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! Official Monthly Record of United States FgrgA^lrofaft/ Volume 89 / Number 2142 



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January 1989 




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Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2142 I January 1989 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 

for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 

SHARON R. HAYNES 
Assistant Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
sary in the transaction of the public busi- 
ness required by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget through 
September 30, 1989. 



Department of State Bulletin (ISSN 
0041-7610) is published monthly (plus ai 
nual index) by the Department of State. 
2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 
20520. Second-class postage paid at Was 
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fices. POSTMASTER: Send address 
changes to Department of State Bulletii 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Go' 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, E 
20402. 



NOTE: Most of the contents of this publi- 
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preciated. Pei-mission to reproduce all 
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online by Magazine Index (Dialog file 17; 

BUS file MAGS), in the Readers' Guide to 
Periodical Literature and the online ver- 
sion of Readers' Guide (WILSONLINE file 
RDG), and in the PAIS (Public Affairs In- 
formation Service, Inc.) Bulletin. Articles 



are abstracted by Readers' Guide Ab- 
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For sale by the Superintendent of DocUj 
meats, U.S. Government Printing office 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



CONTENTS 







m^ 



The Secretary 

1 The Future Agenda in Arms 

Control 
4 Security Awareness, Measures, 

and Management 
6 The Ecology of International 

Change 
10 The I nter- American System: Into 

the Next Century 



Africa 

14 Visit of Mali President (President 

Reagan, Moussa Traore) 

15 Emergency Relief to Sudan (De- 

partment Statement) 

16 South Africa Accepts Angola/ 

Namibia Accords (Department 
Statement) 



Arms Control 

16 Krasnoyarsk Radar Discussions 
(Department Statement) 

16 Conference on Chemical Weapons 
Use (White House Statement) 



East Asia 

17 U.S. Review of Relations With the 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (Department Statement) 

17 Cambodian Independence (Presi- 
dent Reagan) 



Economics 

18 Global Economic Integration 

(John C. Whitehead) 
20 U.S. Stance Toward the Soviet 

Union on Trade and Technology 

(E. Allen Wendt) 

Europe 

23 The European Community's 

Program for a Single Market in 
1992. 

28 NATO Nuclear Planning Group 

Meets in The Hague (Final 
Communique) 

29 Embassy Reconstruction in 

Moscow Proposed (Department 
Announcement) 
29 Czechoslovak Police Detain Dissi- 
dents (Department Statement) 



General 

30 U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of 

Transition (Colin L. Powell) 
33 Building a Flexible Framework 

for New Information Services 

(Parker W. Borg) 
35 Berne Convention Implementation 

Act of 1988 (President Reagan) 



Human Rights 

36 Good News: Our Human Rights 
Policy (George Lister) 

38 Genocide Convention Implementa- 
tion Act of 1987 (President 
Reagan, White House Fact 
Sheet) 



Terrorism 

39 U.S.-Canadian No-Takeoff Decla- 

ration (Department Statement) 

United Nations 

40 UN Calls for Full Implementation 

of Afghanistan Peace Accords 
(Vernon A. Walters, Text of 
Resolution) 

41 An Overview of U.S. Arms Con- 

trol Objectives (William F. 
Burns) 

Western Hemisphere 

44 El Salvador: The Battle for 

Democracy 

45 Aid to Nicaraguan Democratic 

Resistance (White House State- 
ment) 

47 U.S. Restricts Entry of Nic- 

araguan Officials, Employees 
(Proclamation) 

48 U.S. Import Duties Increase for 

Certain Brazilian Products 
(Proclamation) 

Treaties 

49 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

51 Department of State 

51 USUN 

Publications 

52 Department of State 

53 Foreign Relations Volume 

Released 



Index 



IE SECRETARY 



ie Future Agenda in Arms Control 



Secretary Shultz's address before 
imerican and European Nuclear 
ities and the Nuclear Energy 
m on October 31, 1988A 

a paradox of history that great 
)ds of ferment and unrest often 
e creativity in the arts and sci- 
s. Insecurity can impel us to probe 
imits of knowledge and sometimes 
! beyond them. 

Forty-six years ago, in the midst 
e horror and destruction of world 
Enrico Fermi and his colleagues 
ed the limits of mankind's knowl- 

beyond anything then imaginable. 

bitter cold day in December 1942, 
squash court under Stagg Field at 
Jniversity of Chicago, mankind 
;ved the first controlled nuclear re- 
n. It ushered in the atomic and 

|";ar era, and it defined the course of 
•national politics and security in the 
math of the World War. 
i These meetings of the American 
■ European Nuclear Societies and 
Nuclear Energy Forum commemo- 
I the 50th anniversary of the discov- 
] )f nuclear fission. You are here 
irobe issues related to energy. You 
iiere because mankind continues to 
1 tie with fundamental questions 
I ing to security in the nuclear 
|j -among them, proliferation and 
K control. 

Sllenges of 
(Nuclear Era 

I the United States, the nuclear era 
I presented enormous challenges. In 
I mmediate aftermath of Fermi's 
in reaction, the desperate struggle 
Jim back totalitarian aggression in 
tape and Asia guided our policy on 
(development and use of nuclear en- 
I'. The policy choices and challenges 
Ing this period were clear, and our 
(ibility of pursuing them was un- 
llenged: The United States was the 
I nuclear power. 

After World War II, this situation 
l|iged. The Soviet Union became a 
liear power and strove for strategic 
ty. In time, the United States and 
Soviet Union entered into a pro- 
ved period of global competition, in 
ch nuclear weapons provided nei- 
r side with an advantage. Against 
backdrop of nuclear arsenals capa- 
of vast destruction, the Soviets 



sought military preponderance as a 
means of ensuring political domination. 
This placed special demands on the 
United States — how to deal with a situ- 
ation that was fraught with dangers 
and ambiguities. 

In dealing with these challenges of 
the postwar period, the United States 
has enjoyed the advantages of democ- 
racy, cooperative relations with allies, 
and strength. We are a free and demo- 
cratic society, founded on principles of 
liberty and openness. Our creative en- 
ergies are not spent on internal repres- 
sion or state-dominated enterprise. We 
are able to engage with the world as 
free people, interested in seeing that 
others enjoy, too, freedom and liberty. 

We are a society anxious to expand 
the circle of like-minded people. As 
more and more people turn to open 
economies, democracy, and freer so- 
cieties, they join together in more 
multilateral associations. Such regional 
and functional groupings have taken on 
increasing importance, for they have 
provided new avenues of approach in 
dealing with issues of global security. 

And we are a society committed 
to strength— strength through our own 
political, economic, and military power 
and strength through alliances with the 
world's great democracies; and, I might 
say, the strength that comes from being 
convinced that our way, our ideals, are 
the right ideals. It's very important 
for us, in this competition, to be secure 
in the belief that we are on the right 
track. And in this day when the Rea- 
gan Administration is coming to an end 
and people are looking at what it is 
that Ronald Reagan brought to this 
country, my own opinion is that the 
most profound contribution was to re- 
store our self-confidence and our sense 
of self-esteem that the things we stand 
for are the right things. So, certainly, 
these sources of strength are impor- 
tant, and our military and political 
strength — and that of our allies — has 
expanded exponentially as it has devel- 
oped into a shared defense burden. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation 

These values and strengths impelled us 
initially to seek to maximize control 
over the spread of nuclear weapons. 
This meant nuclear nonproliferation. 

Twenty-five years ago, experts as- 
sumed that the spread of nuclear weap- 
ons was inexorable. They predicted that 



between 15 and 25 countries would have 
nuclear weapons by the late 1980s. 
Well, they were wrong. Despite difficul- 
ties, the effort to prevent nuclear pro- 
liferation has succeeded. 

The earlier prophets of gloom did 
not foresee the determined efforts that 
would be undertaken by the interna- 
tional community to deter the spread of 
those deadly weapons. They did not an- 
ticipate the ability of countries like the 
United States and others to control this 
threat to world peace through a web of 
institutional arrangements, legal com- 
mitments, technological safeguards, and 
alternative means for addressing se- 
curity concerns. They did not under- 
stand that the will of people throughout 
the world seems to be imbedded in the 
Nonproliferation Treaty. All of this has 
instilled confidence in the nonprolifera- 
tion effort, and this has paid off in an 
increasing number of adherents to the 
treaty. 

In promoting nonproliferation 
efforts, we have been mindful of the 
underlying reality that basic nuclear 
knowledge cannot be kept secret. Nu- 
clear fission itself was discovered by 
German scientists, who sought to ex- 
plain the results of pioneering experi- 
ments by Italian scientists using the 
neutron, itself discovered by British 
scientists. The futility of total secrecy 
was recognized by President Eisen- 
hower in 1953 when he proposed a 
program of international nuclear 
cooperation. And it was the fundamen- 
tal principle behind the creation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the nuclear Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty — namely, that peaceful nu- 
clear development could be secured by 
agreement not to engage in develop- 
ment of nuclear weapons. 

Nonproliferation is consistent with 
a policy of nuclear cooperation. The key 
element for security is prudent re- 
straint on the dissemination of nuclear 
know-how and equipment. For this rea- 
son, we continue to withhold nuclear 
assistance from nations whose inten- 
tions are suspect or unclear. We con- 
tinue to press for universal adherence 
to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We con- 
tinue to work on strengthening the 
IAEA safeguards system to meet the 
challenges of increasing technological 
sophistication and expanding nuclear 
commerce. This is the nonproliferation 
challenge, and it must be met. 



3artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



Don't misunderstand me. We have 
plenty of problems, and we struggle 
everyday with these. But the main 
point is that, compared with predictions 
of 15 or 20 years ago, it hasn't turned 
out that way. It's much better. It's 
much better because the effort has 
been made. The effort has been made 
and succeeds because people support it, 
and they support it because they know 
it's the right thing to do. 

Arms Control and the 
U.S. -Soviet Agenda 

Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons 
and weapons technology is not enough. 
The Reagan Administration has worked 
hard and successfully on arms reduc- 
tion agreements. 

Creative and sustained diplomatic 
engagement has led to fair and mutu- 
ally beneficial agreements to provide 
for greater international security. The 
combination of strength and diplomacy 
has guided our approach to U.S. -Soviet 
relations. 

But arms control and arms reduc- 
tion have not monopolized our atten- 
tion. Under President Reagan, the 
United States has engaged with the So- 
viet Union with unprecedented vigor 
and effectiveness on all aspects of our 
agenda — human rights, bilateral rela- 
tions, arms control, and regional con- 
flicts. The environment in which we 
pursue these issues has changed 
fundamentally. 

• Respect for human rights has 
now become an integral part of the 
agenda. I remember when I first 
started in and I would bring up these 
subjects. Nyetl Couldn't be on the table 
for discussion. Now it's built right in. 

• America's military might has 
been restored and invigorated. 

• Alliance unity has been renewed 
and strengthened. 

• Efforts to resolve regional con- 
flicts have moved forward, as in 
Afghanistan, and maybe Angola, and 
elsewhere. 

• Arms control agreements have 
resulted from patient and successful 
negotiations. 

In this environment, enhanced 
efforts in the areas of arms control and 
nuclear security have paid off. A work- 
able process of negotiations, implemen- 
tation, and verification resulted in 
agreements carefully negotiated and 
founded on principles adhered to 
faithfully. The starting point is the con- 
cept posed by President Reagan, and 



agreed to by Soviet leader Gorbachev, 
at their first meeting in Geneva: "A 
nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought." 

I remember — I think it was in 
1983 — I was invited to give the com- 
mencement address at Stanford. I had 
come from a NATO meeting and talked 
about that mainly, but I got off that 
phrase. The graduating class, and 
everybody, exploded in applause. It 
went on for about a minute, which was 
a long time for applause. After every- 
body died down, I said, "That's a quote 
from Ronald Reagan." 

We negotiated the historic interme- 
diate-range nuclear forces (INF) agree- 
ment — the first agreement to require 
reductions in nuclear arsenals rather 
than simply slowing down increases in 
nuclear capability. It was preceded by 
tough decisions by the United States 
and our allies to deploy Pershing II and 
ground-launched cruise missiles in 
Western Europe in order to protect our 
security and to induce a serious Soviet 
response in the negotiations. 

The INF Treaty eliminates an en- 
tire class of nuclear arms. It demon- 
strates that arms control can do more 
than simply codify existing deployment 
plans. This agreement reduces and re- 
shapes nuclear arsenals; it promotes a 
safer and more stable world. The treaty 
has rigorous provisions on inspection, 
monitoring, and data exchange; these 
will result in effective verification, and 
they set valuable precedents for future 
agreements. These provisions will pro- 
duce openness and cooperative contacts 
on sensitive military matters that, over 
time, will profoundly affect how we and 
the Soviets perceive one another. 

In START — the strategic arms re- 
duction talks — we are pursuing this 
course of reducing nuclear arms. We 
are far down the road toward complet- 
ing a treaty calling for 50% reductions 
in strategic offensive arms. Some key 
issues remain unresolved. But the out- 
lines of the agreement and many of its 
details are already in place, providing a 
sound basis for completing the treaty 
early in the next Administration. 

START will contribute to the policy 
of deterrence. Until an alternative sys- 
tem of security becomes feasible, we 
must continue to rely on nuclear deter- 
rence. For the foreseeable future, our 
goal must be to strengthen nuclear de- 
terrence and make it work at lower, 
safer force levels. That is the goal 
of START. 



START allows us to retain div< 
survivable retaliatory forces. Whik r 
START requires substantial reduct i 
in U.S. and Soviet forces, including 
50% reduction of their heavy ICB& 
[intercontinental ballistic missiles], 
programs to enhance the survivabi 
and effectiveness of our ICBMs, su 
marine-launched ballistic missiles, . 
bombers can go forward. With the 
combination of START limits on thi|| 
threat and our own modernization ] 
gram, we will be in a stronger posi 
to ensure the continued survivabilrl. 
our deterrent than we would be wijl 
out an agreement. 

The objective of START is stall 
ing reductions — reductions structm 
so as to decrease incentives to laur 
an attack. The draft treaty being 
worked out in Geneva will do just 
The sooner it is completed, the bet 
off we will all be. 

Now, let me comment on the f 
agenda in arms control. 

The Future Agenda 
in Arms Control 

So, continued efforts on nonprolife 
tion and intensified negotiations oi 
arms control and arms reductions < 
help meet the challenges of the nu 
age. But, even as we achieve great 
strategic stability at lower levels 01 
fensive nuclear arms, and just as I 
begin to see real progress on nucle 
nonproliferation, new dangers app* 
Sophisticated missile technology a; 
ballistic missiles are proliferating. 
Chemical weapons are being used 
a growing number of states. 

The availability of sophisticate 
weapons presents serious problems 
But two dangers stand out. 

First, the increasing availabili i 
on the world arms market of relati 
long-range, surface-to-surface balli 
missiles. In the gulf war, both bell 
erents used Soviet SCUD missiles. 
Saudi Arabia is acquiring Chinese 
CSS-2 missiles with a range excee' 
1,500 miles. Other countries in the 
die East and elsewhere are acquiri 
ballistic missiles. The superpowers 
might consider some of these missi 
"obsolete," but not the consumers. 
Soon, many countries will be able 1 
build their own missiles — maybe, u 
we are able to stop them. Weaponr 
of enormous destructive potential i; 
reaching the hands of parties with 
regard for traditional inhibiting 
controls. 



Department of State Bulletin January 



THE SECRETARY 



econd, there is the renewal of 
ical warfare, surely the most de- 
ble and abhorrent development of 
ay. Nations are now confronted by 
ions of the oldest and most widely 
•ved arms control agreement — the 
Geneva protocol that prohibits poi- 
is gas and chemical warfare. The 
ge is spreading. The protocol is 
repeatedly violated. We stand up 
riticize these violations, but some- 
; we have been almost alone in do- 

D. 

The most frightening nightmare 
i be the eventual combination of 
ical warheads on ballistic missiles 
j hands of states with little regard 
ternational opposition to their 
For this reason, the United States 
aken the lead to curb the prolifera- 
>f both technologies, 
n bilateral talks with the Soviets 
n the UN Committee on Disarma- 
, there have been negotiations on a 
rehensive chemical warfare ban. 

negotiations are based on a U.S. 
V convention tabled by Vice Presi- 
nBush in 1984. We also want to 
Ionize and strengthen chemical ex- 
Icontrols. And, on September 26, 
Bdent Reagan called for a confer- 
B of the parties to the 1925 Geneva 
I col and other concerned states to 
igthen norms against the use of 
M abhorrent weapons. This confer- 
B will be held in Paris in early 
1 try. 

I The United States and key Western 
Biers developed the Missile Tech- 
ly Control Regime to control the 
tj.d of ballistic missiles. Now, we are 
lig with the Soviets and Chinese in 
■fort to deal with this growing 

i -I'. 

•I )ur agenda also includes a broad 
le of other activities, all aimed at 
B-ring conflict. 

I I Thirty-five members of the Stock- 
I conference devised advance notifi- 
|n and observation measures — first 
lonsite inspection — for certain mili- 
I activities in Europe. 

|» The Soviet Union and we estab- 
Id Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
I r capitals to reduce the risk of war 
ligh accident or miscalculation. We 
laded the "Hot Line" and agreed to 
lotify all launches of ballistic 

pll(?S. 

I* Two new negotiations on conven- 
ed arms will begin soon. One will 
Kre additional confidence- and 
Irity-building measures for Europe. 



The other will seek to eliminate de- 
stabilizing conventional force asymme- 
tries in Europe. 

• Headway has been made on an 
agreement in the area of defense and 
space. 

• We and the Soviets have agreed 
to a practical, step-by-step program to 
limit nuclear testing in parallel with 
progress in reducing nuclear arms. The 
first step is to strengthen the verifica- 
tion arrangements of the Threshold 
Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explo- 
sions Treaties so that those agreements 
can be ratified. 

Controlling Arms: 
Ingredients for Success 

Our efforts in nonproliferation, arms 
control, and arms reduction have 
helped us confront the challenges of the 
past and those of today. This experi- 
ence points to seven ingredients for 
success in confronting the challenge of 
arms control in the period ahead. 

First, we must continue to depend 
primarily on our own defense pro- 
grams. Arms control efforts can com- 
plement those programs and contribute 
importantly to our security. But it can- 
not take their place, so pay attention to 
the defense budget. 

Second, success through nego- 
tiations for our security depends on 
readiness to ensure our security by 
ourselves. Active U.S. defense pro- 
grams give the Soviets incentive to ne- 
gotiate flexibly. You can't sell it if you 
give it away. 

Third, for the effort to control 
arms to be effective, progress must be 
pursued on every aspect of our foreign 
policy agenda. Our policy cannot be 
sustained politically against a back- 
ground of Soviet human rights abuses 
and regional adventurism. As agree- 
ments between the superpowers on 
force levels and structures are negoti- 
ated, the two sides must find areas of 
common trust and sensibility on human 
rights, regional conflicts, and other bi- 
lateral problems. 

Fourth, negotiating leverage de- 
rives, in large part, from support by 
our allies, the Congress, and the Amer- 
ican public. The INF Treaty is a trib- 
ute to, and a product of, alliance 
unity — the determination of the basing 
countries to go forward with deploy- 
ments, the cohesion of NATO at every 
step of the negotiations, and the soli- 
darity of our allies and friends in Asia 



who contributed so substantially to the 
global-zero outcome. Support from the 
U.S. Congress and public is no less es- 
sential. The need to protect the confi- 
dentiality of sensitive negotiating 
details must be balanced against the 
need to share information with the 
Congress and the public. 

Fifth, the proper balance must be 
struck between deliberateness and de- 
cisiveness. Care, patience, and firmness 
are essential in formulating negotiating 
objectives and persisting at the table 
until they are achieved. But there also 
must be the courage necessary for 
closure. In many respects, it's easier to 
argue than it is to agree and to say I 
will agree to this and I will sell it, I 
will stand up for it. So we have to have 
the courage for closure while pushing 
to get the details right. It's not easy. 
But strong and decisive leadership is 
required to close a deal, as President 
Reagan provided in INF. 

Sixth, we must think realistically 
about verification. The Soviet record of 
noncompliance with previous arms con- 
trol agreements calls for the highest 
standards of verifiability. But not all in- 
trusive verification measures are ac- 
ceptable to the United States or the 
Soviet Union; on our side, certain facili- 
ties simply cannot be exposed to Soviet 
inspection. So, realistically, no arms 
control agreement will be perfectly ver- 
ifiable. The key question is whether 
particular trade-offs are justified and 
whether the resulting verification re- 
gime, taken overall, will protect U.S. 
security by ensuring timely detection of 
any militarily significant violations. The 
new Soviet openness to inspection is 
most welcome, but the heart of our ver- 
ification capability continues to be our 
national technical means, which must 
be modernized and expanded. 

Finally, we need to establish pri- 
orities. NATO's ministers agreed in 
June 1987 that the leading arms control 
tasks for the period ahead were con- 
cluding a START agreement, achieving 
a more stable balance of conventional 
forces, and negotiating an effectively 
verifiable global ban on chemical weap- 
ons. Those priorities are sound. In ad- 
dition, we must continue to strengthen 
our efforts against the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other destabilizing 
weapons technologies. 



Hartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



The Challenges Ahead 

The pace and scope of change now are 
great. So, too, is the potential for sci- 
entific and technological change. Forty- 
five years ago, the United States met 
the challenge of fascism and aggression 
with a commitment to science that 
ushered in a new world of creativity 
and discovery. In the ensuing decades, 
we have met the challenge of the nu- 
clear age through commitment to our 
own deterrent capability, but also to 
nonproliferation, arms control, and 
arms reduction. The period ahead will 
be no less challenging. 

American leadership, broad inter- 
national cooperation, and global com- 
mitment to enforceable agreements — 
these are the ways to meet the chal- 
lenges that lie ahead. Let us work and 
hope that: 

• As science and technology make 
the world smaller, it will become too 
small for conflict with increasingly 
dangerous weapons; 

• As ideas about freedom and lib- 
erty spread, the world will become in- 
tolerant of ideological rigidity or self- 
centered ambition; and 

• As the internationalization of the 
global marketplace tears down trade 
and commercial barriers, the world will 
cooperate more fully in international 
politics and collective security. 

Our enduring spirit of pragmatism 
will guide us well during this period of 
fundamental change. We achieved re- 
markable success in transforming the 
legacy of Fermi into the international 
system of checks and balances that ex- 
ists today. That same commitment — to 
strength, to realism, to diplomacy, to 
deterrence and international coopera- 
tion — must propel us forward to meet 
the challenges of tomorrow. 



'Press release 230 of Nov. 2, 1988. 



Security Awareness, Measures, 
and Management 



Secretary Skultz's address before 
the Overseas Security Advisory Council 
on November 2, 1988. 1 

I remember very well the first of the 
meetings we had, when this council was 
formed around 3 years ago. If my mem- 
ory is right, we had around 75 or 80 or 
so of the founding members come and 
have our first discussion about an inter- 
action between the efforts we're mak- 
ing in the government and in the State 
Department and the needs and prob- 
lems and contributions that people 
working overseas — corporate citizens 
working overseas — can make and help 
that we can give. So, this pattern of 
interaction started. I suppose it's a 
measure of the fact that the problems 
are real and that the pattern of cooper- 
ation is worthwhile — that we have seen 
this activity grow and prosper. 

Let me just step back and review 
the efforts that we have made, and the 
strategy we have followed in coming to 
grips with the problems of terrorism. 

Realizing Terrorism Problems 

Certainly, it greeted me when I first 
became Secretary of State, because I 
had hardly been here when our Em- 
bassy in Beirut was blown up by a car 
bomb. If I hadn't realized that ter- 
rorism was a problem for us, I knew it 
right away, and we started working on 
this subject. 

We had the benefit of a very strong 
report from a dedicated group of peo- 
ple, chaired by Bobby Inman, who gave 
us a lot of ideas on what to do. I think 
the basic strategy we could see goes 
something like this: First of all, we 
have to be aware, as people in a coun- 
try and as people who are determined 
to be engaged and must be engaged 
overseas, we have to be aware of the 
fact that there is a security threat. 

It's always, I think, necessary, if 
you're going to solve a problem, for 
people first to see that they've got one. 
If you start talking about solutions be- 
fore people have taken it on board that 
there is a problem, they don't pay any 






attention to the solutions. So, first 
all, we have wanted to make it clea 
that there is a problem and what tl 
nature of the problem is, what its d 
mensions are. 

Then we have said to ourselves 
we're going to contend w T ith this pr 
lem adequately, we have to have go 
intelligence about it, good informa- 
tion — intelligence that we can gath< 
a government, things that you are ; 
to as you work overseas that come 
a central pool, you might say, in wl 
we can share with you, intelligence 
operation with other governments. 
We've worked very hard to develop 
own intelligence and a network of i 
ligence about the terrorists. We ha 
been really pretty successful. The I 
rorists would be surprised to know 
much we know about them by this t 

Taking Defensive Measures 

Understanding the problem and ha 
information about it then puts you 
position where you have to be read 
do something about it. I think ther 
two basic things that we need to d< 
One is, of course, to take defensive 
measures, to figure out things that 
can do that tend to make us hardei 
get at. There are all sorts of thing; 
have come about and, I think, to a 
tain extent, been created by this e 
It's always interesting to me t< 
read that in some installation we h< 
somewhere, there was an explosior 
instead of the glass flying all over 
place and cutting people up or may 
killing people — because we've learr 
something about what to do with 
glass — it didn't shatter, and innum 
ble other examples of things that a 
being clone under the very good wc 
Bob Lamb [Assistant Secretary foi 
Diplomatic Security Robert E. Lar 
and his group to make our facilitie: 
more secure. We see them right ar | 
this building. It's a little harder t 
in. 



THE SECRETARY 



)n the other hand, it's also a much 
I secure building. I might say that 
pen done — some of the exterior 
Is — I think with very good taste, 
It looks fine. 

in making ourselves secure in our 
lies as much as we can, among 
1 things, within the constraints of 
.ludget, we don't want to present a 
ire of the United States and its fa- 
Is as being sort of enclosed and 
liding. We want to maintain our 
le in the world where we go places 
Ive want to be part of the commu- 
■We want to mix. We want to have 
le come in and try to understand 
Imd we want to understand them. 
Is our way. That's the American 
l)f doing things. 

■But at the same time, I don't think 
I at all incompatible with having 
l;ies that are secure. I liken it to 
larly days of our efforts around air- 
1 . Some of you may have heard me 
Jjefore that I was the Budget Direc- 
H'hen we first started in on that 
(j'am, and we were going to have to 
i 1 these things all over our country, 
Sof all. Of course, as the Budget 
l:tor, my first instinct was always 
ly, "No, we can't spend that money. 
1/ou sure? Why?" and so forth. So 
1 ork at that, but we spent the 
a) *y, and we put these facilities out 

id at the airports. 

[ remember, at first, people used 
mplain. "Why do I have to stand in 

1 ;o wait to go through this thing to 

il o the airplane?" But by now people 
« hat it works and that it's impor- 
r I believe most of you now, if you 
R i an airport and you see there's no 
> rity, it makes you uneasy. 

i aging Security Problems 

fcnk, by the same token, we want to 
i age our security problems in such a 
J that it's more inviting than ever, in 
■ iense that people say we've taken 
aible steps to see that the facilities 
I come into are secure facilities. By 
name token, part of our job is to 

e the American community over- 
and to work with you. And this 
of representative group enables us 

o that together, and to extend our 



ideas and hear yours and share infor- 
mation so that the Americans overseas 
and the American facilities overseas — 
not just the U.S. Government ones — 
can be done as well as they possibly can 
be. 

We've also worked on all sorts of 
security awareness measures. You, I 
think, probably will see or have seen 
the exhibit that is here, and this has 
become something that we're doing an- 
nually. I might say this came about, at 
least a little bit in part, out of thinking 
about safety in American industry. 

It's a good story. At least, my ob- 
servation always was that you could 
take two offices or plants or construc- 
tion jobs, or whatever, doing more or 
less the same thing with the same 
equipment, and so on, and you often 
would see very different safety records 
in the two places. The answer to why 
was always the same: Management and 
awareness and the getting of people to 
see that there is a problem and that 
they can do something about it by pay- 
ing a little attention to their behavior. 

I think I asked you all to be in 
touch with Du Pont, which I remember 
has an outstanding safety record and an 
outstanding approach to it that I hap- 
pen to know a little bit about. I think it 
helped us quite a lot in looking at their 
program and designing one here. So 
there's a little bit of interaction. 

At any rate, awareness, intel- 
ligence, and doing things that are tak- 
ing proper precautions to make 
ourselves and our facilities as secure as 
possible are important elements in this 
picture. 

I think there is also an importance 
to letting the terrorists know that if we 
can, we're going to make them pay a 
price. It's not free. [Libyan Col. Muam- 
mer] Qadhafi found that out when the 
President decided to let him know we 
were here. In all sorts of other ways, 
through our intelligence, we have man- 
aged to let them know that. 

I have lost track of the number of 
terrorist acts that didn't happen be- 
cause of our intelligence and because of 
our interdiction. And then also, of 
course, there is the rule of law. 

We have seen the rule of law ap- 
plied to this problem with increasing 
effectiveness, and we see people who 



are sentenced to life imprisonment, 
sentenced to death, caught, ap- 
prehended, brought to justice, in- 
creasingly. The more one country does 
it, the more other countries take heart. 
We need to support all of these ele- 
ments that go with the rule of law. 

Extradition treaties are a big part 
of it, and letting people see they will be 
extradited to the place where they com- 
mitted a crime. We have to stand by 
these things. We had, of course, a tre- 
mendous amount of scrutiny and debate 
about extradition treaties here, particu- 
larly one with the United Kingdom re- 
cently, but it got clone and it's a good 
thing to have it done. It sends a mes- 
sage to the terrorists: There's no place 
to hide. 

The activity that we've been en- 
gaged in together is an important one. 
Unfortunately, the problem continues, 
but we have to continue a very strong 
effort against it. You can be sure that 
your government will continue a pro- 
gram of making people aware of the 
problem and that they can do some- 
thing about it: of pushing our intel- 
ligence capabilities as rapidly as we 
can; of learning as much as we can 
about how to protect ourselves ade- 
quately and snaring that kind of infor- 
mation, and listening to your ideas; and 
being willing to take the offense against 
terrorists through the various means 
that I've described. 

Conclusion 

Let me just say, in conclusion, again, 
that I'm glad to see this organization 
growing. I am very appreciative of your 
participation. It's a good example of the 
private sector and the public sector co- 
operating on a problem that we have in 
common — sharing ideas, improving the 
situation on all sides. 

I thank you very much for your 
participation here and throughout the 
year because while this may be Se- 
curity Awareness Day, we have to get it 
across that every day is Security 
Awareness Day. 



'Press release 232 of Nov. 3, 1988. 



•artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



The Ecology of International Change 






Secretary Shultz's address before 
the Commonwealth Club of California 
in San Francisco on October 28, 1988. l 

Next week we Americans will carry on, 
once again, one of history's most re- 
markable developments: our nation's 
electoral rite of self-renewal. It hap- 
pens every 4 years, rain or shine. 

Every presidential campaign sea- 
son leads each of us, whatever our pol- 
itics, to reflect on our society and our 
nation's role in the world. This election 
year, more than almost any in recent 
recollection, requires our most serious 
attention. Why? Because we have come 
to a turning point in world affairs. 
Enormous changes are underway. As 
Shakespeare said: 

There is a tide in the affairs of men, 
which, taken at the flood, leads on to for- 
tune; ... on such a sea we are now afloat, 
and we must take the current when it 
serves, or lose our ventures. 

We have reached this moment in 
history not because of fate or forces 
beyond our control but because our own 
drive and creativity and commitment to 
freedom and openness brought us here 
and brought us success. Just look at 
what has been achieved. 

• The shadow of a third world war 
has faded; for the first time ever, nu- 
clear weapons have been reduced. 

• The once-small handful of embat- 
tled democracies find themselves grow- 
ing in strength and number and viewed 
around the world as the wave of the 
future. 

• The tide of Marxism — and with 
it, communism as the model for devel- 
opment — is a tide that is going out. 

• National economies — once 
thought destined to be buffeted by 
chance, disaster, and bitter rivalry — 
are finding new ways to cooperate and 
prosper in openness. 

And, most significantly for the 
future, we have entered a new era of 
revolutionary change. 

• Knowledge, and its rapid trans- 
mission as information, has become the 
key to progress; and 



• A global process of economic inte- 
gration is underway, with little regard 
for national borders and beyond the 
capacity of governments to control in 
familiar ways. 

All these changes are in our inter- 
est — for Americans, as De Tocqueville 
noted 150 years ago, are eager for 
change and confident in their ability 
to master the future. 

It is American political, scientific, 
technological, and commercial creativity 
and dynamism that has brought us to 
this point. This is our kind of world, 
and it presents our kind of challenge. 
It is a picture of stunning success. But 
with it have come enormous complex- 
ities, uncertainties, and difficulties. 

About a year ago, at the World 
Affairs Council of Washington, I ad- 
dressed the scientific and technological 
dimensions of the problems we now 
face [Department of State Bulletin, Jan- 
uary 1988, pp. 3-7]. Six months ago, at 
an annual MIT [Massachusetts In- 
stitute of Technology] meeting, I spoke 
about the need to maintain American 
leadership in the new global economy 
[Department of State Bulletin, June 
1988, pp. 18-22]. Needless to say, these 
are "must reading" for all serious and 
responsible Americans. I just happen 
to have brought copies with me, which 
you can pick up at the back of the room 
today. We have called these speeches 
"Global Trends I," and "Global Trends 
II." You are now about to get "Global 
Trends III." 

New Political Complexities 

So this is the third and final install- 
ment. It deals with the new political 
coynplexities we face as a result of our 
recent years of accomplishment. 

I call this "the ecology of interna- 
tional change." The relatively recent 
concept of ecology teaches us that our 
natural environment is interrelated. 
Beneficial activity in one location can 
create unexpected problems in another. 
We increased dependence on coal and 
oil when people grew concerned about 
nuclear energy, but now we know that 
fossil fuels are producing the gases that 
lead to global warming problems. 



We are beginning to realize tha 
do not live in a world of totally disti 
phenomena. It is not a world of yes 
no, up or down, this or that. In the 
past, Americans tended to believe t 
war and peace were two different si 
tions: We were either in a happy st;I 
of tranquility, or we were embarked 
on a crusade for all-out victory, afte 
which we hoped to retire into inwar 
looking innocence, spurning "power 
politics" and all that represents. 

In this decade, I believe Amerii 
have come to recognize that we are 
likely to face either an era of total ' 
or of total peace. Nor does the futu 
hold either an era of perpetual eco- 
nomic success or a destiny of econo 
decline. We face, instead, a spectru 
often ambiguous challenges, of unce 
tain possibilities, of fresh developm. 
that overflow traditional lines of 
control. 

I see three areas where new po 
cal developments will outstrip old a 
proaches unless we identify what is 
happening and deal more flexibly w 
the difficulties involved. They are: 

• The Soviet-American rela- 
tionship: It will not, in the future, 1 
the same kind of rivalry that has ta 
center stage in world affairs for the 
past 40-plus years. 

• The politics of preventing wa 
The old diplomacy is not going to b 
sufficient to meet the novel threats 
world security that have already be 
to emerge. 

• And the nature of nations, th 
peoples, and their associations is ch 
ing the international environment ii 
ways not felt since the birth of the 
nation-state at the end of the Middl 
Ages. 

U.S.-Soviet Relations 

First, U.S.-Soviet relations: The vaj 
different histories, cultures, econon^ 
governmental systems, force struc- 
tures, geographical circumstances, 
visions of the future held by the tw 
superpowers have transfixed intern 
tional politics since World War II. I 



Department of State Bulletin/January 



THE SECRETARY 



been not only a rivalry between 
ts but a contest between different 
fels for progress for governments 
iywhere. Our achievement has been 
Kduct of open debate, deliberations, 
Political competition guided by con- 
Itional processes; theirs, the dictate 
■massive central authority marked 
fepression and hostility to free 
lical, intellectual, or religious ex- 
kion. A nation whose system is the 
|;y of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin bears 
It resemblance to one that draws 
Iration from Washington, Jefferson, 
((Lincoln. 

[Under President Reagan's lead- 
lip in this decade, we engaged our 
let adversary with unprecedented 
Ir and effectiveness. 

h* We put human rights at the top 
lir agenda. We left them in no doubt 
I they could never be accepted as a 
lonsible nation among nations for so 
n as they abuse their own people's 
Is for justice. 

• We restored America's military 
lit; we reinvigorated the morale of 
jirmed forces. We demonstrated the 
jto put power behind our diplomatic 
|:h for real solutions. 

|w We took the accepted notion that 
wintry once communist can never 
Ji be free" and stood it on its head, 
el dom fighters everywhere took 

! t. 

I«» And we showed ourselves ready, 
i no illusions and no concessions to 
■i:iple, to reach solid, negotiated 
r ements on the range of problems 
1 strategic arms reductions to con- 
4 ' services. 

i Whatever the assessments of ex- 
s 3 may be about what is now bap- 
s' ng inside the Soviet Union, there 
i ;ome undeniable realities. 

• Marxism is discredited as a model 
'Jlvorld development. 

«• Soviet troublemaking in regional 
tliicts has been reduced and even re- 
led, as in the current departure of 
u Soviet Army from Afghanistan. 



• An arms control treaty has been 
signed with the Soviets, and our Senate 
gave its "advice and consent" to ratify 
it. And we have made real progress, as 
of this date, in the highly complex task 
of concluding an even farther-reaching 
agreement — START [strategic arms re- 
duction talks] — that will serve our na- 
tion's security interests significantly. 

• And major developments undeni- 
ably are taking place inside the Soviet 
Union. 

How far those changes go, and 
what they will mean to the Soviet peo- 
ple remains to be seen. But real change 
can only come when an individual or a 
government faces up to the reality that: 
(a) it has a problem, and (b) it must 
change its ways of thought and action. 
So listen to what the Soviets them- 
selves are saying. 

On Human Rights: 

The image of a state is its attitude toward 
its own citizens, the respect for their 
rights and freedoms and recognition of the 
sovereignty of the individual. ... We must 
do a good deal to make certain that the 
principles of the presumption of innocence, 
the openness of a court trial, and ensuring 
the full right to defense become deeply 
rooted. (Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 
address to senior Foreign Ministry and mil- 
itary officials, July 1988) 

On Models for Third World Development: 

The myth that the class interests of so- 
cialist and developing countries coincide in 
resisting imperialism does not hold up to 
criticism at all, first of all, because the 
majority of developing countries already 
adhere to, or tend toward, the Western 
model of development, and second, because 
they suffer not so much from capitalism, as 
from a lack of it. (Andrei Kozyrev, Deputy 
Chief of the International Organizations 
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an 
article in International Life, October 1988) 



On Regional Conflicts: 

Our direct and indirect involvement in re- 
gional conflicts led to colossal losses by 
increasing general international tension, 
justifying the arms race and hindering the 
establishment of mutually beneficial, ad- 
vantageous ties with the West. (Kozyrev) 

On Military Power: 

. . . the notion established in the minds 
and actions of various strategists that the 
Soviet Union can be as strong as any possi- 
ble coalition of states opposing it is abso- 
lutely fallacious. (Shevardnadze) 

On the Rule of Law: 

The work of the judicial bodies is of enor- 
mous importance. The fate of many people, 
the defense of their rights, and the ines- 
capable punishment of those who have bro- 
ken the law, depend on how accurately the 
scales of justice function. ... It is ex- 
tremely important to restore the Leninist 
vision of the role of our court in a system 
of democracy and strictly to observe the 
principle of the independence of judges and 
their subordination to law. (General 
Secretary Gorbachev, speech to 19th Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Union Confer- 
ence, June 28, 1988) 

On the Soviet Economic System: 

It is well known, that from the late seven- 
ties, negative trends in our development 
began emerging with increasing clarity. 
Socialism found that it had lost its advan- 
tage over capitalism in terms of the pace of 
economic development. The essence of eco- 
nomic reform lies in the creation and an 
intensification of economic incentives. . . . 
In our conditions, the market is an irre- 
placeable instrument for the flexible eco- 
nomic coordination of production with the 
growing and constantly changing social 
needs. (Vadim Medvedev, Politburo mem- 
ber, in an October 1988 speech reported in 
Pravda, October 5, 1988) 



lartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



These are communists talking. 
Their words are important words. Ac- 
tions will be difficult, and results will 
take a while. But actions and results 
start from ideas and words, whether 
called "new thinking," perestroika and 
glasnost, or just plain, pragmatic ob- 
servation of what works. 

Only one conclusion is possible 
from the facts and from the Soviets' 
own perceptions of them: The state that 
Lenin founded and Stalin built is being 
reconstructed. Soviet leaders deserve 
credit for recognizing problems and 
seeking to solve them. The outcome 
cannot be foretold with precision, but 
this we do know already — the environ- 
ment for America's values of peace, 
freedom, and democracy is healthier 
than it has been in some time. We and 
our allies are the rising nations. 

Some say we should change our ap- 
proach because the Soviets are chang- 
ing. I say we must keep to the course 
that has brought us success. There are 
plenty of reasons to be vigilant. 

• Soviet military forces are as large 
as ever. Their defense spending has not 
decreased. The Soviets still knock on 
Europe's door with 30,000 tanks parked 
in the driveway. 

• Soviet-supported forces and arms 
are still contributing to violence and 
tension, especially in Central America. 
Half of all the arms shipped to the 
Third World last year came from the 
Soviet Union. 

• Human rights progress has been 
dramatic but disappointingly short of 
international standards, which even the 
Soviets themselves have accepted. 

So the first principle to follow as 
we face the changes underway is to 
stay true to our principles. Realism, 
strength, and diplomacy have been our 
watchwords throughout the 1980s and 
will be just as valid for the rest of this 
century and beyond. We will continue 
to measure progress in U.S. -Soviet re- 
lations through a four-part test: prog- 
ress on human rights, on regional 
conflicts, on arms control, and on bilat- 
eral relations. The worst thing we could 
do now, just as our policy is succeeding, 
would be to accept the promise of con- 
structive Soviet policy without the 
performance. 



The direction General Secretary 
Gorbachev has set is one we welcome. 
It aims to make the Soviet Union a 
more rational, more lawful and com- 
petitive society. Such an achievement, 
should it come, can benefit not only the 
Soviet people but all the nations of the 
world. 

But if we are to catch this tide 
toward a new, more hopeful, and differ- 
ently structured international scene, we 
need to look to other principles as well. 
For beyond the changing U.S. -Soviet 
relationship, we will encounter other 
new concerns in the next global era. 

What guidelines are needed as we 
try to comprehend the changing picture 
before us? 

First, we must build on the bul- 
wark of our strength — our alliances 
with the other great democracies. That 
means unswerving attention to our mil- 
itary capabilities: nuclear deterrence, 
conventional forces, and shared defense 
burdens. 

Second, we must seek to widen 
our circle of like-minded friends. The 
world's nations increasingly are turning 
toward more open economies and freer 
societies, and they are banding to- 
gether in new multilateral associations. 
There is no part of the world that I 
have been more interested in, or 
worked harder to cooperate with, than 
that represented by the Association of 
South East Asian Nations. Our ties to 
them have been immensely fruitful and 
filled with potential. We want to help 
create and tie together such networks 
all over the globe. 

Third, and most important, we 
need to speak out for, and stand up for, 
the values that have made us great, 
that others now emulate, and that can 
further our success. That means a 
deepened commitment to the dignity 
and liberty of the individual, to open 
trade and market-based economics, and 
to government by the consent of the 
people. Let us not be shy about it; the 
world is catching on to the American 
way. It is not just our ship that will 
catch the tide, it's a whole fleet of 
ships — and America is the flagship of 
that fleet. 

This means we must stay engaged. 
Those who talk protectionism or isola- 
tionism; those who say we should fear 
foreign competition or investment; 



those who say we have no business n 
suing our interests abroad because!) 
aren't yet perfect at home — those ]t 
pie couldn't be more wrong. This iG 
time to get out there and get goin 
for our sakes and for a better, safei 
tomorrow. 

The Politics of 
Preventing War 

Second, new dangers in weaponry 
Such engagement is more needed 
ever, for there are new dangers to 
ecology of the world political body I 
at the point when we have begun t 
achieve greater strategic stability 
lower levels of offensive nuclear ar 
and just as we are getting a handl 
the proliferation of nuclear weapoi 
are seeing unexpected correlative 
gers appear: the spread of sophist 
missile technology and the use of ■ 
ical weapons. These increase the p 
tial for devastation in unstable reg. 
of the Third World. And the confli; 
themselves may become far more i 
cult to contain or isolate. 

The availability of sophisticate 
weapons presents plenty of proble 
But two dangers stand out. 

The first is the increasing ava 
ity on the world arms market of n 
tively long-range surface-to-surfac 
missiles. In the Iran-Iraq war, we 
seen Soviet SCUD missiles emplo, 
by both belligerents. Across the g 
Saudi Arabia is acquiring Chinese 
CSS-2 missiles with a potential n 
exceeding 1,500 miles. Elsewhere 
Middle East, as in other regions, 
tries have acquired ballistic missil 
These weapons, which may be tho 
of as "obsolete" by the superpowe 
are nothing of the sort when it co: 
to regional conflicts. And beyond 
arms market, more and more nati 
will be able to build their own bal 
missiles. Weaponry of enormous d 
structive potential can reach the h 
of parties with little regard for tr; 
tional inhibiting controls. With tht 
minimal warning times and often ; 
stantial ranges, ballistic missiles v 
pose significant new threats to the 
bility of already tense regions. As 



THE SECRETARY 



It, established doctrines designed 
eter aggression and keep the peace 
be undermined in more than one 
of the world. 

The other new danger is the re- 
i lescence of chemical warfare — per- 
5 the most odious and despicable 
:lopment of our day. Nations are 
confronted by violations of the 
st and most widely observed arms 
rol agreement, the 1925 Geneva 
ocol prohibiting poisonous gas and 
Jnical warfare — a terrible change for 
(worse. Yet that is the case. Since 
did War II, there have been hun- 
ijls of conflicts and more than two 
l|?n significant civil wars. But until 
intly, only a few conflicts — those in 
lien, Afghanistan, and Laos — had 
li the use of chemical weapons. 
i| Now the scourge is spreading. The 
• ocol has been repeatedly violated. 
dhave stood up and criticized these 
i^itions and have sometimes been al- 
Jt alone in doing so. 

JThe worst nightmare of all, of 
rse, would be the eventual combina- 
.( of ballistic missiles and chemical 
Ineads in the hands of governments 
|. terrorist histories. To meet this 
j;er we took the lead to establish, 
4. the seven largest industrial de- 
piracies, a Missile Technology Control 
'lime in April 1987, putting limits on 
I transfer of missiles and the means 
luild them. We have identified this 
■t >lem in its early stages and gone 
<jr it energetically. As a result, there 
"4 >pe that the spread of such missiles 
( be curbed. 

To ban all chemical weapons, we 
L| working with 40 nations in Geneva 
I treaty tabled by Vice President 
4a in 1984. To further this effort, 
I ;ident Reagan has called for a con- 
Ince to strengthen the 1925 Geneva 
■ ocol, and France has agreed to host 
i| conference in January. Our aim will 
1 o reverse the erosion of respect for 
1 norms which have held the line 
1 nst the illegal use of such hideous 
fpons. 



Vice President Bush has announced 
a six-point action plan that combines 
international cooperation, tough penal- 
ties, and missile defense systems. A 
time when ballistic missiles are pro- 
liferating is no time to listen to those 
who cannot understand the need for 
defense against them. 

The Imperative 

of Cooperative Effort 

These new problems threaten the ecol- 
ogy of civilization and political reason. 
They call for: 

• Engaged American leadership, to 
build 

• Broad international cooperation, 
backed by 

• Tough measures of enforcement. 

These steps may sound obvious and 
simple. I can assure you they are not. 
We know this from the experience of 
our fight against the scourges of ter- 
rorism and drugs. Last year, terrorism 
claimed over 3,000 casualties in 80 
countries. The terrorists, in all too 
many cases, work with drug traf- 
fickers, whose immense funds provide 
the money to finance the muscle of ter- 
ror. Together, they assault civilized so- 
cieties. We and other countries must 
and do apply strenuous and increasing 
effort to win the war against drugs and 
terror. For the United States, the 
sweeping Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
marks a new level of commitment to say 
"no" to drugs. All aspects of the chal- 
lenge are addressed: demand, educa- 
tion, law enforcement, and international 
cooperation. 

But no country can deal with these 
problems alone. They respect no bound- 
aries. So we take the lead to build in- 
ternational cooperation on intelligence 
and to apply pressure on states that 
use terrorism. We establish the concep- 
tual recognition that terrorists and 
drug traffickers are criminals. We ap- 
ply the rule of law and, through inter- 
national cooperation, extend its reach 
so that there is no place to hide. 



Cooperative international regimes 
are required. To build them takes im- 
mense energy, a worldwide effort, and 
heretofore unfound readiness to put 
aside old habits of thought and behav- 
ior limited to narrow nation-bound 
concepts. 

From the first recorded treaty in 
3100 B.C. between two Mesopotamian 
city-states, to the philosophic urgings of 
Grotius in the 17th century, to the 
efforts toward international law and co- 
operation of my predecessors — Elihu 
Root, William Jennings Bryan, Charles 
Evans Hughes, and others in the first 
part of this century — the hope that na- 
tions would cooperate for peace has 
sprung eternal and, just as eternally, 
has fallen short of the dream. 

The clear fact is, however, that all 
nations face a new imperative. In a 
way, our global society of states is not 
unlike our early American states when 
Benjamin Franklin said: "We must all 
hang together or, most assuredly, we 
shall all hang separately." 

It is the people of the world who 
are telling us this. Their activities; 
their aspirations; their social, cultural, 
and spiritual associations are spilling 
out beyond the boundaries of conven- 
tional politics. They represent, in many 
respects, the most significant challenge 
of all. 

The international political system 
we have today is several centuries old. 
Its key concepts are: 

• The nation as a unit; 

• The state as its political form; 

• Well-defined borders as its geo- 
graphical expression; 

• The allegiance of its citizens to 
give it strength; and 

• A patriotic focus to give them 
identity. 

Today, people are pushing on this 
system from different directions. Some- 
times it's through mass migratory 
movements. In other instances, people 
bewildered by change seek an identity 
beyond the state, such as religion or 
ethnicity. And what is happening to 



Miartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



traditional concepts of national sov- 
ereignty in a world of instantaneous 
satellite communications and global fi- 
nancial networks? Human and corpo- 
rate connections are being forged that 
transact more business in more unor- 
thodox ways than governments can 
comprehend or catch up with. 

But, at the same time, people 
whose dreams for national self-deter- 
mination have been frustrated see new 
opportunities for self-assertion. Rigid 
governments face the alternatives of po- 
litical pluralism and economic reform or 
violent resistance and rapid decline. 
The problems of managing these ten- 
sions can be seen all over the world, 
and they are difficult to handle. Look 
at Fiji. Look at Sri Lanka. Look at 
what's happening in Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia. 

What we see is a paradox. National 
borders are transcended by the forces 
of change, even as nationalism grows 
more intense. National sovereignty has 
never been more cherished, even as 
sovereign prerogatives must yield to 
new global realities. 



Prime Minister Thatcher addressed 
this when she spoke at Bruges last 
month on the coming single market in 
Europe. She said that "willing and ac- 
tive cooperation between independent 
sovereign states" is the best way to 
build an international community. 

Sooner or later, nations will orient 
themselves to a world grown too small 
for violent conflict and too big for rigid 
attitudes, wild ambitions, and self- 
centered policies. Sooner or later, gov- 
ernments will be forced to see that 
joining with others is the only way to 
meet the challenges of the future. 

Our diplomatic imperatives must be 
to use what has worked, such as collec- 
tive security, while recognizing that 
new tactics may be required. For most 
problems, the answer can only be found 
in a pragmatic working-out. There are 
no blueprints because we are, as yet, 
too unfamiliar with the terrain to know 
where or how to build. 

This gives me heart. The American 
philosophy is pragmatism. Pragmatism 
dictates that problem-solving be a coop- 
erative process — just as our pioneers 



came together to work as one whei 
prairie house had to be built. 

This century has not been frie 
to freedom, or to democracy, or ev 
peace. The environment for those 
ues began to improve when Ameri 
long content to cultivate its own g 
den, became fully engaged. Now, ; 
near the end of the century, the e( 
is changing, and changing for the 
better — with critical help from oui 
engagement. 

When we have kept that in mi 
the past, we have succeeded. My r 
sage is one of change, of hope, of t 
challenges of a bright new world, 
it's also a call for continued Ameri. 
engagement with our allies and fri 
and, yes, our rivals to bring that r 
world to its promise. That's what 
can give to ourselves, to our child) 
and to our grandchildren — the eco 
of peace and freedom. 



'Press release 229 of Oct. 31, 198* 



The Inter-American System: Into the Next Century 



Secretary Shultz's statement before 
the General Assembly of the Organiza- 
tion of American States (OAS) in San 
Salvador and news conference on 
November Ik, 1988. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT 

As the General Assembly gathers in 
San Salvador, we all pay tribute to 
[Salvadoran] President Jose Napoleon 
Duarte, a leader whose achievements 
embody the highest ideals of this orga- 
nization. He is a man of vision and 
courage. He is a man who understands 
the challenges faced by the people of 
this hemisphere. He understands that 
peace requires both democracy and de- 
velopment. President Duarte is a man 
of justice. We salute him as we all did 
this morning. 

This has been a decade of momen- 
tous developments. The most important 
is the democratic revolution: Elected ci- 
vilians have replaced almost all the mil- 



itary rulers in our member states; more 
than 300 million people have voted in 
50 elections since 1980. But dramatic 
events have taken place in other areas 
as well: in defense of human rights, in 
economic reform, and in the search for 
social justice. 

Sometimes, of course, our labors 
have seemed like those of Sisyphus, 
with new problems and crises appear- 
ing at every turn. But for all that, it 
has been a decade in which the ideals 
expressed in the Charter of this or- 
ganization have found new hope of 
realization. 

As the inter-American system ap- 
proaches its centennial, it is, therefore, 
important to take stock of what we in 
the Organization of American States 
are, what we have accomplished, and 
what needs to be done in the period 
ahead. Progress achieved in diverse 
areas — narcotics, technical cooperation, 
human rights, democracy — is impres- 
sive. But our business is far from 
finished. 



The challenges we face are be 
ing more acute. Changes in global 
ical and economic relations porten 
forms of cooperation and peaceful 
petition. We must prepare ourselv 
and our peoples for the next centi 
We must start by dealing success! 
with the problems of today. 

The Challenge of Democracy 

This hemisphere is now a place of 
for most of its citizens. Tyrannies 
toppled, and militaries have retun 
the barracks. Over 90% of the peo 
of the Americas enjoy the blessing 
democratic government. For many 
nations, the democratic transition 
moving into its second generation, 
day, parties alternate power withii 
mocracies and through elections. P 
passes from one elected governmei 
another. 

We are seeing that process tal 
place in the United States right nc 
As we move into the second gener; 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/January 



THE SECRETARY 



mocratic governments, we still face 
f challenges — and some unique op- 
anities. The issues of debt, drugs, 
i -gencies, political violence, and 
red social needs will test our 
>cratic systems, 
ut these issues can be addressed 
Jtively. The time is right for a new 
|macy — a diplomacy based on dem- 
iic solidarity and on the aggressive 
'icacy of democracy by democratic 
,j|s. Solidarity means mutual sup- 
i Sometimes it means going out 
i limb to pressure nondemocratic 
libors to open up. The odd men out 
lis hemisphere know who they are; 
I are the states that are suppressing 
Ipcracy and denying their people 

i'reedom, openness, and liberty that 
■est of us enjoy. We need to con- 
; these states with a diplomacy 
emocracies, for democracy. 
Democratic solidarity is not a 
Jige notion to the OAS. Our Char- 
1| lakes it the foundation of inter- 
irican solidarity. If new democ- 
|s are threatened, we must rally to 
lort them. The message must be 
J.al clear. No would-be coup plotters 
Ing to overthrow a democratic gov- 
Jient — whether they be of the left 
| e right, civilian or military — 
i Id count on our indifference. 
|[ must be frank. This organization 
rl lot always been out front on issues 
jjrning democracy. Too often it has 
« one step behind when it has needed 
r one step ahead. As we challenge 
I *s to adopt democracy, we need to 
»1 them to their promises and com- 
ments. No one is fooled by empty 

■ lises. I need not remind members 
i is organization that commitments 

I "pluralistic" political system were 
| a by Nicaragua to this body as long 
lis 1979. Those earliest commit- 
l.s have not yet been fulfilled. 
I At Esquipulas in 1987, the Central 
n rican presidents committed them- 
es to advance democracy in their 
I tries. They put an end to the no- 
Ithat active support for human 
l:s and democracy is somehow inter- 
lice in internal affairs. Agreements 
I,; promises have been made. The 
litors and the totalitarians must be 
1 that they are not free to subjugate 

■ • peoples. A diplomacy of demo- 

■ c solidarity must ensure that prom- 
Band commitments are kept. 



The Challenge of Debt 

The future of democracy in Latin 
America depends on more than the po- 
litical will of its people. Consolidation of 
democratic government also depends on 
strong, growing economies and on the 
prospect of better lives for this and 
succeeding generations. 

This decade has given us all cause 
for reflection about the impact of debt 
on economic growth. But it has also, I 
believe, given us tools with which to 
address the obstacles we face. Three 
considerations help define the problem. 

First, the answer to debt is devel- 
opment and economic growth. We all 
know that growth requires investment. 
We all know that the more internal sav- 
ings a country can generate, the better, 
because the only way we can have in- 
vestments is saving. Savings, and the 
capital and equity flows from abroad to 
supplement them, will occur only if a 
country offers a proper economic- 
environment. I'm just saying what is 
obvious. 

A country can test itself on its prog- 
ress. Do its own savings stay home, 
and are they applied to its own capital 
needs, or do savings end up as a terri- 
ble drain in the form of capital flight? 
Are investments made in needed infra- 
structure and productive sectors? Is 
private domestic capital returning from 
abroad rather than continuing to flee? 

If the answers are positive, the 
country has begun its journey toward 
growth. If the answers are negative, 
the country should take a hard look at 
its domestic policies and ask: Has eco- 
nomic reform been as thorough and 
comprehensive as possible? Are struc- 
tural and regulatory rigidities still a 
stubborn reality? Are incentives to 
work, save, and invest adequate? 

Second, reforms are essential, but 
they must also be realistic — a point 
that many of you have made. Neither 
debtors nor creditors should make the 
mistake of viewing adjustment pro- 
grams as cost free. But if the im- 
mediate visible impact of changes in 
economic policy is hardship at home to 
keep up service on this debt, then that 
debt service can have the effect of a 
marginal tax on economic reform. Any 
effort taxed at 100%, or at any exces- 
sively high rate, will be discouraged 
and become politically difficult to sus- 
tain. So we have to ask ourselves: What 
is the marginal cost? 

Third, and most fundamental, co- 
operation is essential. Creditors and 
debtors are in this together. Private 
and public lenders have a role, as do 



governments through bilateral and mul- 
tilateral lending. 

Creditors and debtors alike need to 
understand that adjustment takes time. 
In the early stages, while the pain of 
reforms is often only too visible, the 
benefits of essential reforms are often 
hard to see. At such times, the goal of 
debtors and creditors alike must be to 
work together to ensure that both the 
domestic and the external environ- 
ments support reform efforts. 

For our part, recognizing that ex- 
ternal factors play a vital part in the 
growth equation, we intend to continue 
to keep our markets open for the goods 
and services of expanding Latin econo- 
mies. From the onset of the debt crisis, 
the United States has imported $43 to 
$50 billion in goods and services from 
this region each year. Latin America 
has maintained a trade surplus with us 
of between $13 and $21 billion a year. 

The new Trade Information Service 
of the OAS is an important initiative for 
getting the most out of our trade rela- 
tions. Stimulated by a million-dollar 
grant and gift of equipment from IBM, 
the service uses computers and satel- 
lites to transmit current information 
about trade opportunities and regu- 
lations to businessmen, chambers of 
commerce, and governments through- 
out the hemisphere. 

This new OAS service should be 
implemented rapidly and expanded to 
include trade rules and regulations for 
all the major trading countries — Europe 
and Japan as well as all OAS members. 

The more open our markets — not 
only our market but your market — the 
more useful this information will be. All 
of us have a stake in the success of the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations; we must all commit our- 
selves to a gradual but meaningful 
opening of our markets and more lib- 
eral trading rules. 

There is no quick fix or single 
grand solution to the problem of debt 
and growth. The Mexican/Morgan Guar- 
anty bond plan and the Brazilian bank 
package — just referred to by the Bra- 
zilian Foreign Minister — are innovative 
approaches to meeting financing needs. 
The menu of options enables debtors 
and creditors to develop alternatives 
ranging from innovative new lending to 
voluntary debt conversion techniques 
to meet diverse needs. 

The United States will continue 
seeking to help debtor countries to 
manage the debt and implement needed 
policy changes. 



lartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



11 



THE SECRETARY 



The Drug Problem 

Even as societies turn to democracy, 
reform their economies, and deal with 
their debt problems, they are beset by 
the growing clanger of drugs. The con- 
sumption of illegal drugs is a pervasive 
evil, poisoning public and private life 
throughout our hemisphere. Drug traf- 
ficking is international. A vast net- 
work links growers on the slopes of the 
Andes with users on the city streets in 
North America. It is an evil business 
that undermines law and democracy 
and human dignity wherever it touches. 

The answer begins at home — I'm 
talking about the United States now. 
The omnibus drug bill that became 
U.S. law last month embodies a new 
level of commitment against illegal 
drugs in the United States. As the 
largest single market for illegal drugs, 
the United States has a special respon- 
sibility in this struggle — a responsi- 
bility fully as great as that of the 
producing countries. 

Our First Lady, Mrs. Nancy Rea- 
gan, made this clear last month at the 
United Nations when she said: "It is 
the United States which bears respon- 
sibility for its own drug problem. I am 
not blaming other nations for America's 
drug problem. While most of the illegal 
drugs are imported, the drug users are 
home grown There can be no sub- 
stitute for focusing on the user, which 
is also a loser." 

Individuals must say "no" to drugs. 
So, too, must nations. International co- 
operation is essential. All of our nations 
will participate in the upcoming confer- 
ence in Vienna to negotiate a conven- 
tion against drug trafficking. We must 
negotiate a strong, effective treaty that 
will defeat the drug traffickers by prin- 
cipled and concerted action. 

Other forms of cooperation can also 
work. In August, 29 Latin American 
and European nations teamed up to 
crack down on drug cartel operations. 
In 1986, the OAS approved a program 
of action against drug trafficking and 
abuse. We created the OAS Drug Com- 
mission (CICAD) to provide member 
states with basic information on drug 
abuse and trafficking and to heighten 
popular awareness of the dangers of 
illicit drugs. 

The OAS must continue to make a 
strong contribution to the overall fight 
against drugs. For 2 years, the United 
States has made voluntary contribu- 
tions to this program; we hope the or- 
ganization will intensify its efforts and 



increase their effectiveness. We would 
urge that cabinet-level ministers meet 
as soon as possible this coming year to 
energize this narcotics effort. 

A History of Cooperation 

Now let me speak about the inter- 
American system, particularly looking 
ahead to the next century. The record 
of inter- American cooperation — on is- 
sues as profound in their day as drugs 
and debt — is one of achievement. 

• In 1903, we organized the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau, which 
became so successful it served as 
the model for the World Health 
Organization. 

• In 1935, we launched together a 
new trade policy that helped bring the 
world out of a deep depression. And 
we united in the face of external 
aggression. 

• After World War II, the OAS 
provided a model for the United Na- 
tions. And the Rio Treaty provided the 
precedent for NATO. 

• In the late 1950s, through an ini- 
tiative in the OAS, we created the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 

• In the 1960s, we launched an 
innovative concept important to 
worldwide trade expansion — namely, 
the generalized system of trade 
preferences. 

• At Tlatelolco in 1967, Latin Amer- 
ican countries negotiated the first re- 
gional obligation to restrict nuclear 
weapons. 

• In 1969 and throughout the 1970s, 
OAS peacekeeping missions helped end 
the conflict and maintain peace between 
El Salvador and Honduras. 

• Today, a network of organizations 
is at work to make democracy and hu- 
man rights an enduring achievement — 
namely, the Inter- American Commis- 
sion on Human Rights, the Inter- 
American Court, the Human Rights In- 
stitute, and the Center for Electoral 
Assistance and Promotion. 

This record makes clear that we 
are united by far more than the acci- 
dents of geography. The vision that has 
guided our system of nations through 
the first century of cooperation must 
continue. We must bring to the contem- 
porary challenges of democracy, debt, 
drugs, hemispheric security, develop- 
ment, and social justice the strength of 
purpose and commitment to progress 
that have characterized our efforts in 
the past. 



The Challenge Ahead 

We must also recognize that the 
cumulating changes that are a cent! 
fact of the modern world will also s. 
our efforts in the future. The pace i 
change is accelerating constantly. IV. 
new groupings — the Caribbean Con 
nity and Common Market, the And( 
Pact, the Organization of Eastern C 
ibbean States, the Group of Eight- 
have emerged in the past generatio 
Subregional cooperation is entirely 
compatible with the ideals of the 0^ 
It reflects the changes taking place 
around us, and it enables us to imp: 
regional and global cooperation as v 

To work, and work well, into itil 
second century, this organization, t< 
must change. My government inteni 
to work closely with Secretary Gen 
Baena Soares to revitalize the OAS. 
believe a task force of foreign minis 
could help us to define the prioritie 
of this organization and give the me 
ber governments the incentive to pi 
vide the resources to achieve those 
priorities. 

We have in the OAS the instrun 
to define a framework of our relatio 
We must use it. This General Asser 
should not compete with the Gener; 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
They're going out at the same time, 
fact, our regional organization shou 
complement and even help shape ou 
participation in the world organizat: 
That implies, to give an example, tl 
this assembly might be more effecti 
it were to meet in the second instea 
the fourth quarter of each year. 

Our hopes and plans for the 0/ 
depend on adequate funding. As Se 
tary of State, I have sought full sup 
port for the OAS in our government 
and Congress. The United States v\ 
continue to try to do its part. We w 
ask in the President's budget for ful 
funding of our assessed contributior 
the OAS in 1990. 

From the start, the OAS has bt 
part of our efforts to make freedom 
peace, and development lasting com 
tions of life in the Americas. It has 
sought to realize the promise inhere 
in the discovery of the "new world" 
500 years ago: a refuge from tyrann 
and a place of hope and opportunity 

Today, we are on the threshold 
another "new world" created by disi 
eries in science and technology. This 
new world promises changes as gret 
and momentous as the earlier discoi 
of the Americas. We can find freedo 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/January 1 



THE SECRETARY 



ipportunity in those changes if we 

esponsive to the challenges that 

I before us. 

Vorking together, we can advance 

her. 

Proud of the progress of human 
s and democracy, we cannot take 
for granted and must sustain 
viden them until they are enjoyed 
1. 

i Aware of the burdens of debt, we 
redouble our cooperation to make 
eforms needed to restore growth. 
Conscious of the dangers of 
, we must fight them without 
,er from the city streets to the 
isolated of rural hamlets. 
Awake to the potential for coop- 
)n among free nations, we must 
dize the OAS and regional and 
^gional efforts generally. 
Above all, mindful of the hope for 
justice, freedom, and liberty that 
'ates our peoples, we must keep 
a grand objectives at the center of 
rlgendas. 

ijJever before have we been as close 
aiieving the historic mission of the 
jricas: "to offer to man a land of 
■ y, and a favorable environment for 
development of his personality and 
a palization of his just aspirations." 
u| work remains, but we are up to 
ji hallenge. 



BRETARY'S NEWS 
CONFERENCE* 

(t ne say first to President Duarte 
id he people of El Salvador our 
i ;s for being such gracious hosts for 
if neeting, and our admiration for 
)n is being done here. I can't help 
t :ularly but reflect on the courage 

■ trength of President Duarte, 

■ e dedication and energy and drive 
Oelflessness come through to you, 
jj inspiration. If there are ques- 

1, I'll be glad to try to take them. 

J. The United States has given 
stance for $3,000 million to El 
ilidor in the last 6 or 7 years. The 
U continues, the Christian Demo- 
a are not having much success ac- 
ting to the polls. The question is 
I have had success in our efforts 

ihat we have tried to do here in El 
ilidor. 

■1\. I think the people of El Sal- 
Ir have accomplished miracles. First 
{ , they have put into place a work- 



ing democracy, where governments are 
put into place and changed according to 
an election, in which the people of El 
Salvador have taken part — in very 
heavy proportion. So that is number 
one. 

Number two, they have got their 
economy back into real growth. It is a 
slow, hard process, but nevertheless, 
has contrasted with say Nicaragua, 
which is in a total downspin. They have 
real growth taking place with inflation 
coming down and more or less under 
control. 

Number three, they have a commu- 
nist opposition that is heavily armed 
and supported from outside the country 
and which has over a period of time 
disrupted life here, and they have taken 
that military opposition to democracy 
on. And, in full recognition that the 
problems are not solved, they have 
made great progress. So, I think that 
what we see here in El Salvador, as in 
the rest of Central America, is 
encouraging. 

The discouraging part is not so 
much here as it is in Nicaragua, where 
we see people living under clear, ob- 
vious repression, with standards of liv- 
ing roughly half that when the present 
government took over. And with a 
country dedicated to a gigantic military 
machine and which is disrupting its 
neighborhood. That's the problem. 

Q. Among El Salvador's principal 
political parties, one of them is in 
favor of escalating the war here in El 
Salvador. If that were to occur, my 
question is, if the United States 
would continue supporting El Sal- 
vador at present levels regardless of 
how the next government decides to 
combat the guerrillas, and if there 
would be some way of carrying out 
the war that would lead to a reduc- 
tion of U.S. military assistance? 

A. I can't comment on a specula- 
tion about what might be so a year 
from now or 2 years from now. It's im- 
possible, but I can say this: What we 
support is the democratic process. It is 
up to the people of El Salvador to de- 
cide on their government leaders. They 
do that through a vote. We support the 
process, and when the process has been 
concluded, we will support the outcome 
that has been produced by the people of 
El Salvador. 

Q. Just a few moments ago, you 
called for a new diplomacy in Central 
America. I would like to know if this 
includes U.S. military support for the 
contras. 



A. We believe that people who are 
ready to fight for decency, democracy, 
freedom, justice in their own country 
deserve support. We'll continue to sup- 
port them. The kind of diplomacy I'm 
calling for is an expression of solidarity 
by people who believe in democracy; a 
diplomacy that calls upon people to live 
up to the things we have agreed to. 

Just as in Europe, we point to the 
Helsinki Final Act as a solemn commit- 
ment on the part of all the governments 
that signed it. So too here. Esquipulas 
II, for example, should be taken as a 
solemn commitment by all governments 
that signed it, and we should hold them 
to those commitments. 

I will give an example of the soli- 
darity of democracy in diplomacy, and 
that is the decision by the Group of 
Eight to exclude Panama from its meet- 
ings so long as the present regime is 
there. That's expressing yourself in a 
clear definitive way about a problem re- 
lated to democracy. 

Q. You have said that you believe 
that the government of President Rea- 
gan has supported the Arias plan, but 
President Arias says he thinks he will 
get along better with President Bush. 
You know both men — the President, 
as well as the President-elect — and I 
would like to ask you if you see any 
difference between them about their 
position with regard to support for 
the contras and the situation in Cen- 
tral America. Do you see, perhaps, a 
change in tone? 

A. President-elect Bush has played 
a strong part in the development and 
implementation of U.S. policy toward 
Central America. For example, here in 
El Salvador, in helping develop a strong 
move for the protection of human 
rights, he did a very great job. We have 
made a lot of progress in seeing the 
growth of democracy, human rights, 
and economic development in Central 
America, but there is work still to be 
done. And it will fall to President-elect 
Bush to do it. I'm sure he'll do it in his 
own effective way. But I'm not in a 
position to describe it, that's for him 
and his Secretary of State and others to 
do. 

It should not be overlooked that 
during the election campaign, Presi- 
dent-elect Bush expressed his strong 
support for the freedom fighters in Nic- 
aragua — the contras. 



'Press release 241 of Nov. 16, 1988. 
-Press release 242 of Nov. 16. ■ 



wartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



13 



AFRICA 



Visit of Mali President 




President Moussa Traore of the Re- 
public of Mali made a state visit to the 
United States October 5-9, 1988, to 
meet with President Reagan and other 
government officials. 

Following are remarks at the wel- 
coming ceremony and dinner toasts 
made by the two Presidents on Octo- 
ber 6.1 



ARRIVAL REMARKS^ 



President Reagan 

It's an honor and a pleasure to welcome 
you on your first official visit to the 
United States. You and all the people of 
Mali are good friends of the United 
States. In addition to deeply appreciat- 
ing your support on international is- 
sues, we admire Mali as a country 
where people of different ethnic and re- 
ligious backgrounds respect each other 
and live together in peace. 

You and your country have also 
courageously embarked on an economic 
reform program. As a result, Mali has 
been one of the major aid recipients in 
Africa, and we're pleased to have been 
able to assist you with this program. 

We're also pleased by your visit be- 
cause you represent not only Mali but 
also the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), of which you were recently 
elected chairman. And we ask you to 



accept our congratulations on your elec- 
tion to this important post. Earlier this 
year, the OAU celebrated its 25th anni- 
versary. During its history, the OAU 
has played a vital role in resolving re- 
gional conflicts in Africa and has helped 
African countries to work together to 
solve problems and promote economic 
development. Under your leadership, 
I'm confident the OAU will continue 
with these crucial activities. You have 
already demonstrated interest in help- 
ing to promote regional settlements in 
southern Africa and the Western Sa- 
hara. We hope the OAU can play an 
even more active role in solving those 
regional problems and play a key role in 
promoting development in Africa by en- 
couraging economic reform and 
cooperation. 

I understand there is a Malian 
proverb that goes: Bolokoni kelvti te 
bele ta — One finger cannot lift a rock. I 
think this proverb expresses perfectly 
the goal and the strength of the Orga- 
nization of African Unity. Africans 
must pull together and work together. 
And we wish you and the OAU great 
success in working together to achieve 
common goals during your time as 
chairman and throughout the OAU's 
next 25 years. 

We look forward to talking with 
you over the next few days not only 
about bilateral concerns and African re- 
gional issues but about concerns we 



share in other parts of the world. I 
Africa, I believe, which represents 
nearly one-third of the member nac| 
of the United Nations, truly has coT 
of age as a participant in the interrl 
tional area. 

Let me say again how pleased I 
are to welcome you to the United 
States. We wish you an enjoyable a| 
profitable visit. 

President Traore 3 

I should like on behalf of my delegil 
and my own name to express my vij 
sincere thanks to you for the kind il 
tation extended to us to visit this gl 
nation, the United States of Ameriil 

Our visit meets two concerns; ! 
of all, the concern of making even 
stronger the friendship and solidar 
which have been a trademark of rel 
tions between our two nations. Maj 
cite in this connection Vice Preside 
Bush's memorable visit in Mali on 
March 8th and 9th, 1985. It was for 
people tangible evidence of the un- 
wavering commitment of the Unitei 
States to the Republic of Mali. May 
now express my honest wish to brii 
the American people in my capacit; | 
president of the OAU a message of 
friendship from the peoples of Afrii | 
Indeed, over and above the world w 
role played by the United States, t 
are between your nation and the A 
rican Continent human, cultural, an 
spiritual relations becoming strong 
every day, to the greatest benefit o 
American and African peoples. 

I know for a fact that my visit 
give us a chance to discuss togethe 
major issues of common interest. Ai 
am convinced that our discussions 
enable us to make progress in the 
search for a solution to the problen 
which are of concern to both our si( 



DINNER TOASTS 



President Reagan 

It's a pleasure to welcome you here 
evening. We're honored by your vis 
the United States, both as the Pre£ 
dent of Mali and as the chairman of 
Organization of African Unity. Duri 
your visit, we've been discussing is: 
of concern to Mali, the Organizatioi 
African Unity, and the United Stat* 
And I'm gratified that you share ou 
concerns about regional stability an 
economic development in Africa. An 
we've appreciated your efforts to pi 
mote peace and development. 



14 



AFRICA 



I want you to know that we'll con- 
liue to work with you and be as sup- 
rtive as possible in addressing these 
eas. But Africans and Americans do 
t just share a concern for various in- 
•national problems. We share a rich 
ltural heritage as well. One out of six 
nericans trace their ancestry to Af- 
a. And indeed all of us are very 
oud of that African heritage and are 
e;er to learn more about the African 
qltures from which they came. 

I think this points to another com- 
flin cultural thread between Mali and 
hi United States. Mali has a proud 
■d ancient history. It had three em- 
o-es before Europeans first settled in 
jLat is now the United States. Malian 
fialorers sailed the high seas and may 
(>n have visited America. All Ameri- 
|is, even if they know little else about 
|rica, have heard of the great and his- 
6,-ical city of Timbuktu. It once meant 
Jus a distant place. Your visit has 
I night both our nations closer. Mali, 
\i the United States, is a country 

I de up of people from different ethnic 

I I religious groups. We admire Mali's 
■ pect for diversity that is both in 

1 ir constitution and in practice. 
I Americans believe that the ethnic 
iersity of the United States is one of 
I ' country's greatest strengths. And I 
t ik this is best summed up in one of 
| ir proverbs: One person, one 
S ught; two persons, two thoughts. 
fj >m the ideas of many different peo- 
1 and the freedom to express those 
it as comes the strength of a nation. 

I look forward to continuing to 
I re ideas with you. By exchanging 
it as and working together with the 
ill :lers of a great and ancient conti- 
1 it, I believe we can find solutions 
I h a human face to the problems con- 
fi nting the world. I salute you as a 
I >d friend, a great leader of your peo- 
1 , and as the chairman of the Organi- 
st ion of African Unity. 

F !sident Traore 1 

ly I on this occasion renew my very 
J cere thanks to you, as well as the 
Inks of my delegation for the warm 
» Icome and very cordial hospitality 
l.t we have been enjoying ever since 
¥ arrived in the United States, this 
g 'at and beautiful land of freedom. 
Mali and the United States have 
1 client relations in the areas of politi- 
1, economic, social, and cultural rela- 
Hns. The many agreements for cooper- 
Ion between our two countries cover 
i fields of activity, and they fall very 



clearly within our strategy for develop- 
ment. We seek, first of all, self-suffi- 
ciency in food production, control of our 
water resources, breaking away from 
the landlocked situation of our country, 
both domestic and foreign, and training 
our human resources. 

I'm happy to salute here the very 
valuable assistance that your govern- 
ment has been extending to us in secur- 
ing these objectives. In order to have a 
better performance for our economy, 
we have undertaken, together with in- 
ternational financial institutions and 
friendly nations, a very profound and 
exhaustive reform which touches upon 
all sectors of development, public fi- 
nances, state-owned enterprises, devel- 
opment of the rural area, and private 
sector. Basically, we are seeking to mo- 
bilize all energies and all the creative 
potential of the people — Mali. The peo- 
ple of Mali, just like the people of the 
United States, have a very highly de- 
veloped sense of enterprise. 

Concerning Africa, our principal 
concerns remain the total liberation of 
the continent and the social and eco- 
nomic development. Recent trends in 
southern Africa allow us to think that it 
may soon become a reality that Resolu- 
tion 435 may soon become implemented 
helping Namibia accede to independ- 
ence. The international community 
must spare no effort and gather all its 
strength in order to force the Govern- 
ment of South Africa to comply with 
the requirements of the implementation 
of this pertinent resolution. Side by 
side with the fighters of South Africa, 
the Organization of African Unity will 
continue to struggle for the taking 
down of the intolerable system of 
apartheid. We seek to establish in 
South Africa a more human, more just 
society which has been rid of all forms 
of segregation. 

In this connection, Africa enjoys 
very much the ever-growing support of 
the great American people. Your con- 
stitution, your democratic traditions 
have inspired many people throughout 
the world. 

In the economic area it is urgent to 
find a just and lasting solution to the 
problem of the African debt. Thus, the 
Organization of African Unity has been 
calling for the convening of an interna- 
tional conference on that issue. In solv- 
ing the problem of the African debt, we 
will have to factor in the issue of raw 
materials and commodity prices as Af- 
rica is a producer because it is only 
through a just remuneration of their 
production that the African nations will 



secure the steady resources necessary 
to their development and to payment of 
the debts. 

May I, in closing, ask you to raise 
your glass with me to the health of 
President Ronald Reagan, to the health 
of Mrs. Reagan, the strengthening of 
the friendship between our two nations, 
and closer bonds of cooperation and sol- 
idarity among all people of the world. 



■Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 10, 1988. 

2 Made at the South Portico of the 
White House where President Traore was 
accorded a formal welcome with full mili- 
tary honors. 

•President Traore spoke in French, and 
his remarks were translated by an inter- 
preter. ■ 



Emergency Relief 
to Sudan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 17, 19881 

A major human catastrophe continues 
to unfold in Sudan. The world is wit- 
nessing famine that is the result not of 
nature but of endemic civil war and the 
failure to distribute available food. As a 
result, many innocent Sudanese are 
dying. 

We urge parties on both sides of 
the war and all friends of Sudan to par- 
ticipate in a massive and urgent effort 
to end the suffering and starvation of 
civilians in southern Sudan who have 
lost the means to survive on their own. 

The United States is encouraged 
that the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, with the cooperation of the 
Government and the Sudanese People's 
Liberation Army (SPLA), is planning 
to provide relief to civilian victims on 
both sides of the war zone. But it is 
only a first step. Action on many fronts 
will be needed to halt starvation. 

We urge the Sudanese Government 
and the SPLA — despite their political 
differences — to participate with donors 
and the private voluntary agency com- 
munity to meet the challenge of provid- 
ing and administering relief to those in 
critical need, regardless of where they 
are. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



u partment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



15 



ARMS CONTROL 



South Africa Accepts 
Angola/Namibia Accord 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 22, 19881 

We are pleased to confirm notification 
by the Government of South Africa that 
its Cabinet has accepted the schedule 
for total Cuban troop withdrawal from 
Angola negotiated under U.S. media- 
tion in Geneva last week. With this 
step, all three governments involved in 
these talks have signaled their accept- 
ance of the Geneva understandings. The 
way is now clear to completion of the 
negotiations and the signing of the in- 
terlocking set of agreements the parties 
have agreed to conclude. 

South African, Cuban, and An- 
golan delegations are currently confer- 
ring with each other and with UN 
officials in New York to prepare for a 
final round of negotiations in Brazza- 
ville. The United States continues to 
mediate discussions between the 
parties. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Krasnoyarsk Radar Discussions 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 2, 19881 

The Krasnoyarsk radar is a significant 
violation of a central element of the 
ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty. We 
have made clear to the Soviets that the 
violation must be corrected without de- 
lay or preconditions. 

Last week, the United States 
agreed to a Soviet proposal to have a 
meeting of technical experts in order to 
listen to Soviet proposals and to clarify 
Soviet positions on actions they are 
prepared to take to correct the 
Krasnoyarsk problem. We had hoped 
that they were prepared to meet U.S. 
concerns about the radars. 

That meeting of U.S. Soviet ex- 
perts on the Krasnoyarsk radar vio- 
lation ended on November 2. We 
listened to what they had to say. Unfor- 
tunately, the Soviet experts did not 
have any new proposals that addressed 
our concerns and could not answer U.S. 
questions about how they would correct 
the Krasnoyarsk radar in a verifiable 
manner that meets U.S. criteria. We 



have made clear to them that any sa 
factory solution of the Krasnoyarsk ' 
lation must: 

• Reestablish the lead time acce 
able to the United States that was tl 
purpose of the LPAR [large, phased 
array radarj provisions of the ABM 
Treaty; and 

• Must verifiably remove all trea 
prohibited radar capability. 

Based on what we have heard tc 
date, we continue to believe strongb 
that the U.S. criteria can only be m 
by dismantlement of the radar and c 
struction of the transmitter and re- 
ceiver buildings, including their 
foundations. 

We continue to reserve all our 
rights under international law to tab 
appropriate and proportionate re- 
sponses to the Soviet violation. We 
have not foreclosed the option of dec 
ing that violation to be a material 
breach. 



'Read to news correspondents by E 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. 



Conference on Chemical Weapons Use 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
OCT. 21, 19881 

French Ambassador to the Conference 
on Disarmament Pierre Morel an- 
nounced yesterday to the UN First 
Committee in New York that France 
will host the Conference on Chemical 
Weapons Use in Paris from January 7 
to 11, 1989. The conference is aimed at 
focusing worldwide attention on the 
problems of chemical weapons use and 
proliferation, and helping to put a stop 
to the abhorrent illegal use of these 
weapons. 

President Reagan proposed such a 
conference in his speech at the United 
Nations on September 26, calling on all 
concerned nations to consider actions 
we might take together to reverse the 
erosion of respect for the existing 
norms against the illegal use of chem- 
ical weapons. Recent expressions of 
support for the idea of holding this con- 
ference by nations from various regions 
indicate that many others share our 
concern. We hope that nations attend- 
ing the conference will reaffirm their 



political commitment to comply witl 
existing prohibitions on chemical we 
ons use. We also invite those nation 
which have not done so to adhere tc 
1925 Geneva protocol. The purpose > 
the conference is neither to change 
Geneva protocol in any way nor to s 
gle out any country for its previous 
actions. 

The United States remains com 
ted to the negotiation of a comprehc 
sive, effectively verifiable, and truh 
global ban on chemical weapons. Su 
ban would be the best solution to th 
threat posed by illegal chemical wea 
ons use and proliferation. We hope ( 
participants in the conference will e 
press their support for the continuii 
negotiations for a ban at the 40-nati 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament 

The United States welcomes thi 
action by the Government of France 
host the conference and will make 
every effort to ensure that it succee 
Secretary of State Shultz will lead t 
U.S. delegation to the conference. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 31. 198H 



16 



!\ST ASIA 

S. Review of Relations with 

e Democratic People's Republic of Korea 



PARTMENT STATEMENT, 
T. 31, 1988' 

sident of the Republic of Korea, Roh 
Woo, has recently made several 
structive suggestions concerning re- 
ons between the Republic of Korea 
O.K.) and the Democratic People's 
mblic of Korea (D.P.R.K.). Further- 
•e, in his speech to the UN General 
embly on October 18, and in his dec- 
ition of July 7, President Roh called 
joint efforts by the Republic of 
•ea's friends and allies, including the 
ted States, to help draw the Demo- 
;ic People's Republic of Korea out of 
ation and encourage it to abandon 
longstanding policies of confronta- 
i and violence. The U.S. Govern- 
it is announcing several steps 
arding relations with the Demo- 
te People's Republic of Korea. 
The U.S. Government will encour- 
unofficial, nongovernmental visits 
n the D.P.R.K. in academics, 
rts, culture, and other areas so long 
>rospective D.P.R.K. visitors are eli- 
e under our visa laws. 



To facilitate the travel of U.S. cit- 
izens to the Democratic People's Re- 
public of Korea, the U.S. Government 
will be reviewing financial regulations 
affecting travel to the D.P.R.K. with a 
view toward permitting travel services 
for exchanges and group travel on a 
case-by-case basis. The United States is 
not able to offer consular protection or 
services to U.S. citizens who travel to 
the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea. 

We are reviewing Commerce reg- 
ulations with a view toward permitting 
certain limited commercial exports of 
humanitarian goods to the D.P.R.K. on 
a case-by-case basis. U.S. law already 
permits the donation of certain human- 
itarian goods such as foodstuffs, 
clothing, and medicine. 

General commercial trade remains 
unlawful; it remains regulated strictly 
under provisions of the Trading With 
the Enemy Act and the Export Admin- 
istration Act. Furthermore, the 
D.P.R.K. remains on our list of states 
which support or are engaged in inter- 
national terrorism. Its behavior in this 



area is something we will continue to 
scrutinize closely. 

The Department of State is in- 
structing U.S. diplomats that they may 
once again hold substantive discussions 
with officials of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea in neutral settings. 
We issued such guidance in September 
1983 and March 1987 in the hope that 
such contacts could lead to increased 
mutual understanding and perhaps, 
eventually, to improved relations. These 
hopes were not realized and the guid- 
ance was withdrawn. We are again au- 
thorizing substantive diplomatic 
exchanges. 

We have taken these steps in close 
consultation with our R.O.K. ally and 
with other interested parties. We have 
informed the Governments of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and asked 
that they convey our views to the Dem- 
ocratic People's Republic of Korea. We 
look to that government for a positive, 
constructive response. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Cambodian Independence 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
OCT. 18, 1988' 

I have today signed H.J. Res. 602, 
which expresses congressional support 
for the restoration of a free and inde- 
pendent Cambodia, the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from that country, 
and the protection of the Cambodian 
people from a return to power by the 
Khmer Rouge. I welcome this clear 
statement of principles on a subject on 
which we are all in agreement. 

I note that the resolution is prop- 
erly cast in admonitory terms and ac- 
cordingly must be interpreted as a 
nonbinding expression of the sense of 
the Congress. I disagree with the 
wording of certain clauses, which, as 



written, could complicate our efforts 
to work with other governments to 
achieve the objective we all seek: to 
prevent the Khmer Rouge from ever 
again being in a position of absolute 
authority from which to wage its rule of 
terror over the Cambodian people. I 
have, however, signed this legislation 
because it makes clear that the United 
States will continue to do everything 
possible to assure that the Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia is brought to 
an end and that effective guarantees 
are put into place to prevent the Khmer 
Rouge from ever again taking control of 
Cambodia. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 24, 1988. 



Apartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



17 



ECONOMICS 



Global Economic Integration 



by John C. Whitehead 

Address before the Economic Pol- 
icy Council of the United Nations As- 
sociation of the USA on September 20, 
1988. Mr. Whitehead is Deputy Secre- 
tary of State. 

I am very pleased to have this oppor- 
tunity to address the annual plenary 
session of the Economic Policy Council 
of the United Nations Association of 
the USA. That's a big nametag denot- 
ing big responsibilities. My remarks, 
however, will be reasonably brief, even 
on so broad a subject as "global eco- 
nomic integration." 

I would like to explore the follow- 
ing points: 

• The basic forces promoting freer 
trade and economic integration since 
World War II; 

• The damage national govern- 
ments do when they try to frustrate 
economic integration; and 

• The current challenges threaten- 
ing integration and global prosperity. 

Finally, I want to say a few words 
about the relative position of the 
United States in the world economy. 

Understanding Global 
Economic Integration 

The globalization of our daily lives is 
evident everywhere — from the products 
we buy and use to the attention paid to 
exchange rate movements in the morn- 
ing newspaper. Globalization is not sim- 
ply a matter of increased trade; we see 
it also in the worldwide markets for 
currencies and credit, in the pattern of 
production, and in the flow of informa- 
tion and technology. At the dawn of the 
industrial revolution, new ideas took 
decades to filter even across Europe; 
now they spread around the world at 
the speed of light. 

[Economist] Joseph Schumpeter 
viewed economic growth as a process of 
"creative destruction," with new tech- 
nologies and products constantly re- 
placing the old and outmoded. Today, as 
such changes come more quickly than 
ever, we hear calls for protectionism 
and economic nationalism. But history 
shows that it would be wrong to heed 
those calls. Globalization and rapid 



economic advance are linked. Global 
integration is the best way for all coun- 
tries — rich and poor, large and small — 
to become wealthier together. 

The distinguished men who shaped 
our international economic policy in the 
1940s — people like Cordell Hull, Harry 
White, William Clayton, and George 
Marshall — were guided by a fine sense 
of history and, above all, by the bitter 
lessons of the interwar years. The in- 
ternational economy, which had flour- 
ished in the decades before 1914, was 
largely destroyed in subsequent war 
and revolution. Efforts to rebuild the 
system after 1918 were only partially 
successful, and the world economy 
almost disintegrated in the Great 
Depression. 

As country after country resorted 
to "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, trade 
shriveled, and employment and output 
plunged. The United States contributed 
to the sorry legacy of the 1930s through 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff and by scut- 
tling the London economic conference. 

The Postwar Record 

Fortunately, after the Second World 
War, we rejected isolationism and eco- 
nomic nationalism. Instead, in the 
spirit of Bretton Woods and the Mar- 
shall Plan, we opened our markets and 
allowed others to follow at their own 
pace. In Europe, men of vision — Robert 
Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Ludwig 
Erhard — guided the reconstruction of a 
war-torn continent. Economic integra- 
tion replaced ancient rivalries; pros- 
perity became a joint pursuit. 

Aided by timely Marshall Plan aid, 
the countries of Western Europe 
achieved remarkable economic growth 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Japan did 
even better. In less spectacular fashion, 
Canada and the United States also 
prospered. 

These were years of rapid de- 
colonialization as many former colonies 
became new countries. Whereas the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund] 
and World Bank had 31 members ini- 
tially, they have 151 members today. 

In the postwar period, growing 
output and living standards were pro- 
moted by a progressive freeing-up of 
trade and investment flows. Wide- 
spread exchange controls were phased 
out; tariffs were cut; capital controls 
were eased; and a variety of regional 
free trade arrangements — most notably 



the EEC [European Economic Com 
nity] — were introduced, encouragin 
further flows of goods, services, inv 
ment, and manpower among memb* 
countries. 

While enlightened government 
icies established a more open, mart 
oriented framework for postwar rec 
ery and growth, the real heroes of 
story were the unsung millions of ii 
viduals on every continent whose 
creativity and hard work made pos; 
an unprecedented era of prosperity. 

Transcending National Borders 

Increasingly, the world economy ha 
become a single stage with leading 
roles played by multinational comp; 
nies. Citicorp raises capital, obtain: 
deposits, extends loans, and trades 
rencies all around the world. Gener 
Motors buys and produces compont 
in scores of countries, assembles th 
in strategic locations, and markets 
finished vehicles on every continent 
And, of course, not all multinationa 
are headquartered in America — cor 
sider such names as Siemans, Phili] 
Thomsen, Mitsubishi, Honda, Hyui 
and Daewoo. 

Global economic integration is 
driven by continuing advances in sc 
ence and technology. Columbus too 
months to cross the Atlantic. By IS 
a clipper ship could make the trip i 
days. Some 70 years later, Lindber 
daring flight took 33 hours. Today, 
Concorde gets us there in 3 hours ; 
20 minutes. For much of today's coi 
merce, physical distance is irreleva 
modern telecommunications links u 
voice, visual image, and documents 
in less than a second. 

Nation States and 
the Gains From Trade 

National governments can impede c 
promote global economic integratioi 
Trade is, of course, the standard e> 
pie. Import-competing producers of 
seek protection from competitors 
abroad. Such protection widens the 
profit margins, but it limits choice ; 
raises prices to domestic consumers 
And it harms domestic exporters ai 
those domestic firms which receive 
protection against imports. 

Governments also often choose 
limit incoming foreign direct invest- 
ments. Such constraints benefit dor 
tic firms that would face additional 
competition. But they hurt domesti< 
consumers and those domestic resi- 
dents who might supply goods and 1 






1ft 



Deoartment of State Bulletin/January 



ECONOMICS 



services to the incoming foreign- 
ed concerns. 

Although a free trade policy bene- 
some domestic residents and hurts 
:rs, the gainers generally gain more 

the losers lose. Conversely, pro- 
ion usually hurts domestic residents 
lalance. These conclusions hold even 
lout taking account of the dynamic 
s from free trade, stemming from 
htened competition and the intro- 
,ion of new products and services. 
Aside from their diverse impacts 
iomestic residents, trade restric- 
s, of course, usually hurt foreign 
lucers. Japanese quotas hurt U.S. 
growers; U.S. quotas hurt New 
and lamb producers. In light of 
e considerations, this Administra- 
— albeit with some important slip- 
is — has sought to encourage open 
e policies both at home and abroad. 

ersing the Trend? 

ing the past several years, however, 
iomic integration has come under 
sure as the world economy has 
i buffeted by extreme inflation and 
lflation. 

We have cut inflation, but the leg- 
of the struggle remains: heavily 
bted developing countries, low com- 
ity prices, high unemployment in 
Dpe, and large trade imbalances. 
ie dislocations have prompted a 
of dire forecasts. But do they re- 
reality? 

Consider the record. Since 1982, 
United States has enjoyed a robust 
iomic expansion and markedly lower 
■ttion. Assisted by lower taxes and 
tjifieant deregulation — and prodded 
ji oreign competition — our output has 

■ i during the past 6 years at an an- 
p rate of 3.8%; our manufacturing 

19 luctivity has risen by almost 5% per 
I lm; and our unemployment rate has 
ii n from over 10% in early 1983 to 
H than 5.5% today. 

■ For a considerable period, this ex- 

fl uon was accompanied by a widening 
I. budget deficit and a growing U.S. 
trent account deficit. But a signifi- 
I shrinkage in both deficits is now in 
i^ress. In 1985, the budget deficit 
l*ed a peak of 5.2% of GNP [gross 
Bonal product]; this year, it will 
loably amount to about 3.2% of GNP. 
■t year, our current account deficit 
fainted to 3.4% of GNP; this year, it 
id well fall below 2.5%. 
I Recent strong U.S. economic 
■.vth has been accompanied by even 
linger growth in Japan, Britain, Can- 
I, and Asia. And this past year, ac- 
Ity in Germany has also quickened. 



The IMF now projects that industrial- 
country output will grow at a healthy 
3.8% in 1988. 

Continuing Challenges 

But, of course, problems remain — in 
particular, an overhang of Third World 
debt, creeping protectionism, and a big 
U.S. trade deficit; a few words on each: 

The Debt Problem. Since 1982, the 
creditor banks in the industrial coun- 
tries have bolstered their ability to ab- 
sorb defaults by adding to capital and 
reserves. Nonetheless, a serious con- 
frontation between the debtor countries 
and the banks would still threaten the 
international financial system. 

This Administration has sought to 
avoid that confrontation — encouraging 
the banks to lend new money and the 
debtor countries to reform their pol- 
icies with IMF assistance. The process 
has proceeded case by case. To 
strengthen their trade balances, the 
debtor countries have had to endure se- 
vere economic austerity. Is there a bet- 
ter way? 

Numerous "global solutions" have 
been proposed. But these schemes all 
fail to reflect important differences 
among the debtor countries; they would 
tend to reward poor policies; and they 
would require backstop insurance by 
creditor-country taxpayers. I believe 
that the case-by-case approach will 
work provided: 

First, that we can lower barriers 
to debtor-country exports; and 

Second, that the debtor countries 
revamp their economies. 

These countries have spawned nu- 
merous state-owned enterprises. (In 
Mexico, for example, state-owned firms 
rose from 86 in 1970 to 1,155 in 1982.) 
Inefficient and overstaffed, these con- 
cerns often require massive state sub- 
sidies. They should be cut back, closed 
down, or privatized. 

Debtor countries have also tended 
to fix exchange rates, interest rates, 
and other key prices at levels that lead 
either to shortages or to gluts. They 
need less price fixing and more reliance 
on market forces. For their part, cred- 
itors must realize that a large external 
debt imposes "a marginal tax on re- 
form." Unless both sides work together 
to reduce this tax, reforms may never 
occur. 

To prevent LDC [less developed 
country] debts from burdening the in- 
ternational economy in the 1990s will 



i>ar1 



artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



require cooperation and goodwill. This, 
I believe, was a key message in your 
group's recent thoughtful study of the 
LDC debt problem. 

Creeping Protectionism. Alas, the 
free-trading ideal of this Administration 
differs from the "warts-and-all" real 
world. In country after country, narrow 
domestic interests have persuaded all- 
too-willing governments to impose re- 
strictions on imports. True, tariffs have 
been cut substantially. But all too of- 
ten, they have been replaced with even 
more damaging nontariff barriers de- 
signed to evade GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] jurisdiction. 

The GATT needs refurbishing. It 
needs a quicker-acting, binding mecha- 
nism for settling disputes and a routine 
procedure for monitoring trade policies. 
It needs to cover services as well as 
goods and agricultural products as well 
as manufactures. And it needs to cover 
intellectual property rights. We hope to 
persuade our trading partners to accept 
these changes in the current Uruguay 
Round. 

The U.S. Trade Deficit. The U.S. 

trade balance can strengthen only if 
our domestic savings rise relative to 
our domestic investment spending. As- 
suming further growth in investment 
spending, we need to achieve some 
combination of smaller budget deficits 
and greater personal and business sav- 
ing. If Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sticks, 
our budget deficits will fall; and if the 
recent changes in consumer spending 
and corporate profits persist, private 
savings will also rise. As the latest fig- 
ures show, our external accounts are 
strengthening far more rapidly than 
most people thought likely even 6 
months ago. 

Our Relative Economic Strength 

Let me conclude with a few words 
about the place of the United States in 
the world economy. 

At the end of World War II, the 
United States dominated the world 
economy. In 1950, we accounted for 
two-thirds of the total output of the 
G-7 countries [Canada, France, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and West Germany] and over 
one-third of total G-7 exports. Our real 
wages and worker productivity were 
well above levels in other countries. 

Now, some four decades later, we 
remain the world's leading industrial 
power, but other free-world countries 
have gained enormously in relative 
wealth, output, and productivity. Some 



19 



ECONOMICS 



say that this development represents a 
failure of our national will and lead- 
ership. Not at all; it was inevitable — 
and highly desirable — that the war-torn 
economies of Japan and Western Eu- 
rope regain their prewar capabilities. 
Indeed, that was the explicit purpose of 
the Marshall Plan. It was also natural 
for their economies to benefit from a 
technological catchup. As these coun- 
tries have prospered, they have become 
stronger markets for our exports and 
low-cost suppliers of many desirable 
goods and services. 

French wines, Japanese auto- 
mobiles, Italian suits, British woolens, 
and German machine tools — these for- 
eign-made products, and many more, 
enhance our living standards and stim- 
uate innovation by our own producers. 

Despite the debt crisis, the devel- 
oping countries, as a group, have 
achieved an even more impressive rate 
of growth than our OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment] trading partners since the 
end of World War II. This, too, was 
natural. Starting from a much lower 
economic base, they had even greater 
scope for borrowing (and adapting) ad- 
vanced technology than did Japan or 
Western Europe. 

Nowhere have these gains been 
more impressive than in the newly in- 
dustrializing economies of the Pacific 
rim. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong — and, to a lesser ex- 
tent, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and the Philippines — have become 
important producers and exporters of 
manufactures. Indeed, their successes 
are forcing painful adjustments in com- 
peting sectors in all of the older indus- 
trial countries. 

Since 1983, trade across the Pacific 
has exceeded trade across the Atlantic. 
Nonetheless, the Pacific rim countries 
can benefit materially from greater co- 
operation. As George Shultz recently 
pointed out in a speech in Jakarta, we 
need to undertake joint discussions and 
cooperative actions in the areas of 
transportation, telecommunications, ed- 
ucation, and natural resources. 

More interesting than a comparison 
of the United States against its major 
trading partners is a comparison of the 
free-market NATO countries against 
the countries of the Warsaw Pact. In 
1960, the combined gross national prod- 
ucts of the NATO countries exceeded 
those of the Warsaw Pact by some 
$2.5 trillion (in 1986 dollars). By 1986, 
the gap had more than doubled to 
$5.5 trillion. 



20 



Far from burying the Western 
economies, the communist command 
economies have fallen increasingly be- 
hind. Recognizing that central planning 
just doesn't deliver the goods, the lead- 
ers of the two largest communist coun- 
tries — China and the Soviet Union — 
have recently sought to inject large ele- 
ments of capitalism into their systems. 



» 



These evolving actions — togethej ' 
with glasnost and perestroika — have 
momentous implications for the peop. I- 
of the free world as well as for the 
peoples of China, the Soviet Union, a 
the Soviet satellites. Is it possible th;fr- 
the Russian bear will become the Ru - 
sian lamb — and a neocapitaiist free- 
trading lamb, at that? Time will tell. I 



U.S. Stance Toward the Soviet Union 
on Trade and Technology 



by E. Allan Wendt 

Address before The Houston Club 
in Houston on October 27, 1988. Am- 
bassador Wendt is Senior Represen- 
tative for Strategic Technology Policy. 

I am delighted to be with you today to 
discuss U.S. policy on trade and tech- 
nology with the U.S.S.R. This is an 
issue of great importance for us as a 
nation. It has significant impact on our 
national security, and on our economic 
and political relationships with the So- 
viet Union and other countries of East- 
ern Europe. It affects our ties with 
China and with other friendly and al- 
lied countries. Our controls on such 
trade are applied for national security, 
foreign policy, and short supply rea- 
sons. It is on the first of these — na- 
tional security — that I will primarily 
focus. 

National Security Controls 

These controls have a long history. 
While I have not done any research on 
the matter, I would not be surprised to 
find that there were, early on, prohibi- 
tions on sales of muskets and powder to 
the Indians. The present legal basis is 
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
and the Export Administration Act of 
1979, as amended, most recently by the 
Omnibus Trade Act a few months ago. 
The Export Administration Act is ad- 
ministered primarily by the Depart- 
ment of Commerce, but many other 
agencies, especially the Departments of 
State, Defense, and Energy also play a 
role in policymaking and execution. 

National security controls are 
intended to prevent or delay our poten- 
tial adversaries from obtaining goods 



s; 



t 

« 

( 
l 

li 

and technologies from the advanced i f 
dustrial states and utilizing them for j* 1 
strategic or military purposes. Sever: 
friendly countries, the NATO allies 
(excluding Iceland) plus Japan, have 
worked together since 1949 in control 
ling such trade in an informal multi- li 
lateral grouping known as the 
Coordinating Committee on Multilate ij 
Strategic Export Controls, or COCO |fc 
which meets in Paris. That committee I 
establishes the lists of goods and teel 
nologies subject to control: lists deali 
with specific weapons and implement 
of war, with nuclear materials and 
equipment, and with so-called dual-u 
or general industrial equipment and li 
technologies that have military signif I 
cance. The committee seeks to keep L 
those lists up-to-date, works out pro- {) 



cedures for compliance with the con- 
trols, and reviews requests from 
members for exceptions to the em- 
bargo. Each member country applies 
the controls through its own domesti 
legislation, regulations, or procedure 

Committee proceedings are confi 
dential and decisions are by unanimo I 
agreement. In addition, a number of ' 
neutral and nonaligned countries coo I 
erate in varying degrees with the 
COCOM system, in their own politic; 
security, and commercial interests. 

Contrary to the assertions of sor 
it is not our policy to wage economic 
warfare against the U.S.S.R. and its 
allies. There was a time, at the heigl 
of the cold war and during the Chine 
intervention in the Korean conflict, 
when our export controls were quite 
extensive. These constituted a broad 
instrument that included financial an 
shipping limitations, and were intend 
to have a generalized adverse impact 
the economies of the Soviet Union ar 



Department of State Bulletin/January 19 



ECONOMICS 



Bailies. The controls then sought to 
dJbargo a wide variety of basic indus- 
Id raw materials, machinery, fuels, 
Iricants, and the equipment to pro- 
le and process them, in addition to 
I more understandable munitions and 
blear-related controls that were part 
Ihe package. 

Janges in the Controls 

l:r the years, reflecting the ups and 
l/ns of East-West political rela- 
liships, there have been many 
Inges in the types and levels of con- 
ns. Compared with the Korean war 
Jiiod, there has been a sharp reduc- 
i l in the extent of coverage of the 
Ititegic controls. They now focus more 
■ cifically on the critical components 
( technologies of modern warfare, 

9 ch we believe give us a qualitative 
|e over potential adversaries. 

I The change has been attributable: 

• First, to a realization that the 
S ted States could not "go it alone," 
t t such controls could not be effective 
tfhout the cooperation of the major 
r Jstrial nations of the West; and 
i • Second, to a recognition that 
t h incremental improvements in the 
r rail East- West relationship, the 
jl wth of West European economic in- 

I nee and the desire of those coun- 
ts to expand export markets, our 

II 3s in the COCOM multilateral con- 
I system were not prepared to coop- 
5! te in any but a strictly justified and 
r *e narrowly defined embargo list. 

Compared with the 1950s, and 
1$ )s, the character of the embargo 
:1 nged, as well. High-tech devices and 
< inology are less and less the product 
)1 nilitary-related research, or spin-offs 
id Defense Department laboratories or 
p jects. The process has been re- 
Wsed. Now, much of the new tech- 
V }gy and materials on the control 
i s come from research and develop- 
fe at funded by industry, in expectation 
K >rofitable sale and application in the 
limercial world. We sometimes find 
i v later that this technology has 
mpons or other defense applications. 
j;se are the so-called dual-use items, 
w ich have major civil uses, but also 
iDortant strategic applications that we 
|jld not want the Soviets to use 
iiinst us. 
I I know there are those among you 

10 are keenly interested in the pros- 
I'ts for relaxation in the controls on 
- lie of the equipment and technology 
B'lized for seismic exploration for oil 



and gas. I am sure many of you know 
that much of the sophisticated equip- 
ment used in seismic work has signifi- 
cant strategic applications in antisub- 
marine warfare, nuclear research, and 
weapons development and design. 
High-capacity, high-speed computers 
used in seismic work are subject to 
strict export controls to all destinations 
outside the United States. 

