Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

See other formats 


B0ST01>3 

PUBLIC 

LIBRARY 


Superintendent  of  Docunnents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 

Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

375 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  in  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Depuriitteni 


bulletin 


ie  Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2073 

April  1983 


C<^  a^e*t 


^w<«»^t-5»*r ^^/ »•*<<  Ato'r 


^  11^  ^^e^^^  I 


•%t,Aty  ^^.^^^jJ  ^J^Ay^J^-rf^-y^ 


X  P^^^^^^*>^.  '?e^..J~£:4^  Jy  <^^^*^ f^'A^-^^'^^"*'^ 


^i.tcyyt 


If, I  ej^y^a-^-^  t-^^     /^^-t.^^e,*^^x^'- 


<z 


m  'fy  "f^'/fM^  '-'^  .^'  L  '-v///        ^"  ^ -^ 


The  U.S. 

and  Sweden: 

An  Enduring  Friendship  /  1 


Departntpnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2073  /  April  1983 


Cover: 

Copy  of  last  page  of  U.S.-Swedish  Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Commerce,  signed  in  Paris  on 
April  3,  1783. 

(Courtesy  National  Archives) 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affairs 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  tliis  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  OF  State  Bulletin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  L 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D.C. 


CONTENTS 


FEATURE 

1        The  U.S.  and  Sweden:  An  Enduring  Friendship  {Janie^  Edward  Miller) 


President 

Peace.and  National  Security 

The  Trade  Challenge  for  the 
1980s 

Strategic  Importance  of  El  Salva- 
dor and  Central  America 

News  Conference  of  February  16 
(Excerptfi) 

i  Secretary 

J  Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  National 
Interests 

1  Question-and-Answer  Session 

'      Following  Atlanta  Address 

I  The  U.S.  and  East  Asia:  A  Part- 
nership for  the  Future 
Question-and-Answer  Session 

Following  San  Francisco  Address 
Strengthening  Democracy  in 
Central  America 

I  American  Principles  and  Foreign 
Policy 

1   Interview  on  "This  Week  With 

i      David  Brinkley" 

I   Project  Democracy 

ka 

The  Search  for  Regional  Security 
in  Southern  Africa  {Chester  A. 
Crocker) 

Our  Development  Dialogue  With 
Africa  {Chester  A.  Crocker) 

ris  Control 

Ensuring  Security  in  the  Nuclear 
Age  {Kenneth  W.  Dam) 
I    ACDA  Annual  Report  {Message  to 
I       the  Congress) 


East  Asia 

63        Developing  an  Enduring  Relation- 
ship With  China  {Paul  Wolfowitz) 

Europe 

65  U.S.  Relations  With  Europe 

and  Ties  to  NATO  {Richard  Burt) 

66  Poland's  Debt  {Department  State- 

ment) 

67  12th  Report  on  Cyprus  {Message 

to  the  Congress) 

69  Visit  of  Austrian  Chancellor 

Kreisky  {President  Reagan, 
Bruno  Kreisky) 

70  Visit  of  Norwegian  Prime 

Minister  Willoch  {President 
Reagan,  Kaare  Willoch) 

71  Visit  of  Queen  Elizabeth  II  {Queen 

Elizabeth  II.  President  Reagan) 


Human  Rights 

73        \ 


KiKhts  I'rogres 
\ny  (Elli„ft  Ahi 


in  El 
ns) 


International  Law 

74        r  S.-lr:iii  Claims  Tribunal:  Recent 
l)vyv\n]mv<ns  {James  H.Michel} 

Military  Affairs 

77        Yelli.w  Rain:  The  Arms  Control 
Implications  {Lawrence  S. 
Ka,,lch„r,rr) 


Nuclear  Policy 

79        U.S.  Completes  Assessment  of 
IAEA  {Richard  T.  Kennedy) 


United  Nations 

81         Liliya  {.lca,ir.J.  Kirkjialnrk) 

81  L;.S.  I'articipation  in  the  UN, 

1981  {Message  to  the  Congress) 

82  Funding  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Pre- 

paratorv  Commi.ssion  {President 
Reagan] 


Western  Hemisphere 

83  Aiiiliassa.lur  Himcn  Interviewed 

on  "This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  {Deane  R.  Hinton) 

84  Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  Inter- 

viewed on  "Meet  the  Press" 
{Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick) 

87  El  Salvador  Announces  Peace 

Commission  {Department 

88  CaniaK'an  llasm  Initiative  Legis- 

lation (President  Reagan.  Message 
to  the  Cangress) 

89  Radio  Broadcasting  to  Cuba 

{Prpartmcit  Statement) 

Treaties 

90  Current  Actions 

Chronology 

92        Friiruarv  1983 


Press  Releases 

92  Department  of  Slate 

93  U.S.UN 


Publications 

94        DepartimMit  of  State 


smess 


Department  of  State  Activities  in 
the  Private  Sector  Area 


•partment 

!     Foreign  Policy  Planning  Council 

Members  Announced  {Secretary 
'■       Shultz) 


Pacific 

80 


Index 


I'alau  Approves  Free  Association 

With  the  U.S. 
U.S. -Micronesia  Plebiscite 


EDITOR'S  NOTE 

The  article  "Armenian  Terrorism:  A  Profile,"  which  appeared  in  the  August  1982 
issue  of  the  Bulletin,  and  its  accompanying  note  and  footnotes  were  not  intended 
as  statements  of  policy  of  the  United  States.  Nor  did  they  represent  any  change  in 
U.S.  policy. 


^ 


////  CUfz/h/hj.  r/.  lA '////( '/}/u  v:^t  A...  S^:  t/i^W 


cX'a*//t,rtA-c.    -'/^NUru,,  r.A.   (':<„,,„„„./, 
i  y,/tf/ .  ).f!f//r/yu-  A/-/.r,,  'J^y   W/^jh/ 

Copy  of  the  first  page  of  the  instrument  of  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Amity  and  Commerce 

exchanged  on  February  6,  1784.  (Courtesy  National  Archives) 


I 


FEATURE 


The  U.S. 

and  Sweden: 

An  Enduring  Friendship 

by  James  Edward  Miller 


A  he  treaty  of  amity 
and  commerce  signed 
by  the  United  States 
and  Sweden  on  April 
3,  1783,  was  the  first 
between  the  newly  in- 
dependent American 
Republic  and  a  Euro- 
pean neutral  state. 
Recognition  by  Sweden 
of  American  independ- 
ence facilitated  the 
establishment  of 
diplomatic  relations 
with  most  of  the  other 
European  states.  Conn- 


menting  on  the  treaty, 
John  Adams  stated: 
'The  King  of  Sweden 
has  done  the  United 
States  [a]  great  honor 
in  his  commission 
.  ...  by  insisting  that 
he  has  a  great  desire 
for  connexion  with 
States  which  had  so 
fully  established  their 
independence  and  by 
their  wise  and  gallant 
conduct  so  well  de- 
served it. " 


983 


Sweden  and 

the  American  Revolution 


M.   oUowing  the  outbreak  of  the  war  for 
independence  in  1775,  Sweden,  although 
officially  a  neutral  power,  showed  a 
strong  sympathy  for  the  American 
cause.  Before  the  Revolution  all  Swedish 
trade  with  the  Colonies  had  to  pass 
through  England  and  was  subject  to 
high  customs  duties.  American  in- 
dependence offered  the  prospect  for 
direct  and  less  costly  trade  between 
Sweden  and  the  United  States.  Mer- 
chants from  both  countries  eagerly  ex- 
ploited this  opportunity,  and  the  volume 
of  trade  between  the  two  nations  rose 
dramatically  during  the  Revolutionary 
War. 

Sweden's  brilliant  and  dynamic 
King,  Gustav  III,  was  eager  to 
reestablish  his  nation  in  the  great  power 
role  it  had  played  prior  to  1718.  Support 
for  the  American  colonists  permitted  the 
King  to  cooperate  with  Sweden's  closest 
ally,  France,  and  simultaneously  under- 
cut a  major  commercial  rival,  the  United 
Kingdom.  The  King  also  hoped  to  gain  a 
trading  colony  in  the  West  Indies.  More- 
over, Gustav  genuinely  admired  the 
American  patriots  and  their  struggle  for 
independence.  The  King  granted  leaves 
of  absence  for  a  number  of  Swedish  of- 
ficers to  serve  with  the  Colonial  Armies 
and  French  Navy.  More  than  one 
American  diplomat  in  Europe  gratefully 
reported  back  to  the  Continental  Con- 
gress on  the  moral  and  practical 
assistance  they  received  from  Sweden 
during  the  war  years,  and  Swedish  ports 
became  a  safehaven  for  Colonial  mer- 
chant ships  seeking  to  avoid  capture  by 
the  British  Navy. 

After  France  entered  the  war  on  the 
side  of  the  United  States  in  1778, 
Sweden  took  an  even  more  active  role  in 
assisting  the  Colonies.  When  the  British 
attempted  to  cut  off  all  trade  between 
Europe  and  the  rebellious  Colonies  by 
unleashing  full-scale  privateering,  the 
Swedish  Government  issued  so  strong  a 
protest  that  one  British  minister  called 
it  indistinguishable  from  a  declaration  of 


war.  Sweden  also  was  one  of  the  north- 
ern European  powers  that  responded 
favorably  to  the  appeal  in  February  1780 
by  Catherine  II  of  Russia  for  the 
establishment  of  a  League  of  Armed 
Neutrality.  Sweden  enforced  its  neutral- 
ity through  a  system  of  heavily  pro- 
tected convoys.  By  1782  almost  all  the 
neutral  states  of  Europe  had  joined  the 
Armed  Neutrality,  undermining  Britain's 
ability  to  wage  a  two-front  war  and 
challenging  its  control  of  the  seas  and  its 
leadership  in  trade.  The  free  passage  of 
neutral  merchant  shipping  to  and  from 
the  Colonies  together  with  the  ability  of 
American  seamen  to  avoid  the  British 
Navy  defeated  the  blockade  and  the 
privateering  campaign. 


First  Approaches 


JLA.lthough  Sweden  aided  the  Colonies, 
no  formal  diplomatic  relations  existed 
between  the  two  states.  When  the 
British  used  French  recognition  of 
American  independence  as  its  caus^is 
belli  in  1778,  the  Swedes,  seeking  to 
avoid  a  war,  refrained  from  a  similar 
act.  After  the  surrender  of  Lord  Corn- 
wallis'  army  at  Yorktown  on  October  18, 
1781,  British  political  leadership  slowly 
reconciled  itself  to  the  loss  of  the  Col- 
onies and,  in  April  1782,  opened  secret 
peace  talks  with  the  American  repre- 
sentative in  Paris,  Benjamin  Franklin. 

The  Swedish  Government  had 
already  decided  that  it  should  establish 
permanent  diplomatic  ties  with  the 
American  Republic.  In  late  March  Count 
Gustav  Creutz,  the  Swedish  Ambassador 
to  France,  approached  Franklin  to  ask  if 
he  had  powers  from  the  Continental 
Congress  to  conclude  a  treaty  of  amity 
with  Sweden.  After  Franklin  replied  af- 
firmatively, Creutz  stated  that  King 
Gustav  III  wished  to  conclude  a  treaty 
and  noted  that  Sweden  was  the  first 
neutral  European  power  to  offer 
recognition  to  the  United  States.  The 


Swedes,  however,  washed  to  keep  tl 
negotiations  secret  for  fear  of  Briti 
reaction.  Swedish  caution  on  this  pt 
delayed  the  completion  of  a  treaty  : 
over  a  year  but  was  well  founded. 

Although  serious  fighting  in  the 
United  States  ceased  after  Yorktow 
the  war  still  raged  in  Europe.  Each 
the  powers  which  allied  with  the  Ui 
States  against  the  United  Kingdom 
entered  the  war  to  achieve  its  own 
political  objectives.  France  wanted    ' 
reduce  British  power  by  depriving   ; 
United  Kingdom  of  its  most  valuab 
Colonies.  Spain  wanted  to  break  th 
British  hold  on  the  western  Medite  :■ 
nean  by  recapturing  the  fortress  of 
Gibraltar.  In  order  to  concentrate  I  ii 
forces  for  the  defense  of  their  Eur(  a 
interests  the  British  were  willing  t(  i 
with  their  American  Colonies. 

The  Marquis  de  LaFayette,  wh  U 
recently  returned  from  service  witl  hi 
Continental  Army,  approached  Cre  ! 
shortly  after  the  latter's  meeting  w  i 
Franklin.  LaFayette  had  a  commis  i 
from  the  Continental  Congress  to  j  ■■ 
mote  a  peace  settlement.  He  also  e 
joyed  the  confidence  of  the  French 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count ! 
Vergennes.  Unaware  of  Creutz's  e<  ie 
talks  with  Franklin  and  acting  on 
Vergennes  instructions,  LaFayette 
urged  that  the  Swedes  open  negoti  lOi 
with  the  United  States  with  the  ob  ;t 
granting  it  full  diplomatic  recogniti  i. 

Spurred  by  this  request,  Creut:  ne 
with  Franklin  on  the  following  day 
April  22,  1782,  and  offered  a  treat.)! 
amity  and  commerce.  Franklin  rep  d 
enthusiastically,  telling  Creutz  thate 
would  immediately  inform  Congres  of 
this  offer  and  again  promising  to  k  p 
the  matter  secret.  Creutz  then  met  nl 
Vergennes  and  informed  him  of  th' 
Swedish  initiative.  Vergennes  was  |Ui 
ly  pleased  but  cautioned  Creutz  to  fCf 
the  approach  a  secret  from  the  Bri  ih 
Government.  France  had  achieved  > 
political  objectives  in  its  war  with  ji- 
tain  and  with  its  treasury  bankrupva 
now  seeking  a  quick  peace  settlemi  t. 
Spain  continued  to  resist  peace  tal  as 
long  as  it  believed  it  could  recover 
Gibraltar.  Announcement  of  Swedf  s 
pact  with  the  United  States  could  <  ly 
complicate  French  diplomatic  effor'to 
end  the  conflict. 


Department  of  State  Btbti 


FEATURE 

The  U.S. 

and  Sweden: 

An  Enduring  Friendship 


"^^^^S^^ 


Gustav  III: 
Enlightened  Monarch 


Gustav  III  (1746-92)  gave  his  name  to  a 
glittering  era  of  Swedish  history.  During 
his  reign  from  1771-1792,  Swedish  arts 
and  crafts  reached  their  high  points.  His 
court,  like  those  of  Prussia  and  Russia, 
nurtured  the  culture  of  the  French 
Enlightenment.  The  King  was  a  man  of 
immense  personal  talent  and  widerang- 
ing  interests,  including  a  passion  for 
theater. 

As  a  statesman,  Gustav  was  a  model 
enlightened  despot.  In  1772,  he  staged  a 
coup  against  the  aristocratic  parties 
which  ruled  Sweden  and  centralized  all 
powers  in  his  own  hands.  Gustav 
energetically  reformed  the  legal  and 
fiscal  systems  of  Sweden,  extended 
religious  toleration,  suppressed  corrup- 
tion within  the  bureaucracy,  and  em- 
barked on  large-scale  public  works  pro- 
grams. He  also  curtailed  freedom  of  the 
press  and  weakened  representative  in- 
stitutions. 

Despite  his  absolutism,  Gustav 
greatly  admired  the  courage  of 
American  patriots  and  provided  them 
with  moral  and  material  support  in  the 
war  for  independence.  On  March  16, 
1792,  he  was  shot  during  a  masked  ball 
at  the  opera  in  Stockholm  and  died  13 
days  later.  His  tragic  end  provided 
Giuseppi  Verdi  with  the  inspiration  for 
the  opera  "Un  Ballo  in  Maschera."  ■ 


{Courtesy  Embassy  of  Swei 


Waiting  on  Peace 

^J  ecause  of  his  concern  with  the 
British  reaction  to  disclosure  of  the  pro- 
posed treaty,  Creutz  planned  to 
negotiate  at  a  slow  pace,  awaiting  the 
completion  of  peace  treaties  recognizing 
American  independence,  before  signing 
an  agreement  with  the  United  States. 
As  further  insurance  against  premature 
disclosure,  Creutz  would  only  discuss  the 
proposed  treaty  orally. 

Creutz  could  also  count  on  long 
delays  in  communications  between 
Franklin  and  the  Continental  Congress 
to  slow  the  pace  of  negotiations.  It  was 
September  19,  1782,  before  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  appointed  a  three-man 
committee  consisting  of  Arthur  Lee, 
Ralph  Izard,  and  James  Duane  to  draft 
a  treaty  with  Sweden  and  prepare 
negotiating  instructions  for  Franklin.  On 
September  28  the  committee  reported 
back  with  a  draft  treaty  and  instructions 
based  largely  on  the  treaty  of  amity  and 
commerce  with  the  Netherlands  which 
would  be  signed  on  October  8,  1782.  In 
addition  to  recognizing  the  United 
States  and  establishing  friendly  relations 
between  the  two  states,  the  treaty  pro- 
vided equal  access  for  American  and 
Swedish  merchants  to  the  other  state's 
markets,  and  set  out  the  protections 
which  each  state  would  provide  the 
citizens  of  the  other.  These  instructions 
were  immediately  sent  to  Franklin. 

On  November  9,  1782,  Robert  Liv- 
ingston, the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs of  the  Congress,  wrote  Franklin 
urging  quick  action  on  the  treaty.  Liv- 
ingston told  Franklin  that  "We  are  much 
flattered  by  the  proposals  of  Sweden," 
which  would  widen  the  scope  of  foreign 
recognition  of  American  independence 
and  add  weight  to  the  forces  driving  the 
United  Kingdom  "to  acknowledge  us 
foreign  and  independent." 

By  November  1782  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  United 
Kingdom  on  a  preliminary  peace  treaty 
were  well  advanced,  and  the  Swedish 
Government  also  wanted  to  speed  up  the 
negotiations  on  the  treaty.  The  Swedish 
foreign  office,  on  November  21, 
authorized  Creutz  to  sign  a  treaty  with 


the  United  States.  British  and  American 
negotiators  signed  a  preliminary  peace 
and  requested  ratification  by  their 
governments  on  November  30.  On 
December  14  Franklin  and  Creutz  ex- 
changed the  documents  which  granted 
them  power  to  act  for  their  govern- 
ments in  completing  a  treaty. 

The  Swedes,  however,  continued  to 
pace  their  negotiations  with  Spanish, 
French,  and  British  discussions  on  a 
preliminary  peace  in  Europe.  On 
December  24,  Franklin  reported  to 
Livingston  that  after  a  number  of  con- 
ferences on  the  treaty,  Creutz  had 
suspended  the  talks  pending  new  in- 
structions from  his  government. 
Gustav  III  approved  Creutz's  view  that 
the  wisest  course  for  Sweden  was  to 
delay  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  until  the  signature  of  the 
preliminary  peace  among  the  European 
powers  removed  recognition  as  a  caitsus 
belli  with  the  United  Kingdom.  On 


January  16,  1783,  as  European  peac, 
negotiations  entered  their  last  stage, 
Gustav  instructed  his  ambassador  tl  | 
view  of  the  "high  importance"  of  thf , 
negotiations  with  the  United  States  , 
Creutz  should  take  no  further  actioi , 
until  he  received  specific  instruction 
However,  Creutz  acted  before  he  re 
ed  the  King's  orders. 


Signature 

and  Ratification 


^  n  early  February  Creutz  decidec 
that  the  time  had  come  to  conclude 
treaty  with  the  United  States.  On 
January  20,  1783,  France  and  Spain 
finally  came  to  terms  with  the  Unita 


U.S.  Ambassador  to  Sweden 


Franklin  S.  Forsberg  holds  a  B.S.  in 
economics,  an  M.B.A.  in  foreign  trade,  a 
an  honorary  Doctor  of  Laws  degree.  He  i 
the  recipient  of  the  U.S.  Distinguished  T 
ice  Medal;  the  Order  of  the  British  Empij 
the  Royal  Order  of  Vasa  from  the  Swedi 
Kmg;  and  several  awards  from  the  publii 
mdustry. 

Before  his  appointment  as  U.S.  Am- 
bassador to  Sweden  in  December  1981, 1 
was  President  of  Forsberg  Associates,  Ir 
New  York  organization  consulting  in  ( 
niunication  matters  with  newspapers, 
magazines,  books,  radio,  and  television  o 
panies.  He  was  also  Executive  Vice  Pres 
and  Director  of  Holt,  Rinehart,  &  Winsti: 
publisher  of  Field  and  Stream  magazine  i 
four  other  periodicals;  publisher  and  boa 
member  of  Popular  Mechanics  Publishin; 
Company  and  Street  and  Smith  Pul>lishii 
Company,  Inc.;  and  publisher  ol  Mudi  m: 
and  Charm  magazines. 

During  World  War  II,  Ambassador 
Forsberg  created  Yank  and  reactivateil ,'  - 
and  Stripes  for  distribution  to  U.S.  troo[ 
throughout  the  world.   ■ 


Department  of  State  Bull  i" 


FEATURE 

The  U.S. 

and  Sweden: 

An  Enduring  Friendship 


lom.  The  three  powers,  together 
U.S.  representatives,  also  signed  an 
tice  agreement  which  ended  the 
ng  in  Europe  and  formalized  the 
-fire  which  had  been  in  effect  in  the 
d  States  since  October  1781.  On 
lary  5,  1783,  Creutz  and  Franklin 
d  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce 
fier  with  a  separate  article  limiting 
aration  of  the  treaty  to  15  years, 
negotiators  agreed  to  keep  the 
I  secret  until  they  could  exchange 
;ations. 

reutz  received  Gustav's  instructions 
)llowing  day,  and  immediately 
ted  to  Stockholm  that  he  had 
iy  signed  the  treaty.  Explaining  his 
1,  Creutz  noted  that  in  a  recent 
ige  to  parliament.  King  George  III 
tated  that  U.S.  sovereignty  would 
ly  recognized  as  soon  as  the  final 
treaty  was  signed.  Since  other 
rs  were  lining  up  to  grant  recogni- 
.nd  establish  commercial  and 
natic  ties,  Creutz  felt  that  Sweden 
d  firmly  establish  itself  in  the 
Tide  of  the  new  republic  by  being 
rst  neutral  to  grant  it  recognition. 
;z  then  met  wth  Franklin  and  ex- 
ed  the  predicament  in  which 
iv's  instructions  placed  him. 
din,  recognizing  that  cooperation 
1  win  more  for  the  American  cause 
aggrieved  protestations,  im- 
itely  agreed  to  destroy  the  original 
y  and  sign  another  which  would  re- 
undated  until  after  the  ratification 
3  preliminary  peace  between  the 
■d  States  and  United  Kingdom.  The 
"ican  representative  also  agreed  to 
a  public  signing  of  yet  another  copy 
fe  treaty  at  a  later  date  and  to  con- 
to  keep  the  existence  of  the  agree- 
!  a  secret  until  that  time.  In  return, 
Iklin  asked  that  the  public  ceremony 
j-ld  as  soon  as  possible  after  the 
ng  of  the  preliminary  peace  treaty 
iig  the  European  powers. 
;ormal  ratification  of  the  treaty 
-A  on  events  in  the  United 
Horn.  On  February  14,  King  George 
nrmally  declared  the  termination  of 
titles  by  the  British  Government, 
bver,  Lord  Shelburne's  ministry  fell 
''<"  a  severe  parliamentary  attack  on 
jaary  20,  and  Lord  North  returned 


to  power.  Charles  Fox,  an  early  propo- 
nent of  American  independence,  took 
over  the  foreign  office,  and  the  new 
government  pledged  only  to  seek 
modifications  in  the  preliminary  peace 
with  the  United  States.  Creutz  decided 
he  could  proceed  with  the  signature  of 
the  treaty  and  on  March  2,  1783, 
reported  that  he  would  immediately  set 
a  date  for  the  formal  signature  of  the 
treaty.  He  and  Franklin  then  dated  the 
earlier  signed  copies  of  the  treaty  and 
sent  them  to  their  respective  govern- 
ments for  ratification.  The  formal  sign- 
ing ceremony  took  place  in  Paris  on 
April  3,  1783.  During  the  ceremony, 
Creutz  informed  Franklin  that  Sweden 
was  favorably  disposed  to  the  ideas  of  a 
special  reduction  of  its  port  duties  in 
favor  of  American  shipping. 

Shortly  after  the  signature  of  the 


treaty,  Creutz  was  recalled  to  Stockholm 
to  become  foreign  minister.  His  replace- 
ment. Baron  de  Stael,  informed  Franklin 
that  he  had  received  Sweden's  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  on  June  12,  1783. 
Franklin,  meanwhile,  was  reaping  the 
diplomatic  rewards  of  American  military 
and  political  success  as  other  neutral 
states  lined  up  to  negotiate  recognition 
and  commercial  treaties.  The  Swedish 
treaty  served  as  the  model  for  these  set- 
tlements. 

On  July  29,  1783,  the  Continental 
Congress  took  up  and  speedily  approved 
the  Swedish  treaty.  Instructions  sent  to 
Franklin  that  same  day  authorized  him 
to  deliver  the  U.S.  ratification  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  the  Swedes.  Franklin  ex- 
changed ratifications  with  Baron  de 
Stael  on  February  6,  1784. 


Ambassador  to  the  United  States 


Count  Wilhelm  Wachtmeister  was  bom  in 
1923.  Upon  completion  of  his  law  studies  in 
1946,  he  began  his  career  in  the  Swedish 
Foreign  Ministry.  His  first  assignments  sent 
him  to  Vienna,  Madrid,  and  Lisbon. 

During  the  mid-1950s.  Ambassador 
Wachtmeister  was  stationed  in  Moscow  for  3 
years  and  was  a  personal  assistant  to  U.N. 
Secretary  General  Dag  Hammarskjold 
(1958-61).  Following  5  years  in  Stockholm  as 
head  of  the  U.N.  section  of  the  Foreign 
Ministry,  he  was  named  Ambassador  to 
Algeria.  After  a  year  in  Algeria,  he  was 
recalled -to  Stockholm  to  take  the  position  as 
head  of  the  Political  Department.  He  was  ap- 
pointed Ambassador  to  the  United  States  in 
May  1974.  ■ 


Gustav  Philip  Creutz: 
Poet  and  Diplomat 


Count  Gustav  Creutz  (1731-85),  scholar, 
linguist,  and  poet,  was  also  one  of 
Sweden's  most  successful  diplomats. 
Creutz  began  his  diplomatic  career  in 
1764  as  Minister  to  Spain.  After  his  ap- 
prenticeship at  Madrid,  the  Swedish 
Government  nominated  Creutz  Minister 
to  France  in  1766.  Thoroughly  steeped 
in  the  culture  of  the  French  Enlighten- 
ment, Creutz  won  the  admiration  and 
trust  of  Kings  Louis  XV  and  Louis  XVI 
and  the  affection  of  Voltaire.  In  the 
1760s  he  repaired  Sweden's  damaged 
relations  with  France  and  was  promoted 
to  full  ambassador  for  his  achievements. 
During  the  American  Revolution,  Creutz 
managed  to  keep  those  relations  in  good 
repair  despite  Sweden's  refusal  to  join 
France  in  a  war  against  the  United 
Kingdom.  An  early  supporter  of 
American  independence  and  a  warm 
friend  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  Creutz  was 
the  ideal  man  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with 
the  United  States.  In  1783,  King  Gustav 
III  recalled  Creutz  from  Paris  to  serve 
as  his  foreign  minister  and  chancellor.  In 
addition  to  his  broadened  diplomatic 
duties,  Creutz  used  his  new  position  to 
promote  educational  reforms  during  the 
brief  period  before  his  death.  ■ 


(Courtesy  Embassy  of  Sweden) 


Department  of  State  Bull  " 


FEATURE 

The  U.S. 

and  Sweden: 

An  Enduring  Friendship 


Benjamin  Franklin 

(National  Portrait  Gallen,',  Smithsonian  Institu 


jmin  Franklin  (1706-90)  was  the 
snification  of  the  American  EnHght- 
rnt  with  its  emphasis  on  the  prac- 
i^ipplication  of  scientific  knowledge. 
f  establishing  a  successful  printing 
i?ss  in  Philadelphia,  Franklin  at- 
:'d  Colonial  and  then  European  at- 
tin  with  his  Poor  Richard's 
r^nac,  a  collection  of  useful  informa- 
i.nd  witticisms  which  he  published 
rl732-1757.  A  passionate  believer 
><f-improvement,  Franklin  founded 

rst  lending  library  in  the  Colonies 
151,  launched  the  American 
J^ophical  Society  in  1743,  and  found- 
t;  first  city  hospital  in  Philadelphia 
ihe  University  of  Pennsylvania  in 
>|  He  served  as  an  assemblyman  in 
ipylvania's  legislature  and  as  deputy 
piaster  for  the  Colonies  from 
i^a774. 

'i  17.54  Franklin  became  active  in 
I'iolonial  struggles  against  arbitrary 
'h  laws.  He  twice  went  to  the 
i  d  Kingdom  for  extended  missions 
"■epresentative  of  Colonial  interests. 


In  1775-76,  Franklin,  as  a  member  of 
the  Second  Continental  Congress,  helped 
to  organize  the  national  government 
which  led  the  Colonies  through  the 
American  Revolution.  Late  in  1776,  the 
Congress  sent  him  to  France  to  seek  an 
alliance.  Franklin's  fame  preceded  him, 
and  he  shrewdly  cultivated  his  popular 
image  as  an  American  sage.  Utilizing  his 
immense  popularity,  Franklin  estab- 
lished a  close  working  relationship  with 
the  French  Government  and  organized 
the  shipment  of  badly  needed  supplies  to 
the  embattled  American  patriots.  In 
1778,  he  took  a  leading  role  in 
negotiating  a  formal  alliance  with 
France  which  proved  to  be  the  key  to 
eventual  American  victory.  In  1781, 
Congress  appointed  Franklin  one  of  the 
commissioners  to  conclude  peace  with 
the  United  Kingdom.  At  his  own  re- 
quest. Congress  finally  recalled  Franklin 
from  France  in  1785.  He  then  served  as 
a  delegate  at  the  constitutional  conven- 
tion of  1787,  playing  an  important  role 
in  forging  the  compromises  which  pro- 
duced the  U.S.  Constitution.   ■ 


Conclusion 


A.  he  Swedish  treaty  of  1783  provided 
a  major  psychological  boost  for  the  new 
American  Republic.  Following  quickly  on 
the  military  successes  of  the  war  for  in- 
dependence, Sweden's  offer  of 
diplomatic  recognition  opened  the  way 
for  a  rapid  normalization  of  relations 
with  the  states  of  continental  Europe 
and  gave  legitimacy  to  the  state  created 
by  the  American  Revolution.  The  treaty 
also  regularized  commercial  relations 
between  the  two  states  and  prompted 
Sweden  to  expand  its  trade  and  invest- 
ment in  the  United  States.  Within  weeks 
of  the  ratification,  the  Swedish  Govern- 
ment sent  communications  to  Richard 
Soderstrom  and  Charles  Hellstedt  to 
serve  as  its  counsels  in  Boston  and 
Philadelphia.  This  friendship,  established 
during  the  American  Revolution,  has  en- 
dured for  200  years.  ■ 


James  Edward  Miller  is  with  the 
General  European  Division,  Office  of  the 
Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs. 


'rl983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Peace  and  National 
Security 

by  President  Reagan 


Address  to  the  nation 

Washington,  D.C., 

March  23,  1983^ 


The  subject  I  want  to  discuss  with  you, 
peace  and  national  security,  is  both  time- 
ly and  important.  Timely,  because  I've 
reached  a  decision  which  offers  a  new 
hope  for  our  children  in  the  21st  cen- 
tury, a  decision  I'll  tell  you  about  in  a 
few  minutes.  And  important  because 
there's  a  very  big  decision  that  you  must 
make  for  yourselves. 

This  subject  involves  the  most  basic 
duty  that  any  President  and  any  people 
share— the  duty  to  protect  and 
strengthen  the  peace.  At  the  beginning 
of  this  year,  I  submitted  to  the  Congress 
a  defense  budget  which  reflects  my  best 
judgment  of  the  best  understanding  of 
the  experts  and  specialists  who  advised 
me  about  what  we  and  our  allies  must 
do  to  protect  our  people  in  the  years 
ahead.  That  budget  is  much  more  than  a 
long  list  of  numbers.  For  behind  all  the 
numbers  lies  America's  ability  to  prevent 
the  greatest  of  human  tragedies  and 
preserve  our  free  way  of  life  in  a 
sometimes  dangerous  world.  It  is  part  of 
a  careful,  long-term  plan  to  make 
America  strong  again  after  too  many 
years  of  neglect  and  mistakes. 

Our  efforts  to  rebuild  America's 
defenses  and  strengthen  the  peace 
began  2  years  ago  when  we  requested  a 
major  increase  in  the  defense  program. 


Since  then,  the  amount  of  those  in- 
creases we  first  proposed  has  been 
reduced  by  half,  through  improveme) 
in  management  and  procurement  am 
other  savings. 

The  budget  request  that  is  now 
before  the  Congress  has  been  trimm« 
to  the  limits  of  safety.  Further  deep  • 
cannot  be  made  without  seriously  em 
dangering  the  security  of  the  nation. 
The  choice  is  up  to  the  men  and  won 
you've  elected  to  the  Congress,  and  I 
means  the  choice  is  up  to  you. 

Tonight,  I  want  to  explain  to  yoi 
what  this  defense  debate  is  all  abouti 
and  why  I'm  convinced  that  the  budg 
now  before  the  Congress  is  necessar 
responsible,  and  deserving  of  your  i 
port.  And  I  want  to  offer  hope  for  tl 
future. 

But  first,  let  me  say  what  the 
defense  debate  is  not  about.  It  is  not 
about  spending  arithmetic.  I  know  tf 
in  the  last  few  weeks  you  have  been 
bombarded  with  numbers  and  percer 
ages.  Some  say  we  need  only  a  5%  i 
crease  in  defense  spending.  The  so-c 
alternate  budget  backed  by  liberals  i 
the  House  of  Representatives  would 
lower  the  figure  to  2%-3%,  cutting  < 
defense  spending  by  $163  billion  ove 
the  next  5  years. 

The  trouble  with  all  these  numk! 
is  that  they  tell  us  little  about  the  ki; 
of  defense  program  America  needs  c 


Department  of  State  Bull  i" 


THE  PRESIDENT 


snefits  and  security  and  freedom 
')ur  defense  effort  buys  for  us. 
'i  seems  to  have  been  lost  in  all  this 
^e  is  the  simple  truth  of  how  a 
^se  budget  is  arrived  at.  It  isn't 
^by  deciding  to  spend  a  certain 
jer  of  dollars.  Those  loud  voices 
jre  occasionally  heard  charging  that 
i)vernment  is  trying  to  solve  a 
ifty  problem  by  throwing  money  at 
^  nothing  more  than  noise  based  on 
^nce.  We  start  by  considering  what 
.|be  done  to  maintain  peace  and 
ff  all  the  possible  threats  against 
■curity.  Then,  a  strategy  for 
jthening  peace  and  defending 
5t  those  threat  must  be  agreed 
And,  finally,  our  defense  establish- 
must  be  evaluated  to  see  what  is 
fary  to  protect  against  any  or  all  of 
itential  threats.  The  cost  of  achiev- 
;se  ends  is  totaled  up,  and  the 
is  the  budget  for  national  defense, 
lere  is  no  logical  way  that  you  can 

spend  X  billion  dollars  less. 
an  only  say,  which  part  of  our 
;e  measures  do  we  believe  we  can 
hout  and  still  have  security 
;t  all  contingencies?  Anyone  in  the 
ess  who  advocates  a  percentage  or 
jific  dollar  cut  in  defense  spending 
i  be  made  to  say  what  part  of  our 
hes  he  would  eliminate,  and  he 
I  be  candid  enough  to  acknowledge 
is  cuts  mean  cutting  our  com- 
nts  to  allies  or  inviting  greater 
•  both. 


)efensive  Strategy 

Ijfense  policy  of  the  United  States 
[;d  on  a  simple  premise:  The 
il  States  does  not  start  fights.  We 
)!ver  be  an  aggressor.  We  maintain 
(rength  in  order  to  deter  and  de- 
gainst  aggression— to  preserve 
jm  and  peace. 

:nce  the  dawn  of  the  atomic  age, 
isought  to  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
fntaining  a  strong  deterrent  and 
iking  genuine  arms  control.  "Deter- 
1  means  simply  this;  making  sure 
:iversary  who  thinks  about  attack- 
;s  United  States,  or  our  allies,  or 
'tal  interests,  concludes  that  the 
f-o  him  outweigh  any  potential 
;  Once  he  understands  that,  he 
^attack.  We  maintain  the  peace 
irh  our  strength;  weakness  only  in- 
liggression. 

'lis  strategy  of  deterrence  has  not 
i3d.  It  still  works.  But  what  it 
jto  maintain  deterrence  has 
led.  It  took  one  kind  of  military 
:".o  deter  an  attack  when  we  had 


far  more  nuclear  weapons  than  any 
other  power;  it  takes  another  kind  now 
that  the  Soviets,  for  example,  have 
enough  accurate  and  powerful  nuclear 
weapons  to  destroy  virtually  all  of  our 
missiles  on  the  ground.  Now  this  is  not 
to  say  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  planning 
to  make  war  on  us.  Nor  do  I  believe  a 
war  is  inevitable— quite  the  contrary. 
But  what  must  be  recognized  is  that  our 
security  is  based  on  being  prepared  to 
meet  all  threats. 

There  was  a  time  when  we  depended 
on  coastal  forts  and  artillery  batteries 
because,  with  the  weaponry  of  that  day, 
any  attack  would  have  had  to  come  by 
sea.  Well,  this  is  a  different  world,  and 
our  defenses  must  be  based  on  recogni- 
tion and  awarenesss  of  the  weaponry 
possessed  by  other  nations  in  the 
nuclear  age. 

We  can't  afford  to  believe  that  we 
will  never  be  threatened.  There  have 
been  two  World  Wars  in  my  lifetime. 
We  didn't  start  them  and,  indeed,  did 
everything  we  could  to  avoid  being 
drawn  into  them.  But  we  were  ill 
prepared  for  both— had  we  been  better 
prepared,  peace  might  have  been 
preserved. 

For  20  years  the  Soviet  Union  has 
been  accumulating  enormous  military 
might.  They  didn't  stop  when  their 
forces  exceeded  all  requirements  of  a 
legitimate  defensive  capability,  and  they 
haven't  stopped  now.  During  the  past 
decade  and  a  half,  the  Soviets  have  built 
up  a  massive  arsenal  of  new  strategic 
nuclear  weapons— weapons  that  can 
strike  directly  at  the  United  States. 

As  an  example,  the  United  States  in- 
troduced its  last  new  intercontinental 
ballistic  missile,  the  Minuteman  III,  in 
1969;  and  we're  now  dismantling  our 
even  older  Titan  missiles.  But  what  has 
the  Soviet  Union  done  in  these  interven- 
ing years?  Well,  since  1969,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  built  five  new  classes  of 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic 


INTERCONTINENTAL   MISSILES 


ki 


missiles]  and  upgraded  these  eight 
times.  As  a  result,  their  missiles  are 
much  more  powerful  and  accurate  than 
they  were  several  years  ago;  and  they 
continue  to  develop  more,  while  ours  are 
increasingly  obsolete. 

The  same  thing  has  happened  in 
other  areas.  Over  the  same  period,  the 
Soviet  Union  built  four  new  classes  of 
submarine-launched  ballistic  missiles  and 
over  60  new  missile  submarines.  We 
built  two  new  types  of  submarine 
missiles  and  actually  withdrew  10  sub- 
marines from  strategic  missions.  The 
Soviet  Union  built  over  200  new 
Backfire  bombers,  and  their  brand  new 
Blackjack  bomber  is  now  under  develop- 
ment. We  haven't  built  a  new  long-range 
bomber  since  our  B-52s  were  deployed 
about  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  and 
we've  already  retired  several  hundred  of 
those  because  of  old  age.  Indeed,  despite 
what  many  people  think,  our  strategic 
forces  only  cost  about  15%  of  the 
defense  budget. 

Another  example  of  what's  hap- 
pened. In  1978,  the  Soviets  had  600 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles 
based  on  land  and  were  beginning  to  add 
the  SS-20— a  new,  highly  accurate 
mobile  missile  with  three  warheads.  We 
had  none.  Since  then  the  Soviets  have 
strengthened  their  lead.  By  the  end  of 
1979,  when  Soviet  leader  Brezhnev 
declared  "a  balance  now  exists,"  the 
Soviets  had  over  800  warheads.  We  still 
had  none.  A  year  ago  this  month,  Mr. 
Brezhnev  pledged  a  moratorium,  or 
freeze,  on  SS-20  deployment.  But  by 
last  August,  their  800  warheads  had 
become  more  than  1,200.  We  still  had 
none— some  freeze.  At  this  time  Soviet 
Defense  Minister  Ustinov  announced 
"approximate  parity  of  forces  continues 
to  exist."  But  the  Soviets  are  still  adding 
an  average  of  three  new  warheads  a 
week  and  now  have  1,300.  These 
warheads  can  reach  their  targets  in  a 
matter  of  a  few  minutes.  We  still  have 
none.  So  far,  it  seems  that  the  Soviet 
definition  of  parity  is  a  box  score  of 
1 ,300  to  nothing,  in  their  favor. 

So,  together  with  our  NATO  allies, 
we  decided  in  1979  to  deploy  new 
weapons,  beginning  this  year  as  a  deter- 
rent to  their  SS-20s  and  as  an  incentive 
to  the  Soviet  Union  to  meet  us  in 
serious  arms  control  negotiations.  We 
will  begin  that  deployment  late  this 


(White  House  photos) 


1983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


1300 


INTERMEDIATE  RANGE 

WEAPONS  (LAND  BASED) 


WEAPONS  PRODUCTKi 
1974-1982 


PARITY. 
FREEZE 


RIT^ 


BALANCE 


SS-20 


USSR      1300 


US 


600 


1978 


1980 


1982 


year.  At  the  same  time,  however,  we're 
willing  to  cancel  our  program  if  the 
Soviets  will  dismantle  theirs.  This  is 
what  we've  called  a  zero-Zero  plan.  The 
Soviets  are  now  at  the  negotiating  table; 
and  I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that  without 
our  planned  deployments,  they  wouldn't 
be  there. 

Now,  let's  consider  conventional 
forces.  Since  1974,  the  United  States 
has  produced  3,050  tactical  combat  air- 
craft. By  contrast,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
produced  twice  as  many.  When  we  look 
at  attack  submarines,  the  United  States 
has  produced  27  while  the  Soviet  Union 
has  produced  61.  For  armored  vehicles, 
including  tanks,  we  have  produced 
11,200.  The  Soviet  Union  has  produced 
54,000— nearly  5  to  1  in  their  favor. 
Finally,  with  artillery,  we  have  produced 
950  artillery  and  rocket  launchers  while 
the  Soviets  have  produced  more  than 
13,000— a  staggering  14-to-l  ratio. 


Spread  of  Soviet  Military  Influence 

There  was  a  time  when  we  were  able  to 
offset  superior  Soviet  numbers  with 
higher  quality.  But  today,  they  are 
building  weapons  as  sophisticated  and 
modern  as  our  own.  As  the  Soviets  have 
increased  their  military  power,  they 
have  been  emboldened  to  extend  that 
power.  They  are  spreading  their  military 
influence  in  ways  that  can  directly 
challenge  our  vital  interests  and  those  of 
our  allies. 

The  following  aerial  photographs, 
most  of  them  secret  until  now,  illustrate 
this  point  in  a  crucial  area  very  close  to 
home:  Central  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean Basin.  They  are  not  dramatic 
photographs.  But  I  think  they  help  give 
you  a  better  understanding  of  what  I  am 
talking  about. 


® 


AIR( 

__5S 


® 


SUBMARINES 


10 


Department  of  State  Bl  Jti 


THE  PRESIDENT 


rhis  Soviet  intelligence  collection 
ity  less  than  100  miles  from  our 
t  is  the  largest  of  its  kind  in  the 
d.  The  acres  and  acres  of  antennae 

nd  intelligence  monitors  are 
eted  on  key  U.S.  military  installa- 

and  sensitive  activities.  The  in- 
ation  in  Lourdes,  Cuba,  is  manned 
,500  Soviet  technicians.  And  the 
lite  ground  station  allows  instant 
■nunications  with  Moscow.  This 
juare-mile  facility  has  grown  by 

than  60%  in  size  and  capability 
ig  the  past  decade, 
n  western  Cuba,  we  see  this  mili- 
airfield  and  its  compliment  of 
em,  Soviet-built  MiG-23  aircraft. 
Soviet  Union  uses  this  Cuban  air- 
for  its  own  long-range  reconnais- 
e  missions.  And  earlier  this  month, 
modern  Soviet  antisubmarine  war- 
aircraft  began  operating  from  it. 
ng  the  past  2  years,  the  level  of 
jet  arms  exports  to  Cuba  can  only  be 
pared  to  the  levels  reached  during 
Cuban  missile  crisis  20  years  ago. 
rhis  third  photo,  which  is  the  only 
lin  this  series  that  has  been  previous- 
jade  public,  shows  Soviet  military 
ware  that  has  made  its  way  to  Cen- 
JAmerica.  This  airfield  with  its  MI-8 
opters,  antiaircraft  guns,  and  pro- 
;d  fighter  sites  is  one  of  a  number  of 
ary  facilities  in  Nicaragua  which  has 
ved  Soviet  equipment  funneled 
agh  Cuba  and  reflects  the  massive 
ary  buildup  going  on  in  that  coun- 

Dn  the  small  island  of  Grenada  at 
iouthern  end  of  the  Caribbean  chain, 
Cubans  with  Soviet  financing  and 

are  in  the  process  of  building  an 
sld  with  a  10,000-foot  runway. 

ida  doesn't  even  have  an  air  force. 

is  it  intended  for?  The  Caribbean  is 
ry  important  passageway  for  our  in- 
itional  commerce  and  military  lines 
immunication.  More  than  half  of  all 
rican  oil  imports  now  pass  through 
Caribbean.  The  rapid  buildup  of 

's  military  potential  is  unrelated 
ly  conceivable  threat  to  this  island 
try  of  under  110,000  people  and 
ly  at  odds  with  the  patterns  of  the 
3rn  Caribbean  states,  most  of  which 
inarmed. 

The  Soviet-Cuban  militarization  of 
lada,  in  short,  can  only  be  seen  as 


THE  PRESIDENT 


power  projection  into  the  re^on.  Am 
is  in  this  important  economic  and 
strategic  area  that  we're  trying  to  he 
the  Governments  of  El  Salvador,  Cos 
Rica,  Honduras,  and  others  in  their 
struggles  for  democracy  against  guei 
rillas  supported  through  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua. 

These  pictures  only  tell  a  small  p 
of  the  story.  I  wish  I  could  show  you 
more  without  compromising  our  mos 
sensitive  intelligence  sources  and 
methods.  But  the  Soviet  Union  is  als 
supporting  Cuban  military  forces  in 
Angola  and  Ethiopia.  They  have  bas 
Ethiopia  and  South  Yemen,  near  the 
Persian  Gulf  oil  fields.  They  have  tal 
over  the  port  that  we  built  at  Cam  F 
Bay  in  Vietnam.  And  now  for  the  fif 
time  in  history,  the  Soviet  Navy  is 
force  to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  So 
Pacific. 

Some  people  may  still  ask:  Wou) 
the  Soviets  ever  use  their  formidablt 
military  power?  Well,  again,  can  we 
ford  to  believe  they  won't?  There  is 
Afghanistan.  And  in  Poland  the  Sov 
denied  the  will  of  the  people  and,  in 
doing,  demonstrated  to  the  world  he 
their  military  power  could  also  be  us 
to  intimidate. 

The  final  fact  is  that  the  Soviet 
Union  is  acquiring  what  can  only  be 
sidered  an  offensive  military  force.  ' 
have  continued  to  build  far  more  int 
continental  ballistic  missiles  than  thf 
could  possibly  need  simply  to  deter  ; 
attack.  Their  conventional  forces  ari' 
trained  and  equipped  not  so  much  tc 
fend  against  an  attack  as  they  are  ti 
permit  sudden  surprise  offenses  of  t 


Repairing  U.S.  Defenses 

Our  NATO  allies  have  assumed  a  gr 
defense  burden,  including  the  militai 
draft  in  most  countries.  We're  work) 
with  them  and  our  other  friends  arc 
the  world  to  do  more.  Our  defensive 
strategy  means  we  need  military  for 
that  can  move  very  quickly,  forces  ti 
are  trained  and  ready  to  respond  to. 
emergency. 

Every  item  in  our  defense  pro- 
gram—our ships,  our  tanks,  our  pla 
our  funds  for  training  and  spare 
parts— is  intended  for  one  all-import 
purpose:  to  keep  the  peace.  Unfortu 
ly,  a  decade  of  neglecting  our  milita; 
forces  has  called  into  question  our  a 
to  do  that. 

When  I  took  office  in  January  V 
I  was  appalled  by  what  I  found: 
American  planes  that  couldn't  fly  an  ' 
American  ships  that  couldn't  sail  for^d 
of  spare  parts  and  trained  personne  f 


12 


Department  of  State  Bui  i" 


THE  PRESIDENT 


cient  fuel  and  ammunition  for 
ial  training.  The  inevitable  result 

was  poor  morale  in  our  Armed 
i,  difficulty  in  recruiting  the 
young  Americans  to  wear  the 
and  difficulty  in  convincing  our 
sxperienced  military  personnel  to 
ri. 

lere  was  a  real  question  then 
how  well  we  could  meet  a  crisis. 
was  obvious  that  we  had  to  begin 
ir  modernization  program  to  en- 
e  could  deter  aggression  and 
ve  the  peace  in  the  years  ahead. 
d  to  move  immediately  to  improve 
sic  readiness  and  staying  power  of 
nventional  forces,  so  they  could 
■and,  therefore,  help  deter — a 
We  had  to  make  up  for  lost  years 
^stment  by  moving  forward  with  a 

Frm  plan  to  prepare  our  forces  to 
r  the  military  capabilities  our 
aries  were  developing  for  the 

now  that  all  of  you  want  peace, 
do  I.  I  know,  too,  that  many  of 
riously  believe  that  a  nuclear 
would  further  the  cause  of  peace, 
freeze  now  would  make  us  less, 
're,  secure  and  would  raise,  not 
,  the  risks  of  war.  It  would  be 
unverifiable  and  would  seriously 
ut  our  negotiations  on  arms 
ion.  It  would  reward  the  Soviets 
ir  massive  military  buildup  while 
ting  us  from  modernizing  our  ag- 
i  increasingly  vulnerable  forces. 
Jheir  present  margin  of  superiori- 
«y  should  they  agree  to  arms 
(ions  knowing  that  we  were  pro- 
i  from  catching  up? 
:lieve  me,  it  wasn't  pleasant  for 
!ne  who  had  come  to  Washington 
iiined  to  reduce  government 
(ng,  but  we  had  to  move  forward 
ne  task  of  repairing  our  defenses 
•would  lose  our  ability  to  deter 
lit  now  and  in  the  future.  We  had 
ijionstrate  to  any  adversary  that 
ision  could  not  succeed  and  that 
ly  real  solution  was  substantial, 
pie,  and  effectively  verifiable  arms 
(ion— the  kind  we're  working  for 
Slow  in  Geneva. 

lanks  to  your  strong  support,  and 
<san  support  from  the  Congress, 
pn  to  turn  things  around.  Already 
neeing  some  very  encouraging 
(•.  Quality  recruitment  and  reten- 
|e  up  dramatically— more  high 
I  graduates  are  choosing  military 
Is  and  more  experienced  career 
|ne!  are  choosing  to  stay.  Our  men 
Umen  in  uniform  at  last  are  get- 
|e  tools  and  training  they  need  to 
Ir  jobs. 


Ask  around  today,  especially  among 
our  young  people,  and  I  think  you  will 
find  a  whole  new  attitude  toward  serv- 
ing their  country.  This  reflects  more 
than  just  better  pay,  equipment,  and 
leadership.  You,  the  American  people, 
have  sent  a  signal  to  these  young  people 
that  it  is  once  again  an  honor  to  wear 
the  uniform.  That's  not  something  you 
measure  in  a  budget,  but  it's  a  very  real 
part  of  our  nation's  strength. 

It'll  take  us  longer  to  build  the  kind 
of  equipment  we  need  to  keep  peace  in 
the  future,  but  we've  made  a  good  start. 
We  haven't  built  a  new  long-range 
bomber  for  21  years.  Now  we're  building 
the  B-1.  We  hadn't  launched  one  new 
strategic  submarine  for  17  years.  Now 
we're  building  one  Trident  submarine  a 
year.  Our  land-based  missiles  are  in- 
creasingly threatened  by  the  many  huge, 
new  Soviet  ICBMs.  We're  determining 
how  to  solve  that  problem.  At  the  same 
time,  we're  working  in  the  START 
[Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks]  and 
INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear  forces] 
negotiations  with  the  goal  of  achieving 
deep  reductions  in  the  strategic  and  in- 
termediate nuclear  arsenals  of  both 
sides. 

We  have  also  begun  the  long-needed 
modernization  of  our  conventional 
forces.  The  Army  is  getting  its  first  new 
tank  in  20  years.  The  Air  Force  is 
modernizing.  We're  rebuilding  our  Navy 
which  shrank  from  about  1,000  ships  in 
the  late  1960s  to  453  during  the  1970s. 
Our  nation  needs  a  superior  Navy  to 
support  our  military  forces  and  vital  in- 
terests overseas.  We're  now  on  the  road 
to  achieving  a  600-ship  Navy  and  in- 
creasing the  amphibious  capabilities  of 
our  Marines,  who  are  now  ser\'ing  the 
cause  of  peace  in  Lebanon.  And  we're 
building  a  real  capability  to  assist  our 
friends  in  the  vitally  important  Indian 
Ocean  and  Persian  Gulf  region. 

The  Need  for  Defense  Resources 

This  adds  up  to  a  major  effort,  and  it 
isn't  cheap.  It  comes  at  a  time  when 
there  are  many  other  pressures  on  our 
budget,  and  when  the  American  people 
have  already  had  to  make  major  sacri- 
fices during  the  recession.  But  we  must 
not  be  misled  by  those  who  would  make 
defense  once  again  the  scapegoat  of  the 
Federal  budget. 

The  fact  is  that  in  the  past  few 
decades  we  have  seen  a  dramatic  shift  in 
how  we  spend  the  taxpayer's  dollar. 
Back  in  1955,  payments  to  individuals 
took  up  only  about  20%  of  the  Federal 
budget.  For  nearly  three  decades,  these 


payments  steadily  increased,  and  this 
year  will  account  for  49%  of  the  budget. 
By  contrast,  in  1955  defense  took  up 
more  than  half  of  the  Federal  budget. 
By  1980,  this  spending  had  fallen  to  a 
low  of  23%.  Even  with  the  increase  that 
I  am  requesting  this  year,  defense  will 
still  amount  to  only  28%  of  the  budget. 

The  calls  for  cutting  back  the 
defense  budget  come  in  nice,  simple 
arithmetic.  They're  the  same  kind  of  talk 
that  led  the  democracies  to  neglect  their 
defenses  in  the  1930s  and  invited  the 
tragedy  of  World  War  II.  We  must  not 
let  that  grim  chapter  of  history  repeat 
itself  through  apathy  or  neglect. 

This  is  why  I'm  speaking  to  you 
tonight— to  urge  you  to  tell  your 
Senators  and  Congressmen  that  you 
know  we  must  continue  to  restore  our 
military  strength.  If  we  stop  in  mid- 
stream, we  will  send  a  signal  of  decline, 
of  lessened  will,  to  friends  and  adver- 
saries alike.  Free  people  must  voluntari- 
ly, through  open  debate  and  democratic 
means,  meet  the  challenge  that  totali- 
tarians  pose  by  compulsion.  It's  up  to  us, 
in  our  time,  to  choose  and  choose  wisely 
between  the  hard  but  necessary  task  of 
preserving  peace  and  freedom  and  the 
temptation  to  ignore  our  duty  and  blind- 
ly hope  for  the  best  while  the  enemies  of 
freedom  grow  stronger  day  by  day. 

The  solution  is  well  within  our 
grasp.  But  to  reach  it,  there  is  simply  no 
alternative  but  to  continue  this  year,  in 
this  budget,  to  provide  the  resources  we 
need  to  preserve  the  peace  and  guaran- 
tee our  freedom. 

Commitment  to  Arms  Control 

Now,  thus  far  tonight  I've  shared  with 
you  my  thoughts  on  the  problems  of  na- 
tional security  we  must  face  together. 
My  predecessors  in  the  Oval  Office  have 
appeared  before  you  on  other  occasions 
to  describe  the  threat  posed  by  Soviet 
power  and  have  proposed  steps  to  ad- 
dress that  threat.  But  since  the  advent 
of  nuclear  weapons,  those  steps  have 
been  increasingly  directed  toward  deter- 
rence of  aggression  through  the  promise 
of  retaliation.  This  approach  to  stability 
through  offensive  threat  has  worked. 
We  and  our  allies  have  succeeded  in 
preventing  nuclear  war  for  more  than 
three  decades. 

In  recent  months,  however,  my  ad- 
visers, including,  in  particular,  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  have  underscored  the 
necessity  to  break  out  of  a  future  that 
relies  solely  on  offensive  retaliation  for 
our  security.  Over  the  course  of  these 
discussions,  I've  become  more  and  more 


983 


13 


THE  PRESIDENT 


PERCENT  OF  BUDGET 

50  n 


SOCIAL 
SPENDING 


1960 


1970 


1980 


deeply  convinced  that  the  human  spirit 
must  be  capable  of  rising  above  deaHng 
with  other  nations  and  human  beings  by 
threatening  their  existence.  Feeling  this 
way,  I  believe  we  must  thoroughly  ex- 
amine every  opportunity  for  reducing 
tensions  and  for  introducing  greater 
stability  into  the  strategic  calculus  on 
both  sides. 

One  of  the  most  important  contribu- 
tions we  can  make  is,  of  course,  to  lower 
the  level  of  all  arms  and  particularly 
nuclear  arms.  We  are  engaged  right 
now  in  several  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  bring  about  a  mutual 
reduction  of  weapons. 

I  will  report  to  you  a  week  from 
tomorrow  my  thoughts  on  that  score. 
But  let  me  just  say,  I  am  totally  commit- 
ted to  this  course.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
will  join  with  us  in  our  effort  to  achieve 
major  arms  reduction,  we  will  have  suc- 
ceeded in  stabilizing  the  nuclear  balance. 
Nevertheless,  it  will  still  be  necessary  to 
rely  on  the  specter  of  retaliation,  on 
mutual  threat.  And  that's  a  sad  commen- 
tary on  the  human  condition.  Wouldn't  it 
be  better  to  save  lives  than  to  avenge 
them?  Are  we  not  capable  of  demon- 
strating our  peaceful  intentions  by 
applying  all  our  abilities  and  our  ingenui- 
ty to  achieving  a  truly  lasting  stability? 

I  think  we  are.  Indeed,  we  must. 
After  careful  consultation  with  my  ad- 
visers, including  the  Joint  Chiefs  of 


Staff,  I  believe  there  is  a  way.  Let  me 
share  with  you  a  vision  of  the  future 
which  offers  hope.  It  is  that  we  embark 
on  a  program  to  counter  the  awesome 
Soviet  missile  threat  with  measures  that 
are  defensive.  Let  us  turn  to  the  very 
strengths  in  technology  that  spawned 
our  great  industrial  base  and  that  have 
given  us  the  quality  of  life  we  enjoy  to- 
day. 

What  if  free  people  could  live  secure 
in  the  knowledge  that  their  security  did 
not  rest  upon  the  threat  of  instant  U.S. 
retaliation  to  deter  a  Soviet  attack,  that 
we  could  intercept  and  destroy  strategic 
ballistic  missiles  before  they  reached  our 
own  soil  or  that  of  our  allies? 

I  know  this  is  a  formidable,  technical 
task;  one  that  may  not  be  accomplished 
before  the  end  of  this  century.  Yet,  cur- 
rent technology  has  attained  a  level  of 
sophistication  where  it  is  reasonable  for 
us  to  begin  this  effort.  It  will  take  years, 
probably  decades  of  effort  on  many 
fronts.  There  will  be  failures  and  set- 
backs, just  as  there  will  be  successes  and 
breakthroughs.  And  as  we  proceed,  we 
must  remain  constant  in  preserving  the 
nuclear  deterrent  and  maintaining  a 
solid  capability  for  flexible  response. 

But  isn't  it  worth  every  investment 
necessary  to  free  the  world  from  the 
threat  of  nuclear  war?  We  know  it  is.  In 
the  meantime,  we  will  continue  to  pur- 
sue real  reductions  in  nuclear  arms, 
negotiating  from  a  position  of  strength 


that  can  be  ensured  only  by  moderni; 
our  strategic  forces. 

At  the  same  time,  we  must  take 
steps  to  reduce  the  risk  of  a  conven- 
tional military  conflict  escalating  to 
nuclear  war  by  improving  our  non- 
nuclear  capabilities.  America  does 
possess— now— the  technologies  to  at 
very  significant  improvements  in  the 
fectiveness  of  our  conventional,  non- 
nuclear  forces.  Proceeding  boldly  wil 
these  new  technologies,  we  can  signi 
cantly  reduce  any  incentive  that  the 
Soviet  Union  may  have  to  threaten  j 
tack  against  the  United  States  or  its! 
allies.  I 

As  we  pursue  our  goal  of  defens  j 
technologies,  we  recognize  that  our  ,■ 
rely  upon  our  strategic  offensive  po\  j 
to  deter  attacks  against  them.  Their ! 
vital  interests  and  ours  are  inextrica 
linked.  Their  safety  and  ours  are  one 
And  no  change  in  technology  can  or 
alter  that  reality.  We  must  and  shall 
continue  to  honor  our  commitments. 
I  clearly  recognize  that  defensive 
systems  have  limitations  and  raise  o 
tain  problems  and  ambiguities.  If  pa 
with  offensive  systems,  they  can  be 
viewed  as  fostering  an  aggressive  p( 
and  no  one  wants  that.  But  with  the 
considerations  firmly  in  mind,  I  a 
upon  the  scientific  community  in  oui 
country,  those  who  gave  us  nuclear 
weapons,  to  turn  their  great  talents 
to  the  cause  of  mankind  and  world 
peace,  to  give  us  the  means  of  rende 
these  nuclear  weapons  impotent  and 
solete. 

Tonight,  consistent  with  our  ( 
tions  of  the  ABM  [antiballistic  missil 
Treaty  and  recognizing  the  need  fori 
closer  consultation  with  our  allies,  I' 
taking  an  important  first  step.  I  am 
directing  a  comprehensive  and  inten 
effort  to  define  a  long-term  research 
development  program  to  begin  to 
achieve  our  ultimate  goal  of  eliminat 
the  threat  posed  by  strategic  nucleai 
missiles.  This  could  pave  the  way  fbi 
arms  control  measures  to  eliminate  i 
weapons  themselves.  We  seek  neith« 
military  superiority  nor  political  adv 
tage.  Our  only  purpose— one  all  peoj 
share— is  to  search  for  ways  to  redu 
the  danger  of  nuclear  war. 

My  fellow  Americans,  tonight  w 
launching  an  effort  which  holds  the 
promise  of  changing  the  course  of 
human  history.  There  will  be  risks,  i 
results  take  time.  But  I  believe  we  c 
do  it.  As  we  cross  this  threshold,  I  i 
for  your  prayers  and  your  support. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  relea; 


14 


Department  of  State  Bui  *" 


THE  PRESIDENT 


le  Trade  Challenge  for  the  1980s 


ddress  before  the  Commonwealth 
San  Francisco,  California,  on 
1 4.  1983.^ 

pleasure  to  be  back  here  where 
ossroads  of  trade  are  meeting 
for  ideas  that  stretch  our  sights 
limits  of  the  horizon  and  beyond, 
iolden  Gate  city  is  a  place  where 
)reneurs  with  great  dreams,  dar- 
nd  determination  chart  new  paths 
igress  through  the  winds  and 
B  of  commerce. 

DU  provide  an  appropriate  setting 
American  challenge  for  the  1980s, 
the  help  of  your  vision,  courage, 
adership,  we  can  begin  the  first 
a  new  voyage  into  the  future,  a 
in  which  commerce  will  be  king, 
gle  will  soar,  and  America  will  be 
jightiest  trading  nation  on  Earth, 
haven't  come  here  to  echo  those 
bearts  who  have  little  faith  in 
can  enterprise  and  ingenuity, 
ijlead  for  retreat  and  seek  refuge 
rusty  armor  of  a  failed,  protec- 
past.  I  believe,  and  I  think  you  do 
lat  the  world  hungers  for  leader- 
nd  growth  and  that  America  can 
e  it.  And  my  message  is  that  our 
listration  will  fight  to  give  you  the 
'ou  need,  because  we  know  you 
t  the  job  done. 

ir  forefathers  didn't  shed  their 
to  create  this  union  so  that  we 
become  a  victim  nation.  We're  not 
nd  daughters  of  second-rate  stock, 
ive  no  mission  of  mediocrity.  We 
Dorn  to  carry  liberty's  banner  and 
he  very  meaning  of  progress,  and 
)portunities  have  never  been 
!r.  We  can  improve  the  well-being 
people,  and  we  can  enhance  the 
for  democracy,  freedom,  peace, 
iman  fulfillment  around  the  world, 
stand  up  for  principles  of  trade  ex- 
)n  through  freer  markets  and 
!r  competition  among  nations. 
dealing  with  our  economy,  more 
uestion  than  just  prosperity, 
ately,  peace  and  freedom  are  at 
The  United  States  took  the  lead 
World  War  II  in  creating  an  inter- 
lal  trading  and  financial  system 
mited  government's  ability  to 
)t  trade.  We  did  this  because 
y  had  taught  us  the  freer  the  flow 
de  across  borders,  the  greater  the 
economic  progress  and  the 
;r  the  impetus  for  world  peace. 


But  the  deterioration  of  the  free  world 
and  the  U.S.  economy  in  the  1970s  led 
to  the  decline  of  Western  security  and 
the  confidence  of  the  people  of  the  free 
world. 

Too  many  otherwise  free  nations 
adopted  policies  of  government  interven- 
tion in  the  marketplace.  Many  people 
began  thinking  that  equity  was  incom- 
patible with  growth.  And  they  argued 
for  no-growth  societies,  for  policies  that 
undermined  free  markets  and  com- 
promised our  collective  security.  There 
can  be  no  real  security  without  a  strong 
Western  economy.  And  there  can  be  no 
freedom  unless  we  preserve  the  open 
and  competitive  international  and  finan- 
cial systems  that  we  created  after  World 
War  II.  Prosperity  alone  cannot  restore 
confidence  or  protect  our  basic  values. 
We  must  also  remember  our  objectives 
of  peace  and  freedom.  And  then  we  can 
build  a  prosperity  that  will,  once  again, 
lift  our  heads  and  renew  our  spirits. 

Now,  I'm  not  going  to  minimize  the 
problems  that  we  face  or  the  long,  tough 
road  that  we  must  travel  to  solve  them. 
For  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the  Sec- 
ond World  War,  we  exported  more 
goods  each  year  to  the  rest  of  the  world 
than  we  imported.  We  accumulated  a 
surplus  of  funds  which  was  invested  at 
home  and  abroad  and  which  created  jobs 


Since  1976,  imports  have 
exceeded  exports  every 
year.  And  our  trade 
deficit  is  expected  to  rise 
sharply  in  this  year  of 
1983. 


and  increased  economic  prosperity.  But 
during  the  past  decade,  we  began  im- 
porting more  than  we  were  exporting. 
Since  1976,  imports  have  exceeded  ex- 
ports every  year.  And  our  trade  deficit 
is  expected  to  rise  sharply  in  this  year  of 
1983. 


In  the  past  few  years,  high  real  in- 
terest rates  have  inhibited  investment, 
greatly  increased  the  value  of  the  dollar, 
and  made  our  goods— as  a  result— less 
competitive.  High  interest  rates  reflect 
skepticism  by  financial  markets  that  our 
government  has  the  courage  to  keep  in- 
flation dovm  by  reducing  deficit  spend- 
ing. 

The  Potential  for  Growth 

If  the  history  of  our  great  nation  and 
the  character  of  this  breed  called 
American  mean  anything  at  all,  it  is 
that,  when  we  have  believed  in 
ourselves,  when  we  pulled  together- 
putting  our  wisdom  and  faith  into 
action — we  made  the  future  work  for 
us.  And  we  can  do  that  now. 

Wealth  is  not  created  inside  some 
think  tank  on  the  Potomac.  It  is  born  in 
the  hearts  and  minds  of  entrepreneurs 
all  across  Main  Street  America.  For  too 
long,  government  has  treated  the  en- 
trepreneur more  as  an  enemy  than  an 
ally.  Our  Administration  has  a  better 
idea.  We'll  give  you  less  bureaucracy,  if 
you  give  America  your  audacity.  We 
want  you  to  out  plan,  out  produce,  and 
out  sell  the  pants  off  this  nation's  com- 
petitors. You  see,  I  believe  in  what 
General  Patton  once  said,  and  I'm  par- 
tial to  cavalry  officers.  He  said,  "Don't 
tell  people  how  to  do  things.  Tell  them 
what  needs  doing  and  then  watch  them 
surprise  you  with  their  ingenuity." 

Every  citizen  has  a  role  and  a  stake 
in  helping  the  United  States  meet  her 
trade  challenge  in  the  1980s.  We  need 
jobs.  Well,  one  of  the  best  job  programs 
we  can  have  is  a  great  national  drive  to 
expand  exports  and  that's  part  of  our 
program.  We  have  only  to  look  beyond 
our  own  borders.  The  potential  for 
growth  is  enormous:  a  $2-trillion  market 
abroad,  a  chance  to  create  millions  of 
jobs  and  more  income  security  for  our 
people.  We  have  barely  seen  the  tip  of 
that  iceberg.  Four  out  of  five  new 
manufacturing  jobs  created  in  the  last  5 
years  were  in  export-related  industries. 
And  yet,  90%  of  American  manufac- 
turers do  not  export  at  all.  We  believe 


rl983 


15 


THE  PRESIDENT 


tens  of  thousands  of  U.S.  producers  of- 
fer products  and  services  which  can  be 
competitive  abroad.  Now,  many  of  these 
are  small-  and  medium-sized  firms. 

Our  Administration  has  a  positive 
plan  to  meet  the  trade  challenge  on 
three  key  points. 

First,  to  lay  a  firm  foundation  for 
noninflationary  growth  based  on  endur- 
ing economic  principles  of  fiscal  and 
monetary  discipline,  competition  incen- 
tives, thrift,  and  reward; 

Second,  to  enhance  the  ability  of 
U.S.  producers  and  industries  to  com- 
pete on  a  fair  and  equal  basis  in  the  in- 
ternational marketplace,  to  work  with 
our  trading  partners  to  resolve  outstand- 
ing problems  of  market  access,  and  to 
chart  new  directions  for  free  and  fair 
trade  in  the  products  of  the  future. 

Third,  to  take  the  lead  in  assisting 
international  financial  and  trade  institu- 
tions to  strengthen  world  growth  and 
bolster  the  forces  of  freedom  and 
democracy. 

Taken  together,  these  actions  give 
the  United  States  a  positive  framework 
for  leading  our  producers  and  trading 
partners  toward  more  open  markets, 
greater  freedom,  and  human  progress. 

But  progress  begins  at  home.  Our 
economic  reforms  are  based  on  time- 
tested  principles:  spending  and 
monetary  restraint  to  bring  down  infla- 
tion and  interest  rates  and  to  give 
lenders  confidence  in  long-term  price 
stability;  less  regulatory  interference  so 
as  to  stimulate  greater  competition;  and 
growth  of  enterprise  and  employment 
through  tax  incentives  to  ecncourage 
work,  thrift,  investment,  and  produc- 
tivity. 

Now,  we've  suffered  a  long,  painful 
recession  brought  about  by  more  than  a 
decade  of  overtaxing  and  spending  and, 
yes,  government  intervention.  But  reces- 
sion is  giving  way  to  a  rainbow  of 
recovery,  reflecting  a  renaissance  in 
enterprise.  America  is  on  the  mend.  In- 
flation has  plunged  from  12.4%  in  1980 
to  just  3.8%  in  the  last  12  months.  And 
in  the  last  6  months,  it's  been  running  at 
1.4%.  We've  sought  common  sense  in 
government  and  competition,  not  con- 
trols, in  the  marketplace.  Two  years 
ago,  we  accelerated  the  deregulation  of 
crude  oil.  And  we  heard  ourselves  de- 
nounced for  fueling  inflation.  The  na- 
tional average  for  a  gallon  of  gasoline 
when  we  took  office  was  $1.27,  and  now 
you  can  buy  it  in  most  places  for  less 
than  a  dollar.  The  prime  interest  rate 
was  a  crippling  21.5%.  Now,  it's  down  to 
10.5%.  Tax  rates  have  been  cut.  Real 


wages  are  improving.  Personal  savings 
and  productivity  are  growing  again.  The 
stock  market  has  hit  a  record  high.  Ven- 
ture capital  investments  have  reached 
record  levels.  Production  in  housing, 
autos,  and  steel  is  gaining  strength.  And 
new  breakthroughs  in  high  technology 
are  busting  out  all  over.  Katie,  bar  the 
door.  We're  on  our  way  back. 

Let  me  say  to  the  pessimists  who 
would  cancel  our  remaining  tax  incen- 
tives, I  have  one  thing  to  say:  Don't  lay 
a  hand  on  the  third  year  of  the  people's 
tax  cut  or  the  indexing  provision.  Index- 
ing is  our  promise  to  every  working  man 
and  woman  that  the  future  will  not  be 


made  America  the  greatest  nation  od 
Earth.  Let  us  create  more  opportuni' 
for  all  our  citizens.  And  let  us  encoui 
achievement  and  excellence.  We  wanj 
America  to  be  a  nation  of  winners  ag. 

Promoting  Free  Trade  j 

So  you  might  as  well  know  that  we  \, 
not  turn  our  backs  on  the  principles  j 
our  recovery  programs,  especially  orj 
principles  of  free  trade.  The  great  , 
English  historian,  Thomas  Babingtoi| 
Macaulay,  wrote  more  than  a  centur 
ago  that  free  trade,  one  of  the  great 
blessings  which  a  government  can  c( 


America  is  on  the  mend.  Inflation  has  plunged 
from  12.4%  in  1980  to  just  3.8%  in  the  last  12 
months.  And  in  the  last  6  months,  it's  been  runni 

at  1.4%. 


like  the  past.  There  will  be  no  more 
sneaky,  midnight  tax  increases  by  a 
government  resorting  to  bracket  creep 
to  indulge  its  thirst  for  deficit  spending. 
To  pretend  eliminating  indexes  is 
somehow  fair  to  working  people  remind 
me  of  Samuel  Johnson's  comment  about 
the  fellow  who  couldn't  see  any  dif- 
ference between  vice  and  virtue.  He 
said,  "Well,  when  he  leaves  the  house, 
let's  count  the  spoons." 

Capping  the  third  year  tax  cut  and 
eliminating  indexing  and  our  remaining 
tax  cuts  would  send  the  worst  possible 
signal  to  potential  exporters.  As  I  men- 
tioned, 90%  of  U.S.  businesses  do  not 
export  at  all.  And  about  85%  of  our 
firms  pay  their  taxes  by  the  personal  in- 
come tax.  If  those  who  would  dismantle 
the  tax  cuts  get  their  way,  the  chilling 
message  to  the  business  community  will 
be:  "Don't  scrap  and  struggle  to  succeed, 
export,  expand  your  business,  and  hire 
more  workers  because  we  won't  thank 
and  reward  you  for  helping  your  coun- 
try. We'll  punish  you." 

Well,  maybe  I'm  old-fashioned,  but  I 
don't  think  pitting  one  group  of 
Americans  against  another  is  what  the 
Founding  Fathers  had  in  mind.  This  na- 
tion was  not  built  on  a  foundation  of 
envy  and  resentment.  The  dream  I've 
always  believed  in  is,  no  matter  who  you 
are,  no  matter  where  you  come  from,  if 
you  work  hard,  pull  yourself  up,  and 
succeed,  then,  by  golly,  you  deserve 
life's  pri-e.  A.nd  trying  for  that  prize 


on  a  people,  is  unpopular  in  almost 
every  country.  Well,  for  some,  time: 
haven't  changed. 

There's  a  great  hue  and  cry  for 
bend  to  protectionist  pressures.  I've 
been  around  long  enough  to  rememl 
that  when  we  did  that  once  before  :' 
this  century,  something  called  Smoc 
Hawley,  we  lived  through  a  nightm; 
World  trade  fell  by  60%,  contributii 
the  great  depression  and  to  the  poll 
turmoil  that  led  to  World  War  II.  Ml 
and  our  trading  partners  are  in  the 
same  boat.  If  one  partner  shoots  a  1' 
in  the  bottom  of  the  boat,  does  it  m  I 
sense  for  the  other  partner  to  shoot  I 
another  hole  in  the  boat?  There  are  ' 
those  who  say  yes  and  call  it  gettinfjj 
tough.  I  call  it  getting  wet— all  over  j 

We  must  plug  the  holes  in  the  b 
of  open  markets  and  free  trade  and 
sail  again  in  the  direction  of  prospei 
No  one  should  mistake  our  determii 
tion  to  use  our  full  power  and  influt 
to  prevent  anyone  from  destroying 
boat  and  sinking  us  all.  There's  a  fu 
damental  difference  between  positi\ 
support  of  legitimate  American  inte 
and  rights  in  world  trade  and  the 
negative  actions  of  protectionists.  F 
trade  can  only  survive  if  all  parties 
by  the  same  rules.  But  we're  detern 
to  insure  equity  in  our  markets.  De: 
ing  workers  in  industries  from  unfa 


Department  of  State  Bu  ti 


THE  PRESIDENT 


redatory  trade  practices  is  not  pro- 
[lism.  It's  legitimate  action  under 
^nd  international  law. 
pw,  one  example  of  protectionist 
[tion  that  could  quickly  sabotage 
^ry  is  the  local  content  rule.  This 
^tion,  proposed  in  the  Congress, 
force  foreign  and  domestic 
"acturers  of  automobiles  sold  in  the 
i  States  to  build  their  cars  with  an 
ting  percentage  of  U.S.  parts  and 
Stic  labor.  The  Congressional 
^t  Office  concluded  that  this  would 
\y  more  jobs  than  it  would  save, 
hat's  true.  It  would  add  substan- 
to  the  cost  of  a  new  car. 
,"hat  the  proponents  of  this  bunker 
tlity  never  point  out  is  that  the 
bf  protectionism  for  one  group  of 
irs  are  always  passed  on  to 
er  group  down  the  line.  And  once 
fegislation  is  passed,  every  other  in- 
I'  would  be  a  target  for  foreign 
Ition.  We  would  buy  less  from  our 
i;rs.  They'd  buy  less  from  us.  The 
I  economic  pie  would  shrink. 
|es  for  political  turmoil  would  in- 
I  dramatically. 

ither  than  reacting  in  fear  with 
r-thy-neighbor  policies,  let  us  lead 
Utrength  and  believe  in  our 
j's.  Let's  work  at  home  and  abroad 
lance  the  ability  of  U.S.  producers 
jdustries  to  compete  on  a  fair  and 
basis  in  the  international 
tplace. 

e're  very  excited  about  some  land- 
legislation  that  I  signed  last 
■signed,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  here 
ifornia— the  Export  Trading  Com- 
\.ct.  It's  an  innovative  idea  based 
mwork.  I'm  confident  it  will  create 
inds  of  new  exporters,  and  I  hope 
of  them  are  sitting  in  this  room, 
.w  is  designed  to  attract  manufac- 
,  export-management  companies, 
,  freightforwarders,  and  other  ex- 
ervices  into  joint  efforts  to  gain 
n  markets.  "The  Commerce  Depart- 
is  holding  seminars  across  the 
7  to  promote  the  legislation,  and 
sponse  has  been  remarkable, 
lousands  have  attended,  and  in 
cases,  the  numbers  were  so  over- 
ling people  had  to  be  turned  away. 
lajority  of  attendees  have  not  been 
rs,  tax  accountants,  or,  forgive  me, 
rs,  but  business  people— the  people 
an  take  this  legislation  and  use  it. 
can  expand  our  markets,  become 
ters,  or  sell  to  export  trading  com- 
i  who  can  do  it  for  them.  The  bot- 
ne  will  be  a  breakthrough  in  ex- 


ports, higher  growth,  lower  deficits,  and 
a  tremendous  surge  in  new  jobs  and  op- 
portunities for  our  people.  Each  billion 
dollars  that  we  add  in  exports  means 
tens  of  thousands  of  new  jobs. 

More  companies  will  seek  the  world 
of  exports  when  they  realize  that 
government  is  not  an  adversary.  It's 
your  partner.  And  I  don't  mean  senior 
partner.  We  have  eased,  substantially, 
taxation  of  foreign-earned  income,  and 
introduced  a  25%  tax  credit  for  research 
and  development.  We're  also  working  to 
reform  the  Foreign  Corrupt  Practices 
Act,  not  to  weaken  safeguards  against 
bribery  but  to  remove  disincentives  that 
discourage  legitimate  business  transac- 
tions overseas. 

Another  obstacle  is  export  controls 
on  technology.  A  backlog  of  two  thou- 
sand applications  greeted  us  when  we 
arrived  in  office.  We  eliminated  those 
and  relaxed  export  controls  on  low 
technology  items  that  do  not  jeopardize 
our  national  security.  Still,  there  are 
limits.  I'm  confident  each  of  you 


to  the  increases  this  year  in  the  regular 
loan  guarantee  program  for  promoting 
U.S.  farm  exports. 

To  retain  America's  technological 
edge— of  which  there  is  no  greater 
evidence  than  California's  Silicon 
Valley— and  to  revive  our  leadership  in 
manufacturing,  we've  implemented  a 
research  and  development  policy  to 
enhance  the  competitiveness  of  U.S.  in- 
dustry in  the  world  economy.  In  our 
1984  budget,  we've  asked  for  significant 
increases  for  basic  research.  And  we  will 
seek  to  improve  the  teaching  of  science 
and  mathematics  in  secondary  schools, 
so  tomorrow's  work  force  can  better 
contribute  to  economic  growth.  We  will 
also  seek  to  encourage  greater  and  more 
creative  interaction  between  university 
and  industry  scientists  and  engineers, 
through  programs  similar  to  the  one  be- 
tween Hewlett  Packard  and  Stanford 
University. 

Finally,  we're  taking  steps  to  en- 
courage more  industrial  research  and 
development  through  changes  in  our  tax 


Either  the  free  world  continues  to  move  forward 
and  sustain  the  postwar  drive  toward  more  open 
markets,  or  we  risk  sliding  back  to  the  tragic 
mistakes  of  the  1930s,  when  governments  convinced 
themselves  that  bureaucrats  could  do  it  better  than 
entrepreneurs.  The  choice  we  make  affects  not  only 
our  prosperity  but  our  peace  and  freedom. 


understands  that  we  must  avoid 
strengthening  those  who  wish  us  ill  by 
pursuing  short-term  profits  at  the  ex- 
pense of  free-world  security.  Trade  must 
serve  the  cause  of  freedom,  not  the  foes 
of  freedom. 

To  export  more,  we  must  do  a  bet- 
ter job  promoting  our  products.  We're 
strengthening  our  export  credit  pro- 
grams by  increasing  the  level  of  the 
Export-Import  Bank  ceiling  on  export 
guarantees.  We're  also  designing  a  tax 
alternative  to  the  Domestic  International 
Sales  Corporation  that  will  fully  main- 
tain existing  incentives  to  our  exporters. 
We've  begun  a  Commodity  Credit  Cor- 
poration blended  export  credit  program 
for  our  farmers.  And  that's  in  addition 


and  antitrust  policy.  And  we  will  at- 
tempt to  remove  legal  impediments  that 
prevent  inventors  of  new  technology 
from  reaping  the  rewards  of  their 
discoveries. 

Supporting  American  producers 
gives  us  the  means  to  press  our  trading 
partners  toward  more  free  and  open 
markets.  We're  challenging  the  unfair 
agricultural  trade  practices  of  Japan  and 
the  European  Community.  And  we're 
charting  a  new  course  for  the  products 
of  the  future.  We  have  agreed  to  a  work 
program  with  the  Government  of  Japan 
to  eliminate  trade  and  investment  bar- 
riers to  high  technology  industries.  We 
have  also  established  a  working  group 
with  the  Japanese  to  actively  explore  op- 
portunities for  the  development  of  abun- 
dant energy  resources. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Leading  Role  of  the  U.S. 

By  restoring  strength  to  our  economy, 
enhancing  the  ability  of  our  producers  to 
compete,  America  is  leading  its  trading 
partners  toward  renewed  growth  around 
the  world.  The  world  economy,  like  ours, 
has  been  through  a  wrenching  experi- 
ence: a  decade  of  inflation,  ballooning 
government  spending,  and  creeping  con- 
straints on  productive  enterprise.  Other 
countries,  including  many  of  the  devel- 
oping countries,  are  now  making  major 
efforts  to  restrain  inflation  and  restore 
growth.  The  United  States  applauds 
these  efforts,  and  we're  working  in  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  to  keep  a 
firm  focus  on  the  role  of  effective 
domestic  policies  in  the  growth  and 
stability  of  the  world  economy. 

But  for  all  countries,  international 
trade  and  financial  flows  are  extremely 
important.  Either  the  free  world  con- 
tinues to  move  forward  and  sustain  the 
postwar  drive  toward  more  open 
markets,  or  we  risk  sliding  back  to  the 
tragic  mistakes  of  the  1930s,  when 
governments  convinced  themselves  that 
bureaucrats  could  do  it  better  than 
entrepreneurs.  The  choice  we  make  af- 
fects not  only  our  prosperity  but  our 
peace  and  freedom.  If  we  abandon  the 
principle  of  limiting  government  inter- 
vention in  the  world  economy,  political 
conflicts  will  multiply  and  peace  will  suf- 
fer, and  that's  no  choice  at  all. 

The  United  States  will  carry  the 
banner  for  free  trade  and  a  responsible 
financial  system.  These  were  the  great 
principles  at  Bretton  Woods,  New 
Hampshire,  in  1944,  and  they  remain 
the  core  of  U.S.  policy.  We  will  do  so 
well  aware  of  the  changes  that  have  oc- 
curred in  the  international  trade  and 
monetary  system. 

In  trade,  for  example,  we've  prac- 
tically eliminated  the  barriers  which  in- 
dustrial countries  maintain  at  the  border 
on  manufactured  products.  Today, 
tariffs  among  these  countries  average 
less  than  5%.  Our  problems  arise  instead 
from  nontariff  barriers  which  often 
reflect  basic  differences  in  domestic 
economic  policies  and  structures  among 
countries.  These  barriers  are  tougher  to 
remove.  We're  determined  to  reduce 
government  intervention  as  far  as  possi- 
ble and,  where  that  is  unrealistic,  to  in- 
sist on  Hmits  to  such  intervention. 


In  trade  with  developing  countries, 
on  the  other  hand,  tariffs  and  quotas 
still  play  a  significant  role.  Here,  the 
task  is  to  find  a  way  to  integrate  the 
developing  countries  into  the  liberal 
trading  order  of  lower  tariffs  and  dis- 
mantled quotas.  They  must  come  to  ex- 
perience the  full  benefits  and  respon- 
sibilities of  the  system  that  has  produced 
unprecedented  prosperity  among  the  in- 
dustrial countries.  We've  taken  the  lead, 
proposing  the  Caribbean  Basin  initiative 
to  encourage  poor  and  middle-income 
countries  to  trade  more,  and  we  pro- 
posed a  North-South  round  of  trade 
negotiations  to  maintain  expanding 
trading  opportunities  for  more  advanced 
developing  countries.  We  seek  to  build  a 
collective  partnership  with  all  developing 
countries  for  peace,  prosperity,  and 
democracy. 

At  the  GATT  [General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade]  ministerial 
meeting  last  November,  the  United 
States  took  the  lead  in  resisting  protec- 
tionism, strengthening  existing  institu- 
tions, and  addressing  the  key  trade 
issues  of  the  future.  While  we're  not 
totally  satisfied  with  the  outcome  of  that 
meeting,  we'll  continue  in  our  support  of 
free  and  equal  trade  opportunities  for  all 
countries. 

Expanding  trade  is  also  the  answer 
to  our  most  pressing  international  finan- 
cial problem— the  mounting  debt  of 
many  developing  countries.  Without  the 
opportunity  to  export,  debt-troubled 
countries  will  have  difficulty  servicing, 
and  eventually  reducing,  their  large 
debts.  Meanwhile,  the  United  States  will 
support  the  efforts  of  the  international 
financial  community  to  provide  adequate 
financing  to  sustain  trade  and  to  en- 
courage developing  countries  in  the  ef- 
forts they  are  making  to  improve  the 
basic  elements  of  their  domestic  eco- 
nomic programs. 

Earlier  this  week  I  forwarded  draft 
legislation  to  the  Congress  for  additional 
American  support  for  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  Lending  by  the  IMF 
has  a  direct  impact  on  American  jobs 
and  supports  continued  lending  by  com- 
mercial institutions.  If  such  lending  were 
to  stop,  the  consequences  for  the  Ameri- 
can economy  would  be  very  negative. 

This  spring,  in  May,  the  United 
States  will  host  the  annual  economic 
summit  of  the  major  industrial  countries 
in  Williamsburg,  Virginia.  The  leaders  of 
the  greatest  democracies  will  have  a 


quiet  opportunity  to  discuss  the  cri1 
issues  of  domestic  and  Internationa 
economic  policy  and  reflect  on  then 
dividual  and  collective  responsibiliti 
free  peoples  throughout  the  world, 
not  a  forum  for  decisionmaking.  E; 
leader  is  responsible  primarily  to  h 
her  own  electorate.  But  by  exchanj, 
views,  these  leaders  can  gain  a  bet 
understanding  of  how  the  future  ol 
own  people  depends  on  that  of  othi 

And  may  I  just  interject  here, 
thing  brand  new  in  international  n 
tions  has  been  brought  about  by  or 
Prime  Minister  Margaret  Thatcher 
When  we  sit  around  those  summit 
tables,  the  protocol  is  gone,  and  wi 
on  a  first-name  basis.  And  she  saw 
that. 

I  began  today  by  saying  that  ii 
believe  in  our  abilities  and  work 
together,  we  can  make  America  th 
mightiest  trading  nation  on  Earth, 
in  this  room,  and  not  far  from  thi? 
building,  are  people  and  companiei 
the  burning  commitment  that  we  i 
to  make  our  country  great.  One  oi 
companies,  the  Daisy  Systems  Coi 
tion,  is  a  computer  firm  in  Sunnyv 
California.  It  was  formed  in  Augu 
1980,  and  it  made  $7  million  in  sal 
first  shipping  year.  This  year  it  ex 
to  earn  $25  million  and  by  1986,  $ 
million.  Daisy  Corporation  is  a" 
selling  its  products  in  the  markets 
France,  Norway,  Belgium,  Great  1 
tain,  Germany,  Israel,  and  Japan, 
work  force  has  nearly  quadrupled 
last  year. 

Well,  my  dream  for  America, 
know  it's  one  you  share,  is  to  take 
kind  of  success  story  and  multiply 
a  million.  We  can  do  it.  Albert  Eii 
told  us,  "Everything  that  is  really 
and  inspiring  is  created  by  indivld: 
who  labor  in  freedom."  With  all  tb 
wisdom  in  our  minds,  and  all  the  1 
our  hearts,  let's  give  of  ourselves 
make  these  coming  years  the  grea 
America  has  ever  known. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  7,  198 


Department  of  State  E, He 


THE  PRESIDENT 


rategic  Importance  of  El  Salvador 
d  Central  America 


ddr-ess  before  the  National  Associa- 
)f  Manufacturers,  Washington, 
on  March  10,  1983.^ 

idn't  come  to  Washington  at  an 
time,  and  we've  certainly  had  our 
!  of  problems.  But  the  signs  of 
'ery  are  springing  up  all  around  us. 
e's  no  mistaking  the  fact  that,  at 
last,  America  is  on  the  mend,  and 
ourage  and  the  vision  of  the  people 
nstitutions  represented  here  today 
•ve  a  big  share  of  the  credit  for  this 
earned  but  inflation-free  recovery, 
n  behalf  of  all  your  fellow  citizens 
have  been  freed  from  the  ravages 
naway  inflation  and  can  look  again 
future  of  better  times  and  then  new 
rtunity,  I  thank  you. 
America  is  meeting  her  challenge 
at  home.  But  there  are  other 
Bnges,  equally  important,  that  we 

face.  And  today  I'd  like  to  talk  to 
ibout  one  of  them.  Late  last  year,  I 
;d  Central  America.  Just  a  few 
;s  ago,  our  U.N.  Ambassador,  Jeane 
Patrick,  also  toured  the  area.  And 
e  last  few  days,  I  have  met  with 
irs  of  the  Congress  to  discuss  recent 
ts  in  Central  America  and  our 
ies  in  that  troubled  part  of  the 
i.  So,  today  I'd  like  to  report  to  you 
lese  consultations  and  why  they  are 
■rtant  to  us  all. 

Phe  nations  of  Central  America  are 
ig  our  nearest  neighbors.  El  Salva- 
for  example,  is  nearer  to  Texas 

Texas  is  to  Massachusetts.  Central 
rica  is  simply  too  close,  and  the 
;egic  stakes  are  too  high,  for  us  to 
re  the  danger  of  governments  seiz- 
)ower  there  with  ideological  and 
ary  ties  to  the  Soviet  Union, 
^et  me  show  you  just  how  important 
;ral  America  is.  At  the  base  of  Cen- 
America  is  the  Panama  Canal.  Half 
1  the  foreign  trade  of  the  United 
es  passes  through  either  the  canal 
ther  Caribbean  sealanes  on  its  way 
•  from  our  ports.  And,  of  course,  to 
lorth  is  Mexico,  a  country  of  enor- 
s  human  and  material  importance, 

which  we  share  1,800  miles  of 
eful  frontier. 

And  between  Mexico  and  the  canal 
Central  America.  As  I  speak  to  you 
y,  its  countries  are  in  the  midst  of 


the  gravest  crisis  in  their  history.  Ac- 
cumulated grievances  and  social  and  eco- 
nomic change  are  challenging  traditional 
ways.  New  leaders  with  new  aspirations 
have  emerged  who  want  a  new  and  bet- 
ter deal  for  their  peoples.  That  is  good. 

The  problem  is  that  an  aggressive 
minority  has  thrown  in  its  lot  with  the 
Communists,  looking  to  the  Soviets  and 
their  own  Cuban  henchmen  to  help  them 
pursue  political  change  through  violence. 
Nicaragua  has  become  their  base.  These 
extremists  make  no  secret  of  their  goal. 
They  preach  the  doctrine  of  a  "revolu- 
tion without  frontiers."  Their  first  target 
is  El  Salvador. 


Importance  of  El  Salvador 

Why  is  El  Salvador  important?  Well,  to 
begin  with,  there  is  the  sheer  human 
tragedy.  Thousands  of  people  have 
already  died,  and,  unless  the  conflict  is 
ended  democratically,  millions  more 
could  be  affected  throughout  the  hemi- 
sphere. The  people  of  El  Salvador  have 
proved  they  want  democracy.  But  if 
guerrilla  violence  succeeds,  they  won't 
get  it.  El  Salvador  will  join  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  as  a  base  for  spreading  fresh 
violence  to  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Costa 
Rica— probably  the  most  democratic 
country  in  the  world  today.  The  killing 
will  increase  and  so  will  the  threat  to 
Panama,  the  canal,  and  ultimately  Mex- 
ico. In  the  process,  vast  numbers  of 
men,  women,  and  children  will  lose  their 
homes,  their  countries,  and  their  lives. 

Make  no  mistake.  We  want  the  same 
thing  the  people  of  Central  America 
want— an  end  to  the  killing.  We  want  to 
see  freedom  preserved  where  it  now  ex- 
ists and  its  rebirth  where  it  does  not. 
The  Communist  agenda,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  to  exploit  human  suffering  in 
Central  America  to  strike  at  the  heart  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  By  preventing 
reform  and  instilling  their  own  brand  of 
totalitarianism,  they  can  threaten  free- 
dom and  peace  and  weaken  our  national 
security. 

I  know  a  good  many  people  wonder 
why  we  should  care  about  whether  Com- 
munist governments  come  into  power  in 
Nicaragua,  El  Salvador,  or  such  other 


countries  as  Costa  Rica,  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  and  the  islands  of  the  Carib- 
bean. One  columnist  argued  last  week 
that  we  shouldn't  care  because  their 
products  are  not  that  vital  to  our 
economy.  That's  like  the  argument  of 
another  so-called  expert  that  we 
shouldn't  worry  about  Castro's  control 
over  the  island  of  Grenada— their  only 
important  product  is  nutmeg. 

Well,  let  me  just  interject  right  here. 
Grenada— that  tiny,  little  island  with 
Cuba  at  the  west  end  of  the  Caribbean, 
Grenada  at  the  east  end— that  tiny,  lit- 
tle island  is  building  now,  or  having  built 
for  it,  on  its  soil  and  shores  a  naval 
base,  a  superior  air  base,  storage  bases 
and  facilities  for  the  storage  of  muni- 
tions, barracks  and  training  grounds  for 
the  military.  I'm  sure  all  of  that  is  simp- 
ly to  encourage  the  export  of  nutmeg. 

People  who  make  these  arguments 
haven't  taken  a  good  look  at  a  map  late- 
ly or  followed  the  extraordinary  buildup 
of  Soviet  and  Cuban  military  power  in 
the  region  or  read  the  Soviets'  dis- 
cussions about  why  the  region  is  import- 
ant to  them  and  how  they  intend  to  use 
it. 

It  isn't  nutmeg  that  is  at  stake  in  the 
Caribbean  and  Central  America.  It  is  the 
U.S.  national  security.  Soviet  military 
theorists  want  to  destroy  our  capacity  to 
resupply  Western  Europe  in  case  of  an 
emergency.  They  want  to  tie  down  our 
attention  and  forces  on  our  own 
southern  border  and  so  limit  our  capaci- 
ty to  act  in  more  distant  places  such  as 
Europe,  the  Persian  Gulf,  the  Indian 
Ocean,  the  Sea  of  Japan.  Those  Soviet 
theorists  noticed  what  we  failed  to 
notice— that  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  Cen- 
tral America  constitute  this  nation's 
fourth  border. 

If  we  must  defend  ourselves  against 
a  large  hostile  military  presence  on  our 
border,  our  freedom  to  act  elsewhere,  to 
help  others,  and  to  protect  strategically 
vital  sealanes  and  resources  has  been 
drastically  diminished. 

They  know  this.  They  have  written 
about  this.  We  have  been  slow  to  under- 
stand that  the  defense  of  the  Caribbean 
and  Central  America  against  Marxist- 
Leninist  takeover  is  vital  to  our  national 
security  in  ways  we're  not  accustomed 
to  thinking  about.  For  the  past  3  years, 
under  two  presidents,  the  United  States 
has  been  engaged  in  an  effort  to  stop 
the  advance  of  communism  in  Central 
America  by  doing  what  we  do  best — by 
supporting  democracy.  For  3  years,  our 
goal  has  been  to  support  fundamental 


THE  PRESIDENT 


change  in  this  region— to  replace  pover- 
ty with  development  and  dictatorship 
with  democracy. 

These  objectives  are  not  easy  to  at- 
tain, but  we're  on  the  right  track.  Costa 
Rica  continues  to  set  a  democratic  exam- 
ple, even  in  the  midst  of  economic  crisis 
and  Nicaraguan  intimidation.  Honduras 
has  gone  from  military  rule  to  a  freely 
elected  civilian  government.  Despite  in- 
credible obstacles,  the  democratic  center 
is  holding  in  El  Salvador,  implementing 
land  reform  and  working  to  replace  the 
politics  of  death  with  the  life  of 
democracy. 

So  the  good  news  is  that  our  new 
policies  have  begun  to  work.  Democracy, 
with  free  elections,  free  labor  unions, 
freedom  of  religion,  and  respect  for  the 
integrity  of  the  individual,  is  the  clear 
choice  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
Central  Americans.  In  fact,  except  for 
Cuba  and  its  followers,  no  government 
and  no  significant  sector  of  the  public 
anywhere  in  this  hemisphere  want  to  see 
the  guerrillas  seize  power  in  El 
Salvador. 

The  bad  news  is  that  the  struggle 
for  democracy  is  still  far  from  over. 
Despite  their  success  in  largely  eliminat- 
ing guerrilla  political  influence  in  popu- 
lated areas,  and  despite  some  improve- 
ments in  military  armaments  and  mobili- 
ty. El  Salvador's  people  remain  under 
strong  pressure  from  armed  guerrillas 
controlled  by  extremists  with  Cuban- 
Soviet  support. 

The  military  capability  of  these  guer- 
rillas—and I  would  like  to  stress  military 
capability,  for  these  are  not  peasant  ir- 
regulars, they  are  trained  military 
forces— this  has  kept  political  and 
economic  progress  from  being  turned  in- 
to the  peace  the  Salvadoran  people  so 
obviously  want.  Part  of  the  trouble  is  in- 
ternal to  El  Salvador.  But  an  important 
part  is  external:  the  availability  of  train- 
ing, tactical  guidance,  and  military  sup- 
plies coming  into  El  Salvador  from 
Marxist  Nicaragua. 

I'm  sure  you've  read  about  guerrillas 
capturing  rifles  from  government  na- 
tional guard  units,  and  recently  this  has 
happened.  But  much  more  critical  to 
guerrilla  operations  are  the  supplies  and 
munitions  that  are  infiltrated  into  El 
Salvador  by  land,  sea,  and  air— by  pack 
mules,  by  small  boats,  and  by  small  air- 
craft. These  pipelines  fuel  the  guerrilla 
offensives  and  keep  alive  the  conviction 
of  their  extremist  leaders  that  power 
will  ultimately  come  from  the  barrels  of 
their  guns. 


Now,  all  this  is  happening  in  El 
Salvador  just  as  a  constitution  is  being 
written,  as  open  presidential  elections 
are  being  prepared,  and  as  a  peace  com- 
mission named  last  week  has  begun  to 
work  on  amnesty  and  national  reconcilia- 
tion to  bring  all  social  and  political 
groups  into  the  democratic  process.  It  is 
the  guerrilla  militants  who  have  so  far 
refused  to  use  democratic  means,  have 
ignored  the  voice  of  the  people  of  El 
Salvador,  and  have  resorted  to  terror, 
sabotage,  and  bullets  instead  of  the 
ballot  box. 


It  isn't  nutmeg  that  is  at 
stake  in  the  Caribbean 
and  Central  America.  It 
is  the  U.S.  national 
security. 


Questions  Concerning  El  Salvador 

During  the  past  week,  we  have  dis- 
cussed all  of  these  issues  and  more  with 
leaders  and  Members  of  the  Congress. 
Their  views  have  helped  shape  our  own 
thinking,  and  I  believe  that  we've  de- 
veloped a  common  course  to  follow. 
Here  are  some  of  the  questions  raised 
most  often. 

First:  How  bad  is  the  military 
situation?  It  is  not  good.  Salvadoran 
soldiers  have  proved  that  when  they  are 
well  trained,  led,  and  supplied,  they  can 
protect  the  people  from  guerrilla  at- 
tacks. But  so  far,  U.S.  trainers  have 
been  able  to  train  only  1  soldier  in  10. 
There  is  a  shortage  of  experienced  of- 
ficers; supplies  are  unsure.  The  guer- 
rillas have  taken  advantage  of  these 
shortcomings.  For  the  moment,  at  least, 
they  have  taken  the  tactical  initiative 
just  when  the  sharply  limited  funding 
Congress  has  so  far  approved  is  running 
out. 

A  second  vital  question  is:  Are  we 
going  to  send  American  soldiers  into 
combat?  And  the  answer  to  that  is  a  flat 


A  third  question:  Are  we  going  to 
Americanize  the  war  with  a  lot  of  U.S. 
combat  advisers?  And  again  the  answer 
is  no.  Only  Salvadorans  can  fight  this 
war,  just  as  only  Salvadorans  can  decide 


El  Salvador's  future.  What  we  can  ■ 
help  to  give  them  the  skills  and  sup 
they  need  to  do  the  job  for  themsel  ■ 
That  mostly  means  training.  Witho' 
playing  a  combat  role  themselves  a: 
without  accompanying  Salvadoran  i ' 
into  combat,  American  specialists  c ' 
help  the  Salvadoran  Army  improve  I 
operations.  Over  the  last  year,  desj  I 
manifest  needs  for  more  training,  \ ' 
have  scrupulously  kept  our  training ' 
tivities  well  below  our  self-imposed  ' 
numerical  limit  on  numbers  of  trail  I 
We  are  currently  reviewing  what  v  I 
do  to  provide  the  most  effective  tn  I 
possible  to  determine  the  minimum  ) 
of  trainers  needed  and  where  the  t  ■ 
ing  should  best  take  place.  We  thir  I 
best  way  is  to  provide  training  out  ' 
El  Salvador,  in  the  United  States,  ' 
elsewhere,  but  that  costs  a  lot  mor  I 
the  number  of  U.S.  trainers  in  El  f 
Salvador  will  depend  upon  the  res(  I 
available.  ' 

Question  four:  Are  we  seekiri 
political  or  a  military  solution?  I  j 

all  I  and  others  have  said,  some  pe  I 
still  seem  to  think  that  our  concen  j 
security  assistance  means  that  all  j 
care  about  is  a  military  solution.  T  | 
nonsense.  Bullets  are  no  answer  t(  j 
nomic  inequities,  social  tensions,  o  n 
political  disagreements.  Democrac 
what  we  want.  And  what  we  want  ti 
enable  Salvadorans  to  stop  the  kill 
and  sabotage  so  that  economic  anc 
political  reforms  can  take  root.  Th  a 
solution  can  only  be  a  political  one 

This  reality  leads  directly  to 
fifth  question:  Why  not  stop  the  l 
ings  and  start  talking?  Why  not 
negotiate?  Well,  negotiations  are 
already  a  key  part  of  our  policy.  V  a 
port  negotiations  among  all  the  na  .m 
of  the  region  to  strengthen  democ  y 
to  halt  subversion,  to  stop  the  llov  : 
arms,  to  respect  borders,  and  to  r 
all  the  foreign  military  advisers— 1 
Soviets,  the  Cubans,  the  East  Ger  J« 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Or^  'H 
tion],  as  well  as  our  own— from  th 
region.  A  regional  peace  initiative  ;Di 
emerging.  We've  been  in  close  tou 
with  its  sponsors  and  wish  it  well.  M 
we  support  negotiations  within  na  '- 
aimed  at  expanding  participation 
democratic  institutions— at  get  t  mi  I 
parties  to  participate  in  free,  nnii\ 
elections. 

What  we  oppose  are  negotiati 
that  would  be  used  as  a  cynical  dt  ' 
for  dividing  up  power  behind  the 
people's  back.  We  cannot  support 


Departnnent  of  State  B  le' 


THE  PRESIDENT 


lations  which,  instead  of  expanding 
fracy,  try  to  destroy  it— negotia- 
Ivhich  would  simply  distribute 
i  among  armed  groups  without  the 
nt  of  the  people  of  El  Salvador, 
lade  that  mistake  some  years  ago 
KS  when  we  pressed  and  pressured 
[^otian  Government  to  form  a 
oment,  a  co-op,  with  the  Pathet 
■armed  guerrillas  who'd  been  doing 
the  guerrillas  are  doing  in  El 
flor.  And  once  they  had  that  tri- 
ip  government,  they  didn't  rest  un- 
ee  guerrillas,  the  Pathet  Lao,  had 
I  total  control  of  the  government  of 
! 

;ie  thousands  upon  thousands  of 
dorans  who  risked  their  lives  to 
kst  year  should  not  have  their 
fe  thrown  into  the  trash  heap  this 
iy  letting  a  tiny  minority  on  the 
•'  of  a  wide  and  diverse  political 
um  shoot  its  way  into  power.  No, 
ly  legitimate  road  to  power,  the 
oad  we  can  support,  is  through  the 
booth,  so  that  the  people  can 
;  for  themselves— choose,  as  His 
!ss  the  Pope  said  Sunday,  "far 
:error  and  in  a  climate  of  demo- 
i  conviviality."  This  is  fundamental, 
:  is  a  moral  as  well  as  a  practical 
^that  all  free  people  of  the 
Seas  share. 


folicy  Toward  El  Salvador 

ig  consulted  with  the  Congress,  let 
til  you  where  we  are  now  and  what 
<i\\  be  doing  in  the  days  ahead.  We'll 
;me  all  the  help  we  can  get.  We  will 
i^mitting  a  comprehensive,  inte- 
il,  economic  and  military  assistance 
lor  Central  America. 

Irst,  we  will  bridge  the  existing 
li  military  assistance.  Our  projec- 
bf  the  amount  of  military  assist- 
Eieeded  for  El  Salvador  have  re- 
id  relatively  stable  over  the  past  2 
r  However,  the  Continuing  Resolu- 
I  udget  procedure  in  the  Congress 
"ecember  led  to  a  level  of  U.S. 
Jty  assistance  for  El  Salvador  in 
Jbelow  what  we'd  requested,  below 
(Provided  in  1982,  and  below  that  re- 
^d  for  1984.  I  am  proposing  that 
'Million  of  the  monies  already  ap- 
>>'iated  for  our  worldwide  military 
iiance  programs  be  immediately  re- 
■^ted  to  El  Salvador. 

urther,  to  build  the  kind  of  disci- 
L4,  skilled  army  that  can  take  and 
r.he  initiative  while  respecting  the 
i^;  of  its  people,  I  will  be  amending 

ipplemental  that  is  currently  before 


the  Congress,  to  reallocate  $50  million 
to  El  Salvador.  These  funds  will  be 
sought  without  increasing  the  overall 
amount  of  the  supplemental  that  we 
have  already  presented  to  Congress. 
And,  as  I  have  said,  the  focus  of  this 
assistance  will  remain  the  same:  to  train 
Salvadorans  so  that  they  can  defend 
themselves.  Because  El  Salvador's 
security  problems  are  not  unique  in  the 
region,  I  will  also  be  asking  for  an  addi- 
tional $20  million  for  regional  security 
assistance.  These  funds  will  be  used  to 
help  neighboring  states  to  maintain  their 
national  security  and  will,  of  course,  be 
subject  to  full  congressional  review. 

Second,  we  will  work  hard  to  sup- 
port reform,  human  rights,  and  democ- 
racy in  El  Salvador.  Last  Thursday,  the 
Salvadoran  Government  extended  the 
land  reform  program  which  has  already 
distributed  20%  of  all  the  arable  land  in 
the  country  and  transformed  more  than 
65,000  farm  workers  into  farm  owners. 
What  they  ask  is  our  continued  eco- 
nomic support  while  the  reform  is  com- 
pleted. And  we  will  provide  it.  With  our 
support,  we  expect  that  the  steady  prog- 
ress toward  more  equitable  distribution 
of  wealth  and  power  in  El  Salvador  will 
continue. 

Third,  we  will,  I  repeat,  continue  to 
work  for  human  rights.  Progress  in  this 
area  has  been  slow,  sometimes  disap- 
pointing. But  human  rights  means  work- 
ing at  problems,  not  walking  away  from 
them.  To  make  more  progress,  we  must 
continue  our  support,  advice,  and  help  to 
El  Salvador's  people  and  democratic 
leaders.  Lawbreakers  must  be  brought 
to  justice,  and  the  rule  of  law  must  sup- 
plant violence  in  settling  disputes.  The 
key  to  ending  violations  of  human  rights 
is  to  build  a  stable,  working  democracy. 
Democracies  are  accountable  to  their 
citizens.  And  when  abuses  occur  in  a 
democracy,  they  cannot  be  covered  up. 
With  our  support,  we  expect  the  govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  to  be  able  to  move 
ahead  in  prosecuting  the  accused  and  in 
building  a  criminal  justice  system  appli- 
cable to  all  and  ultimately  accountable  to 
the  elected  representatives  of  the  peo- 
ple. 

Now,  I  hope  you've  noticed  that  I 
was  speaking  in  millions,  not  billions, 
and  that,  after  2  years  in  Federal  office, 
is  hard  to  do.  In  fact,  there  are  some 
areas  of  government  where,  I  think, 
they  spill  as  much  as  I've  talked  about 
here  over  a  weekend. 

Fourth,  the  El  Salvador  Govern- 
ment proposes  to  solve  its  problems  the 


only  way  they  can  be  solved  fairly— by 
having  the  people  decide.  President 
Magana  has  just  announced  nationwide 
elections  moved  up  to  this  year,  calling 
on  all  to  participate— adversaries  as  well 
as  friends.  To  help  political  adversaries 
participate  in  the  elections,  he  has  ap- 
pointed a  peace  commission,  including  a 
Roman  Catholic  bishop  and  two  inde- 
pendents. And  he  has  called  on  the 
Organization  of  American  States  (OAS) 
and  the  international  community  to  help. 
We  were  proud  to  participate,  along 
with  representatives  of  other  democratic 
nations,  as  observers  in  last  March's 
Constituent  Assembly  elections.  We 
would  be  equally  pleased  to  contribute 
again  to  any  international  effort, 
perhaps  in  conjunction  with  the  OAS,  to 
help  the  government  insure  the  broadest 
possible  participation  in  the  upcoming 
elections— with  guarantees  that  all,  in- 
cluding critics  and  adversaries,  can  be 
protected  as  they  participate. 

Let  me  just  say  a  word  about  those 
elections  last  March.  A  great  worldwide 
propaganda  campaign  had,  for  more 
than  a  year,  portrayed  the  guerrillas  as 
somehow  representative  of  the  people  of 
El  Salvador.  We  were  told  over  and 
over  again  that  the  government  was  the 
oppressor  of  the  people. 

Came  the  elections,  and  suddenly  it 
was  the  guerrilla  force  threatening 
death  to  any  who  would  attempt  to  vote. 
More  than  200  busses  and  trucks  were 
attacked  and  burned  and  bombed  in  an 
effort  to  keep  the  people  from  going  to 
the  polls.  But  they  went  to  the  polls, 
they  walked  miles  to  do  so  and  stood  in 
long  lines  for  hours  and  hours.  Our  own 
congressional  observers  came  back  and 
reported  one  instance  that  they  saw 
themselves  of  a  woman,  who  had  been 
shot  by  the  guerrillas  for  trying  to  get 
to  the  polls,  standing  in  the  line  refusing 
medical  attention  until  she  had  had  her 
opportunity  to  go  in  and  vote.  More 
than  80%  of  the  electorate  voted.  I  don't 
believe  here  in  our  land,  where  voting  is 
so  easy,  we've  had  a  turnout  that  great 
in  the  last  half  century.  They  elected  the 
present  government,  and  they  voted  for 
order,  peace,  and  democratic  rule. 

Promoting  Regional 
Economic  Progress 

Finally,  we  must  continue  to  help  the 
people  of  El  Salvador  and  the  rest  of 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean  to 
make  economic  progress.  More  than 


THE  PRESIDENT 


three-quarters  of  our  assistance  to  this 
region  has  been  economic.  Because  of 
the  importance  of  economic  development 
to  that  re^on,  I  will  ask  the  Congress 
for  $65  million  in  new  monies  and  the 
reprogramming  of  $103  million  from 
already  appropriated  worldwide  funds 
for  a  total  of  $168  million  in  increased 
economic  assistance  for  Central 
America.  And  to  make  sure  that  this 
assistance  is  as  productive  as  possible, 
I'll  continue  to  work  with  the  Congress 
for  the  urgent  enactment  of  the  long- 
term  opportunities  for  trade  and  free 
initiative  that  are  contained  in  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  initiative. 

In  El  Salvador  and  in  the  rest  of 
Central  America,  there  are  today  thous- 
ands of  small  businessmen,  farmers,  and 
workers  who  have  kept  up  their  produc- 
tivity as  well  as  their  spirits  in  the  face 
of  personal  danger,  guerrilla  sabotage, 
and  adverse  economic  conditions.  With 
them  stand  countless  national  and  local 
officials,  military  and  civic  leaders,  and 
priests  who  have  refused  to  give  up  on 
democracy.  Their  struggle  for  a  better 
future  deserves  our  help.  We  should  be 
proud  to  offer  it,  for,  in  the  last 
analysis,  they  are  fighting  for  us,  too. 

The  Need  for  U.S.  Support 

By  acting  responsibly  and  avoiding  il- 
lusory shortcuts,  we  can  be  both  loyal  to 
our  friends  and  true  to  our  peaceful, 
democratic  principles.  A  nation's  char- 
acter is  measured  by  the  relations  it  has 
with  its  neighbors.  We  need  strong, 
stable  neighbors  with  whom  we  can 
cooperate.  And  we  will  not  let  them 
down. 

Our  neighbors  are  risking  life  and 
limb  to  better  their  lives,  to  improve 
their  lands,  and  to  build  democracy.  All 
they  ask  is  our  help  and  understanding 
as  they  face  dangerous,  armed  enemies 
of  liberty,  and  that  our  help  be  as  sus- 
tained as  their  own  commitment.  None 
of  this  will  work  if  we  tire  or  falter  in 
our  support.  I  don't  think  that  is  what 
the  American  people  want  or  what  our 
traditions  and  faith  require.  Our  neigh- 
bors' struggle  for  a  better  future  de- 
serves our  help,  and  we  should  be  proud 
to  offer  it. 

We  would,  in  truth,  be  opening  a 
two-way  street.  We  have  never,  I 
believe,  fully  realized  the  great  potential 
of  this  Western  Hemisphere.  Oh,  yes,  I 
know  in  the  past  we  have  talked  of 
plans,  we've  gone  down  there  every  once 
in  a  while  with  a  great  plan  somehow 
for  our  neighbors  to  the  south,  but  it 
was  always  a  plan  which  we— the  big 


colossus  of  the  north— would  impose  on 
them.  It  was  our  idea. 

On  my  trip  to  Central  and  South 
America,  I  asked  for  their  ideas.  I 
pointed  out  that  we  had  a  common  heri- 
tage. We'd  all  come  as  pioneers  to  these 
two  great  continents.  We  worshipped 
the  same  God,  and  we'd  lived  at  peace 
with  each  other  longer  than  most  people 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 

There  are  more  than  600  million  of 
us  calling  ourselves  Americans— North, 
Central,  and  South.  We  haven't  really 
begun  to  tap  the  vast  resources  of  these 
continents. 

Without  sacrificing  our  national 
sovereignties,  our  own  individual 
cultures  or  national  pride,  we  could  as 
neighbors  make  this  Western  Hemi- 
sphere— our  hemisphere— a  force  for 
good  such  as  the  Old  World  has  never 
seen.  But  it  starts  with  the  word  neigh- 
bor. And  that  is  what  I  talked  about 
down  there  and  sought  their  partner- 
ship— their  equal  partnership — in  we  of 


the  Western  Hemisphere  coming 
together  to  truly  develop  fully  the  ] 
tial  this  hemisphere  has. 

Last  Sunday,  His  Holiness  Popei 
John  Paul  II  prayed  that  the  measu: 
announced  by  President  Magana  wo 
"contribute  to  orderly  and  peaceful  ] 
ress"  in  El  Salvador,  progress  "foun 
on  the  respect  for  the  rights  of  all,  i 
that  all  have  the  possibility  to  coope 
in  a  climate  of  true  democracy  for  t 
promotion  of  the  common  good." 

My  fellow  Americans,  we  in  the 
United  States  join  in  that  prayer  foi 
democracy  and  peace  in  El  Salvadoi 
and  we  pledge  our  moral  and  mater 
support  to  help  the  Salvadoran  peo{  '■ 
achieve  a  more  just  and  peaceful  fu' 
And  in  doing  so,  we  stand  true  to  b 
the  highest  values  of  our  free  societ 
and  our  own  vital  interests. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  14,  198 


News  Conference  of  February  16 
(Excerpts) 


Q.  The  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee today  held  off  your  nomination 
of  Kenneth  Adelman  as  arms  control 
director,  and  several  Senators  asked 
that  you  withdraw  his  nomination. 
Will  you? 

A.  No,  I  believe  the  young  man  is 
eminently  qualified  for  this.  All  of  his 
experience  indicates  it.  He  is  well 
educated.  He  is  a  very  intelligent 
man— his  experience  with  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick  up  at  the  United  Nations 
and  all.  And  I  don't  believe  that  they,  in 
delaying  this,  have  done  anything  to 
help  us  in  our  efforts  to  get  an  arms 
reductions  agreement.  I  look  very  much 
forward  to  having  him  doing  this,  and  I 
have  to  disagree  with  those  who — 

First  of  all,  arms  reduction  should 
not  be  a  political  problem  on  the  Hill. 
It's  too  serious,  and  we  are  too  con- 
cerned with  it.  Frankly,  I  feel  that  since 
I  was  the  one  who  took  the  lead  in 
bringing  about  the  first  real  arms  reduc- 
tion talks  that  we've  ever  been  able  to 
hold  with  the  Soviet  Union— and  they 
are  engaged  in  those  talks  right  now — I 
believe  that  I  had  a  right  to  ask  for  my 
choice  of  whom  I  thought  could  be  of 
help  to  me  in  that. 


Q.  What  do  you  expect  to  do  i 
the  next  week  to  turn  around  thai 
majority  that  is  now  against  Mr. 
Adelman?  And  if  Mr.  Adelman  caii 
win  the  confidence  of  the  Republi 
majority  in  the  Senate  Foreign  R( 
tions  Committee,  how  do  you  expr 
him  to  be  an  effective  spokesman 
the  United  States  with  the  Soviet. 
Union  and  our  European  allies? 

A.  I  think  that  what  I'll  do— yd 
don't  give  away  trade  secrets  or 
anything,  but  I  will  try  to  be  as  per 
suasive  as  I  can  and  make  them  see 
light.  If  that  falls  short,  maybe  I'll  t 
make  them  feel  the  heat. 

Q.  Since  November  1981  youri 
ministration  has  stuck  to  the  so-c;B 
zero  option  in  the  INF  [intermedi:^ 
range  nuclear  forces]  phase,  and  fit 
tack  so  far  has  just  led  to  deadloe 
There's  been  a  good  deal  of  debat(jnr 
side  the  Administration  about  off  Jul 
a  different  position,  one  that  migl 
lead  to  more  bargaining.  You've  a 
parently  chosen  not  to  do  that.  Ca' 
you  tell  us  why? 

A.  No,  the  situation  is  just  v\:i<  > 
what  [Vice  President]  George  Bush 
telling  our  friends  in  Europe — callii.a' 
tention  back  to  when  I  first,  before  « 


22 


Department  of  State  BuJ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


;  (lull,  introduced  this  proposal  for 
'  i|iiin[i  — I  said  that  we  would 
.Male  III  good  faith  any  legitimate 
'  wal  that  might  be  offered.  We  still 

•ir  Mime  thing.  So  far,  no  legitimate 
I  fipioposal  has  been  offered  that 
il  warrant  negotiation  or  study.  But 

1  lulii've  that  the  zero  option  is  the 
ill  hmii  ground  in  this  situation,  that 
■  lipiirtunity  in  that  area  to  get  rid  of 
111  ire  i-lass  of  weapons  and  release 
itln'  ."^iiviet  Union,  the  Eastern  bloc, 
if\estern  Europe  from  the  threat 
lis  hanging  over  them  warrants  do- 
;lir  best  to  get  that  solution, 

^.  By  clinging  to  that  position,  if 
ipading  nowhere,  don't  you  run  the 
lof  the  worst  of  both  worlds— no 
ijement  with  the  Soviets  and  a 
;ing  down  by  the  European  allies 
jjt  deployment  of  the  new  cruise 
ales  and  Pershings? 

\.  Let  nie  just  say,  without  getting 
dhe  strategy-  of  negotiating,  I  don't 

J':'e  we've  reached  that  point  yet. 
I  don't  think  that's  a  valid  threat. 


^.  Back  on  your  arms  control 
(tor  nomination,  Kenneth 
(man.  He  was  quoted  today  in  the 
tie  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
)ing  as  having  said  that,  "Arms 
1;  are  a  sham  that  we  just  have  to 
I  out  to  keep  the  American  people 
[European  allies  happy."  With  that 

!of  statement  on  the  record  from 
and  with  the  fact  that  he  doesn't 
a  lot  of  practical  experience  in 
ii  control  negotiations,  are  you  not 
iling  the  Soviet  Union  a  propagan- 
dvantage  in  that  propaganda  war 
urope  by  presenting  this  man  as 
ilead  man  on  arms  control? 
A.  No,  I  don't  believe  so,  and  I 
t— I  know  that  he  is  aware  of  what 
fe  proposing  and  what  we're  trying 
p.  And  it  isn't — he  knows  it  isn't  a 
n,  that  we're  as  on  the  level  as 
ne  can  be  in  trying  to  promote  this. 
I  think  he  can  be  helpful  in  that.  I 
c  that  it  would  be  far  more  destruc- 
to  our  allies  and  their  peace  of  mind 
!e  me  repudiated  by  a  Senate  com- 
ee  on  someone  that  I  want  to  help  in 
after  the  great  success  that  George 
1  has  had  and  George  Shultz  in  Asia. 

Q.  In  not  voting  on  him  today,  as 
derstand  the  committee  action, 
ler  than  vote  against  your  choice, 
're  asking  you  not  to  make  them 


do  that,  but  to  withdraw  him  so  they 
won't  have  to.  But  if  they  did  have  a 
vote,  they  would  have  voted  against 
him.  So — 

A.  Either  way  I  would  lose  then, 
wouldn't  I?  And  what's  the  difference 
whether  I  surrender  or  they  beat  me  by 
one  vote? 


Q.  There's  a  report  tonight  that 
we  have  sent  AWACS  [airborne  warn- 
ing and  control  system]  to  Egypt  and 
that  we've  sent  a  carrier  nearby.  And  I 
wanted  to  ask  you,  do  you  fear  that 
there's  going  to  be  a  Libyan  attack  on 
Egypt,  or  could  you  explain  why  we've 
taken  these  actions  that  we  apparently 
have  taken? 

A.  I  don't  believe  that  there's  been 
any  naval  movement  of  any  kind.  And 
we're  well  aware  of  Libya's  attempts  to 
destabilize  its  neighbors  and  other  coun- 
tries there  in  that  part  of  the  world. 

But  the  AWACS,  this  is  not  an 
unusual  happening.  We  have  conducted 
joint  exercises  and  training  exercises 
with  the  Egyptian  Air  Force— one,  last 
year.  We'll  do  more  in  the  future.  These 
planes  have  been  there  for  quite  some 
time  in  Egypt,  the  AWACS  planes,  for 
this  kind  of  an  exercise,  and  that's  what 
they're  going  to  conduct. 

Q.  You  don't  see,  then,  any 
unusual  or  particular  threat  from 
Libya  toward  Egypt  or  its  neighbors 
at  this  moment  beyond  the  general  at- 
titude the  Libyans  have  had? 

A.  As  I've  said  to  you,  we're  well 
aware  of  their  propensity  for  doing 
things  like  that,  so  we  wouldn't  be  sur- 
prised. But  this  is  an  exercise  that  we've 
done  before,   are  going  to  do  again,  and 
going  to  do  it  now.  And  there,  as  I  say, 
has  been  no  naval  movement  at  all. 

Q.  We  understand  that  the  threat 
may  be  from  [Col.  Muammer]  Qadhafi 
to  the  Sudan.  How  serious  is  the 
threat  to  the  Sudan?  And.  if  neces- 
sary, would  you  use  American  forces 
to  stop  Qadhafi? 

A.  I  don't  think  there's  any  occasion 
for  that;  it's  never  been  contemplated. 
But  we've  known  that  the  Sudan  is  one 
of  the  neighboring  states  that  he  has 
threatened  with  destabilizing  and  so 


forth,  just  as  he  has  with  Chad.  And 
that's  all  I  can  say  about  that.  But,  no, 
we  don't  have  any  forces  in  that  area 
that  would  be  involved. 

Q.  The  question  arises  because, 
you'll  remember  very  well,  in  1981  we 
shot  down  two  of  Qadhafi's  aircraft 
that  we  said  were  challenging  us  in 
the  Gulf  of  Sidra.  I  take  it  if  we  do 
have  naval  forces  there  we'd  repeat 
that,  if  necessary? 

A.  This  was  an  exercise  that  is  held 
annually  by  our  Navy,  and  part  of  the 
force  was  deployed  narrowly  in  the  Gulf 
of  Sidra,  which  he  had  tried  to  claim— 
international  water  or  was— not  interna- 
tional waters,  I'm  sorry— was  his 
waters.  This  is  as  if  we  ran  a  line  from 
the  Texas  border  over  to  the  tip  of 
Florida  and  said  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  is 
American  waters.  No  one  else  can  get 
in. 

But  in  that  instance,  it  was  just  very 
clearcut.  They  sent  out  planes,  and  they 
shot  missiles  at  two  of  our  airplanes. 
And  two  of  our  airplanes  turned  around 
and  shot  missiles  at  them.  We  were  just 
better  shots  than  they  were. 

Q.  Would  we  do  it  again  if 
necessary? 

A.  I  think  that  any  time  that  our 
forces,  wherever  we  have  put  them,  are 
fired  upon,  I  have  said,  they've  got  a 
right  to  defend  themselves,  yes. 


Q.  In  a  recent  interview,  you  in- 
dicated that  if  the  stabilization  of 
Lebanon  would  require  more  peace- 
keeping forces  that  we  ought  to  be 
willing  to  do  that.  Is  the  United 
States  proposing  or  is  it  backing  a 
plan  that  would  include  more  peace- 
keeping forces  in  Lebanon,  and  would 
those  forces  be  somewhere  other  than 
the  Beirut  area? 

A.  We  have  said— and  there  had 
been  talk  of  this  with  regard  to  the  dif- 
ficulty in  getting  the  present  forces  of 
the  PLO,  the  Syrians,  and  the  Israelis 
out  of  Lebanon  while  they  establish 
themselves  and  their  government — we 
have  said  that  if  in  consultation  with  our 
allies,  the  multinational  forces,  if  an  in- 
crease and  redeployment  of  those  forces 
could  aid  and  speed  up  this  getting  of 
the  other  forces  out  of  there,  I  would  be 
willing  to  go  along  with  that.  Of  course, 
we  would  have  to  have  the  equal  agree- 
ment of  our  allies  in  that,  or  maybe 
other  countries  could  join,  too. 


THE  PRESIDENT 


I  think  it  would  be  well  worth  it, 
this  is  too  great  an  opportunity 
to  finally  bring  peace  to  the  Middle  East 
for  us  to  let  this  go  by.  And  I  would 
like— as  I  say,  I  think  it  would  be  well 
worth  the  price  to  have  them  there.  It 
doesn't  mean  that  their  duty  would  be 
very  much  different  than  it  is  today.  It's 
to  be  a  stabilizing  force  while  Libya 
[Lebanon]  recovers  from  this  long  period 
of  warlords  with  their  own  armies  and 
so  forth,  and  establishes  its  sovereignty 
over  its  own  borders. 

Q.  You  seem  to  be  indicating  that 
you  have  decided.  Have  you  proposed 
it?  Is  it  part  of  the  plan  that  Mr. 
Habib  [Philip  C.  Habib,  special  repre- 
sentative of  the  President  to  the  Mid- 
dle East]  has  taken? 

A.  No,  this  is  just,  as  I've  said,  that 
if  this  should  become  a  factor,  and  this 
could  be  the  key  element  in  resolving 
this  situation,  this  departure  of  forces 
from  Lebanon.  Then,  yes,  I  would  be 
willing  to  go  along  with  this. 

Q.  As  you  know,  there's  an  elec- 
tion approaching  in  West  Germany, 
and  the  latest  polls  appear  to  give  the 
opposition  a  prospect  at  least  of  win- 
ning those  elections  in  March.  What 
do  you  think  the  consequences  would 
be  for  the  Western  alliance  if  a  new 
German  Government  took  office  and 
declined  to  deploy  the  Pershing 


A.  I  think  it  would  be  a  terrible  set- 
back to  the  cause  of  peace  and  disarma- 
ment. So  far,  I've  had  no  indication  that 


that  would  be  a  possibility.  Herr  Vogel 
[Hans-Jochen  Vogel,  Social  Democratic 
Party  candidate  for  chancellor]  has  been 
here  in  this  country.  He  indicated  sup- 
port of  what  it  is  that  we're  proposing  in 
the  arms  reduction  talks,  and  he  seemed 
to  indicate  his  knowledge  of  how  impor- 
tant our  continued  plan  to  deploy — re- 
member, at  their  request— those 
missiles  would  be  in  securing  this  reduc- 
tion in  armaments. 

So,  we're  not  going  to  inject 
ourselves  into  anyone  else's  internal  af- 
fairs or  elections  at  all.  But  I  believe 
that  the  Vice  President's  trip  there 
found  great  support  all  over  Europe  of 
what  it  is  we're  doing,  and  in  Germany, 
even,  from  the  fact  that  there  is— 
they're  preparing  for  an  election. 

Q.  So  you  think  the  deployment 
question  will  not  turn  on  the  West 
German  elections,  then? 

A.  No,  I  don't.  I  don't  really  believe 
that. 

When  I  said  it  would  be  terrible,  I 
did  not  mean  that  to  infer  as  that  some- 
one else  might  win  an  election.  I  meant 
that  it  would  be  terrible  if  any  of  our 
allies  withdrew  from  their  present  posi- 
tion of  support  for  this. 


Q.  The  message  that  Vice  Presi- 
dent Bush  seemed  to  bring  back  and 
that  we  heard  from  him  on  television 
last  week  was  that  they  do  support 
your  zero  option  proposal,  but  since  it 
has  gotten  nowhere  that  they  would 


very  much  like  the  consideration  ol 
so-called  interim  move  toward  less 
progress.  Coming  out  of  your  spok 
man  in  the  past  2  or  3  days  seems  I 
be  a  very  hard  line  against  that,  ar 
wonder,  don't  you  think  that  is  ma 
ing  it  politically  more  difficult  for 
NATO  leaders  to— 

A.  No,  what  he  came  back  with 
support  expressed  for  our  zero  optic 
And  what  he  also  did— there's  no  qu 
tion  about,  they  wanted  to  know 
whether  we're  going  to  be  willing  to 
other  issues— and  he  pointed  out  to 
them  my  original  statement,  and  thf 
has  been  our  position.  If  somebody 
wants  to  present  another  offer,  wel 
negotiate  in  good  faith  with  this. 

Q.  Since  your  zero  option,  Mr 
Andropov  [Yuriy  V.  Andropov,  Ge 
Secretary  of  the  Communist  Part) 
the  Soviet  Union]  made  a  counter- 
proposal which  has  been  rejected 
Doesn't  that  leave  a  lot  of  NATO  j 
leaders  feeling  like  the  ball  shoul 
in  your  court  if  there  is  going  to  1 
some— 

A.  No,  when  you— you  know,  1  j 
a  reasonable  proposal.  A  hundred  a  , 
sixty-two  missiles  with  three  warhe  | 
on  each  one— we  are  up  to  the  r 
neighborhood  of  500  missiles— and  i 
we  would  still  be  zero;  we  would  nc  | 
have  any  deterrent  force  on  our  | 
side — that  does  not  sound  to  me  likj] 
reasonable  proposal.  Now,  I  think  t  j 
ball  is  still  in  their  court.  I 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi 
tial  Documents  of  Feb.  21,  1983.  I" 


Deoartment  of  State  BiBti 


SECRETARY 


ireign  Aid  and  U.S. 
iitional  Interests 


)^ret<iry  Shultz's  address  before  the 
h-n  Ceyiter  for  International 
',  Atlanta,  Georgia,  on  Febru- 


^h  such  as  today's  provides  an  op- 
lity  for  me  to  use  a  wide-angle 
ilthough  the  broad  picture  is  ever 
imind,  the  day-to-day  business  of 
lite  Department  generally  finds  us 
;iot  the  broad  brush  but  the 
•'s  glass  as  we  examine  the 
individual  issues  on  which  our 
■  relations  turn.  So  today  I  want 
ji  by  opening  the  lens  full  scope.  I 
fecribe  the  fundamental  tenets 
iinderlie  President  Reagan's 

i  policy, 
m  I'd  like  to  turn  the  lens  down 
successive  notches:  first,  a 
•te  turn  to  discuss  the  importance 
^foreign  policy  of  the  more  than 
keloping  countries  of  the  Third 
f-Asia,  Africa,  and  South 
b. 

Jially,  I  plan  to  focus  way  down 
|n  this  time  of  tight  budgets— 
i  the  funds  which  the  United 
(must  expend  to  achieve  its  objec- 
itontrary  to  popular  opinion,  the 
!':y  of  foreign  affairs  is  not 
';.  It  takes  resources— modest  but 
,ed,  applied  credibly  over  time— to 
1  international  peace,  foster 
3iic  growth,  and  help  insure  the 
ling  of  each  of  our  citizens.  But 
Urt  with  the  broader  view. 

(mental  Tenets  of 
foreign  Policy 

!iis  inauguration  2  years  ago, 
unt  Reagan  has  sought  to 
lize  U.S.  foreign  policy.  He  is 
'd  to  reduce  a  decade's  accumula- 
?  doubt  about  the  U.S.  commit- 
:,nd  staying  power.  Our  watch- 
lin  doing  this  are  four  ideas: 

'.•st,  we  start  with  realism. 
^cond,  we  build  our  strength. 
lird,  we  stress  the  indispensable 
o  negotiate  and  to  reach  agree- 

'urth,  we  keep  the  faith.  We 
'■  that  progress  is  possible  even 
ii  the  tasks  are  difficult  and  com- 


jt  me  take  each  of  these  very 
'  in  turn.  I'm  very  conscious  of 


them,  because  as  I  get  caught  up  in  the 
day-to-day  details  of  foreign  policy  and 
go  over  to  the  White  House  to  discuss 
my  current  problems  with  the  President, 
he  has  the  habit  of  bringing  me  back  to 
these  fundamentals.  And  I  believe  they 
are  truly  fundamental. 

Realism.  If  we're  going  to  improve 

our  world,  we  have  to  understand  it. 
And  it's  got  a  lot  of  good  things  about  it; 
it's  got  a  lot  of  bad  things  about  it.  We 
have  to  be  willing  to  describe  them  to 
ourselves.  We  have  to  be  willing  if  we 
see  aggression  to  call  it  aggression.  We 
have  to  be  willing  if  we  see  the  use  of 
chemical  and  biological  warfare  contrary 
to  agreements  to  get  up  and  say  so  and 
document  the  point.  When  we  see  perse- 
cution, we  have  to  be  willing  to  get  up 
and  say  that's  the  reality,  whether  it 
happens  to  be  in  a  country  that  is  friend- 
ly to  us  or  not. 

When  we  look  at  economic  problems 
around  the  world,  we  have  to  be  able  to 
describe  them  to  ourselves  candidly  and 
recognize  that  there  are  problems. 
That's  where  you  have  to  start,  if  you're 
going  to  do  something  about  them.  So,  I 
think  realism  is  an  essential  ingredient 
in  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  policy. 

Strength.  Next,  I  believe  is 
strength.  We  must  have  military 
strength,  if  we're  going  to  stand  up  to 
the  problems  that  we  confront  around 
the  world  and  the  problems  imposed  on 
us  by  the  military  strength  of  the  Soviet 
Union  and  the  demonstrated  willingness 
of  the  Soviet  Union  to  use  its  strength 
without  any  compunction  whatever. 

So,  military  strength  is  essential,  but 
I  think  we  delude  ourselves  if  we  don't 
recognize — as  we  do,  as  the  President 
does— that  military  strength  rests  on  a 
strong  economy;  on  an  economy  that  has 
the  capacity  to  invest  in  its  future, 
believe  in  its  future— as  you  do  here  in 
Altanta;  an  economy  that  brings  infla- 
tion under  control  and  that  stimulates 
the  productivity  that  goes  with  adequate 
savings  and  investment  and  has  given  us 
the  rising  standard  of  living  and 
remarkable  economic  development  that 
our  country  has  known.  But  more  than 
that,  we  have  to  go  back  to  our  own 
beliefs  and  ideals  and  be  sure  that  we 
believe  in  them.  And  there  is  no  way  to 
do  that  better  than  to  live  by  them 
ourselves.  So,  we  have  to  maintain  our 
own  self-confidence  and  our  own  will 


power  and  our  own  notion  that  we  are 
on  the  right  track  to  go  with  the 
strength  in  our  economy  and  our 
military  capability. 

Negotiation.  Of  course,  beyond  this, 
if  we  are  realistic  and  we  are  strong,  I 
believe  it  is  essential  that  we  also  are 
ready  to  go  out  and  solve  problems,  to 
negotiate  with  people,  to  try  to  resolve 
the  difficulties  that  we  see  all  around 
the  world— not  simply  because  in  doing 
so  we  help  the  places  where  those  dif- 
ficulties are  but  because  in  doing  so  we 
also  help  ourselves,  we  further  our  own 
interests.  So,  negotiation  and  working 
out  problems  has  got  to  be  a  watchword 
for  us,  and  we  do  that  all  around  the 
world.  I  think  it  is  no  exaggeration  to 
say  that  the  efforts  of  the  United  States 
resulted  in  saving  the  city  of  Beirut 
from  complete  destruction.  We  are  ac- 
tive in  trying  to  resolve  difficulties  in 
Kampuchea.  We  have  called  attention  to 
the  problems  in  Afghanistan.  We're 
working  in  southern  Africa  in  a  most 
difficult  situation  to  bring  about  a 
resolution  of  the  Namibia  issues,  and  so 
on  around  the  world.  But  I  like  to  think 
that  the  United  States  must  be  con- 
ceived of  as  part  of  the  solution  and  not 
part  of  the  problem.  That's  where  we 
want  to  be  standing. 

Finally,  if  we  can  achieve  these 
things,  if  we  can  be  strong  enough  so 
that  people  must  take  us  seriously,  and 
put  our  ideas  forward  in  a  realistic  man- 
ner, then  we  will  be  able  to  solve  prob- 
lems and  have  some  competence  to  be 
successful,  and,  if  we're  successful,  cer- 
tainly the  world  can  be  better. 


Relations  With  the  Third  World 

Against  that  background,  let  me  turn  to 
the  problems  of  the  Third  World  and  our 
dealings  with  them  and  our  stake  in 
doing  so  successfully.  Many  of  our 
citizens  still  see  the  developing  countries 
as  accessories  to  our  basic  interests.  But 
over  the  past  two  decades,  these  coun- 
tries have  increasingly  moved  to  the 
front  of  the  stage  where  issues  of  peace 
and  prosperity  are  played  out.  I  believe 
this  trend  has  assumed  such  proportions 
that  I  can  advance  two  fundamental 
propositions. 

First,  there  will  be  no  enduring 
economic  prosperity  for  our  country 
without  economic  growth  in  the  Third 
World. 


25 


THE  SECRETARY 


Second,  there  will  not  be  security 
and  peace  for  our  citizens  without 
stability  and  peace  in  developing  coun- 
tries. 

Let  me  explain  these  propositions. 
For  the  past  15  years,  until  the  current 
recession  took  its  toll,  the  developing 
countries  as  a  whole  have  been  growing 
more  rapidly  than  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  As  they  have  grown,  they  have 
become  increasingly  important  as 
customers  and  suppliers  for  ourselves 
and  other  industrial  nations. 

In  1980,  developing  countries  pur- 
chased about  40%  of  U.S.  exports- 
more  than  bought  by  Western  Europe, 
Eastern  Europe,  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
China  combined.  These  countries  have 
accounted  for  more  than  half  the  growth 
in  U.S.  exports  since  1975.  At  this  junc- 
ture, approximately  1  out  of  every  20 
workers  in  our  manufacturing  plants 
and  1  out  of  every  5  acres  of  our 
farmland  produce  for  Third  World 
markets.  I  might  say  that  2  out  of  every 
5  acres  of  our  farmland  produce  for  ex- 
port. That's  how  interrelated  our  farm 
community  is  with  the  international 
community. 

The  current  worldwide  recession  has 
vividly— if  painfully— highlighted  these 
relationships.  In  the  past  several  years, 
growth  rates  in  the  developing  countries 
have  dropped  from  over  5%  per  year  to 
around  2%.  Partly  as  a  result,  our  ex- 
ports to  these  countries— which  were  in- 
creasing at  more  than  30%  a  year  in  the 
late  1970s— have  tapered  off.  For  exam- 
ple, in  the  first  8  months  of  1982,  U.S. 
exports  to  Mexico  dropped  26%;  to 
Chile,  59%;  and  to  Thailand,  25%.  Ac- 
cording to  estimates,  every  $1  billion 
decline  in  U.S.  exports  erases 
60,000-70,000  U.S.  jobs  after  multiplier 
effects  are  taken  into  account.  There's  a 
direct  correlation.  Today  some  of  the 
workers  in  our  unemployment  lines  and 
some  of  the  businesses  and  farms  on  the 
auction  block  are  living,  if  unwanted, 
proof  that  the  well-being  of  our  citizens 
is  linked  to  the  well-being  of  citizens  in 
the  Third  World. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  trade 
ledger,  the  developing  countries  supply 
about  40%-45%  of  the  goods  which  we 
import  for  our  factories  and  consumers. 
Although  we  are  richer  in  minerals  than 
most  industrialized  countries,  the  Third 
World  supplies  more  than  half  the  baux- 
ite, tin,  and  cobalt  used  by  U.S.  indus- 
try. For  some  11  other  strategic  metals 
and  minerals,  the  developing  countries 
supply  more  than  half  of  our  imports. 
For  some  natural  products,  such  as  rub- 
ber, coffee,  cocoa,  and  hard  fibers,  the 
Third  World  supplies  everything  we  use. 

This  intertwining  of  the  European 


and  our  economy  with  those  of  the  Third 
World  will  increase  in  the  1980s  and 
1990s.  As  the  recession  fades,  we  can 
expect  the  faster  growing  countries— 
particularly  in  Asia  but  also  in  South 
America — to  resume  their  role  as 
engines  of  growth  in  the  world  economy. 
They  will  open  up  new  opportunities  for 
our  exports  and  jobs  for  our  citizens.  We 
have  an  abiding  interest  in  fostering  this 
growth. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  are  join- 
ing with  other  industrial  nations  to  add 
funds  to  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  These  funds  are  critical  to  helping 
debt-plagued  developing  countries  make 
painful  but  unavoidable  adjustments  in 
their  economies  and  thereby  resume 
healthy  growth  rates.  We  have  a  direct 
stake  in  their  success. 

For  this  reason,  also,  we  resist— and 
call  on  all  Americans  to  resist— pleas  for 
further  protectionism.  Putting  up  bar- 
riers to  imports  will  only  result  in  losing 
markets  for  our  exports  and  paying 
higher  prices  for  goods.  Resorting  to 
protectionism  as  an  antidote  to  recession 
is  like  turning  to  alcohol  to  ward  off  the 
cold.  It  may  feel  good  at  first,  but  it 
shortly  becomes  corrosive.  The  tonic  for 
our  ills  is  noninflationary  growth,  not 
stiff  draughts  of  old  Smoot-Hawley. 


Beyond  the  demands 
of  economies,  the  Third 
World  is  fundamental  to 
our  aspirations  for 
security  and  peace. 


Beyond  the  demands  of  economies, 
the  Third  World  is  fundamental  to  our 
aspirations  for  security  and  peace.  Since 
1950,  most  of  the  major  threats  to  inter- 
national stability,  and  the  chief  oppor- 
tunities for  expansion  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  political  reach,  have  come  in 
the  Third  World.  The  headlines  have 
rung  with  now  familiar  names:  Korea 
in  1950;  Dienbienphu  in  1954;  Suez, 
Cuba,  and  more  recently  Iran,  Angola, 
Afghanistan,  Kampuchea,  El  Salvador, 
and  Ethiopia. 

A  study  by  the  Brookings  Institution 
has  identified  no  fewer  than  185  in- 
cidents in  developing  countries  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II  when  U.S.  military 
forces  were  used  in  situations  which 
threatened  our  political  or  economic  in- 
terests. As  we  speak  today,  1,200 
Marines  are  on  duty  in  Lebanon  helping 
again  to  patch  the  torn  fabric  of  peace. 

The  point  is  clear.  The  fault  line  of 


global  instability  runs  strongly  acres 
the  continents  of  the  Third  World.  T 
instability  is  inimical  to  our  security 
many  ways.  Small  incidents  can  flar 
to  larger  conflagrations  and  potentif 
into  confrontations  between  the  supi 
powers.  Korea  and  Cuba  teach  this 
lesson  well. 

More  subtly,  the  Soviet  Union  a 
its  allies  are  able  to  feed  on  political 
stability.  Some  of  the  most  significa 
uses  by  the  SoNnets  of  military  powt 
since  World  War  II  have  been  in  thi 
developing  world.  The  Soviet  deploj 
ment  of  a  deepwater  navy,  an  airlifi 
capacity,  and  mobile  ground  forces 
given  them  the  ability  to  intervene  • 
they  perceive  opportunities. 

In  addition,  the  Soviet  Union 
supports  870,000  troops  in  North 
Korea— 60%  more  than  maintained 
South  Korea.  It  bankrolls  the  Viet- 
namese Army,  which  has  positionec 
180,000  troops  directly  on  the  bord 
Thailand.  It  supports  about  40,000 
Cuban  troops  in  Angola,  Ethopia,  a 
Mozambique.  In  1981,  the  Soviet  U  i 
supplied  about  three  times  as  many  i 
tanks,  aircraft,  and  artillary  pieces 
did  the  United  States. 

We  cannot  ignore  these  realitie 
they  challenge  oar  national  interest 
Strategically,  some  of  the  least  sec 
Third  World  countries  are  sources  i 
critical  raw  materials  or  lie  astride  ( 
sealanes  which  carry  our  military  f  { 
and  world  commerce.  The  premier  H 
ample  is  the  Persian  Gulf.  About  3;  I 
the  free  world's  oil  supplies  is  pum)  n 
there.  The  region  is  vital  to  the  i 
economic  and  political  security  of 
Europe,  Japan,  and  the  United  Sta  ^ 
It  is  in  our  interest  to  build  stability 
this  region  and  thereby  help  assure  ' 
cess  to  those  supplies.  |j 

As  a  parenthetical  remark,  I  w  | 
mention  my  belief  that  the  recent  i 
decline  in  oil  prices — and  the  possill 
of  further  declines— will  spur  the  f  i 
world's  economic  recovery.  For  sor|j 
countries— such  as  Venezuela  and 
ico— cheaper  oil  surely  means  tougl 
times.  But  it  will  be  good  for  most  [ 
I  have  seen  one  illustrative  estimatj 
a  decline  in  oil  prices  to  $20  per  bai 
would  boost  real  growth  rates  in  thl 
dustrial  countries  by  up  to  1.5%.  Ai 
steep  decline  would  have  proportio| 
positive  effects.  So,  I  have  the  seni: 
that  as  people  contemplate  the  dec  \ 
in  oil  prices,  there's  a  tendency  for  \ 
pie  to  wring  their  hands  about  whf 
pened  to  this  or  that  business  or  fi  "■ 
cial  institution  or  country— and  th( ' 
are  problems  and  we  need  to  look 
them,  all  right.  But  let's  not  forget  if 


I 


Department  of  State  BiB'i' 


THE  SECRETARY 


point,  it's  going  to  be  good  for  us 
[ood  for  economic  growth,  which 
ed. 

16  job  of  building  our  security  also 
■es  that  we  maintain  military 
ies  and  strengthen  indigenous 
se  forces  around  the  world.  This 
[es  U.S.  bases  in  the  Philippines 
1  Turkey,  the  Azores,  Morocco,  and 
strategically  placed  countries, 
le  United  States  cannot  defend  its 
sts  by  operating  out  of  the  United 

and  Europe  alone.  We  need  the 
ration  of  countries  in  the  Third 
1  to  grant  transit,  refueling,  and 
ights.  Otherwise,  while  we  may 
,0  build  up  a  rapid  deployment 
we  will  be  unable  to  deploy  it 
lit  Third  World  friends  who  will 
us  to  use  their  facilities.  We  must 
pared,  in  turn,  to  help  these  key 
ries  achieve  their  aspirations  for 
ty  and  economic  growth.  This  is 
st  a  short-term  proposition.  The 
5S  of  mutual  cooperation  weaves 
f  interdependence  and  friendship 
will  redound  to  our  benefit  in 
to  come. 

goes  without  saying  that  the  least 
ble  method  for  preserving  our 
gic  interests  and  insuring  stability 
developing  countries  is  by  sending 
5.  forces.  The  185  incidents  which  I 
oned  earlier  represent,  in  essence, 
lilures  to  resolve  problems  by  more 
ired  means.  If  we  are  to  reduce  in- 

in  the  future,  we  need  a  signifi- 
)rogram— sustained  over  time— to 
;  peace  and  economic  well-being  in 
IS  vital  to  our  security. 


security  and  Development 
sration  Program 

;t,  we  have  such  a  program.  It  is 
i  the  U.S.  Security  and  Develop- 
)Cooperation  Program.  Although 
(dministration  has  clarified  its  goals 
harpened  its  focus,  it  is  essentially 
^me  program  endorsed  by  every 
President  since  Harry  Truman.  It's 
fimes  called  foreign  aid  and  all  too 
depicted  as  a  giveaway.  But  that  is 
Inomer.  The  program's  purpose  is 
iate  those  conditions  of  growth, 
ity,  and  freedom  in  developing 
jries  which  serve  the  fundamental 
fsts  of  each  U.S.  citizen, 
jet  me  give  some  examples  of  how 
fks.  Our  highest  priority  in  this 
Jam  is  bringing  peace  to  the  Middle 


East.  Because  of  the  ties  between  the 
United  States  and  Israel,  a  crisis  in  this 
region  has  always  placed  us  in  the 
center  of  a  potentially  serious  world  con- 
frontation. 'This  has  been  so  for  more 
tlian  25  years.  Achieving  a  lasting  peace 
in  the  Middle  East  will  not  only  benefit 
each  and  every  citizen  in  those  lands  but 
will  ease  one  of  the  fundamental  threats 
to  world  peace  and  our  own  security. 

Making  peace  there  means  more 
than  holding  talks,  as  vital  as  these  are. 
Sustained  economic  growth  is  needed  in 
Egypt,  Israel,  and  Jordan.  Lebanon 
needs  to  open  roads,  restore  electrical 
service,  restart  its  economic  engines, 
and  resume  its  place  as  a  stable  and 
friendly  nation  in  that  part  of  the  world. 
These  countries  also  need  to  be  able  to 
defend  themselves  against  those  they 
see  as  aggressors.  In  this  circumstance, 
we  and  other  nations  provide  both 
economic  and  military  aid.  This  aid  is  in- 
dispensable to  the  peace  process. 

Another  program— with  particular 
bearing  here  in  the  south— is  the  Presi- 
dent's Caribbean  Basin  initiative.  Some 
of  you  have  dealt  directly  with  the  con- 
sequences of  poverty,  political  turmoil, 
and  SovietyCuban  interventionism  near 
our  shores.  These  have  come  in  human 
form— off  airplanes  and  out  of  boats — 
to  present  in  person  their  claims  for  a 
better  deal.  For  the  south,  the  need  to 
help  the  Caribbean  and  Central 
American  nations  grow  economically  and 
build  democratic  institutions  is  not  an 
abstract  issue.  It  is  one  which  can  direct- 
ly affect  your  economy  and  society. 

Another  part  of  our  program  is  help- 
ing curb  the  rampant  population  growth 
which  underlies  much  of  the  Third 
\\'orld's  poverty  and  threatens  our 
planet's  resource  base.  The  arithmetic  is 
inexorable.  Before  World  War  II  there 
were  more  than  2  billion  people  in  the 
world.  Now  there  are  4.3  billion.  Even 
though  growth  rates  have  slowed  in  re- 
cent years,  17  years  from  now,  in  the 
year  2000,  there  will  be  6  billion.  If  we 
act  effectively,  the  world  population  may 
stabilize  at  between  12  and  16  billion  in 
the  last  half  of  the  next  century.  That's 
12-16  billion  people  to  feed,  clothe,  and 
provide  jobs  for. 

To  bring  it  closer  to  home,  Mexico 
currently  has  62  million  people.  If  they 
ai-e  able  to  lower  their  birth  rate  to  the 
two-children-per-family  level  in  the  first 
20  years  of  the  next  century,  they  will 
have  "only"  about  250  million  people 
when  their  popuation  stops  growing. 

Faced  with  these  numbers,  the 
United  States  provides  direct  technical 


advice  and  training  to  27  countries  to 
assist  them  to  mount  voluntary  family 
planning  programs.  It's  been  an  effective 
effort.  We  have  a  deep  interest  in 
continuing  it. 

Similarly,  we  provide  funds  for  U.S. 
agricultural  universities  to  help  develop- 
ing countries  grow  more  food.  Although 
there  are  food  surpluses  now,  population 
increase,  plus  growth  in  the  world 
economy,  means  that  food  production  in 
the  developing  countries  must  keep 
growing  at  3%-4%  per  year,  or  we  may 
all  face  shortages  and  rising  prices  again 
by  the  end  of  the  decade. 

So  with  U.S.  funds,  Mississippi  State 
is  introducing  improved  seed  in 
Thailand.  The  University  of  Florida  is 
increasing  crop  production  in  Ecuador. 
Auburn  is  working  in  Jamaica  and  In- 
donesia on  fish  production.  It  is  in  all 
our  interests  that  these  universities,  and 
others  across  our  agricultural  heartland, 
continue  with  our  support  to  devote 
some  of  their  considerable  talents  to 
building  secure  food  supplies  in  the 
world. 

Let  me  give  one  more  example,  this 
time  on  the  security  side.  A  glance  at  a 
map  indicates  the  importance  of  Turkey 
to  our  strategic  interests.  It  sits  like  a 
wedge  between  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
Middle  East,  and  the  western  flank  of 
the  Persian  oil  fields.  With  Iran  and  Iraq 
in  turmoil,  the  importance  of  an 
economically  and  militarily  strong 
Turkey  has  increased.  In  the  last  few 
years,  the  Russians  have  increased  the 
size  of  their  forces  stationed  north  of 
Turkey. 

Hence,  we  and  other  countries  of 
Europe,  led  by  the  Germans,  are  helping 
the  Turks  spur  their  economy  and 
replace  obsolete  tanks  and  other  equip- 
ment in  their  armed  forces.  The  cost  to 
us  of  assisting  Turkey  maintain  strong 
defense  forces  between  Russia  and  the 
Middle  East  is  less  than  one-sixth  of  the 
cost  of  maintaining  U.S.  solidiers  over- 
seas for  the  same  purpose. 

These  are  examples  of  how  an  in- 
vestment of  our  resources  contributes  to 
the  well-being  and  security  of  each  of  us 
in  this  room.  The  cost  is  modest.  For  the 
coming  fiscal  year,  the  amounts  we've 
requested  from  the  Congress  for  the  ex- 
amples I've  given  work  out  as  follows 
for  each  U.S.  citizen: 

For  building  peace  in  the  Middle 
East $12.35    per  person 

For  the  Caribbean  Basin $3.84    per 

person 

For  curbing  population  growth  .  .  92C  per 
person 

For  building  secure  food  supplies  .  .$3.15 
per  person 

For  helping  Turkey  . .  .$1.78    per  person 


1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  total  request  for  all  our  security 
and  economic  assistance  programs  in  the 
developing  countries  is  $43.91  per  per- 
son.' By  contrast,  we  Americans  spend 
$104  per  person  a  year  for  TV  and  radio 
sets,  $35  per  person  per  year  for  barber- 
shops and  beauty  parlors,  $97  per  per- 
son per  year  for  soap  and  cleaning  sup- 
plies, and  $21  per  person  per  year  for 
flowers  and  potted  plants. 

I'm  not  belittling  any  of  these  ex- 
penses. That's  not  my  intent.  They're 
part  of  our  commerce,  which  provides  us 
with  jobs  as  producers  and  satisfies  us 
as  consumers.  I  am  simply  trying  to 
establish  some  relative  values. 

Every  American  must  understand 
that  it's  necessary  to  spend  a  fraction  of 
our  collective  resources  to  secure  our 
most  precious  goals  of  freedom, 
economic  well-being,  and  peace.  An 
esteemed  son  of  Georgia  and  prede- 
cessor of  mine.  Dean  Rusk,  said  it  suc- 
cinctly: "Freedom  is  not  free." 

Progress  Is  Possible 

Let  me  close  by  opening  my  lens  back 
up  and  reverting  to  the  fourth  of  the 
tenets  which  guide  our  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs:  namely,  our  conviction 
that  progress  is  possible.  We  Americans 
have  lived  for  over  40  years  in  a 
tumultuous  world  in  which  we  have  pur- 
sued four  basic  goals: 

First,  building  world  peace  and 
deterring  war— above  all,  nuclear  war 
which  would  threaten  human  existence; 

Second,  containing  the  influence  of 
nations  which  are  fundamentally  op- 
posed to  our  values  and  interests — 
notably  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies; 

Third,  fostering  a  growing  world 
economy  and  protecting  U.S.  access  to 
free  markets  and  critical  resources;  and 

Fourth,  encouraging  other  nations 
to  adopt  principles  of  self-determination, 
economic  freedom,  and  the  rule  of  law 
which  are  the  foundation  stones  of 
American  society. 

In  these  endeavors,  we  have  had 
some  signal  successes.  Some  formerly 


troubled  countries  of  the  world— for  in- 
stance, the  countries  of  East  Asia— are 
now  relatively  strong  and  prosperous. 
Western  Europe,  a  cockpit  of  warring 
nationalities  for  a  century,  has  been  at 
peace  for  37  years.  Progress  has  been 
made  in  fundamental  areas  affecting  the 
mass  of  mankind:  better  health,  longer 
life  expectancy,  more  schooling,  in- 
creased income.  We  have  a  chance  in  the 
coming  year  to  make  major  strides  in 
fashioning  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
Americans  as  a  people  are  prag- 
matists,  suspicious  of  grand  assurances 
or  easy  promises.  But  I'm  convinced  that 
if  we  persevere— proceeding  realistical- 
ly, backed  by  strength,  fully  willing  to 
negotiate  and  search  for  agreement — we 


will  be  able  to  brighten  the  future  for 
ourselves  and  for  others  throughout  t 
world. 


'Press  release  62. 

The  figures  cited  are  derived  by 
dividing  the  Administration's  FY  1984  re 
quest  for  development  assistance,  PL  480 
economic  support  funds,  military  educatic 
and  training  program,  military  assistance 
foreign  military  grants  by  the  U.S.  populi 
of  approximately  $230  million.  The  figure 
not  include  foreign  military  sales  guarant 
loans  which  are  extended  at  market  or  nf 
market  rates  to  foreign  governments.  Tb 
loans  by  law  are  not  included  in  the  U.S. 
budget.  ■ 


Question-and-Answer  Session 
Following  Atlanta  Address 


Following  is  an  excerpt  from  a 
question-and-answer  session  Secretary 
Shultz  held  with  the  audience  at  the  con- 
clusion of  his  address  before  the  Southern. 
Center  for  International  Studies  in 
Atlanta  on  February  2U,  1983. 


Q.  Today's  New  York  Times 
reports  on  page  1  that  Moshe  Arens  is 
reported  to  be  saying  that  Jordan  is 
the  Palestinian  homeland.  Would  you 
comment  on  that? 

