Fixed Structure for Launcher * 
Training Missile J 


Deployment Area 








Lutsk 








51 10 05 N 025 27 21 E 








50 43 54 025 07 49 








50 47 35 024 33 38 








51 11 22 024 35 49 








Missile Operating Base 








Lutsk 


9 


9 


Launch Canister } 


50 50 06 N 025 04 02 E 






Missile Transporter Vehicle ) 
Fixed Structure for Launcher ) 
Training Missile ) 


Deployment Area 








Brody 








50 14 00 N 025 29 11 E 








50 00 46 025 09 30 








50 17 32 024 41 55 








50 22 10 024 58 33 








Missile Operating Base 








Brody 


9 


9 


Launch Canister ) 


50 06 09 N 025 12 14 E 






Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 
Fixed Structure for Launcher ) 
Training Missile ) 


Deployment Area 








Chervonograd 








50 41 07 N 024 33 58 E 








50 13 10 024 38 45 








50 19 02 024 11 30 








50 36 26 024 17 15 








Missile Operating Base 








Chervonograd 


9 


9 


Launch Canister ) 


50 22 45 N 024 18 16 E 






Missile Transporter Vehicle ) 



Deployment Area 

Slavuta 
50 18 55 N 027 03 22 E 
50 08 07 027 03 21 

50 07 59 026 16 22 

50 29 38 026 29 34 

Missile Operating Base 

Slavuta 
50 17 05 N 026 41 31 E 



Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



38 



Department of State Bullen 



ARMS CONTROL 



Deployment Area 

Belokorovichi 

51 10 19 N 

50 51 05 

51 21 28 
51 21 22 



028 12 04 E 
027 51 07 
027 01 43 
027 37 54 



Missile Operating Base 

Belokorovichi 

51 10 45 N 028 03 20 E 



Deployment Area 
Lipniki 

51 11 38 N 

50 52 28 

51 05 53 
51 20 57 



029 10 28 E 
028 55 56 
028 22 14 
028 26 07 



Missile Operating Base 

Lipniki 

51 12 22 N 028 26 37 E 



Deployment Area 

Vysokaya Pech' 
50 29 13 N 
50 09 49 
50 10 10 
50 29 33 



028 21 10 E 
028 20 37 
027 40 19 
027 43 58 



Missile Operating Base 

Vysokaya Pech' 
50 10 11 N 028 16 22 E 



Deployment Area 

Vysokaya Pech' 
50 13 33 N 
49 56 07 

49 52 42 

50 07 39 



029 01 05 E 
029 10 23 
028 06 47 
028 20 33 



Missile Operating Base 

Vysokaya Pech' 
50 05 43 N 028 22 09 E 



Deployment Area 

Korosten' 

50 54 31 N 
50 41 34 
50 42 05 
50 55 01 



029 02 51 E 
029 02 16 
028 28 20 
028 28 44 



Missile Operating Base 

Korosten' 
50 52 22 N 028 31 17 E 



Launchers 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 6 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 6 

Training Missile 



39 



ARMS CONTROL 



Deployment Area 

Lebedin 
50 35 26 N 
50 12 10 
50 14 25 

50 35 42 



034 41 41 E 
034 00 31 

033 50 28 

034 21 21 



Missile Operating Base 

Lebedin 
50 33 06 N 034 26 02 E 



Deployment A rea 

Glukhov 
52 02 16 N 
51 36 21 

51 34 22 

52 02 21 



033 52 28 
033 55 26 
033 27 42 
033 38 28 



Missile Operating Base 

Glukhov 
51 41 00 N 033 30 56 E 



Deployment Area 

Glukhov 

51 42 59 N 
51 23 31 
51 23 37 
51 43 02 



033 27 47 E 
033 37 56 

032 56 33 

033 10 25 



Missile Operating Base 

Glukhov 

51 36 44 N 033 29 17 E 



Deployment Area 

Akhtyrka 
50 17 58 N 

49 49 59 

50 10 03 
50 18 24 



034 54 32 E 
034 50 05 

033 57 06 

034 24 13 



Missile Operating Base 

Akhtyrka 
50 16 01 N 034 49 53 E 



Deployment A rea 

Akhtyrka 
50 10 43 N 

49 54 08 

50 18 24 
50 26 42 



035 34 34 E 
035 00 16 
034 24 13 
034 48 07 



Missile Operating Base 

Akhtyrka 
50 21 59 N 034 57 03 E 



40 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister !i 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile ' 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 
Training Missile C 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



9» 



Department of State Bui A 



ARMS CONTROL 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Deployment Area 

Novosibirsk 
55 51 09 N 
55 14 33 
55 21 52 
55 30 29 



083 52 28 E 
083 49 49 
083 08 41 
083 09 09 



Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 
55 22 05 N 083 13 52 E 



Deployment Area 

Novosibirsk 
55 06 17 N 083 34 11 E 

54 57 40 083 33 38 

55 04 53 082 52 45 
55 24 16 082 53 40 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 
55 22 57 N 082 55 16 E 



Deployment Area 

Novosibirsk 
55 31 47 N 
55 13 26 
55 20 01 
55 40 13 



084 08 57 E 

082 56 55 

082 49 41 

084 00 42 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 

55 19 32 N 082 56 18 E 



Deployment Area 

Novosibirsk 
55 08 01 N 083 53 07 E 

54 52 56 083 52 02 

55 11 17 082 56 49 
55 22 00 083 01 07 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 
55 18 44 N 083 01 38 E 



Deployment Area 

Novosibirsk 
55 03 58 N 084 18 27 E 

54 53 12 084 19 10 

55 04 49 082 56 30 
55 22 00 083 01 07 

Missile Operating Base 

Novosibirsk 
55 19 07 N 083 09 59 E 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



February 1988 



41 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Launchers 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Deployment Area 

Drovyanaya 

51 44 02 N 
51 22 28 
51 22 49 
51 44 16 



113 08 33 E 

113 07 32 

112 46 52 

112 54 39 



Missile Operating Base 

Drovyanaya 
51 27 20 N 113 03 42 E 



Deployment Area 

Drovyanaya 
51 37 34 N 
51 22 28 
51 18 39 
51 27 14 



113 08 14 E 

113 07 32 

112 36 23 

112 40 08 



Missile Operating Base 

Drovyanaya 
51 26 10 N 113 02 43 E 



Deployment A rea 

Drovyanaya 
51 24 52 N 
51 20 36 
51 18 54 
51 23 13 



112 53 51 

112 50 13 

112 15 44 

112 15 51 



Missile Operating Base 

Drovyanaya 
51 22 59 N 112 49 55 E 



Deployment Area 

Drovyanaya 

51 26 54 N 113 00 50 E 

51 18 13 113 03 54 

51 18 47 112 26 03 

51 29 39 112 19 29 

Missile Operating Base 

Drovyanaya 
51 20 18 N 113 00 54 E 



Deployment Area 
Drovyanaya 

51 33 19 N 
51 22 32 
51 22 49 
51 33 36 



113 04 35 E 

113 04 05 

112 46 52 

112 47 17 



Missile Operating Base 
Drovyanaya 
51 23 49 N 112 52 13 E 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister !• 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



42 



Department of State Bullfn 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Deployment Area 

Barnaul 

53 54 32 N 084 01 02 E 

53 43 46 084 01 48 

53 35 30 083 43 07 

53 44 16 083 36 24 

Missile Operating Base 

Barnaul 

53 46 08 N 083 57 11 E 



Deployment Area 

Barnaul 

53 29 21 N 

52 58 43 

53 13 47 
53 29 02 



084 31 45 E 
083 47 57 

083 48 56 

084 17 18 



Missile Operating Base 

Barnaul 

53 18 21 N 084 08 47 E 



Deployment Area 

Barnaul 
53.16 38 N 
52 59 32 

52 55 09 

53 16 02 



084 43 16 E 
084 51 20 
084 47 58 
084 14 31 



Missile Operating Base 

Barnaul 
53 13 29 N 084 40 10 E 



Deployment Area 

Barnaul 

53 27 33 N 084 49 55 E 

53 16 42 084 46 52 

53 16 02 084 14 31 

53 26 58 084 21 02 

Missile Operating Base 

Barnaul 

53 18 47 N 084 30 27 E 



Deployment Area 

Kansk 

56 32 14 N 096 12 14 E 

56 15 16 095 34 54 

56 28 30 095 20 13 

56 34 39 095 36 13 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 

56 22 31 N 095 28 35 E 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



Launch Canister 9 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 9 

Training Missile 



i February 1988 



43 



ARMS CONTROL 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Deployment Area 

Kansk 

56 30 47 N 095 12 33 E 

56 19 53 095 19 41 

56 13 45 094 59 58 

56 31 03 094 56 58 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 
56 20 09 N 095 16 34 E 



Deployment A rea 

Kansk 

56 19 29 N 096 20 56 E 

56 08 43 096 21 41 

56 08 17 096 02 24 

56 19 14 095 50 42 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 
56 11 19 N 096 03 13 E 



Deployment Area 
Kansk 

56 14 50 N 096 05 46 E 
55 59 57 096 14 35 

55 59 41 096 03 03 

56 15 00 095 46 30 

Missile Operating Base 

Kansk 
56 02 19 N 096 04 58 E 



(ii) SS-4 

Deployment Area 

Sovetsk 

55 05 33 N 021 52 38 E 

55 03 22 021 56 20 

54 57 04 021 29 58 

55 01 23 021 26 16 

Missile Operating Base 

Sovetsk 
54 59 07 N 021 36 36 E 



Deployment Area 




Gusev 




54 46 02 N 


022 07 07 E 


54 24 14 


022 28 42 


54 20 01 


022 21 10 


54 43 58 


021 55 53 


Missile Operating Base 


Gusev 




54 43 59 N 


022 03 27 E 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



7 
(Launch 
Stand) 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



44 



Department of State Bulla' 



i 



ARMS CONTROL 



Deployment Area 

Malorita 
51 53 50 N 
51 43 09 
51 42 59 
51 53 45 



024 05 39 E 
024 09 49 
023 57 07 
023 57 50 



Missile Operating Base 

Malorita 
51 51 47 N 024 01 55 E 



Deployment Area 
Pinsk 

52 15 03 N 
52 04 09 
52 03 56 
52 14 54 



025 49 43 E 
025 39 30 
025 22 00 
025 35 40 



Missile Operating Base 

Pinsk 

52 10 56 N 025 41 27 E 



Deployment Area 
Vyru 

57 49 33 N 
57 43 05 
57 43 04 
57 49 32 



027 00 00 E 
027 00 00 
026 43 54 
026 43 51 



Missile Operating Base 

Vyru 

57 45 47 N 026 47 13 E 



Deployment Area 

Aluksne 
57 25 51 N 026 56 00 E 
57 21 32 026 56 01 

57 17 12 026 40 06 

57 25 49 026 40 01 

Missile Operating Base 

Aluksne 
57 25 04 N 026 49 46 E 



Deployment Area 

Ostrov 

57 38 21 N 028 20 22 E 
57 21 04 028 23 43 

57 21 14 028 07 47 

57 38 28 028 08 19 

Missile Operating Base 

Ostrov 
57 31 53 N 028 12 19 E 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



5 
(Launch 
Stand) 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



(Launch 
Stand) 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



14 
7 

48 
5 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



13 
6 

47 
6 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



11 
5 

51 
6 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



12 
6 

45 
6 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



12 
7 

48 
6 



Ijebruary 1988 



45 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Deployment Area 

Karmelava 
55 06 12 N 024 22 04 E 
54 57 49 024 33 51 

54 55 00 024 04 05 

55 01 28 024 03 36 

Missile Operating Base 

Karmelava 

55 00 51 N 024 14 16 E 



Deployment Area 

Ukmerge 

55 17 41 N 
55 04 25 
55 08 35 
55 19 43 



024 59 06 E 
024 40 58 
024 33 12 
024 51 26 



Missile Operating Base 

Ukmerge 
55 07 51 N 024 38 36 E 



Deployment Area 

Taurage 
55 18 07 N 
55 09 30 
55 03 10 
55 13 35 



022 30 42 E 
022 30 22 
022 18 52 
022 21 01 



Missile Operating Base 

Taurage 

55 04 58 N 022 19 38 E 



Deployment Area 



Kolomyya 




48 45 01 N 


024 55 59 E 


48 36 23 


024 56 20 


48 36 04 


024 40 04 


48 44 42 


024 39 40 


Missile Operating Base 


Kolomyya 




48 39 32 N 


024 48 04 E 


Deployment Area 




Stryy 




49 19 59 N 


023 58 46 E 


49 11 22 


023 58 29 


49 21 09 


023 31 57 


49 29 46 


023 32 24 



Missile Operating Base 
Stryy 
49 25 23 N 023 34 56 E 



5 
(Launch 
Stand) 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



6 
(Launch 
Stand) 



(Launch 
Stand) 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 



46 



Department of State Bullet 



ARMS CONTROL 



Deployment Area 

Skala-Podol 'skaya 

48 54 37 N 026 17 26 E 

48 48 09 026 17 32 

48 48 02 026 01 12 

48 54 30 026 01 04 

Missile Operating Base 

Skala-Podol 'skaya 

48 51 02 N 026 08 36 E 



Missiles 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



6 Missile Transporter Vehicle 12 

(Launch Missile Erector 6 

Stand) Propellant Tank 46 

Training Missile 5 



2. Non-Deployed 

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for 
each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types 
in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and 
support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for 
agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 



Launchers 



.i) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(i) Pershing II 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Hercules Plant # 1 
Magna, Utah 
40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



Launcher Production Facilities: 

Martin Marietta 

Middle River, Maryland 
39 35 N 076 24 W 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 
Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Redstone Arsenal 
Huntsville, Alabama 
34 36 N 086 38 W 

Weilerbach 

Federal Republic of Germany 

49 27 N 007 38 E 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Redstone Arsenal 
Huntsville, Alabama 
34 35 N 086 37 W 



111 



12 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 

Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 




20 



^bruary 1988 



47 



ARMS CONTROL 










Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








Missile Repair Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 
Pueblo, Colorado 
38 18 N 104 19 W 








Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 


Launcher Repair Facilities: 

EMC Hausen, Frankfurt 
Federal Republic of Germany 

50 08 N 008 38 E 








Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



Redstone Arsenal 
Huntsville, Alabama 
34 37 N 086 38 W 

Ft. Sill 
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 
34 40 N 098 24 W 

Pueblo Depot Activity 
Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Test Ranges: 

Complex 16 
Cape Canaveral, Florida 
28 29 N 080 34 W 

Training Facilities: 

Ft. Sill 
Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 
34 41 N 098 34 W 

Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

(ii) BGM-109C. 

Missile Production Facilities: 

McDonnell-Douglas 
Titusville, Florida 
28 32 N 080 40 W 

General Dynamics 

Kearney Mesa, California 
32 50 N 117 08 W 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Air Force Plant 19 
San Diego, California 
32 45 N 117 12 W 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

NONE 



52 

with launch 

canister 

48 

with launch 

canister 



with launch 
canister 



10 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 

2 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 

Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 



Launch Pad Shelter 
Training Missile Stage 



39 Launch Pad Shelter 

Training Missile Stage 



Training Missile Stage 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 

Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



48 



Department of State Bullet! 



ARMS CONTROL 



Launchers 



Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 
SABCA 
Gosselies, Belgium 

50 27 N 004 27 E 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 



16 

with launch 

canister 



Support Structures and 
Equipment 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



Test Ranges: 

Dugway Proving Grounds 
Utah 
40 22 N 113 04 W 



with launch 
canister 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



Training Facilities: 
Davis-Monthan AFB 

Tucson, Arizona 

32 11 N 110 53 W 

Ft. Huachuca 
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona 
31 29 N 110 19 W 



with launch 
canister 



with launch 
canister 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 

Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



2 

27 



Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 



15 

with launch 

canister 



Training Missile 
Training Launch Canister 



») UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

(i) SS-20 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 



36" 



Launch Canister 36 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 



Launcher Production Facilities: 

Barrikady Plant 
Volgograd 
48 44 N 044 32 E 



Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 



*In various stages of manufacture. 



^ebruary 1988 



49 



ARMS CONTROL 












Missiles 


Launchers 


Support Structures and 
Equipment 


Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 








Missile/Laun 

Postavy 

55 10 N 


cher Storage Facilities: 

026 55 E 


2 


3 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Gezgaly 

53 36 N 


025 28 E 


2 


2 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Mozyr' 
52 03 N 


029 11 E 


2 


2 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Lutsk 
50 53 N 


025 30 E 


1 


1 


Launch Canister 1 
Missile Transporter Vehicle i 
Fixed Structure for Launcher i 
Training Missile '. 


Belokorovich: 

51 09 N 


i 
028 00 E 


2 


2 


Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle ' 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Lebedin 

50 36 N 


034 25 E 


2 


1 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Novosibirsk 

55 16 N 


083 02 E 


1 


1 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Drovyanaya 

51 30 N 


113 03 E 


2 


2 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Kansk 

56 16 N 


095 39 E 


1 


1 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 


Barnaul 
53 34 N 


083 48 E 


1 


1 


Launch Canister 
Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



Kolosovo 
53 31 N 026 55 E 



Zherebkovo 

47 51 N 029 54 E 



144 



20 



Launch Canister 1- 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 

Launch Canister 1 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Fixed Structure for Launcher 
Training Missile 



50 



Department of State Bulleli 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 



Support Slruclures and 
Kquipmcnl 



Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 

Bataysk 

47 08 N 039 47 E 



Test Ranges: 

Kapustin Yar 

48 37 N 046 18 E 



Training Facilities: 

Serpukhov 

54 54 N 037 28 E 



Krasnodar 

45 03 N 038 58 E 



Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar 

48 38 N 046 10 E 



Elimination Facilities: 

Sarny 
51 21 N 026 35 E 



Aral'sk 

46 50 N 61 18 E 



Chita 
52 22 N 113 17 E 



Kansk 
56 20 N 095 06 E 



Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit: 

NONE 

(ii) SS-4 

Missile Production Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 
NONE 



29 



68 



Launch Canister 2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 4 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 2 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 3 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 1 

Training Missile 

Launch Canister 4 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 4 

Launch Canister 2 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 2 

Launch Canister 12 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 3 

Training Missile 12 

Launch Canister 32 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 35 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 3 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 

Launch Canister 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Fixed Structure for Launcher 

Training Missile 



ijjebruary 1988 



51 



ARMS CONTROL 










Mi.ssilvs 


l.aunthers 


Support StruclureM and 
Kquipment 


Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Kolosovo 
53 31 N 026 55 E 


35 


1 

(Launch 
Stand) 


Missile Transporter Vehicle ' 
Missile Erector ' 
Propellant Tank i 
Training Missile 


Zherebkovo 

47 51 N 029 54 E 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

Bataysk 

47 08 N 039 47 E 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 


56 



3 
(Launch 
Stand) 


(Launch 
Stand) 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle < 
Missile Erector ) 
Propellant Tank 1 
Training Missile i 


Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 








Test Ranges: 
Kapustin Yar 

48 35 N 046 18 E 

Training Facilities: 
NONE 


14 


2 
(Launch 

Stand) 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 
Missile Erector I 
Propellant Tank 
Training Missile 


Elimination Facilities: 








Lesnaya 

52 59 N 025 46 E 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit- 

NONE 






(Launch 
Stand) 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Missile Erector 

Propellant Tank ] 
Training Missile 3 


(iii)SS-5 








Missile Production Facilities: 
NONE 








Launcher Production Facilities: 
NONE 








Missile Storage Facilities: 

Kolosovo 
53 31 N 026 55 E 


6 







Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 








52 






Department of State Bulle 



ARMS CONTROL 



... ., , , Support Structures and 

Missiles Launchers *'■' Equipment 



Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Test Ranges: 
NONE 

Training Facilities: 
NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

Lesnaya 
52 59 N 025 46 E 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 

Transit: 
NONE 



3. Training Launchers 

In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, 
the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate- 
range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be 
training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is: 

(a) for the United States of America— 29; and 

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics— 65. 

Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures 
set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. 



f February 1988 



53 



ARMS CONTROL 






IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and 
Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and 
Launchers 




1. Deployed 

The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, 
for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in 
Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support 
equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include 
boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 




Missiles Launchers 


Support Equipment 


(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 




(i) Pershing lA 




Missile Operating Base: 
NONE 




(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 




Se 


(i)SS-12 






Missile Operating Bases: 

Koenigsbrueck 19 11 
German Democratic Republic 
51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 




Bischofswerda 8 5 
German Democratic Republic 
51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 




Waren 22 12 
German Democratic Republic 
53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


P 


Wokuhl 5 6 
German Democratic Republic 
53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


Hranice 39 24 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


Pashino 4 

55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 1 
Training Missile 1 




Gornyy 36 14 

51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle n 
Training Missile 


Lapichi 9 5 

53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


Kattakurgan 9 5 

39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


Saryozek 36 15 

44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


Novosysoyevka 37 14 
44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


54 


Department of State Bullet! 





ARMS CONTROL 



(ii) SS-23 

}fissile Operating Bases: 

Weissenfels 
German Democratic Republic 
51 11 50 N Oil 59 50 E 



Jena-Forst 
German Democratic Republic 

50 54 55 N Oil 32 40 E 


Stan'kovo 

53 38 30 N 


027 13 20 E 


Tsel' 

53 23 38 N 


028 28 06 E 


Slobudka 

52 30 30 N 


024 31 30 E 


Bayram-Ali 

37 36 18 N 


062 10 40 E 


Semipalatinsk 
50 23 00 N 


080 09 30 E 



47 



12 



40 


18 


26 


12 


26 


12 





12 


22 


12 



Support Equipment 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 

Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



2. Non-Deployed 

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for 
each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in 
Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile 
support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to 
this Memorandum of Understanding. 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(i) Pershing lA 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant 
Marshall, Texas 
32 39 N 094 08 W 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Martin Marietta 
Middle River, Maryland 
39 35 N 076 24 W 

Missile Storage Facilities: 
Pueblo Depot Activity 

Pueblo, Colorado 

38 19 N 104 20 W 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 



169 



Support Equipment 



Training Missile Stage 



Training Missile Stage 



Training Missile Stage 53 



-ebruarv 1P88 



55 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Support Equipment 



Launcher Repair Facilities: 

Pueblo Depot Activity 
Pueblo, Colorado 
38 19 N 104 20 W 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 



Training Missile Stage 



Test Ranges: 
NONE 

Training Facilities: 

NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

(Not determined) 



Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit- 



Training Missile Stage 



(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

(i)SS-12 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Barrikady Plant 
Volgograd 
48 44 N 044 32 E 

Missile Storage Facilities: 

Lozovaya 
48 55 N 036 22 E 

Ladushkin 

54 35 N 020 12 E 

Bronnaya Gora 
52 37 N 025 04 E 

Balkhash 
4ti 50 N 075 36 E 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Berezovka 

50 20 N 028 26 E 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 



15 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



126 





Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


72 





Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


170 





Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


138 





Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



56 



Department of State Build 



ARMS CONTROL 



Launchers 



Support Equipment 



Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 



Saratov 

51 34 N 


046 01 E 









3 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


2 



Kazan' 

55 58 N 


049 11 E 









2 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 


2 



Kamenka 

53 11 N 


044 04 E 












Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 






Elimination Facilities: 

Saryozek (Missiles) 
44 32 N 077 46 E 












Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 






Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missi 
Vehicles) 
53 38 N 027 13 E 


e Transporter 








Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 






Missiles, Launchers, and 

Transit- 
NONE 


Support Equipment in 











(ii) SS-23 

Missile Production Facilities: 

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant 
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR 
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Launcher Production Facilities: 

V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building 
Plant 

Petropavlovsk 
54 51 N 069 09 E 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Missile Storage Facilities: 

Ladushkin 
54 35 N 020 12 E 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 

Training Missile 42 



Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Berezovka 

50 20 N 028 26 E 



13 



Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Test Ranges: 
NONE 



i'ehni3rv IQftfl 



57 



ARMS CONTROL 



Training Facilities: 

Saratov 
51 34 N 046 01 E 

Kazan' 

55 58 N 

Kamenka 

53 11 N 



049 11 E 



044 04 E 



Elimination Facilities: 

Saryozek (Missiles) 
44 32 N 077 46 E 

Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter 
Vehicles) 
53 38 N 027 13 E 



lies 


l.aunihers 


Support Kquipnu'iil 





3 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 





3 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 





1 


Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 








Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 








Missile Transporter Vehicle 
Training Missile 



Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 
Transit 

NONE 



V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry 
into Force of the Treaty 

The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, 
for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers 
of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but 
were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed 
missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are 
appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 



Launchers 



Support Equipment 



(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

(i) Pershing IB 

Missile Production Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 



58 



Department of State Bull 



i 



ARMS CONTROL 



Missiles 



Support Equipment 



Test Ranges: 
NONE 

Training Facilities: 
NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 
NONE 

Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 

Transit: 
NONE 

) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

(i) SSC-X-4 

Missile Production Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Production Facilities: 

Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated Produc- 
tion Works "M. I. Kalinin Machine Building 
Plant" 
Sverdlovsk 
56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E 

Missile Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Storage Facilities: 
NONE 

Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities: 

Jelgava 
56 40 N 024 06 E 



Missile Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Launcher Repair Facilities: 

NONE 

Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities: 
NONE 

Test Ranges: 

NONE 

Training Facilities: 
NONE 

Elimination Facilities: 

Jelgava 

56 40 N 024 06 E 



Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in 

Transit: 
NONE 





with 

launch 

canister 



84 

with 

launch 

canister 





with 
launch 
canister 



■ebruarv 1988 



59 



ARMS CONTROL 



VI. Technical Data 

Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers 
subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. 
Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment 
listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding. 



1. Intermediate-Range Missiles 

(a) Missile Characteristics: 

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile 

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters) 

(iii) Length of 

1st stage (meters) 
2nd stage (meters) 

(iv) Maximum diameter of 
1st stage (meters) 
2nd stage (meters) 

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front 
section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty 
weight) 

1st stage 

2nd stage 

Missile in canister 

(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons 
(with fuel) 
In canister 
Without canister 

(b) Launcher Characteristics: 

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in 
meters) 



(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is 
capable of carrying or containing at 
one time 

(iii) Weight (in metric tons) 

(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maxi- 
mum length, width, height in meters): 

(i) Fixed structure for a launcher 



(ii) Launch pad shelter 



(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated 
With Such Missiles and Launchers 

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (max- 
imum length, width, height in meters): 

(i) Launch canister 
(Diameter) 



P-II 


BGM-109G 


SS-20 


SS-4 


SS-5 


1 


1 


3 


1 


1 


10.61 


6.40 


16.49 


22.77 


24.30 


3.68 


_ 


8.58 


18.60 


21.62 


2.47 


— 


4.60 


— 


— 


_ 


0.53 


_ 


1.65 


2.40 


1.02 


— 


1.79 


— 


— 


1.02 


— 


1.47 


— 


— 


6.78 






3.35 


4.99 


4.15 


— 


26.63 


— 


— 


2.63 


— 


8.63 


— 


— 



74.00 
14.60 
10.00 



27.70 
9.07 
6.82 



0.,' 



— 


1.71 


— 


— 


— 


2 . 


~ 


1.47 


" 






i; 


9.60 


10.64 


16.81 


3.02 




12.^ 


2.49 


2.44 


3.20 


3.02 


— 


3.( 


2.86 


2.64 


2.94 


3.27 


— 


3.,^ 


1 


4 


1 


1 





6 


12.04 


14.30 


40.25 


6.90 


_ 


29.1 



6.94 
0.53 



19.32 

2.14 



8.3!l 
0.6)1 



60 



Department of State Bulle^ 



ARMS CONTROL 



(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles 
per vehicle) 



(iii) Missile erector 



(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable) 
Fuel 

Oxidizer 



jBhorter-Range Missiles 

ta) Missile Characteristics: 

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile 

(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters) 

(iii) Length of 

1st stage (meters) 
2nd stage (meters) 

(iv) Maximum diameter of 
1st stage (meters) 
'2nd stage (meters) 

(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front 
section) 
1st stage 
2nd stage 

(b) Launcher Characteristics: 

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in 
meters) 

(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is 
capable of carrying or containing at one time 

(iii) Weight (in metric tons) 

1(c) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With 
Such Missiles and Launchers: 

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maxi- 
mum length, width, height in meters): 
Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per 
vehicle) 



II BGM-109(; 


SS-20 


SS-4 


SS-5 


SSC-X-4 


- 


- 


17.33 
3.20 
2.90 

(1) 


22.85 

2.72 

2.50 

(1) 


- 


- 


- 


— 




15.62 
3.15 
3.76 


' 




- 


— 


- 


11.38 
2.63 
2.96 

10.70 
2.63 
3.35 


- 


- 


Pershing 


lA 


Pershing IB 




SS-12 


SS-23 


1 




1 




1 


1 


10.55 




8.13 




12.38 


7.52 


2.83 
2.67 




3.68 




4.38 
5.37 


5.17 


1.02 
1.02 




1.02 




1.01 
1.01 


0.97 


4.09 
2.45 
1.64 




4.15 




8.80 
4.16 
4.64 


3.99 


9.98 
2.44 
3.35 




9.60 
2.49 
2.86 




13.26 
3.10 
3.45 


11.76 
3,13 
3.00 


1 




1 




1 


1 


8.53 




12.04 




30.80 


24.07 



13.15 
3.10 
3.50 

(1) 



11.80 
3.13 
3.00 

(1) 



February 1988 



61 



ARMS CONTROL 



VII. Research and Development Booster Systems 

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research 
and development booster systems. 



1. Research and Development Launch Sites 

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Eastern Test Range, Florida 
28 27 N 080 42 W 

Eglin AFB, Florida 
30 36 N 086 48 W 

White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 
32 30 N 106 30 W 

Green River, Utah 
38 00 N 109 30 W 

Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska 
65 07 N 147 29 W 

Roi Namur, Kwajalein 
09 25 N 167 28 E 

Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii 
22 06 N 159 47 W 

Western Test Range, California 
34 37 N 120 37 W 

Cape Cod, Massachusetts 
42 01 N 070 07 W 



Wake Island 

19 18 N 



166 37 E 



Wallops Island, Virginia 
37 51 N 075 28 W 

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 



Plesetskaya 

62 53 N 



040 52 E 



Number of 
Launchers 



Kapustin Yar 

48 32 N 046 18 E 



62 



Department of State Bullen 



ARMS CONTROL 



Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it 
is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this 
Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data 
and inclusion of the data contained herein. 

This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It 
shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall 
remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. 



DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 



FOR THE UNITED STATES OF FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
AMERICA SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

Ronald Reagan M. Gorbachev 

President of the United States General Secretary of the 

of America Central Committee of the CPSU 



k 



63 



ARMS CONTROL 



Protocol 

on Procedures Governing the Elimination of 

the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty Between 

the United States of America and 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 

Shorter-Range Missiles 



iile 



Pursuant to and in implementation of 
the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 
1987, hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon 
procedures governing the elimination 
of the missile systems subject to the 
Treaty. 

I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to 
Elimination 

The specific items for each type of 
missile system to be eliminated are: 

1. For the United States of 
America: 

Pershing II: missile, launcher 
and launch pad shelter; 

BGM-109G: missile, launch 
canister and launcher; 

Pershing lA: missile and 
launcher; and 

Pershing IB: missile. 

2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: 

SS-20: missile, launch canister, 
launcher, missile transporter vehicle 
and fixed structure for a launcher; 

SS-4: missile, missile transportei 
vehicle, missile erector, launch stand 
and propellant tanks; 

SS-5: missile; 

SSC-X-4: missile, launch 
canister and launcher; 

SS-12: missile, launcher and 
missile transporter vehicle; and 

SS-23: missile, launcher and 
missile transporter vehicle. 

3. For both Parties, all training 
missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training 
launchers shall be subject to 
elimination. 



4. For both Parties, all stages of 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
GLBMs shall be subject to elimination. 

5. For both Parties, all front 
sections of deployed intermediate-range 
and shorter-range missiles shall be 
subject to elimination. 



II. Procedures for Elimination at 
Elimination Facilities 

1. In order to ensure the reliable 
determination of the type and number 
of missiles, missile stages, front 
sections, launch canisters, launchers, 
missile transporter vehicles, missile 
erectors and launch stands, as well as 
training missiles, training missile 
stages, training launch canisters and 
training launchers, indicated in Section 
I of this Protocol, being eliminated at 
elimination facilities, and to preclude 
the possibility of restoration of such 
items for purposes inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Treaty, the 
Parties shall fulfill the requirements 
below. 

2. The conduct of the elimination 
procedures for the items of missile 
systems listed in paragraph 1 of this 
Section, except for training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers, shall 
be subject to on-site inspection in 
accordance with Article XI of the 
Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. 
The Parties shall have the right to 
conduct on-site inspections to confirm 
the completion of the elimination 
procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
this Section for training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers. The 
Party possessing such a training 
missile, training missile stage, training 
launch canister or training launcher 
shall inform the other Party of the 



name and coordinates of the 
elimination facility at which the on-si 
inspection may be conducted as well 
the date on which it may be conduct,! 
Such information shall be provided rr 
less than 30 days in advance of that 
date. 

3. Prior to a missile's arrival at 
elimination facility, its nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elemeir 
may be removed. 

4. Each Party shall select the 
particular technological means 
necessary to implement the procedu i 
required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of 
this Section and to allow for on-site 
inspection of the conduct of the 
elimination procedures required in 
paragraph 10 of this Section in 
accordance with Article XI of the 
Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocft 
on Inspection. 

5. The initiation of the eliminativ 
of the items of missile systems subje^ 
to this Section shall be considered tOi 
the commencement of the procedures 
set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of thii 
Section. 

6. Immediately prior to the 
initiation of the elimination procedu: 
set forth in paragraph 10 of this 
Section, an inspector from the Party 
receiving the pertinent notification 
required by paragraph 5(c) of Article 
IX of the Treaty shall confirm and 
record the type and number of items 
missile systems, listed in paragraph : 
of this Section, which are to be 
eliminated. If the inspecting Party 
deems it necessary, this shall include 
visual inspection of the contents of 
launch canisters. 

7. A missile stage being eliminafc 
by burning in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 10 
this Section shall not be instruments 
for data collection. Prior to the 



64 



rionartmont r,f QtQto Ri 



i 



ARMS CONTROL 



itiation of the elimination procedures 
t forth in paragraph 10 of this 
■ction, an inspector from the 
specting Party shall confirm that 
oh missile stages are not 
strumented for data collection. Those 
issile stages shall be subject to 
ntinuous observation by such an 
spector from the time of that 
spection until the burning is 
mpleted. 

8. The completion of the 
imination procedures set forth in this 
BCtion, except those for training 
Ussiles, training missile stages, 
■aining launch canisters and training 
unchers, along with the type and 
imber of items of missile systems for 
iiich those procedures have been 
mpleted, shall be confirmed in 
riting by the representative of the 
irty carrying out the elimination and 
■ the inspection team leader of the 
her Party. The elimination of a 
aining missile, training missile stage, 
aining launch canister or training 
uncher shall be considered to have 
«n completed upon completion of the 
•ocedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
lis Section and notification as 
•quired by paragraph 5(e) of Article 
; of the Treaty following the date 
lecified pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
lis Section. 

9. The Parties agree that all 
nited States and Soviet intermediate- 
inge and shorter-range missiles and 
leir associated reentry vehicles shall 
; eliminated within an agreed overall 
iriod of elimination. It is further 
p-eed that all such missiles shall, in 
ict, be eliminated fifteen days prior to 
' le end of the overall period of 
imination. During the last fifteen 
I ays, a Party shall withdraw to its 
r| ational territory reentry vehicles 
I hich, by unilateral decision, have 
een released from existing programs 
f cooperation and eliminate them 
uring the same timeframe in 
ccordance with the procedures set 
)rth in this Section. 

10. The specific procedures for the 
limination of the items of missile 
ystems listed in paragraph 1 of this 
■action shall be as follows, unless the 
'arties agree upon different procedures 
achieve the same result as the 
lie irocedures identified in this paragraph: 



For the Pershing II: 
Missile: 

(a) missile stages shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 

(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 

For the BGM-109G: 

Missile: 

(a) missile airframe shall be 
cut longitudinally into two pieces; 

(b) wings and tail section shall 
be severed from missile airframe at 
locations that are not assembly joints; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device t-nd guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size or destroyed by explosion. 

Launcher: 

(al erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 



(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 

For the Pershing lA: 

Missile: 

(a) missile stages shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; and 

(d) launcher chassis shall be 
cut at a location that is not an 
assembly joint into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 



For the Pershing IB: 
Missile: 

(a) missile stage shall be 
eliminated by explosive demolition or 
burning; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and 
motor case not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device and guidance elements, 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

For the SS-20: 

Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminated 
by explosive demolition of the missile 
in its launch canister or by burning 
missile stages; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in this 
process shall be burned, crushed, 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; 
and 



I 



65 



ARMS CONTROL 



(c) front section, including 
reentry vehicles, minus nuclear 
warhead devices, and instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be destroyed by explosive 
demolition together with a missile, or 
shall be destroyed separately by 
explosion, cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size, crushed or 
flattened. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, shall 
be removed from launcher chassis; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the launcher 
chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, 
shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
with missile loading and mounting 
shall be removed from transporter 
vehicle chassis; 

(b) all mountings of such 
mechanisms shall be cut off 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(c) all components of the 
mechanisms associated with missile 
loading and mounting shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(d) external instrumentation 
compartments shall be removed from 
transporter vehicle chassis; 

(e) transporter vehicle leveling 
supports shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle chassis and cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two 
pieces of approximately equal size; and 



(f) a portion of the transporter 
vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in 
length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle. 

For the SS-4: 

Missile: 

(a) nozzles of propulsion 
system shall be cut off at locations that 
are not assembly joints; 

(b) all propellant tanks shall 
be cut into two pieces of approximately 
equal size; 

(c) instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(d) front section, minus 
nuclear warhead device, shall be 
crushed or flattened. 

Launch Stand: launch stand 
components shall be cut at locations 
that are not assembly joints into two 
pieces of approximately equal size. 

Missile Erector: 

(al jib, missile erector leveling 
supports and missile erector 
mechanism shall be cut off missile 
erector at locations that are not 
assembly joints; and 

(b) jib and missile erector 
leveling supports shall be cut into two 
pieces of approximately equal size. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

mounting components for a missile and 
for a missile erector mechanism as well 
as supports for erecting a missile onto 
a launcher shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle at locations that are not 
assembly joints. 

For the SS-5: 

Missile: 

(a) nozzles of propulsion 
system shall be cut off at locations that 
are not assembly joints; 

(b) all propellant tanks shall 
be cut into two pieces of approximately 
equal size; and 

(c) instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size. 



For the SSC-X-4: 
Missile: 

(a) missile airframe shall be 
cut longitudinally into two pieces; 

(b) wings and tail section sh 
be severed from missile airframe at 
locations that are not assembly joint 
and 

(c) front section, minus nuclju 
warhead device and guidance elemei^. 
shall be crushed or flattened. 

Launch Canister: launch 
canister shall be crushed, flattened, it 
into two pieces of approximately eqi I 
size or destroyed by explosion. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher chassis; 

(b) all components of erecto 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly join 
into two pieces of approximately eqi I 
size; 

(cl missile launch support 
equipment, including external 
instrumentation compartments, sha 
be removed from launcher chassis; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling suppoi 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(f) the launcher chassis sha) 
be severed at a location determined ' 
measuring no more than 0.70 metert 
rearward from the rear axle. 

For the SS-12: 

Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminatii 
by explosive demolition or by burnini 
missile stages; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles 
and motor cases not destroyed in thi 
process shall be burned, crushed, r 
flattened or destroyed by explosion; I 
and I 

(c) front section, minus nucljir 
warhead device, and instrumentatior 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed, flattened' 
destroyed by explosive demolition 
together with a missile. 



|i(l 



66 



nQnarfmQi-it o< C(-^t^ Dull, 



ARMS CONTROL 



Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
echanism shall be removed from 
lUncher chassis; 

(b) all components of erector- 
uncher mechanism shall be cut at 
cations that are not assembly joints 
to two pieces of approximately equal 
le; 

(cl missile launch support 
[uipment, including external 
■strumentation compartments, shall 
'. removed from launcher chassis; 

(dl mountings of erector- 
uncher mechanism and launcher 
veling supports shall be cut off 
uncher chassis; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
tail be cut at locations that are not 
»sembly joints into two pieces of 
jproximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the launcher 
lassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, 
all be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
ith missile loading and mounting 

i tail be removed from transporter 
ihicle chassis; 

(b) all mountings of such 
echanisms shall be cut off 
ansporter vehicle chassis; 

' (c) all components of the 

! echanisms associated with missile 
ading and mounting shall be cut at 
cations that are not assembly joints 

I .to two pieces of approximately equal 
: ze; 

)] (d) external instrumentation 

i )mpartments shall be removed from 

II 'ansporter vehicle chassis; 

Ij (e) transporter vehicle leveling 

' apports shall be cut off transporter 
shicle chassis and cut at locations 
lat are not assembly joints into two 
'ieces of approximately equal size; and 
(f) a portion of the transporter 
ehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in 
ength, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
ixle. 

For the SS-23: 

I Missile: 

(a) missile shall be eliminated 
y explosive demolition or by burning 
he missile stage; 

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and 
actor case not destroyed in this 
'irocess shall be burned, crushed, 
lattened or destroyed by explosion; 

ind 



(c) front section, minus nuclear 
warhead device, and instrumentation 
compartment, minus guidance 
elements, shall be crushed, flattened, 
or destroyed by explosive demolition 
together with a missile. 

Launcher: 

(a) erector-launcher 
mechanism shall be removed from 
launcher body; 

(b) all components of erector- 
launcher mechanism shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(c) missile launch support 
equipment shall be removed from 
launcher body; 

(d) mountings of erector- 
launcher mechanism and launcher 
leveling supports shall be cut off 
launcher body; 

(e) launcher leveling supports 
shall be cut at locations that are not 
assembly joints into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; 

(f) each environmental cover of 
the launcher body shall be removed 
and cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size; and 

(g) a portion of the launcher 
body, at least 0.85 meters in length, 
shall be cut off aft of the rear axle. 

Missile Transporter Vehicle: 

(a) all mechanisms associated 
with missile loading and mounting 
shall be removed from transporter 
vehicle body; 

(b) all mountings of such 
mechanisms shall be cut off 
transporter vehicle body; 

(c) all components of 
mechanisms associated with missile 
loading and mounting shall be cut at 
locations that are not assembly joints 
into two pieces of approximately equal 
size; 

(d) control equipment of the 
mechanism associated with missile 
loading shall be removed from 
transporter vehicle body; 

(e) transporter vehicle leveling 
supports shall be cut off transporter 
vehicle body and cut at locations that 
are not assembly joints into two pieces 
of approximately equal size; and 

(f) a portion of the transporter 
vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in 
length, shall be cut off aft of the rear 
axle. 



11. The specific procedures for the 
elimination of the training missiles, 
training missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers 
indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section 
shall be as follows: 

Training Missile and Training 
Missile Stage: training missile and 
training missile stage shall be crushed, 
flattened, cut into two pieces of 
approximately equal size or destroyed 
by explosion. 

Training Launch Canister: 

training launch canister shall be 
crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces 
of approximately equal size or 
destroyed by explosion. 

Training Launcher: training 
launcher chassis shall be cut at the 
same location designated in paragraph 
10 of this Section for launcher of the 
same type of missile. 

in. Elimination of Missiles by Means 
of Launching 

1. Elimination of missiles by means of 
launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of 
Article X of the Treaty shall be subject 
to on-site inspection in accordance with 
paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty 
and the Protocol on Inspection. 
Immediately prior to each launch 
conducted for the purpose of 
elimination, an inspector from the 
inspecting Party shall confirm by 
visual observation the type of the 
missile to be launched. 

2. All missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching shall be launched 
from designated elimination facilities 
to existing impact areas for such 
missiles. No such missile shall be used 
as a target vehicle for a ballistic 
missile interceptor. 

3. Missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching shall be launched 
one at a time, and no less than six 
hours shall elapse between such 
launches. 

4. Such launches shall involve 
ignition of all missile stages. Neither 
Party shall transmit or recover data 
from missiles being eliminated by 
means of launching except for 
unencrypted data used for range safety 
purposes. 



•ehriiaru IPfift 



67 



ARMS CONTROL 



5. The completion of the 
elimination procedures set forth in this 
Section, and the type and number of 
missiles for which those procedures 
have been completed, shall be 
confirmed in writing by the 
representative of the Party carrying 
out the elimination and by the 
inspection team leader of the other 
Party. 

6. A missile shall be considered to 
be eliminated by means of launching 
after completion of the procedures set 
forth in this Section and upon 
notification required by paragraph 5(e) 
of Article IX of the Treaty. 

IV. Procedures for Elimination In Situ 

1. Support Structures 

(a) Support structures listed in 
Section I of this Protocol shall be 
eliminated in situ. 

(bl The initiation of the 
elimination of support structures shall 
be considered to be the commencement 
of the elimination procedures required 
in paragraph 1(d) of this Section. 

(c) The elimination of support 
structures shall be subject to 
verification by on-site inspection in 
accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 
XI of the Treaty. 

(d) The specific elimination 
procedures for support structures shall 
be as follows: 

(i) the superstructure of the 
fixed structure or shelter shall be 
dismantled or demolished, and removed 
from its base or foundation; 

(ii) the base or foundation of 
the fixed structure or shelter shall be 
destroyed by excavation or explosion; 

(iii) the destroyed base or 
foundation of a fixed structure or 
shelter shall remain visible to national 
technical means of verification for six 
months or until completion of an on- 
site inspection conducted in accordance 
with Article XI of the Treaty; and 

(iv) upon completion of the 
above requirements, the elimination 
procedures shall be considered to have 
been completed. 

2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 
Missiles 

Fixed and transportable propellant 
tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be 
removed from launch sites. 



3. Training Missiles, Training 
Missile Stages, Training Launch 
Canisters and Training Launchers 

(a) Training missiles, training 
missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers not 
eliminated at elimination facilities 
shall be eliminated in situ. 

(b) Training missiles, training 
missile stages, training launch 
canisters and training launchers being 
eliminated in situ shall be eliminated 
in accordance with the specific 
procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of 
Section II of this Protocol. 

(c) Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct an on-site inspection to 
confirm the completion of the 
elimination procedures for training 
missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training 
launchers. 