Last week a member of my staff 
met with export control officials of the 
Commerce and Defense Departments 
and members of the International Asso- 
ciation of Geophysical Equipment Man- 
ufacturers. The industry represent- 
atives gave a clear and convincing pres- 
entation of the problems these controls 
had for their business. They stressed 
their willingness to try to work out ar- 
rangements that might permit addi- 
tional exports to the U.S.S.R., 
Hungary, and China but with safe- 
guards against unfriendly use of the 
equipment. We may be successful in 
reaching some reasonable accommoda- 
tion, or we may not, but I cite this case 
to underscore the high level of shared 
effort by industry and government in 
the export control area to mesh our 
national security and export promotion 
objectives wherever possible. 

Foreign Policy Controls 

In addition to the multilateral re- 
straints exercised through COCOM, the 
United States maintains near total 
unilateral embargoes and import re- 
strictions on trade and financial trans- 
actions with Cuba, Vietnam, North 
Korea, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Lib- 
ya. These controls have their origins in 
special circumstances arising from the 
expropriation of U.S. properties by the 
Castro regime, the absence of nor- 
malization agreements following the 
Korean and Vietnamese conflicts, and 
the state terrorism of the Qadhafi re- 
gime. In addition, we also exercise con- 
trols for other policy reasons, such as 
against South Africa because of its 
apartheid policies. 

As many of you know, the United 
States has also applied similar foreign 
policy export controls against the 
U.S.S.R. as an expression of political 
condemnation of Soviet human rights 
violations or — as noted above — for stra- 
tegic control purposes. One such in- 
stance was the effort to prevent the 
development of high-capacity gas pipe- 
lines from Soviet western Siberia to the 
border between the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO members. These controls met 



fierce resistance from our NATO allies, 
who were adamantly opposed to what 
they saw as the extraterritorial applica- 
tion of U.S. controls on firms in those 
countries even though these firms were 
subsidiaries of American companies. 
Other limitations on oil and gas explo- 
ration equipment and technologies were 
applied in reaction to increased Soviet 
violations of human rights, to the im- 
position of martial law in Poland, and 
as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 

Under the Export Administration 
Act, foreign policy export controls are 
subject to annual review and renewal in 
order to ensure that they remain neces- 
sary, effective, and in the national in- 
terest. The controls on oil and gas 
transmission equipment lapsed in 1983 
because they no longer met these crite- 
ria, and the remaining controls on ex- 
port of oil and gas exploration and pro- 
duction equipment (including equip- 
ment and technology to manufacture 
such equipment) lapsed on January 20, 
1987. As I mentioned earlier, however, 
some equipment and technology are 
still controlled by national security reg- 
ulations because of their potential for 
strategic applications. 

Controls in a Global Context 

Fundamental to understanding U.S. 
economic policy toward the Soviet 
Union is a recognition that it is but one 
component of our bilateral relationship 
and our global stance. That is the ap- 
proach of the present Administration, 
and it is well founded in history. The 
promotion of U.S. -Soviet economic rela- 
tions in the early 1970s outpaced other 
areas of the relationship. This resulted 
in feelings of frustration and failure. 
Both countries should seek to avoid re- 
peating that experience. 

Today, the relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union re- 
mains competitive and adversarial. So 
long as the adversarial dimension re- 
mains in Soviet relations with the 
United States, Western Europe, Japan, 
and much of the rest of the world, re- 
strictions on strategic trade will remain 
in force. 

Changed economic realities here in 
the United States, the massive adverse 
trade balance, unemployment and over- 
capacity in many domestic industries, 
and an awareness that the United 
States does not have the same relative 
size that it once had in the world econ- 
omy, have made the American business 
community, the Congress, and the Ad- 
ministration much more sensitive to our 



i partment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



21 



ECONOMICS 



need to be competitive in world mar- 
kets. We are all looking for ways to 
increase that competitiveness. 

One area being addressed is the 
impact our security trade controls have 
on our trade with noncommunist cus- 
tomers, particularly the delays inherent 
in the need to ensure that exports of 
sensitive materials are not diverted or 
illegally reexported to proscribed desti- 
nations. The January 1987 report of the 
National Academy of Sciences, Balanc- 
ing the National Interest: U.S. Na- 
tional Security Export Controls and 
Global Economic Competition, con- 
tends that U.S. components may be de- 
signed out of foreign high-tech products 
because of the difficulty of securing 
timely U.S. Government reexport ap- 
proval. If this is a widely shared view, 
we hope to be able to deal with it con- 
structively in the near future. 

Many of the Export Administration 
Act amendments passed by the Con- 
gress in the trade act last summer 
address these issues. Staffing and pro- 
cedural improvements in the Bureau of 
Export Administration at Commerce, 
and in the Office of Munitions Control 
at State, continue to cut down the proc- 
essing time for license applications. In 
addition, for the first time in many 
years, there appears to be concerted 
interest in our industrial and commer- 
cial circles for reductions in the U.S. 
and COCOM control lists, particularly 
with regard to those few items where 
export restrictions on the commodity 
control list or the U.S. munitions list 
are broader or more severe than on the 
multilaterally agreed COCOM list. 

Opinions sometimes differ among 
the various interested agencies of our 
government about the precise formula- 
tion of the control lists, and about par- 
ticular control measures required. It is 
part of my job to promote a reasonable 
consensus among these agencies. Nev- 
ertheless, I believe there is no dis- 
agreement about the broad lines of our 
security export control policy. I feel 
confident, moreover, that the continua- 
tion of our program is not a partisan 
political issue and that future admin- 
istrations will continue to give the pro- 
gram the priority it traditionally has 
carried. 

Only fundamental and sustained 
changes in Soviet national security and 
foreign policies could lead to the basis 
of trust needed to diminish significantly 
these restrictions. We would welcome 
such changes, and we remain alert to 
identify them. What we face now, how- 
ever, is a Soviet Union where the de- 
fense budget continues to increase and 



formidable military deployments remain 
in an offensive posture. Illicit Soviet 
efforts to obtain foreign strategic tech- 
nology are undiminished: The Toshiba/ 
Kongsberg case, which has had its 
share of media coverage and congres- 
sional attention over the past year, is 
but one example. 

The Soviet Union maintains a 
military-industrial complex far in ex- 
cess of legitimate defense needs. They 
are the largest manufacturers of weap- 
ons in the world. They deploy enormous 
firepower throughout Asia and Europe. 

How do we deal with this situa- 
tion? Our own military deterrent and 
arms reduction agreements with 
Moscow are important components of 
our policy. But our superiority in tech- 
nology is essential to our continuing 
success. To the extent that such things 
may be calculated, we may have a 10- 
year lead over the Soviets in tech- 
nology. We may be even further ahead 
in computers, telecommunications, and 
command and control mechanisms. 

If we ever lose that lead we would 
be in serious trouble. We must bear in 
mind that a publicly proclaimed goal of 
perestroika is to improve the Soviet 
Union's technological capabilities. Tra- 
ditionally, the Soviet Union does not 
create significant new technology but 
rather imports it from the West — either 
by legitimate purchase or by stealing 
it. 

In October 1988 we may judge that 
there has been substantial improvement 
in U.S. -Soviet relations over the last 3 
years in the areas of human rights, re- 
gional issues, arms reduction, and bilat- 
eral matters. This improvement is 
understandably leading to renewed in- 
terest in a higher level of economic 
interchange. 

At both the Washington and 
Moscow summits, President Reagan 
and General Secretary Gorbachev ex- 
pressed their "strong support for the 
expansion of mutually beneficial trade 
and economic relations." This past 
April in Moscow the Joint U.S. -Soviet 
Commercial Commission (JCC) held its 
10th meeting, with specific instructions 
from the Washington summit to develop 
concrete steps to facilitate such an ex- 
pansion. These are significant ex- 
pressions by the leadership of the two 
governments and are taken very seri- 
ously in the two countries. In April the 
Joint U.S. -Soviet Commercial Commis- 
sion agreed on the following actions: 

• To establish a joint legal seminar 
to examine the changes needed in com- 
mercial law to facilitate business; 

• To set up working groups on five 
key economic sectors, where further co- 



operation looks promising and stratej J 
considerations are manageable (food ; 
processing, oil and gas equipment, 
housing, medical equipment, construe J 
tion); and, 

• To allow the U.S. Commercial (J 
fice in Moscow to publish a newletter :l 
advertising American products for di. J 
tribution to Soviet trade organization'] 
and enterprises. 

No time has been wasted in building j 
these agreements. The legal seminar- J 
including general counsels from For- » 
tune 500 firms and the relevant gov- I 
ernment agencies — took place in Sep ij 
tember 1988 in Moscow, as did the fir' 
of the working group meetings. 

Future Expectations and Constrain I 

All of these steps have been taken in ) 
the current context of improved U.S. [J 
Soviet relations. They represent, on w 
American as on the Soviet side, the <U 
velopment of policies in response to I 
new opportunities. But limits remain i 
the development of future economic i li 
operation. As we see it, these limits 
are found in three broad categories c • 
constraints. 

The first relates to strategic tra J 
with which I have already dealt in sc e 
detail. Needless to say, so long as th 
adversarial dimension remains in U.i 
Soviet relations, restrictions on strai 
gic trade necessarily will stay in pla> 

Despite these factors, there is, i I 
principle, ample scope for more peat 
ful trade. If Mr. Gorbachev pursues I 
port and joint venture opportunities 
designed to improve the standard of ■ 
ing and quality of life of the long suf I 
ing average Soviet citizen, there are ' 
many areas where we can cooperate 
with minimum strategic technology ] - 
icy problems. Medical technology, co 
sumer products, and the food sector t 
just a few examples that come to mi . 

A second, systemic, constraint 
comes into play, however: There are I 
obstacles, inherent in the Soviet sys 
tern, to conducting profitable busines 
in the Soviet Union. There is the rel 
tive paucity of economically attractiv 
Soviet exports, the nonconvertibility 
the ruble, and the apparent Soviet n | 
quirements that the Western joint vt 
ture partner be primarily responsibli 
for generating enough convertible fu - 
ing to carry the partnership. These :| 
other aspects of the Soviet economy 
have an adverse impact on the attrac 
tiveness of such arrangements for in I 
ested American firms. 



22 



Department of State Bulletin/January 1'9 



EUROPE 



The third set of constraints con- 
ns nonstrategic trade. In this area 

bstantial trade gains could be possi- 
B if there are major and enduring 
iprovements in Soviet practices in 

gard to human rights and emigration. 
Is cannot overlook the Jackson- Vanik 
.aendment, which stipulates that 
>)st-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treat- 
fcnt may not be granted to any coun- 
V which restricts emigration. 

(mclusion 

■je thought that I wish to leave with 
i u is that the authority to bring about 
te required changes lies in Moscow, 
it in Washington, Tokyo, or in West- 
m Europe at COCOM meetings. 
!;aningful Soviet actions — not words — 
t address human rights concerns and 
t lift the obstacles to emigration could 
pduce the necessary consensus in the 
jnerican public, the Congress, and the 
( ecutive branch needed for granting 
] 7 N treatment in the context of 
j.'kson- Vanik. Recent developments in 
Sviet emigration policies — the increase 
i those permitted to leave — have been 
t couraging. But far more remains to 
1 done. 

This link between the Soviet mili- 
1-y posture, illicit technology acquisi- 
i n, human rights, and trade is not the 
i :lusive preoccupation of the executive 
1 inch or the object of only sporadic 
i ention by the Congress. On the con- 
1 iry, it is an enduring feature of U.S. 
i operation with its allies when dealing 
" th the Soviet Union because it re- 
! cts the longstanding attitudes of the 
. nerican people. We await increased 
! viet efforts to address these con- 
i "ns. If such efforts bear fruit, I do 
] t believe the American people and 
1 jir elected representatives will be 
1 jgard in making the appropriate ad- 
I ;tments in our trade policies. 

Perhaps it is a Russian proverb 
;1it says, "When your feet are cold, 
] t on a hat." The way for Moscow to 
jomote U.S. -Soviet economic relations 
i to accelerate progress on the other 
i 'ments in our relationship that I have 
liefly touched on. 

Secretary of Defense Carlucci re- 
i ntly wrote about "the realism that 
nst accompany the hope that the fa- 
ire will see a less threatening Soviet 
lion." The Soviet Union is exploring 
any new positive ways of dealing with 
■ internal problems. If Moscow should 
come equally creative in its dealings 
! th the United States and the rest of 
e world, U.S. -Soviet trade is but one 
ea that would prosper. ■ 



The European Community's 
Program for a Single Market 
in 1992 



.rt« Unilad SUIQB Govarnment 
haa not necoflnizad tha incorporation of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
into tha Soviet Union 
Othar boundary rapraaantation 
la not nacBaaarily authoritative 




Since its origins in the 1950s, the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) has moved con- 
tinually toward greater economic 
integration. However, each EC state 
has maintained many of its own indus- 
trial standards, taxes, and other fea- 
tures of national economic sovereignty 
that have complicated the free move- 
ment of goods and services within the 
Community. Now, in an environment of 
increased economic interdependence, 
the 12 member countries [Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal] are work- 
ing to remove barriers to the movement 
of goods, services, capital, and labor. If 
all goes as planned, the European Com- 
munity essentially will become a single 
market of more than 320 million con- 
sumers by January 1, 1993. 

The proposed EC single market 
would have many features in common 
with the 50 American States, which 
benefit from the efficiencies generated 
by the free flow of economic and human 
resources. Politically, greater economic 



integration would bind Europe closer 
together, a primary goal of the Commu- 
nity's founders. A single market also 
would enhance the influence of the EC 
institutions in relation to individual Eu- 
ropean governments. Nonetheless, the 
EC's political power would continue to 
be substantially less than that of the 
U.S. Federal Government. 

Studies indicate that full implemen- 
tation of the program would bring 
wide-ranging, advantageous structural 
adjustment in Europe, as well as gains 
in gross domestic product. Specific ben- 
efits are expected from: 

• Supply-side effects — the direct 
cost savings from the removal of border 
barriers; 

• Economies of scale in production 
for a larger market; 

• Increased competition; 

• Greater expenditure on research 
and development; and 

• Demand side effects — lower 
prices, greater variety of products to 
stimulate consumer demand, and lower 
budgetary expenditures on government 
regulations. 



epartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



23 



EUROPE 



The EC's single market program 
significantly will affect U.S. business 
through new product standards, new 
laws and business regulations, stronger 
growth, and stiffer competition. Our 
mutual economic interests are huge: in 
1987, U.S.-EC trade totaled $145 bil- 
lion. Direct investment in each other's 
markets is estimated at $280 billion, 
and portfolio investment is even higher. 
American businesses should be prepar- 
ing now to deal with a more integrated 
and stronger European Community. 

U.S. support for European integra- 
tion remains a cornerstone of our 
foreign policy. An open and vibrant Eu- 
rope reinforces the common bond of de- 
mocracy, strengthens the Atlantic 
alliance, and can be a powerful engine 
for economic growth. Some aspects of 
various proposals under discussion, 
however, have the potential to harm 
U.S. interests and move the world away 
from a multilateral trading system. In- 
creased competition from within the 
EC could lead European businesses to 
seek more protection from outside. 
Senior EC officials have stated repeat- 
edly that the program, as envisioned, 
will not result in an economic monolith 
but, rather, will generate dynamic com- 
petition. Nevertheless, as the single 
market evolves, the U.S. Government 
continues to consult with the EC and 
will take appropriate steps to prevent 
establishment of new barriers to for- 
eign trade and investment. In addition, 
the U.S. Government is working with 
businesses and other interested groups 
to identify problems and opportunities 
that might arise in the new EC pro- 
posals and laws. Finally, we hope that 
the EC uses the program to promote 
increasingly open policies by eliminat- 
ing remaining trade barriers such as 
quotas and restrictive standards. We 
believe the EC owes it to the world to 
be a champion of free trade. 

The Single Market Program 
and Beyond 

The basis for the single market pro- 
gram is contained in a 1985 White Pa- 
per by the European Commission which 
identified 300 directives (since reduced 
to 285) needed to remove physical, 
technical, and fiscal barriers among 
member states. The EC also has 
pledged to strengthen Community law 
to achieve and enforce an integrated 
market. The program received an 
important boost in 1987 with the entry 



into force of the Single European Act, 
which provides for qualified majority, 1 
rather than unanimous, voting in the 
Council to adopt most legislation. The 
act also set the 1992 deadline for the 
program and expanded the Parliament's 
legislative role. 

While the bulk of the program 
focuses on eliminating border controls 
and harmonizing standards for goods, 
significant progress is being made in 
other areas, such as the removal of bar- 
riers to free capital flows and provision 
of financial services, promoting airline 
competition, and the mutual recognition 
of professional diplomas. European in- 
tegration, exceeding the confines of the 
single market program, will take the 
EC increasingly into environmental 
protection, law enforcement, and eco- 
nomic policy coordination. It also will 
strengthen existing common energy 
and transport policies. 

Creating a true common market 
will involve a shift in policy and a sig- 
nificant transfer of authority from 
member state governments to the EC. 
So far, members have agreed to most of 
the single market program, partly be- 
cause the Commission has insisted on 
an "all or nothing" approach. However, 
as more difficult subjects come up 
(e.g., the harmonization of taxation, the 
creation of a European central bank, or 
proposals for worker participation in 
firms), the Commission may encounter 
more resistance from individual govern- 
ments. Also, political leaders through- 



out the Community have different id' 
about the exact shape of a future int. 
grated market and the accompanying 
political structures. 

In some areas, such as tax harm 
nization, in which members are less 
willing to cede national sovereignty, 
the elements of the single market wi 
not be completely in place by the em 
1992. But Europe seems likely to pre 
ceed significantly along its pragmati 
approach to integration within the n 
4 years, and the momentum should 
impetus to the removal of difficult hi 
riers. As of October 1988, the Comm. 
sion has proposed 204 directives (law 
81 remain to be formulated. The EC 
has adopted 91 directives, and they ; 
in various stages of implementation 
member states. Lord Cockfield, EC 
Vice President in charge of the singl 
market effort, wants virtually all dii 
tives to be presented to the Europe; 
Parliament and the Council of Minisl 
by December 1988. 

The present push for integratioi 
driven by a series of forces that havi 
not been present in earlier efforts t( 
form a single market. European bus 
nesses have been strong supporters 
the single market program since the 
realize that they cannot compete wi 
companies from the United States, 
Japan, and elsewhere without a larg 
home market. In anticipation, Euro 
pean business is reorganizing, as 
evidenced by a wave of mergers, tat 
overs, and modernizations. Citizens 



EC Public Opinion 



As the single market program gains mo- 
mentum, more people in Europe have 
focused on the EC's decisionmaking proc- 
ess and have concluded that the mecha- 
nism is not sufficiently democratic. The 
EC Commission, a nonelected body, iden- 
tifies areas that need work and drafts pro- 
posals for submission to the Council and 
to the Parliament, which is the only di- 
rectly elected body in the EC. Despite 
majority support for the process of eco- 
nomic integration, polls indicate three out 
of four EC citizens favor a referendum in 
which the question of European union 
would be decided by the public. A major- 
ity favors giving the Parliament full leg- 
islative power. Proponents of more 
openness in the EC use these poll results 
to demonstrate a growing backlash 
against the "democratic deficit" of the 
present process. 

According to an EC poll, interesting 
discrepancies appear. The British and 



Danish peoples are the most reluctant t( 
give the Parliament power to enact laws 
that would directly affect countries and 
about forming a European government t I 
would answer to this Parliament. On the \ 
other hand, almost 70% of the Italian re- 
spondents would favor those steps. A m 
jority of French, Belgians, and Spanish 
also are willing to see more authority 
shifted to a European government and tl 
Parliament. 

Each member state has commission 
polls to gauge the depth of national und< 
standing of the single market program. 1) 
French get highest marks, showing almo 
universal awareness of the program and 
aims. The German and British publics hi! 
about 50% awareness, while other coun-' 
tries tend to be somewhat lower. In 
response, many EC members have unde 
taken education campaigns, in part to p<- 
tion their businesses and publics for the 
more competitive environment after 199S 



24 



Department of State Bulletin/January 



EUROPE 



ch member state slowly are becoming 
ibued with a spirit of "Europeanism." 
laropean leaders are responding to the 
jlitical appeal of a more united Eu- 
■pe. Most importantly, EC members 
iw accept more readily the long-term 
Inefits of allowing market forces to 
i termine adjustments to change and 
dcognize this is easier with a large, 
tegrated market. As West Europeans 
jree to common rules for trade, in- 
stment, and travel, their monetary 
d fiscal policies also will tend to con- 
^jrge further. 

The 1985 White Paper underscores 
4s Commission's obligation to take 
Mat ever steps are necessary to ensure 
{s free movement of goods within the 
(immunity. For instance, Article 90 of 
is 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing 
t> European Economic Community 
Ires the European Commission the au- 
Iprity to issue direct orders to mem- 
ir states (without EC Council or 
lrliament approval) to allow competi- 
t n in areas of market monopoly. Re- 
it ltly, the Commission used this tool to 
c en up the market for telecommunica- 
te ns terminal equipment. 



Common Agricultural Policy 



Instituted in 1962, the common agricultural 
policy has allowed the EC to become more 
than self-sufficient in many agricultural 
commodities and has provided more stable 
incomes to the European farming popula- 
tion. The common agricultural policy today, 
however, consumes some 70% of the EC 
budget and — through its complicated net- 
work of protection, price supports, and sub- 
sidies — has created large surpluses of 
many agricultural products. EC export sub- 
sidies, used to dispose of some of these 
surpluses, have helped to create a dis- 
torted and unstable market in agricultural 
commodities. Over the years, EC products 
benefiting from the common agricultural 
policy have displaced some U.S. farm 
exports. 

The single market program will have 
only a small direct effect on the common 
agricultural policy. The harmonization of ag 
ricultural health rules for animals and 
plants will reduce barriers that have kept 
the EC's agricultural markets somewhat 
segmented. As the Community eliminates 
border controls, it must act on the taxes or 



subsidies levied at the frontier on agri- 
cultural trade. Further monetary harmoniza- 
tion is likely to result in the elimination of 
the special agricultural exchange rates 
which also have served to protect markets 
from intra-EC competition. 

Another effect of the single market pro- 
gram on the common agricultural policy will 
come as other sectors seek funds to ease 
the adjustment brought about by the pro- 
gram. An EC budget package adopted last 
winter, aimed at balancing the budget and 
reducing growth in agricultural expenditures 
over the next 4 years, resolved short-term 
budgetary problems by basically resorting 
to supply management techniques. While 
the package may reduce agricultural over- 
supply within the EC and help limit new 
pressure on international agricultural mar- 
kets, it does not contribute significantly to 
the fundamental reform needed to create a 
system where farmers produce in response 
to market signals. The global reform of ag- 
ricultural policies remains a U.S. objective 
and a major task of the current round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. 



ecific Sectors 

dustrial Standards. Although each 
Z state has its own set of industrial 
indards, the list of product categories 
rered by harmonization and mutual 
:ognition is growing. The EC's new 
proach will mandate minimum stand- 
is and then require member coun- 
es to recognize other EC countries' 
indards. As an example, France re- 
ntly was forced to accept German 
lam cheese for sale, despite the fact 
at the cheese did not meet minimum 
■ench fat content. German beer purity 
vs also were found in violation of the 
mtual recognition" concept. 

Standards are a two-edged sword. 
i the one hand, the elimination of 12 
parate standards and requirements 
ows Europe-wide marketing. On the 
her, new European standards could 
elude foreign products from all EC 
untries. Clearly, standards can he- 
me barriers to trade. 

The Commission has identified sev- 
'. al high priority areas for harmoniza- 
Dn of standards, including motor 
hides, tractors and agricultural 
achines, food industries, pharmaceu- 
!?als, chemicals, and construction. 
I.S. multinational companies estab- 
■hed in Europe are better able to 
ake their voices heard in the crucial 



area of standards setting than are U.S. 
exporters. The United States has been 
consulting with the EC Commission to 
achieve better access to the process for 
all our firms. 

Government Contracts. The an- 
nual value of government procurement 
in the EC is estimated at about $550 
billion, of which roughly 20% is subject 
to open tendering and only 2% awarded 
to non-national firms. The Commission 
aims to substantially open EC procure- 
ment practices by the end of 1992 and 
to extend competition into the telecom- 
munications, water, energy, and trans- 
port sectors. It also has proposed to 
improve the remedies open to suppliers 
who believe that the contracting au- 
thority has violated their Community 
right to bid. An EC content rule of 
origin will be the likely vehicle used for 
limiting third-country competition. The 
U.S. Government will continue to press 
the EC to open up procurement to U.S. 
companies, both in bilateral discussions 
and in the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions taking place under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 



Financial Services. The major 
thrust in banking is to create a single 
EC banking license and to agree on 
equivalent banking supervision stand- 
ards. This would give a bank incor- 
porated in any member state the 
automatic right to set up branches and/ 
or conduct cross-border transactions in 
any other member state, while remain- 
ing under "home country control" for 
legal and regulatory purposes. A Com- 
mission directive liberalizing non-life in- 
surance transactions finally received 
Council approval in February 1988. 
Efforts to reduce restrictions in life in- 
surance are scheduled to follow. The 
Commission also intends to facilitate 
Community-wide trading for stocks and 
bonds, including electronic linkages be- 
tween West European stock markets. 

In parallel with the liberalization 
of financial services is a separate effort 
to free the movement of capital within 
the Community. In November 1986, the 
Council liberalized long-term flows, 
such as loans and securities. In June 
1988, EC Finance Ministers decided to 
remove all remaining barriers to short- 
term capital movements within the 
Community by 1990 (Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Ireland by 1992). EC mem- 



epartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



25 



EUROPE 



bers also are discussing the possibility 
of a European Central Bank and a sin- 
gle currency. It is unlikely that any 
form of unified EC banking authority 
could be achieved without first extend- 
ing the European monetary system 
to include all the EC currencies and 
strengthening the European currency 
unit. 

Transportation. A series of EC 
domestic air transport liberalization 
measures took effect in January 1988. 
Designed to increase competition, the 
package contains three major elements: 
measures allowing airlines to reduce 
fares on intra-EC routes, increased ac- 
cess to certain routes through "multiple 
designation" measures, and greater 
flexibility in passenger-sharing ar- 
rangements. Block exemptions from 
these rules are allowed for certain 
kinds of agreements, such as those for 
computer reservation systems. This 
package is regarded as a first step and 
is valid for 30 months, with a commit- 
ment to revise the measures subse- 
quently. Maritime transport legislation 
took effect in July 1987, with major 
changes to be phased in through the 
end of 1992. Key features are the reduc- 
tion of cargo-sharing arrangements, 
measures to address unfair pricing by 
third-country carriers, and common ac- 
tion against third-country offenders. 
Road transport measures are farther 
advanced, with a single customs docu- 
ment for truckers and agreement on 
deregulated competition. 

New Technologies and Services. 
Four areas are covered: television 
broadcasting, information services, pay- 
ment cards, and electronic payment. A 
"Television Without Frontiers" directive 
regarding TV broadcasting was pro- 
posed in 1986, significantly including a 
"European content" rule. The Commis- 
sion also has proposed a decision to 
encourage the development of the infor- 
mation services market, such as better 
use of data bases. 

Telecommunications. Although 
not covered expressly in the single mar- 
ket program, the EC is making slow 
but steady progress toward liberaliza- 
tion in this sector. Recently, the Com- 
mission ordered member states to open 
up competition in telephone and other 
user equipment. Further directives are 
promised on services, compatibility of 
standards, and government procure- 
ment of telecommunications equipment. 

Social Programs. Significant by its 
absence from the EC's 1985 White Pa- 
per was any mention of social issues, 



The European Community and the U 


nited States, 


1987 






U.S. Exports 


U.S. Impo 




Per Capita 


to EC 


trom EC 




Population GNP GNP 


(l.a.s. 


(c.i.f. 




(million) ($ billion) ($) 


$ billion) 


$ billion) 


EC 


323.62 4,120.2 12,732 


60.6 


84.9 


Belgium- 


10.27 144.7 14,090 


6.2 


4.4 


Luxembourg 








Denmark 


5.12 97.5 19,041 


0.9 


1.9 


France 


55.61 846.9 15,229 


7.9 


11.2 


Germany 


60.99 1,129.9 18,526 


11.7 


28.0 


Greece 


10.01 45.9 4,584 


0.4 


0.5 


Ireland 


3.56 25.6 7,180 


1.8 


1.2 


Italy 


57.36 632.1 11,021 


5.5 


11.7 


Netherlands 


14.64 213.5 14,581 


8.2 


4.2 


Portugal 


10.35 33.4 3,229 


0.6 


0.7 


Spain 


38.84 284.0 7,312 


3.1 


3.1 


United Kingdom 


56.87 666.7 11,723 


14.1 


18.0 


United States 


243.77 4,526.7 18,659 






Source: U.S. Department of Commerce 







such as workers' rights, health and 
safety in the workplace, unemployment, 
and training. The Commission has rem- 
edied that by recently proposing 80 
steps addressing social concerns. Chief 
among them are provisions to allow 
workers to participate in some corpo- 
rate decisionmaking and a standard la- 
bor contract. The Commission has said 
that these proposals would not be ap- 
plied to EC companies in non-EC coun- 
tries (unlike a highly controversial 
earlier proposal). European trade 
unions have welcomed this package; 
previously they complained that the 
single market was a program designed 
only for business. Labor is an impor- 
tant sector for the EC to "win over." 
There does appear, however, to be sub- 
stantial early opposition from some 
countries to the broad scope of some 
of these social proposals. 

EC Business Law. Proposals in 
this area will primarily affect EC sub- 
sidiaries of U.S. firms located in the 
EC rather than U.S. exporters. The 
impact on these subsidiaries essentially 
will be the same as on EC firms. The 
Commission wants to create an environ- 
ment that allows companies from dif- 
ferent member states to be able to 
cooperate more effectively. In promot- 
ing this goal, the Commission intends 
to harmonize the rules that apply to 
how firms operate. On the important 
issue of intellectual property rights, 
trademark and copyright regulations 
eventually will be harmonized. The EC 



will continue to examine and rule on ] 
mergers and acquisitions. In general I 
hopes to use company law to promot 
economic and technical progress witr 
the framework of a single market. 

Health Standards in Agricultui I 
Shipments. Border authorities genei 
ally apply their own national laws in 
regulating shipments of plant and mi 
products. The single market would 
allow free circulation of agricultural 
goods. Health standards would be er 
forced in the originating country for 
shipments within the EC and the po 
of first entry into the Community foi 
imports from non-EC countries. Pro; 
ress has been slow, however, in adop 
ing Commission initiatives to harmoi I 
regulations. 

This could spark a number of trt 
frictions with the United States be- 
cause of the importance of the Euro- 
pean market for U.S. farm exports. i 
U.S. agricultural exporters are con- 
cerned that EC health directives and I 
regulations could be used to protect I 
European products. In particular, thi 
are watching to see the directives on 
pesticides and allowable pesticide res 
dues on products. Two measures in tl| 
animal health field (meat inspection l 
quirements and a ban on certain hor- 
mones) already have created trade 
problems for U.S. exporters. While t' 
first issue has been resolved, the latt 
will induce U.S. retaliation if it be- 
comes fully effective in its current fo:i 
on January 1, 1989. The United State: 



26 



Department of State Bulletin/January 19l| 



EUROPE 



1 continue to monitor EC agri- 
tural directives and take appropriate 
ps to ensure that U.S. farm export- 
do not become victims of discrimi- 
ory policies. 

Taxes. The EC proposes reducing 
iations in indirect tax rates so that 
der controls no longer will be neces- 
y to adjust indirect taxes as goods 
;a frontiers. It would establish a 
ted range for the value added tax in 
member states. The proposal faces 
lificant resistance because of the 
e variety of value added tax rates 
differences in the products covered, 
porate taxation also is a controver- 
issue. Agreement on taxes requires 
lanimous vote of the Council. 

Energy. Creation of an internal en- 
11/ market long has been a goal of the 
| Issues include the sale of elec- 
I ty across borders and directly to 
ijpanies, common carrier gas and oil 

lines, tax harmonization, environ- 
j tal protection, and security of en- 
supplies. There has been little 
|;ress so far, although the European 
■ nic Energy Agency has responsi- 
I y in the nuclear energy field for 
! ty and environmental standards and 
I supplies. 

U iprocity 

1 EC Commission has proposed re- 
i ing "reciprocity" from third coun- 
r i before granting new rights in the 
i le market, especially in areas, such 
8 ervices, not governed currently by 
"i rnational trading rules in the GaTT 
r the Organization for Economic Co- 
{ - ation and Development. The 
a imission — still in the process of for- 

I iting policy on the implications of 
h single market program for non-EC 
i ibers— has yet to define reciprocity. 
k ie in the Community want to use 

h benefits of the program as negotiat- 
n leverage to open up foreign markets 
iij to reach multilateral agreements 
ai rable to the EC in areas not cov- 

I I by the GATT. Others want to use 
e procity to protect EC firms from 
oign competition. EC officials have 
U jested a number of possible stand- 
s'; for judging reciprocity, including 
isonal treatment, identical regula- 
rs, or a cross-sectoral balance of 

io sessions. 

National Treatment. The United 
Jfi.es accords national treatment in 

ually every sector and believes that 
W onal treatment should be granted 



unconditionally. However, the EC may 
make national treatment and the right 
to do business conditional on receiving 
the same treatment for EC firms in the 
foreign country. 

Identical Treatment. Some in the 
EC want firms operating abroad to re- 
ceive the identical treatment and rights 
that the EC would extend to foreign 
firms. For instance, in banking the EC 
might seek an exemption from our 
restrictions on bank activities. The 
United States would argue strongly 
that nations have differing regulatory 
views on how best to serve and protect 
the public, and U.S. firms should not 
be excluded from other markets be- 
cause of such differences. 

Overall Balance of Concessions. 

The EC could adopt some measure of 
"overall reciprocity" based on the de- 
gree of market access provided EC 
firms in specific foreign markets or the 
magnitude of the concessions offered by 
individual foreign countries in the cur- 
rent multilateral trade negotiations 
under the GATT. 



APPENDICES 

History of European Integration 

The peaceful union of European states 
had been a dream for centuries, but not 
until the devastation of World War II 
was political cooperation perceived as 
necessary to ensure Europe's survival. 
National governments nevertheless re- 
mained reluctant to cede any substan- 
tial authority to a supranational body. 
In the political sphere, the Council of 
Europe was organized in 1949 by 10 Eu- 
ropean countries, but all decisions were 
made by unanimous agreement of the 
ministers of each member state, effec- 
tively weakening the Council. Mili- 
tarily, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, an alliance of most West 
European countries with the United 
States and Canada, was formed in 1949. 

On the economic front, the Euro- 
pean Coal and Steel Community, 
ratified by the Governments of France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem- 
bourg (the Six), began functioning in 
1952. It was the first international or- 
ganization with an integrated federal 
governing body. Attempts to create an 
overarching supranational authority to 
make political and economic decisions 
in the interest of the whole continent 



were blocked, however, by the British 
and Scandinavians who preferred inter- 
national cooperation rather than formal 
integration. 

In 1957, the Six agreed to establish 
the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic En- 
ergy Community (EURATOM). The 
two new organizations started operat- 
ing in January 1958. The EEC, also 
known as the Common Market, began 
the difficult process of eliminating all 
trade barriers among its members. 

The three communities were united 
in the European Communities (also re- 
ferred to as the European Community) 
in 1967. By that year all member-to- 
member tariff duties were completely 
abolished, and a customs union of the 
Six was established. The customs union 
has been extended as new members 
joined the Community. 

The United Kingdom initially re- 
jected EC membership because of its 
Commonwealth ties and its desires to 
create a larger free trade area. It and 
six other European countries conse- 
quently formed the European Free 
Trade Association, which was designed 
to boost nonagricultural trade among 
its members and to provide a united 
platform for relations with the EC. 

By the late 1960s, the British de- 
cided to join the Community. Although 
a French veto temporarily blocked Brit- 
ish membership, in 1973 the United 
Kingdom, along with Denmark and 
Ireland, was admitted into the Commu- 
nity, creating the EC Nine. Greece 
joined the Community in 1981. The 
most recent expansion occurred with 
the addition of Spain and Portugal 
in 1986, resulting in the current EC 
Twelve. 

Institutions 

The major EC institutions are the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, 
the European Parliament, and the 
Court of Justice. 

The Commission. The Commis- 
sion, headquartered in Brussels, is 
comprised of 17 commissioners ap- 
pointed by their national governments. 
(France, West Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Spain each appoint 
two.) Members of the Commission act 
independently of their governments and 
represent the interests of the Commu- 
nity as a whole. The Commission's 
major responsibility is to oversee the 
implementation of the EC treaties. The 
Commission proposes EC policy to the 



i artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



27 



EUROPE 



Council of Ministers and steers its pro- 
posals through the Council and the Par- 
liament. The Commission also prepares 
the preliminary draft of each year's EC 
budget. The approved budget for 1987 
was about $45 billion. The budget is 
financed by a customs duty, a 1.4% 
value added tax collected on the goods 
and services consumed in member 
states, and a percentage donation based 
on member countries' gross national 
product. 

The Council of Ministers. The 

Council, which has its secretariat in 
Brussels, is the body that approves all 
Community legislation. The Council 
does not initiate legislation; it can act 
only on proposals from the Commission. 
The Council issues the draft EC budget 
for approval by the European Parlia- 
ment. Most voting by the Council is 
now by weighted majority, except in 
cases involving health, environmental, 
or taxation issues, when unanimity is 
required. Each country assumes the 
Council presidency for a 6-month term, 
rotating by alphabetical order of states. 

The European Parliament. The 

Parliament is the only EC institution 
that directly represents the people of 
Europe. The Parliament has gained a 
greater role in EC decisionmaking in 
recent years. It has significant power 
over budgetary matters (except agri- 
cultural spending) because it can amend 
or reject the budget and approves its 
adoption. Since 1987, the Parliament 
has had the right to amend or reject 



legislation approved by the Council, 
which can overrule the Parliament only 
by a unanimous vote. Direct elections 
to the Parliament have been held since 
1979. Deputies are elected to 5-year 
terms. The 518 members sit in eight 
major transnational political groups 
ranging across the political spectrum. 

The Court of Justice. The Court of 
Justice has a role similar to that of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. It enforces EC 
treaties, determines if Community leg- 
islation is interpreted and implemented 
correctly, and resolves conflicts be- 
tween Community and national laws. 
The justices have played a major role in 
the process of removing barriers to the 
right of business establishment and to 
the movement of goods and people. 
Court decisions generally have ex- 
tended rights embodied in the treaties 
to individuals, strengthened EC institu- 
tions, and promoted integrated EC pol- 
icies. The Court's decisions, by simple 
majority, are binding on all parties and 
are not subject to appeal. The 13 jus- 
tices sit in Luxembourg and serve 
renewable 6-year terms. 



■EC member states have a total of 76 
votes in the EC Council: West Germany 
(10), France (10), Italy (10), U.K. (10), 
Spain (8), Belgium (5), Netherlands (5), 
Greece (5), Portugal (5), Denmark (3), 
Ireland (3), and Luxembourg (2); 54 votes 
are necessary for a qualified majority and 
23 votes for a blocking minority. ■ 



NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
Meets in The Hague 



The Nuclear Planning Group of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) met in The Hague October 27- 
28, 1988. The United States was repre- 
sented by Secretary of Defense 
Frank C. Carlucci III. Following 
is the final communique issued on 
October 28. 

1. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG) met in Ministerial session in The 
Hague (Scheveningen), The Netherlands, 
on 27th and 28th October, 1988. Iceland 
attended as an observer. We reviewed our 
work underway to ensure that the Alliance 
continues to maintain a credible nuclear 
deterrent posture and discussed a variety 
of security and defense matters pertaining 
to NATO's nuclear forces, including the 
United States strategic modernization pro- 
gramme, current arms control negotia- 
tions and the implementation of the INF 



[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] 
Treaty. We also received a briefing on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative. 

2. The Atlantic Alliance remains the 
basis for the collective security of all its 
members. NATO's security policy, sup- 
ported by a credible mix of conventional 
and nuclear forces, has assured peace in 
Europe for almost forty years. Nuclear 
weapons will continue to make an essential 
contribution to NATO's strategy of deter- 
rence for the foreseeable future. While we 
are encouraged by signs of change in the 
policies of the Soviet Union and some of its 
allies, we have as yet seen no relaxation in 
their military efforts. In particular, War- 
saw Pact superiority in conventional 
forces, with the capability this provides for 
surprise attack and large-scale offensive 
action, constitutes a basic source of in- 
stability and tension between East and 
West. Thus, we are determined to continue 
to take those actions required to preserve 



NATO's security interests and to maint: 
the credibility of our deterrent forces, e 
ventional and nuclear, which will be kej 
up-to-date where necessary. This remai 
an essential basis for our policy, as re- 
affirmed by NATO's Heads of State and 
Government in their declaration of 
3rd March, 1988. This policy of which a 
control is an integral part seeks to achi 
a peaceful and more stable environment 
the lowest level of armament consistent 
with our security needs. We reaffirmed 
willingness to share fairly the risks, bu 
dens and responsibilities as well as the 
benefits of our common efforts. 

3. We noted with satisfaction that t 
INF Treaty has entered into force sinc( 
last met and that to date its implement 
tion is proceeding smoothly. In this reg 
we stressed the importance of the rigoi 
verification measures agreed by the Ur 
States and Soviet Union. We reaffirms 
that progress in the achievement of 
NATO's arms control objectives has bet 
made possible by the solidarity of the / 
liance and its demonstrated willingness 
take those steps necessary to ensure it 
security. 

4. We received reports on the stati 
the United States Strategic Moderniza 
Programme and the Strategic Defense 
tiative. We expressed appreciation for 
efforts of the United States and the Ui 
Kingdom to maintain the effectiveness 
their strategic deterrent capabilities. 1 
noted that strategic nuclear systems ci 
tinue to be an essential element of the 
liance's deterrent posture. We express' 
our continuing full support for the Uni 
States position in the START [strategi 
arms reduction talks] negotiations aim 
at a fifty percent reduction in the stra 
nuclear forces of the United States am 
Soviet Union, welcomed the progress i 
and supported timely agreement in th< 
negotiations. We also looked forward t 
successful conclusion of the negotiatioi 
the verification protocols to the Peace! 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Th 
old Test Ban Treaty and to the ratifica 
of these treaties. 

5. Our step-by-step approach, und 
which decisions will be taken when nei 
sary, will ensure that NATO's nuclear 
forces continue to provide a credible a 
effective contribution to the Alliance's 
strategy of deterrence. In this context 
reviewed a number of nuclear related i 
sues and agreed that for the foreseeab 
future NATO requires diversified, sur 
ble and operationally flexible nuclear 
forces in Europe across the entire spei 
trum of ranges, which take account of 
scale and quality of the threat. We als< 
received reports on the progress towai 
making necessary adjustments in the . 
liance nuclear force structure. 

6. We noted with satisfaction the p 
ress being made in our work, reaffirm< 
our objectives and provided instructioi 
appropriate NATO bodies for future w 
We also expressed continued support f 






28 



Department of State Bulletin/January '» 



EUROPE 



efforts of member countries to meet 
uirements stemming from Montebello to 
intain a credible nuclear deterrent pos- 
e at the minimum necessary level of 
ipons. While no decisions are required 
I on the implementation of specific 

sures, we will continue to review our 
urity needs in the context of the Mon- 
ello framework and in accordance with 



the continuing development of our compre- 
hensive and integrated concept for security 
and arms control. 

7. We agreed to hold our next meeting 
at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 
Belgium in the spring of 1989. 

8. Greece expressed its views in a 
statement included in the minutes. ■ 



rnbassy Reconstruction in Moscow Proposed 



1PARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, 

IT. 27, 19881 

i; President has decided to propose 
c he Congress that the new U.S. Em- 
■. sy office building in Moscow be torn 
in and rebuilt from the ground floor 
cto provide secure facilities needed in 
I Soviet capital. 

.i Secretary Shultz recommended the 
mantlement and rebuild approach, 
>■ approved by President Reagan. 
y Secretary's recommendation was 
lied on a thorough review which con- 
i 'red studies done by specialists both 
iiin and outside the government. 
I ong these studies was a recent con- 
I ant's report which recommended 
J; the existing building be demol- 
] -d and reconstructed from the 
land floor up. Alternative means of 
i ling with the present insecure build- 
s and overall U.S. Government office 
) :e needs in Moscow were carefully 
« sidered. The rebuild option, how- 






ever, offers the best overall solution to 
the problem. 

Rebuilding will be expensive, but 
the new embassy facilities will have to 
serve us in Moscow for the next half- 
century or so. Reconstruction is the 
only option that will provide both the 
degree of security and the amount of 
space necessary for current and future 
embassy activities. 

This decision affects only the new 
chancery, the building which will be 
used for embassy offices. The rest of 
the new embassy complex — housing 
units, Marine quarters, school, and 
support facilities — are and will remain 
in use. 

We will continue our policy of not 
permitting the U.S.S.R. to use its new 
chancery in Washington until we move 
into our rebuilt chancery in Moscow. 



■Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Czechoslovak Police 
Detain Dissidents 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 28, 19881 

We were pleased to note that the anni- 
versary of the establishment of the first 
Czechoslovak Republic was to be cele- 
brated in Czechoslovakia this year for 
the first time since 1951. The United 
States played a role in the establish- 
ment of independent Czechoslovakia, 
and Americans are proud of that role. 
As Deputy Secretary Whitehead said 
in his press conference in Prague Octo- 
ber 16, many people expressed to him 
their desire to commemorate the anni- 
versary in a fitting and dignified fash- 
ion, and it seemed an opportunity for 
all Czechoslovaks to recommit them- 
selves to building a more prosperous 
and freer nation. We expressed our 
hope that this opportunity would be 
taken. 

Unfortunately, the Czechoslovak 
authorities have chosen not to seize the 
opportunity. Czechoslovak police yester- 
day detained more than 50 prominent 
dissidents on the eve of the 70th anni- 
versary of the founding of the republic. 
The detentions were aimed at prevent- 
ing an unofficial commemoration of the 
anniversary scheduled for today in 
Prague. 

We regret these detentions and 
urge the immediate release of those 
taken into custody. The detentions 
show that Czechoslovakia has far to go 
to bridge the chasm between the cur- 
rent practices of the authorities and the 
democratic ideas upon which the coun- 
try was founded. We will continue to 
support those in Czechoslovakia who 
work for the day when the gap will be 
closed. 



■Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputv spokesman Phyllis 
Oakley. ■ 



bartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



29 



GENERAL 



U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition 



by Colin L. Powell 

Address before the National Press 
Club on October 27, 1988. Lt. Gen. 
Powell is Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. 

In the closing days of the 100th Con- 
gress last week, one of the most impor- 
tant legislative struggles was perhaps 
one of the least appreciated. Among the 
priority efforts of this Administration 
was to secure passage of new fiscal 
transfer authority in order to shift 
funds out of the budgets of the Depart- 
ments of Defense and State to support 
UN peacekeeping activities. That's 
right, UN peacekeeping, which was 
suddenly in desperate need of funding 
for a number of new missions. We 
needed to find the money to pay our 
share of the cost. 

I regret that we didn't succeed in 
convincing the Congress of this need, 
even though we fought for it until 
3:00 a.m. of the day they adjourned. 
It is an issue that will be high on the 
agenda of the 101st Congress when it 
convenes in January. The problem arose 
because we hadn't budgeted enough for 
peace, and peace is on the march 
around the world. 

• The Iran-Iraq war, which went on 
8 years, has resulted in a cease-fire, 
peace talks, and a UN military ob- 
server group. 

• In Afghanistan, a Soviet invasion 
and war that have been going on for 9 
years are heading toward a resolution; 
the Geneva accords last April set up a 
UN good offices mission to supervise 
implementation of those accords. 

• In Angola, a Cuban intervention 
and civil war that have been going on 
for 13 years may finally be heading to- 
ward a diplomatic solution, along with 
independence for Namibia, once again 
under UN auspices. 

• In Cambodia, the Indochina war, 
which in one form or another has gone 
on for 40 years, may be giving way to a 
diplomatic solution, perhaps also under 
some form of international auspices. 

• Diplomacy also has made prog- 
ress in the Western Sahara. And just 
last week, we saw South and North 
Korea both speak at the United Nations 
for the first time and begin haltingly to 
reach out to each other. 



And something else is going on in 
the world — not only peace but a drive 
for freedom. In Burma, in Haiti, or in 
Chile, the people want real democracy. 
In the Republic of Korea, or the Philip- 
pines, "people power" has already won 
great victories. In South Africa, the 
struggle has reached a new stage. In 
Latin America 10 years ago, only about 
one-third of the population lived under 
democratic rule; today it's over 90%. 
Interestingly, some of the most 
striking advances toward freedom and 
self-determination are taking place in 
the communist world. We see in the 
Baltic states a powerful quest for self- 
expression and democracy. In Poland, 
we see the resurgence of the free labor 
movement, Solidarity; the government, 
after years of trying to suppress it, is 
now forced to negotiate with it. As the 
Vice President said a few weeks ago, 
there's still an iron curtain, but it's a 
rusting curtain, and shafts of light are 
piercing through. Throughout the So- 
viet empire, the pressures for change 
are accelerating. Moscow seeks to man- 
age these pressures and channel them, 
but it is a certainty that, given the op- 
portunity, people will press to the lim- 
its — and perhaps even beyond. 

It's extraordinary. The quest for 
freedom is turning out to be the most 
powerful political force in the world 
today. 

As Americans, we should not be 
surprised; not if we believe in our own 
system. But why are all these good 
things happening now? Is it blind luck? 
The policies of the Reagan Administra- 
tion? Gorbachev's "new thinking"? Bril- 
liant efforts by the United Nations? 
Some basic trends in the world? Or, as 
I believe, some combination of these 
and other factors? All these factors I 
have mentioned deserve consideration. 

The Lesson of Regional Conflicts 

First, the lesson of regional conflicts: 
In some of the regional conflicts that 
have been going on so long — in Iran- 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, and Cam- 
bodia — there has been diplomatic 
progress, as I said. To some extent, it 
is also simply the result of a kind of 
exhaustion that has set in after years of 
brutal conflict with no conclusive re- 
sult. Statesmen have shown the wisdom 






to draw appropriate conclusions, and 
the decisiveness to act on those 
conclusions. 

• In the gulf, Iraq fought back fc 
years, with determination, to regain 
the initiative, and Iran discovered tht| 
futility of its military offensives whicl, 
year after year, made no headway am 
cost millions of lives. It was one of th, 
bloodiest and costliest wars of this cej 
tury and also posed dangers to the rt, 
gion as a whole and to the oil shippir 
lanes on which the free world depends 

• In Afghanistan, the Soviet Uni| 
discovered it could not suppress the 
fierce resistance of the Afghan muja 
din, who displayed extraordinary bn 
ery and resourcefulness and also 
enjoyed the support of the rest of ths 
world. 

• In Angola, a true military stall 
mate had developed— years ago— as 1 
Angolan regime's military offensives 
suppress Jonas Savimbi and UNITA 
[National Union for the Total Inde- 
pendence of Angola] failed time aftei 
time. It was costing the regime's So^ 
backers something like $1 billion a yt 
in weaponry with no productive resu 

One lesson here is that sometim 
leaders have the wit to see the futili 
of war and to seek diplomatic solutio 
But the deeper lesson is that effecti 
resistance to aggression is what der 
onstrates the futility of war. A side 
sees an easy victory will go after it. 
so-called peace purchased at the prii 
of surrender is not real peace, or 
security. 

Clausewitz said the conqueror a 
ways prefers peace, in that he much 
prefers to march into a city unoppos 
But such conditions only tempt and 
invite aggression. In Nicaragua, for 
example, diplomacy is not going wel 
freedom is not winning, precisely be 
cause effective resistance has been i 
dercut, and we face the grim prospe | 
of further deterioration and continui J 
crisis in that country. 

I believe this Administration un 
derstood this lesson and, therefore, j 
deserves some of the credit for the 
winding down of those various confli { 
on which there has been progress. 

• In Afghanistan, we resolutely [ 
supported the mujahidin, Pakistan, 
and the diplomatic process, and we . 
a guarantor of the Geneva accords. 

• In Angola and Namibia, it wa i 
only after the United States began i| 
tary aid to the UNITA freedom figh 
ers in 1986 that the Angolan regime 



30 



GENERAL 



) ; ted to take seriously the idea of a 
|)tiated settlement. The United 
(es, of course, has mediated the 
sj)tiation. 

• In Cambodia, we have actively 
U)orted ASEAN's [Association of 
i;h East Asian Nations] efforts. 
jU In the case of Iran and Iraq, we 
B; not central to the conflict, but I 
convinced our firm defense of free- 

■ of navigation in the gulf helped to 
sjurage any who had designs on the 
II and contributed to the conviction 

li the war had become a losing 
ivosition. 

In all these cases of success, we 
s benefited from solid bipartisan 
iiressional support and the support 

I ue American people. 

II Soviet Union Under Gorbachev 

t-:her factor has to be the role 

ad by the Soviet Union under now- 

n ident Gorbachev. The Soviet Union 

■ Dlayed a constructive role in help- 
fnd some of these conflicts, and this 
n. be acknowledged. This has con- 
iited to the overall improvement in 

.; -Soviet relations, which, in turn, is 
li her of the most important positive 
• is of the present period. 

Major changes are taking place in- 
d the Soviet Union, and in Soviet 

I gn policy. And these are related. 

II Soviet leaders are facing up to 

h • internal challenges, and this adds 
n eir incentive to seek a "breathing 
K 2" in the international environ- 
€ .. Whether this is a temporary phe- 
>: ;non, or a lasting one, is too early 
i dge. 

What is clear is that the Soviet 
a j rship does want to concentrate its 
ii gies and resources on internal eco- 
X c reform. It is also becoming clear 
ii the restive nationalities in the So- 
« Union and around the Soviet em- 
i taking advantage of the relative 
3 alization of the recent period, are 
)] y to preoccupy Moscow more than 
ljne anticipated. 

The bold new leadership in the 
r nlin has candidly acknowledged the 
■ulems the Soviet system faces. But 
Problems are fundamental, even 
natural. Essentially, perestroika is 
H:knowledgment of the failure of the 
let system to provide for its people. 
Ither it can be fixed, as long as it 
liins a communist one-party system, 
Biins to be seen. 



There is little we can do to affect 
the Soviet Union's internal evolution. 
We can continue to press for human 
rights, as we have. We can encourage 
steps that are clearly improvements in 
Soviet internal political practice, even 
if they do not correspond fully to what 
we know as democracy. We can lend 
our moral support to all those decent 
people in the Soviet Union who seek 
greater freedom and well-being and 
who feel an enormous stake in the sur- 
vival and success of the present reform 
program. 

We can have more effect, however, 
on Soviet foreign policy. While these 
domestic preoccupations give the Soviet 
Union an interest in a calmer interna- 
tional environment, simultaneously the 
Soviets are drawing appropriate lessons 
from their foreign policy failures. That 
has much to do with us. 

The Soviets are correctly reassess- 
ing their past foreign policy — including 
their adventurism of the 1970s — as a se- 
ries of mistakes, because they and their 
allies were unable to consolidate their 
gains because of resistance to their 
challenge. In Afghanistan, in Angola, 
in Cambodia, and for a time — and per- 
haps yet — in Nicaragua, indigenous re- 
sistance forces with timely outside 
support prevented a communist victory. 
The Soviets and their clients are in the 
process of reexamining their investment 
and dealing diplomatically to liquidate 
their costly misadventures. 

Let me read you some excerpts 
from an article in the latest issue of the 
Soviet journal International Affairs by 
a senior foreign ministry official. La- 
menting the aid resources poured into 
some Third World clients, he writes: 

[T]he aid itself is only the tip of the 
iceberg. Our direct and indirect involve- 
ment in regional conflicts lead to colossal 
losses by increasing general international 
tension, justifying the arms race, and hin- 
dering the establishment of mutually ad- 
vantageous ties with the West. 

Elsewhere the writer calls for reex- 
amination, on the basis of "profita- 
bility," of Soviet use of military 
instruments in support of "regimes 
which declare themselves to be pro- 
gressive but which far from always pos- 
sess an adequate democratic base in the 
country." 

And so, we really do have a great 
opportunity now and in the future to 
engage the Soviet Union in some his- 
toric settlements of outstanding re- 
gional conflicts. We must be alert to 
that opportunity. But we must also 
draw the right lessons. We must re- 



member that there is no historical 
precedent for the Soviet Union's for- 
swearing a strategic advantage if it is 
handed to it on a silver platter. Nic- 
aragua looks disturbingly like confirma- 
tion of that, just as Cuba was 30 years 
ago. 

In other places, where the West 
has stood firm, the Soviets clearly are 
reassessing their foreign policy. If the 
West continues to make clear, across 
the board, that accommodations can 
only be made on the basis of compro- 
mise, then the decisions the Soviets are 
now making under tactical necessity 
may turn into a new pattern that 
amounts to a strategic change. 

Maintaining Strong Defenses 

It's worth repeating: the outcomes I've 
just described depend on our strength 
and our resolve. Future outcomes de- 
pend on continuing strength and con- 
tinuing resolve. This is not the time 
to relax. 

This requires not only an adequate 
budget for economic and security as- 
sistance so that allies and friends can 
be helped helping themselves. It also 
requires an adequate defense budget. 

Even in these times of fiscal strin- 
gency, we must not forget the lesson 
we learned 8 years ago that there is no 
substitute for defensive strength. 
America's bipartisan effort to restore 
the military balance did wonders for 
our allies' — and the world's — sense of 
security. When America is weak, the 
world is a more dangerous place. Our 
strength has contributed to world sta- 
bility, and to the possibilities for con- 
structive — and balanced — negotiations 
with our adversaries on arms control 
and arms reduction. 

The United Nations 

Earlier, I mentioned the United Na- 
tions and its rapidly expanding peace- 
keeping role. This is another factor in 
the present situation. The Nobel Peace 
Prize committee appropriately awarded 
the blue-helmeted UN soldiers this 
year's peace prize. 

This is a tribute to the kind of 
heroic, unsung work that UN peace- 
keepers have been doing on many con- 
tinents for decades. As the United 
Nations implements internal reforms of 
its budget and administration and con- 
tinues to avoid some of the polarizing 
General Assembly excesses of the 
1970s, there is a prospect of even 



lartment of State Bulletin/Januarv 19AQ 



31 



GENERAL 



greater successes for the organization 
in the future, fulfilling the promise of 
its bold and noble charter. 

It has always been recognized that 
the success or failure of the United Na- 
tions depended a lot on the relations 
between the superpowers. As we enter 
a period of growing cooperation be- 
tween the superpowers, it is natural to 
hope to see this reflected in further 
achievements of the UN system. 

The Vindication of Our Values 

These various positive developments 
underlie the recent progress toward 
peace. But there is a deeper trend un- 
derlying these. First of all is the re- 
surgence of the simple idea of freedom. 
A decade or so ago, some pessimists 
used to dismiss the philosophy of de- 
mocracy as a culture-bound luxury of 
the industrialized nations; doomed for- 
ever to minority status in the world. 
Today it turns out to be a vibrant 
force — from El Salvador to the Philip- 
pines, from Botswana to the Republic 
of Korea. This is a vindication of the 
values that all of us hold so dear. 

It's happening, secondly, in the eco- 
nomic sphere. Both developed and de- 
veloping countries are relearning some 
ancient truths about economic growth — 
about the basic reality that innovation 
and progress spring from the creative 
energy of individuals, not government. 

In 1985, the economic summit of 
the industrial democracies acknowl- 
edged unanimously that governmental 
rigidities were a key obstacle to 
growth. In 1986, a special session of the 
UN General Assembly dealing with Af- 
rica acknowledged, similarly, that struc- 
tural reforms along the same lines were 
a precondition for development. Most 
amazingly we see these truths now 
taken as gospel even in the communist 
world — in China, in Eastern Europe, 
and, yes, in the Soviet Union. There's a 
new Soviet joke: "What's the definition 
of socialism? Answer: the slowest and 
most painful way to make the transition 
from capitalism to capitalism." 

It is coming to be recognized — even 
in the communist world — that there is a 
connection between economic progress, 
economic freedom, and political free- 
dom. Look at the success of the demo- 
cratic world in the postwar period — a 
resurgent Europe and Japan. Look at 
the success of the East Asian "Tigers," 
the newly industrialized economies of 
the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Tai- 
wan, Hong Kong, and others. Their per 
capita GNP [gross national product] 
now equals or exceeds that of some 



members of the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], the traditional grouping of the 
industrialized nations. And then look at 
those who follow the old Soviet model: 
Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Nicaragua — 
basket cases, all of them. In Nicaragua, 
income per capita is half of what it was 
in 1977— yes, half. The Soviets subsi- 
dize Cuba to the tune of nearly $7 bil- 
lion a year. The communist world is, in 
the words of some of its own spokes- 
men, in a state of economic back- 
wardness and crisis. 

The West faces plenty of economic 
and social problems — budget deficits, 
trade problems, the need to lift up the 
disadvantaged. But these are chal- 
lenges to policy, not challenges to the 
essence of the system or to the struc- 
ture itself. On the contrary, our econo- 
mies are strong, and it only takes some 
wisdom and discipline in our democratic 
policymaking to meet these challenges. 

Our adversaries face a systemic 
crisis; they sense that their system is 
wrong but they are seeking to "fix" it 
without changing it wholesale. It is not 
yet clear whether they will succeed. 

And they see a new phase of the 
industrial revolution — the information 
age of supei'computers and global tele- 
communications — passing them by, rele- 
gating them to minor-league status in 
the 1990s. Is it an accident that this 
new burst of creativity originated in the 
West, where ideas and information flow 
freely and entrepreneurship flourishes? 

President Reagan spoke of these 
things in his address at Moscow State 
University in May. I was privileged to 
be there, and what a sight it was — an 
American president talking to Soviet 
students about his passionate belief in 
freedom. Perhaps these ideas will truly 
take hold there and transform our 
world. 

Finally, there is the interconnec- 
tion between freedom, progress, and 
peace itself. This is the point made elo- 
quently by Andrei Sakharov, who next 
week, finally, will be allowed to leave 
the Soviet Union and visit the United 
States. He said, in his Nobel lecture: 

I am convinced that international 
trust, mutual understanding, disarma- 
ment, and international security are incon- 
ceivable without an open society with 
freedom of information, freedom of con- 
science, the right to publish, and the right 
to travel and choose the country in which 
one wishes to live. I am also convinced 
that freedom of conscience, together with 
other civic rights, provides both the basis 
for scientific progress and a guarantee 
against its misuse to harm mankind. 



As President Reagan likes to p* 
it, people don't make wars; govern- 
ments do. How governments behave 
ward their own people is a good ind< 
of how they are likely to behave tow 
other nations. The worldwide trend 
ward democracy thus offers profouni 
hope. 

The West can be proud of what 
has achieved and the promise that it 
future holds. We in America have re 
covered, in recent years, not only oi 
military strength and economic vita! 
but also our pride and faith in our- 
selves. America has contributed to 1 
resurgence of the West and, in turn 
draws strength from it. Events rem 
us — constantly — of the eternal powe 
our values of freedom and democrac 
under law. This country, for all its u 
finished business, remains the beacc 
of hope and inspiration for all those 
the world who aspire to enjoy thes< 
blessings, and who struggle for the 
We must never let that beacon fail. 



32 



Department of State Bulletin/January 



GENERAL 



uilding a Flexible Framework 
Jr New Information Services 



^Parker W. Borg 

Address before the INTELEVENT 
iConference in Cannes, France, on 
iober 19, 1988. Mr. Borg is acting Co- 
Knator and Director of the Bureau of 
r.-r national Communications and In- 
itiation Policy. 

flrshall McLuhan, who gave us so 
Uny insights into the implications of 
I. information revolution, observed in 
D book Understanding Media that we 
■d to look at the future through a 
Irview mirror. That, unfortunately, is 
t rut in which we telecommunications 
•i cymakers constantly find ourselves 
<rm trying to keep up with the explo- 
it of technology. Like Sisyphus of an- 
i it Corinth, who could never quite 
$ a rock to the top of a hill, we al- 
l's seem to be just one step behind 
I inology. 

The challenge at WATTC [World 
kninistrative Telegraph and Tele- 
■ ne Conference] will be to escape 
rn that cycle by forging a highly flex- 
fa framework for the new network- 
k id information services that will not 
I : us into today's technology or to- 
fc's regulatory norms. To reach con- 
it 3us on such a framework by the over 
C ITU [International Telecommunica- 
i . Union] countries expected in 
d bourne will require that we put 
H y our rearview mirrors and find the 

rard-looking solutions that have so 
i n eluded us. It is crucial that we 

;< the rock to the top of the hill 

1 time. 

f - Importance of WATTC 

I framers of the 1973 regulations cov- 
aig international telecommunications 
unices did an adequate job of for- 
ii ating guidelines for the technology 
riheir day, but it was a simple day. By 
I late 1970s, some countries were al- 
*dy proposing revisions. By 1982, 
my countries believed that teeh- 
lOgy had advanced well beyond the 
Kpe of the 1973 regulations. They pre- 
n ed at the 1982 Nairobi plenipotenti- 
u, which called for the 1988 WATTC. 

Since 1982, new applications of 
<nnology and new regulatory ap- 
i aches have changed the world of 



telecommunications in a way nobody 
could have predicted a decade ago. On 
the regulatory front, a host of countries 
has moved away from traditional tele- 
communications monopolies. In the 
United States we replaced the virtual 
monopoly of AT&T with a competitive 
long-distance market and a competitive 
terminal equipment market. Today, pri- 
vate networks exist side by side with 
public switched networks. Telecom- 
munications users have benefited from 
this new competitive environment; they 
can do more at a lower cost than ever 
before. Consequently, we have been 
able to reduce regulatory constraints. 
This, in turn, has stimulated new serv- 
ices and additional user demand. 

Similar results flowed from the 1981 
British Telecommunications Act, the 
1984 privatization of British Telecom, 
the 1985 privatization of Japan's Nippon 
Telephone and Telegraph, and the pas- 
sage the same year of the Japanese 
Telecom Business Law. The recent Eu- 
ropean Community Green Paper has 
started a sea change of liberalization in 
Europe that will culminate in 1992. In 
the developing world, countries such as 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Guate- 
mala, Costa Rica, and Grenada have 
either privatized or are seriously study- 
ing privatization of their telecommu- 
nications facilities. 

On the technological front, the 
spread of personal computers, auto- 
mated teller machines, global financial 
markets, data bases, digital private 
networks, and computerized airline res- 
ervation systems have radically trans- 
formed the way we do business and 
interact with one another. Not only 
have network-based telecommunications 
services become multimillion dollar in- 
dustries in the last decade, but they 
have vastly improved the lives of people 
around the globe. 

Less industrialized countries have 
taken advantage of the new technology 
as it has become more affordable and 
accessible to individuals and small 
groups. Over 70 countries, for instance, 
use computer packet switching sys- 
tems, which can cost as little as 
$30,000, to better the lives of their cit- 
izens. At the Oswaldo Cruz Institute in 



Rio de Janeiro, thanks to a grant from 
Apple Computer, researchers have 
started using microcomputers linked to 
laboratories in other countries to fight 
the deadly Chagas disease, which af- 
flicts 8 million Latin Americans. 

Dominican Republic farmers, who 
formerly relied on one crop — bananas — 
have been able to diversify their crops 
using CONCARID, a Caribbean coop- 
erative computer network that helps 
members find successful development 
models. A sweater factory in Mauritius 
has gone from a modest business to a 
major employer and exporter because it 
is now linked to computer-aided design 
services in New York and can keep up 
with the world's latest fashions. The 
data entry industry is providing new 
jobs in the Caribbean. Over 2,000 peo- 
ple now work at it in the Jamaica Tele- 
port, and the industry is growing in the 
Dominican Republic, Barbados, and 
elsewhere. 

WATTC, therefore, is not an ar- 
cane debate among telecommunication 
nitpickers. A well-crafted, flexible in- 
ternational regulatory framework can 
serve to foster continued growth and 
innovation in global telecommunica- 
tions. A rigid document, we believe, 
could have the opposite effect. Thus, 
the outcome of WATTC could have real 
world consequences for the way people 
have access to the latest information. 
This access is the key to national com- 
petitiveness in today's global economy. 
It often makes the difference between 
success and failure in business and, in 
cases such as the Oswaldo Cruz In- 
stitute, the difference between life and 
death. 

WATTC is also important for the 
future of the ITU. We are meeting just 
a few miles from Nice, the site of next 
May's ITU plenipotentiary conference. 
At the plenipotentiary, the 165 ITU 
member countries will chart the future 
course for the "grandad" of UN organi- 
zations — one that has had remarkable 
success in its 123 years of existence. 

The ITU cannot rest on its laurels 
as the telecommunication landscape 
changes. The world market for all tele- 
communication services is growing by 
12% a year — 5% for telephony and telex 
and 20% for new services, including 
value added services. If the ITU is to 
remain relevant, it will have to address 
effectively the fastest growing sector of 
new "enhanced" or "value added" tele- 
communications services. WATTC is a 
key challenge to the ITU's adaptability 



apartment of State Bulletin/Januarv 1989 



33 



GENERAL 



to altered conditions. Reaching consen- 
sus at WATTC would provide an impor- 
tant stimulus to the plenipotentiary and 
give the ITU momentum to face other 
more serious challenges going into the 
21st century. 

The preparation for WATTC has 
been a useful educational process. It 
has helped focus attention on the grow- 
ing needs of telecommunications users, 
thus contributing to the liberalizing 
trend so much in evidence. Unfortu- 
nately, the preparations for WATTC 
have also seen the development of a 
draft document that exhibits the rear- 
view mirror mentality which I men- 
tioned earlier. This draft document to 
be considered in Melbourne was devel- 
oped through a series of WATTC pre- 
paratory committee meetings (PC/ 
WATTC) held during 1985-87. We have 
circulated the draft widely between the 
U.S. Government and the private sec- 
tor, including carriers, noncarrier serv- 
ice providers, public and private users, 
and equipment manufacturers. The 
U.S. position at the WATTC consoli- 
dates the views of these groups and 
concludes that the draft proposal does 
not meet two basic tests: that of flexi- 
bility and that of neutrality. 

U.S. Position on 
PC/WATTC Proposals 

Our concern is that certain provisions 
of the PC/WATTC draft could be used 
to restrict national domestic regulatory 
choices. Similiarly, the adoption of a 
rigid international regulatory frame- 
work at WATTC, along the lines of the 
PC/WATTC draft, could discourage 
future procompetitive liberalization 
policies and hinder the continued 
evolution of international tele- 
communications. 

The United States is not alone 
in questioning provisions of the PC/ 
WATTC draft. Last April, ITU Secre- 
tary General Butler suggested an alter- 
native text. The United States and a 
significant number of others welcomed 
the Secretariat's informal comments 
and have developed submissions based 
heavily on Mr. Butler's suggestions. 
Let me examine those submissions at 
this time. 

The United States has proposed a 
text which is both flexible and neutral. 
It is based on our conviction that each 
nation is unique and, as a sovereign 
state, must retain the right to regulate 
or not regulate telecommunications as 
best serves its interests. While we in 



the United States believe that open en- 
try, competition, and deregulation are 
extremely beneficial, we do not seek to 
impose our philosophy on any other na- 
tion. We recognize that other countries 
will pursue their own approaches to 
telecommunications facilities and serv- 
ices according to their particular 
needs. 

Therefore, any set of international 
regulations must permit each nation to 
develop domestic regulations and reg- 
ulatory processes best suited for its na- 
tional circumstances. The regulations 
should not directly or indirectly sug- 
gest any particular form of domestic 
regulation and should not be seen as a 
model for domestic regulation. Thus, 
no country should view CCITT [Con- 
sultative Committee for International 
Telegraph and Telephone] recommenda- 
tions as a requirement to apply to do- 
mestic telecommunications. 

By the same token, any regulatory 
framework must be broad enough to ac- 
commodate the inevitable, rapid, and 
wide-ranging change which will occur 
in telecommunications technology, user 
demand, and economics in the years 
ahead. Such flexibility is especially 
important for developing countries 
which may want to change their reg- 
ulatory priorities and practices as they 
move from one stage of development to 
another. 

More specifically, the United States 
has sought to correct several points in 
the PC/WATTC draft that could im- 
pinge upon national regulatory choices. 

First, the U.S. proposal attempts 
to delineate between services that ad- 
ministrations and recognized private 
operating agencies offer to the public 
and those services which other private 
companies use to satisfy their own in- 
ternal telecommunications needs. 

Second, these latter "special ar- 
rangements" should be protected from 
the inappropriate application of ITU 
regulations. I believe this element of 
the U.S. proposal is a reasonable com- 
promise between the desire of some ad- 
ministrations to include all types of 
service under the ITU regulatory um- 
brella and the interest of other govern- 
ments — such as the United States — to 
keep nonpublic services free from inter- 
national regulatory control. 

Third, the U.S. proposal would 
eliminate language in the draft that ex- 
tends regulation to any entity using an 
international network. Without clarifi- 
cation, the phrase "any entity providing 
international telecommunications serv- 



ices" in article 1.7 of the draft treaty 
would subject previously unregulated 
and new services to ITU regulation. 
Such regulation could lead to domest. 
regulation of providers of any interna 
tional service. We believe internation 
regulations should be limited to admi 
istrations or recognized private open 
ing agencies providing transmission 
service to the public. 

Fourth, the U.S. proposal would 
eliminate language scattered through 
out the draft that might be used to 
support nonvoluntary applications of 
CClTT recommended standards. Tod 
administrations are free to view CCI 
technical recommendations as guide- 
lines. Compliance is voluntary, allow 
individual countries to apply the reci 
mendations consistent with their par 
ular circumstances. This flexibility is 
important to the ITU's continued 
viability as an effective forum for sta 
ards setting. The language in the cu 
rent draft, if adopted, could cause s< i 
U.S. firms to refuse to participate ir 
the CCITT standards process for fet 
that any recommendations might lat 
become mandatory. 

And fifth, the U.S. submission 
seeks to preclude references to a list 
services, as has been proposed in th 
Secretary General's draft. We believ 
that a list of services would encoura 
the fencing-off of rapidly developing 
technologies. Practically speaking, 
keeping such a list up to date would 
almost impossible, given the fast pa 
of technological progress. We are av 
that some countries, especially in tl 
developing world, see such a list as 
way to ensure that traditional unive 
services like telex and telegraph do 
disappear from the international see 
We think that these concerns can be 
met in a suitable fashion without an 
elaborate listing of services. 

Our diplomatic effort for WATT 
has been underway for many month 
We have discussed our concerns on i 
proposed PC/WATTC draft with mil 
tries of telecommunications, econom 
industry and trade, foreign affairs, . I 
telecommunications providers and ui I 
in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the An I 
icas. Arthur Latno, the head of our 
WATTC delegation, is currently on : 
trip to five countries in Europe and 
Asia to explain our proposals. We w 
continue in the remaining weeks bet b 
WATTC to try to build an internatic J 
concensus on the twin pillars of flex I 
ity and neutrality that can make 
WATTC an important milestone in 1. 
history. 



34 



DeDartment of State Bulletin January 



GENERAL 



t We can draw on the example of the 
ently concluded Space WARC [World 
ministrative Radio Conference on 
: Geostationary Satellite Orbit] con- 
ence for inspiration. Space WARC 
3 conducted in an exemplary manner 
,h contentious issues resolved sys- 
aatically over the 5-week conference 
ij-iod. In the end, the over 100 nations 
presented at the conference opted for 
Sdble approaches to allotment plan- 
Ig and to improved procedures that 
ll allow technology to develop 
»■ imally. 

I am confident, based on my con- 

• sat ions with other administrations, 
It good faith exists to reach a similar 
Isensus at WATTC. If we do, the 
IJ's goal of efficiency, equity, and 

• lity in international telecommunica- 
lis will be enhanced, as will the 
Ionization's role as a leader in the 
fcrmation revolution. ■ 



Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
OCT. 31, 19881 

Today we celebrate victory in the name 
of a right as old as the Union itself and 
as central to our Union as any: The 
right all Americans have to protect 
their property. We're here to sign into 
law the Berne Convention Implementa- 
tion Act of 1988. It will enable the 
United States to adhere to the Berne 
convention for the protection of literary 
and artistic works. The Berne conven- 
tion, which was originally concluded in 
1886 and approved by our Senate ear- 
lier this month, provides for the protec- 
tion of copyrighted works from 
international pirates who make their 
living by stealing and then selling the 
creative accomplishments of others. 

With 77 countries as members, in- 
cluding most of our trading partners, 
the Berne convention features the high- 
est internationally recognized standards 
for the protection of works of au- 
thorship. Our membership will auto- 
matically grant the United States 
copyright relations with 24 new coun- 
tries and will secure the highest avail- 
able level of international copyright 
protection for U.S. artists, authors, 
and copyright holders. This is espe- 
cially significant because American 
works protected by copyright — books, 
recordings, movies, computer software 
prominent among them — have been at 
risk because of differences between 
U.S. law and the Berne convention. 

The cost to Americans has been 
substantial not only in terms of the vio- 
lation of the property rights of Ameri- 
cans but in terms of our trade balance 
as well. We've been running a trade 
surplus of over $1 billion annually in 



copyrighted goods, and it would have 
been much larger had it not been for 
the pirating of American copyright 
work. In 1986 alone, the entertainment 
industry may have lost more than $2 
billion in potential revenue, and our 
computer and software industries more 
than $4 billion in potential revenue. 
That's why adherence to the Berne con- 
vention has been such an important 
goal of the Administration and why this 
occasion marks a watershed for us. 

As [U.S. Trade Representative] 
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter has said, 
joining the Berne convention will also 
boost U.S. efforts to strengthen intel- 
lectual property protection in multi- 
lateral negotiations. In 1986 we 
succeeded in placing the issue on the 
agenda of the Uruguay Round of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations and commit- 
ted the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to address the relationship 
between trade and intellectual property 
rights. When trade ministers meet in 
Montreal in December for the mid-term 
review of the Uruguay Round, they 
must direct negotiators to commence 
substantive negotiations. 

Officials in our Administration 
worked closely with many key Mem- 
bers of Congress, such as Senator Pete 
Wilson and Congressman Carlos Moor- 
head, to get this bill passed in Con- 
gress. And we must also remember our 
good friend and former Secretary of 
Commerce, the late Malcolm Baldrige, 
who led the charge on this legislation. 

And now, with great pleasure and 
great pride, I will sign the Berne Con- 
vention Implementation Act into law. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 7, 1988. 



Jpartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



35 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



Good News: Our Human Rights Policy 



by George Lister 

Address at Florida International 
University in Miami on October 3, 
1988. Mr. Lister is Senior Policy Ad- 
viser for the Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. 

The invitation to speak to you regard- 
ing our human rights policy was most 
welcome. The subject is one in which I 
have been involved for many years. In- 
deed, you might say that I was in at 
the creation, over a dozen years ago, 
when our current policy began to 
evolve. So I am very pleased to be 
with you here today. 

First, I am going to review briefly 
the development of our policy and its 
specific human rights achievements 
thus far. 

Second, I will discuss some other 
very important, though less recognized, 
benefits of that policy. 

And finally, I will say a few words 
about the key roles played by Congress 
and the nongovernmental human rights 
organizations. Then I will be happy to 
try to respond to any questions, com- 
ments, and criticism. 

Development of U.S. 
Human Rights Policy 

First of all, a quick review of the devel- 
opment of our present policy and the 
results achieved: In the early 1970s, hu- 
man rights advocates, both in and out 
of government, began urging that hu- 
man rights considerations be assigned a 
higher priority in our overall foreign 
policy and that the United States do 
more to help to protect and strengthen 
human rights around the world. Over 
time, and after considerable discussion 
and controversy, those efforts proved 
generally successful. A separate Bu- 
reau of Human Rights and Human- 
itarian Affairs was established in the 
State Department in 1977, and the hu- 
man rights factor began to be included 
routinely in the daily application of our 
foreign policy. Congress ruled that the 
State Department should prepare an- 
nual reports on human rights practices 
in all countries which are members of 
the United Nations. In brief, over time 
and despite numerous problems and dif- 
ficulties, our current policy became in- 
stitutionalized. By the way, the specific 
human rights we are discussing here 



36 



today are set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 
by the UN General Assembly on De- 
cember 10, 1948. I have copies of the 
declaration here, if you wish to read it. 

Our policy is supposed to be ap- 
plied evenhandedly in all countries, re- 
gardless of their political and economic 
systems. One criticism often heard is 
that we only criticize leftwing regimes, 
never rightwing governments. That is 
nonsense. For example, if you read our 
annual human rights reports, I believe 
you will find that they are generally 
free of political bias and discuss a mul- 
titude of human rights violations by 
both the right and the left. At our 
annual December 10 Human Rights Day 
commemoration in the White House, 
both the President and Assistant Secre- 
tary Richard Schifter, the head of our 
Human Rights Bureau, have cited hu- 
man rights violations in a wide variety 
of countries, including Iran, the 
U.S.S.R., Paraguay, South Africa, 
and Cuba. Victims of both leftwing 
and rightwing oppression have been 
included among the honored guests 
at these ceremonies. 

As to specific human rights 
achievements over the past dozen years 
or so, it is easy to see encouraging evi- 
dence of the effectiveness of our policy. 
For example, our diplomatic efforts 
have contributed directly and/or indi- 
rectly to a reduction of torture in some 
countries, releases of political pris- 
oners, the holding of honest elections, 
the lifting of states of siege, visits by 
human rights inspection teams, and the 
relaxation of censorship, to name just a 
few results. I am not suggesting that 
the U.S. Government deserves the sole 
credit for this progress. Obviously, hu- 
man rights advocates around the world 
play leading roles. But we have made 
a major contribution, and we can be 
proud of that record. 

Now, of course, I am greatly over- 
simplifying because of lack of time. 
None of this has been as easy or simple 
as I am making it sound. Foreign rela- 
tions can become extremely compli- 
cated, and our primary goal must be 
the preservation of a democratic United 
States in a dangerous world. Clearly, 
our human rights policy, in itself, pro- 
vides no guarantee against poor judg- 
ment and failures in our overall foreign 
policy. Moreover, there is no reliable 
prescription for helping human rights, 
and it is often unclear exactly which 



tactics are most likely to advance tbj 
human rights cause at any given tirr 
and place. Our performance, especu 
in the early years, sometimes has b< 
uneven and spotty. But I would say 
that, on balance, our record on behs 
of individual human rights has been 
quite good. 



Impact of Human Rights 
on U.S. Foreign Policy 

I am sure there are many who woul 
agree with what I have said thus fai 
although, certainly, there are also n 
others who would disagree. But no\ 
want to focus for a moment on one i 
pect of our human rights policy whi 
has been almost totally ignored; ths 
how our human rights policy has he 
us to avoid some potential shortcorr 
in our daily overall foreign policy ir 
mentation. The following are just tl 
examples. 

One potential weakness in dip 

macy is called "clientitis," or the te 
ency to identify with the foreign 
government with which we are dea 
Naturally, we would like to have go 
relations with most governments, £ 
there is a very understandable tent 
ency for, let us say, our ambassado 
Country X to seek to remain on go 
terms with the local Foreign Office 
while the State Department endea< 
to do the same with the Country X 
Embassy in Washington. That mat 
bureaucratic life much more pleasa 
As a result, there can sometimes b 
conscious and/or unconscious tende 
to try to minimize "problems" whi« 
seem to threaten such good relatio 
Human rights violations are often 
of those problems. 

But with the higher priority n 
accorded human rights, I believe t 
is considerably less danger of clien 
I think the present system has cor 
work reasonably well, and our dipl 
mats are aware of the importance i 
attached to human rights consider I 
tions. And when there are differen | 
of views which cannot be resolved 
the bureau level, they can always I 
referred to the Deputy Secretary < 
State or the Secretary. Thus, the 1 
man rights factor often helps us tc 
maintain a healthy distance from ( 
governments. 

Another potential weakness itl 
tendency to identify a country wit I 
government, so that, for example, fl 
enjoy good relations with the Gove I 
ment of Country X it may sometinfc 
be assumed that our relations wit! I 
Country X are good. Of course, qifi 



Department of State Bulletin January Bl '■■ 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



opposite may be true. A dic- 
rship can be in complete control of 
untry, but with a high percentage 
le population strongly opposed to 
'here may well be serious problems 
nr relations with a country's popula- 
which do not surface in our discus- 
s with its government. Our human 
ts policy helps us to bring into 
>er focus our relations with the 
re country. 

A third possible weakness to be 
ded is a tendency to neglect contact 
i some democratic elements on the 
which are highly critical of the 
ted States. Daily application of our 
.an rights policy inevitably involves 
act with many such elements, often 
iding victims of human rights per- 
Ition. The value of such contact is 
lly underestimated. My own experi- 
I' in depth has been that there are 
ly leftists, especially in the so-called 
Id World, who are strongly opposed 
rhat they assume to be the policies 
lie United States but who have 
It been here and are incredibly un- 
armed and misinformed about our 
litry and government. Dialogue with 
ly such people — although, of course, 
■ all of them — frequently proves mu- 
l.y beneficial. Among other things, 
I dialogue can help us to make the 
I distinction between the democratic 
—those who often seek profound po- 
ll, economic, and social change, but 
protection for human rights — and 
antidemocratic left — those working 
he establishment of a dictatorship. 

These three examples illustrate, I 
;ve, why our human rights policy 
been helpful not only to individual 

I an rights victims but also in the 

I I implementation of our foreign pol- 
:j However, there is another, even 

l :r, area in which our human rights 
I :y has achieved a noteworthy 
i let, and that is in our contribution 
il le cause of genuine democracy 
(ughout the world, resulting in an 
riroved role and image for the United 

(es on the international political 
e. 
I For one thing, in the past dozen 
Jf-s or so, the United States has come 
ile identified with the cause of hu- 
i rights. Our views, advice, and 
Dort are constantly sought on behalf 
'hat cause. Many human rights vic- 
;l; across the political spectrum now 
^al to our embassies for assistance. 
n those who are critical of our per- 
,^iance identify us with the cause, 
(i ising us of not living up to our pro- 
.Tied standards. That would have 



been unusual 20 years ago and speaks 
well for our human rights policy. 

In this connection, it is relevant to 
point out that communist propaganda 
has long portrayed the United States as 
supporting rightwing dictatorships — 
and, indeed, this is still an obvious ob- 
jective of, for example, broadcasts from 
Moscow and Havana. The reasons for 
this are readily apparent. A favorite 
communist Third World scenario is one 
in which a country is ruled by an op- 
pressive and unpopular rightwing dic- 
tatorship, employing both torture and 
death squads to stay in power, while 
the great mass of the population see no 
opportunity to improve their lot peace- 
fully. As Lenin said: "the worse, the 
better." Then a desperate people can be 
persuaded to support a revolutionary 
movement intent on establishing still 
another communist dictatorship, al- 
though, of course, the insurgents' pro- 
claimed public program focuses almost 
entirely on the injustices prevailing, 
not on the solutions to follow. And if 
the United States can credibly be por- 
trayed as supporting the rightwing 
dictator, that helps to feed resentment 
and to show us as on the side of the 
oppressors, while the Soviets appear 
to be on the side of the oppressed. 

Our human rights policy has done 
much to counter such propaganda. I 
would venture to guess that, over the 
past dozen years, far more people have 
come to identify the Soviet Union with 
oppression, while many more now 
associate us with the cause of human 
rights — and rightly so. 

Indeed, nowhere does our human 
rights policy seem to have produced a 
more dramatic impact than in our rela- 
tions with the U.S.S.R. itself. Today, 
we frequently meet with Soviet repre- 
sentatives, both here and in Moscow, 
to discuss human rights issues. And, 
meanwhile, the human rights cause has 
achieved noteworthy progress in the 
Soviet Union and in parts of Eastern 
Europe, to an extent that would have 
been unbelievable just a few years ago. 

Possibly the most remarkable re- 
cent success in the international field of 
human rights has been the UN Human 
Rights Commission's opportunity to 
visit Cuba this past September. For 
years, Castro has succeeded in avoiding 
the human rights spotlight. But, finally, 
he was forced by world opinion to ac- 
cept a UN inspection team. Once that 
visit became inevitable, Havana tried to 
put it in the best possible light, por- 
traying the visitors as responding to an 
invitation. But, of course, the visit rep- 
resents a major victory for the Cuban 
people and the cause of human rights. 



artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



Once again, I am not claiming that 
all of these gains are due solely to our 
human rights policy. Foreign affairs are 
far more complicated than that. But our 
human rights efforts have been a major 
factor contributing to those changes, 
and that is no mean achievement. 

The Role of Congress 

Of course, no discussion of our human 
rights activity can be complete with- 
out reference to the important role of 
Congress, both as coformulator of our 
policy and as monitor of our implemen- 
tation thereof. I have already men- 
tioned the annual human rights reports 
mandated by Congress. Congressional 
legislation and resolutions often have a 
direct effect on human rights policy. In 
addition, many congressional offices are 
in frequent contact with our bureau 
with questions regarding individual hu- 
man rights cases. Moreover, there are 
now frequent congressional hearings at 
which the Department is called upon to 
testify concerning specific issues and 
countries. Such congressional interest 
and activity reflect a marked change 
from some 15 or 20 years ago. For ex- 
ample, I recall, back in the early 1970s, 
how surprised some of us were at a 
congressional request for the Depart- 
ment to testify on the honesty of an 
election just held in a Latin American 
country. Now such invitations are al- 
most routine. 

I believe that, on balance, this con- 
gressional interest and activity exert a 
healthy influence on our policy. On the 
other hand, of course, sometimes hu- 
man rights issues can be exploited for 
partisan political purposes. I recall a 
Latin American friend — a woman with 
an excellent human rights record — once 
remarking to me with some exaspera- 
tion: "I'm not interested in your two 
political parties; I want democracy in 
my country." 

The Role of Nongovernmental 
Organizations 

Now, in conclusion, a few words on 
the very valuable work performed by 
private human rights groups and orga- 
nizations — the nongovernmental organi- 
zations; the NGOs, as we call them — 
such as Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, the International League 
for Human Rights, and many others. 
These organizations play a key role in 
gathering details on human rights vio- 
lations around the world and in helping 
the victims of such violations. In so do- 
ing, the NGOs frequently obtain infor- 
mation and insights unavailable to our 



37 



HUMAN RIGHTS 



government and, thus, provide as- 
sistance in the implementation of our 
human rights policy. 

At the same time, many of these 
groups are frequent critics of the State 
Department's performance, criticizing 
our human rights reports, our public 
statements or absence thereof, and our 
policy implementation as they see it. 
And there is certainly nothing wrong 
with criticizing our government, espe- 
cially if that criticism is reasonably ac- 
curate. Accurate, constructive criticism 
can be very helpful. I would go further 
and say it is indispensable. 

Having said that, however, I want 
to discuss for a moment the overall per- 
formance of these private organizations. 
Just as there is nothing wrong with 
NGOs criticizing the State Department, 
so I see nothing wrong with our offer- 
ing some constructive criticism as to 
their performance. And I speak as one 
who is a member of Amnesty Interna- 
tional and has many friends in the hu- 
man rights movement. Over the years, 
some of them have been more effective 
than they realize, and I salute them. 

First of all, I am inclined to sepa- 
rate NGOs into two general groups: 

• Those which are prepared to crit- 
icize human rights violations by left- 
wing as well as rightwing governments 
and organizations; and 

• Then those which are eloquent 
in their criticism of rightwing dic- 
tatorships but either remain silent 
about the same crimes committed by 
leftwing dictatorships or at least seek 
to minimize them. 

It is noteworthy that some in this 
latter group are the most vociferous in 
accusing the State Department of ideo- 
logical hypocrisy and a double stand- 
ard, of favoring rightwing dictatorships 
over leftist regimes. 

How can this be explained? Well, a 
few NGOs apparently see human rights 
merely as a political issue to be ex- 
ploited to advance their own political 
objectives. Fortunately, I would guess 
such organizations are a very small mi- 
nority, and I do not wish to devote fur- 
ther time to them here today. However, 
the problem of the double standard is 
not that simple. Unfortunately, there 
are genuine human rights activists who 
tend to apply a double standard for a 
variety of reasons. For example, some 
seem to be influenced by domestic po- 
litical considerations — Democrats v. Re- 
publicans, or conservatives v. liberals. 
Thus, there are those who tend to 
judge our human rights policy and 



38 



performance mainly on the basis of 
whether one prefers an incumbent ad- 
ministration or a previous administra- 
tion of another party. The fact is that 
our human rights policy is bipartisan in 
origin and should remain so. The imple- 
mentation of our human rights policy 
should be evaluated on its merits, not 
on the basis of domestic political 
considerations. 

Another, perhaps more subtle, fac- 
tor which tends to produce the double 
standard is the reluctance of some 
NGOs to criticize human rights vio- 
lations by governments which are hos- 
tile to the United States, especially if 
one also dislikes our government or at 
least an incumbent administration. One 
striking example of this problem is pro- 
vided in Against All Hope, the book in 
which human rights activist Armando 
Valladares describes his 22 years in 
Cuban jails. Valladares tells how his 
wife visited Europe, speaking to politi- 
cians, journalists, and intellectuals on 
his behalf. At one point, a well-known 
democratic leader urged Ms. Valladares 
to desist from her campaign. When she 
asked why he would not speak out on 
human rights violations in Cuba, he 
is quoted as replying: "Because that 
would be giving the Americans a pub- 
licity weapon." Should we refrain from 
criticizing human rights violations in, 
for example, South Africa or Chile on 
the grounds that such criticism would 
be useful to the communists? 

It seems to me that if one is genu- 
inely devoted to the human rights cause 
one should be opposed to human rights 
violations wherever they occur — includ- 
ing, of course, the United States. And 
in countries with free speech, it is well 
within the reach of everyone to criticize 
our government every day, if so de- 
sired, while also opposing violations in 
Cuba, the U.S.S.R., South Korea, or 
wherever. Indeed, NGOs should realize 
that their willingness to be objective 
and candid in their criticism of all vio- 
lations will make their criticism of our 
government more effective. 

Lastly, it seems obvious that, just 
as our foreign policy should make the 
important distinction between the dem- 
ocratic and antidemocratic left, so 
should genuine advocates of human 
rights among the NGOs. Yet it is disap- 
pointing to note how many of the latter 
fail to do so — for example, accepting as 
"democratic" some avowedly Leninist 
political parties which support commu- 
nist regimes with appalling human 
rights records. And, incidentally, the 
failure of human rights advocates to 
make this distinction plays directly into 
the hands of apologists for rightwing 






dictatorships, who welcome the opj 
tunity to dismiss all human rights a 
tivity as "communist propaganda ai 
agitation." I suggest that NGOs wo 
do well to focus more on some of thif 
striking similarities of the struggle 
human rights under rightwing and 
wing regimes, such as in Poland an< 
Chile. 

Conclusion 

Well, to sum up, I submit that the i 
tutionalizing of our human rights pi 
was one of the wisest and most sigi 
cant decisions ever made by the St; 
Department and one which has pro 
to be very much in our own interes 
It certainly has not been easy, but 
have come a long way in the last fe 
years. We still have a long way to j 
Inevitably, our performance is impi 
feet. Human rights advocates, both 
and out of government, can help es 
other. Let's work together. 



Genocide Convent 
Implementation Ac 
Act of 1987 



President Reagan's remarks a« \ 
signing ceremony of the Genocide 
vention Implementation Act of 191 
Chicago on November h, 1988, ana 
text of a White House fact sheet. 



PRESIDENT'S REMARKS 1 

We gather today to bear witness t | 
past and learn from its awful exarr 
to make sure we are not condemn* i 
relive its crimes. I am today signii 
the Genocide Convention Impleme 
tion Act of 1987, which will permit [ 
United States to become party to 
International Convention on the P 
vention and Punishment of the Cri 
Genocide that was approved by th> ! 
General Assembly in 1948. 

During the Second World War 
mankind witnessed the most heincl 
crimes — the Holocaust. After the 
the nations of the world came toge I 
and drafted the genocide conventiij 
a howl of anguish and an effort to I 
vent and punish future acts of gen | 
The United States signed the conv 
tion and in 1949, President Trumail 
quested the Senate's advice and ccj 
to ratification. 



TERRORISM 



In 1986, the Senate gave its con- 
, conditioned upon enactment of im- 
lenting legislation. We finally close 
circle today by signing the imple- 
iting legislation that will permit the 
ted States to ratify the convention 
formally join 97 nations of the 
:d in condemning genocide and 
ting it as a crime. 
I am delighted to fulfill the prom- 
•nade by Harry Truman to all the 
)les of the world — and especially 
Jewish people. I remember what 
Holocaust meant to me as I 
;hed the films of the death camps 
r the Nazi defeat in World War 
. Slavs, Gypsies, and others died in 
fires as well. And we've seen other 
•ors this century — in the Ukraine, 
ambodia, in Ethiopia. They only re- 
our rage and righteous fury and 
e this moment all the more signifi- 
for me and all Americans. 
Under this legislation, any U.S. 
tjjnal or any person in the United 
ies who kills members of a national, 
i ic, racial, or religious group with 
H specific intent of destroying that 
I p in whole or in substantial part, 
I spend his or her life in prison. 
»er acts of violence are punishable 
Is much as 20 years in prison and a 
El of up to $1 million. While I would 
4 preferred that Congress had 
|»ted the Administration's proposal 
v ?rmit the death penalty for those 
■acted of committing genocidal mur- 
I , this legislation still represents a 
;i ig and clear statement by the 
\i ed States that it will punish acts of 
b 'cide with the force of law and the 
ig:eousness of justice. 

liming of the enactment is particu- 
V fitting, for we are commemorating 
il 'ek of Remembrance of the Kris- 
d ncht, the infamous "night of bro- 
Iglass," which occurred 50 years ago 
November 9, 1938. That night, Nazis 
Germany and Austria conducted a 
el> mwide pogrom against the Jewish 
I'le. By the morning of Novem- 
eHOth, scores of Jews were dead, 
i Ireds bleeding, shops and homes in 
«K and synagogues defiled and de- 
li d. That was the night that began 
•(Holocaust, the night that should 
l{ alerted the world to the gruesome 
(12m of the final solution. 
I i This legislation resulted from the 
l| eration of our Administration and 
Ijy in Congress — such as Congress- 
■ Henry Hyde, Jack Davis, and John 
Her, and Senator Bill Proxmire — to 
rv re that the United States redou- 
N its efforts to gain universal ob- 
Hance of human rights. 



We pay tribute to those who suf- 
fered that night and all the nights that 
followed upon it with our action today. 



WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET2 

President Reagan today signed legisla- 
tion which amends the U.S. criminal 
code to allow the United States to 
ratify the International Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. The convention was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly 
and signed by the United States in 
1948. The United States will join 
97 other nations which have ratified the 
genocide treaty. 

The President actively supported 
the genocide treaty and urged the U.S. 
Senate to give its long-overdue consent 
to this important international agree- 
ment. The Senate gave its consent to 
ratification on February 19, 1986, on the 
condition that implementing legislation 
be enacted. That legislation, passed by 
Congress overwhelmingly last month 
[October 19, 1988], was signed by the 
President today. 

Treaty Background 

The International Convention on Gen- 
ocide, which declared genocide to be a 
crime under international law, was 
drafted in response to the Nazi Holo- 
caust and was approved unanimously by 
the UN General Assembly on De- 
cember 9, 1948. The United States was 
the first nation to sign the treaty. 

On June 16, 1949, President 
Harry S Truman submitted the treaty 
to the Senate for its advice and con- 
sent. Every president from Truman to 
Reagan urged the Senate to act. 

President Reagan's support, along 
with the efforts of numerous senators 
of both parties, moved the Senate to 
finally consent to the genocide treaty 
after nearly 37 years. 

Terms of the Treaty 

The act defines genocide as acting with 
a "specific intent to destroy, in whole or 
in substantial part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group." 

It will be a Federal crime of gen- 
ocide to commit, or attempt to commit, 
specified acts on members of such 
groups. These acts are: 

• Killing; 

• Causing serious bodily injury; 

• Causing permanent mental im- 
pairment through drugs, torture, or 
similar techniques; 



• Subjecting to conditions of life 
intended to cause physical destruction; 

• Imposing measures to prevent 
births; and 

• Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group. 

Genocide would also include trying 
to prevent births within such a group 
or using force to remove children from 
the group. 

When death results from a crime of 
genocide, the penalty will be life im- 
prisonment and a fine of up to $1 
million. 

In other instances, the penalty will 
be a fine of up to $1 million and 20 
years in prison. Anyone who incited an- 
other to violate the law could be fined 
up to $500,000 and imprisoned up to 5 
years. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 6, 1988. 

2 Text from White House press re- 
lease. ■ 



U.S. -Canadian 
No-Takeoff Declaration 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 2, 1988 1 

The Governments of Canada and the 
United States today issued the follow- 
ing declaration. 

The Governments of Canada and the 
United States agree that, except under ex- 
traordinary circumstances, they will not al- 
low hijacked aircraft which have landed in 
their territory to take off again. They will 
also make every effort to consult with the 
state of the operator of the aircraft. The 
two governments, in accordance with inter- 
national obligations, will take all appropri- 
ate measures to restore control of a 
hijacked aircraft to its lawful commander 
and to detain the hijackers for the purpose 
of prosecution or extradition. 

This is another step in our common 
fight against terrorism. It will help to 
deter hijackings by not permitting ter- 
rorists to move an aircraft looking for a 
sympathetic government or shopping 
for concessions. We hope that this no- 
takeoff policy will receive the broadest 
possible application among the coun- 
tries of the world. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



ejartment of State Bulletin January 1989 



39 



UNITED NATIONS 



UN Calls for Full Implementation 
of Afghanistan Peace Accords 



Following is a statement by Am- 
bassador Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Per- 
manent Representative to the United 
Nations, in the UN General Assembly 
on November 3, 1988, and text of the 
UN General Assembly resolution 
adopted that day. 



AMBASSADOR WALTERS' 
STATEMENT 

This resolution, adopted by consensus, 
is consistent with previous Afghanistan 
resolutions adopted annually in the 
General Assembly since 1979 by over- 
whelming votes which called for with- 
drawal of foreign troops and Afghan 
self-determination. 

I consider this resolution one more 
indication of success of our policy in 
this area. It is also a tribute to the 
brave Afghan freedom fighters whose 
courage has helped create, once again, 
the hope of a free and independent 
Afghanistan. 

The resolution adopted today has 
the following important, fundamental 
elements. 

• First, it explicitly notes that 
Afghanistan's travail has resulted from 
"the violation of principles of the 
United Nations Charter and of the rec- 
ognized norms of inter-state conduct." 

•Second, it calls for completion of 
the withdrawal of foreign (i.e., Soviet) 
troops in accordance with the Geneva 
accords. 

•Third, it reaffirms the Afghan 
people's right to self-determination. 

• Fourth, it calls for the preserva- 
tion of Afghanistan's territorial integ- 
rity and political independence. 

The fact that the resolution was 
adopted by consensus means that the 
Soviets supported it. In taking this ac- 
tion today, the international community 
served notice that it expects the Soviet 
Union to abide by this resolution and to 
abide fully by its commitments under 
the Geneva accords, including total 
troop withdrawal no later than Febru- 
ary 15, 1989. 

Unfortunately, Soviet actions in 
Afghanistan in recent days — the intro- 
duction of high performance aircraft 
and their use in offensive operations 
against the mujahidin and the intro- 
duction of other advanced weaponry 



40 



into Afghanistan — are not consistent 
with the intent and words of the resolu- 
tion adopted here. 

These actions will increase the suf- 
fering of the Afghan people but will not 
alter the outcome. They are to be con- 
demned. I consider them acts of des- 
peration. The world expects the Soviets 
to conform their actions in Afghanistan 
to the resolution to which they and the 
entire international community have 
just adhered. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 43/202 

The General Assembly 

Having considered the item entitled 
"The situation in Afghanistan and its im- 
plications for international peace and 
security," 

Reaffirming the purposes and princi- 
ples of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the obligation of all States to refrain in 
their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the sov- 
ereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of any State, 

Reaffirming further the inalienable 
right of all peoples to determine their own 
form of government and to choose their 
own economic, political and social system 
free from outside intervention, subversion, 
coercion or constraint of any kind 
whatsoever, 

Gravely concerned at the situation in 
Afghanistan, which results from the vio- 
lation of principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and of the recognized 
norms of inter-State conduct, 

Noting the conclusion at Geneva, on 
14 April 1988, of the Agreements on the 
Settlement of the Situation Relating to 
Afghanistan, and the partial withdrawal of 
foreign troops in accordance with the 
agreed time-frame, 

Aware of the continuing concern of the 
international community at the sufferings 
of the Afghan people and the magnitude of 
the social and economic problems posed to 
Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their 
soil of millions of Afghan refugees, 

Deeply conscious of the urgent need 
for a comprehensive political solution of 
the situation in respect of Afghanistan, 

Conscious that a successful final politi- 
cal settlement of the Afghanistan problem 
would have a favourable impact on the in- 
ternational situation and provide an impe- 
tus for the resolution of other acute 
regional conflicts, 

Expressing its appreciation to the 
Secretary-General and his Personal Repre- 
sentative for their efforts to bring about 
peace and security. 



Taking note of the report of the 
Secretary-General, [A/43/720-S/20230] 
the status of the process of political 
settlement, 

1. Welcomes the conclusion at Genei 
on 14 April 1988, of the Agreements on 
Settlement of the Situation Relating to 
Afghanistan under United Nations aus- 
pices, which constitute an important st< 
towards a comprehensive political soluti 
of the Afghanistan problem; 

2. Expresses its deep appreciation 
the Secretary-General and his Personal 
Representative for their constant effort 
to achieve a political solution of the 
Afghanistan problem; 

3. Calls for the scrupulous respect 
and faithful implementation of Geneva 
Agreements by all parties concerned w 
should fully abide by their letter and 
spirit; 

4. Notes the continuing process 
of withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Afghanistan and expresses its expectat 
that the withdrawal will be completed i 
accordance with the relevant provision; 
the Geneva Agreements; 

5. Reiterates that the preservation 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, pi 
cal independence and non-aligned char: >r 
of Afghanistan is essential for a peaeef t 
solution of the Afghanistan problem; 

6. Reaffirms the right of the Afghi.j 
people to determine their own form of 1 
ernment and to choose their economic, 1 
litieal and social system free from outs i] 
intervention, subversion, coercion or c 
straint of any kind whatsoever; 

7. Calls upon all parties concernei If 
work for the urgent achievement of a e ■ 
prehensive political solution and the ci • 
tion of the necessary conditions of pea< 
and normalcy that would enable the 
Afghan refugees to return voluntarily j 
their homeland in safety and honour; 

8. Emphasizes the need for an int 
Afghan dialogue for the establishment a 
broad-based government to ensure the !l 
broadest support and immediate partic I 
tion of all segments of the Afghan peo] ; I 

9. Requests the Secretary-General idi 
his Personal Representative to encourM 
and facilitate the early realization of a |l 
comprehensive political settlement in 
Afghanistan in accordance with the pn nl 
sions of the Geneva Agreements and o:]B 
present resolution; 

10. Renew its appeal to all States ill 
national and international organization io 
continue to extend humanitarian relief i- 
sistance with a view to alleviating the I ' 
hardship of the refugees, in co-ordinat i 
with the United Nations High Commisi t 
sioner for Refugees; 

11. Welcomes the appointment of a )B« 
cial Co-ordinator for channelling econo c 
and humanitarian assistance to the pec e 
of Afghanistan; 

12. Calls upon all States to provid 
adequate financial and material resour l 
to the Special Co-ordinator for the pui 






Department of State Bulletin January 89 



UNITED NATIONS 



s of achieving the speedy repatriation 
rehabilitation of the Afghan refugees 
>ell as for the economic and social re- 
. miction of the country; 
13. Requests the Secretary-General to 
a Member States and the Security 
ncil informed of progress towards the 
lementation of the present resolution 
to submit to the General Assembly at 
orty-fourth session a report on the 
ation in Afghanistan, on progress 



achieved in the implementation of the Gen- 
eva Agreements and the political settle- 
ment relating to Afghanistan; 

14. Decides to include in the provi- 
sional agenda of its forty-fourth session the 
item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan 
and its implications for international peace 
and security." 



'USUN press release 122. 
-Adopted by unanimous vote. 



h Overview of 

|S. Arms Control Objectives 



\Villiam F. Burns 

Statement before Committee I 
c ideal and Security! of the UN Gen- 
Assembly on October 18, 1988. 
Burns is Director of the Arms 
t Control and Disarmament Agency 
DA).i 

a special privilege for me to meet 
i you today and to participate in the 
ite of this committee on important 
(•national security issues that are of 
em to the community of nations. 
In the weeks ahead, this committee 
be considering a full agenda of 
5 control and disarmament topics, 
nember states will have an oppor- 
ty to express their views and put 
•ard their proposals on these issues, 
its part, the U.S. delegation will 
icipate constructively. In addition 
;ating U.S. positions as clearly as 
ible, we will listen carefully during 
First Committee debate and will 
due consideration to all views and 
posals. We will support substantive 
losals and resolutions that promote 
rnational security and stability, that 
feasible, and that make sense. We 
however, oppose proposals and res- 
ions that do not meet these criteria 
are counter to U.S. security pol- 
■, in particular any such initiative 
gned to disrupt defense rela- 
ships we have with our allies or to 
lenge the legitimacy of fundamental 
epts on which our security is 
•d, such as nuclear deterrence. 
Arms control is not an end in itself; 
an integral part of the security 



equation. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that serious participants approach dis- 
armament negotiations with the same 
care that they give to other important 
security and defense decisions. While 
arms control is not devoid of its dra- 
matic moments, progress normally is 
made one step at a time rather than in 
some quantum leap. To the extent that 
arms control and disarmament meas- 
ures enhance security and stability, 
and can be verified to provide confi- 
dence that all parties are in compliance, 
they are worth pursuing. However, ill- 
conceived arms control proposals actu- 
ally may be dangerous and, if imple- 
mented, destabilizing. In short, arms 
control is serious business and should 
be treated as such. 