A.  There  are  many  Palestinians  liv- 
ing in  Jordan.  The  point  is,  however, 
that  there  are  also  many  Palestinians 
living  on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza. 
There  are  also  many  Palestinians  who 
are  homeless  and  refugees  in  other  coun- 
tries, notably  Lebanon.  And  it  must  be 
true  that  one  of  the  principal  reasons 
why  we  have  so  much  difficulty  with 
peace  in  the  Middle  East  is  that  we 
haven't  been  able  to  find  the  answer  to 
the  legitimate  rights  and  aspirations  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  We  have  to  ad- 
dress ourselves  to  that  issue,  and  the 
President's  September  1  "fresh  start 
proposal"— fully  consistent  with  the 
Camp  David  accords  which  have  tremen- 
dous ingenuity  and  creativity  in 
them— aspires  to  do  that.  So,  without  in 
any  way  commenting  on  whatever  the 
context  was  of  that  comment,  I  don't 
think  you  can  pass  off  the  Palestinian 


issue  with  a  statement  about  the  Pal.i| 
tinians  and  Jordan.  The  problem  is 
deeper  and  bigger  than  that.  [Applai  i 

Q.  What  strength  and  special 
skills  does  Mr.  [Kenneth]  Adelmar 
bring  to  his  new  post?  What  speci: . 
cally  do  you  expect  him  to  accomp.  j! 

A.  First  of  all,  he  is  smart;  seco- 
he  works  hard— he  is  full  of  energy; '. 
third,  he  knows  a  good  bit  about  the 
subject;  fourth,  he  is  quite  experienc 
in  this  area;  and  finally — I  would  sa; 
this  particularly  since  he  has  been 
criticized  on  this  score  heavily— he  i 
years  old.  Now,  some  of  my  kids  thi 
that  when  you're  36  years  old,  you'n 
pretty  old  guy.  But  the  point  is  this:  ■ 
Someone  who  is  in  his  30s  is  going  t 
have  to  live  with  the  results  of  what  ■' 
fruits  we're  able  to  get  from  arms  C( 
trol  negotiations  a  lot  longer  than  s( 
of  the  older  people  who  are  criticizir 
him  for  being  young.  So  I'm  for  him 
and  I  think  some  of  the  36-year-()liip 
our  country  ought  to  get  a  crack  at  > 
issue. 

Q.  During  your  recent  visit  to 
People's  Republic  of  China,  was  tl 
textile  quota  dispute  discussed  in 
detail?  And  was  an  agreement  reai^ 
to  resume  negotiations  on  it? 

A.  The  textile  negotiations  whic 
reached  an  impasse,  as  you  perhaps  ' 
know,  were  discussed,  although  I  di'W' 
go  there  to  negotiate  a  textile  agree ' 
ment  and  made  that  clear.  It  is  very^' 
portant,  as  we  have  negotiations  goi ' 


Department  of  State  Bui 


THE  SECRETARY 


great  variety  of  subjects  all  over 
*'orld,  that  we  support  the  people 
«ave  put  out  there  to  do  the 
jtiating,  not  to  undercut  them  by 
ig  to  make  a  deal  by  the  Secretary 
late  or  some  other  intermediary  who 
ts  along.  It  you  want  the  negotiator 
I  effective,  you  have  to  support  him 
ck  him  up,  and  that's  what  we're 

.S.  positions  in  that  negotiation  are 
reasonable,  and  we're  ready  to 

to  that  bargaining  table 
lever  they  are  ready.  So,  I  think, 
nly,  the  subject  was  discussed;  I 
I  say  that  I  made  any  particular 
<way  about  it,  although  it  may  be 
jas  a  result  of  the  conversations  we 
ithey  understand  a  little  more  clear- 
^at  our  position  is,  what  some  of  the 
j)unding  negotiations  have  brought 
Sard,  and  why  it  is  that  we  feel  as 
jigly  as  we  do  about  the  positions  we 
j  taken. 

5.  How  low  do  you  expect  the 
is  of  oil  to  go  before  it  stabilizes? 

\.  I  don't  have  any  idea,  but  I  know 
Ut's  going  down.  And  as  I  said  to 
i  after  due  regard  to  the  prob- 
[— and  there  will  be  some  severe 
:|lems  for  some  countries,  some 
iicial  institutions,  and  for  some  com- 
Ks— the  overall  result  of  a  signifi- 
i  fall  in  the  price  of  oil  will  be  good 
■is.  [Applause] 

5.  Could  we  fight  a  conventional 
1  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  win 
'vhere  in  the  world? 

\.  I  don't  like  to  think,  talk  about 
rher  you  win  a  war  or  not.  Certain- 

•e  want  to  equip  ourselves  so  that 
;an  defend  our  interests  and  help  our 
lids  and  allies  defend  our  interests. 

1  have  spent  quite  a  number  of  years 
Ving  in  a  very  fine  company,  and  like 
iompanies,  you  wind  up  with  lawsuits 
itlawyers  advising  you  on  this,  that, 
I'the  other.  We  would  occasionally 
i;'  our  lawyer  come  in  and  pound  the 
h  and  say,  "By  gosh,  we  can  win  this 

)urt."  We  would  say  to  him,  "Look! 
'don't  want  to  be  in  court."  [Ap- 
E'se]  I  think  the  United  States  is 
ihg;  we're  going  to  continue  our 
lingth,  but  we  don't  want  to  be  in  a 
i  We  want  to  avoid  war.  [Applause] 

Q.  When  you  have  facts,  you  argue 
I  facts;  when  you  have  the  law  on 
•r  side,  you  argue  the  law.  When 
y  have  neither,  you  pound  on  the 
t,e. 

A.  I  didn't  pound  on  the  table.  You 
;  I've  got  both.  [Laughter] 


Q.  How  much  of  a  threat  does 
Libya  pose  to  peace  in  the  Middle 
East?  Did  the  Sixth  Fleet  play  a 
pivotal  role  in  the  recent  Sudan  crisis? 
And  how  far  is  the  nation  prepared  to 
go  to  contain  Libyan  terrorism? 

A.  Libya  is  a  threat  to  peace  and 
stability  because  it  supports  terrorism. 
Remember  what  country  harbored  the 
murderers  in  the  Munich  Olympics? 
They  have  supported  assassinations. 
They  have  threatened  their  neigh- 
bors— Chad  and  the  Sudan— there's  no 
question  about  it.  They  say  so.  So,  they 
are  a  problem.  It  behooves  us  all  to 
watch  them  and  to  see  to  it  that  they 
know  that  we're  watching,  and  that 
there  is  the  strength  and  determination 
to  see  that  they  don't  succeed  in  these 
efforts  to  destabilize  their  region  and 
peoples'  lives. 

Now  what  the  actions  the  President 
took  may  have  had  to  do  with  their  not 
being  able  to  carry  off  their  effort  to 
destabilize  Sudan,  you'll  have  to  ask 
them.  I  don't  know.  All  I  know  is  that 
there  was  very  clear  evidence  of  a  plot; 
there  was  definite  movement  of  Libyan 
armed  forces.  The  President,  to  quote 
myself  from  last  Sunday,  "acted 
decisively,  quickly,  and  effectively;  and 
at  least  for  now,  Qaddafi  is  back  in  his 
box  where  he  belongs."  [Applause] 

Q.  Could  you  give  us  your  view  of 
the  future  relationship  between  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  People's 
Republic  of  China? 

A.  That,  of  course,  is  something  that 
they  are  working  on,  and  I  would 
hesitate  to  try  to  put  forth  some  view 
about  that.  Many  of  the  issues  that  trou- 
ble the  People's  Republic  of  China  about 
the  behavior  of  the  Soviet  Union  are,  for 
example,  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  and  the  Soviet  support  and 
instigation  through  Vietnam  of  the  tur- 
moil in  Kampuchea;  they  bother  the  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China,  and  they  bother 
us. 

If,  through  their  negotiation,  they 
can  do  something  about  those  problems, 
I'm  all  for  it.  It  bothers  us  that  there  are 
so  many  SS-20s  in  Asia.  I  wonder  who 
those  SS-20S  are  pointed  at?  It  bothers 
us  that  the  so-called  proposal  made  by 
Mr.  Andropov  [Yuriy  V.  Andropov, 
General  Secretary  of  the  Communist 
Party  of  the  Soviet  Union]  on  arms 
reduction  seemed  to  contemplate,  to  the 
extent  you  can  read  it  at  all,  taking 
these  mobile  SS-20s  and  moving  some 
of  them  from  being  a  threat  to  Europe, 
to  being  a  threat  to  Asia.  That  didn't 


thrill  our  Asian  friends  at  all;  the 
Chinese  can  talk  to  them  about  that. 
That's  fine  with  us. 

We  thought  the  Andropov  proposal, 
if  I  may  again  revert  to  the  kind  of  lingo 
we  used  to  use  when  I  was  in  the  busi- 
ness world— if  a  business  guy  made  you 
that  kind  of  a  proposition,  you'd  say  he 
offered  you  the  sleeves  from  his  vest. 
[Laughter]  So,  as  far  as  where  their 
relationship  may  go,  I  don't  know,  but 
there  are  lots  of  difficult  problems  be- 
tween them  and  between  us  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  If  the  Chinese  can  resolve 
some  of  them,  I'm  for  that. 

Q.  It  has  been  reported  that  Am- 
bassador [Soviet  Ambassador  to  the 
United  States  Anatoliy  F.]  Dobrynin 
will  be  recalled  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Is 
there  any  particular  significance  to 
that,  in  your  view? 

A.  I've  read  rumors.  I  don't  pay  any 
attention  to  them.  When  there  is  a  reali- 
ty, then  we'll  deal  with  that  as  it  comes. 
But  I  don't  want  to  comment  on  what 
the  future  plans  of  the  Soviet  Union 
may  be  for  Ambassador  Dobrynin.  He 
has  been  in  Washington  a  long  time;  he 
is  well  known  in  Washington— a  very  ef- 
fective ambassador. 

Q.  Given  Mexico's  dire  economic 
predicament,  what  can  the  United 
States  do  to  keep  Mexicans  from  flee- 
ing to  the  United  States? 

A.  Part  of  the  burden  of  my  talk 
here  today  was  to  that  point,  namely, 
we  want  to  do  everything  we  can  to 
restore  the  international  economy  to  a 
healthy  state,  to  a  point  where  it  is 
growing  vigorously  and  where  inflation, 
by  and  large,  is  under  control.  There  are 
a  lot  of  things  that  we  are  trying  to  do 
now,  and  must  do,  to  make  that  happen. 

I  mentioned  the  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  quota  increase,  on 
which  we  have  agreed  with  other  coun- 
tries. This  is  designed  to  give  the  IMF, 
which  I  might  say  has  outstanding 
leadership  from  a  truly  gifted  interna- 
tional civil  servant,  a  man  named 
Jacques  de  Larosiere — more  funds  to 
use  in  helping  debt-ridden  countries  that 
are  having  great  difficulty  with  their 
balance-of-payments  bridge  over  from 
the  situation  they  are  in  to  one  where 
more  disciplined  programs  will  bring 
them  out.  I  think  we  want  to  support 
that  kind  of  an  effort,  efforts  that  will 
promote  prosperity  in  the  world. 

Beyond  that,  of  course,  we  have 
worked  directly  with  Mexico  to  help 
resolve  some  of  its  problems  during  the 
last  3,  4,  or  5  months.  And  I  think 
Secretary  [Donald  T.j  Regan,  in  the 


|il  1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


Treasury,  and  Paul  [A.]  Volcker,  [Chair- 
man of  the  Board  of  Governors]  in  the 
Federal  Reserve,  working  with  the  IMF, 
have  really  done  a  brilliant  job  of  it.  But 
there  are  different  problems,  and  as  I 
said  earlier,  we  have  to  look  at  them 
realistically  and  deal  with  them. 

It  is  the  case  that  all  the  programs 
having  to  do  with  debt  rescheduling  and 
rearrangements,  and  so  forth,  ultimately 
depend  for  their  success  on  economic 
growth  in  the  world.  This  is  the  under- 
lying ingredient  that  we  must  have.  I 
think  that  we  can  see  some  pretty  good 
signs  that  it  is  coming. 

First,  The  U.S.  economy  is  starting 
its  upward  movement.  In  concept,  as 
you  look  at  it,  as  an  economist,  we  have 
a  very  expensive  policy  in  place.  When 
you  look  at  the  statistics,  the  statistics 
are  almost  unambiguous  that  the  begin- 
ning of  growth  is  occurring. 

Second,  the  fall  in  the  price  of  oil, 
difficult  though  it  may  be  for  Mexico, 
will  be  a  great  stimulant  to  economic 
growth  in  the  industrialized  countries 
and  for  most  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries, which  are  importers  of  oil,  and 
which  have  been  hurt  badly  by  the  in- 
creasing prices.  So  that  is,  basically,  a 
very  positive  factor  in  the  outlook. 

Third,  with  growth  in  the  U.S. 
economy  and  in  the  growth  stimulated 
by  a  lower  price  for  a  key  resource,  we 
will  see  the  other  industrial  economies 
pick  up  a  little  bit  more  than  they  might 
otherwise  have  done — Japan,  a  very  im- 
portant country,  and  the  European 
countries. 

Finally,  if  we  keep  our  wits  about 
us,  the  developing  countries  again  can 
resume  growth,  and  there  is  plenty  of 
room  for  it  and  plenty  of  need  for  it, 
and  plenty  of  drive  to  get  it  out  there. 

The  key  here,  if  this  starts  to  take 
place,  is  to  keep  our  markets  open  and 
to  persuade  others  to  do  likewise  so  that 
the  interactive  effects  of  these  develop- 
ments can  have  their  impact.  It  would 
be  a  terrible  thing  if,  in  the  light  of 
these  positive  things,  the  world  turns  in- 
ward, country  by  country,  and  insulates 
one  country  from  another,  and  aborts 
the  kind  of  prosperity  that  we  can  see. 
That  is  why,  with  all  of  the  cries  for  pro- 
tection, we  pound  the  table  and  say, 
"Let  us  keep  our  markets  open.  Let  us 
work  on  others  to  do  the  same,"  so  that 
the  interactive  effects  of  these 
developments  can  take  hold.  It's  that 
kind  of  expansion  that  is  going  to  help 
Mexico,  that  is  going  to  help  us,  that  is 
going  to  help  everybody! 


Q.  Would  an  expanded  Bretton 
Woods  conference  help  get  some  order 
back  into  the  world  economy? 

A.  Of  course,  a  conference  doesn't 
mean  anything;  it's  what  takes  place  and 
whether  there  are  some  ideas  that  some- 
body has  that  are  concrete  and  opera- 
tional and  will  really  help. 

I  believe,  to  a  certain  extent,  those 
kind  of  questions  focused  on  currency 
relationships  in  the  system  which 
governs  international  exchange  markets. 
I  believe  that  there  is  too  much  volatility 
in  exchange  markets.  We  saw,  for  exam- 
ple, a  situation  involving  the  yen  /dollar 
relationship,  where  it  went  from  about 
230  yen  to  the  dollar,  in  mid-May  last 
year,  to  276,  I  think— a  big  depreciation 
of  the  value  of  the  yen  in  the  fall  some- 
time— and  by  the  end  of  the  year  was 
back  to  230.  In  the  process  of  doing 
that,  it  changed  the  relative  cost  of  a 
Japanese  and  American  piece  of  manu- 
factured product  tremendously,  just  to 
take  that  example,  in  a  way  that  no 
amount  of  managerial  improvement,  or 
whatever,  could  account  for.  We  had 
outstanding  companies  like  Caterpillar 
Tractor  priced  out  of  third  markets. 
That's  a  problem.  I  don't  by  any  means 
suggest  that  the  Japanese  manipulated 
the  yen.  There  is  absolutely  no  evidence 
of  that. 

I  think  our  dollar  right  now  is  feel- 
ing what  we  might  call  a  "Switzerland" 
effect;  that  is,  a  lot  of  money  is  coming 
into  the  United  States,  to  be  sure,  in 
part  because  of  high  interest  rates  here, 
although  it's  interesting  that  as  interest 
rates  decline,  it  still  comes.  So,  it  must 
be  that  there  is  a  big  "safe  haven"  effect. 
But  in  the  meantime,  of  course,  what 
that  means  is  that  the  dollar  is  very, 
very  strong.  So,  we  feel  that  in  our 
trade  relationships. 

This  is  a  long  way  around  to  say 
that  if  the  problem  you're  speaking  of  is 
volatility  in  the  exchange  markets,  I've 
scratched  my  head  about  that,  and  I 
acknowledge  it  is  a  problem.  If  you 
asked  me  what  to  do  about  it,  well,  I've 
got  an  idea  or  two,  but  I  wouldn't  want 
to  advance  them  in  a  serious  interna- 
tional conference  designed  to  solve  the 
world's  problems— at  least  not  yet,  until 
they're  thought  through  some  more. 

Q.  Back  to  Japan  and  China,  do 
you  foresee  closer  relationships  grow- 
ing between  those  two  countries? 

A.  There  is  a  close  relationship,  a 
working  relationship,  between  Japan 
and  China.  They  live  right  next  door  to 
each  other;  they  have  a  lot  to  offer  each 
other  just  as  we  have  a  lot  to  offer 


mutually  with  China  and  with  Japan, 
I  would  certainly  expect  to  see  that  r 
tionship  grow. 

Q.  The  Reagan  Administration 
policy  of  constructive  engagement  i 
friendly  way  with  the  Government  ■ 
South  Africa  has  come  under  recen  " 
criticism.  Do  you  see  this  policy  as  ■ 
useful  in  producing  a  real  change  ii 
the  apartheid  policies  of  South  Afr 
or  in  a  successful  conclusion  to  the 
negotiations  for  an  independent 
Namibia? 

A.  I  do.  I  think  it  is  helpful  U<  ha 
a  relationship  and  to  work  with  th>' 
South  Africans.  That  doesn't  by  any 
means  condone  the  existence  of  an 
apartheid  policy  which  is  repreht-iisil: 
and  unacceptable.  We  have  to  be  ab- 
solutely clear  about  that.  However, 
there  are  important  problems  in  the 
region.  There  is  the  possibility  of  s.n 
progress,  and  we  should  be  on  the  si 
of  that  progress. 

Furthermore,  insofar  as  the 
emergence  of  an  independent,  self- 
governing  Namibia  is  concerned,  olv 
viously,  the  attitudes  and  policies  ( if 
South  Africa  will  be  an  important  m 
dient  in  bringing  that  about.  And  if 
you're  going  to  have  some  impact  m- 
what  their  policies  are,  you  have  tn  1 
able  to  talk  to  them.  So  we  are  tryii 
have  ourselves  in  a  position  of  talkin 
them,  even  though  on  the  aparthenl 
policy,  we  have  no  time  at  all  for  tli; 
policy. 

Q.  Does  the  United  States  also 
endeavor  to  get  not  only  Israel  but 
Syria  to  withdraw  from  Lebanon? 

A.  Of  course.  And  people  fre(iue  v 
say,  "Wliy  is  it  that  you're  spenditi.u 
your  time  on  the  negotiations  witii  I  >' 
and  not  with  Syria?"  The  answer  i-  i  ■ 
The  Lebanese  have  talked  to  the 
Syrians;  so  have  we  and  others,  and  f 
Syrians  say  that  when  the  Israelis 
withdraw,  they  will  withdraw.  In  on  : 
to  call  that  card,  we  then  have  to  go  id 
say,  "All  right,"  to  Israel,  "What  areie 
conditions  under  which  you  will  with 
draw?"  In  view  of  the  history  whei'i' 
southern  Lebanon  has  been  a  base  t' 
which  guerrilla  war,  in  effect,  was  r 
ducted  on  Israel,  it's  true  and  justifi  ' 
that  Israel  would  be  concerned  ali"ii 
creating  conditions  in  that  part  of 
Lebanon  that  will  avoid  having  that 
threat  exist  again.  We  agree  on  thai 
and  so  do  the  Lebanese. 

Having  said  that,  though,  it  posi 


Department  of  State  Bui  ti" 


THE  SECRETARY 


tough  issues  for  negotiation  about 
y  how  you  bring  that  about,  while 
.  same  time  being  consistent  with 
ea  of  a  free  and  sovereign 
ion.  It's  not  the  easiest  problem  in 
orld,  but  it  is  being  given  very  high 
ion,  and  I'm  sure  that  before  long, 
be  resolved.  Out  of  it,  we  will 
lave  a  program  under  which  the 
i  forces  will  withdraw;  and  at  that 
the  Syrians  will  be  confronted 
;hat,  and  I  expect  them  to 
raw  as  they  have  said  they  would, 
them,  I  believe,  will  go  the  PLO 
itine  Liberation  Organization] 
rs  that  remain  in  Lebanon. 

.  How  do  you  feel  the  United 
s  could  make  more  effective  use 
;  United  Nations? 

..  I  think  the  way  to  behave  in  the 
Id  Nations  is  to  be  realistic  about 
it  is  that  our  interests  are,  to 
,  up  unceasingly  about  it,  not  have 
e  make  outrageous  statements,  and 
just  let  it  go,  but  get  up  and  say 
we  object  to  and  why.  And  when 
;t  outrageous  behavior  such  as  the 
ised  vote  on  Puerto  Rico,  to  work 
vith  our  friends.  Then  we  will  see, 
■  did  last  year,  that  we  got  a  very 
vote.  When  the  United  Nations 
tens  to  expel  Israel,  for  no  reason, 
.nd  up  and  say,  as  we  did  last  year, 
lU  expel  Israel,  good-bye.  We'll 
and  take  our  money  with  us."  [Ap- 
e] 

[aving  said  that,  I  think,  "Why 
lid  we  care  that  much?  I  think  the 
sn  is  that  the  United  Nations  can 
nd  has  been  under  many  cir- 
rtances,  a  constructive  course  for 
1^  and  stability.  The  United  Nations 
;iut  peace-keeping  forces  in  various 
tkl  situations.  That  is  useful.  It  pro- 
\  a  place  for  dialogue  and 
Jlogue.  and  it  has  spun  a  number  of, 
iiight  say,  technical  or  professional 
;liizations  such  as  the  World  Health 
iiization  or  Relief  and  Rehabilitation 
1  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Ad- 
rttration]  that  perform  very  useful 
roses  and  which  we  should  support. 
,he  way  to  get  something  out  of  the 
ltd  Nations,  our  money's  worth,  you 
dt  say,  is  as  one  of  the  adver- 
ients  puts  it,  "the  old  fashioned 
i  to  work  at  it,"  and  that's  what 
^  doing.  [Applause] 


'ress  release  62A  of  Feb.  28,  1983. 


The  U.S.  and  East  Asia: 

A  Partnership  for  the  Future 


Address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  in  San  Francisco  on  March  5, 
1983.^ 

Phil  Habib's  [Philip  C.  Habib,  special 
representative  of  the  President  to  the 
Middle  East]  magnificent  work  in  the 
Middle  East  has  made  him  almost  a 
legend— and  in  his  own  time  no  less.  We 
salute  him  for  his  tireless  efforts  and  for 
what  those  efforts  have  achieved.  But 
remember:  In  the  course  of  his  outstand- 
ing career,  he  has  been  involved  in  every 
part  of  the  world.  In  East  Asia  and  the 
Pacific,  he  served  with  distinction  as  am- 
bassador and  assistant  secretary.  The 
ambassador's  residence  in  Seoul  is 
known  admiringly  as  "the  house  Habib 
built."  Phil  will  agree  and  note  ruefully 
that  he  never  lived  in  it.  I  have  just 
returned  from  a  trip  to  Phil's  old  stomp- 
ing ground  convinced  more  than  ever 
that  if  you  want  to  understand  the 
future,  you  must— like  Phil— understand 
the  Pacific  region. 

Understanding  Asia  and  the  Pacific 

My  recent  trip  to  Northeast  Asia,  and  2 
days  of  meetings  with  our  chiefs  of  mis- 
sions from  all  of  the  Asian  Pacific  area, 
underlined  for  me  the  importance  of  this 
vibrant  area  for  the  United  States  and 
for  the  world.  The  dynamism  that  I  saw 
convinces  me  that,  as  important  as  the 
region  is  today,  it  will  only  be  more  im- 
portant tomorrow.  The  people  are 
smart,  they  learn,  they  work,  they  have 
resources.  They  have  an  important 
future,  and  we  should  be  part  of  it. 
Nothing  underscores  the  direct  interest 
of  the  United  States  in  this  region  more 
than  two  simple  facts. 

•  We  trade  more  today  with  the  na- 
tions of  the  Asian  Pacific  than  with  any 
other  region  on  Earth. 

•  We  have  fought  three  wars  in  the 
Pacific  in  the  last  40  years.  We  do  not 
want  to  fight  another,  and  this  is  a 
reason  why  the  United  States  will  con- 
tinue to  maintain  a  presence  there. 

My  trip  left  me  with  many  strong 
impressions.  Some  features  of  the 
region— such  as  its  economic  and  politi- 
cal progress— offer  great  hope. 


Others — such  as  the  poverty  and  in- 
justice that  can  still  be  found  and  the 
menacing  military  postures  of  Vietnam, 
North  Korea,  and  the  Soviet  Union- 
present  all  too  familiar  challenges.  But 
all  observers  would  agree  that  the 
region  is  less  troubled  than  it  was  in  the 
eariy  1970s. 

Tlie  great  majority  of  nations  in  the 
region  have  used  the  last  decade  well. 
They  have  developed  a  new  self-confi- 
dence, and  they  have  much  to  be  self- 
confident  about.  It  is  a  confidence  born 
of  economic  success  and  of  an  emerging 
political  maturity.  Responsible  leader- 
ship has  come  to  the  fore  in  Asia  and 
the  Pacific.  The  result  is  that  our  rela- 
tions with  most  nations  of  the  region  are 
strong  and  getting  stronger.  If  there  is 
a  symbol  of  the  dramatic  change  that 
has  marked  the  region  in  recent  years, 
and  of  the  benefits  that  such  develop- 
ments can  bring  to  us  all,  it  is  perhaps 
China's  emerging  role  as  a  constructive 
force.  But  this  is  only  one  of  many  im- 
portant factors  in  the  region's  success 
and  in  the  progress  that  has  been  made 
since  earlier  years  of  the  post- World 
War  II  period. 

The  new  success  and  maturity  in 
Asia  today  provide  a  pattern  for  the 
future  but,  as  well,  valuable  lessons  for 
the  present.  Tonight,  I  would  like  to  dis- 
cuss four  of  these  lessons. 

First,  there  is  a  need  for  a  global, 
not  merely  a  regional,  view. 

Second,  despite  great  diversity,  a 
growing  community  of  interests  is  ap- 
parent in  the  Pacific  region. 

Third,  the  extension  of  economic 
and  political  freedom  is  of  essential  im- 
portance to  the  region's  future. 

Fourth,  the  United  States  has  both 
vital  interests  and  a  unique  and  critical 
role  to  play  in  the  area. 


The  Need  for  a  Global  View 

First  and  foremost,  the  trip  reinforced 
what  we  all  know:  The  fate  of  regions 
and  nations  around  the  world  are  inter- 
twined. No  one  area  of  the  world  can 
pull  up  the  drawbridge  and  ignore  prob- 
lems elsewhere. 


31 1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


Thirty  years  ago,  in  his  famous  fare- 
well address  to  Congress,  General 
MacArthur  said: 

The  issues  are  global  and  so  interlocked 
that  to  consider  the  problems  of  one  sector, 
oblivious  to  those  of  another,  is  but  to  court 
disaster  for  the  whole. 

While  Asia  is  commonly  referred  to  as 
the  gateway  to  Europe,  it  is  no  less  true  that 
Europe  is  the  gateway  to  Asia,  and  the  broad 
influence  of  the  one  cannot  fail  to  have  its  im- 
pact upon  the  other. 

MacArthur's  statement  is  today 
more  true  than  ever. 

•  Decisions  about  nuclear  missile 
deployments  in  Europe  could  have  a  ma- 
jor impact  upon  Asian  security,  a  fact 
dramatized  by  proposals  by  the  Soviet 
Union  which  would  have  the  effect  of 
shifting  the  Soviet  intermediate-range 
missile  threat  from  Europe  to  Asia. 

•  Decisions  on  trade  and  free 
markets  in  Asian  lands  influence  the  ac- 
tions of  legislators  in  Washington  and 
governments  worldwide.  The  world  is 
watching  Japan,  in  particular,  to  see  if 
its  markets  will  be  more  open  to  compe- 
tition from  abroad. 

•  The  continued  growth  of  Asian 
economies  is  an  essential  element  of 
U.S.  and  European  recovery,  while  im- 
provement in  those  economies  will  send 
waves  coursing  across  the  Pacific. 

•  The  sealanes  and  resources  of  the 
region  are  not  only  of  strategic  import- 
ance to  the  countries  in  the  region,  they 
are  crucial  to  the  defense  of  the  Indian 
Ocean,  East  Africa,  and  the  Middle 
East. 

As  East  Asian  and  Pacific  nations 
prosper,  we  hope  to  see  them  adopt  an 
increasingly  global  view.  Indeed,  we 
already  see  encouraging  steps  in  this 
direction. 

•  East  Asian  and  Pacific  nations, 
and  most  importantly  Japan,  have 
acknowledged  their  responsibilities  for 
strengthening  the  General  Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and  main- 
taining an  open  international  trading 
system,  as  they  see  with  growing  clarity 
the  threat  of  protectionism  around  the 
world. 

•  Even  smaller  Asian  countries, 
such  as  Korea,  see  that  they  must  con- 
sider modification  of  their  own  protec- 
tionist policies  (local  content  legislation, 
for  example)  to  help  insure  their  own 
continued  access  to  larger  markets. 

•  On  the  security  front,  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  and  Fiji  have  contributed 
peacekeeping  forces  for  the  Sinai. 


•  ASEAN  [Association  of  South 
East  Asian  Nations]  governments  are 
playing  an  effective  and  constructive 
role  in  the  Nonaligned  Movement,  the 
Islamic  Conference,  and  other  interna- 
tional fora. 

•  Japan  has  provided  economic  as- 
sistance to  states  in  the  Middle  East  and 
Caribbean. 

•  China,  while  not  yet  a  wealthy  na- 
tion, has  proven  itself  among  the  most 
sophisticated,  with  a  decidedly  global  ap- 
proach to  economic  and  security  issues 
and  a  clear  view  of  the  importance  of  re- 
sisting Soviet  aggression. 

As  the  Pacific  region  gains  strength 
and  confidence,  it  will  be  increasingly 
aware  of,  and  increasingly  influential  in, 
the  global  agenda. 

A  Growing  Community  of  Interests 

The  second  lesson  about  the  Pacific 
region  is  that  our  policy  must  reflect  the 
growing  community  of  interests  among 
nations  there  in  preserving  peace  and 
promoting  economic  progress.  There  are 
no  broad  regional  institutions  like  NATO 
and  the  European  Communities  (EC)  to 
provide  a  framework  for  regional  co- 
operation. The  great  differences  and 
historical  animosities  that  separate  dif- 
ferent countries  probably  preclude  the 
establishment  of  such  institutions  for  the 
immediate  future.  But,  despite  enormous 
diversity,  the  nations  of  the  region  are 
increasingly  cooperating  with  one 
another.  This  new  and  encouraging  pat- 
tern is  driven  by  two  factors: 

•  The  immense  stake  that  they  have 
in  continued  economic  growth  and  an 
open  world  economy  and 


No  one  area  of  the  world 
can  pull  up  the  draw- 
bridge and  ignore  prob- 
lems elsewhere. 


•  A  clear-eyed  perception  of  the 
military  threat  posed  by  the  forces  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  Vietnam,  and  North 
Korea. 

Economically,  the  area  leads  the 
world  in  economic  growth.  During  the 
1960s,  Japan's  annual  rate  of  growth 


averaged  above  10%.  Later,  during  t 
1970s,  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  Singapou 
and  Korea  all  achieved  average  grow 
rates  above  8%,  while  the  Philippines 
Thailand,  Indonesia,  and  Malaysia 
posted  average  growth  rates  of  from 
to  8%— all  above  the  average  even  f( 
developing  countries. 

These  economic  achievements  ha 
given  the  nations  of  the  Asian  Pacifi 
new  weight  in  the  world.  For  examp 
the  region  now  accounts  for  one-sixt 
total  world  trade.  These  achievemen 
are  not  accidental.  They  are  the  frui 
a  commitment  to  hard  work,  a  willin 
ness  to  sacrifice  immediate  benefits 
future  growth,  and  generally  sound 
policies  of  economic  management.  B 
Pacific  region  nations  recognize  that  j 
continued  success  is  dependent  on  a  | 
healthy  world  economy.  | 

Nations  of  the  region  are  similai 
aware  of  the  keen  threat  to  the  regi 
security  posed  by  the  Soviet  Union  < 
its  clients.  A  decade  and  a  half  ago, 
Soviet  warships  seldom  ventured  soi 
into  the  Pacific.  Now,  the  Soviets  I 
their  largest  fleet  in  that  ocean,  ba 
by  modern,  long-range  bombers.  Sc 
land  forces  in  the  region  have  also 
grown  during  that  time,  from  20  to 
more  than  50  divisions.  Most  ominc 
of  all,  some  100  intermediate-range 
SS-20  missiles,  each  equipped  with 
three  warheads,  threaten  Asia. 

With  massive  Soviet  assistance, 
180,000  Vietnamese  troops  occupy  1 
puchea,  use  toxin  and  chemical  weal 
on  innocent  civilians,  and  threaten  t 
peace  and  stability  of  Southeast  Asii 
The  North  Koreans,  who  spend  209f 
their  gross  national  product  on  theij 
armed  forces,  threaten  their  southa 
neighbors  with  an  armed  force  of  ot 
700,000,  one  of  the  largest  armies  ii 
world.  When  you  visit  the  DMZ  [de 
tarized  zone]  in  Korea,  as  I  did  rece 
the  tension  is  palpable.  You  know 
it  means  to  confront  real  danger,  as 
American  soldiers  and  their  South 
Korean  allies  do  every  day. 

Nonetheless,  common  economic* 
security  concerns  are  breaking  dow- 
communication  barriers,  reducing 
historical  animosities,  and  spurring  « 
nations  of  the  region  to  take  respor  il< 
steps  in  their  own  interests.  Let  mt  i*' 
just  a  few  examples. 

•  The  Japanese  Government  hi 
acknowledged  its  responsibility  for  iil 
taining  an  open  world  economy  and , 


Department  of  State  Bu ' 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  ng-  its  own  markets  for  freer  trade. 
;ie\\  prime  minister's  attitude 
'■(i  this  effort  is  refreshingly  opera- 
1,,  recognizing  that  procedures  for, 
.iceiising,  inspection,  and  registra- 
iire  as  important  as  policy  pro- 
1  ■finents.  In  addition,  Japan  has  af- 
i(i  Its  commitment  to  undertake 
:ler  ii'sponsibilities  for  its  own  de- 
;.  appropriate  to  its  abilities  and  its 
isitutional  requirements. 

Prime  Minister  Nakasone's  recent 
ito  Seoul,  and  Japan's  sizable 
(•rn  assistance  to  Korea,  have  put 
nportant  Japanese-Korean  relation- 
fin  a  new  and  stronger  footing. 

The  ASEAN  states  have  put  be- 
othem  many  of  their  differences. 
f:  are  working  effectively  together  to 
!  Vietnamese  aggression  and  to 
1  ize  international  support  for  a 
i'ful  outcome  in  Kampuchea. 

Thailand,  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  the 
iiipines,  Australia,  Hong  Kong, 
j|"i,  and  China  have  all  played  major 
e  in  handling  the  massive  exodus  of 
i?hinese  refugees. 

The  new  Pacific  island  states  are 
ing  both  regional  and  national  in- 
b.ions  simultaneously,  with  the  help 
t?ir  neighbors  in  Australia  and  New 
ind. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  has  ini- 
tl  a  productive  dialogue  with  states 
t3  region. 

And  China  has  begun  to  seek 
iSr  cooperation  with  a  number  of  its 
labors  and  to  play  a  constructive 
^nal  role,  especially  in  its  efforts  to 
mat  Vietnam's  aggression  in  Kam- 
Ka  and  elsewhere. 

'learly,  there  is  more  that  can  be 
r  and  more  that  we  would  like  to  see 
r.  We  will  continue  to  urge  Japan  to 
sue  a  greater  share  of  the  burden  of 
I  vn  defense  and  to  open  its  own 
i:et  to  the  free  competition  that 
.f  nese  products  enjoy  in  the  United 
a;s. 

iut  both  we  and  Japan  must  also 
D  beyond  these  bilateral  concerns  to 
u;hared  responsibilities.  As  President 
B;;an  recently  said,  "...  no  two  na- 
)i  are  more  mutually  dependent  than 
ifiJnited  States  and  Japan  .  .  .  Our 
i.'liership  is  so  essential,  we  have  a 
Mg  obligation  to  our  own  peoples,  to 
u  other,  to  insure  its  continued  vitali- 

Vs  .hipan's  weight  has  grown,  so  too 
1  its  responsibilities.  Decisions  on 
c5  issues,  bank  credit  to  developing 
n'tries  in  Asia  and  Latin  America, 
^'official  economic  assistance  must  re- 
e  Japan's  global  interests.  If  we  are 


patient,  as  well  as  persistent,  we  can  do 
more  than  just  maintain  the  remarkable 
post- World  War  II  record  of  Japanese- 
American  cooperation.  We  can  build  on 
it  and  make  it  an  increasingly  important 
part  of  our  future. 

China's  new,  more  constructive, 
though  guarded,  role  is  welcome,  and  a 
closer  relationship  with  China  will  bene- 
fit the  people  of  both  our  countries. 
However,  frustrations  and  problems  in 
our  relationship  are  inevitable.  They  will 
arise  not  only  out  of  differences  concern- 
ing Taiwan  but  out  of  the  differences  be- 
tween our  systems.  We  believe  that 
these  problems  can  be  managed  and  that 
the  community  of  interests  that  prom- 
ises further  progress  is  real.  Our  rela- 
tionship with  China  has  brought  tangible 
results  and  can  be  a  potent  force  for 
stability  in  the  future  of  the  region.  As 
President  Reagan  has  said,  "Our  rela- 
tionship with  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  is  important  not  only  for  stability 
and  peace  in  Asia  but  around  the  globe 
.  .  .  Despite  our  differences,  it  is  clear 
that  both  sides  value  this  relationship 
and  are  committed  to  improve  it." 

Progress  in  U.S. -China  relations 
need  not  come  at  the  expense  of  rela- 
tions with  our  other  friends  in  the 
region,  including  our  close  unofficial 
relationship  with  the  people  of  Taiwan. 
To  the  contrary,  it  can  contribute  to  the 
peace  and  economic  progress  of  the  en- 
tire region.  The  key  to  managing  our 
differences  over  Taiwan  lies  in  observing 
the  commitments  made  in  our  three 
joint  communiques  and  allowing  the  par- 
ties themselves  to  resolve  their  differ- 
ences peacefully  with  the  passage  of 
time.  To  improve  our  relations  we  must 
both  work  to  reduce  impediments  to  ex- 
panding trade  in  technology,  as  well  as 
other  economic  relations,  consistent  with 
our  long-term  security  needs.  We  must 
also  seek  to  resolve  any  misunderstand- 
ing or  dispute  through  consultations  and 
negotiations  rather  than  by  unilateral  ac- 
tion. 

In  so  doing,  we  work  to  build  a  long- 
term,  enduring,  and  constructive  rela- 
tionship on  a  basis  of  mutual  confidence. 
As  I  made  clear  in  Beijing,  Chinese 
leaders  will  find  the  United  States  ready 
to  join  with  them  on  that  basis  in  pursu- 
ing our  common  interests  in  peace  and 
modernization.  We  value  Sino-American 
relations  and  want  them  to  advance. 


Importance  of  Economic  and 
Political  Freedom 

The  third  lesson  is  the  importance  of 
economic  and  political  freedom  for  the 
region's  progress  and  security.  Our 
bilateral  relations  are  on  their  most  solid 
footing  with  those  countries  that  share 
our  commitment  to  democratic  values. 
We  believe  that  democratic  nations  are 
more  likely  to  follow  the  just  and  sensi- 
ble policies  that  will  best  serve  the 
future  of  the  region  and  the  globe. 

The  Pacific  region's  economic 
growth  has  shown  the  efficiency  of  a 
free-market  system.  The  progress  of  the 
ASEAN  states.  South  Korea,  Hong 
Kong,  and  Taiwan  has  become  a  model 
of  successful  development  for  the  Third 
World. 

Political  progress  is  more  difficult  to 
gauge  than  economic  change.  And  usual- 
ly it  seems  to  move  at  a  slower  and  less 
even  pace  than  we  would  all  desire.  But 
a  long-range  perspective  of  free-market 
nations  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
clearly  reveals,  I  believe,  a  trend  toward 
the  growth  of  democratic  institutional 
arrangements  for  economic  and  political 
conduct. 

Japan  is  the  most  obvious  example, 
but  younger  nations  are  moving  in  a 
similar  direction.  Indonesia  last  year 
added  to  an  increasingly  long  record  of 
regularly  held  elections.  And  Malaysia 
has  accomplished  that  most  difficult 
task:  peaceful  changes  of  leadership 
through  an  electoral  process.  The  new 
Pacific  nations  have  laid  strong  founda- 
tions for  popular  participation  in  govern- 
ment. The  Republic  of  Korea,  despite 
continuing  intense  pressure  from  the 
north  that  creates  severe  internal 
pressures  as  well,  has  taken  additional 
welcome  steps  recently  toward  liberali- 
zation and  toward  an  eventual  constitu- 
tional transition  of  power  in  1987. 

The  extension  of  democratic  proc- 
esses and  institutions  and  the  respect  of 
human  rights  in  general  are  integral  ele- 
ments to  the  achievement  of  lasting 
progress  and  legitimacy.  Abuses  of 
human  rights  undermine  the  progress, 
legitimacy,  and  even  the  stability  of 
governments,  thereby  vitiating  other 
gains. 

In  the  end,  economic  and  political 
freedom,  both  important  in  their  own 
right,  are  closely  intertwined  with 
security  concerns.  For  economic  and 
political  progress  provides  the  resources 
for  defense  and,  at  once,  reduces  the 
risks  of  internal  chaos  and  the  oppor- 
tunities for  external  aggression.  As 


C1 1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


President  Reagan  has  said,  "economic 
freedom  is  the  world's  mightiest  engine 
for  abundance  and  social  justice." 

The  Unique  U.S.  Role 

The  fourth  and  final  lesson  is  that  our 
role  in  the  region  is  unique.  We  are  the 
one  nation  of  the  region  with  both  a 
worldwide  view  and  the  capacity  to  im- 
plement a  worldwide  policy.  As  a  great 
power,  we  have  great  responsibilities. 
We  have  borne  them  well,  and  we  must 
continue  to  do  so. 

It  is  necessary  and  proper  that  we 
encourage  those  countries  that  share  the 
benefits  of  a  peaceful  and  prosperous 
world  order  to  assume  greater  responsi- 
bilities for  maintaining  it.  We  will  not 
ask  how  we  can  perform  that  task  by 
ourselves  or  how  we  can  get  others  to 
do  it  for  us,  but  how  we  can  combine 
our  strength  with  those  who  share  our 
commitment  to  peace  and  economic 
progress.  Fortunately,  in  the  Pacific 
region  there  are  many  who  share  those 
interests,  and  their  strength  is  growing. 

Our  goal  in  asking  others  to  increase 
their  efforts  is  to  gain  added  strength 
together,  not  to  decrease  our  own  ef- 
forts. The  United  States  will  remain  a 
Pacific  power.  Although  specific  tasks 
may  change,  our  overall  responsibilities 
will  not  be  diminished  in  importance  nor 
shifted  to  others.  This  is  particularly 
true  of  our  security  relationships  with 
our  friends  and  allies  in  the  area. 

•  Our  treaty  commitments — particu- 
larly to  the  front-line  states  of  Korea 
and  Thailand — are  essential  to  give  our 
partners  the  self-confidence  necessary  to 
face  potential  threats. 

•  These  commitments  and  our 
alliances  with  Japan,  with  Australia  and 
New  Zealand,  with  the  Philippines,  and 
others  provide  a  security  framework  and 
coordinating  element  in  a  region  where 
broader  alliance  arrangements  are  not 
feasible. 

•  And  because  our  influence  is  so 
broadly  felt  throughout  the  region,  the 
way  we  handle  each  of  our  bilateral  rela- 
tionships affects  the  interests  of  many 
others.  As  we  seek,  for  example,  to 
build  a  stronger  relationship  with  China 
and  to  manage  the  differences  between 
us,  we  must  remember  that  the  interests 
of  many  other  friends  in  the  region  may 
be  affected  as  well. 


•  In  Asia,  as  in  the  rest  of  the 
world,  there  remain  threats  that  only 
the  United  States  can  meet.  If  we  do  not 
play  our  role,  the  shadow  cast  by  So\iet 
military  power  will  threaten  the  region's 
hopes  for  progress. 

In  playing  that  security  role  in  the 
world,  we  intend  to  be  attentive  to 
Asian  interests.  That  specifically  in- 
cludes our  approach  to  the  Geneva 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union  on 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missiles.  As 
President  Reagan  recently  said,  "Soviet 
proposals  which  have  the  effect  merely 
of  shifting  the  threat  from  Europe  to 
Asia  cannot  be  considered  reasonable. 
Security  in  this  sense  is— and  will  re- 
main—indivisible." 

In  the  years  since  the  Vietnam  war 
ended,  we  have  made  great  progress  in 
overcoming  the  inevitable  doubts  that 
arose  in  the  region  about  the  will  and 


Our  goal  in  asking 
others  to  increase  their 
efforts  is  to  gain  added 
strength  together,  not 
to  decrease  our  own 
efforts. 


capability  of  the  United  States  to  fulfill 
its  important  role  in  Asia.  President 
Reagan's  strong  efforts  to  continue  that 
progress  have  increased  the  credibility 
of  our  role  in  Asia  and,  in  the  process, 
increased  the  self-confidence  of  our 
friends  in  the  area  as  well. 


Conclusion 

If  it  is  true  that  much  of  the  future ' 
be  shaped  in  Asia,  then  our  policies 
toward  this  region  are  of  special  imp 
ance.  The  record  of  the  nations  of  tl; 
Asian  Pacific  in  recent  years  is  en- 
couraging too.  Not  that  the  region  is 
free  of  problems— far  from  it.  Butr 
of  the  nations  of  the  region— despiti 
enormous  differences  of  every  kind- 
share  a  realistic  and  confident  apprc 
toward  solving  problems.  And  a  dyn 
community  of  economic,  political,  ar 
security  interests  has  begun  to  take 
shape. 

•  Most  nations  of  the  area  have 
faced— and  many  still  face— immen 
problems  of  poverty  and  dislocation 
these  problems  are  being  addressed 
imagination,  with  self-reliance,  and  ' 
remarkable  success.  ' 

•  The  countries  of  the  region  ii ' 
great  threats  from  the  Soviet  Unioi 
Vietnam,  and  North  Korea.  But  the  ' 
meeting  these  threats  with  realism  ' 
with  a  determination  not  to  be  intin ' 
dated,  ' 

•  Great  national  and  cultural  di ' 
ences,  deepened  by  historical  antag  ' 
nisms,  place  obstacles  in  the  way  ot 
cooperation  among  nations  of  the 
region.  But  increasingly  these  natio  ' 
are  recognizing  the  overriding  impc ' 
ance  of  working  together  in  the  inti  k 
of  peace  and  economic  progress. 

We  Americans  recognize — and  , 
welcome— this  progress.  Our  Asian  , 
Pacific  partners  are  developing  rew  ,■ 
ing  relationships  not  only  with  us  bi 
with  each  other.  They  also  are  joini 
with  us  in  cooperative  efforts  that  ( 
tend  beyond  the  Pacific  region  and 
creasingly  bring  their  positive  influi ; 
into  the  world  at  large.  These  steps  t 
the  basis  for  a  global  role  that  will : ' 
the  region's  growing  strength  and   ' 
responsibilities.  We  Americans  are  ' 
determined  to  join  in  these  steps  to  ^' 
ther  our  community  of  interests.  Tl 
results  will  have  much  to  say  about  ■' 
future— for  us  and  for  others  throu* 
the  world. 


'Press  release  68  of  Mar.  7,  1983.  I 


Department  of  State  Bi* 


THE  SECRETARY 


lestion-and-Answer  Session 
Sllowing  San  Francisco  Address 


pUoinng  is  the  qnestwn-and-answer 
.11  Sirri'tary  Shultz  held  with  the 
iii-i  ill  Ike  conclusion  of  his  address 
till   Wdiid  Affairs  Council  in  San 
•/,sr,.  n„  March  5.  19S3.^ 

(ould  YOU  comment  upon  the  talks 
began  in  the  fall  of  1982  between 
copies  Republic  of  China  and  the 
■t  Union,  and  their  effect,  if  any, 
Sno-American  relationships? 
..  There  are  quite  a  number  of 
IS  that  the  Chinese  and  the  Soviet 
;-i  have  to  discuss.  Some  of  them  in- 
,  prclilfms  in  which  we  have  as 
■ij  an  interest  and  stake  as  do  the 

he  Chinese  believe,  and  we  believe, 
1  he  i;ussians  should  get  their 
tite.  \'ietnam,  out  of  Kampuchea, 
that  we  should  have  an  independent, 
leratie  Kampuchea.  If  they  can 
1:  some  headway  on  that  with  the 
it  Union,  I'm  all  for  it. 

he  Chinese  believe,  and  we  believe, 
i\here  is  no  excuse  for  the  Soviet  in- 
iin  of  Afghanistan.  The  Soviets 
)d  leave  Afghanistan.  If  they  can 
J  some  progress  in  that,  we're  all 

n  other  words,  there  are  things  that 
!  lare  in  our  concern  about  Soviet 
tivHor,  and  we  wish  the  Chinese  luck 
t,ang  to  do  something  about  it. 

t  is,  nevertheless,  true  that  the 
liese  have  to  remember,  as  other 
m  countries  do  and  we  do,  that  those 
)-',0s  are  pointed  at  Asia. 

J.  Your  comment  in  China  regard- 
ghe  problems  which  American 
isiessmen  were  experiencing  was 
yically  caustic.  Why  shouldn't  the 
ae  Department  help  American 
laiess? 

'^.  The  American  businessmen  that  I 
i()nto  in  Beijing  had  it  coming  to 
ei.  They  had  it  coming  to  them 
!(use  there  I  was  negotiating  on  their 
illf— I'm  on  your  side,  remember— 
)i  t  a  whole  range  of  extremely 
>,'ate  and  difficult  issues.  Everybody 
Ta's  that  everything  that  is  said  in  a 
5-1  room  privately  is  listened  to  and  is 
iright  back  into  the  kind  of  negotia- 
'■i  that  I'm  having.  So  after  awhile, 
ang  the  Chinese  position  thrown  at 
K'l  began  to  wonder  who  was  on 
'He  side.  I  knew  pretty  well  what  side 
\is  on,  so  I  gave  them  a  piece  of  my 


mind,  and  I  don't  apologize  for  it.  [Ap- 
plause] 

Q.  In  Cambodia  there  is  and  has 
been  genocide  taking  place.  How  are 
we  exerting  our  influence  to  end  it? 

A.  It's  interesting  that  you  say  Cam- 
bodia. It's  hard  to  know  what  to  call 
that  poor  country;  some  people  say 
Kampuchea.  It  took  me  a  while  to  catch 
up  with  that.  We  are  exerting  our  in- 
fluence to  get  Vietnam  out  of  there  by 
supporting  countries  in  the  region  in  all 
the  effective  ways  that  we  can  think  of. 

We  are  helping  the  ASEAN 
[Association  of  South  East  Asian  Na- 
tions], countries  which  have  taken  a 
lead.  We  work  with  the  Chinese,  the 
People's  Republic  of  China.  We  provide 
humanitarian  help  to  those  in  need. 
There  has  been  a  tremendous  exodus  of 
refugees,  as  we  all  know.  We've  done 
our  part  in  that.  We  have  worked  at  the 
United  Nations  where  Vietnam  is  totally 
isolated,  and  the  Soviet  Union  isolated, 
on  this  issue.  So  we  have  worked  with 
people  in  the  region,  and  our  approach 
has  been  to  support  their  effort— they 
live  there— and  to  make  it  clear  on  a 
world  basis  not  only  the  wrongness  of 
that  invasion  but  the  horrors  that  are 
taking  place  in  that  country.  It  makes 
you  wonder  about  all  the  people  who 
thought  North  Vietnam  was  such  a 
wonderful  country.  [Applause] 

Q.  Are  the  Philippine  bases  in 
jeopardy  because  of  political  instabil- 
ity in  the  Philippines? 

A.  No.  The  Philippine  bases  are  very 
important  to  us  and  to  the  Philippines. 
We  have  periodically  and  are  now  in  the 
midst  of  base  negotiations,  and  we 
believe  that  the  Government  of  the 
Philippines  is  quite  able  to  negotiate  and 
carry  through  agreements  with  us. 
Q.  What  are  the  chances  of  a 
nuclear  arms  reduction  agreement 
with  Russia  on  something  other  than 
the  zero-option  plan? 

A.  Are  you  trying  to  ask  me 
whether  we're  going  to  change  our  posi- 
tion? [Laughter] 

I  don't  know  what  the  chances  are.  I 
know  what  we  will  do.  We  will  take 
reasonable  positions.  We  believe  that  the 
positions  of  eliminating  a  whole  class  of 
these  destabilizing  and  lethal  weapons 
from  the  globe  is  the  right  position;  it's 
the  moral  position;  it's  the  position  that 
we  can  all  be  proud  of. 


The  President  has  also  said  from  the 
first  speech  he  made  on  the  subject  that 
we  recognize  we're  in  a  negotiation.  Our 
position  is  not  take-it-or-leave-it.  We're 
flexible.  We're  willing  to  listen.  But  we 
think  that  the  position  the  United  States 
has  taken  on  behalf  of  our  allies,  as  well 
as  ourselves,  is  a  wonderful  position  to 
support. 

Whether  the  Soviet  Union  would 
ever  agree  to  the  deployment  of  U.S. 
weapons  replacing  those  that  are  there 
now,  I  don't  know.  But  we  will  be  there 
at  the  negotiating  table,  we  will  be 
reasonable,  and  in  the  meantime,  we 
must  be  realistic  about  what  is  going  on 
in  the  world  and  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
We  must  maintain  our  basic  strength  so 
that  we  are  able  to  continue  as  we  can 
now  to  defend  our  interests  around  the 
world,  and  to  help  our  allies  defend 
theirs.  [Applause] 


Q.  Yesterday  President  Reagan 
assured  the  American  people  that  El 
Salvador  would  not  become  another 
Vietnam.  It's  difficult  to  deny, 
however,  that  the  building  tension  and 
fighting  there  are  reminiscent  of  the 
early  days  of  Vietnam.  How  are  we  to- 
day better  prepared  to  accurately 
assess  the  conflict  in  El  Salvador? 

A.  Of  course,  we  are  constantly 
assessing  what  is  taking  place,  and  in  re- 
cent days  we  have  been  especially  work- 
ing hard  at  that  and  consulting  with  the 
Congress.  The  President  met  with  the 
bipartisan  leadership  last  Tuesday  and 
undoubtedly  will  be  meeting  again  in  the 
coming  week  to  hear  their  views  and  to 
give  ours. 

I  think  it's  important  to  recognize 
several  things.  First  of  all,  there  are 
many,  many  differences  between  the  El 
Salvador  situation  and  Vietnam.  One  of 
them  is  that  El  Salvador  is  nearby.  It  is 
part  of  an  area  of  the  region  of  the 
world  that  is  literally  connected 
geographically  to  us. 

It  is  not  a  pleasant  thing  to  con- 
template that  the  Soviet  Union  might  in- 
crease its  influence  from  Cuba, 
Nicaragua,  Grenada— where  it  now 
holds  sway— to  additional  countries  in 
Central  America.  So  that's  something 
we  have  to  remember  about  the  direct 
security  interests  of  the  United  States. 

But  I  think  also  we  must  remind 
ourselves  that  the  program  that  the  peo- 
ple of  El  Salvador,  and  the  Government 
of  El  Salvador,  have  in  place  and  are 
trying  to  implement  and  which  we  are 
trying  to  help  them  implement,  has  got 
several  strands  to  it. 

The  first,  of  course,  is  to  try  to  do 
everything  we  can  to  help  those  people 


^|il1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


develop  themselves  economically.  We 
have  provided  aid.  We  have  provided  en- 
couragement for  the  development  of 
economic  capacity  there.  We  have  sup- 
ported the  land  reform  program,  which 
has  just  been  extended  for  another  10 
months,  and  it's  quite  possible  that  it 
might  be  completed  in  that  time. 

We  have  sought  to  support  the 
development  of  democratic  government 
in  El  Salvador.  We  have  supported  a 
diplomatic  initiative  in  the  region  which 
was  taken  in  the  first  instance  in  San 
Jose  as  the  democratic  countries  of  the 
region  came  together  and  laid  down  a 
diplomatic  program  calling  for  the 
elimination  of  offensive  weapons  from 
the  region,  the  cessation  of  the  shipment 
of  arms  from  one  country  to  another  on 
a  verifiable  basis,  the  removal  of  all 
foreign  advisers  of  a  military  sort,  and 
efforts  toward  reconciliation  and  amnes- 
ty in  the  region;  all  of  this  in  the  in- 
terests of  trying  to  bring  about  peace. 
So  I  think  those  are  all  very  strong  and 
important  efforts  that  are  being  made. 

It  must  also  be  apparent  to  everyone 
that  if  you  have  a  foreign-supplied, 
reasonably  sizable  guerrilla  movement 
blowing  up  bridges— 55  bridges— blow- 
ing up  power  plants,  disrupting  the  in- 
frastructure, it's  very  hard  to  imagine 
that  you  attain  that  threshold  of  security 
necessary  for  economic  development  to 
take  place  for  people  to  serve  their  own 
interests  and  to  be  able  to  achieve  a 
stable  and  decent  life. 

I  think  it's  pretty  apparent  that  the 
same  people  who  tried  desperately  to 
stop  an  election  about  a  year  ago— 
threatened  people  to  keep  them  away 
from  the  polls  but  nevertheless  80%  of 
the  people  turned  out  to  vote— are  now 
trying  to  shoot  their  way  into  the 
government.  I  think  the  answer  to  that 
should  be  "no  dice." 

But  we  need  to  continue  to  support 
the  efforts  of  the  people  not  only  in  El 
Salvador  but  Honduras,  Costa  Rica,  and 
throughout  the  Caribbean  region  in  their 
effort  to  develop  democratic  institutions, 
to  serve  their  own  economic  interests 
and  development,  and  to  resist  efforts  to 
destabilize  them  through  the  shipment  of 
arms  to  guerrillas  who  are  out  to  unseat 
those  governments. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  discussion 
about  military  aid  and  should  it  be  in- 
creased. That's  not  really  the  question. 
The  numbers  are  as  follows.  Last  year 
the  United  States  helped  the  Salvadoran 
Government  to  the  tune  of  $80  million  of 
military  aid.  In  this  fiscal  year,  which 
began  October  1,  through  a  curious 


Washington  program  known  as  a  contin- 
uing resolution,  we  have  managed  $25 
million. 

You  can  take  25  as  a  proportion  of 
80  and  compare  it  with  5  months  out  of 
12,  and  you  can  see  the  kind  of  support 
that  we  are  giving.  It's  not  adequate.  I 
believe  very  strongly  that  in  our  own 
security  interests  and  in  the  interests  of 
having  in  our  neighborhood  democratic 
governments  in  societies  where  people 
have  a  chance  to  develop  themselves  and 
achieve  economic  gains  for  themselves 
that  we  simply  must  continue  to  support 
the  people  who  are  on  our  side  and 
resist  those  who  are  against  us. 
[Applause] 

Q.  How  will  the  outcome  of  the 
West  German  elections  affect  our 
policy  toward  that  country,  especially 
if  the  Social  Democrats  come  out  on 
top? 

A.  One  of  the  things  I've  learned 
from  Phil  Habib  [special  representative 
of  the  President  to  the  Middle  East]  and 
others  is  never  comment  on  the  internal 
political  arrangements  of  another  coun- 
try. That  is  up  to  them  to  determine, 
and  we  will  work  with  the  government 
that  the  German  people  put  there,  and  I 
believe  we'll  be  able  to  work  successfully 
with  it.  [Applause] 

Q.  Why  should  the  United  States 
support  the  IMF  [International 
Monetary  Fund]  quota  increase? 

A.  The  IMF  quota  increase  amounts 
to  a  commitment  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  exchange  assets  for 
assets;  that  is,  money  that  we  put  in, 
like  a  loan,  and  we  get  an  asset  back  to 
the  tune  of  $5.8  million. 

In  addition,  the  Treasury,  working 
with  the  10  principal  industrial  coun- 
tries—known as  the  Group  of  10— has 
worked  out  an  increase  in  the  scope  of 
what  are  called  the  general  ar- 
rangements to  borrow  amounting,  I 
think,  to  $2.8  billion. 

What  is  this  money  for?  It  is  for  the 
purpose  of  helping  to  keep  the  interna- 
tional financial  system  on  an  even  keel.  I 
believe  this  can  be  done  without  our  los- 
ing money,  and  if  we  don't  do  it,  we  ex- 
pose ourselves  and  all  of  the  trading  na- 
tions to  a  tremendous  exposure  of  finan- 
cial mishaps  that  could  well  be  avoided. 

I  think  it  is  especially  important  to 
do  this  and  do  it  properly  right  now 
because,  as  it  happens,  with  all  of  the 
economic  troubles  of  the  world,  I  think 
we  are  right  now  at  a  point  where 
there's  a  good  chance  that  we  can  see  a 
kind  of  interacting  expansion  in  the 


world  economy.  And  we  don't  wan 
see  it  aborted  by  the  failure  to  do 
that  we  can  do  and  that  we  should 

I  think  it's  clear,  number  one, 
the  economy  of  the  United  States 
starting  an  expansion,  one  that  1 1: 
will  be  considerably  more  vigorous 
was  forecasted  in  the  President's 
economic  report  issued  about  a  r 
so  ago. 

Second,  fully  recognizing  the  | 
lems  for  some  that  a  fall  in  the  pr 
crude  oil  may  bring,  I  think  that  a 
decline  in  the  price  of  crude  oil  is 
basically  very  good  news  for  most 
and  it  will  have  a  positive  effect  o 
economic  growth  in  our  country  i 
most  other  countries.  So  that's  thii 
ond  thing,  and  I  think  that  in  turri 
tend  to  have  the  other  industrial  ( 
tries'  economies  expand  a  little  mc 
than  otherwise.  Under  those  cir- 
cumstances, perhaps  the  Third  W 
the  developing  countries — will  om 
again  be  able  to  pick  up  the  very 
pace  of  growth  that  they  have  suf 

If  those  things  happen,  and  if 
have  the  wit  to  avoid  the  pressun 
protection  which  are  fierce  in  this 
try  and  around  the  world— but  if 
avoid  that  so  that  these  developm 
can  interact  with  each  other,  ther  | 
can  see  the  kind  of  expansion  in  1 1 
world  economy  that  will  enable  pi  | 
the  end  to  pay  their  debts. 

So  you  ask  about  the  IMF  qui  I 
crease.  It  is  connected  with  all  th  I 
way  of  putting  the  IMF -which,  i  \ 
all,  we're  a  big  part  of  and  which  I 
might  say  has  superb  leadership  i  I 
a  Frenchman  named  Jacques  de  I 
Larosiere— enabling  the  IMF  to  c  f 
job  of  keeping  stability  in  the  intet 
tional  financial  house.  I  think  it  is  t 
very  much  to  our  advantage.         i 

I  have  testified  quite  a  bit  on  J 
and  I  find  that  people  are  terribl}  bi 
cerned  that  if  this  is  done,  there  ;i)i 
some  bankers  who  made  bad  loan  i 
they  won't  pay  a  big  enough  pens  j 
that  misjudgment.  J 

I  believe  that  people  who  mal  IM 
judgments  ought  to  pay  a  penalty  br| 
but  I'm  certainly  not  ready  to  sayM 
would  rather  have  the  world  go  t  tie! 
for  the  sake  of  seeing  a  few  bank 'S  ( 
fer.  [Laughter]  Frankly,  I  would  1 4 
ing  to  let  some  people  get  away  \  thi 
little  bit  in  order  to  have  this  eco  imi 
expansion  that  we  need,  we  can  1  ve/ 
and  I  believe  we  will  have  if  we  l<!p< 
wits  about  us  properly.  [Applaus« 


'Press  release  68A  of  Mar.  7,  19f '■ 


Department  of  State  I  Hl«' 

1^ 


THE  SECRETARY 


engthening  Democracy  in  Central  America 


atement  before  the  Subcommittee 

n  Operations  of  the  Senate  Ap- 
■ations  Committee  on  March  22, 


irch  10,  the  President  described 
learly  the  national  security  stake 
ve  in  Central  America  and  the 
)ean.  Many  factors  are  involved, 
le  remedies  are  complex,  but  the 
ssues  are  relatively  simple:  Cen- 
merica  is  in  transition,  trying  to 
e  the  tensions  of  the  past  by 
ping  democratic  institutions  and 
ble  reforms.  Violent,  antidemo- 
minorities  with  close  military  and 
jical  ties  to  Cuba  and  the  Soviet 

are  attempting  to  disrupt  this  ef- 
id  seize  power  by  force  of  arms, 
il  America  is  too  close  and  of  too 
strategic  importance  for  us  to 
idly  by  while  that  happens.  Our 
ty  is  at  stake,  and  our  most  basic 
Dies  are  being  tested, 
is  not  surprising  that  our  con- 
ons  with  a  wide  spectrum  of  the 

over  the  last  3  weeks  have 
iced  the  President  and  all  of  us 

bipartisan  consensus  on  goals 
in  fact,  exist.  No  one  wants  to  see 
unist  guerrillas  take  power  in  El 
lor.  No  one  wants  to  see  a  second 
rd  or  fourth  Nicaragua  in  Central 
ica.  We  are  unanimous  in  wanting 
itcome  of  the  crisis  in  the  region  to 
^ceful  and  democratic. 
i  would  like  to  focus  today  on  the 
.3  to  achieve  these  common  objec- 
ll  would  like  to  review  our  regional 
tgy  and  explain  why  we  believe  the 
bl  strategy  the  President  set  forth 
'.  March  10  speech  can  help  end  the 
Ind  produce  a  democratic  outcome 
ISalvador.  I  wOl  then  discuss  the 
jrces  we  need  to  make  it  work. 


regional  Strategy 

ttrategy  proceeds  from  an  analysis 
j-ecognizes,  in  fact  emphasizes,  that 
jare  legitimate  social,  economic, 
[olitical  grievances  in  many  parts  of 
Egion.  For  example,  many  of  El 
Idor's  problems  stem  directly  from 
js  of  past  Salvadoran  govern- 
s—failings that  often  go  back 
es  but  which  must  be  addressed 


The  second  critical  factor  is  the  deci- 
sion by  Cuba  with  Soviet-bloc  support  to 
organize  and  arm  guerrilla  forces  under 
Marxist-Leninist  control.  This  tactic— 
and  its  fruits— are  evident  in  Nicaragua, 
which  since  1979  has  become  a  base  for 
the  export  of  violence  to  its  neighbors. 
Almost  immediately  after  the  Sandinista 
takeover  in  Nicaragua,  El  Salvador 
became  a  target,  with  the  expectation 
that  communist  bloc  training  and  sup- 
plies would  bring  a  quick  military  victory 
to  Cuban-backed  extremists. 

Our  conclusion  is  that  we  face  two 
related  challenges;  to  help  alleviate 
longstanding  political,  economic,  and 
social  problems;  and  to  help  counter  a 
communist  strategy  which  seeks  to  ag- 
gravate and  exploit  these  problems  and 
so  to  seize  power  by  force  of  arms. 

The  strategy  we  have  developed  is 
comprehensive  and  regional.  Much  of  it 
has  been  elaborated  in  consultation  with 
the  region's  democracies.  It  consists  of 
six  mutually  reinforcing  elements.  Each 
is  necessary  to  ensure  the  success  of  the 
whole. 

The  first  and  critical  component  is 
support  for  democracy,  reform,  and 
the  protection  of  human  rights. 
Violence  feeds  on  the  failure  of  local  in- 
stitutions to  provide  responsive  govern- 
ment, justice  under  law,  or  means  to 
achieve  peaceful  social  and  economic 
change.  We  know  that  democratic 
governments  are  far  less  likely  to  abuse 
their  citizens  than  dictatorial  regimes 
whether  of  the  right  or  left.  And  we 
know  that  democracy  cannot  flourish  in 
the  presence  of  extreme  inequalities  in 
access  to  land,  opportunity,  or  justice. 
We  cannot  hope  to  succeed  unless  we 
address  these  first-order  concerns. 

The  second  element  is  support  for 
economic  development.  Underdevelop- 
ment, recession,  and,  in  the  case  of  El 
Salvador,  the  guerrillas'  "prolonged  war" 
against  jobs,  transport,  and  crops  create 
human  hardship  and  misery  that  are  be- 
ing exploited  by  the  enemies  of  democ- 
racy. Three-quarters  of  the  resources  in 
support  of  our  Central  American  policy 
go  to  economic  assistance. 

The  third  element  is  support  for  the 
security  of  the  nations  of  the  region. 
We  must  provide  El  Salvador  and  our 
other  friends  struggling  for  democracy 


enough  military  training  and  assistance 
to  protect  against  the  military  power  of 
the  guerrillas  so  that  nonmilitary  solu- 
tions can  be  found.  Security  assistance  is 
not  an  end  in  itself  but  a  shield  for  the 
region's  democratization  and  develop- 
ment. 

The  fourth  element  is  to  give  the 
area  hope  in  the  future.  That  is  why 
our  economic  efforts  go  beyond  the 
traditional  forms  of  assistance:  the 
President's  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative 
proposes  unique  long-term  incentives  to 
spur  the  sustained  economic  growth 
these  countries  have  demonstrated  in 
the  past  they  are  capable  of  achieving. 

The  fifth  element  is  to  deter  the 
Sandinista  attempt  to  promote  a 
"revolution  without  frontiers."  We  are 
providing  essential  economic  and  securi- 
ty support  to  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras. 
And  together  with  other  democratic 
countries  of  the  region,  we  are  working 
to  persuade  the  Sandinistas  that  they 
should  come  to  the  bargaining  table 
ready  to  come  to  terms  with  their  own 
society  and  their  neighbors. 

The  sixth  element  is  support  for 
peaceful  solutions.  Internal  reconcila- 
tion— through  democratic  elections, 
guarantees  of  personal  security,  and 
amnesty— can  be  an  alternative  to 
violence  and  the  consequences  of 
violence  for  all  concerned.  Similarly, 
regional  agreements  can  strengthen 
democracy  and  reduce  sources  of  con- 
flict and  militarization. 

All  six  of  these  elements  must  be  ap- 
plied and  sustained  for  the  strategy  to 
succeed.  No  amount  of  reform  alone  can 
bring  peace  so  long  as  the  guerrillas  ex- 
pect and  seek  military  victory.  No 
amount  of  economic  assistance  alone  can 
suffice  if  the  guerrillas  can  destroy  basic 
infrastructures  again  and  again  with  im- 
punity. And  even  sustained  government 
military  superiority  alone  will  not  bring 
sustained  peace  in  the  absence  of  more 
freedom  and  of  better  opportunities  for 
social  and  economic  development. 

Situation  in  El  Salvador 

Let  me  turn  now  to  El  Salvador.  How  is 
our  strategy  working  there? 

First,  respect  for  human  rights  has 
grown  slowly,  but  steadily.  Political 


1983 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


violence  against  noncombatants  is  a 
serious  problem  but  is  down  markedly 
since  our  assistance  began  3  years  ago. 
Military  operations  have  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  prisoners.  The  treatment  of 
individuals  in  prison  for  security  reasons 
has  improved— international  access  to 
detained  individuals  is  regular  and 
prison  facilities  are  cleaner  and  better 
administered.  Even  so,  the  criminal 
justice  system  remains  a  major  concern, 
one  I  will  examine  in  greater  detail  in  a 
moment. 

Second,  in  3  short  years  and  despite 
determined  guerrilla  opposition,  El 
Salvador's  Government  has  redistributed 
more  than  20%  of  all  arable  land.  Some 
450,000  people— about  1  Salvadoran  in 
every  10— have  benefited  directly. 
Strong  peasant  organizations  have 
emerged.  An  AID-financed  [Agency  for 
International  Development]  study  by  in- 
dependent consultants  visiting  El 
Salvador  reported  that:  "Members  of  the 
team  .  .  .  were  under  the  impression  that 
the  conservative  coalition  that  won  the 
March  1982  election  had  attempted  to 
annul  the  reforms.  During  2  months 
of  field  work,  however,  we  discovered 
that  reforms  were  still  very  much  alive." 
The  recent  extension  of  land  reform 
legislation  confirms  this  judgment.  The 
distributive  aspects  of  the  reform,  if  con- 
tinued at  the  present  pace,  can  be  com- 
pleted this  year. 

Third,  the  general  economic  situa- 
tion is  poor.  In  the  last  4  years,  the 
Salvadoran  economy  has  contracted  by 
25%.  Overall  unemployment  is  in  the 
neighborhood  of  40%.  Imports  of 
medicines  and  food  have  been  hampered. 
To  maintain  even  zero  growth  in  real 
terms.  El  Salvador  needs  substantial 
assistance  to  import  materials,  in- 
termediate goods,  and  essential 
agricultural  inputs  for  which  it  lacks 
foreign  exchange. 

Part  of  the  problem  is  that  the  inter- 
national recession  has  depressed  com- 
modity and  agricultural  markets  on 
which  El  Salvador  depends  for  foreign 
exchange.  But  the  more  serious  weak 
point  is  that  since  the  failure  of  their 
1981  "final  offensive,"  the  guerrillas 
have  moved  against  the  economic  in- 
frastructure. They  have  destroyed  55  of 
the  country's  260  bridges  and  damaged 
many  more.  The  national  water  authori- 
ty is  carrying  out  112  reconstruction 


projects  to  restore  facilities  damaged  by 
guerrilla  action.  Two  hundred  forty-nine 
separate  attacks  have  caused  millions  of 
dollars  of  damages  to  the  telephone 
system.  Electrical  systems  have  suffered 
over  5,000  power  interruptions  in  a 
22-month  period  ending  last  Novem- 
ber—an average  of  almost  eight  a  day. 
The  eastern  region  was  blacked  out  for 
over  a  third  of  the  year  in  both  1981  and 
1982.  Thirteen  crop-dusting  planes  have 
been  destroyed  or  damaged  since  last 
October.  Over  200  buses  were  destroyed 
in  1982  alone.  Less  than  half  the  rolling 
stock  of  the  railways  remains  opera- 
tional. 

In  short,  guerrilla  sabotage  is 
depriving  the  people  of  El  Salvador  of 
food,  water,  transportation,  light,  sanita- 
tion, and  work. 

It  cannot  be  stressed  enough  that 
this  guerrilla  campaign  of  "rule  or  ruin" 
is  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  Salvadorans.  The  Arch- 
bishop of  El  Salvador  put  it  this  way  on 
March  18:  "The  population  wants  there 
to  be  peace.  I  do  not  see  that  the  guer- 
rillas, who  have  progressed  militarily 
and  in  experience,  have  popular 
support .  .  .  There  have  been  about  four 
or  five  offensives  and  who  knows  how 
many  more  to  come.  But  the  people 
want  [peace]." 

This  brings  me  to  a  fourth  point. 
The  military  situation  is  not  desperate 
but  could  become  so  if  we  fail  to  help. 
The  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  face  the 
difficult  task  of  fighting  mobile  and  well- 
trained  enemy  units  supported  from  the 
outside,  while  also  protecting  static 
targets  and  population  and  production 
centers.  Ten  days  ago,  we  had  to  pro- 
vide an  emergency  airlift  of  critically 
needed  small  arms  ammunition.  The 
Salvadoran  soldier,  when  well-trained 
and  well-led,  is  capable;  guerrilla  opera- 
tions have  for  the  most  part  been  local- 
ized to  certain  areas  of  the  country,  and 
the  government  forces  we  have  trained 
are  performing  effectively.  The  three 
U.S. -trained  units  conduct  themselves 
professionally  both  on  the  battlefield  and 
in  their  relations  with  noncombatant 
populations.  But  only  10%  at  most  of 
the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  have 
received  our  training. 

Fifth,  democracy  and  reconcilation 
have  made  major  advances  this  past 
year.  The  Constituent  Assembly  has 
engaged  a  wide  and  diverse  political 
spectrum,  from  ARENA  [National 
Republican  Alliance]  on  the  right  to 


Christian  Democracy  on  the  left.  It 
not  been  easy  for  often  bitter  politii 
rivals  to  deal  with  each  other  in  a 
parliamentary  forum  with  the  outsi 
world  watching  skeptically.  But  gn 
ly  they  are  coming  to  listen  to  each 
other,  moderate,  compromise,  acco 
modate.  In  addition  to  working  on 
constitution,  the  Assembly  has  reac 
agreement  on  a  Government  of  Na 
Unity  guided  by  the  multiparty  pac 
Apaneca  and  proceeded  seriously  v 
land  reform  including  the  vital  lane 
the-tiller  program. 

As  envisioned  in  the  pact  of 
Apaneca,  the  Salvadoran  Governm 
has  designated  three  high-level  cor 
sions— on  the  political  process,  on 
human  rights,  and  on  peace.  The  I 
Commission  is  specifically  charged 
developing  measures  of  national  re 
ciliation.  Its  members  include  a  Ca 
bishop  and  two  civilians— one  a 
representative  of  the  political  part 
the  other  a  former  foreign  ministe 
March  17,  this  independent  commi 
formally  proposed  legislation  prov 
for  a  general  amnesty. 

It  is  this  atmosphere— the  yea 
for  peace,  the  viability  of  El  Salva 
new  democratic  institutions,  and  v 
Archbishop  Rivera  has  called  "a  dr 
for  understanding  more  than 
revenge"— that  gives  impetus  to  t 
decision  to  hold  presidential  electii 
this  year— a  decision  greeted  with 
and  approval  by  all,  including  His 
Holiness  Pope  John  Paul  II,  when 
announced. 

In  sum,  despite  continued  hun 
rights  problems  and  troubled  econ 
and  security  conditions,  particular 
side  major  population  centers,  hea 
ing  progress  has  been  made  in  po! 
economic,  and  social  reform.  Esse 
groundwork  has  been  laid  for  pro) 
in  national  reconciliation. 

Resource  Needs  and  Objectives 

Economic  assistance  is  vitally  neet 
permit  the  purchase  of  essential  in 
and  to  help  restore  basic  services 
frastructure  disrupted  by  the  gue: 
It  is  needed  to  strengthen  the  agr 
reform  and  to  help  finance  labor- 
intensive  reconstruction  that  will 
work  to  those  deprived  of  it  by  gi' 
sabotage.  It  is  needed  to  help  the 
private  sector,  now  cut  off  from  c 
markets,  regain  access  to  credit  f 
critical  imports. 


Department  of  State  E 


THE  SECRETARY 


D  accomplish  these  objectives,  we 
anning  to  provide  El  Salvador 
$227  million  in  FY  1983  economic 
ance,  including  economic  support 
(ESF),  development  assistance, 
L  480  commodity  financing.  This 
es  $67.1  million  the  President  has 
sed  to  reallocate  for  El  Salvador 
current  funds.  This  additional 
ince— for  which  no  new  appropria- 
are  being  sought— will  be  heavily 
itted  to  public  services,  medical 
,  and  food  imports.  A  major  com- 
t  will  support  a  comprehensive 
irogram  of  services  and  reconstruc- 

I  two  parts  of  the  country  most 
illy  affected  by  the  guerrilla  war. 
)  continue  building  the  kind  of 
lined,  skilled  armed  forces  that  can 
ind  hold  the  initiative  while  re- 

ng  the  rights  of  its  people,  we  sub- 
i  to  Congress  on  March  10  a 
;ation  of  our  intent  to  reprogram 
lillion  in  foreign  military  sales 
)  loan  guarantees  to  El  Salvador, 
•e  also  planning  to  reallocate  to  El 
dor  $50  million  in  grant  military 
ance  program  (MAP)  funds  from 
muary  supplemental  request.  As 
'conomic  assistance,  none  of  this 
ise  will  involve  funds  other  than 
previously  requested, 
'e  are  not  planning  to  send  El 
dor  advanced  heavy  weapons  like 
)viet  tanks  acquired  by  Nicaragua, 
ave  we  any  intention  of  American- 
the  fighting  by  introducing  U.S. 
it  advisers.  Rather  our  emphasis  is 
eatly  expanded  training  for 
doran  soldiers,  with  all  or  most  of 
Iditional  training  taking  place  out- 

II  Salvador  if  funds  permit.  The 
we  have  requested  would  enable 
train  some  50%  of  El  Salvador's 
fighting  units — compared  to  10% 
;iow.  They  would  also  help  El 
dor's  Armed  Forces  to  increase 
mobility  with  additional 

pters,  small  naval  craft,  and  trucks 
3  acquire  necessary  munitions  and 
parts.  Some  of  this  military 
ance  will  also  be  used  for  engineer- 
juipment  and  medical  supplies  to 
ie  relief  for  the  people  suffering 
the  effects  of  the  guerrilla  war. 
ime  is  important  to  this  objective, 
nore  quickly  we  help  these  armed 
5  become  more  effective  and 
nsible  instruments  of  El  Salvador's 
aal  policy,  the  sooner  their  shield 
e  available  to  protect  the  emerging 
cracy  and  developing  economy  we 


all  seek.  To  quote  Senator  Jackson,  "if 
you're  going  to  have  the  ballot  box  free 
and  open,  there  must  be  a  shield  behind 
which  the  people  can  participate." 

Let  me  return  here  to  one  problem 
that  is  not  primarily  a  question  of 
resources— the  deeply  troubling  ineffec- 
tiveness of  El  Salvador's  system  of 
criminal  justice.  It  is  true  that  this 
stems  directly  from  the  larger  problem 
of  violence.  But  it  is  equally  true  that  ef- 
forts to  protect  human  rights  and  instill 
respect  for  the  law  are  gravely 
hampered  if  the  courts  are  unable  to 
bring  cases  to  a  timely  and  impartial 
conclusion. 

The  Salvadoran  Peace  Commission 
and  Human  Rights  Commission  together 
have  a  mandate  to  review  all  laws  and 
procedures  governing  political  crimes 
and  to  make  recommendations  for  im- 
proving the  judicial  system  as  a  whole. 
Some  problems  may  be  subject  to 
relatively  prompt  action;  for  example, 
increasing  security  for  judges  and  other 
court  officials  or  transferring  jurisdic- 
tion over  military  offenders  to  military 
courts.  Other  problems,  such  as  review- 
ing rules  of  evidence  and  substantive 
criminal  law  or  upgrading  case  manage- 
ment, investigative  techniques,  and 
judicial  administration  will  by  their  very 
nature  take  longer. 

We  have  been  asked  for  help  in  this 
delicate  area  and  want  to  be  of 
assistance.  However,  because  El 
Salvador's  judicial  system  is  quite  dif- 
ferent from  our  own,  specific  recommen- 
dations will  require  more  detailed 
knowledge  and  cooperative  programs 
than  we  have  now.  We  are  working  on 
both.  And  we  hope  that  Latin  American 
democracies,  like  Costa  Rica  and 
Venezuela  whose  legal  systems  are 
closer  to  that  of  El  Salvador,  will  also 
help. 

Negotiations 

The  President  has  emphasized  our  sup- 
port for  negotiations  aimed  at  "expand- 
ing participation  in  democratic  institu- 
tions—at getting  all  parties  to  par- 
ticipate in  free,  nonviolent  elections." 
We  will  not  support  negotiations  that 
short-circuit  the  democratic  process  and 
carve  up  power  behind  the  people's  back. 


We  will  support  negotiations  to  help  pro- 
vide guarantees  of  electoral  fairness  and 
protection  for  voters  and  candidates  of 
all  persuasions. 

For  18  months,  the  Government  of 
El  Salvador  has  been  attempting  to  open 
democratic  political  processes  to  all 
political  forces  including  the  Marxist 
ones.  The  Peace  Commission  has  the 
specific  mandate  to  help  incorporate  all 
social  and  political  groups  in  the  elec- 
tions this  year.  The  President  of  the 
Constituent  Assembly  has  called  for  the 
main  political  unit  of  the  guerrillas,  the 
Frente  Democratico  Revolucionario 
(FDR),  to  take  part  in  the  election. 

As  the  President  indicated,  we  are 
willing  to  help.  Surely  there  will  be  in- 
terest in  measures  which  would  guar- 
antee the  personal  security  of  candidates 
and  their  supporters,  in  the  provision  of 
observers  to  encourage  fairness  and 
discourage  coercion  or  intimidation,  and 
in  specific  ways  to  ensure  access  to 
media,  an  accurate  tally,  and— ulti- 
mately—respect  for  the  results. 

We  will  be  making  proposals  to  the 
Salvadorans  on  how  we,  the  Organiza- 
tion of  American  States,  and  other  con- 
cerned countries  can  help  to  achieve 
each  of  these  objectives.  We  are  fully 
committed  to  this  course. 

We  also  support  negotiations  among 
countries,  as  the  President  has  said,  "to 
strengthen  democracy,  to  halt  subver- 
sion, to  stop  the  flow  of  arms,  to  respect 
borders,  and  to  remove  all  the  foreign 
military  advisers— the  Soviets,  Cubans, 
East  Germans,  PLO  [Palestine  Libera- 
tion Organization],  as  well  as  our 
own — from  the  region."  Eight 
democratic  countries  of  the  region, 
meeting  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica,  in  Oc- 
tober 1982  called  on  Nicaragua  to  join 
them  in  pledging  an  end  to  cross-border 
support  of  guerrilla  violence,  a  freeze  on 
the  growth  of  military  arsenals,  and 
freedom  of  action  for  peaceful 
democratic  groups.  Nicaragua  refused  to 
discuss  these  principles.  The  San  Jose 
proposals,  if  accepted,  would  reduce 
East-West  tensions  in  Central  America 
and  contribute  to  a  regional  political 
solution. 


1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


Discussion  now  centers  on  the 
possibility  of  a  meeting  of  Foreign 
Ministers  of  the  five  Central  American 
countries— Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador, 
Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Guate- 
mala—observed by  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  five  other  countries  within 
the  region— Colombia,  the  Dominican 
Republic,  Mexico,  Panama,  and 
Venezuela.  This  is  what  the  President 
referred  to  in  saying  that  a  regional 
peace  initiative  is  emerging.  Nicaragua 
would  be  engaged  in  the  process.  Its 
good  faith,  or  lack  of  it,  will  be  tested. 

Regional  Development  and  Security 

Pending  a  peaceful  solution,  we  must 
also  seek  to  bolster  Honduras  and  Costa 
Rica,  two  democracies  with  troubled 
economies  where  major  externally 
directed  terrorist  incidents  have  oc- 
curred. These  nations— on  the  borders 
of  Nicaragua— feel  most  strongly  the 
growing  threat  of  Nicaraguan  military 
power,  which  is  fortified  by  some  2,000 
Cuban  and  Soviet-bloc  military  advisers. 

Both  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica  have 
democratic  systems.  Yet  they  too  are 
prey  to  self-proclaimed  Marxist 
"liberators"  who  despise  democracy  and 
attack  reform.  By  strengthening  these 
democracies  and  by  helping  them  to  pass 
through  difficult  economic  times,  we  can 
help  both  countries  to  provide  stability 
and  hope  even  in  the  midst  of  regional 
crisis. 

We,  therefore,  plan  to  provide  an 
additional  $101  million  in  economic 
assistance  in  FY  1983  for  Honduras, 
Costa  Rica,  and  Belize.  With  the  critical 
$67.1  million  in  additional  economic 
assistance  for  El  Salvador,  this  is  a 
regionwide  economic  assistance  increase 
of  $168  million,  of  which  $65  million  has 
been  added  to  our  January  supplemental 
request.  With  respect  to  military 
assistance,  we  are  increasing  our 
January  supplemental  request  for  MAP 
funding  by  $20  million,  mainly  for  Hon- 
duras, with  some  assistance  for  Costa 
Rica  and  the  Panama  Canal  area 
schools.  Thus,  as  called  for  by  the  Presi- 
dent, total  additional  military  assistance 
for  Central  America,  including  El 
Salvador,  will  be  $130  million  in  FY 


Conclusion 

Let  me  conclude  with  a  final  observa- 
tion. The  President  eloquently  set  forth 
the  reasons  why  the  outcome  of  the  cur- 
rent conflict  in  Central  America  is  im- 
portant to  our  national  security.  I  would 
like  to  suggest  an  additional  reason.  Our 
communist  adversaries  the  world  over 
depict  the  United  States  as  a  reac- 
tionary, stattis  quo  power  standing  in 
the  way  of  legitimate  aspirations  for 
change.  Their  propaganda  dismisses  the 
relevance  of  political  democracy  to  the 
problems  of  the  developing  world  and 
asserts  that  we  seek  weak,  unstable 
neighbors  that  we  can  dominate  and  ex- 
ploit. 


These  assertions  are  lies.  We  a 
fact,  allied  with  progressive  forces 
ing  for  economic  development,  refc 
and  democracy.  We  seek  not  weak 
ploitable  neighbors  but  ones  that 
strong,  secure,  and  independent.  ^ 
democracy  irrelevant  to  the  proble 
faced  by  the  developing  nations. 
Democracy,  not  communism,  is  th( 
way  to  deal  with  their  problems.  T 
what  the  struggle  in  Central  Amet 
all  about. 


'Press  release  80.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  publi 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washingi 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


American  Principles  and 
Foreign  Policy 


Following  is  a  speech  by  Secretary 
Shultz  and  a  question-and-answer  ses- 
sion at  the  Conservative  Political  Action 
Conference  on  February  18,  1983.^ 


SECRETARY  SHULTZ 

Thank  you  very  much.  I  appreciate  your 
introduction  and  especially  the  job 
history.  Insofar  as  my  business  career  is 
concerned,  I  do  have  some  advice  to 
you,  and  it's  pretty  unambiguous  as  to 
how  to  get  ahead,  and  that  is,  start  at 
the  top.  [Laughter] 

As  you  can  see,  I've  held  many  jobs, 
and  the  most  recent  one— the  one  I'm 
on  now — I've  been  on  for  about  7 
months.  So,  I  thought  I'd  give  you  a  lit- 
tle report  on  what  it's  like  to  be  working 
for  President  Reagan  in  the  foreign 
policy  arena. 

Of  course,  in  my  job,  I'm  sort  of 
down  in  the  problems  all  the  time,  and 
they  have  an  endless  amount  of  detail 
connected  with  them.  Quite  frequently, 
I'm  over  in  the  White  House  talking 
with  the  President  and  getting  his 
guidance  and  advice  on  one  thing  or 
another,  and  I  find  that  he  has  a  per- 
spective in  quality  that  is  very  helpful  to 
me  and,  I  think,  all  of  us  who  are  work- 
ing with  him.  That  is  a  capacity  to  stand 
back  from  these  details  that  tend  to  con- 
sume you  all  the  time  and  take  you  back 
to  certain  fundamentals  in  your  think- 
ing. I  thought  what  I  might  do— just  in- 
formally here  for  a  few  minutes— is  talk 


about  those  fundamentals  and  wh 
mean  and  where  they  are  leading 
our  foreign  policy. 

Economic  and 
Military  Realities 

The  first  one  the  President  alway 
comes  back  to  is  the  importance  c 
realistic  and  honest  with  yourself 
what  is  taking  place.  We  have  to 
realistic  about  the  problems  we  fs 
have  to  be  realistic  about  the  nati 
the  world  that  we're  living  in.  Th« 
thing  in  the  world  we  can  do  is  b« 
wishful  thinkers  about  what  is  tat 
place. 

Insofar  as  some  of  our  econor 
problems  and  international  econoi 
problems  are  concerned,  we  have 
those  in  the  eye  and  recognize  thi 
the  President  inherited  in  the  wa; 
economy  was  way  out  of  kilter;  tl; 
taken  some  very  tough  action  to  ! 
correct  those  problems.  There  ha- 
major  results  in  terms  of  inflation 
particular. 

Beyond  that,  there  are  many 
in  the  international  economy  we  m 
look  at.  Not  all  is  well.  On  the  otll" 
hand,  the  cure  for  most  all  of  the  i 
issues  is  expansion  in  the  world 
economy— healthy  expansion— aril' 
think  it  is  beyond  doubt  now  that  B1 
the  world  economy — namely,  the  I.S 
economy— is  starting  that  expansm.i 
Since  the  inflation  rate  is  really  ' 
down — and  we're  very  conscious  'tk 


Department  of  State  I  Ills 


THE  SECRETARY 


tance  of  keeping  it  that  way— we 
pact  that  expansion  to  be  a 
ly  one,  and  it  is  going  to  do 
srs  for  everybody  else  around  the 

I 

iving  said  that,  I  think  we  have  to 

icognize  that  our  way  of  looking  at 

nic  organization  in  terms  of  the 

tplace,  in  terms  of  freedom  of 

irise,  has  a  rival.  That  rival  is  the 

ind  economy  approach. 

lave  found,  in  traveling  around  the 

as  a  businessman  and  in  my  pres- 

pacities,  that  it  widely  recog- 

increasingly  widely  recognized — 
le  command  economy  approach  to 
nic  development  doesn't  work.  It 
t  serve  people  in  a  material  way 
f  course,  everywhere  it  is 
ited  with  human  repression  that 
uldn't  tolerate. 

,  our  way  of  organizing  things— 
jt  perfect,  we  have  our  difficulties, 
ouldn't  kid  ourselves  about  them, 
e're  getting  some  place— is  basical- 
rking;  the  other  way  isn't,  and  peo- 
^  increasingly  realizing  that  fact, 
here  is  another  reality,  and  it's  a 
jmore  military  reality.  Perhaps  I 
i't  it  across  to  you— although  I'm 
ou  all  recognize  it— by  just  a  few 
Dies.  In  the  Christmas  season  of 
Inearly  200,000  Vietnamese  troops 
\'A  Kampuchea.  They're  still  there 
'  years  later  along  with  40,000 
kmese  troops  in  Laos.  That's  a 

I  the  Christmas  season  of  1979, 
i  100,000  Soviet  forces  invaded 
inistan.  They're  still  there  3  years 
wacticing  chemical  warfare.  We 

il  be  realistic  about  these  practices 
i  willing  to  say  what  we  observe, 
'ry  reassured  to  have  been  able  to 
t  the  NATO  ministerial  meeting  in 
■els  last  December  that  all  of  the 
Jers  present  subscribe  to  a  com- 

II  ue  noting  and  condemning  this  use 
smical  warfare. 

■  the  Christmas  season  of  1980, 
efore  President  Reagan  took  of- 
ioviet-  and  Cuban-supported  guer- 
isought  to  overthrow,  by  force,  the 
i,nment  of  El  Salvador.  Last  spring 
•ivador  held  free  elections;  the 
iillas  continue  their  efforts,  and 
<is  a  very  considerable  problem  in 
sivador  as  a  result  of  the  Soviet- 
luban-supported  guerrilla  efforts. 
I  the  Christmas  season  of  1981,  the 
':  Union  culminated  a  year  of 
tal  and  military  pressure  to  crush 
!d's  experiment  in  democratization, 
're  all  know  the  sad  results  of  that 


These  are  realities,  just  as  the  thou- 
sand nuclear  warheads  on  Soviet  SS-20s 
are  realities.  We  have  to  look  at  all  of 
these  things.  There  are  some  good 
things  to  look  at  on  the  economic  side. 
There  are  some  threatening  things  to 
look  at,  and  we  have  to  be  clear  about 
them. 

At  any  rate,  across  the  board — and 
I've  just  hit  some  examples,  some  good, 
some  not  so  good— we  have  to  be 
realistic  about  what  is  going  on.  That's 
the  first  thing  the  President  always 
comes  back  to.  Don't  kid  yourself  now. 
What's  really  taking  place?  Good,  bad, 
or  indifferent— we  have  to  call  it  as  we 
see  it. 

Economic  and 
Military  Strength 

The  second  thing  that  we  must  come 
back  to  always  is  the  importance  of 
strength.  Economic  strength— ourselves 
and  our  economy— and  we  all  know  our 
economy  is  fabulous.  It's  very  produc- 
tive. It  is  going  through  a  rough  spot, 
but  it's  coming  out  more  healthy  than  it 
has  been  in  the  recent  past.  It's  a  very 
powerful,  dynamic,  strong  economy,  and 
we  need  to  keep  it  that  way. 

We  need  to  keep  and  develop  our 
strength  of  will  and  our  recognition  and 
adherence  to  the  principles  and  the 
values  that  we  stand  for;  and  that  what 
strength  we  can  muster  seeks  to  defend 
and  to  find  allies  around  the  world  who 
have  the  same  values. 

But,  of  course,  beyond  that,  we  must 
look  to  our  military  capabilities  and  our 
military  strength.  The  President  has 
placed  tremendous  emphasis  on  the  im- 
portance of  strength,  and  there  is  no 
substitute  for  it.  There  is  no  foreign 
policy  for  the  United  States  unless  we're 
strong  and  unless  we  have  a  healthy  and 
vibrant  economy.  These  are  the  fun- 
damental underpinnings  of  anything 
you're  going  to  do  around  the  world. 

There's  no  question  about  the  fact 
that  the  President  has  been  brilliantly 
successful  in  turning  around  the  defense 
attitude  and  the  defense  strength  of  the 
United  States.  The  battle  continues, 
however,  and  it's  certainly  joined  right 
now.  I'm  glad  to  notice  on  your  program 
that  Cap  [Caspar]  Weinberger  will  be 
here.  Cap  Weinberger  seems  to  be  the 
center  of  criticism  these  days.  He  gets  a 
lot  of  criticism,  and  they  say  Cap  is  in- 
flexible. Let  me  say,  he  has  a  lot  to  be 
inflexible  about.  [Applause]  He  needs 
support,  and  he's  getting  support.  We 


must  recognize  the  importance  of 
developing  and  maintaining  our  capacity 
to  defend  ourselves,  to  defend  our  in- 
terests, to  defend  our  values,  and  to 
help  our  allies  and  friends  around  defend 
those  same  objectives.  Strength — mili- 
tary strength,  economic  strength, 
strength  of  will  and  purpose  are  fun- 
damentals that  the  President  comes 
back  to  time  and  time  again. 

Constructive  Problem  Solving 

That,  of  course,  is  not  the  end  of  the 
matter  because,  as  you  all  know,  the 
President  is  a  problem  solver.  As  we 
look  at  problems  at  home  and  around 
the  world,  we  have  to  scratch  our  heads 
and  say,  "What  can  we  do  about  them?" 
It's  not  enough  just  to  be  realistic  and  to 
be  strong,  we've  got  to  be  able  to  use 
that  strength  and  determination  for  con- 
structive purposes. 

I  believe  we  can  be  proud  to  say  that 
around  the  world  the  United  States  is 
always  trying  to  be  part  of  the  solution, 
not  part  of  the  problem.  It's  fair  to  say 
that  the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States 
under  the  President's  direction  saved 
Beirut  from  destruction.  [Applause]  We 
are  striving  to  bring  about  a  more 
peaceful  situation  in  the  Middle  East. 
It's  a  tough  struggle.  It's  been  going  on 
a  long  while.  But  we're  making  some 
headway.  At  any  rate,  in  all  cases  we're 
trying  to  be  part  of  the  solution.  We're 
bringing  suggestions. 

In  another  part  of  the  world  we  are 
working  with  the  ASEAN  [Association 
of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  countries 
to  try  to  get  the  Vietnamese  forces  out 
of  Kampuchea  and  to  create  a  better 
situation  there — a  situation  that  will 
serve  our  interest  as  well  as  theirs.  You 
can  look  at  the  situation  in  southern 
Africa  and  see  similar  efforts.  You  can 
look  at  the  problems  in  the  economic 
sphere  of  our  friends  around  the  world 
and  see  that  the  United  States  again  is 
trying  to  be  helpful,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  trying  to  carry,  with  that  help,  a 
sense  of  the  kind  of  principles  on  which 
we  think  economic  development  can 
properly  proceed.  I  think  that  with  our 
realism,  with  our  strength,  with  our 
alliances— I've  been  in  Asia  recently,  in- 
cidentally, visiting  Japan  and  China, 
Korea — how  many  of  you  here  have 
stood  up  at  the  DMZ  [demilitarized  zone] 
in  Korea?  Probably  a  few  of  you.  [Show 
of  hands]  Let  me  tell  you,  if  you  ever 
have  a  chance  to  do  that,  go  do  it, 
because  you  can  feel  the  hostility.  You 


THE  SECRETARY 


know  that  you're  on  a  front  line.  You 
can  also  be  very  proud  of  the  American 
soldiers  there  and  of  the  Korean  soldiers 
who  are  there,  and  of  our  capacity  to 
work  together  with  them  in  defense  of 
freedom. 

But  I  found  in  all  of  the  countries 
that  I  visited  a  very  realistic  and  clear 
view  of  what  country  is  the  root  cause 
of  the  big  problems  that  we  have  around 
the  world.  That  was  reassuring.  We  are 
realistic,  we  are  strong,  we  try  to  solve 
problems,  and  I  suppose  any  tour  of  the 
horizon  on  those  principles  is  incomplete 
without  saying  something  about  the 
Soviet  relationship.  This  is  something 
that  we  must  address  ourselves  to.  It's 
important  because  the  Soviet  Union  is  a 
large  country  with  a  tremendous 
military  capacity  and  a  demonstrated 
willingness  to  use  that  military  strength 
without  scruple.  So  it's  there,  and  we 
have  to  deal  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Again,  I  think  the  principles  the 
President  has  laid  out  are  the  ones  to 
follow,  and  they're  the  ones  he's  follow- 
ing. Namely,  be  realistic,  first  of  all. 
Don't  allow  yourself  to  kid  yourself 
about  what's  going  on.  Be  ready  to  say 
what's  going  on.  Be  strong,  but  also  be 
wOling  to  solve  problems. 

What  has  been  happening  in  recent 
days  is  the  President's  policy  has  been  in 
place— it  is  in  place,  it  will  be  in 
place— based  on  those  ideas.  With  new 
leadership  in  the  Soviet  Union  the  Presi- 
dent has,  on  several  occasions,  sought  to 
underline  the  third  point:  Don't  forget 
the  other  two  points.  And  in  underlining 
the  third  point,  always  the  message  is,  if 
you're  genuinely  ready  to  solve  problems 
in  terms  of  behavior — not  words, 
deeds— then  the  United  States  will  be 
there  to  be  a  constructive  partner 
always,  but  with  realism,  strength,  and 
determination. 

I  think  there's  also  a  fourth  point, 
and  it's  a  point  that  is  very  much  in  the 
spirit  that  the  President  brings  to 
things.  Because  he  is  a  great  believer 
that  if  you  will  counsel  realistically  with 
yourself— you'll  be  strong  and  you'll 
solve  problems  on  the  basis  of  that  kind 
of  an  approach— it's  possible  that  life 
can  be  better;  that  we  can  have  an 
economy  that's  more  bountiful;  that  we 
can  have  a  world  that's  more  stable  and 
peaceful  if  we're  determined  about  it. 

In  terms  of  stability  and  economic 
terms— but  not  just  in  those  terms— 
that  we  can  have  a  world  that's  better  in 
terms  of  freedom:  Freedom  to  worship, 
freedom  to  vote,  freedom  to  speak, 
freedom  to  write,  freedom  to  object,  to 
find  peace,  with  liberty  and  justice  for 
all.  [Applause] 


QUESTION-AND-ANSWER  SESSION 

Q.  You  said,  during  your  speech,  that 
the  command  economic  approach 
doesn't  work.  Would  you  go  so  far  as 
to  recommend  that  we  stop  any  and  all 
taxpayers'  guaranteed  loans  to  Com- 
munist economies?  If  not,  why  not? 
[Applause] 

A.  I  think  always  in  our — you're 
speaking  of  the  multinational  lending  in- 
stitutions, of  course.  In  our  policies 
toward  those  institutions,  we  need  to 
represent  and  to  call  to  their  attention 
this  fact  of  what  works  and  what  doesn't 
work,  and  to  look  for  projects  that  are 
truly  justified. 

Countries  vary  across  a  broad  spec- 
trum as  to  how  they're  organized,  and 
we  don't  have  to  make  the  decision  in 
terms  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  im- 
mediate bloc,  which  I  think  are  the  real 
typical  command  economies.  In  terms  of 
others,  of  course,  we  are  a  participant  in 
those  multinational  banks,  and  we  have 
a  strong  vote  and  a  strong  voice.  We  get 
mileage  out  of  our  money  by  having  it 
attract  other  money,  and  we  have  to 
compose  ourselves  with  our  allies  in 
those  banks.  I  would  say,  certainly,  that 
is  what  we  expect  and  that  is  mostly 
what  happens.  But,  no  doubt,  there  are 
some  cases  in  which  loans  go  to  things 
that  we  would  not  particularly  favor, 
and  we  can  work  against  that.  But  I 
would  not  support  withdrawing  from  all 
of  the  international  financial  institutions 
on  that  account,  which  I  guess  is  the 
gist  of  your  question. 

Q.  I  meant  the  Export-Import 
Bank,  particularly. 

A.  The  Eximbank  loans — certainly,  I 
would  expect  to  see  that  criterion  upheld 
and  to  expect,  also,  to  see  us  looking  at 
projects  in  the  Eximbank — a  case,  of 
course,  that  definitely  benefits  American 
exporters.  That's  the  purpose  of  it. 

Q.  This  Administration,  as  the 
previous  Administration,  in  the  Mid- 
dle East  has  operated  on  the  assump- 
tion that  certain  Arab  nations  were 
moderate  and  could  be  induced  into 
more  moderation.  Therefore,  Presi- 
dent Reagan  has  proposed  a  peace 
plan  in  which  King  Hussein  of  Jordan 
would  play  an  enormous  role,  and  he 
has  also  led  the  fight  to  sell  AWACS 
[airborne  warning  and  control  sys- 
tems] to  Saudi  Arabia.  At  this  point 
certain  conservatives,  including 
William  Safire,  asked  what  have  we 
gotten  in  return.  In  light  of  Saudi 
Arabia's  continuing  funding  of  the 
FLO,  what  evidence  is  there  that  the 
original  assumption  is  sound  and  that 


the  current  policy  is  prudent? 
[Applause] 

A.  I  don't  like  the  alternatives  i 
effort  to  attain  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  It  is  terrifically  important  to 
everyone,  including  Israel— especia 
Israel — to  have  peace  in  the  Middk 
East.  Look  at  what  has  happened  t 
Lebanon.  Really  savaged  over  man 
years  by  the  fact  that  the  problems 
the  Palestinians  have  simply  not  b€ 
addressed  in  any  legitimate  way.  I 
believe  that  uiJess  and  until  they  a 
dressed  and  some  reasonable  soluti 
found  to  the  legitimate  rights  of  th 
Palestinians,  we  will  not  have  peac 
the  Middle  East. 

They're  people,  they  live  there, 
they've  lived  there  a  long  time,  anc 
can't  be  ignored.  They  won't  go  av, 
That  being  the  case,  it  seems  to  m 
proper  and  pnjdent,  necessary  set 
policies  to  be  seeking  all  the  time, 
kind  of  setting,  the  kind  of  negotis 
that  will  lead  to  normal  relations  t 
tween  the  countries  in  that  part  of 
world. 

The  President  on  September  1 
posed  a  plan  that  is  within  the  Cai  i 
David  framework,  and,  of  course,   | 
to  bringing  about  the  sort  of  resul  | 
seek,  and  the  President  seeks,  is  t 
additional  countries  represented  a 
bargaining  table  and,  particularly, 
dan.  Certainly,  we  have  been  worl 
with  King  Hussein  to  see  if  the  co 
tions  can't  be  created  that  will  lea( 
to  the  bargaining  table,  and  with  £ 
implicit  suppoit  from  other  Arabs 
from  the  Palestinian  population,  g  I 
ly.  I  think  it's  a  worthy  objective,  ;  .1 
necessary  objective.  li 

We're  not  there  yet,  but  that  c  I 
mean  that  we  can't  get  there  or  th  i 
shouldn't  be  trying,  because  I  thinj  I 
alternative  to  trying  is  to  throw  u]  | 
hands  and  say,  "Let  there  be  what  8 
measure  of  security  there  can  be  1: 1 
on  armed  force."  In  the  end  you  hi| 
reckon— and  people  are  fond  of  qil 
statements  like  "an  eye  for  an  eye  | 
"a  tooth  for  a  tooth"— I  think  you  i 
to  remember,  too,  that  if  you  live  li 
sword,  you  can  die  by  the  sword.  .'M 
try  to  be  peacemakers  in  that  part  f 
the  world  and  bring  these  populat;  i 
together.  That  is  what  we're  tryin  ^ 
do,  and  it's  not  impossible;  it  sure  '& 
ficult.  [Applause] 

Q.  I'm  from  Phoenix,  Arizon;  th 
only  state  to  defeat  the  nuclear  i '« 
[Applause]  In  light  of  that.  I'd  li  t( 
ask  two  questions.  First  of  all,  cJil 


42 


Department  of  State  B  et' 


THE  SECRETARY 


jmment  on  the  reported  attempts 
:  Administration  to  suppress  the 
igation  of  the  Italian  Govern- 
that  the  Pope's  attempted 
sination  was.  in  fact,  headed  up 
t  present  Premier  of  the  Soviet 
),  Yuriy  Andropov,  who,  at  the 
was  head  of  the  KGB  [Commit- 
r  State  Security  (U.S.S.R.)]  in 

nothing  happens  of  that  sort 
they  get  the  okay  from  the  head 

KGB;  and,  if  this  were  the  case, 
aid  be  tremendous  in  opposing 
esent-day  nuclear  freeze, 
he  second  question:  Would  you 
;  comment  on  the  Administra- 

attempt  at  the  so-called  playing 

China  card  and  the  selling  of 
in,  in  general,  and  the  lack  of 
g  the  F-5C  Tiger  Shark,  in  par- 
r,  to  Taiwan  to  defend  her  coun- 
\pplau8e] 

.  I  can  see  that  in  addition  to 
:ing  the  nuclear  freeze,  you're  real- 
led.  [Laughter]  I  don't  know  of 
'fort  on  the  part  of  the  U.S. 
nment  to  suppress  the  investiga- 
f  the  attempted  assassination  of 
)pe.  Quite  the  contrary.  That  in- 
ation  is  being  carried  on  by  the 
nment  of  Italy.  We  await  the 
s  of  what  the  Italian  Government 
j;  up  with.  We  regard  it  as  a  most 
is  matter  and  look  to  the  Italian 
(nment  to  conduct  that.  We're  not 
It  to  discourage  them  in  any  way  or 
less  any  evidence  whatsoever.  [Ap- 

k 

Js  far  as  the  relationship  of  the 
Ijd  States  and  the  People's  Republic 
*ina  is  concerned,  I  believe  that  it  is 
^tant  for  us  to  have  a  reasonable 
■tinship  with  the  country.  It's  a  vast 
ijry.  It's  an  important  country.  It's 
1  to  develop— develop  very  strong- 
[n  sure. 

he  issue  of  Taiwan  is  one  of  the 
i  that  is  very  troublesome  with 
Et  to  that  relationship.  On  the  one 
i  the  Chinese  on  Taiwan  and  the 
ise  on  the  mainland  both  agree  that 
Kin  is  part  of  China.  We  say,  "Well, 
ti  their  problem  to  work  out."  But 
je  on  Taiwan  have  been  friends  of 
nited  States  for  a  long  while. 


They've  fought  on  our  side  in  Korea. 
They  fought  on  our  side  in  Vietnam. 
They  have  constructed  a  very  in- 
teresting and  strong  economy  and  socie- 
ty. We're  not  going  to  turn  our  backs  on 
them,  by  which  we  mean  that  we  will 
have  commercial  and  cultural  relations 
with  the  people  of  Taiwan,  and  we  stand 
for  the  idea  that  whatever  composure  of 
the  issues  comes  about,  it  must  be  by 
peaceful  means.  Therefore,  as  specified 
in  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act,  we'll  sell 
the  armaments  to  Taiwan  needed  to 
uphold  that  idea.  [Applause] 

I  think  what  is  said  in  the  communi- 
que simply  describes,  following  the 
statement  made  on  the  Chinese  side, 
that  the  situation  is  peaceful,  but  the 
level  of  arms  needed  basically  is  a  reflec- 
tion of  the  conditions  that  exist.  If  there 
is  a  peaceful  situation,  one  could  expect 
the  level  of  armaments  to  decline,  but 
that  doesn't  change  our  commitment 
that  any  resolution  of  the  issues  would 
be  by  peaceful  means. 

■This  is  one  of  the  issues  that  makes 
our  relationship  with  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  difficult  to 
achieve— one  kind  of  relationship  we 
want.  It's  a  hard  issue  to  manage,  but  I 
believe  that  we  can  do  so  and  do  so  with 
honor  to  our  commitments  to  longstand- 
ing friends  and  with  a  sense  of  reason 
anci  good  sense  about  the  importance  of 
a  relationship  with  the  People's  Republic 
of  China.  [Applause] 

Q.  I'm  from  Georgetown  Universi- 
ty. While  President  Reagan  was  in 
Europe  last  summer,  he  proposed  U.S. 
action  to  promote  democratic  values  in 
institutions  across  the  globe.  What 
specific  steps  will  the  Administration 
be  taking  in  this  initiative? 

A.  We've  taken  quite  a  few  steps  on 
that  initiative.  There  have  been  a  couple 
of  conferences  attended  by  people  from 
throughout  the  world,  including  people 
from  totalitarian,  Communist  societies, 
and  we  have  talked  in  those  conferences. 
They've  gotten  a  fair  amount  of 
publicity— about  democratic  values, 
about  free  elections,  and  it  has  been  sur- 
prising to  me  to  see  how  much  reaction 
we've  gotten  from  the  Soviet  Union. 
They  sort  of  shake  their  finger  at  us  and 
say,  "What  do  you  mean  talking  about 


principles  of  freedom  and  democracy 
around  the  world."  So  it's  got  their 
attention. 

Beyond  that,  we  seek  to  put  these 
values  forward  as  part  of  an  effort  of 
what  is  being  called  "public  diplomacy." 
We  are  seeking,  in  connection  with  the 
President's  budget,  a  fair  sum  of  money 
to  help  us  to  do  that— to  take  concrete 
steps,  to  call  attention  to  these  values, 
to  put  them  forward,  to  see  that  people 
come  here,  and  back  and  forth,  and  get 
exposed,  and  so  on— a  program  of  pro- 
moting the  values  that  we  believe  in 
rather  than  just  sitting  here  and  expect- 
ing people  will  naturally  recognize  them. 
We're  very  much  in  favor  of  this  effort 
that  flows  from  the  President's  speech 
before  the  British  Parliament,  and  it's 
getting  a  lot  of  attention  and  a  lot  of  ef- 
fort. 

Q.  In  light  of  the  constant  covert 
terror  emanating  from  Bulgaria,  what 
is  Bulgaria's  status  of  relations  with 
the  United  States,  and  what  do  you 
see  as  its  future  status  of  relations? 

A.  The  harboring  of  terror  is 
something  that  we  abhor,  and  we  don't 
have  any  prospect  of  any  kind  of  a  fruit- 
ful relationship  with  a  country  that  does 
that,  as  Bulgaria  does. 


'Press  release  54. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Interview  on  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley" 


Secretary  Shultz  was  interviewed  on 
ABC-TV's  'rhis  Week  With  David 
Brinkley"  on  February  20,  1983.  by 
David  Brinkley,  Sam  Donaldson,  Peter 
Jennings,  and  Pierre  Salinger,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  News 


Q.  We've  had  now  roughly  100 
days  of  the  new  administration  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  Mr.  Andropov.  What  are 
your  impressions  of  him  at  this  point? 

A.  My  impression  is,  starting  with 
my  observations  at  the  Brezhnev 
funeral,  that  he  has  taken  charge;  he's 
the  person  with  authority.  So  far,  the  ef- 
forts that  we  have  made  to  emphasize 
our  willingness  to  discuss  substantive 
problems  and  work  them  out  have  not 
produced  anything  fruitful;  nevertheless, 
we  continue  to  follow  our  policies— the 
President's  policies — of  being  realistic, 
of  being  strong,  and  of  being  ready  to 
seek  constructive  solutions  to  problems. 

Q.  Would  you  say  he  is  less  dif- 
ficult or  more  difficult  to  deal  with 
than  his  predecessor? 

A.  He  has  said  that  his  policy  is  to 
continue  those  of  his  predecessor,  and  so 
far  as  we  can  see,  that's  what  he's  do- 
ing. 

Q.  Just  below  the  general  issue  of 
the  economy,  which  is  worldwide,  in 
Europe,  as  you  well  know,  is  the  sub- 
ject of  intermediate-range  nuclear 
missiles.  Can  you  point  publicly  to 
some  evidence  now  that  the  inter- 
mediate-range missile  negotiations  at 
Geneva  are  not  stalemated? 

A.  The  negotiations  are  taking 
place,  the  Soviet  negotiators  are  there, 
we  have  very  good  proposals  on  the 
table,  they  are  supported  by  our  allies.  I 
think  it's  quite  apparent  that  the  Soviet 
Union  does  not  want  to  see  the  Pershing 
lis  and  the  ground-launched  cruise 
missiles  deployed  in  Europe,  as  the  allies 
and  we  have  agreed  to  do. 

So  with  a  proposal  for  eliminating 
that  whole  class  of  missiles  on  the  table, 
I  think  there  are  big  incentives  on 
everyone's  part  to  do  just  that.  We  have 
a  good  proposal,  we're  discussing  it,  and 
that's  the  way  you  conduct  a  negotia- 
tion. 


Q.  There  is  a  certain  feeling  in 
Europe  that  negotiations  and  really 
serious  debate  about  deployment  is 
suspended  until  after  the  German  elec- 
tions on  March  6th.  Do  you  think  that 
election  is  so  crucial  to  the  NATO 
deployment? 

A.  I  don't  think  there  is  such  a  big 
debate  about  deployment,  especially 
among  the  leaders.  They  all  have  said 
that  it's  important  to  deploy  on  schedule 
unless  there  is  some  breakthrough  in 
negotiations.  That  is  our  position;  that  is 
their  position. 

The  negotiations  themselves  have  to 
follow  their  own  pace,  and  any 
developments  in  the  negotiations,  it 
seems  to  me,  can't  be  connected  to  any 
particular  election. 

Q.  My  point  about  the  German 
election  was  that  we're  not  altogether 
sure  who  the  leader  will  be  after 
March  6th;  whether  it  will  be  Mr. 
Vogel,  the  opposition  candidate,  who 
is  not  altogether  sure  that  he  would 
deploy  the  missiles. 

A.  We  can't  try  to  predict  election 
results.  They're  difficult  to  predict 
anywhere,  and  I  think  it's  very  impor- 
tant, from  the  standpoint  of  the  United 
States,  to  be  neutral  in  elections.  So  I 
don't  want  to  comment  on  the  can- 
didates. 

Q.  One  of  the  most  predominant 
European  perceptions  is  that  the  zero 
option,  while  being  a  very  good  plan 
and  even  a  moral  plan,  is  unattainable. 
When  Vice  President  Bush  was  in 
Europe,  he  kind  of  threw  open  the 
debate,  suggesting  that  maybe  if 
somebody  had  some  ideas,  they  could 
put  them  on  the  table. 

Now.  former  French  President 
Valerie  Giscard  d'Estaing  yesterday  in 
a  very  long  article  in  the  French 
newspaper  La  Monde  did  make  a  pro- 
posal. What  he  suggested  was  to 
change  the  zero  option  to  the  zero  ob- 
jective, and  what  he  said  was  that  the 
missiles  should  be  deployed,  but 
deployed  on  a  staged  basis,  agreed  to 
by  the  governments  of  the  countries 
where  they're  going  to  be  deployed, 
and  if  the  Soviet  Union  decided  to 
destroy  part  of  their  SS-20s  and  other 
missiles,  you  could  stop  the  deploy- 
ment at  a  point  of  equality  between 


the  East  and  West  and  Europe,  bm 
the  final  objective  being  no  mediui 
range  missiles  on  either  side.  Wha 
you  think  of  that  proposal? 

A.  I  like  very  much  the  emphasi 
that  Giscard  put  on  deployment  and 
importance  of  that  unless  there  is  a 
satisfactory  agreement.  Of  course,  t 
fact  of  the  matter  is  that  these  | 

deployments  don't  take  place  instan- 
taneously, all  at  once;  they  take  placi 
a  schedule  over  a  period  of  time,  th( 
first  being  toward  the  end  of  this  ye 
So  there's  plenty  of  time  for  the  Soi 
Union  to  come  forward  with  worthw 
suggestions. 

Q.  What  about  the  part  of  Mr 
Giscard  d'Estaing's  proposal  wher 
suggests  that  the  European  leadei ' 
the  countries  involved  get  togethf 
and  work  out  the  stages,  in  conju  ' 
tion  with  the  United  States?  Wou  ' 
you  approve  such  a  plan?  ' 

A.  I  think  that  it's  very  import  j 
that  the  allies  together  work  out  wl ' 
the  strategy  should  be.  First  of  all,  i 
strategy  of  a  two-track  approach,  t 
is,  deployment  and  negotiations,  vii ' 
worked  out  jointly,  and  the  zero  op  I 
so-called  the  elimination  option,  wa 
a  product  of  joint  consultations.  Th 
consultations  are  going  on  constant 
As  I  have  watched  the  cable  traffic 
and  forth  across  the  Atlantic  and  h  j 
to  people,  one  of  the  refrains  that  I 
heard  is  how  appreciative  people  ai 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  rich  and  full 
sultant  process  going  on.  It  should 
alliance  process,  not  a  European  or 
then  a  U.S.  one. 

Q.  Haven't  we  lost  sight  of  a . 
ess  or  portion  of  the  negotiating 
ess,  a  lot  of  talk  about  numbers- 
reduce  the  SS-20S,  not  put  in  the 
Pershing,  not  put  in  the  cruise?  I 
there  a  more  basic  problem?  We  \ 
a  worldwide  limit  on  intermediatt 
range  nuclear  missiles  and  the  Sd 
want  ceilings  only  on  those  in  Eu 
Is  the  Administration— and  this  ( 
concern  Europeans— flexible  enon 
to  be  able  to  harmonize  those  tw« 
positions? 

A.  I  think  you  make  a  very  got 
point,  and,  of  course,  we  are  harmo 
ing  those  positions.  The  zero  option 
global  proposal,  and  one  of  the  thin 
that  was  wrong  with  the  proposal  t 
fered  by  Mr.  Andropov  was  that  it 
ply  seemed  to  propose  moving  a  Id 
SS-20S  from  the  European  theater 


Department  of  State  Bu  ti 


THE  SECRETARY 


ar  Eastern  theater.  I  happen  to 
been  in  the  Far  East  recently,  and 
/roposal  was  not  a  hit  in  the  Far 
by  a  long  shot.  There's  very  firm 
rt  there  for  the  U.S.  position, 
he  proposal  of  Mr.  Andropov,  if 
)ody  had  made  that  to  me  when  I 

businessman,  I  would  have  said  he 
sed  to  give  me  the  sleeves  from  his 
All  he  was  going  to  do  was  move 
missiles  over  here,  and  they  could 

be  moved  back  again, 
think  there's  another  point, 
h,  that  I'd  like  to  comment  on  in 
ction  with  your  question.  I  think 
!  right  in  saying  that  with  all  of  the 
asis  on  arms  and  missiles  and  so 

there  is  an  important  point  being 
d,  and  there  is.  And  the  important 
is  this:  What  this  is  all  about  is  not 

it's  about  values,  the  values  of 
3m— of  the  freedom  to  speak,  the 
)m  to  vote,  the  freedom  to  wor- 
the  freedom  to  choose  the  way  of 
lat  we  want.  That's  what  it's  all 

le  only  reason  why  we  have  the 
ifense  effort  that  we  have  in  this 
ry  and  abroad  and  the  only  reason 
.'e  are  debating  these  things  is  that 
:ognize  that  we  have  to  be  willing 
:end  these  freedoms.  But  the 
i)ms  are  what  this  is  all  about. 

|.  Another  European  perception 
e  United  States  no  longer  has  any 
ige  over  the  State  of  Israel  and, 
fore,  it  cannot  move  the  State  of 
,!  toward  adoption  of  the  Reagan 
I  What  would  you  say  to  that 
:ption? 

..  I  think  the  leverage,  not  only 
}he  State  of  Israel  but  everybody  in 
'igion,  is  the  leverage  given  by  the 
!)ility  of  peace.  That  is  the  goal  that 
•jve  talked  about  and  others  have 
i  about.  I  think  it  is  increasingly 
(nized  as  something  that  is  obvious- 

i  desirable  but  perhaps  even  at- 
;,  and  it's  that  possibility  that  we 
keep  in  front  of  people  as  the 
•eason  why  an  effort  should  be 
0  sit  down  and  work  out  the  con- 
that  will  lead  to  peace. 

\.  Have  you  heard  any  more  news 
(King  Hussein  about  the  peace 
lithe  progress?  Is  he  going  to  join 
ill  he  take  part  in  it?  Anything 
on  that? 

I.  There's  nothing  new  that  can  be 
'1  publicly,  but  I  think  it  is  well 
«n  by  this  time  that  King  Hussein 
;i  to  enter  the  peace  process.  He 
:nizes  the  importance  of  working 


out  peace  problems  with  Israel,  and  I'm 
pretty  optimistic  that  one  of  these  fine 
days  the  conditions  will  be  right  for  rais- 
ing that  negotiating  level  a  new  notch. 

Q.  He  was  on  this  program  a  few 
weeks  ago,  and  one  of  the  conditions 
he  seemed  to  be  insisting  on  was  the 
Israeli  withdrawal,  or  something, 
from  the  West  Bank,  which  does  not 
seem  to  be  a  live  prospect. 

A.  Of  course,  one  of  the  issues  in 
what  are  called  final  status  negotiations, 
whenever  those  are  gotten  to,  will  be 
the  jurisdiction  over  those  territories 
and  the  establishment  of  that  in  a  way 
that's  consistent  with  the  security  needs 
of  Israel.  There  are  a  lot  of  difficult 
issues  there. 

There  is  also  in  the  Camp  David 
process  envisaged  something  called  the 
transition  arrangements.  I  think  that 
they  are  perhaps  less  controversial  but 
very  important,  so  presumably  that 
would  be  the  first  thing  that  would  be 
tackled  if  these  negotiations  can  be  got- 
ten going  again. 

Q.  This  Administration  came  into 
power  with  a  lot  of  hopes  that  the 
Saudis  would  play  a  moderating  and 
constructive  role,  and  to  that  end  a  lot 
of  sophisticated  weaponry  was  sold  to 
them.  It  is  not  perhaps  the  case  that 
one  reason  Hussein  won't  enter  is  the 
Saudis  won't  give  him  the  go-ahead, 
and  he's  afraid  they'll  do  to  him  what 
they  did  to  Sadat,  which  is  cut  off 
their  substantial  support  to  him, 
which  would  be  much  more  damaging 
to  him,  even  than  it  was  to  Egypt? 

A.  No,  I  don't  think  so.  I  think  that 
the  Saudis  have  been  playing  a  construc- 
tive role  in  the  region,  not  only  with 
respect  to  King  Hussein  but  also  with 
respect  to  Lebanon.  It  doesn't  mean  that 
they  have  done  everything  that  at  least 
we  think  they  might  do,  but  they've 
done  a  lot  and  will  continue  to  do  a  lot.  I 
think  they're  a  very  constructive  partner 
in  this  whole  process. 

Q.  Do  they  want  Hussein  to  enter 
the  negotiations? 

A.  Under  the  right  conditions,  I 
think  they  do. 

Q.  It's  reported  that  the  President 
has  ordered  the  return  of  the  four 
AWACS  [airborne  warning  and  con- 
trol system]  planes  sent  to  Egypt.  Can 
you  tell  us  about  that,  and  what  is  the 
threat  at  the  moment  from  Libya 
toward  the  Sudan? 

A.  As  far  as  we  know,  the  threat 
that  was  clearly  present  has  receded.  I 


don't  want  to  go  into  all  of  the  ins  and 
outs  of  it,  but  I  think  the  net  of  the 
whole  thing  is,  as  your  broadcast 
brought  out,  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  acted  quickly  and  decisive- 
ly and  effectively,  and  at  least  for  the 
moment,  Qadhafi  is  back  in  his  box 
where  he  belongs. 

Q.  For  the  moment.  What  are  the 
plans  for  the  future?  What  can  be 
done  to  keep  Qadhafi  in  that  box  and 
to  keep  him  from  trying  to  break  out 
again? 

A.  Of  course,  there  is  a  long  history 
of  reprehensible  behavior  on  the  part  of 
Qadhafi.  Perhaps  you  remember  the 
murders  at  the  Munich  Olympics  and 
who  harbored  and  gave  asylum  to  those 
who  conducted  the  murders.  This  is  just 
one  among  a  great  many  things  that  he 
has  done,  both  in  terms  of  destabilizing 
his  neighbors  and  in  various  other  ways. 

So  I  expect  that  he  will  continue  to 
cause  trouble,  and  our  approach,  I  think, 
is  to  let  him  see  that  his  options  are 
limited  and  we  know  what's  going  on 
and  to  conduct  ourselves  accordingly. 

Q.  You  say  his  options  are  limited. 
Is  one  of  the  lessons  the  President 
wants  out  this  week  is  that  Qadhafi 
will  not  be  allowed  to  cause  trouble? 
Are  you  really  serving  notice  to 
Qadhafi  in  Libya  that  he's  not  to  try  to 
destabilize  his  neighbors? 

A.  We  certainly  oppose  these 
destabilization  efforts,  have  consistently 
over  a  period  of  several  Administrations 
and  will  continue  to  do  so.  I  think  that 
it's  apparent  that  Qadhafi's  actions  are 
not  at  all  appreciated  by  his  neighbors. 
After  all,  it's  interesting  that  the  OAU 
[Organization  of  African  Unity]  meeting 
under  his  leadership  never  took  place. 
Why?  Not  because  of  us,  but  because  of 
the  attitude  of  his  neighbors  toward  him 
and  his  behavior. 

Q.  Your  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs  [Chester  A.  Crocker] 
has  an  essay  or  an  article  published 
today  in  which  he  says  Qadhafi  is  try- 
ing to  destabilize  about  half  the  coun- 
tries in  North  Africa.  That  could  keep 
us  pretty  busy  if  we  are  going  to  try 
to  contain  him. 

A.  I  think  the  fact  of  the  matter  is 
that  people  are  pretty  well  onto  him.  It 
isn't  that  we  have  to  do  everything; 
other  people,  too,  have  identified  the 
nature  of  the  problem  he  presents.  So  I 
think  that  he  has  been  pretty  well  con- 
tained, and  he'll  continue  to  be  so.  It 
isn't  just  the  United  States  that's  in- 
volved or  aware. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  American  policy  is  a  speedy 
withdrawal  of  Israel  from  parts  of 
Lebanon  it  now  occupies,  but 
Lebanese  politics  seem  to  be  at  least 
as  murderous  as  always  with  one  fac- 
tion murdering  another  and  a  third 
faction  joining  them.  Is  there  not  a 
danger  that  if  Israel  was  to  withdraw, 
you'd  have  a  massacre,  or  many 
massacres,  much  more  brutal  than  the 
one  that  occurred  in  the  two  refugee 
camps? 

A.  There  are  problems  in  Lebanon 
absent  the  foreign  forces,  although  I 
think  it's  fair  to  say  that  the  problems 
have  been  less  evident  in  areas  of 
Lebanon  where  the  foreign  forces  have 
not  been  present  and  where  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  have  been 
responsible  for  security. 

Having  said  that,  I  think  it's  an 
oversimplification  that  our  policy  is 
speedy  withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces.  Our 
policies  are  speedy  withdrawal  of  all 
forces  in  a  manner  that's  consistent  with 
the  security  needs  of  Israel,  recognizing 
the  implications  of  southern  Lebanon 
and  their  historic  destabilizing  effect  on 
Israel  and  the  emergence  of  a  Lebanon 
that  can  govern  itself. 

Q.  That  sounds  like  a  very  long 
process. 

A.  It  will  be  long  in  some  respects, 
but  it  can  be  rapid  in  others. 

Q.  You've  just  come  back  shortly 
from  a  trip  to  China,  where  you  found, 
what  I'm  sure  you  already  knew,  that 
the— 

A.  I  went  to  Japan,  China,  Korea, 
and  Hong  Kong,  but  China  was  a  very 
important  part  of  that  trip. 

Q.  That's  why  I  wanted  to  ask  you 
about  it.  You  heard  what  you  already 
knew,  that  the  Chinese  are  somewhat 
restless  and  irritable  about  the 
Taiwan  issue  and  the  American  sale  of 
arms  to  Taiwan.  What  can  we  do 
about  it?  Isn't  that  going  to  continue 
to— poison  is  too  strong  a  word, 
but— make  difficult  our  relations  with 
China  for  the  foreseeable  future? 

A.  It's  been  a  difficult  part  of  our 
relations  with  China  from  the  beginning, 
and  each  time  a  communique  has  been 
negotiated,  that  issue  has  been  taken  up 
and  treated.  I  think  that  we  must 
recognize  that  a  relationship  with  China 
is  a  very  important  one  to  us,  and  in- 
sofar as  the  difficulty  that  our  relations 
with  the  people  of  Tawian,  which  are 
unofficial,  pose  a  problem,  it  seems  to 
me  the  thing  for  us  to  do  is  manage  that 
in  a  way  that  meets  the  commitments 
that  have  been  made  in  the  various  com- 


muniques, and  that's  what  we  undertake 
to  do. 

Q.  Why  can't  Taiwan  buy  whatever 
weapons  it  needs  somewhere  else?  The 
French  are  big  weapons  manufac- 
turers, for  example. 

A.  You  mean  you  want  us  to  take  a 
cop-out?  Why  should  we  do  that? 

Q.  No,  they  would  just  buy  their 
weapons  somewhere  else  and  get  us 
off  the  hook. 

A.  Oh,  come  on. 

Q.  What  we've  paid  for  our 
Chinese  relationship  is  fairly 
clear— an  attenuated,  downgraded 
relationship  with  Taiwan.  What  have 
we  got  out  of  this  in  11  years?  What 
do  we  have  to  show  for  it?  What  value 
is  China  to  us? 

A.  China  is  an  important  country 
now,  it  will  be  more  important  as  time 
goes  on.  It  has  similar  interests  to  ours 
in  some  respects,  internationally,  so  we 
have  been  able  to  work  effectively 
together  there.  I  think  that  there  is  a 
strong  possibility  of  a  developing 
economic  relationship  with  China,  so  I 
think  that  it's  important  for  us  to  have  a 
stable  and  reasonable  relationship  with 
China. 

Q.  In  an  interview  this  morning  in 
The  New  York  Times,  Moshe  Arens, 
the  man  selected  by  Prime  Minister 
Begin  to  be  the  new  Defense  Minister 
of  Israel— 

A.  Yes,  outstanding  man. 

Q.  He  said  some  Washington  of- 
ficials have  idealized  notions  of  what's 
possible  in  Lebanon,  as  far  as  with- 
drawal. Are  you  one  of  them?  Do  you 
plead  guilty  to  that? 

A.  I  don't  know  who  he's  talking 
about,  but  if  idealized  means  that  we 
should  aspire  to  help  the  Lebanese 
recreate  their  country  so  that  the 
Lebanese  people  can  live  in  peace  and 
prosperity,  I  plead  guilty.  That  is  an  im- 
portant objective.  I  have  been  to 
Lebanon  and  Beirut  in  the  days  before 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion] ravaged  the  country  and  seen  what 
a  beautiful  and  central  place  it  can  be  in 
the  Middle  East. 

Q.  He  seems  to  mean,  judging 
from  the  interview,  that  some  officials 
in  Washington  are  putting  too  much 
pressure  on  Israel  to  withdraw  too 
quickly,  consistent  with  Israel's 
security  needs. 

A.  Israel's  security  needs  are  an  im- 
portant and  legitimate  aspect  of  any 


withdrawal  plan,  and  there  is  no  con 
troversy  about  that  whatever.  The  p 
lem  is  how  do  you  do  it?  I  think  that 
proposals  to  have  a  permanent  Israt 
armed  force  presence  in  Lebanon  is 
hardly  consistent  with  the  idea  of 
sovereignty  for  Lebanon.  Neverthel 
it  seems  to  me  that  there  are  ways ' 
give  the  kind  of  insurance  that  Israt 
properly  wants  in  southern  Lebanor 
that  are  consistent  with  sovereignty 
That's  sort  of  the  nature  of  the  prol 
as  we're  trying  to  work  it  out. 

Q.  What  is  one  of  these  ways? 

A.  There  are  a  host  of  problems 
There  is  the  need  for  intelligence  al 
what  is  going  on,  and  is  there  any  i 
filtration  taking  place,  and  I  think  t 
kind  of  thing  can  be  met.  Of  course 
think  one  of  the  important  matters 
that's  sometimes  talked  about  as 
separate,  although  I  think  it's  conm 
is  the  degree  of  normalization  betw 
Lebanon  and  Israel  that  is  present.  ■ 
Some  normalization  in  a  process  th  ' 
can  unfold  I  think  is  important,  am 
course,  the  more  of  that  there  is,  tl  | 
more  that  lends  to  security  aspects 
because  there  are  people  there  goir 
back  and  forth  in  the  normal  coursi 
events,  and  they  can  see  for  thems' 
what's  taking  place. 

Q.  Nigeria  this  morning  anno 
a  cut  of  $5.50  a  barrel  for  oil.  No 
and  Britain  some  $3  earlier  in  th( 
week.  Is  OPEC  [Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries] 
breaking  up?  Is  this  a  good  thing 
that's  happening. 

A.  I  think  in  the  history  of  cart 
takes  time  for  them  to  run  into  the 
ficulties,  but  history  shows  that  tht 
always  do.  I  think  the  fact  of  the  n 
is  that  the  price  that  had  been  set 
earlier  was  too  high  for  the  econon 
the  situation,  and  the  market  has  t 
over.  Where  it  will  go,  I  don't  knov 
I  think  with  whatever  problems  for 
dividual  countries  a  fall  in  the  price' 
oil  may  pose,  for  the  world  in  gene 
it's  a  good  thing.  It  will  help  us  in  (| 
effort  to  have  our  GNP  grow  in  re!« 
terms  and  to  have  inflation  kept  ur 
control  and  deal  with  some  of  the  i  f 
national  flows  involved.  ( 

Q.  The  President  has  emphati 
reaffirmed  his  support  for  Ken 
Adelman  as  his  choice  to  be  Diret 
of  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarms 
Agency.  Some  Senators  opposing 
say  that  you  and  the  President  an 
[Defense  Secretary]  Cap  Weinber 
are  busy  rookies,  you  don't  knowi 
enough  about  this  and  your  schec 


Department  of  State  Bi9* 


THE  SECRETARY 


i»  busy,  and,  therefore,  you  need 
iveteran  of  the  arms  control 
?.s.  Do  you  need  Adelman,  do  you 
idelman,  and  how  serious  a 
3  you  will  it  be  if  you  can't  get 
in  you  choose? 

W'c  iii'fii  him  and  we  want  him 
n\'  uniiij;  to  fight  for  him  and 
iijnu  to  get  him.  He  is  a  person, 
;all.  of  great  ability.  He  has 
;  and  thought  about  this  subject  a 
eal  over  a  period  of  time.  The 
lit  he's  young — I  don't  know, 
re  pt'ople  who  tell  me  that  when 
'.St'i  years  old.  they're  old,  depends 
r  perspective.  But  personally  I 

you  can  get  some  of  that  zest  in 
Kil  lie  brings,  it'll  be  a  good 
M'ter  all.  we  have  to  remember 
-  people  who  are  really  going  to 
the  future  are  not  those  of  us 
^  in  our  sixties;  it's  the  people 
in  their  thirties.  And  what's 
with  a  little  youth  in  this  picture, 

as  it's  competent  and  conscien- 
^hich  he  is. 

jYou  mentioned  the  declining 
[f  oil,  which  will  be  a  difficulty 
xico,  for  example,  which  owes  a 
dous  amount  of  money  to 
•an  banks  and  others  and  will 

able  to  pay  it,  selling  oil  at  low 

You  were  Secretary  of 

ry  before  you  were  Secretary  of 

ind  an  economist.  Are  you 

)ed  about  this— all  the  money 

o  American  banks  which  seems 

singly  unlikely  to  be  paid? 

The  debt  problems  are  a  problem. 

•e  they  can  be  handled  with  good 

IS  we  have  been  getting  good 

rom  our  own  Secretary  of  the 

ry,  Don  Regan,  and  from  Paul 

r  at  the  Fed,  working  with 

s  de  Larosiere,  who  is  a  terrific 

at  the  IMF  [International 

iry  Fund],  and  people  from  other 

es  around.  I  think  that  problem 

handled,  although  it's  a  difficult 

Even  though  the  money  seems, 
moment,  unlikely  to  be  paid,  it 
handled? 

The  real  way  out  of  the  dilemmas 
e  debt  problems  is  expansion  in 
rid  economy.  If  we  get  expansion, 
'erything  gets  into  a  little  differ- 
irspective.  That's  the  name  of  the 
ight  now,  in  my  opinion,  and  I 
hat  the  U.S.  economy  is  poised 
start  of  a  healthy  expansion  and 
s  some  others  will  be,  too. 

!ss  release  59  of  Feb.  23,  1983.  ■ 


Project  Democracy 


Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  February 
23,  1983.'^ 

On  a  few  occasions  since  I  became 
Secretary  of  State,  a  new  policy  or  pro- 
gram has  been  presented  to  me  whose 
purpose  was  so  clearly  in  our  interest 
that  I  asked,  "Why  hasn't  this  been  done 
before?"  I  asked  that  question  when 
presented  with  this  democracy  program. 
The  answer  was  that  although  the  U.S. 
Government  has  programs  to  support 
the  development  of  democracy  abroad, 
they  are  inadequate.  Some  programs 
have  even  been  weakened  in  the  past 
few  years,  victims  of  our  all  too  typical 
preference  for  quick  results  over  sus- 
tained effort. 

The  United  States,  as  a  great  power 
with  worldwide  interests  and  obliga- 
tions, must  take  a  long-range  view  of 
the  international  environment.  We  can- 
not allow  our  preoccupation  with  the 
policies  and  events  of  the  next  days  or 
months  to  lead  us  to  neglect  the  trends 
in  attitudes  and  values  which  will  shape 
the  world  in  the  decades  to  come.  The 
U.S.  Government— the  executive  and 
the  Congress— has  a  responsibility  to 
look  far  ahead  to  insure  that  the  values 
and  principles  that  Americans  of  all 
political  persuasions  share  with  many 
peoples  throughout  the  world  will  shape 
the  course  of  events  in  the  future  and 
will  insure  that  the  world  evolves  in  a 
way  that  will  maximize  the  chances  for 
peaceful  cooperation,  freedom,  enhance- 
ment of  human  rights,  and  economic  de- 
velopment. 

President  Reagan  exercised  this 
responsibility  in  his  speech  before  the 
British  Parliament  on  June  8,  1982.  He 
promised  that  the  United  States  would 
make  a  major  effort  to  help  ".  .  .  foster 
the  infrastructure  of  democracy — the 
system  of  a  free  press,  unions,  political 
parties,  universities— which  allows  a 
people  to  choose  their  own  way,  to 
develop  their  own  culture,  to  reconcile 
their  own  differences  through  peaceful 
means."  He  also  called  upon  our  country 
to  stand  up  more  vigorously  for  the 
principles  and  values  which  underpin  our 
democratic  society.  He  emphasized  that 
the  ultimate  determinant  in  the  struggle 
now  going  on  for  the  world  "...  will  not 
be  bombs  and  rockets,  but  a  test  of  wills 
and  ideas,  a  trial  of  spiritual  resolve.  . . ." 


The  program  I  am  presenting  to  you 
today  is  an  important  step  in  the  imple- 
mentation of  President  Reagan's  London 
initiative.  But  it  is  just  a  beginning.  It  is 
the  Federal  Government's  initial  contri- 
bution to  what  must  become  a  larger  ef- 
fort for  all  America.  Support  of  democ- 
racy is  an  activity  in  which  communities, 
organizations,  and  individuals  through- 
out our  country  can  and  must  partici- 
pate. In  this  regard,  we  are  especially 
pleased  that  the  chairmen  of  the  two 
political  parties,  the  president  of  the 
AFL-CIO,  and  representatives  from  the 
Congress  and  business  are  conducting  a 
study  on  how  the  United  States — par- 
ticularly its  nongovernmental  organiza- 
tions—can work  to  strengthen  democ- 
racy abroad.  We  are  in  close  consulta- 
tion with  the  study's  executive  board 
and  staff  and  look  forward  to  their 
recommendations.  We  believe  that  the 
program  we  are  proposing  today  is  com- 
patible with  the  direction  of  this  study, 
and,  indeed,  both  will  become  part  of  a 
larger,  broader  effort. 

Support  for  Democracy 

Many  in  our  society  have  for  years  ad- 
vocated a  stronger  American  effort  to 
support  the  institutions  and  proponents 
of  democracy  abroad.  They  have  recog- 
nized that  only  in  democracies  is  there 
inherent  respect  for  individual  liberties 
and  rights.  In  democracies,  there  is  free- 
dom of  expression  and  real  participation 
in  choosing  leaders,  both  of  which  insure 
that  governments  serve  their  citizens, 
not  vice  versa.  In  the  postwar  world, 
democracies  have  exhibited  extraordi- 
nary economic  vitality.  With  their  more 
flexible  economies,  democracies  have 
continued  to  demonstrate  the  efficiency 
and  dynamism  necessary  to  maintain 
strength  in  a  complex  and  difficult  inter- 
national economic  environment.  Democ- 
racies stand  for  peaceful  cooperation; 
they  do  not  invade  or  subvert  their 
neighbors. 

If  we  are  to  achieve  the  kind  of 
world  we  all  hope  to  see — with  peace, 
freedom,  and  economic  progress— de- 
mocracy has  to  continue  to  expand. 
Democracy  is  a  vital,  even  revolutionary, 
force.  It  exists  as  an  expression  of  the 
basic  human  drive  for  freedom.  While  it 
is  threatened  or  repressed  by  those 
forces  for  whom  power  takes  precedence 


THE  SECRETARY 


over  liberty,  with  the  hard  work,  perse- 
verence,  and  courage  of  its  proponents 
throughout  the  world,  democracy  will 
flourish.  It  is  not  the  preserve  of  in- 
dustrialized nations.  Today,  in  a  number 
of  countries  in  varying  stages  of  eco- 
nomic development,  democracy  is  grow- 
ing stronger.  President  Monge  of  Costa 
Rica  pointed  out  to  us  last  November 
that  democracy  can  thrive  in  developing 
countries.  Democracy  is  not  just  the 
hope  of  the  distant  future;  it  is  the  pres- 
ent. 

Support  for  the  development  of 
democracy  is  an  essential  part  of  our 
human  rights  policy.  This  Administra- 
tion is  committed  to  promoting  the  ob- 
servance of  human  rights  worldwide 
through  concrete  actions.  While  we  con- 
tinue to  talk  to  governments  about 
specific  human  rights  violations,  we 
know  well  that  the  protection  of  human 
rights  and  liberties  over  the  long  term 
can  only  be  insured  by  a  democratic 
form  of  government. 

We  are  not  so  naive  to  believe  that 
imitations  of  the  U.S.  system  will  or 
even  should  spring  up  around  the  globe. 
Democracy  is  more  a  set  of  basic  prin- 
ciples and  institutions  than  a  single,  im- 
mutable model.  The  principles  and  basic 
institutions  are  valid  worldwide;  the 
overall  structure  has  to  be  adapted  to 
take  into  account  historic,  cultural,  and 
social  conditions. 

It  is  naive  to  believe  that  we  do  not 
have  to  work  for  democracy— that  mere- 
ly its  existence  somewhere  in  the  world 
is  sufficient  incentive  for  its  growth  else- 
where. Some  claim  that  the  United 
States  must  be  a  beacon  for  democracy, 
and  that,  if  we  make  sure  the  beacon  is 
bright,  others  will  inevitably  follow.  Cer- 
tainly, if  we  are  successful  in  meeting 
the  economic,  social,  and  political  needs 
of  our  own  people,  we  will  give  democ- 
racy more  momentum  throughout  the 
world.  But  that  is  not  enough.  Many  in 
the  world  cannot  see  our  beacon,  and  for 
many  more  it  has  been  distorted.  And 
still  others  who  are  able  to  see  it  and 
are  inspired  by  it  need  help  in  the  form 
of  practical  assistance. 

We  have  provided  assistance  before, 
in  postwar  Western  Europe  and  Japan. 
What  we  helped  achieve  there  con- 
stitutes one  of  the  most  remarkable, 
positive  chapters  of  recent  history.  Since 
then,  we  have  let  this  critical  dimension 
of  our  foreign  relations  atrophy.  In  some 
instances  in  the  past  it  became  a  func- 
tion of  covert  activity— to  counter  the 
substantial  efforts  by  the  Soviets  and 


their  allies  to  spread  their  oppressive 
system  throughout  the  world.  Our  sup- 
port for  democracy  should  not  be  hid- 
den; we  should  be  proud  to  be  seen  to 
provide  it.  Those  nations  and  institu- 
tions—  such  as  certain  West  European 
parties  and  our  own  labor  unions— that 
have  been  active  in  supporting  demo- 
cratic forces  in  the  past  two  decades 
have  demonstrated  that  this  is  a  legiti- 
mate and  important  activity  that  can 
and  should  be  done  openly.  There  is 
democracy  today  in  Spain  and  Portugal 
in  large  part  because  of  the  substantial 
support  provided  democratic  parties  in 
these  two  countries  by  their  West  Euro- 
pean counterparts. 

We  are  interested  in  assisting  con- 
structive change  which  can  lead  to 
greater  political  stability,  social  justice, 
and  economic  progress.  We  do  not  seek 
destabilization.  Change  must  come  from 
within,  not  be  imposed  from  outside.  It 


Democracies  stand  for 
peaceful  cooperation; 
they  do  not  invade  or 
subvert  their  neighbors. 


must  follow  a  path  dictated  by  national 
and  local  traditions.  In  some  instances, 
the  United  States  may  not  have  that 
much  to  offer.  Instead,  assistance  and 
guidance  might  better  be  provided  by 
other  democracies.  And  change  may  be 
slow.  Patience,  respect  for  different 
cultures  and  political  traditions,  and  rec- 
ognition of  our  own  limitations  must  be 
hallmarks  of  our  effort;  but  our  ultimate 
objectives  must  remain  uppermost  in  our 
minds. 


Project  Democracy 

Project  Democracy  emphasizes  five 
closely  related  areas. 

Leadership  Training.  This  includes 
making  available  to  current  and  future 
leaders  education  and  training  in  the 
theory  and  practice  of  democracy  and 
the  skills  necessary  both  to  build  the 
basic  institutions  of  democracy  and  to 
counter  the  actions  of  nondemocratic 
forces.  Programs  would  be  conducted 
both  in  the  United  States  and  foreign 
countries.  Nongovernmental  institutions 


such  as  political  parties,  labor,  univi 
sities,  business,  state  and  local  govt 
ment  associations,  legal  and  commn 
action  organizations,  and  others  wi 
a  key  role. 

Education.  We  should  strive  U 
courage  exposure  to  the  principles 
practice  of  democracy  and  to  the  d 
acter  and  values  of  the  United  Stai 
the  educational  systems  of  other  n; 
We,  therefore,  intend  to  strengthe 
book  programs,  American  studies  i 
stitutions,  English  teaching,  schola 
and  fellowships,  and  related  progri 

Strengthening  the  Institutioil 
Democracy.  A  number  of  our  prog  I 
will  strengthen  the  basic  institutioi  I 
democratic  society— unions,  partie  ! 
media,  universities,  business,  legal  j 
cial  systems,  religious  and  comniui 
action  groups,  and  others.  Here  ag  I 
we  will  rely  on  American  nongovei 
mental  organizations  to  carry  mosi 
the  load. 

Conveying  Ideas  and  Informs 

Through  conferences;  meetings;  di ; 
nation  of  books  and  journals;  and  ;  ^ 
programs  in  universities,  other  ins 
tions,  and  the  media,  we  hope  in  j: 
mote  an  intellectual  and  political  ii , 
in  democracy  and  a  reinvigorated  , 
of  the  shared  values  of  democratic 
societies. 

Development  of  Personal  and  J 
stitutional  Ties.  Perhaps  the  mos  i 
portant  result  of  all  our  programs 
be  the  development  of  lasting  ties 
working  relationships  between  Arr 
individuals  and  organizations  and  1 
foreign  counterparts.  The  propone 
democracy  need  an  international  n . 
work  which  will  provide  them  with 
moral  support,  intellectual  stimulaj 
practical  and  technical  assistance,  j 
protection  against  their  adversarie 

The  specific  projects  we  are  pr 
ing  contain  several  traditional  prof 
that  need  strengthening.  There  is  ■■ 
increased  support  for  nongovernm' 
organizations  such  as  the  AFL-CI' 
the  Asia  Foundation,  which  over  t! 
years  have  built  a  unique  and  adm: 
record.  There  are  new  programs  a 
proaches,  particularly  in  the  areas 
training  and  support  for  democrat 
stitutions.  There  is  an  emphasis  or 
veloping  regional  approaches  to  pr 
moting  democratic  development.  A 
there  is  an  important  and  urgent  { 


Department  of  State  I 


THE  SECRETARY 


)  assist  Liberia  in  its  ongoing 
on  to  a  democratic  government, 
st  of  the  programs  are  directed 
n  America,  Africa,  and  Asia, 
^re  a  few  which  involve  Western 
p.  While  we  hope  that  West  Euro- 
^ill  be  our  partners  in  supporting 
|-acy  in  other  areas  of  the  world, 
t)  believe  that  we  must  give  atten- 

I  strengthening  the  perception— 
larly  of  the  successor  generations 
tern  Europe  and  the  United 

—of  shared  values  and  a  common 
.  Our  young  people,  who  did  not 
ince  the  postwar  period,  are 
r  farther  apart.  If  this  trend  con- 
democracy  itself  will  ultimately 
jkened.  The  economic  summit  na- 
^cognized  this  problem  last  year 
reed  to  take  one  important  step 
?r— a  substantial  expansion  of 
jxchange  programs.  Other  steps 
allow.  The  democracy  project  con- 
few  suggestions,  hut  even  these 
from  adequate. 

oject  Democracy  also  addresses 
n  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
we  are  limited  in  our  ability  to 
'ith  such  closed  societies,  we  pro- 
i)  strengthen,  both  in  quality  and 
;y,  our  information  programs 
iig  these  countries.  This  includes 
'ination  of  books  and  journals, 
igful  and  reciprocal  exchanges, 
pport  for  research  and  publica- 
■n  issues  facing  the  Soviets  and 
Europeans.  Our  goal  is  to  make 
iile  to  the  people  of  the  Soviet 
land  Eastern  Europe  full,  objec- 
scussions  of  political,  economic, 
cial  concepts  and  events.  We  hope 

II  contribute  to  an  evolution  in 


these  countries  toward  more  open,  re- 
sponsive, and  humane  societies — and 
eventually  toward  democracy.  The 
Soviets  and  their  allies  accepted  in 
Helsinki  the  concept  of  free  flow  of  in- 
formation and  ideas.  They  are  active 
throughout  the  world  promoting  their 
own  ideology  and  their  distorted  version 


While  we  are  limited  in 
our  ability  to  deal  with 
such  closed  societies  [as 
the  Soviet  Union  and 
Eastern  Europe],  we  pro- 
pose to  strengthen,  both 
in  quality  and  quantity, 
our  information  pro- 
grams reaching  these 
countries. 


of  world  events.  They  have  no  grounds 
to  complain  that  our  information  pro- 
grams are  an  interference  in  their  inter- 
nal affairs.  We  should  not  be  inhibited  in 
our  proper  mission  to  provide  alterna- 
tive sources  of  information  to  the  people 
of  these  nations. 

The  proposed  programs  in  Project 
Democracy  are  not  set  in  concrete.  A 
number  need  further  refinement,  and 
some  may  be  dropped  as  they  prove  less 
feasible  or  productive  than  others.  Three 
agencies— the  U.S.  Information  Agency 
(USIA),  State  Department,  and  the 
Agency  for  International  Development- 
have  worked  together  to  develop  these 
proposals.  Though  Project  Democracy  is 
contained  in  the  USIA  budget,  funds 


will  be  allocated  to  the  other  agencies  to 
carry  out  certain  programs.  Decisions  on 
programs,  allocation  of  funds,  and  ulti- 
mate recipients  will  be  made  by  an  inter- 
agency committee  structure. 

Conclusion 

We  invite  this  committee  to  work  with 
us  as  we  develop  and  implement  this 
program.  We  want  this  to  be  a  biparti- 
san effort.  I  believe  that  we  all  share  the 
same  objectives  and  that  we  must  now 
create  together  a  program  that  will  last 
through  many  administrations— a  pro- 
gram that  will  become  a  fundamental 
dimension  of  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States.  This  $65  million  proposal 
is  just  a  beginning.  The  Administration, 
Congress,  and  the  private  sector  should 
build  a  more  comprehensive  program 
over  the  course  of  the  next  few  years. 
I  realize  this  is  a  difficult  time  to 
begin  any  new  program.  But  we  have 
neglected  this  area  for  too  many  years 
already,  and  we  cannot  afford  to  let  any 
more  time  pass.  The  needs  of  those 
striving  for  democracy  are  immediate. 
They  will  grow  in  the  years  ahead.  We 
must  develop  a  better  capability  to  help. 
This  is  a  matter  critical  to  our  national 
security.  I  ask  you  to  give  it  your  sym- 
pathetic consideration. 


'Press  release  60.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


AFRICA 


The  Search  for  Regional 
Security  in  Southern  Africa 


by  Chester  A.  Crocker 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Africa  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee  on  February  15,  1983.  Mr. 
Crocker  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
African  Affairs.^ 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  be  able  to 
report  to  you  on  developments  in 
southern  Africa  at  the  mid-point  in  the 
first  term  of  President  Reagan's  Ad- 
ministration. 

These  hearings  on  progress  toward 
independence  for  Namibia  and  the 
broader  subject  of  "destabilization"  in 
southern  Africa  are,  indeed,  important, 
for  they  address  issues  at  the  core  of 
our  southern  Africa  policy.  Over  the 
past  25  years,  virtually  all  of  formerly 
colonial  Africa  has  gained  independence 
from  the  European  metropolitan 
powers.  These  newly  independent  na- 
tions, many  with  which  we  have  signifi- 
cant economic,  commercial,  and  political 
ties,  have  made  clear  the  importance 
they  attach  to  eliminating  colonialism 
from  their  continent.  Thus,  even  apart 
from  the  traditional  American  desire  to 
help  the  spread  of  self-government  and 
democracy,  there  are  profound  political 
reasons  for  engaging  in  the  effort  to 
bring  independence  to  Namibia. 

There  are  equally  important  reasons 
for  our  concern  about  tension  and  in- 
stability in  the  region.  Clearly,  our 
desire  to  strengthen  economic  and  com- 
mercial links  with  Africa  are  not  served 
by  local  conflicts  or  arms  races,  or  by  ef- 
forts of  outside  powers  to  exploit  them 
from  unilateral  advantage.  On  the  con- 
trary, our  national  interests  are  best 
served  by  an  atmosphere  of  political 
stability  and  economic  growth,  which 
alone  can  nurture  modern  African  eco- 
nomic and  political  institutions.  It  is  ob- 
viously to  our  advantage  to  do  whatever 
we  can  to  ease  tensions  and  work 
toward  the  peaceful  resolution  of  prob- 
lems and  disputes  among  the  nations  of 
the  region.  This  is  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple behind  our  policy  of  constructive 
engagement  in  the  search  for  a  more 
stable,  secure,  prosperous,  and  demo- 
cratic southern  Africa. 

I  would  like  to  start  by  restating  the 
Administration's  objectives,  so  it  will  be 


clear  that  they  have  not  changed  and 
that  we  are  continuing  to  pursue  them 
with  vigor  and  purpose. 

•  The  United  States  seeks  to  help 
strengthen  communication  between  the 
countries  of  southern  Africa  in  order  to 
ease  tensions,  bolster  regional  security, 
and  encourage  negotiated  solutions  and 
peaceful  change. 

•  We  are  intent  upon  using  every 
diplomatic  tool  at  our  command  in  order 
to  bring  about  conditions  which  will  lead 
to  Namibia's  independence  at  the 
earliest  possible  date. 

•  Believing  that  "apartheid,"  as  a 
structure  of  legally  entrenched  racial 
separation,  is  morally  unacceptable  to  a 
democracy  such  as  ours,  we  have  sought 
to  encourage  those  elements  within 
South  Africa  seeking  constructive 
change,  in  order  to  see  widened  the  base 
of  participation  in  government  and  the 
economy  to  include  all  the  elements  of 
South  Africa's  varied  population. 

•  Finally,  we  seek  constructive 
engagement  with  all  the  states  of  the 
region  which  wish  the  same  with  us.  We 
do  not  approach  the  region  with  the 
belief  that  our  task  is  to  choose  sides;  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  the  fact  of  our  desire 
for  strengthened  relations  with  all  the 
states  of  the  region  that  enables  us  to 
play  a  role— where  such  is  welcome — in 
working  for  regional  security,  develop- 
ment, and  peaceful  change.  The  United 
States  is  on  the  side  of  peaceful  change 
and  negotiated  solutions.  This  is  where 
our  interests  lie,  and  this  is  what  makes 
us  uniquely  relevant  to  the  region. 


REGIONAL  SECURITY 

It  has  long  been  clear  to  all  who  were 
genuinely  concerned  about  Africa's  ef- 
forts to  develop  modern  democratic  in- 
stitutions and  processes — social,  eco- 
nomic, and  political— that  tension  and 
hostility  were  inimical  to  those  efforts. 
Certainly,  a  region  threatened  with  the 
prospect  of  heightened  violence  and 
polarization  would  find  it  difficult,  at 
best,  to  focus  positive  efforts  on  its  own 
development. 

The  recent  history  of  southern 
Africa  must  serve  as  a  cause  of  alarm  to 
us.  With  the  collapse  of  the  Portuguese 


Empire  in  the  mid-1970s,  violence  hi 
escalated  throughout  the  region  to  i 
point  today  where  the  fact  or  threat 
violence  is  a  major  feature  of  the  ar 
Cross-border  conflict  risks  becoming 
endemic.  The  question  the  United  S 
faces— alone  and  with  its  allies— is 
whether  diplomacy  can  provide  an  i 
native  to  violence  or  whether  soutb 
Africa  is  in  the  process  of  condemn 
itself  to  violence  as  a  way  of  life.  W 
have  seen  this  happen  elsewhere  in 
world — in  the  Middle  East— with  S| 
calculable  consequences  for  world  p 
and  our  national  security.  It  is  in  o\ 
tional  interests  to  seek  to  avoid  sue 
development. 

This  Administration  did  not  inv  i 
violence  in  southern  Africa.  We  did 
make  it  our  purpose  to  do  somethir  | 
about  it.  We  have  set  out  as  a  cons  I 
objective  of  policy  to  provide  an  alt  i 
native  to  conflict — not  only  in  Nair  i 
our  most  visible  effort,,  but  through  \ 
the  region.  We  have  made  it  our  pi  i 
pose  to  work  with  the  nations  of  th 
region  to  see  if  a  framework  of  res 
and  broad  rules  of  conduct  could  b<  j 
veloped  which  could  contain  conflic  ' 
and  provide  this  basis  for  solutions 
Vice  President  summed  up  our  poli 
Nairobi  on  November  19,  1982,  wh 
said:  "We  are  determined  to  help  ti 
the  sad  tide  of  growing  conflict  anc 
sion  in  southern  Africa." 