(d) The Party possessing such a 
training missile, training missile stage, 
training launch canister or training 
launcher shall inform the other Party 
of the place-name and coordinates of 
the location at which the on-site 
inspection provided for in paragraph 
3(c) of this Section may be conducted as 
well as the date on which it may be 
conducted. Such information shall be 
provided no less than 30 days in 
advance of that date. 

(e) Elimination of a training 
missile, training missile stage, training 
launch canister or training launcher 
shall be considered to have been 
completed upon the completion of the 
procedures required by this paragraph 
and upon notification as required by 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the 
Treaty following the date specified 
pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this 
Section. 



V. Other Types of Elimination 

1. Loss or Accidental Destruction 

(a) If an item listed in Section I 
of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a 
result of an accident, the possessing 
Party shall notify the other Party 
within 48 hours, as required in 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the 
Treaty, that the item has been 
eliminated. 

(b) Such notification shall 
include the type of the eliminated item. 



its approximate or assumed location 
and the circumstances related to tht 
loss or accidental destruction. 

(c) In such a case, the other 
Party shall have the right to conduci 
an inspection of the specific point aXm^ 
which the accident occurred to provp 
confidence that the item has been 
eliminated. 



2. Static Display 

(a) The Parties shall have the 
right to eliminate missiles, launch 
canisters and launchers, as well as 
training missiles, training launch 
canisters and training launchers, lis 
in Section I of this Protocol by placi 
them on static display. Each Party 
shall be limited to a total of 15 
missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 
launchers on such static display. 

(b) Prior to being placed on st 
display, a missile, launch canister o 
launcher shall be rendered unusabli 
for purposes inconsistent with the 
Treaty. Missile propellant shall be 
removed and erector-launcher 
mechanisms shall be rendered 
inoperative. 

(c) The Party possessing a 
missile, launch canister or launcher 
well as a training missile, training 
launch canister or training launche 
that is to be eliminated by placing i 
static display shall provide the othe 
Party with the place-name and 
coordinates of the location at which 
such a missile, launch canister or 
launcher is to be on static display, a 
well as the location at which the on 
site inspection provided for in 
paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may 
take place. 

(d) Each Party shall have the 
right to conduct an on-site inspectioi 
such a missile, launch canister or 
launcher within 60 days of receipt o: 
the notification required in paragra] 
2(c) of this Section. 

(e) Elimination of a missile, 
launch canister or launcher, as well 
a training missile, training launch 
canister or training launcher, by 
placing it on static display shall be 
considered to have been completed 
upon completion of the procedures 
required by this paragraph and 
notification as required by paragrapi 
5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. 



68 



Department of State Bulltw 



ARMS CONTROL 



This Protocol is an integral part of 
e Treaty. It shall enter into force on 
e date of the entry into force of the 
eaty and shall remain in force so 
ig as the Treaty remains in force. As 
ovided for in paragraph Kb) of 
tide XIII of the Treaty, the Parties 
ay agree upon such measures as may 
necessary to improve the viability 



and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such 
measures shall not be deemed 
amendments to the Treaty. 



DONE at Washington on 
December 8, 1987, in two copies, each 
in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 



FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 



FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 



Ronald Reagan 



M. Gorbachev 



President of the United States 
of America 



General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 



igbruary 1988 



69 



ARMS CONTROL 



Protocol 

Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty 

Between the United States of America and the 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 

Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 

Shorter-Range Missiles 






Pursuant to and in implementation of 
the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 
1987, hereinafter referred to as the 
Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon 
procedures governing the conduct of 
inspections provided for in Article XI 
of the Treaty. 

I. Definitions 

For the purposes of this Protocol, the 
Treaty, the Memorandum of 
Understanding and the Protocol on 
Elimination: 

1. The term "inspected Party" 
means the Party to the Treaty whose 
sites are subject to inspection as 
provided for by Article XI of the 
Treaty. 

2. The term "inspecting Party" 
means the Party to the Treaty carrying 
out an inspection. 

3. The term "inspector" means an 
individual designated by one of the 
Parties to carry out inspections and 
included on that Party's list of 
inspectors in accordance with the 
provisions of Section III of this 
Protocol. 

4. The term "inspection team" 
means the group of inspectors assigned 
by the inspecting Party to conduct a 
particular inspection. 

5. The term "inspection site" 
means an area, location or facility at 
which an inspection is carried out. 

6. The term "period of inspection" 
means the period of time from arrival 
of the inspection team at the inspection 
site until its departure from the 
inspection site, exclusive of time spent 
on any pre- and post-inspection 
procedures. 



7. The term "point of entry" 
means: Washington, D.C., or San 
Francisco, California, the United States 
of America; Brussels (National 
Airport), The Kingdom of Belgium; 
Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbasel, The 
Federal Republic of Germany; Rome 
(Ciampinol, The Republic of Italy; 
Schiphol, The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or 
Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the 
German Democratic Republic; and 
International Airport Ruzyne, the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 

8. The term "in-country period" 
means the period from the arrival of 
the inspection team at the point of 
entry until its departure from the 
country through the point of entry. 

9. The term "in-country escort" 
means individuals specified by the 
inspected Party to accompany and 
assist inspectors and aircrew members 
as necessary throughout the in-country 
period. 

10. The term "aircrew member" 
means an individual who performs 
duties related to the operation of an 
airplane and who is included on a 
Party's list of aircrew members in 
accordance with the provisions of 
Section III of this Protocol. 

II. General Obligations 

1. For the purpose of ensuring 
verification of compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty, each Party 
shall facilitate inspection by the other 
Party pursuant to this Protocol. 

2. Each Party takes note of the 
assurances received from the other 
Party regarding understandings 
reached between the other Party and 
the basing countries to the effect that 



the basing countries have agreed to II 
conduct of inspections, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, u 
their territories. 
III. Pre-Inspection Requirements 

1. Inspections to ensure verification v 
compliance by the Parties with the 
obligations assumed under the Treatt 
shall be carried out by inspectors 
designated in accordance with 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section. 

2. No later than one day after 
entry into force of the Treaty, each 
Party shall provide to the other Partt 
a list of its proposed aircrew membeir 
a list of its proposed inspectors who 
will carry out inspections pursuant ti 
paragraphs 3, 4, .5, 7 and 8 of Article' 
of the Treaty; and a list of its proposi 
inspectors who will carry out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty. None of these lists shall 
contain at any time more than 200 
individuals. 

3. Each Party shall review the lit 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
proposed by the other Party. With 
respect to an individual included on 
the list of proposed inspectors who w 
carry out inspection activities pursua 
to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty, if such an individual is 
unacceptable to the Party reviewing 
the list, that Party shall, within 20 
days, so inform the Party providing t " t; 
list, and the individual shall be deem I 
not accepted and shall be deleted froi| 
the list. With respect to an individua.l 
on the list of proposed aircrew P 
members or the list of proposed 
inspectors who will carry out 
inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3 

4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Trea 
each Party, within 20 days after the 
receipt of such lists, shall inform the 
other Party of its agreement to the 



70 



Department of State Built r 



ARMS CONTROL 



|esignation of each inspector and 
ircrew member proposed. Inspectors 
hall be citizens of the inspecting 
'arty. 

4 Each Party shall have the right 
3 amend its lists of inspectors and 
ircrew members. New inspectors and 
ircrew members shall be designated in 
!ie same manner as set forth in 
aragraph 3 of this Section with 
sspect to initial lists. 

."i. Within 30 days of receipt of the 
litial lists of inspectors and aircrew 
, lembers, or of subsequent changes 
lereto, the Party receiving such 
.iformation shall provide, or shall 
Qsure the provision of, such visas and 
ther documents to each individual to 
•hom it has agreed as may be required 
) ensure that each inspector or 
ircrew member may enter and remain 
1 the territory of the Party or basing 
)untry in which an inspection site is 
: )cated throughout the in-country 
eriod for the purpose of carrying out 
j ispection activities in accordance with 
i 18 provisions of this Protocol. Such 
jf isas and documents shall be valid for 
i period of at least 24 months. 
j 6. To exercise their functions 
I ffectively, inspectors and aircrew 
I lembers shall be accorded, throughout 
i le in-country period, privileges and 

nmunities in the country of the 
j, ispection site as set forth in the 
Lnnex to this Protocol. 
[ 7. Without prejudice to their 
i' rivileges and immunities, inspectors 
ii nd aircrew members shall be obliged 
i|i D respect the laws and regulations of 
he State on whose territory an 
nspection is carried out and shall be 
bliged not to interfere in the internal 
E ffairs of that State. In the event the 
IS, nspected Party determines that an 
nspector or aircrew member of the 
'ther Party has violated the conditions 
loverning inspection activities set forth 
n this Protocol, or has ever committed 
i-i I criminal offense on the territory of 
.| he inspected Party or a basing 
r) :ountry, or has ever been sentenced for 
, ommitting a criminal offense or 
'xpelled by the inspected Party or a 
)asing country, the inspected Party 
naking such a determination shall so 
lotify the inspecting Party, which shall 
mmediately strike the individual from 
he lists of inspectors or the list of 
iircrew members. If, at that time, the 
ndividual is on the territory of the 
nspected Party or a basing country, 
he inspecting Party shall immediately 
'amove that individual from the 
country. 



8. Within 30 days after entry into 
force of the Treaty, each Party shall 
inform the other Party of the standing 
diplomatic clearance number for 
airplanes of the Party transporting 
inspectors and equipment necessary for 
inspection into and out of the territory 
of the Party or basing country in which 
an inspection site is located. Aircraft 
routings to and from the designated 
point of entry shall be along 
established international airways that 
are agreed upon by the Parties as the 
basis for such diplomatic clearance. 



IV. Notifications 

1. Notification of an intention to 
conduct an inspection shall be made 
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Centers. The receipt of this notification 
shall be acknowledged through the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the 
inspected Party within one hour of its 
receipt: 

(a) For inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, such 
notifications shall be made no less than 
16 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team 
at the point of entry and shall include; 

(i) the point of entry; 

(ii) the date and estimated 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 

(iii) the date and time when 
the specification of the inspection site 
will be provided; and 

(iv) the names of inspectors 
and aircrew members. 

(b) For inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, such 
notifications shall be made no less than 
72 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team 
at the point of entry and shall include: 

(i) the point of entry; 

(ii) the date and estimated 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 

(iii) the site to be inspected 
and the type of inspection; and 

(iv) the names of inspectors 
and aircrew members. 

2. The date and time of the 
specification of the inspection site as 
notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of 
this Section shall fall within the 
following time intervals: 

(a) for inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, neither less 



than four hours nor more than 24 
hours after the estimated date and 
time of arrival at the point of entry; 
and 

(b) for inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI 
of the Treaty, neither less than four 
hours nor more than 48 hours after the 
estimated date and time of arrival at 
the point of entry. 

3. The inspecting Party shall 
provide the inspected Party with a 
flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centers, for its flight from 
the last airfield prior to entering the 
air space of the country in which the 
inspection site is located to the point of 
entry, no less than six hours before the 
scheduled departure time from that 
airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in 
accordance with the procedures of the 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization applicable to civil 
aircraft. The inspecting Party shall 
include in the remarks section of each 
flight plan the standing diplomatic 
clearance number and the notation: 
"Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance 
processing required." 

4. No less than three hours prior to 
the scheduled departure of the 
inspection team from the last airfield 
prior to entering the airspace of the 
country in which the inspection is to 
take place, the inspected Party shall 
ensure that the flight plan filed in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
Section is approved so that the 
inspection team may arrive at the 
point of entry by the estimated arrival 
time. 

5. Either Party may change the 
point or points of entry to the 
territories of the countries within 
which its deployment areas, missile 
operating bases or missile support 
facilities are located, by giving notice of 
such change to the other Party. A 
change in a point of entry shall become 
effective five months after receipt of 
such notification by the other Party. 

V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival 
at the Point of Entry 

1. The in-country escort and a 
diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to 
the Government of either the inspected 
Party or the basing country in which 
the inspection site is located shall meet 
the inspection team and aircrew 
members at the point of entry as soon 
as the airplane of the inspecting Party 
lands. The number of aircrew members 
for each airplane shall not exceed ten. 



JL 



ARMS CONTROL 



The in-country escort shall 
expedite the entry of the inspection 
team and aircrew, their baggage, and 
equipment and suppUes necessary for 
inspection, into the country in which 
the inspection site is located. A 
diplomatic aircrew escort shall have 
the right to accompany and assist 
aircrew members throughout the in- 
country period. In the case of an 
inspection taking place on the territory 
of a basing country, the in-country 
escort may include representatives of 
that basing country. 

2. An inspector shall be considered 
to have assumed his duties upon 
arrival at the point of entry on the 
territory of the inspected Party or a 
basing country, and shall be considered 
to have ceased performing those duties 
when he has left the territory of the 
inspected Party or basing country. 

3. Each Party shall ensure that 
equipment and supplies are exempt 
from all customs duties. 

4. Equipment and supplies which 
the inspecting Party brings into the 
country in which an inspection site is 
located shall be subject to examination 
at the point of entry each time they 
are brought into that country. This 
examination shall be completed prior 
to the departure of the inspection team 
from the point of entry to conduct an 
inspection. Such equipment and 
supplies shall be examined by the in- 
country escort in the presence of the 
inspection team members to ascertain 
to the satisfaction of each Party that 
the equipment and supplies cannot 
perform functions unconnected with 
the inspection requirements of the 
Treaty. If it is established upon 
examination that the equipment or 
supplies are unconnected with these 
inspection requirements, then they 
shall not be cleared for use and shall 
be impounded at the point of entry 
until the departure of the inspection 
team from the country where the 
inspection is conducted. Storage of the 
inspecting Party's equipment and 
supplies at each point of entry shall be 
within tamper-proof containers within 
a secure facility. Access to each secure 
facility shall be controlled by a "dual 
key" system requiring the presence of 
both Parties to gain access to the 
equipment and supplies. 

5. Throughout the in-country 
period, the inspected Party shall 
provide, or arrange for the provision of, 
meals, lodging, work space, 



transportation and, as necessary, 
medical care for the inspection team 
and aircrew of the inspecting Party. 
All the costs in connection with the 
stay of inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the 
Treaty, on the territory of the 
inspected Party, including meals, 
services, lodging, work space, 
transportation and medical care shall 
be borne by the inspecting Party. 

6. The inspected Party shall 
provide parking, security protection, 
servicing and fuel for the airplane of 
the inspecting Party at the point of 
entry. The inspecting Party shall bear 
the cost of such fuel and servicing. 

7. For inspections conducted on the 
territory of the Parties, the inspection 
team shall enter at the point of entry 
on the territory of the inspected Party 
that is closest to the inspection site. In 
the case of inspections carried out in 
accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection 
team leader shall, at or before the time 
notified pursuant to paragraph l(a)(iii) 
of Section IV of this Protocol, inform 
the inspected Party at the point of 
entry through the in-country escort of 
the type of inspection and the 
inspection site, by place-name and 
geographic coordinates. 



VI. General Rules for Conducting 
Inspections 

1. Inspectors shall discharge their 
functions in accordance with this 
Protocol. 

2. Inspectors shall not disclose 
information received during inspections 
except with the express permission of 
the inspecting Party. They shall 
remain bound by this obligation after 
their assignment as inspectors has 
ended. 

3. In discharging their functions, 
inspectors shall not interfere directly 
with on-going activities at the 
inspection site and shall avoid 
unnecessarily hampering or delaying 
the operation of a facility or taking 
actions affecting its safe operation. 

4. Inspections shall be conducted in 
accordance with the objectives set forth 
in Article XI of the Treaty as 
applicable for the type of inspection 
specified by the inspecting Party under 
paragraph KbI of Section IV or 
paragraph 7 of Section V of this 
Protocol. 



5. The in-country escort shall ha\ 
the right to accompany and assist 
inspectors and aircrew members as 
considered necessary by the inspected 
Party throughout the in-country 
period. Except as otherwise provided ir 
this Protocol, the movement and trave 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be at the discretion of the in- 
country escort. 

6. Inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treat} 
shall be allowed to travel within 50 
kilometers from the inspection site 
with the permission of the in-country 
escort, and as considered necessary by 
the inspected Party, shall be 
accompanied by the in-country escort 
Such travel shall be taken solely as a 
leisure activity. 

7. Inspectors shall have the right 
throughout the period of inspection to 
be in communication with the embass\ 
of the inspecting Party located within 
the territory of the country where the 
inspection is taking place using the 
telephone communications provided bv 
the inspected Party. 

8. At the inspection site, 
representatives of the inspected facilit- 
shall be included among the in-countr\ 
escort. 

9. The inspection team may bring 
onto the inspection site such document 
as needed to conduct the inspection, as 
well as linear measurement devices; 
cameras; portable weighing devices; 
radiation detection devices; and other 
equipment, as agreed by the Parties. 
The characteristics and method of use 
of the equipment listed above, shall 
also be agreed upon within 30 days 
after entry into force of the Treaty. 
During inspections conducted pursuant 
to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection 
team may use any of the equipment 
listed above, except for cameras, which 
shall be for use only by the inspected 
Party at the request of the inspecting 
Party. During inspections conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article 
XI of the Treaty, all measurements 
shall be made by the inspected Party a 
the request of the inspecting Party. At 
the request of inspectors, the in- 
country escort shall take photographs 
of the inspected facilities using the 
inspecting Party's camera systems 
which are capable of producing 
duplicate, instant development 
photographic prints. Each Party shall 
receive one copy of every photograph. 



ARMS CONTROL 



10. For inspections conducted 
)ursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors 
ihall permit the in-country escort to 
)bserve the equipment used during the 
,nspection by the inspection team. 
I 11, Measurements recorded during 
Inspections shall be certified by the 
lignature of a member of the 
nspection team and a member of the 
n-country escort when they are taken. 
5uch certified data shall be included in 
he inspection report. 

12. Inspectors shall have the right 

request clarifications in connection 
vith ambiguities that arise during an 
nspection. Such requests shall be made 
)romptly through the in-country 
;scort. The in-country escort shall 
jrovide the inspection team, during the 

1 nspection, with such clarifications as 
nay be necessary to remove the 
imbiguity. In the event questions 
•elating to an object or building located 
vithin the inspection site are not 
-esolved, the inspected Party shall 
photograph the object or building as 
-equested by the inspecting Party for 
;he purpose of clarifying its nature and 
'unction. If the ambiguity cannot be 
removed during the inspection, then 
;he question, relevant clarifications 
and a copy of any photographs taken 
shall be included in the inspection 
\ report. 

■I 13. In carrying out their activities, 
inspectors shall observe safety regu- 
lations established at the inspection 
site, including those for the protection 
of controlled environments within a 
facility and for personal safety. 
Individual protective clothing and 
equipment shall be provided by the 
,| inspected Party, as necessary. 
"ll 14. For inspections pursuant to 
Jiparagraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI 
' I of the Treaty, pre-inspection 
i procedures, including briefings and 
' ' safety-related activities, shall begin 
upon arrival of the inspection team at 
the inspection site and shall be 
j completed within one hour. The 

1 inspection team shall begin the 
1 inspection immediately upon 

\ completion of the pre-inspection 
^' I procedures. The period of inspection 
! shall not exceed 24 hours, except for 
' I inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 

or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The 
j period of inspection may be extended, 
I by agreement with the in-country 

escort, by no more than eight hours. 

Post-inspection procedures, which 

include completing the inspection 



report in accordance with the pro- 
visions of Section XI of this Protocol, 
shall begin immediately upon 
completion of the inspection and shall 
be completed at the inspection site 
within four hours. 

15. An inspection team conducting 
an inspection pursuant to Article XI of 
the Treaty shall include no more than 
ten inspectors, except for an inspection 
team conducting an inspection 
pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that 
Article, which shall include no more 
than 20 inspectors and an inspection 
team conducting an inspection 
activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
that Article, which shall include no 
more than 30 inspectors. At least two 
inspectors on each team must speak 
the language of the inspected Party. 
An inspection team shall operate under 
the direction of the team leader and 
deputy team leader. Upon arrival at 
the inspection site, the inspection team 
may divide itself into subgroups 
consisting of no fewer than two 
inspectors each. There shall be no more 
than one inspection team at an 
inspection site at any one time. 

16. Except in the case of 
inspections conducted pursuant to 
paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of 
the Treaty, upon completion of the 
post-inspection procedures, the 
inspection team shall return promptly 
to the point of entry from which it 
commenced inspection activities and 
shall then leave, within 24 hours, the 
territory of the country in which the 
inspection site is located, using its own 
airplane. In the case of inspections 
conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 
7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the 
inspection team intends to conduct 
another inspection it shall either: 

(a) notify the inspected Party of 
its intent upon return to the point of 
entry; or 

(b) notify the inspected Party of 
the type of inspection and the 
inspection site upon completion of the 
post-inspection procedures. In this case 
it shall be the responsibility of the 
inspected Party to ensure that the 
inspection team reaches the next 
inspection site without unjustified 
delay. The inspected Party shall 
determine the means of transportation 
and route involved in such travel. 
With respect to subparagraph (a), the 
procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of 
Section V of this Protocol and 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of 
this Protocol shall apply. 



VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant 
to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI 
of the Treaty 

1. Within one hour after the time for 
the specification of the inspection site 
notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of 
Section IV of this Protocol, the 
inspected Party shall implement pre- 
inspection movement restrictions at the 
inspection site, which shall remain in 
effect until the inspection team arrives 
at the inspection site. During the 
period that pre-inspection movement 
restrictions are in effect, missiles, 
stages of such missiles, launchers or 
support equipment subject to the 
Treaty shall not be removed from the 
inspection site. 

2. The inspected Party shall 
transport the inspection team from the 
point of entry to the inspection site so 
that the inspection team arrives at the 
inspection site no later than nine hours 
after the time for the specification of 
the inspection site notified pursuant to 
paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this 
Protocol. 

3. In the event that an inspection 
is conducted in a basing country, the 
aircrew of the inspected Party may 
include representatives of the basing 
country. 

4. Neither Party shall conduct 
more than one inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 5(a) of Article XI of the 
Treaty at any one time, more than one 
inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) 
of Article XI of the Treaty at any one 
time, or more than 10 inspections 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI 
of the Treaty at any one time. 

5. The boundaries of the inspection 
site at the facility to be inspected shall 
be the boundaries of that facility set 
forth in the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 

6. Except in the case of an 
inspection conducted pursuant to 
paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of 
the Treaty, upon arrival of the 
inspection team at the inspection site, 
the in-country escort shall inform the 
inspection team leader of the number 
of missiles, stages of missiles, 
launchers, support structures and 
support equipment at the site that are 
subject to the Treaty and provide the 
inspection team leader with a diagram 
of the inspection site indicating the 
location of these missiles, stages of 
missiles, launchers, support structures 
and support equipment at the 
inspection site. 



73 



ARMS CONTROL 



7. Subject to the procedures of 
paragraphs 8 through 14 of this 
Section, inspectors shall have the right 
to inspect the entire inspection site, 
including the interior of structures, 
containers or vehicles, or including 
covered objects, whose dimensions are 
equal to or greater than the dimensions 
specified in Section VI of the 
Memorandum of Understanding for the 
missiles, stages of such missiles, 
launchers or support equipment of the 
inspected Party. 

8. A missile, a stage of such a 
missile or a launcher subject to the 
Treaty shall be subject to inspection 
only by external visual observation, 
including measuring, as necessary, the 
dimensions of such a missile, stage of 
such a missile or launcher. A container 
that the inspected Party declares to 
contain a missile or stage of a missile 
subject to the Treaty, and which is not 
sufficiently large to be capable of 
containing more than one missile or 
stage of such a missile of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, shall be 
subject to inspection only by external 
visual observation, including 
measuring, as necessary, the 
dimensions of such a container to 
confirm that it cannot contain more 
than one missile or stage of such a 
missile of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty. Except as provided for in 
paragraph 14 of this Section, a 
container that is sufficiently large to 
contain a missile or stage of such a 
missile of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty that the inspected Party 
declares not to contain a missile or 
stage of such a missile subject to the 
Treaty shall be subject to inspection 
only by means of weighing or visual 
observation of the interior of the 
container, as necessary, to confirm that 
it does not, in fact, contain a missile or 
stage of such a missile of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty. If such a 
container is a launch canister 
associated with a type of missile not 
subject to the Treaty, and declared by 
the inspected Party to contain such a 
missile, it shall be subject to external 
inspection only, including use of 
radiation detection devices, visual 
observation and linear measurement, 
as necessary, of the dimensions of such 
a canister. 

9. A structure or container that is 
not sufficiently large to contain a 
missile, stage of such a missile or 
launcher of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty shall be subject to 



74 



inspection only by external visual 
observation including measuring, as 
necessary, the dimensions of such a 
structure or container to confirm that 
it is not sufficiently large to be capable 
of containing a missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty. 

10. Within a structure, a space 
which is sufficiently large to contain a 
missile, stage of such a missile or 
launcher of the inspected Party subject 
to the Treaty, but which is 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the 
inspection team not to be accessible by 
the smallest missile, stage of a missile 
or launcher of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty shall not be 
subject to further inspection. If the 
inspected Party demonstrates to the 
satisfaction of the inspection team by 
means of a visual inspection of the 
interior of an enclosed space from its 
entrance that the enclosed space does 
not contain any missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, such an 
enclosed space shall not be subject to 
further inspection. 

11. The inspection team shall be 
permitted to patrol the perimeter of 
the inspection site and station 
inspectors at the exits of the site for 
the duration of the inspection. 

12. The inspection team shall be 
permitted to inspect any vehicle 
capable of carrying missiles, stages of 
such missiles, launchers or support 
equipment of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty at any time 
during the course of an inspection and 
no such vehicle shall leave the 
inspection site during the course of the 
inspection until inspected at site exits 
by the inspection team. 

13. Prior to inspection of a building 
within the inspection site, the 
inspection team may station subgroups 
at the exits of the building that are 
large enough to permit passage of any 
missile, stage of such a missile, 
launcher or support equipment of the 
inspected Party subject to the Treaty. 
During the time that the building is 
being inspected, no vehicle or object 
capable of containing any missile, stage 
of such a missile, launcher or support 
equipment of the inspected Party 
subject to the Treaty shall be permitted 
to leave the building until inspected. 

14. During an inspection conducted 
pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article 
XI of the Treaty, it shall be the 
responsibility of the inspected Party to 
demonstrate that a shrouded or 



a 



environmentally protected object whic 
is equal to or larger than the smallest 
missile, stage of a missile or launcher 
of the inspected Party subject to the , 
Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage o 
such a missile or launcher of the 
inspected Party subject to the Treaty. 
This may be accomplished by partial 
removal of the shroud or 
environmental protection cover, 
measuring, or weighing the covered 
object or by other methods. If the 
inspected Party satisfies the inspectioni 
team by its demonstration that the 
object is not a missile, stage of such a 
missile or launcher of the inspected 
Party subject to the Treaty, then there 
shall be no further inspection of that 
object. If the container is a launch 
canister associated with a type of 
missile not subject to the Treaty, and 
declared by the inspected Party to 
contain such a missile, then it shall be 
subject to external inspection only, 
including use of radiation detection 
devices, visual observation and linear 
measurement, as necessary, of the 
dimensions of such a canister. 



VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuanii 
to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of 
the Treaty 

1. Inspections of the process of 
elimination of items of missile systems 
specified in the Protocol on Eliminatioji 
carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 off 
Article XI of the Treaty shall be 
conducted in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in this paragraph 
and the Protocol on Elimination: 



HI 



(a) Upon arrival at the 
elimination facility, inspectors shall be) 
provided with a schedule of eliminatioj 
activities. 

(b) Inspectors shall check the 
data which are specified in the 
notification provided by the inspected 
Party regarding the number and type 
of items of missile systems to be 
eliminated against the number and 
type of such items which are at the 
elimination facility prior to the 
initiation of the elimination 
procedures. 

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 
11 of Section VI of this Protocol, 
inspectors shall observe the execution 
of the specific procedures for the 
elimination of the items of missile 
systems as provided for in the Protocol 
on Elimination. If any deviations from 
the agreed elimination procedures are 
found, the inspectors shall have the 
right to call the attention of the in- 



n^r^-^r^ro^.^t r^l Ol-~»-^ P..ll^t;, 



ARMS CONTROL 



ountry escort to the need for strict 
lompliance with the above-mentioned 
irocedures. The completion of such 
irocedures shall be confirmed in 
: iccordance with the procedures 
pecified in the Protocol on 
Elimination. 

(d) During the elimination of 
nissiles by means of launching, the 
nspectors shall have the right to 
iscertain by visual observation that a 
nissile prepared for launch is a missile 
if the type subject to elimination. The 
nspectors shall also be allowed to 
ibserve such a missile from a safe 
ocation specified by the inspected 
'arty until the completion of its 
aunch. During the inspection of a 
eries of launches for the elimination of 
' nissiles by means of launching, the 
nspected Party shall determine the 
neans of transport and route for the 
ransportation of inspectors between 
nspection sites. 

2. Inspections of the elimination of 
j terns of missile systems specified in 
I he Protocol on Elimination carried out 
jursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI 
)f the Treaty shall be conducted in 
iccord3nce with the procedures set 
brth in Sections II, IV or V of the 
Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise 
•eed by the Parties. 



[X. Inspection Activities Conducted 
Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI 
of the Treaty 

1. The inspected Party shall maintain 
an agreed perimeter around the 
periphery of the inspection site and 
shall designate a portal with not more 
than one rail line and one road which 
shall be within 50 meters of each other. 
, All vehicles which can contain an 
i intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party shall exit only through this 
>i portal. 

2. For the purposes of this Section, 
the provisions of paragraph 10 of 
Article VII of the Treaty shall be 
applied to intermediate-range GLBMs 
of the inspected Party and the longest 
stage of such GLBMs. 

3. There shall not be more than 
two other exits from the inspection 
site. Such exits shall be monitored by 
appropriate sensors. The perimeter of 
and exits from the inspection site may 
be monitored as provided for by 
paragraph 11 of Section VII of this 
Protocol. 



4. The inspecting Party shall have 
the right to establish continuous 
monitoring systems at the portal 
specified in paragraph 1 of this Section 
and appropriate sensors at the exits 
specified in paragraph 3 of this Section 
and carry out necessary engineering 
surveys, construction, repair and 
replacement of monitoring systems. 

5. The inspected Party shall, at the 
request of and at the expense of the 
inspecting Party, provide the following: 

(a) all necessary utilities for the 
construction and operation of the 
monitoring systems, including 
electrical power, water, fuel, heating 
and sewage; 

(b) basic construction materials 
including concrete and lumber; 

(c) the site preparation necessary 
to accommodate the installation of 
continuously operating systems for 
monitoring the portal specified in 
paragraph 1 of this Section, 
appropriate sensors for other exits 
specified in paragraph 3 of this Section 
and the center for collecting data 
obtained during inspections. Such 
preparation may include ground 
excavation, laying of concrete 
foundations, trenching between 
equipment locations and utility 
connections; 

(d) transportation for necessary 
installation tools, materials and 
equipment from the point of entry to 
the inspection site; and 

(e) a minimum of two telephone 
lines and, as necessary, high frequency 
radio equipment capable of allowing 
direct communication with the 
embassy of the inspecting Party in the 
country in which the site is located. 

6. Outside the perimeter of the 
inspection site, the inspecting Party 
shall have the right to: 

(a) build no more than three 
buildings with a total floor space of not 
more than 150 square meters for a data 
center and inspection team 
headquarters, and one additional 
building with floor space not to exceed 
500 square meters for the storage of 
supplies and equipment; 

(b) install systems to monitor the 
exits to include weight sensors, vehicle 
sensors, surveillance systems and 
vehicle dimensional measuring 
equipment; 

(c) install at the portal specified 
in paragraph 1 of this Section 
equipment for measuring the length 



and diameter of missile stages 
contained inside of launch canisters or 
shipping containers; 

(d) install at the portal specified 
in paragraph 1 of this Section non- 
damaging image producing equipment 
for imaging the contents of launch 
canisters or shipping containers 
declared to contain missiles or missile 
stages as provided for in paragraph 11 
of this Section; 

(e) install a primary and back-up 
power source; and 

(fi use, as necessary, data 
authentication devices. 

7. During the installation or 
operation of the monitoring systems, 
the inspecting Party shall not deny the 
inspected Party access to any existing 
structures or security systems. The 
inspecting Party shall not take any 
actions with respect to such structures 
without consent of the inspected Party. 
If the Parties agree that such 
structures are to be rebuilt or 
demolished, either partially or 
completely, the inspecting Party shall 
provide the necessary compensation. 

8. The inspected Party shall not 
interfere with the installed equipment 
or restrict the access of the inspection 
team to such equipment. 

9. The inspecting Party shall have 
the right to use its own two-way 
systems of radio communication 
between inspectors patrolling the 
perimeter and the data collection 
center. Such systems shall conform to 
power and frequency restrictions 
established on the territory of the 
inspected Party. 

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted 
to land within the perimeter of the 
monitored site except for emergencies 
at the site and with prior notification 
to the inspection team. 

11. Any shipment exiting through 
the portal specified in paragraph 1 of 
this Section which is large enough and 
heavy enough to contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party shall be declared by the 
inspected Party to the inspection team 
before the shipment arrives at the 
portal. The declaration shall state 
whether such a shipment contains a 
missile or missile stage as large or 
larger than and as heavy or heavier 
than an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party. 



75 



ARMS CONTROL 



12. The inspection team shall have 
the right to weigh and measure the 
dimensions of any vehicle, including 
railcars, exiting the site to ascertain 
whether it is large enough and heavy 
enough to contain an intermediate- 
range GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party. These 
measurements shall be performed so as 
to minimize the delay of vehicles 
exiting the site. Vehicles that are 
either not large enough or not heavy 
enough to contain an intermediate- 
range GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party shall not 
be subject to further inspection. 

13. Vehicles exiting through the 
portal specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Section that are large enough and 
heavy enough to contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party but that are declared not to 
contain a missile or missile stage as 
large or larger than and as heavy or 
heavier than an intermediate-range 
GLBM or longest stage of such a 
GLBM of the inspected Party shall be 
subject to the following procedures. 

(a) The inspecting Party shall 
have the right to inspect the interior of 
all such vehicles. 

(b) If the inspecting Party can 
determine by visual observation or 
dimensional measurement that, inside 
a particular vehicle, there are no 
containers or shrouded objects large 
enough to be or to contain an 
intermediate-range GLBM or longest 
stage of such a GLBM of the inspected 
Party, then that vehicle shall not be 
subject to further inspection. 

(c) If inside a vehicle there are 
one or more containers or shrouded 
objects large enough to be or to contain 
an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party, it shall be the 
responsibility of the inspected Party to 
demonstrate that such containers or 
shrouded objects are not and do not 
contain intermediate-range GLBMs or 
the longest stages of such GLBMs of 
the inspected Party. 



14. Vehicles exiting through the 
portal specified in paragraph 1 of this 
Section that are declared to contain a 
missile or missile stage as large or 
larger than and as heavy or heavier 
than an intermediate-range GLBM or 
longest stage of such a GLBM of the 
inspected Party shall be subject to the 
following procedures. 

(a) The inspecting Party shall 
preserve the integrity of the inspected 
missile or stage of a missile. 

(b) Measuring equipment shall 
be placed only outside of the launch 
canister or shipping container; all 
measurements shall be made by the 
inspecting Party using the equipment 
provided for in paragraph 6 of this 
Section. Such measurements shall be 
observed and certified by the in- 
country escort. 

(c) The inspecting Party shall 
have the right to weigh and measure 
the dimensions of any launch canister 
or of any shipping container declared 
to contain such a missile or missile 
stage and to image the contents of any 
launch canister or of any shipping 
container declared to contain such a 
missile or missile stage; it shall have 
the right to view such missiles or 
missile stages contained in launch 
canisters or shipping containers eight 
times per calendar year. The in- 
country escort shall be present during 
all phases of such viewing. During such 
interior viewing: 

(i) the front end of the launch 
canister or the cover of the shipping 
container shall be opened; 

(ii) the missile or missile stage 
shall not be removed from its launch 
canister or shipping container; and 

(iiil the length and diameter of 
the stages of the missile shall be 
measured in accordance with the 
methods agreed by the Parties so as to 
ascertain that the missile or missile 
stage is not an intermediate-range 
GLBM of the inspected Party, or the 
longest stage of such a GLBM, and that 
the missile has no more than one stage 
which is outwardly similar to a stage of 
an existing type of intermediate-range 
GLBM. 



lukf 

(ii! 

lars 



md 



p. 



(d) The inspecting Party shall 
also have the right to inspect any oth 
containers or shrouded objects inside 
the vehicle containing such a missile ( 
missile stage in accordance with the 
procedures in paragraph 13 of this 
Section. 

X. Cancellation of Inspection 

An inspection shall be cancelled if, du 
to circumstances brought about by 
force majeure, it cannot be carried out 
In the case of a delay that prevents ai 
inspection team performing an 
inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, 
or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from 
arriving at the inspection site during 
the time specified in paragraph 2 of 
Section VII of this Protocol, the 
inspecting Party may either cancel or 
carry out the inspection. If an 
inspection is cancelled due to 
circumstances brought about by force 
majeure or delay, then the number of 
inspections to which the inspecting 
Party is entitled shall not be reduced 

XI. Inspection Report 

1. For inspections conducted pursuant 
to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article 
XI of the Treaty, during post-inspectit' 
procedures, and no later than two 
hours after the inspection has been 
completed, the inspection team leader 
shall provide the in-country escort wit 
a written inspection report in both thi 
English and Russian languages. The 
report shall be factual. It shall include 
the type of inspection carried out, the n, 
inspection site, the number of missiles I 
stages of missiles, launchers and item I 
of support equipment subject to the 
Treaty observed during the period of 
inspection and any measurements 
recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of 
Section VI of this Protocol. 
Photographs taken during the 
inspection in accordance with agreed 
procedures, as well as the inspection 
site diagram provided for by paragrap 
6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall 
be attached to this report. 

2. For inspection activities 
conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 day 
after the end of each month, the 
inspection team leader shall provide 



76 



Department nf Stats Riiiifit; 



ARMS CONTROL 



he in-country escort with a written 
|( nspection report both in the English 
nd Russian languages. The report 
hall be factual. It shall include the 
umber of vehicles declared to contain 
missile or stage of a missile as large 
r larger than and as heavy or heavier 
ihan an intermediate-range GLBM or 
mgest stage of such a GLBM of the 
ispected Party that left the inspection 
ite through the portal specified in 
aragraph 1 of Section IX of this 
'rotocol during that month. The report 
hall also include any measurements of 
iunch canisters or shipping containers 
ontained in these vehicles recorded 
ursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI 
f this Protocol. In the event the 
ispecting Party, under the provisions 
f paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this 
'rotocol, has viewed the interior of a 
junch canister or shipping container 
leclared to contain a missile or stage of 
I missile as large or larger than and as 
leavy or heavier than an intermediate- 
ange GLBM or longest stage of such a 
JLBM of the inspected Party, the 
eport shall also include the 
neasurements of the length and 
liameter of missile stages obtained 
luring the inspection and recorded 
)ursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI 
)f this Protocol. Photographs taken 
luring the inspection in accordance 
vith agreed procedures shall be 
ittached to this report. 

3. The inspected Party shall have 
;he right to include written comments 
in the report. 

4. The Parties shall, when possible, 
resolve ambiguities regarding factual 
information contained in the inspection 
report. Relevant clarifications shall be 
recorded in the report. The report shall 
be signed by the inspection team leader 
and by one of the members of the in- 
country escort. Each Party shall retain 
one copy of the report. 

This Protocol is an integral part of 
the Treaty. It shall enter into force on 
the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and shall remain in force as 
long as the Treaty remains in force. As 
provided for in paragraph 1(b) of 
Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties 
may agree upon such measures as may 



be necessary to improve the viability 
and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such 
measures shall not be deemed 
amendments to the Treaty. 

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 

Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 
of America 



DONE at Washington on 
December 8, 1987, in two copies, each 
in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 

M. Gorbachev 

General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 



ANNEX 



Provisions on 

Immunities of 

Aircrew 

In order to exercise their functions 
effectively, for the purpose of 
implementing the Treaty and not for 
their personal benefit, the inspectors 
and aircrew members referred to in 
Section III of this Protocol shall be 
accorded the privileges and immunities 
contained in this Annex. Privileges and 
immunities shall be accorded for the 
entire in-country period in the country 
in which an inspection site is located, 
and thereafter with respect to acts 
previously performed in the exercise of 
official functions as an inspector or 
aircrew member. 

1. Inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be accorded the inviolability 
enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant 
to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 
1961. 

2. The living quarters and office 
premises occupied by an inspector 
carrying out inspection activities 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI 
of the Treaty shall be accorded the 
inviolability and protection accorded 
the premises of diplomatic agents 
pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 

3. The papers and correspondence 
of inspectors and aircrew members 
shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to 
the papers and correspondence of 
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 
30 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the 
aircraft of the inspection team shall be 
inviolable. 

4. Inspectors and aircrew members 
shall be accorded the immunities 
accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to 
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of 



Privileges and 
Inspectors and 
Members 

the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. The immunity from 
jurisdiction of an inspector or an 
aircrew member may be waived by the 
mspecting Party in those cases when it 
is of the opinion that immunity would 
impede the course of justice and that it 
can be waived without prejudice to the 
implementation of the provisions of the 
Treaty. Waiver must always be 
express. 

5. Inspectors carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty 
shall be accorded the exemption from 
dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic 
agents pursuant to Article 34 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations. 

6. Inspectors and aircrew members 
of a Party shall be permitted to bring 
into the territory of the other Party or 
a basing country in which an 
inspection site is located, without 
payment of any customs duties or 
related charges, articles for their 
personal use, with the exception of 
articles the import or export of which 
is prohibited by law or controlled by 
quarantine regulations. 

7. An inspector or aircrew member 
shall not engage in any professional or 
commercial activity for personal profit 
on the territory of the inspected Party 
or that of the basing countries. 

8. If the inspected Party considers 
that there has been an abuse of 
privileges and immunities specified in 
this Annex, consultations shall be held 
between the Parties to determine 
whether such an abuse has occurred 
and, if so determined, to prevent a 
repetition of such an abuse. 



February 1988 



77 



ARMS CONTROL 



U.S., European Allies 

Sign INF Basing Agreement 



Secretary Shultz departed Wash- 
ington, D.C., on December 10, 1987, to 
consult with European allies and sign, 
for the United States, the agreement re- 
garding inspections relating to the In- 
termediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
T)-eaty between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. His stops included 
Brussels (December 11-12), Copenhagen 
(December 12-lS), Oslo (December 
13-15), Bonn (December 15), and Lon- 
don (December 15-16). He returned to 
the United States December 16. 

Following is the text of that agree- 
ment signed in Brussels on December 
11. 

AGREEMENT AMONG 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, 

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 

GERMANY, 

THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, 

THE KINGDOM OF THE 

NETHERLANDS 

AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF 

GREAT BRITAIN 

AND NORTHERN IRELAND 

REGARDING INSPECTIONS 

RELATING TO THE TREATY 

BETWEEN 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

AND 

THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST 

REPUBLICS 

ON THE ELIMINATION OF 

THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE 

AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES 

The United States of America, the 
Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, the Republic of 
Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland, noting the 
terms agreed between the United 
States of America and the Union of So- 
viet Socialist Republics for the elimina- 
tion of their intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, 

Have agreed as follows: 



ARTICLE I 

General Obligations 

L Inspection activities related to Arti- 
cle XI of the Ti-eaty between the 
United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 



the Elimination of Their Intermediate- 
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
signed at Washington on December 8, 
1987, may take place on the territory of 
the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Republic of 
Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom of Great Brit- 
ain and Northern Ireland and shall be 
carried out in accordance with the re- 
quirements, procedures and arrange- 
ments set forth in the Protocol 
Regarding Inspections Relating to the 
Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics on the Elimination of 
Their Intermediate-Range and Shortei-- 
Range Missiles and this Agreement. 

2. The Kingdom of Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Re- 
public of Italy, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ii'eland, 
hereinafter the Basing Countries, 
hereby agree to facilitate the imple- 
mentation by the United States of 
America of its obligations under the 
Treaty, including the Inspection Pro- 
tocol thereto, on their territories in ac- 
cordance with the requirements, 
procedures and arrangements set forth 
in this Agreement. 

3. E.xcept as herein agreed by the 
United States of America and the Bas- 
ing Countries, nothing shall affect the 
sovereign authority of each state to en- 
force its laws and regulations with re- 
spect to persons entering, and 
activities taking place within, its 
jurisdiction. 

4. The Basing Countries do not by 
this Agreement assume any obligations 
or grant any rights deriving from the 
Treaty or the Inspection Protocol other 
than those e.xpressly undertaken or 
granted in this Agreement or otherwise 
with their specific consent. 

5. The United States of America: 

a) Remains fully responsible to- 
wards the Soviet Union for the imple- 
mentation of its obligations under the 
Treaty and the Inspection Protocol in 
respect of United States facilities lo- 
cated on the territories of the Basing 
Countries; 

b) Undertakes on request at any 
time to take such action, in exercise of 
its rights under the Treaty, including 



the Inspection Protocol, as may be re- 
quired to protect and preserve the 
rights of the Basing Countries under 
this Agreement. 