Is the world community better off 
today in terms of international security 
and stability than it was at the begin- 
ning of this decade? I believe that the 
answer is "yes," and I believe that arms 
control has made an important contri- 
bution in this regard. 

Reducing and Eliminating 
Nuclear Armaments 

In the area of reducing and eliminating 
nuclear armaments, on the 1st of June 
this year, the United States and the 
Soviet Union exchanged instruments of 
ratification bringing into force the 



Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty. This treaty, which is now 
being implemented, bans an entire class 
of nuclear arms and provides for the 
effective verification of their destruc- 
tion. The INF Treaty is an important 
step in nuclear arms control. However, 
additional steps are required if the bi- 
lateral nuclear and space talks are to 
make the full contribution to interna- 
tional security and stability that we all 
desire. 

The second, and more difficult, 
step will be the conclusion and imple- 
mentation of the strategic arms reduc- 
tion treaty (START). The United States 
and the Soviet Union have reached 
agreement on important elements of 
such a treaty that will provide for 50% 
reductions in the strategic offensive 
arms of the two sides. The result for 
each side will be a ceiling of 6,000 war- 
heads on 1,600 strategic nuclear deliv- 
ery vehicles and subceilings of 4,900 
ballistic missile warheads and 1,540 
warheads on 154 heavy ballistic mis- 
siles. Both sides have agreed that there 
will be a 50% reduction in throw-weight 
for Soviet missiles. There is also agree- 
ment on a counting rule for heavy 
bomber armaments and on elements of 
a verification regime that will include 
several types of onsite inspection and 
data exchange. Several difficult issues 
remain to be settled, including ques- 
tions regarding air-launched cruise mis- 
siles, mobile intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) (if they are permit- 
ted), limits on ICBM warheads and 
heavy ICBMs, and some important ver- 
ification details. For its part, the 
United States is willing to continue the 
hard bargaining necessary to bring this 
task to a successful conclusion. 

These negotiations, like any other 
negotiations, have their own dynamic 
and imperative. It is neither realistic 
nor appropriate to attempt to force 
them to conform to artificial deadlines. 
What is important is that the end re- 
sults produce greater strategic stability 
and a less provocative, and less dan- 
gerous, nuclear balance. 

Defense and Space Talks 

In the defense and space talks, the 
United States seeks agreement with 
the Soviet Union on how to manage 
jointly a stable transition to increasing 
reliance on effective defenses, should 



^artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



41 



UNITED NATIONS 



they prove feasible, which will threaten 
no one. Greater emphasis on strategic 
defense is the only way which has been 
suggested in recent times that has a 
realistic possibility of reducing the de- 
pendence on nuclear deterrence. It is 
not yet clear whether or not the U.S. 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or 
longstanding efforts by the Soviet 
Union in this field, will fulfill their full 
potential. However, we already know 
from the U.S. perspective that there is 
considerable promise. Once again I 
would like to state that the United 
States will not bargain away its SDI 
program nor accept any provisions that 
would cripple its research, develop- 
ment, and testing program, which is in 
full compliance with the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty. 

I would note, however, that the 
United States believes the existence of 
the large phased-array radar at 
Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union is a 
significant violation of a central ele- 
ment of the ABM Treaty and that 
measures must be taken to resolve 
this serious problem. 

Nuclear Testing Limitations 

In the area of nuclear testing limita- 
tions, the United States and the Soviet 
Union have agreed to deal with the is- 
sues involved through full-scale step-by- 
step negotiations. As the first step in 
these negotiations, the two sides are 
hard at work on new protocols that will 
provide for effective verification of the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 
which will make it possible to ratify 
these two treaties. There has been con- 
siderable progress in these negotia- 
tions, as well as on the recent Joint 
Verification Experiment. At the Wash- 
ington summit in December 1987, it 
was agreed that each side would con- 
duct a nuclear test at its own test site, 
while the other side used its own in- 
struments to measure directly the yield 
of the test. Those tests and measure- 
ments have now been carried out. If 
anyone had suggested 10 years ago that 
such an experiment could be carried 
out, he would have been considered out 
of touch with reality. Yet today, this 
important cooperative measure is likely 
to facilitate further negotiations on nu- 
clear testing limitations. 

Following ratification of the two ex- 
isting treaties, the United States and 



the Soviet Union have agreed to pro- 
ceed to enter into negotiations on ways 
to implement a step-by-step parallel 
program — in association with a pro- 
gram to reduce and ultimately eliminate 
all nuclear weapons — of limiting and ul- 
timately ending nuclear testing. 

At the Conference on Disarma- 
ment, the United States continues to 
support the establishment of an ad hoc 
committee on a nuclear test ban on the 
basis of a non-negotiating mandate 
which would permit substantive exami- 
nation of specific issues relating to a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban, includ- 
ing scope, verification, and compliance. 
However, the United States is not pre- 
pared to engage in negotiations on a 
comprehensive test ban treaty at this 
time and consequently would oppose 
any call to initiate such negotiations. 

By the same token, the United 
States is opposed to the proposal that 
has been made to amend the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 to 
make it a comprehensive test ban, cov- 
ering all environments. We believe that 
it would be a waste of the parties' time 
and resources to convene an amend- 
ment conference. Under the provisions 
of the treaty, for any amendment to be 
accepted, it would be required, inter 
alia, that all depositaries approve it. 
The United States will not approve any 
amendment which would turn the Lim- 
ited Test Ban Treaty into a comprehen- 
sive test ban. The LTBT, the first 
international arms control agreement 
in the nuclear era, was concluded a 
quarter of a century ago. It is a very 
important instrument which has served 
the interests of mankind all these 
years. It should not be used as a politi- 
cal football in international debates 
over the issue of a comprehensive test 
ban. Nonetheless, despite its opposition 
to this amendment, and to holding an 
amendment conference, the United 
States has met all of its obligations as a 
depositary and will continue to do so. 

Chemical Weapons 

My government considers one of the 
most urgent arms control challenges 
facing the community of nations today 
to be illegal chemical weapons use and 
the dangerous spread of chemical weap- 
ons capabilities. The best solution to 
this problem, in our view, would be a 
truly global, comprehensive, and effec- 
tively verifiable ban. In 1984, Vice 
President George Bush presented a 
U.S. draft text of a chemical weapons 
convention to the Conference on Disar- 



mament. Based in large part on this 
initiative, and on the proposals of otr 
participants, the Conference on Disa: 
mament has made considerable prog- 
ress in negotiations on a chemical 
weapons convention. But considerabl 
work remains to be done. 

In his address to the General As 
sembly on September 26th, Presides 
Reagan called on the parties to the 
Geneva protocol of 1925 and all other 
concerned states to convene a confer- 
ence to take action to reverse the sei 
ous erosion of respect for internation 
norms against the illegal use of chem 
ical weapons in armed conflict. Such 
conference is not intended to delay o 
substitute for the ongoing negotiatio 
in Geneva on a comprehensive ban. I 
fact, it should give additional impetu 
to the negotiations. By focusing high 
level attention by the governments o 
the world on the questions of illegal 
and proliferation of chemical weapon 
we will work toward broadly accepta 
solutions which could be expressed c 
lectively by the participants. A re- 
newed international commitment 
against illegal use of chemical weapo 
is needed now to give a comprehensi 
ban a fighting chance. 

The United States also supports 
the continuation of the work of the 
group of experts that are assisting t 
Secretary General to develop furthe: 
technical guidelines and procedures 
investigation of possible use of chem 
and biological or toxin weapons. Thi 
work should be completed promptly 
order that it might be available to tl 
Secretary General for appropriate u 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Goals 

There is broad international recogni | 
that the spread of nuclear weapons 
would threaten regional and global s 
bility. And there is wide support for 
international cooperative efforts to c 
front this threat. The Nuclear Non- 
proliferation Treaty (NPT), the trea 
of Tlatelolco, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all < 
tribute significantly to nonproliferat 
objectives and will continue to recei 
strong support from the United Stai 
This year, during the work of th 
First Committee, the states party t< 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
will organize themselves to prepare 
the review of the treaty in 1990. The 
NPT has made an important contrib 
tion to international security and to 
peaceful use of the atom. Today the 
world is a safer place, for both parti 



42 



Department of State Bulletin/January 11 



UNITED NATIONS 



'i nonparties, because of the broad 
servance of the NPT's provisions, 
e fact that the NPT continues to at- 
ct important new adherents is testi- 
ny to its vitality. For its part, the 
ited States will work together with 
other parties to ensure that the 
review conference will examine the 
aty thoroughly in order to make sure 
,t it continues to function effectively. 

The United States also remains 
itimitted to making the peaceful 
»iefits of the atom available to those 
o have demonstrated a commitment 
:he principles of the NPT, or any 
lparable internationally binding 
imitment not to acquire nuclear ex- 
sive devices, and are responsible 
mbers of the world community, 
ile the growth of nuclear energy has 
ved somewhat over the past decade, 
in large part to the changing eco- 
iics of energy, many nations will be- 
iie increasingly dependent upon 
lear power as a safe, reliable, and 
ironmentally friendly source of en- 
y in the years ahead. Also, the ap- 
ations of nuclear isotopes in 
licine and agriculture are growing 
becoming more important. 
It will be necessary to maintain 
■ng support for the International 
mic Energy Agency, particularly its 
rts to implement the best possible 
.guards system on civil nuclear ac- 
;ies. This will require cooperation 
contributions on the part of all 
es, especially those with substantial 
H ear programs. It seems clear that 
I importance of the NPT and the 
1 )A will continue indefinitely into the 
b re and that they should remain key 
il lents of international security. 

As the United States and Soviet 
u on continue to negotiate toward sig- 
li ant nuclear reductions, so must all 
I es maintain their support for efforts 
c revent the spread of nuclear weap- 
■ to additional countries. Nuclear 
(I shold states that have rejected the 
I T cannot escape their responsibility 
I lis area. We urge them to consider 
I illel initiatives, on a regional or in- 
I ational basis, to reduce the risks of 
I ear weapons proliferation. 

I er Space Issues 

I he Conference on Disarmament, the 
Ited States has supported the work 
lie ad hoc committee responsible for 
I consideration of outer space arms 



control issues of global interest. This 
committee was established originally, 
and has continued to operate, on the 
basis of a non-negotiating mandate. The 
United States has made a serious at- 
tempt to identify measures that might 
be feasible and desirable as the basis 
for negotiating further multilateral 
arms control agreements that apply to 
outer space. We remain willing to listen 
to any proposals and to give them the 
consideration that they are due. How- 
ever, we have identified no appropriate 
measures and have seen no proposals 
from others which we believe would en- 
hance international security and are 
both feasible and verifiable. Frankly, at 
this point my government is skeptical 
that there are any new multilateral 
outer space arms control measures just 
waiting to be discovered that make 
sense. 

Conventional Arms Reductions 

Conventional arms control also de- 
serves serious consideration, for it is 
these weapons that have caused mil- 
lions of casualties since the founding of 
the United Nations. On the positive 
side, the implementation of the meas- 
ures agreed to in Stockholm in 1986 has 
proceeded smoothly. Today, as a result, 
there may be less likelihood of war in 
Europe caused by miscalculation or 
misunderstanding. 

However, Europe remains the most 
heavily armed region in the world, 
where major imbalances of forces ex- 
ists. Therefore, the United States and 
its NATO allies have proposed two sets 
of negotiations to deal with conven- 
tional forces in Europe. In one set of 
negotiations between the 23 members 
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we seek 
to enhance stability at a lower level of 
conventional forces. The other negotia- 
tion among the 35 CSCE [Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe] 
states will build upon and expand the 
measures agreed to in Stockholm. 

While situations in other regions 
of the world are different, perhaps the 
European experience in developing 
confidence-building measures and con- 
sidering limitations on forces and 
equipment might be adapted to fit in 
certain other cases. In particular where 
there are tensions among neighbors, or 
conflicts are coming to an end, the role 
of confidence-building measures tailored 
to the specific situations might contrib- 



artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



ute to greater regional stability and 
help to dispel longstanding suspicions. 
The United States would be prepared 
to share its experience in this regard 
with any country or group of countries 
that might have an interest. 

The fact that the UN Disarmament 
Commission is now seized with the sub- 
ject of conventional disarmament indi- 
cates a broad recognition of the global 
importance of this issue. The specific 
questions involved, including the causes 
of the accumulation of conventional 
arms, may differ from one region of the 
world to another. This makes the task 
of the UN Disarmament Commission 
extremely complex, but all the more 
important. We hope that all member 
states will make every effort to see that 
conventional disarmament issues re- 
ceive the attention that they are due. 

We understand that this committee 
may be presented with arms proposals 
for limits or constraints on naval ac- 
tivities. This makes it necessary to 
state the firm position of the United 
States regarding such proposals. Re- 
quirements for naval armaments and 
activities of various nations are inher- 
ently asymmetrical and are based on 
broader geographic, political, strategic, 
and other military factors. Located be- 
tween and separated from allies by two 
oceans, the United States relies on 
maritime activities and freedom of navi- 
gation under international law to pro- 
tect its security and trade interests. 
Therefore, the United States cannot 
agree to any arms limitations or addi- 
tional constraints on its naval activities. 

Compliance and Verification 

If arms control measures are to be ef- 
fective, the parties must comply with 
all of the provisions. It is not only 
important for each party to make sure 
that it is in compliance, it is just as 
important to remove any doubts that 
others may have regarding that party's 
compliance. Confidence in the effective- 
ness of existing agreements is an 
important part of the foundation of fu- 
ture agreements. Over the past several 
years, the First Committee has given 
recognition to the importance of com- 
pliance with arms control agreements if 
the benefits of such agreements are to 
be realized. Again this year the United 
States, together with a number of co- 
sponsors, intends to introduce a resolu- 
tion that encourages faithful compliance 
with arms control obligations. We 
would welcome the continued support 
of all member states for this resolution. 



43 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 






Conclusion 

The United States shares the disap- 
pointment that many others also have 
expressed that it was not possible to 
reach a consensus on a concluding docu- 
ment at the third special session of the 
United Nations devoted to disarma- 
ment. But we do not judge the session 
to have been a failure. The exchanges 
of views that took place, and the work 
carried out in attempting to achieve a 
consensus on a concluding document, 
point to a deepened understanding of 
the real issues involved in our search 
for a more peaceful and secure world. 
Realism in our work is always needed. 
As also noted by the Secretary General 
in his recent report on the work of the 
United Nations, the discussion during 
the special session demonstrated that 
arms control cannot be separated from 
the general state of relations in the 
world. 

This committee will be considering 
many issues and many resolutions in 
the weeks ahead. There will be many 
opportunities to examine longstanding 
issues once again and to consider new 
issues. One of the most important con- 
tributions that this committee can make 
is to discover the common ground that 
can serve as the basis for progress in 
ongoing work or new actions. This 
search for common ground, for mean- 
ingful consensus, is not easy. Posturing 
and polemic should be set aside. Where 
serious security concerns have been ex- 
pressed, they must be considered and 
taken into account. They cannot be 
swept aside for the sake of "good will." 

The world remains a dangerous 
place. There is still aggression and sup- 
pression of freedom on a massive scale. 
The most effective way for most coun- 
tries to protect themselves remains the 
deterrence of aggression and maintain- 
ing the ability to defeat aggression 
should it occur. The Charter of the 
United Nations recognizes the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-de- 
fense if an armed attack occurs against 
any member state. 

Our goal, and a goal that most 
other countries share, is to make the 
world safer. To reduce the opportunity 
for aggression. But a safer world is not 
enough. We must seek a better world — 
a world where disputes are settled 
peacefully. A world where the rights of 
nations and the rights of individuals are 
respected and protected. A world 



where there is justice and freedom. A 
world where all countries are at peace 
with one another and with themselves. 

The United Nations is playing an 
important role in helping to restore the 
peace in many areas. We should all be 
grateful for the fact that this institu- 
tion, which was founded on such lofty 
principles and with great expectations, 
is reinvigorating its utility and purpose 
in the area of peacekeeping. 



As we undertake our work in tl:| 
committee, let us move down the paj 
toward a better world. We have nw. 
progress. Additional progress can b- 
made. We should not despair that tl 
end of the road is not in sight. Let i] 
continue our journey, one step at a ! 
time. 



■USUN press release 96. 



El Salvador: The Battle for Democracy 



In the early 1980s, the United States 
made the historic decision to join in 
El Salvador's effort to transform itself 
from a closed oligarchy into a modern 
democracy. The immediate impetus was 
the emergence of a Marxist-Leninist in- 
surgency. The key question then was — 
assuming that El Salvador could sur- 
vive the insurgency — whether democ- 
racy was a realistic option. 

Did El Salvador, in fact, possess a 
political center with enough leaders and 
followers to make a difference? Could 
these men and women coalesce suffi- 
ciently to lead a democratic transforma- 
tion despite violent opposition from the 
extreme left and right? 

The Salvadoran people have been 
answering this question affirmatively 
for almost a decade. They have made 
the difficult decision to defy the ex- 
tremes which seek their allegiance 
through violence and terrorism and, in- 
stead, to rally to try to build a modern 
system of political debate, choices, and 
competition. Since then, in their over- 
whelming majority, they have continued 
to support the struggle for El Sal- 
vador's democratic transformation. 

At the end of 1988, the question for 
El Salvador is how to continue this re- 
markable democratic experiment. Ex- 
tremist forces are declining in numbers, 
but their behavior still reflects the pol- 
itics and passions of a decade ago. The 
violent right remains isolated outside 
the system, as it has since the 1979 
reformist coup; the armed left still 
attempts to advance its agenda by 
driving the Salvadoran people to 
revolutionary despair. 

More clearly than ever, the political 
extremes are relevant only because 
they are violent. As viable options, 
they have been left behind by the pub- 
lic debate that now concentrates on is- 
sues of governance and national policies 
within a democratic consensus. 



The center has held. Its membe } 
are developing self-confidence and til 
in the maturing democratic framewoj 
They are determined to overcome thj] 
political culture of the antidemocratic 
past. The center's challenging object 
is to complete El Salvador's democn 
transformation despite the resistanc 
and provocation of the extremes. 

The United States reengaged in) 
Salvador after prolonged noninvolve 
ment during the decisive period of t 
late 1970s, when the outlines of the - 
vadoran conflict developed and an ir 
choate center had begun to emerge. 
Reformist juntas groped for an optii 
between oligarchy and the slaughtei 
(matanza) of civilians, as in 1932, ai 
capitulation to Marxism-Leninism. 1 * 
ognizing that emergence, and the fa 
that the leftist attacks against it wc 
linked to Cuba, President Carter re | 
versed U.S. policy — from detachme 
to near-total engagement. Four day: ( 
before the end of his term, he authc 
rized resumption of military assista ' 
to El Salvador. 

For more than 7 years, in part- 
nership with El Salvador's legitimat 
political leadership, the United Stat 
has sought to help the center to con • 
idate its position. We have brought 
resources and influence to bear on 
the democratic transformation of 
Salvadoran institutions. One impor- , 
tant objective has been to assist th( 
development of a defense force that 
could hold its own in the field while , 
also changing itself from a partner J 
of the oligarchy into a professional 
military service for the defense of 
democracy. 

The process of change in El Sal 
vador remains incomplete, sometirm 
with tragic effects for its private cit 
izens as well as for those who have '■ 
courage for public service or politic! 
leadership. It will require economic , 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/January 11 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



J>wth and political maturity. The pace 
phange is a crucial issue. It depends 
an issue even more fundamental: the 
ure of the partnership of the United 
lites and El Salvador to keep the 
Iremes at bay and to reduce the 
jjistraints extremist violence places 
i<the dynamics of democratic 
Irelopment. 

iiarization, Process, and Politics 

[j; several years preceding U.S. re- 
i:;agement in El Salvador provided 
■ndant, if superficial, evidence that 
J vadoran society and politics were 
l- ply polarized around reactionary 
I revolutionary extremes. In 1979-81, 
I center seemed miniscule and 
Irerless to endure, much less to reach 
I and hold on to power. Its military, 
nal, and political elements and mod- 
aist economic sectors seemed irrele- 
it. Organized absolutist factions of 
1 left and right (which included 
I huge paramilitary organization, 
I DEN) were in open conflict that 
1 pt up thousands of citizens and 
K iuced thousands of deaths. 

The desire for change, in fact, was 
i ' widely shared. The fact that the 
t ority of Salvadorans had no real 
he, were not speaking through the 

I )lutist groups, and were primarily 
( 'erned with shielding themselves 

I I the consequences of the struggle 
li t largely unnoticed. For most ob- 
e ers it was even less obvious that 

h seeds of real change already had 
t i sown by the two transitional re- 
5 list juntas led by Col. Adolfo Ma- 

I in 1979 and then by Jose Napoleon 
M rte in 1980. 

Although beset by their own politi- 
a nexperience and disunity, by 
B tionary plotting, and by violent dis- 
C. r, the Majano and Duarte juntas 
U j able to proceed with fundamental 
g rian and other economic reforms. 
)i he military front, they prevented a 
|<over by the armed left; on the po- 
| il, they prepared for a systematic 
n sition to democratic constitutional 
prnment. The apparently imminent 
U Teak of full-scale civil war instead 
« aled itself to be a struggle of ex- 
H list minorities against each other 

II the center. The armed left re- 
nted to the hills to wage guerrilla 
n and rural terrorism or into clan- 
ie ine cells for urban terrorism. The 
leme right was obliged to go under- 
laid for a vigilantist war against the 
Bor violent reactionary subversion 

■ nst the emerging democratic struc- 
H. Left to emerge as the extremes 



retreated was the center — the great 
majority of Sal vadoran people who be- 
gan to look to the reform process to 
provide the change they sought and ac- 
commodate the spectrum of political 
views they held. 

El Salvador elected a Constituent 
Assembly in 1982 which wrote the Con- 
stitution of 1983. A civilian indepen- 
dent, Alvaro Magana, became interim 
president and worked indefatigably to 
cement alliances among fractious politi- 
cians and retain military loyalties. 
Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Du- 
arte was elected to a 5-year term as 
president in 1984. Legislative and mu- 
nicipal elections were held in 1985 and 
1988. In each case, international ob- 
servers testified that the election had 
been conducted fairly, in an open and 
noncoercive environment. 

The development of a radically 
new political culture has proceeded 
erratically but steadily, finding 
expression in a carefully tended elec- 
toral mechanism and especially in com- 
petitive party politics and their 
application in an open system of politi- 
cal rewards and punishment. For the 
March 1988 legislative and municipal 
elections, voter registration cards were 
issued to 1.65 million people, of whom 
67% voted. When the votes were 
counted, the Christian Democrats 
(PDC) had lost control of the National 
Assembly to the opposition Nationalist 
Republican Alliance (ARENA) along 
with most of the nation's mayoralties. 



This first peaceful transfer of 
power by an incumbent party in El 
Salvador's history thus was decided 
on issues of national policy and of per- 
formance in office. The elections proved 
correct the emerging sense that Sal- 
vadoran democracy is making decisions 
to punish and reward parties based on 
their record rather than on ideological 
matters. They reaffirmed yet again that 
the Salvadoran people have already 
made their ideological choice — for de- 
mocracy. The internal debate con- 
tinues — as it has for the past 5 years — 
to be about the array of concrete issues 
that democratic change has opened up 
for public decision. 

El Salvador is preparing for the 
regular presidential election of March 
1989 (with a possible runoff in June). 
It will apparently do so with the par- 
ticipation of the principal leaders of 
the Democratic Revolutionary Front 
(FDR), who have returned to El Sal- 
vador and to electoral competition. The 
FDR has been allied politically with the 
insurgents of the Farabundo Marti Na- 
tional Liberation Front (FMLN) since 
1980. Guillermo Ungo, the Secretary 
General of the National Revolutionary 
Government, and Ruben Zamora, of the 
Popular Social Christian Movement, 
have joined with the Social Democratic 
Party to form the Democratic Con- 
vergence (CD), which has been regis- 
tered as a legal political party and has 
begun to campaign. 



Aid to Nicaraguan 
Democratic Resistance 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
OCT. 14, 19881 

I recently signed into law the Depart- 
ment of Defense Appropriations Act for 
fiscal year 1989. That act provided $27 
million for limited humanitarian aid for 
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance 
through March 31, 1989. 

Shortly, Congress will adjourn for 
the year, and its members will return to 
their States and districts. If, during ad- 
journment, the Sandinista regime at- 
tacks the resistance, available resources 
may not be enough to protect and sus- 
tain the freedom fighters until the new 
Congress convenes. In the event the 
Sandinistas attempt to capitalize on this 
situation, they should know I would not 



hesitate to call the 100th Congress back 
into session to consider emergency as- 
sistance to the freedom fighters. 

Our policy in Nicaragua remains the 
same: freedom for the people of Nic- 
aragua, restoration of democratic institu- 
tions, and peace and stability for all 
Central America. America must stand 
with those who fight for freedom in Nic- 
aragua, as it has stood with the valiant 
freedom fighters in Afghanistan and An- 
gola. We have an obligation to share the 
blessings of our liberty with those who 
yearn for freedom in Nicaragua. Their 
struggle is our struggle, and together 
we can achieve democracy in Nicaragua. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 17, 1988. 



gartment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



45 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Against the background of the past 
8 years of armed conflict, the return of 
these leftist leaders is a dramatic de- 
parture that potentially expands the 
constitutional political center and re- 
defines the realm of the possible in Sal- 
vadoran political culture. The good 
faith of the CD remains to be tested: it 
has refused explicitly to sever ties with 
the FMLN and its strategy of violence, 
but it has been legally accepted and is 
free to organize its supporters and pub- 
licize its views. The FMLN itself has 
been ambiguous about the CD, and it is 
unclear whether the guerrillas will 
again target polling places, candidates, 
and voters for assassination, harass- 
ment, and intimidation. 

Other leftist leaders also have re- 
turned to El Salvador from abroad. 
Mario Aguinada Carranza, Aronette 
Diaz de Zamora, and Tirso Canales 
of the Nationalist Democratic Union 
(UDN) reentered El Salvador without 
incident after self-imposed exile. (The 
UDN, the political arm of the Commu- 
nist Party of El Salvador, always has 
been legally recognized as a political 
entity.) 

In 1988, it is clear that the major- 
ity in El Salvador has found the politi- 
cal voice that it lacked in the violent 
uproar of 1977-81. It exercises that 
voice through political parties and elec- 
toral judgments on issues and perform- 
ance. The consensus on democratic 
principles and procedures underscores 
the political irrelevance of the two ex- 
tremes, which have only violence with 
which to resist the democratization 
of power. U.S. policy supports those 
struggling to empower the democratic 
center more fully against the extremes 
that still seek to destroy it. 

The Armed Left 

Spawned by the radical political blocs 
of the late 1970s, the armed left has 
remained outside the process of change 
in Salvadoran political and economic 
life. In battling the reformist politics 
that emerged from the 1979 coup, the 
insurgent Salvadoran leftist groups 
found unity in Havana through Fidel 
Castro. The military front they formed 
during 1979-80, the FMLN, since has 
been a formidable obstacle to orderly 
democratic development. The FMLN 
continues to follow a strategy of guer- 
rilla war against national political, eco- 
nomic, and defense institutions with 
cycles of urban and village terrorism. 
Some FMLN component groups remain 
committed to prolonged military attri- 
tion of the democratic state; others to 



46 



classic schemes of provoking mass up- 
rising. Overall, however, the FMLN 
tries to provoke governmental repres- 
sion through terrorism and sabotage 
and openly hopes to see it develop 
should the conservative ARENA party 
win the presidential election in March. 

In a profound sense, the leftist 
option collapsed politically with the 
FMLN's defeat in its badly miscalcu- 
lated "final offensive" of January 1981. 
El Salvador was not Nicaragua: the 
FMLN demonstrated that it had little 
popular support, and it failed to 
provoke a general uprising against the 
beleaguered Duarte junta. The army 
remained loyal to the civil-military 
junta. It declined the opportunity for 
a counter coup or a new matanza of 
suspected FMLN supporters. The 
paramilitary right had to remain under- 
ground. The reforms continued. The 
democratic reform option had been se- 
verely tested under fire and had 
endured. 

Guerrilla strength in 1988 is esti- 
mated at 6,000-7,000, down from a 1983 
high of 12,000. The Salvadoran Govern- 
ment has met with the FMLN/FDR 17 
times since 1983 in an effort to reach a 
negotiated solution, but the armed left 
still rejects the government's repeated 
offer of amnesty and challenge to test 
their popular support at the polls. The 
guerrillas walked out of the last meet- 
ing in October 1987. Their precondi- 
tions for renewed talks — including 
power-sharing before elections in a 
transitional government, a de facto 
demand that the political center dis- 
solve its agonizingly developed con- 
sensus on democracy — are formally 
rejected by the Salvadoran Government 
as unconstitutional. 

Doubts about the FMLN's sincerity 
regarding a negotiated democratic solu- 
tion seem fully justified: the FMLN has 
changed nothing in its position since it 
presented a scenario of peace through 
government surrender during the first 
talks at La Palma and Ayagualo in 
1984. Guerrilla documents captured by 
the Salvadoran Army in February 1988 
included a communication between 
FMLN leaders on the peace talks. 
It reads in part: 

The dialogue is not an end. It is a 
means. Whatever form a negotiated politi- 
cal solution takes does not mean that we 
cease the struggle. Even the best negoti- 
ated solution would mean that we would 
put more emphasis on the political, rather 
than the military struggle; in the most 
likely event, it would mean the continua- 



tion of the struggle in all its forms — pot 
cal and military — but now from a positJ 
of legitimate and recognized power at t 
national and, to a good extent, internal 
tional level. 



The Army 

The Salvadoran Army has come far 
from the confused, poorly equipped 
force of about 10,000 that began the 
decade. While the FMLN has remai 
intellectually frozen in 1981 and de- 
creased to half of its peak strength, 
Salvadoran Armed Forces have beet 
a more professional and efficient foi 
of more than 50,000 troops. The arr 
increased effectiveness in direct cor 
has forced the guerrillas to operate 
chiefly at the small-unit level and 
against soft economic targets. The 
FMLN's frontal attack on the 4th b 
gade headquarters at El Paraiso on 
September 13, 1988, followed almos' 
year of relative inactivity in the fiel 
The guerrillas were unable to penel 
the inner perimeter and took nume 
casualties. It was a failed repetitior 
a similarly heavy attack in January 
which overran El Paraiso and route 
defenders. 

At the end of 1988, it is instruc 
to look back to the beginning of th(« 
decade. The democratic center in H 
Salvador did not then and still has 
defined political success in military 
terms, e.g., totally exterminating! 
guerrillas. The basic issue from tht 
military perspective in 1979-81 was 
whether the juntas could field an a> 
able to protect the democratic optii 
against the attacks of the armed le 

Ironically, before January 1981. 
U.S. weapons were available to the 
FMLN (provided clandestinely by 
nam, Cuba, and Nicaragua, along 
other materiel from the PLO, Ethl 
and Eastern Europe) but were den 
by the United States to the Salvad 
Government forces that were tryini 
offer their nation the possibility of 
alternative to monopoly of power b 
political extremes. 

In fact, the democratic option 
proven that it had the loyalty of tht 
army in 1980 when Duarte took the 
courageous step of committing his 
party's life and credibility to a tran 
tional partnership with the militar; 
democratic reform. As an institutic 
the military had committed itself ti 
quasirevolutionary reform decrees 
1979-80 — physically implementing ; 
defending the land reform — but lef 
their administration to the political 
leadership, and it has continued to 






Department of State Bulletin/January 



ftk 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



/The army backed the transition 
|n junta to Alvaro Magana's provi- 
lal presidency in 1982 and then the 
Inulgation of a constitution in 1983 
i subjected the military to the au- 
|Hty of the president, as civilian 
jmander in chief, for the first time. 

In June 1985, the conservative 
iENA tried to invalidate the legis- 
ts election won by the Christian 
locrats. However, the army's com- 
ment to the democratic process was 
■ firmed by the united senior military 
lership, which publicly underscored 
i| the outcome of free elections was 
fling. Since then, the military 
111 institution has continued to 
pts blood on the line in the field 
Win the city streets without seeking 
fcassert control over political life or 
lie policy. By accepting the re- 
■is — which Ungo, as he rallied to the 
led left, claimed it never would — the 
I,' fundamentally has realigned eco- 
lic power in El Salvador. Today, the 
l-e of the sociopolitical vision first 
8 ulated by the leaders of the 1979 
I ary coup rests totally in the hands 
l/ilian leaders appealing for a man- 
I to a civilian electorate. 

I lan Rights 

I I a horrifying level of political 

i nality in the late 1970s, El Sal- 
|t has experienced a steady upward 
1 1 in respect for human rights to 
K iresent uneven plateau of perform- 
I Progress has been insufficient, 
u he present situation remains too 
i] rfect to qualify El Salvador as an 
s utionalized democracy capable of 
u ring respect for the human and 
I; rights of all its citizens. But the 
1 cal center has created sufficient 
|c confidence, despite the violent 
I 'mes, to encourage its natural ma- 
I ' to participate in the political proc- 
If choosing leaders and policies. 
J ^resident Duarte's personal com- 
lent, governmental institutional 
Its, and the provision of training 
lijuman rights instruction to the 
Id forces have brought unequivocal 
I 'ess. The governmental Human 
Its Commission, with offices in San 
I dor and other cities, documents 
lations of abuses, conducts investi- 
■ns, visits prisoners, and keeps sta- 
lal records. Another official body, 
I Commission on Investigations, has 
i j cial Investigative Unit and a Fo- 
Ic Unit to apply modern crimi- 
l;ical techniques in investigating 
lus crimes, including those that 
q politically motivated. 



U.S. Restricts Entry of 
Nicaraguan Officials, Employees 



PROCLAMATION 5887, 

OCT. 22, 1988' 

In light of the current state of relations 
between the United States and Nicaragua, 
including the July 11, 1988, unjustified ex- 
pulsion from Nicaragua of the United 
States Ambassador and seven other United 
States diplomats for pursuing legitimate 
diplomatic activities, the Nicaraguan gov- 
ernment's refusal to allow the entry of 
United States diplomats to ensure the con- 
tinued functioning of the U.S. embassy, 
and long-standing Nicaraguan government 
suppression of free expression and press 
and support of subversive activities 
throughout Central America, I have deter- 
mined that it is in the interests of the 
United States to impose certain restric- 
tions on entry into the United States of 
officers and employees of the Government 
of Nicaragua and the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (hereinafter, the 
"FSLN"). 

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Rea- 
gan, President of the United States of 
America, by the power vested in me by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States 
of America, including section 212(f) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
as amended (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), having 
found the unrestricted nonimmigrant entry 
of officers and employees of the Nic- 
araguan government and the FSLN, ex- 
cept as provided for in Sec. 2 of this 
Proclamation, to be detrimental to the in- 
terests of the United States, do hereby 
proclaim that: 



Section 1. Entry of the following 
classes of Nicaraguan nationals as nonim- 
migrants is hereby suspended: (a) officers 
and employees of the Government of Nic- 
aragua or FSLN holding diplomatic or offi- 
cial passports; and (b) individuals who, 
notwithstanding the type of passport that 
they hold are considered by the Secretary 
of State or his designee to be officers or 
employees of the Government of Nicaragua 
or the FSLN. 

Sec. 2 The suspension of entry as non- 
immigrants set forth in Section 1 shall not 
apply to officers or employees of the Gov- 
ernment of Nicaragua or the FSLN: (a) 
who are representatives to, or officers or 
employees of, organizations designated un- 
der the International Organizations Immu- 
nities Act (22 U.S.C. section 288) and 
members of their immediate families resid- 
ing with them; or (b) in such other cases or 
categories of cases as may be designated 
from time to time by the Secretary of 
State or his designee. 

Sec. 3. This Proclamation is effective 
immediately. 

In Witness Whereof, I have here- 
unto set my hand this twenty-second day of 
October, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty-eight, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and thirteenth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 31, 1988. 



El Salvador, nonetheless, remains a 
violent society. Disturbingly, the gen- 
eral level of violence has increased 
slightly over the past year. As always, 
it remains difficult to determine the 
motive in the majority of murders. 
However, U.S. Embassy statistical indi- 
cators, based on news accounts of vio- 
lence and other public sources, confirm 
that murders of apparently political mo- 
tivation have declined dramatically over 
the last 8 years, from a high of 750 
deaths a month in 1980 to 23 a month in 
1987. There is little reason to expect 
the basic improvement to be reversed. 

While the Salvadoran Government 
has made concerted efforts to improve 
the military's observance of human 
rights, FMLN assassinations, kidnap- 
ings, use of pressure-detonated mines 



that kill and maim indiscriminately, and 
other abuses continue to mount. The 
FMLN assassinated six mayors in Mor- 
azan and Usulutan Departments this 
year; guerrilla mines have killed 39 peo- 
ple and injured more than 130 in the 
first 9 months of 1988. 

The violence today, although 
deeply rooted in history, is deeply con- 
ditioned by the turmoil of the 1970s. At 
the beginning of the decade, the violent 
right found a natural recruitment base 
in the former members of the clan- 
destine White Warriors Union and of 
ORDEN, the massive paramilitary or- 
ganization linked to army elements 
which was dispersed by the army under 
junta orders in October 1979. Retired 
and active-duty police and military per- 
sonnel linked to individual landowners 



I'tment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



47 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



or personally opposed to the reform 
juntas were another source of support. 
At the same time, guerrilla terrorism — 
especially the assassinations of political 
figures and individual active-duty or re- 
tired uniformed personnel going about 
civilian pursuits (still a favorite tac- 
tic) — provoked passionate reactions. 

The resulting dynamic led some 
security force personnel to adopt a 
pattern of abuse against policy and or- 
ders, which has not been extirpated 
and which plays into the hands of the 
enemies of the democratic center. In 
some cases, this has meant lack of ac- 
tion against abuses by members of 
state institutions or indifference to the 
activities of clandestine rightwing ter- 
rorism. In other cases it has meant 
shooting first and asking questions 
later or reprisals against noncombat- 
ants known or thought to be sym- 
pathetic to the guerrillas. 

The fact that some elements of the 
army still chafe against the relatively 
new obligation to respect civilian wel- 
fare while it fights the war is clear. Its 
evolution is incomplete — notably its in- 
ability still to accept that fully subject- 
ing the officer class to law and justice 
will strengthen, rather than weaken, 
the army's prestige, cohesiveness, pro- 
fessionalism, and institutional pros- 
pects. Yet, this is an army whose his- 
tory encompasses the wholesale mas- 
sacre of civilians in the matanza of 
1932. The extent of change in military 
conduct and attitudes is as striking as 
the extent of socioeconomic and politi- 
cal change it has endorsed. 

If change is an issue and a chal- 
lenge for the military, it is neither for 
those at the political margins where 
nothing has changed. The extreme left 
and right still embrace the politics of 
systematic terror and induced de- 
spair — disappearances, murder, the 
calculated destruction of people's live- 
lihoods through economic sabotage — in 
fanatic opposition to the accrual of 
power at the center. 

Justice 

A judicial system upon which all cit- 
izens can depend for reliable law en- 
forcement and justice is an obvious 
requirement for systematic protection 
of human rights. The Salvadoran judi- 
cial system, by contrast, is character- 
ized by poorly paid and trained court 
officers and judges subject to intim- 
idation and bribery, as well as by inade- 
quate material and personnel resources. 
The Salvadoran Government acknowl- 



edges the challenge of judicial reform, 
which the United States supports with 
financial and training assistance. It has 
taken some positive steps forward, but 
much remains to be done. 

El Salvador's democratic transition 
inherited a historic lack of reliable jus- 
tice for any element of society. The 
poor have been abused, exploited, and 
murdered; the rich have been kidnaped, 
extorted, and murdered. El Salvador's 
democratic leaders inherited a culture 
of violence and vigilantism that long 
has been a substitute for dependable 
justice. The creation of a satisfactory 
system of justice will require time — to 
produce a sufficient pool of properly 
trained attorneys, magistrates, pros- 
ecutors, court officers, and enforcement 
officials. It will require time as well to 
overcome the instinctive distrust of 
state institutions bred by El Salvador's 
history of class division and to dissipate 
the passions of the past decade of 
violence. 

Meanwhile, however, one crucial 
change in El Salvador's administration 
of justice has been largely unnoticed in 
the past 5 years: the judicial system is 
still unable to deliver justice evenly and 
adequately, but it is no longer a system 
of state repression. It now operates on 
a basis of openness and accountability. 
The use of secret prisons and places of 
confinement has been outlawed and 
abandoned; arrestees are no longer held 
incommunicado; the International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross is notified of 
arrests and has access to prisoners. 
Standards of proof and due process are 
applied in determining whether ar- 
restees should stand trial (which few 
do, given the police's insufficent investi- 
gative training and resources); time 
spent in prejudicial confinement, which 
magistrates alone can impose, is de- 
ducted from sentences of those con- 
victed; the death penalty has been 
constitutionally abolished. 

This quiet transformation — a cru- 
cial foundation for progress — is un- 
matched by change at the political 
extremes, which remain explicitly 
committed to murder, abduction, and 
extortions, whether in the name of 
the traditions of the past or of 
revolutionary justice. 

Economic Challenge 

In 1986, gross domestic product (GDP) 
was $4 billion; per capita GDP was 
$780, and the rate of inflation was 32%. 
With coffee production accounting for 
21% of GDP, agriculture remains the 
mainstay of the economy and of exports 



(coffee, cotton, sugar, and shrimp), j 
Light industry (food processing, tex-j 
tiles, clothing, petroleum products, ;] 
cement) now accounts for 15% of GDi 
International debt stood at $1.7 billk; 
in 1987, and debt service payments t| 
taled 31.2% of 1987 export earnings, i 

El Salvador's once solid economi) 
base — the most dynamic and promis | 
in Central America in the 1970s — ha;| 
deteriorated drastically under the ps: 
chological and physical blows of neai, 
a decade of insurgency and sabotage; 
Economic decline has made it ex- 
tremely difficult for the government 
to achieve institutional effectiveness 
eroded popular confidence in the fu- , 
ture, magnified unemployment, and (■ 
couraged investment. It now rivals 1j 
insurgency itself as a threat to El S 
vador's democratic transition. 

Nine years of guerrilla attacks ) 
on the economic infrastructure have 
caused billions of dollars of damage. 
The guerrillas repeatedly have targi d 
hydroelectric stations, transmission 
towers, water and sewer lines, telec • 
munieations facilities and equipmen 
roads, railways, and public and priv 
transportation networks. They have ' 
systematically forced the abandonm I 
of farm operations, destroyed the v 
coffee mills, burned crops, and atta i 
workers to prevent them from har- 
vesting. 

In addition, the economic situa I 
has been damaged by the drought c | 
ditions of the last 3 years and the s p 
drop in world commodity prices for I 
fee, sugar, and cotton. In October '. I 
a major earthquake in San Salvado: I 
caused more than $1 billion worth c I 
damage. 

The government launched an ec [ 
nomic program in 1986-87 which ha I 
begun to produce results. Inflation I 
dropped from 32% in 1986 to 25% ii I 
1987, and projections for 1988 are s'l 
lower. The country also has registei I 
consecutive years of modest growth I 
gross domestic product (2.6% in 19^1 

U.S. Support for 
Democratic Transition 

Cooperation between the United St » 
and El Salvador has kept open and 
given shape to a democratic option at 
seemed unthinkable when the decail 
began. U.S. policy in El Salvador e 
compasses assistance for the consol 
dation of the democratic transition, i 
the promotion of equitable economi i 
growth, the reduction of human rig 3 
violations, the support of El Salvad's 
regional peace efforts, and the devf p- 
ment of an adequate national secur: 1 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/January jg 



TREATIES 



jacity. Since 1980, U.S. economic as- 
nce to support private sector initia- 
s, to assist the government to 
,ir damage to the economic in- 
tructure from guerrilla sabotage, 
g to fund programs in education, 
(ilth, land reform, human rights, and 
cial reform has totaled $2.4 billion. 
ir providing no military assistance 
;veen 1977 and 1981, the United 
tes has provided more than $800 
liion in military aid to help equip, 
■;n, and professionalize the Sal- 
Dran Army. 

Ironically, however, the decade 
,ces with the communist insurgents 
jiting on political fatigue in the 
Iced States, hoping to solve their 
ijiary problems and achieve their po- 
tal objectives by inhibiting or even 
ii erupting the U.S. support that has 
mled El Salvador's center to seize 
it hold the initiative in defense 
: jmocracy. ■ 



15. Import Duties 
nrease for Certain 
izilian Products 



I )CLAMATION 5885, 

H '. 20, 1988 1 

j i July 21, 1988, prior to the date of 
I tment of section 1301 of the Omnibus 
t e and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
| . L. 100-418), I determined pursuant 
ii ction 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
it ided (19 U.S.C. 2411), that the Govern- 
K of Brazil has failed to provide process 
il jroduct patent protection for phar- 
i! utical products and fine chemicals, 
n hat this failure is unreasonable and 
]] :itutes a burden or restriction on U.S. 
Dinerce (53 Fed. Reg. 28177). This 
a -e permits the unauthorized copying of 
It maceutical products and processes 
w were invented by U.S. firms. I di- 
Bi d the United States Trade Represen- 
<l e to hold public hearings on products 
f/azil that were appropriate candidates 
H icreased duties or other import re- 
tations, and those hearings were held 
* ember 8 and 9, 1988. I have further 



determined, pursuant to section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the Om- 
nibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, that appropriate and feasible action 
in response to Brazil's unreasonable pol- 
icies and practices is to impose increased 
duties of 100 percent ad valorem on certain 
imported articles that are the products of 
Brazil. 

2. Section 301 of the Act as amended 
authorizes appropriate and feasible action 
within the power of the President to obtain 
the elimination of an act, policy, or practice 
of a foreign government that is inconsistent 
with the provisions of, or otherwise denies 
benefits to the United States under, a 
trade agreement; or is unjustifiable, unrea- 
sonable, or discriminatory and burdens or 
restricts U.S. commerce. Section 301 au- 
thorizes the suspension, withdrawal, or 
prevention of the application of benefits of 
trade agreement concessions with respect 
to, and the imposition of duties or other 
import restrictions on the products of, such 
foreign country for such time as is appro- 
priate. Pursuant to section 301, such ac- 
tions may be taken on a nondiscriminatory 
basis or solely against the products of the 
foreign country involved. 

3. I have decided, pursuant to section 
301, to increase U.S. import duties on the 
articles provided for in the annexes to this 
Proclamation that are the products of 
Brazil. 

4. Section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(19 U.S.C. 2483) authorizes the President 
to embody in the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States (TSUS) the substance of the 
provisions of that Act, of other Acts affect- 
ing import treatment, and of actions taken 
thereunder. Section 1204(b) of the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 re- 
quires that I proclaim such modifications to 
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States (HTS), as enacted in section 
1204 of that Act, as are necessary or ap- 
propriate to implement the applicable 
provisions of statutes enacted, executive 
actions taken, and final judicial decisions 
rendered, after January 1, 1988, and before 
the effective date of the HTS. 

Now, Therefore, I Ronald 
Reagan, President of the United States of 
America, acting under the authority vested 
in me by the Constitution and statutes of 
the United States, including but not lim- 
ited to sections 301 and 604 of the Trade 
Act of 1974, as amended and section 1204 of 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988, do proclaim that: 

(1) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix 
to the TSUS is modified as provided in 
Annex I to this Proclamation. 

(2) Chapter 99 of the HTS is modified as 
provided in Annex II to this Proclamation. 



(3) The United States Trade Represen- 
tative is authorized to suspend, modify, or 
terminate the increased duties imposed by 
this Proclamation upon publication in the 
Federal Register of his determination that 
such action is in the interest of the United 
States. 

(4)(a) The modifications to the TSUS 
made by Annex I to this Proclamation are 
effective with respect to articles entered, 
or withdrawn from warehouse for con- 
sumption, on or after the 10th day after 
the date of signature of this Proclamation. 

(b) The modifications to the HTS made 
by Annex II to this Proclamation are effec- 
tive with respect to articles entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse for consump- 
tion, on or after January 1, 1989. 

In Witness Whereof, I have here- 
unto set my hand this twentieth day of 
October, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and eighty-eight, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America 
the two hundred and thirteenth. 

Ronald Reagan 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Oct. 24, 1988. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforce- 
ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
New York June 10, 1958. Entered into 
force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 
1970. TIAS 6997. 

Accession deposited : Dominica, Oct. 28, 
1988. 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual 
text of the eovention on international civil 
aviation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 30, 1977. 1 
Acceptance deposited : Antigua and Bar- 
buda, Nov. 14, 1988. 

Canals 

Protocol to the treaty concerning the per- 
manent neutrality and operation of the 
Panama Canal (TIAS 10029). Done at 
Washington Sept. 7, 1977. Enters into 
force for each state at the time of deposit 
of its instrument of accession. 
Accession deposited : U.S.S.R., Nov. 2, 
1988. 



f artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



49 



TREATIES 



Conservation 

Convention on international trade in en- 
dangered species of wild fauna and flora, 
with appendices. Done at Washington 
Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 
1975. TIAS 8249. 

Accession deposited : Burundi, Aug. 8, 
1988. 

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 
1973, on international trade in endangered 
species of wild faunr. and flora (TIAS 
8249). Done at Gaborone Apr. 30, 1983. ' 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-10. 
Acceptances deposited : China, July 7, 1988; 
Mauritius, July 21, 1988. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the civil aspects of interna- 
tional child abduction. Done at The Hague 
Oct. 25, 1980. Entered into force Dec. 1, 
1983; for the U.S. July 1, 1988. [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 99-11. 
Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 7, 1988. - 

Inter-American convention on letters 
rogatory. Done at Panama City Jan. 30, 
1975. Entered into force Jan. 16, 1976; for 
the U.S. Aug. 27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 98-27. 

Additional protocol to the Inter-American 
convention on letters rogatory, with annex. 
Done at Montevideo May 8, 1979. Entered 
into force June 14, 1980; for the U.S. Aug. 
27, 1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-27. 
Proclaimed by the President : Nov. 8, 1988. 2 

Organization of American States 

Protocol of amendment to the Charter of 
the Organization of American States (TIAS 
2361) "Protocol of Cartagena de Indias." 
Signed at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 
Dec. 5, 1985.' 

Ratification deposited : Argentina, Nov. 7, 
1988; Brazil, Oct. 3, 1988. 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection and develop- 
ment of the marine environment of the 
wider Caribbean region, with annex and 
protocol concerning cooperation in combat- 
ting oil spills in the wider Caribbean re- 
gion, with annex. Done at Cartagena 
Mar. 24, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 11, 
1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-13. 
Accession deposited : Cuba, Sept. 15, 1988. 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna 
Mar. 22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 
1988. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Accession deposited : Nigeria, Oct. 31, 
1988. 



Terrorism 

International convention against the taking 
of hostages. Done at New York Dec. 17, 
1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for 
the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985. 
Accession deposited : Brunei, Oct. 18, 1988. 



BILATERAL 



Argentina 

Swap agreement, with memorandum of un- 
derstanding. Signed at Washington and 
Buenos Aires Oct. 19, 1988. Entered into 
force Oct. 19, 1988. 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 19 and 24, 1986, as amended, concern- 
ing trade in certain apparel categories. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Dhaka July 
14 and Sept. 15, 1988. Entered into force 
Sept. 15, 1988. 

Canada 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Feb. 26, 1973, as amended (TIAS 7837, 
9352), for promotion of safety on the Great 
Lakes by means of radio. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Ottawa Dec. 22, 1987, 
and Aug. 10 and Oct. 24, 1988. Enters into 
force Feb. 1, 1989. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement for the sale of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at San Jose Mar. 3, 1988. 
Entered into force : Sept. 20, 1988. 

Egypt 

Project grant agreement for Cairo Water 
Supply II. Signed at Cairo Sept. 30, 1988. 
Entered into force Sept. 30, 1988. 

Project grant agreement for telecom- 
munications IV. Signed at Cairo Sept. 27, 
1988. Entered into force Sept. 27, 1988. 

Ghana 

Agreement relating to and amending the 
agreement of June 15, 1987, for sales of 
agricultural commodities. Signed at Accra 
Sept. 23, 1988. Entered into force Sept. 23, 
1988. 

Jamaica 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Jan. 15, 1987, as amended, for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities. Signed at Kingston 
Sept. 22, 1988. Entered into force Sept. 22, 
1988. 






Jordan 

Mutual support agreement, with anne 
Signed at Amman Oct. 30, 1988. Entei 
into force Oct. 30, 1988. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement o 
June 18, 1982, as amended (TIAS 1053 
relating to assignments and usage of t 
sion broadcasting channels in the fre- 
quency range 470-806 MHz (channels 
14-69) along the U.S. -Mexico border, 
fected by exchange of notes at Washin 
June 22 'and Oct. 19, 1988. Entered intl 
force Oct. 19, 1988. 

Agreement on reduced air fares. Effeil 
by exchange of letters at Mexico Sept I 
1988. Entered into force Sept. 23, 198« 
Supersedes agreement of Jan. 20, 197M 
extended (TIAS 10115). 

Memorandum of understanding on adcl 
tional services (double designation), w|| 
annex. Signed at Mexico Sept. 23, 198« 
Entered into force Sept. 23, 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding on all- 1 
services. Signed at Mexico Sept. 23, 11 
Entered into force Sept. 23, 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding on chel 
flights. Signed at Mexico Sept. 23, 19*1 
Entered into force Sept. 23, 1988. 
Supersedes agreement of Jan. 20, 191M 
extended (TIAS 10115). 

Oman 

Memorandum of agreement relating t I 
provision of technical assistance to im I 
Oman's air transportation services, wl 
annexes. Signed at Muscat Sept. 13, 1 1 
Entered into force Sept. 13, 1988; eff< I 
Apr. 1, 1988. 

Supersedes agreement of Dec. 14, 197 I 
May 18, 1980, as extended (TIAS 982< I 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement I 
May 20 and June 11, 1987, as amendec I 
concerning trade in textiles and texti I 
products. Effected by exchange of let I 
at Washington Oct. 14 and 17, 1988. E I 
tered into force Oct. 17, 1988. 

Agreement relating to the agreement I 
June 25, 1987, for the sale of agricult I 
commodities. Signed at Islamabad Sel 
22, 1988. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1 

Ninth amendment to the commodity i I 
grant and loan agreement for agricult I 
commodities and equipment. Signed ; 9 
lamabad Sept. 22, 1988. Entered into I 
Sept. 22, 1988. 



50 



Department of State Bulletin/January 



. 



PRESS RELEASES 



Agram grant agreement for balance of 
ments support and special development 
d. Signed at Islamabad Sept. 29, 1988. 
:ered into force Sept. 29, 1988. 

ject grant agreement for private sector 
er. Signed at Islamabad Sept. 29, 1988. 
,ered into force Sept. 29, 1988. 

■aguay 

tual cooperation agreement for reducing 
land, illicit production, and traffic of 
igs. Signed at Asuncion Sept. 22, 1988. 
.ered into force Sept. 22, 1988. 

» lippines 

Inorandum of agreement supplementing 
I amending the agreement of Mar. 14, 
m, as amended (TIAS 1775, 10699), con- 
piing military bases, with agreed min- 
is. Signed at* Washington Oct. 17, 1988. 

I ered into force Oct. 17, 1988. 

■Lanka 

II eement relating to the agreement of 

% . 13, 1986, for sales of agricultural eom- 
jjlities. Signed at Colombo Sept. 30, 
I;. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1988. 

L eement relating to trade in textiles and 
e ile products, with annexes. Effected by 
: lange of notes at Colombo May 23 and 
- L988. Entered into force May 24, 1988; 
i :tive June 1, 1988. 

I ted Kingdom 

(j eement extending the agreement of 
I 14, 1987, concerning the British Vir- 
I Islands and narcotics activities. Ef- 
led by exchange of notes at Washington 
I 10, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 10, 
I ; effective Nov. 12, 1988. 

I lorandum of understanding on the ex- 
P ige of subunits. Signed at Washington 
1 5, 1988. Entered into force Oct. 5, 



I ;ement for sales of agricultural com- 
ities. Signed at Sanaa Sept. 29, 1988. 
?red into force Sept. 29, 1988. 



cement amending the agreement of 
24, 1988, as amended, for sales of ag- 
tural commodities. Effected by ex- 
ge of letters at Kinshasa Oct. 4-5, 
. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1988. 



■Not in force. 
; With reservation(s) 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 



Date 



230 11/2 



231 11/2 



232 11/3 



*233 11/4 



*234 11/4 



*235 11/4 



*236 11/8 



*237 11/8 



Subject 

Shultz: remarks before 
American and European 
Nuclear Societies and the 
Nuclear Energy Forum, 
Oct. 31. 

Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 
1952-1951,, Volume VIII, 
Eastern Europe; the So- 
viet Union; Eastern Med- 
iterranean, released. 

Shultz: remarks before 
Overseas Security Ad- 
visory Council, Nov. 2 

Shultz: remarks at Una 
Chapman Cox awards 
ceremony. 

Shultz: remarks at Security 
Awareness Week awards 
ceremony. 

Shultz: remarks upon re- 
ceiving the B'nai B'rith 
Philip M. Klutznick 
award. 

Shultz: remarks at opening 
of Sergei Petrov photog- 
raphy exhibit. 

Shultz: remarks, question- 
and-answer session be- 
fore the American Coun- 
cil of Young Political 
Leaders. 



USUN 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, 
New York, N.Y. 10017. 



No. Date Subject 

*71 8/17 Okun: condolences to the 
Government of Pakistan 
on death of President 
Zia, UN General 
Assembly. 

*72 9/8 Byrne: Khmer refugees, 
UNBRO. 

*73 9/12 Korn: Africa, Programme 
of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986-1990. 



*238 11/9 Shultz: remarks on 

President-elect Bush's 
appointment of James 
Baker as Secretary of 
State. 

*239 11/14 Program for the official 
visit to Washington, 
D.C, of Prime Minister 
Thatcher of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, 
Nov. 15-17. 

*240 11/14 Program for the official 
working visit to Wash- 
ington, D.C, of Chancel- 
lor Kohl of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 
Nov. 15. 

241 11/16 Shultz: address at the OAS 

General Assembly, San 
Salvador, Nov. 14. 

242 11/16 Shultz: news conference, 

OAS General Assembly, 

San Salvador, Nov. 14. 
*243 11/17 Shultz: luncheon toast, 

OAS, San Salvador, 

Nov. 14. 
11/16 Shultz: luncheon toast in 

honor of Prime Minister 

Thatcher. 
11/18 Shultz: remarks before 

group of Soviet and 

American municipal 

leaders. 
*246 11/30 Shultz: interview on USIA 

Worldnet's "Dialogue." 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



*244 



*245 



*74 9/13 White House announce- 
ment on U.S. contribu- 
tions to the UN. 

*75 9/20 U.S. delegation to the 43d 
session of the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

*76 9/23 Byrne: Nicaraguan delega- 
tion visa applications, 
Committee on Relations 
with the Host Country. 
77 9/26 Reagan: address before 43d 
session of the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

*78 9/27 Walters: Panama, UN Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

*79 9/30 Rondon: Cuba, UN General 
Assembly, Sept. 29. 

*80 9/29 Walters: note to correspon- 
dents on the Nobel Peace 
Prize. 



artment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



51 



PUBLICATIONS 



*81 


9/30 


*82 


10/4 


*83 


10/5 


*84 


10/5 


*85 


10/5 


*86 


10/6 


*87 


10/12 



10/13 



*89 


10/13 


*90 


10/13 


*91 


10/13 


*92 


10/13 


*93 


10/14 


*94 


10/17 



*95 10/17 



96 


10/18 


97 


10/20 


98 


10/20 


99 


10/20 



"100 10/21 



101 


10/24 


102 


10/24 


103 


10/25 


104 


10/24 



Rondon: Cuba, UN General 
Assembly, Sept. 29. 

Shearouse: conference pat- 
terns, Committee V. 

Okun: reply to Libya, 
UN General Assembly, 
Oct. 4. 

Korn: world economy, Com- 
mittee II. 

Gross: reply to Syria, 
plenary. 

Hoh: Joint Inspection Unit, 
Committee V. 

Okun: pledging conference 
for assistance to 
Afghanistan, Trusteeship 
Council. 

Gross: report on effects of 
atomic radiation, Special 
Political Committee. 

Chisholm: financial state- 
ments, Committee V. 

Cahill: locust, human set- 
tlement, ECOSOC re- 
form, Committee II. 

Montgomery: U.S. -Israeli 
relations, Committee II. 

Rondon: reply to Nic- 
aragua, UN General 
Assembly. 

Byrne: racial discrimina- 
tion, Committee III. 

Montgomery: UN and 
League of Arab States 
cooperation, UN General 
Assembly. 

Note to correspondents: 
Ambassador Korn re- 
turns to private sector. 

Burns: arms control and 
disarmament, Committee 
II. 

Rosenstock: report on UN 
Charter Special Commit- 
tee, Committee VI. 

Byrne: American Samoa, 
Guam, and U.S. Virgin 
Islands, Committee IV 

Reagan: statement upon 
signing House Joint Res- 
olution 602 regarding 
Cambodia, Oct. 18. 

Montgomery: external debt 
and development, Com- 
mittee II. 

Montgomery: outer space, 
Special Political 
Committee. 

Note to correspondents: 
Mrs. Reagan's address to 
Committee III, Oct. 25. 

Reagan: narcotics, Com- 
mittee III. 

Reagan: UN Day proclama- 
tion, Oct. 24. 



107 


10/25 


108 


10/26 


109 


10/26 


110 


10/26 


111 


10/27 


112 


10/27 



"115 



105 10/25 White House statement: 
conference on chemical 
weapons use to be hosted 
in Paris on Jan. 7-11, 
1989, Oct. 21. 
*106 10/25 Okun: International Court 
of Justice judgment 
against Nicaragua, UN 
General Assembly. 

Bunton: Western Sahara, 
Committee IV 

Byrne: social issues, Com- 
mittee III. 

Okun: UN peacekeeping 
operations, Special Polit- 
ical Committee. 

Byrne: apartheid, UN Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

Kennedy: IAEA report, 
UN General Assembly. 

Koop: WHO 40th anniver- 
sary, UN General 
Assembly. 
*1 13 10/27 Boschwitz: environment 
and development, Com- 
mittee II. 
10/28 Saddler: UNITAR, Com- 
mittee II. 
10/28 Shearouse: International 

Civil Service Commission 
report, Committee V 
"116 10/31 Cahill: disaster relief as- 
sistance, Committee II. 

*Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available 
from the Public Information Division, Bu- 
reau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



The Secretary 

The Ecology of International Change, 
Commonwealth Club of California, San 
Francisco, Oct. 28, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1120). 

The Administration's Arms Control Leg- 
acy, American and European Nuclear So- 
cieties and the Nuclear Energy Forum, 
Oct. 31, 1988 (Current Policy #1121). 

The Inter-American System: Into the Next 
Century, General Assembly of the Orga- 
nization of American States, San Sal- 
vador, Nov. 14, 1988 (Current Policy 
#1126). 



East Asia 

Trends in U.S. -Japan Economic CoopeJ 
tion, Deputy Assistant Secretary CI. f 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific A 
fairs of the House Foreign Affairs &M 
mittee, Oct. 13, 1988 (Current Policv, 
#1124). 

Philippines Military Bases Agreement | 
view, 1988, Oct. 17, 1988, (Selected Ifa 
ments #33). 

Economics 

Global Economic Integration, Deputy | 
retary Whitehead, Economic Policy H 
Council of the United Nations AssocM 
tion of the USA, Sept. 20, 1988 (Cuifl 
Policy #1119). 

Europe 

Western Europe: The European Comn 
nity's Program for a Single Market i ■ . 
1992 (Regional Brief, Nov. 1988). 

General 

Building a Flexible Framework for N< . 
Information Services, Acting Coord B 
nator and Director Parker W. Borg, H 
INTELEVENT '88 Conference, Cailj 
France, Oct. 19, 1988 (Current Polic 1 
#1123). 

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Tran I 
tion, national security adviser Powe , . 
National Press Club, Oct. 27, 1988 ( 9 
rent Policy #1127). 

Human Rights 

Good News: Our Human Rights Polic; 
Senior Policy Adviser George Liste 
Florida International University, M li, 
Oct. 3, 1988 (Current Policy #1125) 

Universal Declaration of Human Rig! 
40th Anniversary (GIST, Nov. 1988 



Middle East 

Lebanon: At the Crossroads, Assista 
Secretary Murphy, American Univi 
of Beirut (AUB) Alumni Conference 
lando, Oct. 29, 1988 (Current Polid 
#1122). 

Refugees 

UNHCR Programs to Protect Vietna 
Refugees (GIST, Nov. 1988). 

Western Hemisphere 

El Salvador: The Battle for Democrai 
(Public Information Series, Nov. 19 1 

Caribbean Basin Special Textile Acce 
Program (GIST, Nov. 1988). ■ 



52 



Department of State Bulletin Januarvl 



PUBLICATIONS 



ireign Relations Volume Released 



•■ Department of State, on Novem- 
1 2, 1988, released Foreign Relations 
\ke United States, 1952-1954, Volume 

I, Eastern Europe; the Soviet 
'on; the Eastern Mediterranean. 

The U.S. policy toward Eastern 
/•ope during this period was domi- 
Jj;d by two considerations: encour- 
j! ment of the independence of 
litem European countries from So- 
i control and concern over refugees 
t, escapees from the area. The 
I ted States considered national com- 
iiism along the lines of Tito's model 
I'ugoslavia a step toward greater in- 
iendence in the region. Treatment of 
e gees and escapees remained a deli- 
st problem throughout the period. 

Diplomacy finally solved the issue 
f ivided Trieste. The United States 
n anxious to withdraw its troops 
|i the territory as well as to recon- 
il Yugoslav and Italian territorial 
lins. A diplomatic settlement was fi- 
a / achieved in the fall of 1954 despite 
i difficulties created by Italian and 
'{ oslav mutual distrust. 



U.S. relations with the Soviet 
Union during the period were charac- 
terized by tension and discord cul- 
minating in the Soviet declaration of 
Ambassador George Kennan as persona 
non grata in October 1952. Marshal 
Stalin's death in March 1953 and the 
rise of Georgi Malenkov to power, how- 
ever, ushered in a period of relative 
detente. 

Military and economic considera- 
tions dominated U.S. policy toward 
Yugoslavia. The economic needs of that 
country were partially met by uni- 
lateral and tripartite assistance, but 
military cooperation between Yugo- 
slavia and the West experienced shaky 
beginnings and remained uncertain at 
the end of 1954. 

Documentation on Cyprus focuses 
on the questions of self-determination 
at the United Nations for Cyprus and 
the movement within the island for 
union with Greece. Bilateral relations 
with Greece and Turkey centered on 
political, military, and economic 
matters. 



Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, Vol- 
ume VIII, comprising over 1,400 pages 
of previously classified foreign affairs 
records, was prepared in the Office of 
the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. This official rec- 
ord is based upon the files of the White 
House, the Department of State, and 
other government agencies. 

Copies of Volume VIII (Depart- 
ment of State Publication No. 9618; 
GPO Stock No. 044-000-02196-0) may 
be purchased for $33.00 from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. Checks or money 
orders should be payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents. 



Press release 231. 



ajrtment of State Bulletin/January 1989 



53 



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IJDEX 



inuary 1989 
jlume 89, No. 2142 

thanistan. UN Calls for Full Implemen- 
tation of Afghanistan Peace Accords 

Walters, text of resolution) 40 

lerican Principles. U.S. Foreign Policy 

In a Time of Transition (Powell) 30 

.ms Control 

( nference on Chemical Weapons Use 

White House statement) Hi 

ie Ecology of International Change 

Shultz)' ' ti 

Ie Future Agenda in Arms Control 

Shultz) . . .' 1 

lasnoyarsk Radar Discussions (Depart- 

nent statement) 16 

I Overview of U.S. Arms Control Objec- 

ives (Burns) 41 

.-'sola. South Africa Accepts Angola/ 

Namibia Accords (Department state- 
ment) 16 

hizil. U.S. Import Duties Increase for 

'ertain Brazilian Products (proclama- 

lion) 48 

(mbodia. Cambodian Independence 

Reagan I 17 

(nada. U.S. -Canadian No-Takeoff Deela- 

ation (Department statement) 39 

( mmunieations. Building a Flexible 

'ramework for New Information Serv- 
es ( Borg) 33 

( >choslovakia. Czechoslovak Police 
■Oetain Dissidents (Department 

Statement) 29 

I'Dartment & Foreign Service. Security 
IKwareness, Measures, and Management 

Shultz) 4 

i jnomics 

1 ! European Community's Program for a 

ingle Market in 1992 23 

( bal Economic Integration 

Whitehead) 18 

1 ■ Inter-American System: Into the Next 

'entury (Shultz) 10 

I a. Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition 

Powell) 30 

I i. Stance Toward the Soviet Union on 

'rade and Technology (Wendt) 20 

I Salvador 

I Salvador: The Battle for 

Democracy 44 

1 ■ Inter-American System: Into the Next 

'entury (Shultz) 10 

Ivironment. The Ecology of Interna- 

lonal Change (Shultz) 6 

i ropean Communities. The European 

Community's Program for a Single Mar- 

et in 1992 23 



Human Rights 

Genocide Convention Implementation Act 
of 19.N7 (Reagan, White House fact 
sheet) 38 

Good News: Our Human Rights Policy 
(Lister) . .' 36 

Information Policy. Building a Flexible 
Framework for New Information Serv- 
ices (Borg) 33 

Korea. U.S. Review of Relations With the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(Department statement) 17 

.Mali. Visit of Mali President (Reagan, 
Traore) 14 

Namibia. South Africa Accepts Angola/ 
Namibia Accords (Department state- 
ment) 16 

Narcotics. The Inter-American System: 
Into the Next Century (Shultz) 10 

Nicaragua 

Aid to Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance 
(White House statement) 45 

U.S. Restricts Entry of Nicaraguan Offi- 
cials, Employees (proclamation) 47 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meets in 
The Hague (final communique) 28 

Nuclear Policy. The Future Agenda in 
Arms Control (Shultz) 1 

Organization of American States. The 
Inter-American System: Into the Next 
Century (Shultz) 10 

Presidential Documents 

Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
19SS (Reagan) 35 

Cambodian Independence (Reagan) .... 17 

Genocide Convention Implementation Act 
of 1987 (Reagan, White House fact 
sheet) 38 

U.S. Import Duties Increase for Certain 
Brazilian Products (proclamation) ... 48 

U.S. Restricts Entry of Nicaraguan Offi- 
cials, Employees, (proclamation) .... 47 

Visit of Mali President (Reagan, 
Traore) 14 

Publications 

Department of State 52 

Foreign Relations Volume Released ... 53 

Science &. Technology. U.S. Stance To- 
ward the Soviet Union on Trade and 
Technology (Wendt) 20 

South Africa. South Africa Accepts 
Angola/Namibia Accords (Department 
statement) 16 

Sudan. Emergency Relief to Sudan (De- 
partment statement) 15 

Terrorism 

Security Awareness, Measures, and Man- 
agement (Shultz) 4 

U.S. -Canadian No-Takeoff Declaration 
(Department statement) 39 



Trade 

Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1988 (Reagan) 35 

The European Community's Program for a 
Single Market in 1992 23 

Global Economic Integration 
(Whitehead) 18 

U.S. Stance Toward the Soviet Union on 
Trade and Technology (Wendt) 20 

Treaties. Current Actions 49 

U.S.S.R. 

The Ecology of International Change 
(Shultz) 6 

Embassy Reconstruction in Moscow Pro- 
posed (Department announcement) . . 29 

The Future Agenda in Arms Control 
(Shultz) 1 

Krasnoyarsk Radar Discussions (Depart- 
ment statement) 16 

An Overview of U.S. Arms Control Objec- 
tives ( Burns) 41 

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition 
(Powell) 30 

U.S. Stance Toward the Soviet Union on 
Trade and Technology (Wendt) 20 

United Nations 

Global Economic Integration 
(Whitehead) 18 

An Overview of U.S. Arms Control Objec- 
tives (Burns) 41 

UN Calls for Full Implementation of 
Afghanistan Peace Accords (Walters, 
text of resolution) 40 

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Transition 
(Powell) 30 

Western Hemisphere. The Inter-American 
System: Into the Next Century 
(Shultz) 10 

Name Index 

Borg, Parker W 33 

Burns, William F 41 

Lister, George 36 

Powell, Colin L 30 

Reagan, President ... 14, 17, 35. 38, 47, 48 

Shultz, Secretary 1, 4, 6, 10 

Traore, Moussa 14 

Walters, Vernon A 40 

Wendt, E. Allan 20 

Whitehead, John C 18 



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„„„ bulletin 

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Pofa^Yolume 89 / Number 2143 






February 1989 




Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2143 / February 1989 



President Gorbachev, President Reagan, 
and Vice President Bush, Governor's Is- 
land, New York, on December 7, 1988. 

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick) 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
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but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
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GEORGE P. SHULTZ 

Secretary of State 

CHARLES REDMAN 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

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COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

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CONTENTS 



r a President 

President Reagan and President 
Gorbachev Meet in New York 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 

News Conference of December 8 
(Excerpts) 

r fe Secretary 

Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 

Mca 

Angola/Namibia Accords 

(Chester A. Crocket; President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz, 
White House Statement, Texts 
of Agreements) 

6 The United States and Angola, 
1974-1988: A Chronology 
(Nina D. Howland) 

larctica 

3 Antarctic Mineral Resource Con- 
vention Signed (Department 
State)}ient) 



mis Control 

4' Nuclear Testing Talks Conclude 
Round Three (White House 
Statement) 

4 First Anniversary of INF Treaty 
(White House Statement) 

\c t Asia 

U.S., China Celebrate Decade of 
Diplomatic Relations (Secretary 
Shultz) 

U.S. -China Initial Agreement on 
Communications Satellites 
(Department Statement) 



» 



xnomics 

Secretary Meets With EC Minis- 
ters (Jacques Delors, Secretary 
Shultz) 

American Leadership in Interna- 
tional Trade (W. Allen Wallis) 

EC Project 1992: The Dynamics 
of Change (Denis Lamb) 

U.S. Trade Objectives in the Uru- 
guay Round 



Europe 

38 An Agenda for U.S. -Soviet Coop- 

eration (Richard H. Solomon) 

39 Earthquake in the Soviet Union 

(White House Statement) 

42 NATO Defense Planning Commit- 

tee Meets in Brussels (Final 
Communique) 

43 North Atlantic Council Session 

Held in Brussels (Secretory 
Shultz, Statement, Final Com- 
munique, Extracts From Min- 
utes) 
47 U.S. -Greek Defense Agreement 
Expires (Department State- 
ment) 

50 40th Report on Cyprus (Message 

to tlie Congress) 

Middle East 

51 U.S. Opens Dialogue With PLO 

(Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., 
President Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz) 

53 U.S. Denies Visa to PLO Leader 

Arafat (Department Statement) 

54 Under Secretary Armacost's In- 

terview on "Face the Nation" 

55 Assistant Secretary Murphy's In- 

terview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 

57 The Search for Middle East Peace 

(Richard W. Murphy) 

58 Situation in Lebanon (Depart- 

ment Statement) 



Nuclear Policy 

59 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Hold Nonprolifera- 

tion Talks (U.S. Statement) 

Pacific 

60 U.S. to Resume Aid to Fiji 

(Department Statement) 



Terrorism 

61 Countering Terrorism in the 1980s 

and 1990s (L. Paul 
Bremer, III) 

62 Greece Denies Extradition of Sus- 

pected Terrorist (Department 
Statement) 

63 Department Expands Terrorism 

Rewards Program (Department 
Statement) 

64 French Court Convicts Palesti- 

nian Terrorist (Department 
Statement, Fact Sheet) 

United Nations 



65 



68 



Efforts Toward a Cambodian 

Settlement (Vernon A. 

Walters, Text of Resolution) 
The United Nations: Progress in 

the 1980s (Richard S. 

Williamson) 



Western Hemisphere 



71 



72 



Secretary Attends Inaugural of 
Mexico's President (Secretary 
Shultz) 

U.S. Supports Panama's National 
Unity Plan (Department State- 
ment) 



Treaties 

73 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

76 Department of State 

Publications 

76 Department of State 

77 America)) Foreign Policy: For- 

eign Affairs Press Briefings, 
1984, Supplement Released 

Index 




President Reagan, President Gorbachev, 
and Vice President Bush on Governor's 
Island with the New York City skyline in 
the background. 



Department of State Bulletin/February^; 



THE PRESIDENT 



President Reagan and President Gorbachev 
Meet in New York 

President Reagan arid Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 

Chairman of the Presidium 

of the Supreme Soviet, 

met on Governor's Island, New York, 

07i December 7, 1988. 



.our meeting today is under the gaze 
' Lady Liberty, and I think that's al- 
gether appropriate. The quest for hu- 
an rights and personal freedom is 
Ty much a part of the agenda of 

merican-Soviet relations since they 

■gan in 1985, my discussions with 
•esident Gorbachev have been 
iendly, businesslike, and productive, 
id although our time together today 
11 be brief, I welcome this opportu- 
ty for a final meeting between myself, 
•esident Gorbachev, and Vice Presi- 
nt Bush that will demonstrate the 
ntinuity of the process we first put in 
ice at Geneva in 1985. 

The pursuit of peace is, of course, 
rays in season. But I think it's espe- 
illy appropriate that President Gor- 
chev should be here at this time of 
■ar, a time when the thoughts and 
ayers of all of us turn to the hope 
at someday nations and people from 
gry part of the world will live in 
ace and harmony with one another, 
i for this reason that I journey to 
w York. 

President Reagan's 
Departure Remarks, 
The White House, 
Dec. 7, 1988 




«t from Weekly Compilation of 
JSldential Documents of Dec. 12, 1988. 



'partment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 







President Reagan hosted a luncheon for 
President Gorbachev at the Coast Guard 
Commandant's residence on Governor's 
Island. Around the table (left to right) 
are Vice President Bush, President 
Reagan, Secretary Shultz, national se- 
curity adviser Gen. Powell, Secretary 
Carlucci, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin, 
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and 
President Gorbachev. 




Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Min 
ister Shevardnadze. 






THE PRESIDENT 



.S. -Soviet Relations 



Following are President Reagan's 
iio addresses of December 3, 1988, 
d December 10. 



!C. 3, 1988> 

ere's a meeting in New York next 
ek I'm looking forward to. I'll be 
;ting together next Wednesday on 
vernor's Island with the leader of the 
/iet Union, Chairman Gorbachev, 
is will be our last such meeting, and 
lust admit that I would not have 
dieted after first taking office that 
neday I would be waxing nostalgic 
>ut my meetings with Soviet leaders. 
t here we are for the fifth time, Mr. 
rbachev and I together, in the hope 
furthering peace. 

And always in my mind, I go back 
;hat first summit held in 1985 at a 
vate villa on the shores of Lake Ge- 
■a. At the first of our fireside talks, 
lid to Mr. Gorbachev that ours was a 
que meeting between two people 
a had the power to start world war 
or to begin a new era for humanity. 
S opportunity for such a new era is 
re and very real. That isn't to say, of 
rse, that that era is already upon 
No, too many fundamental differ- 
es on matters such as human rights 
regional tensions remain unsettled 
ween East and West. But it is to say 
t there is the hope of an era in 
ch the terrible nightmares of the 
twar era — totalitarianism and nu- 
ir terror — may diminish significantly 
, please, God, someday fade away, 
•oughout the postwar period, this 
always been America's agenda: that 
blessings of peace and freedom we 
iw so well in this country will some- 
belong to every nation, to every 
pie. 

Toward this end, the United States 
its allies have, over the last 8 
rs, pursued a course of public can- 
and military strength but also a 
rse of vigorous diplomatic engage- 
nt with the Soviets. And the Soviets 
e responded. The result has been 
gress on a wide series of fronts, 
st and most obvious, we have signed 
first treaty in history reducing nu- 
ir armaments, indeed, wiping out a 
3le class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
isiles. So, too, other arms negotia- 
is are moving forward. In pursuing 



this cause, the Soviets must abide by 
past agreements. And in this regard, 
the Krasnoyarsk radar violation re- 
mains a significant problem. 

In the area of regional conflicts, 
we've seen a partial Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan and a commitment to 
full withdrawal by February. In Angola 
U.S. mediation has led to a cease-fire 
and prospects for a political settlement 
and withdrawal of Cuban troops. In 
Cambodia steps have been taken to- 
ward a withdrawal of Vietnamese 
troops. And in other regions, we have 
seen movement toward peace. 

So, too, in our bilateral relations 
with the Soviets, there has been move- 
ment toward wider exchanges between 
our two peoples that bring American 
and Soviet citizens in closer contact and 
communication. 

Finally, but most important, in the 
area of human rights, we have also seen 
progress. Yes, we welcome recent steps 
like an end to jamming of Western 
broadcasts heard in the Soviet Union. 
But we also are hopeful that talk of 
democratic reform and greater freedom 
for all the Warsaw Pact countries will 
become more than just talk. We hope, 
for example, for a day when the Soviet 
Union will permit the publication of the 
works of Solzhenitsyn or the day when 
the Berlin Wall will be no more. Yes, 
we want bold words of reform about 
political and religious expression to be- 
come more than just words. 

So for all the progress and all the 
hope, the journey to this final meeting 
between Mr. Gorbachev and me at Gov- 
ernor's Island has been a difficult one. 
And believe me, the journey toward 
better Soviet-American relations will 
remain a difficult one. Yet it is a jour- 
ney that must continue beyond any sin- 
gle President or term of office. And 
that's why I'm particularly delighted 
that Vice President George Bush will 
be joining Mr. Gorbachev and me at 
Governor's Island next week. 

I've spoken many times about Vice 
President Bush's foreign policy creden- 
tials and his long experience in this 
field. At every stage in the summit 
process, he has been at my side. No 
one is better versed in the details of 
Soviet American relations or has a 
stronger foreign policy portfolio than 
our Vice President. 



While our get-together next week 
will not be a working summit with a 
formal agenda, you can be sure I'll be 
telling Mr. Gorbachev that George Bush 
represents change, yes, but also con- 
tinuity; that he stands for firmness and 
strength and candor in the cause of 
freedom; that he knows intimately the 
essentials of the Soviet- American rela- 
tionship; and that the American people 
do not want treaties for the sake of 
treaties — they want agreements that 
endure and help prevent wars as the 
world moves relentlessly toward a new 
birth of freedom for all humanity. 



DEC. 10, 1988 2 

On Wednesday, this week, I met with 
Soviet President Gorbachev for the 
fifth time. Together we stood under the 
gaze of Lady Liberty, speaking of the 
prospects of peace for the peoples of 
our two nations and for all the world. 
Yes, since our first summit in Geneva 3 
years ago, we've traveled a great jour- 
ney that has seen remarkable progress, 
a journey we continue to travel to- 
gether. I am pleased that the Soviet 
Union has accepted our offer of human- 
itarian aid in the wake of their devas- 
tating earthquake tragedy. 

This has also been a period of 
important change inside the Soviet 
Union. The greater openness permitted 
by Moscow can be found in films, art, 
and literature. There is greater toler- 
ance for those seeking to peacefully as- 
semble, and the official press carries 
more independent opinions and factual 
reporting. 

And just a few years ago, who 
would have anticipated seeing a Soviet 
leader stand before the world commu- 
nity, heralding a plan for economic re- 
structuring and military deployments 
and promising to meet the world com- 
munity's highest standards of human 
rights? If this vision is realized and 
these promises are turned into deeds, 
we would be witnessing a dramatic 
change in the Soviet system, a long- 
awaited break with the past and the 
opening of a new era in international 
affairs. 

Certainly the Soviet reforms have 
their limits, and brave dissenters 
within that country who have sought a 
fuller measure of openness continue to 
be dealt with harshly. But I was en- 
couraged by the new promises of re- 
form that Mr. Gorbachev made before 
the United Nations and hope to see 



partment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 



these and past promises translated into 
permanent institutional changes that 
will signal to the peoples of the Soviet 
Union and the world a courageous com- 
mitment to a new path of democratiza- 
tion. We already see unprecedented 
diversity in Eastern Europe, with some 
countries pursuing reforms that go even 
beyond the Soviet example, while other 
countries continue to lag behind. We 
hope to see the day when all countries 
of Eastern Europe enjoy the freedom, 
democracy, and self-determination that 
their peoples have long awaited. 

Just a decade ago, some intellec- 
tuals widely predicted what they called 
convergence: the idea that the demo- 
cratic world and the communist world 
would merge into one hybrid system. 
The main question amounted to how 
much freedom would democratic nations 
have to give up in the bargain. But 
instead the free world held firm to its 
democratic values, cleaving to truths 
deeply rooted in Western culture and 
our Judeo-Christian tradition. Moreover 
we spoke openly of the moral superi- 
ority of our ideal of freedom. We can- 
didly criticized the violations of human 
rights occurring behind the Iron Cur- 
tain. We rebuilt our defenses and with 
our allies worked to counter interna- 
tional aggression by our totalitarian ad- 
versaries. And we exhibited that 
scarcest of commodities: patience. And 
our steadfastness, our policies, our 
whole approach has borne fruit. Per- 
haps the most dramatic achievement 
came 1 year ago, when Mr. Gorbachev 
and I signed the historic Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty to 
eliminate an entire class of U.S. and 
Soviet nuclear missiles. 

Next week the Prime Ministers of 
two of our key NATO allies — Turkey 
and Italy — will visit Washington. And 
certainly, along with other issues, we 
plan to discuss this week's visit by Mr. 
Gorbachev and the strategic situation 
in Europe. 

For some time now, the Soviet bloc 
has had overwhelming superiority in 
conventional forces in Europe, so we 
welcome the Soviet force reductions 
that are promised. But let's remember 
this: Even after these redeployments 
are completed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact 
will still have a large conventional ad- 
vantage — an edge of about 5 to 2 in 
tanks and artillery and some 300,000 
more troops. These unilateral reduc- 
tions would, however, give a long- 
awaited encouragement for our efforts 
to achieve the genuine balance in con- 
ventional forces that would assure 



greater security and stability in 
Europe. 

In these brightest of times, let us 
recall that in the darkest clays of World 
War II, when hopes for the free world 
seemed most bleak, Winston Churchill 
rallied us to carry on, saying that "We 
have not journeyed all this way because 
we are made of sugar candy." By sum- 
moning all their strength and courage, 
and by pulling together, the Allies pre- 
vailed. The war was won. The decades 
following World War II were filled with 
political tensions and threats to world 
freedom. But in recent years, we've 
seen hopes for a free and peaceful fu- 
ture restored and the chance for a new 



U.S. -Soviet relationship emerge. To tn 
American people and to our allies I 
would echo Churchill and say we !iave 
not come this far through lack a 
strength or any weakness in our re- 
solve, nor has there been anything in- 1 
evitable about what we've achieved. 
The unity, confidence, power, and 
firmness of the democracies has 
brought us forward, and maintaining il 
strong alliance will keep us moving 
forward. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 12, 1988. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19. ■ 



News Conference of December 8 
(Excerpts) 



President Reagan held a news 

conference on December S, I98S. 1 

We've got to stop meeting like this. 
[Laughter] 

As most of you know, President 
Gorbachev has had to return to the So- 
viet Union due to the enormity of the 
tragedy in Armenia. And in a phone 
conversation this morning, I conveyed 
to him the deep sympathy of the Amer- 
ican people and our anxiousness to pro- 
vide any humanitarian assistance we 
possibly can. 

The nature of President Gor- 
bachev's departure is unfortunate and 
provides a sad final note to what has 
been an otherwise successful — and I 
use the next words advisedly — happy 
and historic visit to the United States. 
It was in this spirit that yesterday at 
lunch I presented Mr. Gorbachev a me- 
mento of our first meeting: an inscribed 
photo of the walk we took together in 
Geneva in 1985. The inscription read 
simply: "We have walked a long way 
together to clear a path for peace." 

And so we have. It was exactly 1 
year ago today that an event here in 
this room spoke to the epoch-making 
nature of what has been achieved: the 
signing of the first treaty to eliminate 
an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nu- 
clear missiles. Even in the short year 
since then, we've had the Moscow sum- 
mit and Mr. Gorbachev's visit here. In 
our negotiating agenda of regional 
conflicts, human rights, bilateral ex- 
changes, and arms reductions, we've 
seen serious movement and even some 
breakthroughs. Yesterday's address to 
the United Nations by President Gor- 



bachev was not only a part of this pro 
ess, it was the result of this process; 1 
congratulate him on it. 

On a personal note, Nancy and I 
were delighted that the Gorbachevs 
extended an invitation for us to visit 
Moscow. And as we have done before, 
each of us expressed the hope that th 
would visit us in California. 

The path remains open, and the 
pace of peace continues. As I said yes 
terday, this means our responsibilitie: 
have grown not less but more serious 
We must remain resolute and without 
illusion. And we must speak candidly 
about fundamental points of differenc 
We must especially maintain our mili- 
tary strength, but we must also con- 
tinue our course of vigorous diplomat 
engagement. 

I cannot tonight attempt to put a 
these events in perspective or, still le 
to claim credit for any person or adm 
istration. Let it be enough to say this 
that since 1985, extraordinary things 
have happened, and nothing more ex- 
traordinary than the sight yesterday 
a President of the United States and 
future President of the United States 
and a President of the Soviet Union 
standing together in New York harbc 
under the protective gaze of the Stati 
of Liberty. 

Our hope, our prayer, remains th 
same as that heard on the lips of so 
many millions who looked up once, as 
we did yesterday, to see the out- 
stretched lamp of liberty and who fel' 
for the first time its warmth and glo\ 
a prayer that someday freedom will 
light the world and become the blessi 



Department of State Bulletin/February 19l 



THE PRESIDENT 



d birthright of every people 
erywhere. 

Q. Mr. Gorbachev yesterday 
nounced a major cutback in the 
viet troop strength and talked 
nerally about nations relying less 
military might. Do you think that 
r. Gorbachev is trying to remake 
e Soviet Union into a less threaten- 
X country? 

A. Yes, I do. And I think he recog- 
,es that their massive buildup has 
en responsible for the great economic 
sis that he faces there in the Soviet 
lion. And, yes, he has proposed this, 
t even so, there still will be room for 
Tie negotiations on arms because this 
II leaves them with superiority in the 
ount of conventional weapons that 
?y have. 

Q. Aside from the conventional 
•ces where the Soviets do retain 
s advantage, is there an area where 
! United States might be able to 
ike a unilateral cutback in arms 
elf? 

A. We're still way below them in 
.t. But we have announced our will- 
ness to continue into — well, before 
ever made this move — and we're 
y grateful for this, and I appreciate 
'ery much — but we have proposed 
t the next negotiations with regard 
nilitary and then between us should 
in the area of conventional weapons. 

Q. This is your final news confer- 
■e with us, we think. And at your 
it news conference, you said that 

Soviets would commit any crime, 
uld lie, would cheat, would steal to 
•Jiieve their political goals. Now, 
ight, you're celebrating your joint 
■gress with President Gorbachev 
1 celebrating a speech in which he 
ounced the use of force by the So- 
t Union to achieve foreign policy 
lis. Do you think that he has really 
inged? And to the extent that he 

changed, have you changed? 
at have you learned over these 
ears that may have changed your 
w of the Soviet System? 

A. I know so many of you have 
>ted this in that first press confer- 
e of mine, and Sam [Sam Donaldson, 
C News], I think it was your 
istion. 

Q. She stole my question. 

A. Yes, but none of you ever 
ught to give the complete answer. I 
1, in their own words this was their 



philosophy, and it was in writing that 
there was no crime. All of these things 
were not a crime if they advanced the 
cause of socialism. Now, I didn't make 
that up. That's what they said. I think 
there's been a change. That was four 
leaders back before this one. And I 
think there have been some changes. 
One we just talked about earlier, of his 
cut in armaments. 

Q. What about the changes in 
your own thinking? Granted that they 
have changed and that Mr. Gorbachev 
is a very different kind of Soviet 
leader, but do you think in any way 
that your previous views might have 
been rigid or poorly formed? 

A. There were differences in these 
leaders. And there is a situation now 
where many of the things that they 
preached have been proven unsound, 
and that's why their economy is in such 
great trouble. But I must say I have 
never met with one of those leaders 
that was comparable to this man or had 
the approach that he has. But he knows 
that I feel that — well, we put it this 
way, as I've said, my philosophy is: 
Trust everybody, but cut the cards. 

Q. Until recently the United 
States has been reluctant for the So- 
viet Union to play a significant role 
in the Middle East. But now, with Mr. 
Gorbachev's new cooperation or open- 
ness, how do you suppose you could 
use him to expedite the peace process? 

A. I think that, once again, here 
we're going to have to see whether this 
is still acceptable to the parties that 
are to be involved in the direct negotia- 
tions. Actually, we talk of an interna- 
tional gathering or something, but the 
Middle East, which is still technically 
in a state of war — that must be re- 
solved between the nations of the Mid- 
dle East in direct negotiations. And if 
we can help bring that about, then I 
would welcome anyone who wants to 
help. 

Q. In light of his speech yester- 
day at the United Nations, are there 
any new steps that we can take to 
continue the arms reduction process? 

A. Oh, yes. We have long said that 
as soon as we once settle this issue of 
the START [strategic arms reduction 
talks] agreement — I have said that I 
think our next goal must be to now 
engage in negotiations on reducing con- 
ventional weapons. 

Q. Now that you're leaving the 
White House, or will soon, what is 



going to become of the contras and 
resistance forces in Nicaragua with- 
out you here as their champion? And 
do you have a commitment from Pres- 
ident-elect Bush to carry on the same 
policy line that you have for support- 
ing the Nicaraguans — 

A. Obviously, I do not try to pin 
him down. He is the President-elect, 
and he will be the President when he 
takes over. But I do believe, knowing 
him — and our association together for 
all these years — I believe that he 
agrees with me that the contras are 
freedom fighters, and they are trying 
to achieve democracy in their country, 
which is now a communist totalitarian 
government. 

Q. You've made a career lately of 
using an old Russian proverb: "Trust, 
but verify." But given that verifica- 
tion can never be a 100% science, 
given that there are always a few per- 
centage points where you just can't 
be sure, do you trust General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev for those few points? 

A. As I said, right now with re- 
gard to the INF [Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces] Treaty, we have 
worked out verification provisions that 
are greater than anything that has ever 
been done before between us. And I 
think that there is a reasonable chance, 
a very reasonable chance, that we 
can continue to have that kind of 
verification. 

One of the first things that I talked 
over with Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva 
when we first met was that I said to 
him we both didn't have great mili- 
tary — how did I say it — put it that 
we — that we didn't mistrust each other 
because of our great military; we had 
our military because we mistrusted 
each other, and that our negotiations 
should be aimed at removing the causes 
of mistrust. And I have to say it's 
pretty much followed that pattern. 

Q. What I want to know is: Do 
you trust Gorbachev? 

A. He hasn't shown me any reason 
yet that I shouldn't, but again, as I've 
said, that's why I kept referring to 
dovorey no provorey — trust but verify. 
And he knows that, and neither one of 
us — I don't think that he would gamble 
on believing that he shouldn't protect 
his own interests also. 

Q. At your meeting with Mr. Gor- 
bachev yesterday, you toasted the 
things that he and Vice President 
Bush will accomplish. You spoke this 
evening about the grave economic 
crises that Mr. Gorbachev faces. What 
is the U.S. assessment of his long- 
term chances for political survival? 



partment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



THE PRESIDENT 



A. I realize, that I think we all 
should, that he is battling a bureau- 
cracy; because whether it's a Russian 
bureaucracy or one of our own, the first 
rule of bureaucracy is protect the 
bureaucracy. And it would mean 
some great changes for some of the 
nomenclatura, as they call their bu- 
reaucracy there, if he institutes the re- 
forms that he's talking about. But on 
the plus side for him, it's very evident 
that the people of the Soviet Union are 
on his side. They want this perestroika 
and this glasnost that he has talked 
about very much. And I have to believe 
that the nomenclatura is going to have 
to think twice with regard to how far 
they would go in trying to block him 
when the man in the street over there 
wants the things that have been seen. 

Q. You could help Mr. Gorbachev 
with a severe domestic political prob- 
lem, that is, Afghanistan — how to 
pull out of there with honor. He sug- 
gested at the United Nations yester- 
day an in-place cease-fire, a cessation 
of outside military aid. Some people 
think this could lead to a partition of 
Afghanistan. What's wrong with that? 
It would save lives and would help 
Mr. Gorbachev. 

A. There's one thing. If we're talk- 
ing about disarming the mujahidin, re- 
member that there is still a military 
force in Afghanistan that was organized 
by the puppet government established 
by the Soviet Union. And they're a 
force that has been fighting along with 
the Soviets and side by side against the 
mujahidin. If you want to get around 
to disarming both sides — you can't sud- 
denly disarm the mujahidin and leave 
them at the mercy of this already mili- 
tary management. 

Q. But Mr. Gorbachev proposed 
at the United Nations yesterday send- 
ing in a UN peacekeeping force just 
to do this. 

A. You'd have to take up with the 
United Nations. This is something 
rather exceptional that he's asking on 
that, and I'm not sure that the United 
Nations would like that or that the 
United Nations is prepared to do such a 
thing. 

Q. What would you like? 

A. I think that we've got to recog- 
nize that if the Afghan people are going 
to be able to state and create the gov- 
ernment they want, then that puppet 
government has got to be ready and 
willing to step down, and not have 
some kind of a compromise thing in 
which it remains as a government, com- 
promising with the others. Let's let 



them start from scratch and build the 
government they want. 

Q. Let me bring you back to the 
Middle East. You've got very little 
time left, and Mr. Arafat of the PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] 
seems to be inching toward the kinds 
of conditions you and Mr. Shultz have 
said he should. Is this perhaps not 
time to go the inch in his direction 
and start some kind of talks with 
Mr. Arafat rather than, as Mr. Shultz 
did, close the door on him? 

A. No, we've been watching very 
closely. And for example, we thought in 
the last few clays that there was a 
statement that came out of that meet- 
ing in Sweden that appeared to be 
clean-cut and not with the things 
around the edge that then defused 
what seemed to be a pledge. But we 
had to wait until his press conference 
and what he said. And I have to say 
that again he has left openings for him- 
self, where he can deny that he meant 
this or meant that that sounded so 
clean-cut. It's up to him. We are willing 
to meet with him and talk with him, 
and I'm sure the Israelis would be, 
when once and for all it is clear-cut that 
he is ready to recognize Israel's right to 
be a nation, that he is ready to negoti- 
ate on behalf of the Palestinian people 
for a homeland for them, and so forth. 

The thing about George Shultz's 
decision — I'd like to call to your atten- 
tion — there is a law passed by the Con- 
gress with regard to the conditions for 
granting a waiver to someone to come 
in and meet with the United Nations or 
participate in what they're doing. And 
there's no way under that law that Mr. 
Arafat qualifies as yet. And the day 
that he does, and it is clear-cut, then 
we can grant that visa. But as I say, he 
is barred by the terms of that law, and 
the only way that the — and the Secre- 
tary of State has full power under that 
law. It's his decision to make. And he 
can only grant a waiver if an individual 
meets certain requirements, and Arafat 
doesn't. 

Q. Did he not in his statement 
say that he accepts the UN articles 
and that he recognizes Israel? What 
is the fine line that he hasn't crossed? 

A. What we're still analyzing is — 
then, as he went on, other things in 
which — it's a case, and this has hap- 
pened before, certainly with the same 
individual — you could quote to him, Oh, 
you said this, but he's still in a position 
where he can say, well, yes, but wait a 
minute, I also said this. And then you 
find that the second "this" kind of re- 
duces or nullifies the first "this." 



Q. Do you have any reason to b' 
lieve that the American hostages wb 
are still being held in the Middle Ef 
will be released after you leave of fie 

A. I don't think that anyone that 
takes over this office is going to give 
nor did I. That is, again, one of those 
things I should have said to your que; 
tion — that you go to bed with every 
night. And we are hopeful that there 
can be avenues that would open. We 
cannot enter into negotiating in the 
sense of what kind of ransom to pay, 
you're just encouraging more hostage 
taking. But there are other channels. 
We're not advocating that any Individ 
ual, as some have, take it upon them- 
selves to try to get them out. But we 
looking at every channel that we can 
find to try and get them. And I imag 
ine that the ultimate is going to have 
be somehow a negotiation with Iran, 
because they have control of those 
people. 

Q. So, you would be willing to 
this negotiation with Iran. Is that 
right — either now or before you lea 
office or after Mr. Bush takes over- 
you're willing to negotiate with Ira 

A. Oh, there have got to be som 
changes there, too. We were not neg 
tiating with them on the so-called In 
contra affair at all. We were heeding 
plea from some individuals. And at t 
time all of you were kind of heraldinj 
the day in the media that was going 
come within a week that the ayatollE 
would no longer be the head of govei 
ment because of his health. And the; 
people [were] among those who wert 
planning ahead to have a governmen 

Q. Are vou going to do it now? 
A. What? 

Q. Are you going to do it now? 

A. There are things, conditions, 
that have to be met also there. Any 
time that they are ready to come for 
ward on an open basis, we would be 
ready to talk to them. 

Q. The United States and the i 
viet Union were once allies during 
World War II. Do you see that the 
beginning that had been made hert 
with you and Mr. Gorbachev result 
in a situation where we would one* 
more count the Soviet Union as an 
ally and have free and open trade 
with them on a large-scale basis? 

A. I think that is all dependent 
them. If it can be definitely establish 
that they no longer are following the 
expansionist policy that was institut 
in the communist revolution: that thi 



Department of State Bulletin/February 



THE SECRETARY 



al must be a one-world communist 
ite. If that has definitely been given 
), and certainly there are indications, 
e could anticipate bringing such a 
ing about. Then I do think that there 
evidence that they don't like being 
e pariah, that they might want to join 
e family of nations and join them with 
e idea of bringing about or establish- 
g peace. 

Q. Is that something you want? 

A. Yes. One of the first things that 
ever told him when we met, I said, 
'here are two of us here in this room, 
st two men." And I said, "It's a 
dque situation. Between us, we have 
e power to start world war III, or 
tween us, we have the power to bring 
ace to the world — a lasting peace." 
id apparently, we've been working in 
at direction. 

Q. If the Soviet Union makes 
od on it, and does reduce its troop 
■ength, there's talk on Capitol Hill 
at perhaps the United States can 
How suit, and in the process reduce 
r defense spending and make an 
pact on the budget deficit. Do you 
*esee that as a realistic possibility? 

A. I guess I wasn't switching sig- 
1s here fast enough at the very begin- 
lg of this. Are you suggesting that 
3 defense spending is — 

Q. Soviet troop cuts could lead to 
me cuts on our own, and that this 
uld help to reduce the deficit? Peo- 
; are already looking — some Demo- 
its — thinking that this may help us 
reduce the deficit. 

A. Once again, I must repeat, that 
l't happen with our defense spending 
til we have reached a parity and at 
,ich time then both sides can con- 
ue the reduction of weapons and 
sping it at a parity. But that is not 
le today. The dropping of 500,000 
litary personnel still leaves them 
th 5 million under arms. They still 
cnumber us in tanks and artillery 
lapons after they make these cuts. 
, we haven't achieved parity, but at 
■.st if he goes through with that and 
:ceeds in that, he is going to bring it 
wn to a range where I think that he 
uld see that we could proceed and 
itinue then mutually reducing arms. 



Secretary's Interview on 

"This Week With David Brinkley" 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Kidential Documents of Dec. 12, 1988. 



Secretary Shultz teas interviewed 
on ABC-Ws "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on December It, 1988, by 
David Britikley and Saw Donaldson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
News analyst. 

Q. Thank you very much for coming 
in. I calculate roughly you have 7 
weeks left as Secretary of State, 
about that time? 

A. Something like that. And I 
must say, it's very active. It doesn't 
seem to let up at all. 

Q. It never does. What will you 
do when you leave here, when your 
term is over? 

A. Go back to California. Stanford 
University offered me a chair, and I 
declined. I said I must have a couch. So 
I'm hoping to occupy a couch at 
Stanford. 

Q. We wish you luck. Now you 
heard Mr. Gerasimov [Soviet foreign 
ministry spokesman] and a number of 
others talking about American-Soviet 
Union relations. And you hear people 
saying the cold war is over. What is 
your view? 

A. Things are certainly very differ- 
ent. And you can say that with justifi- 
cation. But it seems to me what one 
should do is go through, subject-by- 
subject, human rights, regional issues, 
efforts at arms control, as well as our 
bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union. And when you do that, you see 
that our ability to solve problems — 
important problems, as well as lesser 
ones — is much improved. And it's hav- 
ing its effect, its ripple effect, on many 
other issues. 

Q. Now those issues you men- 
tioned were — what was the first? 
Human rights? 

A. Human rights. 

Q. Human rights. We haven't 
been able to do much with that, have 
we? 

A. We've done a tremendous 
amount with that. 

Q. I mean for the Russians. 

A. It's a totally different picture. 
When I first became Secretary of State 
and I brought up human rights issues 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko, he just 
said, "I won't discuss it." And I kept 



discussing it, but he wouldn't. Now we 
have an organized, systematic dialogue 
on the subject. And there have been 
sweeping changes inside the Soviet 
Union. There are still problems, and 
they're still not measuring up, we don't 
think, completely to their undertakings 
in the Helsinki Final Act. But things 
are certainly very, very different and 
much better. 

Q. Concerning the regional issue 
of Afghanistan, Mr. Gerasimov, if I 
heard him right, said, "Well, we 
should talk about the business of full 
compliance with the agreement to be 
out bv when, I guess Februarv 15th?" 

A. Yes. 

Q. Why do we need to talk about 
that? 

A. We don't. 

Q. It's an agreement entered 
into. Are you confident then that they 
will be out? 

A. That is my expectation. And 
there's no reason why they shouldn't, 
and every reason why they should. 

Q. Didn't he say that that's our 
agreement and — 

Q. We're as good as our word, he 
said. 

Q. As to imply it was taken for 
granted they will abide by it. That 
was my understanding. 

Q. He said that their word is to 
be taken there, as elsewhere. It is the 
position of the U.S. Government, for 
example, to take one live issue, that 
their word was not good with regard 
to the radar. 

A. The Krasnoyarsk radar, we be- 
lieve it's a violation of the ABM [Anti- 
ballistic Missile] Treaty. 

Q. We have never, under any Ad- 
ministration of any party, seemed to 
have found a way to make our belief 
in arms control violations effective, 
to actually get the things changed 
very well. Are we going to get that 
changed? And what — 

A. I think in the end we'll be 
able to deal successfully with the 
Krasnoyarsk radar. But we're going to 
have to stick to our position, which is 
that it has to be so arranged that the 
advantage from what has been con- 
structed already in lead time toward a 
phased-array radar, which that is, is 
basically eliminated. And maybe they'll 
do that in the context of the space re- 



.'partment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



search center that Mr. Gerasimov 
referred to. And that's a matter for ne- 
gotiation. But it'll have to be altered. 

Q. In the context of this idea of 
Soviet compliance with agreements, 
Vice President Bush campaigning 
made a complete ban on the produc- 
tion and stockpiles of chemical weap- 
ons sort of the Bush next stage in 
arms control. I believe you, in a 
closed session in October 1987 in 
Brussels, indicated to NATO members 
that such an agreement would be 
flatly unverifiable, and it is hard to 
see how you could verify that. Given 
that, and given the principle that you 
shouldn't limit things you can't verify 
the limitations on, isn't the Vice 
President mistaken? And isn't his pro- 
posal one that would simply result 
in the dismantling of our deterrent 
capacity in chemical warfare? 

A. No, I think the Vice President 
is profoundly correct that the potential 
or a spread of chemical and biological 
weapons, and their use, is one of the 
most serious threats we face. And in 
labeling it so, and expressing a deter- 
mination to do everything possible to 
deal with it, I think he's right. But 
now, it's in the nature of the case that 
being absolutely sure that you know 
that agreements are being lived up to 
is practically impossible in that field. 
Nevertheless, we know a lot about 
chemical weapons in various countries. 
We know who is producing them. We 
know where they're producing them. So 
it isn't as though we're totally without 
knowledge on this subject. 

Q. Israel, when they decided that 
Iraq was building a nuclear weapons 
facility and would be apt to use it, 
went in and disarmed Iraq. We know, 
I gather, the building in Libya where 
they're producing chemical weapons. 
What would be wrong with Israel and/ 
or the United States disarming Libya? 

A. We feel very strongly that this 
facility in Libya you referred to is a 
chemical weapons production plant. We 
object to it strenuously. And our tack 
at this point is to call attention to.it, 
among our allies, including those who 
we think have helped, perhaps not 
knowingly, in the production of that 
plant, and to try to bring it about that 
way. 

Q. But chemical warfare was 
used to devastating effect — something 
Hitler didn't do — in the Iran-Iraq 
war, and nothing happened. There 
were no sanctions whatever. I mean, 
world opinion and all that, but noth- 
ing happened. 



