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ie Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2061 

April 1982 

Caribbean Basin / 1 

Dvpartmf»nt of State 


Volume 82 / Number 2061 / April 1982 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through January 31. 1986. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Acting Chief, Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

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1 Caribbean Basin Initiative {Pr-esident Reagan) 
7 Background on the Caribbean Basin Initiative 

rhe Secretary 

33 Update on International Develop- 

36 Proposed FY 1983 Foreign Assist- 

ance Program 

37 Visit to Europe and North Africa 

(Statement, News Conferences) 

fVrms Control 

iO INF Negotiations (President 


iO U.S. -Canada Transboundary Air 
Pollution Negotiations 
(Thomas M. T. Niles) 

East Asia 

>2 Japan and the United States: A 

Cooperative Relationship 

(John H. Holdridge) 
iO 10th Anniversary of Shanghai 

Communique (President Reagan, 

Zhao Ziyang) 


A Polish Debt Situation (Robert D. 


62 Soviet Energy Development and 

the Western Alliance (Ernest B. 
Johnston, Jr.) 


65 In Defense of Western Values 
(Richard R. Burt) 

67 Situation in Poland (Department 


Human Rights 

68 Human Rights Situation in El Sal- 

vador (Elliott Abrayns) 

69 Human Rights Situation in Nica- 

ragua (Elliott Ab7-ams) 
71 Country Reports on Human Rights 

Middle East 

77 Visit of Egyptian President 

Mubarak (Presidents Mubarak 

and Reagan) 
80 Secretary's News Conference on 

President Mubarak's Visit 
83 Military Assistance Policies for the 

Middle East (President Reagan) 

Security Assistance 

84 Proposed Sale of Aircraft to 

Venezuela (James L. Buckley) 

South Asia 

85 Afghanistan Day: March 21 

(Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.) 

Western Hemisphere 

87 The Certification for El Salvador 

(Thomas 0. Enders) 

88 U.S. to Observe El Salvador's 

Elections (Department State- 


90 Current Actions 


93 February 1982 

Press Releases 

93 Department of State 


94 Department of State 


*i|l! FEATURE 

III Caribbean Basin 

Caribbean Basin 

President Reagan's address 

before the 

Organization of American States (OAS) 

on February 2U, 1982^ 

The principles which the Organization of 
American States embodies — democracy, 
self-determination, economic develop- 
ment, and collective security — are at the 
heart of U.S. foreign policy. The United 
States of America is a proud member of 
this organization. What happens any- 
where in the Americas affects us in this 
country. In that very real sense, we 
share a common destiny. We, the 
peoples of the Americas, have much 
more in common than geographical 
proximity. For over 400 years our 
peoples have shared the dangers and 
dreams of building a new world. From 
colonialism to nationhood, our common 
quest has been for freedom. 

Most of our forebears came to this 
hemisphere seeking a better life for 
themselves. They came in search of 
opportunity and, yes, in search of God. 
Virtually all descendants of the land and 
immigrants alike have had to fight for 
independence. Having gained it, they've 
had to fight to retain it. There were 
times when we even fought each other. 

In an address before the permanent 
representatives to the OAS, President 
Reagan outlined an integrated program to 
help the Caribbean and Central American 
nations to help themselves. 

(White House phoU» by Jack Kightlinger) 

Gradually, however, the nations of 
this hemisphere developed a set of com- 
mon principles and institutions that pro- 
vided the basis for mutual protection. 
Some 20 years ago, John F. Kennedy 
caught the essence of our unique mission 
when he said it was up to the New 
World ". . . to demonstrate. . . that 
man's unsatisfied aspiration for 
economic progress and social justice can 
best be achieved by free men working 
within a framework of democratic in- 

In the commitment to freedom and 
independence, the peoples of this 
hemisphere are one. In this profound 
sense, we are all Americans. Our prin- 
ciples are rooted in self-government and 
nonintervention. We believe in the rule 
of law. We know that a nation cannot be 
liberated by depriving its people of lib- 
erty. We know that a state cannot be 
free when its independence is subor- 
dinated to a foreign power. And we 
know that a government cannot be 
democratic if it refuses to take the test 
of a free election. 

We have not always lived up to 
these ideals. All of us at one time or 
another in our history have been 
politically weak, economically backward, 
socially unjust, or unable to solve our 

problems through peaceful means. My 
own country, too, has suffered internal 
strife including a tragic civil war. We 
have known economic misery and once 
tolerated racial and social injustice. And, 
yes, at times we have behaved arro- 
gantly and impatiently toward our 
neighbors. These experiences have left 
their scars, but they also help us today 
to identify with the struggle for political 
and economic development in the other 
countries of this hemisphere. 

Out of the crucible of our common 
past, the Americas have emerged as 
more equal and more understanding 
partners. Our hemisphere has an 
unlimited potential for economic 
development and human fulfillment. We 
have a combined population of more 
than 600 million people; our continents 
and our islands boast vast reservoirs of 
food and raw materials; and the markets 
of the Americas have already produced 
the highest standard of living among the 
advanced as well as the developing coun- 
tries of the world. The example that we 
could offer to the world would not only 
discourage foes, it would project like a 
beacon of hope to all of the oppressed 
and impoverished nations of the world. 
We are the New World, a world of 
sovereign and independent states that 
today stands shoulder-to-shoulder with a 
common respect for one another and a 
greater tolerance of one another's short- 

Some 2 years ago when I announced 
as a candidate for the presidency, I 
spoke of an ambition I had to bring 
about an accord with our two neighbors 
here on the North American Continent. 
Now, I was not suggesting a common 
market or any kind of formal arrange- 
ment. "Accord" was the only word that 
seemed to fit what I had in mind. I was 
aware that the United States has long 
enjoyed friendly relations with Mexico 
and Canada, that our borders have no 
fortifications. Yet it seemed to me that 
there was a potential for a closer rela- 
tionship than had yet been achieved. 
Three great nations share the North 
American Continent with all its human 

and natural resources. Have we done all 
we can to create a relationship in which 
each country can realize its potential to 
the fullest? 

Now, I know in the past the United 
States has proposed policies that we 
declared would be mutually beneficial 
not only for North America but also for 
the nations of the Caribbean and Central 
and South America. But there was often 

Our economic and 
social program cannot 
work if our neighbors 
cannot pursue their own 
economic and political 
future in peace but must 
divert their resources 
. . . to fight imported 
terrorism and armed at- 

a problem. No matter how good our in- 
tentions were, our very size may have 
made it seem that we were exercising a 
kind of paternalism. 

At the time I suggested a new North 
American accord, I said I wanted to 
approach our neighbors not as someone 
with yet another plan but as a friend 
seeking their ideas, their suggestions as 
to how we would become better neigh- 
bors. I met with President Lopez- 
Portillo in Mexico before my inaugura- 
tion and with Prime Minister Trudeau in 
Canada shortly after I had taken office. 
We have all met several times since— in 
the United States, in Mexico, and 
Canada. And I believe that we have 
established a relationship better than 
any our three countries have ever 
known before. 

Economic Health of the i 

Caribbean Basin j 

Today I would like to talk about our { 
other neighbors— neighbors by the i 
sea— some two dozen countries of the i 
Caribbean and Central America. Thes' ' 
countries are not unfamiliar names fr( i 
some isolated corner of the world far 
from home. They're very close to hom ' 
The country of El Salvador, for ex- , 
ample, is nearer to Texas than Texas ] 
to Massachusetts. The Caribbean regii 
is a vital strategic and commercial 
artery for the United States. Nearly h i 
of our trade, two-thirds of our import* 
oil, and over half of our imported 
strategic minerals pass through the i 
Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. 
Make no mistake; The well-being and 
security of our neighbors in this regior 
are in our own vital interest. 

Economic health is one of the keys 
to a secure future for our Caribbean 
Basin and to the neighbors there. I'm 
happy to say that Mexico, Canada, and 
Venezuela have joined in this search fo 
ways to help these countries realize thi 
economic potential. Each of our four 
nations has its own unique position anc 
approach. Mexico and Venezuela are 
helping to offset energy costs to Carib- 
bean Basin countries by means of an oi 
facility that is already in operation. 
Canada is doubling its already signifi- 
cant economic assistance. 

We all seek to insure that the 
peoples of this area have the right to 
preserve their own national identities, 
improve their economic lot, and to 
develop their political institutions to sui 
their own unique social and historical 
needs. The Central American and Carik 
bean countries differ widely in culture, 
personality, and needs. Like America j 
itself, the Caribbean Basin is an extraoii 
dinary mosaic of Hispanics, Africans, i 
Asians, and Europeans, as well as nativl 
Americans. i 

At the moment, however, these ! 
countries are under economic siege. In I 
1977, 1 barrel of oil was worth 5 poundsl 

Department of State BulletirJ 

Caribbean Basin 

of coffee or 155 pounds of sugar. To buy 
that same barrel of oil today, these small 
countries must provide five times as 
much coffee (nearly 26 pounds) or 
almost twice as much sugar (283 
pounds). This economic disaster is con- 
suming our neighbors' money, reserves, 
and credit, forcing thousands of people 
to leave for other countries— for the 
United States, often illegally— and shak- 
ing even the most established democ- 
racies. And economic disaster has pro- 
vided a fresh opening to the enemies of 
freedom, national independence, and 
peaceful development. 

Proposed Economic Program 

We've taken the time to consult closely 
with other governments in the region, 
both sponsors and beneficiaries, to ask 
them what they need and what they 
think will work. And we've labored long 
to develop an economic program that in- 
tegrates trade, aid, and investment— a 
program that represents a long-term 
commitment to the countries of the 
Caribbean and Central America to make 
use of the magic of the marketplace, the 
market of the Americas, and to earn 
their own way toward self-sustaining 

At the Cancun summit last October, 
II presented a fresh view of a develop- 
ment which stressed more than aid and 
government intervention. As I pointed 
out then, nearly all of the countries that 
have succeeded in their development 
over the past 30 years have done so on 
the strength of market-oriented policies 
and vigorous participation in the inter- 
national economy. Aid must be comple- 
mented by trade and investment. 

The program I'm proposing today 
puts these principles into practice. It is 
an integrated program that helps our 
neighbors help themselves, a program 
that will create conditions under which 
creativity and private entrepreneurship 
and self-help can flourish. Aid is an im- 
portant part of this program because 
many of our neighbors need it to put 
themselves in a starting position from 

Before his address. President Reagan met with (left to right) Victor Mclntyre. Permanent 
Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the OAS and Chairman of the Permanent Coun- 
cil; J. William Middendorf 11, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS; Alejandro 
Orfila (Argentina), Secretary General of the OAS; and Val T. McComie (Barbados), Assist- 
ant Secretary General of the OAS. 

which they can begin to earn their own 
way. But this aid will encourage private 
sector activities but not displace them. 

First. The centerpiece of the pro- 
gram that I am sending to the Congress 
is free trade for Caribbean Basin prod- 
ucts exported to the United States. Cur- 
rently, some 87% of Caribbean exports 
already enter U.S. markets duty free 
under the generalized system of 
preferences. These exports, however, 
cover only the limited range of existing 
products, not the wide variety of poten- 
tial products these talented and in- 
dustrious peoples are capable of pro- 
ducing under the free trade arrange- 
ment that I am proposing. Exports from 
the area will receive duty-free treatment 
for 12 years. Thus, new investors will be 
able to enter the market knowing that 
their products will receive duty-free 
treatment for at least the pay-off 
lifetime of their investments. Before 
granting duty-free treatment, we will 

discuss with each country its own self- 
help measures. 

The only exception to the free trade 
concept will be textile and apparel prod- 
ucts because these products are covered 
now by other international agreements. 
However, we will make sure that our 
immediate neighbors have more liberal 
quota arrangements. 

This economic proposal is as un- 
precedented as today's crisis in the 
Caribbean. Never before has the United 
States offered a preferential trading 
arrangement to any region. This com- 
mitment makes unmistakably clear our 
determination to help our neighbors 
grow strong. The impact of this free 
trade approach will develop slowly. The 
economies that we seek to help are 
small. Even as they grow, all the protec- 
tions now available to U.S. industry, 
agriculture, and labor against disruptive 
imports will remain. And growth in the 
Caribbean will benefit everyone with 
American exports finding new markets. 


Second. To further attract invest- 
ment, I will ask the Congress to provide 
significant tax incentives for investment 
in the Caribbean Basin. We also stand 
ready to negotiate bilateral investment 
treaties with interested basin countries. 

Third. I'm asking for a supplemental 
fiscal year 1982 appropriation of $350 
million to assist those countries which 
are particularly hard hit economically. 
Much of this aid will be concentrated on 
the private sector. These steps will help 
foster the spirit of enterprise necessary 
to take advantage of the trade and in- 
vestment portions of the program. 

Fourth. We will offer technical 
assistance and training to assist the 
private sector in the basin countries to 
benefit from the opportunities of this 
program. This will include investment 
promotion, export marketing, and tech- 
nology transfer efforts, as well as pro- 
grams to facilitate adjustments to 
greater competition and production in 
agriculture and industry. I intend to 
seek the active participation of the 
business community in this joint under- 
taking. The Peace Corps already has 861 
volunteers in Caribbean Basin countries 
and wdll give special emphasis to 
recruiting volunteers with skills in 
developing local enterprise. 

Fifth. We will work closely with 
Mexico, Canada, and Venezuela, all of 
which have ah-eady begun substantial 
and innovative programs of their own to 
encourage stronger international efforts 
to coordinate our own development 
measures with their vital contributions, 
and with those of other potential donors 
like Colombia. We will also encourage 
our European, Japanese, and other 
Asian allies as well as multilateral 
development institutions to increase 
their assistance in the region. 

Sixth. Given our special valued rela- 
tionship with Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands, we will propose special 
measures to insure that they also will 
benefit and prosper from this program. 
With their strong traditions of democ- 
racy and free enterprise, they can play 
leading roles in the development of the 

Caribbean Basin Countries 

The Caribbean Basin is the region south 
' from Florida and the Bahamas across 
the nearly 2,000 mOes of ocean between 
Barbados and the islands of the eastern 
Caribbean on one side and the moun- 
tains of Guatemala on the other. The 
area is, of course, extremely 
heterogeneous. So are its problems. It 
ranges from English-speaking island 
countries (in some cases with less than 
10,000 people); French-speaking Haiti; 
Spanish speaking Central America and 
the Dominican Republic; middle-class 
Costa Rica; densely populated El 
Salvador; and very low population densi- 
ty Belize, Guyana, and Honduras. 

Some of the problems of these coun- 
tries, however, are common: Prices for 
many of these countries' basic exports 
have collapsed. Coffee and sugar prices 
are a third of what they were a few 
years ago. Oil prices, of course, have 

This program has been carefully 
prepared. It represents a farsighted act 
by our own people at a time of con- 
siderable economic difficulty at home. I 
wouldn't propose it if I were not con- 
vinced that it is vital to the security 
interests of this nation and of this 
hemisphere. The energy, the time, and 
the treasure we dedicate to assisting the 
development of our neighbors now can 
help to prevent the much larger expen- 
ditures of treasure as well as human 
lives which would flow from their col- 

One early sign is positive. After a 
decade of falling income and exceptional- 
ly high unemployment, Jamaica's new 
leadership is reducing bureaucracy, 
dismantling unworkable controls, and 
attracting new investment. Continued 
outside assistance will be needed to tide 
Jamaica over until market forces gen- 
erate large increases in output and 
employment, but Jamaica is making 
freedom work. 

risen over 1,500%. World interest rates 
have doubled the cost of debt and have 
caused capital to flow out of their bank: 
and into ours. 

Throughout Central America and 
the Caribbean, there is wide recognitior 
among politicians, technical people, and 
businessmen alike, that past statist 
policies must give way to more open 
systems, even though change may hurt. 

These countries do have resources 
with which to attack their problems; 
e.g., hard-working people, fundamentall 
market-oriented economies though with 
statists overlay, a tradition in many 
countries of political pluralism, rich 
natural resources in some, and lots of 
progress in educating their people in 
most countries. Most importantly, many 
have leadership which is aware of the 
problems and determined to resolve 
them. ■ 

Threats to Security 

I've spoken up to now mainly of the 
economic and social challenges to 
development. But there are also other 
dangers. A new kind of colonialism 
stalks the world today and threatens our 
independence. It is brutal and totali- 
tarian. It is not of our hemisphere but it 
threatens our hemisphere and has estab- 
lished footholds on American soil for the 
expansion of its colonialist ambitions. 

The events of the last several years 
dramatize two different futures which 
are possible for the Caribbean area: 
either the establishment or restoration 
of moderate, constitutional governments 
with economic growth and improved liv- 
ing standards; or further expansion of 
political violence from the extreme left 
and the extreme right resulting in the 
imposition of dictatorships and in- 
evitably more economic decline and 
human suffering. 

The positive opportunity is illus- 
trated by the two-thirds of the nations in 
the area which have democratic govern- 

Department of State Bulletin 

^»^- -^111 FEATURE 
^iz^^^gi^^ Jtli; Caribbean Basin 

Gulf of 



merits. The dark future is foreshadowed 
by the poverty and repression of 
Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the 
totalitarian left in Grenada and 
Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet- 
backed, Cuban-managed support for 
violent revolution in Central America. 

The record is clear. Nowhere in its 
whole sordid history have the promises 
of communism been redeemed. Every- 
where it has exploited and aggravated 
temporary economic suffering to seize 
power and then to institutionalize 
economic deprivation and suppress 
human rights. Right now, 6 million 
people worldwide are refugees from 
Communist systems. Already, more than 
a million Cubans alone have fled Com- 
munist tyranny. 

Our economic and social program 
cannot work if our neighbors cannot 
pursue their own economic and political 
future in peace but must divert their 
resources, instead, to fight imported ter- 

rorism and armed attack. Economic pro- 
gress cannot be made while guerrillas 
systematically burn, bomb, and destroy 
bridges, farms, and power and transpor- 
tation systems— all with the deliberate 
intention of worsening economic and 
social problems in hopes of radicalizing 
already suffering people. 

Our Caribbean neighbors' peaceful 
attempts to develop are feared by the 
foes of freedom because their success 
will make the radical message a hollow 
one. Cuba and its Soviet backers know 
this. Since 1978, Havana has trained, 
armed, and directed extremists in guer- 
rilla warfare and economic sabotage as 
part of a campaign to exploit troubles in 
Central America and the Caribbean. 
Their goal is to establish Cuban-style 
Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. Last 
year, Cuba received 66,000 tons of war 
supplies from the Soviet Union— more 
than in any year since the 1962 missile 
crisis. Last month, the arrival of addi- 

tional high-performance MiG-23/Flog- 
gers gave Cuba an arsenal of more than 
200 Soviet warplanes— far more than 
the military aircraft inventories of all 
other Caribbean Basin countries com- 

For almost 2 years, Nicaragua has 
served as a platform for covert military 
action. Through Nicaragua, arms are 
being smuggled to guerrillas in El 
Salvador and Guatemala. The Nicar- 
aguan Government even admits the 
forced relocation of about 8,500 Miskito 
Indians. And we have clear evidence 
that since late 1981, many Indian com- 
munities have been burned to the 
ground and men, women, and children 

The Nicaraguan junta cabled written 
assurances to the OAS in 1979 that it 
intended to respect human rights and 
hold free elections. Two years later, 
these commitments can be measured by 
the postponement of elections until 

April 1982 

1985; by repression against free trade 
unions, against the media and 
minorities; and— in defiance of all inter- 
national civility— by the continued ex- 
port of arms and subversion to neighbor- 
ing countries. 

Two years ago, in contrast, the 
Government of El Salvador began an 
unprecedented land reform. It has 
repeatedly urged the guerrillas to 
renounce violence, to join in the 
democratic process — an election in 
which the people of El Salvador could 
determine the government they prefer. 
Our own country and other American 
nations through the OAS have urged 
such a course. The guerrillas have re- 
fused. More than that, they now 
threaten violence and death to those 
who participate in such an election. 

Can anything make more clear the 
nature of those who pretend to be sup- 
porters of so-called wars of liberation? A 
determined propaganda campaign has 
sought to mislead many in Europe and 
certainly many in the United States as 
to the true nature of the conflict in El 
Salvador. Very simply, guerrillas, armed 
and supported by and through Cuba, are 
attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist 
dictatorship on the people of El 
Salvador as part of a larger imperialistic 
plan. If we do not act promptly and 
decisively in defense of freedom, new 
Cubas will arise from the ruins of 
today's conflicts. We will face more 
totalitarian regimes tried militarily to 
the Soviet Union; more regimes support- 
ing subversion; more regimes so in- 
competent yet so totalitarian that their 
citizens' only hope becomes that of one 
day migrating to other American 
nations, as in recent years they have 
come to the United States. 

I believe free and peaceful develop- 
ment of our hemisphere requires us to 
help governments confronted with 
aggression from outside their borders to 
defend themselves. For this reason, I 
will ask the Congress to provide in- 
creased security assistance to help 
friendly countries hold off those who 
would destroy their chances for 

economic and social progress and 
political democracy. Since 1947, the Rio 
treaty has established reciprocal defense 
responsibilities linked to our common 
democratic ideals. Meeting these respon- 
sibilities is all the more important when 
an outside power supports terrorism and 
insurgency to destroy any possibility of 
freedom and democracy. Let our friends 
and our adversaries understand that we 
will do whatever is prudent and 
necessary to insure the peace and securi- 
ty of the Caribbean area. 

In the face of outside threats, secur- 
ity for the countries of the Caribbean 
and Central American area is not an end 
in itself but a means to an end. It is a 
means toward building representative 
and responsive institutions, toward 
strengthening pluralism and free private 

Let our friends and our 
adversaries understand 
that we will do whatever 
is prudent and necessary 
to insure the peace and 
security of the Carib- 
bean area. 

institutions— churches, free trade 
unions, and an independent press. It is "a 
means for nurturing the basic human 
rights that freedom's foes would stamp 
out. In the Caribbean we above all seek 
to protect those values and principles 
that shape the proud heritage of this 
hemisphere. I have already expressed 
our support for the coming election in El 
Salvador. We also strongly support the 
Central American Democratic Com- 
munity formed this January by Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador. The 
United States will work closely with 
other concerned democracies inside and 
outside the area to preserve and 
enhance our common democratic values. 

We will not, however, follow Cuba 
lead in attempting to resolve human 
problems by brute force. Our economic 
assistance, including the additions that 
are part of the program I've just out- 
lined, is more than five times the 
amount of our security assistance. The 
thrust of our aid is to help our neighbc 
realize freedom, justice, and economic 

We seek to exclude no one. Some, 
however, have turned from their 
American neighbors and their heritage 
Let them return to the traditions and 
common values of this hemisphere, anc 
we all will welcome them. The choice is 

The Need for Assistance 

As I have talked these problems over 
with friends and fellow citizens here in 
the United States, I'm often asked, 
"Why bother? Why should the problems 
of Central America or the Caribbean 
concern us? Why should we try to help: 
I tell them we must help because the 
people of the Caribbean and Central 
America are in a fundamental sense 
fellow Americans. Freedom is our com- 
mon destiny. And freedom cannot sur- 
vive if our neighbors live in misery and 
oppression. In short, we must do it 
because we're doing it for each other. 

Our neighbors' call for help is ad- 
dressed to us all here in this coun- 
try—to the Administration, to the Con- 
gress, to millions of Americans from 
Miami to Chicago, from New York to 
Los Angeles. This is not Washington's 
problem; it is the problem of all the peo- 
ple of this great land and of all the othe 
Americas— the great and sovereign 
republics of North America, the Carib 
bean Basin, and South America. The 
Western Hemisphere does not belong to 
any one of us — we belong to the 
Western Hemisphere. We are brothers 
historically as well as geographically. 

Now, I'm aware that the United 
States has pursued good neighbor 
policies in the past. These policies did 
some good, but they're inadequate for 

Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

oday. I believe that my country is now 
eady to go beyond being a good 
leighbor to being a true friend and 
irother in the community that belongs 
,s much to others as to us. That, not 
^ns, is the ultimate key to peace and 
ecurity for us all. 

We have to ask ourselves why has it 
aken so long for us to realize the God- 
jiven opportunity that is ours. These 
wo great land masses north and south, 
lO rich in virtually everything we 
leed— together our more than 600 
nillion people can develop what is 
indeveloped, can eliminate want and 
joverty, can show the world that our 
nany nations can live in peace, each 
vith its own customs and language and 
■ulture but sharing a love for freedom 
md a determination to resist outside 
deologies that would take us back to 

We return to a common vision. 
■Nearly a century ago a great citizen of 
,he Caribbean and the Americas, Jose 
Vlarti, warned that: "Mankind is com- 
)osed of two sorts of men — those who 
ove and create and those who hate and 
iestroy." Today more than ever the 
compassionate, creative peoples of the 
\mericas have an opportunity to stand 
;ogether; to overcome injustice, hatred, 
md oppression; and to build a better life 
for all the Americas. 

I have always believed that this 
lemisphere was a special place with a 
.pecial destiny. I believe we are destined 
o be the beacon of hope for all 
nankind. With God's help, we can make 
t so. We can create a peaceful, free, 
md prospering hemisphere based on our 
;hared ideals and reaching from pole to 
Dole of what we proudly call the New 

'Text from Weel<ly Compilation of 
r'residential Documents of Mar. 1, 1982. 

Background on the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative 


The Caribbean Basin includes some two 
dozen small developing nations in 
Central America, the Caribbean, and 
northern South America. The region 
forms the third border of the United 
States, contains vital sea lanes through 
which three-quarters of our oil imports 
must flow, is an important market for 
U.S. exports, and is our second largest 
source of illegal immigration. 

The Problem 

The basin countries have been seriously 
affected by the escalating cost of im- 
ported oil and declining prices for their 
major exports (sugar, coffee, bauxite, 

Frigate Bay, St. Christopher 

(Canbbean Tourism Asso. photo) 

etc.). This has exacerbated their deep- 
rooted structural problems and caused 
serious inflation, high unemployment, 
declining gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth, enormous balance-of-payments 
deficits, and a pressing liquidity crisis. 
This economic crisis threatens political 
and social stability throughout the 
region and creates conditions which 
Cuba and others seek to exploit through 
terrorism and subversion. 

Development of the Initiative 

The United States has been developing 
its program for responding to the 
economic crisis in close consultation with 
potential recipients and other donor 
countries. Last July Secretary Haig and 

^pril 1982 

U.S. Special Trade Representative 
William Brock met in Nassau with the 
Foreign Ministers of Canada, Mexico, 
and Venezuela. They agreed to sponsor 
a multilateral action program for the 
region within which each country would 
develop its own program. Venezuela and 
Mexico are making a significant con- 
tribution to the basin, particularly 
through their joint oil facility. Canada 
recently announced major increases in 
its foreign assistance to the area. The 
Colombians also intend to increase their 
financial contribution to the basin. We 
expect other donors will also expand 
their efforts in the areas of trade and 

Key Elements of Proposed U.S. 

The proposed U.S. program consists of 
integrated, mutually reinforcing meas- 
ures in the fields of trade, investment, 
and financial assistance. 

The centerpiece of the U.S. program 
is the offer of one-way free trade. Cur- 
rently the countries of the region are 
already afforded liberal entry into the 
U.S. market. Nevertheless, some of the 
duties which remain in place are in sec- 
tors of special interest to the basin coun- 
tries. They also limit export expansion 
into many nontraditional products. 

The President will request from the 
Congress authority to eliminate duties 
on all imports from the basin except tex- 
tiles and apparel. Sugar imports will 
receive duty-free treatment but only up 
to a certain limit in order to protect the 
U.S. domestic sugar price support pro- 
gram mandated by Congress. A safe- 
guard mechanism will be available to 
any U.S. industry seriously injured by 
increased basin imports. Rules of origin 
will be liberal to encourage investment 
but will require a minimum amount of 
local content (25%). The President will 
have discretion to designate bene- 
ficiaries, taking into account countries' 
own efforts to carry out necessary 
reform of their internal economic 

The Bahamas 

Area: 5,380 sq. mi. 
Population: 240,000 
Capital: Nassau 
GDP: $1.3 million (1980) 
Major Trade Items: Imports — petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 1 Bahamian dollar = 

With a per capita GDP of approximately 
$4,800, The Bahamas is among the most 
developed of the Caribbean islands. 
Traditionally, the country has managed 
its balance of payments and government 
accounts without serious difficulty. In 
1979 and 1980, The Bahamas registered 
balance-of-payments surpluses. In 1980 
government revenues totaled $260.1 
million and expenditures $262.5 million. 
Growth rates have been excellent, with 
8% gains registered in 1978 and 1979 
and 3-4% in 1980. 

The economy is not likely to 
duplicate this performance in 1981 and 
1982. While the islands' off-shore bank- 
ing business continues to be strong, 
tourism, by far the most important in- 
dustry, has slackened due to several fac- 
tors. The strongest factor affecting 
tourism is the U.S. recession. However, 
substantial pay raises for hotel 
employees and the strong U.S. dollar, to 
which the Bahamian dollar is pegged, 
may also have tended to make The 
Bahamas' tourism industry less com- 
petitive. Construction of tourist hotels 
and dwellings has dipped, in part due to 
a Bahamian law which restricts foreign 
property ownership. 

There is an increasing tendency for 
unemployed and underemployed young 
adults living on the outer islands to 
migrate to Grand Bahama and New 
Providence. To counter this influx, the 
Government of The Bahamas has con- 
centrated its development efforts in the 
outer islands to create employment op- 
portunities and build fishing and 
agriculture production. 

With limited potential for 
agriculture. The Bahamas relies heavily 


Atlantic Ocean 

Nassau THE 



Caribbean Sea 

on food imports from the United States. 
If other Caribbean countries were to 
boost their food production, and a 
reliable cargo service could be 
developed. The Bahamas could con- 
ceivably be a potential market. ■ 

The President will also seek congres- 
sional authorization to grant U.S. in- 
vestors in the Caribbean Basin a signifi- 
cant tax measure to encourage invest- 
ment. We are still consulting with the 
Congress on the exact measures to be 

The President will request a fiscal 
year (FY) 1982 supplemental economic 
assistance appropriation of $350 million 
to provide emergency assistance for 

several key countries whose situation is 
particularly critical. That will bring pro- 
posed FY 1982 economic assistance to 
$824.6 million, or $403 million above FY 
1981. The Administration's request is for 
$664.5 million in FY 1983 economic 
assistance. As the table on page 15 j 

shows, the security assistance is only a 
small portion of the total assistance pro- 
vided by the United States to the Carib- ] 
bean Basin region. i 

Department of State Bulletin 

Sill Caribbean Basin 

)ther Economic Initiatives 

• The United States will extend 
nore favorable treatment to Caribbean 
Basin textile and apparel exports under 
jilateral and multilateral agreements 
vhile continuing our overall policy of 
seeking tighter limits on import growth 
'rom our major suppliers. 

• The United States will seek to 
legotiate bilateral investment treaties 
ivith interested countries. 

• The United States will work with 
multilateral development banks and the 
private sector to develop insurance 
facilities to supplement the noncommer- 
cial investment risk insurance operation 
of the Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration (OPIC). 

• The U.S. Export-Import Bank will 
expand protection, where its lending 
criteria allow, for short-term credit from 
commercial banks to basin private sec- 
tors for critical imports. 

• The United States will work with 
each country to develop private sector 
strategies to coordinate and focus 
development efforts of local business, 
U.S. firms, and private voluntary 
organizations. The strategies will seek to 
remove impediments to growth, in- 
cluding lack of marketing skills, short- 
ages of trained manpower, poor regional 
transport, and inadequate infrastruc- 

Potential Beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 1980 

rOTAL AREA: 494,684 square miles 
rOTAL POPULATION; 39 million 
rOTAL GDP: $45 billion 





;;ayman Islands 

Dosta Rica 

Dominican Republic 

Eastern Caribbean 

(Anguilla. Antigua and Barbuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, Saint 
Chnstopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) 

El Salvador 






Netherlands Antilles 




Trinidad and Tobago 

Turl<s and Caicos Islands 




{millions of 

Gross Domestic 

($ millions) 


to US 
($ millions)' 


(rom U.S. 
(% of total) 




























































































' Source: International Monetary Fund. Directories of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1974-80. 
' Primarily processed products of imported crude oil. 

April 1982 

Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands 

A series of measures wi]l support the 
efforts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands to play a dynamic role in the 
Caribbean region. For example, involve- 
ment of the possessions will be critical 
to the success of private sector develop- 
ment strategies. In addition, the U.S. 
Government has consulted closely with 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands 
about the Caribbean Basin initiative. 
Legislation under the initiative will 
reflect Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
interests in many important ways. 
Excise taxes on all imported rum will be 
rebated to Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands. Inputs into Caribbean Basin 
production from the possessions will be 
considered domestic under the rules of 
origin. Their industries will have access 
to the same safeguards provisions as 
mainland industries. 


The U.S. program for the Caribbean 
Basin initiative has been developed over 
the last 8 months in an intensive inter- 
agency process and wide-ranging con- 
sultations with the governments and the 
private sectors of donor and potential 
recipient countries. The resulting in- 
tegrated program of trade, investment, 
and aid attacks both emergency prob- 
lems and structural impediments to 
long-range economic development. 

The backbone of the program is the 
offer of one-way free trade. While the 
economic benefits are long term, the 
offer of an unimpeded U.S. market to 
those small nations is a major political 
commitment with immediate impact. It 
will also strongly encourage sound inter- 
nal economic policies. 

Investment incentives (particularly 
extension of a significant tax incentive 
for U.S. direct investment in the basin) 
promise an immediate return to U.S. 
investors who undertake the increased 


Area: 166 sq. mi. 

Population: 250,000 

Capital: Bridgetown 

GDP: $815 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— sugar; 

Imports — petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 2 Barbadian dollars = 


The Barbadian economy has been a 
strong performer in recent years in spite 
of its small size and geographical isola- 
tion. The primary causes for this success 
have been an effective, stable govern- 
ment; a strong commitment to private 
enterprise and free markets; a 
cooperative, pragmatic approach by 
labor unions; and a highly literate and 
trainable work force. Barbados has a 
very open economy, vulnerable to 
cyclical world trends in prices and de- 

Barbados achieved a consistent level 
of economic growth, averaging 5% from 
1976 to 1980, before dipping to a prob- 

Bridgetown, founded by the British in 
1628, is the capital, commercial center, and 
major port of Barbados. The port serves 
also as an important transshipment point 
for the Caribbean Basin. 

able slight negative growth in 1981. Th» 
partial recovery of the industrial nation 
follovidng rapid oil price increases in tht 
early 1970s, and increased levels of 
private investment in tourism and 
manufacturing, contributed to the 
1976-80 boom. This rapid growth reduc©' 
unemployment from an estimated 25% 
in 1975 to about 12% in 1980. 

In 1980 international inflation, in- 
creased levels of public and private in- 
vestment, a strong demand for con- 
sumer goods, and an increased oil bill 
led to a large increase in imports. Due 
to booming sugar prices and production 
which reached its highest level since 
1971, and tourist receipts, exports 
revenues outpaced import growth. Net 
private capital inflows, in contrast with 
previous years, were relatively low, 
largely a consequence of high interest 
rates abroad and of increased interest 
rate differentials between financial 
markets abroad and Barbados. 

In 1981 foreign exchange earnings 
dropped in real terms due to declines in 
tourism growth and the value of sugar 
exports, contributing to a balance-of- 
payments deficit. The decline in tourism 
grovrth was primarily due to a 
Caribbean-wide downturn in tourism 
caused by recession in developed coun- 
tries and, to a much lesser degree, to 
competition caused by the rebound of 
Jamaica's tourist industry. The drop in 
sugar receipts was due to a relatively 
poor harvest and a drop in the world 
price in the last part of the year. 

Fortunately, nontraditional light in- 
dustry continued to show impressive 
growth, particularly in electronic compo- 
nent assembly. This diversification has 
enabled the nontraditional export sector 
to replace sugar as Barbados' second 
most important foreign exchange earner 
after tourism. U.S. investment on the 
island totals over $100 million and ac- 
counts for an estimated 5,500 jobs. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

111 Caribbean Basin 

•isk perceived in the basin. They thus 
jncourage the location of new produc- 
non there. 

The emergency economic aid pro- 
gram confronts the acute liquidity crisis 
faced by many countries in the region. 
^t stake is the survival of the private 
sector and with it the pluralism, diver- 
sity, and political moderation on which 
viable long-run policies depend. The 
development assistance and economic 
support funds in the FY 1983 budget, 
which incorporate significant increases 
from earlier years, will be directed into 
new programs aimed at removing basic 
impediments to growth. 

In order to insure that Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands not only can con- 
tribute to, but benefit from, these new 
policies, a package of new measures con- 
cerning them is being prepared. 

Free Trade Area 

Griven the serious economic deterioration 
in the Caribbean Basin region, the trade 
component of the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative was designed to provide the 
most favorable access possible for ex- 
ports from the basin. Currently the 
countries of the region are already 
afforded liberal entry into the U.S. 
market. (In 1980, $6.4 billion— out of 
total Caribbean Basin exports to the 
United States of $10.4 billion— were 
free of duty; a large part of dutiable 
trade was accounted for by 
petroleum— $2.7 billion— for which 
tariffs are not economically meaningful.) 
Nevertheless, some of the duties which 
remain in place are in sectors of special 
interest to the basin countries. They also 
limit export expansion into many non- 
traditional products. 

The generalized system of pref- 
erences (GSP) already extends duty-free 
treatment on many products to a large 
number of developing countries. 
However, the GSP has a complex struc- 
ture which limits the ability of small and 
relatively inexperienced traders— which 
is the case in a great many of the Carib- 
bean Basin's enterprises— to take advan- 

^pril 1982 


Area: 8,866 sq. mi. 

Population: 150,000 

Capital: Belmopan 

GDP: $165 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— sugar, 
garments, citrus fruits; Im- 
ports — petroleum 

Exchange Rate: 2 Belize dollars = US$1.00 

Almost immediately upon achieving in- 
dependence, Belize finds itself facing a 
difficult short-term economic situation. 
Belize enjoys a large land area relative 
to its small population and has the 
physical resources necessary to support 
a strong agricultural base, but the next 
few years will be difficult. With little in- 
dustry, inadequate infrastructure, a 
shortage of skilled labor, and an uncer- 
tain resolution of its border dispute with 
Guatemala, Belize faces an uphill fight 
to achieve sustainable growth. The re- 
cent fall in world sugar prices, combined 
v/ith capital flight and stagnation in 
manufacturing activity, has sharply com- 
pounded the country's immediate 
economic problems. 

Over the middle term, Belize 
possesses considerable development 
potential. The country has extensive 
timber reserves and enjoys soil and 
climatic conditions conducive to the 
cultivation of vegetables, tropical fruits, 
and the raising of livestock. Tourism 
shows some promise, as well as labor- 
intensive nontraditional export in- 
dustries. But in order for this potential 

to be realized, the short-term problems 
will have to be overcome. 

The situation in agriculture requires 
bringing more land under cultivation, 
both to increase the volume of export 
crops, such as bananas, and to reduce 
food imports. Foodstuffs currently com- 
prise over 20% of total imports. 

In industry, Belize has considerable 
potential for agroprocessing and forest- 
based enterprises. To realize these op- 
portunities, Belize will have to build in- 
vestor confidence and remedy the cur- 
rent shortage of skilled manpower. 

Private sector development in 
agriculture and manufacturing will also 
continue to be linked to progress in im- 
proving the country's infrastructure. ■ 

St. John's Cathedral in Belize, founded in 
1812, is the oldest Protestant church in 
Central America. Most Belizeans are of 
multiracial descent and about half are 

tage of the opportunities which GSP 
offers. Many of the more promising 
prospects for basin exports are in prod- 
uct categories which have been 
legislatively excluded from the GSP pro- 
gram for global reasons which are not 
relevant to the Caribbean Basin. Also, 
GSP has both dollar and percentage 
limitations which are arbitrary in their 
application to many Caribbean Basin 

Therefore, the Administration will 
seek legislative authority to grant 
beneficiaries in the Caribbean Basin 
duty-free treatment for 12 years for all 
products with the sole exception of tex- 
tiles and apparel items which are subject 
to textile agreements. Sugar imports 
will receive duty-free treatment but only 
up to a certain limit in order to protect 
the U.S. domestic sugar price support 
program mandated by Congress. "The 



Secretary of Agriculture will retain 
standby authority to further limit the 
entry of duty-free imports should this be 
necessary to protect the sugar program. 

A safeguard mechanism will be 
available. This will require a finding by 
the International Trade Commission that 
increased imports are a substantial 
cause of serious injury or threat thereof 
to U.S. domestic industry and a recom- 
mendation to the President to grant 
relief (e.g., a restoration of the tariff). 
Where safeguard relief is sought for 
perishable commodities, the legislation 
provides authority for the Secretary of 
Agriculture to recommend to the Presi- 
dent the restoration of most-favored- 
nation (MFN) treatment on an imme- 
diate basis if warranted pending the 
completion of the formal escape clause 

The rules of origin under the free- 
trade arrangement are an important fac- 
tor in determining the accessibility of 
duty-free access for resource-poor basin 
countries. The free trade area has been 
designed to avoid fostering the type of 
investment in the region which would 
result in mere "pass-through" operations 
involving little value added in the coun- 
try. The Administration does not want 
to reduce the level of required local in- 
put to the point where the free trade 
area will encourage "runaway plants." 
Because of the relatively low level of 
development of many of the countries in 
the region and their limited access to 
local inputs, the free trade area will re- 
quire that basin countries supply a 
minimum of 25% of local value added. 
Inputs from all basin countries can be 
cumulated to meet the 25% minimum. 
Inputs from Puerto Rico and the Virgin 
Islands will be treated as Caribbean 
products for purposes of the rules of 

The President will have discretion to 
designate countries in the Caribbean 
Basin as beneficiaries of the free trade 
area subject to many of the same 
caveats contained in the GSP system 
(nondesignation of Communist countries 
and of countries which expropriate 

British Virgin Islands 

Area: 59 sq. mi. 

Population: 11,000 

Capital: Road Town 

GDP: $30 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — fresh fish, 

gravel, sand; Imports — foodstuffs, 

Exchange Rate: U.S. dollars are used 

The British Virgin Islands are divided 
into two separate and distinct sets of 
islands — the Virgin Gorda grouping and 
the Tortola grouping. Virgin Gorda 
maintains a large, well-equipped yacht 
basin which offers complete winter lodg- 
ings for international yachtsmen. The 

majority of the islands' tourist facOitiea 
are geared toward the needs of the 
yacht trade which supplies a major per 
tion of the British Virgin Islands' in- 
come. Conversely Tortola caters to the 
upper-class hotel tourists who seek 
seclusion and superior accommodations 

The British Virgin Islands is also 
known for its expertise in cosmetic 
surgery. A portion of the government's 
income is derived from its renowned 
hospital which features plastic and 
reconstructive surgery. 

Offshore banking has recently 
evolved as an important sector to the 
British Virgin Islands' economy. ■ 

Cayman Islands 

Area: 118 sq. mi. 

Population: 16,677 

Capital: Georgetown 

GDP: $73 million (1977) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — turtle shells, 
tropical and dried fish; Im- 
ports — foodstuffs, textiles, building 

Exchange Rate: .833 Cayman dollar = 

The Cayman Islands are situated about 
200 miles northwest of Jamaica and 
southeast of Cuba. The remote islands 
have few basic resources other than the 
sand and the sea, which make them ■ 
popular tourist centers. With the excep- ' 
tion of turtle farming, local industry and 
agriculture is geared to the domestic 
market only. Because of the absence of ! 
taxation, the islands have attracted any ' 
number of offshore banking and trust 
companies. The United States is the ma-i 
jor source of imports and tourists. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin! 

Caribbean Basin 

without compensation or which discrim- 
inate against U.S. exports). The Presi- 
dent will also take into account economic 
criteria such as the attitude of the 
beneficiaries toward private enterprise 
and the policies recipient countries are 
pursuing to promote their own devel- 
opment. The U.S. Government will enter 
into discussions with the Caribbean 
Basin countries to develop self-help 

The free trade area will require the 
United States to seek a waiver of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 


The textile and apparel industry in most 
Caribbean Basin countries is of modest 
scale. U.S. imports from the region in 
1981 amounted to $472 million and 192 
million square yards equivalent, account- 
ing for 6% of total U.S. imports of 
apparel on a volume basis. 

Most textile exports from Caribbean 
Basin countries to the United States are 
made by U.S. companies which assemble 
garments in those countries from fabric 
produced and cut in the United States. 
Under Section 807 of the U.S. tariff 
code, these companies pay duty only on 
the value added abroad. 

In 1981 the United States exported 
$8 million worth of textile machinery 
and $519 million worth of textile and 
apparel products to the Caribbean Basin 
countries, much of the latter as cut 
fabric for assembly into garments. 

International textile trade is gov- 
erned by the provisions of the GATT 
arrangement commonly known as the 
multifiber arrangement (MFA). The 
MFA provides a framework for insuring 
orderly development of textile and 
apparel trade while avoiding disruption 
of importing country markets. In recog- 
nition of the special nature of textile 
trade as reflected by the MFA, textile 
and apparel products are not proposed 
for duty-free treatment under the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative. The U.S. Govern- 
ment intends, however, to allow more 
favorable access for Caribbean Basin 

Costa Rica 

Area: 19,700 sq. mi. 

Population: 2.24 million 

Capital: San Jose 

GDP: $4.9 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— coffee, 

bananas, beef; Imports — petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 8.57 colones = US$1.00 

Traditionally the most prosperous of the 
Central American countries, Costa Rica 
is in the midst of a severe financial 
crisis. High oil prices, reduced coffee 
prices, and years of high public sector 
deficits and external borrowing have 
brought the country to a state of virtual 
bankruptcy. Foreign exchange reserves 
are depleted and the country has fallen 
behind in repayments of external debt. 
A decline in GDP, 60% inflation, and ris- 
ing unemployment occurred in 1981. 
These trends continued into 1982. 

Because of Costa Rica's traditional 
prosperity, U.S. Government assistance 
has, m recent years, been limited to a 
modest-sized development assistance 
program. In recognition of Costa Rica's 
worsening economy, the United States is 
proposing an increased assistance 
package combining development 
assistance, a food-for-peace program, 
and balance-of-payments support. The 
increased assistance will be used 
primarily for credit for the private sec- 

Costa Rica has been in discussions 
with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for an economic stabilization pro- 
gram. The country is also negotiating a 
private debt rescheduling. If successful, 
an official rescheduling is likely to 

follow. Increased international 
assistance will provide a psychological 
boost to investment in Costa Rica, but 
the country's economic recovery will re- 
quire compliance with an IMF program 
and other economic reforms. Even with 
an IMF agreement and increased official 
assistance, Costa Rica will face several 
years of austerity and falling real in- 
comes as the government will be forced 
to restrain imports, credit, and public 
spending. ■ 

^1 "%'<>•«• 1 

The National Theater in San Jose, Costa 
Rica, was inaugurated in 1897. It is con- 
structed in elaborate rococo style, copied 
from the Opera Comique in Paris. It was 
the site of the 1963 meeting of the Central 
American chiefs of state. 

products, on a case-by-case basis within 
the context of overall Administration 
textile policy implementing the MFA. 
The U.S. Government will continue to 
seek tighter limits on import growth 
from our major suppliers. 

The United States has textile trade 
agreements with Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic, Costa Rica, and Jamaica, 
which set agreed levels of trade for cer- 
tain products. (No quotas are currently 
in effect under the Jamaica agreement.) 

Tax Measures 

The Administration recognizes that 
some U.S. entrepreneurs may be hesi- 
tant to invest in some Caribbean Basin 
countries. The risk may be perceived as 
high for venture capital, especially when 
coupled with the start-up costs of 
developing new markets and marketing 
channels, training new local employees 
and managers, and overcoming trans- 

April 1982 


portation bottlenecks to insure a steady 
flow of raw materials and export prod- 

For this reason, the Administration 
is developing a tax proposal to en- 
courage U.S. investment in the Carib- 
bean Basin. We are still consulting on 
the exact nature of this proposal. An 
example of a possible tax measure under 
discussion is a 5-year legislative exten- 
sion of the domestic investment tax 
credit for up to 10% of the amount of 
fixed asset investment in the countries 
of the region. Such a system would 
operate in much the same fashion as 
does the tax credit for investment cur- 
rently in effect in the United States. The 
tax credit would be granted for a 5-year 
period to individual countries which 
enter into executive agreements for tax 
administration purposes. After the 
5-year period, the program would be 
evaluated and a decision made on 
whether to continue the extension. The 
credit would permit U.S. businesses to 
reduce their net tax liability in the 
United States. 

Bilateral Investment Treaties 

Bilateral investment treaties are in- 
tended to help stabilize the bilateral in- 
vestment relationship with a developing 
country by establishing an agreed legal 
framework for investment, by assuring 
certain minimum standards of treat- 
ment, and by providing agreed means 
for resolving investment disputes. 

Other developed countries are fur- 
ther along in their bilateral investment 
treat>' programs than the United States. 
(The Federal Republic of Germany, for 
example, has approximately 50 outstand- 
ing.) During 1981 the United States 
developed a prototype and late in the 
year began discussions with several 
countries. It is generally agreed that the 
U.S. prototype treats the investment 
issue more comprehensively than the 
treaties signed by other developed coun- 
tries and has the potential to have a 
greater impact on investment climates in 

Dominican Republic 

This statue of Christopher Columbus 
stands in Santo Domingo — the oldest city 
in the Western Hemisphere, founded in 
1496. In 1542 Columbus' remains and those 
of his son Diego were moved from Spain 
and interred in the Cathedral of Santo 

Area: 18,712 sq. mi. 
Population: 5.43 million 
Capital: Santo Domingo 
GDP: $6.7 billion (1980) 
Major Trade Items: Exports— sugar, cof- 
fee, cacao, gold, ferronickel 
Exchange Rate: 1 peso = US$1.00 

Economic growth in the Dominican 
Republic has been nmning at around 5"!^ 
for the past several years. However, it 
was down in late 1981 (to a figure of 
about 3.5% growth for 1981), and last 
year's plunge in world prices for all of 
the Dominican Republic's major ex- 
ports—sugar, coffee, cacao, gold, fer- 
ronickel, and bauxite — has produced a 
gloomy outlook for 1982. Dominican 
foreign exchange earnings from sugar in 
1982 are expected to decline by about 
$200 million. The Dominican Republic 
has been hard hit by high oil prices; last 
year the country spent over $400 million 
on petroleum products. 

Last year the Dominican Govern- 
ment began tightening imports, credit, 
and public sector spending in anticipa- 
tion of the 1982 shortfalls, and a 
slackening of economic growth resulted. 
Despite the government's conservative 
monetary and fiscal policies, the public 
sector deficit will increase this year as 
lower export prices will lead to a sharp 
drop in government revenue. This wdU 
make it more difficult for the govern- 
ment to proceed with its plans to expand 
use of hydroelectric and coal generating 
plants in order to lessen dependence on 
oil. The government will come under in- 
creasing pressure to relax its austerity 
measures as the May 1982 elections ap- 

Sugar is the primary sector of the 
Dominican economy, and there is much 
concern in the country about U.S. sugar 
policy and its possible effect on world 
sugar prices. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

less developed countries (LDCs). The 
key elements of the U.S. prototype 
bilateral investment treaty are: 

• Provisions concerning entry and 
duration of investment; 

• Treatment for established U.S. in- 
vestors which is no less favorable than 
that given domestic investors and other 
foreign investors; 

• Prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation in the event of nationaliza- 

• Unrestricted repatriation and 
other transfers of assets; and 

• Dispute settlement provisions. 

The United States is prepared to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties 
with interested countries in the Carib- 
bean Basin. Negotiations have already 
begun with Panama, at that country's 

Investment Insurance and OPIC 

The Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration currently offers political risk in- 
surance for U.S. investors in approx- 
imately 100 developing countries. 
Coverages offered are for expropriation, 
war risk, and inconvertibility. Similar 
programs are offered by other developed 
countries, although their participation in 
Latin America varies according to per- 
ceived commercial and strategic in- 

OPIC also has other programs to 
facilitate U.S. investment flows to the 
Caribbean Basin region. OPIC can make 
direct loans for certain kinds of in- 
vestments. This authority is used almost 
exclusively in the region. OPIC also 
organizes missions of U.S. business 
representatives to explore investment 
opportunities. In late 1981 OPIC took in- 
vestment missions to two basin states, 
Jamaica and Haiti. 

OPIC is increasing its activities in 
the Caribbean Basin in both the in- 
surance and other programs. However, 
for legislative and other reasons, there 
are gaps in insurance coverage available 

to Caribbean Basin investment. These 

• Limited coverages in countries 
where OPIC is at or near its country 

• Lack of general coverage for non- 
developed country investment, i.e., 
regional investment, domestic invest- 
ment, Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries (OPEC) investment; 

• Lack of sufficient coverage for 
major investments in mining and energy 

To expand insurance coverage avail- 
able to eligible U.S. investors, OPIC is 
working with private sector insurers to 
establish informal consortia where 
appropriate on a project-by-project basis. 
Mixed coverage of this kind is currently 

being discussed for a major project in 
the basin. 

For other investments not eligible 
for OPIC coverage, some form of 
multilateral insurance may be possible. 
World Bank (IBRD) President Clausen 
stated his interest in examining such a 
scheme in his September 1981 speech to 
the World Bank Board of Governors. 

Concessional Aid 

Concessional U.S. assistance is expected 
to increase rapidly under the Caribbean 
Basin initiative. The three primary tools 
for providing direct economic aid are: 

• Development assistance, which is 
project oriented, with emphasis on 
agriculture, health, and population prob- 

Summary of U.S. Economic and Military 
Assistance to the Caribbean Basin 


Development Assistance 
Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
Food Aid (PL 480) 


International Military 
Education and Training 

Foreign Military Sales Credits 

Grants (Military Assistance 

Program and under Section 506A 
of the Foreign Assistance Act) 

Total Assistance 

Percent Military 

($ millions) 







to be proposed 

to Congress) 



overall figures 

submitted m 

FY 1983 budget) 



































'For allocation by country, see pp 18-19 

' Includes $20 million earmarked for Nicaragua in ttie FY 1982 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act, Tfie Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Act, 1982 contains no specific 
reference to Nicaragua, fiowever, it was tfie intention of the committees as reflected in tlie Appropriations 
Conference Report that no funds sfiould be spent for tfiese purposes. Tfie disposition of ttiese funds will be 
decided after furlfier consultation with Congress 



• Economic support funds (ESF), 
which are more flexible and can provide 
direct balance-of-payments support as 
well as credit for crucial imports; and 

• Food aid, provided through PL 
480 programs, which provides needed 
foreign exchange and generates counter- 
part development funds. 

Some increase of total concessional 
assistance to the Caribbean Basin is 
planned in FY 1982 under the current 
budget level. A major increase will be 
achieved, however, through a $350 
million supplemental request to Con- 
gress to increase FY 1982 funding. In 
FY 1983 the proposed level is more than 
50% higher than the actual level of 
obligations in FY 1981 and double the 
FY 1980 level. 

The bulk of the planned increase in 
U.S. assistance is in the economic sup- 
port fund program for the region. ESF 
assistance for the basin would increase 
from $15 mOlion in FY 1980 to $490 
million in FY 1982 if the supplemental 
request is approved and to $326 million 
in FY 1983. The ESF would be used pri- 
marily to finance private-sector imports, 
thus strengthening the balance of 
payments of key countries of the basin 
while facilitating increased domestic pro- 
duction and employment. At the same 
time, we will be discussing with other 
donors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
and with the policymakers of these coun- 
tries, possible reform measures to insure 
that the ESF assistance is utilized effec- 
tively and will have the greatest possible 
impact on local production and employ- 

In FY 1982, development assistance 
for the basin will increase by $44 
million, or 25%, over the FY 1981 level. 
In FY 1983, $218 mUlion of development 
assistance is proposed, a further in- 
crease of 3% over the FY 1982 level. 
These amounts are approximately the 
same as the $215 million of development 
assistance provided in FY 1980, but the 
level in FY 1980 was extraordinarily 
high since it included funding provided 
in response to several natural disasters 

in the Caribbean as well as to the 
worsening situation in Central America. 
Food for Peace assistance under PL 
480 is projected to increase by $40 
million, or nearly 50%, over FY 1980 
levels. This will increase the foodstuffs 
available in the basin countries while 
also providing balance-of-payments sup- 
port. Local currency generated through 
this assistance supports local develop- 
ment activities and helps reduce govern- 
ment budget deficits. Conditions asso- 
ciated with this assistance relate to 
macroeconomic policy reforms as well as 
policies and programs to increase 
agricultural production. 

Assistance under the Caribbean 
Basin initiative will be focused increas- 
ingly on private sector support. Both 
capital and technical assistance will be 
provided to ameliorate infrastructure, 
credit, institutional, and training con- 
straints to trade and investment expan- 
sion throughout the area. 

The table on pages 18-19 shows: 

• Actual amounts of concessional 
assistance to the basin in FY 1980 and 

• Current planning figures for FY 
1982; and 

• Congressional presentation pro- 
posals for FY 1983. 

El Salvador 

Area: 8,260 sq. mi. 

Population: 4.5 million 

Capital: San Salvador 

GDP: $3.5 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— coffee, 

cotton; Imports— petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 2.5 colones = US$1.00 

El Salvador's economy is torn by an 
intractable combination of deteriorating 
terms of trade, the inevitably negative 
effects of fundamental economic and 
social reform, and a highly destructive 
guerrilla insurrection. Private external 
credit has been entirely cut off, capital 
flight now totals something over $500 
million, and net private investment has 
been negative for at least 2 years. GDP 
growth was negative again in 1981, for 
the third year in a row. 

Even without an ongoing insurrec- 
tion, El Salvador would be facing 
serious economic difficulties. Falling 
coffee prices dealt the first blow. The 
effect on production and investment of 
politically necessary economic reforms 
then greatly increased uncertainty. Pro- 
duction has declined, straining the 
administrative and financial resources of 
the government. The reform program is 
going ahead in spite of a number of 

implementation problems, but produc- 
tion, particularly for export, wOl un- 
doubtedly suffer for at least the near- 
term future. Construction is off about 
60% and tourism has dropped to near | 
zero. Unemployment is up to at least ' 
25%. I 

Economic fall-out from the insurrec- i 
tion has been serious thus far, in spite ot I 
some success by the government in 
restricting the operational area of the 
rebels. The problem now is not so much 
direct attacks on industry; it is the 
indirect impact of attacks on infrastruc- 
ture and the more serious negative 
effects they have on investor 
psychology. The insurrection has also 
effectively closed off the economy from 
foreign bank credits. For that reason 
local industry and remaining private 
agriculture is suffering as much from 
the lack of working capital as from 
other negative elements in the economy. , 

El Salvador is receiving major J 

assistance from the United States, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and international ' 
financial institutions. Without additional ' 
help, however, as well as a reduction in 
internal violence, it will be very difficult 
to avoid a further drop in GDP in 1982 ' 
and perhaps also in future years. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


Caribbean Basin 

Country planning figures for the $350 
million supplemental for FY 1982 will in- 
clude increases to El Salvador, Costa 
Rica, and Jamaica. Other recipients will 
be countries such as Honduras, 
Dominican Republic, Belize, and the 
eastern Caribbean. 

Agricultural Modernization 

The Caribbean Basin initiative accords a 
high priority to the problems of the 
region's food and agriculture sector. The 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
has special expertise which can help 
modernize the basin's agriculture. 

Agricultural output in the Caribbean 
Basin countries increased only 1.5% in 
1981, down sharply from the 4%-6% 
growth trend of the 1970s. World prices 
are currently soft for the region's major 
agricultural exports (bananas, coffee, 
beef, sugar, cotton, and cocoa). 
Agricultural commodities account for 
about half of the basin's export earnings. 

Although the agricultural sector's 
contribution to the economies of the 
region has been steadily declining (and 
nowhere exceeds 40%), about 57% of the 
region's population is still rural. Modern- 
ization of the agricultural sector is vital 
to meeting the food needs of the region's 
growing populace and to enhance export 

Improving Animal and Plant 
Health and Quality. Plant and animal 
products exported to the United States 
must meet U.S. agricultural health and 
sanitary regulations which USDA en- 
forces. USDA is prepared to make a 
concerted, coordinated effort to promote 
increased regional understanding of U.S. 
agricultural health and sanitary regula- 
tions, to provide technical assistance on 
plant inspection procedures and on 
operating fumigation facilities, and to 
offer training in enforcing health and 
sanitary regulations. An interagency 
group is working to develop means for 
providing assistance to comply with U.S. 
health and sanitary regulations. 

An animal disease-free Caribbean 
Basin would be mutually beneficial to 


Area: 133 sq. mi. 

Population: 110.000 

Capital: Saint George's 

GNP: $61.3 million (1978) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— nutmeg, 
bananas, cocoa; Imports — bev- 
erages, tobacco, machinery 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 
dollars = US$1.00 

The island of Grenada is located approx- 
imately 100 miles north of Trinidad and 
the Venezuelan mainland. It has a 
population of about 110,000. Grenada's 
principal exports have traditionally been 
nutmeg, bananas, and cocoa. It is cur- 
rently ruled by a Marxist-oriented 
government which came to power 
through a 1979 coup and has since re- 

fused to hold democratic elections. Since 
the coup, the Grenadian economy has 
been in steady decline. 

Tourism, once an important source 
of foreign exchange, has dropped 
precipitously, and there has been little 
new private investment. The small pri- 
vate business sector which remains on 
the island faces an uncertain future. ■ 

Grenada, known as the "Isle of Spice," i 
famous for its nutmeg, cacao, and cin- 
namon. This decades-old lighthouse at 
Point Saline on the southern tip of the 
island offers a view of the many inlets. 

(Photo by Abon Jack Lowe. Ameru-aji) 

April 1982 


the region and the United States. The 
U.S. Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID) and USDA have programs 
to contain and eradicate swdne fever and 
encephalomyelitis. Additional coopera- 
tion in this field is envisioned. 

Caribbean Basin countries need to 
better gear their agricultural production 
to the standards of the world market, to 
better serve their domestic and export 
needs both in terms of quality and 
seasonal availability. To aid these coun- 
tries to achieve acceptable standards 
and grades, technical assistance could be 
offered from USDA, drawing on the ex- 
perience of the Food Quality and Safety 
Service which assures that all imported 
food products meet U.S. standards for 
proper labeling and wholesomeness. 
Technical advice could assist Caribbean 
exporters to serve the world market by 
supplying quality products which may 
not be available otherwise at reasonable 
prices. Minimizing losses during distribu- 
tion and storage of perishables is essen- 
tial to the successful marketing of these 

Promotion of Agroindustries. 

USDA has begun to play an important 
role in facilitating the involvement of 
U.S. agribusiness in developing coun- 
tries. Technical expertise found in U.S. 
agribusiness can help solve agricultural 
problems in developing countries and to 
provide additional opportunities for U.S. 
firms. Given the relatively small 
economies of the Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries, agroindustries must be carefully 
designed vnth regard to location and 
scale. USDA is already actively involved 
in providing agribusiness development 
assistance to Jamaica, including the for- 
mulation of joint ventures, provision of 
management expertise, and the sale of 
U.S. capital goods. 

Expanding Agricultural Research 
and Training Opportunities. Both 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have 
proposed establishment of a tropical 
agriculture research center for the en- 
tire Caribbean region. Establishing such 
a center on U.S. territory can take ad- 
vantage of linkages with the entire U.S. 


U.S. Economic 

Assistance to the Carl 

bbean Bas 


($ millions) 

FY 1980 

FY 1981 

FY 1982 

FY 1982 

FY 1983 






Costa Rica 






Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 






Dominican Republic 






Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 





PL 480 






El Salvador 






Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 












Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 




PL 480 











Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 



PL 480 











Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 




PL 480 












Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 





PL 480 












Development Assistance 





Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 












Development Assistance 




Economic Support Fund 





PL 480 





Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 


Development Assistance 
Economic Support Fund 
PL 480 


Development Assistance 
Economic Support Fund 
PL 480 

FY 1980 





FY 1981 





FY 1982 FY 1982 FY 1983 

(Budget) (Supplemental) (Request) 















Development Assistance 






Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 






Caribbean Regional 






Development Assistance 






Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 






Regional Office for Central 

America and Panama 






Development Assistance 






Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 






Latin America and 

Caribbean Regional 







Development Assistance 






Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 






Caribbean Basin Total: 






Development Assistance 






Economic Support Fund 






PL 480 





' Due to rounding, some figures may not total. 

' Includes $20 million earmarked for Nicaragua in tfie FY 1982 International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act- Ttie Foreign Assistance and Related Program Appropriations Act. 1982, contains no 
specific reference to Nicaragua: fiowever, it was tfie intention of ttie committees as reflected in the Ap- 
propriations Conference Report that no funds should be spent for these purposes. The disposition of these 
funds will be decided after further consultation with Congress 

= Specifically for the American Institute lor Free Labor Development- 

' Unallocated for special requirements- 

agricultural research and educational 
system. USDA, through its own re- 
search organizations and in concert with 
the land grant universities, can play a 
useful role in advising both the hosts 
and financers of such a center. Careful 
coordination will be necessary with ex- 
isting educational and research institu- 
tions in the region, such as the Center 
for Agricultural Research and Training 
located in Costa Rica. 

Expanded agricultural training activ- 
ities are anticipated as a result of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative. Examples of 
USDA's involvement include a recent 
agricultural credit course in Haiti, a 
comprehensive agricultural training plan 
in Guyana, and a tropical forestry cur- 
riculum developed in cooperation with 
the Forest Service's Tropical Forestry 
Station in Puerto Rico. Training of plant 
health inspectors from the Caribbean 
can also be envisioned. 

Coordinating Bilateral Agricul- 
tural Programs With Multilateral 
Organizations. USDA experts, as well 
as short-term consultants, work with 
international organizations involved in 
the Caribbean Basin. USDA is 
represented on the governing bodies of 
the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture, as well as 
other such organizations, and thereby 
helps direct the organizations' programs 
and policies of assistance. Discussions 
are now underway with the staffs of the 
World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank to establish subcom- 
mittees on food and agriculture to func- 
tion within the framework of the consor- 
tia led by the respective banks. 

Assistance for Private Sector 

The U.S. Government will be working 
with Caribbean Basin governments to 
design private sector development 
strategies which combine private, public, 
and voluntary organizations' resources in 
imaginative new programs. We will also 
explore ways to promote regional 
trading companies, to provide assistance 



to comply with U.S. health and sanitary 
regulations, to improve transportation 
links, and in general to remove public 
and private national and regional im- 
pediments to private sector development 
with emphasis on new investment. 

AID will be coordinating this process 
in Washington, and the AID missions 
will have a parallel role in the basin 
countries. Other U.S. Government in- 
stitutions, particularly the Department 
of Commerce, and the private sector in 
the United States and in the basin will 
have important responsibilities. Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands will also 
have an important role in sharing their 
own expertise and experience. But the 
creation of an environment which en- 

courages business activity will require 
the leadership of basin governments. 

Among the factors that will be con- 
sidered are: the current condition of the 
private sector; the business climate; 
government policies affecting the private 
sector; public and private institutions 
serving the private sector; and bottle- 
necks to significant expansion of invest- 
ment, production, exports, and par- 
ticularly jobs. Some of the specific bot- 
tlenecks which will be addressed are 
financing shortfalls, market information 
and export/investment know-how, defi- 
cits in trained people, and infrastructure 

Trade Credit Insurance Program 

At the present time, U.S. banks are 
reluctant to provide short-term credits 
for certain Caribbean Basin countries. 
This reluctance stems from the banks' 
perceptions of the serious economic 
and/or political developments in these 
countries and their assessment that pro- 
viding credits in the face of these 
developments would entail extraordinar 
risks of loss which they are not preparei 
to take. Within the Caribbean Basin 
countries the demand for U.S. credits— 
which is not being fulfilled because of 
these risks— is estimated to exceed $1 
billion. To induce the reopening of short 
term credits, there is a need for 



t'V •■]} •■■■ . -I- 'f '' I 


The Bank of Guatemala in the capital city 
displays modernized Mayan de8ig:ns. The 
great Mayan civilization flourished 
throughout much of what is now 
Guatemala and surrounding territories 
before the Spanish conquest in the 1520s. 
More than 50% of today's population are 
descendants of Maya Indians. 

Area: 42,000 sq. mi. 

Population: 7.3 million 

Capital: Guatemala 

GDP: $7.9 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— coffee, 
cotton, bananas; Imports — petro- 

Exchange Rate: 1 quetzale = US$1.00 

Guatemala has enjoyed greater economic 
success in recent years than any other 
country in Central America but is facing 
economic stagnation in 1982. The rate of 
economic growth fell in 1981 due to 
declines in commodity prices, deteriora- 
tion of the regional market, and the 
destructive effect of internal violence on 
tourism. These elements continue to 
threaten the Guatemalan economy in 

Favored by a relatively large inter- 
nal market and a strong agricultural 
base, Guatemala was poised to take full 
advantage of the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) when it was 
created. As a result of the CACM, 
Guatemalan industry developed into the 

largest in Central America. The country 
also benefitted until recently from a 
lucrative tourist industry, as well as 
from a government whose proprivate 
sector attitudes and caution in contract- 
ing external debt left the country in 
essentially sound economic condition. 
Guatemala also produces some oil and 
could be self-sufficient in the near 
future. A large, modern agricultural sec- 
tor efficiently produces a variety of 
crops for the export market. 

The major economic problems facing 
Guatemala are the decline in its regional 
market, which primarily affects in- 
dustry, and the possibility that internal 
and regional political problems will in- 
crease and further counterbalance the 
more positive elements in the economy. 
Internal violence resulting from guerrilla 
activities has choked off the tourist 
trade, increased capital flight, and, if ex- 
tended, could inhibit production of major 
agricultural exports. Solutions to these 
problems must be found if Guatemala is 
to return to its earlier pattern of suc- 
cessful economic growth and develop- 
ment. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

reasonably priced and effective in- 
surance which would protect the U.S. 
banks against these extraordinary risks. 

The Export-Import Bank has 
already been providing medium-term 
credit or credit guarantees through U.S. 
exporters and banks to borrowers in the 
Caribbean Basin which meet Eximbank's 
statutory standard of "reasonable 
assurance of repayment." This amounted 
to $365.5 million in FY 1981. All of Ex- 
imbank's programs are available to U.S. 
suppliers exporting to those countries, 
and Eximbank will intensify its efforts 
to increase the use of its programs by 
the private sector. 

In addition, Eximbank will expand 
its present protection by considering 
cover for short-term credits to in- 
digenous commercial banks in creditwor- 
thy markets. 

Measures for Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
are important components of the U.S. 
presence in the Caribbean area. The 
United States recognizes the need to in- 
sure that the economic development of 
the U.S. possessions is enhanced by U.S. 
policy toward the Caribbean region and 
welcomes their contribution to imple- 
mentation of the Caribbean Basin in- 

The U.S. Government has been in 
close consultation with the Governments 
of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands about the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative and their role in it. Suggestions 
made by these governments have been 
taken into account in designing Carib- 
bean Basin initiative proposals and 
legislation. In particular, legislation 
under the Caribbean Basin initiative will 
reflect Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
interests in the following ways. 

• Inclusion of rum in the proposed 
free trade area is coupled with a proviso 
that excise taxes on imported rum will 
be rebated to Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. 


Area: 83,000 sq. mi. 

Population: 790,000 

Capital: Georgetown 

GDP: $524 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— bauxite, 
alumina, sugar, rice; Imports — petro- 

Exchange Rate: 2.55 Guyana dollars = 

Guyana differs from most Caribbean 
countries in that it has a favorable ratio 
of population to land area. The country 
is blessed with relatively abundant 
natural resources, with the important 
exception of oil and natural gas. 
Guyana's economy is Socialist-oriented, 
with extensive government control of 
the means of production and a number 
of consumer subsidies and price controls. 

Over the past several years, 
economic growth has declined, and the 
country's foreign exchange position has 
continued to deteriorate. Export growth 
has not matched the rising cost of im- 
ports, which have grown in large part as 
a result of oil price increases. The 
country's external debt is approximately 
$500 million, nearly equivalent to annual 
GDP. Thus, negative capital flows, 
resulting in part from heavy debt serv- 
ice, have contributed to the loss of 

Guyana is primarily reliant on baux- 
ite, rice, and sugar exports for foreign 

exchange earnings. Over the past 
decade, annual output from the nation- 
alized bauxite industry has declined. 
Rice production has been stunted by in- 
efficient operation of the state-controlled 
marketing agency, low farmgate prices, 
and poor weather. The government- 
owned sugar industry has also suffered 
production setbacks, which in 1982 will 
be exacerbated by the precipitous drop 
in the world sugar price. These in- 
dustries, as well as Guyana's small 
manufacturing sector, have all been 
crippled by a chronic, and worsening, 
shortage of foreign exchange for inputs 
and spare parts. 

The private sector in Guyana has 
particularly faltered in recent years. The 
growing public role in distribution, 
manufacturing, and construction has 
limited investment opportunities in areas 
in which private firms were most ex- 
perienced. At the same time, a lack of 
understanding on areas open to private 
investors has dampened the investment 
climate. Investor confidence has been 
further exacerbated by the foreign ex- 
change scarcity problem. ■ 

Umana Yana, the meeting place of the chief 
of the Wai Wai Amerindian tribe in 

(Department of State photo) 


April 1982 


• The Administration will support 
additional tax and investment benefits 
for the possessions. 

• Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
industries will have recourse to the same 
safeguard procedures as mainland in- 
dustries in the event they are seriously 
injured by increased imports from the 

• Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands 
inputs will be considered as Caribbean 
inputs under the rules-of-origin re- 
quirements for duty-free treatment, so 
as to encourage the use of Puerto Rican 
and Virgin Islands products. 

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands will play a major role in 
technical assistance, private sector 
development, and transportation within 
the Caribbean region. As part of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative, the Ad- 
ministration will seek congressional 
authorization for the following measures 
to foster the development of Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands: 

• Establishment of a tropical 
agricultural research center in 
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; 

• Funding for an eastern Caribbean 
center for educational, cultural, 
technical, and scientific interchange at 
the College of the Virgin Islands; 

• Use of Puerto Rican and Virgin 
Islands facilities, personnel, and firms in 
technical assistance programs and devel- 
opment projects; and 

• Expansion of airports in the 
Virgin Islands and other measures to en- 
courage the development of Puerto Rico 
and the Virgin Islands as a transporta- 
tion hub for the Caribbean region. 

Other measures not directly related 
to the Caribbean Basin initiative are be- 
ing discussed with Puerto Rican and 
Virgin Islands officials. 


Area: 10,714 sq. mi. 

Population: 5 million 

Capital: Port-au-Prince 

GDP: $1.5 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— coffee, 

bauxite, sugar 
Exchange Rate: 5 gourdes = US$1.00 

The poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere, Haiti had annual GDP 
growth in the 2.5-3.8% range during 
1970-79, an increase only slightly more 
than population growth. For 1981 no 
real increase in GDP occurred, as lower 
commodity prices, high oil prices, and an 
increasing public sector deficit have 
darkened the country's medium-term 
economic prospects. 

Export volume has been trending 
upward, especially the assembly-for- 
export industries which now account for 
over one-third of total net exports; 
however, imports have been increasing 
much more rapidly, with petroleum 
products, food, and consumer durables 
leading the increase. During 1979 and 
1980, Haiti's current account deficit was 
around $50 million, approximately the 
amount of grant assistance received by 
the country. Official grants and loans to 
Haiti totaled over $100 million in 1980, 
around 10% of GDP. 

Of greatest concern is the rapidly 
escalating public sector deficit, which 
was around $130 million in 1980. This 
deficit, the rising import bill, and in- 

creasing difficulties borrowing abroad 
led to an acute foreign exchange short- 
age in early 1981, which prompted the 
government to tighten import restric- 
tions and to increase taxes on gasoline, 
automobiles, and luxury products. The 
foreign exchange shortage has continue 
into 1982. The debt service ratio for 
1981 was about 4.6% but is on the in- 

The exchange rate has been un- | . 
changed (5 gourdes = $1.00) since 1919. ■«' 

This "gingerbread" house in Port-au-Princs 
is typical of French colonial architecture in 
Haiti. French buccaneers used the area 
now known as Haiti as a point from which 
to harass English and Spanish ships in the 
1600s. As piracy was gradually suppressed, 
these French adventurers turned to plant- 
ing and made "Saint-Dominque" one of the 
richest colonies of the French Empire in 
the 18th century. 


From the beginning, the Caribbean 
Basin initiative has been a multilateral 
and not just a U.S. effort. The first 
foreign heads of state to visit President 
Reagan were President Lopez Portillo of 
Mexico and Prime Minister Seaga of 
Jamaica. Out of their conversations 
came the concept of a multilateral, 
region-wide effort to counteract the 

economic decline of the countries of the 
Caribbean Basin. 

The United States then began con- 
versations with the countries in the 
region; with Canada, Venezuela, and 
Mexico; and with our European and 
Japanese allies. In July 1981 Secretary 
Haig and U.S. Trade Representative 
Brock met in Nassau with their col- 
leagues from Mexico, Canada, and 
Venezuela. This meeting agreed on a 
coordinated approach to the region's 
development, combining multilateral ef- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

forts, consultations with the countries of 
the region, and bilateral assistance. It 
also went beyond traditional foreign aid 
approaches to include changes in trade 
and investment policy. More recently 
Colombia has also expressed an interest 
in contributing to the initiative. 

The United States and the other 
three countries of the so-called Nassau 
group have held a series of multilateral 

and bilateral meetings with the countries 
of the Caribbean Basin. In San Jose in 
September 1981, it was agreed to form 
a multilateral consultative group for the 
Central American countries, analogous 
to the Caribbean Group for Cooperation 
in Economic Development. These two 
groups will provide fora where donor 
countries can coordinate their develop- 
ment assistance effort and where coun- 

try policies can be discussed, studied, 
and coordinated. 

After an October 1981 multilateral 
meeting in Santo Domingo with the 
Caribbean island countries, the United 
States held bilateral consultations with 
almost every country in the Caribbean 
Basin region. During these meetings we 
sought their comments and suggestions, 
got a better idea of their needs and 


Area: 43,277 sq. mi. 

Population: 3.7 million 

Capital: Tegucigalpa 

GDP: $2.5 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports- 
bananas, coffee, beef; 
Imports — petroleum 

Exchange Rate: 2 lempiras = US$1.00 

The poorest country in Central America, 
Honduras recently completed a suc- 
cessful election and a transition from 
military to civilian rule. It is faced exter- 
nally with unfriendly or politically 
threatened governments on three sides. 
It is also suffering a serious balance-of- 
payments problem which has adversely 
affected investment and growth. At the 
same time, however, Honduras has an 
essentially sound development program 
which is supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD). It should be able 
to return to a normal growth path when 
short-term problems are overcome. 

Honduras' short-term problems were 
caused by a combination of deteriorating 
terms of trade, the financial pressures of 
a possibly over-optimistic development 
progi'am, capital flight, and some loss of 
foreign private credit due to regional 

Tegucigalpa is the capital and largest city Z 

in Honduras. Founded in the late 16th cen- | 

tury, it was a Spanish colonial center of t 
silver and gold mining. 

political problems. As a result of these 
factors, the country is going through a 
period of serious balance-of-payments 
pressure. In addition, government- 
owned productive facilities, particularly 
in the nationalized timber industry, have 
turned out to be highly inefficient drains 
on the already pressed central govern- 
ment budget. The country's export- 
oriented agricultural sector is still pro- 
ductive but suffers from a lack of credit 
and from the same drop in world com- 
modity prices which has adversely af- 
fected other countries in the region. 

While the balance-of-payments short- 
fall is certainly dangerous, outside 
observers are confident that a combina- 
tion of internal policy change and some 

additional foreign assistance will allow 
Honduras to weather the current storm. 
Within about 3-4 years, the bulge in 
development spending should be over, 
and the country will begin to benefit 
from substantial improvements in in- 
frastructure. The El Cajon power proj- 
ect, in particular, will provide a better 
supply of electricity, reduce Honduras' 
dependence on imported crude, and per- 
mit the export of electricity to neighbor- 
ing countries. With a balanced program 
of internal policy reform, greater access 
to world markets, and additional foreign 
assistance, there is every reason for 
optimism that the economy will return 
to its previous pattern of significant 
growth. ■ 

April 1982 


priorities, and informed them which 
U.S. actions appeared the most feasible. 

Emphasis on the multilateral ap- 
proach derives from three factors. First 
is the recognition that many other coun- 
tries and institutions have interests in 
the basin and are already active there. 
Second is the recognition that the 

isolated efforts of a single coun- 
try—even such a relatively rich and 
powerful country as the United 
States — are not enough to reverse the 
economic decline of the region. A coor- 
dinated approach can multiply the im- 
pact of each individual effort. In the 
final analysis, of course, most of the 

responsibility for development of the 
Caribbean Basin rests with the countrie; 
of the region themselves. We will inten- 
sify our efforts through the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and, bilaterally, to help these govern- 
ments devise coherent development 


Area: 4,411 sq. mi. 

Population: 2.2 million 

Capital: Kingston 

GDP: $2.4 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— alumina, 

bauxite, sugar; Imports— petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 1.78 Jamaican 

dollars = US$1.00 

Although largely a limestone plateau, 
Jamaica has a mountainous backbone that 
extends across the island from the west 
and rises to the Blue Mountains in the east 
(above)— the highest mountains in the 
Caribbean. Rainfall is heavy in this area, 
where there are extensive timber reserves. 

Under the new leadership of Prime 
Minister Seaga, Jamaica reversed 7 con- 
secutive years of ruinous negative 
growth when a 1.5% growth rate was 
recorded in 1981. The consumer price 
index rose only 5%, in contrast with 
high levels of inflation over most of the 

Mr. Seaga's strategy has been to 
make private enterprise and the free 
market place the engine for develop- 
ment. Over the past year, his govern- 
ment has been working to eliminate con- 
trols on the Jamaican economy and to 
return state-run enterprises to the 
private sector. At the same time, he has 
actively encouraged domestic and 
foreign private investment, particularly 
in labor-intensive, nontraditional export 
industries. Several hundred investment 
leads are being processed, although the 
actual realization of new projects has 

Achieving full recovery leading to 
self-sustained growth will continue to be 
a challenge for the Seaga government. 
Jamaica is totally dependent on im- 
ported oil. Skilled workers and middle- 
level managers who emigrated during 
the 1970s must be enticed to return, and 
new entrants into the labor force will 
have to acquire needed skills. Bauxite 
exports, which account for 70% of 
foreign exchange earnings and nearly a 
third of Government of Jamaica rev- 
enues, have dropped sharply owing to a 
cyclical down-turn in world demand for 
aluminum. Acquisition of Jamaican-type 
bauxite for the U.S. strategic stockpile 

will only partially compensate for the 
drop in bauxite exports to industrial 
users. The world price for sugar, 
Jamaica's most important agricultural 
export, has plummeted. 

Agricultural production for domestic 
markets, however, rose 4% in real terms 
in 1981, and construction was strong. 
Tourism also rebounded, with this 
winter's occupancy rate leaping to 70% 
after years of decline. But manufactur- 
ing continued to be stymied by a short- 
age of foreign exchange to finance raw 
materials, spare parts, and capital equip- 

Resolution of the short-term foreign 
exchange scarcity problem and access to 
developed country markets for Jamaica's 
exports are critical to the continued suc- 
cess of Mr. Seaga's recovery program. 
To address the foreign exchange prob- 
lem, the Jamaican Government nego- 
tiated a 3-year stabilization program in 
1981 with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). In order for this stabiliza- 
tion program to achieve its goal of self- 
sustained recovery over 3 years, timely 
short-term balance-of-payments support 
from friendly donor countries is essen- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 


Canadian interest and assistance to 
countries in the Caribbean Basin liave 
been growing rapidly in the past year. 
Traditionally, Canadian political and 
economic ties in the area had been con- 
centrated in Commonwealth countries. 
These contacts reflected both the 
English- and French-speaking heritages 
of Canadians. Canada has recently, 
however, broadened its emphasis to a 
wider group of Caribbean countries. 

Foreign Minister MacGuigan in a 
speech on Canadian policy toward Latin 
America and the Caribbean said the 
government recognized two main con- 
cepts in its development policy: the 
mutuality of interest of both North and 
South in solving global economic prob- 
lems and the humanitarian need to focus 
attention and resources on the world's 
poorest peoples and countries. 

Canada sees economic progress over 
the longer term as a key factor in 
achieving regional stability. The Carib- 
bean Basin initiative area has had a 
growing role for Canada in economic 
terms. Canadian exports to the area 
have grown from slightly under C$800 
million in 1977 to an estimated C$1.8 
billion m 1981. Imports from the area in- 
to Canada have increased from roughly 
C$600 million to C$1.8 billion over the 
same period. While Canadian trade with 
the area only accounts for about 2% of 
Canada's total foreign trade, the in- 
creases are significant. Countries of the 
region have benefitted from the Cana- 
dian generalized preferential tariff 
system since the early 1970s. In addition 
Commonwealth countries in the region 
enjoy the benefits of Canada's Com- 
monwealth preferences. 

In its aid program, Canada has just 
announced a threefold increase in devel- 
opment assistance to Central American 
countries— C$105 million has been 
allocated for the region over the next 5 
years. This compares to about C$60 
million allocated from 1972 until now. 
Minister MacGuigan said the move 
reflected "Canada's deep concern for the 

Netherlands Antilles 

Area: 394 sq. mi. 

Population: 270,000 

Capital: Willemstad 

GDP: $864 million (1978) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — petroleum 
products, crude petroleum, phosphate: 
Imports — petroleum products, food- 
stuffs, live animals 

Exchange Rate: 1.8 guilders = US$1.00 

The Netherlands Antilles are separated 
two groups by over 1,000 miles of the 
Caribbean Sea. St. Eustatias, Saba, and 
Sint Maarten are in the Leeward 
Islands. The more populous "ABC" 
islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao 
lie off the coast of Venezuela. The 
islands are semiautonomous and handle 
their own internal affairs but are not yet 
fully independent. The total population 


6 . * '-^Ir-^Tm-j 

Willemstad (on the Island of Curacao) is 
the capital of the Netherlands Antilles. 
U.S. relations with the islands date to 1776 
when Fort Orange on Sinl Eustatius gave 
the first salute by a foreign nation to the 
flag of the United States. 

of the islands is about 270,000. Per 
capita GDP is estimated at $2,500. In 
spite of a relatively high standard of 
living, the unemployment rate is approx- 
imately 25%. 

The three pillars of the Antillean 
economy are tourism, oil refining, and 
off-shore banking. While the islands 
have felt the impact of the Caribbean- 
wide slowdown in tourism over the past 
year, the Antilles have remained 
relatively competitive by relying heavily 
on low-cost package tours and a well- 
developed duty-free industry which sells 
luxury items to tourists. The oil 
refineries on Curacao and Aruba have 
been running at 40-45% of capacity, 
reflecting the worldwide decline in con- 
sumption and refinery overcapacity. The 
offshore banking business has been 
flourishing and now accounts for 32% of 
government revenues and 1,000 jobs by 
Government of the Netherlands Antilles 
estimates. The most important activity 
of this industry is Eurobond borrowing 
for U.S. multinationals. The United 
States is currently renegotiating the tax 
treaty as it applies to the Netherlands 
Antilles with the next round expected to 
occur this spring. The Government of 
the Netherlands Antilles is concerned 
about the impact on the Antillean 
economy of any precipitous change in 
treaty provisions affecting the banking 

Overall development prospects for 
the islands are hampered in that they 
possess virtually no natural resources. 
The arid ABC islands must rely on 
desalinated drinking water. The islands' 
best economic goal may lie in the con- 
tinued utilization of their skilled labor 
force in such areas as refining, banking, 
tourism, and mariculture in a future 
Singapore-type role in the Caribbean. 
No timetable has been set for full in- 
dependence by the Dutch. ■ 

April 1982 


conditions of poverty and economic 
dislocation in Central America which lie 
beneath the current instability and trau- 
matic social change there." Major recipi- 
ents of assistance will be Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. 

Earlier, Canada announced plans to 
increase its official development 
assistance to the Commonwealth Carib- 
bean from about C$43 million in 
1981-82 to C$90 million in 1986-87. 


Venezuela is one of the four sponsoring 
countries of the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. It has long been a donor of aid 
to less developed nations. Venezuela has 
reported that it gave $6.5 billion in 

financial assistance abroad from 1974 to 
1980. Annual amounts equaled between 
1.2% and 2.2% of GNP. The bulk of this 
assistance was to countries of the Carib- 
bean, Central America, and the Andean 



Since June 1981 when Mexican Presi- 
dent Lopez Portillo met with President 
Reagan at Camp David, Mexico has been 
a partner in the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative. Despite differences with the 
United States on regional political 
developments, Mexico views the initia- 
tive as positive in terms of North/South 
cooperation. Mexico shares the U.S. 
perception that additional cooperative 
measures should be taken to stimulate 
economic and social development in the 
region in order to eliminate the underly- 
ing causes of political instability in the 
area. At the same time it has stressed 
its interest in seeing the benefits of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative open to all 
countries of the region on a nonexclu- 
sionary, nonpolitical basis. 

Mexico's principal contribution to the 
region, worth at least $300 million an- 
nually, is through the joint Mexican- 
Venezuelan oil facility. This program 
finances 30% of Mexico's and 
Venezuela's oil shipments to El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Barbados, 
Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. 

Mexico grants trade preferences to 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
Panama, and the countries of the Carib- 
bean Common Market (CARICOM). The 
preferences, which take the form of 
50%-75% import rebates on about 25 
products from each country, are general- 
ly for the principal exports of those 

Mexico also finances over 200 in- 
dividual technical assistance grants in 
the Caribbean and Central America. 

Area: 147,888 sq. mi. 

Population: 2.7 million 

Capital: Managua 

GDP: $1.6 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— cotton, meat, 

coffee; Imports — petroleum 
Exchange Rate: 10.50 cordobas = US$1.00 

Nicaragua was named for Nicarao, an In- 
dian chief who peacefully received Spanish 
conquerors in 1522. The population is 
predominantly Roman Catholic; this 18th 
century Cathedral of Leon is one of the 
largest in Latin American. 

Serious physical damage during the 
country's recent revolution and anti- 
private sector attitudes by the San- 
dinista government have reduced the 
productivity of the Nicaraguan economy. 
Only the assistance of nontraditional aid 
donors has prevented a further serious 
fall in income. The outlook for the future 
is uncertain but depends upon a con- 
tinued high level of outside aid and 

official attitudes toward the private sec- ] 

In spite of an inherently rich 
agricultural base, the Nicaraguan 
economy is suffering from a serious 
balance-of-payments shortage, which ha.^ 
resulted in a general lack of the spare 
parts and raw materials necessary to 
make it run. More importantly, recent 
expropriations, public attacks, and 
hostile articles in the government-owned 
press have left the private sector with 
little or no sense of security and even 
less cause to make the long-term invest- 
ment necessary to provide for economic 
growth. In addition, deteriorating condi- 
tions in the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) have reduced the 
market for Nicaragua's manufactured 
exports and further cramped the coun- 
try's ability to provide employment and 
earn needed foreign exchange. 
Agriculture is the one relative bright 
spot. But even in agriculture, labor 
shortages and indiscipline, combined 
with a continuing lack of new invest- 
ment, threaten future production. This 
is particularly true in the beef and coffee 
export subsectors. 

Nicaragua's longer term economic 
future is to some degree unpredictable. 
It depends heavily upon the policies and 
attitudes in the revolutionary govern- 
ment, as well as help from outside 
donors. In the short run, however, it 
appears that Nicaragua faces continuing 
uncertainty in the private sector, official 
economic decisionmaking based upon 
political factors, and a resulting 
deterioration in investment, production, 
and exports. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


111 Caribbean Basin 

Venezuela remains committed to 
continuing financial assistance in the 
Caribbean Basin region. In 1980, 
Venezuela joined Mexico in formulating 
an oil facility for the energy poor na- 
tions of the Caribbean Basin. Nine na- 
tions are currently benefiting from this 
agreement, and several more may be 
added shortly. Under the facility's 
terms, the two donors agreed to extend 
semisoft loans (5 years at 4% interest) 
to the recipients to cover 30% of their 
oil bill. If the loan proceeds are used for 
economic development projects, the 
terms change to 20 years at 2% interest. 
The two donors also agreed to 
guarantee half of each recipient 
country's oil supply requirement, up to a 
total of 160,000 barrels per day. At cur- 
rent oil prices, the oil facility is worth 
approximately $700 million in conces- 
sional financing per year to the recipi- 
ents. During the facility's first year, 
Venezuela disbursed $289.2 million, and 
for the second year, running from 
August 1981 to July 1982, Venezuela 
has committed a total of $302 million. 

Venezuela has further assisted 
Caribbean Basin nations financially 
through the following Central Bank 
deposits: 1980— Nicaragua, $37 million, 
and the Dominican Republic, $11.1 
million; 1981— Costa Rica, $20 million, 
and Jamaica, $25 million. The Govern- 
ment of Venezuela has also announced 
that $69 million in project-related loans 
will be granted in Central America in 
1982. The beneficiaries will be El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
Venezuela is also a generous donor to 
multilateral institutions such as the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the OPEC special fund, which 
extend financial help to Caribbean Basin 
countries. Total Venezuelan multilateral 
disbursements in 1980 (last year 
available) were $456 million. 


Area: 28,753 sq. mi. 

Population: 2 million 

Capital: Panama 

GDP: $3.5 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — bananas, 

refined petroleum, sugar; Imports — 

Exchange Rate: 1 balboa = US$1.00 

Panama was the only economic bright 
spot on the Central American isthmus 
during the past 2 years. Led by a con- 
struction boom, the economy grew by 
5.5% in 1980; 1981's growth rate is 
estimated to have been in the same 

Unlike the other economies in the 
region, Panama has primarily a service 
economy. The Panama Canal, the bank- 
ing sector, the Colon Free Zone, and 
tourism together account for over 60% 
of GDP. The canal contributes over $400 
million a year to the country's economy. 
Over 100 foreign banks operate in 
Panama, attracted by Panama's liberal 
banking regulations and dollar-based 
economy. Panama stands fourth in the 
region in terms of total bank assets, 
lagging behind only Mexico, Brazil, and 
Venezuela. The Colon Free Zone is the 
busiest such zone after Hong Kong; its 
warehousing and reexport operations in- 
volve $4 billion worth of merchandise 
per year. Bananas are the principal com- 
modity export. 

Traditionally the United States is 
Panama's most important trading part- 
ner. Currently we are attempting to 
negotiate a bilateral investment treaty 
with the Government of Panama. 

There are some problems on the 
horizon however. Panama has been 
unable to absorb the thousands of young 
Panamanians who enter the labor force 
each year. The agricultural sector has 
traditionally been neglected or over- 
regulated, and its growth has been slow. 
Instability in the Central American 
countries has made some investors wary 
of increasing their exposure in the 

region. Despite good performance under 
its International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
agreement, Panama still has a large 
foreign debt, which limits the amount of 
additional external borrowing the coun- 
try may undertake. Panama traditionally 
runs a large trade deficit, and in recent 
years its surplus on the services account 
($580 million in 1980) has not matched 
the trade deficit ($870 million in 1980). ■ 

Panamanians are predominantly Roman 
Catholic, as are the people of the other 
Central American countries. This is El 
Carmen Catholic Church in Panama. 

April 1982 


Europe and Japan 

In several consultations on the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative, European aid 
donors and the Commission of the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) have expressed 
interest in cooperating with the ini- 
tiative. Eleven Caribbean states (An- 
tigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Jamaica, St. Lucia, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago) are beneficiaries 
of the EC's trade and aid program 
under the Lome II convention. Also the 
EC has provided aid to "nonassociated" 
countries in the region and is consider- 
ing an expanded assistance program for 
Central American states. In addition to 
the EC programs, several European 
states maintain bilateral assistance pro- 
grams for both Lome members and 
"nonassociated" states in the region. 

Lome members, including the Carib- 
bean states, receive trade benefits in the 
form of duty-free access for their ex- 
ports to the EC, subject to provisions on 
rules of origin and safeguards. A special 
arrangement on sugar provides for 
specified amounts of sugar to be im- 
ported by the EC at prices well above 
the world market price. Barbados, 
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, and 
Trinidad and Tobago benefit from this 
arrangement. A quota arrangement for 
duty-free importation of rum also 
benefits Caribbean members. 

The EC's generalized system of 
preferences is open to Lome members as 
well as non-Lome LDCs, including all 
states in the Caribbean and Central 

In recent years Japan has adopted 
an increasingly more global foreign 
policy in recognition of its respon- 
sibilities as the free world's second 
largest economic power. Japanese rela- 
tions with the Caribbean Basin have 
developed slowly, commensurate with 
Japan's relatively limited interests in the 
region. However, Japan's engagement in 
the area is expanding. 

Japanese policies in the region have 
generally complemented our own, 
although they diverge on some issues 


Area: 70,060 sq. mi. 

Population: 390,000 

Capital: Paramaribo 

GDP: $109 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— alumina, 

bauxite, aluminum 
Exchange Rate: 1.785 guilders = US$1.00 

The buildings on this street in Paramaribo 
illustrate early p]uropean influence on 
Suriname. The Netherlands acquired 
Suriname in 1667 in exchange for Dutch 
rights in Niew Amsterdam (Manhattan, 

The economy of Suriname and its tiny 
population (390,000) is dominated by 
bauxite and Dutch assistance. Bauxite 
products comprise about 80% of export 
earnings (rice and shrimp together 
account for 10%), and bauxite levies 
supply 20-25% of government revenues. 
At independence in 1975 the Dutch 

Government approved a $1.5 billion 
development fund for Suriname, only a 
small part of which has been disbursed. 

Real GDP has stagnated in recent 
years due to a soft world bauxite marke 
and political uncertainty. Suriname's 
population decreased during the 1970s 
due to heavy emigration, so that per 
capita GDP ($2,240 in 1978) has con- 
tinued to increase. In 1978 GDP was 
dominated by government (23% of 
GDP), mining and minerals processing 
(18%), and trade and tourism (17%). 

In recent years Suriname has usual- 
ly enjoyed a modest trade surplus, and 
its current account deficit has been 
covered by Dutch financing. The 
Netherlands canceled Suriname's debts 
at independence, and Suriname's debt 
service is only 1% of exports. The public 
sector has been running a current 
account budget surplus, with outside aid 
financing the investment budget. 

Despite its relatively good perform- 
ance in the recent past, Suriname's 
economy faces serious challenges in the 
immediate future. Suriname will have to 
expand and diversify its economic base 
over the next 10 years to reduce the cur- 
rent overreliance on the bauxite sector 
and Dutch aid. The heavy loss of skilled 
manpower, investor caution, and polit- 
ical uncertainty cloud the country's 
future prospects. Efforts to develop the 
agricultural and forestry sectors and 
communications and transportation in- 
frastructure are underway or being 
planned. ■ 

(e.g. Japan's active trade with Cuba). 
Japan's $10 million loan to Jamaica in 
1981 reflects both Japan's willingness to 
contribute to the economic development 
of the region and the will to cooperate 
with the United States. 

International Financial 

The international financial institutions 
most active in the Caribbean Basin have 
been the World Bank, the Inter- 
American Development Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. Over the 
past 2 years, the two banks have under- 
taken new commitments to basin coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

tries totaling more than $1.6 billion, 
with about $700 million committed by 
the World Bank and $900 million by the 
Inter-American Development Bank. The 
World Bank, through its lending and 
technical assistance activities, has pro- 
moted sound economic policies in Carib- 
bean and Central American countries. In 
addition to project loans, the World 
Bank has recently begun some structural 
adjustment lending in selected basin 
countries, conditioning drawings from 
these loans to progress on specific 
economic reforms agreed to by the bor- 
rowing governments. The Inter- 
American Development Bank has fo- 
cused its activities on agriculture, 
related rural development projects, and 
energy. It is also becoming more in- 
volved in an economic policy dialogue 
with its borrowers. 