U.S.  Communication  With 
African  Nations 

From  the  outset  of  this  Administra 
we  sought  to  establish  effective  coi 
munication  with  all  those  nations  a 
other  political  elements  with  which 
munication  was  inadequate  or  had 
lapsed.  It  seemed  self-evident  that 
unilaterally  isolating  ourselves  fror 
those  with  which  we  had  difference 
however  strongly  felt,  served  no  pi 
other  than  to  cut  us  off  from  an  ab 
to  influence  or  affect  their  policies. 
We  began  with  a  series  of  intei 
discussions  with  all  of  the  major  ao 
in  the  region  in  order  to  identify  th 
concerns,  see  how  these  fit  in  with' 
objectives,  and  determine  how  best 
might  proceed  to  advance  America 
Western  interests.  The  priorities  w 
seemed  apparent  to  us  were  enumt 
earlier:  regional  security,  independ 
for  Namibia,  the  encouragement  ol 
ments  favoring  peaceful  change  wi 
South  Africa  away  from  the  syster 
apartheid,  and  constructive  engage 


Department  of  State  BiB 


AFRICA 


jgional  states  in  tackling  the 
problems  of  economic  and  politi- 
elopment. 

th  respect  to  regional  security,  it 
1  clear  that  one  of  the  major  bar- 
■if  not  the  principle  stumbling 
-was  the  inability  or  unwillingness 
;ies  on  either  side  of  South 
s  borders  to  speak  to  each  other, 
ility,  coupled  with  a  self-imposed 
mce  on  the  part  of  the  United 
to  act  in  concert  with  potential 
;  on  behalf  of  our  interests,  had 
openings  which  were  being  ex- 
by  our  adversaries.  Another  ma- 
iblem  was  our  own  lack  of  a  credi- 
logue  with  significant  actors  in 
ithern  African  region— not  the 
f  which  were  the  Governments  of 
Africa  and  Angola, 
'er  the  course  of  the  past  2  years, 
fe  worked  assiduously  to  restore 
iinication  and  get  a  dialogue  going 
I  believe  we  can  point  to  a  con- 
ble  record  of  success. 

;We  have  now  had  an  extensive 
iof  discussions  at  senior  levels  with 
jigolan  Government,  exploring 
jif  improving  our  bilateral  relation- 
lith  that  country  and  seeking  to 
iibout  circumstances  which  will 
bossible  agreement  on  Namibian 
jndence. 

'After  a  period  of  difficulty  in  our 
inship  with  Zambia,  we  have 
\i  hard  to  re-establish  a  basis  of 
fence  and  improved  communica- 
dminating  in  a  highly  successful 
aat  Vice  President  Bush  paid  to 
funtry  in  November  1982.  We 
p  have  President  [Kenneth] 
]a  visit  the  United  States  in  the 
Uture. 

'We  have  continued  to  attach  a 
riority  to  assisting  Zimbabwe,  now 
^.hird  year  of  independence,  as  it 
!to  meet  pressures  from  the  world 
■nic  downturn,  a  devastating 
,nt  sweeping  across  much  of 
SjTn  Africa,  and  the  stresses  and 
i^  from  political  divisions  within. 
:bwe  has  traveled  a  rough  road 
'he  past  2  years,  but  those  who 
:o  judge  its  performance  should 
i^he  humility  to  recall  our  own 
V  at  a  similar  stage  in  America's 
indence,  as  well  as  the  daunting 
nges  facing  Zimbabwe's  leadership, 
jtend  to  continue  our  efforts  to 
jthis  new  country,  convinced  that  it 
9  important  prospects  for  becoming 
|tone  in  the  economic  development 
''igional  stability  of  southern  Africa. 


Just  as  we  seek  to  foster  a  regional 
climate  of  security  and  confidence  that 
will  encourage  constructive  change  in 
South  Africa,  so,  too,  do  we  seek  a 
regional  climate  conducive  to 
Zimbabwe's  success  as  an  independent 
nation. 

•  This  Administration  took  office 
just  as  U.S.  relations  with  Mozambique 
reached  a  low-water  mark.  Communica- 
tion with  the  Mozambican  Government 
was  practically  nonexistent;  that  coun- 
try's policies  seemed  unalterably  aligned 
with  those  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
satrapies,  its  perceptions  warped  by 
hostile  disinformation.  But  the  utter  in- 
capacity of  Marxist  economics  to  cope 
with  the  problems  of  a  developing  coun- 
try, and  the  conspicuous  inability  of  the 
Soviet  Union  to  assist  Mozambique  with 
security  and  political  problems  stemming 
from  its  isolation,  led  to  indications  that 
the  Mozambican  Government  wished  to 
reestablish  communication  with  the 
United  States.  We  responded  by  making 
clear  that  we  were  interested  in  a 
positive  relationship  based  upon  respect 
for  each  other's  interests  and  were  will- 
ing to  engage  in  building  bridges  be- 
tween us  based  upon  mutual  respect. 
Within  just  the  past  3  months,  we  have 
had  two  sets  of  discussions  between 
senior  American  and  Mozambican  of- 
ficials aimed  at  engaging  the  Mozam- 
bican Government  in  a  constructive  ef- 
fort to  improve  regional  stability  and 
restore  communications  between  us.  We 
believe  that  a  solid  basis  now  exists  for 
a  meaningful  improvement  in  relations 
between  us. 

Similarly,  in  our  contacts  with  South 
Africa,  we  quickly  moved  beyond  discus- 
sion of  the  Namibia  issue  and  bilateral 
questions  to  the  overarching  question  of 
regional  security.  We  believe  our  exten- 
sive contacts  with  Pretoria  have  enabled 
us  to  more  fully  grasp  the  South  African 
Government's  concerns  about  the 
region's  dynamics  while  also  making 
clear  the  terms  on  which  we  must  oper- 
ate if  we  are  to  be  credible  and  effective 
there.  While  much  remains  to  be  done, 
the  conditions  now  exist  for  a  candid, 
sensitive,  and  productive  dialogue  on 
regional  matters  with  that  country. 

Effective  Communication 
Between  Neighbors 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  another  facet 
of  our  diplomacy  in  southern 
Africa— encouraging  effective  com- 
munication between  South  Africa  and  its 
neighbors.  We  have  not  engaged  in  this 


effort  as  a  search  for  glory  or  out  of  our 
own  ambition.  We  have  done  so  for  the 
good  and  sufficient  reason  that  it  is  ob- 
viously in  our  national  interest.  The  cy- 
cle of  violence  that  threatens  southern 
Africa  is  antithetical  to  everything  this 
country  stands  for.  Militarized  conflict 
and  the  recourse  to  violent  means  can 
only  advance  the  interests  of  our  adver- 
saries. 

Dialogue  alone,  of  course,  will  not 
necessarily  solve  the  problems,  but  com- 
munication among  countries  that  have 
serious  disputes  and  basic  political  dif- 
ferences is  an  obvious  first  step.  Within 
the  past  6  months.  South  Africa  has  had 
significant  and  positive  discussions  with 
Angola,  with  Mozambique,  and,  in  fact, 
with  virtually  all  of  its  immediate  neigh- 
bors. It  is  difficult  to  overstate  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  developing  dialogue  be- 
tween South  Africa  and  its  neighbors,  a 
dialogue  we  have  sought— in  unintrusive 
ways— to  further.  We  welcome  the  fact 
of  these  contacts  and  hope  that  by  a 
thorough  airing  of  differences,  a  con- 
structive effort  can  be  made  toward 
their  resolution. 

It  is  important,  we  believe,  to  recog- 
nize that  as  dialogue  itself  is,  by  defini- 
tion, a  two-way  street,  so,  too,  is 
regional  security.  There  is  a  compelling 
need  for  all  the  parties  to  recognize  this. 
Although  at  any  given  moment,  follow- 
ing some  specific  development  or  event, 
it  might  be  possible  to  pronounce  a 
moral  or  political  judgment  upon  that 
event,  it  is  not  always  useful,  or  even 
wise,  to  do  so.  For  that  matter,  it  is  not 
always  even  possible  to  know  precisely 
what  has  taken  place,  or  why.  Public 
posturing  and  the  passing  of  judgment, 
however  gratifying  to  those  who  do  it,  is 
not  usually  the  most  helpful  way  to  deal 
with  the  root  causes  of  disputes.  We 
seek  results.  This  Administration  is  pro- 
foundly conscious  of  the  fact  that 
southern  Africa  is  a  highly  charged, 
politically  polarized  environment.  Some 
would  say  it  is  a  minefield.  There  is  am- 
ple public  posturing  by  the  regional  ac- 
tors themselves  without  adding  our  own 
rhetoric  to  the  mix. 

Regional  security  runs  in  both  direc- 
tions across  international  borders,  and  in 
southern  Africa  each  side  in  every  dis- 
pute claims  grievances  against  the  other. 
We  have  not  chosen  to  condemn  each 
transgression  by  one  or  another  of  the 
parties,  but  have,  rather,  chosen  the 
perhaps  less  gratifying  but  certainly 
more  important  long-term  task  of  trying 
to  ease  tensions.  In  our  view,  our  effec- 
tiveness depends  on  our  ability  to  be  a 
credible  partner  of  all  who  wish  our 


1983 


AFRICA 


partnership  and  are  prepared  to  engage 
in  good-faith  efforts  to  solve  problems. 
Apart  from  Namibia,  all  states  of  the 
region  are  sovereign  and  recognize  each 
other's  sovereignty.  That  is  a  fact,  and  it 
carries  with  it  certain  obvious  implica- 
tions. Some  states  are  not  more  sover- 
eign than  others.  We  recognize  no 
state's  right  to  harbor  plotters  or  perpe- 
trators of  violence  across  borders  and 
against  other  lands. 

I  recognize  that  some  observers  are 
less  than  satisfied  with  the  balance  and 
discretion  inherent  in  what  I  have  just 
said.  But  we  believe  that  those  who 
would  have  us  take  sides  among  the  par- 
ties in  southern  Africa  would  have  us 
unlearn  every  important  role  of  diplo- 
macy. In  southern  Africa  as  in  the  Mid- 
dle East,  it  is  not  by  choosing  sides  that 
we  shape  events  or  resolve  conflicts.  Our 
nation  should  be  proud  to  stand  on  the 
side  of  peace  and  diplomacy  and  be  pre- 
pared to  weigh  the  concerns  and  in- 
terests of  the  parties  involved  as  we 
seek  to  build  bridges  and  explore 
avenues  for  agreement. 


NAMIBIA 

When  President  Reagan  took  office  in 
January  1981,  the  Namibia  negotiations 
had  broken  down,  despite  the  substantial 
efforts  and  accomplishments  of  our 
predecessors.  There  was  an  atmosphere 
of  mutual  suspicion  and  recrimination 
among  the  parties  whose  agreement  was 
essential  for  Namibia  to  secure  its  free- 
dom. The  obstacles  to  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties  were  so  great  that  it 
would  have  been  tempting  for  us  to  walk 
away  from  the  problem,  washing  our 
hands  of  the  negotiations,  and  leaving  it 
to  debate  and  doubtful  resolution  by 
others.  Certainly,  there  were  other 
urgent  priorities. 

Instead,  partly  in  response  to  what 
we  were  clearly  told  by  our  African 
friends  and  our  key  allies  in  NATO,  and 
partly  because  of  America's  historic 
tradition  of  support  for  self-determina- 
tion, we  set  out  to  find  a  way  to  move 
toward  Namibian  independence.  In 
preparation  for  this,  we  conducted  ex- 
tensive and  exhaustive  discussions  with 
each  of  the  major  parties  to  the  negotia- 
tion—the front-line  states,  SWAPO 
[South  West  Africa  People's  Organiza- 
tion], other  states  in  Africa,  the  South 
Africans  and  the  internal  parties  inside 
Namibia,  and  our  European  allies. 

We  concluded  that  Namibia's  inde- 
pendence could  not  be  achieved  in  the 
absence  of  conditions  which  gave  all  par- 
ticipants reasonable  confidence  that 


their  security  interests  would  be  pro- 
tected. It  was  obvious  to  any  observer 
that  irrespective  of  the  reasons  for  their 
being  there,  the  presence  of  Cuban  com- 
bat forces  in  Angola  was  an  integral 
part  of  the  regional  security  problem. 

I  know  that  the  members  of  this  dis- 
tinguished subcommittee  are  familiar 
with  the  charges  and  countercharges 
from  both  Angola  and  South  Africa 
about  the  fighting  across  the  Namibian- 
Angolan  frontier.  My  point  is  a  simple 
one:  The  Cuban  troop  issue  is  not  an 
issue  we  made  up;  it  is  an  objective 
reality  at  the  core  of  the  question  of 
regional  security.  The  South  Africans, 
whose  concurrence  and  cooperation 
must  be  secured  for  any  agreement 
leading  to  Namibian  independence,  have 
repeatedly  made  clear  that  they  regard 
the  Cuban  troop  issue  as  fundamental  to 
their  security  concerns.  Quite  apart  from 
that,  the  United  States,  as  Vice  Presi- 
dent Bush  said  in  Nairobi  on  Novem- 
ber 19,  1982,  "is  not  ashamed  to  state 
the  U.S.  interest  in  seeing  an  end  to  the 
presence  of  Cuban  forces  in  Angola," 
just  as  we  seek  internationally  recog- 
nized independence  for  Namibia.  Such 
an  outcome  would  contribute  to  both 
regional  security  and  a  global  climate  of 
restraint. 

We  have,  for  more  than  a  year  now, 
been  engaged  in  intensive  discussions 
with  the  Angolan  Government  in  an  ef- 
fort to  reach  a  broadly  acceptable  for- 
mula for  parallel  withdrawal  of  foreign 
forces  from  Namibia  and  Angola.  These 
bilateral  discussions  have  been  held  out- 
side the  framework  of  U.N.  Security 
Council  Resolution  435,  and  are  not  part 
of  the  Western  contact  group's  mandate. 
We  are  fully  prepared  to  respond  to 
Angola's  security  concerns  as  well  as  to 
deal  forthrightly  with  the  reality  of 
South  Africa's  concerns.  We  believe  that 
this  is  a  viable  means  of  achieving  the 
goal  of  Namibian  independence  to  which 
we  are  profoundly  committed.  We  know 
of  no  other  means. 

We  believe  that  Angola  wishes  to 
contribute  to  a  Namibian  independence 
agreement,  so  long  as  its  own  security 
interests  are  preserved.  We  have 
achieved  real  progress  in  our  talks  with 
the  Angolans  and  will  spare  no  effort  in 
continuing  our  search  for  a  comprehen- 
sive, peaceful  settlement. 

Your  letter  inviting  me  to  partici- 
pate in  these  hearings,  asked  what  the 
"short-  and  long-run  prospects"  are  for  a 
Namibian  settlement,  as  well  as  a 
number  of  specific  questions  about 
"when"  South  Africa  and  the  United 


States  made  Cuban  troop  withdraws, 
necessary  accompaniment  to  Namibij 
independence. 

The  answer  to  the  first  question 
"Reasonably  good."  Certainly,  we  in^ 
to  continue  the  effort.  But  this  is  a  ■ 
plicated  and  difficult  negotiation,  ari 
involves  fundamental  issues  and  chc , 
for  both  sides.  It  has  taken  time,  an 
may  take  more.  I  believe  the  greate 
mistake  that  we  could  make  would  1 
yield  to  the  historic  American  impa- 
tience with  the  progress  of  negotiat 

That  carries  with  it  the  answer  , 
your  second  question,  about  "when"  [ 
Cuban  troop  issue  became  a  prereqi  j 
for  Namibian  independence.  Securit  | 
which  the  Cuban  troop  issue  is  an  ii  | 
tegral  part,  has  always  been  a  pre-  | 
requisite  for  agreement  on  Namibia  ^ 
dependence.  As  a  practical  diploma  ^ 
matter,  it  will  not  be  possible  to  obi 
Namibian  independence  agreement  , 
without  satisfactory  regional  securi  ^ 
assurances.  Quite  apart  from  the  di  | 
matic  problem,  it  would  not  be  desi  | 
to  bring  Namibia  to  independence  i  | 
cumstances  that  held  the  prospects  ] 
greater  regional  instability  and  tun  . 
This  Administration  would  not  be  a 
ty  to  it,  and  I  would  hope  that  no  o 
this  room  would  wish  to  see  that  ei , 

This  approach  does  not  mean  a 
definite  delay  for  Namibia's  transit 
independence.  Some  in  the  media  a  i 
elsewhere  press  for  our  forecasts  o 
these  negotiations.  In  reply,  I  woul 
that  we  are  neither  optimistic  nor  j 
mistic;  instead,  we  have  a  realistic 
tive,  and  we  are  determined  to  mo\ 
steadily  toward  it. 


CONCLUSION 

I  would  emphasize  that  we  have  sei 
selves  goals  worthy  of  the  support 
Americans  and  developed  a  road  m 
for  reaching  them.  The  parties  in  tl 
region  are  well  aware  of  our  seriou 
ness.  Not  surprisingly,  all  of  them  i 
find  fault  with  this  or  that  aspect  o 
diplomacy.  But  our  goals  and  metb 
are  increasingly  understood.  Despit 
inherent  difficulties,  the  Administn 
sees  no  reason  to  shift  course  and  ( 
reason  to  persevere. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  heal 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  p 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of. 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  ; 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bu  I 


AFRICA 


r  Development  Dialogue  With  Africa 


'lister  A.  Crocker 

^'(itrKK  at  the  Georgetown  Universi- 
-trr  fur  Strategic  and  International 
■s,  IVa.'^hington,  D.C.,  on  March  3, 
Ii\  ( 'rocker  is  Assistant  Secretary 
.■inni  Affairs. 

■iiiif  World  War  II,  men  of  good- 
\t'  lu'i'ii  debating  the  problem  of 
Ifvrldiiment  in  the  Third  World. 
tVw  countries,  mostly  in  East  and 
least  Asia,  the  issue  is  now  a  sub- 
historical  research.  The 
lOres  and  South  Koreas  are 
our  concern;  and,  if  they  keep 
ing  at  current  levels,  the  time 
t  be  far  away  when  their  develop- 
xperts  deliberate  over  the  stagna- 
d  backwardness  of  the  West, 
ewhere,  however,  and  most 
in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  the 
continues  with  heightened  urgen- 
s  is  not  surprising:  Africa  was  the 
ntinent  to  gain  independence,  and 
50  with  the  least  preparation.  The 
t  world  recession  has,  at  least, 
rarily  aggravated  the  results  of 
c  underdevelopment.  Today, 
's  economic  crisis  threatens  the 
il  viability  of  many  states,  en- 
rs  Western  interests,  and  wreaks 
lardship  on  millions  of  individual 


isting  Perspectives 

it  glance  there  is  a  striking,  if 
surprising,  contrast  between 
n  and  Western  perspectives  on 
•oblem.  At  the  risk  of  some  over- 
"ication,  let  me  spell  out  in  very 
il  terms  these  differing  views.  The 
n  viewpoint,  particularly  that  of 
rican  politician,  must  assume  a 
that  is  economically  viable  and 
illy  sustainable.  It  must  assume 
rialization  and,  at  least,  a  promise 
inological  equality  with  the  West 
iing  Japan).  It  must  encompass 
al  health  and  self-reliance  as  well 
;erial  well-being.  The  perspective 
e  naturally  Africa-centric, 
though  there  are,  of  course,  many 
ts,  the  African  perspective  is  often 
ieply  influenced  by  the  trauma  of 
ilism.  Because  colonial  economic 
is  were  totally  subservient  to 


metropole  interests,  the  African  perspec- 
tive is  frequently  suspicious  of  external 
economic  orientation  and  sympathetic  to 
import-substitution  models.  Because 
Africans  recognize  the  widespread  prob- 
lem of  weak,  fragmented,  national 
economies,  this  perspective  places  great 
stress  on  regional  integration.  Because 
modern  capitalism  was  associated  with 
colonialism,  there  is,  as  in  other  areas  of 
the  Third  World,  an  instinctive  sym- 
pathy for  statist  solutions.  Last,  but  not 
least,  foreign  aid  is  often  seen  as  an 
open-ended  moral  obligation  on  the  part 
of  the  West  to  compensate  for 
underdevelopment  and  the  perceived 
wrongs  of  the  colonial  past. 

The  Western  perspective  is  even 
more  varied,  so  let  me  take  one  variant, 
that  of  the  policymaker.  First  of  all, 
Africa  does  not  dominate  his  perspec- 
tive; it  is  only  one  of  a  panoply  of  global 
concerns.  Unlike  the  African  politician, 
the  Western  bureaucrat  is  not  compelled 
to  assume  politically  viable  solutions 
within  Africa,  nor  does  he  take  for 
granted  the  feasibility  of  rapid  economic 
progress.  Quite  the  contrary,  he  is  usual- 
ly more  impressed  by  the  negative, 
short-term  implications  of  Africa's 
economic  crisis,  particularly  its  effect  on 
political  stability.  Likewise,  he  sees 
economic  growth  as  beginning  necessari- 
ly with  assets  in  hand  and  is  not  easily 
persuaded  by  such  long-term  solutions 
as  regional  economic  integration.  He  is 
deeply  aware  of  the  potential  costs— 
both  political  and  budgetary— of  his 
country's  involvement  with  Africa.  At 
the  same  time  he  is  eager  for  success 
stories— one  or  two  non-oil-exporting 
countries  growing  at  7%,  hopefully 
governed  by  parliamentary  democracies 
or,  at  least,  by  benevolent,  technocratic 
despots. 

The  apparent  contrast  between 
African  and  Western  perspectives  is 
nowhere  greater  than  with  regard  to 
aid.  The  Westerner— and  here  I  speak  of 
the  citizen  as  well  as  policymaker- 
has  forgotten  about  colonialism  and 
regards  aid  not  as  a  moral  obligation  but 
as  a  burden  whose  relationship  to  na- 
tional interest  is  ill  articulated  and  il! 
understood,  especially  when  domestic 
programs  are  strapped  for  funds. 
Beyond  this  point  there  is  a  noticeable 
divergence  between  Americans  and 
Europeans:  Americans,  still  inspired  by 


basic  faith  in  the  potential  for  human 
progress,  want  their  aid  to  have  rapid 
transforming  results  and  are  discour- 
aged when  it  doesn't.  The  Europeans 
and  Japanese,  more  inclined  to  a  skep- 
tical view  of  history,  are  more  easily 
satisfied  by  short-term  political  or  com- 
mercial goals  and  not  as  disturbed  by 
the  implications  of  open-ended  involve- 
ment in  a  process  whose  benchmarks 
are  barely  visible. 

These  differing  perspectives,  African 
and  Western,  are  reflected  in  two  much 
discussed  documents,  the  "Lagos  Plan  of 
Action"  and  the  report  of  the  World 
Bank  entitled  "Accelerated  Development 
in  Sub-Saharan  Africa:  An  Agenda  for 
Action."  The  Lagos  plan  is  a  unique  ex- 
pression of  African  economic  goals,  ap- 
proved by  the  African  heads  of  state  in 
1980.  It  looks  toward  a  prospering,  in- 
dustrializing Africa,  internally  self- 
reliant  and  well  on  the  road  to  economic 
integration  across  national  boundaries. 
It  is  essentially  a  statement  of  targets 
which,  once  achieved,  will  comprise  a 
just  and  prosperous  Africa.  While  it 
stresses  self-reliance,  it  also  states  flatly 
that  Africa  is  owed  a  "massive  and  ap- 
propriate contribution"  of  aid  by  the 
developed  countries. 

Although  the  Lagos  plan  decries  ex- 
cessive dependence  on  export  of  a  few 
commodities,  it  does  not,  in  general,  say 
very  much  about  how  its  numerous  goals 
and  targets  should  be  achieved.  It  is 
careful  not  to  dictate  national  develop- 
ment strategies  on  such  sensitive  topics 
as  the  mix  between  public  and  private 
sectors.  It  does  not  attempt  to  calculate 
the  cost  of  development  or  to  speculate 
on  where  the  massive  sums  of  money  re- 
quired will  come  from. 

The  World  Bank  report  was  pro- 
duced 2  years  later  in  a  completely  dif- 
ferent context.  Suggested  by  the  African 
governors  of  the  Bank  in  response  to 
growing  signs  of  economic  crisis,  it 
delineates  a  strategy  to  meet  the  am- 
bitious goals  of  the  Lagos  plan.  The 
report  differs  most  notably  from  the 
plan  in  advocating  export  orientation.  It 
says,  in  effect,  that  exportable  com- 
modities are  Africa's  "bird  in  the  hand," 
and  argues  that  African  countries  which 
have  done  well  at  exporting  have  also 
done  comparatively  well  in  other  areas 
(e.g.,  food  production).  While  the  report 
accepts  the  goals  of  the  Lagos  plan  as 
valid,  it  is  deeply  concerned  about  the 
feasibility  of  attaining  them— in  other 
words,  about  tactics  and  costs.  It  puts 
much  more  emphasis  on  the  importance 
of  better  economic  management  by 
African  countries,  concluding  that  both  a 


AFRICA 


doubling  of  foreign  aid  and  a  greatly  im- 
proved African  policy  environment  will 
be  necessary  to  achieve  acceptable 
economic  growth  in  sub-Saharan  Africa. 

At  present  there  is  a  tendency  to 
debate  African  development  in  terms 
which  exaggerate  the  differences  be- 
tween plan  and  report  and  between 
African  and  Western  perspectives.  The 
key  issue  involves  the  relative  role  of  ex- 
ternal versus  internal  causative  factors 
in  contributing  to  the  present  unsatisfac- 
tory state  of  affairs.  At  best  this  debate 
can  result  in  a  failure  of  communica- 
tion—of Africans  and  Westerners  talk- 
ing past  each  other.  At  worst  it  can 
degenerate  into  polemics  and  sterile  ef- 
forts to  blame  one  party  or  another.  So 
it  is  important  to  remember  that  in- 
formed observers,  whether  African  or 
non-African,  agree  more  than  they 
disagree.  In  fact,  a  considerable  intellec- 
tual consensus,  not  yet  adequately 
translated  into  concerted  policy,  has 
emerged  in  the  last  2  or  3  years  on 
many  of  the  key  issues  of  African 
development. 

I  would  like  to  spend  the  rest  of  my 
time  talking  about  these  areas  of  agree- 
ment and  then  conclude  by  considering 
some  policy  implications. 


America,  the  possibility  of  default  by 
one  or  more  major  African  countries 
nonetheless  poses  an  incremental  threat 
to  the  health  of  the  global  financial 
system. 

Second,  there  is  implicit  agreement 
that  there  can  be  no  meaningful  equity 
without  economic  growth.  Among  devel- 
opment experts  there  is  broad  and  bipar- 
tisan agreement  that  the  more  extreme 
manifestations  of  the  "basic  human 
needs"  aid  philosophy  of  the  1970s 
overlooked  this  fundamental  point. 

Third,  and  a  logical  corollary  of  con- 
cern with  growth,  aid  programs  must 
strive  to  stimulate  productivity  and  must 
be  wary  of  creating  government- 
dominated  "pilot  projects"  which  are  not 
productive  and  which  are  often  too  ex- 
pensive for  host  governments  to 
operate,  much  less  to  replicate. 

Fourth,  aid  donors  have  unwittingly 
contributed  to  the  African  economic 
crisis  by  failure  to  cooperate  in  a  man- 
ner which  will  insure  the  most  efficient 
use  of  their  resources,  by  insisting  on 
their  own  complex  yet  highly  diverse  ad- 
ministrative requirements,  by  constantly 
changing  their  own  policies,  and  some- 
times by  the  pursuit  of  short-term 
political  and  commercial  advantage. 


The  Westerner  .  .  .  the  citizen  as  well  as  policy- 
maker .  .  .  has  forgotten  about  colonialism  and 
regards  aid  not  as  a  moral  obligation  but  as  a 
burden  whose  relationship  to  national  interest  is  ill 
articulated  and  ill  understood,  especially  when 
domestic  programs  are  strapped  for  funds. 


Areas  of  Agreement 
First  and  foremost,  everyone  agrees 
that  the  African  crisis  is  sufficiently 
deep  so  that  status  quo  solutions  are  not 
acceptable.  From  both  the  African  and 
Western  perspectives,  it  is  dangerous 
and,  indeed,  intolerable  that  Africa's 
economic  performance  should  lag  so 
badly  behind  that  of  other  regions.  From 
our  perspective,  the  African  crisis  delays 
a  potentially  significant  contribution  to 
world  trade,  thereby  diminishing  U.S. 
growth  prospects.  Although  debt  prob- 
lems are  not  on  the  scale  of  Latin 


Fifth,  there  is  no  doubt  that  African 
economic  management  capability  is  a 
critical  constraint,  as  is  the  pervasive 
shortage  of  mid-level  management  skills 
and  experience. 

Sixth,  there  is  also  no  doubt  that 
rapid  deterioration  in  terms  of  trade  has 
been  sufficient  to  swamp  some  countries 
which  might  otherwise  have  been 
making  respectable  progress.  A  ton  of 
Zairian  or  Zambian  copper  which  would 
pay  for  115  barrels  of  oil  in  1975  bought 
only  43  barrels  last  July.  Similarly,  the 


purchasing  power  of  coffee  in  tern 
oil  is  down  to  roughly  one-half  whj 
was,  of  cotton  to  one-third,  of  cocc 
almost  one-quarter. 

Seventh,  agriculture  is  at  the  1 
of  the  crisis.  Today,  while  food  sel 
sufficiency  remains  a  fundamental 
African  aspiration,  food  imports  ai 
costing  Africa  more  than  oil  impor 
While  it  is  well  known  that  the  Wi 
Bank  report  stresses  the  need  for 
agricultural  policy  reform,  it  is  les 
predated  that  the  Lagos  plan  mat 
much  the  same  point.  To  quote  fn 
latter: 

For  an  improvement  of  the  food  si 
in  Africa,  the  fundamental  requisite  is 
strong  political  will  to  channel  a  great 
creased  volume  of  resources  to  agricu] 
carry  through  essential  reorientations 
social  systems,  to  apply  policies  that  v 
duce  small  farmers  and  members  of  ai 
tural  cooperatives  to  achieve  higher  le-l 
of  productivity,  and  to  set  up  effective  I 
machineries  for  the  formulation  of  ret  \ 
programs  and  for  their  execution.  (Enj 
added.)  , 

Eighth,  regional  economic  int  i 
tion  is  a  valid  long-term  objective,  | 
problem  of  weak,  fragmented  nat  i 
economies  and  small  market  size  :  I 
Africa  needs  no  elaboration.  Beca  ( 
the  incredible  political  problems  ii  i 
volved,  the  Africans  have,  in  the 
Charter  of  the  Organization  of  Al 
Unity  (OAU),  explicitly  ruled  out  ■ 
ing  boundaries,  and  instead  are  pi 
ahead  with  a  more  realistic  coope 
agenda  involving  such  organizatio 
the  Economic  Community  of  Wes 
African  States  (ECOWAS),  the  F 
cophone  structure  in  West  Africa, 
the  new  preferential  trade  area  ir 
eastern  and  southern  Africa.  But 
be  years,  if  not  a  generation  or  tv 
before  this  effort  results  in  appree 
economic  integration,  for  reasons 
known.  The  economies  that  must ' 
tegrate  are  frequently  competitiv* 
rather  than  complementary,  and  ' 
process  is  often  further  complicati 
fear  of  dominance  by  one  relative 
or  advanced  partner. 

Ninth,  there  is  no  questioning 
Africa's  critical  need  for  institutid 
development  and  human  skills.  A 
generation  or  two  from  now,  histt 
may  well  conclude  that  foreign  ai» 
its  greatest  contribution  in  these 
related  areas. 

Finally,  there  is  growing  awa 
that  the  various  elements  in  the  I 
economic  crisis  must  be  seen  and  i 


Department  of  State  Eleli 


AFRICA 


(if  one  complex  problem.  Ex- 
(Iflit,  the  drying  up  of  new  credit 
ick  (if  investment,  the  inade- 
r  institutions,  policy,  and 
,rial  shortcomings,  and  even  lack 
ical  will  all  are  part  of  a  chain. 
A,  for  example,  an  inexorable,  cir- 
ijlationship  between  food  short- 
■platile  urban  consumers,  over- 
ption,  weak  institutions,  official 
ia  about  autonomous  nongovern- 
foower  centers  (worker,  farmer, 
fprise  groups),  and  poor  policies, 
jch  stimulating  the  other.  It  re- 
jhe  primary  objective  of  foreign 

tee  to  help  enlightened  leaders 
le  vicious  circle  at  whatever 
ill  serve  the  purpose. 

[mplications 

go  on  at  greater  length,  but  I've 
)ugh  to  illustrate  the  point:  Peo- 
oodwill,  whether  Africans  or 
•icans,  development  experts  or 
erts,  liberals  or  conservatives, 
lore  than  they  disagree  on  the 
and  extent  of  Africa's  economic 
a.  What  are  the  policy  implica- 
l'  this  consensus? 
ibegin  with,  it  is  important  that 
I  the  Africans  talk  to  each  other 
lolutions  geared  to  the  specifics  of 
v^aried  country  situations.  There 
of  practical  value  to  be  gained  by 
over  those  areas,  mainly 
ical,  where  disagreement  seems 
•ish.  There  is  a  great  deal  to  be 
by  getting  down  to  cases, 
lilarly,  in  a  situation  where  there 
ty  of  blame  to  go  around,  we 
lot  overlook  the  fact  that  both 
H  and  external  factors  are  in- 
land avoid  the  temptation  to  seek 
^ats.  Weighing  the  blame  is  a 
|r  historians,  not  policymakers, 
•ofar  as  external  factors  are  at 
;here  is  no  doubt  that  the  United 
because  of  its  enormous  in- 
!  on  the  world  economy,  bears  a 
responsibility.  For  that  reason, 
iministration  has  consistently  em- 
3d  the  importance  of  restoring  our 
jmestic  prosperity  and  getting  in- 
rates  down  as  the  most  important 
)ution  that  we  can  make  to  the 
and  prosperity  of  the  world,  most 
illy  the  Third  World, 
you  know,  commercial  loans  to 
ign  states  are  usually  tied  to  an 
itional  interest  rate  which  varies 
lay  to  day.  For  that  reason,  the 
ational  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  now 
ites  that  every  1%  shift  in  world 


interest  rates  translates  into  roughly  a 
$2  billion  net  increase  in  interest  pay- 
ments by  the  non-oil  developing  coun- 
tries. The  IMF  also  reports  that  bench- 
mark interest  rates  for  international 
lending  increased  in  real  terms— after 
adjusting  for  inflation— from  0.9%  in 
1973  to  5.2%  in  1979-81.  Leaving  aside 
the  problem  of  increased  cost,  these 
violent  fluctuations  pose  an  almost  im- 
possible challenge  to  national  economic 
policymaking. 

Commodity  prices  will,  of  course, 
respond  as  restored  world  economic 
health  gives  strength  to  weakened 
markets.  Nevertheless,  this  is  one  area 
where  developing  nation  producers 
should  be  especially  careful  to  avoid 
complacency.  The  improvement  in 
markets  is  likely  to  be  both  slow  and  er- 
ratic. The  development  of  substitutes 
(for  example,  fiber  glass  optics  in  place 
of  copper  and  corn  fructose  in  place  of 
sugar),  plus  the  ever-increasing  efficien- 
cy of  industrial  consumers,  bode  ill  for 
long-term  consumption  trends.  A  recent 
article  in  Forbes  magazine,  describing 
the  impact  on  Liberia  of  a  50%  drop  in 
rubber  prices  in  the  last  3  years, 
observes  that  the  implication  is  ominous: 
".  .  .  that  Africa's  hope,  its  legendary 
storehouse  of  raw  materials,  may  not  be 
able  to  lift  the  continent's  people  from 
backwardness  and  poverty." 

We  know  from  long  experience  that 
interference  with  market  forces  is  not 
the  way  to  solve  the  commodity  prob- 
lem. Yet  we  must  also  recognize,  just  as 
we  do  in  the  case  of  our  own  domestic 
agriculture,  that  goverments  and  inter- 
national authorities  have  some  respon- 
sibility to  cushion  producers  from  the 
shock  of  extreme  market  fluctuations 
and  to  facilitate  necessary  restructuring. 
Certainly,  we  favor  full  use  of  existing 
international  mechanisms,  such  as  the 
IMF's  compensatory  finance  facility,  to 
provide  temporary  relief  where  ap- 
propriate. We  believe  it  is  important  to 
distinguish  between  viable  commodity 
agreements,  which  attempt  to  iron  out 
destructive  boom-and-bust  price  fluctua- 
tions and  those  which  are  nothing  more 
than  resource  transfer  mechanisms- 
disguised  aid,  if  you  will.  We  remain 
open  to  suggestions  for  better  ways  to 
tackle  this  vexing  problem. 

The  extent  of  the  African  crisis  has 
additional  implications  for  the  way  that 
we  do  business,  and  by  "we"  I  mean  both 
the  U.S.  Government  and  the  broader 
community  of  aid  donors  to  Africa.  The 
basic  lesson  is  that  a  more  coherent, 


purposeful,  efficient,  coordinated  effort 
is  needed.  Within  the  U.S.  Government 
we  must  try  to  improve  the  interconnec- 
tion between  various  aspects  of  our 
foreign  economic  policy  toward  the 
Third  World.  For  example,  there  may  be 
occasions  when  AID  [Agency  for  Inter- 
national Development]  and  export  pro- 
motion programs  can  work  together, 
enabling  the  same  scarce  budget  dollar 
to  serve  multiple  policy  ends.  The  rele- 
vant bureaucracies— State,  AID, 
Treasury,  Overseas  Private  Investment 
Corporation  (OPIC),  Export-Import 
Bank,  and  Commerce — must  evolve  a 
system  which  relies  more  on  cooperation 
and  communication  and  less  on  the 
traditional  Washington  pattern  of 
bureaucratic  compartmentalization  or 
conflict. 

The  same  need  for  better  coordina- 
tion is  visible  at  the  international  level. 
The  day  has  long  passed  when  in  almost 
any  situation  the  United  States  was  the 
dominant  aid  donor.  We  never  have 
been  number  one  in  Africa.  Today,  in 
Africa,  we  are  number  three  among 
bilateral  donors,  behind  France  and  Ger- 
many, and  we  contribute  less  than  10% 
of  total  official  development  assistance. 
In  many  countries  our  own  efforts  to 
enhance  economic  stability  and  growth 
are  heavily  dependent  on  the  efforts  of 
the  World"  Bank  and  the  IMF.  Only  a 
massive  increase  in  our  bilateral  assist- 
ance, virtually  unthinkable  under  cur- 
rent budgetary  circumstances,  would 
change  this  pattern. 

It  follows  that  to  improve  the  effec- 
tiveness of  our  own  policies,  we  must 
work  more  closely  with  our  allies  and 
with  the  international  financial  institu- 
tions. This  cooperation  encompasses  a 
series  of  subagendas.  To  minimize  the 
burden  on  host  governments,  donors  can 
attempt  to  simplify  and  regularize  their 
administrative  requirements.  To  increase 
efficiency  and  avoid  duplication  of  ef- 
fort, they  can  better  coordinate  activities 
within  sectors.  Such  sector-level  coor- 
dination is  the  major  activity  of  the 
seven-nation  donor  group  known  as 
Cooperation  for  Development  in  Africa 
(CDA). 

By  their  own  behavior,  donors  can 
have  enormous  impact  on  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  multilateral  institutions 
as  they  proceed  with  the  delicate  busi- 
ness of  persuading  governments  to  im- 
plement improved  policies  which  may  be 
painful  or  expensive  or  both.  For  exam- 
ple, increased  bilateral  aid  as  well  as 
generous  debt  relief  is  often  required  in 
the  early  phases  of  an  IMF  stabilization 


AFRICA 


program,  when  austerity  measures 
would  otherwise  create  politically  in- 
tolerable budget  pressures  and  a 
growth-throttling  shortage  of  foreign  ex- 
change. On  the  down  side,  ill-advised 
donor  activities— such  as  the  promotion 
of  complex  projects  that  are  unrealis- 
tically  expensive  to  build  or  operate— 
can  slow  down  a  fledgling  recovery  ef- 
fort. We  must  recognize  that  the  World 
Bank  and  the  IMF  need  the  active,  in- 
telligent support  of  member  govern- 
ments in  order  to  do  their  own  difficult 
jobs. 

To  provide  such  support,  we  have 
launched  an  effort  to  coordinate  our  own 
bilateral  programs  with  those  of  other 
donors,  the  IMF,  and  the  Bank.  The  key 
mechanism  is  an  informal  interagency 
working  group— attended  by  State,  AID, 
Treasury,  and  U.S.  representatives  to 
the  Fund  and  Bank— which  convenes 
periodically  to  consider  specific  country 
situations.  While  this  is  still  a  new  in- 
itiative, it  is  clearly  a  promising  ap- 
proach to  the  problem  of  more  effective 
and  efficient  use  of  our  scarce  resources. 

We  must  also  think  through  the  im- 
plications of  the  emerging  consensus  on 
the  vital  role  of  the  private  sector- 
always  defined  to  include  both  large  and 
small  producers— in  the  search  for  in- 
creased productivity  and  self-sustaining 
growth.  Spurred  by  adversity,  African 
leaders  are  beginning  to  get  over  some 
of  the  ideological  hangups  and  en- 
trenched bureaucratic  habits  of  the  past. 
We  should  listen  when  they  tell  us,  as 
they  increasingly  do,  that  they  want 
more  American  trade  and  investment. 

Our  response  to  them  correctly  em- 
phasizes the  importance  of  self-help  ef- 
forts to  achieve  the  kind  of  economic 
climate  that  will  both  stimulate  local 
enterprise  and  attract  outside  capital. 
But  we  must  go  further,  lest  our 
rhetoric  on  the  virtues  of  the  private 
sector  be  seen  by  the  Africans  as  a 
hollow  joke.  If  we  are  serious  about  the 
developmental  impact  of  the  private  sec- 
tor, we  must  increase  the  resources  we 
devote  to  private  sector  programs  in- 
cluding Eximbank  and  OPIC.  We  must 
continue  and  expand  the  major  new  ef- 
fort launched  by  AID's  Bureau  for 
Private  Enterprise. 

That  untapped  possibilities  may  be 
present  is  suggested  by  the  case  of 
Somalia.  In  that  country,  long  regarded 
as  an  archtype  of  poverty  and  backward- 
ness, economic  liberalization  and  decon- 
trol has  recently  given  a  sudden  stimu- 
lus to  commercial  agriculture:  the 


result— new  opportunities,  identified  by 
an  AID  consultant,  to  provide  assistance 
directly  to  local  producers,  including 
cooperatives,  rather  than  following  the 
more  traditional  pattern  of  channeling 
aid  into  government  bureaus.  Another 
example  is  found  in  Zimbabwe,  where 
aid's  commodity  import  program 
enables  the  local  subsidiary  of  Cater- 
pillar, Inc.  to  obtain  the  U.S.  parts  and 


.  .  .  we  must  not  be  seen 
as  hectoring  or 
preaching  nor  lose  sight 
of  the  fact  that  the  reex- 
amination of  past 
policies  should  be  a 
mutual  undertaking.  In 
the  end,  it  will  be  the 
Africans  who  take  the 
risks  and  make  most  of 
the  sacrifices. 


equipment  needed  to  sustain  healthy  and 
expanding  operations  at  a  time  of  great 
foreign  exchange  constraint.  This,  in 
turn,  will  help  enable  Caterpillar  to 
maintain  its  ambitious  training  pro- 
gram—covering everything  from  sales 
to  engineering— for  black  Zimbabweans. 

But  we  do  not  have  nearly  enough 
commodity  import  programs  in  Africa, 
and  those  that  exist  are  under  severe 
budgetary  pressures.  Legal  and  budget 
constraints  on  Eximbank  and  OPIC  in- 
evitably make  those  agencies  loath  to 
commit  funds  in  the  comparatively  high- 
risk  circumstances  that  prevail  in  Africa. 

Up  to  now  I  have  spoken  mainly  of 
policy  implications  for  the  industrialized 
countries,  but  there  are,  of  course, 
similar  implications  for  the  Africans. 
They  must  redouble  their  efforts  to 
think  through  how,  in  practical  fact,  the 
goals  of  the  Lagos  plan  may  be  reached. 
They  must  recognize  the  jarring  reality, 
not  likely  to  be  reversed,  of  static,  or  at 
best,  slowly  rising  aid  levels.  Some  old 
shibboleths  badly  need  reexamination, 
including  the  notion  that  a  country  must 
physically  produce  its  own  food  supplies, 
when  in  some  cases  it  may  be  more  effi- 
cient—and no  less  self-sufficient— to 
concentrate  on  cash  crops  and  buy  food 


with  the  money  thus  earned.  Misgi 
preconceptions  of  bureaucracies  as 
benevolent,  of  profits  as  evil,  are 
diminishing  but  still  widespread. 

Conclusion 

I  began  this  talk  by  noting  the  dif- 
ferences in  perspective  that  charac 
African  and  Western  views  of  devi 
ment  policy.  I  suggested  that,  in  f; 
we  agree  more  than  we  disagree  a 
that  the  reality  of  the  economic  cri 
which  grips  Africa  today  has  unde 
lined  the  core  problem — stagnatini 
growth— in  a  manner  which  has  al 
compelled  us  some  distance  towan 
sensus.  One  of  the  central  element 
that  consensus  is  awareness  that  a 
us— Africans  and  non- Africans— r 
reexamine  the  habits  and  mindsets 
the  past  to  see  how  we  can  apply  1 
resources  more  effectively  to  solve 
crisis. 

This  Administration  has  alreac  | 
barked  on  an  expanded  process  of  | 
sultation  and  dialogue  with  Africa:  | 
with  other  donors.  The  tone  of  voi  | 
with  which  we  conduct  this  dialog! 
important,  for  we  must  not  be  i 
hectoring  or  preaching  nor  lose  sij 
the  fact  that  the  reexamination  of 
policies  should  be  a  mutual  undert 
In  the  end,  it  will  be  the  Africans 
take  the  risks  and  make  most  of  tl , 
sacrifices. 

The  kind  of  dialogue  that  we  r. 
not  painless.  For  the  industrializec 
tries  it  demands  flexibility,  innovai 
and  an  increased  commitment  of  b 
cratic  and  budgetary  resources.  F( 
Africans  it  involves  a  willingness  t 
discuss  policy  issues  which  are  the 
sovereign  prerogatives  of  indepenc 
governments.  If  we  are  serious,  th 
bound  to  be  friction  from  time  to  t 
My  comment  would  be  that  assista ' 
relationships  are  never  completely  j 
tion  free,  nor  should  they  be  unles:  i 
want  them  perpetuated  indefiniteh 
I  am  reminded  of  India,  a  com  ' 
which  for  many  years  received  ma  i 
U.S.  aid,  often  accompanied  by  ad'! 
that  was  not  always  completely 
welcome.  Today  India  has  made  in 
pressive  developmental  strides  anc  > 
parently  achieved  food  self-sufficie  /■ 
There  is  continuing  debate  over  th  ^ 
of  foreign  aid  in  this  achievement,  i 
own  preferred  version  of  India's  si  es 
story  would  give  some  credit  to  th  f 
forts  of  American  and  other  donor ' 
invested  millions  in  Indian  agricult-'i 


Department  of  State  B  p" 


ARMS  CONTROL 


iOs  and  1960s.  But  I  would  also 
Sbelieve  the  theory  which  holds 
ie  Indians  were,  as  time  went  by, 
Id  by  the  volume  of  advice  they 
(accept  from  well-meaning  for- 
5  and  increasingly  determined  to 
he  point  where  they  no  longer 
:  such  help. 

ispite  the  enormously  varying  cir- 
i,nces  which  prevail  in  Africa,  our 
■ere  must  be  similar.  We  must 
c  and  share  the  vision  of  human 
[  and  prosperity  that  pervades  the 
[plan  of  action.  That  vision  can 
l!  achieved  through  economic 
1,  which  will  require  new  levels  of 
ie  cooperation  among  the  in- 
ilized  countries  and  African  na- 
rhe  issues  involved  are  complex, 
mes  seemingly  insoluble.  The 
t  for  solutions  will  be  arduous  and 
;  burdens  on  both  sides.  We  must 
afraid  to  speak  frankly  to  each 
because  we  are  hopefully  beyond 
.ge  of  paternalism  and  double 
irds.  But  above  all  we  must,  as 
s  partners  linked  by  mutual  in- 
■  persist  in  the  search, 
r  success  or  failure  will,  of  course, 
ected  in  the  development 
iements  of  African  nations.  And 
jlespite  the  vicissitudes  of  world 
on,  there  are  new  grounds  for 
Por  example,  in  Sudan,  coopera- 
fort  between  donors  and  Africans 
mched  a  new  stabilization  and 
pment  program  involving  extraor- 
I  debt  rescheduling,  aid,  and  wide- 
ig  policy  reform  efforts.  If  sus- 
',  this  program  can  bring  Sudan 
its  deep-seated  economic  crisis, 
r  efforts  are  underway  in  Kenya, 
a,  Senegal,  and  are  beginning 
aere.  In  short,  expanding  our 
pment  dialogue  is  not  a  theoretical 
As  our  consensus  grows,  it  can 
ust  be  used  as  a  basis  for 


Ensuring  Security  in  the  Nuclear  Age 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Addreas  before  a  regional  foreign 
policy  conference  sponsored  by  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  Institute  of 
International  Education,  Denver,  Col- 
orado, on  March  8,  1983.  Mr.  Dam  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 

As  a  native  of  Kansas  speaking  in  Col- 
orado, I  am  reminded  of  former  Presi- 
dent Truman's  remarks  about  the 
disputes  that  have  occasionally  arisen 
between  these  two  great  states.  "When 
Kansas  and  Colorado  have  a  quarrel 
over  the  water  in  the  Arkansas  River," 
Truman  said,  "they  don't  call  out  the 
National  Guard  in  each  state  and  go  to 
war  over  it.  They  bring  a  suit  in  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and 
abide  by  the  decision." 

As  a  former  law  professor,  I  can 
testify  to  the  role  the  Supreme  Court 
plays  in  resolving  conflicts  among  states. 
There  is,  of  course,  no  ultimate  arbiter 
of  disputes  among  nations.  As  a  result, 
each  nation  must  develop  its  own 
strategy  for  resolving  disputes.  The  U.S. 
strategy  for  ensuring  security  in  the 
nuclear  age  is,  like  our  judicial  system, 
based  on  a  commitment  to  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  conflicts.  This  Administra- 
tion seeks  to  ensure  our  continued 
security  by  maintaining  a  credible 
military  deterrent,  while  simultaneously 
negotiating  significant  arms  reduction 
agreements. 

Our  strategic  policy  has  been  the 
result  of  a  consensus  shared  by 
presidents,  representatives  of  Congress, 
the  public,  our  allies,  and  our  friends. 
That  consensus  is  based  on  two  princi- 
ples. The  first  is  that  war  is  best  avoided 
by  maintaining  sufficient  arms  to  deter 
it  in  the  first  place.  The  second  is  that 
the  risk  of  war  is  lessened  by  reducing 
the  armaments  of  war.  These  two  prin- 
ciples are  complementary,  not  contradic- 
tory. Mutual  reductions  to  equal  and 
verifiable  levels  can  simultaneously 
reduce  the  risk  of  war  and  the  quantity 
of  arms  needed  to  deter  it.  Thus  the 
strategic  program  of  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ministration is  based  squarely  on  the 
conviction  that  the  two  paths  to  peace 
are  deterrence  and  arms  reduction. 

I  should  like  to  begin  my  remarks  by 
discussing  the  strategy  of  deterrence 


and  the  changing  military  balance.  I 
shall  then  discuss  how  our  moderniza- 
tion program  seeks  to  restore  that 
balance  by  improving  our  deterrent. 
Finally,  I  shall  describe  this  Administra- 
tion's arms  control  proposals,  which 
have  already  moved  us  beyond  the  con- 
cept of  a  freeze  at  current  levels  and 
toward  the  higher  goal  of  meaningful 
arms  reductions. 

The  Strategy  of  Deterrence 

The  foundation  of  peace  in  the  nuclear 
age  has  been  America's  strategy  of 
deterrence.  Since  we  first  acquired 
nuclear  weapons,  the  United  States  has 
sought  to  prevent  war  by  discouraging 
aggression  against  the  United  States 
and  its  allies.  By  presenting  any  poten- 
tial aggressor  with  the  prospect  of  cer- 
tain retaliation,  peace  has  been  main- 
tained for  nearly  40  years.  The  history 
of  the  20th  century  makes  it  sadly  clear 
that  peaceful  intentions  and  good 
motives  alone  will  not  stop  aggressors. 
Adequate  military  strength  does  do  so, 
and  the  strategy  of  deterrence  has  been 
successful  in  protecting  the  security  of 
America  and  Western  Europe  since  the 
end  of  World  War  II. 

However,  while  our  policy  of  deter- 
rence has  remained  constant,  the  means 
of  achieving  it  have  changed  dramatical- 
ly. In  the  late  1950s,  a  few  hundred 
American  bombers  were  sufficient  to 
discourage  an  attack  against  us  or  our 
allies.  Today,  maintaining  an  effective 
deterrent  requires  a  triad  of  manned 
bombers,  land-based  intercontinental 
missiles,  and  sea-launched  ballistic 
missiles.  The  task  of  adjusting  to 
technological  change  and  Soviet 
developments  was  not  easy.  Yet  it 
preserved  the  peace  because  it  main- 
tained a  balance  of  forces  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Changing  Military  Balance 

That  stabilizing  balance  of  forces  has 
now  been  upset  by  the  Soviet  military 
buildup,  which  contrasts  sharply  with 
our  own  military  restraint.  U.S.  defense 
spending  has  actually  declined  over  the 
last  several  decades,  both  as  a  percen- 
tage of  the  nation's  gross  national  prod- 
uct (GNP)  and  as  a  fraction  of  the 
Federal  budget.  In  1962,  when  John 


57 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Kennedy  was  president,  46%,  or  almost 
half  of  the  Federal  budget,  went  to  our 
national  defense;  in  recent  years,  only 
one-quarter  of  our  budget  has  gone  to 
defense.  Even  with  our  planned  in- 
creases, defense  spending  will  represent 
only  6.8%  of  our  GNP  in  1984— just  1% 
more  than  the  5.9%  we  averaged  in  the 
1970s. 

By  contrast,  Soviet  military  invest- 
ment has  grown  constantly  over  the  last 
two  decades  and  was  nearly  double  ours 
by  the  early  1980s.  In  particular,  for 
strategic  nuclear  forces,  Soviet  invest- 
ment was  about  three  times  higher  than 
ours  during  1980-81;  for  general  pur- 
pose forces,  it  was  50%  higher;  and  for 
research  and  development  expenditures, 
it  proceeded  at  approximately  twice  our 
rate. 

This  increase  in  Soviet  defense 
spending  has  resulted  in  a  dramatic  in- 


more  numerous  but  also  more  modern 
than  our  own.  The  U.S.  bomber  fleet  is 
a  product  of  the  Eisenhower  and  Ken- 
nedy years.  Few  of  us  would  regularly 
drive  25-year-old  automobiles  except  in 
antique  car  rallies,  yet  some  of  our  B-52 
bombers  are  older  than  the  pilots  who 
fly  them.  Similarly,  our  land-based 
missiles  were  conceived  in  the  1950s  and 
installed  in  the  1960s.  We  have  not 
deployed  a  new  land-based  intercon- 
tinental ballistic  missile  in  13  years.  In 
some  cases,  even  the  safety  of  these 
systems  has  decreased  over  time. 

In  contrast,  the  Soviets  have  gained 
qualitative  advantages  by  continually 
upgrading  their  strategic  weapons.  In- 
deed, there  has  been  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  the  accuracy  of  Soviet  missile 
warheads  over  the  last  decade.  The 
lethal  combination  of  greater  numbers 
and  improved  accuracy  makes  our  own 


.  .  .  for  strategic  nuclear  forces,  Soviet  investment 
was  about  three  times  higher  than  ours  during 
1980-81;  for  general  purpose  forces,  it  was  50% 
higher;  and  for  research  and  development  expendi- 
tures, it  proceeded  at  approximately  twice  our 
rate. 


land-based  missile  force  vulnerable  to  a 
Soviet  first  strike. 

These  Soviet  strides  in  arms  invest- 
ment, numbers,  and  quality  have 
resulted  in  an  imbalance  in  the  strategic 
relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  As  the  events  in 
Washington  this  week  demonstrate, 
many  concerned  Americans  believe  that 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
should  agree  to  freeze  their  nuclear 
arsenals  at  existing  levels.  Yet  a  freeze 
would  leave  uncorrected  the  very  im- 
balance that  unsettles  the  world. 
Moreover,  a  freeze  would  saddle  the 
United  States  with  an  aging  strategic 
force.  Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  Union 
would  be  free  to  maintain  the  advan- 
tages of  its  more  modern  nuclear 
arsenal. 


in  the  number  of  their  strategic 
systems.  For  example,  in  the  8  years 
from  1974  to  1982,  the  Soviet  Union 
deployed  almost  six  times  as  many  inter- 
continental ballistic  missiles  as  the 
United  States  and  over  16  times  as 
many  ballistic  missile-firing  submarines. 
And  in  the  past  6  years,  while  the 
United  States  withdrew  1,000  nuclear 
warheads  from  Europe,  the  Soviet 
Union  de-ployed  over  1,000  highly  ac- 
curate warheads  on  mobile  SS-20 
ballistic  missiles.  NATO  currently  has 
nothing  comparable  to  the  SS-20.  In 
short,  as  former  Secretary  of  Defense 
Harold  Brown  has  described  the  history 
of  the  U.S. -Soviet  arms  relationship, 
"When  we  build,  they  build;  when  we 
stop,  they  build." 

As  a  result  of  the  sustained  Soviet 
buildup  and  corresponding  American 
restraint,  the  Soviet  arsenal  is  not  only 


The  President's  Modernization 
Program 

This  brief  overview  of  the  U.S.-Soi 
arms  relationship  reveals  the  fact : 
as  the  President  has  said,  althougl 
has  been  much  talk  of  an  arms  rac 
"the  truth  is  that,  while  the  Soviet 
Union  has  raced,  we  have  not."  Ni 
we  intend  to  enter  any  such  race. 
Rather,  we  intend  to  modernize  o\ 
nuclear  deterrent  and  restore  thai 
essential  balance  that  has  preserv 
peace  since  World  War  II.  The  So 
must  understand  that  while  we  wiJ 
seek  superiority,  neither  will  we  a| 
them  to  achieve  it.  I 

As  a  result,  the  President  has ' 
posed  a  vigorous  modernization  p 
gram.  That  program  is  not  inexpt 
But  even  with  our  proposed  budg 
creases,  defense  spending  as  a  pe 
age  of  our  GNP  will  rise  less  thar 
over  the  next  4  years  to  an  estimi  i 
7.7%  in  1988-about  half  the  com 
estimate  for  the  Soviet  Union. 

Though  the  President  has  dec 
his  political  career  to  reducing  go 
ment  spending,  he  believes  it  esse 
ask  for  this  increase  in  our  defens 
budget.  He  does  so  in  order  to  en 
the  prospects  for  peace  at  minimi 
cost.  The  President's  modernizati' 
gram  will  reduce  the  risk  of  war 
increasing  the  Soviet  incentive  to 
negotiate  arms  reduction.  The  he: 
that  program  is  our  effort  to  incr 
the  survivability  and  capability  of 
strategic  deterrent  of  air,  sea,  an 
based  systems. 

Improving  the  Strategic  Trij. 

modernize  the  air  leg  of  our  strat 
triad,  the  President  has  proposed 
program  of  procuring  a  mixed  foi 
B-1  bombers  to  be  deployed  begii 
in  1985,  and  the  Advanced  Techn 
Bomber— the  so-called  "Stealth 
Bomber"— to  be  deployed  in  the  e 
1990s. 

Since  our  current  ballistic  mis 
submarines  will  become  more  vuli 
in  the  face  of  Soviet  advances,  tb 
dent's  program  calls  for  moderniz 
sea-based  leg  of  the  triad  with  thi 
Trident  submarine  and  Trident  I ; 
missiles.  The  first  Trident  becamt' 
tional  last  December. 

The  third  element  of  the  mod 
tion  program  involves  our  effort  1 
prove  the  survivability  and  capab 
our  land-based  intercontinental  bi 
missiles.  This  effort  is  currently  t 
reviewed  by  the  Scowcroft  Comn 
which  will  report  to  the  President 
few  weeks.  I  shall  not  try  to  pred 


Department  of  State  Eil' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


('  I  if  I  his  review,  but  I  will  say 
'  mitroine  is  important,  not  only 
fuiLiii'  strategic  posture,  but  also 
ichaiR-i's  for  meaningful  arms 
ifi.  A  modern,  land-based  intercon- 
i  ballistic  missile  (ICBM),  such  as 

1!  MX  missile,  is  essential  to  help 
lish  the  strategic  balance.  It  also 
important  bearing  on  our  ability 
ttiate  a  meaningful  arms  reduc- 
•eement  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

viding  a  Negotiating  Incentive. 

vyer,  I  know  that  negotiations 
nly  when  both  parties  believe 
ve  something  to  gain  by  talking 
jthing  to  lose  by  failing  to  talk, 
t  the  incentive  of  gain  or  loss 
d  by  our  modernization  program, 
lets  would  see  no  advantage  in 
to  the  table  in  the  first  place. 
Vlarch  of  1977,  for  example,  the 
States  presented  to  Moscow  an 
us  proposal  for  redirecting  the 
Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks] 
.  What  we  sought  was  a  commit- 
)  genuine  reduction  of  nuclear 
Vhat  we  received  from  the 

was  a  blunt  refusal  even  to 

the  proposal.  They  had  no  incen- 

discuss  reductions.  For  two 

the  Soviets  had  been  investing 
)us  sums  in  modernizing  their 
•  weapons,  and  the  military 

was  tipping  in  their  favor, 
entually,  of  course,  a  SALT  ac- 
as  negotiated.  That  accord  pro- 
as its  name  implied,  for  strategic 
imitation— meaning  that,  with 
captions,  it  merely  limited  further 

in  certain  strategic  systems. 
■eaty  was  never  ratified  by  the 


gsident  Reagan  took  office  in 
■y  1981  with  a  pledge  to  restore 
^ategic  balance.  On  October  2, 
tie  announced  the  comprehensive 
.m,  which  I  have  just  described, 
kdernizing  America's  strategic 
and  on  November  18  of  that  year, 
lounced  that  his  Administration 
seek  a  strategic  arms  reduction 
nent  with  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
s  thus  had  an  incentive  to  come 
0  the  table,  and  they  remain  at  the 


^rms  Reduction  Proposals 


i,  we  are  now  engaged  in  two  sets 
lear  arms  negotiations  with  the 
;  Union  in  Geneva.  One  is  the 
^gic  Arms  Reduction  Talks  or 
.T;  the  other  is  the  intermediate- 
nuclear  forces,  or  INF,  talks.  Our 


approach  in  both  these  negotiations— 
and,  indeed,  in  all  our  arms  control  ef- 
forts—is based  on  the  four  principles 
first  outlined  by  President  Reagan  in  his 
speech  at  the  National  Press  Club  in 
1981. 

First,  we  insist  on  significant  reduc- 
tions. We  are  committed  to  reducing  the 
number  and  destructive  potential  of 
weapons,  not  just  freezing  them  at  cur- 
rent high  levels. 

Second,  we  seek  equality  and  will 
accept  nothing  less.  We  believe  that  a 
reduction  to  equal  levels  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  restore  that  essential 
balance  that  can  provide  our  country 
with  adequate  security. 

Third,  we  insist  on  verif lability. 
Arms  control  agreements  cannot  be 
based  on  trust  alone:  Witness  the  Soviet 
use  of  biological  and  chemical  weapons— 
"yellow  rain"— against  the  peoples  of 
Afghanistan  and  Southeast  Asia,  in 
direct  violation  of  international  treaties 
to  which  the  Soviets  are  a  party.  The 
United  States  will  thus  insist  that  any 
future  arms  control  agreements  contain 
effective  measures  to  ensure  compliance 
by  both  sides. 

Finally,  we  will  insist  that  arms  con- 
trol agreements  genuinely  enhance  U.S. 
and  allied  security.  We  must  not  accept 
cosmetic  agreements  that  engender  a 
false  sense  of  security. 

START  Negotiations.  Our  START 
proposals  are  based  on  these  four  prin- 


.  .  .  "the  truth  is  that, 
while  the  Soviet  Union 
has  raced,  we  have  not. 
Nor  do  we  intend  to 
enter  any  such  race. 


ciples.  We  have  proposed,  as  a  first 
step,  that  both  sides  reduce  their 
ballistic  missiles  to  about  half  of  what  is 
now  in  the  U.S.  inventory.  We  also  pro- 
pose that  the  number  of  warheads  for 
these  missiles  be  reduced  by  one-third, 
only  half  of  which  would  be  allowed  on 
the  most  destabilizing  systems— the 
land-based  ICBMs.  We  are  prepared  in  a 
later  phase  to  seek  a  reduction  in  the 
throw-weight  of  these  missiles  to  equal 


levels  below  current  U.S.  levels.  We  also 
intend  to  propose  limits  on  other  kinds 
of  strategic  nuclear  systems.  In  short, 
the  United  States  is  not  seeking  negotia- 
tions for  its  own  sake.  The  United 
States  is  not  seeking  an  agreement  that 
would  merely  limit  the  growth  of 
strategic  forces.  Rather,  we  are  seeking 
a  START  agreement  that  would  result 
in  substantial,  equitable,  and  verifiable 
reductions  in  nuclear  weapons. 

INF  Talks.  The  other  nuclear  arms 
negotiation  underway  in  Geneva  is  the 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF) 
talks.  The  U.S.  position  in  the  INF  talks 
is  based  on  the  initiative  which  Presi- 
dent Reagan  announced  in  November  of 
1981  and  which  has  been  fully  supported 
by  our  allies.  He  proposed  cancellation 
of  the  NATO  decision  to  start  deploying 
U.S.  Pershing  II  and  ground-launched 
cruise  missiles  in  Europe  later  this  year 
if  the  Soviet  Union  agreed  to  dismantle 
its  INF  missiles-the  SS-4,  SS-5,  and 
SS-20.  This  proposal  was  based  upon 
the  belief  that,  as  the  President  stated 
in  his  speech  to  the  American  Legion  on 
Washington's  birthday,  "the  complete 
elimination  of  the  entire  class  of  longer 
range,  land-based  INF  missiles  remains 
the  best  and  most  moral  outcome"  to  the 
negotiations. 

The  President  has  made  it  clear, 
however,  that  ours  "is  not  a  take-it-or- 
leave-it  proposal."  He  has  instructed 
Paul  Nitze,  our  ambassador  to  the  INF 
talks,  "to  explore  in  Geneva  every  pro- 
posed solution"  that  is  consistent  with 
the  principles  supported  by  our  Euro- 
pean allies.  These  principles  state  first 
that  a  fair  agreement  must  be  based  on 
equal  levels  of  U.S.  and  Soviet  forces. 
As  a  corollary,  British  and  French  na- 
tional strategic  systems  are,  by  defini- 
tion, not  a  part  of  these  negotiations  and 
not  to  be  considered  in  them.  In  addi- 
tion, Soviet  proposals  which  have  the  ef- 
fect of  merely  shifting  the  Soviet  threat 
from  Europe  to  Asia  cannot  be  con- 
sidered reasonable.  Finally,  a  fair  agree- 
ment must  be  underwritten  by  effective 
verification  measures. 

Thus  far,  however,  the  Soviets  have 
responded  to  our  INF  proposal  with 
ones  designed  to  retain  the  current 
Soviet  monopoly  in  longer  range  land- 
based  INF  missiles— a  monopoly  that 
has  been  strengthened  by  the  addition, 
on  average,  of  one  SS-20  a  week  since 
the  talks  have  begun.  The  Soviet  pro- 
posals would  permit  them  to  keep  a 
formidable  arsenal  of  INF  missiles,  in- 
cluding every  SS-20  deployed  to  date, 
while  NATO  would  be  prevented  from 
deploying  any  counterbalancing  missiles 


1983 


ARMS  CONTROL 


in  Europe.  Moreover,  there  would  be 
nothing  to  prevent  the  Soviets  from 
deploying  even  more  INF  missiles  in 
Asia  or  moving  missiles  from  Europe  to 
Asia— from  where  these  mobile  weapons 
could  be  returned  to  Europe  in  short 
order. 

In  sum,  our  INF  and  START  pro- 
posals aim  to  achieve  substantial, 
equitable,  and  verifiable  reductions, 
especially  in  the  most  powerful,  ac- 
curate, and  rapid  systems— ballistic 


missiles.  Our  proposals  thus  will  not  ad- 
vance the  national  interests  of  one  side 
at  the  expense  of  the  other's  but  will  ad- 
vance the  best  interests  of  both.  The 
Soviets  have  not  yet  responded  in  kind. 
But  our  efforts  to  modernize  our  nuclear 
deterrent  have  simultaneously  reduced 
the  risk  of  conflict,  while  providing  the 
Soviets  with  the  necessary  incentive  to 
sit  down  with  us  at  the  negotiating 
table. 

It  is  important  to  note,  however, 


ACDA  Annual  Report 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  9,  19831 


I  am  pleased  to  transmit  to  you  the  1982  An- 
nual Report  of  the  United  States  Arms  Con- 
trol and  Disarmament  Agency.  This  report, 
the  22d  submitted  since  the  creation  of  the 
agency,  provides  a  complete  review  of  the  im- 
portant work  of  an  Agency  which  plays  a 
crucial  role  in  our  country's  national  security 
program. 

On  September  21,  1982,  I  met  at  the 
White  House  with  the  three  U.S.  arms  con- 
trol negotiators.  Ambassadors  Rowny,  Nitze, 
and  Starr  before  they  returned  to  Europe  for 
the  final  1982  sessions  of  the  START 
[Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks],  INF 
[intermediate-range  nuclear  forces],  and 
MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions] negotiations,  respectively.  At  that 
time,  I  outlined  the  following  general  prin- 
ciples which  guide  the  formation  of  our  arms 
control  policies: 

•  Arms  control  must  be  an  instrument 
of,  and  not  a  substitute  for,  a  coherent  securi- 
ty policy  aimed  in  the  first  instance  at  the 
Soviet  advantage  in  the  most  destabilizing 
class  of  weapons— ballistic  missiles  and, 
especially,  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles 
(ICBMs).  We  will  work  for  agreements  that 
truly  enhance  security  by  reinforcing  peace 
through  deterrence. 

•  We  must  seek  agreements  that  involve 
substantial  and  military  significant  reductions 
on  both  sides. 

•  Agreements  must  be  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  equality  of  rights  and  limits. 

•  Arms  control  agreements  must  include 
effective  means  of  verification.  They  cannot 
be  based  on  trust  alone. 

•  Our  efforts  will  be  guided  by  serious- 
ness of  purpose,  reflected  in  our  willingness 
to  seek  reduction  to  significantly  lower  levels 
of  nuclear  forces  based  on  equal,  balanced 
levels  of  comparable  systems. 

These  principles  are  in  full  accord  with 
the  basic  purpose  of  both  U.S.  and  NATO 
security  policy— ensuring  the  peace  through 
deterrence  of  aggression.  Deterring  nuclear 


or  conventional  attack  against  us  or  our 
Allies  must  guide  our  approach  to  defense 
and  arms  control.  These  principles  also  lie  at 
the  heart  of  the  comprehensive  and  in- 
novative arms  control  approaches  which  this 
Administration  has  adopted.  In  each  of  the 
three  most  important  areas  of  arms  con- 
trol—strategic nuclear  arms,  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces,  and  conventional  forces 
in  Europe— we  have  presented  to  the  Soviet 
Union  bold  and  equitable  proposals  which  are 
in  our  mutual  interest  and  which  provide  an 
opportunity  to  enhance  world  security  and 
peace  by  significantly  reducing  the  arsenals 
of  both  sides. 

In  each  of  these  three  negotiations,  the 
United  States  has  presented  considered  and 
equitable  proposals  which  seek  to  establish  a 
military  equilibrium  at  reduced  levels, 
eliminate  the  most  destabilizing  factors  in  the 
existing  military  balance,  and  enhance  the 
security  of  both  sides.  When  our  national 
security,  and  that  of  our  Allies,  is  at  stake, 
we  must  approach  arms  control  realistically. 
We  do  not  seek  agreements  for  their  own 
sake;  we  seek  them  to  build  international 
security  and  stability.  This  Administration's 
reductions  proposals  for  strategic  and 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  and  for 
conventional  forces  reflect  this  approach.  We 
are  encouraged  by  the  serious  and  business- 
like conduct  of  these  negotiations  thus  far. 
Although  much  hard  bargaining  lies  ahead,  I 
am  determined  to  bargain  in  good  faith  until 
our  objectives  can  be  realized.  We  urge  our 
Soviet  negotiating  partners  equal  seriousness 
of  purpose. 

The  1982  Annual  Report  not  only  in- 
cludes details  on  all  aspects  of  the  three 
negotiations,  but  also  refers  to  such  other  im- 
portant elements  of  ACDA's  responsibilities 
as  providing  expertise  on  both  policy  and 
technical  levels  for  all  other  multilateral  arms 
control  negotiations,  for  our  nuclear  non- 
proliferation  efforts,  and  for  research  and 
analysis  of  military  budget  and  arms 
transfer. 

Ronald  Reagan 


that  a  freeze  at  existing  levels,  su 
that  proposed  in  last  November's 
resolution,  would  remove  the  ince 
to  negotiate  by  preserving  the  cui 
rough  Soviet  advantages  in  strate 
arms.  Indeed,  if  we  achieved  agre 
on  a  verifiable  freeze— a  task  whi( 
might  take  precious  months— the 
would  have  an  incentive  to  prolon 
freeze  and  avoid  any  serious  talk 
significant  arms  reductions  to  low 
equal  levels.  More  importantly,  oi 
gram  of  modernization  and  negot 
has  already  compelled  the  Soviets 
acknowledge  the  desirability  of  so 
moderate  arms  reductions.  A  free 
therefore,  would  actually  represei 
step  back  from  the  progress  we  h 
made.  We  have,  in  short,  moved  1 
the  freeze. 

Conclusion 

I  began  these  remarks  by  speakin  i 
the  peaceful  resolution  of  conflict- 
between  states  or  between  nation  I 
I  should  like  to  close  on  the  same  ' 
The  path  to  peace  in  the  nuclear ;  | 
the  proven  course  I  have  outlined  i 
deterrence  and  arms  reduction.  T 
two  concepts  are  complementary.  ^ 
Mutual  arms  reduction  to  lower  b  ' 
equal  levels  will  reduce  the  risk  ol 
flict  and  the  level  of  arms  needed 
deter  it  in  the  first  place.  Admittc 
the  President  said  in  his  address  t 
nation,  it  is  a  sad  irony  that  it  "sti 
takes  weapons  to  prevent  war."  B 
proposals  for  deep  reductions  will 
in  both  diminished  stockpiles  and  ; 
diminished  risk  of  war. 

In  seeking  to  ensure  our  secur 
the  nuclear  age,  however,  we  shot 
remember  that  peace  is  an  aspirat 
and  it  is  not  an  aspiration  unique  1 
peace  marchers. 

Indeed,  peace  is  the  goal  to  wl 
we  all  aspire.  The  President's  poli( 
achieving  that  goal  is  one  of  deter: 
obtained  through  modernization,  a 
arms  reduction,  obtained  through 
negotiation.  With  our  arms  contro; 
posals,  we  have  already  moved  bey 
the  concept  of  a  freeze  and  toward 
higher  goal  of  deep  reductions  and 
lasting  peace.  We  should  not  step 
backward  now.  ■ 


'Text  from  Weekly  Conipilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  14,  1983. 


Department  of  State  Bi  3'" 


NESS 


rtment  of  State  Activities 
le  Private  Sector  Area 


t  year,  the  Department  of 
b  worked  closely  with  the 
[ector  toward  achieving  a 
^f  foreign  policy  objectives.  This 
lion  is  designed  to  encourage 
[and  economic  growth  abroad, 
y  in  the  developing  world;  to 
j  free  trade  and  investment 
[id  to  promote  understanding 
jjort  for  U.S.  international 
i 

^rtment  officials  have  conferred 
[with  private  sector  representa- 
iarticularly  with  business  groups, 
It  foundations,  and  univer- 
jo  elicit  ideas  on  how  the  sector 
ingthen,  expand,  and  take  on  ac- 
erformed  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
e  response  has  been  extensive, 
nd  encouraging— focusing  on 
ways  to  reinforce  and,  in  some 
pplant  government  efforts.  Im- 
tion  has  taken  place  around  the 


{-ibbean 

I  of  our  strong  interest  in 
'c  and  political  well-being  in  the 
:ie  Department  has  worked  with 
^ate  sector  and  other  U.S. 
inent  agencies  to  formulate  a 
jan  Basin  initiative.  Allied  in  this 
bve  been  the  Council  of  the 
as,  Caribbean  /Central  American 
ithe  U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
ler  private  sector  organizations, 
■in  thrust  of  the  initiative  is  the 
iion  of  incentives  for  expanded 
'nd  private  investment  for 
lie  growth.  Close  contact  with 
iJ.S.  firms  interested  in  the  Carib- 
ilntinues  to  engender  promising 
Jes  ranging  from  feasibility 
^for  a  regional  trading  company 

ions  for  traditional  transporta- 

;tlenecks  in  the  area. 


imerica 

}:  of  a  broadened  effort  in  Latin 
?a,  the  Department,  through  the 
■ission  to  the  Organization  of 
^an  States  (OAS),  has  obtained  an 
I'solution  calling  for  a  study  of 
5  sector  involvement  in  all  its  pro- 
(  with  the  accent  on  increasing 
'involvement. 


Asia 

Links  with  the  private  sector  are  equally 
strong  in  Asia.  Having  been  instrumen- 
tal in  the  formation  of  the  ASEAN-U.S. 
Business  Council  several  years  ago,  the 
Department  of  State  maintains  a  close 
working  relationship  with  the  council, 
helping  to  spark  a  number  of  programs 
directly  helpful  to  our  economic  position 
in  Asia.  The  Department  has  for  some 
time  conducted  a  series  of  joint  action 
programs  with  the  Asia  Pacific  Council 
of  American  Chambers  of  Commerce.  It 
has  also  sponsored  the  formation  of 
U.S. -Korean  subcabinet  level  study 
groups  to  expand  cooperation  and  solve 
problems  in  science  and  technology,  in- 
vestment, and  fisheries  by  utilizing 
specific  inputs  from  the  private  sector 
through  "AmCham"  committees.  SimOar 
activities  are  carried  out  with  embassy 
encouragment  in  Japan,  one  typical  proj- 
ect being  an  analysis  of  U.S.  manufac- 
turing investment  in  that  country. 


Africa 

In  Africa  the  Department  takes  a 
leading  role  in  establishing  bilateral 
business  councils  and  chambers  of  com- 
merce. The  U.S.-Nigeria  Business  Coun- 
cil was  established  in  March  1982  and 
held  its  first  operating  meeting  in 
Washington  in  September.  The  purpose 
of  the  council  is  to  provide  a  mechanism 
to  solve  practical  problems  between  the 
business  people  of  both  countries  and  to 
influence  government  policies  as  needed. 
Through  government-to-government 
dialogue  and  direct  staff  support,  we 
assist  the  Joint  Agricultural  Con- 
sultative Committee,  a  group  of  promi- 
nent U.S.  and  Nigerian  firms  which  pro- 
mote agricultural  joint  ventures. 

The  Department  has  cosponsored 
with  local  business  associations  regional 
conferences  in  the  United  States  to  in- 
form the  public  about  opportunities  in 
Africa.  In  addition,  the  Department's 
Bureau  of  African  Affairs  has  par- 
ticipated with  public  affairs  organiza- 
tions in  programs  that  engage  academ- 
ics, policymakers,  and  business  in  assess- 
ing the  political  and  economic  climate  in 
Africa.  The  Department  has  also  invited 
representatives  of  American  business 
with  long  experience  in  less  developed 
countries  to  symposia  to  discuss 
strategies  for  government  and  business 


cooperation  in  promoting  Africa's 
economic  growth  and  development. 

Worldwide  Initiatives 

On  a  global  basis,  the  Department  has 
made  a  concerted  effort  to  identify  ways 
in  which  the  private  sector  might  more 
effectively  assist  developing  countries. 
We  have  conducted  a  dialogue  with  over 
250  business  organizations  in  the  United 
States  and  with  all  Foreign  Service 
posts  in  the  developing  world.  Through 
this  dialogue,  we  first  elicited  proposals 
from  the  private  sector,  then  trans- 
formed ideas  into  actual  working 
models.  Sharing  examples  and  informa- 
tion on  this  project  stimulated  further 
action  from  others.  Programs  for  train- 
ing laboratory  technicians  and  other 
specialists  in  a  variety  of  fields,  inviting 
participants  from  developing  countries 
to  U.S.  symposia  and  industrial  conven- 
tions, expanding  companies'  overseas 
training  programs,  and  distributing  used 
or  surplus  equipment  are  but  a  few  of 
the  initiatives  under  this  project. 

The  Department  is  also  working 
with  our  executive  directors  at  the 
Inter-American  Development  Bank,  the 
Asian  Development  Bank,  and  the 
World  Bank  and  with  foreign  govern- 
ments to  encourage  greater  dependence 
on  the  private  sector  in  the  development 
process.  There  has  been  progress  in  get- 
ting the  multilateral  development  banks 
to  involve  American  banks  and  other 
private  institutions  in  cofinancing 
development  projects  and  in  contributing 
to  growth  in  ways  that  supplement  the 
efforts  of  the  developing  countries 
themselves. 

A  State  Department  official  serves 
as  a  director  on  the  board  of  the 
Overseas  Private  Investment  Corpora- 
tion (OPIC),  a  self-sustaining, 
semiautonomous  agency  of  the  U.S. 
Government  which  provides  political  risk 
insurance  and  financial  services  to  en- 
courage U.S.  private  investment  in 
developing  nations.  In  FY  1983,  OPIC 
doubled  its  volume  of  insurance  business 
worldwide  and  now  insures  over  $3 
billion  in  U.S.  private  investment  in  the 
developing  world. 


DEPARTMENT 


A  Philosophy  of 
Private  Sector  Initiative 

Our  many  discussions  with  the  private 
sector  produced  tactics  and  a  strategy 
and  also  yielded  a  philosophy.  Repre- 
sentatives from  business  and  other 
organizations  stressed  that  in  order  to 
be  lasting  and  productive,  activities 
should  benefit  both  the  American  "giver" 
and  the  "receiver"  abroad.  As  far  as 


possible,  existing  private  sector  groups 
and  mechanisms  should  manage  ac- 
tivities and  programs.  The  government's 
principal  role  should  be  as  a  backstopper 
and  reinforcer,  as  a  supplier  of  informa- 
tion and,  on  occasion,  of  seed  money  to 
make  possible  a  new  initiative.  In  short, 
activities  should  be  those  in  which  all 
participants  gain. 


Press  release  44  of  Feb.  9,  1983. 


Foreign  Policy  Planning 
Council  Members  Announced 


Following  is  Secretary  ShuUz's  state- 
ment of  February  23,  1983,  announcing 
the  members  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Plan- 
ning Council.  ^ 

One  of  the  great  challenges,  I  think,  in 
working  effectively  in  any  active 
organization  responsible  for  things  that 
are  going  on  and  have  to  be  ad- 
ministered and  managed  day-to-day  and 
hour-to-hour  is  to  find  some  way  of 
standing  back  and  thinking  a  little  more 
broadly  and  strategically  about  what  it 
is  that  you  want  to  do,  where  you  want 
to  see  things  go. 

Beyond  that,  of  course,  in  the 
Department  of  State,  there  are  different 
geographic  and  functional  bureaus;  and 
while  the  coverage  of  the  world  and  the 
functions  are  pretty  complete,  neverthe- 
less, there  are  always  issues  that  cut 
across  and  are  broader  than  any  one 
unit  finds  naturally  within  its  scope. 

I  find  myself  searching  around  for 
ways  to  contend  with  the  tendency  to  be 
preoccupied  with  what  is  right  in  front 
of  you  each  day,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to 
be  sure  that  things  don't  fall  between 
the  cracks,  and  that  we  think  broadly 
about  our  problems,  on  the  other.  There 
are  a  lot  of  devices  for  doing  that  in  this 
organization  or  any  other. 

One  is  to  take  some  time  to  scratch 
your  head  and  think  things  over. 
Another,  of  course,  is  to  have  people  in 
the  various  bureaus  who  have  the 
capacity  to  think  beyond  the  confines  of 
the  particular  assignment  that  they 
have,  and  I  believe  we  have  people  of 
that  kind  in  the  Department. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  useful  to 
have  some  sort  of  institutionalized  way 
for  being  sure  that  a  broad  perspective 


is  brought  to  bear  and  is  available  to 
everyone,  and  that's  been  recognized 
here  in  the  Department  of  State  for  a 
long  time.  I  had  dinner  last  night  with 
George  Kennan.  I  guess  he  was  the 
first— he  was  the  first  Director  of  the 
policy  planning  staff. 

It  has  existed  for  a  long  time, 
basically  for  the  reasons  that  I  have 
outlined,  and  I  guess  it  has  sometimes 
been  great  and  not  so  great  other  times. 
But,  at  any  rate,  the  idea's  been  around 
for  quite  awhile. 

As  I,  Ken  Dam,  and  others  have 
thought  about  it,  it  seemed  to  us  that  a 
good  way  to  use  the  policy  planning 
staff,  and  the  concept  there  is  to  create 
a  council;  that  is,  to  have  a  number  of 
people  of  eminence,  in  a  variety  of 
fields,  who  were,  in  our  thinking  about 
it,  council  members;  to  have  a  chairman 
who's  also  a  council  member,  of  course, 
and  who  runs  the  staff;  to  have  it  set  up 
so  that  there  would  be  permanent  people 
there.  But  also,  it  would  be  structured 
so  that  somebody  could  come  in  for  6 
months  and  work  on  something  and  so 
on.  So,  last  December  we  announced 
this  idea. 

Since  that  time  we've  been  working 
to  identify  top-notch  people  to  hold  these 
positions.  Today,  we'll  announce  four 
people  who  will  be  council  members. 

•  Mr.  Jeremy  R.  Azrael,  former 
professor  of  political  science  at — you 
guessed  it— the  University  of  Chicago. 


He  has  both  academic  and  goverr 
experience  in  the  East-West  rela1 
and  Soviet  affairs  areas.  He'll  be 
the  Council  from  his  present  post 
Bureau  of  Politico-Military  Affair 
where  he  has  been  a  senior  advis.. 
the  Soviet  affairs  area. 

•  Paul  Boeker,  a  career  mini 
the  Foreign  Service.  His  orientat 
the  economic  area.  He's  had  seve 
positions  in  international  econom 
policy,  including  senior  Deputy  A 
Secretary  of  State  for  Economic 
Business  Affairs  in  the  Ford  Adn 
tration.  In  terms  of  area  expertis 
would  be  a  European  and  Latin 
American  specialist. 

•  Robert  Osgood,  who's  a  pn 
author.  He's  a  Christian  A.  Herte 
fessor  of  American  Foreign  Polic 
Johns  Hopkins  School  of  Advano 
ternational  Studies  where,  until  ] 
was  also  Dean.  He  was  a  senior  s 
member  at  the  National  Security 
(NSC)  in  the  Nixon  Administrate 
will  join  the  Council  this  summer 

•  Peter  Rodman,  who  has  mi  > 
recently  been  a  Fellow  in  Diplom  i 
Studies  at  Georgetown  Universit;  | 
Center  for  Strategic  and  Internal  | 
Studies.  He  was  a  member  of  the  j 
staff  from  1969  through  1977,  an 
participated  in  negotiations  and  t 
about  a  range  of  major  issues  am 
very  central  in  the  drafting  of  po 
statements  by  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  State  at  the  time;  ar 
has  been  a  close  associate  of  Hen 
Kissinger's. 

Those  are  four  outstanding  p« 
each  different,  each  with  consider 
power  of  intellect  and  perspective 
pect  to  meet  with  members  of  the 
cil  individually  and  as  a  group,  an 
use  them  to  help  me  in  my  own  t\ 
about  the  directions  in  which  we  ; 
be  going.  Steve  Bosworth,  of  coui 
will  be  the  ringmaster  as  well  < 
thinker  himself. 


'Press  release  63  of  Feb.  25,  1983 
Secretary  announced  the  appointment 
Stephen  W.  Bosworth  as  Chairman  of 
Council  of  Dec.  8,  1982.)  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bi6l 


r  ASIA 


eloping  an  Enduring  Relationship 
1  China 


[  Wolfowitz 

ement  before  the  Subcommittee 
n  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
"oreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
•y  28,  1983.  Mr.  Wolfowitz  is 
It  Secretai-y  for  East  Asian  and 
Affairs.^ 

ing  a  strong,  stable,  and  endur- 
.-China  relationship  is  an  impor- 
Tient  of  President  Reagan's 
policy.  For  compelling  historical 
,  it  has  occupied  a  central  place 
jreign  policies  of  four  successive 
trations.  We  ought  not  forget 
the  more  than  two  decades 
ig  the  Shanghai  communique, 
ina  relations  were  predominantly 
China  was  a  large  and  menacing 
vith  which  we  maintained  no 
communication,  cultural  contact, 
omic  relations.  We  were  at  war 
a;  nearly  came  to  war  over 
/  and  Matsu;  and  supported  op- 
;ides  in  Vietnam.  Indeed,  China 

supported  guerrilla  movements 
3oil  of  many  of  our  Asian  allies 
?nds.  We  maintained  at  great 
;ignificant  naval  presence  be- 
Taiwan  and  the  mainland  at  the 
me  that  we  faced  a  growing 
from  the  Soviet  Union. 
1972  it  had  become  clear  to  the 
hip  of  both  sides  that  continua- 
this  hostile  atmosphere  was  in 

country's  short-  or  long-term  in- 
ind  that  our  respective  interests 
DC  better  served  through  a 
itive  and  productive  relationship, 
suit  was  a  reconciliation  of 
;  importance.  Developments  dur- 
■  11  years  since  that  time  have 
strated  the  importance  of  that 
illation. 

lile  I  might  cite  many  important 
■s  in  our  relations,  let  me  mention 
)articular  instances  that  illustrate 
iw  far  we  have  come  and  what  has 
chieved. 

Perhaps  nothing  more  dramatical- 
trates  the  changes  of  the  last  1 1 
than  the  fact  that  China  has 
ed  as  a  major  restraint  on  further 
imese  aggression  in  Asia. 
I  As  another  important  indicator  of 
te,  our  economic  relations  have 
A  substantially.  Our  bilateral  trade 


with  China  has  jumped  from  zero  to  a 
present  figure  of  more  than  $5  billion 
per  year. 

•  Perhaps  most  important  of  all  for 
the  long-term  strength  of  the  relation- 
ship between  ourselves  and  China, 
cultural  relations  and  personal  ties  have 
resumed  at  many  different  levels. 
People-to-people  contacts  have  virtually 
exploded,  with  nearly  10,000  Chinese 
students  studying  at  American  univer- 
sities, 100  Chinese  delegations  per 
month  visiting  the  United  States,  and 
over  100,000  Americans  visiting  China 
each  year  as  tourists  or  in  other 
capacities.  These  exchanges  cannot  help 
but  bring  to  each  of  our  societies  in- 
creasingly sophisticated  appreciation  of 
the  other. 

There  are  other  benefits  I  should 
mention.  We  no  longer  have  to  plan  and 
spend  to  confront  a  Chinese  threat.  Our 
parallel  interests  in  containing  the 
Soviet  Union  have  been  repeatedly  reaf- 
firmed, and  we  are  in  fundamental 
agreement  that  the  Soviets  remain  the 
principal  threat  to  the  peace  of  the 
world.  We  have  common  interests  in 
containing  not  only  Vietnamese  aggres- 
sion in  Southeast  Asia  and  encouraging 
a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  Kam- 
puchean  problem  based  on  Khmer  self- 
determination,  but  also  in  resisting 
Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan.  We 
are  able  to  maintain  a  useful  dialogue 
with  China  on  a  wide  range  of  important 
international  problems  of  common  con- 
cern. China  has  developed  constructive 
regional  policies  and  cooperative  rela- 
tions with  our  Asian  allies.  China  has 
developed  increasingly  strong  ties  to  the 
Western-oriented  international  economic 
system.  Trade  and  investment  oppor- 
tunities for  American  business  have 
grown  tremendously;  despite  problems. 
East  Asia  has  emerged  as  one  of  the 
more  stable  and  prosperous  regions  of 
the  world  with  China  playing  an  mcreas- 
ingly  responsible  regional  role.  Even 
Taiwan  has  never  been  more  prosper- 
ous, and  the  situation  in  the  Taiwan 
Strait  is  peaceful. 


Underlying  Principles 

These  benefits  have  flowed  over  an 
11 -year  period.  They  are  an  outgrowth 
of  a  wide  variety  of  agreements  that 


have  established  the  framework  for  an 
extensive  relationship.  Throughout  this 
process,  we  have  been  guided  by  consist- 
ent adherence  to  three  underlying  funda- 
mental principles  and  realities: 

First,  that  China,  with  its  many 
talented  and  resourceful  people  and  with 
a  sophisticated  concern  about  global  as 
well  as  regional  problems,  is  already  a 
significant  factor  in  Asia  and  is  destined 
to  be  an  important  element  in  interna- 
tional affairs  in  the  future.  It  is  a  coun- 
try with  which  we  hope  to  be  able  to 
work  with  constructively  and  coop- 
eratively for  mutual  benefit; 

Second,  that  the  United  States  and 
China  share  certain  common  and  impor- 
tant international  perceptions  and  con- 
cerns and  that  the  development  of 
U.S. -China  relations  serves  the  interests 
of  both  our  peoples  and  the  cause  of 
peace  and  stability  in  East  Asia  and  the 
world;  and 

Third,  that  progress  in  U.S. -China 
relations  could  be  made  without  sacri- 
ficing the  interests  of  our  friends  and 
allies  in  the  region  or  our  valued  com- 
mercial, cultural,  and  other  unofficial 
relations  with  the  people  of  Taiwan. 

Adhering  to  these  fundamentals,  in 
1979  we  negotiated  a  normalization 
agreement  which  established  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  United  States  and 
China  and  under  which  it  was  under- 
stood that,  henceforth,  commercial, 
cultural,  and  other  contacts  with  the 
people  of  Taiwan  would  be  conducted  on 
an  unofficial  basis.  Both  sides,  reflecting 
the  importance  they  placed  on  good  rela- 
tions and  their  confidence  in  the  rela- 
tionship's evolution  and  progress,  chose 
to  move  ahead  with  normalization  even 
though  not  all  of  their  differences  had 
been  resolved. 

Among  the  differences  left  unre- 
solved by  the  normalization  communique 
was  the  question  of  arms  sales  to 
Taiwan.  In  the  August  17  joint  com- 
munique of  last  year,  we  addressed  this 
difficult  matter.  The  communique,  which 
was  the  result  of  10  months  of  negotia- 
tions, does  not  settle  the  issue  but  does 
provide  a  framework  for  managing  our 
differences  with  the  Chinese  over  a  mat- 
ter of  great  sensitivity  to  us  both.  The 
negotiating  process,  however,  which  was 
intense  and  difficult,  placed  a  con- 
siderable strain  on  the  relationship,  and 
it  created  a  long  hiatus  in  high-level  con- 
tacts and  exchanges— a  part  of  our  rela- 
tionship with  China  that  is  particularly 
important  for  allaying  suspicions.  We 


EAST  ASIA 


needed  to  clear  the  air  to  revive  con- 
fidence that  the  relationship  would  pro- 
gress as  we  wished. 

Secretary  Shultz's 
Visit  to  Beijing 

Thus,  the  Secretary's  objectives  in 
visiting  Beijing  [February  2-6,  1983]  at 
this  time  were  to  put  U.S. -China  rela- 
tions back  on  a  stable,  realistic  footing; 
to  resume  the  process  of  building  the 
essential  elements  of  confidence  and 
trust;  to  continue  our  dialogue  on  impor- 
tant international  issues;  and  to  address 
openly  and  honestly  the  various  bilateral 
issues  that  were  commanding  attention 
on  both  sides. 

The  atmosphere  in  which  the  visit 
took  place  was  very  good,  which  is  itself 
an  indication  of  the  value  both  sides 
place  on  the  relations.  Secretary  Shultz 
had  9  hours  of  intense,  substantive,  and 
constructive  discussion  with  Foreign 
Minister  Wu  Xueqian,  as  well  as  exten- 
sive talks  with  a  range  of  other  Chinese 
leaders  including  Premier  Zhao  Ziyang 
and  Chairman  Deng  Xiaoping.  Secretary 
Shultz  presented  U.S.  positions  forth- 
rightly,  at  the  same  time  that  he  earned 
Chinese  respect  and  public  compliments 
for  what  the  Chinese  called  "his  patience 
in  listening  to  the  views  of  others." 
Foreign  Minister  Wu  was  equally  candid 
in  stating  his  government's  position  on 


not  help  but  be  impressed  with  the 
serious,  constructive,  and  realistic  ap- 
proach the  Chinese  leadership  took  to  a 
wide  variety  of  key  issues. 

On  the  Soviets— the  Chinese  im- 
pressed us  all  with  their  realistic  ap- 
proach and  their  recognition  of  the  con- 
tinued threat  posed  by  Soviet  expan- 
sionism. 

On  Afghanistan  and  Kampuchea— 
we  share  common  assessments  of  the 
situations  and  discussed  these  issues  in 
depth.  We  welcome  Chinese  support  for 
the  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  position  calling  for  Viet- 
namese withdrawal;  an  independent, 
peaceful,  neutral,  and  nonaligned  Kam- 
puchea; and  a  Soviet  withdrawal  from 
Afghanistan.  The  Chinese  were  equally 
appreciative  of  our  policies. 

On  the  Middle  East— while  there 
are  important  differences,  we  agree  on 
the  goal  of  a  just  and  stable  peace  in 
which  all  parties  can  survive  and  pros- 
per. Our  differences  are  in  how  best  to 
achieve  peace  in  the  region,  not  on  its 
desirability  or  on  Israel's  basic  right  to 
exist. 

On  southern  Africa— despite  impor- 
tant differences  on  strategy,  we  do  not 
disagree  on  the  desirability  of  Namibian 
independence  from  South  Africa  or  on 
the  desirability  of  the  withdrawal  of 
Cuban  troops  from  Angola.  The 


.  .  .  despite  problems,  East  Asia  has  emerged  as 
one  of  the  more  stable  and  prosperous  regions  of 
the  world  with  China  playing  an  increasingly 
responsible  regional  role. 


the  various  matters  discussed,  and  there 
was  a  useful  exchange  both  on  points  of 
agreement  and  difference.  Indeed,  the 
constructive  and  substantive  relationship 
that  the  Secretary  and  the  Foreign 
Minister  established  was  one  of  the 
more  useful  results  of  the  visit. 

The  two  men  succeeded  in  restoring 
the  international  dialogue  to  its  rightful 
place  in  the  relationship.  It  was  a 
dialogue  of  high  quality,  proving  that, 
while  China  may  not  yet  be  among  the 
world's  wealthiest  nations,  it  is  among 
the  more  sophisticated,  with  a  decidedly 
global  approach.  Our  delegation  could  " 


Secretary  held  in-depth  discussions  with 
Premier  Zhao  and  Foreign  Minister  Wu 
who  had  just  returned  from  a  month- 
long  trip  to  Africa  and  were  willing  to 
provide  us  with  the  benefit  of  the  views 
and  insights  they  brought  back. 

On  arms  control— we  were  able  to 
clarify  for  the  Chinese  the  U.S.  position 
and  reassure  them  that  we  have  the 
security  of  East  Asia  in  mind  as  we  ad- 
dress the  issue. 

On  Taiwan— we  continue  to  have 
some  differences  over  Taiwan.  However, 
the  relationship  with  China  is  important 


enough  to  us— and  it  seems  also  t 
Chinese— that  we  will  work  hard 
manage  those  differences  in  a  wa 
preserves  our  focus  on  our  strong, 
terest  in  bilateral  and  Internationa 
cooperation. 

The  Secretary's  visit  was  not 
tended  to,  and  did  not  attempt  to, 
renegotiate  or  go  beyond  the  Aug 
communique,  or  any  previous  con- 
ques  we  have  negotiated  with  Chi 
about  Taiwan.  But  the  Secretary  ■ 
reassure  the  Chinese  that,  consist 
with  our  intent  to  rebuild  mutual 
and  confidence,  we  will  faithfully 
out  the  policies  we  enunciated  in  1  i 
communiques.  The  Secretary  and  j 
President  have  made  clear  that  w  I 
adhere  to  the  communiques  that  v ! 
previous  administrations  have  neg  I 
tiated,  and  we  are  confident  that  i 
Chinese  will  do  the  same.  That  is  I 
key,  I  believe,  to  managing  effecti ' 
our  differences  over  Taiwan.  At  tl  I 
same  time,  we  have  consistently  n 
clear  to  the  Chinese  that  we  have 
interest  in  the  well-being  of  the  pe 
of  Taiwan,  as  reflected  in  the  Tai\ 
Relations  Act,  and  will  continue  tl 
ductive,  unofficial  relationship  we 
with  them. 

We  also  have  differences  on  s( 
other  matters  of  bilateral  concern, 
ing  Secretary  Shultz's  visit,  we  ha^ 
variety  of  differences  and  disagree 
with  which  to  deal.  Indeed,  it  is  in 
evitable,  as  relations  mature  and 
develop,  and  as  trade  and  exchang 
vance  and  multiply,  that  the  attem 
bilateral  problems  grow  progressiv 
more  complex.  This  is  especially  th 
for  two  countries  such  as  ours  whi 
maintain  such  fundamentally  differ 
systems. 

Some  of  our  remaining  bilatera 
problems  are  born  of  the  progress  ' 
have  made.  The  technology  transfe' 
issue  is  a  good  illustration  of  a  pro! 
born  of  progress.  Since  1979,  and  i 
ticularly  under  this  Administration, 
great  effort  has  been  undertaken  ti 
facilitate  Chinese  access  to  advance 
American  technology.  Licenses  issu 
have  gone  up  300%  in  the  last  3  ye 
reaching  1,700  in  1982.  The  Secret! 
made  clear  to  the  Chinese  that  we : 
tend  to  support  their  modernizatior 
forts  and  will  continue  to  provide  tl 
with  a  broad  range  of  American 
technology  from  agricultural  know- 
to  advanced  scientific  information. . 
of  these  items  are  not  subject  to  ex- 
controls.  We  intend  to  administer  o 
regulations  in  a  manner  that  suppojU 
China's  development  and  maintain  crj 
those  restrictions  that  are  necessarjl 


Department  of  State  Bu  H" 


EUROPE 


security  purposes.  We  en- 
1  the  Chinese  to  consider  the 
re  of  items  made  available  in 
few  years,  to  appreciate  how 
ave  come  in  this  important  area, 
ork  together  in  streamlining 
ir  bureaucracy  and  ours  in  order 
smoother  interaction  between 
economies. 

iid  not  seek  to  resolve  the  tex- 
lem  during  this  brief  visit. 
r,  we  were  able  to  clarify  ap- 
;  and,  with  goodwill  and  mutual 
we  should  be  able  to  arrive  at  a 
ory  agreement.  We  hope  for  an 
sumption  of  negotiations  leading 
entual  settlement, 
le  of  the  bilateral  difficulties  now 
;  U.S. -China  relations  may  be 
stem  from  an  insufficient 
inding  of  our  differing  legal 
and  societies.  The  Secretary 
le  Chinese  to  learn  more  about 
•  system  operates,  offering  to 
B  Chinese  efforts  to  do  so.  As  an 
we  will  send  a  briefing  team  to 
to  explain  our  legal  system  to 
officials  there. 

)oking  back  over  the  events  of 
month,  as  well  as  the  rapid 
of  U.S. -China  relations  over 
1 1  years,  it  is  noteworthy  that 
es,  despite  the  peaks  and  valleys 
e  characterized  various  episodes 
jlationship's  development,  con- 
place  high  value  on  it,  wish  to 
;  what  has  been  accomplished, 
ve  forward  where  possible  and 
y  beneficial.  As  the  Secretary 
)  the  Chinese,  enduring  relation- 
ore  often  emerge  from  a  process 
ing  out  satisfactory  arrange- 
or  seemingly  intractable  disputes 
)m  choosing  to  deal  only  with  the 
oblems. 

n  the  progress  made  thus  far 
undeniable  benefits  to  both 
.  is  clear  that  there  will  be  no 
back.  Some  difficult  problems  lie 
n  U.S. -China  relations.  We  intend 
with  them  fairly  and  openly  and 
e  the  relationship  for  granted, 
jodwill,  appreciation  of  the  value 
elationship,  adherence  to  our 
rinciples,  and  Chinese  re- 
y— for  good  relations  are  a  two- 
•eet— the  prospects  for  further 
s  are  encouraging.  The  stable 
during  relationship  we  seek  are 
int  to  the  healthy  economic 
we  all  desire  and  make  an  im- 
t  contribution  to  regional  stability 
irld  peace. 

mplete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
)ipublished  by  the  committee  and  will 
'lable  from  the  Superintendent  of 
i-nts,  U.S.  Government  Prmtmg  Of- 
'ashington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Relations  With  Europe 
and  Ties  to  NATO 


by  Richard  Burt 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  7,  1983.  Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  Affairs.'^ 

In  the  past  few  months,  we  have  main- 
tained an  especially  intensive  dialogue 
with  our  European  allies.  Both  the  Vice 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
have  recently  undertaken  extensive  con- 
sultations with  Europe's  most  important 
leaders.  Despite  reports  to  the  contrary, 
both  were  struck  by  the  fundamental 
vitality  of  the  transatlantic  relationship. 
My  own  impressions  are  of  the  same 
nature.  They  differ  sharply  from  the 
talk  one  hears  these  days  about  a  new 
and  dangerous  rift  in  the  Western 
alliance  over  economic  and  security 
issues.  The  challenges  facing  us  are,  in- 
deed, important,  even  fundamental,  to 
the  future  of  the  alliance.  But  the  debate 
which  accompanies  these  challenges  is 
over  ways  and  means  of  achieving  our 
common  goals  of  prosperity,  security, 
and  peace  with  justice;  it  is  not  over 
basic  values  or  interest. 

I  believe  it  is  also  important  to  keep 
in  mind  that  many  of  our  current  dif- 
ficulties can  be  traced  to  the  global 
economic  recession  from  which  we  are 
now  beginning  to  emerge.  This  recession 
has  been  the  most  severe  in  the  postwar 
period.  It  has  limited  the  ability  of  all 
Western  governments  to  meet  defense 
goals,  and  it  has  strained  our  common 
commitment  to  free  trade.  The  fact  that 
we  are  coming  through  this  recession 
with  our  relationships  intact  demon- 
strates once  again  the  underlying 
strength  of  Western  institutions. 

Alliance  Consultations 

An  alliance  of  free  nations  can  endure 
only  if  its  undertakings  can  be  harmo- 
nized with  differing  national  perspec- 
tives and  attract  public  understandmg 
and  support.  We  pursue  this  consensus 
through  a  never-ending  process  of  con- 
sultations. One  should  not  mistake  the 
process  of  consensus-building  for  disar- 
ray or  weakness. 

In  reality  our  relations  with  Western 
Europe  reflect  a  remarkable  shared 


commitment  to  common  ideals  and  ob- 
jectives. This  emerges  in  both  day-to-day 
conduct  of  business  and  in  our  consulta- 
tions at  the  highest  levels.  The  informal 
meeting  of  allied  foreign  ministers  at  La 
Sapiniere  in  Canada  last  October  provid- 
ed impetus  for  resolving  the  pipeline 
dispute  and  establishing  a  process  for 
reaching  a  consensus  on  the  main 
elements  of  East-West  economic  rela- 
tions. In  Europe  last  December,  Sec- 
retary Shultz  built  on  that  consensus 
and  achieved  agreement  on  a  program 
of  studies  which  will  help  us  give  con- 
crete expression  to  a  Western  policy  on 
economic  relations  with  the  East  over 
the  longer  term. 

At  the  meeting  in  Canada,  at  the 
December  NATO  ministerial  in  Brussels, 
and  in  intense  consultations  here  and 
abroad,  the  Secretary  has  found  strong 
European  support  for  our  approach  to 
East- West  security  issues,  including  the 
President's  arms  control  program.  He 
also  has  found  a  deep  commitment  on 
the  part  of  our  allies  to  resolving  any 
differences,  fairly  and  with  good  will, 
through  our  transatlantic  consultative 
mechanisms,  such  as  NATO,  our  discus- 
sions in  various  forums  with  the  Euro- 
pean Communities,  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD),  and  the  Coordinating  Commit- 
tee for  Multinational  Security  Export 
Controls  (COCOM). 


Intermediate-Range  Nuclear  Forces 

The  value  of  our  intense  consultative 
process  on  both  the  deployment  and 
negotiation  aspects  of  the  1979  NATO 
decision  on  intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces  (INF)  was  reflected  in  the  contin- 
uing allied  resolve  and  unity 
demonstrated  during  Vice  President 
Bush's  trip  to  Europe  last  month.  The 
Vice  President  presented  our  assess- 
ment of  the  negotiations  and  listened 
carefully  to  what  our  allies  had  to  say. 
The  result  was  virtually  complete  accord 
on  what  we  are  trying  to  achieve  and 
what  is  necessary  for  a  satisfactory 
agreement.  Most  importantly,  the  Vice 
President  was  able  to  dispel  a  number  of 
myths  about  the  alliance's  two-track 
decision  which  have  confused  publics  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States.  These 


EUROPE 


myths  are,  in  part,  the  result  of  the 
enormous  Soviet  propaganda  campaign 
directed  at  dividing  the  Atlantic  alliance 
and  decoupling  Europe  from  the  U.S. 
nuclear  guarantee. 

The  debate  over  INF  is  not  over. 
People  in  Europe  are  concerned  about 
nuclear  weapons  issues,  as  they  rightly 
should  be.  No  other  issue  is  of  more  im- 
portance in  our  time.  The  President  has 
a  deep,  personal  commitment  to  achiev- 
ing an  arms  reduction  agreement  at  the 
negotiations  in  Geneva  on  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces.  We  and  our  allies 
are  in  full  agreement  that  our  proposal 
for  the  complete  elimination  of  the  en- 
tire class  of  longer  range,  land-based 
INF  missiles  remain  the  best  and  most 
moral  outcome.  We  are  negotiating  in 
good  faith,  and  ours  is  not  a  take-it-or- 
leave-it  proposal.  Our  negotiations  in 
Geneva  are  premised  upon  sound  prin- 
ciples. 

•  The  only  basis  on  which  a  fair 
agreement  can  be  reached  is  that  of 
equality  of  rights  and  limits  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

•  As  a  corollary,  British  and  French 
strategic  systems  are,  by  definition,  not 
a  part  of  these  bilateral  negotiations 
and,  therefore,  not  to  be  considered  in 
them. 

•  In  addition,  Soviet  proposals — 
which  have  the  effect  of  shifting  the 
threat  from  Europe  to  Asia— cannot  be 
considered  reasonable. 

•  As  in  all  areas  of  arms  control,  it 
will  be  essential  that  an  INF  agreement 
be  underwritten  by  effective  measures 
for  verification. 

While  we  continue  our  negotiations, 
we  are  making  a  major  effort  to  better 
inform  our  publics  about  the  INF  issue. 
As  more  people  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  learn  more  about  what  the 
Soviets  are  doing,  rather  than  what  the 
Soviets  are  saying,  they  are  realizing 
that  the  West  must  remain  united 
behind  the  NATO  decision  if  Moscow  is 
going  to  have  any  incentive  to  negotiate 
an  equitable  agreement. 

In  sum,  transatlantic  consultations 
are  functioning  effectively.  We  should 
not  be  overly  concerned  about  inevitable 
differences  of  view  on  some  issues,  and 
we  should  expect  and  welcome  scrutiny 
of  our  policies  and  actions  by  publics  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  The  alliance 
has  repeatedly  shown  that  it  is  as 
resilient  as  the  peoples  and  institutions 
which  it  protects. 


European  Integration 

In  the  past  several  years,  we  have  seen 
further  progress  on  the  long  road 
toward  West  European  integration.  The 
10  members  of  the  European  Communi- 
ty (EC)  are  seeking  to  expand  their  col- 
lective influence  in  world  political  as  well 
as  economic  affairs.  This  is  a  process 
which  we  have  long  supported  and  will 
continue  to  support.  Through  it,  the  EC 
is  playing  an  increasing  role  in  address- 
ing the  West's  global  concerns.  We  view 
this  greater  European  activism  on  the 
world  stage  as  a  positive  development. 
In  expanding  their  cooperation  on 
political  matters,  the  EC  countries  have 
begun  to  search  for  common  positions 
on  security  issues  which  also  concern 
NATO.  They  have  been  careful  to  in- 
sure, however,  that  questions  of  defense 
are  left  to  NATO.  The  EC  does  not 
have,  and  does  not  foresee  acquiring,  an 
independent  defense  capability.  Our 
partners  clearly  understand  that  the 
Atlantic  alliance  is  the  vital  underpin- 
ning of  Western  security. 

Conventional  Defense  Issues 

Last  June  at  the  NATO  summit,  allied 
leaders  agreed  to  a  series  of  initiatives 
to  improve  NATO's  defense  capability. 
These  included  an  emphasis  on  improv- 
ing burdensharing  within  the  alliance, 
applying  emerging  technologies  to  con- 
ventional defense,  a  renewed  effort  to 
restrict  the  transfer  of  militarily  rele- 
vant technology  to  the  Warsaw  Pact, 
and  recognition  that  the  threat  to  allied 
interests  outside  of  the  NATO  treaty 
area  must  be  deterred. 

Allied  defense  spending  generally  is 
the  only  sector  of  European  budgets 
that  has  not  been  cut  as  a  result  of  the 
economic  recession.  Many  allies  still 
register  defense  budget  growth  in  real 
terms,  some  at  significant  levels.  New 
and  affordable  technologies  offer  the 
alliance  an  opportunity  to  multiply  the 
effectiveness  of  conventional  forces. 
Within  NATO  work  is  going  forward  to 
identify  the  most  promising  of  these 
technologies  with  an  eye  to  accelerating 
their  deployment  through  allied  defense 
industrial  cooperation. 

While  progress  is  being  made  in  im- 
proving allied  contributions  to  the  com- 
mon defense,  recent  U.S.  legislation  has 
caused  our  allies  to  question  the  extent 
of  the  U.S.  commitment  to  NATO.  For 
the  first  time.  Congress  has  legislated  a 
limit  to  the  number  of  U.S.  troops  sta- 
tioned in  Europe.  Production  funds  have 


been  eliminated  for  the  Pershing  II 
cut  from  the  cruise  missile  progran 
There  is  no  money  for  the  U.S.  sha 
jointly  funded  programs  with  our  a 
for  the  storage  of  military  equipme 
Europe  and  for  allied  support  pers( 
dedicated  to  U.S.  reinforcements.  I 
forts  to  improve  weapons  standard 
tion  and  reduce  costs  through  grea 
allied  defense  industrial  cooperatioi 
must  contend  with  such  "buy  Amer 
provisions  as  a  specialty  metals  am 
ment.  Initiatives  such  as  those  ougl 
be  reconsidered  and  reversed;  raisi 
doubts  about  America's  commitmer ' 
the  alliance  and  to  constructive  rel; ' 
with  the  allies  will  only  weaken  NA  j 
and  detract  from  the  security  we  Sf  | 
promote. 


Poland's  Debt 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  3,  19831 

We  understand  the  official  position 
the  Polish  Government  to  be  that  it 
wishes  to  meet  its  debt  obligations, 
although  it  admits  it  cannot  make  a 
payments  due.  In  fact,  Poland  has  k 
paying  only  a  small  fraction  of  inter 
due  on  official  debt  obligations  whili 
maintaining  its  professed  desire  to  i 
obligations  under  a  rescheduling  agi 
ment.  Western  government  creditor 
eluding  the  United  States,  have  refi 
to  reschedule  Poland's  1982  official ' 
obligations  in  protest  over  the  impo: 
of  martial  law  in  Poland.  A  substani 
net  outflow  of  payments  from  Polan 
private  and  other  creditors  has  con- 
tinued, however. 

While  calling  the  Poles  into  forn 
default  remains  an  option,  it  would  i 
force  the  Polish  Government  to  pay 
debt  arrears  to  the  West  and  might 
to  an  illegal  debt  repudiation  by  the 
Poles. 

The  implications  of  the  Europea 
Community  (EC)  statement  are  not 
clear.  We  understand  the  EC  wants 
consult  with  the  other  Polish  credito 
governments  in  the  near  future.  We 
not  wish  to  speculate  on  the  EC  pos 
before  such  consultations. 


'Made  available  to  news  corresponde 
by  Department  spokesman  John  Hughes. 


Department  of  State  Bulli" 


EUROPE 


[ssues 

rid  recession  has  put  an  enor- 
;rain  on  the  world  trading 
Nowhere  has  this  been  more 
than  in  the  case  of  agricultural 
[vhere  the  United  States  is  a  large 
icient  producer,  and  the  EC  coun- 
ive  long  subsidized  inefficient 
6.  This  has  permitted  the  EC 
y  to  become  a  major  competitor 
svorld  market  for  agricultural 
jOur  farmers  are  naturally  con- 
l  We  are  trying  to  resolve  this 
h  in  a  way  which  is  fair  to  U.S. 
B  and  which  preserves  a  liberal 
ten  trading  system.  It  will  be  a  dif- 
lUt  not  impossible  task,  and  I 
jncouragement  from  the  success 
1  last  October  in  negotiating  a 
lly  successful  arrangement  on 
hade.  The  United  States  and  the 
ire  able  to  work  together  in  that 
[e  to  resolve  a  vexing  situation. 
5  both  committed  to  a  similarly 
iative  approach  on  the  agricultural 
Issue,  and  we  have  already  had 
!1  high-level  rounds  of  talks. 


iVest  Relations 

(.proach  to  East- West  relations 
oi  course,  take  into  account  that 
jviet  Union  is  in  the  midst  of  its 
iadership  transition  in  18  years. 
lis  accession  to  the  post  of 
ill  Secretary,  Yuriy  Andropov  in- 
fl  from  his  predecessor  a  mixed 
!  of  impressive  gains  in  foreign  and 
itic  policy  and  a  host  of  pressing 
ims. 

1  one  side  of  the  ledger,  the  Soviet 
,  during  the  Brezhnev  period, 
■ed  as  a  global  military  power  with 
ern  and  massive  military  arsenal 
global  network  of  friends,  allies, 
lent  states  that  enabled  Moscow  to 
iQge  Western  interests  around  the 
.  On  the  domestic  scene,  un- 
dented stability  was  maintained 
■1  Soviet  society  and  the  ranks  of 
ommunist  Party,  and  slow  but 
'/  growth  was  made  in  the  civilian 
my. 

it  the  same  time,  these  accom- 
;aents  of  the  Brezhnev  period  car- 
:vithin  them  the  seeds  of  the  policy 
mas  which  now  confront  his  suc- 
rs.  The  unprecedented  military 
ip  and  geopolitical  expansionism  of 
rezhnev  period  generated  a  strong, 
ated,  American  response  and 
lately  raised  the  risk  for  the  Soviet 


Union  of  imperial  overextension  in 
places  like  Afghanistan.  The  domestic 
stability  of  the  Brezhnev  era  ultimately 
degenerated  into  immobility  as  the 
politics  of  consensus  became  increasingly 
inadequate  to  deal  with  mounting 
economic  problems  and  the  deep-seated 
malaise  of  Soviet  society.  Thus,  by  the 
time  of  Brezhnev's  death,  the  new 
Soviet  leadership  faced  a  set  of  mutually 
reinforcing  foreign  and  domestic  prob- 
lems as  severe  as  that  confronted  by  any 
Soviet  leadership  since  the  death  of 
Stalin. 

Internationally,  detente  with  the 
United  States— which  was  the  center- 
piece of  Brezhnev's  foreign  policy— has 
collapsed,  and  a  more  confident  and 
assertive  Administration  has  taken 
charge  in  Washington.  Despite  an  un- 
precedented Soviet  "peace  offensive"  in 
Western  Europe,  NATO  remains  united 
in  its  determination  to  follow  through  on 
the  two-track  alliance  decision  on  INF. 
At  a  time  when  its  own  resources  are 
under  greater  strain,  the  Soviet  Union 
must  cope  with  continuing  discontent 


and  potential  instability  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  a  stalemated  war  in 
Afghanistan.  Farther  afield,  the  burdens 
of  empire  continue  to  grow  as  Soviet- 
supported  regimes  in  Africa,  Asia,  the 
Middle  East,  and  Latin  America  seek  to 
cope  with  a  host  of  challenges,  many  of 
their  own  making. 

At  home,  economic  growth  rates 
continue  to  decline,  threatening  the 
regime's  ability  to  maintain  growth  in 
defense  capabilities  without  cutting  liv- 
ing standards.  On  this  political  side,  the 
advanced  age  of  the  top  leadership 
group  suggests  that  we  may  be  at  the 
beginning  of  a  necessarily  far-reaching 
transition  in  the  Soviet  leadership  over 
the  next  decade. 

It  is  too  early  to  make  any  definitive 
judgments  about  the  approach  which 
Andropov  and  his  colleagues  will  take  to 
these  problems.  Andropov  almost  cer- 
tainly played  a  major  role  in  the  person- 
nel shifts  made  since  Brezhnev's  death, 
which  appear  to  be  aimed  at  putting  in 
place  a  network  of  younger  and  possibly 
more  energetic  supporters  capable  of  in- 


12th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
JAN.  27,  19831 

In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Public 
Law  95-384,  I  am  submitting  the  following 
report  on  progress  made  during  the  past  60 
days  toward  reaching  a  negotiated  settlement 
of  the  Cyprus  problem. 

The  intercommunal  negotiations  between 
Greek  Cypriot  and  Turkish  Cypriot  repre- 
sentatives recessed  from  December  4  until 
mid-January,  a  period  during  which  the 
United  Nations  Secretary  General's  Special 
Representative,  Ambassador  Gobbi,  visited 
New  York  and  Geneva  on  U.N.  business. 

On  December  1,  U.N.  Secretary  General 
Perez  de  Cuellar  submitted  his  latest  semi- 
annual report  on  Cyprus  to  the  Security 
Council.  In  the  report,  a  copy  of  which  is  at- 
tached, the  Secretary  General  reviews  prog- 
ress in' the  peacekeeping  operations  of 
UNFICYP  and  in  the  parallel  humanitarian 
assistance  programs,  ile  also  reports  the  in- 
tercommunal negotiations  continue  to  focus 
on  the  "evaluation"  previously  submitted  by 
Ambassador  Gobbi  to  the  two  sides.  This  ap- 
proach, the  Secretary  General  reports,  is  the 
best  means  available  to  provide  a  "structured, 
substantive"  method  of  discussing  the  dif- 
ferences. He  states  further  that  the  discus-^^ 
sions  "remain  cooperative  and  constructive" 
and  that  the  interlocutors,  having  essentially 
completed  discussion  of  constititutional 
issues,  will  now  focus  on  territorial  matters. 
Perez  de  Cuellar  observes  that  the  task  of 
developing  "an  overall  package  deal"  should 


be  undertaken  soon  in  the  talks  and  that  he  is 
confident  that,  "with  the  political  will"  on 
both  sides,  such  a  package  can  be  accom- 
plished. 

Subsequent  to  the  Secretary  General's 
report,  on  December  14,  the  Security  Council 
voted  unanimously  to  extend  the  mandate  of 
the  U.N.  forces  in  Cyprus  until  June  15, 
1983. 

We  fully  concur  with  the  Secretary 
General's  assessment.  We  remain  in  very 
close  touch  with  him,  his  staff,  and,  in  par- 
ticular, with  Ambassador  Gobbi.  During  the 
period  the  Special  Cyprus  Coordinator, 
Christian  A.  Chapman,  visited  New  York 
twice  to  discuss  the  situation  with  senior 
U.N.  officials.  At  present  we,  the  U.N.  of- 
ficials, and  the  parties  to  the  negotiations 
doubt  much  progress  can  be  made  during  the 
present  electoral  campaign  in  Cyprus.  The 
possibilities  for  progress  should  improve, 
however,  after  the  February  13  election. 

This  Administration  continues  strongly  to 
support  efforts  to  find  just  and  lasting  solu- 
tions for  the  serious  problems  facing  the  peo- 
ple of  Cyprus. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr..  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, and  Charles  H.  Percy,  chairman 
of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
(text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  Jan.  31,  1983.)  ■ 


1983 


EUROPE 


suring  execution  of  his  policy  once  it  is 
more  fully  developed.  These  personnel 
changes  have  been  more  numerous  than 
Khrushchev's  or  Brezhnev's  at  com- 
parable stages  in  their  incumbencies,  but 
they  are  still  essentially  limited  in  scope 
as  Andropov  functions  within  a  basically 
unreconstructed  Politburo. 

With  regard  to  policy,  the  hallmark 
of  Andropov's  first  100  days  has  been 
continuity  in  both  the  domestic  and 
foreign  arenas.  In  domestic  policy, 
Andropov  has  been  extraordinarily  frank 
in  public  about  Soviet  economic  dif- 
ficulties and  the  need  for  greater 
discipline  throughout  the  economy.  This 
theme  has  been  implemented  in  policy 
through  a  campaign  to  enforce  labor 
discipline  on  the  shop  floor  and  to 
replace  a  number  of  officials  in  the 
economic  bureaucracies.  These  dismis- 
sals have  been  accompanied  by  an  an- 
ticorruption  campaign  in  the  Soviet 
media. 

Beyond  this  clear  determination  to 
administer  a  dose  of  discipline  to  the  ail- 
ing Soviet  economy,  Andropov  has 
revealed  little  of  whatever  longer  term 
plans  he  may  have  for  getting  the  coun- 
try moving  again.  This  may  reflect  cau- 
tion in  the  face  of  the  extremely  for- 
midable structural  and  bureaucratic  bar- 
riers that  would  impede  any  effort  at 
far-reaching  and  meaningful  reform  of 
the  Soviet  economy.  It  may  also  reflect 
Andropov's  desire  to  solidify  his  own 
political  position  before  staking  out  a 
more  innovative  policy  position. 
Whatever  the  reason,"  there  is  littie 
evidence  yet  to  suggest  that  Andropov 
and  his  colleagues  are  ready  to  under- 
take important  reforms  of  the  Soviet 
economy. 

In  foreign  policy,  the  emphasis  has 
also  been  on  continuity.  The  number  one 
objective  of  Soviet  policy  remains  to 
derail  INF  deployments  in  Europe.  We 
can  expect  the  Soviet  anti-INF  campaign 
to  accelerate  now  that  the  German  elec- 
tions are  over.  While  the  primary  focus 
of  Soviet  arms  control  propaganda  is 
INF,  Moscow's  larger  objective  is  to 
complicate  and,  if  possible,  undermine 
our  efforts  to  rebuild  Western  military 
strength.  However,  as  we  make  clear 
that  in  the  absence  of  an  acceptable 
agreement,  we  will  not  be  diverted  from 
our  INF  goal,  the  Soviets  may  negotiate 
more  seriously.  We  are  hopeftil  that  this 
will  prove  to  be  the  case. 


In  the  Far  East,  the  Soviets  con- 
tinue to  seek  greater  manuever  room 
through  their  talks  with  China— the  sec- 
ond round  of  which  has  just  begun. 
Although  neither  side  in  these  talks 
seems  inclined  to  make  concessions  that 
would  open  the  way  for  substantial 
movement  forward  in  the  dialogue,  the 
Soviets  almost  certainly  view  this  proc- 
ess as  positive  and  will  seek  to  keep  it 
going. 

Moscow  has  not  been  able  to  achieve 
even  a  modest  degree  of  improvement  in 
its  relations  with  Japan.  Indeed,  the 
heavy-handed  public  threats  made  by 
Soviets  following  Prime  Minister 
Nakosone's  visit  to  the  United  States 
have  further  damaged  Soviet-Japanese 
relations.  The  mounting  Soviet  military 
capability  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
only  reinforces  this  posture  of  intimida- 
tion. 

The  new  Soviet  leadership  has  as  yet 
developed  no  new  discernible  strategy 
for  dealing  with  the  dilemma  of 
Afghanistan.  The  Afghan  resistance  con- 
tinues to  fight  with  courage  and 
resourcefulness  and  to  deny  the  Soviets 
a  victory  on  the  ground.  Internationally, 
the  occupation  remains  a  major  impedi- 
ment to  improvement  of  Soviet  relations 
with  the  Islamic  world  and  with  the 
West,  including  the  United  States. 
Beyond  strengthening  its  existing 
military  supply  and  assistance  relation- 
ships with  Syria,  the  Soviet  Union  re- 
mains on  the  sidelines  in  the  Middle 
East  as  U.S.  diplomacy  seeks  to  move 
the  region  toward  peace. 

U.S.  Policy 

The  Soviet  record  of  the  past  decade 
compels  us  to  be  realistic  and  sober  in 
our  calculation  of  our  policy  toward  the 
Soviet  Union,  and  particularly  in  our 
assessments  of  prospects  for  an  im- 
provement of  relations.  At  the  same 
time,  it  would  be  unrealistic  and  short- 
sighted of  us  to  exclude  the  possibility  of 
a  change  in  Soviet  behavior  that  would 
make  an  improvement  in  relations  possi- 
ble, particularly  as  a  new  Soviet  leader- 
ship wresties  with  its  policy  options.  If 
in  these  circumstances  Andropov  and  his 


colleagues  encounter  a  firm  and  ui 
West  under  revitalized  American  1 
ship,  there  is  a  possibility  that  pro, 
can  be  made  toward  a  real  and  las 
reduction  of  East- West  tensions.  / 
same  time,  it  is  essential  that  we 
demonstrate  the  will  and  the  capac 
correct  the  military  imbalances  wh 
have  been  created  by  the  Soviet  m 
buildup  of  recent  years. 

With  regard  to  regional  issues 
do  not  seek  to  prevent  the  Soviet ' 
from  pursuing  its  foreign  policy,  b 
do  insist  that  it  do  so  within  establ 
rules  of  international  law  and  with 
restraint  expected  of  a  major  nucli 
power.  Against  the  background  of 
pansionism  by  the  Soviet  Union  ar  ; 
allies  over  the  past  decade,  we  mu 
sure  that  we  follow  through  on  sec  j 
commitments  made  to  our  Third  V 
allies  and  friends.  In  addition,  we  i 
continue  to  seek  regional  settlemei 
in  the  Middle  East  and  southern  A 
where  conflicts  would  otherwise  pi 
fertile  ground  for  the  expansion  of 
Soviet  influence. 

The  fundamental  difference  be 
U.S.  and  Soviet  societies  is  nowhei 
more  apparent  than  in  the  area  of 
human  rights.  Our  objective  is  clea 
encourage  Soviet  fulfillment  of  the 
obligations  which  it  freely  assumec 
under  the  Helsinki  Final  Act  and  o 
international  agreements  on  humaii 
rights.  We  will  also  continue  to  spa 
out  on  the  Soviet  human  rights  rec< 
for  to  fail  to  do  so  would  be  neithei 
morally  defensible  nor  effective  in  : 
porting  those  Soviet  citizens  who  r 
repression  in  the  cause  of  human  rr 
In  all  these  areas,  as  well  as  in 
U.S. -Soviet  bilateral  relationship,  w 
prepared  for  an  improvement  in  re  ii 
tions  on  the  basis  of  the  compreher  « 
agenda  we  have  established  over  th  ■ 
past  2  years.  At  the  same  time,  we  ui 
make  a  clear  distinction  between  w  is 
and  actions.  It  is  up  to  the  Soviet  1(  l« 
ship  to  determine  whether  its  inten  s 
lie  in  the  direction  of  changes  in  So  't 
behavior  that  would  make  possible  : 
meaningful  and  lasting  reduction  of  » 
sions.  If  so,  the  Soviet  Union  will  fi  a 
ready  partner  in  the  United  States. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hea)B 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  1 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  ( 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bui  tin 


it  of  Austrian  Chancellor  Kreisky 


EUROPE 


•nifi'lUo-  Bruno  Kreisky  of  the 
>,'  ni  Austria  made  an  official 
,,  .-.,-//  to  Washington,  D.C., 
rm  '   ;.  198S,  to  meet  with  Presi- 
,n.iii,i  iind  other  government  of- 

•  lh:iri>iii  are  remarks  made  by 
jrnt  h'ragan  and  Chancellor 
}rr  their  meeting  on  Fehru- 


ent  Reagan 

low,  of  course,  that  our  guest 
)day  has  been  Chancellor  Kreisky 
Republic  of  Austria.  And  in  the 
of  our  meeting  in  the  Oval  Office 
r  working  lunch  today,  Chancellor 
y  and  I  have  had  the  opportunity 
;uss  two  areas  of  the  world  that 
al  to  the  maintenance  of  peace 
iman  dignity— the  Middle  East 
Dland. 

le  Chancellor  is  a  man  of  extensive 
jence  in  international  affairs.  And 
leased  that  I  was  able,  like  the 
!J  American  Presidents  before  me, 
Se  the  opportunity  to  exchange 
Jwith  him.  Our  bilateral  relation- 
iHth  Austria  remains  close  and 
rative. 

Jnd  I  was  also  pleased  today  to  be 
lb  tell  him  and  to  have  his  im- 
|te  approval  of  my  intention  to 
iate  as  our  next  Ambassador  to 
ilia  Helene  von  Damm,  who  has 

Srith  our  Administration  from  the 
eginning. 
s  been  a  pleasure  to  welcome 
ifcellor  Kreisky  to  Washington  again 
lb  reaffirm  our  friendship  with  the 
ian  people. 


Chancellor  Kreisky 

I  am  very  happy  that  today  I  had  this 
opportunity  for  an  exchange  of  views 
with  you. 

The  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Austria  are  completely 
without  frictions.  They  are  characterized 
by  long  lasting  friendship  between  the 
two  peoples  and  by  close  cooperation 
between  the  two  governments. 

Austria  today,  at  the  time  when  it  is 
prosperous  and  in  a  good  position,  is  still 


grateful  for  all  which  has  been  done  dur- 
ing more  than  35  years  by  the  United 
States.  And  all  this  has  established  an 
unshakeable  friendship  which  connects 
the  great  democracy  of  the  United 
States  with  the  small  Republic  of 
Austria. 

I  am  extremely  grateful  to  tell  you 
that  the  Austrian  Republic  and  the 
government  and  the  federal  president 
would  be  happy  to  see  Mrs.  von  Damm 
in  Austria  as  the  next  Ambassador  of 
the  United  States. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


EUROPE 


Visit  of  Norwegian  Prime  IViinister  Wilioch 


Prime  Minister  Kaare  Wilioch  of 
Norway  made  an  official  working  visit 
to  Washington.  D.C.,  February  16-18, 
1983.  Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Wilioch  after  their  meeting  on  Febru- 
ary 18^ 

President  Reagan 

I  can  tell  you  that  I'm  very  pleased— 
and  we  all  are— with  the  meetings  that 
we've  had  with  Prime  Minister  Wilioch. 
Norway  and  the  United  States  enjoy 
close  ties  that  long  predate  our  alliance, 
and  it's  always  a  happy  occasion  when 
we  fmd  a  friend  like  Prime  Minister 
Wilioch  paying  us  a  visit. 

Our  discussions  today  come  at  a 
critical  time  for  our  alliance,  a  time 
when  it's  more  important  than  ever  for 
freedom-loving  people  on  both  sides  of 


the  Atlantic  to  reaffirm  their  shared 
security  interests.  For  our  part,  I  assure 
the  Prime  Minister  of  a  firm  American 
commitment  to  the  preservation  of 
peace  and  freedom  and  of  our  continuing 
efforts  in  coordination  with  our  allies  in 
the  North  Atlantic  Community  to 
achieve  reductions  in  the  military 
arsenals  of  both  the  East  and  the  West. 

The  Prime  Minister  and  I  also 
discussed  general  NATO  security  issues 
and  the  importance  of  Norwegian 
energy  supplies  to  the  West.  Our  talks 
on  all  these  matters  were  positive  and 
upbeat,  as  was  our  discussion  of  the  in- 
ternational economic  issues. 


I'm  deeply  impressed  that  in  tf 
challenging  times  Norway  and  the 
United  States— two  long-time  frie: 
continue  to  have  strong  commonal 
interests.  I  hope  that  Prime  Minis) 
Wilioch  found  the  visit  as  useful  a; 
and  I  look  forward  to  maintaining 
close  and  friendly  relationship  thai 
traditional  between  the  leaders  of 
people  and  our  two  countries.  It's 
good  to  have  you  here. 

Prime  Minister  Wilioch 

I  would  first  like  to  thank  you  for 
gracious  words.  My  visit  to  Washi:- 
my  discussions  with  a  number  of  t ' 
American  leaders,  and  of  course,  i 
ticular,  the  meeting  with  you  toda} 
indeed,  been  very,  very  useful  to  u 
And  I  would  like  to  add  that  we  fe^ 
here,  as  we  felt  in  Minnesota  earli' 
week,  how  close  our  two  nations  a 

I  have  had  the  opportunity  to 
sent  Norwegian  views  on  a  numbe 
problems  facing  us  today.  The  moi 
portant  current  issue  is  the  questi( 
disarmament  and  arms  control,  an 
particular,  the  Geneva  negotiation: 

The  Western  goal  remains  cleg 
want  to  reach  a  balance  of  forces  i 
Europe  with  as  few  nuclear  weapo 
possible.  The  zero  option  with  no  ii 
termediate  nuclear  weapons  on  eiti 
side  is  the  optimum  outcome.  We  I 
that  the  United  States  will  make 
possible  efforts  to  get  an  agreemei 
with  the  Soviet  Union  as  close  to  t 
optimum  as  possible.  And  to  achie\ 
this,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
the  allies  stand  united. 

We  also  had  the  opportunity  to 
cuss  a  number  of  other  issues,  , 
President  mentioned.  We  discussed' 
among  other  issues,  the  economic  c 
look  and  the  possibilities  for  imprG^ 
international  cooperation  to  achievf 
revival  of  our  economies  and  a  redi 
of  unemployment. 

I  wish  to  thank  you  once  again  i 
wholeheartedly  for  your  kindness  a 
for  all  the  useful  discussions  we  ha^ 
had. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  21,  198' 


Department  of  State  Bu  ti 


t  of  Queen  Elizabeth  II 


EUROPE 


Majesty  Queen  Elizabeth  II 

I  official  visit  to  the  United 
'ebruary  26-March  7,  1983. 
owing  is  an  exchange  of  dinner 
stween  President  Reagan  and  ^ 
jesty  at  the  De  Young  Museum  in 
incisco  on  March  3. ' 

^nt  Reagan 

iajesty,  I  welcome  you  this  eve- 
j  behalf  of  the  American  people 
iparticular,  on  behalf  of  the  peo- 
ny home  State  of  California.  [Ap- 
j  We're  honored  by  your  presence 
ountry  and  in  this  State, 
fitting  that  this  evening's  ban- 
ould  be  held  in  this  place  and  in 
I.  The  De  Young  Museum  is  one 
rica's  great  cultural  landmarks, 
inks  to  Her  Majesty's  gracious- 
e  will  soon  have  Leonardo  da 
horse  drawings— some  50  of 
from  the  Royal  Library  of  Wind- 
tie  that  will  be  touring  the 
States.  [Applause]  From 
ber  1985  through  February  1986, 

II  be  on  view  in  the  California 
of  the  Legion  of  Honor.  The  tour 
janized  by  the  Fine  Arts 
ns  of  San  Francisco,  the  National 

of  Art  of  Washington,  and  the 
;titute  of  Chicago. 
It  particular  tour  and  this  cultural 
rk  that  we're  in  tonight  reflects 
ersity  of  our  people  who  have 
unique  nation  from  many  cultures 
firm  foundations  of  democracy 
V  which,  in  large  measure,  we  in- 
^.  from  Britain.  It  represents  a 
don  we  share  with  our  British 
s:  the  peaceful  furtherance  of  art 
ience  for  the  enrichment  and 
|ss  of  all  mankind, 
i  also  appropriate  to  recall  that,  in 
sal  way,  San  Francisco,  which  has 
e  home  to  so  many  different  peo- 
spresents  the  culmination  of  our 
I  s  great  wartime  alliance.  Of 
E,  the  local  links  to  great  Great 
SI  go  back  much  further.  One  of 
'st  titled  tourists  to  visit  this  area, 
ancis  Drake,  arrived  long  before 
y  did.  Not  only  was  there  no  room 
i  inn,  there  was  no  inn.  [Laughter] 
■5  greatest  hours  came  centuries 
sin  August  of  1941,  President 
iVelt  and  Prime  Minister  Churchill 


set  down  in  the  Atlantic  Charter  their 
hope  "to  see  established  a  peace  which 
will  afford  to  all  nations  the  means  of 
dwelling  in  safety  within  their  own 
boundaries,  and  which  will  afford 
assurance  that  all  the  men  in  all  the 
lands  may  live  out  their  lives  in  freedom 
from  fear  and  want." 

And  almost  4  years  later  in  this  city, 
America,  Britain,  and  44  other  nations 
formed  the  U.N.  Organization  as  a 
means  of  putting  those  great  principles 
of  the  Atlantic  Charter  into  practice. 

Unhappily,  subsequent  events  have 
continued  to  put  our  values  and  our 
ideals  to  the  test.  We  have  seen  con- 
tinued war,  terrorism,  and  human  op- 
pression in  too  many  quarters  of  the 
globe.  We  are  challenged  to  restrain  and 
reduce  the  destructive  power  of  nuclear 
weapons.  Yet  we  must  maintain  our 
strength  in  the  face  of  the  enormous 
military  buildup  of  our  adversaries.  And, 
nationally  and  internationally,  we  face 
the  challenge  of  restimulating  economic 
growth  and  development  without  re- 
kindling inflation. 

All  this,  we  can  do.  We  will  find  the 
strength  to  meet  these  dangers  and  face 
these  challenges  because  it  beats  within 
the  hearts  of  free  societies  and  free 
men.  We  need  only  look  about  us  for  in- 
spiration. This  beautiful  city  and  this 
great  State  testify  to  the  power  and  the 
vision  of  free  men  inspired  by  the  ideals 


and  dedication  to  liberty  of  John  Locke, 
Thomas  Jefferson,  John  Stuart  Mill,  and 
Abraham  Lincoln. 

In  the  words  of  a  great  American 
and  warm  friend  of  Britain,  Franklin 
Roosevelt:  "The  only  limit  to  our  realiza- 
tion of  tomorrow  will  be  our  doubts  of 
today.  Let  us  move  forward  with  strong 
and  active  faith." 

Happily  and  conscious  of  the  honor 
that  is  ours  tonight,  I  ask  you  to  join  me 
in  a  toast  to  Her  Majesty  the  Queen. 

Her  Majesty  Queen  Elizabeth  II 

Thank  you  for  the  very  kind  things  you 
have  said  tonight.  It  is  only  9  months 
since  we  had  the  great  pleasure  of  hav- 
ing you  and  Mrs.  Reagan  stay  with  us  at 
Windsor.  Now  we  have  had  the 
memorable  experience  of  visiting  you  in 
your  home  State  of  California  and  of 
seeing  your  ranch  at  Santa  Barbara.  I 
knew  before  we  came  that  we  have  ex- 
ported many  of  our  traditions  to  the 
United  States,  but  I  had  not  realized 
before  that  weather  was  one  of  them. 
[Laughter.  Applause]  But  if  the  climate 
has  been  cool,  your  welcome  and  that  of 
the  American  people  have  been  wonder- 
fully warm.  We  are  very  grateful  for 
your  charming  hospitality  and  for  the 
generous  reception  we  have  had 
everywhere  since  our  arrival  in  Califor- 
nia last  week. 

The  past  few  days  have  been  a  vivid 
and  sometimes  poignant  reminder  of  the 
human  drama  and  achievement  which 


EUROPE 


account  for  the  greatness  of  America  to- 
day. We  have  seen  some  magnificent 
technological  achievements:  the  space 
shuttle  which  has  begun  to  turn  the 
adventure  of  space  exploration  into  the 
equally  adventurous  but  more  tangible 
reality  of  scheduled  space  travel;  Silicon 
Valley  which  has  brought  the  world  of 
yesterday's  science  fiction  into  today's 
home  office,  and  classroom,  and  into 
Buckingham  Palace  too.  [Laughter] 

This  image  of  the  United  States  at 
the  forefront  of  technological  invention 
is  one  of  which  you  are  rightly  proud  as 
we  are  proud  of  our  continued  inven- 
tiveness in  an  era  of  pressing  competi- 
tion. But  the  miracle  of  the  space  shuttle 
or  of  the  silicon  chip  lies  not  in  the 
wizardry  of  electronics  but  in  the  genuis 
and  shared  dedicated  determination  of 
men  and  women.  That  is  what  speaks 
loudest  in  California. 

I  think  of  the  families  who  struggled 
against  impossible  odds  leaving  their 
dead  in  places  whose  names  still  bear 
witness  to  their  desperation  to  make 
their  way  to  the  west  coast.  In  today's 
prosperity,  their  fortitude  is  often 
overlooked.  But  it  is  their  character  and 
courage  which  have  permeated  each  suc- 
ceeding generation. 

I  have  seen  that  courage  at  work  for 
myself  this  week  as  many  California 
families  have  coped  with  the  hardship 
brought  by  the  storms  and  tornado 
which  have  hit  this  State  so  hard. 

Prince  Philip  and  I  made  a 
memorable  visit  to  your  country  in  1976 
to  share  with  so  many  Americans  in 
celebration  of  your  bicentenary.  Nine- 
teen eighty-three  marks  another  bi- 
centenary—the signing  of  the  Treaty  of 
Paris,  formally  bringing  the  War  of  In- 
dependence to  an  end. 

Two  years  before  that,  British 
troops  had  marched  to  surrender  at 
Yorktown  to  the  tune  of  "The  World 
Turned  Upside  Down."  So  it  must  have 
seemed  to  men  at  that  time.  But  what 
would  our  world,  200  years  later,  be  like 
if  theirs  had  not  been  turned  upside 
down? 


Since  then,  the  hand  of  friendship 
has  reached  out  from  your  shores  and 
ours  at  critical  periods  in  our  history  to 
insure  not  just  our  own  survival  but  the 
survival  of  freedom  itself. 

In  1939  my  father  was  the  first 
reigning  British  sovereign  to  visit 
America,  and  he  and  President 
Roosevelt  talked  long  and  earnestly 
about  the  coming  crisis.  At  the  end  of 
their  visit,  Mrs.  Roosevelt  wrote  that  "in 
time  of  danger,"  as  she  put  it, 
"something  deeper  comes  to  the  surface 
and  the  British  and  we  stand  firmly 
together  with  confidence  in  our  common 
heritage  and  ideas." 


At  the  President's  ranch. 


By  far  the  most  important  idea 
which  we  share  is  our  belief  in  free 
as  you  made  clear  in  your  speech  a 
Westminister  last  year.  It  is  an  ide 
whose  power  is  such  that  some  mei 
go  to  a  great  length  to  suppress  it 
others  will  to  keep  it  alive,  as  our  t 
countries  have  fought  to  keep  it  ali 

We  are  deeply  grateful  for  the 
unstinting  contribution  of  the  Unit* 
States  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
Western  alliance.  For  our  part,  no 
who  knows  the  British  and  their  hi 
could  have  any  doubt  about  our  ste 
fastness  as  an  ally  or  our  willingne 
stand  up  in  defense  of  the  values  w 
we  hold  dear. 

I  say  that  not  to  strike  a  solem 
note  but  to  state  a  simple  truth.  "W 
have  had  a  visit  which  has  been  sp 
ular  and  has  fulfilled  a  longstandin 
bition  on  my  part  to  visit  Californi; 
the  west  coast.  What  better  time  t 
when  the  President  is  a  CaliforniarJ 
[Laughter]  i 

We  have  enjoyed  ourselves  anc  i 
greatly  appreciate  the  warmth  of  j  i 
hospitality.  What  will  remain  after  i 
is  more  significant— the  cementing  i 
relationship.  From  time  to  time,  fr  i 
ships  must  be  publicly  reaffirmed, 
visit  has  given  me  the  opportunity  i 
reaffirm  the  ideals  which  we  share  '• 
the  affection  that  exists  between  oi  I 
peoples  without  which  the  formalit  I 
alliance  would  be  meaningless  but  1 1 
the  certainty  of  which  our  two  coui  I 
continue  to  draw  strength.  I 

I  raise  my  glass  to  you  and  to  1 1 
Reagan,  to  the  friendship  between 
two  countries,  to  the  people  of  Cali » 
nia,  and  to  the  people  of  the  Unitec ' 
States. 


'Text  from  White  House  press  rele: ' 


72 


Department  of  State  Bu  ti 


rtAN  RIGHTS 


fnan  Rights  Progress 
:l  Salvador 


ott  Abrams 

ktement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 

E  Committee  on  February  2, 
Abrams  is  Assistant  Secretary 
n  Rights  and  Humanitarian 

[Itant  secretary  abrams, 

lUARY  2,  1983 

ome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
iyou  today  to  discuss  the  human 
eituation  in  El  Salvador.  As  the 
lation  we  have  submitted  to  the 
[ttee  indicates,  we  believe  the 
8  rights  situation  in  El  Salvador 
iproved  over  the  last  6  months. 
!;heless,  it  is  still  the  case  that 
ill  violence  is  extraordinarily  wide- 
i  in  El  Salvador.  Innocent  civilians 
dng  their  lives  there.  This  being 
',ie,  the  human  rights  situation  in 
jvador  necessarily  confronts  us 

troubling  question:  In  view  of  the 
i.  rights  violations  occurring  there, 
fe  the  justification  for  American 
ay  assistance  to  the  Government  of 
iivador?  Why  not  cut  off  this  mili- 
ssistance  and  disassociate 
wes  completely  from  the  human 
t  violations  in  that  country? 
1  establishing  the  certification  proc- 
ongress  has  set  certain  precondi- 
s'or  our  military  assistance.  We 
S5  that  these  conditions  have  been 
Jhe  behavior  of  the  Salvadoran 
ni  Forces  is  better  than  it  was  6  or 
cths  ago;  the  overall  level  of 
ece  continues  to  decline;  the  land 
)n  program  is  proceeding;  political 
))n  is  underway.  But  these  condi- 
inf  certification,  though  they  permit 
,  D  not  compel  it.  I  hope  we  will  look 
a  not  only  at  the  narrowly  defined 
rt  of  the  certification  but  beyond 
s  terms  to  the  overall  situation  in  El 
vdor.  We  must  do  so  to  achieve  any 
lent  view  of  American  interests  in 
itountry. 

1  Salvador  is  a  country  with  little 
i>-;ion  of  moderate,  democratic,  re- 
Tst  politics  but  with  a  long  history 
jverty,  repression,  military  rule, 
^hce,  and  fear.  Today  there  are  two 
a  ies  which  exist  side  by  side  in  El 
il'idor:  violence  and  reform.  It  is 
itvorthy  that  the  conditions  for  cer- 
'iction  which  you  have  set  require  us 

ialyze  both. 

'he  violence  has  destroyed  a  sub- 
a  ial  portion  of  El  Salvador's 


economy,  has  created  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  displaced  persons  and 
refugees,  and  has  largely  subverted  the 
system  of  law  and  justice  in  El  Salvador. 

But  side  by  side  with  this  record  of 
violence  is  another  reality:  reform.  For 
El  Salvador  is  a  country  which  has 
undertaken  an  extraordinary  program  of 
economic  reforms.  The  data  we  have 
presented  make  it  quite  clear  that  these 
reforms  continue  and  that  efforts  to 
derail  them  have  failed.  Moreover,  El 
Salvador  is  beginning  to  try  democratic 
politics.  With  vast  public  support,  an 
election  was  held  last  March,  and  a  con- 
stituent assembly  now  sits  debating  the 
country's  future  and  writing  a  new  con- 
stitution. Next  year  there  will  be  a 
presidential  election.  El  Salvador  is 
beginning  what  is  always  an  extremely 
difficult  process:  the  transition  to 
democracy.  The  habits  of  moderation, 
compromise,  and  submission  to  law  are 
not  easily  learned;  and  they  will  not  be 
easily  learned  in  El  Salvador.  The  prog- 
ress already  made  is  remarkable.  El 
Salvador  now  has  a  civilian  president 
and  cabinet  and  a  vigorous  political  par- 
ty structure. 

The  ultimate  solution  to  the  crisis  of 
violence  in  El  Salvador  is  this  process  of 
building  democratic  institutions.  The 
guerrillas  will  not  be  defeated  in  one 
great  battle  some  day;  rather,  they  will 
be  defeated  because  the  process  of 
political  and  economic  reform  makes 
them  utterly  irrelevant  to  the  future  of 
El  Salvador. 

Our  purpose  in  El  Salvador  is  two- 
fold: to  encourage  the  process  of  reform 
and  to  assist  the  army  in  fighting  the 
guerrillas.  For  if  one  thing  is  certain  in 
El  Salvador,  it  is  this:  Guerrillas  armed 
and  led  by  Communists  who  are  allied 
with  Moscow,  Havana,  and  Managua  are 
not  fighting  for  human  rights  and  are 
not  fighting  for  reform.  They  are  fight- 
ing for  power,  and  we  know  from  the 
models  they  seek  to  emulate  that  they 
mean  power  for  themselves,  power 
never  to  be  shared  with  the  people  of  El 
Salvador. 

It  is  not  certain  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  and  the  people  of 
El  Salvador  will  win  this  struggle  for 
peace  and  for  reform.  On  the  extreme 
left  and  extreme  right,  people  with 


radically  different  views  share  a  com- 
mon detestation  of  democracy  and  a 
common  determination  to  block  El 
Salvador's  progress  toward  reform  and 
peace.  But  it  is  quite  clear  that  their 
aims  do  not  have  the  support  of  the  vast 
majority  of  the  people  of  El  Salvador. 
Our  policy  is  to  help  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  win  their  struggle.  Because  of 
the  strength  of  the  right-  and  leftwing 
extremists  and  the  outside  support  the 
guerrillas  receive  from  various  Marxist 
states,  reform  in  El  Salvador  depends  in 
no  small  part  on  our  willingness  to  help. 

It  is  a  task  which  many  Americans 
resist  because  it  enmeshes  us  in  the 
violent,  sometimes  obscure,  always  com- 
plex, life  of  a  small  and  poor  society  at 
the  most  difficult  stage  in  its  history.  All 
of  us  wish  sometimes  we  could  turn 
from  these  kinds  of  involvements  in 
regions  of  turmoil.  But  let  us  face  the 
fact  that  we  cannot,  if  we  take  seriously 
our  responsibility  to  promote  democracy 
and  respect  for  human  rights. 

Those  who  seek  peaceful  change  in 
El  Salvador  look  to  us  because  they 
know  that  their  cause  may  well  be 
doomed  without  us,  without  our  help. 
We  can,  of  course,  turn  away;  but  let  us 
not  be  under  any  illusions  about  the 
results  of  that  action.  It  would  lead  to 
more  and  more  violence  in  El  Salvador. 
We  have  a  responsibility,  if  we  take 
seriously  a  commitment  to  help  the 
cause  of  democracy  in  El  Salvador,  to 
give  the  Salvadoran  people  the  help  they 
need.  If  we  refuse,  with  the  full 
knowledge  that  our  refusal  will 
strengthen  extremists  of  the  left  and 
right,  let  us,  at  least,  acknowledge  that 
we  act  out  of  a  desire  to  avoid  political 
controversy.  But  let  us  not  delude  our- 
selves into  thinking  that  such  an  act 
would  have  anything  to  do  with  advanc- 
ing the  cause  of  human  rights  in  El 
Salvador,  which  is  the  common  goal  that 
brings  us  together  here  today. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


pi  1983 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


U.S.-lran  Claims  Tribunal: 
Recent  Developments 


by  James  H.  Michel 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  International  Economic  Policy  and 
Trade  of  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee on  December  7,  1982.  Mr.  Michel 
is  Deputy  Legal . 


It  is  a  privilege  to  appear  before  you  to- 
day to  testify  in  support  of  the  proposed 
legislation  relating  to  the  settlement  of 
claims  against  Iran. 

The  Algiers  Accords 

As  you  know,  under  the  Algiers  accords, 
which  led  to  the  release  of  the  American 
hostages  held  in  Tehran,  the  United 
States  and  Iran  agreed  to  establish  an 
international  arbitral  tribunal,  the  Iran- 
U.S.  Claims  Tribunal.  This  tribunal- 
composed  of  three  members  appointed 
by  the  United  States,  three  by  Iran,  and 
three  third-country  arbitrators  chosen  by 
the  six  party-appointed  members— was 
empowered  by  the  accords  to  decide 
claims  of  U.S.  nationals  against  Iran 
arising  out  of  debts,  contracts,  ex- 
propriations, and  other  measures  affec- 
ting property  rights.  The  tribunal  may 
also  hear  certain  Iranian  claims  against 
the  United  States.  Awards  issued  by  the 
tribunal  are  binding  on   the  parties  and 
are  enforceable  in  the  courts  of  any  na- 
tion. To  assure  payment  of  awards  in 
favor  of  U.S.  nationals,  a  security  ac- 
count was  established  at  a  subsidiary  of 
the  Netherlands  Central  Bank,  with  an 
initial  deposit  of  $1  billion,  using  certain 
Iranian  assets  which  had  been  frozen  in 
the  United  States.  Under  the  accords, 
Iran  has  an  obligation  to  replenish  the 
security  account  when  payments  to  suc- 
cessful U.S.  claimants  cause  the  amount 
in  that  account  to  fall  below  $500 
million. 

The  accords  established  the  basic 
framework  for  the  operation  of  the 
tribunal.  They  set  filing  deadlines  for 
claims,  adopted  the  arbitration  rules  of 
the  U.N.  Commission  on  International 
Trade  Law  (UNCITRAL)  as  the  basis 
for  the  tribunal's  procedural  rules, 
designated  The  Hague  as  the  seat  of  the 


tribunal,  and  provided  that  the  expenses 
shall  be  borne  equally  by  the  two  gov- 
ernments. In  addition,  the  accords 
stipulated  that  claims  under  $250,000— 
so-called  small  claims — must  be 
presented  to  the  tribunal  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  claimant.  So-called  large 
claims— those  of  $250,000  or  more- 
were  to  be  presented  directly  to  the 
tribunal  by  the  claimant.  The  accords 
also  gave  the  tribunal  the  authority  to 
decide  disputes  between  the  parties  con- 
cerning interpretation  or  application  of 
this  agreement. 

Operation  of  the  Tribunal 

When  the  tribunal  first  convened  in  May 
1981,  the  arbitrators  confronted  the 
monumental  task  of  "setting  up 
shop" — establishing  a  claims  registry, 
hiring  essential  staff,  finding  competent 
interpreters  and  translators  to  enable 
proceedings  to  be  conducted  in  both  of- 
ficial languages,  adopting  special  rules 
of  procedure,  and  deciding  a  series  of 
threshold  issues  of  jurisdiction  and  inter- 
pretation on  which  the  parties  could  not 
agree. 

More  than  4,000  claims  have  been 
filed  with  the  tribunal:  2,795  small 
claims  and  approximately  650  large 
claims  of  U.S.  nationals  against  Iran; 
about  100  contract  disputes  between  the 
two  governments;  more  than  200  claims 
of  Iranian  banks  based  on  standby  let- 
ters of  credit  and  some  200  based  on 
disputed  amounts  of  deposits  in  U.S. 
banks;  and  several  hundred  claims 
raised  by  Iran  and  Iranian  nationals.  In 
order  to  expedite  hearing  this  tremen- 
dous case  load,  the  tribunal  divided  itself 
into  three  chambers,  each  headed  by  a 
third-country  arbitrator  and  containing 
an  American  and  an  Iranian  arbitrator. 
While  the  chambers  hear  the  individual 
claims,  the  full  tribunal  convenes  to 
decide  interpretation  disputes  and 
significant  legal  issues  common  to  many 
claims  when  those  issues  are  relin- 
quished by  the  chambers. 

The  tribunal  is  a  unique  institution, 
representing  one  of  the  most  ambitious 
and  complex  international  claims  ad- 
judication programs  ever  undertaken.  To 
appreciate  its  progress  to  date,  you 


must  keep  in  mind  that  it  labors  ui' 
difficult  circumstances.  The  tribun 
operation  is  affected  by  the  contin  I 
absence  of  diplomatic  relations  bet  j 
the  United  States  and  Iran  and  tb 
ongoing  domestic  revolution  and  e 
nal  war  of  Iran. 

Against  this  background,  the 
tribunal  has  made  considerable  pn  | 
in  the  past  year  and  a  half.  During ' 
first  year  of  operation,  the  full  tril  \ 
ruled  on  several  major  issues,  sett  i 
the  framework  for  future  decision; ' 

In  an  important  decision  prote  | 
U.S.  nationals  who  chose  not  to  fil ' 
claims  with  the  tribunal,  the  tribui ' 
decided  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  ' 
claims  by  one  government  against  ' 
nationals  of  the  other.  As  a  result  1 
decision,  Iran  withdrew  over  1,40( 
claims  from  the  tribunal.  ' 

In  another  decision,  the  tribur  \ 
that  settlements  between  arbitrat ' 
parties  could  be  paid  from  the  sec  > 
account  when  the  tribunal  approvi  i 
settlement  and  issues  an  award  oi  ' 
agreed  terms.  This  decision  benef 
American  claimants  in  two  ways.  ' 
courages  settlements  by  making  t  ' 
security  account  available  for  this  • 
pose.  At  the  same  time,  it  assures 
American  claimants  who  are  unab  ' 
obtain  settlements  that  the  securi'  i 
count  will  not  be  depleted  unfairlj  ' 
all  settlements  to  be  paid  from  tht ' 
count  are  subject  to  tribunal  revie 

The  tribunal  has  also  decided  ( 
terest  earned  on  the  security  acco  ' 
should  not  be  paid  to  Iran  but  sho 
continue  to  be  credited  to  a  sepan  ' 
suspense  account  in  the  depositor]  \ 
Interest  may  be  used  by  Iran  to  r< 
plenish  the  security  account.  Until 
claims  are  decided  and  all  awards  i 
however,  use  of  the  interest  for  ai 
other  purpose  will  require  the  agri ' 
ment  of  both  the  United  States  an 
Iran. 