A. It's a tragedy that that's hap- 
pened. And we called attention to it, 
whenever we had evidence, including 
the use of chemical weapons by Iraq 
against the Kurdish population. It's a 
very serious problem. And the Presi- 
dent has called for a reconvening of the 
countries that signed the 1925 protocol 
against the use of chemical and biolog- 
ical weapons. The French are going to 
host that conference in January. We 
have to heighten people's concern about 
this subject, as well as put into place 
everything we can possibly do to ban 
these weapons. They're terrible. 

Q. I know we want to get to a 
discussion of your decision to bar 
Arafat [Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation leader Yasir Arafat] from the 
United Nations here. But before we 
do, I have a couple of news questions 
this morning. The revolt in Argen- 
tina, or what appears to be a revolt 
against the Alfonsin government, 
what is our position, and what's your 
latest information on that? 

A. Our position is that we are ab- 
solutely opposed to military coups. We 
totally support President Alfonsin, and 
I think he's going to succeed. 

Q. Without U.S. aid? He has not 
asked for U.S. assistance? 

A. He can handle that. But we 
have made it very clear that we're com- 
pletely on the side of President Alfon- 
sin and on the side of democratic 
civilian rule. And I think it's worth not- 
ing that throughout Argentina, there 
are expressions of support for demo- 
cratic, civilian rule. 

Q. The Israeli arms merchant, 
Amiram Nir, who brought us the idea 
of selling arms to the Ayatollah, who 
brought the idea of diverting some of 
the money from that sale to the 
contras, was killed in Mexico, as you 
know, this past week. And this morn- 
ing The Washington Post has a story 
saying that he told them that Israel 
and the United States has a secret 
accord. In 1985 and 1986, we worked 
together in counterterrorist measures 
according to that accord. Does such 
an accord exist? 

A. Not that I know of. 

Q. Did it ever exist? 

A. Not that I know of. 

Q. You suggest that maybe it ex- 
isted and you didn't know about it. 

A. There are all sorts of— I'm just 
giving an honest answer. 



Q. I'm not challenging your hon 
esty. I'm just saying that we — 

A. We have all sorts of discussion 
with Israel about many things. We ar. 
both opposed to terrorism. We both 
have many interests in common. But i 
far as the sort of thing being inferred 
in the Post article, I have no informa- 
tion on that. 

Q. Is it not regular that if there 
were such an accord, the Secretary c 
State should know about it? 

A. Apparently a lot of things hap 
pened in the course of the Iran/contra 
business that the Secretary of State 
didn't know about. 

Q. Your decision to deny a visa 
to Yasir Arafat has antagonized our 
friends and enemies all over the 
world. You have any regrets? 

A. No. I think it's a good decisioi 
And as people get further and furthe 
away from it, and look back on it, I 
think they're gong to come around an 
see how important it is for us to be 
very clear and very firm in our attitu 
toward terrorism. 

Q. Do you think that applies to 
our closest friends and allies in We; 
em Europe — the British, the Frenc 
and so on? 

A. I'm very comfortable with th 
decision. 

Q. They voted against it. 

A. They voted against us, but I 
have a few supporters. 

Q. You do have some supportei 

Q. You didn't in the United Na 
tions. We only heard there were tw 
votes. 

A. I live in the United States. .A 
I'm Secretary of State for the Unitei 
States. And I was very pleased to h< 
what the President of the United St; 
had to say. And I was very pleased t 
hear what I think around 68 Senator 
of the United States had to say. 

Q. May I ask you about two of 
the rationales? You have decided it 
in the national security interest of 
the United States not to allow Mr. 
Arafat a visa. But you've said that 
other members of the PLO, includi 
their permanent representative Ter 
can speak. Why? Why not keep eve 
one out from the PLO? 

A. Because, as chairman and th 
responsible party, Mr. Arafat must 
know about, condone, and lend supp 
to the terrorist activities taking 
place, particularly within the Fatah 
organization. 









THE SECRETARY 



Q. But other members would not 
now? 

A. So he bears a responsibility. 

Q. Other members of the organi- 
ation would not know about these 
ctivities? 

A. They are more in the nature of 
eople functioning in the organization, 
ind we have concluded that since the 
Jnited Nations has invited the PLO to 
e an observer for the General Assem- 
ly sessions, that we would grant visas 
3 the people who come in connection 
. T ith manning that post. 

Q. But that's what I don't under- 
tand. You say they're functioning, 
ou mean they're just following or- 
ers and, therefore, somehow they're 
kay? 

A. They are a problem. But we 
ave to swallow and go ahead with 
lat. On the other hand, Arafat is pre- 
imably the leader. And these people 
ore or less report to him. So he bears 
responsibility; that's a little different. 

Q. Let me ask about a second ra- 
onale. We asked Mr. Gerasimov 
)out a visa for Gorbachev. You 
anted a visa for him. 

A. Yes, of course. 

Q. Yet the Soviet Union has con- 
lcted terrorism against its own cit- 
ens and against Americans. I 
member at the time of the shooting 
>wn of Flight #007, you excoriated 
ic Soviet Union. You said they knew 

tactly what they were doing, that 
ey were shooting down a civilian 
ane. And that's still your belief, 
lat they knew that? 

A. I believe that the pilot must 
ive been able to observe that plane 
id should have been able to identify it 
cause of its very distinctive profile. 

Q. And I've heard you speak, the 
icaraguan — 

A. Now as far as the Arafat visa is 
Deemed — as far as the Arafat visa is 
Deemed — let me remind you that 
ere is a law in the United States that 
ids the PLO to be a terrorist organi- 
.tion and denies visas to members of 
e PLO. That's the law. And I admin- 
ter under that law. 

Q. Why not keep Terzi out? 

A. It says that the Secretary of 
;ate may recommend to the Attorney 
eneral, who then has to make another 
^termination, a waiver of the visa, if 
! deems it proper. So in judging 
nether or not to make that request 
r a waiver, I think it's quite proper 
r me to look especially at terrorism, 
nd that's what I did. 



Q. That's what I've asked you 
about the Soviet Union. How about 
Nicaragua? 

A. And what I find is — 

Q. Ortega? Is Ortega all right? 
You've allowed him to come. 

A. There is no such law having to 
do with Nicaragua. But — and I don't 
particularly like some of these charac- 
ters you're referring to — on the other 
hand, as Secretary of State, I have a 
decision to make under a law. And I 
considered that decision very carefully, 
and I'm very comfortable that it's the 
right answer. 

Q. One theme of the criticism of- 
fered of your decision was that it 
came after, unfortunately, the Algiers 
decision, which ostensibly, say your 
critics, represented substantial move- 
ment on the part of the PLO toward 
moderation. After several weeks of 
looking at that heavily nuanced docu- 
ment, can you tell us, was there sig- 
nificant movement toward moderation 
on the part of the PLO? And if so, 
wherein did it consist? 

A. I think that it had some signifi- 
cant movement. And we said so, and 
encouraged that. On the other hand, 
the things that people are saying are 
not, I don't think, reasonable inter- 
pretations of the document. It is said, 
for example, that they accept [UN Se- 
curity Council Resolutions] 242 and 338 
as a basis for peace negotiations. What 
they did was, they listed in one part of 
the document UN resolutions they ac- 
cept: 242 and 338 were not there. Then 
they have a portion on an international 
conference that very heavily conditions 
the acceptance of 242 and 338. So you 
can't really say that they have accepted 
it. Furthermore, it's on that that people 
hang this notion that they have recog- 
nized Israel's right to exist. And you 
have to strain yourself to find that. So 
what I would like to see is for them to 
say straight out that they accept Is- 
rael's right to exist; that they accept 
242 and 338; and they flatly renounce 
the use of terrorism in all its forms. 

Q. Bearing in mind that in recent 
Middle Eastern history, Arab leaders 
who have taken a "moderate" view of 
Israel have been killed — 

A. Yes, that's terrorism. Those 
people are enemies of the peace 
process. 

Q. So in view of that, was it not 
surprising that they did even what 
they did in Algiers? 

A. I'm glad to see them do what 
they did in Algiers, and I don't mind 



saying so, and I hope to do more, be- 
cause we need more. And I'll encourage 
it in every way I can. 

Q. We have a treaty with the 
United Nations when it was formed — 
a headquarters agreement treaty — in 
which we have said we would not in- 
terpose any impediment to people 
coming to the United Nations on offi- 
cial or — I don't have the exact lan- 
guage — on business that the United 
Nations requested. Why do that? Why 
break that treaty? 

A. We didn't break the treaty. 

Q. You did in the case, many be- 
lieve, of Arafat. 

A. I don't think so. Because we 
also said that we agreed to the head- 
quarters agreement, but we carefully 
preserved our right to exclude people 
who we think threaten the security in- 
terests of the United States. 

Q. But you said that wasn't the 
law that you were using. 

A. And we have done that on 
many occasions. And we did it in this 
occasion. 

Q. So your view is not, then — let 
me get it straight — previously you 
cited the law, you said, against the 
PLO. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Now you're citing another law, 
which talks about security of the 
United States. Did you believe Mr. 
Arafat might be a personal threat to 
Americans if he came here? 

A. The chain of logic you have to 
go through is, first of all, do we have 
any right to exclude anybody that the 
United Nation invites? The answer to 
that is clearly, yes, we do. And then 
second, within the scope of that reser- 
vation, given our law, was it proper to 
exclude Arafat on the grounds of ter- 
rorism and terrorism's relationship to 
our security. And I think the answer to 
that is yes. 

Q. Won't he get a lot more pub- 
licity in Geneva now? Won't the spot- 
light be on him, if you oppose 
terrorism? 

A. I think the spotlight is certainly 
on him. It would have been on him in 
New York. And I hope that the right 
result of the spotlight is that it is 
clearer and cleaner and comes forward 
in a stronger way. Nothing could please 
me more if he does that. 



'Press release 249 of Dec. 5, 1988. 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



AFRICA 



Angola/Namibia Accords 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 13, 19881 

The signing of the protocol of Braz- 
zaville this morning by the Govern- 
ments of South Africa, Cuba, and 
Angola opens the way to peace and sta- 
bility in southwestern Africa. This de- 
velopment fulfills President Reagan's 
policy determination made early in this 
Administration to seek the removal of 
all foreign troops from Angola, the im- 
plementation of UN [Security Council] 
Resolution 435 for the independence of 
Namibia, and support for the UNITA 
[National Union for the Total Inde- 
pendence of Angola] freedom fighters 
in Angola. It was the combination of 
the U.S. steadfast support for these ob- 
jectives and skillful mediation over a 
period of 8 years that made this break- 
through for peace possible. The Ameri- 
can mediating team, the participating 
governments, and President Sassou- 
Nguesso of the Congo are to be con- 
gratulated for their role in this extraor- 
dinary achievement. We hope that this 
major diplomatic milestone in southern 
Africa will be followed by renewed 
efforts to settle the internal conflict in 
Angola through a process of national 
reconciliation and peaceful negotiation 
among Angolans. 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
CROCKER'S REMARKS, 

DEC. 13, 19882 

Today's ceremony — the signing of the 
Brazzaville protocol by Angola, Cuba, 
and South Africa — is the culmination of 
many months of hard work by distin- 
guished representatives of three sov- 
ereign governments which, faced by a 
stark choice of peace or war, chose to 
work for peace. With the signature of 
this protocol, the path is now clear for 
early signature of a tripartite agree- 
ment that will bring an end to the in- 
ternational conflict in southwestern 
Africa. This event signifies the end of a 
sad chapter in Africa's modern history 
and the beginning of a new chapter. 
Speaking for my government, we have 
high hopes that this will be a chapter 
that witnesses reduced internal and in- 
ternational strife, greater opportunity 



for the building of just and prosperous 
societies, and strengthened prospects 
for international cooperation in support 
of African development and stability. 

On behalf of the delegation of the 
United States, which has had the honor 
to serve as mediator in these negotia- 
tions, and on behalf of the delegations 
of the three governments here present 
today, I would like to express our deep- 
est gratitude to you, Mr. President 
[Denis Sassou-Nguesso]. As the leader 
of the People's Republic of the Congo, 
we salute your own contributions to this 
historic peace process in southern Af- 
rica. I recall that in April 1987 it was 
your invitation, while chairman of the 
Organization of African Unity, to meet 
in Brazzaville that served as a catalyst 
to restore and reinvigorate contact and 
dialogue between my government and 
the Government of the People's Re- 
public of Angola. Today is the fifth 
occasion since that meeting nearly 2 
years ago that we have assembled in 
Brazzaville in our joint search for peace 
in the region. Your hospitality, Mr. 
President, and the cooperation and as- 
sistance of the Government of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of the Congo have been a 
vital part of this process. You have en- 
couraged us and supported us, and we 
are most grateful. 

It is also appropriate today to 
salute the determination and profes- 
sionalism of the delegations from 
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa that 
over the past 8 months have met in 
London, Cairo, Geneva, New York, and 
here in Brazzaville. The process has 
been long, painstaking, and often frus- 
trating for everyone concerned. With- 
out the extraordinary dedication and 
skill of the principal negotiators, we 
would not have been able to achieve 
this settlement. I would also like to pay 
tribute to two parties who have not 
been present officially at the negotiat- 
ing table but whose cooperation and as- 
sistance have been crucial throughout 
the course of these negotiations. 

As mediator, we have developed a 
pattern of close, practical, and effective 
cooperation with our Soviet counter- 
parts. Despite some differences in per- 
spective and different roles in the nego- 
tiating process, the United States and 



the U.S.S.R. have been able to work 
cooperatively to move the process 
forward. It has been a case study of 
superpower effort to support the reso- 
lution of regional conflicts. So, I woulc 
like to salute the hard work and profes 
sional dedication of the Soviet officials 
who have been involved in this inten 
sive effort over the past months. 

The United Nations has the re- 
sponsibility to implement UN Security 
Council Resolution 435/78 and to 
oversee the transition to Namibian 
independence, as well as to verify the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from An- 
gola. These are complex undertakings 
and are essential for the successful im 
plementation of the agreements the 
parties are entering into. We have bet 
fortunate to have had the benefit of tH 
advice, support, and counsel of a real 
statesman, UN Secretary General Jav 
ier Perez de Cuellar, and of another 
distinguished international civil ser- 
vant, Under Secretary General Martt 
Ahtisaari, and his colleagues from 
the United Nations, through the 
negotiations. 

In conclusion, I would like to say 
word about my own country and its n 
in the search for a peaceful solution i; 
Africa. As this protracted negotiatior 
means a successful conclusion, it is 
worth noting the ingredients that ha\ 
made success possible. First, our rol< 
has been welcomed by our partners i: 
Africa and by our friends and allies 
around the world. My country does n 
have blueprints for the solution of ev< 
problem or a mandate to play such a 
role. But we are prepared to involve 
ourselves in the search for constructi 
solutions when such a role is welcorm 
and appropriate. Second, we have bei 
realists. We have recognized that last 
ing solutions can only be based on th 
concrete historical realities of a giver 
situation. Just as man cannot eat slo- 
gans, neither can statesmen solve 
problems with rhetorical cliches and 
abstract formulas. Third, we have tri 
to chart a clear course and stick with 
it. This is an approach that may som 
times fall short of shifting fashions ai 
popular hopes for instant results. Bu 
over time this is the approach that 
gives confidence and predictability to 
key decisionmakers. It is the approai 
that works. 



10 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1! 



AFRICA 



ROTOCOL OF BRAZZAVILLE, 

IEC. 13, 1988 

ifelegations representing the Governments 
' the People's Republic of Angola, the Re- 
ublie of Cuba, and the Republic of South 
frica. 

Meeting in Brazzaville with the media- 
on of the Government of the United 
tates of America, 

Expressing their deep appreciation to 
le President of the People's Republic of 
le Congo, Colonel Denis Sassou-Nguesso, 
r his indispensable contribution to the 
luse of peace in Southwestern Africa and 
r the hos pitality extended to the delega- 
ons by the Government of the People's 
epublic of the Congo, 

Confirming their commitment to act in 
•cordance with the Principles for a Peace- 
1 Settlement in Southwestern Africa, ini- 
alled at New York on 13 July 1988 and 
>proved by their respective Governments 
i 20 July 1988, each of which is indispens- 
»le to a comprehensive settlement; with 
e understandings reached at Geneva on 5 
ugust 1988 that are not superseded by 
is document; and with the agreement 
ached at Geneva on 15 November 1988 for 
e redeployment to the North and the 
aged and total withdrawal of Cuban 
oops from Angola, 

Urging the international community to 
ovide economic and financial support for 
e implementation of all aspects of this 
ttlement, 

Agree as follows: 

1. The parties agree to recommend to 
i Secretary General of the United Na- 
ns that 1 April 1989 be established as 

I date for implementation of UNSCR 
6/78. 

2. The parties agree to meet on 22 De- 
Tiber 1988 in New York for signature of 

3 tripartite agreement and for signature 
Angola and Cuba of their bilateral 
reement. By the date of signature, An- 
la and Cuba shall have reached agree- 
;nt with the Secretary General of the 
lited Nations on verification arrange- 
;nts to be approved by the Security 
mncil. 

3. The parties agree to exchange the 
isoners of war upon signature of the tri- 
rtite agreement. 

4. The parties agree to establish a 
nt Commission in accordance with the 
nex attached to this protocol. 



inex on the Joint Commission 

With the objective of facilitating the res- 
ition of any dispute regarding the inter- 
etation or implementation of the 
partite agreement, the parties hereby 
ablish a Joint Commission, which shall 
gin its work upon signature of the tripar- 
e agreement. 



2. The Joint Commission shall serve as 
a forum for discussion and resolution of 
issues regarding the interpretation and im- 
plementation of the tripartite agreement, 
and for such other purposes as the parties 
in the future may mutually agree. 

3. The parties invite the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics to participate as observ- 
ers in the work of the Commission. 
Furthermore, the parties agree that, upon 
the independence of Namibia, the Nami- 
bian Government should be included as a 
full member of the Joint Commission. To 
that end, the parties will extend a formal 
invitation to the Namibian Government to 
join the Joint Commission on the date of 
Namibian independence. 

4. The Joint Commission shall be con- 
stituted within thirty days of the signing of 
the tripartite agreement. The Joint Com- 
mission shall establish its own regulations 
and rules of procedure for regular meet- 
ings and for special meetings which may be 
requested by any party. 

5. The decision by a party to discuss or 
seek the resolution of an issue in the Joint 
Commission shall not prejudice the right of 
that party to raise the issue, as it deems 
appropriate, before the Security Council of 
the United Nations or to pursue such other 
means of dispute resolution as are available 
under international law. 

6. The Joint Commission shall in 

no way function as a substitute for UNTAG 
(including the monitoring role of UNTAG 
outside Namibia) or for the UN entity per- 
forming verification in Angola. 



SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 22, 1988-5 

This is a moment for celebration of 
achievement and dedication to a better 
future in southern Africa. 

But it is a moment as well of the 
immense tragedy of yesterday's airline 
disaster [in Scotland]. Here we re- 
member the UN Commissioner for 
Namibia, Mr. Bernt Carlson. Bernt 
Carlson was a tireless champion of 
Namibia's independence. His memory 
will be honored by all who wish 
Namibia well. We grieve for him and 
for all those who lost their lives and 
extend profound sympathy to their rela- 
tives and friends. Please join me in a 
silent moment of grief and prayer. 

Mr. Secretary General; Your Excel- 
lencies the Foreign Ministers of the 
People's Republic of Angola, the Re- 
public of Cuba, and the Republic of 



South Africa; distinguished guests: We 
meet here today for the signing of two 
major agreements — a bilateral agree- 
ment between the People's Republic of 
Angola and the Republic of Cuba and a 
tripartite accord among the People's 
Republic of Angola, the Republic of 
Cuba, and the Republic of South 
Africa. 

The first order of business this 
morning is the signing of the trilateral 
agreement, and I now invite His Excel- 
lency the Foreign Minister of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Angola, Afonso Van 
Dunem, His Excellency the Foreign 
Minister of Cuba, Isidoro Octavio 
Mamierca, and His Excellency the For- 
eign Minister of the Republic of South 
Africa, R.F Botha, to sign their tri- 
lateral agreement. [The parties sign the 
agreement.] 

Mr. Secretary General, on behalf of 
the United States, as mediator of these 
now-concluded negotiations, and on be- 
half of the parties themselves — Angola, 
Cuba, and South Africa — I am honored 
to present to the community of na- 
tions — through you — the agreement 
just signed by these ministers. 

This is an occasion for both cele- 
bration and sober reflection. We have 
just witnessed the signing of an un- 
precedented agreement that will bring 
long-awaited peace to southwestern Af- 
rica and independence to Namibia. It is 
appropriate that we do so at the head- 
quarters of the United Nations, where 
10 years ago, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 435. Today we are 
privileged to participate in the culmina- 
tion of a decade of effort to implement 
the UN plan to assist Namibia in tak- 
ing its rightful place in the family of 
nations. 

The regional settlement concluded 
here today represents a momentous 
turning point in the history of southern 
Africa. 

With the independence of Namibia, 
Africa's last colonial question will have 
been resolved. As the guns fall silent 
across the borders of southwestern Af- 
rica, the world will look to the nations 
of that vast region to turn to resolution 
of their pressing internal problems 
through peaceful means. We are espe- 
cially mindful of the heavy responsibil- 
ity assumed by the parties to the 
tripartite agreement and by the inter- 
national community to see that the 
commitments undertaken today are 
fully and faithfully implemented. Noth- 
ing else will adequately respond to the 
aspirations of all the peoples of south- 
western Africa for a new era of peace 
and prosperity. 



JDartment of State Bulletin February 1989 



11 



AFRICA 




UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar (seated, center) presided at the signing 
ceremony of the Angola/Namibia accords at UN headquarters. On the left is South 
African Foreign Minister Botha and on the right is Secretary Shultz. 



I salute the negotiators of the 
agreement. In an age of mass media 
and public diplomacy, we are sometimes 
told that the ancient arts of negotia- 
tion — communication, compromise, and, 
above all, patience — are no longer rele- 
vant. You have proven otherwise. Each 
of your governments empowered you to 
negotiate and supported you with bold 
and timely decisions for peace. Your 
triumph has vindicated their faith in 
you and will give heart to others who 
still struggle to resolve conflicts around 
the world. You have reminded us all 
that, even in the complex world of mod- 
ern diplomacy, individuals do make a 
difference. 

We welcome the presence today of 
Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin 
and department head Vasev as repre- 
sentatives of the Soviet Union. It is 
fitting that they be here because the 
Soviet Union has played an important 
and constructive role in the peace proc- 
ess in southwestern Africa. The parties 
themselves made the sovereign decision 
for peace, but, in doing so, they have 
been encouraged and strongly sup- 
ported by both the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Though our roles 
have been different, our close coopera- 
tion has made an effective contribution 
to the achievement of this agreement. 
Let us hope that we can both draw 
from our experience in this process as 
we continue our regional dialogue 
aimed at peaceful resolution of other 
pressing regional conflicts. 

Now that the parties have signed 
their trilateral agreement, the United 
Nations will undertake in earnest the 



formidable task of implementing Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435. This will 
be a complex undertaking requiring 
considerable expenditure of resources 
in an era of tight budgets for member 
governments and the United Nations it- 
self. I reaffirm today that the United 
States will do its share. We look to 
other member states to join us in this 
great endeavor. 

The United Nations can be justly 
proud of its leading role in the imple- 
mentation of this regional settlement. 
The UN Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) will have the challenging task 
of ensuring free and fair elections lead- 
ing to independence in Namibia. The 
United Nations has also been requested 
by the Governments of the People's Re- 
public of Angola and the Republic of 
Cuba to verify the departure of Cuban 
troops from Angola. The Secretary 
General, his Special Representative for 
Namibia, Marti Ahtisaari, and their 
team enjoy the full confidence of the 
parties and the member states. I am 
confident that they will perform mag- 
nificently, further enhancing the pres- 
tige of the United Nations. 

At this season, millions of people 
around the world consider in a special 
way the meaning of peace on Earth and 
look forward with hope to a new year. 
The governments and individuals 
gathered together in this place have 
truly given the world a special gift. 
They have given us all a fresh and very 
welcome demonstration of the human 
capacity to put aside the tools of war in 
favor of the instruments of peace. 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
DEC. 22, 1988^ 

I am pleased to announce that Secre- 
tary of State Shultz represented the 
United States at a very important cerel 
mony today in New York, in which for| 
mal agreements were signed aimed at 
bringing peace to southwestern Africa 
The Foreign Ministers of South Africa, 
Angola, and Cuba signed accords lead- 
ing to the staged and complete with- 
drawal of Cuban military forces from 
Angola and for implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 435 leadin 
to independence for Namibia. The 
United States mediated negotiations 
leading to these historic agreements. 

The agreements signed today are 
the result of intense negotiations whic 
have taken place over several years. 
They promise to end the cycle of vio- 
lence which has plagued the Namibiar 
Angolan border area for more than 13 
years, inflicting untold human misery 
and property damage. We are pleased 
that Namibia is to gain its long overdi 
independence, after being occupied bj 
South African forces for more than 7C 
years. 

Regarding the Cuban military in 
Angola, the United States long has cc 
tended that the presence of Cuban co: 
bat forces was a destabilizing element 
in the region. We are gratified that 
they will be departing the African Cc 
tinent. When completed in 1991, the 
total withdrawal of Cuban forces fron 
Angola will end one of the major re- 
gional problems that have troubled 
U.S. -Soviet relations in recent years. 

The United States, as mediator i 
the negotiations, is pleased to have a, 
sisted the parties to find a peaceful f( 
mula to reconcile differences and look 
forward to working with other mem- 
bers of the joint commission formed t 
monitor implementation of the 
agreements. 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1£l 



AFRICA 



I'RIPARTITE AGREEMENT, 
lEC. 22, 1988 



Agreement Among 

the People's Republic of Angola, 

the Republic of Cuba, 

AND 

the Republic of South Africa 

tie governments of the People's Republic 
Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the 
epublic of South Africa, hereinafter des- 
nated as "the Parties," 

Taking into account the "Principles for 
Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Af- 
:a," approved by the Parties on 20 July 
88. and the subsequent negotiations with 
spect to the implementation of these 
•inciples, each of which is indispensable 
a comprehensive settlement, 

Considering the acceptance by the Par- 
s of the implementation of United Na- 
>ns Security Council Resolution 435 
978). adopted on 29 September 1978, 
reinafter designated as "UNSCR 
5/78," 

Considering the conclusion of the bilat- 
al agreement between the People's Re- 
blic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba 
oviding for the redeployment toward the 
jrth and the staged and total withdrawal 
Cuban troops from the territory of the 
ople's Republic of Angola, 

Recognizing the role of the United Na- 
ns Security Council in implementing 
>JSCR 435/78 and in supporting the im- 
mentation of the present agreement, 

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign 
uality, and independence of all states of 
ithwestern Africa, 

Affirming the principle of non-inter- 
ence in the internal affairs of states. 

Affirming the principle of abstention 
m the threat or use of force against the 
ritorial integrity or political indepen- 
lce of states, 

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of 

southwestern region of Africa to self- 
.ermination, independence, and equality 
rights, and of the states of southwestern 
rica to peace, development, and social 
figress, 

Urging African and international coop- 
ition for the settlement of the problems 
the development of the southwestern re- 
n of Africa, 

Expressing their appreciation for the 
diating role of the Government of the 
ited States of America, 

Desiring to contribute to the establish- 
nt of peace and security in southwestern 
rica, 



Agree to the provisions set forth 
below. 

(1) The Parties shall immediately re- 
quest the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to seek authority from the Se- 
curity Council to commence implementa- 
tion of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989. 

(2) All military forces of the Republic 
of South Africa shall depart Namibia in 
accordance with UNSCR 435/78. 

(3) Consistent with the provisions of 
UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Af- 
rica and People's Republic of Angola shall 
cooperate with the Secretary-General to 
ensure the independence of Namibia 
through free and fair elections and shall 
abstain from any action that could prevent 
the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Par- 
ties shall respect the territorial integrity 
and inviolability of borders of Namibia and 
shall ensure that their territories are not 
used by any state, organization, or person 
in connection with acts of war, aggression, 
or violence against the territorial integrity 
or inviolability of borders of Namibia or 
any other action which could prevent the 
execution of UNSCR 435/78. 

(4) The People's Republic of Angola 
and the Republic of Cuba shall implement 
the bilateral agreement, signed on the date 
of signature of this agreement, providing 
for the redeployment toward the North and 
the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from the territory of the People's 
Republic of Angola, and the arrangements 
made with the Security Council of the 
United Nations for the on-site verification 
of that withdrawal. 

(5) Consistent with their obligations 
under the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Parties shall refrain from the threat or 
use of force, and shall ensure that their 
respective territories are not used by any 
state, organization, or person in connection 
with any acts of war, aggression, or vio- 
lence, against the territorial integrity, in- 
violability of borders, or independence of 
any state of southwestern Africa. 

(6) The Parties shall respect the princi- 
ple of non-interference in the internal af- 
fairs of the states of southwestern Africa. 

(7) The Parties shall comply in good 
faith with all obligations undertaken in this 
agreement and shall resolve through nego- 
tiation and in a spirit of cooperation any 
disputes with respect to the interpretation 
or implementation thereof. 



(8) This agreement shall enter into 
force upon signature. 

Signed at New York in triplicate in the 
Portuguese, Spanish and English lan- 
guages, each language being equally au- 
thentic, this 22nd day of December'l988. 



FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF ANGOLA 

Afonso Van Dunem 

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 
Isidoro Octavio Malmierca 

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 

Roelof F. Botha 



BILATERAL AGREEMENT, 
DEC. 22, 1988 

Agreement Between the 

Governments of the People's 

Republic of Angola and the Republic 

of Cuba for the Termination of the 

Internationalist Mission of the 

Cuban Military Contingent 

The Government of the People's Republic of 
Angola and the Republic of Cuba, here- 
inafter designated as the Parties, 

Considering, 

That the implementation of Resolution 
435 of the Security Council of the United 
Nations for the independence of Namibia 
shall commence on the 1st of April, 

That the question of the independence 
of Namibia and the safeguarding of the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of the People's Republic of Angola 
are closely interrelated with each other 
and with peace and security in the region 
of southwestern Africa, 

That on the date of signature of this 
agreement a tripartite agreement among 
the Governments of the People's Republic 
of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and the 
Republic of South Africa shall be signed, 
containing the essential elements for the 
achievement of peace in the region of 
southwestern Africa, 

That acceptance of and strict com- 
pliance with the foregoing will bring to an 
end the reasons which compelled the Gov- 
ernment of the People's Republic of Angola 
to request, in the legitimate exercise of its 
rights under Article 51 of the United Na- 



13 



AFRICA 



Cuban Troop Withdrawal Schedule: First Year 



CONGO 



I)-Day + 4 Months 

Approximate Cuban Troop 

Strength = 35,000; All Cuban 

Troops North of the 15th Parallel 



AREA FROM WHICH CUBAN 
TROOPS ARE EXCLUDED 



ZAIRE 




South 
Atlantic 
Ocean 



Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative 



0235 12-88 STATE (INR/C 



14 



Department of State Bulletin/February 15 



AFRICA 



pons Charter, the deployment to Angolan 
lerritory of a Cuban internationalist mili- 
ary contingent to guarantee, in coopera- 
tion with the FAPLA [the Angolan 
Government army], its territorial integrity 
Ind sovereignty in view of the invasion and 
occupation of part of its territory, 

Noting, 

The agreements signed by the Govern- 
lents of the People's Republic of Angola 
nd the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 
982 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the 
rovernment of the People's Republic of An- 
ola approved in November 1984, and the 
rotoeol of Brazzaville signed by the Gov- 
rnments of the People's Republic of An- 
ola, the Republic of Cuba and the 
epublic of South Africa on December 13, 
P8, 

Taking into account, 

That conditions now exist which make 
ossible the repatriation of the Cuban mili- 
iry contingent currently in Angolan ter- 
tory and the successful accomplishment 
'their internationalist mission, 

The parties agree as follows: 



Article 1 

To commence the redeployment by stages 
to the 15th and 13th parallels and the total 
withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who 
constitute the Cuban troops contingent 
stationed in the People's Republic of An- 
gola, in accordance with the pace and time- 
frame established in the attached calendar, 
which is an integral part of this agree- 
ment. The total withdrawal shall be com- 
pleted by the 1st of July, 1991. 



Article 2 

The Governments of the People's Republic 
of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve 
the right to modify or alter their obliga- 
tions deriving from Article 1 of this Agree- 
ment in the event that flagrant violations 
of the Tripartite Agreement are verified. 



Article 3 

The Parties, through the Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations Organization, 
hereby request that the Security Council 
verify the redeployment and phased and 



total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the 
territory of the People's Republic of An- 
gola, and to this end shall agree on a 
matching protocol. 

Article 4 

This agreement shall enter into force upon 
signature of the tripartite agreement 
among the People's Republic of Angola, the 
Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of 
South Africa. 

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the 
Headquarters of the United Nations Orga- 
nization, in two copies, in the Portuguese 
and Spanish languages, each being equally 
authentic. 



FOR THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 

Akonso Van Dunem 
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA 

I.SIDORO OCTAVIO MaLMIERCA 



Schedule of Events 



Transition to Namibian Independence 



Events During Cuban Troop Withdrawal 



1989 

1 April - UN Resolution 435 implemented | 

July - South Africans down to 1,500 men H 



November- Elections In Namibia, remaining 
South African troops depart 

1990 



1991 



1 April - Cuban troop withdrawal begins 

August - All Cuban troops move north of 
15th parallel 

November - 50% of Cubans withdrawn, 
remaining Cubans north of 13th parallel 

April - 66% of Cubans withdrawn 



October - 76% of Cubans withdrawn 



-« July - All Cubans withdrawn 






partment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



15 



AFRICA 



Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule 

Calendar 

In compliance with Article 1 of the agree- 
ment between the Government of the Re- 
public of Cuba and the Government of the 
People's Republic of Angola for the termi- 
nation of the mission of the Cuban interna- 
tionalist military contingent stationed in 
Angolan territory, the parties establish the 
following calendar for the withdrawal: 

Time Frames 

Prior to the first of April, 1989 
(date of the beginning 
of implementation 



of Resolution 435) 



3,000 men 



Total duration of the calendar 
Starting from the 
1st of April, 1989 27 months 

Redeployment to the north: 
to the 15th parallel by 1 August 1989 

to the 13th parallel by 31 Oct. 1989 

Total men to be withdrawn: 
by 1 November 1989 25,000 men (50%) 
by 1 April 1990 33,000 (66%) 

by 1 October 1990 38,000 (76%); 12,000 

men remaining 
by July 1991 50,000 (100%) 

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 
men. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1988. 

2 Chester A. Crocker is Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs. 

'Press release 260 of Dec. 28 and 
USUN press release 181. 

4 Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 26. ■ 



Provisions of UN Resolution 435 



Following agreement on a date to 
implement UN Resolution 435 
and establishment of a formal 
cease-fire, a UN representative 
and a UN planning group would 
administer Namibia during the 
transition to independence in con- 
junction with the South African- 
appointed Administrator General. 
A UN Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG) would supervise 
the cease-fire and monitor South 
African and South-West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO) 
forces. 

Within 3 months of a cease- 
fire. South African forces would 
be reduced to 1,500 men, confined 
to one or two bases in northern 



Namibia. SWAPO forces would be 
restricted to specified locations in 
Angola under UN supervision. 
All political prisoners held by 
both sides would be released. 

Seven months after the im- 
plementation date, elections 
would be held under UN auspices 
for a new constituent assembly. 
The remaining South African 
troops would depart within a tew 
months, once elections were cer- 
tified by the United Nations and 
independence granted. Unarmed 
SWAPO members and Namibian 
refugees would be permitted to 
return to participate in the elec- 
tion process. 



The United States and Angola, 1974-88: 
A Chronology 



The following chronology was pre- 
pared by Nina D. Howland of the Pol- 
icy Studies Division, Office of the 
Historian. Bureau of Public Affairs. 

April 1974. A military coup in Por- 
tugual brought to power a new govern- 
ment dedicated to granting independ- 
ence to Portugal's colonies. In Angola, 
however, the decolonization process was 
complicated by the existence of three 
competing nationalist movements en- 
gaged in combat: the National Front 
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 
the Popular Movement for the Libera- 
tion of Angola (MPLA), and the Na- 
tional Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA). The FNLA had 
close ties to Zaire; the MPLA was sup- 
ported by Cuba and the Soviet Union; 
and UNITA was receiving some as- 
sistance from China. Publicly the 
United States, which had been advocat- 
ing independence for Portugal's colonies 
since 1961, expressed no preference 
among these contenders. 

January 15, 1975. The leaders of 
the three rival nationalist movements — 
Holden Roberto of FNLA, Agostinho 
Neto of MPLA, and Jonas Savimbi of 



UNITA — signed the Alvor accord in A 
vor, Portugual. They agreed to tripar- 
tite participation in a transitional 
coalition government headed by a Por- 
tuguese high commissioner, who was t 
be assisted by a presidential council 
with the chairmanship rotating among 
the three leaders. It was also agreed 
that Angola was to become fully inde- 
pendent from Portugal on November 1 
1975. On January 31, a transitional gov 
ernment was installed in Luanda, An- 
gola, but the truce soon broke down, 
and the three factions renewed their ii 
ternecine warfare. 

June 11, 1975. FNLA leader 
Roberto publicly accused the Soviet 
Union of supplying the MPLA with 
tanks, heavy artillery, and guided 
missiles. 

July 1975. Amid continuing vio- 
lence in Angola, the public position of 
the U.S. Government was that the 
three factions should resolve their dif- 
ferences through negotiations. South 
Africa — unhappy at the prospect of an 
unfriendly, communist-dominated statf 
on the Namibian border — began to su] 
ply arms to the FNLA and UNITA. 



16 



Department of State Bulletin/February 19! 



AFRICA 



August 1, 1975. UNITA formally 
eclared war on the MPLA. 

August 6-8, 1975. The transitional 
overnment in Luanda collapsed as 
JNITA and the FNLA, which had 
>rmed a weak alliance, withdrew their 
linisters in the midst of full-scale civil 
ar. At this point, the MPLA had suc- 
eeded in securing control over 12 of 
ingola's 16 provinces. 

August 29, 1975. Portugal formally 
nnuled the Alvor accord and dissolved 
ie transitional government after ap- 
ointing a new high commissioner. 

September 23, 1975. Secretary of 
tate Kissinger declared that events in 
.ngola had taken a "distressing turn" 
nd that the United States was "most 
larmed at the interference of extracon- 
nental powers," i.e., the Soviet Union 
ad Cuba. 

October 23, 1975. South Africa 
ent a heavily armed unit of the South 
frican Army, including black Africans 
ho had served in the Portuguese co- 
nial army and white Portuguese An- 
jlans, into Angola to aid the FNLA- 
NITA alliance. The force began a ma- 
•r thrust north toward Luanda. The 
ltry of South African forces into An- 
)la was followed by a massive increase 
Soviet arms shipments to the MPLA. 
Duth Africa subsequently claimed that 
3 intervention had been intended to 
■event the communists from gaining a 
othold in Angola. 

November 5, 1975. Cuba, which 
id been sending military advisers and 
irsonnel to aid the MPLA since March 
'75, began direct participation in com- 
it. By mid-November, Western intel- 
*ence sources estimated that 2,000 
uban troops were fighting in Angola; 
f February 1976, the number had in- 
leased to an estimated 14,000. 

November 11, 1975. On Independ- 
lce Day, the existence of two Angolan 
^publics was declared — the MPLA an- 
junced the establishment of the Peo- 
.e's Republic of Angola with its capital 
. Luanda, while the FNLA and 
NITA called their divided territories 
ie People's Democratic Republic of An- 
ola with its capital at Huambo in 
mthern Angola. (At this point, the 
*PLA occupied a strip of Angolan ter- 
tory from Luanda eastward to the 



Zairian border, as well as the enclave of 
Cabinda; the FNLA controlled the 
northwest; and UNITA held the entire 
southern sector of the country.) 

Secretary Kissinger said that the 
United States would not recognize the 
MPLA, which had managed to seize 
Luanda "through a very substantial in- 
flow of communist arms" and that it 
favored negotiations to attempt to 
create "a transitional government that 
would permit the popular will to be 
consulted." 

December 4, 1975. After consulta- 
tions between President Ford and So- 
viet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, 
the Soviet Union halted its airlift to 
Angola. 

December 19, 1975. The Senate 
voted 54 to 22 to approve the Tunney 
amendment to the FY 1976 Defense De- 
partment appropriations bill (H.R. 
9861) prohibiting the use of any funds 
in the bill "for any activities involving 
Angola." 

December 20, 1975. President 
Ford strongly criticized the Senate ac- 
tion because it would tie U.S. hands in 
Angola and warned that Cuba had al- 
ready sent 4,000-6,000 combat troops. 

December 25, 1975. The Soviet 
Union resumed its airlift to Angola. 

January 4, 1976. President Ford 
said that the Soviet Union's large-scale 
military involvement in Angola was 
"inconsistent with detente." 

January 27, 1976. Despite last 
minute appeals from President Ford 
and Secretary Kissinger, the House of 
Representatives, voted 323 to 99 to 
adopt the Tunney amendment. The 
President said that the vote would re- 
sult in "serious harm to the interests of 
the United States." On February 9, he 
signed into law the FY 1976 Defense 
Department appropriations bill contain- 
ing the Tunney amendment. 

February 11, 1976. The Organiza- 
tion of African Unity (OAU) recognized 
the Luanda (MPLA) government and 
accepted it into membership. On Febru- 
ary 14, UNITA leader Savimbi an- 
nounced that his forces had moved into 
the bush and would henceforth carry on 
the struggle against the MPLA through 
guerrilla warfare. On February 22, Por- 



tugal recognized the MPLA govern- 
ment in Luanda. By the end of 
February, the MPLA had established 
its control of Angola. 

March 31, 1976. Following South 
African raids against South West Africa 
People's Organization (SWAPO) bases 
in Angola, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Italy, and 
Japan abstained on UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 387 condemning South 
African aggression against Angola and 
calling upon South Africa to pay com- 
pensation for the damage it had in- 
flicted upon that country. The United 
States had sought unsuccessfully dur- 
ing the debate to obtain a resolution 
condemning all foreign involvement in 
Angola. SWAPO, the most active Nami- 
bian liberation movement, had been 
conducting intermittent guerrilla war- 
fare against South Africa's occupation 
of Namibia from bases in Angola since 
the 1960s and had greatly expanded its 
guerrilla activity after Portuguese 
forces left Angola. 

May 1, 1976. Secretary Kissinger 
said that the United States would be 
willing to normalize relations with An- 
gola if the 15,000 Cuban troops in that 
country were withdrawn. 

June 30, 1976. President Ford 
signed into law the International Se- 
curity Assistance and Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976. The act contained 
an amendment sponsored by Senator 
Dick Clark of Iowa, which reaffirmed 
the Tunney amendment's ban on U.S. 
military and other forms of assistance 
to any group or persons in Angola. 

November 22, 1976. The United 
States abstained on a UN Security 
Council resolution recommending that 
the General Assembly admit Angola to 
membership in the United Nations. (It 
had vetoed a similar resolution on June 
23.) On December 1, the General As- 
sembly admitted Angola by a vote of 
116 to 0, with one abstention (the 
United States). 

February 16, 1977. President Car- 
ter declared that his Administration 
"would like to move toward the re- 
establishment of normal relationships" 
with Angola but that the "Cuban mer- 
cenaries" in that country presented a 
problem. He said that the removal of 
Cuban troops from Angola would be "a 
step toward full normalization." 



17 



AFRICA 



May 4, 1978. South African air 
and ground forces launched a major at- 
tack on SWAPO bases in Angola— their 
first direct action since 1976. On May 6, 
the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 428, which con- 
demned South Africa for its attack and 
for using Namibia as a springboard, 
and demanded its withdrawal from An- 
gola and the end of its illegal occupa- 
tion of Namibia. 

May 25, 1978. President Carter 
told a news conference that while he 
did not intend to seek modification of 
the Clark amendment, he had asked 
the Secretary of State to review the 
various legislative restrictions on U.S. 
foreign aid programs in light of the 
need "to preserve Presidential capacity 
to act in the national interests at a time 
of rapidly changing circumstances." He 
also said that the United States had 
"no intention of getting involved in the 
conflict in Angola." 

June 20, 1978. Secretary of State 
Vance declared that increased U.S. con- 
sultations with the Angolan Govern- 
ment could improve the prospects for 
reconciliation between Angola and 
Zaire, as well as for achieving a peace- 
ful settlement in Namibia. (Katangan 
rebels from Angola had invaded the 
Shaba Province of Zaire on May 11. ) 

June 26, 1978. President Carter 
told a news conference that his Admin- 
istration had no current plans to 
"normalize" the U.S. relationship with 
Angola but there had been U.S. nego- 
tiations or consultations directly with 
Angolan officials ever since he came 
into office and that U.S. Deputy Am- 
bassador to the United Nations Don- 
ald F. McHenry's current visit to 
Angola was "part of a series of con- 
sultations." In response to a question, 
the President also told reporters that 
he had "no knowledge" of a reported 
CIA plan to send weapons through a 
third country to the rebels in Angola. 
He declared that no "responsible per- 
son" in his Administration would have 
violated the Clark amendment and that 
he had no intention of sending weapons 
to Angola either directly or indirectly. 

July 21, 1978. Angolan President 
Neto said that his government had "no 
reservations" about establishing diplo- 
matic ties but that the United States 
would have to "take us as we are." On 



July 22, the Department of State said 
that the United States was pleased 
with Neto's offer but concerned about 
the Cuban presence in Angola and de- 
clared that diplomatic relations could 
not be established so long as there ex- 
isted the "problem of internal recon- 
ciliation among the various factions in 
Angola." 

March 26, 1979. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, and 
France abstained on UN Security 
Council Resolution 447 condemning 
South Africa for its attacks against An- 
gola and for its use of Namibia as a 
springboard for those attacks, demand- 
ing that it cease such attacks immedi- 
ately. It requested that UN member 
states extend all necessary assistance 
to the Angolans and all other front-line 
states to strengthen their defense ca- 
pacities. The U.S. abstention was 
based on opposition to the resolution's 
call for assistance to strengthen the de- 
fense capacities of the front-line states. 
On November 2, 1979, and June 27, 
1980, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France again abstained 
on Security Council resolutions which 
repeated the major points of Resolution 
447. 

April 18, 1979. Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs Richard M. 
Moose stated that although the United 
States had not recognized the Luanda 
government, it had found it possible to 
work constructively with the Angolans 
on "regional security problems." He 
also said that Angola would have "a 
crucial role" to play in any Namibia 
settlement. 

December 16, 1980. President Car- 
ter signed into law the FY 1981 foreign 
aid appropriations bill which contained 
an amendment — proposed by Senator 
Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts on June 
17 and modified by the conference com- 
mittee on November 19 — revising the 
1976 Clark amendment. The new 
amendment prohibited U.S. aid to any 
faction for military or paramilitary op- 
erations in Angola unless: (1) the Presi- 
dent determined that such aid should 
be furnished "in the national security 
interests of the United States;" (2) the 
President submitted this determination 
to Congress along with a description of 
the aid recommended and the identity 
of its proposed recipients; and (3) Con- 
gress enacted a joint resolution approv- 
ing the furnishing of such aid. 



March 19, 1981. The Reagan Ad- 
ministration formally requested that 
Congress repeal the Clark amendment 
on the grounds that it involved "an un- 
necessary restriction" on the powers on 
the President. 

April 17, 1981. Assistant SecretaH 
of State for African Affairs Chester A. 
Crocker arrived in Angola. Crocker, 
who was on a 2-week, 12-nation tour of 
southern Africa aimed at reviving stall-j 
ed efforts to achieve negotiated inde- 
pendence for Namibia, told the Angola 
Government that progress on Namibia 
was related to the withdrawal of Cubai 
troops from Angola — the first public 
linkage of the two issues. 

May 19, 1981. The House Foreign 
Affairs Committee recommended (19-5 
that Congress not repeal the Clark 
amendment and stated that repeal 
would play into the hands of the Soviet 
and Cubans by increasing Angola's re- 
liance on the Cubans for security 
needs. The foreign aid appropriations 
bill retaining the Clark amendment ba | 
was signed into law on December 29. 

August 29, 1981. Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker stated that the U.S. Govi 
ernment recognized the "intimate rela 
tionship between the conflicts in 
Namibia and Angola" and was con- 
vinced that "a satisfactory outcome ca. 
only be based on parallel movement in 
both arenas." 

August 31, 1981. The United 
States vetoed a UN Security Council 
resolution supported by the other 13 
Council members, which strongly con- 
demned South Africa for its "unpro- 
voked and persistent armed invasion" 
of Angola and for using Namibia as a 
springboard for such invasions. The 
U.S. representative explained that th( 
United States had voted against the 
resolution because it placed "all the 
blame on South Africa for the escala- 
tion of the violence." 



December 8, 1981. UNITA leadei 
Savimbi, on a private visit to Wash- 
ington, met with Secretary of State 
Haig after a series of talks with other 
senior U.S. officials. The Secretary to 
Savimbi that the United States wishei 
to see all foreign forces leave Angola, 
and Savimbi declared his commitment 
to a political solution to the civil war 
Angola. 



1 



18 



Department of State Bulletin/February 



19; 



AFRICA 



December 17, 1981. The United 
tates cast the only vote against UN 
eneral Assembly Resolution 36/172 C 
dopted by a vote of 136 to 1, with 8 
Dstentions). which condemned South 
frica's "unprovoked acts of aggres- 
on" against Angola and other inde- 
endent African states, urged the 
[ecurity Council to adopt effective 
Erasures (i.e., sanctions) against South 
frica under Chapter VII of the UN 
iharter, and demanded that South 
frica pay full compensation for the 
pillages caused by its aggression. 

January 15-16, 1982. Assistant 
cretary Crocker met with Angolan 
jreign Minister Paulo Jorge in Paris to 
scuss a recent "Western Five" pro- 
isal to achieve Nambian independ- 
lce. On March 4, the two met 
(ain in Paris for further talks. (The 
Western Five" — Canada, France, West 
ermany, the United Kingdom, and the 
nited States — had been attempting to 
gotiate a Namibian settlement since 
pril 1977.) 

June 17, 1982. South African 
ime Minister Pieter W. Botha de- 
ired that no agreement on Namibian 
dependence was possible until Cuban 
sops were removed from Angola. On 
ly 25, Angola rejected the proposed 
ikage between South African with- 
awal from Namibia and Cuban with- 
awal from Angola. 

December 20, 1982. UN General 
isembly Resolution 37/233-B was 
opted by a vote of 129 to 0, with 17 
stentions (including the United 
ates). The resolution reaffirmed Se- 
rity Council Resolutions 385 and 435 
the only basis for a Namibian settle- 
jnt and rejected U.S. and South Af- 
:an attempts to establish linkage 
tween Namibian independence and 
xtraneous issues" such as the with- 
awal of Cuban forces from Angola. 

January 26, 1983. The United 
ates and Angola began a new round 
talks on Namibia. 

February 16, 1983. A de facto 
>ase-fire between South Africa and 
igola went into effect while negotia- 
>ns proceeded between the two coun- 
ies. The Department of State 
?lcomed this as "a constructive step 
ward a more comprehensive regional 
•ace." 



April 13-14, 1983. Angolan Inte- 
rior Minister Manuel Alexandre 
Rodrigues met with top U.S. officials, 
including Secretary of State Shultz and 
Vice President Bush, in Washington to 
discuss Namibia and the presence of 
Cuban troops in Angola. 

August 29, 1983. Following his re- 
turn from a working visit to South Af- 
rica, Namibia, and Angola, UN Secre- 
tary General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
reported to the Security Council that 
South Africa's insistence on the removal 
of Cuban troops from Angola made it 
impossible to implement Resolution 
435 — the UN plan for the independence 
of Namibia. 

October 28, 1983. The United 
States abstained on UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 539 which rejected South 
Africa's insistence on linking Namibian 
independence to withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola. 

December 6, 1983-January 8, 1984. 

South African forces launched a major 
offensive against SWAPO guerrilla 
bases, attacking targets more than 150 
miles inside Angola. 

December 15, 1983. South African 
Foreign Minister Roelef F (Pik) Botha 
sent a letter to UN Secretary General 
Perez de Cuellar saying that South Af- 
rica was prepared to begin a disengage- 
ment of its troops from southern 
Angola for a month beginning Janu- 
ary 31, 1984, in order to advance the 
possibility of a Namibian settlement. 
He said the offer was made "on the 
understanding that the Angolan Gov- 
ernment... would not exploit the situa- 
tion." The Department of State 
welcomed the Foreign Minister's offer. 
On December 30, President Dos Santos 
sent a letter to the Secretary General 
accepting the possibility of a truce be- 
tween Angola and South Africa. 

December 20, 1983. The United 

States abstained on UN Security Coun- 
cil Resolution 545 condemning South 
Africa's continued occupation of parts 
of southern Angola which "endangered 
international peace and security" 
and demanding its immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal. On Janu- 
ary 6, 1984, the United States ab- 
stained on a similar resolution 
repeating the condemnation. 

February 16, 1984. A U.S. delega- 
tion headed by Assistant Secretary 
Crocker met with delegations from 



Angola and South Africa in Lusaka, 
Zambia, where the three delegations 
reached agreement on the disengage- 
ment of Angolan and South African 
forces in southern Angola (the Lusaka 
accord). At the request of South Africa 
and Angola, it was agreed that a small 
number of U.S. representatives would 
participate in the activities of the joint 
South African/Angolan commission es- 
tablished to monitor the disengagement 
process. 

October 31-November 1, 1984. 

Assistant Secretary Crocker met with 
Foreign Minister Botha in Cape Verde 
to discuss Namibian independence and 
disengagement in southern Angola. At 
the request of the Angolan Govern- 
ment, Assistant Secretary Crocker 
transmitted an Angolan proposal con- 
taining specific suggestions for the 
withdrawal of South African troops 
from Angola, implementation of Resolu- 
tion 435, a cease-fire between South 
Africa and SWAPO, withdrawal of 
Cuban troops once implementation was 
in progress, and an international agree- 
ment guaranteeing Namibia's inde- 
pendence and Angola's security and 
territorial integrity. Angola submitted 
this proposal to the United Nations on 
November 17. Crocker later called this 
"an important step forward" because 
Angola had accepted the principle that 
Namibian independence could only take 
place in the context of the withdrawal 
of Cuban troops from Angola. 

March 18 and 21, 1985. Assistant 
Secretary Crocker presented to the An- 
golan and South African Governments a 
new U.S. compromise proposal for a 
Namibian settlement which included 
provisions drawn from the positions of 
both sides. On April 18, however, the 
South African Government announced 
its intention to unilaterally establish an 
interim administration in Namibia. The 
U.S. Government stated that it would 
not recognize the transfer of power to 
any such government. 

May 21-29, 1985. Following An- 
golan interception of a South African 
commando team about to sabotage an 
oil installation partially owned by Gulf 
Oil Corporation, South Africa admitted 
that it had mounted "covert military 
reconnaissance forays" into northern 
Angola but denied giving orders to 
commit sabotage. The Department of 
State spokesman indicated that the 
United States took the "strongest ex- 
ception" to the presence of South Af- 
rican armed units inside Angola and 



apartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



19 



AFRICA 



was "deeply concerned" about the 
safety of U.S. citizens and property 
overseas. 

June 14, 1985. The United States 
recalled Ambassador Herman Nickel to 
protest South Africa's June 14 attack on 
Botswana and its attempted sabotage 
of Angola's oil facilities in Cabinda on 
May 21. 

June 20, 1985. The United States 
voted for UN Security Council Resolu- 
tion 567 condemning South Africa's re- 
cent aggression against Angola and its 
use of Namibia as a springboard for its 
attacks and demanding its uncondi- 
tional withdrawal from Angolan 
territory. 

July 10, 1985. The House of Repre- 
sentatives voted 236 to 185 to repeal 
the 1976 Clark amendment. The Senate 
had voted 63 to 34 to repeal the ban on 
June 11. On August 8, President Rea- 
gan signed the repeal into law as Sec- 
tion 811 of the International Security 
and Development Cooperation Act of 
1985. 

July 13, 1985. The Angolan Gov- 
ernment announced that it was sus- 
pending all diplomatic contacts with the 
United States in protest against the 
congressional vote repealing the Clark 
amendment. The Department of State 
said that the United States had no 
plans to aid the UNITA rebels or to 
relax its diplomatic efforts concerning 
Angola. 

September 20, 1985. The United 
States voted for UN Security Council 
Resolution 571 condemning South Af- 
rica's September 16 incursion into An- 
golan territory and announcing the 
appointment of a UN Commission of In- 
quiry to investigate the damage in An- 
gola resulting from this invasion. It 
abstained, however, on paragraph 5 
which called on member states to 
strengthen the defense capabilities of 
the front-line states. On October 7, the 
United States voted for a similar reso- 
lution which repeated the 
condemnation. 

November 22, 1985. President 
Reagan said in an interview that he 
favored covert aid to UNITA in prefer- 
ence to the overt economic and military 
assistance being advocated by some 
Members of Congress. 



November 27-28, 1985. A U.S. 
delegation headed by Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker met with Angolan repre- 
sentatives in Lusaka, Zambia, to 
discuss a regional settlement between 
South Africa and Angola leading to the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from An- 
gola and implementation of UN Se- 
curity Council Resolution 435. 

December 6, 1985. The UN Se- 
curity Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 577 strongly condemning 
South Africa for its aggression against 
Angola. In a separate paragraph, on 
which the United States abstained, UN 
member states were requested to ex- 
tend all necessary assistance to Angola 
"to strengthen its defense capacity." 

January 8-9, 1986. A U.S. delega- 
tion, headed by Assistant Secretary 
Crocker, met with President Dos San- 
tos and senior officials in Luanda for 
further negotiations on implementing 
Resolution 435. On January 12-14, 
Assistant Secretary Crocker met with 
senior officials in South Africa to dis- 
cuss a regional settlement. 

January 30, 1986. UNITA leader 
Savimbi, who was on a private visit to 
Washington January 29-February 6, 
met with President Reagan at the 
White House. Afterward, an Admin- 
istration official said that Savimbi told 
the President his goal was "a peaceful 
national reconciliation in Angola." 

February 13, 1986. The United 
States and the United Kingdom ab- 
stained on UN Security Council Resolu- 
tion 581 condemning South Africa for 
threatening aggression against the 
front-line states and asking UN mem- 
bers to "expand urgently all forms of 
assistance" to those states. 

February 18, 1986. Assistant Sec- 
retary Crocker told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that the decision 
had been made to provide covert mili- 
tary aid to UNITA in order to prevent 
the Angolan Government from achiev- 
ing a "military solution." Crocker 
stressed, however, that the United 
States remained committed to a diplo- 
matic solution to the Angolan conflict. 
The Angolan Government subsequently 
stated that the U.S. decision amounted 
to "a declaration of war. " 

March 4, 1986. The South African 
Government announced that it would 
implement the UN plan for the inde- 



pendence of Namibia (Resolution 435) 
beginning on August 1, 1986, but made 
it clear that implementation depended 
upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. The U.S. Government 
welcomed the announcement as "a sig- 
nificant and positive step." On March 8, 
the Angolan Government rejected the 
South African proposal. 

March 6, 1986. Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker met in Geneva with 
Vladilen M. Vasev, the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry official in charge of southern 
African affairs, to discuss a settlement 
of the regional problems in southern 
Africa. 

March 13-14, 1986. Foreign Minis- 
ter Botha met with U.S. Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs Frank Wisner in Cape Town to 
discuss a regional settlement. 

March 18, 1986. Angolan Presi- 
dent Dos Santos sent a letter to Secre- 
tary General Perez de Cuellar urging 
him to take full responsibility for nego- 
tiations regarding Namibian independ 
ence and peace in southern Africa. Dos 
Santos wrote that the "deliberate and 
systematic support" of the United 
States for South Africa and its increas- 
ing military support for UNITA had 
"jeopardized its credibility as a 
mediator." 



March 25, 1986. Department of 
State spokesman Charles Redman said 
that "American companies operating ir 
Angola should be fully aware of the ris 
they run" and that the U.S. Govern- 
ment had asked these companies to 
consider U.S. interests, as well as thei 
own, in making business decisions re- 
lating to Angola. He said that U.S. ec< 1 
nomic policy toward Angola was "to 
deny, pending an achievement of a ne- 
gotiated settlement, all U.S. exports t 
Angola with a military use and to not 
support... Angola's ability to earn for- 
eign currency and thus fund its war 
against UNITA." 



II 






1 

June 18, 1986. The United States 
and the United Kingdom vetoed a UN ?j 
Security Council resolution which con 
demned South African aggression 
against Angola, called for mandatory 
economic sanctions against South Af- 
rica, and asked UN members to pro- 
vide military assistance to the Angola) 
Government. 



It! 

v 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/February 19f > (1 , 



v 
- 



AFRICA 



August 11, 1986. A South African 
brce crossed the Namibian border and 
ttacked a Soviet-supported air base 
50 miles inside Angola. The State De- 
>artment declared that the United 
tates could not condone any South Af- 
rican raid into Angola. 

August 18, 1986. President Dos 
antos declared that he would welcome 

meeting with President Reagan, in- 
ited him to Angola, and expressed the 
vish that the two countries might es- 
ablish diplomatic relations. On Sep- 
iember 17, Angolan Foreign Minister 
Lfonso Van Dunem called for a top- 

vel meeting between U.S. and An- 
olan officials as a prelude to the estab- 
shment of diplomatic ties. 

September 17, 1986. By a vote of 
29 to 186, the House of Represen- 
atives rejected an amendment to the 
Y 1987 intelligence authorization bill 
nat would have barred any further cov- 
rt aid to UNITA unless it was first 
ublicly debated and approved by both 
houses of Congress. 

April 7, 1987. After Assistant Sec- 
tary Crocker met with an Angolan 
^legation in Brazzaville, Congo, the 
vo sides agreed to resume the U.S.- 
ngolan negotiations aimed at reaching 
regional settlement of the Angola- 
amibia conflict which had been broken 
f by Angola in protest against the 
Sbruary 1986 U.S. decision to send aid 
UNITA. 

July 14-15, 1987. Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker met with Angolan officials 
l Luanda to discuss a timetable for the 
rithdrawal of Cuban troops from An- 
ola and independence for Namibia, 
fter returning to Washington, how- 
ler, he said that the talks had been 
waste of time." 

September 7-8, 1987. Assistant 
ecretary Crocker visited Luanda for 
Iks regarding Angola's August 5 pro- 
•osal for accelerated implementation of 
N Security Council Resolution 435 on 
amibia and the establishment of last- 
ig peace in southern Africa. The De- 
irtment of State said Assistant 
ecretary Crocker hoped to "clarify 
?rtain ambiguities" in the proposal 
jgarding the withdrawal of Cuban 
oops. 

October 30, 1987. The United 
tates abstained on a draft Security 
ouncil resolution calling for rapid im- 



plementation of Resolution 435. U.S. 
representative Herbert Okun indicated 
that implementation could not be 
achieved without addressing the se- 
curity concerns of both Angola and 
South Africa. South Africa said that 
the only remaining obstacle to imple- 
mentation was the presence of Soviet 
and Cuban military personnel in 
Angola. 

November 12, 1987. South Africa 
admitted that its troops had recently 
intervened in southern Angola to assist 
UNITA and clashed with Soviet and 
Cuban forces. Defense Minister Gen. 
Magnus Malan said that if South Africa 
had not intervened, UNITA would have 
been defeated, leading to eventual com- 
munist domination of southern Africa. 
UNITA leader Savimbi later said that 
U.S. -supplied weaponry had been de- 
cisive in warding off the offensive. 

November 25, 1987. The UN Se- 
curity Council adopted a resolution con- 
demning South Africa's aggression in 
southern Angola. U.S. Ambassador 
Vernon Walters stated that the United 
States had voted for the resolution but 
declared that this did not address many 
important issues. He said that the fates 
of Namibia and Angola were "inextri- 
cably linked" and that the U.S. Govern- 
ment was seeking a settlement 
removing all foreign forces from the 
region. 

December 23, 1987. The UN Se- 
curity Council adopted a resolution con- 
demning South Africa for its delay in 
pulling out of Angola. Foreign Minister 
Botha rejected the UN demand for a 
complete withdrawal, although he de- 
clared that a gradual South Africa De- 
fense Force pullback was underway. 

January 28-29, 1988. A new round 
of negotiations between a U.S. delega- 
tion headed by Assistant Secretary 
Crocker and Angolan representatives 
took place in Luanda. On February 1, 
the Department of State announced 
that Angola and Cuba had jointly 
agreed to a total withdrawal of Cuban 
troops in Angola as part of a still- 
unresolved overall southern Africa 
peace settlement. 

March 6, 1988. Defense Minister 
Malan announced that South Africa was 
willing to make a direct deal with the 
Soviet Union to withdraw from Angola 
if the Soviet Government committed it- 
self to a neutral government in that 



country. On March 10, the Soviet For- 
eign Ministry rejected Malan 's offer. 

March 14, 1988. Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker met with Foreign Minister 
Botha in Geneva to discuss Angola. The 
meeting came a day after Angola an- 
nounced that it had presented the 
United States with a specific timetable 
for the total withdrawal of Cuban 
troops, if both the United States and 
South Africa ended their support of 
UNITA. After the meeting, Botha com- 
plained that the Angolan plan lacked 
specific "numbers, figures, and time 
schedules." 

May 3-4, 1988. The first round of 
quadripartite talks on the Angola- 
Namibia conflict was held among the 
United States, South Africa, Angola, 
and Cuba in London. On May 13, fol- 
lowup talks between South Africa and 
Angola took place in Brazzaville, 
Congo. 

June 1, 1988. During the Moscow 
summit, the United States and the So- 
viet Union announced their support for 
a September 29, 1988, target date for 
reaching agreement on the withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from Angola and 
the independence of Namibia. 

July 20, 1988. South Africa, An- 
gola, and Cuba announced ratification 
of an agreement on principles, which 
called for "the staged and total with- 
drawal of Cuban troops" from Angola 
and stated that Resolution 435 was 
"indispensable to a comprehensive set- 
tlement." The agreement evolved dur- 
ing a series of quadripartite talks, 
beginning in London May 3-4 and con- 
tinuing in Cairo June 24-25 and in New 
York July 11-13. Assistant Secretary 
Crocker, who had served as a mediator, 
called the agreement "a set of guide- 
lines" but warned that "hard bargain- 
ing" lay ahead. 

August 2-5, 1988. A new round of 
Namibia-Angola peace talks chaired by 
Assistant Secretary Crocker took place 
in Geneva. 

August 8, 1988. The parties to the 
Geneva talks issued a joint communique 
announcing an immediate cease-fire and 
stating that they had agreed to recom- 
mend to the United Nations implemen- 
tation of Resolution 435 beginning on 
November 1, with Namibian elections 
to be held 7 months later. South Africa 



21 



AFRICA 



would begin to withdraw its troops 
from southern Angola on August 10 and 
complete withdrawal by September 1. 
Angola and Cuba agreed to subscribe 
to an accord including a timetable for 
"the staged and total withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola" to be nego- 
tiated by September 1. 

August 9, 1988. Assistant Secre- 
tary Crocker said that "the cooperation 
of the Soviet Union" had been an 
important factor in making the Geneva 
agreement possible and that Soviet offi- 
cials had met with U.S. representatives 
before and after the negotiating ses- 
sions. He also said that two unresolved 
questions could still hamper and post- 
pone a final settlement: the schedule 
for withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
Angola and the refusal of the Angolan 
Government to talk to UNITA. In addi- 
tion, Crocker declared that the United 
States would not end weapons ship- 
ments to UNITA until the Soviet Union 
ended its deliveries of military supplies 
to the Angolan Government, comment- 
ing that "we are not going to uni- 
laterally disengage." 

August 11, 1988. The Soviet Union 
urged the Angolan Government to 
"start a dialogue" with UNITA and 
warned that in the absence of such ne- 
gotiations, the quadripartite agreement 
reached in Geneva would be "placed in 
jeopardy." 

August 13, 1988. Following the 
House of Representatives' vote for a 
new sanctions bill ending all U.S. in- 
vestment and banning almost all trade 
with South Africa, Foreign Minister 
Botha warned that the new sanctions 
would present problems for implemen- 
tation of the Namibia-Angola peace 
plan. 

August 15-16, 1988. As a followup 
to the Geneva agreement, military ex- 
perts from Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa met at Ruacana on the Angola- 
Namibia border to establish a Joint Mil- 
itary Monitoring Commission (which 
would include Namibian represen- 
tatives) to guarantee the cessation of 
hostilities and to smooth the way for 
implementation of Resolution 435. 

August 24-26, 1988. During a fifth 
round of quadripartite talks in Braz- 
zaville, the United States worked with 
the parties to narrow differences on a 
timetable for total withdrawal of Cuban 



troops from Angola. Following the 
talks, President Dos Santos stated that 
he would not be pressured into a 
power-sharing agreement with UNITA. 

August 30, 1988. The final con- 
tingent of South African troops with- 
drew from southern Angola into 
Namibia — 2 days before the Septem- 
ber 1 deadline set by the Geneva cease- 
fire agreement. South African officials 
announced that SWAPO had agreed to 
stay 120 miles north of the Namibian 
border and to begin observing a cease- 
fire. 

September 2, 1988. The Depart- 
ment of State said that Cuba had sent 
substantial amounts of military aid to 
Angola in recent weeks but denied re- 
ports that Cuba had recently increased 
its troop strength to 60,000. 

September 3, 1988. UNITA leader 
Savimbi told a press conference that he 
had decided to disassociate UNITA 
from the quadripartite peace talks and 
warned that those talks were bound 
to fail if they continued to exclude 
UNITA. He said that UNITA would 
not abandon the areas under its control 
along the Angolan-Namibian border. 
Savimbi stated that the U.S. Govern- 
ment and people fullv supported 
UNITA. 

September 7-8, 1988. Following 
the sixth round of quadripartite talks in 
Brazzaville, the four delegations issued 
a joint communique reconfirming their 
commitment to the November 1 target 
date for implementing Resolution 435. 
The communique noted that the agree- 
ments reached in Geneva in August 
had been implemented: South African 
forces had withdrawn from Angola be- 
fore the September 1 deadline and the 
Joint Military Monitoring Commission 
was functioning satisfactorily. It indi- 
cated that the Cuban and Angolan Gov- 
ernments would reach agreement on a 
timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola within the frame- 
work of the general negotiations. 

September 22-23, 1988. UN Secre- 
tary General Perez de Cuellar met in 
South Africa with high-ranking South 
African officials and Namibian political 
leaders to discuss remaining obstacles 
to Namibian independence — including 
the question of who would pay the esti- 
mated $700 million needed to put the 
independence plan into effect. After- 



ward, the Secretary General told a 
joint press conference that he had as- 
sured President Botha that the United 
Nations would act impartially once im- 
plementation of Resolution 435 began, j 
Botha said that he had approved plans 
to send a UN technical team to 
Namibia to prepare the way for the Uf 
Transitional Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) which was to oversee 
Namibia's transition to independence. 

September 24, 1988. Following 
talks with Secretary General Perez de 
Cuellar in Luanda, Angolan President 
Dos Santos said that he had reaffirmed 
the Angolan Government's willingness 
to offer its full cooperation with the 
UN mission in Namibia. 

SWAPO announced that it had re- 
jected a proposal by the Namibian 
provisional government calling for a 
national reconciliation conference of all 
Namibian parties in preparation for thi 
implementation of Resolution 435. 

September 26-29, 1988. The sev- 
enth round of quadripartite peace talks 
in Brazzaville adjourned without reach 
ing agreement on a timetable, but the 
negotiators expressed "their firm inter I 
tion to solve the remaining problems 
after consultation with their respective I 
governments." They also reaffirmed 
their earlier commitment to the 
November 1 target date for implement | 
ing Resolution 435. 

October 6, 1988. Angolan Presi- | 
dent Dos Santos said that his govern- 
ment was prepared to talk to UNITA 
once agreement on such issues as the 
presence of South African troops and 
Namibian independence was reached 
and that he would "not exclude" grant 
ing cabinet posts in a government of 
reconciliation to UNITA members — 
with the exception of Dr. Savimbi, 
whom he described as "a special case.' | 

October 7-9, 1988. Assistant Sec 
retary Crocker presided over informal 
talks among high-ranking Angolan, 
Cuban, and South African officials at- 
tending the 43d UN General Assembl; 
U.S. officials said the purpose of thes( 
talks was to discuss new proposals 
aimed at settling differences regarding 
the timetable for Cuban troop with- 
drawal and implementation of Resolu- 
tion 435 before the next round of form 
negotiations in Brazzaville. 






22 



ANTARCTICA 



October 17, 1988. UNITA leader 
Savimbi told the press that he had "no 
intention" of moving his bases and sup- 
ply dumps into northern Angola and 
that he would "not give up the in- 
frastructure it has taken us 13 years to 
develop and move north to an uncertain 
future." Savimbi asserted that he was 
confident that UNITA could hold its 
own militarily against Angolan and 
9 Cuban forces but also said that there 
(was no question of asking South Africa 
Ifor assistance even if those forces broke 
Ithrough UNITA's lines. 

November 15, 1988. After a 5-day 
Iround of quadripartite peace talks 
Ichaired by Assistant Secretary Crocker 
lin Geneva, the South African, Angolan, 

and Cuban delegations announced that 
Ithey had reached agreement in princi- 
ple on a framework for the phased 
i withdrawal of Cuban troops from An- 
gola and U.N. -supervised elections in 
{Namibia which was to be submitted to 
J:heir governments for approval. If all 

ihree governments accepted the pro- 
I jpsal, Crocker was to arrange a final 
i, - ound of quadripartite talks in Brazza- 
ville to achieve and sign a formal agree- 
ment. U.S. officials said they expected 
Ithat an agreement would provide a ma- 
I or impetus to the beginning of talks 
netween the Angolan Government and 

Ijnita. 

November 18, 1988. The Cuban 
md Angolan Governments announced 
.hat they would accept the U.S. -medi- 
ated plan for the phased withdrawal of 
3uban troops from Angola reached in 
Geneva on November 15. 

November 19, 1988. UNITA leader 
Savimbi told a press conference that his 
orces had reached a tacit cease-fire 
igreement with Cuban forces in Angola 
md would not harass the departing 
]uban troops as they withdrew. Sa- 
'imbi also said that UNITA would con- 
tinue its civil war against Angolan 
Government troops until all the Cubans 
vere gone and national reconciliation 
vith the government had been 
ichieved. 

November 22, 1988. Saying that 
the hard nut that had to be cracked 
las been cracked," Foreign Minister 
(Jotha announced that the South Af- 
rican Government had advised the 



United States of its acceptance of the 
U.S. -mediated agreement in principle 
reached in Geneva on November 15. 
Botha warned, however, that verifica- 
tion and monitoring of the Cuban with- 
drawal would be crucial to the peace 
process and noted that the parties still 
had to work out verification pro- 
cedures. He also stressed that there 
could be no lasting peace in the region 
until there was national reconciliation 
inside Angola. Botha said, however, 
that UNITA leader Savimbi had told 
him that South African acceptance of 
the November 15 agreement would con- 
tribute to peace and stability in the re- 
gion so long as the Cuban withdrawal 
from Angola was properly monitored. 
Department of State spokesman Red- 
man welcomed the South African an- 
nouncement and said that officials from 
the four countries would meet soon in 
Brazzaville to work out the final details 
of what would be "a complex interlock- 
ing set" of agreements. 

December 1-3, 1988. The 10th 
round of quadripartite peace talks, 
which had been expected to conclude 
with the signing of a protocol outlining 
the terms of the agreement reached in 
Geneva on November 15, ended pre- 
maturely when the South African dele- 
gation abruptly left Brazzaville on 
December 3. Saying that his delegation 
needed to return to consult President 
Botha, Foreign Minister Botha declared 



that South Africa could not sign a docu- 
ment that was "not specific" regarding 
verification of Cuban troop withdrawal. 
He added, however, that he still ex- 
pected a protocol to be signed during 
December — once the last few issues 
were resolved. 

December 13, 1988. In Brazzaville, 
South Africa, Angola, and Cuba signed 
an agreement (the Brazzaville protocol) 
committing themselves to the phased 
withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from 
Angola over 27 months and the inde- 
pendence of Namibia by November 1, 
1989. The signatories agreed to recom- 
mend to the UN Secretary General 
that April 1, 1989, be established as the 
date for implementation of Resolution 
435 and to meet in New York on De- 
cember 22 for signature of a formal tri- 
partite treaty and a bilateral Angolan- 
Cuban agreement governing Cuban 
withdrawal. By that date, Angola and 
Cuba were to have reached agreement 
with the UN Secretary General on ver- 
ification of the withdrawal. The parties 
to the Brazzaville protocol also agreed 
to establish a joint commission (which 
would include U.S and Soviet observ- 
ers) to serve as a forum for discussion 
and resolution of issues regarding the 
interpretation and implementation of 
the tripartite agreement. 



Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Convention Signed 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 2, 1988' 

The United States signed the conven- 
tion on the regulation of Antarctic 
mineral resource activities on 
November 30. The convention was 
signed in Wellington, New Zealand, 
by the U.S. Ambassador to New Zea- 
land, Paul M. Cleveland. 

The agreement was concluded fol- 
lowing 6 years of negotiation among 
the parties to the Antarctic Treaty. It 
is an important environmental and re- 
source management treaty which es- 
tablishes the legal obligations and 
institutional mechanisms necessary 
for considering and regulating com- 
mercial mineral resource activities in 



the Antarctic, should interest in them 
emerge in the future. 

The convention is designed to 
protect the environment of Antarctica 
and create a stable and predictable 
framework for dealing with possible 
mineral resource activities there, in- 
cluding provision of security of invest- 
ment for any permitted activities. It 
represents an important contribution 
to the Antarctic Treaty system which 
has maintained Antarctica as a zone 
of peace, free of military activity and 
reserved for peaceful international co- 
operation, for the past three decades. 



'Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Phyllis 
Oakley. ■ 



lepartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



23 



ARMS CONTROL 



The signatories hailed the protocol 
as heralding a "new era" of peace in 
southern Africa. U.S. mediator, As- 
sistant Secretary Crocker, said that 
U.S. and Soviet cooperation during the 
negotiations leading to the agreement 
had been "a case study of superpower 
effort to support the resolution of re- 
gional conflicts." Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Anatoly Adamishin, who had 
attended a number of the talks, praised 
the "brilliant role" played by Crocker in 
mediating the agreement and recog- 
nized "the reasonable position adopted 
by South Africa." 

December 20, 1988. The UN Se- 
curity Council unanimously approved 
the creation of a 70-man unarmed 
peacekeeping force — the UN Angola 
Verification Mission (UNAVEM)— to 
monitor the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban 
troops from Angola. 

December 21, 1988. Saying that 
there could be "no military solution," 
Assistant Secretary Crocker said that 
the United States would continue its 
military aid to UNITA and reject full 
diplomatic relations with the Angolan 
Government until it made peace with 
its opponents. 

December 22, 1988. At a signing 
ceremony at the United Nations, pre- 
sided over by Secretary Shultz, repre- 
sentatives of Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa signed an accord providing for 
implementation of Resolution 435 on 
Namibian independence beginning on 
April 1, 1989, and for the withdrawal of 
all Cuban troops from Angola by July 1, 
1991. The three signatories also pledged 
to "respect the principle of non-inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of the 
states of southwestern Africa" and 
promised not to allow their territories 
to be used by "any state, organization, 
or person in connection with any acts of 
war, aggression, or violence" against 
other countries in the region. Angola 
and Cuba then signed a second accord 
providing a detailed timetable for the 
withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops 
in Angola. ■ 



Nuclear Testing Talks 
Conclude Round Three 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 15. 1988' 

The United States and the Soviet 
Union today concluded the third round 
of nuclear testing talks in Geneva. This 
round, which began on August 29, has 
been a successful one, highlighted by 
the completion of the joint verification 
experiment (JVE) and by significant 
progress toward the completion of ef- 
fective verification protocols for the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
(PNET) and the Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT). 

These talks are part of step-by-step 
negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on the subject of 
nuclear testing. The first priority of the 
talks is agreement on effective verifica- 
tion measures for two existing treaties, 
the PNET and TTBT. Neither treaty 
has been ratified because they were not 
verifiable in their original form. During 
this round, the delegations have sub- 
stantially finished work on the verifica- 
tion protocol for the PNET. They have 
also made progress on the verification 
protocol for the TTBT. 

Another noteworthy event during 
this round was the JVE. Under the 
terms of a U.S. -Soviet agreement nego- 
tiated in the previous round of the nu- 
clear testing talks and signed at the 
Moscow summit, underground nuclear 
explosions were conducted at the U.S. 
test site in Nevada in August and at 
the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk in 
September, with observers from both 
sides present. The purpose of the JVE 
was to allow each side to demonstrate 
its preferred verification method for the 
TTBT and PNET. The results of the 
test were discussed during this round. 
We believe the experiments demon- 
strated the effectiveness and non- 
intrusive nature of CORRTEX 
[continuous reflectometry for radius vs. 
time experiment], our preferred 
method of on-site measurement. 

Once the verification provisions for 
the PNET and TTBT are finalized, the 
treaties will be submitted to the Senate 
for advice and consent to ratification. 
Following ratification, the United 
States will immediately propose that 
we and the Soviet Union enter into 
negotiations on ways to implement a 
step-by-step parallel program — in asso- 
ciation with a program to reduce and 



ultimately eliminate all nuclear arms- 
of limiting and ultimately ending nu- 
clear testing. 

For the past four decades, a strong j 
nuclear deterrent has ensured the se- 
curity of the United States and our 
allies. As long as we must rely on 
nuclear weapons, we must continue to 
test to ensure their safety, security, 
reliability, effectiveness, and 
survivability. 

In this context, the United States 
seeks effective and verifiable agree- 
ments with the Soviet Union on nu- 
clear testing limitations that would 
strengthen security for all nations. The 
substantial progress which has been 
made in this round of the nuclear test- 
ing talks is a positive step which 
reflects the success of the Administra- 
tion's practical and measured approach 
to nuclear testing. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1988. 



First Anniversary 
of INF Treaty 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 8, 19881 

One year ago today, on December 8, 
1987, in the East Room of the White 
House, President Reagan and General 
Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed a 
historic document, the Treaty Betweei 
the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of Their Intermediate- 
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
commonly referred to as the INF 
Treaty. Under this agreement, for the 
first time in history, an entire class of 
U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles will b 
eliminated, based on the zero-option 
proposal first put forward by Presiden 
Reagan in 1981. This achievement is a 
direct consequence of the President's 
steadfast commitment to real arms re 
ductions that strengthen U.S. and al- 
lied security rather than merely 
limiting increases as in previous trea- 
ties. It is also the result of allied soli- 
darity in responding to the threat 
posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 
missiles. 



24 



EAST ASIA 



The INF Treaty provides for the 
{elimination of all U.S. and Soviet mis- 
siles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilo- 
neters (about 300-3,400 miles), along 
mth their launchers, support equip- 
nent, and support structures, by 
fune 1, 1991, 3 years after the treaty 
jntered into force. The treaty also bans 
ill production and flight testing of 
hese missiles immediately upon entry 
nto force. Once the missiles are elimi- 
lated, the treaty prohibits either party 
rom possessing any INF missiles, 
aunchers, support equipment, or sup- 
>ort structures. 

From the beginning of the INF ne- 
gations, President Reagan enipha- 
ized that it would be better to have no 
reaty rather than one that could not be 
ffectively verified. The INF Treaty 
ontains the most stringent verification 
•revisions in the history of arms con- 
rol, including extensive data ex- 
hanges, on-site inspections, resident 
ispectors at a key missile facility in 
ach country, and prohibitions on inter- 
jrence with national technical means of 
erification. 

The elimination of U.S. and Soviet 
NF missile systems is well under- 
lay — the Soviets have eliminated about 
33 missiles, while the United States 
as eliminated about 108, in the pres- 
nce of inspectors from the other side, 
ince eliminations began in August of 
ais year. In addition to monitoring the 
estruction of missiles, U.S. and Soviet 
ispectors have also conducted inspec- 
ons at 130 Soviet facilities and 31 U.S. 
NF facilities, and each side has estab- 
shed a continuous monitoring presence 
t a key missile facility in the other's 
}untry. 

The signing of the INF Treaty last 
lecember was a remarkable success for 
'.S. foreign policy and for the NATO 
Uiance as a whole, a success made pos- 
ble by allied unity and perseverance. 
fATO demonstrated that it has the po- 
tical will to make and stand by the 
>ugh decisions necessary to ensure its 
scurity. Our common objectives were 
thieved: the elimination of both longer 
ange and shorter range Soviet INF 
lissiles — limitations that are global in 
rder to prevent transfer of the INF 
ireat from one region to another, and 
greement that INF limits apply only 
d the forces of the United States and 
ne U.S.S.R. The treaty also affirmed 
le principle of asymmetrical reduc- 
ons to achieve equal U.S. and Soviet 
ivels, an important precedent for fu- 
are arms negotiations. 



Since the signing of the INF 
Treaty, the United States has continued 
its efforts to achieve a safer world, in- 
cluding through negotiations for deep, 
equitable, and verifiable reductions in 
strategic arsenals; a stable balance in 
conventional forces in Europe; an effec- 



tively verifiable global ban on chemical 
weapons; and effective and verifiable 
agreements on nuclear testing limita- 
tions. The signing of the INF Treaty 1 
year ago today was a good first step. 



■Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 12, 1988. 



U.S., China Celebrate 

Decade of Diplomatic Relations 



SECRETARY'S TOAST, 
DEC. 15, 1988 1 

On this chilly December night, it is 
warming to see gathered here so many 
of the eminent people whose labors 
helped to open the way to full relations 
between the United States and China a 
decade ago. This evening is a tribute to 
far-sighted policies pursued over two 
decades by leaders of the United States 
and the People's Republic of China. Our 
leaders understood that two great na- 
tions bordering on the Pacific could not 
remain in confrontation without grave 
consequences for the interests of their 
countries and peoples and for global 
security. 

The groundbreaking Shanghai com- 
munique of 1972 anticipated a time of 
"important changes and great up- 
heavals" in global affairs. We have now 
witnessed more than 16 years of pro- 
found changes in the international envi- 
ronment. The process of normalizing 
Sino-American relations helped to 
launch a worldwide trend of greater re- 
liance on political means to resolve seri- 
ous international differences. And 
today, from Afghanistan to Angola, we 
see a quickening of efforts to move 
away from force of arms toward the ne- 
gotiated settlement of disputes. Around 
the world, in country after country, we 
see nations decentralizing their econo- 
mies, opening up to international com- 
merce, and increasing the role of 
market forces. The reforms in China 
embarked upon 10 years ago under 
Deng Xiaoping's farsighted leadership 
have fostered a decade of impressive 
domestic growth and a remarkable ex- 
pansion of U.S. -China trade. Thus, in 
the economic sphere as well, China has 
been a pace-setter. 



Ten years ago, in the Joint Commu- 
nique on the Establishment of Diplo- 
matic Relations [Between the United 
States of America and the People's Re- 
public of China], our leaders asserted 
that "normalization of [Sino-American] 
relations is not only in the interest of 
the Chinese and American peoples but 
also contributes to the cause of peace in 
Asia and the world." Tonight we can 
truly say that these words were more 
than diplomatic politesse, more than 
hopes beyond realization. Their promise 
has been confirmed by practical 
achievements. 

The Reagan Administration — build- 
ing on the efforts of the three Admin- 
istrations preceding it — has attached 
high priority to strengthening friendly 
and productive relations with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. Under Presi- 
dent Reagan, we have vastly expanded 
the scope of cooperation between our 
nations and peoples. 

Ten years ago, cultural and eco- 
nomic exchanges were a fraction of 
what they are today. Trade has ex- 
panded tenfold. U.S. -China joint ven- 
tures have proliferated. Where once 
there were no Chinese scholars and re- 
searchers studying in the United 
States, now there are over 30,000. We 
have broadened defense collaboration to 
the benefit of our mutual security. We 
are now developing exciting prospects 
for cooperation in space — as by working 
together to launch U.S. -made satellites 
on Chinese rockets. And we are open- 
ing wider the door to people-to-people 
communication with the planned dis- 
patch to China of Peace Corps volun- 
teers. Thus the fabric of Sino-American 
relations in the 1980s has become ever 
more richly and closely woven. 



25 



EAST ASIA 



During my tenure as Secretary of 
State, I traveled to China four times. 
On each visit, I deepened my apprecia- 
tion of the potential contribution our 
bilateral ties can make to enhancing 
global peace and stability, even when 
we find it necessary to address frankly 
remaining areas of difference. Our con- 
tinuing dialogue, and the improved mu- 
tual understanding that has resulted 
from these regular exchanges, has 
helped us make progress toward restor- 
ing peace in troubled areas such as 
Afghanistan and Cambodia. 

I am heartened as I contemplate 
the future of Sino-American ties. Our 
relationship has a solid foundation in 
the three joint communiques. Ambas- 
sador Han, I know you were present 
when the Shanghai communique was is- 
sued in 1972. In that historic document, 
the U.S. side acknowledged that all 
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan 
Strait maintain there is but one China 
and that Taiwan is part of China. Our 
policy will remain firmly based on the 
principle that there is but one China, 
just as we will continue to reaffirm our 
interest in a peaceful settlement of the 
Taiwan question by the Chinese 
themselves. 

We attach particular significance to 
the joint communique of August 17, 
1982 — concluded during this Admin- 
istration — in which both sides re- 
affirmed the fundamental principles 
that have guided our relations. As 
President Reagan stated when the com- 
munique was issued, we value this doc- 
ument as it will promote the further 
development of friendly relations be- 
tween the governments and peoples of 
the United States and China and con- 
tribute to the further reduction of ten- 
sion in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
United States takes seriously its com- 
mitments in this communique, which 
has played a positive role in strengthen- 
ing stability in East Asia. 

Over the 21 months since I spoke in 
Shanghai to mark the 15th anniversary 
of the Shanghai communique, we have 
seen a blossoming of private contacts, 
travel, and indirect economic relations 
across the Taiwan Strait. Let there be 
no mistake about the U.S. attitude to- 
ward these developments. We welcome 
them as consistent with our interest in 
relaxing tensions and improving mutual 
understanding. As I made clear in 
Shanghai, our steadfast policy seeks to 
foster an environment in which this 
peaceful process can continue to evolve, 
free of outside interference. 



26 



The Chinese and American peoples 
are both hard working and practical. 
Our two governments have done much 
to reflect these traits in the way we 
have worked to resolve differences and 
expand cooperation. This is a valuable 
legacy that will guide the future lead- 
ers of our two countries as they seek to 
meet the challenges of the future. I 
have no doubt that President-elect 
Bush, who knows China well from his 
service in the 1970s as Chief of the 
U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, will find 
new ways to advance our relationship. 

In the years ahead, we see many 
opportunities for the United States and 
China to work together for peace, to 
ensure that regional conflicts do not 
dangerously escalate, and to foster the 
expansion of the global trading system. 

• Unresolved disputes on the 
Korean Peninsula, in Indochina, and in 
the Middle East require our consulta- 
tion and cooperation to promote the po- 
litical resolution of dangerous threats to 
stability. 

• China and the United States, 
joining together with all nations, must 
address the challenge posed by the pro- 
liferation of advanced weaponry — espe- 
cially chemical and biological agents 
and high-tech delivery systems. 

• On the trade front, China and the 
United States must strive to keep the 
international trading system as open as 
possible, in order to ensure our growth 
and competitiveness in the years ahead. 



One of the satisfactions I will take 
with me from my 6 years as Secretary 
of State will be the knowledge that, 
through our mutual efforts, relations 
between the United States and China 
have strengthened and matured. My ir 
terest in further consolidating the 
friendly ties between our two great 
peoples, and in following the accom- 
plishments of old friends such as Am- 
bassador Han who have helped to 
advance this historic process of nor- 
malization, will remain strong. 

In closing, let me convey to you, 
Mr. Ambassador, and to China's lead- 
ers, the warm personal greetings of 
President Reagan and the good wishes 
of the American people. In that spirit 
I now ask all present here to join me i 
a toast: To the health of Chairman 
Deng Xiaoping, President Yang Shang 
kun, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, 
and Premier Li Peng; to the health of 
old friends Vice Premier Wu Xueqian 
and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen; to 
the bright future ahead for friendship 
and cooperation between our two coun 
tries; and to all those friends gathered 
here today who have worked so hard t 
make our relationship normal, const ru 
tive, and enduring. Ganbeil 



'Toast at a dinner Secretary Shultz 
hosted for China's Ambassador to the 
United States Han Xu (press release 258 
Dec. 20, 1988). ■ 



U.S., China Initial Agreement 
on Communications Satellites 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 19, 1988' 

The United States and the People's Re- 
public of China (P.R.C.) initialed an 
agreement Saturday, December 17, on 
international trade in commercial 
launch services. The agreement was ne- 
gotiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. This is the last of three 
agreements required by an Administra- 
tion decision taken September 9 on the 
issuance of export licenses for the Chi- 
nese launch of three U.S. -made commu- 
nications satellites under China's 
contracts with AUSSAT and AsiaSat. 

Also on Saturday, the United 
States and China signed two earlier 
agreements — on technology safeguards 
and on Chinese indemnification for po- 



tential U.S. Government liability — 
which had been initialed October 21 in 
Beijing. 

Under the latest agreement, the 
P.R.C. undertook to adhere to market 
economy practices regarding govern- 
ment support, pricing, insurance, and 
the avoidance of government induce- 
ments. The P.R.C. also agreed to 
launch no more than nine communica- 
tions satellites for international custor 
ers during the next 6 years and to 
distribute launch commitments propor 
tionately during the agreement. 

The United States and China botl 
agreed to consult annually and exchani 
information regarding obligations in th 
agreement and developments in the in 
ternational market for commercial 
launch services. 



ECONOMICS 



The trade agreement will enter 
to force as soon as the United States 
sues a satellite export license for 
hina. It expires on December 31, 1994, 
nless extended or superseded by a 
[Unilateral agreement. 

We are not yet in a position to is- 
le the export licenses for the three 

S.-made communications satellites 
>vered by the AsiaSat and AUSSAT 
mtracts, although reaching agreement 

the last of the three areas was 
early a major step. We must still 
view and formally approve the 
■ade agreement. We also must await 
OCOM [Coordinating Committee for 
unilateral Export Controls] approval 

the satellite exports. 

We obviously are very pleased with 
wing reached agreement with China 

the last area required for issuing 
>ese licenses. This agreement, along 
ith the other two already signed, en- 
ires that U.S. national security inter- 
ns will be fully safeguarded. At the 
.me time, the agreement allows the 
linese to enter the international com- 
ercial launch market in accordance 
ith market principles and in a way 
iat will not materially impair the 
looth and effective functioning of that 
arket. 

Because of the need to protect our 
tional security interests, U.S. policy 
th respect to Chinese launches of sat- 
tites embodying U.S. or Western 
ehnology remains one of case-by-case 
view. 



Secretary Meets With EC Ministers 



■Made available to news correspond- 
ts by Department deputy spokesman 
lyllis Oakley. ■ 



Secretary Shultz attended the min- 
isterial meeting of the European Com- 
munities (EC) Commission in Brussels 
on December 9, 1988. Following is the 
joint news conference he had with EC 
Commission President Jacques Delors 
at the conclusion of that meeting. 1 

President Delors. I open this press 
conference following on the ministerial 
meeting between the United States and 
the European Economic Community. I 
would like to welcome you all. In par- 
ticular I'd like to welcome Secretary of 
State, Mr. Shultz, and his team, and I 
give you the floor immediately, Mr. Sec- 
retary of State. 

Secretary Shultz. It's been a priv- 
ilege once again for me to meet with 
my friend Jacques Delors. I think this 
is the seventh time that I've come here 
to the commission, and I'd like to make 
a couple of remarks about the event 
and the particulars. 

First of all, I think there is a cer- 
tain symbolism, that has real meaning, 
to the fact, at this time of the year, 
there is a meeting in NATO and then 
there is a meeting with the European 
[Communities] Commission. It is as 
though there are two sides to the same 
coin. We think about our relationship in 
terms of the security of our freedom, 
and we know it depends on our defense 
capabilities on the one hand and has 
strong relationships to our prosperity 
and general well-being on the other. 
This meeting symbolizes that fact. 

Second, I just again call attention 
to the importance of this relationship. I 
do so recognizing there are lots of is- 
sues and we fight about them and ar- 
gue about them and bargain about 
them and so on all year long. But in the 
broad perspective of it, I want to just 
once again call your attention to the 
trade figures, the investment figures. 

Back in 1985 the trade was huge — 
it was $121 billion, two-way trade — but 
in 1986 it was even larger — $130 bil- 
lion—and in 1987, larger still— $145 bil- 
lion. Our estimate is in 1988 it will be 
$166 billion, two-way trade. That is a 
huge relationship. 

When it comes to investment, in 
the next to most recent year we have, 
it was $225 billion, and in the most 
recent year, even larger, $280 billion — a 
little bit more EC investment in the 
United States than the other way 
around but very substantial and reason- 
ably equal in both cases. 



This is a tremendous relationship of 
great importance to both the United 
States and Europe. I think it's interest- 
ing to place these two meetings back- 
to-back from what they suggest about 
the interplay of security and prosperity. 

Finally, I'd like to say a word of 
esteem for Mr. Jacques Delors, whom I 
think I first had contact with when you 
were Finance Minister. Both of us are 
graduates of that occupation. It's a good 
training ground, and you can't help but 
return to it all the time. I think he has 
given brilliant leadership here at the 
commission, and it has been a great 
pleasure for me to associate with you 
and to have these chances to meet and 
talk with you and your colleagues. 

President Delors. I'm sure you will 
remember that in December 1987, after 
the European Council in Copenhagen, 
the heads of state and government, 
since they were unable to reach an 
agreement, declared to you — the jour- 
nalists, that is — that the European 
Council had not ended and that it would 
continue in Brussels in February 1988. 
And there the 12 did reach an 
agreement. 

I see a certain analogy with what 
has happened in Montreal, where the 
nations participating in the mid-term 
review have said that the mid-term re- 
view has not ended. It will continue 
until the end of April with the mission 
of Mr. Duncan. Therefore, since the 
mid-term review is continuing, I have 
no intention of answering any questions 
at all on that subject, and I fix a ren- 
dezvous with you in May to talk about 
this. 

As for the rest, I'd like to say that 
we have followed our well-established 
rules and held an exchange of views on 
the world economic and financial situa- 
tion, on progress achieved, and the rea- 
sons for optimism. And, as far as that 
is concerned, we have quite a different 
situation from last year. We also talked 
about the problems of indebtedness, 
the different situations in the United 
States and in the European Commu- 
nity. Now this is not purely academic. 
It is, in fact, something that helps bet- 
ter understanding between us and is 
also something that is essential to our 
work, which is why I hope that these 
annual meetings will continue. 

As I said at our working session, 
I'd like to say the style and success of 
this meeting owe a lot to George 
Shultz. We're sorry to see him leaving 



27 



ECONOMICS 



his post, although of course we have to 
say, "The king is dead, long live the 
king," as one usually says. But, none- 
theless, we do wish him the greatest 
success in his future activities, and I'm 
sure for my part he will continue to 
play an important role in the great de- 
bates of the American democracy on 
political matters and international 
affairs. 

Q. You just pointed out about the 
flourishing state of the two-way trade 
between the EEC and the United 
States — an estimated amount in 1988 
of $166 billion dollars. Now there 
seems to be a little difficulty between 
the two parts with regard to what is 
being called the "war of the hor- 
mones," which is — as you are well 
aware — a conflict, a trade conflict, 
regarding about $150 million, which is 
one-thousandth of the total amount. 

Do you think that, in view of the 
relative size of the matter, a compro- 
mise solution really cannot be 
reached? And secondly, is it at all 
possible that the United States cannot 
accept the European view that this is 
a matter not of trade but of health, 
the same as the Europeans accepted 
when the United States introduced 
limits on car pollution? 

Secretary Shultz. I think you're 
right. The volume is not that large pro- 
portionately, but it's large to the people 
involved, and obviously we want to 
work out an acceptable solution if we 
can. It hasn't been possible to do it. If 
you set up a standard that is strictly 
health, then I think that what the 
United States wants to send is very 
acceptable. There is no health problem 
involved, as we see it, so that standard 
looks very good to us. But, of course, I 
have to acknowledge that others have a 
different view of the matter. 

Q. Don't you think that in view 
of the size of the disagreement, a so- 
lution cannot be found? 

Secretary Shultz. Disagreements 
have to be struggled at in their own 
terms. Of course, people put them in 
their perspective, but there is a differ- 
ence, and we think that we are right. If 
you watch over a period of time, I'll bet 
you'll find a lot of what seems to be 
objectionable being used in Europe. We 
don't think there is a health problem in 
the way they're used in the United 
States. 



Q. I think that in the bilateral 
meeting you talked a lot about the 
development of East-West rela- 
tionships. Could you say something 
about that? 

Secretary Shultz. The fact that we 
have an interest in exchanging views on 
East- West relations is once again a way 
of underscoring the relationship be- 
tween security and economic matters. I 
gave a little report on our view of these 
relationships and particularly the re- 
cent events. 

Today, as in the past, we've had 
some discussion, and the President 
gave his view and, to a certain extent, 
the management of economic rela- 
tionships — not only with the Soviet 
Union but with the countries of East- 
ern Europe — is something where you 
see this interplay very clearly. We de- 
liberately tried to exchange views and 
appraisals and what each is going to do. 
I think it's a very worthwhile exercise. 
It's the way you coordinate your policy. 

Q. This is a question on a subject 
where the United States and EC have 
not always been on the sides of the 
same coin: the Middle East. You said 
this morning you were surprised by 
the Israeli raid on the pro-Syrian Pal- 
estinians in Beirut. Don't you feel 
that refusing Arafat as a person to 
whom to talk, you, in a way, encour- 
age the Israelis to find another per- 
son to talk with arms, a small group 
of extremists? 

Secretary Shultz. No, I don't. I 
don't think there is any relationship at 
all between those two matters. Of 
course, we are working hard always to 
find ways to talk to Palestinians. As far 
as the efforts toward Middle East peace 
are concerned, they must include Pal- 
estinians all the way through. I have 
talked to many Palestinians and sought 
such meetings. We do have a very sim- 
ple set of requirements, views about 
what we think the PLO [Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization] should step up to, 
after which we are prepared for a sub- 
stantive dialogue with the PLO as such, 
as the representative of the Palestin- 
ians. What we have in mind is very well 
known to the PLO, and I hope they will 
see their way clear to doing that. But, 
so far as I know, they haven't. 

Q. Notwithstanding Mr. Delors' 
reticence on this point and knowing 
you have never refused to answer any 
question in 6V2 years, can I ask you to 
tell us whether the Montreal break- 



down in your view is a mere technical 
hitch — a hiccup — in the process that 
will, in a few months, result in agree 
ment, or whether it has got a more 
serious content? Secondly, if I might 
ask to Mr. Delors: Did you speak to 
Mr. Shultz about the kind of concerns 
over U.S. conduct of its dollar policy 
which you expressed so eloquently to 
the European Parliament last year? 

Secretary Shultz. I think Presi- 
dent Delors described the situation 
very well in pointing out this effort in 
Montreal has made progress in some 
respects. I think in something like 11 of 
the 15 issues that were under review, 
there has been a satisfactory outcome. 
There will be continued effort on the 
others; the problem of agriculture is a 
deep and important and difficult 
problem. 

I might say, in the history of these 
trade negotiations — and I participated 
in them, I led the U.S. delegation to 
Tokyo at the start of the Tokyo Round 
and have worked on these quite a lot — 
this idea of a mid-term review, I think, 
is something unique. It is an effort to 
push things along. I think it has proba- 
bly succeeded in doing that. Yet there 
are some great problems. There is no 
doubt about that, and they will need a 
lot of work. 

President Delors. My eloquence 
has not diminished after a year. A year 
ago, just after the stock market crash, 
I had feared that the dollar would con- 
tinue to decline, and it did not. I had 
occasion to speak to the heads of states 
and governments in Rhodes and to an- 
swer an ironic question put by one or 
two heads of government, to the effect 
that the economists had made a mis- 
take after the stock crash. I explained 
quite serenely to them, as I did again 
today, that if the stock market crash 
had not had negative effects on the de- 
velopments in the world economy, that 
was essentially due to two reasons: 
first, that the stability of the dollar ha> 
been achieved thanks to fairly positive 
cooperation among the major industri- 
alized nations, and I even mentioned 
the active role played by the Federal 
Reserve Board. 

The second reason was that after 
the stock market crash, there had beei 
no repetition of the errors committed i 
1929. You remember that then, restric 
tions had been placed on monetary pos 
sibilities and on liquidity, and the 
financial markets had been prevented 
from carrying out their adjustment 
without trauma. This time the gover- 






28 



ECONOMICS 



nors of the central banks were wise 
enough to supply the market with 
enough liquidity so that this adaptation 
should take place. So you see, there 
has been full consistency between what 
I feared a year ago and what, very for- 
tunately, has not happened by today. 
This allowed me at the same time 
before the heads of states and govern- 
ments to defend the social group of 
economists as such, as a body. 

Q. With two questions just to ex- 
plore your thesis about the intertwin- 
ing between security and economics, 
and they are, basically: What is your 
view of the European Community's 
defense ambitions, both in the pro- 
curement and policy side? Do you, for 
instance, find it helpful or divisive if 
the Community were to stick to an 
earlier indication that it would extend 
its single market into defense pro- 
curement? Do you find it generally 
helpful or divisive in the alliance 
when European governments begin to 
talk not only generally about East- 
West issues but also about arms con- 
trol issues? 

Secretary Shultz. The question of 
exchange of defense goods and services 
imong members of the alliance is of 
critical importance. It's critical that it 
De unimpeded so that, in the interest of 
lefending our freedom, we make the 
Dest possible use of our resources. 
Therefore, without in any way ques- 
ioning or having anything to say about 
;he competence of the European Com- 
nission, it is my view that there 
shouldn't be, for instance, duties placed 
m these matters that are going to our 
iommon defense. I find that when I put 
hat point, that there is not any dis- 
igreement with it. 

Now as far as discussions of arms 
control issues — or any other defense is- 
sues — by various people in Europe, of 
•oui'se they talk about them and we 
alk about them. Then we talk about 
hem together. We don't have any prob- 
ems with it. We don't want to see 
vithin the the alliance — which is an al- 
iance of 16 countries — a caucus of some 
I sort that makes it difficult to break into 
i he discussion. But that does not seem 
l.o be taking place. We are, for exam- 
hie, most recently working our way 
Through developing a common position 
|>n what we will propose on conven- 
tional armaments when that new nego- 
I iation starts. I think it's a very 
creative and strong position, and it's 
I lone with quite a lot of enthusiasm on 
I ill parts. 



President Delors. I wanted to say 
to you that the extension of the rules of 
the single market to cover defense 
goods and services must in no way un- 
dermine the two priority objectives 
that we have and which are: first, to 
ensure as best as possible the defense 
of the West in the context of the Atlan- 
tic alliance; and, secondly, to make it 
possible to bring about the best possi- 
ble financial allocation of resources. 

Q. European agricultural policy 
is in accordance with the rules of 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade]. My question: Will the 
Government of the United States go 
so far as to contest this principle? 

Secretary Shultz. We are in a 
broad examination in the Uruguay 
Round of agricultural policies and, I 
might say, this is responsive to the 
statements made by the heads of state 
and the European Commission in Tokyo 
where we met and discussed this. 
Again last year, at the Ottawa summit, 
we discussed this issue. I think there is 
a general recognition that the system of 
subsidies to agriculture has got itself 
structured wrong and is altogether too 
costly. The estimates are that the cost 
to the society — if you add up the Euro- 
pean Commission, the United States, 
and Japan, together — is well over $200 
billion a year. We have to do better 
than that. Furthermore, the way these 
systems work, it is a disservice to de- 
veloping countries. 

All of this is now, by common con- 
sent, under very intense review. That's 
what the negotiation is about. Exactly 
what the outcome will be is far from 
determined. There are big stakes in- 
volved — economic stakes and political 
stakes — and that's the reason why peo- 
ple are so intense about it. The need to 
do something that is drastic in order to 
correct this situation, I think, is gener- 
ally agreed to. But then you come down 
to cases, and it is not so easy. That's 
why it's such a problem. 

Q. This morning after the NATO 
conference, you said you were sur- 
prised by the Israeli moves into 
Lebanon, that you didn't have a lot of 
information. I wonder if you now 
have more information and if you 
could elaborate on your reaction. 

Secretary Shultz. I didn't have 
any real information. I don't have much 
more now, because I have been engaged 
in meetings pretty much continuously. 
So I don't have anything more to say on 
that subject than I did this morning. 



Q. I would like to come back on 
the GATT. You made an analogy with 
the council of Copenhagen, but the 
day after the Copenhagen council, of- 
ficials in the Community — yourself 
included — made certain comments or 
prognoses as to the possibility of an 
agreement being reached in February 
in Brussels. Could you at least tell us 
then whether in the next few weeks or 
months, what are your feelings? Are 
you optimistic or pessimistic with re- 
gard to something that has, in fact, 
concluded with a serious failure? 