The World Bank chairs the Carib- 
bean Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development, which has served to coor- 
dinate aid policy by the donors and self- 
help efforts by recipient Caribbean coun- 
tries. Recently, the Inter-American 
Development Bank agreed to serve as 
the secretariat institution for a Central 
American group which will seek to coor- 
dinate donor activities and individual 
country programs for countries in that 

The International Monetary Fund 
has been active in the Caribbean and 
Central America in formulating in- 
dividual country economic stabilization 
programs, when necessary. Under these 
programs, the IMF and basin govern- 
ments have agreed on measures to cor- 
rect balance-of-payments disequilibria. 
While these measures are being im- 
plemented, the IMF allows its member 
countries to purchase foreign exchange 
to be repaid gradually once stabilization 
has been achieved. The IMF currently 
has active programs in Jamaica, 
Dominica, and El Salvador and is ex- 
pected to begin new programs soon in 
Costa Rica and Honduras. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Area: 1,980 sq. mi. 

Population: 1.1 million 

Capital: Port-of-Spain 

GDP: $6.7 billion (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — petroleum, 

Exchange Rate: 2.4 Trinidad and Tobago 

dollars = US$1.00 

This Sunday outdoor market in Chaguanas, 
a town in western Trinidad, is a popular 
gathering place. Trinidad and Tobago were 
merged in 1888 to form a single British 
colony; full independence was obtained in 

Trinidad and Tobago's economy has 
experienced rapid growth in recent 
years, in large part reflecting increases 
in the value of petroleum exports. The 
country has recorded healthy balance-of- 
payments surpluses in spite of some 
sluggishness in other exports and a 
heavy import bill. 

The growth in revenue and foreign 
exchange earnings moderated in 1981 as 
world petroleum prices stabilized, and 
crude oil production continued below its 
1978 high. The country enjoys the 
highest per capita GDP in the Carib- 

Sugar has traditionally been 
Trinidad and Tobago's most important 
agricultural crop, followed by coffee, 
cocoa, and citrus. Trinidad manufactures 
a fairly wide range of goods, including 
such products as motor vehicles, 
household appliances, textiles, and 
petrochemicals. A new ammonia plant 
and a steel rolling mill were opened in 
late 1981. 

The recently installed new govern- 
ment in Trinidad and Tobago has 
pledged to strengthen the capacity of 
sister Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) countries to generate and 
accumulate capital. In its 1982 budget, 
the Government of Trinidad and Tobago 
has allocated $21 million for develop- 
ment projects within CARICOM. It is 
also an important donor to CARICOM 
countries through its oil facility. 

While the United States does not 
provide bilateral assistance to Trinidad 
and Tobago, the country is a potential 
beneficiary of trade and investment 
measures under the Caribbean Basin 
initiative. ■ 

April 1982 


Consultative Groups 

Since 1978, the nations of the Caribbean 
and principal donors have coordinated 
assistance and development programs 
under the framework of the Caribbean 
Group for Cooperation in Economic 
Development, with the World Bank as 
the lead institution. Recently, the Inter- 
American Development Bank accepted a 
secretariat role for a Central American 
group, which will develop individual 
country programs and coordinate donor 
assistance for Central American coun- 

The United States supports these 
two groups as important mechanisms to 
insure that sound development programs 
are formulated which can draw broad 
donor support. 

Turks and Caicos Islands 

Area: 192 sq. mi. 

Population: 7,000 

Capital: Cockburn Town 

GNP: $15 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — conch shells, 
crayfish, salt, fish meat; Imports- 
foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, 
manufactured goods 

Exchange Rate: U.S. dollar is used 

The Turks and Caicos Islands lie east of 
The Bahamas and directly north of 
Hispaniola. With a population of approx- 
imately 7,000, the disparate islands of 
the Turks and Caicos are sparsely 
populated and possess few natural 
resources. Even tourist prospects are 
limited by the absence of airstrips on 
most of the islands. 

In addition to tourism, fishing is an 
important industry in the Turks and 
Caicos. The United States maintains a 
small naval station on Grand Abaco 
Island which contributes to government 
revenue. ■ 

Caribbean Group for Cooperation 
in Economic Development. The United 
States has been a strong supporter of 
the Caribbean group and was instrumen- 
tal in its formation. Beginning in 1978, 
annual meetings have been held at the 
IBRD each June under the Bank's 
auspices. These have been supplemented 
by ad hoc sessions throughout the year 
which prepare for the annual meetings 
and focus on particular issues, such as 
the May 1981 meeting in Antigua con- 
cerning the special problems of the 
eastern Caribbean countries. At the an- 
nual meetings, subgroups are held on in- 
dividual countries, as well as regional 
sessions touching on issues affecting all 

The stated objective of the group as 
presently constituted is to nurture an 
ongoing process through which external 
donors increase, in a coordinated way, 
their financial and technical assistance 
to the Caribbean area in support of ap- 
propriate short- and long-term economic 
programs undertaken by countries of the 
region. Particular attention is given to 
the need to increase regional coopera- 
tion among Caribbean countries. 

The United States has found the 
group particularly useful as a forum for 
recipient countries to focus on their self- 
help efforts and progress on compliance 
with sound development programs 
worked out in coordination with the IMF 
and major donors. It also has been effec- 
tive in providing a framework to attract 
nontraditional donor assistance. 

Our basic assumption has been that 
full development potential of the in- 
dividual policies of the Caribbean can on- 
ly be achieved through regional coopera- 
tion and economic complementarity. We 
have promoted the Caribbean group as a 
continuing consultative mechanism to 
analyze development problems; to 
achieve common understanding of Carib- 
bean development priorities and 
assistance requirements; and to coor- 
dinate external assistance in an efficient 

We have sought to assure that the 
group devotes its attention not only to 
short-term balance-of -payments dif- 
ficulties but to the longer term task of 
correcting the underlying structural 
problems. Within this context, we have 
encouraged recipient government poli- 
cies which are conducive to mobilizing 
domestic and external resources, which 
promote private enterprise development 
and employment opportunities, which 
recognize the importance of revitaliza- 
tion of agriculture and the strengthening 
of government institutions, and which 
encourage common services among the 
small islands and other forms of regional 
cooperation for providing essential serv- 
ices at affordable costs. 

Assistance flows have increased 
significantly during the operation of the 
Caribbean group— from an estimated 
total of $467.3 million in FY 1978-79 to 
$683 million in FY 1980 and to $1,064 
billion in FY 1980-81. 

Central American Group. The 

Inter-American Development Bank 
recently accepted a request from Central 
American countries to serve as the 
secretariat institution for a Central 
American group. The new group would 
formulate individual country develop- 
ment and stabilization strategies, draw- 
ing heavily on technical expertise from 
the IDB and other international institu- 
tions. The United States supports the 
formation of this new group, and an- 
ticipates that it will provide a useful 
mechanism for recipients and donors 

As the Caribbean and Central 
American groups evolve, we believe it 
would be productive for both to address 
trade and investment matters as well as 
assistance, drawing in private sector 
participation as well. In this way, the 
key bottlenecks to increased production 
could be brought to the forefront. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 

Caribbean Basin 

Eastern Caribbean 

The eastern Caribbean islands of St. 
Christopher-Nevis, Anguilla, Antigua, 
and Barbuda, Montserrat, Dominica, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines vary in population from 
12,000 to 120,000. The largest island 
(Dominica) has a land area of 289.5 sq. 

The eastern Caribbean islands differ 
considerably in their stages of develop- 
ment but share a common British Com- 
monwealth tradition and seek to work 
together in such areas as common 
government services to minimize 
inherent smallness of scale difficulties. 

Unemployment, approaching 50% 
among young adults in some islands, is a 
chronic problem throughout the eastern 
Caribbean. Private-sector production is 
hampered by small domestic markets, 
expensive and irregular transport, the 
emigration of skilled workers, and a 


Area: 35 sq. mi. 

Population: 7,000 

Capital: The Valley 

GNP: $4 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — salt, 

lobsters, fish 
Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 

dollars = US$1.00 


Area: 171 sq. mi. 

Population: 74,000 

Capital: St. Johns 

GNP: $8.5 million (1980) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— mineral 
fuel lubricants; Imports — foodstuffs, 
live animals, machinery equipment 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 
dollars = US$1.00 

paucity of medium- to long-term financ- 
ing for new productive enterprises. As a 
result, insufficient revenue has been 
generated to fund basic recurrent 
government services. In some of the 
islands, infrastructure deficiencies and 
the difficulty of maintaining existing in- 
frastructure are a factor in developing 
the domestic private sector and attract- 
ing foreign investment. Domestic 
policies in such areas as interest rates 
and land tenure have also been impor- 
tant constraints. The perilous state of 
the islands' economies has fueled 
political instability. 

Fortunately, some of the islands 
have recently shown some success in 
attracting nontraditional export in- 
dustries, in part due to favorable low 
wages and tax holidays granted by the 
eastern Caribbean governments. Their 
ability to attract further such industries. 


Area: 289.5 sq. mi. 

Population: 79,000 

Capital: Roseau 

GNP: $36.9 million (1978) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— bananas, 

coconuts, citrus fruits; Imports — 

foodstuffs, manufactured goods, 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 

dollars = US$1.00 

and to reverse a decade-long decline in 
agricultural production, is regarded as 
key to addressing the pressing economic 
problems of unemployment and a heavy 
reliance on imported foodstuffs. In addi- 
tion, the islands do possess considerable 
tourism potential which might be ex- 
ploited with greater promotion efforts 
and better transportation facilities. 

Recognizing the serious economic 
difficulties of the eastern Caribbean 
islands, they have recently drawn in- 
creased foreign donor focus, particularly 
by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the European 
Economic Community (EEC). While this 
donor activity has helped to buttress the 
democratically elected eastern Caribbean 
governments, it has just begun to 
stimulate the private sector, which is 
vitally needed to generate employment 
and sustained growth. ■ 


This Roman Catholic cathedral is a 
reminder of the island's early association 
with France. Columbus named Dominica— 
the Italian word for Sunday — when he 
discovered it on his second voyage to the 
New World in 1493. 

April 1982 



Area: 39.5 sq. mi. 

Population: 12,000 

Capital: Plymouth 

GNP: $15.2 million (1979) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — cotton, 
machinery, cattle; Imports — 
foodstuffs, machinery and trans- 
portation equipment 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Carribbean 
dollars = US$1.00 


Area: 104 sq. mi. 

Population: 40,400 

Capital: Basseterre 

GNP: $39.6 million (1979) 

Major Trade Items: Exports — sugar, 
molasses, beer and ale; Imports — 
foodstuffs, manufactured goods 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 
dollars = US$1.00 


Area: 238 sq. mi. 

Population: 124,000 

Capital: Castries 

GNP: $11.2 million (1979) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— bananas, 

cardboard boxes, cocoa; Imports — 

manufactured goods, foodstuffs, 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 

dollars = US$1.00 


<0 "=^1^-^ C3 

Atlantic Ocean 

Caribbean Sea 






Area: 150 sq. mi. 

Population: 116,000 

Capital: Kingstown 

GNP: $50.3 million (1979) 

Major Trade Items: Exports— bananas, 
arrowroot, sweet potatoes; Imports — 
foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, manu- 

Exchange Rate: 2.70 eastern Caribbean 
dollars = US$1.00 

One of the oldest botanical gardens in the 
Caribbean is found on St. Vincent. So 
renowned for its beauty, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines is often referred to as the 
"gem of the Antilles." 


Department of State Bulletin 


Update on International Developments 

by Secretary Haig 

Statement before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on March 2, 1982.'^ 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss 
current international developments, 
especially East-West relations and the 
situation in the Caribbean Basin. With- 
out taking too much time from the ques- 
tion period, I would also like to discuss 
briefly our proposed foreign assistance 
package for fiscal year (FY) 1983. 

East-West Relations 

Over the past year, the President has 
frequently expressed the desire for a 
constructive and mutually beneficial rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union. At the 
same time, we have made clear that 
such a relationship must be based on 
Soviet restraint, especially in the use of 
force or the threat of violence. The role 
of Soviet threats in the Polish crisis, 
coming while Soviet troops occupy 
Afghanistan and Moscow's arms flood 
Cuba, undermines the very basis for pro- 
ductive East-West relations. 

The recent pattern of Soviet be- 
havior, especially Moscow's role in 
Poland, was uppermost in my recent 
discussions with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei 
A. Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister]. 
During a full day of wide-ranging ex- 
changes, we reviewed also the situation 
in Afghanistan, Cuba, and southern 
Africa, as well as our traditional concern 
for human rights issues. Coercion, 
subversion, and repression pose great 
dangers to the prospects of improved 
relations between our countries. 

Mr. Gromyko and I also had a de- 
tailed discussion of arms control, pro- 
viding me the opportunity to explain 
President Reagan's initiative of last 
November for zero levels of inter- 
mediate-range missiles. I noted that the 
United States is actively preparing for 
START [Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks] negotiations, which we will in- 
itiate when conditions permit. 

The meeting illustrated President 
Reagan's point that in time of crises, 
clear communication between the United 
States and the Soviet Union is essential. 
At the same time, it demonstrated that 
our hope for improved relations will not 
silence our concern over Soviet trans- 
gressions, especially in Poland and 

April 1982 

It is crucial that we understand the 
historic events taking place in Poland, 
what they mean for East- West relations, 
and what we can do to influence the 
situation. Our policy is based on three 

• First, the Polish crisis is far from 
over. The Polish Communists' failure to 
meet the needs of the Polish people re- 
flects a profound failure of Soviet-style 
communism and foreshadows failures 

The martial law regime in Poland 
will find progress elusive. The Polish 
economy can be revived only with the 
cooperation of the Polish worker — on 
whom the brunt of repression has fallen. 
Until martial law is lifted, those arrested 
for exercising their internationally 
recognized rights are released and na- 
tional reconciliation begins, resistance 
will continue and even grow. Demon- 
strations in Gdansk and Poznan are 
testimony that the Polish people have 
not been" silenced. And Gen. Jaruzelski 
[Polish Communist Party leader, Prime 
Minister, and Defense Minister] himself 
admitted last week that resistance per- 

• The second principle that guides 
our policy is the conviction that the 
West can and must act to influence the 
situation. Prudent and effective action 
can encourage Warsaw and Moscow to 
reconsider their march toward the abyss 
in Poland. 

Moreover, our response to the Polish 
crisis has far-reaching implications for 
East-West relations. If we do not take 
serious actions commensurate with our 
concern, then the Soviets may doubt our 
resolve at other critical points in the 

• Third, we must bear in mind that 
individual national action becomes much 
more meaningful, especially for Moscow, 
in the context of allied unity. Fifteen 
sovereign nations have never found it 
easy to act in concert, but this must be 
our goal. It would, indeed, be tragic if 
Poland's misfortune becomes the instru- 
ment of allied disunity. 

Based on these principles, the Presi- 
dent has fashioned a strategy that seeks 
to lead the allies toward unified action. 
This process is well underway. The 
United States has made clear that we 
will not do business as usual with either 
Poland or the Soviet Union while repres- 
sion in Poland continues. In December, 
the President announced a series of 
economic sanctions against both Poland 

and the Soviet Union. He warned that 
we would take further measures, if 
necessary. Cosmetic improvements will 
not be enough. We will not be deceived 
by a continuation of repression disguised 
as moderation. 

The United States is not alone. We 
are working closely with our allies on 
political and economic actions that will 
drive home to the Soviet Union and the 
Polish regime the costs of repression in 
Poland. In January an unprecedented 
special meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council condemned the Soviet Union's 
sustained campaign against the Polish 
people. The allies agreed to a number of 
economic measures, such as holding in 
abeyance future official credits to Poland 
for goods other than food and suspend- 
ing negotiations to reschedule the Polish 
1981 official debt. The allies pledged not 
to undercut each other's action. Signi- 
ficantly, the allies have begun an exami- 
nation of the course of future economic 
and commercial relations with the Soviet 
Union. Recently, several European allies 

The role of Soviet 
threats in the Polish 
crisis, coming while 
Soviet troops occupy 
Afghanistan and 
Moscow's arms flood 
Cuba, undermines the 
very basis for productive 
East-West relations. 

and Japan have announced specific polit- 
ical and economic steps against Poland, 
and European Community foreign 
ministers announced that restraints on 
imports from the Soviet Union are 

At the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe in Madrid on 
February 9, the foreign ministers of our 
allies also joined me in denouncing the 
violations of the Helsinki Final Act by 
the Soviets and the Polish military 



Sanctions and denunciations are not 
the only elements of our policy. The 
West has indicated its readiness to help 
revive Poland's shattered economy when 
the Polish people regain their rights. 
This is an important part of our 

We should not underestimate the im- 
pact of Western unity on both Poland 
and the Soviet Union. I believe that the 
unity of the West thus far comes as an 
unpleasant surprise to Moscow. The im- 
plications are far-reaching. We can look 
forward in the days ahead to an exami- 
nation of other areas for allied action, 
such as the question of future credits. 
Continued Western unity and concrete 
pressure— coupled with an offer of 
help— hold out the best prospect for the 
future of freedom in Poland. 

At this point, I would like to convey 
my deep appreciation to Congressmen 
Lantos, Winn, and Fascell for their elo- 
quent bipartisan support of the Presi- 
dent's policy on Poland during the an- 
nual meeting in January between the 
U.S. Congress and the European Parlia- 
ment. As you know, the European 
Parliament has itself now proposed ways 
to send the Soviets a signal that the 
West remains firm and united in opposi- 
tion to Soviet aggression. This is true 
not just in the case of Poland but in the 
case of Afghanistan as well. It was the 
European Parliament that first proposed 
declaring a day in commemoration of 
the Afghan people's struggle. President 
Reagan strongly supports the designa- 
tion of March 21 as Afghanistan day as 
an expression of allied displeasure with 
Soviet aggression. 

Caribbean Basin 

Now let me turn to another area of 
great concern to us, the Caribbean 
Basin, where we face two distinct but 
related challenges: first, the economic 
and social upheavals that mark the 
development process; second, the threat 
to democracy and individual rights from 
the forces of totalitarianism in Cuba and 
elsewhere, supported by the Soviet 

Last week the President spoke at 
length on our new Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative. This program is a first step 
toward meeting these challenges. As the 
President explained, the United States 
will work with Mexico, Canada, and 
Venezuela to assist countries facing 
severe economic problems. The 
American part of the package includes 
trading opportunities, investment incen- 
tives, and increased financial assistance. 

Beyond the economic challenge, the 
countries of the Caribbean are also con- 
fronted by a growing threat from Cuba 
and its new-found ally Nicaragua. In re- 
cent years, Cuba has embarked on a 
systematic campaign to destabilize 
legitimate governments in Jamaica, Col- 
ombia, Honduras, El Salvador, and else- 
where. At the same time, Cuba has 
systematically expanded its ability to 
project its military power beyond its 
own shores. The Soviets shipped more 
military supplies to Cuba last year than 
at any time since 1962. Most notably, 
Cuba recently acquired a second 
squadron of MiG-23/Floggers. 

In Nicaragua, Soviet, East Euro- 
pean, and Cuban military advisers are 
building Central America's largest mili- 
tary establishment with Soviet-supplied 
arms. Disturbing accounts of the govern- 
ment's campaign against the Miskito In- 
dians are reaching the outside world. 
Meanwhile, the clandestine infiltration of 
arms and munitions from Nicaragua into 
El Salvador is again approaching the 
high levels recorded just before last 
year's "final offensive." 

The United States has tried to com- 
municate with Cuba and Nicaragua. We 
have offered a way out of confrontation. 
We have sought explanations for the 
massive military buildups that consume 
the scarce resources of development. 
But our efforts have thus far been re- 

The threat to democracy from op- 
ponents of peaceful change is particular- 
ly acute in El Salvador. The Duarte 

[The Duarte govern- 
ment's] opponents, sup- 
ported by Nicaragua 
and Cuba, are deter- 
mined to win by force 
what they could not 
achieve by the ballot. 

government is committed to political 
reform, free elections, and economic 
development. Its opponents, supported 
by Nicaragua and Cuba, are determined 
to win by force what they could not 
achieve by the ballot. In the face of such 
threats to the democratic process, the 
United States has firmly stated its com- 
mitment to free elections. 

The U.S. position has been embrace 
by the Organization of American States 
(OAS). At the meeting of the OAS in St 
Lucia last December, 22 of 29 nations 
voted in favor of the Salvadoran pro- 
gram for elections— only three voted 
against. Indeed, a collective response to 
the danger is emerging within Central 
America. The Governments of Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador, which 
recently formed the Central American 
Democratic Community, have been 
joined by Venezuela, Colombia, and the 
United States to help carry through the 
democratic transformation of El 

We must not be misled by the myth 
that the Duarte government has refused 
to negotiate an end to the trouble in El 
Salvador with the guerrillas. President 
Duarte has offered to negotiate on the 
electoral process, so that elections can 
proceed peacefully and the people of El 
Salvador can choose their own leaders 
without fear. The United States sup- 
ports this call. I note that the Council of 
Bishops of El Salvador supports the 
electoral process, too, and has echoed 
the government's call for all groups to 
desist from using violence to block the 

Other Areas 

This brief review of events in Europe 
and the Caribbean should not distract us 
from other highly troubled areas where 
we must act. To cite just a few. 

• We have helped to revive the 
negotiations on Namibia that had effec- 
tively collapsed before this Administra- 
tion took office, and we are actively 
engaged with our allies, the front-line 
states, and South Africa in a realistic 
effort to obtain a settlement that could 
lead to independence for Namibia in 

• We are supporting the restoration 
of peace in Chad under the auspices of 
the Organization of African Unity, 
thereby displacing Libyan influence and 
military forces there. 

• As part of our firm stand against 
Libyan support for international ter- 
rorism, we have increased support for 
Libya's threatened neighbors. 

• We continue to support efforts to 
achieve a negotiated settlement in the 
Western Sahara. 

• We have given our full support to 
efforts of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations in opposition to the Viet- 
namese occupation of Kampuchea, and 
we have sought to maintain military 
strength in the area to balance the ever- 


Department of State Bulletin 


growing Soviet military presence in 
northeast Asia and in Vietnam. 

• We have helped to organize the 
multilateral force and observers, moving 
Israel and Egypt ever closer to a suc- 
cessful withdrawal from the Sinai, while 
seeking to give all parties the sense of 
security needed for them to move 
toward an agreement on the autonomy 
portion of the Camp David accords. 

• Finally, in a period of depressed 
economic activity worldwide, we are 
working diligently to prevent emergence 
of protectionism and to support a free 
and open international system adhered 
to by all. 

Foreign Assistance 

Even this quick review of events in 
Europe, the Caribbean, and elsewhere 
reflects the myriad of important prob- 
lems faced by America. There is a pro- 
found relationship between our ability to 
handle these problems and the resources 
available to us. Today's challenges re- 
quire that we commit ourselves to a vital 
foreign assistance program. 

Foreign assistance was once dis- 
missed as naive idealism or misplaced 
philanthropy. But today's foreign assist- 
ance programs have been redirected to 
specific and vitally important strategic 
objectives. These include: 

• Promoting peaceful solutions to 
regional rivalries; 

• Gaining access to critical military 

• Confronting growing military 
threats from and subversive efforts by 
the Soviets; and 

• Reducing the economic and social 
travail that encourages domestic 
violence and external intervention. 

To insure that the resources we re- 
quest are sharply focused on only the 
most critical foreign policy goals, the 
President has fundamentally realigned 
aid priorities and the process of allocat- 
ing assistance. These steps were taken 
to avoid scattering resources among 
widely divergent and unattainable goals, 
as sometimes happened in the past. 

The overwhelming proportion of our 
1983 aid program will go to nations 
which share our strategic concerns or 
which are situated to improve our own 
diplomatic and military capabilities. 

• Our aid enables Israel and Egypt 
to retain the confidence necessary to 
take new steps for peace. 

• Our aid secures our ties to Kenya, 
Somalia, Oman, and others that provide 
a U.S. presence all along the vital oil 
lines of the Middle East. 

• Our assistance to threatened 
states, such as Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, 

additional $60 million in security 
assistance for the area, which will not 
require an additional authorization. 
Naturally, I will be discussing this more 
fully Thursday in my testimony before 
the House Appropriations Committee. 
Wednesday we will transmit to you and 
other Members of the Congress a writ- 
ten description of these requests. 

The overwhelming proportion of our 1983 aid 
program will go to nations which share our 
strategic concerns or which are situated to improve 
our own diplomatic and military capabilities. 

Morocco, and Tunisia guards against ex- 
ternal coercion and reduces the likeli- 
hood that the United States will have to 
undertake more direct and immensely 
more expensive action. 

• Our aid to Turkey strengthens a 
strategically vital ally and contributes 
decisively to Western security along 
NATO's critical southern flank. 

This aid will be both economic and 
security oriented. Bolstering a nation's 
economic development increases its 
chances of avoiding internal problems. 
Promoting and encouraging private in- 
vestment will receive a special priority. 

To meet the specific objectives I 
have outlined, we are requesting addi- 
tional authorizations of appropriations of 
$1.8 billion. As you know, the President 
has already asked for a $350 million sup- 
plemental appropriation for FY 1982 to 
meet our commitments for economic 
assistance under the Caribbean Basin in- 
itiative. He has also requested up to an 

We recognize that many in Con- 
gress, in authorizing foreign assistance 
for both FY 1982 and 1983, hoped that 
additional authorizations would not be 
necessary this year. The approval of 
foreign assistance increases is especially 
difficult as we endure austerity and eco- 
nomic privation. But the cost of inaction 
now will far exceed the resources we 
seek. Our most essential interests are 
under attack, both close to horne and in 
distant but critical parts of the world. 
Our nation's security tomorrow requires 
an investment in foreign assistance to- 

'Press release 82 of Mar. 3, 1982. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 




Proposed FY 1983 

Foreign Assistance Program 

Secretary Haig's statement before the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of 
the House Appropriations Committee on 
March 4. 1982.'- 

It is a pleasure to appear before the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations to present the Ad- 
ministration's proposed fiscal year (FY) 
1983 foreign assistance program. Over a 
year ago, in my first testimony here as 
Secretary of State, I committed myself 
to developing a close working relation- 
ship with you, Mr. Chairman, and all the 
committee members so that we could 
move together to strengthen our 
nation's international position. While we 
have not always agreed on specific 
issues, I believe we have developed a 
constructive relationship. Your wise 
advice has been most appreciated. 

Together we have made an impor- 
tant beginning as we seek to rein- 
vigorate American leadership abroad. 
For the first time in 3 years, the Con- 
gress has enacted foreign assistance 
appropriation legislation, giving 
substance to President Reagan's declara- 
tion that "America will not shrink from 
making the investments necessary for 
both peace and security." 

But we cannot stop here. We must 
build on the progress we have made. 
The competition we face is too serious 
and our own requirements too great to 
rest now. A first-rate American foreign 
policy simply cannot be run on second- 
rate resources. 

The task of statecraft is to master 
events, not simply to react to them. In 
this complex age of interdependence, 
American diplomacy requires broad and 
flexible assets to deal with a variety of 
situations. Foreign economic and secur- 
ity assistance is a critical element in 
giving us such flexibility. 

For too long, foreign aid has been 
misunderstood and underrated, dis- 
missed as naive idealism or ineffective 
philanthropy. Whatever the accuracy of 
such views in the past, they cannot be 
sustained today. We are requesting 
foreign assistance to serve compelling 
national security, foreign policy, and 
economic needs. 

Today, I would like to explain the 
President's request for an increase of 
$1.4 billion in security and economic aid 
in FY 1983. With your permission, I 
would also like to submit for the record 
a short but comprehensive report that 
details the major elements of our FY 
1983 foreign assistance proposals. 

As you know, the President has 
already asked for a supplemental 
appropriation for FY 1982 of $350 
million to meet our economic assistance 
commitments under the Caribbean Basin 
initiative and an additional $60 million in 
security assistance for this area. 

Let me be more specific about the 
risks to American national interests that 
would be the consequence of inadequate 
foreign assistance. 

• We would not be able to help 
reduce the economic misery in the Carib- 
bean Basin that encourages domestic 
violence and external intervention. 

• We would risk critical setbacks to 
our peacemaking efforts in the Middle 
East and southern Africa. 

• We might lose military facilities 
essential to the defense of Western in- 
terests in distant but vital regions of the 
world. Our access agreements with 
Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and others help 
us to sustain a U.S. presence all along 
the vital oil routes to the Middle East. 

• We would court the danger of fur- 
ther deterioration in the military 
capabilities and economies of key allies, 
such as Turkey. 

• We might encourage the subver- 
sive efforts by Soviet and Soviet-proxy 
forces. Our assistance is vitally impor- 
tant to countries friendly to the West 
such as Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and Oman 
that are under growing pressure from 
Soviet client states. 

• We risk damage to important 
markets and commercial ties. Today 
more than one-quarter of our agri- 
cultural and manufactured exports goes 
to the developing world. 

• Finally, we might weaken valuable 
multilateral financial institutions which 
have contributed to economic growth 
and must continue their vital role in 
economic development. 

The President's program of foi-eign 
assistance is not only a safeguard 
against all those dangers but an integral 
element of the President's foreign policy 
It is absolutely necessary if our 
strategies are to succeed in achieving 
their objectives. For example, our policy 
in the Middle East pursues two goals: 
the search for a just and lasting peace 
and the urgent requirement that our 
friends in the region be secure against 
threats from the outside and from 
Soviet surrogates and radical forces 
within the region. These goals reinforce 
each other. No peace is possible unless 
local countries are secure from outside 
coercion; and security will not be 
achieved if we fail to address the 
underlying sources of conflict and in- 

Our foreign assistance serves both of 
these goals. It seeks to advance the 
welfare (if the populations and the 
economic health of their countries to 
promote economic and political stability 
throughout the region. The security and 
economic health of Israel and Egypt 
give these nations the confidence to con- 
tinue on the path toward peace begun at 
Camp David. 

Similarly, our policy in Southwest 
Asia seeks to insure Western access to 
oil from the Persian Gulf. Almost all the 
countries in the area stretching from 
Pakistan to Morocco are economically 
troubled. In addition, they face potential 
subversion or regional threats, in many 
cases supported by the Soviets or their 
proxies. Our 5-year program of military 
modernization and economic assistance 
will help Pakistan to meet the Soviet 
threat from Afghanistan and facilitate 
the development essential to internal 
stability. Our assistance helps Sudan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia to face threats of 
subversion or aggression emanating 
from Libya. 

In the eastern Mediterranean, we 
seek to strengthen our relations with 
two major allies, Greece and Turkey, to 
buttress NATO's vital southeastern 
flank, and to facilitate the search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem. Our 
assistance is required for a strong 
Turkey, which lies at a key geopolitical 
crossroad, the intersection of our 
NATO, Southwest Asia, and Middle 
East interests. Both security and 
economic stability are necessary to main- 
tain tlie momentum toward restoration 
of democratic institutions in Turkey. 
Security assistance also helps a 
democratic Greece fulfill its NATO 


Department of State Bulletin 


In the Caribbean, the President's 
poHcy seeks to provide both the 
economic help that the nations ol' the 
region need to overcome legacies of 
poverty and injustice and the security 
assistance needed to prevent Castro 
from exploiting those conditions to 
establish new totalitarian regimes. We 
must provide the resources needed until 
increased investment, a strengthened 
private sector, and expanded export 
markets enable these countries to 
achieve economic self-sufficiency. The 
amounts for security assistance are 
modest, equaling just over $100 million 
out of a total aid request of $675 million 
for the entire basin area. 

El Salvador, where insurgents seek 
to prevent elections and destroy the 
economy, would be the largest single 
recipient of both security and economic 
assistance. Jamaica will continue to need 
substantial assistance in order to restore 
the vitality of its shattered private sec- 
tor. Our support for Costa Rica's rapidly 
deteriorating economy will help that 
country to carry out fundamental 
economic reforms and to preserve the 
longest democratic tradition in Central 
America. In Honduras, another move 
toward democracy faces the dangerous 
combination of a quickening economic 
decline and a political-military crisis 
upon its borders. 

To assure the most effective use of 
our scarce resources, the President has 
realigned foreign assistance allocations 
with careful attention to priorities. The 
promotion of truly lasting economic 
growth remains one of our key objec- 
tives. Our program recognizes that 
assistance alone will not guarantee 
economic development. Growth also 
requires proper economic incentives, 
national commitment, and a reliance on 
the creativity and resourcefulness of the 

The program also responds to the 
pressing needs of key strategic nations 
for increased economic support and con- 

The Comprehensive 

The comprehensive report to which the 
Secretary referred is entitled "International 
Security and Economic Cooperation Program 
FY 1983" (Special Report #99). Free, single 
copies are available from the Public Informa- 
tion Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. ■ 

cessional military sales. Such nations 
must receive help in order to bolster 
their defense against outside subversion 
and to prevent economic crises. 

Our new focus on essential strategic 
and development objectives should not 
obscure our pride in the continuing 
American commitment to traditional 
humanitarian objectives. We remain the 
major source of assistance to refugees in 
Africa, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and 
the Middle East. We direct the bulk of 
our development and food aid to the 
world's poorest countries. These coun- 
tries — with limited access to private 
capital markets — depend on concessional 
assistance to support their development 
efforts. To meet these needs, President 
Reagan committed the United States at 
Cancun to maintaining assistance levels 
to these nations. 

I recognize that approval of foreign 
assistance in this time of austerity will 
be difficult. But we shall pay a greater 
price later if we do not act now. 
America's most essential interests are 
under attack. The President firmly 
believes that the resources he has re- 
quested are crucial to defense of these 
interests and to the promotion of a more 
peaceful and secure world. Our nation's 
security tomorrow requires that we 
make an investment in foreign assist- 
ance today. 

'Press release 86. The complete 
transcript of the hearing will be published 
by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402.B 

Secretary Haig Visits 
Europe and North Africa 

Secretary Haig departed the United 
States February 7, 1982, to visit Madrid 
(February 7-10), Lisbon (February 
10-11), Marrakech (February 11-12), and 
Bucharest (February 12-13). He returned 
to the United States on February 13. 

Following are the Secretary's state- 
ment made before the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) in Madrid on February 9 and 
texts of news conferences held in each ci- 



FEB. 9, 19822 

We are at a critical crossroads in the 
postwar history of Europe. Our peoples 
have invested great hopes in the promise 
and principles of Helsinki. From Madrid 
we must send them a clear signal that 
we are determined to fulfill that promise 
and to insist upon those principles. 
Otherwise, the Helsinki Final Act and 
the process of reconciliation, which it 
symbolizes, will be seriously, perhaps ir- 
reparably, damaged. In 1975, 35 heads 
of government committed themselves to 
heal the wounds and divisions of 
Europe. Respect for the rights of na- 
tions and individuals was to form the 
basis for much greater security and 
cooperation. A new era of trust, trade, 

travel, and freedom was to ensue. 
Europe was to be made whole again. 
Now that vision has been funda- 
mentally challenged. As we confront the 
complexities of the present situation, we 
might well heed Winston Churchill, who 
advised that: "In critical and baffling 
situations, it is always best to recur to 
first principles and simple action." We 
are, indeed, in a critical situation. The 
first principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
are under attack. My purpose — and, in- 
deed, the purpose of this conference — 
must be to defend the act by speaking 
clearly about what is happening and 
why. For more than a year, the Ameri- 
can delegation, ably directed by Am- 
bassador Kampelman, has sought with 
others to build on the promise of the 
Helsinki Final Act. We have discussed 
our differences, and we have pursued 
new initiatives. Throughout, our purpose 
has been to strengthen security and co- 
operation in Europe. All of these efforts 
are now overshadowed by ominous 
events in the heart of Europe itself. The 
Polish people, whose destiny has always 
affected European security, are being 
denied their right to determine their 
own affairs. A forcible suppression of 
the Polish search for dignity in the 
workplace, for freedom, and for self- 
determination is underway. The generals 
of this war against the Polish people are 

April 1982 



none other than the Polish regime itself, 
acting under the instigation and coercion 
of the Soviet Union. How can these ac- 
tions be reconciled with Polish and 
Soviet signatures on the Helsinki ac- 

Danger to Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 

Nothing endangers security and coopera- 
tion in Europe more than the threat and 
the use of force to deny internationally 
recognized rights. Nothing endangers 
the Helsinki Final Act and the Helsinki 
process more than this willful violation 
of solemn international obligations. We 
would be threatening the future peace of 
Europe if we ignored this dramatic at- 
tack on international principles. 

Clearly, all countries interested in a 
more secure, united, and open Europe — 
the work of this conference — have a 
responsibility to raise their voices here 
today. The American people, and other 
peoples as well, could never countenance 
a cynical attempt to place the Polish 
tragedy beyond the reach of the Helsinki 
Final Act. To the contrary, the act justi- 
fies our concern and demands our pro- 
test. Put most simply, the issue is 
whether we meant what we said in 
August of 1975. 

In principle I of the Final Act, the 
signatories said that states had the right 
to choose and develop their political, 
social, economic, and cultural systems. 
Yet through intimidation and inter- 
ference, the Soviet Union has conspired 
with the Polish military authorities to 
deprive Poland of this basic right. 

In principle II the signatories said 
that participating states would refrain 
from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political inde- 
pendence of any state. Yet Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact military demonstrations 
and the palpable fear of Soviet military 
intervention have been used to in- 
timidate the Polish people in their 
search for reform. 

In principles IV and VI, the signa- 
tories said they would refrain from any 
action against the political independence 
of any other participating state and 
from any intervention in their internal 
or external affairs. Yet the Polish nation 
has been the victim of a long and vicious 
campaign. Official statements, some 
emanating from the highest levels of the 
Soviet Government, have warned of dire 
consequences if the Poles persisted in 
their pursuit of Polish solutions to Polish 

Secretary Haig addressed the CSCE in Madrid on February 9. Here he is with Am- 
bassador Max M. Kampelman, chairman of the U.S. delegation (left), and Terence A. 
Todman, U.S. Ambassador to Spain, {in photo) 

In principle VII, the signatories said 
they would promote and encourage the 
effective exercise of civil, political, eco- 
nomic, social, cultural, and other rights 
and freedoms. But the Polish military 
authorities, far from promoting and en- 
couraging the exercise of these rights, 
are suppressing the most fundamental 
freedoms of the Polish people. 

In principle VIII, the signatories 
said they would respect the right of 
peoples freely to determine their politi- 
cal status, without external interference, 
and to pursue as they wished their politi- 
cal, economic, social, and cultural devel- 
opment. Violation of this principle 
threatens the entire Final Act. Yet since 
the beginning of the reform movement 
in Poland, the Soviet Union has attempt- 
ed systematically to deny the right of 
the Polish people to chart their own 

In principle X, the signatories said 
that: "In exercising their sovereign 
rights, including the right to determine 
their laws and regulations, they will con- 
form with their legal obligations under 
international law. ..." The suppression 
of the civil and human rights of the 
Polish people violates the internationally 
recognized rights set forth in the U.N. 
Charter and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as the specific 
provisions of the Final Act. 

What I have just described is the bill 
of rights which the Helsinki Act provid- 
ed Western civilization. Thus, the Final 
Act sets forth basic standards by which 
to judge ourselves and each other. These 
principles were the product of laborious 
negotiations. They were solemnly under- 

taken. My own country's attitude was 
well expressed by President Ford, when 
he said: 

We take this work and these words very 
seriously. We will spare no effort to ease ten- 
sions and solve problems between us. But it 
is important that you recognize the deep 
devotion of the American people and their 
government to human rights and fundamen- 
tal freedoms and thus to the pledges that this 
conference has made. . . . 

Pattern of Violations 

The United States and many other 
governments represented here today 
proudly hold ourselves to these stand- 
ards. The Helsinki Final Act embodies 
our rejection of the self-serving 
sovereignty that equates might with 
right. It reflects the international con- 
sensus that all of the principles are 
equally binding. No state has the right 
to arbitrary definition. No state has the 
right to claim selective exemption. Yet, 
as we meet today, the exercise of arbi- 
trary power and violence has become a 

Together with many others, the 
American delegation has detailed here 
since September 1980 the Soviet Union's 
continuous and utter disregard for the 
Helsinki Final Act. Afghanistan has 
been invaded. Soviet citizens trying to 
monitor the Soviet Union's compliance 
with Helsinki have been attacked, im- 
prisoned, and placed in mental institu- 
tions. Emigration has decreased dra- 
matically. In neighboring Poland, the 
people now face a ruthless campaign of 
oppression instigated and supported by 
the Soviet Union. These are not random 


Department of State Bulletin 


acts but systematic policy. Soviet acts 
have clearly nullified Soviet com- 

Such acts of oppression and in- 
tervention make it impossible to estab- 
lish conditions for a more free and 
secure Europe. To ignore them would 
condemn this conference as a charade. 
The Helsinki Final Act would be reduced 
to a worthless piece of paper. 

We cannot accept the fallacious 
argument that legitimate security in- 
terests or alliance systems are 
threatened by a defense of the Helsinki 
principles. In fact, peaceful change is 
essential to any durable framework for 
security. No legitimate government is 
threatened by freedom and justice. 
Solidarity with the Polish people and our 
support for their rights are essential to 
the survival of the Helsinki pro- 
cess — and to our own self-respect. 

The Need for Constructive Action 

The Polish regime and the Soviet Union 
know very well that they have violated 
the Helsinki Final Act. They have taken 
a path inimical to security and coopera- 
tion in Europe. It is up to them to 
demonstrate that they take seriously the 
principles to which they are pledged. 

• We look for the release from 
prison of those trade union leaders and 
others who seek to realize the objectives 
of the Helsinki Final Act for their peo- 
ple. Promises of good intentions or the 
mere movement of prisoners to model 
camps are not enough. 

• We look for the lifting of martial 
law. This means the end of repressive 

• We look for reconciliation in 
Poland. Restoration of internationally 
recognized rights, and a resumption of a 
process of reform and liberalization pro- 
vide the only basis for a constructive na- 
tional dialogue, free from external coer- 

The American people, like those of 
so many lands, have a special and strong 
attachment to the people of Poland. No 
nation has suffered more, nor displayed 
such enduring courage. Relief from cur- 
rent oppression is not enough — the 
Polish people want more, need more, 
deserve more. The United States has 
decided to join other concerned coun- 
tries in offering a major program to help 
Poland overcome its economic problems, 
including agricultural shortages and 
massive external debt. This assistance 
will become available when the basic 

rights of the Polish people are restored 
and their quest for a more decent socie- 
ty resumed. 

We will not aid tyranny. But if 
tyranny stands aside, we are ready to 
help. It is up to the Polish military 
regime and the Soviet Union to create 
and to maintain the conditions in which 
the Polish people can, with Western 
assistance, rebuild their economy. 

As these conditions are restored, we 
also will be among the first to insist that 
we return to the job of reaching agree- 
ment on moving the Helsinki process 
forward in both the human rights and 
security areas. In the meantime, busi- 
ness as usual here at Madrid would 
simply condone the massive violations of 
the Final Act now occurring in Poland. 
These violations — part of a broader pat- 
tern of Soviet lack of restraint — 
threaten the very basis of this con- 
ference. We cannot pretend to build up 
the structure of peace and security here 
in Madrid while the foundation for that 
structure is being undermined in Poland. 
How can the United States return to 

. . . Soviet and Warsaw 
Pact military demon- 
strations and the 
palpable fear of Soviet 
military intervention 
have been used to in- 
timidate the Polish peo- 
ple in their search for 

negotiations on new words and new 
undertakings while existing obligations 
are being so blatantly ignored? 

Vision of Helsinki 

Today, our deliberations must focus in- 
stead on the challenges to the integrity 
of the Final Act and the CSCE process. 
To do otherwise would endanger suc- 
cessful negotiations, if and when circum- 
stances permit, on the basis of the con- 
structive proposal tabled by the neutral 
and nonaligned states last fall. Even 
more fundamentally, it would dishonor 
the Final Act and our commitment to 
uphold it. 

1 want to conclude by quoting from 
the Polish bishops who wrote recently 
that: "Real peace stems from respect for 
freedom and the correct understanding 
of everyone's right to freedom." This lies 
at the heart of the Helsinki process. In 
the final analysis, peace and security in 
Europe depend on respect for the 
freedom of nations and individuals in 
Europe. Recognition of this fact is the 
key to the removal of the barriers 
dividing East from West. 

Freedom is the proudest achieve- 
ment of Western civilization. It was 
given recent expression in the successful 
and peaceful transition to democracy in 
Portugal and here in Spain. The vision 
of man as a creative and responsible in- 
dividual has flourished despite the arti- 
ficial divisions decreed by ideologues and 
dictators. Western ideals nourish all the 
nations of Europe, not only those 
members of the Atlantic world. After a 
quarter century of iron curtain and cold 
war, the Helsinki Final Act promised a 
new era because it was based on this 
unifying vision of man. 

But the ideals of the West are in 
danger if their defense is not considered 
vital by the nations of Europe. The proc- 
ess of reconciliation can be halted if we 
ignore the acts that betray our faith. 
The structure of security and coopera- 
tion can collapse if we avert our eyes 
from the undermining of its foundation. 
Only full observance of the Helsinki 
Final Act will insure the solidarity of the 
nations of Europe. Only respect for free- 
dom will insure the survival and flourish- 
ing of Western civilization. 



FEB. 9, 19823 

.As you know, member governments 
came here to Madrid more than a year 
ago with the hopes of strengthening the 
CSCE process and to find new ways to 
build on the Final Act of the Helsinki ac- 
cords. The U.S. Government and, in- 
deed, the Western allies support and 
continue to support this process. 
In the intervening period and 
although the conference itself thus far 
has been proceeding against the cloud of 
the situation in Afghanistan, we have 
been faced since December 13th with the 
instigation of martial law in Poland and 
the crushing of civil and political rights 
which now constitute a new threat to 
the CSCE process to this conference and 
all our hopes for it. In this regard, it is 
the considered view of the Western 

April 1982 



governments that the Polish Govern- 
ment and the Soviet Union bear heavy 
responsibility for the situation. The 
presence here at this conference today 
of so many Western foreign ministers, 
indeed, reflects our support for the 
aims, purposes, and objectives of 
Helsinki. But it also reflects our deter- 
mination to set this process right. 

This morning, until a few moments 
ago, Western leaders addressed not as 
an affront to the obligations of Helsinki, 
but there were repeated references to 
the continuing unsatisfactory situation in 
Afghanistan and the suppression of 
human rights within the Soviet Union 
itself. Again, we all collectively em- 
phasized our hopes for progress, but our 
recognition that that progress will de- 
pend on the situation in Poland. From 
the U.S. point of view, we are dedicated 
to the proposition that we will not, I 
repeat not, conduct business as usual 
while this situation continues in Poland. 
We are here to speak to the Polish crisis 
as a violation of the underpinnings and 
the structural framework of the Helsinki 
accords, and the Soviet response this 
morning in no way provided an adequate 
explanation for the repressions that are 
occurring in Poland today. We will, in 
the days ahead, continue to raise our 
concerns from the U.S. delegation, and I 
speak with confidence from the entire 
Western delegations with a great em- 
phasis on the threat that it poses to the 
spirit and the letter of Helsinki. Thus 
far this morning, we have had interven- 
tions on the Western side from Canada, 
Belgium, Italy, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Spain, and the United States. 

I think it's important we not lose 
sight of what all this is about. The 
Soviet Union has invaded Afghanistan 
and occupies and suppresses that coun- 
try today. The Soviet Union has aided 
and abetted the suppression in Poland. 
The Soviet Union has failed to accept 
the rights and principles established in 
the Helsinki accords. And it is important 
at this juncture in history that we ad- 
dress these concerns without furthur in- 

As you know, by alphabetical coin- 
cidence, Poland is in the chair for 
today's meeting. I deeply regret having 
to report that the Polish delegation has 
arbitrarily blocked the opportunity for a 
number of the delegates to speak today, 
contrary to the spirit that has, indeed, 
always marked the CSCE meetings up 
until now— the kind of discussion that 
CSCE was intended to promote. It is no 
surprise that the guilty tried to evade 
exposure of their wrongs. They will not. 

of course, succeed. What they have done 
is to further discredit themselves, to 
outline their guilt all the more sharply, 
and to demonstrate once again their 
disregard for the CSCE process. But 
they will hear the truth anyway, 
however much they wish to hide from it. 

Q. After reading your statement of 
today, I have some doubts whether the 
United States will reduce the level of 
participation here in the CSCE and, 
secondly, why the United States didn't 
mention any of these treaties when 
Turkey had another coup in the past. 
A. With respect to the first ques- 
tion, we are here and at my level today 
and on a permanent basis with Am- 
bassador Kampelman [Max Kampelman, 
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 
CSCE]. We will continue to participate 
as an expression of our concern about 
the situation in Poland. I want to em- 
phasize, however, that it would be in- 
conceivable that we could participate in 
a business as usual atmosphere. In other 
words, for as many days or weeks as it 
takes to express, at our normal level 
after today, our concern about the 
Polish situation, we will do so. We will 
wait and listen to hear what the Soviet 
Union and the Polish Government have 
to say on the very vital subjects that 
have been raised this morning. Thus far, 
we have not heard any acceptable 

The question has come up about par- 
allelism between what is occurring in 
Poland and what has occurred in 
Turkey. It would take probably the 
worst distortion of the so-called double 
standard I referred to, to create a 
parallel. In Turkey, Turkish military 
authorities were faced with the extreme 
terrorism of the right and the left to a 
level in which 20 innocent Turkish 
citizens a day were becoming the victims 
of that violence. There is and was ter- 
rorism in Poland. 

Secondly, the Turkish military 
authorities now responsible for the 
Government of Turkey have committed 
themselves and have, indeed, announced 
a date certain for a return of the con- 
stitutional process. They have reestab- 
lished the law and order that was not in 
evidence before the imposition of martial 
law in Turkey and have set in train a 
sound economic development program 
for the people of Turkey. Precisely the 
opposite is the case in Poland. 

Third, the Turkish authorities today 
enjoy the unanimous or near unanimous 
support of the Turkish people as they at- 
tempt to return the government to law 
and order under democratic process. 

Precisely the opposite is the case in 
Poland where the support of the Polish 
people is for the Solidarity trade union 
movement, which has been brutally sup- 
pressed and which is in the process of 
dismantlement, as a result of the 
repressive acts of the Polish Govern- 

Q. You mentioned in your speech 
today that if basic human rights were 
restored to Poland, your government 
would be prepared to take part in a 
massive aid program. Could you say 
something about the scale and nature 
of that program if basic human rights 
were restored? 

A. I don't want to dot too many i's 
or cross too many t's. I think you will 
note that similar interventions were 
made by other Western ministers today, 
and we have been in discussions with 
our West European partners. Both in 
the Nine and in the NATO forum, we 
have already made it clear that we are 
prepared to concern together to deal 
with the tragedy that is Poland today, 
both in the context of the substantial 
provision of foodstuffs— goods and 
materials— and substantial credits to 
help deal with the staggering debt of the 
Polish Government today. That would be 
a concerted Western action. The United 
States would play its full role as it has 
in the past before the suppression in 
Poland. This last year alone we came 
close to a billion dollars worth of U.S. 
assistance to the Government and people 
of Poland during the period when na- 
tional reform and rejuvenation was per- 

Q. As for your speech, as I under- 
stand it, you said that you separate 
the Polish problems and you treat it 
first before you start to work for the 
final agreement. Instead of this, are 
you not dealing with the Polish prob- 
lem in the very framework of the 
discussion toward final agreement; 
that is the range of contact as usual, 
for, because of Poland, the Western 
alliance has imposed some sanctions in 
technical scientific areas, which turns 
out to be related to topic two of the 
Helsinki Act. Isn't this way of involve- 
ment much the more efficient or prac- 
tical to avoid the new key silent 
period between East and West? 

A. In the first place, I don't see 
these as mutually exclusive alternatives 
in any way, and your question presumes 
a set of decisions that have not been 
made on the part of the West. Youll 
recall that we have continued to par- 
ticipate in the Geneva arms control 
discussions on intermediate missiles. I 


Department of State BulletinJ 


met 2 weeks ago in Geneva with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister to discuss a 
whole range of issues but with focus on 
the backdrop of the Polish question. 

I think it's very important to focus 
on what CSCE is all about. There was 
indeed, the Helsinki accords in 1975 that 
were the structural underpinning, if you 
will, of the concept of detente. It was 
the Helsinki accords and its Final Act 
which have provided the basis for a nor- 
malizing process between East and 
West. It is those Helsinki accords which 
constitute both the spirit and the letter 
of the mutual obligations of the 
signatories to those accords which are 
now being grossly challenged and 
violated by events in Poland, the con- 
tinuation of the situation in Afghanistan, 
and a failure to live with other obliga- 
tions incurred at that time. 

But the situation in Poland is, in 
Europe, the heart and the focus of the 
Helsinki effort; peace and stability and 
security in central Europe or in Europe 
proper. It would be absolutely ludicrous 
to hang additional accoutrements on the 
Final Act when the Final Act itself is be- 
ing basically violated. One of the 
speakers said it would be like building 
on shifting sands, and we must not do 

The other actions being taken by the 
West in response to the suppression in 
Poland, of course, constitute collective 
action to do all that we can do respon- 
sibly to cause the Polish leadership to 
step back, to reinstitute the process of 
reform, to release the prisoners, and to 
lift martial law and above all to in- 
fluence the Soviet Union and its leaders 
to recognize that it is in our collective 
best interest to have a return to nor- 
malcy in Poland at the earliest possible 

Q. What will be your comments 
about the Soviet intervention in the 
countries regarding that the United 
States is a stabilizing force and at the 
same time is guilty of helping Fascist 
governments— like Pinochet, Central 
America, and South Africa? That's 
what the Soviet delegates said at the 

A. Why don't you add to that we 
have considered resuming the produc- 
tion of chemical weapons; add that 
charge, too. 

Q. Also the production of 
chemical weapons. 

A. Let's start with that one first, 
because, as you know, last year when I 
visited Berlin, in a speech I gave there I 
referred to growing, mounting evidence 

of the use of chemical and biological 
weapons — mycotoxins in Afghanistan 
and Southeast Asia, Laos and Kam- 
puchea. Since that time the evidence has 
mounted dramatically. And we have un- 
equivocal evidence of the use of these 
systems. I think it is a ludicrous state- 
ment for any Soviet spokesman to make. 

With respect to our relationships 
with the regimes litanied in the Soviet 
intervention, I won't presume to classify 
each and every one of them because 
they are all in a different state of 
development. Some in the past have 
caused concern in my own country. All 
have been in the process of reform. I 
think if you will analyze each and every 
one, to differing degrees you will find 
responsive reaction to the concerns not 
only of worldwide public opinion but the 
U.S. concern. And major steps have 
been taken in some of those cases to re- 
institute the values and principles that 
we espouse in the Helsinki accords. 

We are today faced with a situation 
in which we are witnessing the conse- 
quences of a direct Soviet invasion of 
the nonaligned neighboring state, 
Afghanistan, the continuing suppression 
and brutalization of the populations 
there by armed might, the installation of 
a puppet regime which is in office simply 
and solely because of Soviet military 
power, and we witnessed on the 13th of 
December the institute of martial law in 
Poland. There is no sign in any of those 
instances either of ameliorating policies 
or commitments. That's not withstand- 
ing certain token steps that have been 
taken by the Government of Poland. So 
I don't think those of us who are con- 
cerned about the truth and objectivity 
should be led astray by specious allega- 
tions designed to deflect our attention, 
as was this parliamentary brouhaha a 
few minutes ago, from the truth of 
what's going on in Poland today. 

Q. I wonder if you can be a little 
more specific on what you mean by no 
business as usual? You seem to in- 
dicate that Ambassador Kampelman is 
going to stay here, that the meetings 
are going to go on at the CSCE. So 
what basically is changing about our 
approach to this conference? 

A. The change is fundamental. The 
focus of every American interven- 
tion—the exclusive focus— will be the 
situation in Poland, not the business of 
the conference. That will continue until 
we have had an ample opportunity to 
assess very carefully what the Eastern 
reaction will be— not just their im- 
mediate reaction today but over a mat- 
ter of days and perhaps weeks. 

Q. [Inaudible] conference it is 
possible human rights in Poland that 
the Helsinki I principles be [inaudible] 
and that everyday [inaudible] Central 
America. What do you think about the 
human rights in that part of the 
world? [Inaudible] go back to years of 
the cold war? 

A. I think with respect to your first 
question, let me assure you that hardly a 
day goes by that I don't concern myself 
that the President's Administration does 
not concern itself about the situation in 
Central America. We've made it very 
clear that we are as opposed to excesses 
of the right as we are to excesses of the 
left. We have been actively engaged in 
trying to alleviate the socioeconomic 
dilemmas and contradictions that exist 
in Central America today and which 
feed the bloodshed and terrorism from 
both the right and the left. 

But I think it is important also to 
remember that it is the left that is ob- 
taining massive amounts of support, ar- 
maments, command and control, train- 
ing, and it was the left which initially in- 
stituted the bloodshed in El Salvador. It 
is our hope that we pursue policies 
which would make the people of El 
Salvador the final criteria of the govern- 
ment under which they would exist. And 
that's why we have consistently en- 
couraged early elections and a national 
referendum where the Salvadoran peo- 
ple can speak at the ballot box what 
they have been unable in certain circles 
to speak toward the extremists who 
have pursued violence in that country. 

I don't see any double standard here 
at all; quite the contrary, the double 
standard would be that if we here in the 
West focused on the admittedly un- 
desirable and, indeed, unacceptable ex- 
cesses that are occurring in the tur- 
bulent Central American region and 
used that as an excuse to accept right 
here in the heart of Europe a far more 
repressive and far less ambiguous sup- 
pression of the values that we espouse 
and cherish. I would hope that those of 
you who engage in these introspections 
keep your focus clearly on that reality. 

Q. Is it true your delegation will 
not leave the conference in the next 
days or next weeks because of the 
Polish press? 

A. I don't think we have threatened 
to leave. I've seen some press specula- 
tion to that effect. We're here because 
of our continuing support for the CSCE 
process. We are going to speak to 
Poland as long as it is necessary out of 
respect for that process. What that will 
mean in the days ahead is too early to 

April 1982 



say. We're going to listen to the other 
side and see whether or not this effort is 
going to reestablish a sound framework 
for the conduct of business as usual. As 
of today, no way. 

Q. Do you expect an early adjourn- 

A. It isn't for us to say. This is a 
consensus operation. I do know I expect 
the United States, and I expect our 
Western partners because they have 
reassured me accordingly, to speak 
vigorously to Poland, and if there is a 
consensus to recess or to terminate, that 
remains to be seen. 



FEB. 10, 1982^ 

I want to state at the outset that the 
purpose of this press conference is to 
focus on Spanish-American bilateral 
relationships having conducted a press 
conference yesterday on the Madrid 
CSCE conference— a conference which 
is proceeding, as expected, with very 
clear and full Western unity, with the 
focus on the situation in Poland and the 
impact that that has on the entire CSCE 
process. I anticipate that that focus will 
continue in the days ahead. 

Turning now to Spanish-American 
bilateral relationships, I want to em- 
phasize that I've had extremely produc- 
tive discussions here in Madrid, first 
with His Majesty King Juan Carlos; with 
Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo; and with 
my counterpart. Foreign Minister Perez 

In these discussions I emphasized 
that the United States is committed to 
the democratic process in Spain, admires 
immensely the strength and vigor of the 
democratic institutions that have been 
established and which are now thriving 
in Spain, and views democracy in Spain 
as the guiding principle of Spanish- 
American relationships. 

We welcome Spain's movement 
toward full membership in Western in- 
stitutions. We consider Spain a valuable 
international partner and welcome and 
fully support Spain's decision to enter 
NATO. With respect to NATO we see 
the alliance moving rapidly to ratify 
Spanish entry. Canada and Norway have 
already done so. The United States and 
two or three others will do so in the im- 
mediate future, and look forward to full 
ratification sometime this spring by all 
member governments. The United 
States also seeks to build in the period 

ahead stronger and more intimate bi- 
lateral relationships with Spain, and in 
this regard the on-going base negotia- 
tions and the U.S. security assistance 
program with Spain will reflect this 
American objective. In conclusion, I con- 
sider this visit to have been highly 
beneficial in the context of the Spanish- 
American relationships. 

Q. You have referred to Spanish- 
American relations in a very vague 
way. I wonder if we could ask you to 
be a bit more specific as to the 
negotiations. Do you believe that they 
will be ended, that they will conclude 
at the same time as the conclusion of 
the ratification process for the entry 
of Spain into NATO, and if that is the 
case, do you believe that this entire 
process will climax with the visit of 
President Reagan to this country in 

A. First let me emphasize that we 
are very, very pleased with the current 

Spanish King Juan Carlos 1. 

conduct of the base negotiation. We do 
see somewhat an interrelationship be- 
tween the completion of the ratification 
process, the program for American 
security assistance that will be sub- 
mitted to the Congress for FY 1983, and 
the timely conclusion of the base 
negotiations by May of this year. I re- 
main very optimistic that all of those 
events will happily, in an interrelated 
way, coincide. 

The question of a future visit from 
President Reagan is one that only he 
can answer. There is no current plan for 
such a visit. I don't have to tell you, 
however, and I could not over emphasize 
the great regard that the President has 
for American-Spanish relationships and 
for his relationships with the officials 

here in Madrid. We've had a very suc- 
cessful visit from His Majesty recently 
in Washington which the President has 
described as one of the highlights of his 
first year in office, and it was, indeed, 
that for all of us. 

Q. In your conversations with 
Spanish authorities, have you consid- 
ered the possibility of a Government 
of Spain headed by Socialists, and I 
say in a medium term span? If that 
were the case, what variations would 
that represent for the 4-year relation- 
ships with this country, and what new 
situations would you envision under 
those circumstances? 

A. I think it would be highly inap- 
propriate for a visiting official from the 
United States to comment on any way 
on the sovereign internal affairs of the 
Spanish people, and I don't intend to do 
so. It would be wrong, self-defeating, 
and counterproductive. 

Q. Since Spain and the United States 
were on the same side in the debate 
yesterday at the conference, I hope 
you will allow me to ask a question 
that reflects on the conference. Why 
do you think the morning after, the 
Soviets and Poland were so deter- 
mined to cut off Western denuncia- 
tions of the crackdown in Poland? 

A. I suppose that many of us have 
spent a good part of our lives trying to 
fathom Soviet and Eastern motivation. 
One could look very intensely at the 
Soviet media this morning, Izvestia in 
particular, which suggests that there 
was an orchestrated unanimity in the 
Western interventions yesterday on the 
topic of Poland. One could also question 
the tactic of accepting interventions by a 
number of Western spokesmen and then 
rather belatedly snuffing off, through a 
trumped up parliamentary procedure, 
the intervention of other ministers who 
had traveled so far. It clearly underlines, 
in my view, the weakness and the in- 
compatibility of the current policies of 
Moscow and Poland in Afghanistan and 
in the broader areas of implementation 
of human rights obligations. I consider it 
to have been a rather unfortunate 
misjudgment of neutral, nonaligned, and 
Western attitudes with respect to these 

As I said yesterday, there is no 
question in my mind that the truth will 
come out, that Western spokesmen and 
nonaligned and neutral spokesmen as 
well will, indeed, have their opportunity 
to speak in the days ahead and have 
every right to insist on this opportunity. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Q. Everybody knows the great ad- 
miration and friendship felt by the 
President of the Socialist Party of 
Spain for Fidel Castro. And my ques- 
tion is did the U.S. Government, in 
receiving Felipe Gonzalez recently, 
receive him as a representative of 
these guerrillas, as a President of the 
Socialist Party, or as a member of the 
Socialist International? 

A. [Laughter] Without accepting 
any of the premises of your question 
necessarily [laughter], the recent visit of 
Felipe Gonzalez to Washington was 
predicated on his recent visit to Central 
America as the Vice-President of the 
Socialist International and our desire to 
discuss with him his own observations 
during that visit and the report that 
hopefully he would make to the upcom- 
ing meeting of the Socialist Interna- 

I would describe that discussion, 
which was essentially of the character I 
just said, as one that reflected Mr. Gon- 
zalez' concern, which parallels my own, 
about the internal developments in 
Nicaragua which clearly manifest a 
trending toward a militaristic, 
totalitarian Marxist/Leninist model, 
which we consider to be unacceptable 
and a serious threat to peace and stabili- 
ty in the Western Hemisphere. 

Q. I would like to have your 
forecast as to the future of the con- 
ference itself. Do you think it's going 
to be postponed, or it's going to be 
canceled as a result of yesterday's 

A. Clearly the future deliberations 
will be determined by a consensus view 
among the participants. It wouldn't be 
appropriate for me to predict how long 
the conference will run. I will suggest 
that from the U.S. point of view, and 
reiterate what I said yesterday, that we 
cannot proceed with these discussions 
business as usual, that it would be our 
intention so long as we are here in this 
session to focus on the situation in 
Poland, hopefully to receive some more 
enlightening responses than we did 
yesterday from the Soviet intervention, 
but to continue to assess the situation as 
it progresses with the focus on the 
Polish issue. 

With respect to the Helsinki process, 
I would want to emphasize that the 
United States very much values the 
Helsinki process and successful continua- 
tion of these talks. However, we con- 
sider incompatible with extention of the 
final act discussions the violations that 
are occurring in Poland. As I said 
yesterday, you cannot build on an edifice 
which is structured on shifting sands, 

and they are the basic violations of the 
basic principles of the Final Act signed 
in 1975. 

Q. Is there any truth in the stories 
about the differences among the 
Western nations as might be reflected 
by the very long meeting that you had 
with West German Foreign Minister 
Genscher and to what degree is there 
a difference of opinion with the Euro- 
pean nations as to the hardness or 
softness of the positions to be adopted 
vis-a-vis sanctions against the United 
States — or against the U.S.S.R. and 
the East-West dialogue as a whole? 

A. While we are drifting away from 
the topic of bilateral relationships, let 
me assure you that the extensive con- 
sultations which I had with my colleague 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher were a reflec- 
tion of a convergence of view, as has 
been traditionally the case rather than a 
lengthy exposition on differences. I 
think it's very clear from the interven- 
tions made yesterday by Western repre- 
sentatives — the Spanish Representative, 
the President of the Economic Com- 
munity, and the Foreign Minister of 
Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, Foreign 
Minister Genscher, and my own inter- 
vention — that there is a very clear con- 
vergence of viewpoint on the whole 
Polish question and its impact on the 
current conference here in Madrid. I do 
not see, and I am conscious of some 
press speculation with respect to dif- 
ferences, any differences, of any 
significance in the conduct of this con- 
ference and its future, but I leave that 
to your judgment as the facts unfold in 
the days ahead. 

With respect to sanctions and the 
question of NATO attitudes on the 
Polish crisis, I would ask you to reflect 
back on similar situations which were 
even less ambiguous, if this one is am- 
biguous—the Czechoslovakian crisis, the 
Hungarian crisis, the crisis in Eastern 
Germany — and never before has there 
been such unanimity of view achieved 
within the NATO alliance; first with 
respect to the true nature of events in 
Poland, second with respect to the 
culpability of the Soviet Union for these 
events, and third with respect to concer- 
tion of effort and policy in reaction to 
these events both in the context of 
political, economic sanctions, and the 
whole array of post Polish policies. 
These are the focus of continuous con- 
sultation among the member govern- 
ments but which will always reflect the 
sovereignty of our member govern- 
ments. While it may be frustrating in 

comparison with the Warsaw Pact, 
which does by mandate and Diktat 
demonstrate unanimity, it is also the 
great strength of our Western alliance, 
and I would never want it to be any 
other way. 

Q. Are you satisfied with the 
response of the NATO partners in 
Europe toward cooperation in the gas 
pipeline project? Would you like them 
to review the attitude and, in par- 
ticular, would you like governments in 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to 
try to discourage companies from par- 
ticipating in that project? 

A. I think the U.S. position on the 
gas pipeline project has been longstand- 
ing and consistent. It has been one of 
great concern that our West European 
partners not permit themselves to 
become overly dependent on Eastern 
sources for natural gas or any energy 
product. In that regard we raised this 
issue at the Ottawa summit in Canada 
last summer. We sought to develop a 
program of attractive alternatives. 

As I recently said in a press inter- 
view, unfortunately those alternatives 
were not attractive sufficiently because 
of our own austerity at home in our 
ability to develop coal alternatives and 
other alternatives. We have not given 
up. We are continuing to review attract- 
ive alternatives to present to our Euro- 
pean partners with the hopes that they 
will scale down or cancel the pipeline 
project. However, it is vitally important 
in the period ahead that we do this in 
the consultative give-and-take way that 
we have approached this problem from 
the beginning and recognize that our 
European partners have their own im- 
peratives as well. I do not think that the 
crisis in Poland should be seized upon to 
change the basic approach that we've 
already consistently followed from the 
outset of this question. 



FEB. 11, 19826 

I just want to say a brief, few remarks 
about this very, very compressed and 
much too brief visit to your country, 
Portugal. This visit was, as you know, at 
the invitation of my colleague and the 
Foreign Minister of the Government of 
Portugal, Goncalve Spereira, with whom 
I have had very close associations since 
assuming my position as Secretary of 

April 1982 



The visit itself I found to be ex- 
tremely fruitful. It was a continuation of 
on-going and close consultations be- 
tween our two governments. Its focus 
involved regional and alliance affairs, 
the coordination that has become so 
essential at a time of the suppression of 
freedoms and liberties in Poland. It in- 
volved a host of discussions related with 
the CSCE conference in Madrid, on- 
going Western actions related to the 
crisis in Poland. It involved also other 
regional discussions in areas of common 
interest between the Government of 
Portugal and the Government of the 
United States. It included extensive 
discussions on the situation in southern 
Africa where Portuguese experience and 
influence has historically played a very 
important role and whose advice and 
counsel with respect to the provisions of 
U.N. Resolution 435 and the sought- 
after independence of Namibia is in- 
valuable to me. 

And third, it focused on bilateral 
relationships. As you know, we have had 
historic and extensive bilateral relation- 
ships between the people of Portugal 
and the people of the United States, be- 
tween our two governments. This in- 
volves cooperation in a host of political, 
economic, and security-related matters 
in this regard. 

Of course, the United States has 
been keenly interested in the progress of 
the Portuguese Government since the 
turbulent days of 1974 and the creation 
of a democratic institution and a 
democratic process which remains the 
bedrock of our relationship. 

During this visit I had an opportuni- 
ty to extend, on behalf of President 
Reagan, an invitation for your head of 
state to visit the United States in the 
latter half of this coming year, and we 
would also, of course, welcome a similar 
visit from your Prime Minister, dates to 
be worked out in the not too distant 

I want to emphasize once again the 
highly constructive and fruitful 
character of our very, very brief visit 
and they've underlined once again the 
friendship, the cooperation, and mutuali- 
ty of interests that have been 
demonstrated by the Government of 
Portugal in a host of recent strategic 
situations — the Afghanistan crisis, the 
American hostage crisis in Iran, and the 
most recent situation where freedom is 
in jeopardy in Poland. And in that con- 
text, I leave here greatly encouraged 
and enthusiastic about the days ahead. 

Q. Do you believe that Portugal 
must be associated to the solution of 
the Namibian question and if yes, 

A. I think all member governments 
of the United Nations have a very keen 
interest in accordance with Resolution 
435 involving the desirability and the 
necessity for the independence of 

Portuguese Prime Minister Francisco Pinto 

Namibia. As you know, the U.S. Govern- 
ment, working with a contact group [in- 
audible] does not include Portugal, have 
very special responsibilities. As you 
know, the United States has been 
leading an effort within the contact 
group to establish an early progress — to 
establish a schedule and a firm realiza- 
tion of the objectives of the U.N. Resolu- 
tion 435. 

In that regard we have repeatedly 
pointed out that there is an empirical 
relationship between the situation in 
Namibia and the continuing Cuban and 
Soviet presence in Angola. We continue 
to work on this problem, and we have 
made substantial progress in the last 
month. We are now dealing with a set of 
constitutional principles which we have 
run through the interested parties — the 
front-line states, the internal parties in 
Namibia, the South African Govern- 
ment, and the contact group — and I 
hope to have in the near future a 
finalization of that first effort. We will 
then turn to the other two aspects of the 
problem which involve the U.N. 
presence in Namibia and the final 
schedule for South African withdrawal. 

Q. Considering that Spain is com- 
ing into NATO, how do you see as a 
major NATO partner the new strategic 

role of the Iberian bloc, especially on 
the position of Portugal in the Atlan- 
tic islands? 

A. As you know, I have been a 
great advocate myself in my past role as 
Supreme Allied Commander to be very 
active in the integration of the Por- 
tuguese forces, the Portuguese brigade, 
for example. The command relationships 
are, of course, a matter for NATO 
authorities and sometimes, to my regret, 
I am no longer a NATO authority. But 
as you know also, the alliance works on 
a consensus, and in that context consen- 
sus is equivalent to unanimity, so that 
whatever arrangements are ultimately 
worked out for the Iberian command 
structure, it would be with the complete 
approval and acceptance of the Govern- 
ment of Portugal. 

Q. Can Portugal be a link between 
Washington and Luanda? 

A. We have been in direct contact 
with Luanda. However, we very highly 
value the advice we receive from the 
Government of Portugal on the situation 
in all of southern Africa, including 

Q. Are you going to meet Mr. 
Savimbi in Morocco? 

A. No, I'm not. 

Q. Can your visit here be seen as a 
support for the Portuguese Govern- 
ment as it is facing a popular discon- 

A. I specifically and very vigorously 
avoid any involvement in the internal af- 
fairs of the sovereign Government of 
Portugal. And anyone who would inter- 
pret my visit here as contributing in any 
way to the internal situation from one 
point of view or another would be guilty 
of not only misjudgment but probably 
mischievous misjudgment. 

Q. What kind of new military 
facilities does the United States in- 
tend to get here in Portugal or in Por- 
tuguese territory. Do you intend to 
assure that the rapid deployment force 
would probably scale the Azores air- 
base without consulting previously 
with the Portuguese Government? J 

A. It would be inconceivable to me, | 
and I'll answer your question, that any 
utilization of sovereign Portuguese ter- 
ritory could or would occur without the 
complete cooperation and coordination 
with the Portuguese Government. That 
would be inconceivable. It has not been 
done in the past and it would not be 
done in the future. 

With respect to the rapid deploy- 
ment force, there are no definitive plans 
at this time, but I think you know that 


Department of State Bulletin 


the employment of the rapid deployment 
force would be, as always, in the basic 
interests of fundamental Western con- 
cern, whether they be energy related or 
in more [inaudible] strategic concerns. 
And again, no utilization of sovereign 
territory of Portugal could nor would oc- 
cur without the full agreement and sup- 
port of the Portuguese Government. 

Q. I would like to ask you a ques- 
tion about the State Department state- 
ment over the last 24 hours that there 
is some violence in northern Syria, 
and I wonder if you have any further 
information you can give us on that 
and whether you feel that might 
jeopardize the peace between Israel 
and the Arab nations. 

A. With respect to the first part of 
your question, yes, there are reports of 
violence in northern Syria and I think 
that's been affirmed by the Department 

Q. Any more details? 

A. No, none that I would feel would 
be a constructive contribution to this 
press conference. With respect to the 
other part of your question, I frankly 
don't know and don't anticipate it would 
have an impact. Too early to say. 

Q. Reports about one of your col- 
leagues in the Cabinet being ready 
to — I don't have the exact words — 
ask Congress for F-16s for Jordan, for 
mobile surface-to-air missiles for Jor- 
dan. What is your position on that? 

A. I only read what you read. I can 
assure you that the current visit of the 
Secretary of Defense to the Middle East 
is a visit which reflects in every respect 
prior coordination with me personally 
and with the Department of State. But I 
don't think that this is the venue to get 
into that issue. 

Q. Do you foresee further steps of 
the Portuguese Government in 
supporting the American position 
against the Soviet Union in Poland? 
Did the Portuguese Government tell 
you they will take new measures in 
this important problem? 

A. I would rather, than talk about 
new measures, suggest that convergence 
of views between the Government of 
Portugal and the Government of the 
United States on the Polish question is 
rather complete and thorough and iden- 
tical. In the period ahead, we will be 
considering whatever steps are nec- 
essary in the light of whatever changes 
may or may not occur in the unsat- 
isfactory situation in Poland. 

Q. Could the relationships be- 
tween Portugal and its ancient col- 
onies have a great importance for the 
United States? What's the importance 
of the good relationships between Por- 
tugal and its ex-African colonies for 
the United States? 

A. I wouldn't want to answer that 
question with specificity because it 
would suggest a point of view that I 
don't think we have explored in the 
depth that it requires and that you 
might have as a journalist. In general, it 
has always been the U.S. view that Por- 
tugal has had a great deal of historic ex- 
perience in Africa and that that ex- 
perience can make a major contribution 
to the democratic development of the 
nonaligned and new governments of 
Africa. I think that is a matter, of 
course, for the sovereign decision of the 
Government of Portugal and its relation- 
ships with the various governments of 
southern Africa. But in general, we are 
not only comfortable with increasing 
relationships, we see advantages to both 
developing states themselves and to the 
Portuguese people as well. 

Q. Did you discuss the use of the 
Porto Santo Island to store nuclear 
arms — the U.S. possible wish to store 
nuclear arms on the Porto Santo 

A. First let me say as a matter of 
policy — and longstanding policy — 
American officials never discuss such 
sensitive issues involving nuclear 
weapons. But in order to set your minds 
at rest, let me assure you there were no 
discussions of any kind during my visit 
here in Lisbon that had to do with 
deployment, stationing, or positioning of 
nuclear weapons. 

Q. Last night in your speech at 
the official dinner, you said that 
totalitarian pressure continues now in 
Portugal. What were you referring to? 

A. I think again without casting any 
particular label, there are certain 
worldwide movements that are influ- 
enced and controlled extensively from 
Moscow. You have such a movement 
here in Portugal and, therefore, any par- 
ty that takes instructions from outside 
the borders of the sovereign nation in 
which it's playing its role would be a 
matter of concern in that regard. 

Q. Is that an internal question? 

A. It's an internal question for Por- 
tugal, but it's an external question as far 
as East- West relations are concerned 
and the activities of the Soviet Union 
and its extension through the Marx- 
ist/Leninist party to the degree that 

those parties are subservient under 
whatever concept you care to refer 
to — democratic centralism, Stalinist 
loyalty, or whatever. 

Q. Are you any nearer U.S. 
recognition of Angola and has the im- 
portance your Administration attaches 
to UNITA [National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola] been 
criticized by Portuguese leaders? Has 
the importance that the Reagan Ad- 
ministration attaches to UNITA been 
criticized by the present Portuguese 

A. I don't know what importance 
you're referring to. We receive many, 
many visitors from many, many coun- 
tries, and that does not suggest any par- 
ticular value judgment one way or the 
other. I met recently with Felipe 
Gonzalez from Spain, a Socialist leader. 
I have met leaders from African splinter 
groups and African opposition groups; I 
have done that with Western European 
groups. We think it's a value to keep an 
open mind, to listen to all points of view, 
and I think that's part of the democratic 
process. It should not be interpreted as 
a subjective value judgment one way or 
the other but hopefully an educational 
experience which will refine the impor- 
tant judgments that governments must 

With respect to any concerns here, 
no because they would not be justified. 
The United States does not have a rela- 
tionship with UNITA or Mr. Savimbi. 
As a matter of fact, in terms of support, 
we are specifically prohibited from such 
activity under the provisions of the so- 
called Clark amendment. 

Q. Are you any nearer U.S. 
recognition of the Angolan Govern- 

A. We are talking and dependent on 
their future actions, orientations, and in- 
dependence of policy. We, of course, 
would welcome continuing improvement 
in our relationships. 

FEB. 12, 1982'^ 

I just have a few brief remarks to make 
to cover the essence of our visit 
here — all too brief visit — in Morocco. 

This is my first visit to the Kingdom 
of Morocco, having had to cancel an 
earlier planned visit at the time of the 
Polish suppression in December. And as 
brief as this visit has been, it has given 
me the opportunity to meet at length 

April 1982 



with His Majesty, King Hassan, with the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister 
and their colleagues, and to conduct 
very fruitful and far-ranging discussions. 

The main focus of the extensive 
discussion with His Majesty were, of 
course, strategic in character and were a 
reflection of the great experience and 
leadership that His Majesty has 
demonstrated over the years. He has 
been both a witness and a participant in 
global affairs and has been a very 
knowledgeable counselor to American 
leaders over many decades. 

Of course, the primary focus of 
these discussions was the restoration of 

Moroccan King Hassan II. 

global and regional peace and stability. 
In this regard, His Majesty has a unique 
perspective and offered sage advice. He 
has been, as you know, an advocate of 
the achievement of a comprehensive and 
just peace in the Middle East, at the 
earliest possible date, and he has also 
been an advocate for a peaceful solution 
to the war in the Western Sahara 
through a peaceful process proposed by 
His Majesty and facilitated recently at 
the OAU [Organization of African Unity] 

An additional purpose of mine, of 
course, was to underline and reiterate 
President Reagan's support and friend- 
ship for His Majesty and the Govern- 
ment and people of Morocco. 

U.S. -Morocco cooperation in the 
political, military, economic, educational, 
and cultural areas were discussed, and 
we signed, just a few moments ago, an 
agreement establishing a permanent 
binational commission for educational 
and cultural exchange. 

Of course, a very specific focus was 
on the security threats to this region 
which are evident — only too evident — in 
the northern African region. In this 
regard, we agreed it would serve our 
mutual interests at this time to establish 
a joint military commission periodically 
to review our security cooperation. And 
I think our statement with respect to 
that is available to the press here this 
morning. We also discussed the potential 
availability of transit facilities for U.S. 
forces on sovereign Moroccan soil, and 
early discussions will commence with the 
possible realization of such objectives. 

I want to emphasize that no deci- 
sions were made with respect to this 
question but that positive and affirm- 
ative communication was established 
with the objective of leading to the 
availability of such facilities. 

We also reviewed His Majesty's plan 
to visit Washington the first half of this 
year before this coming summer. This 
visit is one which President Reagan very 
much looks forward to as an opportunity 
for a working, sleeves-up discussion of 
the strategic situation, globally and 
regionally. Finally, before turning it 
over to your questions, I want to ex- 
press the appreciation of Mrs. Haig and 
myself and our party for the hospitality 
and warmth of our reception here, and 
nothing could contribute more to that 
than the beautiful setting in which this 
visit occurred here at Marrakech. 

Q. Will your talks on the transit 
facilities perhaps involve the reactiva- 
tion of some U.S. military bases which 
were closed over the years? 

A. I think, as you know, there has 
been discussion on two specific possible 
facilities for American transit use. 
Nothing has been discounted; nothing 
has been specifically approved, but I 
think in the very near future detailed 
discussions will focus on these facilities. 

Q. Did you discuss with the King 
the projected American military 
credits that would be available to his 
government in the next fiscal year, 
and could you give us some idea of 
what that might be? 

A. There were, of course, broad 
discussions on future American plans in 
the security assistance area. I think it's 
too soon for me to pinpoint a specific 
level that is contemplated for FY 1983. I 
think the experience of FY 1982 was, 
from my point of view, somewhat disap- 
pointing. I wish we had been able to do 
better, and I hope we will be able to do 
better in FY 1983, and I would an- 
ticipate that will be the case. Because, 
as we look today at the African Conti- 

U.S.-Moroccan Joint 

Military Commission 


We have agreed that it would serve our 
mutual interests to establish a joint 
military commission which will meet 
periodically for consultations. The agree- 
ment to establish this commission stems 
from the growth in the U.S. -Moroccan 
military relationship to the point where 
a more formal structure is required to 
address security matters of mutual in- 

The establishment of this joint 
military commission is symbolic of the 
traditional and longstanding close friend- 
ship between Morocco and the United 
States. The first meeting is planned in 
the spring in Rabat. 

This statement was made available to news 
correspondents by Secretary Haig in Mar- 
rakech on February 12, 1982. ■ 

nent, as we witness the activity of 
Libya— the high level of armaments that 
have been provided to the government 
by the Soviet Union, the appearance of 
these armaments in various destabilizing 
actions, together with funds and re- 
sources from the Libyan Govern- 
ment—it's been clearly a destabilizing 
offensive underway. And I think it's ex- 
tremely important that the advocates of 
international peace and stability 
cooperate together more closely in the 
period ahead to deal with this destabili- 

Q. Can you tell us what you 
learned about the prospect for a set- 
tlement in the Western Sahara, and 
would those prospects be greatly com- 
plicated with Qadhafi expected to 
takeover as head of the OAU? 

A. I think the distinguished Foreign 
Minister of Morocco had a brief press 
conference this morning in which he 
discussed the recently concluded OAU- 
sponsored conference. I think we are all 
encouraged by the fact that a 
framework was put together which 
broadens responsibility in the region 
specifically to include Mauritania, 
Algeria, as well as Morocco, in the direc- 
tion of a cease-fire and referendum. I 
hope in the weeks ahead the framework 
and the time certainly will be established 


Department of State Bulletin 


to continue with this process and that in 
the interim all responsible participants 
will refrain from undertaking actions 
which would put the realization of the 
referendum and the maintenance of a 
cease-fire in jeopardy. In that regard, 
one cannot draw any encouragement 
whatsoever from the rejection by the 
POLISARIO [Popular Liberation Front 
for Rio de Oro and Saguia El Hamra] 
elements of the OAU proposals. 

Q. How about the second part of 
the question on the role that Mr. 
Qadhafi might play in the settlement 
after he becomes head of the OAU? 
Will that complicate the situation or 
does there need to be a settlement 
before that time? 

A. I wouldn't want to speculate 
about that. Clearly, the U.S. concerns 
about Mr. Qadhafi's activity for an ex- 
tended period— his support of interna- 
tional terrorism, the level of armaments 
that have been introduced into Libya, 
the appearance of those armaments 
elsewhere in the region— are all matters 
of concern. There has been no indication 
in the recent past of any moderation in 
Mr. Qadhafi's activity. I would hope that 
his responsibilities within the OAU 
would offer a refreshing departure from 
his past activity. 

Q. Could I just go back to the 
discussion on the transit rights for 
American forces and the press release 
that is coming out on this joint com- 
mission. Mr. Weinberger [U.S. 
Secretary of Defense] recently, I 
think, reached agreement on a joint 
commission with the Saudi Arabians 
on a similar trip. Is there a broad Ad- 
ministration effort to get this kind of 
joint commission or closer ties with 
friendly countries in the region now 
going on? Is this part of a larger ef- 

A. I think you will recall my first 
trip to the region last spring when we 
talked about the desirability of greater 
cooperation and the development of a 
commonality of view to the dangers 
from external sources to stability of the 
region and externally directed internal 
threats to the security of the region. I 
think I recall at the time and in the 
period since a great deal of skepticism 
about this from some of your colleagues 
in the press. That does not make it any 
less desirable, and what you are witness- 
ing is further steps in that direction. 

I would emphasize again as I did at 
the outset of our discussion about this 
objective, that this in no way runs 
counter to our continuing efforts in the 

direction of achieving a comprehensive 
settlement of longstanding Arab-Israeli 
disputes. As a matter of fact, I have 
always described these as mutually rein- 
forcing objectives. And when progress is 
achieved in one area, it contributes to 
progress in the other. Just as when a 
setback occurs in one area, it makes the 
achievement of progress in the other 
more difficult. 

Q. You gave us an opening by 
mentioning the Polish crisis as part of 
your opening remarks. Before you 
leave for Romania, would you tell us 
the significance of a visit to Romania 
at the time when the Polish crisis con- 

A. I think it's very important that 
we maintain contact and communication 
with Eastern Europe and perhaps even 
more so during this troubled and wor- 
risome period. I am responding to a 
very, you might say, evident request 
from President Ceausescu to make this 
stop-off, and I am, of course, looking 
forward to an exchange of views with 
him. We have maintained such an ex- 
change of views over an extended period 
and I recall my discussions with Roma- 
nian officials at the time of the nor- 
malization process with the People's 
Republic of China. I think we will get 
some valuable insight as a result of this 

FEB. 13, 1982^ 

We have just concluded some 4V2 hours 
of discussion with President Ceausescu 
and Foreign Minister Andrei, to include 
a working lunch which I held with the 
Foreign Minister and his colleagues 
from the foreign office. I would describe 
these discussions as cordial, and with 
the same degree of frankness that has 
characterized discussions between our 
two governments for over a decade. 

I did have an opportunity to deliver 
a letter from President Reagan to Presi- 
dent Ceausescu which was a response 
from the President to an earlier piece of 
correspondence from the Romanian 
President and which dealt with the cur- 
rent situation in Poland. 

EXiring our discussions this morning 
and this afternoon we focused on inter- 
European questions, including the Polish 
question, broader East-West matters 
with a very clear focus on disarmament, 
both the discussions under way on the 
INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] 

in Geneva and the strategic arms discus- 
sions as well. We discussed the current 
conference in Madrid — the CSCE con- 
ference — Latin America, the Middle 
East, southern Africa, and a broad 
range of mutual bilateral questions in- 
volving political, economic, cultural, 
scientific, technological exchanges be- 
tween our two countries. 

There were some differences on the 
Polish question as they pertained to 
sanctions against the Polish Govern- 
ment, but a general convergence of view 
on the need for normalization— im- 
mediate normalization— of the situation 
in Poland to include lifting of martial 
law and the elimination of the state of 

This visit to Romania, as you know, 
has been a response to a longstanding 
invitation to visit Bucharest first ex- 
tended to me by Foreign Minister 
Andrei on behalf of President Ceausescu 
when the Foreign Minister visited 
Washington in May of last year. Presi- 
dent Ceausescu's invitation had been 
reiterated several times since then and 
most recently about 3 weeks ago. 

Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu. 

It is President Reagan's view that at 
a time of increased East- West tension, it 
is particularly important to talk with 
those East European countries which 
are open to such talks, and Romania cer- 
tainly must be included among those na- 
tions to seek ways together to reduce 
tension and to continue to seek construc- 
tive relationships on the basis of respect 
and mutual benefit. Romania has, for 
years, pursued a relatively independent 
foreign policy. On many issues, in fact, 
our foreign policy objectives are quite 
similar. On the commercial level we have 

April 1982 



had increased two-way trade from bare- 
ly $300 million in 1973 to over $1 billion 
annually in just the short period of over 
7 years. 

Within the context of generally good 
relations that I have just described, we 
have been able to discuss with Romania 
human rights, emigration, and family 
reunion cases. There has been progress 
in some individual cases; nonetheless, 
some problems continue. But I believe 
that our visit here will help to alleviate 
those remaining problems. I think the 
hallmark of mature relations between 
countries is not the absence of problems 
which do exist. That has been and will 
continue to be the nature of our relation- 
ship with Romania. We demonstrated by 
this visit that we are prepared to con- 
tinue our constructive relationship with 
the Government and the people of 

Romania's policy on issues ranging 
from arms control to the Middle East, 
the foreign economic policies and at- 
titudes toward national independence 
are both longstanding and well known 
and were discussed in detail with Presi- 
dent Ceausescu today. 

In sum, Romania is a nation which, 
ever mindful of its geography, has 
courageously sought to assert its in- 
dependence and full sovereignty. We 
welcome that. We have constructed with 
the Romanians a network of political, 
commercial, cultural, and scientific ties 
which have operated to our mutual 
benefit. And this is a relationship which 
should continue to broaden and deepen 
in the days and months ahead. 

Q. From my notes you said that 
there were some differences on the 
Polish question as to sanctions. But 
you didn't say anything about the 
sanctions that the United States has 
imposed on the Soviet Union. Did that 
matter come up for discussion today, 
and what was the attitude of the 
Romanian Government on that? 

A. I think President Ceausescu 
made it very clear that he felt sanctions 
against the Polish Government might be 
counterproductive in this environment. 
He raised no concerns about sanctions 
with respect to the Soviet Union, and it 
was not discussed in the very terms 
that the Polish question was. 

Q. Did the Romanians ask for any 
help— economic help— to cover their 
short-term situation? 

A. As you know, like so many of 
our industrialized nations, and even 
more importantly our developing nations 
in the Third World, the current 

economic climate worldwide has had a 
severe impact. There are a number of 
contributors to that — high energy costs, 
the impact of high American interest 
rates with the dollar such a heavily- 
employed currency, declining productivi- 
ty, increasing levels of unemployment, 
and they're high here in Romania today 
as they are in our own country and 
throughout Western Europe. This all 
has caused a problem here in Romania 
in terms of their fluidity and the need 
for cash assets to keep economic growth 
moving in a positive direction. There are 
longstanding requests in that regard to 
the IMF [International Monetary Fund] 
and World Bank, and these questions 
were discussed at great length and great 
detail, with a view toward finding near 
term solutions. 

Q. Did the Romanian President 
raise concerns about the status of 
East-West relations; in other words, 
did he feel that the sanctions and the 
refusal to start the strategic arms 
talks were hurting the atmosphere and 
urge you to drop the sanctions and 
begin the talks, and if so, what was 
your response on what we were 

A. I don't like to go into too much 
detail on discussions that were held in a 
mutually, confidential atmosphere. I 
think President Ceausescu has been a 
longstanding advocate of progress in 
arms control, as has President Reagan. I 
would not suggest that our discussions 
this morning focused on the contradic- 
tion imposed by the Polish question and 
our longstanding tensions in the arms 
control area. 

I would say that the concerns here 
involve the impact that sanctions against 
the Polish Government can have toward 
the rapid normalization of the situation 
in Poland. And that was the focus of the 
concerns that were expressed. On the 
other hand, we had rather far-ranging 
discussions on the question of the 
maintenance of normal relations among 
those states in the East and worldwide; 
indeed, that may belong to the Socialist 
system, which conducts independent and 
sovereign policy, and I think we had a 
meeting of the minds on that subject. 

Q. Given the fact that the Roma- 
nian President feels sanctions are 
counterproductive, and we know the 
U.S. decision on that, does that 
amount to a stalemate, insofar as the 
U.S. -Romanian position vis-a-vis 

A. No not at all. As I've pointed 
out, I think that both President Reagan, 
as I know his position to be, and Presi- 

Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. 

dent Ceausescu believe that it is vitally 
important that a normal condition be 
established in Poland, that martial law 
be lifted, that is whether or not 
economic or materiel sanctions against 
Poland, as distinct from the long- 
standing American and Western policy 
to continue humanitarian assistance to 
the Polish people, where we are assured 
that that assistance gets to the people, 
and is not utilized by repressive govern- 
ment action or to re-enforce further 
repression. So there is just a minor dif- 
ference here, and I would describe it in 
terms of this tactical question, with the 
Polish side believing that it would be 
useful to help Poland in this crisis. 

Q. Did President Ceausescu hear 
of the American view that ultimately 
it was the Soviets who were responsi- 
ble for the imposition of martial law? 

A. I must say that we did not 
discuss that question in the context in 
which it was asked. 

Q. Can anybody else know the 
contents of that letter from President 
Reagan to President Ceausescu? 

A. The nature — and there again I 
don't think that it's appropriate for me 
to publicly air communications between 
two heads of state, but clearly I've 
talked about where our differences are 
on the sanction question. 

Q. Did President Ceausescu ex- 
press any concern about a disruption 
or possible discontinuation of the 
CSCE process? 

A. Yes, we had a very good ex- 
change on that subject. I think we have 
a convergence in our broad objectives 
there, and that is the desirability of 
maintaining confidence in and continued 
progress on the implementation of the 
Final Act. 


Department of State Bulletin 


As you know, it is our view that that 
continuation will require very clear 
clarifications on the human rights viola- 
tions that are occurring in Poland today 
and that have thus far remained 
unanswered by the Soviet Union and the 
Polish participants in the conference. I 
would think I would interpret President 
Ceausescu's view as one that we should, 
nevertheless, persevere and seek a 
meaningful outcome of those current 
talks. And these again are tactical dif- 
ferences which underline the concerns of 
both the Romanian and the U.S. Govern- 
ment that the Helsinki process should be 
preserved and protected. It is the 
American view that it's in jeopardy in 
this current climate while these fun- 
damental violations of the obligations of 
the Final Act of Helsinki are underway 
in Poland today, and that there has to 
be some reckoning on these questions. 

Q. Was the question of Soviet in- 
volvement in the situation in Poland 
brought up at all in these discussions? 

A. It was a one-sided discussion in 
which I laid out very clearly the facts 
that the United States holds on Soviet 

Q. How would you appreciate the 
role that the United Nations can have 
and must have in primarily the matter 
of disarmament, the reduction of ten- 
sions, the solving of differences 
among states, and obviously, for the 
promotion of free economic coopera- 

A. I suppose the past record of the 
United Nations in that regard is a mixed 
bag, replete with limited successes and 
many failures. That is not to suggest 
that the U.N. role has not been of in- 
calculable value in a host of other areas 
of international cooperation not the least 
of which is the convening of the 
representatives of the member govern- 
ments each year repeatedly to discuss 
and address and to exchange views on 
such questions. I would hope as an in- 
dividual to see past inadequacies and the 
failures to be able to deal with the more 
profound questions you asked somehow 
strengthened the resolve within the 
United Nations. Thus far, they haven't 
done too well, as you know, but that is 
not to be taken as necessarily a criticism 
but a revelation of fact. 

Q. Does President Ceausescu also 
condemn the martial law imposition in 
Poland in the first instance like the 
United States does? 

A. I can't speak for him on that, 
and I prefer to let him speak for himself 
on that. That's a rather finely honed 

question. I think he would see greater 
justification than perhaps we would see 
from the U.S. point of view. 

Q. Did you discuss the possibility 
of a direct or indirect participation of 
the European countries to the negotia- 
tions in Geneva? 

A. No, we did not. 

Q. From your discussions with 
President Ceausescu, how far did he 
go in agreeing with you that there 
should be a return to dialogue on 
Poland among the church. Solidarity, 
and the government? 

A. I think there are different views 
on how one would describe, would 
outline the best ways to return to nor- 
malcy and what we call a reconstruction 
in the Polish scene. I think basically all 
recognize that there are elements in 
Poland that have to have a voice within 
their proper sphere of responsibility. 
And I'd say in general there was a con- 
vergence there. Conditionality in specific 
terms would probably not be en- 
thusiastically supported here in 

Q. Did President Ceausescu raise 
the question of a European disarma- 
ment conference, and if so, what is 
the American reaction to such a pro- 

A. Yes, we discussed that, as, of 
course, the current focus of attention 
before the Polish situation, there was 
the Madrid conference itself. I think 
both governments recognize that a great 
deal of progress has been made in 
Madrid on the area of confidence- 
building measures under the original 
French proposal of a zone extended 
from the Atlantic to the Urals and the 
need to develop mutual confidence- 
building arrangements for that zone. 
But from my point of view, I em- 
phasized that business as usual— a con- 
tinuation of business as usual — on these 
talks would make a mockery of the 
fundamental obligations of the Helsinki 
accords themselves, through which all 
signatory governments committed them- 
selves in the basic principles of the Final 
Act to a host of obligations which are 
clearly being violated today by both the 
Polish Government and the Soviet Union 
in Poland. 

Q. Does the President feel that the 
sanctions by the United States against 
Poland and not the Soviet Union 
would harm the dialogue that 
Washington wants with this govern- 

A. No, 1 don't think so. I think that 
there was no inference of that kind in 
discussions that were held today which, 
on the bilateral side, of course, focused 
on the continuing need for cooperation 
and the question of credits and trade 
and the cultural-scientific exchanges and 
the like. 

Q. Did you by any chance suggest 
that the U.S. Administration would 
like to see the most-favored-nation 
clause extended over a period of — 

A. This did not come up in the 
discussions. I was prepared to discuss 
them, and as you know, we have certain 
legislative requirements in the United 
States, wWch means that we do have to 
annually review these questions. As a 
matter of principle, we would not have 
any concern about a multiyear approach, 
but we do have our internal regulations. 

Q. In 1968, after the Soviet inva- 
sion of Czechoslovakia, there was a 
great deal of apprehension and fear 
about the possibility of the Russians 
coming here. Did you sense any con- 
tinuing apprehension that that sort of 
thing might happen? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you get any impressions 
from President Ceausescu that any 
worsening of tensions between East 
and West might cause a general Soviet 
clampdown and try to assert its 
authority throughout the Warsaw Pact 

A. I think any responsible leader 
near the East or West today is con- 
cerned about a host of repercussions 
from continuing repression in Poland. 
And I would suggest that they include a 
whole range of possible consequences 
which would further add to international 
tensions. I wouldn't discount the one you 
raised, but I do not want to suggest that 
it was raised, specifically by our Roma- 
nian hosts while we were here. 

Q. I would like to return to the 
Romanian economic problem. Was 
there any specific agreement reached 
on any way in which the United States 
could help Romania regain full capaci- 
ty, do you think? 