The  tribunal  recently  issued  ai  • 
major  decision  in  the  choice-of-fon ' 
forum  selection  cases.  Here,  the  tu 
had  to  decide  whether  its  jurisdict 
eluded  claims  brought  under  contr  5 
within  contained  language  referrir ; 
tractual  disputes  to  Iranian  courts  1 
essence,  the  tribunal  held  that  onl;  t 
contracts  which  explicitly  state  thi  J 
disputes  are  to  be  referred  only  tc  n 
petent  Iranian  courts  are  outside  t' 


74 


Department  of  State  B  ' 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


jtion  of  the  tribunal.  It  should  be 
^at  the  tribunal  did  not  dismiss 
lithe  claims  found  to  contain  such 
ji  selection  clause  but  remanded 
('  them  to  the  individual  chambers 
etermination  of  whether  any 
;gal  bases  exist  under  which  the 
nl  may  retain  jurisdiction.  The 
nl  declined  to  decide  whether  any 
Stual  election  of  an  Iranian  forum 
?rceable  in  light  of  the  dramatic 
3S  in  the  Iranian  court  system 
'le  contract  was  signed  and  the 
bconcerning  the  ability  of 
nan  claimants  to  obtain  a  fair 
^  in  the  present  Iranian  courts, 
pre,  the  tribunal's  decision  will 
f rate  to  bar  a  claimant  from  rais- 
(ih  arguments  in  another  forum, 
ij  a  U.S.  court,  if  the  claim  is 

I  sly  found  to  be  outside  the 
I's  jurisdiction. 
Kth  a  number  of  interpretive  ques- 
^solved,  the  tribunal  has  turned 
:jntion  to  arbitrating  the  individual 
ilof  Americans.  There  is  no  ques- 
tat  the  pace  has  been  slow.  The 
.ijis  have  repeatedly  requested  ex- 
as  of  filing  dates,  interposed  many 
ci-tional  and  procedural  questions, 
ri^de  numerous  untimely  demands. 
,()delaying  tactics  probably  reflect 
ie  real  burden  faced  by  Iran  in 
X  with  so  many  claims  and  the 
in  desire  to  defer  rulings  on  the 
tof  claims  they  oppose.  We  have 
^dly  expressed  our  concern  in  the 
upst  possible  terms  to  the  tribunal 
itts  tolerance  of  Iranian  delays  and 
rsulting  slow  pace  of  operation.  We 
jeen  some  progress,  for  example, 
S  automatic  approval  of  requests 
ie  extensions. 

[spite  the  delays,  the  tribunal  has 
progress  in  arbitrating  the  private 
r.  It  has  assigned  all  650  large 
r  to  the  individual  chambers  for 
•ig,  and  the  chambers  have  set 
ii.i  response  dates  for  almost  all  of 
;e:laims.  Iran  has  filed  approximate- 
f  statements  of  defense  so  far.  By 
td  of  the  year,  the  three  chambers 
live  held  approximately  75  prehear- 
oiferences.  Over  20  more  have 
fy  been  scheduled  for  early  next 
rWhile  only  about  20  hearings  on 
srits  have  been  held  so  far,  about 
'  re  are  scheduled  for  the  coming 
lis.  To  date,  the  tribunal  has  issued 
aards  in  favor  of  American  claim- 
<.^  approving  settlements,  and  2 


contested  awards,  for  a  total  of  about  $8 
million.  In  addition,  the  tribunal  has 
dismissed  2  claims  for  lack  of  jurisdic- 
tion. 

The  tribunal  registry  has  completed 
serving  the  statements  of  claim  for  the 
2,795  small  claims  on  the  Iranian  agent 
in  The  Hague.  The  tribunal  is  currently 
deciding  how  most  efficiently  to  handle 
the  arbitration  of  the  small  claims  and  is 
considering  the  appointment  of  experts 
or  special  masters  to  assist  in  this 
process. 

The  tribunal's  record  to  date,  while 
less  than  satisfactory  in  several 
respects,  compares  favorably  with 
previous  claims  proceedings.  Histori- 
cally, Americans  who  have  asserted 
claims  against  foreign  governments  have 
normally  had  to  wait  many  years  and 
often  have  recovered  only  a  fraction  of 
their  actual  losses.  Here,  only  4  years 
have  passed  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Iranian  revolution,  in  which  longstand- 
ing commercial  ties  were  destroyed  and 
huge  losses  were  incurred  by  Americans 
living  or  working  in  Iran,  Resolution  of 
their  financial  disputes  with  Iran  is  now 
foreseeable.  An  agreement  to  adjudicate 
American  claims  against  Iran  has  been 
signed,  a  fund  from  which  to  pay  awards 
has  been  established,  an  arbitration 
tribunal  has  been  set  up  and  is  now 
operational,  and  arbitration  of  individual 
claims  has  begun  in  earnest. 

Costs  to  the  U.S.  Government 

The  U.S.  Government  has  incurred,  and 
will  continue  to  incur,  substantial  ex- 
penses in  seeking  to  make  the  tribunal 
an  effective  forum  in  which  deserving 
American  claimants  can  obtain  timely 
relief.  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  the  ac- 
cords divided  the  tribunal  expenses 
equally  between  Iran  and  the  United 
States.  The  United  States  also  pays  one- 
half  of  the  security  account  management 
fees.  The  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New 
York  incurred  expenses  in  transferring 
Iranian  assets  and  will  incur  further  ex- 
penses in  processing  payments  of  tri- 
bunal awards.  The  State  Department 
and  other  government  departments  have 
devoted,  and  will  continue  to  devote, 
substantial  resources  to  maintaining  the 
arbitral  process.  The  exact  total  of 
future  U.S.  expenses  depends  on  the 
lifespan  of  the  tribunal  and  the  extent  to 
which  some  claims  can  be  settled 


through  negotiation  rather  than  arbitra- 
tion. However,  we  estimate  that  the 
government's  expenses  may  well  exceed 
$80  million. 

Tribunal  Expenses.  Tribunal  costs, 
shared  by  the  United  States  and  Iran, 
consist  primarily  of  the  salaries  and 
allowances  of  tribunal  personnel;  rental, 
operation,  and  maintenance  of  the  tri- 
bunal building;  and  necessary  supplies 
and  equipment. 

During  FY  1981,  the  U.S.  contribu- 
tion was  $303,000;  during  FY  1982,  it 
was  $2.05  million.  The  tribunal's  recent- 
ly adopted  budget  calls  for  payment  of 
$2,083  million  during  the  period  July  1, 
1982,  to  June  30,  1983.  The  Department 
had  originally  anticipated  that  a  higher 
contribution  would  be  required  for  this 
fiscal  period  on  the  assumption  that 
agreement  would  be  reached  during  this 
period  to  expand  the  tribunal's  decison- 
making  capacity,  by  adding  additional 
arbitrators,  employing  special  masters, 
or  through  some  other  mechanism. 
While  no  such  agreement  has  yet  been 
reached,  some  form  of  expansion  is  con- 
sidered likely  during  the  next  year  or 
two,  requiring  a  corresponding  increase 
in  the  contributions  of  both  the  United 
States  and  Iran. 

Security  Account  Management 
Fees.  The  management  fees  of  the  N.V. 
Settlement  Bank  of  the  Netherlands  the 
depositary  for  the  security  account,  are 
now  set  by  agreement  of  Iran,  the 
United  States,  and  the  Dutch  Central 
Bank.  These  fees  amount  to  $1.8  million 
per  year,  of  which  the  United  States 
pays  $900,000— or  $75,000  a  month. 
That  amount  reflects  considerable  front- 
end  "start-up"  expenses  incurred  by  the 
Central  Bank  and  is  not  tied  to  the 
amount  of  principal  or  interest  in  the  ac- 
count. We  would  expect,  then,  that  any 
increase  in  the  fees  due  to  inflation  will 
be  largely  offset  by  actual  reductions  in 
expenses  incurred. 

Expenses  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank.  In  its  capacity  as  fiscal  agent  of 
the  United  States  for  purposes  of  im- 
plementing the  Algiers  accords,  the  New 
York  Fed  has  incurred  certain  expenses, 
primarily  in  connection  with  the  mar- 
shaling of  Iranian  assets  and  the  proc- 
essing of  awards  of  the  tribunal.  'To  date 
these  expenses  have  totaled  approx- 
imately $100,000.  This  figure  in  large 
part  represents  one-time  costs  and  will 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


be  subject  to  a  substantial  reduction 
beginning  in  FY  1983.  We  project  an- 
nual expenses  directly  related  to  proc- 
essing tribunal  awards  to  be  between 
$20,000  and  $40,000. 

State  Department.  The  State 

Department  has  made  Iran  claims  one  of 
the  top  priorities  in  the  Legal  Adviser's 
office.  The  Office  of  Iranian  Claims, 
staffed  by  10  full-time  attorneys,  five 
paralegals,  and  other  support  personnel, 
has  incurred  sizable  expenses  in  terms 
of  personnel,  services,  and  equipment  in 
connection  with  the  establishment  of  the 
tribunal  and  its  continuing  operation. 
Apart  from  the  presentation  and 
defense  of  the  official  claims  and  inter- 
pretation disputes  between  the  two 
governments,  the  office  devotes  substan- 
tial resources  to  the  preparation  and 
presentation  of  U.S.  positions  on  major 
common  issues  of  importance  to  both 
large  and  small  claimants.  The  office 
monitors  tribunal  activities,  analyzes 
Iranian  factual  and  legal  arguments,  and 
prepares  factual  and  legal  materials  to 
support  U.S.  positions.  It  acts  as  a  coor- 
dination point  for  the  presentation  of 
American  claims  before  the  tribunal.  In 
addition,  the  office  analyzes  and 
distributes  tribunal  decisions  and  other 
information  about  the  tribunal. 

The  U.S.  agent  in  The  Hague  pro- 
vides invaluable  assistance  to  attorneys 
for  large  claimants  and  essential 
representation  of  U.S.  interests  across 
the  entire  range  of  tribunal  issues.  The 
agent  receives  and  serves  tribunal 
documents  on  the  claimants,  briefs  at- 
torneys on  procedural  and  substantive 
matters,  attends  prehearing  conferences 
and  hearings,  and  addresses  issues  of  a 
general  nature  that  inevitably  arise  in 
the  adjudication  of  individual  claims. 
In  addition  to  the  services  I  just 
mentioned,  the  Office  of  the  Legal  Ad- 
viser is  now  preparing  to  present  before 
the  tribunal  the  2,795  small  claims. 

For  FY  1982,  the  costs  attributable 
directly  to  the  office  totaled  approx- 
imately $1  million.  The  FY  1983  and 
1984  estimates  are  $1.2  million  each. 

Other  U.S.  Government  Expenses. 

Both  the  Treasury  and  Justice  Depart- 
ments have  incurred,  and  will  continue 
to  incur,  direct  and  indirect  costs  in  con- 
nection with  the  establishment  and 
operation  of  the  tribunal.  These  agencies 


have  substantial  responsibilities  for 
assuring  U.S.  compliance  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  claims  settlement  agreement 
and  the  various  technical  agreements. 
And  the  State  Department  relies  heavily 
on  their  expertise  in  preparing  U.S. 
positions  on  interpretive  questions 
before  the  tribunal.  In  addition. 
Treasury  plays  a  major  coordinating  role 
in  matters  relating  to  banks  and  their 
customers. 


The  Proposed  Legislation 

The  legislative  proposal  before  the  sub- 
committee authorizes  the  Foreign 
Claims  Settlement  Commission  to  ad- 
judicate any  category  of  claims  by  U.S. 
nationals  against  Iran  that  may  be  set- 
tled by  lump  sum  agreement  between 
the  United  States  and  Iran.  It  also 
authorizes  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  make  payments  to  individual  claim- 
ants in  satisfaction  of  the  commission's 
determinations. 

Of  course,  the  exercise  of  these 
authorities  will  depend  upon  the  ability 
of  the  two  governments  to  come  into 
agreement  on  a  settlement  of  some 
category  of  claims.  We  expect  settle- 
ments of  large  claims  to  occur  only 
through  direct  negotiations  by  claimants 
on  a  case-by-case  basis.  Such  individual 
settlements  will  not  involve  the 
authorities  contained  in  this  bill.  We  do, 
however,  hope  to  avoid  for  both  govern- 
ments the  time,  effort,  and  expense  of 
arbitrating  each  one  of  the  more  than 
2,700  small  claims  now  before  the 
tribunal.  While  we  are  prepared  to  go 
forward  with  arbitration  of  the  small 
claims  and  to  represent  the  claimants 
vigorously  before  the  tribunal,  there  are 
obvious  advantages  to  settlement  of  the 
small  claims.  And  if  such  a  settlement 
can  be  achieved,  we  believe  the  fastest, 
most  economical,  and  fairest  way  to 
divide  the  amount  received  in  the  settle- 
ment among  the  members  of  the  class  of 
claimants  will  be  through  adjudication 
by  the  Foreign  Claims  Settlement  Com- 
mission. 


The  proposed  legislation  also 
vides  authority  and  procedures  f< 
bursement  to  the  U.S.  Governme 
expenses  incurred  by  the  Depart 
of  State  and  the  Treasury,  the  F 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  and 
agencies  for  the  benefit  of  U.S.  r 
who  have  filed  claims  with  the  tr 
This  cost  recovery  would  be  achii 
deducting  2%  from  each  arbitral 
against  Iran  paid  from  the  securi 
count  to  a  successful  U.S.  claima 
We  have  transmitted  with  th 
ministration's  draft  bill  a  detailec 
tional  analysis.  Chairman  Bell  is 
address  the  grant  of  standby  aut 
to  the  Foreign  Claims  Settlemen 
mission.  With  respect  to  recover 
governor's  costs,  this  legislation ' 
tended  to  help  finance  the  efforts 
United  States  to  provide  Americ: 
claimants  with  an  appropriate  ; 
tive  forum  for  the  resolution  of  t 
disputes  with  Iran.  In  proposing 
recovery  of  2%  of  each  tribunal  £ 
favor  of  an  American  claimant,  t 
seeks  to  recover  an  amount  that 
pected  to  approximate  the  costs  i 
government  of  this  arbitration.  V 
the  Department  cannot  predict  tl 
gregate  amount  the  tribunal  ultir 
will  award  to  American  claimants 
have  based  our  projections  on  th( 
expectation  that  the  tribunal  will 
$1  billion  during  its  first  4  years 
operation  and  an  additional  $1  bil 
each  subsequent  3-year  period.  A 
2%  rate  of  recovery  of  costs  whic 
are  proposing,  the  maximum  amc  \ 
U.S.  expenses  exceeds  our  projec 
costs  recovered. 

Conclusion 

In  sum,  we  think  that  the  tribuna 
provide  American  claimants  with 
fective  forum  for  the  resolution  ol 
financial  disputes  with  Iran.  The  1 
ment  of  State  and  other  concerned 
ernment  agencies  are  providing  si 
tial  services  to  claimants  in  connen 
with  the  operation  of  the  tribunal 
are  incurring  significant  costs  in  t ,"] 
regard.  We  believe  that  the  propo  i , 
legislation  will  facilitate  this  arbiti 
process  and  will  fairly  allocate  am  i 
the  claimants  the  costs  of  providir 
forum. 

'The  complete  transcript  of  the  tu- 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  am  " 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  ( 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  f- 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  B  et« 


ARY  AFFAIRS 


ow  Rain:  The  Arms 
trol  Implications 


ence  S.  Eaglehurger 

ment  before  the  Subcommittee 
Control,  Oceans,  International 
IS,  and  Environment  of  the 
ireign  Relatione  Committee  on 
2Jf,  1983.  Ambassador 
ger  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Ajfairs.  ' 

ite  the  opportunity  to  appear 
ur  subcommittee  to  discuss  the 
trol  impUcations  of  the  use  of 
and  toxin  weapons.  Our  goal  is 
;ir  complete  elimination.  Our 
ss  and  dedication  was  shown 
!ntly  during  Vice  President 
p  to  Europe.  While  in  Geneva, 
!sed  the  Committee  on  Disar- 
ind  spoke  forcefully  and  per- 
of  the  need  to  rid  the  world  of 
and  toxin  weapons.  He  took 
ional  constructive  step  of  an- 
an  important  U.S.  initiative  to 
hat  goal. 

than  12  years  ago  we  uni- 
■enounced  the  possession  of  all 
and  toxin  weapons.  Subse- 
ve  played  a  major  role  in 
ig  an  international  agreement 
;hese  weapons.  A  large  number 
ies,  including  the  Soviet  Union, 
in  ratifying  the  treaty.  We  ex- 
at  the  threat  of  this  whole  class 
ns  would  disappear.  Yet,  that 
it  to  be  a  false  hope.  Toxin 
are  being  used  right  now  in 
tan  and  Southeast  Asia.  Re- 
lUs  to  stop  violating  interna- 
•eements  go  unheeded.  Out- 
linst  the  dignity  of  humanity 
But  the  Soviet  Union,  Viet- 
Laos  continue  to  deny  their 
h  we  and  others  have  docu- 

annot,  and  will  not,  remain 
i  )ut  the  death  and  suffering 

f  chemical  and  toxin  weapons 
)  mid-1970s.  Yet,  we  know  it  is 
E;ient  merely  to  exhort  the  world 

Tin  those  who  supply  and  use 

■ther,  we  must  constructively 
■Ay  to  insure  that  these  weapons 
itively  abolished. 


Evidence  of  Soviet  Use 

Toxins  and  chemical  warfare  agents 
have  been  developed  in  the  Soviet  Union 
and  provided  to  Laos  and  Vietnam.  The 
Soviets  use  these  agents,  themselves,  in 
Afghanistan  and  have  participated  in 
their  preparation  and  use  in  Southeast 
Asia.  Neither  the  Vietnamese,  Laotians, 
nor  Afghans  could  have  developed  or 
produced  these  weapons.  The  Soviet 
Union  can,  however,  and  has  extensively 
trained  and  equipped  its  forces  for  this 
type  of  warfare. 

An  incident  which  occurred  in  1979, 
in  Sverdlovsk,  in  the  Soviet  Union  raised 
questions  about  Soviet  compliance  with 
the  prohibition  on  production  of  biologi- 
cal weapons  as  well.  A  sudden  major 
pulmonary  anthrax  outbreak  occurred 
near  a  suspected  biological  weapons 
facility.  The  Soviet  explanation  con- 
tinues to  be  inconsistent  with  available 
evidence. 

Nearly  8  years  ago,  the  world  first 
heard  of  the  use  of  lethal  chemical 
weapons  in  Laos.  In  1978,  similar 
reports  began  coming  out  of  Kam- 
puchea, and  in  1979  from  Afghanistan. 
We  now  have  accumulated  a  large  body 
of  evidence  on  the  use  of  these  weapons 
and  the  plight  of  their  victims.  The  judg- 
ments are  well  documented,  and  the 
facts  do  not  support  any  other  conclu- 
sion. The  United  States  has  raised  this 
issue  publicly  in  the  United  Nations, 
with  Congress,  and  elsewhere.  We  have 
issued  a  series  of  reports  providing  ex- 
tensive evidence  of  these  attacks  and  the 
agents  used.  The  most  recent  report  was 
submitted  to  the  Congress  and  United 
Nations  by  Secretary  Shultz  on  Novem- 
ber 29,  1982. 

Canada,  Thailand,  and  the  United 
Nations  have  produced  documentation. 
Other  nations  have  also  voiced  their  con- 
cern through  their  votes  in  the  United 
Nations  and  individual  and  collective 
statements.  Private  individuals  and 
organizations  are  also  being  heard. 
Some  of  these  individuals  are  here  to- 
day. 

It  is  not  as  if  we  were  deahng  m  an 
area  in  which  civilized  standards  are 
vague  or  international  law  inadequate. 
To  the  contrary:  There  are  two  principal 
international  agreements  which  place 
restrictions  on  chemical,  biological,  and 
toxin  warfare.  The  first  is  the  1925 


Geneva  protocol,  one  of  the  oldest 
treaties  on  weapons  still  in  force,  which 
prohibits  the  first  use  of  these  types  of 
weapons.  The  second  treaty  is  the  1972 
Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Conven- 
tion which  bans  the  development,  pro- 
duction, stockpiling,  transfer,  and 
possession  of  biological  and  toxin 
weapons.  Both  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  are  parties  to  this  trea- 
ty as  are  Afghanistan,  Laos,  and  Viet- 
nam. Not  only  are  both  these  treaties 
being  violated  in  Southeast  Asia  and 
Afghanistan  but  so  are  universally  ac- 
cepted standards  of  international  law 
and  respect  for  humanity. 

Implications  for  U.S.-Soviet  Relations 

The  continuing  use  of  chemical  and  toxin 
weapons  in  Southeast  Asia  and  Afghani- 
stan has  obvious  implications  for 
U.S.-Soviet  relations.  It  does  not  mean 
that  we  can  no  longer  work  with  the 
Soviet  Union  to  build  a  more  stable  and 
secure  world,  for  as  the  two  super- 
powers we  have  a  special  responsibility. 
It  does  mean,  however,  that  the  policies 
of  our  nation  cannot  be  based  on  a  be- 
nign or  naive  view  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  its  intentions.  The  President  has 
noted  the  responsibilities  we  carry  and 
the  need  for  strength  and  preparedness. 
With  a  realistic  appraisal  of  Soviet  goals 
and  an  appreciation  that  they  are  not 
constrained  by  some  of  the  values  we 
espouse,  we  can  proceed,  with  caution 
and  prudence,  to  help  build  a  world 
eventually  free  from  chemical,  biological, 
and  toxin  weapons. 

We  have  all  heard  the  charges  that 
the  continuing  Soviet  defiance  of  inter- 
national norms  through  the  use  of 
chemical  and  toxin  weapons  proves  that 
arms  control  cannot  work.  Further,  if 
the  Soviets  would  so  blatantly  violate 
two  important  international  treaties, 
what  will  keep  them  from  violating 
other  arms  control  agreements  as  well? 
We  would  contend  that  Soviet  actions 
lead  to  a  different  conclusion— real, 
equitable,  and  fully  verifiable  arms  con- 
trol is  an  absolute  necessity.  It  is  not 
that  arms  control  is  pointless;  it  is  that 
we  have  to  do  a  better  job  of  it. 

Effective  arms  control  is  necessary 
if  we  are  to  reduce  the  number  of  de- 
structive weapons  in  the  world  and  re- 
duce the  risk  of  war.  As  the  President 
has  said,  arms  control  is  not  an  end  in 
itself,  but  a  vital  means  toward  insuring 
peace  and  international  stability. 


77 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


Effective  Procedures  for 
Compliance  With  Treaties 

Yet,  if  arms  control  is  to  work,  agree- 
ments of  this  kind  must  be  fully  and  ef- 
fectively verified.  The  Soviet  Union  will 
not  feel  compelled  to  live  by  its  interna- 
tional agreements  if  it  knows  that 
digression  from  those  agreements  will 
go  undetected  and  unchallenged,  and  it 
is  not  obliged  to  pay  a  political  cost.  To 
sign  agreements  which  lack  tough  verifi- 
cation standards  would  be  not  only  mis- 
leading but  also  a  disservice  to  all  who 
want  real  arms  control.  To  refuse  to 
sign  equitable  agreements  with  strong 
verification  procedures  which  are  in  our 
own  interest  would  be  equally  mis- 
guided. 

The  Geneva  protocol  and  the  1972 
Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Conven- 
tion do  not  contain  verification  provi- 
sions or  adequate  measures  to  address 
questions  of  compliance.  We  are  seek- 
ing, with  others,  to  remedy  these  short- 
comings and  to  establish  Soviet  com- 
pliance with  both  agreements.  In 
December,  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
recommended  by  an  overwhelming  vote 
to  call  on  the  states  that  are  parties  to 
the  Biological  and  Toxin  Weapons  Con- 
vention to  hold  a  special  conference  as 
soon  as  possible  to  establish  effective 
procedures  for  compliance  with  its  provi- 
sions. In  December  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  also  requested  the  Secretary 
General  to  establish  procedures  to  in- 
vestigate promptly  possible  violations  of 
the  1925  Geneva  protocol.  We  believe  it 
is  important  that  both  resolutions  be  im- 
plemented promptly,  and  we  will  con- 
tinue to  participate  in  follow-on  actions. 

The  United  States  strongly  sup- 
ported the  adoption  of  both  resolutions. 
The  Soviet  Union  and  a  number  of  its 
allies  did  not.  Soviet  cooperation  is 
necessary  if  we  are  to  achieve  the  goals 
embodied  in  the  resolutions  which  are 
directed  at  making  these  two  treaties  ef- 
fective. Opportunities  are  available  to 
the  Soviet  Union  for  such  cooperation. 

Impartial  Verification 

We  have  taken  steps  to  achieve  a  com- 
prehensive ban  on  chemical  weapons.  On 
February  10  we  tabled,  in  the  40-nation 
Committee  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva, 
our  detailed  views  on  the  content  of  a 
complete  and  verifiable  chemical 


weapons  convention.  In  presenting  this 
initiative,  we  reiterated  our  commitment 
to  the  objective  of  a  chemical  weapons 
ban  and  stressed  its  urgency. 

We  propose  that  any  activity  to 
create  or  maintain  a  chemical  weapons 
capability  should  be  forbidden.  Existing 
chemical  weapons  stocks  and  production 
and  filling  facilities  should  be  promptly 
declared  and  destroyed  over  a  specified 
time  period. 

Our  proposal  emphasizes  the  import- 
ance of  mandatory  on-site  inspection.  An 
independent,  impartial  verification 
system  observed  by,  and  responsive  to, 
all  parties  is  essential  if  we  are  to  be 
confident  that  the  provisions  of  the  con- 
vention are  faithfully  observed.  National 
technical  means  alone  are  insufficient,  as 
they  are  available  only  to  a  few  and 
have  only  a  limited  verification  useful- 
ness. Systems  of  "national  verification," 
or  self-inspection,  are  not  the  answer. 

We  have  proposed  that  the  following 
be  subject  to  mandatory  on-site  inspec- 
tion: 

•  Declared  chemical  weapons  stocks 
and  the  process  of  their  elimination; 

•  Declared  chemical  weapons  pro- 
duction and  filling  facilities  and  the  proc- 
ess of  their  elimination;  and 

•  Declared  facilities  for  permitted 
production  of  chemicals  which  pose  par- 
ticular risks. 

We  have  also  proposed  an  obligation 
to  permit  inspections  on  a  challenge 
basis  when  questions  of  compliance 
arise.  The  verification  approach  we  have 
proposed  is  tough  but  fair  and  practical. 
Although  no  one  can  guarantee  absolute 
verification,  we  believe  that  our  security 
and  that  of  all  other  countries  would  be 
safeguarded.  We  are  insisting  on  a  level 
of  verification  which  meets  that  objec- 
tive, and  we  are  prepared  to  explore 
seriously  any  alternative  suggestions  by 
other  nations  to  achieve  effective  verifi- 
cation. 


Conclusion 

Our  views  are  not  fixed  but  subject  to 
further  refinement.  The  possibility  of 
resuming  bilateral  negotiations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  remains  open.  Such 
negotiations  occurred  earlier  but  lapsed 
in  deadlock  in  mid-1980,  principally  over 


the  issue  of  verification.  We  ha\ 
peatedly  stated  that  for  bilatera 
ations  to  be  fruitful,  the  Soviet 
would  need  to  demonstrate,  rat 
simply  profess,  that  it  is  ready 
effective  provisions  to  verify  co 
with  a  chemical  weapons  prohib 
must  also  be  assured  that  the  S 
Union  is  willing  to  abide  by  exis 
agreements. 

The  focus  of  negotiations  si 
on  the  difficult  issues  which  are 
peding  progress,  especially  veri 
and  compliance.  Such  issues  nu 
solved  if  genuine  achievements 
take  place.  Concentrating  on  th 
contentious  issues,  or  even  drat 
ty  texts,  would  be  a  fruitless  ex 
an  effective  verification  framew 
not  be  built. 

We  hope  that  our  arms  con 
datives  regarding  these  weapor 
succeed.  We  do  not  have  any  ill 
Agreement  will  require  a  major 
of  Soviet  military  strategy-  whic 
use  of  these  weapons.  We  must 
overcome  longstanding  Soviet ; 
to  effective  on-site  monitoring, 
fore,  conclusion  of  an  acceptabl 
ment  cannot  be  guaranteed. 

This  Administration  remain 
cated  to  the  goal  of  completely 
ing  all  chemical,  biological,  and 
weapons.  Success  in  this  enterp 
would  enhance  not  only  our  sec 
that  of  the  whole  world. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the 
will  be  published  by  the  committee 
be  available  from  the  Superintende 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print 
fice,  Washington.  D.C.  20402.  I 


Department  of  State  ul 


EAR  POLICY 


Completes  Assessment  of  IAEA 


<d  T.  Kennedy 

n<')it  Id  the  board  of  governors 
h-iiiitiiinal  Ato7nir  Energy 
{\EA>  III  Viriiini  nil  Fehniaj-y 

Amhas,a,l„r  Krni,r,lii  /s  U.S. 
\t  rrpirsnit.ilnr  t.,  th,  IAEA 

,sa,lnral  Laivr.nnI  sprrnil 
tlwSrrirlarii.n,  ,in,i pml iln;,- 

\j  anil  iiurlnir  riimjii  iijjiiiis. 

advise  the  board  of  certain 
recently  taken  by  my  govern- 
you  all  are  aware,  last 
r  the  United  States  suspended 
pation  in  the  IAEA.  Since  that 
government  has  been  engaged 
msive  review  and  assessment 
EA  and  the  future  role  of  the 

;  in  this  agency.  I  would 
B  this  opportunity  to  share  with 
y  some  of  the  conclusions 
have  reached  from  our  inten- 

,  which  is  now  completed, 
le  begin  by  recalling  for  the 

the  message  President 
ent  to  the  delegates  on  the  oc- 
the  26th  general  conference, 
me  the  President  said: 

lited  States  is  determined  to 
other  countries  to  assure  that  this 
1  successfully  meet  the  challenges 
)m  strengthening  technical 
n  for  sharing  the  benefits  of 
ergy  to  finding  ways  of  improving 
'  technical  and  institutional 

against  its  misuse.  It  is  our  pro- 
■  that  others  will  share  this  deter- 

for  it  would  be  a  tragedy  for  sue- 
nerations  if  we  permit  this 
m  to  be  weakened  or  undermined 
1  issues  and  concerns,  which, 
trong  the  emotions  they  arouse,  are 
5  to  the  central  technical  purposes 
the  agency  was  founded. 

with  these  thoughts  in  mind 
assessment  was  conducted.  Our 
nt  underscored  two  basic 


First,  it  is  overwhelmingly  clear  that 
the  IAEA  has  played  and  should  con- 
tinue to  play  a  critical  role  in  support  of 
very  substantial  interests  of  all  of  its 
member  states.  The  IAEA  has  con- 
tributed in  a  major  way  to  progress  in 
the  expanded  and  safe  use  of  nuclear- 
generated  electric  power  and  through  its 
other  development  programs  such  as 
those  in  medicine,  industry,  agriculture, 
health,  and  safety.  At  the  same  time,  we 
are  all  beneficiaries  of  the  assurance 
provided  through  the  application  of  in- 
ternational safeguards  that  nuclear 
material  is  not  being  misused  for  illicit 
and  destructive  purposes.  Perpetuation 
of  this  assurance  is  essential  if  progress 
in  peaceful  nuclear  development  is  to 
continue. 

We,  therefore,  need  to  work  to- 
gether to  improve  the  effectiveness  of 
IAEA  technical  assistance  programs,  to 
improve  the  agency's  safeguard  system, 
and  to  maintain  an  effective  secretariat. 
The  director  general  is  aware  of  the  con- 
cerns we  have  expressed,  and  I  am  con- 
fident that  we  can  achieve  these  needed 
improvements  if  we  all  exert  our  best  ef- 
forts to  that  end. 

The  second  major  point  emerging 
from  our  assessment  is  that,  just  as  we 
are  all  the  beneficiaries  of  the  work  con- 
ducted by  the  IAEA,  we  will  all  pay  a 
considerable  price  if  the  viability  and  ef- 
fectiveness of  the  IAEA  are  threatened. 
Yet  it  is  clear  to  us  that  the  growing 
trend  toward  controversy  and  divisive- 
ness  over  political  issues  extraneous  to 
the  work  of  the  IAEA  is  such  a  direct 
threat.  We  believe  that  unless  this  tend- 
ency is  promptly  checked,  it  will  render 
the  IAEA  ineffective  and  will  fatally 
corrode  the  enthusiasm  with  which 
member  states  have  participated  here 
for  the  last  25  years. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  there  will  not 
continue  to  be  legitimate  differences 
among  us  regarding  the  allocation  of 
agency  resources  and  the  relative  em- 
phasis placed  on  its  programs.  There 
are,  of  course,  legitimate  differences  in 
perspectives  and  interests  among  the 


member  states  of  the  agency.  We  must 
not,  however,  abandon  debate  of  issues 
germane  to  the  IAEA  in  favor  of  debate 
of  controversial  political  issues  which 
should  be  addressed  elsewhere.  To  do 
that  would  be  to  abandon  our  mutual 
and  important  interests  in  the  IAEA. 

In  short,  the  agency  must  respect 
the  statute  and  not,  for  reasons  of 
political  expediency,  act  in  ways  that  are 
inconsistent  with  that  statute.  The  agen- 
cy's role  in  promoting  the  peaceful  uses 
of  nuclear  energy  during  this  critical 
period  depends  entirely  on  the  credibility 
of  its  technical  expertise. 

As  members  of  the  IAEA's  govern- 
ing body,  we  bear  a  singular  responsibil- 
ity for  determining  the  agency's  future 
course.  I  believe  we  should  make  a 
determined  effort  to  reestablish  the 
tradition  of  member  state  cooperation 
which  characterized  its  first  25  years.  I 
look  forward  to  working  actively  toward 
this  end  with  you. 

My  government  and,  we  are  confi- 
dent, other  concerned  governments  will 
be  watching  carefully  to  see  which  direc- 
tion the  agency  pursues  in  the  months 
ahead.  We  hope  and  trust  that  the  agen- 
cy can  put  behind  it  the  unfortunate 
political  wrangling  of  the  recent  past 
and  get  back  to  the  basic  purposes  which 
brought  us  all  together  in  the  first  place. 

The  United  States  for  its  part  then 
is  prepared  to  renew  its  commitment  to 
the  IAEA  and  its  important  programs. 
Within  the  constraint  of  U.S.  law,  the 
United  States  intends  to  support  fully 
these  programs.  At  the  same  time,  I 
must  note  that  our  commitment  must 
depend  on  the  degree  to  which  other 
members  are  also  determined  to  return 
this  agency  to  its  status  as  an  effective 
international  technical  organization.  It  is 
our  deep  desire  that  all  member  states 
will  join  with  us  in  this  sincere  effort. 
Together  we  can  strengthen  this  unique 
international  organization  and  see  that 
the  agency  lives  up  to  the  principles  con- 
tained in  its  statute.  ■ 


PACIFIC 


Palau  Approves  Free 
Association  With  the  U.S. 


Final  unofficial  results  of  the  February 
10,  1983,  plebiscite  in  Palau  represent  a 
strong  victory  for  the  Compact  of  Free 
Association.  In  the  yes-or-no  vote, 
Palauans  awarded  the  Compact  of  Free 
Association  a  mandate  of  better  than 
62%.  The  voter  turnout  was  very  heavy, 
substantiating  the  high  degree  of  sup- 
port for  the  compact  in  Palau. 

Under  the  compact,  Palau  will 
achieve  its  long-sought  goal  of  full 
autonomy.  The  United  States  will 
assume  the  obligation  and  authority  to 
defend  the  island  nation.  The  compact 
and  its  related  agreements  were 
negotiated  over  a  14-year  period.  Two 
other  prospective  freely  associated 
states— the  Marshall  Islands  and  the 
Federated  States  of  Micronesia — will 
vote  on  the  compact  in  coming  months. 
The  United  States  recognizes  that 
the  plebiscite  is  a  valid  and  sovereign  act 
of  self-determination  by  the  people  of 
Palau.  The  compact  they  approve 
defines  their  relationship  with  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  their  interna- 
tional political  status  after  the  present 
trusteeship  is  terminated.  Now  that  the 
people  and  Government  of  Palau  have 
approved  the  compact,  it  must  receive 
majority  approval  in  both  houses  of  the 
U.S.  Congress. 

The  Palauan  voters  were  asked 
other  questions  on  the  plebiscite  ballot, 
including  the  political  status  they  would 
prefer  if  free  association  were  not  ap- 
proved. Slightly  more  than  half  of  the 
voters  chose  to  answer  this  question, 
which  was  optional.  Here,  the  vote  was 
about  56%  in  favor  of  a  relationship 
with  the  United  States  closer  than  free 
association  and  44%  in  favor  of  in- 
dependence. 

The  ballot  included  an  internal 
referendum  question  which  asked  the 
voters  to  approve  a  Palauan-American 
agreement  relating  to  hazardous,  in- 
cluding nuclear,  substances.  A  ma- 
jority—53%— voted  to  approve  this 
agreement.  However,  because  of  provi- 
sions in  the  Palau  Constitution,  this,  or 
a  similar  specific  question,  requires  ap- 
proval by  a  75%  margin  before  the  Com- 
pact of  Free  Association  can  come  into 
effect.  This  means  that  the  Palauan 
authorities  must  now  devise  an  ac- 
ceptable method  of  reconciling  their  con- 


stitutional provisions  to  comply  with  the 
mandate  of  the  Palauan  electorate  for 
free  association  with  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  has  expressed  its  will- 
ingness to  consult  with  Palau  on  this 
matter  and  awaits  Palau's  initiatives. 

The  Government  of  Palau  mounted 
an  intensive  and  thorough  public  educa- 
tion program  in  advance  of  the 
plebiscite.  That  program,  which  started 
more  than  5  months  before  the  vote,  in- 
cluded translation  of  all  the  pertinent 
documents,  radio  and  television  pro- 
grams and  debates,  town  hall  meetings, 
and  village  discussions.  An  official  team 
from  the  U.N.  Trusteeship  Council  was 
in  Palau  to  observe  the  final  days  of  the 
education  program,  the  voting,  and  the 
tabulation  of  ballots.  Their  report  is  ex- 
pected shortly. 

Palau  is  the  westernmost  chain  of 
islands  in  the  Trust  Territory  of  the 
Pacific  Islands,  which  the  United  States 
has  administered  since  1947  under  a 
trusteeship  agreement  with  the  United 
Nations.  Palau,  with  a  population  of 
15,000,  is  located  east  of  the  Philippines 
and  south  of  Guam. 

The  Northern  Mariana  Islands,  a 


fourth  political  jurisdiction  in  the  T 
Territory,  voted  in  1975  to  become 
ritory  of  the  United  States.  Under  i 
arrangement,  the  people  of  the  Nc^ 
Mariana  Islands,  of  which  Sapian  i 
largest,  will  become  U.S.  citizens  i 
the  trusteeship  agreement  ends.  A 
political  jurisdictions  of  the  Trust ' ' 
ritory  have  locally  elected  constitu  i 
governments.  Palau's  first  such  go  I 
ment  was  inaugurated  on  January  I 
1981. 

Palau  and  the  other  island  gro  | 
the  Trust  Territory  were  administ  I 
by  Japan  under  a  League  of  Natio  I 
mandate  after  World  War  I.  The  1 1 
States  liberated  the  islands  from 
Japanese  occupation  during  the  la; 
years  of  World  War  II.  Palau  was 
as  the  site  of  especially  ferocious 
fighting  during  that  campaign.  To 
the  islands  of  Palau,  marked  by  th 
spectacular  beauty  and  their  unusvi 
rich  and  diverse  marine  ecology,  a 
positioning  themselves  for  future 
economic  development.  Fishing,  a; 
culture,  and  tourism  are  expected 
contribute  to  this  growth.  The  Coi 
of  Free  Association  contains  incen 
for  investment,  trade,  and  busines 
development  and  also  guarantees 
economic  development  i 
the  United  States. 


Press  release  52  of  Feb.  23,  1983. 


U.S.-IVIicronesia  Plebiscite 


The  Governments  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia 
(FSM)  have  announced  the  holding  of  a 
plebiscite  in  the  Federated  States  of 
Micronesia  on  Tuesday,  June  21,  1983. 
The  plebiscite  will  be  an  act  of  self- 
determination  by  the  people  of  the 
Federated  States  of  Micronesia  regard- 
ing their  future  political  status  and  is  a 
step  toward  termination  of  the  last  re- 
maining U.N.  trusteeship. 

In  the  plebiscite,  the  voters  of  the 
Federated  States  of  Micronesia  will  be 
asked  whether  they  approve  or  disap- 
prove a  Compact  of  Free  Association 
and  a  number  of  agreements  subidiary 
to  it,  all  of  which  were  signed  by 
representatives  of  the  two  govern- 
ments— Ambassador  Fred  M.  Zeder, 
personal  representative  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  for  Micronesian 


status  negotiations,  and  Andon  L. 
Amaraich,  chairman  of  the  FSM's  J 
mission  on  Future  Political  Status  1 
Transition— in  Honolulu  on  Octobe  , 
1982. 

At  the  request  of  the  United  S  S 
the  U.N.  Trusteeship  Council  agret )' 
December  20,  1982,  to  organize  a  s « 
of  observer  missions  to  witness  th€ 
plebiscites  in  the  FSM  and  in  two  ( ei 
jurisdictions  of  the  Trust  Territory 
the  Pacific  Islands.  The  first  such  i  • 
sion  observed  a  plebiscite  in  the  R(  bl 
of  Palau  on  February  10,  1983,  am  le 
mission  to  the  FSM  will,  similarly, 
observe  the  final  stages  of  the  pubi 
education  program  now  underway  th 
FSM,  the  voting  in  the  plebiscite  it  i 
and  the  counting  of  the  ballots.  Th 
education  program  in  the  FSM  is  b  ig 


80 


Department  of  State  Bl  !!i< 


UNITED  NATIONS 


ed  by  a  commission  under  the 
nship  of  Vice  President  Petrus 

United  States  and  the  FSM 

n  the  compact  to  call  the 
;e  jointly,  and  an  announcement 
ate  is  being  made  simultaneously 
aia,  Ponape,  capital  of  the  FSM, 
ident  Tosiwo  Nakayama.  Pro- 
I  for  the  plebiscite  are  established 

Public  Law  2-54,  enacted  in  late 

ddition  to  addressing  the  ques- 
'ree  association,  voters  will  be 
)  state  their  preference  for  an 
ive  political  status  to  be 
:ed  with  the  United  States  in  the 
fiat  free  association  is  not  ap- 
I  The  choices  will  be  independence 
tie  form  of  continuing  relation- 
th  the  United  States  other  than 
lociation,  with  the  voter  being 
|ie  further  opportunity  to  describe 
ptionship. 

nature  of  the  compact  and  its 
jagreements  last  October  repre- 
the  completion  of  more  than  a 
[of  negotiations.  U.N.  observation 
plebiscite  is  among  several  gov- 
principles  for  free  association 
i  by  the  negotiators  in  a  meeting 
I  Hawaii,  in  April  1978. 

ilease  66  of  Mar.  2,  1983.  ■ 


Libya 


by  Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick 

Statement  made  in  the  U.N.  Security 
Council  on  February  22,  1983.  Ambas- 
sador Kirkpatrick  is  U.S.  Permanent 
Representative  to  the  United  Nations. ' 

I  have,  today,  addressed  the  following 
letter  to  you  for  circulation  as  an  official 
document  in  the  Security  Council. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  re- 
jects the  false  and  malicious  charges  of  the 
Government  of  Libya  and  calls  the  attention 
of  the  Council  to  yet  another  example  of  a 
threat  to  international  peace  and  security 
posed  by  the  policies  of  the  Libyan  Govern- 
ment. 

Furious  that  its  plans  for  illegal,  violent 
action  were  frustrated,  the  Government  of 
Libya  comes  now  to  the  Security  Council 
with  lying  complaints  against  the  United 
States.  In  fact,  the  United  States  committed 
none  of  the  acts  charged  by  the  Government 
of  Libya. 

The  United  States  dispatched  no  offen- 
sive aircraft  into  the  region,  violated  no 
Libyan  airspace.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  neither 


the  U.S.  carrier  Nimitz  nor  its  aircraft 
entered  waters  or  airspace  claimed  by  Libya 
on  the  days  in  question,  although  we  have 
every  right  to  enter  these  international 
waters,  recognized  as  such  under  interna- 
tional law.  We  also  have  every  right  to  con- 
duct, under  appropriate  circumstances,  train- 
ing exercises  with  friendly  governments. 

The  United  States  affirms  its  rights 
under  international  law  and  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  and  intends  to  exercise 
them. 

Naturally,  the  Government  of  Libya 
would  prefer  that  no  obstacles— however 
legal— be  interposed  to  its  plots  and  expan- 
sionist projects.  But  peace-loving  nations  can- 
not accommodate  Libya's  designs  on  its 
neighbors. 

In  calling  attention  to  Libya's  false 
charges,  the  United  States  notes  that  such 
lies  mock  the  serious  work  of  building  inter- 
national peace,  just  as  Libya's  repeated  ef- 
forts to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  its 
neighbors  destroys  security  in  the  region. 

The  United  States  did  not  seek  this 
confrontation  in  the  U.N.  Security  Coun- 
cil with  the  Governments  of  Libya,  but 
we  welcome  the  opportunity  thus  pre- 
sented to  put  facts  on  the  record— not 
the  fabrications  of  Col.  Qadhafi's 
spokesman — and  to  assign  res 


U.S.  Participation  In  the  UN,  1981 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
FEB.  2,  1983' 

I  am  pleased  to  transmit  herewith  a  report  of 
the  activities  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment in  the  United  Nations  and  its  affiliated 
agencies,  as  required  by  the  United  Nations 
Participation  Act  (Public  Law  264,  79th  Con- 
gress). The  report  covers  calendar  year  1981, 
the  first  year  of  my  Administration. 

During  this  first  year  we  devoted  much 
time  and  effort  to  making  our  participation  in 
the  organization  of  the  United  Nations 
system  more  effective  and  to  rendering  the 
system  more  efficient.  We  have  urged  the 
United  Nations  and  its  affiliated  agencies  to 
slow  budget  growth,  define  priorities, 
upgrade  personnel,  and  purge  debate  of  ir- 
relevant and  divisive  rhetoric.  We  have  pur- 
sued these  changes  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
United  Nations  and  help  it  realize  its  enor- 
mous potential  for  maintaining  international 
peace  and  security  and  for  contributing  to  the 
economic  and  social  betterment  of  the  world's 
peoples. 

The  year  1981  saw  the  United  Nations 
constructively  engaged  in  a  number  of  impor- 
tant areas.  United  Nations  peacekeeping 
forces  have  helped  prevent  serious  fighting  in 
Cyprus  and  the  Golan  Heights;  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly  called  for  an  end 
to  Soviet  and  Vietnamese  aggression  in 
Afghanistan  and  Kampuchea;  and  several 


United  Nations  organizations  and  agencies 
continued  their  valuable  humanitarian  and 
technical  work  around  the  world.  The  year 
also  saw  the  election  of  a  new  United  Nations 
Secretary  General,  Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar, 
an  experienced  and  able  international 
diplomat. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  Nations' 
1981  performance  left  much  room  for  im- 
provement. Ex-treme  United  Nations  resolu- 
tions on  the  Middle  East  and  Southern  Africa 
often  increased  tensions  rather  than  pro- 
moted solutions.  The  General  Assembly  called 
for  the  Government  of  El  Salvador  to 
negotiate  with  the  guerrillas  opposing  it,  dis- 
counting in  advance  the  value  of  elections 
which  proved  a  resounding  success.  Resolu- 
tions on  arms  control  were  often  prop- 
agandistic  and  worked  against  the  goal  of 
genuine,  balanced,  and  verifiable  arms  reduc- 
tions. The  General  Assembly  approved  an  un- 
justifiably large  biennial  budget  in  the  face  of 
United  States  opposition. 

My  Administration  will  continue  to  work 
strenuously  and  constructively  to  defend 
United  States  interests  in  the  United  Nations 
setting  and  to  make  the  Organization  itself 
increasingly  more  responsive  to  global  prob- 
lems and  needs. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  White  House  press  release. 


UNITED  NATIONS 


for  this  grave  threat  to  international 
peace  and  security  where  that  respon- 
sibility belongs. 

I  speak,  of  course,  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Qadhafi's  Libya.  And  I  wish  to 
put  this  threat,  which  seems  for  the  mo- 
ment to  have  receded,  in  the  context  of 
Libyan-sponsored  worldwide  terrorism 
and  adventurism  directed  against  its 
neighbors— indeed,  throughout  north- 
ern, eastern,  and  central  Africa.  This 
pattern  of  lawless  expansionism  con- 
stitutes a  continuing  threat  to  the  peace 
and  security  in  the  region  and  beyond. 
My  government  and  the  American 
people  have  never  sought,  and  do  not 
now  seek,  any  confrontation  with  the 
Government  or  people  of  Libya.  We 
have  never  engaged,  and  do  not  now 
engage,  in  any  acts  of  provocation.  But 
we  are  deeply  sensitive  to  threats  to  in- 
ternational peace,  to  our  own  security, 
and  to  the  security  and  national  in- 
dependence of  Libya's  neighbors.  And 
let  there  be  no  doubt:  We  will  respond 
as  appropriate  to  Libyan  threats. 

Briefly,  I  wish  to  recall  the  salient 
events  that  led  to  this  situation. 

Last  Friday,  February  18,  official 
Sudanese  radio  announced  the  discovery 
of  a  Libyan-backed  coup  plot  against  the 
government  of  President  Gaafar 
Nimeiri.  It  announced  the  apprehension 
of  Libyan-sponsored  dissidents  and  in- 
filtrators. It  also  reported  that  the 
Government  of  Sudan  had  been  closely 
watching  concentrations  of  Libyan 
bombers  and  fighters  in  southeast  Libya 
close  to  the  Sudanese  and  Egyptian 
borders. 

This  concentration  of  Libyan  aircraft 
had  been  of  particular  concern  to  the 
Sudanese.  In  view  of  the  successful 
steps  which  the  Sudan  has  now  taken  to 
deal  with  this  latest  Libyan  effort  to 
destabilize  one  of  its  neighbors,  we  are 
now  able  to  put  the  spotlight  of  world 
attention  on  events  in  the  region. 

We  follow  Qadhafi's  irresponsible  in- 
cursions into  the  affairs  of  his  neighbors 
closely  and  with  deep  concern.  We  have 
been  aware  for  some  time  of  his  efforts 
directed  against  President  Nimeiri.  We 
were  also  aware  of  the  concentrations  of 
Libyan  aircraft  which  were  of  concern  tc 
the  Sudanese  and  Egyptians.  Because  of 
the  situation,  we  moved  up  the  date  of 
an  A  WAGS  [airborne  warning  and  con- 
trol system]  training  exercise,  which  had 
already  been  scheduled  about  a  month 


hence,  and  sent  our  AWACS  and  tanker 
aircraft  into  Egypt.  We  have  also  had 
U.S.  naval  forces  deployed  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean.  Their  presence 
in  international  waters  sometimes  seems 
to  have  a  deterring  effect  on  Libyan 
adventurism  in  the  region. 

The  desired  result  seems  to  have 
been  achieved,  at  least  for  the  present. 
The  statement  on  Sudanese  radio,  and 
yesterday's  statement  by  the  Sudanese 
Assembly,  speak  for  themselves.  We  can 
be  reassured  by  the  bold  and  decisive 
manner  in  which  the  Sudanese  dealt 
with  the  threat  of  Libyan  expansionism. 

Fortunately,  the  most  recent  threat 
has  receded.  But  the  pattern  of  Libyan 
misconduct  is  longstanding. 

Col.  Qadhafi  conducts  a  virulent, 
hostile  foreign  policy  which  respects  the 
territorial  integrity,  national  independ- 
ence, right  to  peace  and  security,  and 
self-determination  of  no  one.  Because  of 
a  relative  lack  of  conventional  military 
power,  Col.  Qadhafi  has  tried  to  ac- 
complish his  goals  through  a  combina- 
tion of  economic  and  military  aid  to 
radical  governments;  bribery  of  officials; 


help  to  international  terrorists  hyi 
viding  sanctuary,  funds,  weapons 
planning;  assassination  of  exiled  > 
ponents;  planned  assassination  of 
government  officials;  and  assistai 
guerrilla  groups  working  to  overt 
established  governments. 

The  Qadhafi  regime  has  been 
gaged  in  these  activities  almost  si 
took  power.  For  example,  in  197i 
provided  sanctuary  to  the  perpeti 
of  the  Munich  Olympics  murders. 
Qadhafi  also  gave  refuge  to  the  t( 
rorists  who  held  hostages  at  the  : 
Vienna  OPEC  [Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries] 
meeting.  Libya  has  been  used  as  ; 
area  in  which  terrorist  groups  ha 
planned  acts  to  be  committed  in  r 
Europe's  capitals.  The  infamous  " 
has  operated  out  of  Libya  over  se 
years.  The  weapons  found  on  the 
terrorists  Breguet  and  Kopp  had 
sold  to  the  Libyan  Army.  It  was  I 
release  which  Carlos  demanded. 

Assassination  has  been  an  imj 
Libyan  tool,  and  the  proof  of  Libi 
utilization  of  this  tool  is  not  hard' 


Funding  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
Preparatory  Commission 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
DEC.  30,  19821 

On  December  3,  1982,  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  passed  a  resolution  that 
would,  among  other  things,  finance  the 
preparatory  commission  under  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Treaty  from  the  regular  U.N. 
budget. 

My  Administration  has  fought  hard 
to  uphold  fiscal  responsibility  in  the 
U.N.  system  and,  in  this  case,  con- 
sistently opposed  this  financing  scheme. 
It  is  not  a  proper  expense  of  the  United 
Nations,  within  the  meaning  of  its  own 
Charter,  as  the  Law  of  the  Sea 
preparatory  commission  is  legally  in- 
dependent of  and  distinct  from  the 
United  Nations.  It  is  not  a  U.N.  sub- 
sidiary organ  and  not  answerable  to  that 
body.  Membership  in  the  United  Nations 
does  not  obligate  a  member  to  finance  or 
otherwise  support  this  Law  of  the  Sea 
organization. 

Moreover  these  funds  are  destined 
to  finance  the  very  aspects  of  the  Law 
of  the  Sea  Treaty  that  are  unacceptable 
to  the  United  States  and  that  have  re- 
sulted in  our  decision,  as  I  announced  on 


July  9,  1982,  not  to  sign  that  trea 
preparatory  commission  is  called  i 
develop  rules  and  regulations  for 
seabed  mining  regime  under  the  t 
It  has  no  authority  to  change  the 
damaging  provisions  and  preceder 
that  part  of  the  treaty.  For  that  r 
the  United  States  is  not  participafe 
the  commission. 

My  Administration  has  conduci 
review  of  the  financing  scheme  foi 
commission.  That  review  has  confi 
that  is  an  improper  assessment  un 
the  U.N.  Charter  that  is  not  legall 
ing  upon  members.  It  is  also  adveh 
the  interests  of  the  United  States.' 
the  United  States  normally  pays  2 
the  regular  U.N.  budget,  the  Unite 
States  is  opposed  to  improper  asse 
ments  and  is  determined  to  resist .' 
abuses  of  the  U.N.  budget. 

In  this  light,  I  have  decided  th. 
United  States  will  withhold  its  pro 
share  of  the  costs  to  the  U.N.  budj 
funding  the  preparatory  commissic 


'Text  irom  U.S. UN  press  release  1 
Jan.  3,  1983.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bi !" 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


J.  The  1980-81  murders  of  a 
xiled  Libyans,  primarily  in 
a  European  capitals,  have  been 
d  by  the  international  press  in 
;jess  widely  known  are  a  1975 
murder  the  prime  minister  of  a 
iring  country;  plans  to  kill 
an  Ambassadors  in  several  Mid- 
tern  countries  and  at  least  one 
an  capital;  and  a  November  1981 
t  to  plant  explosives  in  the 
an  Embassy  Club  in  Khartoum, 
(xplosives  were  concealed  in 
speakers,  designed  to  detonate  on 
day  evening  when  scores  of  peo- 
ild  have  been  present  and  killed, 
najor  facet  of  Libyan  foreign 
las  been  and  remains  subversion 
jtabilization  of  independent 
ments  in  the  Middle  East,  Africa, 
ewhere.  Chad  has  been  a  recent 
1  victim  of  the  aggressive  policy 
a.  Currently,  Libyan  intentions 
Chad  are  a  major  concern.  Col. 
'i  has  brought  large  numbers  of 
n  followers  to  Libya,  trained  and 
2d  them,  and  is  moving  them  into 
•thern  parts  of  Chad.  Other  ef- 
)  increase  its  own  strength  in  that 
•e  underway.  Most  disturbing  was 
i-January  deployment  of  a  dozen 
.  SU-22  ground-attack  fighters  to 
uzou  Airbase  in  northern  Chad, 
ntly  in  preparation  of  a  Libyan 
to  provide  air  cover  to  an  assault 
lidents  and  infiltrators  against  the 
,n  Government  and  Chadian-held 
tion  centers.  A  Libyan  team  of 
^imately  80  "advisers"  in  another 
jn  republic  may  be  assisting  anti- 
mment  Chadians  there.  Libya  has  a 
ecord  of  training  g-uerrillas,  sup- 
[weapons,  plotting  subversion,  and 
Jilization  of  its  North  African 
|)ors. 

I  the  Horn  of  Africa,  Libya  con- 
^  to  try  to  overthrow  the  Govern- 
1  of  Sudan  and  Somalia.  A  number 
ijyans  are  in  Ethiopia  advising 
iji  and  Sudanese  guerrillas.  Libyan 
lift  and  ships  continue  to  train  guer- 
iind  to  supply  arms,  ammunition, 
ifives,  and  materiel  to  the  Somali 
fion  Front  and  to  Sudanese  rebels, 
i^jibya's  deliveries  of  increasingly 
reed  weapons  to  warring  tribes  in 
jdan  have  contributed  to  death  and 
■'  ce  in  that  region. 
Isewhere,  Libya  delivers  military 
ment  and  is  involving  itself  increas- 


ingly, for  example,  in  this  hemisphere, 
always  on  behalf  of  military  dictator- 
ships, always  opposed  to  democratic 
regimes  and  movements. 

That  is  the  pattern  of  Libyan 
misconduct  worldwide.  It  constitutes,  as 
I  have  said,  a  grave  threat  to  interna- 
tional peace  and  security.  The  culprit  in 
this  proceeding  is  identified  beyond  any 
reasonable  doubt  or  question. 

What  has  happened  to  Libya  may 
happen  to  other  states,  the  representa- 
tive of  Libya  has  suggested.  I  should 


like  to  say  that  we  hope  so.  We  hope 
that  what  happened  to  Libya  will  happen 
to  other  states.  We  hope  that  all  states 
with  aggressive  designs  on  their 
neighbors  will  be  discouraged  by  the 
lawful  response  of  others  and  thus  to 
desist  in  their  unlawful  plans.  My 
government  rests  its  case  on  the  factual 
record— and  its  adherence  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  U.N.  Charter  in  the  cause 
of  international  peace  and  security. 


'Text  from  U.S.UN  press  release  13. 


Ambassador  Hinton  Interviewed  on 
"This  Week  With  David  Brinkiey" 


Deane  R.  Hinton.  U.S.  Ambassador 
to  El  Salvador,  was  interviewed  on 
ABC-TVs  "This  Week  With  David 
Brivkley"  on  March  6,  1983,  by  David 
Bnnkley  and  Sam  Donaldson,  ABC 
News,  and  George  F.  Will,  ABC  News 
analyst. 

Q.  As  you  know,  we  have  a 
substantial  debate  going  on  here  in 
Washington  about  sending  more  ad- 
visers, pushing  the  two  sides  to 
negotiate,  or  doing  both.  You  are 
there  on  the  scene.  What  is  your  view? 

A.  I  think  on  negotiations  that  it's 
absolutely  crazy  to  talk  about  nego- 
tiating with  people  with  guns  and 
bombs.  These  people  are  going  to  be  of- 
fered a  chance,  I  am  certain,  to  come 
back  into  the  political  process,  the 
democratic  process,  to  have  a  right  to 
elect  their  representatives  if  they  have 
the  votes.  That's  the  way  democracy 
works. 

As  far  as  advisers,  we're  talking,  I 
guess,  about  trainers.  There's  only  a 
handful  of  advisers  here  from  the 
military  group,  but  the  trainers,  you 
know,  were  about  something  in  the 
neighborhood  of  50  today. 

Q.  We'll  all  recall  about  a  year  ago 
the  people  in  El  Salvador  voted  on  a 
Sunday,  which  we— 
A.  Overwhelmingly. 

Q.  Right.  And  the  results  were 
slightly  ambiguous,  but  it  was  clear 
that  they  were  voting  for  stability.  Is 
that  correct  in  your  view? 

A.  They  were  voting  for  peace,  and 
they  wanted  violence  to  end,  and  they 
wanted  to  give  democracy  a  chance. 
Now  they've  formed  a  government  of 


national  unity  where  all  the  parties  are 
working  together,  and  that  government 
has  slowly  been  evolving  a  new  peace 
program  with  a  Commission  on  Human 
Rights  that's  official;  a  Peace  Commis- 
sion, which  will  be  a  conduit  to  those 
people  on  the  extreme  left  who  want  to 
come  in  and  participate  in  elections.  The 
program  is  going  forward  on  many 
fronts.  They're  going  to  formulate  an 
amnesty.  They  are  considering  the 
release  of  political  prisoners  at  the  ap- 
propriate moment.  And  this  government 
while  it— you  know,  they  work  by  con- 
sensus and  it  is  slow,  is  working. 

Q.  What  is  your  assessment  of  the 
threat  to  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador?  There  are  conflicting  views 
as  to  just  how  important  the  guerrilla 
movement  has  gone  these  days  as  far 
as  achieving  on  the  battlefield  their 
objectives. 

A.  I  think  it's  evident  that  the  guer- 
rillas have  won  a  couple  of  rounds  in  a 
continuing  conflict.  They  certainly 
haven't  won  and  they're  not  imminently 
likely  to  win  the  war.  But  if  we  do  not 
provide  more  military  assistance,  the  ar- 
my here,  which  is  short  of  trained  and 
well-equipped  troops— we  had  a  plan  to 
do  more,  and  then  the  Congress  turned 
the  money  down  last  year.  That  gave 
heart  to  the  guerrillas.  It  kept  the  war 
going.  It  will  result  in  more  people  being 
killed,  but  with  resources,  this  army  can 
hold.  They're  not  about  to  lose,  and  I 
think  it's  perfectly  clear  that  what  they 
need  is  some  ammunition  and  some 
more  trained  and  equipped  units. 

Q.  In  your  view,  is  it  just  a  ques- 
tion of  money  and  resources  or  do  you 


1983 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


think  that  more  American  advisers  or 
trainers  have  to  be  sent  to  El 
Salvador? 

A.  I  have  made  my  recommenda- 
tions to  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
Washington  on  the  trainers  issue;  I 
think  that  will  be  worked  out  in 
Washington  with  the  various  con- 
cerned—Defense and  State  and  the 
White  House  and  the  National  Security 
Council  in  consultation.  I'd  love  to  tell 
you  what  my  recommendations  are,  but 
I  don't  think  that  that's  exactly  what  we 
should  put  on  ABC  television,  if  you'll 
forgive  me. 

Q.  You  said  a  moment  ago  that 
the  government  is  not  about  to  lose. 
Let's  look  at  it  from  the  other  direc- 
tion. Perhaps  it  is  because  of  Korea 
and  Vietnam  and  other  experiences 
that  Americans— many  of  them— think 
it's  almost  impossible  to  win  any  war. 
Is  it  possible?  And  if  not,  why  is  it  not 
possible  for  these  6,000,  and  I  guess 
that's  the  accepted  number,  of  the 
guerrillas  to  be  beaten  militarily? 

A.  Six  to  eight. 

Q.  Is  this  within  the  realm  of 
possibility?  To  win  the  war? 

A.  Everything  is  possible.  It's  a 
function  of  resources  and  training.  What 
we  need  to  do  is  to  be  sure  these  people 
don't  run  out  of  ammunition,  of  the 
resources  of  the  radios,  of  the  medical 
equipment,  of  the  trucks,  of  the 
helicopters,  of  the  rifles.  This  is  needed 
to  defend  this  democracy. 

Q.  Yes,  but  the  question  is  often 
asked  why  should  we  support  the 
regime  down  there?  The  death  squads 
operate.  There  have  been  at  least 
seven  Americans  whom  we  know  have 
been  murdered  in  El  Salvador  and  no 
one  convicted  yet.  Why  should  we  sup- 
port that  government? 

A.  You  have  a  government  that  is 
trying,  after  50  years  of  military  dic- 
tatorship, to  play  by  democratic  rules.  It 
is  carrying  out  social  reforms.  Just 
Thursday  of  this  past  week,  the 
assembly  renewed  the  third  phase  of  the 
land  reform  program  for  another  10 
months.  This  is  a  government  that  is 
trying,  under  teriffic  pressure  from  an 
armed  guerrilla  terrorist  movement  sup- 
ported by  Nicaragua  and  Cuba.  It  is  a 
government  that  has  a  peace  program 
that  makes  sense. 

They  have  an  effort — an  increasing 
effort— to  correct  the  abuses.  Of  course, 
they're  terrible,  and  they're  unac- 
ceptable, but  these  people  are  going  in 
the  right  direction. 

Q.  Some  of  the  people  on  the  other 


side,  however,  are  opposing  increased 
aid  and  cite  the  public  statements  by 
Central  American  and  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment officials  calling  really  for 
negotiation  and  accommodation  and 
including  the  disaffected  left  and  the 
government  and  all  the  rest,  and  they 
say  they  are  not  as  alarmed  as  we,  far- 
ther to  the  north,  are.  Do  they  talk  a 
different  game  in  private  than  they  do 
in  public,  some  of  these  Central 
American  leaders? 

A.  I  think  there's  negotiation  and 
negotiation  in  the  first  place.  It  is 
perfectly  clear  to  me  that  throughout 
the  Central  American  isthmus,  there  is 
great  alarm  and  concern  over  Nicara- 
gua. What  it  is  doing  in  excursions  into 
northern  Costa  Rica:  the  terrorist  acts 
in  San  Jose;  their  incursions  into  Hon- 
duran  territory.  The  continuing  flow  of 
arms  and  trained  men  into  El  Salvador 
is  a  source  of  concern  to  everyone.  And 
as  one  watches  the  tightening  of  the 
Marxist  control  and  the  imposition  of  a 
police  state  in  Nicaragua,  it  becomes  a 
greater  source  of  concern. 

Negotiations  between  governments 
makes  sense;  the  Hondurans,  the  El 
Salvadorans,  the  Costa  Ricans  are  all 
ready  to  put  the  regional  problems  on 
the  table  and  see  if  there  isn't  a  political 
solution  to  be  negotiated  between 
governments. 

Q.  Do  you  buy  the  domino  theory? 
If  El  Salvador  should  fall  to  the  guer- 
rillas, would  other  states  in  that  area 
inevitably  fall? 

Q.  Inevitably  is  a  strong  word,  but  I 


think  the  chances  would  be  great. 
domino  theory  that  I  do  buy  is  tha 
democracy  in  Costa  Rica,  Hondurr 
El  Salvador,  it's  going  to  work  in 
reverse  one  of  these  days,  and  we'' 
going  to  have  a  democratic  goverr 
in  Nicaragua  which  is  what  the  Sa  II 
dinistas  and  other  political  leaders  J| 
ised  their  people  in  1979.  ii 

Q.  The  Pope  is  spending  sevti 
days  traveling  in  your  part  of  th« 
world.  What  impact  has  he  had,  | 
you  say?  | 

A.  I  think  it's  tremendous.  An  I 
know,  the  heckling  in  Nicaragua  a| 
sort  of  party  members  pushing  thii 
representatives  to  the  fore  with  | 
bullhorns  to  heckle  the  Pope,  I  thi  | 
that  gives  us  a  picture.  Everybodj  | 
very  very  excited,  and  expectant  i  I 
thusiastic.  jl 

Q.  What  about  the  security  f.i 
tions?  Do  you  know  anything  abi  i 
this  plot— that  apparently  there  t 
some  evidence  concerning— agai  i 
the  Pope's  life? 

A.  Yes,  I  think  the  evidence  v 
that  something  rather  drastic  was 
ing  from  the  left.  I  am  not  sure  if 
an  assassination  plot,  but  it  could 
been.  It's  an  old  technique  to  do  tl 
like  this  and  then  blame  the  gover 
or  the  right.  Various  people  from 
on,  through  the  Communists  and  ( 
places,  have  done  it. 


'Taped  earlier  and  broadcast  by  sa 
from  San  Salvador.  ■ 


Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  Interviewed 
on  "Meet  the  Press" 


Ambassador  Jeane  J.  Kirkpatrick, 
U.S.  Permanent  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations,  was  interviewed  on 
NBC-TV's  "Meet  the  Press"  on  March  6, 
1983,  by  Bill  Monroe,  moderator;  Marvin 
Kalb,  NBC  News;  Pat  Buchanan, 
Chicago  Trihwyie  syndicate;  Karen 
DeYoung,  The  Washington  Post;  and 
Morton  Kondracke,  New  Republic. 

Q.  When  the  Pope  arrived  in  El 
Salvador  this  morning,  the  President 
of  El  Salvador  announced,  among 
other  things,  that  there'd  be  elections 
by  the  end  of  the  year,  an  amnesty 
program,  and  a  Peace  Commission 


that  he  said  would  set  up  mechu 
to  guarantee  full  democratic  pan 
tion.  I  think  that's  a  direct  quotd 
that  something  that  the  U.S.  Gd 
ment  could  agree  with,  and  whaij 
you  think  he  has  in  mind?  . 

A.  Of  course,  we  would  agree 
it.  We  would  not  only  agree  with  i  j 
we  would,  of  course,  welcome  it. 

Q.  What  does  that  mean,  the  I 
democratic  participation?  Does  tlj 
mean  dialogue?  i 

A.  I  think  what  that  means  is  i 
he's  hoping  that  the  Peace  Commis] 
will  establish  rules  governing  the  e; 
tion  and  also  any  amnesty  progran  | 


Department  of  State  BiJ 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


)vide  an  opportunity  for  full 
ion  in  the  democratic  process 
jps  in  Salvadoran  society. 

it  that  means  that  the  elec- 
hat  we're  talking  about— 

lat's  right.  We're  talking 

fbut  not  a  dialogue  proceeding 
on. 

u  know,  dialogue  is  one  of 
cal  words.  I  think  we're  talk- 
democratic  elections.  We're 
ut  an  amnesty  program,  in 
ons  who  are  willing  to  give  up 
bd  turn  to  ballots  presumably 
Lrticipate  in,  and  some  sort  of 
|)rogram  that  would  provide  op- 

Ifor  full  participation  of  all  sec- 
ilvadoran  society  in  those 
ic  elections. 

^ide  from  the  different  words 
(used  about  full  democratic 
ition,  does  this  represent  a 
n  the  government's  position? 

think  what  it  represents  is  the 
ment  of  institutional  mech- 
Ind,  of  course,  there  is  a  change 
resident  Magana  also  announc- 
he  elections  would  be  held  dur- 
jalendar  year. 

Lit  none  in  the  sense  of  a 
I  with  the  Marxist  rebels  and 
irnment  starting  prior  to  the 

litself? 

,ou  know,  I  really  don't  know 
fet  that  means. 

jcould  ask  it  again. 

^kay,  why  don't  you? 

Jlright.  I  think  the  point  here 
i  the  U.S.  Government  and  the 
iient  of  El  Salvador  have  op- 
idialogue  being  established 
ithe  election  between  the 
lent  and  the  Marxist  rebels 
)  unseat  that  government.  Is 
ement  now  to  say  that  that 
can  begin  prior  to  the  elec- 

take  it  that  to  establish  an 
program  and  provide  for  the 
IS  for  full  participation  of  all 
in  Salvadoran  society  willing  to 
te  in  those  democratic  elections 
quire  some  discussion  between 

rhich  is  an  opening  then  to 
dialogue  between  the  two 
ng  sides  prior  to  an  election,  if 
itand  you  right. 

take  it  that  it  would  involve  in- 
any  kind  of  discussions  neces- 
istablish  open  elections,  in  which 


all  parts  of  the  society  could  participate 
in  those  democratic  elections. 

Q.  Including  those  two  major  par- 
ties I  mentioned? 

A.  Including  any  party.  I  think 
President  Magana  has  been  very  clear 
when  he  said,  "mechanisms  to  guarantee 
full  democratic  participation."  I  think  he 
meant  full  democratic  participation. 

Q.  The  New  York  Times  said  last 
week,  "Americans  can  best  help  by  not 
seeing  the  war  as  an  expression  of  the 
East- West  conflict."  Do  you  see  the 
war  in  El  Salvador  as  an  expression  of 
the  East- West  conflict? 

A.  You  quote  the  Times;  I'll  quote 
myself— in  a  speech  recently  that  what 
is  perfectly  clear  is  that  there's  a  very 
large  Eastern  presence  in  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean  today  in  the 
form  of  Soviet  arms— Soviet  bloc  arms, 
I  should  say — training,  a  lot  of  advice  on 
guerrilla  warfare,  but  most  especially 
arms,  steady  inflow  of  arms. 

There's  also  a  large  Eastern 
presence  in  a  sort  of  cultural  offensive, 
with  radio  and  television  saturation  in 
some  areas,  a  very  large  program  for 
Radio  Venceramos  out  of  Cuba,  for  ex- 
ample, large  effort  of  radio  and  televi- 
sion, offensive  out  of  Nicaragua  now  to 
adjoining  countries  like  Costa  Rica;  very 
large  fellowship  programs,  hundreds  for 
example  of  fully  funded  fellowship  pro- 
grams for  Costa  Rica,  Panama,  et 
cetera.  Those  constitute  a  kind  of  large 
Eastern  presence  in  Central  America. 

Whether  there  is  a  Western 
response  to  this,  I  think,  depends  on  the 
decision  of  the  American  people  and  the 
American  Congress,  quite  bluntly. 
Otherwise,  it's  just  an  Eastern  offensive 
on  our  southern  borders. 

Q.  Do  you  see  the  outcome  of  the 
war  in  El  Salvador  as  being  decisive 
in  terms  of  the  war  in  Central 
America?  In  other  words,  if  hypothet- 
ically  El  Salvador  should  fall  to  the 
guerrillas  or  Marxists,  do  you  think 
that  would  pretty  much  determine  the 
fate  of  Guatemala  and  Honduras  and 
Central  America,  and  how  vital  is  that 
to  the  national  security  interests  of 
the  United  States? 

A.  One  of  the  things  that  most  sur- 
prised me  during  my  trip  in  the 
region— which  included  Panama,  Costa 
Rica,  Honduras,  El  Salvador,  and 
Venezuela— was  the  extent  to  which 
they  see  the  outcomes  of  the  Salvador 
conflict.  Given  the  presence  of 
Nicaragua  today  and  its  powerful 
military  machine,  they  see  it  as  relevant 


to  their  fate.  And  they  talk  a  great  deal 
about  contagion.  They  talk  a  great  deal 
about  the  contagion  of  the  effects  from 
Salvador  to  Honduras  and  Guatemala 
and  Costa  Rica  and  Panama  and,  even- 
tually, Mexico.  They  think  that  it  would 
be  very  difficult  to  contain  that  con- 
tagion. They  say  that  this  is  a  very 
culturally  homogenous  region,  that  there 
aren't  many  barriers. 

Q.  The  Administration  has  said 
repeatedly  that  it's  not  seeking  a 
military  solution  in  El  Salvador.  Yet  it 
seems  like  we've  been  unable  to  work 
out  any  kind  of  political  or  diplomatic 
end  to  the  fighting  there;  in  fact,  the 
fighting  seems  to  have  gotten  worse. 
When  it  was  first  reported  earlier  this 
week  that  there  were  early  elections 
planned,  the  guerrillas  have  already 
rejected  that.  Do  we  have  a  long-term 
strategy  there?  Do  we  just  expect 
them  eventually  to  give  up?  I'm  not 
sure  I  understood  your  answer  to  the 
question  before  in  terms  of  whether  in 
the  long  term  we  are  willing  to  let 
them  sit  down  and  negotiate  some 
kind  of  power  with  the  government 
there. 

A.  Certainly,  we  hope  very  much 
that  the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador  will 
just  give  up,  as  it  were,  the  pursuit  of 
power  by  military— it's  they  who  are 
seeking  a  military  solution,  if  I  may  say 
so.  We  hope  they'll  give  up  the  pursuit 
of  power  by  military  means.  We  hope 
that  theyll  be  willing  to  accept 
democratic  elections  and  a  democratic 
solution  to  the  political  problems  and 
compete  for  power  by  peaceful  demo- 
cratic methods  rather  than  by  military 
methods.  That  is  certainly  our  hope. 
And  our  strategy,  I  suppose,  is  designed 
to  try  to  encourage  that  kind  of 
democratic  political  solution  for  El 
Salvador  and,  indeed,  for  the  region. 

Q.  But  they've  said  that  they  will 
not  participate  in  elections  unless 
there  is  some  discussion  of  structural 
changes  in  El  Salvador  before  they 
even  begin  to  talk  about  elections.  If 
they  won't  participate  in  elections  and 
if  they're  committed  to  keep  on 
fighting,  what  is  our  strategy  at  that 
point? 

A.  They  said  various  things.  You 
know,  they  have  said  from  time  to  time 
that  they  wouldn't  participate  in  elec- 
tions because  they  didn't  feel  that  their 
security  would  be  guaranteed.  They 
didn't  think  they  would  be  safe.  They 
thought  they  might  be  shot,  for  exam- 
ple, as  they  left  the  polling  places  or  just 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


after  or  something.  And  sometimes  they 
say  they  won't  participate  in  elections  at 

all.  We  hope  that  they  will  change  their 
minds  and  be  willing,  in  fact,  to  give  up 
the  search  for  a  military  solution  and 
join  in  democratic  elections  for  El 
Salvador.  The  ultimate  political  solution, 
you  know,  is  democratic  elections.  The 
ultimate  powersharing  arrangement  is 
democratic  elections. 

Q.  We've  been  on  this  same  track 
before,  last  year.  Do  we  have  any 
reason  to  believe  that  it's  going  to 
work  better  this  time  than  it  did  last 
time,  particularly  considering  they're 
in  a  better  military  position  now  than 
they  were  last  year? 

A.  Oh,  I  think  so.  For  one  thing,  the 
Government  of  El  Salvador  today  is,  in 
a  very  real  sense,  stronger.  Today  El 
Salvador  has  a  democratic  government, 
and  it  will  be  a  democratic  elected 
government,  which  itself  has  much  more 
legitimacy  in  the  society  running  its  own 
elections.  I  think  that's  new  and  dif- 
ferent. By  the  way,  that  makes  a  big  dif- 
ference in  the  way  that  other  countries 
in  the  region  feel  about  it.  Costa  Rica, 
for  example,  is  enormously  encouraged 
by  the  spread  of  democratic  institutions 
in  the  region,  in  Honduras  and  El 
Salvador. 

Q.  She  [Karen  DeYoung]  said  that 
the  military  situation  seemed  to  be 
much  worse  than  it  had  been  before. 
You  were  quoted  when  you  were  down 
there  as  saying  that  the  guerrillas 
were  nearly  beaten,  and  you  were 
quoted  in  the  paper  today  as  saying 
that  the  situation  was  not  that 
"dicey."  Yet  you're  reported  to  have 
delivered  a  report  to  the  President 
that  was  exceptionally  gloomy,  and  at 
a  White  House  meeting  on  Monday, 
you  apparently  inspired  people  to 
think  that  the  situation  was  critical. 
Which  is  it? 

A.  I  can't  take  the  responsibility  for 
the  way  I'm  reported,  if  I  may  say  so.  I 
can  do  my  best  to  make  clear  what  I 
think  about  it. 

My  comment  out  of  Honduras  came 
in  response  to  a  question  by  a  Swedish 
reporter,  whose  question  assumed— he 
asserted  that  the  military  situation  in  El 
Salvador  had  deteriorated  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  government  very 
dramatically  in  the  previous  2  years  and 
that  the  guerrillas  were  much  closer  to  a 
military  victory  than  they  had  been  2 
years  previously. 

I  said  to  him  that  was  not  the  case. 
And  I  reminded  him  that  the  leader  of 
the  Salvadoran  Communist  Party, 
Shafik  Handal,  had  written  in  the  fall  of 


1980  that  they  expected  fully  to  achieve 
a  full  military  victory  through  their  so- 
called  final  offensive  in  the  month  of 
December;  then  they  postponed  to 
January  of  1981.  And  I  said,  as  we  all 
knew,  they  had  not  achieved  that 
military  victory  in  the  "final  offensive" 
and  that  now  no  one  even  was  expecting 
such  a  full  victory  by  a  "final  offensive." 
That  got  a  little  distorted  in  the  report- 
ing from  Honduras,  but  that's  what  hap- 
pened. 

Q.  But  the  reports  out  of  El 
Salvador  are  that  the  guerrillas  are 
able  to  do  things  militarily  that  they 
have  not  been  able  to  do  before,  and 
the  reports  from  the  President— from 
the  White  House— describe  the  situa- 
tion as  critical.  Some  people  say  that 
there's  not  enough  ammunition  to  last 
more  than  30  days.  That  has  been  con- 
tradicted by  other  Administration 
statements.  What  is  the  military  situa- 
tion down  there? 

A.  First  of  all,  let  me  just  say,  as 
you  know,  I'm  not  a  military  expert.  I'm 
no  expert  on  military  affairs.  I  will  tell 
you  my  understanding  of  the  situation 
without  any  great  claims  for  reliability 
of  my  military— I  don't  have  any  in- 
dependent judgments  on  this.  That's 
what  I  want  to  say. 

There  is  a  general  view  that  the 
guerrillas  today  are  better  trained  than 
they  were  2  or  3  years  ago;  that  their 
arms  are  more  sophisticated,  in  some 
cases  more  sophisticated  than  those  of 
the  Government  of  El  Salvador.  That,  as 
I  understand  it,  is  no  critical  military 
problem  at  this  time,  but  it  would  be  if 
the  United  States  did  not  continue 
military  assistance  to  El  Salvador  at  the 
levels  that  it  has  been  sustaining  that 
and  at  the  levels  that  the  Soviet  bloc  is 
ultimately  providing  arms  to  the  guer- 
rillas. That's  really  the  point;  that  it 
could  happen  if  the  Soviets  continue  to 
provide  arms  at  the  rate  they  have  been 
providing  them,  and  we  don't  provide 
comparable  to  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador,  then  there  could  indeed  be  a 
very  serious  situation. 

Q.  The  Administration  wants  $60 
million  right  now  from  the  Congress, 
right?  That's  in  military  aid  to  El 
Salvador. 

A.  Right. 

Q.  On  the  face  of  it,  that  doesn't 
seem  like  a  great  deal  of  money,  con- 
sidering sometimes  billions  that  the 
United  States  has  given  out.  Why  do 
you  think  there  is  this  kind  of  an 


outroar  then?  Why  does  the  Con 
seem  to  be  so  resistant  to  the 
thought? 

A.  First  of  all,  I  don't  think  til 
United  States  generally  and  Ame' 
generally,  including  our  policymal 
have  thought  very  seriously  abou 
America — maybe  since  John  Ken 
actually.  He  may  have  been  the  1; ' 
President  to  give  much  very  seri( ' 
thought  to  Latin  America  and  th( ' 
importance  of  this  hemisphere  to  ' 
And  I  don't  think  we  probably  ev  ' 
much  thought  to  Central  Americ? ! 
the  Caribbean,  quite  frankly.  So  ]  ] 
think  that  there's  a  very  good  or 
curate  perception  of  the  relevanc' 
area  to  us  and  to  our  national  set 
and  well-being,  for  one  thing. 

And  for  another,  I  think  that 
because  the  decision  was  made,  f 
reasons  of  legislative  tactics,  to  d 
the  request  for  sustaining  militar 
assistance  at  the  same  level  as  la 
until  later,  as  it  were,  and  not  de 
it  at  the  time  that  all  the  other  sa 
of  the  assistance  bill  were  being  ( 
with  last  year,  it  causes  more  att 
to  be  focused  on  it  now  that  it's 
necessary  to  deal  with  it. 

Q.  When  Ronald  Reagan  w» 
elected,  it  was  said  that  the  Uw 
States  had  gotten  over  the  politi 
paralysis  induced  by  Vietnam,  t 
we're  ready  to  play  our  role  in  J 
world  again.  But  back  in  Vietna 
1968,  for  better  or  worse,  we  w 
spending  $30  billion  a  year  and  , 
half  a  million  troops  10,000  mill 
away  to  prevent  a  Communist  ti  i 
in  Vietnam.  We  are  now  arguin; 
the  $60  million  figure  in  El  Sah  i 
whether  or  not  there  should  be  ; 
55  advisers,  whether  or  not  the  , 
visers  should  be  allowed  to  can  I 
M-16  rifle.  Now  does  this  not  8\) 
that  the  policy  paralysis  endurei  ( 
the  United  States,  in  Washingtt  j 
D.C.? 

A.  I  think  it  does  sugge.'^t  th; 
there's  a  certain  distortion  in  nur 
sideration  of  the  whole  possibility 
use  of  American  power  and  the  il 
of  the  use  of  American  power  in  ' 
world.  The  truth  is  we've  used  Ai 
power  and  American  strength— e 
nomic  and  military,  not  arms  I  iii' 
but  assistance — in  a  good  many  c  ' 
the  period  since  World  War  II.  .M 
the  times,  we've  used  that  succes, 
and  with  very  good  consequences 
people  involved. 

Vietnam  is,  I  think,  our  coins; 
failure.  And  there  is  a  kind  of.  I  t '' 


Department  of  State  E'el 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


sort  of  Vietnam  hangover  still 
icts  some  sectors  of  our 
our  policy  community— with 
fative,  distorting  kinds  of  effects 
lonsideration  of  the  American 
he  world  today. 

Ifou  mentioned  that  we  have 
[n  Central  America  or  Latin 
^  the  attention  it  deserves.  To 
tent  is  that  the  fault  of  this 
stration,  which  has  not  given,  I 
iJentral  America  or  El  Salvador 
!  of  attention  it  gives  the  Mid- 
t  and  the  situation  in  Europe. 

Administration  focused  on  it? 

President  addressed  the  issue 
1  the  American  people  its  im- 


portance to  the  extent  that  you  would 
like  to  see? 

A.  The  President  is  certainly  doing 
so  now.  I  said  clearly  that  I  didn't  think 
that  American  Governments  had  paid  as 
much  attention  to  Latin  America,  prob- 
ably since  John  Kennedy,  as  I  think  it 
deserves.  Now  I  think  in  this  Adminis- 
tration, the  President  entered  with  a 
greater  sensitivity  to  Latin  America, 
mainly  as  a  consequence  of  his  ex- 
perience as  Governor  of  California.  For 
a  variety  of  reasons,  I  think  we  have 
perhaps  been  diverted  from  as  much 
focus  on  it  as  I  might  have  hoped,  but  I 
think  it's  being  rapidly  corrected. 

Q.  I'd  like  to  go  back  a  little  bit  to 


El  Salvador  Announces 
Peace  Commission 


JTMENT  STATEMENT, 
1,  1983' 


(pleased  that  the  Government  of 
idor  has  moved  forward  with  the 
ijiment  of  the  Peace  Commission 
brmation  was  envisioned  in  the 
ill982  pact  of  Apaneca.  Of  par- 
inportance,  in  our  estimate,  is 
:|  Peace  Commission,  along  with 
Hously  formed  Political  and 
iRights  Commissions,  has  the  en- 
int  of  the  major  political  parties 
)untry  and  thus  broad  popular 

1  in  spirit  and  substance,  the  an- 
ient of  the  formation  of  the 
ommission  demonstrates  the 
political  reconciliation  will 
■'in  anticipation  of  El  Salvador's 
i984  presidential  elections.  As 
int  Magana  indicated  in  his  an- 
ient, this  reaffirms  the  "un- 
r,g  decision  to  maintain 
'.  .  [and  the]  firm  determination 
ilish  respect  and  tolerance  for 
«t  ideologies  in  order  to  achieve  a 
ijtic,  democratic,  and  just  society." 
[fernment's  proposal.  President 
A  stated,  underlies  the  point  that 
fiution  to  the  problem  of  violence 
;>  essentially  a  political  and 
(Catic  one."  The  president  noted 
{i  commission's  success  would  de- 
toon  an  end  to  "the  irrational 
By  of  violence,  destruction,  and 


revenge"  regardless  of  what  ideology 
motivates  it. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  1,  1983= 

The  United  States  is  fully  committed  to 
the  democratic  process  in  El  Salvador 
and  to  a  political  resolution  of  the  situa- 
tion there.  In  that  regard,  we  are 
pleased  to  note  that  yesterday,  Presi- 
dent Magana  swore  in  the  three 
members  of  the  El  Salvador  Peace  Com- 
mission. 

In  his  speech  announcing  the 
members,  President  Magana  outlined 
the  objectives  of  the  commission: 
(1)  revision  of  the  amnesty  law  and  its 
efficient  and  just  implementation;  (2)  the 
creation  of  adequate  social  conditions 
and  improvement  in  mechanisms  to  in- 
sure peace,  i.e.,  elections,  communica- 
tions, and  so  forth;  and  (3)  promoting 
the  participation  of  all  social  and 
political  sectors  in  the  democratic 
process. 

We  view  the  announcement  as  pro- 
viding an  institutional  basis  for  national 
reconciliation  in  El  Salvador  within  the 
electoral  framework  and  look  forward  to 
progress  as  the  commission  pursues  its 
objectives. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg^ 

2Read  to  news  correspondents  by  Depart- 
ment spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


last  summer  around  the  time  of  the 
resignation  of  Secretary  of  State 
Haig.  At  the  time,  it  was  said  that  you 
were  involved  in  some  policy  disputes 
with  him,  and  we  can  argue  about 
whether  or  not  that  was  true,  but  I 
think  it  was— you  would  agree  that 
there  was  some  confusion  about  who 
was  speaking  for  foreign  policy,  who 
was  making  foreign  policy.  It's  assum- 
ed now  that  you  have  the  ear  of  Presi- 
dent Reagan.  Over  the  past  few 
weeks,  as  we've  seen  the  Central 
America  issue  come  up  again.  Sec- 
retary Shultz  has  not  had  very  much  to 
say  about  it  other  than  one  day  of 
testimony  on  Capitol  Hill.  And  yet, 
we've  seen  your  trip  to  Central 
America,  a  number  of  newspaper  in- 
terviews, television  interviews.  Are 
you  running  Central  American  policy 
now? 

A.  I  should  say  not.  I  should  say 
not.  You  know,  there's  a  very  strange 
kind  of  a  notion  that  there's  something 
inappropriate,  as  it  were,  about  people 
who  sit  in  the  Cabinet  and  sit  on  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council  having  an  oppor- 
tunity to  talk  to  the  President  about 
policies  of  concern  to  the  Administra- 
tion. The  fact  is  every  member  of  the 
U.S.  Cabinet  has  the  opportunity  to  talk 
to  the  President  about  questions  that 
concern  them.  Every  member  of  the  Na- 
tional Security  Council  has  that  oppor- 
tunity, too.  That's  almost  part  of  the 
definition,  by  the  way,  is  that  you  can 
speak  to  the  President  about  things  that 
concern  you. 

I  made  the  trip  to  Central  America 
because  the  President  asked  me  to,  and 
Secretary  Shultz  asked  me  to,  I  may 
say.  Secretary  Shultz  was  going 
someplace  else  at  that  time,  on  another 
very  important  trip,  as  I  know  you 
know. 

The  Vice  President  was  going  to  a 
third  area  of  the  world  on  another  very 
important  trip.  And  there  was  a  lot  of 
public  attention  to  those  trips  im- 
mediately on  their  return.  Now  there's  a 
little  more  attention  to  my  Central 
American  trip,  but  I  think  that's  more  a 
matter  of  media  focus  than  anything 
else,  quite  frankly. 

Q.  President  Reagan  has  dis- 
missed any  parallel  between  El 
Salvador  and  Vietnam  in  a  sense  that 
he  says  that  American  ground  troops 
will  not  be  sent  there,  and  yet  he 
revives  the  domino  theory,  saying  that 
if  the  communism  isn't  stopped  in  El 
Salvador,  it  may  come  all  the  way  up 
to  the  southern  border.  My  question 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


is,  if  that's  the  case,  if  that's  the 
danger  and  it's  that  kind  of  threat  to 
national  security,  why  rule  out  the  use 
of  U.S.  troops,  and  under  what  cir- 
cumstances would  U.S.  troops  be  ad- 
visable? 

A.  I  want  to  go  back  and  say 
something  in  response  to  Ms.  DeYoung's 
question,  if  I  may,  that's  relative  to 
yours. 

It's  the  President  who  speaks  for  the 
Administration.  It  was  the  President 
last  summer  and  it's  the  President  right 
now  who  speaks  for  the  Administration. 
And  when  the  President  refers  to  a 
domino  theory,  it's  mainly  because 
everybody  else  talks  about  dominoes. 
They  say  in  Central  America  that  you 
North  Americans  are  always  talking 
about  dominoes.  I  think  they  think  it's 
the  national  pastime. 

So  far  as  I  know,  there  has  been  no 
discussion  at  any  level  in  our  govern- 
ment by  anyone,  certainly  in  any 
authoritative  role,  of  any  use  of 
American  troops.  We  cannot  imagine 
circumstances  under  which  it  would  be 
necessary.  We're  quite  sure  that  if  we 
make  wise,  prudent  policy  decisions  now 
to  deal  with  the  problems  as  they  exist 
in  Central  America  today,  we  will  never 
be  confronted  with  the  necessity  of 
using  American  troops  in  this 
Hemisphere. 

Q.  You  were  said  to  be  against  the 
idea  of  a  two-track  policy  of  negotia- 
tions and  supplying  more  military  aid. 
That  was  suggested  by  the  State 
Department.  Is  that  accurate?  And  if 
it's  not  accurate,  how  did  the  reports 
come  to  be  so  persistent? 

A.  One,  I  don't  know.  I  was  out  of 
the  country.  Two,  I'm  in  favor  of  a 
multitrack  approach.  I'm  very  strongly 
in  favor  of  increased  economic  aid,  let 
me  say,  rapidly  increased  economic  aid, 
humanitarian  aid.  I'm  also  in  favor  of 
anything  we  can  do  to  promote  a 
political  solution  through  democratic 
elections.  ■ 


Caribbean  Basin 
Initiative  Legislation 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
FEB.  16,  19831 

In  December,  I  pledged  that  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  initiative  would  be  among 
the  very  first  pieces  of  legislation  that  I 
would  submit  to  the  98th  Congress,  and 
today  I  have  taken  the  opportunity  to 
focus  again  on  this  initiative,  which  is 
close  to  my  heart  and  one  of  my  highest 
priorities. 

As  you  know,  last  year  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  initiative  enjoyed  strong, 
bipartisan  support  and  was  actually 
passed  by  the  House.  It  is  essential  that 
we  renew  our  efforts  now  to  complete 
this  vital  task. 

When  we  think  of  our  country's 
security — about  strategic  areas  absolute- 
ly essential  to  our  safety— certainly  the 
Western  Hemisphere  must  top  the  list. 
If  we  cannot  respond  to  upheavals  in 
our  own  front  yard,  how  can  we  expect 
to  play  a  strong  role  for  peace  in  the 
faraway  Middle  East,  for  example? 

Today  our  democratic  neighbors  in 
the  Caribbean  Basin  area  are  confronted 
with  unprecedented  political  and 
economic  pressures.  Aid  is  important, 
but  it  is  not  enough.  We  must  help  these 
countries  to  renew  their  economies  and 
strengthen  their  democracies.  We  must 
open  new  markets  and  encourage  invest- 
ment and  business  expansion,  which,  I 
would  stress,  will  lead  to  direct  benefits 
to  the  U.S.  economy.  The  tax  and  trade 
provisions  of  the  Caribbean  Basin  ini- 
tiative that  we  are  seeking  are  the 
essential  elements  that  would  make  our 
program  more  promising  than  past  ef- 
forts; leaving  them  out  would  gut  the 
program  of  its  greatest  strengths. 

There  are  those  who  believe  it  takes 
a  general  crisis  to  get  action  out  of 
Washington.  We  cannot  afford  to  wait 
for  a  crisis  to  erupt  so  close  to  home.  It 
has  been  almost  a  year  since  I  met  with 
Caribbean  leaders  in  Barbados.  Their 
people  believe  in  democracy  and  want 
nothing  more  than  an  opportunity  to  live 
and  work  in  freedom.  We  owe  it  to 
them — but  more  importantly,  to 
ourselves— to  follow  through  on  a  pro- 
gram so  vital  to  the  well-being  of  our 
closest  neighbors. 

It  is  no  coincidence  that  I  have  con- 
centrated considerable  efforts  on  the 
Western  Hemisphere  over  these  last  2 
years.  Shortly  after  my  election,  I 


visited  the  President  of  Mexico  a 
forged  close  ties  with  his  success 
first  head  of  state  to  visit  the  W 
House  during  my  Administratior 
Prime  Minister  Seaga  from  Jam; 
And  just  a  few  months  ago  I  visi 
South  and  Central  America,  mee 
with  six  neighboring  heads  of  st; 
Since  entering  office  it  has  been 
privilege  to  have  conferred  direc 
the  leaders  of  15  donor  and  recij 
tions  of  the  Caribbean  Basin  init 
But  I  cannot  do  it  alone.  Su( 
require  a  bipartisan  legislative  e: 
is  the  only  way  we  can  finish  tht 
started  last  year  and  put  into  ef 
tax  and  trade  provisions  of  the  ( 
bean  Basin  initiative.  If  there  is 
thing  I  have  learned  since  gettin 
White  House,  it  is  that  we  have 
work  together  if  anything  is  to  \ 
complished.  I  am  counting  on  m^ 
women  of  both  parties — as  repr 
by  today's  visitors— to  work  wit 
securing  this  vital  program  for  j 
in  the  Caribbean  region  and  gre 
security,  freedom,  and  prosperit 
the  Americas. 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRE 
FEB.  18,  19832 

Last  year  I  proposed  a  major  new  p 
for  economic  cooperation  for  the  Ca 
Basin.  I  am  pleased  to  report  that  tl 
portion  of  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initii 
acted  upon  last  year,  and  that  the  n 
already  reaped  some  of  the  benefits 
$350  million  of  this  emergency  a 
However,  while  the  House  of  Repre; 
also  approved  the  trade  and  tax  por 
this  integrated  program,  Congress  i 
before  favorable  consideration  could ' 
place  in  the  Senate.  Today  I  am  trai  '■ 
to  the  Congress  for  swift  action  the 
and  tax  plan  as  approved  by  a  majoi 
members  during  the  last  session. 

The  economic,  political,  and  sect 
challenges  in  the  Caribbean  Basin  ail 
midable.  Our  neighbors  are  struggliil 
keep  up  with  the  rapidly  changing  g  1 
economic  system,  while  striving  to  c  «J 
nurture  representative  and  responsi  'i 
tions.  These  tasks  would  be  burden  t« 
for  any  nation,  but  they  are  also  bei'f 
to  defend  themselves  against  attem]  I 
externally-supported  minorities  to  ii  t* 
alien,  hostile,  and  unworkable  systei  fl 
them  by  force.  These  challenges  mu  Ix 
ed  foursquare.  The  alternative  is  fui  er 
pansion  of  political  violence  from  th  xt 


88 


Department  of  Statef 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


jthe  extreme  right,  leading  inevitably 
Ir  economic  decline,  and  more  human 
f  and  dislocation. 

Kconomic  crisis  facing  most  of  the 
juntries  is  acute.  Deteriorating  trade 
titles,  worldwide  recession,  mounting 
lldens,  growing  unemployment,  and 
Sted  structural  problems  are  having  a 
phic  impact  throughout  the  region, 
evelopments  have  forced  thousands  of 
D  emigrate  and  have  left  even  the 
ablished  democracies  severely 
This  is  a  crisis  we  cannot  afford  to 

emergency  funding  approved  last 
helped  these  fragile  economies  cope 
r  mounting  balance-of-payments 
.  I  must  stress,  however,  that  the 
i  tax  portions  I  am  transmitting  to- 
lesigned  to  improve  the  lives  of  the 
)f  the  Caribbean  Basin  by  enabling 
earn  their  own  way  to  a  better 
.t  the  same  time,  given  the  in- 
dence  between  U.S.  and  Caribbean 


Basin  economies,  this  bill  will  also  benefit  the 
U.S.  by  expanding  markets  for  our  exports 
and  hence  improving  U.S.  job  opportunities. 
It  should  also  reduce  the  pressures  of 
economically-inspired  immigration  into  this 
country  from  the  region. 

Thanks  to  the  cooperative,  bipartisan 
spirit  with  which  this  program  has  been  con- 
sidered, and  the  changes  that  were  made  last 
year  by  Congress  to  ensure  beyond  any  doubt 
adequate  safeguards  for  domestic  interests,  I 
am  hopeful  that  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative will  be  acted  upon  with  maximum 
speed  by  the  Congress. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Issued  by  the  Office  of  the  Press 
Secretary  following  the  President's  meeting 
with  a  bipartisan  group  of  Congressmen  to 
discuss  the  proposed  legislation  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Feb.  21,  1983). 

^Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Feb.  21.  ■ 


io  Broadcasting  to  Cuba 


RTMENT  STATEMENT. 

|5,  1983' 

ruary  24,  1983,  Senator  Hawkins 
Hawkins  (R.-Fla.)]  introduced  the 
3tration's  bill  on  radio  broad- 
to  Cuba  in  the  Senate.  This 
a  period  of  close  consultation 
dio  broadcasters,  the  National 
tion  of  Broadcasters,  and  key 
•s  of  Congress.  The  objective  of 
)nsultations  was  to  find  a  for- 
r  the  radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba 
ch  would  attract  the  widest  possi- 
)ort. 

I  meeting  on  February  22,  1983, 
jipartisan  group  of  legislators, 
nt  Reagan  stressed  that  the  Ad- 
ition  believes  strongly  that  the 
Jeople  have  the  right  to  know 
going  on  in  their  country  and 
leir  government's  activities 
the  world.  This  bill  is  designed  to 
i  radio  which  will  make  such  in- 
on  available  to  the  Cuban 
-information  that  is  now  denied 
f  their  own  government.  In  the 
lished  tradition  of  Radio  Free 
/Radio  Liberty,  the  proposed 
isting  will  be  a  reliable  source  of 
e,  objective  news  and  informa- 
lis  is  a  peaceful  foreign  policy  ini- 
designed  not  to  provoke  a  con- 
ion  wdth  Castro  but  to  promote 


the  free  flow  of  ideas  and  the  truth. 
Last  year,  in  the  97th  Congress,  a  bill 
authorizing  the  creation  of  such  a  radio 
passed  the  House  of  Representatives 
with  bipartisan  support  by  an  almost 
2-1  margin  and  was  reported  favorably, 
also  with  bipartisan  support,  by  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee. 

American  broadcasters  have  had  a 
number  of  concerns  about  the  bill, 
primarily  that  the  establishment  of 
broadcasting  to  Cuba  would  result  in  an 
increase  in  longstanding  Cuban  in- 
terference with  U.S.  AM  broadcasting. 
The  Administration  did  its  utmost  to 
reach  a  compromise  that  responded  to 
those  broadcasters'  concerns,  as  well  as 
to  the  national  interest.  However,  in  the 
end,  the  Administration  did  not  believe 
that  all  of  the  modifications  requested 
by  the  National  Association  of  Broad- 
casters could  be  accommodated  consis- 
tent with  the  establishment  of  effective 
radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba. 

Nevertheless,  we  believe  the  bill  in- 
troduced on  February  24,  which  contains 
significant  accommodations  to  the  con- 
cerns of  broadcasters,  meets  in  almost 
all  respects  the  provisions  they  have 


sought.  In  fact,  most  of  the  recommen- 
dations made  by  the  National  Associa- 
tion of  Broadcasters  in  a  letter  dated 
November  16,  1982,  to  all  members  of 
the  Senate  have  been  incorporated  in 
this  bill.  The  most  important  of  these  ac- 
commodations is  not  to  establish  a  new 
station  on  the  commercial  portion  of  the 
AM  band  (535  kHz  to  1605  kHz),  other 
than  possibly  on  1180  kHz,  which  has 
been  allocated  to  and  used  by  the 
government  for  Voice  of  America  broad- 
casting to  Cuba  for  over  20  years. 
Although  the  accommodations  made  in 
this  new  bill  are  significant,  the  bill,  as 
introduced,  gives  the  Administration  the 
options  necessary  to  insure  that  radio 
broadcasting  to  Cuba  would  be  done 
right. 

Broadcasters'  concerns  over  Cuban 
interference  with  U.S.  AM  broadcasting 
are  not  new;  this  is  a  significant  problem 
that  has  been  growing  over  the  past  15 
years.  The  Cuban  Government,  in  its  ef- 
forts to  defeat  this  bill,  has  sought  to 
give  the  impression  that  interference 
would  increase.  The  Administration  has 
stated  repeatedly  that  this  is  a  peaceful, 
legal,  and  nonconfrontational  foreign 
policy  initiative  in  the  national  interest 
patterned  after  the  successful  models  of 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty. 
The  Administration  believes  that  we 
should  not  allow  our  foreign  policy  to  be 
determined  by  threats  of  the  Cuban 
Government.  We  believe  that  the  Con- 
gress and  American  broadcasters  share 
that  determination,  and  we  look  forward 
to  early  passage  of  this  important 
legislation. 

'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  acting  Department  spokesman  Alan 
Romberg.  ■ 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Antarctica 

Recommendations  relating  to  the  furtherance 
of  the  principles  and  objectives  of  the  Antarc- 
tic Treaty  (TIAS  4780).  Adopted  at  Buenos 
Aires  July  7,  1981.' 
Notification  of  approval:  U.S.,  Feb.  24,  1983. 

Atomic  Energy 

Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency.  Done  at  New  York  Oct.  26,  1956. 
Entered  into  force  July  29,  1957.  TIAS  3873. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Namibia,  Feb.  17, 
1983. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of  June 
26,  1979  (TIAS  9627)  on  research  participa- 
tion and  technical  exchange  in  the  U.S. 
power  burst  facility  (PBF)  and  heavy  section 
steel  technology  (HSST)  research  programs 
and  the  Nordic  Group's  water  reactor  safety 
research  programs.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
letters  at  Washington  and  Nykoping  Oct.  8 
and  Dec.  23,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  23,  1982;  effective  Aug.  28,  1982. 

Coffee 

Extension  of  the  international  coffee  agree- 
ment, 1976  (TIAS  8683).  Done  at  London 
Sept.  25,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 
1982.  TIAS  10439. 

Definitive  acceptance  deposited:  Singapore, 
Feb.  3,  1983. 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980.' 
Ratification  deposited:  Cameroon,  Feb.  1, 


Customs 

Amendments  to  the  customs  convention  on 

the  international  transport  of  goods  under 

cover  of  TIR  carnets  of  Nov.  14,  1975. 

Adopted  by  the  administration  committee  for 

the  TIR  convention  1975  at  Geneva  Oct.  23, 

1981. 

Entered  into  force:  Oct.  1,  1982. 

Education— UNESCO 

Convention  on  the  recognition  of  studies, 
diplomas,  and  degrees  concerning  higher 
education  in  the  states  belonging  to  the 
Europe  region.  Done  at  Paris,  Dec.  21,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  19,  1982.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Denmark,  Dec.  9, 
1982. 

Expositions 

Protocol  revising  the  convention  of  Nov.  22, 
1928  (TIAS  6548)  relating  to  international  ex- 
positions, with  appendix  and  annex.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  30,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
June  9,  1980.  TIAS  9948. 
Accessions  deposited:  Argentina,  Bolivia, 


Chile,  El  Salvador,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Peru, 
Dec.  7,  1982;  Costa  Rica,  Venezuela,  Nov.  23, 
1982;  Cuba,  Nov.  17,  1982;  Panama,  Dec.  3, 


Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accession  deposited:  Belize,  Dec.  15, 
1982. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Adopted  at 
Paris  Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  12,  1951.2 
Accessions  deposited:  Gabon,  Jan.  21,  1983. 

Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Done  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  1966. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976. ^ 
Accessions  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Jan.  24, 
1983;  Gabon,  Jan.  21,  1983. 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social, 

and  cultural  rights.  Done  at  New  York 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 

1976.' 

Accessions  deposited:  Afghanistan,  Jan.  24, 

1983;  Gabon,  Jan.  21,  1983. 

Judicial  Procedure 

Convention  on  the  taking  of  evidence  abroad 
in  civil  or  commercial  matters.  Done  at  The 
Hague  Mar.  18,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  7,  1972.  TIAS  7444. 
Accessions  deposited:  Cyprus,  Jan.  13,  1983. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum 
age  for  marriage,  and  registration  of  mar- 
riages. Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  9,  1964.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Guatemala,  Jan.  18, 


Nuclear  Material— Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 
na Oct.  26,  1979.' 
Ratification  deposited:  U.S.,  Dec.  13,  1982. 

Patents 

Patent  cooperation  treaty,  with  regulations. 
Done  at  Washington  June  19,  1970.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  24,  1978,  except  for  Chapter 
II  which  entered  into  force  Mar.  29,  1978,3 
TIAS  8733. 
Accession  deposited:  Mauritania,  Jan.  13, 


Racial  Discrimination 

International  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
all  forms  of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at 
New  York  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  4,  1969.2 
Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala,  Jan.  18, 


Safety  at  Sea  i 

Proces-verba]  of  rectification  to  the  ii  I 
tional  convention  for  the  safety  of  lifii 
1974  (TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  El 
1982. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  : 
damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Dor 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  M 

1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  : " 
the  U.S.  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Feb.  24i 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunications  cor 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at 
Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  Entered 
force  Jan.  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S.  Apr. 
TIAS  8572. 
Ratification  deposited:  Sudan,  Oct.  2 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  a 
protocol.  Done  at  (Geneva  Dec.  6,  19' 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982,  exci 
(1)  arts.  25  and  66  and  appendix  43  ' 
entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981  and  ( 
provisions  concerning  aeronautical  n 
service  which  entered  into  force  Feb 
Approval  deposited:  Hungary,  Oct. 

Terrorism 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  pi 
ment  of  crimes  against  international 
tected  persons,  including  diplomatic 
Done  at  New  York  Dec.  14,  1973.  E 
to  force  Feb.  20,  1977.  TIAS  8532. 
Ratification  deposited:  Guatemala, 
Jan.  18,  1983. 

Trade 

U.N.  convention  on  contracts  for  the 

tional  sale  of  goods.  Done  at  Vienna 

1980.' 

Accession  deposited:  Syrian  Arab 

Oct.  19,  1982. 

Protocol  extending  the  arrangment  i 
international  trade  in  textiles  of  Dec 

1973,  as  extended  (TIAS  7840,  8939 
at  Geneva  Dec.  22,  1981.  Entered  in 
Jan.  1,  1982.  TIAS  10323. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Peru,  Jan.  5, 
Yugoslavia,  Jan.  18,  1983.'' 

U.N.  Industrial  Development  Orgai 

Constitution  of  the  U.N.  Industrial  I 
ment  Organization,  with  annexes.  Di 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.' 
Signature:  Cape  Verde,  Jan.  28,  198' 
Ratification  deposited:  Rwanda,  Jan. 
1983;  Venezuela,  Jan.  28,  1983. 

Whaling 

International  whaling  convention  ani 
schedule  of  whaling  regulations, 
by  1956  protocol.  Done  at  Washingt^ 
Dec.  2,  1946.  Entered  into  force  No' 
1948.  TIAS  1849,  4228. 
Adherence  deposited:  Finland,  Feb. 

I 


Department  of  State  ui 


TREATIES 


I  for  the  sixth  extension  of  the 

,)<■  .■..nvention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
VasliinKnon  Mar.  24,  1981,  Entered 
.hiiv  1.  1981:  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  12, 
\S  iii:-:.".o. 
ii'e  lie  ■posited:  Netherlands,  Feb.  18, 


ncol  tor  the  first  extension  of  the 
■i.nvfntion,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 
.Vashiiitrton  Mar.  24,  1981.  Entered 
.  Jiilv  1,  1981;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  12, 
\S  Id.'i.Sl. 
ce  .li'posited:  Netherlands,  Feb.  18, 


an  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 

ation  against  women.  Adopted  at 

k  Dee.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

981.2 

on  deposited:  Gabon,  Jan.  21,  1983. 

eritage 

on  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
tural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
V.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
1975.  TIAS  8226. 
ons  deposited:  Cameroon,  Dec.  7, 


izambique,  Nov.  27, 


esh 


nt  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
Itural  commodities  of  Mar.  8,  1982 
|)483).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
li  Dec.  30,  1982.  Entered  into  force 

1982. 

nt  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
iltural  commodities  of  Mar.  8,  1982 
)483).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
I  Feb.  6,  1983.  Entered  into  force 


ndum  of  understanding  concerning 
ion  in  aerospace  experiments  employ- 
ding  rockets.  Signed  at  Brasilia 
5.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  31, 


»nt  extending  the  agreement  of  June 
(TIAS  9020),  as  extended,  on  ex- 
I  and  cooperation  in  cultural,  scien- 
Licational,  technological,  and  other 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Sofia 
and  Apr."  9,  1982.  Entered  into  force 


ent  concerning  the  test  and  evalua- 
J.S.  defense  weapons  systems  in 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
?ton  Feb.  10,  1983.  Entered  into 
Jb.  10,  1983. 


Dominican  Republic 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  28,  1977  (TIAS  8944),  with  memoran- 
dum of  understanding.  Signed  at  Santo  Dom- 
ingo Dec.  11,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  11,  1982. 

El  Salvador 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  22,  1981,  as  amended.  Signed  at  San 
Salvador  Dec.  15,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  22,  1982. 

France 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  per- 
sons. Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  25,  1983. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  first  day  of  the  sec- 
ond month  after  exchange  of  notifications  of 
completion  of  constitutional  procedures. 

Agreement  regarding  participation  in  the 
U.S.  NRC  steam  generator  safety  research 
project,  with  appendix.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Paris  Mar.  18  and  June  8,  1982.  Entered 
into  force  June  8,  1982. 

Amendment  to  agreement  of  Mar.  18  and 
June  8,  1982  regarding  participation  in  the 
U.S.  NRC  steam  generator  safety  research 
project.  Signed  at  Washington  and  Paris 
Oct.  8  and  22,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  22,  1982. 

International  Coffee  Organization 

Agreement  relating  to  a  procedure  for  U.S. 
income  tax  reimbursement.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  London  Dec.  17,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1983. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  Mar.  20  and 
25,  1980  (TIAS  9739). 

International  Sugar  Organization 

Agreement  relating  to  a  procedure  for  U.S. 
income  tax  reimbursement.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  letters  at  London  Dec.  17,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1983. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  July  10,  1980 
(TIAS  9807). 

Israel 

Grant  agreement  to  support  the  economic 
and  political  stability  of  Israel.  Signed  at 
Washington  Dec.  16,  1982.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  16,  1982. 

Japan 

Agreement  amending  and  extending  the 
agreement  of  Jan.  28,  1980  (TIAS  9915) 
relating  to  space  shuttle  contingency  landing 
sites.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tokyo 
Nov.  11,  1982.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  11, 
1982. 

Liberia 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  11,  1951,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  2171,  8846),  relating  to  a  military  mis- 
sion. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Monrovia  Dec.  12,  1980  and  Jan.  15,  1981. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  15,  1981;  effective 
Jan.  11,  1981. 


Agreement  on  construction  of  additional 
facilities  at  Roberts  International  Airport. 
Signed  at  Monrovia  Feb.  3,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  Feb.  3,  1983. 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  13,  1980  (TIAS  9841).  Signed  at 
Monrovia  Dec.  17,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  17,  1982. 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  Apr.  6,  1982. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Monrovia 
Nov.  19  and  Dec.  8,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  8,  1982. 

Madagascar 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  19,  1981  (TIAS  10218).  Signed  at  An- 
tananarivo Dec.  28,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  28,  1982. 

Mauritius 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  29,  1979  (TIAS  9541),  with  minutes  of 
negotiation.  Signed  at  Port  Louis  Dec.  30, 
1982.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  30,  1982. 

Mexico 

Agreement  concerning  land  mobile  service  in 
the  bands  470-512  MHz  and  806-890  MHz 
along  the  common  U.S. -Mexico  border. 
Signed  at  Mexico  June  18,  1982. 
Entry  into  force:  Jan.  17,  1983. 

Agreement  relating  to  assignments  and  usage 
of  television  broadcasting  channels  in  the  fre- 
quency range  470-806  MHz  (channels  14-69) 
along  the  U.S. -Mexico  border.  Signed  at  Mex- 
ico June  18,  1982. 
Entry  into  force:  Jan.  17,  1983. 
Supersedes:  Agreement  of  July  16,  1958 
(TIAS  4089). 

Agreement  extending  the  air  transport 
agreement  of  Aug.  15,  1960,  as  amended  and 
extended  (TIAS  4675,  7167).  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Mexico  Sept.  16  and 
Dec.  13,  1982.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  13, 
1982. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Jan.  20,  1978  relating  to  reduced  air  fares 
and  charter  air  services  (TIAS  10115).  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Mexico 
Dec.  27,  1982  and  Jan.  13,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  Jan.  13,  1983. 

Philippines 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton,  wool, 
and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile  prod- 
ucts, with  annexes.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Nov.  24,  1982.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  1,  1983. 

Senegal 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  and  memorandum 
of  understanding  of  May  16,  1980  (TIAS 


983 


CHRONOLOGY 


PRESS  RELEASES 


10239).  Effected  by  letter  of  July  14,  1982  at 
Dakar.  Entered  into  force  July  16,  1982. 


February  1983 


ACTeement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  February  1  ^    ,-, 

of^he  U  S  ^th  annexes  and  agreed  minutes.  Honduran  and  U.S.  troops  conduct  joint 

Si^ed  at  Washington  July  29tl982.  military  exercises  in  Gracious  A  Dios  depart- 
Entered  into  force:  Jan.  17,  1983. 


Sudan 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  24,  1977  (TIAS  9157).  Signed  at  Khar- 
toum Jan.  20,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  20,  1983. 

Sweden 

Memorandum  of  agreement  on  the  exchange 
of  military  personnel  and  on  the  general  con- 
ditions which  will  apply.  Signed  at  Wash- 
ington Jan.  13  and  17,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  17,  1983. 

Turkey 

Agreement  to  support  and  promote  the  finan- 
cial stability  and  economic  recovery  of 
Turkey.  Signed  at  Ankara  Dec.  17,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  17,  1982. 

United  Kingdom 

Agreement  extending  the  arrangement  of 
July  20  and  Aug.  3,  1977  (TIAS  8688)  in  the 
field  of  nuclear  safety  research  and  develop- 
ment. Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Warrington  and  Washington  Feb.  18  and 
June  11,  1982.  Entered  into  force  June  11, 
1982;  effective  Aug.  3,  1982. 

Venezuela 

Memorandum  of  understanding  relating  to  in- 
terim agreement  on  maritime  matters. 
Signed  at  Washington  Jan.  14,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Jan.  14,  1983. 


•Not  in  force. 

2Not  in  force  for  U.S. 

'Chapter  II  not  in  force  for  U.S. 

^Subject  to  approval. 

^Applicable  to  Kingdom  in  Europe. 


military  exercises  i 
ment  Feb.  1-9,  1983. 

February  2 

Austrian  Chancellor  Bruno  Kreisky  makes  an 
official  working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C. 
Feb.  2-4. 

President  Reagan  meets  with  six  Afghan 
freedom  fighters  at  the  White  House  to  ex- 
press U.S.  concern  and  sympathy  for  these 
people  because  of  the  continuing  Soviet  oc- 
cupation of  their  country. 

February  8 

The  United  States  formally  joins  the  African 
Development  Bank. 

State  Department  submits  annual  human 
rights  report  to  the  Congress.  The  Report, 
required  by  U.S.  law,  reviews  human  rights 
practices  in  162  nations  including  those  na- 
tions receiving  U.S.  assistance  and  those  that 
are  U.N.  members. 

February  9 

Nepalese  Prime  Minister  Surya  Bahadur 
Thapa,  during  a  private  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.  Feb.  9-16,  meets  with  Vice  President 
Bush  Feb.  16  and  with  Secretary  Shultz 
Feb.  14. 

February  13 

In  the  first  contested  presidential  election  in 
Cyprus  in  22  years,  the  incumbent  President 
of  Cyprus,  Spyros  Kyprianou,  is  re-elected  to 
a  second  5-year  term. 

February  14 

The  Interim  Committee  of  the  Board  of 
Governors  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  agrees  in  its  20th  meeting  in 
Washington,  D.C.  to  an  increase  in  quotas  by 
47.4%. 

State  Department  releases  to  Congress 
and  makes  public  a  new  report  on  Soviet 
forced  labor.  The  report  stresses  the  Soviet 
policy  of  using  forced  labor  as  a  punishment 
for  crimes,  as  well  as  to  build  the  country's 
economy. 

February  15 

By  a  vote  of  28-9  with  4  abstentions,  the 
U.N.  Commission  on  Human  Rights  adopts  a 
resolution  calling  for  "immediate  and  uncondi- 
tional withdrawal  of  foreign  forces  from 
Kampuchea." 

February  16 

President  Reagan  announces  that  Air  Force 
AWACS  reconnaissance  planes  have  been 
sent  to  Egypt  for  exercises  designated  for 
training. 

Norwegian  Prime  Minister  Kaare  Willoch 
makes  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.  Feb.  16-18. 


By  a  vote  of  29-7  with  5  abstentiijl: 
U.N.  Commission  on  Human  Rights  p 
resolution:  i 

•  Urging  a  political  solution  for  t  j, 
istan  based  on  self-determination  free* 
outside  interference;  [ 

•  Calling  for  immediate  withdra»4 
foreign  troops  from  Afghanistan.        f 

February  22 

During  a  private  visit  to  the  United  S  || 
Jamaican  Prime  Minister  Edward  Se . 
vited  by  President  Reagan  to  receive  ' 
American  Friendship  medal. 

February  23 

Israeli  ambassador  to  the  United  Sta  • 
Moshe  Arens,  is  confirmed  as  Israeli  ' 
Minister.  r 

February  27 

Her  Majesty  Queen  Elizabeth  II  arri' 
12-day  official  visit  to  the  west  coast 
the  visit,  the  Queen  will  meet  with  P  j 
Reagan  and  other  U.S.  officials. 

Chief  Hiteswar  Saikia  is  sworn  ij 
Chief  Minister  of  the  Indian  state  of 
following  state  elections.  ■ 


f 

Department  of  Stati^ 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  f  t 
Office  of  Press  Relations,  Departmei  | 
State,  Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

I 


Subject 


Program  for  the  offi 
working  visit  of  A 
Chancellor  Bruno 
Feb.  2-4. 

U.S.,  Japan  exchang 
on  cooperation  in 
research  and  dev6 

Shultz:  arrival  statei 
Tokyo,  Jan.  30. 

Shultz:  luncheon  ren 
Tokyo,  Feb.  1. 

Shultz:  news  confer* 
Tokyo,  Feb.  1.      ' 

Shultz:  news  confer*  j 
route  to  Beijing,  1 

Shultz:  toast,  Beijin): 

Subcommittee  on  Ss 
Life  at  Sea  (SOLi 
ping  Coordinating  I 
mittee(SCC),  Fel' 
tional  Committee 
Prevention  of  Ma 
Pollution  fNCPMl 
Mar.  10. 

U.S.  Organization  f( ' 
International  Rad 
sultative  Commit! 
(CCIR),  study  gro 
Mar.  16. 


Department  of  State 


PRESS  RELEASES 


Shultz:  remarks  to  the 
American  business  com- 
munity, Beijing,  Feb.  3. 
Shultz:  press  conference, 

Beijing,  Feb.  5. 
Shultz:  interview.  Radio 

Beijing,  Beijing,  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  dinner  toast,  Seoul, 

Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  news  conference  en 

route  to  Seoul,  Feb.  6. 
Shultz:  toast,  Beijing,  Feb.  5. 
Department  of  State  activ- 
ities in  the  private  sector 
initiatives  area. 
Shultz:  news  conference, 

Seoul,  Feb.  8. 
Shultz:  news  conference. 

Hong  Kong,  Feb.  9. 
Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of 
Norwegian  Prime 
Minister  Kaare  Willoch, 
Feb.  16-18. 
U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCITT),  study  groups  A 
and  B,  Mar.  2. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 
Shultz:  press  conference,  on 
Williamsburg  Economic 
Summit,  Feb.  17. 
Palau  approves  free  asso- 
ciation with  the  U.S. 
(revised). 
Regional  foreign  policy  con- 
ference, Denver,  Mar.  8. 
Shultz:  address  and  question- 
and-answer  session  before 
the  Conservative  Political 
Action  Conference. 
CCITT,  Integrated  Services 
Digital  Network  (ISDN), 
working  party,  Mar.  10. 
CCIR,  study  group  CMIT, 

Mar.  15. 
Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Budget  Committee. 
Shultz:  arrival  statement, 

Washington,  Feb.  10. 
Shultz:  interview  on  ABC-TV 
"This  Week  With  David 
Brinkley,"  Feb.  20. 
Shultz:  statement  before 
the  Subcommittee  on  In- 
ternational Operations, 
House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee. 
Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Operations,  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee. 
Shultz:  address  at  the 

Southern  Center  for  Inter- 
national Studies,  Atlanta. 


Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  the 
Atlanta  address,  Feb.  24. 

Shultz:  statement  announc- 
ing members  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Planning 
Commission. 

Shultz:  press  conference,  Bal 
Harbour,  Florida,  Feb.  25. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  Appropria- 
tions Committee,  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Commit- 
tee. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 

No.  Date  Subject 


104 

11/1 

Gershman:  world  social 
situation.  Committee  III. 

105 

11/3 

Zimmerman:  world  charter 
for  nature.  General 
Assembly. 

106 

11/2 

Fields:  chemical  weapons 
convention.  Committee  I. 

107 

11/3 

Gershman:  vote  on  Decade 
for  Action  to  Combat 
Racism  and  Racial 
Discrimination,  General 
Assembly. 

108 

11/4 

Adelman:  worid  disarmament 
campaign.  Committee  I. 

109 

11/4 

Bennett:  personnel. 
Committee  V. 

110 

11/3 

Sherman:  Falkland  Islands, 
General  Assembly. 

•111 

11/4 

Lichenstein:  peaceful  uses  of 
outer  space.  Special 
Political  Committee. 

•112 

11/4 

Adelman:  Falkland  Islands, 
General  Assembly. 

•113 

11/4 

Bond:  non-use  of  force. 
Committee  VI. 

•114 

11/4 

Bond:  Central  America, 
Committee  VI. 

•115 

11/4 

Bond:  Central  America, 
Committee  VI. 

•116 

11/4 

Akalousky:  worid  dis- 
armament campaign,  Com- 
mittee I. 

•117 

11/5 

Reynolds:  Decade  for 

Women,  equality,  develop- 
ment. Committee  III. 

•118 

11/5 

Clark:  Central  America, 
Committee  I. 

•119 

11/9 

Housholder:  joint  inspection 
unit,  Committee  V. 

•120 

11/12 

Sherman:  TTPI,  Committee 
IV. 

121 

11/11 

122 

11/11 

123 

11/12 

124 

11/12 

125 

11/15 

126 

11/15 

127 

11/15 

128 

11/16 

130 

11/16 

131 

11/16 

132 

11/16 

133 

11/16 

134 

11/18 

135 

11/17 

136 

11/18 

137 

11/18 

138 

11/19 

139 

11/22 

140 

11/22 

11/23 
11/23 


145 

11/24 

146 

11/24 

147 

11/24 

148 

11/26 

Sherman:  U.S.  territories. 

Committee  IV. 
Kirkpatrick:  death  of 

Brezhnev,  General 

Assembly. 
Luce;  apartheid.  General 

Assembly. 
Sherman:  South  Africa, 

Committee  IV. 
Douglas:  refugees. 

Committee  III. 
Johnston:  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes,  General 

Assembly. 
Gershman:  youth.  Committee 

ni. 

Johnston:  International  Civil 
Service  Commission,  Com- 
mittee V. 

Sorzano:  state  property, 
archives,  and  debts. 
General  Assembly. 

Johnston:  U.N.-OAU  cooper- 
ation, (General  Assembly. 

Johnston:  U.N.-OAU  cooper- 
ation. General  Assembly. 

Johnston:  U.N. -League  of 
Arab  States  cooperation. 
General  Assembly. 

Johnston:  Israeli  attack  on 
Iraqi  nuclear  installation. 
General  Assembly. 

Hoskins:  operational  ac- 
tivities for  development. 
Committee  II. 

Gershman:  refugees.  Com- 
mittee III. 

Lodge:  nuclear  freeze.  Com- 
mittee I. 

Johnston:  IAEA  report, 
CJeneral  Assembly. 

Duggan:  contributions  to 
UNHCR,  General 
Assembly. 

Gundersen:  peace  and  dis- 
armament movements. 
Committee  I. 

Lichenstein:  use  of  satellites 
for  direct  television  broad- 
casting, Special  Political 
Committee. 

Lichenstein:  contributions 
to  UNRWA,  General 
Assembly. 

Kasten:  religious  intolerance, 
Committee  III. 

Padilla:  decolonization.  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

Schwab:  International  Law 
Commission,  Committee 
VI. 

Luce:  decolonization.  Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

Kirkpatrick:  Afghanistan, 
General  Assembly. 

Feldman:  Iran,  Committee 
III. 

Gershman:  human  rights, 
Committee  III. 


PUBLICATIONS 


1 1/26     Sherman:  Cuba  and  Laos, 
General  Assembly. 

11/26     Milton:  prevention  of  an 

arms  race  in  outer  space, 
Committee  I. 

11/29  Gershman:  drug  trafficking, 
Committee  III. 

12/1       Gundersen:  non-first-use  of 
nuclear  weapons.  Commit- 
tee I. 

12/1  U.S.  and  Republic  of  Palau 
call  plebiscite  on  compact 
of  free  association. 

12/1  Gershman:  drug  trafficking. 
Committee  III. 

12/1  Lichenstein:  UNRWA,  Spe- 
cial Political  Committee. 

[Not  issued.] 


'l57       12/2       Lichenstein:  information. 

Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 

'158      12/2        Lichenstein:  information. 

Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 

'159       12/2       Lichenstein:  information, 

Special  Political  Commit- 
tee. 

■160      [Not  issued.] 

'161       12/3        Reich:  program  of  action 
concerning  disabled  per- 
sons. General  Assembly. 

'162       12/3       Adelman:  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference,  General 
Assembly. 

163      12/3       Adelman:  Law  of  the  Sea 
Conference,  General 
Assembly. 

164       12/3        Papendorp:  program  plan- 
ning. Committee  V. 

165  12/3       Lodge:  ECOSOC  report. 

Committee  III. 

166  12/6       Kasten:  human  rights  in 

Poland,  Committee  III. 

167  12/7        Kirkpatrick:  human  rights. 

Committee  III. 

168  12/7        Kuttner:  U.N.  pension  sys- 

tem. Committee  V. 

169  12/8       Gershman:  UNHCR  report. 

Committee  III. 

170  12/8       Lichenstein:  apartheid.  Gen- 

eral Assembly. 

171  12/8       Gershman:  religious  intoler- 

ance, Committee  III. 

172  12/8       Adelman:  chemical  and  bio- 

logical weapons.  Commit- 
tee I. 

173  12/9       Lichenstein:  IAEA  report. 

General  Assembly. 

174  12/9        Lichenstein:  Israeli  practices 

in  the  occupied  territories. 
General  Assembly. 

175  12/9       Luce:  apartheid.  General 

Assembly. 

176  12/9        Lodge:  military  spending, 

Committee  I. 


•177 

12/10 

'178 

12/10 

•179 

12/10 

•180 

12/10 

•181 

12/10 

•182 

12/10 

•183 

12/13 

•184 

12/15 

•185 

12/15 

Craighead:  international 
security,  Committee  I. 

Sherman:  question  of  Pal- 
estine. General  Assembly. 

Craighead:  international 
security.  Committee  I. 

Adelman:  comprehensive  test 
ban.  General  Assembly. 

Gershman:  Guatemala,  Com- 
mittee III. 

Gershman:  Chile,  Committee 
III. 

Luce:  world  disarmament 
campaign,  General 
Assembly. 

Gershman:  ECOSOC  report. 
Committee  III. 

Gershman:  ECOSOC  report. 
Committee  III. 


•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin 


Department  off  State 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Progress  in  the  Quest  for  Peace  and 
Freedom,  American  Legion,  Feb.  22,  1983 
(Current  Policy  #455). 

Vice  President  Bush 

U.S.  Commitment  to  Peace  and  Security  in 
Europe,  Royal  Institute  of  International  Af- 
fairs, London,  Feb.  9,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#452). 

Advancing  the  Cause  of  Peace  and  Arms 
Control,  Committee  on  Disarmament, 
Geneva,  Feb.  4,  1983  (Current  Policy  #448). 

Peace  and  Security  in  Europe  (includes  a 
letter  from  President  Reagan  to  the  people 
of  Europe),  West  Berlin,  Jan.  31,  1983 
(Current  Policy  #447). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Restoring  Prosperity  to  the  World  Economy, 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee, 
Feb.  15,  1983  (Current  Policy  #451). 


Africa 

The  Horn  of  Africa:  U.S.  Policy  (GIST, 
January  1983). 

The  Search  for  Regional  Security  in  Southern 
Africa,  Assistant  Secretary  Crocker,  Sub- 
committee on  Africa,  House  Foreign  Af- 
fairs Committee,  Feb.  15,  1983  (Current 
Policy  #453). 

Background  Notes  on  Mozambique  (Jan. 
1983). 

Background  Notes  on  Namibia  (Jan.  1983). 


East  Asia  I 

Assessment  of  U.S.  Relations  With 
Assistant  Secretary  Holdridge,  N| 
Council  on  U.S. -China  Relations,  ' 
York,  Dec.  13,  1982  (Current  Pol 

Economics 

Agriculture  in  U.S.  Foreign  Econoii 
(GIST,  January  1983).  U.S.  E.xpol 
sion  (GIST,  January  1983).  I 

Europe 

Economic  Health  of  the  Western  A 
Ambassador  Burns,  Deutsche  At! 
Gesellschaft,  Bonn,  Dec.  9,  1982 
Policy  #445). 

Review  of  U.S.  Relations  With  the 
Union,  Under  Secretary  Eaglebu 
Governing  Board  of  the  World  Ji 
gress,  Feb.  1,  1983  (Current  Poll 

Food 

World  Food  Security  (GIST,  Feb.  : 

Human  Rights 

Implementation  of  Helsinki  Final  I 
teenth  Semiannual  Report  (June 
1982-November  30,  1982),  Presi 
Reagan's  report  to  the  Commissi 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Eur 
January  1983  (Special  Report  #1 

Middle  East 

Lebanon  (GIST,  Jan.  1983). 

Nuclear  Policy 

Nuclear  Nonproliferation:  Our  Sha 
sponsibility.  Ambassador  Kennec 
American  Nuclear  Society,  San  I 
Jan.  25,  1983  (Current  Policy  #4' 

Western  Hemisphere 

Background  Notes  on  Brazil 

(December  1982). 
Background  Notes  on  Guyana 

(December  1982). 
Background  Notes  on  Nicaragua 

(January  1983). 
Background  Notes  on  Uruguay 

(December  1982). 
Certification  of  Progress  in  El  Sali 

Assistant  Secretary  Enders,  Hou 

Affairs  Committee,  Feb.  4;  and  1 

Secretary  Abrams,  Senate  Foreij 

tions  Committee,  Feb.  2  (Curren 

#449). 
El  Salvador:  Certification  Process  ■ 

Feb.  1983).  ■ 


Department  of  Stat 


983 

9  83,  No.  2073 


1.  Yellow  Rain:  The  Arms  Control 
))ns  (Eagleburger) 77 

Ipment    Dialogue    With    Africa 

id-Answer    Session    Following 

^ddress  (Shultz) 28 

or  Regional  Security  in  Southern 

rocker) 50 

'inciples 

'rinciples    and    Foreign    Policy 

ocracy  (Shultz) 47 

»1 

ual    Report    (message    to    the 

)   60 

ecurity    in    the    Nuclear    Age 

ence  of  February  16  (Reagan)  .  22 

itional  Security  (Reagan) 8 

-Answer  Session  Following  San 

)  Address  (Shultz) 35 

lultz's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

nd  Brinkley" 44 

is  With  Europe  and  Ties  to  NATO 

65 

;  The  Arms  Control  Implications 
rger)  77 

of  State  Activities  in  the  Private 

rea 61 

d  East  Asia:  A  Partnership  for 

re  (Shultz) 31 

'isit    of    Austrian    Chancellor 

Kreisky,  Reagan) 69 

epartment  of  State  Activities  in 
ite  Sector  Area 61 

an   Enduring  Relationship  With 

'olfowitz) 63 

id-Answer    Session    Following 

Wdress  (Shultz) 28 

,-Answer  Session  Following  San 

D  Address  (Shultz) 35 

lultz's  Interview  on  "This  Week 

vid  Brinkley" 44 

id  East  Asia:  A  Partnership  for 
ire  (Shultz) 31 

lual    Report    (message    to    the 

i)   60 

Basin  Initiative  Legislation 
message  to  the  Congress)  ....  88 
an  Enduring  Relationship  With 

/■olfowitz) 63 

rhts    Progress    in    El    Salvador 

I) 73 

iocracy  (Shultz) 47 

for  Regional  Security  in  Southern 

>ocker) 50 

ig  Democracy  in  Central  Amer- 

tz) 37 

t   on   Cyprus   (message    to   the 

s)    67 

laims  Tribunal:  Recent  Develqp- 

lichel) 74 

ipatinn  in  the  UN,  1981  (mess^e 

longress) 81 

Ins  With  Europe  and  Ties  to  NATO 
' 65 

idcasting    to    Cuba   (Department 

nt) 89 

;h  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to 

gressi 67 

t  and  Foreign  Service.  Foreign 
Planning    Council    Members    An- 

(Shultz) 62 

Countries.  Foreign  Aid  and  U.S. 
1  Interests  (Shultz) 25 


Economics 

American  Principles  and  Foreign  Policy 
(Shultz)    40 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  Legislation 
(Reagan,  message  to  the  Confess)  .  .  .  .88 

Our  Development  Dialogue  With  Africa 
(Crocker) 53 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Atlanta  Address  (Shultz) 28 

The  U.S.  and  East  Asia:  A  Partnership  for 
the  Future  (Shultz) 31 

El  Salvador 

Ambassador  Hinton  Interviewed  on  "This 
Week  With  David  Brinkley" 83 

Ambassador  Kirkpatrick  Interviewed  on  "Meet 
the  Press" 84 

El  Salvador  Announces  Peace  Commission 
(Department  statements) 87 

Human  Rights  Progress  in  El  Salvador 
(Abrams) 73 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following  San 
Francisco  Address  (Shultz) 35 

Strategic  Importance  of  El  Salvador  and  Cen- 
tral America  (Reagan) 19 

Europe 

Secretary  Shultz's  Interview  on  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley" 44 

U.S.  Relations  With  Europe  and  Ties  to  NATO 
(Burt) 65 

Foreign  Aid 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  National  Interests 
(Shultz)    25 

Our  Development  Dialogue  With  Africa 
(Crocker) 53 

Strengthening  Democracy  in  Central  America 
(Shultz)    37 

Human  Rights 

Human  Rights  Progress  in  El  Salvador 
(Abrams) 73 

Information  Policy.  Radio  Broadcasting  to 
Cuba  (Department  statement) 89 

International  Law.  U.S. -Iran  Claims  Tri- 
bunal: Recent  Developments  (Michel)  .  .74 

International  Organizations.  U.S.  Completes 
Assessment  of  IAEA  (Kennedy) 79 

Iran.  U.S. -Iran  Claims  Tribunal:  Recent 
Developments  (Michel) 74 

Japan.  The  U.S.  and  East  Asia:  A  Partnership 
for  the  Future  (Shultz) 31 

Laos.  Yellow  Rain:  The  Arms  Control  Implica- 
tions (Eagleburger) 77 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  Legislation 
(Reagan,  message  to  the  Congress)  ...  .88 

Peace  and  National  Security  (Reagan) 8 

Strategic  Importance  of  El  Salvador  and  Cen- 
tral America  (Reagan) 19 

Strengthening  Democracy  in  Central 
America  (Shultz) 37 

Libya 

Libya  (Kirkpatrick) 81 

Micronesia.  U.S. -Micronesia  Plebiscite  . .  .80 

Middle  East 

News  Conference  of  February  16  (Reagan)  .  22 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Atlantic  Address  (Shultz) 28 

Secretary  Shultz's  Interview  on  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley" 44 

Military  Affairs 

American  Principles  and  Foreign  Policy 
(Shultz)    40 

Monetary  Affairs.  Question-and-Answer  Ses- 
sion Following  San  Francisco  Address 
(Shultz)    35 

Namibia.  The  Search  for  Regional  Security  in 
Southern  Africa  (Crocker) 50 

Non-Self-Governing  Territories 

Palau  Approves  Free  Association  With  the 
U.S 80 

U.S.-Micronesia  Plebiscite 80 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

News  Conference  of  February  16  (Reagan)  .  22 

U.S.  Relations  With  Europe  and  Ties  to  NATO 
(Burt) 65 

Norway.  Visit  of  Norwegian  Prime  Minister 
Willoch  (Reagan,  Willoch) 70 


Nuclear  Policy 

Ensuring  Security  in  the  Nuclear  Age 
(Dam) 57 

U.S.  Completes  Assessment  of  IAEA 
(Kennedy)   79 

Oceans.  Funding  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Pre- 
paratory Commission  (Reagan) 82 

Palau.  Palau  Approves  Free  Association 
With  the  U.S 80 

Poland.  Poland's  Debt  (Department  state- 
ment)   66 

Presidential  Documents 

ACDA  Annual  Report  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   60 

Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  Legislation 
(Reagan,  message  to  the  Congress)  ....  88 

Funding  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Preparatory 
Commission  (Reagan) 82 

News  Conference  of  February  16  (Reagan)  .  22 

Peace  and  National  Security  (Reagan) 8 

Strategic  Importance  of  El  Salvador  and 
Central  America  (Reagan) 19 

The  Trade  Challenge  for  the  1980s  (Reagan)  15 

12th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the  Con- 
gress)   67 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  UN,  1981  (message 
to  the  Congress) 81 

Visit  of  Austrian  Chancellor  Kreisky  (Kreisky, 
Reagan) 69 

Visit  of  Norwegian  Prime  Minister  Willoch 
(Reagan,  Willoch) 70 

Visit  of  Queen  Elizabeth  II  (Queen 
Elizabeth  II,  Reagan) 71 

Publications.  Department  of  State 94 

Security  Assistance 

Strateeic  Importance  of  El  Salvador  and  Cen- 
tral America  (Reagan) 19 

Sweden.  The  U.S.  and  Sweden:  An  Enduring 
Friendship  (Miller) 1 

Trade.  The  Trade  Challenge  for  the  1980s 
(Reagan)    15 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

Ensuring  Security  in  the  Nuclear  Age 
(Dam) 57 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Atlanta  Address  (Shultz) 28 

Secretary  Shultz's  Interview  on  "This  Week 
With  David  Brinkley" 44 

Yellow  Rain:  The  Arms  Control  Implications 
(Eagleburger)   77 

United  Kingdom.  Visit  of  Queen  Elizabeth  II 
(Queen  Elizabeth  II,  Reagan) 71 

United  Nations 

Funding  the  Law  of  the  Sea  Preparatory 
Commission  (Reagan) 82 

Libya  (Kirkpatrick) 81 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  UN,  1981  (message 
to  the  Congress) 81 


Name  Index 

Abrams,  Elliott 73 

Burt,  Richard 65 

Crocker,  Chester  A 50,  53 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 57 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S '77 

Queen  Elizabeth  II 71 

Hinton,  Deane  R 83 

Kennedy,  Richard  T 79 

Kirkpatrick,  Jeane  J 81,  84 

Kreisky,  Bruno 69 

Michel,  James  H 74 

Miller,  James  Edward 1 

Reagan,  President  .8,  15,  19,  22,  60,  67,  69,  70 

71,  81,  82,88 

Shultz,  Secretary  .  .  .25,  28,  31,  35,  37,  40,  44, 

47,  62 

Willoch,  Kaare 70 

Wolfowitz,  Paul 63 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 

Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

375 

Second  Glass 


^ 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  in  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


ih^purtmvnl 


bulletin 

Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2074 


«l 


^e^^^**  axvlvJ(N' 


Oe<^^'* 


May  1983 


The  President  /  1 
The  Secretary  /  10 
FY  1984  Assistance 
Africa  /  20 
East  Asia  /  30 
Europe  /  44 
IVIiddle  East  /  57 
Western 
Hemisphere  /  83 


Uvpartmvnl  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2074  /  May  1983 


The  Department  ov  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  PubHc 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Biilletin'.s  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congi-essional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

A.s.si.-^tant  Secretary  for  Public  Affai 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  fulilie  Conimunicatioii 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Divi.-^ion 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
19S7. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Docu 


and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Departmknt  OK  State  Bcli.etin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 

Government  Prin 
20402 

ting  Office,  Washington,  ( 

CONTENTS 


The  President 

1     Reducing  the  Danger  of  Nuclear 

Weapons 
6    Challenge  of  U.S.  Security  Interests 

in  Central  America 


The  Secretary 

10  Struggle  for  Democracy  in  Central 
America 

13  Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Recov- 
ery Act 

16  FY  1984  and  1985  Authorization 

Requests 

17  News  Briefing  on  Arms  Control 

Africa 

20  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Africa  {Chester  A.  Crocker) 

25    U.S.  Export  Policy  Toward 

South  Africa  (Princeton  Lyman) 


l\/liiitary  Affairs 

65  U.S.  Defense  Policy  {President 

Reagan) 

Nuclear  Policy 

66  U.S.  Nuclear  Policy  Toward  South 

Africa  {Harry  R.  Marshall,  Jr.) 

69  Nuclear  Cooperation  With 

EURATOM  {Letter  to  the 
Con  gress) 

Refugees 

70  FY  1984  Requests  for  Migration 

and  Refugee  Assistance 
{James  R.  Purcell,  Jr.) 

Security  Assistance 

71  FY  1984  Security  Assistance  Re- 

quests {William  Schneider,  Jr.) 


East  Asia 

30    FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 

for  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
{PaulD.  Wolfou'itz) 

36  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Korea  {Thomas  P.  Shoesmith) 

39  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Thailand  {Daniel  A.  O'Donohue) 

41  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
the  Philippines  and  Indonesia 
{Daniel  A.  O'Donohue) 

Europe 

44  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Europe  {Richard  R.  Burt) 

46  Northern  Ireland  (President 

Reagan) 

Foreign  Aid 

47  FY  1984  Request  for  Economic 

Assistance  Programs  (M.  Peter 
McPherson) 

Middle  East 

57  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
(Nicholas  A.  Veliotes) 

61  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Israel  (Nicholas  A.  Veliotes) 

63  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 

Egypt  (Nicholas  A.  Veliotes) 

64  FY  1983  Supplemental  Request  for 

Lebanon  (Nicholas  A.  Veliotes) 


South  Asia 

78  Afghanistan  Day,  1983  (Department 

Statement) 

United  Nations 

79  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 

Organizations  and  Programs 
(Gregory  J.  Newell) 

Western  Hemisphere 

83  F^'  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean (Thoynas  0.  Ekders) 

85  Presidential  Elections  in  El  Salva- 
dor (President  Reagan) 

87    U.S.,  Brazil  Establish  Working 
Groups  (Joint  Statement) 

Treaties 

90    Cuirent  Actions 

Chronology 

92    March  1983 


Press  Releases 

93  Department  of  State 

94  US  LIN 


Publications 

94     Department  of  State 


Index 


All  the  moral  values  which  this  country  cherishes 
.  .  .  are  fundamentally  challenged  by  a  powerful 
adversary  which  does  not  wish  these  values  to 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Reducing  the  Danger 
of  Nuclear  Weapons 

by  President  Reagan 


Address  before  the 

Los  Angeles  World  Affairs  Council 

on  March  31,  1983,  and 

statement  of  March  30 

made  at  the  White  House.  ^ 


Last  week  I  spoke  to  the  American  peo- 
ple about  our  plans  for  safeguarding  this 
nation's  security  and  that  of  our  allies. 
And  I  announced  a  long-term  effort  in 
scientific  research  to  counter  some  day 
the  menace  of  offensive  nuclear  missiles. 
What  I  have  proposed  is  that  nations 
should  turn  their  best  energies  to  mov- 
ing away  from  the  nuclear  nightmare. 
We  must  not  resign  ourselves  to  a 
future  in  which  security  on  both  sides 
depends  on  threatening  the  lives  of 
millions  of  innocent  men,  women,  and 
children. 

And  today,  I  would  like  to  discuss 
another  vital  aspect  of  our  national 
security:  our  efforts  to  limit  and  reduce 
the  danger  of  modern  weaponry.  We 
live  in  a  world  in  which  total  war  would 
mean  catastrophe.  We  also  live  in  a 
world  that's  torn  by  a  great  moral  strug- 
gle between  democracy  and  its  enemies, 
between  the  spirit  of  freedom  and  those 
who  fear  freedom. 

In  the  last  15  years  or  more,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  engaged  in  a  relentless 
military  buildup,  overtaking  and  surpass- 
ing the  United  States  in  major  cate- 
gories of  military  power,  acquiring  what 
can  only  be  considered  an  offensive  mili- 
tary capability.  All  the  moral  values 
which  this  country  cherishes — freedom; 
democracy;  the  right  of  peoples  and  na- 


tions to  determine  their  own  destiny,  to 
speak  and  write,  to  live  and  worship  as 
they  choose— all  these  basic  rights  are 
fundamentally  challenged  by  a  powerful 
adversary  which  does  not  wish  these 
values  to  survive. 

This  is  our  dilemma,  and  it's  a  pro- 
found one.  We  must  both  defend  free- 
dom and  preserve  the  peace.  We  must 
stand  true  to  our  principles  and  our 
friends  while  preventing  a  holocaust. 

The  Western  commitment  to  peace 
through  strength  has  given  Europe  its 
longest  period  of  peace  in  a  century.  We 
cannot  conduct  ourselves  as  if  the 
special  danger  of  nuclear  weapons  did 
not  exist.  But  we  must  not  allow  our- 
selves to  be  paralyzed  by  the  problem,  to 
abdicate  our  moral  duty.  This  is  the 
challenge  that  history  has  left  us. 

We  of  the  20th  century,  who  so 
pride  ourselves  on  mastering  even  the 
forces  of  nature— except  last  week  when 
the  Queen  was  here— we're  forced  to 
wrestle  with  one  of  the  most  complex 
moral  challenges  ever  faced  by  any 
generation.  Now,  my  views  about  the 
Soviet  Union  are  well  known,  although 
sometimes  I  don't  recognize  them  when 
they're  played  back  to  me.  And  our  pro- 
gram for  maintaining,  strengthening, 
and  modernizing  our  national  defense 
has  been  clearly  stated. 


^983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


The  American  Record 

Today  let  me  tell  you  something  of  what 
we're  doing  to  reduce  the  danger  of 
nuclear  war.  Since  the  end  of  World 
War  II,  the  United  States  has  been  the 
leader  in  the  international  effort  to 
negotiate  nuclear  arms  limitations.  In 
1946,  when  the  United  States  was  the 
only  country  in  the  world  possessing 
these  awesome  weapons,  we  did  not 
blackmail  others  with  threats  to  use 
them,  nor  did  we  use  our  enormous 
power  to  conquer  territory,  to  advance 
our  position,  or  to  seek  domination. 

Doesn't  our  record  alone  refute  the 
charge  that  we  seek  superiority,  that  we 
represent  a  threat  to  peace?  We  pro- 
posed the  Baruch  plan  for  international 
control  of  all  nuclear  weapons  and 
nuclear  energy,  for  everything  nuclear 
to  be  turned  over  to  an  international 
agency.  And  this  was  rejected  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  Several  years  later,  in 
1955,  President  Eisenhower  presented 
his  "open  skies"  proposal  that  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  would  ex- 
change blueprints  of  military 
establishments  and  permit  aerial  recon- 
naissance to  ensure  against  the  danger 
of  surprise  attack.  This,  too,  was  re- 
jected by  the  Soviet  Union. 

Now,  since  then,  some  progress  has 
been  made,  largely  at  American  in- 
itiative. The  1963  "Limited  Test  Ban 
Treaty  prohibited  nuclear  testing  in  the 
atmosphere,  in  outer  space,  or  under 
water.  The  creation  of  the  "hotline"  in 
1963,  upgraded  in  1971,  provides  direct 
communication  between  Washington  and 
Moscow  to  avoid  miscalculation  during  a 
crisis.  The  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  of  1968  sought  to  prevent  the 
spread  of  nuclear  weapons.  In  1971,  we 
reached  an  agreement  on  special  com- 
munication procedures  to  safeguard 
against  accidental  or  unauthorized  use  of 
nuclear  weapons  and  on  a  seabed  arms 
control  treaty,  which  prohibits  the  plac- 
ing of  nuclear  weapons  on  the  seabed  of 
the  ocean  floor.  The  strategic  arms 
limitation  agreements  of  1972  imposed 
limits  on  antiballistic  missile  systems 
and  on  numbers  of  strategic  offensive 
missiles.  And  the  1972  Biological  War- 
fare Convention  bans— or  was  supposed 
to  ban— the  development,  production, 
and  stockpiling  of  biological  and  toxin 
weapons. 

But  while  many  agreements  have 
been  reached,  we've  also  suffered  many 
disappointments.  The  American  people 
had  hoped  by  these  measures  to  reduce 


tensions  and  start  to  build  a  constructive 
relationship  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

Instead,  we  have  seen  Soviet 
military  arsenals  continue  to  grow  in  vir- 
tually every  significant  category.  We've 
seen  the  Soviet  Union  project  its  power 
around  the  globe.  We've  seen  Soviet 
resistance  to  significant  reductions  and 
measures  of  effective  verification, 
especially  the  latter.  And,  I'm  sorry  to 
say,  there  have  been  increasingly  serious 
grounds  for  questioning  their  compliance 
with  the  arms  control  agreements  that 
have  already  been  signed  and  that  we 
both  pledged  to  uphold.  I  may  have 
more  to  say  on  this  in  the  near  future. 

Coming  into  office,  I  made  two  pro- 
mises to  the  American  people  about 


In  1946,  when  the 
United  States  was  the 
only  country  in  the 
world  possessing  these 
awesome  weapons,  we 
did  not  blackmail  others 
with  threats  to  use  them, 
nor  did  we  use  our  enor- 
mous power  to  conquer 
territory,  to  advance  our 
position,  or  to  seek 
domination. 


peace  and  security:  I  promised  to 
restore  our  neglected  defenses  in  order 
to  strengthen  and  preserve  the  peace, 
and  I  promised  to  pursue  reliable 
agreements  to  reduce  nuclear  weapons. 
Both  these  promises  are  being  kept. 

Today,  not  only  the  peace  but  also 
the  chances  for  real  arms  control  depend 
on  restoring  the  military  balance.  We 
know  that  the  ideology  of  the  Soviet 
leaders  does  not  permit  them  to  leave 
any  Western  weakness  unprobed,  any 
vacuum  of  power  unfilled.  It  would  seem 
that  to  them  negotiation  is  only  another 
form  of  struggle.  Yet,  I  believe  the 
Soviets  can  be  persuaded  to  reduce  their 
arsenals— but  only  if  they  see  it's  ab- 
solutely necessary.  Only  if  they 
recognize  the  West's  determination  to 


modernize  its  own  military  forces 
they  see  an  incentive  to  negotiate 
verifiable  agreement  establishing 
lower  levels.  And,  very  simply,  th 
one  of  the  main  reasons  why  we  i 
rebuild  our  defensive  strength. 

All  of  our  strategic  force  mod 
tion  has  been  approved  by  the  Co 
except  for  the  land-based  leg  of  ti 
triad.  We  expect  to  get  congressi 
approval  of  this  final  program  lat 
spring.  A  strategic  forces  modert 
program  depends  on  a  national  bi 
tisan  consensus.  Over  the  last  dec 
four  successive  Administrations  l 
made  proposals  for  arms  control 
modernization  that  have  become 
broiled  in  political  controversy.  N 
gained  from  this  divisiveness; 
are  going  to  have  to  take  a  fresh 
our  previous  positions.  I  pledge  t 
my  participation  in  such  a  fresh  '. 
my  determination  to  assist  in  for] 
renewed  bipartisan  consensus. 

My  other  national  security  pr 
on  assuming  office  was  to  thorou 
examine  the  entire  arms  control ; 
Since  then,  in  coordination  with  c 
allies,  we've  launched  the  most  cc 
hensive  program  of  arms  control 
fives  ever  undertaken.  Never  bef 
history  has  a  nation  engaged  in  s 
major  simultaneous  efforts  to  lim 
reduce  the  instruments  of  war. 

•  Last  month  in  Geneva,  the< 
President  committed  the  United  I 
to  negotiate  a  total  and  verifiable! 
chemical  weapons.  Such  inhuman 
weapons,  as  well  as  toxin  weapor 
being  used  in  violation  of  interna) 
law  in  Afghanistan,  in  Laos,  and  I 
puchea. 

•  Together  with  our  allies,  w 
fered  a  comprehensive  new  propc 
mutual  and  balanced  reduction  of 
ventional  forces  in  Europe. 

•  We  have  recently  proposed 
Soviet  Union  a  series  of  further 
measures  to  reduce  the  risk  of  w; 
accident  or  miscalculation.  And  w 
considering  significant  new  measi 
resulting  in  part  from  consultatio 
several  distinguished  senators. 

•  We've  joined  our  allies  in  p: 
ing  a  conference  on  disarmament 
Europe.  On  the  basis  of  a  balance 
come  of  the  Madrid  meeting,  sucJ 
ference  will  discuss  new  ways  to 
enhance  European  stability  and  s 

•  We  have  proposed  to  the  T 
Union  improving  the  verification 
sions  of  two  agreements  to  limit  i 
ground  nuclear  testing,  but,  so  fa 
response  has  been  negative.  We  ^ 
tinue  to  try. 


Department  of  State  f  [II' 


THE  PRESIDENT 


\nd,  most  importantly,  we  have 
ar-reaching  proposals,  which  I 
cuss  further  in  a  moment,  for 
;ductions  in  strategic  weapons 
•  elimination  of  an  entire  class  of 
sdiate-range  weapons. 

tn  determined  to  achieve  real 
Dntrol— reliable  agreements  that 
,nd  the  test  of  time,  not  cosmetic 
lents  that  raise  expectations  only 
I  hopes  cruelly  dashed, 
ill  these  negotiations  certain 
rinciples  guide  our  policy. 


First,  our  efforts  to  control  arms 
should  seek  reductions  on  both  sides- 
significant  reductions. 

Second,  we  insist  that  arms  control 
agreements  be  equal  and  balanced. 

Third,  arms  control  agreements 
must  be  effectively  verifiable.  We  cannot 
gamble  with  the  safety  of  our  people  and 
the  people  of  the  world. 

Fourth,  we  recognize  that  arms  con- 
trol is  not  an  end  in  itself  but  a  vital 
part  of  a  broad  policy  designed  to 
strengthen  peace  and  stability. 


It's  with  these  firm  principles  in 
mind  that  this  Administration  has  ap- 
proached negotiations  on  the  most 
powerful  weapons  in  the  American  and 
Soviet  arsenals — strategic  nuclear 
weapons. 

Strategic  Arms 
Reduction  Talks 

In  June  of  1982,  American  and  Soviet 
negotiators  convened  in  Geneva  to  begin 


President's  Statement,  March  30,  1983 


ek,  when  I  addressed  the  American 
n  this  Administration's  defense  pro- 
[arch  23.  1983],  I  expressed  our 
lation  to  reduce  our  reliance  on  the 
power  of  nuclear  weapons  to  assure 
e.  Today,  I  want  to  say  a  few  words 
is  critical  aspect  of  our  security 
our  efforts  to  drastically  reduce  the 
which  burden  the  lives  of  our  own 
of  our  friends  and  allies,  and,  yes.  of 
-rsaries  as  well. 

ou  know,  over  the  last  year  and  a 
;  Administration  has  undertaken  a 
ensive  and  far-reaching  arms  control 

designed  to  achieve  deep  reductions 
ir  arms,  to  rid  the  world  of  chemical 
,  and  to  cut  the  size  of  conventional 

Europe.  I  will  be  saying  more  about 
■tiatives  in  my  speech  tomorrow, 
this  morning,  let  me  focus  on  one  of 
gotiations.  I  have  just  met  with  the 
dors  of  the  countries  of  the  North 
alliance.  We  invited  them  here 
the  citizens  of  their  countries  share 
.ericans  a  profound  hope  for  success 
;neva  negotiations  on  intermediate- 
clear  missiles. 

forces  being  discussed  in  the  INF 
ons  directly  affect  the  security  of 
As  I  told  you  last  week,  the  Soviet 
deployed  hundreds  of  powerful. 
)  missiles,  armed  with  multiple 
s,  and  capable  of  striking  the  cities 
nse  installations  of  our  allies  in 
md  of  our  friends  and  allies  in  Asia 
The  Soviets  have  built  up  these 
'en  though  there  has  been  no  com- 
hreat  from  NATO.  They've  deployed 
bout  letup — there  now  are  more 

SS-20  missiles  with  more  than 
clear  warheads.  NATO  will  begin 
?  a  specific  deterrent  to  this  threat 
year,  unless,  as  we  hope,  an  agree- 
eliminate  such  weapons  would  make 
oyment  unnecessary. 
United  States,  with  the  full  support 
lies,  has  been  negotiating  in  Geneva 

than  a  year  to  persuade  the  Soviet 
at  it  is  a  far  better  course  for  both 
agree  to  eliminate  totally  this  entire 

of  weapons.  Such  an  ag^reement 


would  be  fair  and  far  reaching.  It  would 
enhance  the  security  of  the  Soviet  Union  as 
well  as  the  security  of  NATO.  And  it  would 
fulfill  the  aspiration  of  people  throughout 
Europe  and  Asia  for  an  end  to  the  threat 
posed  by  these  missiles. 

So  far,  the  Soviet  Union  has  resisted  this 
proposal  and  has  failed  to  come  up  with  any 
serious  alternative.  They  insist  on  preserving 
their  present  monopoly  of  these  weapons. 
Under  their  latest  proposal,  the  Soviets 
would  retain  almost  500  warheads  on  their 
SS-20  missiles  in  Europe  alone  and  hundreds 
more  in  the  Far  East,  while  we  would  con- 
tinue to  have  zero.  Their  proposal  would  ac- 
tually leave  them  with  more  SS-20  missiles 
than  they  had  when  the  talks  began  in  1981. 
In  addition,  the  Soviets  have  launched  a  prop- 
aganda campaign,  aimed  apparently  at 
dividing  America  from  our  allies  and  our 
allies  from  each  other. 

From  the  opening  of  these  negotiations 
nearly  18  months  ago,  I  have  repeatedly 
urged  the  Soviets  to  respond  to  our  zero-zero 
proposal  with  a  proposal  of  their  own.  I  have 
also  repeated  our  willingness  to  consider  any 
serious  alternative  proposal.  Their  failure  to 
make  such  a  proposal  is  a  source  of  deep 
disappointment  to  all  of  us  who've  wished 
that  these  weapons  might  be  eliminated — or 
at  least  significantly  reduced.  But  I  do  not  in- 
tend to  let  this  shadow  that  has  been  cast 
over  the  Geneva  negotiations  further  darken 
our  search  for  peace. 

When  it  comes  to  intermediate  nuclear 
missiles  in  Europe,  it  would  be  better  to  have 
none  than  to  have  some.  But.  if  there  must 
be  some,  it  is  better  to  have  few  than  to  have 
m.any.  If  the  Soviets  will  not  now  agree  to 
the  total  elimination  of  these  weapons,  I  hope 
that  they  will  at  least  join  us  in  an  interim 
agreement  that  would  substantially  reduce 
these  forces  to  equal  levels  on  both  sides. 

To  this  end.  Ambassador  Paul  Nitze  has 
informed  his  Soviet  counterpart  that  we  are 
prepared  to  negotiate  an  interim  agreement 
in  which  the  United  States  would  substantial- 
ly reduce  its  planned  deployment  of  Persh- 
ing II  and  ground-launched  cruise  missiles 
provided  the  Soviet  Union  reduced  the 
number  of  its  warheads  on  longer  range  INF 
missiles  to  an  equal  level  on  a  global  basis. 