ARTICLE II 

Definitions 



i<t 



For purposes of the present 
Agreement: 

1. The term "Ti-eaty" means the 
Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics on the Elimination of 
Their Intermediate-Range and Shorte 
Range Missiles; 

2. The term "Inspection Protocol" 
means the Protocol Regarding Inspec- 
tions Relating to the Treaty between 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate 
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; 

3. The term "Inspected Party" 
means the United States of America; 

4. The term "Inspecting Party" 
means the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; 

5. The term "inspection team" 
means those inspectors designated by 
the Inspecting Party to conduct a par- 
ticular inspection activity; 

6. The term "inspector" means ani 
individual proposed by the Union of St 
viet Socialist Republics to carry out m 
spections pursuant to Article XI of thii 
Treaty, and included on its list of in- 
spectors in accordance with Section II 
of the Inspection Protocol; 

7. The term "diplomatic aircrew es 
cort" means that individual accredited 
to the government of the Basing Coun^ 
try in which the inspection site is lo- 
cated who is designated by the 
Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew 
of the Inspecting Party; 

8. The term "inspection site" 
means the area, facility, or location in 
Basing Country at which an inspection 
provided for in Article XI of the Treat; 
is carried out; 

9. The term "period of inspection" 
means the period from initiation of the! 
inspection at the inspection site until 
completion of the inspection at the in- 
spection site, exclusive of time spent o 
any pre- and post-inspection 
procedures; 



fi 



P 



78 



Department of State Bulletli 



i 



ARMS CONTROL 



10. The term "point of entry" 
lans: in respect of Belgium, Brussels 
ational); in respect of the Federal 
public of Germany, Frankfurt (Rhein 
iin Airbase); in respect of Italy, 

me (Ciampino); in respect of the 
igdom of the Netherlands, Schiphol; 
1 in respect of the United Kingdom 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
F Greenham Common; 

11. The term "in-country period" 
lans the period from the arrival of 

; inspection team at the point of en- 
■ until departure of the inspection 
tm from the point of entry to depart 
country; 

12. The term "in-country escort" 
lans the official or officials specified 

the Inspected Party, one or more of 
om may be nominated by the Basing 
untry within whose territory the in- 
:• iction site is located, who shall ac- 
: njiany an inspection team throughout 
ill-country period and provide ap- 
jpriate assistance to an inspection 
,1 .m, in accordance with the provisions 
1! the Inspection Protocol, throughout 
II ! in-country period; 
i 13. The term "aircrew member" 
ans an individual, other than the 
mbers x)f an inspection team, diplo- 
tic aircrew escort and in-country es- 
t, on the aircraft of the Inspecting 
rty. The number of aircrew members 
r aircraft shall not exceed ten. 



ITICLE III 
itifications 

Upon entry into force of this Agree- 
■nt, the Inspected Party and each 
sing Country shall establish channels 
lich shall be available to receive and 
knowledge receipt of notifications on 
i4-hour continuous basis. 

2. Immediately upon receipt of 
tice from the Inspecting Party of its 
.ention to conduct an inspection in a 
ising Country, the Inspected Party 
all notify the Basing Country con- 
rned thereof and of the date and esti- 
Ued time of arrival of the inspection 
im at the point of entry, the date and 
timated time of departure from the 
■int of entry to the inspection site, the 
,.mes of the aircrew and inspection 
lam members, the flight plan (includ- 
|g the type of aircraft as specified 
erein) filed by the Inspecting 
irty in accordance with the Interna- 
bnal Civil Aviation Organization, 



hereinafter ICAO, procedures applica- 
ble to civil aircraft, and any other in- 
formation relevant to the inspection 
provided by the Inspecting Party 

3. No less than one hour prior to 
the estimated time of departure of the 
inspection team from the point of entry 
for the inspection site, or in the case of 
successive inspections conducted pur- 
suant to paragi'aphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Arti- 
cle XI of the Treaty no less than one 
hour prior to the inspection team's de- 
parture from an inspection site for an- 
other inspection site, the Inspected 
Party shall inform the Basing Country 
of the inspection site, described by 
place name and geographic coordinates, 
at which the inspection will be carried 
out. 



ARTICLE IV 
Pre-Inspection Arrangements 

1. The Inspected Party shall provide 
the Basing Countries with the initial 
lists of inspectors and aircrew mem- 
bers, or any modification thereto, pro- 
posed by the Inspecting Party 
immediately upon receipt thereof. 
Within 15 days of receipt of the initial 
lists or proposed additions thereto, 
each Basing Country shall notify the 
Inspected Party if it objects to the in- 
clusion of any inspector or aircrew 
member on the basis that such individ- 
ual had ever committed a criminal of- 
fense on the territory of the Inspected 
Party or the Basing Country, or been 
sentenced for committing a criminal of- 
fense or expelled by the Inspected 
Party or the Basing Country. The In- 
spected Party shall thereupon exercise 
its right under the Inspection Protocol 
to prevent the named individual from 
serving as an inspector or aircrew 
member. 

2. Within 25 days of receipt of the 
initial lists of inspectors or aircrew 
members, or of any subsequent change 
thereto, each Basing Country shall pro- 
vide such visas and related documenta- 
tion as may be necessary to ensure that 
each inspector or aircrew member may 
enter its territory for the purpose of 
carrying out inspection activities in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty and the Inspection Protocol. 
Such visas and documentation shall be 
valid for a period of at least 24 months. 
The Inspected Party shall immediately 
notify the Basing Countries of the re- 
moval of any individual from the In- 
specting Party's lists of inspectors or 
aircrew members, and the Basing 



Countries may thereupon cancel forth- 
with any visas and related documenta- 
tion issued to such person pursuant to 
this paragraph. 

3. Within 25 days after entry into 
force of this Agreement, each Basing 
Country shall inform the Inspected 
Party of the standing diplomatic clear- 
ance number for the aircraft of the In- 
specting Party which will transport 
inspectors and equipment into its ter- 
ritory. At the same time each Basing 
Country shall inform the Inspected 
Party of the established international 
airways along which aircraft of the In- 
specting Party shall enter the airspace 
of the Basing Country for the purpose 
of carrying out inspection activities un- 
der the Treaty. 

4. Each Basing Country shall ac- 
cord inspectors and aircrew members of 
the Inspecting Party entering its ter- 
ritory for the purpose of conducting in- 
spection activities pursuant to the 
TVeaty, including the Inspection Pro- 
tocol, the privileges and immunities set 
forth in the Privileges and Immunities 
Annex to this Agreement. In the event 
the Inspecting Party refuses or fails to 
carry out its obligations under Section 
III, paragraph 7 of the Inspection Pro- 
tocol to remove an inspector or aircrew 
member who has violated the condi- 
tions governing inspections, the inspec- 
tor or aircrew member may be refused 
continued recognition as being entitled 
to such privileges and immunities. 

5. Each Basing Country shall is- 
sue, at the point of entry, appropriate 
authorizations waiving customs duties 
and expediting customs processing re- 
quirements in respect of all equipment 
relating to inspection activities. 

6. Each Basing Country shall pro- 
vide, if requested, facilities at the point 
of entry for lodging and the provision of 
food for inspectors and aircrew 
members. 

7. The Basing Country in which 
the inspection is to take place shall 
have the right to examine jointly with 
the Inspected Party each item of equip- 
ment brought in by the Inspecting 
Party to ascertain that the equipment 
cannot be used to perform functions un- 
connected with the inspection require- 
ments of the Treaty. If it is established 
upon examination that a piece of equip- 
ment is unconnected with these inspec- 
tion requirements, it shall not be 
cleared for use and shall be impounded 
at the point of entry until the depar- 
ture of the inspection team from the 
country. 



ARMS CONTROL 



ARTICLE V 

Conduct of Inspections 

1. Within 90 minutes of receipt from the 
Inspected Party of notification that a 
flight plan for an aircraft of the In- 
specting Party has been filed in accord- 
ance with ICAO procedures applicable 
to civil aircraft, the Basing Country in 
whose territory the inspection site is 
located shall provide the Inspected 
Party with its approval for the aircraft 
of the Inspecting Party to proceed to 
the point of entry via the filed routing, 
or an amended routing if necessary. 

2. The Basing Country in whose 
territory the inspection site is located 
shall facilitate the entry of inspectors 
and aircrew into the country, and shall 
take the steps necessary to ensure that 
the baggage and equipment of the in- 
spection team is identified and trans- 
ported expeditiously through customs. 

3. Upon notification by the In- 
spected Party, in accordance with Arti- 
cle III above, of the inspection site, the 
Basing Country in whose territory the 
inspection is to take place shall take 
the steps necessary to ensure that the 
inspection team is granted all clear- 
ances and assistance necessary to en- 
able it to proceed expeditiously to the 
inspection site and 

to arrive at the inspection site within 
nine hours of the Inspecting Party's no- 
tification of the site to be inspected. 
The Inspected Party and the Basing 
Country in which the inspection site is 
located shall consult with respect to the 
mode of transport to be utilized, and 
the Basing Country shall have the right 
to designate the routing between the 
point of entry and the inspection site. 

4. Each Basing Country shall assist 
the Inspected Party, as necessary, in 
providing two-way voice communication 
capability for an inspection team be- 
tween an inspection site within its ter- 
ritory and the embassy of the 
Inspecting Party. 

5. The Inspected Party and the 
Basing Country within whose territory 
an inspection site is located shall con- 
sult with respect to aircraft servicing 
and the provision of meals, lodging, and 
services for inspectors and aircrew 
members at the point of entry and in- 
spection site. The cost of the foregoing 
requested by the Inspected Party and 
provided by the Basing Country shall 
be borne by the Inspected Party. 



6. In the event the Inspecting 
Party requests an extension, which 
shall not exceed eight hours beyond the 
original 24-hour period of inspection as 
provided for in Section VI, paragraph 
14 of the Inspection Protocol, the In- 
spected Party shall immediately notify 
the Basing Country in whose territory 
the inspection site is located of the 
extension. 



ARTICLE VI 

Consultations 

1. Within five days after entry into 
force of this Agreement, the Inspected 
Party and the Basing Countries shall 
meet to coordinate implementation of 
the inspection activities provided for by 
Article XI of the Treaty, the Inspection 
Protocol and this Agreement. 

2. A meeting between the In- 
spected Party and any Basing Country 
to discuss implementation of this 
Agreement shall be held within five 
days of a request for such a meeting by 
the Inspected Party or a Basing 
Country. 

3. Should any question arise which 
in the opinion of a Basing Country re- 
quires immediate attention, the Basing 
Country may contact the inspection no- 
tification authority of the Inspected 
Party. The Inspected Party will imme- 
diately acknowledge receipt of the in- 
quiry or question and give urgent 
attention to the question or problem. 

4. In the event that a Basing Coun- 
try determines that an inspector or air- 
crew member has violated the 
conditions governing inspection within 
its territory, the Basing Country may 
notify the Inspected Party which shall 
inform the Inspecting Party of the dis- 
qualification of the inspector or aircrew 
member. The name of the individual 
will be removed from the list of inspec- 
tors or aircrew members. 

5. A Basing Country may change 
the point of entry for its territory by 
giving six months' notice of such change 
to the Inspected Party. 

6. Upon completion of an inspec- 
tion, the Inspection Party shall advise 
the Basing Country within whose ter- 
ritory the inspection took place that the 
inspection has been completed, and 
upon request of the Basing Country 
provide a briefing for the Basing Coun- 
try on the inspection. 



7. The United States of Amen 
shall not, without the express agi'e 
ment of the Basing Countries, pro) 
or accept any amendment to Articl 
of the Treaty or to the Inspection I 
tocol that directly affects the right. , 
terests or obligations of the Basing 
Countries. 



ARTICLE VII 

Entry into Force and Duration 

This Agreement shall be subject to a 
proval in accordance with the constiti 
tional procedures of each Party, whicl 
approval shall be notified by each Pai 
to each of the other Parties. Followin 
such notification by all Parties, the 
Agreement shall enter into force sim 
taneously with the entry into force ol 
the Treaty and shall remain in force 1 
a period of thirteen years. 

DONE at Brussels, on the eleven 
of December, 1987, in a single origins 
which shall be deposited in the archi' 
of the Government of the United Stai 
of America, which shall transmit a d\ 
certified copy thereof to each of the 
other signatory Governments. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the 
dersigned, being duly authorized, ha 
signed this Agreement. 



? 



For the Government of the Kingdom 

Belgium: 

Leo Tindemans 

For the Government of the Federal E 
public of Germany: 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher 

For the Government of the Republic ■ 

Italy: 

GiuLio Andreotti 

For the Government of the Kingdom 
the Netherlands: 
Hans van den Broek 



For the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and North* 
Ireland: 
Geoffrey Howe 



For the Government of the United 
States of America: 
George P. Shultz 



Bit 



1 



ARMS CONTROL 



ANNEX 

J revisions on Privileges 
; id Immunities of Inspectors 
id Aircrew Members 

order to exercise their functions ef- 
ctively, for the purpose of implement- 
g the Treaty and not for their 
irsonal benefit, inspectors and aircrew 
embers shall be accorded the priv- 
.'ges and immunities contained herein, 
•ivileges and immunities shall be ac- 
rded for the entire in-country period 

the country in which an inspection 
;e is located, and thereafter with re- 
>ect to acts previously performed in 
16 exercise of official functions as an 
•spector or aircrew member 

1. Inspectors and aircrew members 
lall be accorded the inviolability en- 
yed by diplomatic agents pursuant to 
ifticle 29 of the Vienna Convention on 
iplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961. 

2. The papers and correspondence 
inspectors and aircrew members 

all enjoy the inviolability accorded to 
I e papers and correspondence of diplo- 
I atic agents pursuant to Article 30 of 
e Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
slations. In addition, the aircraft of 
e inspection team shall be inviolable. 

3. Inspectors and aircrew members 
lall be accoi-ded the immunities ac- 

I rded diplomatic agents pursuant to 
iragi-aphs (1), (2) and (3) of Article 31 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
I elations. The immunity from jurisdic- 
I Dn of an inspector or an aircrew mem- 
;r may be waived by the Inspecting 
irty in those cases when it is of the 
jinion that immunity would impede 
le course of justice and that it can be 
aived without prejudice to the imple- 
entation of the provisions of the 
reaty. Waiver must always be express. 

4. Inspectors and aircrew members 
" the Inspecting Party shall be permit- 
id to bring into the territory of a Bas- 
ig Country in which an inspection site 

located, without payment of any 
istoms duties or related charges, arti- 
es for their personal use, with the 
•tception of articles the import or ex- 
ert of which is prohibited by law or 
Dntrolled by quarantine regulations. 

5. An inspector or aircrew member 
hall not engage in any professional or 
ommercial activity for personal profit 
n the territory of the Basing Coun- 
ries. ■ 



Beyond the Summit: 

Next Steps in Arms Control 



I 



by Paul H. Nitze 

Address before the National Press 
Club on December 15, 1987. Ambas- 
sador Nitze is special adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State on 
arms control matters. 

Before getting into the future, let me 
say a few words about the past. 

When I was appointed to head the 
U.S. delegation to the INF [intermedi- 
ate-range nuclear forces] negotiations 
at their outset in 1981, I made two 
immediate decisions. 

First, we would prepare a draft of 
the "zero option" treaty we wanted be- 
fore the negotiations began. 

Second, we would keep an issues 
book in which we would enter, day-by- 
day, what had been said by either side 
on each issue that arose in the talks. 

At the end of the first year, there 
were 35 issues in our book. Of those 35, 
five issues were clearly the most impor- 
tant, so we focused on those five. Over 
the succeeding years, especially at 
Reykjavik, we finally removed the five 
issues. But having removed those boul- 
ders blocking an agreement, we still 
faced a lot of rocks. 

This past October, after the 2-day 
meeting in Washington between Secre- 
tary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shev- 
ardnadze in which the INF issues that 
loomed largest were resolved, it was 
left that Soviet Ambassador Viktor 
Karpov and I were to try to resolve the 
remaining issues the next day. I asked 
Karpov how many issues he had on his 
list, and he said there were 35, of 
which five were the most important. 

I concluded that it is inherent in 
the human mind, when confronted with 
a very complex situation, to simplify it 
to 35 considerations, and then to 5. 

Next Steps 

During last week's meetings, President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gor- 
bachev accomplished a lot. They signed 
the INF Treaty we had been seeking 
for 6 years. They issued a joint state- 
ment which significantly advanced us 
toward a stabilizing START [strategic 
arms reduction talks] treaty. And they 
agreed on language on defense and 



space which narrows the issues and 
promises to make them more 
manageable. 

Where do we go from here? There 
are many tasks that come to mind; by 
rough estimate, about 35. But allow me 
to concentrate on the most important 
five. These are: 

• Ratifying the INF Treaty; 

• Continuing our work on a START 
treaty; 

• Dealing with defense and space 
issues; 

• Continuing our efforts on non- 
nuclear arms control; and 

• Maintaining our focus on the 
broader context of U.S. -Soviet 
relations. 



Ratifying the INF Treaty 

Clearly, our most immediate and im- 
portant task is to get the advice and 
consent of the Senate in favor of 
ratification of the INF Treaty. All of 
our other efforts depend on this 
outcome. 

Why should the Senate so advise 
the President? Because this treaty 
enhances the security of the United 
States and its allies, and it contains the 
verification measures necessary to mon- 
itor Soviet compliance with confidence 
and to detect any militarily significant 
noncompliance in time for us to respond 
appropriately. 

To determine how the treaty en- 
hances our security interests, one must 
recall how the INF issue and the ensu- 
ing negotiations arose in the first place. 

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union 
began deployment of SS-20 intermedi- 
ate-range missiles, greatly enhancing 
the nuclear threat to both our Euro- 
pean and Asian friends and allies. This 
raised concern, particularly among Eu- 
ropeans, of a significant imbalance in 
the spectrum of nuclear capabilities di- 
rectly affecting not only NATO Europe 
but also other countries on the periph- 
ery of the U.S.S.R. 

In its 1979 dual-track decision, the 
alliance determined to redress this im- 
balance. It decided: 

First, to deploy comparable mis- 
siles of its own; and 

Second, to seek to minimize, 
through negotiations, the number of 
such missiles either side would deploy. 



ARMS CONTROL 



In 1981, President Reagan proposed 
NATO's preferred outcome: the com- 
plete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet 
missiles of this class, or the "zero op- 
tion." In meeting after meeting since, 
the NATO allies, and our Asian allies 
as well, reiterated their preference for 
this global zero outcome. 

This, of course, is what we have 
now achieved. With the elimination of 
the SS-20s and all other Soviet missiles 
of this class, the Soviet Union will no 
longer possess INF missiles capable of 
threatening targets in Europe from So- 
viet soil. This perceived weakness in 
the structure of deterrence has been 
removed. 

In sum, a security threat was iden- 
tified, a strategy to address the threat 
was conceived and implemented, and an 
outcome was achieved that removed 
that threat. This is a NATO success 
story, enhanced by the fact that the 
reductions are decidedly asymmetric in 
NATO's favor, leading to an equal end 
point. This sets a good precedent for 
future arms reduction efforts. 

It appears that much of the 
ratification debate will center on ver- 
ification. In conducting this debate, it 
is important to understand the purpose 
of verification. We negotiate arms con- 
trol treaties to limit the military ca- 
pabilities of our adversary. The purpose 
of verification is to ensure that the 
treaties serve their intended purpose. 
That is, we want to be sure that the 
other side has not moved beyond the 
intended limits in any militarily signifi- 
cant way, and, if they do, we want to 
be able to detect such violations in time 
to respond as necessary. 

Of course, our ability to detect and 
respond to violations serves to deter 
the other side from committing them in 
the first place. The type of verification 
regime I have described is what the 
President has in mind when he calls for 
effective verification. And we have it in 
the INF Treaty 

You have undoubtedly heard much 
about the INF verification regime. Sim- 
ply put, we are entitled to onsite in- 
spection to count Soviet INF missile 
systems and structures, to watch them 
being destroyed, to determine that no 
more are left after the elimination pro- 
cess is completed, and to check the for- 
mer INF sites on short notice to make 
sure no missiles secretly return. We 
also will monitor the output of the pro- 
duction facility where SS-20 missiles 
were assembled in the past and could 
most readily be assembled in the 
future. 



Does this mean that we are guar- 
anteed that the Soviets cannot hide an 
INF missile somewhere on their ter- 
ritory? No. Only anytime, anywhere 
inspections without a possibility of 
refusal would provide hope of such a 
guarantee, and we believe that ceding 
the same right in the INF Treaty to 
Soviet inspectors on our territory is not 
in our own interests. 

But if the Soviets were to succeed 
in secretly retaining some missiles, 
they could not test them, train troops 
in their operation, or maintain the bas- 
ing infrastructure necessary to support 
them, all of which we could detect. 
Without these, the Soviets could not 
maintain a militarily significant ca- 
pability. Thus the regime meets the 
standard of effective verification. 

There is one final point I wish to 
make on the subject of INF ratifica- 
tion. From both sides of the Senate, we 
hear talk these days about the pos- 
sibility of attaching reservations to the 
treaty, and one reservation often sug- 
gested is to delay final implementation 
of the elimination of INF missiles until 
the conventional imbalance is I'esolved. 
Alternatively, some suggest holding up 
a START agreement for this purpose. 

I believe that either course of ac- 
tion would be most unwise. We have 
signed the INF Tj-eaty because it is in 
our security interest, as I have e,\- 
plained. Similarly, the START agree- 
ment we are seeking would be in our 
security interest. If we succeed in 
reaching such agreements, we should 
not be barred from putting them into 
effect. 

The conventional imbalance is a se- 
rious matter, but it is not a problem 
caused or exacerbated by an INF 
agreement. Indeed, one of the forgot- 
ten facts about INF is that, prior to 
1977, when there was no perceived need 
by NATO for INF missiles, NATO 
faced a conventional imbalance and a 
large force of Soviet INF missiles — 
SS-4S and SS-5s— for which NATO had 
no corresponding systems. After the 
INF agreement, we will return to the 
pre-1977 situation, e.xcept that even the 
SS-4s and SS-5s will be gone. 

The way to address the conven- 
tional force problem is through uni- 
lateral NATO programs and at the 
negotiating table, and we are working 
on both. We and our allies are currently 
seeking to establish a mandate for con- 
ventional stability talks between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, and we are dis- 
cussing with our allies improvements in 
conventional capabilities. 



But any realistic assessment of 
prospects in this area would lead one i 
conclude that it will be at least a year 
or two before the problem is resolved. 
In the meantime, why should we allow 
the SS-20 threat to Europe and Asia 
remain, and why should we allow the 
promising momentum of the START n 
gotiations to be dissipated? 

As we move forward with INF ar 
START, however, there should be no 
doubt that we will maintain the ca- 
pabilities necessary to deter Soviet afi 
gression. In Europe, this will include 
maintaining, after the elimination of 
INF missiles, approximately 4,000 nu 
clear warheads on a variety of deliver 
systems, some of which can reach dee 
into the Soviet Union. 

Trying to resolve all of our securi 
concerns in one fell swoop is just too 
difficult a task. As pieces of the prob- 
lem are resolved, those solutions shoi 
be implemented, as long as they do n 
exacerbate other problems. Both INP 
and the agi'eement we seek in START 
would resolve critical security problei 
without aggravating others; we shoul 
move forward on them now. 

START 

Now let me turn to the START area. 
our talks last week with the Soviet 
arms control experts, we emphasized 
three groups of START issues: counti 
rules, sublimits, and verification. Sig- 
nificant headway was made on all thr< 

Counting rules — that is, the agre 
standards by which the sides determi 
how the systems and components to I 
Hmited will be counted against the lln 
its — tend to get passed off as part of 
the technical details of arms control, 
but these rules can have a profound i^ 
pact on an agreement's effects. 

To agree on rules by which the 
number of warheads carried by missil 
and bombers are to be counted is not 
an easy matter; an agreement that ap 
peared to be equal could be anything 
but if it undercounted the systems po 
sessed mainly by one side and over- 
counted the systems emphasized by t: 
other. 

Last week, we made real progres 
on counting warheads on ballistic mis 
siles and ALCMs [air-launched cruise 
missiles] on heavy bombers. For the 
former, each side has declared the 
number of warheads deployed on each 
type of existing missile, and the othei 
side will verify it through agreed pro^ 
cedures, including onsite inspection o 
deployed missiles. 



Ill 



M 



U 



ARMS CONTROL 



For the latter, the problem is some- 
hat different because, unlike with bal- 
5tic missiles, ALCM loads for bombers 
•e normally less than the theoretical 
opacity and can also be changed read- 
f. The Soviets agreed to our idea of 
tributing for counting purposes a cer- 
.in number of ALCMs to each type of 
;avy bomber, regardless of the maxi- 
um number that bomber could carry 
id the specific number it might be 
irrying at any given time. This ap- 
"oach reduces verification problems 
nd takes into account operational 
«alities. 

The sublimit area is one on which 
le have been concentrating for some 
rme. We have emphasized that 50% re- 
actions are not inherently stabilizing; 
is necessary to ensure, through sub- 
mits, that a side cannot retain a pre- 
jnderance of the most destabilizing 
'Stems. 

Previously, the Soviets had agreed 
1 a sublimit on heavy ICBMs [inter- 
mtinental ballistic missiles], the most 
j, ^stabilizing systems of all, at 1,540 
arheads on 154 missiles, or 50% of the 
uTciit Soviet level. Last week, they 
(reed to another sublimit, this one on 
illistic missile warheads at the level of 
90(1. This sublimit would force a re- 
iction of slightly more than 50%- in 
le warheads on the fast-flying Soviet 
illi.-^tic missile force. In 1982, Presi- 
I'tit Reagan proposed 5,000 for this 
inihcr, so again, we have achieved a 
» ngstanding U.S. objective. 
I In the verification area, we were 
|,3le to build on the foundation provided 
L INF. The Soviets agreed that 
■TART would include all of the types of 
1 ispections I mentioned earlier for 
MP, as well as, at least in principle, 
ispect-site inspections and more ex- 
'H.sive monitoring of production facili- 
es. This is necesary in START 
iBcause we will be placing numerical 
mils on systems rather than banning 
lem. 

So where do we go next? Our nego- 
ators in Geneva have created a joint 
racketed treaty text, just like the one 
,'e had for INF last summer. Wherever 
tie two sides disagree on an issue, 
tieir |)ositions are included in brackets. 

The fact that we are far enough 
jlong to have such a text is promising, 
|nd the document helps to focus nego- 
iiating efforts, but many brackets cur- 
lently remain, including in the three 
,ireas I have just discussed. We still 
! eed to agree on the number of ALCMs 
,10 attribute to each type of heavy 
Jiomber and to establish procedures for 



verifying the number of warheads de- 
ployed on each type of existing ballistic 
missile. We need to address the U.S. 
proposal for a sublimit of 3,300 on 
ICBM warheads. And there is much 
work to be done in working out the 
details of verification procedures. 

Beyond these questions, there are 
many more issues, such as the U.S. 
desire to ban mobile ICBMs, the 
number of SLCMs [submarine-launched 
cruise missiles] we allow outside the 
aggregate ceiling of 6,000 warheads 
and how we verify that limit, and the 
question of a possible linkage between 
defense and space and START. 

Despite all the progress we've 
made in START, the list of remaining 
issues is daunting, and the question 
arises of whether it is possible to com- 
plete a treaty during this Administra- 
tion. My own belief is that it will be 
very difficult but not impossible. We 
will be pushing forward intensively, and 
we will do our best to finish the job. 

Defense and Space 

Since Reykjavik, the defense and space 
area has involved three primary issues: 
the length of time during which the 
sides would agree not to withdraw from 
the ABM Treaty in order to deploy de- 
fenses, what happens after the period, 
and what happens during the period. 
All three issues were discussed in de- 
tail last week; the differences remain, 
but progress was made on all three. 

On the question of what happens 
after the nonwithdrawal period, the So- 
viets agreed that, unless the sides 
agree otherwise, "each side will be free 
to decide its course of action." This pre- 
serves the right to deploy we seek. 

On the question of what happens 
during the nonwithdrawal period, we 
included language stating that the sides 
would observe the ABM Treaty "as 
signed in 1972," as well as language 
stating that the sides would "conduct 
their research, development, and test- 
ing as required, which are permitted by 
the ABM Treaty." This should take the 
sharp edges off the ABM debate, while 
assisting in protecting our program to 
proceed with SDI [Strategic Defense 
Initiative] research, testing, and devel- 
opment as a matter of national security 
need. 

Over the next several months, as 
we push forward in START, we intend 
also to continue dealing with the three 
main defense and space issues. 



Non-Nuclear Arms Control 

Our non-nuclear arms control efforts in- 
volve primarily conventional forces and 
chemical weapons (CW). As I men- 
tioned earlier, we are in the midst of 
mandate talks for new negotiations on 
conventional stability. 

These negotiations would involve 
the 23 countries of NATO and the War- 
saw Pact and would address conven- 
tional forces in Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals. Our objective in 
the conventional stability talks is a 
verifiable agreement that would lead to 
a stable balance of conventional forces 
at lower levels. This will require far 
greater reductions in tanks, artillery, 
and other equipment on the Soviet side 
to eliminate the capability of the War- 
saw Pact for surprise attack and sus- 
tained offensive operations and thus to 
restore equality and stability in conven- 
tional forces. 

We hope the mandate talks will 
lead to actual negotiations as soon as 
possible, perhaps as early as next year. 
In the meantime, we will continue our 
current efforts with our NATO allies to 
put together a sound NATO position 
that we can introduce at the outset of 
the negotiations. 

As for chemical weapons, the 
United States remains committed to 
achieving a comprehensive global ban, 
encompassing all nations with chemical 
weapons capability. We tabled a draft 
treaty caUing for such a ban in 1984 in 
the 40-nation Conference on Disarma- 
ment in Geneva. Since then, we have 
negotiated hard to bring it about. 

The key is getting a treaty that is 
both effective and verifiable. We are 
encouraged by recent Soviet agreement 
in principle to mandatory challenge in- 
spection with no right of refusal and an 
early bilateral exchange of data. 

However, there are a number of 
crucial issues remaining to be worked 
out. We have agreed with the Soviets 
to concentrate our bilateral talks on 
maintaining security during the de- 
struction of CW stocks, protecting sen- 
sitive non-CW-related information 
during inspections, and the need to 
strengthen verification in light of new 
technologies, increasing proliferation, 
and a dual-capable chemical industry. 

The Broader Context 

Attaining progress in the various arms 
control areas is only part of the com- 
plex equation of the difficult U.S.- 
Soviet relationship. A long-term, sus- 
tained improvement in the relationship 



ARMS CONTROL 



will depend greatly on resolving differ- 
ences in other crucial areas. 

For 2 years now, we have worked 
hard to establish with the Soviet Union 
a process that addresses a full range of 
issues — what we call the four-part 
agenda that encompasses arms reduc- 
tions, human rights, regional conflicts, 
and bilateral relations. Serious differ- 
ences in all of these areas have accumu- 
lated over the last four decades, and 
they are the source of the profound 
mistrust and suspicion that characterize 
East-West relations today. 

We recently have seen greater 
Soviet willingness to discuss these 
matters in detail, and this has led to 
progress in some areas. For example, 
agreements reached over the last 2 
years have greatly increased the oppor- 
tunities for contact between U.S. and 
Soviet citizens. President Reagan and 
General Secretary Gorbachev have 
agreed that the effort to foster greater 
cooperation and contact on the basis of 
genuine mutual benefit should continue. 

In two other areas — human rights 
and regional affairs — there remains a 
long way to go. We have recognized and 
welcomed recent Soviet human rights 
steps but have pointed out that human 
rights will remain a source of tension in 
East- West relations until the Soviet 
Union fully observes its international 
human rights obligations. Similarly, we 
have made clear that Soviet involve- 
ment in regional conflicts — whether di- 
rectly, as in Afghanistan, or through 
support for such regimes as Vietnam or 
Nicaragua — inevitably will affect West- 
ern perceptions of the Soviet Union's 
ultimate intentions. 

The United States is ready to ad- 
dress all the problems candidly and 
constructively. In the end, however, the 
Soviet Union must demonstrate that it 
is willing to deal with its own people 
and its neighbors through dialogue, not 
intimidation. The burden both sides 
will bear for the foreseeable future is to 
manage our competition peacefully and 
to build a more stable and constructive 
relationship. 

Conclusion 

Thus, we have a very full agenda in the 
days ahead. We have no intention of 
resting on our laurels; to the contrary, 
we want our success in INF to be the 
springboard for progress in other 
areas. 



If we are to find further success, it 
will be because we will succeed in rep- 
licating the elements that led to the 
INF Treaty: strength, domestic co- 
herence, and unity with our allies. With 
these assets, and with patience, we can 
take further steps down the road to- 



ward a safer and stabler world, with 
lower levels of offenses and increased 
reliance on effective defenses, should 
they prove feasible, and with a less- 
ened risk of war. That is our ultimate 
goal. ■ 



INF Treaty: A Success Story 



Background 

On December 8 in Washington, Presi- 
dent Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev signed the historic INF [In- 
termediate-range Nuclear Forces] 
Treaty. This treaty eliminates the en- 
tire class of U.S. and Soviet intermedi- 
ate-range nuclear missiles. The treaty 
is a direct consequence of the Presi- 
dent's steadfast commitment to achiev- 
ing real arms reductions, rather than 
merely limiting increases as in previous 
treaties. It also is the result of NATO 
solidarity in responding to the threat 
posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 
missiles. 

What's in the Treaty? 

The treaty provides for the elimination 
of all U.S. and Soviet INF missile sys- 
tems in the range of 500-5,500 kilo- 
meters (about 300-3,400 miles) and the 
elimination or conversion of related fa- 
cilities within 3 years after it enters 
into force. The treaty bans all produc- 
tion and flight testing of these missiles 
immediately upon entry into force. 
After elimination is completed, the 
treaty will ban all facilities for deploy- 
ment, storage, repair, and production of 
these missile systems. 

How Can We Verify It? 

The President has said that it would be 
better to have no arms control agree- 
ments than agreements that cannot be 
effectively verified. A treaty cannot be 
based on trust; it must be supported by 
effective verification. Accordingly, this 
treaty contains the most stringent ver- 
ification provisions in the history of 
arms control. Compliance with it can be 
effectively verified. 

The treaty meets the objectives the 
United States has established for ver- 
ification of the treaty's terms. These ob- 
jectives are to: 

• Ensure confidence in the 
agreement; 



• Deter violation of the treaty by 
increasing the likelihood that such vi( 
lations would be detected; and 

• Permit timely detection of vio- 
lations, so that we can take approprit 
steps to protect U.S. and allied 
security. 

Specifically, the verification provi 
sions include: 

• An unprecedented exchange of 
data on the systems limited by the 
treaty, including numbers, locations, 
and technical characteristics of all IN 
missiles and launchers; 

• Inspections at INF sites to con 
firm the validity of the data exchange 
to help verify elimination of these 
weapons and related infrastructure, 
and to help verify that INF activity 
ceased; 

• Short-notice onsite inspection a 
INF- related sites during the 3-year r 
ductions period and for 10 years 
afterward; 

• Resident inspectors at key miss 
final assembly facilities; and 

• Prohibition on interference witl 
verification by national technical 
means, which includes satellite 
imagery. 

These provisions will facilitate ef 
fective verification of Soviet compliar 
with the treaty. We will be able to as 
sess compliance in a timely manner, s 
that we can compensate for any risk 
posed to our security or that of our 
allies if the Soviets violate the accorc 



Ire 
C. 

mm 



We've Strengthened 
U.S. and Allied Security 

The INF Treaty is in the security int 
ests of the United States and our alii 
The Soviet Union will eliminate de- 
ployed systems capable of carrying 
more than 1,500 nuclear warheads; th ' 
United States, almost 400. This estal 7' 
lishes the precedent of the Soviets ur 
dertaking greater reductions to reacl ^' 
equal levels with us. The treaty also 



.£A 



sltt 

h 
ft 

l.\T 



EUROPE 



n> any future deployment of INF 
Hssilfs, including the newly developed 
iviet ground-launched cruise missile, 
jployment of these missiles would 
,ve seriously complicated NATO air 
■fense. Elimination of Soviet INF mis- 
es will enhance the survivability of 
ATO forces by eliminating the most 
fective weapons against key NATO 
rgets. NATO will retain a substantial 
(clear capacity sufficient to ensure the 
ntinued viability of its strategy of 
xible response. 

le've Achieved U.S. Objectives 

le treaty meets longheld U.S. goals 
INF negotiations. When the talks 
,gan in 1981, the President proposed 
18 "zero option" for elimination of all 
nger range INF missiles (range 
')00-5,500 kilometers or about 
0-3,400 miles). In July 1987, the Sovi- 
s agreed to eliminate these systems, 
milarly, the United States has sought 
constrain shorter range INF mis- 
ies (range 500-1,000 kilometers or 
•out 300-600 miles) to prevent circum- 
intion of an accord on longer range 
issiles by a Soviet buildup of shorter 
■nge missiles. The treaty satisfies this 
quirement by eliminating all Soviet 
,d U.S. shorter range INF missiles. 
he United States has none of these 
issiles deployed.) In agreeing to 
lOrldwide elimination of these missiles. 

Be Soviets have accepted the U.S. 
inciple that limitations on INF mis- 
sies must be global to prevent trans- 
r of the threat from Europe to Asia. 
ne treaty also meets the U.S. demand 
lat U.S. -Soviet agreements cannot 
mit the forces of our allies. 

.S.and Allied Perseverance: 
NATO Triumph 

he success of these negotiations has 
■jen made possible by Western deter- 
mination to adhere to NATO's 1979 
dual track" decision to respond to So- 
let SS-20 deployments through 
eployment of U.S. longer range INF 
lissiles while seeking through 
negotiations with the Soviets to reach 
An INF balance at the lowest possible 
'I'vel. NATO steadfastness has paid off. 
through this treaty, we achieve elim- 
jiation of the threat to NATO and 
,sian security posed by Soviet INF 
'lissiles. Furthermore, we and our al- 
|es have enhanced the credibility of our 
eterrent by demonstrating convinc- 
igly to the Soviets that we have the 



unity and political will to make and 
stand by tough decisions to ensure our 
security. 

A First Step Toward A Safer World 

Having achieved the INF Treaty, the 
United States continues its determined 
efforts to achieve a safer world, includ- 



ing negotiations for deep reductions in 
strategic (intercontinental) weapons, 
greater balance in conventional forces 
in Europe, and an effective global ban 
on chemical weapons. 



Taken from the GIST series of December 
1987, published by the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State. Editor: 
Harriet Culley. ■ 



NATO Defense Planning 
Committee Meets in Brussels 



The Defense Ministers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
met 171 Brussels December 1-2, 1987. 
The United States was represented by 
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Car- 
lucci. Following is the text of the final 
communique issued December 2. 

The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
ministerial session in Brussels on 1st and 
2nd December 1987. 

We reaffirmed that the objective of the 
Alliance is to preserve the security of its 
members through adequate defensive 
strength and to enhance stability through 
the development of a more constructive re- 
lationship between East and West. We wel- 
comed the forthcoming meeting between 
President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev as an 
important stage in this process. We wel- 
comed and fully support the agreement be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union for the global elimination of land- 
based INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] missiles with a range between 500 
and .5,500 kilometers. This has been made 
possible by the determination and soli- 
darity of the allied governments over the 
years. We look forward to the prospect of 
the INF treaty being signed and ratified in 
the near future. 

We will continue to explore all pos- 
sibilities to improve security and stability. 
The reality with which we must contend is 
the scale of Soviet military power and its 
continuing improvement and moderniza- 
tion. In this respect, our strategy of flexi- 
ble response and forward defense remains 
the most effective and appropriate means 
to safeguard our security. We are deter- 
mined to continue to provide the level, 
quality and mix of systems, nuclear and 
conventional, necessary to ensure the cred- 
ibility of this strategy. 

Referring to our recent discussions on 
nuclear matters at Monterey, we re- 
affirmed that the INF agreement is a ma- 
jor accomplishment for the Alliance. At 
this meeting, we focused our attention on 
conventional forces where imbalances be- 
tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact con- 
tinue to concern us. We are determined to 



improve our conventional forces through 
the implementation of the Conventional 
Defense Improvements (CDI) action plan. 
CD! concentrates attention on the key de- 
ficiencies in our defense posture and iden- 
tifies those areas where extra effort will 
provide the greatest return. We welcome 
progress made thus far in addressing these 
key deficiencies. We shall continue to place 
special emphasis on these areas in our na- 
tional planning. 

It is with the objective of improving 
our forces firmly in mind that we discussed 
the result of the 1987 annual defense re- 
view and adopted the NATO force plan for 
1988-1992. The defense review has demon- 
strated the further consolidation of CDI 
through the greater alignment of national 
plans with collectively agreed objectives. 
The provision of adequate resources and 
improving value for money, in accordance 
with the 1987 ministerial guidance, will 
continue to be a serious challenge for all 
nations. 

The difficulty of reconciling resources 
with force requirements encourages us to 
pursue CDI more vigorously and to redou- 
ble our efforts to optimize our collective 
return through closer cooperation and co- 
ordination. We stressed the need for initia- 
tives designed to offer cooperative 
solutions to potential problems which can 
be better dealt with collectively than by 
nations individually. We agreed that 
changes and adjustments to national plans 
should continue to be made within the 
overall framework of Alliance planning. 

We stressed the need for broader par- 
ticipation by Alliance members in provid- 
ing increased assistance to Greece, 
Portugal and Turkey to strengthen their 
conventional defense, in order that they 
may more effectively fulfill their proper 
roles in the collective defense of the Al- 
liance. We also expressed particular inter- 
est in the continuing work of the 
independent European program group on 
assistance to these countries which aims at 
permitting them to participate more fully 
as partners in armaments cooperation pro- 
grams with their NATO allies. 

We strongly supported proposals for 
the establishment of a NATO Conventional 



^sbruarv 1988 



85 



EUROPE 



Armaments Planning System (NATO 
CAPS) on a trial basis starting early next 
year. Such a system will improve NATO 
defense planning by enabling each member 
nation to get the best value out of its re- 
sources devoted to the research, develop- 
ment, production and procurement of 
conventional defense equipment, and 
thereby to meet better the needs of the 
Alliance. 

We noted the progress made by the 
Conference of National Armaments Direc- 
tors (CNAD) in cooperative projects, in- 
cluding those launched as a result of 
United States legislation. We reaffirmed 
the importance we continue to attach to 
the sharing of technology between the 
members of the Alliance, and to the pro- 
tection of militarily relevant technology. 

The Harmel Report, published 20 
years ago, recognized that the Alliance has 
"tw^o main functions. First, to maintain ade- 
quate military strength and political soli- 
darity to deter aggression and other forms 
of pressure and to defend the territory of 
member countries if aggression should oc- 
cur. Secondly, in the resulting climate of 
stability, security and confidence, to pur- 
sue the search for progress towards a more 
stable relationship in which the underlying 
political issues can be solved. Recent prog- 
ress illustrates the validity of this ap- 
proach. As we move ahead, we must take 
care to sustain this balance between the 
military and political components of our 
strategy, and to ensure a comprehensive, 
integrated and coherent approach to all el- 
ements of arms control and security, nu- 
clear and non-nuclear. 

In this respect, noting the potential of- 
fered by negotiations to establish a stable 
and secure balance of conventional forces 
at lower levels in Europe, we welcomed 
progress made in Vienna to convene con- 
ventional stability negotiations covering 
the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to 
the Urals. The achievement of our priority 
objective of eliminating the Warsaw Pact 
capability for launching surprise attack and 
initiating large-scale offensive action would 
be a significant step towards greater se- 
curity and stability. It will be important 
that defense plans and arms control policy 
objectives remain in harmony in order to 
ensure their complementary contribution 
to Alliance security policy. ■ 



[ST 



34th Report on Cyprus 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
NOV. 20, 1987 ' 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I 
am submitting to you a bimonthly report 
on progress toward a negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus question. 

I would like first to note the United 
Nations Secretary General's October 29 an- 
nouncement of the appointment of a new 
Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on Cyprus, Oscar Hector 
Camilion. Mr. Camilion is a former Foreign 
Minister of Argentina and a distinguished 
diplomat with long and varied experience 
in the art of negotiation. Our best wishes 
and full support go with Mr. Camilion as 
he begins his efforts in the cause of estab- 
lishing a long-lasting and equitable peace 
on Cyprus. 

There was considerable dialogue on the 
Cyprus problem during this period be- 
tween the United Nations Secretary Gen- 
eral and the parties to the dispute and also 
between United States representatives and 
a wide range of interested parties. In the 
context of the opening of the 42nd United 
Nations General Assembly session, the 
Secretary General met separately, in early 
October, with both Cypriot President 
Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot 
leader Rauf Denktash, as well as with the 
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey. 
The Secretary of State held discussions 
with Cypriot Foreign Minister lacovou, 
Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, and 
Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglu. Spe- 
cial Cyprus Coordinator M. James Wilkin- 
son met with Turkish Cypriot leader 
Denktash. 

We continued to consult actively with 
UN representatives, allies, and concerned 
groups and individuals on the problem. In 
discussions regarding the Cyprus dispute. 
United States representatives emphasized 
the need for the parties to give the fullest 
cooperation to the efforts of the UN Secre- 
tary General. 

We also added our voice to that of the 
Secretary General in reiterating concern 
about the potentially dangerous military 
buildup on the island, a serious situation 



that the UN Secretary General once ag; 
pointed to in his latest "Report of the 
ganization," released on September 9. V 
find merit in the Secretary General's eff 
to address the issue through his proposE 
that the United Nations undertake a foi 
verification role on Cyprus. Although th 
parties to the dispute have not agreed v 
this concept, we would hope that constr 
tive reviews with the Secretary General 
this or other ideas can be pursued in thi 
interest of strengthening stability. 

Also on the topic and further to my 
last report to the Congress, there have 
been additional reports of withdrawals ( 
Turkish tanks from Cyprus. Recent re- 
ports indicate that Turkey has continuei 
remove older model tanks from the islai 
consistent with earlier Turkish stateme 
that a modernization program had cause 
temporary rise in the number of tanks. 
The recent difficulties for the Unite 
Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 
caused by the Swedish decision to with- 
draw its soldiers from the Force, have 1: 
resolved through the magnanimous offe 
replacement troops by the Governments 
Austria and Canada. On October 3, the 
UNFICYP spokesman released details 
the arrangements under which the Can: 
dian and Austrian soldiers will be deplo 
along the cease-fire line. These troops, 
added to the already sizeable contingen 
from those two countries and the other 
troop-contributing nations, will enable 
UNFICYP to continue its invaluable ro 
on the island without interruption. Unfi 
tunately, UNFICYP's funding problems 
have not been resolved, and we continui 
urging other countries to increase their 
contributions to the voluntary fund sup- 
porting UNFICYP. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald Reai 



,l(l(i 



' Identical letters addressed to Jim 
Wright, Speaker of the House of Repres 
tatives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman ol 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committe' 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presi( 
tial Documents of Nov. 23, 1987). ■ 



86 



non^^rtmonf nf qt^tP R 



I'ESTERN HEMISPHERE 



I'olicies for Economic Development 



1 Latin America 



Peter D. Whitney 

Address before the Peruvian Center 

■ International Studies (CEPEI) in 
ma on November 25, 1987. Mr. 
litneij is Director of the Office of Re- 
mal Economic Policy in the Bureau 
I nter-A m e rican Affa i rs . 

reatly appreciate the opportunity to 
ak at this CEPEI conference be- 
se the theme being discussed here — 
present world economic situation 
how the United States and other 
ntries of the Americas, including, 
lortantly, Peru, are dealing with it — 
he central concern of the office I 
!et at the State Department. Also, 
a personal level, I cannot tell you 
! pleased I am to be back in Peru 
!r a long absence. I have been a For- 
1 Service officer for 20 years, but 
overseas work began earlier in 
u, in 1962, when I had the good 
;une to work for El Pacifico Insur- 
e Company. The people I met at all 
;ls of El Pacifico and in various 
2;hborhoods of Lima where I went to 
policies for fire insurance, and in 
es such as Ti'ujillo, Chiclayo, and 
ra, could not have been more hospi- 
le, hard working, and impressive. I 
lember visiting Chimbote as it was 
spering from the fishmeal bonanza. 
1962, I was excited about Peru and 
'Ut Latin America. I saw it as an 
a of tremendous economic potential 
ause of its enterprising people and 
untapped natural and human 
ources. 