A. We've had an on-going dialogue 
on this question, and I think our visit to- 
day helped to clarify a number of issues 
related to it— IMF, the area of CCC 
(Commodity Credit Corporation] credits, 
and a host of related trade issues. I 
wouldn't say that any magic light was 
turned on that is going to suggest that 

April 1982 




all of these difficult problems will be in- 
stantaneously solved, but I do think we 
have improved the climate for finding 
solutions to these problems, especially 
the most urgent and immediate ones of 

U.S.-Canada Transboundary 
Air Pollution Negotiations 

'Press releases pertaining to this trip 
which are not printed here are Nos. 60 of 
Feb. 17, 1982, 61 of Feb. 19, 63 of Feb. 19, 
and 65 of Feb. 18. 

^Press release 52. 

^Press release 54 of Feb. 16. 

^Press release 59 of Feb. 16. 

^Press release 62 of Feb. 19. 

''Press release 66 of Feb. 19. 

'Press release 69 of Feb. 17.B 

INF Negotiations 

FEB. 4, 1982' 

On November 18, I announced a broad 
program for peace. In that address, I 
stated that the delegation that was 
about to depart for Geneva for negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union on 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) 
would carry with it the U.S. proposal, 
according to which the United States 
would forego the planned deployment of 
Pershing II and intermediate-range 
ground-launched cruise missiles if the 
Soviet Union dismantled its SS-4, SS-5, 
and SS-20 missiles. 

On Tuesday, February 2, at Geneva, 
the United States submitted to the 
Soviet Union a draft treaty, embodying 
that proposal in order to move the 
negotiations forward as rapidly as possi- 
ble. Such a treaty would be a major con- 
tribution to security, stability, and 

I call on President Brezhnev to join 
us in this important first step to reduce 
the nuclear shadow that hangs over the 
peoples of the world. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of F%b. 8, 1982.1 

by Thomas M. T. Niles 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control, Oceans, International 
Operations, and Environment of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
February 10, 1982. Mr. Niles is Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for European Af- 
fairs. ' 

Today I would like to present to you a 
status report on our negotiations with 
Canada on transboundary air pollution, 
a highly sensitive issue in our relations 
with our close friend and ally to the 
north. Let me preface my report with a 
brief discussion of the general state of 
U.S.-Canada relations. 

U.S. Ties With Canada 

As you know, the ties between the 
United States and Canada extend across 
a broad range of cooperative activities — 
in political, economic, cultural, commer- 
cial, and defense relations. Our relation- 
ship with Canada is broader than that 
with any other foreign country. The two 
governments work closely together and 
consult regularly on bilateral and inter- 
national issues. As long time friends and 
allies, we share the same goals. In his 
first year in office, President Reagan 
met five times with Canadian Prime 
Minister Trudeau, confirmation of 
Canada's important place in American 
foreign policy and of the President's per- 
sonal interest in the U.S. -Canadian rela- 

The United States and Canada are 
close allies in NATO and partners in the 
defense of North America. The North 
American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD), a joint command with a U.S. 
commander and a Canadian deputy com- 
mander, provides for aerospace 
surveillance, warning of possible attack 
by missiles or bombers, and air defense. 
The two governments are assisted in 
managing the broad range of 
U.S.-Canada defense relations by the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defense 
established in 1940. 

U.S.-Canada bilateral trade and in- 
vestment is, far and away, the largest 
with any foreign country. Two-way 
trade in 1981 was in the range of $83 
billion; at the end of 1980, U.S. invest- 

ment in Canada and Canada's invest- 
ment in the United States totaled $54 

Energy is an important area of 
bilateral cooperation, and the United 
States and Canada have been working to 
resolve problems arising in the United 
States from Canada's national energy 
program. An important step ahead in 
the energy area was the Congress' ac- 
tion last fall approving the President's 
proposal to remove roadblocks to private 
financing of the Alaska natural gas 
pipeline. We hope it will now be possible 
for the financial community to arrange 
for the financing of this vast project, 
which would benefit both countries. 

Fisheries is another sector important 
to both countries, and here, too, we are 
encouraged by an important recent 
development. The dispute arising from 
our overlapping boundary claims off the 
east coast, covering the rich Georges 
Bank, has been submitted to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice in The Hague 
for binding adjudication. Last month the 
Court constituted a special chamber to 
hear the case. The Court's decision will 
go a long way toward resolving our 
longstanding problems involving 
fisheries in this area. 

Environmental issues are of great 
importance in the U.S. -Canadian rela- 
tionship. The U.S.-Canada International 
Joint Commission has worked since 1909 
on transboundary problems and it con- 
tinues to monitor and assist in the solu- 
tion of bilateral pollution issues. The 
United States and Canada have ac- 
complished a great deal in cleaning up 
water pollution under the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreements. Today the 
question of transboundary air pollution 
is of particular importance to both coun- 
tries. We approach this problem with an 
acute awareness of the high level of con- 
cern in Canada about acid rain and 
acidification of lakes, rivers, and 
streams. We know that many areas in 
the United States have similar concerns 
and, indeed, that the original impetus 
for a bilateral approach on this issue 
came from the Congress. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Negotiations on Acid Rain 

In the fall of 1978, the Congress 
adopted a resolution calling upon the 
President "to make every effort to 
negotiate a cooperative agreement with 
the Government of Canada aimed at 
preserving our mutual airshed to protect 
and enhance air resources and insure 
the attainment and maintenance of air 
quality protective of public health and 
welfare." As a result of that resolution, 
informal bilateral discussions with 
Canada on air pollution were begun in 
1978. Also in 1978, we organized with 
Canada the bilateral research con- 
sultative group. The group, composed of 
U.S. and Canadian scientists, carried out 
preliminary surveys of research on 
transboundary air pollution and com- 
pleted useful reports on long-range 
transport of air pollutants in 1979 and 

Discussions with Canada continued 
in 1979. In July of that year the United 
States and Canada issued a joint state- 
ment on transboundary air quality, 
recognizing that both countries contrib- 
ute to transboundary air pollution and 
announcing the intention to develop a 
cooperative agreement on air quality. 

As the result of further discussions, 
the United States and Canada signed a 
memorandum of intent in August 1980, 
agreeing on procedures to be followed in 
preparing for and negotiating an agree- 
ment on transboundary air pollution. 
The memorandum provided for the crea- 
tion of a U.S.-Canada coordinating com- 
mittee and under it five joint work 
groups composed of U.S. and Canadian 
Government representatives from scien- 
tific, technical, and legal disciplines. The 
U.S. membership of about 50 is drawn 
from eight different Federal agencies. 
The Canadian membership is com- 
parable. The objective of the 
U.S.-Canada work groups has been to 
develop as much mutual understanding 
of the causes and effects of transbound- 
ary air pollution as possible. The groups 
have been hard at work for more than a 
year now. Their reports are to be ready 
at the end of March. They will be sub- 
jected to peer review and will serve as a 
technical basis for use in the negotia- 

U.S. Commitment 

During his first visit to Canada in March 
of last year, the President confirmed our 
commitment to open negotiations on 
transboundary air pollution, as called for 
in the memorandum of intent. The 

President noted U.S. support for the on- 
going cooperative scientific work to bet- 
ter understand the problem. He also in- 
dicated the expectation that the negotia- 
tions could be lengthy. 

Our interest in an agreement with 
Canada stems from the fact that the on- 
ly sensible approach to the problem is a 
cooperative one with our northern neigh- 
bor, as the Congress has recognized. In 
addition, we want Canada to adopt the 
stricter air pollution control regulation 
now in effect in the United States. At 
present, the Canadian Federal Govern- 
ment is generally able only to rec- 
ommend pollution regulation to the 
provinces, which have final authority to 
implement environmental programs. We 
would like to see improved emissions 

FEB. 24, 1982 

Representatives of the Governments of 
the United States and Canada met in 
Washington on February 24, 1982, to 
continue negotiations on transboundary 
air pollution. The U.S. delegation was 
led by Thomas M. T. Niles, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Euro- 
pean Affairs. Edward G. Lee, Assistant 
Under Secretary for U.S.A. Affairs for 
the Department of External Affairs, led 
the Canadian delegation. 

The negotiations are taking place 
under the 1980 U.S.-Canada memoran- 
dum of intent on transboundary air 
pollution. Formal discussions began in 
June 1981. This was the third 
negotiating session. 

The Canadian delegation tabled a 
draft text of an agreement. The discus- 
sion also included an exchange of views 
on proposed general principles sections 
presented by both delegations. Other 
subjects covered included the state of 
scientific knowledge and control actions 
taken by both countries. 

Progress reports were presented by 
the chairman of the U.S.-Canada work 
groups, which have been assembling an 
agreed basis of understanding on the 
transboundary air pollution problem. 
The work group chairmen confirmed 
their intention to meet the March 31 
deadline for completion of the phase III 

The U.S. and Canadian negotiators 
agreed that the meeting had been useful 
and agreed to meet again at an early 

control technology applied to Canadian 
smelters and major power plants. For 
instance, there are more than 100 SO2 
"scrubbers" now in operation at power 
plants in the United States or in final 
stages of construction. There are no 
scrubbers on power plants in Canada. 
Further, U.S. standards for control of 
automobile emissions are three times 
stricter than Canadian standards. We 
believe that achieving an equivalent level 
of pollution control in the two countries 
should be our mutual objective. 

Because of the importance of the 
issue with Canada and its complexity, 
we believe transboundary air pollution 
can best be addressed in bilateral 
negotiations, whether we work toward a 
treaty or an executive agreement. This 
is a common problem; we believe it re- 
quires a joint solution. We would foresee 
difficulties in concluding an agreement 
with Canada if either country, or both, 
were inclined to act unilaterally now. 

We held our first two formal 
negotiating sessions with Canada in 
June and in November 1981. These 
meetings were devoted in part to review 
of the progress of the work groups and 
to developing further guidance for their 
work. We have also exchanged a series 
of technical papers and have begun 
discussions on the nature of an eventual 
agreement. At our next session, planned 
for February 24, we expect to begin 
discussion of the agreement text. I 
believe the negotiations are going well. 
We intend to push ahead as fast as the 
degree of our scientific understanding of 
the problem will allow. 

Further Research Required 

Canada has made clear it believes the 
two countries should enter into an in- 
terim program to control transboundary 
air pollution. On the U.S. side, we think 
it premature to embark upon expensive 
new control programs now given the 
uncertainty of the scientific data cur- 
rently available. It is generally recog- 
nized in both countries that we do not 
adequately understand the atmospheric 
chemistry which transforms emissions 
into acid deposition. There are other 
significant uncertainties in critical areas 
of air pollution, including the interactive 
role of photochemical pollutants, the 
source-receptor relationships, and the ef- 
fects of weather and seasonal factors. 
Importantly, we do not know whether 
further control actions would produce 
the desired environmental results. 

Press release 77. 

April 1982 



In the United States, at the request 
of the President, we began last year to 
undertake an expanded and accelerated 
research program to address the key 
areas of uncertainty on acid rain. The 
United States will spend over $18 
million on comprehensive research in FY 
1982, exploring virtually every aspect of 
the issue. In FY 1983 the figure will be 
$22.3 million, more than a 20% increase 
in funding. 

The United States believes prudence 
and realism demand a firm foundation of 
understanding upon which best to deter- 
mine what measures would be necessary 
and effective in controlling transbound- 
ary air pollution. This is particularly 
true in view of the enormous cost of ex- 
isting technical approaches to controls. 

In closing, I would Hike to emphasize 
again that transboundary air pollution is 
very much a common problem that will 
require joint U.S. -Canadian efforts. We 
look forward to bringing these negotia- 
tions to a successful conclusion. We 
recognize that there may be no cheap, 
easy solutions to transboundary air 
pollution problems. We intend to con- 
tinue to give this important issue the 
careful and serious attention it deserves, 
in the context of our close, friendly rela- 
tions with Canada. 

Japan and the United States: 
A Cooperative Relationship 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and win 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Grovernment Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

by John H. Holdridge 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs on March 1, 
1982. Ambassador Holdridge is Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Af- 
fairs. ' 

Evolution of U.S. -Japan Relations 

Changes in U.S. -Japan relations in re- 
cent years have not been as dramatic or 
distinct as when we moved from one 
earlier postwar stage in our relationship 
to another. It was easy to draw a de- 
marcation line, for example, between the 
occupation and post-peace treaty era, 
when Japan regained the attributes of 
sovereignty; or between the early years 
after the Korean war, still marked by 
heavy dependence upon the United 
States and an unequal security treaty 
and the 1960s, marked by the breaking- 
in period of the new Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security and the 
dramatic resurgence of the Japanese 
economy. What we have seen over the 
past decade is a broadening and deepen- 
ing of our relations characterized by a 
growing spirit of equal partnership. 
Changes may not be clearly discernible 
in the short term but are, nonetheless, 
marked when we look back at the situa- 
tion 5 or 6 years ago. 

Perhaps Japan's most significant 
shift of the past decade has been from 
the status of a regional power to iden- 
tification as a leading member of the ad- 
vanced industrialized democracies. Japan 
has collaborated with us and West Euro- 
pean nations in the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment] at the annual summit 
meetings and at major issue-oriented in- 
ternational gatherings. Both our coun- 
tries are aware of the tremendous in- 
fluence we assert jointly as the free 
world's two largest industrial powers, 
and we are aware of and sustained by 
the hypothetical prospect we both wish 
to avoid — an Asia in which we were 
working at cross-purposes. 

As we have moved toward what was 
termed, at one recent bilateral summit 
meeting, a "productive partnership," the 
legacy of the patron-client relationship 
that characterized much of the postwar 

period has largely faded away. We are 
now approaching an equilibrium in our 
dealings with one another. As Japan's 
economic strength has grown and its 
political horizons have broadened, we 
find our mutual interests transcending 
the traditional focus of Asia to embrace 
other regions, including the Middle East 
Southwest Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
and most recently Poland. An extraor- 
dinary degree of consensus pervades oui 
diplomatic effort around the globe. 

Basis for Cooperation 

What has made this collaboration possi- 
ble? First, the geopolitical reality that 
our interests as Pacific powers overlap 
in that unique part of the world where 
the Soviet Union, China, and our own 
territory are in juxtaposition. From the 
Japanese perspective, the United States 
has been and remains the dominant 
power in Asia. The U.S. -Japan security 
treaty has insured Japan a stable en- 
vironment which contributed both to the 
recovery of its economy and to the 
establishment of cooperative relations 
with other nations of the region. From 
the U.S. perspective, the security rela- 
tionship, by solidly linking us to the 
strongest economy and potentially the 
most substantial military power in Asia, 
provides us with synergetic reinforce- 
ment of our diplomatic effort. Moreover, 
the assurance that Japan will not seek a 
nuclear or offensive conventional 
military capability makes it possible to 
work in partnership without raising ten- 
sion or undue concern on the part of our 
other friends in Asia. 

We are further sustained in our 
partnership through our economic inter- 
dependence. Trade between our two na- 
tions has grown from $2.5 billion in 1960 
to a little less than $11 billion in 1970, to 
close to $60 billion in 1981. The United 
States in Japan's major export market, 
accounting for 25.4% of its global ex- 
ports and 17.6% of its global imports. 
For the United States, Japan is our sec- 
ond largest country market after 

Perhaps the most important bond of 
all between our two countries is that 
which we sometimes take for granted: 
our dedication to essentially the same 
democratic forms of government, honor- 


Department of State Bulletin 


ing the same basic freedoms and in- 
dividual rights. Democratic values of 
universal political participation, freedom 
of expression and association, and the 
guarantee of fundamental human rights 
did not develop strong roots in Japanese 
society prior to the end of World War 
II. They have now flourished beyond the 
most optimistic expectations. Japan's 
sharing of common political values has 
been a major factor in engendering 
Japanese association, in spite of 
geography, with the West. 

Finally, against this backdrop of in- 
terlocking security, economic, and 
political interests, the United States and 
Japan have increasingly found benefit in 
scientific, technological, and cultural in- 
terchange. And, as in most other aspects 
of our relationship, these exchanges 
have gradually shifted from one-way to 
two-way traffic. 

Mutual Benefits 

Some of the benefits of U.S. -Japan rela- 
tions are more quantifiable than others. 
Economic benefits to both countries are 
enormous in terms of jobs, standards of 
living, and common dedication to a free 
market economy with attendant benefits 
to consumers. Unfortunately, as we 
compete in the same economic sectors, 
we find ourselves confronted with trade 
frictions, the solution to which is dif- 
ficult at best, more so when faced with 
sluggish economic growth. 

A major tangible benefit to the 
United States is our ability to maintain 
forces and bases in Japan, the mission of 
which is not just the defense of Japan 
proper but support for the projection of 
U.S. power in contingencies elsewhere 
in Asia. It would be virtually impossible 
to find adequate substitutes in the 
region or alternatively to deploy directly 
from U.S. territory without incurring 
enormous additional costs. Moreover, 
the expense of maintaining our force 
posture in Japan is increasingly offset 
by Japanese contributions, now totaling 
about $1 billion a year. 

The consequences of a major deteri- 
oration in our relations with Japan are 
as obvious as they would be serious. It 
could lead to a rivalry entailing wasted 
resources on both our parts as we 
denied ourselves the economic benefits 
of free trade or the rational use of 
limited security resources. Beyond the 
deleterious effect on our bilateral rela- 
tionship, we could expect destabilizing 
effects on the region as a whole and 
could find ourselves deprived of a sup- 
portive partner in global forums. 

Special Asia Dimension 

The U.S. -Japan relationship has unique 
significance in Asia, where despite a 
nuanced difference or two, both coun- 
tries see eye-to-eye in regard to most of 
the region's major issues. Our coopera- 
tion has provided stability for the region 
in which free developing countries can 
pursue their national aspirations. Our 
respective involvement in the economic 
development of Southeast Asia, and 
Korea, has been mutually supporting 
and can be credited with the success 
stories of those areas. Both Japan and 
the United States support forces of 
moderation and peaceful development in 
China. Our security treaty, together 
with other treaty obligations in Asia, 
serves to give the region confidence. On 
the one hand, the free nations of Asia 
feel reassured by the support of the two 
Pacific powers with the greatest 
economic and political influence. On the 
other, in instances of substantial 
Japanese and U.S. involvement, Asian 
nations need not fear regional domina- 
tion by one or the other. Moreover, our 

coinvolvement in the region has 
developed at a time when like-minded 
European countries show no inclination 
to revive their radically decreased in- 
terest in the region. In short, as we 
have developed our orientation as a 
Pacific power, it has become increasing- 
ly clear that our relationship with Japan 
is the bedrock for our Asian policy and, 
by extension, an indispensable element 
in our global diplomacy. It is both sym- 
bolic and illustrative that our trade with 
Japan has reached about the same level 
as our trade with Western Europe. 

Problem Areas 

While it is indeed extraordinary that 
two nations so very different in tradi- 
tions, language, and culture have found 
so much common ground, our partner- 
ship is not without strains. These derive 
in large part from Japan's success, 
however, and are not the product of 
malicious rivalry. 

Until recently, strains in our secu- 
rity relationship were felt primarily on 

Japan— A Profile 


Population (1980): 117 million. Annual 
growth rate: 0.8%. Ethnic g^roups: 0.6% 
Korean. Religions: Shintoism and Buddhism; 
0.8% Christian. Language: Japanese. 
Literacy: 99%. Life expectancy: males 73 
yrs., females 78 yrs. 


Area: 381,945 sq. km. (147,470 sq. mi.); 
slightly smaller than California. Cities: 
CaptaZ- Tokyo (pop. 11,372 million). Other 
ctfes- Yokohama (2.67 million), Osaka (2,658 
million), Nagoya (2 million), Kyoto (1.4 
million). Terrain: Rugged, mountainous 
islands. Climate: Varies from subtropical to 


Type: Parliamentary democracy. Date of 
Constitution: May 3, 1947. 

Branches: Executive -Prime Minister 
(Head of Government). Legislative -hicaanera] 
Diet (House of Representatives and House of 
Councillors). Judicial -Civil law system with 
Anglo-American influence. 

Subdivisions: 47 prefectures. 

Political parties: Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito 
(Clean Government Party), Japan Communist 
Party (JCP). Suffrage: Universal over 20. 

Flag: Red sun on white field. 


GNP (1981): $1.7 trillion. Real growth rate: 
3.1% 1980, 6.1% 1969-79. Per capita GNP 
(1981): $8,870. 

Natural resources: Negligible mineral 
resources, fish. 

Agricultural products: Rice, vegetables, 
fruits, milk, meat, natural silk. 

Industrial products: Machinery and 
equipment, metals and metal products, tex- 
tiles, autos, chemicals, electrical and elec- 
tronic equipment. 

Trade (1980): Exports -$129.8 billion: 
machinery and equipment, metals and metal 
products, textiles. Partners -US 24%, EC 
9.6%, Southeast Asia 20.9%, Communist 
countries 6%. /mports- $140.5 billion: fossil 
fuels, metal ore, raw materials, foodstuffs, 
machinery and equipment. Pari7iers-\]S 
18%, EC 5.6%, Southeast Asia 20.7%, Com- 
munist countries 5%. 

Official exchange rate (Feb. 1980 
floating): Approx. 230 yen = US$1. 

Total official development assistance: 
$3.6 billion (budget 1980 = 0.32% of GNP). 

Membership in international organiza- 
tions: UN and its specialized agencies. Inter- 
national Court of Justice (ICJ), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), International Energy Agency (lEA), 
International Labor Organization (ILO), 

April 1982 



the Japanese side, where there was 
Hngering resentment over our base 
rights and the seemingly de facto con- 
tinuation of the occupation in a nation 
that had never before had foreign troops 
on its soil. However, the antibase move- 
ment in Japan lost much of its force 
after the reversion of Okinawa, the rap- 
prochement between the United States 
and China, the end of U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam, and the progressive con- 
solidation of U.S. military facilities. 
While incidents occur from time to time, 
we are no longer plagued by the daily 
frictions one might expect in a crowded 
country hosting a large foreign military 
presence. In the past few years, there 
has been an increase in public support 
for a continuing U.S. military presence 
in Japan as the growth of Soviet 
military strength in the region and per- 
sistent tension on the Korean Peninsula 
have awakened the Japanese public to 
the importance of a credible security tie 
with the United States. 

On the other hand, as Japanese ac- 
ceptance of this security relationship has 
grown, resentment from some sectors in 
the United States over Japan's apparent 
failure to share an equitable burden in 
the defense area has created a new 
source of tension. 

The other major source of friction 
between Japan and the United States 
lies in the trade area. While Japan is our 
largest agricultural market and a major 
buyer of such goods as wood and wood 
products, machinery, coal, and aircraft 
in the years since the war, our trading 
relationship has changed fundamentally. 
Through the 1960s, the United States, 
shipped a wide range of products to 
Japan, but Japan generally shipped only 
low-quality labor intensive items to the 
United States, resulting in large U.S. 
trade surpluses. In the 1970s, Japan 
became an efficient producer of capital 
and technology-intensive goods. 
Japanese products competed with ours 
in Japan, in the U.S. domestic market, 
and in third countries, thereby 
establishing a trade surplus with us. In a 
sense, this can be regarded as a success 
story reflecting the positive outcome of 
U.S. policy objectives in the immediate 
postwar period. 

The movement of Japanese industry 
into industrial areas, long-considered our 
preserve has, however, caused a sub- 
stantial increase in economic friction. An 
additional complication is that while this 
friction in the 1970s was generally 
limited to one or two products at a time 
and thus could be addressed relatively 
easily, the current trade problem in- 

volves the basic nature of the Japanese 
economic system. The perception is 
prevalent that Japan, as the second 
largest economic power in the free 
world, is unwilling to carry its share of 
the burden of supporting the free-trade 
system; that Japan may have a good 
record for adherence to international 
trade agreements but has not yet 
discarded many of its internal ar- 
rangements that inhibit imports. The 
problem is as much attitudinal as a ques- 
tion of formal restrictions. Allowing for 
shortcomings on the part of American 
industry, the situation has resulted in 
one of the most serious challenges to 
U.S. -Japan relations in the postwar 
period, largely, because solutions to such 
fundamental problems cannot be easily 
or quickly found. 

Other current bilateral issues include 
civil aviation, negotiation of a new 
fisheries agreement, issues related to 
nuclear cooperation, and others. This is 
the expected pattern of a partnership as 
extensive as that between Japan and the 
United States. We have faced similar 
issues in the past, and I have every con- 
fidence that with good will we can work 
out differences even when the going 
gets rough. 

U.S. Policy Objectives 

Trade. The United States wishes to ex- 
pand two-way trade and investment 
with Japan while correcting what we 
regard as inequalities in our economic 
relationship. We do not seek a precise or 
even approximate balance in our trade, 
recognizing that we live in a multilateral 
trading system. As the imbalance be- 
tween Japan and the United States has 
grown to record proportions, however, 
we have become increasingly concerned 
that there is not yet sufficient 
awareness in all parts of the Japanese 
public and private sectors that their 
domestic markets are simply not as open 
to foreign competitors as the vast 
American market is open to imports 
from abroad. We do not ask for favored 
treatment. Where questions of price and 
quality are involved, it is incumbent 
upon us to make the grade, and we do 
not seek to penalize Japanese productivi- 
ty through restrictive measures. But 
where we are competitive, we want 
market access free of artificial encum- 
brances, whether it be a government 
regulation of protectionist inspiration or 
informal arrangements that serve the 
same purpose. 

Japan shares our basic interest in a 
growing economy with low unemploy- 
ment and low inflation. Unlike the 
United States with a balanced mix of 
raw material and manufactured exports, 
Japan, as a resource-poor country, must 
export manufactured goods to pay for 
the raw materials it needs. As a result, 
it puts primary emphasis on the main- 
tenance of efficient export industries, 
even at the cost of domestic consump- 
tion. While this makes Japan a strong 
supporter of the principles of a free- 
trading system, in the postwar period, it 
has looked to the United States to act as 
the principal defender of that system. 
Japan would be dismayed at any evi- 
dence that we now seemed to be aban- 
doning this role but, at the same time, 
has been slow to accept responsibility 
itself for helping to maintain the system. 
In particular, it has been unwilling to 
bear the domestic political cost of open- 
ing its markets until or unless it has 
been subject to intense pressure from 
the outside. The strong rural roots of 
the government party, for example, 
have impeded the government from tak- 
ing preemptive steps to avert foreign 
pressure further to open agricultural 

We have sought to encourage at- 
titudinal changes in Japan that will 
facilitate market access through inten- 
sive dialogue and representations, in- 
cluding established mechanisms such as 
the Trade Facilitation Committee, the 
Trade Study Group, and the Trade Sub- 
committee of the Subcabinet Economic 
Committee. Congressional meetings with 
Japanese leaders are also regarded as an 
important part of this process. 

Defense. In the defense area, our 
objective is an equitable sharing of roles 
and missions, taking into account 
Japan's unique constitutional and 
political constraints. Within this 
framework, we are agreed that Japan 
should assume primary responsibility for 
its local defense, pai'ticularly air defense 
and protection of its sealanes up to 
1,000 miles. Improvements in Japan's 
defense posture required to perform 
these tasks effectively will require in- 
creased outlays in the years ahead, but 
rather than dwell on budget figures ppr 
sp, we prefer to make our views on 
defense cooperation known in continuing 
consultation at all levels on agreed roles 
and missions together with the capabil- 
ities to perform them. We recognize that 
the ultimate decisions will be made by 
Japan in its own national interest. 


Departnnent of State Bulletin 


P^rom a Japanese perspective, im- 
pressive progress has been made over 
the past few years in moving toward a 
realistic discussion of security issues, 
even though these remain highly sen- 
sitive politically. The no-war clause of 
the constitution is broadly supported, 
although it has been interpreted to per- 
mit just about all improvements in 
Japan's self-defense posture likely to be 
required in the foreseeable future. Joint 
planning between American and 
Japanese military staffs is proceeding 
smoothly; cost-sharing support for our 
forces has been extended to include 
assumption of a portion of the labor 
costs of our Japanese national 
employees and construction of opera- 
tional as well as nonoperational 
facilities; and joint exercises have been 
expanded among all three services. 

The buildup of Soviet forces in East 
Asia, the militarization of Japan's north- 
ernmost islands, the raw assertion of 
Soviet military power in Afghanistan, 
and the less direct application of Soviet 
military pressure against the forces of 
liberalization in Poland all have served 
to awaken Japanese consciousness of the 
need for increased defense effort. 

Prime Minister [Zenko] Suzuki's 
decision to approve a 7.75% increase in 
defense spending in this year's budget, 
in spite of a large deficit and zero- 
growth budgets for almost all other sec- 
tors, is encouraging evidence that the 
Japanese Government is moving to put 
its defense buildup back on the tracks. If 
differences remain, they are largely over 
the pace of buildup and the urgency we 
attach to meeting the Soviet threat, 
rather than over the basic thrust of 
Japan's defense effort. Any massive in- 
crease in defense spending that called 
for doubling or tripling the defense 
budget would probably have destabiliz- 
ing effects elsewhere in the East Asia 
region and would cause severe political 
upheaval in Japan. 

Foreign Aid. Against this 
background, Japan has developed a con- 
cept of "comprehensive security" — 
embracing a defense effort, foreign aid, 
and diplomacy. While we do not regard 
foreign aid as a substitute for defense, it 
is certainly complementary. We fully 
support Japan's expansion of its foreign 
aid contributions and the improvement 
in the quality of its aid as contributions 
to peace and stability in Asia and other 
regions. Japan now ranks fourth in the 
world in absolute volume of aid 
disbursements, allocating a somewhat 
higher level of GNP (0.32%) to aid than 

Japan's Exports and Imports by Destination and 
Origin (1980) 

(US $ million) 












'/////////////.\I IWt-^ ////////////////J1 

I 31,367 
\////////A 9 A mi 



□ 3,141 
I 1 49,368 





r~~l 8,016 
\/A 4 464 






Exports j_^^^,_^ 
Imports \//////. 

Nole Imports on cif basis. 

Source: Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics (Japan) 

the United States. It is now embarked 
on a program to double between 
1980-85 the amount of aid furnished in 
the 1975-79 period. At the same time, 
Japan has begun to shift the focus of its 
aid from countries that are major poten- 
tial export markets to developmental 
assistance and the fulfillment of basic 
human needs in the poorer countries. It 
has also been increasingly willing to pro- 
vide significant amounts of aid, often 
fast-disbursing to countries of political 
importance to the Western alliance, even 
if they are of relatively little economic 
importance to Japan; for example, aid 
programs in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, 
Jamaica, and most recently, Sudan. We 
believe prospective future aid devel- 
opments in Japan will satisfy both 
Japan's own interest and support U.S. 

International Cooperation. U.S. 
and Japanese policies toward third coun- 
tries are hardly identical, but across the 
broad range of our international rela- 
tions, Japanese policies support or are 
consonant with our own. The similarities 
in our approach to almost all major 
issues and in almost all geographic areas 
are pronounced, and the differences are 
most often those of tactics or style. This 
commonality of approach does not 
derive from some selfless bond of trans- 
Pacific good will. It stems from common 
interests and values. We share essential- 
ly the same world view, emphasizing the 
unity of the Western alliance in the face 
of pressures from the Soviet Union and 
its surrogates, the development of 
moderate private sector-oriented govern- 
ments in the developing world, and op- 
position to force as a means of bringing 
about change. For these reasons, despite 

April 1982 



a somewhat more activist and indepen- 
dent Japanese foreign policy course, we 
still closely coordinate our actions with 
each other and with other Western na- 
tions, especially in regard to crises such 
as those in Iran, Afghanistan, and 

Japanese-Soviet Relations 

The Japanese continue to show a firm 
posture in their dealings with the 
Soviets, and relations with Moscow re- 
main cool and correct. Like the United 
States, Japan wishes to keep open chan- 
nels of communication, as evidenced by 
the recent resumption of vice 
ministerial-level talks, which had been 
discontinued in 1978. At the same time, 
Japan has stood firm in asserting its 
rightful claim to the Soviet-occupied 
northern territories. And while there is 

some talk of differing U.S. and Japanese 
perceptions of the Soviet threat, we 
have both recognized the destabilizing 
effect of the Soviet military buildup and 
have reacted sharply to Soviet direct ag- 
gression in Afghanistan. 

Sanctions imposed by Japan at that 
time went as far or further than those 
imposed by any ally. More recently, the 
Japanese have joined us in directing 
sanctions against the Poles and Soviets 
in response to developments in Poland. 


With respect to China, Japanese goals 
parallel our own. The Japanese welcome 
Beijing's shift toward a more pragmatic 
economic, political, and diplomatic 
course and are providing substantial 
economic assistance to China's modern- 
ization program. The Japanese see an 

amicable U.S. -China relationship as very 
much in their own interest. They accept 
the possibility of U.S. sales of defensive 
weapons to China as a means of pro- 
moting U.S.-China ties but are wary of 
any effort to forge a U.S. -Japan-China 
"alliance" to oppose the Soviet Union, on 
the grounds that such an effort would 
raise tensions in Asia. Japan sees our 
policy of maintaining unofficial commer- 
cial and cultural ties with Taiwan as 
paralleling its own interests. At the 
same time, Japan welcomed our decision 
not to sell Taiwan advanced aircraft, a 
sale which it feared might provoke a set- 
back in U.S.-China relations. 


Both the United States and Japan 
recognize the vital importance of peace 
and security in the Korean Peninsula. 

(US $ million) 
U.S. Exports 


Food and 
Live Animals 

Logs and 

Grain and 
Cereal Products 

Coal, oils, 
and Fats 

Raw Material 


Misc. Mfg. 

Highlights of Major Products In U.S.— Japan Trade (1980) 










U.S. Imports 

Transport Equipment 

Iron and 
Steel Products 

Radio, TV, Phonos, 
and Appliances 

Misc. Mfg. 

v////////A^v^iy//^ ^ 




Note: Imports on FAS. basis 

Source. Highlights ol U S Export and Import Trade 


Department of State Bulletin 


Relations between Japan and Korea are 
complicated by their historical ex- 
perience, but the Japanese have par- 
ticipated with us in continuing efforts to 
assist in Korea's economic development. 
Certainly, Japan's contributions in the 
form of concessional loans, official 
development assistance, and direct 
assistance have been important elements 
in Korea's rapid development. 

Recently, Seoul has sought to con- 
vince Japan to expand its economic 
assistance. The Administration views 
this request strictly as a matter to be 
decided between the Governments of 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. While 
we, of course, hope that our two allies 
will maintain close bilateral relations, we 
have limited our involvement to en- 
couraging both governments to resolve 
the issue amicably, and we have neither 
endorsed nor opposed Korea's request. 

Southeast Asia 

The United States and Japan have 
worked in parallel to assist the peaceful 
nations of Southeast Asia that form the 
Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). Japan's relations with the 
ASEAN countries have continued to 
focus largely on economic activities, in- 
cluding heavy contributions to the In- 
dochina refugee relief program. Japan 
has, however, begun to play a more ac- 
tive political and diplomatic role. 

We both seek to encourage the 
economic development and independence 
of the ASEAN countries, and our ap- 
proaches, including ministerial-level at- 
tendance at ASEAN meetings, reinforce 
each other. Like the United States, 
Japan has also supported ASEAN on 
Vietnam and Kampuchea. There is, 
however, a potential for some 
divergence of U.S. and Japanese views 
on how best to deal with Vietnam. There 
is some support in Japan for the notion 
that isolating Vietnam serves only to 
push it closer to the Soviets, without 
forcing it to withdraw from Kampuchea, 
and that offering the Vietnamese 
positive incentives to adopt a more ac- 
commodating posture might have a bet- 
ter chance of succeeding. Nonetheless, a 
small hospital grant aside, Japanese aid 
to Vietnam has remained frozen since 
Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, and 
no real forward motion in Japan- 
Vietnam relations is anticipated before 
Vietnam withdraws. 

U.S. Trade With Japan 

(US $ million) 

I I Export 
Q Import 













J // 








Note. Imports on F AS basis 

Source: Highlights ot US Export and Import Trade 




The Middle East and Southwest Asia 

Heavy reliance on Persian Gulf oil has 
stimulated vastly increased Japanese at- 
tention to the Middle East and South- 
west Asia following the 1973 oil shock 
and the invasion of Afghanistan. Japan 
has supported U.S. objectives in the 
area, demonstrating a broad under- 
standing of what is at stake. I have 
already referred to Japan's continuing 
backing for our actions relative to 
Afghanistan and would also recall its 
support during the Iran hostage crisis. 
Japan, moreover, has provided substan- 
tial aid to Pakistan, Egypt, and 
Turkey— none of them oil exporters — as 
well as to the more moderate gulf 
states. Yet the Middle East is perhaps 
the area where U.S. and Japanese 
diplomacy most diverges, primarily with 
regard to how to solve the Arab-Israeli 

conflict and bring stability to the area. 
Since the 1973 oil embargo, while 
maintaining correct relations with Israel, 
Japan has placed greater emphasis on 
cultivating close ties with the Arab 
states because of its dependence on 
them for oil. One manifestation of this 
approach has been the development of 
contacts with the PLO [Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization], which culminated in 
the "unofficial" reception of [Chairman, 
PLO Executive Committee, Yasir] 
Arafat by Prime Minister Suzuki in 
Tokyo last autumn. The Japanese see 
the Palestinian issue as the key to settle- 
ment of the Arab-Israeli issue and 
believe that the PLO must be a party to 
this settlement. They view their efforts 
to cultivate the PLO as complementary 
to U.S. efforts to bring peace to the 
region. At the same time, they do not 
want to work at cross-purposes with us 

April 1982 



and have stood by the Camp David ac- 
cords, while giving strong diplomatic 
and economic support to Egypt. 

Africa and Latin America 

In Africa and Latin America, Japan's in- 
terests have been largely economic, 
although there have been indications 
that Japan is seeking to establish a 
broader presence in these areas. Japan 
is interested in assisting African coun- 
tries on the Indian Ocean, a policy which 
complements our own strategic efforts 
there. Along with providing substantial 
aid for the African refugees, Japan has 
now pledged new aid for the Sudan. 
Japan, last year, embarked on a bilateral 
aid relationship with Jamaica and has 
expressed interest in acting as a donor 
and participant in U.S. proposals for a 
Caribbean Basin initiative. 


As a general rule, we have not at- 
tempted to divide responsibilities with 
Japan in our dealings with specific 
regions and countries. We have, 
however, regularly consulted and coor- 
dinated our activities. In some cases, 
this has resulted in the United States 
placing more emphasis on one aspect; 
e.g., military aid, and the Japanese more 
emphasis on another; e.g., developmen- 
tal aid. Generally, our approaches are 
complementary and sometimes overlap- 

As part of our consultative process, 
the President and Prime Minister have 
met twice in the past year, while 
Secretary Haig has met his counterpart 
eight or nine times. There has also been 
a series of visits back and forth by other 
Cabinet and subcabinet-level officials. 
Frequent exchanges take place between 
Members of Congress and their 
Japanese parliamentary counterparts. In 
addition to daily multiple contacts 
through our respective embassies, we 
have annual specialist consultations with 
appropriate Japanese counterparts on 
every major region. 

Looking Ahead 

U.S. -Japan relations have evolved into 
what has been described by Ambassador 
[Michael J.] Mansfield as the most im- 
portant bilateral relationship in the 
world. The advantages of sustaining the 
benefits that accrue to both our coun- 
tries are enormous and should assure 
the continuation of close alliance part- 

nership in the years ahead. It would, 
however, be folly to take for granted a 
projection of our close collaboration into 
the indefinite future. Any relationship 
the magnitude of ours requires constant 
cultivation. It requires that neither side 
permit emotions to overcome reason in 
contending with complex issues. And 
most importantly, it requires that we ad- 
dress any single problem or set of prob- 
lems, no matter how vexatious, in the 
context of our total relationship. 

The fundamental danger facing the 
U.S. -Japanese relationship over the next 
few years is the likelihood of a growing 
disparity between U.S. expectations of 
Japan in the economic and defense areas 
and Japan's ability or willingness to 
meet these expectations. In both areas, 
Japan will assume greater responsibility 
over the next decade; this trend is 
already clear. However, the pace is like- 
ly to be slower than we would like. 

The most immediate issue is trade 
friction. Japan has removed most of the 
formal barriers — tariffs, quotas — to the 
nonagricultural sector of its market. 
Nevertheless, many protectionist devices 
remain, including the imposition of 
standards and day-to-day interpretation 
of complex import regulations in ways 
that discriminate against foreign goods 
that compete with Japanese-made prod- 

Lingering Japanese protectionism 
has been an irritant in our relations for 
some time. However, with a bilateral 
U.S. trade deficit of $16 billion and high 
unemployment in the United States— 
particularly in sectors such as 
automobiles, where Japan has a large 
share of the market— Japan's "double 
standard" of enjoying, through its ex- 
ports, the benefits of free trade but not 
paying through the import route its full 
share of the domestic political and 
economic costs, has become a dramatic, 
front burner political issue. 

The Japanese have, unfortunately, 
been slow to recognize this to be so and 
have tended either to discount our com- 
plaints and those of the EC [European 
Community] as "scapegoatism" for our 
respective economic failures or to argue 
that even if the Japanese market were 
completely open, this would have only a 
marginal effect on the trade imbalance. 
In sum, the Japanese perspective is that 
inflation and low productivity caused by 
inadequate investment have undermined 
the competitiveness of American prod- 
ucts, and high U.S. interest rates have 
compounded this problem by keeping the 
value of the dollar high. 

We believe that these counterargu- 
ments, while having some validity on 
economic grounds, miss the basic 
political point. Even if removal of trade 
barriers were to have only a marginal 
impact on the trade balance, the bar- 
riers, themselves, are perceived as sym- 
bolic of Japan's unwillingness to play th' 
international trade game by the same 
rules used by its partners. Demands for 
retaliation are thereby provoked, which 
could endanger the postwar interna- 
tional free-trading system, from which 
Japan has benefited so greatly. 

Although there is growing recogni- 
tion in some circles in Japan of the 
seriousness of the problem, the barriers 
to substantial progress are great. 

First, the agricultural, industrial, 
and service sectors that are protected 
have great political influence within the 
majority Liberal Democratic Party. 

Second, there is widespread belief 
that the pressure will recede as the 
world economy picks up. 

Third, the Japanese consensus de- 
cisionmaking system makes it very dif- 
ficult for Japan to make the necessary 
hard decisions. 

There is, therefore, real danger that the 
current trade problem between Japan 
and the United States could worsen, 
particularly if the 1980s see a protractec 
period of low growth and high unem- 
ployment in the West. 

The other issue that poses a danger 
to the U.S. -Japan relationship is the 
disparity in the defense burden borne by 
each state. This issue should prove more 
manageable than trade. Basic U.S. and 
Japanese objectives are essentially the 
same, and neither country wants a fun- 
damental reorientation of Japanese 
defense policy. As noted earlier, dif- 
ferences between us relate to the pace 
at which defense goals are to be 
achieved. In this context, by increasing 
the fiscal year 1982 defense budget in 
spite of serious political and budgetary 
constraints and by hinting that it intends 
to do the same next year, the Japanese 
Government has recognized the need for 
Japan to expand its capabilities, both in 
terms of meeting the growing Soviet 
threat and protecting its strategic rela- 
tionship with the United States. 

The Japan defense agency's 1982 
budget appears sufficient to complete 
the procurement goals of its 1980-84 
midterm operations estimate on 
schedule, but this will mean only a 
marginal increase in the present 
capabilities of the Japan self-defense 
forces. We are particularly interested in 


Department of State Bulletin 


the defense forces second estimate, 
which will cover the period 1983-87. 
This estimate is being prepared with the 
goal of reaching the military force levels 
contained in Japan's 1976 national 
defense program outline. This would 
mean a substantial increase in the 
capabilities of the self-defense forces, 
consistent with our views on the need 
for a credible but still strictly defensive 
Japanese military posture. 

We do not yet have specific 
estimates, but it is clear that achieve- 
ment of the 1983-87 estimate goals will 
mean increases in Japan's defense 
budget at rates greater than those of re- 
cent years. While the Japanese Govern- 
ment must balance its commitment to 
strengthened defense capabilities with 
due consideration for domestic political 
constraints, we will continue to en- 
courage it to make the budget decisions 

necessary to implement our agreed goal 
of closer, more effective defense 

There is every prospect that Japan 
will continue substantially to expand its 
foreign aid, and we agree with the 
Government of Japan that greater ef- 
forts in both foreign assistance and 
defense are effective and appropriate 
complements to each other; progress in 
both areas is necessary if Japan is to 
undertake a role in world affairs com- 
mensurate with its economic strength 
and influence. 


The assumption of greater international 
responsibilities by Japan should benefit 
the U.S. -Japan relationship, but the ad- 
justment to shifts in our relative power 
and influence will also entail a certain 

amount of friction. At worst, should 
Japan lose confidence in the credibility 
of the U.S. security guarantee or should 
the United States lose patience in 
Japan's failure to take more responsi- 
bility for its own defense, fundamental 
changes in the relationship could occur. 
By the same token, should the United 
States forsake its economic leadership 
role or the U.S. economy decline to such 
an extent that Japan no longer con- 
sidered our markets or resources in- 
dispensable to its economic survival, the 
U.S. -Japan relationship, as now con- 
stituted, might be radically altered. 

While none of these developments 
seems likely and the basic factors that 
sustain our relationship should continue 
to obtain security interests, economic 
interests, and perhaps above all, shared 
political values, I am less sanguine than 
at any time in the recent past. A high 

(US $ million) 


Motor Vehicles 
Iron and Steel 

Scientific and 
Optical Equipment 


Japan's Exports and Imports by Principal Commodity (1980) 







Q 4,526 
[] 3,008 


Note: Imports on cif basis. 

Source: Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics (Japan) 


™" v/////////A^^^y/^ 

Foodstuffs 'C^/C'C^, 14,666 
Machinery //^ 9,843 

Logs and 


Iron Ore 


Textile Raw 




2 4,458 
^^ 6,202 



April 1982 



degree of emotionalism currently 
envelops discussion of trade, and to a 
lesser degree, defense issues. To assure 
the future, to preserve our interdepend- 
ent partnership, and to put out of mind 
the unthinkable but not impossible alter- 
native of the United States and Japan 
drawing apart, it will be necessary to 
rely more than ever on all the tools at 
our disposal for strengthening mutual 
understanding and cooperation. Frank, 
open, and empathic dialogue is called for 
on both our parts as part of a process of 
full consultation in the formation and 
implementation of decisions of impor- 
tance to our two nations. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and wiff 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402 ■ 

10th Anniversary of 
Shanghai Communique 

The following letters were exchanged 
by President Reagan and Premier Zhao 
Ziyang of the People's Republic of China 
on February 28, 1982, to commemorate 
the 10th anniversary of the Shanghai 

Dear Mr. Premier: 

Ten years ago today the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China 
issued the Shanghai Communique. In the en- 
suing decade, and particularly since the 
establishment of full diplomatic relations be- 
tween the two countries on January 1, 1979, 
our relations with your government and peo- 
ple have greatly expanded, and our contacts 
have embraced almost all areas of human 

Our bilateral ties now encompass trade, 
banking, maritime affairs, civil aviation, 
agriculture, educational and scientific ex- 
change, technology transfer and many other 
fields. Well over one-hundred thousand 
Americans and Chinese now flow back and 
forth between the two countries each year, 
and our relations continue to develop through 
both people-to-people and diplomatic chan- 

These concrete manifestations of good 
relations between the people of the United 
States and China are not only in the interests 
of the two countries. They enhance the pros- 
pects for peace and stability throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 

As we enter the second decade since the 
issuance of the Shanghai Communique, our 
desire is to build an even stronger bilateral 
and strategic framework for long term 
friendship between our two nations. It is ap- 
propriate for me, at this time, to reaffirm the 
positions agreed to by both sides in the 
Shanghai Communique and the Joint Com- 
munique on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations between the United States of 
America and the People's Republic of China 
and to declare my government's willingness 
to work with our counterparts in Beijing to 
overcome differences and deepen US-China 

On behalf of the American people, I ex- 
tend the hand of friendship and warmest 
wishes to the government and people of 
China on this historic anniversary. 


Ronald Reagan 

His Excellency 

Zhao Ziyang, 

Premier of the State Council of the 

People's Republic of China, 


Esteemed Mr. President, 

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary 
of the issuance of the Joint Communique in 
Shanghai by the People's Republic of China 
and the United States of America, I wish to 
extend, on behalf of the Chinese government 
and people and in my own name, our cordial 
regards and good wishes to Your Excellency 
and the government and people of the Unitec 

The Joint Communique issued by China 
and the United States a decade ago was a 
historic document, which started the process 
of normalization of relations between China 
and the United States and subsequently led 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between them. During this period, our two 
sides have had extensive contacts and ex- 
changes in many fields, thus enhancing the 
understanding between the governments and 
deepening the friendship between the 
peoples. The development of Sino-U.S. rela- 
tions is not only in the fundamental interests 
of our two peoples, but also conducive to the 
maintenance of peace and stability in Asia 
and the world as a whole. 

Both the Chinese and American peoples 
hope that Sino-U.S. relations will continue to 
move ahead in the years to come. I believe 
that these relations will continue to develop 
so long as both governments adhere to the 
principles jointly established in the Shanghai 
Communique and the Communique on the 
Establishment of Sino-U.S. Diplomatic Rela- 
tions and overcome the obstacles currently 
existing in the relations between the two 
countries. The Chinese government is willing 
to make efforts together with the U.S. 
government towards this end. 


Zhao Ziyang 

Premier of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China 
Beijing, February 28, 1982. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


Polish Debt Situation 

by Robert D. Hormats 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
m Foreign Operations of the Senate Ap- 
oropriations Committee on February 9, 
1.982. Mr. Hormats is Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Business Af- 

welcome the opportunity to appear 
)efore this subcommittee to discuss our 
jolicy toward Poland and, in particular, 
;he Polish debt situation. I will comment 
ipecifically on an issue which has a 
lirect bearing on that policy: the method 
idopted by the Commodity Credit Cor- 
poration (CCC) to meet its legal obliga- 
,ions to those U.S. banks which have 
•epayments due from Poland on U.S. 
government guaranteed credits ex- 
ended to Poland in 1979, 1980, and 
l981 for purchases of agricultural com- 

\llied Policy Since Martial Law 

^et me begin by sketching out U.S. and 
dlied policy and actions since the imposi- 
ion of martial law in Poland. We and 
)ur allies have agreed that we will ac- 
cept nothing less on the part of the 
'olish Government than lifting martial 
aw, releasing the detainees, and restor- 
ng the dialogue with Solidarity and the 
■hurch. We will keep sustained pressure 
)n Poland until these conditions are met. 
Che January 11 special NATO ministe- 
•ial meeting on Poland, and subsequent 
neetings of the North Atlantic Council, 
vith attendance of senior political and 
'conomic officials from capitals, have led 
.0 measures by allied nations to increase 
jressure on the Poles and Soviets. 

We and our allies are considering 
idditional measures. Among the 
neasures already taken multilaterally 
igainst Poland are cessation of new 
;ommercial credits, restriction on credits 
"or food exports — except humanitarian 
issistance — and suspension of considera- 
;ion of 1982 debt rescheduling negotia- 
;ions. In addition, the United States has 
inilaterally suspended Polish airline 
anding rights and fishing rights. 

The Western alliance is in full agree- 
ment that the Soviet Union bears a 
leavy responsibility for, and is deeply in- 
/olved in, the repressive policies of the 

Polish regime. The allies agree that 
pressure must be put on the Soviets to 
bring about a restoration of the reform 
and renewal process in Poland. The 
United States has taken a number of 
specific steps to exert pressure on the 
U.S.S.R. of which you are all aware. 
Our allies have also announced actions 
against the Soviets. For example Italy 
has declared a "pause for reflection" in 
its negotiations to buy Soviet ^as; many 
European countries have canceled of- 
ficial high-level exchanges and visits and 
are implementing their exchange 
agreements on a restrictive basis. They 
are considering additional measures. For 
example, the European Community is 
considering agreement to increase the 
interest rate charged for export credits 
to the U.S.S.R. We and our allies are 
consulting closely on what we can do to 
bring further economic pressure to bear 
on the Polish and Soviet Governments. 
The military crackdown in Poland 
and related events demonstrate the 
weakness of the Communist system that 
the Soviets have imposed on much of 
Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is 
also attempting to turn its failure in 
Poland into a foreign policy victory by 
dividing the Western alliance. We and 
Europe are attempting to insure that 
this does not happen. Our objective is to 
maintain, and indeed strengthen, allied 
unity through common support of sus- 
tained pressure on the Polish and Soviet 
Governments to end repression in 
Poland. It is vital at this crucial point in 
history that a firmly allied West make 
clear to Warsaw and Moscow that it will 
continue such pressure — and refuse any 
return to "business as usual" — as long as 
violations of internationally recognized 
human rights continue in Poland. 

Polish Debt 

Poland has massive debt obligations to 
Western governments and private 
banks — about $26 billion in all. It owes 
the U.S. Government directly about 
$740 million, mostly for CCC direct 
credits. In addition, Poland owes U.S. 
banks about $800 million for credits ex- 
tended under CCC guarantee programs 
and about $1.3 billion in unguaranteed 

Our objective is to insist that Poland 
repay its debt. At this point, it is our 
assessment that this is the best way of 
keeping pressure on the Polish Govern- 
ment — and indirectly on the Soviet 
Government. Our allies share this view. 
And we and they have agreed to sus- 
pend consideration of talks on reschedul- 
ing Poland's 1982 debt obligations. This 
allows the official Western creditors to 
pursue the collection of 1982 Polish 
debts. In fact, Poland is making partial 
payment to Western creditors, while no 
new credits are going to Poland. Thus, 
there is a net financial flow from Poland 
to the West. With no new Western 
credits going to Poland, and with Poland 
being pressed to repay its debt, the 
Soviets are having to transfer significant 
amounts of resources to Poland. 

It has been suggested that we could 
exert even more pressure on Poland and 
the Soviet Union by declaring official 
Polish debts in default. Clearly, declar- 
ing official default is an option that can 
be used if circumstances warrant. 
However, our current assessment is that 
our officially declaring Poland in default 
might be used by the Polish Government 
as an excuse to relieve itself of its 
obligation to make repayments. In addi- 
tion, it would be a sanction that would 
be difficult to reverse if the Polish situa- 
tion improved. And our allies have ex- 
pressed strong concern about the impact 
of a formal declaration of Polish default 
on their banks and on the international 
financial system — a concern shared by 
U.S. financial officials. Moreover, if we 
were unilaterally to declare default, the 
possibility exists of others being repaid 
before or instead of us. Finally, if the 
objective is to deny the Poles new 
credits, that has been achieved 
already — without formal default being 

The Administration decided that 
CCC should honor its obligations to 
those U.S. banks which have claims 
against CCC guaranteed credits. Since 
there is a great deal of misunderstand- 
ing about the implications of this deci- 
sion, I want to emphasize several points. 

April 1982 



• The CCC proposal in no way 
relieves Poland of its obligation to pay 
these debts. The only difference is that 
the Polish Government would owe the 
money to the U.S. Government instead 
of U.S. banks, and we will press hard to 

• It is not a bail-out of the banks. 
The U.S. Government guaranteed these 
credits; they are due and unpaid, and we 
are obligated to honor our guarantees. 

• It does not prevent the banks 
from declaring Poland in default. The 
banks are owed nonguaranteed credits 
and could declare default if those are 
not repaid. They have not done so. 

• It is not a rescheduling for the 
Poles. There is no extension of 
maturities or change in terms. 

Finally, there has been a great 
tendency to characterize approaches to 
this issue in terms of hard and soft. I 
prefer to look at it in terms of what pro- 
duces the greatest pressure on Poland 
and the Soviets, as well as what insures 
the best chance of loan repayment. It is 
a broadly shared conclusion— by the 
highest levels of this government and by 
the highest levels of allied govern- 
ments—that pressing for repayment 
rather than declaring formal default best 
serves these objectives. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Soviet Energy Development 
and the Western Alliance 

by Ernest B. Johnston, Jr. 

StateTTwnt before the Subcommittee 
on Investigations and Oversight of the 
House Committee on Science and 
Technology on February 9, 1982. Mr. 
Johnston is Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Economic and Business Affairs. ^ 

I suspect that the drafters of the Office 
of Technology Assessment study on 
Technology and Soviet Energy 
Availability did not anticipate how time- 
ly their work would prove to be. Their 
report was issued shortly after our 
discussions last fall with the Europeans 
on the West Siberian gas pipeline which, 
of course, is the largest and single most 
visible example of Western equipment 
and technology associated with Soviet 
energy development. Its release also 
came at a time when the Administration 
was studying a new policy on exports to 
the U.S.S.R. of oil and gas equipment 
and technology. 

Since that time, events in Poland 
took a dramatic turn for the worse and 
caused us to invoke strong measures 
against the Soviet Union for its direct 
role in the Polish repression. In response 
to this heavy Soviet role, and to show 
the seriousness of our concern, the 
President announced on December 29 
that we were placing expanded controls 
on the export of oil and gas equipment 
and technology to the U.S.S.R. He also 
announced that action on licensing cases 
for the U.S.S.R. would be suspended. As 

a result of these actions, oil and gas 
equipment and technology is not now be- 
ing exported from the United States to 
the Soviet Union. We have asked our 
allies to take parallel measures and not 
to undercut the actions we have taken in 
response to martial law in Poland. 

Energy production is important to 
the Soviets not only for their domestic 
use but also for export earnings. I will 
limit my remarks this morning to the oil 
and gas sectors of energy because these 
are the most important sources for 
Soviet energy consumption and for 
Soviet exports. In particular, I will com- 
ment on the subjects of Western imports 
of oil and gas from the U.S.S.R., U.S. 
controls on exports of oil and gas equip- 
ment and technology to the U.S.S.R., 
and the West Siberian gas pipeline proj- 

There is no question that the Soviet 
Union will seek to import large volumes 
of Western equipment and technology as 
it endeavors to develop and exploit its 
oil and gas reserves in the coming 
decades. Oil and gas provide both the 
bulk of domestic Soviet energy needs 
and over half of the U.S.S.R.'s export 

Even under the most optimistic 
assumptions about the level of Soviet oil 
and gas production, it is clear that the 
days of easy Soviet access to cheap 
reserves are rapidly drawing to a close. 
While gas is surpassing planned produc- 
tion levels, oil production has remained 

constant, and the marginal cost of pro- 
duction appears to have risen signifi- 
cantly. This means the Soviets are 
counting on increasing hard currency 
revenues from gas as oil exports decline 
later in this decade. 

New reserves, especially in the all- 
important gas sector, are from major 
population and industrial centers. Long- 
distance transport is needed for the gas 
to reach Soviet and foreign consumers. 
This geographic shift, primarily to the 
West Siberian region, means that the 
construction of new gas pipelines will be 
necessary. The Soviets now depend on 
Western equipment imports for the key 
components in pipeline construction — 
especially large-diameter pipe and com- 
pressor stations to drive the gas through 
the pipes. While much of the Soviet 
equipment imports are not particularly 
technologically advanced, Soviet in- 
digenous production is currently inade- 
quate to meet Soviet needs, in terms of 
both quantity and quality. The Soviets 
clearly envisage a Western role pro- 
viding the pipe and other equipment for 
their oil and gas development, to be 
financed with Soviet energy exports. 

Perhaps the most notable finding of 
the Office of Technology Assessment 
study is that the United States alone has 
little leverage to reduce current and 
future development of Soviet oil and 
gas. According to the report, while 
much of the equipment and technology 
currently in use around the world 
originated in the United States, we do 
not hold a monopoly in this area. The 
study reports that there is no single 
essential energy equipment or 
technology area in which the U.S.S.R. 
must depend on the United States for 
the long run. In areas where the Soviets 
now rely on Western imports, there is 
equipment and technology availability 
outside the United States, principally 
from West Germany, France, Italy, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom. And, in 
the case of large diameter pipe — the 
highest value item in Soviet imports 
from the West for their energy proj- 
ects — the United States does not pro- 
duce the 56-inch diameter pipe used by 
the Soviets. U.S. firms have, in the past, 
licensed some technology to overseas 
companies, including blueprints and 
plans for gas turbine engines to drive 
compressors. But the Office of 
Technology Assessment study points out 
that foreign firms, through research and 
development, have independently 
developed their own oil and gas equip- 
ment and technology capabilities. 


Department of State Bulletin 


The United States does retain an 
dge in some oil and gas equipment and 
echnology areas. The study notes that 
he United States is the sole or pre- 
erred supplier in a number of areas, in- 
luding integrated computer systems 
nd software, submersible pumps, blow- 
lut preventers, and tertiary recovery 
echniques. But the U.S.S.R., in recent 
ears, has shown a definite reluctance to 
)urchase U.S. energy equipment because 
f the possibility of export control prob- 
ems. For instance, the United States 
las sold no submersible pumps to the 
J.S.S.R. since 1978. In some cases the 
oviets have purchased substitute equip- 
nent and technology abroad; in others, 
hey have acquired an indigenous equip- 
nent manufacturing capacity; and in 
till other cases, the Soviets have 
hanged their design to eliminate the 
leed for Western equipment in order to 
void critical dependencies. 

Although the United States may 
lave some delaying possibilities, we can- 
lot markedly reduce the volume or in- 
rease the cost of Soviet energy produc- 
ion through unilateral export controls, 
lowever, the West, acting in a con- 
erted manner, could have a significant 

)iffering Perspectives on 
soviet Oil and Gas Development 

before discussing possible Western 
olicies toward Soviet oil and gas 
levelopment, it is important to describe 
ully the differences of view between the 
Jnited States and our allies, especially 
n Europe, on the desirability of in- 
reased Soviet energy production and 
!xpanded East- West energy ties in those 

The European perspective is dif- 
'erent from ours for a number of 
easons. In the first instance, the Euro- 
jeans are more dependent on imported 
nergy sources than we. They import 
ipproximately two-thirds of their energy 
leeds, whereas we import only about 
)ne-fifth of our energy requirements. 
The Europeans view the development of 
soviet oil and gas as contributing to 
)verall world energy market supplies, 
hereby increasing global stability. Fur- 
;her, given a strong desire to reduce 
heir heavy dependence on Middle 
Eastern energy imports and to diversify 
heir supplies and given the U.S.S.R.'s 
■elative proximity to Europe, they view 
he Soviet Union as an acceptable, even 
lesirable, supplemental supplier. This 
dew is reinforced by the continuing 
European belief that energy and other 

trade links with the Soviets serve to 
moderate Soviet international behavior. 
It is also reinforced by the perception 
that European purchases of Soviet oil 
and gas finance Soviet imports of Euro- 
pean technology and manufactured 

Another key ingredient in the Euro- 
pean and Japanese perspective on Soviet 
oil and gas development is the oppor- 
tunity for related energy equipment 
trade. The importance to Western 
Europe and Japan of these equipment 
exports is particularly evident in the 
context of the West Siberian gas 
pipeline. Estimates vary, but European 
pipe and equipment manufacturers — 
most of whose business has been 
seriously depressed in recent years in a 
period of general economic difficulty — 
stand to gain over $10 billion from con- 
tracts for this single project alone. 
Japan, while importing only a very small 
percentage of its total energy needs 
from the U.S.S.R., exports to the 
U.S.S.R. more energy equipment than 
any Western country. 

These energy, economic, and 
political factors behind our allies' view of 
Soviet energy development are, needless 
to say, not entirely shared by the United 
States. U.S. energy imports from the 
Soviet Union (fuel oil) are extremely 
modest. The majority of our exports to 
the U.S.S.R. is in agricultural com- 
modities, not in industrial products or oil 
and gas equipment. And, in contrast to 
some of our European allies, this Ad- 
ministration remains skeptical that East- 
West economic interaction really has 
had a moderating influence on Soviet in- 
ternational behavior. 

These differences in view are not 
easily bridged. But this Administration 
is committed to working with our allies 
to insure that excessive Western de- 
pendence on Soviet energy does not 
develop. In this context, I will briefly 
discuss the West Siberian pipeline and 
its implications for Western energy 

The West Siberian Pipeline 

In our discussions with European 
governments on the pipeline, we have 
focused on the energy security impact of 
increased West European reliance on 
Soviet energy sources. We have stressed 
the vulnerabilities which could arise 
from increased imports of Soviet gas 
and have emphasized that the volume of 
energy imports from the Soviet Union is 
not in itself a sufficient indicator of 

potential economic and political 
vulnerability that could arise from ex- 
panded energy ties. 

Although the six European par- 
ticipants in the pipeline project will be 
dependent on the U.S.S.R. for only ap- 
proximately 6% of their total energy 
needs once the pipeline is fully opera- 
tional, we feel the Europeans must look 
beyond the aggregate numbers to more 
fundamental energy security considera- 

• Gas— which is rapidly replacing oil 
as the chief Soviet hard currency 
earner — is a difficult fuel to replace in 
the event of a supply interruption. There 
is no spot market for gas and large 
start-up investments are required for 
pipelines or liquefied natural gas 

• Certain regions within Europe will 
be heavily dependent on Soviet gas once 
the pipeline is completed. Unless there 
were excess capacity in other parts of 
the European natural gas grid, it would 
be difficult to replace substantial levels 
of gas should a supply interruption oc- 

• Residential and commercial con- 
sumers will be particularly dependent on 
Soviet gas, and a cut-off in these sectors 
would occasion special and most ■ 
troublesome domestic political problems 
and pressures. 

Thus, we argued that West Euro- 
pean vulnerability to Soviet gas leverage 
could be more substantial than the 
numbers alone indicate. Even without a 
cut-off of Soviet energy flows, the 
Soviets will possess leverage which could 
be brought to bear on West European 

In addition to these energy security 
considerations, we have pointed out that 
the economics of the pipeline are no 
longer as attractive as they were when 
initial negotiations began in 1978. 
Overall energy growth rates are down, 
and European gas demand last year 
declined by 4%. Official estimates of 
future gas demand are now being re- 
vised downward. 

For these reasons, we are continuing 
to discuss with the Europeans alter- 
natives to the West Siberian project 
which we believe are more economic and 
more secure. We have advocated looking 
into increased Norwegian gas supplies 
and the possibility of increased liquefied 
natural gas imports. We have noted as 
well that certain aspects of U.S. energy 
policy will increase the availability of oil 
and gas on world markets. These include 
our decontrol of domestic oil prices and 



steps to accelerate leasing of Federal 
lands for energy development. We are 
also prepared to increase exports of coal 
to Europe. 

In response to our concerns, the 
Europeans have been firm in 
characterizing our alternative energy 
sources as supplementing — but not 
replacing — increased energy imports 
from the Soviet Union. But the Euro- 
peans have gained through our discus- 
sions a better appreciation of the risks 
inherent in East- West energy trade. The 
final results of the consultations are not 
yet certain, but they may include closer 
Western cooperation on issues relating 
to gas trade and on overall energy 
security. As the Office of Technology 
Assessment study notes, this type of 
Western energy cooperation can help to 
limit the risks of East-West energy 

Western Trade Policy Toward 
Soviet Energy Projects 

Even before we recently stopped 
shipments of oil and gas equipment and 
technology exports to the U.S.S.R., we 
were the only Western country to con- 
trol the export of such items to the 
Soviet Union. Of course, our allies do 
control some dual-use items — com- 
puters, for example — that are used on 
Soviet oO and gas projects. Their con- 
trols, however, are based on security, 
not energy, considerations. 

Our unilateral controls can have only 
a limited effect. In this regard, foreign 
sources for all equipment and technology 
required for the West Siberian gas 
pipeline are either already available or 
could be developed quickly enough so as 
not to delay significantly the anticipated 
schedule for putting that project into 
operation. Therefore, substantial allied 
cooperation would be needed to deprive 
the U.S.S.R. of Western equipment and 
technology. Of course, the U.S.S.R. is as 
anxious to avoid a dependency on the 
West as we are to avoid a dependency 
on them. It is probable, however, that 
the Soviets will continue to seek 
Western support, at least for projects 
aimed at increasing their exports of gas 
and maintaining as best they can their 
exports of oil. 

We realize that one effect of tough 
unilateral controls on shipments of oil 
and gas equipment to the U.S.S.R. could 
be the development of production 
capabilities in other countries, which 
could then service not only the Soviet 
market but compete with the United 
States in other markets as well. An in- 

tegral element in our current sanctions 
program is cooperation from our allies 
in not undermining our measures, in not 
filling in for contracts that our com- 
panies have lost as a result of our sanc- 
tions. In the long run, a multilateral 
system of controls, especially on exports 
of technology to manufacture equip- 
ment, could help to minimize losses to 
U.S. companies and could also insure 
that the Soviets do not gain an in- 
dependent equipment manufacturing 

The study notes that our sanctions 
program following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan demonstrated the problems 
of our allies in imposing trade controls 
in areas, such as energy, which do not 
have direct Soviet military applications. 
Our allies' problems are clearly exacer- 
bated when the incentive of equipment 
sales to the U.S.S.R. and the goal of 
energy diversification are added to the 
equation. Nonetheless, the question is of 
such significance that we want our allies 
to consider carefully and constructively 
all possibilities of cooperative controls. 

In spite of the problems of develop- 
ing with our allies a multilateral control 
policy on oil and gas equipment and 
technology exports to the U.S.S.R., our 
own policy in this area is not and should 
not be based entirely on our allies' 
perceptions. We have a leadership as 
well as a partnership role with regard to 
the alliance. We cannot forge consensus 
without taking steps ourselves. 

In this context, we question the 
wisdom of granting subsidized Western 
export credits in support of sales to the 

U.S.S.R. For example, in negotiating 
equipment contracts sales for the West 
Siberian pipeline, the Soviets sought ai 
received export credits at less than 8% 
interest — well below prevailing market 
rates. The effect of this interest rate 
level is that, to the extent not otherwis 
offset by price adjustments, the Euro- 
peans have underwritten some of the 
cost as well as much of the risk sur- 
rounding the project. 


Achieving allied cooperation in meeting 
the problems posed by both Western oi 
and gas imports from the Soviet Union 
and oil and gas equipment technology 
exports to the Soviet Union will not be 
easy. Our experience with the West 
Siberian gas pipeline has demonstrated 
that we have large differences of view 
with the Europeans. But we shall con- 
tinue to work cooperatively with our 
allies to lessen the risks of excessive 
dependence and potential vulnerability 
that could stem from Western imports 
of oil and gas. In the near term, our 
allies have said they will not undermine 
our sanctions on exports to the U.S.S.R 
Both for now and the more distant 
future, we must strive to achieve a 
multilateral approach toward Soviet oil 
and gas development that will 
strengthen the alliance. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be publisned by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 


Department of State Bulletin 


n Defense of Western Values 

y Richard R. Burt 

Address before the Copenhagen 
legional Seminar in Copenhagen, Den- 
lark, on February 5, 1982. Mr. Burt is 
Hrector of the Bureau ofPolitico- 
lilitary Affairs. 

t has become something of a chche to 
uggest that NATO is a victim of its 
iwn success. Thirty years of peace with 
reedom have, it is suggested, weakened 
Vestern resolve to preserve the former 
vhile defending the latter. Western 
lublics have become so accustomed to 
ranquility that they take it for granted 
.nd are unwilling to make sacrifices to 
nsure its continuation. 

Following this thesis, the current 
lebate within the alliance is seen as tak- 
ng place between those who recognize 
he scope of the external threat and 
hose who do not; between those who 
ippreciate the strategic realities of the 
Vestern position and those who remain 
ulled by illusions of detente. 

Yet contrary to this analysis, the 
najor debate within the alliance is not 
in the scope of the Soviet threat but on 
he form of the Western response, 
lesistance in Europe to stronger 
lefense measures does not stem, in the 
nain, from complacency. In fact, opinion 
lolls suggest that Europeans as a whole 
,re considerably more worried that a 
najor war may be approaching than are 
\.mericans. The strength of the peace 
novement in Europe demonstrates the 
evel of anxiety. Those who march in op- 
)osition to measures designed to 
itrengthen NATO do so, in large 
neasure, not because they think defense 
10 longer necessary, but because they 
hink it no longer possible. Current 
iift'erences in the alliance thus go well 
jeyond varying perceptions of Soviet 
;apabilities or intentions. 

The Alliance at Middle Age 

The world has changed significantly in 
iiany ways since NATO's inception over 
30 years ago. The alliance has changed 
ilso but at a slower pace. Consequently, 
is it now begins its fourth decade, the 
West faces the need to reinvigorate its 
security cooperation. 

One change of major significance to 
NATO has been the shift over the last 
30 years in the U.S. -Soviet balance of 
power away from clear American 

superiority to something closer to parity. 
Often commented upon, and generally 
accepted, the consequences of this 
development for NATO's strategy, doc- 
trine, and force planning are becoming 
more widely understood. Yet necessary 
corrective measures have only begun to 
be undertaken. 

More dramatic, less often com- 
mented upon, has been the shift in the 
balance of power between Western 
Europe and the United States. Thirty- 
five years ago Europe lay devastated. 
America produced and consumed half 
the world's wealth. Today Western 
Europe has achieved and in some places 
surpassed American levels of productivi- 
ty and consumption. European societies 
are rich. European economies are 
dynamic. European systems of govern- 
ments are solidly based. Europe is more 
self-reliant and self-assertive than it has 
been for decades. Europe is more united 
than it has been for centuries. Yet the 
patterns of Western defense remain to- 
day essentially what they were over 30 
years ago. 

The single most striking geopolitical 
change over the past 35 years is not, 
however, the shift between East and 
West, or even between the New World 
and the Old, but rather the shift be- 
tween North and South, between the 
First World and the Third. In this brief 
span of years, the bulk of the world's 
population, and nearly as much of the 
world's territory and the world's 
resources, have moved from Western 
colonial tutelage to full independence of 
Western control, and in some cases 
toward outright hostility to Western in- 
terests. Yet the West has fashioned no 
consensus regarding its response to this 
revolution; no means for coordinating its 
relations with the majority of mankind; 
no concerted policy for defending and 
promoting its interests in these regions. 

The pattern of Western security 
cooperation was thus set in an era very 
different from the present. It was set 
when Europe lay prostrate, when the 
United States had power to spare, when 
the only threat to Western interests 
originated with the Soviet Union, and 
when the only possible route for aggres- 
sion was from the East. The security 
structure established by the West in 
those early postwar years met the 
challenges of that era successfully. This 
structure has continued to evolve and to 
meet the new challenges of successive 

decades. But the pace of international 
change has quickened, the challenges 
have multiplied, and the structure has 
begun to develop growing pains. 

Toward a New Division of Labor 

Throughout the postwar era, deficiencies 
in European defense efforts have been 
off'set by what amounted to a surplus in 
American defense capabilities. Today, 
broadly speaking, American superiority 
is gone and that surplus is no more. 
Over the past decade, Europe has taken 
steps to pick up the slack. The propor- 
tional European contribution to NATO's 
defense has risen significantly. The West 
is gradually moving toward a new divi- 
sion of labor, one in which Europe 
assumes greater responsibility. The 
West is also gradually moving toward a 
recognition of common security interests 
extending beyond Europe. But this proc- 
ess still lags behind the real changes in 
the East- West balance, U.S. -Europe 
balance, and the North-South balance. 
Adjustments of the magnitude needed to 
maintain pace with these changes are 
bound to be painful. As the process of 
change within the West accelerates, as 
the West moves more rapidly toward a 
new division of labor, occasional signs of 
discomfort are bound to become evident. 

For America, the challenge is to 
lead a more fractious alliance, in more 
difficult circumstances, with reduced 
margins for error, and lessened instru- 
ments for persuasion. The United States 
is and will remain the single most 
powerful member of the alliance. There 
is no one else to whom the baton of 
leadership can be passed. Yet with each 
passing year the task becomes more 
difficult; the amount of effort required 
greater; the end result, in terms of 
alliance discipline, less. In these cir- 
cumstances, expressions of impatience 
and exasperation from Washington are 
from time to time to be expected. 

For Europe, the challenge is to 
assume responsibilities for Western 
defense commensurate with the place 
Europe has attained in the West's 
economic system and political councils. 
For 35 years, Europe has gotten more 
defense than it has paid for. Europeans 
have become accustomed to relying on 
the United States for their defense and 
on the U.S. Government for their 
defense policies. Assuming greater 



responsibility for fielding an adequate 
Western defense will be difficult for 
Europe. Transferring to Europe greater 
responsibility for formulating and im- 
plementing Western defense policies will 
be even harder for Europe and for the 
United States. 

For the West, the challenge is to 
develop a consensus on Western in- 
terests in the Third World and to 
fashion a more effective means to pro- 
tect and promote them. NATO was 
established to defend European territory 
from an attack. It is not designed to 
deal with threats from other quarters, 
nor should it be turned to that purpose. 
Yet these other threats do exist. They 
endanger us all. They are unlikely to be 
mastered unless the West responds in a 
more concerted way than it has done to 

Agreement on ends should precede 
discussion of means. The West's with- 
drawal from colonial responsibilities has 
left us with a crippling legacy of guilt 
and despair— guilt over past Western ex- 
ploitation; despair over future Western 
ability to influence events in other areas 
of the world. Western policies toward 
the Third World thus rest, more often 
than not, upon little but rhetoric and 
good intentions and lead to little but 
hand wringing and inaction. Economic 
assistance rather than being a primacy 
for the promotion of Western values and 
interests is often little more than con- 
science money, designed to expiate past 
sins and to excuse a failure to involve 
ourselves directly in the fate of distant 
regions and forgotten peoples. 

To the extent that the West has had 
a security policy toward the Third World 
over the past three decades, it has been 
one of gradually transferring to the 
United States the responsibility for pro- 
tecting residual Western interests. Only 
2 years ago, this process culminated in 
the acceptance by the United States of a' 
unilateral responsibility for preserving 
Western access to the oil of the Persian 
Gulf, oil upon which Europe's economy 

This process has gone as far as it 
can. Europe, by reason of its economic 
power, its historical experience, its 
cultural links, and its geographic prox- 
imity, has a critical role to play in much 
of the Third World. A new division of 
labor among Western allies must result 
in a more equitable sharing of the costs 
of defending Europe. A new division of 
labor must also lead to a more equitable 
sharing of defense commitments in 
regions of critical importance to the 
West and a more equitable acceptance of 
the risks inherent in such commitments. 

Toward a Stronger Conventional 

Another area in which the alliance has 
failed to keep pace with a changing 
world is in the relative priorities accord- 
ed its conventional and nuclear defense. 
When NATO was begun in the late 
1940s, the memory of World War II was 
sharp. The fear of a new conventional 
war was keen. Europeans were willing, 
indeed eager, to accept a heightened 
risk of nuclear war to deter the out- 
break of any conventional conflict. By 
threatening the use of nuclear weapons 
and equipping NATO's forces with them, 
Soviet conventional superiority was 
offset and Soviet aggressive designs 

Gradually, however, the Soviet 
Union developed a nuclear capability, 
first against Europe, then against the 
United States. As a result, the concept 
that NATO could compensate for con- 
ventional weakness with nuclear 
strength has come under increasing 
challenge. In the mid-1960s the strategy 
of flexible response was developed to 
provide the alliance with alternatives, in 
responding to aggression, short of 
nuclear war or surrender. There have 
since been continuing efforts to 
strengthen NATO's conventional 
defenses. But these attempts have not 
kept pace with European economic 
potential, with growing Soviet conven- 
tional capabilities, or with changes in the 
strategic balance between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. 

Today the Western publics are clear- 
ly voicing their desire to raise, not 
lower, farther the nuclear threshold. 
Certainly there are some who want no 
defense at all. Yet the vast majority of 
our peoples recognize the need for 
defense. They are seeking, however, an 
approach which reduces the risk of 
escalation to nuclear weapons while con- 
tinuing to deter aggression at any level. 
Such a defense can be constructed. 
Nuclear deterrence is not the sole form 
of dissuasion. In adopting the strategy 
of flexible response the alliance recog- 
nized that a more robust conventional 
defense, combined with the continued 
capability for recourse to nuclear 
weapons, would provide an even more 
effective deterrent. Faced with a credi- 
ble conventional and nuclear deterrent, a 
potential aggressor would need to deal 
not just with an uncertainty over the ex- 
act location of the nuclear tripwire but 
with the real possibility of initial defeat 
at the conventional level. Thus in 
strengthening the alliance's conventional 

capabilities, we not only make nuclear ^ 
war less likely, we make any war less 

Despite the move to flexible 
response, however, leaders on both sid 
of the Atlantic have for too long tendf 
to implicitly accept the common wisdoi 
that Western Europe is indefensible, 
and that only the threat of nuclear 
weapons can deter aggression. Certain 
nuclear deterrence must remain an 
essential element of Western defense. 
But it is time for the problems of con- 
ventional defense to be revisited with 
fresh insights and new approaches. Fo; 
the past several years the West's mili- 
tary and political leadership, its aca- 
demic experts, and its journalistic com- 
mentators have subjected the nuclear 
apex of NATO's strategy to the most ii 
tense examination. It is time, in my 
view, we reexamined its conventional 

Toward a New Sense of Purpose 

If democracy and personal freedom are 
to thrive, the West requires much more 
than a military defense. Societies some 
times are conquered from without. Ofte 
they first crumble from within. The firs 
bastion in the defense of Western socie 
ty is that of the intellect. To rejuvenate 
the structure for Western security, 
which has kept the peace for over 30 
years, the West must first regain that 
sense of purpose which imbued NATO's 
creation. The West must once again 
define its values. It must proclaim them 
and it must apply them, not just to our- 
selves but in our dealings with others. 
What makes Western values unique anc 
worth defending is not their Western 
origin but their universal application. 

Too often we deny the universality 
of our values. We apply a deadening 
relativism to our evaluation of other 
societies and our reaction to events in 
other regions. In Poland the Soviets are 
thus said to demonstrate moderation, 
because they suppress Polish freedom 
without resort to military invasion. In 
Afghanistan the Soviet Union is waging 
a genocidal campaign, employing an 
arsenal of deadly chemical weapons. In 
Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union is 
supplying and controlling the use of tox- 
in weapons against unsophisticated and 
defenseless people. Have these crimes 
inspired one march in the West, one 
demonstration, one dramatic act of pro- 
test? I know of none. 

Those in our societies who question 
the necessity for defense need only look 
East. Those who have difficulty envisag- 


Department of State Bulletin 


ng how the Soviet Union might employ 
nilitary superiority and geopolitical ad- 
/antage to dominate a defenseless 
Europe need only regard on the current 
onditon of Poland. Those who doubt the 
itility of military power in our modern 
vorld need only reflect upon the basis 
'or Soviet control of Eastern Europe. 
Those who see little qualitative differ- 
;nce between Eastern and Western 
'orms of government need only note the 
;reatment of Poland's workers. 

Yet Western opinion leaders too 
)ften regard our democratic forms of 
government and our free institutions as 
10 more than cultural artifacts, the 
esult of a more or less idiosyncratic 
listorical development particular to 
tVestern societies. In consequence we 
'xcuse in others what we would never 
'orgive in ourselves. We tend to regard 
he defense of Western values as a form 
)f parochialism, the spread of those 
'alues as a form of aggression. We put 
turselves on the psychological defensive 
'rom the start. We invite, and half ac- 
cept, the outrageous arguments of the 
soviet Union that the West has inter- 
vened in Poland by its expressions of 
;upport for Polish independence and 

In fact the West has left the in- 
tiative in the ideological field to the 
?oviet Union for too long. Western 
'alues will not survive unless the West 
iropounds them. Ideas, Plato to the con- 
rary, do not exist in some ideal sphere, 
be grasped anew by successive 
generations. Ideas live in the mind of 
nan. If the idea of liberty ceases to light 
)ur eyes and to direct our action, then 
hat idea will die. If the spark of liberty 
s extinguished, it will not soon be 
•ekindled, and in the future all men will 
ive under the varying forms of tyranny 
vhich have been the lot of most 
;hroughout man's past. 

If we harbor any doubts as to 
vhether our values are worth defending, 
)thers do not. The world over, men of 
iitferent cultures, with different 
listories, fight and die to achieve what 
Me have. Western values represent, as 
\braham Lincoln once said of his own 
country, mankind's last best hope. The 
Avorth of what we have to ofter is 
aniversally recognized. Freedom can re- 
Tiain on offer, however, only so long as 
ive ourselves possess it, are willing to 
fight to preserve it, and to encourage 
Dthers who grasp for it. ■ 

Situation in Poland 

FEB. 22, 19821 

The draft plan for reorganizing Polish 
trade unions published iy the Warsaw 
government on February 21 is a matter 
of great importance for Poland's future. 
We, like all those who hope for a return 
to dialogue in Poland, will be carefully 
watching the government's handling of 
this matter. 

In the past, the Warsaw government 
has stated that it intends to reopen a 
dialogue with the church and Solidarity. 
There is no more appropriate subject for 
discussion among the various elements 
in Poland than the future structure and 
role of trade unions. A failure by the 
government to permit Solidarity leaders 
to play a meaningful role in the national 
debate on this question would remove all 
doubt concerning the government's real 

FEB. 23, 19821 

The report of the Polish press agency 
that the Polish Government is trying 
Leszek Moczulski and four other 
members of the tiny Confederation of 
Independent Poland for their political 
activities and the attack carried in the 
Polish media against Lech Walesa 
[leader of the Solidarity labor move- 
ment] unfortunately suggest a continu- 
ing failure of the Polish military regime 
to recognize the obvious need for genu- 
ine reconciliation of all social and 
political forces in Poland. 

Our concern is heightened by the 
fact that these actions come only 1 day 
after the Warsaw government issued a 
draft plan for reorganizing Polish trade 
unions which left the role which Solidari- 
ty will play in the national debate 
unclear. Contrary to Gen. Jaruzelski's 
promises of return to "renewal," the 
Polish Government appears to be mov- 
ing toward increased repression. 

FEB. 25, 19821 

Despite the promises he made in his 
Christmas Eve speech. Premier 
Jaruzelski's remarks yesterday indicate 
that he has still not come up with a 
meaningful plan for restoring Poland's 
political and economic stability. His only 

apparent plan for the future is to con- 
tinue martial law. 

Furthermore, his intemperate at- 
tempt to blame the United States for a 
continuation of martial law is not only 
absurd, it indicates that the General has 
been forced to look for a scapegoat to 
help explain the junta's inability to attain 
even a modicum of acceptance on the 
part of the Polish populace. 

MAR. 4, 19821 

We note the Polish Ministry of Interior 
directive permitting the several thou- 
sand Poles, who have been held as 
political prisoners since December 13, to 
apply with their families for passports 
for emigration from Poland. We find 
this a cynical and deplorable move 
which, in effect, offers the prisoners — 
which the Polish Government persists in 
referring to as detainees — the choice of 
continued imprisonment without being 
formally charged with any criminal act 
or of permanent exile from the home- 
land and people they sought to serve by 
espousing greater democracy, social and 
political justice, and regard for human 

The net effect is forced deprivation 
of citizenship, expulsion from their 
native country, and permanent exile — all 
without due process — which constitutes 
a clear and egregious violation of human 
rights provided for by the Helsinki ac- 
cords which Poland signed. This is a 
glaring admission of the Polish regime's 
inability to meet the democratic aspira- 
tions of the vast majority of the Polish 

Our view remains that Poland's 
crisis can be addressed only through 
release of the prisoners and the 
establishment of a genuine dialogue 
among the authorities, church, and the 
Solidarity trade union movement. In any 
case, we doubt that a policy of forced 
emigration of critics would succeed, 
given the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the Polish people oppose 
martial law. 

'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.B 



Human Rights Situation 
in El Salvador 

by Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on February 8, 
1982. Mr. Abrams is Assistant Secretary 
for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs. ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before you today to discuss the human 
rights situation in El Salvador. 

When I last appeared before the 
committee in November, I stated that 
two principles would guide my efforts in 
promoting respect for human rights and 
the expansion of liberty. First, I said we 
must tell the truth; and second, I said 
we must try to be effective in our 

Last week the Department of State 
submitted the annual Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices for 1981 
around the world^. This is the fifth time 
the Department has submitted such a 
review. I believe this year's submission 
meets the test of candor and honesty, 
not only in the case of countries with 
political and ideological systems we 
abhor, but also in the cases of tradi- 
tionally friendly countries, like El 
Salvador, where the population is under 
attack by violence and counterviolence. 

The report we have submitted on El 
Salvador describes the good and bad 
conduct of a beleaguered govern- 
ment — a government at war. It docu- 
ments that human rights violations of a 
most serious kind continue. It says, for 
example, that: "Human rights violation 
were frequent." It says that "some 
security forces personnel participated" in 
the violence. It notes that civilian deaths 
may have ranged from 6,000 to 12,000. I 
could go on. We know that many inno- 
cent civilians have been murdered by the 
left; we know that many have been 
murdered by the right and the military. 
Anyone who studies the conditions of 
life in El Salvador comes away sick at 
heart. So how, then, can American 
policy be justified on human rights 
grounds? How could we make the cer- 
tification of progress? 

Certification of Progress 

As I noted before, El Salvador is a coun- 
try virtually at war — both with its 

history and with those who would trade 
on that history to abort historic reforms. 

El Salvador is a country with little 
tradition of moderate democratic, 
reformist politics but with a long history 
of poverty, repression, military rule, 
violence, and fear. Today two efforts are 
under way simultaneously. Emboldened 
by the support and strengthened by the 
weapons of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua, the extreme left is seeking 
power through guerrOla action. Mean- 
while, the Duarte government is en- 
gaged in a historic effort; 

• To lay the basis for a truly 
representative system of government in 
a country where no such system has 
ever existed; 

• To introduce revolutionary social 
and economic reforms vehemently op- 
posed by elements of the old order and 
by insurgents who accept change only on 
their own terms; 

• To combat an insurgency sup- 
ported by outside forces whose record in 
respecting basic human rights in their 
own countries is atrocious; and 

• To bring about central control of 
the armed and security forces and con- 
trol violence. 

This is why we supported the Duarte 
government. As I said, human rights 
abuses continue. This is a matter of 
most serious concern to us. Our objec- 
tive is to do everything in our power to 
help improve this situation. 

I can assure you that our efforts, 
both public and private, on behalf of 
human rights will continue. We are 
disturbed about the violations of human 
rights, particularly the incidence of 
violence, as is the present government. 
There is disagreement over the actual 
numbers involved. In our human rights 
report we indicate this. Our conclusions 
about the declining rate of violence is an 
honest one. It has not been manufac- 
tured for this certification. Our 
embassy's data base and sources for the 
data have not changed since September 
198Q when it first began reporting week- 
ly statistics on the incidence of violence. 

Recently several organizations have 
issued reports on the human rights 
situation in El Salvador, and in some 
cases — not all — their conclusions differ 
from ours. These differences are in part, 
I think, explained by the fact that we 

try to look at all the violence, including 
that from the left. Others sometimes 
focus on government or rightist activity 
without equal attention to left-wing 
human rights abuses. Further, our 
report covers all of 1981. Others have 
emphasized early 1981, so that trends t 
which we point would be obscured. 
Taken together, these two flaws make 
some of the reports on the human right 
situation in El Salvador unreliable. 

Progress has been made. We canno 
be satisfied until the killing has stopped 
but we firmly believe the trend is a 
positive one. We want to encourage thi: 
trend. In assessing human rights condi- 
tions in El Salvador we, of course, con- 
sider the evaluations of other organiza- 
tions. Our embassy in San Salvador has 
maintained frequent exchanges vdth 
political and government leaders, the 
church, trade unions, campesinos, and 
community leaders. Based on these 
broad contacts, the embassy's analysis, 
and ours, is that El Salvador "is making 
a concerted effort to comply with inter- 
nationally recognized human rights." 
Clearly, as recent events have shown, 
much more progress needs to be made. 
But I believe that our determination is 
justified given the present context, the 
previous regime's record on human 
rights, and the possible alternatives to 
the Duarte government with all its 

U.S. Pressure for 
Continued Improvement 

I believe this brings us to the question o 
effectiveness. Recognition of human 
rights is the basis of any government's 
legitimacy. This is why we continue to 
press the Government of El Salvador for 
human rights improvements and why we 
favor elections. 

Many people urge us, and urge you, 
to abandon our policy. During my first 2 
months as head of the Bureau of Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, I have 
talked with people across the political 
spectrum here and in Europe — from 
U.S. military commanders, to peace 
movement activists in Flanders. One ap- 
proach which some urge is total 
disengagement from any government 
which commits human rights abuses. 
This has the immediate advantage of 
distancing ourselves from the abusers. 
We just walk away. It looks easy, and it 
looks like a quick, low-cost option. 

I cannot more strongly urge upon 
you that such a policy would eliminate 
any possibility of democracy and reform 
in El Salvador. 


Department of State Bulletin 


What would happen? Clearly, the 
;vel of violence would increase, as the 
isurgents sensed the chance of victory 
nd stepped up their attacks, while the 
lilitary was driven into a siege mentali- 
/. Our own ability to influence the 
lilitary, to counsel restraint with some 
access, would be entirely forfeited. The 
lood would flow at a vastly increased 

But those who urge that the United 
tates abandon the Government of El 
ialvador also say — as they must — that 
he "other side" isn't really so bad, so 
^lat their victory will not be a defeat for 
16 cause of human rights. They equate 
le two sides, or even consider the op- 
osition to be simply more authentic 
eformers. Those who urge that view 
lUst listen to the official voice of the in- 
urgents. Radio Venceremos, which 
jtally supports the Soviet Union and 
tie Polish junta in suppressing human 
ights in Poland. Considering their 
lodels and their backers, two totali- 
irian states and one apparently en- 
aged in the steady elimination of 
-eedom, how can this surprise us? The 
pposition in El Salvador contains peo- 
le ranging from Soviet-oriented Com- 
lunists to reformers, but it is the 
5rmer group which is in control and 
'hich would take power should the 
lUerrillas win. 

In Vietnam, in Nicaragua, in Iran, 
e were told that the government we 
apported was corrupt and oppressive 
nd that the other side was the pro- 
ressive side and would respect 
emocracy. We were told that human 
ghts would gain if the other side won. 
<Ie now hear this argument again about 
1 Salvador— indeed, in Europe it was 
irown at me daily. 

This is in my view blindness. How 
lany times must we learn this lesson? 
his much I strongly urge upon you: 
aat it is no part of human rights policy 
3 allow the Duarte government to be 
eplaced by a Communist dictatorship. 
acquiesce in this, to withdraw our 
upport from the Government of El 
alvador at this junction, would make a 
lockery of our concern for human 
ights, for our goal is not purity; we do 
ot live in Utopia. Our goal is effec- 
iveness in a violent and bitterly divided 
rea of the world. Once again, I would 
ever argue that all those opposed to 
he regime are Communists. I do argue, 
lowever, that the extremists would take 
lower, and a regime would emerge 
/hich would impose a Communist dic- 

There are real reformers in El 
ialvador, and we are supporting them 

and their efforts. El Salvador has one 
chance to find the road to reform and 
democratization, and that is the Duarte 
government. We have to choose: shall 
we help — help achieve land reform, 
social reform, free elections — or shall 
we acquiesce in a guerrilla victory which 
will install a pro-Soviet regime and 
eliminate whatever chances there are for 
future progress in the field of human 

It is worth noting that this is not 
simply our analysis but that of every 
other democracy in the area. 

The cost of our engagement in El 
Salvador is high. Abandoning El 
Salvador would bring human and moral 
costs that are, I would urge, much 
higher. It would eliminate the slightest 
promise of the eventual establishment of 
human rights in El Salvador. 

The outcome in El Salvador will de- 
pend both on the government's ability to 
control the insurgency and on the prog- 
ress it is able to make in maintaining 
and broadening popular support. We 
believe it is clearly in our national in- 
terest that these efforts succeed. In 
unbelievably bad conditions, there has 
been a beginning of progress. Let us en- 
courage, and assist, more. That, in my 
view, is the only effective human rights 
policy we can have in El Salvador today. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^This 1,142-page report is available from 
the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Wasnington, 
D.C. 20402, for $13.00 per copy.B 

Human Rights Situation in 

by Elliott Abrams 

Statement before the Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
February 25, 1982. Mr. Ab7-ams is 
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs. ' 

The Sandinistas assumed power in 
Nicaragua in 1979 in an atmosphere of 
hope created by promises of democracy 
and justice and by relief at the end of a 
repressive regime. Shortly before assum- 
ing power, the Government of National 
Reconstruction had issued a communi- 
que promising to observe human rights, 
respect civil justice, and hold 
Nicaragua's first free election in many 
decades. Since then, we have witnessed 
the dashing of these hopes by the steady 
erosion of freedom, the silencing of 
those who disagree with the Sandinistas, 
the establishment of alliances with the 
Soviet bloc, and, recently, brutal attacks 
on previously unmolested Indians. 
Nicaragua, which many had hoped 
would become a shining example for 
others of progressive democratic 
change, instead has been transformed 
into a repressive, threatening Marxist- 
Leninist oligarchy and a base for violent 
attacks upon other states in Central 
America, possessing an army far more 

powerful than the legitimate defense in- 
terests of Nicaragua can possible justify. 

Basic Rights Curtailed 

The process of the destruction of 
pluralism, freedom, and justice in 
Nicaragua has been gradual, cumulative, 
and relentless. After promising elec- 
tions, the government announced soon 
after it took power that they would be 
postponed until 1985. The Defense 
Minister declared that there was no 
need for elections because the people 
had "voted" during the revolution. The 
multiparty Council of State, established 
after the creation of the regime, has 
been packed with Sandinistas and 
relegated to an inconsequential role. 
Political expression has been gravely 
limited for those who disagree with the 
Marxist oligarchy. One unarmed opposi- 
tion leader was murdered by govern- 
ment security forces. Opposition party 
rallies have been canceled and mobs 
used to ransack government opponents' 
offices. Travel of independent party 
leaders has been blocked. Private sector 
leaders; Mr. Fagoth, the leader of the 
Indian Federation; and others disagree- 
ing with the regime have been arrested. 

The Sandinistas have proceeded 
methodically to restrict freedom of the 
press and freedom of speech, perhaps 
the most essential steps in the establish- 




ment of a totalitarian regime. They have 
repeatedly invaded and closed La Pren- 
sa, a newspaper which criticizes the 
regime — as it criticized the Somoza 
regime — and speaks out for freedom. 
They have banned critical news pro- 
grams and even masses said by Arch- 
bishop Obando y Bravo from independ- 
ent radio stations. They have forbidden 
radio reports on national security, sen- 
sitive economic issues, and activities on 
the east coast. 

The Sandinistas have severely cur- 
tailed their citizens' economic rights. In 
September 1981 they eliminated the 
right to strike and prohibited the com- 
munication of views that might lead to 
change in salaries or prices. 

In order to illustrate how this 
gradual process of repression works, let 
us observe what happened in just 1 
month, January 1982. 

• Early January: The news pro- 
grams El Momenta of Radio Mundial 
and La Opinion of Radio Mil were 
forced off the air "indefinitely," charged 
with being "antipatriotic" and with 
violating the law by broadcasting "misin- 
formation and lies." 

• January 13: The Minister of the 
Interior ordered indefinite suspension of 
two independent radio news programs, 
the "Free Press" on Radio Catolica and 
the "Fourth Power" on Radio Mil. 

• January 13: A mob of government 
supporters attacked the offices of the op- 
position independent newspaper La 
Prensa and three people were shot. 
There is some dispute as to the source 
of the gunfire. The government closed 
La Prensa for 2 days following the inci- 
dent, the sixth shutdown since the 
Sadinista government took power in 
July 1979. The demonstrators also 
defaced the homes of La Prensa's 
editors Jaime Chamorro Barrios and 
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. State security 
troops occupied La Prensa for 2 days 
before allowing it to resume publication. 

• January 17: The government 
closed indefinitely Radio Amor after it 
reported that its owner was beaten for 
broadcasting the text of a Venezuelan 
Government communique denying 
charges by the Nicaraguan Government 
that employees of the Venezuelan Em- 
bassy were involved in a plot to 
sabotage two industrial facilities. The 
government said the broadcast was an 
"attempt to damage friendly relations 
between the two countries." 

• January 25: The Sandinistas an- 
nounced travel restrictions to the east 
coast area of Nicaragua, effectively 
banning investigation of its actions in 

that zone. Reports indicated that the 
Miskito Indians had been forcibly reset- 
tled away from the border. Thousands 
have fled into Honduras to escape 
government repression. 

• January 28: A last minute police 
intervention forced cancellation of a 
planned Conservative Democratic Party 
(PCD) rally in Masatepe, Carazo, on 
January 31. The PCD maintains that 
neither prior police permission nor in- 
spection of rally facilities is required by 
existing laws and that Interior Ministry 
intervention is a violation of fundamen- 
tal political rights. 