Ambassador  Nitze  has  explained  that  the 
United  States  views  this  proposal  as  a  serious 
initial  step  toward  the  total  elimination  of 
this  class  of  weapons,  and  he  has  conveyed 
my  hope  that  the  Soviet  Union  will  join  us  in 
this  view.  Our  proposal  for  the  entire  elimina- 
tion of  these  systems  remains  on  the  table. 

We've  suggested  that  the  negotiations 
resume  several  weeks  earlier  than  originally 
planned.  The  Soviets  have  agreed  to  that, 
and  talks  will  resume  on  May  17th.  I  hope 
this  initiative  will  lead  to  an  early  agreement. 
We  remain  ready  to  explore  any  serious 
Soviet  suggestions  that  meet  the  fundamental 
concerns  which  we  have  expressed. 

I  invited  the  NATO  ambassadors  here  to- 
day not  only  to  review  these  developments 
but  to  express  my  appreciation  for  the  firm 
support  which  the  allies  have  given  to  our 
negotiating  effort  in  Geneva.  And  I  can 
assure  them  of  my  personal  commitment  to 
the  closest  possible  consultations  with  them 
on  INF.  This  consultation  process  has  already 
proven  one  of  the  most  intensive  and  produc- 
tive in  the  history  of  the  North  Atlantic 
alliance.  It's  made  the  initiative  announced  to- 
day an  alliance  initiative  in  the  best  sense  of 
that  term. 

Over  the  past  months,  we  and  our  allies 
have  consulted  intensively  on  the  INF 
negotiations.  I  have  been  in  frequent  and 
close  contact  with  other  heads  of  govern- 
ment. Vice  President  Bush  had  very  produc- 
tive discussions  with  allied  leaders  on  INF 
during  his  trip  to  Europe.  Secretaries  Shultz 
and  Weinberger  have  exchanged  views  with 
their  counterparts  from  allied  governments. 
And  the  NATO  special  consultative  group  has 
met  regularly  to  review  the  negotiations  and 
consider  criteria  which  should  form  the  basis 
for  the  alliance  position  in  INF.  The  very 
thoughtful  views  expressed  by  the  allies  in 
these  consultations  have  been  a  significant 
help  in  shaping  this  new  initiative. 

This  process  is  a  model  for  how  an 
alliance  of  free  and  democratic  nations  can 
and  must  work  together  on  critical  issues.  It 
is  the  source  of  our  unity  and  gives  us  a 
strength  that  no  one  can  hope  to  match.  And 
it  gives  me  great  confidence  in  the  eventual 
success  of  our  efforts  in  Geneva  to  create  a 
safer  world  for  all  the  Earth's  people.  ■ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


the  strategic  arms  reduction  talks,  what 
we  call  START.  We've  sought  to  work 
out  an  agreement  reducing  the  levels  of 
strategic  weapons  on  both  sides.  I  pro- 
posed reducing  the  number  of  ballistic 
missiles  by  one-half  and  the  number  of 
warheads  by  one-third.  No  more  than 
half  the  remaining  warheads  could  be  on 
land-based  missiles.  This  would  leave 
both  sides  with  greater  security  at  equal 
and  lower  levels  of  forces.  Not  only 
would  this  reduce  numbers,  it  would  also 
put  specific  limits  on  precisely  those 
tj-pes  of  nuclear  weapons  that  pose  the 
most  danger. 

The  Soviets  have  made  a  counter- 
proposal. We've  raised  a  number  of 
serious  concerns  about  it.  But— and  this 
is  important— they  have  accepted  the 
concept  of  reductions.  Now,  I  expect 
this  is  because  of  the  firm  resolve  that 
we've  demonstrated.  In  the  current 
round  of  negotiations,  we  have 
presented  them  with  the  basic  elements 
of  a  treaty  for  comprehensive  reductions 
in  strategic  arsenals.  The  United  States 
also  has,  in  START,  recently  proposed  a 
draft  agreement  on  a  number  of  signifi- 
cant measures  to  build  confidence  and 
reduce  the  risks  of  conflict.  This  negotia- 
tion is  proceeding  under  the  able  leader- 
ship of  Ambassador  Edward  Rowny  on 
our  side. 


Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear  Forces 

We're  also  negotiating  in  Geneva  to 
eliminate  and  entire  class  of  new 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  Earth. 
Since  the  end  of  the  mid-1970s,  the 
Soviet  Union  has  been  deploying  an 
intermediate-range  nuclear  missile,  the 
SS-20,  at  a  rate  of  one  a  week.  There 
are  now  351  of  these  missiles,  each  with 
three  highly  accurate  warheads  capable 
of  destroying  cities  and  military  bases  in 
Western  Europe,  Asia,  and  the  Middle 
East. 

NATO  has  no  comparable  weapon, 
nor  did  NATO  in  any  way  provoke  this 
new,  unprecedented  escalation.  In  fact, 
while  the  Soviets  were  deploying  their 
SS-20s,  we  were  taking  a  thousand 
nuclear  warheads  from  shorter  range 
weapons  out  of  Europe. 

This  major  shift  in  the  European 
military  balance  prompted  our  West 
European  allies  themselves  to  propose 
that  NATO  find  a  means  of  righting  the 
balance.  And  in  December  of  1979,  they 
announced  a  collective  two-track  deci- 
sion: 


First,  to  deploy  in  Western  Europe 
572  land-based  cruise  missiles  and 
Pershing  II  ballistic  missiles,  capable  of 
reaching  the  Soviet  Union.  The  purpose: 
to  offset  and  deter  the  Soviet  SS-20s. 
The  first  of  these  NATO  weapons  are 
scheduled  for  deployment  by  the  end  of 
this  year;  and 

Second,  to  seek  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  Union  for  the  mutual  reduc- 
tion of  these  intermediate-range 
missiles. 

In  November  of  1981,  the  United 
States,  in  concert  with  our  allies,  made  a 


Since  the  end  of  the 
mid-1970s,  the  Soviet 
Union  has  been  deploy- 
ing an  intermediate- 
range  nuclear  missile, 
the  SS-20,  at  a  rate 
of  one  a  week.  There 
are  now  351  ...  .  NATO 
has  no  comparable 
weapon  .... 


sweeping  new  proposal:  NATO  would 
cancel  its  own  deployment  if  the  Soviets 
eliminated  theirs.  The  Soviet  Union 
refuLed  and  set  out  to  intensify  public 
pressures  in  the  West  to  block  the 
NATO  deployment,  which  has  not  even 
started.  Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  weapons 
continue  to  grow  in  number. 

Our  proposal  was  not  made  on  a 
take-it-or-leave-it  basis.  We're  willing  to 
consider  any  Soviet  proposal  that  meets 
these  standards  of  fairness. 

•  An  agreement  must  establish 
equal  numbers  for  both  Soviet  and 
American  intermediate- range  nuclear 
forces. 

•  Other  countries'  nuclear  forces, 
such  as  the  British  and  French,  are  in- 
dependent and  are  not  part  of  the 
bilateral  U.S. -Soviet  negotiations.  They 
are,  in  fact,  strategic  weapons,  and  the 
Soviet  strategic  arsenal  more  than  com- 
pensates for  them. 

•  Next,  an  agreement  must  not  shift 
the  threat  from  Europe  to  Asia.  Given 
the  range  in  mobility  of  the  SS-20s, 
meaningful  limits  on  these  and  com- 


parable American  systems  iiv 
global. 

•  An  agreement  must  1  h 
verifiable. 

•  And  an  agreement  niu 
undermine  NATO's  ability  t.- 
itself  with  conventional  force: 

We've  been  consulting  closel; 
our  Atlantic  allies,  and  they  stro 
dorse  these  principles. 

Earlier  this  week,  I  authorize 
negotiator  in  Geneva,  Ambassad 
Nitze,  to  inform  the  Soviet  deleg 
a  new  American  proposal  which 
full  support  of  our  allies.  We're  j 
to  negotiate  an  interim  agreeme 
reduce  our  planned  deployment ' 
Soviet  Union  will  reduce  their  cc 
responding  warheads  to  an  equa 
This  would  include  all  U.S.  and  ! 
weapons  of  this  class,  wherever 
located.  Our  offer  of  zero  on  bot 
will,  of  course,  remain  on  the  tal 
our  ultimate  goal.  At  the  same  t 
remain  open — as  we  have  been  1 
very  outset — to  serious  counter 
posals.  The  Soviet  negotiators  h; 
returned  to  Moscow  where  we  h! 
new  proposal  will  receive  careful 
sideration  during  the  recess.  Am 
bassador  Nitze  has  proposed  and 
Soviets  have  agreed  that  negotid 
resume  in  mid-May,  several  weel 
earlier  than  scheduled. 

I'm  sorry  that  the  Soviet  Un? 
far,  has  not  been  willing  to  accef 
complete  elimination  of  these  sys 
both  sides.  The  question  I  now  p 
the  Soviet  Government  is:  If  not 
tion,  to  what  equal  level  are  you 
to  reduce?  The  new  proposal  is  d 
to  promote  early  and  genuine  pn 
at  Geneva.  For  arms  control  to  h 
complete  and  world  security  stre 
ened,  however,  we  must  also  inci 
our  efforts  to  halt  the  spread  of : 
arms.  Every  country  that  values 
peaceful  world  order  must  play  i1 

Our  allies,  as  important  nucle 
porters,  also  have  a  very  imports 
responsibility  to  prevent  the  spre 
nuclear  arms.  To  advance  this  go 
should  all  adopt  comprehensive 
safeguards  as  a  condition  for  nuc 
suppply  commitments  that  we  m: 
the  future.  In  the  days  ahead.  IT 
talking  to  other  world  leaders  ab 
need  for  urgent  movement  on  th; 
other  measures  against  nuclear  p 
liferation. 


Department  of  State 


THE  PRESIDENT 


"Juclear  Freeze 

lat's  the  arms  control  agenda 
een  pursuing.  Our  proposals  are 
ey're  far  reaching  and  com- 
iive.  But  we  still  have  a  long  way 
Ve  Americans  are  sometimes  an 
nt  people.  I  guess  it's  a  symptom 
raditional  optimism,  energy,  and 
)ften,  this  is  a  source  of  strength, 
jotiation,  however,  impatience 
1  real  handicap.  Any  of  you 
been  involved  in  labor- 
iment  negotiations  or  any  kintl  of 
ing  know  that  patience 
hens  your  bargaining  position.  If 
;  seems  too  eager  or  desperate, 
ir  side  has  no  reason  to  offer  a 
mise  and  every  reason  to  hold 
{pecting  that  the  more  eager  side 
e  in  first. 

II,  this  is  a  basic  fact  of  life  we 
ford  to  lose  sight  of  when  dealing 
3  Soviet  Union.  Generosity  in 
tion  has  never  been  a  trademark 
s.  It  runs  counter  to  the  basic 
■y  of  Marxist-Leninist  ideology, 
'ital  that  we  show  patience, 
nation,  and,  above  all,  national 
f  we  appear  to  be  divided,  if  the 
suspect  that  domestic  political 
3  will  undercut  our  position, 
ig  in  their  heels.  And  that  can 
ay  an  agreement  and  may 

all  hope  for  an  agreement, 
t's  why  I've  been  concerned 
16  nuclear  freeze  proposals,  one 
1  is  being  considered  at  this  time 
■iouse  of  Representatives.  Most 
f  who  support  the  freeze,  I'm 
e  well  intentioned,  concerned 
16  arms  race  and  the  danger  of 
war.  No  one  shares  their  con- 
)re  than  I  do.  But,  however  well- 
ned  they  are,  these  freeze  pro- 
I'ould  do  more  harm  than  good, 
ay  seem  to  offer  a  simple  solu- 
t  there  are  no  simple  solutions 
lex  problems.  As  H.  L.  Mencken 
yly  remarked,  "For  every  prob- 
ire's  one  solution  which  is  simple, 
nd  wrong." 

freeze  concept  is  dangerous  for 
iasons. 

would  preserve  today's  high, 
,  and  unstable  levels  of  nuclear 
nd,  by  so  doing,  reduce  Soviet 
6s  to  negotiate  for  real  reduc- 

would  pull  the  rug  out  from 
or  negotiators  in  Geneva,  as  they 
tified.  After  all,  why  should  the 


Soviets  negotiate  if  they've  already 
achieved  a  freeze  in  a  position  of  ad- 
vantage to  them? 

•  Also,  some  think  a  freeze  would 
be  easy  to  agree  on,  but  it  raises  enor- 
mously complicated  problems  of  what  is 
to  be  frozen,  how  it  is  to  be  achieved, 
and,  most  of  all,  verified.  Attempting  to 
negotiate  these  critical  details  would  on- 
ly divert  us  from  the  goal  of  negotiating 
reductions  for  who  knows  how  long. 

•  The  freeze  proposal  would  also 
make  a  lot  more  sense  if  a  similar  move- 


If  we  appear  to  be 
divided,  if  the  Soviets 
suspect  that  domestic 
political  pressure  will 
undercut  our  position, 
they'll  dig  in  their  heels. 


ment  against  nuclear  weapons  were  put- 
ting similar  pressures  on  Soviet  leaders 
in  Moscow.  As  former  Secretary  of 
Defense  Harold  Brown  has  pointed  out, 
the  effect  of  the  freeze  "is  to  put 
pressure  on  the  United  States,  but  not 
on  the  Soviet  Union." 

•  Finally,  the  freeze  would  reward 
the  Soviets  for  their  15-year  buildup 
while  locking  us  into  our  existing  equip- 
ment, which  in  many  cases  is  obsolete 
and  badly  in  need  of  modernization. 
Three-quarters  of  Soviet  strategic  war- 
heads are  on  delivery  systems  5  years 
old  or  less.  Three-quarters  of  the 
American  strategic  warheads  are  on 
delivery  systems  15  years  old  or  older. 
The  time  comes  when  everything  wears 
out.  The  trouble  is,  it  comes  a  lot  sooner 
for  us  than  for  them.  And,  under  a 
freeze,  we  couldn't  do  anything  about  it. 

Our  B-52  bombers  are  older  than 
many  of  the  pilots  who  fly  them.  If  they 
were  automobiles,  they'd  qualify  as 
antiques.  A  freeze  could  lock  us  into  ob- 
solescence. It's  asking  too  much  to  ex- 
pect our  servicemen  and  women  to  risk 
their  lives  in  obsolete  equipment.  The  2 
million  patriotic  Americans  in  the  armed 
services  deserve  the  best  and  most 
modern  equipment  to  protect  them  and 
us. 

I'm  sure  that  every  President  has 
dreamed  of  leaving  the  world  a  safer 
place  than  he  found  it.  I  pledge  to  you. 


my  goal — and  I  consider  it  a  sacred 
trust— will  be  to  make  progress  toward 
arms  reductions  in  every  one  of  the 
several  negotiations  now  underway. 

I  call  on  all  Americans  of  both  par- 
ties and  all  branches  of  government  to 
join  in  this  effort.  We  must  not  let  our 
disagreements  or  partisan  politics  keep 
us  from  strengthening  the  peace  and 
reducing  armaments. 

I  pledge  to  our  allies  and  friends  in 
Europe  and  Asia:  We  will  continue  to 
consult  with  you  closely.  We're  conscious 
of  our  responsibility  when  we  negotiate 
with  our  adversaries  on  issues  of  con- 
cern to  you  and  your  safety  and  well- 
being. 

To  the  leaders  and  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  I  say:  Join  us  in  the  path 
to  a  more  peaceful,  secure  world.  Let  us 
vie  in  the  realm  of  ideas,  on  the  field  of 
peaceful  competition.  Let  history  record 
that  we  tested  our  theories  through 
human  experience,  not  that  we  de- 
stroyed ourselves  in  the  name  of  vindi- 
cating our  way  of  life.  And  let  us  prac- 
tice restraint  in  our  international  con- 
duct, so  that  the  present  climate  of  mis- 
trust can  some  day  give  way  to  mutual 
confidence  and  a  secure  peace. 

What  better  time  to  rededicate  our- 
selves to  this  undertaking  than  in  the 
Easter  season,  when  millions  of  the 
world's  people  pay  homage  to  the  one 
who  taught  us  peace  on  Earth,  goodwill 
toward  men? 

This  is  the  goal,  my  fellow  Ameri- 
cans, of  all  the  democratic  nations — a 
goal  that  requires  firmness,  patience, 
and  understanding.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
responds  in  the  same  spirit,  we're  ready. 
And  we  can  pass  on  to  our  posterity  the 
gift  of  peace — that  and  freedom  are  the 
greatest  gifts  that  one  generation  can 
bequeath  to  another. 


'  Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  4,  1983.  I 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Challenge  to  U.S.  Security  Interests 
in  Central  America 


President  Reagan's  remarks  at  the 
annual  meeting  of  the  National  Associa- 
tion of  Manufacturers  at  the  Washington 
Hilton  Hotel  on  March  10,  1983.^ 

Late  last  year,  I  visited  Central 
America.  Just  a  few  weeks  ago,  our  Am- 
bassador [to  the  United  Nations],  Jeane 
Kirkpatrick,  also  toured  the  area.  And 
in  the  last  few  days  I  have  met  with 
leaders  of  the  Congress  to  discuss  recent 
events  in  Central  America  and  our 
policies  in  that  troubled  part  of  the 
world.  Today  I'd  like  to  report  to  you  on 
these  consultations  and  why  they're  im- 
portant to  all  of  us. 

The  nations  of  Central  America  are 
among  our  nearest  neighbors.  El 
Salvador,  for  example,  is  nearer  to 
Texas  than  Texas  is  to  Massachusetts. 
Central  America  is  simply  too  close,  and 
the  strategic  stakes  are  too  high,  for  us 
to  ignore  the  danger  of  governments 
seizing  power  there  with  ideological  and 
military  ties  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

Let  me  just  show  you  how  important 
Central  America  is.  Here  at  the  base  of 
Central  America  is  the  Panama  Canal. 
Half  of  all  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
United  States  passes  through  either  the 
canal  or  the  other  Caribbean  sealanes  on 
its  way  to  or  from  our  ports.  And,  of 
course,  to  the  north,  as  you  can  see,  is 
Mexico,  a  country  of  enormous  human 
and  material  importance  with  which  we 
share  1,800  miles  of  peaceful  frontier. 

And  between  Mexico  and  the  canal 
lies  Central  America.  As  I  speak  to  you 
today,  its  countries  are  in  the  midst  of 
the  gravest  crisis  in  their  history.  Ac- 
cumulated grievances  and  social  and 
economic  change  are  challenging  tradi- 
tional ways.  New  leaders  with  new 
aspirations  have  emerged  who  want  a 
new  and  better  deal  for  their  peoples. 
And  that  is  good. 

The  Threat 

The  problem  is  that  an  aggressive 
minority  has  thrown  in  its  lot  with  the 
communists,  looking  to  the  Soviets  and 
their  own  Cuban  henchmen  to  help  them 
pursue  political  change  through  violence. 
Nicaragua  has  become  their  base.  And 
these  extremists  make  no  secret  of  their 
goal.  They  preach  the  doctrine  of  a 
"revolution  without  frontiers."  Their 
first  target  is  El  Salvador. 


Important?  To  begin  with,  there's 
the  sheer  human  tragedy.  Thousands  of 
people  have  already  died  and,  unless  the 
conflict  is  ended  democratically,  millions 
more  could  be  affected  throughout  the 
hemisphere.  The  people  of  El  Salvador 
have  proved  they  want  democracy.  But 
if  guerrilla  violence  succeeds,  they  won't 
get  it.  El  Salvador  will  join  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  as  a  base  for  spreading  fresh 
violence  to  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Costa 
Rica — probably  the  most  democratic 
country  in  the  world  today.  The  killing 
will  increase  and  so  will  the  threat  to 
Panama,  the  canal,  and,  ultimately, 
Mexico.  In  the  process,  vast  numbers  of 
men,  women,  and  children  will  lose  their 
homes,  their  countries,  and  their  lives. 

Make  no  mistake.  We  want  the  same 
thing  the  people  of  Central  America 
want— an  end  to  the  killing.  We  want  to 


.  .  .  if  guerrilla  violence 
succeeds,  [the  people  of 
El  Salvador]  won't  get 
[democracy].  El  Salva- 
dor will  join  Cuba  and 
Nicaragua  as  a  base  for 
spreading  fresh  violence 
in  Guatemala,  Hon- 
duras, Costa  Rica  .  .  . 


see  freedom  preserved  where  it  now  ex- 
ists and  its  rebirth  where  it  does  not. 
The  communist  agenda,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  to  exploit  human  suffering  in 
Central  America  to  strike  at  the  heart  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  By  preventing 
reform  and  instilling  their  own  brand  of 
totalitarianism,  they  can  threaten 
freedom  and  peace  and  weaken  our  na- 
tional security. 

I  know  a  good  many  people  wonder 
why  we  should  care  about  whether  com- 
munist governments  come  into  power  in 
Nicaragua,  El  Salvador,  or  other  such 
countries  as  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  and  the  islands  of  the  Carib- 
bean. One  columnist  argued  last  week 
that  we  shouldn't  care,  because  their 


products  are  not  that  vital  to  oi 
economy.  That's  like  the  arguim 
another  so-called  expert  that  w 
shouldn't  worry  about  Castro's  ( 
over  the  island  of  Grenada— tin 
important  product  is  nutmeg. 

Let  me  just  interject  rigli! 
Grenada,  that  tiny  little  islam  i 
Cuba  at  the  west  end  of  the  ( ',.i 
Grenada  at  the  east  end— is  bui 
now,  or  having  built  for  it,  on  il 
and  shores  a  naval  base,  a  suv'' 
base,  storage  bases  and  facilith 
storage  of  munitions,  barrack - 
training  grounds  for  the  militai , 
sure  all  of  that  is  simply  to  encour 
the  export  of  nutmeg. 

People  who  make  these  argun- 
haven't  taken  a  good  look  at  a  ma 
ly  or  followed  the  extraordinary  b 
of  Soviet  and  Cuban  military  pow< 
the  region  or  read  the  Soviets'  diS' 
sions  about  why  the  region  is  impo 
to  them  and  how. they  intend  to  us. 

It  isn't  nutmeg  that's  at  stake 
Caribbean  and  Central  America;  it 
U.S.  national  security. 

Soviet  military  theorists  want 
destroy  our  capacity  to  resupply 
Western  Europe  in  case  of  an  erne 
cy.  They  want  to  tie  down  our  attt 
and  forces  on  our  own  southern  be 
and  so  limit  our  capacity  to  act  in 
distant  places,  such  as  Europe,  the 
sian  Gulf,  the  Indian  Ocean,  the  Se 
Japan. 

Those  Soviet  theorists  noticed 
we  failed  to  notice:  that  the  Caribt 
Sea  and  Central  America  constitut 
nation's  fourth  border.  If  we  must 
fend  ourselves  against  a  large,  hos- 
military  presence  on  our  border,  m 
freedom  to  act  elsewhere  to  help  o 
and  to  protect  strategically  vital 
sealanes  and  resources  has  been 
drastically  diminished.  They  know 
they've  written  about  this. 

We've  been  slow  to  understand 
the  defense  of  the  Caribbean  and  C<- 
tral  America  against  Marxist-Lenir; 
takeover  is  vital  to  our  national  sec  il 
in  ways  we're  not  accustomed  i'<  tl  '> 
ing  about. 

For  the  past  3  years,  under  w 
Presidents,  the  United  States  has  in 
engaged  in  an  effort  to  stop  the  ad  n' 
of  communism  in  Central  America 
doing  what  we  do  best— by  suppon'g 


Department  of  State  Bl 


THE  PRESIDENT 


racy.  For  3  years,  oiu-  goal  has 
0  support  fundamental  change  in 
gion.  to  replace  poverty  with 
pment  and  dictatorship  with 
racy. 

lese  objectives  are  not  easy  to  ob- 
Ve're  on  the  right  track.  Costa 
ontinues  to  set  a  democratic  exam- 
en  in  the  midst  of  economic  crisis 
icaraguan  intimidation.  Honduras 
ne  from  military  rule  to  a  freely 
i  civilian  government.  Despite  in- 
,e  obstacles,  the  democratic  center 
ing  in  El  Salvador,  implementing 
'form  and  working  to  replace  the 
5  of  death  with  a  life  of 
racy. 

e  good  news  is  that  our  new 
3  have  begun  to  work.  Democracy, 
•ee  elections,  free  labor  unions, 
m  of  religion  and  respect  for  the 
ty  of  the  individual,  is  the  clear 
of  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
.1  Americans.  In  fact,  except  for 
ind  its  followers,  no  government 
significant  sector  of  the  public 
ere  in  this  hemisphere  wants  to 
'  guerrillas  seize  power  in  El 
or. 

e  bad  news  is  that  the  struggle 
nocracy  is  still  far  from  over. 
3  their  success  in  largely 
'.ting  guerrilla  political  influence  in 
ted  areas,  and  despite  some  im- 
lents  in  military  armaments  and 
y,  El  Salvador's  people  remain 
strong  pressure  from  armed  guer- 
ontrolled  by  extremists  with 
Soviet  support. 

8  military  capability  of  these  guer- 
•and  I  would  like  to  stress 
•y  capability,  for  these  are  not 
t  irregulars;  they  are  trained, 
y  forces.  This  has  kept  political 
)nomic  progress  from  being 
into  the  peace  the  Salvadoran 
so  obviously  want, 
rt  of  the  trouble  is  internal  to  El 
,Dr,  but  an  important  part  is  exter- 
le  availability  of  training,  tactical 
ce,  and  military  supplies  coming 
Salvador  from  Marxist 
?ua.  I'm  sure  you've  read  about 
rrillas  capturing  rifles  from 
ment  national  guard  units.  And 
this  has  happened.  But  much 
ritical  to  guerrilla  operations  are 
plies  and  munitions  that  are  in- 
d  into  El  Salvador  by  land,  sea, 
—by  pack  mules,  by  small  boats, 
small  aircraft. 

;se  pipelines  fuel  the  guerrilla  of- 
s  and  keep  alive  the  conviction  of 
ctremist  leaders  that  power  will 
ely  come  from  the  barrels  of  their 


guns.  All  this  is  happening  in  El 
Salvador  just  as  a  constitution  is  being 
written,  as  open  presidential  elections 
are  being  prepared,  and  as  a  peace  com- 
mission— named  last  week — has  begun 
to  work  on  amnesty  and  national  recon- 
ciliation to  bring  all  social  and  political 
groups  into  the  democratic  process. 

It  is  the  guerrilla  militants  who  have 
so  far  refused  to  use  democratic  means, 
have  ignored  the  voice  of  the  people  of 
El  Salvador,  and  have  resorted  to  ter- 
ror, sabotage,  and  bullets,  instead  of  the 
ballot  box. 

During  the  past  week,  we've  dis- 
cussed all  of  these  issues  and  more  with 


We've  been  slow  to 
understand  that  the 
defense  of  the  Caribbean 
and  Central  America 
against  Marxist-Leninist 
takeover  is  vital  to  our 
national  security  in 
ways  we're  not  accus- 
tomed to  thinking  about. 


leaders  and  Members  of  the  Congress. 
Their  views  have  helped  shape  our  own 
thinking.  And  I  believe  that  we've 
developed  a  common  course  to  follow. 

Now,  here  are  some  of  the  questions 
that  are  raised  most  often. 

U.S.  Concerns 

First,  how  bad  is  the  military  situa- 
tion? It  is  not  good.  Salvadoran  soldiers 
have  proved  that  when  they're  well 
trained,  led,  and  supplied,  they  can  pro- 
tect the  people  from  guerrilla  attacks. 
But  so  far,  U.S.  trainers  have  been  able 
to  train  only  one  soldier  in  ten.  There's  a 
shortage  of  experienced  officers.  Sup- 
plies are  unsure.  The  guerrillas  have 
taken  advantage  of  these  shortcomings. 
For  the  moment,  at  least,  they  have 
taken  the  tactical  initiative  just  when 
the  sharply  limited  funding  Congress 
has  so  far  approved  is  running  out. 

A  second  vital  question  is:  Are  we 
going  to  send  American  soldiers  into 
combat?  And  the  answer  to  that  is  a  flat 


A  third  question:  Are  we  going  to 
Americanize  the  war  with  a  lot  of  U.S. 
combat  advisers?  And  again,  the 
answer  is  no. 

Only  Salvadorans  can  fight  this  war, 
just  as  only  Salvadorans  can  decide  El 
Salvador's  future.  What  we  can  do  is 
help  to  give  them  the  skills  and  supplies 
they  need  to  do  the  job  for  themselves. 
That,  mostly,  means  training.  Without 
playing  a  combat  role  themselves  and 
without  accompanying  Salvadoran  units 
into  combat,  American  specialists  can 
help  the  Salvadoran  Army  improve  its 
operations. 

Over  the  last  year,  despite  manifest 
needs  for  more  training,  we  have 
scrupulously  kept  our  training  activities 
well  below  our  self-imposed  numerical 
limit  on  numbers  of  trainers.  We're  cur- 
rently reviewing  what  we  can  do  to  pro- 
vide the  most  effective  training  possible, 
to  determine  the  minimum  level  of 
trainers  needed,  and  where  the  training 
should  best  take  place.  We  think  the 
best  way  is  to  provide  training  outside 
of  El  Salvador,  in  the  United  States  or 
elsewhere,  but  that  costs  a  lot  more.  So 
the  number  of  U.S.  trainers  in  El 
Salvador  will  depend  upon  the  resources 
available. 

Question  four:  Are  we  seeking  a 
political  or  a  military  solution?  Despite 
all  I  and  others  have  said,  some  people 
still  seem  to  think  that  our  concern  for 
security  assistance  means  that  all  we 
care  about  is  a  military  solution.  That's 
nonsense.  Bullets  are  no  answer  to 
economic  inequities,  social  tensions,  or 
political  disagreements.  Democracy  is 
what  we  want,  and  what  we  want  is  to 
enable  Salvadorans  to  stop  the  killing 
and  sabotage  so  that  economic  and 
political  reforms  can  take  root.  The  real 
solution  can  only  be  a  political  one. 

This  reality  leads  directly  to  a 
fifth  question:  Why  not  stop  the  kill- 
ings and  start  talking?  Why  not 
negotiate?  Negotiations  are  already  a 
key  part  of  our  policy.  We  support 
negotiations  among  all  the  nations  of  the 
region  to  strengthen  democracy,  to  halt 
subversion,  to  stop  the  flow  of  arms,  to 
respect  borders,  and  to  remove  all  the 
foreign  military  advisers — the  Soviets, 
the  Cubans,  the  East  Germans,  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization],  as 
well  as  our  own  from  the  region. 

A  regional  peace  initiative  is  now 
emerging.  We've  been  in  close  touch 
with  its  sponsors  and  wish  it  well.  And 
we  support  negotiations  within  nations 
aimed  at  expanding  participation  in 
democratic  institutions,  at  getting  all 


THE  PRESIDENT 


parties  to  participate  in  free  and  non- 
violent elections. 

What  we  oppose  are  negotiations 
that  would  be  used  as  a  cynical  device 
for  dividing  up  power  behind  the 
people's  back.  We  cannot  support 
negotiations  which,  instead  of  expanding 
democracy,  try  to  destroy  it;  negotia- 
tions which  would  simply  distribute 
power  among  armed  groups  without  the 
consent  of  the  people  of  El  Salvador. 

We  made  that  mistake  some  years 
ago— in  Laos— when  we  pressed  and 
pressured  the  Laotian  Government  to 
form  a  government,  a  co-op,  with  the 
Pathet  Lao,  the  armed  guerrillas  who'd 
been  doing  what  the  guerrillas  are  doing 
in  El  Salvador.  And  once  they  had  that 
tripartite  government,  they  didn't  rest 
until  those  guerrillas— the  Pathet 
Lao— had  seized  total  control  of  the 
Government  of  Laos. 

The  thousands  of  Salvadorans  who 
risked  their  lives  to  vote  last  year  should 
not  have  their  ballots  thrown  into  the 


A  great  worldwide  prop- 
aganda campaign  had 
.  .  .  portrayed  the  guer- 
rillas as  somehow  repre- 
sentative of  the  people  of 
El  Salvador.  .  .  .  Came 
the  elections,  and  sud- 
denly it  was  the  guer- 
rilla force  threatening 
death  to  any  who  would 
attempt  to  vote. 


trash  heap  this  year  by  letting  a  tiny 
minority  on  the  fringe  of  a  wide  and 
diverse  political  spectrum  shoot  its  way 
into  power.  No,  the  only  legitimate  road 
to  power,  the  only  road  we  can  support, 
is  through  the  voting  booth  so  that  the 
people  can  choose  for  themselves; 
choose,  as  His  Holiness  the  Pope  said 
Sunday,  "far  from  terror  and  in  a 
climate  of  democratic  conviviality."  This 
is  fundamental,  and  it  is  a  moral  as  well 
as  a  practical  belief  that  all  free  people 
of  the  Americas  share. 


U.S.  Position 

Having  consulted  with  the  Congress,  let 
me  tell  you  where  we  are  now  and  what 
we'll  be  doing  in  the  days  ahead.  We 
welcome  all  the  help  we  can  get.  We  will 
be  submitting  a  comprehensive,  in- 
tegrated economic  and  military 
assistance  plan  for  Central  America. 

First,  we  will  bridge  the  existing 
gap  in  military  assistance.  Our  projec- 
tions of  the  amount  of  military 
assistance  needed  for  El  Salvador  have 
remained  relatively  stable  over  the  past 
2  years.  However,  the  continuing  resolu- 
tion budget  procedure  in  the  Congress 
last  December  led  to  a  level  of  U.S. 
security  assistance  for  El  Salvador  in 
1983  below  what  we'd  requested,  below 
that  provided  in  1982,  and  below  that  re- 
quested for  1984.  I'm  proposing  that  $60 
million  of  the  moneys  already  appro- 
priated for  our  worldwide  military 
assistance  programs  be  immediately 
reallocated  to  El  Salvador. 

Further,  to  build  the  kind  of 
disciplined,  skilled  army  that  can  take 
and  hold  the  initiative  while  respecting 
the  rights  of  its  people,  I  will  be  amend- 
ing my  supplemental  that  is  currently 
before  the  Congress  to  reallocate  $50 
million  to  El  Salvador.  And  these  funds 
will  be  sought  without  increasing  the 
overall  amount  of  the  supplemental  that 
we  have  already  presented  to  the  Con- 
gress. And,  as  I've  said,  the  focus  of  this 
assistance  will  remain  the  same — to 
train  Salvadorans  so  that  they  can  de- 
fend themselves. 

Because  El  Salvador's  problems  are 
not  unique  in  this  region,  I  will  also  be 
asking  for  an  additional  $20  million  for 
regional  security  assistance.  These  funds 
will  be  used  to  help  neighboring  states 
to  maintain  their  national  security  and 
will,  of  course,  be  subject  to  full  congres- 
sional review. 

Secondly,  we  will  work  hard  to  sup- 
port reform,  human  rights,  and 
democracy  in  El  Salvador.  Last  Thurs- 
day, the  Salvadoran  Government  ex- 
tended the  land  reform  program  which 
has  already  distributed  20%  of  all  the 
arable  land  in  the  country  and 
transformed  more  than  65,000  farm 
workers  into  farm  owners.  What  they 
ask  is  our  continued  economic  support 
while  the  reform  is  completed.  And  we 
will  provide  it.  With  our  support,  we  ex- 
pect that  the  steady  progress  toward 
more  equitable  distribution  of  wealth 
and  power  in  El  Salvador  will  continue. 

And  third,  we  will,  I  repeat,  con- 
tinue to  work  for  human  rights.  Prog- 
ress in  this  area  has  been  slow,  some- 


times disappointing.  But  human  i 
means  working  at  problems,  not 
away  from  them.  To  make  more 
ress,  we  must  continue  our  suppc 
vice,  and  help  to  El  Salvador's  pe 
and  democratic  leaders.  Lawbrea 
must  be  brought  to  justice,  and  t 
of  law  must  supplant  violence  in 
disputes.  The  key  to  ending  viola 
human  rights  is  to  build  a  stable, 
ing  democracy.  Democracies  are 
countable  to  their  citizens,  and  w 
abuses  occur  in  a  democracy,  the 
not  be  covered  up.  With  our  supp 
expect  the  Government  of  El  Sal 
to  be  able  to  move  ahead  in  prose, 
the  accused  and  in  building  a  crir 
justice  system  applicable  to  all  ar 
ultimately,  accountable  to  the  ele 
representatives  of  the  people. 

And  I  hope  you've  noticed  th. 
speaking  in  millions,  not  billions, 
that,  after  2  years  in  Federal  offi 
hard  to  do.  [Laughter]  In  fact,  th 
some  areas  of  government  where 
they  spill  as  much  as  I've  talked 
here  over  a  weekend. 

Fourth,  the  El  Salvador  Gov 
ment  proposes  to  solve  its  problc 
only  way  they  can  be  solved  fairl 
having  the  people  decide.  Presidf 
Magana  had  just  announced  natii 
elections  moved  up  to  this  year, 
on  all  to  participate,  adversaries 
as  friends.  To  help  political  advei 
participate  in  the  elections,  he  ha 
pointed  a  peace  commission,  inch 
Roman  Catholic  bishop  and  two  i 
dependents.  And  he  has  called  or 
Organization  of  American  States 
international  community  to  help, 
were  proud  to  participate,  along 
representatives  of  other  democra 
tions,  as  observers  in  last  March' 
stituent  Assembly  elections.  We  ' 
be  equally  pleased  to  contribute  a 
an  international  effort,  perhaps  ii 
junction  with  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  to  help  the  goV' 
ment  ensure  the  broadest  possibl* 
ticipation  in  the  upcoming  electio: 
guarantees  that  all,  including  crit 
adversaries,  can  be  protected 
participate. 

Let  me  just  say  a  word  about 
elections  last  March.  A  great  won 
propaganda  campaign  had,  for  m( 
than  a  year,  portrayed  the  guerrt 
somehow  representative  of  the  pe 
El  Salvador.  We  were  told  over  a 
over  again  that  the  government  v 
oppressor  of  the  people.  Came  tb 
tions,  and  suddenly  it  was  the  gui' 
force  threatening  death  to  any  wl 
would  attempt  to  vote.  More  thai  01 


Department  of  State  Ble 


THE  PRESIDENT 


ind  trucks  were  attacked  and 
I  and  bombed  in  an  effort  to  keep 
jple  from  going  to  the  polls.  But 
ent  to  the  polls;  they  walked 

0  do  so.  They  stood  in  long  lines 
irs  and  hours.  Our  own  congres- 
observers  came  back  and  reported 
incident  that  they  saw  them- 
-of  a  woman  who  had  been  shot 
guerrillas  for  trying  to  get  to  the 
itanding  in  the  line,  refusing 

,1  attention  until  she  had  had  her 

unity  to  go  in  and  vote. 

re  than  80%  of  the  electorate 

1  don't  believe  here  in  our  land, 
voting  is  so  easy,  that  we've  had 
)ut  that  great  in  the  last  half  cen- 
'hey  elected  the  present  govern- 
md  they  voted  for  order,  peace, 
mocratic  rule. 

lally,  we  must  continue  to  help 
)ple  of  El  Salvador  and  the  rest  of 
1  America  and  the  Caribbean  to 
iconomic  progress.  More  than 
uarters  of  our  assistance  to  this 
has  been  economic.  Because  of 
jortance  of  economic  development 
region,  I  will  ask  the  Congress 

million  in  new  moneys  and  the 
-aming  of  $103  million  from 

appropriated  worldwide  funds, 
■)tal  of  $168  million  in  increased 
lie  assistance  for  Central 
a.  And  to  make  sure  that  this 
ice  is  as  productive  as  possible, 
;inue  to  work  with  the  Congress 
urgent  enactment  of  the  long- 
jportunities  for  trade  and  free 
■'e  that  are  contained  in  the  Carib- 
asin  Initiative. 

El  Salvador  and  in  the  rest  of 
I  America,  there  are  today  thou- 
if  small  businessmen,  farmers, 
!rkers  who  have  kept  up  their  pro- 
;y  as  well  as  their  spirits  in  the 
personal  danger,  guerrilla 
:e,  and  adverse  economic  condi- 
Vith  them  stand  countless  na- 
nd  local  officials,  military  and 
iders,  and  priests  who  have 

to  give  up  on  democracy.  Their 
e  for  a  better  future  deserves  our 

e  should  be  proud  to  offer  it.  For 
ast  analysis,  they're  fighting  for 


By  acting  responsibly  and  avoiding 
illusory  shortcuts,  we  can  be  both  loyal 
to  our  friends  and  true  to  our  peaceful 
democratic  principles.  A  nation's 
character  is  measured  by  the  relations  it 
has  with  its  neighbors.  We  need  strong, 
stable  neighbors  with  which  we  can 
cooperate.  And  we  will  not  let  them 
down.  Our  neighbors  are  risking  life  and 


There  are  more  than  600 
million  of  us  calling 
ourselves  Americans — 
North,  Central,  and 
South.  We  haven  Y  really 
begun  to  tap  the  vast 
resources  of  these  two 
great  continents. 


limb  to  better  their  lives,  to  improve 
their  lands,  and  to  build  democracy.  All 
they  ask  is  our  help  and  understanding 
as  they  face  dangerous  armed  enemies 
of  liberty  and  that  our  help  be  as  sus- 
tained as  their  own  commitment. 

None  of  this  will  work  if  we  tire  or 
falter  in  our  support.  I  don't  think  that's 
what  the  American  people  want  or  what 
our  traditions  and  faith  require.  Our 
neighbors  struggle  for  a  better  future, 
and  that  struggle  deserves  our  help,  and 
we  should  be  proud  to  offer  it. 

We  would,  in  truth,  be  opening  a 
two-way  street.  We  have  never,  I 
believe,  fully  realized  the  great  potential 
of  this  Western  Hemisphere.  Oh,  yes,  I 
know  in  the  past  we've  talked  of  plans. 
We've  gone  down  there  every  once  in  a 
while  with  a  great  plan,  somehow,  for 
our  neighbors  to  the  south.  But  it  was 
always  a  plan  in  which  we,  the  big  co- 
lossus of  the  north,  would  impose  on 
them.  It  was  our  idea. 

On  my  trip  to  Central  and  South 
America,  I  asked  for  their  ideas.  I 
pointed  out  that  we  had  a  common 
heritage.  We'd  all  come  as  pioneers  to 


these  two  great  continents.  We  worship 
the  same  God.  And  we'd  lived  at  peace 
with  each  other  longer  than  most  people 
in  other  parts  of  the  world.  There  are 
more  than  600  million  of  us  calling 
ourselves  Americans— North,  Central, 
and  South.  We  haven't  really  begun  to 
tap  the  vast  resources  of  these  two 
great  continents. 

Without  sacrificing  our  national 
sovereignties,  our  own  individual 
cultures,  or  national  pride,  we  could,  as 
neighbors,  make  this  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, our  hemisphere,  a  force  for  good 
such  as  the  Old  World  has  never  seen. 
But  it  starts  with  the  word  "neighbor." 
And  that  is  what  I  talked  about  down 
there  and  sought  their  partnership,  their 
equal  partnership  in  we  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  coming  together  to  truly 
develop,  fully,  the  potential  this 
hemisphere  has. 

Last  Sunday,  His  Holiness  Pope 
John  Paul  II  prayed  that  the  measures 
announced  by  President  Magana  would 
"contribute  to  orderly  and  peaceful  prog- 
ress" in  El  Salvador,  progress  "founded 
on  the  respect,"  he  said,  "for  the  rights 
of  all,  and  that  all  have  the  possibility  to 
cooperate  in  a  climate  of  true  democracy 
for  the  promotion  of  the  common  good." 

My  fellow  Americans,  we  in  the 
United  States  join  in  that  prayer  for 
democracy  and  peace  in  El  Salvador, 
and  we  pledge  our  moral  and  material 
support  to  help  the  Salvadoran  people 
achieve  a  more  just  and  peaceful  future. 
And  in  doing  so,  we  stand  true  to  both 
the  highest  values  of  our  free  society 
and  our  own  vital  interests. 


'Opening  remarks  omitted  (text  from 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  Mar.  14,  1983).  ■ 


THE  SECRETARY 


Struggle  for  Democracy 
in  Central  America 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
World  Affairs  Council  and  the  Chamber 
of  Commerce  in  Dallas  on  April  15, 


I  thought  about  what  I  might  discuss 
here,  and  there's  always  a  temptation 
for  a  Secretary  of  State  to  go  around 
the  world  and  make  a  few  comments 
about  this  place  and  that  place.  But  it 
seemed  to  me  right  now  and  right  here 
that  the  subject  to  talk  about  should  be 
Central  America  because  it's  very  much 
on  our  minds  in  Washington,  and  I'm 
sure  it's  very  much  on  your  minds  right 
here,  close  as  in  the  sense  you  are. 

I  think  that  any  discussion  of  Cen- 
tral America  must  address  three  ques- 
tions. 

•  First  of  all,  why  should  we  care 
about  Central  America? 

•  Second,  what's  going  on  there 
now? 

•  And,  third,  what  should  we  do 
about  it? 

Importance  to  the  U.S. 

The  questions  are  important,  and  I'll  try 
to  answer  them  plainly  and  clearly.  I 
think,  first  of  all,  that  Central  America's 
importance  to  the  United  States  cannot 
be  denied.  Central  America  is  so  close 
that  its  troubles  automatically  spill  over 
onto  us;  so  close  that  the  strategic 
posture  of  its  countries  affect  ours;  so 
close  that  its  people's  suffering  brings 
pain  to  us  as  well. 

I  need  not  remind  Texans  that  only 
the  stability  of  our  neighbors  will  pre- 
vent unprecedented  flows  of  refugees 
northward  to  this  country.  Especially 
now,  when  a  troubled  world  economy  in- 
vites unrest,  we  must  safeguard  democ- 
racy and  stability  in  our  immediate 
neighborhood. 

I  did  not  use  the  word  "strategic" 
lightly.  Despite  the  1962  Cuban  missile 
crisis,  and  despite  last  year's  war  be- 
tween Argentina  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  most  Americans  think  of 
Latin  America  as  not  involved  in  the 
global  strategic  balance.  People  are 
aware,  of  course,  that  Cuba  has  inter- 
vened militarily  in  Africa,  but  they  may 


not  realize  that  Cuba's  Army  is  today 
three  times  larger  than  it  was  in  1962, 
or  that  40,000  Cuban  troops  are  now 
stationed  in  Africa,  or  that  2,000  Cuban 
military  and  security  advisers  are  in 
Nicaragua.  Some  of  you  may  also  not 
have  noticed  that  Nicaragua's  Minister 
of  Defense  said  on  April  9  that  Nicar- 
agua would  consider  accepting  Soviet 
missiles  if  asked. 

In  the  great  debate  about  how  best 
to  protect  our  interests  in  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  only  thing  all  sides  agreed  on 
was  that  the  canal  is  critical  and  must 
be  kept  open  and  defended.  Yet  the 
security  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  directly 
affected  by  the  stability  and  security  of 
Central  America. 

The  canal  itself  is  but  a  50-mile  span 
in  thousands  of  miles  of  sealanes  across 
the  Caribbean.  In  peacetime,  44%  of  all 
foreign  trade  tonnage  and  45%  of  the 
crude  oil  to  the  United  States  pass 
through  the  Caribbean.  In  a  European 
war,  65%  of  our  mobilization  require- 
ments would  go  by  sea  from  gulf  ports 
through  the  Florida  Straits  onward  to 
Europe. 

During  World  War  II— just  to  re- 
mind you  again— our  defenses  were  so 
weak,  our  lifeline  so  exposed,  that  in  the 
first  months  of  1942  a  handful  of  enemy 
subs  sank  hundreds  of  ships  in  the 
Caribbean  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
did  it  more  easily  and  faster  than  did 
Hitler's  whole  fleet  in  the  North  Atlan- 
tic. The  Caribbean  was  a  better  target 
for  them.  Almost  exactly  41  years  ago  a 
Mexican  tanker— running  with  full 
lights,  as  was  the  custom  for 
neutrals— was  sunk  off  Miami.  That 
June,  a  single  submarine,  U-159,  sank 
eight  American  ships  in  4  days,  two  of 
them  just  off  the  entrance  to  the 
Panama  Canal.  Remember,  Hitler's  Ger- 
many had  no  bases  in  the  Caribbean,  not 
even  access  to  ports  for  fuel  and  sup- 
plies. 

Most  Americans  have  assumed  that, 
because  the  Soviet  Union  knows  that  we 
will  not  accept  the  emplacement  of  stra- 
tegic weapons  in  Cuba,  we  had  nothing 
more  to  fear.  It's  true  that  there  are  no 
nuclear  weapons  in  Cuba,  and  it  is  true 
that  Cuba's  communist  Utopia  has 
proved  such  an  economic  disaster  that  it 
is  entirely  dependent  on  massive  Soviet 


aid  to  the  tune  of  some  $4  billion 
ly.  Yet  this  has  not  kept  Cuba  fro 
traying  itself  as  the  vanguard  of 
future  and  mounting  a  campaign 
establish  new  communist  dictator 
Central  America. 

The  Danger  in  Central  Americai 

There  are  some  people  I  know  wl 
we  in  the  Administration  are  exai 
ing  the  danger.  Let  me,  however' 
you  this  quote: 

The  revolutionary  process  of  Cen 
America  is  a  single  process.  The  triui, 
one  are  the  triumphs  of  the  other, 
mala  will  have  its  hour.  Honduras  its- 
Rica,  too,  will  have  its  hour  of  glory, 
first  note  was  heard  in  Nicaragua. 

In  case  you're  wondering,  the 
speaker  was  not  an  Administratic 
spokesman.  That  confident  predii 
comes  from  Cayetano  Carpio,  pri 
leader  of  the  Salvadoran  guerrillt 
the  August  25,  1980,  edition  of  tl 
lean  magazine  Proceso.  Look  it  u; 

Our  analysis,  our  strategy,  oi 
predictions  for  the  future  of  Ceni 
America  are  rooted  in  two  percej 
One  is  that  democracy  cannot  flo 
the  presence  of  extreme  inequalit 
access  to  land,  opportunity,  or  ju.. 
The  second  perception  is  that  Mr 
pio  and  his  allies  are  exploiting  si 
quities  for  antidemocratic  ends. 

I  quoted  a  terrorist  leader  bei 
is  beliefs  like  his,  backed  by  arme 
violence,  that  so  concern  our  friei 
Central  America.  In  Costa  Rica, 
democracy  and  respect  for  humar 
are  an  ancient  tradition;  in  Hondv 
where  democratic  institutions  are 
ing  hold;  in  El  Salvador,  where  di 
racy  is  beginning  to  work;  even 
agua,  where  disillusionment  is  the 
of  the  day. 

Ask  the  people  who  live  there 
will  tell  you,  as  they  have  told  us- 
through  their  governments,  in  the 
public  opinion  polls,  and  in  their  r 
paper  and  radio  editorials— that  t 
revolution  about  which  Carpio  boj 
a  frightening  phenomenon:  a  diret 
threat  to  their  democracy  and  wel 
being.  They  will  tell  you  that  we  I 
Americans  should  also  be  concern' 
Not  because  Mr.  Carpio  will  toma 
lead  an  FMLN  [Farabundo  Marti 
tional  Liberation  Front]  battalion 
the  Rio  Grande  but  because  the  i 
democracy  and  human  rights  is  ou 
cause  too. 

Frankly,  I  agree.  We  cannot  ii 
conscience  look  the  other  way  wh« 


Department  of  State  B  « 


THE  SECRETARY 


)cracy  and  human  rights  are 
snged  in  countries  very  near  to  us, 
tries  that  look  to  us  for  help.  Presi- 
Reagan  put  it  well  last  month: 
lan  rights,"  he  said,  "means  work- 
t  problems,  not  walking  away  from 


Strategy 

le  key  question  is:  What  should  we 
I  primary  element  of  our  strategy 
be  to  support  democracy,  reform, 
he  protection  of  human  rights. 
)cracies  are  far  less  likely  to  threat- 
eir  neighbors  or  abuse  their  citizens 
dictatorships. 

'he  forces  of  democracy  are  many 
■aried.  Some  are  deeply  rooted,  as 
sta  Rica,  which  has  known  nothing 
emocracy  for  35  years.  Others  are 
fragile  but  have  grown  steadily  as 
imic  development  has  strengthened 
liddle  class  and  as  trade  unions  and 
.nt  organizations  are  making 
lism  a  reality.  The  Catholic  Church 
Iso  made  important  contributions  to 
cracy  and  social  progress.  So  also 
le  United  States  through  culture, 
pie,  and  more  recently  through 
nacy  as  well. 

ie  forces  of  dictatorship  are  of  two 
One  is  old,  the  other  new.  The  old 
y  is  that  of  economic  oligarchy, 
■a.\  despotism,  and  military  repres- 
Except  for  Costa  Rica,  this  has 
;he  traditional  method  of  social 
ization  for  most  of  Central 
ica's  history.  The  new  form  of  die- 
hip  is  that  of  a  command  economy, 
■appointed  elitist  vanguard,  and 
j.lla  war.  Nicaragua  has  become  its 
lall  of  Central  America  its  target, 
sfore  the  Sandinistas  came  to 
r  in  Nicaragua  in  1979,  they  prom- 
i*ee  elections,  political  pluralism, 
Dnalignment.  Today  every  one  of 
promises  is  being  betrayed.  First 
indinistas  moved  to  squeeze  the 
;rats  out  of  the  governing  junta; 

0  restrict  all  political  opposition, 
:ss  freedom,  and  the  independence 
church;  then  to  build  what  is  now 

rgest  armed  force  in  the  history  of 
il  America;  then  to  align  them- 

with  the  Soviet  Union  and  Cuba 
verting  their  neighbors. 

Salvador  became  the  first  target. 
'0,  at  Cuban  direction,  several 
ioran  extremist  groups  were  uni- 

1  Managua,  where  their  operational 
Ijarters  remains  to  this  day.  Cuba 
H  Soviet-bloc  allies  then  provided 
'ig  and  supplies  which  began  to 


tlow  clandestinely  through  Nicaragua  to 
El  Salvador  to  fuel  an  armed  assault. 
The  communist  intervention  has  not 
brought  guerrillas  to  power,  but  it  has 
cost  thousands  of  lives  and  widened  an 
already  bitter  conflict.  Today  El  Salva- 
dor hangs  in  the  balance  with  reforming 
democrats  pitted  against  the  forces  of 
old  and  new  dictatorships  alike. 

The  struggle  for  democracy  is  made 
even  more  difficult  by  the  heavy  legacy 
of  decades  of  social  and  economic  in- 
equities. And  in  El  Salvador,  as  else- 
where, the  world  recession  has  hit  with 
devastating  effects. 

We  must  also,  therefore,  support 
economic  development.  Underdevelop- 
ment, recession,  and  the  guerrillas'  "pro- 
longed war"  against  El  Salvador's  econo- 
my cause  human  hardship  and  misery 
that  are  being  cynically  exploited  by  the 
enemies  of  democracy.  Three-quarters  of 
the  funds  that  we  are  spending  in  sup- 
port of  our  Central  American  policy  go 
to  economic  assistance.  And  our  eco- 
nomic program  goes  beyond  traditional 
aid:  The  President's  Caribbean  Basin  In- 
itiative is  meant  to  provide  powerful 
trade  and  investment  incentives  to  help 
these  countries  achieve  self-sustaining 
economic  growth. 

But  just  as  no  amount  of  reform  can 
bring  peace  so  long  as  guerrillas  believe 
they  can  win  a  military  victory,  no 
amount  of  economic  help  will  suffice  if 
guerrilla  units  can  destroy  roads, 
bridges,  power  stations,  and  crops  again 
and  again  with  impunity.  So  we  must 
also  support  the  security  of  El  Salvador 
and  the  other  threatened  nations  of  the 
region. 

Finally,  faced  with  a  grave  region- 
wide  crisis,  we  must  seek  regional, 
peaceful  solutions.  We  are  trying  to  per- 
suade the  Sandinistas  that  they  should 
come  to  the  bargaining  table,  ready  to 
come  to  terms  with  their  neighbors  and 
with  their  own  increasingly  troubled 
society. 


El  Salvador 

Let's  now  look  at  how  this  strategy 
works  in  practice,  and  let  me  turn  first 
to  El  Salvador.  The  basic  fact  about  El 
Salvador  today  is  that  its  people  want 
peace.  Because  they  do,  they  have  laid 
the  essential  groundwork  for  national 
reconciliation  and  renewal.  Let  me  give 
you  some  details. 

First:  Even  in  the  midst  of  guerrilla 
war,  respect  for  human  rights  has 
grown.  Violence  against  noncombatants 
is  still  high,  but  it  has  diminished  mark- 


edly since  our  assistance  began  3  years 
ago.  The  criminal  justice  system  does  re- 
main a  major  concern,  and  I'll  come  back 
to  that  in  a  moment. 

Second:  In  3  short  years  and  despite 
determined  guerrilla  opposition,  El 
Salvador's  Government  has  redistributed 
more  than  20%  of  all  arable  land.  Some 
450,000  people— about  1  Salvadoran  in 
every  10— have  benefited  directly  and 
have  acquired  a  personal  stake  in  a 
secure  future. 

Third:  The  general  economic  situa- 
tion is  poor.  Just  to  stay  even  this  year, 
El  Salvador  will  need  substantial  eco- 
nomic assistance  to  import  seed,  fer- 
tilizer, and  pesticides  for  its  farms  and 
raw  materials  for  its  factories. 

The  economic  crisis  stems  in  part 
from  the  international  recession  which 
has  depressed  prices  of  agricultural  ex- 
ports—coffee, cotton,  sugar— on  which 
El  Salvador  depends  for  foreign  ex- 
change. But  the  more  serious  problem  is 
the  guerrilla  war  against  the  economy. 
Some  of  the  most  fertile  land  cannot  be 
cultivated  because  of  guerrilla  attacks. 
They  have  destroyed  55  of  the  country's 
260  bridges  and  damaged  many  more. 

The  national  water  authority  must 
rebuild  112  water  facilities  damaged  by 
guerrilla  action;  249  attacks  on  the  tele- 
phone system  have  caused  millions  of 
dollars  in  damage.  The  guerrillas  caused 
over  5,000  interruptions  of  electrical 
power  in  a  22-month  period  ending  last 
November— an  average  of  almost  8  a 
day.  The  entire  eastern  region  of  the 
country  was  blacked  out  for  over  a  third 
of  the  year  in  both  1981  and  1982.  The 
guerrillas  destroyed  over  200  buses  in 
1982  alone.  Less  than  half  the  rolling 
stock  of  the  railways  remains  opera- 
tional. 

In  short,  unable  to  win  the  free 
loyalty  of  El  Salvador's  people,  the  guer- 
rillas are  deliberately  and  systematically 
depriving  them  of  food,  water,  trans- 
portation, light,  sanitation,  and  work. 
These  are  the  people  who  are  claiming 
that  their  objective  is  to  help  the  com- 
mon people. 

Fourth:  This  brings  me  to  a  fourth 
point.  The  three  government  battalions 
we  have  trained  conduct  themselves  pro- 
fessionally, both  on  the  battlefield  and  in 
their  relations  with  civilians.  But  only  1 
Salvadoran  soldier  in  10  has  received 
our  training— fewer  than  the  many  guer- 
rillas trained  by  Nicaragua  and  Cuba. 

Fifth:  And,  finally,  what  is  at  issue 
in  El  Salvador  is  the  cause  of  democ- 
racy. I  cannot  stress  this  point  enough, 
and  here  the  progress  has  been  substan- 
tial. The  Constituent  Assembly,  elected 


THE  SECRETARY 


a  year  ago,  has  drafted  a  new  constitu- 
tion, sustained  a  moderate  government 
of  national  unity,  and  extended  land 
reform. 

I  remind  you  of  that  election  just 
over  a  year  ago  with  over  80%  of  the 
people  voting— not  a  bad  percentage— in 
the  face  of  armed,  violent  efforts  to  pre- 
vent people  from  coming  to  the  polls. 

Most  important,  perhaps,  the  politi- 
cians and  parties  who  participated  in  the 
March  1982  elections  and  are  now  repre- 
sented in  the  assembly  have  begun  to  fix 
common  goals  in  the  pursuit  of  a 
political  solution  to  their  country's  prob- 
lems. 

The  most  concrete  indication  of  the 
self-confidence  and  growing  strength  of 
El  Salvador's  new  democratic  leaders 
took  place  last  month  in  the  presence  of 
His  Holiness,  Pope  John  Paul  H.  On 
March  6,  the  President  of  El  Salvador, 
Alvaro  Magana,  announced  that  national 
elections  will  be  held  in  El  Salvador  this 
year  and  that  they  will  be  open  to  all 
political  parties  and  groups.  You  have  to 
have  some  confidence  in  the  democratic 
process  to  move  up  the  election  and  say, 
"All  right,  let's  decide  by  the  electoral 
process  who  should  be  the  president." 

On  March  17,  El  Salvador's  Peace 
Commission,  made  up  of  a  Catholic 
bishop  and  two  civilians,  proposed 
legislation  for  a  general  amnesty  that  is 
now  before  the  Constituent  Assembly. 
And  the  president  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly  has  explicitly  called  for  the 
main  political  unit  of  the  guerrillas,  the 
FDR  [Revolutionary  Democratic  Front], 
to  take  part  in  the  elections. 

As  President  Reagan  has  made 
clear,  we  support  negotiations  aimed  at 
"expanding  participation  in  democratic 
institutions,  at  getting  all  parties  to  par- 
ticipate in  free,  nonviolent  elections." 
We  will  not  support  negotiations  that 
short  circuit  the  very  democratic  process 
El  Salvador  is  trying  to  establish.  We 
will  not  carve  up  power  behind  people's 
backs  as  happened  in  Nicaragua.  I'm 
shocked  at  the  suggestions  I  sometimes 
hear  when  I'm  testifying  that  what  we 
ought  to  do— having  observed  these  peo- 
ple try  by  violence  to  prevent  an  election 
from  happening,  should  by  violence  and 
with  our  agreement  shoot  their  way  into 
the  government.  No  dice.  We  will  not 
support  that  kind  of  activity. 

We  will  help  El  Salvador  to  guaran- 
tee the  personal  security  of  candidates 
and  their  supporters;  discourage  coer- 
cion or  intimidation;  and  help  insure  ac- 
cess to  media,  an  honest  tally,  and  ulti- 
mately respect  for  the  people's  verdict. 


Let  me  turn  a  moment  to  the  deeply 
troubling  problem  of  El  Salvador's  in- 
effective system  of  criminal  justice.  They 
must  do  much  better.  The  courts  must 
bring  cases  to  a  timely  and  impartial 
conclusion,  and  we  have  to  make  that 
point  to  them  unequivocally  and  very 
clearly.  I  might  say,  Attorney  General 
Bill  Smith  is  in  El  Salvador  today,  and  a 
legal  team  has  been  down  there,  and 
we're  doing  our  best  to  be  helpful  in  that 
regard. 

Nicaragua 

Let  me  turn  now  to  Nicaragua.  Nicar- 
aguans  in  growing  numbers  have  con- 
cluded that  their  struggle  for  democracy 
has  been  betrayed.  The  preeminent  hero 
of  the  anti-Somoza  revolution,  Eden 
Pastora,  who  as  Commander  Zero  led 
the  takeover  of  the  Somoza  National 
Assembly  in  1978,  is  now  in  exile.  So  is 
Alfonso  Robelo,  a  key  member  of  the 
governing  junta  that  replaced  Somoza. 
So  is  Miskito  Indian  leader,  Brooklyn 
Rivera.  And  so  now  is  Adolfo  Calero, 
the  anti-Somoza  businessman  who  for  3 
years  tried  hard  to  play  the  role  of  "loyal 
opposition"  inside  Nicaragua.  They  and 
thousands  of  others  in  and  out  of 
Nicaragua  bear  witness  that  what  began 
as  an  extraordinary  national  coalition 
against  Somoza  has  cracked  and 
shriveled  under  the  manipulation  of  a 
handful  of  ideologues,  fortified  by  their 
Cuban  and  Soviet-bloc  military  advisers. 

But  there  is  an  answer  to 
Nicaragua's  problems.  As  in  El 
Salvador,  it  is  a  political  one.  Last  Oc- 
tober, eight  democratic  countries  of  the 
region,  meeting  in  San  Jose,  Costa  Rica, 
called  on  Nicaragua  to  join  them  in 
allowing  freedom  of  action  for  peaceful 
democratic  groups,  ending  cross-border 
guerrilla  violence,  and  freezing  the 
growth  of  military  arsenals.  We  support 
such  negotiations.  President  Reagan  has 
said, 

...  to  strengthen  democracy,  to  halt 
subversion,  to  stop  the  flow  of  arms,  to 
respect  borders,  and  to  remove  ail  the 
foreign  military  advisers — the  Soviets. 
Cubans,  East  Germans,  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  as  well  as  our 
own— from  the  region. 

If  accepted,  the  San  Jose  proposals 
would  reduce  East-West  tensions  in 
Central  America  and  lead  to  a  regional 
political  solution.  Yet  Nicaragua  has  so 
far  refused  even  to  discuss  these  prin- 
ciples, just  as  it  earlier  spurned  our  own 
efforts  to  reach  a  bilateral  understand- 
ing to  deal  with  mutual  concerns. 


U.S.  Commitment  to  Regional 
Peace  and  Democracy 

Our  commitment  to  peace  and  den 
racy  in  Central  America  is  not,  of 
course,  limited  to  El  Salvador  and 
agua.  Like  us,  Costa  Rica  and  Hor 
have  not  given  up  hope  that  Nicar; 
will  return  to  the  tenets  of  democf 
and  peace  for  which  its  people  fou; 
1979.  But  as  Nicaragua's  immedial 
neighbor,  they  feel  directly  the  spii 
of  Nicaragua's  militarization  and  g 
ing  internal  troubles.  Six  thousand 
Nicaraguans  are  now  living  in  exili 
Costa  Rica.  In  Honduras  the  flow 
refugees  from  Nicaragua  continue? 
rise.  Last  year  alone,  some  15,000i 
Miskito  Indians  fled  to  Honduras  v 
than  accept  forced  relocation  by  tM 
Nicaraguan  Government. 

Until  a  peaceful  solution  is  foui 
we  must  continue  to  bolster  Hondv 
and  Costa  Rica.  Both  are  democra 
Both  have  been  hit  hard  economic; 
the  regional  turmoil  and  the  world 
sion.  And  both  have  been  victimize 
terrorism  directed  from  Nicaragua 
want  to  strengthen  these  democran 
and  help  them  provide  their  people 
stability  and  hope,  even  in  the  miJ 
regional  crisis. 

Democracy  in  Central  AmericE 
not  be  achieved  overnight,  and  it  \ 
not  be  achieved  without  sustained 
support.  To  support  our  objectives 
Central  America — democracy,  dev 
ment,  justice,  and  the  security  to  r 
them  possible— Congress  has  autb 
substantial  economic  assistance.  C( 
versy  continues,  however,  over  mil 
aid  to  El  Salvador — the  country  lit 
under  the  gun. 

The  security  assistance  we  hav 
asked  for  is  to  build  disciplined,  sk: 
armed  forces  to  serve  as  a  shield  f( 
democratization  and  development- 
shield.  We  are  not  planning  to  Ami 
canize  the  fighting  or  to  send  El  Si 
dor  advanced,  heavy  weapons,  like 
Nicaragua's  Soviet  tanks.  We  will  1 
El  Salvador's  Armed  Forces  to  inci 
their  mobility  and  to  acquire  necess 
munitions,  spare  parts,  engineering 
equipment,  and  medical  supplies.  B 
our  primary  emphasis  is  on  greatly 
panded  training  for  Salvadoran  sol< 
As  I  mentioned  earlier,  only  a  tent) 
the  soldiers  have  received  our  train 
and  those  who  have,  have  a  superic 
performance.  So  if  we  can  increase 
level  of  training,  we  can  expect  per 
mance  to  improve. 

Time  is  important.  To  quote  Sei 
Henry  Jackson,  "If  you're  going  to  i 


12 


Department  of  State  Bu  I 


THE  SECRETARY 


illot  box  free  and  open,  tliere  must 
hield  behind  which  the  people  can 
ipate."  WTiether  we  will  be  able  to 
irovide  this  shield  in  time  depends 
;  Congress.  In  the  middle  of  a  war. 
ingress  has  cut  security  assistance 
;vel  two-thirds  below  the  previous 
year.  So  here  you  are — you're  an 
you're  fighting,  and  all  of  a  sud- 
18  flow  of  what  you  need  to  fight 
3  cut  by  two-thirds.  Then  people 
How  come  that  army  isn't  doing 
?"  It's  a  terrific  blow, 
le  Administration  is  seeking  to 
e  these  funds.  The  people  of  El 
lor  must  have  confidence  that  we 
e  their  struggle  through,  or  else 
or  democracy  may  not  survive. 


imation,  let  me  say  again  that 
are  many  reasons  for  us  to  care 
what  happens  in  Central  America, 
strategic,  and  we  better  remem- 
What  is  happening  in  Central 
ca  could  endanger  our  own  securi- 
that  of  our  friends  throughout 
ribbean  Basin,  from  Mexico  to  the 
a  Canal. 

t  an  equal  reason  is  moral.  How 
■,  in  the  name  of  human  rights, 
m  our  neighbors  to  a  brutal,  mili- 
ikeover  by  a  totalitarian  minority? 
concern  is  freedom,  will  a  corn- 
victory  provide  it?  If  our  concern 
:ial  fairness,  will  a  communist 
provide  it?  If  our  concern  is 
y,  will  a  communist  economic 
provide  prosperity? 
e  American  people  and  their 
representatives  have  difficult 
;  to  make.  It  is  easy  to  play  the 
ogue,  and  it  is  tempting  to  avoid 
ecisions.  But  if  we  walk  away 
lis  challenge,  we  will  have  let 
lot  only  all  those  in  Central 
^a  who  yearn  for  democracy,  but 
have  let  ourselves  down.  We 
be  for  freedom  and  human  rights 
the  abstract.  If  our  ideals  are  to 
eaning,  we  must  defend  them 
hey  are  threatened.  Let  us  meet 
ponsibility. 

!SS  release  109.  ■ 


Caribbean  Basin  Economic 
Recovery  Act 


Secretary  ShuUz's  statement  before 
the  Senate  Finance  Committee  on 
April  13,  198SJ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  continue 
our  dialogue  on  the  Caribbean  region 
and  specifically  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Economic  Recovery  Act.  The  legislation 
we  have  proposed  is  a  far-sighted 
response  to  a  deepening  economic  and 
social  crisis  troubling  some  of  our  closest 
neighbors.  It  deserves  to  become  law 
this  year— the  sooner  this  year,  the 
better. 


Our  Vital  Interests 

Let  me  begin  by  reviewing  our  own  vital 
interests  in  the  Caribbean  Basin.  The 
Caribbean  is  an  unfenced  neighborhood 
that  we  share  with  27  island  and  coastal 
nations.  Their  security  and  economic 
well-being  have  a  direct  impact  on  our 
own  strategic  and  economic  interests. 

We  do  not  have  to  go  to  Miami  to 
come  in  daily  contact  with  people  born 
in  the  Caribbean  region  or  to  appreciate 
the  rapid  impact  of  turmoil  there  on  our 
own  society.  In  fact,  our  country  has 
become  a  safehaven  for  thousands  upon 
thousands  of  Caribbean  citizens  who  pin 
their  hopes  for  a  better  life  on  a 
dangerous,  uncertain,  and  clandestine 
migration  to  this  country.  As  a  result, 
the  basin  area  is  now  the  second  largest 
source  of  illegal  immigration  to  the 
United  States.  This  situation  will  not  im- 
prove until  the  nations  of  the  Caribbean 
Basin  are  better  able  to  offer  their  peo- 
ple opportunities  to  build  secure,  produc- 
tive lives  at  home. 

Economically,  the  Caribbean  Basin 
region  is  a  vital  strategic  and  commer- 
cial artery  for  the  United  States.  Nearly 
half  our  trade,  three-quarters  of  our  im- 
ported oil,  and  over  half  our  imported 
strategic  minerals  pass  through  the 
Panama  Canal  or  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  If 
this  region  should  become  prey  to  social 
and  economic  upheaval,  and  dominated 
by  regimes  hostile  to  us,  the  conse- 
quences for  our  security  would  be  im- 
mediate and  far  reaching. 


The  health  of  the  Caribbean  econo- 
mies also  affects  our  economy.  The  area 
is  now  a  $7  billion  market  for  U.S.  ex- 
ports. Thousands  of  American  jobs  were 
lost  when  our  exports  to  the  region  fell 
$L50  million  last  year  as  income  in  the 
region  declined.  A  large  portion  of  the 
debt  of  Caribbean  countries  is  owed  to 
banks  in  this  country.  At  the  end  of 
1981,  U.S.  direct  investment  in  the 
region  was  approximately  $8  billion. 

The  Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Re- 
covery Act  is  the  cornerstone  of  our  ef- 
fort to  come  to  grips  with  these  issues. 
This  legislation  recognizes  the  critical 
relationship  between  economic  develop- 
ment and  political  stability.  It  is  de- 
signed to  promote  self-sustaining 
economic  growth;  to  enable  countries  in 
the  region  to  strengthen  democratic  in- 
stitutions; and  to  implement  political, 
social,  and  economic  reforms.  Ultimate- 
ly, its  purpose  is  to  help  restore  the 
faith  of  people  of  the  region  in  their 
countries'  ability  to  offer  them  hope  for 
a  better  future. 

Economic  Problems 

The  societies  of  the  Caribbean  Basin 
republics  are  undergoing  inevitable 
change  that  puts  them  under  con- 
siderable stress.  Declining  employment 
in  agriculture,  high  birth  rates,  and  slow 
creation  of  urban  jobs  have  diminished 
hopes  for  combating  poverty  and  caused 
appalling  rates  of  unemployment, 
especially  among  the  young.  Youth 
unemployment  in  Jamaica,  for  example, 
is  estimated  to  be  50%.  Without 
dramatic  increases  in  investment  to  im- 
prove living  standards  and  to  create 
jobs,  rising  crime  and  urban  instability 
will  create  a  downward  spiral  of  social 
disintegration.  And  because  the  Carib- 
bean economies  are  so  small,  new  in- 
vestment—domestic as  well  as 
foreign— will  not  take  place  without 
assured  access  to  outside  markets. 

The  diminutive  size  of  individual 
Caribbean  markets— averaging  just  1.5 
million  people,  with  16  countries  under 
0.5  million— makes  them  uniquely  de- 
pendent on  the  outside  world  in  ways  we 
can  only  dimly  imagine.  The  national  in- 
comes of  most  Caribbean  Basin  coun- 
tries are  less  than  that  of  a  U.S.  metro- 
politan area  of  300,000  people,  such  as 


THE  SECRETARY 


Omaha,  Nebraska,  or  Charlotte,  North 
Carolina.  Dominica,  for  example,  with  a 
population  of  only  80,000,  is  the  least 
developed  country  in  the  eastern  Carib- 
bean. It  is  also  one  of  the  most 
democratic  and  pro- Western.  If  small, 
vulnerable  economies  like  Dominica  are 
to  be  at  all  viable,  they  must  have  access 
to  bigger  markets.  In  Central  America 
where  the  economies  tend  to  be  a  bit 
larger,  the  disruptions  in  recent  years  of 
the  Central  American  Common  Market 
have  made  economies  such  as  Costa  Rica 
much  more  dependent  on  markets  out- 
side its  region.  As  long  as  they  are 
limited  to  production  for  their  small  and 
poor  domestic  markets,  the  small  econo- 
mies of  the  Caribbean  Basin  cannot 
diversify  their  economies.  Nor  can  they 
develop  the  expertise  and  efficiency 
needed  to  become  prosperous  interna- 
tional traders. 

We  recognize  that  the  Caribbean 
Basin  economies  will  always  be  depend- 
ent to  some  degree  on  markets  outside 
the  region.  But  developments  of  the  past 
few  years  have  had  a  devastating  im- 
pact. Prices  of  the  non-oil  commodities 
the  Caribbean  republics  export— sugar, 
coffee,  bananas,  bauxite— have  fallen 
drastically.  And  this  is  at  a  time  when 
they  are  still  struggling  to  cope  with  the 
massive  increases  of  the  1970s  in  the 
price  of  their  most  basic  import:  oil. 
Recession  in  the  United  States  has 
caused  a  steep  drop  in  revenue  from 
tourism.  Foreign  debt  has  mounted  to 
increasingly  burdensome  levels.  The 
withering  of  government  revenues  has 
stopped  or  delayed  development  proj- 
ects. Real  per  capita  incomes  have 
declined  throughout  most  of  the  basin 
region. 

All  this  adds  up  to  a  massive  prob- 
lem: the  governments  of  the  Caribbean 
republics  must  find  ways  to  assure 
sociopolitical  stability  and  revive 
economic  growth  while  also  accommo- 
dating rapid  internal  change.  Their  suc- 
cess or  failure  in  meeting  this  challenge 
will  greatly  affect  the  environment  in 
which  we  live. 

The  Challenge/The  Alternatives 

The  United  States  thus  has  a  vital  stake 
in  helping  its  Caribbean  neighbors  pur- 
sue their  goals  of  open  societies  and 
growing  economies  through  productive 
exchange  with  us  and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  The  Administration  has  ap- 
proached this  task  with  full  recognition 
that  we  have  great  assets  and  advan- 
tages when  it  comes  to  supporting 
democratic  development. 


This  becomes  most  clear  when  we 
look  at  the  alternatives.  One  alternative 
is  the  closed  solution:  the  society  which, 
while  not  a  viable  economy,  turns  in  on 
itself  and  enforces  by  fiat  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  limited  economic  benefits  a 
small  economy  can  generate  itself  or 
receive  in  aid.  This  is  a  recipe  for 
totalitarian  force— because  people  will 
not  take  it  willingly— and  economic 
stagnation.  It  is  the  Cuban  solution.  It 
poses  continuing  threats  to  our  interests 
in  this  hemisphere  which  we  have  had  to 
counter  for  the  last  20  years. 

A  second  alternative  is  decline  of  the 
population  to  the  level  which  a  small 
economy  can  support  on  its  own.  With 
the  young  populations  and  high  birth- 
rates of  these  countries,  this  alternative 
entails  massive  emigration  from  the 
Caribbean  Basin  region.  Our  country  is 
inevitably  the  preferred  destination.  As 
much  as  we  welcome  the  rich  contribu- 
tion of  the  region's  immigrants  to  our 
own  life,  massive  immigration  is  not 
what  we  want.  Nor  is  it  what  the  coun- 
tries of  the  region  want.  That  is  not  at 
issue.  Nor  is  it  the  only  reason  we  care. 

The  President's  proposed  legislation 
supports  a  third  alternative— democratic 
development.  This  is  the  only  alternative 
that  meets  our  vital  self-interests  and 
our  nation's  long  tradition  as  a  source  of 
progress  and  hope  in  the  world.  Politi- 
cally, the  people  of  these  societies  have 
shown  they  want  a  voice  in  their  own 
fate  and  that  they  reject  totalitarian  for- 
mulas. Two-thirds  of  the  governments  of 
the  region  have  democratically  elected 
governments.  Significant  progress 
toward  democracy  is  occurring  in  others 
as  well,  despite  the  obstacles.  Democ- 
racy represents  a  set  of  values  that  vir- 
tually all  the  peoples  of  the  region  see  as 
sympathetic  to  their  own  aspirations. 
The  Cuban  and  now  Nicaraguan  models 
stand  as  clear  demonstrations  of  both 
political  repression  and  economic  failure. 

Economically  we  have  the  assets 
that  can  be  ultimately  decisive  in  the 
orientation  of  Caribbean  development. 
We  represent  a  market  economy  that 
works,  a  natural  market  for  Caribbean 
exports,  the  major  source  of  private  in- 
vestment in  the  region,  and  the  manage- 
ment and  technology  that  come  with  it. 

The  Caribbean  initiative  of  the  Ad- 
ministration is  an  imaginative  and  com- 
prehensive approach  to  bringing  these 
assets  to  bear  on  the  problems  of  our 
Caribbean  neighbors.  It  is  a  forward- 
looking  effort  to  boost  both  development 
and  stability.  Because  it  builds  on 
private  resources  and  enterprise,  it  has 
the  potential  to  deal  with  their  deep 


economic  plight  in  a  fundaments 
Because  it  can  help  to  ease  delic 
social  and  political  transitions  be 
they  create  security  problems  of 
ternational  dimension,  it  is  a  pn 
get  ahead  of  history,  instead  of . 
countering  its  unwelcome  effect 

Caribbean  Basin  Program 

Our  program  is  part  of  a  major 
eral  effort.  Other  higher  income- 
tries  of  the  region  are  also  incre 
their  efforts  significantly.  Canao 
embarked  on  a  5-year  program 
area  providing  over  $500  millior 
Canada  currently  provides  duty- 
treatment  or  preferential  access 
of  its  imports  from  the  Caribbes 
Mexico  and  Venezuela,  despite  t 
financial  difficulties,  are  continu 
cessional  credits  to  the  region  tl 
their  oil  facility.  Venezuelan  fin; 
support  has  been  over  $2.5  billi( 
last  5  years.  Colombia  is  initiati 
technical  assistance  of  up  to  S')!  .i 
new  credit  lines  of  $10  million  | 
try,  and  additional  balance-(if-|i:  i 
financing  and  a  trust  fund  for  It 
developed  countries  of  the  easti 
Caribbean.  The  collective  effort  ii 
these  democracies  are  a  stroiiu    ■ 
couragement  to  open  societit-;-  a 
democratic  development  in  tlu^  i  r 
But  success  would  be  imperiled  1   ; 
us.  Our  full  participation  is  \  ii.il 
needed. 

The  U.S.  contribution  integi.i 
three  types  of  mutually  reinforc  g 
economic  measures— trade  oppop 
tax  incentives,  and  aid.  The  proii 
been  developed  in  continuint:  >  o  ; 
tion  with  the  governments  ai;>l  i 
private  sectors  of  the  region-    I 
their  own  priorities  and  ass( 
their  needs. 

As  you  know,  we  were  ali:r 
a  start  on  our  Caribbean  ecoiioir 
tiatives  last  summer,  when  tlio  ( i 
approved  an  emergency  suiipl'ii  i 
aid  package  of  $350  million  — a  I 
ment  in  the  President's  original 
bean  Basin  program.  Our  ain  :  o 
for  both  FY  1983  and  FY  H'.-i 
the  new  higher  priority  we  ha.t 
the  Caribbean  Basin  area  in  ila-  k 
tion  of  our  scarce  economic  assii' 
resources.  As  a  percentage  oi di 
overall  economic  assistance  luid! 
sistance  to  the  Caribbean  rcuior 
double  in  FY  1983  and  1984.  ov  1 
1980,  from  6.6%  authorized  in  1  " 
13.6%  proposed  in  FY  1984. 

Most  of  the  $350  million  api 
priated  last  year  has  been  ohligE,<' 


Department  of  State  Jl 


THE  SECRETARY 


the  private  sector  in  those  coun- 
ith  the  most  serious  financial 
ns.  This  assistance  has  helped 
istablished,  productive  private 
ontinue  to  olitain  needed  raw 
lis  and  equipment  from  the 
States.  In  addition,  it  has  pro- 
ritical  support  for  balance-of- 
its  problems  and  infrastructure 
s  in  the  small,  least  developed 
es. 

have  also  been  able  to  use  a  por- 
these  funds  to  support  training 
lolarship  opportunities  for  in- 
Is  from  the  Caribbean  region 
idership  potential.  These  oppor- 
I  support  our  goal  of  transferring 
dge  and  skills,  enhancing  eco- 
;ooperation  among  nations  of  the 
and  strengthening  political  ties 
n  recipient  countries  and  the 
States.  We  are  currently  offering 
cholarships  each  year.  As  new 
is  available,  the  number  of 
ship  recipients  will  continue  to  in- 
These  programs  have  high  devel- 
,  economic,  and  political  impact 

a  key  element  in  our  assistance 
'aribbean  Basin  region. 

as  the  President  said  when  he 
ed  that  emergency  CBI  [Carib- 
isin  Initiative]  appropriation, 
.1  assistance  is  only  a  short-term 
.  Indeed,  financial  assistance  and 
ment  projects  will  be  wasted  if 
elopment  process  is  not  a  broad- 
nd  integrated  process.  We 
that  such  development  can  only 
;ved  through  a  strategy  which 
.ges  private  initiative  and  invest- 


Market 

I'  to  new  production  and  employ- 
the  Caribbean  is  assured  access 
itural  market  in  this  country, 
•s  in  the  Caribbean  need  help  to 
ted  in  the  competition  with 
nore  experienced,  and  estab- 
roducers  elsewhere.  That  sug- 
bold  solution  that  reinforces  the 
pole  of  attraction  of  the  U.S. 

President's  proposal  to  grant 
e  entry  to  Caribbean  Basin  prod- 
a  12-year  period  is  the  center- 
the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative, 
rovide  a  decisive  boost  to  Carib- 
/elopment.  The  proposal  is 
2  and  simple.  It  offers  long-term 
c  benefits  of  free  trade  and  the 
te  impact  of  a  major  political 
nent  to  the  region.  By  assuring 
e  access  to  the  vast  U.S. 


market,  this  measure  will  provide  strong 
and  continuing  incentives  for  invest- 
ment, innovation,  and  risktaking  in 
Caribbean  countries. 

As  I  have  pointed  out,  the  domestic 
economies  of  most  Caribbean  Basin  na- 
tions are  simply  too  small  to  permit  the 
diversification  essential  for  noninfla- 
tionary  growth.  An  opening  of  the  U.S. 
market  to  the  nontraditional  products  of 
these  countries  will  provide  important 
opportunities  to  develop  new  production 
and  an  incentive  to  produce  more  effi- 
ciently. Increased  and  diversified  pro- 
duction will  mean  higher  wages,  a 
strengthened  middle  class,  more 
resources  available  for  education  and 
health— and  more  demand  for  raw 
materials,  equipment,  and  finished  goods 
from  the  United  States. 

I  recognize  that  these  are  difficult 
economic  times  in  our  own  country. 
Understandably,  there  is  concern  over 
the  impact  this  legislation  will  have  on 
workers  in  the  United  States.  I  am  con- 
vinced that  the  impact  on  our  economy 
will  be  positive.  Because  the  Caribbean 
countries  are  so  closely  linked  to  our 
economy,  our  sales  to  them  will  grow 
apace  with  their  economies.  Excluding 
petroleum  trade,  we  have  a  $2  billion 
trade  surplus  with  the  Caribbean  Basin 
and  are  already  the  major  trade  partner 
of  most  countries  there.  A  stronger 
Caribbean  Basin  will  be  an  even  better 
and  more  reliable  customer  for  U.S. 
products.  As  countries  in  the  region  pro- 
duce more,  they  will  import  more. 
American  workers  will  share  in  the 
fruits  of  that  growth. 

The  Caribbean  Basin  economies  are 
equal  to  only  2%  of  our  GNP,  and  our 
imports  from  the  region  are  less  than 
4%  of  our  total  imports.  Imports  not 
already  entering  duty-free  are  an  even 
smaller  percentage.  Therefore,  even  a 
significant  increase  in  Caribbean  Basin 
production  and  exports  will  not  have  a 
significant  negative  impact  on  our 
economy.  And  if  American  industries 
are  injured  by  Caribbean  imports,  they 
have  the  remedy  of  seeking  relief  under 
the  safeguard  provisions  of  the  1974 
Trade  Act. 

The  United  States  is  the  world's 
most  open  major  market.  A  large  share 
of  the  Caribbean  Basin's  exports  to  the 
United  States  already  enter  duty  free. 
Petroleum  accounts  for  almost  60%  of 
our  imports  from  the  region.  In  1982, 
70%  of  our  nonpetroleum  imports  from 
the  Caribbean  Basin  entered  duty  free. 
Sixteen  percent  of  these  nonpetroleum 
imports  entered  under  GSP  [generalized 
system  of  preferences].  But  GSP  is  due 


to  expire  next  year.  While  the  Ad- 
ministration strongly  supports  the  ex- 
tension of  GSP,  it  contains  competitive 
need  restrictions  and  product  exclusions 
which  limit  its  usefulness  as  a  stimulus 
to  broad-based  recovery  by  the  small 
Caribbean  Basin  countries.  The  products 
that  would  be  extended  duty-free  entry 
as  a  result  of  the  proposed  CBI  legisla- 
tion comprised  only  one-quarter  of  1%  of 
U.S.  imports  in  1982.  Yet  these  products 
represent  an  important  area  of  potential 
new  production  for  the  Caribbean  Basin 
countries. 

I  would  like  to  mention  briefly  a  sec- 
tion of  this  bill  that  was  not  included 
when  I  addressed  this  committee  last 
August  on  this  legislation.  I  refer  to  the 
convention  tax  deduction.  This  provision 
recognizes  the  vital  importance  of 
tourism  and  travel  to  the  economies  of 
many  Caribbean  nations.  I  should  em- 
phasize that  this  provision  would  simply 
grant  Caribbean  Basin  conventions  tax 
status  equal  to  that  presently  enjoyed  by 
Mexico,  Canada,  and  Jamaica.  In  our 
consultations  with  Caribbean  Basin 
business  and  government  leaders,  they 
have  frequently  cited  the  disadvan- 
tageous present  tax  treatment  of  Carib- 
bean conventions  as  being  an  obstacle  to 
the  recovery  of  their  travel  industries. 
We  should  also  keep  in  mind  that  many 
American  travel  dollars  spent  in  the 
Caribbean  come  back  via  U.S. -owned 
airlines,  hotels,  and  recreation  facilities. 

Let  me  reiterate  the  important  role 
that  Puerto  Rico  and  the  U.S.  Virgin 
Islands  have  in  the  Caribbean  Basin  Ini- 
tiative. Since  the  earliest  days  of  this 
Administration,  we  have  consulted  close- 
ly with  the  governments  of  Puerto  Rico 
and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands  to  fashion 
the  initiative  in  a  way  that  would  foster 
the  development  of  the  U.S.  Caribbean. 
The  legislation  reflects  that  in  several 
ways.  It  liberalizes  duty-free  imports 
into  the  United  States  from  insular 
possessions.  It  explicitly  permits  in- 
dustries in  Puerto  Rico  and  U.S.  ter- 
ritories to  petition  for  relief  under  the 
safeguard  provisions  of  U.S.  trade  law. 
It  also  modifies  environmental  restric- 
tions on  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands  rum  in- 
dustry and  constructs  the  rules-of-origin 
requirements  to  encourage  the  use  of 
products  of  Puerto  Rico  and  the  U.S. 
Virgin  Islands.  An  important  provision 
would  transfer  excise  taxes  on  all  im- 
ported rum  to  the  treasuries  of  Puerto 
Rico  and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands.  In 
sum,  the  facilities,  skills,  and  people  of 
Puerto  Rico  and  the  U.S.  Virgin  Islands 
are  a  major  component  of  our  develop- 
ment cooperation  efforts  elsewhere  in 
the  Caribbean. 


THE  SECRETARY 


The  Political  Dimension 

The  political  dimension  of  Caribbean 
progress  is  of  great  and  ultimate  impor- 
tance to  us.  We  do  not  seek  clients.  Our 
goal  is  a  region  of  independent  countries 
in  which  people  can  choose  their  leaders 
and  their  own  path  to  economic  and 
social  progress.  We  are  confident  that 
will  produce  societies  and  regimes  which 
are  not  hostile  to  us.  That  same  belief 
underlies  the  strong  commitment  of  the 
other  democracies  in  the  region  to  the 
Caribbean  initiative.  Together  with  Mex- 
ico, Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  the 
region's  other  democratic  governments, 
we  seek  to  encourage  economic  and 
social  reforms  which  address  the  real 
grievances  of  various  sectors  of  the 
population  of  Central  America  and 
Caribbean  countries. 

Stability  in  societies  based  on  free 
association  rather  than  coercion  must 
depend  on  addressing  people's  right  to 
own  their  own  land.  They  must  be  able 
to  organize  in  cooperatives  and  unions  to 
promote  their  economic  interests.  And 
they  must  be  able  to  exercise  their 
political  rights,  free  of  intimidation. 
That  is  the  course  we  encourage  through 
our  support  in  the  Caribbean  Basin 
region.  That  is  also  the  course  which  the 
peoples  of  the  region  seek— as  they  have 
shown  repeatedly  in  their  own  political 
life. 


Conclusion 

The  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  is  solidly 
grounded  in  the  tradition  and  values  of 
both  this  country  and  the  Caribbean 
region.  It  is  a  strong  and  multilateral  ef- 
fort in  which  the  U.S.  Government  has 
cooperated  and  consulted  with  the 
Governments  of  Canada,  Venezuela, 
Mexico,  and  Colombia;  with  other  donor 
countries;  and  with  the  international 
financial  institutions.  The  proposals 
before  this  committee  are  the  result  of 
extensive  discussions  with  business  and 
government  leaders  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin  region  about  the  obstacles  to  their 
economic  revival.  The  focus  of  our  ef- 
forts is  on  the  private  sector,  which 
must  be  the  engine  of  a  lasting  economic 
growth. 

The  nations  of  the  Caribbean  Basin 
are  counting  on  us.  It  is  now  over  a  year 
since  President  Reagan  outlined  his 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  proposals 
before  the  Organization  of  American 
States.  Those  proposals  were  warmly, 
even  enthusiastically,  received  by  most 
government,  labor,  and  private  sector 
leaders  in  the  region.  For  those  in  the 
Caribbean  Basin  countries  who  believe 


in  cooperation  with  the  United  States,  in 
pluralistic  democracy  and  private  enter- 
prise, the  announcement  of  the  initiative 
demonstrated  that  the  United  States 
realizes  the  importance  of  urgent  and 
far-reaching  action  to  promote  the 
region's  prosperity.  They  were  bitterly 
disappointed  that  this  legislation  did  not 
reach  the  Senate  floor  during  the  last 
Congress.  If  we  fail  to  act  now,  our  in- 
action will  be  interpreted  as  lack  of  in- 
terest and  a  broken  promise.  It  would 
undercut  moderate  leaders  in  the  region 
who  have  geared  their  policies  to 
cooperation  with  the  United  States  and 
to  serious  efforts  for  economic  develop- 
ment and  democracy.  It  would  ex- 
tinguish the  hopes  that  have  been  raised 


in  the  region  that  the  United  Stat 
willing  to  give  significant  help  to  : 
economic  and  social  progress  in  tl 
Caribbean  Basin. 

I  am  confident  that  after  care 
amination,  this  committee  and  the 
Senate  will  recognize  that  this  leg 
tion  is  important  to  the  interests  i 
United  States  and  the  Caribbean  : 
countries.  I  strongly  urge  favorab 
tion. 


'  Press  release  108.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  publ 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  avaitabli 
the  Superintendent  of  Docimients.  U. 
Government  Printing  Office.  Washing 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1984  and  1985 
Authorization  Requests 


Excerpt  from  Secretary  Shultz's 
statement  before  the  Subcommittee  on 
International  Operations  of  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  Febru- 
ary 23,  1983.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  to  begin  discussion  of  the 
Department  of  State  authorization  re- 
quest for  fiscal  years  1984  and  1985.  Of 
all  my  appearances  before  Congress, 
none  is  more  important.  Indeed,  our  suc- 
cess in  the  world  depends  on  our  will- 
ingness to  allocate  the  resources 
necessary  to  support  a  foreign  policy 
worthy  of  our  traditions  and  the  role  we 
must  play  in  today's  world. 

I  iDelieve  I  know  as  well  as  anyone 
the  competition  for  our  nation's 
resources.  I  also  understand  the  in- 
evitable trade-offs  between  our  domestic 
and  international  priorities  that  are  a 
part  of  that  process.  I  firmly  believe, 
however,  that  just  as  we  cannot  com- 
promise on  funding  vital  to  America's 
defense,  it  is  equally  important  that  our 
diplomatic  efforts  receive  the  resources 
essential  for  their  success.  Indeed,  to  the 
extent  we  succeed  diplomatically  in 
assuring  the  security  and  well-being  of 
ourselves,  our  friends,  and  allies,  our 
military  strength  need  never  be  tested. 


U.S.  Agenda  Goals 

Our  nation's  foreign  policy  agenda  is  a 
very  ambitious  one.  Three  broad  goals 


dominate  that  agenda— goals  whi 
at  once  interdependent  and  mutal 
forcing. 

•  The  first  goal  is  our  commi 
to  a  more  peaceful,  secure  world, 
countries  are  free  to  pursue  peace 
change  and  to  realize  their  politic; 
economic  aspirations  safe  from  th 
or  intimidation.  To  address  this  g 
President  Reagan  is  moving  decis 
restore  our  military  strength,  to 
negotiate  on  disarmament  and  an 
trol,  and  to  act  decisively  and  ima 
inatively  to  help  make  peace  a  rea 
regions  of  the  world  which  have  k 
only  anguish  and  strife  for  genera 

•  The  second  goal  is  to  restor 
order  and  stability  to  the  internati 
economic  system  by  recognizing  tl 
own  domestic  and  foreign  econom 
policies  must  interact  effectively  t 
achieve  sustainable  noninflationar 
growth. 

•  A  third  goal  is  the  Presiden 
commitment  to  expanding  the  fori 
democracy  and  freedom.  Last  Jun 
speech  to  the  British  Parliament, 
President  pointed  out  the  need  to 
decisively  to  strengthen  the  infras 
ture  of  democracy;  a  free  press,  ft 
trade  unions,  free  political  parties 
institutions  which  allow  people  to 
mine  their  own  future. 


Department  of  State  B ' 


THE  SECRETARY 


lary  Resources 

1  like  now,  however,  to  discuss 
ources  needed  by  the  Department 
e  to  advance  U.S.  interests 
IS.  I  am  requesting  appropriation 
ty  for  $2.4  billion  in  1984  and 
lion  in  1985.  The  1984  request 
mts  an  increase  of  $169  million  or 
)ver  1983  estimates. 
5  largest  component  of  this  in- 
-$85  million— results  from  com- 
a  previously  approved  change  in 
ing  of  our  payment  of  assessed 
utions  to  the  major  international 
;ations.  This,  therefore,  does  not 
ite  an  increase  in  the  budgets  of 
rganizations.  In  fact,  without  this 
1  process,  our  1984  authorization 
.  would  be  only  4%  greater  than 
i3  level.  If  the  budget  request  is 
iroved,  the  U.S.  payment  will  be 
irs.  This  would  be  inconsistent 
r  global  responsibilities. 
3t  of  the  Department's  1984  in- 
s  necessary  to  continue  opera- 
existing  levels  and  to  correct 
jnal  deficiencies.  We  must  meet 
d  wage  and  price  increases 
s,  where  inflation  rates  have 
niificantly  higher  than  domestic 
Bspond  to  the  growing  demand 
'estic  and  overseas  passport  and 
-  services;  and  continue  efforts 
ct  life  and  property  abroad  in  an 
ngly  dangerous  international  en- 
■nt. 

remaining  growth  in  the 
nent's  budget  is  devoted  to 
ng  several  programs  of  critical 
nee  to  U.S.  interests. 
:it,  we  must  continue  the 
ir  effort  to  strengthen  reporting 
lysis  of  foreign  political  and 
c  events.  Our  ability  to  influence 
ional  events  is  dependent  upon 
Ige  of  and  sensitivity  to  unique 
situations.  The  Iranian  crises  of 
jw  what  can  happen  when  we 
equately  informed. 
)nd,  we  must  continue  to  renew 
rade  our  operational  capability, 
to  make  these  investments  not 
pardizes  the  effective  conduct  of 
affairs  but  also  increases  the 
uch  necessary  investments  in 
re.  In  this  area,  it  is  necessary 


iprove  the  security  and  reliabili- 
Department's  telecommunica- 

items.  The  Falklands  and 
conflicts  demonstrated  the 
upgrading  our  crisis  manage- 

nmunications  system; 


•  Provide  new  facilities  where 
needed  and  restore  the  condition  of 
existing  overseas  property.  Maintenance 
activities  have  been  seriously  neglected, 
and  renewal  of  our  existing  capital  in- 
vestment is  both  cost-effective  and  a 
high  priority; 

•  Meet  increased  demands  for  the 
continued  security  of  life  and  property; 

•  Expand  the  Department's  world- 
wide information  processing  capability 
to  meet  increased  workload  demands 
and  to  improve  our  management  effi- 
ciency; and 

•  Improve  our  administrative  sup- 
port for  U.S.  Government  activities 
abroad,  particularly  in  lesser  developed 
countries. 

Finally,  there  are  several  matters  of 
current  interest  to  this  committee  that  I 
would  like  to  address  briefly.  First,  this 
request  provides  authorization  to  sup- 
port the  1983  reopening  of  seven  con- 
sulates closed  in  1980— Brisbane,  Man- 
dalay,  Salzburg,  Nice,  Bremen,  Turin, 


and  Goteborg.  Our  authorization  also 
will  support  the  opening  of  three  new 
posts  in  Chengdu,  People's  Republic  of 
China;  Bandar,  Brunei;  and  Enugu, 
Nigeria.  Each  of  these  is  important  to 
our  foreign  policy  and  commercial  in- 
terests. 

I  would  like  to  report  that  our  Office 
of  Foreign  Missions  is  steadily  expand- 
ing its  operations,  including  a  careful 
review  of  ways  to  ensure  reciprocity. 
The  Department  also  is  establishing  a 
Coordinator  for  International  Com- 
munication and  Information  Policy.  The 
coordinator  will  provide  executive 
branch  leadership  and  we  welcome  your 
continuing  interest  and  support  for  our 
efforts  in  this  important  area. 


'  Press  release  61.  The  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  published 
by  the  committee  and  will  be  available  from 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Secretary's  News  Briefing  on  Arms  Control 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  new>>  briefing 
at  the  White  House  on  March  31.  1983^ 

I  thought  I  would  make  a  few  opening 
comments  and  then  we  can  just  have  the 
questions  we  wish.  I  have  been  trying  to 
think  to  myself  what  is  this  really  all 
about.  And  obviously  it  is  about  reduc- 
tions in  nuclear  arms,  particularly  a  par- 
ticular class  of  armaments  in  Europe 
that  are  highly  destabilizing  and, 
therefore,  especially  dangerous.  And 
clearly  we  have  been  in  the  position — 
the  President  has— of  wanting  to  see 
that  whole  class  of  weapons  eliminated 
globally.  We  continue  to  think  that  is  the 
best  solution. 

We  recognize  that  this  is  a  negotia- 
tion and  the  Soviet  Union  has  rejected 
that,  and  so  the  President  has  made 
another  proposal.  The  new  proposal  you 
will  have  so  I  won't  repeat  it  other  than 
to  say  that  it  is  a  further  effort  to 
negotiate  something  that  still  aspires, 
although  it  isn't  a  condition,  to  get  to 
elimination  of  these  weapons  but  is  will- 
ing to  take,  as  an  interim  step,  some 
finite  number  somewhere  between  zero 
and  572  warheads  on  both  sides,  accord- 
ing to  specified  criteria  that  has  been  set 
out. 


So  partly  this  is  about  that.  But  I 
think  that  in  the  full  perspective  of 
things,  we  tend  to  mislead  ourselves  if 
we  concentrate  overly  on  the  weapons 
aspect  of  this  problem.  And  it  is  a  fact 
that  we  have  had  an  extensive  rich  con- 
sultative process  with  our  allies  on  the 
original  1979  dual-track  decision,  in  the 
first  place,  then  on  the  elimination  op- 
tion, in  the  second  place,  and  now  on  the 
President's  most  recent  proposal. 

And  we  have  had  really  sort  of  an 
alliance  view  throughout.  It  is  very 
unified  and  strong  and  determined.  So  I 
think  that  raises  a  question  of  how  it  is 
possible  to  get  so  many  countries  that 
are  geographically  spread  around  and 
which  have  varying  interests  on  many 
things  to  be  so  unified  on  something  of 
this  kind.  And  I  think  you  have  to  come 
back  to  the  values  that  these  countries 
share  in  a  determination  to  be  able  to 
defend  those  values  against  a  very  clear 
threat  to  them. 

It  is  really  that  that  underlies  the 
unity  that  we  have  and  the  fact  that  we 
are  undertaking  both  to  confront  the 
Soviet  Union  with  the  strength  implied 
by  the  first-track  and  the  dual-track 
decision,  but  at  the  same  time  hold  out 
to  everyone  the  prospect  of  a  reduction 


THE  SECRETARY 


or,  in  our  basic  prospect,  elimination  of 
these  very  destabilizing  weapons. 

The  perspective  that  I  want  to  lend 
is  the  strength  of  the  alliance  and  the 
reason  for  that,  namely  our  jointly  held 
values,  as  really  the  underlying  source  of 
strength.  And  I  don't  say  that  in  any 
way  to  neglect  the  importance  of  the 
particulars  of  the  arms  reduction 
negotiation  and  the  weapons  systems 
and  all  that. 

Q.  From  Moscow  recently,  we  have 
heard  from  Andropov  and  we  have  had 
some  journalists  reporting  on  the 
temper  of  the  talk  over  there.  And  the 
general  feeling  seems  to  be  that  the 
Russians  have  had  it  up  to  here,  if  you 
will,  with  dealing  with  the  Reagan 
Administration.  Is  that,  do  you  find 
that  is  their  reading? 

A.  There  have  been  some  very 
sharp  statements  made,  and  I  think  it  is 
fair  to  characterize  the  U.S. -Soviet  rela- 
tionship as  not  a  particularly  good  one 
right  now.  It  is  tense.  At  the  same  time, 
I  think  it  is  important  to  point  out  that 
we  have  discussions  going  on  with  the 
Soviet  Union  in  two  fora  in  Geneva  that 
include  both  the  INF  [intermediate- 
range  nuclear  forces]  and  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  talks 
also  kind  of  adjoining  each  one  of  those 
talks  about  confidence-building 
measures. 

There  is  a  continuing  discussion  in 
Vienna  and  MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced 
force  reduction]  talks.  We  are  engaged 
with  them  across  a  range  of  Helsinki 
Final  Act  and  disarmament  issues  in 
Madrid.  And  we  have  quite  a  number  of 
other  settings  in  which  there  are  from 
time-to-time  meetings,  for  example, 
meetings  that  I  have  with  Ambassador 
Dobrynin.  So  there  is  a  dialogue. 

And  it  is  our  feeling  that  the  impor- 
tant element  here  is  to  see  and  to  probe 
and  to  find  out  whether  there  are  some 
areas  of  importance  where  substantive 
agreements  can  be  made.  That  is,  tone 
reflects  substance,  not  the  other  way 
around.  And  there  are  a  great  many 
substantive  matters  where  we  are  in 
deep  disagreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  and  that  is  the  essence  of  it. 

We  need  to  work  at  the  substance. 
And  if  it  turns  out  that  the  substance 
can  be  improved,  then  I  think  the  tone 
of  the  relationship  will  improve. 

Q.  There  are  some  very  sharp  dif- 
ferences in  statements  which  the 
President  made  over  a  period  of  some 
weeks— very,  very  harsh  denuncia- 
tions of  the  Soviet  Union— and  what 
everyone  seems  to  feel  is  a  verv  con- 


structive proposal  at  this  time.  Why  is 
there  such  a  great  variance  between 
the  President's  rhetoric  on  some  of 
these  occasions  when  he  speaks  so 
sharply  and  so  strongly  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  the  focus  of  all  evil,  and  then 
made  movement  toward  this  kind  of 
substantive  thing?  Because  the  first 
statements  almost  indicate  that  it 
wouldn't  matter  what  negotiation  we 
had,  we  wouldn't  trust  them  to  carry 
it  out.  And  it  would  be  almost  im- 
possible to  negotiate.  Is  there  a  plan 
here?  Is  it  by  accident?  Why  are  these 
enormous  differences  in  tone? 

A.  I  think  that  if  we  didn't  feel  that 
there  was  a  reasonable  possibility  of  ar- 
riving at  significant  agreements  in  these 
discussions,  we  wouldn't  be  having  them. 
The  fact  that  they  are  going  on,  at  least 
from  our  standpoint,  shows  that  we 
think  there  is  a  chance  that  things  can 
improve  and  that  the  improvement  can 
be  genuine  in  the  sense  that  it  can  be 
built  on  substance. 

The  range  of  issues  that  one  can 
discuss  is  quite  broad.  And,  of  course, 
on  many  of  them,  particularly  when  you 
are  talking  about  something  like  arms 
control,  I  think  that  it  is  not  so  much  a 
matter  of  trust  as  it  is  verifiability,  that 
you  are  going  to  aspire  to  an  agreement 
that  is  inherently  capable  of  being  car- 
ried out  because  you  can  know  on  both 
sides,  they  as  ourselves,  that  it  actually 
is  being  carried  out.  The  key  here  is  the 
subject  of  verifiability. 

Q.  Do  you  get  any  indication  from 
the  Soviets  at  all  of  a  shift  in  their 
position  on  verifiability?  Are  they 
moving  toward  a  more  acceptable  posi- 
tion as  far  as  we  are  concerned?  Is 
there  any  shift  in  that  whole  area? 

A.  Our  negotiations  are  ongoing  in 
various  areas,  and  I  think  that  the  no- 
tion that  an  agreement  ought  to  be 
verifiable  is  an  accepted  notion.  The 
question  of  what  it  takes  to  satisfy 
yourself  on  that  is  where  all  of  the  argu- 
ment comes.  For  example,  the  President 
feels  that  the  Threshold  Test  Ban 
Treaty  is  capable  of  considerable 
improvements  in  the  area  of  verifiability, 
and  the  Soviets  have  told  us  that  they 
do  not  agree  with  that.  The  Soviets  have 
a  difference  of  opinion  there.  It  is  not 
over  whether  verifiability  is  a  proper 
concept;  it  is  over  the  implementation  of 
the  concept. 

Q.  Given  that  you  have  said  that 
the  tone  for  that  meeting  reflects 
substantive  disagreements  between  us 
and  the  Soviet  Union,  wherein  lies  the 
possibility  for  an  improvement  or  a 


chance  of  an  agreement  on  impr 
ment  of  the  relationship?  Why  dij 
think  there  might  be  such  a  thin, 
do  you  think  there  is  any  prospe 
summit  meeting  before  the  end  ' 
first  term  in  this  Administratior 

A.  I  think  you  have  to  re\ nw 
the  issues  and  then  appraise  tlun  : 
by  one  and  see  what  the  prosiir-i  ; 
be  piece  by  piece,  so  if  you  sa>  ";i 
agreement,"  that  can  cover  a  bm; 
range.  The  focus  of  attention  li^ii' 
is  on  the  major  arms  reduction  ik  • 
tions  and  particularly  today  the  1.' ' 
negotiations.  But  there  are  a  !>  it  ■  i 
things. 

The  President  has  said,  ami  a  ' 
I  can  read  it  Mr.  Andropov  has  al 
said,  that  in  principle  they  are  lu'i 
to  have  a  summit  meeting  but  onl 
the  basis  of  the  prospect  that  sorr 
really  significant  could  be  achieve 
the  meeting.  So  the  idea  of  a  simj 
acquainted  meeting  doesn't  seem 
in  the  cards. 

Q.  You  have  expressed  the 
wonder— the  pleasurable  wondc 
that  at  the— 

A.  No,  I  didn't  express  any  w 
ment.  I  insist  that  it  is  remarkabl 
that  it  is  important  and  then  I  tri. 
to  have  wonderment  but  rather  tc 
you  an  answer,  namely  our  share( 
values. 

Q.  Isn't  it  true  though  that  J 
dent  Reagan  would  have  stayed 
original  zero-zero  option  had  it 
been  for  pressure  from  our  alliei 
Europe? 

A.  The  President  has  said — a 
has  been  an  alliance  proposition 
as  I  understand  it,  I  am  relatively 
to  it,  but  the  1979  decision— the  o 
proposal— has  been  an  alliance  pr* 
tion  all  along  and  it  has  been  disci 
continuously  about  what  position 
should  take  and  what  our  negotiat 
strategy  should  be,  and  so  on.  Am 
have  been  lots  of  discussions  withi 
U.S.  Government,  as  well  as  withi 
European  governments  and  amon; 
think  it  was  a  shared  view  that  th 
ing  is  right  now  to  make  this  chan 
our  position.  So  I  don't  think  it  is 
tion  of  pressure  this  way  or  that  v 
is  a  question  of  a  continuous  proce 
consultation,  and  I  think  there  em 
a  very  broad  consensus  in  our  gov 
ment  and  in  the  governments  abrc 
that  this  was  the  time  to  make  a  c 
as  the  President  has  done. 

Q.  You  didn't  find  a  reluctani 
the  Pentagon  to  make  this  chang 


Department  of  State  Bie 


THE  SECRETARY 


.  No.  We  had  lots  of  discussions  of 
■actically  ever  since  I  got  here — I 
minded  this  morning  9  months 
omebody  implied  that  it  ought  to 
e  for  me  to  produce  something. 
Iter] 

Isn't  there  perhaps  a  con- 
ble  danger  that  offering  the  in- 
proposal  at  this  point,  shortly 
he  hurdle  of  the  West  German 
ms,  will  suggest  or  be  inter- 
:  as  meaning  that  the  Adminis- 

1  was  not  terribly  intent  on  zero- 
ption  to  begin  with,  that  once 
litical  hurdle  had  been  cleared 
ow  out  a  more  specific  bargain- 
sition  and  that  this  might  tend 
ercut  the  substance  of  zero- 

I  don't  think  there  is  really  a 
ate  question  about  what  the 
;nt  feels  and,  for  that  matter, 
ur  allies  feel  is  the  best  outcome. 
e  elimination  of  these  weapons. 
nk  so,  we  continue  to  think  so, 
hink  that  that  position  has  a  kind 
•d  appeal  to  mankind  in  a  sense, 
pported  by  the  Japanese.  The 
?  think  that  is  the  right  proposal 
on.  There  is  a  worldwide  accept- 
that.  I  think  there  is  also  a 
tion  of  the  reality  that  we  are 
to  bring  about  arms  reduction 
it,  in  the  process  of  conducting 
jotiation,  we  need  to  try  out 
ptions,  and  so  we  have, 
link  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that 
/  the  President  has  constructed 
)posal,  he  did  not  substitute  some 
■  for  zero.  He  rather  said,  in  ef- 
at  there  are  a  variety  of  numbers 

2  conceivable,  and  we  are  saying 
50viet  Union  that  we  are  willing 

an  interim  number.  And  if  they 
iccept  this  concept,  maybe  there 
le  numbers  that  they  think  are 
;han  other  numbers.  Obviously, 
mot  just  pick  any  number  for  a 
lunch  of  reasons.  But  I  think  it  is 
rt  to  put  this  forward  in  a  man- 
t  maximizes  the  potential  for 
tion  and  for  some  reality  of  the 
;t  of  getting  some  place  as  much 

cannot  do  it,  of  course.  It  takes 
es  to  make  an  agreement. 

Ooes  this  put  the  onus  on  the 
Union  now  to  come  up  with  a 
—an  acceptable  number— and 
s  of  the  public  relations  battle 
is  the  ball  now  to  be  perceived 
ioviet  court? 

I  think  that  the  ball  has  always 
the  Soviet  court  because  we 


have  tabled  a  complete  and  very  good 
proposal  in  what  has  been  called  the 
zero  option.  I  guess  you  could  say  that 
they  have  made  a  response  but  the 
response  is  so  far  out  of  the  ballpark 
that  I  don't  think  anyone  really  took  it 
that  seriously.  But  at  any  rate,  certainly 
this  is  another  effort  to  put  forward 
something  as  they  have  said  very  clearly 
that  they  do  not  accept  the  idea  "that 
they  will  have  none  of  these  weapons. 
So  this  is  another  way  of  trying  to 
get  at  it  consistent  with  the  principles 
that  have  been  implicit  in  the  President's 
position  and  the  alliance  position  all 
along  and  has  been  enunciated  most 
recently  in  his  American  Legion  speech 
and  again  by  Paul  Nitze  [head  of  the 
U.S.  delegation  to  the  INF  negotiations] 
in  Geneva. 

Q.  You  are  saying  to  the  Soviets  in 
effect,  what  number  will  you  take?  Is 
that  the  way  that  you  read  it? 

A.  It  leaves  it  open  to  the 
negotiators  to  say,  well,  you  think  this 
number,  we  might  think  "that  number, 
but  if  we  can  get  the  thing  into  that 
ballpark  then  it  seems  to  me  that  that  is 
a  big  advance.  I  don't  know  whether  the 
Soviets  will  respond  that  way,  but  at 
any  rate,  I  think  that  our  position  is  a 
good  one.  It  has  a  good  ultimate  objec- 
tive, and  it  is  a  negotiating  position,  and 
it  has  strong  alliance  support. 

Q.  We  are  truly  trying  to  maximize 
the  prospects  of  coming  up  with  an 
agreement.  Will  there  be  some  way  to 
take  account  of  the  fact  that  the 
British  and  the  French  are  moderniz- 
ing their  strategic  nuclear  forces  in  a 
significant  way  and  either  in  this 
negotiation  or  in  START  might  we  ac- 
commodate that  fact  somehow?  Be- 
cause it  doesn't  seem  to  me  from  the 
Soviet  perspective  of  a  priori  crazy  to 
insist  that  these  forces  be  factored  in 
this  tabulation  of  forces. 

A.  I  will  just  focus  on  the  negotia- 
tions we  are  talking  about.  You  used  a 
good  word,  "strategic,"  and  these  are 
intermediate-range  missiles  that  we  are 
talking  about.  We  are  talking  about 
land-based  missiles,  and  we  are  talking 
about  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  don't  think  that  it  is  reasonable 
to  consider— we  should  not  consider  a 
proposition  broadly  that  equality  con- 
sists of  adding  up  the  armed  forces  of 
every  country  in  the  world  and  then  say- 
ing that  the  Soviet  Union  has  to  have 
the  same  as  everybody  else  combined. 


I  think  this  problem  that  we  have 
has  to  be  put  in  terms  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  and  equality 
and  capacity  to  deter  on  our  part  based 
on  that  notion.  As  you  know,  the  over- 
whelming number  of  U.K.  and  French 
systems  are  submarine-based  so  that 
they  are  not  land-based  systems— I 
believe  only  a  very  small  number  of  the 
French  systems  are  land-based.  Stra- 
tegic land-based— those  are  national 
systems.  They  are  not  NATO  systems.  I 
don't  think  that  they  should  be  counted, 
let  alone  taken  into  account  in  this 
negotiation. 

Q.  I  wondered  if  the  United  States 
would  feel  that  the  number  of  SS-4 
and  SS-5  missiles  that  the  Soviet 
Union  has,  if  they  eliminated  those 
would  this  be  a  realistic  approach  to 
the  thing?  Because  the  Soviets  have 
never  given  an  indication  in  their 
history  of  eliminating  a  new  weapons 
system. 

A.  You  must  be  kidding. 

Q.  No.  I  am  not. 

A.  You  must  be  kidding. 

Q.  The  Soviet  Union  has  never 
eliminated  an  operating  weapons 
system.  They  have  only  gotten  rid  of 
the  old  obsolete  systems,  and  they 
haven't  given  any  indication  in  these 
negotiations,  I  am  sure,  that  they 
wish  to  dismantle  any  of  the  SS-20s. 

A.  We  cannot  appraise  proposals  ac- 
cording to  what  the  Soviet  Union  would 
like.  We  have  to  appraise  proposals  ac- 
cording to  what  would  be  sensible  and 
reasonable  from  the  standpoint  of  our 
allies  and  which  one  would  think  would 
be  reasonable  for  them.  If  they  feel,  as 
it  has  been  said  so  often,  that  they  are 
threatened,  then  why  isn't  it  reasonable 
to  say  let's  just  eliminate  all  of  these 
weapons  and  then  they  don't  threaten 
anybody. 

Q.  I  wasn't  talking  about  what 
was  reasonable — 

A.  I  think  that  there  are  all  sorts  of 
responses  to  these  things,  but  to  think 
that  we  could  accept— the  number  of 
SS-20  warheads  now  deployed,  I  think, 
well  exceeds  1,000  and  not  have  any- 
thing to  confront  that  and  to  be  used  as 
a  component  of  our  deterrence  would  be 
absolutely  ridiculous. 


19 


AFRICA 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Africa 


by  Chester  A.  Crocker 

Statemevt  before  the  Svhrommittee 
on  Africa  oflli<'  Hmis,'  Fnrr!,ii,  Affairs 
Committee  on  Mnrrh  A',  I'is.r  Mr. 
Crocker  is  A^^sishiiil  Sirrrhirii  fm- 
African  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  you  publicly  and  for  the  record  our 
proposals  for  Africa  for  1984.  I  am  most 
concerned  that  those  of  us  who  are  truly 
committed  to  a  positive  future  for  Africa 
carefully  examine  the  role  of  foreign 
assistance  in  achieving  that  future. 

The  West's  interests  in  Africa  in- 
clude such  obvious  material  and 
strategic  interests  as  access  to  vital 
materials  and  the  importance  of  main- 
taining partnership  with  friendly  nations 
flanking  the  transportation  lanes  to  the 
Persian  Gulf.  They  include  our  deep  con- 
cern for  the  economic  development  and 
growth  of  Africa,  without  which  the  con- 
tinent cannot  realize  its  great  potential. 

Americans  are  tied  to  Africa  by 
bonds  of  ancestry  and  culture.  We  re- 
main committed  to  helping  Africans  suf- 
fering the  effects  of  famine  and  civil 
strife,  all  too  common  in  the  world's 
most  recently  independent  continent. 
We  are  actively  seeking  peaceful  solu- 
tions to  the  conflicts  and  problems  in 
southern  Africa.  We  remain  equally 
determined  to  prevent  Soviet,  Cuban, 
and  Libyan  adversaries  from  taking  ad- 
vantage of  Africa's  current  weaknesses 
to  pursue  strategies  of  destabilization, 
which  could  further  delay  Africa's  prog- 
ress toward  economic  and  political  well- 
being. 

The  United  States,  by  virtue  of  our 
technical  skills,  economic  strength,  and 
humanitarian  concern,  has  the  where- 
withal to  forge  a  growing  and  mutually 
advantageous  partnership  with  Africa. 
And  we  know  that  increasing  numbers 
of  African  leaders  look  to  the  West  for 
help. 

The  request  for  economic  and 
military  assistance  now  under  construc- 
tion is  certainly  not  the  only  means  to 
help  us  achieve  a  more  effective  partner- 
ship with  Africa— much  can  be  done  by 
private  individuals  and  organizations— 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  aid  is  of 
critical  importance. 

We  are  not  alone  in  this  effort.  Our 
allies,  particularly  the  Europeans,  bear  a 
major  share  of  the  burden.  Our  own  con- 
tribution of  bilateral  economic  aid  ranks 


third  behind  France  and  West  Germany. 
The  United  States  is  taking  the  lead  in 
only  a  few  countries,  such  as  Liberia  and 
Sudan,  which  are  of  special  importance 
to  us.  While  we  welcome  the  key  role  of 
our  allies,  it  is  nonetheless  clear  that  in- 
adequate assistance  levels  will  threaten 
our  ability  to  promote  U.S.  interests  or 
even  to  cooperate  effectively  with  our 
allies.  In  this  connection,  it  must  be  a 
matter  of  concern  that  although  our  in- 
terests in  Africa  are  steadily  increasing, 
American  aid  is  barely  keeping  pace 
with  inflation.  A  recent  General  Ac- 
counting Office  (GAO)  study  notes  that 
in  the  early  1960s,  the  United  States 
contributed  60%  of  total  economic  aid 
worldwide.  Today  the  level  of  U.S. 
bilateral  aid  is  down  to  16%  of  world- 
wide official  aid  flows.  In  Africa,  U.S. 
bilateral  economic  aid  is  less  than  10% 
of  official  aid  from  all  sources. 

Economic  Crisis:  The  Threat 
to  Africa's  Political  Viability 

In  the  past  year,  we  have  witnessed 
growing  economic  crisis  in  African  coun- 
tries, most  of  which  are  dependent  on 
one  or  two  primary  products  for  their 
income,  as  they  have  had  to  suffer  the 
painful  consequences  of  continued  low 
commodity  prices.  For  these  countries, 
declining  food  production,  mushrooming 
population,  and  skyrocketing  interna- 
tional indebtedness  are  not  descriptive 
terms  but  threats  to  the  lives  of  their 
people  and  to  their  very  existence  as  na- 
tions. The  impact  of  today's  world  reces- 
sion has  been  aggravated  substantially 
by  the  growth-inhibiting  economic 
policies  pursued  by  many  African  coun- 
tries over  the  past  generation. 

In  the  last  year,  some  two  dozen 
African  countries  have  sought  the 
assistance  of  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  in  dealing  with  their 
economic  difficulties.  A  dozen  or  so  of 
these  nations  have  also  had  to 
reschedule  their  external  government 
debt.  And  still  the  great  majority  of 
African  nations  face  extremely  limited 
short-run  prospects  for  improvement  in 
their  financial  situations. 

The  unprecedented  economic  crisis 
in  Africa  threatens  U.S.  interests  on 
several  levels.  Unless  it  is  alleviated, 
African  leaders  will  be  increasingly  at- 
tracted by  authoritarian  or  repressive 
political  strategies  with  destructive  con- 
sequences. Although  Africa  does  not 


have  debt  problems  on  the  scale  < 
America,  default  by  one  or  more 
African  countries  would  certainly 
crease  present  strains  on  the  inte 
tional  financial  system.  Unchecke 
economic  crisis  will,  in  time,  geni 
further  burden  on  famine,  refuge 
civil  strife,  deplorable  in  itself  am 
demanding  expensive  internation' 
efforts  in  response.  Finally  I  woi 
mind  you  that  one  out  of  five  U.i: 
depends  in  some  way  on  internat 
trade  and  that  40%  of  our  cropla 
devoted  to  production  for  export 
performance  in  Africa  reduces  t\ 
growth  in  our  export  sales,  depn 
our  economic  growth,  and  slows 
creation  in  the  United  States. 

The  Successful  Uses  of  Assistai 

We  must  not  conclude,  however, 
is  doom  and  gloom.  There  are  br 
spots  on  the  African  horizon,  anc 
aid  programs  have  a  significant : 
some  of  them.  In  Senegal,  for  ex 
the  U.S.  Agency  for  Internation; 
Development  (AID)  has  been  insi 
tal  in  improving  health  condition 
bringing  to  rural  villages  the  res 
agricultural  research  and  new  te 
ical  developments,  and  in  increas 
crop  yields  significantly.  Our  aid 
been  equally  successful  in  Zimbal 
where,  despite  political  problems 
government  has  clearly  demonst; 
ability  to  absorb  and  use  effectiv 
assistance  in  support  of  pragmat 
economic  policies.  An  economic  s 
funds  (ESF)  commodity  import  p 
has  provided  badly  needed  direct 
port  for  the  private  sector,  amon 
things  enabling  a  major  America 
firm— Caterpillar— to  continue 
gram  which  trains  black  employe 
wide  range  of  skills. 

For  many  countries  in  Africa 
present  crisis  requires  a  two-pha: 
response.  The  first  phase  is  usua 
IMF-supported  stabilization  progi 
which  emphasizes  short-term  I 
payments  adjustment.  If  success! 
stabilization  phase  will  eliminate 
disincentives  to  exporters  and  otl 
domestic  producers  and  set  the  s 
renewed  growth.  The  second  pha 
typically  an  investment  program 
by  the  World  Bank  (IBRD)  and  o 
donors  encourage  and  help  finan« 
growth-producing  development  a 
tivities. 


Department  of  State  Ijl 


AFRICA 


aid  is  essentia!  in  both  phases, 
igrams  often  demand  painful 
tieasures,  including  adjustment 
alued  exchange  rates,  reduction 
stic  budgets,  and  elimination  of 
3.  Fast  disbursing  balance-of- 
;s  assistance,  often  provided  in 
1  of  ESF,  may  be  required  to 
;e  the  balance-of-payments  gap 
iction  with  the  IMF  and  other 
Our  balance-of-payments  sup- 
.irectly  keyed  to  economic 
;fforts  being  urged  by  the  IBRD 
'.  Later  in  the  investment  phase, 
ject  and  nonproject  aid  funded 
'elopment  assistance,  ESF,  and 
can  be  provided  with  accom- 
technical  assistance  to  help  get 
/th  process  going  again.  It  is 
I  that  the  two  phases — stabiliza- 
growth— be  presented  together, 
unless  African  leaders  perceive 
erstand  and  can  reasonably 
I  the  relationship  between 
I  and  growth,  they  will  hardly  be 
0  take  the  political  risks  which 
;ess  demands  of  them.  Our 
ip  over  the  past  6  months  has 
trumental  in  organizing  a  multi- 
response  to  Sudan's  economic 
it  takes  these  two  phases  into 
Within  the  past  month,  donors 
•eed  to  support  a  World  Bank 
i  investment  program,  the  IMF 
oved  a  new  stabilization  pro- 
•  Sudan,  and  official  creditors 
■vided  needed  debt  relief. 
\T  kinds  of  ESF  programs  also 
|h  developmentally  oriented  con- 
e  common  means  of  disbursing 
is  the  commodity  import  pro- 
lis  program  enables  us  to  pro- 
.  made  capital  goods  and  spare 
thout  which  local  American 
ten  squeezed  by  severe  foreign 
i  shortages,  might  go  under. 
It  is  a  boost  to  the  private  sec- 
uently  to  firms  which  are  train- 
;ans,  contributing  to  agricultural 
lent,  and  serving  as  agents  of 
^,  as  in  Zimbabwe.  A  signifi- 
iponent  of  our  commodity  im- 
jrams  in  Africa  consists  of  in- 
mportance  to  food  production 
3edy  people:  fertilizer  and  farm 
•y  are  two  examples  which 
)  mind.  Finally,  when  commodi- 
im-fmanced  goods  are  sold, 
erate  local  currencies  which  are 
iministered  by  AID  and  the  host 
ent  to  fund  development  ac- 

lort,  Mrica's  crisis  demands  a 
and  tlexible  mixture  of  project 
)roject  economic  assistance. 


The  growth  in  nonproject  aid  in  re- 
cent years,  delivered  through  ESF  and 
Title  I  PL  480,  reflects  the  depth  of  the 
current  crisis  and  the  consequent  em- 
phasis on  successful  economic  stabiliza- 
tion. The  need  for  such  assistance  is 
recognized  by  virtually  all  development 
experts  and  was  endorsed  li\'  tho  World 
Bank's  1981  study,  AcceU-r„)nl  lirrrh.p^ 
ment  in  Sub-Saharan  Afm-n:  An  Aijiniln 
for  Action,  which  noted  that  "quick 
disbursing  balance-of-payments  assist- 
ance is  critically  needed  in  some  coun- 
tries to  permit  fuller  operation  and 
maintenance  of  existing  productive 
capacity  and  infrastructure." 

Addressing  Africa's  Security 
and  Development  Needs 

Whatever  we  and  the  Africans 
themselves  may  wish,  the  politics  of  sur- 
vival dictate  that  for  the  majority  of 
African  countries  security,  economic 
growth,  and  development  are  in- 
separable. In  Africa  the  security  pro- 
gram is  particularly  difficult  because  not 
only  are  the  economies  weak  and 
vulnerable  but  the  means  of  legitimate 
self-defense  are  expensive  and  draw  on 
scarce  resources.  Our  answer  to  Africa 
must  include  a  response  to  legitimate 
needs,  both  for  self-defense  and  for 
development.  In  shaping  our  response, 
we  have  focused  most  heavily  on  the 
economic  requirement,  but  we  have  not 
and  must  not  neglect  the  defense  needs 
of  our  friends  in  Africa  who  face  direct 
threats  from  abroad. 

Terms  of  Partnership.  In  undertak- 
ing a  response  to  Africa's  several  prob- 
lems, we  cannot  force  on  Africa  solu- 
tions that  we  would  reject  for  ourselves 
as  untenable  and  unrealistic.  Instead,  in 
his  speech  this  past  November  in  Kenya, 
Vice  President  Bush  spoke  explicitly  of 
the  kind  of  partnership  with  Africa  that 
this  Administration  views  as  possible 
and  desirable. 

Because  we  believe  that  Africa  has  the 
capacity  and  will  to  be  master  of  its  destiny. 
President  Reagan  has  over  the  past  20 
months  worked  to  forge  a  new  and  mature 
partnership  with  the  nations  and  people  of 
Africa.  We  speak  of  a  partnership  that  begins 
with  mutual  respect.  We  speak  of  a  partner- 
ship that  includes  honest  discussions.  We 
speak  of  a  partnership  which  recognizes  that 
each  nation  must  do  its  part  if  the  goals  we 
share  are  to  be  achieved.  Partnership  is  a 
two  way  street  based  on  shared  goals,  com- 
mon principles,  and  mutual  interests. 

What  we  envision  and  propose  for 
Africa  is  a  program  of  security  and 
developmental  assistance  that  takes  into 


consideration  African  needs  and  realities 
as  well  as  our  own  interests  and 
capabilities.  In  view  of  the  importance  of 
this  proposal,  I  want  to  make  clear  to 
you  the  process  by  which  we  arrived  at 
the  request  levels  we  are  placing  before 
you  today. 

Security  Assistance:  Myths  and 
Realities.  I  believe  we  need  to  begin  by 
dealing  with  the  pernicious  misconcep- 
tion that  this  Administration's  goal  is  to 
arm  Africa  and  in  so  doing  contribute  to 
both  the  diversion  of  funds  that  could  be 
used  for  development  and  the  increase 
of  Africa's  debt  burden.  In  1981,  all  of 
Africa,  with  the  exception  of  Egypt,  ac- 
counted for  less  than  1%  of  the  total 
value  of  U.S.  exports  of  defense  articles 
and  services.  The  foremost  supplier  of 
military  equipment  in  Africa  continues 
to  be  the  Soviet  Union;  the  United 
States  is  fourth  or  fifth  on  the  list. 
African  nations  themselves  have  asked 
us  for  assistance  in  assuring  their 
security. 

The  Administration  is  often  criti- 
cized for  requesting  funds  for  large,  ex- 
pensive military  assistance  programs 
that  wind  up  in  ruins  and  that  detract 
from  the  critical  need  for  economic 
development.  I  would  like  to  take  a  mo- 
ment to  set  the  record  straight.  The 
United  States  can  point  with  pride  to 
the  fact  that  the  great  majority  of  our 
programs  in  Africa  are  successful.  These 
programs  run  the  gamut  from  engineer- 
ing in  Liberia,  Senegal,  and  Sudan  to 
aviation  in  Kenya  and  mechanized  infan- 
try and  armor  in  Botswana,  Gabon,  and 
Somalia.  These  programs  have  not  only 
added  to  the  capabilities  of  the  host 
military  but  have  introduced  senior  of- 
ficials to  the  concepts  of  planning, 
budgeting,  and  logistics  that  are  vital  to 
the  success  of  any  military  organization. 
I  would  also  like  to  point  out  that  all  of 
the  U.S.  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
programs  in  Africa  have  come  in  at,  or 
under,  the  projected  cost. 

These  programs  also  provide  direct 
civilian  benefits.  The  engineering  and 
construction  programs  in  Kenya, 
Liberia,  Senegal,  and  Sudan  have  made 
direct  contributions  in  the  form  of  new 
facility  and  housing  construction  and  of 
building  and  improving  roads  in  both  ur- 
ban and  rural  areas.  Communications 
programs  in  Somalia  and  Sudan  allow 
units  in  remote  areas  to  communicate 
with  population  centers,  not  only  for 
military  purposes  but  also  to  obtain 
needed  attention  to  civilian  requirements 
and  emergencies. 


AFRICA 


Finally,  I  must  once  again  bring  to 
your  attention  the  tremendous  success 
of  our  international  military  education 
and  training  (IMET)  program.  Without 
exception,  each  of  our  ambassadors 
reports  that  IMET  is  one  of  the  most 
valuable  programs  we  have  to  offer. 
Each  of  our  missions  would  like  to  have 
more  of  such  programs  to  offer  to  the 
host  country.  We  have  trained  large 
numbers  of  managers  and  technicians 
who  are  now  providing  much  needed 
skills  in  their  own  countries.  These  skills 
range  from  finance,  to  administration,  to 
engineering,  to  avionics,  to  electronics 
and  vehicle  maintenance,  to  name  a  few. 
We  are  beginning  to  see  remarkable  im- 
provements in  military  management  and 
equipment  operation  and  maintenance  in 
those  countries  where  we  have  these 
programs.  I  cannot  overemphasize  the 
importance  and  value  of  our  IMET  pro- 
gram in  Africa. 

The  Vetting  Process.  With  regard 
to  requests  from  African  nations 
themselves  for  security  assistance,  let 
me  point  out  that  the  close  scrutiny  the 
American  people  rightfully  demand  of 
such  assistance  requires  that  the  Ad- 
ministration employ  a  very  careful 
screening  process  to  assess  the  validity 
of  a  country's  declaration  of  need.  In  the 
case  of  FMS/MAP,  for  example,  the 
Department  of  Defense  is  often  asked  to 
lend  its  expertise  and  undertake  a 
survey  of  needs.  When  the  survey  in- 
dicates that  a  need  does  exist,  a  strin- 
gent vetting  process  within  the  Adminis- 
tration as  a  whole  measures  individual 
country  requirements  against  other 
policy  demands,  both  foreign  and 
domestic.  The  bulk  of  our  FMS/MAP 
program  is  concentrated  in  a  few  key 
countries  such  as  Sudan,  Somalia,  Niger, 
and  Kenya. 

The  record  proves  that  we  are  not 
ignoring  developmental  goals  in  favor  of 
military  sales.  The  1983  supplemental 
request  for  $47  million  for  ESF  and 
$106  million  for  MAP/FMS  before  you 
does  not  involve  increases  over  our 
original  FY  1983  proposals.  Rather, 
these  funds  are  needed  to  make  up  for 
the  shortfall  which  our  programs  for 
Africa  suffered  as  a  result  of  overall  ap- 
propriations levels  set  by  the  continuing 
resolution.  Including  the  supplemental, 
we  are  proposing  $868.7  million  in 
economic  assistance  and  $193.5  million 
for  military  programs  for  Africa  in  FY 
1983.  For  FY  1984,  we  are  asking  for 
$963.7  million  in  economic  assistance 
against  a  total  of  $202.3  million  for 
military  programs.  We  continue  to 
emphasize  economic  over  military 


assistance  at  a  ratio  of  better  than 
4  to  1. 

I  have,  of  course,  been  discussing 
the  totality  of  our  assistance  effort,  in- 
cluding MAP/FMS,  IMET,  ESF,  devel- 
opment assistance,  and  PL  480.  I  will 
now  turn  to  some  of  the  ESF  and 
MAP/FMS  programs  for  Africa  for 
which  the  State  Department  has 
primary  responsibilities  within  the  ex- 
ecutive branch. 

Southern  Africa 

Perhaps  nowhere  in  Africa  have  our 
own  security  concerns,  and  our  own 
security  policies,  coincided  with  African 
security  needs  and  been  more  intensely 
engaged  than  in  southern  Africa.  This 
region,  from  Zaire  to  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  contains  the  bulk  of  Africa's 
mineral  wealth,  its  most  developed  in- 
dustrial structure,  and  almost  two-thirds 
of  the  continent's  GNP.  It  is  also  a 
region  threatened  with  the  prospect  of 
heightened  violence  and  polarization  that 
could  lead  to  great  power  confrontation. 

It  is  precisely  to  avoid  that  possibili- 
ty of  violence  and  confrontation  that  we 
have  fashioned  a  major  effort  to  bring 
about  regional  peace  and  security.  We 
have  launched  a  policy  of  constructive 
engagement  with  all  the  states  of  the 
region  that  wish  the  same  with  us.  A 
major  policy  objective  is  to  provide  an 
alternative  to  conflict,  not  only  in 
Namibia  but  throughout  the  region.  Vice 
President  Bush  summed  up  our  policy  in 
Nairobi  last  November  when  he  said: 
"We  are  determined  to  help  turn  the  sad 
tide  of  growing  conflict  and  tension  in 
southern  Africa." 

The  United  States  and  its  Western 
allies  are  in  a  unique  position  to  play  a 
leading  role  in  helping  southern  Africa 
reverse  the  trend  of  mounting  violence 
and  avoid  disaster.  The  material 
resources  we  require  in  support  of  this 
regional  diplomatic  effort  are  com- 
paratively modest  but  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  its  success. 

Our  security  assistance  request  for 
southern  Africa  in  FY  1984  includes 
$155  million  for  ESF,  $24  million  for 
FMS/MAP,  and  $1,975  million  IMET, 
for  a  total  of  $180,975  million.  Our  sup- 
plemental request  for  1983  totals  $22 
million  in  ESF  and  $11.5  million  in 
FMS/MAP. 

In  order  to  elucidate  how  these  re- 
quests fit  into  our  strategy  for  the 
region,  however,  I  shall  address  some 
specific  programs. 


Zaire.  Zaire's  size,  mineral  • 
and  the  fact  that  much  of  its  sou 
border— including  the  borders  oi 
invaded  Shaba  Province— are  cc 
with  Angola's  and  Zambia's  norti 
borders  make  Zaire's  continued 
and  viability  important  to  our  sc 
Africa  strategy.  We  are  concern 
recurrence  of  turmoil  in  Shaba  II 
could  have  a  disquieting  affect  o 
Angola  and  Zambia  that  would  1' 
the  West's  efforts  to  engage  the 
states  in  the  process  of  resolvinj 
southern  Africa's  regional  confli 

Zaire  faces  critical  economic 
lems,  and  we  are  engaged  with 
allies — especially  Belgium  and  F 
the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF— 
broadly  based  assistance  effort. 
France's  total  assistance  to  Zair 
about  $60  million  and  Belgium's 
$90  million.  Our  own  FY  1983  a 
level,  including  development  ass 
and  the  supplemental,  will  total 
million.  In  FY  1984  we  are  prof 
total  of  $43.4  million. 

From  the  FMS/MAP  perspe 
have  a  C-130  program  that  is  a 
tant  part  of  an  agreement  on  oi 
with  our  allies  and  with  Zaire  tc 
with  military  airlift  capability  fc 
brigades  now  being  trained  by  I 
France,  China,  and  Israel.  Since 
were  able  to  provide  only  $2  mi 
MAP  and  $2  million  FMS  under 
tinuing  resolution  for  FY  1983, 
requesting  an  additional  $8  milli 
in  the  supplemental  for  a  total  c 
million  in  1983,  as  well  as  $10  n 
FY  1984  in  order  to  begin  to  res 
C-130  program  to  a  working  le\ 

We  are  also  requesting  $7  n 
ESF  in  the  FY  1983  supplement 
$10  million  in  1984  to  be  used  fc 
modify  import  programs.  We  ar 
that  this  subcommittee  last  year 
the  expenditure  of  ESF  monies 
We  have  reason  to  hope,  howev< 
the  current  effort  being  made  bj 
Zairian  Government  to  deal  with 
economic  problems,  including  mi 
agement  and  lack  of  accountabil; 
lead  to  an  accord  with  the  IMF  i 
1983.  Disbursements  of  our  assis 
will  depend  upon  the  existence  o 
accord. 

Our  ESF  program  will  be  di: 
toward  revitalization  of  the  priv; 
tor.  Zaire's  domestic  industry  is 
operating  at  from  25%  to  40%  o 
ty  because  of  shortages  of  impor 
equipment,  spare  parts,  and  raw 
materials.  The  $7  million  ESF  ir 
would  be  expended  in  those  area 


Department  of  State 


AFRICA 


llion  ESF"  in  i;>84  would  help 
r  importation  of  agricultural 
lery. 

mbabwe.  Zimbabwe's  emergence 
3  ago  as  a  newly  independent  na- 
is  a  seminal  event  in  the  political 
on  of  southern  Africa.  The  West's 
n  to  assist  Zimbabwe  was  based 
hope  that  Zimbabwe's  develop- 
rould  reflect  the  best  of  our  own 
—commitment  to  respect  for  in- 
il  rights  and  freedoms,  racial 
y  and  integration,  economic  pro- 
ty,  and  growth  leading  to  a  better 
its  citizens. 

is  year,  under  the  continuing 
ion,  we  fell  $15  million  short  of 
)  million  we  requested  for  1983  as 
'  our  pledge  to  provide  $75  million 
3  years  1982-84.  I  hope  this  sub- 
ttee  will  assist  us  in  keeping  that 
in  1983  and  in  1984  by  giving 
)we  the  funds  we  are  requesting, 
cent  widely  reported  events  in 
)we  may  lead  some  to  question 
ir  we  should  keep  our  commit- 
'  hope  this  subcommittee  will 
tand  that  it  is  critical  that  we  re- 
ngaged  in  Zimbabwe's  future, 
■we  is  a  new  nation  whose  leader- 
;es  many  competing  and 
neous  pressures  and  demands, 
ernment  has  committed  itself  to  a 
itic  course  of  economic  policy,  to 
;  of  law.  and  to  the  path  of  recon- 
1  and  respect  for  international 
•s.  We  take  those  commitments 
ly  and  have  made  our  views 
in  an  appropriate  manner  when 
'e  concerns  about  developments  in 
antry.  In  the  current  context  of 
ths  in  Matabeleland,  for  example, 
e  made  clear  our  concern  not 
the  human  rights  implications 
at  the  implications  for  Zim- 
stability  and  the  reconciliation 

'eover,  we  are  sensitive  to  public 
ion  in  this  country  of  our  rela- 
I  with  key  countries  in  Africa- 
Zimbabwe  and  South  Africa— 
we  are  in  other  regions. 
nng  said  this,  we  are  also  deeply 
>f  the  long-term  and  complex 
af  the  process  of  building  stabili- 
ostering  peaceful  change  in 
n  Africa.  If  we  expect  to  achieve 
results  or  consistent  improve- 
le  are  bound  to  be  disappointed. 
icy  recognizes  this  reality  and  the 
nee  of  this  region  to  the  West, 
rtain  degree,  we  are  exposed  to 
of  occasional  disappointment, 
because  we  have  assumed  an  ac- 


tive, positive,  and  conciliatory  stance 
toward  the  states  of  southern  Africa, 
not  a  self-righteous,  admonitory  one. 
Africa's  political  future  will  hinge  in 
substantial  part  on  the  ways  in  which 
the  deep  tensions  of  southern  Africa  are 
resolved. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  this  Ad- 
ministration has  adopted  a  policy  of  con- 
structive engagement  in  southern 
Africa.  There  is  no  other  responsible 
course  for  American  policy.  The  goal  we 
seek  in  southern  Africa  involves  Zim- 
babwe as  well  as  South  Africa,  Angola 
as  well  as  Namibia,  Botswana  as  well  as 
Mozambique.  Our  reason  for  not  turning 
our  backs  on  Zimbabwe  is  the  same 
reason  for  not  turning  our  backs  on 
South  Africa— the  price  of  success  may 
be  great,  but  the  price  of  failure  cannot 
be  borne. 

Other  Programs.  The  compelling 
nature  of  our  interests  in  southern 
Africa  demands  a  response  that,  indeed, 
encompasses  all  of  the  states  of  the 
region.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  we  are 
requesting  assistance  both  for  specific 
countries  and  for  a  southern  Africa 
regional  program. 

In  Botswana,  our  objective  is  to 
strengthen  that  country's  border  securi- 
ty and  thus  provide  a  deterrent  to 
destabilizing  forces  in  the  region.  Past 
unresponsiveness  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  Botswana's  security 
concerns  contributed  to  the  formation  of 
a  limited  military  supply  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  We  view  our 
FMS  and  ESF  requests  for  Botswana  as 
important  to  the  continued  ability  of  this 
moderate,  democratic,  multiparty  state 
to  make  an  active,  positive  contribution 
to  the  peaceful  evolution  of  the  region. 
We  are  requesting  $10  million  in  ESF 
and  $11  million  in  MAP/FMS  guarantees 
in  1984  as  well  as  an  additional  $2 
million  FMS  in  the  FY  1983  supplemen- 
tal to  assist  Botswana  with  building  an 
adequate  air  defense,  while  at  the  same 
time  helping  to  meet  the  developmental 
needs  of  its  people.  Our  ESF  program  is 
focused  on  the  country's  agriculture  and 
health  sectors. 

Our  FY  1984  request  for  $20  million 
in  ESF  for  Zambia  is  based  on  equal 
concern  about  the  continuing  ability  of  a 
key  player  to  sustain  an  important  role 
in  the  evolution  of  events  in  southern 
Africa.  The  strategic  location  of  Zambia, 
its  mineral  wealth  in  cobalt  and  copper, 
and  the  support  it  has  lent  to  the  con- 
cept of  peaceful  solutions  to  the  conflicts 
of  the  region  make  it  important  that  we 
contribute  to  efforts  to  help  that  nation 


survive  its  current  economic  difficulties. 
Our  programs  in  Zambia  are  principally 
related  to  agriculture  and  specifically 
focused  on  increasing  productivity  and 
reducing  imports. 

The  southern  Africa  regional  pro- 
gram for  which  we  are  requesting  $40 
million  in  ESF  in  1984  is  designed  to 
complement  our  country-specific  pro- 
grams in  addressing  developmental 
issues  that  must  be  resolved  if  regional 
stability  is  to  be  achieved.  The  program 
is  specifically  directed  toward  two  goals: 
(1)  assisting  the  regional  development  ef- 
forts of  the  black-majority  ruled  coun- 
tries in  the  Southern  Africa  Regional 
Coordinating  Conference  (SADCC)  in 
the  fields  of  transportation,  communica- 
tions, and  manpower  training;  and  (2) 
educational  assistance  to  South  African 
youth  disadvantaged  by  the  practice  of 
apartheid  in  South  Africa's  educational 
system.  For  example,  116  students  are 
currently  studying  in  the  United  States 
and  we  hope  eventually  to  place  over 
400  disadvantaged  South  Africans  in 
U.S.  universities. 


East  Africa 

Our  interests  in  East  Africa  and  the 
Horn  reflect  to  a  great  extent  the 
region's  considerable  strategic  sig- 
nificance to  the  West  because  of  ship- 
ping and  oil  tanker  lanes  leading  to 
Europe.  Somalia  and  Kenya  are  critical 
to  our  logistical  supply  systems  in  the 
event  of  a  security  crisis  in  the  gulf  or 
Middle  East,  and  Sudan  plays  a  key  role 
in  containing  Libyan  aggression  in  East 
and  Central  Africa.  The  three  recipients 
of  a  major  portion  of  our  total  assistance 
to  East  Africa  are  Sudan,  Somalia,  and 
Kenya,  which  together  account  for 
$498.9  million  of  the  total  $520.6  million 
(including  development  assistance,  PL 
480,  and  security  assistance)  we  are  re- 
questing for  East  African  and  Indian 
Ocean  countries  in  1984. 

Sudan.  Sudan's  greatest  needs  are 
economic,  but  recent  events  involving 
Libya  make  clear  the  need  for  tradi- 
tional military  assistance  as  well.  We  are 
asking  for  $25  million  ESF  for  Sudan  in 
the  supplemental  as  well  as  $50  million 
FMS/MAP.  This  will  mean  $25  million 
more  in  ESF  for  1983  than  we  originally 
requested  for  Sudan,  but  $32  million  less 
in  FMS/MAP  in  1983  than  we  had 
originally  requested.  For  1984  we  are 
requesting  $120  million  ESF  and  $60 
million  MAP  monies. 

Our  emphasis  on  quick-disbursing 
ESF  money  stems  from  our  concern 


AFRICA 


that  the  most  serious  threat  to  stability 
in  Sudan  is  internal  political  discontent 
as  a  result  of  poor  economic  conditions. 
Over  the  past  18  months,  Sudan  has  im- 
plemented a  series  of  politically  difficult 
economic  reforms  and  far-reaching 
austerity  measures.  Despite  these  ef- 
forts, and  despite  increased  agricultural 
productivity,  Sudan's  balance-of- 
payments  gap  remains  close  to  the  1981 
level  when  the  United  States  gave  $100 
million  in  a  worldwide  effort  that  pro- 
vided $800  million  to  Sudan.  The  World 
Bank's  recent  reappraisal  of  Sudan's 
debt  commitments  in  light  of  declining 
world  prices  for  Sudan's  principal  ex- 
ports has  led  the  Bank  to  conclude  that 
Sudan  will  need  continued  high  levels  of 
assistance  for  several  years.  As  Sudan's 
closest  Western  friend,  we  are  seeking 
to  maintain  the  level  of  assistance  need- 
ed both  to  help  sustain  Sudan  through 
this  difficult  period  and  to  encourage 
other  countries  to  be  as  supportive  as 
possible. 

Our  diplomatic  efforts,  supported  by 
our  significant  assistance  level,  were  in- 
strumental in  securing  about  $780 
million  in  new  aid  commitments  from 
donors  at  the  World  Bank  sponsored 
consultative  group  meeting  in  mid- 
January.  This  aid  level  will  enable  Sudan 
to  implement  the  first  year  of  a  3-year, 
World  Bank  designed  recovery  program. 
It  has  also,  in  combination  with  devalua- 
tion and  other  economic  reforms  by  the 
Sudanese  and  with  the  debt  relief  pro- 
vided by  Sudan's  creditors,  made  a  new 
IMF  economic  stabilization  program 
possible. 

Somalia.  As  one  of  the  countries  on 
the  Horn  with  which  we  have  a  facilities 
access  agreement,  Somalia's  stability 
and  independence  are  important  to 
Western  interests  in  the  Horn.  Somalia 
was  attacked  last  year  by  Ethiopian 
forces  which  continue  to  hold  two  towns 
in  Somali  territory.  Somalia's  own  past 
history  of  irredentism  has  contributed  to 
tensions  in  the  region  and  raised  ques- 
tions on  the  part  of  some  about  possible 
provocations  by  Somalia.  In  this  in- 
stance, however,  we  believe  Ethiopia 
was  the  aggressor.  Ethiopia  possesses 
massive  amounts  of  Soviet  arms  and  has 
the  largest  standing  army  in  sub-Sahara 
Africa,  one  much  larger  and  better 
equipped  than  the  Somali  Army.  It  also 
has  a  security  treaty  with  Libya  and 
South  Yemen.  The  apparent  purpose  of 
this  incursion  was  to  try  to  provoke  the 
downfall  of  the  Somali  Government. 

In  response  to  the  Ethiopian  incur- 
sions, we  provided  two  emergency 


airlifts  of  needed  military  supplies  and 
equipment  to  Somalia.  This  was  an  ap- 
propriate response  to  help  a  friend 
whose  territorial  integrity  was  threat- 
ened. In  recognition  of  Somalia's  contin- 
uing military  inferiority  to  Ethiopia  and 
vulnerability  to  attack,  we  are  continu- 
ing to  provide  military  assistance  design- 
ed to  enhance  Somalia's  ability  to  deter 
and  defend  against  such  attacks.  It  is  in 
this  context  that  we  are  seeking  $9 
million  in  MAP/FMS  for  Somalia  in  the 
1983  supplemental— to  bring  the  total 
up  to  the  $30  million  originally  re- 
quested—and $40  million  in  MAP  in  FY 
1984. 

Important  as  it  is,  however,  I  would 
not  want  to  leave  the  impression  that 
military  assistance  is  the  only  or  even 
the  principal  instrument  of  our  policy 
with  respect  to  Somalia  and  the  prob- 
lems of  the  Horn.  In  the  long  term, 
there  is  no  military  solution  to  the  prob- 
lems of  this  area;  the  only  route  to 
lasting  solutions  to  deepseated  conflicts, 
such  as  that  between  Ethiopia  and 
Somalia,  is  through  negotiated,  political 
settlements.  We  fully  recognize  this  and 
are  working  to  encourage  and  support 
movement  toward  negotiations.  Our  as- 
sistance policies  are  part  of  this  ap- 
proach. We  cannot  be  passive  in  the  face 
of  aggression,  and  we  must  and  will  sup- 
port our  friends,  but  our  response  has 
been  characterized  by  moderation  and 
restraint.  The  amounts  of  our  assistance 
are  very  modest  in  absolute  terms;  the 
minimum  necessary  to  support  deter- 
rence and  defense.  We  are  demonstrably 
not  arming  Somalia  to  a  degree  that 
need  arouse  legitimate  concerns  on  the 
part  of  Ethiopia  or  any  other  state  in 
the  region  about  possible  Somali  aggres- 
sion. Further,  we  have  made  clear  that 
we  are  open  to  dialogue  and  discussion 
with  all  the  states  in  the  region,  in- 
cluding Ethiopia,  and  are  encouraging 
others  whose  relations  with  Ethiopia  are 
better  than  ours  to  do  the  same.  No  one 
wants  more  than  we  to  move  from  de- 
terrence to  dialogue,  but  it  is  only 
realistic  to  recognize  that  an  ability  to 
deter  plays  a  part  in  inducing  others  to 
engage  in  dialogue  as  well. 

Finally,  we  are  also  fully  aware  that 
long-term  security  is  only  possible  under 
conditions  of  basic  economic  health,  and 
in  the  case  of  Somalia  we  are  devoting 
significant  amounts  of  our  assistance— 
nearly  two-thirds  of  the  total,  counting 
food  aid  and  development  assistance  as 
well  as  ESF— to  economic  support. 
Somalia  has,  in  fact,  made  significant 
progress  on  the  economic  side,  including 
freeing  up  the  economy  through  a  series 


of  reforms  endorsed  by  the  LMl  li 
believe  this  process  of  reform  ai 
recovery  needs  to  be  encoura,u,ei  a 
one  of  the  ways  we  are  doing  s(  ^ 
through  our  request  for  $35  mil  ni 
ESF  for  FY  1984  which  will  he  je 
commodity  import  program  dirtje 
providing  raw  materials,  spare  ]f' 
and  the  capital  equipment  neces 
rehabilitate  the  agricultural  sect 

Kenya.  The  August  1982  co 
tempt  in  Kenya  raised  critical  q 
about  the  viability  of  a  countr 
has  been  viewed  by  the  West  as 
Africa's  success  stories  and  as  1- 
protection  of  Western  strategic 
in  the  region.  The  coup  attempt 
ever,  destroyed  neither  our  i 
with  Kenya  nor  civilian  instituti 
that  country.  What  the  coup  die 
force  Kenya  and  the  Western  e( 
ty  to  focus  on  the  interplay  bet\ 
economic  and  political  stability, 
for  economic  reforms  in  Kenya, 
vulnerability  of  even  the  most  s 
of  developing  nations  when  face 
worldwide  economic  crisis. 

We  are  asking  for  $19.5  mil 
FMS/MAP  in  the  supplemental 
the  $35  million  level  we  had  ori; 
requested.  For  1984  we  are  ask 
$35  million  MAP/FMS  and  $42 
ESF.  The  FMS/MAP  funds  will 
in  part  to  help  maintain  the  F-! 
helicopter  programs,  as  request 
Kenyan  Government.  The  ESF 
will  be  used  for  a  commodity  im 
gram  designed  to  finance  items 
to  the  agricultural  production  p; 
The  purpose  is  to  ensure  that  tl 
foreign  exchange  shortages  now 
ing  Kenya  do  not  have  a  harmfi 
on  food  and  export  crop  produc 
counterpart  funds  generated  by 
modity  import  program  will  be 
credit  programs,  extension  serv 
other  activities  directed  to  farm 
tion. 

West  and  Central  Africa 

Our  primary  security  concerns  i 
and  Central  Africa  are  the  conti 
stability  and  viability  of  Nigeria, 
needs  of  nations  facing  threats  ( 
version  or  outright  aggression  f 
Libya.  Nigeria  is  one  of  our  cou: 
primary  sources  of  imported  oil 
dominant  economic  force  within 
16-nation  Economic  Community 
Africa  States  (ECOWAS).  Due  1 
sharp  drop  in  world  oil  prices,  b 
faces  a  precipitous  reduction  in 
budgetary  revenues  and  foreign 
change,  which  is  having  a  seven 


Department  of  State  t 


AFRICA 


ts  domestic  economy.  While  we 
10  economic  or  security  assistance 
ims  for  Nigeria,  and  none  is  con- 
ited  for  FY  1984,  we  will  give  sus- 
attention  to  Nigeria's  economic 
Ities  in  our  continuing  high-level 
lie  with  this  important  country  in 
)nths  to  come. 

lad.  Chad  is  one  of  two  countries 
ica— the  other  was  Uganda  under 
lin— in  which  Libyan  troops  have 
intervened  in  an  attempt  to  im- 
government  to  Libya's  liking, 
it  did  from  December  1980  until 
iber  1981,  when  Libyan  forces 
ew  under  pressure  from  the 
ization  of  African  Unity  (OAU). 
nited  States  on  that  occasion 
ed  $12  million  for  airlift  and  sup- 
•  Zairian  and  Nigerian  contingents 
OAU  peacekeeping  force.  We  also 
ed  $17.8  million  to  Chad  in  FY 
or  emergency  economic  assistance, 
ng  food  aid. 

ice  then  we  have  joined  a  multi- 
effort  to  revive  Chad's  war- 
d  economy  and  central  govern- 
■perations.  We  plan  to  provide  ap- 
lately  $10  million  for  food  and 
itarian  assistance  in  FY  1983  and 
jquested  $9  million  in  develop- 
issistance  in  FY  1984.  Without 
!p,  Chad  will  have  difficulty  with- 
(g  continuing  Libyan  subversion 
?  threat  of  a  second  military  in- 
..  Although  we  look  to  France  and 
.Hies  to  provide  Chad  with  needed 
y  assistance,  we  are  seeking 
I)  in  IMET  for  FY  1984  and  are 
»  Chad's  needs  under  regular 
in  light  of  the  recently  height- 
Sbyan  menace. 

jer  and  Senegal.  Niger  and 
jl  are  two  moderate  states  in  the 
inder  regular  political,  economic, 
urity-related  subversive 
es  from  Libya  but  which  publicly 
hem.  Niger  shares  a  common 
with  Libya  and  stands  in  the  way 
Qadhafi's  pan-Sahara  expan- 
ambitions.  Senegalese  troops  had 
put  down  a  bloody  coup  attempt 
■an-inspired  revolutionaries  in 
)ring  Gambia,  which  has  led  to 
■nal  creation  of  the  Sene-Gambian 
tion.  in  large  part  because  of 
n  security  needs  caused  by 
efforts  at  subversion, 
meet  Niger's  additional  re- 
;nts,  we  are  requesting  $2.5 
in  MAP  in  FY  1983  supplemental 
nd  $.5  million  in  ESF  in  FY  1984. 
also  seeking  to  assist  Senegal  at 
le  of  particularly  urgent  need 


with  an  FY  1983  supplemental  request 
for  $2.5  million  MAP;  $10  million  in 
ESF  in  FY  1984  is  also  requested. 

Liberia.  Because  Liberia  is  our 
oldest  friend  in  Africa,  and  because  of 
our  substantial  interests  there,  we  have 
taken  the  lead  among  foreign  donors  in 
assisting  to  promote  its  economic 
recovery  and  political  stability.  There 
has  been  substantial  progress  on  the 
political  front,  with  the  release  of  all 
political  prisoners,  a  general  amnesty  for 
exiles,  and  a  commitment  by  the  govern- 
ment to  return  Liberia  to  democracy  by 
April  12,  1985.  The  economic  situation 
remains  fragile  due  to  depressed 
markets  for  Liberia's  major  exports,  but 
the  government  has  instituted  difficult 
austerity  measures,  including  sharp  cuts 
in  civil  service  salaries  and  compliance 
for  2'/2  years  with  an  IMF  standby  pro- 
gram—one of  the  best  records  in  Africa. 