Twenty-five years after that initial 
•lerience, I reflect that my optimism 
n about Peru's immediate economic 
ure, and the immediate economic fu- 
e of some other countries in Latin 
lerica, may have been excessive. Al- 
j ugh I had studied Latin American 
' tory in college and was aware of the 
iitory of political instability in the re- 
n and although I was here during 
July 28 coup in 1962 and present at 

■ time of another coup in 1966 in Ar- 
itina, I did not then understand as 
eh as I do now the importance of 
ablishing a longrun, stable demo- 
tic tradition as a basis for sound eco- 

jnic development. Also, with 25 years 
Inindsight and with the benefit of an 
<Dressive array of empirical literature 
lit has been published in recent 
iirs, I think there is now, more than 



ever, ample evidence of the need for 
greater democracy and freedom in the 
political and economic marketplaces. In 
this regard, it is worth i-ecording the 
unprecedented ascendancy of democ- 
racy and that, since 1976, 10 Latin 
American military regimes have moved 
decisively toward democracy. 

Democracy and Economic Growth 

Many have argued that free markets 
and liberty of economic decisionmaking 
are necessary conditions for a stable 
democracy. Using the converse, others 
have argued that political democracy or 
pluralism are necessary conditions for 
equitable economic growth. My sup- 
position is that there may be a lot of 
wisdom in both these approaches and 
that these philosophical arguments have 
a lot to do with why the United States 
wishes to encourage and support coun- 
tries that are democracies or moving in 
the direction of greater democracy and 
why the United States has similarly 
sought to promote free-market-oriented 
economic development. 

In more practical terms, we have 
found that our system simply meshes 
better with democratic governments 
and market economies and that our 
overall foreign relations and interests 
are better served with democracies 
than with other types of political sys- 
tems. Authoritarian regimes may some- 
times show a good side, but ultimately 
they are unstable. Societies character- 
ized by economic and political pluralism 
respond better to the needs of their 
people and, therefore, tend to create 
greater guarantees for human rights 
and for all activities, including eco- 
nomic ones. Therefore, the United 
States is committed to supporting dem- 
ocratic forces in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This involves not only seek- 
ing to stop the aggressive behavior of 
Nicaragua toward its neighbors, but it 
also means that a major objective of 
our policy has to be the promotion of 
economic development and improved 
standards of living, which we believe go 
hand in hand with strong democracies. 

I would like to emphasize the word 
"promote" in talking about economic 
development because the United States 
probably has neither the resources nor 
the responsibihty to solve our neigh- 
bors' problems. Resources, in fact, are 
one of Peru's and Latin America's 



strengths; the central issue is how to 
organize them productively. 

Promoting Economic Development 

How is economic development pro- 
moted? How can the United States or 
the industrialized countries as a group 
help the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean to improve the economic 
and political lives of their citizens? 

Certainly, there are no definitive 
answers to these questions. Nonethe- 
less, there is a wealth of evidence from 
many countries which suggests that, in 
addition to political predictibility and 
democracy, there is a group of economic 
policies that is consistent with sus- 
tained economic growth. The policies 
need not be controversial if they are 
properly understood. For example, I 
believe that a general consensus could 
be developed among moderate Demo- 
crats and moderate Republicans in my 
country around these policies. I sin- 
cerely believe that if the measures I 
will describe had been in place in Latin 
America in the last 25 years, my high 
expectations for Latin America at that 
time would not have been misplaced. 

The policies I will describe are 
defended: 

• By the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers of the United States, which pre- 
pared an excellent review in 1986 of the 
economic experience and economic liter- 
ature of dozens of countries; 

• In the work of Jeffrey Sachs and 
others at Harvard University, who 
sought to answer the question of why 
the Far East has done so dramatically 
better than Latin America and the Car- 
ibbean in the last four decades; and, 

• In an outstanding volume by Bela 
Balassa, Gerardo Bueno, Pedro-Pablo 
Kuczynski, and Mario Henrique Simon- 
sen, entitled. Towards Renewed Growth 
in Latin America. 

Other works which start from dif- 
ferent approaches but arrive at similar 
conclusions include Lawrence Har- 
rison's Under Development is a State of 
Mind, the Latin American Case and 
Hernando De Soto's El Ot.ro Sondero. 

Towards Renewed Growth compares 
the GDP [gross domestic product] per 
capita of various countries in 1985 with 
that of 1950 and computes a ratio. For 
Peru, the ratio is only 1.64. In other 
words, GDP per capita in Peru in 1985 
is only 1.64 times what it was in 1950. 
Argentina's is 1.45. Brazil's is 3.25. 
Chile's is 1.51. Ecuador's is 2.27. Mex- 
ico's is 2.31. Venezuela's is 1.26. For 
Austria and Italy, which each had a 
similar GDP per capita than Argentina 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



or Venezuela in 1950, the ratios are 3.88 
and 3.49. Japan jumped from a GDP of 
$810 per capita in 1950 to $7,130 in 
1985, for a ratio of 8.8. For Korea, the 
ratio is 5.88 and for Taiwan, 6.22. 

Why is there such a striking differ- 
ence in economic performance? What 
are some of the policies that are associ- 
ated with sustained economic growth? 

First, market exchange rates have 
to be established. Too often, Latin 
American nations have maintained over- 
valued currencies. This has stimulated 
their imports and made their exports 
higher priced and less competitive and 
has generally contributed to lack of 
confidence and to capital flight. When 
my family arrive in Chile in 1981, it cost 
less for a Chilean to take a vacation in 
Miami than in southern Chile, which is 
one of the most beautiful places on this 
earth. F\irthermore, overvalued ex- 
change rates in many countries were 
sustained by barriers to trade and un- 
sustainable levels of borrowing. 

Second, general price inflation has 
to be brought under control. In the de- 
veloping countries, there has been high 
growth even with inflation rates in the 
range of 20'7f-50%; but the historical 
record in Latin America is clear that 
rates higher than this have inevitably 
led to economic disruption and to prob- 
lems of confidence, to lack of invest- 
ment and savings, and to capital flight. 
Inflation reached the point in Argen- 
tina and Bolivia at which notes for 1 
million pesos had to be used and at 
which it cost a million or more to buy 
a sandwich. 

Third, a freer trade policy has to 
be established. Although both Latin 
America and Asia suffered through the 
same oil shocks and borrowed heavily 
from abroad, many of the East nations 
promoted exports and maintained com- 
petitive exchange rates, minimized im- 
port barriers and, therefore, were more 
efficient economies and more com- 
petitive exporters. As a result, a 
number of nations in East Asia con- 
tinued to grow in the 1980s and to 
maintain access to international credit 
markets; and Latin America has much 
to learn from this example. 

Fourth, true economic incentives 
must be created by allowing the price 
mechanism to function. In Latin Amer- 
ica, there has been the extensive use of 
price controls, often in the presumed 
interest of low-income groups. A typical 
example is the control of the price of an 
agricultural commodity. The result has 
often been a shift in production toward 
other crops with higher market prices 



and serious shortages in the goods 
whose prices were controlled. In many 
cases, this has led to serious declines in 
national food supply, a creation of a 
black market, and general inefficiencies 
which have hurt hving standards. When 
we were in Brazil in the late 1970s, the 
price of black beans was controlled be- 
cause beans and rice constitute the 
basic Brazilian meal. We were living in 
a bean-producing state, and we watched 
farmers shift to the industrial-use cas- 
tor bean and other products, and even- 
tually Brazil wound up importing food 
beans. 

Fifth, greater fiscal discipline must 
be established. The U.S. Government 
has discovered how difficult this prob- 
lem can be, and we have run up un- 
precedented deficits in the last two 
decades. Nonethless, our deficit is 
equal to roughly 4% of our gross na- 
tional product. This is too much, but, at 
least until October 19 and the 500-point 
drop in the stock market, there has 
been a fundamental confidence in our 
society and in our economy, and Ameri- 
cans and foreigners have been willing 
to buy our Treasury notes and finance 
our deficits. Also, even after October 
19, key fundamentals of our economy 
remain strong, and there appears to be 
further progress in deficit reduction. 

In Latin America, the relative size 
of the deficits has been much larger, 
and the confidence in the economies has 
not been as strong. For example, Mex- 
ico ran a fiscal deficit equal to 17.8% of 
GDP in 1982, just before it announced 
its inability to service its debt. The In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) agree- 
ments and some of the conditions of the 
World Bank loans are aimed at encour- 
aging some of these debtor countries to 
reduce government spending. This in- 
evitably causes difficulties in these na- 
tions, just as it does when spending 
cuts are attempted in our country; but 
it is important to recognize, if I may be 
permitted this analogy, that the hang- 
over is a result of the binge and not of 
going on the wagon. 

The Role of Government 

The discussion of fiscal discipline raises 
the question of the role of government 
and the size of government, which are 
inevitably related and which are contro- 
versial everywhere and notably in Latin 
America. 

The previous five policy recommen- 
dations imply many important roles for 
government, but in general they also 
entail a lessening of the size of govern- 
ment and the level of government inter- 
ference in the economy. In Latin 



America, in the United States, and 
elsewhere, the question then is legit- 
imately asked: "What if markets fail?" 
This could happen as a result of the 
inefficiencies of domestic monopolies o 
of externalities, i.e., when the benefit: 
of costs associated with an economic at 
tivity are not reflected in a market 
price for that activity. Examples of ex 
ternalities include education, which ha 
a benefit that generally exceeds its 
cost, and pollution, which is a cost 
which is not reflected in the price of 
production. Based on the experiences 
many developed and developing coun- 
tries, the answer to these dilemmas c; 
be generalized as a sixth policy pre- 
scription, namely, correcting market 
failure by actions which do not create 
distortions of domestic markets. This 
means that: 



Tu 
ilii 
ici 
niio 
itfi 
ia 



h 



• Governments should promote 
competition and restrict the market 
power of cartels and monopolies, man 
of which have been encoui-aged or su[: 
ported by special incentives. 

• Governments should avoid 
harmful distortionary effects of taxa- 
tion, which generally occur where ove 
all tax rates are high and taxation 
varies greatly on similar products or i fffii 
different uses of the same factors of 
production. 

• Many public sector enterprises, 
such as public utilities and public trai 
portation services (which might plans 
bly be provided by the private sector 
should charge prices that make users 
recognize the cost of the goods and 
services they are using. 

• Governments should also work 
toward establishing a stable policy 
environment so that individuals and 
corporations are not subject to the 
uncertainty of constant changes. 

This general policy description ai 
the examples all speak to making gov 
ernment more efficient. Some of you 
might say these individual policies 
make sense per se, but what about tl" 
vast number of truly suffering people 
who live on the other side of Rio 
Rimac, in the fauelas of Brazil, or in 
the villa miserias and forgotten rura 
areas throughout the hemisphere? Th 
answer, I believe, from the experienC' 
of many countries, is that special as- 
sistance for the poor should not only 
moral imperative, but it also is consis 
tent with greater overall growth in th Wv 
economy. If the governments reduce 
wasteful spending, it means that ther 
are greater resources available for fO' 
distribution, health services, and edv 
cation for low-income groups. ' 



^V; 



^i 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



There are many examples that can 
cited to illustrate these points. 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Na- 
[lal Steel Mill in Chile manufactured 
tually every type of steel known to 
n, but in such low volumes that the 
ts were many times the world price. 
s mill provided jobs for a number of 
pie who could appropriately be de- 
ibed as members of the middle class 
3hile. But given the e.xtremely high 
iffs that also existed at that time, 
many more jobs were sacrificed by 
fact that users of steel in Chile had 
3ay so much more for their inputs? 

0, since the company ran huge oper- 
ig deficits, which were financed by 

Chilean taxpayer, by money crea- 

1, or by borrowing domestically or 
Ti overseas, one has to question how 
:h more effectively these resources 
Id have been used in the service of 

Chilean public. 

• To balance the negative example 
m Chile, let me cite a positive one, 
ch can also serve as a creative il- 
;ration for both making government 
re efficient and truly reaching the 
diest members of society with gov- 
ment assistance. The World Health 
janization has repeatedly cited Chile 
its outstanding performance in dra- 
;ically reducing infant mortality. One 
he important contributors to this 
cess was an extensive program of 
i distribution using criteria for the 
;ribution which better identified the 
5t needy. These criteria included the 
e of access to water, sewerage, and 
:tricity and the number of years of 
i.cation, as well as indices of income. 

This overall discussion about gov- 
ment and the policy of limiting dis- 
tions of domestic products and factor 
rkets can also be summarized by 
:ing; is government contributing, 
)moting, encouraging development, 
is it not, rather, an obstacle to 
!ater domestic and foreign invest- 
nt and a creator of conditions that do 

inspire confidence and longrun in- 
itment? With the results of Her- 
ido DeSoto's careful research, we 
ist ask: can governments in Latin 
lerica continue to make it so hard to 
n property, so difficult to get a li- 
ise to perform a legitimate business 
-ivity, and continue to stifle the en- 
■prise and the opportunities of the 
ijority of their populations? Also, can 
ountry such as Brazil, endowed with 
A immense natural resources, in- 
ding a dynamic workforce, continue 
have high growth rates if two-thirds 
all production is in the hands of the 
ite and the remaining one-third 



(roughly one-sixth Brazilian private 
sector and one-sixth multinational cor- 
poration) operates under fairly exten- 
sive controls? 

Without policy improvement or 
structural reform in the six general 
areas discussed, it is difficult to under- 
stand how Peru and other nations of 
this hemisphere can restore sustained 
economic growth. Sustained economic 
growth, by definition, means a rate of 
investment closer to the 25% of GDP 
which Japan and other nations of Asia 
registered for many years, which Brazil 
managed during the periods of high 
growth, and up from the approximate 
level of 15% which has been the average 
for Latin America from 1983 through 
1986. So sustained economic growth 
then means undertaking the policies we 
have discussed so that both domestic 
and foreign investors regain confidence 
and become willing to take the risks 
that lead to production, jobs, and bet- 
ter standards of living. 

In this regard, many find it curious 
how reluctant Latin America has been 
to receive the capital and technology 
that foreign investors bring. The 
United States would have only a frac- 
tion of its present GDP, were it not for 
foreign investment. For every year of 
its history up until World War I, the 
United States was a net importer of 
capital. Foreign investment created 
thousands of enterprises in our early 
history and continues to do so today. 

Promoting Economic Growth Policies 

If we believe in these policies, how do 
we promote or encourage them? The 
answer is in our debt, aid, and trade 
policies. 

Our debt policy, which was point- 
edly named the Program for Sustained 
Growth (although it also is called the 
Baker plan), has the following three 
elements: 

• Serious economic reforms by the 
debtor countries of the type we have 
discussed; 

• Financial support, principally 
from the multilateral development 
banks, to enable these reforms to 
occur; and 

• Along with reforms and support 
from the World Bank (and other inter- 
national financial institutions), further 
lending by the commercial banks. 

The idea behind this policy is that 
the debtor countries, including those in 
Latin America, have to take steps to 
establish confidence in the future of 
their economies and to reverse capital 



flight. This will take several years. Un- 
til confidence is reestablished and Latin 
savings and investment rates improve, 
additional financial support from abroad 
is needed; and this is why this strategy 
calls for new lending. 

Here is where greater emphasis on 
World Bank lending comes in — struc- 
tural adjustment loans and sectoral ad- 
justment loans enter the picture. 
Typical World Bank loans have been 
made over long periods of time and 
have been used to build dams or high- 
ways. The structural adjustment loans, 
or SAL, are different. They are rela- 
tively fast disbursing, and each dis- 
bursement is tied to specific steps in 
economic policy reform. For example, 
each disbursement of one of the loans 
might be made: 

• After the debtor country takes 
another step toward divesting a money- 
losing public enterprise; or 

• After the recipient country takes 
an additional step to liberalize trade, 
such as substituting a system of import 
licensing with tariffs; or 

• Takes steps to improve basic tax 
collection. 

If such reforms can be undertaken 
and if such reforms can be supported 
by World Bank and Inter- American De- 
velopment Bank lending, then we think 
it is reasonable to expect the commer- 
cial banks to make some additional 
loans to promote growth in the region, 
to protect their assets, and, ultimately, 
to share in the long-term growth of the 
region. 

Perhaps the one good thing to 
come out of the debt crisis is the begin- 
ning of an awareness of the need to 
adopt more appropriate economic pol- 
icies. As a result of this realization and 
as a result of World Bank and IMF sup- 
port, there have been some promising 
first steps in the past 18 months. For 
example: 

• Efforts to reduce inflation have 
had mixed success. Argentina and Bra- 
zil tried "shock" programs, with initial 
success. But now they are seeing a wor- 
risome resurgence of inflation because 
the underlying economic reforms neces- 
sary to support the programs have not 
yet been put into place. Bolivia's more 
conventional and more successful ap- 
proach to its hyperinflation, on the 
other hand, was based on comprehen- 
sive structural reforms emphasizing 
fiscal discipline rather than price con- 
trols which mesh inflation while it 
continues. 

• Belize, Costa Rica, Guyana, Hon- 
duras, Jamaica, Uruguay, and Chile are 



RQ 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



i 



among the countries making significant 
efforts to turn more public sector en- 
terprises over to private sector owner- 
ship and management and improve 
public sector efficiency. 

• Costa Rica, Colombia, and Ec- 
uador are examples of countries which 
are taking steps to reduce market dis- 
tortions in taxation and in other areas. 

Our aid policy is based on the same 
premise as World Bank structural ad- 
justment loans. For example, more 
than half of our economic assistance to 
Central America is in the form of eco- 
nomic support funds, which are tied, in 
written agreements, to specific policy 
changes of the type I have mentioned. 
Again, the idea is that no amount of aid 
to build roads, hospitals, and schools, 
to provide food aid — which we have 
done and we will continue to do — will, 
by itself, be enough to establish sus- 
tained growth. Only the developing 
countries themselves can do that. 

On trade policy, we strive to keep 
as open a market as possible, and U.S. 
trade policy flows out of a deep and 
long-term commitment to maintain and 
improve access to the U.S. market and 
to the markets of other major trading 
countries. This does not mean that the 
U.S. record is perfect. But the negative 
tone of some statements on U.S. trade 
policy is unwarranted when the U.S. 
record is examined, and particularly 
when this record is compared with that 
of other countries. 

Let me illustrate with particular 
reference to Latin America: 

• A large share of U.S. imports 
from Latin America enter the United 
States free of duty. This share 
amounted to 39% in 1986 and has aver- 
aged around one-third in recent years. 

• On those products entering the 
United States subject to duty, the ac- 
tual rate of duty paid is relatively low— 
4.9% in 1986. 

• It is true that the United States 
does maintain some significant nontariff 
barriers; for Latin America, these are 
primarily sugar quotas, textile re- 
straints, and voluntary export restraint 
agreements on steel. However, it is 
important to note that these barriers 
are limited in number and do not affect 
a large proportion of trade or potential 
trade— only 17% of all developing coun- 
try exports were affected in 1986, ac- 
cording to a World Bank study. 

• The United States, along with 
other developed countries, maintains 
a special program— the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP)— to give 
better market access to developing 
countries than to developed ones. The 



.20. 



U.S. program eliminates duties on 
about 3,000 products (out of 7,000 clas- 
sifications in the U.S. tariff schedule). 
U.S. imports from Latin America un- 
der the GSP have been growing. GSP 
imports last year totaled $3.5 billion, 
equal to 7.9% of total imports. This 
represents 8% growth over 1985. 

• In addition, the United States 
provides even more liberal duty-free 
access for countries of the Caribbean 
Basin under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. 

• The President has devoted great 
effort to working with the Congress on 
responsible trade legislation and, in the 
past, has not hesitated to use his veto 
authority when necessary. The Presi- 
dent's willingness to consider using his 
veto on the textile bill recently passed 
by the House of Representatives and 
the Administration's opposition to the 
protectionist portions of the omnibus 
trade bill are only the latest examples 
of our commitment to freer trade. 

• Some criticisms of U.S. trade pol- 
icy focus on U.S. countervailing and 
antidumping duties and section 301 of 
our trade law. These actions are fre- 
quently accused of being protectionist, 
but, in fact, they are directed against 
the protectionist or unfair trade prac- 
tices of other countries and thus are 
designed to correct rather than in- 
crease distortions to free trade. Coun- 
tervailing duties are meant to balance 
the export subsidies of other govern- 
ments; antidumping duties are to bal- 
ance dumping by foreign exporters 
(i.e., lower pricing in export markets 
than in domestic markets). Our actions 
are consistent with international rules 
(e.g.. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Ti-ade). Similarly, section 301 allows 
the President to retaliate against un- 
fair, discriminatory, and unjustifiable 
actions of other countries which harm 
U.S. commerce. For example, in re- 
sponse to Brazilian infringement of in- 
tellectual property and copyright on 
computers, we have just announced our 
intention to retaliate; and we hope this 
process will lead to an end to this pro- 
tectionism. U.S. actions under this 
provision are meant to force open the 
markets of other trading partners and 
not merely to close down our market. 

• A look at trends in Latin Amer- 
ica's trade during the 1980s demon- 
strates the U.S. contribution to the de- 
velopment of exports from the region. 
During the decade, Latin America ex- 
porters increasingly have turned to the 
U.S. market. Since 1981, the U.S. 
share of Latin America's exports to the 
industrialized countries has risen from 
52% to 57%.. At the same time, the 
European Community's market share 



has fallen from 31% to 28%. Japan's 
share has been flat at 8%. 

• The trade balance of the indust 
alized countries with Latin America 
also are revealing. As a group, the in 
dustrialized countries moved from a 
$1.5-billion trade surplus with Latin 
America in 1981 to $15-billion trade dc 
icit in 1986. The United States alone 
accounted for 87%- of this deficit in 

1986. In contrast, Japan has run trad 
surpluses with Latin America throug 
out the decade. 

• These trade trends have continu 
in 1987. During the first quarter of 

1987, the United States purchased 60 
of Latin America's exports to the ind 
trialized countries. The U.S. trade d' 
cit with the region ($3.8 billion) was 
larger than that of all the other indu: 
trialized countries combined ($3.6 bil 
lion), as some other countries — espe- 
cially Japan — registered trade 
surpluses. 

• Thus, the U.S. market is rela- 
tively open in comparison to those of 
other OECD [Organization Economii 
Cooperation and Development] coun- 
tries, as detailed in the World Bank': 
1987 World Development Report, wh 
focuses on trade and economic devel 
ment. In a study of LDC [less devel- 
oped country] exports in 1986, the 
Worid Bank" found that 23% of expor 
to the European Economic Communi 
were subject to "hard-core" nontarifl 
barriers (NTBs), compared to 22% o 
exports to Japan and 17%. of exports 
the United States (hard-core NTBs ; 
those most likely to restrict trade ar 
include such measures as import bar 
and voluntary export restraints). 



iilf 



ifr( 



hf 



The Need for Policy Reform 

The World Development Report of tb 
World Bank carries an extensive loo) 
macroeconomic policies in LDCs froi 
1963-85. The report presents strong 
idence that economies which are mo 
outward-oriented perform better tha 
those which are inward-oriented. Th 
trend has held true despite the elemi 
of protectionism in OECD countries 
International financial statistics also 
document intraregional trade. In re( 
years, this has been around 13% oft 
total trade in Latin America and 
around 27% for Asia, which suggests 
that many barriers to trade betweei 
Latin nations have yet to be address 
In its analysis of trade, the Woi 
Bank makes great effort to emphasi 
that many other factors than trade 
icy affect the ability of a country to 
industrialize and grow. It also concl'f 



^f 



Sitti 



^ 



H 



REATIES 



at stepped-up efforts at policy re- 
irm, along the lines I have discussed, 
ie crucial to sustained development, 
i) the message I wish to leave with 
jiu is that while I am confident that 
'18 World Bank, other international fi- 
l.ncial institutions, and the United 

I ates will continue to assist Latin 
iTierica on its road for economic devel- 
fment, if a certain direction in eco- 

) mic policymaking is not undertaken 
' the Latin American nations them- 
jlves, it is difficult to see how sus- 
lined growth can be restored. No 
(untry on record has achieved solid 

I'owth without these essential policies. 
ley include establishing and maintain- 
I? market exchange rates, bringing 
j neral price inflation under control, 
i" ;ablishing a freer trade policy, creat- 

I I true economic incentives by allow- 
1 1 the price mechanism to function, 

I ;ablishing greater fiscal discipline, 
1 d making government a positive 
; ent for creating confidence rather 
in an all-powerful interfering and dis- 
■ting actor in the economy. ■ 



Ijrrent Actions 



I X,TIL.4TERAL 

I ns Limitation 

i reement regarding inspections relating 
t .he treaty of Dec. 8, 1987, between the 
I 5. and the U.S.S.R. on the elimination 
c heir intermediate-range and shorter 
I ,ge missiles, with annex. Signed at 
I jssels Dec. 11, 1987. Enters into force 
owing notification of approval by all par- 
i in accordance with their constitutional 
icedures, agreement shall enter into 
ce simultaneously with treaty, 
' .•natures: Belgium, Fed. Rep. of Ger- 



ny, Italy, Netherlands, U.K., U.S., 
c. 11, 1987. 

Elation 

' )tocol on the authentic quadrilingual 
' t of the convention on international civil 
I ation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at 
sntreal Sept. 30, 1977.' 
I ceptance deposited: Australia, Dec. 2, 



I mmodities — Common Fund 

reement establishing the Common Fund 
I Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
' neva .June 27. 1980.' 

:nature: Swaziland, Nov. 18, 1987. 
-v proval deposited: U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 

.7. 

nservation 

nvention on wetlands of international 
aortance especially as waterfowl habitat. 



Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into 
force Dec. 21, 1975; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 
1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-28. 

Protocol to the convention on wetlands of 
international importance especially as wa- 
terfowl habitat of Feb. 2, 1971. Done at 
Paris Dec. 3, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 
1, 1986; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986. 
Proclaimed by the President; Oct. 2, 1987. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973, on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 
8249). Done at Bonn June 22, 1979. En- 
tered into force Apr 13, 1987. 
Proclaimed by the President: Oct. 2, 1987. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr 24, 1963. Entered into 
force Mar 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 

Notification of succession deposited: Do- 
minica, Nov. 24, 1987. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into 
force Apr 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 

1972. TIAS 7502. 

Notification of succession deposited: Do- 
minica, Nov. 24, 1987. 

Hydrography 

Convention on the International Hydro- 
graphic Organization, with annexes. Done 
at Monaco May 3, 1967. Entered into force 
Sept. 22, 1970. TIAS 6933. 
Accession deposited: Oman, July 31, 1987. 

Industrial Property — Classification 

Nice agreement concerning the interna- 
tional classification of goods and services 
for the purposes of the registration of 
marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at 
Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force 
Feb. 6, 1979; for the U.S. Feb. 29, 1984. 
Notification of ratification deposited: 
U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1987. ^ 

Jute 

International agreement on jute and jute 
products, 1982, with annexes. Done at Gen- 
eva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force provi- 
sionally Jan. 9, 1984; definitively Aug. 26, 
1986. 

Approval deposited: European Economic 
Community (EEC), Dec. 16, 1987. 

Marine Pollution 

Annex V to the international convention 
for the prevention of pollution from ships, 

1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.' [Sen- 
ate] Treaty Doc. 100-3. 

Instrument of ratification signed: Dec. 2, 

1987. 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Dec. 30, 1987. 

Convention for the protection and develop- 
ment of the marine environment of the 
wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done 
at Cartagena Mar 24, 1983. Entered into 
force Oct. 11, 1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 
98-13. 



Ratification deposited: Panama, Oct. 7, 
1987. 

Protocol concerning cooperation in combat- 
ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean re- 
gion, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 
24, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 11, 1986. 
Ratifications deposited: Grenada, Aug. 17, 
1987; Panama, Oct. 7, 1987. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done 
at New York Mar 30, 1961. Entered into 
force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 

1967. TIAS 6298. 

Protocol amending the single convention on 

narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 

1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975. 

TIAS 8118. 

Accession deposited: Brunei, Nov. 25, 

1987. 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 

Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into 

force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 

1980. TIAS 9725. 

Accession deposited: Brunei, Nov. 24, 

1987. 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 
22, 1985.' [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Approval deposited: France, Dec. 4, 1987. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, Dec. 
17, 1987. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 
3364, 3365), and relating to the protection 
of victims of international armed conflicts 
(Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva 
June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978.3 

Accession deposited: Saudi Arabia, Aug. 
21, 1987. ^ 

Ratifications deposited: Burkina Faso, Oct. 
20, 1987; Guatemala, Oct. 19, 1987. 
Protocol additional to the Geneva conven- 
tions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 
3364, 3365), and relating to the protection 
of victims of noninternational armed con- 
flicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^ 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-2. 
Ratifications deposited: Burkina Faso, Oct. 
20, 1987; Guatemala, Oct. 19, 1987. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered 
into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 

1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Malawi, Dec. 10, 
1987. 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 
1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 
20, 1987.' [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. 
Signatures: Belgium, Denmark, European 
Economic Community (EEC), France, Fed. 



TREATIES 



Rep. of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
U.K., Dec. 18, 1987. 

Scientific Cooperation 

Memorandum of understanding for collab- 
oration on advanced materials and stand- 
ards. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1987. 
Parties: Canada, July 9, 1986; European 
Communities, Mar. 13, 1986; France, Jan. 
30, 1986; Fed. Rep. of Germany, Apr. 2, 
1987; Italy, June 4, 1986; Japan, Oct. 7, 
1986; U.K., Feb. 10, 1986; U.S., Jan. 30, 
1986. 

Seals 

Convention for tiie conservation of Ant- 
arctic seals, witii anne.x and final act. Done 
at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force 
Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826. 
Accession deposited: Fed. Rep. of Ger- 
many, Sept. 30, 1987.2. * 

Trade 

Agreement on technical barriers to trade 
(standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 
1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 
9616. 

Ratification deposited: Greece, Oct. 16, 
1987. 

Agreement on implementation of article 
VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (customs valuation code). Done 
at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979, as amended by 
protocol done at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. En- 
tered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10402. 
Acceptance deposited: Zimbabwe, Oct. 9, 
1987.-I 

United Nations convention on contracts for 
the international sale of goods. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262] 
Ratifications deposited: Finland, Sweden, 
Dec. 15, 1987. 

Trade— Textiles 

Protocol extending the arrangement of 
Dec. 20, 1973, regarding international 
trade in textiles (TIAS 7840). Done at Ge- 
neva July 31, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 
1, 1986. 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, July 
21, 1987. 

Ratification deposited: Austria, Sept. 4, 
1987. 

Transportation — Foodstuffs 

Agreement on the international carriage 
of perishable foodstuffs and on the special 
equipment to be used for such carriage 
(ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Sept. 1, 1970. Entered into force Nov. 21, 
1976; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1984. 
Accession deposited: Hungary, Dec. 4, 
1987. 

United Nations — Privileges and 
Immunities 

Convention on the privileges and immu- 
nities of the United Nations. Adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions on Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force 



Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. 
TIAS 6900. 

Notification of succession deposited: Do- 
minica, Nov. 24, 1987. 

Whaling 

International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations. Done at 
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into 
force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Notification of withdrawal: Philippines, 
Dec. 7, 1987; effective June 30, 1988. 

Wheat 

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at 
London Mar. 18, 1986. Entered into force 
July 1, 1986.« [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. 
Accession deposited: Algeria, Nov. 23, 
1987. 



BILATERAL 

Bolivia 

Agreement concerning reciprocal exemp- 
tion from income tax of income derived 
from the international operation of ships 
and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington July 21 and Nov. 23, 1987. 
Entered into force Nov. 23, 1987; effective 
with respect to taxable years beginning on 
or after Jan. 1, 1987. 

Burkina Faso 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at 
Ouagadougou and Washington Oct. 12, and 
Nov. 5, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 5, 
1987. 

Grant agreement for canal cities water and 
wastewater Phase II project. Signed at 
Cairo Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force 
Sept. 24, 1987. 

Guatemala 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Guatemala May 26, 
1987. 
Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1987. 

Hungary 

Program of cooperation and exchanges in 
culture, education, science, and technology 
for 1988 and 1989, with annexes. Signed at 
Budapest Nov. 13, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 13, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988. 

Italy . . 

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal 
matters, with memorandum of understand- 
ing. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Entered 
into force Nov. 13, 1985. 
Proclaimed by the President: Dec. 2, 1987. 

Jamaica 

Agreement relating to and amending the 
agreement of Jan. 15, 1987, as amended, for 
sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at 
Kingston Nov. 9, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 9, 1987. 



Korea 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of July 26, 1982 (TIAS 10571), 
concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
U.S. Effected bv exchange of notes at 
Seoul May 11 and 20, 1987. 
Entered into force: Oct. 27, 1987. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
Nov. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8456), as extended, 
relating to scientific and technical cooper 
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul Nov. 4 and 6, 1987. Entered into 
force Nov. 6, 1987. 

Malaysia 

Agreement amending agreement of July ; 
and 11, 1985, as amended by agreement o 
Aug. 3, 1987, relating to trade in certain 
textiles, textile products, and apparel. E 
fected by exchange of letters at Wash- 
ington Sept. 9 and 15, 1987. Entered into 
force Sept. 15, 1987. 

Mexico 

Minute 273 of the International Boundar; 
and Water Commission: recommendation 
for the solution of the border sanitation 
problem at Naco, Arizona— Naco, Sonor: 
Signed at El Paso Mar. 19, 1987. Enterec 
into force Apr. 15, 1987. 
Minute 274 of the International Boundar 
and Water Commission: joint project for 
improvement of the quality of waters of \ 
New River at Calexico, California— Mex 
icali, Baja California, with joint report. 
Signed at Ciudad Juarez Apr. 15, 1987. I 
tered into force May 13, 1987. 
Agreement concerning the provision of 
training related to defense articles undei 
the U.S. international military educatioi 
and training (IMET) program. Effected 
exchange of notes at Mexico Aug. 21 and 
Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 
1987. 

Understanding concerning a framework 
principles and procedures for consultatic 
regarding trade and investment relation 
with agenda. Signed at Mexico Nov. 6, 
1987. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1987. 
Treaty on cooperation for mutual legal a 
sistance. Signed at Mexico Dec. 9, 1987. 
Enters into force on date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. 

Papua New Guinea 

Memorandum of understanding concerni 
the operation of the INTELPOST field 
trial, with details of implementation. 
Signed at Boroko and Washington June : 
and Nov. 23, 1987. Entered into force Ja 
1, 1988. 

Saudi Arabia 

Understanding on civil aviation. Signed 
Washington Dec. 1, 1987. Entered into 
force Dec. 1, 1987. 

Sweden 

Memorandum of understanding relating 
the principles governing mutual coopera 
tion in the defense procurement area, w 



iliJe! 



IIVM 



iiirli 
Itdbi 



leenf 
26, 
lerni: 
i.(TI 



RESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



ated exchange of letters. Signed at 
shington and Stockholm June 11 and 16, 
7. Entered into force June 16, 1987. 

5.S.R. 

;aty on the elimination of their interme- 
te-range and shorter range missiles, 
h memorandum of understanding and 
itocols. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 
7. Enters into force on the date of the 
hange of instruments of ratification, 
■reement amending and supplementing 
air transport agreement of Nov. 4, 
6, as amended (TIAS 6135, 6489). Ef- 
ted by exchange of notes at Washington 
e. 9, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 9, 
7. 

reement extending the agreement of 
V. 26, 1976, as amended and extended, 
cerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
(TIAS 8528, 10531). Effected by ex- 
nge of notes at Washington June 26 and 
y 24, 1987. 
tered into force: Dec. 8, 1987. 



United Arab Emirates 

General security of military information 
agreement. Signed at Abu Dhabi May 23, 
1987. Entered into force May 23, 1987. 

United Kingdom 

Investment incentive agreement, on behalf 
of Anguilla. Effected by exchange of notes 
at London Nov. 9, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 9, 1987. 

Supersedes as to Anguilla agreement of 
Nov. 21, 1968, relating to investment guar- 
anties. TIAS 6596. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 26, 1984, as extended, concerning the 
Cayman Islands and narcotics activities. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington Nov. 27, 1987. Entered into force 
Nov. 27, 1987; effective Nov. 29, 1987. 



Not in force. 

With declaration(s). 

Not in force for the U.S. 

With reservation(s). 
• Applicable to Berlin (West). 
' In force provisionally for the U.S. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available 
from the Correspondence Management Di- 
vision, Bureau of Public Affairs, Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

The Washington Summit: Progress Toward 
Peace, TV address to the nation, Dec. 
10, 1987 (Current Policy #1032). 

Secretary Schultz 

National Success and International Sta- 
bility in a Time of Change, World Affairs 
Council of Washington, Dec. 4, 1987 
(Current Policy #1029). 

Africa 

South Africa: What Are America's Op- 
tions?, Deputy Assistant Secretary Free- 
man, World Affairs Council of Inland 
Southern California, Riverside, Dec. 9, 
1987 (Current Policy #1033). 



Department of State 



!ss releases may be obtained from the 
ice of Press Relations, Department of 
,te, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Date Subject 

.28 12/7 Shultz: remarks before 
USIA's meeting of pri- 
vate sector committees, 
Dec. 2. 

29 12/7 Shultz: interview on 
ABC-TV's "This Week 
With David Brinkley," 
Dec. 6. 

30 12/7 Shultz: interview on 
NBC-TV's "Today Show.' 

31 12/7 Shultz: address and 
question-and-answer ses- 
sion, Washington World 
Affairs Council, Dec. 4. 

Shultz: interview on 
CBS-TV's "Evening 
News," Dec. 8. 

Shultz: interview on 
"MacNeil-Lehrer 
Newshour." 

Shultz: interview on 
CNN-TVs "Daybreak." 

Shultz, Gorbachev: lunch- 
eon toasts, Dec. 9. 

Shultz: interview on 
ABC-TV's "World News 
Tonight," Dec. 9. 
:37 12/10 Shultz, Shevardnadze: re- 
marks after signing of 
diplomatic notes cere- 
mony, Dec. 9. 



34 


12/9 


35 


12/10 


:36 


12/10 



*238 
■*239 



Shultz: interview on 
ABC-TV's "Good Morn- 
ing America." 

Program for the official 
working visit to Wash- 
ington, D.C, of Italian 
President Goria, 
Dec. 15-18. 

Shultz: news conference, 
NATO Headquarters, 
Dec. 11. 
sued.] 

Shultz: arrival statement, 
Oslo, Norway, Dec. 13. 

Shultz: news conference, 
Copenhagen, Dec. 13. 

Shultz: news conference, 
Oslo, Dec. 14. 

Shultz: news conference, 
American Embassy Club, 
Bonn, Dec. 15. 

Shultz: news conference, 
London, Dec. 16. 

Shultz: remarks at Christ- 
mas tree lighting cere- 
mony, Dec. 17. 

Shultz: dinner toast in 
honor of Italian Prime 
Minister Goria, Dec. 17. 

Americayi Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, 
1986, released. 

American Foreign Policy: 
Current Documents, 
1982. Supplement, 
released. 



■^Not printed in the Bulletin. 



241 
242 


[not is 
12/16 


243 


12/16 


244 


12/16 


245 


12/18 


►246 


12/18 


►247 


12/18 



250 12/31 



Arms Control 

INF Treaty: A Success Story (GIST, Dec. 
1987). 

Economics 

Protectionism and Liberalization, Under 
Secretary Wallis, Propeller Club, Istan- 
bul, Oct. 26, 1987 (Current Policy #1027). 

Protectionism and Trade Barriers, Under 
Secretary Wallis, 9th German-American 
Roundtable on NATO issues, Oct. 29, 
1987 (Current Policy #1028). 

Export Control Policy and COCOM, Senior 
Representative Wendt, Subcommittee on 
International Economic Policy and 
Trade, House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee, Nov. 3, 1987, and Conference on 
Strategic Export Controls sponsored by 
the Royal Institute of International Af- 
fairs at Chatham House, London, Nov. 
19, 1987 (Current Policy #1031). 

Europe 

European Parliament (GIST, Dec. 1987). 

General 

Second Parliamentary Democracy Confer- 
ence (GIST, Dec. 1987) 

South Asia 

Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupa- 
tion, Dec. 1987 (Special Report #173). 
Afghanistan (GIST, Dec. 1987). 

Western Hemisphere 

Policies for Economic Development in 
Latin America, Director of the Office of 
Regional Economic Policy Whitney, Peru- 
vian Center for International Studies, 
Lima, Nov. 25, 1987 (Current Policy 
#1030). 

U.S.-Mexican Relations (GIST, Dec. 1987). I 



.21. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Current Documents Volumes Released 



CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1986, 
DEC. 30, 1987 • 

The Department of State, on December 
30, 1987, released American Foreign 
Policy: Current Documents, 1986. 

This volume presents official public 
expressions of policy that best set forth 
the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign 
policy in 1986. 

The volume presents the principal 
official pronouncements on the foremost 
foreign affairs events of 1986, including 
the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting at 
Reykjavik, the progress of the INF [in- 
termediate-range nuclear forces] and 
START [strategic arms reduction talks] 
arms control negotiations, and the U.S. 
reaction to the Chernobyl nuclear acci- 
dent. Also covered are military and dip- 
lomatic actions against Libya, U.S. 
policy toward South Africa, U.S. as- 
sistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, 
Central American peace negotiations, 
and the first revelations of the Iran- 
contra affair. Documentation is also in- 
cluded on general principles governing 
U.S. foreign policy as enunciated by 
President Reagan and Secretary of 
State Shultz, the defense budget, the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, U.S. lim- 
itations on the Soviet Mission at the 
United Nations, the Daniloff affair, the 
Tokyo economic summit, trade issues, 
the immigration Reform and Control 
Act, human rights, oil and energy, nar- 
cotics, terrorism, and the war in the 
Persian Gulf 

The volume is a collection of texts 
of major official messages, addresses, 
statements, interviews, press confer- 
ences and briefings, reports, congres- 
sional testimony, and communications 
by the White House, the Department of 
State, and other Federal agencies or 
officials involved in the foreign policy 
process. All of the documents included 
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SUPPLEMENT, 
DEC. 31, 19872 

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Press release 249 of Dec. 30, 1987 
■ Press release 250 of Dec. 31. ■ 



JDEX 



jbruary 1988 
)lume 88, No. 



2131 



ms Control 

lonil the Summit: Next Steps in Arms 

•(introl (Nitze) 81 

■ INF Treaty (Gorbachev, Reagan, text 
f the treaty, memorandum of under- 

tanding, and protocols) 22 

F Treaty: A Success Story 84 

3., European Allies Sign INF Basing 

Agreement (text of agreement) 78 

it of General Secretary Gorbachev of 
he Soviet Union (Gorbachev, Reagan, 
Ihevardnadze, Shultz, joint state- 

lents) 1 

ngress. 34th Report on Cyprus (mes- 

age to the Congress) 86 

prus. 34th Report on Cyprus (message 

the Congress) 86 

onomics. Policies for Economic De- 
elopment in Latin America 

Whitney) 87 

man Rights. Visit of General Secretary 
iorbachev of the Soviet Union (Gor- 
bachev, Reagan, Shevardnadze, Shultz, 
oint statements) 1 



NATO 

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets 
in Brussels (final communique) 85 

U.S., European Allies Sign INF Basing 
Agreement (text of agreement) 78 

Presidential Documents 

The INF Treaty (Gorbachev, Reagan, text 
of the treaty, memorandum of under- 
standing, and protocols) 22 

34th Report on (Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 86 

Visit of General Secretary Gorbachev of 
the Soviet Union (Gorbachev, Reagan, 
Shevardnadze, Shultz, joint 
statements) 1 

Publications 

Current DocKnients Volumes 

Released 94 

Department of State 93 

Treaties 

Current Actions 91 

The INF Treaty (Gorbachev, Reagan, text 
of the treaty, memorandum of under- 
standing, and protocols) 22 

INF Treaty: A Success Story 84 

U.S., European Allies Sign INF Basing 
Agreement (text of agreement) 78 



U.S.S.R. 

Beyond the Summit: Next Steps in Arms 
Control (Nitze) 81 

The INF Treaty (Gorbachev, Reagan, text 
of the treaty, memorandum of under- 
standing, and protocols) 22 

U.S., European Allies Sign INF Basing 
Agreement (text of agreement) 78 

Visit of General Secretary Gorbachev of 
the Soviet Union (Gorbachev, Reagan, 
Shevardnadze, Shultz, joint 
statements) 1 

Western Hemisphere Policies for Economic 
Development in Latin America 
(Whitney) 87 

Name Index 

Gorbachev, Mikhail S 1, 22 

Nitze, Paul H 81 

Reagan, President 1, 22, 86 

Shevardnadze, Eduard A 1 

Shultz, Secretary 1 

Whitney, Peter D 87 



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D0*partntpnt 
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) Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2132 









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S Occupied Territories/71, 81 

2 Persian Gulf/74 



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Di»partmpni of Siaip 

bulletin 



Volume 88 / Number 2132 / March 1988 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of I\iblic 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
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are published frequently to provide ad- 
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but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. jjolicy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

NORMAN HOWARD 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 

Assistant Editor 



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For sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
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CONTENTS 



i President 

State of the Union Address 



Sdiith Africa: What Are 
I America's Options? 
if (Charles W. Freeman) 

1 1S Control 

The INF Treaty: Strengthening 

U.S. Security (Secretary 

Shultz) 
U.S., Soviets to Inspect 

Nuclear Test Sites 

(Department Statement) 
The INF Treaty: Negotiation 

and Ratification (Mayuard W. 