President Delors. A serious 
failure — well, I leave it up to you to 
assess that. There were 15 subjects un- 
der discussion at the mid-term review, 
and it was possible to reach an agree- 
ment on 11 of them. And those agree- 
ments will be put on ice — in other 
words, they will only be implemented 
when we have an agreement on the four 
other subjects, including agriculture, 
textiles, intellectual property, and so 
on. We can't call that a failure. 

As far as agriculture is concerned, 
we all agree with the diagnosis. We 
have to stop engaging in a subsidy war. 
This is simply not a good thing for the 
world economy in general, nor is it 
good for the poorest countries which 
have to export small amounts of 
foodstuffs. It is not a good thing then, 
so we have to stop the subsidy war. 

What are the difficulties? Apart 
from the legitimate interests of the par- 
ties concerned, the difficulties, it seems 
to me, arise out of the fact that we 
don't have a single form of subsidy but 
various types of aid to agriculture. It is 
very difficult to compare them, to 
measure them with a single parameter. 
And the second difficulty is, of course, 
the diversity of agricultural structures, 
a difficulty that we encountered in the 
Community and one which we have 
overcome. I think that all this requires 
time. 

As I said before, quite apart from 
the interest of the different parties con- 
cerned, it is perfectly normal that 
everyone should defend his own inter- 
ests. But at the moment, what is at 
stake is really the prosperity of the 
world economy. From 1985 until 1990, 
we shall have reduced our subsidies by 
20%. That is in the Community. We feel 
that this step-by-step approach is, in 
fact, the best possible. This is not 
everyone's view, but we do hope to be 
able to convince our friends that is the 
right solution. 



. 



epartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



29 



ECONOMICS 



Q. I wanted to ask Mr. Shultz, 
what is he going to leave by way of 
inheritance to his successor, in par- 
ticular with regard to Argentina and 
Mexico? 

Secretary Shultz. I take it you are 
referring to debt, but I call your atten- 
tion to the fact that throughout the 
world and particularly in Latin Amer- 
ica, it is noteworthy that government 
through democratic means and the 
treatment of people according to the 
rule of law has had a remarkable 
upsurgence. 

That is true in Argentina, where 
the human condition of life is much bet- 
ter and much different, and in an inter- 
esting way. While Mexico has had a 
democratic form of government for a 
long time, it now has a different pat- 
tern of opposition that has emerged. I 
went to the inauguration of President 
Salinas only a few days ago, and I was 
struck by the way in which he sort of 
embraced this opposition. It seems to 
be going forward in a tradition of open 
democratic processes. 

I don't know that that was what 
you are particularly calling attention to, 
but I think it is worth calling attention 
to: the fact we see openness, freedom, 
and human rights and the rule of law 
on the march. 

As far as the debt problem is con- 
cerned, of course it is a very significant 
problem. It has been coped with, I 
think, with a lot of skill over the past 
6 years or so that it has been particu- 
larly noted. I think that, probably, peo- 
ple will make a new go at it. But this 
will be done by a new Administration in 
the United States along with others, 
and I don't want to put my oar in and 
stir their waters up. It is for them to 
decide. 



American Leadership in International Trade 



'Press release 256 of Dec. 12, 1988. 



by W. Allen Wall is 

Address before the annual meeting 
of the President's Export Council on 
November 28, 1988. Mr. Wallis is Un- 
der Secretary for Economic Affairs and 
Agriculture. 

In general terms, I will outline the way 
we in the Administration see the future 
of international trade, with special at- 
tention to the European Community's 
(EC) plans for integrating their mar- 
kets by 1993. I must warn you that my 
crystal ball does not contain crystal of 
export quality clarity. 

Trade is as important for America 
now as it has been in our history. It 
accounts for a growing share of our eco- 
nomic activity, and it affects many dif- 
ferent sectors of our economy. Our 
enterprises have become globalized. 
About 40% of our imports come from 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. -owned com- 
panies, and 88% of U.S. manufacturers 
use foreign-made components in their 
final products. 

We have no realistic choice but to 
continue to lead the effort to promote 
free and fair trade, just as we did after 
the Second World War. After the war, 
farsighted leaders, drawing partly on 
lessons learned from earlier mistakes, 
devised new international economic in- 
stitutions, including the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment (OECD), the World Bank, the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). Those institutions have 
worked well. Since 1950, we have seen a 
fivefold increase in world output and a 
ninefold increase in world exports. To- 
day, income and wealth are spread more 
widely among nations than ever before. 
This is truly a magnificent achievement. 
We can be proud of America's leadership. 

We can be proud also of another 
contribution we have made to the world 
economy. We have demonstrated the 
power for good that comes from team- 
ing political freedom with economic 
freedom. That demonstration has im- 
pressed the world so strongly that 
nearly everywhere efforts are being 
made to emulate it. There is a remark- 
able and well-nigh universal movement 
away from political dictatorship and 
economic control toward democracy and 
markets. 



We are in our longest peace-time 
expansion in history, now 6 full years, 
during which the American economy 
has created nearly 18 million new jobs. 
In the 1980s, manufacturing productiv- 
ity has increased over 4% per year, 
three times faster than between 1973 
and 1981. 

International Trade Deficit 
and Foreign Debt 

Not everything is perfect in the econ- 
omy today, of course, but not every- 
thing that is said to be wrong is, in 
fact, wrong. I will mention two of the 
false alarms — the international trade 
deficit and foreign debt. 

The trade deficit is a deficit only 
by virtue of ignoring an important part 
of the international picture. The trade 
deficit is, in fact, balanced by the cap- 
ital surplus. As long as the United 
States remains the best place in the 
world to invest, capital inflows will 
tend to create a trade deficit — or to re- 
duce a surplus if that were to come 
about from other circumstances. (That 
is simply an accounting identity.) Also, 
as long as the U.S. economy is growing 
faster than are the economies of our 
trading partners, the growth gap will 
tend to create a trade deficit. As the 
President has pointed out correctly, one 
of the important causes of our trade 
deficit is the relative strength of our 
economy. The decline in our trade defi- 
cit — over 30% in real terms since the 
peak a year ago — does not mean that 
our economy is weakening, but it does 
reflect (in part) improvement in the 
economies of some of our major trading 
partners. 

As for the absurd idea that the 
United States is now the world's largesi 
debtor — in a class with Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico — I will just mention 
four points. 

First, the figures that are used do 
not even purport to show debt. They 
purport to show net asset position — 
how much we own abroad and how 
much foreigners own here — and the dif- 
ference clearly is not debt. 

Second, the figures are not accu- 
rate anyway since they reflect book, 
not market, values — gold at $42 per 
ounce, for example. 

Third, our debts are mostly in U.S. 
dollars, not in foreign currencies that 
have to be earned by international trade 



30 



ECONOMICS 



Fourth, there would be no harm in 
being a net debtor anyway — we were a 
net debtor for most of our history. Bor- 
rowed capital is beneficial if it earns 
more than its interest and is not dissi- 
I pated unproduetively, as in South 
America. 

Institutional Reforms and 
Regional Cooperation 

We have entered an era of in- 
I stantaneous global communications 
which has created sophisticated finan- 
cial networks that transfer over a tril- 
lion dollars a day worldwide, a daily 
sum about the same as the U.S. Gov- 
ernment's annual expenditures. This is 
an economic force beyond the control of 
any nation, no matter how powerful, or 
even any combination of nations. 

We are bombarded with informa- 
tion from satellite communications and 
I challenged by modern tools that allow 
[more business to be done in more un- 
conventional ways than governments 
can keep abreast of, much less control. 
The very nature of trade is changing, 
dealing less with material, tangible 
things. All of this requires restructur- 
ing some of the institutions which deal 
| with international economics. 

One of the key institutions that 
needs adjustment is the GATT In the 
i GATT, the Uruguay Round of multi- 
I lateral trade negotiations is crucial to 
the long-term health of the world trad- 
ing system. We need to build momen- 
tum for reform at the ministerial 
midterm review in Montreal next week. 
The key problems will not be solved at 
Montreal, but we need to obtain com- 
i mitments on principles and objectives 
that will insure successful negotiations 
during the remaining 2 years of the 
'ound. At Montreal, we hope to achieve 
progress in processes for settling dis- 
putes in services and in other non- 
| craditional issues, such as trade related 
to intellectual property and trade- 
I related investment. 

Regional arrangements will play a 
[significant part in future trade. We will 
make a giant step by removing barriers 
I to free trade between Canada and the 
United States. Our two nations ex- 
change more goods and services — $166 
i| Dilllon last year — than any two coun- 
tries in the world. The elimination of 
Lariffs and most other barriers to trade 
fend investment will increase economic 
Jjrowth, lower prices, expand employ- 
jment, and enhance the competitiveness 
}f both countries in world markets. 



Program 1992 and the U.S. Position 

Another momentous step in regional 
cooperation is now underway with the 
acceleration of European economic inte- 
gration. Broadly speaking, the [EC] 
1992 program is an effort by some of 
our key allies to face global challenges 
together. Not only in trade but also in 
such areas as protecting the environ- 
ment, controlling sensitive technolo- 
gies, and regulating anticompetitive 
behavior, the EC has decided it can do 
better as one than as twelve. If fully 
implemented, integration of the Euro- 
pean market can bring great advan- 
tages to Europe and to the United 
States. Our mutual economic interests 
are huge: in 1987, U.S.-EC trade 
totaled $145 billion. 

While a unified European market 
should be as advantageous to Europe, 
to the United States, and to the rest 
of the world as has been the unified 
American market, there are two haz- 
ards that could reduce the potential 
benefits or even reverse them — namely, 
protectionism and over-regulation. In- 
creased competition from within the 
EC could lead European business to 
seek more protection against the out- 
side. For those U.S. firms already es- 
tablished in Europe, this may not be 
much of a problem, but those not cur- 
rently there could be frozen out if such 
a policy were adopted. We would be 
seriously concerned if EC policies were 
to require investment as a price for do- 
ing business in the single market. A 
company that now exports to Europe 
should not be required to invest in 
Europe in order to continue selling 
there after 1992. Senior EC officials 
have stated repeatedly that the pro- 
gram as envisioned will not result in 
"fortress Europe." As I told them dur- 
ing a recent discussion in Brussels, 



however, they say this in the language 
of 17th century mercantilism, and that 
makes me apprehensive — in particular, 
the way they talk about reciprocity in- 
stead of national treatment. 

With regard to the possibility of 
over-regulation, I refer you to [British] 
Prime Minister Thatcher's important 
speech in Bruges recently. She warned 
against unifying regulations by taking 
the "worst common denominator." 
Because social legislation in Europe 
requires the unanimity of all 12 coun- 
tries — and the 1992 program does not — 
there appear now to be efforts to in- 
corporate into the 1992 program such 
measures as labor participation in man- 
agement and limitations on layoffs or 
plant closings. 

Secretary Shultz will lead a Cabi- 
net delegation to meet with EC minis- 
ters on December 9, and in discussing 
the 1992 program, we will reemphasize 
the importance for the United States of 
ensuring that its trade and other eco- 
nomic interests are not jeopardized by 
market integration. 

In a world that Secretary Shultz 
has described as too small for violent 
conflict and too big for rigid attitudes, 
wild ambitions, and self-centered pol- 
icies, sooner or later governments must 
see that joining with others is the best 
way to meet future challenges. The 
United States always is ready to work 
with others. 

The sine qua nou for keeping a 
steady course in world trade is to main- 
tain American leadership, to broaden 
international cooperation, and to spread 
reliance on incentives, enterprise, and 
markets to control the economies of the 
world. Only by reliance on the market 
to control each economy can all the 
economies of the world be coordinated 
with efficiency and friendship. ■ 



EC Project 1992: 

The Dynamics of Change 



by Denis Lamb 

Address before the Washington 
International Business Council on 
September 9, 1988. Ambassador Lamb 
is U.S. Representative to the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment (OECD). 

Over the past year or so, American 
business and government have become 
aware that something of profound eco- 



nomic and political significance is un- 
derway in Europe. Under the slogan 
"1992," the European Community (EC) 
has set out to perfect the common mar- 
ket formed 30 years ago by its six orig- 
inal members. Legislation is already 
being passed to move the EC toward 
the goal of "Europe without frontiers" 
and to remove the barriers to trade and 
investment that exist within the bor- 
ders of the member states. In response, 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



31 



ECONOMICS 



businesses are adjusting their plans 
and strategies and merging with or ac- 
quiring other businesses in the expecta- 
tion that substantial new challenges 
and opportunities are being created. 

The countries of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), which 
currently enjoy a privileged trading re- 
lationship with the EC, are searching 
for ways to avoid being disadvantaged 
by progress toward the EC's ambitious 
goals. In some EFTA countries, like 
Austria, there is an active public de- 
bate about the wisdom of applying to 
join the EC. Elsewhere, as in Sweden 
and Switzerland, governments are cast- 
ing about for other ways, short of mem- 
bership, to preserve their commerce 
with the EC. 

The U.S. Government has publicly 
welcomed 1992, but, reflecting concerns 
of our own as well as those of the busi- 
ness community, we have also raised 
questions about elements of the pro- 
gram. The Japanese are worried about 
how their interests will fare in a Eu- 
rope that appears ready to replace 
the patchwork protectionism applied 
to Japan by several of the member 
states with a common and centrally 
managed policy. 

When the Community launched 
project 1992 three years ago, the event 
passed virtually unremarked in the 
United States. Aware of the Commu- 
nity's interminable quarrel over farm 
policy and how to pay for it and of the 
poor track record of earlier ambitious 
schemes to advance the cause of Euro- 
pean unity — from the Fouchet Plan of 
1961, which aimed at a common Euro- 
pean foreign policy, to the Werner Plan 
to achieve economic and monetary 
union by 1980 — Community watchers 
tended to divide into two groups — the 
indifferent and the skeptical. Disin- 
terest and doubt began to dissipate 
after the EC's February 1988 summit in 
Brussels. There the heads of Commu- 
nity governments shunted aside the 
quarrel over farm policy, found yet an- 
other fix for the recurring question of 
Britain's payment to the EC budget, 
and put up new money for the in- 
frastructure and investment projects 
that transfer resources from the richer 
members to the poorer. These decisions 
were intended to give the EC 4 or 5 
years of breathing room to get on with 
the business of project 1992. 

Why this relatively sudden move 
forward? The reasons are surely many 
and complex. There is a general desire 
to get on with the unfinished business 
of European construction to which all 



32 



EC members are committed in princi- 
ple. There are proximate causes as 
well. One is the need to overcome 
Western Europe's relative economic 
stagnation. With its accompanying high 
unemployment and creeping internal 
trade restrictions, slow growth has per- 
sisted since the first oil shock. Euro- 
pean multinational business has been 
active in pushing for change. Another 
cause lies in France's failed effort in the 
early 1980s to run an expansionist eco- 
nomic policy independent of its part- 
ners. The experience convinced the 
country's leaders, on both the left and 
right, that recourse to an independent 
policy had become a delusion. In the 
future, they believe, Europe will pros- 
per together or not at all. Britain is 
largely motivated by the deregulatory 
thrust of 1992. What [British] Prime 
Minister Thatcher has preached and 
practiced at home lies at the heart 
of the project. Many knowledgeable 
Germans are convinced that their econ- 
omy will face a crisis some years hence 
unless stultifying regulation can be 
overcome. Absent imminent danger to 
Germany's high standard of living, how- 
ever, only the deus ex machina of 1992 
offers the prospect of forcing action out 
of the political system. A final impor- 
tant factor is that the integration of the 
EC's new large member state, Spain, 
has posed fewer problems than antici- 
pated. Although Spain continues to be 
plagued with severe unemployment, 
its vigorous economic growth is easing 
the transition. 

Toward Mutual Recognition 

The Brussels summit was a powerful 
signal that the Community is serious 
about the structural transformation of 
its economy. After Brussels, we in the 
United States began to examine the 
prospect and the process with greater 
care and attention. What did we find? 
First, that on taking office in 1985, a 
new EC Commission under President 
Jacques Delors had catalogued some 
300 remaining fiscal, technical, and 
physical barriers to internal trade in 
goods and services; and that the Com- 
mission and the Council of Ministers, 
representing the member states, had 
established the goal of passing legisla- 
tion to eliminate these barriers by the 
time the next Commission completes its 
4-year term of office at the end of 1992. 
Second, we found that the EC had 
amended its "constitution" — the treaty 
of Rome — by the passage at the end of 
1985 of the Single European Act. The 



act will allow most of the 1992 legisla- 
tion to pass by qualified majority 
rather than by unanimous vote. Equally 
important, the act fundamentally re- 
orients that legislation away from "har- 
monization," or the quest for uniform 
Community-wide rules, and toward the 
concept of "mutual recognition." 

The Single European Act says that 
"the Council may decide that provisions 
in force in a member state must be 
recognized as equivalent to those ap- 
plied by another." Beyond the consider- 
able contribution this language will 
make to the passage of the Commis- 
sion's legislative program, it opens the 
way to competitive lawmaking in Com- 
munity countries. Over time, busi- 
nesses will be able to "shop" for the 
most advantageous regulatory climate 
and in doing so to exert pressure on all 
members to dismantle barriers. Con- 
templating this prospect in his excellent 
survey of 1992 in the July 9 issue of the 
Economist, Nicholas Colchester con- 
cludes that the exercise is nothing less 
than "an adventure in deregulation." 

It will be well into the next century 
before a full evaluation of project 1992 
is possible, even if the legislative phase 
encounters only predictable delays. In 
attempting to gauge its eventual im- 
pact, observers have focused on two 
main elements: the elimination of fron 
tier controls and the removal of internal 
obstacles to trade. Each is worth a 
closer look. The goal of a "Europe with- 
out frontiers" is important because 
frontier posts add an estimated 5% to 
10% to the cost of traded goods. They 
also aid the enforcement of market seg- 
mentation based on product standards 
and regulations and give individual 
member states the means to conduct 
trade policies which are different than 
those conducted by the Commission on 
behalf of the EC as a whole. The aboli- 
tion of frontier posts may also loom 
large as a goal for some because their 
absence would encourage — even force — 
cooperation at the Community level on 
a range of noneconomic matters, in- 
cluding technology transfer controls, 
terrorism, and immigration policy. 

Mutual recognition offers a power- 
ful remedy for internal barriers to 
trade — like different product standards 
and conflicting regulatory regimes. One 
can even see how convergence might 
occur over time toward the French ap- 
proach to policing the movement of 
people from within its borders for the 
purpose of controlling immigration and 
combating drug dealing and terrorism. 



Department of State Bulletin/February 198 



ECONOMICS 



But, as the Economist survey argues, 
it is hard to see how the member states 
will be able to convince themselves to 
dispense with the role border posts 
play in isolating each EC nation's 
indirect tax system. 

The problem lies both with national 
differences in the application of the 
EC's value added tax, or VAT, and in 
the way VAT is collected on exports 
and imports. The extent to which the 
member states rely on the VAT for rev- 
enue varies from 4% of GNP in West 
Germany to 10% in Denmark. The inci- 
dence of VAT ranges from a standard 
rate of 22% in Denmark to 12% in Spain 
and Luxembourg. Luxury goods face 
rates between 25% and 38%; food is 
subject to rates of between 1% and 10%. 
Coverage varies from 40% of consump- 
tion in the United Kingdom and Ireland 
to almost 90%' in the rest of the Com- 
munity. These disparities can be main- 
tained because exporting countries re- 
fund to the exporter all of the VAT 
previously assessed on the value of the 
export, and importing countries slap 
their VAT rate on the import price of 
goods entering their territory. Frontier 
posts exist to ensure that untaxed ex- 
ported products actually leave the 
country and that VAT is collected on 
imports. 

Judging that it would be unworka- 
ble simply to apply the principle of 
mutual recognition and ignore VAT dif- 
ferences, the Commission fell back to a 
variant of the old method — harmoniza- 
tion — and devised an approach that 
would allow governments to retain 
some flexibility in setting rates. To deal 
with the collection side of the tax equa- 
tion, they put forward a clearing house 
scheme. So far, these proposals have 
not found favor with the member 
states. Perhaps because, as the 
Economist put it, governments see 
them for what they are — a threat to 
their ability to decide "where for the 
good of the society to make life cheaper 
or more expensive." At the moment, 
the way out of this impasse is not visi- 
ble to outside observers, particularly 
since fiscal changes require unanimous 
agreement. Progress toward an answer 
may flow from the 1984 agreement be- 
tween France and Germany, soon to be 
implemented, to remove completely 
their respective border controls. Since 
France's dependence on VAT for reve- 
nue and the role of public spending 
in its economy are greater than Ger- 
many's, leading to obvious problems, 
this bold step may identify solutions 
that can be generalized to the rest of 
the EC. 



Eliminating Internal Barriers 

If the ideal of a frontier-free Europe 
seems difficult to achieve, especially on 
the Community's ambitious timetable, 
things look brighter when it comes to 
the removal of internal barriers, includ- 
ing those that restrict the right of com- 
panies operating in one EC country to 
establish themselves in another. Many 
of the EC's fragmented, cartelized mar- 
kets remain so because companies are 
not now free to enter other markets to 
compete for government business or to 
sell services. 

Here the story lies in the details, 
too many to be recounted here. Not all 
of the 300 pieces of legislation have 
been written, and much of what has 
been committed to paper remains to be 
subjected to searching scrutiny within 
the Community. Even so, evidence to 
illustrate what is at stake is readily 
available. In road transport, for exam- 
ple, an estimated 30% of trucks cross- 
ing national borders return empty 
because of national restrictions. Gov- 
ernment procurement remains a 
method of promoting "national cham- 
pions," or just plain nationals. Only 2% 
of large government procurements are 
awarded to outside bidders. 

The Commission is actively wield- 
ing its new tools — qualified majority 
voting and mutual recognition — to 
break down these barriers. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in financial 
services, where project 1992 is moving 
forward smartly toward the single mar- 
ket ideal. Financial services merit spe- 
cial attention for this reason, and for 
some others as well. For one thing, the 
EC's plans in this area have raised con- 
cerns in the United States that illus- 
trate the kind of difficulties for third 
countries which can arise as 1992 un- 
folds. For another, analysts have begun 
to point out that financial market de- 
regulation implies major concessions of 
national sovereignty. The Commission's 
proposals in this area, and their im- 
plications, have already provoked con- 
siderable discussion of the creation of a 
single central bank and a single Euro- 
pean currency. 

Spurred by the telecommunications 
revolution, financial markets are tend- 
ing toward global unification. Protected 
margins are being eroded as new finan- 
cial instruments and methods are de- 
vised. Wisely, the EC has decided to 
make the best of this situation, realiz- 
ing that if it does not, it will stunt the 
growth and the competitive strength of 
its private financial institutions. 



The Commission's study, "The 
Economics of 1992," amasses the evi- 
dence of financial market fragmenta- 
tion. For example, a consumer loan in 
the United Kingdom carries a spread 
over money market rates three times 
higher than a similar loan in Belgium. 
Mortgages in France and West Ger- 
many carry twice the spread as do 
mortgages in the United Kingdom. 
Similar disparities exist in insurance 
and brokerage services. For these mar- 
kets to open up, three things have to 
happen: There must be freedom of cap- 
ital movement so funds can seek their 
best return and sellers of financial serv- 
ices can be assured of payment, the 
right to sell financial services across 
borders must be provided in order to 
broaden markets, and providers of fi- 
nancial services in one EC country 
must have the right to establish them- 
selves in other member countries. 

In banking, the Council of Minis- 
ters has before it a banking directive 
based on the mutual recognition princi- 
ple. It would create a single banking 
license enabling a bank legally resident 
in one EC country to open a branch in 
any other or to provide services to all 
of the other countries. Each branch will 
be subject to EC-wide standards for 
bank soundness, but these will be inter- 
preted and applied by the country in 
which the parent is located. 

The specific concern the United 
States has with the banking directive 
(and a parallel investment services di- 
rective) is that it contains a "recipro- 
city" clause which states that the 
treatment afforded an EC financial in- 
stitution in a non-EC market will deter- 
mine whether firms from that market 
will be permitted access to the inte- 
grated EC market. The point we are 
making, as forcefully as we can, is that 
the correct standard to apply is "nation- 
al treatment." The difficulty we have 
with the reciprocity clause is that it 
could easily be applied to justify dis- 
criminatory treatment against foreign 
firms based on legitimate differenes in 
national regulatory regimes. As U.S. 
Treasury Deputy Secretary McPherson 
said in a recent speech, "Reciprocity 
that seeks to achieve identical commer- 
cial privileges in countries with differ- 
ent regulatory regimes will almost 
inevitably result in discrimination." 

Freeing up financial markets will 
require the removal of all exchange con- 
trols. This may not sound like much to 
Americans able to move money in and 
out of the country without restriction. 
For the EC's highly integrated, trade- 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



33 



ECONOMICS 



dependent economies, it means more. 
The Economist argues that "freedom of 
capital movements will make or break 
the European monetary system (EMS), 1 
leaving it either a fundamental and per- 
vasive part of the post-1992 market. . . 
or barely worth the candle." With 8 of 
the 12 EC governments committed to 
removing all remaining capital controls 
by 1990, two choices loom: either main- 
tain fixed exchange rates through close 
economic policy cooperation (in a set- 
ting in which interest rates become a 
much more important mecha- 
nism for regulating capital flows), or 
abandon the goal. Although Prime Min- 
ister Thatcher continues to oppose 
bringing the pound into the exchange 
rate mechanism of the EMS, the gen- 
eral tenor of the discussion in the EC is 
strongly aimed at reinforcing the EMS. 

Down the road, economic integra- 
tion would appear to imply a major 
transfer of economic sovereignty and 
the need to create a Community in- 
stitution to exercise that sovereignty. 
The contemplation of this prospect ac- 
counts for much of the increasing atten- 
tion being paid to eventually setting up 
a European central bank and establish- 
ing a single European currency. For the 
moment, however, what seems sensible 
and appealing to European policy- 
makers is a steady development of what 
exists. Thus, closer coordination of 
monetary policy seems possible, as is 
expanding the role of the European cur- 
rency unit (ECU). 2 

A final thought on this topic. We 
divided the discussion of 1992 into two 
parts: frontier posts and internal bar- 
riers. The long-term implication of lib- 
eralizing financial markets is that this 
distinction is logical rather than real. It 
is hard to imagine the persistence of 
border controls as economic decision- 
making power gradually accumulates in 
a Community institution. 

The Effects of Project 1992 

What will 1992 mean for the United 
States? In capsule form, the important 
elements are the following. 

More Growth. In essence, the EC 
is following the prescription that it 
helped elaborate in the OECD and the 
Group of Seven: the cure for "Euro- 
sclerosis" is structural adjustment. The 
Commission forecasts that the elimina- 
tion of nontariff barriers (plus a dollop 
of old-fashioned fiscal stimulus) could 
raise the EC's gross national product 
by 4.5% to 7%, add 1.8 to 5 million new 



34 



jobs, and drop consumer prices up to 
6%. Hard numbers are difficult to come 
by, the more so because so much of the 
effect of 1992 — on investment and the 
labor market, for example — is indirect. 
But it seems fair to conclude that 1992 
will be a major spur to growth. For 
third countries, and for the United 
States in particular, more growth will 
improve prospects for trade. 

EC Unity. 1992 has infused the EC 
with a new sense of confidence and pur- 
pose, but the disparity in economic de- 
velopment between the north and the 
south is a likely source of tension in the 
years ahead. For the north, the imper- 
ative is to restructure to improve com- 
petitiveness; for the south, it is to raise 
living standards. One implication of this 
divergence of interest is that EC deci- 
sionmaking will be more than normally 
cumbersome and fractious. It may be 
difficult for outsiders to draw the EC's 
attention away from internal matters 
and toward issues with a global dimen- 
sion. Over time, however, the EC 
should evolve into a more cohesive 
presence in the OECD and elsewhere 
on monetary, macroeconomic, and re- 
lated issues. 

Expansion of Central Decision- 
making. 1992 implies a major transfer 
of political power to EC institutions, 
with the Commission destined to play 
a central role in dealings with third 
countries on a range of issues where 
the member states now occupy center 
stage. As in trade policy matters now, 
third countries will have to adjust their 
strategies to accommodate increased 
power-sharing between the Commission 
and the member states. As European 
perceptions of this shift in authority 
grow, there will also be a push to make 
the EC's institutions more democratic. 
As a first step, the already directly 
elected European Parliament will play a 
larger role. 

Competitiveness. As a conse- 
quence of 1992, EC firms will get big- 
ger and become more efficient as they 
compete and benefit from economies of 
scale hitherto denied them. Smaller 
firms operating in a more competitive 
environment will also be more efficient. 
Foreign firms established in the EC 
should benefit from deregulation and 
the removal of barriers provided that 
the necessary legislation is written and 
implemented in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. But they will have to be ag- 
gressive competitors to survive and 
prosper. 



Commercial Policy. While it is 
abundantly clear that 1992 is not moti- 
vated by narrow mercantilistic trade 
policy interests, the EC's trading part- 
ners have legitimate cause for concern. 
It arises because the 1985 Commission 
White Paper on 1992 is largely silent on 
matters of external policy, and because 
of a certain dissonance between the 
Commission's protestations of innocent 
commercial intentions and "the facts" 
as they have begun to emerge. 

"Reciprocity," the concept incorpo- 
rated in the banking directive, could 
be applied broadly on a sectoral basis. 
Some EC protectionists are not bashful 
about arguing that opening the internal 
market is, in effect, an unmatched con- 
cession to the EC's trading partners. 

So-called transition measures pre- 
sent another problem. Article 115 of 
the Rome treaty reserves to member 
states "in economic difficulty" the right 
to impose national restrictions on im- 
ports. Of those in force, the most 
important by far restrict imports of 
Japanese automobiles. What can we 
learn from the automobile case? Ac- 
cording to the July 22 Financial 
Times, the Commission is putting the 
finishing touches on a package to phase 
out national restrictions on imports of 
Japanese cars maintained by France, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and 
Portugal. It would work like this: on 
the trade side, industry-to-industry 
deals would be eliminated, national 
technical standards maintained solely 
for the purpose of regulating imports 
would be replaced by Community 
standards readied for adoption over a 
decade ago, and the Japanese would 
agree to a 4-year freeze on imports at 
present levels (just over 1 million units, 
or about 9.5% of the current market). 

Internally, national subsidies to the 
auto industry would be curbed, and 
constraints would be placed on the abil- 
ity of the member states to compete foi 
Japanese investment in auto production 
capacity. As to the desirability of all 
this, perhaps the rule ought to be "let 
he who is without sin cast the first 
stone." What can be said with justice h 
that these proposals hardly constitute i 
bold stroke to eliminate barriers of du- 
bious legality under international trade 
rules. The pertinent practical question 
is whether that import freeze will actu- 
ally go by the boards after "x" years. 

A third problem area is product 
standards. It is to be anticipated that 
suppliers that do not participate in the 
setting of standards, including U.S. 



ECONOMICS 



suppliers, will be disadvantaged. A 
number of such issues already confront 



The Uruguay Round and Agri- 
culture. What does 1992 portend for 
the ongoing round of multilateral trade 
negotiations in Geneva? What about the 
resolution of differences over farm pol- 
icy that have pitted the EC against the 
United States for more than 20 years? 
A number of considerations apply. 
Where the EC is prepared to liber- 
alize, as in services, the 1992 exercise 
is capable of furnishing it with "trading- 
stock" that can be used to obtain 
concessions in Geneva. In this way, 
1992 could energize the Uruguay 
Round, which must compete for the at- 
tention of policymakers with the U.S.- 
Canada Free Trade Agreement, rapidly 
envolving trade relationships centering 
on Japan in Asia, and with 1992 itself. 

Many commentators have said that 
the key to a successful Uruguay Round 
is a deal on agriculture. Equally numer- 
ous are those who hold that the only 
solution to the global problem of agri- 
cultural overproduction and resulting 
trade strains lies in the multilateral 
round. No country, or entity, the rea- 
soning goes, can disarm unilaterally in 
agriculture. There has to be a global 
ideal. What are the prospects? Here op- 
timism begins with pessimism, in that 
it seems clear enough that the Brussels 
summit financed CAP [Common Agri- 
cultural Policy] overproduction without 
finding a solution to it. 1992 may give 
the Uruguay Round a welcome boost 
because it will generate a need for 
large sums of money to ease EC North- 
South differences. Reducing agri- 
cultural support can help provide it. 
There is another factor that may turn 
out to be important. For many years 
the policy that has served as the "glue" 
to hold the EC together — "crazy glue" 
in the eyes of some — has been the CAP. 
As 1992 directs the EC's search for co- 
hesion toward other policies, the way 
will be eased for the United States and 
the Community to agree on rational 
farm policies. If this happens, then 
Japan, which has a major contribution 
to make through the lowering of its 
barriers to agriculture imports, will 
find it difficult not to go along. 

Conclusion 

We are fond of observing it in football 
games and tennis matches. "Big mo," 
or momentum, is a vital if elusive ele- 
ment in any struggle. In project 1992, 



the momentum lies with the forces of 
liberalization and openness and integra- 
tion. The restoration of European dyna- 
mism and self-confidence is at issue. 
Major changes for the better in the way 
the EC does business, inside Europe 
and with the rest of the world, are in 
the offing. But the outcome is far from 
decided. Powerful forces are ranged on 
the other side and some important U.S. 
interests will be put at risk. These in- 
terests will be defended with vigor. We 
have the tools to do so, including rights 
embodied in our Treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation with the 
member states; and mutual commit- 



ments undertaken in the OECD and 
the GATT [General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade]. If the Community fol- 
lows its sound and bold prescription for 
more growth and more unity and liber- 
alizes without turning inward, then we 
and it and the rest of the world will 
benefit. I think they can do it. 



'The eight currencies participating in 
the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS 
are West Germany, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg. 

-The ECU includes the EMS currencies 
plus those of Greece and the United 
Kingdom. ■ 



U.S. Trade Objectives in the Uruguay Round 



Overview 

The current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, expected to last 4 years, 
is vital to the future well-being of the 
United States and global economies. In- 
ternational trade has been an important 
engine for economic growth and devel- 
opment since World War II. Most non- 
communist countries, which account for 
more than 80% of world trade, are par- 
ticipating in the Uruguay Round of 
talks that were initiated at Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 un- 
der the auspices of the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 

For more than 40 years, the GATT 
has been the major international trade 
organization and forum responsible for 
reducing trade barriers. Seven rounds 
of multilateral trade negotiations have 
been completed under the GATT. They 
have focused on cuts in tariffs, which 
are now at historically low levels among 
the industrial countries. The previous 
series of trade talks — the Tokyo Round 
of 1973-79 — also reduced some nontariff 
barriers. 

The major U.S. goals in the Uru- 
guay Round are trade liberalization ex- 
tending GATT coverage to major new 
areas (such as services and intellectual 
property) and reinvigoration of the 
GATT system of international rules 
through timely and efficient enforce- 
ment. The result should be far fewer 
distortions to world trade in goods, ser- 
vices, and high technology, greatly ben- 
efiting American farmers, businesses, 
and consumers. Specific U.S. objectives 
include: 



• Long-term, market-oriented re- 
forms of agricultural policies that will 
permit the dismantling of subsidies and 
import barriers that serve as artificial 
roadblocks to free trade; 

• Agreement on principles govern- 
ing trade in services; 

• Common standards for protection 
of intellectual property, such as pa- 
tents, trademarks, and copyrights; 

• Greater integration of developing 
countries into the GATT system; 

• Improvements in the codes on 
standards, government procurement, 
and subsidies; and 

• Institutional improvements in the 
GATT, including the strengthening of 
its dispute settlement mechanism. 

Although adjustments would be 
necessary in every country, the bottom 
line would be increased growth and effi- 
ciency for those participating in a more 
open, competitive, and dynamic world 
trading system. A successful Uruguay 
Round would result in increased access 
to foreign markets by American busi- 
nesses and farmers, particularly in 
areas where we have a comparative ad- 
vantage. U.S. service firms would be 
able to sell their products and experi- 
ence in this rapidly growing sector of 
the global economy. American consum- 
ers would be able to buy a greater vari- 
ety of reasonably priced foreign goods. 

The alternative — greater protec- 
tionism and the unraveling of multi- 
lateral trade ties — is a prospect that 
must be avoided. Trade barriers are 
still too high, not only in the industrial 
nations of Europe and Japan but also in 
developing countries. The United 
States believes that all GATT members 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



35 



ECONOMICS 



must make a determined effort to re- 
duce these barriers because it is in 
everyone's interest to do so. 



Major Issues 

Agriculture. The United States places 
very high priority on reaching an 
agreement on agriculture in the Uru- 
guay Round. Agricultural distortions 
need to be reduced multilaterally so 
that no country obtains an unfair ad- 
vantage over its competitors. World- 
wide protectionism, subsidies, and 
quotas are rampant in agriculture. Ag- 
ricultural trade is the only area in 
which the GATT permits export sub- 
sidies. Most governments use price sup- 
ports and import restrictions to keep 
internal agricultural prices high. The 
result is overproduction of agricultural 
goods, which are often dumped in for- 
eign markets. Partly as a consequence, 
America's farmers have been losing 
their share of export markets in recent 
years. The traditional U.S. surplus in 
agricultural trade has declined sharply 
from $26.6 billion in 1981 to $6.5 billion 
in 1987. 

U.S. policymakers believe strongly 
that action is required on two fronts: 
trade liberalization and reform of do- 
mestic farm programs. In July 1987, 
the United States proposed that agri- 
culture be fully integrated into the 
GATT system by phasing out all tariff 
and nontariff barriers, including export 
subsidies and all domestic support pro- 
grams, by the year 2000. The U.S. pro- 
posal also recommended harmonization 
of health-related measures affecting ag- 
ricultural trade. Governments with re- 
strictive farm policies have resisted 
these ideas. 

Market-oriented agricultural pol- 
icies and trade would benefit many 
countries. According to a recent study 
by the Center for International Eco- 
nomics in Canberra, Australia, agri- 
cultural liberalization would reduce the 
U.S. budget deficit, create additional 
jobs in the European Community, in- 
crease real wages for Japanese workers 
(by lowering local food and other 
prices), and provide higher real incomes 
for developing countries. Farmers in 
the United States (and other com- 
petitive agricultural nations) would be 
able to increase their exports. For ex- 
ample, if the Uruguay Round agreed to 
eliminate subsidies, agricultural prices 
might rise, and U.S. wheat producers 
could substantially increase their sales 
and revenues. 



36 



Services. The services sector — 
e.g., transportation, tourism, finance, 
insurance, telecommunications, con- 
struction, and engineering — has become 
increasingly important in the 1980s. 
Services account for 70% of U.S. gross 
national product and 75% of American 
jobs. In 1987 U.S. exports of services 
amounted to $175 billion, about 40% of 
total U.S. exports of goods and serv- 
ices. Nevertheless, few international 
agreements cover trade in services; 
previous GATT rounds have not negoti- 
ated this issue. 

The United States supports GATT 
agreement on principles to prevent the 
spread of new barriers and liberalize 
trade in services. Such an agreement 
would enable American firms to export 
more services. Although some develop- 
ing countries fear competition from 
firms in advanced industrial economies 
in such areas as banking, insurance, 
and telecommunications, they would 
gain needed expertise in making their 
service sectors more efficient. Deci- 
sions on trade in services issues, which 
are being handled by a separate nego- 
tiating group, will have to be part of 
the total package of agreements 
reached at the end of the Uruguay 
Round. 



General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 

The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade is an international arrangement 
(a code of rules, an institution, and a 
forum for negotiations) designed to 
achieve a more open trading system by 
reducing tariff and nontariff barriers. 
Adopted in October 1947 by the United 
States and 22 other countries, the 
GATT has made a major contribution to 
the rapid growth in international trade 
since World War II. A basic GATT 
principle, embodied in the most- 
favored-nation clause, is that trade 
must be conducted on a nondiscrim- 
inatory basis. The GATT faces major 
challenges, including protectionist pres- 
sures in many countries, the need for 
consensus among its major members to 
reach decisions, and a defective dispute 
settlement mechanism. The GATT cur- 
rently has 96 "contracting parties" that 
account for more than 80% of world 
trade; an additional 30 countries apply 
GATT rules. Its headquarters and sec- 
retariat are located in Geneva. 



Foreign Investment. Foreign in- 
vestment has become an important 
GATT issue because of its extremely 
rapid growth worldwide. Subsidiaries 
of foreign companies often have to pro- 
vide services on the spot in the user 
country. Many countries have trade- 
distorting investment policies, such as 
excessive local content requirements. 
The United States believes that it is 
important to develop international rules 
and disciplines on foreign direct invest- 
ment, particularly as it relates to 
trade. GATT agreement on this issue 
would contribute to improving the in- 
vestment climate in developing coun- 
tries and help them to attract foreign 
investment. As a major source of cap- 
ital flows to developing countries, for- 
eign investment is a key factor in their 
future economic growth and efficiency. 

Intellectual Property. The protec- 
tion of intellectual property, such as pa- 
tents, trademarks, and copyrights, is 
increasingly important to the world 
trading system. Where previous intel- 
lectual property piracy centered on the 
unauthorized copying of books, films, 
musical works, and brand name con- 
sumer goods, we now confront the 
counterfeiting of computer software, 
semiconductor chips, pharmaceuticals, 
agrichemicals, and even spare parts for 
aircraft. These actions increasingly dis- 
tort trade, result in inferior quality 
products for consumers, and reduce the 
incentives for economic and scientific 
progress throughout the world. As pari 
of the Uruguay Round, the United 
States has proposed a comprehensive 
agreement on intellectual property that 
includes standards, internal and bordei 
enforcement, and GATT-type dispute 
settlement procedures that minimize 
obstructions to legitimate trade. 

Developing Countries. More than 
two-thirds of GATT members are devel- 
oping countries, which have a growing 
role in the international trading sys- 
tem. In 1987 U.S. trade with develop- 
ing countries amounted to $231 billion, 
or approximately one-third of total 
U.S. trade. An important objective of 
the Uruguay Round is to encourage th( 
more advanced developing countries, in 
eluding those in East Asia, to shoulder 
more of the obligations of GATT mem- 
bership. We hope that developing coun- 
tries, as they reach higher levels of 
economic development, will "graduate" 
to taking full-fledged responsibility for 
the future health of world trade rela- 
tionships. 



Department of State Bulletin/February 198! J> 



ECONOMICS 



The developing countries are vi- 
tally interested in tropical products in 
which they have a comparative advan- 
tage. They want the industrial coun- 
tries to allow freer and fuller access to 
these products. The United States has 
offered a faster track for the phaseout 
of import restrictions on tropical prod- 
ucts than for other agricultural com- 
modities, provided that other GATT 
members, including developing coun- 
tries, do likewise. The developing coun- 
tries also are requesting industrial 
nations to have less protectionist trade 
policies toward textiles and natural re- 
source products. 

Safeguards Against Import In- 
jury. Safeguards are emergency actions 
by governments to temporarily restrain 
imports to protect domestic industries 



The Uruguay Round 

The latest round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, in which 105 countries are 
participating in Geneva, is scheduled to 
end in 1990. A mid-term review meet- 
ing of the GATT trade ministers takes 
place in Montreal in December 1988. 
There are two major groups dealing 
with the complicated and potentially 
unwieldy negotiations. One group han- 
dles trade barriers to goods and has 14 
subgroups on separate issues; the other 
has responsibility for trade in services. 
Although both groups are operating 
separately, they report to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee. The trade is- 
sues of goods and services are related 
and will have to be considered together 
in a final package toward the end of the 
negotiations. 



from harmful imports and give compan- 
ies time to adjust to foreign competi- 
tion. GATT members worked hard 
during the previous Tokyo Round to 
reach agreement on a safeguards code, 
but they were unable to reach a con- 
sensus. Some industrial countries, 
particularly those in the European 
Community, strongly supported the 
right to retaliate selectively against the 
imports of some countries. Many devel- 
oping nations vehemently opposed se- 
lectivity, favoring the principle of 
similar universal treatment. Other 
countries (both developing and devel- 
oped) accepted selectivity in principle 



but only under clear and restricted con- 
ditions. This unresolved issue is again 
being discussed and negotiated in the 
Uruguay Round. 

Other Nontariff Barriers. The 

Tokyo Round agreed on nine codes re- 
ducing nontariff barriers, but their im- 
plementation has only been partially 
successful. These codes of common 
standards and procedures lower na- 
tional nontariff barriers, increase public 
information, and reduce uncertainty in 
the flow of trade. The United States 
wants to improve the codes on sub- 
sidies, product standards, and govern- 
ment procedures by reducing subsidies, 
limiting the restrictive nature of prod- 
uct standards, and liberalizing the 
scope and implementation of govern- 
ment procurement practices. The 
overall result would be increased com- 
petition in the marketplace and greater 
economic efficiency. 

Institutional Changes. Despite 
the importance of trade in the global 
economy, the GATT does not have the 
same institutional standing as other in- 
ternational organizations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. The United States and 
many other GATT members want to 
strengthen the organization and its en- 
forcement powers in order to improve 
the international trading system. They 
would like a more independent role for 
the GATT secretariat. The dispute set- 
tlement mechanism has been criticized 
for being too weak and time consuming. 
Countries sometimes tend to selectively 
observe or stretch the GATT rules 
when they feel it is in their interest to 
do so. 

Tariffs. Although a reinvigorated 
and expanded GATT system will be the 
key to the success of the Uruguay 
Round, tariffs also are a subject of the 
negotiations. Tariffs in the industrial 
countries are now so low (about 4%) 
that they cannot be reduced much fur- 
ther. However, the more advanced de- 
veloping countries can afford to reduce 
tariff barriers in view of their economic 
progress. In addition, the United 
States is encouraging all countries to 
lower their tariffs, especially if they 
have not done so in the past. A "bound 
tariff' under the GATT guarantees that 
rates will not be changed without nego- 
tiation and compensation to trading 
partners. ■ 



World Trade 
and Economic Growth 

The rapid growth of international trade 
has been a major feature of the modern 
world economy. From 1950 to 1985, 
total merchandise exports increased in 
volume terms by approximately 780%, 
compared with a rise in world real 
gross domestic product of about 330%. 
World trade as a percentage of world 
output doubled in 20 years, from almost 
8% in 1960 to almost 16% in 1980, and 
has remained essentially the same since 
then. Consequently, most countries, in- 
cluding the United States, have become 
more open to and influenced by foreign 
trade. 



World Merchandise Exports 

and Gross Domestic Product, 1950-85 



Unrt Value 1970= 100 
200 -, 



World Merchandise Exports 
World Gross DomeslK: Product 




975 1980 1985 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



37 



EUROPE 



An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Cooperation 



by Richard H. Solomon 

Address at the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Moscow on 
November J, 1988. Mr. Solomon is Di- 
rector of the Policy Planning Staff. 

I appreciate this opportunity to address 
senior diplomats of the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Today's occasion re- 
ciprocates the presentation that Ambas- 
sador L. I. Mendelevich made to the 
U.S. Department of State's "Open 
Forum" in April of this year, on the 
occasion of the second round of Soviet- 
American policy planning talks. His re- 
marks were warmly received by my 
American colleagues. I hope I can live 
up to his pathbreaking example. 

My remarks today are oriented to 
the future — the future of U.S.-Soviet 
relations in a world undergoing dra- 
matic changes. But let me begin this 
look forward with one step backward, 
with a brief recall of some history. 

The State Department's Policy 
Planning Staff was established in the 
spring of 1947 by then-Secretary of 
State George Marshall — just after he 
returned from a trip to the Soviet 
Union, just as the relationship we had 
established during the wartime alliance 
against the Nazis was coming apart. 
The staffs first director, the distin- 
guished Sovietologist George Kennan, 
and his deputy, the noted economist 
and defense expert Paul Nitze, were 
present at the creation of America's 
postwar foreign policy. They were 
charged with developing policies for the 
economic reconstruction of Europe. 
They were also concerned with the So- 
viet Union's expanding international ac- 
tivity, particularly in Eastern Europe. 
Their labors produced the Marshall 
Plan and the basic concepts for Amer- 
ica's postwar defense strategy. 

Today, 41 years later, we are again 
at the beginning of a new international 
era. And the Policy Planning Staff has 
a very different agenda from that which 
confronted Kennan and Nitze — one ori- 
ented to the profound scientific, eco- 
nomic, and political changes that are 
transforming the global system. One in- 
dicator of the depth of these changes is 
that U.S. and Soviet policy planners 
are now able to sit clown together and 
assess the meaning of these changes, 
for the world and for U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 



38 



One of our concerns, as we look 
toward the future, is the "new political 
thinking" put forward by President 
Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shev- 
ardnadze. Their bold and farsighted 
program of reform for the Soviet 
Union, and the dramatic ferment it has 
unleashed in your country, have cap- 
tured the interest and the hopes of 
many Americans. What kind of change 
will perestroika, glasnost, and 
demokratizatsia bring to your country? 
What does it mean for the United 
States when we are told that Soviet 
foreign policy is no longer governed by 
the theory of "class struggle"? And do 
the concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" 
and "nonoffensive defense" offer real 
prospects for diminishing the military 
confrontation that has burdened our re- 
lationship for the past 40 years? The 
form and substance you give to such 
concepts will have an important impact 
on our own approach to arms control 
and to the evolution of our relations. 

The frank and productive dialogue 
that has grown between Secretary of 
State Shultz and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze, and my own free-wheel- 
ing exchanges with Ambassador Men- 
delevich and his colleagues, have 
enhanced our understanding of this 
"new thinking." And based on the sub- 
stantial progress made in U.S.-Soviet 
relations in recent years, we are now 
able to explore the following question: 
In what ways can our two countries co- 
operate so as to move us beyond the 
confrontations of the cold war era? 

Our "dialogue of planners" is de- 
signed to help answer this question. 
"New thinking" is required on our side 
as well as yours. We cannot allow rigid 
policy guidelines, outdated concepts, or 
stereotypes to prevent us from develop- 
ing new ways of meeting the profound 
changes that are taking place in the 
world. We cannot afford to be prisoners 
of doctrines developed generations ago 
in very different times and circum- 
stances. Yet, we must also be realists. 
It will take time and mutual efforts to 
unburden ourselves of the legacy of 
decades of confrontation. 

Today, I would like to share with 
you two future oriented aspects of our 
dialogue: first, our assessment of the 
global trends that require us all to 
adjust to a new future; and second. 



the kind of agenda for U.S.-Soviet re- 
lations that could move us away from 
confrontation and toward increasing 
cooperation. 

New Global Trends 

Secretary of State Shultz, in a recent 
series of speeches, 1 has explored the 
transformation of our economies from 
the agrarian era to the industrial age to 
what is now emerging as an era of in- 
formation technologies. As policy plan- 
ners, what is particularly interesting 
about today's "information revolution" is 
its profound impact on global economic, 
political, and security trends. 

I might summarize the most evi- 
dent of these trends as follows. 

• Scientific and economic power is 
dispersing widely around the world. 
Countries such as China, India, and Is- 
rael are getting into the space launch 
business. South Korea, Brazil, and 
Singapore are major producers of elec- 
tronic products. At the same time, the 
gap between the advanced countries 
and the less developed, between those 
participating in the information revolu- 
tion and those that are not, continues 
to widen. Even as China and India be- 
come self-sufficient in grain production 
and develop high-technology industries, 
a major portion of the African Conti- 
nent is increasingly burdened with the 
threat of famine, and many of its people 
live generations away from the world of 
computers, industrial robots, and satel- 
lite communications. 

• This dispersion of power is erod- 
ing the bipolar world of the 1950s and 
1960s. China is now moving to a posi- 
tion of greater equidistance in its rela- 
tions between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. New coalitions of states 
are forming, especially on a regional 
basis, to deal with problems of eco- 
nomic growth and security. I have in 
mind such groupings as ASEAN [Asso- 
ciation of South East Asian Nations] in 
Southeast Asia and the Gulf Coopera- 
tion Council in Southwest Asia. And 
new international institutions are being 
created — or old ones are being 
strengthened — to deal with the chal- 
lenges of this emerging era. 

• There is a clear trend toward in- 
terdependence and integration on a 
global scale. Satellite communications 
and modern transportation now make 



EUROPE 



>ossible a worldwide financial market, 
he cross-national production and mar- 
ceting of industrial products, and in- 
tantaneous global transmission of news 
iroadcasts. Yet, perhaps in reaction to 
hese trends, we also see tendencies to- 
vard economic protectionism and isola- 
ionism — even in as internationalized a 
ountry as the United States. 

• The character of the nation-state 
s being transformed. Countries are be- 
ng "pulled apart" by the opposing 
orces of national integration into the 
lobal economic and political order and 

>y the concurrent trend toward de- 
entralization of domestic economic 
nanagement and political democratiza- 
ion. Yet, the concept of state sov- 
reignty endures, even as national 
overnments are increasingly unable to 
out ml currency values or the informa- 
ion that crosses sovereign borders 
hrough electronic means, and as they 
ind that problems of security or ecol- 
fgy can be dealt with only through co- 
iperative measures with other states. 

• This trend toward global interde- 
lendence is also producing a worldwide 
ulture of common information and ma- 
erial products, shared music, and com- 
non cuisine. At the same time, we also 
ee parochial trends of language, na- 
ionalism, and religious fundamentalism 
ihat, while giving people a sense of 
jlentity in this era of rapid change, also 
elp to fuel unresolved ethnic conflicts 
nd regional disputes. 

• We see a worldwide trend toward 
•olitical decentralization and a stress 

n human rights. Military regimes and 
lighly centralized governments are 
Ending that they cannot deal with the 
ihallenges and opportunities of this 
merging new era without major politi- 
al and economic reforms. From 
Argentina to El Salvador, from the 
Philippines to South Korea, there is a 
ontinuing, if unstable, pattern of de- 
nocratization. And in the communist 
vorld — in China and the Soviet Union 
n particular — we find concurrent 
•fforts to adapt Marxist-Leninist 
mlitical institutions to this new era. 

• And finally, despite the advances 
n material well-being offered by this 
ra of spreading high-technology ca- 
)abilities, there are also sources of 
greater insecurity: the proliferation of 
lighly destructive weaponry — aircraft, 
nissiles, chemical weapons — and the 
emergence of new threats to personal 
security — the international drug trade, 
.errorism, and ecological damage. 



Earthquake in the Soviet Union 



WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, 
DEC. 8, 19881 

The President and Mrs. Reagan tele- 
phoned General Secretary and Mrs. 
Gorbachev at the Soviet Mission in 
New York this morning to convey their 
sympathy at the earthquake in the So- 
viet Union and to wish them well on 
their journey to Moscow. The Reagans 
spoke from the family quarters on the 
second floor of the White House. The 
President spoke to the General Secre- 
tary from 10:21 to 10:28 and Mrs. Rea- 
gan spoke to Mrs. Gorbachev from 
10:28 to 10:34 a.m. 

The President told General Secre- 
tary Gorbachev: "I received word last 
night of your early departure from New 
York and wanted to tell you how sorry 
I am that you must leave. I fully under- 
stand, however, that you have no choice 
but to return to your own country and 
be with your people following the early 
morning earthquake. I know I speak 
for all Americans when I express my 
deep personal sorrow at the loss of life 
caused by this earthquake. We under- 



stand that it was a very serious one. If 
there is any way in which we can be of 
assistance, either bilaterally or through 
the international community, please let 
me know. I want to tell you again how 
much both the Vice President and I en- 
joyed meeting with you yesterday. I 
think it was a very useful meeting for 
both sides. I wish you much success in 
the future and a safe journey home. 
Godspeed." 

The General Secretary thanked the 
President for his understanding and 
condolences. 

Mrs. Reagan told Mrs. Gorbachev: 
"I also wanted to convey to you directly 
my personal sorrow and concern over 
this tragedy. I'm so sorry. If we can do 
anything at all to help you, we're more 
than willing to. We look forward to 
seeing you either in the Soviet Union 
or California. Have a safe trip back." 

Mrs. Gorbachev thanked Mrs. Rea- 
gan "for remembering us, for calling, 
and for your support." 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 12, 1988. 




As Soviet Ambassador to the I'nited States Yuriy Dubinin, Mrs. Dubinin, and Mrs. 
Reagan look on. President Reagan signed the condolence book at the Soviet Embassy 
for the earthquake victims in Armenia. 



39 



EUROPE 



Ambassador Mendelevich and I, in 
our productive exchanges, largely agree 
on chis assessment of global trends. Yet 
we have significant differences in our 
policy perspectives on dealing with 
these challenges. Our contrasting views 
could be described as the difference 
between a "top down" approach to 
problem-solving and one "from the bot- 
tom up." It is the difference between a 
"comprehensive system of international 
security" and day-by-day cooperation to 
combat terrorism or to constrain the 
international arms trade. 

Despite these differences, our 
shared analysis of global trends pro- 
vides the basis for a U.S. -Soviet 
agenda designed to build the founda- 
tions of a more cooperative relationship. 
Let me describe how I see this agenda. 

An Agenda for Cooperation 

The changes now underway in Soviet 
foreign and domestic policies have dra- 
matically expanded the working agenda 
for U.S. -Soviet relations adopted at the 
Geneva summit in 1985. Our dialogue in 
the four areas of human rights and hu- 
manitarian affairs, arms control, re- 
gional problems, and bilateral issues is 
now intensive and increasingly focused 
on practical achievements. 

And what is just as important as 
the practical issues we are working on 
is that we are gradually and carefully 
eroding the mistrust of the past and 
laying a foundation of mutual confi- 
dence. Over time, this will help us ex- 
pand our agenda of cooperation. If we 
learned anything from the experience 
of detente in the 1970s, it was that 
trust cannot be manufactured simply 
through vague "agreements in princi- 
ple" or by high-sounding exchanges be- 
tween leaders. It must be built from 
the bottom up, issue by issue, and it 
must be fortified by continuing efforts 
to solve concrete problems. This is not 
to slight the importance of broad con- 
cepts which can guide us toward the 
future in a time of great change; yet, 
the most durable foundation of mutual 
confidence will be built by more agree- 
ments of the sort now helping to avoid 
incidents at sea and more treaties of 
the INF [intermediate-range nuclear 
forces] variety, not by new "codes of 
conduct" or abstract commitments to 
"peaceful coexistence." 

In assessing prospects for new 
forms of U.S. -Soviet cooperation, we 
must recognize that we are dealing 
with a process, one that will be pru- 
dent, practical, and evolutionary. We 



40 



are not heading for utopia. The funda- 
mental differences that have divided us 
in the past are not going to disappear 
as if by magic. Our two nations will 
continue to be competitors and to have 
conflicting interests; and our peoples 
will continue to have differing values 
and outlooks. Yet, to the extent that 
we succeed in identifying common in- 
terests and creating practical solutions 
to concrete problems, we can build a 
foundation of public support for cooper- 
ative efforts. And hopes are high in 
many circles that this is the new direc- 
tion in which our relations are headed. 
Let me develop this perspective in 
more detail, in terms of the four-part 
agenda. 

First, human rights — Human 
rights is always high on our agenda, 
because the values we associate with 
the term are essential to a just and 
peaceful world, and because the Ameri- 
can people give great weight to human 
rights concerns in our dealings with 
other countries. Public support for co- 
operative activities that our two gov- 
ernments might undertake rests on 
concrete progress in the human dimen- 
sion of our relationship. 

As we look at the recent pattern of 
Soviet human rights performance, we 
see a moving, shifting picture, not the 
grim, frozen image which was so long- 
in our mind's eye. This is a vital area 
which you are now addressing in the 
context of your own political and legal 
reforms. We welcome this process, and 
anticipate further progress. 

In this area, as in others, the 
United States favors a realistic, prob- 
lem-solving approach. Our starting 
point is the plight of the individual — 
divided spouses, the refusenik, the re- 
ligious believer, the dissident in a psy- 
chiatric hospital, and the imprisoned 
human rights activist. Our interest 
then extends to the larger legislative, 
administrative, and juridical framework 
in which the fundamental rights of the 
individual can be protected and their 
exercise given positive encouragement. 

We have engaged in a practical, of- 
ficial dialogue on human rights and hu- 
manitarian affairs with you for the past 
2 years. This is a remarkable develop- 
ment in comparison with past practice, 
and the dialogue is now expanding be- 
yond governmental channels to involve 
parliamentarians, lawyers, psychia- 
trists, and other interested private cit- 
izens. Our dialogue gives real meaning 
to glasnost and will facilitate the ex- 
pansion of your external relations. 



There is still great room for fur- 
ther developments both in your reforms 
and in our discussions. Your efforts will 
be an important source of the trust and 
confidence we hope to build into the 
relationship in the coming years. 

Next, security and arms control, 
a major area of cooperation and prog 
ress in our relations — The recent 
achievement of the INF Treaty affirms 
the value of a concrete, practical ap- 
proach to problem-solving. Unfortu- 
nately, some Soviet arms control 
proposals have been substantially less 
practical. One example is the notion of 
creating a non-nuclear world by the 
year 2000. We, too, look forward to a 
future free of the threat of nuclear an- 
nihilation. President Reagan and Gen- 
eral Secretary Gorbachev have agreed 
that "a nuclear war cannot be won and 
must never be fought." Yet, while we 
share this lofty goal, the United States 
and its allies are not about to cast 
aside — even rhetorically — the system o 
nuclear deterrence that, like it or not, 
has kept the peace for more than 40 
years. 

We seek a safer, more secure 
world. Yet, history would not look 
kindly on us if, in the interest of elim- 
inating nuclear weapons, we only made 
the world safer for conventional war- 
fare. We want not only major reduc- 
tions in nuclear arms but also a more 
stable balance in conventional arms at 
the lowest possible levels. We want re- 
ductions that are verifiable as well as 
stabilizing. This is not to say we can bi 
complacent about the risks of nuclear 
weapons. Since the 1960s, the United 
States has unilaterally reduced its 
stockpile of nuclear weapons by 33% 
and our total megatonnage by 75%. 

In the period ahead, we should 
complete the negotiation on 50%' redu< 
tions in strategic offensive forces. And 
it is now time to give serious thought 
to where the broad range of arms con- 
trol discussions now underway — on 
strategic arms, defenses, testing, con- 
ventional weapons, chemical arms, anc 
missile proliferation — is taking us. We 
have a unique opportunity to give con- 
crete meaning to the goal of "strategic 
stability" — in part by considering 
whether strategic defenses can in time 
be used to enhance stability. 

We are learning from the experi- 
ence of INF verification that the proc- 
ess of building trust is dynamic and 
evolutionary. Patterns of openness anc 
cooperation on sensitive military mat- 
ters are growing as we implement the 



Department of State Bulletin/February 191 



EUROPE 



treaty. Direct contacts between our mil- 
itary officials, such as those that have 
occurred at senior levels in recent 
months, can have a profound effect in 
building confidence and making possible 
farther efforts to solve practical 

roblems. 

I mentioned at the outset of these 
remarks the global trend toward pro- 
iferation of high-technology weaponry. 
The Iran-Iraq war taught us all many 
essons about the destructiveness and 
the ready availability from many 
sources of high-performance aircraft, 
missiles of all varieties, and even chem- 
cal weapons. Arms control is no longer 
;he exclusive concern of the major 
Dowers — not that it ever was. Yet, the 
sxample of our concrete achievements 
n limiting nuclear and conventional 
weapons will be a powerful example to 
others. 

We now face many additional chal- 
enges to cooperate — among ourselves 
ind with others — in efforts to limit or 
eliminate the proliferation of this ad- 
vanced weaponry. We also must cooper- 
ite in dealing with such unconventional 
security threats as terrorsim and the 
nternational drug trade. As we con- 
front these issues, we will have to re- 
solve a variety of daunting problems, 
>uch as appropriate organizational 
brms for restricting the international 
irms market, and the most effective 
ways to verify the absence of chemical 
veapons. And we are just beginning to 
•onfront the substantial costs of ver- 
fication regimes and peacekeeping 
brces which support our efforts to re- 

olve regional conflicts. Arms control, 
we are discovering through practice, is 
is expensive as it is worthwhile. And 
ve should not create illusions that nu- 
clear disarmament will free up large 
imounts of funding for economic 

evelopment. 

Which brings me to the third 
element of our cooperative agenda: 
•egional conflicts — Over the past 2 
i-lrears we have achieved levels of mutual 
ilanderstanding that were quite unimag- 
inable at the time we decided in Geneva 
iJi.n 1985 to embark on regional experts 
ii :onsultations. And we have made sig- 
nificant progress on some of the 
kjbonflicts that have long engendered dis- 
trust in our relations — most notably 
Afghanistan and southern Africa. 

Yet, we must be clear eyed about 
fvvhat we have accomplished and what 
(•remains to be clone. We are making 
.some progress in disengaging the East- 
, West confrontation from several of the 
Imany regional conflicts that continue to 
trouble our world. This is no small 



achievement, although much work re- 
mains to be done in such areas as 
Korea, Indochina, and Central Amer- 
ica. We look forward to further bold 
and farsighted Soviet decisions such as 
the one your leadership made regarding 
Afghanistan. We await signs of "new 
thinking" in your approach to Central 
America, as well as indications of 
perestroika and glasnost in Cuba, Nic- 
aragua, North Korea, and Vietnam. 

We have been less successful in 
promoting political settlements among 
the warring parties to regional or local 
disputes. Moscow and Washington can- 
not determine the outcome of internal 
political conflicts, and an approach 
which assumes we can impose settle- 
ments is bound to fail. Yet, we should 
persist in our efforts to promote na- 
tional reconciliation, realizing that our 
influence will be limited and that other- 
parties may usefully substitute for our 
involvement. 

The United Nations can play a role 
in facilitating the resolution of such 
conflicts, but two things must happen 
first. The parties to a dispute must 
genuinely want the help of the United 
Nations; and the UN member states — 
especially those on the Security Coun- 
cil — must agree on concrete actions for 
peacemaking. 

We can draw satisfaction from the 
fact that we have now moved a number 
of regional disputes from overt conflict 
to a process of political resolution. The 
challenge for the future will be whether 
we can prevent U.S. -Soviet differences 
from becoming caught up in regional 
conflicts yet to emerge. And that test 
will have an especially important bear- 
ing on our ability to broaden our coop- 
erative agenda. 

Finally, the bilateral dimension 
of our agenda has produced most of 
the agreements that have been signed 
at ministerial meetings and summits 
in the past 2 years. None has been as 
dramatic as the INF Treaty, but taken 
together they form the building blocks 
of a more constructive relationship. 

As perestroika advances, we are 
finding new areas of common interest 
for practical cooperation. Cultural and 
scientific exchanges have expanded dra- 
matically in the last 2 years. And our 
bilateral trade and economic relations 
are also likely to expand as the Soviet 
economy shifts toward a market 
orientation. 

We must recognize, however, that 
economic success in today's world does 
not come with membership in this or 
that international organization. It is 



based on being competitive in a rapidly 
changing global marketplace; it comes 
with producing goods and services that 
are world class in quality. Achieving 
these objectives will depend largely on 
the progress of your reforms. Many na- 
tions before you have discovered that 
there are no easy solutions to such fun- 
damental problems as price reform or 
currency convertibility; yet they are 
the basis of your integration into the 
international economy. 

Limitations and Responsibilities 

In conclusion, Americans draw great 
hope from the remarkable progress 
made in U.S. -Soviet relations since the 
Geneva summit of 1985. We now have 
before us new opportunities to resolve 
a broad range of problems that have 
long troubled our relationship, and to 
build new patterns of cooperation. In 
January of 1989, a new American Ad- 
ministration will inherit a rich agenda 
for U.S. -Soviet relations and a 
strengthened foundation of public sup- 
port for continuity along the road that 
was opened 3 years ago by President 
Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev. 

All the same, we must be realistic 
about the limits of cooperation. What 
are the limits? First and foremost, we 
will remain competitors with conflicting 
interests in some very fundamental re- 
spects. We are certainly not going to 
abandon our alliances, or our defenses, 
even as we strive to lower and stabilize 
the level of military confrontation. We 
will continue to have differences of view 
about how to organize national econo- 
mies and the international economic 
order. We each see advantages to being 
participants in a vigorously expanding 
global economy; yet success in that 
economy is a function of our respective 
abilities to adjust to an increasingly 
competitive, market-oriented world eco- 
nomic system. 

We will continue to have fundamen- 
tal differences about the relationship 
between the state and the individual. 
Yet, both our governments have made 
international commitments to respect 
fundamental human rights and provide 
conditions where these rights can be 
fully exercised. Now the challenge 
is to thoroughly implement those 
agreements. 

We must also deal promptly and 
wisely with the political tensions which 
arise all too readily as a consequence of 
the dispersal of economic and scientific- 
power and of the growing multipolarity 



jjpepartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



41 



EUROPE 



of the world. For example, the United 
States will continue to improve its rela- 
tions with the states of Eastern Eu- 
rope. This is natural and should be 
understood as without threat to the So- 
viet Union's interests in the region. In 
similar fashion, as the Soviet Union de- 
velops its relations with Western Eu- 
rope, we expect that Soviet leaders 
will recognize U.S. interests in the 
"common European home." Rapid 
change always heightens uneasiness, 
and our official dialogue will be all the 
more important for dispelling mistrust. 

Some countries may not always re- 
act positively to new forms of U.S. -So- 
viet cooperation. Some may exaggerate 
in their own minds the extent of U.S.- 
Soviet "collusion," and they may seek 
to resist our cooperative efforts. Should 
these concerns arise, they must be ad- 
dressed. Our task will be to reassure 
allies and friends that improvements in 
U.S. -Soviet relations will not come at 
the expense of older and deeper friend- 
ships and alliance commitments. 

And, as Ambassador Mendelevich 
suggested last spring to [the Depart- 
ment's] "Open Forum" audience, our 
two countries have a special responsi- 
bility to manage our differences so that 
we compete without becoming hostile 
adversaries, and we must seek new 
opportunities to transform our re- 
lationship from that of opponents to 
partners. 

Recognizing these limitations on 
U.S. -Soviet relations and our special 
responsibilities, it is our unique oppor- 
tunity as policy planners to identify 
areas of cooperation which will enhance 
our national interests and international 
security. We must strive — as Ambas- 
sador Mendelevich has suggested — to 
make the process of improving Soviet- 
American relations irreversible this 
time. Our common goal must be to at- 
tempt to redirect our competition into 
areas that are less threatening to our 
mutual security and to find cooperative 
ways to build the better world we each 
seek. 



NATO Defense 

Planning Committee Meets in Brussels 



'See Department of State Bulletin of 
January 1988, p. 3, "National Success and 
International Stability in a Time of 
Change," December 4, 1987, before the 
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.; 
Department of State Bulletin of June 1988, 
p. 18, "The Winning Hand: American Lead- 
ership and the Global Economy," April 28, 
1988, before the annual dinner of the Mas- 
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Wash- 
ington, D.C.; and Department of State 
Bulletin of January 1989, p. 6, "The Ecol- 
ogy of International Change," October 28, 
1988, before the Commonwealth Club of 
California, San Francisco. ■ 



The Defense Ministers of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
met in Brussels December 1-2, 1988. 
The United States was represented by 
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci 
III. Following is the text of the final 
communique issued December 2. 

1. The Defense Planning Committee of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in 
ministerial session in Brussels on 1st and 
2nd December 1988. 

2. We reaffirmed our commitment to 
preserve the peace, freedom and common 
security of the Alliance through effective 
deterrence and defense and, on this basis, 
to pursue our arms control objectives of 
enhancing security and stability at lower 
levels of forces. Only by maintaining ade- 
quate military strength and political soli- 
darity will we be able to continue to meet 
with confidence the challenge of the new 
opportunities for dialogue and broader co- 
operation with the East, including arms 
control. 

3. In this respect, we welcome and are 
encouraged by the signs of change in the 
policies of the Soviet Union, under the 
leadership of Mr. Gorbachev, and of some 
other members of the Warsaw Pact. These 
offer the potential for improved and pro- 
gressively more stable East-West rela- 
tions. However, the Soviet Union, despite 
its declared intention of moving towards a 
defensive doctrine, maintains a formidable 
array of nuclear and conventional forces. 
These continue to be modernized at a 
steady and impressive rate and are struc- 
tured and deployed for offensive opera- 
tions. We have, as yet, seen no evidence of 
relaxation in the scale of the Soviet Union's 
military effort which continues to absorb 
an estimated 15 per cent to 17 per cent of 
its GNP and remains the reality against 
which we must measure our own defenses. 
We, therefore, call upon the Soviet Union 
to make changes in its military capabilities 
consistent with its declared policies. 

4. Central to our discussions has been 
the need for all Alliance members to share 
equitably the roles, risks and respon- 
sibilities, as well as the benefits, of our 
collective defense. This fundamental princi- 
ple was the basis for the preparation of a 
wide-ranging and major report on enhanc- 
ing NATO's collective security. This report, 
which we have agreed and which has been 
published, addresses the perceptions and 
realities involved in the fair sharing of the 
burdens and the benefits of Alliance mem- 
bership. It concludes that, as the Alliance 
approaches its 40th anniversary, its 
strength and cohesion remain as firm as 
ever with major contributions being made 



by both the European and North Americar 
pillars of the Alliance. Nevertheless, the 
report has also shown that there are signif 
icant variations among countries in the 
scale and nature of their contributions and 
has identified a number of areas where fur 
ther improvements could be made to 
strengthen the Alliance's defense 
capability. 

5. The report emphasizes the need to 
provide adequate resources for defense anc 
to use them as efficiently as possible. Our 
decisions on the rebasing and common 
funding arrangements for the United 
States' 401st Tactical Fighter Wing in Italy 
in continued support of the Southern Re- 
gion, and the co-operative effort leading tc 
the establishment of a NATO Composite 
Force for the Northern Region are two re- 
cent examples of our collective resolve in 
this respect. In addition, we have agreed 
that a study should be undertaken by the 
NATO Military Authorities with the coun- 
tries concerned on how to enhance the ef- 
fectiveness and availability of operational 
capabilities of the European forces in the 
Northern Army Group area which will ex- 
amine the feasibility of forming a multina- 
tional division. The report also concludes 
that sustained public support for defense 
and security will continue to be of funda- 
mental importance. In this context, we 
considered the problem of how to ensure 
that our forces continue to receive the nee 
essary level of training while seeking to 
minimize the impact on our publics. We ar 
determined to meet fully the demanding 
challenges identified by the report. We wi 
periodically review progress as part of our 1 
regular planning process. 

(3. At the recent meeting of the Nu- 
clear Planning Group in The Hague, we 
expressed our views on the nuclear re- 
quirements of Alliance strategy and on th 
work underway to ensure the continued 
credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent 
posture. At our present meeting, we con- 
centrated attention on conventional forces 
and, in this context, reaffirmed our com- 
mitment to enhance the effectiveness of 
this equally essential component of our 
strategy. Our discussion of the Annual De 
fense Review underlined that the aims we 
defined under the Conventional Defense 
Improvements (GDI) initiative remain cru> 
cial, particularly in the present era of con' 
strained defense resources. We welcomed 
the further progress that has been made 
towards redressing key deficiencies in our 
conventional forces, which has been 
achieved in part by applying our resource: 
with greater efficiency to the agreed pri- 
ority areas; although we noted that much 
more remains to be done. In this context, 
we agreed that it is essential that coun- 
tries make every effort to meet those fore 
goals most relevant to CDI. 



42 



Department of State Bulletin/February 198 



EUROPE 



7. We adopted the NATO Force Plan 
Ifor 1989-1993, and we reaffirmed our com- 
Jmitment to maintain, and where necessary 
[pigment, the momentum of the GDI pro- 
gramme and thus redress existing short- 
jfalls. This is an important challenge to the 
(Alliance: we must seek not only to increase 
Ithe resources available for defense but also 
jobtain greater value for the money we de- 
Ivote to defense. To this end, we are deter- 
Imined to further our concerted efforts 
[towards increased co-operation in order to 
Pachieve collective improvements which are 
nbeyond the resources of individual 
Ijcountries. 

8. We welcomed the progress being 
made in the participation of Spain in Al- 
liance defense planning and the approval of 
(the guidelines for the development of co- 
ordination agreements between the Major 

|NATO Commanders and the Spanish Mili- 
tary Authorities for Spain's military contri- 
bution to the common defense outside the 
[integrated military structure. 

9. We stressed the need to enhance 
[Alliance efforts to increase the overall level 
lof assistance to Greece, Portugal and Tur- 
key. In this respect, Military Assistance 

^Requirements which we have introduced 
Into our defense planning process this year 
■will focus attention on the specific needs of 
these countries. We welcomed the exami- 
nation that is now in hand of assistance 
through research and cost-sharing arrange- 
Inents w'ithin armaments projects, and we 
look forward to early results. We will con- 
tinue to explore, in the context of fair 
Sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities 
In the Alliance, opportunities that such ar- 
rangements might offer for broadening the 
oasis of assistance. 

10. We noted with particular satisfac- 
tion that the trial of a NATO Conventional 
[Armaments Planning System (NATO 
CAPS) is proceeding well. We reaffirmed 

>ur commitment to the success of this 
Important Alliance initiative. The Alliance 
has continued its work in a range of co- 
i jperative armaments projects, including 
| hose being pursued as a result of United 
States legislation. These endeavors, con- 

lucted on the basis of fair and equitable 
trade practices among all the Allies, have 
l.he potential to improve substantially effi- 
ciency and economy in equipping our con- 
ventional forces, thus contributing to 
Alliance strength, cohesion and solidarity. 

iVe continue to attach great importance to 
».he sharing of technology among the mem- 

3er countries of the Alliance and to the 
protection of militarily relevant technology. 

11. Concluding our regular Biennial 
Review of the NATO Common Funded In- 
frastructure Programme, we agreed an ini- 
tial commitment to the first two years 

1991 and 1992) of the next six-year Slice 
Eroup which will be sufficient to maintain 
.he current real rate of NATO infrastruc- 
ture programming. In this context, we 
kgreed to provide additional funding for 
\he NATO Common Infrastructure Pro- 



gramme to accommodate the relocation of 
the United States' 401st Tactical Fighter 
Wing from Spain to Italy. 

12. Arms control is an integral part of 
our security policy. We reaffirmed that we 
will continue to explore all opportunities, 
consistent with our security requirements, 
for effectively verifiable arms control 
agreements. In Europe the conventional 
disparities, as evidenced in the facts and 
figures on conventional forces published by 
the Alliance on 25th November, remain at' 
the core of our concerns, and this field of- 
fers the greatest potential for enhancing 
security. Our objective is to establish a se- 
cure and stable balance of forces at lower 
levels through the elimination of disparities 
and, as a matter of priority, the Warsaw 
Pact capability for launching surprise at- 



tack and initiating large-scale offensive ac- 
tion. We, therefore, look forward to the 
early commencement of Conventional Sta- 
bility Talks covering Europe from the At- 
lantic to the Urals following a substantial 
and balanced outcome to the Vienna Fol- 
low-up Meeting of the Conference on Se- 
curity and Co-operation in Europe. Until 
then the MBFR [mutual and balanced force 
reductions] negotiations will continue. 

13. We remain determined to sustain 
our efforts to provide the necessary nu- 
clear and conventional forces of sufficient 
quantity, quality and diversity to ensure 
the continued credibility of the Alliance's 
strategy of flexible response and forward 
defense. ■ 



North Atlantic Council Session 
Held in Brussels 



Secretary Shultz attended the reg- 
ular semiannual session of the North 
Atlantic Council ministerial meeting 
in Brussels December 8-9, 1988. Fol- 
lowing are the texts of a statement on 
conventional aryns control, the final 
communique, extracts from the min- 
utes of the meeting, and Secretary 
Shultz's news conference held at the end 
of the meeting. 



STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL 

ARMS CONTROL, 
DEC. 8, 19881 

1. In their statement "Conventional 
Arms Control: The Way Ahead," the 
Heads of State and Government par- 
ticipating in the meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council in March 1988 empha- 
sized that the imbalance in conventional 
forces remains at the core of Europe's 
security concerns. We shall be present- 
ing specific proposals at the negotiating 
table to redress this imbalance. 

2. We look forward to the early 
commencement of the two negotiations 
we have proposed: one on conventional 
stability between the 23 members of 
the two military Alliances in Europe 
and one on confidence- and security- 
building measures among all 35 signato- 
ries of the Helsinki Final Act. 

3. In these negotiations, we will be 
guided by: 



• The conviction that the existing 
military confrontation is the result, not 
the cause, of the painful division of 
Europe; 

• The principle of the indivisible se- 
curity of all our nations. We shall reject 
calls for partial security arrangements 
or proposals aimed at separate 
agreements; 

• The hope that the new thinking in 
the Soviet Union will open the way for 
mutual agreement on realistic, mili- 
tarily significant and verifiable arrange- 
ments which enhance security at lower 
levels. 

Towards Stability 

4. The major threat to stability in Eu- 
rope comes from those weapons sys- 
tems which are capable of counting 
large-scale offensive operations and of 
seizing and holding territory. These 
are, above all, main battle tanks, artil- 
lery and armored troop carriers. It is 
in these very systems that the East has 
such a massive preponderance. Indeed, 
the Soviet Union itself possesses more 
tanks and artillery than all the other 
members of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Alliance combined. And they are con- 
centrated in a manner which raises 
grave concerns about the strategy 
which they are intended to support, as 
well as their role in maintaining the 
division of Europe. 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



43 



EUROPE 



5. The reductions announced by the 
Soviet Union are a positive contribution 
to correcting this situation. They indi- 
cate the seriousness with which the 
conventional imbalances, which we have 
long highlighted as a key problem of 
European security, are now also ad- 
dressed by the Soviet government. We 
also welcome the declared readiness of 
the Soviet Union to adjust their force 
posture. The important thing is now to 
build on these hopeful developments at 
the negotiating table in order to correct 
the large asymmetries that will still re- 
main and to secure a balance at lower 
levels of forces. For this, it will be nec- 
essary to deal with the location, na- 
tionality and the state of readiness of 
forces, as well as their numbers. Our 
proposals will address these issues in 
the following specific ways: 

• We shall propose an overall limit 
on the total holdings of armaments in 
Europe. This limit should be substan- 
tially lower than existing levels, in the 
case of tanks close to a half. This would 
mean an overall limit of about 40,000 
tanks. 

• In our concept of stability, no 
country should be able to dominate the 
continent by force of arms. We shall, 
therefore, also propose that no country 
should be entitled to possess more than 
a fixed proportion, such as 30 percent, 
of the total holdings in Europe of the 23 
participants in each equipment cate- 
gory. In the case of tanks, this would 
result in an entitlement of no more than 
about 12,000 tanks for any one country. 

• Limiting numbers and nationality 
of forces would not by itself affect the 
stationing of forces on other countries' 
territory. Stationed forces, particularly 
those in active combat units, are espe- 
cially relevant to surprise attack. We 
shall propose limits on such forces. 

• Our proposal will apply to the 
whole of Europe. In order to avoid un- 
due concentration of these weapon cate- 
gories in certain areas of Europe, we 
shall propose appropriate sub-limits. 

6. To buttress the resulting reduc- 
tions in force levels in the whole of Eu- 
rope, we shall propose stabilizing 
measures. These could include meas- 
ures of transparency, notifications and 
constraint applied to the deployment, 
movement and levels of readiness of 
conventional armed forces, which in- 
clude conventional armaments and 
equipment. 



7. Finally, we shall require a 
rigorous and reliable regime for moni- 
toring and verification. This would in- 
clude the periodic exchange of detailed 
data about forces and deployments and 
the right to conduct on-site inspections. 

Towards Transparency 

8. Greater transparency is an essential 
requirement for real stability. There- 
fore, within the framework of the 
CSCE [Conference on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe] process, the nego- 
tiations on confidence- and security- 
building measures form an essential 
complement to those on conventional 
stability. We are encouraged thus far 
by the successful implementation of the 
Stockholm Document, and we consider- 
that the momentum must be 
maintained. 

9. In order to create transparency 
of military organization, we plan to in- 
troduce a proposal for a wide-ranging, 
comprehensive annual exchange of in- 
formation concerning military organiza- 
tion, manpower and equipment, as well 
as major weapon deployment programs. 
To evaluate this information, we will 
propose modalities for the establish- 
ment of a random evaluation system. 

10. In addition, in order to build on 
the success of the Stockholm Document 
and to create greater transparency of 
military activities, we will propose 
measures in areas such as: 

• More detailed information with 
regard to the notification of military 
exercises; 

• Improvements in the arrange- 
ments for observing military activities; 

• Greater openness and predictabil- 
ity about military activities; 

• A strengthening of the regime for 
ensuring compliance and verification. 

11. Finally, we shall propose addi- 
tional measures designed to improve 
contacts and communications between 
participating states in the military 
field; to enhance access for military 
staffs and media representatives; and to 
increase mutual understanding of mili- 
tary capabilities, behavior and force 
postures. We will also propose 
modalities for an organized exchange of 
views on military doctrine tied to ac- 
tual force structures, capabilities and 
dispositions in Europe. 



A Vision for Europe 

12. We will pursue these distinct nego- 
tiations within the framework of the 
CSCE process, because we believe that 
a secure peace cannot be achieved with- 
out steady progress on all aspects of 
the confrontation which has divided 
Europe for more than four decades. 
Moreover, redressing the disparity in 
conventional forces in Europe would re- 
move an obstacle to the achievement of 
the better political relationship betweer 
all states of Europe to which we aspire. 
Conventional arms control must, there- 
fore, be seen as part of a dynamic proc- 
ess which addresses the military, 
political and human aspects of this 
division. 

13. The implementation of our pres 
ent proposals and of those we are mak- 
ing for further confidence- and security 
building measures will involve a quan- 
tum improvement in European security 
We will wish to agree and implement 
them as soon as possible. In the light c 
their implementation, we would then b 
willing to contemplate further steps to 
enhance stability and security in Eu- 
rope, for example: 

• Further reductions or limitations 
of conventional armaments and 
equipment; 

• The restructuring of armed force 
to enhance defensive capabilities and 
further reduce offensive capabilities. 

Our vision remains that of a conti- 
nent where military forces only exist t 
prevent war and to ensure self-defens< 
not for the purpose of initiating aggre 
sion or for political or military 
intimidation. 



FINAL COMMUNIQUE, 
DEC. 9, 19882 

1. Our meeting has taken place amid clea 
signs of change in the internal and exterr 
policies of the Soviet Union and of some ( 
its allies. Promising prospects are openin 
up for an improved East-West dialogue. ) 
are encouraged by this trend which, if sui 
tained, would provide us with an unprece 
dented opportunity to shape a better 
international environment reflecting our 
basic values and the aspirations of our 
peoples. 

Among the most promising recent de 
velopments is the address made by Presi- 
dent Gorbachev at the 43rd UN General 
Assembly, which indicates the extent of 
change in Soviet policies. 



44 



Department of State Bulletin/February 191 * 



EUROPE 



We will continue to seize every oppor- 
tunity to co-operate in the search for polit- 
eal solutions to East-West differences, 
rith a view to promoting our ultimate aim 
f a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe. 

2. In the pursuit of this endeavor, we 
jok for further tangible and lasting 
hanges addressing directly the issues di- 
iding East and West. We reiterate our 
illingness to work closely with the Soviet 

Inion and its allies in the search for ways 
o ease and finally overcome the painful 
ivision of Europe. 

We will continue to evaluate closely 
he current developments in Eastern Eu- 
ope, where pressures for movement to- 
rards political and economic reform are 

ounting. While welcoming progress 
chieved in certain areas, we need to take a 
ealistic view of developments. The Soviet 
Jnion and other Eastern countries still 
ave to meet fully their obligations on 
uman rights. Nevertheless, we are en- 
ouraged by the recent introduction or 
nnouncement of important measures in 
his field. In the defense area, we express 
he hope that President Gorbachev's ad- 
ress also represents the starting point of 

new approach by the Soviet Union to the 
ize and structure of their military forces 
nd programs, which both in the nuclear 
nd conventional fields still exceed any 
easonable defense need. 

3. Our approach to these developments 
ill continue to be based on: 

• The validity of the Harmel Report 
dth its two complementary and mutually 
einforcing principles, adequate military 
trength and political solidarity and, on 
hat basis, the search for constructive di- 
logue and co-operation, including arms 
ontrol; 

• The common interests, as well as the 
istorical, cultural and moral values, that 
ie the United States, Canadian and Euro- 
ean members of our Alliance indivisibly 
ogether; these are at the basis of the eom- 
litment of the North American democ- 
acies to the preservation of peace and 
ecurity in Europe. A free, independent 
nd increasingly united Europe is vital to 
lorth America's security; 

• The continuing validity of our strat- 
gy of deterrence for the prevention of war 
i the terms set out in the declaration of 
mr Heads of State and Government at 
heir Summit Meeting of March of this 

i ear; 

• Our firm resolve to maintain the 
trategic unity of the Alliance and the 
>rinciple of indivisibility of security. 

4. The security policy of the Alliance 
mbraces a broad spectrum of political as 
rell as military concerns. We attach par- 
icular importance to the CSCE process, 
.'hich provides a road map for stable and 
onstructive relations between East and 
Vest and for a dynamic evolution in Eu- 
ope. We note with regret that a number of 






governments in the East still continue to 
ignore important provisions of the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Doc- 
ument; full implementation of the under- 
takings contained in these documents, 
including full respect for human rights, is 
an essential requirement for genuine peace 
and enhancement of mutual confidence. We 
will continue to strive for the conclusion of 
the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Vienna in 
the immediate future, with a substantial 
and balanced concluding document. 

5. Arms control is an integral part of 
Alliance security policy. In expressing full 
support for the United States position in 
the START | strategic arms reduction talks] 
negotiations, i.e., its aim to reach a 50 
percent reduction in the strategic nuclear 
forces of the US and the Soviet Union, we 
welcome the substantial progress achieved, 
including preliminary agreement on key el- 
ements, and look forward to a timely, suc- 
cessful conclusion of these negotiations. 
We reaffirm the importance of the INF 
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] 
Treaty and welcome its smooth implemen- 
tation. We also take note of progress to- 
wards the early ratification of the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Thresh- 
old Test Ban Treaty as a result of the nego- 
tiations on the verification protocols to 
these treaties. 

6. We recall the document on conven- 
tional arms control issued by the Heads of 
State and Government in March of this 
year, which indicated that the conventional 
imbalance in Europe remains at the core of 
Europe's security concerns. 

We look forward to beginning as soon 
as possible conventional stability negotia- 
tions, within the framework of the CSCE 
process, with the objective of establishing 
a secure and stable balance of forces at 
lower levels, between the 23 members of 
the two military Alliances in Europe. We 
want a situation in Europe in w'hich force 
postures, as well as numbers and deploy- 
ments of weapons systems, no longer make 
a surprise attack and a large-scale offen- 
sive action a feasible option, an option 
which we have never possessed or desired. 
Our vision remains a continent where mili- 
tary forces should only exist to prevent 
war and to ensure self-defense, not for the 
purpose of military aggression and not for 
the purposes of political or military intim- 
idation. We, therefore, welcome the latest 
pronouncement by the Soviet leadership 
regarding significant reductions of Soviet 
conventional forces in Europe and re- 
structuring of the remaining forces. This 
implicitly acknowledges our long-held view 
that redressing the conventional imbalance 
is a key to more security and stability in 
Europe. Implementation of these measures 
would be a very important first step in this 
direction and reduce, but not eliminate, 
the conventional imbalances. In particular, 
it would provide a very favorable impetus 
to the conventional stability negotiations. 

The conventional stability talks will be 
accompanied by distinct negotiations on 
further confidence-building measures 



)epartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



among the 35 CSCE participants. Such ne- 
gotiations will have to build upon and ex- 
pand on the results of the Stockholm 
Conference, which marked a significant 
step towards increasing transparency and 
contributed to greater confidence and pre- 
dictability of military activities in Europe. 
To promote transparency and confidence, 
we have recently taken the initiative of 
publishing data on conventional forces in 
Europe. We look to the countries of the 
Warsaw Pact Organization and other par- 
ticipating states to reciprocate this effort. 

Recognizing the urgency and central 
importance of addressing conventional sta- 
bility and increased confidence in Europe, 
we have adopted a separate statement out- 
lining our proposal for the forthcoming ne- 
gotiations on conventional stability and 
further confidence- and security-building 
measures in Europe. 

The member states participating in the 
MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduc- 
tions] talks emphasize their agreement to 
the continuation of these talks until a new 
mandate for negotiations on conventional 
stability has emerged. They also agree that 
these talks should be concluded before the 
start of new negotiations. 

7. We reiterate our full commitment to 
the goal of an early conclusion of a truly 
world-wide, comprehensive and effectively 
verifiable ban on chemical weapons. 

In that spirit, we endorse the call for a 
conference in Paris of the states party to 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other con- 
cerned states. We will lend our full support 
to its work. We expect that the conference 
will strengthen the authority of the Pro- 
tocol and of principles prohibiting the use 
of chemical weapons, recall the condemna- 
tion by the international community of the 
recourse to these weapons and give a 
strong further impetus to the negotiations 
on a total and effectively verifiable ban on 
chemical weapons. 

The solution of the outstanding issues 
in the negotiations at the Geneva Confer- 
ence on Disarmament will not only require 
greater openness about capabilities in 
order to promote more confidence between 
the participating states but also the inten- 
sification of the technical work, in particu- 
lar on the crucial issue of verification, 
needed to underpin the negotiating effort. 
In the perspective of a chemical weapons 
ban, we also underline the importance of 
stringent controls on the export of com- 
modities related to chemical weapons pro- 
duction. Such a ban is all the more 
imperative as a priority at a time of re- 
ports of use of these weapons against civil- 
ians and continuing proliferation in various 
parts of the world. 

8. As called for in the Ministerial 
statement issued in June 1988 in Madrid, 
we received a written report on the further 
development of the comprehensive concept 
of arms control and disarmament. We re- 
viewed the state of work and welcomed the 
progress achieved to date. 



45 



EUROPE 



The Council in Permanent Session was 
directed to pursue intensively, in the per- 
spective of the comprehensive concept, its 
consideration of all outstanding arms con- 
trol issues, in accordance with the Reyk- 
javik statement of June 1987 and to submit 
a complete report by our next meeting. 

9. We reaffirm our commitment to 
share fairly the risks, burdens and respon- 
sibilities, as well as the benefits, of our 
participation in the Alliance. This commit- 
ment to equitable sharing is a fundamen- 
tal principle of the Alliance and a pre- 
requisite for maintaining its cohesion and 
solidarity. We all attach great importance, 
in an evolving political, trade and economic 
environment, to maintaining balance and 
equity in our partnership. 

The countries concerned welcome the 
publication of a major and wide-ranging re- 
port on enhancing the collective security of 
the Alliance. It breaks new ground, and its 
conclusions and recommendations chart a 
clear course of action for the future. The 
report also underlines the determination of 
the countries concerned to ensure the 
provision of adequate resources available 
for defense and to exert the maximum 
effort to obtain the greatest return on 
their defense investment. 

10. The maintenance of a calm situation 
in and around Berlin and the achievement 
of practical improvements for Berliners re- 
main of fundamental importance for East- 
West relations. In this context, the Al- 
liance strongly supports the current West- 
ern initiative on Berlin. It welcomes 
progress over Berlin's inclusion in interna- 
tional agreements. 

The Alliance supports the continued 
efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany 
to strengthen dialogue and co-operation 
with the GDR [German Democratic Re- 
public] in the interest of the German peo- 
ple, including Berliners, and thus to 
contribute to peace and stability in 
Europe. 

11. We continue to follow closely the 
situation in Afghanistan. We previously 
noted the start of the Soviet troop with- 
drawal and expect the Soviet Union to re- 
sume that process and to meet the 15th 
February deadline. We support the aspira- 
tion of the Afghan people to exercise their 
right to self-determination and to recover 
their country's full sovereignty and 
independence. 

12. We reiterate our condemnation of 
terrorism in all its manifestations and re- 
affirm our determination to combat it. We 
believe international co-operation to be es- 
sential in the eradication of this scourge. 

13. In the spirit of Article 2 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and in view of the 
prosperity gap among the various members 
of the Alliance, we renew our support for 
our economically less favored partners and 
reaffirm our goal of improving the present 
level of co-operation and assistance within 
the Alliance. 



14. We note and welcome the approval 
of the guidelines for the co-ordination 
agreements to be concluded between the 
Major NATO Commanders and the Spanish 
Military Authorities. We consider this to 
be an important event for the Alliance. It 
opens the way to a significant Spanish mili- 
tary contribution to the common defense 
outside the integrated military structure. 

15. We agree that civil emergency 
planning and preparedness are essential el- 
ements in NATO's policy of deterrence and 
defense. The human and financial re- 
sources required for civil preparedness 
constitute a cost-effective contribution to 
that policy, as well as to the efficiency of 
peacetime disaster relief arrangements. 
Civil emergency planning remains a re- 
sponsibility of member countries. To be 
fully effective, the actions of the countries 
in this field must, however, be comple- 
mented by the maximum co-operation be- 
tween capitals and at Alliance level. 

16. As our Alliance approaches its 40th 
Anniversary, we acknowledge the results 
of our common endeavor, the enduring vi- 
tality of our organization and its ability to 
adapt to change while upholding its basic 
purposes and principles. The success of our 
past efforts to achieve a safer and more 
peaceful world enhances our confidence in 
the future. 

17. The Spring 1989 meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Ses- 
sion will be held in London on 8th and 9th 
June. 



EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES. 
DEC. 9, 1988' 

In addition to the Communique, Foreign 
Ministers decided to publish the following 
extracts from the Minutes of their meeting 
in Brussels on 8th and 9th December 1988. 



East-West Trade 

Recalling previous statements, Ministers 
reaffirmed that trade conducted on the 
basis of commercially sound terms and mu- 
tual advantage, that avoids preferential 
treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes 
to constructive East-West relations. At the 
same time, bilateral economic relations 
with the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Eastern Europe must remain consistent 
with broad Allied security concerns. These 
include avoiding dependence on the Soviet 
Union or contributing to Soviet military 
capabilities. In order to avoid further use 
by the Soviet Union of some forms of trade 
to enhance its military strength, the Allies 
will remain vigilant in their continuing re- 
view of the security aspects of East-West 
economic relations. This work will assist 
Allied governments in the conduct of their 
policies in this field. 

As the issue of East- West trade is of 
importance, the Allies will continue ex- 
changes on this subject. 



The Situation in the Mediterranean 

Ministers noted the report on the Situatioi 
in the Mediterranean. In view of the actual 
and potential impact on Alliance security c 
events in the area, they requested the 
Council in Permanent Session to continue 
to consult on the question and to submit 
further reports at their future meetings. 



Armaments Co-Operation and Planning 

Ministers examined the report by the Com 
ferenee of National Armaments Directors 
(CNAD). They noted with particular satisi 
faction that the trial of a NATO Conven- 
tional Armaments Planning System 
(CAPS) is proceeding well, and they re- 
affirmed the great importance they attach 
to this major Alliance initiative. 

Ministers reviewed CNAD progress ii 
a range of co-operative armaments proj- 
ects, including those being pursued as a 
result of United States legislation, and 
welcomed the positive contribution made 
by these co-operative projects to the mair 
tenance of a credible conventional defense 
posture. 

Ministers noted with interest that the 
CNAD is examining Canadian proposals 
for assistance to countries with lesser de- 
veloped defense industries, by means of r| 
search and development, cost-sharing 
arrangements within co-operative arms 
projects. They looked forward to receivin 
firm recommendations from the CNAD in 
this area at the earliest opportunity. 



SECRETARY'S NEWS 

CONFERENCE, 
DEC. 9, 1988^ 

The atmosphere for our just conclude! 
meeting here in Brussels has been so- 
bered by the earthquake in the Cau- 
casus affecting people mostly in 
Armenia, the full dimensions of which 
we still are learning, and by the air- 
plane crash in Germany in which ther 
have been several casualties. I want t' 
express my deep sympathy to all af- 
fected. These are tragedies we all fee 
and we extend our sympathy and wan 
to be as helpful as we possibly can be 
This is my last NATO ministerial 
after a great many over a 6V2-year 
period; somebody counted up that I'd 
been to Brussels over 30 times and hi 
ministerials elsewhere and lots of indi 
vidual meetings. I've been very move' 
by the warm words that have been ex 
pressed by my colleagues during the 
course of our meetings and at the end 
And I reciprocate these sentiments of 
friendship and respect. 



46 



Department of State Bulletin/February 19J 



EUROPE 



The alliance, it seems to me, is in a 
■rv strong position. It's cohesive, it's 
formed about what is taking place, 
id it's informing our publics. We look 
iw to the prospect of conventional 
ms talks, which we have long sought, 
i the concept of the Atlantic to the 
rals. And we look to those with confi- 
nce on the basis of a constructive and 
eative proposal which we are pre- 
red to make as soon as the talks 
art. You've had an indication as to 
st what that proposal will be, dis- 
ibuted yesterday. 

I take a lot of personal satisfaction 
a citizen of the free world that this 
eat anchor for the security of the free 
Drld is strong and in place, moving 
rward with strength and optimism to 
e coming agenda ahead of us. 

Q. I wonder whether you would 
ree with the sentiments expressed 
the West German Foreign Minister 
sterday that one effect of the Gor- 
ichev initiative announced in New 
»rk was to "make the question of 
iclear arms modernization even less 
nterstage in the alliance than it al- 
ady was"? 

And secondly, if I might take the 
iportunity of your presence to ask 
u whether you personally have any 
mment to make on the latest un- 
ovoked military aggression of Israel 
to Lebanon which appears to be 
iding to substantial fighting south 
Beirut. 

A. First of all, on the proposals 
at Mr. Gorbachev made in his speech 
New York, they are very welcome 
oposals. Of course, you can see why, 
ien you look at these extensive docu- 
>nts and in particular the one 
onventional Forces in Europe: The 
cts." And I'm sure you've looked at 
e facts. We welcome these decisions 
d what will happen over a 2-year pe- 
»d. They will be significant, they'll 
ike a difference, but they leave the 
.uation still very asymmetrical, and 
i shouldn't forget that. 

Let me just read you the numbers 
fiich somebody computed from just 
jking at these factual things. The cur- 
nt status on divisions has an asymme- 
y of 2.99 on their side to 1 on our 
le. After the reductions that Mr. Gor- 
.chev announced, the ratio will be 2.91 
their side to 1 on our side. 

When it comes to tanks, the ratio 
2.70 on their side to 1 on our side, 
fter the reductions it's 2.18 on their 
die to 1 on our side. 






When it comes to artillery, 2.30 to 
1; after the reductions, 1.74 to 1. Com- 
bat aircraft: 3.20 to 1 now; 3 to 1 after 
the reductions. 

So you can see why the reductions 
are welcome, but it seems to me you 
can also see why the fundamental 
asymmetry that's there remains. And 
that is why it seems to me, and to us I 
think in NATO, that we look forward to 
the conventional arms talks that will be 
getting going. And we have put for- 
ward a really constructive and creative 
proposal — or we are ready to and 
you've seen the outlines of it — and 
that's what we need to do. 

In the meantime, NATO has devel- 
oped and depended upon and found 
very successful a means of deterrence 
that has kept the peace based on our 
capacity to have a flexible response to 
whatever may happen. In maintaining 
our posture, obviously we have to main- 
tain, as we have said in our communi- 
ques, forces that are up to date. We 
want to continue to have all of those 
options before us. Modernization has 
been going on, and we have to continue 
to work at it. 

Now as far as your second question 
about the Israeli forces in Lebanon, I 
have just heard that that is so moments 
before I came in here. It's a surprise to 
me. And I'll just have to learn more 
about it before I make any comment 
about it. But I had thought by this 
time the Israelis would have learned 
their lesson about putting troops well 
inside of Lebanon. It didn't work be- 
fore, and I am surprised. But I don't 
know enough about it to comment in 
any definitive way. 

Q. Looking at the communique 
today, there are two topics that are 
quite noticeably not mentioned. One 
is troop levels in Europe. I wonder 
why that is not mentioned consider- 
ing the stress that Mr. Gorbachev put 
on it. The second is the possible mod- 
ernization of the Lance missiles, 
which is certainly a hot topic among 
the alliance, yet the communique 
does not reflect that debate at all. 
Can you tell us why? 

A. As far as troop levels are 
concerned, we have tried to learn 
something from the long period of 
negotiations in the MBFR talks and to 
say: Now we are going to go about con- 
ventional talks in new form, and let us 
think hard about what is likely to work 
and give us some results that mean 
something and have a better chance of 
being verifiable so that we don't argue 



U.S. -Greek Defense 
Agreement Expires 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 16, 19881 

The 12th round of negotiations concern- 
ing future bilateral defense cooperation 
between the United States and Greece 
concluded today in Athens. 

As is known, the 1983 Defense and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement be- 
tween the United States and Greece ex- 
pires on December 20, 1988, and, in 
accordance with its terms, on that date, 
a 17-month withdrawal period begins 
during which the terms and conditions 
of the agreement remain in force. 

Negotiations concerning future bi- 
lateral defense cooperation between the 
two countries began in November 1987 
and have been conducted in a serious 
and professional manner. They have 
covered the various aspects of a new 
agreement. Important differences re- 
main on many issues, but the negotia- 
tions are not at an impasse. 

Negotiations will, therefore, go on 
during the 17-month withdrawal period 
in order to continue exploring pos- 
sibilities for reaching a mutually satis- 
factory new agreement. The next round 
of negotiations will take place in Janu- 
ary 1989. 



lihpartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



■Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Charles Redman. 



interminably as we did in MBFR about 
data. And I think we concluded that if 
you talk about tanks and you talk about 
armored personnel carriers and things 
of that kind, you are in better shape. If 
you restrict those weapon systems that 
carry people forward and take ground, 
then the personnel question, in a way, 
kind of takes care of itself. It's not that 
we are not interested in it, but we 
think the emphasis should be placed 
elsewhere. And in doing so we think 
that we have learned something from 
the long efforts in negotiation in 
MBFR. That's the reason for that. 

As far as the Lance missile is con- 
cerned, there is no need for a discus- 
sion or deployment kind of decision to 
be reflected in any document today. It's 
something that needs to be developed 
so that the possibility, the option of do- 
ing so, and the intention of doing so is 



47 



EUROPE 



present for the future. That's all that's 
involved there, and the funding for the 
engineering work on the follow-on to 
Lance is something that will be in the 
President's budget, no doubt, as he 
submits it to Congress. That's the stage 
that it's in, so it isn't in an operational 
stage at this point. But I think every- 
one is committed to the idea that we 
have to keep our weapons systems up 
to date. And our doctrine, which has 
been successful, includes the notion of 
flexible response. 

Q. You've had a unique opportu- 
nity for a perspective of the changing 
nature of U.S. -Soviet relations over a 
6V2 year period, and I am sure you 
must take some satisfaction in the 
changing nature that has actually 
taken place. Could you give us your 
assessment — I'm sure that you don't 
like the notion of the idea that the 
cold war is dead — but your assess- 
ment as to the likelihood of a war in 
Europe today as opposed to 6V2 years 
ago when vou began to be Secretary 
of State? 

A. Contrary to what you said, I do 
like the notion that the cold war is 
dead, and I wish, I hope, it's so. There 
is still tension. There are still varieties 
of interest. There's still these big force 
structures that are there. The Berlin 
Wall is still there. If there is any single 
symbol of the cold war, that's it. So 
these problems are still there, but 
there has been a huge change in the 
capacity of the United States and the 
Soviet Union, of the East and the West 
broadly, to look at problems and to dis- 
cuss them in a careful and constructive 
way and to do something about them. 

Whether you are talking about is- 
sues of arms control, whether you're 
talking about regional hot spots, 
whether you're talking about the hu- 
man rights dimensions as outlined in 
the Helsinki Final Act, or whether 
you're talking about the variety of bilat- 
eral relationships that exists between 
the countries involved — all of these 
things are different now than they 
were. And I believe they are different 
in a good direction, a positive direction, 
a direction that gives a little more con- 
fidence; and I think that is very, very 
good. And to the extent that I've had 
an opportunity to be a part of it, I'm 
very grateful for having that opportu- 
nity and proud of it. I think that what 
people want to do as they move for- 
ward, and I'm sure they do want to do, 
is to keep these positive developments 
going and realize all of the oppor- 
tunities that there are before us. 



But at the same time, we have to 
keep remembering what, from our side, 
has helped anyway to bring all this 
about. It has been the cohesion of the 
alliance and our capacity to defend our- 
selves and, therefore, to deter any ag- 
gressive intent against us. That has 
kept the peace, and that has kept us in 
the position to have these negotiations 
and have them go forward successfully. 
If there is any lesson, that is the 
lesson; and so I think we want to stick 
with a formula that's worked and to 
continue on and try to see more posi- 
tive developments to go with those 
we've seen, particularly since Mr. Gor- 
bachev came into view in the Soviet 
Union. 

Q. Three or four days ago, the 
Greek Government had liberated a 
Palestinian whose extradition was 
asked by Italy in order to be judged 
in this country for the terrorist bomb 
attack in the synagogue of Rome in 
1982. At a time when intensified inter- 
national organization is needed to 
fight against terrorism, what is Wash- 
ington's position as far as the Greek 
Government's handling of this affair 
is concerned? And do you have any 
fears that the same will happen in the 
case of another suspected Palestinian 
terrorist named Rashid whose extra- 
dition the U.S. Administration has al- 
ready asked from the Greeks? 

A. I think the release of the ter- 
rorist that you mentioned is shocking, 
and it is a blow against the fight on 
terrorism. Terrorism is a threat to our 
societies, and we can't mince words or 
in any way shirk the actions that we 
have to take to deal with it unequiv- 
ocally. This release is bad from that 
standpoint, and I'm shocked by it. I 
hope that Mr. Rashid is — that they do 
allow him to be extradited to the 
United States. He should stand trial as 
we, in our civilized societies, try to 
work against terrorism, among other 
means, by applying the rule of law, 
which is being applied. 