• January 31: Two Polish Solidarity 
union leaders, in exile, were refused en- 
try visas to Nicaragua. They had earlier 
met with the heads of state of 
Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica. 

• At the end of the month, the 
leaders of the private business coun- 
cil — Consejo Superior de la Empresa 
Privada (COSEP)— arrested in October 
1981, were still in prison. Accused of 
and tried for antigovernment ac- 
tivities — the publication of a document 
critical of government policies — they 
were given substantial prison sentences 
despite protests from a wide spectrum 
of international business and human 
rights groups. They were finally released 
in mid-February due to international 

The Soviet Influence 

Despite rhetoric about "nonalignment," 
the Sandinistas have moved ever closer 
to the Soviet bloc in the international 
arena. Cuban advisers are serving in key 
posts throughout the government, and a 
total of about 6,000 such advisers are 
currently in the country, including 
1,800-2,000 military advisers. Advisers 
from East Germany, Bulgaria, North 
Korea, and the U.S.S.R. are now in 
Nicaragua; and substantial support has 
been given to leftist guerrillas in El 
Salvador. While proclaiming itself to be 
nonaligned, the government's actions 
speak louder than its words. For exam- 
ple, the Nicaraguan Government joined 
with the Soviet bloc in a letter to the 
chairman of the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission regarding Kampuchea. 
Nicaragua's cosigners included Bulgaria, 
Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, 
South Yemen, Ethiopia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, 
U.S.S.R., and Vietnam. Moreover, PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] 
leader Yasir Arafat publicly stated last 
January that Palestinian guerrillas are 
serving as pilots in Nicaragua. 

A variety of groups independent of 
the U.S. Government have voiced alarn 
about the actions of the Sandinistas. Or 
February 17, the Socialist International 
warned Sandinista leaders that it wUl 
withdraw its support if they lead the m 
tion into a totalitarian dictatorship. A 
Socialist International leader from Lati 
America said that displeasure and disai 
pointment over the course taken by the 
Sandinista revolution prevails among 
Socialist International leaders. He aske 
the Sandinistas to honor their commit- 
ment to keep to revolution within a 
pluralist framework and stated that am 
move toward totalitarianism and dic- 
tatorship will cause the Socialist Inter- 
national to withdraw its support. He 
also said the great emphasis given by 
the Sandinistas to the support they 
receive from Cuba greatly concerns 
most Latin American leaders of the 
Socialist International. 

Attacks on Civilians 

While all of the Sandinistas' repressive 
actions are of deep concern to us, by fa; 
the most disturbing are its barbaric at- 
tacks upon the Miskito, Sumo, and 
Rama Indians. Using the transparent 
and flimsy excuse of "development 
plans" and an alleged desire to integratt 
the Miskitos into the rest of society, the 
Sandinistas have viciously attacked 
these Indian tribes, killing many. Dozen; 
of villages have been destroyed, and 
thousands of the Indians have been 
uprooted and forcibly driven to other 
parts of the country. This appalling 
assault has yet to receive the attention i 
merits. The fate of the Miskito is impor- 
tant as a grave human rights problem 
and in addition for what it tells us about 
the kind of people the Sandinistas are 
and the kind of society they seek to 

After initiating a variety of offensive 
actions against the Miskitos, including 
the refusal to permit instruction in local 
language and the imposition of Cuban 
instructors attempting to indoctrinate 
the Miskitos in Marxism-Leninism, the 
Sandinistas have attacked and burned 
many Indian villages since clashes with 
exile groups along the Honduran border 
increased in mid-December. Eyewitness 
accounts from reliable sources agree 
that the Sandinista army attacked as 
many as 20 Indian settlements along the 
Honduran-Nicaragfuan border (the Rio 
Coco) and others in northeastern 
Nicaragua. Refugees frequently mention 
Leimus as the scene of heavy fighting 
between Indians and Sandinista military 


Department of State Bulletin 


forces. There are allegations that 
dinista soldiers buried alive badly injured 

Eight Indian villages have been 
burned down along a 30-kilometer 
stretch of the Rio Coco since January 1. 
Seven of these villages (each consisting 
of about 25 structures) were totally 
destroyed, and one village was partially 
destroyed. Some 70 structures along the 
border between the villages have also 
been burned. 

Aerial attacks against civilians by 
Sandinista military units have also oc- 
curred during military engagements 
with exile groups near the towns of San- 
dy Bay and Prinzapolka away from the 
border. The Sandinista military has 
blocked shipments of food and medicine 
into the area, arguing that this aid 
might be diverted to exile groups. 
Several thousand Indians have been 
forcibly resettled in camps away from 
the border near the mining town of La 
Rosita. Further to the south, in Puerto 
Cabezas, over 60 Indians who were 
suspected of collaborating with the exile 
groups have been held prisoner since at 
least late December. 

As a result of the attacks and forced 
resettlement thousands of Indians have 
fled to Honduras. A U.S. Embassy 
officer reported on January 6 that the 
population of the refugee camp in 
Mocoron had grown from 175 to 1,700 
since mid-December. By February 10, 
the camp contained 4,800 refugees, and 
the total refugee population in Honduras 
had reached about 7,500. 

The Nicaraguan authorities have 
gone to great lengths since mid- 
December to restrict travel to and infor- 
mation about military activities on the 
east coast, suggesting they have 
something to hide. The government: 

• Notified the U.S. Embassy in 
Managua on January 25 that travel to 
the east coast would not be allowed for 
"security reasons" without permission of 
the Ministry of the Interior. Our em- 
bassy has been unable to obtain such 

• On December 30 took over the in- 
dependent radio station Radio Ver on 
the east coast; 

• Ordered a blackout of all news 
from Nicaragua's east coast on 
December 30; 

• Suspended temporarily five news 
programs in early January for allegedly 
reporting "false information" about a 
Nicaraguan incursion into Honduras; 

• Restricted travel between east 
coast villages in early January. 

I want to call to your attention what 
President Reagan said yesterday. 

The Nicaraguan Government even admits 
the forced relocation of about 8,500 Miskito 
Indians, and we have clear evidence that 
since late 1981 many Indian communities 
have been burned to the ground and men, 
women, and children killed. 

The government disingenuously ex- 
plained that the resettlement ef- 
fort — which they claimed had long been 
underway — was aimed at improving liv- 
ing conditions for the Indians and 
removing them from the scene of the 

The Roman Catholic Church in 
Nicaragua has vigorously condemned the 
oppression of the Indians. The communi- 
que of the Nicaraguan Episcopal con- 
ference issued on February 18, 1982, 
stated in part: 

[W]e wish to remind everyone that there 
are inalienable rights that under no cir- 
cumstances can be violated and we must 
state, with painful surprise, that in certain 
concrete cases there have been grave viola- 
tions of the human rights of individuals, 
families, and entire populations of peoples. 
These include: 

• Relocations of individuals by military 
operations without warning and without con- 
scientious dialogue; 

• Forced marches, carried out without 
sufficient consideration for the weak, aged, 
women, and children; 

• Charges or accusations of collaboration 
with the counterrevolution against all 
residents of certain towns; 

• The destruction of houses, belongings, 
and domestic animals; and 

• The deaths of individuals in cir- 
cumstances that, to our great sorrow, remind 
us of the drama of other peoples of the 

On February 22, Freedom House 
issued a report on the Sandinistas' at- 
tacks upon the Miskito Indians. The 
report describes: 

• Forced mass evacuation of Indian com- 
munities, 20 villages emptied, five fire- 
bombed, and many Indians placed in "pro- 
tected" hamlets; 

• Burial alive of 15 Indians whose names 
are given by eyewitnesses; 

• Imprisonment or explusion of clergy 
and Indian leaders; and 

• Destruction of Indians' economic and 
political as well as religious institutions. 

Freedom House has appealed to 
human rights agencies of the United Na- 
tions and the OAS to investigate the 
status of the Indians in Nicaragua and 
the possibility of genocide. 

The Sandinista Minister of Interior 
justified this repression in a speech on 
February 21. He described the Miskito 
Indians as "victims of a backwardness 
that has been used by the enemies of 
Nicaragua. In the face of the eflforts to 
divide Nicaragua, it is necessary to 
carry out measures that will unite the 
two regions." To quote the Duke of 
Wellington, if you believe that, you will 
believe anything. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and win 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices 

Following is the introduction from 
Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1981, which was prepared 
by the Department of State and submit- 
ted to the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee and the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in February 1982. 

This report is submitted to the Congress 
by the Department of State in com- 
pliance with Section 116(d)(1) and 
502 B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
1961, as amended.' 

The report draws on information 
furnished by United States Missions 
abroad. Congressional studies, non- 
governmental organizations, and human 
rights bodies of international organiza- 

tions. ^ Conditions in most countries are 
described up to the end of 1981; for a 
few countries, significant developments 
occurring during the first weeks of 1982 
also are included. 

A list of twelve international human 
rights covenants and agreements is in- 
cluded as an Appendix to this report, 
along with a listing of the parties to 
those agreements. Internationally 
recognized human rights can be grouped 
into broad categories: 

• first, the right to be free from 
governmental violations of the integrity 
of the person— violations such as tor- 
ture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treat- 
ment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or 

April 1982 



imprisonment; denial of fair public trial; 
and invasion of the home; 

• second, the right to enjoy civil and 
political liberties, including freedom of 
speech, press, religion and assembly; the 
right to participate in government; the 
right to travel freely within and outside 
one's own country; the right to be free 
from discrimination based on race or 

The organization of the report 
follows these two basic categories. After 
an introduction, the description of condi- 
tions in each country is divided into two 
sections which correspond to these two 
categories of rights. A third section 
describes the government's attitude 
toward outside investigations of internal 
human rights conditions, while a fourth 
section discusses general economic and 
social conditions in the country. An ob- 
jective of the latter section is to provide, 
to the extent possible, comparable 
statistical data covering such matters as 
the population growth rate, life expect- 
ancy at birth, infant mortality, per 
capita annual gross national product (in 
US dollars), the adult literacy rate, the 
ratio of students enrolled in primary 
schools, the percentage of persons 
having access to safe water, and the 
percentage of the population considered 
to live below the absolute poverty level. ^ 

Each report is then followed by sta- 
tistical tables, where relevant, listing the 
amounts of United States bilateral 
assistance and multilateral development 
assistance for fiscal year 1979, 1980 and 

Regional and International Institu- 
tions for the Protection of Human 

During the past year the U.S. has taken 
the lead in opposing in international fora 
the double standard applied to human 
rights violations, and has worked toward 
encouraging a more regional approach 
to solving international human rights 

The 37th (1981) session of the 
United Nations Human Rights Commis- 
sion (HRC) met in Geneva scarcely less 
than two weeks after the Inauguration. 

The U.S. delegation used the oppor- 
tunity of the HRC session to express the 
abiding commitment of the United 
States to fundamental human rights. 
The delegation continually emphasized 
the need to deal with human rights con- 
cerns in an evenhanded way and 
stressed that the United States was par- 
ticularly concerned that Latin American 
countries supportive of the West were 

being singled out for condemnation 
while equal or greater violations of 
human rights in Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union and Cuba went virtually 
unnoticed. The United States insisted 
that international bodies entrusted with 
protecting human rights judge human 
rights performance by a single standard. 
While the delegation, at this meeting 
alone, could not accomplish this objec- 
tive, which would represent a profound 
change in the political culture of the 
HRC, it was encouraging that the HRC 
condemned foreign intervention in 
Afghanistan and in Kampuchea, and the 
flagrant violation of the human rights of 
the Khmer people. 

Furthermore, the Human Rights 
Commission reached agreement on the 
draft Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrim- 
ination Based on Religion or Belief, 
which had been twenty years in the 
making. The Commission's action com- 
pleted an important step toward inter- 
national recognition of religious freedom 
as a basic human right. 

Many of these problems appeared 
during the 36th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly: a double 
standard which focuses solely on certain 
countries, almost ignoring the violations 
of human rights in Communist lands, 
partisan treatment of issues where com- 
mon decency could be expected to guide 
national positions and an atmosphere in 
which those who would ordinarily resist 
such distortions felt it futile to do so. 

The General Assembly's Third Com- 
mittee (Social and Humanitarian Affairs) 
voted on issues regarding, among 
others, racial discrimination, misuse of 
psychiatric institutions and human rights 
in El Salvador, Chile and Guatemala. 
Although the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Religious 
Intolerance was the most significant 
resolution adopted by the Third Commit- 
tee, in other areas our efforts served 
primarily to limit damage and to provide 
a forum for articulating the beliefs of 
the Administration, including emphasis 
on the hypocrisy of current double 
standards, discrimination against Latin 
American countries and indifference to 
violations by the Soviet Union and its 
Communist allies. 

It was particularly significant at this 
session that many countries in Latin 
America began to perceive the impact of 
the current imbalance and seemed more 
inclined to move toward regional solu- 
tions to problems rather than suffer 
under the sharp light of discriminatory 
focus. The vote on El Salvador was one 
example; those who abstained or voted 

against the resolution outnumbered 
those who sought to charge that countr 
with gross violations of human rights. 
We hope to move further in the cominfj 
year toward encouraging greater impai 
tiality in evaluating human rights condi 
tions in Latin America, and toward 
greater regional consciousness and 
responsiveness to regional problems. 

U.S. efforts in the coming year in i) 
ternational and regional bodies will foci 
on a heightened international conscious 
ness of human rights concerns in which 
there is implicit recognition of equity 
and consistency as underlying themes. 

The Madrid meeting of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) continued intermittent! 
throughout 1981 in an attempt to reac? 
agreement on a final document which 
would reflect the need for substantial 
steps forward in human rights, includir 
full Soviet and East European imple- 
mentation of the 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act. In addition, the U.S. and other 
Western states used Madrid to raise 
many individual human rights cases. 
Delegates from the Soviet Union and 
some Eastern European countries con- 
sistently opposed important Western 
proposals on human rights and criticizei 
the West for its human rights emphasis 
The Madrid meeting recessed in 
December 1981 at an impasse over 
human rights and other issues in the 
military field. The recent suppression of 
the Solidarity labor movement in Polanc 
constitutes a massive violation of the 
Final Act further damaging the work of 
the Madrid conference. The Madrid 
meeting is to resume in February 1982; 
the West plans to raise the damaging ef 
fects of repression in Poland. 

In 1981, the European Commission 
on Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights continued to 
hear and decide on cases involving viola- 
tions of human rights in the 21 countries 
which are members of the Council of 
Europe. The Commission registered ap- 
proximately 400 individual cases for ex- 
amination during the year. Spain and 
France joined the list of more than a 
dozen member countries which permit 
their citizens to appeal directly to the 
Commission when they believe their 
basic rights have been infringed. Council 
of Europe member states regard Euro- 
pean Court of Human Rights judge- 
ments as binding and generally seek to 
make amends in accordance with the 
Court's rulings. While neither the Court 
nor the Council of Europe is empowered 
to enforce the Court's rulings, member 
countries' voluntary acceptance of its 
findings demonstrates that the Court 



xerts a positive influence on human 
ights issues in Europe. 

The Inter- American Commission on 
luman Rights (lAHRC) was established 
1 1960 with its primary function being 
promote the observance and protec- 
ion of human rights and to serve as a 
onsultative organ for the Organization 
f American States (OAS). 

The lAHRC approves definitive re- 
lorts on the situation regarding human 
ights in various Latin American nations 
nd prepares the annual report which is 
iresented to the OAS General 
assembly. It also considers certain in- 
ividual cases submitted for the Com- 
lission's review. 

The Organization of African Unity 
assembly of Heads of State and Govern- 
lent meeting in Nairobi at the end of 
une, 1981, approved the Charter of 
luman and People's Rights which was 
rafted the previous year. The Charter 
/ill come into force upon ratification by 
simple majority of the member states. 

'he Problem of Human Rights 

Human Rights" is today the term with 
/hich most of those yearning for justice 
nd for relief from oppression voice 
heir hopes. Today, the cause of human 
ights exists throughout the world and 
xpresses the longings and convictions 
f millions of men and women. But we 
lust understand that it is a cause with 
recent origin and short history. 

The moral principles we call human 
ights incorporate maxims of justice of 
very epoch and every culture. The 
pecific concern for human rights as we 
nderstand them, however, has not 
xisted throughout human history. It 
riginated as a set of demands in seven- 
eenth century England, and was first 
mbodied in political institutions in the 
Jnited States, after 1776. Older moral 
odes and philosophies laid primary 
mphasis not on rights, but on duties, 
'hese codes characteristically took the 
orm of a series of prohibitions, rather 
han a list of freedoms— such as freedom 
•f religion and freedom of assembly— 
vhich the individual was justified in 
lemanding from government. 

The first historical event of the 
lodern era driven by the belief in 
idividual rights was the American 
ievolution of 1776. And the original 
nderstanding of the meaning of human 
ights was clearly expressed in the 
i.merican Declaration of Independence, 
'he Declaration asserted that human 
ights could not be created or abrogated 
ly any human enactment, whether of 

one government or of an international 
body, because they were based on "the 
laws of nature and of nature's God," on 
truths which are "self-evident." Thus it 
was confidently stated that "all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by 
their creator with certain inalienable 

When the authors of the Declaration 
called these rights "inalienable," they 
implied that rights should not depend 

A continuing prob- 
lem for human rights 
policy is the fact that it 
traditionally aims at af- 
fecting the domestic 
behavior of other coun- 
tries, while governments 
are reluctant to alter 
their nation's political 
systems for foreign 
policy reasons. 

upon the prior performance of certain 
duties by the citizen or be postponed un- 
til any other group of "rights" was 
achieved. The original enumeration of 
human rights in the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence thus did not include anything 
that could only be gained gradually, such 
as economic development. 

The rights the Declaration asserted 
covered only part of justice as it was 
understood in earlier moral codes, and 
supplied only some of the goods men 
normally desired. As examples of in- 
alienable rights, the Declaration gave 
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap- 
piness." Rights were considered to 
enable individuals to pursue happiness 
freely, but not to supply happiness itself. 
For a government to insist it could 
define and supply happiness itself would 
take away men's right to liberty. 

The intention of the originators of 
human rights, then, seems to have been 
to select from the vast range of things 
that men need or want, certain crucial 
things that they are entitled to by their 
very nature — human rights — which, 
when fulfilled, will create the precondi- 
tions for the satisfaction of other needs. 

These preconditions are created, in this 
understanding, by an economic system 
that enables individuals to engage freely 
in various approaches to the "pursuit of 
happiness," and by a political system of 
liberty, in which men participate in 
choosing the laws and the officials that 
govern them. Such a system was under- 
stood as the likeliest source of the other 
rights, and the Declaration of 
Independence asserts: 

That to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed. 

In other words individuals do not 
owe their humanity to the community, 
as earlier philosophies often argued; the 
community owes its whole legitimacy to 
the individuals, whose existence is prior 
to it. 

The original demand for human 
rights seems Utopian in the face of con- 
ditions experienced by many nations to- 
day. But when this demand arose — in a 
world where there was not even one 
state under wholly democratic govern- 
ment, and the few republics existing did 
not recognize the principles of in- 
alienable rights— it appeared infinitely 
more visionary and unrealistic. 

Yet the human rights movement in 
world politics proved to be unbelievably 
successful after 1776. It is to this 
historical movement that democratic 
countries owe their possession of rights, 
and because of it that other peoples 
express their yearnings for justice as a 
demand for rights. It created the situa- 
tion we have today, in which nearly 
every regime, no matter how narrowly 
based or despotic, refers to the people 
as the source of its legitimacy and has a 
constitution that provides for a repre- 
sentative assembly and for elections, no 
matter how meaningless. 

Unfortunately, the widespread long- 
ing for rights in the contemporary world 
confronts a real lack of consensus on 
these rights. Many governments fear in- 
dividual liberty; many others do not 
even accept the original and distinctive 
intellectual foundations of the belief in 
human rights. Those opposing the 
human rights movement find themselves 
in a world already shaped by it, and they 
are compelled to fight on its ground, 
using the terminology of democracy. 
(This explains the great number of so- 
called "peoples' democracies" today that 
are not democratic in any normal sense.) 
In 1776 those who practiced slavery or 
absolute monarchy admitted it openly; 
now they draw around themselves the 
names of freedom. A nominal consensus 

^pril 1982 



on human rights thus hides the reserva- 
tions of leaders who remain more com- 
fortable with the ancient priority of 
duties over rights, and of rulers who 
simply find it inconvenient or threaten- 
ing to respect their subjects' rights. For 
such people there is a great temptation 
to legitimize their own interests by 
broadening the basic concept of rights to 
include these interests— thus allowing 
some to claim, for example, that duty to 
authority is a special kind of right and 
others to claim that certain theoretically 
desirable rights cannot be afforded at 
their country's stage of development. 

This leads to increasing uncertainty 
as to what desirable things really are 
rights. This uncertainty has been en- 
couraged by some new interpretations of 
social and economic rights, such as the 
newly minted concept of the "right to 
development." The urgency and moral 
seriousness of the need to eliminate 
starvation and poverty from the world 
are unquestionable, and continue to 
motivate large American foreign aid 
efforts. However, the idea of economic 
and social rights is easily abused by 
repressive governments which claim that 
they promote human rights even though 
they deny their citizens the basic rights 
to the integrity of the person, as well as 
civil and political rights. This justifica- 
tion for repression has in fact been ex- 
tensively used. No category of rights 
should be allowed to become an excuse 
for the denial of other rights. For this 
reason, the term economic and social 
rights is, for the most part, not used in 
this year's Reports. A section on 
Economic and Social Circumstances is 
included because of the moral imperative 
of conquering poverty and since an 
understanding of these circumstances is 
useful in appreciating the conditions 
under which the struggle for political 
and civil liberties is carried on in a par- 
ticular country. Moreover, the legislative 
history of the statute which requires the 
annual Reports made clear that govern- 
ments' commitment to fulfillment of the 
basic needs of the people was to be a 
factor in consideration by the Congress 
of foreign assistance proposals. 

Human Rights in International 

How to embody the fundamental prin- 
ciples of democratic societies— human 
rights— in foreign policy has become an 
especially pressing question for the 
United States. Because Americans are 
of many faiths and ethnic heritages, the 
national identity of the United States is 
more constituted by its political prin- 

ciples than is that of any other powerful 
nation. The United States had fought its 
bloodiest war not for territory but to 
free the slaves. In fact the United 
States, protected from the harsh neces- 
sities of foreign policy by two great 
oceans, only entered world politics in a 
serious way when impelled to do so by 
its sense that freedom was threatened. 
The three times when the United States 
recommitted itself to active involvement 
with the outside world— whether in wars 
for the liberty of Europe or in the Mar- 
shall plan— it has done so because it felt 
called by the defense of human rights. 

The attempt to make foreign policy 
serve human rights confronts several 
specific problems that must be faced in 
developing a policy. 

A continuing problem for human 
rights policy is the fact that it tradi- 
tionally aims at affecting the domestic 
behavior of other countries, while 
governments are reluctant to alter their 
nation's political system for foreign 
policy reasons. The leverage that the 
United States does have is strongest in 
friendly countries, where we have more 
access and more influence. Such in- 
fluence is an important resource in pur- 
suing human rights,, but its concentra- 
tion in friendly countries creates a 
danger: human rights policy might 
highlight and punish human rights viola- 
tions in friendly countries, while giving 
unfriendly countries immunity. If this 
took place it would not fairly represent 
the distribution of human rights abuses 
in the world. Moreover, a nation that 
came to display a general pattern of 
undermining or estranging friendly 
governments would obviously limit its 
future influence over them, including its 
influence over their human rights 
behavior. This is a second problem of 
human rights— the need to avoid press- 
ing only where our influence is greatest 
rather than where the abuses are 

There is a danger that human rights 
policy will become like the labor of 
Sisyphus because it deals only with 
effects and not with their causes. To 
take an example, it is important not only 
to free political prisoners, but also to en- 
courage conditions in which new political 
prisoners are not taken. Many, although 
not all, of the things we consider rights 
are difficult to implant in adverse condi- 
tions. This fact creates the danger that 
by aiming at too much we will not get 
what is really possible. The founders of 
the Weimar Republic, by aiming at a 
democracy stripped of all the authori- 
tarian features of imperial Germany, 
created a system so fragile that it was 

overwhelmed by something wholly bar- 
baric in only fourteen years. On the 
other hand, there still exist in many 
areas of the world indigenous tradition 
of decency that coincide in part with tl 
human rights tradition. The best hope 
for creating the preconditions of effec- 
tive human rights observance may 
sometimes lie in working on the basis c 
these traditions. 

For all these reasons, a human 
rights policy, unless it is very carefully 
constructed, runs the danger of being i 
effective. And if it is ineffective it can 
also be counterproductive, creating adc 
tional resistance to improvement in 
human rights. It can embitter bilateral 
relations with other countries, increasii 
international tension. 

Efforts for human rights in the 
years before 1914 had the advantage 
that most of the major powers re- 
spected, at least in principle, the same 
conception of human rights. If their 
practice often faOed to live up to their 
principles, there was a perceived 
legitimacy to the principles that caused 
each of these countries to develop in th 
direction of greater equality before the 
law and more and more scrupulous 
adherence to human rights. Because of 
the fundamental consensus on human 
rights issues, the great powers that 
diverged most in practice from the intei 
national consensus, such as imperial 
Russia, did not try to export an alter- 
native ideology. 

The fundamental consensus on 
human rights was broken after World 
War I by the emergence of totalitarian 
regimes among the major powers. Thesi 
political systems were visibly founded ir 
opposition to the way of life of the in- 
creasingly democratic Western world. 
They rejected in principle the ideas upor 
which were based the great movement 
for human rights after the American 
and French revolutions. 

The world after 1945 has been 
characterized by competition between 
two adverse ideologies, one represented 
by the United States and one by the 
Soviet Union. The United States is the 
nation that has most vigorously under- 
taken the effort to make human rights a 
specific part of its foreign policy. The 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, is ruled 
by a very small elite through a massive 
bureaucratic and police apparatus. Its 
regime inherits in a modified form the 
Marxist tradition that reacted against 
the philosophic ideas on which the 
original human rights concept was 
based, and superimposes this on a 
heritage of absolute monarchy. In con- 
trast to the Western democracies, whose 



riginal human rights principles gradual- 
yf radicalized themselves, producing a 
jeater and greater transformation of 
ocial life, the alternative Marxist con- 
eption of justice in the USSR was soon 
/ithered by tactical compromises with 
he necessities of absolute rule. 

The effect of Soviet foreign policy 
las not been to encourage human rights, 
'he Soviet Union dominates, without 
heir consent, not only the non-Russian 
leoples of the former Czarist empire, 
lut also the nations of Eastern Europe, 
'he efforts of the people of East Ger- 
nany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
'oland to create freer and more 
)luralist systems have all been 
rustrated by Soviet intervention or 
)ressure. In 1979 the Soviet army in- 
-aded Afghanistan to impose a govern- 
nent unacceptable to the overwhelming 
najority of the Afghan people. In the 
leveloping countries, the Soviet Union 
las a tendency to use its influence to 
nove governments toward political 
tructures of the Soviet type where 
lossible. For example, in Ethiopia, 
vhose government is a friend of the 
Soviet Union, there has been persistent 
Soviet pressure to create a communist 
larty on the Soviet model. Thus a world 
n which several major powers were in 
heoretical agreement over human rights 
iias given way to a world in which the 
wo greatest powers are fundamentally 
livided over this issue. 

Jnited States Human Rights Policy 

!'his is the complex setting in which 
J.S. human rights policy must be con- 
tructed. The concern for human rights 
las been a constant theme throughout 
American history. The United States 
iwes its formation as a nation to the 
3ve of liberty; it owes its continuing as 
united nation, in the crisis over 
lavery, to the desire to extend that 
reedom to those who did not enjoy it. 
Americans are right to see their national 
oncern for justice as a strength that in- 
elligent foreign policy should build on, 
ather than as a defect to overcome. In 
act, every recent U.S. administration 
las seen the advancement of freedom 
md justice, by one approach or another, 
LS an important goal of foreign policy. 
There is thus a fundamental consensus 
imong the American people on the aims 
)f human rights policy; there is dis- 
igreement only about means of carrying 
)ut these ends. Here there is room for 
lonest disagreement, because the prob- 
ems faced in constructing an effective 
luman rights policy have no simple or 
;asy solution. 

This Administration believes that 
human rights is an issue of central 
importance both to relieve suffering and 
injustice and to link foreign policy with 
the traditions of the American people. 

But no nation can carry out an effec- 
tive human rights policy unless it shows 
that its principles can make it successful 
and confident. The strength and prestige 
of the most powerful democratic nation 
is inevitably important for human rights. 

The other side of this principle is 
that it is a significant service to the 
cause of human rights to limit the in- 
fluence the USSR (together with its 
clients and proxies) can exert. A consist- 
ent and serious policy for human rights 
in the world must counter the USSR 
politically and bring Soviet bloc human 
rights violations to the attention of the 
world over and over again. 

At the same time, the United States 
must continue to respond to serious 
human rights problems in friendly coun- 
tries. U.S. human rights policy will not 
pursue a policy of selective indignation. 
Every act of torture or murder is 
equally repugnant to the American 
people, no matter who commits it. Of 
course, the means available to us to halt 
such human rights violations always 
vary with the specific case. Our specific 
response to human rights violations 
appropriately differs from country to 
country, but the intensity of our concern 
should not. 

Since the United States will continue 
to seek the redress of human rights 
abuses even in friendly countries, human 
rights policy wUl sometimes be very 
troubling. We will sometimes be forced 
to make hard choices between the need 
to answer human rights violations and 
other foreign policy interests, such as 
trade or security. In some cases we will 
have to accept the fact that bilateral 
relations with a friendly country may be 
damaged because of our human rights 
concern. This is the unavoidable price of 
a consistent policy. 

But a realistic policy must be alert 
not only to human rights violations by 
governments, but also to those by oppo- 
sition groups. It should be obvious that 
murder, torture, the intimidation of free 
expression, interference with free elec- 
tions, or attacks on the independence of 
the judiciary are equally reprehensible 
whether they are committed by a 
government or by a group attempting to 
replace or capture it. 

Terrorist groups, whether of the left 
or right, usually display a distaste for 
democratic institutions and civil liber- 
ties. But regardless of terrorists' specific 
political aims, their activity erodes 

democracy. The brutal tactics pursued 
by terrorists almost never bring them to 
power, but democracies find it difficult 
to cope with these tactics; terrorism 
creates a temptation to respond by a 
turn to authoritarian political structures. 
What terrorist movements have some- 
times succeeded in doing, at the cost of 
great suffering, is to destroy democracy. 
Terrorism has an intrinsic tendency to 
corrode the very basis of human rights; 
accordingly. United States policy in- 
cludes a serious effort to control it. 

Building Freedom 

It would narrow the range of action of 
our human rights policy excessively to 
limit it to responding to individual viola- 
tions of human rights when they appear. 
This "reactive" aspect of human rights 
policy is essential. But it must be accom- 
panied by a second track of positive 
policy with a bolder long-term aim: to 
assist the gradual emergence of free 
political systems. It is in such systems 
that we can most realistically expect the 
observance of human rights across the 
board. The development of liberty is, in 
turn, encouraged by the emergence of 
areas within a political system where 
free choice and free expression can 
become familiar and respected, even 
while they are not permitted in other 
parts of the political system. Among 
these areas where freedom can develop 
are labor unions, churches, independent 
judicial systems, bar associations and 
universities. Where we do not have 
leverage over the shape of an entire 
society, we can nourish the growth of 
freedom within such institutions. 

Copies of the Report 

Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1981 is a 1,142-page 
document prepared by the Department 
of State and submitted to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in February 1982. It documents human 
rights practices in 47 countries in 
Africa, 32 in Central and South 
America, 21 in East Asia and the 
Pacific, 31 in Europe and North 
America, and 27 in the Near East, 
North Africa, and South Asia. 

This report may be purchased for 
$13.00 a copy from the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
Remittance must accompany order. ■ 




"Positive" policy of this kind will be 
aided by the genuine echo that the con- 
cept of human rights evokes around 
much of the world, and by the fact that 
no other conception of political justice 
has been able to win as much legitimacy 
over the last two hundred years. In 
aiding this movement, we will not be 
struggling alone, but assisting the most 
powerful current of history during the 
last 200 years. This Administration is 
committed to developing such a positive 
track of human rights policy. 

The Congress has already estab- 
lished one human rights program on the 
"positive" side. Section 116(e) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act provides AID 
[Agency for International Development] 
funding for programs and activities 
which will encourage or promote in- 
creased adherence to civil and political 
rights in countries eligible for U.S. 
bilateral assistance. In FY 1981 AID 
obligated a total of $1,512,000 for 
twenty-eight separate projects. Activ- 
ities included the training of black 
magistrates, primary court officers and 
legal draftsmen in Zimbabwe, provision 
of legal and human rights materials in 
Zambia and travel of participants from 
developing nations to conferences and 
meetings on human rights issues. The 
United States Government also spent 
$582,000 in FY 1981 in support of 
similar programs carried out by the Law 
and Human Rights Program of the Asia 

Present United States human rights 
policy gives special attention to en- 
couraging major improvements in the 
observance of human rights over the 
long term. But it does not neglect the 
imperative of simply responding to the 
fact of suffering. The United States is a 
major haven for refugees and the major 
contributor to the work of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees, giving $137.5 million in FY 1981, 
in addition to $5 million donated to the 
Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration. In FY 1981 the United States 
contributed just over $13 million to the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross for its programs on behalf of 
prisoners, missing persons and civilians 
in wartime. In FY 1981 the United 
States added a contribution of $1.5 
million for the ICRC's political detainee 
work, which we had not supported in 
FY 1980. 

In the pursuit of its human rights 
policy the United States uses a wide 
range of instruments. Decisions on 

foreign assistance provided by the 
United States take human rights condi- 
tions into account. The transfer of police 
and military equipment is carefully 
reviewed in order to avoid identifying 
the United States with violations of 
human rights. In addition, the human 
rights policy employs a varied mix of 
diplomatic tools: frank discussions with 
foreign officials; meetings with victims 
of human rights abuses; and, where 
private diplomacy is unavailing or 
unavailable, public statements of con- 
cern. These instruments are applied in a 
manner that takes into account a coun- 
try's history, culture and current 
political environment, and recognizes 
that human rights concerns must be 
balanced with other fundamental in- 
terests. This Administration has used all 
of these instruments at one time or 
another during its first year. 

In choosing among these instru- 
ments United States policy is guided 
primarily by the cnterion of effec- 
tiveness, choosing the response that is 
most likely to actually improve human 
rights. In the majority of cases this 
criterion suggests an emphasis on tradi- 
tional diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy 
maximizes the limited leverage we do 

This Administration 
believes that human 
rights is an issue of cen- 
tral importance both to 
relieve suffering and in- 
justice and to link 
foreign policy with the 
traditions of the 
American people. 

possess, while minimizing counter- 
productive reactions, damage to bilateral 
relations, and international tension. 
Traditional diplomacy has the drawback 
of being least visible precisely where it 
is most successful. But this Administra- 
tion is pledged to employ traditional 
diplomacy vigorously on behalf of human 

Our response to the suppression of 
human rights in Poland offers an ex- 
ample of the United States government's 
serious concern for human rights. The 

initial repression of trade unions, and 
other rights, was raised in private 
diplomatic discussions with the Polish 
government. When the abuses con- 
tinued, the United States denounced th 
proceedings of the Polish and Soviet 
governments publicly and sought sup- 
port from other nations. Finally, we 
identified a wide range of sanctions 
against both the Polish government an^ 
the Soviet Union, since in this case the 
abuse of human rights was substantiall 
due to pressure from an outside power 
We implemented the mildest sanctions 
first, to show our concern and to back 
private representations with a credible 
demonstration that we would bring oui 
political and economic resources into 
play in a manner calculated to be effec 
five in this situation. We are now apph 
ing more effective sanctions demon- 
strating that violators of human rights 
on a similar scale would pay a price. 
Most important, the more substantial 
sanctions are calculated to develop con 
Crete leverage that might influence the 
decisions the Polish and Soviet govern- 
ments will have to make about whethei 
to relax repression or to carry it 
through to the end. 

Poland and other key human rights 
issues will be discussed and debated at 
the UN Human Rights Commission 198 
session now underway, at the CSCE 
Madrid meeting beginning February 9 
and at international meetings through- 
out the year. The United States will of 
course be vigorously represented. 

Americans can be justly proud of 
their country's contributions to the caus 
of liberty today as over the decades. Th 
Reagan Administration will maintain 
this historic commitment. 

We in America are blessed with rights 
secured for us by the sacrifices of our 
forefathers, but we yearn for the day when 
all mankind can share in these blessings. 
Never is there any excuse for the violation o 
the fundamental rights of man— not at any 
time or in any place, not in rich countries or 
poor, not under any social, economic or 
political system. 

President Ronald Reagan 
Human Rights Day Proclamation 
December 10, 1981 

'Section 116(d)(1) provides as follows: 

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, by January 31 of each year, a ful 
and complete report regarding— 


Department of State Bulletii 


"(1) the status of internationally recog- 
ized human rights, within the meaning of 
ubsection (a) — 

"(A) in countries that received assistance 
nder this part, and 

"(B) in all other foreign countries which 
re members of the United Nations and 
^hich are not otherwise the subject of a 
uman rights report under this Act." 

Section 502(B)(b) provides as follows: 

"The Secretary of State shall transmit to 
Congress, as part of the presentation 
laterials for security assistance programs 
roposed for each fiscal year, a full and com- 
lete report, prepared with the assistance of 
le Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
nd Humanitarian Affairs, with respect to 
ractices regarding the observance of and 
sspect for internationally recognized human 
ignts in each country proposed as a recipient 
r security assistance.' 

^Human rights practices in the United 
tates are treated in the report submitted to 
le Congress by the Commission on Security 
nd Cooperation in Europe entitled "Imple- 
lentation of the Final Act of the Conference 
n Security and Cooperation in Europe: Find- 
igs and Recommendations Five Years After 
lelsinki," August 1, 1980. See also the 
sports submitted by the President of the 
'nited States to the Commission on Security 
nd Cooperation in Europe on the Implemen- 
ition 01 the Helsinki Final Act, December 1, 
980-May 31, 1981 and June 1, 1981- 
lovember 30, 1981. Private non- 
overnmental human rights organizations 
Iso prepare reports on numan rights prac- 
ces in the United States. 

'The statistics employed in the fourth 
jction of each country report were drawn 
•om sources at the International Bank for 
.econstruction and Development, and from 
ublished materials from the country con- 
jrned. While every effort was made to ob- 
iin the latest and most accurate of such 
atistics available, it should be recognized 
lat for many of trie countries covered by 
lis report only the most meager and unre- 
able, often outdated, statistical data is 
vailable. Accordingly, especially in the 
eveloping countries, these statistics should 
ot be taken as affording a degree of relia- 
ility comparable to data available in the 
lore developed countries. 

''Fiscal years 1979 and 1980 are from the 
JD report "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 
nd Assistance from International Organiza- 
ons" (the Green Book). FY 1981 data for 
JD country programs are based on the AID 
Congressional Presentations. ■ 

Visit of Egyptian President IVIubaral^ 

President Mohayned Hosni Mubarak 
of the Arab Republic of Egypt made a 
state visit to the United States Febru- 
ary 2-5, 1982, to meet with President 
Reagan and other government officials. 

Following are remarks made at the 
welcoming ceremony on February 3 and 
on the departure of President Mubarak 
on February U and a statement of prin- 
ciples signed on February 4 by Fouad 
Iskandnr, Egypt's Under Secretary of the 
Ministry of the Economy, and Bradshaw 
Langmaid, Jr., Acting Assistant Ad- 
ministrator for the Near East of the 
Agency for International Developmenf^ 

FEB. 3, 19822 

President Reagan 

It's an honor and a pleasure to welcome 
you, Mr. President, Mrs. Mubarak, and 
those who accompanied you from Egypt. 

Your visit today reaffirms our 
friendship, and all Americans thank you 
for that reaffirmation. Your visit and 
the current excellent relations between 
our two governments are testimony that 
the friendship between Egypt and the 
United States is more than a compact 
between individuals; it is a commitment 
between nations. 

In your inaugural address to the 
Egyptian parliament, you told the parlia- 
ment: "We are all sons of the same 
destiny and history." I believe that's true 
of all mankind as well. And today all 
good and decent people join in proclaim- 
ing that terrorists will not be permitted 
to determine the future of mankind. 

There's much to discuss. Our talks 
will touch on issues of global, regional, 
and bilateral significance. We share a 
mutual concern as we observe the ex- 
pansion of a totalitarian power based on 
an ideology that smothers freedom and 
independence and denies the existence 
of God. The people of Poland and 
Afghanistan now suffocate under the op- 
pressive whim of this fearful master. 
Within the Mideast, this same power en- 
courages hatred and conflict, hoping to 
take some advantage of instability. 

The United States stands firmly 
with Egypt and other Mideastern na- 
tions concerned with regional security. 
As Secretary Haig emphasized on his re- 
cent visit, we have never sought a 
military, permanent presence, but we do 
ask and are grateful for mutually agreed 

arrangements that will enhance the 
security of the nations in that region. 

In an address last December, you 
stated that one of the characteristics of 
great nations is their ability to learn 
from history. But if history teaches us 
anything, it is that good people must 
cooperate if peace is to be maintained 
and if progress is to be made. 

Over the last decade, the United 
States played a part in the peace proc- 
ess which has led to peace between 
Egypt and Israel. We are willing to con- 
tinue in that role to seek a lasting peace 
in the Middle East between Israel and 
all its Arab neighbors. And Camp David, 
we believe, is a first step toward that 
goal. It has brought recognizable and 
measurable progress. As Israeli with- 
drawal from the Sinai takes place later 
this year, we must commit ourselves to 
push on. In a spirit of understanding, we 
must address the remaining issues in the 
negotiation for autonomy in the West 
Bank and Gaza and chart a course that 
will build upon that which has already 
been accomplished. 

Others should be brought into the 
Camp David process, because no matter 
how long and arduous, it offers the best 
opportunity for tangible results. In the 
months ahead, we must maintain our 
flexibility, yet never lose sight of the 
goal of establishing a lasting and com- 
prehensive peace that will provide 
security and justice and a better life for 
all peoples of the region. Without setting 
deadlines, I personally believe the time 
has come to get on with the task before 
us and the sooner the better. 

Secretary Haig has explained to me 
your sincere commitment now that you 
have peace with Israel to seek a broader 
peace in the region. The United States 
also remains eager to do whatever we 
can to help Egypt enjoy the fruits of 
peace. We offer the helping hand of 
friendship, and we're optimistic that 
working with you, we can streamline our 
joint economic efforts, make them more 
flexible, more efficient, and more 
responsive to our mutual needs, so that 
all can share in the bounty of peace. 

In the coming spring, America's 
trade ambassador, William Brock, will 
visit your country with the expressed 
purpose of strengthening our trade and 
economic ties. And we also share your 
concern for the well-being of your 
neighbors in the Sudan. In this world of 
advanced technology, communication, 
and transportation, all nations are 

^pril 1982 



neighbors. Furthermore, with you and 
all those who would be our friends, we 
hope to be a good neighbor. 

I grew up in a small town in the 
Midwest of our country, and in the tiny 
school where I received my initial educa- 
tion, our history books taught us about 
the magnificent 7,000-year-old culture 
that grew and prospered along the Nile. 
I remember wondering what kind of 
people they were— those people who laid 
the foundation for Western civilization. 
Today, we Americans know the Egyp- 
tian people well, their courage and 
nobility, and we're proud to have you as 
our friends. 

President Mubarak 

Thank you very much for the warm 
reception and the kind words. It is a 
source of great pleasure to visit your 
great country once again in less than 4 

As you know, the sentiments which 
you have expressed are shared by 44 
million Egyptians. They look upon the 
United States with admiration and 
respect. They remember very vividly the 
words of President Abraham Lincoln, 
who spoke of a nation conceived in liber- 
ty and dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal. They recall 
also that President John Kennedy urged 
all nations to join in creating a new en- 
deavor—not a new balance of power but 
a new world of law where the strong are 

just and the weak secure and the peace 

During the past few years our late 
leader. President Sadat, worked 
vigorously with you and your 
predecessors to forge an ever-growing 
friendship. In doing so he was express- 
ing the will of the Egyptian people. 
Hence this policy will continue un- 
changed. We are determined to build 
upon what has been achieved and add to 
it every day. We are here to reinforce 
our friendship and intensify our coopera- 
tion in all fields. We are here to cement 
the bonds of interaction between our 
two nations. We are here to reaffirm 
our commitment to work together for 
peace and reconciliation. 

The steps we took on the road to 
peace in the Middle East generated a 
historic change in that troubled part of 
the world. However, they must be 
followed up in the months ahead. We 
must double our efforts in order to fulfill 
our pledge to establish a just and a com- 
prehensive peace. The key to peace and 
stability in the area is to solve the 
Palestinian problem. 

A just solution to this problem must 
be based on mutual recognition and ac- 
ceptance. Both sides have an inherent 
right to exist and function as a national 
entity, free from domination and fear. 
The exercise of the right to self- 
determination cannot be denied to the 
Palestinian people. In fact, it is the best 
guarantee for Israeli security. This is 


the lesson of history and the course of 
the future. 

To make it a living reality, the 
Palestinians need your help and your 
understanding. We are certain that yoi 
will not fail them— you will not defeat 
the expectations of those who look upc 
you as a nation of freedom-fighters am 

I'm looking forward to the talks th 
we'll have today with hope and op- 
timism. Much depends on the success < 
our efforts and the clarity of our visior 
I have no doubt that we shall meet the 
challenge with resolve and determina- 

On behalf of the Egyptian people, 
invite you and Mrs. Reagan to visit 
Egypt in order to enable the Egyptian 
people to express to you the genuine 
feeling towards every American in the 
United States. 

FEB. 4, 19823 

President Reagan 

President Mubarak and I have just con 
pleted a most fruitful and wide-ranging 
set of meetings. Our discussions were 
frank and cordial, covering a number o 
matters of mutual concern. President 
Mubarak's visit demonstrates more 
clearly than any words the continuity o 
American-Egyptian relations and 
reflects the strong ties that bind us 

Foremost among these ties is our 
belief in, and commitment to, a peacefu 
solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
President Mubarak has assured us that 
Egypt remains committed to a peaceful 
solution of this conflict. And to that enc 
we'll spare no effort to achieve a com- 
prehensive peace as set forth in the 
Camp David agreement. 

During our talks, we reaffirmed our 
commitment to press ahead with the 
autonomy talks in order to reach agree- 
ment on a declaration of principles, 
which is the best means of making tangi 
ble progress toward a solution of the 
Palestinian problem in all its aspects as 
envisaged by Camp David. 

We reviewed our mutual concerns 
about the strategic threats to the region 
and reconfirmed our identity of views or 

President Reagan and President Mubarak 
held talks in the White House during the 
latter's visit, his first since becoming 
President of Egypt. 

(White House photo by Michael Evans) 


Department of State Bulletin 


2 need to work closely together. We 
icussed in some detail our economic 
d military assistance programs. We 
reed to consult regularly on methods 
implementing and improving them, 
lese consultations have, in fact, already 
gun among our principal advisers. 

And, finally, let me just say that it 
s been a pleasure having this oppor- 
nity to further my personal relation- 
ip with President Mubarak. I'm confi- 
nt that we will be working closely 
^ether to achieve those many goals 
at are in the mutual interest of our 
'o countries. 

Thank you very much, and, Presi- 
nt Mubarak, we've been delighted to 
,ve you here. 

•esident Mubarak 

n very pleased with the outcome of my 
Iks with President Reagan. As he just 
ated, the discussions we held were 
ank and cordial. They were very fruit- 
1 as well. 

I welcomed the reaffirmation, the 
mtinuation of the U.S. role as a full 
irtner in the peace process. We are 
itermined to pursue our peace efforts 
itil a comprehensive settlement is 
lached according to the Camp David 

I intend to maintain close coopera- 
m and consultation with President 
eagan and his Administration. And we 
■e looking forward to seeing him in 

EB. 4, 1982" 


Egypt and the United States have 
ien full partners in the pursuit of peace 
the Middle East; 

• Egypt and the United States are 
ill partners in the pursuit of regional 
ability and in the continuation of peace 
I the Middle East; 

• The United States has cooperated 
1 the economic development of Egypt 
irough a program of assistance to the 
Igyptian Government in recognition of 
le sacrifices made by the Egyptian peo- 


• The Government of Egypt has an- 
ounced its intentions to undertake its 
wn program of economic reform that 
tilizes the initiative and capabilities of 
he Egyptian people; 

• Egypt has, with substantial U.S. 
assistance and the infusion of other ex- 
ternal resources, strengthened its 
economy and rebuilt much of the capital 
and social infrastructure base; 

• Egypt has entered a period of 
economic progress that will require its 
own management of substantial external 
resources, including continued U.S. 

• It is in the interest of both nations 
to assure the success of the economic 
reform program in Egypt in a manner 
that recognizes the substantial 
capabilities of the Government of Egypt 
to accomplish its intentions and the con- 
tinuing commitment of the United 
States to provide resources that may be 
utilized to this end. 

Now, Therefore: 

• The United States endorses the inten- 
tions expressed by the Government of 
Egypt to acknowledge the continued 
need for economic reform and progress 
and to undertake necessary measures 
towards that end; 

• The Government of Egypt ex- 
presses appreciation for U.S. assistance 
and the significant contribution it is 
making to Egypt's present stage of 
development and to the enhancement of 
living conditions in Egypt; 

• Both nations recognize Egypt's 
commitment to improving the efficiency 
with which it uses its human and finan- 
cial resources; 

• Both nations are now embarking 
on a new phase of greater interest in 
economic progress in Egypt with a view 
toward making U.S. assistance, as per- 
mitted by U.S. law, be of an optimum 
impact and to assure Egypt a more ac- 
tive role in the allocation and disburse- 
ment of the U.S. assistance. 


1. The two parties agree that directing 
U.S. economic resources into program 
assistance in support of Egypt's sectoral 
strategies can significantly improve 
overall sectoral efficiency, and, 
therefore, they shall seek means for in- 
creasing programing resources in this 
manner. Under sectoral funding, Egypt 
shall be responsible for the design, im- 
plementation, and evaluation of specific 
activities; the allocation of resources to 
those activities; and related policy objec- 
tives within each sector. 

2. The use of incremental budgeting 
can increase the flow of assistance and 
expand its effectiveness. The current 

program and planned new activities will 
be reviewed to apply this budgeting 
principle. To the maximum extent con- 
sistent with Egypt's sectoral strategy 
and specific nature of the financing of 
capital projects, U.S. assistance will be 
provided on an incremental basis, thus 
assuring maximum current distribution 
of the resources transferred. 

3. The two parties agreed that the 
commodity import program can play an 
important role not only for financing im- 
ports of consumption and intermediate 
commodities but also for investment in 
productive enterprises and to support 
structural program adjustment. Both 
parties agreed to consider additional 
means for using the commodity import 
program in support of development ob- 
jectives. Specifically, the parties agreed 
to consider programming $350 million 
for the commodity import program in 
FY 1982, of which $300 million will be 
obligated immediately, and to consider 
an increasing level of commodity import 
program financing in future fiscal years. 

4. Egyptian professional and 
technical experts shall have wider oppor- 
tunity to participate in the design and 
implementation of all projects and pro- 
grams funded through U.S. assistance 

5. In recognition that the assistance 
pipeline of obligated but undisbursed 
funds represents a substantial resource 
available for economic progress in 
Egypt, both parties agree to develop ef- 
fective ways to accelerate the utilization 
of these funds. 

'Texts of the remarks from the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents of 
Feb. 8, 1982, which also includes toasts made 
at a state dinner on Feb. 3. 

^Made in the East Room of the White 

^Made to reporters assembled at the 
South Portico of the White House. 

■•Text from White House press release of 
Feb. AM 

^pril 1982 



Secretary's News Conference on 
President Mubarak's Visit 

Secretary Haig held a news con- 
ference on February 5. 1982, to brief 
news correspondents on President 
Reagan's meeting with Egyptian Presi- 
dent Mubarak.^ 

First, let me welcome some of our 
Egyptian colleagues we're delighted to 
have with us here today. I do want to 
say a few words on the record, sum- 
marizing our assessment of the about-to- 
be-completed visit of President Mubarak 
and his colleagues here to the United 
States. This, as you know, is the first 
visit of President Mubarak, as Presi- 
dent. He was here, I think about 4 
months ago, in behalf of President 

I think in summary we can say that 
the visit has deepened and broadened 
the relationship between the United 
States and Egypt begun under President 
Sadat. It confirmed the continuing con- 
formity of views on peace, justice, and 
security and strengthened that con- 
vergence of views. 

We in the United States, of course, 
have great admiration for the Egyptian 
people, for the strength of their institu- 
tions, and for the leadership of Presi- 
dent Mubarak which have been so clear- 
ly confirmed by the successful transition 
in Egypt following the recent national 

All in all, I think the visit can be 
described as a highly successful one at 
all levels from personal to strategic. It is 
clear that the visit reinforced the U.S. 
conviction that it will remain a full part- 
ner in the peace process begun at Camp 
David. In that regard the Egyptian 
Government and the U.S. Government 
at the presidential level have renewed 
their mutual commitment to the Camp 
David peace process and to work with 
Israel to bring full autonomy for the 
Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza 
as the first stage described in the Camp 
David accords itself with the following 
language: "the resolution of the Pales- 
tinian problem in all its aspects." 

The United States reaffirmed the 
value of its relationship with Egypt and 
will work closely with Egypt and Presi- 
dent Mubarak to bring a better life to 
the people of Egypt through cooperative 
economic efforts. 

The United States fully understands 
Egypt's desires for flexibility in 

economic assistance programs and in 
that regard yesterday afternoon an 
agreement between the representatives 
of the two governments was arrived at 
which will establish a framework to pro- 
vide greater flexibility in the administra- 
tion and conduct of American economic 
aid programs for Egypt. 

The United States believes that a 
strong Egypt is essential to the peace 
and security in the Middle East. In that 
regard we consider and continue to sup- 
port programs designed to modernize 
Egyptian armed forces. This is part of a 
broad regional effort which will be con- 
ducted in fiscal year (FY) 1983 and 
reflected in our program for FY 1983 in 
the region. This issue was, of course, 
discussed in detail not only between the 
President and President Reagan but be- 
tween President Mubarak and myself, 
and between President Mubarak and 
Defense Secretary Weinberger in 
separate meetings. 

I think it's important to say that 
President Reagan especially appreciated 
the opportunity afforded by this visit to 
discuss the full range of regional 
bilateral issues and issues related to the 
peace process in the Middle East per- 
sonally with President Mubarak. There 
is no question but that the conclusion of 
this important visit leaves President 
Reagan with a deep sense of confidence 
and optimism that the period ahead of 
Egyptian-U.S. relationships will pro- 
gress on a sound and solid basis to the 
mutual benefits of the American and 
Egyptian people. 

Q. Do you now have a clearer idea 
of what President Mubarak meant by 
a national Palestinian entity? For ex- 
ample, does it mean Palestinian 
authority over the land as well as the 
people— population? 

A. I think you're referring to the 
language of the Camp David agree- 

Q. I'm referring to a phrase he 
used in his arrival statement on Wed- 
nesday at the White House where he 
talked of the creation of a Palestinian 
national entity. 

A. That is the focal point of the 
discussions on full autonomy with 
respect to the West Bank and to Gaza. 
It is, of course, the focal point of the 
autonomy talks themselves, the power 
and authorities, and the multitude of 

arrangements which provide first for a 
transition arrangement in this regard 
which would ultimately lead to a final 
settlement of these problems and the 
character of the entity to which you 

I think it's premature to go beyond 
the point of the language of Camp Da\ 
itself and the ongoing discussions, whi( 
I do not think it's helpful to engage in 
here on the topic of autonomy. But I d 
want to emphasize that what we are 
talking about is a transition period 
where confidence can be structured on 
both sides and where the ultimate out- 
come will reach, in the words of Camp 
David itself, the resolution of the 
Palestinian problem in all of its aspect; 

Q. Could that, in the U.S. view, 
encompass the possibility of a nation 
entity of some kind emerging from 
this process? 

A. I think it's important that thos( 
of you who have questions on that sub- 
ject—and it's a sensitive area— go back 
to the language of Camp David. That 
provides, if you will, an overall frame- 
work to which the participants have 
committed themselves. There are othei 
aspects of this question which are to bt 
determined in the context, first, of an 
agreement in principle for the transi- 
tional period, then a detailed autonomy 
agreement, and then an ultimate solu- 
tion. And some of these nettling ques- 
tions have been deferred until the final 
stages, so I think you're asking a ques- 
tion for which there is no timely or con 
temporary answer. 

Q. I understand clearly your stat 
ment concerning the right of the 
Palestinians and the full solution of 
the problem of Palestine. But let me 
put this question: President Mubarak 
repeated several times his appeal for 
dialogue between the American 
Government and the Palestinians. 
How do you figure this can be imple- 
mented? What kind of Palestinians? 
How can you do it? Are you going to 
do it or not? 

A. The question was. President 
Mubarak had referred repeatedly to the 
desirability of a dialogue between the 
Palestinian people and the Americans ai 
a partner in the peace process. I think 
President Mubarak was equally careful 
in not putting out any road maps, any 
specific formula for this. We know we 
have the question of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), and the 
U.S. position on that question is clear 
and has not changed. 

With respect to discussions with the 
Palestinian inhabitants of the West 



Department of State Bulletir 


mk and Gaza, these lines of commun- 
ation have been exercised, not in a f or- 
al sense because the structure for that 
)es not exist, but in the recent trips 
lat I made. In the first trip I had a 
scussion with the Mayor of Bethlehem, 
ssistant Secretary [for Near Eastern 
id South Asian Affairs] Veliotes had 
iditional discussions, not only with the 
alestinian inhabitants of the territories 
it also with other friendly Arab states 
[ the region. 

So I think that's the answer to your 
aestion with an underlying emphasis on 
le conditions which have been stated 
reviously with respect to the PLO. 

Q. Do you think it's realistic to 
ontinue this policy of refusing to 
ntertain the possibility of conversa- 
ions with PLO representatives? 

A. I don't think it's a question of 
ealistic. I think there's nothing that 
uggests we're not prepared to do that 
/hen the PLO is prepared to meet its 
bligations as a participant in such 
liscussions, and we've made those posi- 
ions very clear. 

Q. You're talking about changing 
heir covenant? Is this specifically 
vhat you refer to? 

A. I wouldn't refer to it as changing 
I covenant. I would call it certain obliga- 
ions or certain commitments with 
•espect to Israel's right to exist. 

Q. The President offers the PLO 
IS an entity, to which you answered— 
^ou also made very clear that the 
Palestinian peoples have the right for 
jelf-de termination. Could you inter- 
wet your understanding of self- 
ietermination within the context of 
the Camp David that you are saying? 
A. As I say, you sharpies that deal 
with this subject every day know even 
better than I the risks of greater 
specificity in that area. After all, we are 
talking about the establishment of full 
autonomy for the populations on the 
West Bank and Gaza. This is going to be 
the product, hopefully, of an agreement 
in principles which will spell out those 
details with the mutual agreement of the 
participants in the peace process, and 
I'm not going to unilaterally get out with 
interpretative statements on a subject 
that is so sensitive and controversial. 

Q. How close are we to a declara- 
tion of principles now? 

A. I said in my recent trip my own 
assessment was that we had a farther 
distance to go than we had already 
traveled. I want to point out, however, 
that that shouldn't sound quite as grim 
as it might be interpreted. One must 

remember that we in January entered 
into a situation in which the whole proc- 
ess was stalled— not only autonomy but 
a framework for retiirn of the Sinai this 
coming April was stalled— and there 
were a number of profound disa- 

Some of them have been bridged. 
For example, I don't know of any issues 
on the return of the Sinai as part of the 
Camp David process which now will 
pose an obstacle. I think all those things 
have been solved, and I must say they 
were not easy to solve, but they have 
been done. 

With respect to autonomy, as a 
result of the two trips we've taken, the 
work of the specialists established by the 
two governments with our full participa- 
tion—which we're going to upgrade 
somewhat as you know— we've now 
gotten to the point where we are not 
discussing differences on many key 
issues but rather are discussing solutions 
to differences. We've said that we'd do 
this without establishing deadlines, and 
we have none, and we are going to con- 
tinue to work. It's, I think, encouraging 
that the leaders of both Israel and 
Egypt— and specifically during this visit 
at the presidential level. President 
Mubarak committed himself to the full 
engagement of the resources of Egypt. 
We've had that commitment from Israel, 
and we've made it ourselves to continue 
to work the problem. 

Q. You spoke earlier about a pro- 
gram of modernization of armed 
forces for not only Egypt but the 
region in FY 1983. Could you tell us 
some of the details of what you envi- 

A. I've seen a lot of press specula- 
tion on it, and it won't be very long 
before it's all in the public venue, but it's 
not appropriate for me to get out ahead 
of it. Let me just say that the ongoing 
discussions— and they've gone on for 
many months and many venues. Defense 
to Defense, State to Foreign Office, and 
President to President— leave me with a 
great deal of confidence that the frame- 
work we have put together for 1983 is 
responsive to Egypt's needs and will fur- 
ther enhance regional security and 

You know as well as I do that some 
figures have been bandied around, and 
there have been some improvements in 
those figures. I think we have to wait 
until we formally submit them. 

Q. Do you intend to intensify your 
contacts with the Palestinians? With 
whom, when, and how; and do you 
consider, as President Mubarak said. 

the [inaudible] organization as a 
moderate Palestinian? 

A. Oh, my golly. [Laughter] I just 
love to have our visiting Egyptian press 
corps here. 

Q. It just means one man on the 
West Bank. 

A. I think what you say is that, 
however you answer it, somebody will 
be mad. That's what you mean, because 
that's the truth of it, and I'm going to 
skip the answer; skirt it. 

Q. But in the West Bank are you 
planning to intensify your contacts 
with the Palestinians? 

A. It's always been our policy, for 
example, in Jerusalem, to have our In- 
terests Section be in close contact with 
the inhabitants of the city, and we have 
maintained contact with the inhabitants. 

Q. How can we get them to agree 
to a principle or to the autonomy or 
anything like that without contact? 

A. I think I said we are maintaining 
that contact, but I think you will recall 
that at the time of Camp David, those 
agreements were arrived at based on 
the conscience of the participants. We 
will carry that process forward with 
great sensitivity, with the objective of a 
reasonable autonomy agreement. 

Q. In light of these visits and your 
travel out there, can you talk about 
what you see now as the biggest 
threat in the, I guess. Southwest 
Asia/Middle East region? I mean what 
concerns you now? 

A. The greatest threat? 

Q. The biggest problem or 

A. I said threats, like beauty, are in 
the eye of the beholder; and I think that 
varies. Clearly, there is an interrelation- 
ship between external threats and 
threats to internal stability supported 
and abetted by external threats; and I'm 
talking of the Soviet Union and their 
adherents. There are threats associated 
with radicalism. That has a distinctly 
threatening character in its own right to 
incumbent regimes. There is the contin- 
uing instability associated with the 
Palestinian question and the Arab/Israeli 
peace process. 

Now, all three of these threats, if 
you will, are independently serious and 
are, at the same time, interrelated in 
that one draws sustenance from the 
other and perhaps direction and aggra- 
vation. And, again, as we go back to the 
so-called "strategic consensus" that we 
talked about last spring, clearly this 
issue is not a substitute for our concern 
about the peace process and achieving 

April 1982 



progress in the peace process; and I said 
that at the time and repeated it at the 
time. I find a preoccupation in some of 
the writings that have occurred that 
these are alternative problems. They are 
not alternative problems. They are in- 
timately interrelated in that progress, 
and one, as I have said, contributes to 
progress in the other and a deterioration 
of one aggravates the possibility of prog- 
ress in the other. And I hope I've 
answered your question. 

Q. Can I ask you to be specific 
then by asking: One of our Arab 
friends in the area, King Hussein, has 
just, you know, asked for volunteers 
to go to Iraq. Are you concerned in 
any new level with the Iraq-Iran war, 
what the Soviets are doing in Iran? 

A. Let me reiterate again American 
policy with respect to that conflict. We 
are concerned by any policy which would 
drag that conflict on. 

Q. Do you think the Soviets are 
pursuing a policy that drags that con- 
flict on? 

A. I think we all know that both of 
the combatants are the recipients of 
military equipment and assistance from 
the Soviet Union and that the provision 
of such armaments can only contribute 
to a continuation of the conflict. We 
would hope to see an early negotiated 
termination of that conflict. Its continua- 
tion serves no one's interest. And we 
would hope that success would soon be 
arrived there, although I must say I 
have no basis for expressing optimism in 
that regard. 

Q. There are reports that the 
Soviets have recently provided Pales- 
tinian units with fairly sizable 
amounts of military hardware, in- 
cluding some ground-to-ground 
missiles. First of all, is that correct? 
And, secondly, what do you make of 
it; what impact is it likely to have? 

A. This is a very key aspect of the 
cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, 
southern Lebanon. We view the provi- 
sion of such armaments to Palestinian 
elements in southern Lebanon as an ag- 
gravation to the efforts we have been 
engaged in to prevent the outbreak of 
conflict. It is true that there are reports 
of levels of both tubed artillery and 
rocketry moving through Lebanon to the 
Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon. 
This is one of the areas that is a focus of 
Ambassador Habib [Philip C. Habib, the 
President's special emissary to the Mid- 
dle East] to achieve a termination of 
these destabilizing actions and in the 
period ahead we clearly have additional 
work to do in that area. 

Q. Does it seem to remain a prob- 
lem for new fighting in southern 

A. It has that potential, of course. 

Q. There were reports before 
President Mubarak came that the 
President said that President Carter 
had made a sacred promise in 1978 to 
have Israel and Egypt make their 
military aid compare. Would this new 
FY 1983 plan that you were not going 
to tell about — will it bring them 
closer together or would they now be 
comparable in the military aid that 
they will get from the United States? 

A. There are a number of evalua- 
tions that go into that kind of com- 
parability commitment: absorption 
capacity, needs, current equipment 
levels — a host of contributory factors 
that have to go into such an assess- 
ment — but to answer your question in 
an uncharacteristically blunt way, I 
would say that comparability has been 
increasingly the direction in which our 
assistance levels to Egypt have been 
moving, and this next year's program 
will be a further continuation of that. 

Q. Will it satisfy President 

A. I can't speak, and I would not 
presume to speak for President 
Mubarak. All I can say is that I think 
our discussions were both fruitful and 
successful this past week here in 

Q. After meeting with President 
Mubarak, do you have any thought 
that President Mubarak is much more 
independent of the United States than 
President Sadat? 

A. I wouldn't presume to make a 
value judgement of that kind either 
other than to — you know, I've known 
President Mubarak, I suppose, since the 
mid-1970s, and I think he's pledged 
himself, with respect to the peace proc- 
ess and mutual assessment of the 
dangers to the region, the cooperation in 
the security and economic areas, to pur- 
sue the policies that his predecessor 
committed Egypt to. I have seen 
nothing, and I've discovered nothing, in 
our many hours of discussion that would 
change that assessment on my part. 

Now, there are a number of related 
questions associated with the costs of 
Camp David to Egypt in the Arab world 
which are not necessarily in conflict with 
the basic character of the relationship 
between the United States and Egypt; 
and I would expect that in affairs among 
nations and regions that they will 
always be dynamic. 

Q. Specifically with regard to tht 
Palestinians, it does look as though- 
or manages to look as though— these 
talks, this particular series of talks, 
did not really work. Is that a fair 

A. I'm really not sure I understand 

Q. With regard to the Palestiniar 
issue and all its ramifications, these 
talks got you nowhere. Is that a fair 

A. Not at all. Precisely the opposit 

Q. Where is the progress? 

A. I think I described the progress 
In some areas we have come very close 
I think, to a consensus of views. In 
other areas we have narrowed the dif- 
ferences. In other areas we have at lea: 
launched a process of ingenious and 
creative thinking for solutions, and the 
months ahead and weeks ahead will 
demonstrate whether or not we succee( 

Again, I don't want to characterize 
my attitude on the situation as one of 
excessive optimism. There are many 
problems. But I am confident that I cai 
state without exaggeration that we hav 
made progress, and I anticipate that wi 
will continue to in the period ahead. 

Q. Can you tell us what you ex- 
pect to achieve through the declara- 
tion of principles that you are workin 
on? Do you think it will be a kind of 
Camp David II? 

A. No, no. I don't anticipate a Cam 
David II. 

Q. What do you hope to achieve 
through this declaration of principles 
in specific terms? 

A. What we hope to achieve is the 
establishment of a transition process 
which will ultimately lead to a resolutioi 
of the Palestinian problem in all of its 
aspects, and that's the objective of Cam 
David. With respect to the issue and th< 
process itself. Camp David was agreed 
to 3V2 years ago. Certain very difficult 
questions were deferred in those agree- 
ments, such as the ultimate status of 
Jerusalem. Tiiat deferral was a con- 
scious deferral. And the differences thai 
existed then and continue to exist today 
are approached in an autonomy agree- 
ment in principle. 

Now, we can either choose in our 
efforts to achieve an autonomy agree- 
ment to solve those problems that could 
not be solved at Camp David or to con- 
tinue on with a conceptual approach tha 
visualizes an evolutionary solution 
through mutual confidence building and 
the establishment of a framework which 
will get that process started. And I hav€ 


Department of State Bulletin 


d that if the participants in this peace 
Dcess seek to make the principles that 
I are seeking to achieve agreement on 
be a leg up on the final outcome 
;her than a solution, to providing a 
imework that will permit that con- 
ence building, that experience, and 
it evolution, then it makes the prob- 
n all the more tractable, and I think 
u gather what I'm saying. 

Q. In Italy recently one of the in- 
stigators who has been looking into 
e sources of Italian terrorism — 
dge Imposinato — has declared that 
e Red Brigades were being con- 
jlled by factions within the PLO 
thin the Israeli side and, within 
jypt, Egyptians who had assass- 
ated President Sadat. 

Now, also in Italy, the head of 
ilitary intelligence has charged 
cently that these same sources, the 
ntroUers of the Red Brigades, had 
en depositing into numbered Swiss 
ink accounts money which was then 
ed for the payoff of certain U.S. 
ficials. What he was talking about 
rticularly was his predecessor in 
ilitary intelligence who was a 
ember of Italy's propaganda to the 
asonic Lodge which was linked to 
rrorism and, according to Lm Repub- 
ica, the Italian newspaper, the 
tnerican official who was paid off 
ith this news was Michael Ledeen. 
nd I wonder if you can tell me what 
e purpose of this was or whether 
lu can confirm it. 

A. I'm so confused, I'm not sure I 
low where to start. [Laughter] If you 
ean by that am I appalled by inter- 
ttional terrorism, the answer is "yes;" 
id is it the policy of President Reagan's 
dministration to work actively to 
amp out this international plague, the 
iswer is "yes" again. 

Q. But the specific charge that 
as made— 

A. I never got it amongst the other 
larges. [Laughter] 

Q. Specifically that the head of 
;alian military intelligence, according 
) the newspaper La Repubblica, says 
lat Michael Ledeen was paid off by 
ropaganda too. 

A. I would reject that without 
nowing anything about it as incon- 
sivable to me, and I've never heard of 
uch a thing, and it's probably because I 
on't read the same Italian papers that 
ou may read. I leave it to you to ask it 
^here the answer may be more forth- 

Q. Does Mr. Fairbanks [Richard 
Fairbanks, special adviser to the 
Secretary] have any new proposals to 
accelerate the momentum of the 
autonomy talks with regard to the 

A. Is Mr. Fairbanks going to carry 
any new proposals? 

Q. Yes. 

A. He's going to put forth, as a full 
partner in this process, ideas and sug- 
gestions that we have that might pro- 
vide solutions to existing differences. As 
I said, at the end of my first trip 3 
weeks ago— it's almost 4 now — we were 
going to gather facts. We would come 
home and assess those facts. We would 
come back and, on a bilateral basis, sug- 
gest to both governments certain ideas 
or approaches — no formula and no 

blueprint, no "made in America" solution 
but what I would term catalyzing sug- 
gestions. We've done that, and that 
process is going to continue in the weeks 
ahead, and Mr. Fairbanks will engage in 
it very actively. 

Q. How significant is the current 
resolution under consideration in the 
General Assembly regarding Israel's 
Golan Heights legislation; and what 
happens after it's approved, in the 
U.S. view? 

A. I looked very carefully yesterday 
at the current draft, and we consider it 
basically unacceptable not only its own 
right but in the context of the direction 
to which it might lead. 

'Press release 51.1 

Military Assistance Policies 
for the Middle East 

President Reagan sent the following 
letter to Israeli Prime Minister Begin 
on February 16, 1982.^ 

Dear Menachem: 

Recent press reports have presented 
incorrect and exaggerated commentary 
regarding U.S. military assistance 
policies for the Middle East. 

I want you to know that America's 
policy toward Israel has not changed. 
Our commitments will be kept. I am 
determined to see that Israel's 
qualitative technological edge is main- 
tained and am mindful as well of your 
concerns with respect to quantitative 
factors and their impact upon Israel's 

The policy of this government re- 
mains as stated publicly by me. 
Secretary Haig's and Secretary 
Weinberger's statements on the public 
record are also clear. There has been no 

change regarding our military supply 
relationship with Jordan, and Secretary 
Weinberger brought me no new request. 
Any decision on future sales to Jordan 
or any other country in the region will 
be made in the context of my Admin- 
istration's firm commitment to Israel's 
security and the need to bring peace to 
the region. 

Israel remains America's friend and 
ally. However, I believe it is in the in- 
terest of both our countries for the 
United States to enhance its influence 
with other states in the region. I 
recognize the unique bond between the 
United States and Israel and the serious 
responsibilities which this bond imposes 
on us both. 



'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 22, 1982.1 

Vpril 1982 



Proposed Sale of 
Aircraft to Venezuela 

by James L. Buckley 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on February 5. 
1982. Mr. Buckley is Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance, Science, and 
Technology. ' 

I am pleased, as always, to be here. I 
welcome the opportunity to discuss 
Venezuela's request to purchase F-16 
aircraft and to explain why the Ad- 
ministration has approved the request 
and believes the proposed purchase 
should be allowed to proceed. 

Our decision is consistent with the 
Administration's arms transfer policy 
and should be viewed in the context of 
the strategic situation in the world to- 
day. Over the last decade, Soviet arms 
transfers to the Third World have 
steadily increased. For the last several 
years, the Soviets have been the largest 
source of arms for Third World coun- 
tries, exceeding U.S. arms deliveries in 
virtually every major arms category, 
sometimes by two- or threefold and 
more. Soviet arms transfers to the Third 
World include sophisticated, high-quality 
equipment as well as quantity. Indeed, 
in some cases the Soviets have offered 
top-of-the-line equipment to their Third 
World customers even before it moves 
into the inventories of other Communist 
countries, such as MiG-25 fighters to 
Iraq and Nanuchka class patrol craft to 

In short, in recent years the Soviets 
have supplied the Third World with 
more and higher quality arms than ever 

Soviet arms are the life's blood of 
Soviet aggression by proxy. In recent 
years, the Soviets and their proxies have 
repeatedly used force or the threat of 
force to expand their influence and 
frustrate peaceful change. With Soviet 
arms and support, Vietnamese troops 
occupy Kampuchea and threaten Thai- 
land; Libya threatens Chad, Tunisia, the 
Sudan, Egypt, and Morocco; Afghani 
planes and armored units raid Pakistan; 
and Cuban troops stationed in Angola 
and Ethiopia threaten regional stability. 

Not surprisingly, the worldwide pat- 
tern of Soviet aggression repeats itself 
in this hemisphere. In the last few 
years, the quantity and quality of Soviet 
arms sent to Cuba, and through Cuba to 

others, have sharply increased. In 1981 
the Soviet Union flooded Cuba with over 
63,000 tons of arms, the largest inflow 
in 20 years. This is only part of a 
decade-long effort by the Soviets to 
modernize Cuba's forces with top-of-the- 
line aircraft, armored vehicles, rocket 
launchers, antiaircraft weapons, and 
even submarines. Ominously, Cuba has 
recently received additional shipments of 
advanced high-performance aircraft and 
a missile-carrying frigate. Nicaragua, 
which receives Soviet arms, threatens to 
create forces that far exceed any 
reasonable needs for defense, and there 
are now reports that the Sandinista 
government will receive older MiGs from 

Meanwhile, Cuba has renewed and 
redoubled its efforts to export revolution 
in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
Cuban-supported forces have taken 
power in Nicaragua and threaten to 
destroy El Salvador's best hope for 
political and social reform. A Cuban- 
oriented regime heads Grenada. Cuban- 
supplied and -directed efforts to subvert 
elected governments have been exposed 
in Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia. 

Soviet and Cuban activities betray 
an extensive effort to increase their air 
capabilities. With Cuban support, air- 
fields capable of handling advanced 
Soviet combat or transport aircraft are 
being constructed in Grenada and 
Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the Soviets have 
already increased the number of their 
reconnaissance flights from Cuba and 
their naval presence in the Caribbean 

It is in this worldwide and regional 
context that we must assess Venezuela's 
request to purchase on a cash basis 
eighteen F-16A and six F-16B aircraft. 
The sale, including initial training, spare 
parts, and support, will amount to ap- 
proximately $615 million. 

Last summer. President Reagan an- 
nounced a new conventional arms trans- 
fer policy to supplement our own de- 
fense buildup and our foreign assistance 
efforts. The policy was designed to help 
us counter Soviet aggression and Soviet 
proxies and the massive Soviet arms 
transfers which destabilize regions of 
strategic importance to the West and 
stretch our resources to their limits. 

This Administration knows that 
arms are only a small part of any solu- 

tion. Underlying economic and politica 
problems will not disappear because a 
country has arms. Nonetheless, there 
a constructive role for a sound and we 
considered arms transfer policy. As 
President Reagan's directive stated, 
"prudently pursued, arms transfers ca 
strengthen us." 

Carefully crafted decisions on arrr 
transfers promote our national interes 
in three general ways. 

First, by helping others to help 
themselves, we allow them to underta 
responsibilities in strategic areas that 
our forces might otherwise have to 
assume alone. 

Second, by supplying others with 
modern equipment and compatible 
facilities, we complement the capabilit 
of our forces, should they have to act. 

Third, by proving ourselves a sen 
tive and reliable supplier, we strength 
our ties with allies and nations that 
share our concerns. 

President Reagan's flexible, case-l 
case arms transfer policy will look 
favorably on a sale that furthers our 
security in these ways. At the same 
time, however, our policy requires tha 
we take into account other conditions 
which would argue against a particula 
transfer. For example, we would ques 
tion any transfer which might disrupt 
relations within a region, overburden : 
nation's economy, strain the capacity ( 
its military, compromise critical tech- 
nology, or support violations of basic 
human rights. 

With respect to sales of aircraft, i 
the Administration's policy to recom- 
mend, when appropriate, consideratioi 
of our intermediate tactical aircraft ar 
aircraft especially manufactured for e: 
port, rather than those that are more 
advanced and costly. Nonetheless, the: 
are circumstances in which U.S. natioi 
interests are best served by the sale o: 
advanced weapons. In order to be efFe 
tive, implementation of our arms trans 
fer policy must be responsive to a na- 
tion's legitimate needs. 

Measured against these criteria, it 
makes good sense to accede to Vene- 
zuela's request to purchase F-16s. 

• Venezuela has good cause to wis 
to insure the future safety of its peopli' 
its resources, and the surrounding sea 
lanes vital to its economy. 

• Venezuela currently produces 
about 1.9 million barrels of oil per day 
Other than Mexico, and our own coun- 
try, Venezuela is the only major sourcf 
of oil in this hemisphere. If oil supplies 
from the Persian Gulf were interruptei 


Department of State Bulleli 


pnezuelan oil would be critical to the 
lited States. 

• Venezuela is also strategically 
jiated. It controls the eastern ap- 
oaches to the Panama Canal and lies 
hwart the major sea lanes of the 
stern Caribbean, through which run a 
ijor portion of our international trade 
id our imports of foreign oil. 

• In the past few years, Venezuela 
,s contributed to regional stability by 
bsidizing oil prices and providing 
lancial assistance to less well-off na- 
ms. Most recently, Venezuela joined 
ith Canada, Mexico, and the United 
ates in the formation of the Caribbean 
isin initiative. 

• Less tangible, but no less real, is 
e important role Venezuela plays in 

e region as an example of a pluralistic 
id democratic society. 

In short, Venezuela is a key source 
oil and a strategically located 
smocracy which plays a constructive 
id growing role in an important region, 
fter 9 years of increasing oil revenues, 
enezuela has made a deliberate and 
.refully considered decision to modern- 
3 its air force with aircraft that will 
■rve its defense needs into the 21st 
intury. We should accede to Vene- 
lela's request. To refuse it would be un- 
ise and insulting. 

It would also be futile. Venezuela 
early has the resources to go else- 
here. Whether or not we sell our 
anes to Venezuela, Venezuela will ac- 
lire advanced aircraft. 

There may be some concern that ap- 
"oving Venezuela's request heralds un- 
!Strained American sales of advanced 
eapons in the hemisphere. It will not. 
1 several ways, Venezuela is unique, 
ew other countries are as uniquely 
tuated; few have as good a record on 
uman rights and democratic govern- 
lent; fewer still have the economic 
^sources to buy these planes. We are 
jluctant to impose, and our experience 
idicates that less prosperous nations 
re reluctant to undertake, the immense 
ebt burden which the purchase of top- 
f-the-line aircraft entails. 

In any case, this Administration in- 
jnds to pursue a judicious and meas- 
red approach to all arms requests, 
ssessing them on a case-by-case basis 
nd against a backdrop of total U.S. in- 
erests. We are seeking to be both 
esponsive and responsible. U.S. in- 
erests in this hemisphere and the world 
equire an arms transfer policy that is 

We have the opportunity to enhance 
the future stability and defense of a 
friendly democracy. In the process, we 
enhance our own security. This sale 
meets all of our tests. It strengthens our 
ties with an important nation, enhances 
its capabilities, lessens the burdens on 
the United States, and contributes to the 
stability of our "third border," the Carib- 

Venezuela has made a deliberate, 
measured, and well-reasoned decision to 

Afghanistan Day: 
March 21 

by Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Statement before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 8, 1982. 
Ambassador Stoessel is Deputy Secretary 
of Stated 

It is a great pleasure for me to appear 
before your committee today on the joint 
congressional resolution adopted 
unanimously by the Senate and by the 
House of Representatives designating 
March 21 as Afghanistan Day. I wish to 
congratulate you for the action you have 
taken to pay tribute to a valiant people 
struggling for their freedom against 
foreign aggressors. Our European allies, 
who conceived of this initiative, and 
other countries around the world will 
also be observing Afghanistan Day. 

The President will sign the procla- 
mation of Afghanistan Day this Wednes- 
day at a White House ceremony. The 
same day, the State Department will 
brief and host a reception for repre- 
sentatives of ethnic groups in the United 
States from Eastern Europe, South and 
Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean on 
the commemoration. The President fully 
supports and endorses the purpose of 
Afghanistan Day as do former Presi- 
dents Carter, Ford, and Nixon and 
former Secretaries of State Muskie, 
Vance, Kissinger, and Rusk. 

The President has requested former 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers to 
coordinate private American observance 
of this date. Over the next several days. 
Secretary Rogers will be outlining 
various nongovernmental activities 
which will be undertaken in our obser- 
vances here. We hope that these ac- 
tivities by concerned private groups will 

provide for its own defense into the next 
century. We should respect its choice. 
As we would not deny ourselves the 
means to defend our freedom, so we 
should not deny Venezuela the right to 
defend its own. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 

will be published by the committee and wilT 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 

help focus American public attention on 
what is happening in Afghanistan today. 

The vernal equinox— March 21— has 
traditionally been celebrated as the be- 
ginning of the Afghan New Year. The 
worldwide observance of Afghanistan 
Day will signal to the Afghan people 
that they enjoy the solidarity of the free 
world. We believe that it is of the ut- 
most importance that the international 
community also signal to the Soviet 
Union that the passage of time has not 
dimmed the concern of free men every- 
where over Soviet aggression nor 
diminished demands that the Soviet 
Union withdraw its troops from that 

We must not forget the Afghan peo- 
ple's struggle. We must not allow the 
Soviets to believe that their aggression 
is accepted as a fait accompli. 

Soviet Military Actions 

December 27, 1979, was a watershed in 
post-World War II history. On that date, 
for the first time, Soviet forces invaded 
an independent country which was not a 
member of the Warsaw Pact. This act 
was one of outright aggression— even 
more pronounced than recent Soviet ac- 
tions in Poland. Today we estimate that 
as the result of Moscow's augmentation 
of its forces in Afghanistan since 
November, the Soviets may have when 
at full strength as many as 100,000 
troops in Afghanistan. Their actual 
presence varies from day to day, how- 
ever, and may be as much as 10% lower 
than this figure at any one time. 

The saga of Afghan resistance to 
Soviet occupation is one of personal 
courage and heroism against great odds. 
The hardships and losses which the 

kpril 1982 



Afghan people have suffered in this un- 
equal battle have been high. Thousands 
of innoncent civilians have been killed or 
maimed as the Soviets and the puppet 
Afghan army have destroyed villages 
and crops, strewn antipersonnel mines 
over trails and inhabited areas, em- 
ployed lethal chemical weapons, and for- 
cibly impressed young Afghans in the 
armed forces. 

Just recently Soviet troops sur- 
rounded Afghanistan's second largest 
city— Kandahar— and subjected it to a 
savage artillery and air bombardment in 
which hundreds of innocent civilians lost 
their lives. After the bombardment, 
Soviet forces entered the city and 
engaged in wanton looting and killing 
among the civil population. Many of the 
city's buildings were severely damaged; 
two-thirds of its population fled. Soviet 
forces also moved against Afghanistan's 
fourth largest city— Herat— with similar 
ruthlessness causing great suffering 
among its population. 

Use of Chemical Weapons 

I would like to refer to a particularly 
heinous aspect of Soviet military actions 
in Afghanistan. The use of chemical 
weapons in war is a violation of the 1925 
Geneva protocol, to which the U.S.S.R. 
is a party, and the rules of customary 
law, which apply to all nations. Analysis 
of all of the information available leads 
us to conclude that attacks have been 
conducted with irritants, incapacitants, 
nerve agents, phosgene oxime and 
perhaps mycotoxins, mustard, lewisite, 
and toxic smoke. Afghan mOitary de- 
fectors have provided information on 
chemical weapons containing lethal 
nerve agents, where they were stock- 
piled, and where and when they have 
been used. This information generally 
corresponds with refugee reports and 
recorded military operations. As a result 
of chemical attacks, 3,042 deaths attri- 
buted to 47 separate incidents between 
the summer of 1979 and the summer of 
1981 have been reported. 

The Soviet Puppet Regime 

Today, the Soviet Union maintains the 
fiction that the regime of Babrak Kar- 
mal is a legitimate government. How- 
ever, it is the Soviets who not only make 
policy in Kabul but who also make the 
day-to-day political, administrative, and 
military decisions of government. More- 
over, it is commonly accepted that the 
Babrak regime would not last till night- 
fall without the presence of Soviet 

Human Rights 

The Soviet suppression of Afghan 
political freedom is paralleled in all other 
aspects of life. For example, the Soviets 
are currently imposing their brand of 
judicial system and the Soviet model of 
education in Afghanistan. At Kabul Uni- 
versity, medical school degrees are no 
longer granted, and medical students 
are required to obtain their degrees in 
the Soviet Union. 

Despite regime efforts to cloak itself 
in religious piety, concern for the preser- 
vation of Islamic values remains at the 
heart of the anti-Communist resistance. 

The most basic human right— to life 
itself— is being violated daily by the 
Soviets and their puppets in Afghani- 
stan. There are thousands of political 
prisoners. We have frequent reports of 
torture, of summary executions, and a 
long list of other violations which testify 
to the brutality of the Afghan regime 
and its Soviet masters. 

Afghan Refugees 

About 3 million Afghan refugees have 
fled their homeland seeking freedom— 
principally in neighboring Pakistan. 
Almost one-fifth of the preinvasion 
population of Afghanistan— the largest 
group of refugees in the world— has so 
voted with its feet. Although conditions 
in refugee camps are hard, the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), aided by resources from 
many countries including our own, has 
done a commendable job of assisting 
these innocent victims of Soviet aggres- 
sion. The Government and people of 
Pakistan have also displayed a generosi- 
ty and hospitality of the highest order in 
welcoming these refugees to their coun- 

The plight of the Afghan refugees is 
one which deserves our help. We will 
continue to support the UNHCR with 
funds and food assistance. 

Afghan Nonalignment 

It is the very concept of freedom which 
is on the line today in Afghanistan— the 
freedom of a people to determine their 
own destiny, to form a government of 
their own choosing, to practice freely 
their religion, and to enjoy full 
sovereignty and independence. Historic- 
ally, Afghanistan existed— sometimes 
uneasily— between the expanding Czarist 
empire and British India. On three occa- 
sions, when external powers sought to 
expand their influence in Kabul through 

military action, they were rebuffed as 
Afghans united to repel the foreign in- 

I recall this history to highlight a 
major characteristic of the Afghan 
people— their fierce determination to re 
tain their freedom despite the misfor- 
tune of a geography which places them 
on the border of a powerful, expansive 
neighbor. To achieve this, various 
Afghan Governments adopted a policy ( 
nonalignment. We accepted this policy, 
which also seemed to serve the interest 
of the Soviet Union until it was 
destroyed overnight by a decision made 
in Moscow. 

International Condemnation 
of Soviet Aggression 

Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has 
been viewed with particular concern by 
other nonaligned nations, which rightly 
see it as an example of super-power im- 
perialism. This has been reflected in 
overwhelming votes in the U.N. Genera 
Assembly and other U.N. bodies and a 
wide variety of international organiza- 

• The Islamic countries have felt a 
special empathy for the fate of their 
Muslim brothers. On four separate occa 
sions, the 43-member Islamic Conferenc 
has passed resolutions calling on the 
Soviets to withdraw their forces, for 
restoration of Afghanistan's neutrality 
and nonalignment, for the right of the 
Afghan people to form a government of 
their own choosing, and for conditions 
which will permit the Afghan refugees 
to return to their homes. 

• In South Asia, the Government oi 
India and other regional states have 
called on Moscow to withdraw its forces 
whose presence in Afghanistan has 
changed the regional strategic equation. 

• The 99 members of the nonalignec 
movement, meeting in plenary session ir 
New Delhi 1 year ago, made a similar 

• Last fall, 116 countries— five more 
than the previous year— endorsed a U.N 
General Assembly resolution along 
similar lines. This was the third such 
resolution overwhelmingly adopted by 
the General Assembly since the invasion 

A Political Solution 

Our government earnestly wants to see 
a political solution to the Afghanistan 
conflict which brings the violations of 
human rights and the sufferings of the 
Afghan people to an end. We have con- 
sistently made it clear to the Soviets 
that we are ready for serious discussions 


Department of State Bulletin 


1 Afghanistan which might promote a 
aviet withdrawal and a pohtical settle- 
ent on terms acceptable to the Afghan 

Let me outline some of the actions 
e and others have taken in a search for 
political solution. 

• Secretary Haig made clear to 
oviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during 
leir recent meeting in Geneva that the 
oviet occupation remains a major im- 
ediment to prospects for improvement 

f U.S. -Soviet relations. Unfortunately, 
le Soviet side has not demonstrated 
■illingness seriously to discuss a peace- 
il settlement of the Afghan conflict. 

• We will continue to raise this mat- 
3r in our high-level contacts and in our 
ormal diplomatic dialogue wdth 
loscow. Our hope is that eventually the 
oviet Union will remove its forces from 
ifghanistan, thereby reducing a major 
arrier to better East- West relations, 
nternational efforts to achieve a Soviet 
/ithdrawal are also in progress. 

• The U.N. Secretary General Perez 
e Cuellar has appointed a personal 
epresentative to continue discussions 
/ith the concerned regional nations 
bout a political solution. We support 
ihis effort by the Secretary General, 
hough we must point out that the 
lource of the problem is not in 
slamabad, Tehran, or Kabul but in 
/loscow. It is there that a solution must 
iltimately be sought. 

• The European Community last 
June proposed a two-stage international 
conference on the Afghan conflict. 
Regrettably, the Soviet Union has 
chosen to reject this important initiative. 
We note that it remains on the table; a 
serious proposal which we will continue 
to urge the Soviets to pick up. 

In closing let me praise the courage 
and heroism of those Afghan freedom 
fighters who refuse to accept foreign 
domination of their homeland. Their 
courage, steadfastness of purpose, and 
determination have earned the admira- 
tion of all who cherish freedom. Let us 
also remember the Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan who have been forced to flee 
Soviet oppression. 

The joint resolution is a fitting 
tribute to these Afghan patriots from a 
people who also guard their freedom 
zealously. It forcefully reminds the 
Soviet Union that the Afghan conflict is 
at the very heart of the increase of in- 
ternational tension and that a negotiated 
settlement will serve the genuine securi- 
ty interests of all parties, including the 
Soviet Union. 

^The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 

The Certification for El Salvador 

)«/ Thomas O. Enders 

Statement, before the Senate Foreign 
Helations Committee on February 8, 
1982. Ambassador Enders is Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. ' 

[ welcome this opportunity to review 
mth you the certification required under 
aw with regard to El Salvador. 

The Administration is solidly com- 
mitted to the goals set out in the 
Poreign Assistance Act. As we under- 
stand it, the act says, yes, there is a 
challenge to our national security, so 
military and economic assistance are re- 
quired. But yes, we must also use our 
assistance to help El Salvador control 
violence, make land reform work, 
develop a democratic process, bring 
murderers to justice. The certification 
the President made on January 28 

reflected substantial progress toward 
each of the goals laid out in law. 

You asked me to cover each of the 
five items in the certification: human 
rights, control of the military, economic 
reforms, progress toward elections, and 
the investigation of the murders of 
Americans in El Salvador. 

Human Rights and Control 
of the Security Forces 

The law requires us to certify that El 
Salvador is "making a concerted and 
significant effort to comply with inter- 
nationally recognized human rights" and 
"is achieving substantial control over all 
elements of its armed forces." It does 
not say that human rights problems 
must be eliminated. But it does demand 

There is no question that the human 
rights situation is troubled. We have just 
analyzed it in detail in the annual human 
rights report just submitted to the Con- 
gress. The explosion of violence and 
counterviolence following the extreme 
left's receipt of outside support for guer- 
rilla warfare has exacerbated already 
high historic levels of violence, strained 
the system of justice to the breaking 
point, and eroded normal social con-- 
straints against violence. Countless 
violations of human rights have arisen 
from partisan animosities of both left 
and right, personal vendettas, retalia- 
tions, provocations, intimidation, and 
sheer brutality. The breakdown has been 
profound; the society will take years to 

Accurate information is hard to 
establish. Responsibility for the over- 
whelming number of deaths is never 
legally determined nor usually ever 
accounted for by clear or coherent evi- 
dence. Seventy percent of the political 
murders known to our embassy were 
committed by unknown assailants. And 
there is much special pleading. For ex- 
ample, the legal aid office of the arch- 
bishopric, often cited by the inter- 
national media and human rights organi- 
zations, lists no victims of guerrilla and 
terrorist violence from the left. In 
January Apostolic delegate Rivera y 
Damas deprived the legal aid office of 
any right to speak on behalf of the arch- 
bishopric. The prejudice of the other 
main organization that collects 
statistics— the Central American 
University— is evident in the heading it 
gives to statistics of persons killed by 
the guerrillas; "aJMS^iciados"— "justly 
executed." The organization that calls 
itself the Human Rights Commis- 
sion—which occasionally issues statistics 
from outside the country— has become 
an insurgent propaganda vehicle and has 
no credibility. 

Most difficult to assess of all are the 
repeated allegations of massacres. There 
are clearly incidents in which noncom- 
batants have suffered terribly. One prob- 
lem has already been referred to; the 
difficulty of determining responsibility 
and in the case of massacre allegations, 
even numbers. Another is that the in- 
surgents have also repeatedly fabricated 
or inflated alleged mass murders as a 
means of propaganda. 

• Last year, in a widely-publicized 
case, the massacre of 1,000 people in a 
cave was related by Radio Venceremos 
(and picked up in our media) in convinc- 
ing detail, until it was determined that 
there are no large caves in the region 
where the atrocity supposedly occurred. 

April 1982 



• More recently, our press published 
a detailed account of how American 
Green Berets had witnessed Salvadoran 
soldiers torturing prisoners. A careful 
investigation showed this report to be a 
Revolutionary Democratic Front/ 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FDR/FMLN) fabrication. 

• We sent two embassy officers to 
investigate recent reports of a massacre 
in the Morazan village of El Mozote. 
They reported that while it is clear that 
an armed confrontation between guer- 
rillas occupying El Mozote and attacking 
government forces occurred last 
December, no evidence could be found to 
confirm that government forces system- 
atically massacred civilians in the opera- 
tion zone, nor that the number of 
civilians killed even remotely approached 
the 733 or 926 victims variously cited in 
press reports. In fact, the total popula- 
tion of El Mozote canton last December 
is estimated locally at only 300, and 
there are manifestly a great many 
people still there. 

So we must be careful. We try to in- 
vestigate every report we receive. We 

use every opportunity to impress on the 
El Salvador Government and Army that 
we are serious about practicing human 
rights— and so must they be. 

Results are coming slowly, but they 
are coming. Since October 1979, the 
Salvadoran authorities have done much 
more than repeatedly emphasize to 
officers and men the need to protect 
human rights. They have: 

• Broken traditional links between 
large landowners and the security forces 
by outlawing the paramilitary organiza- 
tion ORDEN [Nationalistic Democratic 

• Promulgated a military code of 
conduct that highlights the need to pro- 
tect human rights; 

• Transferred, retired, cashiered, or 
punished over 1,000 soldiers for various 
abuses of authority or for their coopera- 
tion with the violent right; and 

• Gradually reasserted control over 
scattered local security force personnel 
by strengthening the authority of the 
high command and repeated command 
discipline efforts. 

U.S. To Observe 
El Salvador's Elections 

MAR. 1, 19821 

The United States is pleased to an- 
nounce its acceptance of the Govern- 
ment of El Salvador's invitation to send 
observers to witness the March 28 con- 
stituent assembly elections in that 

The U.S. observer delegation will be 
headed by Senator Nancy Kassebaum. 
Other delegation members include Con- 
gressman Robert Livingston of 
Louisiana; Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter- American Affairs 
Everett Briggs; the President of Notre 
Dame University, Father Theodore 
Hesburgh; Mr. Clark Kerr, President 
Emeritus of the University of California 
at Berkeley; and election specialists 
Richard Scammon and Howard 

Mr. Scammon and Mr. Penniman 
will make a preliminary visit to El 
Salvador this week to observe election 
preparations as well as the ongoing 
political campaign. The entire delegation 
will visit El Salvador during the final 
week of the campaign to witness the 

polling and vote-counting process. 

The U.S. Government is convinced 
that the electoral process represents an 
essential first step for a peaceful solu- 
tion to El Salvador's political problems. 
The March 28 elections have been 
strongly endorsed within El Salvador by 
the Catholic Church and the nation's 
major peasant, labor, business, and pro- 
fessional organizations and externally by 
the overwhelming majority of members 
of the Organization of American States 

The OAS and five countries — Costa 
Rica, Colombia, the United Kingdom, 
Egypt, and Uruguay— have already 
publicly announced their intention to 
send observers. We anticipate that many 
Latin American democracies will also 
send observer-missions, as will several 
governments, political parties, or private 
organizations from other regions. The 
presence of this significant group of in- 
ternational observers will help insure the 
Salvadoran people an opportunity to 
choose their own leaders in free and fair 

'Read to news correspondents by Depart- 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 


In consequence, the level of noncoi 
bat violence — to judge by our best 
estimates and the trends even in oppos 
tion groups' figures — appears to have 
declined by more than half over the las 
year; this despite the fact that the gue 
rilla FMLN boasted on Radio Vencere- 
mos that it inflicted more than 2,000 
casualties in the last 7 months of 1981 

But let me make this clear. Contro 
of violence is at the center of our rela- 
tionship with the Salvadoran Govern- 
ment. We mean to see it reduced to th 
minimum levels possible in the existing 
civil strife and to create conditions tha 
will ultimately reduce the strife itself. 