Glitman, Max M. 

Kampeiman) 
U.S. Tables Draft Defense and 

Space Treaty (White House 

Statement) 
Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 

Open Round Nine (Max M. 

Kampeiman, President 

Reagan) 
Soviet Noncompliance With 

Arms Control Agreements 

(Message to the Congress, 

Unclassified Report) 

lada 

U.S., Canada Sign Free Trade 
Agreement (President 
Reagan, White House Fact 
Sheet) 

>t Asia 

Indonesia: Entering the 1990s 
(Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.) 

Recent Developments in the 
Philippines (David F. 
Lambertson) 



FEATURE 

1 Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation 
(Craig Karp) 



Economics 

63 Export Control Pohcy and 
COCOM (E. Allen Wendt) 

66 Industrial Nations to Intensify 
Policy Coordination Efforts 
(Group of 7 Statement owrf 
Annex) 

Europe 

68 Visit of Italian Prime Minister 

(Giovanni Goria. President 
Reagan) 

69 Imports From the European 

Economic Community (White 
House Statement) 

69 U.S., Spain Announce 

Framework for Defense 
Cooperation (Joint Statement) 

General 

70 Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 
1989 (President Reagan) 

Middle East 

71 U.S. Policy Toward the Occupied 

Territories (Richard W. 
Murphy) 

72 Visit of Israeli President (Chaim 

Herzog, President Reagan) 

74 Developments in the Persian 

Gulf (Richard W. Murphy) 

76 Arms Sale to Bahrain (White 

House Statement) 

Refugees 

77 Refugees Worldwdde and U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Reciprocal 
Impacts 

(Jonathan Moore) 



Science & Technology 

79 U.S. International Space 

Cooperation (Michael A.G. 
Michaud) 



South Asia 

80 Afghanistan (President Reagan) 

United Nations 

81 Situation in the Occupied 

Territories (Herbert S. Okun) 

82 Israeli Deportations (Herbert S. 

Ok%m, Vernon A. Walters, 
Texts of Resolutions) 

Western Hemisphere 

83 U.S. Support for Democracy in 

Chile (Department Statement) 
83 Haitian Election (Department 
Statement) 

Treaties 

83 Current Actions 



Press Releases 

86 Department of State 
86 USUN 



Publications 

86 Department of State 
86 Background Notes 

Index 



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Department of State Butr 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Afghanistan: 
Eight Years of Soviet Occupation 



dlowing report was prepared by 
Karp, Afghanistan analyst, ivith 
•sistance of other analysts in the 
lu of Intelligence and Research 
department officials. It is part of 
nual series of Special Reports on 
ituation in Afghanistan. 



bduction and Summary 

8 years of brutal war on the 
m people, the Soviet attempt to 
ol Afghanistan has failed. The con- 
)etween the Soviet occupation 
and the Afghan resistance grinds 
at it has changed. Death, destruc- 
and the suffering of an innocent 
e continue, but military, diplo- 
, and political events have moved 
st the Soviets. These pressures 
lead Moscow to end its horrible 
iltimately futile endeavor in 
anistan. 

n the 8th year of Soviet occupa- 
the military initiative in many 
passed to the mujahidin. They 
ted a higher level of combat, which 
higher throughout the year and 
subject to seasonal fluctuations, 
regime announced a cease-fire in 
ary and extended it in July and 
1 in November, but its forces did 
ceep the cease-fire commitment. 
Soviet forces also were more active 
iltimately adopted a more reactive, 
nsive posture. In the latter part of 
/ear, they pulled back from several 
ted bases. The Soviets and their 
lan clients have seen their unques- 
3d dominance of the skies slip. They 
■ suffered increased losses in the air 
on the ground. Kabul's forces de- 
ed repeatedly, sometimes by the 

(dreds, and force levels are main- 

<ed mostly by press-gang 

|icription. 



Despite a year-long effort, the So- 
viet proxies in Kabul failed to entice 
either their Afghan opponents or prom- 
inent neutrals to support or join a gov- 
ernment dominated by NajibuUah 
(Najib) and his People's Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In Janu- 
ary, Najib announced a campaign for 
"national reconciliation." Offers of some 
form of participation have been made to 
Afghanistan's former monarch, Zahir 
Shah, to a variety of prominent non- 
party Afghans, and to leaders of the 
resistance, who rejected these offers 
and refused to become "reconciled" to 
Soviet domination (even if disguised in 
Afghan clothes). The regime made more 
concessions over the year that also 
were unacceptable to the Afghan 
people. 

The PDPA, Moscow's chosen in- 
strument of rule, has become weaker. 
Party factionalism was further compH- 
cated by the purge of former party 
leader Babrak Karmal and his fol- 
lowers. Although Najib has little per- 
sonal support, even within the party, he 
had himself named head of state in Sep- 
tember. In December, when a new con- 
stitution was imposed by an illegiti- 
mate, party-packed assembly, Najib 
had himself elected president. At that 
session the regime changed its name 
from the "Democratic Repubhc of 
Afghanistan" (DRA) to the "Republic of 
Afghanistan" (RA). 

The Afghan resistance continues to 
challenge Soviet and regime control 
from every corner of the country. In 
the last year, however, it became a 
greater threat. Mujahidin military ca- 
pabilities grew in many ways— better 
cooperation and air defense meant that 
many areas of the country were effec- 
tively free of Soviet/regime control. 
Mujahidin morale is at an all-time 
high. Political cooperation within the 
seven-party resistance alliance in 



Peshawar improved. In October, the Al- 
liance members selected Maulavi 
Mohammed Yunis Khalis of the Hezb-e- 
Islami (Khalis) party to an 18-month 
term as its Rais, or leader. 

The UN-sponsored indirect talks 
on the Afghan issue continued in 1987. 
The proximity talks — between Pakistan 
and the Kabul regime — narrowed differ- 
ences on a timetable for the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops, the only outstanding 
issue. In two rounds, in March, and 
September, the gap narrowed to 16 
months offered by Kabul and 8 months 
by Pakistan. By the end of the year, 
Najib suggested Kabul might accept 12 
months or less. 

Diplomatically, the Soviets tried to 
improve the government's international 
legitimacy by sending Kabul emissaries 
on a 6-month-long worldwide diplomatic 
and public relations campaign. Kabul 
scored some gains in diplomatic recog- 
nition, but the overall effort failed. 
Other countries continued to condemn 
the occupation and reject the Soviet as- 
sertion that there is any solution to the 
Afghan issue short of Soviet with- 
drawal. In November, at the General 
Assembly, 123 nations, the largest total 
to date, voted for a resolution calling 
for the immediate and complete 
withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Afghanistan. The resolution has 
passed with increasing margins every 
year since the Soviet invasion on 
December 27, 1979. 

Outlook. The prospect of peace has 
great appeal for a people who have suf- 
fered 9 years of tyrannical rule backed 
by 8 years of foreign occupation. But 
the Afghans have made it clear that 
they will not accept peace at the price 
of continued foreign rule. 

Moscow has stated repeatedly that 
"a political decision to withdraw has al- 
ready been made." Soviet public state- 
ments on the eve of the December 



SS9Q'9SiV»9^fi«0dS^^'>SSC«^S^^^«^>dSS^^C^N$«^ 



Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Wash- 
ington, D.C., raised expectations that 
the U.S.S.R. might bring an acceptable 
withdrawal proposal. In fact, the Sovi- 
ets refused to commit themselves to an 
early "date certain" for a troop 
withdrawal. 

The world will remain skeptical of 
Soviet intenet until the Soviet Union 
agrees to and implements a settlement 
which provides for the rapid and com- 
plete withdrawal of its troops without 
preconditions. 



Military Activity 

In many ways 1987 can be described as 
the year of the mujahidhi, a year in 
which the resistance began to seize 
the initiative from the Soviets. Unlike 
past years, when the Soviets exercised 
more choice in their operations, the 
mujaliidin generally dictated the 
pace and location of combat. 

The level of fighting was consis- 
tently higher than in the past and less 
subject to seasonal variation. Combat 
escalated dramatically in the winter. 
Summer combat also was at historic 
levels, particularly in the Qandahar 
area, Kabul environs, and in Paktia 
Province. By late December, heavy 
fighting still raged in much of the east- 
ern part of the country; the expected 
winter decline in fighting had not 
occurred. 

The War of the Cities 

The Soviets and the regime increased 
their emphasis on urban security in 
1987. As a result, mujahidin penetra- 
tion and operations in major urban cen- 
ters became more difficult and less 
frequent. The Soviets improved defen- 
sive belts around the cities, and re- 
sistance rocket attacks had to be made 
from greater distances. In the cases of 
Kabul and Qandahar, the defensive pos- 
ture required costly and almost con- 
stant operations around the cities' 
edges to keep the iiiujahidin off bal- 
ance. The sights, sounds, and casualties 
from nearby combat served to curb any 
increased sense of urban security. 



Kabul. Kabul remains key to inter- 
national perceptions of the security sit- 
uation in Afghanistan, but calm in the 
city often coincides with heavy fighting 
in the surrounding areas. 

Soviet upgrading of the defensive 
infrastructure — now three rings extend- 
ing up to 20 miles from downtown — 
prevented major military losses like the 
spectacular destruction of the Kharga 
arms storage facility in 1986. About 
22,000 Soviet troops are in the Kabul 
vicinity. They are supported by about 
10,000 Afghan army troops and consid- 
erable numbers of militia, state se- 
curity (KHAD), and Sarmidoy forces. 

Whenever there is a major security 
alert — because of threat, regime event, 
or high-level visit — the Soviets take 
charge of security in the capital. Soviet 
tanks guard key intersections every 
night during curfew. Security concerns 
were particularly apparent during the 
January visit of Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze and CPSU [Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union] adviser 
Dobrynin; Kabul skies were well lit 
by the flares dropped by Soviet escort 
aircraft during their arrival. 

Nevertheless, security remains a 
major problem, even in the city itself. 
The frequency of small arms fire from 
Soviet or Afghan security posts reflects 
the level of tension in the city. Pro- 
tracted firing or exchanges usually indi- 
cate that the mujahidin have been 
spotted or have attacked security 
elements. 

Intraparty or intraregime factional 
disputes also erupt frequently, with ex- 
changes of fire clearly audible from re- 
gime installations. Urban dislocation, 
refugee influx, and degenerating re- 
gime cohesion also contributed to an in- 
crease of crime and attacks by regime 
and Soviet personnel on civilians, par- 
ticularly in the spring. 

The mujahidin focus their attacks 
on regime military and official and So- 
viet targets. Enjoying strong popular 
support, they avoid attacks which 
would harm the general population. The 
resistance may have reduced rocketing 
in recent years in order to avoid civilian 
casualties, although they also were de- 
terred by Soviet security measures. 
Rocketings focused on specific targets, 
such as on the Soviet cultural center in 



January, and four rockets that dis- |te 
rupted Najib's November Loya Jirg 
In September, the Soviet Embassy |'i 
complex was hit by mortars. Bombi 
increased in 1987. 

i« 

Kabul Vicinity. If the capital i ^ 
was somewhat quieter this year, its j 
roundings saw record combat. Bagr 
Airbase to the north of Kabul, perh 
the most important Soviet base in t 
country, often was hit by rocket 
attacks. 

The area along the Salang high 
to the Soviet Union was the scene ( 
fierce fighting most of the year. In 
spring resistance attacks triggered 
vere Soviet retaliation in the Shorn; 
that caused numerous refugees to 
stream into Kabul. In August, this 
mile basin was hit by its most desti 
tive Soviet attack since the invasioi 
Thousands of residents fled indiseri 
nate rocket, artillery, and air bomb 
ment. Both mujahidin and Soviets 
suffered heavy casualties, but regin 
losses were limited to heavy desert 
The highway itself was closed sever 
times by resistance attacks and one 
April, by a snowslide that complete 
destroyed a 70-man Soviet post at 
Khenjan, north of the Salang tunne 

To the east of Kabul, in early J 
a coordinated attack on the Kabul-J 
lalabad highway caused the loss of f 
eral Soviet outposts and a number ( 
vehicles. In the west, the level of fij 
ing fluctuated in Paghman througho 
the year, beginning with an unusual 
winter offensive by the mujahidin. 
tillery flashes and bomb blasts here 
visible in Kabul. Soviet operations i 
August destroyed orchards to elimii 
mujahidin cover. 

Herat and the West. There are 
continued reports of heavy fighting 
and around Herat. The mujahidin v 
particularly effective in the spring. 
Damage in the city remains severe, 
though the regime has launched son 
repair programs. The Soviets have 1 
dozed a large swath across the west 
part of the city and turned the west 
outskirts into a free-fire zone. By la 
in the year, these security measures 
have apparently succeeded in limitir 
mujahidin operations in the city. 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Resistance forces continue to oper- 
utside the city, where they are tar- 
of intense, but not precise, high- 
ide bombing. Regional commander 
lil Khan continues to broaden 
reas of influence (see Central 
anistan). One of the largest regime 
a formations in the Herat area de- 
d to the resistance in early fall. 

jandahar. Qandahar remains a 
,orn city. Soviet/regime forces took 
sad during the winter, when Qan- 
r is traditionally the major theater 
nflict. Spetsnaz (Special Forces) 

|)ther operations focused on re- 
nce resupply efforts and caravan 
diction. But their efforts failed to 
If '. a major impact, as the resistance 
j mdahar remained well stocked and 
,0 the logistics train deeper inside 
•ountry. 

In Qandahar, the resistance is well 
nized with a local council, including 
arties, presided over by a nonpar- 
elder. Most actions involve 
ihidin from several parties; they 
se a leader from among the par- 
ating commanders at a war council. 
y in the year, the resistance almost 
eeded in gaining full control of the 
ity from the regime. 
By the onset of summer, the capital 
lUthern Afghanistan and its sur- 
ding areas had become the scene of 
t has been probably the heaviest 
entration of combat of the war. In 
June, Afghan forces led a drive up 
Arghandab Valley. They were 
ed back by well-entrenched 
ahidin, although prominent local 
mander Lala Malang was killed, 
ime military suffered severe losses, 
hundreds of troops deserted. 
Soviet and regime forces launched 
Tal other operations over the sum- 
. The regime was only able to pro- 
! troops for these operations by 
OTng forces from all over Afghan- 
n, particularly the north. The long 
es of Soviet/regime drives into the 
jvai and Mahalajat Valleys were 
-ly and did not overwhelm resis- 
26 formations, but they did keep lo- 
mujahidin off balance. The Soviets 
d the opportunity to extend the se- 
ity belt around (Qandahar. In addi- 




tion, they bulldozed a grid network of 
roads through the old city, indis- 
criminately destroying homes and 
shops. 

While resistance activity has been 
complicated, the mnjahidin still oper- 
ate in the city. Combat continued on a 
steady basis throughout the latter part 
of the year, with the mujahidin in full 
control of outlying areas. 

In the latter part of the year, So- 
viet military correspondents in the 
Qandahar area painted a particularly 
grim picture. On September 18, an 
Izvestiya correspondent reported: 



If you judge by newspaper reports, es- 
pecially television reportage, on what is 
happening in Afghanistan, especially in the 
south, you get the impression that columns 
of people returning home fill all the roads 
leading into Afghanistan, that the national 
reconciliation policy has already led to a 
situation where yesterday's enemies kiss 
each other in the city squares. But you go 
to Qandahar and you'll see how it really is. 

The city is one big ruin. There is 
shooting all the time. Nobody would give a 
brass farthing for your life if you took it 
into your head, say, to walk down the 
street unarmed. 



rch 1988 



A Soviet drive established as many 
as 70 security posts to guard the road 
from Qandahar to the Pakistan border. 
These posts were manned with tribes- 
men loyal to militia leader Gen. 
Ismatullah Achekzai, who 2 years ago 
became the regime's prize defector from 
the mujahidin. In September, 35 
gi-oups belonging to six parties 
launched a coordinated attack along a 
40-mile stretch and took many of the 
posts. 

Ismatullah is a warlord without 
particular loyalty, who often fought 
party officials, especially Interior Min- 
ister Gulabzoi. In November, on his 
way into the Kabul Loya Jirga where 
he was a delegate, Ismatullah was 
wounded in a shootout with security 
guards. A number of his followers were 
killed in subsequent gunbattles. What- 
ever his ultimate fate, regime control in 
the south is shaken. 



The North 

Over the past year, resistance activities 
markedly increased north of the Hindu 
Kush Mountains — once considered rela- 
tively secure for the Soviets — and even 
spilled over the Soviet border. 
Mujahidin actions included the storm- 
ing of regime garrisons, a rocket attack 
on the city of Mazar-e-Sharif during the 
anniversary of the April coup, and a 
variety of attacks in the northwest 
(near the gasfields). 

Comparatively little Soviet/regime 
offensive action occurred in the Panj- 
sher Valley as mujahidin commander 
Masood concentrated his efforts north 
of the Hindu Kush. Following news of 
successes in the north, rumors spread 
that he was about to, as he did in 1985, 
storm the most exposed regime gar- 
rison in the valley, Peshghowr. In Oc- 
tober, the base's defenders suddenly 
pulled further back into the valley, leav- 
ing Peshghowr to the mujahidin. 

The Council of the North strength- 
ened its organization and ties with par- 
ties other than the founding Jamiat-i- 
Islami. However, perhaps the heaviest 
fighting of the year anywhere in 
Afghanistan among mujahidin groups 
took place in this region. 

Mujahidin in Masood's sphere are 
organized in four levels: self-defense 
units defend villages from attack; sec- 




Commander Masood with captured Soviet artillery at Kalafgan. 



ond-level units defend whole valleys; 
mobile groups with training and heavy 
weapons attack and operate on a 
provincial level; and central units are 
the potential core of a professional re- 
sistance army and operate throughout 
the north. Extensively trained and ex- 
perienced, they have been a crucial ele- 
ment in the garrison assaults. Fighters 
from a number of groups in the north 
and elsewhere have trained with Ma- 
sood's units. 

Northern council forces were re- 
sponsible for some of the major re- 
sistance successes of the year. In July, 
they attacked and stormed Kalafgan, 
less then 50 miles from the Soviet 
border. More than 100 regime prisoners 
were taken, and large amounts of weap- 
ons, including light artillery, were 
seized. The operation was led by lo- 
cal mujahidin. including Harakat-i 
Inqilab-i-Islami (Nabi) forces, and 
planned by Masood. The garrison sits 
astride a major supply route for Soviet 
forces just inside Afghanistan. A late 
summer Soviet supply operation along 
this road was heavily contested by the 
m,ujahidin. 



In October, local forces, mujah 
from the Ittihad of Sayyaf, and coui 
forces overran the regime garrison 
Koran va Monjan, in Badakshan, as 
tride a critical supply path into the 
Panjsher. 

Because of careful planning. Ma 
ood's assaults have been successful 
relatively few casualties. The Soviet 
and the regime have not been able t 
reoccupy the garrisons overrun by 
Masood during the last 2 years. 

Kabul broadly publicized the lal 
summer defection of Abdul Rasul 
Phelwan, from Faryab Province in t 
northwest, who delivered French jo 
nalist Alain Guillo to the regime. Tl 
size of Phelwan's group testifies to l 
standing resistance presence in this 
sensitive region (near the gasfields 
the Soviet border) which continued 
after his defection. In December 19!- 
Kabul media had reported that Phel 
had been killed by the regime secur 
forces. 

Across the Soviet Border 

The resistance has long operated ac; 
the Soviet/Afghan border, sometime 
along traditional smuggling routes. 



Department of State Bull 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



lly this movement has simply in- 
id the distribution of Korans and 
y cards into the largely Muslim re- 
ics of Soviet Central Asia, but 

! have been occasional armed 

ks. 

In 1987, for the first time, Soviet 

ia acknowledged two assaults, in 

cases after mujafudin claims were 
lyed in Western media. On March 

sistance forces rocketed a match 
)ry in Pyandzh, a city on the Amu 
fa River border. Soviet media ac- 
dedged the raid in April. On April 
^ASS reported that on April 9 
ihidin slipped across the border 
attacked a contingent of Soviet 
er guards, killing two. It stated in 
h terms that the U.S.S.R. would 
verything necessary to protect its 
ier. Soon after, KGB chief 
brikov visited the area and ad- 
sed the border guards about the 
at to Soviet security. By May, So- 
media denied the existence of 
ahidin incursions, which had ta- 
'd off. By the end of the year, how- 
; there was at least one additional 
ahidin action inside the U.S.S.R. 
After both raids Soviet forces from 
U.S.S.R. immediately launched 
1 counterinsurgent and reprisal at- 
;s on Konduz and Ikkhar Provinces 
n apparent effort to construct a 
ion sanitaire south of the border, 
ilian casualties were enormous, and 
lerous villages were destroyed. Ref- 
es from these attacks constituted 
most visible — and appeared the 
;t miserable — group that entered 
;istan all year. Few refugees had 
viously fled the north. 

item Afghanistan 

jahidin activity increased in the 
tern provinces. Several large Soviet 
ime operations occurred, but the 
-to-day Soviet/regime presence 
Hned. 

Nangarhar and the Konar Valley. 

ch of Nangarhar has become liber- 
d territory. Foreign journahsts noted 
tners planting in areas under 
jahidin control that previously had 
!n abandoned. The provincial capital, 
ilabad, was under constant re- 
;ance pressure. The road to Pakistan 




6882 12-86 STATE (INR/GE 



remained open, but the mujahidin 
exerted nearly as much control over 
what travels on it as the regime. 

In late October and November, a 
long awaited mujahidin assault hit a 
number of Soviet and regime posts and 
garrisons in the Konar Valley. The op- 
eration — one of the most broadly coor- 
dinated operations of the war — involved 
several parties and attacks on almost 
every bivouac, from Barikowt almost to 
the Kabul River. Barikowt did not fall 
but remained under siege as it has been 
since the war began. A concentrated 
attack on the Soviet garrison at Asmar 
was an example of increased mujahidin 
readiness to target Soviets, as opposed 
to Kabul regime installations. Soviet 
and regime forces took substantial 
losses, but all garrisons in the valley 
held. 



Paktia. Paktia Province, on the 
border of Pakistan, is the site of heavy 
resistance concentration and a hub of 
transport routes. It has been the scene 
of some of the heaviest fighting of the 
war. 

In late May, a multiregimental 
force of about 5,000 Soviet troops 
moved to attack mujahidin near Ali 
Khel, in one of the key battles of the 
conflict. They were backed by tanks, 
armored personnel carriers, and artil- 
lery, including 152mm self-propelled 
guns along with Kabul forces. 

The Soviet assault was accom- 
panied by intense air attacks, but the 
attackers dropped bombs from high al- 
titudes, apparently trying to stay out of 
the reach of niMJahidin defense. Sev- 
eral Soviet/regime aircraft — perhaps a 
dozen — were shot down. Forced to rely 



rch 1988 



PROVINCES 




7377 12-87 STATE (INR/GE) 



less on air power, the Soviets attacked 
with the most intense artillery fire of 
the war. 

The most dramatic engagement 
occurred when Soviet/regime forces 
tried to attack mujaltidin positions 
near Bayan Khel. When initial air 
strikes and artillery barrages failed, 
Soviet troops, led by elite Spetsnaz 
commandos, charged. They were re- 
pulsed by the mujahidin in fierce hand- 
to-hand fighting with heavy casualties 
on both sides. 

Some regime units at Bayan Khel 
attempted to surrender but were 
stopped when they were bombed by the 
Soviets and incurred heavy casualties. 
Despite such antidefection measures, 
hundreds of regime soldiers defected to 
the tnujakidm. Observers in Kabul re- 
ported almost daily funerals. At one 
mass funeral, mourners clashed with 
the police. Kabul media claimed the re- 
gime captured a number of Arab na- 
tionals who were fighting with the 
mujahidin in Paktia. 

The battle was notable for the abil- 
ity of the niHjahidin to stand and fight, 
for their good logistics, and for the ex- 



cellent cooperation between resistance 
parties. Several of the Peshawar re- 
sistance leaders personally participated 
in the battle, which boosted mujahidin 
morale. Despite substantial casualties, 
the mujahidin claimed a victory in 
Paktia, and their morale reached its 
highest level since the Soviet invasion. 

In November-December, a major 
battle occurred around the regime gar- 
rison at Khowst, scene of a large re- 
sistance attack in 1985. The ynujahidi^i 
tightened their siege of Khowst and on 
a number of regime positions on this 
vulnerable plain. In the city food was in 
short supply, and casualties were high. 

A major Soviet-Afghan coun- 
teroffensive was launched from the 
provincial capital Gardeyz with an un- 
precedented amount of artillery fire- 
power — in an apparent effort to open 
the road to Khowst, closed since 1979. 
By late December, the Soviets and 
their allies had not broken through. 
Mujahidin poured into the area to 
resist the advance, coordinated as 
in previous years by joint provincial 
commander Jallaluddin Haqqani 
(Hezb-e-Islami Khalis). 



Central Afghanistan 

Afghanistan's Soviet forces evacuate! 
their garrisons in Bamian — after a ri [ 
sistance attack — and in Chagcharan, 
capital of Ghor Province, in the sumi 
mer However, the regime retained c 
trol in these cities, since Afghan for 
remained. 

In general, the situation in the 
Hazarajat was relatively quiet and fi 
of regime presence. Most of the aret 
remained under the influence of pro- 
Iranian groups, but the traditionalis 
Shi'a Shura party continued to hold 
fringe areas and operate against the 
Soviets. 

A remote part of southern Ghor 
Province was the scene of one of the 
most broadly based meetings of com 
manders ever held inside Afghanists 
Chaired by Ismail Khan of Herat (Je 
iat), the meeting included hundreds 
mujahidin and commanders from se 
eral parties and many of the provinc 
of western Afghanistan. For several 
weeks in July, this large group — un- 
harassed by Soviet/regime forces — d 
cussed military and political issues. 

Their communique, distributed 
side and outside the country, called 
practical measures to improve milita 
coordination, including improved con 
munication. It demanded military an 
political unity and chastised the poll' 
cal leaders for not being able to wor 
together. It called for the establishn' 
of a national commanders' council an. 
role in determining the future of 
Afghanistan. 



An Increasingly 
Powerful Resistance 



The Afghan resistance is a broad na- 
tional movement encompassing almo; 
the whole population inside the coun 
try, Afghan refugees in Iran and 
Pakistan, and Afghans in exile throu 
out the world. The military side of tl 
resistance, the mujahidin fighters, £ 
grouped in hundreds of fronts in eve: 
part of the country. Most are affiliat< 
with one of seven parties headquar- 
tered in Peshawar, Pakistan, which 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



joined to form the Islamic Alliance 
i'ghanistan Mujahidin (lUAM), gen- 
av referred to as the Alliance. (See 
i!"or the seven parties and their 

ITS.) 

riu' growing resistance threat is 
1 y line to the improvement in quan- 
■ 111(1 quality of resistance supplies in 
( It years. Despite recent efforts to 
t, diet resistance supply lines, the 
I 't ,s have not been able to staunch 
( nil Jiiliidin logistics flow. As a So- 
f aiiiiy correspondent described the 

• ly train; "Caravans sometimes 

itr lip to 300 or 400 pack animals. 
. travel not only on camels but they 
( rucks and tractors. Their guards 
( nobile — on horseback or 

ircycles." 

Small arms are plentiful, and the 

1 ihidin still get significant supplies 
I sympathizers or through capture 

1 the regime military and from the 
j ets. They have used 107mm and 
im rockets, like the Soviet model 
I 21 multiple rocket launcher, to ex- 
ncreased direct and standoff 
power. 

Advanced surface-to-air missiles 
improved resistance air defense 
made heavy machine guns, still the 
istay of resistance air defense, 
i effective. Soviet/regime aircraft 
is are up, and more important, at- 
ing pilots are more cautious — cut- 
the impact of their air power. 
Improving resistance strength also 
es from more training and combat 
jrience (which leads to better tac- 
', expanded cooperation (intergroup 
ting has steadily declined), and the 
d development of a communications 
supply network in a country that in 
retime had only the most basic road 
em. The Soviets have not been 

• to counter these developments, 
while Soviet forces rotate, the 

iahidin remain and know the terrain 
mately. Over time, the mujahidin's 
IS have increased. 

The resistance's cumulative military 
political successes have greatly 
sted their morale, which, in 1987, 
3 to its highest level since the 
ision. 




Mujahidin with antiaircraft gun (top) 
and witli 107mm rocket (bottom). 



Political Developments. Whereas 
the pace on the battlefield was dictated 
by the mujahidin, many political 
efforts responded to regime initiatives. 
Reacting to Najib's January campaign, 
the Alliance held an unprecedented 
demonstration in January in Peshawar 
that was attended by hundreds of thou- 
sands of refugees and mujahidin. The 
seven leaders appeared publicly to- 
gether and denounced the Kabul re- 
gime. They called for: 

• A total and unconditional with- 
drawal of Soviet forces; 

• An interim mujahidin govern- 
ment, which would hold free and fair 
elections; and, 

• Resistance unity and arbitration 
of interparty disputes. 

In April, the resistance parties an- 
nounced a scheme for election, to be 
held among the refugees and the popu- 
lation inside Afghanistan, particularly 
among the commanders. The elections 
were postponed, however, due to the 
difficult security conditions inside the 
country. Also in the spring, having suc- 
cessfully completed the rotation of the 
role of spokesmen among all seven Al- 
liance leaders, the parties decided to 
give Mohammed Yunis Khalis a second 
term as spokesman. 




In July, again rejecting regime pro- 
posals, the party leaders in Peshawar 
reiterated their positions that, should 
the Soviets leave, they would not indis- 
criminately retaliate against Kabul 
regime personnel, would pursue non- 
alignment, and would maintain correct 
relations with Afghanistan's neighbors. 

In October, as Khalis' term as Al- 
liance spokesman expired, the Alliance 
met again to further refine its organi- 
zational arrangements. A Shura, or 
council, was chosen, with equal repre- 



rch 1988 



i^: 



»!d«>Vfi^>0S9^S^>fi»^^CSi'^Si9^««V>d9i9^«l>^«^^^^ 



Resistance Alliance Leadership 

On November 18, 1987, the Islamic 
Unity of Afghanistan Mujahidin, the 
Peshawar Resistance Alliance, chose 
Mohammed Yunis Khalis as its rais for 
an 18-month term. (The term rais can 
mean president or chairman, but most 
Afghans understand it to mean leader.) 
Following is a listing of the seven Al- 
liance parties and their leaders. 

Islamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami- 
Khalis): Maulavi Mohammed Yunis 
Khalis. Khalis was born about 1920 
in Nangarhar Province, near 
Pakistan. He was educated in re- 
ligious schools in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and acquired the title 
Maulavi (religious teacher). In the 
1950s, Khalis lived in Kabul as an 
author, editor, and teacher of Islamic 
studies. In 1965, he became politi- 
cally active and went into hiding after 
the Daoud coup in 1973. His son was 
arrested (and subsequently killed), 
but Khalis himself escaped to 
Pakistan. In the 1970s, he helped 
form the Hezb-e-lslami and took up 
arms against the communist regime. 
In 1979, Khalis became leader of the 
faction of the Hezb-e-lslami that 
bears his name. Among Khalis' ad- 
herents are some of the most effec- 
tive commanders of the resistance: 
Abdul Haq of Kabul; Jallaluddin Haq- 
qani of Paktia; and Mullah Malang of 
Qandahar Khalis himself is re- 
nowned for going into Afghanistan 
and personally participating in 
combat. 

Khalis was chosen as the first 
spokesman of the combined re- 
sistance alliance in 1985 and served 
6 months as spokesman just before 
being named rais in October. 

Following are other party lead- 
ers, beginning with the two who ac- 
companied Khalis in October: 

Afghanistan National Libera- 
tion Front (Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli 



Afghanistan): Sebghatullah Mo- 
jadeddi. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi 
comes from one of the most re- 
spected religious families in 
Afghanistan. Mojadeddi was born in 
Kabul in 1925. He has an MA degree 
in Islamic law from Al-Azhar Univer- 
sity in Cairo and taught theology at 
Kabul University during the 1950s. In 
the 1960s, Mojadeddi was imprisoned 
by the former Afghan King, Zahir 
Shah, for suspicion of involvement in 
a plot to assassinate Khrushchev. He 
fled to Denmark where he lived and 
taught Islam. Mojadeddi has traveled 
extensively in support of the 
resistance. 

National Islamic Front for 
Afghanistan (NIFA) (Mahaz-e- 
Melli): Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani. 

Gailani, about 55, is a hereditary re- 
ligious leader. A graduate of the Fac- 
ulty of Theology of Kabul University, 
tor many years he was a religious 
adviser to King Zahir and later to 
President Daoud. He also was active 
in commerce. Gailani, who advocates 
a parliamentary system for 
Afghanistan, has been an articulate 
spokesman for the resistance. 

Islamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami- 
Gulbuddin since 1974): Gulbuddin 
Hikmatyar. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar 
heads the Islamic Party (Gulbuddin 
faction), one of the largest and oldest 
resistance groups. A Pashtun, 
Gulbuddin was born in 1947 in Kon- 
duz. While a student of engineering 
at Kabul University in the mid-1970s, 
he became a prominent figure in the 
Islamic movement. He fled to 
Pakistan in 1974 and launched armed 
resistance against the Daoud regime. 
Gulbuddin was recently reelected 
head of the Hezb-e-lslami (G). 

Islamic Society (Jamiat-i-ls- 
lami): Burhanuddin Rabbani. 

Rabbani was born in Badakshan in 
1942. Rabbani studied, then taught 



Islamic law at Kabul University in the 
early 1960s. In 1968, he received a 
PhD in Islamic philosophy from Al- 
Azhar University in Cairo and re- 
turned to Afghanistan to become 
dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at 
Kabul University. A Jamiat member 
since 1968, he was selected leader In 
1972. He escaped arrest in 1974 and 
then moved to Pakistan. Rabbani is 
the leader of the party of Masood and 
Ismail Khan of Herat — two of the most 
effective resistance commanders. 

Islamic Revolutionary Move- 
ment (Harakat-e-lnqilab-i-lslami): 
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Nabi 
Mohammadi was born in Lowgar in 
1925. He operated an influential Isla- 
mic school in Afghanistan in the 
1960s where he was vociferously 
anticommunist. He was a member of 
the Afghan Parliament during 
1970-74. He has lived in Pakistan 
since the 1978 coup. Nabi Moham- 
madi was elected joint Amir (chief) of 
an earlier resistance alliance by the 
Jamiat and Hezb-e-lslami 
(Hikmatyar) Parties in 1979. When 
that arrangement dissolved, he 
formed his own party. 

Islamic Union for the Libera- 
tion of Afghanistan (Ittihad-i-ls- 
lami): Abd Al-Rab Abd ul-Rassul 
Sayyaf. Sayyaf, a Ghilzai Pashtun, 
was born in Paghman around 1944. 
He graduated from Kabul University 
with a BA in theology, then earned a 
masters from Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo. He then returned to teach at 
Kabul University where he was active 
in the Islamic movement. He was im- 
prisoned for 6 years following the 
1973 coup. After his release under a 
post-Soviet invasion amnesty in 
1979, he fled to Pakistan. In 1980, 
Sayyaf was elected chairman of the 
Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of 
Afghanistan, and then served as the 
chairman of the old seven-party al- 
liance from 1982 to 1985. 



sentation from each party. The Shura 
chose Khalis for the new post of rais, 
or chairman, of the Alliance (see 
above). Although the Alliance displayed 
significant political development, its 
members continue to disagree on 
Afghanistan's future and sometimes on 
tactical issues. 



International Relations. In 1987, 
Alliance leaders were increasingly visi- 
ble on the world scene. Individual lead- 
ers were welcomed in many countries. 
In January, they attended the Islamic 
Conference in Kuwait. In November, 



Rais Khalis led an alliance delegatioi 
to the United Nations for the UN G( 
eral Assembly (UNGA) Afghanistan 
bate. Following the successful UN vc 
Khalis took a delegation to Washingt 
to meet with President Reagan. 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



Soviets in Afghanistan 

Military: A Changing 
Bt Strategy 

Soviets have shifted their strategy 
the years. At first, their efforts 
;ed on the major cities and on the 
; around the road between Kabul 
;he Soviet Union. They concen- 
d on large attacks. The Soviets 
up to 20,000 troops in their nu- 
>us drives into the Panjsher Valley 
ligh-level carpet bombing, 
several years ago, the Soviets be- 
notice an improvement in the 
hidiyi supplies and placed more 
lasis on cutting off the flow. They 
ed on the border areas near 
itan and increased helicopter use 
idopted small unit tactics. Many 
ved these tactics would help build 
Afghan army and destroy the 
Jiidiu, and these tactics were suc- 
ul for a time. But the mujahidin 
learned how to counter these tac- 
so their success was temporary, 
[n the past year, the Soviets again 
been forced to shift their strategy, 
time they were more on the defen- 
They no longer have complete con- 
)f the air. The Soviets reduced 
efforts to stop the movement of 
lies, although they occasionally at- 
id caravans, and tended to operate 
in the border areas. Major opera- 
appeared to keep the mujahidin 
alance and unable to attack while 
Soviets improved their defenses in 
Tiajor cities — Qandahar, Herat, and 
al. Over the summer, Soviet forces 
id out of several isolated bases, 
ing much of the country without a 
et presence. 

Infrastructural Constraints. 

er Soviet General Secretary Gor- 
lev, the Soviets have only mar- 
lly increased their forces in 
rianistan. This may not be a solely 
:ical decision; it also may reflect the 
ntial difficulties of supplying addi- 
al forces using the rudimentary 
sportation infrastructure in rugged 
hanistan. Indeed, because of the 
ted transportation network beyond 
immediate border area, they have 
some problems supplying the 
)ps there now — particularly during 
iods of sustained combat. 



Soviets in Combat in 1987. Soviet 
combat forces may have increased 
slightly since last year. A few new ar- 
tillery units and slightly higher per- 
sonnel levels in units already in the 
country, raised overall Soviet troop 
strength to about 120,000. According to 
most estimates, some 30,000 troops in 
the U.S.S.R., primarily just across the 
border, support combat operations, in- 
cluding flying combat air missions from 
the U.S.S.R. Most Soviet troops re- 
main in static defensive/security deploy- 
ments. The performance of the average 
conscripted Soviet soldier remains 
unimpressive. 

During the past year, the Soviets 
drastically altered their tactics in the 
face of the resistance's improved air 
defense. While small sweep operations 
continued on the ground, they no 
longer had ample air support. Opera- 
tions now include massive amounts of 
artillery and appear to develop more 



Zahir Shah 

In addition to its appeals to the re- 
sistance Alliance, the Kabul regime, 
explicitly, and the Soviets, implicitly, 
have referred to the possibility of 
some future role for the former King 
of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. In a 
November 1987 interview, Zahir 
stated that the determination of a 
role for him "is up to the Afghan 
nation." 

Mohammed Zahir Shah was born 
in 1914 in Kabul into the Muham- 
medzai branch of the Durrani 
Pashtuns. He was educated in 
Afghanistan and France. Zahir was 
Assistant War Minister and Education 
Minister prior to ascending the throne 
in 1933, following the assassination 
of his father, and reigned for 40 
years. In 1964, King Zahir promul- 
gated a new constitution which al- 
lowed for a parliamentary system 
featuring a Wolesi Jirga (National As- 
sembly) and excluded members of 
the royal family from government 
positions. 

While on tour in Italy, Zahir was 
overthrown by his cousin and former 
Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, 
who declared the Republic of 
Afghanistan. (Daoud was killed in the 
communist coup of 1978.) Zahir Shah 
has since lived in Rome. 



slowly. Heliborne assaults by elite 
troops also decreased as casualties 
mounted. 

Aircraft losses have soared over 
the past year. For some periods the So- 
viet/Afghan side lost an aircraft a 
day — or more — to resistance fire. Air- 
craft downings were particularly high 
in the early part of the year, then de- 
clined as pilots began to stay out of the 
reach of mujahidin gunners. Total So- 
viet/Afghan losses were in the range of 
some 150-200 aircraft for the year. 
These losses forced the Soviets to re- 
evaluate their tactics. In some areas 
there has been a marked decrease in 
Soviet air activity with a resulting drop 
in air losses. 

Soviet and regime aircraft are fly- 
ing higher and faster, which reduces 
the accuracy with which they can de- 
liver their ordnance. They also employ 
countermeasures which degrade their 
performance. The Soviets may be more 
reluctant to use their devastating heli- 
copter gunships, relying instead on 
faster — but less accurate — fixed-wing 
aircraft. Yet, even fixed-wing pilots 
have become more reluctant to chal- 
lenge mujahidin air defense. 

The Soviets have made efforts to 
reduce casualties — even though combat 
operations increased — and over the past 
year probably another 3,000 Soviets 
were wounded or killed, bringing the 
total number of Soviet casualties in 
Afghanistan since 1979 to at least 
33,000-38,000, more than one-third of 
whom were killed. These estimates do 
not include heavy losses to disease. 
Total losses may be significantly higher; 
some Soviet sources cite 50,000 or 
more, or 25,000 killed over the course 
of the war. Despite publication of nu- 
merous requests for casualty data in 
Soviet media over the last year, Soviet 
authorities have only hinted that the 
numbers might be released after a So- 
viet withdrawal. 

Moscow continues to place great 
faith in deploying Spetsnaz troops. 
With reduced air support, and in- 
creased mujahidin awareness of their 
tactics and methods, however, Spetsnaz 
troops have not been as successful as 
they were initially. Casualties have in- 
creased, morale has suffered, and they 
have been fought to a standstill and 



rch 1988 



/X:^^ia^J!S^>S^!^X!^^:^S^^^S^<S^^C!^i:^^S^Xa^S9S;^^^9^ 



Significant Connbat in Afghanistan - 1987 




^\li l^eyzabod* 
Konduz. OKolofgon 

Koron va MonjonQ 

PeshghowrO Acrr^nrV 




DChaghcharan Paghman^ * 

vJ^Kabu 

AirOIHIAlfllSTAir AliKheyl^ 

Khowst 



iArghondob 



v-/ .Oandoho 



^^Mohalajat 



slamabad* 



AMiron Shah 

F A K II T 




Names ond boundory representotic 
are not necessorily authoritolive. 





Legend 


o 


Coptured by the mujohidin 


9- 


Major bottles 


A 


Major Soviet air raids 


on Pakistan 


D 


Vacated by Soviet troops 




50 100 miles 
50 100 kilometers 



3 



sometimes defeated. Spetsnaz 
performance is now at about the same 
level as other regular forces in 
Afghanistan. 

Throughout 1987, the Soviets con- 
tinued to pour new equipment, espe- 
cially artillery, into the country. Many 
of the new weapons were the best self- 
propelled artillery pieces in the Soviet 
inventory. For example, two types of 



7376 12-87 STATE (INR/GE) 



sophisticated 152mm cannons, a 122mm 
howitzer, and a new automatic 82mm 
mortar have all been sent to 
Afghanistan to compensate for reduced 
air support. Most of it was destined for 
Soviet forces, but Kabul's forces re- 
ceived a share. 

Infrastructure improvements con- 
tinued unabated — airfield runways are 
being improved, revetments made for 



h 



aircraft, and fuel and ammunition st 
age sites expanded to include the co 
struction of mountainside and 
underground bunkers. Security zom j, 
around Kabul and other major cities 
are being increased. These defensive 
stallations are key to the Soviet stra 
egy of protecting the cities. These 
measures indicate Soviet plans to da ^ 
part the country, if any, have not yet ^i 
been reflected in actions on the grou g| 

Soviet forces continue to suffer 
rious morale problems in what retur 
ing veterans have called "a dirty wa 
Soviet propaganda cannot obscure fi 
their own troops the reality that the 
are fighting a war against the Afghi 
people. Disease is rampant, particu- 
larly dysentery and hepatitis caused 
poor hygiene. Defectors report seve 
abuse of conscripts by other troops, 
eluding male rape, extensive black r 
keteering, and alcohol and drug abu 
Some defectors fight alongside the 
mujahidin. The Soviets have made 
greater efforts to exchange capturec 
nntjahidin for Soviets held by the 
resistance. 

Soviet Political Moves 

Soviet diplomacy in 1987 has concen 
trated on a single theme: Moscow's ; 
leged desire to find a political soluti 
to the conflict. The Soviets have an- 
nounced repeatedly that the "politic: 
decision" to leave Afghanistan has b 
made. At the same time, they have i 
backed down from their insistence tl 
the PDPA play a leading role in any 
postwithdrawal regime. In essence, 
Soviets have been pushing hard at tl 
negotiating table for the victory tha 
becoming increasingly elusive on the 
battlefield. 

There have been several differei 
expressions of Soviet policy on 
Afghanistan over the past year, sug- 
gesting that Gorbachev's search for i 
solution in Afghanistan is a continui 
process and that the Soviets are reai 
to consider less optimal solutions th: 
in the past. However, there still is n 
sign that Gorbachev has made the h; 
decision to leave Afghanistan and let 
his PDPA clients depend on the will 
the Afghan people for their political 
survival. 



10 



Department of State Bulli i 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



The past year has seen Soviet 
merit on a number of questions re- 
to Afghanistan. On the issue of a 
drawal timetable for Soviet forces, 
nstance, the Soviet position has 
erated considerably. Whereas in 
, the Soviet/regime insisted on a 4- 
timeframe, in February 1987, they 
ced it to 18 months and in Sep- 
')er to 16 months. In December, 
ng up to and during the Reagan- 
)achev summit in Washington, So- 
spokesmen spoke repeatedly of a 
onths (or less) timeframe. They 
ireferred to Najib's conditional offer 
H months (or less). No formal offer 
I Deen tabled at Geneva, however. 
I , there is no agreement on the 
irtant questions of when the time- 
; would begin or how the with- 
( .'als would be scheduled. 
' The Soviet position that an end to 
j side interference" must precede 
withdrawal of Soviet troops would 
^ar to be satisfied in the draft Gen- 
te.xt on "mutual noninterference." 
key question here is one of defini- 
As long as Moscow maintains that 
ling in Afghanistan is prima facie 
ence of "outside interference," they 
saying, in effect, that their troops 
not leave until the war is won on 
et terms. 