It's an Italian court that found Mr. 
Abu Abbas guilty of murder involving 
the Achille Lauro and Mr. Klinghoffer. 
It's a French court that has found Mr. 
Hawari guilty in the things that they 
identified, and there are many other 
court actions: the British court in the 
case of the Syrian incident — one that 
didn't take place because they were 
alert. So we apply the rule of law in 
these cases, and we do other things, 
but when a known terrorist like this is 
released, it's shocking. I can only have 
a sense of great disappointment and a 
kind of outrage about it. 



Q. President Gorbachev's pro- 
posed unilateral cuts were given a 
time scale of 2 years. What sort of 
time scale have you in mind for the 
NATO proposals to get a 50% reduc- 
tion? Is it 2 years in that case, too, 
from the start of negotiations? 

A. First, obviously, we have to ge 
the negotiations going, and this is our 
proposal. It's a very interesting and 
creative proposal, I think, and if it is 
accepted, it will do a great deal for th« 
situation in Europe — and the world 
generally, for that matter. First, we 
have to see whether or not the Soviets 
and the Warsaw Pact countries will 
agree to it. If it is agreed to, it calls f( 
rather large-scale reductions, and peo- 
ple will want to work out what kind of 
phasing is appropriate for such large- 
scale reductions. They are reductions 
that would be considerably more — a loi 
more — than those that have been de- 
cided upon by Mr. Gorbachev. 

As I understand it, incidentally, it 
not a proposal. It's a decision about 
what they are doing. I have been liste 
ing to the military experts talk about 
it, and they think a 2-year period to 
accomplish those results is going at it 
at a pretty good pace. We'll just have 
see. But the first thing is to get agre< 
ment on the proposals, and then we'll 
have to see how they would spin out 
over a period of time. 

Q. What obstacles remain to t\\ 
commencement of conventional sta- 
bility talks in Vienna? And will you 
the United States, accept a confer- 
ence on human rights in Moscow at 
some time in the next 3 years as pai 
of the CSCE process? 

A. As far as the conventional ma 
date is concerned, it is not totally 
nailed down but is pretty close to it, 
and I think that basically, that will fail 
into place pretty well. Of course, 
Vienna has in it many other subjects, 
and we and the Soviets in general ha> 
all agreed that there must be a bal- 
anced outcome — not just an outcome 
that's satisfactory on conventional 
arms — and human rights is a central 
aspect of that balance. We have been 
making a great deal of headway in th 
regard. 

The Soviet Union, as Mr. Gor- 
bachev described in his speech, has 
concluded that the internal reforms 
that they feel are essential — and I ca 
well understand their reasoning in th 
regard — depend upon changing the r< 
lationship of the state to its citizens t i 
its citizens to each other in ways thai 



48 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1!9 



EUROPE 



Ijhey've described and ways that move 
ery much toward the kind of human 
lights arrangements that we think are 
Ihe right ones and that are described in 
Ihe Helsinki Final Act. 

Having said that, we have set out 
Jery clearly to the Soviet leadership 
Ihe things that we think are essential, 
|nd quite a few of them — most of 
Ihem — have fallen into place — essential, 
lhat is, to have us be comfortable in a 
■pan rights conference in Moscow. So 
hope that this will all fall into place as 
m/e move on. We are working at it very 
ard to do everything we can to have 
hat be so, but we aren't there yet, so I 
llways have to reserve until we see. 
liut there has been a huge amount of 
headway made, and I think the picture 
I ow is drastically different than it was 
Inly a few years ago — not only in the 
Substance but in the ability of people to 
, alk about it and to go through individ- 
ual cases and go through ideas and talk 
Ibout elements of the criminal code and 
jionstitutional arrangements in a con- 
tructive way. I feel encouraged, but 
l-'e're not there yet. 

Q. Do you feel that the Gor- 
achev decision will, in fact, present 
'fie danger of diminishing the public 
erception in Europe of the Soviet 
'ihreat and thereby stiffen resistance 
) not only nuclear modernization but 
lso military spending programs in 
eneral? 

A. People keep saying that, and 
eople keep asking that same question, 
End so obviously it is a problem on peo- 
le's minds. I think, from our stand- 
oint, it's good to raise the issue so 
lat it can be dealt with. I've tried to 
i eal with it, as others, by pointing out 
lat we welcome this development. We 
'elcome it because the asymmetries 
[ re so great, and this reduces the 
symmetries. I don't want to read from 
lis piece of paper all over again, but 
i ne asymmetries are still very great 
nd they still remain, so we have a lot 
] do. While we are looking toward, we 
ope, a successful conventional arms 
egotiation, the way to insure you are 
uccessful is to maintain your capability 
/hile you're doing the negotiating. And 
think if our recent experience brings 
ut anything, it brings that out. So this 
E something that we need to do, and I 
hink people are entitled to feel — and 
- hould feel — encouraged by what is tak- 
ing place. I certainly do. But being en- 
.ouraged doesn't mean that you just go 
I 'ananas and forget about what got you 
ere. And so you want to keep doing 
he things that are constructive. 



Q. As a followup to the last 
question and your answer, are you 
concerned about the ability of your- 
selves — Washington — to maintain its 
troop strength in Europe in the light 
of the euphoria that could be created, 
or perhaps is being created, as a re- 
sult of Mr. Gorbachev's statement? 

A. I think the commitment in the 
United States to NATO— and the rec- 
ognition that it involves a presence 
here — that commitment is a deep com- 
mitment. And that is so as far as the 
outgoing President is concerned; it's so 
as far as the incoming President is con- 
cerned; it's so as far as the Congress 
and the leadership of Congress. And as 
far as public opinion polls in the United 
States are concerned, it shows a very, 
very high support for NATO, consider- 
ably higher than any other interna- 
tional undertaking the United States is 
involved in. So the support is solid. 

There is always, of course, discus- 
sion of relative burdens and respon- 
sibilities, and I think that subject has 
been brought into some considerable 
focus and a deeper understanding of it. 
And I might say again, in this very 
productive period in the last few 
months, the report on "Shared Roles, 
Risks and Responsibilities in the Al- 
liance" is very helpful. And I might say 
it teaches the United States something 
about what others are doing, as well as 
maybe others learning something about 
what we're doing. So the facts, I think, 
are very helpful here. 

Q. You've called several times the 
Gorbachev decision significant, but I 
wonder if you would tell us what you 
think is behind the decision, whether 
you've been told there will be addi- 
tional cuts? 

Is there something tricky Mr. 
Gorbachev is up to? As you look down 
the road, do you anticipate any more 
of this from Gorbachev? I haven't 
heard anybody recently simply dis- 
miss it as a public relations gesture, 
which is the way Gorbachev initia- 
tives in the past have sometimes been 
dealt with by others. Can you ponder 
with us what might be behind it, and 
what's ahead? 

A. I don't think it's good for me to 
speculate about motivations of the So- 
viet leadership. Pm more inclined to 
take it at face value, and at face value 
what you see are, in a sense, responses 
to the asymmetrical situation — an 
asymmetrical situation that has been of 
great concern to us. It is responsive to 
the comment that the Soviet forces are 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1989 



positioned in a kind of offensive, ag- 
gressive way, so some of the things that 
are done are designed to deal with that 
question. 

Certainly, you wouldn't want to 
sort of dismiss this as a propaganda 
ploy, because there is a great deal of 
important substance in it. And I think 
it's appropriate that I and others — the 
President last night — recognize that 
fact, as we did in our statement. At the 
same time, as I have said earlier, 
there's still plenty of room to go, and 
that's why we need this negotiation and 
why we look forward to this negotiation 
on conventional arms. I sat in New 
York and listened to the General Secre- 
tary give his address, of which this was 
a component part, and he had many 
other interesting things to say that 
were of a piece of this in the sense that 
his comments on human rights were 
very interesting, I thought, and his 
comments in the beginning of his 
speech that were, let's say, philosophic 
in nature. 

I think people tend to look at some 
particular number or suggestion and 
focus on that as the key, but oftentimes 
it's more interesting to read what the 
man is saying philosophically because 
that may tell you more about where 
he's going. I thought those were inter- 
esting parts of his speech as well. It's a 
welcome development. What we need to 
do is to be able to look at something 
that is positive in the face and say so, 
and at the same time maintain our anal- 
ysis of what the situation is and con- 
tinue as we have with our own positive 
program of being able to defend our 
interests, on the one hand, and being 
ready to negotiate and work out ar- 
rangements that will allow us to do that 
at lower and lower levels of armaments. 
That's been the approach of NATO, the 
approach of the West. It's a good ap- 
proach, we're continuing with it, and 
we are in a good position. 

We have strong proposals, interest- 
ing proposals, that we're prepared to 
make; and when the opening gong 
starts at these new negotiations, NATO 
will be there, NATO will be ready with 
a good set of proposals. I hope that 
negotiations are very short and that the 
Soviets and their allies simply say, 
"Gee, those are good proposals from 
NATO, we agree." And then we can 
start worrying about such matters as 
the timing that we're asked about. 

If that doesn't happen, presumably 
in this new atmosphere, it will be possi- 
ble to come to agreement. And I think 
that that is one of the lessons, that it is 



49 



EUROPE 



possible for them and it is possible for 
us, on a matter of genuine significance, 
to come to a point where we agree to 
do something of significance that takes 
us in a direction that we both want to 
go in. It's always, in a way, easy to 
show how strong you are and how you 
can disagree, and you're not afraid to 
take everybody on in sight, and so on. 
But I think it's also a mark of good 
progress to be able to say, "All right, 
here is something that's positive, and 
here is something we can agree on," 
and be willing to step up and say "yes," 
as well as to say "no." I hope that in 
the future, as we go on and as we see 
these proposals coming forward, there 
will be an increased capacity on their 
part, as well as ours, to say "yes." 



40th Report on Cyprus 



'NATO press release M-3(88)75. 
2 NATO press release M-3(88)76. 
:l Annex to NATO press release 
M-3(88)76. 

4 Press release 255 of Dec. 12, 1988. 



MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, 
DEC. 7, 1988 1 

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I 
am submitting to you this bimonthly report 
on progress toward a negotiated settlement 
of the Cyprus question. 

I am pleased to note that the Cyprus 
intercommunal negotiating process is con- 
tinuing under the auspices of UN Secre- 
tary General Perez de Cuellar. Numerous 
sessions were held in October and early 
November, and the Secretary General 
hosted a meeting in New York November 
22-23 to review the progress of talks. I 
commend the Secretary General and the 
leaders of the two communities for their 
determination in striving for a solution to 
the conflict. 

Special Cyprus Coordinator M. James 
Wilkinson visited Cyprus from October 
24-26 and consulted with the parties, UN 
officials, and others. Mr. Wilkinson was en- 
couraged by the willingness of the two 
Cypriot leaders to engage candidly with 
each other in a discussion of very difficult 
issues and problems. The numerous meet- 
ings held in September, October, and 
November attest to the fact that a commit- 
ted effort is being made to listen, under- 
stand, and move toward resolution of 
serious differences. Mr. Wilkinson also re- 
affirmed our strong backing for the con- 
tinuation of the intercommunal dialogue. 

The United Nations hosted an open 
house in Nicosia on October 24, which 
brought together members of the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot communities. We con- 



tinue to encourage personal contact be- 
tween members of the two communities, 
which helps to foster progress toward a 
lasting solution on the island. 

Demonstrators on two occasions en- 
tered into the buffer zone. Such activities 
hinder UNFICYP's efforts to maintain the 
peace on the island and place the UN 
Force in a difficult position. We urge the 
Cypriot communities to cooperate fully 
with UNFICYP in the execution of its 
mandate from the UN Security Council. 

I would like to reiterate my admiration 
and appreciation for the efforts of United 
Nations personnel in Cyprus, particularly 
the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UN- 
FICYP). The Force remains an important 
factor in maintaining peace in Cyprus, 
providing an atmosphere of calm that per- 
mits the continuation of the search for a 
just and lasting solution to the dispute. 
Regrettably, the accumulated operating 
deficit for UNFICYP continues to grow. 
The UN Secretary General now estimates 
that the shortfall will reach $167 million by 
the end of 1988. I join the Secretary Gen- 
eral in urging the UN member nations to 
help reduce this deficit by contributing to 
the Force's operating budget. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald Reai;ai- 



1 Identical letters addressed to Jim 
Wright, Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman o 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(text from Weekly Compilation of Presiden 
tial Documents of Dec. 12, 1988). ■ 



50 



Department of State Bulletin/February 198 



MIDDLE EAST 



J.S. Opens Dialogue With PLO 



•RESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
fee. 14, 19881 

'he Palestine Liberation Organization 
■PLO) today issued a statement in 
L'hich it accepted UN Security Council 
Lesolutions 242 and 338, recognized Is- 
ael's right to exist, and renounced ter- 
brism. These have long been our 
Inditions for a substantive dialogue. 

hey have been met. Therefore, I have 

Jiuthorized the State Department to en- 

>r into substantive dialogue with PLO 

;presentatives. The Palestine Libera- 

fion Organization must live up to its 

tatements. In particular, it must dem- 
■nstrate that its renunciation of ter- 
rorism is pervasive and permanent. 

The initiation of a dialogue between 
le United States and PLO represen- 
» itives is an important step in the peace 

rocess and more so because it repre- 
ftnts the serious evolution of Palestin- 
n thinking toward realistic and 
ragmatic positions on the key issues, 
i ut the objective of the United States 
'mains, as always, a comprehensive 
..isace in the Middle East. In that light, 
Hie view this development as one more 
■ ,ep toward the beginning of direct ne- 
Dtiations between the parties, which 
one can lead to such a peace. 

The U.S. special commitment to Is- 
iel's security and well-being remains 
nshakable. Indeed, a major reason for 
jr entry into this dialogue is to help 
srael achieve the recognition and se- 
; arity it deserves. 



ECRETARYS STATEMENT, 

EC. 14, 19882 

he Palestine Liberation Organization 
0day issued a statement in which it 
icepted UN Security Council Resolu- 
ons 242 and 338, recognized Israel's 
ght to exist in peace and security, 
nd renounced terrorism. As a result, 
le United States is prepared for a 
ubstantive dialogue with PLO 
spresentatives. 

I am designating our Ambassador 
d Tunisia (Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.] 

the only authorized channel for that 
ialogue. The objective of the United 
tates remains, as always, a compre- 
ensive peace in the Middle East. 



In that light, I view this develop- 
ment as one more step toward the be- 
ginning of direct negotiations between 
the parties which alone can lead to such 
a peace. 

Nothing here may be taken to im- 
ply an acceptance or recognition by the 
United States of an independent Pal- 
estinian state. The position of the 
United States is that the status of the 
West Bank and Gaza cannot be deter- 
mined by unilateral acts of either side 
but only through a process of negotia- 
tions. The United States does not 
recognize the declaration of an inde- 
pendent Palestinian state. 

It is also important to emphasize 
that the U.S. commitment to the se- 
curity of Israel remains unflinching. 

Q. What was it today that 
changed your mind? 

A. I didn't change my mind. They 
changed theirs — they made their state- 
ment clear, so that it doesn't have the 
ambiguities in it that earlier statements 
had which tended to allow various peo- 
ple to give different interpretations of 
what was meant. 

Q. What was different about it 
today? 

A. It was clear. It was not 
encumbered. 

Q. What about the PLO's record, 
which only 2 weeks ago you described 
as a terrorism record? You called Ara- 
fat I PLO leader Yasir Arafat] an ac- 
complice or an accessory to terrorism. 
You denied him a visa. Are you ex- 
punging the PLO record and saying 
"let bygones be bygones"? 

A. No. When we have our di- 
alogue, you can be sure that the first 
item of business on our agenda in that 
dialogue will be the subject of ter- 
rorism, and we'll make it clear that op- 
position about the importance of the re- 
nunciation of terrorism is central. 

Q. But what can a dialogue do 
about people who are already dead, 
and how does your statement bear on 
the promise Kissinger made the 
Israelis? 

A. The promise that Kissinger 
made the Israelis — which had to do 
with [Resolutions] 242 and 338 and with 
the recognition of Israel's right to ex- 
ist — since that time, we have added our 
insistence on a renunciation of 
terrorism. 



Those conditions have been U.S. 
conditions for a dialogue with the PLO 
going back to 1975. Our position has 
not changed. We have stayed with that 
position consistently, and now today we 
have an acceptance of those conditions 
in a clear-cut way. 

Q. Have you told the State of Is- 
rael of your intentions? And can you 
tell us what their response was? 

A. Everybody has been put on 
notice repeatedly since 1975, in effect, 
that if the PLO meets our conditions, 
then we're prepared for a substantive 
dialogue. That is well known. 

Of course, we have had communica- 
tions with Israel, as we have with other 
states; and we have been engaged in 
the last hour or so in trying to call 
people to tell them explicitly what we 
are prepared to do now that there is 
this statement. But I don't want to try 
to speak for others. I'm only speaking 
for the United States. 

Q. Do you have any reason to be- 
lieve that the Israelis would be will- 
ing to sit down with the PLO? 

A. No, I don't have any reason to 
believe that. All I'm telling you is what 
the U.S. policies are; this policy has 
been in place since 1975, and it has 
been consistently adhered to. Now that 
we see a change in the posture of the 
PLO, all we're doing is following 
through on that policy. Our policy re- 
mains unchanged. 

Q. Do you see this as a single 
meeting or as the beginning of a proc- 
ess in which there will be a series of 
meetings, and aimed at what result? 
If it is going to be a series of meet- 
ings, where do you want it to go? 

A. The meetings are not an end in 
themselves. Our object is a comprehen- 
sive peace, and so our object in any 
dialogue that we have with the PLO 
will emphasize our desire for that and 
our views of what it takes to get there. 

I made a speech last September on 
behalf of the United States and set out 
our views as a supplement to the views 
contained in the initiative that we 
worked on earlier this year. So our ob- 
ject is not a dialogue; our object is 
peace, and we will be talking to the 
PLO as to others in an effort to move 
things along toward that objective. 



tepartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



<£,3 



MIDDLE EAST 




U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr., (right) shakes hands with 
Abdulla Hourani. a representative of the PLO, at their first meeting, held in Tunis on 
December 16, 1988. At the conclusion of this meeting. Ambassador Pelletreau said: 
"We have just concluded the initial meeting between the United States and represen- 
tatives of the PLO. The Palestinian side was represented by two members of the 
executive committee, director general of the political department, and the PLO repre- 
sentative in Tunis. On the American side. 1 was accompanied by the embassy political 
counselor, Edmund Hull. Our discussions were very practical and characterized, 1 
would say, by seriousness of purpose. It is our hope this dialogue, as it develops, will 
help bring about direct negotiations that lead to a comprehensive peace. I also wish 
to express our appreciation to President Ben Ali and the Tunisian Government for 
their assistance in helping with the arrangements for this initial get-together." 



Q. Secretary Kissinger was at the 
White House this morning. Was that 
why he was there? 

A. No, it wasn't. However, I did 
talk to Secretary Kissinger since we 
got word of this development. 

Q. Your statement at the Ameri- 
can Colony [Hotel] was addressed spe- 
cifically to Palestinians resident in 
the West Bank and Gaza and specifi- 
cally not to the PLO. Does this di- 
alogue with the PLO now mean that 
the United States is prepared to ad- 
dress that sort of statement to the 
PLO leadership as well as to other 
Palestinians? 

A. That was a statement to Pales- 
tinians that I made in Jerusalem last 
spring, as I remember. You have the 
date of it in mind? 

Q. February. 

A. I forget. It's been some while 
ago. Anyway, I sought a meeting with 
Palestinians; I went to their turf, so to 



speak, and they would not meet. Of 
course, the word we got was that they 
were afraid to meet because they were 
afraid they would be killed if they did. 
So I went, and I made a statement 
that you referred to, saying, "Here is 
what I would have told you if you had 
come." We issued that statement as a 
statement of our efforts toward peace 
and of our recognition, which has been 
consistent. It's obviously so that if 
you're going to get to a peaceful settle- 
ment in the Middle East, you have to 
include Palestinians in the process from 
the beginning and at the end. That is 
clear enough, and that was basically 
what I said. 

Q. As an example of this, are you 
going to be willing to talk with Mr. 
Arafat before you leave office? 

A. What I am doing is authorizing 
our Ambassador in Tunisia to make 
himself available for a direct dialogue, 
and we are making it clear that this is 
the only authorized channel of commu- 
nication. So anybody else who is repre- 



senting themselves as a channel is not 
channel. This is the authoritative chan- 
nel representing the U.S. Government. 
What may evolve from this remain! 
to be seen. But I think that when it 
comes to any genuine, substantive dis- 
cussion, we are in a transition phrase, 
and it is basically for the next Admin- 
istration to decide what they do. 

Q. When will the first meeting b 
held? 

A. We have seen this PLO state- 
ment. I'm making this response on be- 
half of the President. I might say the 
President [and] the Vice President 
agree with this, and I'm authorizing 
now the Ambassador in Tunis to under 
take this dialogue. But when there wil 
be a meeting, I don't know. 

Q. Now that the United States 
has recognized the PLO as a legiti- 
mate partner for negotiations, do yoi 
feel that there's any reason for Israel 
not to negotiate with the PLO? 

A. What we are doing, as a result 
of the PLO's meeting our conditions, is 
establishing a substantive dialogue wil 
them. We hope that that dialogue may 
help bring about direct negotiations 
that will lead to peace. 

How those negotiations are struc- 
tured, who is there to speak on behall 
of the Palestinians, is a subject that's 
difficult one. We've worked on it a Ion 
time, and I imagine it will continue to 
be difficult. But, at any rate, we'll hai 
a dialogue with the PLO, and that di- 
alogue will be designed to find answei 
to those questions. 

Q. Now that the PLO has recog 
nized Israel's right to exist and the 
UN resolutions and renounced ter- 
rorism, do you feel there's any reaso 
that Israel should not now talk to tl 
PLO? 

A. Israel has its own views and 
own policies, and Israel has always 
made it clear that these conditions th: 
are U.S. conditions are not necessaril 
theirs. So I am not in any way speaki 
for Israel. It's totally for Israel to ma 
its own decisions about what it wants 
to do, and there's nothing to be inferr 
judgmentally about what thev should 
do. 

I'm only saying that for the perio 
since 1975, the United States has had 
position in effect that if the PLO mee 
these conditions, we will have a sub- 
stantive dialogue. And since they hav 
met the conditions, we are carrying 
through on our policy. That's the sum 
and substance of it. 



52 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1S 



MIDDLE EAST 



Q. Have you conferred with the 
ncoming Administration, since you 
iave insisted that you're in a transi- 
tional state? And will you be able to 
fell us what's their stand on it? 

A. The President and the Vice 
[resident both have followed these de- 
elopments very closely; they have re- 
newed — each of them — this most 
j?cent development. They both agree 
liat under these circumstances, the 
bnditions for a substantive dialogue, 
ihich we had in place since 1975, have 



been met, and so we should state that 
we are ready to undertake that 
dialogue. 

Now as far as what will be the 
efforts of the Administration of 
President-elect Bush, that is for them 
to determine, and that remains to be 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Dec. 19, 1988. 
-Press release 257. ■ 



I.S. Denies Visa to PLO Leader Arafat 



KPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
fov. 26, 19881 

lie 1947 UN headquarters agreement 
i ligates the United States to provide 
Irtain rights of entry, transit, and 
Isidence to persons invited to the 
IM headquarters district in New 
' rk City. 

The Congress of the United 
lates conditioned the entry of the 
kited States into'the UN headquar- 
l"s agreement on the retention by 
le U.S. Government of the authority 
1 bar the entry of aliens associated 
n tin or invited by the United Nations 
I order to safeguard its own 
j -urity." 

In this regard, U.S. law excludes 
imbers of the Palestine Liberation 
jjganization (PLO) into the United 
5 ites by virtue of their affiliation in 
a organization which engages in ter- 
■ •ism. The Secretary of State is 
\;ted by law with the discretion to 
K ommend to the Attorney General 
tit the prohibition against a particu- 
1 PLO member be waived. 

The UN General Assembly in 
I '4 invited the Palestine Liberation 
Conization to participate as an ob- 
sver at the General Assembly. The 

I ited States acknowledged that this 

II invitation obligates the United 
Jjites to accord PLO observers entry, 
I nsit, and residence; therefore, visa 
livers have been issued to such indi- 
1 uals as a routine practice. As a 
lult, a PLO Observer Mission has 
■en in operation at the United Na- 

t ns since 1975. The PLO, therefore, 
n- had, and continues to have, ample 
ibortunity to make its positions 
Jjjwn to the membership of the 
I ited Nations. 



On November 24, 1988, we re- 
ceived an application from Mr. Yasir 
Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, for a 
visa to attend the UN General As- 
sembly session in New York City as 
an invitee. The Secretary of State has 
decided not to recommend a waiver of 
ineligibility in this case; the visa ap- 
plication, therefore, is not approved. 

The U.S. Government has con- 
vincing evidence that PLO elements 
have engaged in terrorism against 
Americans and others. This evidence 
includes a series of operations under- 
taken by the Force 17 and the Hawari 
organizations since the PLO claimed 
to foreswear the use of terrorism in 
the Cairo declaration of November 
1985. As Chairman of the PLO, Mr. 
Arafat is responsible for actions of 
these organizations which are units of 
Fatah, an element of the PLO of 
which he also is chairman and which 
is under his control. 

The most recent sign of Mr. Ara- 
fat's associations with terrorism was 
the presence at the Algiers session of 
the Palestine National Council this 
month of Abu Abbas, a member of the 
Executive Committee of the PLO who 
has been convicted by the Italian ju- 
dicial system of the murder of an 
American citizen, Mr. Leon 
Klinghoffer. 

In summary, we find that: 

• The PLO, through certain of its 
elements, has employed terrorism 
against Americans; 

• Mr. Arafat, as Chairman of the 
PLO, knows of, condones, and lends 
support to such acts; he, therefore, is 
an accessory to such terrorism; 



• Terrorism and those involved in it 
are a serious threat to our national se- 
curity and to the lives of American cit- 
izens; and 

• The headquarters agreement, 
contained in Public Law 80-357, re- 
serves to us the right to bar the entry 
of those who represent a threat to our 
security. 

The United States firmly believes 
that Palestinian political rights must be 
recognized and addressed. A compre- 
hensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is achievable through the peace 
process that already has brought signif- 
icant progress. Palestinian participation 
is required at every stage of the nego- 
tiations required to achieve peace, jus- 
tice, and security. Participation 
requires responsibilities, however. All 
parties must demonstrate their desire 
to make peace; they must adhere to 
internationally accepted principles and 
norms. No participant in a peace proc- 
ess can wave the flag of justice in one 
hand and brandish the weapons of ter- 
rorism in the other. All participants 
must renounce violence and terrorism. 

The outcome of the Palestine Na- 
tional Council session in Algiers pro- 
duced signs that there are Palestinians 
who are trying to move the PLO in a 
constructive way. That is encouraging 
and should continue. It is unfortunate 
that the blight of terrorism still afflicts 
the Palestinian cause and leaves no al- 
ternative to decisions such as the Sec- 
retary has taken today. 



'Made available to news correspond- 
ents by Department spokesman Charles 
Redman. ■ 



ijpartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



53 



MIDDLE EAST 



Under Secretary Armacost's 
Interview on "Face the Nation" 



Under Secretary for Political Af- 
fairs Michael H. Armacost was inter- 
viewed on CBS-TV's "Face the Nat uni- 
on December 18, 1988, by Lesley Stahl. 

Q. The U.S. Government has, we are 
told, put all of our Embassies around 
the world on special alert out of fear 
of a terrorist attack. If such an at- 
tack should take place, what do we 
expect Mr. Arafat [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization (PLO) leader Yasir 
Arafat] to do? 

A. We are going to take him at his 
word. He's made an unqualified com- 
mitment not only to condemn but to 
renounce all forms of terrorism. And if 
terrorism persists and if they are 
accountable for it, then we would be 
unable to move forward in our dialogue. 
If attacks occur, and it appears the re- 
sponsibility of elements that are close 
to the PLO, we would expect him to 
denounce them, to dissociate from 
them, certainly to expel any elements 
that are involved in this from the PLO. 

Q. But basically, in terms of de- 
nouncing and condemning, he's done 
that in the past, and we are told even 
when we've had evidence of direct 
PLO involvement. 

A. As I said, we are not talking 
simply about condemning; we are talk- 
ing about dissociation and expulsion. 

Q. Why did we accept the fact 
that Mr. Abu Abbas remains on his 
executive committee? He is the mem- 
ber of the PLO that has been indicted 
for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, 
the American who was on the Achille 
Lauro. 

A. I think it highlights the prob- 
lem. If elements that are still associ- 
ated with the executive committee, if 
they are involved in further acts of ter- 
rorism by which — 

Q. What about past acts? 

A. I think we are really having to 
move forward at this point. They've 
made this declaration for the first time; 
it is a new step, and we'll be watching 
very closely to see whether or not they 
live up to their word. 

Q. Have we asked him, will we 
ask him to expel this man from the 
executive committee, or are we just 
going to swallow the fact that he's 
there, an indicted murderer? 

A. I think our interest is in their 
conduct. 



Q. From here forward? 

A. If these are merely rhetorical 
matters, then we are not going to get 
very far. If it foreshadows a change of 
conduct, then it seems to me we've ac- 
complished something that's significant. 
And from Israel's standpoint, if it's 
merely rhetorical and there are further 
acts of terrorism, then the dialogue 
won't proceed. If there is a change of 
behavior, they will be the principal 
beneficiary. 

Q. Where do you think the ball 
is? Is it in Israel's court right now? Is 
it incumbent upon Israel at this stage 
to come out with some kind of initia- 
tive of its own to match or to answer? 

A. I think the initiative has to be 
assumed by all the parties. 

Q. Mr. Arafat made a step. 

A. He has taken a step. And we 
have acknowledged the step by initiat- 
ing a dialogue. Israel obviously has to 
form a government. We've got a new 
Administration that has to take office. 
The PLO has to demonstrate by deeds 
that these words are meaningful. 

But we have a situation in which 
the Palestinians, if they are going to 
secure the recognition of their political 
rights, which they deserve and they re- 
quire, then they have to accommodate 
themselves to Israel's right to exist 
and, indeed, Israel's right to have se- 
cure borders. Israel has to step up like- 
wise, if it wishes security, which it 
deserves and requires, to the need to 
withdraw from territories and to accept 
the fact that the Palestinians have legit- 
imate rights. How these accommoda- 
tions are struck must emerge from the 
negotiations. We are still trying to fig- 
ure out a way to get the negotiations 
started. That's an issue on which all the 
parties have a role to play. 

Q. [Israeli Foreign Minister! 
Peres very passionately makes the 
point that if they really do want to 
live in peace, why doesn't Mr. Arafat 
say to the young people in these oc- 
cupied territories: Prove to the Is- 
raelis that we do want to live in 
peace, and just for a short time, let's 
have a cease-fire, or whatever you 
want to call it, in the violence? Is 
that the next step? 

A. I think it would be very helpful 
if there is a subsiding of violence in the 
territories. 



Q. But Mr. Arafat seems to be 
saying just the opposite. 

A. Spokesmen have been saying 
that. It's true, of course, that the 
intifada — which covers a lot: demon- 
strations, strikes — there is violence, 
and the violence is unhelpful, it rein- 
forces the chasm of distrust which ex- 
ists. The objective of the peace proces 
is to overcome that. So a subsiding of 
this violence would be very helpful at 
this point. 

Q. But how does the American 
Government square what's going on' 
Mr. Arafat rhetorically says we wan 
to live in peace with Israel, we recoj 
nize their right to live in peace, we 
want peace; and yet he, basically, ei 
courages with words the continuatu 
of the rock-throwing and the fire- 
bombing and the Molotov cocktails. 

A. There are differences betweei 
different kinds of acts. The intifada, 
when it emerged, was not a byproduc 
of a PLO decision; it reflected a reac- 
tion to prolonged occupation. So the i 1 
action of people to occupation is not 
going to cease immediately. But I thi 
the pursuit of that objective through 
violent means is not going to bring 
about the result which Palestinians 
want. And we have some new state- 
ments from the PLO. I think we have 
initiated a practical, business-like di- 
alogue. We hope now there will be 
deeds which allow the parties to so- 
berly reflect and initiate this process 
which can result in some accommoda 
tion. It's a long road, but we need to 
get the process started. 

Q. All we have so far is rhetori 
but we also have, just in terms of 
words, the Arab press continuing t( 
talk about what Arafat did as the 
first phase in reaching their goal. 
And according to the PLO charter, 
which still exists, that goal is still 
writing and rhetoric the liquidatioi> 
of the State of Israel. Why was thei 
no insistence by the United States 
that the PLO change that charter 
which still is the basis of their — 

A. These statements represent i 
supercession of those aspects of the 
Palestinian national covenant. 

Q. How do you know that? 

A. That's what they have indicat 

Q. They didn't indicate it 
publicly. 

A. They have indicated publicly 
that they accept Israel's right to exis 
in peace and safety. And if this is a 
clever tactical ruse, not only will the 



54 



MIDDLE EAST 



alogue with us go nowhere, but 
ere's no prospect for peace — and they 
ould have no illusions. Our commit- 
jnt to Israel's security is very firm, 
shakable, rock-solid; that isn't going 
change. 

Q. This is a test basically. 
A. Exactly. 

Q. There have been reports that 
ter Mr. Shultz denied Arafat his 
sa, between that and the acceptance 
this language, that he came under 
me prodding, described by Time 
igazine as gentle but, nevertheless, 
m prodding from President-elect 
orge Bush. Is that true? 

A. I don't have any way of know- 
',. What I suspect is the case is that 
5 Secretary made a strong decision 
the visa; it was based upon our law 
d evidence that was available to him 
jarding Arafat's complicity in ter- 
ism. Subsequently, in response to 
jssures from a variety of sources, 
afat made declarations which met 
iditions of long standing, and, there- 
e, they having adjusted their policy 
1 pronouncements, we did what we 
d for many years we would do. 

Q. The PLO is now out ahead of 
t so-called moderate Arab states in 

region in recognizing Israel's 
ht to exist. Will the United States 
w launch some kind of a mission or 
initiative to urge the moderate 
ab states like Jordan and Morocco 
d Saudi Arabia and others in that 
;egory to recognize Israel? 

A. I think they recognize Israel's 
ht to exist, and they have long era- 
iced the UN resolutions. They have 
. established diplomatic relations, 
1 their position has long been that 
1 be a byproduct of a comprehensive 
ice negotiation. 

Q. What is the point of these 
<ks? What's the goal, the end goal 

the United States? Is it to get Is- 
■1 into the talks? 

A. Talks with the Palestinians? 

Q. Yes — into that room with the 
ited States and the PLO? Is that 
: end? 

A. The objective is not the di- 
gue itself. The dialogue is helpful if 
)romotes a comprehensive peace ne- 
gation. And the objective in the first 
eting, beyond describing in some de- 
1 what we expect on this issue of 
■rorism, was to see whether or not 

can figure out a process through 
ieh a negotiation can be established 



acceptable to Arabs and Israelis, so 
that we can move toward a comprehen- 
sive peace. 

Q. What is your reaction to the 
latest news out of Israel that Mr. 
Shamir is forming a government with 
the religious parties and not with 
Labor? 

A. I'd rather wait until the results 
are in before commenting. 

Q. On the reports that a hos- 
tage — an American hostage, maybe 



Terry Anderson — may be released 
soon, any information? 

A. I regret to say we haven't had 
any authoritative information on it. 

Q. Do we expect or not expect? 
Before Christmas I think the report 
was. 

A. I think, through bitter experi- 
ence, we've learned not to count our 
chickens before they are hatched. But 
we will work very hard on it. ■ 



Assistant Secretary Murphy's Interview 
on "This Week With David Brinkley" 



Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
ern and South Asian Affairs Rich- 
ard W. Murphy was interviewed on 
ABC-TV's "This Week With David 
Brinkley" on December 18, 1988, by 
David Brinkley and Sam Donaldson, 
ABC News, and George F. Will, ABC 
News analyst. 

Q. You've just heard a member of the 
Israeli Knesset [Benjamin 
Netanyahu] — and probably a member 
of its government sooner or later — 
that he feels betrayed and that the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organiza- 
tion], in its Arabic publications, still 
promises the threat — the destruction 
of Israel. Now we can read Arabic. We 
know that, don't we? 

A. When Mr. Netanyahu speaks of 
betrayal, it is, as he said, a very strong 
word. In 1975 — 13 years ago — we gave a 
commitment to Israel that we would 
not be dealing with the PLO unless 
they accepted [UN Security Council 
Resolutions] 242, 338, and Israel's right 
to exist. They did that on Wednesday. 
The Reagan Administration added that 
we would not deal with them unless 
they renounced terrorism. They did 
that on Wednesday. So it should be no 
surprise that we moved as we did. 

Q. He [Mr. Netanyahu] seems 
not to believe any of that. What as- 
surance can we give him, or need we 
give him any? 

A. I don't think there's an as- 
surance that can be given today, be- 
cause until we see how these talks go, 
until some time has gone on and they — 
the PLO — have proved that they meant 



exactly what they said in renouncing 
terrorism everywhere, without excep- 
tion, then Mr. Netanyahu and other Is- 
raelis are not going to feel assurance. 
I'm not surprised. They're living in a 
dangerous area, a volatile area. And, 
naturally, they're deeply suspicious. 

Q. Why is the speaking of a few 
words, orchestrated by the U.S. Gov- 
ernment, by a terrorist at a press con- 
ference in Geneva more impressive to 
the U.S. Government than the con- 
tinued talk in Arabic that Mr. 
Netanyahu spoke about about the 
two-staged process for destroying Is- 
rael, and the continued implacable 
total hostility to Israel stated in the 
charter of the PLO? 

A. Why did it take 13 years for the 
PLO leadership and Arafat speaking as 
chairman of the executive committee, 
why did it take 13 years for those 
words to be said? We did orchestrate 
those words, but they were orches- 
trated 13 years ago. They have not 
found it possible, until this past week, 
to accept them. I think that in itself is 
.significant. Time will tell how signifi- 
cant. They have not moved to renounce 
the covenant, as you were discussing 
earlier on the program. But they have 
said, and Abu Sharif [senior adviser to 
PLO leader Arafat] himself said a cou- 
ple of weeks ago in London, that the 
covenant had been superseded in many 
of its parts by their decision to go for a 
two-stage solution. 

Q. If the Palestinians, those al- 
legedly most aggrieved by the Israeli- 
Arab dispute, are, as the American 



55 



MIDDLE EAST 



Government now says, converts to 
moderation, would you now expect in 
short order Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Morocco, the United Arab 
Emirates, and other Middle Eastern 
nations that the United States calls 
moderate on this issue also to quickly 
recognize the legitimacy of the State 
of Israel? And if they don't, what in- 
ference will you draw from that. 

A. They accepted — most of those 
governments that you're referring to — 
explicitly Resolution 242 years ago. 
What happened this past week was that 
the PLO accepted 242 and thereby Is- 
rael's right to exist. What is yet to 
come is diplomatic recognition and nor- 
malization between those other govern- 
ments and Israel. And that's going to 
come in the context of the comprehen- 
sive peace settlement which we're aim- 
ing at. 

Q. The United States has now 
said that if the words are not matched 
by deeds, if terrorism continues, we 
will immediately break off talks, and 
it will be, as the President said, just 
back to square one. I'm unclear as to 
how you're going to measure that. Let 
me give you a situation; it may arise. 
Next week — 2 weeks from now — peo- 
ple cross from Lebanon into Israel. 
They burn a bus. They kill civilians. 
The Israelis say, here's the PLO. Ara- 
fat says, I never heard of these peo- 
ple. Who are they? What does the 
United States do? 

A. We are going to take these 
things on a case-by-case basis, as has 
been said. The President has made it 
plain we can't sustain this dialogue if 
terrorism continues. Terrorism has 
been renounced in words. Now we shall 
see what happens. Arafat has said he 
will do his best. Arafat does not con- 
trol — and he's accurate in that — all Pal- 
estinian elements. He's got death 
threats out on him from some extremist 
elements such as the Abu Nidal organi- 
zation. He has had statements already 
critical of what he did in Geneva from 
outfits such as Anmed Jebril's PFLP 
[Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine] general command. So we will 
look at an incident when it occurs. But 
terrorism — 

Q. Will we investigate it our- 
selves to try to ascertain the facts? 

A. Of course, we will. Of course, 
we will. 

Q. How do we do that? 

A. We have our sources. We have 
our means. But what is plain is that we 
are not just going to go on words alone. 



56 



We will expect the PLO leadership to 
dissociate itself, to discipline up and in- 
cluding expelling those involved from 
the organization. 

Q. If that hypothetical— but I 
think in the past very close-to-life 
example that I gave you — occurs, are 
you going to send to Israel investiga- 
tors from the FBI? I mean, I'm not 
quite clear how, if these incidents 
continue, the United States decides 
that it's not Yasir Arafat and the 
main council of the PLO; they're still 
trying to live up to their commit- 
ment. Or how, in Ambassador 
Netanyahu's words, they've simply 
lied to us, and we've got to break off. 

A. We will, as I say, look at each 
case as it comes up. I think it would be 
fatuous to assume today that there will 
be no further violence in the region. It 
is very volatile. It is a dangerous situa- 
tion. And further actions can be ex- 
pected. What we're aiming at by 
opening this dialogue is to advance the 
issue of Israel's security, to advance 
through negotiations in the framework 
of an international conference to get to 
a comprehensive settlement. 

Q. This new American policy was 
quite startling. Describe for us the 
genesis of it. Where did it come from? 
Whose idea was it? 

A. It came from 1975. It is not a 
new policy. There was no change. You 
can use words like breakthrough, if you 
will. But the breakthrough was made 
by the PLO, not in terms of U.S. pol- 
icy. Nor did we dictate the words to 
Arafat to say last Wednesday in Ge- 
neva. Those words were set out by the 
U.S. Government, most of them liter- 
ally 13 years ago. 

Q. In 1980 candidate Ronald Rea- 
gan said, and I quote: "Israel and Jor- 
dan are the two Palestinian states 
envisioned by the United Nations." Is 
that still the policy of the U.S. 
Government? 

A. We do not consider Jordan the 
Palestinian state, no. Jordan has its 
own history. Jordan has its own status 
as a sovereign state. 

Q. Ethnically, geographically, 
historically, it's Palestine. And the 
PLO calls it Palestine in its charter. 

A. Ethnically I wouldn't say it was 
Palestine. It's a mix. You have what are 
known as East Bankers, people from 
the stock, from the ethnic — 

Q. Has Ronald Reagan changed 
his mind on this? 

A. We today do not certainly con- 
sider Jordan to be part of Palestine. 



Q. Where do we go from here? I; 
the Israelis won't ever talk to the 
PLO, what good does it do for us to 
talk to the PLO? Where is the end o! 
that conversation? 

A. "Won't ever" is perhaps a long 
period of time. The Israelis are natu- 
rally suspicious; we understand that. 
They're disappointed; we understand 
that. But we expect that through our 
dialogue, some of the answers that an 
troubling the Israelis, as they have 
troubled us over the years, will becon 
clearer. Who is going to represent the 
Palestinians in talks? How will a confe 
ence be structured? All of these ques- 
tions are out there to be clarified. We 
hope this dialogue — 

Q. Israel now has told us, at 
least Ambassador Netanyahu has to 
us, that there may be strained rela- 
tionships between our two countries 
with consequences that could lead 
toward peace but toward more unrei 
in the area. 

A. Israel has no reason to doubt 
our reliability as its ally. We will star 
with — we will stand with it maintaini 
its military edge. We will stand with 
through negotiations. There is no rea 
son for a sense of betrayal or deep 
disappointment. 

Q. Clearly, Israel will never co 
ply with the preconditions that Ara 
has set out for the convening of th< 
international conference — the with 
drawal from the West Bank and th» 
occupation, in effect, of the West 
Bank by the United Nations. That 
means, before you can conceivably 
think of an international conferenc 
the PLO has to drop lots of preconi 
tions. Do you expect that? 

A. I would expect that there wo 
be many changes in the positions of 
each of the parties before you can ge 
down to brass tacks. 

Q. Do you expect Israel to con- 
promise on those two points? 

A. I would not expect Israel to 
cept a UN trusteeship, mandate, wh 
ever you want to call it, over the are 
from which its forces might one day 
withdraw. Israel wants to deal face-t 
face with the parties. 

Q. When Secretary Shultz den 
Arafat a visa to the United Nations 
did he think all of this out? Did he 
intend all of this to happen? Or die 
just fall into it? 

II 



t, 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1 



MIDDLE EAST 



A. The Secretary saw it as two 
separate issues. He had the law govern- 
ing the question of the visa, and he 
applied that law. He did not seek a 
I waiver to that law. This was a separate 
natter. When the PLO moved on 
Wednesday to meet these longstanding 



p he Search for Middle East Peace 



American conditions, then he 
responded. 

Q. So you don't claim it was 
Shultz's pressure and genius that did 
this? 

A. Oh, no, absolutely not; two sep- 
arate issues. ■ 



y Richard W. Murphy 

Address before the Center for Stra- 
gic and International Studies 
pnposium on December 8, 1988. 
mbassador Murphy is Assistant Sec- 
tary for Near Eastern and South 
sian Affairs. 

greatly appreciate the opportunity to 
■ here this morning with such an as- 
mbly of experts. I returned several 
urs ago from a 2-week trip to South 
sia — where the problems are as tena- 
)us and as baffling as the Arab-Israeli 
nflict; deep-seated communal tensions, 
curity concerns, minority issues, 
undary and other disputes — all 
th a familiar ring to those who have 
irked at resolving the divisions be- 
■een Arabs and Israelis. The thorny 
ues in South Asia too have caused 
H irs, are seen by many as intractable, 
I, d demand creativity and flexibility if 
2re ever is to be true peace. The 
ders in that region are well aware of 
; challenges facing them and of the 
ed to work for acceptable compro- 
ses. The recent election in Pakistan 
an example of this process in 
ogress. 

But let's look directly at what Pal- 
inians have been doing over recent 
mths to affect their future, how this 
i into the search for Middle East 
ace, and what the intifada [Israeli 
rd meaning "uprising"] may portend 
here is no resolute effort to achieve 
I'l legotiated settlement. 



i 



Dli 



III 



amining the Intifada 

r a year now, Palestinians in the oc- 
iried territories have been protesting 
•aeli occupation with demonstrations, 
ikes, and violent confrontation with 
; Israeli Army. They are determined 
keep world attention focused square- 
on the Palestinians and their protest. 
ere are signs that a new leadership 
y be emerging. There also are signs 
it some see their new energy of op- 



position in Islamic terms, while others 
are trying to figure out how to direct 
this vigor into political channels which 
could lead to a resolution of the conflict 
with Israel. In examining the intifada 
and what it means, a number of ques- 
tions come to mind; answers, as always, 
are more difficult. 

But the principal questions are: Is 
all of this sustainable? Can the Israeli 
military wear down the resistance — en- 
during the open defiance of the opposi- 
tion and smother its political out- 
growths? Will the PLO [Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization] be seen as doing 
enough to maintain its position of lead- 
ership over the population in the occu- 
pied territories? Is there a new leader- 
ship emerging in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip determined to insert more 
realism into Palestinian demands? Will 
the PLO itself become more realistic? 
Has the intifada really become a durable 
priority in the Arab world's perspective 
on the peace process? And finally, has 
the significance of four decades of state- 
to-state warfare diminished and the 
problem really come full circle back to 
its basic, communal beginnings? 

At least for now, the intifada is an 
important part of the Middle East 
problem facing our next Administra- 
tion. But there are other factors in the 
region, other realities and develop- 
ments which the new Adminstration 
will have to deal with; and probably 
early on in its term. 

Palestinian Participation in 
the Peace Process 

Over the past several months, Palestin- 
ians have begun to demonstrate 
broader interest in participation in the 
peace process. There has been much 
debate in Palestinian circles about just 
how to become involved. Increasingly, 
Palestinians are thrashing out the com- 
plexities of moving toward accommoda- 
tion with Israel and of resolving the 
status of the occupied territories. Ob- 
viously, many in the Palestinian com- 



Itpartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



munity are grappling with the issues of 
terrorism and the role of [UN Security 
Council] Resolutions 242 and 338 and 
are reexamining and abandoning the 
earlier dogmas of armed struggle and 
total victory. And, as Secretary Shultz 
said December 4, there was some sig- 
nificant movement at the PNC [Pal- 
estine National Council]. We are glad to 
see the PNC do what it did at Algiers, 
we encourage it, and we hope to see 
more progress toward the fundamental 
issue of the acceptance of Israel. How- 
ever, in its public statements, the PNC 
fell short. It failed to address clearly 
and unambiguously the core issues of 
terrorism and UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of 
negotiations. It also failed to accept 
explicitly the right of Israel to exist. 
Yesterday in Stockholm, Arafat took 
the process another step forward. Still 
he fell short of the mark, but the pro- 
gress is in the right direction and again 
is welcome. 

True, the intifada is in the minds 
of most as this debate goes on. But, it 
lacks a positive thrust; it rejects the 
status quo but, so far, offers little con- 
crete in its place. 

And so, I ask, has the PLO done 
all it can to make it plain that they 
seriously desire peace? Have Palestin- 
ian leaders mounted a persuasive politi- 
cal program for peace in ways that are 
convincing to Israelis? We cannot for- 
get that it is with Israel that Pales- 
tinians must ultimately deal in concrete 
and constructive ways. Have they, in 
fact, reassured those of us who are in- 
volved but come from outside the re- 
gion that Palestinians are committed 
to a comprehensive peace addressing 
Israeli concerns as well as Palestinian 
rights? 

These past few days there has been 
a sharp, critical reaction to the Secre- 
tary's decision not to grant a visa for 
Yasir Arafat, who was invited to ap- 
pear at the UN General Assembly in 
New York. The Secretary decided the 
issue on the basis of terrorism and the 
intensity of the U.S. opposition to ter- 
rorism in all its forms. The decision was 
not, nor could it be directed in any way 
against Palestinians and their centrality 
to the peace process. No one contests 
the principle that legitimate Palestinian 
rights must be addressed and that Pal- 
estinians must participate at every 
stage of the negotiating process. With- 
out their participation — and their ac- 
ceptance of the final results — there can 
be no peace in the region. But, the 
vagueness and ambiguous words which 



57 



MIDDLE EAST 



the PLO has used to address terrorism, 
and actions taken by some elements of 
the PLO since 1985, point openly to the 
need for change in Arafat's position on 
this issue. In this context, we particu- 
larly welcome the relative clarity of the 
language at Stockholm. Let's hope that 
performance matches that promise. 

Political Efforts Within the Region 

Elsewhere in the region, turning to Jor- 
dan and King Hussein, there's no ques- 
tion that Jordan will remain fully 
committed to peace and active in seek- 
ing it. For years, King Hussein has per- 
sisted in courageous and exhaustive 
efforts to explore paths toward a com- 
mon ground of accommodation and 
peace acceptable to all. Jordan's inter- 
est in reaching peace continues as firm 
as ever. Its disengagement from the oc- 
cupied territories has placed a greater 
obligation on the Palestinians them- 
selves which may be beneficial in the 
long run. They must now shoulder the 



Situation in Lebanon 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 12, 1988' 

The United States views with deep con- 
cern the escalating tension in Lebanon. 
The intensifying competition between 
Lebanon's two rival governments deep- 
ens the dangerous instability in 
Lebanon and underscores the urgent 
need to fill the vacant post of the 
Lebanese presidency. We call on all 
parties to exercise maximum restraint 
and to refrain from violence. We urge 
the governments of Gen. 'Awn and Dr. 
Huss to desist from any action that fur- 
ther weakens the institutions of state, 
including the central bank. 

Immediate action is needed to re- 
store the unity and authority of the 
central government. The first step 
must be the constitutional election of a 
consensus president who is dedicated to 
the implementation of political reform. 
We call on all parties to work energet- 
ically toward this end, and we reaffirm 
our own commitment to political reform 
and the restoration of Lebanon's unity, 
sovereignty, and territorial integrity. 



■Read to news correspondents by 
Department spokesman Charles Redman. 



responsibilities for their future and 
take a more active part in the search 
for ways to open a dialogue with Israel. 
Palestinians must play a greater role in 
energizing the peace process, but Jor- 
dan's participation in negotiations re- 
mains vital. 

Other Arab states are searching 
for ways to move forward. President 
Mubarak of Egypt has always been 
aware of the special role for Egypt in 
bringing moderation and foresight to 
the parties and has sought to use his 
role to that end. Since early this year, 
he has been actively engaged in encour- 
aging the sides to move toward peace. 

Others, like the Saudis, seek to be 
helpful, continuing and increasing their 
efforts to build on and give expression 
to the growing regional consensus that 
the conflict must be resolved through 
political negotiation. We must all sup- 
port this theme and encourage this con- 
sensus. Certainly, the United States 
will do so. And, we must continue to 
maintain the strong working relations 
we have with our friends in the re- 
gion — in both the political and security 
assistance spheres. 

In Israel, the electorate is ob- 
viously very divided on many key is- 
sues — one among them being the way 
to approach peace. Many Israelis recog- 
nize that they cannot achieve security 
and acceptance in the region without a 
resolution of the Palestinian issue. Is- 
rael is trying to find a means to resolve 
its religious and secular differences and 
to work out a concerted approach to the 
territories from widely differing views. 
At the same time, it is struggling with 
its demographic and ideological prob- 
lems which tug at its very heart. As we 
all know, security for Israel means a 
peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and acceptance in the region. 

Whatever government is eventually 
formed, Israelis will have to be pre- 
pared to deal with the hard question of 
how to achieve peace — and that in- 
cludes the territorial dimension. I've 
suggested that the Palestinians have 
not mounted a case sufficiently per- 
suasive to the Israelis that they are se- 
riously interested in peace. But the 
question should also be asked of Israel: 
Have Israeli leaders mounted a per- 
suasive political program for peace in 
ways convincing to Palestinians? The 
positions of the Israeli Government and 
how it demonstrates its dedication to 
peace will be essential if momentum is 
to be restored to the process. 



The Soviet Approach 

Among other players, the Soviet Unio 
is playing a more assertive role and 
taking a more realistic approach to 
the region and the peace process. Coni 
tacts between Soviets and Israelis are 
increasing. The Soviets are reemphasi 
ing the need for Palestinians to accom 
modate Israeli security within the 
context of negotiations based on [Res< 
lution] 242. The Soviets still fall lock- 
step into many old positions (an 
example being this year's UN General 
Assembly vote on Israeli credentials). 
At the same time, they have shown a 
new awareness of the complexities ac- 
companying the peace process. 

Our own talks with them on the 
Middle East have proceeded from the 
annual, almost perfunctory exchange 
views to more frequent, deeper, and 
wider ranging discussions. We are sti 
cautious in our exchanges, but there i 
no question they are expanding their 
positions. This new Soviet interest of- 
fers pluses and minuses for the future 
It will require a careful and measurec 
response on our part, but there are 
constructive ways by which Moscow c 
use its leverage to influence the par- 
ties. We must continue to explore thi: 
avenue. 

Increasing Focus on Missiles and 
Chemical Weapons 

Aside from the political efforts in anc 
outside the region, another emerging 
factor is the increasing focus on mis- 
siles and chemical weapons in the re- 
gion. There is alarming missile 
proliferation, as well as a steady flow 
technology and materiel into the area 
The all-too-familiar demand for newe 
more dangerous weaponry continues. 
The specter of chemical weapons use 
has cast its sinister shadow. We have 
already seen a willingness to use che 
ical weapons in the gulf war and a bu 
geoning fascination with its productic 
in Libya. With chemical weapons a 
gruesome danger in and of itself, the 
possibility of longer range chemical 
weapons-armed missiles is particular 
ominous. The risks of miscalculation, 
preemptive strike, of irresponsible 
leadership are real and present. This 
problem will be a major focus for the 
next Administration. 

As we ask what problems the ne: 
Administration may face in the Middl 
East and how it will approach them, 
there are a few general conclusions tl 
we can make based on past events in 
the region — conclusions that might b( 
used as a measure for future use. 



58 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1£ 



NUCLEAR POLICY 



fhe U.S. Role 

ur involvement in the search for Mid- 
le East peace is inescapable. The sit- 
ation in the region has its own dynam- 
s; the new Administration will have to 
atch closely and be ready to adjust 
le American role in channeling the 
irties away from conflict, toward di- 
ogue and peace. As we all recall, 
rents there can easily get out of con- 
ol. Tension and instability in the Mid- 
e East are present today as rarely 
;fore and require a continuing U.S. 
immitment to the search for construc- 
ve ideas and flexibility. 

However, it is the parties in the 
gion that have to provide the funda- 
ental answers. They cannot be man- 
actured in Washington or in the 
pitals of the other permanent mem- 
rs of the Security Council. It is the 
•oples in the area who must live with 
e results of any settlement on a di- 
et, day-to-day basis. It is they who 
ust work out the living arrangements 
this sliver of territory beside the 
stern Mediterranean. While the new 
(ministration can help set the tone for 
bate, can act as a catalyst and medi- 
}r between the parties, and can con- 
liually keep the realities of the 
iDblem before them, the parties them- 
I ves are the ones who have to engage 
I th each other and come to terms with 
( ?h others' concerns and aspirations. 

We will preserve and we will build 
( past achievements in the peace proc- 
I;. This is not a new concept. After 
I > 1967 war, we exerted strong efforts 
t bring [Resolution] 242 to the point 
\ ere it achieved general acceptance; 
t it resolution is now recognized as the 
i iropriate basis for negotiations. The 
I engagements after the 1973 war, 
^mp David, President Reagan's initia- 
te in 1982, and Secretary Shultz's pro- 
jhal of this year are all built upon 
Iwious progress. It will be for the 
iv Administration to examine differ- 
I approaches and other emphases, 
I: the fundamentals will remain the 
■Ine. After all, the problems haven't 
linged that much. 

I Experience shows that the time re- 
Ired for movement toward peace has 
Ian been misjudged. Dramatic events 
•ly catch international attention and 
•seen as historical turning points ei- 
tl r in the direction of peace or of war 
■I instability. Major crises or critical 
i'elopments do offer opportunities 
■ not without a lot of hard work. The 
■3 war caught us by surprise. Like 
1st wars in the Middle East, it was a 



U.S., U.S.S.R. Hold 
Nonproliferation Talks 



U.S. STATEMENT, 
DEC. 15, 1988 

The 12th round of U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilat- 
eral consultations on nuclear non- 
proliferation issues were held 
December 12-15, 1988, in Washington. 
The consultations covered a wide range 
of issues, including preparations for the 
1990 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) re- 
view conference, prospects for further 
strengthening the international non- 
proliferation regime, enhancement of 
international safeguards, mutual sup- 
port for the strengthening of the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), and situations of regional con- 
cern from a nuclear proliferation per- 
spective. The American delegation was 
headed by Ambassador at Large Rich- 
ard T Kennedy, and the Soviet delega- 
tion was headed by Dr. Boris Semenov, 
First Deputy Chairman of the State 
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic 
Energy. 



Secretary of State Shultz opened 
the first plenary session, expressing 
appreciation for the valuable contribu- 
tion that these consultations have made 
to the task of preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons to additional countries 
and noting the importance of continuing 
cooperation between the United States 
and U.S.S.R. to strengthen the non- 
proliferation regime and the need for 
continuing discussions of this kind. He 
noted that the leaders of both countries 
viewed these consultations with 
satisfaction. 

The consultations were conducted 
in a business-like and constructive at- 
mosphere, with both sides confirming 
their interest in preventing prolifera- 
tion of nuclear explosives and helping 
other countries enjoy the benefit of the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy under 
effective international safeguards. Both 
sides affirmed the value of continuing 
these consultations on a regular basis 
in the future. ■ 



situation where an uncontrollable chain 
of events could have been triggered. 
Fortunately, in that case, it was man- 
aged and contained. And out of it came 
a long-lasting disengagement impossi- 
ble to foresee in the immediate wake of 
the conflict. Similarly, when President 
Sadat went to Jerusalem, hopes for a 
rapid breakthrough were high. But, 
that visit was followed up by months of 
tough negotiations — and, ultimately, the 
formula of Camp David. This formula 
succeeded in the Egyptian-Israeli con- 
text but fell short of its goal of a com- 
prehensive peace. Will changing 
Palestinian attitudes, as seen in the 
intifada and the recent PNC, for exam- 
ple, be looked back on as one of these 
turning points? Will Arafat's speech 
next week in Geneva contribute to 
these changes? We will be listening 
attentively. 

Future Prospects for Peace 

It's a favorite pastime to prophesy on 
Middle East peace prospects in the fu- 
ture. So what are the prospects for 
peace during the next U.S. Administra- 
tion? Over the longer term, there is 
reason for optimism if the leaders of 



both sides are ready to make the neces- 
sary moves toward accommodation and 
peaceful resolution of their differences. 

Past progress has been attained 
when the parties engaged in pragmatic 
diplomacy and made that fact clear to 
others. If each side is prepared to ne- 
gotiate seriously, then movement is 
possible, and those who wish to help 
can do so. When I speak of an intent to 
negotiate seriously, I mean that there 
must be a genuine willingness on the 
part of Israelis and Arabs to address 
each others' concerns. All the parties 
must be prepared to negotiate on the 
basis of [Resolution] 242 and the princi- 
ple of land for peace. And, to negotiate 
means give and take, without the pre- 
sumption that preferred positions must 
and will carry the day. 

Political rights of Palestinians must 
be high on the negotiating agenda, just 
as Israeli security and acceptance by 
its neighbors must be. Obviously, each 
party will bring its own positions on 
this and other points to the negotia- 
tions. An independent Palestinian state 
may be demanded by the Palestinians. 
The Israelis will bring their own set of 
demands. We will have our own posi- 



jpartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



59 



PACIFIC 



tions. The opening arguments will 
sound absolutest, but as negotiations 
proceed, it will become clearer to all 
that there can be no security for Israel 
without addressing Palestinian con- 
cerns, and likewise there can be no so- 
lution for Palestinian concerns without 
addressing Israel's security needs. 

Conclusion 

These issues present challenges to the 
leaders in the region. Do Israelis, Pal- 
estinians, and other Arabs have the 
ability, the desire, and foresight to ac- 
cept them? Can the people in the area 
overcome the entrenched mistrusts, the 
stereotypes, and disputes of 40 years 



and take the risks of dialogue and ne- 
gotiation? Do they have the wisdom to 
perceive that the only alternative to a 
legitimate political process will be more 
war and more bloodshed? And, above 
all, will they have the patience to pur- 
sue the political path? 

We don't know the answers today, 
but assuredly the United States will 
continue its role of pushing the parties 
toward dialogue, toward negotiation, 
chipping away at differences, and de- 
manding realism and flexibility from all 
parties in order to reach the goal of 
comprehensive peace. We cannot do 
less, but more will depend on those 
who must live with the results. ■ 



U.S. to Resume Aid to Fiji 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 27, 19881 

The United States has consistently sup- 
ported efforts to encourage the return 
of representative constitutional govern- 
ment and a broadly based political solu- 
tion in Fiji. We view as positive steps 
the return of executive authority to ci- 
vilian hands, the suspension of the in- 
ternal security decree, and the public 
commitment of Prime Minister Mara to 
a process that will restore constitu- 
tional government. 

In support of these efforts, the 
President of the United States, after 



consultation with the Congress, has de- 
cided to restore economic assistance 
programs that were statutorily placed 
on hold following the May 1987 coup in 
Fiji. Our goal is to encourage steps 
made in returning Fiji to represen- 
tative constitutional and civilian rule. 

Further the restoration of our 
$1,357 million economic assistance pro- 
grams to Fiji will enable us to help 
address important development 
problems that affect all of Fiji's 
communities. 



'Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Phyllis 
Oakley. ■ 



60 



Department of State Bulletin/February 



ERRORISM 



Countering Terrorism in 
he 1980s and 1990s 



I L. Paul Bremer, III 

Address before the George Washing- 
n University conference on terrorism 
i November 22, 19SS. Ambassador 
■enter is Ambassador at Large for 
mnter-Terrorism. 

>day I would like to talk to you about 
.S. counterterrorism policy in the 
80s and the priorities for the 1990s, 
jasonable observers have questioned, 
ntinue to question, and will likely go 
questioning the effectiveness of our 
vernment's counterterrorism effort, 
is not hard to see why. After all, the 
m-contra affair dealt a blow to our 
edibility. Nine Americans are still held 
stage in Lebanon. And according to 
e State Department's own statistics, 
37 was the bloodiest year for terrorist 
adents since we began compiling such 
;ures. This year attacks on U.S. tar- 
ts are running 31% above their 1987 
'els; while incidents for 1988 are 
nning about 4% above 1987. So it is 
•tainly fair to question the effectle- 
ss of our country's counterterrorism 
I icy- 
Let me suggest to you, however, 
it these data do not reflect a failed 
licy. Rather, they are evidence that 
•rorism is now and will be a persistent 
ernational problem. 

We cannot expect completely to 
idicate terrorism. But we can aim to 
luce significantly terrorism's status on 
; international agenda. And I believe 
B policy is moving toward that goal. 



p. Counterterrorism Policy 

aerican counterterrorist policy stands 
three solid pillars. 

First, we will not accede to terror- 
demands. We will not pay ransom, 
:"don convicted terrorists, or pressure 
ler countries to give in to terrorist de- 
nds. In other words, we will make no 
lis. But we will talk to anyone authori- 
se, anywhere, anytime about the 
lfare and unconditional release of 
r hostages. 
Second, we have taken the lead in 
ssuring states which support terror- 
groups and use terrorism as part of 
:ir foreign policy. We have shown 



these states that they will be penalized 
for supporting terrorism. The United 
States will not tolerate their aiding and 
abetting terrorist groups by supplying 
them with weapons, money, passports, 
training bases, and safehouses. 

Third, we are imposing the rule 
of law on terrorists for their criminal 
actions. Good police work is catching 
terrorists, and they are being brought 
to trial. The United States now has on 
the books a law which enables our law 
enforcement agencies to better combat 
terrorism. Popularly called a "long arm" 
statute, the law makes it a Federal crime 
to kill, injure, threaten, detain, or seize 
an American citizen anywhere in the 
world in order to compel a third person 
or government to accede to a terrorist's 
demands. 

U.S. Policy- 
How Is It Working? 

So we have a clear and comprehensive 
counterterrorist policy. How is it 
working? 

Let us look first at the "no conces- 
sions" element of our policy. Obviously, 
this element of our policy was damaged 
by the Iran-contra affair. However, for 
the past 2 years, the President has made 
it crystal clear to Iran and others our 
government's steadfast commitment to 
the no deals principle. No country, no 
group should believe there is gain in 
trying to blackmail the United States. 
Based on my own meetings with counter- 
terrorism officials and experts from 
other countries and in this country, we 
have largely recovered the credibility 
lost by the Iran-contra affair. The inter- 
national counterterrorism community 
understands our position, and there is 
strong bipartisan support here for our 
policy of firmness in dealing with 
terrorists. 

We have enjoyed an important 
measure of success on the second in- 
gredient of our policy — pressuring 
states supporting terrorism. Some of 
the more notorious state supporters of 
terrorism have attempted — publicly at 
least — to distance themselves from 
terrorism. 

Our 1986 airstrike on Libya's terror- 
ist camps was the watershed event in the 
world's fight against terrorist support- 



ing states. European nations followed 
our lead against Libya by imposing polit- 
ical, economic, and security measures 
against the Qadhafi regime. European 
Community members expelled more 
than 100 Libyan "diplomats" and re- 
stricted the movements of other Libyan 
"diplomatic" and "consular" personnel. 
These moves severely damaged Libya's 
European network dedicated to support- 
ing international terrorism. 

Qadhafi learned that his support for 
international terrorism would not be 
cost free. And he changed his behavior 
which, after all, was the objective of our 
attack. Libya's involvement in terrorism 
declined from 19 incidents in 1986 to 
6 in 1987. 

Syria, another long-time supporter 
of terrorism, felt the pressure of our 
counterterrorism strategy also. In late 
1986, British and West German courts 
established Syrian complicity in terror- 
ist attacks in London and West Berlin. 
Together with Great Britain, the United 
States joined an international campaign 
employing diplomatic, political, and eco- 
nomic sanctions to convince Syria to 
reduce its links to terrorist groups. 

These efforts worked. In 1985 Syria 
was implicated in 34 terrorist incidents 
but in 1986 only 6. In 1987, a year after 
our pressures, we detected Syria's 
hand in only one incident. Moreover, 
Syria expelled the violent Abu Nidal 
organization in June 1987 — a major victo- 
ry for our counterterrorist policies. 

This pillar of U.S Government poli- 
cy may not force these nations to cease 
entirely their support for terrorist 
groups. Indeed, both Libya and Syria 
continue to provide such support. But a 
concerted, vigorous Western strategy 
does make them move more cautiously 
and become more circumspect. 

The third and final element of our 
tripartite program — using the rule of 
law against terrorist and encouraging 
others to do the same — is maturing 
into a potent weapon for two basic rea- 
sons. First, there has been a sea change 
in international attitudes toward terror- 
ists. Second, governments have decided 
to provide law enforcement agencies the 
resources necessary to deter terrorism. 

Not long ago, many usually re- 
sponsible countries granted terrorists 
dispensation for their crimes. Ironically, 



61 



TERRORISM 



terrorists were perceived as victims of 
those vague forces called "oppression" 
and "imperialism" — victims, or worse, 
romantic adventurers whose behavior 
should be indulged. 

No longer is this true. Terrorists 
began to lose this international indul- 
gence as they widened their circle of 
targets in the late 1970s. In some in- 
stances, they even attacked their 
sympathizers and supporters. The shock 
of such actions turned indulgence to 
revulsion. 

And as popular disgust mounted, 
politicians finally insisted on action to 
counter the terrorists. Law enforcement 
agencies were given the resources to do 
their jobs. National police departments 
now have the surveillance gear, the com- 
munications equipment, and the money 
for overtime to gather intelligence and 
to track and arrest terrorists. As a re- 
sult, more and more terrorists are being 
brought to trial and convicted. 

• Two weeks ago, a Maltese court 
sentenced the sole surviving terrorist in 
the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyp- 
tian airliner to 25 years imprisonment — 
the maximum sentence under Maltese 
law. The surviving hijacker belonged to 
the Abu Nidal organization. 

• Last month a Sudanese court 
passed the death sentence on five 
Palestinian terrorists for their attack 
this year on Khartoum's Acropole Hotel 
and the Sudan Club. These five were also 
members of the Abu Nidal organization. 

• Also last month, a French court 
convicted in absentia the notorious 



Fatah terrorist Colonel Hawari to 10 
years, the maximum allowed under 
French law, for complicity to transport 
arms, ammunition, and explosives and 
for criminal associations. 

• A West German court is currently 
trying Muhammad Hamedei, a Lebanese 
terrorist implicated in the 1985 TWA hi- 
jacking which resulted in the murder of 
an innocent American seaman. 

• In Greece authorities will soon de- 
cide on Muhammad Rashid's extradition 
to this country where he is wanted for 
planting a bomb in 1982 on a Pan Am air- 
liner. His extradition to the United 
States would be an important indication 
of Greece's adherence to its stated policy 
of combating terrorism. 

• And here in Washington, D.C., 
Fawaz Younis, a Lebanese terrorist, will 
go on trial next year for holding Ameri- 
can citizens hostage when he led the 1985 
hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines 
flight. 

So the United States has a policy 
in place, and it works. But we cannot 
become complacent. 

The Threat Remains 

Terrorists still have the means to out- 
rage us, to force our attention to them, 
and to strike almost anywhere in the 
world. As we look at the threat environ- 
ment today, we identify three particular 
threats in the period just ahead. And as 
we look into the next decade, we have 
some additional concerns. Let me ad- 
dress both sets of issues. 



Greece Denies Extradition 
of Suspected Terrorist 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 8, 1988 1 

The United States supports the Italian 
Government's call for a full clarification 
of Greece's decision to deny extradition 
and to deport a suspected terrorist — 
Abdel Osama al-Zomar — to Libya. 
Abdel Osama al-Zomar is wanted in 
Italy for a clear act of terrorism — an 
attack on a Rome synagogue in 1982 
which killed a 2-year-old child and 
wounded 37 people. 

We are profoundly disturbed by the 
Greek Government's decision refusing 
to permit him to stand trial in Italy. We 



are making our concerns known both 
here and in Athens. We note that Mem- 
bers of Congress have also expressed 
their strong concern on this matter. 

As reported in the press, the ex- 
planation offered by the Greek Justice 
Minister that an armed attack on a syn- 
agogue and the murder of a 2-year-old 
child would "fall within the domain of 
the struggle to regain a homeland" and 
are, therefore, not crimes is deplorable. 



■Read by news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Phyllis 
Oakley. ■ 



Radical Palestinian Groups. Oui 

first immediate concern is the likely ii 
crease in radical Palestinian terrorisii 
This May terrorists from the radical 
Palestinian group, the Abu Nidal orga 
zation, used machine guns and grenad 
to attack a Sudanese hotel and club fr< 
quented by foreign visitors. Two mont 
later, Abu Nidal terrorists struck agai 
attacking the Greek passenger ship d 
of Poms with grenades and machine 
guns. Just last month, West German ] 
lice arrested members of another radi 
Palestinian group, the PFLP-GC [Poi 
lar Front for the Liberation of Palestii 
General Council], before they could ca 
ry out a terrorist attack. And recently 
other violent fanatical Palestinian 
groups, including Abu Musa and the 
Marxist Popular Front for the Liberat 
of Palestine, publicly proclaimed their 
intention to step up their terrorism 
effort against Israel. 

Combining a deep, visceral hostil 
toward the West with cold-blooded ter 
ror, these radical Palestinian groups 
receive financial, logistical, and weap 
support from Syria and Libya. They a 
responsible for some of the most vicioi 
terrorist operations on record. Althoi 
Israel is their main target, Israel is n^ 
their only target. These groups repre 
sent an ongoing international danger. 

Libya. Libya's continued — even 
growing — involvement in terrorism is 
our second concern. After 2 years of l 
ative quiet, Qadhafi is becoming mor 
active. Instead of using Libyan citizei 
he is increasingly using surrogates tc 
implement his terrorist attacks. We 1 
indications that Libya is augmenting 
assistance to and enhancing its relati 
ship with such terrorist groups as th< 
Abu Nidal organization, the Japanese 
Red Army, and the Provisional IRA 
[Irish Republican Army]. 

In the last 3 years, the relations! 
between Tripoli and the vicious Abu . 
dal organization has intensified. Abu 
Nidal is now based in Tripoli, and Lit 
provides most of its funding. One oft 
Abu Nidal organization terrorists wh 
attacked the City of Poros carried a 
Libyan passport. The weapons used i 
that attack were from Libya's militar 
inventory. 

The April 14 attack on the USO c 
in Naples, in which one American am 
four Italians were killed, was conduct 
by the Japanese Red Army. It took pi 
on the anniversary of the U.S. attack 
Libya, and the attackers proclaimed 
their solidarity with Libya. 



62 



Department of State Bulletin/February 1 



TERRORISM 



Qadhafi has obviously calculated 
[at if he can hide his hand well enough, 
e West will not respond. He may be 
Wit. At the exact moment we detect 
creased Libyan activity, a number of 
iropean countries are responding to a 
harm offensive" launched by Qadhafi 
improving their relations with him. 
may inadvertently be sending 
dhafi the message that it is not ac- 
ptable to directly commit terrorism, 
t that there is no price for using 
rrogates. 

Terrorism in the Andes. The final 
m on our short list of immediate 
ncerns is terrorism in the Andean 
BBtries — Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, 
d Bolivia — and the increasing danger 
sed by the narcoterrorists. We do 
t read or hear much about terrorism 
these countries, but terrorist acts 
ainst American facilities and person- 
I are becoming more disturbing. 

Because of economic and political in- 
ence in Latin America, the United 
ites is an obvious target for groups 
e the National Liberation Army in 
lombia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, 
r aro Vive Carajo (AVC) in Ecuador, 
1 far-left groups in Bolivia — groups 
ling to undermine foreign investment 
as to create economic chaos in their 
n countries. 

So far this year, Colombian terrorist 
nips have carried out more than 70 
ti-U.S. attacks — almost half of all 
rorist attacks against U.S. targets 
rldwide. Almost all of these attacks 
re against U.S. oil company facilities, 
d all four major Colombian terrorists 
iups have received arms and training 
m Cuba and reportedly aid from 
lya. 

Looking at Peru, a modest decline in 
lent anti-U.S. activity does not truly 
fleet the considerable level of violence 
re. Since 1980, when the Sendero Lu- 
noso launched its terror campaign, 
re than 12,000 people have been 
ed, and more than $10 billion in mate- 
1 losses has been registered. Sendero 
;an targeting foreign interests about 
ear ago. Several recent attacks have 
;n made on U.S. interests. 

In Ecuador, the small but deadly Al- 

Vice group has been contained by 
Ecuadoran Government. Although 

akened, these urban terrorists are 

1 capable of violent and coordinated 
ion, especially when they receive help, 
:hey have in the past, from the better 
anized Colombian terrorist groups. 



Department Expands 
Terrorism Rewards Program 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
DEC. 21, 1988' 

As part of continuing efforts to combat 
terrorism, the Department of State is 
expanding its rewards program. The 
program to date has focused on obtain- 
ing information that would lead to the 
arrest and conviction of the per- 
petrators of specific terrorist acts. 
Since December 1984, rewards have 
been offered in six such incidents. 

The expanded rewards program 
will now include payment for informa- 
tion that leads to the prevention, frus- 
tration, or favorable resolution of 
terrorist acts against U.S. persons or 
property overseas. 

In order to publicize the expanded 
program, the Department is distribut- 



ing posters advertising payment of up 
to $500,000 for information that aids in 
the prevention of terrorist acts or leads 
to the arrest or conviction of individu- 
als who have committed terrorist acts 
against U.S. persons or properties 
overseas. The multilingual posters are 
printed in English, French, German, 
Spanish, and Arabic and will be sent to 
all U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. 

Persons with terrorism information 
should notify the nearest U.S. Em- 
bassy or Consulate. Information re- 
ceived will be handled confidentially, 
and the identities of informants will be 
protected. 



'Read to news correspondents by 
Department deputy spokesman Phvflis 
Oaklev. ■ 



Bolivia, until recently, had largely 
avoided the terrorist problems plaguing 
its neighbors. Now some elements of the 
far left are preparing and carrying out 
terrorists activities. Examples of the 
growing threat level in this Andean 
country include the recent bombing at- 
tempt on Secretary Shultz's motorcade. 
But the predominant threat in Bolivia 
comes from drug traffickers. 

Narcoterrorism is on the rise 
throughout the Andes. Drug traffickers 
have always used terrorist tactics to 
suit their purpose, but now they are fre- 
quently working together with terrorist 
groups. Big-time narcotics dealers 
offer Latin American terrorist groups 
financial backing in exchange for the 
terrorists attacking the drug traffickers' 
enemies. And the U.S. Government is 
at the top of the drug dealers' enemies 
list. 

Terrorism in the 1990s 

These three issues — radical Palestinian 
terrorist groups, Libya, and Andean 
terrorism — will certainly demand our 
attention for the rest of the 1980s. But 
what of the next decade? Should we an- 
ticipate changes in strategy or tactics 
by terrorists? Are there any trends 
we should be alert to? 



You have all read or heard apocalyp- 
tic stories of terrorists stealing or 
building their own nuclear weapons. Yet 
most experts agree that nuclear terror- 
ism presents less potential danger than 
terrorists resorting to less dramatic, 
but no less potent, means of mass 
destruction — such as chemical weapons 
or by exploiting more sophisticated 
technologies. 

Terrorists have noted that the use of 
chemical weapons by the Soviets in Af- 
ghanistan and during the Iran-Iraq war 
provoked little public outrage. They have 
seen increased deterrent measures 
around their traditional targets — 
airports, embassies, and government 
buildings. These favored terrorist tar- 
gets are no longer easy marks. And 
equally important, the international me- 
dia have been relatively restrained lately 
in reporting on terrorist outrages. 

Some terrorist groups might decide, 
therefore, to welcome the new decade by 
upping the ante — by using chemical 
weapons to gain attention. A number of 
states which support terrorism have 
chemical weapons in their arsenals. Re- 
cently, Libya acquired a very substantial 
capacity to make chemical weapons. 

We also believe terrorists will make 
greater use of high technology in their 
attacks. To take one example, the Provi- 
sional IRA, which has contact with 
Middle Eastern groups and Libya, has 



63 



TERRORISM 



become expert in building bombs with 
long-delay timing devices; bombs which 
can be set to explode in days rather than 
hours. The IRA placed such a bomb in 
their 1985 attempt on [British] Prime 
Minister Thatcher. 

We also expect that terrorists will 
make more use of modern plastic explo- 
sives. These are much more powerful 
than traditional explosives like dynamite 
and TNT. And they are much more diffi- 
cult to detect with current technology. 
Libya has already shipped several tons 
of a Czech plastic called SEMTEX to the 
Provisional IRA in recent years. And 
the IRA has used SEMTEX in devastat- 
ing attacks in Northern Ireland. 

Priorities for the New Administration 

What are the lessons from the 1980s for 
the new Administration? 

• Firmness and persistence must 
continue as the hallmarks of this coun- 
try's counterterrorism effort. Only a 
sustained, relentless effort will suppress 
terrorism. So we must maintain the pa- 
tience and discipline to allow our current 
policy to work for the next period. 

• We should be confident enough not 
to cut deals with hostage-takers. 

• States supporting terrorism must 
be exposed to the sunlight. When neces- 
sary, international sanctions, including 
military force, should be imposed on 
these states to make them behave as 
responsible members of the world 
community. 

• To further international coopera- 
tion against terrorist-supporting states, 
we should expand our cooperation with 
Latin American, East Asian, and Afri- 
can countries. Terrorism is not limited 
to the Middle East or Europe. 

• Let us buttress the rule of law as a 
tool by having Congress pass the "Ter- 
rorist Alien Removal Act." The proposed 
legislation, drafted by the Justice De- 
partment, would expedite procedures for 
deporting alien terrorists found in the 
United States. To further reinforce our 
law enforcement tactics, we and our 
allies should agree to share as much 
information on terrorists as possible. 
Complementing this effort, U.S. Govern- 
ment agencies need to work more closely 
in permitting access to data bases on 
terrorism. Ideally, within the U.S. Gov- 
ernment and with our allies, we should 
all be working from a central data base. 
By enhancing the flow of data among and 
between ourselves and our allies, we can 
make it easier to track and eventually 
apprehend terrorists. 



• On a less visible level, there will 
continue to be a place in the fight 
against terrorists for covert action. Ter- 
rorist groups draw strength from their 
small size and secrecy. This inherent 
strength is also a weakness which we can 
exploit by making them doubt their 
cadre's loyalty and making them worry 
about Western infiltration. 

• We need to combat the terrorists' 
use of high technology. This means being 
willing to expend time and money for 
research and development activities. For 
most of our agencies, counterterrorism 
research and development projects sim- 
ply do not cross above the budgetary cut 
line. 

To deal with this problem, we have 
created a national counterterrorism re- 
search and development program for 
which the State Department annually 
seeks funds. Unfortunately, the amount 
of funds appropriated by Congress for 
the national counterterrorism research 
and development program is shrinking 
at an alarming rate. I hope the new Ad- 
ministration and the new Congress will 
restore this vital program to a high 
priority. 

We, too, can put new technologies to 
work. Progress in miniaturization has 
permitted the development of more 
accurate sensors better able to detect 



explosives and hazardous gases. Re- 
search into DNA technology is providii 
forensic scientists with the biological 
tools to determine whether a specimen 
comes from a specific individual. Re- 
finements in computer software are 
enhacing our ability to gather and 
analyze information. 

Conclusion 

No one can promise a world free of ter- 
rorism. But, through hard-earned 
experience, our country has developed i 
policy which is showing signs of success 
against the terrorists. They know we ai 
serious. States, which in the past rou- 
tinely supported terrorists, are now 
more cautious in their actions. Terror- 
ists once caught are being put on trial 
and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. N 
longer are they being allowed to slip 
quietly away. 

Our successes should encourage 
confidence that the tide is turning our 
way — that we are on the right path. W 
must understand, however, that sup- 
pressing terrorism will not be easy. W 
still have a long and difficult struggle 
before us. With heightened vigilance, 
clear thinking, and steady discipline, ] 
am confident that we can prevail. ■ 



French Court Convicts Palestinian Terrorh 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
OCT. 31, 19881 

The U.S. Government welcomes the Oc- 
tober 20 conviction by a French court 
of the notorious Palestinian terrorist 
Abdullah Abd al-Hamid Labid, also 
known as Col. Hawari. Hawari's convic- 
tion is a major step in the international 
fight against terrorism. The court sen- 
tenced Hawari in absentia to the maxi- 
mum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. 
Harawi heads the Special Operations 
Group within the Fatah organization. 

The court found Col. Hawari guilty 
of complicity to transport arms, am- 
munition, and explosives and for crimi- 
nal association. The French court 
concluded that Hawari financed and di- 
rected the assembling of an arms cache 
in Paris that was linked to a wave of 
bomb attacks throughout Europe in the 
1980s. According to our information, 
these attacks were aimed at Middle 
Eastern and American targets. 



Although a number of countries 
deny him permission to enter (Tunisi; 
Iraq), the French action is the first 
time Col. Hawari has been convicted 
for his terrorist activities. It shows 
once again that terrorists will be hek 
accountable for their criminal actions 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

FACT SHEET, 
OCT. 31, 1988 

Background 

The Hawari Group 

Leader: Col. Hawari (alias) 

True Name: Abdullah Abd al-Hamid 

Labid 
Date of Birth: Circa 1941 
Place of Birth: Gaza, Palestine 

The Hawari group, officially known ai 
the Special Operations Group of Fata 
Central Security and Intelligence Ap 



64 



DeDartment of State Bulletin/February 1! 



UNITED NATIONS 



atus, is named after its leader who 
ommonly known as Col. Hawari. 
e group, which has conducted opera- 
ns since 1985 under the name of 
artyrs of Tal al Za'atar" and been 
ntified elsehwere as "Amn Araissi," 
ludes among its membership a 
mber of senior operatives who were 
iviously members of the radical Pal- 
inian 15 May Organization, including 
hammad Rashid (Abu Zahayr). We 
ieve Hawari, a senior Fatah oper- 
re, has total control of the group. 

Hawari group has a network of ter- 
ist cells, controlled and directed by 
. Hawari's deputies, in the Middle 
3t, Western Europe, and the Eastern 
c. 



ronology of Terrorist Activities 



•il 1. Bomb exploded at the Syrian 
ib Airlines office in Rome. No group 
med responsibility, but subsequent 
rmation strongly suggests that the 
dent was the first in a series of 
vari attacks in Western Europe. 
April 26. Two bombs exploded in 
<eva — one outside the Libyan Arab 
ines office and the second beneath a 
ian diplomat's car. A third bomb, lo- 
ci in the car of another Syrian diplo- 
, was defused. The two Palestinians 
^sted in connection with the bomb- 
i claimed to be members of the 
irtyrs of Tal al Za'atar," presumed 
-e a cover name used by Hawari's 
ip. In March 1986, they were given 
nd 9-year sentences. 
May. Two Romanian bomb disposal 
jrts were killed trying to dismantle 
awari bomb. 

June 2. Bomb exploded at the Ge- 
t railway station. In a telephone 
munique issued to an Arab news- 
ir in London, a man claimed re- 
lsibility for the action in the name 
»e "Martyrs of Tal al Za'atar." 
June 3. British authorities dis- 
red a bomb planted outside the 
an Embassy in London by a Hawari 
•ative named Mutran who is also 
vn by a number of aliases. 
July 2. Italian authorities arrested 
'ari operative, Mutran, for carrying 
ed documents. (In June 1988, 
ran was sentenced to 17 years in 
on by the Italian courts for involve- 
t in the June 3, 1985, attempted 
bing in London.) 
July 11. Spanish authorities dis- 
red a Hawari safehouse in Madrid 
arrested its two Palestinian 
pants. 



1986 

April 3. Bomb exploded aboard TWA 
Flight #840 shortly before its sched- 
uled landing in Athens, killing four 
Americans. The explosion ripped a hole 
in the fuselage, and the victims were 
sucked out of the plane. Hawari oper- 
ative May Mansur is suspected of hav- 
ing placed the bomb aboard the plane. 
The Hawari group attempted attacks 
against other U.S. facilities in Western 
Europe during the summer of 1986 but 
were unsuccessful in carrying out these 
operations. 

Late August. Moroccan security 
forces arrested four members of a ter- 
rorist team operating under Col. 
Hawari's direction. Those arrested in- 
cluded two Tunisian women and two 
Lebanese/Palestinian men. The arrest- 
ing officers recovered several unas- 
sembled explosive devices and 
associated equipment. The suspects 
claimed that the objective of the team 
was to perpetrate attacks in Moroccan 



public places. The explosives were pre- 
pared by Abd al-Qadir Ayyash, a 
Hawari member and an explosives 
expert. 

1987 

March 4. Explosives and arms were 
discovered in a basement storage room 
in Paris. Seven individuals were ar- 
rested, one of whom admitted working 
for Hawari. 

1988 

May 30. At U.S. request, Greek police 
arrested Muhammad Rashid for his in- 
volvement in the 1982 bombing of a 
PanAm aircraft over Honolulu, which 
resulted in one death and several inju- 
ries. The Greek Government is cur- 
rently considering the U.S. request 
that Rashid be extradited to the United 
States to stand trial for this crime. 



■Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



Efforts Toward a 
Cambodian Settlement 



Following is a statement by U.S. 

I'trmiiiirnt Reprcsciitatire to the 
V iiited Nations Vernon A. Walters 
in the UN General Assembly on 
November 3, 1988, and tlie text of UN 
General Assembly Resolution 13/19 of 
November 3. 



AMBASSADOR WALTERS' 
STATEMENT! 

For the first time in nearly 10 years, 
there is reason for cautious optimism 
regarding Cambodia's future. During 
the past 6 months, there has been con- 
siderable diplomatic activity surround- 
ing the Cambodian conflict and some 
signs of progress. This activity includes 
the Vietnamese announcement in May 
that they will withdraw 50,000 troops 
from Cambodia by the end of 1988, the 
Jakarta informal meeting at the end of 
July, and the special talks on Cambodia 
between the Soviet and Chinese Vice 
Foreign Ministers held in Beijing at the 
end of August. 

In addition, other avenues for fur- 
ther progress toward a Cambodian set- 
tlement are being vigorously pursued. 



artment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



These include the discussion of the As- 
sociation of the South East Asian Na- 
tions' (ASEAN) revised "Situation in 
Kampuchea" resolution here at the 
General Assembly, the Jakarta informal 
meeting working group which met in 
Jakarta earlier this month and con- 
tinues to explore ways of achieving last- 
ing peace for this war ravaged land, 
and the upcoming meeting in Paris be- 
tween [Cambodian] Prince Sihanouk 
and Hun Sen — the so-called prime min- 
ister of Vietnam's puppet regime in 
Phnom Penh. 

An acceptable settlement of this 
tragic conflict must permit the Cambo- 
dian people to determine their own 
future without internal or external ma- 
nipulation or intimidation. It should be 
based on the complete withdrawal of all 
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia so 
that this foreign occupation is brought 
to an end as soon as possible. We strong- 
ly hope Hanoi will follow through on its 
pledge to undertake a partial with- 
drawal in the remaining weeks of this 
year. There have, however, been few 
concrete signs up to this time of major 
movement of Vietnamese forces out of 
Cambodia. We must ensure as well that 
Hanoi's withdrawal will not lead to the 
return to power of the Khmer Rouge, a 



65 



UNITED NATIONS 



contingency to which the United States 
and the international community are 
unalterably opposed. 

H. J. Res. 602 and Other Measures 

Recently, my government approved a 
Joint Resolution of the Congress on 
Cambodia [H. J. Res. 602], and it was 
signed by President Reagan. It reflects 
the overwhelming bipartisan sentiment 
in the United States for a total with- 
drawal of Vietnamese forces and for the 
prevention of a Khmer Rouge return to 
power. The resolution calls on all par- 
ties to "respect the territorial integrity 
of Cambodia" and to "deny safe haven 
to Khmer Rouge forces seeking the 
overthrow of a newly formed sovereign 
Cambodian Government." It urges that 
the international community "use all 
appropriate means available to prevent 
a return to power of Pol Pot, the top 
echelon of the Khmer Rouge, and their 
armed forces, so that the Cambodian 
people might genuinely be free to pur- 
sue self-determination without the 
spectre of the coercion, intimidation, 
and torture that are known elements of 
the Khmer Rouge ideology." Finally, it 
asks that those nations providing aid, 
support, and sanctuary to the Khmer 
Rouge, especially arms and military 
equipment, cease doing so. 

Along with these principles, which 
we believe must govern any comprehen- 
sive settlement of the tragic situation 
in Cambodia, there are a number of 
possible measures concerning the 
Khmer Rouge which warrant serious 
and urgent consideration. These include 
the holding of internationally super- 
vised elections. We cannot imagine that 
the Cambodian people would willingly 
vote for the return of the Khmer 
Rouge. Another essential element is 
the removal of Pol Pot and other senior 
Khmer Rouge leaders most responsible 
for crimes against the Cambodian peo- 
ple and violations of basic human rights 
on a massive scale. A third is the dis- 
patch of some form of international 
monitoring and peacekeeping force. 
Another basic element should be pro- 
visions for the disarming of all the fac- 
tions under international monitoring. 
Finally, measures should be developed 
to provide for the cutoff of arms aid 
from the outside in a balanced and sym- 
metrical manner. We believe some com- 
bination of these or other approaches 



can prove effective. Following the im- 
plementation of these measures, the in- 
ternational community should stand 
ready to assist the Cambodian people in 
the resettlement of refugees and the 
reconstruction of their war ravaged 
country. 

The United States believes that the 
best course for the international com- 
munity is to continue to support Prince 
Sihanouk and the noncommunist resist- 
ance forces in their valiant struggle for 
a free and independent Cambodia. Be- 
cause they constitute an increasingly 
viable alternative to both the Viet- 
namese and the Khmer Rouge, they can 
and must play a key role in a settle- 
ment which will serve the best inter- 
ests of the Cambodian people. We view 
Prince Sihanouk as the indispensable 
leader of any future coalition govern- 
ment in Cambodia. 

Vietnamese Occupation 

It is vital that all peace-loving nations 
continue to stand firm in opposition to 
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. We 
believe that the international effort to 
ostracize Vietnam has, over the years, 
helped to bring home to Hanoi the cost 
of its action and that the recent, al- 
though inconclusive, signs of change in 
Vietnam's approach attest to its effec- 
tiveness. Under current conditions, 
Vietnam cannot and should not partici- 
pate fully in the world's economic and 
diplomatic activities. One result has 
been that as the economies of other na- 
tions in Southeast Asia thrive, Viet- 
nam's has disintegrated. Until Vietnam 
withdraws from Cambodia, it cannot 
hope to seriously address its social and 
economic malaise. Thus, not only Cam- 
bodians but also Vietnamese continue 
to suffer from the folly of Hanoi's mili- 
tary adventurism. 

Unquestionably, Vietnam's illegal 
occupation remains the root cause of 
the conflict in Cambodia today, and the 
expeditious withdrawal of all of the 
Vietnamese troops — we believe that 
more than 100,000 are still in country — 
is the key to resolving this tragic situa- 
tion. The United States has joined with 
the vast majority of the nations of the 
world in condemning Vietnam's occupa- 
tion and has called for Hanoi to with- 
draw its forces and to negotiate a 
settlement acceptable to all sides. We 
believe that only through a political so- 
lution can the suffering of the Cambo- 
dian people be brought to an end and 
regional stability be restored. Our goal 
is a free and independent Cambodia 
which is not a threat to its neighbors. 



Today, despite a series of announ< 
ments by Hanoi over the years that it 
troops would soon withdraw, the Cam 
bodian people continue to endure the 
pain and humiliation of the Vietnames 
occupation of their homeland. The inf 
ence and control of Vietnam permeate 
all aspects of Cambodian life and soci 
ety. Vietnamese personnel, euphemisi 
cally referred to as "advisers," can bt 
found at almost every level of govern- 
ment in Phnom Penh and are assigne* 
as watchdogs to all Cambodian milita 
units. There are also disturbing repoi 
of attempts by Hanoi to bring about 
demographic change in Cambodia 
through the establishment of a numb' 
of Vietnamese settlements. 

Nevertheless, Vietnam, like op- 
pressors from time immemorial, has 
found it impossible to suppress the ir 
domitable spirit of the courageous Ce 
bodian people. Rather than submit 
meekly to Hanoi's attempt to seize 
hegemony over Cambodia, thousands 
resistance fighters have flocked to th 
banners of the noncommunist resist- 
ance, seeking to drive the invaders 
from their country. This effort has bi 
fueled by the widespread popular dis 
satisfaction with the puppet Heng 
Samrin regime. 

In addition to its impact on Cam 
bodia and its people, the Vietnamese 
invasion and continuing occupation o: 
that country constitute a direct thre; 
to the security of Thailand, a long-ti: 
friend and treaty ally of the United 
States, and to the stability of the em 
region. ASEAN has responded to th 
danger with vigor and effectiveness, 
has marshaled international opposite 
to Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia 
and has fostered the growth of the 
Cambodian noncommunist resistance 
into a viable military and political fo 
in the struggle for a free and indepe 
dent Cambodia. 

The United States has noted wit 
interest Hanoi's frequent announce- 
ments of its intention to withdraw 
50,000 troops by the end of 1988 and 
the remainder of its troops by 1990 
without regard to the political, eco- 
nomic, or military situation existing 
that time. We hope Vietnam will mei 
and preferably beat these deadlines, 
and we will be watching. In another 
positive step, Hanoi has recently reii 
erated its willingness to allow foreig f 
observers into Cambodia to verify it J 
announced 50,000 troop withdrawal. 



66 



Department of State Bulletin/February 



UNITED NATIONS 



spite these encouraging signs, how- 
;r, fundamental uncertainties remain. 
r en if Hanoi were to withdraw 50,000 
diers, the continued presence of an 
imated 70,000 troops in Cambodia 
uld preclude genuine national recon- 
ation. Moreover, the United States 
nains skeptical of Vietnam's promise 
depart Cambodia by 1990 in light 
past announced troop withdrawals 
ich later proved to be no more than 
op rotations. The international com- 
nity has the right to expect the act 
ictual withdrawal to follow the words 
Vietnam's promise. 

5. and International Support 

closing, I would like to offer several 
)ortant points for your consideration. 

• First, the United States will con- 
ae to support the efforts of ASEAN 
ichieve a negotiated solution to this 
gedy. Since the beginning of the con- 
;, ASEAN has been in the forefront 
i he search for peace. By focusing 
•rnational attention on Cambodia, it 

functioned as our conscience, ensur- 
that the world does not forget. 

• Second, the United States also 
ngly supports UNGA Resolution 
9 now before us. We believe that 
newly drafted language better re- 

s the current situation in Cambodia 
e maintaining as the world's pri- 
the need for the Vietnamese to 
draw their forces. The resolution is 
armony with my own government's 
l goals for Cambodia: first, immedi- 
unconditional, and total withdrawal 
'ietnam's forces in Cambodia; and, 
e 'lid, a nonreturn to power of Pol Pot 
■ those closely associated with him in 
h Khmer Rouge. 

t • Third, the invasion and occupa- 
I of Cambodia by Vietnam are ille- 
4 This assembly has overwhelmingly 
I repeatedly demanded that Vietnam 
ti idraw from Cambodia. We should do 
ogain with the hope that our com- 
I d voices may persuade Vietnam to 
mw up its conciliatory words with ac- 
I. In this way, our votes here can 
Miribute to the achievement of a 
'B-eful settlement in Cambodia. 
#• Fourth, it is the Cambodian peo- 
ih:hemselves who must determine 
•r own future course. We are certain 
I for this eminently reasonable and 
Mane objective to be realized, there 
It be workable measures to assure 
I the Khmer Rouge can never again 



exercise control over that country's des- 
tiny. Complete Vietnamese withdrawal, 
however, remains the first step toward 
resolution of this conflict. 

The Cambodian people have suf- 
fered long enough. They deserve the 
right to determine their own form of 
government, free from outside inter- 
ference. They are entitled to our best 
effort. The international community, 
which has come to equate the name 
Cambodia with tragedy, should do ev- 
erything possible to ensure that Cam- 
bodia becomes once again a gentle land, 
independent and free from conflict. 



GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
RESOLUTION 43/192 

Recalling its resolutions 34/22 of 14 
November 1979, 35/6 of 22 October 1980, 
36/5 of 21 October 1981, 37/6 of 28 October 
1982, 38/3 of 27 October 1983, 39/5 of 30 
October 1984, 40/7 of 5 November 1985, 
41/6 of 21 October 1986 and 42/3 of 14 Oc- 
tober 1987, 

Recalling further the Declaration on 
Kampuchea and resolution 1(1) adopted by 
the International Conference on 
Kampuchea, 

Taking note of the report of the Secre- 
tary-General on the implementation of 
General Assembly resolution 42/3, 

Deploring that foreign armed interven- 
tion and occupation continue and that for- 
eign forces still remain in Kampuchea, thus 
causing continuing hostilities in that coun- 
try and seriously threatening international 
peace and security, 

Noting the continued and effective 
struggle waged against foreign occupation 
by the Kampuchean forces under the lead- 
ership of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, 

Taking note of Economic and Social 
Council decision 1988/143 of 27 May 1988 on 
the right of peoples to self-determination 
and its application to peoples under co- 
lonial or alien domination or foreign 
occupation, 

breath/ disturbed that the continued 
fighting and instability in Kampuchea have 
forced an additional large number of Kam- 
pucheans to flee to the Thai-Kampuchean 
brder in search of food and safety, 

Recognizing that the assistance ex- 
tended by the international community has 
continued to reduce the food shortages and 
health problems of the Kampuchean 
people. 

Emphasizing that it is the inalienable 
right of the Kampuchean people who have 
sought refuge in neighbouring countries to 
return safely to their homeland, 

Emphasizing further that no effective 
solution to the humanitarian problems can 
be achieved without a comprehensive polit- 
ical settlement of the Kampuchean conflict. 

Seriously concerned about reported 
demographic changes being imposed in 
Kampuchea by foreign occupation forces, 



Convinced that, to bring about lasting 
peace in South-East Asia and reduce the 
threat to international peace and security, 
there is an urgent need for the interna- 
tional community to find a comprehensive 
political solution to the Kampuchean prob- 
lem, with effective guarantees, that will 
provide for the withdrawal of all foreign 
forces from Kampuchea under effective in- 
ternational supervision and control, the 
creation of an interim administering au- 
thority, the promotion of national recon- 
ciliation among all Kampucheans under the 
leadership of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, 
the non-return to the universally con- 
demned policies and practices of a recent 
past and ensure respect for the sov- 
ereignty, independence, territorial integ- 
rity and neutral and non-aligned status of 
Kampuchea, as well as the right of the 
Kampuchean people to self-determination 
free from outside interference, 

Recognizing that the Jakarta Informal 
Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, held from 25 
to 28 July 1988 was a significant develop- 
ment, which marked for the first time the 
participation of the parties directly in- 
volved and other concerned countries, 

Reiterating its conviction that, after 
the comprehensive political settlement of 
the Kampuchean question through peaceful 
means, the countries of the South-East 
Asian region can pursue efforts to estab- 
lish a zone of peace, freedom and neu- 
trality in South-East Asia so as to lessen 
international tensions and to achieve last- 
ing peace in the region. 

Reaffirming the need for all States to 
adhere strictly to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, which call 
for respect for the national independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
States, non-intervention and non-inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of States, 
non-recourse to the threat or use of force 
and peaceful settlement of disputes, 

1. Reaffirms its resolutions 34/22, 35/6, 
37/6, 38/3,' 39/5, 40/7, 41/6 and 42/3 and 
calls for their full implementation; 

2. Reiterates its conviction that the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kam- 
puchea under effective international super- 
vision and control, the creation of an 
interim administering authority, the pro- 
motion of national reconciliation among all 
Kampucheans under the leadership of Sam- 
dech Norodom Sihanouk, the non-return to 
the universally condemned policies and 
practices of a recent past, the restoration 
and preservation of its independence, sov- 
ereignty, territorial integrity and neutral 
and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, the 
reaffirmation of the right of the Kam- 
puchean people to determine their own 
destiny and the commitment by all States 
to non-interference and non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of Kampuchea, with ef- 
fective guarantees, are the principal com- 
ponents of any just and lasting resolution 
of the Kampuchean problem; 



Apartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



67 



UNITED NATIONS 



3. Takes note with appreciation of the 
report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
International Conference on Kampuchea on 
ts activities during 1987-1988 and requests 
that the Committee continue its work, 
pending the reconvening of the Conference; 

4. Authorizes the Ad Hoc Committee 
to convene when necessary and to carry 
out the tasks entrusted to it in its 
mandate; 

5. Reaffirms its commitment to recon- 
vene the Conference at an appropriate 
time, in accordance with Conference reso- 
lution 1(1), and its readiness to support any 
other conference of an international nature 
under the auspices of the Secretary- 
General; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General to 
continue to consult with and assist the 
Conference and the Ad. Hoc Committee and 
to provide them on a regular basis with the 
necessary facilities to carry out their 
functions; 

7. Expresses its appreciation once 
again to the Secretary-General for taking 
appropriate steps in following the situation 
closely and requests him to continue to do 
so and to exercise his good offices in order 
to contribute to a comprehensive political 
settlement; 

8. Expresses its deep appreciation 
once again to donor countries, the United 
Nations and its agencies and other human- 
itarian organizations, national and interna- 
tional, that have rendered relief assistance 
to the Kampuchean people, and appeals to 
them to continue to provide emergency as- 
sistance to those Kampucheans who are 
still in need, especially along the Thai- 
Kampuchean border and in the various en- 
campments in Thailand; 

9. Reiterates its deep appreciation to 
the Secretary-General for his efforts in co- 
ordinating humanitarian relief assistance 
and in monitoring its distribution, and re- 
quests him to intensify such efforts as 
necessary; 

10. Urges the States of South-East 
Asia, once a comprehensive political solu- 
tion to the Kampuchean conflict is ach- 
ieved, to exert renewed efforts to establish 
a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in 
South-East Asia; 

11. Reiterates the hope that, following 
a comprehensive political solution, an in- 
tergovernmental committee will be es- 
tablished to consider a programme of 
assistance to Kampuchea for the recon- 
struction of its economy and for the eco- 
nomic and social development of all States 
in the region; 

12. Requests the Secretary-General to 
report to the General Assembly at its 
forty-fourth session on the implementation 
of the present resolution; 

13. Decides to include in the provi- 
sional agenda of its forty-fourth session the 
item entitled "The situation in Kampuchea." 



The United Nations: Progress in the 1980s 



■USUN press release 119. 
-Adopted by a vote of 122 (U.S.) to 19, 
with 13 abstentions. ■ 



68 



by Richard S. Williamson 

Address before a series sponsored 
till the American Academy of Diplo- 
macy and the Woodrow Wilson Interna- 
tional Center for Scholars on 
"Adapting American Diplomacy to the 
Demands of the 1990s" held on Octo- 
ber 19, 1988. Ambassador Williamson is 
Assistant Secretary for International 
Organization Affairs. 

In recent days there has been a re- 
surgence of enthusiasm for the United 
Nations in some quarters. This is due, 
in large part, to the progress that has 
taken place with respect to UN actions 
on reform and the advancement of hu- 
man rights, as well as the increased 
contributions of UN peacekeeping oper- 
ations which led to the award of the 
1988 Nobel Peace Prize to the UN 
peacekeeping forces. 

At the same time, however, signifi- 
cant problems continue to plague this 
world body. For example, the 1975 reso- 
lution which branded Zionism as racism 
is an outrage. It is a cancer which con- 
tinues to eat away at the moral legit- 
imacy of this world body. The rhetoric 
within the United Nations is too often 
reckless. Sometimes the United Na- 
tions even serves to exacerbate prob- 
lems rather than help to resolve them. 
Nevertheless, the past 8 years have 
witnessed an evolution within the 
United Nations. 

When the Reagan Administration 
took office, the United Nations was 
hostile to U.S. interests, and the 
United States was in retreat. Name- 
calling was a common practice that 
many considered to be not only legiti- 
mate but too enjoyable to resist. 
Efforts to delegitimize Israel and even 
deny it credentials were accepted prac- 
tices within the United Nations. A dou- 
ble standard existed in human rights 
whereby the clients of the Soviet Union 
avoided close scrutiny while weaker and 
isolated nations such as El Salvador 
and Chile were condemned. From the 
standpoint of its administrative prac- 
tices, the United Nations was poorly 
managed and rife with fiscal ineffi- 
ciency. And in many respects, the 
United Nations had become at best a 
marginal actor on the world stage. 
While many areas still exist in which 
the United Nations has strayed from its 



original goals and objectives, there 
have been noteworthy improvements. 