Economic Reforms 

The law asks us to certify that El 
Salvador "is making continued progres 
in implementing essential economic an 
political reforms, including the land 
reform program." Progress in land 
reform has been substantial. Estates 
larger than 1,235 acres have been 
distributed to farmers who work on 
them. Compensation to former owners 
being made. A second part of the pro- 
gram transfers ownership of small fan 
to tenants and sharecroppers. The titli 
process has accelerated since midyear 
and provisional titles are now being 
issued at the rate of 4,000 per month. 
In response to the government's re 
quest, the largest campesino organiza- 
tion, the Union Comunal Salvadorena 
(UCS), representing over 100,000 
peasants, submitted a report in 
December detailing the many problems 
with the program which remain to be 
addressed in the months ahead. When 
this report was used by others to 
criticize land reform implementation, tl 
UCS went out of its way to emphasize 
that the government was responsive to 
its concerns and that the union expecte 
to participate "massively" in the electio 
In its letter of January 25, 1981, the 
UCS said: 

As for the Agrarian Document that was 
presented in an updated form to President 
Duarte by UCS in December 1981, dealing 
with the implementation of Decree 207, we 
note that many of the suggestions bearing 
therein have been taken into account by the 
Government. . . . This document was pre- 
sented without any intention of giving ammi 
nition to the enemies of the Land Reform 
Process. . . . 

From December 1, 1981, the system of 
liaison between the Armed Forces and the 
UCS began to function and now we can rely 
on a high ranking responsible person who hs 
a direct connection with the Ministry of 
Defense. . . the political consciousness of tl 
Salvadoran campesinos has changed substan 

Department of State Bulletl 


ly, influenced by the agrarian changes 
t have taken place lately. . . we under- 
nd that the vote is the weapon of 
nocracy and at this time the elections will 
in for us the definitive bond cementing 
land tenure. 


e law asks that we certify that the 
^fernment is "committed to the holding 
free elections at an early date." This 
mcontestably the case. Preparations 
• constituent assembly elections on 
irch 28, 1982, are well-advanced. The 
w electoral law promulgated in 
icember was drawn up after months of 
en discussion. Eight parties, ranging 
)m the nonviolent left to the far right, 
3 now participating in the campaign, 
lich opened last week. Momentum is 
owing. The independent labor group 
campesinos and trade unions (UPD) 
d the businessmen's association 
NEP) have appealed for the public to 
te. Just two weeks ago, the Council of 
shops of El Salvador's Catholic 
lurch stated: 

We see in the elections ... a possible 
ginning of a solution to the current 
sis . . . Through this Constituent 
isembly election, we will pass from a de 
•to government to a constitutional govern- 
;nt, which is of fundamental importance for 
= development of the country's life. ... It 
)u]d be ideal for all citizens to participate in 
e elections. That is why we regret that 
me of our brothers are rejecting them. 

In December, the Organization of 
merican States (OAS) General 
ssembly gave an overwhelming 22-3-4 
idorsement of the Salvadoran election 
•ocess. The new Central American 
emocratic Community represents a 
milar endorsement of democratic prin- 
ples and institutions by El Salvador 
id its near neighbors. 

The law also asks us to certify that: 

... to this end [that is, to the end of 
irly free elections], [the government] has 
;monstrated its good faith efforts to begin 
scussions with all major political factions in 

I Salvador which have declared their will- 
igness to find and implement an equitable 
)lution to the conflict, with such solution to 
ivolve commitment to (A) a renouncement of 
u-ther military or paramilitary activity; and 
i) the electoral process with internationally 
jcognized observers. 

Last spring President Duarte invited 

II political parties and groups to re- 
ounce violence and participate in the 
lections after an advance dialogue on 
he ground rules. The Communist and 
locial Democratic Parties were both for- 
nally recognized and invited to par- 

Nonetheless, the FDR/FMLN— 
whose origin derives from the belief that 
armed struggle with Cuban support 
would bring victory from the muzzle of 
an imported gun— refused even to 
discuss election rules. The guerrillas 
have burned town halls, threatened to 
kill anyone found with voting ink on his 
finger, and assassinated and intimidated 
local officials and candidates. 

An apparently authoritative 
December statement clarifies how the 
FDR/FMLN views elections. It says 
there should be a "plebiscite" to ratify 
the government 6 months after the 
guerrillas have gained a share of power. 
Voters would not have a choice between 
competing slates. 

Apostolic administrator Rivera y 
Damas in his January 10 homily said 

. . . not to believe in elections or not to 
see them in a solution gives no right to resort 
to blackmail and fraud on one hand, or 
sabotage on the other. I believe that voters 
have the right to express what they feel. 

Murder Investigation 

I am pleased to report the Salvadoran 
Government has made major progress in 
its investigation of the murder of the 
four American churchwomen. We expect 
indictments based on a strong case im- 

U.S. Regional Interests 

As you requested, I have discussed the 
specific items in the certification. Let me 
close by placing the developments in El 
Salvador in the context of our interests 
throughout the region. 

The Caribbean Basin is at our 
southern border. Everything from 
migration to geopolitics and from com- 
mon sense to narcotics dictates that we 
not ignore it. The Administration, the 
Congress, the American people have no 
choice but to face its problems together. 
We have tried to convince Castro of 
the dangers of confrontation. In 
response, Cuba is sytematically expand- 
ing its capacity to project military power 
beyond its own shores. Additional 
MiG-23/Floggers and 63,000 tons of war 
supplies from the Soviet Union have ex- 
panded Cuba's air, land, and sea 
arsenals out of all proportion to the 
capabilities of other countries in the 
region. The Cubans are aggressively 
organizing and supporting violent in- 
surgencies throughout Central America. 
We have also tried to communicate 
with the Nicaraguans. We offer a way 
out of confrontation if they will restrain 

their military build-up and cease their 
support of insurgency in El Salvador. 
Instead, Nicaragua is allowing itself to 
be exploited as a base for the export of 
subversion and armed intervention 
throughout Central America. Soviet, 
East European, and Cuban military 
advisers have poured into Nicaragua to 
build with Soviet arms a military 
establishment larger than those of 
Nicaragua's neighbors combined. Inter- 
nal repression has grown— for their 
large Miskito Indian minority, for what 
is left of the independent radio stations 
and press, for the church, for demo- 
cratic political and business leaders. 
There is no mistaking that the decisive 
battle for Central America is underway 
in El Salvador. 

For most of its life as a nation, our 
country has faced no threat from its 
neighbors. But, unless we act decisively 
now, the future could well bring more 
Cubas: totalitarian regimes so linked to 
the Soviet Union that they become fac- 
tors in the military balance and so in- 
competent economically that their 
citizens' only hope becomes that of one 
day migrating to the United States. 

The people of the Caribbean Basin 
are threatened by poverty, violence, and 
dictatorship as well as subversion. 

• An acute economic crisis is ' 
troubling both Central America and the 
Caribbean. The area's small and 
vulnerable economies have felt the shock 
of the world recession hard. It is dif- 
ficult to achieve or maintain democracy 
in the presence of bitter economic hard- 
ship, particularly if the social and 
economic consequences are unevenly 

• Private and official lawlessness 
sometimes interact destructively with in- 
surgency and external intervention. The 
fragility under stress of nascent 
democratic institutions brings chain 
reactions of disorder and abuse that too 
easily feed on each other and create con- 
ditions conducive to dictatorship. 

• We fear erosion of faith in repre- 
sentative democracy and government in- 
stitutions. Yet in deeply divided 
societies, only pluralistic institutions can 
enable people to live with each other 
without violence. 

To gain the initiative, and make sure 
the area's besieged and aspiring 
democracies survive, the Administration 
proposes to: 

• Support, bilaterally and 
multilaterally, the nascent Central 
American Democratic Community and 
its efforts to protect democracy and pro- 

^pril 1982 



mote the common welfare, defense, and 

• Provide needed military assistance 
to threatened El Salvador and Hon- 
duras. The President has decided to use 
emergency authority to draw on Depart- 
ment of Defense stocks for up to $55 
million to replace aircraft lost in the 
recent attack in Ilopango and assure 
that the Government of El Salvador has 
the means to defend its economy and 
protect the electoral process; 

• Provide emergency financial 
assistance to several states in the area 
facing economic catastrophe. The Ad- 
ministration will shortly forward its pro- 
posals to the Congress; and 

• Strengthen— along with our part- 
ners in the Nassau group, Venezuela, 
Mexico and, Canada — international 
cooperation to help bring long-term 
prosperity to the Caribbean Basin. The 
Administration will shortly send specific 
proposals in trade and investment to the 

There is something else. If we do 
not sustain the struggle now, we shall 
fall back into that terrible vicious circle 
in which in Central America the only 
alternative to right-wing dictatorship is 
left-wing dictatorship. 

Starting in October 1979, a military- 
civilian coalition committed to 
reform — land reform and the transfor- 
mation of El Salvador into a 
democracy— shattered El Salvador's 
traditional narrowly-based authoritarian 
system. We supported the reforms then, 
we support them now. And real prog- 
ress has been made — for all the civil 
strife, even though there is a long way 
to go, above all in bringing violence 
under control. 

Some are proposing that we now cut 
off aid to El Salvador. I do not see how 
that would advance the goals embodied 
in the Foreign Assistance Act, whether 
they be security, democracy, or human 
rights. Clearly, the hope for democracy 
would be extinguished. The Soviet Union 
and Cuba would have a new opening to 
expand their access to the American 
mainland. And I wonder how it would 
promote human rights to make El 
Salvador into another Nicaragua. 

Our intention is to keep up the 
pressure in order to promote the full 
scope of our interests in the region, in- 
terests we believe are widely shared in 
this country — defense of our national 
security interests against the 
Soviet/Cuban challenge and promotion 
of human freedom, including those social 

and economic reforms that may be 
necessary to make the exercise of 
freedom meaningful. 

tracting parties have notified their objectio 
to the amendments. 



'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.B 

Current Actions 



Recommendations relating to the furtherance 
of the principles and objectives of the An- 
tarctic Treaty (TIAS 4780). Adopted at 
Buenos Aires July 7, 1981 at the 11th An- 
tarctic Treaty Consultative meeting. Enters 
into force when approved by all contracting 
parties whose representatives were entitled 
to participate in meetings to consider 


Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague Dec. 
16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14, 1971. 
TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited : Liberia, Feb. 1, 1982. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful 
acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done 
at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. TIAS 7570. 
Accession deposited : Liberia, Feb. 1, 1982. 

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text 
of the convention on international civil avia- 
tion (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Mon- 
treal Sept. 30, 1977. ' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President : Feb. 11, 1982. 

Acceptance deposited: U.S., Feb. 11, 1982. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591) [to add Russian as an authentic 
language of the convention]. Done at Mon- 
treal Sept. 30, 1977.1 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President : Feb. 11, 1982. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the 
convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591) [concerning lease, charter, and 
interchange]. Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980.' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the 
President : Feb. 5, 1982. 


Amendments to the international regulations 
for preventing collisions at sea, 1972 (TIAS 
8587). Adopted at London Nov. 19, 1981. 
Enters into force June 1, 1983, unless by 
June 1, 1982, more than one- third of the con- 


Agreement establishing the Common Fund 
for Commodities, with schedules. Done at 
Geneva June 27, 1980.' 
Signatures: Central African Republic, 
Jan. 28, 1982; New Zealand, Feb. 12, 1982 
Ratifications deposited : Papua New Guinea 
Jan. 27, 1982; Mexico, Feb. 11, 1982. 


Convention on the conservation of Antarct 

marine living resources, with annex for an 

arbitral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 2C 


Instrument of ratification signed by the 

President : Feb. 2, 1982. 

Ratification deposited: U.S., Feb. 18, 1982, 


Agreement establishing the International 

Fund for Agricultural Development. Done 

Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force N. 

30, 1977. TIAS 8765. 

Accession deposited : Ivory Coast, Jan. 19, 



Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at 
Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force 
Jan. 12, 1951.2 

Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 
Jan. 27, 1982. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international conventio 
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted a 
London Oct. 12, 1971.' 
Acceptances deposited : F.R.G., Apr. 29, 
1981;3 Hungary, Jan. 5, 1982. 

Amendments to the international conventio 
on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted ai 
London Nov. 15, 1979.' 
Acceptances deposited : Greece, Nov. 10, 
1981; Hungary, Jan. 5, 1982. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to article VII of the conventioi 
on facilitation of international maritime tra 
tic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London 
Nov. 19, 1973.' 
Acceptance deposited: Monaco, Jan. 8, 1982 

International convention on standards of 

training, certification, and watchkeeping foi 

seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 7, 


Ratification deposited: Norway, Jan. 18, 


Approval deposited: China, June 8, 1981. 

Accessions deposited : Czechoslovakia, May ( 

1981; Colombia, July 27, 1981; Bangladesh, 

Nov. 6, 1981; Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982; Mexico, 

Feb. 2, 1982. 


Department of State Bullet 


ircotic Drugs 

otocol amending the single convention on 
rcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva 
ir. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 
75. TIAS 8118. 
^cession deposited : Gabon, Oct. 14, 1981. 

jrth Atlantic Treaty 

p-eement to amend the protocol of 
piature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, 

supplement the agreement between the 
rties to the North Atlantic Treaty regard- 
5 the status of their forces with respect to 
reign forces stationed in the Federal 
'public of Germany, as amended by the 
Teement of Oct. 21, 1971 (TIAS 5351, 

59). Signed at Bonn May 18, 1981.' 
itification deposited: France, Feb. 3, 1982. 

•otocol to the North Atlantic Treaty (TIAS 
164) on the accession of Spain. Done at 
'ussels Dec. 10, 1981.' 
gceptances deposited : Norway, Feb. 25, 
)82; Iceland, Feb. 26, 1982. 


itemational convention relating to interven- 
Dn on the high seas in cases of oil pollution 
isualties, with annex. Done at Brussels 
ov. 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 
^75. TIAS 8068. 
ccessions deposited : Bangladesh, Nov. 6, 

}81; Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982. 

itemational convention on civil liability for 

1 pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

ov. 29, 1969. Entered into force June 19, 


ccession deposited : Gabon, Jan. 21, 1982. 

itemational convention on the establishment 

f an international fund for compensation for 

il pollution damage. Done at Brussels 

'ec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 


■ccessions deposited : Spain, Oct. 8, 1981; 

rabon, Jan. 21, 1982. 

Itemational convention for the prevention 
f pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols 
nd annexes. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.' 
Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Jan. 21, 1982." 
iccessions deposited : Yugoslavia, Oct. 31, 
980; Colombia, July 27, 1981. 


loney orders and postal travellers' checks 

.greement with detailed regulations with 

inal protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 

;6, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981. 

:iAS 9973. 

Vpprovals deposited : Netherlands, Oct. 28, 

.981; Netherlands Antilles, Oct. 28, 1981; 

Czechoslovakia, Nov. 13, 1981; Belgium, 

Dec. 30, 1981. 

Ratifications deposited : Austria, Oct. 7, 1981; 

^^.R.G., Dec, 11, 1981." 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 
Jnion, with final protocol and annex, and the 
iniversal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
laneiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 


July 1, 1981 except for Article 124 of the 
general regulations which became effective 
Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 9972. 
Approvals deposited : Netherlands, Oct. 28, 
1981; Netherlands Antilles, Oct. 28, 1981; 
Australia, Nov. 2, 1981; Czechoslovakia, 
Nov. 13, 1981; Belgium, Dec. 30, 1981. 
Ratifications deposited : Austria, Oct. 7, 1981; 
Ethiopia, Oct. 29, 1981; F.R.G., Dec. 11, 
1981;" Jamaica, Dec. 14, 1981; Swaziland, 
Dec. 17, 1981.^ 
Accession deposited : South Africa, Nov. 20, 


Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of in- 
dustrial property of Mar. 20, 1883, as revis- 
ed. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force Apr. 26, 1970; for the 
U.S. Sept. 5, 1970, except for Articles 1-12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the U.S. 
Aug. 25, 1973. TIAS 7727. 
Notification of accession deposited: 
Guinea, Nov. 5, 1981. 

Property — Industrial — Typefaces 

Vienna agreement for the protection of 

typefaces and their international deposit, 

with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 


Ratification deposited: F.R.G., Nov. 9, 


Protocol to the Vienna agreement for the 
protection of typefaces and their interna- 
tional deposit concerning the term of protec- 
tion. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.' 
Accession deposited : F.R.G., Nov. 9, 


Convention concerning the exchange of of- 
ficial publications and government documents 
between States. Signed at Paris Dec. 3, 1958. 
Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the U.S. 
June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439. 
Notification of succession : Solomon 

Islands, Oct. 6, 1981. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969.2 
Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 

Jan. 27, 1982. 


Protocol relating to the status of refugees. 
Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered in- 
to force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 
1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited : BoHvia, Feb. 9, 

Safety at Sea 

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international 
convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974. 
Done at London Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into 
force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009. 
Accessions deposited : Israel, Aug. 21, 
1981; South Africa, Jan. 11, 1982; Hungary, 
Feb. 3, 1982. 

Slave Trade 

Convention to suppress slave trade and 
slavery. Concluded at Geneva Sept. 25, 1926. 
Entered into force Mar. 9, 1927; for the U.S. 
Mar. 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183. 
Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 
Jan. 27, 1982. 

Protocol amending the slavery convention 
signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 
2183), and Annex. Done at New York Dec. 7, 
1953. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1953 for the 
Protocol; July 7, 1955 for Annex to Protocol. 
TIAS 3532. 

Accession deposited : Papua New Guinea, 
Jan. 27, 1982. 


International telecommunication convention 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 
Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. April 7, 1976. 
TIAS 8572. 
Accession deposited : Grenada, Nov. 17, 



Agreement on technical barriers to trade. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. 
Acceptance : Rwanda, Jan. 22, 1982.« 


Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.^ ■ 
Accession deposited : Egypt, Feb. 11, 1982. 

U.N. Industrial Development Organization 

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Develop- 
ment Organization, with annexes. Done at 
Vienna Apr. 8, 1979.' 

Ratifications deposited : Democratic Yemen, 
Jan. 29, 1982; Gabon, Feb. 1, 1982; Ghana, 
Feb. 8, 1982. 


International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations, as amended. 
Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered 
into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849, 4228. 
Territorial application: Netherlands Antilles, 
Feb. 16, 1982. 


1981 protocol for the sixth extension of the 
wheat trade convention, 1971 (TIAS 7144). 
Done at Washington Mar. 24, 1981. Entered 
into force for the U.S. provisionally July 1, 
1981, definitively Jan. 12, 1982. 
Accession deposited : Nigeria, Feb. 4, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Feb. 4, 


Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981.2 

Ratifications deposited : Bulgaria, Feb. 8, 
1982; Czechoslovakia, Feb. 16, 1982; Viet- 
nam, Feb. 17, 1982. 



World Health Organization 

Amendments to Articles 24 and 25 of the 
constitution of the World Health Organiza- 
tion, as amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976 by the 29th 
World Health Assembly.' 
Acceptances deposited : Vietnam, Dec. 30, 
1981; Ireland, Feb. 16, 1982. 

Amendment to Article 74 of the Constitution 

of the World Health Organization, as 

amended (TIAS 1808, 8086, 8534). Adopted 

at Geneva May 18, 1978 by the 31st World 

Health Assembly.' 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, Jan. 5, 


World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the 
world cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
Paris Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
Dec. 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Acceptance deposited: Oman, Oct. 6, 1981.^ 


Antigua and Barbuda 

Agreement concerning the provision of train- 
ing related to defense articles under the U.S. 
international military education and training 
(IMET) program. Effected by exchange of 
notes at St. John's Dec. 7 and 10, 1981. 
Entered into force Dec. 10, 1981. 


Agreement on social security, with final pro- 
tocol. Signed at Washington Feb. 19, 1982. 
Enters into force on the first day of the 
second month following the month in which 
each Government shall have received from 
the other Government written notification 
that it has complied with all statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into 


Agreement concerning the provisions of 
training related to defense articles under the 
U.S. international military education and 
training (IMET) program. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Belize and Belmopan 
Dec. 8, 1981 and Jan. 15, 1982. Entered into 
force Jan. 15, 1982. 


Arrangement for the exchange of technical 
information and cooperation in nuclear 
regulatory and safety research matters, with 
patent addendum. Signed at Rio de Janeiro 
Jan. 14, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 14, 

Agreement on salted cattle hides, leather, 
and manufactured leather products. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Brasilia and Rio de 
Janeiro Jan. 14 and 22, 1982. Entered into 
force Feb. 1, 1982. 


Treaty to submit to binding dispute settle- 
ment the delimitation of the maritime bound- 
ary in the Gulf of Maine area, with annexed 

agreements, as amended. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 29, 1979. Entered into 
force Nov. 20, 1981. 
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 5, 1982. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a 
Peace Corps program, Effected by exchange 
of notes at Santiago Oct. 3 and 4, 1962. 
Entered into force Oct. 4, 1962. TIAS 5199. 
Terminated : Mar. 31, 1982. 


Consular convention, with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Washington Sept. 17, 1980. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982. 
Proclaimed by the President: Feb. 8, 1982. 


Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 
3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to 
trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber tex- 
tiles and textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Bogota Sept. 23 and 
Dec. 11, 1981. Entered into force Dec. 11, 


Statement relating to greater support to 
economic progress in Egypt. Released at 
Washington Feb. 4, 1982. Entered into force 
Feb. 4, 1982. 

Grant agreement in the amount of $300 
million for commodity imports. Signed at 
Washington Feb. 5, 1982. Entered into force 
Feb. 5, 1982. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales 
of agricultural commodities of Dec. 21, 1981. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
Feb. 5, 1982. Entered into force Feb. 5, 

European Atomic Energy Community 

Agreement in the field of nuclear material 
safeguards research and development, with 
annex. Signed at Brussels Jan. 28, 1982. 
Entered into force Jan. 28, 1982. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement amending and extending the 
memorandum of July 18, 1974, as amended 
and extended, on the participation of the 
F.R.G. in the International Phase of Ocean 
Drilling of the Deep Sea Drilling Project 
(TIAS 9233). Signed at Bonn-Bad Godesberg 
Nov. 16, 1981. Entered into force Nov. 16, 


Loan agreement in the amount of $38 million 
for production and employment. Signed at 
Kingston Dec. 29, 1981. Entered into force 
Dec. 29, 1981. 


Agreement relating to a cash assistance 
grant in the amount of $806 million during 
fiscal year 1982 to support the economic and 
political stability of Israel. Signed Dec. 31, 
1981. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1981. 


Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the prepositioning of U.S. Air Force comba 
communications assets in the Republic of 
Korea. Signed at Osan Oct. 15, Dec. 2 and 
14, 1981. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1981. 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
establishing a permanent Taegu operation 
location. Signed at Osan Dec. 30, 1981 and 
Jan. 20, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 20, 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
June 2, 1977 (TIAS 8952) relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb the 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico Jan. 6 and 8, 
1982. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1982. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 3, 1979 (TIAS 9696) relating to addi- 
tional cooperative arrangements to curb tht 
illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by ex- 
change of letters at Mexico Dec. 29, 1981. 
Entered into force Dec. 29, 1981. 

Agreement amending and extending the 
agreement of Feb. 26, 1979, as amended 
(TIAS 9419), relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textil 
products. Effected by exchange of letters a 
Washington Dec. 23 and 24, 1981. Entered 
into force Dec. 24, 1981. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Jun 
23, 1976 on procedures for mutual assistant 
in the administration of justice in connectioi 
with the General Tire and Rubber Company 
and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Compan 
matters (TIAS 8533) to include a company 
which is the subject of U.S. Department of 
Justice investigation No. MA 105. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico and 
Washington Nov. 10 and 25, 1981. Entered 
into force Nov. 25, 1981. 

Agreement amending the agreement of Juni 
23, 1976 on procedures for mutual assistanc 
in the administration of justice in connectior 
with the General Tire and Rubber Company 
and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Compan; 
matters (TIAS 8533) to include several com- 
panies which are the subject of U.S. Depart- 
ment of Justice investigation No. MAIOI. 
Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington and Mexico Aug. 25 and Nov. 9 

1981. Entered into force Nov. 9, 1981. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural com- 
modities, relating to the agreement of 
May 17, 1976 (TIAS 8309). Signed at Rabat 
Jan. 19, 1982. Entered into force Jan. 19, 

NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Organization (NAMSCO) 

Basic agreement on mutual support, with 
annex Signed at Stuttgart- Vaihingen Feb. 2, 

1982. Entered into force Feb. 2, 1982. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 




61, 9804), relating to trade in cotton tex- 
3S. Effected by exchange of letters at 
ashington Oct. 28 and Nov. 3, 1981. 
itered into force Nov. 3, 1981. 

udi Arabia 

freement extending the agreement of 

ly 24 and June 5, 1965, as extended (TIAS 

30, 9590), relating to the construction of 

rtain military facilities in Saudi Arabia. 

'fected by exchange of notes at Jidda 

ly 18 and July 22, 1981. Entered into force 

ly 22, 1981; effective May 24, 1981. 


jreement relating to the status of U.S. per- 
nnel temporarily stationed in Sudan, 
'fected by exchange of letters at Khartoum 
)V. 12 and Dec. 27, 1981. Entered into 
rce Dec. 27, 1981. 


isistance agreement in the amount of $100 
illion for bSance-of-payments financing to 
pport and promote the financial stability 
id economic recovery of Turkey. Signed at 
ikara Nov. 20, 1981. Entered into force 
w. 20, 1981. 

nited Kingdom 

jreement amending and extending the 
emorandum of understanding of Sept. 29, 
175, as amended and extended, on the par- 
•ipation of the U.K. in the International 
lase of Ocean Drilling an extension of the 
lep Sea Drilling Project (TIAS 8591, 9410). 
gned at Washington and Swindon Dec. 31, 
181 and Jan. 14, 1982. Entered into force 
,n. 14, 1982. 

'Not in force. 

2Not in force for the U.S. 

^With declaration. 

■I Applicable to Berlin (West). 

^With reservation. 

'^Subject to ratification. ■ 

February 1982 

'ebruary 2 

n a joint resolution denouncing the Soviet in- 
asion of Afghanistan and praising the 
ifghan "freedom fighters," both Houses of 
longress call on President Reagan to 
esignate March 21 as "Afghanistan Day." 
'he resolution also urges the American peo- 
le to observe the occasion with ceremonies 
nd activities commemorating the struggle of 
he Afghan people and calls for an early 
egotiation to end the Soviet occupation of 
hat country. 

Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni 
lubarak makes State visit to the U.S. 
>b. 2-5. 

February 5 

n official ceremonies, President Reagan an- 
lounces that he is launching the first 
gricultural task force to Peru to help that 

Government find ways of improving its 
agricultural production and marketing 
policies. The task force will be headed by Dr. 
Clayton Yeutter, President of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange. 

The follovnng newly appointed Am- 
bassadors presented their credentials to 
President Reagan: Nicolas Karandreas of 
Greece; Chitmansing Jerreransing of 
Mauritius; Dr. Cedric Hilburn Grant of 
Guyana; and Julio Sanjines Goitia of Bolivia. 

In the 9th special emergency session, the 
U.N. General Assembly adopts a nonbinding 
resolution, by a vote of 86 to 21 (U.S. voted 
against) with 34 abstentions and 16 countries 
not voting, calling on all members to end aid, 
trade, and diplomatic ties with Israel and to 
"cease forthwith, individually and collectively, 
all dealing with Israel in order totally to 
isolate it in all fields" as punishment for that 
Government's decision to extend its law, 
jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan 

February 7 

Secretary Haig departs Washington to make 
official visits to Madrid (Feb. 7-10) where he 
participates in the plenary session of the 
CSCE Review Conference held Feb. 9, and 
holds bilateral meetings with King Juan 
Carlos, Prime Minister Calvo-Sotelo, and 
Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca; Lisbon 
(Feb. 10-11) for bilaterals with President 
Eanes, Prime Minister Pinto Balsemao, and 
Foreign Minister Goncalves Pereira; Mar- 
rakech (Feb. 11-12) for bilaterals with King 
Hassan II; and Bucharest (Feb. 12-13) for 
discussions with President Ceausescu, 
Foreign Minister Andrei, and other Roma- 
nian officials. The Secretary returned to 
Washington Feb. 13. 

Yugoslav Vice Premier Zvone Dragan makes 
official visit to the U.S. Feb. 7-10 to meet 
with Vice President Bush, Acting Secretary 
Stoessel, and U.S. energy trade officials. 

February 8 

Senate confirms Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. to be 
Deputy Secretary of State. 

February 9 

The 35-nation Conference on European 
Security and Cooperation resumes in Madrid. 
On Dec. 18, 1981, the Conference adjourned 
with participants agreeing to return in 
February to complete a supplement to the 
1975 Helsinki agreement. In a press con- 
ference following his speech to the plenary 
session. Secretary Haig states that "the in- 
stigation of martial law in Poland and the 
crushing of civil and political rights . . . 
constitute a new threat to the CSCE process" 
and while the situation persists, the U.S. will 
not "conduct business as usual." 

February 12 

U.S. and Morocco announce the formation of 
a joint military commission and agree to open 
discussions at the request of the United 
States for facilities access rights for the U.S. 
Rapid Deployment Force. 

State Department announces the appoint- 
ment of Richard Fairbanks as Secretary 

Haig's "Special Adviser" to the negotiations 
for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank 
and Gaza under the Camp David accords. 

February 16 

By a vote of 19 to (3 abstentions) the 
Organization of American States decides to 
accede to El Salvador's request for election 
observers during the period Feb. 15 through 
Mar. 30. 

Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens 
makes official working visit to Washington, 
D.C., Feb. 16-18. 

The following newly appointed Am- 
bassadors presented their credentials to 
President Reagan: Bernard Vernier-Palliez of 
France; Francisco Feallos Navarro of 
Nicaragua; Franklin Baron of Dominica; and 
Moshe Arens of Israel. 

February 24 

In a speech to the Organization of American 
States, President Reagan announces a new 
"integrated" program to help the Caribbean 
and Central American nations to "help 
themselves — a program that will create con- 
ditions under which creativity, private en- 
trepreneurship and self-help can flourish." 
The program's "centerpiece" — a joint effort 
with Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela — will be 
"free trade for Caribbean Basin products ex- 
ported to the United States" in all areas ex- 
cept textiles and apparel which are governed 
by international agreements. 

February 25 

By a vote of 13 to (Soviet Union and 
Poland abstaining), U.N. Security Council 
passes a resolution increasing by 1,000 the 
number of troops (6,000) to its peacekeeping 
forces in southern Lebanon. 

Norway becomes the second NATO 
member country to deposit an instrument of 
ratification of the Protocol inviting Spain to 
join NATO. 

February 28 

In an exchange of letters between President 
Reagan and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
released simultaneously in Beijing and 
Washington, the U.S. and China com- 
memorate the 10th anniversary of the signing 
of the Shanghai Communique. ■ 

Department of State 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

•35 2/2 Haig, Hassan All: arrival 
remarks, Cairo, Jan. 28. 

*36 2/3 Haig, Hassan Ali: departure 
remarks, Cairo, Jan. 29. 

•37 2/3 Haig: remarks following 
meeting with Prime 
Minister Thatcher, London, 
Jan. 29. 

\pril 1982 


















2/2 Program for the State visit 
to the U.S. of His Ex- 
cellency Mohamed Hosni 
Mubarak, President of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, 
and Mrs. Mubarak, Feb. 
2/2 Haig: remarks at Solidarity 
Day rally, Chicago, Jan. 
2/2 Haig: statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations 
2/2 Haig: remarks after meeting 
with President Mubarak, 
Cairo, Jan. 28. 
2/2 U.S., Mexico extend bilateral 

textile agreement. 
2/2 Advisory Committee on the 
Law of the Sea, Feb. 18 
(partially closed). 
2/2 Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee (SCC), Subcommit- 
tee on Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on the carriage of 
dangerous goods, Feb. 17. 
2/2 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on radio communications, 
Feb. 18. 
2/2 SCC, SOLAS, working 
groups on subdivision, 
stability, and load lines and 
on safety of fishing vessels, 
Mar. 2. 
2/2 SCC, SOLAS (open meeting), 

Mar. 22. 
2/2 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, working group on 
transfer of technology, 
Feb. 18. 
2/2 Oceans and International 

Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs Advisory Com- 
mittee, Antarctic section. 
Mar. 18. 
2/4 U.S., Japanese meet on nu- 
clear energy matters, 
Feb. 1 and 2. 
2/5 Haig: press conference on 
Egyptian President 
Mubarak's visit. 
2/9 Haig: statement at CSCE 

Conference, Madrid. 
2/11 Secretary's Advisory Com- 
mittee on Private Interna- 
tional Law, study group on 
international child abduc- 
tion. Mar. 12. 
2/16 Haig: news conference, 

Madrid, Feb. 10. 
2/11 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, working group on 
energy and development. 
Mar. 18. 
2/11 SCC, SOLAS, working group 
on standards of training 
and watchkeeping. Mar. 4. 

•57 2/11 Fine Arts Committee, 

Mar. 6. 
•58 2/11 Advisory Committee on In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology, and Develop- 
ment, working group on 
transborder data flows. 
Mar. 23. 
59 2/16 Haig: news conference, 
Madrid, Feb. 10. 

*.59A 3/2 Haig: statement upon arrival 
in Madrid, Feb. 7. 

•60 2/17 Haig: arrival remarks, Lis- 
bon. Feb. 10. 

*61 2/19 Haig: dinner toasts in the 

Palacio Das Necesidades, 
Lisbon, Feb. 10. 
62 2/19 Haig: departure statement, 
news conference, Lisbon, 
Feb. 11. 

•63 2/19 Haig: arrival statement, 
Marrakech, Feb. 11. 

•64 2/12 Program for the official visit 
of Belgian Prime Minister 
Wilfried Martens, Feb. 

'65 2/18 Haig: remarks upon arrival, 

Bucharest, Feb. 13. 
66 2/19 Haig: press conference, 
Rabat, Feb. 12. 

*67 2/16 Haig: interview on "This 
Week With David 
Brinkley," Feb. 14. 

•68 2/16 Fred J. Eckert sworn in as 
Ambassador to Fiji, 
Kiribati, Tonga, and 
Tuvalu (biographic data). 
69 2/17 Haig: news conference, 

•70 2/17 Haig: interview on "The 
Macneil/Lehrer Report," 
Feb. 16. 

*71 2/17 Presidential Commission on 
Broadcasting to Cuba, 
Mar. 2 (partially closed). 

•72 2/17 International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative 
Committee (CCITT), study 
group A, Mar. 17. 

•73 2/18 Fred M. Zeder II sworn in as 
LI.S. Representative for 
Micronesian status negotia- 
tions (biographic data). 

*74 2/22 Haig: news conference, Bal 
Harbour, Fla., Feb. 19. 

*75 2/23 Haig: address and question- 
and-answer session at Na- 
tional Governors' Associa- 
tion, Feb. 22. 

•76 2/23 Haig: interview with Belgian 

press, Feb. 21. 
77 2/24 Joint U.S.-Canada statement 
on Transboundary Air 

•78 2/25 U.S. makes contribution for 
Khmer relief. 

*79 2/25 Michael H. Armacost sworn 
in as Ambassador to the 
Philippines (biographic 

•Not printed in the Bulletin. ■ 

Department of State 

Free, single copies of the following Depart- 
ment of State publications are available froi 
the Public Information Service, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

President Reagan 

Law of the Sea, statement by the President 
and statement by Special Representative 
the President for the Third U.N. Con- 
ference on the Law of the Sea Ambassad' 
Malone before the House Merchant Marir 
and Fisheries Committee, Feb. 22, 1982 
(Current Policy #371). 

Caribbean Basin Initiative, Organization of 
American States, Washington, D.C, 
Feb. 24, 1982 (Current Policy #370). 

Secretary Haig 

Europe at the Crossroads, Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(CSCE), Madrid, Feb. 9, 1982 (Current 

Policy #367). 
News Conference on the Middle East, Feb. 

1982 (Current Policy #366). 
Current International Developments, Senat 

Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 2, 

1982 (Current Policy #365). 
Poland Has Not Perished, Solidarity Day ra 

Iv, Chicago, Jan. 10, 1982 (Current" 

Policy #363). 


Background Notes on Senegal, Dec. 1981. 


In Defense of Western Values, Director of 
the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 
Burt, Copenhagen Regional Seminar, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, Feb. 5, 1982 
(Current Policy #368). 

Background Notes on France, Jan. 1982. 




Pacific Affairs 

Background Notes on Nauru, Dec. 


Security Assistance 

Proposed Sale of Aircraft to Venezuela, 
Under Secretary Buckley, Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Feb. 5, 
1982 (Current Policy #369). 

Western Hemisphere 

Democracy and Security in the Caribbean 
Basin, Assistant Secretary Enders, Sub 
committee on Western Hemisphere Af- 
fairs, Senate Foreign Relations Commit 
tee, and Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs, House Foreign Affaii 
Committee, Feb. 1 & 2, 1982 (Current 
Policv #364). 

Treaty of Tlatelolco (GIST, Feb. 1982).H 



Department of State Bulleti 


^pril 1982 

Volume 82, No. 2061 

fghanistan. Afghanistan Day: March 21 

rms Control! INF Negotiations (Reagan) .50 

anada. U.S.-Canada Transboundary Air 
Pollution Negotiations (Niles, joint 

hina. 10th Anniversary of Shanghai Com- 
munique (Reagan, Zhao) 60 

longress ^ ,^ __ 

ighanistan Day: March 21 (Stoessel) . ... .85 

'he Certification for El Salvador (Enders) . 87 

lountry Reports on Human Rights Prac- 

luman Rights Sitiiation in El Salvador 
(Abrams) : • • ■ • ■ "8 

luman Rights Situation in Nicaragua 
(Abrams) • • • -P^ 

apan and the United States: A Cooperative 
Relationship (Holdndge) 52 

'olish Debt Situation (Hormats) ■ • bl 

Proposed FY 1983 Foreign Assistance Pro- 
gram (Haig) ■ • • 36 

Proposed Sale of Aircraft to Venezuela 
(Buckley) ■,•;••,•,;•. 

soviet Energy Development and the Western 
Alliance (Johnston) ^ • ■ • -62 

J.S.-Canada Transboundary Air Pollution 
Negotiations (Niles, joint statement) ... 50 

Economic Assistance 

Background on the Caribbean Basin Initi- 
ative ■ • ' 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (Reagan) i 

Update on International Developments 
(Haig) 33 


.Japan and the United States: A Cooperative 
Relationship (Holdndge) 52 

Polish Debt Situation (Hormats) ol 

Secretary's News Conference on President 
Mubarak's Visit ■ • •••■•• ■ ■ ■ ^0 

Visit of Egyptian President Mubarak (Mub- 
arak, Reagan) ' ' 

El Salvador , ^ , „„ 

The Certification for El Salvador (Enders) .87 

Human Rights Sitiiation in El Salvador 
(Abrams) ,■;■;,•,•••. A^ 

U.S. To Observe El Salvador's Elections (De- 
partment statement) -88 

Energy. Soviet Energy Develooment and the 
Western Alliance (Johnston) .o2 

Environment. U.S.-Canada Transboundary 
Air Pollution Negotiations (Niles, joint 
statement) 5" 

In Defense of Western Values (Burt) . . . ^ . . 65 
Secretary Haig Visits Europe and North 
Africa (news conferences, state- 
ment) , ; ■■ j';^! 

Soviet Energy Development and the 

Western Alliance (Johnston) • • • • ."'^ 

Foreign Aid. Proposed FY 1983 Foreign 

Assistance Program (Haig) 3b 

Human Rights 

Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices '1 

Human Rights Situation in El Salvador 

(Abrams) ■. ■ ■ ■ • •. 6H 

Human Rights Situation in Nicaragua 

(Abrams) ,•.•;■ oi: '■ a 

Japan. Japan and the United States: A 
Cooperative Relationship (Holdndge) . .52 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Background on the Caribbean Basin 

Initiative • ■ .' 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (Reagan) i 

Update on International Developments 

(Haig) •^'^ 

Middle East ^ , ,, , ,, 

Military Assistance Policies for the Middle 

East (President's letter) ^- ■ ■.,■ , 

Secretary's News Conference on President 

Mubarak's Visit ,- ■- ™ 

Morocco. Secretary Haig Visits Europe and 
North Africa (news conferences, state- 
ment) ; ■,: ■•••■■ •■^' 

Nicaragua. Human Rights Situation in 

Nicaragua (Abrams) .■ • ■ ; 69 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 

Defense of Western Values (Burt) - ■ • 65 

Organization of American States. Canb- 

bean Basin Initiative (Reagan) 1 

Poland Debt Situation (Hormats) bl 

Situation in Poland (Department state_ 

ments) rA' ■< / 

Update on International Developments 


Portugal. Secretary Haig Visits Europe and 
North Africa (news conferences, state- 
ment) •^' 

Presidential Documents 

Caribbean Basin Initiative i 

INF Negotiations ;■■■;■• •.i'jji 

Military Assistance Policies for the Middle 
East (President's letter) • S'i 

10th Anniversary of Shanghai Communique 
(Reagan, Zhao) ,■■■•..■ \- •• i ' ;;, u 

Visit of Egyptian President Mubarak (Mub- 
arak, Reagan) ■ ■ '' 

Publications. Department of State vi 

Romania. Secretary Haig Visits Europe and 
North Africa (news conferences, state- 
ment) ;.■•:■ -^ n 

Science and Technology. Soviet Energy De- 
velopment and the Western Alliance 
(Johnston) 6Z 

Security Assistance „ , . 

Background on the Caribbean Basin Initi- 
ative ' 

Caribbean Basin Initiative (Reagan) . . 1 

Proposed FY 1983 Foreign Assistance Pro; 
gram (Haig) • ■ ■ 3b 

Proposed Sale of Aircraft to Venezuela 
(Buckley) ■ ■ ^^ 

Spain. Secretary Haig Visits Europe and 
North Africa (news conferences, state- 
ment) ■ • ; ■ -37 

Trade. Japan and the United States: A Co- 
operative Relationship (Holdndge) 52 

Treaties. Current Actions 90 

|T c C D 

Afghanistan Day: March 21 (Stoessel) 85 

INF Negotiations (Reagan) ■■.■■■■■ y °^ 

Soviet Energy Development and the Western 

Alliance (Johnston) 62 

Update on International Developments 

(Haig) 33 

Venezuela. Proposed Sale of Aircraft to 

Venezuela (Buckley) 84 

Name Index 

Abrams, Elliott 68,69 

Buckley, James L °^ 

Burt, Richard R 65 

Enders, Thomas 87 

Haig, Secretary 33, 36, 37, 80 

Holdridge, John H ^2 

Hormats, Robert D 61 

Johnston, Ernest B. Jr . 62 

Mubarak, Mohamed Hosni 77 

Niles, Thomas M. T 50 

Reagan, President 1, 50, 60, 77, 83 

Stoessel, Walter J. Jr 85 

Zhao Ziyang 60 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Wasfiington, D.C. 20402 


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Depai*iiitvit t 


he Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 82/ Number 2062 

May 1982 

► ^. 

MPvparirnvni of Siai4» 


Volume 82 / Number 2062 / May 1982 


Her Majesty Queen Beatrix and 
His Royal Highness Prince Claus 
attend dinner in their honor hosted 
by the President and Mrs. Reagan 

(White House photo by Bill Fitz- Patrick I 

The Department of State Bulletin , 
published by the Office of Public 
Communication in the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, is the official record of U.S. 
foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide 
the public, the Congress, and 
government agencies with information 
on developments in U.S. foreign 
relations and the work of the 
Department of SUte and the Foreign 

The Bulletin's contents include major 
addresses and news conferences of the 
President and the Secretary of State; 
statements made before congressional 
committees by the Secretary and other 
senior State Department officials; 
special features and articles on 
international affairs; selected press 
releases issued by the White House, 
the Department, and the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations; and treaties and 
other agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a party. 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is 
necessary in the transaction of the public 
business required by law of this 
Department. Use of funds for printing this 
periodical has been approved by the 
Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget through March 31, 1987. 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the 
Department of State Bulletin as the 
source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is 
indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical 


Secretary of State 


Assistant Secretary for Ptiblic Affairs 



Office of Public Communication 


Acting Chief. Editorial Division 




Assistant Editor 

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The President 


News Conference of March 31 

The Secretary 


Peace and Deterrence 
Interview on "Meet the Press" 

Arms Control 





U.S. Responds to Soviet 
Missile Proposal [Presideyit 
Reagan. Larry Speakes) 

Arms Control in Proper Per- 
spective {Eugene V. Rostow) 

Nuclear Freeze {Richard R. 

Status of INF Negotiations {Paul 
H. Nitze) 

East Asia 


ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue {Walter J. 
Stoessel, Jr., Joint Press State- 


LI.S.-NATO Defense Relationship 
{Lawrence S. Eagleburger) 

Si.xth Report on Cyprus {Presi- 
dent Reagan's Message to the 

Alliance Strategy and the INF 
Negotiations {Richard R. Burt) 

Current State of the CSCE 
Process {Lawrence S. 


1 "The most friendly and beneficial connexion:" The Netherlands Recognizes the 

United States, April 19. 1782 {SherriU Brown Wells) 
25 Visit of Netherlands Queen Beatrix {Arrival 
Remarks. Dinner Toasts) 

54 Proposed CSCE Conference 

Recess {Departmeyit Statement) 

55 Visit of French President 

Mitterrand {Francois 
Mitterrand, President Reagan) 

56 Human Rights in Poland {Depart- 

ment Statement) 

IVIilitary Affairs 

57 U.S. Issues Report on Chemical 

Warfare {Walter J. Stoessel, 

58 U.S. Program To Deter Chemical 

Warfare {Fact Sheet) 

59 U.S. Sale of Trident II Missile 

Systems to the U.K. {White 
House Statement, Exchange of 


61 U.S. Participation in Law of the 
Sea Conference {James L. 


63 Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Official 

Personnel Abroad, 1981 {Evan 

Western Hemisphere 

64 Caribbean Basin Initiative Re- 

viewed by Foreign Ministers 
{Joint News Conference, Joint 


Secretary Meets With Mexican 

Foreign Minister {News Brief- 



U.S. -Jamaica Barter Agreement 

{White House Anmyuncemeyit) 


Secretary Meets With Central 

American Foreign Ministers 

{Secretary Haig) 


Cuban and Nicaraguan Support 

for the Salvadoran Insurgency 


El Salvador's Elections {Secre- 

fa ry Ha ig) 



Current Actions 



March 1982 

Press Releases 

81 Department of State 


82 Department of State 


SPECIAL (See Center Section) 

Atlas of U.S. Foreign Relations: National Security 

J± { 38982 

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Allegory on the Recognition of the United States by the Netherlands. A 

woman on a pedestal representing America, with the coats-of-arms of the 

United States, France, and Amsterdam, is trampling upon the fallen figure of 

England, while to the right the King of France pushes down the British 
crown. On the left the Mayor of Amsterdam offers to America the 1778 secret 
treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which was a draft agreement between the United 
Provinces and the United States and was called the Preparatory Plan. The 
translation of the caption is as follows: "America tramples down angry Albion, 
while the British crown is crushed by the Bourbon, and America, in the per- 
son of Adams, is recognized by the Netherlands after the example of the 
citizens of Amsterdam." (Private Collection of J.W. Schulte Nordholt) 


A Bicentennial 

''The most friendly 
and beneficial connexion^' 

The Netherlands Recognizes 
the United States 

April 19, 1782 

April 19, 1982, marked the 
200th anniversary of the 
establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the 
Netherlands and the United 
States — the United States' 
longest unbroken, peaceful 
relationship with any foreign 

In recognition of this 
relationship. President 
Reagan called on Americans 
to join with the citizens of the 
Netherlands in observing the 
occasion with appropriate 
ceremonies and activities 
which included a state visit to 
the United States by Her 

Majesty Queen Beatrix and 
His Royal Highness Prince 
Glaus April 18-24. The 
Queen was the third reigning 
Monarch of the Netherlands 
to visit the United States; her 
grandmother. Queen 
Wilhelmina, visited in 1942, 
and her mother. Queen 
Juliana, in 1952. 

In connection with the 
celebration, following is a 
reprint of a paper prepared 
by Sherrill Brown Wells of 
the Office of the Historian, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Department of State. 


stablishment of diplomatic relations 
between the United Provinces of the 
Netherlands and the United States on 
April 19, 1782, marked a significant event 
in the history of the two nations.'^ Linked 
with America by common traditions of in- 
tellectual and political freedom, as well as 
by financial, commercial, and cultural 
ties, the Netherlands was the second coun- 
try — after France — to recognize the Thir- 
teen Colonies as an independent and 
sovereign nation. 

From, the beginning of the War 
for Independence, the American revolu- 
tionaries found sympathy among the 
Dutch, who had won their own inde- 
pendence from Spain two centuries before 
and who shared the Americans' views on 
the importance of seapower, free trade, 
and neutral rights on the high seas. But 
widespread British influence in the 
United Provinces and fear of British 
retaliation against Dutch shipping 
delayed concrete demonstrations of sup- 
port for the Colonies until the tide of bat- 
tle turned in favor of the rebels. While 
American diploTnat John Adams' initial 
months in the Netherlands were full of 
perplexity over the workings of Dutch 
political institutions and frustration at 
the procrastination of the government and 
financiers, in the end he saw the establish- 
ment of official relations and the conclu- 
sion of a treaty of amity and commerce 
between the two republics on October 8, 
1782, as "the greatest action of my life."^ 

It wcLS clearly more than a per- 
sonal triumph. As one historian has 
observed, the two countries dealt with one 
another as equals, and the Dutch actions 
"established the value of the United States 
in the eyes of the world, thereby marking 
a step forward in the independent na- 
tional life of the new commonwealth. "^ A 
year later— October 31. 1783— the first 
Dutch Minister to the United States, 
Pieter Johan van Berckel, presented his 
credentials to the Continental Congress. 


he International Setting 

An already flourishing Dutch trade 
with the Colonies increased after the 
American Revolution erupted in the 
spring of 1775. Much of this trade was 
carried on at the Dutch island of Sint 
Eustatius in the Caribbean, where Ameri- 
can merchants exchanged their products 
for gunpowder, iron, and other goods. 
Much to the annoyance of the British, the 
Dutch soon became a most important 
supplier of munitions to the American in- 

To gain European support for the 
war against Great Britain, the Continen- 
tal Congress in November 1775 in- 
structed the Committee of Secret Corre- 
spondence to write to certain agents in 
England and France to ascertain the at- 
titudes of the major powers toward the 
rebellion. On behalf of the committee, 
Benjamin Franklin asked an old friend, 
Charles Guillaume Frederic Dumas, to 
act as the American agent in the Dutch 
Republic. A man of letters and a capable 
linguist, Dumas was a naturalized Dutch 
citizen of Swiss origin who had long been 
fascinated by life in colonial America and 
who was an early supporter of the Col- 
onies' rebellion. Franklin also made an 
urgent request for arms and ammunition. 
Dumas willingly accepted the offer, and 
his enthusiasm and incessant efforts on 
behalf of the American cause contributed 
significantly to the success of John 
Adams' mission to the Netherlands a few 
years later. 

France, England's archenemy, 
was the first power to respond to the ap- 
peals of the American rebels. A few 
months after the Colonies proclaimed in- 
dependence in July 1776, Congress sent a 
commission to France, headed by 
Franklin, to obtain funds and munitions. 
At Versailles on February 6, 1778, 
France signed treaties of alliance and 

Department of State Bulleti 


A Bicentennial 

John Adams (1735-1826), burn in Brain- 
tree (now Quincy), Massachusetts, was educated at 
Harvard University and elected a delegate to the 
First Continental Congress in 1774. A signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, Adams served as a 
commissioner to France 1777-1779, before being 
appointed as Minister to the Netherlands in January 
1781. He was received by the Dutch Government on 
April 19, 1782. Later that year he secured loans in 
the Netherlands and negotiated a treaty of amity 
and commerce. He then joined other American 
diplomats in Paris to negotiate the treaty of peace 
with Great Britain. He served as Vice President 
under (George Washington, 1789-1797, and as the 
second President of the United States, 1797-1801. 
(Courtesy Harvard University Portrait Collection, 
Bequest-Ward Nicholas Boylston, 1828) 

friendship with the United States, there- 
by becoming the first country to recog- 
nize the Thirteen Colonies as an inde- 
pendent nation. 

French recognition created a diffi- 
cult foreign policy problem for the Dutch 
Republic. On the one hand, it was tied to 
Britain by two treaties — a commercial 
treaty of 1674 and an alliance of 1678; 
moreover, its weak army and un- 
protected borders made it vulnerable to 
invasion by the French. On the other 
hand, an alliance with France would ex- 
pose Dutch shipping — the major source 
of wealth — to attack and destruction by 
the powerful British Navy. In addition, 
many of the Dutch feared a possible 
reconciliation between England and the 
United States or recognition by England 
of American independence in exchange 
for a monopoly on the American trade. 

The preservation of its existing 
trade became increasingly important be- 
cause, in contrast to its great commercial 
prosperity of the previous century, the 
Dutch economy had declined in the 
1700s. Moreover, the Netherlands was 
losing its traditional position as a staples 
market of Europe. While the Netherlands 
was still a major factor in commercial 
shipping from the Baltic to the Carib- 
bean, many of the Dutch knew that their 
vulnerability to British seapower meant 
that neutrality, which allowed them to 
profit from trade with France and other 
belligerents, was the best guarantee of 
their independence and commerce. 

Even though part of the Dutch 
people favored neutrality, this issue divid- 
ed the major domestic political factions. 
The Orangists — the party of the Stad- 
holder, Prince Willem V of Orange — tra- 
ditionally favored close ties with 
England. The pro-French Patriots, by 
contrast, held republican views and sym- 
pathized with the United States on philo- 
sophical grounds. In France and Russia, 
they saw a counterbalance to the per- 
vasive English influence in the economic 
and political life of the United Provinces. 
Another group, the merchants of the 
principal seaports, supported trade with 
France and America, and while they did 

May 1982 

not agree with the poUtical philosophy of 
the Patriots, they joined them in their 
strategy of obstructing the Stadholder. 
This power struggle between the chief of 
state and the municipalities, dominated 
by the wealthy bourgeoisie, continued 
throughout 1779 and 1780. 

The reaction to the arrival of the 
American Navy Captain John Paul Jones 
in Dutch waters with captured British 
ships on October 4, 1779, underscored 
the complexity of the Dutch situation. 
While the people of Amsterdam gave 
Jones an enthusiastic reception, the 
English Ambassador, Sir Joseph Yorke, 
strongly urged the Stadholder to take 
firm action against Jones. However, the 
States General, not the Stadholder, had 
sovereign powers in foreign affairs, and 
this body was in no hurry to decide the 

question. Finally, after 3 months of 
maneuvering by British and French diplo- 
mats in the Netherlands, the States 
General required Jones to leave. 

The question of neutral rights 
concerned Russia as well as the Nether- 
lands. In February 1780, Catherine II of 
Russia proclaimed a code of maritime 
principles for the protection of neutrals 
and asked other sovereigns to join her in 
the League of Armed Neutrality. Many 
nations responded; even the rebellious 
Colonies were interested. On October 5 
Congress adopted a resolution stating its 
support for the league and its desire to 
join if invited. On December 10 the Dutch 
Republic announced it would accede to 
the league; less than two weeks later it 
found itself unexpectedly and involuntari- 
ly at war with Great Britain. 

(Independence National Historical Park, 

John Paul Jones 

In early October 1779, a week after he 
fought his famous battle with the Serapis 
during which he lost his flagship the 
Bonhomme Richard, John Paul Jones 
entered neutral Dutch waters with his re- 
maining damaged ships and the captured 
British vessels. British Ambassador Sir 
Joseph Yorke demanded that the seized 

ships and their crews be released and 
that the Dutch Government hand over 
Jones to the British authorities as a 
criminal. Although Willem V was sym- 
pathetic to the British demands, the 
States General delayed taking any action. 
In the meantime, Jones became a celebri- 
ty in the Netherlands. People mobbed 
him on the streets, and spontaneous ova- 
tions broke out when he attended the 
theater in Amsterdam. To this day Dutch 
children recite a verse in his honor: 

Here comes John Paul Jones, 
About him ev'ry Dutchman raves! 
His ship went down 'neath the waves. 
An English ship he boards and owns, 
If we had him here, If they had him 

There is still no end to all his pluck. 
He's ready again to try his luck. 

Provision was made to care for the 
British prisoners, and the French Navy 
eventually assumed control of the cap- 
tured ships. Finally, on December 27, 
1779, having obtained supplies and seen 
to the repair of his own ships, Jones 
bowed to pressure from the Dutch Ad- 
miralty and sailed from the Netherlands. 

Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 


Y Tar Between 
the Netherlands and 
Great Britain 

Great Britain declared war on the 
Netherlands on December 21, 1780, after 
accusing the Dutch of negotiating a 
secret treaty with the American rebels. 
Since 1776 American agents and Dutch 
bankers had been holding talks in 
Amsterdam about the possibility of 
negotiating a loan for the United States. 
Lack of official relations and uncertainty 
in the Netherlands about American credit 
were major obstacles in these negotia- 
tions. But in September 1778, William 
Lee, the representative of the Continen- 
tal Congress to the Courts of Berlin and 
Vienna, and Jean de Neufville, a prom- 
inent Amsterdam merchant and banker, 
secretly drew up a draft treaty of amity 
and commerce between the United Prov- 
inces and the Thirteen States of North 
America without authorization from 
either of their governments. It was 
modeled on the Franco-American treaty 
of 1778 and strongly supported by 
Engelbert Francois van Berckel, one of 
its initiators, who was Amsterdam's Pen- 
sionary and one of its most powerful 
magistrates. The draft accord 
demonstrated the desire of the Amster- 
dam magistrates to restrain Congress 
from making agreements disadvan- 
tageous to the Netherlands and to pro- 
vide American leaders with proof of their 
pro-American sentiments. 


.n October 1779, after receiving a copy 
of this draft treaty from Lee, Congress 
commissioned Henry Laurens of South 
Carolina to obtain a loan of $10 million in 
the Netherlands and to negotiate a treaty 

The Andrew Doria Incident 

The first occasion on which a ship of the 
Continental Navy was saluted in a 
foreign port apparently occurred at the 
Dutch island of Sint Eustatius in the 
Caribbean. On November 16, 1776, the 
Andrew Doria, flying the flag of the 13 
stripes, dropped anchor at Sint Eustatius 
and saluted the Dutch fort there with 11 
guns. A salute of nine guns was returned. 
A resident of the island observed that the 
ship's captain, Isaiah Robertson, was 
"most graciously received" by Governor 
Johannes de Graaf and "all ranks of peo- 
ple. All American Vessells here now wear 
the Congress Coulours. Tories sneak and 
shrink before the honest and brave 
Americans here." 

When the British Government 
learned of the incident, it demanded a 
formal disavowal of the salute and the 
immediate recall by the Dutch Govern- 
ment of Governor De Graaf, whom it also 
accused of aiding the supply of munitions 
and arms to the North American rebels. 
The Dutch Republic, formally allied to 
Great Britain, disavowed De Graaf s ac- 
tion insofar as it might have been con- 
strued to imply recognition of American 
independence and requested De Graaf to 
return to the Netherlands to explain his 
conduct. Delaying his departure on the 
grounds that he and other members of 
his family had recently been ill and that 
he feared seasickness from a long 
voyage, De Graaf did not reach home un- 
til July 1778 and did not present his ex- 
planation until the following February. 
He said that the salute of the Andrew 
Doria had, at his instructions, been 
returned with two fewer guns than she 
had fired. As the customary return salute 
to merchant vessels, this had not con- 
stituted recognition of American in- 
dependence. De Graaf was exonerated of 
any misconduct and returned to his 

lay 1982 

of amity and commerce. Because 
Laurens' departure was considerably 
delayed, Congress also sent a letter in 
June 1780 to John Adams — one of the 
commissioners in Paris — empowering 
him, pending Laurens' arrival, to act in 
his stead. In August 1780 Laurens set 
sail from Philadelphia, but a British 
frigate seized his ship off the coast of 
Newfoundland. Before the British stormed 
the ship, Laurens tossed overboard 
the bag containing his letters of credence 
to the States General and the copy of the 
draft secret treaty. But the iron shot at- 
tached to the bag was insufficient to sink 
it, and the British easily fished it out of 
the sea. 

When the copy of the draft treaty 
reached London, the British Government 
imprisoned Laurens in the Tower of Lon- 
don. Aware that the Dutch were pre- 
pared to join the League of Armed 
Neutrality, the British Government de- 
nounced the Anglo-Dutch alliance. Rather 
than have the Dutch Republic join the 
league and make its ships and goods 
available to France and Spain, the British 
preferred a war that would give them 
freedom to capture Dutch ships and end 
Dutch contraband trade with America. 
British attacks on Dutch shipping began 
immediately, and an English squadron 
captured Sint Eustatius and other Dutch 
possessions in the Caribbean. 


•dams' Mission 
in the Netherlands 

While the battle over Dutch 
neutrality was being waged in the sum- 
mer of 1780, John Adams arrived in the 
Netherlands. He reached Rotterdam on 
August 4 with his two sons, 13-year old 
John Quincy and 10-year old Charles, 

and, after proceeding through Delft, The 
Hague, and Leyden, arrived in Amster- 
dam on August 10. Disagreeing with 
French Foreign Minister Vergennes and 
Franklin, whom he considered too sub- 
servient to the French, Adams thought 
he was wasting his time in Paris. On his 
own initiative, even before receiving Con- 
gress' instructions, Adams had decided to 
go to the Netherlands to seek recognition 
and money for his government. His pur- 
pose was "to see if something might not 
be done there, to render my country 
somewhat less dependent of France, both 
for political consideration, for loans of 
money and supplies for our army."* He 
resided at Amsterdam because he felt it 
would be easier to secure loans there and 
he would not be under the thumb of the 
Due de la Vauguyon, French Ambassador 
at The Hague. 

This round-faced and outspoken 
New England lawyer found the Dutch 
people hospitable and friendly. The thriv- 
ing city of Amsterdam, full of foreigners, 
merchants, and diplomatic agents, ex- 
cited him and he easily made many new 
friends. Soon after arriving he praised 
the country in a letter to his wife, 

/ have been here three weeks, and have 
spent my time very agreeably here. I am 
very much pleaded with Holland. It is a 
singular Country. It is like no other. It is 
all the Effect of Industry and the Work of 
Art. The Frugality, Industry, Cleanliness 
etc. here, deserve the Imitation of my 
Countrymen. The Fruit of these Virtues 
has been immense Wealth and great Pros- 
perity. They are not Ambitious, and 
therefore happy. They are very sociable, 
however, in their peculiar Fashion.^ 

Adams immediately set out to 
learn Dutch, to study the country's 
history, and to understand its people, 
government, and international situation. 
For Adams, comprehending the compli- 
cated Dutch political system was difficult: 

The sovereignty resides in the States- 
general; but who are the States-general? 
Not their High Mightinesses who assemble 

Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

(Private Collection of Andres Oliver, Jr.. Daniel 
Oliver, and Mrs. Daniel Morley) 

John Quincy Adams 

John Adams' young sons, John Quincy 
(1767-1848) and Charles (1770-1800), 
were enrolled in the Amsterdam Latin 
School from August through November 

1780. In December they were placed 
under the care of a tutor in Ley den and 
were subsequently enrolled at the Llniver- 
sity of Leyden. There John Quincy 
studied jurisprudence, Dutch history, 
French drama, Pope's poetry, and 
various Greek and Latin authors. 
Perhaps because some misconduct by 
John Quincy had been responsible for his 
leaving the Amsterdam Latin School, 
Abigail Adams wrote to her son in 
Leyden expressing the hope that "the 
universal neatness and cleanliness of the 
people where you reside will cure you of 
all your slovenly tricks, and that you will 
learn from them industry, economy, and 
frugality." In July 1781, shortly before 
he turned 14, John Quincy left the 
Netherlands for St. Petersburg where he 
was to serve for more than a year as 
secretary and interpreter to the Minister- 
Designate to Russia, Francis Dana. 

John Quincy Adams later served in 
various diplomatic posts, as Secretary of 
State (1817-25), as sixth President of the 
United States (1825-29), and as a 
member of the House of Representatives 

at the Hague to deliberate; these are only 
deputies of the States-general. The States- 
general are the regencies of the cities and 
the bodies of nobles in the several Prov- 
inces. The burgomasters of Amsterdam, 
therefore, who are called the. regency, are 
one integral branch of the sovereignty of 
the United Provinces, and the most 
material branch of all, because the city of 
Amsterdam is one quarter of the whole 
republic, at least in taxes.^ 


month after his arrival, Adams 
received a provisional commission from 
Congress to negotiate a loan. His initial 
expectation was that support would be 

easily obtained, but he soon discovered 
that the merchants and bankers of the 
United Provinces did not want to risk 
their funds without assurance of repay- 
ment and that they wanteci commercial 
advantage as much as the United States 
wanted credit. 

To the Dutch capitalists, the pros- 
pect of an American triumph looked slim 
in 1780 in view of British victories at 
Charleston in May and at Camden, South 
Carolina, in August. The longer Adams 
stayed in Holland, the more he realized 
how difficult it would be to persuade the 
Dutch to take any concrete action. By the 
end of 1780, although discouraged by his 
lack of success in obtaining a loan, he 

May 1982 

had not given up hope. In a letter to the 
President of Congress, he wrote: 

Patience, firmness, and perseverance are 
our only remedy; these are a sure and in- 
fallible one; and, with this observation, I 
beg permission to take my leave of Con- 
gress for the Year 1 780, which has been to 
me the most anxious and mortifying year 
of my whole life.'' 

Because of Laurens' capture by 
the British, Congress on January 1, 1781, 
appointed Adams as Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary to the Government of the Nether- 

Adams realized that in order to 
obtain loans from the United Provinces, 
he would have to educate its people about 
his country. Even in the large port cities, 
he found pessimism about the chances of 
the rebellion succeeding, suspicion that 
the United States would fall under the 
control of France and Spain, and un- 
familiarity with either the government or 
resources of the United States. In 
writing to the President of Congress, he 

This country has been grossly deceived. It 
has little knowledge of the numbers, 
wealth, and resources of the United 
States, and less faith in their finally sup- 
porting their independence, upon which 
alone a credit depends. They have also an 
opinion of the power of England vastly 
higher than the truth. Measures must be 
taken, but with great caution and 
delicacy, to undeceive them.^ 


.dams' Supporters 
in the Netherlands 

Adams demonstrated his excep- 
tional talents as an advocate for the 
United States. He read, talked, ques- 
tioned, persuaded, and skillfully argued 

with those he met and seemed instinc- 
tively to know what would appeal to 
Dutch readers. With the assistance of 
friends and collaborators, he flooded the 
United Provinces with sermons, articles, 
and letters from America. Dumas, who 
put Adams in touch with writers and 
publishers in the Patriot party, translated 
and edited any material Adam wanted to 

Through Dumas, Adams met 
Johan Luzac, a Patriot, lawyer, and 
classical scholar of Leyden who became a 
close personal friend. Luzac was editor of 
the Nouvelles extraordinaires de divers 
endroits published in Leyden and known 
throughout Europe as the Gazette de 
Leyde. Extremely interested in the goals 
and policies of the Thirteen Colonies and 
wanting to publish factual accounts, not 
propaganda or rumors, Luzac printed the 
reports provided by Adams of meetings 
of the American Philosophical Society in 
Philadelphia and the American Academy 
of Arts and Sciences in Boston. Later he 
printed, in installments, the new Massa- 
chusetts constitution which Adams him- 
self had drafted. 


.nother important friend was An- 
toine Marie Cerisier, a Frenchman, 
classical scholar, and authority on Dutch 
history and government who published 
the journal Le politique hollandais of 
Amsterdam. Since this publication was 
an organ of French propaganda, he 
eagerly followed many of Adams' sugges- 
tions and printed material favorable to 
America. Adams was especially pleased 
when Cerisier printed and distributed in 
large numbers translations of accounts by 
the defeated British Generals Burgoyne 
and Howe. While the authors attempted 
to excuse their military failures, they also 
unwittingly demonstrated the desperate 
state of the British cause in America. 

Adams also met the prominent 
Amsterdam jurist, Hendrik Calkoen, who 
bombarded him with questions about 
America. Adams suggested they be put 

Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. -Netherlands: 
A Bicentennial 

Prince Willem V (1748-1806), served as 
Stadholder of the United Provinces of the Nether- 
lands from 1751-1795. The later years of his rule 
saw the Netherlands weakened by its participation 
in European conflicts in 1780 and again in 
1792-1793 and by internal factional strife. He was 
overthrown in 1795 and fled to England. (Private 
Collection of J.W. Schulte Nordholt) 

^ay 1982 

; /^rU'/fAt. 

, I . 



</l/fli/u.jr • 

Copy of John Adams' letter of credence, 
which he presented to the States General on 
April 20, 1782, and to Prince Willem V two days 
later. (Courtesy of the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

Johan Luzac, editor of the Gazette de Leyde, pro- 
fessor at Leiden University, and close friend of 
John Adams. (Private Collection of J.W. Schulte 

in writing and systematically answered. 
The 26 short essays Adams wrote as 
replies were used by Calkoen to compare 
the 16th century revolt of the Low Coun- 
tries against Spain with the American 
rebellion against Great Britain. He con- 
cluded that the success of the former was 
a miracle and that it would be a greater 
miracle if the latter did not succeed. 
Calkoen read a paper containing these 
conclusions to a literary society in Am- 
sterdam and thereby spread some of 
Adams' ideas as well as his own. 

ther close friends of Adams includ- 
ed Johan Derk van der Capellen, a noble- 
man who had been the first in the 
Netherlands to espouse the American 
cause. As early as 1775, Van der 
Capellen declared that the Americans de- 
served esteem "as brave folk who in a 
calm, courageous and Godfearing manner 
are defending the rights granted to them 
as human beings, not by the Legislature 
in England, but by God himself. "» He 
gave Adams useful advice and support. 

as did the Mennonite preacher from 
Leyden, Francois Adrian van der Kemp, 
who demonstrated his faith in America 
through preaching and publication of 
American documents. Van der Kemp, 
who eventually settled in the United 
States, wrote enthusiastically: 

In America the sun of salvation has risen 
which shall also shine upon ws if we wish: 
only America can revive our Commerce, 
our Navigation: . . . America can teach us 
how to fight the degeneration of the 
people's character, to stay moral corrup- 
tion, to put an end to bribery, to smother 
the seeds of tyranny and to restore the 
health of our moribund freedom. America 
has been ordained by the Being of all be- 
ings to be the Netherlands' last preacher 
of penitence; America has been ordained 
to heal the flaws in the character of the 
Netherlands people, if they wish to follow 
in its footsteps. '° 


JL JL Time of Difficulty 
for Adams 

In the early months of his mission 
in the Netherlands, Adams encountered a 
clear unwillingness to lend financial 
assistance to the Colonies. Consequently 
he was heartened by increased signs of 
support for his countrymen that began 
appearing early in 1781. Addresses sup- 
porting the Colonies were presented in 
the theaters, and popular songs were 
sung in the streets of Amsterdam. 
Adams also saw hope in the new wave of 
anti-British feeling in Haarlem, Leyden, 
The Hague, Delft, and Rotterdam follow- 
ing England's declaration of war against 
the Netherlands. These signs encouraged 
him to make himself and his mission 
known formally to the Dutch Govern- 



.fter receiving his credentials, along 
with instructions to conclude a treaty if 
possible with the States General, Adams 
consulted with his most influential and 
knowledgeable Dutch friends and decided 
not to present his credentials. At Adams' 
request, Dumas instead submitted a 
memorial to the States General on March 
10 informing them of Congress' support 
of the League of Armed Neutrality. They 

Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, (1741-84), 
a nobleman from Overijssel, was the first champion 
of the American cause in the Netherlands. (Private 
Collection of J.W. Schulte Nordholt) 

Francis Adrian van der Kemp was a Mennonite 
minister at Leiden and a great defender of the 
American cause. He was banished from Holland in 
1788 and emigrated to the United States where he 
settled in Barneveld. near Utica, New York, until 
his death in 1829. (Courtesy New-York Historical 

were asked to discuss the issue among 
themselves and with the other neutral 
powers. Nothing came of the memorial; 
the States General received it, but took 
no action. Officials in Amsterdam, Dor- 
drecht, and Haarlem told Dumas they 
were happy to see the memorial but 
regretted they could not reply. 

At the end of March, Adams 
began to compose a second memorial to 
the States General. In this document, 
written in Leyden and completed April 

19, Adams outlined America's claim to 
recognition by the Dutch Republic and 
his own claim to reception as minister. 
He explained how the American rebellion 
began and reviewed the wrongs of the 
English who had deprived the colonists of 
"the rights and liberties of Englishmen" 
and who had left them no alternative but 
to rise in rebellion and to assume "an 
equal station among the nations." The 
British fleets and armies, Adams said, 
had failed to alter America's determina- 
tion to be free. He declared that "a 
natural alliance" existed between the two 
republics. The first inhabitants of New 
York and New Jersey, Adams recalled, 
were Dutch emigrants who "transmitted 
their religion, language, customs, man- 
ners, and character": 

The originals of the two republics are so 
much alike, that the history of one seems 
but a transcript from that of the other; so 
that every Dutchman instructed in the 
subject must pronounce the American 
Revolution just and necessary, or pass a 
censure upon the greatest actions of his 
immortal ancestors; actions which have 
been approved and applauded by mankind 
and justified by the decision of Heaven. 

Adams argued that once the 
British monopoly was broken, the United 
States and the Netherlands could benefit 
from an alliance which facilitated trade 
between Holland — rich in ships, traders, 
and funds — and America — overflowing 
with products and raw materials. Adams 
concluded that it was the desire of the 
United States "to form equitable commer- 
cial treaties with all the maritime powers 
of Europe, without being governed or 
monopolized by any." He observed that 
"if such benevolent policy should be 
adopted, the New World will be a propor- 
tional blessing to every part of the Old."" 


• dams journeyed to The Hague at 
the beginning of May to transmit the 
memorial to the States General. La 
Vauguyon, the French Ambassador, tried 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

but failed to dissuade Adams from 
delivering it. On May 4 Adams presented 
the memorial to Pieter van Bleiswyk, 
Grand Pensionary of Holland, who 
replied that he could not receive it but 
advised Adams to see the current Presi- 
dent of the States General, the Baron 
van Lynden van Hemmen. Adams went 
immediately to see the President to ex- 
plain his mission. The President replied 
that he could not receive Adams' creden- 
tials or the memorial because the United 
States was not yet acknowledged as a 
sovereign state by the Netherlands. He 
did agree to report their conversation to 
his colleagues and said that he thought 
the matter of great importance to the 
Netherlands. The same day Adams called 
on the Baron de Larrey, secretary to 
Prince Willem V, and presented the 
memorial and his diplomatic credentials. 
A few hours later, the secretary told 
Adams that the Prince sent his com- 
pliments but wished to return the 
documents, since he could not receive 
any letters from Adams because his na- 
tion was not yet recognized. 

Despite the official rejection, 
Adams knew he must keep the issue of 
recognition alive. With the help of Luzac 
and Dumas, he had the memorial trans- 
lated into French and Dutch and distri- 
buted to every political official in the 
provinces— some 4,000-5,000 persons. 
The appeal was also published by news- 
papers in the Netherlands and later 
throughout Europe. 

Adams realized his only alterna- 
tive was to wait. Heavy losses to the 
British at sea, the paralysis of Dutch 
commerce, and military weakness divided 
the Dutch Republic in the spring and 
summer of 1781 and meant that the time 
for recognition had not yet come. At the 
end of August, Adams became very ill 
and despondent. He was discouraged by 
his lack of success; depressed by Dutch 
indecision, procrastination, and am- 
bivalence; and lonely for his family. His 
wife was still in America and his sons 
had left Amsterdam. John Adams 
suffered for 2 months with what he 
termed a nervous fever. 


he Tide Turns 

Both Adams' health and Ameri- 
ca's chances of winning the war improved 
in October 1781. The French-American 
victory over Cornwallis' army at York- 
town on October 19 turned the tide of 
battle and simplified Adams' tasks. Al- 
though it was 6 weeks before word of the 
victory reached Europe, it was decisive 
because it was understood everywhere 
that England could not replace its 8,000 
surrendered soldiers. American independ- 
ence now seemed assured. Moreover, at 
the end of November, Adams received 
new instructions from Congress to con- 
clude, if possible, an alliance with the 
Dutch Government, preferably as part of 
a triple alliance with France. The pre- 
condition for this alliance was Dutch 
recognition of American independence. 
Pleased by his new instructions, he 
reported them to La Vauguyon, who ad- 
vised Adams to begin negotiations with 
the Netherlands. 

Adams resumed the diplomatic in- 
itiative and journeyed to The Hague early 
in the new year. On January 9, 1782, he 
asked the President of the States General 
for a "categorical answer" to his 
memorial of the preceding May. The 
President said he would report this new 
request to the States General for 
transmission to the members for their 
deliberation and decision. Adams also 
spoke to delegations from the principal 
cities of the Province of Holland who 
were headquartered in The Hague. The 
Hollanders, who favored close ties with 
America, received him warmly. 

The campaign of the American 
diplomat and his Dutch friends began to 
bear fruit in February and March of 
1782. In many cities, petitions were 
presented to the magistrates urging them 
to receive Adams as minister. Adams' 
supporters — Van der Capellen, Luzac, 


and Calkoen — gave spirit to this move- 
ment and composed numerous pamphlets. 
On February 26, the assembly of the 
northern Province of Friesland, whose 
shipping had suffered terrible losses at 
the hands of the British, voted to instruct 
its deputies in the States General to 
move formally for the reception of 
Adams as the American Minister. The 
assembly of the Province of Holland 
voted similarly on March 28, and during 
the first weeks of April one province 
after another followed suit. 


of the United States 

On April 19, 1782, a year after 
Adams had signed his first appeal to the 
States General and on the seventh anni- 
versary of the battles of Lexington and 
Concord, he achieved the long-sought 
goal. The States General of the United 
Provinces resolved to admit and acknowl- 
edge Adams "in quality of envoy of the 
United States of North America."i2 The 
Netherlands had at last recognized the 
United States. The next day, April 20, 
Adams went to the States General to 
present his credentials. 

On April 22, Prince Willem V 
granted the American envoy an audience 
to present his credentials. In describing 
his reception at the Prince's palace, Huys 
ten Bosch, on the outskirts of The 
Hague, Adams noted that they spoke in 

/ told him that I was happy to have the 
honor of presenting the respects of the 
United States of America, and a letter of 
credence from them to his Most Serene 
Highness, and to assure him of the pro- 
found veneration in which the House of 
Orange had been held in America, even 
from its first settlement, and that I should 

be happier still to be the instrument of 
further cementing the new connexions be- 
tween the two nations professing the same 
religion, animated by the same spirit of 
liberty, and having reciprocal interests, 
both political and commercial, so exten- 
sive and important. . . . 

The Prince read the credentials and 
accepted them and asked Adams several 
polite questions about his stay in the 
Netherlands, to which Adams graciously 
replied. '2 


.dams had reason to be pleased with 
his achievement. By applying at the 
earliest possible moment for recognition 
and then pressing for an answer from the 
States General, he had not only drawn 
attention to his own mission but also had 
helped to rally the anti-British faction in 
the Netherlands with his dramatic appeal 
for Dutch- American friendship. As the 
Spanish Minister at The Hague remarked 
to Adams: 

You Sir, have struck the greatest blow in 
all Europe. It is the best blow that has 
ever been struck in the American cause. It 
will be a fright and terror to the Anglo- 
manes. It will kindle the enthusiasyn of 
this nation. It is you who have turned 
their heads in the right direction.^^ 

Dutch recognition of the United 
States thrust Adams into public promi- 
nence. He spent several days receiving 
and paying visits to more than 150 
members of the government and Court. 
On April 23, La Vauguyon gave a recep- 
tion for the diplomatic corps in honor of 
the United States and introduced Adams 
to all the ministers of the foreign Courts. 
In the following weeks, Adams was 
showered with invitations to attend ban- 
quets, public dinners, festivals, and fire- 
works displays in celebration of the 
recognition. Dutch artists, poets, and 
publishers commemorated the occasion 
with portraits, poems, publications, 
songs, and coins. The persistent Adams 
had become a hero to the Dutch. 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

Huys ten Bosch, the Stadholder's resi- 
dence on the outskirts of The Hague, where John 
Adams presented his credentials as American 
Minister to Prince Willem V on April 22, 1782. 
(Courtesy Gemeente-Archief, The Hague) 


I he Treaty of Amity and 

On April 23, the day after his au- 
dience with the Prince, the American en- 
voy presented the proposal for a treaty of 
amity and commerce to the President of 
the States General. That same day the 
assembled dignitaries appointed a com- 
mittee to discuss the matter of the trea- 
ty, and Adams was introduced to its 

members, to whom he presented a copy 
of a draft treaty drawn up on the basis of 
his instructions from Congress. 

While the government deliberated 
over the treaty, Adams succeeded in ob- 
taining the loan which his country needed 
so desperately. After 6 weeks of negotia- 
tion and bargaining, Adams signed an 
agreement on June 11 with a syndicate of 
three Amsterdam firms — the Willinks, 
the Van Staphorsts, and De la Lande & 
Fynje — for a loan of 5 million guilders 
payable in 15 years at 5'K) interest. 
Adams had hoped for a larger sum, but 
he was satisfied with the terms finally 

May 1982 



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Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

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First and last pages of U.S.-Netherlands Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 
signed at The Hague, October 8, 1782. (National Archives Photos) 


negotiated. The Dutch loan agreement 
served as an important precedent and 
laid a permanent foundation for Ameri- 
can credit abroad. This was the first of 
several such loans negotiated by the new 
American Government with the Nether- 
lands during the next 10 years. They 
enabled the relatively weak government 
under the Articles of Confederation to 
survive the peace and to function until 
the establishment of a stronger govern- 
ment under the Constitution of 1787. 

Once the first loan was secured, 
Adams focused on negotiations for the 
treaty of amity and commerce. He re- 
gretted the lengthy deliberations by the 
committee, the States General, the prov- 
inces, the cities, and the Admiralty. On 
June 15 Adams conferred with Van 
Bleiswyk and overcame some of his 
minor objections to the treaty. By the 
end of August, the States General had 
received reports on the treaty from the 
provinces, and Adams was invited to 
meet with the committee to discuss them. 
Adams' consultations with the committee 
were successful, and it completed its 
work early in September. On September 
17 Adams went over the text of the trea- 
ty word by word with the Secretary of 
the States General. In a letter that day 
to Francis Dana, American Minister- 
designate to Russia, Adams wrote with 
an eye toward France as much as toward 
the Netherlands and Great Britain: 

/ shall sign the treaty of commerce next 
week. . . . The standard of the United 
States waves and flies at The Hague in 
triumph over Sir Joseph Yorke's insolence 
and British pride. When I go to heaven I 
shall look down over the battlements with 
pleasure upon the Stripes and Stars wan- 
toning in the wind at The Hague. There is 
another triumph in the case, sweeter than 
that over our enemies. You know my 
meaning; it is the triumph of stubborn in- 
dependence. Independence of friends and 
foes. 1^ 

Elias Boudinot (1740-1821), a Philadelphia 
lawyer, who served as a member of the Continental 
Congress, 1777-1784, and as its President, 
1782-1783. He later was a Congressman from New 
Jersey and the director of the U.S. Mint. In this 
portrait by Charles Willson Peale, Boudinot is 
shown holding the "Proclamation of Peace with 
Great Britain 1783." In the lower right corner are 
three documents entitled "Confederation," "Treaty 
with the United Netherlands," and "Treaty with 
Sweden." According to one art historian, both the 
painter and the subject considered these four 
documents "the crowning accomplishments of a 
distinguished public career." (Courtesy Princeton 
University Art Museum) 


'n October 8 Adams went to the 
State House at The Hague for the formal 
signing ceremony. He was received by 
the deputies of Holland and Zeeland and 
conducted into the Truce Chamber where 
he and George van Randwyck, Van 
Bleiswyk, and six other Dutch officials 
signed the treaty of amity and 
commerce. ^^ A convention concerning re- 
captured vessels was also signed. 

In a report to Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs Robert Livingston, 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

Nassau Hall, Princeton, New Jersey, 
detail from a watercolor based on an 1800 engrav- 
ing. The site of the presentation by Pieter Johan 
van Berckel of his credentials as the Netherlands 
first Minister to the United States on October 31, 
1783. Congress had left Philadelphia on June 24, 
1783, after the local authorities proved unwilling or 
unable to deal with army mutineers demonstrating 
in the city. Congress met in Princeton until 
November 3, 1783, when it adjourned and moved to 
Annapolis, Maryland. (Courtesy Princeton Universi- 
ty Art Museum) 

Robert R. Livingston (1746-1813), first 
Secretary for Foreign Aflfairs, was appointed by the 
Continental Congress October 20, 1781, and served 
until June 4, 1783. (Department of State Photo) 

May 1982 


Adams explained the points of disagree- 
ment that had been settled and indicated 
that the treaty followed Congress' in- 
structions as closely as possible. Adams 
had compromised on two provisions 
essential to the Dutch. The first pledged 
Americans to respect the Dutch colonies 
and their rights; the second insisted there 
be conformity to the laws of each country 
respecting public worship. "Upon the 
whole," wrote Adams, "I think the treaty 
is conformable to the principles of perfect 
reciprocity, and contains nothing that can 
possibly be hurtful to America, or offen- 
sive to our allies, or to any nation, except 
Great Britain, to whom it is, indeed, 
without a speedy peace a mortal blow."" 

The treaty was ratified by the 
Netherlands on December 27, 1782, and 
by the Continental Congress on January 
23, 1783. To Adams it represented the 
culmination of his efforts to win Dutch 
support and demonstrated that the 
United States, no longer dependent sole- 
ly on France for support, had widened its 
freedom of maneuver. 


^^^flstablishment of the 
American Legation 

At the instruction of Congress, 
Adams left the Netherlands for Paris on 
October 17, 1782, to join the negotiations 
for a preliminary treaty of peace with 
Great Britain. After a brief trip to 
Holland in the summer of 1783, Adams 
returned to Paris where, on September 3, 
1783, he and his colleagues signed the 
definitive treaty which ended America's 
Revolutionary War. He left the affairs of 
the United States in the hands of Dumas. 
Although he held no commission because 
he was not an American citizen, Dumas 
continued to serve as charge d'affaires in 

the Netherlands until 1790. At Adams' 
request, Dumas installed himself in the 
Hotel des Etats-Unis at The Hague, the 
first legation building actually owned 
abroad by the United States. Adams had 
purchased this house in February 1782 
because he believed it important for 
America to have its envoy ensconced in a 
proper residence at The Hague. As 
Adams had written at that time: 

. . . it appears to me of indispensable im- 
portance that a minister should reside 
constantly here, vested with the same 
powers from Congress with which they 
have honored me; for which reason, hav- 
ing the offer of a large and elegant house 
in a fine situation on a noble spot of 
ground at The Hague at a very reasonable 
rate, I have . . . purchased it. . . .'^ 


ihe First Netherlands 
Minister to the United 

In the spring of 1783, the Dutch 
Government appointed Pieter Johan van 
Berckel, Mayor of Rotterdam and brother 
to the Pensionary of Amsterdam, as the 
first Netherlands Minister to the United 
States. Dumas reported that Van Berckel 
had been nominated by the Province of 
Holland and accepted by the States 
General. The new minister, he wrote, 
was "amiable, estimable, and patriotic." 
At Van Berckel's request, Dumas asked 
Secretary for Forei^ Affairs Livingston 
to arrange for the rental of a "fine, large, 
and spacious house" in Philadelphia for 
the minister and his five children. He also 
requested that a new coach be made and 
that "six fine carriage horses" be bought 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

Pieter Johan van Berckel (died 1800), 
Mayor of Rotterdam, was appointed the Nether- 
lands' first Minister to the United States in May 
1783. He presented his credentials to Congress on 
October 31, 1783, and served as minister until his 
recall by the States General in 1788. (Private Col- 
lection of J.W. Schulte Nordholt) 

for Van Berckel. Livingston replied that 
he rejoiced at Van Berckel's appointment 
and that "the patriotic character of his 
family" would insure him an agreeable 

In their instructions to Van Ber- 
ckel, the States General stressed the im- 
portance of the promotion and protection 
of Dutch commerce. They asked him to 
identify the principal interests of both 
countries and to safeguard the interests 
of Dutch merchants. He was also asked 
to inform his government about the con- 
stitutions of the Thirteen States, their 

relationship to each other and to the cen- 
tral government, and the land- and sea- 
power of the new nation as well as its ex- 
ternal commitments.^" 


▼ an 

an Berckel sailed from the 
Netherlands on June 23, 1783, in a ship 
of the line accompanied by three other 
vessels. After a stormy crossing, the new 
Dutch Minister arrived in Philadelphia. 
On October 30 Van Berckel journeyed to 
Princeton, New Jersey, where Con- 
gress — having left Philadelphia in June 
following public disturbances there — was 
convening. He had received an invitation 
from Elias Boudinot, the President of 
Congress, to present his credentials on 
October 31. Boudinot, who had also 
offered the hospitality of his Philadelphia 
home to the Dutch Minister upon his ar- 
rival, informed him that Congress was 
"greatly mortified, that our present cir- 
cumstances, in a small country village, 
prevent us giving you a reception more 
agreeable to our wishes. . . .'^'' In describ- 
ing the journey to Princeton and his 
reception. Van Berckel wrote: 

In the evening when I was still a distance 
of six Eyiglish miles away, I was met by 
an escort which had orders to accoinpany 
me. It consisted of an officer and eight 
light riders belonging to the bodyguard of 
General Washington. Upon my arrival in 
Princeton I was welcomed beside my 
coach by General Lincoln in his capacity 
as Secretary of the War Department, as 
well as by some other gentlemen on behalf 
of Congress, and led to the apartment 
which the Congress had provided for me 
and a few of my attendants in the home of 
the Pastm' of Princetoyi. Thereupon I went 
immediately to pay a visit to the Presi- 
dent of the Congress; and after having 
settled some matters with him relating^ to 
my audience the following day, I was in- 
formed toward noon on the second day by 


the Superintendent of Finances and by the 
Secretary of War, who had been jointly 
designated, in the absence of a Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, to iritroduce me, that 
the Congress was assembled and prepared 
to receive me; whereupon I rode in my 
own coach to the Howie of the Assembly, 
and there, at the foot of the stairs, I was 
received by the above-mentioned intro- 
ducers and led into the Assembly. After 
giving an address appropriate to the mat- 
ter, a copy of which is herewith enclosed, I 
presented the Letter of your High 
Mightinesses, which was read by a Dutch 
interpreter; the President then read a 
reply in English . . . to the address I had 
given; with this the solemn ceremony was 
concluded and I was led out again and 
brought to my coach.^^ 

The ceremony took place in 
Nassau Hall in Princeton where Congress 
held its meetings. This stately building 
was named after Prince Willem V's fore- 
father, Willem III, Prince of Orange and 
Nassau, Stadholder of the Netherlands, 
who became King of England in 1688. In 
his address to Congress given in French, 
Van Berckel expressed his joy and satis- 
faction at the opportunity to meet with 
such illustrious men "whom the present 
age admires." He declared: 

While all Europe kept its eyes fixed on 
your exploits, their High Mightinesses 
could not refrain from very seriously in- 
teresting themselves therein, recollecting 
as they always did the dangers and diffi- 
culties to which their forefathers were sub- 
jected, before they could free themselves 
from the yoke in which they were en- 
thralled. They knew better than any other 
the worth of independence, and they kyiew 
how to set a just value on the greatness of 
your designs. They applauded your 
generous enterprise, which was inspired 
by a love of your country, conducted with 
prudence and supported with heroic 
courage; and they rejoiced at the happy 
success which crowned your labours.'^^ 

Van Berckel's credentials conclud- 
ed with the following statement: 

We shall at all times rejoice in your in- 
creasing felicity; and we desire nothing 
more ardently than that we may main- 
tain the strictest friendship and corre- 
spondence with you, for the good of the 
subjects and inhabitants of both 


' oudinot then addressed the 
gathering. He welcomed the new 
minister, received his credentials, and ac- 
cepted with pleasure "the honorable testi- 
monials of confidence and esteem of their 
High Mightinesses, and their affectionate 
congratulations on the success of our 
efforts in the sacred cause of liberty." 
Boudinot said: 

Governed by the same ardent love offree- 
dmn, and the same maxiyns of policy; 
cemented by a liberal system of commerce, 
and earnestly disposed to advance our 
mutual prosperity, by a reciprocity of 
good offices; we persuade ourselves that 
the most friendly and beneficial connexion 
between the two republics, will be pre- 
served inviolate to the latest ages.^^ 

After the ceremony, Boudinot 
gave a banquet for the new Dutch Min- 
ister. That same day. General George 
Washington visited Van Berckel and in- 
troduced him to a number of generals 
and prominent officers. The next day, the 
Dutch envoy received all the members of 
Congress and dined again with Boudinot. 
On November 2, Washington arranged an 
elegant dinner for the minister and many 
members of Congress and officers. In his 
report to the States General, Van Ber- 
ckel wrote that "the character of your 
High Mightinesses has been treated with 
all distinction by the Congress and its 
members, as well as by George 
Washington. "2^ 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 


Continuing Bond 

In 1782 the United States and the 
Netherlands shared certain traits. Both 
were small and vulnerable, dependent on 
the sea, and devoted to free trade. Both 
were republics, committed to decentral- 
ized government and the rule of law, 
domestic and international. This common 
perspective facilitated Adams' efforts to 
persuade the Dutch to risk supporting 
the American Revolution. While the 
United States obtained from the 
Netherlands needed funds, a boost in 
morale, and enhanced prestige, Dutch ex- 
pectations for an expansion of trade with 
the United States were not fulfilled. In 
fact, the United States soon became a 
commercial rival, not a customer. And 
during the 1780s and 1790s the example 
of the American Revolution was 
repeatedly invoked in various forms by 
different factions in the political debates 
that occurred in the Dutch Republic. 

Through the years relations be- 
tween the two countries have matured 
and the bonds between them have been 
strengthened. Grateful generations of 
Americans have viewed the Dutch as kin- 
dred spirits with the same fierce love of 
independence as their own Founding 
Fathers. As John Adams remarked to his 
wife in 1782: 

/ love the People where I am. They have 
Faults but they have deep Wisdom and 
great Virtues — and they love America and 
will be her everlasting Friend, I think.^'' 


1 In addition to various biographies of John Adams 
and monographs on the diplomacy of the American 
Revolution, several specialized works treat the sub- 
ject of the establishment of Dutch-American rela- 
tions: Friedrich Edler, The Dutch Republic and the 

American Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1911); Lyman H. Butte rfield, "John 
Adams and the Beginnings of Netherlands- 
American Friendship, 1780-1788," in Butterfield in 
Holland: A Record ofL.H. Butterfield's Pursuit of 
the Adamses Abroad in 1959 (Cambridge, Mass: 
privately printed, 1961) which was of particular use 
in preparing this paper; J.W. Schulte Nordholt, 
"The Impact of the American Revolution on the 
Dutch Republic," in The Impact of the American 
Revolution Abroad (Washington: Library of Con- 
gress, 1976); James H. Hutson, John Adams and the 
Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky, 1980); and J.W. 
Schulte Nordholt, The Dutch Republic and 
American Independence (to be published by the 
University of North Carolina Press in 1982). 

2 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, circa 
August 15, 1782; Lyman H. Butterfield, et ai, eds., 
Adams Family Correspondence (Cambridge: Har- 
vard University Press, 1964), vol. IV, p. 361. 

3 Edler, The Dutch Republic and the American 
Revolution, p. 232. 

4 Adams to the Boston Patriot. June 23, 1809; Cor- 
respondence of the Late President Ada-ms (Boston, 
1809), pp. 102-103. 

5 Letter to Abigail Adams, September 4, 1780; But- 
terfield, Adams Family Correspondence, vol. II, pp. 

6 Adams to the President of Congress, November 
16, 1780; Charies Francis Adams, ed.. The Works of 
John Adams. Second President of the United States 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852), vol. 
VII, p. 329. 

7 Adams to the President of Congress, December 
31, 1780; ibid., pp. 348-349. 

8 Adams to the President of Congress, October 14, 
1780; Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary 
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 
vol. IV, pp. 97-98. 

9 Quoted in J.W. Schulte Nordholt, "John Adams 
and the Dutch Republic," in The Dutch Republic in 
the Days of John Adams (The Hague: Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976), p. 11. 

10 Quoted in J.W. Schulte Nordholt, "The Impact of 
the American Revolution on the Dutch Republic," in 
The Impact of the American Revolution Abroad. 

p. 46. 

11 Memorial to the States General, April 19, 1781; 
Wharton, Revolutionary Diplonuitic Correspond- 
ence, vol. IV, pp. 370-376. 

12 Adams to Secretary for Foreign Affairs Robert 
R. Livingston, April 19, 1782; ibid., vol. V, p. 319. 


13 Adams to Livingston, April 22, 1782; ibid., pp. 

14 Quoted by Adams in a letter to Edmund Jenings, 
April 28, 1782; Massachusetts Historical Society, 
The Adams Papers, Microfilm Reel 356. 

15 Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence, vol. V, pp. 732-733. 

16 For the text of the treaty, see Charles I. Bevans, 
ed.. Treaties and Oth^r International Agreements of 
the United States of America, 1776-19U9 (Washing- 
ton: Government Printing Office, 1972), vol. 10, pp. 

17 Adams to the President of Congress, October 8, 
1782; Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre- 
spondence, vol. V, pp. 803-805. 

18 Adams to Livingston, February 27, 1782; ibid., 
pp. 206-207. 

19 Dumas to Livingston, March 4, 5, and 20, 1783; 
National Archives, Papers of the Continental Con- 
gress (Record Group 360), Microfilm Reel 121; Liv- 
ingston to Dumas, undated but circa April 1783; 
Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence vol. VI, pp. 384-385. 

20 Secret Resolution of the States General with in- 
structions for Van Berckel, May 27, 1783; The 

Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Archief Staten- 
Generaal, invent, nr. 4773. 

21 Boudinot to Van Berckel, October 25, 1783; U.S. 
Department of State, The Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence of the United States of America from the Sign- 
ing of the Definitive Treaty ofPeaee. 10th Septem- 
ber. 1783, to the Adoption of the Constitution, 
March J,. 1789 (Washington: Francis Preston Blair, 
1833), vol. VI, pp. 423-424. 

22 Van Berckel to the States General, November 4, 
1783; The Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Archief 
Staten-Generaal, invent, nr. 7461. 

23 Worthington Chauncey Ford, et ai. eds.. Jour- 
nals of the Continental Congress. 177J,-1789 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922), 
vol. XXV, pp. 780-783. 

24 Ibid., pp. 783-785. 

25 Ibid., pp. 785-786. 

26 Van Berckel to the States General, November 4, 
1783; The Hague, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Archief 
Staten-Generaal, invent, nr. 7461. 

27 Letter circa August 15, 1782; Butterfield, Adams 
Family Correspondence vol. IV, p. 361. 


This paper was prepared for publication in connection with the bicentennial 

celebration of the establishment of Dutch-American relations. Sherrill Brown 

Wells of the General and European Division, Office of the Historian, Bureau 

of Public Affairs, Department of State, wrote it under the direction of Charles 

S. Sampson and Ronald D. Landa, Chief and Senior Historian, respectively, of 

that Division. WilHam Z. Slany, the Acting Historian, and Neal H. Petersen. 