Over the past year, Soviet officials 
t discussed Afghanistan in many 
ms, although thus far they have 
1 unwilling to deal directly with 
ahidin representatives. U.S. and 
iet officials have been holding reg- 
exchanges on Afghanistan since 
i, and in late 1986 and early 1987, 
iet and Pakistani officials met for 
ussions as well. 

In early November 1987, in a de- 
ture from past practice, a retired 
iet military officer appeared at a 
ilic forum in The Hague with a rep- 
antative of a resistance party. This 
/ foreshadow a Soviet willingness to 
I directly with mtijafudin leaders in 
future. Soviet officials also have be- 
18 more willing to consider alter- 
ive political arrangements for 
;hanistan than before. In line with 
Dul's "national reconciliation" policy, 
iet officials now call for a coalition 
ernment in Kabul, although they 



still insist that their clients — the 
PDPA — must control the presidency 
and major ministerial portfolios, 
thereby ensuring a dominant PDPA 
role in any such arrangement. During 
the past year, Soviet officials have 
shown an interest in some role for the 
former king, Zahir Shah. 

Growing Unhappiness 
on the Home Front 

Concern about the fighting in 
Afghanistan and its impact on life ap- 
pears to be increasing, but there is lit- 
tle evidence of widespread opposition to 
the war. Complaints, however, have be- 
come more frequent, and Moscow is re- 
sponding with vastly expanded and 
more realistic press coverage of the war 
and special counterpropaganda cam- 
paigns throughout the country. 

This effort now appears to have 
backfired. These campaigns have had 
the unintended consequence of making 
Soviet citizens even more worried and 
ever more willing to question Moscow's 
policy. A letter published in Pravda on 
November 25, 1987, is typical: it stated 
that "There is talk that the war in 
Afghanistan would have ended long ago 
if along with the sons of [ordinary peo- 
ple] the children of the leaders were 
sent there as well." 

Cynicism and anger are especially 
widespread among combat veterans and 
those who might be sent to Afghanistan. 
While many officers may have benefited 
from Afghan service, enlisted personnel 
have not. Many have returned home 
openly hostile to the war, bringing with 
them psychological, drug, and a wide 
variety of other problems. Efforts to 
help veterans or to draw them into pa- 
triotic propaganda work have generally 
failed. In the November 1987 Ogonyek, 
for example, one veteran urged jour- 
nalists to "call a dirty war a dirty war," 
and another said: "The main question 
about Afghanistan is not the truth 
about the horrors and the deaths, but 
why are we there?" Partially as a re- 
sult, draft evasion has increased to the 
point where military journals discuss it 
openly. 



The Kabul Regime 



Military and Security Forces 

After massive infusions of equipment, 
training, money, and advice, the re- 
gime's armed forces cannot defend the 
government without major Soviet as- 
sistance. Combat experience over the 
last 9 years has not improved perform- 
ance, which appears to have reached a 
new low. 

Under Najib the armed forces have 
made no significant improvements. The 
army continues to retain about some 
40,000 men, less than half its preinva- 
sion level. The air force has approxi- 
mately 10,000. The numbers of 
paramilitary, militia. Secret Police 
(KHAD), and border guards fluctuate 
with a total strength probably less than 
100,000. Kabul can take little comfort in 
the questionable abilities and loyalties 
of its personnel. 

In combat operations, Kabul's 
forces depend on Soviet air and artil- 
lery support and Soviet advisers. Re- 
gime troops have been unable to hold 
their own on any significant scale this 
past year. Indeed, the regime continues 
to lose numerous outposts as the 
mujahidin nibble away at Kabul's erod- 
ing authority. Afghan air force pilots 
occasionally have refused to fly. 

Conscription and Desertion. 

Recruitment remains a serious prob- 
lem, especially with regime control 
ebbing in many areas. Those party 
cadres still in the countryside also are 
charged with helping the conscription 
effort. A regular conscription cannot 
raise enough troops; the regime is 
forced to rely on forced conscription — 
press ganging. Young men throughout 
Afghanistan continue to leave school, 
invoke family connections in the party, 
go underground, or flee the country to 
avoid the sweeps of army units to dra- 
goon new recruits. 

Draftees are thrown into battle 
with little or no training and with pre- 
dictable result: high casualties and de- 
sertions. Most officers are poorly 
trained, with party loyalty being more 
important than professionalism. High 
casualty rates further reduce man- 
power, since medical care is 
rudimentary. 



chigss 






The most serious problem facing 
Kabul's forces is desertion. Troops de- 
sert by the hundreds. Several times 
Afghan units deserted as a whole. 
Other units were only prevented from 
deserting by force. Inductees from Ka- 
bul comprise an increasing part of the 
military since it is only in the capital 
that the army can capture enough 
youths. 

Factionalism remains a chronic 
problem within Afghan units. Differ- 
ences appear to have been accentuated 
in the aftermath of Karmal's removal, 
easing the way for increased inujakidin 
penetration. Karmal loyalists have 
largely been purged from key military 
and security positions. 

Militia. Najib has placed more em- 
phasis on the militias and directed more 
resources to them. Nevertheless, mili- 
tia elements have even worse training 
and equipment than the regular army 
and have not significantly added to re- 
gime strength. 

Police. The Ministry of the Inte- 
rior, headed by Khalq faction chief 
Gulabzoi, includes some 30,000 police. 
Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces, 
the Sarandoy, are equipped as a light 
infantry force. In 1987, Sarandoy were 
increasingly posted outside Kabul in 
order to reduce their threat to the Na- 
jib regime and reinforce depleted mili- 
tary. On its limited combat operations, 
the Sarandoy suffered severe casu- 
alties. The Interior Ministry also has 
control over regional militias (revolu- 
tionary defense groups and civil de- 
fense youth militias). 

Tribal militias are undependable, 
often remaining on the regime payroll 
only for the winter months. Under the 
nominal control of the Ministry of 
Tribes and Nationalities, these ele- 
ments are normally used near the 
border with Pakistan in an attempt to 
limit infiltration. Some of the tribal mi- 
litias facilitate regime military opera- 
tions in their areas, which they know 
better than regular troops. 

The Secret Police (KHAD). The 

Secret Police continues to be known by 
the Afghan acronym KHAD, from the 
days when Najib was its chief. When he 
was promoted to head the regime, he 
boosted the former State Information 



Service to cabinet status as the Minis- 
try for State Security (Dari acronym 
WAD). KHAD maintains a reputation 
for brutality and ruthlessness, includ- 
ing the use of torture. 

KHAD now is led by Najib protege 
Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, who was pro- 
moted both to Politburo status and to 
the military rank of Colonel General, 
the highest held by regime military. 
Numerous Soviet KGB advisers are re- 
portedly very influential. KHAD has 
some 20,000 personnel. These numbers 
are maintained, in large part, because 
KHAD personnel are extremely well 
paid. 

KHAD is responsible for regime 
security, counterintelligence, and the 
suppression of opposition — both in the 
resistance and among Afghans who con- 
tinue to live under regime control. It 
has military forces under its command, 
which have played a small, but growing, 
part in the war. KHAD operatives are 
present at Afghan military installations 
to try to prevent desertions or defec- 
tions to the resistance. KHAD also is 
responsible for foreign intelligence and, 
in large measure, for the terrorist cam- 
paign in Pakistan. 

National Reconciliation 

The new year began with an announce- 
ment from Najib that the PDPA was 
willing to share power with its oppo- 
nents. His January 1 call for "national 
reconciliation" had three main 
elements. 

First, the regime (and Soviets) and 
the opposition would observe a cease- 
fire. 

Second, opposition representatives 
would be invited to participate in the 
regime, creating a "national unity 
government." 

Third, about 5 million refugees 
would be asked to return. 

Ultimately, the purpose of the 
"national reconciliation" campaign was 
to convince the Afghan people to 
"reconcile" themselves to continued 
PDPA domination. 

Phantom Cease-fire. Key to Na- 
jib's plan was a cease-fire, which he 
said the government would observe for 
6 months from January 15, 1986. Najib 



said the opposition must not fight, 
plant mines, transport, and store wefcjii 
ons and must refrain from subversivili' 
action. Afghan troops would return 1 \i 
bases but could conduct security tas.|| 
without restrictions on supply and 
transport. 

Afghan and, to a lesser extent, 1 
viet troops for a short time did obsei fci 
a cease-fire, but there were always 
some troops in action. Within 2 weet 
major operations were again underw 
in contrast to Najib's claims that the 
regime observed the cease-fire for 
about 50 days. The niujahidin 
responded with a greater level of ac- 
tivity over the winter, which increasi 
throughout 1987. Najib extended the 
cease-fire for an additional 6 months 
June and again at the Loya Jirga in 
November. The regime and Soviets c 
not reduce operations after either of 
these extensions. 

The offer to share power was a > 
parture from previous regime initia- 
tives which had sought to "broaden 
base," or include nonparty or neutra 
figures under the regime. The appet 
was traceable to Gorbachev's July 19 
speech in Vladivostok, which called 
an opposition role in the regime. Na, 
made his New Year announcement 
shortly after returning from his first 
trip to the Soviet Union as Kabul's 
leader. 

To induce refugees to return, K; 
bul made a number of material conc( 
sions. It promised to restore properl 
confiscated from those who had fled, 
return seized financial assets, provid 
relief from accrued interest and tax 
ligations, defer military service (and 
halt to forced press gang conscriptio 
and provide material assistance for r 
settlement. However, refugee return 
was less than Kabul's exaggerated 
claims (100,000 by year's end) and wi 
exceeded by continued refugee exod 
(see p. 20). 

Few Afghans with political stati 
before the Marxist takeover have joi 
the regime. Those who have joined h 
not brought major constituencies wit 
them. Appeals to expatriate Afghans 
the West have similarly failed. 

Despite regime claims about def 
tors (30,000 in August 1987), mujah 
commanders have almost universally 



12 



Department of State Bull if 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



•ned Kabul's reconciliation efforts. 

ime announcements of local cease- 
areas can be read as an admission 
idespread mujaliidin control. 

Reconciliation Offer Enriched. 

failure of "reconciliation" to gain 
;oort led Kabul progressively to 
aden its offer. After the rejection by 
mujahidin of the January cease-fire 
Kabul's concessions increased. 
In February, Najib offered to meet 
.osition representatives in a neutral 
ling — recognizing their status as 
els. Kabul's offer to negotiate re- 
but the resistance insists on 
Iing to the Soviets rather than the 
ppet regime." By mid- winter 1987, 
ib had offered to accept an unde- 
il d role for former king Zahir Shah. 

On July 14, Najib extended the so- 
i ed cease-fire for an additional 6 
r iths beyond its July 15 e.xpiration 
1 '. He offered specific posts to the 
< osition, including more than a dozen 
i| inet seats and the posts of vice pres- 
j it and of deputy prime minister. He 
) suggested that the post of prime 
lister could be negotiable. (This was 
r specifically offered.) Najib's offer 
not include any of the ministries 
icipally responsible for security, 
;he Foreign Ministry, or even the 
listry of Finance. 

Najib invited royalists and mem- 
■s of the "moderate" parties to as- 
ne these high-level, but powerless 
its. Kabul targeted these groups 
its appeals, apparently hoping to 
it the resistance. Najib promised 
muine division of power" but as- 
■ted that it "does not mean the 
>PA would lose its authority." 

On July 15, the regime finally is- 
jd a draft constitution (see p. 15). It 
s designed to replace its Fundamental 
inciples, promulgated in 1980 but 
ver ratified. The regime launched a 
tional public relations campaign to 
rner support for the new constitu- 
n. Ultimately, Kabul claimed that 
Tiillion Afghans approved the docu- 
;nt and that it received 15,000 sug- 
stions for changes. Many details, but 
tie substance, were changed in the 
lal draft, submitted to the November 
ya Jirga, or assembly. 



iMajor Soviet Units in Afghanistan 




Islamabad \ mBiA 

K I S T & K 



Legend 

■^ Brigade or Regiment 



A Multiparty Facade. By mid- 
year, Najib also began to speak of a 
multiparty system. Parties (organized 
under regime auspices) would be re- 
quired to support the state and "nation- 
al reconciliation" but would be allowed 
some independence. The constitution 
appears to associate the parties with 
the PDPA-dominated National Front. 
Regime spokesmen noted that the 
new parties would have to respect 
Afghanistan's historic "friendship with 
the Soviet Union." 

In November, the establishment of 
four new parties was announced. Two 
were leftist groupings that had earlier 
been "merged" with the PDPA. Just as 
Najib forecast in early summer, there 
also were two regime-dominated parties 
identified with the "peasantry" and 
"patriotic clergy." Najib later said that 
he would welcome a party for the 
"national bourgeoisie." 

The resistance (particularly the 
moderate leaders referred to by Najib) 
swiftly rejected the July 14 coalition of- 
fer, as it had his earlier proposals. Soon 



Xi 12-e7 SIATE (rNB/GO 



after, Najib was called to Moscow to 
meet Gorbachev. A communique an- 
nounced that they discussed "further 
measures" along the path of reconcilia- 
tion. Najib, at a subsequent press con- 
ference, said that he would give up not 
only his position but his life, if he per- 
sonally became an obstacle to peace. 

In the fall, the "national reconcilia- 
tion" offer broadened still further. At 
the October party conference, Najib 
forecast the "Second Stage of National 
Reconciliation" — including leftist demo- 
cratic unity, coalition, and the strength- 
ening of posts offered to the opposition. 
Najib specifically named the "seven [Al- 
liance] parties" in his appeals. The op- 
position would be allowed to open 
offices and publish newspapers if they 
renounced their resistance. 

Following his admission that Soviet 
troops had pulled back from some hin- 
terland posts, Najib said Soviet troops 
would leave, and regime forces not op- 
erate in, areas where the mujahidin 
ceased their attacks. He implied the re- 
sistance could run those areas. At the 
November Jirga, he said that Soviet 



*arch 1988 



13 






troops could be withdrawn in 12 months 
or, less if the resistance would give up 
their fight against his regime. 

"De-conciliation." Najibs "peace" 
campaign, combined with the modifica- 
tion of Soviet/Kabul positions on the 
timing of a withdrawal, have fed con- 
cern among Kabul regime supporters. 
There are numerous reports of regime 
members attempting to accumulate for- 
eign exchange in preparation for an es- 
cape. Others established or upgraded 
contacts with the resistance. 

The national reconciliation program 
exacerbated endemic PDPA factional 
disputes. Ideologically committed 
Marxists, particularly among the Khalq 
faction, opposed the offer to share 
power with the opposition and the tac- 
tical retreat on "progressive" policies. 
Although Najib acknowledged criticism 
from within the party of the reconcilia- 
tion process, he repeatedly stressed 
that national reconciliation is 
"irreversible." 

Hopes for Peace. Understandably, 
the "national reconciliation" campaign 
kindled sentiments in favor of return 
among the refugees and of hopes on 
both sides that the fighting might be 
ended inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, 
the refugees, by their refusal to return, 
and the iniijaliidiri, by their continued 
resistance, maintain that there can be 
no peace while the Soviet occupation 
continues and the PDPA remains in 
power. 

Changes in Government 

In 1987, the Soviet-sponsored regime in 
Kabul received a new name, a new con- 
stitution, a new head of state, and 
dozens of new faces. Most of these 
changes were associated with the 
"national reconciliation" effort. Despite 
a year of change, however, the regime 
remained under the thumb of the Sovi- 
ets and their instruments of rule, the 
PDPA and Najibullah. 

Najib continued to replace Karmal 
backers in the government as well as in 
the party The Revolutionary Council, 
at a September 30 session, named Na- 
jib its chairman and head of state. He 
replaced nonparty H. M. Chamkani, 
acting chairman since Babrak Karmal's 



14 



ouster a year before. Chamkani re- 
mained vice chairman, but the second 
in command was apparently shifted to 
PDPA politburo member Nur Ahmed 
Nur, who as deputy chairman ran the 
council in Najib's absence. 

The Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan (DRA) transformed itself 
into the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) 
at a Loya Jirga, held November 29 and 
30. The vast majority of the more than 
1,300 delegates were ruhng party mem- 
bers or regime functionaries. The ses- 
sion was the second so-called Loya 
Jirga held by the Kabul regime and 
was no more legitimate than the council 
convoked by Babrak Karmal in 1985. 
Like that session, Najib's meeting was 
quickly condemned by the Afghan re- 
sistance and ignored by most Afghans. 

The Jirga also adopted the new 
constitution proposed in July, com- 
pletely transforming the formal struc- 
ture of government, which had retained 
a revolutionary structure since the 1978 
Marxist coup. In one of their last acts, 
the delegates elected Najib as presi- 
dent of the Republic of Afghanistan. 
But at his inaugural press conference, 
the new president was embarrassed 
when he was forced to admit that his 
own, albeit estranged, brother had de- 
fected to the resistance. 

A Party in Disarray. Change also 
shook the party, as Najib continued 
efforts to consolidate his position within 
the PDPA. Several party plenums were 
held to elicit, or coerce support among 
reluctant cadre for "national 
reconciliation." 

However, since Najib took over, 
factions have proliferated in the party, 
within and beyond the two major 
groupings: Babrak's and Najib's Par- 
cham, and the Khalq — now led by 
Gulabzoi. 

Former leader Babrak Karmal con- 
tinues to withhold his endorsement 
from Najib. Despite increasing purges 
from party, military, and government 
positions, Babrak's faction, nurtured by 
6'/2 years of Soviet patronage, has not 
yet given up. A large demonstration by 
supporters of the deposed leader, at 
coup anniversary festivities in April, 
reportedly prompted the Soviets to 
"invite" Babrak to Moscow with his 
family a few days later. Babrak re- 
mained in the U.S.S.R. of the end of 
the year. 



Action against Karmal's supporte 
continued throughout the year as the 
former president's brother Baryalai a 
close associate Anahita Ratebzad wer 
removed from first the Politburo, the 
from the central committee. Ten addi 
tional Karmal backers were dropped 
from the central committee at the 17t 
plenum in October. Najib's protege 
Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, head of the Se 
cret Police, and Foreign Minister Wal 
earlier had been given full Politburo 
membership. 

Party reorganization culminated 
the second PDPA party conference, 
held in mid-October. Its goal was to 
improve party unity and discipline ar 
promote "reconciliation." Efforts to 
hold the conference had bogged dowr 
part because several local party ses- 
sions, including a Kabul precinct, tri 
to elect Karmal as a delegate. At thf 
conference, Najib painted a stark pic 
ture of party disarray: "A number of 
leadership and party personnel have 
brought doubt, panic, and pessimism 
The result, according to Najib, was < 
party wracked with "factionalism, 
nepotism, and sometimes even 
revenge." 



The Afghan Economy 



As the war in Afghanistan intensifies 
so has the destruction and erosion of 
the economic base. While estimates c 
fer, the latest figure cited in regime 
and Soviet media for wartime destrui 
tion is 50 billion Afghanis. Included i 
the estimate of damages, which the r 
gime attributes exclusively to the 
mujahidin, are about 2,000 schools, 
several hundred mosques, and more 
than 100 medical establishments. 

At the PDPA conference in 
November, Prime Minister Keshtman 
who is responsible for the economy, 
noted severe problems on the industr 
side. In the last yeai', production of n 
ural gas (Afghanistan's major export) 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



An Illegitimate Constitution 

On November 30, the Loya Jirga 
approved a new constitution. Najib intro- 
duced the draft as "the most important 
document of the national reconciliation 
policy." The document was swiftly re- 
jected by the resistance and, like the so- 
called Loya Jirga that adopted it, is 
viewed by most Afghans as illegitimate. 

Although it changed the name of the 
regime, dropping "Democratic" from the 
current name, "Republic of Afghanistan," 
Najib's constitution would perpetuate the 
power of Kabul's Soviet-backed l\/larxist 
rulers. It contains significant elements 
commonly found in Soviet-bloc constitu- 
tions and provides for leading roles for 
the PDPA and its associated organiza- 
tion, the National Front. 

The most striking aspect of the con- 
stitution is its near total concentration of 
power in a strong presidency, unchecked 
by other branches of government. The 
president: 

• Acts as supreme commander of 
the armed forces; 

• Approves all laws, decrees, and 
resolutions; 

• Convenes and dissolves the Na- 
tional Assembly and Loya Jirga; 

• Appoints the prime minister. Su- 
preme Court, and attorney general; 

• Approves appointments of cabinet, 
high-ranking officials, and military 
officers; 

• Declares a state of national 
emergency; 



• Vetoes decisions of the National 
Assembly; and 

• Declares war "with agreement of 
the Loya Jirga." 

Bicameral Legislature. A lower 
house would have 10 representatives 
popularly elected from each of 
Afghanistan's 29 provinces. One-third 
of the upper house, or "Senate," 
would be appointed by the president. 
The assembly can override presiden- 
tial vetoes by a two-thirds vote. 

Loya Jirga. A Loya Jirga (or 
Grand National Assembly) is ac- 
corded its traditional role as 
Afghanistan's ultimate source of au- 
thority. However, contrary to the con- 
sensus tradition of the institution, 
decisions are by majority rule. Also 
breaking with tradition, it does not in- 
clude tribal and traditional lead- 
ership. Instead, delegates are from 
the regime, the PDPA-directed Na- 
tional Front, the assembly, or are 
chosen by the president. 

The Courts. The judiciary not 
only lacks independence but is 
clearly subordinate to the executive. 
The Supreme Court reports on the 
activities of all courts to the presi- 
dent, who appoints members for lim- 
ited terms of 5 years. 

Foreign Policy. The constitution 
provides that Afghanistan is non- 
aligned and "does not join military 
blocs nor allow establishment of for- 
eign military bases." This provision 
would appear to be contravened cur- 
rently by the presence of Soviet 
troops and bases. 



Rights and Liberties. The con- 
stitution makes specific guarantees 
of a full spectrum of individual rights 
and guarantees equal rights to 
women. However, every right is 
paired with accompanying provisions 
that deprive it of its meaning; ulti- 
mately, "no one has the right to act 
against the public interest," which the 
state itself would define. 

Religion. Article 2 establishes 
Islam as "the religion of Afghanistan." 
No law may be contrary to Islamic 
tenets "and the values enshrined 
in this constitution." Islamic law 
(Shari'a) is used as a guide to inheri- 
tance court judgment. However, "no 
citizen has the right to use religion 
for antinational or antipeople propa- 
ganda purposes, or contrary to the 
interests of the RA." 

Political Parties are allowed, 
provided that they are "not opposed 
to the values embodied in the laws of 
this Constitution and in the laws of 
the country" Nevertheless, the PDPA 
is given a leading role as the for- 
mulator of national reconciliation. 
Marxist rule is further preserved by 
the importance given the National 
Front, a PDPA subsidiary. The Na- 
tional Front, described as "the most 
extensive sociopolitical organization," 
would unite parties and their mem- 
bers "on the basis of a common pro- 
gram." Among other powers, the front 
would be the only nongovernmental 
body authorized to propose laws to 
the National Assembly. 



other basic goods slumped. Defi- 
Lcies in domestic production had to 
Tiade up by the Soviets. 

Price levels depended on market 
litions for a particular item or 
•e. Inflation was noticeable but not 
tnatic for a wartime situation. Early 
he yeai-, anticipation of a settlement 
mg the refugees and preparations 
return drove the price of the 
;hani (Afs) up in Pakistan. Toward 

end of the year, erosion of the 
;hani in part was due to efforts of 
ime members to accumulate foreign 
rency in case they fled the country. 

The Afghani remains officially 
;ged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 
Afs/$1. The rate on Kabul's unofficial 



but free money market fluctuated 
around 150-155Afs/$ for most of the 
year. It rose to about 180Afs/$ late in 
the year. 

Agriculture and Food Supply 

The wheat crop, Afghanistan's predomi- 
nant food source, was generally the 
same and perhaps a little larger than in 
previous years. Yields in the subsis- 
tence, peasant agriculture that domi- 
nates in Afghanistan remain stable. 
There was no major crop failure any- 
where in the country. However, the cit- 
ies, especially Kabul, continue to be fed 



by imports. Regular commercial chan- 
nel imports from Pakistan rose. Wheat 
continues to be imported from the 
Soviet Union. 

Food shortages continue to occur, 
in large part due to distribution prob- 
lems or shortfalls in imports. Spot 
shortages often result from transport 
difficulties — the road system is severely 
degraded except for the segment be- 
tween Kabul and the U.S.S.R. Short- 
ages become most serious in late April- 
May before the harvest. Areas north of 
Kabul and Qandahar, Konduz, Paktia, 
and Paktika Provinces experienced the 
most problems. Land abandonment was 
aggravated by actual destruction of 



rch 1988 



15 



crops and agricultural infrastructure by 
Soviet/regime military operations. 

Massive Soviet use of artillery and 
high-level saturation bombing caused 
total crop damage to increase, but over- 
all damage remained a relatively small 
fraction of total area and production — 
probably 5%-10% of cultivated area has 
been damaged since the invasion. Fruit 
growing areas were particularly tar- 
geted by the Soviets. 

There was significant damage to 
some agricultural areas in and around 
Qandahar, including grape arbors, that 
had previously been immune from 
damage. Sustained heavy fighting 
caused land abandonment near Qan- 
dahar, adversely affecting production. 
Konduz experienced serious damage, 
both in the spring and in August. Per- 
haps the worst hit area of the year was 
north of Konduz near the Soviet border, 
which was almost devastated. This was 
the site of reprisal raids for mujakidin 
activity in the Soviet Union. Shortages 
in Kabul were e.xacerbated by the city's 
growing population and because of de- 
struction caused by heavy fighting in 
the nearby Shomali Valley, where So- 
viet forces destroyed grape arbor and 
other agricultural assets. 



Statistics on Afghanistan, 1975-85t 



Despite destruction of both agri- 
culture and industry, many Afghans 
continue their lives of subsistence farm- 
ing, herding, and trading and are no 
worse off than before the coup and in- 
vasion. Afghanistan remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world 
(see below). According to the most re- 
cent International Monetary Fund esti- 
mate, gross national product is about 
$200 a year (1986). According to some 
regime estimates, however, per capita 
income may be as low as $130-$150 per 
year. 

The Private Sector 

Kabul continued to moderate disruptive 
economic reforms while continuing to 
promote, where possible, state enter- 
prise. Efforts to stimulate the private 
sector continued. In February, Sayyid 
Amanoddin Amin, a businessman, was 
named vice chairman of the Council of 
Ministers (one of several deputy prime 
ministers). In April, the regime held a 
conference for private investors but 
failed to attract international or e.x- 
patriate Afghan investors. An unusual 
development was the establishment of 



he Soviet Gr 



joint ventures between the 
ernment and Afghan private 
businesses. 



Trade 

Keshtmand told the party conferencn 
that Afghanistan's foreign trade tota 
$1.4 biUion in 1986-87. Of the total 
trade, 16% was with less developed 
countries and 68% with socialist cou) 
tries (of which 60% was with the 
U.S.S.R.). Natural gas remained 
Afghanistan's major export, some 50 
of total value. In the Afghan year er 
ing March 1986, about 2.4 billion cub 
meters were shipped north to the 
U.S.S.R., at the world market price 
according to Kabul's Minister of Min 
and Industries. 

Soviet Aid in 1987 

During the year, the U.S.S.R. con- 
tinued its heavy budgetary support 
the Afghan economy. In addition to 
about $220 million in development a; 
sistance, the Soviet Union pledged a 
record $405 million in grant com- 
modities in 1987. Regime and Soviet 
media reported that this grant aid w 
intended to support the national rec( 
ciliation process. 









Gross 


Central 










Armed 






Military 




National 


Government 








ME 


Forces 


GNP 




Expenditures 


Armed 


Product 


Expenditures 




ME 


ME 


Per 


Per 1.000 


Per 




(ME) 


Forces 


(GNP) 


(CGE) 


People 


GNP 


CGE 


Capita 


People 


Capita 


Year 


($ mtllions) 


(thousands) 


($ millions) 


($ million) 


(millions) 


(%) 


(%| 


(dollars) 




(dollars) 


1975 


104 


130 


3,788 


410.9 


14.1 


2.7 


25.3 


7 


9.2 


268 


1976 


91 


142 


4,015 


550.9 


14.5 


2.3 


16.5 


6 


9.8 


277 


1977 


92 


143 


4,164 


479.4 


14.9 


2.2 


19.2 


6 


9.6 


280 


1978 


100 


110 


4,335 


496.6 


15.3 


2.3 


20.1 


7 


7.2 


284 


1979 


260- 


89 


4,297 


570.1* 


15.6 


6.1 


45.7 


17 


5.7 


276 


1980 


254- 


43 


4,164 


788.7* 


15.0 


6.1 


32.2 


17 


2.9 


278 


1981 


219' 


45 


4,279 


807.1* 


14.1 


5.1 


27.1 


16 


3.2 


304 


1982 


183- 


55 


4,093* 


577.1* 


13.6 


4.5 


31.7 


13 


4.0 


300 


1983 


225- 


75 


3,955* 


359.3* 


13.7 


5.7 


62.7 


16 


5.5 


289 


1984 


287* 


60 


3,735* 


444.7* 


13.8 


7.7 


64.4 


21 


4.3 


270 


1985 


NA 


55 


3,438* 


NA 


13.9 


NA 


NA 


NA 


4.0 


248 



t Dollar amounts expressed in constant 1984 dollars 
* Estimate. 
NA— not available 

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Translers, 1987 (to be published) 



16 



Department of State Build 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



U™.™___i:i 



U.S.S.R.: Econom 


c Aid 


to Afghanistan 

(Disbursements) 




Year 


$ Million 


1980 


350 


1981 


200 


1982 


220 


1983 


350 


1984 


220 


1985 


225 


1986 


205 



Some of these aid commodities 
»e, in fact, distributed in 
[hanistan's towns and villages by So- 
I; troops or by Afghan military or 
ty officials. On several occasions, 
i )ul and Soviet media directly chas- 
i d Afghan party and state officials 
1 embezzling or misusing Soviet aid. 
Moscow also made new allocations 
I )rojects already begun under some 
million of outstanding credit 
eements. Preliminary information 
icates that Soviet aid disbursements 
B substantially over the $205 million 
.986, possibly" to the record 1980 

3l. 

The invasion of Afghanistan in De- 
iber 1979 ushered in a more expen- 
'. era for the Soviet aid program in 
communist developing countries. 
; grant package provided Kabul in 
7 brought total commodity support 
:e 1980 to $1.4 billion. Until its first 
3;e-scale commitment of commodities 
Kabul in 1980, the U.S.S.R. had 
adfastly refused to provide more 
n token amounts of free commodities 
any developing countries not associ- 
d with the Council for Mutual Eco- 
nic Assistance (CMEA). In 
jhanistan, Moscow was forced to 
wide consumer goods and food to 
jport Kabul when it was cut off from 
ler sources of imports and, more re- 
itly, to provide local funds for Soviet- 
ansored projects. 

The U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan 
jned a comparatively large number of 
reements and protocols during the 
ar. A protocol of cooperation between 
ghanistan and the Soviet-bloc CMEA 
IS signed in November. 



A new economic and technical 
agreement in January 1987 also pro- 
vides for increased assistance during 
Afghanistan's current 5-year plan 
(1986-91) to agriculture, water manage- 
ment, and power development, although 
it does not appear to provide new de- 
velopment credits. It mentioned aid for 
the centerpiece of Moscow's current 
program, a 10-year, $150-million project 
to connect Kabul and several adjacent 
provinces with the Soviet power gi'id by 
1991. In addition, major irrigation pro- 
jects at Jalalabad and Nangarhar, com- 
pleted in the 1960s and 1970s, would be 
renovated and expanded to irrigate 
600,000 hectares of crop and grazing 
land. Moscow is scheduled to complete 
130 projects during the 5-year develop- 
ment plan; its total aid accounting for 
up to three-fourths of all annual eco- 
nomic aid flows to Afghanistan through 
1991. 

In a departure from the traditional 
Soviet/ Afghan aid relationship, separate 
agreements were signed directly be- 
tween Afghanistan's 29 provinces and 
republics in the U.S.S.R. These were 
particularly concentrated between the 
northern part of Afghanistan and the 
adjacent republics of Soviet Central 



Asia, but nearly all provinces were in- 
volved. For example, the Russian Re- 
public made a direct transfer of 
agricultural machinery and fertilizer to 
Kabul City. 



Social Developments 



Youth and Education 

Kabul's educational system remains 
dependent on the Soviets. In June, 
Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. signed 
an education protocol "to ensure the 
teaching of various subjects," under 
which Soviet education advisers would 
be maintained in Afghanistan. 

The Soviets continue to take 
Afghans of all ages to the U.S.S.R. for 
long-term education and training, in 
hopes of creating a loyal cadre. There 
are nursery schools specifically de- 
signed for Afghan children in the 
Soviet Union. About 1,700 Afghan 
children spent the summer at Pioneer 
(Komsomol) camps in the U.S.S.R. 
More than 10,000 Afghan youths are in 
the U.S.S.R. on long-term civilian and 
military training. Each year more than 
1,850 are sent. At least 1,500 higher 



Afghanistan: Value of Arms Transfers 
and Total Imports and Exports, 1977-86* 



Year 


Arms 

Imports 

($ millions) 


Arms 

Exports 

($ millions) 


Total 

Imports 

(S millions) 


Total 

Exports 

($ millions) 


Arms 
Imports 

Total 
Imports 

(%) 


Arms 
Exports 

Total 
Exports 

(%) 


1977 


175 





523 


488 


33.5 





1978 


192 





585 


475 


32.9 





1979 


683 





581 


648 


117.6 





1980 


624 





688 


836 


90.6 





1981 


835 





717 


800 


116.6 





1982 


507 





749 


763 


67.6 





1983 


331 





956 


753 


34.6 





1984 


650 





1,390 


633 


46.8 





1985 


508 





1,155 


539 


44.0 





1986 


565 





NA 


494 


NA 





•Dollar amounts expressed in constant 1984 dollars 
NA — not available 








Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Worl 
Transfers. 1987 (to be published) 


i Military Expe 


nditures an 


■J Arms 



arch 1988 



17 







Afghan girls at a school maintained by the resistance. (Mohammed Es-Haq, Jamiat-i-lsiami) 



and professional students were sent to 
the U.S.S.R. for advanced training. 
There is no indication, however, that 
the regime's long-term efforts are pro- 
ducing a loyal communist political base 
among Afghans. 

There continue to be credible re- 
ports that the regime is using child 
spies. In January, it was reported that 
children too young for the militai'y 
were picked up in press-gang sweeps 
and then dispatched to the Kabul Police 
Academy for agent training. 

Najib has claimed that some 40% of 
the teachers are members of the PDPA 
and that 30% of students either belong 
to the PDPA or to the Democratic 
Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA). DYOA 
Chief Farid Mazdak, a Najib protege, 
was elevated to the Politburo of the 
PDPA. Members or not, students must 
participate in forced labor; over the 
summer, several groups were drag- 
ooned in Kabul to assist reconstruction 
in Qandahar. 

Health 

The health situation in Afghanistan re- 
mains precarious. Facilities under re- 
gime control remain inadequate and 
overtaxed. During heavy fighting, when 
blood supplies ran low, Kabul's clinics 
forced patients to give blood. (Soviet 
media have reported intensive blood 
drives in Soviet Central Asia.) 



The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) concluded an agree- 
ment with the regime in January to 
resume humanitarian work. ICRC 
workers had been expelled just after 
the Soviet invasion and allowed to re- 
turn only 2 months in 1982. The agree- 
ment is keyed to the resumption of Red 
Cross work among regime prisoners, 
which ICRC remained unable to fully 
implement. 

Volunteer foreign doctors continue 
to provide some medical care in areas 
under resistance control, but they are 
subject to attack inside the country. 
Medical care is increasingly being of- 
fered by Afghan "barefoot doctors," 
trained by some of the same organiza- 
tions that have sent expatriate doctors 
into the country. Commander Jallalud- 
din Haqqani of Paktia told an inter- 
viewer that, for the tnujahidi)!, health 
conditions had recently improved 
50%-100%. 

Status of Women 

The regime continued to pay lip service 
to its commitment to improve the sta- 
tus of women and referred to women's 
rights in its constitution. In practice, 
however, the status of women within 
the regime has never been as high as 
Kabul claimed; indeed, it has declined 
over the past year. 



tt. 



Najib admitted to the party conff 
ence that women make up only 3.6% 
the party apparatus and about 9% of 
trade union officials. Even in ministrif*' 
such as education, where women are 
43% of the workforce, the regime hasfl' 
promoted no women into leading 
positions. 

The highest ranking woman in th « 
regime, Anahita Ratebzad, was purgf 
from the party leadership, because oD "' 
her support for the deposed Babrak 
Karmal. There are now no women on 
the Politburo. 

Religion 

Despite claims it has become more 
Islamic, the regime has failed to con- 
vince Afghans that it is still not dom 
nated by the atheistic, Marxist PDVI 
Najib cited the Koran and a newly 
formed Council of Religious Leaders 
and Ulema as the original sources of 
the policy of national reconciliation. 

Regime efforts to assume an Ish 
ic mantle are perhaps best illustratei 
by Najib's reassumption of the Islam: 
"-uUah" (name of God), as a suffix to 
own name, upon being named presidf 
by the Revolutionary Council in Sep- 
tember. Though he had not used his 
name since he joined the party in tht 
1960s, Najib said he felt it was apprc 
priate to reclaim it as leader of a pioi 
nation. 

One of Kabul's means of using re- 
ligion to promote its control is by at- 
tempting to co-opt the clergy in areas 
under regime control. It claimed 2 bil 
lion afghanis were spent on mosques 
and to "help the prayer leaders," witl 
out mentioning that these sums come 
from the religious institutions' own ei 
dowments. Najib, speaking at the 
shrine of Ali in Mazai'-e-Sharif, claims 
16,000 mullahs, preachers, and clergy 
receive salaries from the state. Mone- 
tary inducements are backed up by cc 
ercion against those clergymen who d 
not cooperate. 

Kabul also attempted to use its 
new-found piety to promote its image 
the Islamic world. The regime held at 
international contest for Koranic recit 
and opened an Institute of Islamic Sci 
entific Research but has been unable 
obtain support from religious institu- 
tions in the Muslim world. Cairo's Al- 
Azhar University closed a mission in 
Kabul. 



18 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



gal Drugs 

hanistan remains a major producer 
ashish and opium. Estimated 
dish production in 1986 was 200-400 
iric tons, one of the highest in the 
Id. Afghanistan appears to be the 
ling producer of ilhcit opium in the 
den Crescent and the second largest 
lucer in the world. The 1986 poppy 
»rest yielded an estimated 500-800 
ric tons, a substantial increase from 
5. Good weather in producing areas 
,gests a similar figure for 1987. 
ae of the opium is refined into her- 

principally in Nangarhar Province 
;he Pakistan border. 

Much of Afghanistan's hashish and 

I am and nearly all of its heroin are 
■orted to or through Pakistan and 
^^ 1. Illicit drugs also have been smug- 
1 into the Soviet Union — complicat- 
the domestic Soviet drug problem- 
through that country to Western 
•kets. 

Increased Soviet efforts against 
Iffickers have produced evidence that 
Soviet Union is used as a drug 
Qsit route. As a result of a joint So- 
t-Canadian operation, approximately 
)ns of hashish were seized in Canada 
\ugust 1987. The hashish was un- 
ded from a Soviet ship docked in 
ntreal. On another occasion, au- 
rities in Moscow announced they had 
zed $30-million worth of hashish 
md for West Germany. 

Current information on drug abuse 
ide Afghanistan is difficult to obtain, 
I it is estimated that there are over 
),000 chronic opium abusers. Regime 
icials have hinted that Kabul has its 
n drug problems. 

All major resistance organizations 
principle oppose narcotics produc- 
n, trafficking, and abuse, and most 
iividual mujahidiv adhere to this 
licy. Invoking Islamic disapproval, 
me resistance groups are waging an 
tive antidrug use campaign, but illicit 
Dp destruction is limited. 

uman Rights 

buse of human rights remains a key 
irollary of the unpopular Kabul re- 
me's efforts to maintain power. Arbi- 
ary arrest and detention are common; 
fair trial is not. Some prisoners are 
jld for years without access to legal 



assistance, family, or medical care. 
Prisons are overcrowded. Food, water, 
and sanitary facilities are in short sup- 
ply, and many prisoners are chronically 
ill 

Torture and mistreatment of pris- 
oners continue to be widespread and 
systematic in the Kabul regime's pris- 
ons. During incommunicado detention, 
physical and psychological torture is 
used to extract "confessions" and to in- 
timidate regime opponents. Prisoners 
are beaten; subjected to electric shocks; 
burned with cigarettes; immersed in 
cold water or snow; forced to watch 
other people being tortured; placed in 
cells with the corpses of other torture 
victims; and deprived of water, food, 
and sleep. Human rights groups con- 
tinue to receive credible reports con- 
cerning executions of political 
prisoners. 

Prisoners and Amnesty. A major 
component of "national reconciliation" 
was amnesty for prisoners, but the re- 
gime has not lived up to its promises. 
According to regime spokesmen, some 
6,000 prisoners were released through 
November. Local observers reported 
only 320 prisoners were released in 
March, versus 1,300 claimed by the 
regime. 

Among the released prisoners were 
members of the PDPA's Khalq faction, 
some in jail since the Soviet invasion, 
and members of leftist/nationalist orga- 
nizations. Old people, women, and chil- 
dren also were released. Few resistance 
prisoners and no significant mujahidhi 
have been released. For the regime, the 
most important category was those im- 
prisoned for military offenses. They and 
other able-bodied detainees were con- 
scripted immediately upon release. 

Conscription. One of the first an- 
nouncements made by the regime dur- 
ing the recent "national reconciliation" 
campaign was the end of forced con- 
scription. Despite this promise, the re- 
gime has resumed the practice. In its 
current drive to swell the ranks of the 
military, the regime has extended its 
"recruitment" to include 15- and 16- 
year-old youths along with recently re- 
turned refugees. Reports indicate that 
the regime gains recruits by surround- 
ing high schools as graduation cere- 
monies take place. Parents have 



demonstrated at Kabul conscription 
centers in search of their lost sons. 
Some were themselves taken away, and 
the demonstrations ended by gunfire. 

Human Suffering. The most seri- 
ous violations of human rights in 
Afghanistan are the pervasive violence 
and dislocation inflicted on the popula- 
tion by Soviet and Afghan forces. 
These include apparent Soviet vio- 
lations of the humanitarian rules of war. 
Killings of civilians have continued una- 
bated as Soviet/Kabul forces retaliate 
and attempt to create secure zones. 
Some sources report that from the end 
of last year until August of this year, 
about 15,000 civilians have been killed. 
Indiscriminate air and artillery at- 
tacks, time bombs set to detonate dur- 
ing peak travel hours along popular 
supply routes, and boobytraps cleverly 
designed to be attractive to children 
are but a few of the tactics used against 
noncombatants by the Soviets and their 
regime allies. Resistance forces also oc- 
casionally commit violence against non- 
combatants, mostly political figures 
associated with the regime, but some- 
times in the course of operations. 

The Kabul regime also denies the 
following human rights to the Afghan 
people: freedom of speech and press; 
freedom of peaceful assembly and asso- 
ciation; freedom of movement within 
the country, foreign travel, emigration, 
and repatriation; the right to privacy; 
and the right of citizens to change their 
government. 

The nearly 10 years of Marxist rule 
and Soviet occupation have wreaked un- 
precedented tragedy on the Afghan 
people, according to the "Preliminary 
Findings From A Survey of Afghan 
Refugees," conducted by Gallup 
Pakistan. The survey, based on inter- 
views with 1,300 refugee families, 
found that over the past 10 years, 9% — 
or 1 in 1 1 members — of the Afghan 
families surveyed have been killed in 
the past decade. This is greater than 
the fatality rate in the Soviet Union 
during World War II. 

Forty-six percent of those killed 
(mostly women) died in aerial bombing 
of civilian houses or while fleeing; 33% 
died as a result of wounds from bullets; 
12% from artillery shelling; 3% from 
mines; 2% from exhaustion; and 4% 



larch 1988 



19 



from miscellaneous causes. About 5.5% 
of the refugee population died of natu- 
ral causes such as aging or harshness of 
life as refugees. But the Afghans live 
on— about 24% of the present refugee 
population were born in e.xile in the 
camps. 

UN Human Rights Commission. 
Each year since 1984, the UN Human 
Rights Commission Special Rapporteur, 
Felix Ermacora, revealed overwhelming 
evidence of widespread massive human 
rights violations in Afghanistan. This 
year, the Kabul regime, which earlier 
tried to impugn the Special Rapporteur 
and his report, allowed Ermacora to 
visit Afghanistan for the first time. The 
regime thus acknowledged, also for the 
first time, the role of the Special Rap- 
porteur Ermacora paid a brief visit to 
Kabul and later to Peshawar, where 
Afghan refugees protested Kabul's at- 
tempt to cover up the ongoing use of 
torture in regime prisons. 

Although Ermacora observed in his 
report that there has been some ame- 
lioration of human rights conditions in 
certain government-controlled areas in 
Afghanistan, he reiterated his previous 
statement that "there can be no mean- 
ingful self-determination for the Afghan 
people so long as the Soviet presence 
continues." 

The Third Committee (Human 
Rights) of the UN General Assembly 
voted for a third consecutive year to 
adopt a resolution on human rights in 
Afghanistan. The vote was 85 for, 21 
opposed, and 28 abstentions — an im- 
provement over the 1986 vote of 
79-23-36. 

In the spring, at its 43d session, 
the UN Commission on Human Rights 
adopted two resolutions on Afghanistan. 
One, on the human rights situation, 
extended the mandate of Special Rap- 
porteur Ermacora. A resolution calling 
for self-determination in Afghanistan 
was adopted by a vote of 30-5-6. 



Refugees 



Afghans in Pakistan are the single 
largest group of refugees in the world. 
The Government of Pakistan reports 
registration of more than 2.9 million 
Afghans. Numbers continue to gi'ow, 
although at a much slower pace than in 
the early years after the coup and inva- 
sion. In 1986, refugee officials in 
Pakistan registered only about 70,000 
new refugees. Preliminary estimates 
from 1987 are lower still. Many areas of 
heavy fighting are already heavily 
depopulated. 

Afghan refugees are sheltered in 
more than 320 camps, primarily in the 
rural areas of Pakistan's North West 
Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Re- 
lief assistance — including food, shelter, 
clothing, and medicine — is provided by 
the international community, primarily 
through the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the World 
Food Program. 