Our  security  assistance  has  been  an 
important  factor  in  helping  to  bring 
stability  to  Liberia.  The  $3.5  million  in 
MAP  amount  we  are  requesting  under 
the  FY  1983  supplemental  is  to  be  used 
for  the  construction  of  military  housing. 
This  amount  will  restore  the  shortfall  in 
this  long-planned  program  which  oc- 
curred as  a  result  of  the  FY  1983  con- 
tinuing resolution.  Inadequate  housing 
contributed  to  instability  in  the  past,  and 
the  government  has  linked  provision  of 
decent  housing  for  the  troops  with  the 
return  to  civilian  rule.  We  consider  this 
a  high  priority.  Our  ESF  has  all  been 
used  for  economic  support,  specifically 
for  oil  payments  and  to  help  meet  IMF 
targets.  Our  FY  1984  request  for  $13 


million  in  MAP  and  $35  million  in  ESF 
reflect  modest  increases  in  security 
assistance  which  we  believe  are 
necessary  to  promote  economic  recovery 
and  progress  toward  democracy.  We 
have  also  requested  funds  under  the 
U.S.  Information  Agency's  Project 
Democracy  to  assist  with  Liberia's 
return  to  civilian  rule. 

Conclusion 

At  a  time  when  domestic  budgetary  con- 
straints demand  scrupulous  examination 
of  any  proposed  expenditures,  we  all 
face  difficult  decisions  with  regard  to  re- 
quests for  foreign  assistance.  The 
amount  we  are  asking  for  sub-Sahara 
Africa,  however,  comes  to  about  14%  of 
our  total  foreign  assistance  budget  re- 
quest. It  is  the  minimum  the  United 
States  needs  to  sustain  its  part  of  the 
commitment  we  have  undertaken  with 
our  allies  to  further  Africa's  develop- 
ment. In  asking  you  to  support  this  re- 
quest, I  also  ask  you  to  keep  in  mind  the 
gravity  of  Africa's  need  and  the  impor- 
tance to  our  own  future,  in  terms  of  ex- 
port markets,  trade,  and  jobs,  not  to 
mention  meeting  humanitarian  concerns 
which  are  central  to  the  Western  tradi- 
tion of  helping  Africa  to  survive  the 
threat  to  its  political  and  economic 
growth  and  stability  that  is  posed  by  the 
current  economic  crisis. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 


Documents.  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Export  Policy 
Toward  South  Africa 

by  Princeton  Lyman 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Africa  and  on  Inlcniatintiol 
Economic  Policy  it  ml  Trail,  iftheHoust 
Foreign  Affairs  Com  nutter  on  Decem- 
ber 2,  1982.  Mr.  Lyman  is  Deputy  As- 
Secretaryfor  African  Affairs^ 


The  Administration  welcomes  this  op- 
portunity to  testify  before  your  respec- 
tive subcommittees  concerning  U.S. 
policy  toward  South  Africa  and  the  role 
that  economic,  trade,  and  investment 
policy  play  in  U.S. -South  African  rela- 
tions. In  the  context  of  this  hearing,  I 
would  like  to  begin  by  responding  to  the 


subcommittees'  interest  in  the  broader 
approach  of  U.S.  relations  with  South 
Africa,  our  policy  of  constructive 
engagement.  To  put  the  economic  issues 
in  perspective,  let  me  then  begin  with  an 
overview  of  Administration  policy. 

U.S  policy  objectives  toward  the 
Republic  of  South  Africa  include: 

•  Fostering  movement  toward  a 
system  of  government  by  consent  of  the 
governed  and  away  from  the  racial 
policy  of  apartheid  both  as  a  form  of 
racial  discrimination  and  national 
political  disenfranchisement  of  blacks. 

•  Continued  access  to  four  strategic 
nonfuel  minerals  where  the  United 


AFRICA 


States  and  OECD  [Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] countries  are  either  import  or 
price  dependent  on  South  Africa,  assur- 
ing the  strategic  security  of  the  Cape 
sea  routes  through  which  pass  vital  U.S. 
oil  supplies  from  the  Middle  East;  and 

•  Regional  security  in  southern 
Africa. 

Peace  and  stability  are  needed  so 
that  this  key  region  can  develop  and 
prosper,  so  that  peaceful  change  can  oc- 
cur in  South  Africa,  and  so  that  the 
region  does  not  slide  into  an  escalating 
cycle  of  destructive  cross-border  violence 
exploited  by  our  adversaries  as  we  are 
pursuing  these  goals.  Our  objectives  are 
pursued  through  a  regional  policy  of 
constructive  engagement — constructive 
engagement  not  only  with  South  Africa 
but  with  all  the  states  of  the  region.  The 
specific  components  of  our  regional  ap- 
proach include: 

First,  internationally  recognized  in- 
dependence for  Namibia; 

Second,  internationally  supported 
programs  of  economic  development  in  all 
the  developing  countries  of  the  region; 

Third,  a  negotiated  framework  that 
will  permit  agreement  on  the  issue  of 
withdrawal  of  Cuban  troops  from 
Angola; 

Fourth,  detente  between  South 
Africa  and  the  other  states  in  the 
region;  and 

Fifth,  peaceful,  evolutionary  change 
in  South  Africa  itself,  away  from  apart- 
heid and  toward  a  system  of  govern- 
ment to  be  defined  by  South  Africans 
themselves  but  firmly  rooted  in  the  prin- 
ciple of  government  by  consent  of  the 
governed. 


Diplomatic  Efforts 

The  United  States  is  presently  leading  a 
major  diplomatic  effort  designed  to 
achieve  independence  for  the  territory  of 
Namibia  based  on  implementation  of 
U.N.  Security  Council  Resolution  435.  In 
a  separate  but  parallel  negotiating  proc- 
ess, the  United  States  is  seeking  to 
resolve  the  related  issue  of  the  presence 
of  Cuban  forces  in  adjacent  Angola  with 
the  impact  that  their  presence  has  in 
terms  of  southern  African  regional 
security.  The  United  States  believes  that 
a  resolution  of  these  conflicts  is  essential 
to  build  a  regional  climate  conducive  to 
constructive  change  inside  South  Africa 
away  from  apartheid.  U.S.  policy  toward 
South  Africa  is  thus  both  a  bilateral 
policy  and  also  an  important  part  of  our 
policy  toward  a  key  region,  a  region  also 
vital  in  global  terms. 


President  Reagan  indicated  that  the 
United  States  views  the  apartheid 
system  as  repugnant  to  basic  U.S. 
values.  He  has  stated  that  as  long  as 
there  is  a  sincere  and  honest  effort  to 
move  away  from  apartheid  in  South 
Africa,  the  United  States  should  be 
helpful  in  encouraging  that  process.  On 
this  basis,  the  United  States  has  in- 
dicated to  South  Africa  that  relations 
with  the  United  States  are  based  on  the 
commitment  of  the  South  African 
Government  to  reform  away  from  apart- 
heid and  on  South  African  cooperation 
in  moving  toward  an  internationally 
recognized  settlement  for  Namibian  in- 
dependence. 

The  United  States  has  no  blueprint 
for  a  future  political  system  for  South 
Africa.  Nor  would  we  have  a  right  to  at- 
tempt to  impose  such  a  plan  if  we  had 
one.  We  do  have  a  right  to  ask  South 
Africa  to  respect  the  same  universal 
principles  of  human  rights  and  human 
freedoms  that  we  seek  for  peoples 
everywhere.  For  all  South  Africans,  as 
for  people  everywhere,  we  ask  for 
government  based  squarely  on  the  freely 
expressed  consent  of  the  governed. 
South  Africa's  present  system  of  govern- 
ment is  not,  although  there  are  signs  of 
a  willingness  to  move  toward  such 
government. 

The  subcommittees  have  asked 
whether,  as  a  result  of  South  Africa's 
apartheid  policy,  the  Department  con- 
siders that  country  to  be  a  gross  violator 
of  internationally  recognized  human 
rights.  The  Department's  view  with 
respect  to  the  human  rights  situation  in 
South  Africa  is  expressed  in  some  detail 
in  our  annual  human  rights  report  to 
Congress.  The  Department  would  not 
argue  that  South  Africa  is  not  a  violator 
of  internationally  recognized  human 
rights.  However,  the  Department  does 
not  advocate  a  formal  determination 
that  South  Africa— or  any  other  coun- 
try— is  a  gross  violator,  because  such 
determinations  are  barriers  to  dialogue 
that  might  serve  to  induce  the  human 
rights  improvements  that  we  seek.  In 
situations  where  there  is  a  consistent 
pattern  of  gross  violations,  the  intent  of 
the  legislation  is  being  carried  out  by 
refraining  from  security  assistance  and 
from  issuance  of  licenses  for  crime  con- 
trol equipment.  However,  formal 
designations  would  largely  rob  the 
legislation  of  its  desired  effect  by  signal- 
ing to  the  designated  party  that  the 
United  States  saw  no  hope  for  improve- 
ment. 


Ending  Apartheid 

Apartheid  is  by  no  means  the  onl 
system  by  which  contemporary  g; 
ments  deny  citizens  freedom  of  s 
and  assembly,  the  right  to  democ 
participation  in  government,  and 
ty  under  the  law.  Government  by 
with  the  consent  of  the  governed' 
mains  a  rare  commodity  in  our  w 
The  principles  of  freedom,  equali 
democracy,  and  the  standards  of 
rights  which  so  many  endorse  foi 
Africa  are  also  utterly  absent  fro 
political  practice  of  many  other  r 
not  similarly  subject  to  either  the 
scrutiny  or  sanctions  applied  to  J 
Africa.  This  double  standard  has 
hindered  constructive  changes  in 
country  by  persuading  some  Soui 
Africans  that  their  country  will 
be  singled  out  for  negative  pressi 
be  held  accountable  to  standards 
plied  uniformly  elsewhere,  and  b, 
suading  others  that  constructive 
when  it  does  occur,  will  not  be  hi 
recognized  for  what  it  is. 

The  United  States  is  looking 
mere  expressions  of  sympathy  ai 
outrage  toward  practical  and  effi' 
means  to  help  end  apartheid.  Thi 
ing  focuses  specific  attention  on 
port  of  several  items  to  South  A 
might  be  said  to  address  the  gen 
issue  of  what  influence  we  have  1 
change  in  South  Africa.  The  real 
whether  a  policy  of  denial  is,  in  ; 
itself,  going  to  cause  such  disrup 
the  South  African  economy  that 
South  African  Government  will  h 
choice  but  to  abandon  apartheid, 
believe  that  the  change  we  wish  1 
in  South  Africa  is  more  likely  to  ' 
place  in  a  relationship  of  mutual » 
fidence. 

The  subcommittees  have  aske 
an  explanation  of  how  trade  cont 
relate  generally  to  U.S.  relations 
South  Africa.  I  speak  to  what  thii 
tion — and  to  the  question  of  whal 
regime  of  trade  controls  can  playi 
in  the  effective  pursuit  of  peacefu 
evolutionary  change  in  South  Afr 
away  from  apartheid. 


Trade  Restrictions  I 

The  United  States  has  restricted  I 
with  South  Africa  since  1961  to  a)^ 
greater  or  lesser  extent  as  a  meai|<i 
denial  and  symbolic  disassociationi'O 
its  racial  system.  A  strict  U.S.  ar'i 
bargo  was  followed  by  a  mandate 
U.N.  arms  embargo  in  1977. 

The  decision  of  the  Carter  Ad 
ministration  to  go  beyond  the  maiJ' 


26 


Department  of  State  El< 


AFRICA 


imbargo  to  also  restrict  all  exports 
police  and  military  was  not 
■ly  emulated  by  other  nations.  A 
oil-exporting  countries  for  a 
t  of  oil  shipments  to  South  Africa 
ith  very  mixed  adherence. 
;perience  presents  questions  that 
gitimately  be  asked  with  regard 
use  of  trade  controls  as  a  coercive 
nent  of  foreign  policy  with  regard 
th  Africa.  It  would  seem  a  fair 
Dtion  to  make,  that  symbolism  per 
)t  the  only  objective  of  trade  con- 
nplemented  for  foreign  policy  pur- 
Trade  controls  are  also  expected 
;  a  substantive  impact  on  the 
)n  which  one  is  trying  to  affect;  in 
stance,  South  Africa's  apartheid 

lat,  then,  has  been  the  effect  of 
;ontrols  on  internal  change  in 
Africa?  There  are  some  rather 
liar  results.  Over  the  course  of  the 
)  years.  South  Africa  has 
Ded  the  world's  10th  largest  arms 
•y  and  is  now  becoming  an  ex- 
of  arms.  Over  the  course  of  the 
I  years.  South  Africa  has  become 
i  leader  in  sjmthetic  fuel  produc- 
ver  the  course  of  the  past  5 
South  Africa  has  made  giant 
toward  nuclear  self-sufficiency  in 
duction  and  fabrication  of  low 
d  uranium. 

;  logic  of  this  sequence  does  not 
the  conclusion  that  all  controls 
be  abolished.  On  the  contrary, 
ministration  has  continued  to  im- 
t  a  wide  set  of  controls  on  trade 
wrts  to  South  Africa.  But  we  do 

question  seriously  the  efficacy  of 
lar  controls  and  to  look  carefully 

to  see  whether  they  are,  indeed, 
g  their  objective — or  if  in  some 
hether  the  objective  is  better  ad- 

by  other  policy  tools.  The 

should  be  the  impact  these  con- 
ve  on  events  in  the  country.  The 
shows  that  controls  have  en- 
id  greater  self-sufficiency  and 

y  have  not  in  themselves  been 
It  to  encourage  a  process  of 


.Objective 

'  It  I  it  <  >ur  policy  is  not  merely  to 
I  '>r  ^cem  to  criticize  practices  of 
I  mitiit.  If  our  views  are  to  have 
'111-  'il'jective  must  be  to  devise 
Ifiiirnt  an  effective  and  con- 
t .'  means  policy  by  which  the 
'■^tati's  can  encourage  genuine 
(Ml  South  Africa. 

jlescribed  earlier,  the  objective  of 
P'tive  engagement  is  to  create  a 


climate  of  confidence  in  which  persons 
can  be  encouraged  to  make  difficult 
changes,  on  Namibia  and  on  domestic 
change.  In  specific  reference  to  export 
controls,  we  need  to  maintain  those  con- 
trols which  serve  as  an  instrument  for 
symbolically  and  substantively 
disassociating  ourselves  from  the  apart- 
heid regime  in  South  Africa.  At  the 
same  time,  we  do  not  believe  that  a 
regime  of  controls  or  coercive  leverage 
by  itself  is  a  sufficient  means  to  en- 
courage the  process  of  change  in  South 
Africa.  In  that  regard,  we  oppose  pro- 
posals for  total  embargoes  to  South 
Africa. 

The  United  States  had  identified 
three  areas  where  significant  change  is 
underway  in  South  Africa  and  which  can 
lead  to  meaningful  reform  away  from 
apartheid:  economic  growth,  education, 
and  trade  union  development.  In  order 
to  help  insure  that  the  change  which  is 
beginning  to  take  place  moves  in  a 
peaceful  direction  away  from  apartheid, 
the  Administration  has  moved  to  sup- 
port people  and  programs  both  inside 
and  outside  the  government  in  South 
Africa  seeking  to  develop  a  new 
nonracial  system.  Because  this  hearing 
focuses  on  trade  controls  as  an  instru- 
ment of  foreign  policy,  let  me  address 
the  relationship  between  economic 
growth  and  movement  away  from  apart- 
heid as  it  affects  our  policy  and  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  U.S.  private  sector. 

The  South  African  Government  and 
its  business  community  even  more  so 
recognize  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
segregate  South  Africa  into  separate 
economies.  The  growth  of  the  economy 
has  resulted  in  a  growing  demand  for 
skilled  manpower.  While  South  Africa's 
economic  growth  is  historically  based  on 
the  exploitation  of  unskilled  black  labor, 
the  development  of  a  modern  diversified 
economic  system  requires  that  blacks  be 
included  on  an  equal  wage  base  with 
whites.  Economic  growth,  therefore, 
renders  ineffective  the  apartheid 
political  system.  The  United  States  has 
traditionally  supported  American  private 
sector  trade  and  investment  in  South 
Africa.  While  not  promoting  U.S.  trade 
and  investment  in  South  Africa,  we  op- 
posed disinvestment  by  U.S.  firms  from 
South  Africa  and  have  supported  the 
Sullivan  principles,  a  voluntary  code  of 
fair  employment  practices. 

The  Reagan  Administration  believes 
that  U.S.  firms  can  help  to  foster  mean- 
ingful change  away  from  apartheid.  U.S. 
economic  interests  in  South  Africa  are 
substantial.  Two-way  trade  totaled  over 
$5.3  billion  in  1981,  with  the  United 
States  holding  its  position  as  South 


Africa's  leading  trade  partner.  U.S. 
direct  investment  in  South  Africa  now 
stands  at  over  $2.5  billion.  Over  200 
U.S.  firms,  affiliates,  and  subsidiaries  do 
business  in  South  Africa.  While  the 
United  States  continues  to  fully  adhere 
to  the  arms  embargo,  the  vast  majority 
of  U.S.  exports  to  South  Africa  are 
unaffected  by  any  special  export  con- 
trols. 

I  have  prepared  for  the  sub- 
committees a  detailed  description  of  the 
legislative  and  administrative 
mechanisms  of  controls  which  are  cur- 
rently being  administered.  In  the  de- 
tailed description,  it  will  be  evident  that 
the  existing  controls  are  substantial.  The 
arms  embargo  remains  fully  in  force  and 
remains  an  important  symbol  of  dis- 
association  from  apartheid.  Where 
changes  have  been  made  in  other  con- 
trols— such  as  those  made  earlier  this 
year  and  discussed  with  these  subcom- 
mittees— they  were  made  because  they 
were  found  to  be  counterproductive  and 
to  be  having  no  effect  in  encouraging 
the  process  of  change. 

Current  Restrictions  on  Exports 

Let  me,  then,  review  for  the  sub- 
committees what  specific  controls  do  af- 
fect U.S.  exports  to  South  Africa.  U.S. 
export  restrictions  of  importance  to  our 
policy  toward  South  Africa  fall  very 
generally  under  three  separate 
regulatory  regimes: 

•  That  administered  by  the  State 
Department  under  the  Arms  Export 
Control  Act  (AECA)  and  the  Interna- 
tional Traffic  in  Arms  Regulation 
(ITAR); 

•  That  administered  by  the  Com- 
merce Department  pursuant  to  the  Ex- 
port Administration  Act  (EAA)  of  1979, 
the  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Act 
(NNPA)  of  1978,  and  the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Regulations  (EAR);  and 

•  That  administered  by  the  Nuclear 
Regulatory  Commission  (NRC)  and  the 
Department  of  Energy  (DOE)  under  the 
NNPA  and  regulations  promulgated 
thereunder. 

Nuclear  nonprofileration  related  con- 
trols are  discussed  in  detail  in  the 
testimony  of  the  other  agencies.  I  will 
concentrate  here  on  controls  promul- 
gated under  the  authority  of  the  AECA 
and  the  EAA. 

Arms  Embargo.  The  United  States 
has,  since  1962.  enforced  an  embargo  on 
the  sale  of  military  equipment  to  South 
Africa.  From  1963  to  1977,  the  United 
States  observed  a  voluntary  arms  em- 


113 


AFRICA 


bargo  pursuant  to  U.N.  Security  Council 
Resolutions  181  and  182  (1963).  In  1977 
the  Security  Council,  with  U.S.  support, 
established  a  mandatory  embargo  on  the 
export  of  arms  and  related  material  to 
South  Africa. 

Security  Council  Resolution  418 
(1977)  provides  in  pertinent  part  that 
the  Security  Council  "Decides"  that  all 
States  shall  cease  forthwith  any  provi- 
sion to  South  Africa  of  arms  and  related 
material  of  all  types,  including  the  sale 
or  transfer  of  weapons  and  ammunition, 
military  vehicles  and  equipment,  para- 
military police  equipment,  and  spare 
parts  for  the  aforementioned,  and  shall 
cease  as  well  the  provision  of  all  types  of 
equipment  and  supplies  and  grants  of 
licensing  arrangements  for  the  manufac- 
ture and  maintenance  of  the  aforemen- 
tioned .  .  .  ." 

The  U.S.  Government  has  imple- 
mented the  arms  embargo  primarily 
through  control  of  items  on  the  U.S. 
munitions  list.  Under  the  provisions  of 
the  AECA  of  1976  and  the  ITAR  pro- 
mulgated pursuant  to  the  act,  no  item 
on  the  munitions  list  may  be  exported 
without  a  license  issued  by  the  Depart- 
ment of  State.  The  ITAR  also  require 
such  a  license  for  the  export  of  technical 
data  useful  in  the  production  of  muni- 
tions list  items  and  State  Department 
approval  for  manufacturing  license 
agreements  and  technical  assistance 
agreements  relating  to  items  on  the 
munitions  list.  Applications  for  licenses 
or  other  approvals  for  exports  to  South 
Africa,  with  very  rare  exceptions  for 
items  for  non-military  use,  are  denied. 

In  addition.  Section  385.4(a)(1)  of  the 
EAR  provides  that: 

An  embargo  is  in  effect  on  the  export  or 
reexport  to  the  Republic  of  South  Africa  and 
Namibia  of  arms,  munitions,  military  equip- 
ment and  materials  and  machinery  for  use  in 
manufacture  and  maintenance  of  such  equip- 
ment. Commodities  to  which  this  embargo  ap- 
plies are  listed  in  Supplement  No.  2  to  Part 
379  [15  C.F.R.  Section  385.4(aXl)]. 

The  commodities  listed  in  that  sup- 
plement are  items  on  the  commodity 
control  list— and  so  not  on  the  munitions 
list— that  are  military-related  or  capable 
of  military  use.  They  include  machinery 
for  the  manufacture  of  arms  and  mili- 
tary equipment,  military  construction 
equipment  designed  for  airborne 
transport,  certain  vehicles  designed  for 
military  purposes,  ammunition  com- 
ponents, nonmilitary  shotguns,  and 
shotgun  shells.  These  controls,  designed 
to  implement  the  U.N.  arms  embargo, 
were  not  altered  by  the  1982  revision  of 
the  trade  controls. 


The  subcommittees  have  asked  for 
the  Department's  views  regarding  en- 
forcement of  the  Department's  export 
control  regulations  and  the  arms  em- 
bargo against  South  Africa.  You  re- 
quested our  reaction  to  a  staff  study  of 
the  subcommittee  that  was  published  as 
an  appendix  to  the  hearing  on  "Enforce- 
ment of  the  United  States  Embargo 
Against  South  Africa"  and  inquired 
about  actions  taken  subsequently  to 
strengthen  the  enforcement  of  export 
controls  and  embargoes. 

The  Department  attaches  great  im- 
portance to  its  statutory  functions  and 
responsibilities  under  the  AECA.  As  you 
know,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Director  of  the  Bureau  of  Politico- 
Military  Affairs,  the  Director  of  the  Of- 
fice of  Munitions  Control  is  responsible 
for  carrying  out  the  functions  assigned 
to  the  Department  by  law  to  control  the 
commercial  export  of  defense  articles 
and  services.  In  discharging  these  func- 
tions, the  office  of  Munitions  Control  is 
directly  concerned  with  enforcing  export 
control  regulations.  It  is  standard  pro- 
cedure to  refer  reports  of  violations, 
which  the  Office  of  Munitions  Control 
obtains  from  a  variety  of  sources  in- 
cluding the  intelligence  community,  to 
the  U.S.  Customs  Service  for  investiga- 
tion. The  Office  of  Munitions  Control 
provides  appropriate  support  to  Customs 
and  other  law  enforcement  agencies  in 


the  investigation  and  prosecution 
alleged  violations.  This  support ' 
form  of  record  searches  and  certii 
tions,  research  material  related  Ui 
ed  violations,  and  testimonies  bef' 
grand  juries  and  courts. 

In  direct  response  to  your  inq; 
would  like  to  apprise  you  specific:; 
the  Department's  recent  efforts  t 
prove  and  strengthen  export  contt 
forcement.  Interagency  consultat; 
coordination  through  established 
nels  have  been  increased  on  a  wic 
range  of  enforcement-related  mat  n 
Our  Foreign  Service  posts,  havinj  M 
reminded  of  the  importance  of  th  Di 
of  Munitions  Control's  enforce' ■  ^ 
tion,  have  been  prompt  in  rei  •• 
alleged  or  possible  violations, 
of  Munition  Control  has  also  ii 
more  frequent  end-use  checks 
our  posts  in  order  to  verify  pr 
ports.  During  the  summer,  thi   '  ' 
Munitions  Control  conducted  i    ■ 
the  licensing  history  of  certain     ■ 
related  items  to  selected  coun; 
ascertain  the  likelihood  of  di\r 
other  than  the  authorized  em  I 

In  this  connection,  you  sli' 
that  the  Department  is  deeply 
in  Operation  Exodus,  a  U.S.  i 
Service  enforcement  program 
to  stop  the  illegal  export  of  <ii  ' 
tides  and  dual-use  technolog>  -  . 
end,  the  Office  of  Munitions  Cmit   '■■ 


South  Africa— Economic  Profile 


3 


Economy 

GNP(1981):  $81.9  billion.  GDP(1981):  S78.4 
billion.  Annual  growth  rate  (tJDP):  13.7% 
nominal,  4.6%  real.  Per  capita  GNP:  $2,800. 
Avg.  inflation  rate  (1981);  15.2%. 

Natural  resources:  Nearly  all  essential 
minerals  except  oil. 


Agriculture  (7.4">n  of  1981  GNP); 
nets — corn,  wool,  dairy  products,  whe 
sugarcane,  tobacco,  citrus  fruits.  Cult 
Innd-lOVo. 

Mining;  16.7%  of  GDP.  Manufaci 
2r,%  of  GDP. 

Industries  (24.4%,  of  GNP);  Mineo 
ucts,  automobiles,  fabricated  metal, 
machinery,  textiles,  chemicals,  fertilize 

Trade  (1980):  Erports—$25.o  billi 
gold,  diamonds,  corn,  wool,  sugar,  fru- 
and  skins,  fish  products,  metals,  : 
ores,  metal  products,  coal.  Major 
markets— VS.  UK,  Switzerland,  Japa 
ports — $18.3  billion:  machinery,  electr 
equipment,  transportation  equipment, 
machinery  and  data  processing  equipn 
textiles,  metal  products.  Major  sup- 
pliers—VS.  FRG,  Japan. 

Official  exchange  rate:  The  South 
African  rand  is  under  a  managed  float 
rand  =  US$1,  1981  avg. 

Membership  in  international  org! 
tions:  UN  and  many  related  agencies, 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Tr? 
(GATT);  INTELSAT. 


Department  of  State  B  el 


AFRICA 


1  a  Customs  officer  on  detail, 
has  markedly  increased  its 
jity  to  support  Operation  Exodus 
wide  range  of  related  enforcement 
;  and  has  enhanced  the  already 
lollaboration  between  the  Depart- 
ind  the  Customs  Service.  To  date 
have  been  765  seizures  of  all  kinds 
Operation  Exodus,  including  10 
snts  destined  for  South  Africa. 
e  have  noted  the  recommendations 
staff  study  regarding  the 
zation  and  mission  of  the  Depart- 
,  enforcement  function.  In  this 
1,  we  believe  that  the  reinforced 
zation  arrangements  and  in- 
d  level  of  effort  within  the  Depart- 
in  addition  to  the  more  active  par- 
ion  of  Foreign  Service  posts  in  en- 
lent  and  enhanced  interagency  coi- 
tion, are  adequate  to  carry  out  our 
)ry  export  control  responsibilities, 
ng  enforcement  of  the  arms  em- 
against  South  Africa. 

strictions  on  Exports  to  the 
ry  and  Police.  In  1978  the  United 
unilaterally  went  beyond  the  re- 
lent  of  the  1977  U.N.  arms  em- 
ind  imposed  a  total  ban  on  all  ex- 
■f  goods  and  technical  data  to  the 
African  police  and  military.  In 
ae  exception  was  established  for 
)ort  of  medicines,  medical  sup- 
quipment,  and  related  technical 
s  well  as  parts  and  components 
imarily  destined  for  the  South 
1  police  and  military.  In  1981  two 
ons  were  established  to  permit 
I  exports  to  the  police  and 
/  and  to  permit  the  export  of 
dities,  data,  parts,  and  com- 
3  "to  be  used  in  efforts  to  prevent 
unlawful  interference  with  inter- 
J  ci\il  aviation"  (i.e.,  airport  x-ray 
ig  equipment). 

March  1,  1982,  further  modifica- 
ere  introduced  that  have  the  ef- 

letaining  the  ban  on  exports  to 
ce  and  military  as  to  those  goods 
hnical  data  controlled  for  na- 
ecurity  purposes; 
'ermitting  the  export  of  five 
ies  of  goods  and  data  to  the 
'  and  police  under  a  general 

'ermitting  the  export  of  all  other 
nd  data  under  a  validated  license 
to  a  determination  that  the  ex- 
uld  not  "contribute  significantly 
iry  or  police  functions;"  and 
Establishing  two  de  minimis  pro- 
one  allowing  the  export  of  U.S. 
ents  that  will  constitute  up  to 


20%  by  value  of  goods  assembled  over- 
seas and  sold  to  the  South  African 
military  or  police,  and  the  other  permit- 
ting reexport  or  resale  to  the  military  or 
police  of  insubstantial  portions  of  items 
originally  sold  to  purchasers  other  than 
the  military  and  police  if  the  item  would 
not  contribute  significantly  to  military 
and  police  functions. 

On  September  15,  1982,  the  regula- 
tions were  further  modified  to  allow 
companies  which  have  sold  equipment  to 
the  police  and  military,  under  approved 
license,  to  supply  service  manuals 
without  submitting  a  separate  license 
application,  to  place  air  ambulances 
under  the  exception  for  medical  equip- 
ment, and  to  allow  the  export  without 
license  of  items  falling  under  the  "basket 
entries"  of  the  commodity  control  list, 
namely  miscellaneous  electronic  products 
and  other  products  not  elsewhere 
specified.  In  addition,  subsidiaries  of  the 
South  African  parastatal  arms  manufac- 
turing organization,  ARMSCOR,  were 
specifically  defined  as  military  entities. 

Crime  Control  Equipment.  Section 
385.4  (a)(5)  of  the  EAR  requires  a 
validated  license  for  the  export  to  any 
end-user  in  South  Africa  or  Namibia  of 
"any  instrument  and  equipment  partic- 
ularly useful  in  crime  control  and  detec- 
tion. ..."  The  commodities  controlled 
under  this  section  are  listed  in  EAR  Sec- 
tion 376.14.  This  restriction  is  not 
unique  to  South  Africa;  pursuant  to  Sec- 
tion 6(j)  of  the  EAA,  a  validated  license 
is  required  for  the  export  of  such  equip- 
ment to  any  country  except  NATO 
members,  Japan,  Australia,  and  New 
Zealand.  EAR  Section  376.14  provides 
that  applications  for  validated  licenses 
will  generally  be  considered  favorably  on 
a  case-by-case  basis  "unless  there  is 
evidence  that  the  government  of  the  im- 
porting country  may  have  violated  inter- 
nationally recognized  human  rights  and 
that  the  judicious  use  of  export  control 
would  be  helpful  in  deterring  the 
development  of  a  consistent  pattern  of 
such  violations  or  in  distancing  the 
United  States  from  such  violations." 

The  Department  does  not  view 
favorably  the  proposal  to  transfer  all 
crime  control  equipment  to  the  U.S. 
munitions  list.  The  munitions  list,  which 
derives  its  authority  from  the  AECA, 
covers  arms,  ammunition,  and  imple- 
ments of  war.  Crime  control  equipment, 
such  as  handcuffs  or  lie  detectors,  do 
not  logically  fall  into  these  categories. 

In  addition,  pursuant  to  Section  107 
of  the  International  Security  and 
Development  Cooperation  Act  of  1981, 
the  munitions  list  is  subject  to  periodic 


review  to  determine  whether  any  items 
should  be  removed  from  it  and  perhaps 
transferred  to  the  Commerce  commodity 
control  list.  Our  Office  of  Munitions  Con- 
trol, in  consultation  with  the  Depart- 
ment of  Defense,  thus  endeavors  to  limit 
the  munitions  list  to  defense  articles  and 
defense  services.  To  add  items  which  are 
arguably  not  defense  articles  would  not 
be  consistent  with  this  effort. 

The  other  two  types  of  e.xport  con- 
trols—nonproliferation  and  short  sup- 
ply—also affect  trade  with  South  Africa. 
Short  supply  controls  restrict  the  export 
of  commodities  of  which  there  is  a 
critical  shortage  in  the  United  States. 
The  nuclear  nonproliferation  controls  ef- 
fectively supplement  those  administered 
by  the  NRC  and  DOE. 

In  processing  applications  for  vali- 
dated licenses,  the  Commerce  Depart- 
ment must  consult  "to  the  extent  neces- 
sary"  with  other  interested  agencies. 
The  Secretary  of  State  has  the  right  to 
review  any  application  for  export  of 
commodities  controlled  for  foreign  policy 
purposes. 

Aircraft.  Section  385.4(a)(8)  of  the 
EAR  states  that  a  validated  license  is 
required  for  the  export  to  any  South 
African  consignee  of  aircraft  and 
helicopters.  Applications  for  exports  for 
civil  use  are  generally  considered 
favorably  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  subject 
to  a  license  condition  that  the  aircraft 
will  not  be  put  to  military,  paramilitary, 
or  police  use.  This  provision  thus  assists 
in  enforcing  the  arms  embargo  in  the 
classic  "grey  area"  of  nonmilitary  air- 
craft and  addresses  the  problem  of 
South  Africa's  paramilitary  Air  Kom- 
mandos. 

Computers.  Section  385.4(a)(9)  of 
the  EAR  requires  a  validated  license  for 
the  export  of  computers  as  defined  in 
commodity  control  list  entry  1565A  to 
the  Ministry  of  Cooperation  and 
Development,  the  Department  of  the  In- 
terior, the  Department  of  Community 
Development,  the  Department  of 
Justice,  the  Department  of  Manpower, 
and  administrative  bodies  of  the 
"homelands"  that  carry  out  similar  func- 
tions. Applications  for  validated  licenses 
will  generally  be  considered  favorably  on 
a  case-by-case  basis  for  the  export  of 
computers  that  would  not  be  used  to  en- 
force the  South  African  policy  of 
apartheid. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wiU 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


133 


EAST  ASIA 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific 


by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  East  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relntions  Cmmittee  on 
March  11.  1983.  Mr.  Wnlfninl:  ,s  Assist- 
ant Secretary  for  En  st  Asian  mill  Pacific 
Affairs. ' 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  present  both  our  FY  1984  foreign  as- 
sistance request  and  the  need  for  a  sup- 
plemental appropriation  for  FY  1983.  I 
would  like  to  give  you  a  brief  overview 
of  how  both  requests  relate  to  our 
foreign  policy  objectives  in  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific.  This  will  be  followed  by 
supplemental  material  presenting  a  more 
detailed  discussion  of  our  proposals 
country-by-country. 


U.S.  INTERESTS  AND  OBJECTIVES 

The  Secretary's  recent  Northeast  Asian 
trip  and  our  recent  chiefs  of  mission 
conference  in  Hong  Kong  underscored 
for  me  the  serious  need  for  additional 
foreign  assistance.  As  important  as  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  are  today,  they  will  only 
be  more  important  tomorrow.  There  is 
perhaps  no  other  area  of  the  world 
about  which  this  can  be  said  with  such 
confidence.  There  are  myriad  ways  in 
which  to  support  this  view.  But  to  make 
this  point  today,  in  shorthand,  let  me 
point  to  just  two  facts. 

First,  we  trade  more  today  with 
East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  than  with  any 
other  region  on  Earth,  including 
Western  Europe;  and  East  Asia's  share 
of  the  pie  is  gaining. 

Second,  we  have  fought  two  wars 
since  World  War  II,  both  in  Asia.  We  do 
not  want  to  fight  another. 

The  resources  we  seek  for  East 
Asian  and  Pacific  countries  serve  in 
numerous  ways. 

•  They  bolster  our  treaty  relation- 
ships with  Korea  and  Thailand,  two 
front-line  states,  and  with  the  Philip- 
pines, with  which  we  will  shortly  enter 
important  base  negotiations. 

•  They  strengthen  our  relationships 
with  other  treaty  allies  such  as  Japan, 
Australia,  and  New  Zealand  which  do 
not  receive  credit  or  grant  assistance 
but,  nevertheless,  view  U.S.  assistance 
to  other  key  Pacific  nations  as  an  in- 


dicator of  our  resolve  to  remain  a 
Pacific  power. 

•  They  reinforce  our  defense  rela- 
tions with  countries,  such  as  the 
Association  of  South  East  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN),  in  strategic  proximity  to  sea 
lanes  of  communication  essential  not 
only  to  the  region  but  to  access  to  the 
Indian  Ocean  and  the  Middle  East  as 
well. 

•  They  help  to  assure  our  access  to 
key  commercial  markets  and  raw 
material. 

•  They  strengthen  movement  to- 
ward democracy  in  those  countries,  such 
as  the  ASEAN  states,  that  have  become 
a  voice  for  peace  in  the  region. 

These  are  some  of  the  major 
benefits  we  gain,  but  I  could  have  easily 
mentioned  half  a  dozen  more,  such  as 
managing  refugee  flows,  impeding  the 
flow  of  narcotics,  promoting  peaceful 
resolution  of  regional  conflicts,  and 
reducing  the  abject  poverty  and  social 
strains  that  spawn  domestic  violence  and 
weigh  heavily  on  all  of  us. 

Finally,  all  of  these  benefits  serve 
as  useful  components  of  our  efforts  to 
improve  human  rights  practices  in  the 
region.  Governments  which  are  secure 
and  prosperous  are  better  able  to  imple- 
ment human  rights  policies.  Closer  ties 
with  the  United  States,  furthered  by  our 
assistance  programs,  make  it  more  likely 
that  our  concern  with  human  rights  will 
be  given  consideration.  Progress  on 
human  rights,  vitally  important  on  its 
own,  in  turn  is  an  integral  part  of  all  our 
other  concerns.  Human  rights  abuses 
undermine  the  legitimacy,  progress,  and 
even  stability  of  governments,  thereby 
vitiating  other  components  of  our 
strategy. 

With  that  brief  background,  let  me 
discuss  in  very  broad  terms  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific's  share  of  the  requests 
before  you. 


THE  REQUESTS 

In  the  supplemental  bill  for  FY  1983,  we 
seek  only  to  restore  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  guaranteed  credits  and 
military  assistance  program  (MAP) 
funds  to  the  amounts  initially  sought. 

•  The  FMS  funds  which  can  be 
feasibly  allocated  to  East  Asia  under  the 


current  continuing  resolution — $2 
million— fall  20%  below  the  level 
tually  funded  last  year  and  30%  b 
what  we  sought  for  this  year.  Sue 
substantial  reduction  poses  seriot 
lems  for  us  in  terms  of  our  key  n 
ships,  the  gravest  being  with  Kor 
Thailand. 

•  Regarding  MAP,  we  face 
situation.  The  $9  million  proposed 
East  Asia  under  the  continuing  r 
tion  level  is  barely  a  third  of  the 
we  have  requested. 

•  Rapid  restoration  of  these 
required  to  prevent  hazardous  de 
and  disruptions  in  urgent  militar; 
modernization  programs  and  to  6 
that  the  United  States  is  perceiv< 
steady,  reliable  security  partner. 

Our  FY  1984  request,  of  coui 
covers  not  only  FMS  and  MAP, 
ternational  military  education  an 
ing  (IMET),  economic  support  fu 
(ESF),  development  assistance,  a 
480.  Over  four-fifths  of  the  regio 
economic  assistance  would  go  to 
key  countries— the  Philippines, 
Thailand,  and  Indonesia— and  th 
amounts  requested  are  virtually 
lined  from  last  year's  requests  ar 
real  terms,  are  virtually  the  sam^ 
amounts  funded  in  FY  1982. 

The  $436  million  in  FMS  gua 
credits  sought  for  FY  1984  excet 
FY  1983  request  by  12%.  The  m. 
real  dollar  increase  sought  is  tarj 
two  front-line  states— Korea  and 
Thailand.  The  FMS  requests  for 
other  three  FMS  recipients— the 
pines,  Indonesia,  and  Malaysia— 
straight-lined  from  the  FY  1983 

The  increases  sought  for  Kor 
Thailand  are  well  justified.  As  he 
recently  at  the  DMZ  [demilitarize 
in  Korea,  Secretary  Shultz  remai 
how  strong  an  impression  standii 
the  edge  of  hostility  leaves  and 
great  contribution  the  people  of  I 
are  making  to  their  own  security 
the  world's.  Much  the  same  migh 
said  of  the  Thai,  whose  contribut 
the  front-line  state  are  crucial  to 
ASEAN's  and  the  world's  efforts' 
resist  Vietnamese  aggression  in 
neighboring  Kampuchea.  Funds  i 
these  front-line  states  will  serve  i 
purposes  and  send  an  important 
message  to  others. 

Ironically,  due  to  the  limited 
available,  we  have  reduced  our  F 
MAP  request  for  Thailand  to  $5  ! 
a  reduction  of  80%. 

Similarly,  we  have  reduced  oi 
requests  below  the  FY  1983  requ( 


Department  of  State  B! 


EAST  ASIA 


iVe  would  retain  the  $50  million 
r  the  Philippines  as  part  of  the 

bases  agreement  but  permit 
)n  of  the  ESF  to  Thailand  from 
inal  FY  1983  request, 
illy,  we  have  requested  $9.69 
in  IMET  funds,  a  mere  4.6%  in- 
)ver  the  FY  1983  request  level, 
mall  in  total  dollars,  IMET  is 

our  most  cost-effective  form  of 

assistance. 

believe  that  these  requests, 
as  they  have  been  with  an  eye  to 
esource  constraints,  and  the  in- 
f  Soviet,  North  Korean,  and 
lese  threat,  represent  the 
n  resources  needed  to  protect 
it-line  allies  and  preserve  our 
•eements.  The  needed  restora- 
''MS  and  MAP  funds  initially  re- 
fer this  year,  and  the  small  real 
icrease  sought  for  next,  will 

an  important  investment  in  the 
future  and  in  our  own. 


lental  .Appropriation  — 

standing  East  Asia's  vast 
ay,  rich  resources,  and  signifi- 
tribution  to  many  of  our  highest 
wlicy  objectives,  our  requested 
?MS  guaranteed  credits  for  FY 
ounted  to  only  $388.5  million,  or 
I  of  the  global  request  level, 
pest  level  would  be  an  increase 
over  the  FY  1982  level  of 
lillion  in  nominal  dollars  and,  of 
nuch  less  an  increase  in  real 

jht  also  mention  that  a  by- 
)f  the  lower  worldwide  level 
e  continuing  resolution  has  been 
;  East  Asia's  percentage  of 
irantees  from  9%  of  the  larger 
le  request  level  of  $4,323.3 
)  7.4%  of  the  smaller  continuing 
n  level  of  $3,638  million.  Both 
ional  earmarks  and  the  require- 
:und  new  high  priority  pro- 
itside  of  East  Asia  have  con- 
to  this  effect. 

59  million  FMS/MAP  proposed 
Asia  under  the  continuing 
1  level,  although  double  the  FY 
led  level  of  $4.5  million,  is  a 
lotion  from  the  FY'  1983  re- 
el of  $25  million.  Moreover,  the 
funded  level  itself  was  far 
!  concessionality  requested  for 
program  in  that  the  $4.5 
AP  program  was  in  lieu  of  an 
equest  for  $50  million  in  direct 
>ur  original  FY  1983  request 
e  million  FMS/MAP  program  is 


designed  to  provide  a  degree  of  conces- 
sionality that  would  both  help  compen- 
sate for  last  year's  shortfall  and  permit 
reduction  of  concessional  financing 
beginning  with  the  FY'  1984  program. 
As  with  FMS  guarantees,  the  reduction 
in  FMS/MAP  worldwide  levels  under  the 
continuing  resolution  has  had  the  effect 
of  reducing  the  percentage  of  the  total 
available  to  East  Asia.  Thus,  under  the 
continuing  resolution.  East  Asia  would 
receive  3.6%  of  the  worldwide  allocation 
for  country  programs  of  $250  million 
vice  5.8%  of  $427  million  under  the 
original  request  level.  Let  me  now  turn 
to  some  of  the  country  programs;  that  is 
those  for  which  we  are  requesting  a  sup- 
plemental appropriation. 

Korea.  For  the  past  30  years,  the 
combined  U.S. -Republic  of  Korea  deter- 
rent has  been  successful  in  preventing 
renewed  aggression  on  the  Korean 
Peninsula.  The  peace  has  been  main- 
tained, and  the  Republic  of  Korea  has 
enjoyed  an  era  of  unprecedented 
economic  and  social  progress.  Despite 
this  impressive  record,  however,  the 
need  for  continued  U.S.  support  re- 
mains. In  the  past  10  years.  North 
Koi-ea,  which  spends  between  15%  and 
20%  of  its  GNP  on  defense,  carried  out 
a  major  force  buildup  which  has  serious- 
ly affected  the  military  balance  on  the 
peninsula.  North  Korea  has  about  1.25 
times  as  many  men  under  arms  as  the 
South,  and  2V2  times  as  many  armored 
personnel  carriers,  artillery  pieces,  and 
tanks— which  are  larger  and  more 
modern  than  those  of  the  South.  The 
North  also  possesses  more  combat  air- 
craft than  the  South  and  maintains  a 
100,000-man  commando  force,  probably 
the  largest  such  force  in  the  world. 
Because  it  is  a  totalitarian  state.  North 
Korea  can  and  does  maintain  a  high 
state  of  readiness.  With  its  forces  only 
some  35  miles  from  Seoul,  North  Korea 
could  mount  an  attack  with  very  little 
notice. 

To  counter  this  threat,  South  Korea, 
which  spends  6%  of  its  GNP  on  defense, 
is  engaged  in  a  major  force  improve- 
ment program,  designed  to  improve  its 
warning  capability,  increase  its  effective 
firepower,  and  enhance  its  air  defense 
capability.  The  program,  which  includes 
the  coproduction  of  F-5s  and  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  F-16,  is  projected  to 
cost  some  $10.3  billion  during  the  period 
FY  1982-86,  with  $4.7  billion  slated  for 
procurement  in  the  United  States. 

To  assist  the  vital  efforts  of  this  im- 
portant ally,  we  provided  $166  bilHon  in 
FMS  credits  in  FY  1982.  Our  FY  1983 


proposal  for  $210  million  was  limited  by 
the  continuing  resolution  to  $140  million, 
some  16%  below  last  year's  figure.  This 
has  been  a  major  blow  to  Korean 
defense  planning  in  a  time  when  South 
Korea's  budget,  like  our  own,  faces 
unusual  constraints  and  pressures 
because  of  economic  conditions.  It  is 
worth  noting  in  this  context  that  during 
FY  1982,  the  South  Korean  Government 
paid  some  $254  million  to  the  U.S. 
Government  on  principal  and  interest 
charged  for  previous  loans,  exceeding  by 
some  $88  million  the  amount  of  new 
credits  provided  in  that  year. 

In  order  to  ease  the  very  real 
burden  Korea  faces  in  maintaining  a 
credible  deterrent  against  North  Korean 
aggression,  we  are  proposing  the 
restoration  of  $70  million  to  the  FY 
1983  budget  for  Korea. 

Our  Korean  allies  are  doing  their  ut- 
most for  their  own  security.  We  believe 
it  is  in  our  interest  to  assist  Korea  in 
meeting  its  force  improvement  goals  and 
our  mutual  security  objectives.  We 
should  bear  in  mind  that  Korean  combat 
forces,  whose  capabilities  would  be 
enhanced  by  higher  FMS  levels,  are  sta- 
tioned with  our  own  forces  along  the 
DMZ  and  would  operate  with  ours  under 
a  joint  command  in  time  of  war.  Thus, 
we  have  a  very  direct  stake  in  the  force 
improvement  efforts  of  this  front-line 
ally. 

Thailand.  Restoration  of  all  or  most 
of  Thailand's  FY'  1983  request  levels  is 
necessary  to  maintain  our  support  for  its 
position  as  the  ASEAN  front-line  state 
in  its  confrontation  with  improved  Viet- 
namese forces  in  Kampuchea.  Thus,  we 
are  requesting  restoration  of  $9  million 
in  FMS  guaranteed  credits  and  $16 
million  in  FMS/MAP  to  provide  the  $66 
million  and  $25  million  in  FMS  guaran- 
tees and  FMS/MAP,  respectively,  which 
were  originally  requested  for  FY'  1983. 

The  continuing  resolution  FMS  level 
of  $57  million  in  guaranteed  credits  and 
$9  million  in  MAP  for  a  total  FMS  pro- 
gram of  $66  million  falls  27.5%  short  of 
the  $91  million  request  level  for  FY' 
1983  and  16.6%  below  the  FY  1982  total 
FMS  program  of  $79.2  million.  More- 
over, the  original  request  included  $25 
million  in  FMS/MAP  which  would  have 
provided  badly  needed  concessionality. 

Thailand  is  confronted  with  a  serious 
military  threat  from  Vietnam.  Soviet- 
supplied  Vietnamese  troops  occupy 
Kampuchea,  operate  in  strength  along 
the  Thai-Kampuchea  border,  and  have 
already  begun  to  exploit  the  dry  season 
by  launching  combined  armor— infantry 


EAST  ASIA 


operations  against  all  elements  of  the 
Khmer  coalition  government's  resistance 
forces.  Moreover,  the  Vietnamese  opera- 
tions suggest  further  improvements  in 
their  force  capability— specifically  in 
command  and  control,  target  acquisition, 
and  logistical  support. 

In  response  to  this  increasing 
military  threat,  the  Royal  Thai  Govern- 
ment has  continued  a  major  force  im- 
provement program  to  deter  or  defend 
itself  against  an  invasion,  while  continu- 
ing operations  to  contain  a  small  but 
troublesome  insurgency  in  rural 
Thailand.  President  Reagan  has  publicly 
reiterated  our  commitment  to  Thailand 
under  the  Manila  pact  and  made  clear 
our  continued  support  to  Thailand  under 
the  Manila  pact.  In  the  context  of  in- 
creasing Vietnamese  capabilities  and  ac- 
tivities, cutting  Thailand's  FMS  program 
below  the  FY  1982  levels  might  lead  the 
Thais,  the  other  ASEAN  states,  and  the 
Vietnamese  to  feel  that  the  United 
States  is  unlikely  to  remain  a  serious 
player  in  the  area. 

Maintaining  adequate,  consistent 
levels  of  military  assistance  is  necessary 
to  maintaining  U.S.  influence  in  an  im- 
portant part  of  the  world  at  relatively 
low  cost,  without  risking  involvement  in 
military  hostilities. 

Finally,  permitting  the  Thai  pro- 
gram to  fall  below  the  FY  1982  level 
could  impair  Royal  Thai  Government 
cooperation  with  us  on  some  of  our 
other  objectives,  such  as  assistance  to 
refugees  seeking  first  asylum,  control  of 
narcotics  traffic,  and  support  for  other 
U.S.  policies  in  the  international  arena. 

Indonesia.  Although  not  allied  with 
us  or  with  other  powers,  Indonesia  is  a 
major  regional  power  with  which  we 
have  significant  relationships.  Indonesia, 
the  largest  ASEAN  state,  is  a  central 
element  in  ASEAN's  resistance  to  ex- 
panding Soviet  and  Vietnamese  in- 
fluence in  the  region  and  plays  a  con- 
structive, moderate  role  in  the  Non- 
aligned  Movement,  the  Islamic  Con- 
ference, and  other  international  fora. 

The  continuing  resolution  level  of 
$20  million  in  FMS  guarantees,  a  reduc- 
tion of  60%  from  the  requested  $50 
million  and  of  50%  from  the  FY  1982 
funded  level  of  $40  million,  is  likely  to  be 
interpreted  by  the  Indonesian  Govern- 
ment as  a  downgrading  by  the  United 
States  of  its  security  relationship  with 
Indonesia,  especially  since  it  comes  so 
soon  after  the  state  visit  of  President 
Soeharto.  We  have  expected  that  the  In- 
donesian Government  would  use  most  of 
its  FY  1983  credits  for  four  C-130  air- 


craft, after  which  Jakarta  would  use  its 
FY  1983  FMS  credit  for  badly  needed 
air  or  naval  force  improvements.  A  ma- 
jor cut  below  the  FY  1982  level  will 
undercut  the  credibility  of  our  commit- 
ment to  support  Indonesia's  military 
modernization  program  and  could  conse- 
quently harm  our  overall  relationship.  In 
order  to  avoid  these  adverse  conse- 
quences, we  urge  that  a  supplemental 
appropriation  include  an  additional  $30 
million  for  Indonesia's  FMS  program  to 
bring  it  up  to  the  requested  $50  million. 

Malaysia.  A  reduction  from  the  re- 
quest level  of  $12.5  million  to  $4  million, 
a  drop  of  68%,  will  impede  Malaysian 
efforts  to  modernize  its  forces  and 
restructure  them  to  address  an  external 
threat.  Moreover,  the  unavailability  of 
FMS  credits  will  lessen  the  attrac- 
tiveness of  American  military  equipment 
to  the  Malaysians  and  may  lead  to 
greater  reliance  on  other  suppliers.  It 
may  also  give  the  Malaysians  second 
thoughts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  seeking 
closer  security  relations  with  the  United 
States.  Therefore,  we  are  requesting 
that  a  supplemental  appropriation  in- 
clude an  additional  $8.5  million  to 
restore  the  FY  1983  request  level,  which 
exceeds  the  $10  million  FY  1982  funded 
level  by  only  $2.5  million. 

Assistance  Request— FY  1984 

I  would  like  now  to  turn  to  our  foreign 
assistance  request  for  FY  1984.  FY 

1983  was  the  first  year  in  which  this  Ad- 
ministration integrated  military  and 
economic  assistance  into  a  single 
strategic  package.  The  FY  1984  foreign 
assistance  proposal  continues  to  refine 
this  concept  in  linking  all  components  of 
U.S.  assistance  to  our  strategic  interests 
and  foreign  policy  objectives. 

Although  my  remarks  concern 
primarily  security  assistance,  that  is, 
FMS  guaranteed  credits,  FMS/MAP, 
ESF,  and  IMET,  I  will  touch  on  the 
total  request  to  include  development 
assistance  and  PL  480. 

Our  total  East  Asia  and  Pacific 
foreign  assistance  request  for  the 
aforementioned  kinds  of  bilateral 
assistance  during  FY  1984  is  $722 
million,  or  an  increase  of  less  than  5% 
over  the  FY  1983  request  level  of  $689 
million.  It  exceeds  the  FY  1982  funded 
level  of  $606  million  by  19.1%.  Thus,  full 
funding  of  the  requested  levels  for  FY 

1984  would  be  a  decrease  from  fully 
funded  FY  1983  programs  in  real  terms, 
since  inflation  exceeded  5%.  Even  for 
the  2-year  period,  full  funding  would,  at 
best,  keep  pace  with  inflation. 


Our  development  assistancf  ki 
level  of  approximately  $168.;"  nn  c 
virtually  a  straight  line  from  \-'\  '< 
and  exceeds  the  FY  1982  fun.!.,  e 
about  $163  million  by  only  3.7";..)!, 
quested  levels  for  PL  480  of  $:;nii 
for  Title  I  and  $17  million  for  Ti  > 
respectively,  both  represent  \  in 
straight  line  from  the  revisei  I  '  ' ' 
request. 

Some  $180  million  of  oui-  ici  e 
economic  assistance — developnu  ; 
assistance  and  PL  480,  or  8.'^.:'.": 
go  to  Indonesia,  the  Philippines, 
Thailand.  Thus,  most  of  our  res( 
would  be  allocated  to  a  country 
which  we  have  a  military  bases  ; 
ment,  the  ASEAN  front-line  sta 
to  Indonesia  which  occupies  a  ke 
strategic  position,  both  geograpl 
and  politically  and  is  the  poorest 
in  ASEAN.  The  remaining  porti 
allocated  to  Burma  and  regional 
are  small  in  dollar  amounts  but 
ly  and  economically  significant  a 
shall  discuss  later. 

Turning  to  our  FY  1984  seci 
assistance  request  levels,  you  ca 
that  most — in  fact  about  87%— 
total  FMS  guarantees,  FMS/MA 
and  IMET  requested  is  to  protei 
treaty  relationships  with  Korea, 
Philippines,  and  Thailand.  I  shoi 
that  the  FY  1984  military  assist 
quest  of  $506.09  million  is  less  tl 
5%  increase  over  the  FY  1983  n 
level  of  $482.65  million;  in  other 
no  increase  at  all  in  real  terms.  ' 
1984  request  level  exceeds  the  F 
funded  level  of  $407,103  million 
24.3%  in  nominal  dollars  and  thi 
little  more  than  keep  pace  with  i 

Our  request  for  FMS  guaran 
credits  for  FY  1984  totals  $436.; 
million.  It  exceeds  the  FY  1983  i 
level  of  $388.5  million  by  12.3% 
FY  1982  funded  level  of  $340.7  1 
28.1%.  Thus,  if  fully  funded  for  1 
1983  and  FY  1984,  our  overall  F 
quest  is  an  extremely  small  incre 
real  terms.  In  addition  to  FMS 
guaranteed  credits,  we  have  reqi 
$5  million  in  FMS/MAP  for  Thai 
decrease  of  $20  million  from  the 
1983  requested  level.  The  reduce 
quest  was  necessitated  by  the  shi 
of  MAP  funds  available  and  othe 
priorities.  Nevertheless,  a  MAP  ] 
has  significance  in  Thailand  and 
throughout  ASEAN  as  an  indical 
U.S.  commitment  to  the  region. 

The  modest  nominal  dollar  in' 
sought  in  East  Asia's  overall  FMf 
both  guaranteed  credits  and  MAI 
level  is  targeted  on  two  front-line 


Department  of  State  El 


EAST  ASIA 


—Korea  and  Thailand.  The  FMS 
5ts  for  our  other  three  FMS  recip- 
-the  Philippines,  Indonesia,  and 
sia— are  all  straight-lined  from  the 
'83  request.  We  believe  that  these 
it  levels,  devised  as  they  have  been 
,n  eye  on  severe  resource  cen- 
ts and  on  the  increasing  Soviet, 
Korean,  and  Vietnamese  threats 
region,  represent  the  minimum 
ces  to  protect  our  front-line  treaty 
ind  preserve  our  base  agreements, 
ir  ESF  request  level  of  $55  million 
ents  a  $5  million  reduction  from 
'  1983  request  level.  This  would 
the  $50  million  level  for  the 
)ines  as  part  of  the  military  bases 
nent  but  permit  reduction  of  the 
3  Thailand  in  anticipation  of  a 
singly  adverse  impact  on  Thai 
3  from  refugee  flows.  The  lower 
t  level  also  is  predicated  on  full 
I  of  Thailand's  FY  1983  ESF  re- 
evel  of  $10  million, 
r  IMET  request  for  FY  1984  of 
nillion  represents  a  4.8%  increase 
le  FY  1983  request  level  of  $9.15 
and  a  38.7%  increase  over  the 
82  funded  level  of  $6.91.  IMET  is 
s  our  most  cost-effective  form  of 
/  assistance.  For  FY  1984,  we  are 
dng  slight  increases  for  seven  of 
'rent  IMET  recipients,  straight- 
wo  of  them  from  FY  1983,  and 
ng  one  new  $30,000  program  for 
a  country  whose  government  has 
itly  supported  U.S.  objectives  in 
.1  organizations  and  has  rejected 
approaches  in  the  form  of  aid  of- 
d  the  establishment  of  a 
iitic  mission.  Let  me  now  address 
:  the  specific  country  programs 
M  for  FY  1984. 

•ea.  Our  proposed  program  of 
illion  in  FMS  credits  for  the 
c  of  Korea  is  designed  to  help 
eans  address  more  effectively 
gerous  military  balance  on  the 
la,  an  imbalance  likely  to  worsen 
bsence  of  even  heavier  South 
defense  expenditures, 
ds  are  m-gently  needed  to  permit 
;inuation  of  the  F-5  coproduction 
1,  the  completion  of  a  tactical  air 
system,  and  the  procurement  of 
;overy  vehicles,  TOW  [tube- 
i,  optically  tracked,  wire-guided 
:]  missiles,  and  Hawk  modifica- 
he  $230  million  request  level  to 
Republic  of  Korea  sustain  its 
provement  program  objectives  is 
ncrease  over  the  FY  1983  re- 
rel  of  $210  million,  but  a  38.5% 
over  the  FY  1982  funded  level 
million.  The  adequacy  of  the  FY 


1984  request  level  is  predicated  upon  full 
funding  of  the  FY  1983  request. 

For  IMET,  we  seek  to  hold  the  FY 
1983  request  level  of  $1.85  million, 
which  is  an  increase  of  $450,000  over 
the  FY  1982  level.  The  proposed  IMET 
program  is  essential  to  assure  the 
necessary  training  to  support  the  force 
improvement  program,  as  well  as  to  im- 
prove the  interoperability  of  South 
Korean  and  U.S.  forces,  enhance  the 
commonality  of  U.S. -South  Korean  tac- 
tics, and  to  assist  the  development  of 
modern  management  expertise  in  the 
South  Korean  Armed  Forces. 

For  FY  1984  we  are  proposing  that 
Korea  receive  $230  million  in  FMS 
credits.  In  order  to  permit  more  effec- 
tive use  of  resources  available  for  this 
important  program,  we  are  also  propos- 
ing for  FY  1984  that  Korea  be  granted 
better  repayment  terms.  Specifically,  we 
are  proposing  that  Korea  be  permitted  a 
10-year  grace  period  as  to  principal  with 
a  total  of  30  years  for  repayment. 

The  diversity  and  slower  economic 
growth  that  characterizes  Southeast 
Asia  necessitates  that  U.S.  assistance  to 
the  subregion  include  diverse  forms  of 
assistance— economic  and  military— and 
be  spread  among  a  number  of  recipients. 

Philippines.  The  Philippines  is  the 
United  States'  oldest  Asian  ally  and 
shares  U.S.  perceptions  about  the 
danger  to  peace  in  Southeast  Asia.  The 
state  visit  of  President  Marcos  in 
September  1982  and  his  discussions  with 
President  Reagan  served  to  reaffirm  the 
excellent  state  of  U.S. -Philippine  rela- 
tions. 

U.S.  military  facilities  at  Subic 
Naval  Base  and  Clark  Air  Base  in  the 
Philippines  are  of  central  strategic  im- 
portance. With  their  advantageous  geo- 
graphic position,  they  help  the  United 
States  protect  the  Western  Pacific  sea- 
and  airlanes  and  respond  to  contingen- 
cies in  the  Indian  and  Pacific  Oceans. 
They  enable  the  United  States  to  fulfill 
its  treaty  obligation  to  defend  the  Philip- 
pines under  our  mutual  defense  treaty. 

The  requested  FMS  and  ESF  levels 
for  FY  1984— $50  million  for  each  pro- 
gram— are  unchanged  from  FY  1983 
and  FY  1982.  They  reflect  President 
Carter's  pledge  at  the  time  of  the  1979 
amendment  to  the  U.S.-Philippine 
military  bases  agreement  that  the 
United  States  would  make  its  "best  ef- 
fort" to  secure  $500  million  in  security 
assistance  for  the  Philippines  during  the 
period  FY  1980-84.  Security  assistance 
is  a  prime  element  of  our  good  relations 
with  the  Philippines  and  thus  of  con- 


tinued and  effective  U.S.  military  opera- 
tions at  the  bases.  It  assumes  added 
significance  in  view  of  the  growing 
challenge  of  the  communist  New 
People's  Army  insurgency  which,  if  un- 
checked, could  ultimately  threaten  U.S. 
military  facilities.  Your  support  for  our 
FY  1984  request  for  the  full  $100  million 
combined  FMS  and  ESF  total— continu- 
ing the  support  the  Congress  has  con- 
sistently given  to  honoring  the  1979 
pledge— is  highly  important. 

The  Philippines  is  expected  to  re- 
quest use  of  the  proposed  FMS  financ- 
ing for  aircraft,  including  helicopters, 
naval  combat  systems,  ground  vehicles, 
communications  gear,  engineering  and 
electronics  equipment,  and  other  defense 
articles. 

The  ESF  requested  will  continue  to 
make  a  major  contribution  to  improving 
the  lot  of  Filipinos  residing  in  the  areas 
surrounding  our  military  base  facilities. 
This  close  association  with  base  security 
distinguishes  our  ESF  from  the  less 
directly  connected  projects  which  come 
under  development  assistance  projects  in 
the  Philippines.  The  ESF  funds  will  con- 
tinue to  fund  such  major  activities  as:  (1) 
a  municipal  development  fund  to  im- 
prove local  government  administration 
and  construct  public  works  and  in- 
frastructure projects  in  about  21  cities 
and  municipalities  adjacent  to  U.S. 
military  facilities;  (2)  improvement  of 
municipal  market  operations  and  con- 
struction of  new  or  rehabilitation  of  ex- 
isting markets  throughout  the  country; 
(3)  improvement  of  social  and  economic 
conditions  in  six  provinces  adjacent  to 
U.S.  military  facilities  through  the 
development  of  high  growth  related  in- 
frastructure projects;  and  (4)  a 


renewable 


energy  resources  project  m 


rural  areas  using  gasifiers,  wood,  and 
charcoal. 

In  IMET  we  are  requesting  $1.3 
million  for  FY  1984,  the  same  figure  as 
requested  for  FY  1983.  IMET  is  closely 
related  to,  but  not  a  part  of,  our  military 
bases  agreement  with  the  Philippines. 
At  the  time  of  the  1979  military  bases 
agreement  amendment.  Secretary  Vance 
wrote  Foreign  Minister  Romulo  that  "we 
will  support  those  efforts  [to  achieve 
military  self-reliance]  by  means  of  our 
security  assistance  programs,  including 
the  important  training  component."  The 
Philippine  Government  has  always 
placed  a  high  value  on  IMET  training  in 
increasing  the  efficiency  and  profes- 
sionalism of  its  armed  forces. 

In  addition  to  military  assistance,  we 
have  requested  $40  million  in  develop- 


EAST  ASIA 


ment  assistance  and  $7.78  million  PL 
480,  Title  II.  A  significant  portion  of  the 
Philippine  population  lives  below  the 
poverty  line.  The  communist  New  Peo- 
ple's Army  exploits  rural  poverty  to 
build  support.  The  Philippine  Govern- 
ment is  working  to  improve  living  stand- 
ards. Our  assistance  program  em- 
phasizes agricultural  production,  rural 
employment,  and  family  planning. 
Although  these  broad  economic  and 
social  projects  are  not  as  directly  tied  to 
our  military  security  as  those  under 
ESF  and,  therefore,  are  not  categorized 
under  the  broad  rubric  of  "military 
assistance,"  they,  nevertheless,  are 
linked  to  our  broad  strategy  in  the 
Pacific  in  the  sense  that  I  outlined  in  my 
opening  remarks  on  U.S.  interests  and 
objectives  in  East  Asia.  It  was 
understood  at  the  time  of  the  1979 
military  bases  agreement  amendment 
that  the  United  States  would  maintain 
approximately  the  1979  level  of  develop- 
ment assistance  through  1984. 

The  United  States  and  the  Philip- 
pines will  begin  a  complete  review  of  the 
military  bases  agreement  in  April  1983 
to  ensure  that  it  continues  to  meet  our 
mutual  interests. 

Thailand.  Thailand's  overall  FMS  re- 
quest level  of  $99  million— $94  million  in 
FMS  guaranteed  credits  and  $.5  million 
in  FMS/MAP— is  an  8.8%  increase  over 
the  FY  1983  request  level  of  $91  mil- 
lion and  an  increase  of  20%  over  the 
FY  1982  funded  level  of  $79.2  million. 
However,  the  $5  million  in  FMS/MAP 
requested  for  FY  1984  represents  a 
sharp  drop  in  concessionality  from  the 
requested  FY  1983  level  of  $25  million, 
but  a  drop  which  we  believe  Thailand 
can  handle  if  the  FY  1983  request  is  ful- 
ly funded  and  the  overall  request  levels 
for  all  of  our  bilateral  assistance  pro- 
grams requested  for  FY  1984  are  fully 
funded. 

We  expect  that  most  of  the  FMS 
financing  will  be  used  to  purchase 
military  equipment  which  will  supple- 
ment or  replace  equipment  previously 
purchased;  this  includes  tanks  and 
missiles.  Equipment  to  be  purchased  for 
the  first  time  will  probably  include  air- 
craft capable  of  operating  against  ar- 
mored units  which  constitute  a  major 
threat  to  Thailand. 

The  $5  million  which  we  are  re- 
questing in  ESF  for  FY  1984  is  half  of 
the  FY  1983  request  level  of  $10  million, 
and  the  same  as  the  FY  1982  funded 
level.  The  requested  funds  will  continue 
to  be  used  to  supplement  Royal  Thai 
Government  resources  directed  to 
assistance  programs  in  areas  which  have 


been  most  seriously  affected  by  past 
military  incursions  and  the  inflow  of 
refugees.  About  200,000  Thais  along  the 
border  are  so  affected. 

Under  this  program,  the  government 
is  restoring  homes,  building  or  repairing 
roads,  furnishing  medical  facilities,  and 
other  essential  services  to  Thai  villagers. 
Such  economic  assistance  to  Thais 
adversely  affected  by  refugee  inflow  is 
still  funded  under  ESF  as  a  form  of 
security  assistance,  due  in  part  to  the 
military  or  security  importance  of  coping 
effectively  with  refugees  and  our  securi- 
ty interests  in  maintaining  Thai  political 
support  for  handling  refugees  as  a  coun- 
try of  first  asylum. 

We  are  requesting  $2.4  million  in 
IMET,  an  increase  of  9%  over  the  FY 
1983  request  level  of  $2.2  million  in 
order  to  maintain  the  training  levels 
necessary  to  support  Thailand's  urgent 
military  modernization  efforts,  on  which 
the  Royal  Thai  Government  places  so 
much  emphasis.  The  Thais  always  make 
maximum  use  of  IMET  funds  allocated 
to  them. 

The  $29  million  in  development 
assistance  proposed  for  FY  1984  is  a 
$1  million  increase  over  the  FY  1983  re- 
quest level  and  some  $400,000  over  the 
FY  1982  level.  It  is  designed  to  abet 
government  efforts  to  mitigate  poverty 
and  facilitate  social  and  economic 
development  in  backward  areas,  par- 
ticularly such  politically  sensitive  regions 
as  the  northeast.  The  Thai  Government 
fully  recognizes  the  political  hazards  in- 
herent in  a  "grapes-of-wrath"  economy 
and,  accordingly,  gives  development  its 
highest  budgetary  priority.  Finally,  our 
development  assistance  to  Thailand  is 
designed  to  promote  growth  in  the 
private  sector  to  help  limit  the  time 
period  in  which  Thailand  will  require 
economic  assistance. 

Indonesia.  The  $50  million  FMS  re- 
quested for  FY  1984  is  the  same  as  the 
FY  1983  request  level  but  exceeds  the 
FY  1982  funded  level  by  $10  million,  or 
25%.  Modernization  of  existing  forces 
continues  to  be  the  major  thrust  of  the 
FMS  financing  program.  However,  if 
the  Indonesians  select  a  U.S.  fighter  air- 
craft and  it  is  approved  for  sale,  we  ex- 
pect that  over  half  of  its  FY  1984 
credits  will  be  used  for  initial  payments 
for  the  purchase  of  such  aircraft  from 
the  United  States.  The  remainder  may 
be  spent  on  other  air  defense  systems 
such  as  the  Stinger  missile,  the  Vulcan, 
or  Chapparal  air  defense  equipment.  The 
government  also  has  a  strong,  continu- 
ing interest  in  purchasing  four  to  six 
used  ships,  particularly  Corvettes, 


frigates,  and  patrol  craft.  If  sulj. 
become  available,  the  Indonesian 
Government  may  give  high  priorii 
such  purchases. 

The  IMET  request  level  of  $2 
million  is  an  increase  of  less  than 
the  FY  1983  request  level  of  $2.6 
exceeds  the  FY  1982  funded  level 
$2.2  million  by  22.7%.  The  top  le^ 
Indonesia's  leadership  continue  to 
the  importance  of  proper  training 
component  of  military  modernizal 
and  regard  U.S.  provision  of  adec 
IMET  levels  as  indicative  of  the  I 
commitment  to  Indonesia's  securi 
donesia's  military  remains  in  criti 
need  of  more  qualified  technician: 
managers,  and  officers  with  adeq 
professional  military  education.  IV 
students  in  the  FY  1984  program 
take  courses  in  these  fields.  This 
gram  will  permit  about  300  Indor 
middle-grade  officers,  who  will  b( 
backbone  of  their  country's  futun 
military  and  government  establisl 
to  travel  to  and  train  in  the  Units 
States.  The  mobile  training  team 
nent  of  the  program  provides  for 
instruction  in  technical  subjects  ti 
military  technicians. 

Our  development  assistance  r 
for  FY  1984  is  for  $64  million,  a 
tion  of  $1  million  from  the  FY  19 
quest  and  a  little  over  $3  million  ; 
the  FY  1982  funded  level.  Our  re 
for  $30  million  in  PL  480,  Title  I, 
hold  the  line  at  the  FY  1983  level 
the  requested  $9,246  million  in  Ti 
would  be  a  slight  increase  over  th 
1983  level. 

Our  development  assistance  a 
480  requests  are  aimed  at  fosterii 
continued  stability  of  the  Indones) 
economy  and  Government  in  the  1 
a  deteriorating  global  economy.  Ii 
past  2  years,  Indonesia's  export  e 
ings,  which  have  fueled  its  past  in 
pressive  development,  have  dropp 
a  third.  A  serious  drought  and  otl 
natural  disasters  reduced  the  198! 
rice  crops  substantially,  slowing  I: 
donesia's  drive  to  reach  food  graii 
sufficiency  in  the  face  of  a  growin 
population.  In  this  context,  Indom 
continues  to  need  and  deserve  dev 
ment  and  PL  480  assistance  at  thi 
quested  levels. 

Malaysia.  The  $12.5  million  F 
quest  level  for  Malaysia  in  FY  198 
straight-line  of  the  FY  1983  reque 
level  and  a  25%  increase  over  the 
FY  1982  $10  million  program.  Ma 
is  expected  to  use  the  FMS  credits 
quested  toward  purchase  of  F-5E  " 
A-4  aircraft  and  for  radar  equipm ' 


Department  of  State  B I 


EAST  ASIA 


B  its  air  defense  capability. 
'.  IMET  request  of  $900,000  is 
iase  of  $50,000,  or  6%,  over  the 
3  requested  level  of  $850,000  and 
1  FY  1982s  $500,000  program  by 
'0,  or  80%.  These  higher  levels 
;ntial  to  provide  the  trained  per- 
;o  mold  the  conventional  force 
'6  already  mentioned.  These 
:  requirements  should  be  ad- 
now,  on  a  priority  basis,  and  the 
build  the  relationships  with  the 
an  military  and  Government  by 
ig  the  training  desired  is  now. 
T,  Malaysian  budgetary  con- 
suggest  that  that  government 
send  military  students  to  any 
which  does  not  provide  the 

japore.  U.S.  interests  in 
re  relate  to  our  objectives  of 
ng  Southeast  Asian  stability  and 
ling  unimpeded  transit  for  U.S. 
:d  commercial  and  military  air 
traffic  between  the  Pacific  and 
•ceans,  as  well  as  maintaining 
y  U.S.  naval  and  air  forces  to 
i-e's  excellent  sea  port,  ship  sup- 
i-epair  services,  and  air  terminal 
The  economic  vitality  of 
;,  its  active  role  internationally, 
fcegic  location  at  the  entrance  to 
ts  of  Malacca  accord  Singapore 
tance  far  in  excess  of  what  its 
lically  small  size  would  suggest, 
military  assistance  to 
e  in  FY  1983  consisted  of 
n  IMET.  The  same  level  is  be- 
3sed  for  FY  1984.  Because  of 
•e's  relatively  advanced 
,  additional  assistance  is  not 

d.  This  nominal  level  of 

e,  however,  demonstrates  to  a 
nonaligned  nation  our  continu- 
9St  in  its  security  and  helps  en- 

the  Singaporean  Armed 
mtinue  to  look  to  the  United 
r  training  and  equipment  pur- 
'his  assistance  program  is  con- 
ith  U.S.  policy  supporting 

While  we  do  not  expect  a 
1  Burma's  basic  commitment  to 
nent,  it  is  in  our  interest  to  en- 
ts  continued,  quiet  opening  to 
Although  it  is  currently  one  of 
's  poorest  countries  in  per 
;ome,  it  has  significant  mineral 
ultural  resources  which,  if 
developed,  could  ensure  inter- 
erity  and  contribute  to 
prosperity  in  the  region  as  a 


whole.  A  small  investment  now  could, 
therefore,  yield  significant  dividends 
later. 

U.S.  Agency  for  International 
Development  (AID)  and  IMET  programs 
resumed  in  FY  1980  after  a  16-year 
hiatus  and  have  grown  rapidly  although 
they  remain  relatively  small.  Together 
with  our  antinarcotics  assistance  to  Bur- 
ma, these  programs  have  promoted  a 
warming  of  our  bilateral  relations  at  the 
same  time  that  Burma  has  been  spurn- 
ing approaches  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
They  have  also  supported  our  broader 
interests,  including  narcotics  coopera- 
tion, and  have  responded  to  specific 
Burmese  requests. 

The  $12.5  million  in  development 
assistance  proposed  for  FY  1984 
represents  a  $1.3  million  decrease  from 
FY  1983,  which  has  been  necessitated  by 
current  budgetary  constraints.  While 
this  figure  is  sufficient  to  maintain  ex- 
isting agricultural  development  and 
public  health  projects,  the  planned  ex- 
pansion of  our  AID  program  will  require 
slightly  higher  funding  levels  in  subse- 
quent years.  The  modest  increases  con- 
templated will  maintain  the  momentum 
of  our  program,  assist  Burmese  develop- 
ment efforts  in  a  number  of  promising 
new  areas,  and  demonstrate  to  the 
Burmese  our  continued  concern  and 
commitment. 

The  proposed  25%  increase  in  IMET 
funding  in  FY  1984  to  $250,000  will 
enable  about  45  Burmese  officers  to 
receive  U.S.  military  training,  compared 
to  35  officers  in  FY  1983.  These  officers 
will  gain  exposure  to  U.S.  concepts  and 
systems  by  attending  courses  in  the  U.S. 
Army  Command  and  General  Staff  Col- 
lege program,  helicopter  maintenance, 
field  artillery,  and  other  subjects.  Given 
the  key  role  of  the  military  in  Burma's 
political  structure,  IMET  "training  will 
have  a  favorable  long-term  impact  on 
Burmese  attitudes  toward  the  United 
States  far  out  of  proportion  to  its 
modest  cost. 

We  will  continue  to  assist  Burmese 
antinarcotics  efforts,  primarily  through 
maintenance  support  for  aircraft  which 
we  have  supplied  for  use  in  antinarcotics 
operations.  Both  we  and  the  Burmese 
attach  high  priority  to  curbing  narcotics 
production  and  trafficking  in  Burma  and 
maintain  an  active  dialogue  regarding 
ways  in  which  we  might  cooperate  more 
closely  to  achieve  this  objective. 

World  War  II  demonstrated  the  im- 
portance of  the  Pacific  Islands,  which  lie 
across  the  lines  of  communication  be- 
tween the  U.S.  west  coast  and 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  Southeast 


Asia  to  our  security.  The  importance  of 
these  lines  of  communication  has  in- 
creased greatly  over  the  past  40  years. 

Since  the  war,  island  states  have 
undergone  great  changes  and  in  the  past 
20  years  have,  in  the  main,  transformed 
themselves  from  dependent  to  independ- 
ent states.  Our  relations  with  them  are 
friendly;  we  share  a  belief  in  democratic 
government  and  a  devotion  to  individual 
liberties.  It  is  in  the  U.S.  interest  to 
assist  island  governments  in  their  ef- 
forts to  promote  economic  growth. 

For  the  third  straight  year,  we  have 
requested  $5.1  million  in  development 
assistance  to  support  an  innovative, 
region-wide  program  to  improve  agri- 
cultural and  fishing  techniques  and  to 
promote  regional  cooperation  in  this 
area  of  small  populations  and  small 
markets.  Our  military  assistance  pro- 
grams are  even  more  modest  in  size. 

Fiji.  The  $80,000  IMET  program  re- 
quested for  FY  1984  would  be  a  $25,000 
increase  over  the  FY  1983  initial  fund- 
ing level.  The  additional  money  will 
assist  the  Royal  Fiji  military  forces  in 
acquiring  needed  professional  and 
technical  skills  to  better  operate  a  small 
but  modern  defense  force,  which  permits 
them  to  continue  their  participation  in 
Middle  East  peacekeeping  forces. 

The  Fiji  Government  is  pro- Western 
and  broadly  supportive  of  U.S.  policy 
goals  in  international  fora,  Fiji's  par- 
ticipation, at  our  request,  in  the  Sinai 
multinational  force  and  observers  was 
critical  to  international  acceptance  of  the 
organization;  Fiji  has  also  provided, 
since  1978,  one  of  the  best  trained  bat- 
talions to  the  U.N.  forces  in  Lebanon. 
Fiji  stations  more  troops  in  the  Middle 
East  to  try  to  keep  peace  there  than  it 
garrisons  at  home. 

Papua  New  Guinea.  The  United 
States  has  enjoyed  friendly  relations 
with  Papua  New  Guinea  before  and 
since  its  independence  from  Australia  in 
1975.  The  country's  size,  strategic  loca- 
tion, and  resources  make  it  a  major  ac- 
tor in  the  South  Pacific. 

Papua  New  Guinea  maintains  the 
largest  defense  force  in  the  Pacific 
island  region,  and  it  has  recently  in- 
creased its  military's  cooperation  with 
the  U.S.  Army's  western  command.  The 
proposed  FY  1984  IMET  program  of 
$30,000  is  an  increase  of  $10,000  over 
last  year's  request  level,  enough  to  per- 
mit adding  one,  or  perhaps  two.  addi- 
tional training  programs.  Papua  New 
Guinea  is  expected  to  use  its  IMET 
grant  to  provide  staff  or  technical  train- 
ing for  two  or  three  officers  and  equip- 


EAST  ASIA 


ment  repair  and  maintenance  courses 
for  the  same  number  of  enlisted  men. 

Tonga.  The  United  States  has  a  long 
history  of  missionary  and  merchant  con- 
tacts with  the  Kingdom  of  Tonga.  This 
small,  pro-Western  and  staunchly  anti- 
communist  nation  has  publicly  welcomed 
U.S.  Navy  ships  and  has  done  so  when 
other  island  governments,  concerned 
over  an  upsurge  in  public  sensitivity  to 
nuclear  energy  uses,  have  been  reluctant 
to  do  so.  Tonga's  defense  budget  is  very 
small,  and  the  nation  is  still  recovering 
from  the  effects  of  a  disastrous  hur- 
ricane which  swept  through  Tonga  in 
early  1982. 

This  is  the  first  IMET  program  that 
we  have  proposed  for  Tonga.  The  re- 
quested $30,000  will  be  used  to  train 
Tonga  defense  force  officers  and  men  in 
a  mix  of  professional  and  technical 
courses,  from  midlevel  command  train- 
ing to  patrol  boat  maintenance  and 
disaster  relief  techniques. 

ASEAN.  ASEAN  continues  as  a 
major  force  for  stability  in  Southeast 
Asia  and  is  of  central  importance  to 
U.S.  interests  in  the  region.  The 
ASEAN  nations  are  united  in  their  op- 
position to  the  continuing  Soviet- 
supported  Vietnamese  occupation  of 
Kampuchea,  and  they  are  resisting  the 
expanding  Soviet  military  presence  in 
the  region.  Soviet  port  calls  are  denied 
by  all  member  countries,  for  example. 

The  proposed  $4.5  million  develop- 
ment assistance  program  for  FY  1984 
will  fund  scholarships  and  training  in 
Southeast  Asia  studies  and  regional  pro- 
grams in  agricultural  planning,  plant 
quarantine,  watershed  conservation,  and 
tropical  medicine.  Although  only  a  por- 
tion of  the  $18.3  million  in  Asia  regional 
development  assistance  will  be  allocated 
to  East  Asia,  we  urge  full  funding  of 
this  request.  Full  funding  will  permit  ini- 
tiation of  an  ASEAN  small  industries 
project.  We  feel  strongly  that  it  is  in  the 
U.S.  interest  and  cost-effective  to 
strengthen  the  free  market  economies  of 
ASEAN  countries. 


have  meshed  well  with  our  alliance  and 
security  relationships  in  Asia  and 
Europe. 

The  relationship  has  also  produced 
many  other  bilateral  benefits.  Our  ex- 
panding economic,  scientific,  and 
cultural  ties  have  been  mutually 
beneficial  and  have  become  a  very  im- 
portant element  in  our  overall  relation- 
ship. A  strong  factor  is  our  two-way 
trade  in  goods  which  totaled  $5.2  billion 
during  1982,  with  a  surplus  of  $628 
million  in  the  U.S.  favor.  We  share  a 
broad  range  of  official  exchanges— over 
100  Chinese  delegations  visit  the  United 
States  each  month  and  over  9,000 
Chinese  students  now  study  in  the 
United  States.  In  1982,  more  than 
100,000  Americans  visited  China.  The  17 
protocols  under  the  U.S. -China  science 
and  technology  agreement  have  pro- 
moted valuable  exchanges  in  such  widely 
varying  fields  as  earthquake  studies, 
hydropower,  and  health. 

Consistent  with  our  growing  rela- 
tionship, the  President  in  June  1981 
decided  to  seek  legislative  change  to 
laws  that  link  China  with  the  Soviet 
bloc.  I  am  pleased  to  note  that  with  your 
assistance,  important  progress  was 
made  in  this  effort  during  the  past  year. 
Congressional  clarification  of  language 
in  the  Agi-icultural  Trade  Development 
and  Assistance  Act  now  permits  the 
President  to  declare  China  eligible  for 
PL  480  programs.  In  addition,  the  Presi- 
dent recently  signed  legislation  lifting 
the  prohibition  on  importation  of 
Chinese  furskins. 

The  proposal  to  eliminate  the  pro- 
hibition of  foreign  assistance  to  China, 
which  was  submitted  to  the  Congress  in 
our  FY  1983  authorization  bill,  received 
favorable  consideration  in  both  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  and  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committees.  However, 
the  overall  bill  was  not  passed  by  the 


97th  Congress  for  reasons  unrelaii 
China.  We  have  resubmitted  the  \{ 
posal  concerning  China  in  this  yef 
foreign  assistance  bill. 

I  would  again  emphasize  that 
have  no  plans  to  establish  bilater 
development  assistance  or  PL  48 
grams  for  China.  Our  principal  ii 
in  amending  these  laws  is  to  ensi 
that,  in  principle,  we  treat  China 
same  way  that  we  treat  other  fri 
nonaligned  countries.  We  do  not 
request  additional  funds  for  Chin 
result  of  these  amendments. 

Amendment  of  the  Foreign  I 
ance  Act  would  allow  China  to  p; 
ticipate  in  ongoing  AID  technical 
ance  programs,  under  current  fu 
levels,  in  the  same  manner  as  do 
countries.  We  previously  provide 
committee  staff  a  paper  outlining 
type  of  ongoing  projects  which  w 
consider  for  China.  We  have  not 
cussed  any  of  these  ideas  with  th 
Chinese  and  will  not  do  so  until 
is  amended.  I  would  stress  that  ( 
participation  in  these  programs 
threaten  AID  programs  with  oth 
tries  but  will  contribute  to  China 
development  through  existing  A] 
research  and  training  projects  w 
familiarizing  China  with  comnier 
available  U.S.  technology. 

We  would,  of  course,  consult 
with  the  Congess  if,  in  the  futun 
should  decide  that  development ; 
ance  programs  for  China  were  ir 
U.S.  interest.  The  initiation  of  ai 
assistance  program  for  China  wc 
be  subject  to  the  normal  authoriz 
and  appropriation  procedures. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  ■ 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  ai 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printii 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.H 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  K( 


China 

Having  now  completed  the  discussion  of 
security  assistance  recipients,  I  now 
want  to  emphasize  the  importance  the 
Administration  places  on  completing  ac- 
tion on  proposed  legislative  changes  for 
China. 

Our  rapprochement  with  China  over 
the  past  decade  has  made  important 
contributions  to  global  and  regional 
peace  and  stability.  U.S. -China  relations 


by  Thomas  P.  Shoesmith 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Asian  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  9,  198S.  Mr.  Shoesmith  is  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
Pacific  Affairs.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  appear  before  you  today 
to  discuss  an  issue  important  to  Korea, 
to  the  U.S. -Korea  relationship,  and  to 


American  interests  in  Northeast 
Asia— security  assistance  for  the 
Republic  of  Korea.  We  firmly  bel 
that  the  level  of  foreign  military 
(FMS)  credits  available  under  the 
uing  resolution,  which  is  16%  lesi 
was  provided  last  year  and  3?  " 
than  our  original  FY  1983  requef 
sufficient  to  meet  the  pressing  re 
quirements  of  this  front-line  ally. 
However,  before  turning  to  that 
subject,  and  in  order  to  place  it  ii 


Department  of  State  )' 


EAST  ASIA 


'  context,  I  would  like  to  speak 
ibout  the  full-range  of  our  in- 
in  Korea  and  the  policy 
ork  within  which  we  seek  to  ad- 
bose  interests. 

overriding  objective  in  Korea, 
throughout  the  past  30  years,  is 
!rve  peace  on  the  peninsula.  We 
immense  stake  in  the  mainte- 
f  stability  in  Northeast  Asia,  and 
1  Korea  is  absolutely  essential  to 
active.  North  Korean  hostility 
the  South  appears  unabated,  and 
;  remain  high.  War  in  Korea, 
our  view  not  likely  to  occur  so 
South  Korea  and  U.S.  strength 
ained,  is  always  possible— and 
itial  consequences  are  sobering 
mplate.  In  addition  to  massive 
;ion  and  loss  of  life  in  Korea 
icluding  the  lives  of  American 
,  a  North  Korean  attack  upon 
th  would  risk  direct  confronta- 
ween  the  United  States  and  the 
Jnion.  At  the  least,  it  would 
rains  between  ourselves  and  the 
unprecedented  since  the  Cuban 
:risis.  It  would  sharply  disrupt 
laps  end  for  the  medium  term 
ving  relationship  with  China.  It 
ireaten  directly  the  security  of 
do  not  believe  I  have  overstated 
ssible  effects  of  renewed  war- 
;he  Korean  Peninsula,  nor  do  I 
hey  need  further  elaboration 
ffice  it  to  say  that  deterring  war 
nain  a  basic  and  urgent  objec- 
le  United  States  in  Korea,  and 
lat  context  that  we  have  put 
le  Congress  our  request  for 
assistance  funds. 

erests 

urn  to  that  request  later  in  my 
It,  but  first  I  want  to  sketch  for 
variety  of  our  other  interests 
;y  objectives  in  Korea,  all  of 
e  interrelated  and  which 
have  given  our  ties  with  that 
considerable— and  growing — 
ice. 

la's  dramatic  economic  progress 
lown  to  this  committee.  In  one 
)n,  Korean  per  capita  GNP  has 
m  less  than  $100  to  more  than 
ts  international  trade  has 
;cordingly,  making  Korea  a 
t  factor  in  world  trade  and  an 
gly  important  trading  partner 
lited  States.  Last  year,  two-way 
-■ween  Korea  and  the  United 
irtually  in  balance,  amounted  to 
.n  $12  billion.  During  1982,  and 
he  effects  of  worldwide  reces- 


sion upon  this  traditionally  export-led 
economy,  Korea's  GNP  recorded  more 
than  5%  real  growth.  The  Korean  per- 
formance is,  of  course,  all  the  more  im- 
pressive when  one  considers  that  Korea 
lacks  natural  resources  and  must  rely 
heavily  on  imported  sources  of  energy 
and  industrial  raw  materials.  Korean 
progress  instead  stems  from  the  en- 
trepreneurial and  managerial  talents  of 
its  economic  leaders  and  the  unsur- 
passed industriousness  of  its  people.  We 
anticipate  that  Korea,  drawing  on  its 
abundant  human  strengths,  will  continue 
to  make  impressive  progress  in  its  ef- 
forts to  develop  its  economy.  As  it  does 
so,  the  importance  of  our  economic  in- 
terests in  Korea  will  grow  apace. 

In  policy  terms,  we  seek  greater  ac- 
cess to  Korea's  expanding  domestic 
market  and  the  smooth  management  of 
sectoral  trade  problems.  In  a  more 
general  sense,  we  want  to  enlist  Korean 
support  in  the  global  battle  against  pro- 
tectionism. We  also  seek  improved  in- 
vestment opportunities  for  American 
business.  We  are  encouraged  by  pros- 
pects in  all  of  these  areas.  Korean 
leaders  appear  to  recognize  the  signifi- 
cant benefits  to  be  derived  from  greater 
American  private  sector  involvement  in 
their  development  process,  and  we 
believe  they  are  as  determined  as  we  to 
manage  successfully  this  increasingly 
complex  and  constructive  economic  rela- 
tionship. 


Diplomatic  Objectives 

Related  to  both  our  security  and 
economic  interests  in  Korea,  we  have 
certain  diplomatic  objectives,  which  form 
a  third  element  of  our  policy  toward  the 
peninsula.  Broadly  speaking,  we  seek  to 
alleviate  tension  between  North  and 
South  Korea  and  thereby  to  reduce  the 
possibility  of  dangerous  confrontation. 
The  Government  of  the  Republic  of 
Korea  shares  that  objective,  faced  as  it 
is  with  a  constant  military  threat  and 
the  consequent  need  to  devote  fully  6% 
of  the  country's  GNP  to  defense.  There 
has  been  little  progress,  however.  The 
North  remains  unwilling  to  accept  the 
legitimacy  of  South  Korea  or  to  have 
any  dealings  with  its  government.  In- 
stead, it  insists  on  preconditions  to 
dialogue— a  change  of  leadership  in  the 
South,  dismantling  of  the  "anticom- 
munist  system"  there,  and  a  withdrawal 
of  U.S.  forces.  Thus,  North  Korea  has 
rejected  a  series  of  proposals  put  for- 
ward by  the  Republic  of  Korea  for 
resuming  a  dialogue;  has  blocked  ini- 
tiatives by  the  UN  Command  in  the 


Military  Armistice  Commission  at  Pan- 
munjom  designed  to  reduce  possibilities 
for  incidents  along  the  DMZ  and  to  build 
mutual  confidence  concerning  the  inten- 
tions of  both  sides;  and,  we  believe, 
resists  strongly  any  moves  by  its  major 
allies  to  develop  even  informal  contacts 
with  the  South. 

The  United  States  has  expressed 
support  for  the  initiatives  put  forward 
by  Seoul,  which  we  believe  are  both 
comprehensive  and  realistic.  Consistent 
with  our  view  that  the  reunification  of 
Korea  is  something  which  must  be 
worked  out  by  the  Korean  people 
themselves,  we  have  maintained  our 
position  that  we  will  have  no  direct  con- 
tact with  North  Korea  unless  the  South 
is  represented  as  a  full  and  equal  partici- 
pant. We  have  continued  to  make  pro- 
posals in  the  Military  Armistice  Com- 
mand which  we  believe  could,  if  ac- 
cepted, reduce  the  danger  of  military 
confrontation  without  prejudging  the 
fundamental  political  issues  at  stake.  We 
also  support  South  Korea's  efforts  to 
develop  contacts  with  the  Soviets, 
Chinese,  and  other  communist  countries, 
and  we  continue  to  have  as  a  long-term 
objective  "cross-recognition"  of  the  two 
Koreas  by  each  other's  major  allies. 

Given  North  Korean  attitudes,  we  do 
not  anticipate  major  progress  in  any  of 
these  areas  in  the  near  future.  We  will, 
nonetheless,  continue  to  do  what  we  can, 
when  we  can,  to  reduce  tension  on  the 
peninsula  and  consolidate  the  diplomatic 
framework  which  helps  to  maintain 
stability  there. 

But  Korean  diplomacy,  and  our  own 
diplomatic  objectives  in  relation  to 
Korea,  are  not  confined  exclusively  to 
North-South  Korea  issues.  The  South 
Korean  Government  has  sought,  with  in- 
creasing success,  to  develop  a  more  ac- 
tive and  influential  role  in  the  East  Asia 
region  and  globally,  befitting  Korea's 
growing  economic  importance.  Koreans 
take  pride  in  having  been  named  host 
for  the  1988  Olympics.  In  the  more  im- 
mediate future,  Seoul  will  also  be  the 
venue  for  the  1983  conference  of  the  In- 
terparliamentary Union,  the  1984  Inter- 
national Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  world 
conference,  and  the  1986  Asian  Games. 
All  of  these  events  will  underscore  the 
new  and  more  substantial  role  of  Korea 
and  its  considerable  potential.  We  sup- 
port these  Korean  efforts,  which  are 
consistent  with  our  interest  in  greater 
regional  cohesion  and  broader  interna- 
tional acceptance  for  an  important  ally. 


EAST  ASIA 


Human  Rights  Issue 

There  is  a  fourth  major  strand  in 
American  policy  toward  Korea,  of  par- 
ticular interest  to  several  members  of 
this  committee,  which  is  to  seek  con- 
tinued progress  toward  liberalization  of 
the  political  environment  there  and 
greater  respect  for  human  rights.  We 
have  made,  and  continue  to  make,  our 
views  known  to  Korean  Government 
leaders  on  these  issues.  We  do  so  to  the 
maximum  extent  possible  through  quiet 
diplomatic  means,  in  the  belief  that  this 
is  not  only  the  most  effective  approach 
but  the  most  appropriate  in  a  relation- 
ship of  friendship  and  alliance. 

Korean  political  life  is  remarkably 
active  and,  by  the  standards  of  many 
countries,  unfettered.  It,  nonetheless,  is 
constrained  within  what  has  to  be  called 
an  authoritarian  framework.  While  I 
believe  one  should  exercise  restraint  in 
making  judgments  about  the  politics  of 
other  countries,  we,  nonetheless,  believe 
that  a  more  open  and  participatory 
political  system  and  greater  respect  for 
human  rights  are  important  for  the  long- 
term  stability  of  Korea,  and  we  hope 
that  Korea  will  continue  to  move  in  this 
direction. 

We  are  encouraged  by  recent  devel- 
opments, including  the  December  release 
of  Mr.  Kim  Dae  Jung  and  more  than  40 
other  persons  imprisoned  for  political 
reasons;  the  recent  removal  of  the  ban 
on  political  activity  by  some  250  promi- 
nent politicians  of  the  Park  Chung  Hee 
era;  and  the  increasingly  assertive  role 
of  the  National  Assembly  and  the 
political  parties.  We  would  welcome  fur- 
ther progress. 

As  I  hope  my  remarks  have  made 
clear,  our  relations  with  the  Republic  of 
Korea  in  the  1980s  have  several  impor- 
tant dimensions,  reflecting  the  variety  of 
our  interests  in  this  increasingly  impor- 
tant country.  And  yet,  while  security 
issues  are  by  no  means  our  only  policy 
concern  with  respect  to  Korea,  they  are, 
as  I  stated  at  the  outset,  of  fundamental 
importance.  Economic  and  political  prog- 
ress in  Korea,  as  well  as  Korea's  ability 
to  play  its  deserved  role  internation- 
ally—developments very  much  in  our  in- 
terest—are dependent  upon  the 
maintenance  of  security.  So  too  are  the 
broader  strategic  concerns  I  outlined 
earlier  in  commenting  upon  the  effects 
war  in  Korea  could  have  for  the  peace 
and  stability  of  the  entire  region.  The 
threat  to  that  security  posed  by  North 
Korea  is  both  immediate  and  unrelent- 
ing. 


Security  Threat 

The  major  force  buildup  undertaken  by 
North  Korea  over  the  past  10  years  has 
resulted  in  a  significant  military  im- 
balance on  the  peninsula.  This  effort  has 
annually  absorbed  some  20%  or  more  of 
North  Korean  GNP.  The  North  has 
more  men  under  arms  than  the  South 
and  a  pronounced  superiority— more 
than  2  to  1— in  several  important 
categories  of  offensive  weaponry, 
notably  tanks,  long-range  artillery,  and 
armored  personnel  carriers.  The  North's 
80,000 -100,000-man  commando  force, 
one  of  the  largest  such  contingents  in 
the  world,  would  pose  a  serious  threat 
to  South  Korea's  military  facilities  and 
population  centers  behind  the  lines  in 
time  of  war.  North  Korea's  well- 
equipped  and  modern  forces  are 
deployed  well  forward,  with  major 
elements  arrayed  along  the  DMZ  only  35 
miles  from  Seoul,  and  they  are  maintain- 
ed in  a  high  state  of  readiness.  The 
North  could  mount  an  attack  with  very 
little  warning. 

While  we  are  able  to  assess  with 
some  clarity  North  Korean  military 
capabilities.  North  Korean  intentions  re- 
main obscure.  We  believe,  however,  that 
there  has  been  no  diminution  in  North 
Korea's  determination  to  achieve  the 
reunification  of  the  peninsula  on  its  own 
terms.  Its  arms  buildup  had  given  it  an 
impressive  force  with  which  to  pursue 
that  objective  militarily  should  it  so 
choose.  Thus,  while  we  believe  the  North 
Korean  leadership  must  recognize  the 
risks  any  attack  upon  the  South  would 
entail,  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility 
that  the  North  might  accept  those  risks. 
Prudence,  therefore,  requires  that  the 
Republic  of  Korea  forces  and  our  own 
also  maintain  a  high  state  of  readiness 
and  that  there  be  no  room  for  doubt 
about  either  our  determination  or  our 
ability  to  defeat  an  attack. 

In  view  of  continuing  North  Korean 
efforts  to  strengthen  their  forces,  and 
with  no  sign  of  change  in  North  Korean 
attitudes  or  policy  toward  the  South, 
Republic  of  Korea  military  capabilities 
must  also  be  further  strengthened.  Ac- 
cordingly, South  Korea— which  as  I 
have  noted  devotes  6%  of  its  GNP  to 
defense— is  pursuing  a  major  force  im- 
provement program  designed  to  enhance 
warning  capabilities,  increase  effective 
firepower,  and  improve  air  defenses. 
That  carefully  phased  program  includes 
the  coproduction  of  F-5s  and  acquisition 
of  the  F-16.  It  is  projected  to  cost  some 
$10.3  billion  over  the  next  5  years,  with 
$3.2  billion  for  new  equipment  purchases 
in  the  United  States.  'Total  procurement 


from  the  United  States  during  th: 
period  will  come  to  $4.7  billion.  V 
and  when  this  program  will  be  su 
to  eliminate  the  military  imbalanc 
the  peninsula  is  difficult  to  predic 
it  should  help  to  narrow  the  gap; 
tainly  without  it  the  North's  lead 
widen  dangerously. 

Assistance  Request 

Our  Korean  allies  are  doing  their 
to  counter  the  North  Korean  thr( 
restore  a  military  balance  on  the 
sula.  I  believe  it  is  clearly  in  our 
to  assist  this  crucial,  long-term  el 
To  that  end,  we  provided  $166  m 
FMS  credits  in  FY  1982.  Our  FY 
request  of  $210  million  was  redu( 
under  the  continuing  resolution  t 
million,  16%  below  last  year's  fig 
This  has  severely  complicated  Kc 
defense  planning  at  a  time  when 
like  ourselves,  faces  unusual  budj 
straints  due  to  economic  conditio 
Despite  having  achieved  more  th;  S 
real  growth  in  1982,  Korea  still  Y  i 
sizeable  current  account  deficit—  | 
imately  $2.5  billion— sharply  limi  [ 
availability  of  foreign  exchange  f 
equipment  purchases.  Moreover,  ( 
repayments  of  interest  and  princ 
previous  credits  during  FY  li'^- 
million— exceeded  by  some  $^^  n 
the  new  credits  provided,  furtlui 
stricting  the  funds  available  {"r  i 
equipment  procurement.  We,  the 
believe  that  in  the  absence  of  a  si 
mental  appropriation,  the  Kdicai  ■ 
improvement  program  would  I  >e  :  . 
and  our  mutual  security  objective  o 
some  degree  jeopardized. 

Accordingly,  we  believe  it  is  ipi 
tant  to  restore  the  FY  1983  level  i 
figure  previously  requested,  and  ]| 
viously  supported  unanimously  bjl 
subcommittee  and  by  the  full  com^ 
This  is  what  our  proposed  suppleii 
would  do.  I 

For  FY  1984,  we  are  requesti 
$230  million  in  FMS  credits.  The  | 
these  proposed  credits  would  be  ( 
to  ongoing  projects  involving  F-5 
F-16  aircraft,  automated  air  d 
systems,  antiaircraft  missiles,  : 
TOW  [tube-launched,  optically  tra« 
wire-guided  antitank]  missiles  anc 
similar  equipment.  We  are  also  rt.e 
ing  authorization  to  provide  exters 
repayment  terms  in  FY  1984.  Sp<| 
ly,  we  are  proposing  that  Korea  \' 
mitted  a  10-year  grace  period  as  ilp' 
cipal  followed  by  20  years  for  rep  ■ 
ment.  While  this  would  mean  sub:-" 


tially  higher  total  interest  paymei 


Department  of  State  El' 


EAST  ASIA 


over  the  full  life  of  the  loan,  an- 
lyments  would  be  much  less  than 
axisting  terms.  This  would  enable 
rean  Government  to  devote  pro- 
lately  more  each  year  to  needed 
ent  purchases.  We  believe  it 
oe  in  Korea's  interest,  and  ours, 
flit  through  this  means  a  more  ef- 
use  of  available  resources  in 
J  essential  Korean  security  re- 
ents.  Prospects  for  attaining 

force  improvement  goals,  and 
rowing  the  North's  military  lead, 
)e  enhanced  by  this  action, 
lay,  no  less  than  30  years  ago, 

security  is  of  vital  importance  to 
ted  States.  Then,  Korea  was  at 
tex  of  an  area  in  transition  and 
il.  Today  it  is  at  the  center  of  an 
lere  the  interests  of  four  of  the 
iwerful  nations  of  the  world  come 
r.  Then,  Korea  was  a  newly  inde- 
;  and  weak  nation.  Today  it  is  an 
ngly  consequential  factor  in  the 


political  and  economic  life  of  East  Asia 
and  the  world.  Today,  as  in  1950,  war  in 
Korea  would  have  implications  reaching 
far  beyond  the  peninsula.  In  sum,  today 
more  than  ever  before  Korean  security 
is  essential  for  the  peace,  stability,  and 
continuing  prosperity  of  Northeast 
Asia — a  condition  in  which  our  own 
stake  is  very  great  indeed.  Our  commit- 
ment to  the  security  of  Korea  must, 
therefore,  remain  at  the  center  of  our 
policy  concerns  in  East  Asia,  and  we 
must  insure  that  the  credibility  of  the 
deterrent  represented  by  U.S.  and 
Korean  forces  on  the  peninsula  remains 
unquestioned.  It  is  in  this  context  that 
we  ask  your  support  for  the  proposals 
now  before  this  committee. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t'he  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


1984  Assistance  Requests 
fhailand 


el  A.  O'Donohue 

?7ne)it  before  the  Subcommittee 
1  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
oreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
It,  1983.  Mr.  O'Donohue  is  Depu- 
tant  Secretary  for  East  Asian 
ific  Affairs.'^ 

ighted  at  this  opportunity  to  ap- 
ore  you  to  discuss  our  assistance 

for  Thailand,  one  of  our  closest 

an  allies. 


objectives  and  Interests 

fowitz  [Paul  D.  Wolfowitz, 
t  Secretary  for  East  Asian  and 
ffairs],  in  his  testimony  before 
ommittee,  set  forth  our  basic 
s  and  interests  in  East  Asia.  All 
lai  programs  are  in  direct  sup- 
he  objectives  he  outlined. 

ailand  is  a  long  time  security 
ly  and  is  the  Association  of 
ist  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
state  facing  a  direct  threat 
det-supported  Vietnamese 
Kampuchea. 

ailand  is  a  key  member  of 
which  has  emerged  as  the  ma- 
rf  for  stability  in  Southeast  Asia 


and  a  subregional  grouping  of  central 
importance  to  U.S.  interests. 

•  Thailand  is  in  strategic  proximity 
to  the  key  sealanes  of  communication 
linking  East  Asia  to  the  Indian  Ocean 
and  Middle  East. 

•  Thailand  has  borne  the  heaviest 
burden  of  refugees  in  Southeast  Asia 
and  is  central  to  maintaining  the  first 
asylum  principle  and  the  continuation  of 
the  major  international  efforts  which 
have  allowed  us  to  cope  with  this  im- 
mense human  problem. 

•  Thailand's  cooperation  is  essential 
in  our  efforts  to  stem  the  flow  of  nar- 
cotics out  of  the  Golden  Triangle. 

Program  Summary 

In  the  FY  1983  supplemental,  we  have 
asked  for  $19  million  in  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  guaranteed  credits  and  $6 
million  in  FMS  and  the  military  assist- 
ance program  (MAP).  These  sums  would 
bring  our  FY  1983  level  up  to  the 
amount  requested  by  the  Administration 
originally,  which  was  supported  by  this 
committee. 

In  FY  1984  the  Administration  is  re- 
questing: 

•  $94  million  in  FMS  guaranteed 
credits  and  $5  million  in  MAP.  This  is  a 
9%  increase  over  our  FY  1982  request; 


•  $2.4  million  in  international  mili- 
tary education  and  training  (IMET) 
funds,  a  moderate  increase  over  the 

1983  continuing  resolution  amount  of 
$1.7  million; 

•  $5  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF),  the  same  as  FY  1983,  to  be 
used  to  assist  the  Thai  directly  affected 
by  the  heavy  refugee  inflow  and  border 
fighting;  and 

•  $29  million  in  development  assist- 
ance, $1  million  over  this  year's  level. 

Policy  Justification 

These  programs  directly  support  U.S. 
interests  in  Thailand  and  contribute  to 
its  security  and  economic  development. 
They  also  support  security,  economic, 
political,  and  humanitarian  interests  of 
regional  and  global,  as  well  as  bilateral, 
importance. 

The  security  assistance  levels  we 
have  requested  for  FY  1983  and  FY 

1984  reflect  the  Administration's  deter- 
mination to  strengthen  the  defense  capa- 
bilities of  a  close  treaty  ally  manning  the 
front-lines  against  a  threat  to  the  region 
as  a  whole.  The  program  is  not  only  an 
essential  signal  of  our  commitment  to 
Thailand  and  its  ASEAN  policies  but 
also  demonstrates  our  determination  to 
play  an  appropriate  security  role  in  the 
area. 

ASEAN  has  emerged  as  a  dynamic 
force  for  peace  and  progress  in  South- 
east Asia  and  deserves  our  full  support. 
The  Thai  and  their  ASEAN  partners 
have  been  defending  the  region's  con- 
tinued stability  by  resolutely  opposing 
the  Vietnamese  occupation  of  Kam- 
puchea and  by  determinedly  pursuing  a 
political  solution  to  this  problem.  A 
strong,  confident  Thailand,  around 
which  the  other  ASEAN  states  and 
most  of  the  international  community 
have  rallied,  is  central  to  this  task.  Our 
assistance  to  Thailand  consequently  con- 
tributes significantly  to  the  overall 
ASEAN  efforts  to  bring  about  a 
comprehensive  political  solution  to  the 
Kampuchea  problem. 

FMS/MAP.  Unfortunately,  as  a 
result  of  the  FY  1983  reduction,  not 
only  have  we  been  unable  to  increase  the 
Thai  FMS  program,  as  we  had  hoped, 
but,  in  fact,  the  overall  level  is  $13.2 
million  less  than  that  provided  in  FY 
1982.  This  undercuts  our  whole  ap- 
proach, creating  an  erroneous  impres- 
sion of  diminishing  U.S.  interest  at  a 
time  when  the  Vietnamese  threat  re- 
mains unchanged.  Consequently,  we 
have,  as  a  matter  of  high  priority,  re- 


EAST  ASIA 


quested  that  the  Congress,  in  the  supple- 
mental, restore  the  FMS  and  MAP 
funds  which  we  have  requested. 

In  looking  at  our  FY  1984  program 
levels,  we  are  projecting  a  measured  in- 
crease in  the  FMS/MAP  program.  This 
program  is  the  most  visible  and  concrete 
manifestation  of  our  security  relation- 
ship and  of  our  readiness  to  play  an  ap- 
propriate security  role  with  Thailand. 
The  Thai  have  indicated  they  believe 
they  can  manage  their  own  security 
problems  without  U.S.  military  involve- 
ment but  have  stressed  their  hope  that 
we  would  provide  the  security  assistance 
needed  to  allow  them  to  meet  the  Viet- 
namese challenge.  Our  program  does 
that.  The  funds  we  have  requested  will 
enable  the  Thai  to  proceed  with  their 
force  modernization  program  as  well  as 
build  an  inventory  of  badly  needed  spare 
parts  for  existing  weaponry. 

IMET.  Our  military  training  pro- 
gram will  be  devoted  to  expanding  space 
allocations  for  training  of  officers  and 
enlisted  men  in  use  of  modern  weapons, 
management  of  logisitics,  and  technical 
fields  such  as  intelligence  and  com- 
munications. The  Thai  are  making  a  gen- 
uine effort  to  improve  their  logistics 
systems,  which  will  be  a  great  step  for- 
ward in  their  overall  defense  effec- 
tiveness. In  FY  1983,  we  have  projected 
training  for  about  369  military  personnel 
and  a  larger  total  in  FY  1984. 

ESF.   The  large  number  of  refugees 
and  displaced  persons  which  remain  on 
Thai  soil  constitute  a  serious 
humanitarian  problem,  as  well  as  a 
threat  to  the  region's  stability.  It  is  an 
international  problem  which  requires  an 
international  solution.  The  United  States 
is  firmly  committed  to  helping  alleviate 
this  burden  by  providing  relief  and 
resettlement  within  the  framework  of  an 
international  program.  Tangible  expres- 
sion of  our  continued  support  is 
necessary  to  maintain  the  momentum  of 
the  international  effort  and  the  principle 
of  first  asylum. 

As  part  of  this  cooperation,  we  and 
other  countries  provide  assistance  to 
Thai  villages  affected  by  border  fighting 
and  the  influx  of  refugees.  We  believe 
the  ESF  will  be  needed  in  FY  1984  at 


about  the  same  levels  as  FY  1983.  The 
recent  Vietnamese  attacks  in  the  area  of 
Nong  Chan,  on  the  Kampuchea  border, 
have  added  to  the  number  of  refugees  in 
Thailand  and  caused  new  losses  of  Thai 
lives  and  property.  In  addition,  ESF 
funds  are  being  directed  to  areas  of  the 
Thai-Lao  border,  also  affected  by 
refugee  flows,  where  many  of  the  na- 
tion's poorest  people  live.  These  pro- 
grams will  fund  improvements  in  basic 
services  in  the  villages,  assist  in  improv- 
ing agricultural  productivity,  and  help 
bind  these  areas  into  the  economic  and 
political  mainstream  of  the  country. 
Most  importantly,  they  encourage  the 
Thai  to  maintain  first-asylum  policies 
and  to  facilitate  international  relief  and 
resettlement  efforts. 

Development  Assistance.  Thailand 
has  suffered  from  the  world  recession 
and  spiraling  energy  costs  over  the  past 
several  years  along  with  most  Third 
World  countries.  Yet  due  to  favorable 
harvests,  Thailand  has  managed  to  re- 
tain relatively  high  growth  rates  in  both 
its  agricultural  and  industrial  sectors. 
Agricultural  productivity,  however,  re- 
mains low  relative  to  its  potential. 
Significant  disparities  of  income  persist 
both  between  regions  and  between  dif- 
ferent occupational  groups.  Our  develop- 
ment assistance  to  Thailand  is  part  of  a 
much  larger  international  effort  to  assist 
this  important  developing  country, 
which  has  proven  its  determination  to 
put  such  resources  to  effective  use. 
Besides  our  bilateral  assistance,  the 
United  States  contributes  significantly 
to  the  international  effort  through  the 
World  Bank  and  the  Asian  Development 
Bank  (ADB). 

U.S.  development  assistance  for 
Thailand  will  increase  slightly  over  1983 
if  the  FY  1984  program  is  approved  at 
the  requested  level.  This  program  sup- 
ports current  Thai  Government  efforts 
to  redirect  public  and  private  investment 
toward  rural  growth  and  development. 
Other  projects  will  seek  to  enhance  effi- 
ciency of  the  private  sector  in  Thailand 
in  meeting  overall  development  objec- 
tives. Finally,  the  program  is  designed 
to  aid  the  Thai  Government  in  directing 
economic  growth  toward  increased 
equity  for  the  poorest  sectors  of  its 
population. 


Conclusion 

I  have  outlined  a  balanced  : 
program  for  Thailand  reflecting  f 
strengths  and  diversity  of  our  rel 
ship.  There  is  a  proper  emphasis 
security  assistance  given  the  thre 
Thailand  faces  from  Vietnam  anc 
own  security  treaty  commitment. 
President,  Secretary  Shultz,  and 
[Defense]  Secretary  Weinberger 
reaffirmed  our  clear  commitment 
Thailand  embodied  in  the  Manila 
Our  military  assistance  and  the  s 
sends  of  U.S.  constancy  and  supj 
essential  elements  in  strengtheni 
security. 

At  the  same  time,  we  recogn 
economic  development  is  equally 
tant  in  enhancing  domestic  stabil 
social  development.  Through  dev 
ment  assistance,  we  remain  dete 
to  contribute  along  with  other  dc 
such  as  the  World  Bank  and  Jap 
help  Thailand  maintain  its  priori- 
education,  economic  developmen 
more  equitable  income  distributi< 

Both  of  these  programs  also 
secure  Thai  cooperation  on  refug 
narcotics  matters.  In  the  broade 
text,  the  ASEAN  countries  look 
our  security  relationship  with  Th 
and  our  assistance  program  as  ti 
measure  of  our  support  to  their 
to  reach  a  comprehensive  politic: 
ment  in  Kampuchea. 

The  levels  we  have  requeste( 
the  severe  budgetary  constraints 
working  under.  They  are  necess; 
are  to  demonstrate  our  continue^ 
port  for  Thailand— a  treaty  ally 
ASEAN  front-line  state. 


'  The  complete  transcript  of  the 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  a 
be  avaikble  from  the  Superintendeir 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Print! 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  ul 


EAST  ASIA 


1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Philippines  and  Indonesia 


Uel  A.  O'Donohue 

tement  before  the  Subcommittee 
m  and  Pacific  Affairs  of  the 
'''oreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
18,  1983.  Mr.  O'Donohue  is 
Assistant  Secretary  for  East 
md  Pacific  Affairs.^ 

eased  to  address  today  our 
ice  requests  and  U.S.  interests 
icies  toward  two  key  countries  in 
It  Asian  and  Pacific  area,  both 
rs  of  the  Association  of  South 
sian  Nations  (ASEAN)— the 
nes  and  Indonesia.  The  United 
ind  the  Philippines  have  had 
istoric  ties  this  entire  century, 
ilippines  has  been  our  ally  since 
dence  in  1946.  Indonesia,  the 
ASEAN  state,  is  a  major 
I  power  with  which  we  have  im- 
poiitical  and  economic  relation- 

'  policies  toward  these  two 
Southeast  Asian  states  stem 
3  set  of  regional  foreign  policy 
3S  that  Assistant  Secretary  Paul 
stz  outlined  to  this  subcommittee 
iruary  23.  These  objectives  are 

potect  our  existing  treaty  rela- 

|aintain  unhampered  use  of  our 
I  facilities  in  the  Philippines; 
aintain  and  enhance  defense 
hips  with  countries  with 
;  proximity  to  key  sealanes; 
ssure  continued  access  to  signifi- 
imercial  markets  and  basic  raw 

s; 

ipport  ASEAN  and  strengthen 
;  to  ASEAN  countries; 
rengthen  domestic  efforts  to 
ioverty  and  social  strains  that 
iolence  and  political  instability; 

iprove  human  rights  practices. 


fVM  SUMMARY 

lest  for  the  Philippines  in  FY 

0  million  in  foreign  military 
IS)  guaranteed  credits.  This  is  a 
line  of  our  FY  1983  request  and 


corresponds  to  the  presidential  best  ef- 
fort pledge  made  in  1979,  when  our 
military  bases  agreement  was  amended, 
to  provide  security  assistance  at  in- 
dicated levels  over  a  5-year  period; 

•  $1.3  million  in  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET). 
This  is  equal  to  the  FY  1983  level; 

•  $50  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF),  the  same  as  FY  1983,  cor- 
responding to  the  presidential  best  ef- 
fort pledge  made  in  1979; 

•  $40  million  in  development  assist- 
ance and  $7.8  million  in  PL  480,  Title  II. 
Development  assistance  levels  have  re- 
mained roughly  constant  since  1979, 
when  during  military  bases  agreement 
negotiations  it  was  understood  that 
development  assistance  would  not  be 
supplanted  by  ESF. 

Our  request  for  Indonesia  is  for  FY 
1983,  $21  million  in  supplemental  FMS 
guaranteed  credits,  bringing  the  FY 
1983  request  to  $41  million. 

For  FY  1984,  we  are  requesting: 

•  $50  million  in  FMS  guaranteed 
credits,  a  straight  line  projection  of  our 
original  FY  1983  requests; 

•  $2.7  million  in  IMET,  an  11%  in- 
crease over  FY  1983; 

•  $64  million  in  development  assist- 
ance, $1  million  less  than  last  year 
because  of  overall  budget  stringencies; 
and 

•  $39.2  million  in  PL  480  assistance, 
up  approximately  $500,000  over  FY 
1983. 


THE  PHILIPPINES 

There  is  no  country  in  the  region  with 
which  the  United  States  enjoys  a  deeper, 
longer  relationship  than  the  Philippines. 
This  oldest  of  our  Asian  allies,  which 
shared  with  us  the  suffering  of  World 
War  II  and  has  inherited  so  much  from 
the  United  States,  today  shares  our 
perceptions  about  the  dangers  in 
Southeast  Asia.  We  have  had  a  mutual 
defense  treaty  with  the  Philippines  since 
1952.  Economic  ties  are  strong;  the 
United  States  continues  to  be  the  largest 
source  of  foreign  investment  and  largest 
market  for  Philippine  goods.  Our 
cultural  links  span  this  entire  century. 
Most  recently,  the  state  visit  of  Presi- 
dent Marcos  last  September,  and  his 
discussions  with  President  " 


served  to  underscore  the  excellent  state 
of  our  bilateral  relations  and  to  reaffirm 
our  security  ties. 

Current  Economic  Situation 

Like  many  nations,  the  Philippines  today 
is  passing  through  a  period  of  political 
transition  and  economic  difficulties 
brought  on  by  the  world  recession.  The 
country  maintained  a  good  growth 
record  of  around  6%  during  the  1970s. 
However,  rising  oil  prices  and  escalating 
interest  costs  have  created  financial 
limitations  on  growth  over  the  past  3 
years.  Debt  service  costs  increased  dur- 
ing the  past  year,  but  self-imposed 
restraints  have  controlled  large  in- 
creases in  debts.  Balance-of-payments 
deficits  widened  as  terms  of  trade, 
reflecting  decreased  world  market  prices 
for  the  country's  prime  exports, 
deteriorated.  It  is  important  to  note  that 
about  one-third  of  the  population  of  the 
Philippines  depends  in  some  way  upon 
income  derived  from  one  of  these, 
coconut  products. 

In  contrast,  exports  of  electronic 
components  have  continued  vigorous 
growth,  the  government  has  pressed 
ahead  with  a  broad  export  development 
program,  and  new  financial  policies 
recently  show  a  capacity  to  face 
economic  adjustment  problems  and  lay  a 
firm  foundation  for  future  growth.  The 
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the 
World  Bank,  and  the  international  finan- 
cial community  have  all  recently 
recognized  those  positive  steps  by 
negotiating  support  of  well  over  $1 
billion  for  the  Philippines. 

Political  and  Human  Rights 
Developments 

As  this  was  happening,  changes  were 
taking  place  within  a  political  system  in 
which  a  strong  president  unquestionably 
dominates  the  arena.  Martial  law  ended 
in  1981,  a  presidential  election  was  held, 
and  the  political  climate  became  more 
relaxed.  Controls  on  the  press  have  been 
eased,  although  on  occasion  reasserted, 
as  witnessed  by  the  recent  closure  of  an 
opposition  newspaper.  Nevertheless, 
criticism  of  the  government  continues  in 
the  media,  though  subdued.  It  is  fair  to 
say  that  some  gradual  expansion  in  the 
exercise  of  civil  and  political  liberties  has 
continued  in  the  Philippines.  At  the 
same  time,  of  course,  problems  remain, 
and  church  groups  and  others  have  not 
hesitated  to  bring  them  to  the  govern- 
ment's attention.  Initial  indications  are 
that  the  government  is  ready  to  engage 


EAST  ASIA 


in  dialogue.  We  welcome  any  such  ef- 
forts on  the  part  of  the  government  and 
concerned  Filipinos  to  address  human 
rights  concerns  through  dialogue. 

The  human  rights  situation  in  the 
Philippines  is  a  complex  picture  which 
we  have  attempted  to  portray  in  detail 
in  our  annual  human  rights  reports.  It  is 
a  situation  made  more  difficult  by  the 
existence  of  active  rural  insurgencies, 
particularly  the  New  People's  Army  in 
the  remote  areas  of  many  provinces, 
government  efforts  to  control  them,  an 
inefficient  judicial  system,  a  depressed 
international  market  for  traditional 
Filipino  exports,  and  resulting  rural 
poverty.  In  particular,  abuses  of  civilians 
by  some  members  of  the  military,  pre- 
dominantly in  insurgency  areas,  are  a 
continuing  problem  for  the  Philippine 
Government. 

For  our  part  we  continue  to  pay 
close  attention  to  the  human  rights 
situation  in  the  Philippines.  We  look 
toward  progress  in  the  direction  of  a 
more  open  political  system.  Parliamen- 
tary elections  in  1984  will  be  a  step  for- 
ward in  this  process.  We  deal  with 
human  rights  through  a  policy  of  quiet 
dialogue,  not  only  with  the  government 
but  also  with  a  wide  spectrum  of  Philip- 
pine society.  This  policy  is  pursued  in 
consonance  with  our  other  objectives 
and  is  an  integral  element  in  our  overall 
approach  in  the  Philippines. 

Strategic  Relationship 

Two  treaties  are  central  to  the  U.S. 
strategic  relationship  with  the  Philip- 
pines. Our  military  bases  agreement  of 
1947  enables  us  to  maintain  advan- 
tageous geographic  position  through  our 
military  facilities  at  Subic  Naval  Base 
and  Clark  Air  Force  Base.  These 
facilities  allow  us  to  protect  the  Western 
Pacific  sea  and  airlanes  and  to  project 
U.S.  power  into  the  Indian  Ocean  and 
beyond  at  a  time  of  growing  Soviet 
military  power  in  the  Far  East.  They 
also  permit  us  to  fulfill  our  obligation  to 
defend  the  Philippines  under  our  1952 
mutual  defense  treaty. 

Our  present  security  assistance 
levels  reflect  President  Carter's  best  ef- 
fort pledge  in  1979  to  provide  $500 
million  from  FY  1980  to  1984  to  the 
Philippines.  However,  the  maintenance 
of  a  $100  million  level  annually  does  con- 
siderably more  than  ensure  continued 
and  effective  U.S.  military  operations  at 
the  bases.  It  assists  the  Philippines  to 
meet  its  own  defense  needs,  which  these 
days  include  the  threat  of  a  slowly  grow- 
ing communist  insurgency,  and  to  ad- 


vance toward  its  goal  of  military  mod- 
ernization. Through  the  ESF  compo- 
nent, we  are  contributing  to  municipal 
and  provincial  development  activities, 
which  bring  improvements  to  the  hves  of 
Filipinos. 

The  United  States  and  the  Philip- 
pines will  begin  a  complete  review  of  the 
military  bases  agreement  in  April  1983 
to  ensure  that  it  continues  to  meet  our 
mutual  interests. 


Development  Assistance  and  PL  480 

Promoting  Philippine  economic  develop- 
ment is  an  essential  component  of  our 
constructive  relationship  with  the  Philip- 
pines. It  is  aimed  at  reaching  that  part 
of  the  Philippine  population  which  lives 
below  the  poverty  line.  Our  PL  480  Title 
II,  assistance  provides  feeding  programs 
to  the  poorest  Filipinos.  Indeed  when 
ESF,  development  assistance,  and  PL 
480  programs  are  considered  together, 
we  provide  twice  as  much  bilateral 
economic  assistance  as  we  do  military 
assistance.  We  also  contribute  in  a 
major  way  to  Philippine  economic 
development  through  our  participation 
in  such  multilateral  development  banks 
as  the  World  Bank  and  Asian  Develop- 
ment Bank  (ADB). 

Program  Descriptions 

EMS— $50  million.  FMS  credits 
enable  the  Philippine  Armed  Forces  to 
continue  to  modernize  during  a  period  of 
serious  financial  stringency.  Contem- 
plated FMS  purchases  include 
helicopters,  ground  vehicles,  engineering 
equipment  for  development-related  proj- 
ects, light  aircraft,  communications 
gear,  and  other  needed  defense  items. 
Maintenance  of  FMS  at  levels  of  $50 
million  for  the  5-year  period  from  FY 
1980  to  1984  was  contemplated  in  the 
President's  "best  effort"  pledge  at  the 
time  of  the  amendment  to  our  military 
bases  agreement  in  1979. 

IMET— $1.3  million.  Heaviest  em- 
phasis would  be  on  the  training  of 
selected  junior  to  midlevel  officers,  not 
only  to  provide  technical  and  managerial 
training  that  assists  in  force  moderniza- 
tion but  also  to  give  them  better  under- 
standing of  the  United  States,  our 
political  institutions,  and  U.S.  policies. 
This  is  particularly  important  in  dealing 
with  a  new  generation  of  Filipinos  who 
does  not  recall  the  shared  World  War  II 
experience  of  our  two  countries.  Ap- 
proximately 400  members  of  the  Philip- 
pine military  would  benefit  from  these 
programs. 


ESF— $50  million.  The  ESF   - 

nent,  about  half  of  the  securif. 
ance  package,  is  making  an  ir; 
contribution  to  Philippine  soci.  -  ■ 
development,  especially  for  Fill pii 
ing  in  areas  near  the  U.S.  milit;ir\ 
facilities.  In  FY  1984,  we  proii.ise  i 
continue  to  fund  municipal  ami  pr  i 
cial  infrastructure  activities  (i.e.,  "  i 
systems,  markets,  flood  control, 
hospitals,  nonconventional  eneru'A 
systems). 

Development  Assistance— S^t 
million.  Our  development  assistai  '= 
emphasizes  agricultural  productio 
rural  employment,  and  family  pla  ii 
Of  this  total,  $7.78  million  is  PL 
Title  II. 


INDONESIA 

I  would  turn  now  to  our  relati(in.- 
Indonesia,  a  nation  strategical!)  I 
astride  vital  interocean  scalane  s, 
portant  member  of  ASEAN,  and 
moderate,  friendly  voice  in  \\t>r\d 


Policy  Framework 

For  nearly  two  decades,  we  ha\  e  i- 
joyed  close  and  cooperative  politi 
economic  relations  with  Indont-si;  n 
on  three  essential  pillars: 

•  Common  strategic  peretpt 
interests  in  Southeast  Asia,  e-^i  •- 
our  mutual  commitment  to  tli. 
and  independence  of  the  state 
region; 

•  Mutually  beneficial,  mult  ill  > 
dollar  trade  and  investment  relat  ; 
and 

•  Political  dialogue  and  frt- qi  u 
cooperation,  bilaterally  and  in  nu  i- 
lateral  fora,  on  such  diverse  issiu  :•■ 
the  Indochinese  refugee  prohKni. 
situation  in  Kampuchea,  and  luiii 
rights. 

The  state  visit  of  President  -^ 
last  October  underscored  the  imi 
we  attach  to  our  relationship  wit  n 
donesia  and  imparted  to  it  a  new  li 
and  warmth.  This  new  momentui  it 
our  relations  comes  at  an  opjinrti 
time,  as  Soeharto  embarks  on  hi^ 
term  as  Indonesia's  President  :!n'  ■ 
confront  such  challenges  as  gr<  i\\  ^ 
Soviet  military  presence  in  the  f 
and  the  severe  impact  of  the  ,el"l 
recession. 


Program  Justification 

Our  developmental  and  security 
assistance  programs  play  a  key  r ' 


Department  of  State  lH 


EAST  ASIA 


ring  strong  relations  with  and 
rving  our  interests  in  Indonesia. 
;  programs  aim  at  three  general 

They  help  ensure  the  stability  and 
ng  prosperity  of  Indonesia,  one  of 
ichpins  of  a  stable  Southeast  Asia. 

They  provide  a  measure  of  U.S. 
3  to  key  Indonesian  decision- 
rs. 

They  are  a  concrete  manifestation 

humanitarian  concerns  which 
ly  our  policies. 

Economic  Assistance 

esia  has  made  major  economic 
;ss  during  the  past  15  years.  By 
ndonesia,  in  fact,  joined  the  ranks 
world's  middle  income  per  capita 
s,  as  measured  by  the  World 
The  reelection  of  President 
rto  March  11,  and  the  likelihood 
3  will  continue  to  rely  on  many  of 
me  members  of  his  economic 
•ement  team,  indicate  that  the 
^'s  moderate  and  pragmatic 
lie  policies  will  continue, 
t  the  economic  challenges  which 
sia  faces  are  formidable.  Some  of 
olems  are  long-term  and  struc- 
1  nature— overdependence  on  oil 
IS,  daunting  unemployment  in  a 
whose  workforce  grows  2  million 
iy,  and  an  agricultural  economy 
to  the  limit  to  meet  its  basic  food 

more  immediate  concern  are  the 
impact  of  the  global  recession, 
lias  cut  Indonesia's  export  earn- 
out  49%  the  past  2  years;  the 
Irtain  further  drop  in  oil  prices, 
;h  the  country  has  depended 
to  fund  its  ambitious  and  suc- 
development  efforts;  and  the  ef- 
a  prolonged  drought,  which  has 
;d  adversely  on  the  1982  and 
;e  crop.  This  coincidence  of 
essentially  beyond  the  control  of 
onesian  Government,  presents 
ntry  with  a  serious  economic 
e. 

Indonesian  Government  has 
taken  several  important  steps  to 
;h  these  problems.  President 
0  recently  announced  an  austeri- 
et,  putting  a  lid  on  government 
ig  expenditures.  The  government 
subsidies  on  key  consumables 
fertilizers  and  refined  petroleum 
s  and  taken  measures  to  improve 
n  of  public  revenues.  New  trade 
ons  will  probably  result  in  fewer 


consumer  imports,  while  a  major  effort 
IS  underway  to  spur  nonpetroleum  ex- 
ports. 

The  past  strong  record  of  economic 
management  of  Indonesia's  leadership 
indicates  it  will  succeed  in  surmounting 
its  problems.  We  are  commited  to  help, 
as  the  President  pledged  we  would  to 
President  Soeharto  last  October,  As  you 
know,  we  have  already  increased  our  FY 
1982  PL  480  Title  I  assistance  to  In- 
donesia from  the  originally  projected 
$20  million  to  $30  million,  in  recognition 
of  the  drought's  impact.  For  FY  1984, 
we  are  seeking  $30  million  in  PL  480  ' 
Title  I  and  $64  million  in  developmental 
assistance,  essentially  a  straight  line 
projection  from  this  year. 

Our  developmental  aid  will  be 
directed  at  four  main  targets:  (1)  helping 
Indonesia  achieve  food  self-sufficiency; 
(2)  expanding  rural  employment  oppor- 
tunities, especially  in  nonfarm  jobs;  (3) 
improving  family  planning  and  basic 
health  care;  and  (4)  improving  selected 
aspects  of  education  and  training. 

Our  PL  480  assistance  will  help 
minimize  the  amounts  of  scarce  foreign 
exchange  that  Indonesia  need  commit  to 
grain  imports,  while  generating  funds 
for  specifically  designated  projects 
aimed  at  the  neediest  elements  of 
society. 

I  would  also  note  that  our  bilateral 
economic  assistance  programs  are  sup- 
plemented by  important  U.S.  contribu- 
tions to  the  international  financial  in- 
stitutions. The  World  Bank  and  the 
ADB,  in  particular,  work  cooperatively 
with  the  Indonesian  Government  and 
have  made  major  contributions  to  In- 
donesia's development  effort. 

Security  Assistance 

Turning  to  security  assistance,  I  would 
like  first  to  address  our  request  for  both 
an  FY  1983  FMS  supplemental  of  $21 
million  and  an  FY  1984  FMS  level  of 
$50  million. 

As  the  subcommittee  is  aware,  we 
regret  deeply  that  extremely  tight 
budgetary  constraints  forced  the 
slashing  by  60%  of  our  original  FY  1983 
FMS  request  of  $50  million.  The  cut 
came  at  a  particularly  unfortunate  time: 
immediately  on  the  heels  of  the  Soeharto 
visit,  just  when  Jakarta  was  beginning 
to  feel  the  impact  of  its  economic  prob- 
lems, and  at  a  time  when  we  are  looking 
to  strong  and  stable  governments  in 
countries  like  Indonesia  to  contribute  to 
the  stability  of  Southeast  Asia.  More 
generally,  such  a  cut  contributes  to  the 
erroneous  impression  that  the  United 
States  is  lessening  its  interest  in  the 


area  and  in  ASEAN  at  a  time  when  we 
wish  to  support  just  the  opposite. 

We  believe  that  a  restoration  of  FY 
1983  FMS  through  a  $21  million  sup- 
plemental—yielding a  level  slightly 
above  the  FY  1982  total— would 
mitigate  much  of  the  disappointment  in 
Jakarta  over  the  initial  cut.  It  would 
also  be  of  particular  substantive  impor- 
tance to  the  Indonesian  Government 
now  in  light  of  its  tight  foreign  ex- 
change situation.  We  anticipate  that  the 
bulk  of  the  funds  would  be  used  in  pro- 
curement of  badly  needed  war  reserve 
munitions  and  the  overhaul  of  C-130  air- 
craft, which  are  essential  to  give  the  In- 
donesian Armed  Forces  even  a  minimal 
capability  to  defend  their  far-flung 
archipelago. 

We  believe  with  equal  vigor,  and  for 
many  of  the  same  reasons,  that  an  FY 
1984  FMS  level  of  $50  million  is  war- 
ranted and  needed.  While  respecting  In- 
donesia's nonaligned  status,  we  have 
developed  a  constructive  security 
assistance  relationship.  This  reflects  our 
mutually  shared  strategic  perceptions 
and  demonstrates  our  readiness  to  assist 
Indonesia  in  meeting  its  legitimate 
defense  needs.  The  FMS  we  provide  will 
be  used  in  essential  military  modern- 
ization programs.  We  anticipate,  for  ex- 
ample, that  substantial  portions  of  the 
funds  would  be  used  in  procurement  of 
an  adequate  air  defense  system  and 
shipborne  weapons  systems. 

Before  concluding  the  discussion  of 
security  assistance  programs,  I  would 
say  a  brief  word  about  our  FY  1984 
IMET  request  of  $2.7  million. 
Indonesia's  military  leaders  regard  per- 
sonnel training  as  a  key  element  in  their 
force  modernization  program,  and  our 
IMET  program  as  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant aspects  of  their  training  effort. 
The  FY  1984  program  will  permit  about 
300  Indonesian  middle-  and  upper-grade 
officers  to  travel  to  and  train  in  the 
United  States,  while  U.S.  mobile  train- 
ing teams  train  additional  hundreds  of 
Indonesian  officers  in  Indonesia.  This 
overall  effort  makes  a  considerable  con- 
tribution to  upgrading  Indonesian 
managerial  and  technical  capabilities  in 
critical  defense-related  fields  and,  in- 
cidentally, provides  those  officers  who 
will  be  the  backbone  of  their  country's 
future  military  and  political  leadership 
with  an  understanding  and  appreciation 
of  the  United  States. 


EUROPE 


CONCLUSION 

I  would  conclude  my  comments  this 
afternoon  with  three  observations. 

First,  we  have  substantial  security, 
political,  and  economic  interests  in  the 
Philippines,  in  Indonesia,  and,  more 
generally,  in  Southeast  Asia,  where  as 
ASEAN  members  these  countries  play 
leading  roles.  It  is  important  that  we 
provide  sufficient  resources  to  match 
and  promote  these  bilateral  and  regional 
interests. 

Second,  our  assistance  programs 
are  tied  to  our  continuing  humanitarian 
interests  in  the  Philippines  and  In- 
donesia. Our  developmental  and  food  aid 
programs,  of  course,  address  those  in- 
terests directly.  Our  total  aid  effort,  in- 


cluding security  assistance,  fosters 
stronger  bilateral  relationships.  Out  of 
these  grow  bilateral  dialogues  and 
cooperation  on  other  important  issues 
such  as  human  rights  and  refugees. 

Third,  we  seek  to  be  a  nation  clear 
in  our  strategic  goals,  faithful  in  our 
friendships,  and  reliable  in  our  long-term 
commitments.  That,  too,  is  what  our 
friends  want  of  us.  I  would  hope  that 
our  assistance  programs  for  the  Philip- 
pines and  Indonesia  for  FY  1983  and  FY 
1984  can  be  constructed  and  imple- 
mented according  to  those  principles. 

'  The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 
for  Europe 


by  Richard  R.  Burt 

Statement  before  the  House  Foreign 
Affairs  Committee  on  March  16,  1983. 
Mr.  Burt  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
European  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  this  committee  in  support  of  the 
European  portions  of  the  Administra- 
tion's proposals  for  security  assistance  in 
FY  1984. 

As  Secretary  Shultz  emphasized  to 
this  committee  on  February  15,  1983, 
the  general  program  of  security  assist- 
ance and  economic  assistance  is  of  great 
importance  to  us  in  our  foreign  policy. 
He  also  emphasized  before  the  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on  Febru- 
ary 16,  in  support  of  our  foreign 
assistance  programs,  that  NATO  is  an 
alliance  that  serves  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  as  well  as  of  our  allies.  I 
have  participated  in  the  development  of 
the  integrated  foreign  assistance  pro- 
gram to  meet  our  national  economic  and 
security  objectives,  as  well  as  those  of 
our  close  allies  who  share  these  objec- 
tives. I  want  to  emphasize  that  security 
assistance  is  an  essential  part  of  both 
our  foreign  policy  and  defense  planning, 
and  I  would  now  like  to  describe  our 
major  programs  in  support  of  the  NATO 
allies  requiring  assistance,  as  well  as  a 
program  for  Cyprus. 


Spain 

Spain  has  been  an  important  strategic 
partner  since  1953.  Now,  with  its  entry 
into  NATO  last  May  and  its  democracy 
firmly  in  place  following  elections  and  a 
peaceful  change  of  government  last  fall, 
Spain  has  become  an  important  demo- 
cratic ally  as  well.  The  basis  for  our 
security  cooperation  has  thus  broadened, 
modernization  of  Spanish  military  forces 
to  NATO  standards  has  gained  new  im- 
portance, and  our  security  assistance 
relationship  has  become  more  vital  than 
ever. 

In  this  context,  the  United  States 
and  Spain  signed  a  successor  agreement 
to  the  1976  treaty  of  friendship  and 
cooperation  on  July  2,  1982.  The  new 
Spanish  Government,  after  negotiating  a 
supplementary  protocol  which  clarifies 
the  relationship  between  the  agreement 
and  NATO,  has  proceeded  with  the  rati- 
fication process  which  is  expected  to  be 
completed  in  late  April  or  early  May.  It 
has,  however,  "frozen"  further  military 
integration  into  NATO  pending  an 
overall  review  of  its  security  policy.  The 
new  agreement  provides  for  U.S.  "best 
efforts"  in  security  assistance  and  en- 
sures continued  U.S.  use  of  important 
Spanish  military  facilities. 

U.S.  security  assistance  is,  thus,  an 
integral  part  of  this  important  security 
relationship.  It  is  vital  to  the  credibility 
of  our  "best  efforts"  pledge  and  to  our 
reliability  as  an  ally,  and  it  is  vital  to 
Spanish  efforts  to  bring  their  force  to 


NATO  standards.  And,  apart  from 
securing  U.S.  direct  military  benefr 
Spain,  U.S.  security  assistance  willl 
broader  security  interests,  encoura.; 
Spain  to  see  the  greater  benefits  oJ 
cooperation  in  a  NATO  context,  an 
signal  our  continuing  support  for  S 
still  young  democracy. 

The  proposed  FY  1984  securitj 
sistance  program  for  Spain  consist: 
$400  million  of  foreign  military  sale 
(FMS)  financing,  $3  million  of'intei 
tional  military  education  and  traini 
(IMET),  and  $12  million  of  econom 
support  fund  (ESF)  assistance. 

The  FMS  financing  request  wil 
Spain  to  purchase  advanced  fightej 
craft,  an  air  defense  missile  systen 
helicopters,  harpoon  missiles,  torpt' 
improvement  kits,  and  ground  sup] 
weapons  (tracked-landing  vehicles 
tanks). 

The  FY  1984  IMET  will  suppo 
armed  forces  modernization  by  inc 
ing  the  overall  professionalism  of  t 
Spanish  Armed  Forces.  It  will  also 
vide  specific  training  courses  (pilot 
training  missile  systems,  maintena 
logistics,  administration)  to  help  er 
the  most  efficient  use  of  FMS-sup{ 
resources. 

The  FY  1984  ESF  request  willi 
the  educational,  cultural,  and  scieni 
programs  administered  by  the  Dep 
ment  of  State  and  the  U.S.  Inform 
Agency.  These  programs  enhance  ■ 
nonmilitary  aspects  of  our  relation: 
with  Spain  and  are  important  in 
developing  a  broad  range  of  ties  ap 
propriate  for  two  friends  and  allies 

Portugal 

Portugal  is  a  close,  reliable,  and 
strategically  important  ally.  It  ha 
sistently  stood  by  us,  taking  a  foEi 
stand  on  such  international  issue 
Poland  and  Afghanistan,  an  intec 
and  helpful  stance  on  problems  i 
Middle  East,  and  it  is  a  valued  i" 
terlocutor  regarding  developmen 
southern  Africa.  Furthermore,  ' 
facilities  it  makes  available  for  o^ 
as  part  of  our  security  cooperati^ 
tionship  are  critical  to  NATO  : 
and  reinforcement  and  to  possible 
tingencies  in  other  parts  of  the 

We  are  currently  engaged  in  nel 
tiations  regarding  that  relationships- 
While  the  negotiations  are  in  abeya* 
at  the  moment  pending  the  electio;.''' 
new  government  in  Portugal,  we  ar 
confident  that  it  will  be  possible  to  • 
rive  at  a  new  and  mutually  satisfac  1 
agreement  in  the  course  of  this  yea' 


Department  of  State  Bui" 


EUROPE 


is  clearly  in  our  own  interests  to 
Not  only  are  the  facilities  to 
we  have  access  vital,  but  our 
;y  cooperation  relationship  is  close- 
to  the  process  through  which  Por- 
ieeks  to  expand  its  own  direct  and 
contribution  to  Western  defense 

rtugal  is  a  charter  member  of 
and  takes  seriously  its  alliance 
sibilities.  It  wants  to  play  a  more 
role  in  NATO,  and  we  welcome 
sire.  At  the  same  time,  the  Por- 
e  economy  has  been  very  hard-hit 
international  recession,  and  Por- 
leeds  help  from  its  friends  if  it  is 
ble  to  carry  out  the  military 
lization  required  for  it  to  meet 
force  goals  and  expand  its  own 
Dation  and  contribution  to  the 
n  defense. 

s  clearly  in  our  own  interests  to 
ige  this  effort,  and  we  and  other 
.partners  are  engaged  in  a  con- 
leffort  to  do  so. 

multilateral  program,  to  which 
1  security  assistance  is  partially 
1,  focuses  on  the  construction  of 
■w  antisubmarine  warfare 
,  which  would  enable  Portugal  to 
an  important  role  in  antisub- 
warfare  protection  of  the  central 

Other  anticipated  purposes  of 
stance  include  a  second  squadron 
lircraft,  a  few  more  C-130s  for 
of  a  NATO-dedicated  airlift 
and  P-3  aircraft  to  contribute 
jbmarine  warfare  effort, 
training  is  a  further  and  in- 
art  of  the  effort  to  enable  Por- 
contribute  more  actively  and  ef- 
to  the  defense  of  the  West, 
nomic  support  funds  are  also  im- 
■  Portugal  is  the  poorest  country 
;rn  Europe,  and  the  Azores 
where  most  of  these  funds 
),  have  a  per  capita  income  one- 
it  of  the  country  as  a  whole, 
nds  are  an  important  expression 
ipport  for  Portuguese  democ- 
of  our  friendship  for  the  Por- 
people.  The  remaining  portion 

i'  funds  would  be  aimed  at 
a  Luso-American  Foundation  to 
te  private  efforts  at  economic 
lical  cooperation  following  the 
an  of  our  program  in  Portugal. 

Mediterranean 

ow  turn  to  the  Administration's 
issistance  proposals  for  Greece, 
ind  Cyprus  for  FY  1984  and  to 

9f.S.  relations  with  the  countries 

ejtern  Mediterranean. 


Several  political  areas  of  key  impor- 
tance to  U.S.  interest  come  together  in 
the  eastern  Mediterranean— Western 
Europe,  the  Balkans,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  the  Middle  East-Southwest  Asia. 
The  area  continues  to  be  of  great 
strategic  significance.  For  example, 
Greece  and  Turkey  face  the  Warsaw 
Pact  in  the  Balkans  and  Black  Sea 
Straits  area,  and  Turkey  has  an  impor- 
tant role  in  the  Caucasus  where  it  abuts 
directly  potential  Soviet  lines  of  advance 
to  the  gulf.  A  strong  and  effective 
NATO  southern  flank  is  essential  to  pro- 
tect our  interests  and  those  of  our  allies. 
Unfortunately,  the  effectiveness  of  this 
flank  has  been  weakened  in  recent  years 
to  the  point  where  it  is  a  matter  of 
grave  concern  to  our  allies  and  to  the 
United  States. 

Several  fundamental  aims  guide 
U.S.  policy  in  this  region.  It  is  essential 
that  we  strengthen  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions with  two  firm  and  longstanding 
friends  and  allies— Greece  and  Turkey. 
Furtherm.ore,  it  is  vital  to  strengthen 
NATO's  southern  flank,  thus  advancing 
Western  security  interests  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean  and  beyond. 

At  the  same  time,  the  President  and 
all  of  us  in  the  Administration  remain 
fully  committed  to  help  in  the  search  for 
a  solution  in  Cyprus  that  will  enable  the 
two  Cypriot  communities  to  live  peace- 
fully together  as  one  country.  I  want  to 
emphasize  that  each  of  these  goals  is  im- 
portant, and  full  effort  and  attention 
must  be  paid  to  them  if  we  are  to  suc- 
ceed. What  I  want  to  do  today  is  to  out- 
line the  Administration's  program  for 
assistance  which  we  believe  will  help 
meet  our  goals  and  contribute  to  resolv- 
ing some  of  the  outstanding  problems  in 
this  critical  region. 

Greece.  Security  assistance  for 
Greece  demonstrates  continuing  Ameri- 
can support  for  a  traditional  close 
friend.  It  is  an  integral  part  of  our  com- 
mitment to  a  strong,  mutually  beneficial 
bilateral  relationship.  As  the  Congress  is 
aware,  we  are  currently  negotiating 
with  the  Greek  Government  a  new 
defense  and  economic  cooperation  agree- 
ment to  modernize  and  define  our 
security  relationship  with  Greece,  in- 
cluding the  status  of  the  U.S.  facilities 
there.  In  view  of  these  on-going  discus- 
sions, we  felt  it  would  not  be  prudent  to 
propose  an  increase  in  the  level  of  assist- 
ance until  our  overall  security  relation- 
ship with  Greece  had  been  determined. 
However,  we  have  informed  the  Greek 
Government  that,  in  the  context  of  an 
agreement,  the  United  States  will  seek 


increased  levels  of  defense  support 
above  the  level  currently  proposed. 

U.S.  assistance  is  also  intended  to 
assist  recipients  to  carry  out  NATO 
defense  missions.  Greece,  in  recent 
years,  has  made  substantial  progress  in 
modernizing  its  military  equipment,  us- 
ing significant  U.S.  assistance  as  well  as 
its  own  resources.  However,  further 
U.S.  assistance  is  needed  to  continue  the 
process.  I  would  note  that  Greece's  im- 
portance is  reflected  in  the  Administra- 
tion's proposal  which  makes  it  the  sixth 
largest  recipient  in  our  FY  1984  pro- 
gram, aside  from  any  increase  which 
may  be  requested  in  the  context  of  the 
current  negotiations. 

Turkey.  Our  assistance  program  for 
Turkey  has  significant  changes.  Eco- 
nomic assistance  drops  from  the  high 
level  of  recent  years,  reflecting  con- 
tinued strong  recovery  of  the  Turkish 
economy.  Military  assistance,  on  the 
other  hand,  increases  substantially, 
reflecting  our  strong  conviction  that 
prompt  measures  to  modernize  the 
Turkish  Armed  Forces  can  be  delayed 
no  longer.  In  addition  to  its  borders  with 
the  U.S.S.R.  and  Bulgaria,  Turkey  faces 
Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria,  the  first  two  pres- 
ently engaged  in  a  shooting  war  and  the 
third  closely  tied  to  the  U.S.S.R.  The 
age  of  their  major  equipment  lines 
makes  it  difficult  for  the  Turkish  Armed 
Forces  to  fulfill  NATO  responsibilities, 
much  less  adequately  defend  their  other 
borders  and  make  a  contribution  to 
stability  and  security  in  that  region. 

Turkey's  military  government  has 
been  in  power  2V2  years  and  has  re- 
stored law  and  order,  curbed  political 
violence,  bolstered  public  confidence, 
and  continued  an  impressive  economic 
recovery  program.  While  the  effort  to 
eliminate  the  terrorism  which  wracked 
Turkey  before  September  1980  in- 
evitably produced  limitations  on  political 
freedoms  and  some  abuses  of  human 
rights,  we  think  the  military  govern- 
ment, by  and  large,  has  observed  the 
rule  of  law.  Equally  important,  it  has 
adhered  to  its  timetable  for  returning 
power  to  civilian  authority,  a  process 
which  will  culminate  this  fall  with  parlia- 
mentary elections  and  installation  of  a 
representative  democratic  government 
established  under  the  recently  approved 
Constitution  which  was  overwhelmingly 
endorsed  by  more  than  90%  of  Turkey's 
voters. 

The  significant  reduction  in  eco- 
nomic support  funds  reflects  the 
substantial  progress  Turkey  has  made 
under  its  stringent  economic  stabiliza- 


EUROPE 


tion  program.  While  Turkey  still  faces 
long-term  economic  problems,  its  strong 
performance  over  the  past  2  years 
should  enable  it  to  begin  to  return  to 
private  capital  markets,  thus  reducmg 
dependence  on  the  need  for  balance-of- 
payments  support  from  other  govern- 
ments. 

Cyprus.  Concerning  Cyprus,  this 
Administration  has  from  its  very  first 
days  placed  a  high  priority  on  the 
achievement  of  a  just  settlement.  We 
are  committed  to  that  goal,  for  as  long 
as  Cyprus  is  divided  and  its  status 
uncertain,  it  constitutes  a  humanitarian 
issue  and  it  also  remains  a  serious  bar- 
rier to  good  relations  between  Greece 
and  Turkey. 

In  support  of  our  commitment  to 
achieving  a  Cyprus  settlement,  the  Ad- 
ministration has  made  extensive  efforts 
to  encourage  realistic  and  meaningful 
negotiations  between  the  parties  which 
are  being  conducted  under  the  auspices 
of  the  U.N.  Secretary  General.  The 
Secretary  of  State  has  appointed  a 
special  Cyprus  coordinator  who  is  re- 
sponsible for  orchestrating  our  activities 
with  the  parties  in  support  of  the  U.N. 
talks.  Unfortunately,  despite  these  ef- 
forts, the  talks  have  so  far  produced  no 
dramatic  breakthrough.  However,  there 
has  been  progress  in  narrowing  the 
difference,  and  we  are  hopeful  that  fur- 
ther gains  can  be  made  in  the  months 
ahead. 

Authorization  Requests.  For 
Greece,  we  would  continue  the  level  of 
FMS  funds  at  last  year's  level— that  is, 
$280  million— for  the  purchase  of  equip- 
ment, spare  parts,  and  ammunition  and 
also  propose  $1.7  million  in  IMET  to  im- 
prove managerial  and  technical  exper- 
tise. Again,  it  is  important  to  note  that 
in  the  context  of  a  new  base  agreement, 
we  are  prepared  to  return  to  the  Con- 
gress to  ask  for  additional  assistance  for 
Greece. 

For  Turkey,  our  request  is  for  $755 
million  in  military  assistance  ($230 
million  in  MAP  and  $525  million  in  FMS 
guarantees),  $175  million  in  ESF,  and 
$4  million  in  IMET.  Turkey's  Armed 
Forces  are  the  second  largest  in  NATO 
and  consume  over  17%  of  the  govern- 
ment budget.  But  because  Turkey  does 
not  enjoy  the  wealth  and  industrial 
capability  of  most  other  NATO  coun- 
tries, we  and  other  allies  must  help  fill 
the  gap.  Some  of  our  assistance  will  con- 
tinue to  provide  maintenance  and  sup- 
port of  equipment  for  which  spare  parts 
are  no  longer  in  the  U.S.  military  inven- 
tory and  to  replace  that  equipment  with 


newer  but  still  outdated  equipment. 
Some  will  be  used  for  procurement  of 
new  equipment  for  naval  modernization 
and  for  a  first  tranche  of  modern  fight 
aircraft  for  future  delivery.  While  our 
request  falls  short  of  meeting  all  of 
Turkey's  urgent  military  equipment 
needs,  it  will  begin  the  task  of  helping 
Turkey  meet  NATO  commitments  con- 
tributing directly  to  our  own  defense. 

For  Cyprus,  we  propose  $3  million 
in  ESF  grant  authority  to  be  applied  to 
the  existing  university  scholarship  pro- 
gram. The  program  is  presently  fully 
funded  to  bring  150  Cypriots  from  both 
communities  to  the  United  States  for 
their  studies.  There  are  no  universities 
in  Cyprus,  and  our  program,  therefore, 
provides  an  opportunity,  and  often  an 
alternative  to  study  in  the  Eastern  bloc, 
for  young  Cypriots. 

The  provision  of  security  assistance 
to  Greece  and  Turkey  is  consistent  with 
our  policy  of  encouraging  these  two 
countries  to  find  a  peaceful  resolution  of 
their  differences,  and  with  U.S.  support 
for  efforts  to  solve  the  Cyprus  problem. 


•The  completed  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Prmtmg  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Northern  Ireland 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  17,  1983' 

For  those  of  us  whose  ancestors  come 
from  Ireland  and  for  those  of  us  who 
share  the  spirit  of  Irish  humor,  hard 
work,  and  spiritual  faith,  St.  Patrick's 
Day  is  a  time  of  grateful  celebration  and 
much  happiness. 

Today  is  a  time  to  honor  and  cele- 
brate the  enormous  contribution  to 
American  life  made  by  Irish  immigrants. 
As  frontiersmen  in  the  American  Col- 
onies and  citizen  soldiers  in  Washing- 
ton's army,  they  helped  found  our 
republic.  Their 'ingenuity  and  effort  built 
our  economy,  added  to  our  spiritual 
values,  and  enriched  our  literature. 
Their  humor  enriches  life's  happy 
moments  and  makes  life's  setbacks  more 
bearable. 

And  yet  our  joy  is  tempered  by  the 
tragedy  that  divides  neighbor  from 
neighbor  in  Northern  Ireland.  We  deeply 
regret  that  some  would  use  this  day  to 
enlist  support  for  more  violence  and  con- 


flict on  that  small  island  which 
much  in  our  hearts  today.  Wr 
main  indifferent  to  the  tragfo 
fronts  the  people  of  Northern  i 
and  which  affects  the  Republu 
Ireland,  Britain,  and  their  fru  i 
United  States.  Those  who  aii\^ 
engage  in  violence  and  ternu-: 
find  no  welcome  in  the  Unitf  i 
We  condemn  all  such  act- 
pose  the  forces  of  discord  in  '■ 
Ireland,  which  obstruct  the  |h 
reconciliation  so  essential  for  \ 
ask  all  Americans  to  refrain  fr 
porting,  with  financial  or  other  ai 
organizations  involved  directly  or 
directly  in  perpetuating  violence, 
we  urge  that  those  Americans— : 
there  are  many— who  wish  to  he 
their  support  and  contributions  t< 
mate  groups  and  organizations  w 
work  to  promote  reconciliation  ai 
nomic  cooperation. 

The  U.S.  Government  contini 
take  specific  actions  to  hasten  an 
this  violence  and  discord  by: 

•  Discouraging  Americans  fr 
tributing  to  organizations  engage 
violence; 

•  Arresting  and  prosecuting 
engaged  in  the  illegal  export  of  a 
those  groups;  and 

•  Confiscating  weapons  intei 
terrorists. 

Next  to  peace  and  reconcili_ 
Northern  Ireland's  greatest  need 
jobs  to  bring  hope  and  opportuni 
its  people,  especially  the  young. 
American  companies  which  have 
vested  in  Northern  Ireland  alrea' 
employ  a  significant  percentage  i 
dustrial  work  force,  making  a  re; 
tribution  to  its  well-being.  This  A 
ministration  will  continue  to  enc( 
private  investment  in  and  the  en 
more  job  opportunities  in  both  N 
Ireland  and  the  Republic. 

We  recognize  that  it  is  not  fc 
United  States  to  chart  a  course  f 
people  of  Northern  Ireland,  but  \ 
have  an  obligation  to  urge  our  lo 
friends  in  that  part  of  the  world  • 
reconciliation  between  the  two  tr 
in  Northern  Ireland  and  accomm 
through  democratic  means.  Dura 
equitable  solutions  and  peace  car 
imposed  by  outsiders,  however  w 
meaning.  Our  role,  accordingly,  i 
support  efforts  by  the  people  anc 
governments  directly  involved. 


Department  of  State 


REIGN  AID 


o,  on  St.  Patrick's  Day  1983,  let  us 
lebrate  our  Irish  heritage  in  fine 
But  let  us  also  remember  those  in 
lern  Ireland  for  which  1983  is  one 
year  of  terrorism  and  dim  eco- 
:  prospects— and  let  us  rededicate 


ourselves  to  helping  to  bring  these  twin 
evils  to  an  end. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  21.  li)83. 