Adviser on Research, reviewed the manuscript. The paper was edited by 
Harriet P. Culley, with coordination by Martin Judge, in the Office of Public 


For their kind assistance in the preparation of the paper, the author wishes to 

thank J.W. Schulte Nordholt, Professor of American History at the University 

of Leiden; Matthew Hodgson, Director of the University of North CaroHna 

Press; Gregg L. Lint of The Adams Papers, located at the Massachusetts 

Historical Society, Boston; Mary Deane Conners of the U.S. Embassy at The 

Hague; and Andries Ekker and Theo J.M. van den Muijsenberg of the 

Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C. 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

Queen Beatrix Visits the United States 

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix and His 
Royal Highness Prince Claus of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands made a state 
visit to the United States April 18-2U. 
1982, to commem,orate the 200th anniver- 
sary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. While in Washington, D.C.. 
April 18-22, Her Majesty met with 
President Reagan and other government 

Following are remarks made at the 
arrival ceremony on April 19 and the ex- 
change of toasts made at the state dinner 
that evening. '^ 

APR. 19, 19822 

President Reagan 

Nancy and I take great pleasure in 
welcoming Her Majesty Queen Beatrix 
and His Royal Highness Prince Claus of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 

This visit couldn't take place at a 
more appropriate moment. Today marks 
the 200th anniversary of the establish- 
ment of diplomatic relations between 
our countries. We're delighted that you 
honor us with your visit, Your Majesty, 
a visit that coincides with this historic 

The bonds between our two peoples 
represent the longest unbroken, peaceful 
relationship that we have had with any 
other nation. When we were seeking our 
independence 200 years ago, your coun- 
try was one of the first to which our 
forefathers turned. At that time, the 
Netherlands was a bastion of freedom 
and tolerance on the European Conti- 
nent, having fought its own long and cost- 
ly war for independence. John Adams, 
who later was to become our second 
President, was dispatched to your coun- 
try and reported the origins of the two 
republics are so much alike that the 
history of one seems but a transcript 
from that of the other. This parallel 
course did not end with the birth of our 
republic. Throughout the years, the 
Dutch and the Americans were the 
world's quintessential free traders — men 

and women of enterprise and commerce 
traversing the world in pursuit of 
peaceful trade. 

Today we recognize not only the 
200th anniversary of our relations but 
also the lasting imprint your country has 
made on America. Your Majesty, who 
can forget that New York was first New 
Amsterdam? Later Dutch families 
helped settle the frontier, and investors 
from the Netherlands played an in- 
dispensable role in producing the 
American economic miracle. Even today, 
our citizens build upon this heritage, re- 
maining a major source of foreign in- 
vestment capital for each other, interact- 
ing peacefully and constructively in 
mutually beneficial commerce. 

Few nations have had the good will 
that is the hallmark of the relations be- 
tween the United States and the 
Netherlands. Our shared values extend 
beyond the commercial vigor that built 
our standard of living that developed in 
both our countries. A respect for the 
rights of the individual, a recognition of 
human dignity more valuable than 
wealth generated by commerce, in- 
dustry, and a desire for peace more 
powerful than a tyrant's threat. In only 
a few places on this planet do people en- 
joy the treasures of liberty and tranquilli- 
ty. Those who do must be ever mindful 
of the costs of such well being. If 
totalitarian nations are permitted to 
achieve military superiority, liberty and 
peace will depend only on the good will 
of tyrants. 

The American people and the people 
of the Netherlands traditionally have 
been advocates of peace. Today our 
challenge lies not only in a desire for 
peace or in its advocacy but in accepting 
the responsibility to do that which is 
necessary to maintain peace. It is an ar- 
duous task, often a thankless one. 

In 1942 Queen Wilhelmina came to 
Washington and spoke to a joint 
meeting of our Congress. She said: 
"Democracy is our most precious 
heritage. We cannot breathe in the 
sullen atmosphere of despotic rule." 

Your Majesty, as we stood and 

President Reagan escorts Her Majesty and 
His Royal Highness during the welcoming 
ceremony on the South Lawn of the White 

heard the cannons welcome you a mo- 
ment ago, I couldn't help but think back 
to the early years of our fledgling 
republic. In 1776, shortly after we'd 
declared our independence, a tiny 
American fighting ship sailed into the 
Dutch port of Sint Eustatius in the 
Windward Islands of the Caribbean, our 
new nation's flag flying proudly on the 
mast. No powerful government had yet 
recognized us. But the cannons of the 
Dutch fort bellowed out the first foreign 
salute to the American flag flown by a • 
naval vessel. Today we return the honor. 

We've been side by side for 200 
years. Such friendship is appreciated 
here. Your Majesty, welcome to the 
United States. [Applause] 

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix 

Mr. President and Mrs. Reagan, my hus- 
band and I thank you for your warm 
welcome. Your words of cordiality are 
addressed to us and through us to my 
fellow countrymen. In a certain sense, 

May 1982 


we can regard our visit as a milestone 
on a journey that started some 200 
years ago, the end of which is not yet in 

Many Dutch people have also taken 
part in this journey to the new world. 
Hundreds of thousands have come to 
this great country to settle and build a 
new future. Others have come to seal 
the bonds of friendship. My grand- 
mother did so in 1942 when our coun- 
tries were joining hands to preserve 
freedom for the world and human digni- 
ty for mankind. In 1952 my mother 
came here to pay tribute to what the 
United States had done for us during 
the Second World War and in the subse- 
quent period of reconstruction. Now, as 
we jointly celebrate 200 years of 
uninterrupted diplomatic relations, we 
pause to reflect on the support our 
peoples have given each other since the 
very beginning of this great and proud 
nation, both in times of danger and in 
times of joy. We have looked forward to 
this official visit, which we realize will 
be altogether too short to cover such a 
vast area as the United States of 
America. We welcome the opportunity 
to become better acquainted with the 
American people later this year when 
my husband and I will be touring, in an 
official visit, to mark the bicentennial 
and celebrate, again, our very good rela- 

You, Mr. President, have officially 
proclaimed the 19th of April as Dutch- 
American Friendship Day. It marks the 
beginning of our state visit today— a 
promising beginning — and an ap- 
propriate moment to dwell on the value 
of our lasting friendship, of the very 
good ties between the United States and 
the Netherlands in the past, in the pres- 
ent, and in the future. Thank you. [Ap- 

APR. 19, 19823 

President Reagan 

This evening we welcome you to the 
White House realizing that this is a 
special occasion even for this house, 

steeped in tradition as it is. The history 
of our two countries will undoubtedly 
record that on this date, the 200th an- 
niversary of our diplomatic relations, the 
Queen of the Netherlands was our guest 
at a state dinner in the White House. 
We thank the Dutch people for sharing 
you with us. You're the third successive 
queen of the Netherlands to grace our 
nation's capital. 

We look forward to many such visits 
from you, from your heirs, because if 
any friendship is lasting and true, it is 
the one between our two peoples. The 
Dutch played a significant role in 
developing America, shaping our na- 
tional character. When thinking of this, 
images come to mind of Henry Hudson 
in 1609 sailing up the river that now 
bears his name, of pilgrims embarking 
at Delfshaven bound for America after 
living 12 years in Holland, of the Dutch 
West India Company buying Manhattan 
Island and laying the foundation for a 
magnificent city of commerce and of 
sturdy Dutch pioneers breaking ground 
for new farms in our Midwest. I thought 
that I would surprise Her Majesty by 
telling her that each year there's a tulip 
festival in Holland, Michigan. She's 

already booked to go there. [Laughter] 

Her Majesty, three American 
Presidents were of Dutch ancestry and 
111 bet that doesn't surprise you, 
either— Martin Van Buren, "Theodore 
Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt. 
Their contributions are well known. 

But countless lesser known men and 
women of Dutch ancestry composed the 
buildingstones of America. If we were 
successful in creating a free and pros- 
perous society of which we're rightfully 
proud, we must be thankful for the part 
played by our kindred spirits from the 
Netherlands— people who believed in 
hard work and who valued freedom. 
That's the spirit that built America, a 
spirit that citizens of Dutch ancestry 
helped instill in the American character. 

Rembrandt, one of your great art- 
ists, showed the world new uses of light 
to add depth and meaning to painting. 
Similarly, the Dutch, with uncompromis- 
ing devotion to liberty, have been a 
light, an inspiration, to Americans even 
in the depth of their darkest hours. 

In the early 1780s your nation 
fought a war which was at least partial- 
ly caused by the affinity between the 
Netherlands and the American colonists 

U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands 

William J. Dyess was born August 1, 1929, in 
Troy, Alabama. He received a B.A. (1950) 

and an M.A. (1951) from the University of 
Alabama and served in the U.S. Army 

Ambassador Dyess entered the Foreign 
Service in 1958. His assignments in the 
Department of State included exchange pro- 
gram officer; intelligence research specialist; 
Serbo-Croation (1960-61) and Russian (1965) 
language training; international relations 
officer (1970-75); and Executive Director 
(1975-77), Deputy Assistant Secretary 
(1977-80), and Assistant Secretary for Public 
Affairs (1980). 

His overseas assignments have been 
political officer in Belgrade (1961-63) and in 
Copenhagen (1963-65); administrative officer 
and political officer in Moscow (1966-68); and 
political officer at the U.S. Mission in Berlin 
(1968-70). He was sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands on 
August 21, 1981. Ambassador Dyess received 
the Department's Meritorious Honor Award 
in 1973. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


A Bicentennial 

then fighting for independence. Our 
friendship, cemented in time and blood, 
is not taken lightly here. On this 200th 
anniversary of our fraternity, let us 
again pledge that we will meet the 
future together — two nations dedicated 
to peace, faithful to the cause of human 
liberty, and confident that right will 

And now may I ask all of you to join 
me in a toast to our good friends, the 
people of the Netherlands, to Her 
Majesty the Queen, and to His Royal 
Highness. [Applause] 

Her Majesty Queen Beatrix 

Mr. President, my husband and I would 
like to thank you most sincerely for your 
warm words of welcome. We greatly ap- 
preciated the cordial reception given to 
us by your country which has high- 
lighted the special nature of the ties of 
friendship uniting our two nations. 
There are few countries whose relations 
down the centuries have been so genu- 
inely cordial and mutually beneficial as 
those between your great country and 
my own. 

It is surprising how many simi- 
larities one encounters in the stories of 
the birth of our two nations. The theory 
that a people could liberate themselves 
from their sovereign if he abused his 
powers was clearly formulated when the 
Dutch rose in revolt against their 
king — the King of Spain — in the 16th 
century. This was the conviction which 
was echoed in your historic Declaration 
of Independence two centuries later. 

In 1780 we allied ourselves with you 
in your fight for freedom alongside 
France and Spain. We were the second 
country to officially recognize the United 
States of America, not entirely without 
self-interest, I'm afraid; Dutch bankers 
provided you with the financial aid so 
desperately needed [laughter] in the 
period of rehabilitation following the 
War of Independence. 

During the 19th century, millions of 
people from a great many countries, in- 
cluding the Netherlands, felt oppressed 
in the Old World and set their hopes on 
the New. It was their hard work and 
resourcefulness, coupled with the efforts 

of the descendants of the early colonists, 
that soon made the United States one of 
the strongest powers of the world. 

Your intervention in the First World 
War brought peace to Europe. When 
that terrible struggle was over, it was 
your President Woodrow Wilson who in- 
spired countless Dutchmen with his 

Even more vital was your interven- 
tion in the Second World War for both 
Europe and Asia. Although I was only a 
child growing up in Canada, I have vivid 
memories of the warm affection felt by 
my mother. Princess Juliana, and my 
grandmother, Queen Wilhelmina, for 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. One of 
the last letters that President Roosevelt 
wrote early in 1945—2 days before his 
death — was to my grandmother assur- 
ing her that measures to help the 
Netherlands then suffering from famine 
and oppression were very much in his 
mind. "You can be very certain," he 
wrote, "that I shall never forget the 
country of my origin." 

The memory of that great statesman 
with his sense of social justice is cher- 
ished and honored by enumerable Dutch 

people. Nor do they forget what they 
owe to his courageous successor, Presi- 
dent Truman, and to President 

It was Eisenhower who, after 
leading the Allied forces to victory, 
became the first Supreme Commander 
of that great alliance founded a genera- 
tion ago — the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. This alliance, relying prin- 
cipally on the strength of your country, 
has insured the security of Europe and 
thus of the Netherlands. 

It was also your country that helped 
us restore our shattered economy. I 
have in mind, of course, the Marshall 
plan, that brilliant example of American 
statesmanship — statesmanship above all 
because the plan did not seek to impose 
a pattern of its own but respected the 
values cherished in Europe and because 
it was based on the understanding that 
helping others to help themselves is in 
the long run the most effective form of 
aid, thereby serving best the purposes of 
both donor and recipient. 

We in the Netherlands undoubtedly 
owe a great deal to the United States. 
The spirit of enterprise and daring, of 

Ambassador to the United States 

Dr. Jan Hendrik Lubbers was born February 
18, 1919, in Wijhe, the Netherlands. He was 

educated in Zwolle and received his "doc- 
toraal" in economics from the Economic 
University of Rotterdam (now Erasmus 
University). He was granted a doctor's 
degree in economic science in 1962. 

During World War II, Dr. Lubbers was a 
member of the resistance forces in the 
Netherlands. He worked for the Netherlands 
Economic Institute in Rotterdam until 1949 
when he entered the Netherlands Foreign 

He has held diplomatic assignments at 
the OECD and NATO in Paris and at the 
United Nations in New York. Ambassador 
Lubbers was Minister Plenipotentiary at the 
European Communities in Brussels and in 
1973 was appointed Netherland's Am- 
bassador to Norway. He returned to the 
European Communities as Permanent 
Representative in 1976 and held that position 
until August 1980, when he presented his 
credentials as the Netherlands' Ambassador 
to the United States. ■ 

May 1982 


Her Majesty and His Royal Highness attend a luncheon at the State Department hosted 
by Acting Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Mrs. Haig. 

constant innovation, is a feature of 
American life that has always been an 
inspiration to others. 

The winds of change, for example, 
that swept across Europe in the late 
1960s also originated in your country. 
Dutch society has been profoundly af- 
fected by artistic influences from 
America. Constantly improving means 
of communication have contributed to 
the advancement of science, trade, and 
culture on both sides of the Atlantic. All 
this has brought us closer together than 
ever before. 

In sketching the associations be- 
tween the United States and the 

Netherlands over more than 200 years, I 
intended not only to look back but also 
to look forward. 

It is the events of the past that have 
brought us to this point. We face an 
uncertain future together. Let us set our 
sights on the ideal of a just and humane 
society for all mankind. We cannot 
achieve this without standing up for 
freedom and respect for human rights. 
These ideals should constitute the theme 
underlying our mutual cooperation. I 
need hardly add, however, that it is only 
natural, in view of our long and eventful 
histories, that our two nations should 
play the theme in different variations. 
While recognizing that the stress should 

be on unity, especially in times of adver- 
sity, I regard pluraformity, also within 
our North Atlantic partnership, as 
natural and meaningful. The partnership 
would not benefit from uncritical, 
mutual admiration. Assuming that the 
dialogue between the countries is in- 
spired by honest motives and based on 
mutual trust, we must continue to listen 
to one another. 

The Netherlands will endeavor to 
make a contribution by being open- 
minded and undogmatic. Tolerance has 
always been a feature of our national 
character. May I, therefore, express the 
hope that tolerance, openness, and pa- 
tience will continue to mark our interna- 
tional partnership. 

Whatever our differences, there is 
infinitely more that binds our peoples 
together. We have become partners of 
our own free will. Above all, let us not 
underestimate the strength that can 
emanate from a union that succeeds in 
safeguarding both external and internal 

In view of this, I'm confident that 
relations between your country and my 
own will be even closer in the future 
than they have been in the last 200 

May I ask you all to raise your 
glasses and drink to the health and hap- 
piness of the President of the United 
States of America and Mrs. Reagan, to 
the good fortune and prosperity of the 
American people, and to our good rela- 
tions and centuries-long friendship. [Ap- 

'Texts from White House press releases. 
^Made on the South Lawn of the White 

'Made in the State Dining Room. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


News Conference of 
March 31 (Excerpts) 

Twice in my lifetime I've seen the world 
plunged blindly into global wars that 
inflicted untold sufferings upon millions 
of innocent people. I share the deter- 
mination of today's young people that 
such a tragedy, which would be 
rendered even more terrible by the 
monstrous inhumane weapons in the 
world's nuclear arsenals, must never 
happen again. 

My goal is to reduce nuclear 
weapons dramatically assuring lasting 
peace and security. Last November, I 
stressed our commitment to negotiate in 
good faith for the reduction of both 
nuclear and conventional weapons. I 
made a specific proposal to eliminate en- 
tirely intermediate-range missiles. We 
remain committed to those goals. 

In Geneva we've proposed a treaty 
with the Soviet Union which embodies 
our proposals. In Vienna, along with our 
allies, we're negotiating reductions of 
conventional forces in Europe. And here 
in Washington, we're completing 
preparations for talks with the Soviets 
on strategic weapons reductions. 

We know all too well from past ex- 
perience that negotiations with the 
Soviet Union must be carefully 
prepared. We can't afford to repeat past 
mistakes — to arrive hastily at an arms 
control process that sends hopes soaring 
only to end in dashed expectations. 

Last week a distinguished group of 
senators and congressmen submitted 
resolutions to the Senate and House call- 
ing for major verifiable reductions of 
U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to 
equal force levels. This is an important 
move in the right direction, and these 
points are essential elements of a truly 
effective arms control agreement — 
elements which are consistent with the 
views of this Administration. 

I commend Senators Jackson and 
Warner and Congressman Carney and 
all those who joined with them in this 
important initiative. I have and I will 
continue to seek realistic arms control 
agreements on nuclear and conventional 
forces. I want an agreement on strategic 
nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of 
war, lowers the level of armaments, and 
enhances global security. We can accept 
no less. 

America's national security policy is 
based on enduring principles. Our 
leaders and our allies have long 
understood that the objective of our 
defense efforts has always been to deter 
conflict and reduce the risk of 
war — conventional or nuclear. 

Together with our partners and the 
Atlantic alliance, every president in the 
postwar period has followed this 
strategy, and it's worked. It has earned 
the overwhelming bipartisan support of 
the Congress and the country at large, 
and it has kept world peace. 

Yesterday, with the successful com- 
pletion of the Columbia space shuttle's 
latest mission, I think we were all 
reminded of the great things the human 
race can achieve when it harnesses its 
best minds and efforts to a positive goal. 
Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union have written proud chapters in 
the peaceful exploration of outer space. 

So I invite the Soviet Union to join 
with us now to substantially reduce 
nuclear weapons and make an important 
breakthrough for lasting peace on 
Earth. There have been four wars in my 
lifetime. I believe the people want to 
return to a level of civilized behavior we 
once knew. Most of all, they want peace, 
and so do I. 

Q. The experts say that the Rus- 
sians are far ahead of us in some 
nuclear weaponry, and we are far 
ahead of them in terms of the Polaris 
missile and so forth. And we also have 
the capability of swift massive retalia- 
tion against the Soviets. Under those 
circumstances, why don't we seek 
negotiations for a freeze now and 
carry on to reductions? That way we 
can halt the making of doomsday 
weapons and save billions to help poor 

A. I know that there are people 
who have tried to fig^ure this out. The 
truth of the matter is that on balance 
the Soviet Union does have a definite 
margin of superiority, enough so that 
there is risk and there is what I have 
called, as you all know, several times a 
window of vulnerability. 

And I think that a freeze would not 
only be disadvantageous — in fact, even 
dangerous to us with them in that posi- 
tion — but I believe that it would also 

militate against any negotiations for 
reduction. There would be no incentive 
for them, then, to meet with us and 

Let me call your attention to what's 
going on in Geneva. They have 300 
intermediate-range missiles with 900 
warheads aimed at all of Western 
Europe and that includes Northern 
Africa and the Middle East. And there 
was no talk of any reduction of those 
weapons until our allies asked us to sup- 
ply them with intermediate-range 
weapons as a deterrent and which would 
be placed in the countries of Western 
Europe. And then when I made my pro- 
posal last November, the Soviet Union is 
sitting down and talking with us on that. 

If they're out ahead, we're behind, 
and we're asking them to cut down and 
join us in getting down to a lower level, 
there isn't much of an incentive. 

Q. Are you saying that we are 
vulnerable now, right today, to a 
nuclear attack that we could not 
retaliate on? 

A. That would be possible, because 
of some of our triad, retaliation, but the 
Soviet's great edge is one in which they 
could absorb our retaliatory blow and hit 
us again. 

Q. Do you think that a nuclear 
war would be winnable or even sur- 
vivable and under what conditions? 

A. I just have to say that I don't 
think there could be any winners; 
everybody would be a loser if there's a ' 
nuclear war. 

Q. Leonid Brezhnev yesterday im- 
plied that if the United States went 
ahead with the Pershing II missiles 
that the ground-launch cruise 
missiles — that he would take some 
kind of retaliatory step. Did you inter- 
pret this as a threat, and if so, how 
are you responding to him in private 
or how do you plan to respond to him? 

A. I know that we're looking at all 
these various statements and so forth 
and analyzing them to see what they 
may mean. Frankly, I myself am in- 
clined to believe that this is just part of 
the dialogue that goes on and part of a 
kind of a propaganda campaign that is 
aimed at making them look like the 
peacemakers and as if we're the seekers 
of war. And that is completely contrary 
to fact. 

Q. But he's implying that he 
would perhaps install nuclear weapons 

May 1982 



in this hemisphere. If that's the case, 
how would you respond? 

A. The only place that he could in- 
stall them in this hemisphere would be 
in Cuba, which is his satellite now, 
although they're working up to where it 
might be Nicaragua — also considered 

But this would be in total violation, 
even though there have been other 
things we think are violations also, of 
the 1962 agreement at the time of the 
missile crisis. 

And then there are options open to 
us that I would prefer not to discuss 
because, as you know, I don't like to 
discuss the things that we could or 
might or might not do. 

Q. What do you think of the 
latest situation in Poland, especially 
in the light of your statement a few 
weeks ago that if necessary, you 
would impose more sanctions? 

A. We're watching this. We have 
joined with our allies on a number of 
sanctions. We are working now with 
them in regard to the cutting off of 
credit to the nations like that, and to the 
Soviet Union, which we know is behind 
the whole Polish problem. At the same 
time that we are doing everything we 
can to try and help the Polish people 
without having it appear that their 
government is providing that help — 
some $55 million in grain and corn that 
was provided by us, other things that we 
have been trying to do through the 
Catholic charities, and we are watching. 
I think that it is also necessary that they 
understand that there could be a carrot 
along with the stick if they straighten up 
and fly right. 

Q. The right-wing parties in El 
Salvador, taken together, seem to 
have won the elections there. Will we 
back any government that abandons 
the social reforms that are now under- 
way there and specifically, would we 
back a government headed by Major 

A. Let me just say, we are watch- 
ing this very carefully. I think that it 
would give us great difficulties if a 
government now appeared on the scene 
that totally turned away from the 
reforms that have been instituted. But I 
think right now — and before we begin 
inviting trouble or looking for that — we, 
all of us, should have been a little bit in- 
spired by what took place there in that 
election. This morning Senator Kasse- 
baumn, the congressmen who were with 

her on the trip down there to be 
observers at the election, have just told 
some things that ought to make us a 
little ashamed of ourselves and how 
much we take for granted in the right to 
vote. They told of a woman standing in 
the line who was hit by a ricochet — a 
bullet ricocheted — and refused to leave 
the line to have her wound tended until 
she had voted. 

They told of another woman who 
was individually threatened with death 
by the guerrillas and she told them — she 
voted — and she told them: "You can kill 
me, you can kill my family, you cannot 
kill us all." They turned out in the face 
of that in greater numbers than we did. 
She said also that the attitude — and I 
wish more of this had been seen by 
Americans — she said that people, 
whenever they saw them, the people 
there in those voting lines called out 
their gratitude to the United States for 
the fact that we have been helping them. 

Now they really showed that there is 
a real desire for democracy there, and I 
am, therefore, going to be optimistic 
about what happens and avoid a specific 
answer to your question. 

Q. In your first press conference, 
you referred to the Soviet Union as 
having shown a pattern of, I believe 
you used the word "lying and cheat- 
ing" over the years. Tonight you're 
calling upon a return to civilized con- 
duct and a sustained negotiation on 
nuclear arms. Have you, in your 15 
months in office, formed any diff'erent 
opinion than you came into office with 
about the Soviet Union. Are they more 
conciliatory than you thought they 

A. No, I don't think they've 
changed their habits. I think, however, 
they're in a more desperate situation 
than I had assumed that they were 
economically. Their great military 
buildup has, and at the expense of denial 
of consumer products up to and in- 
cluding food for their people, now left 
them on a very narrow edge and that's 
why we're proposing to our allies a shut- 
off of credit with regard to the Polish 
and the Afghanistan situation. 

Q. Do you think the recent 
clashes between the Israeli military 
and the Palestinians on the West Bank 
will destroy progress toward the 
Palestinian autonomy? 

A. I'm hopeful that it won't because 

I have the pledge of my friend 
Menahem Begin and of President 
Mubarak that they are going forward 
and within the framework of the Camp 
David agreement to resolve all these 
other problems. I'm hopeful that we will 
see more progress on these talks after 
April 25th, when the transfer of the 
Sinai comes. 

Israel claims that some of the 
mayors that they are ousting there are 
mayors that they themselves had ap- 
pointed but that they believe have now 
become a part of the more radical PLO 
[Palestine Liberation Organization] 

But the Camp David agreement 
comes within Resolutions 242 and 338 of 
the United Nations. And they have, as I 
say, pledged to me that they're going to 
abide by that. 

Q. Going back to your opening 
statement, how soon do you expect 
strategic arms negotiations to begin, 
and will they include a summit with 
Mr. Brezhnev? 

A. We have been thinking possibly 
this summer would be — we would be 
ready as far as our own team is con- 
cerned. It takes a lot of work to prepare 
for one of these. You don't just go and 
sit down at the table and say: "Let's talk 
about nuclear weapons." And then there 
will have to be our own review. We've 
had quite a talented group working on 
this. When we're ready, then, of course, 
setting a date will depend somewhat on 
the whole international situation. There 
could be things that could make it seem 
a little unseemly to propose such a 
meeting. But I would be hopeful that 
possibly we could do this by this sum- 

Text from White House press release. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Peace and Deterrence 

Secretai'y Haig's address before 
Georgetouni University's Center for 
Strategic and International Studies on 
April 6. 1982.'^ 

It is a melancholy tact of the modern age 
that man has conceived a means capable 
of his own destruction. For 37 years man- 
kind has had to live with the terrible bur- 
den of nuclear weapons. ?>om the dawn 
of the nuclear age, these weapons have 
been the source of grave concern to our 
peoples and the focus of continuous public 
debate. Every successive president of the 
United States has shared these concerns. 
Every Administration has had to engage 
itself in this debate. 

It is right that each succeeding gen- 
eration should question anew the manner 
in which its leaders exercise such awe- 
some responsibilities. It is right that each 
new Administration should have to con- 
front the awful dilemmas posed by the 
possession of nuclear weapons. It is right 
that our nuclear strategy should be ex- 
posed to continuous examination. 

Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence 

In debating these issues, we should not 
allow the complexity of the problems and 
the gravity of the stakes to blind us to 
the common gTound upon which we all 
stand. No one has ever advocated nuclear 
war. No responsible voice has ever 
sought to minimize its horrors. 

On the contrary, from the earliest 
days of the postwar era, America's lead- 
ers have recognized that the only nuclear 
strategy consistent with oui- values and 
our survival — our jihysical existence 
and what makes life worth living — is the 
strategy of deterrence. The massive de- 
structive power of these weapons pre- 
cludes their serving any lesser purpose. 
The catastrophic consequences of another 
world war — with or without nuclear 
weapons — make deterrence of conflict 
our highest objective and our only ra- 
tional military strategy for the modern 

Thus, since the close of World 
War II, American and Western strategy 
has assigned a single function to nuclear 
weapons: the prevention of war and the 
preservation of peace. At the heart of 
this deterrence strategy is the require- 
ment that the risk of engaging in war 
must be made to outweigh any possible 

benefits of aggression. The cost of ag- 
gression must not be confined to the vic- 
tims of aggression. 

This strategy of deterrence has won 
the consistent approval of Western 
peoples. It has enjoyed the bipartisan 
support of the American Congress. It has 
secured the unanimous endorsement of 
every successive allied government. 

Deterrence has been supported be- 
cause deterrence works. Nuclear deter- 
rence and collective defense have pre- 
served peace in Europe, the crucible of 
two global wars in this century. Clearly, 
neither improvement in the nature of 
man nor strengthening of the interna- 
tional order has made wai- less frequent 
or less brutal. Millions have died since 
1945 in over 130 international and civil 
wars. Yet nuclear deterrence has pre- 
vented a conflict between the two super- 
powers, a conflict which even without 
nuclear weapons v\ould be the most de- 
structive in mankind's history. 

Requirements for Western Strategy 

The simple possession of nuclear weapons 
does not guarantee deterrence. Through- 
out history societies have risked their 
total destruction if the prize of victory 
was sufficiently great or the conse- 
quences of submission sufficiently grave. 
War and, in particular nuclear war, can 
be deterred, but only if we are able to 
deny an aggressor military advantage 
from his action and thus insure his 
awareness that he cannot prevail in any 
conflict with us. Deterrence, in short, re- 
quires the maintenance of a secure mili- 
tary balance, one which cannot be over- 
turned through surprise attack or sudden 
technological breakthrough. The quality 
and credibility of deterrence must be 
measured against these criteria. Succes- 
sive administrations have understood this 
fact and stressed the impoi-tance of the 
overall balance. This Administration can 
do no less. 

The strategy of deterrence, in its es- 
sentials, has endured. But the require- 
ments for maintaining a secure capability 
to deter in all circumstances have 
evolved. In the early days of unques- 
tioned American nuclear superiority the 
task of posing an unacceptable risk to an 
aggressor was not difficult. The threat of 
massive retaliation was fuUv credible as 

long as the Soviet Union could not re- 
spond in kind. As the Soviet Union's nu- 
clear arsenal grew, however, this threat 
began to lose credibility. 

To sustain the credibility of Western 
deterrence, the concept of flexible re- 
sponse was elaborated and formally 
adopted by the United States and its 
NATO ])artners in 19(57. Henceforth, it 
was agreed that NATO would meet ag- 
gi'ession initially at whatever level it was 
launched, while preserving the flexibility 
to escalate the conflict, if necessary, to 
secure the cessation of aggression and 
the withdrawal of the aggressor. The 
purpose of this strategy is not just to 
conduct conflict successfully if it is forced 
upon us but, more importantly, to pre- 
vent the outbreak of conflict in the first 

Flexible response is not premised 
upon the view that nuclear war can be 
controlled. Every successive allied and 
American government has been con- 
vinced that nuclear war, once initiated, 
could escape such control. They have, 
therefore, agreed upon a strategy which 
retains the deterrent effect of a possible 
nuclear response, without making such a 
step in any sense automatic. 

The alliance based its implementa- 
tion of flexible response upon a spectrum 
of forces, each of which plays an indis- 
pensable role in assuring the credibility 
of a Western strategy of deterrence. At 
one end of the spectrum are America's 
strategic forces, our heavy bombers, in- 
tercontinental missiles, and ballistic mis- 
sile submarines. Since NATO's inception, 
these forces have been the ultimate guar- 
antee of Western security, a role which 
they will retain in the futui-e. 

At the other end of the spectrum are 
the alliance's conventional forces, includ- 
ing U.S. forces in Europe. These forces 
must be strong enough to defeat all but 
the most massive and |)ei'sistent conven- 
tional aggression. They must be resistant 
and durable enough to give political lead- 
ers time to measure the gravity of the 
threat, to confront the inherently daunt- 
ing prospects of nuclear escalation, and to 
seek through dij^lomacy the cessation of 
conflict and restoration of any lost West- 
ern territory. The vital role which con- 
ventional forces ])lay in deterrence is too 
often neglected, particularly by those 
most vocal in theii- concern over reliance 
upon nuclear weajjons. A strengthened 
conventional posture both strengthens 
the deterrent effect of nuclear forces and 
reduces the prospect of their ever being 

Linking together strategic and con- 
ventional forces are theater nuclear 

May 1982 



forces, that is, NATO's nuclear systems 
based in Europe. These systems are con- 
crete evidence of the nature of the Amer- 
ican commitment. They are a concrete 
manifestation of NATO's willingness to 
resort to nuclear weapons if necessary to 
preserve the freedom and independence 
of its members. Further, the presence of 
nuclear weapons in Europe insures that 
the Soviet Union will never believe that 
it can divide the United States from its 
allies or wage a limited war w'ith limited 
risks against any NATO member. 

The strateg>- of flexible response and 
the forces that sustain its credibility re- 
flect more than simply the prevailing mil- 
itary balance. Western strategy also re- 
flects the political and geographical 
reality of an alliance of 1.5 independent 
nations, the most powerful of which is 
separated from all but one by 4,000 miles 
of ocean. 

Deterrence is consequently more 
than a military strategy. It is the essen- 
tial political bargain which binds together 
the Western coalition. Twice in this cen- 
tury, America has been unable to remain 
aloof from European conflict but unable 
to intervene in time to prevent the dev- 
astation of Western Europe. In a nuclear 
age neither we nor our allies can afford to 
see this pattern repeated a third time. 
We have, therefore, chosen a strategy 
which engages American power in the 
defense of Europe at the outset and gives 
substance to the principle that the secu- 
rity of the alliance is indivisible. 

The Tksk Ahead 

During the past decade the Soviet Union 
has mounted a sustained buildup across 
the range of its nuclear forces designed to 
undermine the credibility of the Western 
strategy. Soviet modernization efforts 
have far out.stripped those of the West. 
The development and dejjloyment of 
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles 
now pose a serious and increasing threat 
to a large ])art of our land-based ICBM 
[intercontinental ballistic missile] force. 
A new generation of Soviet intermediate- 
range missiles is targeted upon our Euro- 
pean allies. 

In the last 10 years, the Soviets in- 
troduced an unprecedented array of new- 
strategic and intermediate-range systems 
into their arsenals, including the SS-17, 
SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Backfire 
bomber, the Typhoon submarine and sev- 
eral new types of submarine-launched 
missiles, and the SS-20 intermediate- 
range missile. In contrast, during this 
same period, the United States exercised 

restraint, introducing only the Ti'ident 
missile and submarine and the slower air- 
breathing cruise missile. 

In order to deal with the resulting 
imbalances. President Reagan has 
adopted a defense posture and recom- 
mended programs to the U.S. Congress 
designed to maintain deterrence, rectify 
the imbalances, and thereby support the 
Western strategy I have just outlined. 
His bold strategic modernization pro- 
gram, announced last October, is de- 
signed to insure the maintenance of a se- 
cure and reliable capability to deny any 
adversary advantage from any form of 
aggi-ession, even a surprise attack. 

The President's decision, in his first 
weeks in office, to go ahead with the pro- 
duction and deployment of the Pershing 
II and ground-launched cruise missiles, 
in accordance with NATO's decision of 
December 1979, represents an effort to 

. . . the presence of 
nuclear weapons in 
Europe insures that the 
Soviet Union will never 
believe that it can divide 
the United States from 
its allies or wage a 
limited war with limited 
risks against any NATO 

reinforce the linkage between our stra- 
tegic forces in the United States and 
NATO's conventional and nuclear forces 
in Europe. A response to the massive 
buildup of Soviet SS-20s targeted on 
Western Europe, this NATO decision was 
taken to insure that the Soviet Union will 
never launch aggression in the belief that 
its own territory can remain immune 
from attack or that European security 
can ever be decoupled from that of the 
United States. 

The improvements we are making in 
our conventional forces — in their readi- 
ness, mobility, training, and equipment 
— are designed to insure the kind of 
tough and resilient conventional capabil- 
ity required by the strategy of flexible 
response. It is important to recognize the 
interrelationship of these three types of 

forces. The requirements in each cate- 
gory ai'e dependent upon the scale of the 
others. Their functions are similarly 
linked. The Soviet Union understands 
this. That is why they have consistently 
proposed a pledge against the first use of 
nuclear weap(jns, an idea which has 
achieved some resonance here in the 

NATO has consistently rejected such 
Soviet proposals, which are tantamount 
to making Europe safe for conventional 
aggression. If the West were to allow 
Moscow the freedom to choose the level 
of conflict which most suited it and to 
leave entirely to Soviet discretion the na- 
ture and timing of any escalation, we 
would be forced to maintain conventional 
forces at least at the level of those of the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. 

Those in the West who advocate the 
adoption of a "no first use" policy seldom 
go on to propose that the United States 
reintroduce the draft, triple the size of 
its armed forces, and put its economy on 
a wartime footing. Yet in the absence of 
such steps, a pledge of "no first use" ef- 
fectively leaves the West nothing with 
which to counterbalance the Soviet con- 
ventional advantages and geopolitical po- 
sition in Europe. 

Neither do Western pi'oponents of a 
"no first use" policy acknowledge the con- 
sequences for the alliance of an American 
decision not to pose and accept the risk of 
nuclear war in the defense of Europe. A 
"no first use" policy would he the end of 
flexible response and thus of the very 
credibility of the Western strategic de- 
terrence. In adopting such a stance, the 
United States would be limiting its com- 
mitment to Europe. But the alliance can- 
not function as a limited liability corpora- 
tion. It can only survive as a partnership 
to which all are equally and fully com- 
mitted — shared benefits, shared bur- 
dens, shared risks. 

Another concept which has recently 
attracted interest is that of a freeze on 
nuclear weapons. While being sensitive 
to the concerns underlying this proposal, 
we have had to underscore the flaws in 
such an approach. A freeze at current 
levels would perpetuate an unstable and 
unequal military balance. It would re- 
ward a decade of unilateral Soviet 
buildup and penalize the United States 
for a decade of unilateral restraint. As 
President Reagan stressed last week, 
such a freeze would remove all Soviet in- 
centive to engage in meaningful arms 
control designed to cut armaments and 
reduce the risk of war. 

Much of the argumentation for a nu- 
clear freeze revolves ai'ound the question 


Department of State Bulletin 


of how much is enough. Each side pos- 
sesses thousands of deliverable nuclear 
weapons. Does it really make any differ- 
ence who is ahead? The question itself is 
misleading, as it assumes that deterrence 
is simply a matter of numbers of weapons 
or numbers of casualties which could be 
inflicted. It is not. 

• Let us remember, first and fore- 
most, that we are trying to deter the So- 
viet Union, not ourselves. The dynamic 
nature of the Soviet nuclear buildup dem- 
onstrates that the Soviet leaders do not 
believe in the concept of "sufficiency." 
They are not likely to be deterred by a 
strategy or a force based upon it. 

• Let us also recall that nuclear de- 
terrence must work not just in times of 
peace and moments of calm. Deterrence 
faces its true test at the time of ma.xi- 
mum tension, even in the midst of actual 
conflict. In such e.xtreme circumstances, 
when the stakes on the table may already 
be immense, when Soviet leaders may 
feel the very existence of their regime is 
threatened, who can say whether or not 
they would run massive risks if they be- 
lieved that in the end the Soviet state 
would prevail? 

• Deterrence thus does not rest on a 
static comparison of the number or size of 
nuclear weapons. Rather, deterrence de- 
pends upon our cajiability, even after suf- 
fering a massive nuclear blow, to prevent 
an aggressor from securing a military ad- 
vantage and prevailing in a conflict. Only 
if we maintain such a capability can we 
deter such a blow. Deterrence, in conse- 
quence, rests upon a military balance 
measured not in warhead numbers but in 
a complex interaction of capabilities and 

The Military Balance, Crisis 
Management, and the Conduct of 
American Diplomacy 

The state of the military balance and its 
impact upon the deterrent value of 
American forces cast a shadow over 
every significant geopolitical decision. It 
affects on a day-to-day basis the conduct 
of American diplomacy. It influences the 
management of international crises and 
the terms upon which they are resolved. 
The search for national interest and 
national security is a principal preoccujia- 
tion of the leaders of every nation on the 
globe. Their decisions and their foreign 
policies are ijrofoundly affected by their 
perception of the military balance be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 

Union and the consequent capacity of 
either to help provide for their security 
or to threaten that security. 

More important still, perceptions of 
the military balance also affect the i)sy- 
chologieal attitude of both American and 
Soviet leaders, as they respond to events 
around the globe. For the foreseeable fu- 
ture the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union will be one 
in which our differences outnumber our 
points of convergence. Our oiijective 
must be to restrain this competition, to 
keep it below the level of force, while 
protecting our interests and those of our 
allies. Our ability to secure these objec- 
tives will be crucially influenced by the 
state of the strategic balance. Every 
judgment we make and every judgment 
the Soviet leadership makes will be 
shaded by it. 

Thus the Soviet leadershij), in calcu- 
lating the risks of subversion or aggres- 
sion, of acquiring new clients or propping 
up faltering proxies, must carefully eval- 
uate the possibilities and prospects for an 
effective American response. Soviet cal- 
culations must encompass not only Amer- 
ican cajjabilities to influence regional de- 
velopments but American willingness to 
face the prospect of U.S.-Soviet confron- 
tation and consequent escalation. Ameri- 
can leaders, for their part, must go 
through comparable calculations in re- 
acting to regional conflicts, responding to 
Soviet adventurism, and seeking to re- 
solve international crises in a manner 
consistent with U.S. interests. 

Put simply, our own vulnerability to 
nuclear blackmail, as well as the suscepti- 
bility of our friends to political intimida- 
tion, depends upon our ability and will- 
ingness to cope credibly with any Soviet 
threat. A strong and credible strategic 
posture enhances stability by reducing 
for the Soviets the temptations toward 
adventurism at the same time that it 
strengthens our hand in responding to 
Soviet political-military threats. 

Arms Control and Nuclear Deterrence 

In no area of diplomacy does the military 
balance have greater effect than in arms 
control. Arms control can reinforce de- 
terrence and stabilize a military balance 
at lower levels of risk and effort. Arms 
control cannot, however, either jjrovide 
or restore a balance we are unwilling to 
maintain through our defense efforts. 
Just as the only justifiable nuclear 
strategy is one of deterrence, so the 
overriding objective for arms control is 
reducing the risk of war. The essential 

purpose to ai-ms control is not to save 
money, although it may do so. Its pur- 
pose is not to generate good feelings oi- 
imjirove international relationshijjs, al- 
though it may have that effect as well. 
Arms control's eenti'al jiurpose must be 
to reinforce the military balance, ujjon 
which deterrence depends, at reduced 
levels of weapons and risk. 

On November 18, President Reagan 
laid out the framework for a comprehen- 
sive progi'am of arms control designed to 
serve these objectives. He committed the 
United States to seek major reductions in 
nuclear and conventional forces, leading 
to equal agreed limits on both sides. Last 
week he reviewed the steps we have 

• In Geneva we have put forth de- 
tailed proposals designed to limit 
intermediate-range nuclear forces and to 
eliminate entirely the missiles of greatest 
concern to each side. This proposal has 
W'on the strong and unified support of our 

• In Vienna we are negotiating, 
alongside our allies, on reductions in con- 
ventional force levels in Eurojje. These 
negotiations have gone on without real 
progress for over 8 years. Because we 
are now facing diplomatic atrophy, we 
must urgently consider how to revitalize 
East -West discussions of conventional 
force reductions and stimulate progi-ess 
in these talks. 

• Our highest priority, in the i«st 
several months, has been completing 
preparations for negotiations with the 
Soviet Union on strategic arms. Here too 
we will be proposing major reductions to 
verifiable, equal agreed levels. Here too 
w^e will be presenting detailed proposals 
when negotiations open. 

The prospects for progi'ess in each of 
these areas of arms control depend upon 
support of the President's defense pro- 
gi-ams. This imperative has been carica- 
tured as a policy of building up arms in 
order to reduce them. This is simply not 
true. As President Reagan's pi-oposals 
for intermediate-i-ange missiles make 
clear, we hope that we never have to de- 
ploy those systems. But we must demon- 
strate a willingness to maintain the bal- 
ance through foi-ce deployments if we are 
to have any prospect of reducing and sta- 
bilizing it through arms control. 

Negotiations in the early 1970s on a 
treaty limiting antiballistic missile (ABM) 
systems provide an historic example. At 
the time, the Soviets had already built a 
system of ballistic missile defenses 
around Moscow. The United States had 

May 1982 



deployed no such system. Arms control 
offered the only means of closing off an 
otherwise attractive and expensive new 
avenue for arms competition. Yet it was 
not until the American Administration 
sought and secured congressional support 
for an American ABM progi-am that the 
Soviets began to negotiate seriously. The 
result was the 1972 treaty Umiting anti- 
baUistic missile systems, which remains 
in force today. 

This same pattern was repeated 
more recently with intermediate-range 
missiles. For years the Soviets had 

It is . . . unrealistic to 
believe that the Soviet 
Union will agree to 
reduce the most 
threatening element of 
its force structure . . . 
unless it is persuaded 
that otherwise the 
United States will re- 
spond by deploying com- 
parable systems itself. 

sought limits on U. S. nuclear forces in 
Europe but refused to consider any limits 
upon their nuclear forces targeted upon 
Western Europe. Only after NATO took 
its decision of December 1979 to deploy 
U.S. Pershing II and gi-ound-launched 
cruise missiles did the Soviet Union 
agi-ee to put its SS-20 missiles on the ne- 
gotiating table. 

In the area of strategic arms, as 
well, there is little prospect the Soviet 
Union will ever agi'ee to equal limits at 
lower levels unless first persuaded that 

the United States is otherwise deter- 
mined to maintain equality at higher lev- 
els. It is, for instance, unrealistic to be- 
lieve that the Soviet Union will agree to 
reduce the most threatening element of 
its force structure, its heavy, multiwar- 
headed intercontinental missiles unless it 
is persuaded that otherwise the United 
States will respond by deploying compa- 
rable systems itself. 

For many opposed to reliance on nu- 
clear weapons — even for defense or de- 
terrence — the issue is a moral one. P^or 
those who first elaborated the strategy of 
deterrence, and for those who seek to 
maintain its effect, this issue is also pre- 
eminently moral. A familiar argument is 
that, in a nuclear age, we must choose 
between our values and our e.xistence. If 
nuclear weapons offer the only deterrent 
to nuclear blackmail, some would argue 
we should submit rather than pose the 
risk of nuclear conflict. This choice, how- 
ever, is a false one. By maintaining the 
military balance and sustaining deter- 
rence, we protect the essential values of 
Western civilization — democratic govern- 
ment, personal liberty, and religious free- 
dom — and preserve the peace. In failing 
to maintain deterrence, we would risk 
our freedoms, while actually increasing 
the likelihood of also suffering nuclear 

As human beings and free men and 
women, we must reject this false alterna- 
tive and avoid the extremes of nuclear ca- 
tastrophe and nuclear blackmail. In the 
nuclear age, the only choice consistent 
with survival and civilization is 

An eminent theologian once de- 
scribed our age as one in which "the 
highest possibilities are inextricably in- 
termingled with the most dire perils." 
The scientific and technological advances 
so vital to our civilization also make pos- 
sible its destruction. This reality cannot 
be wished away. 

Americans have always been con- 
scious of the dilemmas posed by the nu- 
clear weapon. I-Yom the moment that sci- 
ence unleashed the atom, our instinct and 

policy have been to control it. Those who 
direct America's defense policies today 
share completely the desire of people 
everywhere to end the nuclear arms race 
and to begin to achieve substantial reduc- 
tions in nuclear armament. 

Confronted by the dire perils of such 
weapons, America has responded in a 
manner that best preserves both security 
and peace, that protects our society and 
our values, and that offers hope without 
illusion. The strategy of deterrence has 
kept the peace for over 30 years. It has 
provided the basis for arms control ef- 
forts. And it offers the best chance to 
control and to reduce the dangers that we 

Deterrence is not automatic. It can- 
not be had on the cheap. Our ability to 
sustain it depends upon our ability to 
maintain the military balance now being 
threatened by the Soviet buildup. If we 
are to reinforce deterrence through arms 
control and arms reduction, we must con- 
vince the Soviets that their efforts to un- 
dermine the deterrent effect of our forces 
cannot and will not succeed. 

The control and reduction of nuclear 
weapons, based on deterrence, is the 
only effective intellectual, political, and 
moral response to nuclear weapons. The 
stakes are too great and the conse- 
quences of error too catastrophic to ex- 
change deterrence for a leap into the un- 
known. The incentives for real arms 
control exist, and we have both the 
means and the duty to apply them. 

Let us be clear about our objectives 
in the nuclear era. We seek to reduce the 
risk of war and to establish a stable mili- 
tary balance at lower levels of risk and 
effort. By doing so today, we may be able 
to build a sense of mutual confidence and 
cooperation, offering the basis for even 
more ambitious steps tomorrow. But 
above all, we shall be pursuing the "high- 
est possibility" for peace. 

'Press release 117. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Interview on 
"Meet the Press" 

Secretary Haig was interviewed on 
NBC's "Meet the Press" on March 28, 
1982. by Bill Monroe. NBC News 
(moderator and executive producer); 
Karen E. House. Wall Street Journal; 
Morton Kondracke, New Republic 
magazine; and Maryin KaW, NBC 
News. ' 

Q. NBC News reports from El Salva- 
dor today that voting in that country 
is heavy with long lines of voters, but 
some people are saying that today's 
elections may not make much differ- 
ence because when it's over, the civil 
war and economic deterioration will 
just continue. What is the prospect, in 
your view, that talks between the new 
government and guerrilla groups or 
some other process might bring actual 
improvement in that country. 

A. I think it's a little early to say. 
Clearly, President Duarte, who's cur- 
rently in charge, has made it clear that 
he would be willing to talk to the left 
providing they will lay down their arms 
and join in a peaceful political process. 
We have never been averse to that here 
in the United States and would favor 
such an outcome. 

Q. Can you offer us any more hope 
than what you've just expressed that 
some improvement might come in El 
Salvador after today's elections? Many 
people feel, for example, that the pros- 
pect of the guerrillas laying down 
their arms for talks is very slim, if ex- 
istent at all. 

A. I think the very fact of a free 
election, the outcome of which will be a 
constituent assembly of some 60 
deputies, is a step in the political process 
toward democratization. It stands rather 
in sharp contrast to the Sandinista 
government which has been in place 
substantially longer in time and which 
has yet to program a specific date for 
the expression of the will of the people 
of Nicaragua. They talk about 1985. So I 
think the Salvadoran example is one 
that deserves our support and is a 
source of some encouragement. 

Q. One possible outcome in today's 
election in El Salvador is the possible 
victory of Roberto D'Aubuisson who is 
regarded as an extreme rightwinger. 
He favors using napalm on the guer- 
rillas, and he has been called by the 

previous U.S. ambassador a pathologi- 
cal killer. What are the chances that 
the United States might cooperate 
with or support a government headed 
by D'Aubuisson? 

A. If we espouse democratic process 
and the people of El Salvador in credible 
elections select a candidate, I think 
that's their business. 

As far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we have supported the current 
regime based on the reforms that 
regime has instituted: land reform, im- 
proved pluralization and democratic 
reform, efforts to improve the human 
rights situation, economic reform. Clear- 
ly, both before the election and after the 
election — whatever the outcome — it will 
be adherence to those principles that will 
determine the level of American sup- 

Q. The President said, when he 
announced sanctions against the 
Soviet Union and Poland shortly after 
the military crackdown there, that if 
things didn't get better, there would 
be further steps. Since the credibility 
of the United States is at stake, when 
will we see these further sanctions 
and what will they be? 

A. I think we have seen a steady in- 
crease of sanction pressure against the 
Soviet Union. We have used an ap- 
proach which is not unilateral but rather 
multilateral. In other words, it's clear by 
any measure of analysis that what the 
United States alone is able to do in this 
area is rather limited, so we have at- 
tempted to proceeed on a broad base, 
using our NATO allies and the Atlantic 
community, including Japan, to work 
together to deal with pressures on the 
Soviet Union. We've had both political 
and economic coordination — some meas- 
ures taken in concert, some unilaterally, 
dependent on what is the most effective 
and meaningful approach. 

With respect to Poland we have in a 
very united way isolated that regime 
and put Poland, if you will, on the back 
of the Soviet Union in economic and 
credit terms. We are now engaged in a 
process of seeking to deal with the sub- 
ject of future credits and future credit 
guarantees with the Soviet Union. 
Under Secretary [for Security Assist- 
ance, Science and Technology] Buckley 
has just returned from what is an initial 
effort to put a mechanism in place to do 
that more effectively in the period 

Q. There are a number of experts 

who say our sanctions and our credi- 
bility both would be much more effec- 
tive if we had a more credible threat 
and a more attractive carrot to offer in 
dealing with that problem. Do you 
subscribe to that? And, if so, what are 
the carrots and what are the sticks 
that we can continue pursuing this 

A. The most meaningful area for 
pressure on the Soviet Union, assuming 
continuation of the crackdown, is of 
course in the area of credits. There is no 
question about that, and all of our 
analyses have confirmed it. So that is 
the area of primary focus. 

With respect to carrots, we've made 
it very, very clear to both the Soviet 
Union and the Polish leadership that the 
West is prepared to concert together to 
offer substantial economic and commodi- 
ty and trade supports for Poland if 
there's a return to the reconciliation of 
the elements in Poland. 

Q. As you know, there's a move- 
ment in Congress and in the public ad- 
vocating a bilateral U.S. -Soviet 
nuclear freeze. What's the Administra- 
tion's response to this idea? 

A. I think later this week— about 
mid-week— the President is going to ad- 
dress this issue, and I would prefer to 
leave it to him. But it's clear that we 
view the Brezhnev freeze proposal as 
neither a freeze nor an acceptable pro- 
posal. It's tantamount to the option of 
"quit while you're behind," and I don't 
think the American people want that. 

Q. The President said that the 
Brezhnev proposal was not good 
enough, that he was going to advocate 
real reductions in nuclear weapons. 
But why not freeze at the start of 
talks over strategic reductions to in- 
sure that the arsenals don't get bigger 
and also to insure that in case the 
talks fail, something will be ac- 

A. Why don't we let the President 
address the issue for the American peo- 
ple, which he will do with clarity and 
definity. I think it's well to recall the ex- 
periences we had in Western Europe at 
the time the Soviets commenced the 
deployment of the SS-20 which has now 
reached a level of one new system every 
5 days and a level of 300 such systems. 

There were those in Europe and on 
this side of the Atlantic during that 
deployment period that recommended 
that we sit down and talk. We made 
such offers and the Soviets rejected any 
such approaches until the West decided 

May 1982 



that they would start their own moderni- 
zation program with the Pershing lis 
and the ground-launched cruise missiles. 
When that decision was made in Decem- 
ber of 1979, shortly thereafter the 
Soviets agreed to sit down and talk. 

It's an unfortunate fact of life, but 
you wouldn't go to a negotiating table as 
a labor leader or a representative of 
business without incentives. 

Q. Will the President's speech be 
a comprehensive statement of foreign 

A. No, not at all. 

Q. Will it be the beginning of the 
START [Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks] talks which have been long 

A. No. The President is going to 
discuss this issue in conjunction with a 
press conference that he'll have— as I 
understand, a brief opening statement. 
There will be subsequent pronounce- 
ments, of course, in the period ahead. 

Q. Going back to D'Aubuisson — 
the possibility of him winning in El 
Salvador— for a minute, would Ameri- 
can support be contingent upon 
D'Aubuisson accepting the Duarte pro- 
gram of continued reform in El 

A. I don't like to engage in condi- 
tionality on a situation which is now in 
the hands of the people of El Salvador. I 
think the broad comments I made at the 
outset of the show, that American sup- 
port and the degree of that support thus 
far provided is premised largely on the 
adherence of the current regime in El 
Salvador to the reforms that represent 
American objectives in the region and 
are compatible with American values. 
It's clear that in the future our level of 
support will continue to be premised on 
those values. 

Q. On another subject concerning 
the space shuttle, is there any reason 
to believe that the Soviet Union might 
have been responsible in any way for 
interference with communication be- 
tween the shuttle and control in 

A. I'm not aware of any such possi- 

Q. The question comes up because 
of this highly energized radar system 
that the Russians have in Rostov that 
is capable of doing that. I just 
wondered if there's any evidence to 
that effect. 

A. I've seen none personally. 

Q. On still another subject — the 

Middle East-with the violence that 
has taken place in both Gaza and the 
West Bank in recent weeks, does the 
Administration fear that the situation 
will move toward an Israeli annexa- 
tion of the West Bank? 

A. No. I think not. And I think 
Prime Minister Begin stated last week 
that the interim 5-year period, during 
which the future status of the West 
Bank and Gaza is to be determined 
under the autonomy formula, will be 
honored by Israel. And I'm optimistic 
that they will be as good as their word, 
as they will be with the return of the 
Sinai scheduled for the month of April. 

Q. Is the United States at this 
point preparing some kind of new in- 
itiative that would go beyond Camp 
David and try to amplify and push 
toward a Palestinian autonomy agree- 

A. I think Camp David and the pro- 
visions of autonomy laid out in the 
Camp David agreements are adequate. 
What we need to do is to get further 
progress. That has been difficult during 
a period when both sides are focused 
almost exclusively on the return of the 
Sinai and the arrangements associated 

And incidentally, in the case of 
Israel, this is a very traumatic period for 
them because they are, after all, now be- 
ing required to relinquish what has been 
a strategic butfer that came out of the 
Sinai occupation and to move settlers 
who had moved in there and set down 
their roots over an extended period. 
This kind of a transition is difficult; and, 
therefore, I would hope that in the 
period following the relinquishment of 
the Sinai, we will find greater progress 
in autonomy. 

Q. Do you feel that there is room 
for an American initiative following 
the withdrawal from the Sinai? 

A. I think the American initiative is 
to serve as a solid partner, as we have 
been, in the process of Camp David— the 
framework established at Camp David. 
People, in their frustration and impa- 
tience, forget that in just a period of a 
brief few years the United States has 
witnessed and participated in an unprec- 
edented treaty between Israel and 
Egypt, states that have had three 
decades of animosity, and that normali- 
zation has begun. Clearly we have to 
recognize that excess impatience can 

bring about the very outcome we are 
seeking to avoid. 

Q. Some Central American coun- 
tries, as you know, have been op- 
pressed for decades by military juntas 
or by dictators who sometimes seem 
to serve large landowners and who 
have a tendency to murder their op- 
ponents. Do you have any objection to 
the citizens of such countries forcibly 
rebelling against such governments? 

A. You have put your finger on a 
very sensitive contemporary question, in 
which we Americans sit here and always 
seek to pontificate and create mirror im- 
ages of the American society worldwide 
in societies which are less than capable 
of dealing— it took 200 years of Ameri- 
can history to bring us to our current 
high state of democratic sophistication. 

The real problem in contemporary 
terms is that the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology has, if you will, perverted 
classic support for revolution in the 
quest of social justice to espouse such 
revolutions under the guise of a search 
for social justice, but which really are 
tantamount to the imposition of totali- 
tarianism of the kind we are seeing 
emerge in Nicaragua, that we are wit- 
nessing in Eastern Europe in the 
tragedy of Poland today. And I think we 
Americans have to be a little more clear 
headed and clear eyed. 

Q. We often hear the charge that 
the United States, by siding with re- 
pressive governments, often opens the 
door to the Communists to move in on 
legitimate revolutions and gain con- 
trol of them. In other words, the ques- 
tion is, why shouldn't the United 
States, which is still proud of its own 
revolution, befriend an occasional 
revolution in the 20th century? 

A. First, I think it should be under- 
stood very clearly that President 
Reagan's policy with respect to extre- 
mism from the right or from the left is 
balanced and objective, and we would 
oppose either. 

On the other hand, there is a great 
tendency also in American society and 
our Anglo-Saxon roots to both misread 
and misunderstand perhaps the role of 
the military in the romantic societies 
where, historically, they are frequently 
viewed as the protectors of the liberties 
of the people. 

That is not a view that we Ameri- 
cans have ever shared, with our Crom- 
wellian experiences; but we must be sen- 
sitive to these differences and not 
believe we have either the luxury or the 


Departnnent of State Bulletin 


ability to recreate the world in our own 
image and in contemporary terms. We 
have to assist, we have to facilitate, and 
we have to conduct our policies in a 
credible, rational way in which the im- 
position of our standards does not 
result — as they did in Iran and have in 
several other model cases — in something- 
far more onerous to the values that you 
and I espouse. 

Q. I want to read you a quote from 
a prominent Israeli, Abba Eban, com- 
menting on the present Israeli Govern- 
ment's policies on the West Bank. He 
said. "I can't think of anything more 
grotesque than a government which 
professes to aspire full autonomy for 
the Palestinians on a national scale 
canceling the limited municipal 
autonomy that already exists." What is 
our policy toward the Israeli Govern- 
ment's de facto annexation on the 
West Bank? 

A. First, I would not subscribe to 
the term "de facto annexation." There 
have been a number of measures taken 
by the current government in Israel that 
have not been a source of comfort to 
this government. On the other hand, I 
think "annexation" is somewhat too 

Also, it is important that we keep 
the whole issue of this contemporary 
violence on the West Bank, which we 
abhor, in proper perspective. I think you 
will recall there were some measures 
taken also by the Government of Jordan 
which tended to trigger the events that 
we are faced with today. And I think it 
is important, whether we are in the 
United Nations or here in our own na- 
tion's capital, that we attempt to main- 
tain a level of objectivity on these very 
vexing questions. 

Q. Can I switch you rapidly to 
another part of the world, China? We 
all seem to agree that China is a 
"strategic asset," to use this Ad- 
ministration's words, and yet there is 
a growing impression that this Ad- 
ministration no longer subscribes to 
the one-China policy of Richard Nixon, 
Jerry Ford, and Jimmy Carter. Is it 
fair to say that U.S. -China relations 
have deteriorated? 

A. It is fair to say that they are at a 
very sensitive stage, but it would be 
totally unfair to attribute that to the 
policies of this Administration. There 
has been no departure whatsoever from 

longstanding, four-Administration ap- 
proaches to this problem of one China. 
What we have had is a situation in 
China itself where some of the aspects 
of the value of a relationship with the 
United States have been put in question, 
and that goes beyond the difficult issue 
of Taiwan and arms for Taiwan. It in- 
volves assessments of American credi- 
bility, after years of American inability 
in a post-Vietnam period to deal realis- 
tically and effectively with Soviet im- 
perialism or, as our Chinese friends 
refer to it, "the quest for hegemony." 

It involves perhaps disappointment 
that the relationship with the United 
States did not bring an explosion toward 
modernization with vast amounts of 
American credit, technology, and re- 
sources. And it also involves the very 
sensitive question of Taiwan. 

So we should not believe that history 
started this past January. We are living 
today with the consequences of decades 
of previous American policies — bi- 
partisan, of course. 

Q. Critics of the Administration 
say that in almost every area of the 
world there is more disarray now than 
there was when you took office, and 
these critics would cite Central 
America, the Middle East. Europe, 
and U.S. -Soviet relations. They also 
allege that the Administration lacks a 
coherent, strategic desig^n. I realize 
this question covers a lot of ground, 
but can you tell us, in outline at least, 
what your strategy is, or at least 
when the President will make a 
speech telling us these — 

A. No. First, let me say that the 
answer to your question and its in- 
ferences is "nonsense." Nonsense. Over 
the past 15 months, would you please 
cite for me a major setback for U.S. in- 
terests, where the Soviet Union, as it 
did in the previous 5 years — ranging 
from the takeover of Angola, of 
Ethiopia, of Southern Yemen, of 
Afghanistan, increased influence and 
dangerous trends in Iran. We haven't 
had a repeat of that over the last 15 

Sure, tensions have risen in Central 
America, but they began long before this 
Administration came into power, and if 
you are able to assess this objectively. 
I'm sure you will agree with that. You 
will recall that when we came into office 
in January, the major guerrilla offensive 
had just taken place and fortunately 
failed. You will recall that the stirrings 

in the Middle East, which we are con- 
cerned with today, were a reflection of 
total stalemate in the Camp David proc- 
ess, which for 3 years had not moved 

With respect to the Soviet Union, I 
think it was necessary for this 
President— and for the American people 
who put this President in office— to cor- 
rect the deficiencies that I just touched 
upon; to make it clear to the Soviets 
that we are prepared to deal with them 
on a normalized basis, with rationality 
and mutual benefit, only if they will 
engage in increased restraint in a period 
of excessive Soviet interventionism 

Q. In this brief period of time, it's 
probably unfair to ask this question, 
but would the Administration consider 
working with the Soviet Union on a 
ban on the first use of nuclear 

A. I think this is a very difficult 
question that has historic overtones. It 
involves the fundamental strategic ap- 
proach that free Western nations have 
taken since the nuclear genie came out 
of the bottle. It involves the belief that 
what we want is substantial reductions 
in levels of nuclear armaments^ not 
public posturing with rather surfacely 
attractive gimmickry. That kind of a 
non-first-use proposal we have rejected 
historically over several decades when 
the Soviets have raised it for their own 

Q. But what about the idea of the 
Administration seeming to come for- 
ward now, wanting nuclear arms con- 
trols. You don't have much time. 

A. There is no question but that the 
President is a strong advocate of 
substantial nuclear reduction. 

'Press release 107 of Mar. 29, 1982. 

May 1982 



U.S. Responds to Soviet Missile Proposal 

Following are President Reagan's 
opening remarks before the Oklahoma 
State Legislature and a statement by 
Larry Speakes, principal Deputy Press 
Secretary, on March 16, 1982.^ 


Before I begin my planned remarks this 
morning, I would like to speak again to 
the question of controlling nuclear arms, 
a subject of deep concern to all 
Americans, to our allies, and to the peo- 
ple of the world. The hope of all men 
everywhere is peace — peace not only for 
this generation but for generations to 
come. To preserve peace, to insure it for 
the future, we must not just freeze the 
production of nuclear arms; we must 
reduce the exorbitant level that already 

Those who are serious about peace, 
those who truly abhor the potential for 
nuclear destruction, must begin an 
undertaking for real arms reduction. 
President Brezhnev has proposed a 
unilateral moratorium on further deploy- 
ment of SS-20 missiles in Western 
Europe. Well, I say today, as I said 
yesterday, and as I made clear on 
November 18th, a freeze simply isn't 
good enough, because it doesn't go far 
enough. We must go beyond a freeze. 

Let's consider some facts about the 
military balance in Europe. The Soviet 
Union now has 300 brand new SS-20 
missiles with 900 warheads deployed. All 
can hit targets anywhere in Western 
Europe. NATO has zero land-based 
missiles which can hit the U.S.S.R. 

When President Brezhnev offers to 
stop deployments in Western Europe, he 
fails to mention that these are mobile 
missiles. It doesn't matter where you 
put them, since you can move them 
anywhere you want, including back to 
Western Europe. And even if east of the 
Urals, they could still target most of 
Western Europe. 

Our proposal, now on the table in 
Geneva, is that we not deploy any of the 
intermediate missiles in Europe, in ex- 
change for Soviet agreement to disman- 
tle what they now have there. And 
that's fair. That is zero on both sides. 
And if President Brezhnev is serious 

about real arms control — and I hope he 
is — he will join in real arms reduction. 


Upon examination, the "unilateral 
moratorium" offered by President 
Brezhnev is neither unilateral nor a 

The offer. President Brezhnev makes 
clear, is limited to the European Soviet 
Union, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. free to 
continue its SS-20 buildup east of the 
Urals, well within range of Western 
Europe. As we have noted on many oc- 
casions, given its range and mobility, an 
SS-20 is a threat to NATO wherever 

President Brezhnev clearly links his 
"unilateral" offer to the condition that 
Western preparations for the deploy- 
ment of ground launched cruise missiles 
(GLCM) and Pershing II's, agreed upon 
in December 1979, do not proceed. This 
condition, plus the fact that the Soviets 
have already prepared sites for new 
SS-20s west as well as east of the 
Urals, demonstrate that this is a prop- 
aganda gesture and that the Soviets do 
not really intend to stop their SS-20 

The Soviet SS-20 force already ex- 
ceeds the dimensions of the expected 
threat when NATO took its decision of 
December 1979 to deploy U.S. GLCM 
and Pershing II missiles in Europe and 
to seek, through arms control, to reduce 
planned levels of long-range inter- 
mediate nuclear force (INF) missiles on 
both sides. The Soviets now have 300 
SS-20 missiles deployed, with 900 
warheads. Brezhnev's freeze proposal is 
designed, like previous Soviet 
statements over the past 3 years, to 
direct attention away from the enor- 
mous growth of Soviet capabilities that 
has already taken place and the enor- 
mous preponderance that the Soviet 
Union has thereby acquired. 

It is unfortunate that the Soviets did 
not choose to exercise real restraint 
before their SS-20 buildup began. 
NATO, for its part, has been observing 
restraint on INF missiles for well over a 
decade, which the Soviets simply ex- 

In sum. President Brezhnev's offer is 
neither evidence of Soviet restraint nor 
is it designed to foster an arms control 
agreement. Like previous such Soviet 
freeze proposals, this one seeks to 
legitimize Soviet superiority, to leave the 
Soviet Union free to continue its 
buildup, to divide the NATO alliance, to 
stop U.S. deployments, and, thus, to 
secure for the Soviet Union unchal- 
lenged hegemony over Europe. 

The United States has put forward 
concrete proposals in Geneva for the 
complete elimination of missiles on both 
sides, cited by Brezhnev in his remarks 
of today. We regret the Soviet Union 
apparently prefers propaganda gestures 
to concentrating on serious negotiations 
in Geneva. For its part, the United 
States, with the full support of its allies, 
will continue to implement both tracks 
of the December 1979 decision on the 
deployment of new systems to Europe 
and the pursuit of genuine arms control, 
which we hope will make those deploy- 
ments unnecessary. 

President Brezhnev's proposal to 
place limits on the operations of missiles 
submarines is also not a serious pro- 
posal. LI.S. submarines, by deploying to 
extensive ocean areas, are able to re- 
main invulnerable to Soviet attack and 
thus constitute a stable deterrent force. 
Reducing their area of operations in the 
world's oceans would increase their 
vulnerability and erode our confidence in 
their deterrent capability. The Soviet 
proposal, therefore, is entirely self- 
serving. Having made a large fraction of 
our land-based ICBM [intercontinental 
ballistic missile] force vulnerable through 
their large ICBM buildup, the Soviets, in 
this proposal, are attempting to reduce 
the confidence we have in the seabased 
leg of our deterrent. 

The proposal for a ban on the 
deployment of ground-based, long-range 
cruise missiles is yet another trans- 
parent effort to disrupt NATO's 1979 
two-track decision. Moreover, in focus- 
ing on sea-based as well as land-based, 
long-range cruise missiles, the proposal 


Department of State Bulletin 


ignores the hundreds of shorter range 
cruise missiles that the Soviet Union 
currently deploys aboard its warships. 

Finally, we want to reiterate the 
four principles underlying the Reagan 
Administration's approach to arms con- 
trol. These are to seek agreements that: 

1. Produce significant reductions in 
the arsenals of both sides; 

2. Are equal, since an unequal 
agreement, like an unequal balance of 
forces, can encourage coercion or ag- 

3. Are verifiable, because when our 
national security is at stake, agreements 
cannot be based simply upon trust; and 

4. Enhance U.S. and allied security, 
because arms control is not an end in 
itself but an important means toward 
securing peace and international sta- 

These four principles were 
highlighted by the President in his 
speech of November 18, 1981. They 
underlie our position in the current 
Geneva negotiations on the elimination 
of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range 
nuclear missile forces. They also form 
the basis for our approach to negotia- 
tions with the Soviet Union on the 
reduction of strategic arms — the 
START talks. 

Arms Control in Proper 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 22, 1982. 

by Eugene V. Rostow 

Statements before the Connmittee on 
Disarmament in Geneva on February 9, 
1982. Mr. Rostow is Director of the 
Anns Control and Disarmament Agency 

Being in this beautiful room, the Council 
Chamber of the League of Nations— the 
Serf Room — to recall the artist who 
painted the murals is always a moving 
and a chastening experience. The 
memory of lost battles hovers in the air, 
reminding us that good intentions are 
not enough. 

Last fall many of you participated in 
the meeting of Committee I [Political 
and Security] of the U.N. General 
Assembly at which I had the honor to 
present the position of the United 
States. I shall try not to repeat here 
what I said on that occasion. But a cer- 
tain degree of repetition is inevitable in 
the interest of continuity and desirable 
in the interest of emphasis. For that I 
apologize and ask you and my other col- 
leagues to forgive me. 

Before Committee I, I noted the 
abiding support of the United States for 
the work of the Committee on Disarma- 
ment. It has taken one practical step 
after another to reduce the danger of 
war, and particularly of nuclear war. We 
can all draw resolve as well as pride 
from this record which has given power- 
ful impetus to the arms control move- 
ment in general and to the role of the 
committee and its predecessors in the 
diplomacy which led the nations to a 
series of useful agreements— the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 
1968, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty 
of 1971, the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion of 1972, and the Environmental 
Modification Convention of 1977. 

The Committee on Disarmament is 
unusual among multilateral organiza- 
tions both in its mandate and in its 
methods of work. Its objective is not 
only to exhort the nations but to develop 
consensus looking to realistic action on 
the matters which come before it. 

In noting the importance of the com- 
mittee's work, I do not wish to be 
misunderstood. The committee cannot 

and should not force consensus where 
none exists. A willingness to com- 
promise on nonessentials is one of the 
most vital and appealing qualities of 
democracy— it is the basis for social and 
political life in democratic societies. It is 
equally important to the possibility of in- 
ternational cooperation. The United Na- 
tions exists, after all, as a center for 
harmonizing the actions of the member 
states in seeking to attain the purposes 
of the charter. But compromise on 
nonessentials cannot and must not mean 
submerging fundamental differences. 
The charter is founded on the principle 
of respect for the equal rights of nations 
large and small. Consensus should never 
be sought by asking any nation to 
sacrifice its fundamental and inherent 

While it may seem paradoxical, the 
way toward consensus can often be 
eased by a frank and thorough airing of 
differences. And, where consensus is not 
possible, a clear understanding of why 
this is the case can make an important 
contribution to eventual agreement. For 
this reason, among others, the United 
States will not hesitate to set forth its 
views on the controversial issues with 
which this committee deals. We expect 
others to be equally frank. I assure you 
that in developing our future positions, 
we shall give respectful attention to 
views which differ from our own. 

In the spirit of that precept, I should 
like now to direct attention to the key 
relationship between the state of world 
politics and a number of arms control 
projects which are, or should be, on our 
agenda. The arms control effort should 
be a formative influence in the process 
of world politics and a catalyst for 
peace. But the converse of that sentence 
is also true. At any given moment, the 
state of world politics can all too easily 
frustrate and overwhelm the poten- 
tialities of arms control. That is the 
challenge faced by all who are working 
in the cause of peace today. 

State of World Politics and 
Arms Control Agenda 

In my remarks last fall before Commit- 
tee 1, I made the point that there is a 
certain unreality in the traditional 

May 1982 



discussion of many hardy perennials on 
the arms control agenda of the General 
Assembly and of this committee. The 
reason for this tone of other-worldliness. 
1 said, is that it has become the habit of 
the United Nations to ignore the central 
issue in any objective study of the prob- 
lem of peace — the declining influence of 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter on the 
behavior of states. This momentous 
sentence is necessarily the first com- 
mandment of the charter. It forbids the 
threat or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political in- 
dependence of any state. Its prohibition 
is qualified only by the "inherent right" 
of individual or collective self-defense, 
protected categorically by Article 51 and 
by the powers of the Security Council. 

Yet the last two decades and espe- 
cially the last decade have witnessed a 
rising tide of threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and aggres- 
sions — actions which have involved the 
threat or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political in- 
dependence of states in every part of 
the world. From Southeast Asia to the 
Caribbean, state after state is under 
threat or under actual attack. Unpro- 
voked aggressions occur without even 
the pretext or the excuse of self-defense. 
Armed bands and terrorists cross 
political boundaries with impunity to 
assault the political independence of 

The habit of shameful silence or im- 
potent protest in the face of aggression 
has many consequences — all bad. 
Perhaps the most insidious in the long 
run is its impact on international law. 
Law reflects the pattern of behavior 
which a society deems right. Legal 
norms can survive if they are not 
perfectly or instantly obeyed, so long as 
society seeks to enforce them and does 
so effectively in the end. But when the 
breach of declared legal norms becomes 
the rule rather than the exception, when 
a society gives up any serious effort to 
insist that its legal norms be obeyed, 
those declarations cease to be norms in 
any meaningful sense and become no 
more than pious platitudes. I ask you to 
look at a globe and count the number of 
places where war is raging in violation 
of Article 2(4), and then consider 
whether our failure to defend that arti- 
cle strictly and impartially is not, in fact, 
repealing it as a constitutional principle 
for the society of nations. 

In the view of the United States, 
this question should be the first item on 
the agenda of the Committee on Disar- 
mament. If Article 2(4) should become a 
dead letter, the quest for disarmament 
would be a quixotic and Utopian activity. 
These are not words I use in a pe- 
jorative sense. The spirit of Cervantes 
and St. Thomas More are indispensable 
to civilization. Even so, we want arms 
control to be more than a dream, more 
than an aspiration. With the world in a 
state of anarchy, the effort to negotiate 
arms control agreements would cease to 
be a practical way for reinforcing and 
safeguarding peace. It would be nothmg 
more than a despairing protest of the 
human spirit, a cri du coeur, expressing 

. . . the last two 
decades . . . have 
witnessed a rising tide 
of threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, 
and aggression. . . . Un- 
provoked aggressions oc- 
cur without even the 
pretext of the excuse of 

man's yearning for reason and decency 
in a world which was becoming more ir- 
rational and more menacing every day. 

Driven by fear or by the lust for 
power, large and small nations rush to 
arm, although they continue to recite 
the litany of disarmament and arms con- 
trol. It is no wonder, under such cir- 
cumstances, that we have achieved no 
significant arms reduction agreements 
for nearly 10 years. 

The basic cause of the declining in- 
fluence of Article 2(4) in world affairs, 
and the corresponding eclipse of arms 
control, is the expansionist policy of the 
Soviet Union and the extraordinary 
military buildup on which it is based. 

Soviet propaganda recognizes that 
the world lives under threat, but it pro 
claims that the threat to the peace is 
caused by a supposed "arms race," which 
takes the form of a Western effort to at- 
tain military superiority over the Soviet 
L'nion and then start a nuclear war. 
There is no arms race. The history of 
the military balance between the Soviet 

Union and the United States is clear for 
all to see. For many years after 1945. 
the Soviet Union had larger conven- 
tionally armed forces than the United 
States, and the United States had larger 
nuclear forces. During the 1970s, the 
Soviet Union continued to increase both 
its conventional and its nuclear forces, 
while the United States remained stable 
in the nuclear sphere and reduced its 
conventional forces. The United States 
did not race. On the contrary, it ac- 
cepted what it described as an effort by 
the Soviet Union to attain parity and 
equality, a place in the sun, recognized 
status as a great power. Once the Soviet 
Union reached equality, many people in 
the West believed, it would end its 
military buildup and settle down to 
peaceful coexistence under the rules of 
the charter. 

No one in the West can accept such 
views now. The Soviet Union has at- 
tained military parity with the United 
States by any measure, yet it continues 
to build its armed forces and to expand 
its empire by means of force. 

In response, the United States, its 
allies, and many other nations have 
reluctantly undertaken the burden of 
modernizing their armed forces in a 
belated effort to restore the military 

The Soviet Union does not initiate 
all the turbulence in the world. A great 
deal occurs without benefit of Soviet in- 
tervention. But the Soviet LInion does 
exploit and manipulate regional tur- 
bulence in the interest of enlarging its 
sphere of dominance. And the Soviet ex- 
ample tempts other states to commit ag- 
gression also, hoping for the immunity 
from effective response which the So\'iet 
Union has thus far enjoyed in its im- 
perial adventures. 

Soviet expansion is not a marginal 
nuisance at the periphery of world 
politics. It is, on the contrary, one of the 
dominant elements determining the 
course of events. Soviet expansionism 
seeks to destroy the world balance of 
forces on which the survival of freedom 
depends. In that quest, the Soviet drive 
has gone too far. It has produced a wave 
of fear which will become a wave of 
panic unless we move promptly and ef- 
fectively to restore Article 2(4) as part 
of the living law of international politics. 

It is the conviction of the United 
States that the time has come for the 
peoples of the world and their govern- 
ments to demand that the Soviet Union 
accept the only possible rule of true 
detente — that of scrupulous respect for 


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the provisions of the U.N. Charter 
regarding the international use of force. 

When that view is explained to 
Soviet representatives, they sometimes 
respond that we are asking them to give 
up a foreign policy "rooted in their 
nature as a society and a state." To that 
claim, the United States replies that we 
recognize the right of the Soviet Union 
to preach the creed of communism at 
will and in perfect freedom. No 
democracy could ever consider a dif- 
ferent position. What we cannot ac- 
cept—what the state system cannot 
tolerate— is the thesis that the Soviet 
Union has special— and exclusive— right 
to spread its faith by the sword. No 
U.N. body, no scholar in any country has 
been able to reconcile this basic Soviet 
position with the charter or with the 
corpus of international customary law on 
which the charter is based. No state can 
accept a doctrine which would authorize 
its neighbors to send armies or armed 
bands across its frontiers or to send 
arms to those who would challenge its 
authority. The Soviet doctrine is an at- 
tempt to square the circle. It has failed 
as a theory. And in practice it stands 
revealed as incompatible with the 
necessary conditions for cooperation in 
the international society of states. 

The leaders of the Soviet Union may 
imagine that they have made great prog- 
ress toward their goal of dominion. But 
that belief is an illusion. At enormous 
cost, the Soviet Union has made signifi- 
cant tactical gains during the last three 
decades in its quest for empire. But the 
Soviet effort has transformed its strate- 
gic position. It has called into being a 
vast coalition of nations determined to 
retain their freedom. It is clear that the 
Soviet Union can never achieve its pur- 
pose, even through war. 

The moral of this tragic chapter in 
20th century history is clear, and we 
stress it now while there is time to 
change course and return to the way of 

The highest national interest of the 
United States in world politics is a 
system of peace in which all the nations 
respect the rules of the charter regard- 
ing the international use of force. All the 
other ambitions of our foreign policy — 
economic stability and progress: the vin- 
dication of human rights; the advance of 
literacy, of education, and of culture; 
and the encouragement of progressive 
peaceful change — depend in the end on 

the achievement and maintenance of 
peace in that sense. 

It is our view that the achievement 
of a system of peace is equally the 
highest national interest of every other 
state. Indeed, through the charter, every 
state has solemnly promised every other 
state that peace in this sense is its 
highest national interest. It should now 
be obvious — in the phrase of the Soviet 
former Foreign Minister Maxim 
Litvinov — that peace is indivisible. The 
dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries. 
As President Reagan has said, the world 
cannot justify or tolerate a double stand- 
ard with regard to the international use 
of force. All must obey the same rules. 
In the words of Secretary Haig, "the 
rules of the charter governing the inter- 
national use of force will lose all their in- 
fluence on the behavior of nations if the 
Soviet Union continues its aggressive 

We hope that this session of the 
Committee on Disarmament will make a 
powerful contribution to the cause of 
peace by calling on the members of the 
United Nations to rededicate themselves 
to a policy of strict and unwavering 
respect for the rule of Article 2(4). The 
discussion of the problem here, and the 
pursuit of that discussion at the forth- 
coming Second Special Session on Disar- 
mament (SSOD) should help to 

The highest national 
interest of the United 
States in world politics 
is a system of peace in 
which all the nations 
respect the rules of the 
[U.N.] charter regarding 
the international use of 

crystallize a new state of public opinion 
throughout the world — a state of public 
opinion which could compel all nations to 
accept the vision which dominated the 
conference at San Francisco where the 
charter was approved in 1945, in the 
shadow of an appalling war. 

The significance of what we propose 

here is brought out by the pattern of 
Soviet policy in Poland. 

It has been clear for several years 
that, except for a thin layer of party and 
state officials in Poland, the Polish peo- 
ple have been seeking a new order of 
things in its homeland — an order 
characterized by freedom and pluralism 
in every aspect of the life of the nation. 
Above all, the Polish people have made 
it clear that the spirit which sustained 
the Polish nation between 1792 and 1918 
is still unconquerable. 

Poland and the other countries of 
Eastern Europe were promised a free 
choice by the three victorious Allies who 
met a generation ago at Yalta and 
Potsdam. President Kennedy said on a 
famous occasion that "our two peoples, 
which now live in danger" would not be 
able to live in peace until the Soviet 
promise of free choice in Eastern 
Europe was kept. 

But the promises of Yalta and 
Potsdam for Eastern Europe have not 
been kept. Those promises of themselves 
transform the crisis in Poland into a 
matter of deep and legitimate interna- 
tional concern, especially since the other 
terms of the postwar understanding 
have also eroded. 

There is another and even more 
basic international dimension to the 
crisis in Poland. The military coup d'etat 
in Poland and the imposition of martial 
law by the military dictator of Poland 
were acts done with Soviet complicity 
and participation, under the compelling 
threat that if the Polish armed forces 
did not act, the Soviet Union would do 
so itself. This is a threat and use of 
force in violation of Article 2(4) of the 
charter, a flagrant breach of the peace 
in one of the most sensitive and impor- 
tant strategic areas of world politics. 

Finally, the United States and its 
NATO allies have stressed that events in 
Poland violate the Final Act of the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), which was signed at 
Helsinki in 1975. The assurances and the 
hopes embodied in that document give 
further ground for the conviction that 
what is happening in Poland is not a 
purely domestic problem. 

It has been the objective of the 
United States in the Polish crisis not on- 
ly to stress the gravity of what is hap- 
pening but to offer the Soviet Union a 
peaceful and constructive way to recon- 
cile its security concerns with the 
legitimate demands of the Polish people. 
The state system as it developed after 
1945 must accommodate itself to 

May 1982 



peaceful change. If it fails to bend, it 
will surely break. Therefore, President 
Reagan, in his statement of Decem- 
ber 23, 1981, offered the cooperation of 
the United States in large-scale pro- 
grams for effective action that would 
restore the vitality of the Polish 
economy, without in any way threaten- 
ing the legitimate security interests of 
the Soviet Union. He recalled the 
American offer of the Marshall plan in 
the late 1940s, an offer which Poland 
first accepted and then was forced to re- 
ject. At the same time. President 
Reagan warned against steps that could 
let slip the dogs of war. No man can 
foresee or control the consequence of 
such developments. 

The United States has high hopes 
for a fair and reasonable outcome of the 
crisis in Poland. Such a turn in Soviet 
policy could make many other agree- 
ments possible and help prepare the way 
for a genuine improvement in the 
climate of world politics and the fabric 
of the international community. 

Negotiation of Fair and 
Balanced Agreements 

One of the principal means on which we 
rely to achieve that goal is the negotia- 
tion of fair and balanced agreements for 
the reduction of nuclear arms, and par- 
ticularly of offensive nuclear arms. Our 
policy in such talks, as President Reagan 
made clear in his speech of Novem- 
ber 18, 1981, is to propose whatever 
reductions are necessary to achieve for 
each side the equal capacity to deter 
nuclear war. The policy of equal deter- 
rence would deny to either side the 
capacity to use or to brandish nuclear 
weapons as an instrument of aggression 
or political coercion. Measuring deter- 
rence and distinguishing retaliatory 
weapons from those capable of use as 
weapons of aggression are complex 
problems. With good will, they can be 

U.S. policy with respect to nuclear 
weapons currently includes several dif- 
ferent elements. With respect to in- 
termediate range land-based nuclear 
missiles, negotiations have begun in a 
constructive atmosphere, and considera- 
tion is being given to President Reagan's 
proposal to abolish all such weapon 
systems, wherever located. 

American arms control policy is by 
no means limited to this aspect of the 
problem. In his speech of November 18, 
President Reagan also proposed the 
early resumption of Soviet-American 
negotiations on the reduction of 

Nuclear Freeze 

by Richard R. Burt 

Tke following statement was read to 
news correspondents by Department 
spokesman Dean Fischer on March 11, 
1982. on behalf of Mr. Burt. Director of 
the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. 

I would like to make a brief statement 
with respect to the nuclear freeze resolu- 
tion which was introduced in the Senate 

The President and his entire Ad- 
ministration share the concern felt 
throughout the world over the danger 
that nuclear weapons pose for mankind. 
That is why, in his speech of Novem- 
ber 18, the President proposed a far- 
reaching arms control program for seek- 
ing equitable and verifiable agreements, 
which will not just freeze current 
nuclear and conventional forces but ac- 
tually significantly reduce them. 

In Geneva the United States is now 
negotiating with the Soviet Union on the 
basis of the President's bold proposal of 
November 18, which calls for the 
elimination of the Soviet nuclear 
systems most threatening Europe in ex- 
change for cancellation of scheduled 
NATO deployments of comparable 
intermediate-range land-based nuclear 

While we understand the spirit that 
motivates the freeze efforts, the Ad- 
ministration cannot support the freeze 
itself. A number of compelling facts 
argue against a freeze. 

• It would freeze the United States 
into a position of military disadvantage 
and dangerous vulnerability. Soviet 

defense investments have far outpaced 
ours over the last decade. While we ex- 
ercised substantial restraint, the Soviets' 
across-the-board modernization efforts 
have produced new weapons, including 
new generations of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles directly threatening our 
nuclear deterrent. In Europe, Soviet 
deployments of new intermediate-range 
missiles have given the Soviet Union an 
overwhelming advantage over the West 
in this category of weapons. 

• We want verifiable agreements 
that go beyond freezes to produce real 
reductions. The freeze proposal, which is 
neither verifiable nor reduces weapons, 
is not only bad defense but, as Secretary 
Haig said yesterday, is bad arms control 
as well. 

• The President needs the strategic 
modernization program if we are to 
have a credible chance to negotiate a 
good strategic arms reduction agree- 
ment with the Soviets. The freeze 
would, of course, kill the modernization 
program and with it our chances for 
achieving the reductions that we all 

• We have embarked on very impor^ 
tant negotiations on intermediate-range 
nuclear forces with the Soviet Union in 
Geneva — negotiations in which the 
United States is seeking far more than a 
freeze. Our goal in Geneva is the total 
elimination of land-based intermediate- 
range missiles. Thus the United States 
and the NATO alliance must have the 
flexibility to continue with the two-track 
approach that NATO agreed to in 1979. 
The freeze proposal would concede to 
the Soviet Union its present advantage 
in intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
and eliminate any Soviet incentive to 
reach a fair and balanced agreement 
that would reduce nuclear weapons in 
Europe. ■ 

intercontinental-range missiles, the 
revitalization of the negotiations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions, 
and a vigorous attack on the problem of 
measures for reducing the risk of sur- 
prise attack and the chance of war aris- 
ing out of uncertainty or miscalculation. 
All these proposals, the President said, 
are based "on the same fair-minded prin- 
ciples: substantial, militarily significant 
reduction in forces; equal ceilings for 
similar types of forces; and adequate 
provisions for verification." 

This then is the policy framework 
within which the United States is work- 
ing toward arms control. I can assure 
you that the United States will play its 
full part in devising solutions for these 
problems if the Soviet Union, by adopt- 
ing policies of restraint, makes it possi- 
ble for the full range of arms control 
negotiations and other cooperative ac- 
tivities in this field to continue. 

These basic pillars of U.S. arms con- 
trol policy are fundamental to the issues 
on which this committee has focused 
much of its attention since its establish- 
ment. Foremost among these has been 


Department of State Bulletin 


the question of a comprehensive ban on 
the testing of nuclear weapons. In the 
many discussions of this problem here, 
the ultimate desirability of a test ban 
has not been at issue, but unanimity has 
been lacking on questions of approach 
and timing. 

The U.S. Government has reviewed 
the question of nuclear testing in the 
context of its impact not only on arms 
control efforts but also on the need to 
maintain the stability of the nuclear 
balance, bearing in mind in particular 
the importance of achieving effective 
verification measures and insuring com- 
pliance with any agreed restrictions. It 
is clear that any consideration of a com- 
plete cessation of nuclear explosions 
must be related to the ability of the 
Western nations to maintain credible 
deterrent forces. It is equally clear that 
a test ban cannot of itself end the threat 
posed by nuclear weapons. Limitations 
on testing must necessarily be con- 
sidered within the broad range of nu- 
clear issues. Direct means for achieving 
progress toward the elimination of the 
nuclear menace are the restoration of 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a 
reality in world politics, the negotiation 
of significant reductions in nuclear 
weapons, and the eventual elimination of 
the weapons themselves. Thus, while a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing 
remains an element in the full range of 
long-term U.S. arms control objectives, 
we do not believe that, under present 
circumstances, a comprehensive test ban 
could help to reduce the threat of 
nuclear weapons or to maintain the 
stability of the nuclear balance. The 
United States fully shares the keen con- 
cern of members of this committee to 
move forward rapidly in the effort to 
remove the burden of nuclear weapons 
from world politics. The United States 
will work constructively with the com- 
mittee in its efforts to achieve this end. 

In the area of chemical weapons, the 
Committee on Disarmament has already 
done useful work, and the United States 
commends the chairmen of previous 
chemical-weapons working groups and 
the delegations that have participated so 
effectively in this effort. President 
Reagan has reaffirmed U.S. support for 
efforts to achieve a complete and 
verifiable ban on chemical weapons and 
has directed U.S. representatives to par- 
ticipate actively in this important quest. 
The United States believes that the 
Committee on Disarmament is the ap- 
propriate forum for work toward a 
chemical weapons convention. It is the 

intention of the United States to concen- 
trate its efforts toward the elaboration 
of a convention banning chemical 
weapons in this committee. We believe 
the working group has successfully com- 
pleted the bulk of its initial task and, in 
so doing, has identified important areas 
of agreement and disagreement. The 
next step is to see if it is possible to har- 
monize views on the major elements of 
an eventual agreement. Such a step is a 
prerequisite to the achievement of our 
ultimate objective, and the U.S. delega- 
tion, therefore, will support a revised 
mandate for the working group that will 
allow it to undertake this essential task. 

It is no secret that views diverge 
widely on the subject of verifying com- 
pliance with arms control agreements. 
The United States believes that the 
chemical weapons working group should 
devote particular attention to verifica- 
tion and compliance issues, from both a 
political and a technical standpoint. I 
urge the members of the working group 
to apply their expertise and imagination 
to finding ways to overcome the many 
complex problems which face us in this 
area. One such problem is that of 
undeclared stocks and undeclared 
chemical weapons production, tilling, 
and storage facilities. 

Further, when the chemical weapons 
experts meet, I urge that, in addition to 
continuing their work on toxicity stand- 

the work of the group of scientific ex- 
perts, whose efforts thus far have been 
pointed toward the international ex- 
change of seismic data. As you are 
aware, the United States has been an 
active participant in all the activities of 
this group. We want this work to con- 
tinue for as long as useful results are be- 
ing produced, and we intend fully to 
support its ongoing efforts. We are 
aware of the interest which has been ex- 
pressed by other delegations in an 
enlarged mandate for the group, one 
that would enable it to address the 
possibility of exchanging data on nuclear 
explosions and on certain other unusual 
events occurring in the atmosphere. We 
have also examined this possibility and 
want to share our views informally with 
other delegations. The idea here is to in- 
crease the ability of the group of scien- 
tific experts to make a useful contribu- 
tion to improving our verification 

At the last session of the General 
Assembly, the question of controlling 
arms in outer space was the subject of a 
lively debate which resulted in the adop- 
tion of two resolutions, both of which 
put the problem on the agenda of this 
committee. The United States believes 
that is an appropriate step. This- is a 
difficult, complex issue that cannot be 
separated from broader arms control 
issues. Because of the magnitude of the 

. . . We do not believe that, under present cir- 
cumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to 
reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to main- 
tain the stability of the nuclear balance. 

ards, they be asked to examine promis- 
ing technical methods for monitoring the 
shutdown of chemical weapons produc- 
tion and filling facilities. In this manner, 
the committee can make use of our col- 
lective expertise to try to surmount a 
major hurdle relating to the verification 
of an eventual agreement. It is the con- 
viction of the United States that in this, 
as in other areas, the problem of verify- 
ing compliance with arms control 
agreements requires active cooperation 
among the signatories and not reliance 
on national means alone. 

While I am on the subject of expert 
groups, I should dwell for a moment on 

problems involved, we cannot expect im- 
mediate progress in this area. The prob- 
lem is one that we believe must be ap- 
proached with extreme care. Its 
ramifications are legion; so are the pit- 
falls. Too quick a plunge without ade- 
quate prior reflection could be fatal to 
our objective of achieving a stable en- 
vironment in outer space. At this stage, 
the United States is prepared to discuss 
the issue in a general way in informal 
meetings of the committee where 
various points of view and proposals can 

May 1982 



be thoroughly vented before any further 
steps are taken. 

I have not yet mentioned three 
items that have been on the committee's 
agenda in the past and which await final 
action. I refer to the draft radiological 
weapons treaty, the question of effective 
arrangements to assure non-nuclear- 
weapon states that nuclear weapons will 
not be used against them, and the 
development of a comprehensive pro- 
gram for disarmament. The United 
States would like to see the radiological 
weapons treaty completed soon. As we 
have said many times before, it would 
not be a major step toward putting the 
nuclear genie back in the bottle, but it 
would be a step and anything we can do 
in this area should surely be done. More 
delay can only mean more difficulty in 
achieving ultimate agreement on this 

In connection with another issue 
which has been under active considera- 
tion by the committee during its past 
three sessions — that of the so-called 
negative security assurances — I reaffirm 
the unilateral assurance given by the 
United States at the time of the first 
U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 
1978. As we said at that time: 

The United States will not use nuclear 
weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons 
state party to the NPT [Nonproliferation 
Treaty] or any comparable internationally 
binding commitment not to acquire nuclear 
explosive devices, except in the case of an at- 
tack on the United States, its territories or 
armed forces, or its allies, by such a state 
allied to a nuclear-weapons state or 
associated with a nuclear-weapons state in 
carrying out or sustaining the attack. 

The United States stands by this 
statement as a reliable and firm 
assurance. We have participated, none- 
theless, and are willing to continue to 
participate in the working group which 
deals with this issue and would join a 
consensus to reestablish the group. The 
United States believes that development 
of a common assurance, as has been 
suggested, would be extremely difficult, 
although we are not opposed to this con- 

The committee's task of developing a 
comprehensive program of disarmament 
was mandated by the First Special Ses- 
sion on disarmament. It is extremely im- 
portant. We support this effort and will 
continue to work constructively toward 
enunciation of a meaningful program to 
be presented to the Second Special Ses- 
sion. The United States believes that to 

achieve the necessary consensus, such a 
program must be realistic and must 
reflect the security needs of all states. It 
should provide guidelines for the actions 
of states, with an overall goal of pro- 
moting world stability and peace. 

Compliance With Treaties 

Both the increased complexity of 
modern weapons and the turbulent con- 
dition of world politics have highlighted 
the special importance of compliance 
with treaties as a factor among the 
responsibilities of this committee. Trust 
is an essential ingredient of the condi- 
tion of peace. Montesquieu spoke of 
peace as a state of tranquility in which 
no man need fear his neighbor. Alas, 

Status of the INF 

Following is a statement made on 
March 18, 1982, by Ambassador Paul H. 
Nitze, head of the U.S. delegation to the 
interTnediate-range nuclear force (INF) 
negotiations being held in Geneva. 

I left London this morning. Yesterday in 
Brussels I fully briefed our NATO part- 
ners on the progress of the Geneva talks 
on limiting intermediate-range nuclear 
missiles. The talks have been intense, 
serious, and businesslike. We have 
covered at length all the important and 
difficult issues between us. I have 
agreed with Ambassador [Yuli A.] 
Kvitsinskiy, the head of the Soviet 
delegation, to maintain the confidentiali- 
ty of the exchanges between us. I can 
say, however, that I have had the oppor- 
tunity fully to present the case for the 
draft treaty which we presented on 
February 2, which would implement the 
President's proposal for zero on our side 
and zero on theirs, with respect to those 
missiles which are of greatest concern to 
both sides. 