Name-calling, while still too fre- 
quent, has diminished. The cacophon; 
of reckless rhetoric has abated. Israe 
credentials are not in threat in the Gt 
eral Assembly nor within the UN spt 
cialized agencies. In human rights the 
double standard has been challenged, 
and we have seen Soviet human right 
abuses within Afghanistan condemne 
and Cuba put under the scrutiny of a. 
UN Human Rights Commission inves 
gative team. There has been recogni- 
tion and gradual progress in the area 
management and fiscal efficiency. An 
finally, the United Nations is playing 
worthwhile role in peacekeeping in 
Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and potentia 
in the Western Sahara, Namibia, 
Cyprus, and Cambodia. 

Three distinct and separate ele- 
ments have combined to contribute t 
this transformation within the Unite 
Nations. 

First, President Reagan's firm 
leadership and consistent policies in 
United Nations and elsewhere have j 
a salutory impact. 

Second, the Third World is play 
an increasingly constructive role wit 
the United Nations. 

And, third, the positive develop, 
ments in U.S. -Soviet relations have 
creased the opportunities for the 
United Nations to play a meaningfu" 
role. 



U.S. Leadership in the 
United Nations 

In 1981, when Ronald Reagan took o 
fice, the United States was in ret re; 
within the United Nations. It had b 
come commonly accepted practice tc 
challenge the United States throug? 
the most grotesque rhetoric and nar 
calling. U.S. interests seemed to ha 
become subjugated to a standard of 
moral legitimacy that was set by a ^ 
of the United Nation's majority men 
bership (undemocratic and unfree) 
rather than the constant values of ft 
dom, human rights, and democracy 
which have been the hallmarks of oi 
nation since its founding over 200 yt 
ago. By the late 1970s, we seemed b 



DeDartment of State Bulletin February & 



UNITED NATIONS 



Ive accepted within the UN General 

lsembly a position of moral inferiority 
the face of a hostile majority of mid- 
nations and mini-states (often in col- 
ion with the Soviets and the Eastern 
). 

President Reagan, through his first 
tibassador to the United Nations, 
ine Kirkpatrick, took the "kick me" 
n off the United States. We no 
ger passively accepted outrageous 
irges and name-calling. Those who 
1 challenged the United States began 
realize that such reckless accusations 
uld be met by an equally forceful 
llenge and the truth. 
With his appointment of Ambas- 
lor Kirkpatrick and later Ambas- 
lor Vernon Walters, President 
agan signaled a new determination 
h respect to the United Nations. It 
5 not a frivolous body to be ignored 
a serious forum to be engaged. The 
en visits which Ronald Reagan him- 
made to the General Assembly — a 
ord number of appearances before 
t world body by any President of the 
ited States — further demonstrated 
importance which he placed on it. 
the United States evinced its own 
(ous approach toward the United 
;ions, others began to take the 
Id body and their own actions more 
ously. 

With respect to the double stand- 
B on human rights, the United 
tes has aggressively pursued the 
"orm application of the Universal 
laration of Human Rights. This doc- 
li 'lit , which was crafted in 1948 
aely by American delegates Eleanor 
lisevelt and John Foster Dulles, re- 
U ted our own values about human 

■ its as embodied in the U.S. Con- 
flation. It reflected our understand- 
n after World World II that countries 
Ich tend to abuse their own citizens' 
lian rights will be more inclined to 
Be the rights of their neighbors. 

I In selecting his first representative 

■ he Human Rights Commission, 
l»d theologian and political scientist 
lhael Novak, President Reagan ele- 
I'd the consideration of human rights 
■)nd the rhetoric and actively sought 
Cush the United Nations to evenly 
Bly universal standards. In achieving 
lian rights scrutiny in Afghanistan 
I now Cuba, the United States' per- 
Isnce and political handiwork were 

• 'ly rewarded. Just as the Reagan 
■gation sought to continue close 
Bltiny of Chile, we set out to achieve 



close scrutiny of the Western Hemi- 
sphere's most egregious abuser of hu- 
man rights, Fidel Castro. At first 
reluctantly, but eventually with an 
overwhelming majority, the members of 
the United Nations recognized the im- 
portance of this initiative, not only for 
the United States but for all member 
states. 

In the area of management and ad- 
ministration, under the leadership of 
Ambassador Walters, the United States 
started a multi-year campaign to bring 
some sanity to the reckless, spendthrift 
manner in which the United Nations 
had been operating. Joining first with 
other major donors such as Japan and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
then eventually gaining support from 
the Soviet Union and from leading 
G-77 developing countries, the United 
States achieved a miraculous develop- 
ment: In 1986 a group of 18 government 
experts was formed to look at UN 
management. 

The G-18's report was far-reaching 
and profound. It contained 71 recom- 
mendations that addressed four main 
areas of concern: 

• The proliferation of intergovern- 
mental bodies which had caused the 
UN machinery to become overly com- 
plex, noncohesive, and difficult to 
coordinate; 

• The mushrooming of the number, 
frequency, and duration of UN meet- 
ings and the corresponding increase in 
paperwork; 

• The tremendous growth in the 
size of the Secretariat, which had be- 
come topheavy and inefficient; and 

• The seemingly unending growth 
in UN budgets. 

In order to address these prob- 
lems, the G-18 proposed, among other 
things, a 15% reduction in staff and a 
reform of the UN's budgetary process 
that would ensure that budgetary ques- 
tions would be settled by consensus. 

When I was serving as U.S. Am- 
bassador to the United Nations offices 
in Vienna, Austria, in 1983 and 1984, I 
never would have imagined that Gen- 
eral Assembly formation of a team like 
the G-18 would have been possible. If 
such a group of diverse nations had 
been formed, I never would have 
thought that it could have reached con- 
sensus recommendations. If recommen- 
dations had been forthcoming from such 



a group, I never would have believed 
that the General Assembly might 
largely adopt them. And even if their 
adoption were achieved, I never would 
have foreseen implementation. 

But through the persistence of the 
Reagan Administration, the leadership 
of Secretary Shultz and Ambassador 
Walters, and the help of Secretary Gen- 
eral Perez de Cuellar, these sweeping 
recommendations were adopted by the 
Group of 18 experts, endorsed by the 
General Assembly, and have now under- 
gone the first phases of implementa- 
tion. The process is not perfect. Our 
steps are only small ones when we con- 
sider the massive task ahead. But the 
reform process has begun and begun 
well. 

The Reagan Administration's firm, 
uncompromising yet nonconfrontational 
approach has been a major contributor 
to this progress. Further, in the peace- 
keeping efforts of Afghanistan, Iran- 
Iraq, and Angola/Namibia, the United 
States has played a very strong, sup- 
portive role in the "real world" beyond 
the United Nations as well as within 
the United Nations itself to support the 
Secretary General and his good offices 
in seeking settlements and the resolu- 
tion of regional conflicts. 

• In Afghanistan, for example, it 
was the steadfast support of Ronald 
Reagan and the strong bipartisan sup- 
port in the U.S. Congress for the 
mujahidin that raised the Soviet costs 
of the brutal occupation of that country. 

• It was the deployment of U.S. 
naval forces in the Persian Gulf, as well 
as the diplomatic isolation of Iran, that 
led Iran to accept the terms of Resolu- 
tion 598 and agree to a cease-fire. 

• Finally, the United States is tak- 
ing the lead in trying to arrange among 
the parties a peaceful solution to the 
Angola/Namibia conflict. However, the 
mediator in these talks, Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs Chet 
Crocker, has recognized from the outset 
the helpful role the United Nations can 
play in implementing the arrangements 
the parties eventually agree on con- 
cerning self-determination in Namibia 
and the end of civil war in Angola. 

In all of these areas — human 
rights, UN reform, and peacekeeping — 
Ronald Reagan deserves significant 
credit not only for having improved the 
United Nations as a tool which can 
both help advance U.S. interests and 
the interests of all those serious-minded 
countries but also for having improved 
the United Nations itself as an 
institution. 



3)artment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



69 



UNITED NATIONS 



The Changing Role 
of the Third World 

The majority of the nations of the de- 
veloping world are former colonies. 
President Franklin Roosevelt played a 
major role in spurring decolonization. 
He began to confront this issue with 
both the British and the French during 
World War II when they found such a 
challenge offensive to their national in- 
terests. Nonetheless, the United States 
continued to push for decolonization 
after the war, and the United Nations 
served as an invaluable midwife in this 
process. The result was the end of tra- 
ditional European colonization. Begin- 
ning in 1958 with the independence of 
Tunisia a cascade of new nations was 
founded where former colonies existed. 

These new nations did not have a 
history in bilateral relations nor the fi- 
nancial resources to have embassies 
throughout the world. They did not 
have the wealth to impact world events 
through economic force. Nor did they 
have the military power to exert their 
independence. But these new nations 
desperately sought to proclaim their in- 
dependence. The United Nations be- 
came their preferred forum. 

Within the United Nations, they 
could have one delegation which could 
deal with all the other countries of the 
world. Also within the United Nations, 
they had an equal vote with other mem- 
bers in the General Assembly. And 
within the General Assembly, they 
could express their independence. In 
some ways this was constructive. How- 
ever, it also distorted the General As- 
sembly. The rhetoric of the newly 
independent countries became exces- 
sive. Perhaps frustrated about the lim- 
itations of their power to have an 
impact on the real world, they issued 
sweeping and often reckless state- 
ments, whether hurling accusations 
against former colonial powers or other 
powerful nations such as the United 
States. Frustrated with their poverty 
versus the wealth of other nations, they 
condemned the wealthy. 

These developing nations also found 
it very salutory to pass sweeping reso- 
lutions mandating great changes. How- 
ever, over a period of time they learned 
that excessive rhetoric in the United 
Nations did have a cost. They were 
taken less seriously. And the sweeping 
resolutions had little impact on their 
very urgent and real needs. 



The developing world has begun to 
understand that passing a broad resolu- 
tion calling for a new international eco- 
nomic order has not put more food on 
the tables of the citizens in their coun- 
tries. They have learned that passing a 
New Delhi declaration at the UNIDO 
[UN Industrial Development Organiza- 
tion] conference in 1974 has not created 
new jobs in their countries. They have 
learned that passing a sweeping Lima 
declaration in 1978 has not created fur- 
ther markets for their products. 

The result of these developments, 
nurtured by Secretary General Perez 
de Cuellar, has been a gradual yet per- 
ceptible movement of the G-77 nations 
toward more responsible behavior. 
There has been a recognition that the 
spendthrift ways of the United Nations 
hurt their interests, which are so de- 
pendent on a viable and vital United 
Nations, more than any other group of 
countries. Thus, by degrees, leading 
nations among the G-77 have embraced 
the reform process and helped advance 
it. To strengthen the United Nations is 
to help strengthen their own abilities. 

In the economic fora, sweeping 
condemnations of industrialized coun- 
tries have slowly diminished and are 
being replaced by responsible work pro- 
grams for specific projects to advance 
economic development. 

This transformation within the de- 
veloping nation majority in the United 
Nations is terribly important. It has 
created new responsible leadership 
among their ranks, as well as a recep- 
tiveness for greater responsibility. It 
has created a new opportunity as we 
face the United Nations in the 1990s. 

These changes have contributed 
mightily to the improvements within 
the United Nations. They are to be 
nurtured for the sake of the developing 
nations, for the sake of the United 
States, and for the sake of the United 
Nations itself. 

The Changing U.S.-Soviet 
Relationship 

A third major element in the evolving 
real world beyond the United Nations, 
which has helped the United Nations 
mightily in its gradual movement to- 
ward an improved body, has been the 
changed U.S.-Soviet relationship. While 



the Soviet Union remains the United 
States' primary adversary and the 
East- West confrontation the primary 
threat, there is no question that the 
U.S.-Soviet relationship is in a perioc 
of adjustment. 

President Reagan deserves credi 
for this in part by having provided a 
stronger America, both militarily an< 
economically, in which to engage the 
Soviet Union. In part this is a result 
General Secretary Gorbachev and hi; 
efforts at perestroika and glasnost. 

There is no question that the sofl 
ened rhetoric and the efforts to avok 
direct confrontation by both super- 
powers have created a new environm 
and opportunity for the United 
Nations. 

Furthermore, as the superpowei 
have exerted influence to resolve sor 
of the serious regional conflagrations 
that have been waged, be they in 
Afghanistan, Namibia, Cambodia, o 
elsewhere, the United Nations has 
stood available as a convenient facili 
tator to help bridge the final gaps t< 
ward peace, to provide a buffer for 
graceful exits, and to provide a frar 
work for reconstruction. Both Presi 
Reagan and General Secretary Gor- 
bachev have provided political and 
moral leadership to nurture this 
process. 

Conclusion 

All three of these elements — Presic' 
Reagan's firm leadership, the modil 
tion and maturing of views in devel 
ing countries, and the changing U.l 
Soviet relationship — have contribut 
to this evolution. It is not a revolut 
ary change. The United Nations st: 
does much that is undesirable. The 
"Zionism is racism" resolution still 
as part of the UN General Assemb 
theology. The rhetoric is excessive, 
double standards persist, whether 
South Africa or on human rights. I 
the reckless ship cast out toward d 
seas of oblivion has been steadied. 
Enough progress perhaps has been 
made even to say it has begun to 
change its course. This is good for 
United States and it is good for th<- 
world. It is a process that the next 
Administration must engage, nurti 
and advance — both for the United 
tions' own interests and for the go( 
the world community. 



70 



Department of State Bulletin/FebruanlSl: 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Maintaining this progress will re- 
ire continued firm, persistent lead- 
hip in the United States. This means 
ng all resources available — political, 
ral, rhetorical, and financial — to ad- 
lce U.S. interests and to fight those 
ions that profoundly offend our 
ral and political values. This is a 
llenge for the next Administration. 

This also means working construe- 
ely with developing nations, both on 
ilateral basis and in their preferred 
um of the United Nations; to nurture 
ognition of the benefits of responsi- 
action, reasonable rhetoric, and 
istructive joint endeavors to avoid 
ifrontation; and seek the progress of 
dualism, which is the only solution 
their many problems of poverty 
1, too often, limited freedoms. 

Finally, we must continue our steps 
the path that was opened by Presi- 
it Reagan and General Secretary 
bachev through their efforts to ex- 
re areas of mutual interest to the 
■erpowers. In the INF [Intermedi- 
-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty we 
e seen the benefits of the coopera- 
1 between the superpowers. We have 
n in the INF Treaty the benefits of 
ce through strength. In the INF 
aty we have seen a harbinger of op- 
tunities. While recognizing our ad- 
sarial relationship and the serious 
sat to our values and standards, this 
h should be explored. And one arena 
vhich it can, should, and must be 
lored is within the UN system. The 
ted States and the Soviet Union 
e long cooperated within the United 
dons on areas of mutual interest 
in as nuclear nonproliferation. We 
■e now found areas of cooperation 
hin the United Nations on peace- 
ping efforts such as in Afghanistan. 

Soviet Union remains our primary 
ersary. But President Reagan has 

n valuable steps toward limited 
peration. 

Secretary General Dag Hammarsk- 

once said that the United Nations 

like a hoe. By itself it can do noth- 

But in the hands of the mem- 
ship it can till the garden and bear 
t. The three developments in the 
)s discussed above have contributed 
i more constructive atmosphere 
lin the United Nations and greater 
ortunities. As the leader of the free 
id and the founding force of the 
ted Nations, the United States has 
obligation to seek to use the hoe for 

advantage of all mankind. ■ 



Secretary Attends Inaugural 
of Mexico's President 



Secretary Shultz headed the Presi- 
dential delegation at the inauguration 
of Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de 
Gotiari on December 1, 1988. Following 
is an interview the Secretary had on 
Televisa Mexico in Mexico City on that 
day. 1 

Q. I wanted to ask you, how would 
you rate the relationship in the past 6 
years while you have been in office, 
the relationship between Mexico and 
the United States? What can we look 
forward to in the future? 

A. It's been a good relationship, a 
constructive one, and we've had the 
ability to take a look at problems that 
we have and opportunities and deal 
with them. Of course, there are plenty 
of problems remaining for the new Ad- 
ministrations coming in but, I think, on 
the whole, we would have to say that 
it's been a good working relationship, 
and I am proud of myself to have had 
some part in it. I noticed in the cere- 
mony this morning when the new Presi- 
dent had nice things to say about the 
outgoing President, there was a very 
warm burst of applause, and I thought 
it was well deserved. 

Q. Talking about President Sali- 
nas and his inauguration speech to- 
day, he mentioned that Mexico will 
now focus on the economic growth, 
and paying the debt will take second 
place. Would you see this as a major 
change in the U.S. -Mexico rela- 
tionship and Mexican policies? 

A. Of course we have to explore 
exactly what President Salinas has in 
mind, but I think he is absolutely right 
that growth is what every country 
needs. It's what Mexico needs. For that 
matter, if the debt is to be dealt with 
successfully, it can only be when there 
is a growing economy. If the economy 
isn't growing, we don't have anything 
to work with on the debt, let alone 
growth or progress for the people of 
Mexico. I think he hits it right on the 
head in saying that growth has to be a 
key objective. 

Q. Would you think that the cred- 
itors will accept reducing the debt? 
Would you think that would be a solu- 
tion or part of a solution? 



Klllpartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



A. The debt problem is complex 
and difficult. If it were otherwise, it 
would long since have been dealt with. 
President Salinas had some interesting 
things to say. I am noting them down 
and I'm going back to the United 
States. I'll have a chance to talk with 
our new Secretary of the Treasury, and 
so I'll pass some information along. But 
at any rate, I think it's already been 
shown that the new Secretary of the 
Treasury, Nick Brady, has been ready 
to work very constructively with his 
colleagues in Mexico in trying to look at 
your problems and our problems to see 
what we can do about them. But I 
wouldn't want to say anything substan- 
tive about the debt issue, because it is 
something that will have to be worked 
out very carefully. 

Q. Why don't we touch the drug 
problem? Do you think both countries 
have worked together enough to fight 
this problem? Are you satisfied, is the 
United States satisfied, with what has 
been done in Mexico? 

A. I was very struck by the way 
President Salinas handled this problem 
at his inaugural address, which inciden- 
tally, I thought was a very strong ad- 
dress. I was quite struck by it. But at 
any rate, he stepped up to the drug 
problem in a very forceful way, and it 
was clear from what he said that he is 
not satisfied with the way things are 
going, and I'm sure that people in the 
United States are not satisfied. 

None of us is doing enough, and we 
have to sort of take a deep breath and 
say we must really get after this in the 
United States. We have to do some- 
thing about the demand for drugs, and 
we are, but we have a big battle on our 
hands and a big responsibility on our 
hands. Of course, then there is the 
question of the supply that worries you 
here — and worries us — that there is a 
very substantial flow from here. It isn't 
only the problems that [it] creates for 
us, but it creates lots of problems for 
you, as President Salinas pointed out. 
This is an example of the problem that 
is a very important one for both coun- 
tries and both new Presidents, as was 
true of the outgoing Presidents. They 
are, I think, prepared to be fully en- 
gaged in doing everything possible 
again about it, and I was very glad to 
hear what President Salinas said in his 
address. 



71 



WESTERN HEMISPHERE 



Q. Would you say that drugs at 
their time were a major concern and 
maybe with the Camarena case made 
the relationship at its lowest point we 
have seen in years? 

A. That was a very tough case, 
and the problem still is an edgy prob- 
lem on all sides. At the same time, we 
have had good constructive work to- 
gether, and that's what we need to push 
on and push on hard. 

Q. It's a major concern here in 
Mexico in terms of illegal workers 
who cross the border and go to the 
United States. Do you think there is a 
way in which both countries can work 
together? Apparently there is no easy 
solution to this Simpson-Rodino law. 
Apparently it has not given the re- 
sults you expected. Can you give us 
your opinion about this? 

A. It wouldn't be quite so much of 
that judgment. I think it has begun to 
settle in, and I have a sense that the 
problem of illegal immigrants as illegal 
workers is not as great as it was; at 
least we feel we have some handles on 
it. As a matter of fact, more generally 
the work on our border on all the vari- 
ous issues — naturally if you have a long 
border you have environmental issues, 
you have all sorts of issues, that a lot of 
progress has been made on that area 
too. I have a sense that on this illegal 
worker issue, we are a little better off 
than we were, not that it isn't still a 
problem. 



I asked when we were coming 
down — talking in our party before com- 
ing here — a person who would know 
how many border crossings there are 
between the United States and Mexico. 
How many times does a human being 
go across the border in a year? 

Q. It's very hard to tell if it's a 
million or if it's 5 million people. 

A. Apparently it's up in the neigh- 
borhood of 80 million. It's gigantic. This 
shows how rich and large and human 
the relationship between Mexico and 
the United States is. We have to work 
with each other, and we have to live 
with each other. We have to respect 
each other. I think in President Salinas' 
speech, he talked about going about 
this in a balanced way, in a way that 
showed mutual respect. I think that is 
absolutely right, and that is the way 
I'm sure the United States intends to 
proceed with it. I'm sure it received 
notice here in Mexico, as it did in the 
United Sates, that the first then pro- 
spective head of state who was Mr. Sa- 
linas — who was still President-elect at 
that time — but the first head of state, 
so to speak, that President-elect Bush 
traveled somewhere to go and see was 
the incoming President of Mexico. I 
think that tells you something about at- 
titudes that President Bush will be 
bringing into this relationship. 

Q. So we are good neighbors, and 
we can expect more from the 
relationship? 



U.S. Supports Panama's 
National Unity Plan 



DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, 
NOV. 25, 19881 

The Plan for National Unity, released 
by the opposition in Panama yesterday, 
is a welcome effort to set out a plan for 
the resolution of the political crisis in 
Panama and the recovery of the Pan- 
amanian economy. It is an important 
attempt to create the conditions for na- 
tional reconciliation in a post-Noriega 
Panama. 

We endorse Panamanian efforts to 
work with the Panamanian Defense 
Force to reestablish political stability, 



and we look forward to working with a 
professional Panamanian Defense Force 
in meeting our joint responsibilities for 
defense of the canal. We support this 
unified Panamanian effort, and we 
agree with the opposition political par- 
ties that political stability can only re- 
turn if Noriega steps down. Likewise 
relations between the United States 
and Panama cannot be normalized as 
long as Noriega continues to exercise 
power unlawfully. 



'Read to news correspondents by De- 
partment spokesman Charles Redman. ■ 



A. We are going to try our very 
best to be good neighbors. We know 
that there are lots of problems, and y 
touched on some of the key ones, and 
they are not going to go away easily. 
There'll be hard work on them, and 
there'll be times when we'll be a littj 
edgy about it and you will be too. Bu 
the big thing is to have a constructive 
and respectful attitude and to try to 
get the problems solved. I feel sure 
that that is the way in which Preside 
Bush and the people working with hi 
are going to approach this. From all 
can tell from President Salinas' ad- 
dress, that seems to be his orientatic 
as well. I'm looking forward to an op 
portunity to meet with him a little 
later. He has done me the honor of g 
ing me an appointment, and I look fo 
ward to that. 

Q. We know we have a surplus 
Mexico in the trade relationship. 
Would the United States be willing 
help us out in terms of buying mon 
and reducing what we will call 
"protective measures" on your beha 

A. Trade has to take place on co 
mercial terms, and if you can bring 
things to the United States that Am* 
can consumers want to buy, then tha 
will cause that flow. What we, of 
course, want is an ability to have a s 
ilar situation of U.S. goods and servi 
coming into Mexico; and we have see 
growth of trade. It is balanced in yoi 
favor, as they say, but, at any rate, 
these are things that come about 
through the operation of the commei 
cial system. We'll want our chances 
your markets, just as you want then 
into our markets. 

Q. We are a bit smaller in tern 
of billing at the same level, don't y 
think? 

A. Your population is smaller, a 
your GNP is smaller, but that doesn 
really affect, particularly, the trade 
lationship. There are lots of small co 
tries around the world — a lot smalle: 
than Mexico — which have very stron 
trade relationships with us. 

Q. Japan? 

A. No, Japan is bigger than Me: 
ico. But take, for instance, Singapor 
which is tiny in relationship to you. 
have a big trading relationship with 
Singapore. 



72 



Department of State Bulletin/February 11 



TREATIES 



Q. You will be leaving office very 
n. What should we remember Sec- 
ry of State Shultz for? How would 
like us to remember your years in 
:e? How would you like people to 
ember you? 
A. As a friend of Mexico. 

Q. Thank you very much. Is 
e something you would like to 

A. No, I think you've gone through 
orts of problems here. The general 
ng that I have and would impart, 
king on behalf of my country to the 
lie of Mexico, is that we want to be 
neighbors. We want to be friends, 
relieve that we do a pretty good job 
ying to understand the world as 
see it. We want you to do the same 
ir as we are concerned. We know 
e are problems, and we are ready 
ill up our sleeves and work with 
in trying to resolve them to our 
ial satisfaction. 



Press release 251 of Dec. 9, 1988. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered 
into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. 
Dec. 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Notification of succession deposited : 
Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of Article VI. A. 1 of the 
Statute of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency of Oct. 26, 1956, as 
amended (TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668). Done at 
Vienna Sept. 27, 1984. ' [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 99-7. 

Acceptance deposited : Burma, Dec. 5, 
1988. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the 
development, production, and stockpiling 
of bacteriological (biological) and toxin 
weapons and on their destruction. Done at 
Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 
1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 

Accession deposited : Bahrain, Oct. 28, 
1988. 2 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. 
Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into 
force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 

Notification of succession deposited : 
Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, with 
annexes and protocol of signature. Done at 
Geneva May 18, 1956. Entered into force 
Aug. 4, 1959; for the U.S. Mar. 3, 1969. 
TIAS 6634. 

Notification of succession deposited : 
Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Environmental Modification 

Convention on the prohibition of military 
or any other hostile use of environmental 
modification techniques, with annex. Done 
at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force 
Oct. 5, 1978; for the U.S. Jan. 17, 1980. 
TIAS 9614. 

Notification of succession deposited : 
Antigua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 



Fisheries 

Pacific Island regional fisheries treaty. 
Done at Port Moresby Apr. 2, 1987. 
Entered into force June 15, 1988. [Senate] 
Treaty Doc. 100-5. 

Ratification deposited : New Zealand, 
Nov. 9, 1988. 3 

Genocide 

Convention of the prevention and punish- 
ment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at 
Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force 
Jan. 12, 1951. 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Nov. 25, 
1988. 2J 

Proclaimed by the President: Dec. 27, 
1988. 

Enters into force for the U.S. : Feb. 23, 
1989. 

Notification of succession deposited: Anti- 
gua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judi- 
cial and extrajudicial documents in civil or 
commercial matters. Done at The Hague 
Nov. 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb. 10, 
1969. TIAS 6638. 

Accession deposited : Canada, Sept. 26, 
1988. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 
1966. Done at London Apr. 5, 1966. En- 
tered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 
6629, 6720. 

Accession deposited : Mauritius, Oct. 11, 
1988. 

Marriage 

Convention on consent to marriage, mini- 
mum age for marriage, and registration of 
marriages. Done at New York Dec. 10, 
1962. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1964. 5 
Notification of succession deposited : Anti- 
gua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. 
Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into 
force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 
1980. TIAS 9725. 

Accession deposited : Canada, June 18, 
1987, effective Dec. 9, 1988. 2 

Nuclear Material — Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 
nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
Feb. 8, 1987. 
Accession deposited : Japan, Oct. 28, 1988. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into 
force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 
Accession deposited : Bahrain, Nov. 3, 
1988. 



73 



TREATIES 



Oil Pollution 

Protocol of 1984 to amend the international 
convention on civil liability for oil pollution 
damage, 1969, and the protocol of 1984 to 
amend the international convention on the 
establishment of an international fund for 
compensation for oil pollution damage, 
1971. Done at London May 25, 1984. • [Sen- 
ate] Treaty Doc. 99-12. 
Ratification deposited : Germany, Fed. Rep. 
of, Oct. 18, 1988. fi 

Organization of American States 

Protocol of amendment to the Charter of 
the Organization of American States 
"Protocol of Cartagena de Indias." Signed 
at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, Dec. 5, 
1985. 

Signature : St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Sept. 28, 1987. 

Ratifications deposited : Bolivia, El Sal- 
vador, Nicaragua, Nov. 16, 1988: Mexico, 
Oct. 11, 1988; 7 St. Vincent and the Grena- 
dines, Sept. 28, 1987; Suriname, Nov. 12, 
1987. 
Entered into force : Nov. 16, 1988. 5 

Pollution 

Convention for the protection of the ozone 
layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 
22, 1985. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1988. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9. 
Ratification deposited : Italy, Sept. 19, 
1988. 

Accessions deposited : Ireland, Malta, 
Sept. 15, 1988; Kenya, Nov. 9, 1988. 

Montreal protocol on substances that de- 
plete the ozone layer, with annex. Done at 
Montreal Sept. 16, 1987. ' [Senate] Treaty 
Doc. 100-10. 

Signatures : Austria, Aug. 29, 1988; Bur- 
kina Faso, Philippines, Sept. 14, 1988; 
Congo, Ireland, Malta, Thailand, Uganda, 
Sept. 15, 1988. 

Ratifications deposited : Kenya, Nov. 9, 
1988; Uganda, Sept. 15, 1988. 
Acceptance deposited : U.S.S.R., Nov. 10, 
1988. 

Protocol to the convention on long-range 
transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13, 
1979, (TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring 
and evaluation of long-range transmission 
of air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with 
annex. Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984. En- 
tered into force Jan. 28, 1988. 
Accession deposited : Poland, Sept. 14, 
1988. 

Postal 

Money orders and postal travelers' checks 
agreement, with detailed regulations and 
final protocol. Done at Hamburg July 27, 
1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for 
the U.S. June 6, 1986. 
Ratifications deposited : Chad, Jan. 28, 
1987: Syria, Oct. 25, 1988. 



Postal parcels agreement, with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at 
Hamburg July 27, 1984. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1986; for the U.S. June 6, 1986. 
Ratifications deposited : Bolivia, Aug. 16, 
1988; New Zealand, Nov. 17, 1988; Oman, 
July 26, 1988; Syria, Oct. 25, 1988; 
Venezuela, Aug. 2, 1988. 

Third additional protocol to the constitu- 
tion of the Universal Postal Union of July 
10, 1964, general regulations, with annex, 
and the universal postal convention, with 
final protocol and detailed regulations. 
Done at Hamburg July 27, 1984. Entered 
into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the U.S. June 6, 
1986. 

Ratifications deposited : Bolivia, Aug. 16, 
1988; Chad, Jan. 28, 1987; New Zealand, 
Nov. 17, 1988; Oman, July 26, 1988; Syria, 
Oct. 25, 1988; Venezuela, Aug. 2, 1988. 

Prisoner Transfer 

Convention on the transfer of sentenced 
persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983. 
Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS 
10824. 

Signature : Malta, Nov. 4, 1988. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellec- 
tual Property Organization. Done at Stock- 
holm July 14, 1967. Entered into force 
Apr. 26, 1970; for the U.S. Aug. 25, 1970. 
TIAS 6932. 

Accession deposited : Malaysia, Oct. 1, 
1988. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination 
of all forms of racial discrimination. Done 
at New York Dee. 21, 1965. Entered into 
force Jan. 4, 1969. 5 

Notification of succession deposited : Anti- 
gua and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

Rubber 

International natural rubber agreement, 

i987, with annexes. Done at Geneva 

Mar. 20, 1987. ' [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification : 

Sept. 7, 1988. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President : Nov. 3, 1988. 

Ratification deposited : U.S., Nov. 9, 1988. 

Notification of provisional application : 

France, Oct. 7, 1988. 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to international 

convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 

(TIAS 9700). Done at London Feb. 17, 

1978. Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 

10009. 

Accession deposited : Indonesia, Aug. 23, 

1988. 



Satellite Communications System 
(INMARSAT) 

Amendments to the convention and ope 
ing agreement on the International Mai 
itime Satellite Organization (INMARS^ 
of Sept. 3, 1976 (TIAS 9605). Adopted a 
London Oct. 16, 1985.' 
Acceptances deposited : Egypt, Sept. 13 
1988;* Germany, Fed. Rep. of, Oct. 7, IS 
Singapore, Oct. 6, 1988. 

Satellites — Program-Carrying Signals 

Convention relating to the distribution 
program-carrying signals transmitted I 
satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 197- 
Entered into force Aug. 25, 1979; for tl 
U.S. Mar. 7, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doe 
98-31. 

Accession deposited : U.S.S.R., Oct. 2C 
1988. 

Sugar 

International sugar agreement, 1987, w 

annexes. Done at London Sept. 11, 198' 

Entered into force provisionally Mar. 2 

1988. 

Ratification deposited : Korea, Rep. of, 

Oct. 31, 1988. 

Telecommunication 

International telecommunication conve 
tion, with annexes and protocols. Done 
Nairobi Nov. 6, 1982. Entered into fori 
Jan. 1, 1984; for the U.S. Jan. 10, 1986. 
[Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-6. 
Accession deposited : Western Samoa, 
Oct. 7, 1988. 

Terrorism 

Convention to prevent and punish the 
of terrorism taking the form of crimes 
against persons and related extortion 
are of international significance. Signs 
Washington Feb. 2, 1971. Entered intc 
force Oct. 16, 1973; for the U.S. Oct. \ 
1976. TIAS 8413. 

Ratifications deposited : Panama, Nov. 
1988; Peru, July 8, 1988. 

Timber 

International tropical timber agreeme 

1983, with annexes. Done at Geneva 

Nov. 18, 1983. Entered into force prov 

ally Apr. 1, 1985; for the U.S. Apr. 26 

1985. 

Ratification deposited : Gabon, Oct. 31 

1988. 






Tonnage 

International convention on tonnage n 

urement of ships, 1969, with annexes. 

at London June 23, 1969. Entered int< 

force July 18, 1982; for the U.S. Feb. 

1983. TIAS 10490. 

Accession deposited : Mauritius, Oct. 1 

1988. 



:■•■ 



74 



Department of State Bulletin/Februaryi 



TREATIES 



;ed Nations — Privileges and 
■unities 

Mention on the privileges and immu- 
s of the United Nations. Done at New 
; Feb. 13, 1940. Entered into force 
. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. 
S 6900. 

fieation of succession deposited : Anti- 
and Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 

ling 

rnational whaling convention and 
dule of whaling regulations. Done at 
lington Dec. 2, 1946. TIAS 1849. 
fieation of withdrawal : Egypt, Nov. 29, 
effective June 30, 1989. 

at 

at trade convention, 1986. Done at 
Ion Mar. 14, 1986. Entered into force 
1, 1986; for the U.S. Jan. 27, 1988. 
ate] Treaty Doc. 100-1. 
ssion deposited : Israel, Nov. 21, 1988. 



ention on the elimination of all forms 
^crimination against women. Done at 
York Dee. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
3, 1981. 5 
ication deposited : Sierra Leone, 
11, 1988. 

ention on the political rights of 

■in. Done at New York Mar. 31, 1953. 

red into force Julv 7, 1954; for the 

July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289. 

ication of succession deposited : Anti- 

■.nd Barbuda, Oct. 25, 1988. 



iTERAL 



national express mail agreement, with 
led regulations. Signed at La Paz and 
ington Aug. 10 and Nov. 21, 1988. 
•ed into force Dec. 15, 1988. 



)randum of agreement on liability for 
ite launches. Signed at Washington 
17, 1988. Enters into force upon U.S. 
cation of approval of a license for 
Kport of the AsiaSat or AUSSAT 
ite(s) to China for launch therein. 

)randum of agreement on satellite 
ology safeguards. Signed at 
ington Dec. 17, 1988. Enters into 
upon U.S. notification of approval of 
nse for the export of the AsiaSat or 
5AT satellite(s) to China for launch 
in. 

i Rica 

ement amending the agreement of 
3, 1988, for sales of agricultural 
lodities. Effected by exchange of 
at San Jose Oct. 17, 1988. Entered 
'orce Oct. 17, 1988. 



Egypt 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
June 7, 1974, as amended, (TIAS 7855) for 
sales of agricultural commodities. Signed 
at Cairo Oct. 13, 1988. Entered into force 
Oct. 13, 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding relating to 
the coproduction of the M1A1 tank in 
Egypt, with annexes. Signed at Cairo 
Nov. 1, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 1, 
1988. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
Mar. 10, 1988, for sales of agricultural 
commodities. Signed at San Salvador Nov. 
3, 1988. Entered into force Nov. 18, 1988. 

Honduras 

Protocol II to the military assistance 
agreement of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975), 
concerning the conduct of combined 
military exercises and maneuvers, with 
annex. Signed at Tegucigalpa Nov. 14, 
1988. Enters into force through an 
exchange of notes confirming that both 
governments have completed their 
respective procedures. 

Hungary 

Agreement amending the arrangement 
of Feb. 2 and 3, 1984, relating to a visa 
system for exports to the United States of 
wool textiles and textile products. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Budapest Oct. 27 
and 31, 1988. Entered into force Oct. 31, 
1988. 

Indonesia 

Agreement relating to the agreement oi 
June 3, 198S, for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Jakarta Oct. 22, 1988. 
Entered into force Oct. 22, 1988. 

Internationa! Natural Rubber 
Organization 

Tax reimbursement agreement. Signed at 
Kuala Lumpur Oct. 5, 1988. Entered into 
force Oct. 5, 1988. 

Israel 

Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of Jan. 12 and 16, 1984, for 
cooperation in the fields of social services 
and human development. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Jerusalem and Wash- 
ington Sept. 23 and Oct. 28, 1988. Entered 
into force Oct. 28, 1988; effective Jan. 15, 
1989. 

Italy 

Protocol amendin" the air transport agree- 
ment of June 22, 1970 (TIAS 6957). Signe d 
at Washington Oct. 25, 1988. Enters into 
force on the 15th day following the date of 
a subsequent exchange of notes covering 
the Italian instrument of ratification. 



Japan 

Agreement on cooperation in the develop- 
ment of the support fighter (FS-X) weapon 
system. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Tokyo Nov. 29, 1988. Entered into force 
Nov. 29, 1988. 

Memorandum of understanding covering 
cooperation in the field of earth sciences. 
Signed at Tsukuba and Reston Oct. 13 and 
28, 1988. Entered into force Oct. 28, 1988. 

Kenya 

Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Nairobi Oct. 17, 1988. 
Entered into force Oct. 17, 1988. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Junt 18, 1982 (TIAS 10535). as amended, 
relating to assignments and usage of televi- 
sion broadcasting channels in the fre- 
quency range 470-806 MHz (channels 
14-69) along the U.S. -Mexico border. 
Signed at Mexico City Nov. 21, 1988. En- 
tered into force provisionally Nov. 21, 1988; 
enters into force definitively upon notifica- 
tion of completion by Mexico of the re- 
quirements of its national legislation. 

Agreement modifying the agreement of 
Apr. 18, 1962, as amended, (TIAS 5043, 
8185, 9641, 9746, 10447) relating to the as- 
signment and use of television channels 
along the U.S. -Mexico border. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mexico City Sept. 14 
and 26, 1988. Entered into force" Sept. 26, 
1988. 

Micronesia 

Maritime search and rescue agreement. 
Signed at Honolulu June 10, 1988. Entered 
into force June 10, 1988. 

Morocco 

Agreement relating to the agreement of 
June 25, 1987. for sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Signed at Rabat Oct. 20, 1988. 
Entered into force Oct. 20, 1988. 

Peru 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 3, 1985, as amended, relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Washington Nov. 27, 1987, 
Jan. 6, Feb. 3, Mar. 18, June 2 and 10, 
1988. Entered into force June 10, 1988. 

Poland 

Memorandum of understanding on coopera- 
tion in geoscience research, with annex. 
Signed at Washington and Warsaw July 1, 
Aug. 25, Sept. 25, and Oct. 24, 1988. En- 
tered into force Oct. 24, 1988. 



lartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



75 



PRESS RELEASES 



PUBLICATIONS 



Spain 

Agreement on defense cooperation, with 
annexes and related letters. Signed at 
Madrid Dec. 1, 1988. Enters into force 
upon written communication between the 
parties that they have satisfied their re- 
spective constitutional requirements. 

Switzerland 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
defense acquisition, with annex. Signed at 
Washington and Bern Oct. 25 and Nov. 1, 
1988. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1988. 

Thailand 

Treaty on cooperation in the execution of 
penal sentences. Signed at Bangkok 
Oct. 29, 1982. 

Ratifications exchanged : Dec. 7, 1988. 
Entered into force : Dec. 7, 1988. 

Turkey 

Agreement concerning trade in cotton and 
manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts, with annexes. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Ankara Oct. 19 and Nov. 16, 
1988. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1988; ef- 
fective July 1, 1988. 

Uganda 

International express mail agreement, with 
detailed regulations. Signed at Kampala 
and Washington Oct. 4 and Nov. 3, 1988. 
Entered into force Dec. 15, 1988. 

U.S.S.R. 

Agreement on mutual fisheries relations, 

with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 31, 

1988. 

Entered into force : Oct. 28, 1988. 

Supersedes agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, as 

amended and extended, (TIAS 8528, 10531) 

and agreement of Feb. 21, 1988. 

Treaty on the elimination of their interme- 
diate-range and shorter-range missiles, 
with memorandum of understanding and 
protocols. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 

1987. Entered into force June 1, 1988. 
Proclaimed by the President : Dec. 27, 
1988. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement (on behalf of the Government of 
Bermuda) for the exchange of information 
with respect to taxes. Signed at Wash- 
ington Dec. 2, 1988. Entered into force 
Dec. 2, 1988. 

Master information exchange arrangement, 
with annex. Signed at London Sept. 6, 

1988. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1988. 

Uruguay 

Agreement amending the administrative 
arrangement of Aug. 24 and Sept. 13, 1984, 
as amended, for a visa system relating to 
trade in certain textile products. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Montevideo Apr. 8, 
July 14, and Oct. 4, 1988. Entered into 
force Oct. 4, 1988. 



Yugoslavia 

Memorandum of understandings relating to 
the air transport agreement of Dec. 15, 
1977, as amended, (TIAS 9364) and the 
nonscheduled air services agreement of 
Sept. 27, 1973, as amended, (TIAS 7819, 
9460). Signed at Washington Oct. 21, 1988. 
Enters into force on the date of an ex- 
change of notes indicating approval of the 
respective parties in accordance with their 
constitutional requirements. 



'Not in force. 
2 With reservation(s). 
'Applicable to Tokelau. 
4 With understanding(s). 
f, Not in force for the U.S. 
"Applies to Berlin (West). 
'With statement(s). 
•'Accepted the convention only. 



Department of State 



Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*247 12/1 Shultz: remarks at National 
Foreign Affairs Training 
Center ceremony, Arling- 
ton Hall Station", Nov. 29. 

248 12/1 American Foreign Policy: 

Foreign Affairs Press 
Briefings, 1984 released. 

249 12/5 Shultz: interview on 

ABC-TV's "This Week 
With David Brinklev," 
Dec. 4. 

*250 12/5 Shultz: remarks following 
exchange of instruments 
of ratification of the 
U.S. -Bermuda Tax 
Treaty, Dec. 2. 
251 12/9 Shultz: interview on Tele- 
visa Mexico, Mexico City, 
Dec. 1. 

*252 12/7 Shultz: statement and ques- 
tion-and-answer session 
following meeting with 
Mexican President Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari, 
Mexico City, Dec. 1. 

*253 12/7 Shultz: news conference. 
Governor's Island, 
New York. 

*254 12/9 Whitehead: address at the 
ceremony commemorat- 
ing the 40th anniversary 
of the signing of the Uni- 
versal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Dec. 8. 
255 12/12 Shultz: news conference fol- 
lowing NATO ministerial 
meeting, Brussels, 
Dec. 8. 



256 12/12 



257 12/14 



258 12/20 



*259 12/20 



260 12/28 



261 12/29 



Shultz, Delors: news co 
ference following EC 
ministerial meeting, 
Brussels, Dec. 9. 

Shultz: news briefing o 
U.S. dialogue with tl 
PLO. 

Shultz: toast on the 101 
anniversary of U.S.- 
P. R.C. diplomatic rel 
tions, Dec. 15. 

Shultz: remarks at tree 
lighting ceremony, 
Dec. 16. 

Shultz: statements at t 
signing ceremony foi 
the tripartite agreer 
among Angola, Cuba 
South Africa and the 
lateral agreement be 
tween Angola and C 
United Nations, Dec 

American Foreign Pol 
Current Documents, 
released. 



*Not printed in the Bulletin. 



Department of State 



Free single copies of the following De 
ment of State publications are availab 
from the Public Information Division, 
reau of Public Affairs, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Africa 

Tripartite Agreement on Southweste 
rica: Blueprint for Peace and Nami 
Independence (Regional Brief, Dec 
1988). 

Arms Control 

Conference on Chemical Weapons Us> 
(Public Information Series, Dec. 19' 

Economics 

U.S. Stance Toward the Soviet Unior 
Trade and Technology, Senior Repr 
tative for Strategic Technology Poli 
Wendt, The Houston Club, Housto 
Oct. 27, 1988 (Current Policy #112c 

EC Project 1992: The Dynamics of CI 
U.S. Representative to the OECD 
Washington International Business 
Council, Sept. 9, 1988 (Current Pol 
#1132). 

American Leadership in Internatiom 
Trade, Under Secretary Wallis, an 
meeting of the President's Export 
cil, Nov. 28, 1988 (Current Policy *\ 

OECD Arrangement on Export Crec 
(GIST, Dec. 1988). 

U.S. Trade Objectives in the Urugus 
Round (Public Information Series, 
1988). 



76 



Department of State Bulletin/FebruarWt 



PUBLICATIONS 



rope 

Agenda for U.S. -Soviet Cooperation, 
olicy Planning Staff Director Solomon, 
oviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
[oscow, Nov. 2, 1988 (Current Policy 
1129). 

nan Rights 

l Anniversary: Universal Declaration of 
uman Rights (Public Information Se- 
es, Dec. 1988). 

Idle East 

Search for Middle East Peace, As- 
stant Secretary Murphy, Center for 
trategic and International Studies sym- 
Dsium, Dec. 8, 1988 (Current Policy 
1138). 



Freedom of Navigation Program 
IIST, Dec. 1988). 

Mice & Technology 

'ELSAT (GIST, Dec. 1988). 

. International Communications and In- 

rmation Policy (GIST, Dec. 1988). 

th Asia 

hanistan: Soviet Occupation and With- 

•awal (Special Report #179, Dec. 1988). 

•orism 

ntering Terrorism in the 1980s and 
90s, Ambassador Bremer, George 
ashington University conference on 
rrorism, Nov. 22, 1988 (Current Policy 
11135). 

ted Nations 

Overview of U.S. Arms Control Objec- 
ves, ACDA Director Burns, UNGA 
jmmittee I, Oct. 18, 1988 (Current Pol- 
y #1130). 

■rts Toward a Cambodian Settlement, 
bassador Walters, UNGA, Nov. 3, 

18, with text of House Joint Resolution 
> »2 of Oct. 18, 1988 (Current Policy 
1131). 

United Nations: Progress in the 1980s, 
ssistant Secretary Williamson, Ameri- 
n Academy of Diplomacy and the 
oodrow Wilson International Center for 

holars, Oct. 19, 1988 (Current Policy 
1134). 

tern Hemisphere 

ama and the Canal Treaties: An Update 
'.1ST, Dec. 1988). 

Situation in Central America (Public 
iformation Series, Nov. 1988). ■ 



American Foreign Policy: 

Foreign Affairs Press Briefings, 1984, 

Supplement Released 



The Department of State has just pub- 
lished [December 1, 1988] on microfiche 
the full transcripts of the daily press 
briefings conducted by the Depart- 
ment's press spokesmen, as well as of 
the special briefings by senior Depart- 
ment and White House officials, on cur- 
rent major foreign affairs crises and 
issues during 1984. These transcripts 
highlight the discourse that takes place 
daily between authorized government 
spokesmen and representatives of the 
print, radio, and television media. 

The briefings cover the full range 
of foreign policy issues and crises that 
occurred in 1984. Of major importance 
are the U.S. -Soviet relationship, includ- 
ing the Soviet military presence in 
Afghanistan, Soviet reaction to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and 
U.S. contacts with Soviet leaders An- 
dropov and Chernenko. President Rea- 
gan's and Secretary of State Shultz's 
meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister 
Gromyko in the fall of 1984 prepared 
the way for a bilateral announcement at 
the end of the year to resume negotia- 
tions on a wide range of questions con- 
cerning nuclear and outer space arms. 

The briefings also provide principal 
policy statements on President Rea- 
gan's trip to China and to Europe for 
the London economic summit confer- 
ence and the 40th anniversary of the 
Normandy invasion, Secretary Shultz's 
trips to Central and South America and 
Europe, regional conflicts in the Middle 
East, U.S. policies toward El Salvador 
and Nicaragua, the Contadora peace 
process, developments in U.S. -Cuban 
relations, the question of steel imports 
and other foreign trade matters, emer- 
gency food aid to Ethiopia and other 
drought-stricken African nations, the 
conflict over apartheid in South Africa, 
U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO [UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or- 
ganization], NATO ministerial meet- 
ings, and visits of foreign leaders and 
heads of state to the United States. 

The documents presented are in 
two parts: I. Department of State Daily 
Press Breifings; and II. Department of 
State and White House Special Press 
Briefings. A printed guide, which con- 



tains a comprehensive index for both 
parts, is also included. 

This publication provides the public 
with direct access to a unique body of 
documents that present the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's positions on a wide range 
of foreign policy issues. The transcripts 
will help researchers gain a more pre- 
cise understanding of the give-and-take 
between the briefer and the press and 
of the exact nature and severity of the 
issues and to obtain verbatim quota- 
tions made by the spokesmen. 

American Foreign Policy: Foreign 
Affairs Press Briefings, 1984, Supple- 
incut is intended to be used as a sup- 
plement to the printed volume 
American Foreign Policy: Current Doc- 
uments, 198i, which is one of many vol- 
umes in the American Foreign Policy 
series begun in 1950. Some of the full 
texts reproduced in the microfiche sup- 
plement were published in extracted 
form in the printed volume. In addition 
to the 1984 book, volumes for 1981, 
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 have also 
been printed recently. Microfiche sup- 
plements for 1981, 1982, and 1983 were 
published in the last few years. The 
subtitle to this 1984 edition has been 
changed from Current Documents, 
which was used for previous supple- 
ments to the the series. The new subti- 
tle more accurately describes the 
contents of the publication. Supple- 
ments for 1985 and subsequent years 
are in preparation. 

This microfiche publication was 
prepared in the Office of the Historian, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State. It comprises about 325 docu- 
ments totaling about 6,000 pages on 
61 microfiche cards. 

Copies of the microfiche series may 
be purchased for $27.00 from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402 (Department of 
State Publication No. 9652, GPO Stock 
No. 044-000-02226-5). Checks or 
money orders should be made payable 
to the Superintendent of Documents. 



Press release 248 of Dec. 1, 1988. 



jartment of State Bulletin/February 1989 



77 



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notes, and maps. 

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are updated about every 2 years. 



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(ruary 1989 
Hjme 89, No. 



2143 



nistan 

lent's News Conference of December 

xcerpts) 4 

,ary's Interview on "This Week With 

id Brinkley" 7 

a 

a/Namibia Accords (Crocker, Rea- 
Shultz, White House statement. 

s of agreements) 10 

nited States and Angola, 1974-88: A 

onology (Howland) 16 

ctica. Antarctic Mineral Resource 
vention Signed (Department state- 

t) •,■■■23 

tina. Secretary's Interview on "This 

k With David Brinkley" 7 

Control 

Anniversary of INF Treaty (White 

se statement) 24 

jr Testing Talks Conclude Round 

?e (White House statement) 24 

ent's News Conference of December 

■icerpts) 4 

.ary's Interview on "This Week With 

id Brinkley" 7 

odia. Efforts Toward a Cambodian 

lenient (Walters, text of 

lution) 65 

China Celebrate Decade of Diplo- 

c Relations (Shultz) 25 

China Initial Agreement on Commu- 
nions Satellites (Department state- 

t) 26 

ess. 40th Report on Cyprus (mes- 

to the Congress) 50 

■s. 40th Report on Cyprus (message 

■le Congress) 50 

J imics 

I oject 1992: The Dynamics of Change 

(Jnb) 31 

|>ade Objectives in the Uruguay 

,i nd 35 

r jnment. Antarctic Mineral Resource 
H vention Signed (Department state- 
it) 23 

n ean Communities 

I -oject 1992: The Dynamics of Change 

(nb) 31 

I arv Meets With EC Ministers (De- 

| , Shultz) 27 

■J.S. to Resume Aid to Fiji (Depart- 

I I statement) 60 

l;n Assistance. U.S. to Resume Aid 

i iji (Department statement) 60 

ile. U.S. -Greek Defense Agreement 

I ires (Department statement) 47 

Aon. Situation in Lebanon (Depart- 

'I t statement) 58 

4 o. Secretary Attends Inaugural of 
1 ico's President (Shultz) 71 



Middle East 

Assistant Secretary Murphy's Interview on 

"This Week With David Brinkley" 55 

President's News Conference of December 

8 (excerpts) 4 

The Search for Middle East Peace (Mur- 
phy) 57 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 7 

Under Secretary Armacost's Interview on 
"Face the Nation" 54 

U.S. Denies Visa to PLO Leader Arafat 
(Department statement) 53 

U.S. Opens Dialogue With PLO (Pel- 
letreau, Reagan, Shultz) 51 

Military Affairs. U.S. -Greek Defense 
Agreement Expires (Department state- 
ment) 47 

Namibia. Angola/Namibia Accords 
(Crocker, Reagan, Shultz, White House 
statement, texts of agreements) 10 

Nicaragua. President's News Conference 
of December 8 (excerpts) 4 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

North Atlantic Council Session Held in 
Brussels (Shultz, statement, final com- 
munique, extracts from minutes) 43 

NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets 
in Brussels (final communique) 42 

Nuclear Policy. U.S., U.S.S.R. Hold Non- 
proliferation Talks (U.S. statement) . . 59 

Panama. U.S. Supports Panama's National 
Unity Plan (Department statement) . . 72 

Presidential Documents 

40th Report on Cyprus (message to the 
Congress) 50 

President Reagan and President Gorbachev 
Meet in New York 1 

U.S. Opens Dialogue With PLO (Pel- 
letreau, Reagan, Shultz) 51 

U.S. -Soviet Relations 3 

Publications 

American Foreign Policy: Foreign Affairs 
Press Briefings. 1981,, Supplement 
Released 77 

Department of State 76 

Science & Technology. U.S., China Initial 
Agreement on Communications Satellites 
Department statement) 26 

Terrorism 

Countering Terrorism in the 1980s and 
1990s (Bremer) 61 

Department Expands Terrorism Rewards 
Program (Department statement) .... 63 

French Court Convicts Palestinian Ter- 
rorist (Department statement, fact 
sheet) 64 

Greece Denies Extradition of Suspected 
Terrorist (Department statement) .... 62 

Trade 

American Leadership in International 
Trade (Wallis) 30 

Secretary Meets With EC Ministers (De- 
lors. Shultz) 27 

U.S. Trade Objectives in the Uruguay 
Round 35 



Treaties 

Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention 
Signed (Department statement) 23 

Current Actions 73 

U.S., China Initial Agreement on Commu- 
nications Satellites Department state- 
ment) 26 

U.S. -Greek Defense Agreement Expires 
(Department statement) 47 

U.S.S.R. 

An Agenda for U.S. -Soviet Cooperation 
(Solomon) 38 

Earthquake in the Soviet Union (White 
House statement) 39 

First Anniversary of INF Treaty (White 
House statement) 24 

Nuclear Testing Talks Conclude Round 
Three (White House statement) 24 

President Reagan and President Gorbachev 
Meet in New York (Reagan) 1 

President's News Conference of December 
8 (excerpts) 4 

Secretary's Interview on "This Week With 
David Brinkley" 7 

U.S. -Soviet Relations (Reagan) 3 

U.S., U.S.S.R. Hold Nonproliferation 
Talks (U.S. statement) 59 

United Nations 

Angola/Namibia Accords (Crocker, Rea- 
gan, Shultz, White House statement, 
texts of agreements) 10 

Efforts Toward a Cambodian Settlement 
(Walters, text of resolution) 65 

The United Nations: Progress in the 1980s 
(Williamson) 68 

The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A 
Chronology (Howland ) 16 

U.S. Denies Visa to PLO Leader Arafat 
(Department statement) 53 

Name Index 

Armacost, Michael H 54 

Bremer, L. Paul III 61 

Crocker, Chester A 10 

Delors, Jacques 27 

Howland, Nina D 16 

Lamb, Denis 31 

Murphy, Richard W 55,57 

Pelletreau, Robert H. Jr 51 

Reagan, President 1,3,4,10,50,51 

Shultz, Secretary 7.10,25,27,43,51,71 

Solomon, Richard H 38 

Wallis, W. Allen 30 

Walters, Vernon A 65 

Williamson, Richard S 68 



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Mh>partmvn t 



jm of State ~iw -\m j & 

hh\\\i\ wWwmmsMwLy wswsmwL 

ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 89 / Number 2144 



March 1989 




Chemical Weapons/4 

1988 Trade Bill/11 

Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting/21 

Afghanistan/72 



*l ■■■;■>. 






■DQCUWiMI* 



■mc % m 



i 



*k$t 



• 




Department of State 

bulletin 



Volume 89 / Number 2144 / March 1989 



The Department of State Bulletin, 
published by the Office of Public Com- 
munication in the Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and govern- 
ment agencies with information on de- 
velopments in U.S. foreign relations 
and the work of the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin's contents include major ad- 
dresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; se- 
lected press releases issued by the 
White House, the Department, and the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
and treaties and other agreements to 
which the United States is or may be- 
come a party. Special features, articles, 
and other supportive material (such as 
maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) 
are published frequently to provide ad- 
ditional information on current issues 
but should not necessarily be inter- 
preted as official U.S. policy 
statements. 



JAMES A. BAKER, III 

Secretary of State 

MARGARET DeB. TUTWILER 

Assistant Secretary 
for Public Affairs 

PAUL E. AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office of Public Communication 

COLLEEN LUTZ 

Chief, Editorial Division 

PHYLLIS A. YOUNG 

Editor 



The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is neces- 
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ness required by law of this Department. 
Use of funds for printing this periodical 
has been approved by the Director of the 
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•4r / 
•:■ / 



CONTENTS 



The Secretary 

1 Public Service in America 



Arms Control 

4 Prohibition of Chemical Weap- 

ons Conference Held in Paris 
(William F. Bums, Secretary 
Shultz, Final Declaration) 

10 Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 

Conclude Round 10 
(President Reagan) 

Economics 

11 The 1988 Trade Bill (Alan F. 

Hohuer. Judith Hippler 
Bella) 

15 Negotiations Toward A New 

International Coffee Agree- 
ment (W. Allen Wall is) 

17 Telecommunications and Eco- 

nomic Development in the 
Caribbean (Parker W. Borg) 



Middle East 

70 Libvan Planes Downed 

{Frank C. Carlucci, III, 

Defense Department 
Statement) 

71 Libya's Chemical Weapons 

Plant (Department Statement) 
71 U.S. Oil Companies Authorized 

to Resume Operations in 
Libya (White House 
Statement) 



Oceans 

72 



Territorial Sea of the United 
States (Proclamation) 



South Asia 



72 



89 



Afghanistan: Soviet Occupation 

and Withdrawal 
Ninth Anniversary of Soviet 

Invasion of Afghanistan 

(President Reagan) 



Europe 

21 CSCE Follow-Up Meeting Held 

in Vienna (President Reagan, 
Secretary Shultz, Warren 
Zimmermann, Concluding 
Document) 

54 U.S., Soviet Union Exchange 

New Year's Messages 
(Mikhail S. Gorbachev, 
President Reagan) 

56 Chancellor Kohl's Visit (Helmut 

Kohl, President Reagan) 

57 Prime Minister Thatcher's Visit 

(President Reagan, Margaret 
Thatcher) 

Human Rights 

59 U.S. Commemorates 40th An- 

niversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 
(President Reagan, Richard 
Schifter, Vernon A. Walters, 
John C. Whitehead, 
Richard S. Williamson, 

_ -^ ^proclamation) 

JjS^* u\. Supports Human Rights 
ference in Moscow (White 
Ho\se Statement) 




United Nations 

90 U.S. Reports to United Na- 

tions on Downing of Libyan 
Planes (Herbert S. Okuu, 
Letter to Security Council) 

Treaties 

91 Current Actions 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 

Publications 

93 Department of State 

94 American Foreign Policy: Cur- 

rent Documents, 1987, 
Released 



Index 



HE SECRETARY 



jblic Service in America 



secretary Shultz's address before 
Citizens Network for Foreign Af- 
s on January 9, 1989. 1 

ally appreciate deeply this evening 
if you here, such a distinguished 
ip of people — people I've known and 
ked with, going way back to my 
time in Washington. And it's a 
.sure to be sponsored by the Cit- 
s Network. I've always felt what it 
ly stands for is the idea of public 
ice and the idea of American en- 
ement in the world. Certainly Mel 
d, Joe Fowler, and Leonard Marks 
d for that. So I appreciate very 
h the fact that you're here and 
;r this sponsorship. 
A new American Administration is 
it to take office. We will have a new 
;ident and a new Secretary of State. 
~e will be new ideas and a new 
m of the future. 

This is as it should be. For over 
centuries, we have renewed our 
rnment at 2- and 4-year intervals, 
.he best way we know to give 
lington a fresh infusion of public 

We are now in the midst of transi- 
— not only to a new Administration 
1,0 a new era in world affairs. Some 

said that the cold war is over. 

may be true. Or it might be more 
rate to say, as President-elect Bush 
that the postwar era is over. Con- 

• these significant changes. 

■• The fear of nuclear war has been 
;ly diminished. 

• We have embarked on a new rela- 
| hip with the Soviet Union that 
|<iises a lessening of superpower ten- 

I and a more cooperative approach 

Drld problems. 

- A new global economy based on 

mation and openness is steadily 

icing the old divisions based on 
)>nal borders and ancient rivalries. 
|» We have made important prog- 
I in resolving long and bitter 
jinal conflicts. 

U And most heartening of all, hu- 
1 rights, the rule of law, and the 
l:ice of democracy have begun to 
I root in new locations of the world. 



We face new difficulties, too. Prog- 
ress in nuclear arms control is mocked 
by the spread of chemical weapons. 
Vast international imbalances mark a 
transition to the global economy. The 
democracies are still menaced — by ter- 
rorism, by the international drug trade, 
by dangerous conventional military 
asymmetries in Europe and elsewhere. 
There is no shortage of political, ethnic, 
and religious strife in our world. 

Yet on the whole, the facts suggest 
optimism, especially optimism about 
Americas future. I reflect on my years 
in Washington not only as Secretary of 
State, but also at Treasury, at what we 
now call the Office of Management and 
Budget, at the Department of Labor, 
and the Council of Economic Advisers. 
I find that while some things are worse, 
much is better. There can be no doubt 
that the United States, its allies and 
friends, are stronger, more prosperous, 
and more secure today than they were 
a decade ago. But of all the changes, 
the most important is the ascendancy of 
an idea — the idea of democracy. 

We saw it vividly, a snapshot of our 
times, last month. There in New York 
stood President Reagan and President- 
elect Bush. General Secretary Gor- 
bachev stood beside them. And above 
them presided the Statue of Liberty, 
the symbol of our democracy. 

Precepts of Public Service 

As a university man, I believe in ideas. 
As an American, I believe in the idea of 
democracy. And this idea, which was so 
embattled, so much on the defensive 
when I came to Washington over three 
decades ago, is now lighting the way 
for the hopes and aspirations of count- 
less millions around the world. 

We Americans did not invent de- 
mocracy. We do not have a patent on its 
processes. But we do have a tradition 
and a responsibility to make good on 
the promises of democracy, for our- 
selves and for the world. And that 
responsibility can only be exercised 
through "public service." 

To me, public service means far 
more than the classic neutral bureau- 
cracy of the sociologists and the po- 
litical scientists. It's an unwritten 
doctrine, seen and understood in the 
practice. It rests on three precepts: 



• First, on trust — the democratic- 
trust in the ability of the people to se- 
lect their government, trust within the 
government that the people's will is to 
be served and that we will deal with 
each other honestly. Trust is the coin 
of the realm. 

• Second, it depends on diversity — 
a free society drawing on the talents of 
many people from all backgrounds. We 
are a free society which now as ever 
attracts immigrants from far around 
the globe and is an elite of the common 
people. Public service must reflect the 
diversity of America. 

• Third, public service is volun- 
tary — nowhere is it decreed or written 
that Americans must serve the public 
interest. We don't even have a draft 
anymore. But a society composed only 
of self-seekers, no matter how finely 
written its constitution, cannot func- 
tion. This country of rugged individuals 
is also built on volunteers, on our un- 
derstanding that our own self-interest 
is best served if we also serve each 
other and our country. 

Today the concept of public service 
goes a step further. We have entered a 
new international era, and public serv- 
ice needs an international dimension. 
Just as an individual may be dedicated 
to the national interest, so a country 
may be dedicated to an international 
interest. The new global era owes much 
to our political, scientific, technical, 
and commercial creativity. Clearly 
America's national interest is served 
best by being "engaged," by continuing 
to shape the new developments we have 
done so much to create. So public serv- 
ice in our times also means interna- 
tional engagement. 

And, just as public service within 
our country rests on pillars of trust, 
diversity, and voluntarism, so does the 
international dimension of public serv- 
ice. We trust that we have something to 
give the world — it's a matter of confi- 
dence in ourselves and our values. We 
know it's a diverse world, and we must 
work with many peoples. And at our 
best, we work for a better world, not 






rtment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



THE SECRETARY 



because we're forced to do it but be- 
cause we want to do it — and because a 
better world is better for America. 

When all is said and done, I believe 
that democracy needs these precepts of 
public service to succeed. And in our 
times, the world needs an American 
precept of international public service 
to advance. We must provide leadership 
and stimulate others to lead as well. If 
we don't show the will to lead, no one 
else can. 

But as I take leave of office, this 
is what bothers me. There is today a 
steady erosion of the precepts of public 
service in America, which, if it con- 
tinues, can do enormous harm to our 
institutions. Progress will become re- 
gress. Much that we have achieved will 
be jeopardized. The idea of democracy 
itself could once again be put on the 
defensive. Let me be specific. 

Erosion of the Precepts: 
America in Decline 

First, there is an idea afoot that Amer- 
ica is in decline and we're in decline 
because we are engaged abroad. "Over 
extended," the prophets of decline call 
it. These are false prophets. I've pointed 
out, as have others, that the foreign 
affairs and defense budgets, as percent- 
ages of GNP [gross national product], 
are far lower than they were 20 or 30 
years ago. Our economy is far larger. 
Our economic problems are not those of 
a society unable to produce wealth or 
jobs. And the economic vitality of our 
allies was and is a precious asset for us 
as well as for them. 

Great nations of history have suf- 
fered decline, but they were imperial or 
absolutist or dominated by tradition- 
bound classes. Our nation is none of 
these. Our democracy holds the poten- 
tial for resilience and rejuvenation 
in the face of any challenge. So ours 
is a winning hand. 

Yet the declinists continue to be 
given a respectful hearing. They touch 
the old American inclination to with- 
draw from the world in order to regain 
economic or moral security. They play 
to the darker side, to the idea that 
America no longer has anything to give 
the world. 

They are wrong. We have some- 
thing to give the world. Moreover, it's 
not simply a choice of deciding to be 
engaged and taking risks or disengag- 
ing and not taking risks. We are either 
going to be a source of progress, sta- 



bility, and harmony or stand aside to 
watch conflict, instability, and the de- 
cline of the international order. That's 
the real stake overlooked by the proph- 
ets of decline. In our world, we shall 
not find our souls or the solution to our 
economic problems in retreat; we may 
very well find chaos instead. 

So let's reject the school of decline 
which, if believed, cuts off the very ra- 
tionale for public service. 

The Diminishing Trust 
Within Government 

The second erosion of public service 
stems from a diminution of trust within 
our government. The founders of our 
country, through the system of checks 
and balances, made it clear that they 
did not expect — or even want — govern- 
ment to be all sweetness and light. Par- 
ticularly in the area of foreign policy, 
the constitutional arrangements have 
been described as an invitation to strug- 
gle. But struggle and argument are not 
necessarily indicative of a lack of trust. 

I'm not talking about the process of 
defining public policy through debate 
and a sifting of the issues. This is our 
lifeblood, and I would have it no other 
way. I'm talking about preventing a 
dangerous loss of trust that could make 
even the decision process itself irrele- 
vant. Here are a few thoughts on what 
it takes to build trust. 

• Within an office or department or 
any organization, putting trust in peo- 
ple will produce trustworthy people. 
That's the foremost of the many reasons 
against the widespread and routine use 
of lie detector tests. Management 
through fear and intimidation is not 
the way to promote honesty and pro- 
tect security. 

• Within the executive branch — at 
a time when domestic and international 
issues are deeply interrelated and the 
perspectives of all departments are 
needed — we need trust that decisions 
arrived at through proper procedures 
are actually decisions that will actually 
be carried out. No one ever gives up 
around here — including me. It's okay 
not to give up while the struggle fairly 
goes on. But leaks and lies too often 
subvert honest discourse. That's one 
reason why people keep fighting. Our 
decisions should be fairly made — and 
once they are, they should be carried 
out, like it or not. You live up to your 
oath of office not just by carrying out 



decisions you agree with but by car 
rying out decisions you don't agree 
with — or else resigning. 

• finally, we want restored tru, 
between the branches of governmei, 
the absence of which can sometime 
a consensus on foreign policy beyor 
reach. Some have argued that the \ 
lem is in the steady encroachment 
Congress on the rightful prerogath 
of the executive. 

That is a problem, but not the 
problem. The respective roles of th 
branches change in response to chi 
ing conditions. The pendulum swin 
back and forth. What we have to fe 
today is not the imperial Congress 
the chaotic Congress. Dialogue bet 
the branches cannot yield producti 
results when, no matter what the 
parent agreement, any faction, anj 
staffer, any subcommittee, any Me 
of Congress can delay and impede 
the will of the majority. What we r 
is not so much a crisis of confidenc 
a crisis of competence — as element 
the legislature seek to conduct the 
business of the executive. 

Adam Smith had it all figured 
long ago. Specialization increases i 
size of the market increases. Amei 
plays in a big market today, and sj 
cialization is good because it gives 
the ability to perform a variety of 
complex tasks. 

This is worth thinking about— 
both for problems within the execu 
branch and between the executive 
legislative branches. 

Why do we have different dep 
ments in the government? Clearly 
because they have different roles, 
department, agency, or council shi 
fall into the error of thinking that 
do anything or everything. The Di 
Department's role is military defei 
The CIA's [Central Intelligence Ag 
role is intelligence. The NSC [Nat 
Security Council] staff role is coor 
tion. The State Department's role 
help develop and then carry out th 
President's foreign policy. 

Of course, each role impinges 
the others to varying degrees. So 
shouldn't tell Defense how to deph 
aircraft carriers in response to a g 
mission, although it will have a coi 
bution to make on key diplomatic < 
siderations. And Defense shouldn'i 
State how to negotiate with the S< 
ets, although it must clearly play i 
part in decisions on issues related 
military matters. And the CIA sho 
find policy more fun than intellige 



Department of State Bulletin/March 



THE SECRETARY 



objective analysis, because when it 
, its intelligence and analytic prod- 
have no credibility. I see Bill Web- 
[CIA Director William Webster] 
, and I'm glad to say he agrees 
that entirely. And the NSC 
ildn't try to do what the depart- 
ts are designed to do because that 
ws their job of coordinating off 
nee. 

I can say to you tonight, with great 
faction, that as Secretary Carlucci 
retary of Defense Frank Carlucci], 
ral Powell [National Security 
ser Colin Powell], and I hand over 

njie new team — which includes Bill 
ter — the system is in terrific 
e. So an Administration can work 
rmony and in success. I'm proud 

ji ive been part of this team and ear- 
mes under President Reagan. 
In America's work in the world, the 
;ress has a comparative advantage 
ing some of those tasks, and the 
itive has a comparative advantage 
lers. We each need to stick to our 
job descriptions. We look to the 
ress to legislate clearly; they 
:o the executive to administer 
■nsibly. 

he Congress, with the executive, 
ise to the occasion. We've done so 
one so recently. We need to en- 
that cooperative ability. Last 
Senator Danforth and Senator 
l proposed periodic meetings of 
oers of Congress with the Secre- 
)f State — and sometimes with the 
lent — to discuss the larger, longer 
problems of foreign policy before 
nfront a specific issue to debate, 
others responded positively and 
Sly to that proposal, and I urge it 
for consideration by the new 
-•ess and the new Administration. 



1' 



gagement Trends 



nird erosion of public service can 
f> in the assault against America's 
ments of engagement with the 
f the world. This hits at the heart 
international dimension of public 
•e. It's manifested most clearly by 
tack on the foreign affairs bud- 
'hich has been cut in real terms 
25% over the past several years. 
of the rest is earmarked so we 
lexibility. 

nother manifestation is the trend 
d protectionism. From our ear- 
iays as a nation, we have known 
pen trade was the key to growth 
... rosperity. But it is not necessary 



to examine the history of the 18th cen- 
tury to understand the alternative. In 
our own century, the breakdown 
of international trade into "beggar-thy- 
neighbor" protectionism in the late 
1920s and 1930s contributed signifi- 
cantly to the ultimate breakdown of 
world peace. 

There are those who say that 
"engagement" lacks a political constitu- 
ency — not so. Every national candidate 
in the recent elections who advocated 
protectionism was soundly defeated. 
Every candidate who sounded a varia- 
tion of "come home, America" lost. The 
public opinion polls show consistently 
that Americans do not support disen- 
gagement. But, like the decisions proc- 
ess in government itself, this part of 
public service — recognizing that the 
people have decided — is also under as- 
sault. Escapism, the idea that we can 
disengage to our advantage, whether 
through the massacre of the foreign af- 
fairs budget or economic protection, is 
just incompatible with the international 
dimension of public service — and the 
reality of our world. 

Faith in America's Youth 

The last and probably most dismaying 
assault on public service concerns 
young Americans. We've been told that 
this is a "me generation." Our young 
people are supposedly interested only 
in themselves, in making money, in self- 
indulgence, in today not tomorrow, in 
succeeding but not in working to suc- 
ceed. Don't believe it for a minute. 

Let's look at a few facts. Young 
Americans over the last decade have 
volunteered in record numbers to de- 
fend our country. The best and the 
brightest have flocked to serve our 
country, to put themselves in harm's 
way if necessary to defend our values. 

Let's look at our schools. The 
United States has been swept — and it's 
a healthy and long overdue sweeping — 
by a school reform movement which 
emphasizes higher standards, harder 
work, and far-reaching objectives. It's 
not just the teachers and the parents 
demanding better quality. Our children 
know that the stakes are their future 
and their country. 

There's no shortage of qualified 
young people seeking service in the 
Peace Corps, in government, or even 
elected office. The idea of some volun- 
tary national service for every able- 



bodied American has taken hold as a 
way to channel the urge for public 
service in the broadest sense. 

Of all the achievements of the last 
8 years, the rekindling of America's 
faith in itself and the faith of America's 
youth in the future has to be ranked 
highest on the list. President Reagan 
knew that in his bones, and our youth 
knew he had faith in them. That's why 
the young in America have always been 
his greatest supporters. 

So the idea that we cannot count 
on our youth when it comes to public 
service is just as wrong as can be. 

And when I speak of public serv- 
ice, I must put at the center the For- 
eign Service. These talented and brave 
Americans are on the front lines of 
American interests every day. It's no 
tea party. Every time you enter the 
State Department lobby, take a look at 
the two plaques erected in memory of 
Foreign Service officers who lost their 
lives. One plaque covers the period up 
to about 1965. It took two centuries to 
fill up, and most of the people listed on 
it died from injury and disease. We've 
now just about filled up another plaque 
in only 20 years. Most of those were 
victims of terrorism. The Foreign Serv- 
ice exemplifies public service. 

Conclusion 

So let me sum it all up. Here are the 
ideas and the practices that are eroding 
public service: the idea of decline and 
the idea that America's contributions 
are past; the lack of confidence in the 
people's judgment; the folly of disen- 
gagement, as if America's withdrawal 
from the world would serve the national 
interest; lack of faith in our youth. 

I know that in Washington very of- 
ten bad ideas and bad habits drive out 
good ideas and good habits — a kind of 
political Gresham's law. But this is one 
set of bad ideas and bad habits that 
cannot be allowed to gain the upper 
hand. If we lose the concept of public- 
service, then we will eventually lose 
the concept of democracy itself. 

Recently, in Washington, you might 
hear it said that if an official believed 
his colleagues were honest, decent, 
public-spirited people, then that official 
was naive and doomed to frustration 
and failure. That's why the cynical 
old sayings are more popular than ever: 
"If you want a friend in Washington, 
get a dog" and "never kick a man 
unless he's down." 



tment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



ARMS CONTROL 



James Madison, the man who gave 
balance to the Constitution, must have 
heard something similar in his day, 
for in the Federalist Papers No. 56 
he wrote: 

As there is a degree of depravity in 
mankind which requires an active degree of 
circumspection and distrust, so there are 
other qualifications in human nature which 
justify a certain portion of esteem and con- 
fidence. Republican government presup- 
poses the existence of these qualities in a 
higher degree than any other form. Were 
the pictures which have been drawn by the 
political jealousy of some among us faithful 
likenesses of the human character, the in- 
ference would be that there is not suffi- 
cient virtue among men for self-government; 
and that nothing less than the chains of 
despotism can restrain them from destroy- 
ing and devouring one another. 

Well, I've read you this long quota- 
tion because, like Madison, I believe 
men and women everywhere, and espe- 
cially Americans, have the virtue nec- 
essary for self-government. Every- 
where today the chains of despotism 
are being loosened. The reality of 
human nature, the creativity of the in- 
dividual, is being recognized as the 
well-spring of political and economic 
progress. Yet in the final analysis, the 
written Constitution and the aspira- 
tions of democracy are joined together 
only by the concept of public service — 
not as the goal, but as the necessary 
means of fulfilling our common purpose 
as a community and nation. 

That is the living legacy which ties 
together the America of a glorious past 
and the America of an even more glor- 
ious future. Let us keep it, cherish it, 
practice it, defend it against those who 
mistrust it, and hand it down to suc- 
cessive generations — so that however 
historians record our struggles, our 
successes and failures, it may be writ- 
ten of us: They served the public. They 
engaged the world. They pursued the 
finest aspirations of our country. ■ 



Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
Conference Held in Paris 



The Conference on the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons was held in Paris 
January 7—11, 1989. Following is Secre- 
tary Shultz's address at that confer- 
ence; his news conference; the text of 
the final declaration; and a statement 
by William F. Bums, head of the U.S. 
delegation and Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency 
(AC DA). 

SECRETARY'S ADDRESS, 
JAN. 7, 1989 1 

As we begin our consideration of the 
compelling challenge that chemical 
weapons pose to world security, I have 
the privilege of conveying to you a mes- 
sage from the President of the United 
States, Ronald Reagan. It reads: 

Distinguished Delegates: 

Less than three months ago, I called on 
the Parties to the Geneva Protocol and 
other concerned countries to convene a 
conference for the purpose of restoring re- 
spect for the international norms against 
the illegal use of chemical weapons. Today, 
thanks to the initiative of President Mitter- 
rand and the French Government, repre- 
sentatives of more than 100 nations are 
gathered in Paris to reaffirm their commit- 
ment to the goal of putting an end to the 
proliferation of these dreaded weapons and 
preventing their use. 

Your presence underlines the deep 
concern and alarm shared by all countries 
of the world over the dangerous spread and 
resurgent use of one of humanity's most 
dreaded and dreadful forms of warfare. 
It demonstrates as w-ell that you share 
a desire to take the necessary actions 
to ensure that such weapons are not 
used again. 

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 remains 
an invaluable and necessary compact, but 
its objectives can only be achieved if na- 
tions comply. Rededication to the objec- 
tives of the Geneva Protocol is not just a 
question of law, but an important step 
toward securing a safer future for mankind. 
It is my hope that the participants in 
the Paris Conference will take that impor- 
tant step. 

The Government and people of the 
United States send our prayers and best 
wishes for the success of the vital effort 
you are undertaking. 

Indeed, we are brought here today 
by a horror that has cast a pall over 
mankind for nearly 100 years — the 
threat and use of chemical and biolog- 
ical weapons. 



History records that on the eve 
this troubled century — one that wou 
prove to be burdened with a variety 
manmade horrors — the participants 
the First Hague Peace Conference c 
1899 were moved to condemn chemk 
weapons. Already, the vicious effect 
such weaponry could be anticipated, 
even though our predecessors of 
90 years ago had not yet experience 
their destructiveness. 

But the warnings of The Hague 
Declaration [of 1899] were not heedei 
And, in 1915, in Flanders Fields net 
Ypres — only 200 kilometers from w 
we now sit — chemical weapons were 
first unleashed on a large scale in w 
In the First World War, over 1 milli 
people, both soldiers and civilians, 
fered casualties from chemical wea] 
ons — a grim harbinger of the hundr 
of-thousands yet to die by this scou 

The fate of the survivors scarce 
was better than that of those who i 
mediately succumbed. An eyewitne 
later described them: 

Faces, arms, hands were a shiny 
black. With mouths open and lead-gla 
eyes, they w'ere all swaying backward 
forwards trying to get their breaths, 
struggling, struggling for life. 

In the Great War, the deadly c 
ical clouds swept over western and 
eastern fronts alike, aeknowledgin, 
boundaries and uniting in horror a 
shared suffering many of the natio 
and governments represented here 
day. This destruction conferred no 
tary advantage. It simply made th 
deadlock of conflict that much mor 
devastating — so terrible that the v 
community finally was moved to at 

That action came quickly, and 
culminated in the 1925 Geneva con 
ence, where the major nations of t 
world — the U.S. Government amo: 
them — crafted an agreement whicl 
lawed the use in war of chemical a 
biological weapons. The work of th 
conference had effect for six decac 
To be sure, these legal and moral 
riers erected in Geneva were trag: 
breached in the 1930s and 1940s. 1 
fore, Franklin Roosevelt was corre 
when he said that it was "the gem 
opinion of civilized mankind" that 
ical weapons should be outlawed. 



Department of State Bulletin MarcN 



ARMS CONTROL 



e We Forgotten 
Lessons of History? 

; opinion remains valid. Yet, in re- 
years, the international norms 
nst chemical weapons use have be- 
to erode in practice — first in the 
lie East and, most recently, in re- 
al conflicts from Southeast Asia, to 
lanistan, to the Persian Gulf. 
And even if peace should come to 
e strife-ridden areas — and we hope 
pray and work for the day that it 
— this horrific legacy of chemical 
)ons use quite literally will harm 
1 for years to come. As the 1970 
d Health Organization report on 
effects of the possible use of chem- 
ind biological weapons on civilian 
lation groups concluded: "Chemical 
oiological weapons pose a special 
it to civilians. Large-scale use of 
lical and biological weapons could 
a lasting changes of an unpredict- 
nature in man's environment." 
The consequences of past chemical 
ons use still plagues Europe today, 
iploded chemical munitions from 
:1 War I continue to release their 
r — yet lethal — contents into the 
*s where they were dumped, 
h Sea fishermen and bathers in 
al areas still suffer mustard gas 
; from sunken and deteriorating 
ical munitions. Similarly, unex- 
d chemical munitions now littering 
aters of the Shatt al Arab will 
ten human life and the environ- 
for decades to come, 
lo like the contaminated battle- 
of Europe, the residue of more 
t chemical weapons use in other 
-ridden parts of the world — un- 
ded chemical munitions, people 
ed for life, a poisoned environ- 
— will be reminders for genera- 
of those vicious conflicts, 
lust it take a fresh shock of hu- 
.ragedy — must more places like 
lers Fields earn their place in the 
•y books through the particular 
liness of their destruction — before 
nments work together to restore 
ict for the international norms 
st chemical weapons use? Ninety 
ago, our predecessors at The 
e conference only could imagine 
arrifying destructive potential of 
| ical weaponry. Today we have wit- 
d its devastating capability. We 
t claim now that we have not 
that we do not know. But have 
e will, the courage, and the vision 
on the collective conscience of 
ind and control this proliferating 
t to civilization? 



We cannot delay. Time is not on 
our side. Technology is not stagnant. 
Ever more lethal and insidious chemical 
weapons are being developed — weapons 
which defeat defenses and are devastat- 
ing in their effects. The ability to pro- 
duce such weapons is rapidly spreading — 
and with it the technology to produce 
ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles. 

None of us can escape the conse- 
quences of chemical warfare. Its re- 
surgence has placed an additional 
burden on international organizations 
and specialized agencies that already 
are overwhelmed with the victims of 
war in hospitals and refugee camps. 
Victims of chemical warfare rarely have 
proper protective equipment or medical 
facilities. A number of governments 
represented here have generously 
treated victims at considerable expense 
in their specialized medical institutions. 
Out of fear more and more countries 
are heavily investing in protective 
equipment for their forces and in some 
cases for their civilian population. We 
must be alarmed that we have reached 
the point where some countries are 
prudently making special protective 
suits for children. Each of us now must 
consider the security of our embassies 
from chemical attack. 

Moreover, we face the even more 
grotesque specter of the proliferation of 
biological weapons. Nations are devel- 
oping, producing, and stockpiling ever 
more deadly and resistant strains of 
disease in violation of the 1972 Biolog- 
ical and Toxin Weapons Convention. It 
is no hyperbole to state that the mere 
existence of these weapons poses one of 
the most serious threats to the survival 
of mankind. 

Isn't it grimly ironic that these 
new and deadly threats have arisen to 
haunt us at the very time we have be- 
gun to make progress in controling and 
reducing nuclear arms? A nightmare 
for all, of course, would be the combi- 
nation of ballistic missiles, chemical 
warheads, and biological weapons in the 
hands of governments with histories of 
the conduct of terrorist violence. 

Terrorists' access to chemical and 
biological agents is another growing 
threat to the international community. 
There are no insurmountable technical 
obstacles that would prevent terrorist 
groups from using chemical weapons. 
With the inhibitions against employing 
such weapons now weakened through 
recent use — and with targets for con- 
ventional terrorist attacks becoming 
better protected — terrorist groups 



could be tempted to shift, without 
warning, to use of chemical weapons for 
dramatic political and media attention. 
The threat is a real one. Some govern- 
ments which have been known to spon- 
sor terrorism now have sizable chemical 
weapons capabilities. 

At stake in all of this is not just 
the violation of codes of international 
conduct but civilization itself. If we tol- 
erate the breakdown of barriers against 
the use of chemical and biological weap- 
ons, such agents of mass destruction 
may come to be seen as both advan- 
tageous and legitimate in pursuit of 
national security interests — as just an- 
other "weapon of choice." Countries 
that use chemical weapons in violation 
of international law are wrong — and 
they know it. We must not legitimize, 
by our acquiescence, a practice that 
will threaten all civilized societies. 

What Action Must We Take? 

President Reagan, in a speech to the 
UN General Assembly, proposed this 
conference. Let us recall his words. 

...poison gas, chemical warfare — the 
terror of it; the horror of it It is in- 
cumbent upon all civilized nations to ban, 
once and for all... the use of chemical and 
gas warfare. 

The international community must 
act now on several fronts to eradicate 
the threat of chemical weapons, prevent 
their illegal use, and staunch their dan- 
gerous proliferation. Even as we push 
forward in the Geneva negotiations to 
ban the development, production, ac- 
quisition, stockpiling, retention, or 
transfer of chemical weapons, each of 
us now must take steps to strengthen 
our political commitment to expose the 
threat and control the spread and use 
of these hideous weapons. 

My government never has under- 
estimated the difficulties — chief among 
them, verification — that must be over- 
come in pursuit of this urgent objec- 
tive. When Vice President Bush, on 
behalf of President Reagan, tabled the 
1984 draft treaty in Geneva, he said 
that a comprehensive ban on chemical 
weapons cannot work unless states are 
prepared to "commit themselves to a 
new but absolutely necessary degree of 
openness" — "a new way of doing busi- 
ness." But however formidable the chal- 
lenge, the world community should not 
underestimate the United States' deter- 
mination to overcome those problems 
and put an effective treaty into force. 

Recently, President-elect Bush has 
declared that one of his highest pri- 



Kd rtment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



ARMS CONTROL 



orities will be to deal with what he 
appropriately calls "this terrible 
scourge." He has said that he wants to 
be remembered as the President who — 
working with our allies, the Soviet 
Union, and other nations — brought 
about the elimination of chemical war- 
fare and chemical weapons. 

The world community needs to 
band together and rededicate itself — 
forcefully and effectively — to the pur- 
poses and principles of the 1925 Geneva 
protocol. No country should face the 
threat of chemical weapons alone, for 
no country is immune to it. We must be 
prepared to exercise statesmanship, to 
cooperate, and to exact enforcement. 

We, therefore, call on this con- 
ference to support the following 
steps immediately. 

• Every nation must undertake the 
political commitment to comply with 
the international norms relating to 
chemical weapons use. 

• Nations which have not done so 
should accede to the 1925 Geneva 
protocol. 

• The UN Secretary General's abil- 
ity to investigate promptly allegations 
of illegal use of chemical weapons in 
armed conflict should be reinforced 
and enhanced. 

There is still more that we must 
do, both at this conference and after it. 

We should consider procedures for 
humanitarian assistance to victims of 
chemical weapons attack. We need to 
bolster support for the measures em- 
bodied in the UN Charter should there 
be any future illegal use of chemical 
weapons — and here I have Chapter 7 
sanctions expressly in mind. As 
President-elect Bush has said: 

...the nations guilty of chemical war- 
fare must pay a price. They must know 
that violation of the ban against the use 
of such weapons carries a heavy penalty. 
Not just a fine or a minor sanction that can 
be ignored. 

There is an urgent need for steps 
to achieve greater international re- 
straint in the export of chemical weap- 
ons-related technologies, chemicals, 
and weaponry. Since 1985 the United 
States has cooperated with 18 other na- 
tions to coordinate efforts to control in- 
ternational trade in chemical weapons- 
related commerce. We should explore 
possibilities for more effective means 
to control the transfer of chemical 
weapons precursors, technology, and 
weapons without impeding legitimate 
commerce and peaceful pursuits that 
will benefit mankind. 



Finally, I also urge you to join me 
in committing our governments not 
only to prevent the use of chemical 
weapons in armed conflict but also to 
prevent the spread of chemical weapons 
to terrorist groups. 

The problem of chemical weapons 
proliferation is as difficult as it is dan- 
gerous. The challenge it poses to world 
security is so urgent that international 
efforts in this area should not be made 
contingent on other difficult arms con- 
trol issues, such as nuclear prolifera- 
tion. And if we are to deal with the 
chemical weapons threat effectively in 
all its respects, we must see the prob- 
lem for what it is. 

Chemical weapons proliferation is 
not an issue between the developed and 
developing world. It is not a matter of 
some nations trying to maintain a mo- 
nopoly on chemical weapons by making 
it impossible for other nations to obtain 
them. All countries have everything to 
gain by keeping their focus on the real 
issue: preventing these weapons from 
spreading and being used, even as we 
devote ourselves to ridding the world 
of those which already exist. 

For our part, the United States has 
participated actively in the negotiations 
at the Conference on Disarmament 
since 1971. We are committed to success 
in these negotiations, and we will stay 
at the table for however long it takes. 
We will abide by the 1925 Geneva pro- 
tocol and all other provisions of interna- 
tional law related to the use of chemical 
weapons, including the 1949 Geneva 
conventions. We urge every country 
here — indeed, every country in the 
world — to make a similar pledge. 

A Global Effort Is Needed 

We all owe a debt of gratitude to the 
Government of France and to President 
Mitterrand for assembling the world 
community here in Paris in answer to 
President Reagan's call at the UN Gen- 
eral Assembly. Together, we must meet 
the challenge posed by chemical weap- 
onry. It is a global challenge. And it is 
grievously apt that these weapons were 
first used during the first worldwide 
war in human history. But as experi- 
ence, stretching back almost a century 
to The Hague Gas Declaration teaches 
us, sweeping statements of principle 
are not a substitute for concrete deeds. 
We all have an obligation to take action. 

The resumption in the past 25 
years of chemical warfare is a dan- 
gerous step backward for mankind, for 



reason, for civilization. President-ele 
Bush has called the outbreak of cher 
ical warfare and ballistic missile pro- 
liferation "sharp reminders of how 
easily the nations can turn from the 
high road and head for the abyss." I 
he has declared it his "solemn missii 
to work with the international comir 
nity "to stop it and stop it now!" 

Now is the time for us all to stai 
up and face our responsibilities squai 
Together, let us get on with the tasl 
fulfilling our solemn moral and legal 
obligations. 

We must, quite simply, reaffirm 
international norms against chemica 
weapons and raise them higher. Unl 
we summon the political will and esl 
lish rigorous and reliable internatioi 
means of vigilance and restraint, we 
will condemn ourselves to repeat tni 
experience. We already have witnes 
one century-long cycle of internatioi 
concern, followed by violence, trage 
outrage, and then, alas, complacenc 

I am haunted by a poem writtei 
1916 by the great American poet Ca 
Sandburg — in his time a European ' 
correspondent. It is called "Grass," 
and it ends with these stark and bit 
lines: 

Pile the bodies high... at Ypres 

and Verdun. 

Shovel them under and let me wor 
Two years, ten years, and passeng 

ask the conductor: 

What place is this? 
Where are we now? 

I am the grass. 
Let me work. 

I say to you now, let us insteac 
work to ensure that we never forge 
victims of chemical warfare. Let ea- 
and every one of us work to ensure 
neither the passage of time nor the 
igencies of the moment ever again ( 
scure the responsibilities we have U 
all mankind. 



Ii 



SECRETARY'S 

NEWS CONFERENCE, 
JAN. 8, 1989^ 

There is every indication of this bei 
an outstanding conference. One hur 
dred and forty-five nations are here 
of them are parties to the Geneva 1 
protocol, and seven more are in the 
process of becoming parties as this 
ference unfolds. It's clear, not only 
the speeches but from the general i 
cussion in the corridors, that every 
is taking this subject with great sei 
ousness. President Mitterrand got ' 



Department of State Bulletin/March 



. 



ARMS CONTROL 



lference off to a great start with his 
ning address. I feel very gratified to 
e had the privilege of representing 
United States at the conference, 
a good thing. 

Q. You had a separate meeting, 
course, afterward with the Soviet 
reign Minister, and on your way 
e you said you hoped you would be 
e to persuade them that the United 
ites has the evidence that Libya is 
the verge of producing chemical 
ipons. Now you have the Germans 
ning to Washington to see some of 
t evidence. Did you make any 
idway with Mr. Shevardnadze? 

A. With the Soviet Foreign Minis- 
and his colleagues, we made a brief 
sentation — about 10 minutes of ma- 
al — that was designed not to be 
le sort of conclusive and detailed ex- 
nation, obviously, but to make it 
ir that this is a very serious proposi- 

and that we know a great deal 
ut what's going on at the Rabta fa- 
y. I was quite gratified by his re- 
nse, because he is as concerned as 
are about any spread of chemical 
ipons. He said so publicly, and he 

so directly. I believe, at least he 

said, and I believe, that he and his 
?agues will look into the matter, 
t is what we wanted. 

Q. What is your reaction to the 
■:ign Minister's statement today? 

A. Which Foreign Minister? That is 
■of the good things about this con- 
mce, you have to say which one, 
te are so many. 

Q. Mr. Shevardnadze's claim that 
Soviet Union has never used 
h nical weapons, never transferred 

■ i weapons to any country. 

I A. I put that in terms of a pledge, 
I I'll take it that way. 

I Q. Mr. Shevardnadze said that 
I Soviet Union would accept full 
b lenge inspection without right of 
I sal for any site in the Soviet 
I)n. Will the United States accept 

■ same program of openness? 

■ A. Yes, of course. We proposed 

I when the Vice President tabled his 

■ :y on behalf of President Reagan — 
ii reaty in 1984. Now, on demand, 
lite inspection is a principle that we 
l-re to, and it's important to get that 
fciple out there. However, translat- 
■that into workable procedures that 
lile can agree to is difficult. We 
■lied that in the INF [intermediate- 
Be nuclear forces] negotiations. We 
I learned that it can be done, and 



. 



we've learned since the treaty has gone 
into force that it can work. There is 
lots of work to be done to translate that 
general principle into an operating 
reality. 

Q. Could you give us your reac- 
tion to Mr. Shevardnadze's announce- 
ment that the Soviet Union will be 
destroying certain of its chemical 
weapon stocks, beginning this year, 
with foreign inspection? 

A. We welcome that statement. Of 
course, we've discussed that before. I 
think it's worth noting that while they 
are building a plant, we have a plant in 
being, and we have a program for de- 
stroying the unitary — so-called uni- 
tary — stocks of chemical weapons that 
we hold. We have invited people to 
come and see that plant. This is some- 
thing that, prospectively, they will do 
when their plant is completed. We have 
a plant, and we have a program, and 
we're proceeding to destroy the unitary 
stocks as we build — until we see a 
treaty in force — the much safer binary 
stocks. 

Q. On the way here, you said that 
on two prior occasions, or at least 
before, you had raised the Libyan 
plant issue with the [Soviet] Foreign 
Minister and that they had remained 
unconvinced of the American evi- 
dence. Can you give us a sense of 
whether you think you changed his 
mind today? 

A. The subject came up in the De- 
cember meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, 
Mr. Shevardnadze, and so on, and we 
simply said that we had a very serious 
concern, and we felt we had convincing 
evidence. Obviously, we did not try to 
present anything in that brief luncheon, 
and they agreed to hear more about it. 
So, they heard a little bit more about 
it. I hope that we may follow up on 
this, and I hope that as they look into 
it, they will develop information of their 
own. The object is to prevent this plant 
from becoming a producing chemical 
weapons plant; that is our object. If we 
can succeed in that, we will feel quite 
gratified. 

Q. With the Soviets saying 
they've stopped producing chemical 
weapons and with the United States 
producing a new generation of weap- 
ons, isn't there a danger that the 
United States is at a moral disadvan- 
tage in this whole affair? 

A. No. We are reducing our net 
stocks as we proceed, and this is per- 
fectly consistent with our position at 
the Geneva negotiations. 



Q. But if you're still producing 
new weapons, aren't you losing the 
moral high ground? 

A. No. We are reducing our net 
stocks, and we are having, in place of 
the rather difficult-to-handle unitary 
stocks, a way of holding our deterrent 
capability while these negotiations go 
on. We are developing that in a much 
safer way. 

Q. What can you tell us about 
the nature of the evidence you showed 
Mr. Shevardnadze? Can you also tell 
us if he specifically promised to con- 
duct an investigation in reaction to 
this evidence? Has he seen this 
evidence? 

A. Yes, he said that he would look 
into it. I forget his exact phraseology, 
but I have no doubt he'll be asking 
questions, since he cares about the sub- 
ject and the Soviet Government seems 
to care about the subject; I have no 
doubt the questions will be pointed. I 
think that is a constructive response. 
What we described for him was sort of 
the general flow of evidence that we 
had and gave a description of some of 
the characteristics of the plant, both of 
the metal fabricating plant and the 
chemical plant. Our object, inasmuch as 
you can achieve in a 10-minute period, 
is simply to show that we have clear 
information, that it is serious informa- 
tion, that we take it seriously, and that 
we hope they will. 

Q. Could you tell us how you see 
the role of the chemical industry in 
the nonproliferation process? 

A. The chemical industry, of 
course, is a great industry that pro- 
duces things of immense significance 
for all of us, and so you want to see the 
chemical industry proceed. 

At the same time, I think, since at 
least in certain aspects of what are per- 
fectly acceptable, desirable types of 
chemical production, you can switch 
the facilities to agents of chemical war- 
fare, the chemical industry will have to 
accept a degree of openness and inspec- 
tion that may cause them some heart- 
burn, but they'll have to do it. The 
chemical industry is one where, for 
commercial reasons, there tends to be, 
at least in certain periods, a tradition 
of some secretiveness. That's under- 
standable. Commercially, you don't 
want to give your ideas away. 

That is an illustration of one of the 
problems that will have to be con- 
fronted in this inspection regime, be- 
cause commercial secrecv can't be an 



jrtment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



ARMS CONTROL 



impediment to being sure that there 
isn't a weapons production operation 
here. The chemical industry will have 
to be a part of this, and it will be of 
some difficulty. 

Q. There have been press reports, 
based on U.S. intelligence reports, 
that the French may be selling Mi- 
rages to Libya. Have you taken this 
up with the French? 

A. No, I had that press report 
called to my attention, and I don't have 
any information to provide you about it, 
except that I certainly would say that 
sales of such aircraft to Libya right 
now would be an unwelcome develop- 
ment, to put it mildly. 

Q. As I understand it, one pur- 
pose of your meeting with Mr. Shev- 
ardnadze was to try to resolve some 
remaining difficulties in the Vienna 
negotiations on human rights and 
conventional arms control. Did you 
work everything out? Will that meet- 
ing conclude as expected next week? 

A. We discussed the CSCE [Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe] matters and, between us and 
the Soviets, we don't have too much in 
the way of outstanding issues. There 
are some things in the language that 
we would like to see strengthened 
somewhat, and we noticed that in Mr. 
Gorbachev's speech to the United Na- 
tions these matters were mentioned. 
We hope that perhaps that will be pos- 
sible, but as between the two of us, we 
don't have issues related to Vienna, as 
such. 

Of course, we expect to see an on- 
going process of attention to human 
rights matters, of attention to institu- 
tionalizing reforms, of continued re- 
leases, and so on. We discussed this, 
and I was assured that that would hap- 
pen. But that is not related, as such, to 
the CSCE final document. Our biggest 
remaining hurdle, I believe, is a dispute 
involving Greece about territory that's 
excluded in Turkey. This is a sticking 
point, and just how we will be able to 
deal with that, I'm not too sure. It's a 
hard point. 

Q. Do you expect the meeting 
will end [inaudible]? 

A. The meeting will end if all the 
issues are resolved. We're pretty close 
to that point, but we aren't there yet. I 
am always a believer that you don't 
have an agreement until you've got one. 



Q. Coming into this Paris confer- 
ence, it was said that one of the 
things you wanted to do here, other 
than take part in the conference, was 
to convince the rest of the world, es- 
pecially the industrialized countries, 
about what's going on in Libya and to 
try to get some support for the U.S. 
position. We've been told that the 
French, the Canadians, and the 
Egyptians, in your bilateral meetings, 
said that they weren't skeptical any- 
more about the American claims. 
Other than that, have you been able 
to gather up some support for the 
U.S. position on this? 

A. I've referred to our discussions 
with the Soviets, but our object here at 
this conference was not to put the Lib- 
yan issue at the center of the stage but 
to put the issue of chemical warfare at 
the center of the stage. That's the pur- 
pose of the conference, and I believe 
that objective is very much being 
served. It's turning out to be a good 
thing. 

In the meantime, we have, of 
course, expressed our concerns to vari- 
ous people we have met with, and 
clearly if you are concerned about 
chemical weapons and you see a credi- 
ble report of this kind, then you are 
going to be concerned about it and 
want to know more about it. That's the 
general reaction we get. 

Q. Does the American Govern- 
ment have any evidence of Italian 
firms being involved in the Rabta 
plant? 

A. I don't want to get into this, 
that, and the other country. My conver- 
sations with Mr. Andreotti and others 
from the Italian Government, on this 
and other matters, have been quite 
satisfactory. 

Q. The entire Paris process seems 
to make little sense when countries in 
the Middle East don't express a will- 
ingness to give up chemical weapons. 
It was clear in the Iraqi speech to- 
day — the right to hold chemical weap- 
ons and the situation. How do you 
feel about that? 

A. Countries, of course, under the 
Geneva protocol have a right to possess 
chemical weapons. That's the reason 
why we're trying to negotiate a treaty 
in Geneva that prohibits the production 
and holding of chemical weapons. We 
would prefer it if they didn't express 
such a sentiment, particularly a state 
that has used them recently. That cer- 
tainly is our view. But the point only 
underlines the importance of the nego- 



tiations in Geneva and. I think, as 
many have said from the podium, or,' 
the purposes that's being served is t< 
give a kind of special spotlight and p 
to those negotiations going on in Ge- 
neva. I might say that President-elec 
Bush has expressed himself very 
strongly and consistently on this issi 

Q. Certainly there is some "po 
ical" momentum toward resolving 
practical problems, and you discus 
verification earlier. How significar 
do you see these political obstacles 
terms of standing in the way of a 
total ban or a total elimination of 
chemical warfare? And what steps 
being taken to remove those politii 
obstacles? 

A. I don't know what you're rei 
ring to in political obstacles. 

Q. Those comments from the 
Arab nations, for example. 

A. A country that says I have r 
agreed to any prohibition against he 
ing, only using, chemical weapons is 
sort of within its rights, so to speak 
Although, as I already said, a count 
that has recently used them and ma 
that statement leaves you concerne( 
but that underlines the importance 
proceeding to agreement to get rid 
them entirely. I presume that Iraq 
have to consider this question, and 
when we get this treaty wound up, 
think a state that says that it is not 
going to join the international comn 
nity may very well find itself in an 
comfortable position. There is a 
growing, emerging, and strong wav 
opinion around the world about this 
sue. I think that's a big political fac 
that we're trying to highlight in thi 
conference. 

Q. How would you answer to 
charges of hypocrisy against the 
United States when it has chemic 
weapons and, under current inter 
tional law, Libya is actually entit 
to have them? 

A. I have already said what w< 
doing is bringing down our stock of 
chemical weapons. We have a plant 
have a process for elimination; we I 
invited people to see it; we will eng 
in that process whereby we will be 
reducing our stocks; and, of course 
have been proponents of the negoti 
tions in Geneva. Vice President Bu 
on behalf of President Reagan, tab! 
sort of the operative draft that peo 
are working from there, and we wa 
see it come to a successful conclusi 



( 



Department of State Bulletin/March 



ARMS CONTROL 



Q. Could you tell us exactly in 
ich way the United States has 
shed the process forward during 
ur stay in Paris? 

A. First of all, President Reagan 
rgested this conference in his speech 
the United Nations. We are gratified 
it there has been such a strong re- 
tnse and, of course, beginning with 
ance, which also felt this was a very 
)d idea. I think it is quite remark- 
e that in the space of, I think it is, 4 
nths, a conference of this magnitude 
; been organized and 145 nations are 
'e. 

I have listened to many of the 
eches, and I hear a building of sup- 
t for the objectives that surround all 
;his, and I hear the same thing in 

corridors and in my private conver- 
ions. I think the general objective of 
ind of consciousness-raising about 

importance of this problem — that is 
>ady a success. We already have 
en additional countries which have 
led on as parties to the protocol. I 
lk this will, undoubtedly, give some 
itional push to the negotiations in 
leva. 

There have been a number of state- 
its made parallel to the suggestion 
t I made on behalf of the United 
tes; that the Secretary General's 
ity to investigate promptly any 
lible charge of the use of chemical 
,pons be strengthened. I noticed Mr. 
vardnadze in his speech said that 
v' felt that no country should have 

right to deny the Secretary General 
mpt inspection rights if that is 
lorized. 

There are a lot of things sort of 

ng into place, and I feel very grati- 

by the whole thing. 

Q. When Mr. Shevardnadze ar- 
•d in Paris on Friday, he said that 

American downing of two Libyan 

poisoned the atmosphere of the 
ference. Did this subject come up 
'our talks with him today? Were 

able to reassure him on that 
it? 

A. I brought the subject up, and I 
lained to him, as Ambassador Wal- 

[U.S. Permanent Representative to 
United Nations Vernon A. Walters] 

in the United Nations, precisely 
it had happened. Our photographic 

audio evidence is quite clear. The 
erican pilots acted only after a tre- 
ldous effort to detach themselves 
n the Libyan aggressive planes, and 
i acted in defense of themselves. I 

those points forward. 



As far as the conference is con- 
cerned, so far as I can see, it is going 
forward very strongly, and the atmos- 
phere of concern about the use of chem- 
ical weapons and the desire to do 
everything possible to stop it and con- 
tain it is a very powerful atmosphere. 

As I said a moment ago, I think we 
can all feel — all of us, you, me, every- 
body — as citizens of the world who 
don't want to be subjected to attack by 
chemical weapons — I don't. I am sure 
you don't — the more we can do to avoid 
that, the better off we are all going to 
be. I think we are a step ahead of the 
game as a result of this conference. 



FINAL DECLARATION, 
JAN. 11, 1989 

The representatives of States participating 
in the Conference on the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, bringing together 
States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 and other interested States in Paris 
from 7 to 11 January 1989, solemnly declare 
the following: 

1. The participating States are deter- 
mined to promote international peace and 
security throughout the world in accord- 
ance with the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and to pursue effective disarmament 
measures. In this context, they are deter- 
mined to prevent any recourse of chemical 
weapons by completely eliminating them. 
They solemnly affirm their commitments 
not to use chemical weapons and condemn 
such use. They recall their serious concern 
at recent violations as established and con- 
demned by the competent organs of the 
United Nations. They support the human- 
itarian assistance given to the victims af- 
fected by chemical weapons. 

2. The participating States recognize 
the importance and continuing validity of 
the Protocol for the prohibition of the use 
in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other 
gases and bacteriological methods of war- 
fare, signed on 17 June 1925 in Geneva. The 
States Parties to the Protocol solemnly re- 
affirm the prohibition as established in it. 
They call upon all States which have not 
yet done so to accede to the Protocol. 