1984  Request  for  Economic 
sistance  Programs 


.  Peter  McPherson 

tateinent  before  the  House  Budget 
littee  Task  Force  on  International 

iceainl  Trad,:  nn  March  J.  IHSS. 
IrPhrrsn,,   is  A,l n, ,  inst  n,l,T  nl  the 
■!ltnrlntrr„at,.,nallh',;'l,,pnient 
ami  Arfing  Director  of  the  Inter- 
'lal  III  rclopment  Cooperation 
■II I II n- A) A 

.n  honor  to  be  here  today  to 
;s  our  foreign  assistance  proposals 
e  coming  fiscal  year  and  the  rela- 
ip  of  our  aid  program  to  the 
itic  economy.  The  foreign  assist- 
mdget  which  we  have  submitted  to 
)ngress  is  the  product  of  intensive 
'3  to  integrate  our  various  pro- 
of international  seciu-ity  and 
'pment  assistance,  food  assistance, 
ir  contributions  to  the  multilateral 
ial  institutions. 
ider  Secretary  [for  Security 
ance.  Science,  and  Technology] 
ider  will  address  the  security 
mce  portion  of  our  request,  and  I 
3CUSS  the  development  and  eco- 
assistance  programs.  The  latter 
;  development  assistance,  the  eco- 
support  fund  (ESF),  the  PL  480 
'or  Peace  program,  and  the  multi- 
assistance  programs,  including 
;ernational  Fund  for  Agricultural 
pment  (IFAD),  the  multilateral 
pment  banks  (with  the  Treasury 
;ment  having  a  primary  respon- 
),  and  international  organizations 
ograms  (with  the  Department  of 
Bureau  of  International 
zations  taking  the  lead  here), 
ese  foreign  assistance  programs 
s  different  but  related  aspects  of 
•eign  policy  objectives  and  the 
rf  the  developing  countries.  The 
)ment  assistance  program  helps 
it  nations  address  their  funda- 
,  long-term  constraints  to  devel- 
t.  The  ESF  is  a  flexible  program 
issists  with  both  short-term  eco- 


nomic crises— such  as  balance-of- 
payments  problems— and  longer  term 
development  needs  in  countries  of  stra- 
tegic importance  to  the  United  States. 
The  PL  480  program  helps  enhance  food 
security  and  reduce  malnutrition  and 
serves  to  augment  local  production.  Our 
various  military  assistance  programs 
help  our  allies  and  friends  acquire  and 
maintain  the  capability  for  self-defense. 
And  our  contributions  to  multilateral 
organizations  help  leverage  contributions 
from  other  donors  and  guide  the  efforts 
of  these  organizations  to  support  ac- 
tivities which  complement  our  own  bi- 
lateral efforts. 

The  Administration  has  sought  to  in- 
tegrate the  activities  of  each  of  these 
foreign  assistance  programs  in  such  a 
way  that  allocations  to  each  recipient 
are  fully  complementary  and  take  full 
account  of  both  priority  foreign  policy 
objectives  and  the  economic  and  security 
needs  of  the  developing  countries. 


THIRD  WORLD 
ECONOMIC  SITUATION 

We  meet  at  a  time  when  nations  around 
the  globe  are  beset  by  serious  economic 
problems.  Particularly  hard  hit  have 
been  the  nations  of  the  Third  World. 
Developing  countries  as  a  group  have 
faced  severe  difficulties  in  recent  years 
as  a  result  of  the  world's  deep  economic 
recession.  Most  developing  countries 
have  suffered  significant  reductions  in 
their  rate  of  growth.  The  average 
growth  rate  of  the  non-oil-developing 
countries  dropped  from  5.3%  in  1978  to 
about  1.5%  last  year.  Coupled  with  con- 
tinued rapid  population  increases,  more 
than  half  of  the  lowest  income  countries 
had  lower  per  capita  real  GDP  in  1982 
than  10  years  ago. 

During  the  last  3  years,  non-oil- 
developing  countries  have  experienced 
record  current  account  deficits— totaling 
.$97  billion  last  year.  These  deficits  can 


be  traced  to  several  factors:  the  recent 
doubling  of  oil  prices  and  sharp  rise  in 
interest  rates,  the  decline  in  world  trade 
as  a  result  of  the  economic  slowdown  in 
the  industrial  countries,  and  the  deterio- 
rating terms  of  trade  in  the  developing 
countries,  particularly  for  those  which 
export  primary  products.  As  a  result, 
they  have  experienced  a  sharp  contrac- 
tion in  export  earnings,  and  their 
foreign  exchange  receipts  have  been  in- 
creasingly diverted  from  investment  pur- 
poses to  financing  immediate  import  re- 
quirements, such  as  food  and  oil,  and  to 
short-term  debt  servicing. 

With  respect  to  the  debt  picture,  it 
has  been  estimated  that  the  average 
ratio  of  debt-service  payments  to  ex- 
ports in  the  developing  countries  rose  by 
50%  or  more  over  the  last  6  years.  Ac- 
cording to  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF),  total  outstanding  external 
debt  of  non-oil-developing  countries  in- 
creased from  $375  billion  in  1980  to 
$505  billion  in  1982.  In  1981,  13  coun- 
tries had  to  undergo  debt  rescheduling, 
and  the  situation  worsened  in  1982,  as  a 
number  of  major  middle-income  coun- 
tries in  Latin  America  and  Eastern 
Europe  began  to  have  difficulties  serv- 
icing their  commercial  debt.  In  response 
commercial  lenders  tightened  up  their 
risk  exposure  in  many  developing  coun- 
tries. 

This  combination  of  trade  and  debt 
pressure  is  particularly  serious  for 
stability  and  longer  run  economic  prog- 
ress in  the  low  income  countries— coun- 
tries important  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  and  our  economy.  With 
the  beginnings  of  economic  recovery, 
suggested  by  recent  reductions  in  in- 
terest rates  and  the  possibility  of  declin- 
ing oil  prices,  the  economic  picture  for 
the  developing  nations  may  begin  to  im- 
prove. Our, foreign  assistance  pi-ogram 
can  play  an  important  role  in  their  eco- 
nomic recovery  just  as  our  supporting 
their  economic  development  is  important 
to  the  economic,  humanitarian,  political, 
and  security  interests  of  the  United 
States. 


U.S.  INTERESTS  IN  THE 
THIRD  WORLD 

These  economic  problems  in  the  Third 
World  have  a  very  direct  impact  on  the 
domestic  economy  of  the  United  States. 
In  terms  of  our  economic  interests,  it 
has  become  a  well-recognized  fact  that 
our  interdependence  with  the  Third 
World  has  increased  markedly  in  recent 
years.  Trade  with  developing  countries 


183 


FOREIGN  AID 


has  become  an  important  part  of  the 
U.S.  economy.  In  short,  every  State  in 
the  Union  is  involved  in  exporting  to 
developing  countries. 

Let  me  cite  some  numbers.  In  1981 
our  exports  came  to  about  $230  billion, 
of  which  exports  to  the  developing 
world,  including  the  oil  exporters, 
totaled  over  $99  billion— nearly  43%  of 
the  total.  Just  10  short  years  ago,  these 
countries  absorbed  only  $15  billion,  or 
30%,  of  our  total  trade  in  that  year. 

In  recent  years,  the  oil-importing 
developing  countries  have  represented 
the  fastest  growing  market  for  U.S. 
products— our  exports  to  these  coun- 
tries have  been  increasing  at  an  average 
of  25%  a  year.  The  growth  of  U.S.  ex- 
ports has  been  particularly  dynamic  in 
those  countries  which  have  achieved 
rapid  economic  growth  and  have  pur- 
sued policies  which  promote  economic 
efficiency  and  development,  including 
outward-looking  trade  policies,  such  as 
Kenya  and  Brazil. 

U.S.  exports  of  manufactures  have 
shown  particularly  strong  growth.  More 
than  80%  of  the  manufacturing  jobs 
created  in  the  late  1970s  were  linked  to 
exports  and  fully  one-eighth  of  all  U.S. 
jobs  in  manufacturing  are  now  export 
related. 

Exports  of  agricultural  products  are 
also  very  important.  Total  U.S.  agricul- 
tural exports  reached  $43  billion  in  1981 
compared  with  less  than  $18  billion  in 
1973.  It  is  estimated  that  the  harvest  of 
one  out  of  every  four  farm  acres  in  the 
United  States  is  now  shipped  to  the 
developing  countries.  Overall,  exports  to 
the  developing  countries  have  come  to 
account  for  20-25%  of  U.S.  gross  farm 
income. 

Foreign  aid  programs  have  expand- 
ed the  capacity  of  developing  countries 
to  be  customers  for  such  U.S.  exports. 
When  the  developing  countries'  econo- 
mies grow,  they  tend  to  buy  more  U.S. 
exports.  Conversely  a  slackening  of  the 
developing  world's  capacity  to  buy  our 
products  weakens  our  production  for  ex- 
port and  thereby  our  economic  situation. 
According  to  one  study,  when  multiplier 
effects  are  taken  into  account,  every  $1 
billion  drop  in  exports  erases  some 
60,000-70,000  jobs  in  this  country. 

In  addition  to  generating  income  for 
workers  directly  involved  in  producing 
export  goods,  many  more  U.S.  jobs  are 
provided  indirectly  by  associated  exports 
of  services,  such  as  grain  elevators, 
transportation,  insurance,  banking, 
management,  technical  assistance,  and 
other  service  areas.  Exports  of  services 
have  been  a  major  positive  element  in 


the  U.S.  balance  of  payments.  As  the 
developing  countries  have  improved 
their  economic  performance,  their 
capacity  to  buy  our  goods  and  services 
has  increased— and  substantially  so. 

Besides  providing  a  market  for  U.S. 
goods  and  services,  the  developing  coun- 
tries are  a  source  of  important,  some- 
times crucial,  imports.  Over  44%  of  our 
imports  currently  are  raw  materials 
essential  to  the  functioning  of  our 
economy,  a  large  proportion  of  which 
come  from  Third  World  nations.  In  par- 
ticular, developing  countries  provide 
75%  of  the  total  amount  of  tin,  bauxite, 
zinc,  and  cobalt  we  require.  Further- 
more, imports  of  other  goods  stimulates 
cost-cutting  technological  change  which 
increases  our  economic  efficiency  and 
helps  to  reduce  inflationary  pressures. 
Not  only  are  the  developing  coun- 
tries becoming  more  important  as 
trading  partners,  they  have  become  ma- 
jor recipients  of  U.S.  private  capital 
flows  as  well.  U.S.  private  bank  lending 
to  the  non-OPEC  [Organization  of  Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries]  developing 
countries  has  increased  significantly, 
both  in  absolute  amount  and  as  a  pro- 
portion of  their  total  foreign  loans. 
Whereas  in  1970,  only  8%  of  U.S.  inter- 
national lending  went  to  these  countries, 
by  1980  they  were  absorbing  fully  47% 
of  the  total.  And  these  external  capital 
flows,  by  helping  foster  economic  de- 
velopment, have  facilitated  the  entry  of 
these  countries  into  the  international 
commercial  capital  market  to  fulfill  their 
capital  needs. 

In  addition  to  the  long-term  con- 
tribution which  our  assistance  programs 
make  to  the  U.S.  economy  and  trade 
through  the  promotion  of  development, 
the  U.S.  foreign  assistance  program 
directly  promotes  U.S.  exports  of  goods 
and  services.  Of  total  spending  for 
foreign  assistance,  about  70%  is  spent  in 
this  country  on  purchases  of  U.S.  goods 
and  services,  including  agricultural  com- 
modities procured  through  the  PL  480 
Food  for  Peace  program.  Also,  require- 
ments for  replacement  parts  for  aid- 
funded  equipment  and  follow-on  or  com- 
plementary activities  increase  the  poten- 
tial for  future  demands  for  U.S.  prod- 
ucts. Technical  assistance  in  the 
preparation  and  design  of  activities  can 
further  increase  the  potential  of  U.S. 
sales.  Finally,  aid  activities  can  increase 
the  general  familiarity  of  developing 
country  officials,  contractors,  and  bene- 
ficiaries with  U.S.  products  and  com- 
panies. 

Our  contributions  to  the  multilateral 
development  institutions  also  have  a 


positive  impact  on  the  U.S.  eeonon 
Total  procurement  of  U.S.  goods  a 
services  deriving  from  their  operat 
exceeds  the  amount  of  budgetary  ( 
lays  for  our  contributions  to  them. 

Besides  these  economic  benefit 
development  assistance  addresses 
traditional  humanitarian  concerns 
American  people  by  promoting  Ion 
term,  self-sustaining,  equitable  de\ 
ment  which  increases  the  developl 
countries'  capacity  to  address  the  ! 
human  needs  of  the  poor  majority 
their  countries.  Through  our  progi 
we  contribute  to  the  fight  against 
hunger  and  disease  throughout  th( 
world.  We  also  help  to  raise  the  st 
ard  of  living  for  a  broad  range  of 
world's  population.  The  PL  480  pr 
gram,  for  example,  provides  assisi 
to  meet  critical  food  needs,  comba 
hunger  and  malnutrition,  and  incr 
resources  for  development.  Our  di 
assistance  provides  relief  to  help  ( 
with  natural  and  man-made  catas- 
trophes, including  refugee  probler 
Also,  foreign  assistance  promotes 
development  in  which  traditional . 
can  concern  with  individual  civil  a 
nomic  rights  is  respected  and  enh. 

In  terms  of  U.S.  political  and 
ty  concerns,  recent  events  in  the  1 
East,  the  Horn  of  Africa,  Afghan: 
Central  America,  and  the  Caribbe 
have  clearly  demonstrated  that  co 
problems,  and  instability  involving 
developing  countries  have  a  very  i 
effect  on  our  political  and  security 
terests.  Often  the  policies  and  act: 
an  individual  developing  country  c 
group  of  developing  countries  can 
significant  impact  on  key  regional 
global  disputes  and  issues  of  impO' 
to  the  United  States. 

Widespread  poverty,  economic 
and  severe  economic  dislocation  ci 
create  an  environment  that  is  sus( 
ble  to  violence,  political  instability 
the  possible  intrusion  of  those  win 
to  exploit  instability  to  their  own  i 
tage.  However,  when  people  have 
reasonable  hope  that  living  conditi 
will  improve  over  time  and  actions 
being  taken  to  address  the  most  p 
ing  economic  problems,  they  have 
greater  stake  in  the  achievement  i 
stability  and  peace.  Our  efforts  in 
port  of  economic  progress  constiti 
key  element  in  helping  to  maintaii 
stability  in  countries  and  regions  i 
tant  to' U.S.  interests.  They  also  C 
tribute  to  furthering  peaceful  chai 
and  the  development  of  open,  deff 
cratic  institutions  in  friendly  coun 


48 


Department  of  State  B< 


FOREIGN  AID 


>RY  OF  U.S.  FOREIGN 
TANCE 

;he  current  economic  situation 
3  importance  of  foreign  assistance 
country,  it  is  worth  spending  a 
nutes  retracing  the  various 
through  which  the  U.S.  develop- 
ssistance  policy  has  moved  since 
ption. 

3  present  day  foreign  aid  program 
)ed,  of  course,  out  of  our  initial 
ful  experience  with  assisting 

lan  and  Japanese  reconstruction 
ig  World  War  II.  Our  subsequent 
during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  in 
ting  to  replicate  that  success  in 
Ay  emerging  nations  of  the  Third 
focused  on  growth  of  the  capital 
1  the  form  of  infrastructure  and 
ial  development,  combined  with 
ements  in  human  capital  through 
Dn  and  training.  With  this  em- 
little  attention  was  paid  to  the 
nt  role  of  agriculture  in  the 
ment  process  or  to  the  employ- 
iiplications  of  capital-intensive  in- 
ization,  or  even  to  the  impor- 
■  trade  as  a  means  of  securing 
based  on  each  country's  com- 
advantage  in  production, 
ard  the  mid-1960s  it  became  in- 
ly clear,  though,  that  population 
!S  were  eroding  a  large  pro- 
of the  gains  in  income  which  had 
lieved  by  many  countries, 
more,  grave  doubts  arose  with 
to  the  distribution  of  these  in- 
ins.  Equity  considerations  came 
:ognized  as  important  factors  in 
dopment  process.  It  became  evi- 
t  the  political,  social,  and 
c  structure  which  had  evolved  in 
3S  developed  countries  had  pro- 
tie  improvement  in  economic 
ig  for  the  poor  of  these  coun- 
help  correct  this  situation,  a 
cern  with  the  effect  of  our 
;e  on  the  poor  majority  emerged 
ago,  in  the  form  of  the  current 
ctions  legislation, 
lonse  to  this  mandate  has  taken 
orms.  Development  projects 
be  designed  to  encourage  local 
tion.  Involvement  and  commit- 
key  population  groups  to  shap- 
own  future  came  to  be  seen  as 
to  broad-based  and  self- 
g  development.  The  new  atten- 
irticipatory  development  also 
ed  a  basic  shift  in  emphasis 
iistrialization  to  agriculture  as  a 
focus,  since  the  bulk  of  the 
n  in  the  developing  countries 
ural  areas.  A  further  response 

4  increased  attention  to  allo- 


cating assistance  directly  to  specific  sec- 
tors and  groups.  As  a  result,  we  are 
now  structuring  the  aid  program  so  that 
we  are  focusing  our  efforts  on  those 
areas  in  which  the  United  States  has 
particular  expertise— institutional  and 
human  resource  development,  appro- 
priate technology  transfer,  and  mobili- 
zation of  private  sector  resourcefulness 
in  support  of  national  development 
goals.  I  will  go  into  this  in  more  detail 
later. 

In  addition  to  this  evolution  in  our 
own  program,  over  time  the  United 
States  has  been  highly  successful  in 
achieving  increased  sharing  of  the 
foreign  assistance  burden  by  other  coun- 
tries and  institutions.  Worldwide  official 
development  assistance  grew  by  over 
40%  between  1970  and  1981.  As  other 
donors  have  been  involved  in  the 
development  effort,  the  U.S.  share  of  of- 
ficial bilateral  development  assistance 
flows— excluding  contributions  from 
East  European  countries— has  dropped. 
In  1960  we  provided  60%  of  official 
development  assistance,  by  1981  our 
share  was  down  to  17%.  Also  in  just  the 
last  decade,  assistance  from  multilateral 
institutions  almost  tripled  in  real  terms. 
And  the  OPEC  countries,  led  by  Saudi 
Arabia,  have  increased  their  share  of  of- 
ficial assistance  to  other  developing 
countries  from  5%  in  1970  to  22%  in 
1981. 

Also,  as  Third  World  nations  have 
developed,  they  have  become  increasing- 
ly able  to  generate  their  own  resources 
for  development.  As  a  result,  between 
1960  and  1980,  we  have  seen  the  pro- 
portion of  official  development 
assistance  from  the  OECD  [Organization 
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment] countries  decline  relative  to  the 
developing  countries'  gross  investment 
expenditures — excluding  capital-surplus 
countries — from  10%  to  5%  and  the 
U.S.  share  has  decreased  corresponding- 
ly from  about  6%  to  just  over  1  %. 

Foreign  economic  assistance  is  a 
very  small— and  shrinking — part  of  the 
total  Federal  budget.  The  combined  con- 
tributions to  AID,  the  ESF,  Food  for 
Peace,  UN  programs,  and  the  multi- 
lateral development  banks  represented 
only  le  out  of  every  Federal  budget 
dollar  and  less  than  0.3%  of  our  GNP. 
By  comparison,  during  the  1950s, 
economic  assistance  represented  an 
average  3«  out  of  every  Federal  budget 
dollar  and  over  0.6%  of  the  GNP. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM 

What  has  this  foreign  assistance  invest- 
ment brought  the  developing  countries? 
While  they  currently  face  serious  finan- 
cial problems,  from  a  longer  term 
perspective  there  has  been  dramatic  im- 
provement in  many  aspects  of  their 
economic  and  human  condition. 
Although  progress  in  many  cases  may 
not  have  been  as  rapid  as  we  might 
wish,  there  is  no  denying  that  advances 
have  occurred  in  the  standard  of  living 
of  much  of  the  world's  population. 
Throughout  much  of  the  developing 
world,  population  growth  rates  have 
leveled  off.  Average  life  expectancy  has 
increased  as  advances  in  health  care 
have  become  more  widespread  and 
nutrition  has  improved.  Mortality  rates 
of  children  under  5  years  of  age  have 
been  more  than  cut  in  half  since  1960. 
And  average  school  enrollment  and 
adult  literacy  rates  registered  important 
increases  for  most  countries. 

Technological  advances  in  agri- 
culture, including  the  development  of 
high-yielding  crops,  and  increased 
availability  of  energy— at  least  until  the 
early  1970s— set  the  stage  for  relatively 
rapid  growth  for  the  developing  coun- 
tries during  the  1960s  and  early  1970s. 
Overall  rates  of  growth  for  non-oil  coun- 
tries averaged  more  than  5%  annually, 
with  middle  income  countries  showing 
even  better  performance. 

As  a  result  of  these  improvements, 
we  now  have  a  situation  where  some  of 
the  countries  which  we  have  assisted 
over  the  years  are  able  to  compete  in 
their  own  right  on  the  world  market; 
Korea  and  Brazil  are  two  such  exam- 
ples. And  we  see  the  emergence  of  mid- 
dle income  countries,  which  by  all 
economic  and  social  indices  are  no 
longer  underdeveloped. 

By  and  large,  the  countries  which 
have  shown  the  most  rapid  advances  are 
those  which  have  used  their  resources 
wisely  and  have  promoted  their  develop- 
ment through  appropriate  and  consis- 
tent, generally  outward-oriented,  eco- 
nomic policies.  The  so-called  newly  in- 
dustrializing countries  have  living  stand- 
ards and  levels  of  development  com- 
parable to  what  some  OECD  countries 
had  a  short  time  ago,  although  pockets 
of  severe  poverty  still  persist  in  some. 
Their  needs  for  concessional  assistance 
are  minimal. 

The  low  income  countries  are  those 
which  suffer  from  the  worst  human, 
social,  and  economic  manifestations  of 
underdevelopment,  and  there  exist  wide 
differences  in  the  basic  human  needs 


49 


FOREIGN  AID 


situation  of  individual  countries.  Most  of 
the  countries  of  Africa  and  the  Indian 
Subcontinent  fall  in  this  low  income 
category.  These  countries  have  inade- 
quate human,  physical,  and  institutional 
infrastructures  and  are  often  highly 
vulnerable  to  the  vagaries  of  climate  and 
international  markets.  These  problems 
have  frequently  been  compounded  by 
economic  policies  which  created  distor- 
tions and  reduced  growth.  It  is  this  lat- 
ter group  of  countries  at  which  our  cur- 
rent development  efforts  are  principally 
aimed. 


CURRENT  DEVELOPMENT 
PICTURE 

A  basic  lesson  learned  from  our  ex- 
perience with  economic  assistance  over 
the  past  decades  is  that  development  is 
truly  a  long-term  process.  The  task  of 
improving  conditions  for  the  millions  of 
people  living  in  absolute  poverty  in  the 
developing  countries  is  tremendous,  and 
achieving  desirable  changes  takes  time. 
In  spite  of  the  advances  which  have  been 
made,  there  still  are  serious  develop- 
ment problems  in  many  countries. 
Though  food  production  in  the  develop- 
ing countries  as  a  whole  has  risen,  on  a 
per  capita  basis  it  has  just  barely  stayed 
ahead  of  expanding  population  and  in 
the  low  income  countries  has  declined 
during  the  last  decade.  Population 
growth,  though  leveling  off,  is  still  high. 
At  the  present  2.1%  annual  rate  of  in- 
crease, the  population  of  the  developing 
world  will  double  in  33  years.  Despite 
recent  health  improvements,  in  much  of 
the  Third  World  life  expectancy  still 
does  not  exceed  50  years,  one-third  of 
infants  die  before  the  age  of  5,  and  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  adults  suffer  from 
chronic,  debilitating  illness.  Despite  past 
gains  in  literacy,  more  than  half  of  the 
adults  in  the  developing  world  remain 
illiterate.  Besides  lack  of  capital,  ability 
to  address  these  problems  is  hindered  by 
such  constraints  as  lack  of  infrastruc- 
ture, including  poor  transport  and  com- 
munications, inadequate  management 
and  institutional  capacity  to  plan  and 
direct  sound  development  programs, 
lack  of  a  skilled  workforce  and  of  the 
means  to  acquire  and  adapt  technology, 
and  policies  which  inhibit  the  most  effi- 
cient use  of  available  resources. 

Given  the  severity  of  these  prob- 
lems, presently  compounded  by  the  ef- 
fects of  the  worldwide  recession,  it  is, 
therefore,  imperative  that  the  interna- 
tional community  provide  the  help  which 
will  permit  these  countries  to  continue 
to  address  their  fundamental  long-term 


economic  problems  and  lay  the  basis  for 
more  dynamic  long-term  growth.  With- 
out such  assistance,  there  is  danger  that 
countries  will  be  forced  to  make  drastic 
cuts  in  their  long-term  development  pro- 
grams as  they  endeavor  to  undertake 
the  structural  adjustments  in  their 
economies  necessary  to  reestablish  a 
sustainable  economic  position.  Such  a 
curtailment  of  the  development  effort 
could  have  serious  negative  long-term 
consequences  neither  the  developing 
countries  nor  we  can  afford. 


FUTURE  OF  THE  FOREIGN 
ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM 

What  role  should  our  foreign  assistance 
program  play  in  the  recovery  effort, 
both  in  the  near  term  and  beyond?  In 
looking  to  the  future,  it  is  instructive  to 
consider  the  lessons  of  the  past.  I 
believe  there  are  some  fundamental 
tenets  which  can  guide  us  in  shaping  the 
future  of  our  foreign  assistance  program 
to  be  derived  from  history. 

As  noted  earlier,  the  situation  in  the 
developing  countries  has  evolved  con- 
siderably over  the  last  two  decades. 
Changes  in  the  development  situation 
and  in  the  role  of  foreign  aid  as  a 
catalyst  to  the  development  process 
have  been  paralleled  by  an  evolution  in 
our  thinking  with  respect  to  three  key 
questions.  First,  what  is  development? 
Second,  how  is  it  best  achieved?  Third, 
how  can  AID  best  contribute  to  the 
development  process? 

At  the  cornerstone  of  our  response 
to  these  questions,  is  our  continued  com- 
mitment to  a  basic  needs  approach  to 
development.  This  orientation  is  more 
widely  shared  in  the  international  com- 
munity today  than  it  was  a  decade  ago 
when  Congress  initiated  the  new  direc- 
tions legislation.  However,  even  if  ac- 
cepted in  principle,  the  political  will  to 
translate  commitment  into  policies,  in- 
vestments, and  budgets  is  often  lacking. 

We  hold  the  dignity  of  the  in- 
dividual, with  maximum  freedom  of 
choice  and  freedom  of  action,  to  be  im- 
portant goals  of  the  development  proc- 
ess. We  see  the  process  as  the  emer- 
gence of  systems  which  provide  for  the 
sustained  satisfaction  of  the  basic  needs 
of  its  people,  including  their  need  to  par- 
ticipate in  a  free  and  open  society.  If 
there  is  economic  growth,  but  the  basic 
needs  of  the  poor  majority  remain 
unmet,  development  has  been  bypassed 
and  the  ultimate  goal  will  not  be 
achieved.  If  basic  needs  are  met  but 
there  is  not  opportunity  for  social, 
economic,  or  spiritual  growth,  then  the 


investment  process  is  still  inconipl ;, 
Both  social  and  economic  needs— Ui 
human  needs  and  economic  better 
ment— are  important  complement  v 
the  overall  development  process. 

Secondly,  there  are  wide  liiHV' 
in  the  extent  to  which  nations  at  -  , 
levels  of  per  capita  income  have  n  li 
progress  in  dealing  with  the  basic  i 
lems  of  hunger,  infant  mortalit\ , 
disease,  and  illiteracy.  We  now  ki 
that  substantial  progress  in  sati.-r  t 
basic  needs  can  be  made  without  ■ 
for  aggregate  income  to  double  or 
We  endorse  and  seek  to  promote 
opment  patterns  which  are  efficie 
translating  overall  growth  into  tb 
widespread  satisfaction  of  basic  n 
Finally,  we  recognize  that  by 
vesting  in  people,  in  their  health, 
tion,  and  capacity  to  adopt  new  te 
nologies,  we  are  investing  in  a  ke; 
development  resource.  Satisfying 
needs  is  not  just  an  end;  it  is  also 
means  to  further  development. 

Within  this  commitment,  we  1 
identified  several  tenets  which  sh 
guide  our  assistance. 

First  is  a  recognition  that  teo 
assistance,  rather  than  resource 
transfers,  is  by  and  large  the  bes- 
to  foster  self-sustaining  developn" 
particularly  given  our  overall  bud 
constraints. 

Second,  our  assistance  shouk 
focused  in  those  areas  where  the 
States  has  recognized  expertise- 
as  the  sharing  of  our  superb  tech 
ical  capacity  in  agriculture. 

Third,  in  identifying  technolo 
transfer,  and  in  setting  our  resea 
priorities,  we  must  carefully  cons 
conditions  in  recipient  countries  s 
provide  scientific  and  technologic, 
appropriate  to  their  needs  and  wl 
will  lead  to  the  creation  of  self-su 
taining  development  institutions. 
Fourth,  we  need  to  maintain 
ibility  in  our  program  to  permit  u 
take  advantage  of  promising,  inn' 
ways  of  providing  assistance  and 
allow  us  to  adapt  to  changing  cor 
in  the  Third  World. 

Fifth,  we  need  to  pay  much  i 
tention  than  we  once  did  to  the  c 
importance  of  host  country  polici' 
determining  the  outcome  of  deve 
efforts,  and  we  must  program  ou 
resources  accordingly. 

Sixth,  we  need  to  pay  close  a 
tion  to  the  planning  and  managei. 
our  program— to  ensure  the  polic 
establish  are  implemented— so  th 
are,  in  fact,  maximizing  the  imp 
the  resources  available  to  us. 


1^ 


Department  of  State!" 


FOREIGN  AID 


tnally,  we  need  to  bear  in  mind 
ur  limited  resources  will  not  per- 
)  to  do  the  job  alone  and  that  we 
leed  to  exercise  our  leadership  to 
ze  and  help  direct  the  far  greater 
•ces  available  from  the  private  sec- 
i  well  as  from  other  donors  and  in- 
ons,  on  behalf  of  development, 
liile  we  cannot  ignore  the  short- 
;rises  in  which  many  developing 
•ies  currently  find  themselves,  the 
Dal  focus  of  our  economic  assist- 
vill  remain  the  basic,  long-term 
)f  development.  Certainly  the 
Tiental  development  problems  of 
lird  World  will  persist  even  as 
recovery  gets  under  way.  The 
ping  countries  will  continue  to  re- 
;xternal  support  as  they  strive  to 
the  goal  of  self-sustaining  develop- 
Thus,  our  assistance  must  con- 
,0  address  the  basic,  long-term 
ige  of  development:  to  foster  in- 
us,  self-sustaining  productivity 
at  alleviating  poverty  and  meeting 
3ic  human  needs  of  the  Third 
s  poor.  Our  assistance  will  con- 

0  concentrate  in  the  functional 

n  which  we  have  been  successful 

1  the  past. 

our  leadership  role,  we  must  help 
climate  necessary  for  sus- 
e,  broadly  based  development  to 
ace— in  those  societies  which 
strate  a  readiness  to  assume  the 
sibility  for  their  own  future.  Ob- 
,  though,  it  is  neither  possible  nor 
lie  for  this  country  to  be  all  things 
eople.  The  development  needs  of 
ird  World  far  outweigh  the 
;es  available  from  us  and  our 
donors.  Our  foreign  assistance 
;es  are  constrained  by  the  same 
lie  conditions  which  have  dictated 
it  on  the  overall  level  of  Federal 
ig.  As  a  result,  it  is  essential  for 
irefully  allocate,  and  leverage, 
ited  foreign  assistance  resources 
r  to  make  best  use  of  what  we 
'ailable. 

3lieve  our  proposed  program  does 
it.  First,  we  have  come  to  recog- 
i  vital  role  that  host  country 
play  in  the  success  or  failure  of 
ment.  Government  policies,  be 
the  area  of  interest  rates,  ex- 
rates,  budget  allocation,  farm 
<T  consumer  subsidies,  are  of 
us  importance  to  the  develop- 
"fort.  The  absence  of  a  sound 
nvironment  can  undermine  the 
3SS  of  individual  projects  and 
long-term  growth  objectives.  Ac- 
ly,  we  are  giving  particular  at- 
to  allocating  our  aid  dollars  so  as 


to  encourage  recipient  countries  to 
change  those  policies  which  hold  back 
developments  by  inhibiting  the  operation 
of  free  markets,  discouraging  private  in- 
vestment, limiting:  resource  mobilization 
and  productivity,  inefficiently  allocating 
public  and  private  resources,  and  ex- 
cluding access  by  the  poor  to  productive 
resources  and  employment. 

Second,  we  recognize  the  absolute 
importance  of  coordinating  our  various 
economic  assistance  programs.  Thus,  we 
are  devoting  considerable  effort  to  inte- 
grating both  the  objectives  and  the 
allocations  of  our  various  aid  programs 
through  full  consultation  with  the 
Department  of  State  and  the  other 
foreign  assistance  agencies. 

We  have  set  definite  priorities  in  our 
budget  allocations.  For  example,  we 
have  given  high  priority  to  countries 
which  demonstrate  commitment  to  their 
own  development.  We  have  focused  our 
efforts  on  activities  in  those  areas  I 
mentioned  earlier  where  the  United 
States  has  a  comparative  advantage- 
agricultural  research,  voluntary  family 
planning,  institutional  development,  and 
science  and  technology.  Our  comparative 
advantage  does  not  rest  in  large  capital 
transfers.  Instead,  we  are  now  concen- 
trating on  activities  which  address  host 
country  constraints  to  self-sustaining 
development  such  as  weak  human  and 
institutional  capacity,  and  the  lack  of 
new,  appropriate  technologies.  We  are 
allocating  our  resources  to  develop 
lasting  institutional  systems  to  carry  out 
the  development  process.  By  developing 
institutions,  be  they  in  primary  health 
care  or  agricultural  research,  we  can 
leave  in  place  structures  that  will  have 
ramifications  far  beyond  the  individual 
project  level.  And  we  have  begun  to  em- 
phasize the  development  and  transfer  of 
knowledge  and  appropriate  technologies 
rather  than  capital. 

We  also  are  paying  greater  attention 
to  efforts  to  mobilize  other  resources— 
in  the  private  sector,  both  from  private 
enterprise  and  from  nonprofit  organiza- 
tions such  as  private  and  voluntary 
organizations  and  universities,  and  that 
of  other  donors,  both  bilateral  and  multi- 
lateral— and  we  strive  to  ensure  our 
assistance  complements  that  of  these 
other  sources  of  development  resources. 
Also  with  respect  to  mobilizing  the 
private  sector,  we  seek  to  emphasize  the 
involvement  of  the  indigenous  private 
sector  as  a  development  resource.  Too 
often  in  the  past,  there  was  a  tendency 
to  rely  on  government  as  the  only  way 
to  carry  out  key  development  functions 


and  thus  a  tendency  to  neglect  the 
useful  role  that  the  private  sector  can 
play  in  advancing  our  efforts. 

These  four  priorities— policy 
reforms,  involvement  of  the  private  sec- 
tor, institutional  development,  and 
transfer  of  science  and  technology- 
have  become  known  within  the  agency 
as  the  "four  pillars"  of  our  development 
effort.  It  is  through  these  four  pillars 
that  we  can  achieve  the  kind  of  foreign 
assistance  program  envisioned  by  the 
President— one  which  seeks  to  foster 
self-sustaining  development  by  using  ini- 
tiative and  creativity  to  help  people  help 
themselves  while  at  the  same  time 
stimulating  international  trade  and 
aiding  the  truly  needy.  It  is  a  program 
which  fosters  the  political  atmosphere  in 
host  countries  wherein  practical  solu- 
tions can  be  applied  to  social  and 
economic  problems. 


PROGRAM  STRATEGY 

Our  effort  to  give  greater  coherence  to 
our  overall  development  strategy  has 
recently  been  intensified.  While  we  have 
had  a  country  strategy  programming 
system  in  place  for  several  years  to  set 
the  best  strategy  for  tackling  the  prob- 
lems in  each  country,  we  have  concluded 
that  we  should  give  greater  coherence  to 
our  efforts  and  concentrate  bilateral 
assistance  on  a  limited  set  of  common 
development  problems.  As  a  result,  we 
have  instituted  an  agency  strategic  plan- 
ning process  to  determine  which  key 
development  problems  we  should  focus 
on,  what  goals  we  should  pursue  with 
respect  to  each,  and  how  we  can  best 
use  our  limited  resources  to  achieve 
results. 

While  this  new  strategy  process  is 
still  in  its  early  stages,  we  expect  it  will 
help  us  to  establish  specific  measures  of 
progress  and  program  our  resources  in  a 
comprehensive  manner  against  key  prob- 
lems, rather  than  in  an  isolated,  project- 
by-project  manner.  And  it  ought  to  lead 
us  to  search  for  ways  of  better  focusing 
our  budget  resources  so  that  they  can 
serve  as  encouragement  to  host  coun- 
tries to  engage  with  us  in  comprehensive 
policy  and  investment  decisions  directed 
to  meet  basic  needs.  We  recognize  that 
not  all  countries  share  our  approach  to 
development,  nor  are  many  prepared  to 
take  the  difficult  budget  and  policy  steps 
required  to  tackle  these  problems.  Our 
objective,  though,  is  to  be  in  a  position 
to  encourage  this  way  of  thinking  about 
development,  to  mobilize  resources  in 
the  international  community,  and  to  pro- 


FOREIGN  AID 


vide  significant  support  to  those  nations 
that  are  committed  to  dealing  with  key 
problems. 

A  part  of  our  new  concern  with 
overall  strategy  is  the  effort  I  cited 
earlier  to  fully  integrate  the  various 
foreign  assistance  programs.  The  in- 
tegration of  the  foreign  assistance 
budget  allowed  us  to  consider  the  total 
level  of  resources  going  to  each  nation, 
rather  than  allocating  each  program 
separately  as  in  the  past.  In  setting 
country  program  levels,  we  carefully 
considered  both  the  relationship  of  each 
recipient  to  U.S.  foreign  policy  priorities 
and  the  developmental,  economic,  and 
security  needs  of  the  country.  This  proc- 
ess permitted  us  to  better  tailor  the  pro- 
gram mix  to  fit  both  the  country's  needs 
and  our  own  policy  objectives  within 
overall  program  availabilities. 

I  think  the  Sudan  is  a  good  example 
of  a  program  where  we  are  combining 
all  our  resources — development 
assistance,  ESF,  and  PL  480— in  sup- 
port of  both  short-term  economic 
stabilization  and  longer  term  develop- 
ment goals.  Resources  are  being  used  to 
complement  our  efforts.  ESF  funds  will 
provide  greatly  needed  foreign  exchange 
to  finance  such  agricultural  inputs  as 
fertilizer  and  spare  parts,  as  well  as 
capital  equipment  for  the  indigenous 
private  sector.  ESF  is  used  to  encourage 
the  Sudanese  to  implement  the 
macroeconomic  policy  reforms  estab- 
lished by  the  IMF  which  will  help  the 
country  overcome  its  immediate  revenue 
shortfall.  Our  PL  480  program  has  been 
successfully  conditioned  on  such  critical 
agricultural  policy  reforms  as  the 
elimination  of  subsidies  on  imported 
food  commodities,  maintenance  of  a 
realistic  exchange  rate,  and  elimination 
of  export  duties.  The  removal  of  these 
policy  constraints  is  essential  to  provide 
an  immediate  incentive  to  increase 
agricultural  production.  Our  develop- 
ment assistance  program  is  establishing 
a  strong  institutional  base  in  research 
and  extension  to  increase  food  produc- 
tion on  a  sustained  long-term  basis.  The 
local  currency  generated  from  the  sale 
of  PL  480  commodities  is  helping  to 
defray  some  of  the  costs  required  to  sup- 
port these  institutions  that  are  so 
necessary  to  improve  the  small  farmer's 
production  capacity. 

Bangladesh  is  another  good  example 
of  a  major  recipient  where  we  have  put 
in  place  a  carefully  integrated  program. 
Bangladesh  is  a  large  but  very  poor 
country.  Its  agricultural  sector  has  been 
unable  to  match  population  growth,  and 
it  is  plagued  by  severe  landlessness  and 


rural  unemployment  and  structural  pro- 
grams. The  government  has  made  major 
economic  policy  reforms  to  encourage  in- 
creased food  production,  rationalize  pric- 
ing and  use  of  imported  commodities, 
and  mobilize  domestic  resources.  Our 
development  assistance,  integrated  with 
PL  480  resources,  provides  a  combina- 
tion of  resource  transfers  to  enable  the 
government  to  maximize  the  effective 
utilization  of  their  development 
resources. 

For  example,  the  combination  of 
PL  480  Title  III  and  a  fertilizer  distribu- 
tion project  emphasize  the  promotion  of 
an  increased  role  of  the  private  sector  in 
food  distribution  and  fertilizer 
marketing.  Past  agreements  have  ad- 
dressed foodgrain  price  supports,  ra- 
tionalization of  the  public  foodgrain 
distribution  system,  and  acquisition  and 
management  of  grain  reserves.  The  cur- 
rent agreement  provides  greater  com- 
modity flexibility  and  moves  in  new 
policy  directions,  including  greater 
private  sector  participation  in  foodgrain 
management.  Local  proceeds  generated 
provide  funding  for  projects  essential  to 
the  increase  in  agricultural  production. 

We  have  also  supported  a  major 
roads  project  which,  combined  with 
PL  480  Title  II  Food  for  Work,  is  help- 
ing build  and  maintain  a  significant  por- 
tion of  the  nation's  rural  road  network. 
Major  donor  programs  are  complement- 
ing our  own  efforts— this  year  a  third  of 
the  commitment  by  the  World  Bank's 
concessional  assistance  through  the  In- 
ternational Development  Association 
(IDA)  is  earmarked  for  the  energy  and 
power  sectors,  with  major  contributions 
in  agriculture  and  program  lending. 
Over  60%  of  the  assistance  from  the 
Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB)  is  in 
the  agriculture  sector.  Other  donor 
assistance,  including  that  of  the  UN 
Development  Program  (UNDP)  and  the 
Food  and  Agriculture  Organization 
(FAO),  provides  a  broad  mix  of  project, 
commodity,  and  food  assistance. 


FY  1984  PROGRAM 

With  this  background,  I  would  like  to 
discuss  the  main  points  of  our  proposals 
for  the  next  fiscal  year  and  mention 
some  interesting  new  activities  which  we 
will  be  getting  into. 

We  are  proposing  an  economic 
assistance  program  of  $7.8  billion.  It  is 
only  2.2%  more  than  our  requirements 
for  the  current  fiscal  year,  representing 
no  increase  in  real  terms. 

In  addition  to  our  requests  for  FY 
1983  security  assistance  supplemental 


we  believe  are  necessary  for  hiu'.  i 
ty  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives,  oi  i 
1984  request  for  bilateral  assistant  • 
sists  of  $1.89  billion  for  develupnu-i 
assistance,  $2,949  billion  for  tlu'  K'. 
$22  million  for  the  trade  and  dt.\.  la- 
ment program,  and  $1,052  billion  i 
budget  authority  for  the  PL  4Si  i  I-"'  i 
for  Peace  program. 

Development  Assistance 

The  development  assistance  requL';|j 
eludes  $1,342  billion  for  the  five  fu 
tional  accounts,  $103  million  for  th 
Sahel  development  program,  $7.5 
for  the  support  of  American  schoo 
hospitals  abroad,  $25  million  for  tl 
ternational  disaster  assistance  pro; 
and  $378.5  million  for  AID  operati 
penses.  In  addition,  an  appropriati 
$33.9  million  is  required  for  the  F( 
Service  retirement  fund,  for  which 
authorization  is  already  in  place. 

More  than  three  fourths  of  the 
allocated  directly  to  countries  in  tl 
functional  development  assistance 
counts  are  directed  to  "low  income 
countries— those  with  a  per  capitf 
come  below  $795.  Let  me  discuss 
the  proposed  program  in  each  of  t 
accounts. 

Agriculture,  Rural  Developir 
and  Nutrition.  Our  agriculture,  n 
development,  and  nutrition  progrE 
three  principal  objectives:  (1)  to  he 
crease  and  sustain  the  productivit 
incomes  of  small  farmers,  (2)  to  as 
creation  of  employment  opportuni 
for  the  rural  poor,  and  (3)  to  help 
prove  access  to,  and  use  of,  food, 
program  stresses  the  removal  of  { 
inhibiting  broadly  based  growth;  t 
development  of  private  and  public 
capacity  to  foster  increased  agrici 
production  and  employment  expar 
the  development  and  use  of  imprc 
agricultural  technologies;  and  the 
provement  of  human  resources,  n 
frastructure,  and  the  natural  reso 
base  in  recipient  countries.  A  tota 
$725.2  million  is  proposed  for  the 
agriculture  account.  About  21%)  o 
would  go  to  Africa,  where  popula) 
growth  continues  to  outstrip  food 
duction. 

An  area  of  great  promise  wit! 
account  is  that  of  agricultural  resi 
As  President  Reagan  said  at  the  ^ 
Affairs  Council  meeting  [in  Philad 
on  October  15,  1981]: 

Increasing  food  production  in  develop 
countries  is  critically  important— for  s 
literally  it's  a  matter  of  life  and  death, 
also  an  indispensable  basis  for  overall 


FOREIGN  AID 


opnunit.  The  I'nited  States  has  always 
!  food  and  agriculture  an  important  em- 
s  of  its  economic  assistance  programs, 
ave  provided  massive  amoimts  of  food 
•ht  starvation,  but  we  have  also  under- 
I  successful  agricultural  research, 
imed  thousands  of  foreign  students  for 
iction  and  training  at  our  finest  in- 
es,  and  helped  make  discoveries  of  the 
gelding  varieties  of  the  Green  Revolu- 
.vailable  throughout  the  world. 

'articularly  vital  to  the  establish- 
of  self-reliant,  sustainable  food  and 
ultural  systems  are  national  institu- 
that  give  a  country  the  capacity  to 
'ate  and  apply  a  continuing  stream 
lovations  designed  to  increase 
ultural  productivity  and  incomes 

0  evaluate  and  adapt  technologies 
ferred  from  developed  countries 
iternational  institutions.  Advances 
id  and  agricultural  science  and 
olog>'  have  not  only  increased  pro- 
nty  but  have  also  facilitated  the 
itution  of  less  expensive  and  more 
iant  resources  for  more  expensive 
icreasingly  scarce  resources. 

ID  supports  this  research,  often 
ng  through  the  Title  XII  land- 
institutions,  through  creation  and 
tthening  of  research  institutions. 
•e  giving  attention  to  adapting  ex- 
research  results  and  to  promoting 
e  of  improved  technologies.  We 
ving  special  attention  to  encourag- 
ikages  among  researchers,  exten- 
jents,  and  farmers.  And  we  are 
•aging  development  of  systems 
ptimize  sustained  resource  use,  in- 
J  the  capabilities  of  farmers  on 
loldings. 

e  have  recently  undertaken  a 
gh  review  of  our  agricultural 
ch  needs,  and  I  am  happy  to  tell 
several  innovative  directions  we 
undertaking  over  the  next 

1  years.  We  will  be  getting  into 

;h  on  farm  systems  for  fragile  en- 
lents  and  for  remote  areas,  which 
ninimum  of  purchased  inputs; 
;h  on  better  crop  and  animal  pro- 
,  including  integrated  pest 
ement;  on  livestock  as  part  of 
farming  systems;  on  the  evalua- 
the  impacts  of  food  and 
tural  policies  on  food  security, 
m,  production  incentives,  and  the 
)or;  and  on  the  factors  necessary 
Eessful  dissemination  of  research 

Julation.  The  AID  population 
•n  addresses  the  critical  problem 
ssive  population  growth  in  the 
Vorld,  which  constitutes  the 
r  obstacle  to  increasing  per  capita 
oduction,  reducing  malnutrition 


and  chronic  disease,  and  conserving 
dwindling  nonrenewable  resources. 
aid's  population  program  emphasizes 
the  provision  of  voluntary  family  plan- 
ning services  and  information,  but  our 
overall  development  program  recognizes 
the  links  between  family  planning  and 
progress  in  the  areas  of  agriculture, 
rural  development,  health,  and  education 
programs. 

Our  program  is  based  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  voluntarism  and  informed 
choice.  We  give  preference  in  our  fund- 
ing to  programs  that  provide  a  wide 
range  of  choices  of  methods— excluding 
abortion— and  strongly  encourage  the 
inclusion  of  information  and  services 
related  to  natural  family  planning 
methods  wherever  this  is  appropriate. 

We  also  believe  that  the  United 
States  has  the  responsibility  to  help 
strengthen  the  institutional'  capacity  of 
developing  countries  to  deliver  basic 
services  and  implement  development 
programs  themselves,  using  local  in- 
frastructures and  the  private  sector  to 
the  maximum  extent  possible.  For  this 
reason,  we  are  investing  heavily  in  the 
training  of  service  providers  and  person- 
nel who  manage  service  programs. 

A  level  of  $212.2  million  is  requested 
for  the  population  program.  Well  over 
80%  of  the  funds  are  for  voluntary  fami- 
ly planning  services  and  related  ac- 
tivities in  country  programs. 

Health.  For  AID's  health  account, 
we  have  proposed  a  program  totaling 
$100.7  million  for  FY  1984.  While  this 
represents  a  decrease  from  the  level  in 
the  current  year,  it  in  no  way  reflects 
any  reduction  in  our  commitment  to  pro- 
viding assistance  in  the  health  area.  Real 
improvements  in  health  status  are  a 
necessary  condition  for  sustained 
economic  development.  The  reduction  in 
health  funding  for  FY  1984  is  the  result 
of  several  short-term  factors  unrelated 
to  our  long-term  commitment  to  this 
area. 

First,  as  a  result  of  our  recently 
completed  analysis  of  health  pro- 
grams— which  culminated  in  a  new 
health  policy  paper— our  health  program 
will  give  greater  emphasis  to  selective 
primary  health  care.  This  new  emphasis 
will  tend  to  be  less  costly,  on  a  project- 
by-project  basis,  than  previous  health  ac- 
tivities, such  as  commodities  and  con- 
struction, and  will  permit  us,  in  the  long 
run,  to  do  more  with  our  available 
resources. 

Second,  our  FY  1984  requirements 
reflect  the  fact  that  we  were  able  to  do 
some  accelerated  programming  which 
would  otherwise  have  had  to  await  FY 
1984  funding. 


Third,  we  anticipated,  and  indeed 
are  seeing,  a  short  hiatus  in  require- 
ments for  health  funding  while  our  field 
missions  identify  and  develop  projects 
consistent  with  the  new  health  policy. 

In  fact,  we  are  already  working  to 
develop  promising  new  health  programs 
in  several  areas,  including  the  following. 

•  The  U.S.  development  assistance 
program  will  continue  to  give  great  at- 
tention to  biomedical  research  leading 
to  the  development  and  application  of 
new  technologies  to  alleviate  the  most 
pressing  health  problems  in  the  develop- 
ing world.  This  will  include  support  for 
basic  research,  such  as  that  done  on 
malaria,  in  which,  by  the  way,  a  major 
breakthrough  was  made  this  past  year 
that  puts  us  one  step  closer  to  an  anti- 
malarial vaccine.  And  it  includes  support 
for  research  aimed  at  the  application  of 
new  technologies,  including  rapid 
diagnosis  of  diseases  and  field  testing  of 
new  vaccines. 

•  Another  exciting  new  area  in 
health  is  that  of  oral  rehydration 
therapy  (ORT).  Diarrheal  disease  cur- 
rently kills  an  estimated  5  million  infants 
and  young  children  each  year.  It  is  the 
largest  single  cause  of  death  among 
children  in  the  developing  world.  Yet 
ORT,  a  simple  home  treatment  for  diar- 
rhea, could  save  the  lives  of  up  to  13,000 
children  every  day.  It  can  be  adminis- 
tered effectively  at  home  by  mothers,  is 
nothing  more  than  repeatedly  feeding  a 
dehydrated  child  a  mixture  of  salt, 
sugar,  and  water.  ORT  is  the  preferred 
therapy  in  all  but  the  most  severe  cases 
of  diarrhea  and  dehydration.  It  has  been 
hailed  as  potentially  the  most  significant 
medical  breakthrough  of  the  century. 

We  have  supported  ORT  research, 
largely  through  funding  the  Interna- 
tional Center  for  Diarrheal  Disease 
Research  in  Bangladesh,  where  much  of 
the  basic  research  on  ORT  was  con- 
ducted. In  FY  1984,  we  hope  to  expand 
our  support  for  ORT  research  to  include 
the  diarrheal  disease  research  program 
sponsored  by  the  World  Health  Organi- 
zation (WHO). 

AID  also  has  been  instrumental  in 
the  dissemination  of  ORT.  One  AID- 
funded  ORT  program  in  Egypt  demon- 
strated that  widespread  use  of  this 
therapy  could  reduce  deaths  among 
children  under  the  age  of  6  by  40-50%. 
We  plan  to  include  ORT  as  a  critical 
element  of  our  primary  health  care  pro- 
grams. We  intend  to  provide  resources 
for  dissemination  of  ORT  through 
numerous  bilateral  health  programs  and 
through  a  centrally  funded  project  aimed 
at  rapid  implementation  of  selected,  ef- 


FOREIGN  AID 


fective  health  measures.  We  also  are 
planning  a  major  international  confer- 
ence in  June  1983  to  call  the  attention  of 
international  donors  and  developing 
country  leaders  to  this  important  health 
breakthrough. 

I  believe  that  these  and  other  new 
activities  in  health  should  lead  to  addi- 
tional, higher  priority  health  programs 
for  future  funding.  Thus  I  expect  that 
the  decrease  in  FY  1984  requirements 
for  the  health  account  will  be  seen  as  a 
temporary  phenomenon.  I  am  certain 
that  it  does  not  in  any  way  reflect  a 
weakening  of  our  historically  strong  sup- 
port for  health  programs  in  developing 
countries. 

Of  the  amount  we  are  requesting, 
about  30%  would  go  to  Africa,  reflecting 
the  continuing  need  in  those  countries 
for  basic  health  services,  rural  water, 
and  sanitation  programs  and  immuniza- 
tion campaigns  to  combat  diseases  which 
are  a  major  cause  of  death  and  disability 
in  the  region.  In  Asia  and  Latin 
America,  where  health  care  programs 
are  well  under  way,  our  focus  is  on  help- 
ing expand  access  to  basic  health  serv- 
ices. We  also  plan  to  give  increased  at- 
tention to  health  planning  and  manage- 
ment, to  operations  research,  and  to  the 
transfer  of  proven  health  technologies. 

Education  and  Human  Resources. 

In  the  education  program,  we  have  pro- 
posed a  modest  increase  for  FY  1984. 
The  education  situation  in  developing 
countries  remains  critical  despite  signifi- 
cant increases  in  budgetary  allocations 
by  the  developing  countries  themselves 
and  significant  gains  in  school  enroll- 
ment over  the  past  several  decades. 
More  than  30%  of  school-age  children  in 
the  Third  World  do  not  enter  primary 
school  and  less  than  half  of  those  who 
do  will  stay  long  enough  to  complete 
their  primary  education.  Most  countries 
still  confront  severe  shortages  of  trained 
manpower,  particularly  those  needed  to 
administer  their  own  development  pro- 
grams effectively. 

The  education  problems  of  the  Third 
World  far  exceed  our  capacity  to  assist. 
Thus  we  have  given  priority  to  activities 
in  selected  areas  where  we  have  recog- 
nized expertise,  such  as  manpower 
development  and  training,  management 
capacities  of  educational  institutions,  im- 
provement and  expansion  of  basic  pri- 
mary education,  vocational  and  technical 
training,  and  support  for  labor  organiza- 
tions. Our  FY  1984  request  for  educa- 
tion is  $121. ,5  million.  We  would  allocate 
about  30%  to  Latin  America,  principally 
for  manpower  development  activities 
and  for  continued  efforts  to  help  reduce 


high  primary  school  dropout  rates. 
Another  30%  would  go  to  Africa  to  help 
reduce  the  acute  shortage  of  trained  ad- 
ministrators which  constitutes  a  major 
obstacle  to  development. 

I  might  mention,  too,  that  as  a 
promising  new  part  of  our  overall  effort 
to  assist  the  educational  needs  of 
selected  countries,  we  are  exploring  ex- 
pansion of  the  reimbursable  program, 
funded  by  our  trust  fund  account, 
through  which  we  have  helped  countries 
such  as  Nigeria  gain  access  to  institu- 
tions of  higher  education  in  this  country 
for  advanced  training  of  their  citizens. 

Energy,  Private  Voluntary 
Organizations,  and  Selected  Develop- 
ment Activities.  In  the  Section  106  ac- 
count, we  have  proposed  an  increase  to 
fund  several  very  high-priority  activities 
aimed  at  a  broad  range  of  Third  World 
Development  problems.  These  include 
growing  demands  for  energy,  mounting 
environment  and  natural  resources  prob- 
lems, such  as  loss  of  agricultural  land 
and  water  pollution,  growing  unemploy- 
ment, and  problems  associated  with 
migration  to  the  cities  and  rapid  urban 
growth.  Our  FY  1984  authorization  re- 
quest for  Section  106  is  $182.4  million, 
which  includes  $10  million  for  science 
and  technology  activities  also  authorized 
under  this  account.  Planned  activities 
place  a  high  priority  on  mobilizing 
private  sector  involvement,  including 
greater  reliance  on  private  and  volun- 
tary organizations.  Including  all  develop- 
ment accounts,  our  funding  for  private 
and  voluntary  organizations  will  exceed 
13%  of  our  development  assistance  pro- 
gram in  FY  1984.  In  addition  PL  480 
Title  II  voluntary  agency  programs  will 
amount  to  $650  million. 

We  also  plan  to  support  increased 
involvement  of  private  enterprises  in 
development.  As  part  of  that  effort,  we 
are  proposing  the  creation  of  a  new 
private  sector  revolving  fund  through 
which  we  would  provide  funds  to  help 
promote  and  expand  private  enterprises, 
particularly  small  and  medium  enter- 
prises, develop  and  transfer  of  ap- 
propriate technology  to  private  enter- 
prises in  developing  countries,  and 
develop  and  adapt  techniques  and  finan- 
cial intermediaries  that  foster  private 
enterprise  development.  We  would  see 
this  fund  as  a  catalyst  through  which  we 
would  provide  resources  for  innovative 
activities  in  pursuit  of  our  basic  human 
needs  goal  not  possible  under  current 
funding  arrangements. 

Science  and  Technology.  For  the 

$10  million  requested  for  programs  of 
scientific  and  technological  cooperation. 


authorized  as  I  indicated  under  Secti 
106,  we  plan  to  continue  our  emphas 
on  small  competitive  grants  to  stimu 
innovative  research  approaches  to 
development  and  to  build  indigenous 
scientific  and  technological  capacity 
recipient  countries. 

Sahel  Development  Program.  I 

the  Sahel  program,  we  will  be  fundii 
the  seventh  year  of  U.S.  support  for 
ongoing  multinational  effort  to  assis 
development  among  these  very  low 
come,  drought-ravaged  countries,  p£ 
ticularly  to  help  them  achieve  greats 
food  self-sufficiency.  Our  request  foi 
1984  is  $103  million,  including  resur 
tion  of  a  program  in  Chad. 

I  am  well  aware,  in  making  this 
quest,  that  there  have  been  a  numbt 
questions  from  the  Congress  on  pro 
lems  with  financial  management  in  i 
region.  We  have  taken  several  steps 
address  these  problems.  Our  primar 
area  of  emphasis  has  been  host  coui 
accounting  practices.  Our  staff  has 
reviewed  182  accounting  systems  o\ 
the  past  year.  Where  deficiencies  W' 
encountered,  either  they  have  been 
rected  or  the  activities  were  suspen' 
or  terminated.  We  also  have  trainee 
large  number  of  host  country  accou 
ants  and  managers  to  maintain  accc 
ing  systems  acceptable  to  us  and  to 
prove  their  management  of  projects 
And  we  have  taken  steps  to  upgrad 
skills  of  our  own  people  in  project 
monitoring  and  management  to  ensi 
that  our  mission  staff  have  a  thorou 
understanding  of  their  responsibiliti 
for  ensuring  the  proper  use  of  AID 
funds. 

As  a  result  of  these  efforts  over 
past  year,  I  am  convinced  that  the  s 
tion  is  much  improved  and  that  the 
tions  we  have  initiated  will  ensure 
significant  improvement  in  the  mans 
ment  and  accountability  of  AID  funo 

American  Schools  and  Hospital 
Abroad.  This  program  will  permit 
assistance  to  schools  and  hospitals  s 
sored  by  private  U.S.  nonprofit  orgj 
zations  which  serve  as  demonstratio 
centers  for  American  ideas  and  prat 
in  education  and  medicine.  We  plan 
give  priority  to  institutions  in  develo 
countries  that  offer  the  greatest  pot 
tial  for  developing  human  resources 
thering  the  transfer  of  technology,  i 
maintaining  and  improving  their  ow 
financial  well-being.  We  consider  thi 
valuable  program  and  recognize  tha 
Congress  also  feels  it  is  important,  1 
budgetary  constraints  and  past  prac 
have  forced  us  to  hold  our  proposal  i 
$7.5  million. 


54 


Department  of  State  Bu'i' 


FOREIGN  AID 


ternational  Disaster  Assistance. 

saster  assistance  program,  for 
we  have  requested  $25  million  for 
84,  provides  for  emergency  assist- 
3  countries  struck  by  natural 
!rs  and  manmade  catastrophes 
sistance  in  disaster  prediction  and 
edness. 

•crating  Expenses.  For  AID 

ing  expenses,  we  have  requested  a 
f  $378.5  million.  These  funds  pro- 
ir  costs  of  managing  AID's  bilat- 
sistance  program.  They  cover  the 
s  and  operating  costs  of  AID 
larters  and  overseas  operations, 
oposed  increase  is  necessitated  by 
'  rising  costs  overseas  as  well  as 
ect  of  having  had  to  defer  some 
litures  in  the  current  year  as  a 
of  substantial  reductions  from  our 
ted  FY  1983  funding  level. 

ircotics.  In  addition  to  these 
:  requests  within  our  development 
nee  program,  I  would  like  to  men- 
'0  priorities  which  transcend  the 
ual  accounts.  One  is  that  of  nar- 
-eduction.  Income  substitution  ac- 
are  a  major  component  of  U.S. 
to  reduce  illicit  narcotics  and  re- 
|ne  of  aid's  important  objectives, 
rently  have  projects  in  Peru, 
id,  and  Pakistan  that,  in  part,  re- 
;o  the  Oilman  amendment.  Addi- 
rograms  are  being  devised  for 
n  and  Bolivia. 

will  continue  to  take  advantage 
8ts  of  opportunity,  but  we  must 
iful  that  our  ability  to  achieve 
cotics  reduction  objective  is  in 
ds  of  the  host  government.  With- 
rong  commitment  to  enforce  ex- 
ans,  there  is  little  we  can  do.  I 
ure  this  committee  that  we  will 
e  to  discuss  this  subject  at  the 
levels  as  part  of  our  policy 
!  initiative.  We  will  continue  to 
ith  host  governments  and  design 
)lement  projects  that  address 
ment  needs  in  order  to  facilitate 
rernment  enforcement. 

men  in  Development.  A  second 
r"  nt  priority  of  our  overall  pro- 

I  that  of  women  in  development. 
i,"ncy  has,  for  the  first  time  since 
-  lili~!inient  of  the  Women  in 
I  nu'tit  ( )ffice  in  1974,  a  formal 

■  aptr  which  spells  out  how  the 
'  s  '-;'  women  in  the  developing 

■  s  arc  til  be  integrated  into  AID's 
'  1.  .\  primary  objective  of  our 

ein  lii'velopment  policy  is  that  it  is 
alow  for  AID  to  move  beyond  its 
1  niviues  and  take  an  active  role 
»vide  leadership  in  ensuring  that 


women  have  access  to  opportunities  and 
the  benefits  of  economic  development. 
Also  clearly  emphasized  in  AID's  new 
policy  is  the  fact  that,  while  the  Office  of 
Women  in  Development  and  mission  of- 
ficers will  continue  to  support  the  agen- 
cy's personnel  in  their  efforts  to  imple- 
ment women  in  development  activities, 
the  overall  responsibility  for  implemen- 
tation of  this  policy  rests  with  all  AID 
offices  and  bureaus  and  in  all  AID  pro- 
grams and  projects. 

In  this  regard,  a  new  emphasis  is 
underway  within  AID  to  focus  on 
women  without  isolating  them  from  the 
mainstream  of  development.  The  agency 
has  begun  to  move  away  from  doing 
women-specific  projects.  Experience  has 
shown  that  a  more  effective  strategy  is 
to  plan  integrated  projects  which  in- 
cludes the  role  of  women  in  the  initial 
project  design  to  assure  balanced  eco- 
nomic development.  Currently  the  agen- 
cy is  giving  priority  to  four  kinds  of 
women  in  development  activities:  (1) 
those  which  recognize  the  crucial  role  of 
rural  women  in  agricultural  development 
and  target  interventions  to  their  needs; 
(2)  those  which  train  women  in  practical 
income-generating  skills;  (3)  those  which 
assess  women's  needs  for  technological 
innovations  and  encourage  adoption  of 
appropriate  technologies;  and  (4)  those 
which  strengthen  indigenous  organiza- 
tions and  groups  to  enable  them  to  ini- 
tiate and  undertake  activities  which  en- 
courage women  to  become  full  partners 
in  development. 

Economic  Support  Fund  (ESF) 

Our  FY  1984  budget  request  for  the 
ESF  totals  $2,949  billion.  We  are  also 
requesting  a  supplemental  appropriation 
of  $294.5  million  for  the  current  fiscal 
year  to  meet  pressing  needs  for  assist- 
ance in  Lebanon  and  elsewhere.  The 
ESF  program  provides  economic 
assistance  to  help  sustain  economic  and 
political  stability  in  countries  and 
regions  of  strategic  importance  to  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives. 

ESF  also  supports  our  development 
goals  in  many  countries.  Peace  in  the 
Middle  East  continues  to  have  the 
highest  priority  in  the  allocation  of  ESF, 
with  the  result  that  slightly  more  than 
one-half  of  the  ESF  program— just 
under  $1.6  billion— continues  to  be 
allocated  to  countries  in  that  troubled 
region.  Most  of  this  amount  goes  to 
Egypt  and  Israel  to  maintain  balance-of- 
payments  stability,  finance  essential  im- 
ports, and,  in  the  case  of  Egypt,  to 
finance  development  projects  which  are 
increasing  production,  employment,  and 


improving  infrastructure  and  basic  serv- 
ices for  a  wide  spectrum  of  the  Egyptian 
populace. 

ESF  is  a  very  flexible  form  of 
economic  assistance.  It  can  be  par- 
ticularly effective  during  the  current 
worldwide  recession  in  helping  develop- 
ing countries  critical  to  U.S.  foreign 
policy  interests  which  are  confronted 
with  severe  balance-of-payments  prob- 
lems and  stagnating  growth  rates.  We 
must  remember  that  economic  stability 
and  growth  are  mutually  reinforcing. 
ESF  can  provide  essential  resources  for 
stability  and  serve  to  underpin  U.S. 
development  assistance  efforts  and  long- 
term  growth. 

Whereas  the  ESF  requirements  for 
Egypt  and  Israel  have  remained  fairly 
constant,  the  need  for  significant 
amounts  of  economic  assistance  to 
counter  the  effects  of  the  current 
economic  crisis  have  greatly  increased  in 
a  number  of  strategically  important 
developing  countries  in  Africa,  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean,  and  Asia. 


Trade  and  Development  Program 

The  trade  and  development  program  has 
proven  an  effective  mechanism  for  help- 
ing foster  development  in  the  Third 
World  and,  at  the  same  time,  assisting 
in  the  improvement  of  this  country's 
competitive  position  in  world  markets 
which  helps  increase  U.S.  exports.  This 
program  helps  U.S.  firms  get  involved  in 
the  early  planning  stages  of  develop- 
ment projects  in  order  to  improve  their 
position  as  potential  participants  and 
suppliers  of  project  requirements.  It 
focuses  on  projects  involving  technolo- 
gies in  which  we  have  a  comparative  ad- 
vantage, including  high  technology  and 
specialized  U.S.  commodities  and  serv- 
ices. In  FY  1982,  the  trade  and  develop- 
ment program  financed  46  projects, 
potentially  leveraging  more  than  $412 
million  in  U.S.  exports.  Our  request  for 
FY  1984  is  $22  million.  The  proposed  in- 
crease is  based  on  last  year's  demand  for 
trade  and  development  program 
assistance  in  excess  of  $25  million  and 
will  allow  us  to  increase  our  support  for 
development  in  a  way  that  helps  expand 
U.S.  exports. 


PL  480 

Food  security  considerations  have 
played  an  increasingly  important  role  in 
international  discussions  of  food  and 
hunger.  PL  480  food  aid  is  a  valuable 
development  resource  for  enhancing 
food  security  and  reducing  malnutrition. 
It  also  serves  to  augment  local  produc- 


FOREIGN  AID 


tion  in  the  developing  countries— pro- 
vided that  it  is  made  available  under 
conditions  that  support  rather  than  dis- 
courage domestic  food  and  agricultural 
production. 

In  emergencies  or  periods  of  dire 
food  shortages,  international  food  assist- 
ance—led by  the  United  States  as  the 
world's  largest  food  aid  donor— plays  a 
vital  role  in  assuring  food  security.  PL 
480  food  commodities  also  augment 
domestic  food  sales  and  distribution  pro- 
grams and  may  be  used  to  help  build  na- 
tional food  reserves.  Local  currency 
generated  from  these  food  sales  pro- 
vides financial  resources  to  assist  with 
the  development  of  food  and  agricultural 
institutions  and  infrastructure. 

We  seek  to  improve  the  impact  of 
both  PL  480  commodities  and  local  cur- 
rency proceeds  on  food  and  agricultural 
development,  including  increasing  their 
integration  with  other  U.S.  bilateral 
financial  and  technical  assistance  at  both 
the  policy  and  project  levels.  PL  480 
resources  are  also  programmed  to  sup- 
port the  efforts  I  have  mentioned  to  im- 
prove country  policies,  develop  human 
and  institutional  capacity,  and  enhance 
the  role  of  the  private  sector  in  food  and 
agricultural  development. 

For  FY  1984,  we  are  proposing  a 
PL  480  program  totaling  $1,522  billion. 
This  includes  $872  million  for  Title  I 
concessional  sales  and  $650  million  for 
the  Title  II  program.  Taking  into  ac- 
count anticipated  receipts  of  $470 
million  from  the  sale  of  commodities, 
this  would  require  appropriation  of 
$1,052  billion.  Of  the  Title  I  allocations, 
about  83%  would  be  directed  to  the  low 
income  countries.  Approximately  22%  of 
the  $400  million  available  for  com- 
modities in  the  Title  II  program  would 
be  designated  as  an  unallocated  reserve 
for  refugee  feeding  and  emergency  pro- 
grams. The  remaining  78%  will  be  used 
for  regular  programs  of  U.S.  voluntary 
agencies  and  the  World  Food  Program, 
as  well  as  several  government-to- 
government  programs. 

Multilateral  Assistance 

Up  to  this  point,  I  have  emphasized  the 
importance  of  our  bilateral  programs  in 
meeting  our  developmental,  political, 
and  economic  objectives  but,  given  the 
enormity  of  the  problems  facing  the 
developing  nations,  overcoming  them 
will  require  the  joint  efforts  of  indus- 
trialized nations,  multilateral  and  inter- 
national organizations,  and  the  efforts  of 
the  developing  countries  themselves. 

Therefore,  I  believe  that  our  contri- 
butions to  the  various  multilateral 


assistance  efforts  in  which  we  par- 
ticipate are  every  bit  as  important  as 
are  our  bilateral  efforts. 

International  Fund  for  Agri- 
cultural Development  (IFAD).  For 
IFAD,  of  which  I  serve  as  the  U.S. 
Governor  in  my  capacity  as  Acting 
Director  of  IDCA,  we  are  proposing  an 
appropriation  of  $50  million.  This 
amount  would  represent  our  second  pay- 
ment against  a  commitment  of  $180 
million  for  the  first  replenishment  of 
IFAD,  as  authorized  by  Congress  in  FY 
1982.  In  making  this  request,  we  have 
carefully  considered  the  conference 
report  on  the  FY  1983  continuing  reso- 
lution concerning  the  appropriate  source 
of  funding  for  IFAD  and  have  concluded 
that  it  should  be  maintained  as  a 
separate  line  item,  rather  than  being  in- 
cluded within  the  international  organi- 
zations and  programs  account  as  it  was 
this  year. 

IFAD  serves  two  critically  important 
functions.  It  is  the  only  funding  organi- 
zation which  directs  its  resources  solely 
to  the  concerns  of  small  farmers  and 
seeks  to  increase  agricultural  productivi- 
ty in  poorer  countries.  It  is  also  the  only 
international  development  agency  in 
which  OPEC  and  the  Western  in- 
dustrialized nations  have  come  together 
to  provide  resources  on  what  approaches 
a  basis  of  equality. 

While  we  continue  to  share  the  con- 
gressional concerns  about  certain 
aspects  of  IFAD's  operations,  we  believe 
that  it  is,  in  fact,  focusing  effectively  on 
the  kind  of  lending  activities  for  which  it 
was  established.  For  this  reason,  and 
because  the  United  States  was  instru- 
mental in  bringing  IFAD  into  being  as  a 
result  of  the  World  Food  Conference  of 
1974,  our  continued  strong  support  is 
extremely  important  so  that  this  still 
relatively  new  organization  can  con- 
solidate its  progress  to  date. 

Multilateral  Development  Banks. 
With  respect  to  our  proposals  for  fund- 
ing commitments  to  the  multilateral 
development  banks,  when  this  Adminis- 
tration came  into  office,  we  had  a 
number  of  questions  about  the  role  of 
these  banks.  We  undertook  an  assess- 
ment of  our  participation  in  them,  on 
which  we  consulted  with  the  Congress. 
That  assessment  concluded  that  the 
multilateral  banks  can  make  an  impor- 
tant and  cost-effective  contribution  to 
development  which  is  supportive  of  U.S. 
interests.  It  also  found  that  multilateral 
development  banks'  activities  are  com- 
plementary to  bilateral  assistance.  For 
example.  World  Bank  structural  adjust- 
ment lending  reinforces  IMF  programs 


in  helping  developing  countries  to  « 
short-term  financial  crises  and  t  <  i  i 
adjust  economic  policy  to  permit  I'l  ,- 
growth.  More  generally,  multilai''i 
banks  fund  projects  suited  to  tli.ii 
capabilities  and  larger  scale  of  fm:  i 
They  also  replicate  investments  v\   'k 
have  been  tested  on  a  more  liniitiM  m 
experimental  basis  through  bilater  p 
grams. 

The  assessment  did  conclude, 
ever,  that  there  are  some  areas  in 
improvements  could  be  made  in  tl 
the  multilateral  banks  work.  For  t 
pie,  they  could  serve  to  a  greater 
as  bridges  to  private  capital  mark 
expanding  private  cofinancing,  enr 
phasizing  market  incentives,  and  ( 
couraging  the  indigenous  private  i 
We  would  like  them  to  give  great< 
sideration  to  the  effectiveness  of 
borrower-country  economic  policif 
They  also  should  adopt  more  cons 
policies  for  maturation  and  gradui 
of  countries  receiving  multilateral 
resources. 

The  United  States  has  vigoroi 
vocated  that  the  banks  adopt  thes 
ciples,  and  the  multilateral  develo 
banks  have  responded  positively  i 
number  of  instances.  Let  me  cite 
of  these. 

The  Inter-American  Developn 
Bank  (IDB)  and  the  Asian  Develo] 
Bank  (ADB)  are  considering  prop, 
for  equity  financing  facilities.  The 
Bank  is  working  on  a  proposal  foi 
facility  to  provide  for  multilateral 
surance  for  private  investments  a 
recently  agreed  on  a  new  more  co 
tent  graduation  policy  to  move  co' 
above  a  certain  income  level  gradt 
away  from  dependence  on  public 
resources  and  toward  greater  reli: 
on  private  capital  markets.  The  II 
adopted  an  improved  policy  on  pu 
utility  tariffs  to  ensure  more  comj 
cost  coverage  for  projects  it  funds 
We  will  continue  to  look  to  ad 
tional  improvements  in  multilaten 
policies  and  lending  programs,  pai 
ticularly  during  the  course  of  negc 
tions  for  replenishments.  This  was 
case  during  recent  negotiation  of 
African  and  Asian  Development  F 
Current  negotiations  to  generate  i 
resources  for  the  IDB  and  the  AD 
elude  a  number  of  policy  issues  of 
terest  to  the  United  States.  As  we 
further  into  IDA-VII  negotiations 
interest  in  the  reforms  advocated 
assessment  will  loom  large. 

At  the  same  time,  in  order  for 
United  States  to  succeed  in  promc 
improved  bank  lending  policies,  w 
be  seen  as  clearly  prepared  to  mei 


Department  of  State  B 


MIDDLE  EAST 


commitments  on  a  timely  basis. 
iingly,  the  Administration  is  mak- 
3ry  effort  to  meet  current  com- 
nts  to  the  IDA-IV  replenishment, 
isted  by  our  request  for  a  $245 
.  FY  1983  supplemental  appropria- 
hich,  along  with  our  FY  1984  re- 
rf  $1,095  billion,  will  complete  our 
tment. 

ternational  Organizations  and 
ims.  Just  as  the  multilateral 
play  a  critical  role  in  meeting  the 

needs  of  developing  countries, 
jgrams  of  the  international  orga- 
ns, particularly  the  UN  Develop- 
'rogram  (UNDP),  are  important 
iting  their  technical  assistance  and 
g  needs.  And  just  as  we  have  had 
;oncern  about  improving  the  effec- 
58  of  the  banks,  we  have  also  had 
ns  about  some  of  the  UN  pro- 
,  There  has  been  a  tendency  for 
a,ry  increases  in  some  of  these 
,ms  to  outstrip  donor  interest  and 
al  support,  and  in  some  programs 
las  been  a  resulting  thinness  or 
'  focus. 

spite  these  reservations,  though, 
itional  organizations  remain  ex- 
y  important  to  us.  They  provide 
ial  technical  and  training  help, 
n  sensitive  areas  where  recipients 

reluctant  to  depend  on  bilateral 
nee  and  often  on  a  broader  range 
>lems  than  can  individual  donors. 
Iso  frequently  galvanize  attention 

cal  development  problems -such 
:CEF's  [UN  Children's  Fund]  cur- 

iphasis  on  the  problems  of  child 

ty  and  the  World  Food  Council's 

to  help  food-short  poor  countries 
and  implement  long-range  food 

ies  to  meet  the  needs  of  their 

these  reasons,  the  United  States 

committed  to  supporting  those 
tional  organization  programs 
re  properly  focused,  which  are 
essive  in  scale,  and  which  remain 
d  from  political  and  ideological 
We  are  upgrading  our  capacity 

with  them  to  improve  program 
and  hold  down  budgetary 

i. 

effectiveness  of  all  development 
ce  also  depends  on  close  under- 
js  among  the  donor  nations 
ves.  New,  intensified  efforts  to 
)ser  cooperation  with  other  donor 
—OPEC  countries  as  well  as  the 
lal  donors— are  underway. 

t  we  are  trying  to  achieve  by 

)le  process  is  better  use  of  all 

going  to  development— our 


own  bilateral  assistance,  resources  pro- 
vided by  multilateral  and  international 
organizations,  financing  coming  from 
other  bilateral  donors,  private  capital 
flows,  and  the  resources  developing 
countries  themselves  invest  in  their  own 
development  programs.  This  objective 
requires  better  mutual  understanding 
about  critical  policy  issues  and  the  best 
approaches  to  the  range  of  development 
issues— from  improving  agricultural  pro- 


duction to  organizing  better  low-cost 
health  delivery  systems— and  the  means 
by  which  donors  and  recipients  can  best 
work  together  so  that  each  one's  efforts 
reinforce  the  others.' 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 


by  Nicholas  A.  Veliotes 

Statement  before  the  Siihroiniinlfi-  on 
Near  Eastern  and  South  .\>iiiiii  Ajjairs 
of  the  Senate  Foreign  Rt'lalnuis  Cottimit- 
tee  on  March  2,  1983.  Ambassador 
Veliotes  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near 
Eastern  and  South  Asian  Affairs.^ 


I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  : 
before  the  committee  in  support  of  the 
Administration's  1984  foreign  assistance 
request  for  the  Near  East  and  South 
Asia.  Secretary  Shultz  and  Under 
Secretary  [for  Security  Assistance, 
Science,  and  Technology]  Schneider,  in 
recent  testimony  before  congressional 
committees,  have  presented  the  overall 
policy  guiding  our  foreign  assistance 
programs  for  the  region. 

They  stated  that  our  security  and 
economic  assistance  programs  are 
designed  to  maximize  the  benefits  to  the 
national  interests  of  the  United  States 
by  supporting  a  variety  of  foreign  piolicy, 
strategic,  and  developmental  objectives 
which  are  vital  to  our  own  peace,  securi- 
ty, and  well-being. 


U.S.  OBJECTIVES 

The  Administration's  proposals  reflect 
the  realities  of  our  foreign  policy  and  na- 
tional security  objectives  in  this  region, 
which  for  the  past  quarter  century  has 
threatened  to  place  the  United  States  in 
potentially  serious  world  confrontation. 
We  are  actively  pursuing  a  just  and 
lasting  Middle  East  peace.  Our  policy 
flows  from  the  President's  initiative  of 
last  September  which  is  based  on  U.N. 
Security  Council  Resolutions  242  and 
338  and  the  Camp  David  framework. 
Our  immediate  goal  is  the  resumption  of 
negotiations  which  will  include  a  Jordan- 


ian delegation,  hopefully  with  represen- 
tative Palestinian  participation.  'Those 
negotiations  should  result  first  in  the 
establishment  of  a  transitional  regime  on 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and  then  in  an 
agreement  on  the  final  status  of  those 
territories. 

We  are  vigorously  pursuing  negotia- 
tions for  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  from  Lebanon.  Our  objective  is  to 
restore  Lebanese  sovereignty  and  en- 
sure Israeli  security.  A  peaceful 
Lebanon,  free  from  all  foreign  forces 
and  with  a  stable  central  government, 
will  make  a  major  contribution  to  Israeli 
security. 

We  are  working  with  friendly  coun- 
tries to  safeguard  our  vital  interests  in 
Southwest  Asia. 

We  continue  to  emphasize  our  sup- 
port, publicly  and  privately,  for  a 
peaceful,  early  resolution  of  the 
devastating  war  between  Iraq  and  Iran 
on  a  basis  which  preserves  the  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity  of 
both  countries.  Continuation  of  the  war 
endangers  the  peace  and  security  of  all 
nations  in  the  gulf  region  and  in  our 
view  serves  neither  the  interests  of  Iraq 
nor  Iran,  nor  does  it  serve  any  U.S.  in- 
terest or  those  of  our  allies. 

We  are  searching  for  the  return  of 
peace  of  the  suffering  people  of 
Afghanistan,  which  must  be  achieved  in 
the  context  of  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet 
military  forces,  the  restoration  of 
Afghanistan's  independence  and  non- 
aligned  status,  the  right  of  the  Afghan 
people  to  form  a  government  of  their 
own  choosing,  and  the  creation  of  condi- 
tions which  will  permit  the  3  million 
Afghan  refugees  to  return  to  their 
homes  with  honor. 

In  our  efforts  to  advance  the  Middle 
East  peace  process  and  to  promote  the 


MIDDLE  EAST 


resolution  of  conflicts  elsewhere  in  the 
region,  we  recognize  that  the  necessary 
spirit  of  accommodation  can  grow  more 
easily  if  friendly  states  feel  secure  and 
confident  of  U.S.  support.  Important 
steps  have  been  taken  to  bolster  the  con- 
fidence of  key  countries  in  our  commit- 
ment to  their  security.  In  a  time  of 
budget  stringencies,  we  have,  with  con- 
siderable sacrifice,  increased  the  na- 
tional resources  for  our  own  military  to 
develop  their  capability  to  deter  threats 
to  the  region. 

We  must  provide  the  resources  com- 
mensurate with  the  need  to  strengthen 
the  economies  and  defense  capabilities  of 
key  countries  in  this  vital  area  of  the 
world  if  we  are  to  advance  major  U.S. 
national  interests. 


PROPOSED  ASSISTANCE 

The  levels  and  terms  of  our  proposed 
assistance  have  been  carefully  developed 
within  the  constraints  of  our  budget 
stringencies  and  the  President's 
economic  program  and  are  the  amounts 
needed  to  meet  the  essential  re- 
quirements of  the  countries  of  this 
region. 

Our  FY  1984  foreign  assistance  re- 
quest for  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
will  fund  six  major  programs: 

•  $3,625  million  in  foreign  military 
sales  (FMS)  guarantees; 

•  $1,095  million  in  grant  military 
assistance  programs  (MAP),  including 
forgiven  FMS  credits  for  Israel  and 
Egypt; 

•  $11.22  million  in  international 
military  education  and  training  (IMET); 

•  $1,817  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF); 

•  $269.8  million  in  development 
assistance;  and 

•  $588  million  in  PL  480  (Food  for 
Peace  program). 

It  is  important  to  note  here  that  the 
FY  1983  continuing  resolution  fell  sub- 
stantially below  the  level  of  our  request 
for  the  region,  particularly  regarding 
programs  for  Southwest  Asian  coun- 
tries. The  amount  received  is  inadequate 
to  meet  our  minimum  security  require- 
ments in  the  area.  Therefore,  we  are  re- 
questing an  FY  1983  supplemental  of 
$251  million  for  Lebanon  and  $205.5 
million  to  make  up  shortfalls  in  the  1983 
program  for  other  Near  East  and  South 
Asian  countries. 


Middle  East 

Our  highest  priority  continues  to  be  fur- 
thering the  Middle  East  peace  process  to 
bring  a  just  and  lasting  end  to  the  tur- 
moil that  has  engulfed  and  threatened 
this  area  for  so  many  decades.  As 
events  of  the  past  year  demonstrated, 
there  are  no  quick  and  easy  solutions  for 
peace  in  the  region,  and  resort  to  armed 
conflict  remains  an  ever  present  danger. 
However,  the  tragic  conflict  in  Lebanon 
may  provide  us  with  new  opportunities 
to  expand  the  peace  process,  as  stated  in 
the  President's  Middle  East  peace  ini- 
tiative last  September. 

Israel  and  Egypt  remain  our  prin- 
cipal partners  in  the  quest  for  peace, 
and  these  two  nations  are  the  largest 
recipients  of  our  proposed  foreign 
assistance  for  FY  1984.  This  assistance 
is  aimed  at  ensuring  their  security  and 
economic  well-being  as  they  continue  to 
take  risks  in  pursuing  the  peace  process 
begun  at  Camp  David.  Other  states 
critical  to  the  peace  process,  such  as  Jor- 
dan and  Lebanon,  require  our  continued 
support  if  they  are  to  attain  the 
necessary  political  and  economic  con- 
fidence to  join  the  peace  process.  Our 
program  also  seeks  to  encourage  eco- 
nomic and  social  cooperation  in  the 
region. 

In  support  of  this  critical  peace  ef- 
fort we  are  requesting: 

•  $3,130  million  in  FMS,  of  which 
$1,000  million  is  forgiven; 

•  $1,570  million  in  ESF; 

•  $4.75  million  in  IMET; 

•  $260.8  million  in  PL  480  funds; 
and 

•  $6  million  in  development  assist- 
ance. 

Israel.  Support  for  Israel's  security 
and  economic  well-being  has  been  a  fun- 
damental tenet  of  American  foreign 
policy  for  the  past  34  years.  As  we  im- 
plement and  expand  the  process  of 
peace,  Israel  requires  tangible  evidence 
that  the  U.S.  commitment  to  this  proc- 
ess in  no  way  reduces  our  commitment 
to  Israel's  continued  security. 

We  must  ensure  that  Israel  main- 
tains its  technological  edge  in  military 
capability  in  the  region.  At  the  same 
time,  we  recognize  that  a  strong 
economy  is  an  essential  foundation  to 
Israel's  security.  Hence,  the  proposed 
$2,485  million  FY  1984  military  and 
economic  assistance  package  for  Israel 
continues  to  be  our  largest  bilateral  aid 
program. 

The  $1,700  million  FMS  request  for 
Israel  includes  $550  million  forgiven 
credits.  As  further  assurance  for  Israel's 


security,  we  have  increased  the  F' 
level  by  $300  million  for  FY  1 
1984. 

The  proposed  $785  million  Isr 
ESF  program  is  to  be  all  grant.  1 
program  provides  funds  on  a  cas? 
transfer  basis  to  support  Israel'i 
of  payments.  Thus,  Israel  can  im} 
essential  civilian  goods  and  servic 
without  overly  heavy  reliance  on 
cost  commercial  borrowing  or  drj 
down  foreign  exchange  reserves, 
terms  of  our  assistance  were  set 
careful  analysis  of  Israel's  securit 
economic  requirements. 

Egypt.  Egypt  remains  the  ke 
much  of  what  we  hope  to  accomp 
the  Middle  East.  Our  sustained  si 
reflects  our  continued  full  partne 
with  Egypt  in  pursuit  of  peace  in 
region.  The  Mubarak  governmem 
ports  President  Reagan's  Septem 
1982,  peace  initiative,  as  well  as  ■ 
forts  to  resolve  the  crisis  in  Leba 
and  has  called  for  PLO  [Palestim 
Liberation  Organization]  recognit 
Israel.  Egypt  also  shares  our  con 
ment  to  security  and  stability  in  ' 
critically  important  Southwest  A; 
region  in  the  face  of  encroachme 
the  Soviets  and  their  surrogates. 

The  requested  FY  1984  FMS 
ing  for  Egypt  of  $1,300  million  ir 
$4.50  million  in  forgiven  credits, 
strong  affirmation  of  our  long-tei 
military  supply  relationship  with 
FMS  for  FY  1984  will  be  devotee 
progress  payments  on  purchases 
through  1983,  follow-on  support, 
some  start-up  costs  for  programs 
tiated  in  1984. 

Equal  attention  must  be  paid 
maintaining  the  growth  of  Egypt 
economy  and  sustained  expansior 
sectors  of  the  country's  infrastruc 
Economic  aid  will  include  $250  m 
PL  480  Title  I  and  grant  ESF  of 
million.  The  ESF  program  consis 
to  $300  million  in  commodity  imp 
gram  support  and  roughly  $450  r 
in  project  and  sector  assistance.  ] 
phasis  will  be  on  increasing  agrici 
and  industrial  productivity  and 
tation  and  expansion  of  water  am 
systems  in  Egypt's  major  cities. 

Lebanon.  Lebanon  deserves  i 
special  consideration.  I  shall  not  c 
on  the  destruction  in  that  countrj 
result  of  last  year's  conflict.  We  i 
aware  of  those  sad  events.  It  is  c 
important  for  us  now  to  demonst) 
a  concrete  way,  the  U.S.  commitr 
Lebanon's  reconstruction  and  resi 
tion  as  a  sovereign  and  independf" 


Department  of  State  Eil« 


MIDDLE  EAST 


^construction  of  infrastructure  is 

and  requires  immediate  ESF 

;  to  help  get  projects  underway 

the  FY  1984  appri    -iations  cycle 

completed. 

■  these  reasons,  we  have  re- 

a  supplemental  for  FY  1983  of 
illion  ESF,  $100  million  FMS 
;ees,  and  $1  million  IMET.  The 
/el  requested  in  the  supplemental 
obligated  throughout  the  re- 
r  of  FY  1983  and  in  FY  1984. 
ect  that  the  FMS  and  IMET  will 
:ated  during  FY  1983.  Therefore, 
'  is  being  requested  for  Lebanon 
1984;  onlv  FMS  of  $15  million 
iO,000  in  IMET  funds. 

security  needs  of  that  war-torn 

require  our  urgent  attention.  By 
g  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces  to 
;  its  capacity,  we  are  helping  the 
government  reassert  and  extend 
ority  throughout  the  country.  An 
;  in  the  effectiveness  of  the 
56  Armed  Forces  in  maintaining 

security  will  permit  the  eventual 
wal  of  the  multinational  forces 

FMS  program  will  be  supported 
lightly  increased  IMET  program 
-ill  improve  overall  training  of 
ed  forces.  Equipment  and  train- 
is  of  their  forces,  while  urgent, 
id  bv  the  availability  of  military 
'er.  FMS  and  IMET  funds 
n  the  supplemental  are  matched 
bility  of  the  Lebanese  Armed 
;o  absorb  them.  Lower  FMS  and 
;vels  are  sought  in  FY  1984 

the  major  Lebanese  Armed 
mildup  should  have  been  achievd 

'  funds  will  be  used  primarily  to 
ate  and  reconstruct  basic  in- 
ture,  such  as  potable  water 
telecommunications,  and  public 
jrvices,  as  well  as  for  helping 
n  institutions  of  higher  learning 
t  maintain  their  valuable,  long- 
presence  in  the  Middle  East. 

Ian.  The  proposed  FY  1984 
assistance  program  for  Jordan 
of  $115  million  FMS  guarantees 
million  ESF. 

assistance  is  important  to  Jor- 
:urity  and  economic  well-being, 
e  essential  if  that  country  is  to 
icient  confidence  to  enter  the 
ocess  at  this  critical  juncture. 
lays  a  role  in  bolstering  gulf 
and  helped  the  Habib  mission  in 
by  receiving  PLO  fighters  from 
.  Our  strong  support  is  crucial 
n's  ability  to  continue  to  take 
this  kind  in  support  of  our 


shared  objectives  of  furthering  the  peace 
process  and  enhancing  regional  security. 

Jordan  has  an  urgent  requirement 
for  more  modern  armament  in  the  face 
of  the  vast  Soviet  resupply  of  hostile 
Syria,  especially  for  air  defense.  FMS 
financing  assists  Jordan  to  acquire  those 
items  more  critical  to  its  legitimate  self- 
defense  needs. 

ESF  funds  will  aid  the  development 
of  water  and  waste  water  systems, 
health  programs,  agricultural  programs, 
and  Jordan  Valley  irrigation  projects,  as 
well  as  to  provide  development  training. 
IMET  funds  enhance  the  professional 
capability  of  Jordan's  Armed  Forces  and 
assure  that  Jordan  can  continue  its 
training  and  advisory  assistance  role  in 
the  region. 

Under  the  supplemental  request  for 
FY  1983,  Jordan  would  receive  an  addi- 
tional $35  million  in  FMS,  for  a  total  of 
$75  million  FMS  guarantees. 

Regional.  The  regional  program  re- 
quest for  FY  1984  consists  of  $6  million 
in  development  assistance.  $15  million  in 
grant  ESF,  and  $1.9  million  for  PL  480 
title  II. 

The  ESF  furthers  the  Middle  East 
peace  process  by  addressing  objectives 
that  cannot  be  met  through  conventional 
bilateral  programs.  Much  of  the  pro- 
gram is  focused  on  efforts  to  develop 
mutual  understanding  through  collabo- 
rative research  projects  between  Israel 
and  Egypt  and  to  sustain  our  develop- 
ment efforts  in  the  West  Bank  and 
Gaza,  areas  of  importance  to  the  peace 
process.  Development  assistance  pro- 
vides continuation  of  a  scholarship  pro- 
gram at  the  American  University  in 
Beirut  and  the  development  of  Near 
East  assistance  projects. 

Under  the  FY  1983  supplemental  re- 
quest, this  program  would  receive  an  ad- 
ditional $2.5  million  in  ESF,  for  a  total 
of  $15  million. 

Southwest  Asia  and  the  Persian  Gulf 

The  Southwest  Asian-Persian  Gulf 
region,  a  critical  source  of  energy  to  the 
free  world,  is  simultaneously  threatened 
by  the  Soviets  through  Afghanistan  and 
radical  forces  from  within.  Our  program 
is  directed  at  supporting  our  efforts  to 
bolster  the  security  of  countries  both  in 
the  region  and  enroute,  which  are 
crucial  for  U.S.  access  to  and  presence 
in  the  region  in  times  of  crisis.  Almost 
all  of  the  countries,  from  Pakistan  in  the 
east  to  Oman  and  Yemen  and  Tunisia 
and  Morocco  in  the  West,  face  serious 
economic  problems  and  potential  subver- 
sion or  regional  threats  from  Soviet 


proxies.  All  are  important,  not  only  to 
our  strategy'  for  the  security  of 
Southwest  Asia  but  potentially  to  the 
prospects  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East 
as  well.  Many  also  face  severe  economic 
problems  which  must  be  addressed  if 
they  are  to  remain  stable.  Through  our 
assistance,  we  must  provide  tangible 
evidence  of  the  concern  we  share  about 
the  threat  to  the  security  of  this  region. 

For  those  Near  East  and  South 
Asian  countries  that  are  part  of  this 
crucial  region  we  are  requesting: 

•  $495  million  in  FMS  guarantees; 

•  $95  million  in  MAP; 

•  $47  million  in  development 
assistance; 

•  $247  million  in  ESF; 

•  $98.6  million  in  PL  480;  and 

•  $5.8  million  in  IMET  funds. 

Pakistan.  The  security  and  stability 
of  Pakistan  is  a  key  element  in  maintain- 
ing stability  within  South  and  Southwest 
Asia.  Our  renewed  security  relationship 
with  Pakistan  derives  from  that 
country's  position  as  a  front-line  state 
facing  Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan. 
In  addition  to  the  direct  threat  this  ag- 
gression poses  to  Pakistan's  security,  it 
has  created  the  largest  single  refugee 
problem  in  the  world  with  over  2.8 
million  Afghan  refugees  flooding  into 
Pakistan  over  the  past  3  years.  Pakistan 
has  been  extremely  generous  and  forth- 
coming in  granting  long-term  first 
aslyum  to  these  refugees  and  providing 
a  major  share  of  the  resources  to  care 
for  them. 

We  are  proposing  for  Pakistan  $225 
million  in  ESF  ($75  million  in  loans  and 
$150  million  as  grants),  $300  million  in 
FMS  guarantees,  $50  million  in  PL  480, 
and  $800,000  in  IMET  for  FY  1984. 
These  amounts  reflect  the  continuing  im- 
plementation of  our  1981  agreement  to 
provide  Pakistan  with  $3.2  billion  in 
economic  and  military  assistance  over  a 
6-year  period,  subject,  of  course,  to  con- 
gressional appropriation.  This  agree- 
ment was  reached  after  extensive  con- 
sultations with  the  Congress. 

Our  economic  assistance  to  Pakistan 
is  designed  to  strengthen  that  country's 
capacity  to  sustain  self-generating  inter- 
nal development  over  the  near  and 
longer  term,  meet  the  country's  short 
and  medium-term  foreign  exchange 
needs  through  quick  disbursing  ac- 
tivities, and  encourage  and  support 
economic  adjustments  that  will  help 
restore  long-term  stability  to  Pakistan's 
balance  of  payments.  Where  feasible,  we 
are  using  program  resources  to  develop 
economic  alternatives  to  opium  produc- 
tion and  to  induce  the  Government  of 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Pakistan  to  tighten  enforcement  of  the 
ban  on  poppy  cultivation.  Our  develop- 
ment projects  focus  on  agriculture,  rural 
development,  energy,  private  sector 
development,  water  management, 
population  and  health,  and  programs  for 
the  underdeveloped  areas  of  Baluchistan 
and  the  Northwest  Frontier  Province. 

The  FMS  and  IMET  components  are 
designed  to  assist  Pakistan  to  achieve  a 
minimum  level  of  military  modernization 
necessary  to  meet  its  legitimate  defense 
requirements,  specifically  those  arising 
from  the  changed  strategic  situation  in 
the  region  resulting  from  the  Soviet  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan.  The  moderniza- 
tion of  Pakistan's  Armed  Forces  to  be 
supported  by  FMS  financing  will  be 
relatively  modest,  consisting  primarily  of 
replacement  of  obsolete  equipment. 

The  economic  and  military  com- 
ponents of  our  security  assistance  pro- 
gram—by promoting  economic  growth 
and  stability  and  helping  to  meet 
minimum  defense  requirements — com- 
bine to  strengthen  Pakistan  in  its  stand 
against  Soviet  expansionism  in  the 
region.  We  believe  that  strengthening 
Pakistan's  conventional  military  capacity 
will  enhance  its  security  and  may  help 
remove  the  underlying  incentive  for  the 
acquisition  of  a  nuclear  weapons  capa- 
bility. 

Under  the  supplemental  FY  1983  re- 
quest, Pakistan  would  receive  an  addi- 
tional $75  million  in  FMS  guarantees, 
for  a  total  of  $275  million  FMS.  The  Ad- 
ministration believes  every  effort  must 
be  made  to  provide  the  $75  million  and 
thus  bring  FMS  up  to  proposed  levels 
for  FY  1983.  Based  on  our  1981 
understanding,  the  Pakistanis  have 
made  obligations  to  U.S.  defense  con- 
tractors which  for  FY  1983  alone  exceed 
$550  million.  If  targeted  levels  are  not 
reached,  the  Pakistanis  will  be  hard 
pressed  to  meet  their  obligations.  More- 
over, we  are  at  an  early,  sensitive  stage 
of  our  renewed  relationship  with 
Pakistan.  A  significant  shortfall  at  this 
time  would  severely  complicate  efforts 
to  build  a  credible  relationship  with  the 
Government  of  Pakistan  which  is  essen- 
tial to  accomplishing  our  strategic  objec- 
tives. 

Morocco.  For  Morocco  we  propose 
$19  million  in  development  assistance, 
$34.5  million  in  PL  480,  $7  million  in 
ESF,  $30  million  in  MAP,  $60  million  in 
FMS  credits,  and  $1.7  million  in  IMET. 
This  continuing  level  of  support  reflects 
the  serious  economic  difficulties  that 
Morocco  faces,  as  well  as  our  support 
for  that  country's  military  modernization 
program. 


Strategically  located,  Morocco  has  a 
long  record  of  cooperation  with  the 
United  States.  The  government  has  con- 
sistently taken  modern  pro- Western 
positions  on  issues  of  mutual  concern, 
and  its  modernization  also  extends  to  its 
internal  policies.  Our  relations  with 
Morocco  have  been  strengthened  over 
the  past  year,  with  several  exchanges  of 
high-level  visits  and  the  agreement  by 
Morocco  to  provide  transit  access. 

The  development  assistance  program 
contains  a  significant  allocation  for  ex- 
panded efforts  in  rainfed  agriculture,  as 
well  as  programs  for  family  planning, 
nutrition,  and  resource  development. 
After  agreement  with  King  Hassan  in 
May  1982,  we  are  proposing  the  begin- 
ning of  an  ESF  program  for  Morocco  in 
FY  1984.  To  augment  the  development 
assistance  program,  $7  million  ESF  is 
being  requested. 

As  a  key  country  in  North  Africa,  it 
is  in  our  interest  to  see  Morocco  main- 
tain a  suitable  level  of  military  prepared- 
ness. The  FMS  credits  will  help  finance 
completion  of  more  sophisticated 
defense  systems,  including  air  surveil- 
lance equipment,  antiarmor  weapons, 
and  will  purchase  spare  parts  and  serv- 
ices for  previously  supplied  U.S.  equip- 
ment. IMET  funding  will  provide  in- 
creased training  opportunities  for 
Moroccan  military  personnel  directly 
related  to  the  ongoing  modernization 
program  of  the  Moroccan  Armed 
Forces. 

Tunisia.  Tunisia,  a  friend  of  the 
United  States  and  a  force  for  moderniza- 
tion in  the  Arab  world,  is  vulnerable  to 
Qadhafi's  adventures  and  looks  to  us  for 
tangible  support  against  Libya  and  other 
radical  influences  in  the  region.  For  this 
moderate,  strategic  country,  we  are  re- 
questing $90  million  in  FMS,  $50  million 
in  MAP,  $1.7  million  in  IMET,  and  a 
total  of  $11.1  million  in  PL  480. 

Although  we  do  not  intend  to  obli- 
gate any  new  development  assistance 
funds  or  ESF  to  Tunisia,  programs 
funded  earlier  will  continue  to  operate 
for  several  years.  We  will  also  support 
Tunisian  development  through  a  PL  480 
program  aimed  at  improving  the  stag- 
nant agricultural  sector. 

The  security  assistance,  substantially 
the  same  level  requested  last  year,  will 
permit  funding  of  a  minimal  needed 
defense  capability  in  the  form  of  F-5  in- 
terceptor aircraft,  M-60  tanks,  Chapar- 
ral missiles,  and  perhaps  lesser  equip- 
ment. IMET  funds  will  provide  accom- 
panying technical  and  professional  train- 
ing for  members  of  the  Tunisian 
military.  The  $50  million  MAP  in  FY 


1984  will  enable  the  Tunisian  Gov 
ment  to  make  essential  improvem 
its  military  without  adversely  affi 
the  country's  economic  developmt 

Under  the  FY  1983  suppleme 
request,  Tunisia  would  receive  an 
tional  $43  million  in  FMS  and  $3( 
lion  in  MAP,  for  a  total  of  $105  r 
in  FMS  guarantees  and  $35  millic 
MAP. 

Oman.  For  Oman  we  are  req 
$45  million  in  FMS  guarantees,  $ 
in  IMET,  and  $15  million  in  ESF 

By  providing  modest  military 
economic  assistance,  we  demonst 
that  we  are  prepared  to  support 
very  real  security  needs  of  this  si 
country  which  shares  a  common  ' 
with  Soviet-backed  South  Yemen 
which  has  granted  the  U.S.  acces 
military  facilities. 

Our  military  facilities  in  Oma 
crucial  to  any  effort  to  halt  aggr< 
in  the  gulf  area.  Our  FMS  progr; 
vides  funds  to  assist  the  moderni 
of  Oman's  Armed  Forces  so  that 
would  have  the  means  to  help  de: 
these  facilities. 

In  an  effort  to  broaden  our  r 
ship  with  Oman  beyond  its  securi 
aspects,  the  U.S. -Oman  joint  con- 
was  established  in  1980  in  conjur 
with  the  facilities  access  agreeme 
provide  $5  million  a  year  in  ESF 
to  fund  the  operation  of  the  joint 
mission,  feasibility  and  design  sti, 
technical  assistance,  and  training 
million  ESF  loan  program  has  th 
concentrated  on  water  resources  ^ 
programmed  in  FY  1984  for  scho  ) 
struction. 

Under  the  FY  1983  suppleme! 
quest,  Oman  would  receive  an  adj 
$10  million  in  FMS,  for  a  total  of  j 
million  FMS  guarantees.  J 

Yemen.  For  the  Yemen  Arab^ 
Republic,  we  propose  $28  million  i 
development  assistance,  $15  milli'ii 
MAP,  $1.5  million  in  IMET,  and  : 
million  PL  480  title  I. 

Yemen  concluded  a  cease-fire  ' 
Marxist-led  guerrillas  last  suninie  > 
the  threat  of  outside  militar\-  ;igg  ■ 
persists.  In  addition,  Yemen,  one  ' 
poorest  nations  in  the  region,  exp" 
enced  a  destructive  earthquake  iri 
December  and  is  facing  a  reductiif 
remittance  from  Yemen's  worker  I 
oil-producing  gulf  states.  It  requiii' 
stantial  assistance  to  cope  with  it, 
economic  problems.  I 

Development  assistance  will  ef 
a  series  of  programs  designed  to  f 
basic  human  needs.  MAP  assistari 
required  because  Yemen  is  increa ! 


Department  of  State  E) 


MIDDLE  EAST 


mt  to  utilize  funds  which  would 
its  medium-term  debt  burden, 
ider  the  FY  1983  supplemental  re- 
Yemen  would  receive  an  addi- 
?6  million  in  FMS  credits,  for  a 
f  $10  million  FMS,  and  $4  million 
P,  for  a  total  of  $5  million  MAP. 

Asia 

th  Asia,  there  is  a  clear 
itarian  need  for  assistance  to 
es  which  have  low  levels  of  per 
income,  high  population  growth 
ind  low  levels  of  literacy.  Bangla- 
ndia,  Nepal,  and  Sri  Lanka  all 
lade  commendable  progress  in 
lie  development,  an  investment  in 
lire  which  we  should  protect  with 
ling  assistance.  Viable  economies 
,ble  political  institutions  are 
il  if  South  Asia  is  to  continue  to 
)  as  a  system  of  independent 
:apable  of  playing  a  constructive 
world  affairs  and  in  regard  to  the 
ireas  of  conflict  on  each  flank.  In- 
ich  is  a  signficant  trading  part- 
j  other  countries  in  this  region 
irly  important  to  broader  U.S. 
c  interests. 

propose  in  FY  1984  for  South 
ountries: 

217  million  in  development 
i.ce; 

229  million  in  PL  480;  and 
370,000  in  IMET.  This  program 
essentially  at  the  same  levels  as 
i,  both  on  a  regional  and  a  coun- 

3. 

ia.  For  India  in  FY  1984,  we  are 

$86  million  in  development 
ce,  $105.4  million  in  PL  480  title 
5200,000  in  IMET.  Though  small 

of  India's  requirement,  our  aid 
ngible  and  valuable  way  in 
e  demonstrate  the  U.S.  desire  to 
1  constructive  ties  with  this 
)werful,  and  democratic  nation. 
a  key  nation  in  a  region  of  the 
iportant  to  U.S.  strategic  in- 
Its  influential  role  as  spokesman 

velopiing  nations  will  be  en- 
vhen  it  takes  over  the  chairman- 
he  Nonaligned  Movement  this 

aid  program  directly  and  in- 
supports  the  joint  efforts  to  im- 
ateral  relations  through  a  vari- 
lys,  including  the  initiatives 
enhancing  commercial,  scien- 
1  technological  cooperation  an- 
at  the  time  of  Prime  Minister 
visit  last  July.  The  strength  of 
era]  relationship  can  help 
16  impact  of  differences  be- 


tween us  and  the  Indians  on  regional 
and  international  issues. 

Bangladesh.  For  Bangladesh  we  are 
proposing  $77  million  in  development 
assistance,  $65  million  in  PL  480  Titles  I 
and  III,  $28  million  in  PL  480  Title  II, 
and  $225,000  in  IMET.  Economic  devel- 
opment and  political  stability  are  inex- 
tricably linked  in  Bangladesh,  a  nation 
born  in  turmoil  and  struggling  with 
severe  political  and  economic  difficulties. 
Bangladesh  is  seen  as  a  moderating  in- 
fluence in  the  Third  World  and  is  often 
in  agreement  with  us  on  international 
issues  of  importance.  Our  assistance  pro- 
gram has  evolved  from  emergency  relief 
to  long-term  development,  which  we 
hope  can  foster  stability  and  encourage 
civilian  representative  rule. 

Sri  Lanka.  For  Sri  Lanka  we  are 
proposing  $40.3  million  in  development 
assistance,  $30.7  million  in  PL  480,  and 
$150,000  in  IMET.  Sri  Lanka  is  strate- 
gically located  astride  the  major  trade 
routes  of  the  Indian  Ocean  and  offers 
access  for  U.S.  Navy  vessels.  Our 
economic  development  program  serves 
to  demonstrate  strong  U.S.  support  for 
this  nonaligned  and  democratic  nation. 
The  recently  reelected  government 
favors  a  market-oriented,  free  enterprise 
economic  philosophy.  Sri  Lanka  plays  an 
important  and  constructive  role  in  inter- 
national fora  and  the  Nonaligned  Move- 
ment. Our  assistance  contributes  to  the 
stability  of  the  country,  its  continuing 
adherence  to  democratic  values  and 
human  rights,  and  the  success  of  a  prag- 
matic path  to  economic  development. 


Nepal.  For  Nepal  we  are  proposing 
$13.5  million  in  development  assistance 
and  $95,000  in  IMET.  Nepal  forms  an 
important  buffer  between  India  and 
China.  U.S.  interests  center  on  its 
strategic  location  and  on  our  resultant 
interest  in  economic  progress  in  this 
least  developed  among  nations  and  the 
evolution  of  orderly  political  institutions. 
We  value  our  relations  with  this 
moderate  nonaligned  country,  which  has 
made  important  contributions  to  U.N. 
peacekeeping  efforts  in  the  Middle  East. 


CONCLUSION 

To  conclude  we  believe  that  all  of  the 
proposed  levels  are  necessary  and  direct- 
ly relevant  to  our  major  interests  in  this 
critical  part  of  the  world.  Through  our 
foreign  assistance  program,  we  seek  to 
assist  friendly  strategic  countries  in  pro- 
moting the  peaceful  solution  of  conflicts, 
strengthening  their  security,  and  pro- 
viding a  better  life  for  their  people.  In 
the  process,  we  protect  and  promote 
vital  American  national  interests 
throughout  the  region.  We  remain  com- 
mitted to  these  objectives  as  crucial  to 
U.S.  national  interests,  and  the  Adminis- 
tration is  convinced  that  the  budget 
figures  which  we  are  proposing  for  FY 
1984  are  the  minimum  required  for 
achieving  these  policy  goals. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Israel 


by  Nicholas  A.  Veliotes 

Statemerit  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
February  28,  1983.  Ambassador  Veliotes 
is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
and  South  Asian  Affairs. ' 

I  am  very  pleased  to  be  here  today  to 
testify  in  support  of  our  military  and 
economic  assistance  programs  for  Israel 
for  FY  1984.  The  Administration  is  pro- 
posing a  funding  level  of  $1.7  billion  in 
foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  financing 
and  $785  million  in  economic  support 
funds  (ESF).  The  overall  level  of  $2,485 
billion  in  combined  military  and 
economic  assistance  for  Israel  would  be 


the  largest  U.S.  bilateral  assistance  pro- 
gram. 

I  am  particularly  pleased  to  be  here 
on  this  occasion  because  I  sense  a  need 
not  just  to  discuss  the  level  and  terms  of 
our  assistance  proposals  but  to  place  this 
program  in  the  perspective  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives.  In  one  sense, 
much  of  what  we  have  to  say  will  not  be 
new  to  this  subcommittee.  A  year  ago  at 
about  this  time,  this  subcommittee  was 
told  the  following: 

We  are  .  .  .  in  the  midst  of  an  extremely 
tense  period,  affecting  not  only  Israel  but  the 
entire  region. 

The  presentation  and  examination  of  our 
foreign  assistance  proposals  are  taking  place 
at  a  particularly  sensitive  juncture  in  Israel 
itself 


MIDDLE  EAST 


These  same  observations  could  be 
made  today,  but  the  specific  events  and 
immediate  problems  have  changed.  The 
events  of  the  last  year— as  momentous 
and  even  tragic  as  they  may  have 
been— have  not  changed  some  funda- 
mental realities  of  the  region  with  which 
we  deal.  Among  these  realities  are  the 
urgency  of  the  need  for  peace;  the  need 
to  support  the  sovereignty,  territorial  in- 
tegrity, and  unity  of  Lebanon;  the  prime 
importance  of  assuring  for  Israel  the 
security  it  requires;  and  the  necessity  of 
addressing  the  legitimate  aspirations  of 
the  Palestinian  people.  This  is,  there- 
fore, an  appropriate  time  to  discuss  the 
role  of  our  assistance  programs  in  Israel 
and  how  they  fit  into  our  larger  strategy 
in  the  region. 

Purpose  of  Our  Assistance 

Support  for  Israel's  security  and 
economic  well-being  is  a  basic,  firm  prin- 
ciple of  American  foreign  policy.  Our 
support  for  Israel  grows  out  of  a  long- 
standing commitment  to  a  free  nation 
which  has  been  a  haven  for  immigrants 
from  all  over  the  world  and  which 
shares  many  of  our  own  social  and 
democratic  traditions. 

Our  security  assistance  programs 
are  designed  to  assist  Israel  in  continu- 
ing to  maintain  its  qualitative  and 
technological  superiority  over  any  poten- 
tial combination  of  regional  forces.  Our 
economic  assistance  helps  Israel  to 
finance  balance-of-payments  deficits. 
Taken  in  combination,  our  programs  are 
the  material  manifestation  of  our  tradi- 
tional commitment  to  Israel. 

While  it  should  be  clear  that  the 
security  of  Israel  occupies  a  central  role 
in  our  concern,  our  objectives  in  the 
Middle  East  continue  to  be  focused  on 
two  mutually  reinforcing  goals:  first,  the 
search  for  a  just  and  lasting  peace  for 
the  region  and,  second,  the  assurance 
that  our  friends  in  the  area  will  be  able 
to  maintain  their  security  against  both 
outside  threats  as  well  as  threats  from 
radical  forces  closer  to  home.  Our  pur- 
suit of  this  overall  objective  requires 
that  we  maintain  and  strengthen  our 
relations  with  other  friendly  moderate 
states  in  the  region  as  well.  The  rela- 
tions which  we  maintain  with  the  states 
of  the  Middle  East  are  obviously  critical 
to  our  ability  to  achieve  those  objectives 
which  we  believe  are  shared  by  Israel. 

The  President  and  Secretary  Shultz 
have  made  crystal  clear  on  many  occa- 
sions in  the  past  few  months  (a)  our  firm 
determination  to  continue  the  search  for 
peace  begun  at  Camp  David  and  re- 


newed in  the  President's  September  1 
initiative,  (b)  our  commitment  to  achieve 
complete  withdrawal  of  foreign  troops 
from  Lebanon  which  will  help  to  return 
stability  to  that  strife-torn  country  and 
will  also  help  to  ensure  the  security  of 
Israel's  northern  border,  and  (c)  our 
fundamental  perception  that  a  lasting 
peace  achieved  through  direct  negoti- 
ations is  the  best  guarantee  of  long-term 
security  for  Israel  and  its  neighbors. 

The  Administration  has  highlighted 
that  its  basic  policies  toward  the  Arab- 
Israeli  problem  are  based  on  the  positive 
benefits  accruing  to  all  parties,  including 
to  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
from  the  resolution  of  these  issues.  We 
have,  through  many  difficult  months, 
continued  a  pattern  of  constant  move- 
ment forward  and  meaningful  consulta- 
tions toward  the  objectives  we  all  share 
both  in  Lebanon  and  with  respect  to  a 
broader  Middle  East  peace.  These  basic 
tenets  guide  our  approach,  and  the 
assistance  programs  you  will  be  con- 
sidering in  the  coming  weeks  are  a  part 
of  this  effort. 

With  these  general  objectives  in 
mind  let  me  turn  to  the  specifics  of  our 
for  Israel. 


Military  Assistance 

We  have  proposed  that  a  total  of  $1.7 
billion  in  military  assistance  be  provided 
for  Israel.  The  bulk  of  this  funding 
would  be  used  for  progress  payments  on 
prior  year  purchases  and  to  initiate  pur- 
chases of  artillery,  missiles,  armored 
personnel  carriers,  and  aircraft  from  the 
United  States.  Our  proposal  includes  an 
increase  in  the  grant  portion  of  that 
assistance  from  $500  million— our  pro- 
posal last  year— to  $550  million  with  the 
remaining  $1.15  billion  to  be  provided  in 
the  form  of  a  30-year  loan  carrying  a 
slightly  concessional  rate  of  interest. 
The  modest  increase  in  grant  funding 
we  propose  is  motivated  by  our  under- 
standing of  Israeli  concerns  over  their 
debt  burden  coupled  with  our  own 
analysis  of  that  situation  and  our  own 
budgetary  constraints. 

Economic  Assistance 

We  are  proposing  a  level  of  $785  mUlion 
in  ESF,  identical  to  the  level  of  the  past 
several  years.  The  program  is  a  cash 
transfer,  and  we  propose  this  year  that 
the  entire  sum  be  provided  as  a  grant. 
Our  decision  to  improve  the  terms  of  our 
proposal  for  ESF  from  the  1-3  loan,  2-3 
grant  ratio  we  have  proposed  in  the  past 
was  motivated  both  by  the  reality  of  the 
fact  that  ESF  assistance  has  been  pro- 


vided to  Israel  on  a  grant  basis  for 
last  four  fiscal  years  and  by  the  slig 
downturn  in  Israel's  export  perforn 
during  the  past  year.  This  decline  i 
function  of  both  the  continued  econ 
problems  from  which  we  and  West< 
Europe  are  suffering,  as  well  as  the 
Government  of  Israel's  domestic 
economic  policies. 

Despite  some  difficulties,  howe- 
preliminary  indications  are  that  caj 
inflows  to  Israel  during  1982  contii 
to  exceed  requirements  as  official 
foreign  exchange  reserves  exceeded 
their  levels  for  1981.  We  continue  jj 
have  strong  confidence  in  Israel's    ' 
economic  potential.  The  levels  and  i 
we  have  proposed  for  our  assistam 
Israel  for  FY  1984  should  be  more 
sufficient  to  meet  the  objectives  of 
program. 

Israel's  Debt  Burden 

Israel's  growing  debt  repayments  ' 
United  States  have  been  a  major  s 
of  concern  to  many  Israeli  officials 
to  members  of  this  committee.  A  c 
examination  of  the  situation,  howe 
reveals  that  Israeli  debt— and  pari 
larly  the  debt-service  burden  assoc- 
with  that  debt— will  be  manageaW 
given  Israeli  policies  and  an  expect 
modest  return  to  growth  in  the  wc 
economy. 

Our  review  of  our  proposals  ol 
ously  had  to  take  into  account  our 
budget  stringencies.  In  reaching  ( 
elusions,  we  weigh  all  factors  to  i 
a  balance.  In  the  real  world  of  bud 
ceilings,  increases  in  assistance,  pi 
ticularly  grant  assistance,  for  one^ 
try  mean  that  funds  will  be  unavai 
to"  achieve  other  objectives.  Under 
proposals  Israel  will  continue  to  re 
funds— both  grant  and  credit— wh 
are  ample  to  meet  our  policy  objec 
in  support  of  the  State  of  Israel. 

Regional  Programs 

In  addition,  we  would  call  attentio 
our  request  for  $15  million  in  ESF 
FY  1984;  $7  million  of  these  monii 
go  toward  sustaining  our  developrS 
efforts  in  the  West  Bank  and  ( laz: 
These  programs  are  implement .-il 
through  American  voluntary  ai;en' 
and  address  needs  in  such  areas  a  ^_ 
tional  and  higher  education,  conin't 
development,  improved  water  stoi« 
and  agricultural  cooperative  mark  }: 
The  program  has  proved  useful  as| 
indication  of  our  humanitarian  cor 
for  the  peoples  of  these  regions,  a" 


Department  of  State  B  ? 


MIDDLE  EAST 


I  urge  its  funding  at  the  level  pro- 

n  additional  $7  million  of  the 
ml  funds  would  finance  cooperative 
ific,  technical,  and  other  activities 
tual  interest  to  Israel  and  its  Arab 
Dors.  The  remaining  $1  million  is 
3ted  for  project  development  and 


support  activities  relating  to  the 
development  of  ESF  country  programs. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  'ZOMYZ.   ■ 


1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Egypt 


jholas  A.  Veliotes 

itemmt  before  the  Subcommittee 
rope  and  the  Middle  Eaftt  of  the 

FnrrniN  AlTnn-sCnwwIttnot, 
.:.    !'.is.:.   ,\,„h„ss,ulnr  \'rlintrs  is 

mth  Asiiui  AijairsA 

sciate  this  opportunity  to  discuss 
ou  the  Administration's  security 
nee  proposals  for  Egypt.  Before 
your  questions,  I  would  like  to 
I  short  statement. 

igyptian  Relations 

■  begin  by  briefly  restating  the 
tions  of  U.S.  policy  toward 

U.S. -Egyptian  relations  are 
i)n  a  shared  strategic  interest  in 
bility  of  the  Middle  East  and  the 
iding  region.  The  Egyptians,  who 
lid  the  heavy  human  and  eco- 
)rice  of  conflict,  fully  understand 
ibility  is  best  achieved  through 
As  a  result,  they  share  with  us  a 
ic  commitment  to  the  peaceful 
1  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict, 
3  the  fundamental  problem  facing 
ion.  This  commitment,  first  made 
ed  on  by  the  late  President 
las  been  reiterated  by  President 
k  and  remains  a  firm  tenet  of 
m  foreign  policy, 
ijle  a  strong  advocate  of  peace, 
like  the  United  States,  under- 
;he  need  to  be  able  to  deter  those 
uld  seek  to  destabilize  the  region 
ipt  to  subvert  friendly  states  in 
I.  The  Mubarak  government 
vith  us  a  concern  about  the 
to  regional  stability  posed  by  the 
or  their  radical  surrogates 
he  region.  Our  military-  coopera- 
Tis  from  this  shared  concern  and 
1  element  in  maintaining  regional 

and  in  deterring  aggression 
thin  or  outside  the  region. 


The  past  year  has  seen  a  number  of 
examples  of  the  importance  of  close 
U.S. -Egyptian  relations.  We  worked 
closely  with  Egypt  and  Israel  to  secure 
final  Israeli  withdrawal  from  the  Sinai  in 
implementation  of  the  Egyptian-Israeli 
Peace  Treaty.  This  successful  exchange 
of  land  for  peace  between  Egypt  and 
Israel  is  the  very  basis  for  our  broader 
peace  efforts  in  the  region.  These  efforts 
continue  to  have  the  full  support  of 
Egypt.  President  Mubarak  has  been  a 
vocal  supporter  of  the  President's 
September  1  peace  initiative,  and  his 
backing  has  complemented  our  efforts  to 
generate  broader  Arab  support  for  an 
expanded  peace  process. 

Egyptian-Israeli  Relations 

I  would  like  briefly  to  review  the  status 
of  Egypt's  relations  with  Israel,  since  I 
know  this  is  a  subject  of  interest  to  the 
committee.  I  note  from  your  report  on 
your  very  useful  trip  to  the  region  last 
fall  that  you  discussed  this  subject  with 
President  Mubarak.  I  know  that  other 
congressional  visitors  to  Egypt  have 
done  so  as  well.  I  would  point  out  that 
President  Mubarak's  statements  to  the 
Congress,  to  this  Administration,  and, 
indeed,  to  the  public  are  strikingly  con- 
sistent on  the  subject  of  peace  with 
Israel.  President  Mubarak's  government 
is  committed  to  a  peaceful  relationship 
with  Israel  in  accordance  with  the  treaty 
between  them  and  to  the  pursuit  of  a 
broader  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 

Despite  Egypt's  commitment  to 
peace  with  Israel,  it  is  fair  to  say  that 
relations  between  the  two  countries  have 
been  strained  by  events  in  Lebanon. 
Egypt  has  recalled  its  ambassador  and 
has  told  the  Israelis  he  will  not  return 
until  there  is  an  announced  plan  for 
Israeli  withdrawal  from  Lebanon.  Israel, 
in  turn,  has  complained  to  Egypt  about 
media  treatment  of  Israel  and  various 
trade  problems.  As  you  know,  both 
states  have  circulated  memoranda  out- 
lining complaints  against  the  other. 


We  have  discussed  our  concerns 
about  these  strains  with  both  govern- 
ments. We  have  urged  both  to  consider 
the  importance  of  their  relationship  to 
the  broader  goal  of  regional  peace  and 
to  be  flexible  in  their  dealings  with  one 
another.  There  is  some  evidence  that 
these  efforts,  plus  the  desire  of  each 
state  to  maintain  a  positive  relationship, 
may  have  begun  to  have  some  effect. 
Delegations  from  the  two  countries  met 
March  2  to  resume  discussions  on  the 
Taba  issue,  which  is  the  major  outstand- 
ing issue  remaining  from  the  Sinai  with- 
drawal. Talks  on  other  issues  of  impor- 
tance to  the  bilateral  relationship  will 
also  be  held  in  the  near  future. 

While  progress  on  Lebanon  is  criti- 
cal to  the  revitalization  of  Egyptian- 
Israeli  relations,  these  direct  bilateral 
talks  are  an  important  step  in  rebuilding 
a  spirit  of  trust  and  confidence  between 
the  two  states.  The  resumption  of  ex- 
panded peace  negotiations,  as  foreseen 
in  the  President's  September  1  initiative, 
would,  of  course,  be  the  strongest 
stimulus  to  improved  Egyptian-Israeli 
relations. 


Administration's  Budget  Request 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  the  Adminis- 
tration's request  for  the  FY  1984  securi- 
ty assistance  request  for  Egypt.  The 
President's  request  for  Egypt  has  three 
components— a  PL  480  title  I  program 
of  $250  million,  an  economic  support 
fund  (ESF)  program  of  $750  mOlion,  and 
a  foreign  military  sales  (FMS)  program 
of  $1.3  bilHon,  of  which  $450  million 
would  be  in  forgiven  credits.  This  re- 
quest is  an  essential  part  of  the  Presi- 
dent's efforts  to  promote  peace  and 
stability  in  the  Middle  East  and  reflects 
the  special  relationship  between  Egypt 
and  the  United  States.  The  individual 
parts  of  our  budget  request  support 
Egyptian  Government  efforts  to 
revitalize  its  economy  and  modernize  its 
military. 

As  your  report  on  your  recent  visit 
to  Egypt  clearly  noted,  Egypt  faces 
serious  economic  problems.  While  the 
economy  is  still  growing,  its  rate  of 
growth  has  slowed  measurably,  and  the 
indications  are  that  this  will  continue.  At 
the  same  time,  foreign  exchange  earn- 
ings from  tourism,  the  Suez  Canal,  oil 
exports,  and  remittances  from  Egyp- 
tians working  overseas  are  all  down. 
The  rapidly  decreasing  price  of  oil  may 
contribute  to  further  declines  in  three  of 
these  four  areas. 

The  Mubarak  government  recognizes 
Egypt's  economic  problems.  President 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Mubarak  has  graphically  outlined  these 
problems  for  the  Egyptian  people, 
speaking  more  frankly  than  any  modern 
Egyptian  head  of  state.  President 
Mubarak  understands  that  change  is 
needed  if  Egypt  is  successfully  to  rebuild 
its  economy  and  achieve  a  better  life  for 
its  people.  Change,  of  course,  means 
economic  reform.  The  Mubarak  govern- 
ment is  implementing  reforms,  although 
not  always  at  the  pace  that  we  and 
others  might  think  best.  But  unlike  the 
past,  the  issue  is  no  longer  whether 
reforms  are  needed  but  rather  the  pace 
at  which  they  are  to  be  implemented. 

Our  military  assistance  program  for 
Egypt  is  designed  to  help  the  Mubarak 
government  modernize  its  military 
establishment,  which  is  still  largely 
equipped  with  aging  Soviet  equipment. 
Egypt  needs  a  credible  military  force  to 
deter  the  direct  threats  to  itself  from 
radical  states  in  the  region  and  to  help 
support  others  from  aggression.  Our 
military  assistance  and  training  pro- 
grams are  critical  parts  of  the  Mubarak 
government's  efforts  to  maintain  a  credi- 
ble military  force.  Given  Egypt's 
economic  problems,  however,  we  have 


sought  to  package  this  assistance  so  it 
will  have  the  lowest  possible  cost  for 
Egypt. 

In  closing,  let  me  reiterate  the 
special  nature  of  our  relationship  with 
Egypt,  which  has  its  roots  in  shared 
strategic  interests  and  a  common  dedica- 
tion to  the  pursuit  of  regional  peace. 
Both  the  economic  and  military  com- 
ponents of  our  security  assistance  pro- 
gram are  designed  to  strengthen  that 
relationship  and  serve  thereby  vital  U.S. 
interests  in  the  Middle  East.  The 
Mubarak  government  sees  this 
assistance  as  a  tangible  demonstration 
of  U.S.  support  and  as  a  key  component 
of  its  own  efforts  to  deal  with  its 
economic  problems  and  to  rebuild  its 
military  strength.  In  short,  this 
assistance  is  an  investment  in  support  of 
not  only  a  key  Middle  Eastern  ally  but 
regional  peace  and  stability  as  well. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t'ne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1983  Supplemental 
Request  for  Lebanon 


by  Nicholas  A.  Veliotes 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Foreign  Operations  of  the  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee  on  March  10, 
1983.  Ambassador  Veliotes  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs.^ 

I  welcome  this  opportunity  to  appear 
before  the  subcommittee  in  support  of 
the  Administration's  supplemental 
foreign  assistance  request  for  Lebanon 
in  FY  1983. 

We  are  requesting  $150  million  in 
economic  support  funds  (ESF),  $100 
million  in  foreign  military  sales  (FMS) 
guarantees,  and  $1  million  in  interna- 
tional military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  funds.  These  funds  are  needed 
now,  to  begin  urgent  projects  which  can- 
not await  the  normal  FY  1984  appro- 
priation cycle. 

The  ESF  funds  will  be  used  primari- 
ly to  rehabilitate  and  reconstruct  basic 
infrastructure,  such  as  potable  water 
systems,  telecommunications,  and  public 
health  services. 


The  funds  we  are  requesting  will 
finance  programs  in  Lebanon  designed 
to  help  rebuild  the  economic  and  securi- 
ty infrastructure  of  that  war-ravaged 
country  by  providing  the  government 
with  the  resources  necessary  to  reestab- 
lish its  sovereign  authority  throughout 
the  country. 

Urgency  of  Reconstruction 

Reconstruction  of  infrastructure  is 
urgent.  The  economy  remains  a 
shambles,  basic  infrastructure  is 
destroyed  or  deteriorated,  the  govern- 
ment cannot  provide  much  in  the  way  of 
basic  services  outside  Beirut,  and  en- 
trepreneurs are  afraid  to  invest  in 
reconstruction  until  they  see  some 
positive  signs  of  improvement.  The 
Government  of  Lebanon  will  need  a 
great  deal  of  assistance  to  accomplish 
the  tasks  before  it,  U.S.  assistance  alone 
will  not  suffice.  Multinational  agencies 
and  other  nations  must  also  help  and,  in- 
deed, have  already  indicated  to  us  their 
willingness  to  do  so.  They  all  are 
waiting,  however,  for  the  political  and 


security  situation  to  improve  and,  c 
course,  for  the  longer  term  stabilit; 
would  be  provided  by  the  complete 
drawal  of  foreign  forces.  Their  ver; 
waiting,  however,  is  contributing  t( 
fact  that,  other  than  the  very  signi 
restoration  of  security  in  Beirut,  pi 
ress  is  limited. 

Thus,  to  an  extent,  Lebanon  is 
caught  in  a  vicious  cycle  of  inactior 
United  States  is  taking  steps  to  he 
break  this  vicious  cycle.  As  a  resul' 
technical  assistance  and  infusions  c 
modest  but  critical  amounts  of  mal 
assistance  from  the  United  States, 
Government  of  Lebanon  is  beginni 
improve  its  organization,  throw  ofl 
torpor  induced  by  years  of  civil  coi 
and  gear  up  to  rehabilitate  and 
reconstruct  basic  infrastructure  in 
to  get  the  economy  moving.  In  Lei 
as  anywhere,  perceptions  are  impc 
As  other  donor  organizations,  such 
the  World  Bank,  and  other  donor  i 
tries  perceive  that  some  progress  i 
ing  made,  there  will  be  a  bandwag 
feet.  Some  other  donors  have  aire; 
agreed  to  participate  in  the  recons 
tion  effort  but  much  more  will  be 
ed.  The  funds  which  the  United  St 
contributes  to  this  reconstruction 
effort— small  in  terms  of  total  nee 
will  allow  vital  reconstruction  to  g 
started  now,  at  a  time  when  other 
watching  and  waiting.  Once  this  i 
begins,  we  fully  expect  it  will  attrj 
funds  from  other  donors;  funds  wl 
will  carry  the  rehabilitation  throug 
completion. 


Strengthening  Lebanese  Military 
Forces 

We  are  strengthening  the  military 
of  the  Government  of  Lebanon  by 
viding  equipment  and  training.  Air 
this  assistance  has  had  a  notable  i 
Lebanon  endured  nearly  8  yeai 
brutal  civil  war  followed  by  the  Isr 
invasion.  During  the  period,  the  : 
of  Lebanon  and  its  residents— as 
measured  in  human  as  well  as  phy; 
terms— has  been  enormous.  Althoi 
the  major  hostilities  are  over,  the  i 
of  the  constant  bloodletting  and  ph 
destruction  are  very  vivid,  and  tod 
agony  goes  on  in  the  form  of  the  c 
tinued  military  occupation  of  most 
Lebanon  by  the  Israeli  defense  for 
the  Syrian  Army,  armed  PLO  [Pal 
Liberation  Organization]  elements, 
other  armed  foreigners.  The  Lebai 
Armed  Forces,  the  legitimate  milit 
arm  of  the  Lebanese  Government, 
trol  only  the  capital  city  of  Beirut. 


Department  of  State  B  e 


MILITARY  AFFAIRS 


le  FMS  program  will  be  supported 
I  slightly  increased  IMET  program 
will  improve  overall  training  of 
;banese  Armed  Forces.  Equipment 
■aining  needs  of  the  armed  forces, 
urgent,  are  paced  by  the  availabili- 
Tiilitary  manpower.  FMS  and 
funds  sought  in  the  supplemental 
atched  to  the  ability  of  the 
ese  Armed  Forces  to  absorb  them. 
■  FMS  and  IMET  levels  of  $15 
1  and  $750,000,  respectively,  are 
:  in  FY  1984  because  all  of  the 
nent  for  the  armed  forces  buildup 
have  been  ordered  by  then, 
e  are  talking  about  a  Lebanese 
i  Forces  structure  of  some  20,000 
inel  which  require  a  great  deal  of 
nent  to  provide  for  national  securi- 
I  have  nearly  completed  a  program 
ce  four  brigades  capable  of  per- 
ig  this  mission.  In  the  next  phase, 
n  to  equip  another  brigade  and 
r  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  one 
original  four  brigades.  This  sup- 
ital  funds  additional  equipment 
lining  for  two  more  brigades. 
I'ould,  in  effect,  give  Lebanon 
quipped  brigades,  urgently  re- 
for  Lebanon's  security.  But  the 
3e  Armed  Forces  are  ready  now 
on  new  missions  and  put  to  use 
V  equipment  and  training  they  are 
ig- 
i  United  States  fully  supports  the 

'  integrity,  unity,  and 
gnty  of  Lebanon  which  we 

consistent  with,  indeed,  the 
lisite  for,  the  long-term  security 
"s  northern  border.  Lebanon  has 
e  victim  over  the  years  of  the 
cycle  of  action  and  reaction- 
tacks  against  Israel  and  Israeli 
ion.  There  can  be  no  repeat  of 
lappy  history.  It  is  necessary  for 
anese  Armed  Forces  to  be  the 
Tied  force  in  Lebanon.  It  must  be 
itly  strong  to  control  effectively 
ers  and  prevent  outside  armed 
from  reentering  the  country.  It 
equipped  and  trained  to  ensure 
Danon  never  again  becomes  the 
ound  for  outside  contending 

ability  of  the  Lebanese  Govern- 
ider  President  Gemayel  to 
essential  government  services 
ntain  security  is  crucial  to 

a  national  consensus,  which  will 
len  the  government's  ability  to 
;e  the  departure  from  Lebanon 
reign  forces.  The  departure  of 
roes  is  of  vital  importance  to  our 
s  both  in  Lebanon  and  with 
;o  the  Middle  East  peace  proc- 


ess. A  sUible,  reconstructed  Lebanon, 
free  from  all  foreign  forces  and  with  a 
strengthened  central  government,  exer- 
cising sovereign  control  over  all  of  its 
territories,  is  a  most  worthy  goal  on  its 
own  merits.  Such  a  Lebanon  will  also 
make  a  major  contribution  to  the  securi- 
ty of  Israel's  northern  border. 

Finally,  this  Lebanon,  enjoying  good 
relations  with  its  neighbors,  will  give  a 
stimulus  to  the  broader  peace  process. 
For  these  reasons,  it  is  critically  impor- 
tant for  us  now  to  demonstrate,  in  a 
concrete  way,  the  U.S.  commitment  to 
Lebanon's  reconstruction  and  restora- 
tion as  a  sovereign  and  independent 
nation. 

Lebanon  and  Israel  are  currently 
conducting  direct,  intense  negotiations. 
Many  exceedingly  difficult  problems  re- 
main, but  the  United  States  is  working 
closely  with  both  sides  to  help  them 
reach  a  compromise  which  will  satisfy 
the  major  issues  of  sovereignty  and 
security.  When  this  occurs,  and  when  all 
foreign  forces  withdraw  from  Lebanon, 
we  fully  expect  a  resurgence  of  con- 
fidence among  both  Lebanese  and 
foreign  private  investors  who  will  then 
start  to  play  a  major  role  in  the  recon- 
struction of  Lebanon. 

Current  Situation 

The  Lebanese  Armed  Forces  are  now  in 
full  control  of  Beirut,  a  city  which  con- 
tains over  one-third  of  the  population  of 
Lebanon.  No  longer  are  armed  militia- 
men or  PLO  fighters  seen  in  the  streets. 
This  provided  a  highly  visible  political 
signal  of  the  expanding  ability  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  to  exercise 
sovereignty  and  to  provide  security.  In 
recent  days,  the  government  has  also 
taken  over  a  portion  of  the  Port  of 
Beirut  which  had  long  been  illegally 
operated  by  a  private  militia.  Govern- 
ment forces  are  now  in  control  of  the 
administration  of  the  entire  port.  Cur- 
rently, the  entire  capital  city  of  Beirut  is 
enjoying  peace  for  the  first  time  in 
years.  That  is  only  the  beginning,  but 
the  restoration  of  central  institutions  in 
Beirut  is  a  model  which  we  want  to  see 
expanded  countrywide. 

However,  these  are  only  initial  ef- 
forts and  the  overall  security  needs  of 
that  war-torn  country  require  our 
urgent  attention.  By  assisting  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  to  increase  its 
capability,  we  are  helping  the  central 
government  reassert  and  extend  its 
authority  throughout  the  country.  The 


expected  increase  in  the  size  and  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces 
in  maintaining  security  will  permit  the 
withdrawal  of  the  multinational  force 
(MNF). 

We  know  that  the  members  of  the 
subcommittee  are  interested  in  knowing 
how  long  the  MNF  will  have  to  remain 
in  Lebanon  to  bolster  the  security  role 
of  the  Lebanese  Armed  Forces.  I  can- 
not, today,  give  you  an  exact  date.  But 
it  is  our  intention  to  phase  out  the 
multinational  presence  just  as  soon  as 
the  evacuation  of  Syrian,  Israeli,  and 
Palestinian  forces  is  complete  and  the 
Lebanese  Army  is  able  to  do  its  job 
countrywide.  The  success  of  the  military 
assistance  program  we  are  describing  to- 
day will  directly  contribute  to  that  goal. 

To  conclude,  even  while  the  United 
States  is  currently  working  with  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  in  an  effort  to 
obtain  the  departure  of  all  foreign 
forces,  critical  projects  for  reconstruc- 
tion and  reequipping  the  armed  forces 
have  begun.  This  is  not  lost  upon  the 
Lebanese  Government  or  the  people  of 
Lebanon,  who  look  to  the  United  States 
as  their  principal  friend  during  this  most 
difficult  time.  The  actions  which  the 
United  States  takes  in  Lebanon  this 
year  and  next  will  benefit  not  only 
Lebanon  but  the  entire  Middle  East  for 
years  to  come.  We  cannot  overempha- 
size the  impact  that  our  programs  in 
Lebanon  will  have  upon  our  efforts  to 
obtain  a  just  and  lasting  peace  for  all 
countries  in  this  important  region. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  t'he  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Defense  Policy 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  9,  1983' 

Our  defense  policy  is  based  on  a  very 
simple  premise:  The  United  States  will 
not  start  fights.  We  will  not  seek  to  oc- 
cupy other  lands  or  control  other 
peoples.  Our  strategy  is  defensive;  our 
aim  is  to  protect  the  peace  by  ensuring 
that  no  adversaries  ever  conclude  they 
could  best  us  in  a  war  of  their  own 
choosing. 

What  this  means  is  that  we  design 
our  defense  program  not  to  further  am- 
bitions but  to  counter  threats.  Today, 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  the 
neatest  of  these  threats  comes  from  the 
Soviet  Union,  the  only  nation  with  the 
military  power  to  inflict  mortal  damage 
directly  on  the  United  States. 

This  also  means  that  if  the  American 
people  are  asked  to  support  our  defense 
program,  they  must  get  the  straight 
facts  about  this  threat.  The  Defense 
Department's  first  edition  of  Soviet 
Military  Power  gave  them  those  facts; 
this  revised  edition  will  keep  them  up  to 
date  and  will  give  them  a  new  oppor- 
tunity to  compare  Soviet  forces  with 
our  own. 

The  facts  in  this  book  are  straight- 
forward. The  Soviets  have  not  slowed 
the  pace  of  their  enormous  military 
buildup.  In  little  over  a  year,  they  have 
begun  testing  new  models  in  almost 
every  class  of  nuclear  weapons.  They 
are  dramatically  expanding  their  navy 
and  air  force,  are  training  and  equipping 
their  ground  forces  for  preemptive  at- 
tack, and  are  using  their  military  power 
to  extend  their  influence  and  enforce 
their  will  in  every  corner  of  the  globe. 

We  must  continue  to  demonstrate 
our  resolve  not  to  allow  the  military 
balance  to  tip  against  the  United  States. 
By  demonstrating  that  resolve,  we  will 
not  only  deter  aggression  but  we  will 
also  offer  the  Soviets  a  real  incentive  to 
accept  genuine,  mutual  arms  reduction. 

Let  me  quote  a  statement  Winston 
Churchill  made  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons in  late  1934,  as  he  urged  the 
British  to  stop  dismantling  their 
defenses. 

To  urge  the  preparation  of  defense  is  not 
to  assert  the  imminence  of  war.  I  do  not 
believe  that  war  is  imminent  or  that  war  is 
inevitable,  but .  .  .  that  if  we  do  not  begin 
forthwith  to  put  ourselves  in  a  position  of 
security,  it  will  soon  be  beyond  our  power  to 
do  so. 

A  strong,  credible  American  defense 
is  indispensable  to  protecting  the  peace 
and  preserving  the  free  way  of  life  our 
people  cherish. 


U.S.  Nuclear  Policy 
Toward  South  Africa 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  14,  1983. 


by  Harry  R.  Marshall,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittees 
on  Africa  and  on  International 
Economic  Policy  ami  Tnulr  oflhc  House 
Foreign  Affairs  ('nininitlrr  mi  l)n-nii- 
ber  2.  1982.  Mr.  Marshall  is  Ihpiitii  As- 
sistant Secretary  for  Oceans  and  Inter- 
national Environmental  and  Scientific 
Affairs. ' 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
with  your  subcommittees  the  nuclear 
policy  aspects  of  this  country's  relations 
with  South  Africa.  Princeton  Lyman, 
Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  in  the 
Bureau  of  African  Affairs,  has 
presented  an  overview  of  U.S.  policy 
toward  that  country  and  has  reviewed 
several  nonnuclear  matters  on  which  you 
requested  the  Department's  views  [see 
p.  25]. 

Let  me  begin  my  testimony  by 
describing  for  you  current  U.S.  nuclear 
export  policy  regarding  South  Africa 
and  the  role  of  the  Department  of  State 
in  the  review  and  approval  of  nuclear 
exports.  As  you  are  aware,  this  Ad- 
ministration announced  a  strong  nuclear 
nonproliferation  policy  in  1981— one 
that  is  supported  by  a  foundation  of  ef- 
fective export  controls.  As  part  of  that 
policy,  we  are  committed  to  continuing 
efforts  to  persuade  South  Africa,  and 
other  nations  which  have  not  ratified  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty,  to  do  so  and  to 
accept  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency  (IAEA)  safeguards  on  all  their 
nuclear  activities  (full-scope  safeguards). 
We  have  told  the  South  African  Govern- 
ment on  several  occasions  that  this  is 
our  position  for  the  basis  on  which  U.S. 
supply  of  uranium  fuel  to  South  Africa 
could  take  place. 

I  want  to  make  clear  that  until 
South  Africa  accepts  full-scope 
safeguards  and  takes  other  steps  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  U.S.  law,  no 
export  from  the  United  States  will  be 
made  of  uranium  fuel  or  any  nuclear 
equipment  licensed  by  the  Nuclear 
Regulatory  Commission  (NRC).  I  find 
this,  contrary  to  what  has  been  said 
already,  to  be  a  rather  significant  policy 
of  denial. 

It  is,  however,  this  Administration's 
view  that  export  approval  of  a  few 
carefully  selectd  nonsensitive,  nuclear- 
related  commodities  or  dual  use  items. 


can  make  a  contribution  to  U.S.  nc 
proliferation  efforts. 

Approval  of  such  a  narrow  ran 
nonsensitive  exports  is  subject  to  c 
case-by-case  interagency  review.  S' 
nuclear-related  commodities  have  1: 
exported  for  use  in  safeguarded  fa» 
for  health  and  safety  applications, 
provals  of  dual-use  commodities  hsi 
been  conditioned  upon  the  receipt 
written  South  African  Governmen' 
surances  of  no  nuclear  explosive  u: 
no  retransfer  for  another  use  with  i 
prior  consent  of  the  U.S.  Governm 
One  example  of  such  exports  is  a 
hydrogen  recombiner  for  the  Koeb" 
nuclear  power  plant.  It  was  appro' 
because  it  could  be  used  only  at  tli 
facility  to  meet  health  and  safety  i 
fives  identified  in  the  Three-Mile  1  i 
reactor  accident  investigation.         i 

We  believe  that  these  few  expi  i 
provals  for  the  South  African  iiticl 
program  can  assist  the  United  Sta  n 
maintaining  a  dialogue  with  Sotith 
Africa  regarding  nonproliferation  • 
and  objectives.  Our  ability  to  influt  t 
other  nations  to  act  in  accordance  (i 
our  nonproliferation  objectives  req  i 
that  we  continue  to  talk  to  them  ai 
that  they  listen  to  what  we  say.  Wv 
believe  that  a  willingness  to  appro'  '■ 
small,  carefully  selected  number  of 
nonsensitive  exports  to  South  Afrini 
its  nuclear  energy  program  can  hel(i 
persuade  South  Africa  to  be  more  fi 
coming  on  nonproliferation  issues.  ; 

Export  Review  Process 

With  respect  to  the  role  of  the  Depr 
ment  of  State  in  the  export  review  f 
ess,  we  are  responsible,  urn  'er  the  i 
Atomic  Energy  Act,  for  the  preparf 
coordination,  and  transmittal  to  thii 
NRC  of  executive  branch  views  on  r 
plications  for  NRC  export  licenses.  ^ 
under  the  Atomic  Energy  Act,  the  i 
currence  of  the  Department  of  Statf 
required  for  approval  of  so-called  s:*' 
quent  arrangements  authorized  by  i 
Department  of  Energy  (DOE).  This  i 
applies  to  transactions  such  as  retrf 
fers  abroad  of  U.S. -origin  spent  nu'^ 
fuel  for  reprocessing  or  the  conclus' 
a  DOE  enrichment  contract  with  a 
foreign  entity.  Department  of  Statt' 
currence  is  also  needed  for  nuclear  i 
technology  transfers  approved  by  t; 
Secretary  of  Energy  pursuant  to  Si ' 


Department  of  State  Bui 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


if  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  (Part 
Title  10  Code  of  Federal  Regula- 
and  for  approvals  of  Department 
merce  licenses  for  export  of  com- 
es, including  nuclear-related  and 
se  items,  which  require  interagen- 


oup  on  Nuclear  Export 
ination 

art  of  this  export  approval  activi- 
und  in  the  work  of  the  subgroup 
lear  export  coordination — more 
nly  known  as  the  SNEC.  The 
ons  of  the  SNEC  were  described 
ne  in  testimony  before  Con- 
len  Zablocki's  and  Bingham's  sub- 
tees  by  the  current  SNEC  chair- 
Carlton  Stoiber,  Director  of  the 
of  Nuclear  Export  Control  in  the 
ment  of  State's  Bureau  of  Oceans 
ternational  Environmental  and 
|fic  Affairs. 

i  SNEC  was  established  in  the 
r  of  1977  as  a  subgroup  to  the 
il  Security  Council  (NSC)  ad  hoc 
)n  nonproliferation  to  meet  the 
r  a  "working  level"  (i.e.,  office 
-)  forum  within  the  Administra- 
ere  controversial  or  sensitive  ex- 

Iitters  and  issues  could  be  re- 
and  discussed, 
ticipants  in  the  SNEC  are:  1)  the 
iinent  of  State,  which  chairs; 
;  department  of  Energy;  3)  the 
rnent  of  Commerce;  4)  the 
rnent  of  Defense  (DOD);  5)  the 
>  ontrol  and  Disarmament  Agency 
•i ;  and  6)  the  Nuclear  Regulatory 
rsioii.  Information  from  the  U.S. 
isnce  ciimmunity  has  always  been 
il?  to  the  SNEC,  and  recently 
sitatives  of  intelligence  agencies 
h:ome  regular  participants  in 
Ilneetings.  If  circumstances  war- 
cier  agencies  are  invited  to  par- 
t  There  are  no  restrictions  on  the 
cof  participants  from  each  agen- 
itin  reason,  provided  all  have  ap- 
i'-e  security  clearances.  There  is 
Oim,  although  the  SNEC  normal- 
Jites  on  a  consensus  basis  with 
Murrence  of  all  participating 
ii  needed  for  export  approvals, 
h  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Act  of 
vich  amended  the  Atomic  Energy 
t^r)A.  provided  in  Sections 
I  md  r)7b  a  statutory  basis  for  an 
^f  ncy  (■(  lordinating  body  to 
:  ■  nuclear  exports  licensed  by  the 
c  authorized  by  DOE.  The  role  of 
11,3  a  body  to  resolve  interagency 
'e:'es  on  nuclear  exports  was  set 
uier  Section  5  of  the  Procedures 


Established  Pursuant  to  the  Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978. 

The  SNEC  acts  on  an  advisory  basis 
only,  and  its  recommendations  are  not 
formally  binding  upon  any  agency. 
Subgroup  agendas,  minutes,  and  discus- 
sions during  meetings  are  classified  and 
are  exempt  from  release  under  the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act  to  protect 
predecisional  interagency  views  which 
are  an  integral  and  necessary  part  of  the 
review  process,  quite  apart  from  the 
specific  national  security  classification  of 
a  matter  under  discussion.  Final  recom- 
mendations on  specific  applications  in- 
cluding reasons  for  denials  and  condi- 
tions, if  any,  for  approvals,  are 
unclassified. 

The  SNEC  meets  at  intervals  of  ap- 
proximately 3  weeks  to  review  proposed 
nuclear-related  exports  which  could  con- 
ceivably pose  proliferation  risk.  The 
SNEC,  as  noted,  serves  as  a  forum  for 
review  and  discussion  of  nuclear  export 
policy  issues  and  specific  case  applica- 
tions. The  SNEC  can  review  NRC 
license  applications,  DOE  subsequent 
arrangements  and  10  CFR  810  applica- 
tions, and  Department  of  Commerce  ex- 
port license  applications,  since  Com- 
merce controls  a  far  wider  range  of 
commodities  and  technology  then  either 
DOE  or  NRC. 

All  Commerce  export  license  applica- 
tions that  have  any  actual  or  potential 
nuclear-related  use  are  reviewed  by 
DOE.  In  this  review  process,  DOE 
follows  policy  guidance  from  the  State 
Department,'  the  SNEC,  and  other 
sources.  DOE  refers  most  of  the  cases  it 
reviews  back  to  Commerce  for  licensing 
action  because  the  country,  end  use,  or 
the  nature  of  the  items  in  question  make 
clear  the  lack  of  any  proliferation 
significance.  For  some  cases  where  it  is 
clear  that  an  item  would  present  a  pro- 
liferation concern,  or  where  export 
would  be  contrary  to  U.S.  policy,  denial 
is  recommended.  The  remaining  cases 
which  raise  some  questions  of  prolifera- 
tion significance  are  referred  by  DOE  to 
the  SNEC  for  consideration.  DOE 
reviews  about  8,000  cases  a  year.  Of 
that  number,  only  about  200-300  are 
referred  to  the  SNEC.  Other  agencies 
may  also  refer  cases  to  the  subgroup  for 
review. 

In  reviewing  license  applications  for 
exports  of  possible  proliferation  concern, 
the  SNEC  takes  into  account  a  range  of 
factors,  including: 

•  Past  practice  concerning  supply  of 
the  commodity  in  question  to  the  in- 
tended recipient  country  and  end-user; 


•  Equivalent  commodities  already  in 
the  recipient  country  and  available  to 
the  end-user; 

•  Foreign  availability; 

•  Intelligence  information  regarding 
activities  of  proliferation  concern  on  the 
part  of  the  recipient  country  and  the  end 
user; 

•  Technical  capabilities  and  signifi- 
cance of  the  commodity  to  be  exported; 

•  Foreign  policy  considerations;  and 

•  Applicable  statutory  criteria. 

If,  on  the  basis  of  its  review  of  the 
factors  described  in  the  preceding 
paragraph  and  any  other  relevant  con- 
siderations, the  SNEC  determines  that 
the  proposed  export  involves  significant 
proliferation  risk,  a  recommendation  for 
denial  of  the  export  will  be  made  to  the 
licensing  agency. 

If  participating  agencies  are  unable 
to  reach  agreement  regarding  the 
disposition  of  a  particular  export  ap- 
plication to  the  SNEC,  the  Procedures 
Established  Pursuant  to  the  Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978  provide  a 
series  of  steps  which  can  be  taken  to 
resolve  the  disagreement.  The  matter 
can  be  referred  to  the  successor  to  the 
NSC  ad  hoc  group  on  nonproliferation,  a 
body  comprised  of  assistant  and  deputy 
assistant  secretaries  charged  with  over- 
sight of  nuclear  proliferation  and  export 
control  responsibilities  in  each  of  the 
concerned  agencies.  If  resolution  of  the 
disagreement  proves  impossible  at  that 
level,  the  matter  can  be  referred  to  the 
Cabinent  level  and  even  to  the  Presi- 
dent. 


State  Department  Study 

The  subcommittees  have  asked  about  the 
status  of  an  "intensive  study"  focusing 
on  South  African  nonproliferation 
issues.  Although  it  is  not  possible  to  say 
now  that  the  study  will  be  completed 
when  originally  anticipated,  progress  has 
been  made  in  clarifying  many  of  the  con- 
cerns involved.  The  issues  under  con- 
sideration in  the  study  are  those  which 
we  have  been  addressing  for  some  time, 
such  as  the  question  of  supply  to  South 
Africa  of  Commerce-licensed,  nuclear- 
related  items  needed  for  the  safe  or  en- 
vironmentally sound  operation  of  the 
Koeberg  nuclear  power  plant.  An  overall 
objective  of  the  study  is  to  develop  fur- 
ther our  policy  goals  vis-a-vis  South 
Africa. 

Fuel  for  Koeberg  Reactors 

I  would  like  now  to  turn  to  the  subcom- 
mittees' question  about  the  acquisition 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


by  South  Africa  of  fuel  to  start  up  the 
Koeberg  nuclear  power  station.  The 
Electricity  Supply  Commission  of  South 
Africa  (ESCOM),  which  is  to  operate  the 
two  French-built  reactors  sited  near 
Cape  Town,  concluded  contracts  with 
the  predecessor  to  DOE  on  August  16, 
1974,  for  the  enrichment  of  South 
African  uranium  at  U.S.  facilities. 
ESCOM  thus  became  obligated  to 
deliver  natural  uranium,  and  DOE  was 
obligated  to  enrich  it  to  approximately 
3%  or  less  for  delivery  to  ESCOM  at  the 
DOE  enrichment  facifity.  ESCOM  was 
obligated  to  obtain  the  necessary  export 
licenses  for  shipment  from  the  Cnited 
States.  However,  as  is  well  known, 
because  of  unsafeguarded  nuclear  ac- 
tivities in  South  Africa,  export  criteria 
in  U.S.  law  are  not  now  met  by  South 
Africa  to  permit  the  NRC  to  issue  ex- 
port licenses  for  nuclear  fuel. 

Numerous  meetings  on  this  issue 
have  taken  place  between  the  two 
governments;  however,  the  U.S.  position 
has  remained  firm— the  executive 
branch  would  not  recommend  NRC  is- 
suance of  any  export  license  until  all 
South  African  nuclear  activities  were 
subjected  to  IAEA  safeguards  and 
South  Africa  adhered  to  the  Non- 
proliferation  Treaty. 

ESCOM  and  the  South  African  Gov- 
ernment have  continued  efforts  to  obtain 
the  necessary  NRC  export  licenses.  In 
fact,  ESCOM  has  carefully  complied 
with  the  enrichment  contracts  and  has 
delivered  feed  material  to  DOE  which 
has  been  enriched  and  stored  at  a  DOE 
enrichment  facility. 

French  Arrangements  To  Supply 
Koeberg  Reactors 

The  French  firm  FRAMATOME  built 
the  reactors  for  ESCOM  at  Koeberg.  In 
addition,  ESCOM  concluded  a  contract 
in  the  mid-1970s  with  a  French- 
controlled  company  for  the  fabrication  of 
low  enriched  uranium  into  fuel  elements 
for  the  reactors.  The  United  States  has 
been  aware  of  this  contract  and  has  held 
discussions  with  French  Government  of- 
ficials about  our  position  on  supply  of 
nuclear  fuel  to  South  Africa.  The 
Government  of  France  told  us  that  it 
would  not  at  this  time  enter  into  any 
new  supply  obligations  with  South 
Africa.  Their  contract  for  fabrication 
was  a  pre-existing  obligation. 

In  1981  ESCOM  acquired,  in  a 
private  transaction,  previously  enriched 
uranium  located  in  Europe.  ESCOM 
then  delivered  this  material  to  the 
French  fabrication  facility  for  production 


of  fuel  elements  for  the  initial  core  of 
one  of  the  two  reactors.  The  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  other  concerned  U.S. 
agencies  have  carefully  examined  the  ac- 
tivities of  Edlow  International,  Inc.,  a 
Washington-based  firm,  in  connection 
with  the  acquisition  by  ESCOM  of  this 
low  enriched  uranium.  We  concluded 
that  there  was  no  violation  of  U.S.  law 
or  regulations.  These  services  provided 
by  Edlow  are  readily  available  from  non- 
U.S.  companies,  could  have  been  per- 
formed by  ESCOM  itself,  and,  to  our 
knowledge,  are  not  controlled  by  any 
other  government.  Officers  of  Edlow  ap- 
prised us  that  they  had  been  in  contact 
with  ESCOM  officials  and  had  arranged 
for  the  purchase  by  ESCOM  in  Europe 
of  non-U. S.,  previously  enriched 
uranium.  We  were  not  advised  by  them 
of  additional  details  of  this  arrangement. 

We  were  aware,  of  course,  that 
South  Africa  desired  to  find  another 
source  of  fuel  for  the  Koeberg  reactors. 
We  told  the  South  African  officials  that 
as  a  matter  of  policy,  we  were  asking  all 
supplier  governments  not  to  enter  into 
new  commitments  for  significant  nuclear 
supply  with  any  non-nuclear-weapons 
state  which  engaged  in  unsafeguarded 
nuclear  activities.  We  had  such  discus- 
sions with  France  and,  as  I  have 
testified,  France  did  not  conclude  any 
new  commitment.  We  do  not  believe 
that  the  actions  of  Edlow  have 
significantly  undermined  the  influence  or 
nonproliferation  policies  of  this  Ad- 
ministration. 