Although the number of new arriv- 
als is lower in 1987 than in previous 
years, there is no indication that many 
refugees are returning to Afghanistan 
in response to the Kabul regime's na- 
tional reconciliation campaign. UNHCR 
officials in Pakistan see no basis for Ka- 
bul's claim that 100,000 refugees have 
returned to Afghanistan in 1987. Nei- 
ther UN nor Pakistani officials dis- 
cerned a measurable drop in camp 
populations. It is unlikely that many 
would return under any PDPA-led, So- 
viet-sponsored regime. (Kabul also 
claims 37,000 refugees returned in the 
previous 7 years.) There were several 
reports in the summer and fall that 
some refugees have returned to newly 
secure resistance-controlled areas in- 
side Afghanistan. 



f 



i 



Despite considerable economic ar| 
political costs, the Government and 
people of Pakistan have extended an 
impressive welcome to the Afghan,-, 
The Pakistani Government estimates 
that the annual relief effort costs snii 
$360 million and that its share of this 
effort comes to nearly half that 
amount, chiefly expenditures for pro- 
gram administration and transportati 
of relief commodities. Pakistan is fur- 
ther strained by refugee competition 
for local jobs, grazing, and water 
supplies. 

Refugee relations with Pakistanis 
have been surprisingly good, largely 
due to the strong cultural and social 
ties between the indigenous populatic 
and the newcom.ers. Soviet/regime 
agents continue their efforts to raise 
Pakistani concern over the refugee 
presence. 

Between 1983 and 1986, the Wor 
Bank, in conjunction with the UNHC 
committed $20 million for forestation, 
irrigation, and road-building projects 
that employ refugee and local labor ij 
repairing environmental damage caus 
by the refugees. These projects were 
successful that Phase II, a $40-millioi 
3-year project was begun in 1987. 

The U.S. Government, the large? 
contributor to the relief effort, pledgi 
nearly $68 million for Afghan assistai 
in fiscal year 1987 including $38-milli( 
worth of commodities through the 
World Food Program. To date, total 
U.S. contributions for Afghan refuge^ 
assistance exceed $551 million. Other 
major contributors are Japan, Canads 
Australia, Saudi Arabia, and a numbf 
of West European nations. 

The second largest concentration 
Afghan refugees is in Iran. The Irani 
Government estimates that up to 1.9 
million Afghans are within its border: 
Many Afghans in Iran have successful 
integrated into the local population. 
The Iranian Government provides son 
assistance. The United States is not a 
contributor to the UNHCR effort in 
Iran. 



20 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



wjional Environment 



1 stan 

r I lit' Afghans themselves, Pakistan 
; ~ 1 lie primary burden of the war in 
I anistan. In 1987, the war con- 
1 m1 t(i spill directly into Pakistan. 
a il's air raids on Pakistani and refu- 
»u-illages intensified early in the 
■; climaxing during the opening days 
f I'fbruary-March session of the 
■\A talks. Hundreds were killed and 
idi'd. The cross-border raids 
iimI when Pakistan threatened to 
i' the talks, but the raids recom- 
t :ed after the talks recessed. Within 
i inth, however, as Pakistan actively 
I ued improved air defense, Soviet/ 
i al tactics suddenly changed. Bombs 
i had been carried by planes were 
I delivered by Kabul-sponsored ter- 
jts. At the same time, Kabul con- 
ed to destabilize the Pakistani 
tier areas by providing arms to ex- 
bate local, tribal, or communal dis- 
'S. More people were killed and 
red in 1987 by Soviet/Afghan 
cks in Pakistan than ever before 
p. 22). 

The Soviet/Afghan terror and sub- 
ion campaign in Pakistan was al- 
ly more than 1 year old. Bomb 
osions have become an almost fa- 
ar sound in Peshawar restaurants, 
;ls, cinemas, and other public 
■•es. Kabul-directed saboteurs also 
mated bombs at bridges and public 
res elsewhere in Pakistan's North 
it Frontier Province and Baluchis- 
, where the bulk of refugees are 
centrated. 

In 1987, Kabul agents for the first 
e exploded several bombs in the 
;istani heartland. The capital, Isla- 
Dad, and its sister city, Rawalpindi, 
lore in Punjab, and even distant Ka- 
hi on the Arabian Sea, suffered cl- 
an casualties from the terror 
ipaign. The bombings are particu- 
y frightening because Kabul's agents 
get public facilities like shopping 
ters and schools. A single bomb 
3t in Karachi in July killed more 
n 70 people. 

More than 1,000 saboteurs have 
n arrested in Pakistan in connection 
h the terror campaign. Some have 
n tried and sentenced, some of them 



to death. Most are Pakistani citizens. 
Many have confessed that they were 
paid, trained, and given targets by 
Afghan intelligence officials. 

The public's fear of the bombs in- 
creased suspicion among Pakistanis to- 
ward the Afghan refugees, despite the 
fact that the public is generally aware 
that the bombs are Afghan/Soviet in or- 
igin. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues 
to be steadfast on the Afghan issue. 
Some politicians have advocated accom- 
modation with Kabul, but the govern- 
ment and principal opposition figures 
continue to back the national consensus 
in support of the Afghan people. 

In 1987, Islamabad intensified its 
efforts bilaterally with the Soviets and 
through the United Nations and other 
channels to find a political, negotiated 
solution to the Afghan conflict. 

Iran 

Tehran has maintained its basic policy 
calling for the speedy and unconditional 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. Iran re- 
fuses to participate in the Geneva talks 
on the grounds that the mujakidin are 
not represented. In 1987, however, Ira- 
nian policies on Afghanistan fluctuated. 

Iran's rejection of the Soviet occu- 
pation is an "Islamic" issue that has 
wide domestic support. Tehran's day-to- 
day Afghan policies, however, have al- 
ways been subsidiary to the greater 
considerations of the Persian Gulf war, 
its overall Middle East/Islamic strategy, 
and the general state of relations with 
the U.S.S.R., with which Iran shares a 
long border. 

Until 1987, Iran's Afghan policy 
was coordinated within Iran by 
AyatoUah Montazeri. In the beginning 
of the year, Iran apparently increased 
.support for the resistance. Iran im- 
proved ties with the Sunni (Peshawar) 
resistance parties, as well as its tradi- 
tional clients, Shia groups based in 
central Afghanistan. (Iran hosts the 
"Alliance of 8," mostly Shia Afghan re- 
sistance parties.) In January, for the 
first time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
invited Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami head 
Rabbani for an official visit to Tehran. 
His previous visits to Iran had been 
under quasiofficial clerical auspices. 



Iran also launched its own "re- 
gional" peace initiative in February, 
when it proposed roundtable talks in- 
volving the Soviets, Pakistan, Iran, and 
the mujahidin. The Kabul regime was 
excluded from the offer The proposed 
participants did not take up Tehran's 
offer. 

Iranian-Afghan tensions continued 
as Kabul protested instances of violence 
against its diplomatic personnel by Ira- 
nian Revolutionary Guards. In August, 
both Iran and Afghanistan protested 
the violation of each other's territory at 
the main border crossing between 
Mashhad and Herat. Tehran charged its 
border post was hit by artillery shelling 
from the Afghan side. The Iranian pro- 
Soviet Marxist opposition groups, 
Tudeh and Fedayeen-e-Khalq, continue 
to be active in Kabul. 

By late summer, the Iranians 
showed some accommodation toward 
Kabul in the wake of their improving 
relations with the Soviet Union. In the 
fall, Iran's ambassador in Kabul at- 
tended an official state function for the 
first time since the invasion. Support 
for the rnujahidin and relations with 
the Sunni resistance parties also dimin- 
ished. Nonetheless, Tehran continued 
to publicly condemn the Soviet 
occupation. 

China 

China continues to cite the Soviet occu- 
pation of Afghanistan as a threat to re- 
gional security and a major obstacle to 
the improvement of its relations with 
the Soviet Union. China raised 
Afghanistan in its renewed bilateral 
discussions with the U.S.S.R. 

During a June visit to Islamabad, 
Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang "con- 
firmed China's support for Pakistan's 
principled position" on the Afghan is- 
sue. During the June visit, it was an- 
nounced that the Chinese Government 
had donated a large quantity of goods 
for the refugees, including 1,250 tons of 
rice and a million yards of cloth. 



ch 1988 



21 



International Concern 



The plight of the Afghan people con- 
tinues to attract the world's attention. 
Demands for an end to the occupation 
can be heard year round. In December 
1986, newspapers of varying ideological 
stripe (including communists) from nu- 
merous countries sharply criticized the 
Soviets for the occupation. Support was 
limited to a few editorials in papers 
published by pro-Moscow communist 
parties. 

India 

India maintained its interest in a politi- 
cal solution to the Afghan problem and 
continued to call for an end to foreign 
intervention and interference in 
Afghanistan. India maintained good re- 
lations with the Kabul government and 
continued its modest pre-1979 program 
of foreign assistance. In 1987, India's 
contacts with Kabul became more visi- 
ble. An early summer Indian trade fair 
in Kabul was one of the largest non- 
Soviet foreign-sponsored spectacles 
since the invasion. 

India welcomed Kabul's "national 
reconciliation" effort. An unprece- 
dented exchange of high-level official 
visits began with the visit of Afghan 
Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil to New 
Delhi in February. In July, Indian For- 
eign Minister Tiwari became the high- 
est level non-Soviet-bloc official to visit 



Kabul. Several regime delegations were 
subsequently received in New Delhi. 
Politburo member and Communications 
Minister Watanjar signed an agreement 
on communications assistance. Other 
technical assistance agreements were 
also initialed by New Delhi. In 
November, Indian efforts to obtain a 
"consensus" UN General Assembly 
Afghanistan resolution came to naught. 
Subsequently, India again abstained on 
the UNGA resolution. 

Islamic Countries 

In January, the leaders of the re- 
sistance alliance attended the Organiza- 
tion of the Islamic Conference summit 
in Kuwait and then-spokesman Abd al- 
Sayyaf addressed the delegates. The 
summit once again issued a resolution 
supporting the Afghan refugees, the 
inujahidin, and Pakistan; calling for a 
withdrawal of Soviet forces; and sug- 
gesting that an end to the Soviet occu- 
pation would remove a major barrier to 
the improvement of relations between 
the Soviet Union and the Islamic coun- 
tries. Kabul was rebuffed in its year- 
long effort to reclaim Afghanistan's seat 
in the conference. It also failed in its 
effort to gain entry to the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation. 

At the third general Islamic confer- 
ence in Mecca in October, Abd al 
Rahman Abd al Khaliq from Kuwait 
called upon Islamic states to sever rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union for its con- 
tinued occupation of Afghanistan. 



European Support 

Afghanistan remains a primary soure 
of European criticism of the Soviet 
Union, both official and from groups 
otherwise sympathetic to Soviet pol- 
icies. Kabul was moved to protest wh 
French Foreign Minister Raimond mc 
with resistance alliance leaders durir 
a May visit to Pakistan. 

In December, the European Conr 
munity (EC) issued a statement callii 
for an immediate end to the occupati 
of Afghanistan, including a Soviet wi 
drawal completed before the end of 
1988. This followed a statement earli' 
in the year in which the EC providec 
the basis for a European diplomatic 
effort on Afghanistan, focused on the 
United Nations. 



Soviet Efforts To Curb Press Cover 

International public interest in the 
Afghan war remains high. It has nev 
been easy, however, to get the news 
of Afghanistan. Kabul permitted moi 
foreign journalists to visit, but mosti 
for regime events. Although they are 
not allowed to move about freely, jou 
nalists often witness evidence of regi 
frailty, such as the mujahidin shellin 
and the internecine shootout that 
plagued the so-called Loya Jirga. 

In contrast to the dramatic in- 
crease in the quantity and realism of 
Soviet media coverage, there has bee 
an effort on the part of the regime ai 
the Soviets to intimidate foreign re- 



Casualties Due to Border Violations by Soviet/Regime Forces 
and Terrorist Blasts in Pakistan, 1980-October 1987 



Year 


Air Attacks 


Artillery Attacks 


Terro 


rist Explosions 


TOTAL 


Viola- 
tions 


Persons 
Injured 


Persons 
Killed 


Viola- Persons Persons 
tions Injured Killed 


Incidents 


Persons Persons 
Injured Killed 


Persons Persons 
Injured Killed 


1980 


174 


4 


2 


25 — — 








4 2 


1981 


94 


3 


5 


17 — — 


— 


— — 


3 5 


1982 


59 


— 


— 


22 4 — 


2 


4 — 


8 — 


1983 


93 


2 


— 


41 8 — 


47 


27 4 


37 4 


1984 


119 


261 


133 


49 24 38 


28 


48 8 


333 179 


1985 


256 


38 


19 


121 19 25 


118 


173 96 


230 140 


1986 


779 


67 


39 


495 120 56 


487 


798 216 


985 311 


Oct. 1987 


574 


437 


183 


517 130 50 


450 


953 198 


1,520 431 



22 



Department of State Bulle 



FEATURE 
Afghanistan 



:ers traveling with the resistance. 
ause of improved resistance air de- 
16, however, there may have been 
e foreign correspondents inside 
Ihanistan in the summer of 1987 
a previously. 

In October, antipress efforts inten- 
id. The regime protested the visit of 
'oup of Pakistani journalists to Pak- 
IProvince. Near Kabul, a BBC-TV 
IV, which was invited by the regime, 
threatened and detained by Soviet 
ps, who also detained diplomats 
tried to intervene. A French jour- 
iBt, Alain Guillo, was captui-ed in 
fember. He was still imprisoned at 
end of the year, charged with try- 
to obtain military secrets. An Ital- 
journalist was reported captured in 
ember. 

The campaign to target foreign 
•nalists had more tragic results. 
I American filmmakers, Lee Shapiro 
Jim Lindelof were apparently 
;d by a regime attack while travel- 
with the mnjahidhi. In 1986, Lin- 
)f had been named paramedic of the 
r for his efforts training Afghan me- 
il workers. In response to protests, 
)ul stated it could not "guarantee 
security of foreign subjects" who 
jr illegally, whose presence it views 
evidence" of "external interference." 

jul's Diplomatic Offensive 

)ul made only limited gains in its 
iet-supported worldwide effort to 
fi international legitimacy. The re- 
le sent representatives to 52 coun- 
'S in hopes of upgrading relations, 
ny countries turned away Kabul's 
resentatives. 

One of Kabul's major diplomatic tri- 
phs was the June visit of Prime Min- 
;r Keshtmand to Iraq. Keshtmand 
B seen by Saddam Hussein, the high- 
level at which a regime functionary 
. ever been received outside the So- 
t bloc. They signed an agreement on 
de and technical cooperation, ratified 
September. 

During 1987, the regime managed 
establish diplomatic relations with 
nbabwe and Cyprus and reached 
■eements on opening embassies in 
^ Democratic People's Republic of 
rea, Nicaragua, and Austria, the re- 
ne's first embassy in Western Eu- 



rope. Kabul Foreign Minister Abdul 
Wakil was received at the Austrian For- 
eign Ministry when he journeyed to 
Vienna in September to open the em- 
bassy. Several African countries, under 
pressure from Moscow, agreed to ex- 
change nonresident ambassadors. 

Kabul's limited successes cost the 
Soviets some diplomatic capital, if not 
also tangible resources. However, the 
net effect inside Afghanistan or on the 
Afghanistan-tarnished Soviet world im- 
age was limited. More importantly, 
even those countries that in some way 
responded to Kabul's diplomatic en- 
treaties did not budge on the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution, the major 
objective of Kabul's diplomatic efforts. 

UN Negotiations 

Since January 1980, the UN General 
Assembly has voted nine times, by 
overwhelming and generally increasing 
margins, for a resolution calling for the 
complete withdrawal of foreign forces 
from Afghanistan, the restoration of 
Afghanistan's independent and non- 
aligned status, Afghan self-determina- 
tion, and the creation of conditions that 
would enable the refugees to return 
home with safety and honor. 

At the 42d UN General Assembly, 
introduced as in the past by Pakistan 
and cosponsored by 47 countries, the 
resolution passed on November 10 with 
a record vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, with 
11 abstentions, a one-vote increase over 
the 1986 affirmative vote total of 122. 
The vote was considered a decided de- 
feat for the Soviet Union, in the wake 
of its year-long effort to erode support 
for the resolution. 

In addition, the Soviets, the Kabul 
regime, India, Syria, and Democratic 
Yemen made last-ditch attempts to 
amend Pakistan's Afghanistan resolu- 
tion with so-called consensus language 
on the eve of the November 10th vote. 
The Soviets and others, realizing that 
they lacked the necessary votes, with- 
drew their amendments just prior to 
the final vote. 

UN attempts to negotiate a settle- 
ment date from a November 1980 
mandate of the General Assembly. 
Negotiations are led by UN Under Sec- 
retary General for Special Political Af- 
fairs Diego Cordovez, the Secretary 
General's personal representative. Talks 



have been held periodically since 1982 
in Geneva. Cordovez shuttles between 
delegations from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of 
the discussions while unofficially in- 
forming the Soviets. 

The UN Secretary General has re- 
ported that the four instruments that 
would comprise the agreement are 
"virtually complete." The text is 
largely settled on three of four pro- 
posed instruments, the first dealing 
with mutual noninterference in 
Afghanistan's affairs, the second en- 
compassing international guarantees, 
and the third governing the voluntary 
return of the refugees. 

The fourth agreement, which is to 
address the key issue of a Soviet troop 
withdrawal and the interrelationship 
between that document and the other 
three, is unfinished. The principal out- 
standing issue remains an agreement 
on a realistic timetable for the with- 
drawal of Soviet troops. 

Two sessions of the seventh round 
of the indirect talks were held in Gen- 
eva in 1987. The first, convened Febru- 
ary 25, lasted until March 9. At the end 
of August, Kabul suddenly requested 
an early resumption of the talks and 
a second session was held Septem- 
ber 7-10. 

The first session was held during 
heavy cross-border attacks on Pakistan. 
For a week Afghan planes bombed and 
rocketed Pakistani villages, killing and 
wounding hundreds. On March 2, 
Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada 
Yaqub Khan threatened to leave the 
talks if the attacks did not cease. The 
raids stopped, and after some prelimi- 
nary negotiation, newly appointed 
Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil 
tabled a proposal that would reduce the 
period required for Soviet troop with- 
drawal to 18 months, less than half the 
4-year position it maintained in 1986. 
Pakistan offered to accept 7 months, up 
from 4 months. 

Kabul's insistence that a September 
round be convened at short notice fed 
widespread speculation that Kabul 
would table a 12-month timetable. In- 
stead, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul 
Wakil reduced the offer only 2 months, 
to 16 months. Pakistan countered with 
8 months, but there was no Afghan 
counteroffer. Both Cordovez and Yaqub 



lirch 1988 



23 



expressed disappointment with Kabul's 
intransigence, particularly since the 
session had been proposed by Kabul. 

In a speech to the UN General As- 
sembly, Wakil said that "the policy of 
national reconciliation and the Geneva 
talks, as two separate processes, are 
contributing toward the achievement of 
a single objective." His implication of 
linkage between Kabul's futile efforts to 
gain domestic support and a Soviet 
withdrawal was rejected at the UN 
General Assembly by Pakistani Prime 
Minister Junejo, who charged that the 
Afghan call to Geneva was "false propa- 
ganda" aimed at the UN vote. 

In his annual report on 
Afghanistan, the UN Secretary General 
reported that negotiations had reached 
"an advanced stage" and that "substan- 
tial, but not sufficiently sustained pro- 
gress" had been made. He urged all 
Afghans "inside and outside their 
homeland" to look beyond a settlement 
and identify "processes and policies 
that they might deem appropriate to 
ensure continued peaceful conditions in 
Afghanistan and the region." All sides 
are committed to continuing the talks, 
which are expected to resume early in 
1988. 



U.S. Policy 

The United States seeks a negotiated 
settlement in Afghanistan which brings 
about the complete and prompt with- 
drawal of Soviet troops and self-deter- 
mination for the Afghan people as 
outlined in the UN General Assembly 
resolutions passed by overwhelming 
majorities each year over the past 8 
years. The United States supports the 
efforts of the UN Secretary General's 
personal representative to achieve a 
settlement. The single remaining issue 
to be agreed to is Soviet troop with- 
drawal. So long as the Soviet Union 
continues to occupy Afghanistan, the 
U.S. Government will maintain its 
strong support for the Afghan people's 
cause. The United States has noted re- 
cent Soviet professions of intent to 



withdraw from Afghanistan. The U.S. 
Government urges the Soviet Union to 
match its words with deeds at the ear- 
liest possible time. 

This was the primary thrust 
of President Reagan's message to Gor- 
bachev at the December 1987 summit in 
Washington. The President urged the 
Soviets to agree to a short timeframe 
and declare a "date certain" for the 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan. 

Humanitarian Assistance 

The U.S. Government contributes heav- 
ily to a sizable humanitarian assistance 
program designed to minimize the suf- 
fering of those who have chosen to re- 
main in the villages of the war-ravaged 
Afghan countryside. Congress provided 
$15 million for the program in FY 1986 
and .$30 million in FY 1987. The pro- 
jected funding for FY 1988 is $45 mil- 
lion. In addition, the United States is 
donating wheat and vegetable oil to 
support the cross-border program. In 
FY 1988, a minimum of 40,000 metric 
tons of wheat, valued at $7.6 million, 
will be provided. 

The humanitarian assistance pro- 
gram is administered by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development. 
Through the program, hundreds of tons 
of food, medical supplies, cold weather 
clothing, and other humanitarian goods 
have been provided to war-affected 
Afghans to counter the ongoing, sys- 
tematic destruction of their crops and 
property. The program also seeks to 
develop the capabilities of the Afghan 
resistance Alliance to provide educa- 
tion, health, and agricultural services 
to the people inside Afghanistan. To 
plan and implement its activities, the 
Alliance has set up technical 
committees. 



Although still in the nascent stagi 
of development, each of the committee 
can claim significant achievements. TI 
Education Committee is implementing 
a program through which almost 660 
schools inside Afghanistan are being 
supplied with textbooks, instructional 
aids, and administrative materials. It 
also has initiated a literacy program f 
adults which has thus far attracted ar 
estimated 8,000 participants. 

The Health Committee has devel- 
oped a training program which is gi"a( 
uating 240 basic health workers every 
months. It is establishing and supply- 
ing hospitals and clinics inside 
Afghanistan and planning a major im- 
munization campaign that will begin i 
early 1988. With less than a year of 
operational experience, the Agricultu 
Committee is already sponsoring the 
preparation and radio broadcast of ag 
cultural extension programs and the i 
habilitation of a number of irrigation 
canals. 

To complement the activities of t 
Alliance committees, the U.S. Goverr 
ment supports private voluntary ager 
cies from the United States, France, 
West Germany, Belgium, United Kinj 
dom, and Sweden. In FY 1987, $9 n- 
lion was provided to 12 voluntary 
organizations for 15 activities. More 
than half of these funds were gi'anted 
to support health activities. The re- 
maining funds finance food, agricultu 
and education activities. 

A separate program created by 
Congress in FY 1986 to help improve 
the living conditions inside Afghanist; 
is the Humanitarian Relief Progi-am 
Through this program, the Defense E 
partment and the Agency for Interna 
tional Development provide nonlethal 
excess Defense Department property 
as well as transport humanitarian goc 
donated by private sector organizatio 
to the Alliance. Under the same pro- 
gram, war wounded Afghan patients 
are transported to the United States, 
Europe, and Middle East for free mec 
cal treatment. To date, an estimated 
450 patients have been placed, 270 of 
them in U.S. medical institutions. ■ 



'I 



\ 



24 



Department of State Bulle 



iE PRESIDENT 



ate of the Union Address 



Excerpt from President Reagan's 
ress before a joint session of the 
gress on January 25, 1988.^ 



of the greatest contributions the 
ted States can make to the world is 
iromote freedom as the key to eco- 
lic growth. A creative, competitive 
erica is the answer to a changing 
Id, not trade wars that would close 
rs, create greater barriers, and de- 
ly millions of jobs. We should always 
ember: protectionism is destruc- 
dsm. America's jobs, America's 
Mrth, America's future depend on 
de — trade that is free, open, and 

This year we have it within our 
'er to take a major step toward a 
wing global economy and an expand- 
cycle of prosperity that reaches to 
the free nations of this Earth. I am 
aking of the historic free trade 
eement negotiated between our 
ntry and Canada. And I can also tell 
. that we are determined to expand 
i concept, south as well as north, 
xt month I will be traveling to Mex- 
where trade matters will be of fore- 
st concern. And over the next 
eral months, our Congress and the 
nadian Parliament can make the 
rt of such a North American accord 
eality. Our goal must be a day when 
! free flow of trade — from the tip of 
;rra del Puego to the Arctic Circle — 
ites the people of the Western Hemi- 
lere in a bond of mutually beneficial 
:hange; when all borders become 
lat the U.S. -Canadian border so long 
s been — a meeting place rather than 
lividing line. 

This movement we see in so many 
ices toward economic freedom is indi- 
iible from the worldwide movement 
ward political freedom — and against 
talitarian rule. This global democratic 
volution has removed the specter — so 
ightening a decade ago — of democracy 
lomed to permanent minority status 
the world. In South and Central 
merica, only a third of the people en- 
yed democratic rule in 1976. Today 
'er 90% of Latin Americans live in na- 
ons committed to democratic 
"inciples. 

And the resurgence of democracy 
owed to these courageous people on 
.most every continent who have strug- 
led to take control of their own des- 



tiny. In Nicaragua the struggle has 
extra meaning because that nation is so 
near our own borders. The recent reve- 
lations of a former high-level Sandinista 
major, Roger Miranda, show us that, 
even as they talk peace, the communist 
Sandinista government of Nicaragua 
has established plans for a large 
600,000-man army. Yet even as these 
plans are made, the Sandinista regime 
knows the tide is turning and the cause 
of Nicaraguan freedom is riding at the 
crest. Because of the freedom fighters, 
who are resisting communist rule, the 
Sandinistas have been forced to extend 
some democratic rights, negotiate with 
church authorities, and release a few 
political prisoners. 

The focus is on the Sandinistas — 
their promises and their actions. There 
is a consensus among the four Central 
American democratic presidents that 
the Sandinistas have not complied with 
the plan to bring peace and democracy 
to all of Central America. The Sandi- 
nistas again have promised reforms. 
Their challenge is to take irreversible 
steps toward democracy. 

On Wednesday [January 27] my re- 
quest to sustain the freeeom fighters 
will be submitted which reflects our 



ing and dying for the same democratic 
liberties we hold sacred. Their cause is 
our cause: freedom. 

Yet, even as we work to expand 
world freedom, we must build a safer 
peace and reduce the danger of nuclear 
war. But let us have no illusions. Three 
years of steady decline in the value of 
our annual defense investment have in- 
creased the risk of our most basic se- 
curity interests, jeopardizing earlier 
hard-won goals. We must face squarely 
the implications of this negative trend 
and make adequate, stable defense 
spending a top goal both this year and 
in the future. This same concern ap- 
plies to economic and security as- 
sistance programs as well. But the 
resolve of America and its NATO allies 
has opened the way for unprecedented 
achievement in arms reduction. Our re- 
cently signed INF [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces] Ti-eaty is historic be- 
cause it reduces nuclear arms and es- 
tablishes the most stringent verification 
regime in arms control history, includ- 
ing several forms of short-notice, on- 
site inspection. I submitted the treaty 
today, and I urge the Senate to give its 
advice and consent to ratification of this 
landmark agreement. 



Our recently signed INF Treaty is historic because 
it reduces nuclear arms and establishes the most 
stringent verification regime in arms control 
history.... 



mutual desire for peace, freedom, and 
democracy in Nicaragua. I ask Con- 
gress to pass this request; let us be for 
the people of Nicaragua what 
Lafayette, Pulaski, and Von Stuben 
were for our forefathers and the cause 
of American independence. 

So, too, in Afghanistan the free- 
dom fighters are the key to peace. We 
support the mujahidin. There can be 
no settlement unless all Soviet troops 
are removed and the Afghan people are 
allowed genuine self-determination. I 
have made my views on this matter 
known to Mr Gorbachev. But not just 
Nicaragua or Afghanistan. Yes, every- 
where we see a swelling freedom tide 
across the world — freedom fighters ris- 
ing up in Cambodia and Angola, fight- 



In addition to the INF Treaty, we 
are within reach of an even more signif- 
icant START [strategic arms reduction] 
agreement that will reduce U.S. and 
Soviet long-range missiles or strategic 
arsenals by half But let me be clear; 
our approach is not to seek agreement 
for agreement's sake but to settle only 
for agreements that truly enhance our 
national security and that of our allies. 
We will never put our security at risk — 
or that of our allies — ^just to reach an 
agreement with the Soviets. No agree- 
ment is better than a bad agreement. 

As I mentioned earlier, our efforts 
are to give future generations what we 



larch 1988 



25 



AFRICA 



never had — a future free of nuclear ter- 
ror. Reduction of strategic offensive 
arms is one step; SDI [Strategic De- 
fense Initiative] is another. Our funding 
request for our Strategic Defense Ini- 
tiative is less than 2% of the total de- 
fense budget. SDI funding is money 
wisely appropi'iated and money well 
spent. SDI has the same purpose and 
supports the same goals of arms reduc- 
tion. It reduces the risk of war and the 
threat of nuclear weapons to all man- 
kind. Strategic defenses that threaten 
no one could offer the world a safer, 
more stable basis for deterrence. We 
must also remember that SDI is our 
insurance policy against a nuclear acci- 
dent — a Chernobyl of the sky — or an 
accidental launch or some madman who 
might come along. 

We have seen such changes in the 
world in 7 years. As totalitarianism 



struggles to avoid being overwhelmed 
by the forces of economic advance and 
the aspiration for human freedom, it is 
the free nations that are resilient and 
resurgent. As the global democratic 
revolution has put totalitarianism on 
the defensive, we have left behind the 
days of retreat — America is again a vig- 
orous leader of the free world, a nation 
that acts decisively and firmly in the 
furtherance of its principles and vital 
interests. No legacy would make me 
more proud than leaving in place a bi- 
partisan consensus for the cause of 
world freedom, a consensus that pre- 
vents a paralysis of American power 
from ever occurring again. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 1, 1988. 



South Africa: 

What Are America's Options? 



by Charles W. Freeman 

Address before the World Affairs 
Council of Inland Southern California 
conference on U.S. foreign policy iri 
Riverside on December 9, 1987. Mr. 
Freeman is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs. 

I have been invited to speak to you 
about South Africa and what role the 
United States can play in promoting 
change there. This is a serious issue, 
and one of vital concern to Americans, 
as it is to Africans. 

This is so, in no small measure, 
because of South Africa's dominant role 
in the region of which it is part. South 
Africa's political and economic fevers in- 
fect the 150 million people who live in 
the area from Zaire to Lesotho. All of 
southern Africa's nations — democracies, 
monarchies, and dictatorships; vigorous 
capitalist economies and bastions of so- 
cialist decrepitude alike — are enfeebled 
and imperiled by the death throes of 
apartheid. Events in South Africa will 
determine much of the future of this 
vast, strategically important region. 
This in itself justifies a high level of 
American and international concern 
about events in that country. 

But what happens in South Africa 
is more than a strategic or regional is- 
sue. For Africans and Americans alike, 
apartheid is, first and foremost, a 



26 



moral issue. All Americans are deeply 
affronted by the intolerable injustice 
and grotesque perversion of Western 
values that apartheid represents. To 
borrow a poignant South African 
phrase, apartheid is a "black spot" on 
the world's conscience that must be re- 
moved. Americans have a strong inter- 
est in seeing South Africa embrace 
the Western democratic values it has 
so long professed but denied to the 
majority of its people in practice. As 
President Reagan has repeatedly 
affirmed; 

Apartheid is morally wrong and polit- 
ically unacceptable. The United States can- 
not maintain cordial relations with a gov- 
ernment whose power rests upon the 
denial of rights to a majority of its people 
based on race. If South Africa wishes to 
belong to the family of Western nations, 
an end to apartheid is a precondition. 

It is worth recalling that last year's 
debate about South Africa was not, in 
fact, about whether the United States 
should do all we can to help South Af- 
ricans bring about the rapid, peaceful 
replacement of apartheid by a demo- 
cratic system based on a universal fran- 
chise. All Americans share these 
objectives. The debate was about how- 
best to pursue them. What, in fact, is 
America's most effective role in catalyz- 
ing change in South Africa? It is to 
that issue I would now like to turn. 



li 



It seems to me that at least thret 
fundamental conceptual differences 
have lain beneath discussion of this is 
sue in this country. The questions 
raised by these differing presupposi- 
tions have seldom been addressed ex- 
plicitly by those engaged in public 
debate about policy toward South Af- 
rica. Nevertheless, they are importai 
and the answers to them are not self 
evident. I would like to speak briefly 
each of them. The questions are; 

• Can rising violence push South 
Africans toward a negotiated compro 
mise, or will it work to entrench 
apartheid? 

• Will isolation of white South 
Africa hasten the replacement of 
apartheid by a truly democratic orde-jtsi 
or will it impede and slow this? 

• Will inflicting economic pain or 
South Africa magnify the power of 
South Africa blacks to achieve a ra- 
cially just society, or will their stren.i 
and bargaining position be diminishe 
and eroded by such measures? 

Fmally, we Americans must ask 
ourselves what kind of South Africa 
hope to see emerge from apartheid, 
and what can we do most effectively 
help such a South Africa be born. 

Let me now attempt to answer 
the questions I have posed. 



The Issue of Violence 

First, the issue of violence; in the 
South African context, this question 
usually — like so many others— debat 
primarily in moral terms. Is violence 
justified or not? Clearly, some forms 
violence — terrorist bombings of supe 
markets or the slaying of nonviolent 
protestors, for example — cannot be j 
tified by any respectable moral stam 
ard. But, beyond this, there is 
disagreement. Theologians have 
wrestled with this question for mil- 
lenia, and I doubt that I can add any 
thing significant to what they have s; 
about it. Nor do I feel compelled to c 
so, because the real questions before 
the actors in South Africa is not 
whether violence is right or wrong, b 
what it will accomplish and where it 
will lead their counti'y. 

The record on this point is clear: 
escalating violence has done nothing 
speed the end of apartheid. It has be 
come a primary obstacle to a negotia 
end to racial injustice in South Africf 
Violence may well have become as 
South African as the braai — the out- 
door barbeque that is the focus of mi' 
die-class Afrikaner social life — but il, 



AFRICA 



itt'i-|)roductive. It is, therefore, a 
• :t.Ml>-, whether it is carried out by 
1 -artned soldiers in armored cars, by 
; la\ ishly equipped infiltrators from 
Ltli Africa's several liberation move- 
iiits, or among political factions in 
h black townships. Let us be clear 
but the effects of all these kinds of 
ience in South Africa. 

The violence of the government 
e es simply to radicalize black opin- 
} and drive it toward the left: to dele- 
i aiize the government in the eyes of 
ilks; to discredit the path of negotia- 
i s: to inhibit those who might other- 
. ' hr inclined to negotiate from doing 
I t(] justify counterviolence; and to 
( a further element of rage and 
u -ed to South Africa's already embit- 
i 'il race relations. The violence car- 
nut by the South African military 
. eit;hboring black-ruled states makes 
t Imost impossible even for those of 

I n inclined to recognize the reality of 

II th African power and to maintain a 
( perative relationship with Pretoria 

( lo so. 

As the recent elections in South 
! ica illustrate, the violence of the 
; iapartheid movements similarly 
j ves to harden white opinion and to 
I /e it to the right; to cause most 
I tes to view such movements as a 
urity problem rather than as a legit- 
ite voice for change; to inhibit those 
D seek an early end to apartheid 
■n openly making common cause with 
ir black compatriots; to give the gov- 
ment an e.xcuse to deny the leaders 
)lack opposition movements a voice 
determining South Africa's future; 
i to add a distinctly unhelpful ele- 
'nt of apprehension and outright fear 
whites contemplate a future non- 
ial regime in their country. The 
'ss-border operations of the libera- 
n movements are cited by the South 
rican military as justification for 
;ir reign of counterterror throughout 
; region. 

An environment in which violent 
imidation of dissent is the norm — 
ether in government action against 
; black opposition or in the mayhem 
political life in the townships — is a 
Dr school for democracy. The prog- 
is toward the institutionalization of 
)lence in South Africa raises grave 
estions about the prospects for civic 
cency in that country. It is no conso- 
ion that most violence takes place 
long members of the same racial and 
anic group rather than between 
cups separated — even in this — by 
artheid. 



One telling measure of the emo- 
tional and intellectual chasm to crossed 
in South Africa is the fact that all but a 
few black South Africans would agree 
toally with what I have said about the 
effects on them of government and in- 
ternecine violence. And all but a few 
white South Africans would agree com- 
pletely with my characterization of the 
effects of ANC [African National Con- 
gress] and PAC [Pan-African Congress] 
violence on their fellow whites. But nei- 
ther side in South Africa is able to see 
that violence directed at the other side 
produces a mirror-image reaction. 

Moreover, violence and counter- 
violence tend to strengthen the role of 
those who command its instruments 
and to weaken those who favor negotia- 
tion and compromise. Thus, with each 
ratcheting upwards of the stages of vio- 
lence, the prospects for a negotiated 
outcome are lessened. 

But if violence is a fundamental 
obstacle to negotiations, could it not be 
an effective alternative to negotiations? 

I have heard a few Americans 
forthrightly justify their stand in favor 
of sanctions and other punitive mea- 
sures against South Africa by their 
view that violent revolution may be the 
quickest and most effective answer to 
apartheid. They believe that a sharp 
rise in black misery could provoke an 
uprising that would overthrow 
apartheid. They reason that, since the 
South African victims of apartheid out- 
number its white beneficiaries almost 
six to one, black victory would be 
quickly attained in such a revolutionary 
struggle. 

Yet I know of no serious student of 
the South African scene who agrees 
that the overthrow of apartheid would 
be the outcome of a black uprising. 
Given the overwhelming superiority — in 
training, organization, discipline, equip- 
ment, weaponry, communications, and 
mobility — of the South African mihtary 
over a brave but largely unarmed popu- 
lace, the tragic result would almost cer- 
tainly be the same as it has been in the 
past in South Africa — thousands upon 
thousands of dead, very few of whom 
would be white. And South Africa 
would have added open race war to all 
the other hobbles that hold it from a 
decent postapartheid future. To prem- 
ise U.S. policy on the incitement of vio- 
lent revolution in South Africa would be 
irresponsible and could implicate Amer- 
icans in an unspeakable tragedy. For- 
tunately, South African opponents of 
apartheid know their own situation 
well; they are unlikely to risk any such 
thing. 



The Isolation 
of South Africa 

This brings me to the question of the 
isolation of South Africa as a way of 
persuading white South Africans to ac- 
cept that apartheid is morally indefen- 
sible and must be abandoned. 

Isolation is a fine way of register- 
ing moral disgust but a very poor way, 
indeed, of influencing the opinion and 
actions of those being isolated. Threats 
to sever specific relationships are one 
thing, actual quarantine is quite an- 
other Across-the-board isolation may 
be an appropriate response to the inter- 
national behavior of foreign nations, but 
it has never worked as a means by 
which to change their human rights or 
other domestic practices. It did not 
work in China, and it will not work in 
South Africa. I mention China because 
I believe that the many positive 
changes which have taken place there 
in recent years might have come about 
earlier had the country not been iso- 
lated — and had it not isolated itself. 
That is, of course, speculation. What is 
fact is that the positive changes with 
which we are all familiar came only 
after the opening of the country to 
much more intensive contact and di- 
alogue with the outside world. The 
same seems to me to have been true in 
South Africa. 

There have, in fact, been signifi- 
cant changes in South Africa over the 
past decade — the recognition by the es- 
tablishment Dutch Reformed Church 
that apartheid is without biblical sanc- 
tion or any other moral justification; 
the ending of many forms of segrega- 
tion and legal discrimination in the 
workplace and daily life; the organiza- 
tion of Africa's strongest trade union 
movement; the government's deter- 
mined efforts to raise black educational 
spending and standards, and so forth. 
These changes came about during a pe- 
riod of intensified international contact 
by white South Africans, who are, to- 
day, a mostly urban, much more cosmo- 
politan people than their rural grand- 
parents were, and far more open to 
foreign ideas. Change was catalyzed by 
exposure to challenging ideas and ide- 
als from the West to which most South 
Africans — whether white or black — had 
not previously been exposed. It was 
produced when rising numbers of South 
Africans came to admit that their pre- 
vious beliefs and practices needed reex- 
amination, if South Africa was — in 
President Reagan's words — "to come 
home to the family of Western nations, 
where she belongs." 



Jrch 1988 



27 



AFRICA 



Many of the same people who de- 
clare the" South African Government 
wrong to have banned contact and di- 
alogue with the African National Con- 
gress because it prevents cross- 
fertilization of ideas and constructive 
dialogue about South Africa's future are 
quick to advocate banning international 
contact and dialogue with the South Af- 
rican Government, white South Af- 
ricans, and the country's universities, 
churches, associations, and even its mu- 
sicians and artists — black and white. I 
find this both ironic and sad. If there 
is, today, a crisis of conscience about 
apartheid among significant numbers of 
white South Africans, this comes be- 
cause they have begun to accept and 
assimilate the ideals of freedom, equal- 
ity, and brotherhood upon which mod- 
ern industrial democracies are based 
and to seek to raise their own country 
to these standards. If such democratic 
ideals live in the battered hearts of 
black South Africans, their vitality 
comes, in part, from the personal dis- 
covery that South Africa is abnormal 
and that there is a more just world 
beyond its borders. If white South Af- 
ricans have had to accept that the 
South African cultural achievement 
most esteemed by the Western world 
today is the music of black townships, 
this lively reminder of the black South 
African creative genius has come about 
because the misguided cultural boycott 
of the country was ignored by a color- 
bhnd American musician. It cannot be 
in the West's or the world's interests to 
avoid challenging — through direct expo- 
sure of South Africans to our ideas and 
our examples — the obnoxious doctrines 
and racial stereotyping to which too 
many of them continue to adhere. 

A South Africa under boycott and 
siege is likely to be a South Africa both 
impervious and indifferent to the new 
ideas it must embrace if it is to have a 
democratic and prosperous future. Iso- 
lation can only work to protest South 
Africans from the need to reexamine 
their ideology and to sustain the moral 
fallacy and horror of apartheid. Con- 
versely, the extent to which the world 
remains open to contact and dialogue 
with South Africa and the extent to 
which South Africa remains receptive 
to such contact and dialogue with the 
industrial democracies will strongly in- 
fluence the speed and ease with which 
apartheid is dismantled and replaced by 
a system with liberty and security for 
all. 



Sanctions and Disinvestment 

This brings me to the.issue of inflicting 
economic pain on South Africa as a 
means of hastening the peaceful end of 
apartheid. With the exception of the 
few who seek a violent revolution in 
South Africa, to whom I have already 
alluded, almost all who advocate a com- 
prehensive embargo do so in the hope 
that a sharp blow to the economy and 
to white living standards would force 
Pretoria to negotiate with the country's 
black majority, thereby accelerating the 
peaceful end to apartheid. Many go on 
the portray the application of broad in- 
ternational sanctions as the last, best 
chance before Armageddon and to as- 
sert that support for sanctions is the 
litmus test of opposition to apartheid. 

Unfortunately, this seductively 
easy remedy for apartheid overlooks 
our historical experiences with sanc- 
tions in other contexts, the nature and 
structure of the South African econ- 
omy, and the impact of economic misery 
on the relative bargaining positions of 
the apartheid state and its black 
opponents. 

Embargoes can be an effective way 
of registering disapproval of another 
country's policy. They can even be an 
effective way of modifying its interna- 
tional behavior. (I think that it is only 
fair to note, however, that sometimes 
embargoes can produce unforeseen and 
unfortunate results even in this arena. 
U.S. sanctions against Japan led di- 
rectly to the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and the Japanese seizure of Southeast 
Asia's oil and rubber resources.) What 
sanctions have never been able to ac- 
complish is to force fundamental con- 
stitutional change inside the country 
against which they are targeted. His- 
torically, they have tended to arouse a 
nationalist backlash and to unite those 
against whom they are directed more 
than to divide them or push them to- 
ward compromise and accommodation. 
South Africa seems highly unlikely to 
be an exception in this regard; indeed, 
the initial effects of the sanctions im- 
posed on South Africa by the United 
States and the other industrial democ- 
racies last years seem to fall very much 
into this depressingly familiar pattern. 
Moreover, South Africa's economy 
is peculiarly insulated against interna- 
tional sanctions. Three-fifths of the 
country's exports are gold and other 
minerals and metals that cannot be 
readily obtained from other sources 
outside the Soviet bloc and which are 
essential to modern industry in the 
West. (To cite only one example, if you 
drive a car, chances are that you have a 



little piece of South Africa in the catap* 
lytic converter — pollution controls de-p' 
pend on platinum group metals from 
there.) Another fifth or more of South 
Africa's exports consists of widely 
traded, fungible products like coal, 
which can easily find loopholes in any 
wall of sanctions. So over three-quar- 
ters of the country's production for ex 
port can find a ready market abroad, 
regardless of sanctions. 

But even if South African export! 
and imports could be drastically re- 
duced, the impact would fall less on 
those white South Africans who sup- 
port apartheid than on its victims anc 
opponents. This is because Afrikaners 
have used their dominance of the coui p 
try's government to ensure their em- p< 
ployment in a huge state-capitalist flF 
economic sector. Over three-fifths of |«' 
employed Afrikaners work for the go^ j|i« 
ernment or state corporations. This |(1 
sector, which includes the self-sufficie p 
arms production industries South Af- li 
rica has built since the United States m 
led the way in imposing international Ki 
embargo in 1962, is largely immune t( il 
the business cycle and affected posi- E 
tively, if at all, by downswings in for- P( 
eign trade. The first consequence of t i 
falling tax revenues that would follow a 
major economic contraction in South 
Africa would be reduced government 
expenditures on education, housing, 
and other services for blacks, all of 
which have been expanding rapidly in 
recent years. Moreover, to the extent 
that sanctions seemed to threaten 
South African access to key industria 
inputs and technologies, the state's re 
in the economy would expand as the 
government redirected investment to- 
ward achieving the same self-suffi- 
ciency in other economic areas that it 
has successfully promoted in the arm: 
industry. 