I would like to make one closing 
comment. I hope that those here at 
home who are considering various 
nuclear freeze proposals take fully into 
account the effect that their proposals, if 
adopted, would have on our negotia- 
tions. If the U.S. deployment of 
intermediate-range missiles is frozen, 
there will be no incentive for the Soviet 
Union to give up theirs; they have vir- 
tually completed their planned deploy- 
ment in Europe of such missiles. ■ 

that criterion is not satisfied today in 
many parts of the world. None of the 
neighbors of the Soviet Union can say 
that it feels comfortable about the in- 
violability of its borders. And more 
generally, the expansionist policy of the 
Soviet Union radiates anxiety far 
beyond the states in its immediate 
neighborhood — to other states which 
fear the fate of Afghanistan, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the 
German Democratic Republic, or 
Bulgaria. Troubling questions have 
arisen about Soviet compliance with in- 
ternational agreements concerning 
chemical and biological warfare. Those 
questions aftect every state in the work 
community. And they cast a shadow 
over the possibility of verifying Soviet 
compliance with treaties on the control 
of other arms, particularly nuclear arm; 

In 1967, the International Commit- 
tee of the Red Cross published disturb- 
ing evidence about the use of Soviet 
chemical weapons in Yemen. Now, initi: 
circumstantial evidence that lethal 
chemical weapons have been used in 
Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has 
been confirmed by new evidence from 
Southeast Asia — evidence of the use of 
prohibited lethal mycotoxins, which are 
particularly cruel and inhumane 
weapons of war. The production and us 
of such weapons raises most serious 
questions about compliance with existin, 
international constraints on such ac- 
tivities, including the Biological and To> 
in Weapons Convention of 1972 and the 
1925 Geneva protocol — to both of whicl 
the Soviet Union is a party — and 
demonstrates the necessity of further 
consideration of the adequacy of ap- 
plicable verification and compliance pro- 

It is vital that all countries con- 
cerned cooperate to the fullest extent 
with the work of the U.N. group of ex- 
perts investigating the matter. It will 
not suffice simply to call attention to thi 
problems. We deserve answers. The 
1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk ha 
never been satisfactorily explained. The 
Soviet Union and its friends and allies 
have vehemently denied that the Soviet 
Union is engaged in any way in the use 
of toxins or other chemical weapons. 
But it remains altogether unwilling to 
discuss these matters in detail or to of- 
fer the kind of cooperation that might 
alleviate the legitimate concerns of the 
world community. Soviet behavior in the 
face of such inquiries has simply deep- 
ened the suspicions and anxiety of all 
persons of good will. This is a fact of 


Department of State Bulletin 


particular importance to the worl< of the 
Committee on Disarmament. 

It is essential, therefore, that the 
verification of compliance with arms con- 
trol treaties be made a central feature of 
our work program here. Until the na- 
tions agree on the principle of far- 
reaching international cooperation in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with such agreements, arms control and 
disarmament cannot begin to achieve 
their full potential as programs of peace. 
The Soviet Union has recently stated 
that, while it continued to rely primarily 
on national means of verification of com- 
pliance with arms control treaties, it was 
willing to accept cooperative means of 
verification where circumstances make 
such procedures necessary and desirable. 
The United States welcomes this 
assurance. And it recalls the fact that in 
1947, the Soviet Union made a far more 
comprehensive statement of its 
readiness to accept inspection and other 
cooperative means of verification in the 
interest of arms control during the con- 
sideration of the U.S. proposal for the 
international control of nuclear energy, 
known as the Baruch plan. The volatility 
and fragility of the international at- 
mosphere make it essential that th? 
Soviet Union go beyond President 
Brezhnev's statement of November 23, 
1981, to Foreign Minister Gromyko's 
earlier and more ample offer. 

Thus far, I have alluded only in 
passing to the Second SSOD. That is 
because in many respects its shape and 
the nature of its contribution to our 
common endeavors cannot yet be clearly 
foreseen. In no small part, what happens 
in New York in June will depend upon 
what happens here between now and 
then. The committee's work on the com- 
prehensive program of disarmament will 
be a major input. In that effort, the 
United States wishes to play an active 
and energetic role. But, obviously, all 
does not rest on what we do here. Much 
will depend on whether the behavior of 
states conforms to their professed goals 
and intentions. The work of the second 
special session will be particularly sen- 
sitive to this factor. Let us hope that, to 
the extent we can influence events, this 
committee will contribute to a special 
session which should be marked by a 
realistic appreciation of the role of arms 
limitations in the effort to maintain 
peace and security for all mankind. ■ 

ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue 

The fourth ministerial meeting of the 
United States and the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
held in Washington, D.C., at the Depart- 
ment of State. March 9-11. 1982. Follow- 
ing are welcomijig remarks made by 
Deputy Secretary Walter J. Stoessel. Jr. . 
on March 9. and the text of the joint 
press statement issued on March 11. 


I am delighted to welcome you to the 
fourth ASEAN-U.S. dialogue. It is espe- 
cially gratifying for me to meet with 
representatives of a regional group 
which has achieved an unqualified suc- 
cess in bringing progress, stability, and 
international prestige to its member 
countries. The cooperation which your 
nations have attained in the economic 
and political fields, both among your- 
selves as well as with the rest of the 
world, is a glistening example for the 
rest of us. 

I am particularly proud of the close 
partnership which my country has 
established with ASEAN. It is a model 
for the way in which nations can work 
together on common problems for the 
common benefit. I can assure you that 
this Administration is determined to 
continue the high level of cooperation, 
friendship, and openness which has been 
established with the ASEAN states; to 
listen carefully to your concerns; and to 
respond positively to the very best of 
our ability. 

The meeting which begins today is 
part of a diverse and constructive 
U.S. -ASEAN interaction which has been 
crucial to our mutual efforts to deal with 
many difficult issues. The process has 
taken place through the formal dialogue 
meetings, through participation by 
Secretaries of State in post-ASEAN 
ministerial consultations with dialogue 
partners, through the ASEAN 
Washington committee, and through fre- 
quent get togethers on many subjects. 
■This fruitful day-by-day exchange truly 
demonstrates, as Philippine Foreign 
Minister [Carlos P.] Romulo stated at 
the last dialogue meeting that ASEAN 
and the United States share long-range 
concerns for the continued stability and 
sustained growth of the ASEAN region. 

Dialogue Accomplishments 

The dialogue process has helped 
ASEAN achieve some very impressive 

First, and particularly impressive, is 
ASEAN's resolute effort to achieve a 
peaceful solution to the tragic situation 
in Vietnam-occupied Kampuchea, which 
the United States has strongly sup- 
ported and will continue to support. 
ASEAN's effectiveness in marshalling 
international support for its position, 
and in keeping the pressure on Vietnam 
to agree to a negotiated settlement 
which allows the Cambodian people self- 
determination under U.N. -supervised 
elections, has provided conclusive 
evidence of the strength, diplomatic 
skill, and maturity of the ASEAN 

Another impressive accomplishment 
facilitated by the dialogue process has 
been the successful effort to deal, in 
humanitarian fashion, with the inunda- 
tion of Indochina refugees, which only 3 
years ago posed a severe crisis for 
ASEAN. ASEAN efforts, including 
establishment of regional processing 
centers and cooperation with the inter- 
national community on refugee relief 
and resettlement, have converted this in- 
to a manageable, though still difficult, 
problem. It is doubtful that this could 
have been accomplished without the ex- 
istence of ASEAN and the dialogue 
process. The United States is continuing 
to support ASEAN and to live up to its 
humanitarian obligations by accepting 
large numbers of Southeast Asian 
refugees for resettlement. 

The 'clialogue process has brought 
about concrete and practical im- 
provements in economic and commercial 
relations between ASEAN and the 
United States. The second dialogue 
meeting in 1978 contributed to the U.S. 
decision to support negotiation of the 
common fund. The United States signed 
the resulting agreement and is prepared 
to take further steps toward ratification 
provided that commodity agreements 
decide to associate with the fund. The 
United States also signed the Interna- 
tional Rubber Agreement and played a 
central role in the establishment of its 
headquarters in Malaysia, an important 
ASEAN goal. We have cooperated in an 
ASEAN development program, which 
addresses crucial regional problems by 

May 1982 



sharing our technology and experience. 
These programs are moving forward at 
a good pace. We intend to build on these 
programs to further advance ASEAN 
regional development. 


In the trade field, ASEAN has been 
given status as a regional association 
eligible for cumulative treatment under 
GSP [Generalized System of Prefer- 
ences] rules of origin, and Indonesia has 
become eligible for GSP. ASEAN is a 
major beneficiary of this program and is 
showing an expanding ability to make 
use of GSP concessions. We have been 
able to discuss GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade] and other 
trade issues with creativity and candor 
because of the relationship built up 
through the dialogue. 

This Administration is particularly 
conscious of the importance of the 
private business sector to development 
and mutually beneficial commerce. The 
ASEAN-U.S. Business Council, which 
has arisen out of the dialogue process, is 
proving to be one of its most important 
accomplishments in terms of long-run 
economic progress and increased trade 
and investment. President Reagan 
strongly believes in the effectiveness of 
the private enterprise contribution to 
economic development, and the Business 
Council is a concept we wholeheartedly 
support. The impressive success of 
market-oriented ASEAN economies is 
eloquent testimony to the progress 
which private enterprises can achieve. 
We are exploring ways in which the 
U.S. Government can further strengthen 
the U.S. private sector contribution to 
ASEAN's development. 

U.S. East Asian Policy 

I would like to say a few words about 
the broader global aspects of U.S. 
foreign policy, particularly in the East 
Asian region. All of you in this room to- 
day will understand how the U.S. global 
responsibilities influence our regional ac- 
tivities and capabilities. We can deal 
harmoniously and productively with 
economic issues only in a climate of 
security and freedom from external 
threats. Indeed, the world trading 
system is predicated on the absence of 
hostilities and aggression. It is precisely 
to preserve a peaceful world system in 
which all can prosper that the United 

States has to focus on threats to that 
system. In this regard, we are deter- 
mined to continue to play a major role in 
assuring peace and security in East 

To help ASEAN withstand the 
threat created by Vietnam's invasion of 
Kampuchea and an expanding Soviet 
naval presence, the United States is in- 
creasing its military assistance to in- 
dividual ASEAN countries, especially 
Thailand, the front-line state. We 
recognize and accept the independent 
status of ASEAN, however, and we will 
continue to provide our support in ways 
fully acceptable to your governments. 

It is in this broader context that the 
United States places such high value on 
its relationship with ASEAN. You are 
independent, self-reliant, and 
economically dynamic. We will continue 
to support this favorable situation with 
trade, investment, development coopera- 
tion, and military assistance. 

This Administration also is engaged 
in a major effort to revitalize the U.S. 
economy. As we proceed, we may not 
always be able to respond immediately 
to your desires for increased access to 
the U.S. market or for increased U.S. 
financial support. But we are committed 
to an open global trading system and 
will strongly resist the winds of protec- 
tionism. Most importantly, the renewed 
health of the U.S. economy will have 
major benefits for international trade, 
including improved markets for the com- 
modity exports of the developing world. 
The Agenda for the fourth dialogue 
is well thought out and unusually ap- 
propriate in view of the upcoming GATT 
Ministerial. The discussions will in- 
fluence how both sides proceed in the 
global context. We are especially aware 
of your concerns about the outlook for 
your commodity exports, as well as your 
interest in increasing the benefits from 
GSP. We will give careful consideration 
to your views on these subjects during 
the course of the dialogue. 

We are also extremely interested in 
thoroughly exploring with you ways in 
which we can increase our investment 
and financial cooperation, including 
transfer of technology and increased ac- 
cess to U.S. capital markets. The 
dynamism of ASEAN economies has led 
OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration], the Eximbank, and the trade 
and development program to count 
ASEAN as one of their prime cus- 
tomers, and we are prepared to consider 

what further participation these U.S. 
agencies can make. 

The meeting you are about to begin 
will play an important role in achieving 
mutual understanding of economic prob- 
lems and concerns on both sides. We 
have assembled our leading experts on 
trade, finance, and development as well 
as leaders from our private business sec- 
tor, to discuss your concerns and aspira- 
tions thoroughly. I am convinced that 
the results will lead to a further 
strengthening of the dynamic and fruit- 
ful relationship between our countries, 
leading to greater prosperity for all. 


The fourth meeting of the ASEAN-U.S. 
dialogue took place in Washington, D.C., 
March 9-11 in the Department of State. 

The ASEAN delegations were led by 
H.E. Atmono Suryo, Director-General, 
ASEAN-Indonesia; H.E. Mohd. Yusof bin 
Hitam, Director-General, ASEAN-Malaysia; 
H.E, Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr., Deputy 
Minister of Trade and Industry, Philippines; 
H.E. Sime D. Hidalgo, Director-General, 
ASEAN-Philippines; H.E. Punch 
Coomarasawamy, Ambassador of Singapore 
to the United States; and H.E. Vudhi 
Chuchom, Director-General, ASEAN- 
Thailand. H.E. Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr., 
leader of the Philippine delegation, was the 
ASEAN spokesman, H.E. Narciso G. Reyes, 
ASEAN Secretary General, and members of 
his staff were also present. 

The U.S. delegation was led by Anthony 
C. Albrecht, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The 
U.S. delegation was made up of representa- 
tives of the Departments of State, Com- 
merce, Treasury. Agriculture, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, AID, Council of Economic 
Advisors, OPIC, and the Eximbank. 

The meeting opened with a welcoming 
statement by Walter J. Stoessel, Deputy 
Secretary of State. The Deputy Secretary 
reaffirmed the close and friendly ties be- 
tween the United States and ASEAN, the in- 
creasingly prosperous effective grouping of 
five nations in Southeast Asia. Secretary 
Stoessel went on to state that this Ad- 
ministration is determined to continue the 
high level of cooperation, friendship, and 
openness which has been established with the 
ASEAN states. The dialogue process has 
helped ASEAN achieve some very impressivt 
accomplishments, including concrete and 
practical improvements in the economic and 
commercial relations between ASEAN and 
the United States. Regarding the role of the 
private sector, the ASEAN-U.S. Business 
Council is proving to be most important in 


Department of State Bulletin 


romoting long-run economic progress and in- 
reased trade and investment. 

Anthony C. Albrecht, Deputy Assistant 
ecretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
iffairs and head of the U.S. delegation, in in- 
roductory remarks, noted the importance of 
lSEAN as the fifth largest trading partner 
lith the United States, the total trade having 
eached $22 billion in 1981 and that U.S. in- 
estment in the region was now over $5 
illion with more to come. He referred to 
2.2 billion in Exim loans and guarantees 
ver the past 5 years. OPIC has provided 
314 million of insurance on 16 projects in 

Dr. Vicente B. Valdepenas, Jr., as the 
VSEAN spokesman, welcomed the fourth 
lialogue as an opportunity for both the 
Jnited States and ASEAN to resolve their 
ommon concern and hoped that the dialogue 
vould further strengthen the partnership be- 
ween ASEAN and the United States. 

Both sides noted with satisfaction the 
)rogress of the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue as 
videnced by the expanding development 
ooperation program, cultural, educational, 
oint narcotics control activities, and the in- 
•reasing flow of technicians and officials be- 
ween the two sides. 

[nternational Economy 

There was a wide-ranging discussion of the 
ssues facing the world economy. Particular 
•eference was made to the importance of 
•evitalizing the U.S. economy in order to 
•estore the prosperity and the growth of the 
vorld trading system, including the ASEAN 
irea. The United States welcomed the contin- 
jing vigorous growth exhibited by the 
\SEAN economies, expressing the view that 
he role of the private sector was one of the 
Tiajor elements in their prosperity. 

The ASEAN side reassured the U.S. side 
hat ASEAN states have always taken a 
wsitive attitude in searching for a healthy in- ' 
.ernational political and economic environ- 
Tient. However, the ASEAN delegations ex- 
pressed concern over certain recent 
developments such as the U.S. policy on com- 
Tiodities of interest to ASEAN particularly 
in and sugar; on the integrated program for 
:ommodities; U.S. policy on multilateral 
development banks; economic cooperation in 
developing countries activities; and the U.S. 
position on global negotiations. Nonetheless, 
ASEAN is hopeful that the spirit of genuine 
cooperation and meaningful consultations 
fostered at the Cancun summit, which has 
characterized the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue and 
its activities, would result in mutually 
beneficial and cooperative endeavors. 

Trade and Commodities 

Both sides discussed the results of the MTN 
multilateral trade negotiations] including the 
reduction of tariffs and the agreements on 
nontariff measures. Both sides noted that 

slow economic growth and unemployment led 
to rising protectionist sentiment in many 
countries and pointed to the advantages of 
maintaining an open international trading 
system and the need to resist protectionist 

Both sides referred to the importance of 
the upcoming GATT ministerial meeting and 
view it as a forum to improve the multilateral 
trading system. 

The ASEAN side expressed appreciation 
for the U.S. GSP [Generalized System of 
Preferences] scheme which has benefitted 
ASEAN exports, particularly of manufac- 
turers, and welcomed the U.S. efforts to fur- 
ther improve the scheme as well as assist 
ASEAN countries in better utilizing the 
scheme. The ASEAN side further stressed 
the importance of making the GSP scheme a 
permanent feature of the U.S. trade policy. 

The ASEAN side emphasized the impor- 
tance of basic commodity exports in their 
respective economies. They expressed their 
concern at the slow progress of the in- 
tegrated program for commodities in the 
establishment and operation of effective in- 
ternational commodity agreements which will 
contribute to the stabilization of prices. The 
ASEAN side reiterated their strong concern 
with regard to GSA [General Services Ad- 
ministration] release of tin onto the world 

The U.S. side recognized the views of 
ASEAN on commodities and reiterated its 
policy of support for a case-by-case approach 
toward commodity matters. The United 
States cited its active participation in the In- 
ternational Natural Rubber, Sugar, and Cof- 
fee Agreements. The U.S. side felt that GSA 
sales had not disrupted the tin market but ex- 
pressed its understanding of the ASEAN con- 
cern with regard to GSA sales of tin and in 
this context offered to hold special consulta- 
tions with ASEAN countries. At the same 
time the U.S. Government wished to assure 
tin producers that it would cooperate with 
the sixth ITA [International Tin Agreement] 
and expects that consumers and producers 
would join even though for well-known 
reasons the United States would be unable to 
participate in the agreement. 

The ASEAN side expressed serious con- 
cern on the possible adverse effects of the 
Caribbean Basin initiative on ASEAN ex- 
ports to the United States, in particular 
sugar, a substantial portion of which have 
been subject to full tariff duties and fees not 
only on account of their being ineligible under 
the U.S. GSP but also due to the U.S. sugar 
price support program. The ASEAN side 
believed that the tariff benefits that would be 
accorded beneficiary sugar exporting coun- 
tries under the Caribbean Basin initiative 
would result in a competitive disadavantage 
for ASEAN sugar exports. The U.S. side in- 
dicated that an objective of the overall Carib- 
bean Basin initiative is to encourage diver- 
sification away from sugar and that the U.S. 
does not expect that Caribbean sugar exports 
to the United States will rise significantly 
above historical levels. 

Investment and Finance 

Both sides recognized the vital role of private 
capital in economic development and stressed 
the importance of maintaining a favorable in- 
vestment climate. 

The ASEAN side requested the United 
States to facilitate ASEAN's efforts to raise 
financing for their development projects, to 
organize investment seminars, and to under- 
take other measures to promote U.S. invest- 
ment in the ASEAN countries. On financial 
cooperation, ASEAN requested the United 
States first, to encourage U.S. financial in- 
stitutions to work on ASEAN industrial proj- 
ect financing; second, to make available 
technical expertise of financial issues; third, 
to organize programs such as seminars, study 
tours, and on-the-job training to assist 
ASEAN access to the U.S. capital market; 
fourth, to organize study tours or training 
programs on insurance; and finally, to en- 
courage the U.S. Eximbank to continue its ef- 
fort to promote ASEAN development. 

The U.S. side indicated that they 
understood and supported the economic 
development objectives which underlay these 
proposals, and they would give serious con- 
sideration to them. In particular, regarding 
seminars, investment missions, and feasibility 
studies, the United States agreed to make 
further proposals. The U.S. representatives 
pointed to the programs of several U.S. 
Government agencies— including the U.S. 
Eximbank, OPIC, the Department of Com- 
merce, Agency for International Develop- 
ment, and the trade and development pro- 
gram — which are active in the ASEAN 
region in support of U.S. investment. The 
Eximbank has sizable commitments in the 
ASEAN region and is prepared to increase 
these commitments. Similarly, the United 
States noted that OPIC had been active in 
providing insurance, loan guarantees, and 
feasibility studies grants in the ASEAN area; 
still there is considerable scope for expansion 
of OPIC activities in the region. 

ASEAN-U.S. Business Council 

Both sides welcomed the special presentation 
closely related to trade and investment issues 
made by Mr. William E. Tucker, chairman of 
the U.S. section of the ASEAN-U.S. Business 
Council. His reference to the training and 
technology transfer opportunities offered by 
U.S. firms for the ASEAN area was wel- 
come. Both sides considered that the 
possibility of future participation by private 
sector representatives in appropriate dialogue 
sessions, by invitation, would be desirable. 

Development Cooperation 

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the 
progress made in six ongoing ASEAN-U.S. 
development projects in the fields of 
agriculture, energy, public health, and 


academic training and research. ASEAN-U.S. 
projects are now underway or planned in all 
five member countries. 

The growing success of the cooperation 
between ASEAN and the United States with 
AID funding was underlined by the signing of 
the seventh project agreement between the 
U.S. Government and ASEAN during the 
dialogue by AID Administrator M. Peter 
McPherson on behalf of the United States, 
and Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia 
to the United States, D. Ashari, on behalf of 
ASEAN. The Agreement provides $1 million 
of AID assistance over 3 years. This is the 
second energy project between ASEAN and 
the United States in the very important area 
of energy planning and development. 

The first ASEAN-U.S. development 
cooperation agreement was signed in 1979 
and since then AID has committed $16.5 
million in economic assistance to ASEAN 
regional projects. 

Other topics discussed during the meeting 
included narcotics control, cooperation in 
science and technology, agriculture, educa- 
tion, cultural affairs, and shipping. On ocean 
shipping policy ASEAN requested the U.S. 
Government to approve as soon as possible 
its proposed legislation to exempt the ship- 
ping lines of developing countries from being 
classified as controlled carriers. Both sides 
agreed to study carefully the proposals and 
suggestions exchanged in the various fields 
during these discussions with the aim of 
strengthening ASEAN-U.S. cooperation. ■ 


U.S.-NATO Defense Relationships 

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on March 26. 1982. 
Ambassador Eagleburger is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs.^ 

I am pleased to join my Defense Depart- 
ment colleagues today to testify on the 
defense relationship between the United 
States and our NATO partners and, 
more specifically, on the relationship be- 
tween the maintenance of U.S. troops in 
Europe and the equitable division of 
labor within the NATO alliance. 

We read about a growing sentiment 
in America to withdraw forces from 
Europe. Ostensibly because of perceived 
European failure to provide adequately 
for its share of the common defense. It 
is only fair that Americans should ask 
whether their sacrifices are being 
matched by those whose territory we 
are committed to defend, especially as 
our allies have become as prosperous as 
we. But a responsible debate on this 
issue must start with a clear apprecia- 
tion of our national interests and the 
facts about allied performance. 

Under Secretary [of Defense, 
Research and Engineering, Richard D.] 
Delauer has already reviewed the facts 
and figures of the allied contribution to 
the common defense. I would like to 
focus my remarks on the critical impor- 
tance of maintaining the U.S. military 
presence in Europe. 


There is no question that a gap exists 
today between the rate of growth of the 
U.S. defense effort and that of the allies. 
But one very basic reason for that is 
that we are now running hard to make 
up for nearly a generation of neglect in 
our military programs. The allies, in con- 
trast, have turned in a remarkably 
steady performance. Roughly speaking, 
they have sustained an increase of be- 
tween 2% and 3% for more than a 
decade. We are climbing out of a serious 
trough; they are not. 

Now that we have begun — and I 
stress, begun — to offer genuine leader- 
ship by our example, we have every 
right to expect a stronger allied 
response. But I want to underscore that 
the main reason we want to see the 
allies do more is that Western defense 


requires it, not simply because it would 
be more fair. As important as the ques- 
tion of equity is, it is secondary to the 
question of security. Had the allies beei 
concerned more for equity than security 
their effort might have declined as ours 
did during the 1970s. 

Thus, I endorse the Defense Depar 
ment's assessment that the allies are 
making an important contribution and 
that the policies we are now following 
are the best policies to induce the allies 
to do even more. I believe that removir 
U.S. forces from Europe would not onl 
harm our security but also damage the 
most important set of relationships we 
have, and erase our hope of a greater 
allied contribution. 

Until the 20th century, the United 
States sought to carve out its own 
destiny independent of those European 
states which are its political, economic, 
and philosophical parents. The lesson 
that the security of the United States i 
indivisible from the security of Europe 
was made tragically clear on two occa- 
sions in this century. At the outset of 
both World Wars, we began in neutral- 
ity, only to join the battle because we 
found that our fundamental interests 
were being threatened. 

We are bound to Europe by history 
culture, politics, and economics. Most 
Americans retain their personal and 
cultural roots in Europe. The vigorous 
and thriving democracies of Europe an 
America are the core of Western 
civilization. Our values are shared with 
Europe in the purest sense: Our values 
have their roots in Europe and have, ir 
turn, nourished the European commit- 
ment to liberty and the dignity of the i 

We and the Europeans provide the 
foundation of the international trading 
and financial systems. Our European 
NATO allies have an aggregate GNP 
slightly larger than that of the United 
States, and they took over $62 billion i: 
U.S. exports in 1980, resulting in a U.^ 
trade surplus of almost $25 billion. The 
represent one of the largest markets fc 
U.S. agricultural exports, which are 
crucial to a healthy U.S. economy. U.S 
direct investment in NATO countries 
amounted to $76 billion at the end of 
1980 and generates a significant flow o 
remittances which are a positive factor 



1 the U.S. balance of payments, as well 
s a major factor in the profitability of 
lany U.S. firms. 

mportance of U.S. -European 

tny discussion of the rationale for U.S. 
roop presence in Europe has to proceed 
rom a recognition of the critical impor- 
ance of the European-American 
jlationship in all of its forms. But it 
nust also take account of the fact that 
he world has changed greatly over the 
.0 years since NATO was created and 
J.S. troops were committed to it. 

First, the U.S. -Soviet balance has 
noved from U.S. superiority to, at best, 
I precarious balance, with powerful ad- 
'erse trends. 

Second, the U.S. -European balance 
las shifted even more dramatically. In 
945, the United States produced and 
•onsumed half the world's goods. Today, 
>ur allies in Europe and the Pacific col- 
ectively produce more than we. 

Third, the balance between North 
md South has shifted most starkly. In 
ittle more than a generation, we have 
noved from a world dominated by the 
Nest to one where over 100 independent 
lations, suspicious of and sometimes 
lostile to the West, control extensive 
•esources and trade routes of vital in- 
erest to the West. 

These changes point to several con- 
■lusions regarding the Atlantic partner- 

First, the Soviet threat to Europe is 
jreater than ever. It requires a greater- 
han-ever response. A decade of detente 
n Europe has failed to moderate Soviet 
jehavior or to stem the growth of Soviet 
nilitary might. 

Second, the United States must rely 
even more on friends and allies to 
counterbalance Soviet power in Europe 
and around the globe. 

Third, while the threat to Europe 
has grown, the threat to Western in- 
terests in other regions, from Soviet 
adventurism and from local instability 
and conflict, has also grown dramat- 

The United States and Western 
Europe continue to form a single social, 
cultural, and economic entity. It is the 

most vital such entity on the globe and 
in the history of mankind. The world is 
a more dangerous and difficult place 
than it was 30 years ago, but the West 
continues to have the resources, the 
talents, the political will, and the 
military potential to maintain its securi- 
ty and promote peaceful progress 
beyond its borders. 

American troops in Europe form the 
essential military bond which holds this 
Western coalition together. American 
troops in Europe are the concrete em- 
bodiment of America's commitment to 
collective security. American troops in 
Europe are the essential prerequisite for 
America's leadership of a united 
Western coalition. Placing that commit- 
ment in doubt would demoralize 
Western Europe and virtually exclude 
allied support for U.S. efforts to meet 
the Soviet challenge outside of Europe. 

I recognize that most of those who 
talk of reducing our troop presence in 
Europe would subscribe to what I have 
said. They would argue that we should 
maintain our commitment and our 

presence but that we should spur our 
allies into action by symbolic 
withdrawals or by threatening 
withdrawals. Their approach is largely 
tactical, designed to produce a more 
equitable distribution of the burden, if 
not a greater overall effort. 

This approach is highly unwise. At a 
time when we are working with allied 
governments to warn publics as to the 
magnitude of the Soviet threat, even 
token troop withdrawals would send a 
totally contradictory signal. It would be 
impossible to counter the argument that 
the European security situation cannot 
be all that bad if the United States has 
begun to pull out forces. We would crip- 
ple allied governments in their efforts to 
gain public and parliamentary support 
for improved defenses. 

The main beneficiary of any U.S. 
troop withdrawal would be the Soviets. 
Dividing the alliance and pushing 
America out of Europe is a central aim 
of Soviet foreign policy. The divisiveness 
that would be created by a U.S. 
drawdown, and the resultant decrease in 

Sixth Report on Cyprus 

JAN. 28, 1982' 

In accordance with the provision of Public 
Law 95-384, I am submitting the following 
report on progress made during the past six- 
ty days toward reaching a negotiated settle- 
ment of the Cyprus problem. 

Following presentation of the United Na- 
tions "evaluation" of the intercommunal 
negotiations on November 18, 1981, the 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have 
begun to discuss the "evaluation" and identify 
points of agreement. The negotiators met on 
December 2 and 8, 1981, and following a 
recess at the end of the year, on January 6, 
13 and 20, 1982. While doubtlessly the issues 
are complex and will require the best efforts 
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to 
resolve, we hope that continued negotiations 
will lead to a mutually acceptable resolution 
of the Cyprus problem. 

As you recall, resolution of the Cyprus 
problem is a priority of this Administration. 
In this regard, I met with Cypriot President 
Kyprianou on December 8, 1981, for a useful 
and productive exchange of views. The 
United States remains fully committed to 
assisting in achieving a just and lasting 
Cyprus settlement and will continue to give 
its full support to the United Nations and the 
UN Secretary General's Special Representa- 

tive on Cyprus, Ambassador Hugo Gobbi, in 
their efforts to secure solutions to the 
negotiating differences separating the par- 

The United Nations has continued to pay 
close attention to developments on Cyprus. In 
his December 12, 1981, report on Cyprus, the 
Secretary General hoped the introduction of 
the UN "evaluation" would "mark the begin- 
ning of a new and fruitful phase in the long 
search for a negotiated settlement." He 
stressed the need for a "concrete and effec- 
tive" negotiating process and expressed the 
opinion that the UN "evaluation" embodies a 
"determined effort to lend structure and 
substance" to the negotiating process. 

I am also pleased to note that on 
December 14, 1981, the Security Council 
passed unanimously a resolution extending 
the mandate of the UN Peace-keeping Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to June 15, 1982. We 
share with other Security Council members 
the conviction that UNFICYP's presence aids 
in maintaining an atmosphere conducive to 
productive intercommunal discussions. 


RONALD Reagan 

'Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. 
O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and Charles H. Percy, 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Feb. 1, 1982). ■ 

May 1982 



allied defense effort, would be a major 
Soviet truimph and only encourage them 
to intensify their wedge driving. 


I know there will be those who argue 
that this analysis is wrong, that by stun- 
ning the Europeans, we can force them 
to accept more responsibility and, thus, 
more of the burden. I believe, and I 
think history shows, that American 
leadership and the American commit- 
ment are the surest means to hold 
NATO together and maintain allied 

Let me assure you that we are not 
complacent, not inactive. We have 
engaged the allies extensively in discus- 
sions of what needs to be done both to 
increase the overall effort and to insure 
that the burden is fairly shared. I expect 
that the NATO summit will produce fur- 
ther progress. 

'The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from tne Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Alliance Strategy 
and the INF 

by Richard Burt 

Statement before the Subcommittees 
on International Security and Scientific 
AJfairs and on Europe arid the Middle 
East of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee on February 23. 1982. Mr. Burt is 
Director of the Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs. ' 

It is a pleasure to appear before you to- 
day to discuss this Administration's 
policy on NATO, European security, 
nuclear deterrence, and arms control. 
These issues go to the heart of 
America's relationship with Europe and 
to the Atlantic partnership which we 
have together fashioned. 'This is a part- 
nership among free nations which share 
a concept of man's place in society and 
of the manner in which intercourse be- 
tween societies should be conducted. By 
bridging the Atlantic with the pledge 
that an attack on one is an attack on 
all — and by giving substance to this 
pledge through the integration of con- 
ventional forces, nuclear forces based in 
Europe, and strategic nuclear forces in- 
to a single continuum of deterrent 
power — this partnership has allowed its 
members to live in freedom, peace, and 
prosperity for over 30 years. 

The Soviet Union's ambition — re- 
flected in its force posture, its propa- 
ganda efforts to derail NATO moderni- 
zation, and its INF [intermediate-range 
nuclear forces] arms control proposal — is 
to dissolve this partnership, to turn the 
United States inward, and to turn 
Western Europe into a nuclear hostage. 
The United States and its allies will not 
allow this to happen. By moving ahead 
with the implementation of both tracks 
of NATO's 1979 decision, the alliance is 
demonstrating its resolve to turn back 
these Soviet efforts and to preserve the 
structure of alliance security which has 
maintained the peace for more than 
three decades. 

December 1979 NATO Decision 

The decision of NATO ministers in 
December 1979 to deploy new U.S. 
ground-launched cruise missiles 
(GLCMs) and Pershing II missiles in 
Europe and at the same time to engage 


the Soviets in arms control negotiations 
involving intermediate-range nuclear 
forces provides the framework for any 
discussion of contemporary NATO 
nuclear weapons policy. This decision 
was the culmination of NATO's efforts 
over several years to come to terms 
with some fundamental — and trou- 
bling — shifts in the strategic environ- 

One important aspect of this shift 
was the gradual erosion of U.S. strate- 
gic nuclear superiority over the Soviet 
Union. Throughout most of its history, 
NATO has relied for deterrence on a 
triad of forces — conventional forces, 
nuclear forces based in Europe, and 
strategic nuclear forces. The strategy o: 
flexible response defines the relationshij 
between the three legs of this triad. In 
response to aggression, NATO would r€ 
spond at a level appropriate to the 
nature of the aggression and would re- 
tain the option of deliberate escalation 
should the initial response fail to cause 
the enemy to cease its attack and with- 
draw. The conventional forces of the 
alliance, though inferior to those of the 
Warsaw Pact, would serve to make a 
conventional response to non-nuclear ag 
gression credible: Nuclear forces based 
in Europe would make clear the possi- 
bility of use of nuclear weapons in re- 
sponse to Warsaw Pact aggression of 
any kind and would serve as a visible 
and credible link to the central strategic 
forces of the United States, which were 
and continue to be, the ultimate deter- 

Up through the early 1970s, NATO 
had high confidence that this posture 
would deter Soviet aggression. While 
the Soviets had conventional superiority 
on the ground in central Europe, the 
alliance had the means to extract a 
heavy price for any conventional aggres 
sion and held the option of bringing the 
conflict to the nuclear level, where the 
West had clear-cut superiority, both in 
theater nuclear forces and in strategic 
nuclear capabilities. 

But as we moved into the mid-to-lat 
1970s, the West began to lose this 
nuclear edge both in theater and in stra 
tegic forces. The result of this profoundlj 
change in the strategic environment waw 
that it was no longer clear that the 
posture NATO had developed and main- 
tained over the past two decades would 
suffice indefinitely to deter the Soviet 
Union. In particular, it was feared that 
the Soviets could come to believe — how- 
ever mistakenly — that they could 
threaten to use nuclear weapons based 
in the U.S.S.R. against our European 

Department of State Bulletir 



.Hies without risking nuclear retaliation 
.gainst the Soviet homeland. 

These fears were substantiated by 
levelopments in the Soviet force posture 
vhich demonstrated that they were, in- 
leed, seeking to weaken the link be- 
ween U.S. strategic forces and Euro- 
jean defense. For not only did the 
Soviets continue their decade-long 
mildup of conventional and strategic 
uclear forces, they introduced in the 
nid- 1970s a new system into their 
irsenal— the MIRVed [multiple 
ndependently-targetable reentry vehicle] 
5S-2O missile— whose range and mobili- 
y was designed to exploit the new 
itrategic relationship between the 
Jnited States and the U.S.S.R. and to 
xpand significantly their capability of 
aunching strikes against our allies from 
;he sanctuary of their own territory. 
This was only part of an across-the- 
3oard nuclear modernization program 
A'hich included new shorter range 
■nissiles and aircraft. 

The alliance recognized that these 
developments threatened to undermine 
the central principle upon which the 
alliance was formed— that an attack on 
Dne member of the alliance is an attack 
on all its members— and to decouple the 
U.S. strategic deterrent from the de- 
fense of Europe. The European allies 
were the first to express concern about 
these developments. The United States 
responded positively. The result was the 
alliance decision to deploy in Europe 
new systems which could reach deep in- 
to the Soviet Union in order to demon- 
strate that the Soviet Union could not 
devastate Europe from a Russian sanc- 
tuary and thus to insure the Soviet 
recognition that any war in Europe 
would result in unacceptable damage to 
the U.S.S.R. 

When INF modernization is seen in 
this broader context of Western deter- 
rence strategy, the myths — sometimes 
expressed here and frequently expressed 
across the Atlantic— which have come to 
surround the alliance decision of Decem- 
ber 1979 melt away. 

• The deployment of cruise and 
ballistic missiles to Europe does not 
move NATO away from its strategy of 
flexible response. Rather, the deploy- 
ment decision is essential to sustaining 
NATO strategy. In particular, it will link 
more firmly the U.S. strategic deterrent 
to the defense of Europe. 

• This deployment was not thrust 
by the United States upon the Euro- 
peans. Rather it represents a considered 
American response to a widely felt 

European need for an evolutionary ad- 
justment of NATO's capabilities to take 
account of the onset of strategic parity 
and the massive and continuing buildup 
of Soviet theater forces, such as the 

• The deployment does not give the 
alliance a qualitatively new capability. 
The United States has had systems in 
Europe capable of striking the Soviet 
Union since 1952. Rather this deploy- 
ment will permit NATO to preserve that 
capability and retain that element of our 
deterrent strategy despite improvements 
in Soviet air defense, the aging of our 
own systems, an increasing need to com- 
mit NATO's aircraft resources to con- 
ventional roles, and large-scale new 
deployments of Soviet INF. 

• This deployment does not increase 
the alliance's reliance upon nuclear 
weapons. Rather, in providing NATO a 
more balanced nuclear posture, this 
planned deployment has already permit- 
ted a significant net reduction in total 
nuclear weapons located in Europe. 

• This deployment does not repre- 
sent a step toward the development of a 
NATO nuclear war-fighting capability. It 
is the Soviet Union which is developing 
the capability to fight and win a nuclear 
war in Europe. This deployment will 
force upon them the realiziation that 
NATO will not fight a war on their 
terms, will not permit them to region- 
alize a conflict to exclude Soviet terri- 
tory, and will not permit them to hold 
Europe a nuclear hostage. 

Role of INF Arms Control 

At the same time, NATO recognized 
that eff'ective arms control could serve 
the same end— reinforcement of the link 
between the United States and its allies. 
When the Reagan Administration took 
office, it recognized that this "track" of 
NATO's 1979 decision was equally im- 
portant. In one of the new Administra- 
tion's first foreign policy steps, it an- 
nounced its intentions to pursue both 
tracks of NATO's December 1979 deci- 

Throughout 1981 the Administration 
conducted an extensive review of U.S. 
INF arms control policy as part of its 
overall review of arms control policy. 
This review, and intense consultations 
with our NATO allies, culminated in the 

off'er made by President Reagan in his 
November 18 address, to cancel U.S. 
plans for deployment of ground-launched 
cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles 
in exchange for the elimination of all 
Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. 

The rationale behind this simple and 
straightforward proposal is simple: If 
the Soviets are willing to eliminate the 
systems of most concern to the West, 
the United States is prepared to forego 
deployment of those systems the Soviets 
declare are of most concern to them — 
the GLCM and Pershing II. This pro- 
posal has the full support of the alliance. 
It provides the basis for the U.S. posi- 
tion in the ongoing INF arms control 
negotiations between the United States 
and Soviet Union which began in Geneva 
on November 30 of last year. 

The principles which guided the 
United States to adopt this position are 
worth highlighting because they illus- 
trate the place of our INF objectives in 
our overall national security policy and 
underscore our commitment to a mili- 
tarily meaningful arms control. 

• The agreement should focus on 
the most dynamic and threatening 
aspect of the threat— longer range land- 
based INF missiles. A negotiation which 
attempted to encompass a wide range of 
other systems would divert attention 
away from this threat and introduce 
complexities which would impede our 
effort to achieve agreement. 

• Limitations should be global in 
scope. Because of the range, mobility, 
and transportability of modern INF 
missiles, such as the SS-20 missile, 
limits applied only to those in Europe 
would not effectively limit the threat to 

• Limits must be equal. Equality be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union is the only acceptable basis for an 
agreement. The United States cannot 
permit the Soviet Union to achieve 
superiority either through negotiation or 
through military buildup. 

• Third-party systems should 
neither be limited nor compensated for 
in any agreement. In a bilateral 

U.S. -Soviet negotiation it would be total- 
ly inappropriate to negotiate on systems 
of countries not present at the 
negotiating table. The Soviet Union can- 
not, in any case, expect to be granted 
the right to maintain forces as large as 
all others combined, for the pursuit of 

May 1982 



total security by any country must result 
in total insecurity for all the rest. 

• Any agreement must be verifiable. 
Given the smaller size and greater 
mobility of INF systems, this will be an 
even greater challenge in INF talks than 
in those on strategic arms. 

The approach chosen by the Presi- 
dent, and endorsed by the allies, adheres 
to these principles. 

• The proposal would place limits on 
those Soviet systems which are of great- 
est concern to NATO: longer range land- 
based INF missiles, such as the SS-20, 
and on those U.S. systems about which 
the Soviets have expressed most serious 
concern, the new ground-launched cruise 
missiles and Pershing II missiles. 

• The proposal calls for limits on a 
global basis, rather than limits confined 
to a specific, arbitrary region. In seeking 
the elimination of all SS-20s, SS-4s, and 
SS-5s, the United States is willing to 
forego deployment of Pershing II and 
GLCM in any part of the world. 

• The proposal would set equal 
limits at the zero level. The Soviets 
claim that they want major reductions 
and parity; our proposal puts that claim 
to the test. 

• The proposal has been put forth 
with verification considerations clearly in 
mind. A total ban on a system, such as 
the ban we are seeking on longer range 
land-based INF missiles, will be easier to 
verify than any numerical limit above 
the zero level. 

Soviet Approach 

The Soviets have their own two-track 
approach to INF. On one track they 

since these systems could not strike the 
United States, but only the European 
allies, they should be of no concern to 
the United States. It was only when 
faced with the prospect of new INF 
missile deployments in NATO Europe 
that they agreed to put their systems on 
the table at all. They have, for example, 
proposed a moratorium on the deploy- 
ment of "medium-range" systems in 
Europe. This proposal is transparently 
designed to perpetuate the current 
Soviet monopoly on longer range INF 
missiles, effectively blocking NATO's 
planned modernization. In addition, it 
would do nothing to prevent the Soviets 
from continuing deployments east of the 
Urals, deployments which would still 
pose a threat to our allies. First made 
public in October 1979 and repeated in 
various forms since, this moratorium 
proposal continues to be put forward by 
the Soviets, but more recently it has 
been accompanied by another approach 
designed to serve the same ends, 
through somewhat different means. 

The Soviets publicly outlined this 
second proposal in TASS on February 9. 
It calls for reductions in NATO and 
Soviet "medium-range systems" down to 
600 by 1985 and down to 300 by 1990. 
Included on the Western side would be 
U.S. aircraft, including carrier-based 
and land-based aircraft not in Europe, 
and French and British systems. On the 
Soviet side the limits would include 
SS-20S, SS-4S, and SS-5s and Backfire, 
Badger, and Blinder aircraft in Europe. 
Excluded would be all Soviet systems 
outside Europe and aircraft in Europe 
of comparable range and capability to 
those U.S. aircraft included. This pro- 

. . . the Soviets must come to realize that they are 
to be denied their primary political and military ob- 
jective: to divide the United States from its allies 
and to shatter the unity which has given NATO its 
strength and resilience for the past three decades. 

seek to decouple the United States from 
Europe with force deployments. On the 
other track they seek to do so through 
arms control and propaganda. Their ob- 
jective is clearly revealed in the sub- 
stance of the proposals they have put 
forward to date. 

For years the Soviets refused to 
place their missiles aimed at Europe on 
the negotiating table. They argued that 

posal would give the Soviets the right to 
have, at the end of nearly a decade of 
supposed reductions, as many as 300 
SS-20 launchers with at least 900 
warheads in the European U.S.S.R. 
alone — a significant increase in Soviet 
nuclear capabilities, despite their claims 
of a two-thirds reduction. It would not 
limit in any way existing Soviet systems 
outside the European U.S.S.R. These 
would thus be allowed to increase 

without limit — and could be further 
augmented under the loophole allowing 
the withdrawal of allegedly "reduced" 
systems from the European U.S.S.R. Ar 
SS-20, it must be noted, is rendered no 
less threatening if it is moved out of 
Europe but can still reach alliance terri- 

The Soviet proposal, in short, would 
not require the destruction of a single 
SS-20 missile. Soviet reductions could 
be accomplished solely by retirement of 
older systems such as SS-4s and SS-5s, 
which Brezhnev himself has stated have 
outlived their useful service life. In 
short, it is anything but a reduction pro- 
posal as far as Soviet forces are con- 

The Soviet proposal rests on the 
claim that a "balance" in "medium-range 
nuclear arms exists in Europe. They 
cannot support this claim except by 
manipulation of the facts — for example 
by including U.S. systems not deployed 
in Europe, U.S. systems which do not 
even meet the Soviet criterion for 
"medium-range systems," as well as 
U.K. and French independent nuclear 
forces. The Soviets ignore the fact that 
if their nuclear-capable aircraft of com- 
parable ranges are also included in the 
count, the disparity in their favor is 
made even worse. The Soviet claim that 
a balance exists is designed to conceal 
the Soviet monopoly in longer range 
land-based INF missiles. 

For NATO, on the other hand, the 
impact of the Soviet so-called reductions 
proposal would be a severe curtailment 
of existing capabilities. U.S. longer 
range land-based INF missiles would be 
held to the present level of zero. Other 
U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces 
would be effectively eliminated from 

The proposed outcome is consistent 
with an apparent Soviet view that the 
U.S.S.R. has a right to maintain forces 
as strong as those of all others combined 
and, therefore, must be superior to the 
United States. In sum, the Soviet so- 
called reductions proposal; 

• Would not result in effective arms 

• Would codify a Soviet nuclear pre- 
ponderance, and 

• Would serve longstanding Soviet 
political ambitions toward Western 
Europe, with the decoupling of the 
United States from Europe as an essen- 
tial first step, thus turning NATO 


Department of State Bulletin 

urope into a nuclear hostage to the 
Dviet Union. 

Serious negotiations can tal<e place 
ily at the negotiating table. The basic 
DJectives of both sides were made 
jblic before the start of talks. The 
oviets have since to put details of their 
gotiating position at Geneva into the 
ablic domain, in a transparent attempt 
gain public support for their position 
nd to undermine alliance support for 
le U.S. position. Continued public dis- 
osures must raise doubts as to their 
•ue objectives in pursuing these 

The United States, for its part, re- 
lams committed to negotiate seriously 
nd in good faith in Geneva. It remains 
ur conviction that the simple, straight- 
jrward U.S. approach, developed in the 
3urse of allied consultations, offers the 
est and most equitable possibility of 
arly agreement leading to real reduc- 
ons. We have tabled a treaty contain- 
ig detailed provisions of such an agree- 
lent, in an etfort to move our discus- 
ions in Geneva forward. 


t is particularly important that the U.S. 
osition in these negotiations enjoy the 
all support of our NATO allies. These 
re unique negotiations. They involve, 
or the first time in a bilateral negotia- 
ion, U.S. systems deployed on the terri- 
ory of our allies and Soviets systems 
resigned to strike our allies', not our 
'Wn, territory. New, truly effective con- 
ultative mechanisms have been created 
within the alliance in response to the 
mique nature of these issues: the High 
^evel Group and the Special Con- 
.ultative Group. 

These groups, chaired by the United 
states and composed of NATO officials, 
lave insured a firm alliance consensus 
)n both tracks of the December 1979 
lecision. In particular, the position even- 
;ually adopted by the United States in 
Geneva was the result not only of care- 
ful work here in Washington but of ex- 
;ensive discussions within the alliance. 
Both of these groups continue to meet in 
Drder to sustain allied support for a 
viable nuclear posture and for a realistic 
approach to arms control. 

It is critical to underscore the im- 
portance of maintaining support for both 
tracks of the December 1979 NATO 
decision. The modernization program is 
a response to a challenge to the central 

basis of the alliance— that an attack on 
one is an attack on all. Without visible 
and continuing support for our moderni- 
zation efforts, the Soviets would have lit- 
tle incentive to negotiate seriously. It 
was only in the face of continuing 
alliance unity behind the modernization 
program that the Soviets agreed to 
come to the negotiating table in the first 

Arms control cannot move forward 
in a political vacuum. The arms control 
approach chosen by the United States 
and supported by the alliance offers a 
serious opportunity for effective arms 
limitations to eliminate the threat which 
made this modernization program neces- 
sary. But Soviet behavior in Poland can- 
not but influence the prospects for prog- 
ress in these negotiations. Events in 
Poland cast a long shadow over all 
aspects of East- West relations and erode 
the basis for arms control. 

The United States remains commit- 
ted to implementing both tracks of the 
December 1979 decision and so are our 
allies. As the depth of this alliance-wide 
commitment is made manifest, the 
Soviets must come to realize that they 
are to be denied their primary political 
and military objective: to divide the 
United States from its allies and to shat- 
ter the unity which has given NATO its 
strength and resilience for the past 
three decades. They must be brought to 
recognize the need to accept substantial 
limits on their own forces, if they are to 
achieve comparable limits on U.S. forces 
of concern to them. It is in the belief 
that this recognition will come that we 
must base optimism for the prospects of 
the negotiations currently underway in 

•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be avaikible from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice. Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 


Current State of 
the CSCE Process 

by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 

Statement before the U.S. Congres- 
sional Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe on March 23, 
1982. Ambassador Eagleburger is Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs.'^ 

It is ;i. pleasure for me to appear with 
Ambassador Kampelman [Max M. 
Kampelman, Chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] to- 
day to give the commission our views on 
the recent session at Madrid and, in- 
deed, on the state of the CSCE process 
as a whole. 

As you know, the goal of the United 
States at Madrid has been to strengthen 
the process launched at Helsinki nearly 
7 years ago. We have sought to do this 
through a detailed review of implemen- 
tation of the commitments the signatory 
states undertook when they signed the 
Helsinki Final Act in 1975. And we have 
sponsored and supported new proposals 
that would build on all aspects of- the 
Final Act— in the field of human rights 
and humanitarian affairs, in economic 
issues, and in military security. 

Obstacles and Burdens 

From the outset, the Madrid conference 
has been encumbered by actions of the 
Soviet Union and, in several instances, 
by other East European governments, 
which are contrary to the spirit and let- 
ter of the Final Act. The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, repression of human 
rights activists, jamming of Western 
radio broadcasts, the decrease in 
emigration, and the long campaign of 
Soviet pressure against the reform 
movement in Poland imposed an op- 
pressive burden throughout the Madrid 

In addition, there were difficult 
negotiating obstacles in the conference 
itself. The East has not hesitated to pro- 
voke procedural fights intended to quell 
the dialogue CSCE was intended to 
foster. The East has stubbornly attacked 



virtually all Western initiatives in the 
human rights and military security 

Nevertheless, by December of last 
year, the conference had made progress. 
This was reflected in a draft concluding 
document developed by the neutral 
nonaligned states which contained many 
Western proposals and criteria. This 
document needed improvements in the 
human rights and military security 
areas, but it, clearly, was a step toward 
final agreement. 

The slow but steady progress was 
abruptly set back by the Soviet-inspired 
military crackdown against the 
democratic reform movement in Poland. 

Madrid Objectives 

Repression in Poland went to the core of 
the CSCE process. It was obvious that 
the reconvened Madrid meeting could 
have only one overriding responsibility: 
restoring respect for the principles and 
provisions of the Final Act as the foun- 
dation on which greater security and 
cooperation in Europe could be built. 

Thus, with our allies, we set the 
following objectives for the Madrid 
meeting when it reconvened in 

First, it was imperative that those 
who support the Final Act must force- 
fully condemn those who disdain it. As 
Secretary Haig told the conference on 
February 9: "The process of reconcilia- 
tion can be halted if we ignore the acts 
that betray our faith. The structure of 
security and cooperation can collapse if 
we avert our eyes from the undermining 
of its foundation." 

Thus, following up on the Janu- 
ary 11 call by the NATO foreign 
ministers for urgent consideration of the 
situation in Poland, the Madrid meeting 
saw the largest gathering of foreign 
ministers from the participating states 
since the signing of the Final Act in 
1975. Their speeches gave a strong and 
simple message to the East: stop repres- 
sion in Poland; start honoring your com- 
mitments under the Final Act. 

Our second goal was to reaffirm our 
own commitment to the CSCE process. 
The Final Act remains, in our view, a 
valid and important standard for guiding 
and measuring progress in solving the 
issues that divide Europe. The CSCE 
forum is an invaluable opportunity for 
East- West dialogue. The CSCE process 

must be used to foster a climate of 
security and cooperation in which 
movements such as that of the people of 
Poland can flourish. We went to Madrid 
in February and will return to Madrid in 
the fall to further these aims. 

Secretary Haig and every other 
foreign minister who addressed the ses- 
sion stressed the need to make the 
CSCE process work. In addition. 
Secretary Haig and other allied 
ministers declared that we would be 
ready not only to resume consideration 
of new commitments in CSCE but to aid 
economic recovery in Poland when 
tyranny is lifted. 

Finally, we were resolved not to let 
the reconvened Madrid meeting resume 
"business as usual" — negotiation toward 
a substantive concluding document — 
while the Final Act itself was under at- 

We did not lightly decide on this 
course. The initiatives which we and our 

allies have worked long and hard to see 
adopted at Madrid are designed to 
benefit not only the West, but all the 
people of Europe. Precisely because we 
value these proposals, we would not let 
them be dishonored — and the victims of 
Soviet repression be ignored — by acting 
as if nothing had happened. The defense 
of the Final Act took priority. 

The West fulfilled all three of these 
goals at the reconvened meeting. It did 
so through an impressive display of uni- 
ty. Allied delegations — not just the 
United States, but our Canadian and 
European colleagues — led the way in 
condemning Eastern offenses against 
the Final Act; in developing and carry- 
ing out tactics for meeting Western ob- 
jectives; in making sure that the East 
understood that the West was one in its 
assessment of the damage wrought by 
repression in Poland and the long and 
sorry list of other Eastern violations of 
the Final Act. 

Proposed CSCE 
Conference Recess 

MAR. 12, 1982' 

Since February 9, the Madrid follow up 
meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has 
been addressing repression in Poland 
and repeated serious violations of the 
Helsinki accords by the Soviet Union. 
Like its allies and many other CSCE 
participating states, the United States 
deplores the turn of events that has 
brought active negotiations at Madrid to 
a standstill. 

Our delegation in Madrid reports to- 
day that a proposal to recess the 
meeting until November 9, 1982, has 
been advanced at today's plenary ses- 
sion, which is still under way. The pro- 
posal to recess was presented by delega- 
tions from the neutral and nonaligned 
states. It follows exhaustive consulta- 
tions by the sponsoring states with other 
delegations. East and West, regarding 
the advisability of continuing the meet- 
ing under the existing circumstances. 
We expect the recess proposal to be 

Events in Poland go to the heart of 
the CSCE process and have prevented 
business as usual at Madrid. The United 
States and many other CSCE participat- 

ing states, greatly concerned about the 
plight of the people of Poland, have in- 
sisted that the Madrid meeting devote 
its attention to these massive violations 
of human rights. With many others who 
are committed to the integrity and suc- 
cess of the Helsinki process, we have 
also insisted that it will be possible to 
negotiate agreements on new CSCE 
undertakings only when the Soviet 
Union and Polish authorities begin to 
live up to their existing commitments. 

Secretary Haig and other allied 
foreign ministers, who addressed the 
Madrid meeting when it reconvened last 
month, stressed our continuing dedica- 
tion to the principles and provisions of 
the Final Act and our desire to be able 
to move ahead on the basis of a draft 
concluding document presented last 
December by the neutral and nonalignec 
countries, taking into account the need 
for improvements in both the human 
rights and military security areas. 

When we return to Madrid in the 
fall, we will review the situation in 
Poland. We hope this review will show 
that conditions in Poland and elsewhere 
permit the conference to resume the ef- 
fort toward agreement on new steps to 
strengthen the Helsinki process. But thi 
depends on evidence of a genuine effort 
by the East to live up to its existing 
Final Act commitments. 

' Read to news correspondents by Depart 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer.H 


Departnnent of State Bulletin 


'uture Sessions 

LS a result of an initiative by the neutral 
nd nonaligned countries, the Madrid 
leeting recessed on March 12. It is 
cheduled to reconvene on November 9, 
nd I would like to give you some 
houghts on the fall session. 

We have not set preconditions for 
eturning in the fall. At the very least, 
/e will want to use the fall session to 
eview the situation in Poland, Eastern 
ompliance generally with the Final Act, 
nd the health of the CSCE process. 

Whether there then can be progress 
oward a substantive concluding docu- 
nent depends on the outcome of this 
eview. If there is no improvement in 
'oland — release of political prisoners, 
he lifting of martial law, initiation of a 
irocess of national reconciliation — then 
here is no prospect for the comprehen- 
ive agreement we long have sought. 

We do not wish for such a situation. 
Ve hope that there will be significant 
mprovement in Poland, principally for 
ts own sake, but also because it would 
reate a climate that would improve 
hances for agreement on new initiatives 
mder the CSCE process. 

Should work resume on the draft 
:oncluding document tabled by the 
leutral nonaligned states last December, 
here would be important East-West dif- 
ferences to overcome regarding human 
■ights and over the mandate for the pro- 
losed conference on disarmament in 
Europe. There is no assurance that the 
Cast will be any more ready in the fall 
.0 accept our proposals than it has been 
n the past. 

As a final note, I would like to pass 
)n Secretary Haig's deep appreciation 
'or the superb performance by Am- 
)assador Kampelman and the members 
)f our delegation in Madrid. For 18 
nonths now — far longer than any of us 
mticipated — Ambassador Kampelman's 
ikilled leadership and deep commitment 
;o CSCE have contributed to Western 
inity and success at Madrid. Throughout 
;he conference, but especially in the re- 
lent session, the commission staff has 
3een a mainstay of our effort in Madrid, 
3oth through their participation on the 
delegation and through their backup 
work here in Washington. 

•The complete transcript of the hearings 
m\\ be published by the committee and will 
De available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■ 

Visit of French 



President Francois Mitterrand of 
France made an official working visit to 
Washington, D.C, on March 12, 1982, to 
participate in discussioris with President 
Reagan and Secretary Haig. Following 
are remarks upon the French President's 
departure on the same day. ' 


President Reagan 

This has been a very unusual friend-to- 
friend meeting and one for which I'm 
very grateful. President Mitterrand and 
I have had a very productive day. In the 
Oval Office and during our working 
lunch, we covered a very broad range of 
subjects which naturally included our 
preparations for two major summit 
meetings in June. 

President Mitterrand will host this 
year's economic summit in Versailles, 
and we are, along with the other par- 
ticipants, committed to a conference 
which will help the industrial democra- 
cies deal more effectively with today's 
economic challenges. With that in mind, 
I look forward with special pleasure to 
my visit to France, America's oldest 


We also touched on the Atlantic 
alliance summit and the need to 
demonstrate allied unity and resolve in 
response to Soviet expansionist 
pressures. I will attend that summit in 
Bonn with the greatest of interest and 

As I indicated a moment ago, our 
talks were comprehensive. Since Presi- 
dent Mitterrand has just returned from 
Israel, I was particularly interested in 
his assessment of the peace process in 
the Middle East. 

Regarding Central America, I 
believe that President Mitterrand now 
has a better understanding of U.S. 
policy objectives in that troubled region. 
Our discussion on this subject was par- 
ticularly candid and thorough. President 
Mitterrand shares my concern that the 
failure to promote the evolution of 
democratic government in this region 
would have the most serious conse- 
quences. The principles and goals that 
we share suggest that we will be able to 

work together on this problem in the 
months ahead. 

Our exchange of views on the 
economic concerns of our two countries 
was equally frank and productive. Presi- 
dent Mitterrand made a forceful and 
thorough presentation of his govern- 
ment's views on outstanding trade and 
financial issues. While it would be im- 
possible to resolve our economic dif- 
ferences in one day, I think we've made 
tangible progress toward better com- 
munications on these important issues. 

And now let me just repeat my per- 
sonal thanks to President Mitterrand for 
coming to Washington. 

Merci beaucoup. 

President Mitterrand 

The first thing that I would like to say is 
to thank President Reagan for the 
welcome extended here in Washington 
to the President of the French Republic. 
The welcome extended to us was, as is 
in the very nature of things, of course, 
both friendly, open, and frank. We were 
able to talk about a number of problems. 
Some of them had been prepared, of 
course, by the continuous exchanges 
which exist among our ministers, our 
embassies, and representatives of all 

But direct talks such as these — after 
I have recently had opportunities of 
meeting a number of European political 
leaders and following my recent visit to 
Israel and in the light of the events that 
take place each day in Europe, in Africa, 
in Latin America — because of all these 
reasons, it was natural that our talks to- 
day were brought to bear on a number 
of very topical problems and, indeed, 
such talks are in themselves very fruit- 
ful. And, indeed, this certainly fully 
justified making this trip. 

The prime reason for my visit to the 
United States was to prepare, in more 
specific terms, the so-called summit of 
the industrialized nations which will be 
meeting in Versailles, in France, at the 
beginning of June. The conference will 
be an opportunity to consider the 
economic, monetary, and financial prob- 
lems that our countries have to face, and 
the purpose — the exercise being that we 
should harmonize our goals so as to be 
able to lend each other mutual 
assistance and not hindrance. It is clear 
that in that, we see very much eye-to- 

Then we talked of the other summit 
meeting that will take place a few days 
afterwards in Bonn, which will be the 

May 1982 



summit meeting of the Atlantic alliance. 
That led us to discuss East-West prob- 
lems, in particular, the relationship with 
the Soviet Union and the need to 
demonstrate our force so as to be able 
to further the possibility of negotiations, 
so as to be able to work toward peace 
while asserting our rights and the rights 
of the peoples of the world, in par- 
ticular, Europe. 

As President Reagan has just said, 
we also talked about Central America. I 
repeated what I have often stated in 
France and in Europe — that our first 
duty is to fight against poverty, the ex- 
ploitation of human beings, and the 
domination on the part of bloody dic- 
tatorships. As has just been said, we 
must work in order to find the way of 
furthering — and this is not always an 
easy path to discover — the cause of 
democratic government. This is some- 
thing that we have in common that leads 
to a meeting of the minds between us. 

That we should do everything that 
can enable the democratic powers of the 
West to achieve a better understand- 
ing — to be able to give more assistance 
to the peoples that are rebelling against 
their fate and that can lead to peace, 
civilian peace, and more freedom — is a 
good thing. And, as I said when I was 
receiving Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt, I 
appreciated the economic proposals 
made in the context of the Caribbean 
plan which would also apply to Central 
America. It is clear that what is needed 
is more aid and consistent aid. I think 
that what is being suggested is a step in 
the right direction. The path to be 
followed will clearly be a long one, but 
everything that is done that can show us 
where that path lies and can enlighten 
us in that respect can but be a good 

As far as the Near East is con- 
cerned, I was in the area recently. Only 
last week, I indicated what my feelings 
were on the subject. It was, therefore, 
only natural, in talking with the Presi- 
dent of the United States, that we 

should also discuss those very serious 
questions. We found that the assertion 
of the rights of Israel and the rights of 
all peoples of the region should make it 
possible to define, with patience and 
tenacity, the policies that will lead to 
peace. Now, our two countries are not 
the only ones to pass judgment on such 
policies, but they are policies which 
should be of interest and concern to the 
countries directly involved in the area. 

Finally, on bilateral matters — there 
we were talking among friends. That is 
a long story that goes back many years. 
But we were able to discuss these mat- 
ters frankly, as friends and allies, whose 
calling should be in the world to express 
their views clearly, so as to be able to 
bring them closer together when they 
are not the same and in order to be able 
to assert them with greater force when 
one's positions do converge, so as to be 
able to give the right kind of orientation 
to the peoples of the world who are 
waiting with anxiety for the outcome. 

As to the hospitality that has been 
extended to me, I would like to say that 
it has given me, again, the opportunity 
to feel the real depth of the ties between 
our two countries. I certainly intend on 
the next occasion, which will be in my 
own country, to continue along the very 
same lines. In such talks, we have been 
able to discuss matters. We must con- 
tinue to do so, to talk about these issues 
with method, in order to be able to in- 
dicate clearly the areas on which we can 
move forward together and in order to 
be able to serve, to the best of our abili- 
ty, the cause of world peace. 

My last words will be to say thank 
you. I turn, particularly, to the Presi- 
dent of the United States in order to ex- 
tend to him, directly, my heartfelt 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 15. 1982. 

2Made on the South Portico of the White 
House. ■ 

Human Rights in Poland 

MAR. 11. 1982.' 

On March 10, the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission, meeting in Geneva, 
adopted a resolution which expressed it; 
deep concern over the widespread viola- 
tions of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in Poland. The 43-member 
Commission adopted the resolution by a 
vote of 19 in favor, 13 opposed, with 10 
abstentions and one nonparticipation. 
The resolution affirms the rights of the 
Polish people to pursue their political 
and economic development free from 
outside interference. It calls for the end 
of measures restricting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, release of 
prisoners detained without charge, and 
review of sentences proposed under 
martial law. It also requests the 
Secretary General to undertake a 
thorough study of the human rights 
situation in Poland and present a com- 
prehensive report to the next annual 
session of the Commission. 

This action by the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission was an important 
event. It was the first time in 38 years 
that the Commission has spoken out on 
human rights violations in an Eastern 
European country. It demonstrates that 
Poland is not an East-West issue but a 
matter of worldwide concern. The 
resolution received support from all 
regions. The sponsors of the resolution 
were all European nations. And many 
small countries courageously resisted 
Soviet pressure to vote against the 

This action by the Commission is a 
victory for human rights and for the 
Polish people. It represents an impor- 
tant expression of deep international 
concern through a U.N. body, for the 
plight of the Polish people who are 
struggling against the deprivation of 
their human rights and fundamental 

'Read to news correspondents by Depart 
ment spokesman Dean Fischer. ■ 


Department of State Bulletin 


I.S. Issues Report on 
Ihemical Warfare 

I Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. 

Statement made to news corre- 
ondents at the Department of State on 
arch 22, 1982. Ambassador Stoessel is 
?puty Secretary of State. 

lis morning Secretary Haig transmit- 
d to the Congress a report on 
;hemical Warfare in Southeast Asia 
id Afghanistan." The report is also be- 
g provided to the Secretary General of 
le United Nations and to each member 
jvernment of that world organization, 
his report contains the most com- 
-ehensive compilation of material on 
lis subject available and presents con- 
usions which are fully shared by all 
■levant agencies of the U.S. Govern- 

The judgments contained in this 
udy were arrived at through a 
gorous analytical process. 

• Every relevant piece of informa- 
on available to the U.S. Government 
as reviewed. 

• All the test data on physical 
/idence, including environment samples 
id background controls, were gone 

ver again. 

• A scientific report on toxins was 

• The medical evidence was ana- 

• Extensive consultations were held 
'ith government and nongovernment 
:ientists and medical authorities, many 
f whom were asked to review the 

This information was then cor- 
elated. The testimony of eyewit- 
.esses— date, place, and type of at- 
ack— was matched against information 
rom defectors, journalists, international 
rganizations, and sensitive sources and 

Information dating back to 1975, 
eviewed, analyzed, and correlated in 
his manner, has led the U.S. Govern- 
nent to come to the following conclu- 

• In Laos, selected Lao and Viet- 
lamese forces, under direct Soviet 

supervision, have employed lethal tricho- 
thecene toxins and other combinations 
of chemical agents against H'Mong 
resisting government control and their 
villages since at least 1976. Trichothe- 
cene toxins have been positively iden- 
tified, but medical symptons indicate 
that irritants, incapacitants, and nerve 
agents also have been employed. 
Thousands have been killed or severely 
injured. Thousands also have been 
driven from their homeland by the use 
of these agents. 

• In Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces 
have used lethal trichothecene toxins on 
Democratic Kampuchean troops and 
Khmer villages since at least 1978. 
Medical evidence indicates that irritants, 
incapacitants, and nerve agents also 
have been used. 

• Toxins and other chemical war- 
fare agents have been developed in the 
Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and 
Vietnamese either directly or through 
the transfer of know-how, and 
fabricated into weapons with Soviet 
assistance in Laos, Vietnam, and Kam- 

• In Afghanistan, Soviet forces have 
used a variety of lethal and nonlethal 
chemical agents on resistance forces and 
Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion 
in December 1979. In addition, there is 
some evidence that Afghan Government 
forces may have used Soviet-supplied 
chemical weapons against the freedom 
fighters even before the Soviet invasion. 

The implications of these findings 
are far-reaching. The use in war of 
lethal chemical or toxin weapons is for- 
bidden by one of the oldest arms control 
agreements still in force— the Geneva 
protocol of 1925— and by the customary 
international law which has grown out 
of that agreement. The possession, 
manufacture, storage, and transfer of 
toxin weapons is forbidden by one of the 
most recent arms control treaties now in 
force— the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention of 1972. As this 
report documents, the Soviet Union and 
its allies are flagrantly and repeatedly 
violating international law and inter- 
national agreement. 

Chemical warfare thus poses a 

threat not only to its immediate victims 
but to the entire international commun- 
ity, and particularly to those nations 
least able to defend themselves against 
such weapons. For the chemical and tox- 
in weapons which the Soviet Union has 
developed, used, and supplied to its 
clients are a cheap, convenient, and 
effective way to subdue, terrorize, and 
exterminate defenseless peoples. If the 
world community fails to halt this activi- 
ty in Laos, Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan, it will have little chance to 
prevent its repetition in other lands, 
against other peoples. 

As the report states: "Only an alert 
and outspoken world community, intent 
to maintain those standards of inter- 
national behavior it has so painfully 
achieved and so tenuously established, 
can bring sufficient pressure to bear to 
halt these violations of law and treaty." 
With the publication of this report, the 
world community has been alerted. The 
United States will continue to be 
outspoken. We are confident other na- 
tions, as they recognize the danger, will 
do likewise. ■ 

Copies of the Report 

This 32-page study presents the evidence 
available to the U.S. Government on chemical 
warfare activities in Laos, Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan through January 1982 and ex- 
amines the Soviet involvement in those ac- 
tivities. It is based on a massive amount of 
information, from a variety of sources, which 
has been carefully compiled and analyzed 
over the years. The report is accompanied by 
annexes and tables that provide details of the 
medical evidence and sample analyses, a 
technical description of trichothecene toxins, 
and other supporting data. 

Free, single copies of Special Report #98 
entitled "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia 
and Afghanistan" may he obtained from the 
Public Information Service, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C. 20520. ■ 



U.S. Program 
To Deter 
Chemical Warfare 

FEB. 8. 1982' 


The Administration's ultimate goal in 
the area of chemical warfare is a com- 
plete and verifiable ban on the produc- 
tion and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons. Until such a ban can be ob- 
tained, our objective, consistent with ex- 
isting treaties and international law, is 
to deter the use of chemical weapons. 
The United States will not use chemical 
weapons unless chemical weapons are 
first used against us or our allies. The 
United States does not and will not 
possess biological or toxin weapons. 

Soviet Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programs 

Soviet military doctrine envisages the 
use of chemical weapons and 
acknowledges their value, particularly 
when used in massive quantities and in 
surprise attacks. 

Of more significance, the Soviet 
Union and its allies are well prepared to 
wage chemical warfare and to fight in a 
chemically contaminated environment. 
The U.S.S.R. possesses a wide variety of 
lethal and incapacitating chemical agents 
and the means to deliver them. They 
have a busy and expanding chemical 
provinggi'ound and a large, well-trained 
chemical organization, with over 60,000 
troops, whose status within the Soviet 
military hierarchy was enhanced during 
the 1970s. They have invested heavily in 
individual and collective protection and 
decontamination equipment, and they 
train with actual chemicals agents. 

In addition to extensive Soviet 
chemical warfare programs, the major 
accident in Sverdlovsk and evidence in 
Southeast Asia indicate that the Soviet 
Union's arsenal also includes toxic 
substances specifically prohibited by the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven- 

U.S. Program in the 1970s 

In contrast with the Soviet Union during 
most of the 1970s, the United States 

allowed its retaliatory capability to 
decline, did little to improve defense 
against chemicals, and neglected rele- 
vant defense doctrine and training. In 
addition, the United States in 1969 
stopped the production of lethal or in- 
capacitating chemical agents and the fill- 
ing of new munitions with chemical 
agents. At the same time, the United 
States renounced the use of biological 
and toxin weapons, destroyed all stocks 
of these weapons, and converted its 
biological warfare facilities to peaceful 

Arms Control Efforts 

While unilaterally restraining our capa- 
bilities, the United States made major 
efforts in the 1970s to eliminate the 
chemical warfare threat by attempting 
to reach an agreement with the Soviet 
Union on a comprehensive and verifiable 
ban on chemical weapons. Verification of 
such a ban is a complex and difficult 
problem. These efforts stalemated due 
principally to fundamental disagreement 
on the tough issue of the need for effec- 
tive verification of a chemical weapons 
ban and particularly Soviet intran- 
sigence on questions relating to on-site 
inspections. Negotiations were further 
complicated by our weakness in this 
area compared to the Soviets, who 
possessed a decisive military advantage 
and had little arms control incentive in 
the face of the large asymmetry in 
chemical warfare capabilities. The 
Soviets did, however, have an interest in 
negotiations as long as it impeded im- 
provement of U.S. deterrent capabilities. 

Requirements for Deterrence 

In view of the overall military balance 
between the United States and the 
Soviets, we cannot rely on other com- 
ponents of our military capabilities to 
deter chemical warfare. Consequently, 
to deter we find we need to improve our 
chemical weapons capabilities sufficient- 
ly to deny the Soviets the significant 
military advantage they would gain from 
using chemical weapons. Improving our 
defenses against chemical weapons is a 
necessary but not sufficient step to deny 
the Soviets such an advantage. 

Improved defenses can save lives, 
reduce casualties, and reduce — but not 
eliminate — significant degradation of 
military performance in a chemically 
contaminated environment. The needed 
protective equipment reduces mobility, 
slows operations, and makes many tasks 
difficult or impossible. Reliance solely on 

improved defenses would leave the ini- 
tiators of chemical warfare largely free 
to operate without the constraints im- 
posed by protection; thus yielding them 
a major advantage and encouraging the 
use of chemical weapons. 

Therefore, in addition to improving 
our defenses, we must maintain a 
capability to retaliate with chemical 
weapons to reduce the incentive to the 
enemy's first use, since he would also 
have to operate with the encumbrance c 
protective equipment. However, our cur 
rent chemical weapon stockpile — which 
will ultimately be destroyed— is inade- 
quate to provide an effective deterrent. 
Most of the current stockpile is not 
usable because it is stored in bulk con- 
tainers. Much of the remainder is in am 
munition for weapons that have been oi 
will be phased out of service. The cur- 
rent stockpile is also lacking in weapons 
that can be used against the rear 
echelons of attacking forces. Finally, th 
current stockpile presents logistical 
problems, due to the elaborate safety 
precautions required in transport, whicl 
further restrict its utility. 

In 1980, both the defense science 
board and a senior interagency review 
group found serious deficiencies in the 
U.S. chemical weapons posture and 
recommended an improvement progranr 
consisting of both the protective and 
retaliatory elements of deterrence. The^ 
made no recommendations on overseas 
weapons deployment. 

Program Objectives and Requirement 

It is the objective of the U.S. chemical 
warfare program to improve defensive 
and retaliatory capabilities to deter 
chemical weapons attack and to provide 
incentive and gain leverage in arms con 
trol negotiations. 

Recent U.S. Government program 
requests include the following. 

• The Carter Administration re- 
quests for the chemical weapons pro- 
gram increased from $111 million in Fli! 
1978 to $259 million in 1981 to improve 
defenses against chemical warfare. 

• In 1981 the new Administration's 
FY 1981 Defense supplemental request 
included $20 million to purchase and in- 
stall the equipment required to completi 
the binary production facility authorizec 
and appropriated by the previous Con- 

• The FY 1982 budget request in- 
cluded $532 million for chemical warfar 
programs, primarily for defense, but no 
funds for the production of weapons. 

The FY 1983 request for the 


Department of State Bulletin 


lemical program is $705 million, with 
rer 70% for defense and 10% for 
sposal of obsolete chemical weapons, 
he remainder supports the retaliatory 
ement of the deterrence program and 
eludes $30 million for procurement of 
nary chemical munitions — the 155mm 
nary artillery projectile and the Bigeye 
;rial chemical bomb. 

The defensive element of the FY 
i83 program ($508 million) will im- 
ove the quality of all aspects of 
emical defense: training, individual 
id collective protection, detection and 
irning, decontamination, and medical. 

The objective for the retaliatory ele- 
ent of the program ($123 million in FY 
183, including the funds for production) 
to maintain the safest, smallest 
emical munitions stockpile that pro- 
des the ability to deny a significant 
ilitary advantage to any initiator of 
emical warfare. We need not, and will 
)t, plan to match the Soviets in 
jent/munition quantities and types. The 
nited States will continue to exercise 
sponsible restraint in this area and 
ill make only those improvements 
cessary to insure that the United 
:ates has a credible and effective deter- 
■nt/retaliatory capability. 

The binary munitions being devel- 
)ed by the United States contain two 
mlethal substances which form the 
andard nerve gas only when mixed, 
le considerable safety, security, and 
gistical advantages that binary 
eapons offer during the entire life 
'cle, from manufacturing through 
orage and transportation to eventual 
sposal, make binaries the logical choice 
/er unitary munitions for stockpile 
odernization. Transportation advan- 
iges make a strategy of centralized 
.orage and crisis deployment more 
orkable, and there is considerable flex- 
ility in storage and control of the 
nary components. 

lliance Issues 

he allies recognize the chemical threat 
nd are committed by the NATO long- 
irm defense plan to improve their 
hemical defenses. Our NATO allies 
ave been informed of our intent to im- 
rove the U.S. retaliatory capability, 
'his U.S. decision involves development 
nd production only. No decisions or 
ecommendations have been made 
egarding deployment of chemical 
/eapons. Should it ever be determined 
hat overseas deployment is desirable, 
here will be full consultation with the 
lations involved prior to making any 


The ultimate goal of U.S. policy is to 
eliminate the threat of chemical warfare 
by achieving a complete and verifiable 
ban on chemical weapons. Our program 
supports this goal by improving our 
military posture sufficiently so that the 
Soviets will perceive that they have 
nothing to gain from chemical or bio- 
logical warfare. 

It is worth noting since the end of 
World War I, all use of toxic chemical 
weapons has been against unprotected 
military forces and civilians who could 
not protect themselves and who had no 
ability to retaliate. Even in the intense 
European conflict of World War II fol- 
lowing D-Day, Hitler did not use his 
chemical arsenal. He believed the Allies 
stood ready to retaliate. 

The thrust of all our efforts in this 
area is to deter the use of chemical and 
biological weapons and to give incentive 
to the Soviet Union to join us in our ob- 
jective of seeking a complete and veri- 
fiable ban on the production, develop- 
ment, and stockpiling of such weapons. 
If we are successful in achieving this 
ban, we will be able and eager to ter- 
minate the chemical weapons program 
at any time. 

U.S. Sale of 
Trident II Missile 
System to the U.K. 

Following are a White House state- 
ment and letters exchanged between 
British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and President Reagan and be- 
tween Secretary of Defense Caspar W. 
Weinberger and British Secretary of 
State for Defence John Nott^ 

MAR. 11, 1982 

Today in London, the British Govern- 
ment is informing the House of Com- 
mons of its decision to purchase from 
the United States the Trident II (D-5) 
missile system rather than the Trident I 
(C-4) system. When the President decid- 
ed in October 1981 that the U.S. Navy 
would develop the Trident II missile, he 
informed the British Government that it 

would be available for purchase by the 
United Kingdom. In an exchange of let- 
ters today. Prime Minister Thatcher for- 
mally requested that the United States 
sell the Trident II missile, and the Presi- 
dent agreed. 

Beginning during the Second World 
War, the United States has cooperated 
intimately with the United Kingdom on 
nuclear matters. In President 
Roosevelt's Administration, American 
and British scientists began working 
together on the development of nuclear 
weapons. In 1962 at Nassau, President 
Kennedy agreed to assist the British in 
the development of their strategic 
nuclear forces by selling Polaris missiles 
to the United Kingdom. Today's an- 
nouncement signals a continuation of 
this longstanding cooperation, which is a 
central element in the close cooperation 
between the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 

The primary reason for the British 
choice of the Trident II missile over the 
Trident I is to maintain commonality 
with the U.S. Navy. Although the per- 
formance of the Trident I was adequate 
for British purposes, there would be a 
long-term logistic and cost penalty 
associated with the uniqueness of the 
system once the U.S Navy made the 
transition to the Trident II missile. 

The Administration believes the in- 
dependent British strategic nuclear force 
which is assigned to NATO makes an 
important contribution to the ability of 
the North Atlantic alliance to deter 
Soviet aggression. For this reason, the 
President has decided to continue to 
assist the United Kingdom in the 
maintenance of a modernized, independ- 
ent British deterrent force into the 21st 
century. In addition, the President's let- 
ter welcomes the Prime Minister's com- 
mitment to use savings from cooperation 
in the strategic nuclear field to 
strengthen British conventional forces, 
which are also vital to the NATO deter- 

MAR. 11, 1982 

Prime Minister Thatcher's Letter 

Dear Mr. President: 

I wrote to your predecessor on 10 July 1980 
to ask whether the United States Govern- 
ment would be ready to supply Trident I 
missiles equipment and supporting services to 
the United Kingdom on a similar basis to that 
on which the Polaris missiles were supplied 
under the Polaris Sales Agreement of G April 



1963. President Carter replied on 14 July 
confirming that the United States Govern- 
ment was prepared to do so, subject to and in 
accordance with applicable United States law 
and procedures. 

In the light of decisions taken by the 
United States Government in 1981 to ac- 
celerate their own programme to procure Tri- 
dent II missiles, and to phase out the Trident 
I programme earlier than had hitherto been 
intended, the United Kingdom Government 
have carried out a review of their nuclear 
deterrent programme. In the light of this 
review, I am now writing to ask whether in 
place of Trident I missiles the United States 
Government would be ready to supply Tri- 
dent II missiles, equipment and supporting 
services on a continuing basis and in a man- 
ner generally similar to that in which Polaris 
was supplied. The United Kingdom Govern- 
ment would wish to purchase these missiles 
complete with multiple, independently target- 
table reentry vehicles but without the 
warheads themselves. I propose that, as in 
the past, close co-ordination should be main- 
tained between the executive agencies of the 
two Governments in order to assure com- 
patibility of equipment. 

Like the Polaris force, and consistent 
with the agreement reached in 1980 on the 
supply of Trident I missiles, the United 
Kingdom Trident II force will be assigned to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and 
except where the United Kingdom Govern- 
ment may decide that supreme national in- 
terests are at stake, this successor force will 
be used for the purposes of international 
defence of the Western alliance in all cir- 
cumstances. It is my understanding that co- 
operation in the modernisation of the United 
Kingdom nuclear deterrent in the manner 
proposed would be consistent with the pres- 
ent and prospective international obligations 
of both parties. 

I would like to assure you that the United 
Kingdom Government remain wholly commit- 
ted to the strengthening of the Alliance's con- 
ventional forces. The United Kingdom 
Government have in recent years substantial- 
ly increased their defence spending and fur- 
ther increases are planned for the future in 
order to sustain the United Kingdom's all- 
round contribution to allied deterrence and 
defence. The economies made possible by the 
United States Government's co-operation 
with respect to the supply of the Trident I 
missile system will be used in order to rein- 
force the United Kingdom Government's con- 
tinuing eft'orts to upgrade their conventional 

If the United States Government are 
prepared to meet this request, I hope that as 
the next step you will be prepared to receive 
technical and financial missions to pursue 
these matters using the framework of the 
Polaris Sales Agreement where appropriate. 

Yours sincerely, 

Margaret Thatcher 

President Reagan's Letter 

Dear Margaret: 

Thank you for your letter of March 11. 

I am pleased to confirm that the United 
States Government is prepared to supply to 
the United Kingdom TRIDENT II missiles, 
equipment and supporting services as pro- 
posed in your letter, subject to and in accord- 
ance with applicable United States law and 

The United States readiness to provide 
these systems is a demonstration of the great 
importance which the United States Govern- 
ment attaches to the maintenance by the 
United Kingdom of an independent nuclear 
deterrent capability. I can assure you of the 
United States' willingness to cooperate close- 
ly with the United Kingdom Government in 
maintaining and modernizing the capability. 

I attach great importance to your 
assurance that the United Kingdom 
TRIDENT II force will be assigned to NATO 
and that the economies realized through 
cooperation between our two governments 
will be used to reinforce the United 
Kingdom's efforts to upgrade its conventional 
forces. Such nuclear and conventional force 
improvements are of the highest priority for 
NATO's security. 

I agree that, as the next step, our two 
governments should initiate the technical and 
financial negotiations which you propose. 



Secretary Weinberger's Letter 

Dear John: 

In the exchange of letters between the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister of today's date, 
it was agreed that the United States Govern- 
ment would supply Trident II missiles to the 
United Kingdom. I am writing now to record 
our joint understanding on specific aspects of 
the agreed arrangements for the sale of the 
Trident II (D-5) missile system and asso- 
ciated equipment. 

It is understood that the Polaris sales 
agreement of 1963 and its implementing 
agreements will be the general pattern for 
the sale of the Trident II (D-5) missile 

It is agreed that the United Kingdom will 
pay a total contribution to research and 
development for the Trident II (D-5) system 
equivalent to $116 million in Fiscal Year 
1982 dollars, subject to actual payments be- 
ing adjusted to reflect an agreed inflation 

It is understood that the United Kingdom 
acknowledges that waiver by the United 
States of all charges (other than the ad- 
ministrative charge) in excess of $116 million 
will fully satisify the requirement that the 
United States Government gives defense 
assistance to the United Kingdom defense 
budget in return for manning by the United 
Kingdom of Rapier air defense of United 
States Air Force bases in the United 

Kingdom, and support and servicing for thi 
Rapier systems. In addition it is understooi 
that the United Kingdom will employ addi- 
tional savings represented by the remainde 
of the United States waiver to reinforce its 
efforts to upgrade its conventional forces. 

With respect to procurement of the Tri 
dent II (D-5) weapon system, the Depart- 
ment of Defense is prepared to undertake, 
subject to compliance with United States h 
and national policy: 

• to permit United Kingdom manufac- 
turers to compete on the same terms as 
United States firms for subcontracts for Ti 
dent II (D-5) weapon system components f 
the program as a whole; 

• to ensure that Department of Defen; 
procedures bearing on such competition fo: 
such Trident II (D-5) weapon system com- 
ponents are consistent with this general pi 
ciple; and 

• to designate appropriate United Sta 
staff in both countries to provide a point o 
contact for United Kingdom manufacturer 
and to offer advice and briefing. 

The United States attaches great impc 
tance to the maintenance by the United 
Kingdom Government of an independent 
nuclear deterrent. I am, therefore, pleased 
that it has been possible to reach this agre 
ment between our two countries. I regard 
this arrangement as a significant contribut 
to the maintenance of stability and peace. 

With warm regards, 

Cap Weinberge 

Secretary Nott's Letter 

Dear Cap, 

Thank you for your letter of today's date 
dealing with specific aspects of the ar- 
rangements for the purchase by the Unitei 
Kingdom Government of the Trident II (D 
missile system. 

I confirm that my understanding of thi 
agreed arrangements is in accord with tha 
set out in your letter. 

Our agreement on this is further evide 
of the closeness of the co-operation betwet 
our two countries and is a matter of the 
greatest satisfaction to the United Kingdo 

Yours sincerely, 

John Not 

'Texts from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 15, 1982. I 


Department of State Bulle'i 


J.S. Participation in 

.aw of the Sea Conference 

/ James L. Ma lone 

Statement before the House Merchant 
'arine and Fisheries Committee on 
ebruary 23, 1982. Ambassador Malone 
special representative of the President 
r the Third U.N. Conference on Law of 
£ Sea. ' 

am pleased to appear before this com- 
ittee today to brief you on the Presi- 
mt's recent decision to resume U.S. 
irticipation in the Law of the Sea Con- 
rence. With your permission, I will in- 
oduce the full text of the President's 
atement for the record. - 

In his public statement, the Presi- 
nt made clear several points, which I 
ould like to reiterate. 

• It is important that a Law of the 
ja treaty be fashioned so that the 
nited States can join in and support it. 

• Major elements of the deep seabed 
ining regime are not acceptable to the 
nited States. 

• We have six broad objectives with 
gard to the deep seabed mining 
gime, and we will be seeking changes 
the draft treaty in order to achieve- 

• The United States remains com- 
itted to the multilateral treaty process 
id will support ratification if our six 
)jectives are fulfilled. 

We are now consulting with our 
incipal allies, the Soviet LInion, the 
adership of the conference, and in- 
uential delegates from the conference, 
eluding the leadership of the Group of 

Beginning tomorrow, we will par- 
cipate in a formal intersessional 
eeting of the conference. That will be 
n important opportunity to explore 
3tential solutions to the problems we 
ave raised with Part XI of the draft 
invention. During the first week of 
[arch, we will assess the results of our 
jnsultations and the intersessional 
leeting, determining whether we 
elieve it is possible to negotiate 
itisfactory changes to the draft conven- 
ion which meet the President's objec- 
ives. The assessment will describe what 
he U.S. delegation believes to be an 
chievable package of improvements in 
'art XI. This assessment will be re- 
iewed carefully before we proceed 

During the February informal con- 
sultations, we have explained our prob- 
lems with the draft convention in a clear 
and precise way. We have discussed 
those potential solutions which we 
believe would meet our national in- 
terests and make the treaty acceptable 
to the United States. I will make 
available a compendium of the ap- 
proaches to problems in Part XI which 
we are placing before the conference 
leaders in order to evaluate the pros- 
pects for successfully negotiating 
changes that satisfy the President's ob- 
jectives. Let me turn now to those objec- 

The President stated that we will 
seek changes necessary to correct unac- 
ceptable elements of the draft treaty 
and to achieve our six objectives. 

First, the treaty must not deter 
development of any deep seabed 
mineral resources to meet national 
and world demand. 

The United States believes that its 
interests, those of its allies, and, indeed, 
the interests of the vast majority of 
nations will best be served by developing 
the resources of the deep seabed as 
market conditions warrant. We have a 
consumer-oriented philosophy. The draft 
treaty, in our judgment, reflects a pro- 
tectionist bias which would deter the 
development of deep seabed mineral 
resources, including manganese nodules 
and any other deep seabed minerals such 
as the polymetallic sulphide deposits 
which have received considerable pub- 
licity recently. 

Many different provisions of the 
draft treaty discourage development of 
seabed resources. Chief among them 

• The production policies of the 
Authority which place other priorities 
ahead of economically efficient resource 

• The production ceiling which 
limits the availability of minerals for 
global consumption; 

• The limit on the number of mining 
operations which could be conducted by 
any one country, thus potentially 
limiting our ability to supply U.S. con- 
sumption needs from the seabed; and 

• Broad areas of administrative and 
regulatory discretion which, if imple- 
mented in accordance with the Author- 
ity's production policies, would deter 
seabed mineral development. 

To meet the President's first objec- 
tive, these and other related areas of 
Part XI would require change and 

Second, the treaty must assure 
national access to those resources by 
current and future qualified entities to 
enhance U.S. security of supply, avoid 
monopolization of the resources by the 
operating arm of the international 
Authority, and promote the economic 
development of the resources. 

The draft treaty provides no assur- 
ance that qualified private applicants 
sponsored by the U.S. Government will 
be awarded contracts. It is our strong 
view that all qualified applicants should 
be granted contracts and that the deci- 
sion whether to grant a contract should 
be tied exclusively to the question of 
whether an applicant has satisfied objec- 
tive qualification standards. We believe 
that when a sovereign state sponsors an 
applicant and certifies that the applicant 
meets the treaty's qualification stand- 
ards, the Authority should accept such a 
certification unless a consensus of 
objective technical experts votes that the 
applicant's qualifications were falsely or 
improperly certified. 

The draft convention also should 
make specific provision for the rights of 
private companies that have made 
pioneer investments in deep seabed 
mining. We are all aware that a few 
companies have devoted substantial re- 
sources to prospecting for deep seabed 
minerals and developing new technol- 
ogies for their extraction. We recognize 
that there are different views as to the 
rights which pioneer investors have ac- 
quired, but practicality should guide us 
in this matter. Deep seabed mineral 
resources will not be made available for 
the benefit of mankind without the con- 
tinuing efforts of pioneer miners. I am 
confident, therefore, that the conference 
can find ways and means to accom- 
modate their special circumstances. 

In addition, the draft treaty creates 
a system of privileges which discrim- 
inates against the private side of the 
parallel system. Rational private com- 
panies would, therefore, have little op- 
tion but to enter joint ventures or other 
similar ventures either with the 
operating arm of the Authority, the 
Enterprise, or with developing coun- 
tries. Not only would this deny the 
United States access to deep seabed 
minerals through its private companies 
because the private access system would 
be uncompetitive but, under some 

\/lay 1982 



scenarios, the Enterprise could establish 
a monopoly over deep seabed mineral 

To meet the President's second 
objective, therefore, qualified applicants 
should be granted contracts, the legal 
and commercial position of pioneer 
operators should be accommodated, and 
the parallel system should be designed 
to permit private miners to operate 

Third, the treaty must provide a 
decisionmaking role in the deep sea- 
bed regime that fairly reflects and 
effectively protects the political and 
economic interests and financial con- 
tributions of participating states. 

The United States has a strong in- 
terest in an effective and fair Law of the 
Sea treaty which includes a viable sea- 
bed mining regime. As the largest 
potential consumer of seabed minerals, 
as a country whose private firms could 
invest substantial amounts in seabed 
mining, and as potentially the largest 
contributor to the Seabed Authority and 
to the financing of the Enterprise, our 
political and economic interests in any 
new international organization are far- 
reaching. The decisionmaking system in 
the Seabed Authority must reflect these 
realities. For example, a treaty which 
makes American access to natural 
resources of the seabed dependent on 
the voting power either of its competi- 
tion or of those countries which do not 
wish to see these resources produced 
would not meet the President's objec- 

Similarly, the President's objectives 
would not be satisfied if minerals other 
than manganese nodules could be de- 
veloped only after a decision was taken 
to promulgate rules and regulations to 
allow the exploitation of such minerals. 
In our judgment, the development of 
other seabed resources should proceed 
without restraint pending the develop- 
ment of rules and regulations. 

We must be candid— many countries 
do not wish to see new sources of 
minerals produced from the seabed 
because they believe that such produc- 
tion will jeopardize their own com- 
petitive position in the world markets. 
We do not criticize them for holding this 
view but do expect them to understand 
that the U.S. national interest is not 
consistent with impediments to the pro- 
duction of seabed minerals. A seabed 
mining regime which deters production 
is antithetical to the interests of all 
nations in the economically efficient 
development of resources. 

A way must be found to assure that 
any nation like the United States, 

having a vital stake in the Authority's 
decisions, has influence sufficient to pro- 
tect its interests. The decisionmaking 
system should provide that, on issues of 
highest importance to a nation, that na- 
tion will have affirmative influence on 
the outcome. Conversely, nations with 
major economic interests should be 
secure in the knowledge that they can 
prevent decisions adverse to their in- 
terests. We will make detailed proposals 
to the conference on ways to achieve 
these objectives. 

Fourth, the treaty must not allow 
for amendments to come into force 
without approval of the participating 
states, including in our case the 
advice and consent of the Senate. 

The draft treaty now permits two- 
thirds of the states parties acting at the 
review conference to adopt amendments 
to Part XI of the treaty which would be 
binding on all states parties without 
regard to their concurrence. It has been 
argued that a state which objects to an 
amendment has the option to withdraw 
from the treaty if the amendment is 
imposed without its consent. This pro- 
posal is obviously not acceptable when 
dealing with major economic interests of 
countries which have invested significant 
capital in the development of deep sea- 
bed mining in an international treaty 
regime. We believe there are ways to 
solve this problem, and we will be ex- 
ploring them during the negotiations. 

Fifth, the treaty must not set 
other undesirable precedents for inter- 
national organizations. 

Most, if not all, of the adverse 
precedents which would be established 
by the draft treaty could be avoided by 
achieving the sLx objectives set out by 
the President. Our negotiating efforts, 
however, should not result in offsetting 
or replacing one undesirable precedent 
with another. Our task in returning to 
the negotiating table is to satisfy all of 
the President's objectives. The job would 
not be complete if, for example, adverse 
precedents related to artificial produc- 
tion limits and protection of land-based 
minerals are avoided at the price of 
acquiescence on other issues of principle 
such as the mandatory transfer of 
technology. In solving problems in the 
draft treaty, we will be alert to the 
possibility that a particular solution may 
be viable in the context of the Law of 
the Sea treaty but inappropriate as a 

precedent for some future negotiation. 
As we proceed to seek solutions to prol 
lems in the Law of the Sea negotiations 
we will be mindful of the broadest 
national interests and the relationship c 
these negotiations to U.S. participation 
in other global institutions. 

Sixth, the treaty must be likely tc 
receive the advice and consent of the 
Senate. In this regard, the conventioi 
should not contain provisions for the 
mandatory transfer of private tech- 
nology and participation by and fund- 
ing for national liberation movement; 

The comprehensive policy review 
process was initiated because this 
Administration recognized that the 
Senate could not and would not give it 
consent to the emerging draft treaty o 
the Law of the Sea. It is, however, oui 
judgment that, if the President's objec- 
tives as outlined are satisfied, the 
Senate would approve the Law of the 
Sea treaty. It would be necessary, of 
course, to demonstrate concretely how 
any renegotiated treaty texts have 
solved the problems raised by Member 
of the Congress and the public which 1- 
to the review and how they have met 
the President's objectives. 

In this regard, there are certain 
issues to which special attention must 
called. The President highlighted these 
in his sixth objective. The mandatory 
transfer of private technology and par 
ticipation by and funding for national 
liberation movements create commerci 
and political difficulty of such conse- 
quence that they must be singled out e 
issues requiring effective solutions. 
These solutions will have to be clearly 
defensible as total solutions to the pro 

There is a deeply held view in our 
Congress that one of America's greate 
assets is its capacity for innovation an 
invention and its ability to produce ad- 
vanced technology. It is understandabl 
therefore, that a treaty would be unac 
ceptable to many Americans if it re- 
quired the United States or, more par- 
ticularly, private companies to transfe 
that asset in a forced sale. That is wh} 
the problem must be solved. 

I would like to emphasize the Pres 
dent's statement that, if his objectives 
are successfully met, he will support tl 
ratification of this treaty. We will wor 
with all Members of Congress, particu 
larly those who have shown a special i 
terest in this subject, in order to insur 
that they will be given an opportunity 
give us their advice in advance of any 


Department of State Bullet 


mmitments we make. We will encour- 
le Members of Congress to participate 
Itively in the work of our delegation 
;d to keep abreast of developments at 
e conference. We will continue to 
irk with members of the advisory coni- 
ttee and other interested Americans. 
3 will do everything possible to avoid 
lituation in which we agree to draft 
■aty provisions which will later face 
litical opposition. 

What we want to do now is return 
the bargaining table with a clear and 

firm position that meets our national 
interests. We believe there is a reservoir 
of goodwill at the conference, and we 
will work cooperatively and diligently at 
the conference to seek a result accep- 
table to all. 

•The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of- 
fice, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

^For text of the President's statement, 
see Bulletin of March 1982, p. 54. ■ 

errorist Attacks on U.S. Official 
ersonnel Abroad, 1981 

January 1982 marked the anniver- 
•^ of the release of the U.S. Embassy 
<~sonnel who were held hostage in Iran 
• 4Jf4 days. That month also saw the 
^assination, in Paris, of assistant 
litary attache Lt. Col. Charles Ray 
d the rescue of Gen. James L. Dozier 
>m the Italian Red Brigades. Both in- 
J^nts illitstrate the continuing threat of 
■rorism to U.S. officials abroad. 