3. The participating States stress the 
necessity of concluding, at an early date, a 
convention on the prohibition of the devel- 
opment, production, stockpiling and use of 
all chemical weapons, and on their destruc- 
tion. This convention shall be global and 
comprehensive and effectively verifiable. It 
should be of unlimited duration. To this 
end, they call on the Conference on Disar- 
mament in Geneva to redouble its efforts, 
as a matter of urgency, to resolve expedi- 
tiously the remaining issues and to con- 
clude the convention at the earliest date. 
All States are requested to make, in an 
appropriate way, a significant contribution 
to the negotiations in Geneva by undertak- 



ing efforts in the relevant fields. The par- 
ticipating States, therefore, believe that 
any State wishing to contribute to these 
negotiations should be able to do so. In 
addition, in order to achieve as soon as 
possible the indispensable universal char- 
acter of the convention, they call upon all 
States to become parties thereto as soon as 
it is concluded. 

4. The participating States are gravely 
concerned by the growing danger posed to 
international peace and security by the 
risk of the use of chemical weapons as long 
as such weapons remain and are spread. In 
this context, they stress the need for the 
early conclusion and entry into force of the 
convention, which will be established on a 
non-discriminatory basis. They deem it 
necessary, in the meantime, for each State 
to exercise restraint and to act responsibly 
in accordance with the purpose of the pres- 
ent declaration. 

5. The participating States confirm 
their full support for the United Nations in 
the discharge of its indispensable role, in 
conformity with its Charter. They affirm 
that the United Nations provides a frame- 
work and an instrument enabling the inter- 
national community to exercise vigilance 
with respect to the prohibition of the use 
of chemical weapons. They confirm their 
support for appropriate and effective steps 
taken by the United Nations in this re- 
spect in conformity with its Charter. They 
further reaffirm their full support for the 
Secretary-General in carrying out his re- 
sponsibilities for investigations in the 
event of alleged violations of the Geneva 
Protocol. They express their wish for early 
completion of the work undertaken to 
strengthen the efficiency of existing pro- 
cedures and call for the co-operation of all 
States, in order to facilitate the action of 
the Secretary-General. 

6. The participating States, recalling 
the Final Document of the first Special 
Session of the United Nations General As- 
sembly Devoted to Disarmament in 1978, 
underline the need to pursue with deter- 
mination their efforts to secure general 
and complete disarmament under effective 
international control, so as to ensure the 
right of all States to peace and security. 



AMBASSADOR BURNS' 

STATEMENT, 
JAN. 11, 1989 

Less than 4 months ago, President 
Reagan called on parties to the Geneva 
protocol and other concerned states to 
convene a conference to consider how to 
prevent the further use of chemical 
weapons in violation of international 
law. This call reflected our deep con- 
cern and alarm over the dangerous 
spread and resurgent use of chemical 
weapons. It was President Reagan's 
hope that the participants at the Paris 
conference would rededicate themselves 



ARMS CONTROL 



to the objectives of the Geneva 
protocol. 

This conference has forged a 
powerful global consensus. The 151 par- 
ticipants gathered here have taken a 
principled and forceful stand against 
the illegal use and dangerous spread of 
chemical weapons. They have given sig- 
nificant political impetus to the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament negotia- 
tions on a comprehensive, effectively 
verifiable, and truly global ban on 
chemical weapons. 

We are pleased that the final decla- 
ration includes the following important 
elements. 

• The conference condemned the 
use of chemical weapons in violation of 
international law and existing norms. 

• All participants stressed the im- 
portance and continuing validity of the 
Geneva protocol of 1925. States party to 
the protocol reaffirmed their commit- 
ments. This fully preserves the terms 
on which each party has ratified the 
protocol, including their reservations. 

• Ten states heeded the confer- 
ence's call to become parties to the 
protocol. 



• Participants expressed grave 
concern over the spread of chemical 
weapons and called on all to exercise 
restraint and act responsibly. For our 
part, we will continue to exercise ex- 
port controls and urge others to do the 
same. 

• The conference reinforced the role 
of the Secretary General in investigat- 
ing reports of chemical weapons use 
and expressed support for appropriate 
and effective actions under the UN 
Charter. This includes consideration of 
international sanctions under Chap- 
ter VII of the UN Charter. 

It remains for the international 
community to translate this consensus 
into relevant actions toward these 
goals. 

The United States is grateful for 
the extraordinary efforts of President 
Mitterrand and the French Government 
in organizing and hosting this historic 
meeting. 



'Press release 1 of Jan. 8, 1989. 
-Press release 2 of Jan. 10. ■ 



Nuclear and Space Arms Talks 
Conclude Round 10 



PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, 
NOV. 16, 1988' 

Today marks the close of round 10 of 
the nuclear and space talks between 
the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Throughout these negotiations, 
my objective has been to achieve agree- 
ment with the Soviet Union on deep, 
equitable, and verifiable reductions in 
the strategic nuclear arsenals of both 
sides as part of a comprehensive effort 
to enhance strategic stability and re- 
duce the risk of war. 

We have made significant progress 
in these negotiations. We have con- 
cluded and begun implementation of the 
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces] Treaty, the first to eliminate 
an entire class of U.S. and Soviet mis- 
siles, with the most extensive verifi- 
cation provisions in any arms control 
agreement. 

In the strategic arms reduction 
talks (START), we have also made 
progress toward our goal of securing 
reductions in the most destabilizing of 
nuclear forces — fast-flying ballistic mis- 
siles, especially heavy intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple 



10 



warheads. The negotiators have re- 
corded extensive and significant areas 
of agreement, as well as remaining 
areas of disagreement, in a joint 
START draft treaty text. This joint 
draft treaty also reflects the areas of 
agreement which General Secretary 
Gorbachev and I reached during our 
meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik and 
at the Washington and Moscow sum- 
mits, as well as progress made at the 
U.S. -Soviet ministerial meetings and in 
H» rounds of negotiations in Geneva. 

In START we are well on our way 
toward an agreement which will signifi- 
cantly reduce the levels of U.S. and 
Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. We 
have agreement on 50% reductions in 
deployed strategic forces, to a ceiling of 
6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic nu- 
clear delivery vehicles, and sublimits of 
4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and 
1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles. 
Both sides have agreed that there will 
be approximately 50% reduction in 
throw-weight for Soviet ballistic mis- 
siles, to equal ceilings for both sides. 
Agreement has been reached on the 
number of warheads attributed to each 
existing type of ballistic missile and on 
some of the counting rules for heavy 



bomber armaments. Agreement has 
also been reached on the outlines of 
verification regime, including several 
kinds of on-site inspection, data ex- 
change, and measures to reduce the 
possibility of cheating. Both sides ha 
presented detailed proposals in thest 
areas. 

Major areas of disagreement re- 
main, including with respect to mobi 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, se< 
launched cruise missiles, rules of ac- 
counting for air-launched cruise mis- 
siles, sublimits on ICBM warheads, 
modernization of heavy ICBMs, and 
viet attempts to link a' START treat- 
provisions that would cripple the Sti* 
tegic Defense Initiative (SDI). 

In the defense and space talks, 
have continued to seek agreement oi 
how we and the Soviets could jointlj 
manage a stable transition to increa: 
reliance on effective defenses, shouli 
they prove feasible. SDI is our best 
hope for a safer world, one in which 
deterrence is increasingly based on 
fenses — which threaten no one — rati 
than on the threat of retaliation. It 1 
also been an important incentive for 
Soviets to negotiate for nuclear arm 
reductions. We will not bargain SDI 
away or accept restrictions on SDI 1 
yond those actually agreed in the A 
ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. 

Finally continued Soviet un- 
willingness to dismantle the large 
phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk, 
which is a significant violation of a < 
tral element of the ABM Treaty, re- 
mains a matter of deep concern. We 
have made it clear to the Soviets th 
we will not accept less than full con 
pliance with the treaty and that we 
not be able to conclude any further 
strategic arms control agreements i 
that violation is corrected in a verif 
ble manner that meets our criteria. 

As this round concludes, I wanl 
express my appreciation to Ambas- 
sadors Max Kampelman, Reed Han 
and Henry Cooper and their teams 
the outstanding job they have done 
these negotiations. 

In the nuclear and space talks, 
have come a long way toward agree 
ments that will strengthen our secu 
and that of our allies. But we want 
good treaties, not quick ones, and v 
will not take shortcuts. We leave th 
next Administration a solid foundat 
upon which to build in the future, a 
am confident that, if the Soviets an 
prepared to make further progress 
will be able to resolve the difficult i 
maining issues. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Nov. 21, 198 

Department of State Bulletin/March 



;onomics 



he 1988 Trade Bill 



Th< folio/ring report was presented 
Ambassador Alan F. Holmer, Dep- 

U.S. Trade Representative, and Ju- 
i Hippler Bello, General Counsel, 
Ice of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
t conference of foreign diplomats at 
Depart im lit of State on Septern- 
19. 1988. 

1974 the United States was the 
■Ids largest international creditor, 
merchandise trade deficit was $5.5 
ion, and exports had surged 38% 
ti the previous year. And if imports 
letroleum (whose price had quad- 
led in 1973) were excluded, the U.S. 
•chandise trade position was a sur- 
5 of more than $21 billion. In this 
nomic environment, the Congress 
sed a landmark trade bill providing: 

• Authority for trade agreements; 

• A new trade remedy called Sec- 
301 to enforce trade agreements 
respond to other unfair foreign gov- 

ment practices; 

• Section 201 escape clause relief 
ugh temporary safeguards mea- 
is; and 

• Some changes to other U.S. 
le laws. 



In 1988 the U.S. economic picture 
gnificantly different. Since 1974 the 
ted States has become the world's 
est international debtor, its net for- 
i debt exceeding that of Brazil, Ar- 
:ina, Mexico, and all other Latin 
?rican countries combined. Its trade 
cit — while reduced from the peak of 
> billion in 1987 — is likely this year 
e between $135 and $140 billion. 

certain trading partners have 
ssed extremely large bilateral sur- 
es in trade with the United States, 
jing up to $59.8 billion for Japan in 

In such far differing circumstances, 
U.S. trade legislation could rea- 
ibly be expected to be quite dif- 
nt as well. Yet the major trade 
isions of the Omnibus Trade and 
ipetitiveness Act of 1988 provide: 

• Authority for trade agreements; 

• Amendments to the Section 301 
le remedy; 

Minor amendments to the Section 
escape clause remedy; and 

• Relatively minor amendments to 
e other trade remedies. 



With the recent passage and sig- 
nature of the 1988 Trade Act, it is time 
to stop stigmatizing, criticizing, prop- 
agandizing, and exaggerating this legis- 
lation and, instead, to analyze it dispas- 
sionately. Relieved of all the emotional 
rhetoric surrounding its history, the fi- 
nal bill signed by the President clearly 
continues rather than contorts tradi- 
tional U.S. trade policy and renews 
rather than reneges on the U.S. com- 
mitment to the multilateral trading sys- 
tem. It does not legislate barriers at 
our borders to close the U.S. market 
and create a "Fortress America" but 
rather simply provides better trade 
remedy tools to use judiciously to open 
foreign markets. 

What the Bill Does Not Do 

Before reviewing the bill's principal 
trade provisions, it is worthwhile to 
remember what this bill does not do. 
Earlier omnibus trade bills included 
provisions that would have: 

• Established quotas on imports of 
lamb and steel products or unilaterally 
revoked most-favored-nation treatment 
for Romania and Angola; 

• Created a private right of action 
in U.S. courts for customs fraud, in 
addition to current administrative 
remedies; 

• Provided a draconian remedy — 
exclusion from the U.S. market — for 
"scofflaw" (i.e., repeat) offenders of 
U.S. customs laws; 

• Included requirements for the 
carriage of automobiles on U.S. vessels; 

• Required the President to pro- 
vide relief automatically in safeguards 
actions in which the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (ITC) found injury 
to U.S. producers; 

• Broadly mandated retaliation in 
Section 301 cases and required the 
"self-initiation" annually of such investi- 
gations (even when U.S. industry did 
not seek such an action); 

• Redefined the term "subsidy" in 
the countervailing duty law to expand 
its application; 

• Provided a private right of action 
in U.S. courts for dumping in addition 
to the antidumping law; 

• Provided relief against diversion- 
ary ("upstream" or "down-stream") 
dumping, in violation of existing inter- 
national rules; 



• Required application of the coun- 
tervailing duty law to nonmarket 
economies; 

• Amended the dumping law to 
make it vastly more likely that the 
Commerce Department would find 
dumping where foreign producers and 
exporters sold in the United States 
through a related company; 

• Amended the dumping law to 
make it more likely that the Commerce 
Department would find dumping in any 
case involving imports from a non- 
market economy; and 

• Required the imposition of 
sweeping trade sanctions against "ter- 
rorist" nations. 

In response to strong objections 
from the Administration (echoed by 
many trading partners), the Congress 
simply dropped these and many other 
protectionist provisions which were 
antigrowth, antijobs, anticonsumer, and 
anti-U.S. competitiveness. 

In part, this accomplishment was 
possible because the two bills passed by 
the House of Representatives and the 
Senate differed so substantially. The 
Senate bill was more objectionable on 
Sections 201 and 301, telecommunica- 
tions, and a host of foreign relations- 
type amendments. The House bill was 
more problematic on amendments to 
the antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws and other nontrade provi- 
sions, such as the Bryant amendment 
(requiring the registration and dis- 
closure of foreign investment in the 
United States). This was no accident. 
Those in the Administration and Con- 
gress who wanted a protrade bill worked 
diligently at early stages of the process 
to ensure that it was legislatively possi- 
ble for the conferees to choose a pro- 
trade course. In virtually every 
instance where the conferees had a 
choice, they chose the protrade 
alternative. 

In addition, many precisely or 
nearly identical provisions included in 
both bills were dropped by the 199- 
member trade conference in response 
to Administration objections. Although 
the conference's mandate was limited to 
resolving differences between the two 
bills, conferees, nonetheless, clumped 
provisions from both bills on, for exam- 
ple, Romanian most-favored-nation 
treatment, the carriage of automobiles 
on U.S. vessels, and sugar duty 
drawback. 

Even when the trade conferees de- 
clined to eliminate provisions altogether, 
time and again they worked with the 



11 



ECONOMICS 



Administration to modify them accept- 
ably. Some provisions that originally 
had a protectionist bent were recast 
into acceptable trade remedies with 
sufficient executive discretion to enable 
their judicious, trade-liberalizing use. 

All of this is not to say that the bill 
is perfect. A number of provisions re- 
mained objectionable to the Admin- 
istration. Indeed, as President Reagan 
said when he signed the bill on Au- 
gust 23, 1988: "There are some things 
in this bill I don't like." But the Presi- 
dent also noted that the emphasis and 
thrust of the bill are to open markets 
and ensure fair play around the world, 
as the following analysis shows. 

Trade Agreements Authority 

The centerpiece of the trade provisions 
of the 1988 Trade Act is the renewal of 
authority for trade agreements. While 
the President's constitutional powers 
to conduct the foreign affairs of the 
United States enable him to negotiate 
trade agreements without Congress' 
blessing, the Congress' constitutional 
powers to regulate commerce require 
an effective executive-congressional 
partnership to make the trade agree- 
ments program work. 

In 1967 the executive, without Con- 
gress' blessing, negotiated agreements 
relating to dumping and the American 
selling price system, but Congress sub- 
sequently refused to implement them. 
To prevent such a recurrence, Congress 
and the President invented the so- 
called fast track procedures in the 
Trade Act of 1974. They don't guaran- 
tee that Congress will approve and im- 
plement trade agreements that the 
President negotiates. But they ensure 
that Congress will review such agree- 
ments on an expedited, nonamendable 
basis, greatly enhancing the prospects 
for congressional implementation. 

The principal achievement of the 
1988 act, like the 1974 act, is its enact- 
ment of fast track procedures. Until 
May 31, 1991—5 months after the Uru- 
guay Round is scheduled to conclude — 
the President has access to congres- 
sional fast track procedures for any 
trade agreements he concludes. And 
just in case the Uruguay Round con- 
tinues a bit longer, the President's ac- 
cess can be continued for 2 additional 
years — until May 31, 1993 — if only he 
certifies to the Congress that, despite 
progress in the negotiations, more time 
is needed to conclude them. 



These provisions renew the U.S. 
commitment to the multilateral trading 
system which has dominated U.S. trade 
policy since the establishment of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947. The United 
States continues to believe that peace 
and prosperity for all nations are best 
served by agreement on, and observ- 
ance of, fair multilateral rules by the 
international community. Today's global 
economy requires multilateral solutions 
to what are, inevitably, increasingly 
multilateral problems defying merely 
unilateral — and often even bilateral — 
responses. 

It was this abiding faith in the 
efficacy of the international trading sys- 
tem that led the United States in Sep- 
tember 1986 to spearhead the launch of 
the current Uruguay Round of multi- 
lateral trade negotiations. We want to 
modernize the GATT — by improving 
existing but inadequate rules, as with 
respect to agriculture and dispute set- 
tlement, and by extending GATT disci- 
pline to frontier trade areas such as 
services, investment, and intellectual 
property. The 1988 act expresses strong, 
bipartisan support for the Administra- 
tion's negotiating objectives in these 
areas. And the tariff authority is the 
broadest that has been provided to any 
Administration in decades. 

To endure and prosper, the GATT 
must both shore up and extend its foun- 
dations. In the dynamic 20th (and in 
the doubtless even more dynamic 21st) 
century, the GATT must go forward 
and revitalize or it will surely fall back 
and decline. Merely treading water is 
neither possible nor acceptable. 

Early in the process of the 1988 
act (1985*and 1986), it seemed to the 
authors that arguing to a congressional 
committee that a provision violated the 
GATT was perceived by some members 
of Congress as a reason to support the 
provision. At least one senator called 
the GATT the "Gentleman's Agreement 
to Talk and Talk." But all that had 
changed by 1988. The leadership of the 
trade committees decided to rid the 
bill of all GATT-illegal provisions. 
They were uniformly successful. No 
GATT-illegal provisions remain in the 
1988 act. 

This, then, is the central message 
of the 1988 act: the United States wishes 
not only to maintain freer trade to the 
extent it now exists but also to extend 
freer trade, to open more markets, and 
to increase the predictability of interna- 
tional rules for businesses. In this di- 



rection lie the best prospects for 
enhancing world wealth, peace, and 
prosperity. 

Section 301 

While our principal objective is to 
achieve multilateral trade liberalizati 
sometimes this goal can be stimulate 
through bilateral or even unilateral ii 
tiatives. Section 301 was enacted in 
1974 as the domestic trade remedy d 
signed to help reach and enforce trad 
agreements by providing for unilater 
measures in response to foreign gove 
ment unfair trade practices. Unilatei 
action — retaliation — was never con- 
ceived as the objective of Section 301 
rather, the credible threat of retaliat 
was intended to serve as a stick that 
combination with the carrot of an op 
U.S. market, could pry open foreign 
markets and thus further liberalize 
trade. 

The United States has been crit 
cized for its aggressive use of Sectio 
301. Yet the results of this program 
the last 3 years have been substanti; 
more open, freer trade, widely bene 
ing producers and exporters in third 
countries as well as the United Stat 
for example: 

• The settlement we reached wi 
Japan on its treatment of beef 1 and 
rus imports will benefit cattlemen ii 
Australia and New Zealand, as well 
in Montana, and citrus growers in tl 
Mediterranean and South America, 
well as in Florida and California. 

• The nondiscriminatory tariff l 
ductions Japan made to compensate 
its GATT-illegal leather and leather 
footwear import quotas improve ace 
to Japanese markets for producers ; 
exporters around the globe. 

• The U.S. Section 301 action 
against the European Economic Coi 
munity (EEC) for its hormone direc 
resulted in a settlement under whic 
foreign meat products — U.S. and tl 
country alike — can continue to be ir 
ported" into the EEC in 1988. 

• The Section 301 investigation 
Korean intellectual property practic 
resulted in an agreement under whi 
intellectual property rights — U.S. £ 
third country — are more effectively 
protected to the benefit of patent a: 
copyright holders around the globe. 

• By enacting mirror quotas ur. 
Section 301 against GATT-illegal im 
quotas established in Portugal duri 



12 



Department of State Bulletin/March 



ECONOMICS 



EEC "enlargement" to include Por- 
al and Spain, the United States 
aed preserve freer trade in Por- 
al, to the benefit of all nations ex- 
ting to the EEC. 

• In the Japan semiconductors case, 
United States sought to obtain 
e equal access to the Japanese 
ip" market for all foreign producers 
emiconductors. Japanese observance 
his commitment would have bene- 
d both U.S. and third-country chip 
iucers. 

U.S. investigations of Taiwanese 
rtices resulted in Taiwan's applica- 
of practices consistent with the 
oms valuation code and improved 
:ss for exporters of all nationalities 
he Taiwan markets for beer, wine, 
tobacco products. 

These efforts by the United States 
itrate how bilateral agreements — 
eved in part to avoid the unilateral 
osition of sanctions — often have a 
trilateral, trade-liberalizing effect 

complements rather than 
•acts from the GATT system. 
The 1988 Trade Act does amend 
;ion 301 significantly. It is intended 
lake it harder for the executive 
ich to sit on its hands and do noth- 
(or next to nothing) in response to a 
jgn government's unfair trade prac- 
i. But although it increases pres- 

on the executive to act (and act 
sively), it preserves sufficient dis- 
ion to ensure that such action can 
udicious and trade liberalizing, 
example: 

Transfer of Authority. The Trade 

specifically authorizes the U.S. 
le Representative to determine 
ther a foreign practice is unfair and 
;t in response. Yet this alleged 
nsfer" of authority is more symbolic 

real. The U.S. Trade Represent- 
s serves at the pleasure of the Pres- 
t, who retains constitutional 
ority to direct the actions of his 
irdinates. 



i 



Mandatory Retaliation. The act 
lires retaliation in response to vio- 
ins of trade agreements and other 
cements if such violations burden or 
rict U.S. commerce. Yet the scope 
lis requirement is limited to 
iches of agreements and, even then, 
onable exceptions are provided, 
if: 

• A GATT dispute settlement panel 
s that U.S. rights under the trade 
'ement have not been denied; 



« A foreign government eliminates 
or agrees to phase out the practice 
complained of or its burden or restric- 
tion on U.S. commerce; 

• A foreign government provides 
compensatory trade benefits, or the 
Trade Representative determines 
that action under Section 301 would 
cause serious harm to the national 
security; or 

• The Trade Representative deter- 
mines (in extraordinary cases) that 
action under 301 would cause 

harm to the economy substantially out 
of proportion to its benefits (taking into 
account the effect of inaction on the 
credibility of the Section 301 program. 

Illustrative Unfair Practices. The 

act specifies export targeting, denial of 
worker rights, and governmental toler- 
ation of systematic private anticom- 
petitive activities as practices that can 
be actionable under Section 301, if they 
burden or restrict U.S. commerce. But 
no responsive action is required, even if 
these criteria are satisfied. And the 
statute underscores the discretion of 
the U.S. Trade Representative not to 
initiate a Section 301 investigation if 
he finds it would not be effective in 
addressing the practice. 

The effect of these admendments is 
essentially to ensure the perpetuation 
of the aggressive, effective use of the 
Section 301 program by the Reagan Ad- 
ministration over the last 3 years. They 
do not require protectionist actions, as 
they allow ample discretion with re- 
spect to their application. But they 
sharpen and hone this particular trade 
remedy tool so that it can be used ef- 
fectively to promote open markets and 
thus to further liberalize trade. 

Clearly the most effective action 
that can be taken by a foreign country 
that fears the "sting" of Section 301 
would be (1) to ensure that its market 
is truly open to imports and (2) to join 
the United States and other trading 
partners in pushing for meaningful 
progress in the Uruguay Round. This is 
the market-opening objective we seek 
and which we believe Section 301 can 
help us achieve. 

"Super 301" 

So-called super 301 requires the Trade 
Representative to start some (number 
unspecified) Section 301 investigations 
on his own motion in 1989 and 1990. 
Based on the annual National Trade 



artment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



Estimates Report identifying foreign 
barriers to trade and investment, he is 
to identify "priority trade-liberalizing 
practices and countries" and then seek 
to negotiate elimination of these unfair 
practices. 

Self-initiated investigations or ac- 
tions were unprecedented until 1985, 
when the Trade Representative and the 
President began resorting to them as 
appropriate responses to priority trade 
problems. The Trade Representative 
self-initiated investigations of Korean 
insurance and intellectual property 
practices and Japanese tobacco and 
Brazilian informatics policies. And the 
President took self-initiated action in 
response to EEC agricultural practices 
in connection with Portugal's and 
Spain's accession to the Community, the 
EEC hormone directive, and Taiwanese 
customs valuation and beer/wine/ 
tobacco practices. 

Some (including the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce) consider "super 301" as 
requiring investigations of "generic" 
or "bundled" foreign practices rather 
than traditional, more narrowly circum- 
scribed practices (such as Japan tobacco 
or Brazil pharmaceuticals). The act cer- 
tainly permits, but does not require, 
this approach. The extensive debate on 
this provision in the Senate stresses 
that "super 301" is not the son of the 
Gephardt amendment (which would have 
required draconian trade sanctions un- 
less "excessive and unwarranted" bilat- 
eral trade surpluses of other nations 
with the United States were reduced at 
least 10% each year). 

Self-initiated Intellectual 
Property Section 301 Cases 

Another self-initiation requirement is 
to begin investigations each year — to be 
conducted on an expedited basis — of de- 
nials of adequate and effective protec- 
tion of intellectual property rights by 
"priority" countries. The act gives the 
Trade Representative substantial dis- 
cretion with respect to this exercise. 
First, he must identify those countries: 

• That have the most onerous or 
egregious practices that deny adequate 
protection of intellectual property 
rights or deny fair and equitable mar- 
ket access to U.S. persons that rely on 
the protection of intellectual property 
rights; 

• Whose practices in this regard 
have the greatest adverse impact on the 
relevant U.S. products; and 

• That are not already entering 
into good faith negotiations or making 



13 



ECONOMICS 



significant progress in negotiations al- 
ready underway. 

The act also expressly exempts 
the Trade Representative from the self- 
initiation requirement if he determines 
that such initiation would be detrimen- 
tal to U.S. economic interests. 



Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Laws 

Trade experts have widely pronounced 
the 1988 act as the "cleanest" package 
of antidumping and countervailing duty 
amendments in decades. As already 
noted, a host of GATT-illegal antidump- 
ing and countervailing duty provisions 
was either dumped from the bill or 
completely transformed into GATT- 
consistent provisions (such as replacing 
a diversionary dumping provision in 
violation of Article VI of the GATT and 
the GATT Antidumping Code, with do- 
mestic authority to implement Article 
12 of the GATT Antidumping Code). 

Perhaps the most interesting — al- 
beit still modest — amendment in this 
regard is enhanced authority for the 
U.S. Department of Commerce (after 
taking into account any advice offered 
by the U.S. International Trade Com- 
mission) to prevent circumvention of 
antidumping and countervailing duty 
orders through: 

• Only minor alteration of affected 
merchandise; or 

• Limited further assembly in the 
United States or third countries. 

This anticircumvention authority 
applies only to products already subject 
to antidumping and countervailing duty 
orders. Moreover, this change is quite 
conservative compared to, for example, 
recently adopted and implemented anti- 
dumping practices of the European 
Economic Community with respect to 
"screwdriver assembly" operations 
within the EEC. 

In fact, the antidumping and coun- 
tervailing duty amendments in the 1988 
act include one quite innovative provi- 
sion clearly intended to retain consis- 
tency with international trade rules. On 
the one hand, the Congress has defined 
in the act what constitutes an industry 
in cases involving processed agricul- 
tural products. On the other hand, it 
simultaneously provides that this defi- 
nition shall cease to have any effect if: 

. . . the Trade Representative notifies 
the [Department of Commerce] and the 
[International Trade] Commission that the 



application of this [provision] is inconsis- 
tent with the international obligations of 
the United States. 

This expression of congressional 
deference to the international obliga- 
tions of the United States signals a 
marked respect for and a renewed com- 
mitment to the multilateral trading 
system. This amendment reflects the 
Congress' desire, wherever possible, to 
formulate U.S. trade policy and to 
make and apply new U.S. trade law 
so to complement rather than thwart 
the GATT and multilateral trade 
liberalization. 

Section 201 

Section 201 is the trade remedy 
through which the United States exer- 
cises its rights under Article XIX of 
the GATT temporarily to restrict in- 
creasing imports that are injuring a 
U.S. industry. Article XIX bestows 
this right but establishes a correspond- 
ing obligation: to compensate affecting 
trading partners for such temporary 
"escape" from normal GATT obligations. 

Section 201 — past, present, and fu- 
ture — is the vehicle for exercising this 
right and meeting this obligation. The 
1988 amendments do not change it sub- 
stantially. Relief may be provided by 
the President only if the U.S. Interna- 
tional Trade Commission finds that in- 
creasing imports are a substantial 
cause of serious injury. And even if the 
ITC finds such injury, the President is 
not required to provide relief if he be- 
lieves that the costs of such action out- 
weigh its benefits. In this respect, the 
Congress specifically rejected recom- 
mendations that the President be re- 
quired to provide import relief if 
recommended by the ITC. Thus the 
fundamental parameters of this remedy 
remain unchanged. 

The theme of some Section 201 
amendments is, nonetheless, signifi- 
cant, because it stresses that the pur- 
pose of Section 201 relief is to promote 
adjustment by U.S. producers to im- 
port competition. Petitioners are not 
required to file adjustment plans, nor 
are individual firms required to make 
commitments about their plans for any 
adjustment. And most importantly, 
governmental officials do not determine 
for the industry and firms concerned 
how they should adjust to import 
competition. 

But plans may be filed and commit- 
ments may be made, and the ITC is 
required to take this information into 



account in shaping its recommendatic 
about relief (if it finds the requisite i 
jury to U.S. industry). The ITC is re 
quired to recommend those actions tl 
will not only address the injury but 
also be most effective in facilitating t 
domestic industry's positive adjustme 
to import competition. The Presidenl 
likewise must take into account the 
dustry's adjustment efforts (including 
any adjustment plan or commitment 
submitted to the ITC). 

The amendments to Section 201 1 
pand the options for the President bi 
yond traditional import relief, such a 
international negotiations or submise 
of legislative proposals. In addition, 
an industry has received relief under 
Section 201 for some time period, it 
cannot submit a new petition until ar 
equivalent time period has elapsed. 

The act's amendments to Section 
201, then, essentially underscore the 
reason GATT Article XIX permits tt 
porary safeguards measures (subject 
the obligation to provide compensatii 
that is, to allow producers seriously 
harmed by increasing imports a resp 
in which to adjust to import competit 

Conclusion 

The overall thrust of the trade provi 
sions of the Omnibus Trade and Con 
petitiveness Act is to open markets | 
liberalize trade. Procedurally, it doe 
increase the pressure on the Preside 
and the U.S. Trade Representative 
particular, to achieve desired and de 
able trade liberalization. But it does 
not violate the international obligati 
of the United States, nor force the , 
ministration down a protectionist pa 
It provides the executive branch wil 
tools with which to achieve trade lit 
alization and gives it substantial dis> 
tion to exercise in deciding how to u 
them in particular cases. 

Yes, the act could theoretically 
be administered by a future adminis 
tion in a protectionist way. But that 
true of prior law as well, and it is 
equally true that the act can be adn 
istered in a way that promotes rath 
than undermines multilateral trade 
eralization. For these reasons, those 
who are concerned about the act sh 
withhold judgment pending its actu 
administration. 



1 



1 This was not actually a Section 3 
case, but failure to achieve a satisfactc 
result would almost certainly have 
provoked action under Section 301. ■ 



in 

IHiji 

iia 



14 



DeDartment of State Bulletin March 



ECONOMICS 



Jegotiations Toward a New 
ternational Coffee Agreement 



" 



y W. Allen Wall is 

Address before the negotiating con- 
rence for a new International Coffee 
g r< i meat in London on November It, 
<88. Mr. Wall is is Under Secretary for 

couoniie Affairs and Agriculture. 

lave followed the work of the ICA 
ring the past 6 years and have parti- 
>ated in the decisions of the U.S. 
wernment about its operations. So, I 
uld not pass up the opportunity to sit 
a meeting and to say a few words 
out the views of the United States 
out the ICA. 

As background, I will first describe 
e perspective from which we view the 
A: How we view the behavior of com- 
)dity prices, how we view the eco- 
mic function of prices, and what we 
isider to be the function of com- 
idity agreements. That is, I will 
int out some general characteristics 
commodity prices and of commodity 
reements before I turn to coffee and 
i ICA specifically. 

mmodity Price Behavior 

are experiencing currently an inter- 
ing and instructive period in interna- 
•nal commodity markets. In recent 
ars, there has been a weakening of 

price of internationally traded oil, 

for most of this decade, the prices 
many commodities have been low. 
e prices paid by consumers for inter- 
ionally traded primary commodities 
»er than fuel (after adjustment for 
lation) have been lower than at any 
le since the Second World War. 

Among the many influences on 
nmodity prices, one of special impor- 
ice was the termination at the begin- 
g of this decade of a period of high 
lation that had been going on for 
re than 15 years. Termination of the 
lation was, of course, generally bene- 
al, but it was accompanied by a tem- 
*ary recession in economic activity, 
mmodity prices are especially sen- 
ive to both inflation and recession. A 
rid index of real commodity prices 
i been rising since 1983, along with 
ady, though modest, economic growth 
he world economy and strong growth 
the United States. 



After adjusting for inflation and for 
fluctuations in exchange rates, the ma- 
jor determinant of commodity prices 
appears to be the rate of world eco- 
nomic growth. Specific commodities are 
subject to their own specific influences; 
for example, frost and drought have 
powerful effects on coffee prices. Those 
specific influences temporarily obscure 
the longer term trends, which other- 
wise are about the same for coffee as 
for commodities in general. 

Economic Function of Prices 

These temporary influences, however, 
illuminate certain features common to 
the markets for most commodities. 
Most commodities have volatile prices; 
they react sharply to decreases or in- 
creases of quantities available. The vol- 
atility of commodity prices stimulates 
efforts to stabilize prices. 

The special characteristics of com- 
modity markets — inelastic demands, in 
the short run, and consequently, vol- 
atile prices — create almost irresistible 
temptations to try to influence the 
course of prices. These temptations 
give rise to seductive arguments, effec- 
tive even in importing countries, favor- 
ing intervention. 

Until about 1960, the most common 
response to this state of affairs was for 
producers to attempt to form a cartel. 
A few examples, such as OPEC [Orga- 
nization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries], have occurred more recently. 
Few, if any, of the cartels have suc- 
ceeded after their first few years. And 
the attempts have been expensive, be- 
cause they resulted in accumulations of 
unsold supplies, because they attracted 
new producers into the market, and be- 
cause they reduced consumption. These 
experiences have discouraged others 
from trying to imitate them. 

When we consider other forms of 
intervention, such as international com- 
modity agreements with both producers 
and consumers participating, we should 
bear in mind the informational function 
of a free price system. Prices are a 
decentralized system of communication 
and incentives that make economies, 
and the world economy, efficient. 



Apartment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



• Prices convey information. They 
tell what is wanted and how much it is 
wanted in relation to the prices of things 
that will be given up to provide it. 

• Prices furnish an incentive to 
adopt the least costly methods of pro- 
duction and, thereby, use resources for 
their most highly valued purposes. 

• Prices determine how income 
is distributed. 

These points have a bearing on the 
arguments for and against participating 
in international commodity agreements 
and can be used to test both the sound- 
ness of the arguments and the sound- 
ness of particular provisions in such 
agreements. 

The economic functions of prices 
apply with special force to long-run 
trends or averages. Short-run move- 
ments of prices that are quickly re- 
versed have relatively little information 
content and relatively little incentive 
effect on production. For a storable 
commodity, an exceptionally low price 
serves as an incentive to consume more 
and produce less of it, but it also serves 
as an incentive to store it and deliver it 
to the market later when the price is 
higher. A commodity agreement can 
engage in or encourage this storing 
function, reducing the volatility of the 
commodity's price without affecting the 
long-run accuracy of the price signal in 
the market. This is the basic idea that 
underlies a potentially sound com- 
modity agreement. 

Commodity Agreements 

As you know, the U.S. Government has 
studied the design of commodity agree- 
ments carefully and has found that 
there are very few that consistently 
benefit commodity producers and con- 
sumers. There are several reasons for 
this, most notably the following two. 
First, few such agreements as actually 
negotiated are economically sound and 
viable, if implemented as written; most 
often, they clearly contain the seeds of 
their own destruction. Second, even 
when an agreement is sound in theory, 
in practice it turns out almost invari- 
ably to have effects very different from 
those intended. 

The disadvantages of commodity 
agreements have been demonstrated by 
long and bitter experience. Neverthe- 
less, under certain circumstances, a 
commodity agreement can — at least in 
theory — increase the welfare of both 
producers and consumers by reducing 
price instability in the manner I noted 



15 



ECONOMICS 



a moment ago. While arguments to that 
effect often seem to be mere wishful 
thinking or masks for other objectives, 
nevertheless, it is important to take a 
pragmatic approach and examine care- 
fully whether a proposed commodity ar- 
rangement might work beneficially. 

An international commodity agree- 
ment almost always is claimed to have 
as its principal aim the stabilization of 
the prices of the commodities it covers. 
On the surface, "stabilize" seems to re- 
fer only to reducing the volatility of 
commodity prices. This aim is legiti- 
mate, and I emphasize again that it 
benefits both producers and consumers. 

In addition, however, the term 
"stabilize" often takes on the connota- 
tion of "support" — to hold the price 
higher, on the average, than it would be 
in a free market. The existence of an 
agreement creates a temptation to pro- 
ducers to try to elevate the average 
price. If an agreement does that, it 
transfers income from consumers to 
producers, obstructs the information 
function of prices, and — most impor- 
tant — sets in motion forces that will 
lead inevitably to the collapse or termi- 
nation of the agreement. The damage 
that follows the collapse more than off- 
sets the advantages that were obtained 
while the agreement appeared to be 
working, even for producers. For con- 
sumers, it is against their interest from 
the start to help raise the average price 
of the commodity, and while the market 
chaos that follows the collapse is not 
as damaging to consumers as to pro- 
ducers, it is not likely to benefit con- 
sumers more than temporarily. 

U.S. Position on ICA 

What I have said summarizes the back- 
ground against which the United States 
has studied the advantages and disad- 
vantages of various features of the In- 
ternational Coffee Agreement as it is 
and as it might be changed — not only 
the direct effects on the United States 
but also the indirect effects through 
its effects on friendly countries. The is- 
sues are complex, but we are near a 
conclusion. 

The expiring ICA differs from 
other commodity agreements in which 
the United States has participated in 
recent years (namely, rubber currently 
and sugar formerly) in that it has no 
buffer stock and no rules governing the 
accumulation and release of official 
stocks in producing countries. If all of 
its provisions were fully implemented, 



16 



however, including the prohibition on 
sales at discounted prices to nonmem- 
ber importing countries, it would work 
in a manner similar to a buffer stock 
arrangement. It imposes quotas on ex- 
ports by producer countries to member 
importing countries at times of price 
downswings, but there is no provision 
for restricting production. If non- 
member countries have to pay the same 
prices for coffee as do member coun- 
tries, the quotas force the accumulation 
of stocks. These can then be sold at 
times of scarcity and high prices, such 
as we had early in 1986. The relaxation 
and subsequent suspension of quotas as 
prices rose made the accumulated stocks 
available to mitigate the scarcity. That 
fits the theory of how it should work — 
unless the stocks that should have been 
accumulated when prices were low were 
not accumulated but were instead sold 
to nonmembers, hence are not available 
to mitigate the scarcity. 

The U.S. Government is concerned 
about income levels and income sta- 
bility in many of the countries that de- 
pend heavily on coffee for their export 
revenues. These points, together with 
those I set out earlier on the argu- 
ments for sound commodity agreements 
in general, are the reasons why the 
United States joined the ICA and are 
the principal reasons for negotiating a 
new agreement. As you know, however, 
we do not believe that all is well with 
the coffee agreement. During some per- 
iods, the agreement has raised prices 
above the appropriate level, becoming 
itself a source of instability. When it 
supports prices above the long-run 
equilibrium level that would prevail in 
a free market, the agreement levies a 
hidden tax on consumers and subsidizes 
production in exporting countries. There 
is no precise estimate of the excess cost 
to consumers caused by the ICA — in 
fact, the amount obviously varies from 
year to year and may even have been 
negative in 1986 and 1987 — but some es- 
timates for some years are several bil- 
lion dollars. That is, the ICA has 
involved "stabilization" in both of the 
two senses that I described — reducing 
volatility and artificially raising the 
level. 

Some argue that we should accept 
this transfer of income on the grounds 
that it provides aid to developing coffee- 
producing countries. Such "aid," how- 
ever is indiscriminate — so much so that 
it is fair to doubt whether much of it 
goes to the producing countries them- 
selves. When stocks accumulated in the 
first few years of the current agree- 



ment, many members sold coffee at i 
discount to nonmember countries. 
Some are still doing it, a matter of 
grave concern. 

Through the operation of the two 
tier market, nonmember countries re 
ceive subsidies of several hundred mi 
lion dollars a year: They are the only 
countries that, with certainty, benefi' 
from the operation of the ICA. A sub 
stantial part of the potential benefit 1 
producers from artificially high price.' 
for coffee is simply passed through tc 
nonmembers. Another substantial pa 
was returned to member importing 
countries (and shared with nonmem- 
bers) in 1986 and 1987, when previous 
accumulated stocks were partly work 
off. But this benefit for all importing 
countries was less than member cour 
tries were entitled to, because much 
the stocks that should have been accu 
mulated had been sold earlier at dis- 
counts to nonmembers. In addition, 
even when prices are higher than the 
otherwise would be, this often fails t 
improve welfare in producing countri 
because marketing boards and simila 
arrangements keep the higher prices 
from reaching producers. 

Since the United States first joii 
the ICA in 1962, U.S. per capita con 
sumption of coffee has declined by 4( 
While it is not clear how much of thi 
reduction is due to the ICA, it is 
clear that it certainly did not benefil 
producers. Hence, the net result of 
the ICA for either producer membei 
or consumer members is at best 
problematical. 

What is clear is that the way th; 
the present ICA operates makes nei 
ther economic nor political sense am 
should not continue. The manner of 
eration of a new ICA, to be acceptal 
to the United States, must be more 
market oriented. It must focus on st 
bilizing prices around their free-mar 
trend without raising their average 
level. In sum, it must be both eco- 
nomically beneficial and politically 
realistic. 



Future U.S. Participation in ICA 

For several years, the U.S. delegati 
to meetings of this organization havi 
tried to persuade other delegations 1 
operate the ICA in a manner that 
would do a minimum of violence to t 
play of market forces. We are please 
that there has been some progress, 
must make it clear, however, that th 



> 



nonqrlmonl /if Citato Ri r I lot i n Mam h 






ECONOMICS 



maining problems are so serious that 
ir participation in a new ICA is in 
partly. The two most serious of these 
oblems are the two-tier market — the 
lies to nonmember countries at prices 
■low those paid by member coun- 
ties — and the inability of our industry 
I obtain adequate supplies of the types 
| coffee our consumers prefer. Despite 

BVreat deal of effort, the former prob- 
n, in particular, continues unabated 
Id casts a pall over the negotiations — 
I such an extent that it was a serious 
■jestion in our Administration whether 
len to participate in the present 
|gotiation. 

2 In carrying out our comprehensive 
alysis of the problems in the agree- 
|mt and their possible solutions, we 
1? consulting with major producing 
Id consuming countries, with the sec- 
■l.ariat of this organization, with our 
■mestie industry, and with all inter- 
l.ed departments of the U.S. Govern- 
■■nt. We find wide agreement about 
I? nature of the problems, but so far 
I find no convergence on solutions, 
rge and influential groups both in 
• government and in our private see- 
strongly prefer a free market and 
xtse our participation in this negotia- 
n. Every solution proposed for a new 
eement is adamantly opposed by 
ne group in our government, in our 
ustry, or in other countries. Thus, in 
s negotiation you face a formidable 
k, for it is not clear that a new ICA 
i be devised that can be signed and 
ified by a sufficient number of coun- 
ts, including the United States, to 
ke it viable. 

Despite the disagreements in the 
ited States about what could be 
le, there is unanimous agreement 
t the present ICA has not worked 
eptably well. An acceptable agree- 
nt should focus on reducing price 
atility by withholding supplies when 
ces are exceptionally low and releas- 
supplies when prices are excep- 
nally high, relative to trend. It must 
hew any effort to elevate the price 
>ve the free-market trend. 

Despite the formidable difficulties 
it I have described, I believe that the 
jotiations that are starting here to- 
I can produce a new International 
ffee Agreement that will benefit both 
iducers and consumers. It will have 
be fundamentally different from the 
;sent agreement. So you are setting 
; on a difficult task. Your chances of 
•cess are greater if you understand 
■ difficulties, and face up to them. ■ 



Telecommunications and Economic 
Development in the Caribbean 



by Parker W. Borg 

Address before the conference 
on /he Caribbean, sponsored by the 
Caribbean/Central American Action 
(CCAA) and the Caribbean Telecom- 
munications Council, in Miami on 
NovemberSO, 1!)88. Ambassador Borg 
is Deputy Coordinator and Deputy Di- 
rector of the Bureau of International 
Communications and Information 
Policy. 

My remarks today will focus on one of 
the most important goals of U.S. inter- 
national communications and informa- 
tion policy: expanding the economic and 
social benefits of the information age to 
the developing nations. Telecommunica- 
tions advances offer unprecedented op- 
portunities for countries across the 
globe. There are few other developing 
regions, however, where the impact of 
recent telecommunications technology 
is so evident or where the potential 
for future growth is so great as in the 
Caribbean Basin. In many ways, the 
Caribbean serves as a model for the 
developing world on the effective use 
of telecommunications technologies for 
economic progress. 

Recent telecommunications devel- 
opments in the Caribbean Basin permit 
me to easily cite numerous local exam- 
ples to make a very basic but little- 
recognized point: Efficient telecom- 
munications networks are not luxuries 
reserved for the industrialized world. 
Rather, they are essential elements for 
the economic progress of every nation 
in a competitive world market increas- 
ingly dependent on the latest 
information. 



The Changing Environment 

In the last 10 years, sophisticated tele- 
communications networks have become 
the central nervous system of a new 
service-oriented global economy. Trade 
in services now represents over 30% of 
world trade, and the percentage is in- 
creasing quickly. Today, people are do- 
ing much more than just talking on the 
phone. While voice communications con- 
tinue to dominate our telecommunica- 
tions networks, machine-generated 
traffic is gaining rapidly. In fact, on 
AT&T's U.S. network, data traffic is 



'nartment nf Statp Rnlletin Marrh IPfiQ 



soaring by some 15%-20% per year and 
could well account for half its traffic by 
the mid-1990s. 

The world market for these new 
"value added" or "enhanced" telecom- 
munications services is growing by 20% 
per year, as opposed to 5% for tele- 
phony and telex. The rising value of 
these services is demonstrated by the 
fact that one of the largest U.S. air 
carriers, American Airlines, now earns 
more revenue from its computerized 
reservation service than from its tradi- 
tional airlines business. American Air- 
lines, incidentally, runs much of its high 
volume reservation system from com- 
puters located in the Dominican 
Republic. 

Instantaneous communications have 
created a global financial market in 
which daily transactions exceed $1 tril- 
lion — or about the same as the entire 
annual budget of the U.S. Government. 
Most of these transactions move elec- 
tronically across national borders via 
international computer networks. The 
October 19, 1987, stock market crash— 
which reverberated instantaneously in 
financial markets around the world — 
confirmed how pervasive these net- 
works have become. 

The transformations propelled by 
communications and information tech- 
nologies rank among the most revolu- 
tionary in human history. The U.S. 
Congressional Office of Technology As- 
sessment, in a May 1988 report, noted: 
"The potential productivity gains in this 
area — the movement and organization 
of information — are at least as great as 
those produced when the first Indus- 
trial Revolution began to revolutionize 
productivity in moving and transform- 
ing material objects." 

In today's information age, access 
to ideas — no matter where they are de- 
veloped — is the key to national success. 
Information is as crucial to us as cap- 
ital, geography, and raw materials were 
in the past. As a result, nations are 
recognizing that material well-being in 
the information age requires a freer 
flow of ideas and information. Even 
communist regimes are opening up 
their political systems and promoting 
market-oriented policies in response to 
information age realities. Let me offer 
a quote here. 



17 



ECONOMICS 



The era of the 1980s has ushered in the 
dawn of the Information Age. The combi- 
nation of digital telecommunications fibre 
optics and computers have brought civiliza- 
tion to the threshold of the third tech- 
nological revolution. The synergistic 
effects of these for us are simply mind bog- 
gling. The potential impact on our 
way of living is staggering and infinite. 

Which futurist am I quoting here? 
Neither an American nor a European, 
but a citizen of the Caribbean Basin, 
the Honorable Dr. Keith Mitchel, 
Minister of Utilities of Grenada, who 
spoke these words earlier this month 
at the second annual meeting of the 
CARICOM [Caribbean Community 
and Common Market] ministers of 
telecommunication. 

Telecommunications and 
Economic Development 

What do these dramatic changes mean 
for the developing world in general and 
the Caribbean nations in particular? I 
would like to make three points here. 

First, while universal service must 
certainly remain a priority for all coun- 
tries — industrialized and developing — 
providing the fastest, most modern 
telecommunications system for urban 
and industrial areas should not be over- 
looked. Just as good harbors, fertile 
soil, and mineral w r ealth were critical 
resources for past economic develop- 
ment, good telephone connections with 
the outside world will be among the 
most important resources of the infor- 
mation age. Those states with the best 
telecommunications will have a distinct 
advantage over any neighbor who fails 
to exploit this basic resource of the 
information age. 

This business-oriented side of the 
telecommunication picture should be 
recognized for what it is — an engine of 
economic growth, increased employ- 
ment, and more revenues to pay for 
other development needs, such as the 
extension of universal service, but in- 
cluding also housing, education, and 
health care. Telecommunications offer 
more bang for scarce bucks, because 
improved technology has actually 
brought down the cost of providing and 
maintaining telecommunications serv- 
ices. Recent economic studies on the 
relationship between telecommunica- 
tions availability and economic growth 
in the Philippines and Costa Rica 
established cost-benefit ratios of over 
5 to 1 and in some sectors 48 to 1. 



A modern telecommunications in- 
frastructure is also a magnet for much 
needed foreign investment, since the 
burgeoning telecommunications service 
providers and users invariably seek to 
operate in countries with high-quality 
telecommunications networks and a lib- 
eral regulatory climate. In addition, the 
rapidity of telecommunications ad- 
vances has made it possible for many 
nations to "leapfrog" technology. It is 
not only possible, but logical, for coun- 
tries to move to the latest equipment 
and systems without investing in the 
intermediary stages that evolved in in- 
dustrialized countries. 

Second, competition tends to pro- 
duce more options for the demanding 
users of today. New telecommunications 
services and technologies — from per- 
sonal computers, automated teller ma- 
chines, telefax machines, data bases, 
digital private networks, and comput- 
erized airline reservation systems — are 
revolutionizing the way we do business. 
The traditional telecommunications mo- 
nopolies lack both the vision and the 
resources to offer the variety of serv- 
ices that are now available and at the 
low costs required by a dynamic busi- 
ness sector. 

Many countries are concluding, 
therefore, as we did some time ago in 
the United States, that telecommunica- 
tions is no longer a natural monopoly. 
In addition to the United States, which 
broke up AT&T in 1984, the United 
Kingdom and Japan have both pri- 
vatized their former telecommunica- 
tions monopolies and allowed a 
competitor in basic telephone services. 
The list of countries which have opened 
their markets to competition in termin- 
al equipment and the provision of en- 
hanced services is growing significantly 
as a result of the European Commu- 
nity's "Green Paper," which is to 
be fully implemented by 1992. The 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic 
of Germany are both already well into 
the process of liberalizing their tele- 
communications monopolies. These 
countries are finding that competition 
not only brings down costs but in- 
creases the variety of services offered. 

Third, some countries are discover- 
ing that privatization can offer advan- 
tages beyond those brought by competi- 
tion. Many states are finding that a 
private company not only can offer 
more innovative services but also can 
overcome many of the management 
difficulties that plague government 
bureaucracies. Privatization can also 



garner revenue for hard-pressed na- 
tional budgets. By the same token, p: 
vatizing a telecommunications entity ; 
an excellent way to access capital for 
development purposes, since the pri- 
vatized company can tap commercial 
lending sources. Jamaica, for exampk 
sold 29% of its state telephone compa 
to Cable & Wireless last year, gainin 
$55 million for its national treasury a 
expanding its credit possibilities. 

I am not suggesting here the sui 
render of national sovereignty over tl 
telecommunications sector to foreign 
terests but rather the recognition th; 
external capital should not be over- 
looked in this process. I understand 
that other Caribbean Basin countries 
which have either privatized their te 
communications administrations or a 
seriously studying the advantages in 
elude the Dominican Republic, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Grenada, Trinidad 
and Tobago, and Belize. 

In spite of the frequently cited 
benefits, many countries continue to 
place their highest priority on protei 
ing the revenue streams of their tele 
communications monopolies. Others 
fear that investment in sophisticated 
telecommunications for the business 
community will siphon resources aw; 
from basic telephone services. Thest 
nations are shortsighted. Their neig 
bors who give liberalized telecom- 
munications approaches a high prior 
in economic planning are the ones m> 
likely to succeed in the years ahead. 

Caribbean Examples 

The Caribbean Basin has been bless 
with leaders who have recognized tl 
long-term potential of telecommunic 
tions to their economies. Consequer 
some Caribbean states have moved 1 
the very cutting edge of the informs 
tion revolution. Undersea optical fib 
cables, for instance, were originally 
conceived for very heavy traffic rout 
in the industrialized north. Howevei 
the middle of 1990, the Caribbean w 
have use of the 2,400-mile-long, $13( 
million trans-Caribbean fiber optic c 
ble (TCS-1), which will dramatically 
crease the total capacity for voice at 
data traffic. The high-capacity TCS- 
(jointly owned by AT&T and 11 othe 
communications companies) will link 
the United States, Puerto Rico, Ja- 
maica, the Dominican Republic, and 
Colombia. Its enormous capacity sh> 
spur lower telecommunications costs 
and wider options for service provid 
and users in the region. 



ECONOMICS 



I Even before this fiber optic cable 
fcs into operation, the region will 
re advanced telecommunications net- 
rks joining the Caribbean with the 
ited States, Canada, and Europe, es- 
•ially for the switching of large pack- 
of data. Already, a growing number 
iata entry firms operate in the re- 
n but have relied until recently on 
lensive air shipping of documents 
1 computer disks. A much faster and 
5 expensive delivery mode will be 
liable as teleports enter the scene, 
jse groupings of satellite earth sta- 
is near business centers will speed 
processing in the Caribbean of air- 
i and credit card coupons; the typing 
tddress labels; and the typesetting of 
nuscripts, novels, and telephone 
ectories. 

An educated workforce and salary 
;ls of about 301 of those in the 
ited States promise to make these 
rations in the Caribbean a major 
rce of foreign investment and new 
3 well into the next decade. Accord- 
to a recent study commissioned by 
Agency for International Develop- 
it (AID), the number of Caribbean 
•kers employed in the data entry in- 
itry will grow from the current 3,500 
:0,000 in the 1990s. 
The first of the new teleport opera- 
s, called "Jamaica Digiport Interna- 
al," began operations recently in 
Montego Bay free zone. The $8 mil- 
venture is owned jointly by AT&T, 
le & Wireless, and Telecommunica- 
s of Jamaica. The data entry indus- 
already employs 2,000 people in 
aica. That number should jump as 
suit of "Digiport," which will ini- 
y transmit data and voice signals 
INTELSAT [International Telecom- 
lications Satellite Organization] sat- 
es but will switch to fiber optic 
e when TSC-1 comes on line, 
dport" should attract other infor- 
ion businesses besides data entry 
s. For example, toll-free tele- 
keting services, such as airline 
rvations or customer assistance, 
d be easily handled there. This 
k could create as many as 10,000 
for the island within 5 years, ac- 
ing to projections by AT&T and 
aican officials. 

Enhanced telecommunications serv- 
are also fueling foreign investment 
economic development in the Do- 
ican Republic. The Dominican Tele- 
le Company, CODETEL, and 
ibbean Data Services, a subsidiary 
merican Airlines, have reportedly 
sted $8 million in a data entry park 



at the privately owned San Isidro free 
zone, which will house a teleport. West- 
inghouse also has plans to establish a 
plant for data entry and digitized draw- 
ings in the free zone. The multiplier 
effect of these operations has already 
spilled over into other sectors of the 
economy, causing CODETEL to double 
its number of employees since late 1985. 
In 1988, the company expects to add 
between 500 and 800 new employees, 
and employment is expected to grow at 
a similar rate in the future. 

Barbados is likewise upgrading its 
growing data services sector, already 
the most advanced in the eastern Car- 
ibbean. The Caribbean data entry busi- 
ness actually started in Barbados 28 
years ago, but until 1984, the industry 
remained tiny. That year, American 
Airlines started its Caribbean data 
services operation, which grew quickly 
and now employs almost 300 people. 
The 12 data processing firms in Bar- 
bados employ close to 1,000 workers. 
The sector created more than 200 new- 
jobs during the first 6 months of this 
year. In the coming months, the Bar- 
bados Industrial Development Corpora- 
tion plans to open a specialized 
complex, which will include a teleport 
catering to offshore data processors. 

While a few U.S. companies, such 
as American Airlines, have established 
their own data entry firms in the Car- 
ibbean, most farm out work to local en- 
trepreneurs at some 40 computer 
centers on a half-dozen islands. One 
such entrepreneur, Lennox Robinson of 
Jamaica, invested $50,000 for 11 IBM 
personal computers in 1984. Today, his 
firm has contracts from a half-dozen 
U.S. companies, employs 160 workers 
in 3 shifts, and is still growing. 

Part of this success story is due to 
geography. Some of our neighbors be- 
lieve that living next to the United 
States is like being in bed with an 
elephant. Any move by the elephant, 
no matter how amorous, tends to cause 
some damage. In telecommunications, 
this is not the case. Because of its 
closeness to the United States, the Car- 
ibbean Basin is ideally situated to take 
advantage of the opportunities which 
satellite and computer technologies pro- 
vide. The irregular shape of the United 
States and the location of geostationary 
orbits cause the footprint of U.S. do- 
mestic broadcast satellites to cover the 
Caribbean, which can take advantage of 
the coverage. In addition to its prox- 
imity to the world's largest market, 



most of the Caribbean shares a common 
language with the United States. While 
I am thinking mainly of English, Span- 
ish is fast becoming our second lan- 
guage. In fact, with over 19 million 
people of Hispanic descent, the United 
States is well on its way to becoming 
one of the larger Spanish-speaking 
countries in the world. 

At the same time, it must be noted 
that technology is making geography 
less relevant. Access to computer infor- 
mation banks and high-speed data flows 
can make an enterprise in Nassau as 
competitive as one in Los Angeles or 
Sydney. A banana grower near Port 
Antonio can call up any article from the 
National Agricultural Library in Wash- 
ington. Within the Caribbean, too, 
members of CONCARID, a regional 
computer cooperative network, can find 
successful development models to emu- 
late. Reportedly, one-half of the farm- 
ers in Dominica successfully diversified 
their crops following a model identified 
by CONCARID, making Dominica less 
dependent on its primary crop, bananas. 

U.S. Government Role 

So far, I have talked about how the 
governments in the region and the pri- 
vate sector have joined hands to stimu- 
late economic development through 
telecommunications. What is the U.S. 
Government role in this process? We at 
the Department of State's Bureau of In- 
ternational Communications and Infor- 
mation Policy — in close coordination 
with the Department of Commerce, the 
Federal Communications Commission, 
and other U.S. Government agencies — 
are working both bilaterally and multi- 
laterally to ensure that the new tech- 
nology makes its full contribution to 
developing as well as developed 
countries. 

On the multilateral front, we coor- 
dinate U.S. participation in the Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the principal forum for the set- 
ting of international telecommunications 
standards and management of the inter- 
national radio spectrum. We confront 
an immediate test at the ITU's World 
Administrative Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Conference (WATTC), which will 
have significant implications for the 
Caribbean Basin. WATTC, which began 
2 days ago in Melbourne, Australia, 
will set the future regulatory frame- 
work for new international network- 
based telecommunications services. 
These include the data networks and 



artment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



19 



ECONOMICS 



other services sparking economic devel- 
opment in the Caribbean. We believe 
that the framework for these services 
should be as flexible as possible to al- 
low technology to develop unhindered 
by cumbersome ITU regulations. 

Some other nations with strong 
telecommunications monopolies favor 
bringing the new services under the 
same kind of ITU regulations as those 
for traditional voice services. Because 
the outcome of WATTC could have 
important implications for the flourish- 
ing telecommunications services in the 
Caribbean Basin, we are hopeful that 
Caribbean governments will recognize 
this interest and support the flexible 
approaches proposed by the United 
States and other liberalizing countries. 

In recent years, the ITU has taken 
on increasing responsibility for commu- 
nications development. Its Technical 
Cooperation Department has been mo- 
bilizing technical cooperation for nearly 
three decades. As a result of the 1985 
Maitland commission report, the ITU 
established the Center for Telecom- 
munications Development in Geneva. 
ITU communications development pro- 
grams have provided tangible benefits 
for the Caribbean Basin. The ITU's 
communications development programs 
will be on the table — as well as all of its 
other activities — at the May^June 1989, 
ITU plenipotentiary conference in Nice, 
France. At this conference, we will pro- 
pose ways to make the ITU's communi- 
cations development programs more 
effective. In particular, we believe that 
the Center for Telecommunications De- 
velopment needs to define its special 
role better and focus its activities on 
high-priority initiatives. I encourage 
Caribbean leaders to also take a hard 
look at these programs and work with 
us to improve them. 

In preparation for the plenipotenti- 
ary conference, we are updating a 1984 
AID-sponsored study of U.S. Govern- 
ment contributions to communications 



development and are cataloging for the 
first time a representative sample of 
the various private sector contribu- 
tions. In addition to providing some 
surprising statistics, this study should 
serve as a useful reference which Car- 
ibbean and other developing countries 
can use to identify previously unex- 
plored sources of assistance. 

Bilaterally, the U.S. Government 
will continue to work closely with in- 
dustry, Caribbean government leaders, 
and major international financing in- 
stitutions — such as the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the Export-Import Bank — to pro- 
mote pragmatic and innovative uses of 
telecommunications in this region. I 
might mention that the State Depart- 
ment coordinated the bilateral negotia- 
tions in 1984-85 which led to trans- 
border satellite agreements with a ma- 
jority of the countries in the Caribbean 
Basin. These agreements have allowed 
the region to exploit the spill-over cov- 
erage by U.S. domestic satellites. 

The State Department has also 
coordinated the consultations in 
INTELSAT for the first U.S. com- 
petitive satellite system separate from 
INTELSAT. We believe that this lim- 
ited competition with INTELSAT will 
foster lower costs and new services. In 
October of this year, the INTELSAT 
Assembly of Parties approved service 
by the first such system, PANAMSAT, 
to the Dominican Republic and Costa 
Rica. 

One of our key objectives is to 
kindle greater interest by the U.S. pri- 
vate sector in the developing world. 
Congress has been very supportive of 
our efforts. This year, for instance, 
thanks to the leadership of Con- 
gressman Dante Fascell, Chairman of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
the State Department received a spe- 
cial 1988 allocation of $250,000 to pro- 
mote communications development. We 
will be receiving a similar allocation in 
fiscal year (FY) 1989. We assigned most 
of the'FY 1988 allocation to the ITU 
Center for Telecommunications 
Development. 



Another part of the 1988 allocatioi 
went to the U.S. Telecommunications 
Training Institute (USTTI) to develop 
pilot project to export its highly suc- 
cessful training program to telecom- 
munications training institutes in the 
developing world. This important trail 
ing institute, which relies in great pai 
on free training programs offered by 
U.S. companies, has trained 1,431 ex- 
perts from more than 108 countries in 
the last 6 years. Over one-fourth of 
these, a total of 367, have been from 
the Caribbean Basin. USTTI is an ex 
cellent example of the commitment of 
U.S. industry to communications 
development. 

Nonetheless, U.S. industry is oft 
too wedded to its quarterly balance 
sheets. It must take a longer term aj: 
proach to the Third World, an approa 
which recognizes that in spite of fre- 
quently reported problems, these are 
vast new markets for tomorrow. I am 
happy to observe that, in the case of 
the Caribbean Basin, American indus 
try seems to have awakened to some 
of the market opportunities in 
telecommunications. 

The growth of data entry and otl 
services supported by telecommunica 
tions has been one of the outstanding 
success stories of the region since th< 
beginning of the Caribbean Basin Ini 
tiative (CBI). These ventures repress 
the kind of synergism embodied in tr 
CBI — a synergism based on our inex 
tricably linked political and economic 
destinies. Because of this common dt 
tiny, the United States will continue 
seek sustained Caribbean Basin eco- 
nomic development and strengthenec 
democratic institutions. Telecommun 
cations, we believe, will play an in- 
creasingly vital role in that process. 



20 



Department of State Bulletin/March 1'H 



EUROPE 



CSCE Follow-Up Meeting Held in Vienna 



The follow-up meeting of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) was held in Vienna 
November ;. WSti-Januaiii 17. 1989. 



Following is the text of the con- 
cluding document, Secretary Shultz's 
address at the closing session of that 

meet i lit/, anil i he Secretary's news 
conferenct . 



Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of 

Representatives of the Participating States of the 

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 

Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act 

Relating to the Follow-up to the Conference 



The representatives of the participating 
States of the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Austria. 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, 
Czechoslovakia. Denmark, Finland, 
France, the German Democratic Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland. Ireland, 
Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America 
and Yugoslavia met in Vienna from 4 
November 1986 to 19 January 1989 in accord- 
ance with the provisions of the Final Act 
relating to the Follow-up to the Confer- 
ence, as well as on the basis of the other 
relevant CSCE documents. 

The participants were addressed on 4 
November 1986 by the Austrian Federal 
Chancellor. 

Opening statements were made by all 
Heads of Delegations among whom were 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers of many 
participating States. Some Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs addressed the Meeting also 
at later stages. 

The participants were addressed by a 
representative of the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations. Contributions were 
made by representatives of the United Na- 
tions Economic Commission for Europe 
ECE) and UNESCO (UN Educational, 
Scientific & Cultural Organization). 

Contributions were also made by the 
following non-participating Mediterranean 
States: Algeria, Egypt. Israel, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. 

The representatives of the participat- 
ing States reaffirmed their commitment to 
die CSCE process and underlined its es- 
sential role in increasing confidence, in 
opening up new ways for cooperation, in 
promoting respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and thus strength- 
ening international security. 



The participating States welcomed the 
favourable developments in the interna- 
tional situation since the conclusion of the 
Madrid Meeting in 1983 and expressed 
their satisfaction that the CSCE process 
has contributed to these developments. 
Noting the intensification of political 
dialogue among them and the important 
progress in negotiations on military se- 
curity and disarmament, they agreed that 
renewed efforts should be undertaken to 
consolidate these positive trends and to 
achieve a substantial further improvement 
of their mutual relations. Accordingly, they 
reaffirmed their resolve to implement fully, 
unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally 
all the provisions of the Final Act and of 
the other CSCE documents. 

As provided for in the agenda of the 
Vienna Meeting, the representatives of the 
participating States held a thorough ex- 
change of views both on the implementa- 
tion of the provisions of the Final Act, and 
the Madrid Concluding Document and of 
the tasks defined by the Conference, as 
well as, in the context of the questions 
dealt with by the latter, on the deepening 
of their mutual relations, the improve- 
ments of security and the development of 
cooperation in Europe and the development 
of the process of detente in the future. 

During this exchange of views the par- 
ticipating States examined thoroughly and 
in detail the implementation of the Final 
Act and of the Madrid Concluding Docu- 
ment. Different and at times contradictory 
opinions were expressed about the extent 
of the realization of these commitments. 
While encouraging developments were 
noted in many areas, the participants criti- 
cized the continuing serious deficiencies in 
the implementation of these documents. 

An open and frank discussion was held 
about the application of and respect for the 
principles of the Final Act. Concern was 
expressed about serious violations of a 



number of these principles. In particular, 
questions relating to respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms were the 
locus of intensive and controversial discus- 
sion. The participating States agreed that 
full respect for the principles, in all their 
aspects, is essential for the improvement of 
their mutual relations. 

The implementation of the provisions 
of the Final Act concerning confidence- 
building measures, co-operation in the field 
of economics, of science and technology and 
of environment, concerning questions re- 
lating to security and cooperation in the 
Mediterranean as well as concerning co- 
operation in humanitarian and other fields 
was discussed. The implementation of the 
provisions of the Madrid Concluding Docu- 
ment and of other CSCE documents was 
also discussed. It was considered that the 
numerous possibilities offered by the Final 
Act had not been sufficiently utilized. 

The participating States also ex- 
pressed concern about the spread of ter- 
rorism and condemned it unreservedly. 

The discussion reflected the broader 
context of the CSCE process and con- 
firmed the importance of taking into ac- 
count its world dimension in implementing 
the provisions of the Final Act. 

In their deliberations the represen- 
tatives of the participating States took into 
account the results of 

• the Stockholm Conference on Confi- 
dence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe; 

• the Athens Meeting of Experts in 
order to pursue the examination and elab- 
oration of a generally acceptable method 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
aimed at complementing existing methods; 

• the Venice Seminar on Economic, 
Scientific and Cultural Co-operation in 
the Mediterranean; 

• the Ottawa Meeting of Experts on 
Questions concerning Respect, in their 
States, for Human Rights and Fundamen- 
tal Freedoms, in all their Aspects, as em- 
bodied in the Final Act; 

• the Budapest "Cultural Forum"; 

• the Bern Meeting of Experts on Hu- 
man Contacts. 

The participating States moreover 
noted that the tenth anniversary of the 
signing of the Final Act had been commem- 
orated at Helsinki on 1 August 1985. 

The participating States reaffirmed 
their commitment to the continuation of 
the CSCE process as agreed to in the 
chapter on the Follow-up to the Conference 
contained in the Final Act. Recognizing 



21 



EUROPE 



the need for balanced progress in all sec- 
tions of the Final Act. they expressed their 
determination also to benefit from new 
opportunities for their cooperation and 
reached corresponding decisions concern- 
ing follow-up activities. 

The representatives of the participat- 
ing States examined all the proposals sub- 
mitted to the Meeting and agreed on the 
following: 



Questions Relating to Security 
in Europe 



The participating States express their 
determination 

• to build on the current positive de- 
velopments in their relations in order to 
make detente a viable, comprehensive and 
genuine process, universal in scope; 

• to assume their responsibility fully to 
implement the commitments contained in 
the Final Act and other CSCE documents; 



• to intensify their efforts to seek solu- 
tions to problems burdening their relations 
and to strengthen safeguards for interna- 
tional peace and security; 

• to promote cooperation and dialogue 
among them, to ensure the effective exer- 
cise of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and to facilitate contacts and 
communication between people; 

• to exert new efforts to make further 
progress to strengthen confidence and 
security and to promote disarmament. 



Principles 

1. The participating States reaffirm their 
commitment to all ten principles of the Fi- 
nal Act's Declaration on Principles Guiding 
Relations between Participating States and 
their determination to respect them and 
put them into practice. The participating 
States reaffirm that all these Principles are 
of primary significance and, accordingly, 
will be equally and unreservedly applied, 
each of them being interpreted taking into 
account the others. 

2. They stress that respect for and full 



President Reagan's 
Message 



It is my great pleasure to be able to 
mark the accomplishment of another 
significant milestone in the history of 
the Conference on Security and Cooper- 
ation in Europe — the conclusion in 
Vienna of the third follow-up meeting of 
the CSCE. 

The Vienna meeting demonstrates 
again the importance of the process 
which began with the historic signing of 
the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. It is 
clear that what started as a forum for 
35 nations to express their hopes and 
concerns for reducing tensions in Eu- 
rope has become a process dedicated to 
the strengthening of peace, human 
rights and economic cooperation among 
all participants. The CSCE process is 
now an integral part of the landscape of 
Europe and North America. It serves 
as a standard for measuring progress 
toward the goal of ensuring human dig- 
nity and the rights of individuals every- 
where. Furthermore, it gives us a way 
of judging how each country has met 
these standards. It stimulates efforts to 
improve working conditions and safe- 
guard the environment. It continues to 
serve as a means to reduce tensions in 
Europe, as demonstrated by the up- 
coming negotiations on Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures, which will 



build upon the successes in Stockholm 
of the first CDE [Conference on Confi- 
dence- and Security-Building Measures 
and Disarmament in Europe] confer- 
ence. With the conclusion of the Vienna 
meeting, an autonomous negotiation on 
conventional stability will also begin 
within the framework of the CSCE 
process in order to address the im- 
balance in conventional forces which 
constitutes the core of the security 
problem in Europe. 

The CSCE process is significant 
not only for its lofty goals but also for 
the practical benefits it has brought. 
Implementation of commitments, while 
still uneven in many countries, has im- 
proved dramatically. This new docu- 
ment can stimulate more effective 
implementation because it provides 
sharply focused standards and offers a 
balanced program of meetings to en- 
courage further progress in human 
rights, economic and scientific coopera- 
tion and European security. 

With effective implementation, the 
Conference on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe can make further his- 
toric contributions to the lives of people 
in Europe. 

Ronald Reagan 



application of these principles, as well : 
strict compliance with all CSCE commit- 
ments deriving from them, are of great p<r 
litical importance and essential for buildir: 
confidence and security as well as for the 
development of their friendly relations an 
of their cooperation in all fields. 

3. In this context, they confirm that 
they will respect each other's right freely 
to choose and develop their political, so- 
cial, economic and cultural systems as we 
as their right to determine their laws, rea 
illations, practices and policies. In exer- 
cising these rights, they will ensure that 
their laws, regulations, practices and pol- 
icies conform with their obligations under 
international law and are brought into hai 
mony with the provisions of the Declara- 
tion on Principles and other CSCE 
commitments. 

4. They also confirm that, by virtue o 
the principle of equal rights and self-dete 
mination of peoples and in conformity wit 
the relevant provisions of the Final Act, a 
peoples always have the right, in full free 
dom, to determine, when and as they wig 
their internal and external political statu; 
without external interference, and to pur 
sue as they wish their political, economic 
social and cultural development. 

5. They confirm their commitment 
strictly and effectively to observe the pri 
ciple of the territorial integrity of States 
They will refrain from any violation of th 
principle and thus from any action aimed 
by direct or indirect means, in contraven 
tion of the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, other obli- 
gations under international law or the 
provisions of the Final Act, at violating t 
territorial integrity, political independen 
or the unity of a State. No actions or siti, 
tions in contravention of this principle w: 
be recognized as legal by the participatii 
States. 

6. The participating States confirm 
their commitment to the principle of pea 
ful settlement of disputes, convinced tha 
it is an essential complement to the duty 
States to refrain from the threat or use ( 
force, both being essential factors for th< 
maintenance and consolidation of peace a 
security. They express their determinate 
to pursue continuous efforts to examine 
and elaborate, on the basis of the relevai 
provisions of the Final Act and the Madr 
Concluding Document, and taking into ai 
count the reports of the meetings of ex- 
perts in Montreux and Athens, a genera 
acceptable method for the peaceful settle 
ment of disputes aimed at complementim 
existing methods. In this context they ai 
cept, in principle, the mandatory involve 
ment of a third party when a dispute 
cannot be settled by other peaceful mear 

7. In order to ensure the progressive 
implementation of this commitment, in- 
cluding, as a first step, the mandatory 
involvement of a third party in the 
settlement of certain categories of dis- 
putes, they decide to convene a Meeting 
of Experts in Valletta from 15 January t( 



22 



February 1991 to establish a list of such 
itegories and the related procedures and 
lechanisms. This list would be subject to 
ibsequent gradual extension. The Meet- 
ig will also consider the possibility of 
itablishing mechanisms for arriving at 
'nding third-party decisions. The next 
SCE Follow-up Meeting will assess the 
rogress achieved at the Meeting of Ex- 
>rts. The agenda, timetable and other 
■ganizational modalities are set out in 
nnex I. 

8. The participating states unreserv- 
lly condemn, as criminal, all acts, meth- 
Is and practices of terrorism, wherever 
id by whomever committed, including 
ose which jeopardize friendly relations 
nong States and their security, and agree 
at terrorism cannot be justified under 

ly circumstances. 

9. They express their determination to 
jrk for the eradication of terrorism both 
laterally and through muiltilateral co-op- 
ation, particularly in such international 
ra as the United Nations, the Interna- 
mal Civil Aviation Organization and the 
ternational Maritime Organization and in 
cordance with the relevant provisions of 
e Final Act and the Madrid Concluding 
icument. 

10. Convinced of the need to combine 
?asures at a national level with rein- 
Ted international cooperation, the par- 
ipating States express their intention 

10.1 • to pursue a policy of firmness in 
iponse to terrorist demands; 

10.2 • to reinforce and develop bilateral 
I multilateral co-operation among them- 
ives in order to prevent and combat ter- 
•ism as well as to increase efficiency in 
-sting co-operation at the bilateral level 
lin the framework of groups of State, 
luding, as appropriate, through the ex- 
inge of information; 

10.3 • to prevent on their territories 
gal activities of persons, groups or or- 
lizations that instigate, organize or en- 
£e in the perpetration of acts of 
rorism or subversive or other activities 
ected towards the violent overthrow of 

regime of another participating State; 

10.4 • to take effective measures for 
prevention and suppression of acts of 

trorism directed at diplomatic or coll- 
ar representatives and against terrorism 
olving violations of the Vienna Conven- 
ns on Diplomatic and Consular Rela- 
:s, in particular their provisions 
ating to diplomatic and consular priv- 
fes and immunities; 

10.5 • to ensure the extradition or 
isecution of persons implicated in ter- 
ist acts and to cooperate closely in cases 
conflict of jurisdiction where several 
Ites are concerned, acting in both re- 
ets in accordance with the relevant in- 
national agreements; 

10.6 • to consider becoming parties, if 
y have not yet done so, to the relevant 
jrnational conventions relating to the 
pression of acts of terrorism; 



10.7 • to continue to work in the appro- 
priate international bodies in order to im- 
prove and extend measures against 
terrorism and to ensure that the relevant 
agreements are accepted and acted upon 
by as many States as possible. 

11. They confirm that they will respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, con- 
science, religion or belief, for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or re- 
ligion. They also confirm the universal sig- 
nificance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, respect for which is an essential 
factor for the peace, justice and security 
necessary to ensure the development of 
friendly relations and co-operation among 
themselves, as among all States. 

12. They express their determination 
to guarantee the effective exercise of hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms, all 
of which derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person and are essential for 
his free and full development. They recog- 
nize that civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and other rights and freedoms are 
all of paramount importance and must be 
fully realized by all appropriate means. 

13. In this context they will 

13.1 • develop their laws, regulations 
and policies in the field of civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and other human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and put 
them into practice in order to guarantee 
the effective exercise of these rights and 
freedoms; 

13.2 • consider acceding to the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Op- 
tional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and other relevant in- 
ternational instruments, if they have not 
yet done so; 

13.3 • publish and disseminate the text 
of the Final Act, of the Madrid Concluding 
Document and of the present Document as 
well as those of any relevant international 
instruments in the field of human rights, in 
order to ensure the availability of these 
documents in their entirety, to make them 
known as widely as possible and to render 
them accessible to all individuals in their 
countries, in particular through public li- 
brary systems; 

13.4 • effectively ensure the right of 
the individual to know and act upon his 
rights and duties in this field, and to that 
end publish and make accessible all laws, 
regulations and procedures relating to hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms; 

13.5 • respect the right of their cit- 
izens to contribute actively, individually or 
in association with others, to the promo- 
tion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 

13.6 • encourage in schools and other 
educational institutions consideration of 
the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; 



EUROPE 



13.7 • ensure human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms to everyone within their 
territory and subject to their jurisdiction, 
without distinction of any kind such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi- 
cal or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status; 

13.8 • ensure that no individual exer- 
cising, expressing the intention to exercise 
or seeking to exercise these rights and 
freedoms, or any member of his family, will 
as a consequence be discriminated against 
in any manner; 

13.9 • ensure that effective remedies as 
well as full information about them are 
available to those who claim that their hu- 
man rights and fundamental freedoms have 
been violated; they will, inter alia, effec- 
tively apply the following remedies; 

• the right of the individual to ap- 
peal to executive, legislative, judicial or 
administrative organs; 

• the right to a fair and public hear- 
ing within a reasonable time before an 
independent and impartial tribunal, includ- 
ing the right to present legal arguments 
and to be represented by legal counsel of 
one's choice; 

• the right to be promptly and offi- 
cially informed of the decision taken on 
any appeal, including the legal grounds on 
which this decision w-as based. This infor- 
mation will be provided as a rule in writing 
and, in any event, in a way that will enable 
the individual to make effective use of fur- 
ther available remedies. 

14. The participating States recognize 
that the promotion of economic, social, cul- 
tural rights as well as of civil and political 
rights is of paramount importance for hu- 
man dignity and for the attainment of the 
legitimate aspirations of every individual. 
They will therefore continue their efforts 
with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of economic, social and' cul- 
tural rights by all appropriate means, in- 
cluding in particular by the adoption of 
legislative measures. 

In this context they will pay special 
attention to problems in the areas of em- 
ployment, housing, social security, health, 
education and culture. They will promote 
constant progress in the realization of all 
rights and freedoms within their countries, 
as well as in the development of their rela- 
tions among themselves and with other 
States, so that everyone will actually enjoy 
to the full his economic, social and cultural 
rights as well as his civil and political 
rights. 

15. The participating States confirm 
their determination to ensure equal rights 
of men and women. Accordingly, they will 
take all measures necessary, including leg- 
islative measures, to promote equally ef- 
fective participation of men and women in 
political, economic, social and cultural life. 
They will consider the possibility of acced- 
ing to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 



EUROPE 



if they have not yet clone so. 

16. In order to ensure the freedom of 
the individual to profess and practice re- 
ligion or belief the participating States 
will, inter alia, 

16.1 • take effective measures to pre- 
vent and eliminate discrimination against 
individuals or communities, on the grounds 
of religion or belief in the recognition, ex- 
ercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural life, 
and ensure the effective equality between 
believers and non-believers; 

16.2 • foster a climate of mutual toler- 
ance and respect between believers of dif- 
ferent communities as well as between 
believers and non-believers; 

16.3 • grant upon their request to com- 
munities of believers, practising or pre- 
pared to practise their faith within the 
constitutional framework of their States, 
recognition of the status provided for them 
in their respective countries; 

16.4 • respect the right of religious 
communities to 

• establish and maintain freely ac- 
cessible places of worship or assembly; 

• organize themselves according to 
their own hierarchical and institutional 
structure; 

• select, appoint and replace their 
personnel in accordance with their respec- 
tive requirements and standards as well 
as with any freely accepted arrangement 
between them and their State; 

• solicit and receive voluntary finan- 
cial and other contributions; 

16.5 • engage in consultations with re- 
ligious faiths, institutions and organiza- 
tions in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the requirements of 
religious freedom; 

16.6 • respect the right of everyone to 
give and receive religious education in the 
language of his choice, individually or in 
association with others; 

16.7 • in this context respect, inter 
alia, the liberty of parents to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their 
children in conformity with their own 
convictions; 

16.8 • allow the training of religious 
personnel in appropriate institutions; 

16.9 • respect the right of individual 
believers and communities of believers to 
acquire, possess and use sacred books, re- 
ligious publications in the language of their 
choice and other articles and materials re- 
lated to the practice of religion or belief; 

16.10 • allow religious faiths, institu- 
tions and organizations to produce and im- 
port and disseminate religious publications 
and materials; 

16.11 • favorably consider the interest 
of religious communities in participating in 
public dialogue, through mass media. 

17. The participating States recognize 
that the exercise of the above mentioned 
rights relating to the freedom of religion or 
belief may be subject only to such limita- 



24 



tions as are provided by law and consistent 
with their obligations under international 
law and with their international commit- 
ments. They will ensure in their laws and 
regulations and in their application the full 
and effective implementation of the free- 
dom of thought, conscience, religion or 
belief. 

18. The participating States will exert 
sustained efforts to implement the provi- 
sions of the Final Act and of the Madrid 
Concluding Document pertaining to na- 
tional minorities. They will take all the 
necessary legislative, administrative, judi- 
cial and other measures and apply the rele- 
vant international instruments by which 
they may be bound, to ensure the protec- 
tion of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms of persons belonging to national 
minorities within their territory. They will 
refrain from any discrimination against 
such persons and contribute to the realiza- 
tion of their legitimate interests and aspi- 
rations in the field of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 

19. They will protect and create condi- 
tions for the promotion of the ethnic, cul- 
tural, linguistic and religious identity of 
national minorities on their territory. They 
will respect the free exercise of rights by 
persons belonging to such minorities and 
ensure their full equality with others. 

20. The participating States will re- 
spect fully the right of everyone 

• to freedom of movement and resi- 
dence within the borders of each State, 
and 

• to leave any country, including his 
own, and to return to his country. 

21. The participating States will ensure 
that the exercise of the above mentioned 
rights shall not be subject to any restric- 
tions except to those which are provided 
by law and consistent with their obliga- 
tions under international, in particular the 
International Covenant on Civil and Politi- 
cal Rights and their international com- 
mitments, in particular the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. These re- 
strictions have the character of exceptions. 
The participating States will ensure that 
these restrictions are not abused and are 
not applied in an arbitrary manner, but in 
such a way that the effective exercise of 
these rights is ensured. 

22. In this context they will allow all 
refugees who so desire to return in safety 
to their homes. 

2:!. The participating States will 

23.1 • ensure that no one shall be sub- 
jected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile; 

23.2 • ensure that all individuals in de- 
tention or incarceration will be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person; 

23.3 • observe the UN Standard Mini- 
mum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
as well as the UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials; 



23.4 • prohibit torture and other crus 
inhuman or degrading treatment or puny 
ment and take effective legislative, admit 
istrative, judicial and other measures to 
prevent and punish such practices; 

23.5 • consider acceding to the Con- 
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, if they have not yet done so 

23.6 • protect individuals from any 
psychiatric or other medical practices th: 
violate human rights and fundamental fn 
doms and take effective measures to pre- 
vent and punish such practices. 

24. With regard to the question of ca 
ital punishment, the participating States 
note that capital punishment has been 
abolished in a number of them. In par- 
ticipating States where capital punishme 
has not been abolished, sentence of deat 
may be imposed only for the most seriou 
crimes in accordance with the law in fore 
at the time of the commission of the crin 
and not contrary to their international 
commitments. This question will be kep' 
under consideration. In this context, the 
participating States will co-operate with 
relevant international organizations. 

25. With the aim of developing mutu. 
understanding and confidence, promotin 
friendly and good neighbourly relations, 
strengthening international peace, secur 
and justice and of improving the implerr 
tation of their CSCE commitments, the 
participating States will further develoj 
co-operation and promote dialogue betw 
them in all fields and at all levels on the 
basis of full equality. They agree that fr. 
respect for and application of the Princi 
pies and the fulfillment of the other CS 
provisions will improve their relations a 
advance the development of their co-opt 
tion. They will refrain from any action < 
consistent with the provisions of the Fi 
Act and other CSCE documents and re< 
nize that any such action would impair 
lations between them and hinder the 
development of co-operation among the 

26. They confirm that governments 
stitutions, organizations and persons h; 
a relevant and positive role to play in e< 
tributing to the achievement of the aim 
their co-operation and to the full realiz; 
tion of the Final Act. To that end they 
respect the right of persons to observe 
promote the implementation of CSCE 
provisions and to associate with others 
this purpose. They will facilitate direct 
contacts and communication among the 
persons, organizations and institutions 
within and between participating State 
and remove, where they exist, legal am 
administrative impediments inconsister 
with the CSCE provisions. They will al 
take effective measures to facilitate act 
to information on the implementation o 
CSCE provisions and to facilitate the f: 
expression of views on these matters. 

27. The participating States heard 
counts of the Meeting of Experts on qu 
tions concerning respect, in their State 
for human rights and fundamental free 



npnarlment of State Bulletin/March 11.. 



EUROPE 



fhen the United States joined 34 other 
itions in opening the Vienna meeting- 
November 1986, we pledged our- 
ilves to work for improved compliance 
ith the human rights commitments we 
id all undertaken. The results, though 
leven, have been remarkable. In the 
ist two years: 

• Jamming of radio broadcasts has 
;ased. Now all of our citizens, not just 
lose in Western and some Eastern 
luntries, can choose for themselves 
hat they want to listen to. 

• Last year more than seven million 
ast Germans visited the West, and 
ore than five million West Germans 
sited the German Democratic Re- 
iblic — record numbers in both direc- 
Dns. Some 20,000 Jews emigrated 

om the Soviet Union — the highest fig- 
■e in nearly a decade. 

• Over 600 political prisoners have 
?en freed from Soviet prisons. Minor- 
/ rights have been vociferously de- 
anded and in some cases granted. 
ssidents have been permitted a 
eater scope of activity. And religious 
lievers have begun to win more 
lerance. 

• Political pluralism has grown in 
istern Europe, especially in Hungary, 
land, and the Soviet Union. Unfortu- 
tely Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and 

e German Democratic Republic have 
far been too timid to take similar 
jps. And the economic and social, as 
?11 as the political and civil, rights of 
imanian citizens have eroded. 

Another goal we set ourselves in 
36 was to help write a Vienna Con- 
iding Document that made the com- 
tments of the Helsinki and Madrid 
cuments more specific, as well as car- 
ing them into new areas. This joint 
brt succeeded beyond all expectation. 
Vienna our 35 countries took on spe- 
ic commitments in such areas as free- 
m of movement, freedom of religion, 
hts of minorities, the fight against 
rorism. rights of prisoners, rights of 



Ambassador Zimmermann's 
Message 



citizens to monitor the human rights 
performance of their own governments, 
ensuring of free reception of foreign ra- 
dio broadcasts and unhindered receipt 
of mail and telephone calls. In addition, 
there are numerous obligations de- 
signed to prevent the delay or denial of 
permission to travel abroad, including 
through the abuse of an applicant's once 
having had access to security 
information. 

In sum, the Vienna Concluding 
Document is the most comprehensive 
statement of human rights commit- 
ments which has ever existed in the 
CSCE process or in the East-West 
framework in general. While we have 
no international police force to enforce 
it, would-be violaters will not be able to 
abuse it without cost to their relations 
with other countries or to their image 
among free peoples. 

While the Vienna meeting helped 
to improve human rights compliance 
and the overall climate of East- West 
relations, it also left much unfinished 
business. That's why I see Vienna not 
as an end, but as a beginning. In the 
area of military security, it marks the 
beginning of two major arms control 
negotiations. The follow-on negotiations 
on confidence- and security-building 
measures will extend the pioneering 
work of the Stockholm conference. The 
negotiation on conventional armed 
forces in Europe between the 23 mem- 
bers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will 
be the most important Europe-wide 
arms control negotiation to be con- 
ducted over coming years. 

In addition, in the next three years 
there will be nine CSCE meetings in 
Eastern, Western and neutral or non- 
aligned countries. Their subjects reflect 
the variety and richness of the CSCE 
process: information, economics, the 
environment, the Mediterranean, 
peaceful settlement of disputes, culture 
and — most important — human rights. 
The Vienna meeting has created a 
mechanism enabling any country to 



raise any human rights issue with any 
other country at any time. This mecha- 
nism, coupled with human rights meet- 
ings in 1989 in Paris, 1990 in Copen- 
hagen, and 1991 in Moscow, gives us a 
continuous process of human rights 
review. 

For the first time, three of these 
meetings will be in communist coun- 
tries: an environment meeting in Sofia, 
Bulgaria: a cultural forum in Krakow, 
Poland; and the third human rights 
meeting in Moscow. The Vienna docu- 
ment commits all host countries, includ- 
ing the Soviet Union, to provide access 
for foreign journalists, nongovernmen- 
tal organizations and individuals; and to 
allow their own citizens unimpeded con- 
tact with delegates and visitors. Some 
may see the Moscow meeting as a po- 
tential victory for Soviet propaganda; I 
see it as a victory for Western values, 
since even the Soviet Union is prepared 
to build a meeting around them. And if 
the West is taking a risk in going to 
Moscow, so is President Gorbachev in 
opening his capital city to an objective 
review of the Soviet human rights rec- 
ord and to a visit from the entire 
CSCE human rights community. 

As our 35 nations prepare to return 
to the source of the CSCE process — to 
Helsinki — in 1992, we must recognize 
that our job is only half done. Com- 
pliance has improved but is still in- 
adequate — in many cases, seriously 
inadequate. The openness which was 
the hallmark of the Vienna meeting 
must be increased and expanded. And 
our countries must turn with renewed 
intensity to the destruction of the bar- 
riers which have divided Europe since 
World War II. The United States will 
continue to play an active and construc- 
tive role in that great objective of the 
CSCE process: to make Europe whole. 

Warren Zimmermann 

Chairman 

U.S. Delegation 

to the Vienna CSCE 

Follovv-Up Meeting 



partment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



25 



EUROPE 



doms, in all their aspects, as embodied in 
the Final Act, held in Ottawa from 7 May 
to 17 June 1985. They welcomed the fact 
that frank discussions had taken place of 
matters of key concern. Noting that these 
discussions had not led to agreed conclu- 
sions, they agreed that such thorough ex- 
changes of views themselves constitute a 
valuable contribution to the CSCE process. 
In this respect it was noted in particular 
that proposals made at the meeting had 
received further consideration at the 
Vienna Follow-up Meeting. They also wel- 
comed the decision to allow public access 
to part of the meeting and noted that this 
principle was further developed at later 
meetings. 



Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Certain 
Aspects of Security and 
Disarmament in Europe 



Stockholm Conference: 
Assessment of Progress Achieved 

The participating States, 

In accordance with the relevant provi- 
sions of the Madrid Concluding Document, 
assessed progress achieved during the 
Conference on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe, which met in Stockholm from 
17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986. 

They welcomed the adoption at Stock- 
holm of a set of mutally complementary 
confidence- and security-building measures 
(CSBMs). 

They noted that these measures are in 
accordance with the criteria of the Madrid 
mandate and constitute a substantial im- 
provement and extension of the confidence- 
building measures adopted in the Final 
Act. 

They noted that the adoption of the 
Stockholm Document was a politically sig- 
nificant achievement and that its measures 
are an important step in efforts aimed at 
reducing the risk of military confrontation 
in Europe. They agreed that the extent to 
which the measures will in practice con- 
tribute to greater confidence and security 
will depend on the record of implementa- 
tion. They were encouraged by initial 
implementation and noted that further ex- 
perience and detailed review will be re- 
quired. They reaffirmed their 
determination to comply strictly with and 
apply in good faith all the provisions of the 
Document of the Stockholm Conference. 

They reaffirmed their commitment to 
the provisions of the Madrid Concluding 
Document relating to the Conference on 



Confidence- and Security-Building Meas- 
ures and Disarmament in Europe and 
agreed to resume the work of the Confer- 
ence with a view to achieving further 
progress towards its aim. 

New Efforts for Security 
and Disarmament in Europe 

The participating States, 

Recalling the relevant provisions of the 
Final Act and of the Madrid Concluding 
Document according to which they recog- 
nize the interest of all of them in efforts 
aimed at lessening military confrontation 
and promoting disarmament. 

Reaffirming their determination ex- 
pressed in the Final Act to strengthen con- 
fidence among them and thus to contribute 
to increasing stability and security in 
Europe, 

Stressing the complementary nature 
of the efforts within the framework of the 
CSCE process aimed at building confidence 
and security and establishing stability and 
achieving progress in disarmament, in 
order to lessen military confrontation and 
to enhance security for all, 

Stressing that in undertaking such 
efforts they will respect the security inter- 
ests of all CSCE participating States in- 
herent in their sovereign equality, 

Having also considered ways and ap- 
propriate means to continue their efforts 
for security and disarmament in Europe, 

Have reached the understanding that 
these efforts should be structured as set 
forth below: 

NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- 
AND SECURITY-BUILDING 
MEASURES 

The participating States have agreed that 
Negotiations on Confidence- and Security- 
Building Measures will take place in order 
to build upon and expand the results al- 
ready achieved at the Stockholm Confer- 
ence with the aim of elaborating and 
adopting a new set of mutually complemen- 
tary confidence- and security-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of 
military confrontation in Europe. These 
negotiations will take place in accordance 
with the Madrid mandate. The decisions of 
the Preparatory Meeting held in Helsinki 
from 25 October to 11 November 1983 
will be applied, mutatis mutandis, (see 
Annex II). 

These negotiations will take place in 
Vienna, commencing the week beginning 
on (5 March 1989. 

The next Follow-up Meeting of the par- 
ticipating States of the CSCE, to be held 
in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1992, 
will assess the progress achieved in these 
negotiations. 



NEGOTIATION ON CONVENTIONAL 
ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE 

The Negotiation on Conventional Arme< 
Forces in Europe will take place as agn 
by those States named in the mandate c 
tained in the Chairman's statement in 
Annex III of this document, who among 
themselves have determined the agenda 
the rules of procedure and the organiza- 
tional modalities of these negotiations, 
will determine their timetable and resu: 
These negotiations will be conducted 
within the framework of the CSCE 
process. 

These negotiations will take place i 
Vienna, commencing in the week begin) 
on 6 March 1989. 

The next Follow-up Meeting of the j 
ticipating States of the CSCE, to be he 
in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1! 
will exchange views on the progress 
achieved in these negotiations. 

MEETINGS IN ORDER TO EXCHAN 
VIEWS AND INFORMATION 
CONCERNING THE COURSE OF 
THE NEGOTIATION ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 
IN EUROPE 

It has been agreed that the participatii 
States will hold meetings in order to ej 
change views and information concernii 
the course of the Negotiation on Conve 
tional Armed Forces in Europe. 

These meetings will be held at leas 
twice during each session of the Negot 
tion on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe. 

Provisions on practical modalities 
lating to these meetings are contained 
Annex IV of this Document. 

At these meetings, substantive inf < 
mation will be provided by the partici] 
in the Negotiation on Conventional Ar 
Forces in Europe on developments, pri 
ress and results in the negotiations wi 
the aim of enabling each participating 
State to appraise their course. 

The participants in these negotiat: 
have undertaken to take into consider; 
tion, in the course of their negotiation 
the views expressed at such meetings 
other participating States concerning I 
own security. 

Information will also be provided < 
bilateral basis. 

The next Follow-up Meeting of the 
ticipating States of the CSCE, to be hi 
in Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 
will consider the functioning of these 
arrangments. 

Taking into account the relevant p 
sions of the Final Act and of the Madr 
Concluding Document, and having con 
ered the results achieved in the two ne 
tiations, and also in the light of other 
relevant negotiations on security and t 



r\~~ ~ -+ ~ 



■*< Ctoln D. 



^in/M^^h 



lament affecting Europe, a future CSCE 
illow-up meeting will consider ways and 
apropriate means for the participating 
tates to continue their efforts for security 
id disarmament in Europe, including the 
jestion of supplementing the Madrid 
andate for the next stage of the Confer- 
lce on Confidence- and Security-Building 
easures and Disarmament in Europe. 



o-operation in the Field of 
conomics. of Science and 
echnology and of the 
invironment 



he participating States reaffirm their 
illingness to further their co-operation in 
je fields of economics, of science and tech- 
llogy and of the environment, and to pro- 
bte stable and equitable international 
lonomic relations in the interest of all 
lates. They express their readiness to in- 
Insify the dialogue in the competent fora 
jkh a view to facilitating appropriate solu- 
Ins for key interrelated economic issues 
Ich as money, finance, debt and trade. In 
lis connection they stress the importance 
[policies aimed at promoting structural 
Ijustments, stimulating the growth of na- 
Inal economies and creating an interna- 
Inal economic environment conducive to 
Jvelopment. 

The participating States recognize the 
portant role of the United Nations Eco- 
mic Commission for Europe (ECE) in 
tering regional economic co-operation 
:1 in contributing to the implementation 
the provisions of the Final Act and sub- 
juent CSCE documents. They express 
sir readiness to make further use of the 
sting framework, resources and experi- 
;e of the ECE in areas which are of 
nificance for the implementation of rec- 
mendations of the CSCE. 

ide and Industrial Cooperation 

n order to make better use of their 
inomic potential, and to foster the ex- 
ision of their commercial exchanges, the 
-ticipating States will make further 
orts to promote favourable conditions for 
de and industrial co-operation, taking 
o account all the relevant provisions of 

Final Act and the Madrid Concluding 
eument. 

2. The participating States recognize 

importance of favourable business con- 
ions for the development of trade be- 
jen them. They will facilitate direct 
itaets between business people, potential 
pers and end-users, including on-site 
itacts relevant to the business intended 
being transacted. They will take meas- 
,'s to improve working conditions for 

iness people regarding, among other 
ngs, accreditation, accommodation, com- 
nications and recruitment and manage- 
nt of personnel. They will also take 



measures to avoid unjustifiable delays in 
visa procedures and customs clearance. 
Further, they recognize the opportunities 
offered by trade fairs and exhibitions for 
developing commercial contacts and achiev- 
ing concrete business results. 

3. The participating States will con- 
tinue their efforts further to reduce or pro- 
gressively eliminate obstacles of all kinds 
to trade, thus contributing to the expan- 
sion and diversification of their commercial 
relations. They express their support for 
the work done in this field in appropriate 
international fora. 

4. The participating States will encour- 
age forms of trade compatible with the ef- 
ficient conduct of international business 
relations and will also encourage business 
partners to decide independently upon 
their trading patterns. As to compensation 
transactions in all their forms, they recom- 
mend that proposals of this kind be ad- 
dressed at the beginning of negotiations 
and, when agreed upon, dealt with in a 
flexible way, especially regarding the 
choice of products. In this connection the 
special concerns of small and medium-sized 
enterprises should be taken into account. 
The participating States recognize the 
valuable role of the ECE in dealing 

with questions related to compensation 
transactions. 

5. The participating States recognize 
that, within their respective economies, in- 
creased autonomy for enterprises can help 
achieve a better response to market needs 
and thus contribute to the development of 
trade and co-operation among them. 

6. In order to facilitate the identifica- 
tion of market opportunities, the partici- 
pating States will further promote the 
publication and availability of comprehen- 
sive, comparable and timely economic and 
commercial information. They will publish 
up-to-date macroeconomic information and 
statistics, and envisage making balance of 
payments figures available. They will also 
provide the United Nations trade data- 
bank, COMTRADE, with detailed data in a 
format relevant to the efficient conduct of 
foreign trade. They will encourage co- 
operation between their statistical services 
and within the framework of the ECE in 
order, inter alia, to facilitate the identifi- 
cation of disparities in foreign trade statis- 
tics and to improve the international 
comparability of such statistics. Further- 
more, they consider it useful to increase 
the publication and exchange of statistics 
on such topics as demography, public 
health, agriculture, the environment and 
energy. 

7. Noting the growing importance of 
services in their mutual economic rela- 
tions, the participating States will exam- 
ine, in appropriate bodies, developments in 
this area and prospects for improved access 
to the services' market. 

8. Affirming the importance of indus- 
trial co-operation in their long-term eco- 
nomic relations, the participating States 
will promote measures designed to create 
favourable conditions for the development 
of such co-operation. They will therefore 



EUROPE 



examine, within the competent fora, the 
improvement of the legal, administrative 
and economic framework for industrial 
co-operation. Furthermore, they will ex- 
change contacts between potential part- 
ners, develop exchanges of appropriate 
information and promote the participation 
of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
industrial co-operation. 

9. The participating States recognize 
that productive, competitive and profit- 
earning joint ventures can play a role in 
mutually beneficial industrial co-operation. 
They will improve the legal, administrative 
and financial conditions for investment in, 
and operation of, joint ventures. They will 
also promote the exchange of all informa- 
tion relevant to the establishment of joint 
ventures, including all necessary technical 
information, as well as information on man- 
agement, labour conditions, accounting and 
taxation, repatriation of profits and the 
protection of investments, production con- 
ditions and access to domestic supplies and 
markets. 

10. The participating States stress the 
importance of their standardization policies 
and practices, and of related activities for 
the facilitation of international trade, espe- 
cially regarding products subject to com- 
pulsory certification. Accordingly, they 
will consider mutual recognition of their 
national testing and certification pro- 
cedures and practices, and promote co- 
operation among relevant national bodies 
and within international organizations 
including the ECE. 

11. The participating States recognize 
the growing importance of effective mar- 
keting in the development of trade and in- 
dustrial co-operation, in the production 
and promotion of new products and in 
meeting the needs of the consumer. Given 
the growth of marketing opportunities, 
they will seek to improve the conditions for 
firms and organizations engaging in re- 
search into domestic or foreign markets 
and in other marketing activities. 

12. The participating States affirm the 
usefulness for all enterprises, and espe- 
cially for small and medium-sized ones, of 
flexible and mutually agreed arbitration 
provisions for ensuring the equitable set- 
tlement of disputes in international trade 
and industrial co-operation. Bearing in 
mind the relevant provisions of the Final 
Act and the Madrid Concluding Document 
they attach particular importance to free- 
dom in the choice of arbitrators, including 
the presiding arbitrator, and of the country 
of arbitration. They recommend that con- 
sideration be given to the adoption of the 
Model Law on international commercial 
arbitration of the United Nations Com- 
mission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). In addition, they recognize 
the value of agreements on co-operation in 
the field of commercial arbitration between 
Chambers of Commerce and other arbitra- 
tion bodies. 



bpartment of State Bulletin/March 1989 



27 



EUROPE 



13. The participating States agree to 
convene a Conference on Economic Co-op- 
eration in Europe. This Conference will 
take place in Bonn from 19 March to 
11 April 1990. The aim of the Conference is 
to provide new impulses for economic rela- 
tions between participating States, in par- 
ticular by improving business conditions 
for commercial exchanges and industrial 
co-operation, and by considering new pos- 
sibilities for, and ways of, economic co-op- 
eration. The Conference will be attended 
by representatives of the participating 
States and of the business community. The 
agenda, timetable and other organizations 
modalities are set out in Annex V. The 
next Follow-up Meeting, to be held in 
Helsinki, commencing on 24 March 1992, 
will assess the results achieved at the 
Conference. 

Science and Technology 

14. The participating States emphasize the 
important role of science and technology in 
their overall economic and social develop- 
ment, bearing in mind particularly those 
sciences and technologies which are of di- 
rect relevance to improving the quality of 
life. 

15. Recognizing the importance of sci- 
entific and technological co-operation, 
the participating States will develop fur- 
ther mutually advantageous co-operation 
in the fields already set forth in the Final 
Act, and will examine possibilities for co- 
operation in new areas of growing impor- 
tance and common interest. Furthermore, 
they express their intention to improve 
conditions for such co-operation by foster- 
ing the exchange of information on, and 
experience with, scientific and techno- 
logical achievements, having in mind espe- 
cially the interests of the countries of the 
region which are developing from the eco- 
nomic point of view. 

16. The participating States also re- 
affirm the role of general intergovernmen- 
tal agreements as well as of bilateral 
agreements involving universities, scien- 
tific and technological institutions and in- 
dustry, in developing mutually beneficial 
exchanges. Underlining the importance of 
freedom of communication and exchange 
of views for progress in science and tech- 
nology, they will promote and support 
direct and individual contacts between sci- 
entists, specialists and interested business 
people. Recalling the conclusions reached 
at the Hamburg Scientific Forum, they will 
respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, which represent one of the foun- 
dations for a significant improvement in in- 
ternational scientific co-operation at all 
levels. They will also endeavour to create 
conditions enabling interested partners to 
develop appropriate joint research pro- 
grammes and projects on the basis of reci- 
procity and mutual advantage and, when 
appropriate, on a commercial basis. 



17. Given the depletion of natural re- 
sources, including non-renewable sources 
of energy, the participating States will pro- 
mote co-operation in the rational use of 
such resources, and in the use of alter- 
native sources of energy, including ther- 
monuclear fusion. 

18. Taking note of the progress made 
in, and the new opportunities offered by. 
research and development in biotechnology, 
the participating States consider it desir- 
able to enhance the exchange of informa- 
tion on laws and regulations relating to the 
safety aspects of genetic engineering. They 
will therefore facilitate consultation and 
exchange of information on safety guide- 
lines. In this context they emphasize the 
importance of ethical principles when deal- 
ing with genetic engineering and its 
application. 

19. The participating States will de- 
velop their co-operation in medical and re- 
lated sciences by intensifying research and 
the exchange of information on drug abuse 
and on new or increasingly wide-spread 
diseases. They will co-operate in particular 
in combating the spread of AIDS (acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome), taking into 
account the global AIDS Strategy of the 
World Health Organization (WHO). They 
will also co-operate in research concerning 
the long-term consequences of radiation. 

20. The participating States recognize 
the importance of scientific research, of en- 
vironmentally sound technologies and, in 
particular, of improved international coop- 
eration in these fields, for the monitoring, 
prevention and reduction of pollution. They 
will therefore promote, inter alia, within 
the relevant international fora, exchange of 
information on, and experience with, these 
technologies. In this respect they will also 
promote, on a commercial basis, exchanges 
in the fields of pollution-abatement tech- 
nologies, technologies and products with 
less or no emission of ozone-deple