This would be doubly tragic: 

First, because it would concentrs 
even more in the hands of the apartht 
state; and 

Second, because it would deny 
black South Africans the opportunity 
develop the economic muscle they nee 
to strengthen their bargaining power 
against apartheid. 

Skills, jobs and property are 
power, and destitution is next to 
powerlessness. Black South Africans 
could not, until the most recent wave 
government-initiated reforms, own re: 
property, open businesses in the citie' 
or engage in many kinds of business 
activity even in their own residential 
areas. There are still major obstaclef 
erected by a paternalistic and insen- 



28 



Department of State Bulle' 



AFRICA 



; \t liureaucracy, but now black South 
.^■u:ms can own property and engage 
i.Hisiiiess of all kinds. The best hope 
:'( lil;ick South Africans to escape the 
vtu- of propertyless labor pool to 
Aicli white domination and apartheid 
If londemned them is through con- 
Licd expansion of the South African 
"iiiiinv. This is essential for the 
iiwth of black business, the strength- 
3 nu of black labor unions, and the 
Jiwth of black employment. It is es- 
sitial for black dignity and the accu- 
n lati(]n of black power in South 
^•ica. 

Unemployment among black South 
i ricans already runs at around 30% — 
" ; in some areas of the country. The 
t inoiny needs to grow at least 5% just 
t provide jobs to the 300,000 new en- 
t nts into its job market each year. It 
i nirrently growing well below that 
1 el, and unemployment is rising. As 
j IS urow more scarce, competition for 
t 'ni becomes increasingly fierce. 
I ery time someone is fired, there are 
i or seven others fighting to take his 
( her place. Americans are often sur- 
I sed that black South Africans con- 
id with each other to get into the 
lice, despite the fact that this makes 
jm accomplices in the enforcement of 
artheid. We should not be surprised; 
speration robs men of their dignity. 
can drive them to make Faustian 
rgains. Rising joblessness in South 
rica is not a prescription for 
'engthening the bargaining position 
blacks in their efforts to end 
artheid. Rising black joblessness is a 
escription for apartheid's perpetua- 
in beyond its natural lifespan. 

In conditions of rapid economic 
owth, that lifespan could be short, 
deed. The South African business 
mmunity has known and said for 
ars that apartheid is the very an- 
;hesis of capitalism and that its con- 
luation is inconsistent with the devel- 
)ment of a modern economy. That is 
hy the private sector in South Africa 
is been the principal white voice for 
18 steady dismantling of apartheid. 

No section of the business commu- 
ty in South Africa has a prouder re- 
)rd of efforts to break down apartheid 
tid build up black South Africans' role 
1 the economy than American compan- 
;s. Despite apartheid, American com- 
anies' workplaces are desegregrated; 
ley follow equal and fair employment 
ractices and provide equal pay for 
qual work. They are steadily increas- 
ig the number of blacks, "coloreds," 
nd Asians in supervisory positions, in- 
luding supervision of white employees. 



ilarch 1988 



They have worked hard to upgrade the 
quality of their employee's lives, hous- 
ing, schooling, transportation, recrea- 
tion, and health facilities. And they are 
committed actively to work to eliminate 
laws and customs that impede social 
and pohtical justice in South Africa. 
Over the past few years, American 
companies have committed over $200 
million and a great deal of management 
time to training programs, community 
development projects, scholarships, and 
other activities designed to put black 
South Africans in positions of authority 
and to prepare them for leadership 
roles in a future South Africa. It dis- 
tresses me that their presence in South 
Africa is often maligned in the United 
States. I'd like to give you just a few 
examples of the kinds of things that 
those companies brave enough to stand 
against the ill-considered disinvestment 
campaign here are doing and which jus- 
tify our being proud of them. 

• One company arranged for chil- 
dren affected by the unrest at 25 
schools in urban areas to attend rural 
schools. Because of the record of vio- 
lence by many of these pupils, rural 
schools were reluctant to accept them. 
It was only after the company provided 
funds and considerable persuasion that 
these children could continue their 
education. 

• Another company supports a 
school started by a group of concerned 
parents and teachers from virtually 
every South African racial and ethnic 
group, but located in an exclusively 
white residential area. Starting at the 
nursery school level, the school tries to 
teach the children appreciation and un- 
derstanding of each other's different 
cultures before their thinking can be 
deformed by attendance at segregated 
schools. 

• Yet another company sponsored a 
nationwide tour of black townships by a 
large group of Afrikaner ministers of 
the gospel. They arranged for them to 
stay with black families, to share meals 
with them, and to meet with black com- 
munity leaders. The experience had 
such an impact on the group that some 
participants have since openly borne 
witness to the need for drastic steps on 
a wide range of issues. The company 
has made a committment to repeat this 
highly successful initiative regularly 
with other groups. 

I could give hundreds of other ex- 
amples of this kind. These are small 
things, perhaps, but they are impor- 
tant; they make a difference. As Ameri- 
can companies pull out of South Africa, 
these patient and often courageous 
efforts to help South Africans prepare 



themselves for a postapartheid future 
will be greatly missed. More concretely, 
who will pick up the nearly 12,000 
scholarships provided by American 
companies to black South Africans? 
Who will carry on the school lunch pro- 
grams they finance? And what positive 
American influence will there be, on 
the ground, in South Africa when the 
American private sector presence is no 
more? 

A final note on the issue of sanc- 
tions and disinvestment before I turn to 
more hopeful and constructive topics. It 
is often said that black South Africans 
demand sanctions and disinvestment 
and that the United States has no busi- 
ness second-guessing the clearly ex- 
pressed judgment of those who have 
the most to gain or lose from these 
measures. Frankly, this argument is 
unconvincing. So are all the polling 
data that are cited to prove that most 
black South Africans oppose sanctions 
and disinvestment. The fact is that if 
black South Africans really want to 
shut down South Africa's imports and 
exports, they have it in their power to 
do so. They don't need Americans to do 
it for them. Similarly, if they believe 
that it would help them for Americans 
business to leave, all they have to do is 
go on strike to force companies out. 
The fact that there have been no 
strikes in favor of disinvestment, while 
there have been a number against it, 
speaks more eloquently about the at- 
titudes of the black rank and file than 
the statements of their prosanction 
leaders, however, well-intentioned they 
may be. And, in the end, no advice 
from South Africans can excuse us from 
making our own considered judgments 
about what we can and should do to 
facilitate change there. 

The U.S. Role 
in South Africa 

If neither sanctions, nor quarantine, 
nor violence will destroy racial injustice 
in South Africa, what can the United 
States do? 

Surely, we must start from a clear- 
headed understanding of South African 
realities. While the striking gains regis- 
tered in race relations in our own coun- 
try in recent decades hold out hope for 
race relations in South Africa as well, 
the analogy of our civil rights struggle 
is not as relevent as many Americans 
imagine to South Africa. In the United 
States, it was a minority that was de- 
nied equality of participation in national 
life; in South Africa it is the majority 
that demands to be accommodated. 



29 



AFRICA 



Here, the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution provided an in- 
controvertible moral and legal stand- 
ard, accepted by all Americans, to 
which to appeal for justice; in South 
Africa, there is no such constitutional 
norm. Here, thei'e was agreement on 
the free enterprise system as the ave- 
nue to black empowerment; in South 
Africa, an alliance of statism with eth- 
nic nationalism clashes with alter- 
natives ranging from genuine free 
enterprise to unreconstructed Sta- 
linism. In short, our task in the United 
States was to affirm our values and po- 
htical culture; in South Africa, it is to 
create a consensus where none yet ex- 
ists and then to implement it. 

In this light, let me return to the 
question of what we can do. Or to put 
it another way, what are our strengths? 
What leverage can we bring to bear to 
promote change in a tormented land 
8,000 miles and a historical era away 
from us? I believe that: 

First, our greatest strength is the 
moral power of our democratic ideas 
and e.xperience and the evidence of our 
example. South Africans know what we 
are against; they need to know that we 
share the vision that most of them hold 
of a postapartheid South Africa built on 
the solid foundation of the elements of 
its heritage that are democratic rather 
than on the rubble of racial injustice. 
And they need to know that we will do 
all we can to help them achieve such 
constitutional democracy for all in their 
country. 

Second, both our government and 
private sector need to remain involved 
on the side of change in South Africa. 
We need to do all we can — both through 
our aid program and through the ac- 
tivities of American companies — to help 
black South Africans gain the skills, 
the experience, and the confidence they 
need to assume their rightful role in 
the running of their country and to help 
them build the power they need to in- 
sist effectively on their right to do so. 

Third, we must expand our own 
contacts with South Africans of all 
races and political opinions to challenge 
them to think seriously about the hard 
choices before them and to stimulate 
them urgently to condsider alternatives 
to increasing violence, isolation from 
the world, and economic decline under 
apartheid. 

Fourth, we must continue to use 
diplomatic, pohtical, economic, and 
other appropriate forms of pressure to 
demonstrate to the South African Gov- 
ernment and the white electorate that 
the costs of maintaining apartheid are 



high, and rising, and to sustain the mo- 
rale of those of all races working for a 
peaceful end to apartheid. 

Fifth, we must lend our active en- 
couragement to those in South Africa 
seeking democratic alternatives to 
apartheid and be prepared to help them 
to conduct the urgent dialogue across 
racial and political lines that must occur 
if South Africans are to define the diffi- 
cult compromises all of them must pre- 
pare to make as they sit down to 
negotiate a just postapartheid order. 

Finally, we must use all our influ- 
ence to help South Africans find their 
way to the negotiating table and to se- 
cure the prosperous, democratic future 
for which the vast majority of them 
yearn and to which the natural endow- 
ment of their country has predestined 
them. 

I would like to close by sharing 
with you what we believe decent and 
farsighted South Africans want for 
their country and what we should help 
them attain. The words are those of 
George Shultz on September 29th of 
this year in New York, but the ideas 
are common to the partisans of democ- 
racy in all times and places. 

Here, then, are the basic ideas that 
we believe must be addressed by all South 
Africans as they negotiate a replacement 
for the current system in South African: 

• A new constitutional order for a 
united South Africa establishing equal po- 
litical, economic, and social rights for all 
South Africans Vvfithout regard to race, lan- 
guage, national origin, or religion: 

• A democratic electoral system with 
multiparty participation and universal 
franchise for all adult South Africans; 

• Effective constitutional guarantees of 
basic human rights for all South Africans 
as provided for in the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights and the canons of 
democracies everywhere, including: the 
right to liberty and security of persons; 
the right to freedom of speech and the 
press, peaceful assembly and association, 
and practice of religion: the right of labor 
to organize and pursue peacefully its eco- 
nomic ojectives; the right not to be de- 
prived of property except by due process of 
law and upon payment of just compensa- 
tion; the right of movement within the 
country, emigration, and repatriation; and 
the right of inidividuals and communtities 
to use their own languages and develop 
their cultures and customs; 

• The rule of law, safeguarded by an 
independent judiciary with the power to 
enforce the rights guaranteed by the con- 
stitution to all South Africans; 



• A constitutional allocation of powers 
between the national government and its 
constituent regional and local jurisdiction 
in keeping with South Africa's deeply 
rooted regional and cultural traditions; an 

• An economic system that guarantee.' 
economic freedom for every South Africar 
allocates government social and economic 
services fairly, and enables all South Af- 
ricans to realize the fruits of their labor, 
acquire and own property, and attain a de 
cent standard of living for themselves anc 
their families. 

Secretary Shultz went on to say: 

Apatheid has condemned the majoritj 
of South Africans to an unjust state of ec( 
nomic underdevelopment. Certainly we a 
strive to do more. As South Africans mov 
toward meaningful negotiations, the 
United States would be willing to encour- 
age this process. One of the ways we coul 
encourage it would be to expand our 
efforts to help the victims of apartheid lif 
themselves out of poverty. 

If the contending parties in South Af 
rica are ready to take risks for peace, the 
may be assured of the active political, dip 
lomatic, and economic support of the Unitt 
States and its allies. We will support thos 
who are working toward these democratii 
goals. We are ready to take whatever ste| 
we can — providing channels of communica 
tion or a site or lending our political sup- 
port for meetings between South African; 
interested in serious dialogue. 

To play this role in South Africa 
will require us to cultivate virtues for 
which we Americans are not famous. 
We must be duly modest our ability tc 
foster change in South Africa and use 
such influence as we have wisely to 
make a real difference when and wher 
we can. We must be consistent in our 
approach and in our message of hope t 
South Africans. We must refrain from 
self-indulgent actions that do little or 
nothing to improve the prospects for a 
peaceful resolution of the issues in 
South Africa itself. 

It is, perhaps painful, to admit th; 
Americans cannot solve South Africa's 
problems; only South Africans can do 
that. But, if we cannot solve South Af- 
ricans' problems for them, we should a 
least refrain from making them worse. 
And, when we can do good — however 
small — we should not disdain to do so. 
believe that this is a course on which a 
Americans can and should agree. I 



30 



Department of State Bullefl 



mS CONTROL 



le INF Treaty: 
i:rengthening U.S. Security 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
m January 25, 1988} 

preciate the three opening state- 
Its. Of course, I especially appreci- 
Senator Dole's unequivocal 
sment of support for this treaty, 

I welcome the fact that he studied 
irefully; and I had the privilege of 
Iting with him and help in that re- 
1. I want to assure you. Senator, 

the Administration is prepared to 
tc with the Senate to be sure that 

lo everything we possibly can on 
Ithree issues you identified on com- 
nce and on verification and on ex- 
nation of the European theater 
|es subject. Those are all important 
|ects, and they are treated to a fair 
iree, as a matter of fact, in my open- 
(statement. 

I welcome, Senator Helms, your 

for a careful and thorough and in- 
live review of this treaty; and we're 
jared to do that — to devote all of 
time necessary to do that — and to 
.'ide materials that you may wish. 

listened carefully to your com- 
its, and I think that as we go 
)ugh this process they can be an- 
red satisfactorily — at least, I hope 
-and we will work at all of them. 

And, Senator Pell, I appreciate, 

Chairman [of the Senate Foreign 
ations Committee], your opening 
iments, and I do hope to be able to 
ig out to your satisfaction that this 
ity doesn't represent some sudden 
nge of heart on the part of the Rea- 
1 Administration. This treaty repre- 
ts the result of a long and patient 
•cess and brings us to the place that 

President set out to get in 1981, not 
g after he took office. So there has 

n a continuous effort to bring this 
aty about. And one of the things 
.t I hope to be able to do here — and I 
I't want to take undue time of this 
nmittee, but you've emphasized the 
portance of being thorough and care- 
— is to review with you carefully the 
jotiating process that we went 
•Qugh because I think it's a very in- 
uctive process in methods of dealing 
th the Soviet Union. 



The President has forwarded to the 
Senate, for its advice, the treaty on 
the elimination of U.S. and Soviet in- 
termediate-range and shorter range 
missiles. The treaty defines intermedi- 
ate-range missiles as land-based sys- 
tems having ranges between 1,000 and 
5,500 kilometers. It defines shorter 
range missiles as land-based systems 
with a range between 500 and 1,000 
kilometers. It requires the United 
States and the Soviet Union to elimi- 
nate their intermediate-range missiles 
within 3 years and their shorter range 
missiles within 18 months. Neither side 
can possess such missiles after they 
have been eliminated, nor can they pro- 
duce or flight-test them. 

The treaty contains a memorandum 
of understanding on data giving the lo- 
cations, numbers, and characteristics of 
each side's intermediate- and shorter 
range missiles. It also includes a pro- 
tocol that sets forth the detailed pro- 
cedures for eliminating missiles, 
launchers, support structures, and sup- 
port equipment. Finally, it contains a 
protocol that gives the detailed pro- 
cedures for a variety of inspections as- 
sociated with the treaty. 

This treaty deserves, and I am 
sure will get, your careful, thorough, 
and complete examination. I particu- 
larly welcome this opportunity to 
testify today as you begin your 
consideration of the treaty, and I will 
look forward to working closely with 
you in that process. 

The treaty is the result of our 
steady, patient approach to U.S. -Soviet 
relations, on the basis of realism, 
strength, and dialogue. We got this 
treaty because we were persistent at 
the bargaining table and because our 
allies went forward with deployments. 
The way we and our allies successfully 
met the Soviet INF challenge shows 
that tough-mindedness, clarity of pur- 
pose, and resolve pay off The INF ex- 
perience offers important lessons on 
how to proceed as we confront other 
challenges to our security. 

The INF Treaty strengthens U.S. 
and allied security It enhances interna- 
tional stability. It may be opening a 
new chapter in arms control — the be- 
ginning of reductions. It reduces nu- 
clear weapons, rather than setting 



guidelines for their future growth. It 
achieves U.S. -Soviet equality by elim- 
inating substantially more Soviet 
weapons than American ones. It 
accomplishes the goals we and our al- 
lies set for ourselves 8 years ago, when 
the deployment of the SS-20 led to the 
NATO dual-track decision. In short, 
the treaty is an achievement — as our 
allies proclaimed last December — 
"without precedent in the history of 
arms control." 

National Security 

Before I discuss the treaty in detail and 
the process that brought it about, I 
want to put it in context. This means 
going back to first principles. 

The first purpose of a government 
is to ensure the security of its citizens, 
both as individuals and as a nation. To 
this end, one of the objectives specifi- 
cally listed in the Preamble to our Con- 
stitution is "to provide for the common 
defense." This sets the standard we 
must all use to assess this or any other 
arms control agreement. 

What are we trying to secure? Our 
strength and integrity as a nation? But 
there is more to it than that. Our pur- 
pose is, again quoting the Preamble, 
"to secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and our posterity." From the 
beginning, Americans recognized that 
their secui'ity could not depend on 
wishful thinking. The United States has 
survived and prospered as a nation be- 
cause our predecessors, in both the ex- 
ecutive and legislative branches, 
understood the need for strength and 
realism. 

Realism means recognizing what is 
right for the times in which you hve. 
George Washington was right in his 
farewell address to warn his country 
against foreign alliances. A century and 
a half later, Harry Truman was right to 
commit his country to such an alliance. 

Strength does not mean simply mil- 
itary might, although military strength 
is essential. For most of our history, we 
were able to get by with much less 
formidable military forces than many 
other countries. This is because, for the 
century following the Napoleonic wars, 
two vast oceans saw to our country's 
security, while other countries main- 
tained a balance of power across the 
Atlantic. 



Jrch 1988 



31 



ARMS CONTROL 



But the world does not stand still: 
distance can no longer guarantee 
safety, and stability is always under 
challenge. Advances in technology have 
transformed the oceans from barriers 
to highways. The development of the 
airplane, and later of the rocket engine, 
added a new dimension to warfare. And 
the European balance collapsed in 1914. 

In the 30 years that followed, Eu- 
rope was twice convulsed by war Both 
times, the United States at first tried 
to stay aloof. Both times, we ultimately 
joined with our democratic allies and 
fought by their side until the war was 
won. Why? Because we recognized that 
our fundamental national security inter- 
ests would be directly threatened by 
the defeat of democracy in Europe. In 
the aftermath of World War II, we 
joined with the European democracies 
to become part of the balance there, to 
ensure that the tragedy we and they 
had just suffered would never come 
about again. 

Since 1945, the principal threat to 
our security, and to that of our friends 
and allies around the world, has come 
from the Soviet Union. It is a threat 
not just of open conflict but of political 
intimidation as well. Therefore, an 
overriding objective of every American 
Administration has been to prevent the 
loss of Europe to the Soviet Union — not 
by fighting a war but by deterring one. 
Every Administration has agreed that 
the way to do this is to make that com- 
mitment to defend freedom in Europe 
crystal clear. 

The advance of technology has 
forever changed the stakes for our 
national security. The awesome 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons — 
especially when combined with the un- 
precedented speed and range of bal- 
listic missiles — has given added 
urgency to the need to build a solid 
structure of peace. As President Rea- 
gan has reiterated many times, "A nu- 
clear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought." General Secretary 
Gorbachev has said he agrees, most re- 
cently in the Washington summit 
statement. 

The fundamental means of prevent- 
ing a nuclear war is deterring it. The 
U.S. strategic triad is the ultimate de- 
terrent. The President has assigned top 
priority to modernizing all three legs: 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, man- 
ned bombers, and submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles. Together, the three 
legs of the triad complement each 
other and provide a solid basis for 
deterrence. 



32 



Another essential element of our 
strategy of deterrence is our network of 
alliances with our fellow democracies. 
These alliances have an importance to 
us that goes well beyond their strictly 
military role, but the military role is 
vital to deterrence. The U.S. strategic 
triad is one leg of the NATO triad. The 
other two legs are nuclear weapons 
based in Europe and conventional 
forces — ^just the two items that Senator 
Dole focused on in his comments. 

All three legs of the NATO triad 
are vital to the success of deterrence. 
Their effect together is more than the 
sum of the individual parts. The U.S. 
strategic deterrent has a unique role, 
but the burden of the other two legs of 
the triad is widely shared. Thus, deliv- 
ery systems for U.S. nuclear weapons 
in Europe are owned and operated by 
seven of our allies. In the case of a 
short-warning attack, the vast majority 
of the NATO forces involved would be 
from our allies, not the United States: 
over 90% of the ground forces, over 
75% of the air forces, and over 50% of 
the naval forces. 

Maintaining an effective deterrent 
is thus the key to a successful national 
security policy. At the same time, the 
United States has also sought to nego- 
tiate agreements with the Soviet Union 
to reduce the risk posed by nuclear 
weapons. As with the other elements of 
our security policy, this has been a bi- 
partisan objective, carried out by Presi- 
dents, and supported by Senators and 
Members of Congress, of both parties. 

There have been important accom- 
plishments. Chairman Pell mentioned 
some. One was the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty in 1963, which you mentioned. 
Another arms control achievement was 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. It 
remains the basis for our continuing 
efforts to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons. 

The Non-Proliferation Treaty also 
obliges the nuclear weapons states to 
negotiate in good faith to reduce nu- 
clear weapons. In 1972, we agreed to 
the ABM [Anti-BalHstic Missile] 
Treaty, substantially reducing our right 
to defend ourselves against nuclear 
weapons. We did so — as the preamble 
to the treaty reflects — in the expecta- 
tion that this would lead the Soviets to 
negotiate reductions in strategic offen- 
sive weapons. We have called this both 
the premise and the promise of the 
ABM Treaty. So far, that promise has 
not been kept. Whatever else they may 
have done, neither SALT I [strategic 



arms hmitation talks] nor SALT II 
achieved nuclear reductions. No agret i 
ment did — until now. 

President Reagan knows that the 
only way to deal with the Soviet Unio 
on arms control as on other areas of o|il( 
agenda, is to return to first princi- 
ples — strength and realism. And he 
knows that to succeed we need anothijifi 
quality that we lose sight of at our 
peril — patience, or, if you prefer, an 
ability to hang tough. 

The President has understood all 
along that the important thing is not s« 
lose sight of the objective. His purpoi [C 
is not to seek agreements for agree- it 
ments' sake. It is to seek agreements 
that enhance our security. And one oi .i; 
his primary objectives is to enhance t (1 
system of collective security that we 
have established with our democratic I'l 
allies around the world. 



Role of NATO 

I've described the hard lessons that t 
World Wars taught the American pec h\ 
pie. That is why NATO is a cornerstc 'i 
of American security policy. That is 
why it enjoys wider bipartisan suppo 
than any other international instituti' 
It is also the reason we have entered 
into alliances in Asia and the Pacific 
with such partners as Japan, Austral 
South Korea, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. 

NATO faces a real threat. The S. 
viet Union occupies almost one-sixth 
the world's land mass. It has a massi 
nuclear arsenal. The Wai-saw Pact ha 
conventional superiority over NATO 
key categories of combat capability, 
such as manpower and equipment. It 
has the advantage of interior lines of 
logistic support. And it has the large 
chemical weapons stockpile in the 
world. 

In these circumstances, the U.S 
nuclear guarantee has been and re- 
mains essential to the security of our 
allies. It is the basis of extended dete 
rence. When and if the leaders of the 
Soviet Union contemplate an attack 
against a U.S. ally, they must eontini 
to conclude that the risks far outweig 
any possible gains. 

At first, the prospect of massive 
retaliation by U.S. strategic forces 
served to deter attack. But the passa 
of time brings changes and challenges 
The alliance has never failed to re- 
spond, to evolve, and to grow. Thus, i 
1967, NATO formally adopted the str; 
egy of "flexible response." Its basic 
premise is that NATO must deter an( 
if necessary, counter aggression at a;i 



ARMS CONTROL 



ai any place in the NATO treaty 
1 his requires a wide array of 
i so that NATO can defeat any 
ck at an appropriate level, or, if 
ssary, can make a deliberate politi- 
iecision to raise the response to a 
er level. 

I'm not talking about a hypo- 
cal "ladder" of escalation; I'm talk- 
ibout options available to NATO if 
ever are needed. The U.S. strate- 
luclear deterrent — clearly linked to 
Dther two legs of the NATO triad — 
ains the ultimate guarantor of 
"O's collective security. The Soviets 
irstand that risks cannot be safely 
led and that any act of aggression 
nst a U.S. ally could lead, ulti- 
■ily, to strategic retaliation against 
- own homeland. Flexible response 
"ly does not depend on any single 
3on system; what is needed de- 
3 is in part on the nature of the 
II at. 

Thus, when NATO considered all 
1 ijptions for the INF talks, it unam- 
1 ously decided that getting rid of all 
V missiles, U.S. and Soviet, would 
E hv hest outcome. From the stand- 
[ t (if NATO's own security, NATO 
•I hi i-etain a variety of systems that 
D d perform the critical deterrence 
1^(111. So President Reagan proposed 
3 zeni option for INF missiles, and, 
e iuse we and NATO held together 
)that goal, that is what we got. 
Wliat holds NATO together so 
,' ? We and our allies share more than 
immon threat. We share the same 
pose I mentioned before: to secure 
blessings of liberty. NATO is more 
n a military alliance. It is a commu- 
' of common values and political 
iciples that we are all committed to 
tect and to foster. We share the goal 
milding a better life for our own 
pie and of helping create the condi- 
is that foster freedom and economic 
elopment elsewhere in the world as 
:\. 

The fact that we and our allies 
ire more than just a threat in itself 
sters deterrence. A major part of 
• strength of the alliance derives 
m the shared values that it is com- 
:ted to defend. 

Moreover, NATO is vital to our 
orts to conduct a dialogue with the 
viet Union. NATO's twin commit- 
mt is to defense and dialogue; it is an 
iance truism. But true it is. It has 
aped NATO's approach to East- West 
ations for decades. It continues to do 
today. It is precisely because of the 
•engt'h of the NATO alliance that we 



in the West are able to deal produc- 
tively with the Soviet Union. The 
strong bonds between the Atlantic al- 
lies and our democratic partners in the 
Pacific — Japan and Australia, particu- 
larly — gives an even broader base to 
our dual approach of defense and 
dialogue. 

INF has been at the center of the 
NATO agenda since 1979. Many 
thought it would weaken or even crip- 
ple the alliance. In fact, the INF expe- 
rience has strengthened it. As we 
prepare for a NATO summit in a little 
over a month, I see a real dynamism in 
the alliance. There is certainly change 
underway, because Uving things must 
change. But the underlying facts are 
continuity, coherence, and cooperation 
within the alliance. 

A continuing peacetime alliance is 
new not just for the United States but 
also for most of our allies. For cen- 
turies, many of them saw each other as 
enemies rather than friends. But sup- 
port for NATO is as strong as ever in 
all 16 member nations — in some cases, 
even stronger than before the SS-20 
threat arose. 

The INF Dual Track 

Historians may come to see the INF 
experience as one of NATO's finest 
hours. We may never know what deci- 
sionmaking process the Soviet lead- 
ership went through before deciding to 
deploy the SS-20. The Soviets may 
have misunderstood how we and our al- 
lies would act during a period of so- 
called detente. They may have misled 
themselves into beheving that the West 
no longer would do what was necessary 
to maintain a strong deterrent, what- 
ever the provocation. If so, they were 
wrong, just as they were wrong when 
they calculated the political and mili- 
tary costs before they marched into 
Afghanistan. 

From the late 1950s, the Soviet 
Union had deployed intermediate-range 
missiles. These are systems which 
could threaten most or all of NATO Eu- 
rope but not reach the United States. 
The United States had deployed no 
such missiles since the mid-1960s, al- 
though some NATO military officers 
felt such deployments to be necessary 
(and I'm sure that when General 
Rogers appears before you, he will de- 
velop his view on that point). In arms 
control terms, at any rate, these sys- 
tems were not considered "strategic." 
Thus, they were excluded from the 
arms control limits in the SALT 
process. 



In 1977, the Soviet Union began to 
deploy the SS-20. It was a substantial 
improvement over its predecessors. It 
had longer range, greater accuracy, and 
enhanced mobility. Moreover, it had 
three independently targetable war- 
heads, where previous systems had 
only one. Both its range and its deploy- 
ment pattern soon made it a threat, not 
just to Europe but to all the Soviet 
Union's neighbors. By our count, 140 
SS-20s, with 420 warheads, had been 
deployed by the end of 1979. When 
President Reagan and General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty 
in December 1987, the Soviets — accord- 
ing to their own figures — had deployed 
405 SS-20S, with 1,215 warheads. 

NATO political leaders and military 
authorities carefully assessed this new 
threat and consulted extensively on 
how to counter it. They were concerned 
that, if left unmatched, this new Soviet 
capability could lead Moscow into be- 
lieving that it could intimidate the al- 
liance or even cause the Soviet Union 
to miscalculate the risks of aggression. 

To prevent this, in 1979, NATO for- 
eign and defense ministers adopted 
what has come to be called the "dual- 
track" decision. On one track, the 
United States would begin in 1983 to 
deploy 572 single-warhead intermedi- 
ate-range missiles in the United King- 
dom, Italy, Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany (F.R.G), and 
the Netherlands. There would be 464 
ground-launched cruise missiles, which 
would be deployed four to a launcher. 
There would be 108 Pershing II ballistic 
missiles, each on a separate launcher. 
At the same time, on a second track, 
the United States would attempt to ne- 
gotiate hmits on U.S. and Soviet INF 
missiles at the lowest possible level. 

As with so much else about NATO, 
INF policy has been fundamentally bi- 
partisan. A decision taken under the 
previous Administration has been car- 
ried out by the present one. Congres- 
sional support for our efforts on both 
tracks has also been essential. 

Deployment Track 

I'll turn to the deployment track. The 
INF Treaty was signed almost 8 years 
to the day after the 1979 dual-track de- 
cision was taken. Neither the deploy- 
ment track nor the negotiating track 
was easy. But we succeeded because we 
and our allies stayed the course — on 
both tracks. 

This took considerable political 
courage. In Europe, the so-called peace 



|rc 



irch 1988 



33 



ARMS CONTROL 



movement took to the streets to try to 
block U.S. deployments. In the United 
States, the "freeze movement," in ef- 
fect, wanted to reward the Soviets for 
deploying first, by letting them keep 
their advantage and removing any in- 
centive to negotiate reductions. The So- 
viet Union threatened a new ice age in 
East-West relations if U.S. deploy- 
ments went forward. 

In 1983, initial deployments of U.S. 
missiles were scheduled to begin in 
three countries— the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom. The leaders of all three coun- 
tries unambiguously supported follow- 
ing through on both tracks of NATO's 
1979 decision. In each case, they put 
their leadership to the ultimate test, 
the ballot. And in each case, they were 
confirmed in power. Similarly, the peo- 
ple of Belgium and the Netherlands 
have kept in power leaders committed 
to the 1979 decision. All five of these 
allies have gone forward with the com- 
mitments they made to NATO in 1979. 
The result is the treaty you now have 
before you. 

Opponents of our deployments have 
been proven dead wrong. If we had 
heeded the "freeze movement" or the 
"peace movement," we would never 
have gotten this treaty. Instead, the 
Soviets would have kept their SS-20s 
and, worse yet, would have every rea- 
son to believe that they could bully and 
intimidate the alliance. This is not the 
peace movement's treaty. It is NATO's 
treaty. As President Reagan has said, 
"NATO is the real peace movement." 

It is not for me, or any American, 
to speak on behalf of other countries — 
in Europe, Canada, or Asia. Our allies 
can speak for themselves, and they 
have. They all fully support this treaty. 
Ratification of this treaty will vindicate 
our friends, particularly in the INF- 
basing countries, who stood by their 
convictions and their commitment to 
NATO's dual-track decision. They knew 
that, to strengthen the peace and safe- 
guard our freedoms, we must share the 
risks and responsibilities of deterrence. 
When the going got tough, they simply 
got tougher. They deserve our respect. 
The treaty they helped bring about de- 
serves your support. 

Negotiations: Basic Approach 

Turning to the negotiating track, U.S. 
INF deployments were absolutely nec- 
essary to our success in the negotia- 
tions. But they alone could not 
guarantee a good treaty. That took 
firmness, patience, and hard work at 



the negotiating table to make good on 
the courage and staadfastness of our 
allies. 

The President put some of our 
finest public servants in charge of this 
effort in Geneva. From 1981 to 1983, 
Ambassador Paul Nitze led the INF 
delegation, paired there with Ambas- 
sador Ed Rowny, who was then chair- 
ing the START [strategic arms reduc- 
tion talks] delegation. Both are present 
here. From 1985 to 1987, Ambassador 
Mike Glitman was in charge, under the 
overall leadership of Ambassador Max 
Kampelman — both here. They did a 
simply splendid job. 

Looking back over the negotia- 
tions, I think we can divide them into 
three periods. 

• From the opening of talks in 1981 
until the Soviet walkout in 1983, it is 
clear that Moscow was simply not will- 
ing to bargain seriously or in good 
faith. The Soviet goal was to block U.S. 
deployments while retaining their mo- 
nopoly of INF missiles. They proposed 
variations on a freeze, which would 
have left the SS-20s in place and kept 
us at zero. 

• The second phase began when 
the Soviets returned to the talks in 
1985. They accepted the reality of U.S. 
deployments but were still insisting on 
terms for a treaty that we and our al- 
lies could not accept. Sometime in mid- 
or late 1986, they realized this wasn't 
going to work. 

• The third phase began with the 
important progress the President made 
on INF at the Reykjavik summit. The 
Soviets finally agreed on many of the 
essential basic conditions for an equita- 
ble treaty. Wrestling the issues to the 
ground from then on, however, was a 
major effort. But we succeeded, includ- 
ing on the all-important verification 
issues. 

The negotiating process was a very 
tough one. I believe it is quite instruc- 
tive to go over the rhythm of it in brief 
so you can see how we achieved what 
we did. And with your permission, Mr. 
Chairman, I'd like to take the time to 
do it. We knew what we wanted, and 
we held out until we got it. Our hand 
was substantially strengthened by the 
fact that, on INF, we carried out the 
most extensive consultative process in 
the history of the NATO alliance. More- 
over, we consulted closely with our 
friends and allies in Asia and the Pa- 
cific. Soviet efforts to split the alliance, 
or play Europe against Asia, flatly 
failed. 



We estabhshed the following crit 
ria for an INF agreement, which the 
President set forth. 

• There must be equality of righl 
and limits. 

• The negotiations must deal witf J' 
U.S. and Soviet systems only. 

• Limits must be global, with no 
transfer of the threat from Europe tc 
Asia, or vice versa. 

• There must be no adverse effec 
on NATO's conventional defense and 
deterrent capability. 

• An agreement must be effective 
verifiable. 

From the outset our position als>| 
called for constraints on Soviet short 
range missiles, in order to enhance t 
effectiveness of the treaty. 

Throughout the negotiations, th 
United States was willing to considei 
any approach that met these criteria i|it 
But we made clear all along that our Ji 



strong preference, and that of our al 
lies, was the "zero outcome" that Pn 
dent Reagan proposed in November 
1981. We persisted in pushing this pr 
posal, even when many derided it as 
unrealistic. But it was what we and ( 
allies agreed from the beginning woi 
best enhance our security. Our hand 
was significantly strengthened as we 
by overwhelming votes of support fo: 
this proposal by both Houses of Con 
gress in November 1981. And I call 
your attention, Mr. Chairman, to a n 
olution — Congressional Resolution 
224 — which explicitly endorsed the z 
option. It says, "Whereas the Presi- 
dent's willingness to cancel deploy- 
ments of Pershing II and grand, larg 
cruise missiles" — that's our zero — "if 
the Soviet Union dismantles its SS-2 
SS-^ and SS-5 missiles"— that's the : 
viet zero — "it is a dramatic and bold 
step toward real nuclear arms reduc- 
tion." And both the Senate and the 
House voted for that. The Senate vot 
unanimously. And I might say that 
every member of this committee who 
was in office in November 1981 voted 
for that resolution. So the outcome y 
voted for and endorsed in November 
1981 is the outcome that is in this 
treaty. 

Negotiations: 1981-83 

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I'll go 
through the ins and outs of this nego 
tiating process because, as I said, I 
think it is instructive. 

The Soviets initially refused to n 
gotiate, insisting that NATO must fij 



34 



Department of State Bulle 



ARMS CONTROL 



>3unce deployments. NATO rejected 
li The Soviets then proposed a so- 
.1 (1 moratorium. As they defined this 
•1, I hey would have kept their mo- 
i|y (in INF missiles in Europe and 
imucd their buildup in the eastern 
. S.i;. against their Asian neigh- 
NATO rejected this, too. 
Iioiiically, this Soviet approach 
istniined what had been basically a 
; 'I » issue into a broader one, a 
!(al line. The range and mobility of 
i(SS-20 made it a threat to all of the 
a et Union's neighbors, wherever it 
; (Kployed. And Soviet insistence 
1 xcluding their missiles in the 
iiTii U.S.S.R. from treaty limits 
1 reinforced our insistence, and that 
' n- NATO allies, on global limits. As 
1 neucitiations proceeded, our NATO 
.issidns were paralleled by intense 
ultations with our friends and allies 
le i'ar East, whose security was 
at stake. 

The standards I described above — 
: just global limits but also U.S.- 
! et equality, no compensation for 
i d-country systems, no adverse im- 
! , on NATO's conventional strength, 
I effective verification — were all em- 
lied in the original U.S. zero pro- 
I d. They were part of every interim 
I )osal we later advanced. In con- 
t, the Soviets' opening position 
'd all five of these security criteria. 
The Soviets' initial position would 
3 allowed them to keep and expand 
1 r SS-20 force, while prohibiting any 
I. deployments. It would have thus 
;ed in U.S. -Soviet inequality. The 
ity would have included independent 
L. and French forces, placed no lim- 
on Soviet systems in Asia, and all 
eliminated from Europe U.S. air- 
rt which play a vital role in NATO's 
lear and conventional deterrent. It 
no provisions for effective verifica- 
1. That's where they started. 
This basic Soviet approach per- 
ed through the two ensuing years of 
;otiations. So did Soviet SS-20 de- 
yments. For its part, NATO went 
ward with the necessary prepara- 
is on the deployment track. 

In February 1982, the United 
ites tabled a draft treaty embodying 
proposal. The Soviets followed suit 
May. We took the initiative in estab- 
ling working groups to supplement 
' efforts of the principal negotiators, 
sought to work out common lan- 
ige where there was some con- 
■gence in the two draft treaty texts. 
the time, we got nowhere on the 
Jes of substance. But this approach 
uld bear fruit later. 



The formal negotiations were some- 
times supplemented by informal explo- 
rations and suggestions. Ambassador 
Nitze was authorized to probe and ex- 
plore areas of Soviet flexibility. In June 
1982, he initiated a series of private dis- 
cussions with his Soviet counterpart. 
Ambassador Kvitsinskiy, in an effort to 
move the negotiations forward. These 
discussions came to be known as the 
"walk in the woods." 

The two negotiators developed a 
package to present to their respective 
capitals for consideration. The details of 
the package are set forth in a 1983 
NATO document, the "Progress Report 
to Ministers of the Special Consultative 
Group." The package was closely stud- 
ied in Washington when Ambassador 
Nitze brought it back. There was con- 
cern about certain elements of it, in 
particular that the Soviets might treat 
it as a new U.S. offer and try to split 
the difference between it and a less 
forthcoming Soviet position. However, 
Ambassador Nitze was authorized to 
continue conversations in the informal 
channel, in the event Kvitsinskiy was 
prepared to do so. 

When Ambassador Nitze returned 
to Geneva, his Soviet counterpart said 
he had been instructed by Moscow to 
reject both the substance of the pack- 
age and the informal channel itself. The 
Soviet Union continued to insist on all 
the unacceptable conditions I have out- 
lined above and was not prepared to 
destroy a single SS-20 missile. So that 
was the end of that. 

In March 1983, following extensive 
consultations with our NATO allies and 
Japan, the President made a new pro- 
posal. While making clear that the 
"zero outcome" remained our strong 
preference, he called for an interim so- 
lution. The United States would reduce 
its planned INF deployments if the So- 
viet Union reduced its own deployed 
INF missiles to an equal, non-zero level 
on a global basis. In May, the United 
States tabled a draft treaty embodying 
this proposal. We did not specify a level 
of an interim outcome but made clear 
we favored the lowest possible number. 

The Soviets flatly rejected our pro- 
posal. The extent of Soviet flexibility in 
the spring of 1983 was their agreement 
in principle with our position that war- 
heads on deployed missiles could be the 
unit of account. I might say this was an 
important thing for us to pocket since 
we had been arguing, not only in INF 
but in START, that it isn't just the 
launchers; it's the warheads and the 
throw- weight that matter. So this was, 
at least, something. Previously, they 



had sought to treat their triple- 
warhead SS-20 the same as a single- 
warhead system. They still showed no 
willingness to engage us on the details 
of verification. 

In September 1983, the Soviets 
stated they would "liquidate" — their 
word — all missiles that were to be re- 
duced by an agreement. The term was 
vague and never clearly defined. 
Amazingly, this announcement gar- 
nered a lot of publicity at the time. Can 
you believe it? In retrospect it is hard 
to see why. If missiles that were re- 
duced were not destroyed, what does it 
mean to "reduce" them? But it had 
taken almost 2 years of negotiations for 
the Soviets to get this far Contrast 
this with the minutely detailed provi- 
sions that are in the elimination pro- 
tocol of the treaty now before you. 

Later that month, the President 
made a new proposal. The product of 
intense consultations within NATO and 
with Japan, it kept intact the principles 
I have outlined but dealt with three 
areas of stated Soviet concern. 

• Within the context of equal global 
limits, the United States was prepared 
to consider a commitment to deploy 
only part of its overall entitlement in 
Europe. 

• Since the Soviets had left a clear 
public impression that they were partic- 
ularly concerned about the Pershing II, 
the United States was prepared to ap- 
portion reductions between Pershing II 
and cruise missiles appropriately. 

• Finally, the United States was 
prepared to explore equal, verifiable 
limits on specific types — not all, just 
specific types — of longer range U.S. 
and Soviet land-based aircraft consis- 
tent with allied criteria for an INF 
agreement. 

The Soviets refused to discuss all 
three initiatives — or any of them. Nor 
did they accept our procedural sugges- 
tion that the teams in Geneva supple- 
ment their plenary meetings with 
heads-of-delegation sessions or infor- 
mal — we called them — "miniplenaries." 
Both ideas proved very useful, when 
the Soviets finally accepted them in 
1987. But in 1983, the Soviets were not 
interested. 

In October 1983, the Soviet Union 
offered what it portrayed as a new 
package of proposals. The proposals 
may have been new, but the essential 
outcome was the same: no U.S. deploy- 
ments, inclusion of third-country sys- 
tems, no binding limits on Soviet forces 
in Asia, and aircraft limits that in- 
cluded non-U. S. and sea-based planes. 



rch 1988 



35 



ARMS CONTROL 



The United States continued to 
press for progress. In November, we 
proposed a specific global ceiling of 420 
deployed INF missile warheads, which 
took an earlier Soviet number but put 
it in the context of the U.S. proposal. 
That same month, the parliaments of 
Great Britain, Italy, and Germany each 
voted to support continued implementa- 
tion of the dual-track decision. On 
November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked 
out of the talks, citing these votes. 
U.S. deployments began in December, 
in accordance with the schedule NATO 
had agreed on. By our count, the Sovi- 
ets had deployed 360 SS-20s, with 1,080 
warheads, at the time the first U.S. 
missiles were deployed. I make that 
point because sometimes people say our 
deployments were provocative, that we 
were causing the Soviet Union to de- 
ploy. But the evidence is stark. 

I will not dwell on the Soviet 
threats about the dire consequences of 
U.S. deployments or the requirements 
they set for talks to resume. We were 
offered plenty of advice from "peace 
groups" and others who took Soviet 
propagandists at their word when they 
said Moscow would never again deal 
with the Reagan Administration. But 
we and our allies simply proceeded 
with the deployment program that had 
been agreed in 1979. At the same time, 
we made clear that we were ready to 
resume negotiations at any time with- 
out preconditions. We were steadfast, 
and steadfastness paid off 

Negotiations: 1985 to Mid-1986 

The Soviets agreed in January 1985 to 
resume negotiations on INF, as part of 
an overall negotiation on nuclear and 
space arms. The new INF talks began 
in March 1985. 

Just as the President had refused 
to make concessions to get the Soviets 
back to the table, he saw no reason to 
change our positions simply because 
they had returned. The Soviets began 
by proposing new variants of their old 
moratorium ideas. We rejected these on 
the basis of longstanding NATO policy 
that the 1979 deployment track would 
continue on schedule until a binding 
and verifiable agreement was reached. 

Much of the initial time in the new 
negotiations was taken up with Soviet 
propagandizing. They argued that U.S. 
deployments were "illegal" because 
they circumvented SALT II. This was 
completely spurious. But we learned a 
lesson from this reckless argument. We 
were careful to keep language out of 
the INF Treaty that could be twisted 



by the Soviets in the future to make 
similar arguments whenever we and 
our allies act to maintain a strong 
deterrent. 

The Soviets spent even more time 
trying to link INF to the START and 
space/defense negotiations. They sug- 
gested including U.S. INF missiles in 
the context of their START proposal, 
along with U.S. land- and sea-based 
aircraft within range of the Soviet 
Union. Comparable Soviet missiles and 
aircraft would be excluded. The Soviet 
START proposal, of course, was, in 
turn, linked to their demands in the 
defense and space negotiation, in which 
they sought to cripple our Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). 

The question of whether an INF 
agreement should be tied to agree- 
ments in other areas, such as START, 
was one which NATO had already con- 
sidered in detail. NATO decided that 
such linkages were artificial and would 
only delay an agreement that was in 
Weste