This article is a supplement to Ter- 
•ist Attacks on U.S. Official Personnel 
road which appeared in the April 
il issue of the Bulletin. It cites in- 
'£nts involving political terrorisjn 
■ected against official representatives 
the United States during the year 
SI, as recorded in various published 
'irces and monographs. Attacks on 
ivate citizens are not listed. 

Evan Duncan, the author of this 
idy, is a Research and Reference 
storian in the Office of the Historian, 
■reau of Public Affairs. Neal H. 
tersen supervised the preparation of 
'.s report. 


arch 17, 1981 

ftist terrorists, protesting U.S. aid to 
Salvador, fired a rocket at a van 
rrying Marine Corps security guards 
San Jose. The van was wrecked, Sgt. 
even Garcia was seriously injured, and 
^. John E. Roberts, Cpl. Jerome 
alters, and their Costa Rican driver 
caped with minor injuries. Sgt. 
)berts later received the Navy Com- 
endation Medal for rescuing Sgt. 
ircia from the burning van. 


October 6, 1981 

Four Americans — Marine Corps Maj. 
Jerald R. Agenbroad, Air Force Lt. Col. 
Charles Loney, Capt. Christopher Ryan, 
and resident Defense contractor Richard 
McClesky— were wounded during the 
assassination of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat by Egyptian dissidents. 
Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., 
and Army Brig. Gen. Edward L. TLxier 
were among the embassy staff members 
who narrowly escaped injury. 


March and April, 1981 

Unidentified gunmen fired at the U.S. 
Embassy in San Salvador on March 4 
and 17. The second incident followed a 
press conference at the embassy by Con- 
gressman Clarence Long. 

On March 25, an estimated 10 
members of the Popular Liberation 
Front attacked the embassy. A rocket- 
propelled grenade damaged a conference 
room, but no embassy personnel were 
injured. A second rocket attack on April 
1 missed the embassy but damaged a 
nearby building. 


November 12, 1981 

A gunman fired six shots at Christian 
Chapman, U.S. Charge d'Affaires, as he 
left his apartment for the embassy in 
Paris. Chapman took cover behind his 

car, and the gunman fled. No group has 
claimed responsibility for the attack. 


March 29, 1981 

Members of the Red Army faction 
firebombed U.S. Army offices in 
Frankfurt and Glessen. Damage was 
estimated at $50,000; there were no 

August 31, 1981 

A bomb exploded in a parked car at 
Ramstein Air Force Base, injuring 18 
military personnel, including a general, 
and two West German civilians. The 
next day, five American-owned cars 
were set afire in Wiesbaden. Members 
of the Red Army faction were 

September 15, 1981 

Members of the Red Army faction fired 
several shots and two rocket-propelled 
grenades at Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, 
commander of U.S. Army forces in 
Europe, as he drove to his headquarters 
in Heidelberg. One grenade struck the 
trunk of his car; he sustained only minor 


October 10, 1981 

Gunmen fired on the U.S. Embassy 
from a passing car. A policeman was 
killed, and a Guatemalan security guard 
was wounded. 


September 23, 1981 

Gunmen shot and wounded Air Force 
Sgt. Russell L. McFall and Army Sgt. 
Robert L. Smith in Tegucigalpa, where 
they were members of a U.S. military 
training mission. 


December 17. 1981 

Four members of the Red Brigades kid- 
napped Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier from 
his apartment in Verona. Gen. Dozier, 

lay 1982 



deputy chief of staff for logistics and 
administration for NATO ground forces 
in southern Europe, became the first 
non-Italian victim of the Red Brigades. 
During his 42-day captivity, Gen. Dozier 
was threatened with "trial" and "execu- 
tion" for his military service in Vietnam. 
On January 28, 1982, Italian police 
raided an apartment in Padua, rescued 
Gen. Dozier, and arrested five of his 


March 10, 1981 

A sniper fired on Ambassador John 
Gunther Dean's motorcade as it passed 
between the Christian and Muslim sec- 
tors of Beirut. One shot struck a tire of 
a security guard's car; there were no in- 

May 25, 1981 

Following the visit of Egyptian Presi- 
dent Sadat to Sudan, rockets were fired 
at the U.S., Egyptian, and Sudanese 
Embassies in Beirut. A Lebanese secu- 
rity guard at the U.S. Embassy and an 
Egyptian consular official were injured. 


September 4, 1981 

A bomb exploded outside the U.S. 
Cultural Center in Maseru. Damage was 
minor, and there were no injuries. 


August 31, 1981 

A bomb exploded outside the U.S. 
Embassy in Lima shortly after 1:00 
a.m., blowing out 115 windows in the 
front of the building. A second bomb 
was thrown into the yard of Am- 
bassador Edwin G. Corr's residence, 
while others damaged the offices of four 
American businesses. No one was hurt, 
and no group claimed responsibility for 
the attacks. ■ 

Caribbean Basin Initiative 
Reviewed by 
Foreign Ministers 

Secretary Haig and Ambassador 
William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Repre- 
sentative, met in New York March 
H-15, 1982, with Minister of State for 
External Affairs Mark MacGuigan 
(Canada), Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
Jorge Ca^taneda de la Rosa (Mexico), 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Alberto 
Zambrano Valasco (Venezuela), and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos 
Lemos Simmonds (Colombia) to review 
the result of the July 1981 consultations 
begun at Nassau regarding an initiative 
to stimulate economic and social 
developement in the Caribbean Basin 

Following is the joint news con- 
ference held in the U.N. Plaza Hotel and 
the joint communique. ' 

MAR. 15, 1982 

Secretary Haig. We'd like to use this as 
an opportunity to review for the press 
corps the results of our last day and a 
half of the meetings here on the Carib- 
bean Basin initiative. 

This meeting in New York was a 
further step in the consultation process 
begun at Nassau in July of 1981. At the 
time the Foreign Ministers of Canada, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and the United 
States committed themselves to address 
the grave and, in some cases, 
catastrophic economic and social prob- 
lems besetting the Caribbean Basin. 

Over the past 6 months, there have 
been additional meetings with the six 
countries of Central America, as well as 
the countries of the Caribbean Basin. 

On this occasion, at this weekend's 
meeting, the original Nassau four 
became the New York five with the ad- 
dition of our colleague from Colombia to 
the discussions and to the donor 
category. We plan as a group to meet 
again, as the communique indicates, in 
Caracas, Venezuela, in August of this 
year to assess again the progress that 
we have been making in this important 
collective endeavor. 

I would like to just say a brief word 
about the U.S. approach to this 

endeavor which is a departure from 
traditional U.S. efforts in the foreign 
assistance area. 

It is testament to the fact that now 
five donor countries can concert 
together to meet the socioeconomic 
crisis in the region and to do so in a 
flexible, understanding, and compatible 
way. We have mutually agreed to be 
free to choose the ways in which each 
donor nation can help in the region. 

In the case of the United States, 
President Reagan's Caribbean Basin in 
tiative will involve a doubling of our 
economic constructions from previous 
years, but the truly innovative aspect c 
the program lies in a longer term tradi 
and investment initiative which we hop 
will be matched by reciprocal self-help 
measures on the part of recipient na- 

I think in general I, personally— ar 
I will let my colleagues comment from 
their perspective— consider this meetir 
to have been highly successful. The cor 
munique itself confirms the un- 
precedented level of sacrifice made by 
the donor countries and the high degre 
of cooperation involved in this project, 
is a project that is not focused on pron 
ises and rhetoric but on real con- 
tributory steps by all of the donor 
states. One might even single out our 
Colombian colleague whose governmer, 
has come to this meeting with com- 
mitments, even though Colombia itself 
in a developmental status, so the 
sacrifices that it entails are, I think, 
most laudable. 

I think it's important that it is 
recognized that in this project we've 
avoided the creation of large 
bureaucracies or controlling mechanisr 
which consume resources and energy 
and have dealt within the framework c 
our existing governmental structures. 

All in all, I think from the U.S. poi 
of view, we can take a great sense of 
satisfaction. This week, as you know. 
President Reagan will forward to the 
Congress the American legislative pro- 
posals to implement his approach to th 
Caribbean Basin initiative. It is clear 
that, following the President's recent 


Department of State Bulleti 


cretary Haig holds joint meeting with foreign ministers who support President Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative. Left to right are 
rge Castaneda of Mexico; Carlos Lemos Simmonds of Colombia; Secretary Haig; William E. Brock, U.S. Trade Representative; 
nister of State for External Affairs, Mark MacGuigan of Canada. Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco of Venezuela, not 
3wn here, also attended the meeting. 

eech, it has garnered strong bipartisan 
pport, and we are very hopeful that 
; American Congress will recognize 
it the United States is now joining a 
mber of donor states which are well 
mg in their commitment and their 
livery on those commitments to the 
guishing problems of the hemisphere. 

Q. I would like to ask the visiting 
reign ministers, since you have re- 
ined freedom of action in your own 
ide and aid programs, to what ex- 
nt are your countries willing to aid 
the economic reconstruction of El 
Ivador even if the insurrection there 
cceeds? And to what extent do you 
are the extreme worry of the United 
ates about that eventuality? 

Secretary MacGuigan. I don't think 
at we are here to answer hypothetical 
estions, but I can say that my country 
poses no ideological tests for its aid 
ograms, but we do impose certain 
actical tests, and one of those, of 
urse, is the safety of any personnel 
at we might have in the country. 

In our recently announced program 
r Central America— El Salvador— is 
rtainly included, as are the other coun- 
les of the region, but we are not 
esently planning any aid to that coun- 
y because we are not sure that we 
uld carry out any program planning 
hich we would begin at this time. So 
sentially it's a pragmatic question for 

We don't have a theoretical or 
eological answer to a question of that 
nd, but we certainly have a lot of prac- 
a,l concerns. We wouldn't want to give 
1 answer in advance. We'd have to 
leck the circumstances at the time. 

Q. Do you share the Secretary's 
stated concern about that eventuality? 

Secretary MacGuigan. I'm giving a 
press conference at noon. You're 
welcome to come. I think the conference 
here really should be on the Caribbean 
Basin initiative, but if you want to get 
into Canadian foreign policy, we'll be 
very happy to discuss it at that time. 
Canada has certainly supported the elec- 
tion process in El Salvador. 

Q. What role will human rights be 
playing in this Caribbean policy ini- 

Secretary Haig. Clearly, human 
rights is an essential ingredient of 
American foreign policy, as it has been 
from the outset. Human rights value 
judgments run across the whole spec- 
trum of America's foreign policy at 
large, and globally, to use that dirty 
word, as well as in the region. 

Q. Is the U.S. ban on aid to Cuba 
in this plan— is that viewed as holding 
up a more structured cooperative ef- 
fort by the donors? 

Secretary Castaneda. As you know, 
in accordance with this Caribbean Basin 
initiative, each donor country chooses 
not only the countries to which it gives 
aid but the manner in which it gives aid. 
So that the American prohibition for aid 
to Cuba affects only the United States. 
It does not affect other countries. 

In the case of Mexico, we will, as 
much as is possible for us — we are a 
developing country — we do give aid to 
Cuba, and we have very rich coordinated 
[inaudible] between the two countries of 
mutual assistance in the technical field 
and in the growing field in general. So it 
does not affect Mexico's participation in 
this effort at all. 

Q. This is a rather impressive ar- 
ray of statesmen from the Western 
Hemisphere. In political terms what 
kind of impact do you think this 
meeting is going to have on your ef- 
forts to sell the Caribbean Basin ini- 
tiative to the American Congress? 

Secretary Haig. I think we have 
Ambassador Brock here who's been 
leading our charge on this situation and 
has just recently returned from some of 
his intensive discussions on it. Bill, why 
don't you answer the question? 

Ambassador Brock. As I said to the 
meeting this morning, the demonstration 
of cooperation and the breadth of sup- 
port, evidenced by the ministers from 
the several countries here, is essential, I 
think, to our success in Congress. 

We face very difficult economic 
problems at home, and the fact that this 
is an effort which is joined by some of 
our most important friends and allies, it 
is imperative to its ultimate success, 
both in real terms and in terms of gain- 
ing the support that we have to have to 
insure congressional passage. I think 
that prospect is greatly enhanced by this 
meeting, and I think we're going to have 
a successful piece of legislation, hope- 
fully in the not-too-distant future. 

Q. In view of recent contacts that 
have been held with Cuba and 
Nicaragua, can the United States con- 
template the possibility of an ap- 
provalistic aid or assistance to all 
those countries? 

Secretary Haig. Again, I want to 
keep the focus of this press conference 
on the Caribbean Basin initiative. But I 
think the basic philosophy that's underly- 
ing the initiative and our respective ap- 
proaches to it have been that there are 

ay 1982 



no automatic exclusions as well as there 
are no automatic inclusions. The pros- 
pects for the future will depend in large 
measure, from the U.S. point of view, 
on a number of uncertainties which are 
yet to clarify. But as they do clarify, 
clearly such an outcome would be very 

Q. The existence of this gathering 
is in some ways viewed as redundant 
to the effort and the mission of the 
Organization of American States. I 
wonder if, indeed, you consider this to 
be in any way supplanting or does 
your organization here indicate the 
OAS is not capable of handling either 
these problems or the peace problems 
in the area? 

Secretary Haig. This in no way 
should be viewed as running counter to 
the objectives and the functions of the 
Organization of American States. In- 
deed, it should be viewed as complemen- 
tary to their efforts, as well as the ef- 
forts of other organizations which have 
long been in place and which are de- 
signed to contribute to the socio- 
economic improvement of the region. 

Beyond that, I think it's important 
to recognize that Canada is not a 
member of the OAS, but it is par- 
ticipating not only actively but as a 
leading contributor to the developmental 
needs of the region. So there are no con- 
tradictions at all in our efforts here. 

Q. In the past, the conduct of 
many of the multinationals in Latin 
America has been the cause for suspi- 
cion and distrust. How is the U.S. 
Government going to guarantee, in a 
sense, the good behavior of the pres- 
ent initiative? 

Secretary Haig. It goes without 
saying that the whole approach of Presi- 
dent Reagan has been one which is 
designed to provide for reciprocity in the 
sense of not only shaping the American 
contribution to elicit progress in the 
socioeconomic spheres in the recipient 
country but to shape our contribution in 
conformance with the wishes of the re- 
cipient country. Therefore, the answer 
to your question is that the basic 
philosophy insures mutual advantage 
and mutual coordination in the develop- 
ment of the program itself. 

Foreign Minister Zambrano. 
Venezuela is most active in cooperative 
efforts in the Caribbean, and this in- 
terest of our country explains our 
presence here at this meeting. 

However, we have a very clear idea 
of what constitutes cooperation and 
what constitutes negotiation. As far as 
we are concerned, the content of 

cooperation is one that allows many and 
variegated forms of cooperation. It 
might be very important cooperation, in 
cooperation of lesser importance, but all 
of this cooperation must be consistent 
with the fundamental concept that this 
is a contribution that one community 
makes to another community, conscious 
of its responsibility and of its solidarity. 
And that these contributions are used 
for the economic development of those 
societies and also must contribute to the 
common good. 

In Venezuela, in our particular case, 
we are making great sacrifices within 
our own community, and instead of 
devoting these resources to our own 
self-interests and our own needs, we are 
making these contributions to other 
areas and to other countries in the 
region. It seems to us that in this sense 
our cooperation and the cooperation that 
any country or any private company or 
corporation might want to make should 
be done under these principles with sub- 
mission to these ideals of what we con- 
sider is a true cooperation, and then the 
recipient state is fully free and complete- 
ly sovereign to use the aid or support in 
any manner it wishes. 

Ambassador Brock. A couple of 
very important or specific points. If 
what we do does not result in an oppor- 
tunity for the individual country to 
choose its own path, we will have chosen 
the wrong way to go. If what we do 
does not result in the development of 
domestic economic growth, domestically 
controlled, the program will not succeed. 

If you look at the legislation, the 
kinds of things that we mention as con- 
stituting a self-help effort are a 
pluralistic, democratic process, a free 
labor movement, the opportunity for in- 
dividuals and groups of individuals to 
better themselves within the societal 
value system of each country as they 
desire their own program. 

I think my own belief is that we 
have very consciously tried to structure 
an effort that will deal with precisely the 
problem you mentioned by letting each 
country control its own destiny and have 
the economic growth and the jobs to do 
so and to maintain a pluralistic, 
democratic society in the process. 

Q. I would like to ask why Colom- 
bia might think that this would be dif- 
ferent from previous aid programs in 
the past, and why Colombia, as a 
developing nation in need of economic 
assistance itself, chose to become a 

Foreign Minister Lemos. I shall 
reply, addressing myself to the last pai 
of your question first. Colombia, thoug 
it is a developing country and, as such, 
it needs assistance, feels, however, tha 
it has reached a level of growth which, 
though it might not be as great as oth( 
larger countries such as the United 
States, Canada, or some other in- 
dustrialized country, is greater than th 
of other nations in the same Caribbean 
Basin area. 

Therefore, we considered that we 
should share what we do have with sor 
of the less developed nations in the art 

Yesterday I stated that one would 
not have to be opulent to feel that one 
should express a feeling of solidarity fi 
other nations in the area. Colombia fei 
a need to show this solidarity and mak 
its contribution toward the economic 
development of other countries becaus 
we feel that economic balance is a pre- 
condition to political balance and well 

Colombia has made great efforts i: 
terms of its own capabilities, and we 
would hope that our initiative would ci 
stitute an example for other countries 
which might be richer and yet are less 
generous. This is what has led Colomb 
to join a common effort of the Nassau 
four and has led us to offer our help. 
And, as we have heard here yesterday 
the result of the initial efforts has 
already been splendid, and we hope th 
this effort will imbue some dynamism 
and some hope to the countries of the 

MAR. 15, 1982 

Secretary of State for External Affairs Me 
MacGuigan of Canada, Secretary of Foreig 
Relations Jorge Castaneda of Mexico. 
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig of t 
United States of America, Ambassador ' 
William E. Brock, United States Trade 
Representative, Foreign Minister Jose Alb 
to Zambrano Velasco of Venezuela, and 
Foreign Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds 
Colombia met in New York on March 14-1 
1982 to review the results of the consulta- 
tions begun at Nassau on July 11, 1981 
regarding an initiative to stimulate the 
economic and social development of the 
Caribbean Basin area. 

The Ministers noted that since that tin 
extensive discussions had been held with tl 
governments of countries in the Caribbean 


Department of State Buiie i 


in area, with other interested govern- 
its and with international iinanoial institu- 
is, iioth on a bilateral basis and at interna- 
lal meetings. They emphasized that their 
ernments' efforts would continue to take 
account of the national plans and 
)rities of the countries of the Caribbean 
lin and their own capacities to assist these 

On the basis of these consultations, the 
liisters stressed that dynamic and balanced 
ial and economic development in the coun- 
■s of the Caribbean Basin area is essential. 

only for the welfare of the people in the 
a biit also for the peace and prosperity of 

entire hemisphere. They agreed that the 
io-economic problems which face the coun- 
ts of the Caribbean and Central America 

critical and in many cases are becoming 
re serious. The Ministers underlined that 
; economic and social development could 
,t be achieved by programs of cooperation, 
hout military considerations or political 
-conditions. They stated that each country 
;he Caribbean Basin could benefit from 
h economic cooperation and that, at the 
ne time, donor countries must be free to 
lose the countries with which they 
■perate, and the ways they can best be of 
p. The Ministers agreed that general 
■nomic development could be stimulated 
ough, inter alia, public financial develop- 
nt cooperation, trade and investment, both 
)lic and private. 

The Ministers took note of the individual 
)grams of each of the participants as 
icribed below: 

Canada's Secretary of State for External 
airs explained that Canada has already 
barked on a five-year expanded program 
economic development cooperation with 
■ English-speaking Caribbean and also with 
iti, the Dominican Republic and the coun- 
ts of Central America, at a value of over 
3 half billion dollars. Canadian tariff treat- 
■nt currently provides duty free or 
;ferential access to the Canadian market 
• some 98 percent by value of all exports 
im the Caribbean Basin area to Canada. In 
; context of the CanadayCARICOM [Carib- 
an Community] Joint Trade and Economic 
^eenient of January 1979, Canada is 
■eady engaged with the Commonwealth 
.ribbean in a wide range of programs to 
omote regional integi-ation, industrial 
velopment and cooperation between Cana- 
m and Caribbean private sector organiza- 
ms. Canada has recently established Petro- 
mada International to assist oil-importing 
veloping countries, including those in the 
tribbean Basin area, to reduce or eliminate 
eir dependence on imported oil. 

The Foreign Ministers of Mexico and 
snezuela advised the meeting that their 
untries are continuing their cooperation 
Ith the countries of the Caribbean Basin 
ea, under the San Jose Declaration of 

Presidents Lopez Portillo and Herrera Cam- 
pins, which assures supply of oil for internal 
consumption and provides long-term conces- 
sional credits for government development 
projects. This program, valued at over $700 
million per year, is of great benefit for the 
countries of the area, enabling them to fulfill 
better their national development priorities. 

Mexico's Foreign Minister described Mex- 
ico's ongoing development cooperation proj- 
ects with the countries of the area. In addi- 
tion to the San Jose agreement, he men- 
tioned specifically the system of trade 
facilities with the Central American coun- 
tries, which will be broadened to Caribbean 
countries, preferential credit lines, currently 
at $68 million to the central hanks of the 
area, Mexico's membership in the Caribbean 
Development Bank and its participation in 
the special program for soft-loans to Carib- 
bean less developed countries, its active role 
in various regional multinational government 
enterprises and its broad programs of 
bilateral technical cooperation with countries 
of the region, which now include 308 specific 

The Foreign Minister of Venezuela ad- 
vised that the Government of Venezuela has 
traditionally cooperated in solidarity with the 
countries of the area, based on principles of 
international social justice, and has provided 
even more significant cooperation since 1974 
through programs of financial support (more 
than US $2.5 billion in the last five years). He 
mentioned particularly the creation of a 
special fund for the Eastern Caribbean that 
provides highly concessional financing for 
balance of payments and development pro- 
jects. He mentioned also the establishment of 
technical and technological assistance in the 
commercial, agricultural, educational and 
cultural areas which are aimed at con- 
tributing to the total development of the 
human and physical resources of the coun- 
tries in question, and thereby to their 
democratic, political, economic and social 

The United States described its program 
of integrated and mutually reinforcing 
measures in the fields of trade, investment 
and financial assistance, which President 
Reagan announced on February 24. 

The following measures are being submit- 
ted to the United States Congress. In trade, 
a key feature will be the elimination of duties 
on imports from the Caribbean Basin, with 
the exception of textiles and apparel which 
are subject to textile agreements. Investment 
will be spurred by granting United States in- 
vestors in Basin countries the same ten per- 
cent tax credit as is available for investment 
in the United States. A requested $350 
million supplemental appropriation for the 
region in fiscal year 1982 will address critical 
short-term economic problems of the region, 
and bring total concessional economic 
assistance there in fiscal year 1982 to $825 

In addition to these legislative requests, 
measures within the discretion of the Presi- 
dent will include: a) favorable treatment for 
Caribbean Basin textiles and apparel exports, 
within the context of the overall United 
States textile policy; b) expanded short-term 
credit guarantees by the United States 
Export-Import Bank; c) willingness to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties; and d) 
a program to enhance the role of Puerto Rico 
and the United States Virgin Islands in the 
development of overall prosperity in the 

The Colombian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated that for some time his country 
has been actively cooperating with the coun- 
tries of the Basin and, in that respect 
welcomed the opportunity to join the nations 
which met in Nassau in their effort to resolve 
the economic and social problems of the 

He described the Colombian contributions 
to the Caribbean Development Bank amount- 
ing to $16 million and the existing credit 
lines and deposits of $42 million. He explain- 
ed that the Colombian Government has now 
decided to initiate the following measures: (1) 
creation of a special fund for technical 
assistance to be provided by official agencies 
with resources up to $50 million; (2) granting 
of new credit lines up to $10 million per coun- 
try; (3) establishment of additional time 
deposits for the financing of balance of 
payments deficits; (4) reciprocal credit 
agreements with the countries not yet 
covered; (5) establishment of a trust fund for 
projects in the less developed countries of the 
Eastern Caribbean; (6) preferential trade 
agreements within the context of the Latin 
American Association of Integration 
(ALADI); (7) improvement, in cooperation 
with other countries, of sea and air transpor- 
tation systems. 

The Ministers expressed their deep 
satisfaction with the ongoing economic 
cooperation in the area. They agreed that the 
announced economic program of the Govern- 
ment of the United States of America could 
make a significant contribution to the region's 
development, and expressed their hope that 
these measures would be implemented as 
quickly as possible. 

The Ministers welcomed the decision 
taken by Governments of the area to be in- 
volved actively in the formulation of regional 
development plans. In this regard, the 
Ministers stressed the importance of existing 
institutions for consultation and coordination 
regarding economic and developmental needs 
and priorities in the Caribbean region. They 
noted the efforts being made to develop a 
coordinating group for Central America and 
hoped there would be an early and positive 
result from this exercise. 

ay 1982 



The Ministers expressed satisfaction that, 
within the region, other countries were par- 
ticipating in the development process. In this 
connection, they welcomed the substantial 
financial assistance provided by Trinidad and 
Tobago in the area. They also noted that 
other countries outside the area were also 
responding to the region's pressing needs. 

The Ministers concluded that the effort 
begun at Nassau had been successful in focus- 
ing greater attention on the critical need for 
increased economic development assistance, 
cooperation and coordination in the Carib- 
bean Basin area and they affirmed their 
political will to continue their efforts to imple- 
ment their respective national cooperation 
programs in the area as quickly and effective- 
ly as possible. The Ministers also reaffirmed 

their view that promotion of peace, stability 
and economic development in the Caribbean 
Basin area is equally important to the 
broader world community and they appealed 
to other nations of the hemisphere and the 
world to contribute toward that objective. 

The Ministers agreed to continue con- 
sultations with other governments with a 
view to inviting senior officials of interested 
countries and multilateral economic organiza- 
tions to an ad hoc meeting to encourage 
greater cooperative efforts for economic and 
social development of the region. 

They also agreed to meet again in August 
in Caracas, Venezuela to examine jointly the 
progress which has been achieved. 

'Press release 101 of Mar. 18, 1982. 

U.S.Jamaica Barter Agreement 

FEB. 25. 1982' 

Today, the United States completed its 
arrangement of November 24, 1981, to 
procure 1.6 million tons of Jamaica 
baiixite for the U.S. strategic stockpile. 
The agreement, which was signed today 
by representatives of the U.S. and 
Jamaican Governments in Jamaica, will 
benefit both countries as it stimulates 
the growth of Jamaica's private sector. 
The United States will receive needed 
bauxite for our strategic stockpile. 
Bauxite is the raw material used to pro- 
duce aluminum, a major element in 
almost all modern military weapons, 
such as the F-15 fighter aircraft and the 
B-1 bomber. 

Jamaica, in return for its bauxite, 
will receive approximately $39 million in 
needed foreign exchange plus about 
7,000 metric tons of nonfat dry milk and 
1,900 metric tons of anhydrous milk fat 
valued at $13 million. These dairy prod- 
ucts are part of the agricultural barter 

aspects of this bauxite procurement, and 
they represent the first use of agri- 
culture barter to acquire strategic raw 
material in almost 15 years. The other 
portions of batixite will be procured by 
direct cash payment, as well as ex- 
change with excess stockpile material no 
longer needed because of the changing 
requirements of technology. The pro- 
curement will be accomplished under 
current budget allocations. 

This program, developed during the 
first year of the Reagan Administration, 
is directly supportive of U.S. policy 
toward the Caribbean Basin announced 
by the President yesterday. The pro- 
gram also demonstrates that trade pro- 
grams between the United States and 
Caribbean countries are mutually 
beneficial as will be the aid, trade, and 
investment aspects of the Caribbean 
Basin initiative. 

'Text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents of Mar. 1, 1982. 

Secretary Meets 
With Mexican 
Foreign Minister 

Secretary Haig was in New York 
March 6-7, 1982, to meet with Mexico't 
Minister of Foreign Relations, Jorge 
Castaneda de la Rosa. 

Following is the Secretary's news 
briefing held in the U.N. Plaza Hotel c 
March 6.' 

I want to just briefly review the 
character of the discussions I've had 
with Foreign Secretary Castaneda of 
Mexico and then submit myself to you 

I want to emphasize that this is tl 
first occasion that I've had to discuss 
with Secretary Castaneda the recent 
proposals of President Lopez Portillo 
the Central American crisis and the p 
posals that he made recently in a spet' 
at Managua. 

I used the occasion to thank 
Secretary Castaneda for Mexico's wa( 
support for President Reagan's Carib- 
bean Basin initiative— support that w 
prompt and forthcoming following the 
President's recent speech. We used th 
occasion to have a wide tour de horizi 
of global and regional questions and, 
most importantly of course, the situat 
in Central America. During the meeti 
I had an opportunity to hear firsthanc 
and in detail from the Secretary 
Mexico's peace plan for the Central 
American region. We talked about cu: 
rent U.S. relations with Nicaragua, w 
Cuba, in light of President Lopez Por 
tillo's proposals, and I reiterated the 
necessity for both to stop arming in- 
surgents in the hemisphere. 

As you know, one area of concerr 
we had with our understanding of Pre 
dent Lopez Portillo's proposals was tl 
failure to grapple very directly with tl 
issue of Nicaraguan involvement in E 
Salvador. We had an opportunity to 
discuss this at length and to review 
possible modifications to the Mexican 

I visualize in the period ahead the 
discussions will continue. For example 
will meet again next weekend here in 
New York with Secretary Castaneda. 
of course, expressed our hope that thi 
Mexican Government will support thei 
elections in El Salvador later this 

We discussed in some detail next 
week's meeting of the Nassau four wl 


Department of State Bullei 


associated with the Caribbean Basin 
;iative. After many meetings with Mr. 
staneda, starting with the very 
•liest period of President Reagan's 
ministration — and, incidentally, I 
nt to emphasize that I spoke to the 
;sident in California this morning just 
'ore this meeting, received his 
dance on the position that we would 
;e with respect to the Mexican pro- 
sals, and they were, of course, 
lected in my discussions. 

As is always the case, I have 
/eloped a very close and I think frank 
i constructive relationship with Mr. 
staneda, as has President Reagan 
;h President Lopez Portillo. We very 
ch appreciate the relationship that 
i been established between our two 
v^ernments even though on some 
ues we differ, not the least of which is 
? I just discussed with respect to in- 

I do feel that our meeting resulted 
a greater convergence of views on 
s very difficult subject, and I look for- 
rd to continuing these discussions in 
= period ahead with the view toward 
ding a solution to this very danger- 
s—and increasingly so— problem. 

Q. Commander Wheelock, a 
mber of the Council of the State of 
caragua, is in town, and he reit- 
ated in Washington 2 days ago his 
llingness to meet with the State 
apartment to go over the peace plan 
d their problems. Can you respond 
that offer? 

A. I think it's too early to say. I do 
mt to emphasize that we made some 
oposals as early as last August to the 
)vernment of Nicaragua with the view 
ward arriving at negotiated settlement 
the difficulties in the region. 

Some of the aspects of that proposal 
3re contained in President Lopez 
jrtillo's Managua speech. The area that 
•ncerned us the most was the one that 
d not address in specific terms Nicara- 
lan involvement in El Salvador which 

feel is an essential and primary 
ipect of a negotiated solution. 

After those initial discussions by Mr. 
nders [Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant 
icretary for Inter-American Affairs] in 
anagua in August, we communicated 
)me further details to the Government 

Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the 
jsponse we received was neither en- 
juraging nor forthcoming. 

Dependent on how the talks go with 
ur Mexican friends, and perhaps next 

weekend in the period following that, 
we'll see where they lead. 

Q. If the Mexicans work in some 
phraseology that would accommodate 
what you regard as critical — the 
cessation of the flow of arms to the El 
Salvadoran guerrillas through 
Nicaragua- would the United States 
then be prepared to pick up the Mex- 
ican proposal of looking for a 
negotiated solution? 

Does your very presence here and 
your meeting with the Foreign 
Minister of Mexico indicate a desire at 
this point on the part of the Ad- 
ministration to try to find a way out 
of the El Salvador crisis through a 
negotiated solution? 

A. Let me suggest to you that it 
has been the policy of the U.S. Govern- 
ment from the outset of this situation to 
attempt to find solutions which would be 
the product of peacful negotiations. Let 
there be no doubt about that. That has 
been the underlying premise of 
everything the President has done. 

With respect to the details you 
asked about in the Lopez Portillo plan, I 
think it's too early to say beyond the 
general observation that the exchanges 
we had here this afternoon were en- 
couraging and brought that process for- 
ward. In other words, they were 
positive. But there are still many uncer- 
tainties that have to be refined, and I 
don't think the place to refine them is in 
the public venue. 

Q. Mr. Guiterrez, the Nicaraguan 
who is now in the Mexican Embassy 
in El Salvador, is he or is he not an 
agent who was assisting the rebels? 

A. I think there's been a number of 
statements made, and I understand one 
made at 1:00 o'clock today by the 
Salvadoran President— President 
Duarte— on this subject, and I'd just as 
soon let those statements stand and run 
their course. 

Q. Did you discuss wjth Mr. 
Castaneda the status of this person 
who you pointed out as being 
evidence — 

A. We had an exchange of views on 
it, and, as I say, a great deal has been 
said locally. Since the local authorities— 
those on the ground, whatever their 
point of view— seem to be the most 
knowledgeable, I would leave it right 

Q. You said before Congress, 
though, that he was an agent, he was 
aiding the rebels. Is that true or not? 

A. I said we had the report that 
there was a Nicaraguan involved in the 
insurgency in El Salvador and that he 
had been captured. And that is true. 


Q. Is that report false, though, 

A. No. I believe it is true. 

Q. Did you know at the time on 
Thursday that this gentleman— the 
Nicaraguan or the student, rebel, or 
whatever — had already escaped, or 
had that not yet been brought to your 

A. I think the circumstances— and 
whether you would describe it as escape 
or whatever — I will leave to those who 
were on the ground, eyewitnesses. I 
think there was some further informa- 
tion put out on that today, and I'm sure 
there will be in the days ahead. 

Q. The fact that the Mexican 
Government is currently harboring 
this man, as you have pointed out as 
the Nicaraguan infiltrator, certainly 
we can take that as evidence that we 
and the Mexican Government are very 
far apart on any sort of agreement 
with regard to this issue, aren't we. 

A. With regard to what issue? 

Q. With regard to how to solve 
the crisis in El Salvador if you take as 
evidence the fact that you can't even 
seem to agree with the Mexicans on 
who this man is or what he is. 

A. Wait a minute. That's your inter- 
pretation of the situation; it is not mine. 
As I say, this is a question for the 
Salvadoran authorities — who are in- 
volved in the capture of this fellow and 
the Mexican authorities who have given 
him refuge — to clarify in the hours and 
weeks ahead, and I'm sure they will. 

Do not always assume that events of 
that kind represent full cognizance by 
the authorities involved on either side. 
Just let the facts shake out. 

Q. Senator Byrd had a press con- 
ference today and called for advance 
congressional approval before any 
troops were sent to El Salvador. 
What's the Administration's view on 
that resolution that he is going to pro- 
pose on Monday? 

A. I wasn't aware of it. I think we 
have a War Powers Act which is a very, 
very impressive and rather complete set 
of constraints on the executive branch 
with respect to the deployment of U.S. 
combat forces anywhere in the world. 

But I do not find it particularly rele- 
vant because, as I have said and as the 

lay 1982 



President has said repeatedly, there are 
no plans — I know of no one in the ex- 
ecutive branch who's made such pro- 
posals — that would involve the direct in- 
tervention of American forces in this 

Q. As I understand what the Mex- 
icans are saying, their number one 
priority is for more talking between 
the United States and Cuba which 
they feel is basic to the settlement of 
the problem in the region. There was 
one meeting between you and a Cuban 
official in Mexico City. Are you will- 
ing to take the discussions between 
the United States and Cuba further, 
either using Mexico as an intermedi- 
ary or without an intermediary? 

A. I think it's clear from the fact 
that the President initiated the talks 
that took place between the Vice Presi- 
dent and myself in Mexico City, that his 
policy — as it has been in the Polish crisis 
as well — is to maintain communication 
and contact. Indeed, in times of crisis 
and increased tension, such communica- 
tion becomes more, rather than less, im- 
portant. I don't see any change in that 
policy of President Reagan in the weeks 
and months ahead. 

I haven't answered your question, 
and I'm not going to. I don't mean to be 
cute; I just think the way and how com- 
munications will be conducted are mat- 
ters which are best left without a lot of 
public hoopla. 

Q. There are a number of Con- 
gressmen and other officials in the 
United States who have said that your 
charge of Nicaraguan and Cuban in- 
volvement in El Salvador is cover for 
the continued aid of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration for the junta. Can you of- 
fer any shred of evidence of the 
Nicaraguan arms shipments and Cuban 

A. I think I again would refer you 
to the very knowledgeable statements — 
and they were bipartisan statements — 
made by the representatives of the 
Senate and the House Intelligence Com- 
mittees who were briefed this past week 
on this subject — in the case of the 
Senate, it was Senator Goldwater, and I 
think in the case of the House, Repre- 
sentative Bolen, a Democrat — that this 
evidence was substantial and persuasive. 

Q. Can you tell us what it is? 

A. What would you do with it? 

Q. You told House Appropriations 
Subcommittee the other day you were 
releasing some information soon to 

back up the U.S. accusations regard- 
ing Cuban involvement and Nicar- 
ag^uan involvement. Is that still com- 
ing? Will that be made public soon? 

A. We're preparing a briefing now, 
and I looked at the dry run of it yester- 
day and felt that it needed some im- 
provement. I hope it will be delivered by 
Wednesday of next week, possibly as 
early as Tuesday — maybe even Monday. 

I want to see it again. I want to be 
sure that Mr. Casey [Director of Central 
Intelligence] and the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency are very 
comfortable that we are not subjecting 
sources that must be preserved to undue 
risk, and I think you know this is the 
responsible position that we must take. 
It not only involves the future viability 
of our ability to acquire necessary in- 
telligence, but in some instances it can 
involve the lives of participants. 

Q. One of the things the 
Salvadorans have said, and you've 
referred us to them now, is that there 
are camps located in Mexico where 
training is going on for rebels in El 
Salvador. Is that true? 

A. I'm not going to add any more to 
that situation other than to point out 
that the Salvadoran Government has a 
viewpoint and evidence to support it, 
and I'm sure the Mexican Government 
has its own point of view, and let's let 
that speak for itself. 

Q. You've referred to it — 

A. I'm not going to intervene in it, 
other than to tell you, as I did, that 
there was such an event and that there's 
a great deal to substantiate the 
validity — 

Q. Could you at least — 

A. I have no question. I'm not self- 
conscious about what I said on it, and 
I'm not apologetic for it. I believe it is 
absolutely correct. 

Q. There are figures— 

A. No. I made no reference to sub- 
ject, and I'm not going to. 

Q. You did or did not? 

A. I did not, and I will not. 

Q. At the outset, this Administra- 
tion gave a very cool response to the 
Mexican President's proposal. Now 
you seem to be going about it much 
more seriously. What is it that has 
represented or produced this change 
in attitude on the part of the Ad- 
ministration? Or is it that the Ad- 
ministration finds itself in such a fix 

in El Salvador that the Mexican pro- 
posal may be indeed a sought-after 
way out of the crisis? 

A. Not at all. In the first place, I 
don't accept the premises with which 
you introduced your question which ar 
subjective judgments on your part and 
not factual, if you don't mind my being 
as obnoxious as you were with your 

Let me say that from the outset w 
have been in very close touch with the 
Mexican Government on the situation 
El Salvador and the very worrisome 
trends in Nicaragua. I do not describe 
our response as cool. I don't give a val 
judgment to our response in terms of 
qualitative judgments. We did point oi 
that we felt the proposals as we 
understood them were inadequate, 
especially with respect to the issue I ji 
touched upon. We continue to believe 
that. That is why it was important am 
valuable to discuss these proposals 
firsthand as we did today. 

In that process I think both sides 
learned something, as is always the ca 
when well-meaning people, attempting 
to solve problems rather than create 
them, sit down and talk in a cordial, c< 
structive atmosphere. And that was th 
result of today's discussion. 

Q. If you could strike a closer 
meeting of the minds on this pro- 
posal — say after next weekend's talk 
with the foreign minister — does the 
Mexican proposal's central offer of a 
negotiated solution between the two 
sides — 

A. It's too early to say. But let m 
assure you that President Reagan's in- 
tention is to explore every avenue thai 
could lead to a successful and ap- 
propriate peaceful resolution to the 
situation in Central America. To do 
otherwise would be irresponsible and 
that includes exploring the Mexican in 
tiative in depth and continuing on ex- 
ploring the initiatives which we have 
been considering for an extended peric 
of time. We haven't reached the point 
those assessments that I can answer 
your question as definitively as you 
would prefer. 

Q. Secretary Enders has said thi 
the United States opposes direct 
negotiations between the Duarte 
government and the leftist oppositioi 
Is that still U.S. policy? 

A. It has never been U.S. policy t 
oppose negotiations between the Gove 
ment of El Salvador and the guerrilla 
leaders. What we have opposed is 
negotiations which, a prion, would ha 


Department of State Bulleti 


objective, without an expression of 
will of the people of El Salvador, to 
t up political power. 
We have urged negotiations which 
lid permit the guerrilla leadership to 
in the electoral process — self- 
srmination of the people of El 
vador— and that happens to be 
cisely the view of President Duarte. 
has added a condition that such 
otiations cannot be conducted while 
idshed and terrorism continue, and I 
ik that is a very acceptable, prudent, 
1 understandable condition. 

Q. You said previously that you 
led that the Mexican Government 
uld support elections in El Salva- 
. Is that realistic, considering last 
r's French-Mexican communique on 
Salvador rejecting elections as a 
ble solution and recognizing the op- 
lition as a representative force in El 

A. I'm not sure I understand what 
I're saying. 

Q. Whether it is realistic for you 
hope that Mexico will support elec- 
ns in El Salvador after the joint 
!nch-Mexican communique of last 
ir criticizing elections or describing 
ctions as not being a viable solu- 

A. I think it's one thing to have an 
itude with respect to the potential 
lefits of a process and another to sup- 
•t the process itself. I think the 
/ernments of the hemisphere— a large 
nber of them, especially those in the 
al area — rejected the French-Mexican 
)posal. We did too; we were not com- 
table with it. 

But that time has passed and we are 
another point in time in a dynamic 
iation. My expression of hope that 
•y will support the election is simply 
at it says. 

Q. Did anything else happen as a 
iult of your talks today? Presumably 
a take their proposal back to 
ishington and Foreign Minister 
staneda the same. But do the Mex- 
ms go to any of the other parties in- 
Ived with American thoughts or pro- 
sals, or is it intragovernmental at 
is point? 

A. We're not dealing bilaterally 
th the Mexican Government in an ex- 
ange of views on ideas they have to 
ing progress. We have been conduct- 
l our own discussions, as I pointed out 
rlier, and it's too early to say where 
; will go from here. 

Q. The Mexican Government fun- 
damentally disagrees on one specific 
point— U.S. aid to El Salvador. I 
understand the Mexican Government 
has come out strongly opposed to any 
more U.S. military aid. Are you ac- 
cepting this from the foreign 

A. We have discussed the full range 
of issues associated with the Nicaraguan 
question, the Salvadoran question, and 
the Cuban question. I don't think it 
serves any purpose for me to lay out in 
detail how both of us come to these 
various problems, other than to say that 
we had a very constructive and, I think, 
valuable exchange. 

Q. What was the foreign 
minister's reaction to what I presume 
would have been your proposal to 
broaden the Mexican proposal to in- 
clude a call for a ban on arms being 
transshipped through Nicaragua to the 

A. I would prefer to let my state- 
ment stand, which suggested that we 
had a constructive discussion and 
modifications and add-ons, and different 
approaches were discussed that might 
offer some hope for progress. 

Q. In President Lopez Portillo's 
proposal, one of the main points sug- 
gests that Nicaragua and the United 
States should sign a pact of non- 
aggression. Did you discuss that with 
Mr. Castaneda? 

A. We discussed the full range of 
President Lopez Portillo's speech in 
Managua— every one of the details— and 
that was one of the details, yes. 
Everything that was in that speech was 

Q. Do you have a comment to 

A. Not yet. All of these things that 
would go forward that might constitute 
a viable negotiating proposal are inter- 
related, and any one of them draws its 
character from those alongside of it. I 
have said that the sine quo non, if you 
will, of potential normalization of rela- 
tions between the United States and 
Nicaragua involves the cessation of their 
intervention in neighboring states. 

'Press release 87 of Mar. 8, 1982. 

Secretary Meets 


Central American 

Foreign l\/linisters 

MAR. 25, 1982 

The foreign ministers of Costa Rica, 
Honduras, El Salvador, and I have 
reviewed the political, economic, and 
mutual security concerns which led these 
three countries to form the Central 
American Democratic Community. The 
United States strongly supports this 
common effort to defend and strengthen 
democratic institutions in the region. 

Foreign Ministers Niehaus [Costa 
Rica], Paz Barnica [Honduras], and 
Chavez Mena [El Salvador] have also 
described for us the economic problems 
confronting their countries. These prob- 
lems are critical and must be attacked 
immediately. We believe that President 
Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative pro- 
gram is an essential U.S. response to 
this economic crisis. It will provide 
emergency assistance and, through its 
trade and investment initiatives, help to 
lay the foundations for sustained 
economic progress. I am confident that 
the Congress and the American people 
will support the President's proposals 
and that the Caribbean Basin initiative, 
which includes the efforts of Canada, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, can 
begin to resolve the underlying problems 
of social inequity and economic 
deterioration in the region. 

In our discussions today, we re- 
affirmed our common interest in a Cen- 
tral America in which basic political and 
economic decisions are made by Central 
Americans within democratic, pluralistic 
political systems. We share concerns 
about the military buildup in the region, 
which is not only destabilizing but which 
also diverts scarce resources from the 
urgent tasks of economic and social 

I stressed to my colleagues the firm 
support of the U.S. Government, on 
behalf of President Reagan, for the con- 
stituent assembly elections in El 
Salvador as an essential step toward the 
establishment of a democratic system in 

ay 1982 



that troubled country. We support elec- 
tions and the popular participation in- 
herent in them — not the so-called 
negotiating proposals of the extreme left 
which would divide political power over 
the heads of the Salvadoran people. Sun- 
day's elections and the work of the con- 
stituent assembly — which will lead to 
elections for a president and a national 
assembly — will strengthen democracy in 
El Salvador and provide the means for 
resolving political conflict. 

As you know, we have repeatedly 
expressed our willingness to facilitate 
contacts among the various political 
elements in El Salvador to achieve the 
broadest possible participation in the 
electoral process — a process which is on- 
ly beginning. We remain ready to do 
this, now and in the period ahead. 

SLx political parties representing a 
broad political spectrum are now deeply 
engaged in the elections. Thus far, 
however, the extreme left has not only 
refused to participate but has mounted a 
major effort to use violence and in- 
timidation to disrupt the March 28 elec- 
tions. We know that the guerrillas will 
try to intensify this campaign of terror 
in the next few days. We are confident 
of the ability of the Government of El 
Salvador to repulse these efl'orts and to 
carry out the elections in a fair and in a 
conscientious manner. 

U.S. support for the basic principles 
of democratic development and social 
and economic justice is constant. We 
consider it essential that whatever 
government emerges in the Salvadoran 
elections be committed to the same prin- 
ciples. We will look to it to carry for- 
ward the advances made by the current 
government with respect to land reform, 
the creation of democratic institutions, 
the restoration of rule of law, and the 
elimination of human rights abuses by 
the left and the right. In this regard, we 
place particular emphasis on the need 
for the prompt prosecution under due 
process of those responsible for the kill- 
ing of the American churchwomen and 
labor advisers in El Salvador. 

The United States will continue to 
support the Salvadoran struggle against 
Cuban and Nicaraguan backed guerrillas 
because we believe that power gained 
and maintained at gunpoint fosters 
violence and lawlessness. The enemies of 
the democratic process, individual liber- 
ties, and human rights are strengthened. 
My colleagues and I share the desire for 
a Central America free of these 
enemies. ■ 

Cuban and Nicaraguan Support for 
the Salvadoran Insurgency 

There has been a lot of debate and 
controversy about Cuban and 
Nicaraguan support for gv£rrillas in 
Central America, particularly in El 
Salvador. This paper summarizes the 
overall pattern as it now stands; it was 
made available to the press on March 20. 

This paper does not contain the sen- 
sitive intelligence that we have provided 
to congressional committees and to a 
number of distinguished Americans. 
They have expressed their views. We can- 
not make this intelligence available 
publicly. Were it to be released, the U.S. 
Government would lose access to critical 
information and might well risk the lives 
of some brave people who believe it is im- 
portant that the Government of the 
United States know what is going on. A 
government that does not keep secrets 
does not receive them. 

The purpose of this paper is, thus, 
not to produce new revelations but to 
describe the general pattern of outside 
support for El Salvador's guerrillas, in- 
cluding arms supply, training, and com- 
mand and control. Some of this informa- 
tion came fi-om classified sources, but 
much of it can be obtained by careful 
analysis of public sources. The cumula- 
tive weight of this information makes 
clear that the guerrilla movement in El 
Salvador receives vital assistance of 
many kinds from an international in- 
frastructwre outside. El Salvador. 

In what follows, the following themes 
should be kept in mind. 

• Although much of our most recent 
information is so sensitive that it cannot 
be provided to the general public, it is 
consistent with patterns of guerrilla ac- 
tivity and foreign support evident for 2 
years and more. A clandestine support 
system, established in 1978 at the time of 
the Nicaraguan civil war, continued to 
operate after the fall ofSomoza in July 
1979 with a neu) final destination — El 
Salvador. Cuba played a major role in 
developing this support system and re- 
mains its key link. 

• The existence of this support 
system — initially identified by the 
Carter Administration — has been 
repeatedly and vigorously denied by 
Nicaraguan and Cuban spokesmen. Yet 
a considerable quantity of solid informa- 
tion shows that those denials are false. 

• Many elements of the pattern ha 
been repeatedly confirmed by independ 
ent researchers and journalists who hn 
gone into the field to investigate the ac 
tual situation on the ground. Confirmi 
tion has come from as far away as 
Lebanon and Vietnam. 

• In assessing the situation in El 
Salvador today, one should pay attent 
to the nature of the guerrilla movemen 
To this end, we are making available i 
brief history of the organization and 
evolution of the Salvadoran insurgent 

The Pattern 

Outside backing for the insurgency in 
Salvador has taken many forms. Befo 
the unification of El Salvador's violen 
left, Cuban support to its elements in 
volved political and some military trai 
ing, modest financial aid, and serving 
a link between Salvadoran extremists 
and Communists outside the hemi- 
sphere. During the Nicaraguan civil w 
Cuba concentrated on support for the 
Sandinistas. After the fall of Somoza, 
Cuba began intense efforts to help pre 
Cuban guerrillas come to power in El 

The pattern of outside support is 
tricate but has three major compo- 
nents — external arms supplies, trainii 
and command and control. 

External Arms Supplies. Within 
weeks after the fall of Somoza in July 
1979, the Sandinistas began to coopei 
with Cuba in support of the Salvador; 
extreme left by establishing training 
camps and the beginning of arms sup 
networks. This clandestine assistance 
initially involved local black markets ; 
relatively limited resources. In 1980, 
after meetings in Havana had unified 
Salvadoran Marxists into a single 
military command structure, the San- 
dinista leadership agreed to serve as . 
conduit for an arms trafficking systen 
unprecedented proportions, originatir 
outside the hemisphere. That structui 
remains in force today. 

Arms and ammunition for the 
Salvadoran insurgents reach Nicaragi 
by ship and occasionally by direct fligi 
from Havana to Nicaragua. Three 
Nicaraguan ships — the, the 
Aracely, and the Nicarao — frequently 


Department of State Bulle'n 


nsport arms and ammunition to 
:aragua from Cuba in their cargo, as 
Cuban and other vessels. These 
itary supplies remain stockpiled out- 
2 El Salvador until guerrilla head- 
irters near Managua arranges for 
ir shipment into El Salvador. The 
ing of the resupply operations ap- 
irs to be coordinated with the planned 
el of fighting, since before each surge 
;he fighting, we have detected large 

Here are some concrete illustrations 
;he arms flow. 

• The Papalonal airfield provides a 
ir case of the direct airlift of weapons 
m Nicaragua to guerrillas in El 
vador. Papalonal is a commercially 
ieveloped area 23 nautical miles 
thwest of Managua. The airfield is 
essible only by dirt roads. Informa- 

1 on Papalonal has not been released 
etofore because of the sensitivity of 
methods by which it was acquired, 
ate July 1980, the airfield was an 
icultural dirt airstrip approximately 
meters long, but by early 1981 the 
p had been lengthened by 50% to ap- 
ximately 1,200 meters. A turnaround 
, been added to each end. A dispersal 
king area with three hardstands — a 
ture typical of a military airfield — 
. been constructed at the west end of 
runway. Three parking aprons had 
n cleared, and six hangar/storage 
dings, each about 15 meters wide, 
. been constructed on the aprons, 
igars were to stockpile arms for the 
vadoran guerrillas. (These hangars 
smbled those at major Cuban air- 
es, and our sources confirmed Cuban 
jlvement in the construction.) C-47 
hts from the airbase, confirmed by 
tographic evidence, corresponded 
h sightings in El Salvador, and 
eral pilots have been identified in 
aragua who regularly flew the route 
) El Salvador. This particular route 
; closed down by March 1981, but 
le air infiltration continues to this 
, despite difficulties in pilot recruit- 

• Weapons delivery by overland 
tes from Nicaragua passes through 
iduras. Several examples of this 

IS traffic can be identified. Honduran 
horities have intercepted various 
jments of arms enroute from 
aragua and in concealed caches in 
iduras. In early January 1981, for 
mple, Honduran police caught six in- 
iduals unloading weapons from a 
:k enroute from Nicaragua. The six 

identified themselves as Salvadorans and 
as members of the International Support 
Commission of the Salvadoran Popular 
Liberation Forces (FPL). They had in 
their possession a large number of 
altered and forged Honduran, Costa 
Rican, and Salvadoran passports and 
other identity documents. This one truck 
contained over 100 M-16/AR-15 
automatic rifles, fifty 81mm mortar 
rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of 
5.56mm ammunition, machine gun belts, 
field packs, and first aid kits. Over 50 of 
these M-16/AR-15 rifles were traced to 
U.S. units assigned to Vietnam in 
1968-69 and which were left in Vietnam 
when LI.S. troops departed. 

• In April 1981, Honduran 
authorities intercepted a tractor-trailer 
truck which had entered Honduras at 
the Guasule crossing from Nicaragua. It 
was apparently heading for Guatemala. 
Ammunition and propaganda materials 
were hidden in the sidewalls of the 
trailer. The same arms traffickers 
operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras, with a false floor and a 
special basement for storing weapons. 

• Costa Rica also has been a staging 
area for arms shipments to El Salvador. 
A special legislative commission, 
established in June 1980 by the Costa 
Rican legislature, confirmed that the 
Cubans had established a clandestine 
arms-supply link between Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua during the Nicaraguan 
civil war and that link continued to func- 
tion between Costa Rica and El 
Salvador once the Sandinistas had come 
to power in Nicaragua. After the 
Nicaraguan civil war was over, accord- 
ing to the Costa Rican commission's 
report issued in May 1981, "arms 
trafficking, originating in Costa Rica or 
through Costa Rican territory, [began] 
toward El Salvador, indirectly or using 
Honduras as a bridge." 

• In April and July 1981, 
Guatemalan security forces captured 
large caches of guerrilla weapons at 
safehouses in Guatemala City. Traces 
made on the serial numbers of individual 
U.S-manufactured weapons revealed 
that 17 M-16/AR-15S had been shipped 
to U.S. units in Vietnam in the late 
1960s and early 1970s and left behind. 
Several of the vehicles captured at the 
Guatemala City safehouses bore recent 
customs markings from Nicaragua, thus 
suggesting that the operation was part 
of the well-established pattern. 

(Note: When a clandestine shipment 
of arms is captured or a safehouse is 

found containing arms and terrorist sup- 
plies, it is often impossible to know with 
certainty whether the ultimate recipients 
are Guatemalan, Honduran, Costa 
Rican, or Salvadoran terrorists, since 
the arms supply networks established by 
Cuba and Nicaragua are funnelling 
lethal military supplies to terrorists and 
guerrillas in all four countries, using the 
same clandestine smuggling techniques 
and routes.) 

Training. Cuban and Nicaraguan 
political and military training create the 
basic framework for the use of the arms 
by the guerrillas within El Salvador. 
Nicaragua and Cuba coordinate training 
efforts, with Cuba providing key 
specialized training. 

Since at least mid-1980, Salvadoran 
guerrillas have been trained in 
Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have trained 
Salvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, 
weapons, communications, and ex- 
plosives at temporary training schools 
scattered around the country and on 
Sandinista military bases. At several 
military sites in Nicaragua, Salvadorans 
receive training under guidance from 
Cuban and other foreign advisers. For 
more specialized training, guerrillas 
transit Nicaragua for Cuba. The 
Managua-Havana air shuttle link is in 
daily operation, and the increase in 
traffic has reached the point where a 
ticketing system is now required. Guer- 
rillas are provided false identity 
documents to help them transit third 
countries. The Cubans are training guer- 
rillas in sabotage and demolition efforts 
and reinfiltrating them through 
Nicaragua back into El Salvador. This 
training in Nicaragua and Cuba has in- 
creased the tactical skills of the guer- 
rillas in El Salvador. Guerrilla opera- 
tions — such as the attacks on Ilopango 
airport in January 1982 and on the El 
Oro bridge in October 1981 — were clear- 
ly performed by trained saboteurs. 

A Salvadoran guerrilla, Santo 
Salome Morales, reported when he 
defected in Honduras in September 1981 
that he and 12 others went from El 
Salvador to Nicaragua via a point near 
the Gulf of Fonseca in May 1980. From 
Managua they proceeded to Cuba where 
they received extensive military train- 
ing, together with over 900 Salvadorans. 
Morales said he was trained in under- 
water demolition. 

The link between training and the 
regional infrastructure behind guerrilla 
activity is evident in information ob- 
tained following a raid late last year by 
the Honduran police on a safehouse for 

y 1982 



the Morazanist Front for the Liberation 
of Honduras (FMLH). This organization 
was described in an October 1981 inter- 
view in the progovernment Nicaraguan 
newspaper El Nuevo Diario by 
"Octavio," one of its founders, as a 
political-military organization formed as 
part of the "increasing regionalization of 
the Central American conflict." The raid 
took place on November 27, 1981, in 
Tegucigalpa, and while the Honduran 
police were attempting to search the 
house, a firefight broke out. The police 
ultimately captured several members of 
this group. This cell of the FMLH in- 
cluded a Honduran, an Uruguayan, and 
several Nicaraguans. The captured ter- 
rorists told Honduran authorities that 
the Nicaraguan Government had provid- 
ed them with funds for travel expenses, 
as well as explosives. 

Captured documents and statements 
by detained guerrillas further indicated 
that the group was formed in Nicaragua 
at the instigation of high-level Sandi- 
nista leaders; the group's chief of opera- 
tions resided in Managua; and members 
of the group received military training 

in Nicaragua and Cuba. The documents 
included classroom notebooks from a 
1-year training course held in Cuba in 
1980. Other captured documents re- 
vealed that guerrillas at one safehouse 
were responsible for transporting arms 
and munitions into Honduras from 
Esteli, Nicaragua. 

Training programs in Nicaragua are 
continuing. A Salvadoran terrorist, Jose 
Roberto Marroquin Acevedo, was ar- 
rested in Costa Rica on January 29, 
1982, in connection with an attempted 
kidnaping of a Salvadoran businessman. 
He told Costa Rican police that he was 
affiliated with a Salvadoran guerrilla 
organization, which had sent him to 
Nicaragua where he and other terrorists 
were provided with false identity 
documents to enter Costa Rica. In the 
presence of his defense attorney Marro- 
quin told a Costa Rican court on 
February 4 that he "received military 
and political training" during the several 
months he spent in Nicaragua. 

Command and ControL The military 
forces of the Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrilla 

El Salvador's Elections 

MAR. 29. 19821 

I want first and foremost to express my 
admiration for the people of El 
Salvador. Ordinary Salvadoran men and 
women, in unprecedented numbers, 
yesterday displayed awesome courage 
and civic responsibility. The Salvadoran 
people's stunning personal commitment 
to the power of the democratic vision is 
an unanswerable repudiation of the ad- 
vocates of force and violence. 

Secondly, I would like to note that 
yesterday's results are a military defeat 
for the guerrillas, quite as much as a 
pohtical repudiation. Despite their clear 
intention to disrupt the elections, the 
guerrilla forces were unable to shake 
either the people or the security forces 
at their moment of greatest vulner- 
ability. Moreover, the behavior of the 
armed forces proved that, although in El 
Salvador soldiers by law cannot vote, 
their professionalism this weekend 
served the cause of democracy. We 
should be aware, of course, that despite 
their undeniable repudiation by the peo- 
ple of El Salvador, the guerrillas still 
have the external support to continue 

their campaign of terror at levels that 
would be impossible if they depended on 
their own people. 

Finally, these elections are a major 
achievement in the development of 
democracy in El Salvador. We are confi- 
dent that the constituent assembly, 
given the extraordinary mandate it has 
received from the Salvadoran people, 
will find ways to hold out a hand of con- 
ciliation to those adversaries who are 
prepared to take part peacefully in the 
democratic process now so encouraging- 
ly under way in El Salvador. 

Formidable tasks still lie ahead. The 
Salvadoran people have dramatically 
demonstrated their desire for peace and 
for democracy. We and the free peoples 
everywhere must be proud of the victory 
we have all won. We owe it to ourselves, 
as well as to the people of El Salvador, 
to continue to support these courageous 
people as they advance the political 
reform process, to strengthen the land 
reform program, and to curb in- 
discriminate violence caused by ex- 
tremists from both the left and the 
right. We believe yesterday's success 
greatly advances these long-term objec- 

movement are controlled by the Unifi 
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) witl 
three members from each of the guer 
rilla groups active in El Salvador. 

The DRU was formed in Havana 
May 1980, after meetings that began 
under Castro's sponsorship in Decern! 
1979. Requiring the creation of a unif 
military command that included the 
Moscow-line Salvadoran Communist I 
ty before any modern armaments wei 
supplied was, and is, a key to Cuba's 
political/military strategy. This patter 
applied previously to the struggle 
against Somoza in Nicaragua and sine 
then elsewhere in Central America, 
draws on ideologically committed and 
Cuban-trained military cadres to mak 
up the guerrilla command and thereb 
insure Marxist-Leninist control of the 
surgency and of any government emt 
ing subsequently from it. 

The DRU command headquarters 
near Managua, Nicaragua, and is par 
an extremely sophisticated command 
and control relationship (in fact, this 
system is more elaborate than that u; 
by the Sandinistas against Somoza). 
Planning and operations are guided 
from this headquarters in Nicaragua, 
where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers 
are involved in command and control 
The guidance flows to guerrilla units 
widely spread throughout El Salvado 
DRU headquarters coordinates logist 
support for the insurgents to include 
food, medicines, clothing, money, 
and — most importantly — weapons an 
ammunition. Although some freelanc 
exists as targets of opportunity appe 
the headquarters in Nicaragua decide 
on locations to be attacked and coord 
nates supply deliveries. 

Evidence of centralized control 
comes from the guerrillas themselves 
On March 4, 1982, the FMLN clande 
tine Radio Venceremos located in El 
Salvador broadcast a message to gue 
rillas in El Salvador urging them "to 
maintain their fighting spirit 24 hour: 
day to carry out the missions orderei 
the FMLN general command [emphas, 

Recent Developments. Three 
months ago — in mid-December 1981- 
Fidel Castro directed, after consulta- 
tions in Havana with guerrilla leader: 
that external supplies of arms to FM 
units should be stepped up to make 
possible an offensive to disrupt a 
peaceful vote in the March 28 constit 
uent assembly elections. Extreme lef 

'Made to news correspondents at the 
Department's regular press briefing. ■ 


Department of State Bulli|l 


Organization and Evolution of the 
Salvadoran Insurgent Movement 

5alvadoran insurgents include a number 
litical and armed groups united in 
•al organizations which are distinct in 
ion but overlap in composition. 

The supreme executive body of the in- 
mts is the Unified Revolutionary Direc- 

,e (DRU). The DRU was formed in IVIay 
at a secret meetirig in Havana. It grew 
f other discussions held in Havana in 
mber 1979 among three Salvadoran ex- 
ist groups. The DRU contains three 
bers from each of the five active armed 
mist organizations operating in El 

The Farabundo Marti National 
ration Front (FMLN) was formed in Oc- 
• 1980 to serve as the political/military 
■ella group for the armed extremist 
lizations and their front groups. 

The Democratic Revolutionarj' Front 
t), a separate political wing attached to 
'MLN, was founded in April 1980 and 
ites outside El Salvador. 

)f these three groups, it is the DRU that 
as a military high command for the con- 
of guerrilla warfare and terrorist ac- 
. The FDR has no control over military 

'our of the five Salvadoran armed 
lizations represented in the DRU can be 
d to the Communist Party of El 
idor. It eschewed violence from its incep- 
in the mid-1920s until late 1979. During 
970s. the refusal of the party to endorse 
nee caused schisms within the party and 
le more radical members to leave it and 
lize independent armed organizations, 
'he Communist Party of El Salvador is 
ed by Jorge Shafik Handal. A long-time 
munist, Handal has been a political 
tor for 30 years. He studied at the 
ersity of El Salvador Law School, 
ugh he failed to earn a degree. He has 
maintained close ties with Havana and 

..eaders of the Communist Party of El 
idor were uncertain how to respond to 
)ctober 1979 coup in El Salvador, which 
^ht to power a reformist civilian-military 
tion. Initially the party decided to 
erate with the new government. Peaceful 
ge, however, did not suit those commit- 
o violent struggles. Other groups on the 
staged violent disturbances. The Com- 
ist Party soon followed their lead and 
ly opposed the government forming its 
military wing, the Armed Forces of 
ration (FAL). In mid-December 1979, 
/ leaders met in Havana with represent- 
:s of two other Salvadoran extremist 
ps — Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) 
Armed Forces of National Resistance 

(FARN) — to initiate the unification process 
and agree on a military strategy. In June and 
July 1980, Handal traveled to the Soviet 
Union, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Eastern 
Europe to seek arms. 

The largest of the armed groups is the 
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation 
Forces (FPL), headed by Salvador Cayetano 
Carpio. Carpio became involved in labor ac- 
tivities in the early 1960s. By 1964, he had 
become Secretary General of the Communist 
Party of El Salvador. In 1969, he split with 
the party over its reluctance to use violence. 
Carpio founded the FPL in 1974 to serve as 
the "vanguard of the revolution." Using the 
nom de guerre of Comandante Marcial, Car- 
pio orders and directs the military operations 
of the FPL. 

By 1972, a separate faction of Castroite, 
Maoist, and Trotskyite dissidents had aban- 
doned the Communist Party of El Salvador 
and organized the People's Revolutionary 
Army (ERP). Headed by Joaquin Villalobos, 
the ERP is dedicated to a strategy of 
"peoples' revolutionary warfare" and has em- 
phasized urban terrorism. Villalobos, like Car- 
pio, is a proponent of armed violence and 
justifies terrorist acts such as kidnapping and 
assassination as "acts of revolutionary 
justice." Another prominent ERP figure is 
Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez, who regular- 
ly travels abroad as a spokesperson for the 
FMLN. She joined the ERP in 1972. In 1976 
she was imprisoned for murdering a 
Salvadoran policeman. She was released in 
1977 as part of a negotiated exchange for an 
industrialist kidnapped by the ERP; the ERP 
bargained in bad faith and the industrialist 
was killed despite Martinez' release. Follow- 
ing the establishment of a reformist civilian- 
military government in El Salvador in Oc- 
tober 1979, the ERP and the FPL staged 
violent disturbances. 

Internal dissension within the ERP 
resulted in the assassination of key leader 
Roque Dalton in 1975 by other ERP activists, 
which led a splinter group headed by Ernesto 
Jovel and Ferman Cienfuegos to break away 
to form the Armed Forces of National 
Resistance (FARN). The FARN took part in 
the initial unification discussions with the 
Communist Party of El Salvador and FPL in 
Havana in December 1979, and joined the 
DRU in 1980. But the FARN temporarily 
retired from the guerrilla command that 
same year following a dispute. After Joval 
died in September 1980 under confused cir- 
cumstances — the FARN command first at- 
tributed his death to a car accident, later to a 
plane crash— the FARN rejoined the DRU. 
Ferman Cienfuegos then emerged as the 
principal FARN leader. He is said to have 
been a member of a Communist youth 

organization and has operated clandestinely 
since 1969. 

The fifth organization represented on the 
DRU is a tiny Trotskyite group, the Revolu- 
tionary Party of Central American Workers 
(PRTC). It was admitted to the DRU near 
the end of 1980. The key figure in the PRTC 
seems to be Fabio Castillo, a former rector of 
the University of El Salvador. He has lived in 
exile since 1972. Formed in the late 1970s, 
the PRTC has conducted acts of terrorism to 
establish its revolutionary credentials. A 
Costa Rican and two Salvadoran terrorists 
captured by Costa Rican police in January 
1982, after an unsuccessful kidnapping at- 
tempt, are closely associated with the PRTC. 
Their statements to Costa Rican police re- 
vealed that they had operated out of a PRTC 
"safehouse" in Managua, Nicaragua, where 
they also received military training. 

Each of these radical groups controls a 
"popular front" organization. The PCES for 
decades has operated through the National 
Democratic Union (UDN), a legal political 
party which was invited by the Salvadoran 
Government to participate in the March 28, 
1982, elections but refused to do so. The FPL 
controls the Popular Revolutionary Bloc 
(BPR). The ERP controls the relatively small 
Popular Leagues of February 28 (LP-28). 
The FARN oversees the United Popular Ac- 
tion Front (FAPU). The PRTC's correspond- 
ing front organization is the Movement of 
Popular Liberation (MLP). 

The political front organizations have 
served to some degree as manpower pools for 
the guerrillas and in the past have been used 
to stage demonstrations, disseminate prop- 
aganda, and occupy public buildings — 
churches, foreign embassies, and government 
offices — as well as to back guerrilla units. 
Since 1980 activities of political front groups 
have dropped dramatically as the armed 
groups which control them put greater em- 
phasis on military actions. 

Not represented on the DRU, but con- 
nected to it through the Democratic Revolu- 
tionary Front (FDR), are several small 
organizations of the democratic left. The 
most visible of these organizations is the Na- 
tional Revolutionary Movement (MNR) 
headed by Guillermo Manuel Ungo, who 
became the FDR's president in December 
1980. The MNR is a member party of the 
Socialist International. The MNR has a small 
membership which never exceeded a few hun- 
dred. Also part of the FDR is the Popular 
Socialist Christian Movement (MPSC). 
which is composed of a handful of former 
Christian Democrats who abandoned or were 
expelled from the Salvadoran Christian 
Democratic Party in early 1980. ■ 

I 1982 



groups throughout Central America 
were mobilized to support the effort. 

Within the past 3 months, shipments 
of arms into El Salvador reached un- 
precedented peaks, averaging out to the 
highest overall volume since the "linal 
offensive" last year. During the past 
year, deliveries of arms to the 
Salvadoran insurgents have been closely 
monitored. The recent Cuban- 
Nicaraguan arms flow into El Salvador 
has emphasized both sea and— once 
again— overland routes through Hon- 
duras. Early in March, for example, a 
guerrilla unit in El Salvador received 
several thousand sticks of TNT and 
detonators (only five sticks of TNT are 
sufficient to blow up an electrical pylon). 
Last month, a Salvadoran guerrilla 
group picked up a large shipment of 
arms on the Usulutan coast after the 
shipment arrived by sea from 

In addition to vitally needed am- 
munition, these most recent guerrilla 
supply operations have included greater 
quantities of more sophisticated heavier 
weapons. Recent deliveries have includ- 
ed M-60 machine guns, 57mm recoilless 
rifles, and M-72 antitank weapons, thus 
significantly increasing guerrilla 
firepower. Individual units also regularly 
receive tens of thousands of dollars for 
routine purchases of nonlethal supplies 
on commercial markets and payments 
(including bribes) to enable the clandes- 
tine pipeline to function. 

On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican 
judicial police announced the discovery 
of a house in San Jose with a sizable 
cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, 
passports, documents, false immigration 
stamps from more than 30 countries, 
and vehicles with hidden compart- 
ments—all connected with an ongoing 
arms traffic through Costa Rican ter- 
ritory to Salvadoran guerrillas. 

Nine people were arrested — 
Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argen- 
tine, a Chilean, and a Costa Rican. 
Costa Rican police so far have seized 13 
vehicles designed for arms smuggling. 
Police confiscated some 150-175 
weapons from mausers to machine guns, 
TNT, fragmentation grenades, a 
grenade launcher, ammunition, and 500 
combat uniforms. One of the captured 

terrorists told police that the arms and 
other goods were to have been delivered 
to the Salvadoran guerrillas before 
March 20, "for the elections." 

Confirmations on the Public Record 

Persuasive evidence that the insurgency 
in El Salvador is part of a broader 
regional pattern has been available for 
some time. 

The Nicaraguan link was clear to the 
Carter Administration. For example, in 
an interview with editors of the 
Washington Post, published January 30, 
1981, former Secretary of State Ed- 
mund Muskie said that Cuban arms and 
supplies being used in El Salvador's 
bloody civil war were flowing through 
Nicaragua "certainly with the knowledge 
and to some extent the help of 
Nicaraguan authorities." 

A guerrilla leader told the San Diego 
Union (March 1, 1981) in El Salvador 
that "the Salvadoran guerrillas have a 
permanent commission in Nicaragua 
overseeing the smuggling of weapons 
from that country to here." He also said 
there have been Cuban advisers in the 
province of Morazan and that Viet- 
namese advisers have made several trips 
to guerrilla camps in El Salvador. 

Fidel Castro publicly denies supply- 
ing arms and military equipment to the 
Salvadoran guerrillas (for example, in 
his September 15, 1981, speech opening 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union Con- 
ference in Havana) and avoids comment- 
ing on Cuban military advisers in 

Yet in a Bonn press conference on 
June 19, 1981, German Social 
Democratic leader Hans-Jurgen 
Wischnewski reported that when he had 
personally confronted Castro with State 
Department contentions that Cuba had 
shipped weapons to Salvadoran guer- 
rillas, Castro had admitted it was true. 
Castro again confirmed the reports of 
transshipment of arms to the Salvador- 
an guerrillas in private discussions with 
several Inter-Parliamentary Union 
delegations in Havana last September. 

And the Washington Post reportec 
March 7, 1982, that Sandinista leader 
Jaime Wheelock confirmed to the Posi 
that Cuban military advisers were pre 
ent in his country, although he claime 
that there were "no more than about 

The New York Times reported 
March 18, 1982, that the guerrillas nc 
concede that Cuba supplied armamen 
through Nicaragua for the January 1 ! 
"final offensive." 

Top Cuban leaders have confirme 
that Salvadoran guerrillas are trainee 
Cuba. Vice President Caslos Rafael 
Rodriguez, for example, confirmed it 
at least two interviews {Der Spiegel, 
September 28, 1981, and El Diario d 
Caracas, October 29, 1981). The Ton 
Globe and Mail reported February \i 
1982, that "at least 30 Salvadoran gu 
rillas" were currently training near 
Havana. The report was based on an 
terview with a Salvadoran guerrilla 
billeted in a Havana hotel, which, ac- 
cording to a hotel employee, had bee 
booked by the Cuban foreign ministr 
for "Latin American" guests. 

In March 1981, [Nicaraguan] Sar 
dinista directorate member Humbert 
Ortega traveled to Hanoi. In a speec 
given there March 11, Ortega said: " 
sincerely thank the Vietnamese peop 
and highly value their support for th. 
heroic Salvadoran people ... the fier 
and bloody struggle in El Salvador n 
quires the support of all progressive 
tions and forces throughout the worl 

Vietnamese support for the 
Salvadoran guerrillas was confirmed 
author William Shawcross when he 
traveled to Vietnam last year {New 1 
Review of Books, September 24, 1981 

Had Vietnam been distributing any o 
vast pile of weapons left by the Americai 
Colonel Bui Tin acknowledged, in effect, 
it had. In El Salvador? "It's not fair to sa 
the U.S. can help the junta but we canno 
help our friends. We do our best to suppi 
revolutionary movements in the world. 

Yasir Arafat, chairman of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization ex 
ecutive committee, confirmed to a gr 
of Palestinian journalists in Beirut o 
January 11, 1982, that "there are 
Palestinian pilots in Nicaragua, then 
are Palestinian revolutionaries with 
revolutionaries in El Salvador. ..." 


Department of State Bulh 


jrrent Actions 



ivention on the Inter-American Institute 
Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at 
ihington Mar. 6, 1979. Entered into force 
. 8, 1980. TIAS 9919. 
ification deposited: Dominican Republic, 
■. 4, 1982. 


ivention on the recognition and enforce- 
it of foreign arbitral awards. Done at 
V York June 10. 1958. Entered into force 
e 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. 
.S 6997. 
ession deposited: Yugoslavia, Feb. 26, 



tocol relating to an amendment to the 
vention on international civil aviation [to 
Russian as an authentic language of the 
vention] (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal 
t. 30, 1977.1 

ification deposited: U.S. Mar. 5, 1982. 
tocol relating to an amendment to the 
vention on international civil aviation 
icerning lease, charter, and interchange] 
(^S 1591). Done at Montreal Oct. 6, 1980.' 
.ifications deposited: Oman, Mar. 11, 1981; 
L, Mar. 16, 1981; Republic of Korea, 
-. 23, 1981; Hungary, May 27, 1981; 
liopia, June 25, 1981; Bulgaria, July 7, 
1; Egypt, Sept. 11, 1981; Barbados, 
. 5, 1981; Netherlands, Nov. 5, 1981; 
;., Feb. 15, 1982. 

ilogical Weapons 

ivention on the prohibition of the develop- 
nt, production, and stockpiling of 
teriological (biological) and toxin weapons 
I on their destruction. Done at 
.shington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 
'2. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. 
VS 8062. 
session deposited: Libya, Jan. 19, 1982. 

mmodities— Common Fund 

reement establishing the Common Fund 
Commodities, with schedules. Done at 

neva June 27, 1980.' 

;natures: Tunisia, Mar. 2, 1982; Kenya, 

,r. 10, 1982; Algeria, Mar. 15, 1982; Ugan- 
Mar. 19, 1982. 

tification deposited: Uganda, Mar. 19, 



nvention on the conservation of Antarctic 

irine living resources, with annex for an ar- 

ral tribunal. Done at Canberra May 20, 


tification deposited: New Zealand, Mar. 8, 


oclai med by the President: Mar. 29, 1982. 

itered into force: Apr. 7, 1982. 


Customs convention on the international 
transport of goods under cover of TIR 
carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 
1978; for the U.S. Mar. 18, 1982. 
Accession deposited: Republic of Korea, 
Jan. 29, 1982. 


Memorandum of understanding for coproduc- 
tion and sale of modular thermal imaging 
systems (MOD FLIR) and their components, 
with annex. Signed at Bonn, The Hague, and 
Washington, Feb. 12, May 21, and Dec. 22, 

1981. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1981. 
Signatures: F.R.G., Feb. 12, 1981; Nether- 
lands, May 21, 1981; U.S., Dec. 22, 1981. 

Education— UNESCO 

Convention on the recognition of studies, 
diplomas, and degrees concerning higher 
education in the states belonging to the 
Europe Region. Done at Paris, Dec. 21, 1979. 
Entered into force: Feb. 19, 1982.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Finland, Jan. 19, 
1982; U.S.S.R., Jan. 26, 1982. 

Human Rights 

International covenant on economic, social, 

and cultural rights. Adopted at New York 

Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 


Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, 

Mar. 17, 1982. 

International Monetary Fund 

Articles of agreement of the international 
monetary fund, formulated at Bretton Woods 
Conference July 1-22, 1944. Entered into 
force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signatures and acceptances: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Feb. 25, 1982; Belize, Mar. 16, 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed 
at Geneva Mar. 6, 1948. Entered into force 
Mar. 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 14, 1975. Enters into force May 22, 

1982, except for Art. 51 which enters into 
force July 28, 1982. 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 
Nov. 17, 1977.' 

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 
1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 

4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London 

Nov. 15, 1979.' 

Acceptances deposited: Nicaragua, Mar. 17, 


Amendment of article VII of the convention 
on the facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London 
Nov. 19, 1973.' 
Acceptance deposited: Israel, Feb. 17, 1982. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at 
New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force 
Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24. 1967. 
TIAS 6298. 
Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, 

Mar. 17, 1982. 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the 

accession of Spain. Done at Brussels Dec. 10, 


Acceptance deposited: U.K., Mar. 1, 1982. 

Approval deposited: Belgium, Mar. 18, 1982. 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: 

Mar. 16, 1982. 

Agreement to amend the protocol of 
signature to the agreement of Aug. 3, 1959, 
to supplement the agreement between the 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regard- 
ing the status of their forces with respect to 
foreign forces stationed in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, (TIAS 5351), as amend- 
ed by the agreement of Oct. 21, 1971 (TIAS 
7759). Signed at Bonn May 18, 1981.' 
Approval deposited: U.S., Mar. 8, 1982. 

Nuclear Material— Physical Protection 

Convention on the physical protection of 

nuclear material, with annexes. Done at 

Vienna Oct. 26, 1979.' 

Signatures: Czechoslovakia, Sept. 14, 1981; 

Korea, Dec. 29, 1981.^ 

Ratification deposited: Philippines, Sept. 21, 


Organization of American States 

Charter of the Organization of American 
States. Signed at Bogota Apr. 30, 1948. 
Entered into force Dec. 13, 1951. TIAS 2361. 

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (TIAS 
2361). Signed at Buenos Aires Feb. 27, 1967. 
Entered into force Feb. 27, 1970. TIAS 6847. 
Signature: The Bahamas, Mar. 3, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Mar. 3, 1982. 


Second addition protocol to the constitution 
of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 
1964, general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal conven- 
tion with final protocol and detailed regula- 
tions. Done at Lausanne Julv 5, 1974. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Ratification deposited; Laos. Jan. 11, 1982. 

General regulations of the Universal Postal 

ay 1982 



Union, with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final pro- 
tocol and detailed regulations. Done at Rio de 
Janeiro Oct. 26, 1979. Entered into force 
July 1, 1981, except for Art. 124 of the 
General Regulations which became effective 
Jan. 1, 1981. 
Approvals deposited: Mauritania, Feb. 23, 

1982; India, Feb. 24, 1982. 
Ratifications deposited: Libya, Feb. 1, 1982; 
Malaysia, Feb. 17, 1982; Democratic Republic 
of Korea, Feb. 24, 1982. 

Money orders and postal travellers' checks 
agreement with detailed regulations with 
final protocol. Done at Rio de Janeiro Oct. 
26, 1979. Entered into force July 1, 1981. 
Ratification deposited: Libya, Feb. 1, 


Approval deposited: Mauritania, Feb. 23, 


Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of 
all forms of racial discrimination. Adopted at 
New York Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force 
Jan. 4, 1969.2 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, Feb. 18, 


Notification of succession: Solomon Islands, 

Mar. 17, 1982. 

Red Cross 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 Aug. 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of international armed conflicts (protocol 
I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 
1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Norway, Dec. 14, 
1981;^ Korea, Jan. 15, 1982;^ Switzerland, 
Feb. 17, 1982.3.4 

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions 
of 12 Aug. 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363. 3364, 
3365), and relating to the protection of vic- 
tims of noninternational armed conflicts (pro- 
tocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. 
Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Norway, Dec. 14, 
1981; Korea, Jan. 15, 1982; Switzerland, 
Feb. 17, 1982. 


International natural rubber agreement, 
1979. Done at Geneva Oct. 6, 1979. Entered 
into force provisionally Oct. 23, 1980. 
Acceptances deposited: Netherlands, Feb. 25, 
1982; U.S.S.R., Feb. 26, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, Feb. 24, 


Satellite Communications System 

Convention on the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with an- 
nex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered 
into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605. 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, Dec. 15, 


Operating agreement on the International 
Maritime Satellite Organization 
(INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London 
Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 
1979. TIAS 9605. 
Signature: Sri Lanka, Dec. 15, 1981. 


Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation in an experimental satellite-aided 
search and rescue system, with annex. 
Signed at Ottawa, Washington, and Paris 
July 16 and 19, Aug. 27, 1979. Entered into 
force Aug. 27, 1979. 

Signatures: Canada, July 16, 1979, U.S., July 
19, 1979; France, Aug. 27, 1979. 

Understanding concerning cooperation in a 
joint experimental satellite-aided search and 
rescue project. Signed at Leningrad Nov. 23, 
1979. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1979. 
Signatures: U.S., Canada, France, U.S.S.R. 

Understanding concerning participation by 

Norway in an investigation of the demonstra- 
tion and evaluation of an experimental 
satellite-aided search and rescue system. 
Signed at Ottawa, Paris, Washington, and 
Oslo Sept. 25 and 30, Oct. 19, Nov. 13, 1981. 
Entered into force Nov. 13, 1981. 
Signatures: Canada, Sept. 25, 1981; 
France, Sept. 30, 1981, U.S., Oct. 19, 1981; 
Norway, Nov. 13, 1981. 


International telecommunication convention 
with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 
Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976. 
TIAS 8572. 
Accession deposited: Belize, Dec. 16, 1981. 

Radio regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva Dec. 6, 1979. 
Entered into force Jan. 1, 1982, except for 
(1) arts. 25, 66, and appendix 43 which 
entered into force Jan. 1, 1981, and (2) cer- 
tain provisions concerning aeronautical 
mobile service which shall enter into force 
Feb. 1, 1983. 
Approval deposited: India, Jan. 8, 1982. 


Convention on the prevention and punish- 
ment of crimes against internationally pro- 
tected persons, including diplomatic agents. 
Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered 
into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532. 
Accession deposited: Argentina, Mar. 18, 



Agreement on technical barriers to trade. 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616. 

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at 
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9620. 

International dairy arrangement. Done at 
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9623. 

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Don 
Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force 
Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9701. 

Agreement on import licensing procedure: 
Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered ii 
force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9788. 

Agreement on implementation of article ^ 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (antidumping code). Done at Genev 
Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 
1980. TIAS 9650. 

Agreement on interpretation and applicat 

of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the Ger 

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidit 

and countervailing duties). Done at Gene^ 

Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 


Acceptance: Egypt, Dec. 28, 1981.* 

Fifth certification of changes to schedule 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Ti 
Done at Geneva Aug. 7, 1981. 
Entered into force: Aug. 7, 1981. 


Vienna convention on the law of treaties, 
with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 196 
Entered into force Jan. 27, 1980.^ 
Ratification deposited: Uruguay. Mar. 5, 


International whaling convention and 
schedule of whaling regulations, as amen 
by the 1956 protocol (TIAS 4228). Done ; 
Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into f 
Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849. 
Notification of adherence: Monaco, Mar. 



Inter-American convention on the granti: 
political rights to women. Signed at Bog( 
May 2, 1948. Entered into force Apr. 22. 
1949; for the U.S. May 24. 1976. TIAS 8 
Signature: Suriname, Feb. 10, 1982. 
Ratification deposited: Suriname. Feb. K 

Convention on the elimination of all forn 
discrimination against women. Adopted ; 
New York Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into fi 
Sept. 3, 1981.2 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, Feb. 


Signature: Greece, Mar. 2, 1982. 

World Health Organization 

Constitution of the World Health Organi 
tion. Done at New York July 22, 1946. 
Entered into force Apr. 7, 1948. TIAS 1 
Acceptance deposited: Bhutan, Mar. 8, 1 



mdments to articles 24 and 25 of the 
stitution of the World Health Organiza- 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976, by 
Twenty-ninth World Health Assembly.' 
;ptances deposited: Democratic Republic 
orea. Mar. 2, 1982; Yemen (Sanaa), 
. 8, 1982. 

;ndment to article 74 of the Constitution 
le World Health Organization, as amend- 
^dopted at Geneva May 18, 1978, by the 
World Health Assembly.' 
;ptance deposited: Yemen (Sanaa), 
. 8, 1982. 

id Heritage 

vention concerning the protection of the 
Id cultural and natural heritage. Done at 
s Nov. 23, 1972. Entered into force 
, 17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
fication deposited: Malawi, Jan. 5, 1982. 



eement for sales of agricultural com- 
ities, with annexes and agreed minutes, 
led at Dacca Mar. 8, 1982. Entered into 
e Mar. 8, 1982. 

eement relating to the employment of 
indents of official government employees, 
jcted by exchange of notes at La Paz 
■. 5, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 5, 

ad a 

eement relating to the addition of annex 
sncerning the waters of DLxon entrance to 
joint marine pollution contingency plan 
nulgated pursuant to the agreement of 
e 19, 1974 (TIAS 7861, 8957). Effected by 
lange of notes at Ottawa Mar. 5 and 17, 
2. Entered into force Mar. 17, 1982. 

■eement amending the agreement of 
t. 17, 1980 (TIAS 9820), relating to trade 
otton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles 
textile products. Effected by exchange of 
srs at Washington Sept. 18, 1981. 
ered into force Sept. 18, 1981. 


radition treaty, with annex. Signed at 

shington Sept. 14, 1979. 

:ruments of ratification exchanged: 

•. 4, 1982. 

■ered into force: Mar. 4, 1982. 

claimed by the President: Mar. 25, 1982. 


■eement on the settlement of certain 
standing claims and financial issues, with 

annexes and related exchange of letters. 
Signed at Prague Jan. 29, 1982. Entered into 
force Feb. 2, 1982. 

Agreements amending the annexes to the 
agreement of Jan. 29. 1982, on the settle- 
ment of certain outstanding claims and finan- 
cial issues. Effected bv exchanges of notes at 
Prague Feb. 2 and Feb. 12, 1982. Entered in- 
to force Feb. 2 and 12, 1982. 


Agreement amending the memorandum of 
understanding of Jan. 15, 1976, on the par- 
ticipation of France in the international phase 
of ocean drilling of the deep sea drilling proj- 
ect (TIAS 8610, 9323). Signed at Paris and 
Washington Oct. 27, 1981 and Feb. 19. 1982. 
Entered into force Feb. 19, 1982. 


Memorandum of understanding for a joint 
program of demonstration of solar 
photovoltaic power in Gabon. Signed at 
Libreville Feb. 4, 1982. Entered into force 
Feb. 4, 1982. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9350, 
9566, 9758, 9844), relating to trade in cotton, 
wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile 
products. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington Aug. 13 and Sept. 9, 1981. 
Entered into force Sept. 9, 1981. 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Dec. 23, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9039, 9566, 
9758, 9844), relating to trade in cotton, wool, 
and manmade fiber textiles and textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Nov. 25 and 27, 1981. Entered 
into force Nov. 27, 1981. 

Memorandum of agreement on the transfer 
of prisoners of war/civilian internees. Signed 
at Seoul Feb. 12, 1982. Entered into force 
Feb. 12, 1982. 


Agreement for scientific cooperation on 
alcohol-related problems. Signed at 
Washington Mar. 11, 1982. Entered into 
force Mar. 11, 1982. 

Agreement extending the agreement of 
July 31, 1970, as amended and extended 
(TIAS 6941, 7927), for a cooperative 
meteorological observation program in Mex- 
ico. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico 
and Tlateloleo Feb. 3 and 19, 1982. Entered 
into force Feb. 19, 1982; effective 
Feb. 1, 1982. 

Multinational Force and Observers 

Agreement relating to participation of United 
States military and civilian personnel in the 
multinational force and observers established 
by Egypt and Israel, with annexes and 
agreed minute, and related exchanges of let- 
ters. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Mar. 26, 1982. Entered into 
force Mar. 26, 1982. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles 
and textile products, with annexes. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 9 
and 11, 1982. Entered into force Mar. 11, 

Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 
9551, 9661, 9804), relating to trade in cotton 
textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Washington Sept. 4 and 10, 1981. Entered in- 
to force Sept. 10, 1981. 


Agreement amending the agreement of 
Jan. 28, 1965 (TIAS 5858), for financing cer- 
tain educational exchange programs. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Lima Nov. 23, 1981, 
and Jan. 19, 1982. Entered into force 
Jan. 19, 1982. 


Agreement extending the memorandum of 
understanding of Feb. 27, 1979 (TIAS 9731), 
on scientific and technological cooperation. 
Effected by exchange of letters at Bucharest 
and Washington Jan. 14 and Feb. 26, 1982. 
Entered into force Feb. 26, 1982. 

St. Lucia 

Arrangement relating to radio communica- 
tions between amateur stations on behalf of 
third parties. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Bridgetown and Castries Aug. 10, 1981, 
and Feb. 17, 1982. Entered into force ■ 
Mar. 19, 1982. 

Saudi Arabia 

Memorandum of understanding concerning 
the Saudi Arabian national guard medical 
services project. Signed at Riyadh, Aug. 24, 
1981. Entered into force Aug. 24, 1981. 


Agreement amending the agreements of 
Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 
9214, 9610, 9719, 9774, 9817, 9958), and 
Aug. 21, 1981, as amended, relating to trade 
in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles 
and textile products. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Geneva Dec. 18, 1981. Entered into 
force Dec. 18, 1981. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and 
rescheduling of payments due under P.L. 480 
title I agricultural commodity agreements, 
with annexes. Signed at Ankara Nov. 25, 

1981. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1981. 

Implementing agreement regarding the con- 
solidation and rescheduling of certain debts 
owed to the Agency for International 
Development. Signed at Ankara Jan. 22, 

1982. Entered into force Jan. 22, 1982. 

'Not in force. 
^Not in force for the U.S. 
^With reservation(s). 
^With declarations. 
'Subject to ratification. ■ 

ly 1982 



March 1982 

March 1 

U.S. announces U.S. observer delegation to 
the El Salvador elections to be held March 
28. The delegation will be headed by Senator 
Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kansas) and will include 
Congressmen Robert Livingston 
(R-Louisiana) and John P. Murtha 
(D-Pennsylvania): Everett Briggs, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs; Father Theodore 
Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame Univer- 
sity; Clark Kerr, President Emeritus of the 
University of California at Berkeley; and 
election specialists Richard Scammon and 
Howard Penniman. 

March 2 

By a vote of 94 to 0, U.S. Senate passes a 
resolution calling on the Polish Government 
to release Lech Walesa. 

March 6 

Secretary Haig and Mexican Foreign 
Minister Jorge Castaneda de la Rosa meet in 
New York to review a number of bilateral 
issues related to the region which includes 
President Lopez Portillo's proposal on the 
Central American crisis and President 
Reagan's Caribbean Basin initiative. 

March 7 

Guatemala holds elections to choose a Presi- 
dent, Vice President, members of congress, 
and municipal officials. 

F.R.G. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher makes official working visit to 
Washington, D.C. March 7-9 to continue 
high-level U.S. -German discussions with 
Secretary Haig. Discussions focus on prep- 
arations for the NATO summit in Bonn. 
While here, the Foreign Minister also calls on 
the President and meets with leading 
members of the Administration and Members 
of Congress. 

March 9 

Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre makes 
official working visit to Washington, D.C. 
March 9-14. 

Fourth ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue is held at 
State Department March 9-11. Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Anthony C. Albrecht heads U.S. 

In Guatemala, results of the elections 
show that the Government's candidate. Gen. 
Angel Aribal Guevara wins and is to take of- 
fice July 1. 

March 10 

President Reagan signs a March 4 resolution 
adopted by Congress and issues a proclama- 
tion designating March 21 as U.S. 

Afghanistan Day to commemorate the valor 
of the Afghan people and to condemn the 
continuing Soviet presence in that country. 

State Department issues a public state- 
ment on Libya to "prohibit imports of Libyan 
oil into the U.S. and to ban selected exports 
of U.S. origin items to Libya." 

By a vote of 19 to 13 (10 abstentions, 1 
nonparticipation) U.N. Human Rights Com- 
mission adopts a resolution on Poland calling 
"for an end of measures restricting human 
rights and fundamental freedom, release of 
prisoners detained without charge and a 
review of sentences proposed under martial 

March 12 

French President Francois Mitterrand and 
Foreign Minister Cheysson make official 
working visit to Washington, D.C. to hold 
discussions with President Reagan and 
Secretary Haig. 

March 14 

Foreign Ministers of Canada (Secretary of 
State for External Affairs Mark MacGuigan); 
Mexico (Jorge Castaneda de la Rosa); 
Venezuela (Velasco Jose Alberto Zambrano); 
Colombia (Carlos Lemos Simmonds); and 
Secretary Haig and Ambassador William E. 
Brock (U.S. Trade Representative) meet in 
New York March 14-15 to review results of 
the July 11, 1981, consultations begun at 
Nassau regarding an initiative to stimulate 
economic and social development in the 
Caribbean Basin area. 

Following the meeting, a joint communi- 
que is issued endorsing President Reagan's 
plan for development; expressing "deep 
satisfaction" with ongoing cooperation in the 
area; welcoming the decision by other area 
governments to actively participate; express- 
ing satisfaction that "other countries were 
participating in the development process," 
and concluding that the Nassau effort had 
been "successful in focusing greater attention 
on the critical need for increased economic 
development assistance, cooperation and 
coordination in the Caribbean Basin area." 
The Ministers agree to continue consultations 
with other governments and to meet again in 
August in Caracas, Venezuela to jointly ex- 
amine progress achieved. 

Under Secretary Buckley, along with 
senior officials from the Departments of the 
Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and the Na- 
tional Security Council staff visits Bonn, Lon- 
don, Paris, Rome, and Brussels March 13-19 
for talks with allied government officials and 
the Commission of the European Community. 
The talks focused on East-West economic 

March 16 

Irish Prime Minister Charles J. Haughey 
makes official working visit to Washington, 
D.C. March 16-17. 

March 19 

Belgium becomes fifth NATO member cou 
try to deposit an instrument of ratification 
the protocol inviting Spain to join the NAT 

Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshio 
Sakurauchi makes official visit to the U.S. 
and to Washington, D.C. March 20-24 for 
meetings with President Reagan, Secretar 
Haig, and other members of the Administ: 
tion and Congress. 

March 21 

International Afghanistan Day— a day 
celebrated in recognition of the Afghan 
peoples struggle to reclaim their freedom 
from Soviet occupation, and a demonstrat 
of support by people— nationwide and 
worldwide— for the principles of freedom 
national independence. 

March 22 

State Department releases a report on 
"Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and 
Afghanistan." The study, based on inforn- 
tion from a variety of sources compiled ai 
analyzed over the years, presents evidenc 
through January 1982, of chemical warfa] 
activities in Laos. Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan and examines Soviet involve 
ment in those activities. 

March 23 

The government of Guatemalan Presideni 
Gen. Fer^iando Romeo Lucas Garcia is ov 
thrown by dissident army officers who de 
nounce the March 7 elections as "fraudule 
and who assert that the elections were 
"manipulated" in order to assure victory 
Gen. Angel Anibal Guevara, the 
government's candidate. A three-man jun 
set up headed by retired Gen. Efrain Rio: 
Montt. Lucas' term was scheduled to end 
July 1. 

March 24 

Italian President Sandro Pertini makes a 
State visit to the U.S. March 24 through 
April 1, and to Washington, D.C. 
March 24-27. 

The 4-month-old civilian government 
President Abdus Sattar is overthrown in 
bloodless coup led by Bangladesh's Army 
Chief Lt. Gen. Mohammed Ershad who 
suspends the country's constitution, prod n 
martial law, and names himself martial-la 

The U.N. Security Council meets at t 
request of Arab States to begin debate ui.l 
violence occurring on the West Bank. 

March 25 

Foreign Ministers of three countries of tl 
Central American Democratic Communit;- 
Costa Rica (Bernd Niehaus); El Salvador 
(Fidel Chavez Mena); and Honduras (Edg"( 
Paz Barnica); and Secretary Haig— mt-ft , 
Washington to discuss the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's Caribbean Basin initiative . 


Department of State Bulleli 


as general developments i