You  may  ask  why  the  United  States 
did  not  try  to  prevent  this  arrangement 
from  going  forward.  In  answering  this 
question,  let  me  first  emphasize  again 
that  no  nuclear  material  subject  to  U.S. 
control  was  involved  in  this  transaction, 
and,  therefore,  the  United  States 
possessed  no  jurisdiction  over  it.  At  the 
end  of  the  previous  Administration,  our 
nonproliferation  discussions  with  South 
Africa  were  at  an  impasse.  By  contrast, 
however,  this  Administration  sought  to 
develop  and  carry  on  a  dialogue  with 
South  Africa  in  order  to  foster  our  non- 
proliferation  and  other  objectives  in  that 
country.  To  that  end,  we  are  willing  to 
consider,  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  the  ex- 
port of  nonsensitive.  Commerce-licensed 
commodities— but  not,  as  I  have  men- 
tioned, nuclear  fuel  in  the  absence  of 
full-scope  safeguards.  And  this  policy 
has  had  some  tangible  benefits.  We  have 
had  very  useful  technical  discussions 
with  South  African  officials  on  the  ap- 
plication of  safeguards  to  enrichment 
facilities.  In  addition.  South  Africa  is 
moving  toward  development  and  use  of 


reduced  enriched  fuels  for  its  Safa 
research  reactor.  |  ' 

Outlook  in  South  Africa 

The  subcommittees  have  also  askel 
an  assessment  of  the  likelihood  of 
Africa  adopting  full-scope  safegiia 
and  adhering  to  the  Nonproliferat 
Treaty.  Frankly,  we  do  not  expect 
favorable  action  by  South  Africa  ti 
ratification  of  this  treaty  or  accep 
of  full-scope  safeguards  in  the  nea  i 
term.  However,  we  continue  to  raj 
issue  with  officials  in  Pretoria  in  ; 
fort  to  persuade  the  government 
that  it  would  be  in  its  own  self-int 
to  adhere  to  the  treaty  and  to  ace 
ternational  safeguards  on  all  its  n 
activities.  While  we  have  not  rece 
any  indication  that  they  are  inclin 
take  such  action  in  the  near  term, 
assessment  will  not  lead  us  to  aba 
our  effort  or  to  view  it  with  less  i 
cy.  Nuclear  nonproliferation  is  no 
undertaking  for  the  short  run.  It 
fundamental,  long-term  policy  obj 
and  we  will  continue  to  use  our  bf- 
forts  to  persuade  other  nations,  ii 
eluding  South  Africa,  to  take  actii 
prevent  the  spread  of  nuclear  w( 

Current  NRC  Export  Applicatio 

The  subcommittees  have  asked  fo 
position  on  the  April  1982  applica 
Transnuclear,  Inc.  to  the  NRC  foi 
authorization  to  export  low-enrich 
uranium  to  South  Africa.  The  app 
tion  was  referred  to  the  executive 
branch  by  the  NRC  but  is  not  und 
five  consideration  as  the  export  ci 
in  the  law  are  not  met.  No  export 
this  nuclear  fuel  from  the  United 
to  South  Africa  would  be  authoriz 
this  Administration  until  the  crite: 
satisfied. 

While  the  law  does  provide  foi 
Presidential  waiver  of  licensing  cr 
to  permit  exports  under  Executiv( 
in  cases  of  overriding  national  intf 
such  actions  must  be  submitted  to; 
Congress  for  review.  No  considers 
being  given  to  proposing  such  a  P 
dential  waiver. 


Status  of  DOE  Enrichment  Cent 

The  subcommittees'  question  regal 
the  current  status  of  the  DOE-ES 
contract  will  be  answered  in  detai' 
the  Department  of  Energy.  In  sun 
situation  is  that  ESCOM,  the  Scut 
African  utility,  and  DOE  are  still 
obligated  to  comply  with  the  term' 


Department  of  State  B  e' 


NUCLEAR  POLICY 


nrichment  services  contract,  but  for 
ins  already  explained,  ESCOM  is 
le  to  obtain  an  export  license  for 
fer  of  any  of  the  enriched  uranium 
the  United  States  to  South  Africa. 
)u  can  imagine,  this  rather  peculiar 
actual  situation  raises  a  number  of 
and  policy  difficulties  which  we 
5  to  resolve.  A  solution  to  the  con- 
ial  impasse,  which  would  not  in- 
export  to  South  Africa  of  any  U.S. 
ar  fuel  except  on  the  basis  I  have 
ioned.  is  under  review  as  part  of 
;udy  I  referred  to  earlier, 
he  subcommittees  have  asked  if  the 
nistration  foresees  a  time  when  the 
•t  of  enriched  uranium  to  South 
1  would  be  approved  short  of  our 
nt  stated  requirements  of  full-scope 
uards  and  ratification  of  the  Non- 
eration  Treaty.  This  is  our  position 
1  we  have  communicated  to  South 
1,  and  I  do  not  see  any  likelihood 
ve  would  change  this  view  in  the 
future. 


rgo  On  All  Nuclear  Exports 

jbcommittees  have  asked  for  the 
tment  of  State's  views  on  H.R. 
which  would  prohibit  the  export  or 
ler  to  the  Republic  of  South  Africa 
lear  material,  equipment,  and 
)logy.  While  we  deplore  apartheid 
•e  vigorously  seeking  more  univer- 
lerence  to  the  Nonproliferation 
',  the  Administration  strongly  op- 
this  bill,  because  its  enactment 
significantly  undermine  important 
onproliferation  objectives. 
preface  to  my  comments  on  the 
sffects  with  respect  to  South 
,  let  me  express  our  broader  con- 
bout  the  impression  that  passage 
1  legislation  would  give  to  other 
ies,  in  particular  those  which 
ate  with  the  United  States  both  in 
r  commerce  and  in  attempting  to 
s  shared  nonproliferation  goals, 
option  of  the  Nonproliferation 
IS  viewed  by  many  abroad  as  a 
criminatory,  unilateral,  and 
)ective  changing  of  U.S.  export 
ons.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  this 
tion  caused  problems  for  us  with 
ies  and  other  suppliers  abroad.  To 
ith  this  situation,  this  Administra- 
t  as  a  high  priority  the 
)lishment  of  the  U.S.  reputation 
liable  nuclear  partner.  We  believe 
.  deal  has  been  accomplished  in 
"ing  the  impression  of  unreliabili- 
more  importantly,  in  developing 
i  lity  in  furthering  international 
*sus  on  supplier  restraint. 


Passage  of  H.R.  7220,  however, 
would  reawaken  those  earlier  concerns 
abroad.  We  would  be  seen  by  many  as 
remaining  prepared  to  unilaterally 
modify  our  conditions  for  nuclear 
cooperation— even  when  no  substantive 
impact  can  be  anticipated.  The  resulting 
damage  to  our  reliability  and  credibility 
would,  we  fear,  be  severe.  Enactment 
would  also  seriously  undercut  achieve- 
ment of  our  nonproliferation  objectives 
in  South  Africa.  Despite  its  apparent 
aim  of  forcing  South  Africa  to  sign  the 
Nonproliferation  Treaty  and  to  accept 
full-scope  safeguards,  passage  of  this  bill 
would  eliminate  the  possibility  of  any 
meaningful  nuclear  dialogue  with  South 
Africa  and,  in  fact,  effectively  destroy 
any  change  of  our  influencing  them  to 
accept  full-scope  safeguards  and  to 
ratify  the  treaty. 

It  must  be  appreciated  that  signifi- 
cant nuclear  commerce  with  South 
Africa  was  effectively  precluded  by  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act.  Therefore,  the  only 
effect  of  H.R.  7220  would  be  to  preclude 
export  of  dual-use  or  nuclear-related 
items  or  nonsensitive  nuclear  technology 
which  are  widely  available  from 
non-U. S.  suppliers.  Almost  no  leverage 
would,  therefore,  result  from  such  a 


step,  particularly  in  view  of  the  negative 
political  reaction  to  such  a  law  which  can 
be  expected  from  South  Africa.  Since 
other  nations  are  quite  able  and  very 
willing  to  supply  such  commodities,  the 
only  practical  effect  of  the  bill  would  be 
to  transfer  trade  and  work  from  U.S. 
companies  and  American  workers  to 
foreign  firms. 

It  is  also  important  to  note  that  U.S. 
dual-use  exports  to  South  Africa  to 
nuclear  and  other  government  end-users 
have  been  carefully  conditioned  upon 
receipt  of  assurances  regarding  end-use, 
no  retransfer,  and,  when  appropriate, 
inspection  rights.  If  U.S.  exports  are 
embargoed,  there  is  every  likelihood  that 
non-U. S.  suppliers  will  provide  these 
commodities  to  South  Africa  without 
such  conditions.  An  embargo  of  all  ex- 
ports and  other  forms  of  nonsensitive 
nuclear  cooperation  with  South  Africa 
would  eliminate  U.S.  access  to  and  in- 
fluence upon  South  Africa's  nuclear 
program. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOIVI 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAR.  7,  19831 

The  United  States  has  been  engaged  in 
nuclear  cooperation  with  the  European  Com- 
munity for  many  years.  This  cooperation  was 
initiated  under  agreements  concluded  over 
two  decades  ago  between  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Communi- 
ty (EURATOM)  which  extend  until 
December  31,  1995.  Since  the  inception  of 
this  cooperation,  the  Community  has  adhered 
to  all  its  obligations  under  those  agreements. 

The  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of 
1978  amended  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  to 
establish  new  nuclear  export  criteria,  in- 
cluding a  requirement  that  the  United  States 
have  a  right  to  consent  to  the  reprocessing  of 
fuel  exported  from  the  United  States.  Our 
present  agreements  for  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  do  not  contain  such  a  right.  To 
avoid  disrupting  cooperation  with 
EURATOM,  a  proviso  was  included  in  the 
law  to  enable  continued  cooperation  until 
March  10,  1980,  and  provide  for  negotiations 
concerning  our  cooperation  agreements. 

The  law  also  provides  that  nuclear 
cooperation  with  EURATOM  can  be  extended 


on  an  annual  basis  after  March  10,  1980, 
upon  determination  by  the  President  that 
failure  to  cooperate  would  seriously  prejudice 
the  achievement  of  United  States  non- 
proliferation  objectives  or  otherwise  jeopard- 
ize the  common  defense  and  security  and 
after  notification  to  the  Congress.  President 
Carter  made  such  a  determination  three 
years  ago  and  signed  Executive  Order  12193, 
permitting  continued  nuclear  cooperation 
with  EURATOM  until  March  10,  1981.  I 
made  such  determinations  in  1981  and  1982 
and  signed  Executive  Orders  12295  and 
12351,  permitting  continued  nuclear  coopera- 
tion through  March  10,  1983. 

The  United  States  has  engaged  in  four 
rounds  of  talks  with  EURATOM  regarding 
the  renegotiation  of  the  US-EURATOM 
agreements  for  cooperation.  These  were  con- 
ducted in  November  1978,  September  1979, 
April  1980  and  January  1982.  We  also  con- 
sulted with  EURATOM  on  a  number  of 
issues  related  to  these  agreements  last  sum- 
mer. We  expect  to  continue  the  talks  in  1983. 

I  believe  that  it  is  essential  that  coopera- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the  Com- 
munity continue  and  likewise  that  we  work 
closely  with  our  Allies  to  counter  the  threat 
of  nuclear  explosives  proliferation.  A  disrup- 


REFUGEES 


tion  of  nuclear  cooperation  would  also  cause 
serious  problems  in  our  overall  relationships. 
Accordingly,  I  have  determined  that  failure 
to  continue  peaceful  nuclear  cooperation  with 
EURATOM  would  be  seriously  prejudicial  to 
the  achievement  of  the  United  States  non- 
proliferation  objectives  and  would  jeopardize 
the  common  defense  and  security  of  the 
United  States.  I  intend  to  sigTi  an  Executive 
Order  [12409]  to  extend  the  waiver  of  the  ap- 
plication of  the  relevant  export  criterion  of 


the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  for  an  ad- 
ditional twelve  months  from  March  10,  1983. 
Sincerely, 


^Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  George  Bush,  President 
of  the  Senate  (text  from  Weeklv  Compilation 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  14, 
1983).  ■ 


FY  1984  Requests  for 

Migration  and  Refugee  Assistance 


by  James  R.  Purcell,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  March  9,  1983. 
Mr.  Purcell  is  Director  of  the  Bureau  for 
Refugee  Programs.'^ 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  appear  before  you  to- 
day to  present  the  Department  of 
State's  request  for  authorization  of  the 
migration  and  refugee  assistance  ap- 
propriation for  FY  1984  and  1985. 

Our  budget  request  for  FY  1984  is 
$344.5  million  and  for  $326.4  million  for 
FY  1985.  The  FY  1984  request  is  a 
decrease  of  $50.5  million  from  the 
FY  1983  continuing  resolution  level  of 
funding.  Half  of  this  decrease  has  been 
made  possible  by  the  success  of  our  ef- 
forts to  reduce  refugee  admissions  to 
the  United  States,  while  continuing  to 
respond  to  humanitarian  needs  and  U.S. 
foreign  policy  interests  and  respon- 
sibilities. 

The  other  half  we  credit  to  the 
absence  of  such  large-scale  refugee 
crises  as  were  experienced  in  past  years, 
such  as  the  surge  of  Vietnamese  boat 
people  and  the  Somalia  crisis,  as  well  as 
policy  and  management  initiatives  that 
are  containing  or  reducing  the  costs  of 
responding  to  ongoing  refugee  relief 
problems.  Furthermore,  we  are  pleased 
with  the  progress  in  our  efforts  to  "in- 
ternationalize" the  world's  response  to 
refugee  problems — that  is,  to  encourage 
broader  participation  by  other  nations  in 
supporting  refugee  programs,  especially 
other  developed  countries  which  are  able 
to  carry  a  bigger  share  of  the  burden. 
We  remain  aware  that  the  decrease  in 
refugee  program  needs  can  be  reversed 
overnight  should  major  conflicts  in  any 
of  the  troubled  areas  of  our  world 
generate  new  refugee  problems. 


Refugee  Admissions 

Our  budget  request  for  FY  1984  is 
presented  in  four  major  subdivisions. 
The  first  area  is  refugee  admissions, 
with  a  request  of  $117  million.  This 
figure  is  about  34%  of  our  total  request 
and  a  decrease  of  about  $25  million  from 
the  FY  1983  funding  level.  The  request 
is  based  on  the  admission  of  72,000 
refugees  to  the  United  States  in  FY 
1984,  representing  a  reduction  of  18,000 
from  the  FY  1983  consultations  level 
and  one-third  the  217,000  consultations 
level  of  FY  1981.  The  72,000  projected 
admissions  are  divided  among  46,000 
East  Asians,  15,000  from  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  6,000  from 
the  Near  East  and  South  Asia,  2,000 
from  the  Western  Hemisphere,  and 
3,000  from  Africa.  Activities  required  to 
admit  refugees  include  four  areas. 

First,  we  request  $20.5  million  for 
processing  of  refugees  prior  to  entry. 
This  includes  funding  the  joint  voluntary 
agency  representatives  for  processing 
services  in  Southeast  Asia,  Pakistan, 
and  Africa,  as  well  as  funding  for  the 
voluntary  agencies  in  Europe.  Also  in- 
cluded are  funding  of  some  necessary 
management  services  by  the  voluntary 
agencies  in  the  United  States,  such  as  a 
data  information  system  on  refugee  ad- 
missions and  American  Red  Cross  trac- 
ing activities. 

Second,  we  are  requesting  about 
$46.6  million  for  capitalization  of  trans- 
portation loans  through  the  Intergovern- 
mental Committee  for  Migration  for 
refugees  admitted  to  the  United  States. 
This  takes  into  account  a  projected  $8 
million  in  loan  repayments  in  FY  1984. 

Third  is  reception  and  placement 
grants  to  voluntary  agencies  which  pro- 
vide initial  reception  and  placement 
services  to  newly  admitted  refugees. 


with  a  request  of  about  $39.5  millia 
This  level  provides  for  a  small  inew 
over  the  per  capita  amounts  budge^ 
FY  1983  in  order  to  cover  the  effec 
inflation. 

Finally,  we  are  requesting  ; 
$10.4  million  for  the  training  and  c 
tation  of  refugees  admitted  to  the 
United  States.  We  have  already  in 
a  sound  program  of  English  langus 
and  cultural  orientation  training  fo 
dochinese  refugee  awaiting  admiss 
the  refugees  processing  centers.  Vv 
requesting  funding  of  program  im- 
provements to  address  the  additior 
training  needs  of  Indochinese  refuji 
least  likely  to  succeed  in  the  Unite* 
States — those  who  are  preliterate 
who  have  very  low  levels  of  learniii 
addition,  we  propose  extending  qui 
training  programs  to  some  other  f 
of  refugees  where  economically  fe 
It  is  our  conclusion,  after  careful  i 
vestigation,  that  the  very  small  pr 
increases  in  this  area  will  result  in 
significant  savings  in  domestic  wel 
costs  because  refugees  enter  muclj 
ter  prepared  for  life  in  the  Unitedl 
States,  especially  to  take  entry-lev 
jobs. 

Relief  Assistance 

Funding  requested  for  relief  assist 
to  refugees  overseas  in  FY  1984  is 
$197.5  million,  about  57%  of  our  t 
request  and  a  decrease  of  $25.8  m 
from  the  FY  1983  funding  level.  T 
years  ago,  the  composition  of  our 
quest  was  about  two-thirds  for  adi 
sion  and  one-third  for  relief  assists 
We  have  now  reversed  these  percf 
ages  reflecting  the  determination  i 
Administration  to  seek  solutions  _ti 
refugee  crises  other  than  admissio 
the  United  States.  We  have  sough- 
address  refugee  needs  through  as- 
sistance in  the  countries  of  first  i 
and  through  pursuit  of  repatriatioi 
resettlement  in  countries  of  asylur 
resettlement  in  third  countries  oth 
than  the  United  States.  We  are  pli'f 
that  we  have  succeeded  in  doing  s^ 
while  continuing  to  meet  our 
humanitarian  responsibilities  thnu  i 
the  admission  to  the  United  States  1 
those  who  need  this  solution  and  a 
eligible  under  our  laws. 

The  relief  assistance  categor\' 
compasses  a  number  of  programs,  'i 
ticularly  relief  programs  identifiet*  ■ 
geographic  area.  In  addition,  we  p  >^ 
maintain  a  small  fund  to  foster  rest* 
ment  opportunities  other  than  resi  1^ 
ment  in  the  United  States,  includi: 


Department  of  State  Bel 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


tary  repatriation  and  resettlement 
ice. 

outheast  Asia.  Relief  for  Indo- 
se  refugees  in  Southeast  Asia  is 
antially  reduced  over  previous 
at  our  request  level  of  $21.7 
n,  but  remains  crucial  to  support 
fforts  of  the  U.N.  High  Commis- 
r  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  and  other 
;ies  to  address  the  needs  of  about 
00  refugees  in  UNHCR  camps  and 
aarter  of  a  million  Kampuchean 
ees  who  remain  in  a  precarious 
ion  on  the  Thai-Kampuchean 


frica.  African  relief  assistance  is 
educed  from  our  FY  1983  request 
equest  of  $52.8  million  for  FY 

This  reflects  not  a  reduced  com- 
3nt  to  the  problems  of  African 
ees  but  rather  the  fortunate  cir- 
ances  which  have  decreased  the 

in  some  key  areas,  such  as 
lia.  Furthermore,  a  shift  in  em- 
5  of  relief  programs  in  Africa 
d  encouraging  an  early  return  to 
mic  independence  of  refugees  in 
hies  of  asylum  is  expected  to  yield 
j.ntial  benefits  for  refugee  well- 
I  host  country  economic  and 
lal  stability,  besides  the  dollar  sav- 
li  the  reduced  U.S.  fair  share 
li  those  programs. 

liar  East.  The  Near  East  continues 
jin  area  of  key  concern.  In  support 
President's  peace  initiatives  in  the 
ilast,  continued  support  for 
ine  refugees  through  the  work  of 
N.  Relief  and  Works  Agency 
NA)  for  Palestine  refugees  in  the 
5ast  is  crucial.  In  our  relief 
mce  request,  we  have  included  $72 
for  this  purpose.  We  also  intend 
inue  to  fund  programs  of  the 
R,  the  International  Committee  of 
Cross  (ICRC),  and  some  volun- 
ncies  for  almost  2.8  million 
refugees  in  Pakistan.  The  sum 
million  is  included  for  this 


Uin  America.  Consistent  with  the 
ws  of  the  Administration  in  Latin 
ii'a  and  the  growing  refugee  needs 

area,  we  are  increasing  our  re- 
'Vir  funding  of  programs  for  Latin 
'■an  refugees  to  $13  million,  $8 
t  more  than  our  FY  1983  request. 
hf  this  amount  would  go  toward 
^R  programs,  although  some  will 
m  be  contributed  to  the  ICRC, 
ijy  to  voluntary  agencies. 


Resettlement.  Finally,  under  relief 
assistance,  we  have  requested  $7  million 
for  resettlement  assistance  programs.  In 
accordance  with  the  U.S.  policy  of  en- 
couraging solutions  to  refugee  problems 
which  minimize  the  need  to  resettle 
refugees  in  the  United  States,  we  intend 
to  pursue  the  development  of  other 
resettlement  options,  including  voluntary 
repatriation,  resettlement  in  countries  of 
first  asylum,  and  resettlement  in  non- 
traditional  resettlement  countries. 

Other  Activities 

Also  included  in  our  request  is  $22.4 
million  for  "other  activities."  This  item 
includes  the  U.S.  contribution  of  $2 
million  to  the  so-called  ordinary  program 
of  the  ICRC  for  its  administrative  ex- 
penses, as  well  as  a  $1.75  million  con- 
tribution to  their  special  program  for 
visitation  of  political  detainees.  The  In- 
tergovernmental Committee  for  Migra- 
tion is  funded  at  about  $3.15  million  for 
its  assessed  administrative  budget  and 
about  $2  million  for  its  voluntary  pro- 
grams—the same  level  as  for  FY  1983. 
Also  in  this  category  is  the  program 
of  assistance  to  refugees  settling  in 


Israel  at  a  level  of  $12.5  million,  the 
same  funding  level  requested  for  FY 
1983.  In  accordance  with  the  action  of 
the  Congress  in  the  authorization  act 
last  year,  this  program  now  covers  not 
only  Soviet  and  Eastern  Europe 
refugees  immigrating  to  Israel  but  also 
refugees  from  other  areas. 

Administrative  Expenses 

For  FY  1984,  we  request  $7.6  million 
for  administrative  expenses,  an  increase 
of  only  $38,000  from  FY  1983.  This 
assumes  maintaining  our  current 
worldwide  staff  level  of  98  positions. 

With  respect  to  FY  1985,  we  request 
an  authorization  of  $326.4  million.  Of 
this  total,  we  are  requesting  $89.4 
million  for  admission,  $205.7  million  for 
refugee  assistance  overseas,  $23.4 
million  for  other,  and  $7.9  million  for  ad- 
ministrative funds. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


FY  1984  Security  Assistance  Requests 


by  William  Schneider,  Jr. 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
nil  InterxiitiiDial  Security  and  Scientific 
Affiiirs  nf  III,'  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Co  mm  I  It, r  ,ni  March  3,  1983.  Mr. 
Schneider  is  Under  Secretary  for  Securi- 
ty Assistance,  Science,  and  Tech- 
nology.'^ 

U.S.  foreign  assistance  programs  con- 
stitute an  integral  part  of  this  nation's 
response  to  international  political  and 
economic  developments  throughout  the 
world.  Resources  provide  us  with  the 
means  to  exercise  leadership  interna- 
tionally and  enable  us  to  help  developing 
countries  address  their  most  pressing 
problems. 

Secretary  Shultz  testified  before  the 
full  committee  on  foreign  assistance  in 
general.  I  am  here  today  to  discuss  U.S. 
security  assistance  programs  and  arms 
transfer  policy. 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 

We  have  developed  an  integrated 
foreign  assistance  program  in  which 
development  and  security  assistance 
combine  to  meet  our  economic  and  na- 
tional security  objectives,  as  well  as 
those  of  other  countries  which  share 
these  objectives.  Security  assistance  is 
but  one  apsect  of  the  whole.  It  is  impor- 
tant to  keep  in  mind  that  assistance  to 
promote  economic  growth  and  develop- 
ment and  security  assistance  are  mutual- 
ly reinforcing  programs  that  cannot 
function  independently. 

The  United  States  has  multiple  in- 
terests involving  the  developing  world. 
On  the  economic  level,  about  40%  of 
total  U.S.  exports  are  to  less  developed 
countries  (LDCs).  U.S.  industry  depends 
on  imports  of  primary  commodities, 
minerals,  and  petroleum.  Open  trading 
and  financial  systems  are  important  to 
the  economic  health  of  developed  and 
developing  countries  alike.  Economic 
progress  in  the  developing  countries  and 
recovery  in  the  industrialized  nations 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


cannot  occur  independent  of  regional 
security  and  stability.  A  sense  of  securi- 
ty from  external  threat  and  internal 
upheaval  is  a  necessary  precondition  of 
development,  and  our  own  self-interest 
requires  that  we  pay  close  attention  to 
events  in  the  sometimes  seemingly 
remote  countries  that  are  commonly 
referred  to  as  the  Third  World.  It  is 
only  at  our  own  peril  that  we  ignore  or 
fail"  to  respond  wisely  to  their  security 
and  development  needs. 

As  it  is  integral  to  our  foreign 
policy,  so  too  is  security  assistance  an 
inseparable  ingredient  of  our  own 
defense  planning.  This  Administration 
has  sought  to  enhance  the  security  of 
the  United  States  and  to  strengthen  its 
ability  to  protect  its  interests  in  various 
regions  of  the  world.  This  requires  in- 
creasing our  own  defense  capabilities 
and  conducting  effective  diplomacy.  In 
part,  however,  it  also  requires  a  realistic 
increase  in  security  assistance  to  allies 
and  friends  around  the  world. 

The  link  between  U.S.  defense  plan- 
ning and  security  assistance  is  direct 
and  occurs  at  several  levels.  The  United 
States  alone  does  not  and  cannot  main- 
tain a  force  structure  and  capabilities 
sufficient  to  defend  the  free  world.  We 
must  depend  upon  allies  to  deter  local 
threats  to  our  common  interests.  We 
factor  their  capabilities  into  our  plan- 
ning, and  the  security  assistance  pro- 
gram is  the  vehicle  for  providing  them 
the  necessary  equipment  and  training.  It 
would  cost  $60,000  to  equip  and  main- 
tain one  U.S.  soldier  in  Turkey,  should 
that  be  necessary;  it  costs  only  $9,000 
for  one  Turkish  soldier.  Thus,  security 
assistance  is  cost-effective. 

Second,  security  assistance  enables 
us  to  maintain  cooperative  relationships 
necessary  for  our  strategic  planning. 
For  example,  the  rapid  deployment  force 
cannot  perform  its  mission  in  a 
Southwest  Asian  contingency  unless  it 
can  move  to  the  area  promptly,  equipped 
to  fight  as  necessary.  This  requires 
enroute  access  and  transit  rights,  as  well 
as  prepositioned  equipment  and  supplies 
in  the  region.  We  cannot  expect  other 
nations  to  cooperate  with  us  unless  we 
are  equally  responsive  to  their  legitimate 
needs.  We  must  be  a  reliable  friend  if 
we  are  to  have  reliable  friends. 

Third,  the  military  security 
assistance  programs  are  managed  by  the 
Department  of  Defense  in  conjunction 
with  U.S.  procurement  so  that  both  the 
United  States  and  the  foreign  buyer 
reap  the  benefits  of  consolidated  plan- 
ning and  economies  of  scale.  This  entails 
both  integrated  procurement  of  weapons 


systems  and  tying  foreign  buyers  direct- 
ly into  our  supply  systems  to  ensure 
timely,  effective  logistical  support.  Cut- 
ting back  on  foreign  sales  by  the  United 
States  will  only  serve  to  channel  these 
sales  to  others  and  raise  the  costs  of  our 
own  purchases. 

Fourth,  security  assistance  helps  to 
maintain  a  strong  defense  industrial 
base  in  the  United  States.  Virtually  all 
security  assistance  resources  are  spent 
in  the  United  States  on  U.S.  equipment 
and  services. 

Finally,  allies  and  friends  who  are 
able  to  deter  and  defend  against  local 
threats  provide  the  President  time  and 
choices  in  a  crisis  situation.  Specifically, 
the  President  is  not  faced  with  the  sud- 
den choice  of  intervening  directly  with 
U.S.  forces  at  the  request  of  an  ally  or 
acquiescing  to  aggression.  A  security 
assistance  recipient  with  a  strong  defen- 
sive capability  provides  valuable  time  for 
the  United  States  to  consider  its  own  ap- 
propriate response. 

In  sum,  adequately  funded,  efficient- 
ly administered  security  assistance  pro- 
grams are  essential  to  U.S.  defense 
planning.  Without  them,  our  own 
defense  effort  would  be  both  far  more 
costly  and,  in  times  of  crisis,  even 
dangerously  crippled. 

One  aspect  of  security  assistance 
that  bears  special  mention  is  the 
economic  support  fund  (ESF).  ESF  is 
not  simply  another  form  of  credits  for 
military  purchases.  We  do  program  a 
major  percentage  of  ESF  to  countries 
where  we  also  have  a  significant  military 
assistance  program.  But  we  use  ESF  to 
address  economic  problems  in  a  way 
that  both  complements  and  enhances  the 
military  assistance  we  provide. 

Many  LDCs  today  are  reeling  from 
the  multiple  shock  of  high  energy  costs, 
decreased  demand  for  their  exports,  and 
their  own  economic  mismanagement. 
Political  stability  and  the  ability  to  fend 
off  external  threats  are  simply  impossi- 
ble objectives  if  a  country  cannot  achieve 
economic  growth  sufficient  to  enable  it 
to  meet  the  aspirations  of  its  people. 
ESF  helps  the  United  States  assert  a 
leadership  role  in  fostering  economic 
recovery  in  nations  of  high  strategic  im- 
portance to  us.  In  some  instances,  such 
as  Israel,  ESF  provides  needed  budget 
support.  In  others,  such  as  Pakistan, 
Jamaica,  and  the  Sudan,  ESF  helps  us 
to  support  countries  that  are  making  ef- 
forts to  restructure  their  economies  and 
to  become  more  self-reliant  in  the 
future.  In  still  others,  such  as  Kenya 
and  Botswana,  ESF  meets  basic  human 


needs  as  do  development  assistance 
grams.  Flexibility  is  the  most  impo 
attribute  of  ESF,  and  it  is  an  impo 
complement  to  other  trade,  financt 
aid  policies  and  programs.  Befoir  i 
ting  into  specifics,  let  me  review  In 
the  five  security  assistance  pr<i.ur.i! 
Although  well  known  to  you,  tin  \ 
evolved  to  meet  changing  needs  ir 
the  world. 

•  Foreign  military  sales  (IM 

financing  facilitates  the  purch:isi  •' 
military  equipment,  spares,  or  trai 
There  are  two  types  of  EMS  fin.iii. 
ing— direct  credits,  which  invoKr  ; 
propriated  funds,  and  guarantees  I 
which  do  not.  While  direct  credit  c 
under  the  law,  be  provided  with  \ ; 
degrees  of  concessionality,  the  Cui 
in  recent  years,  has  limited  its  use 
few  recipients,  for  which  it  has  wa 
in  advance  of  the  requirement  to  r 
U.S.  Government  guaranteed  loan: 
provided  to  a  wide  range  of  counti 
but  85%  of  the  program  is  directec 
seven  key  countries — Spain,  Turk( 
Greece,  Pakistan,  Israel,  Egypt,  ai 
Korea.  Such  loans  are  made  by  th< 
Federal  financing  bank  and  bear  a 
terest  rate  reflecting  the  cost  of  m 
to  the  Treasury. 

•  The  economic  support  fund 
(ESF),  of  which  I  have  already  sp(« 
provides  loans  or  grants  to  promot 
political  and  economic  stability  in  ( 
tries  of  special  economic,  political, 
security  interest  to  the  United  Sta 
This  assistance  may  be  in  the  forn: 
cash  transfers  for  balance  of  paym 
or  budget  support,  commodity  imp, 
programs,  or  project  assistance. 

•  The  military  assistance  proi 
(MAP)  provides  grant  funding  for  i 
defense  articles  and  services.  Whe) 
in  the  past  MAP  was  used  to  provi 
specific  military  items,  it  currently 
recipient  countries  pay  for  equipme 
purchased  under  the  FMS  program 
often  provide  a  degree  of  concessio 
in  financing  military  purchases  thr< 
a  combination  of  EMS  guaranteed : 
and  grant  MAP  funds.  While  the  p 
centage  rise  over  our  FY  1983  req> 
significant,  the  dollar  change  is  mo 
modest  and  clearly  reflects  the  con 
ing  impact  of  worldwide  recession  i 
ability  of  recipients  to  pay  for  nece 
defense  requirements. 

•  International  military  educ  i* 
and  training  (IMET)  provides  gra 
funds  for  professional  military  trai  )i 
Most  is  used  to  bring  promising  mia" 
personnel  to  the  United  States  for 
specialized  training,  which  often  hfw 


Department  of  State  Bi '' 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


advantage  of  exposing  future 
'y  leaders  to  American  values  and 
itions.  The  IMET  program,  while 
■ely  small  in  dollars  committed, 
'ell  have  the  highest  marginal 

of  any  assistance  program. 
Peacekeeping  operations,  the 
st  of  the  security  assistance  ac- 
1,  permits  us  to  participate  in 
iteral  peacekeeping  activities  in 
)f  the  world's  most  volatile  areas. 

Y  1983  and  1984,  the  only  peace- 
g  programs  foreseen  are  those  in 
lai  and  Cyprus. 

83  Supplemental 

Y  1983  continuing  resolution 
which  we  are  operating  does  not 
e  adequate  funds  to  achieve 

ary  national  security  objectives, 
ter  careful  consideration,  we  have 
intly  concluded  that  we  cannot, 
it  sacrificing  important  interests, 
e  within  continuing  resolution 
Our  problems  are  accentuated 
"  by  the  extensive  earmarking  in 
g  authorization  legislation  and  in 
itinuing  resolution  itself.  The  Ad- 
•ation  is  obliged,  therefore,  to 
iditional  funding  for  the  current 
ear  coincident  with  our  request 
1984. 

banon  Supplemental.  I  would  like 
now  to  the  first  of  the  two 
nental  authorizations  we  are 
f— $251  million  to  help  restore 
ind  stability  in  war-torn  Lebanon, 
a  one-time  special  reconstruction 
e.  In  FY  1984  and  beyond,  we  ex- 
revert  to  traditional  levels  of 
ice. 

150  million  in  ESF  grants.  These 
-year"  funds  to  be  obligated  in 
f  1983  and  FY  1984,  about  $100 
and  $50  million,  respectively, 
unds,  together  with  funds  from 
onors.  will  help  the  Lebanese 
ment  rebuild  its  shattered  eco- 
nfrastructure. 

100  million  in  FMS  guaranteed 
'his  will  help  finance  phase  II,  if 
ry,  and  phase  III  of  the  effort  to 
'tute  the  Lebanese  Armed 
Phase  I,  now  almost  complete, 
>  the  formation  of  four  new 
s  and  equipping  them  to  70% 
1.  Phase  II  will  bring  one  of 
•igades  up  to  100%  strength  and 
fth  brigade.  We  have  signed  let- 
)ffer  for  most  of  this  equipment 
irmored  personnel  carriers  which 
(aire  congressional  notification. 
<il  bill  for  phase  II  is  expected  to 


be  on  the  order  of  $55  million.  Phase  III 
would  add  two  more  brigades  at  a  cost 
of  $105  million. 

•  $1  million  in  IMET.  This  will  send 
U.S.  training  teams  to  Lebanon  and 
bring  Lebanese  military  officers  and 
enlisted  crews  to  the  United  States  for 
specialized  training. 

I  am  certain  that  members  of  this 
committee  recognize  that  very  important 
national  interests  are  at  stake  in  trou- 
bled Lebanon.  We  have  a  vital  interest 
in  ending  hostilities  and  promoting  the 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  in  a 
manner  that  promotes  lasting  peace  and 
stability.  The  multinational  force  cannot 
play  a  permanent,  direct  role  in  main- 
taining internal  security.  The  Lebanese 
Armed  Forces  must  gradually  assume 
responsibility  for  that  job.  The  exact 
shape  of  the  Lebanese  deployments  will 
be  determined  in  part  by  the  outcome  of 
the  current  negotiations  with  Israel. 

The  question  is  not  whether  we 
should  participate  in  Lebanon's  recovery 
nor  whether  we  should  help  Lebanon 
develop  the  capacity  to  defend  its  na- 
tional integrity  but  how  quickly  we  can 
bring  about  these  goals.  I  urge  you  to 
consider  this  supplemental  request  on  an 
urgent  basis  so  that  we  can  continue  the 
enormous  task  of  reconstruction. 

Continuing  Resolution.  Our  other 
supplemental  authorization  request  also 
requires  urgent  attention.  In  these  times 
of  economic  constraints  and  domestic 
belt-tightening,  it  takes  a  really  serious 
situation  to  come  before  the  Congress  to 
ask  for  more  foreign  aid.  We  are  con- 
vinced, however,  that  the  request  in  this 
case  is  not  only  justified  but  that  we 
have  no  responsible  alternative.  The 
reasons  are  these. 

The  continuing  resolution  is  $961 
million,  or  11%,  below  the  amount  we 
requested  for  security  assistance  in  FY 
1983.  This  means  cuts  of  48%  in  MAP, 
17%  in  IMET,  16%  in  FMS  guaranteed 
loans,  and  8%  in  ESF.  There  was  a  24% 
increase  in  forgiven  FMS  credit,  but  this 
was  completely  earmarked  for  Israel  and 
Egypt— at  levels  above  the  Administra- 
tion request— and  did  not  provide  funds 
for  the  Sudan  program,  earmarked  in 
authorization  legislation. 

Indeed,  more  than  half  of  the  MAP, 
ESF,  and  FMS  guaranteed  loan  is  ear- 
marked. This  magnifies  the  reduction  to 
be  absorbed  by  the  remaining  unear- 
marked  countries.  For  instance,  the  ef- 
fective cut  for  these  countries  averages 
nearly  70%  in  MAP  and  50%  in  FMS. 

We  cannot  carry  out  an  effective 
security  assistance  program  with  such 


extensive  reductions.  We  face  unaccept- 
able choices  as  to  which  critical  interests 
to  fulfill  and  which  to  sacrifice. 

We  do  not  seek  a  total  restoration  of 
the  difference  between  our  request  and 
the  continuing  resolution  level.  We  are 
requesting  $167  million  in  additional 
MAP  appropriations,  of  which  only  $142 
million  requires  authorization;  $144.5 
million  more  in  ESF  appropriations,  of 
which  $82  million  requires  authorization, 
and  $425  million  in  FMS  guaranteed 
loans.  Let  me  describe  how  the  supple- 
mental funds  will  be  used. 

Major  MAP  recipients  will  be  Sudan 
($50  million),  Tunisia  ($30  million), 
Thailand  ($16  million),  and  Kenya  ($12.5 
million).  As  I  noted  above,  $50  million  in 
forgiven  FMS  credit  is  earmarked  in 
authorization  legislation  for  Sudan,  yet 
no  funds  were  appropriated.  Sudan 
faces  severe  economic  problems  and  a 
serious  threat  from  neighboring  Libya. 
Its  continued  security  is  important  to 
the  Middle  East  peace  process  and  to 
our  access  to  Southwest  Asia  should  the 
need  arise.  The  Sudanese  economy  is  in 
dire  straits;  it  cannot  service  sizable 
high  interest  guaranteed  loans. 

Tunisia,  another  good  friend  threat- 
ened by  Libya,  needs  MAP,  coupled  with 
additional  guaranteed  loans,  to  purchase 
tanks  and  transport  aircraft.  The  total 
package  provides  necessary  concession- 
ality  to  help  Tunisia's  military  moderni- 
zation program. 

A  similar  rationale  supports  our  pro- 
posals for  Thailand,  which  just  last  week 
was  attacked  by  the  Soviet-backed  Viet- 
namese forces  ranged  along  its  eastern 
border,  and  for  Kenya,  which  contrib- 
utes to  stability  and  to  our  objectives  in 
the  Horn  of  Africa  and  Southwest  Asia. 
We  are  also  seeking  small  amounts  of 
MAP  funding  in  the  supplemental  to 
prevent  several  small  programs  in 
Africa  and  Latin  America  from  being 
eliminated. 

Major  ESF  recipients  are  Turkey 
($55  million),  Sudan  ($25  million),  Zim- 
babwe ($15  million),  and  the  Dominican 
Republic  and  Cyprus  ($10  million  each). 
Last  year  we  pledged  $350  million  to  a 
multilateral  effort  through  the  Organiza- 
tion for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  to  help  put  Turkey 
back  on  its  financial  feet.  The  requested 
$55  million,  together  with  the  $245 
million  allocated  under  the  continuing 
resolution  for  this  purpose,  still  leaves 
us  $50  million  short  of  our  pledge. 

For  Sudan  we  hope  to  generate 
matching  support  from  others  to  enable 
Sudan  to  meet  International  Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  foreign  exchange  require- 


ns 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


ments.  Such  support  is  essential  for  a 
country  whose  annual  debt  service  costs 
are  expected  to  exceed  its  total  exports 
this  year.  We  seek  additional  funds  for 
Zimbabwe  to  fulfill  our  public  pledge  to 
provide  $75  million  for  3  years. 

The  Administration  remains  com- 
mitted to  fostering  Caribbean  economic 
growth  and  stability.  The  supplemental 
is  essential  to  this  endeavor.  We  are 
asking  as  well  for  supplemental  funds  to 
meet  the  congressional  earmarks  for 
Cyprus  and  for  added  funding  for  the 
Middle  East  regional  program  which 
promotes  cooperation  between  Israel 
and  Egypt. 

The  off-budget  FMS  guaranteed  loan 
request  of  $425  million  will  support 
Pakistan  ($75  million),  Korea  ($70 
million),  Turkey  ($65  million),  Tunisia 
($43  million),  Jordan  ($35  million),  and 
Indonesia  ($30  million).  Several  smaller 
country  programs  require  funding  to 
prevent  them  from  being  eliminated 
altogether.  The  Pakistan  program  will 
be  raised  to  the  requested  level  consist- 
ent with  our  5-year  program  of  support 
for  that  country  and  to  permit  Pakistan 
to  pay  for  equipment  already  ordered. 
Korea  has  been  forced  by  resource  con- 
straints to  postpone  badly  needed 
modernization  programs  in  such  areas  as 
air  defense  radar  installation.  The  sup- 
plemental will  enable  us  to  restore  the 
33%  cut  from  the  requested  level.  The 
request  for  Turkey  will  allow  a  slight  in- 
crease over  the  amount  provided  in 
FY  1982  to  offset  grant  MAP  reductions 
mandated  in  the  continuing  resolution. 
The  request  for  Jordan  will  return  this 
critical  program  to  its  requested  level.  If 
Jordan  is  to  join  the  peace  process,  it 
must  be  confident  of  U.S.  support. 

We  are  not  seeking  supplemental  in- 
creases in  funds  for  either  IMET— 
although  reductions  have  forced  major 
retrenchments  in  this  highly  effective 
program— or  in  peacekeeping 
operations. 

Our  security  assistance  program  in 
FY  1983  has  been  seriously  compro- 
mised by  inadequate  funding.  We  have 
planned  for  these  extremely  scarce 
funds  to  continue  the  absolute  highest 
priority  country  programs  and  to  con- 
form to  the  congressional  earmarks. 
However,  if  the  supplemental  request  is 
not  approved,  country  programs  that 
are  only  marginally  less  critical  will  suf- 
fer grievously  and  many  of  the  smaller 
programs  will  have  to  be  either  cut  to 
the  point  of  ineffectiveness  or  ter- 
minated altogether.  We  do  not  want— 
and  we  trust  the  Congress  does  not 
want— to  be  responsible  for  the  negative 


impact  on  U.S.  interests  and  our 
bilateral  relationships  that  would  result. 

FY  1984  Request 

Now  let  me  move  on  to  what  would 
normally  have  been  the  only  subject  of 
my  testimony  today— the  FY  1984 
security  assistance  authorization 
request. 

We  are  requesting  total  security 
assistance  programs  of  $9.2  billion,  re- 
quiring $4.8  billion  in  new  FY  1984 
budget  authority.  There  is  no  real 
growth.  In  fact,  the  program  total 
represents  a  modest  4.5%  increase  over 
our  revised  request  for  FY  1983.  By 
program,  we  are  seeking  authorization 
of  $697  million  in  MAP,  which  is  essen- 
tial to  provide  for  increased  military  in- 
puts at  more  concessional  rates;  a  vir- 
tual straight-lining  of  ESF,  to  $2,949 
million,   $56,532  million  in  IMET;  and 
$4,436  million  in  off-budget  FMS 
guaranteed  loans.  We  are  requesting  $1 
billion  in  forgiven  FMS  direct  credits  for 
Israel  and  Egypt  and  a  peacekeeping 
operations  contribution  of  $46.2  million 
for  the  multilateral  force  and  observers 
in  the  Sinai  and  the  U.N.  forces  in 
Cyprus. 

These  figures  are  determined  by  an 
interagency  process  which  carefully 
reviews  all  our  programs.  Our  key 
strategic  objectives  are  established  and 
coordinated  with  foreign  policy  and 
defense  planning.  We  then  design  a 
security  assistance  program  that  is 
carefully  integrated  with  development 
assistance  priorities  to  fulfill  key 
strategic  objectives.  Since  I  have  recent- 
ly returned  from  accompanying  the 
Secretary  on  a  trip  to  East  Asia,  I 
would  like  to  discuss  that  vital  area  of 
the  world  first. 

East  Asia  and  the  Pacific.  For  the 

Pacific,  we  are  requesting  $506  million 
for  10  countries— about  5.5%  of  the 
total  security  assistance  request.  The 
bulk  of  funding  here  goes  to  countries 
with  which  we  have  firm  mutual  security 
agreements.  More  than  85%  of  the  pro- 
gram goes  to  three  countries — Korea, 
Thailand,  and  the  Philippines. 

The  Republic  of  Korea  is  directly 
threatened  by  North  Korea,  which 
spends  15-20%  of  its  GNP  on  arms,  has 
12%  larger  forces  than  the  South,  and 
more  than  twice  the  number  of  artillery 
pieces,  tanks,  and  combat  aircraft.  Our 
$230  million  request  will  help  Korea  pur- 
chase priority  items  in  its  second  force 
improvement  plan  such  as  aircraft,  air 
defense  missiles,  and  improved  armor 
and  artillery  capability. 


For  Thailand  we  are  request) 
$106.4  million  to  be  used  primari  fa 
tanks,  antiaircraft  missiles,  and  a  en 
The  Thais  face  a  direct  threat  frt  a 
estimated  180,000  Soviet-backt-d   h 
namese  soldiers  across  their  east  i 
border  in  Kampuchea.  By  assist ii 
Thailand,  we  help  to  deter  agK''*' 
and  show  members  of  the  Ass'i<i 
South  East  Asian  Nations  (ASl.. 
commitment  to  support  their  unl 
ence  and  security.  Our  assistaini 
gram  also  has  a  catalytic  effect  1  ■ 
couraging  greater  regional  politii  a 
defense  cooperation. 

Our  FY  1984  program  for  th  'h 
pines  represents  the  final  year  i  il  le 
security  assistance  pledge  which  « 
dent  Carter  made  in  1979  followj  ; 
successful  amendment  of  the  n;i! 
base  agreement.  Clark  Air  Ba-.  , 
Naval  Base,  and  other  facilities  t 
help  to  sustain  the  U.S.  position    ai 
Asian  power  and  to  project  Anie  ir 
power  into  the  Indian  Ocean.  Fir  v 
would  note  our  two  smaller  but  i  >' 
tant  programs  in  Indonesia  ami 
Malaysia,  which  promote  seciint; 
terests  in  these  populous,  resouf  • 
countries  lying  beside  vital  sea  li 
tween  the  Pacific  and  Indian  <  >c« 

Middle  East.  A  fundamei';. 
objective,  requiring  the  larges;  | 
age  of  funds,  is  to  further  the  M 
East  peace  process.  Nowhere  i-  i 
for  consistency,  reliability,  an^l  \>: 
of  U.S.  foreign  policy  more  evi.le  - 
in  the  Middle  East.  Our  policy  in  ■ 
region  is  based  on  two  mutually  1 1- 
forcing  goals:  (1)  the  search  for  a  si 
and  lasting  peace  among  all  of  th  'ti 
in  the  area  and  (2)  the  requireme  li 
our  friends  in  the  region  be  able 
assure  their  security  against  thre '. 
from  the  outside  and  from  the  pr  «i 
of  Soviet  surrogates  and  radical  f  "t 
within  the  region. 

U.S.  assistance  programs  td  in 
and  Egypt  reflect  our  best  apprai ; ' 
their  real  needs.  Our  programs  ai 
designed  to  help  give  these  natioi  tl 
confidence  to  continue  on  the  pat 
toward  peace  begun  at  Camp  Da\  ■ 

Lebanon  and  Jordan  are  also  it 
to  peace  and  security  in  the  Midd 
East.  I  spoke  earlier  about  Leban  i 
the  context  of  the  FY  1983  suppl  « 
tal.  The  strengthening  of  instituti  s 
and  the  fostering  of  a  national  co  ?' 
in  Lebanon  would  help  significant  t 
stabilize  the  area  and  would  ther£ 
remove  one  of  the  major  flashpoii  < 
conflict  in  the  region. 

Our  continued  support  for  Joi  J 
creases  its  ability  to  remain  a  vial , 


Department  of  State  Elf 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


ite  actor  in  the  region  and  en- 
es  it  to  assume  an  active  role  in 
ice  process.  Numerically  out- 
j  by  a  potentially  aggressive 
)r,  Jordan  depends  on  well- 
ed, high  quality,  highly  motivated 
to  deter  attack.  Inasmuch  as  the 
I  Jordan  would  increase  if  it  joins 
,ce  process,  Jordan  must  know 
has  a  staunch  friend  in  the 
States  which  will  supply  and  pro- 
lancing  for  military  modernization 
The  requested  $115  million  pro- 
3r  Jordan  is  designed  to  help 
lize  the  armed  forces  through 
385  of  equipment  including  armor, 
\l,  airlift  equipment,  and  TOW 
3  [tube-launched,  optically 
I,  wire-guided  antitank  missiles]. 
•  FY  1984  we  plan  to  devote 
il%  of  our  total  security  assist- 
■ogram  to  this  peace  effort.  In 
Ti  terms,  this  is  $1,570  million  in 
1,000  million  in  forgiven  FMS 
$2,130  million  in  FMS  guar- 
loans,  .$4.75  million  in  IMET,  and 
lillion  for  peacekeeping 
5ns  in  the  Sinai.  By  country,  it 
s  to  $2,485  million  for  Israel, 
Tfiillion  for  Egypt,  $137  million 
ian,  and  $15.75  million  for 
n. 

rO  Alliance.  The  strategic  im- 
e  of  Europe's  southern  tlank  to 
ind  the  West  has  been 
cally  underlined  by  events  this 
ir.  Helping  these  nations  acquire 
eriel  and  training  needed  to 
fectively  their  NATO  respon- 
is  an  important  contribution  to 
mon  defense,  not  only  against 
to  NATO  but  against  challenges 
ommon  interests  beyond  the 
ihic  bounds  of  the  alliance. 
[  ugal  and  Spain  hold  a  strategic 
E  along  the  principal  lines  of  ac- 
(Surope  and  the  Middle  East- 
( ;st  Asia.  The  Portuguese,  with 
1  )f  their  allies,  are  determined  to 
I  .rger  role  in  NATO  and  in  the 
B  of  Western  interests.  Basing 
i  in  Portugal  are  key  to  NATO 
tument,  antisubmarine  warfare 
t  ns,  and  possibly  out-of-area  con- 
i  ;s.  The  FY  1984  FMS-MAP  re- 
$105  million  will  help  provide  a 
S  quadron  of  A-7P  aircraft,  the 
t  of  an  antisubmarine  warfare 
t  irogram,  and  increased  P-3  and 
ipability.  Spain's  decision  to  join 
1  a  historic  milestone  on  the 
1  ;hat  nation's  full  reentry  into  the 
Siropean  community.  It  under- 
slpain's  desire  to  reinforce 


democratic  institutions.  Our  $400  million 
FMS  request  serves  to  solidify  progress 
in  this  direction  and  helps  ensure  the  ac- 
cess we  need  to  bases  vital  to  our  own 
defense  posture. 

In  our  defense  cooperation  agree- 
ment with  Turkey,  we  have  undertaken 
to  assist  the  Turkish  Armed  Forces  in 
their  efforts  to  modernize  their  danger- 
ously obsolescent  military  inventory. 
Turkey  is  outnumbered  three  to  one  by 
Warsaw  Pact  ground  troops,  armed  with 
the  most  modern  armaments  in  the 
Soviet  arsenal  garrisoned  in  the  nearby 
trans-Caucasus  and  Thrace.  Similarly, 
Warsaw  Pact  aircraft  vastly  outnumber 
Turkish  aircraft  in  the  region.  We  are 
requesting  $755  million  in  FMS-MAP  to 
help  Turkey  purchase  a  wide  variety  of 
equipment  including  some  replacements 
for  its  obsolete  fighter  aircraft.  The  use 
of  MAP  funds  will  limit  the  impact  of 
this  large  program  on  Turkey's  heavy 
debt  service  schedule.  We  cannot 
understate  Turkey's  importance,  stand- 
ing as  it  does  at  the  intersection  of  our 
NATO,  Southwest  Asia,  and  Middle 
East  strategies. 

Security  assistance  demonstrates 
American  support  for  a  democratic 
Greece  willing  and  able  to  fulfill  its 
NATO  responsibility  and  to  help  ensure 
political  stability  in  the  eastern  Mediter- 
ranean. We  have  straight-lined  the 
Greek  program  because  base  negotia- 
tions currently  are  underway.  To  do 
otherwise  would  compromise  our  ability 
to  reach  a  reasonable  agreement.  We 
have  told  the  Greeks,  however,  that  we 
are  prepared  to  request  additional  funds 
in  the  context  of  a  satisfactory  defense 
cooperation  agreement. 

We  intend  to  commit  $1,790  million 
in  security  assistance  to  the  European 
southern  tier  states  of  Spain,  Portugal, 
Greece,  Turkey,  and  Cyprus.  By  pro- 
gram this  will  consist  of  $230  million  in 
ESF,  $290  million  in  MAP,  $1,250 
million  in  FMS  guaranteed  loans,  $11.7 
million  in  IMET,  and  $9  million  for  the 
U.N.  forces  in  Cj-prus.  By  country  it  will 
be  $12  million  for  Cyprus,  $281.7  million 
for  Greece,  $148  million  for  Portugal, 
$415  million  for  Spain,  and  $934  million 
for  Turkey. 

Southwest  Asia.  Southwest  Asia 
remains  the  critical  source  of  energy  for 
the  free  world.  Broadly  defined  this  area 
stretches  from  Pakistan  in  the  East  to 
Morocco  in  the  West.  Almost  all  these 
countries  face  severe  economic  problems 
and  potential  subversion  or  regional 
threats,  in  many  cases  supported  by  the 
Soviets  or  their  proxies. 


Our  5-year  program  of  military 
modernization  and  economic  assistance 
will  help  Pakistan  to  meet  the  Soviet 
threat  from  Afghanistan  and  facilitate 
the  economic  development  essential  to 
internal  stability.  Our  renewed  strategic 
relationship  will  help  deter  further  ac- 
tions by  the  Soviets  and  support 
Pakistan  resolve  to  continue  to  oppose 
Soviet  aggression  in  Afghanistan.  A 
Pakistan  more  confident  of  its  security 
has  less  need  for  and  motivation  to 
develop  nuclear  explosives.  The  $300 
million  FMS  request  will  be  used  for 
progress  payments  on  the  $1.7  billion 
package  of  military  assistance  already 
underway,  including  F-16  aircraft.  As 
you  know,  the  first  six  F-16s  recently 
arrived  in  country,  and  the  reaction  was 
overwhelmingly  positive  for  U.S.- 
Pakistan security  relations. 

Sudan,  Morocco,  and  Tunisia  all  face 
threats  of  subversion  or  aggression 
emanating  from  or  supported  by  Libya. 
Sudan  also  faces  a  significant  potential 
military  threat  from  Ethiopia.  These 
countries  have  difficult  economic  prob- 
lems. Grant  U.S.  assistance  is  needed  to 
enhance  military  preparedness  without 
adding  to  already  excessive  economic 
burdens. 

Given  Oman's  strategic  location  on 
the  Strait  of  Hormuz  and  close  coopera- 
tion on  regional  security  issues,  we  put 
high  priority  on  improving  its  defense 
forces.  The  Yemen  Arab  Republic, 
strategically  located  on  the  Bab  el- 
Mandeb  Straits  and  the  southwest  flank 
of  Saudi  Arabia,  faces  a  well-armed, 
Marxist-led  insurgency  supported  by 
South  Yemen  and  Libya.  With  a 
deteriorating  economic  situation,  this 
country  requires  both  development  and 
security  assistance  to  enable  it  to  main- 
tain its  independence  and  stability. 

Also  along  the  Indian  Ocean  littoral, 
in  both  Kenya  and  Somalia,  we  seek  to 
encourage  economic  self-reliance  and  the 
development  of  defense  capabilities  con- 
sistent with  economic  realities.  Both  na- 
tions count  as  key  features  in  our  own 
defense  planning  for  the  region,  and 
Somalia  faces  continuing  pressure  from 
Ethiopian  border  attacks.  Our  aid  to  the 
island  states  helps  maintain  U.S.  access 
and  influence  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 

We  plan  to  commit  som.e  $1,188 
million  to  security  assistance  for  the  12 
countries  whose  cooperation  we  consider 
essential  to  our  Southwest  Asia  policy. 
Programmatically,  this  will  include  $451 
million  in  ESF,  .$220  million  in  MAP, 
$507  million  in  FMS  guarantees,  and 
$10.15  million  in  IMET.  The  major  coun- 
try programs  are  Pakistan  at  $525.8 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


million,  Sudan  at  $181.5  million,  Tunisia 
at  $141.7  million,  Morocco  at  $98.7 
million,  Kenya  at  $78.65  million,  Somalia 
at  $76  million,  and  Oman  at  $60.1 
million. 

Caribbean  Basin.  We  face  a  major 
challenge  in  the  Caribbean  Basin,  where 
Cuba  has  sought  to  exploit  socioeco- 
nomic problems  and  military  vulner- 
abilities. The  FY  1982  Caribbean  Basin 
initiative  supplemental  was  never  in- 
tended to  cure  all  problems;  we  must 
continue  to  provide  resources  until  in- 
creased investment,  a  strengthened 
private  sector,  and  expanded  export 
markets  enable  these  countries  to 
achieve  more  economic  self-sufficiency. 

El  Salvador,  where  the  guerrillas 
seek  to  destroy  the  economy  and  take 
over  the  government,  would  be  the 
largest  single  recipient  of  both  economic 
and  military  assistance  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin.  The  Salvadoran  economy  has 
been  in  sharp  decline  since  1978;  in  real 
terms  the  value  of  goods  and  services 
produced  now  is  estimated  to  be  25% 
below  1978.  We  have  allocated  $140 
million  in  ESF  for  FY  1983  and  are  re- 
questing $120  million  for  FY  1984  in  an 
effort  to  restore  production  in  what  was 
one  of  Latin  America's  most  efficient 
economies.  Honduras  faces  a  severe 
economic  decline  and  a  large  military 
buildup  in  neighboring  Nicaragua.  Costa 
Rica's  rapidly  deteriorating  economy  will 
require  substantial  assistance  while  fun- 
damental reforms  are  effected.  Jamaica 
will  continue  to  need  substantial  assist- 
ance in  order  to  restore  the  vitality  of 
its  private  sector.  Because  of  deterio- 
rating conditions,  other  countries  in  the 
region,  including  Guatemala  and  the 
Dominican  Republic,  require  substantial 
amounts  of  economic  assistance.  We  are 
proposing  a  new  FMS  program  for 
Guatemala  in  FY  1984  because  of  the 
importance  of  Guatemala  in  Central 
America,  the  threat  the  country  faces, 
and  the  progress  being  made  in  improv- 
ing human  rights. 

Under  the  security  assistance  rubric, 
we  expect  to  devote  about  $558  million 
to  Caribbean  Basin  initiative  countries 
and  regional  programs.  This  will  include 
$398  million  in  ESF,  $109.8  million  in 
MAP,  $45  million  in  FMS  guarantees, 
and  $5.13  million  in  IMET  funds.  The 
major  recipients  will  be  El  Salvador  at 
$206.3  million,  Honduras  at  $81  million, 
Costa  Rica  at  $72.15  million,  Jamaica  at 
$59.2  million.  Guatemala  at  $50.25 
million,  and  the  Dominican  Republic  at 
$45.75  million. 


We  also  propose  in  FY  1984,  in  addi- 
tion to  these  areas  of  strategic  concern 
to  the  United  States,  to  provide  security 
assistance  to  a  number  of  other  coun- 
tries in  troubled  parts  of  the  world. 

Africa.  Our  policy  in  southern 
Africa  is  designed  to  advance  the  peace 
process  in  Namibia,  ensure  continued 
Western  access  to  key  strategic 
minerals,  and  support  the  development 
process  from  Zaire  to  the  Cape.  We  are 
committed  to  assist  the  economic 
development  of  the  front-line  states  in 
southern  Africa,  whose  participation  is 
essential  to  the  resolution  of  conflict 
there.  The  alternative — a  new  escalation 
of  conflict— would  provide  significant 
new  opportunities  for  the  Cubans  and 
the  Soviets.  We  seek  $181  million  in 
security  assistance  for  this  region. 

Adequate  aid  is  essential  to  maintain 
peace  and  stability  in  western  Africa, 
where  financial  difficulties  risk  exploita- 
tion by  Libya.  We  propose  modest  new 
ESF  programs  for  two  threatened, 
staunchly  pro- Western  countries — 
Senegal  and  Niger.  Our  aid  to  Liberia  is 
designed  to  address  its  immediate  finan- 
cial crisis,  stimulate  long-term  develop- 
ment, ensure  continued  U.S.  access  to 
key  transportation  and  communications 
facilities,  and  facilitate  the  return  to 
civilian  government  in  1985.  Our 
assistance  elsewhere  in  West  Africa  is 
limited  to  FMS  loans  in  Cameroon  and 
Gabon  and  to  14  IMET  programs. 

South  America.  The  President's  re- 
cent trip  to  Latin  America  underscored 
America's  commitment  to  play  a  major 
role  in  addressing  the  key  problems  of 
our  neighbors  to  the  south.  In  furthering 
our  strategic  and  national  security  in- 
terests in  the  southern  part  of  the 
hemisphere,  we  are  seeking  $51  million 
for  FMS  guaranteed  loans  to  Peru, 
Colombia,  and  Ecuador. 

In  concluding  this  portion  of  my 
remarks,  I  would  emphasize  that  none  of 
these  figures  is  intended  to  set  a  cash 
value  on  the  relationship  between  the 
United  States  and  the  recipient  country. 
Nor  do  they  in  all  cases  indicate  the 
total  amount  of  assistance  we  propose  to 
provide,  as  many  will  receive  various 
other  types  of  development  assistance  as 
well.  Our  security  assistance  budget  pro- 
posal is,  I  believe,  carefully  crafted  to 
move  us  toward  a  variety  of  strategic 
objectives  at  minimum  expense  to  the 
American  taxpayer. 


FY  1984  Legislative  Proposals 

I  would  now  like  to  address  sevei 
our  legislative  proposals  for  FY  : 
These  include  new  proposals  toge^ 
with  those  submitted  last  year,  h 
the  latter  were  included  in  the  ai 
tion  bill  reported  by  this  committ 
have  made  an  effort  to  limit  the 
and  scope  of  the  proposals  to  the 
essential  to  the  effect've  operatic 
administration  of  the  programs, 
regard  those  which  are  before  yc 
tremely  important  and  urge  theii 
sideration  and  adoption. 

Let  me  highlight  some  of  the 
important  proposals. 

We  seek  a  change  to  Section 
the  Arms  Export  Control  Act  to 
simplify  the  current,  multitier  pr 
structure  on  sales  of  training.  Bj 
ing  us  to  charge  all  purchasers  a 
amount  equal  to  the  "additional  c 
not  otherwise  incurred  by  the  Ur 
States  in  providing  the  training, 
proposal  would  reduce  discrimin; 
among  countries  yet  ensure  that 
United  States  recoups  the  total  c 
tributed  to  such  training.  This  pr 
is  similar  to  that  enacted  recentl. 
grant  training. 

Earlier  I  mentioned  the  imp& 
earmarking  in  legislation  has  on  i 
ability  to  allocate  available  fundsr 
priority  objectives.  The  most  seri' 
problems  arise  from  earmarks  in 
authorization  and  appropriations 
tion,  which  assume  availability  oi 
funds  authorized  in  that  bill.  WTii 
worldwide  availability  for  ESF  oi 
is  reduced,  often  severely  in  a  co 
ing  resolution,  we  must  nonethelc 
specific  countries  at  the  full  amov 
earmarked.  This  creates  serious  ( 
tions  in  country  allocations,  often 
unintended,  by  forcing  disproporl 
ly  severe  cuts  in  unearmarked  co 
programs. 

To  help  deal  with  this  problen 
Administration  is  proposing  enacl 
of  a  provision  that  would  reduce  i 
mark  was  to  the  total  funds  availi 
ing  resolution,  to  the  same  propoj 
the  total  funds  available  under  th( 
continuing  resolution  as  the  ori^i 
mark  was  to  the  totol  funds  avails 
the  relevant  account  in  the  law  w 
established  the  earmark.  We  reco 
that  the  Congress  may  not  authoi 
appropriate  all  the  funds  that  hav 
requested.  When  the  funds  are  re 
however,  earmarking  places  us  in 
straitjacket  which  prevents  ration 
country  allocations.  The  combinat 
lower  funding  and  extensive  earn' 


76 


Department  of  State  El< 


SECURITY  ASSISTANCE 


,ting.  I  strongly  urge  adoption  of 
iposal. 

also  need  adequate  numbers  of 
lel  in  certain  countries  to  manage 
irity  assistance  program.  The 
'  of  overseas  military  personnel 
i  significantly  in  the  late  1970s, 
ss  took  the  lead  in  bringing  about 
actions,  many  of  which  were  war- 
and  overdue.  As  certain  pro- 
jrow  in  size  and  importance, 
r,  we  must  seek  prudent  in- 
.  Accordingly,  we  propose  to 
Section  515  of  the  Foreign 
nee  Act  to  add  9  new  countries 
2  currently  authorized  to  have 
lan  six  uniformed  personnel, 
nclude  Pakistan,  Tunisia,  Yemen, 
Sudan,  Zaire,  El  Salvador,  Hon- 
ind  Venezuela, 
propose  to  add  Korea  to  the 
;t  of  countries  authorized  to 
extended  payment  terms  on 
laranteed  loans.  The  size  of  the 
)rogram  has  been  reduced 
jntly  in  recent  years.  The  reduc- 
5  not  by  choice  but  because 
is  an  unearmarked  country,  was 
0  bear  a  sizable  portion  of  the 
■ns  in  overall  funding.  This  pro- 
luld  allow  Korea  to  spread  out 
/ments  and  spend  a  larger  por- 
ts own  funds  on  needed  military 
es. 
rent  law  requires  that  countries 

or  dispose  of  U.S.  equipment 

under  the  MAP  program 
he  proceeds  to  the  United 
Because  there  is  no  incentive  to 
e  obsolete  equipment  which 
vailable  operation  and  main- 
funds,  countries  maintain  such 
nt  in  their  inventories  even 
do  so  is  uneconomical.  We  are 
ig  to  add  a  waiver  authority  that 
low  the  President,  on  a  country- 
ry  basis,  to  permit  countries  to 

proceeds  of  a  sale  when  it  is  in 

national  interest  to  do  so.  All 
e  legal  and  policy  controls  on 
mtry  transfers  would  continue 

to  any  sales  of  this  equipment. 

briefly  I  want  to  mention  a  few 
If  1983  proposals  which  we  are 

in  requesting  in  FY  1984. 

ithorization  of  an  antiterrorism 
program.  Our  proposal  incor- 
artually  all  of  the  changes  made 
mmittees  last  year.  This  pro- 
uld  become  effective  upon 
rt  of  the  bill  to  pro\ade  anti- 
assistance.  Authorization  of  $5 
requested  for  FY  1984. 
smoval  of  prohibitions  against 
;e  to  China.  This  proposal 


removes  China  from  the  prohibited  list 
of  "Communist"  countries  in  Section 
620(t)  of  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act. 

•  Permit  reciprocal  no-cost  ex- 
change training  on  a  one-for-one  basis 
for  professional  military  at  war  colleges 
and  command  and  staff  colleges. 

•  Establish  a  threshold  of  $50,000 
on  reprogramming  notices  to  the  Con- 
gress for  international  narcotics  control 
and  IMET  programs. 

We  are  presenting  you  with  several 
proposals— two  FY  1983  supplemental 
authorization  bills  plus  the  regular  FY 
1984  bill.  We  request  your  urgent  and 
careful  consideration  of  them.  The 
legislative  and  budgetary  requests  have 
been  scrutinized  thoroughly  within  the 
Administration  and  meet  all  of  our 
essential  criteria  in  a  very  tight  budget 
year.  In  conclusion,  I  ask  you  to  con- 
sider not  only  the  costs  of  providing  the 
requested  assistance  but  also  the  costs 
of  not  providing  it. 


ARMS  TRANSFER  POLICY 

With  respect  to  arms  transfers  and  arms 
transfer  policy,  I  would  merely  reiterate 
what  many  officials  of  this  administra- 
tion have  said  before:  We  consider  arms 
transfers  to  be  an  instrument  of  U.S. 
policy,  not  an  exceptional  instrument  as 
our  predecessors  tried  but  in  fact  failed 
to  establish,  nor  as  a  largely  commercial 
activity  as  is  the  case  with  a  number  of 
some  other  nations.  We  will  continue  to 
weigh  carefully  all  of  the  relevant  con- 
siderations likely  to  bear  upon  any 
specific  arms  transfer  decision  in  order 
to  determine  whether  that  transfer  is, 
on  balance,  in  the  clear  U.S.  national 
interest. 

These  considerations  include,  of 
course,  the  military  purpose  of  the  pro- 
posed transfer,  the  ability  of  the  recipi- 
ent to  absorb  and  operate  the  equip- 
ment, the  economic  impact  of  the  pro- 
posed transfer  upon  the  recipient,  the 
impact  upon  surrounding  states- 
stabilizing  or  destabilizing  in  the 
region— and  so  on.  As  a  practical  mat- 
ter, we  continue  to  turn  down  proposed 
sales  at  a  rate  not  significantly  lower 
than  our  predecessors.  This  approach, 
we  firmly  believe,  is  sensible  and  en- 
sures that  arms  transfers  are  integrated 
effectively  with  other  instruments  of 
policy  and  contribute  to  our  broader 
strategic  objectives. 

Arms  transfers  are  inherently 
neither  good  nor  evil.  A  given  weapons 
system  is  not  stabilizing  or  destabilizing 


as  an  abstract  proposition.  Arbitrary 
restraint  and  unrestricted  transfers  are 
equally  unrelated  to  U.S.  national  in- 
terests. There  is  no  virtue  in  cutting 
arms  transfers  or  increasing  them,  in 
the  aggregate.  Transfers  can  be 
evaluated  fairly  only  in  terms  of  their 
impact  on  specific  U.S.  interests  in 
specific  countries  and  regions,  taking  in- 
to account  military,  political,  and 
economic  realities  at  the  time. 

We  have  established  a  rigorous  in- 
ternal review  process  on  arms  transfers. 
All  relevant  departments  and  agencies 
have  an  opportunity  to  review  major 
proposed  transfers  and  present  their 
views.  This  provides  me,  and  other  deci- 
sionmakers, with  assessments  of 
military  need,  political  impact,  regional 
implications,  arms  control  factors,  and 
affordability. 

Sometimes  there  are  clear  and  easy 
choices,  i.e.,  approval  or  disapproval  is 
unambiguously  in  the  U.S.  interest.  In 
other  cases,  there  are  valid  pros  and 
cons.  We  must  then  decide  whether,  on 
balance,  a  proposed  transfer  is  in  the 
U.S.  interest.  We  consult  with  the  Con- 
gress, both  to  factor  your  advice  into  the 
decisionmaking  process  and  to  acquaint 
you  with  the  factors  bearing  on  the  case, 
to  sensitize  you  to  the  gray  areas,  and  to 
minimize  potential  differences  if  we  ap- 
prove a  sale  and  transmit  it  to  you  pur- 
suant to  Section  36(b)  of  the  Arms  Ex- 
port Control  Act. 

We  also  give  close  scrutiny  to 
transfers  of  systems  that  incorporate  ad- 
vanced or  sensitive  technology.  We  must 
be  assured  that  such  technology  will  be 
adequately  protected.  This  factor  adds 
complexity  to  our  analysis,  because  we 
must  take  into  account  the  potential 
stability  of  recipient  governments  over 
the  lifetime  of  the  equipment  being  sold. 
The  probability  that  a  country  will  con- 
tinue to  share  common  policy  objectives 
with  us  over  the  long  haul  is  an  impor- 
tant consideration  as  well. 

Arms  transfers  are  not  substitutes 
for  other  forms  of  diplomacy.  They  are 
not  an  alternative  to  a  long-term  coin- 
cidence of  national  security  interests 
between  the  United  States  and  another 
government.  They  cannot  guarantee  har- 
monious bilateral  relationships  when 
fundamental  interests  diverge.  The 
Soviets  learned  this  in  Egypt,  Somalia, 
and  earlier  in  Indonesia,  or  as  we  have 
experienced  Iran  and  Ethiopia. 

This  being  said,  however,  arms 
transfers  should  be  and  are  an  integral 
part  of  our  security  relationships  with 
friendly  countries  which  seek  to  deter 
and  defend  against  neigbors  which  are. 


77 


SOUTH  ASIA 


most  likely,  armed  by  the  Soviets  or 
other  East  bloc  countries.  As  I  stated 
earlier  in  my  testimony,  if  we  want 
reliable  friends,  we  must  be  one 
ourselves.  Countries  which  cast  their  lot 
with  the  United  States  must  know  that 
they  can  count  on  our  support  to  meet 
their  legitimate  military  needs.  Failure 
to  respond  prudently  and  appropriately 
to  these  needs  would  seriously  damage 
our  credibility  as  a  leader  of  the  free 
world,  would  increase  the  chances  of 
U.S.  forces  having  to  be  deployed  in  a 
crisis,  and  would  jeopardize  defense 
cooperation  with  countries  which  pro- 
vide access  and  facilities  to  the  U.S. 
military.  Our  ability  to  supply  friendly 
nations  with  appropriate  arms  con- 
tributes to  a  reduction  in  what  would  be 
larger  U.S.  defense  needs  to  meet  our 
national  security  objectives. 

Government-to-government  arms 
sales  have  fluctuated  in  recent  years, 
from  $13  billion  in  FY  1979  and  $15.3 
billion  in  FY  1980  to  $8.5  billion  in 
FY  1981  and  $21.5  billion  in  FY  1982. 
They  are,  of  course,  subject  to  inflation 
like  other  areas  of  the  economy:  thus  the 
levels  for  the  past  3  years,  in  constant 
FY  1979  dollars,  would  more  nearly  ap- 
proximate $13.6  billion,  $6.6  billion,  and 
$16.3  billion,  respectively. 

FMS  AGREEMENTS 

(billions) 

1979    1980    1981    1982 

Current  $13      15.3      8..5      21..5 

Constant  FY  1979      $13     13.6      6.6      16.3 

Commercial  military  exports  in  re- 
cent years  have  approximated  $2  billion 
or  less  per  year.  This  figure  might  rise 
somewhat  since  the  Congress  removed 
the  commercial  arms  sales  ceiling 
several  years  ago. 

The  surge  in  arms  sales  in  1982 
largely  reflects  the  impact  of  several 
large  transactions.  During  recent  years, 
for  example,  the  United  States  has  ap- 
proved or  has  under  consideration  the 
following  major  cases: 

•  Trident  for  the  United  Kingdom— 
about  $4  billion; 

•  F-18s  for  Spain — about  $3  billion; 

•  F-18s  for  Australia— about  $2.6 
billion;  and 

•  F-16s  for  Israel— about  $2.7 
billion. 

The  four  sales  exceed  $12  billion,  or 
more  than  half  the  FY  1982  level  of 
$21.5  billion.  Adding  the  $8  billion  Saudi 
airborne  warning  and  control  system 
(AWACS)  package  would,  with  just  the 
five  largest  transfers  of  the  past  2  or  3 


Afghanistan  Day,  1983 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
MAR.  21.  1983^ 

I  would  like  to  note  that  today— 
March  21,  the  Afghan  New  Year— is  be- 
ing commemorated  again  this  year  as 
Afghanistan  Day.  Various  private 
organizations,  including  many  Afghan 
exile  groups  and  some  State  govern- 
ments and  municipalities,  are  planning 
events  throughout  the  United  States  to 
show  their  continuing  support  for  the 
struggle  that  the  Afghan  freedom 
fighters  are  waging  against  Soviet  ag- 
gression in  Afghanistan. 

In  the  3  years  since  their  invasion, 
the  Soviet  forces  have  been  unable  to 
subjugate  Afghanistan.  They  are  pitted 
against  an  extraordinary  people  who,  in 
their  determination  to  resist,  have 
organized  an  effective  and  still 
spreading  countrywide  resistance.  The 
resistance  of  the  mujahidin,  or  Afghan 
freedom  fighters,  is  an  example  to  all 


the  world  of  the  invincibility  of  th 
ideals  we  in  this  country  hold  mos 
dear— the  ideals  of  freedom  and  i 
dependence. 

The  Secretary  of  State  expres 
solidarity  with  the  Afghan  freedo 
fighters  and  sends  his  New  Year's 
greeting  to  Afghans  everywhere, 
would  like  to  recall  for  all  the  woi 
America's  unflagging  sympathy  ft 
determined  people,  its  support  foi 
refugees,  and  its  commitment  to 
a  political  settlement  for  Afghani: 
based  on  the  complete  withdraws 
Soviet  forces,  which  would  also  ir 
self-determination  for  the  Afghan 
pie,  independence  and  nonaligned 
for  Afghanistan,  and  the  return  o 
refugees  with  safety  and  honor. 


•Read  to  news  correspondents  by 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romber 


years,  virtually  match  the  entire 
FY  1982  total.  Shifting  such  large  sales 
from  one  year  to  another  can 
dramatically  change  annual  totals,  with 
absolutely  no  policy  implications. 

In  fact,  the  high  FY  1982  level 
following  the  low  FY  1981  level  is  large- 
ly an  artifact  of  just  such  a  shift  of  the 
Saudi  AWACS  package  from  FY  1981 
into  FY  1982  as  a  result  of  the  extended 
congressional  debate.  Averaging  those 
two  fiscal  years  yields  annual  levels  of 
some  $15  billion— about  the  same  as 
FY  1980. 

For  the  record,  I  would  like  to  pro- 
vide you  with  some  additional  detail  on 
the  major  arms  transfers  recipients  in 
FY  1982. 

FY  1982  Major  Transfers  Recipients 

(millions) 

$  5,170    Weapons-Related 
$  1,844    Construction 
$  7,014 

$  2,653.5(Mostly  F-18s) 
$  l,943.2(Mostly  F-16s) 
$  l,422.9(F-16s  and  Army 

Equipment) 
$  1,046.4  (Mostly  F-16s) 
$14,080.0 


ly  $17  billion,  or  about  80%  of  th( 
for  FY  1982: 


Venezuela 

$615.3 

Israel 

$544.3 

Turkey 

$411.0 

Netherlands 

$324.2 

Tunisia 

$320.3 

Taiwan 

$297.1 

Japan 

$256.1 

West  Germany 

$79.9 

Total 

$2,848.2 

Saudi  Arabia 

Subtotal 
Australia 
Egypt 
Pakistan 

South  Korea 
Total 


These  five  countries,  therefore,  ac- 
counted for  fully  two-thirds  of  total 
FY  1982  sales;  adding  the  next  largest 
eight  recipients  brings  the  total  to  near- 


I  would  note  that  very  few  of 
have  been  the  subject  of  significai 
troversy. 

With  respect  to  FY  1983,  it  is 
ficult  at  this  point  to  make  a  conf 
projection;  however,  we  will  prov 
estimate,  in  the  classified  arms  i 
proposal,  as  required  by  law.  At  t 
point,  we  have  concluded  some  $8 
billion  in  arms  transfer  agreemen 
the  current  fiscal  year.  Of  this  am 
about  60%  is  accounted  for  by  jus 
sales— to  Saudi  Arabia,  Japan,  an 
NATO  plus  two  NATO-member  c> 
tries: 

Major  FY  1983  Arms  Transfer  Agr« 

(March  1.  1983) 

$2,365  billion— Saudi  (Naval  Progran 
$1,178  billion-U.K.  (Trident  Progra 
$  .275  billion— Japan  (Helicopters) 
$  .232  billion— NATO  (Missiles) 
$  .218  billion— Netherlands  (F-16s) 


78 


Department  of  State  El 


JITED  NATIONS 


n  conclusion,  I  would  like  to  remind 
of  the  relationship  between  arms 
and  U.S.  assistance  programs.  In 
ral  terms,  our  military  financing 
lovered  roughly  20%  or  25%  of  an- 
approved  arms  sales  agreements  in 
it  years.  The  remainder  has  been 
for  in  cash.  Of  the  financed  portion, 
een  two-thirds  and  three-fourths 
)een  at  the  cost-of-money  to  the 


U.S.  Treasury— in  recent  years  as  high 
as  14%.  The  remaining  fraction  has  been 
paid  for  by  grant  U.S.  financing,  largely 
to  Israel  and  Egypt. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
ganizations  and  Programs 


I 

regory  J.  Newell 

tatcment  bejorc  the  Subconiniittee 
)reign  Oprriit,,,iis  n/fhr  Sniatf  Ap- 
•iations  (\ntiiiiilln   nil  Man-h  7. 
and  exccrpi  fi-Ktii  shifrninil  hij'ore 
ubcommitli ,  t.n  luti  runt miiiit  (Jper 
of  tin  Huns,   Fnrr„,n  AihnrsCon 
eonMarrh  I.-,.  Mr.  XnnH  ,s  As- 
it  Secretary  for  htternntionnl 
lization  Affairs  J 


ITEMENT, 

7,  1983 

reciate  the  opportunity  to  present 
resident's  FY  1984  request  for  con- 
ions  to  certain  voluntarily  funded 
izations  and  programs  of  the 
d  Nations  and  the  Organization  of 
ican  States  (OAS).  I  wish  first  to 
the  request  in  context  by  describ- 
y  basic  approach  to  the  United  Na- 
and  to  the  Bureau  of  International 
»|iization  Mfairs  (10). 
et  me  address  first  the  relationship 
V'cn  the  10  Bureau  and  our  Mission 
N\v  ^'.irk.  Many  believe  the  Cabinet 
t;  lit'  I  lie  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
ill  Nations  makes  the  assistant 
I  ary's  job  impossible.  I  believe  that 
ils;-:ii|iir  Kirkpatrick  and  I  together 
.  overcome  the  inherent  dif- 
<  \itably,  our  different 
-  have  sometimes  resulted  in 
I'liii    'pinions.  We  have  felt  no  need, 
|\  er,  til  belabor  such  occasional  dif- 
<■(•>;  iiur  common  respect  for  one 
'■■i-  ami  our  common  dedication  to 
'  i.u  ilir  President  have  kept  our 
ii-  I'HUsed  on  the  problems  at 


U.S.  Priorities 

Only  days  after  I  took  office  last  June  4, 
I  announced  five  policy  priorities  to 
guide  the  work  of  the  bureau.  We  have 
incorporated  these  priorities  into  our 
day-by-day  management  of  multilateral 
issues.  And  we  have  used  them  to  main- 
tain a  steady  focus  on  those  matters  of 
greatest  importance  to  the  United 
States. 

The  first  priority  is  reassertion  of 
American  leadership  in  international 
organizations.  When  we  speak  out  clear- 
ly, nations  listen.  When  we  present  con- 
structive proposals,  they  can  win  sup- 
port. In  the  last  General  Assembly,  for 
example,  we  turned  back  Cuba's  effort 
to  put  Puerto  Rico  on  the  Assembly's 
agenda,  and  we  were  instrumental  in 
defeating  an  attempt  to  exclude  Israel. 
Both  were  tough  situations  in  which  we 
took  charge  and  prevailed. 

The  second  priority  is  budgetary 
responsibility.  The  United  States  is 
dedicated  to  supporting  international 
organizations  whose  assessed  budgets 
reflect  conservative  fiscal  policies  and 
economic  reality.  The  President's  own 
budget  policy  is  zero  net  program 
growth  and  significant  absorption  of 
nondiscretionary  cost  increases.  In  view 
of  the  restraint  being  imposed  on  the 
domestic  programs  of  the  United  States 
and  other  major  contributors,  interna- 
tional organizations  simply  cannot  be  im- 
mune from  the  same  economic  con- 
straints. Although  the  battle  is  far  from 
won,  we  are  seeing  encouraging  signs- 
like  the  defeat  of  an  unwarranted  pay 
raise  for  UN  employees — that  our  in- 
sistence on  restricting  budget  growth  is 
starting  to  gain  support. 

Third  is  strengthened  U.S.  influence 
in  international  conferences.  Leaner 
delegations  will  not  only  save  money  but 
also  assure  more  disciplined  delegations. 
Our  goal  here  is  to  reduce  by  30%  the 


number  of  government  delegate 
travelers  compared  to  FY  1980.  Over 
the  last  8  months,  we  achieved  a  reduc- 
tion of  more  than  26%. 

Fourth  is  more  U.S.  nationals  serv- 
ing in  international  organizations.  We 
seek  both  to  identify  important  policy- 
making vacancies  for  Americans  and  to 
ensure  that  Americans  occupy  positions 
at  junior  levels  and  are  given  oppor- 
tunities to  advance.  We  want  no  unfair 
advantage  but  only  that  the  number  of 
positions  held  by  Americans  falls  within 
the  established  ranges.  We  feel  we  are 
making  progress  in  some  key  areas. 

And  fifth,  we  want  an  increased  role 
for  the  private  sector  in  the  programs 
and  activities  of  the  international 
organizations.  We  seek  to  encourage  UN 
programs  which  draw  upon  private  sec- 
tor expertise  and  funding,  to  solicit 
private  sector  views  on  UN  issues,  and 
to  combat  negative  attitudes  toward  the 
private  sector  within  the  UN  system  and 
among  member  states.  Concretely,  we 
have,  for  example,  devoted  greater 
resources  to  UNESCO's  [U.N.  Educa- 
tional, Scientific  and  Cultural  Organiza- 
tion] international  program  for  the 
development  of  communications  to  draw 
the  private  sector  into  UNESCO  ac- 
tivities, and  we  have  gotten  a  number  of 
American  communications  companies  to 
train  developing  country  officials  in  the 
use  of  U.S.  communications  technology. 

To  implement  these  priorities,  I 
launched  on  July  15  a  systematic  review 
of  the  international  organizations  and 
programs  for  which  my  bureau  has  some 
responsibility.  In  consultation  with  other 
bureaus  of  the  Department  of  State  and 
other  executive  agencies,  we  are  assess- 
ing the  effectiveness  of  the  international 
organizations  and  weighing  the  benefits 
and  costs  of  our  participation.  Our  goal 
is  to  ensure  that  these  organizations 
promote  both  American  and  world  in- 
terests. 

Finally,  let  me  indicate  what  I  see  to 
be  the  most  serious  problems  confront- 
ing us  as  we  seek  to  serve  our  interests 
through  participation  in  international 
organizations.  First,  the  introduction  of 
extraneous  political  issues  into  the 
deliberations  of  the  UN  technical  agen- 
cies' meaningful  and  necessary  work;  the 
attacks  on  Israel's  right  to  participate  in 
different  international  organizations  is 
just  one  example.  Both  Secretary  Shultz 
and  the  President  himself  have  deplored 
this  disruptive  tendency.  The  second 
problem  is  the  lack  of  financial  discipline 
in  international  organizations.  Through- 
out my  extensive  consultations  with 
Secretariat  officials  and  representatives 


79 


UNITED  NATIONS 


of  some  58  member  governments,  I  have 
stressed  the  need  for  fiscal  restraint. 
Our  success  in  dealing  with  both  these 
problems  may  well  determine  the  future 
of  international  organizations. 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to 
describe  for  you  the  approach  we  are 
taking  in  the  bureau.  In  sum,  my  at- 
titude is  neither  cyncial  nor  overly  op- 
timistic. The  Bureau's  overall  objec- 
tive— and  that  of  this  Administration- 
is  to  make  the  United  Nations  and  its 
agencies  work  more  effectively.  We  have 
been  critical,  but  for  a  constructive  pur- 
pose. In  and  through  the  United  Na- 
tions, we  will  continue  to  uphold  Ameri- 
can values,  express  American  views,  and 
pursue  American  interests,  and  we  can 
and  must  do  this  within  existing 
budgetary  constraints. 

Appropriations  Request 

The  President's  request  of  $190  million 
for  the  international  organizations  and 
programs  account  is  $16.7  million  above 
the  FY  1983  request  level.  This  increase 
reflects  a  careful  balance  between  the 
President's  goals  of  budgetary  stringen- 
cy required  for  rebuilding  our  national 
economy  and  his  determination  to  main- 
tain the  long-established  leadership  role 
of  the  United  States  in  the  international 
organizations  concerned.  U.S.  leadership 
is  most  important  in  the  two  major  or- 
ganizations funded  from  this  account— 
the  UN  Development  Program  (UNDP) 
and  the  UN  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF). 
A  third  significant  contribution,  to  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA),  is  also  vital  for  balanced  safe- 
guards support  and  technical  assistance 
programs  designed  to  assure  continued 
widespread  support  for  U.S.  nonprolif- 
eration  objectives.  The  fourth  major  con- 
tribution in  the  account  provides  for  pro- 
moting social  and  political  stability 
within  the  framework  of  basic  U.S.  in- 
terests in  Latin  America  and  Caribbean 
nations  through  the  development  assist- 
ance programs  of  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS). 

Although  UNDP,  UNICEF,  IAEA, 
and  the  OAS  are  the  primary  organiza- 
tions in  this  account,  the  total  level  re- 
quested is  calculated  to  demonstrate 
continued  U.S.  commitment  in  these  dif- 
ficult times  to  all  of  the  programs  in- 
volved, to  assure  for  this  country  a  ma- 
jor role  in  shaping  the  direction  of  their 
activities,  and  to  restrain  pressure  for 
increased  technical  assistance  allocations 
in  the  assessed  budgets  of  other  UN 
agencies  where  we  have  less  political 
and  budgetary  influence. 


Unlike  the  organizations  to  which  we 
are  legally  obligated  by  treaty  to  make 
assessed  contributions,  UNDP, 
UNICEF,  and  the  other  voluntarily 
funded  development  and  humanitarian 
assistance  organizations  are  keenly 
aware  that  our  degree  of  participation  is 
dependent  upon  our  perception  of  their 
effectiveness  and  their  responsiveness  to 
our  interests.  Therefore,  historically, 
they  have  tended  to  be  "self- regulating," 
and  because  of  our  usually  large  con- 
tribution, they  remain  very  responsive  to 
our  efforts  to  play  a  strong  leadership 
role.  Disruptive  issues  like  Israeli  par- 
ticipation, apartheid,  and  involuntary 
resource  transfers  to  the  developing 
world — all  too  common  in  some  UN 
organs — rarely  interfere  with  the 
humanitarian  assistance  programs  of 
UNICEF,  the  well-managed  develop- 
ment projects  of  UNDP,  or  the  vital 
meteorological  data  gathered  by  World 
Meteorological  Organization's  (WMO) 
voluntary  cooperation  program. 

Besides  being  well  managed  and 
responsive,  the  agencies  of  this  account 
advance  our  foreign  policy  objectives  in 
the  following  ways. 

•  They  contribute  to  economic 
growth  and  stability  in  developing  coun- 
tries by  helping  the  poorer  nations  plan 
and  implement  development  programs 
that  improve  the  well-being  of  their 
citizenry.  In  so  doing,  they  enhance 
world  security  by  chipping  away  at 
sources  of  discontent. 

•  Our  participation  in  UN  programs 
helps  to  promote  the  integration  of 
developing  world  economies  into  the 
Western  economic  system,  to  ensure 
that  the  growth  and  expansion  of  impor- 
tant developing  countries  takes  place  in 
close  contact  with  the  West. 

•  This  Western  influence  fosters  an 
emphasis  on  self-reliance,  the  ultimate 
requirement  for  effective  development. 
The  fact  that  recipient  governments  help 
direct  UN  projects  and  thus  must  share 
accountability  for  the  success  or  failure 
of  UN  activities  increases  their  self- 
reliance  to  a  degree  often  lacking  in 
other  development  assistance  efforts. 

•  U.S.  contributions  to  agencies 
such  as  UNICEF  demonstrate  American 
humanitarian  concern  around  the  globe. 

•  These  UN  and  OAS  programs 
complement  our  bilateral  aid  efforts  and 
allow  us  to  extend  a  measure  of  our  in- 
fluence to  areas  too  sensitive  for,  or  out- 
side the  reach  of,  U.S.  bilateral  aid. 

UN  Development  Program 

(UNDP).  The  President  is  requesting 
$120  million  as  our  contribution  to 


UNDP.  This  organization,  with  its  e 
tensive  network  of  114  developing  c 
try  field  offices,  remains  the  main  c 
nel  for  technical  cooperation  in  the 
system.  Administering  projects  amc 
ing  to  over  $600  million  a  year.  UN 
responsible  for  program  delivery  in 
more  fields  in  more  developing  coui 
and  territories  (152)  than  any  other 
development  assistance  organizatioi 
the  world.  UNDP  projects  cover  a  I 
range  including  expanding  industris 
commercial  sectors,  increasing  agri- 
cultural production,  and  enhancing 
absorption  capacity  through  the  tra 
of  local  people.  Specifically  the  $12( 
million  is  needed  to: 

•  Maintain  the  comprehensive 
system  of  UNDP  field  representati\ 
The  UNDP's  resident  representativ 
are  the  principal  UN  spokesmen  in 
ly  every  developing  country.  They  f 
form  field  functions  for  nearly  all  L 
agencies  and  the  Secretariat,  achiei 
economies  of  scale  and  improved  ef 
ciency  for  the  UN  system  as  a  whol 
through  their  coordinating  and  cata 
activities; 

•  Stave  off  the  growth  of  techr 
assistance  in  the  regular  budgets  ol 
UN  specialized  agencies.  Now  in  th 
ond  year  of  the  third  program  cyck 
UNDP,  due  to  the  worldwide  econo 
situation,  finds  itself  with  donor 
resources  permitting  programming 
only  55%  of  the  level  originally  plar- 
While  the  original  growth  rate  may 
been  unrealistically  high,  agency  he 
and  developing  nations  have  seized 
this  situation  of  unfulfilled  expectab 
to  urge  increased  technical  assis 
other  agencies  through  the  regular  i 
budget — a  move  we  oppose  for  both 
policy  and  budgetary  reasons.  A  sul 
cient  U.S.  voluntary  contribution  ca 
helpful  in  deflecting  such  increases  ; 
other  agencies; 

•  Maintain  top  level  U.S.  mana^ 
ment  in  the  organization.  The  term 
Brad  Morse,  the  current  UNDP  Ad- 
ministrator, expires  in  1983  and  we 
desire  his  reappointment  or  his  repl 
ment  by  another  American;  and 

•  Continue  a  coordinated  appro 
to  UN  system  development  via  one 
tral  agency. 

UN  Children's  Fund  (UNICEF 

FY  1984  request  of  $27  million  for 
UNICEF  is  necessary  to  respond  to 
needs  of  children  and  mothers  in 
developing  countries.  UNICEF  is  ur 
in  providing  long-term  humanitariar^ 
development  assistance  for  children 
maximizing  popular  participation  an 


Department  of  State  Bui  I 


UNITED  NATIONS 


p  efforts  at  the  village  level.  It 
is  in  cooperation  with  the  host 
•  government  and  often  with  bl- 
and other  multilateral  organiza- 
JNICEF  provides  training  at  the 
ve\.  supplies  and  equipment  for 
3,  and  advocacy  for  poor  children 
iternatlonal  level.  Our  requested 
ution  is  partlcuarly  important  in 
4  to  continue  U.S.  leadership  of 
anlzatlon  and  to  enable  it  to 
ecent  developments  in  medical 
to  reduce  acute  malnutrition  and 
.  These  new  medical  technologies 
low-cost  vaccines  and  oral 
ition  therapy  for  diarrhea.  Other 
ts  of  the  UNICEF  approach  in- 
le  use  of  infant  growth  charts  to 
nalnutrltion,  the  promotion  of 
'eedlng,  and  the  spacing  of 
1.  This  approach  is  consistent 
d  reinforces  our  bilateral  efforts 
!  areas. 

ernational  Atomic  Energy 
'  (IAEA).  Concern  over  the 
)  to  world  peace  of  further  pro- 
<n  of  nuclear  weapons  has  Inten- 
le  focus  on  IAEA's  vital  safe- 

whlch  play  a  central  role  in  the 
(iferatlon  Treaty.  The  United 
vlshes  to  strengthen  the  agency's 
.he  application  of  international 
rds  to  prevent  the  diversion  of 
materials  from  peaceful  to 

purposes.  This  emphasis  is  not 
ired  by  the  developing  countries, 
i)rimary  interest  is  the  IAEA's 
il  assistance  program.  Our  pro- 
18.5  million  voluntary  contrl- 
3  designed  to  help  fund  both  pro- 
thus  maintaining  an  overall 
in  order  to  sustain  the  develop- 
itries'  support  of  the  safeguards 
s.  The  President's  request  for  a 
lion  FY  1983  supplemental  ap- 
ion  for  IAEA  also  is  required  to 
T  this  overall  balance. 

anization  of  American  States 
development  Assistance  Pro- 

*'he  ()AS  is  a  valuable  institution 
■  which  we  promote  Important 
;  interests  in  this  hemisphere:  in 
r,  political  solidarity  and  col- 
n,  the  enhancement  of  human 
,nd  containment  of  conflict 
j  peacekeeping.  Although  the 
'ember  countries  are  concerned 
i-  same  Issues,  they  tend  to  be 
bied  with  their  own  economic 
'nent.  Consequently  they  tend  to 
)ur  commitment  to  inter-Amer- 
•darity  in  large  part  by  the  level 
apport  for  OAS  economic 
'nent  programs.  We  believe  that 


the  requested  $1.5.5  million  is  an  accept- 
able contribution  to  Latin  American 
development  needs  and  will  be  seen  as  a 
testimony  to  U.S.  leadership.  These 
monies  should  ensure  that  the  United 
States  will  continue  to  influence  the  use 
of  OAS  funds  and  preserve  our  leader- 
ship in  the  development  field  throughout 
the  hemisphere.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that 
the  more  developed  countries  in  the 
region  have  begun  to  assume  more  of 
the  development  burden  and  are 
strengthening  thereby  cooperation 
among  the  member  countries. 

UN  Environment  Program 

(UNEP).  The  United  States  was  an  ini- 
tial supporter  of  UNEP's  creation  in 
1972  and  contributed  some  30%  of  its 
total  resources  for  the  1978-82  period. 
Most  UNEP  programs  are  devoted  to 
global  environmental  problems  in  which 
the  United  States  has  fundamental  in- 
terests but  which  by  their  nature  require 
a  multilateral  approach.  These  problems 
Include  build-up  of  toxic  substances  in 
rivers  and  oceans,  accumulation  of  car- 
bon dioxide  and  hydrocarbons  in  the  at- 
mosphere, pollution  of  air  and  water, 
and  deforestation.  UNEP  is  an  impor- 
tant mechanism  for  stimulating  and  or- 
chestrating action  on  such  problems.  A 
$3  million  U.S.  contribution  to  this  pro- 
gram will  allow  developing  countries  to 
take  advantage  of  UNEP's  efforts  to 
build  environmental  safeguards  into  new 
development  projects  and  promote  ra- 
tional resource  management.  In  the  long 
run,  the  United  States  will  be  a  prime 
beneficiary  of  the  support  we  give 
UNEP  today. 

World  Meteorological  Organiza- 
tion (WMO)  Voluntary  Cooperation 
Program.  The  global  operation  of  the 
World  Weather  Watch  of  the  WMO 
voluntary  cooperation  program  is  of 
direct  benefit  to  the  United  States. 
Before  its  establishment,  adequate 
weather  data  had  been  unavailable  from 
over  80%  of  the  Earth's  surface- 
primarily  the  oceans  and  the  developing 
countries.  Data  from  these  areas  are 
becoming  available  as  a  result  of  the 
voluntary  cooperation  program  efforts 
and  are  being  used  to  help  improve 
forecasts  of  short-range  precipitation 
and  temperature,  as  well  as  long-term 
weather  patterns.  The  information  is 
used  by  the  general  public,  civilian  in- 
dustries, and  our  defense  establishment. 
The  data  from  this  program  are  also 
used  for  research  purposes  to  improve 
the  operational  system  and  to  help 
predict  climate  fluctuations.  The  pro- 
gram supports  the  participation  of 


developing  countries  in  the  program  by 
providing  and  installing  equipment  and 
training  personnel  to  operate  it.  The  re- 
quest of  $2.3  million  will  sustain  this 
work. 

UN  Capital  Development  Fund 
(UNCDF).  Established  to  promote  small- 
scale  local  industries  and  production 
within  developing  countries  by  applying 
the  most  appropriate  technology, 
UNCDF  provides  financing  for  those 
projects  considered  too  small  for  exter- 
nal private  or  multilateral  bank  atten- 
tion. UNCDF  projects  are  relatively 
small  in  order  to  enlist  the  widest  local 
participation  and  make  maximum  use  of 
local  resources,  giving  beneficiaries  in- 
creased motivation  and  early  results. 
UNCDF  welcomes  the  cooperation  of 
private  enterprise  in  the  development 
process  as  exemplified  by  Libby's  in- 
volvement with  a  UNCDF-financed 
small-holder  asparagus  project  in 
Lesotho.  We  are  requesting  $2  million 
as  the  U.S.  contribution  to  UNCDF  in 
FY  1984. 

UN  Education  and  Training 
Program  for  Southern  Africa 
(UNETPSA).  We  are  requesting  $1 
million  for  this  program,  which  supports 
the  peaceful  transition  of  southern 
Africa  to  majority  rule,  a  major  U.S.  in- 
terest. Scholarships  are  offered  at  sec- 
ondary and  university  levels  to  black 
students  denied  access  to  such  education 
in  their  homelands.  Many  of  the 
grantees  study  in  the  United  States. 
Their  training  here  and  in  other 
Western  countries  should  enable  them  to 
obtain  first-hand  impressions  of  Western 
concepts  and  ideals  in  action — concepts 
which  will  later  assist  them  to  assume 
responsible  positions  in  government, 
business,  and  education. 

UN  Voluntary  Fund  for  the  Decade 

for  Women.  This  specialized  fund  sup- 
ports projects  which  benefit  the  most 
economically  disadvantaged  women.  The 
emphasis  is  on  activities  which  improve 
women's  abilities  to  contribute  to  their 
families,  communities,  and  countries. 
U.S.  support  of  these  activities  identifies 
us  with  the  social  and  economic  advance- 
ment of  women  worldwide.  The  fund 
sponsors  a  diversity  of  projects  which  in- 
clude community  shops,  fuel  and  energy 
development  training,  brick  industry  for 
rural  women,  and  marketing  of  handi- 
crafts. A  $500,000  U.S.  contribution  to 
the  fund  in  FY  1984  will  help  assure  this 
wide  range  of  projects. 

Convention  on  International  Trade 
in  Endangered  Species  (CITES).  This 
$150,000  request  covers  the  U.S. 


UNITED  NATIONS 


targeted  portion  of  the  CITES 
secretariat's  biennial  budget.  This  con- 
tribution will  support  international 
wildlife  conservation  measures.  The 
Convention  on  International  Trade  in 
Endangered  Species  is  the  preeminent 
wildlife  conservation  treaty.  It  has 
established  machinery  for  advocating 
protection  of  endangered  species  of  flora 
and  fauna.  The  United  States  played  a 
leading  role  in  the  creation  of  CITES. 

In  summary,  we  believe  this  request 
for  the  international  organizations  and 
programs  account  takes  into  considera- 
tion the  need  for  budgetary  stringency 
yet  protects  our  political,  economic,  and 
security  interests.  We  believe  continued 
U.S.  support  for  the  programs  of  the  ac- 
count is  vital  to  the  leadership  role  our 
nation  should  play  in  the  multilateral 
and  international  arenas.  We  hope  that 
Congress  and  this  committee  agree  and 
will  support  the  full  request. 


STATEMENT  (EXCERPT), 
MAR.  15,  1983 


As  you  know,  U.S.  assessed  contribu- 
tions may  be  grouped  into  four  general 
categories: 

•  United  Nations  and  affiliated 
agencies— $388,795,000 

•  Inter-American  organizations— 
$88,609,000 

•  Regional  organizations — 
$40,352,000 

•  Other  international  organiza- 
tions—$8,017,000 

Total— $525,773,000 

Our  budget  request  of  $525,773,000 
for  FY  1984  is  a  total  increase  of  $89.6 
million  over  FY  1983.  Of  this  increase, 
only  $4.7  million  reflects  a  net  increase 
in  assessments.  The  remaining  $84.9 
million  is  attributable  to  the  completion 
of  the  U.S.  deferral  program.  With  the 
split-year  funding  during  the  transition 
period,  our  FY  requests  previously  had 
represented  only  a  portion  of  our  calen- 
dar year  obligations  to  1 1  affected 
organizations.  The  FY  1984  request  is  to 
pay  in  full  our  calendar  year  1983 
obligations  to  those  organizations.  Fur- 
ther deferral  for  any  of  these  contribu- 
tions would  place  the  United  States  in 
arrears. 

The  $388.8  million  request  for  the 
United  Nations  and  affiliated  agencies 
includes  a  net  increase  of  $69.9  million 
over  FY  1983.  Of  this,  only  $0.7  million 
reflects  a  net  increase  in  assessments. 
The  balance,  $69.2  million,  is  attribut- 
able to  the  completion  of  the  U.S.  defer- 


ral program.  Nine  of  the  organizations 
in  this  general  category  were  affected 
by  the  deferral. 

The  1984  request  for  the  inter- 
American  organizations  includes  assess- 
ment increases  totaling  $3  million  for 
the  Inter-American  Institute  for 
Cooperation  on  Agriculture  and  the  Pan 
American  Health  Organization.  This  in- 
crease is,  in  part,  offset  by  a  decrease  of 
$1.2  million  in  the  assessment  of  the 
OAS.  Thus,  the  1984  request  of  $88.6 
million  represents  a  net  increase  of  $1.8 
million  over  FY  1983. 

For  the  regional  organizations,  there 
is  an  increase  of  $13.8  million  at- 
tributable to  the  completion  of  the  defer- 
ral program  for  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
and  an  assessment  increase  of  $1.7 
million.  The  FY  1984  request  of  $40.4 
million  is  an  increase  of  $15.5  million 
over  FY  1983. 

The  $8  million  1984  request  for  the 
21  other  international  organizations  in- 
cludes a  net  increase  of  $2.4  million  over 
FY  1983.  Of  this,  only  $0.5  million  is  for 
increased  assessments.  The  balance,  $1.9 
million,  is  for  completion  of  the  deferral 
program  for  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade. 

Contributions  for  Peacekeeping 
Activities 

The  UN  peacekeeping  forces  on  the 
Golan  Heights  and  in  southern  Lebanon 
are  vital  to  peace  and  stability  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  UN  Disengagement 
Observer  Force  (UNDOF)  and  the  UN 
Interim  Force  in  Lebanon  (UNIFIL) 
were  established  by  the  Security  Council 
in  1974  and  1978,  respectively.  UNDOF 
monitors  the  disengagement  agreement 
on  the  Golan  Heights,  and  UNIFIL's  ob- 
jective is  to  restore  the  authority  of  the 
Lebanese  Government  in  southern 
Lebanon.  Recognizing  the  collective 
financial  responsibility  of  all  members 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  securi- 
ty, the  expenses  of  the  forces  are  appor- 
tioned by  the  UN  General  Assembly  in 
accordance  with  Article  17(2)  of  the 
Charter. 

Our  FY  1984  request  of  $66.9 
million  reflects  a  decrease  of  $6.45 
million  due  to  a  nonrecurring  payment 
in  1983  of  a  1982  shortfall.  This  shortfall 
resulted  when  the  Security  Council  on 
February  25,  1982,  passed  Resolution 
501  increasing  the  authorized  troop 
strength  for  UNIFIL  from  6,000  to 
7,000  men.  The  United  States  FY  1982 
share  of  this  increase  was  $6.45  million 
and  was  paid  from  FY  1983  funds. 


International  Conferences  and 
Contingencies 

This  appropriation  funds  official  L 
participation  in  multilateral  interg; 
mental  conferences,  contributions 
the  U.S.  share  of  expenses  of  new 
provisional  international  organizat 
and  participation  of  U.S.  congress 
groups  in  interparliamentary  unio 
The  FY  1984  request  is  for  $9.6  n 
in  new  budget  authority,  of  which 
million  is  for  conference  participal 
$1.3  million  is  for  contributions, 
$240,000  is  for  the  participation  o 
congressional  groups  in  interparli; 
tary  unions.  Included  in  our  reque 
conference  participation  is  $1.75  r 
for  continued  participation  in  the 
and  balanced  force  reductions  neg, 
tions. 

The  FY  1984  request  is  a  net 
crease  of  $422,000  over  FY  1983. 
increases  of  $516,000  and  the  inci 
costs  of  domestic  conferences- 
$62,000— are  partially  offset  by  a 
estimated  decrease  of  $156,000  in 
requirements  for  new  and  proviso 
organizations. 

FY  1985  Authorization 

For  1985  we  are  requesting  $645. 
million  for  the  category  internatic 
organizations  and  conferences.  Tl 
increase  of  $43.6  million  over  the 
level  is  primarily  for  contribution: 
ternational  organizations  to  fund 
ticipated  increases,  largely  due  to 
tion,  in  assessed  contributions. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  h( 
will  be  published  by  the  committees  a 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printin 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Department  of  State  E 1 


STERN  HEMISPHERE 


1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
tin  America  and  the  Caribbean 


lomas  O.  Enders 

ateTnent  submitted  to  the  Subconi- 
:  on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  of 
nate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
irch  U,  1983,  and  statement  made 
the  Subcommittee  on  Western 
rphere  Affairs  of  the  House  Foreign 
■s  Committee  on  March  16.  Am- 
lor  Enders  is  Assistant  Secretary 
ter-American  Affairs.' 


IITTED  STATEMENT, 

14.  1983 

irepared  statement  reviews  the 
sions  and  purposes  of  our  pro- 
bilateral  assistance  for  Latin 
ica  and  the  Caribbean,  including 
ograms  announced  by  the  Presi- 
m  March  10,  1983. 
i  the  President  said  on  March  10, 
ieve  that  it  is  imperative  to  help 
tions  of  Central  America  forge  a 
ratic  alternative  to  communism, 
t  end,  we  seek  economic  and 
y  assistance  to  help  them  meet 
■nmediate  and  pressing  needs 

comprehensive  plan  to  replace 
y  with  development  and  dictator- 
ith  democracy. 

is  prepared  statement  also  raises 
iportant  proposals  which,  though 
ictly  part  of  our  bilateral  assist- 
rogram,  would  advance  U.S.  in- 
in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
he  Latin  American  dimensions  of 
jsident's  Project  Democracy  and 
de  and  tax  components  of  the 
ean  Basin  initiative. 


1  Requests 

parate  assistance  requests  are  in- 
an  FY  1983  supplemental  for 
illion  for  Latin  America  and  the 
an  and  an  FY  1984  assistance 
1  that  totals  $1,105  million  for 
on:  $894  million  in  economic  sup- 
nds  (ESF),  development 
Jnce,  and  Food  for  Peace  pro- 
land  $211  million  in  foreign 
if  sales  (FMS),  the  military 
\\ce  program  (MAP),  the  interna- 

rilitary  education  and  training 
program. 


Within  the  supplemental,  $90  million 
in  ESF  assistance  is  allocated  to  Costa 
Rica,  the  Dominican  Republic,  the  na- 
tions of  the  eastern  Caribbean,  Guate- 
mala, Honduras,  and  Jamaica.  In  addi- 
tion, $5  million  in  development 
assistance  is  proposed  for  Belize.  On  the 
military  side,  we  are  requesting  $14 
million  in  FMS  credit  and  about  $75 
million  in  MAP.  About  two-thirds  of  the 
MAP  request,  $50  million,  is  for  El 
Salvador;  the  rest  is  for  key  Caribbean 
Basin  countries,  Costa  Rica  and  Hon- 
duras. 

The  bilateral  assistance  proposal  for 
FY  1984  requests  $398  million  in  ESF 
for  the  Dominican  Republic,  Jamaica, 
Suriname,  Haiti,  the  eastern  Caribbean, 
and  four  nations  of  Central  America. 
Development  assistance  totaling  about 
$300  million  is  proposed  for  the  same 
nations,  plus  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Peru, 
Panama,  Belize,  and  Guyana  and  our 
regional  programs.  No  ESF  or  develop- 
ment assistance  request  has  been  made 
for  Nicaragua,  which  last  year  rejected 
ESF  funds  offered  to  private  sector, 
church,  and  trade  union  organizations. 
About  $195  million  in  Food  for  Peace 
programs  is  requested  for  all  recipient 
nations  except  Belize  and  Suriname. 

All  the  supplemental  FY  1983 
economic  assistance  (including  the  recent 
additional  request  of  $65  million),  and 
88%  of  the  proposed  FY  1984  economic 
aid,  are  directed  to  the  nations  of  the 
Caribbean  Basin.  This  is  in  furtherance 
of  the  President's  commitment  to  assist 
the  nations  of  that  region  to  meet  their 
present  economic  challenges  and,  more 
importantly,  to  develop  their  private 
economies  to  the  maximum  in  the 
medium  and  long  term. 

The  FY  1984  request  also  includes 
$88  million  in  FMS  credit  and  $110 
million  in  MAP  for  the  region.  This  is  a 
higher  proportion  of  grant  (MAP) 
assistance  than  in  previous  years,  re- 
flecting the  fact  that  some  countries  can- 
not afford  assistance  in  the  form  of 
high-interest  FMS  loans  because  of 
adverse  economic  conditions.  Of  the 
total  FMS/MAP  request,  some  78%  is 
for  Caribbean  Basin  countries,  which 
continue  to  face  major  military  as  well 
as  economic  problems.  Our  total  IMET, 
or  training  request,  all  of  it  in  the  FY 
1984  proposal,  is  less  than  $13.6  million. 
IMET  is  a  cost-effective  way  to  provide 


professional  and  technical  military 
assistance  and  also  helps  expose  poten- 
tial military  leaders  to  American  values 
and  institutions. 

By  any  measure,  the  assistance 
package  we  are  proposing  is  heavily 
weighted  toward  economic  aid.  Taking 
both  the  supplemental  and  the  FY  1984 
requests,  proposed  economic  assistance 
is  more  than  three  times  larger  than 
military  assistance. 

The  amounts  involved  are  also  very 
modest— perhaps  too  modest— in  light 
of  the  national  interests  at  stake,  par- 
ticularly in  Central  America.  Looking  at 
the  world  as  a  whole.  Latin  America 
accounts  for  only  about  12%  of  the  Ad- 
ministration's global  FY  1983  sup- 
plemental request  for  military  assist- 
ance, and  only  3%  of  the  FY  1984 
request. 

Rationale 

U.S.  policy  is  to  use  our  limited 
resources  to  support  democracies  and 
encourage  those  nations  in  transition  to 
democracy.  In  Central  America,  in  par- 
ticular, our  assistance  is  urgently  needed 
to  assist  friendly  democracies  to  defend 
themselves  against  forces  which  would 
undermine  their  peaceful,  democratic  in- 
stitutions and  would  introduce  in  their 
place  domestic  totalitarianism  and 
foreign  adventurism.  We  are  also  seek- 
ing, in  this  period  of  widespread 
economic  difficulty,  economic  assistance 
programs  to  promote  internal  develop- 
ment and  basic  human  needs,  within 
budgetary  and  economic  graduation  con- 
straints. Finally,  we  also  should  main- 
tain and  refine  the  cooperative  military 
relationships  built  up  over  the  past. 
These  are  the  criteria  which  we  have  ap- 
plied to  develop  our  bilateral  assistance 
program  for  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean.  - 

Now,  more  than  at  any  other  time  in 
recent  memory,  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  face  severe  challenges  to 
their  economic  and  political  stability.  Un- 
fortunately, the  problems  of  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  are  not  only 
economic,  nor  can  they  be  remedied  by 
purely  economic  means.  Tensions  con- 
tinue to  build  in  Central  America,  where 
Cuba  and  Nicaragua  actively  incite  and 
support  guerrillas  and  terrorism  in  El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and 
Costa  Rica.  Though  Cuba  remains 
physically  isolated,  Castro  wields 
substantial  influence  by  maintaining  a 
large  cadre  of  military  and  security  ad- 
visers stationed  in  Nicaragua,  by  coor- 
dinating military  training  and  arms  sup- 
plies to  the  Nicaraguan  regime  and  to 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


the  guerrilla  bands  in  other  Central 
American  nations,  and  by  acting  as  the 
chief  propagandist  and  patron  of  armed 
"revolution."  Nicaragua  continues  its 
policies  of  totalitarian  consolidation  and 
rapid  militarization  at  home  and  support 
of  guerrilla  violence  against  its  neigh- 
bors. 

Some  South  American  democracies 
are  also  under  attack  by  leftist  guer- 
rillas. Colombia  continues  to  face  violent 
attacks  by  leftist  groups,  in  spite  of 
government  offers  of  amnesty.  Peru 
faces  a  narrowly  based  but  troublesome 
challenge  from  the  Sendero  Luminoso 
band.  In  the  eastern  Caribbean, 
democratic  states  must  reckon  with 
Cuba's  destabilizing  activities  and  anti- 
democratic developments  in  Grenada. 

The  answer  to  this  guerilla  threat 
cannot  be  purely  military.  A  lasting 
answer  can  only  be  found  in  the  national 
development  and  personal  security 
which  democracy  can  bring.  But  until 
the  guerrillas  are  stopped,  the  bat- 
tlefields will  spread  and  the  stakes  will 
increase.  That  is  why  economic 
assistance,  domestic  reform,  and  inter- 
national economic  cooperation  must  be 
supplemented  by  security  assistance  and 
why  the  whole  must  be  welded  together 
by  "a  strong  diplomacy  for  peace. 

The  measures  required  to  attain 
peace  in  Central  America  are  reasonably 
clear.  They  are: 

•  Taking  Central  America  out  of 
East-West  competition,  through  such 
steps  as  removal  of  all  foreign  troops 
and  military  advisers; 

•  Defusing  tensions  among  nations 
in  Central  America  by  reciprocal  and 
verifiable  agreements  on  arms  imports, 
frontier  control,  and  an  end  to 
assistance  to  insurgent  groups  in  each 
other's  territory; 

•  Launching  a  region-wide  demo- 
cratic transformation,  by  ensuring  that 
all  citizens  who  organize  politically  can 
have  a  secure  voice  in  the  future  of  their 
country  through  democratic  elections; 
and 

•  Strengthening  the  economies  of 
the  region  \i\  working  to  promote  in- 
creased iineniatiiinal  trade  and  by  im- 
plementing the  economic  initiatives  of 
neighboring  countries,  including  our  own 
Caribbean  Basin  initiative. 

We  favor  negotiations  to  these  ends 
both  among  and  within  nations.  How- 
ever, we  do  not  and  cannot  support 
"negotiations"  designed  to  divide  up 
power  among  armed  groups  on  the  basis 
of  bullets  instead  of  ballots. 


Despite  a  generation  of  rapid 
growth,  economic  reactivation  is  again 
becoming  a  hemisphere-wide  priority.  In- 
ternational economic  and  financial  condi- 
tions are  taking  a  heavy  toll  not  only  on 
Latin  America's  most  fragile  economies 
but  also  on  some  of  its  largest  and 
formerly  strongest.  Prices  for  most  of 
the  region's  exports  (sugar,  coffee, 
minerals)  remain  down  sharply.  Even 
when  the  world  economy  begins  to  pick 
up,  large  stocks  of  these  commodities 
will  depress  prices  for  some  time.  Ac- 
cess to  commercial  credit  markets,  to 
help  finance  shortfalls  in  export 
revenue,  is  restricted  by  political  as  well 
as  economic  uncertainties.  During  the 
last  year,  bankers  reacted  to  the  serious 
financial  problems  of  large  debtor  coun- 
tries by  also  reducing  lending  to  the 
lower  middle  income  nations  of  Latin 
America.  Similarly,  private  direct  invest- 
ment from  abroad,  long  a  mainstay  of 
the  region's  rapidly  growing  economies, 
has  fallen  off  sharply.  In  spite  of  recent 
interest  rate  reductions,  continued  high 
rates  make  even  limited  commercial  bor- 
rowing dangerously  expensive  to  most 
nations. 

The  Latin  American  and  Caribbean 
countries  are  making  extraordinary  ef- 
forts to  put  their  own  economic  houses 
in  order.  At  least  11  countries  have  in- 
stituted economic  stabilization  programs 
leading  to  IMF  [International  Monetary 
Fund]  financial  assistance.  These 
stabilization  efforts  typically  entail  pain- 
ful budget  cuts,  tight  controls  on  money 
supply,  and  strict  limits  on  external  bor- 
rowing. They  often  involve  currency  ad- 
justments which  can  sharply  increase 
the  local  cost  of  imported  goods.  But,  in 
spite  of  their  own  considerable  efforts 
supported  by  international  financial  in- 
stitutions, the  nations  of  Latin  America 
and  the  Caribbean  still  face  significant 
financing  gaps  in  FY  1984. 

Moreover,  from  Argentina  to  Guate- 
mala, these  adverse  economic  develop- 
ments obstruct  the  political  programs  of 
moderate  governments  and,  in  some 
cases,  directly  threaten  existing  and 
developing  democratic  institutions. 
Economic  decline  is  not  an  abstract.  It 
implies  short  rations  on  resources  of  all 
kinds  and,  therefore,  threatens  reform 
and  increases  rivalry  among  different 
national  interests— public  sector  versus 
private  sector;  farmer  versus  city 
dweller;  military  versus  civilian;  the  im- 
mediately needy  versus  long-term  in- 
vestors and  entrepreneurs.  In  nations 
facing  serious  internal  disputes  or  with 
an  urgent  need  for  economic  reform,  as 


in  Central  America,  economic  deter 
tion  feeds  conflict  and  impedes  reco 
ciliation. 

Analysis  of  Major  Country  Progra 

Eight  nations  are  programmed  U 
ceive  more  than  $50  million  each  in 
nomic  assistance  if  Congress  appr 
our  proposal  for  FY  1984:  Costa  Ri 
the  Dominican  Republic,  tlif  island 
states  of  the  eastmi  <  'aril il "•an  tak 
together.  El  Salvadnr.  (kiatemala 
duras,  Jamaica,  and  Peru.  Of  these 
but  El  Salvador  and  Peru  will  also 
ceive  ESF  assistance  through  the 
supplemental  FY  1983  request.  In 
tion,  four  nations  will  receive  more 
$15  million  in  military  assistance  u 
our  combined  FY  1983  supplement 
FY  1984  requests:  Colombia,  El  Se 
dor,  Honduras,  and  Peru. 

El  Salvador.  The  largest  propc 
recipient  of  economic  and  military 
ance  in  the  region  is  El  Salvador. 
Following  the  recent  review  of  the 
tion  in  El  Salvador,  the  Administr: 
has  decided  to  seek  $50  million  in 
through  the  FY  1983  supplements 
addition  to  reprogramming  some  $ 
million  in  FMS  credits  from  funds 
already  authorized.  In  FY  1984  th. 
ministration  seeks  economic  assist 
totaling  some  $195  million  (more  t 
60%  of  it  ESF  grants),  $30  million 
FMS  credit,  $55  million  in  MAP,  a 
$1.3  million  in  IMET.  The  propose 
portion  of  soft  loan  and  grant  aid 
based  on  El  Salvador's  hard  currei 
shortage  and  our  concern  not  to  rr 
gage  its  political  and  economic 
in  coming  years. 

El  Salvador's  national  econom; 
contracted  by  nearly  25%  over  the 
years.  The  nation's  most  inhibiting 
"nomic  constraints  are  economic  w; 
by  the  guerrillas  and  lack  of  foreig 
rency.  Economic  weakness  is  a  soi 
constant  friction  among  the  model 
sectors  and  a  cause  of  human  suff 
through  high  unemployment  (now 
proaching  40%  in  some  sectors),  ir 
tion,  and  the  unavailability  of  basi' 
goods.  Throughout  the  nation,  anc 
especially  in  its  eastern  region,  gu' 
sabotage  has  destroyed  bridges,  pi 
lines,  and  production  facilities.  Fo 
than  8  months,  Salvadoran  guerrii 
have  waged  a  massive  war  agains' 
nation's  economy,  calculating  that 
economic  anarchy  is  more  importa 
their  power  goals  than  the  supper 
the  workers  and  businessmen  thej 
systematically  alienating. 


Department  of  State  B « 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


\SV  assistance  to  El  Salvadiir  goes 
/  to  repair  basic  infrastructure 
ged  by  the  guerrillas  but  most  of 
SF  proposed  for  El  Salvador  will 
•acted  to  purchases  of  critical  im- 
of  raw  materials,  production 
;,  and  basic  consumer  items  and  to 
:ts  which  will  help  relieve  the  high 
ployment.  ESF  disbursements  are 
1  to  the  Government  of  El  Salva- 
performance  on  specified  priority 
;ts,  including  agrarian  reform  com- 
tion,  credit,  and  technical  assist- 
:o  the  reformed  agricultural  sector, 
intensive  public  works  projects, 
■ation  of  vital  public  services,  and 
nitarian  assistance.  We  envision  a 
r  agreement  in  1984. 
n  the  military  side,  our  objective  is 
•mit  the  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces 
p  the  guerrillas,  to  protect  the 
:al  and  economic  reforms,  and  to 
t  the  development  of  an  increas- 
democratic  framework.  Equip- 
munitions,  and  training  are  need- 
meet  the  increasing  capacity  of  the 
illas,  who  are  in  large  measure 
)ed  and  trained  by  outside  Marxist- 
st  forces.  During  the  coming 
>  the  Salvadoran  military  will 
0  devote  additional  resources  to 
ard  the  presidential  elections 
led  for  this  year.  In  addition  to 
ting  the  emerging  democratic 

and  containing  the  guerrilla 
U.S.  military  assistance  also  pro- 
)ur  strongest  leverage  to  encour- 
curity  forces  to  improve  their  own 
rights  performance, 
ht  now,  the  Salvadoran  military 
additional  assistance  on  an 
jncy  basis.  The  guerrillas  have 
ery  active  since  last  October  and 
xpenditure  of  materiel  and  that  of 
vadoran  Armed  Forces  has  been 
hough  they  are  following  the 
it-and-run  tactics  as  in  the  past 
;  confined  to  rural  areas  of  low 
;ion  and  productivity  and,  there- 
little  direct  threat  to  the 
ment  or  the  urban  centers  in  the 

the  country,  there  is  no  question 
eir  efforts  have  escalated.  (They 
iously  confident  of  their  sources 
pply.)  The  Salvadoran  Govern- 
lust  meet  this  challenge.  At  pres- 
;  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  are 
ammunition  and  some  spare 
)nly  about  10%  of  them  have  re- 
;he  training,  including  human 
raining,  which  the  United  States 
vide. 

the  President's  recent  consulta- 
ith  leaders  and  Members  of  Con- 

phasized,  U.S.  policy  is  to  pro- 


vide military  and  economic  assistance  t<i 
help  El  Salvador  maintain  a  national 
consensus  in  favor  of  democratic  reform 
and  to  provide  a  secure  environment  in 
which  development— political,  economic, 
and  social— can  occur.  The  military 
assistance  we  have  requested  will  help 
to  better  train  and  supply  the  Salva- 
doran Army,  helping  to  develop  the  skill 
and  professionalism  needed  to  stop  the 
guerrillas  and  to  protect  the  rights  of 
the  population.  Together  with  our  eco- 
nomic assistance  and  diplomacy,  this 
military  assistance  is  thus  an  essential 
component  to  the  development  of  a 
democratic  political  solution. 

The  strategy  of  the  armed  left  in  El 
Salvador— once  largely  a  political 
strategy  but  now  increasingly  military  in 
its  goals  and  methods— is  to  keep  the 
pressure  on,  hoping  that  a  failure  of  will 
or  a  shortage  of  resources  will  undo  the 
democratic  consensus  which  is  beinar 
built. 


Presidential  Elections 
in  El  Salvador 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  6,  1983' 

I  would  like  to  express  my  admiration 
and  support  for  President  Magana  and 
his  government  for  announcing 
Presidential  elections  this  year.  The 
decision  reflects  the  profound  desire  of 
President  Magana  and  the  Political  Com.- 
mission  to  achieve  political  reconciliation 
and  to  bring  peace  to  that  country. 
Through  the  effort  of  the  Government's 
Peace  Commission,  the  Presidential  elec- 
tions will  be  free  and  open  to  all— I 
stress  all  political  parties  and  groups 
which  are  committed  to  the  peaceful 
resolution  of  disputes.  We  know  that 
open,  fair,  free  elections  in  that  country 
is  the  political  solution  we  all  want.  But 
more  importantly,  the  people  of  El 
Salvador  have  already  shown  what  they 
want.  Their  courage  in  going  to  the  polls 
in  overwhelming  numbers  last  March, 
despite  the  threats  from  the  insurgent 
groups,  prove  they  want  a  political  solu- 
tion too. 

President  Magana's  announcment  is 
a  reaffirmation  of  his  faith  and  ours  that 
what  counts  in  El  Salvador  are  not 
bombs  and  bullets  but  the  will  of  the 
people  expressed  in  open  elections. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  14,  1983. 


Progress  has  been  made.  Although 
the  abuse  of  human  rights  remains  at  an 
unacceptably  high  level,  as  noted  in  the 
Administration's  certification  last  month, 
it  has  nonetheless  moderated  measur- 
ably since  the  inception  of  U.S.  economic 
and  military  assistance  and  continues  to 
moderate.  We  will  continue  to  work  for 
further  improvement. 

Institutional  and  structural  changes 
are  proceeding  faster.  There  were  fears 
last  spring,  including  in  this  subcommit- 
tee, that  the  land  reform  would  be 
halted.  In  fact,  during  the  last  half  year 
or  so,  it  has  made  its  greatest  strides. 
Through  Phase  I  and  Phase  III,  more 
than  20%  of  El  Salvador's  arable  land 
has  been  redistributed  and  more  than 
65,000  former  farm  workers  have  been 
transformed  into  farm  owners.  Follow- 
ing the  recent  extension  of  the  land-to- 
the-tiller  program,  we  expect  further 
progress,  especially  in  the  conflict  areas 
where  the  left  has  prevented  normal  im- 
plementation. 

The  development  of  the  mechanisms 
of  democracy  is  moving  even  faster. 
Political  parties  are  active  and,  for  the 
most  part,  responsible.  Lively  political 
debate  is  the  standard,  not  the  excep- 
tion. The  Constituent  Assembly,  though 
divided  by  the  lack  of  a  clear  majority, 
has  functioned  in  a  balanced  and  effec- 
tive manner.  The  interim  presidency, 
also  hampered  by  its  temporary  man- 
date and  divisions  among  the  parties, 
has  nonetheless  succeeded  in  forging  a 
unified  platform  of  government— the 
Pact  of  Apaneca— and  has  moved  ahead 
to  name  high-level  political,  human 
rights,  and  peace  commissions  to  ad- 
dress specific  issues.  The  presidential 
elections  to  be  held  this  year  should 
strengthen  the  Salvadoran  executive  and 
lead  to  further  progress.  All  three  of  the 
commissions,  and  the  Central  Elections 
Council,  are  presently  working  on 
issues,  such  as  an  amnesty  law  and  in- 
creased access  to  the  media,  which  will 
help  to  permit  the  fullest  possible  par- 
ticipation in  the  elections— including  par- 
ticipation by  the  left,  if  they  so  choose. 
The  achievement  of  a  stable,  demo- 
cratic reconciliation  in  El  Salvador  is  by 
no  means  an  easy  task;  it  requires  our 
understanding  and,  most  of  all,  our  pa- 
tience. To  try  to  force  a  solution,  such 
as  immediate  negotiations  with  the  left 
on  power  sharing,  runs  the  risk  of  frag- 
menting the  evolving  center.  Such  a 
fragmentation  would  remove  all  incen- 
tive for  the  left  to  negotiate  in  good 
faith.  Just  as  important,  it  would  signal 
that  we  accept  as  a  valid  foundation  for 
political  participation  the  military  capaci- 


133 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


ly  of  the  g-uerrillas,  a  capacity  derived 
largely  from  the  support  of  powers 
hostile  to  democracy.  But  if  we  commit 
ourselves  to  a  sustained  policy  of  sup- 
port for  Salvadoran  democracy  and  the 
moderate  center,  we  can  back  our 
friends  and  be  true  to  our  own  values 
and  interests.  It  would  be  tragically 
ironic  if,  while  El  Salvador  is  manifestly 
moving  toward  the  kind  of  society  which 
we  most  want  to  and  need  to  support, 
we  were  to  soften  our  opposition  to  the 
guerrillas'  violent  methods  or  abandon 
El  Salvador's  struggle  for  democracy, 
human  rights,  and  equitable  develop- 
ment. 

Honduras.  The  second  largest  pro- 
posed recipient  is  Honduras,  for  which 
$30  million  in  ESF  and  $17  million  in 
MAP  is  proposed  in  supplemental  FY 
1983  funding.  We  also  request  $83 
million  in  economic  assistance,  $40 
million  in  MAP,  and  $1  million  in  IMET 
in  FY  1984.  Honduras  is  consolidating 
its  recent  return  to  democratic  rule  but 
feels  itself  increasingly  threatened  by 
the  unprecedented  military  buildup  in 
Nicaragua  and  the  persistence  of  the 
war  in  El  Salvador.  The  Honduran 
economy  has  been  buffeted  by  falling  ex- 
port earnings  and  by  regional  political 
uncertainties  which  have  slowed  invest- 
ment in  the  productive  sector.  Our  ESF 
programs  will  provide,  as  in  previous 
years,  balance-of-payments  support  and 
help  to  meet  private  sector  needs  for 
working  capital  and  longer  term  credit 
for  productive  activities,  especially  ex- 
port diversification.  Military  assistance 
for  Honduras  will  also  increase  its  capa- 
bility to  protect  its  borders  and,  thereby, 
restrain  the  illegal  shipment  of  arms  to 
the  insurgents  in  El  Salvador  through 
its  territory  and  airspace. 

Jamaica.  We  have  requested  some 
$108  million  in  economic  assistance  for 
Jamaica  in  FY  1984,  of  which  $55 
million  is  in  ESF  assistance,  $33  million 
in  development  assistance,  and  $20 
million  in  PL  480.  In  addition,  we  have 
requested  $3  million  in  ESF  in  the  sup- 
plemental. 

Jamaica  has  made  notable  progress 
in  reversing  the  decline  in  its  economy 
by  adopting  a  recovery  strategy  based 
on  private  sector  development,  foreign 
investment,  deregulation,  and  careful 
fiscal  management.  Nevertheless, 
balance-of-payments  assistance  is 
needed,  in  part,  to  offset  low  world 
prices  for  a  key  Jamaican  export,  baux- 
ite. Our  ESF  assistance  would  comple- 
ment the  Jamaican  Government's 
strategy  for  recovery  by  providing 


foreign  exchange  to  stimulate  produc- 
tion, exports,  and  employment. 

We  have  also  proposed  for  Jamaica 
small  but  important  military  assistance 
programs  in  the  supplemental  ($2.3 
million)  and  in  FY  1984  ($4.2  million), 
primarily  to  replace  obsolete  equipment 
and  provide  essential  military  training. 

Dominican  Republic.  For  the 

Dominican  Republic,  we  are  seeking  $10 
million  in  ESF  through  the  FY  1983 
supplemental  and  $94  million  in  eco- 
nomic assistance  for  FY  1984,  of  which 
$40  million  is  in  ESF.  On  the  military 
side,  we  seek  supplemental  funding  of 
$3.9  million  and  $5.8  million  in  FY  1984. 

The  Dominican  Republic  has  suf- 
fered severely  from  low  world  prices  for 
its  exports,  such  as  sugar,  cocoa,  baux- 
ite, gold,  and  nickel.  Despite  a  tradition 
of  prudent  fiscal  and  monetary  manage- 
ment, there  are  large  deficits  in  the 
public  sector  and  in  the  Ijalance  of 
payments  and  high  unemployment.  The 
democratic  government  which  took  of- 
fice last  August  has  moved  quickly  and 
decisively  to  implement  a  program  of 
economic  stabilization  and  austerity,  in- 
cluding higher  taxes,  reduced  govern- 
ment spending,  and  lower  import  levels. 
The  IMF,  in  recognition  and  support  of 
these  efforts,  has  approved  a  3-year 
stabilization  program. 

Our  military  assistance  program  will 
finance  the  purchase  of  light  combat  air- 
craft to  replace  World  War  II  vintage 
P-51s  and  other  items  and  permit  the 
continued  training  of  Dominican  officers 
in  professional  and  technical  areas. 

Costa  Rica.  Our  proposal  for  Costa 
Rica  requests  ESF  assistance  of  $35 
million  in  the  supplemental  and  an  eco- 
nomic assistance  package  of  $105  million 
in  FY  1984.  We  have  also  requested 
small  MAP  and  IMET  allocations  in  the 
supplemental  and  the  FY  1984  proposal. 
These  military  assistance  allocations  are 
in  response  to  a  request  by  President 
Monge  during  his  visit  last  June  and 
would  continue  programs  begun  in  FY 
1981. 

Costa  Rica  faces  severe  economic 
difficulties:  hard  currency  shortages, 
high  unemployment  and  inflation,  and  a 
breakdown  in  intraregional  trade.  How- 
ever, there  have  been  encouraging  finan- 
cial developments  in  Costa  Rica.  The 
IMF  has  approved  a  standby  agreement. 
The  government  has  reached  agreement 
with  the  Paris  Club  on  the  rescheduling 
of  official  debt  and  is  holding  discussions 
which  may  lead  to  restructuring  of 
private  debt  and  new  inflows  of  capital. 
But  the  nation's  heavy  debt  burden  will 
severely  restrict  the  availability  of 


foreign  exchange  and  constrain  gr 
for  several  years.  Our  $70  million 
program  for  FY  1984  will  provide 
balance-of-payments  assistance  by 
cing  imports  of  needed  parts  and 
materials  to  help  the  productive  st 
get  back  on  its  feet. 

Guatemala.  For  Guatemala, 
proposed  economic  assistance  of  $ 
million  in  the  supplemental  and  all 
$65  million  for  FY  1984.  Guatema 
need  for  economic  assistance  has  : 
creased  dramatically  during  the  la 
years  as  the  country  has  been  afft 
by  the  same  factors  as  most  of  its 
bors,  guerrilla  insurgency,  deterio 
terms  of  trade,  and  turmoil  in  int( 
tional  financial  circles.  The  progre 
proposed  are  not  large  in  relation 
country's  size  or  needs  but  serve  i 
useful  encouragement  for  continm 
provements  in  human  rights,  as  v, 
contributing  both  to  national  stab: 
tion  and  the  provision  of  basic  hui 
needs. 

In  FY  1984,  for  the  first  time 
many  years,  $10  million  in  FMS  c 
(plus  a  small  IMET  program)  is  rf 
quested  for  Guatemala.  The  funds 
posed  recognize  that  there  have  b 
human  rights  improvements  unde 
Rios  Montt  administration  but  fur 
progress  is  needed.  Our  proposed 
ance  is  based  on  our  expectation, 
we  will  confirm  through  continuec 
toring,  that  such  progress  is  beinj 
made.  These  funds  would  enhance 
effectiveness  of  the  Guatemalan  ^ 
Forces  in  countering  a  Cuban-sup 
insurgency. 

Eastern  Caribbean.  The  islan 
states  of  the  eastern  Caribbean  fS 
only  a  sharply  adverse  economic  c 
but  an  increasingly  uncertain  ; 
situation.  We  have  requested  ecor 
assistance  of  $6  million  in  the  ; 
mental  and  some  $55  million  in  th' 
1984  budget.  The  supplemental  i 
will  fund  projects  whose  design  is 
pected  to  be  finished  later  this  fis( 
year,  including  assistance  to  the  a 
cultural  sector  in  St.  Vincent  ami  ' 
private  sector  development  hank 

In  addition,  we  have  requesiti 
$1.3  million  in  the  supplemental  a 
$3.3  million  in  FY  1984  funds  for  'i- 
tary  assistance  to  the  eastern  Car* 
These  nations  have  begun  to  deve 
their  own  regional  defense  capabil . 
and  we  must  show  our  willingness' 
help  by  providing  modest  amount:' 
military  assistance. 

Peru.  We  have  requested  S5ti  l« 
in  economic  assistance  for  Peru  ir 


Department  of  State  Be 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


14,  all  of  it  development  or 
assistance.  Our  economic  assist- 
designed  to  support  Peru's 

tor  expansion  and  agricultural 
ment,  as  well  as  provide  basic 
eds.  In  addition,  we  have  pro- 
3  million  in  FMS  credit  in  the 
lental  and  $25  million  in  FMS 
plus  a  small  IMET  program,  for 
4,  primarily  to  improve  our  mili- 
istance  relationship  to  demo- 
eru  and  to  permit  it  to  diversify 
)f  military  supply. 

ombia.  For  Colombia,  we  request 
nds  in  the  amount  of  $6  million 
upplemental  and  $12  million  in 
i  to  maintain  our  traditional  mili- 
istance  relationship  with  a 
itic  and  friendly  nation.  These 
ould  be  used  for  the  purchase  of 
rtation,  communications,  and 

ng  equipment  for  use  in  civic 
rograms  and  other  antiguerrilla 
Bs  in  rural  areas.  We  have  also 
;d  a  small  IMET  program  to  sus- 

important  military  training  rela- 


via  and  Ecuador.  Elsewhere  in 
es,  we  are  proposing  in  FY  1984 
/ia  a  small  IMET  program  and 
3  million  in  economic  assistance, 
isure  of  our  support  for  the 
Ltic  government  which  recently 
ice  after  18  years  of  military 
Ecuador,  we  will  continue  to 
the  development  efforts  of  the 
tic  government  with  about  $12 
1  FY  1984  economic  assistance, 
seek  to  maintain  our  military 
:e  program  through  a  supple- 
ilocation  of  $3  million  in 
i  and  a  new  allocation  of  about 
n  in  FY  1984. 

nal  Democratic  Institute 

low  turn  to  a  political  initiative, 
ncluded  in  the  bilateral  assist- 
uest  but  which  could  have  an 
it  multiplier  effect  on  our  ability 
e  most  out  of  our  assistance. 
ident  Reagan  repeatedly  empha- 
5.  support  for  democracy  and 
or  human  rights  during  his  trip 

and  Central  America.  Demo- 
ighbors  are  the  best  neighbors. 

more  likely  to  live  at  peace 
1  other— the  democratic  idea, 
thoritarian  philosophies,  cannot 
ed  by  force  or  repression.  They 
!  likely  to  share  our  funda- 
iewpoints.  Democracy  is  the 
or  direction  of  almost  all  of  the 


countries  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean. 

Our  interest  in  democracy  is  particu- 
larly strong  in  these  times  of  political 
and  economic  crisis.  Democratic  govern- 
ments are  more  flexible  in  adapting  to 
changing  internal  and  world  circum- 
stances because  they  have  the  authority 
of  a  mandate  expressed  freely  by  their 
people.  And  in  Central  America,  where 
divisions  are  particularly  deep,  demo- 
cratic procedures  are  ultimately  the  only 
means  of  bringing  about  national  recon- 
ciliation. 

For  the  President's  Project  Democ- 
racy, we  have  asked  the  Congress  to 
fund  concrete  programs  on  behalf  of 
regional  democracy.  One  program  in 
particular  would  support  a  regional  in- 
stitute for  democracy  to  enable  us  to 
cooperate  with  democratic  political  par- 
ties and  governments  in  developing  lead- 
ership skills  and  mutual  ties  between 
democratic  leaders  of  this  generation 
and  the  next. 

We  have  consulted  with  many  Latin 
American  political  leaders  and  found 
them  enthusiastic  about  the  possibilities 
for  cooperation  in  this  area.  We  know 
that,  to  be  successful,  this  venture  must 
have  a  predominantly  Latin  American 
and  Caribbean  content  to  which  our  par- 
ticipation would  add  only  a  perspective, 
not  a  model.  Many  of  our  neighbors, 
after  all,  have  their  own  rich  and  deep 
e.xperience  in  democracy  to  draw  upon. 
Our  cooperation  must  involve  in  the  very 
earliest  stages  the  active,  bipartisan  par- 
ticipation of  the  democratic  political  par- 
ties, very  much  including  our  own,  since 
they  are  the  ones  who  daily  engage  in 
the  art  of  democratic  politics  and  have 
firsthand  knowledge  of  the  need  to 
strengthen  democratic  leadership  in 
practice.  The  idea  for  cooperation  in 
developing  political  skills  is  not  new.  It 
has  been  widely  supported  here  and  else- 
where in  the  hemisphere  for  more  than 
a  decade.  This  kind  of  cooperation- 
right  out  in  the  open— was  proposed  in 
the  Katzenbach  study  during  the 
Johnson  Administration.  With  the  sup- 
port of  Congress  we  propose  now  to  put 
the  idea  into  practice. 


Completing  the  Caribbean 
Basin  Initiative 

Finally,  I  wish  to  turn  to  a  program 
which  does  not  fit  the  usual  definitions 
of  assistance  but  which  opens  new  eco- 
nomic opportunities  to  the  depressed  na- 
tions of  Central  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean. I  am  talking  about  the  Caribbean 
Basin  initiative. 


The  Caribbean  Basin  is  a  region  of 
key  importance  to  the  United  States.  As 
has  been  mentioned  so  many  times  in 
this  testimony,  the  nations  of  Central 
America  and  the  Caribbean  are  faced 
with  economic  stagnation  or  decline  and, 
in  some  cases,  present  political  or  mili- 
tary threat  by  forces  hostile  not  only  to 
them  but  also  to  us.  Our  security  would 
be  jeopardized  by  a  string  of  hostile 
states  on  our  so-called  "third  border." 
And  our  economy  would  suffer  from  a 
prolonged  economic  disruption  there. 

I  am  very  pleased  that  the  Congress 
passed  the  emergency  aid  portion  of  the 
initiative  legislation  last  September.  But 
we  urgently  need  action  on  the  longer 
term  elements  of  the  program— the 
trade  preferences  and  the  tax  incentives. 
The  program  as  originally  introduced 


U.S.,  Brazil  Establish 
Working  Groups 

JOINT  STATEMENT. 
MAR.  11,  1983 

Brazilian  Foreign  Minister  Guerreiro 
and  Secretary  Shultz  met  today  to 
finalize  arrangements  for  the  five  joint 
working  groups  agreed  upon  between 
President  Figueiredo  and  President 
Reagan  during  President  Reagan's 
December  visit  to  Brazil.  The  groups 
will  explore  possibilities  for  expanded 
bilateral  cooperation  in  the  economic, 
nuclear,  scientific  and  technological, 
space,  and  industrial-military  areas,  tak- 
ing into  account  their  national  policies 
and  legislation. 

Before  today's  meeting,  there  had 
been  an  exchange  of  proposals  on  the 
working  groups'  agendas  and  schedules. 
The  Foreign  Minister  and  the  Secretary 
reached  today  an  understanding  on 
these  points  which  forms  a  basis  for  the 
joint  groups  to  begin  their  work  im- 
mediately, with  the  objective  of  com- 
pleting the  studies  by  the  end  of 
September.  The  groups  will  operate  in- 
dependently of  each  other  and  establish 
their  own  schedules. 

The  Foreign  Minister  and  the 
Secretary  used  the  opportunity  of  their 
meeting  to  exchange  views  on  other 
areas  of  mutual  interest.  In  addition  to 
the  business  meeting,  the  Secretary 
hosted  a  luncheon  for  the  Foreign 
Minister  and  his  party  in  the  Thomas 
Jefferson  Room  of  the  State  Depart- 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


was  a  comprehensive  and  mutually  rein- 
forcing set  of  measures,  coordinated 
closely  not  only  with  beneficiary  nations 
but  also  as  part  of  an  integrated  inter- 
national effort  which  included  Mexico, 
Colombia,  Venezuela,  and  Canada. 

We  have  waited  long  enough.  Now  is 
the  time  to  complete  the  beginning  we 
made  last  year.  As  the  President  said  on 
March  10,  the  trade  and  free  initiative 
measures  contained  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin  initiative  are  a  vital  complement 
to  our  assistance  programs,  for  they 
help  to  assure  that  the  fruits  of  assist- 
ance will  be  as  productive  as  possible. 


STATEMENT, 
MAR.  16,  1983 

Thank  you  for  the  opportunity  to  appear 
and  discuss  the  course  to  follow  in 
Central  America  and  especially  El 
Salvador.  With  national  interests  at 
stake,  we  need  a  consensus  to  sustain 
bipartisan  support  for  policy  in  the 
region. 

As  the  President  said,  if  El  Salvador 
falls  no  country  in  Central  America  will 
be  safe,  and  our  own  security  will  be  af- 
fected. 

Every  American  President — par- 
ticularly since  we  assumed  global 
responsibilities  in  World  War  II — has 
known  that  we  cannot  defend  ourselves 
and  meet  our  commitments  around  the 
world  without  a  secure  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. 

The  challenge  we  face  in  Central 
America  is  unusually  subtle.  There  is  in 
the  area  a  widespread  and  legitimate 
desire  for  change — for  democratic 
change,  as  we  have  seen  in  election  after 
election  over  the  last  17  months.  There 
is  considerable  economic  suffering— the 
result  of  the  worldwide  recession,  the 
fighting,  and  longstanding  political, 
economic,  and  social  problems.  And 
there  is  a  concerted  effort  by  Nicaragua 
and  Cuba,  backed  by  the  U.S.S.R.,  to 
unite,  train,  and  arm  violent  guerrilla 
movements,  turning  them  into  instru- 
ments for  the  destruction  of  established 
governments.  In  a  rare  moment  of  can- 
dor, the  Salvadoran  guerrilla  radio,  a 
few  days  ago,  stressed  the  FMLN's 
[Farabundo  Marti  National  Liberation 
Front]  dependence  on  outside  supply 
and  support,  admitting  "important 
logistical  operations  of  a  clandestine 
character  with  which  we  have  armed 
and  munitioned  our  forces  for  a  long 
time." 

Our  strategy  responds  to  each  of 


these  aspects  of  the  problem.  Much  of  it 
has  been  developed  in  consultation  with 
concerned  democracies  of  the  region. 
Let  me  summarize  it  briefly. 

•  Our  strategy  is  to  promote  and 
protect  democracy,  reform,  and  human 
rights.  That  is  why  we  were  so  en- 
couraged to  hear  President  Magana  call 
for  presidential  elections  this  year,  open 
to  all,  including  the  guerrillas  and  their 
supporters.  You  saw  the  Holy  Father 
support  democracy  as  the  way  to  recon- 
ciliation and  peace  in  El  Salvador.  And 
President  Magana  has  just  named  a 
Peace  Commission,  with  a  Catholic 
bishop  and  two  independents  as 
members,  to  help  adversaries  participate 
under  open  and  protective  conditions. 
He  has  also  asked  the  Organization  of 
American  States  (OAS)  to  help. 

•  It  is  to  provide  economic  assist- 
ance to  help  overcome  the  suffering 
caused  by  the  fighting  and  the  recession, 
which  has  hit  El  Salvador  especially 
hard.  Our  assistance  to  Central  America 
has  been  predominantly  economic  in  the 
past  and  will  remain  so  in  the  future. 

•  It  is  to  give  our  Salvadoran 
friends  enough  military  training  and 
assistance  to  regain  the  initiative  against 
the  insurgents.  This  is  vital  because  the 
guerrillas  now  reject  democracy  because 
they  believe  they  can  win  militarily.  I 
don't  think  the  situation  is  desperate— 
unless  we  fail  to  help  our  friends.  The 
Salvadorans  face  a  mobile,  well-supplied 
enemy,  whose  main  tactic  is  to  attack 
the  economy.  We  believe  we  should  now 
put  the  emphasis  even  more  heavily  than 
before  on  training. 

•  It  is  to  give  the  area  hope  in  the 
future.  That's  what  the  very  untradi- 
tional  Caribbean  Basin  initiative  is  for.  I 
sincerely  hope  the  Congress  will  con- 
sider and  pass  it  soon. 

•  It  is  to  deter  the  Soviets  and 
Cubans  from  putting  forces  in  Nicaragua 
or  giving  Nicaragua  aircraft  which  could 
be  used  to  threaten  its  neighbors.  We 
have  told  them  both  that  a  very  danger- 
ous situation  would  arise  if  they  did.  We 
hope  the  Sandinistas  will  give  up  their 
"revolution  without  frontiers"  and  come 
to  the  bargaining  table,  persuaded  that 
they  must  come  to  terms  both  with  their 
own  society  and  with  their  neighbors. 

•  It  is  to  foster  peaceful  solutions  in 
Central  America.  The  President  spoke  in 
favor  of  negotiation  among  countries  in 
the  region,  covering  such  issues  as  the 
removal  of  foreign  military  and  security 
advisers  and  trainers,  the  banning  of  im- 
ports of  heavy  offensive  weapons,  and 
the  democratic  transformation  of  all 
countries  in  the  area.  The  President  also 
supported  negotiations  within  countries, 


about  how  all  groups— adversaries 
supporters  alike— can  participate  ii 
open  elections.  We  will  not  support 
gotiations  that  short-circuit  the  der 
cratic  process  and  carve  up  power 
behind  the  people's  backs. 

Clearly  none  of  this  will  work  i 
tire  and  fail  to  sustain  our  support 
don't  think  that  is  what  the  Americ 
people  want. 

Over  the  past  2  weeks,  there  h 
been  intensive  consultations  betwe' 
Administration  and  the  Congress, 
me  summarize  the  reactions  we  ha 
received. 

First,  we  found  the  Congress 
unanimous  in  not  wanting  to  see  a 
Marxist-Leninist  victory  in  El  Salv 
I  don't  think  anyone  here  wants  to 
more  Nicaraguas  in  Central  Ameri 

Second,  there  is  widespread 
rence  of  the  violence  which  has  aft 
Central  America  and  a  desire  on  t) 
part  of  all  to  see  the  governments' 
region  adopt  humane  policies  towa 
their  own  populations. 

Third,  there  is  an  appreciatior 
the  fact  that  economic  dislocation 
social  injustice  breed  violence  and 
Central  America's  problems  canno 
solved  without  addressing  these  re 
problems. 

Fourth,  there  is  a  belief  in  dei 
racy  and  the  advantages  of  resolvi 
crises  in  the  region  through  the  de 
cratic  process  in  a  way  that  is  fair 
assures  the  participation  of  all  pot 
elements. 

Fifth,  many  spoke  of  the  need 
haust  such  opportunities  as  there  i 
be  to  reach  a  responsible  solution 
through  negotiation.  A  few  have  s 
to  us  about  the  need  for  powersha* 
negotiations,  or  "unconditional  neg 
tions."  But  frankly  it  appears  to  b< 
minority  view:  the  memories  of  wl 
happened  to  the  coalition  governm 
with  Marxist- Leninists  in  Nicaragu 
for  that  matter  in  Laos  or  Czecho! 
vakia — are  too  alive  to  convince  vt 
many  that  this  approach  will  safeg 
either  security  or  democracy. 

Some  place  hope  that  negotiati 
among  all  Central  American  count 
can  help.  A  regional  peace  initiativ 
now  emerging.  We  have  been  in  c' 
touch  with  its  sponsors  and  wish  i' 

Many  in  Congress  have  expres 
the  hope  that  negotiations  withintB 
framework  of  democratic  institutif* 
can  achieve  results.  We  believe  thi ' 
country  and  other  OAS  members  i 
help  in  this  regard.  Together  we  st 
be  able  to  assist  the  Salvadoran  Gl 


88 


Deoartment  of  State  Bf 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


to  provide  the  ^arantees  of  per- 
security,  of  access  to  media  for 
ligning,  of  a  fair  count,  of  respect 
3  results  of  the  votes  cast  which  all 
ipants  are  entitled  to  expect, 
mstituent  Assembly  President 
to  D'Aubisson  called  last  week  for 
litical  arm  of  the  guerrillas,  the 
!  Democratico  Revolucionario,  to 
art  in  the  election.  The  new  Peace 
ission  has  been  charged  to  under- 
le  contracts  necessary  to  ensure 

)W  some  ask  if  this  notion  of  inter- 
imocratic  reconciliation  is  a 
to  one  for  El  Salvador.  Or  if  in 
imocracy  is  so  divorced  from  the 
oran  reality  that  to  work  for  it  is 
^■ 

5  believe  that  a  significant  con- 
ice  of  support  for  democracy  is 
vay  in  El  Salvador  and  elsewhere. 
e  Salvadoran  people  have  con- 
,  on  democracy  because  it  offers 
lope  than  the  alternatives:  the 
led  violence  of  guerrilla  warfare 
violent  imposition  of  an  unwork- 
[alition  which  history  tells  us 
produce  more  rather  than  less 
human  life, 
jk  at  recent  history.  What  hap- 

0  the  tens  of  thousands  whose 
iemonstrations  of  disgust  for  the 
ime  led  to  the  fall  of  the  Romero 
ment  in  1979?  Did  they  take  to 

ets  when  called  upon  by  the 
as  at  the  time  of  the  "final  offen- 
early  1981?  They  did  not.  What 

1  do,  by  the  hundreds  of  thou- 
was  to  vote  last  March  in  the  face 
rilla  opposition. 

er  informed  observers  appear  to 
erging  toward  a  similar  conclu- 
lis  is  especially  true  of  other  Cen- 
lericans,  whose  geographic  prox- 
id  unique  moral  responsibility 
ide  them  far  more  than  casually 
ed  with  the  Salvadoran  crisis. 

is  also  true  of  His  Holiness 
hn  Paul  n,  who  repeatedly  re- 
iolence  during  his  historic  visit  to 

America,  and  of  the  group  of 
IS  leading  the  regional  peace  ini- 
o  which  I  referred  earlier. 
\i  we  and  others  will  be  making 

proposals  on  how  to  support  EI 
r's  efforts  to  provide  guarantees 
)ral  fairness  and  protection  for 
nd  candidates  of  all  persuasions. 
;h,  because  a  democratic  solution 
be  possible  in  Central  America 
;  is  also  possible  to  hold  off  the 
hallenge  of  the  guerrilla  forces. 

Congress  expressed  concern 

military  effort  in  El  Salvador  be 

ly  supported. 


On  the  basis  of  these  consultations, 
the  President  is  making  these  proposals. 

First,  that  we  meet  a  critical  im- 
mediate need  for  military  assistance  in 
El  Salvador.  Last  week  a  $60  million  re- 
programming  request  for  FMS  loan 
guarantees  for  El  Salvador  was 
presented  to  Congress.  A  little  over  half 
of  this  assistance  is  for  urgently  needed 
ammunition  and  spare  parts.  The  rest  is 
for  training  and  associated  costs.  We 
hope  for  speedy  action  on  this  request. 
The  needs  are  real  and  in  this  period 
when  so  much  progress  is  possible,  we 
want  to  respond  to  these  needs. 

Second,  that  we  take  a  hard  look  at 
the  overall  military  situation  in  El 
Salvador— what  has  worked  over  the 
past  year  and  what  has  not.  We  have 
seen  good  performance  of  the  military 
units  we  have  trained.  By  our  own 
evaluation,  and  that  of  the  guerrillas, 
these  units  have  performed  well;  and 
their  relations  with  local  populations 
have  been  exceptionally  good.  But  we 
have  not  done  enough.  We  have  trained 
less  than  10%  of  the  Salvadoran  forces, 
and  we  must  do  more.  We  are,  there- 
fore, also  requesting,  within  our  January 
supplemental  proposal,  reallocation  of 
$50  million  in  MAP  assistance.  Note  that 
this  increased  assistance  for  El  Salvador 
requires  only  funds  already  requested; 
no  new  funds  are  sought.  This  assist- 
ance would  enable  us  to  train  as  many 
as  half  of  El  Salvador's  main  fighting 
units  and  enable  them  to  obtain 
engineering  equipment  and  medical  sup- 
plies to  provide  services  and  relief  to 
areas  devastated  by  the  guerrilla  war. 

Third,  the  President  emphasized 
that  we  must  continue  support  for 
democracy,  human  rights,  and  develop- 
ment. Human  rights,  he  pointed  out, 
means  working  at  problems,  not  walking 
away  from  them.  Some  of  this 
work — like  judicial  reform — requires 
political  will  more  than  resources.  But 
the  need  for  resources  is  inescapable. 
Accordingly  we  are  proposing,  over  the 
level  approved  in  the  continuing  resolu- 
tion, increased  economic  and  develop- 
ment assistance  for  the  region. 

In  Costa  Rica  we  propose  additional 
programs  totaling  $60.1  million  focused 
on  the  northern  development  project  in- 
augurated by  President  Monge  and 
designed  to  deter  Nicaraguan  encroach- 
ment and  pressure.  In  Honduras  we  pro- 
pose a  $34.1  million  package  of  ESF, 
development  assistance,  and  Food  for 
Peace  assistance  to  help  the  poor 
farmers  that  form  the  majority  in  that, 
the  poorest  country  in  the  region. 


In  El  Salvador  we  sought  additional 
resources  in  our  January  supplemental; 
we  now  seek  additional  reprogramming 
to  provide  other  development  and  food 
assistance.  Overall,  we  seek  increased 
economic  assistance  for  El  Salvador  of 
$67.1  million  over  the  continuing  resolu- 
tion budget.  They  will  be  provided 
through  the  January  supplemental  and 
reallocations;  no  new  funds  are  sought 
at  this  time.  The  bulk  of  this  assistance 
is  to  offset  guerrilla  damage  to  the 
economy  and  to  support  a  new 
Salvadoran  program  designed  to  bring 
security  and  essential  services  to  the 
people  of  the  Central  Eastern  de- 
partments—the key  to  the  outcome  of 
the  struggle  there. 

Altogether,  these  additions  would 
bring  FY  1983  economic  assistance  to 
Central  America  to  $509  million  as 
against  $335  million  in  FY  1982  and 
$448  million  requested  for  FY  1984. 
Military  assistance  would  go  from  $115 
million  in  FY  1982  to  $190  million  in  FY 
1983  to  $140  million  in  FY  1984.  These 
are  not  insignificant  sums,  particularly 
in  a  budget-cutting  year. 

But  U.S.  security  interests  are  at 
stake  and  there  is  growing  agreement — 
not  only  within  the  United  States  but 
among  concerned  observers  in  the 
region  and  outside  it— on  the  kinds  of 
actions  needed  to  end  the  bloodshed  in 
El  Salvador  and  prevent  its  spread  to 
neighboring  countries.  The  funding  we 
have  requested  supports  actions  consist- 
ent with  basic  American  principles  and 
national  security.  And  the  total  is  small 
compared  to  the  much  larger  investment 
that  would  be  needed  later— were  we  to 
interrupt  now  the  policy  of  limited  but 
consistent  support  for  democracy, 
development,  and  security  that  we  have 
sustained  for  3  years  under  two  Ad- 
ministrations. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committees  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


l!i3 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Atomic  Energy 

Agreement  between  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency,  the  U.S.,  and  Yugoslavia 
relating  to  the  fourth  supply  agreement  of 
Jan.  16,  1980,  as  amended  (TIAS  9767),  for 
the  transfer  of  enriched  uranium  for  a 
research  reactor  in  Yugoslavia.  Signed  at 
Vienna  Feb.  23,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  23,  1983. 

Aviation 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
scheduled  transatlantic  passenger  air  fares, 
with  annexes.  Done  at  Paris  Dec.  17.  1982. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  1,  1983. 
Parties:  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden,  Switzerland,  U.K.,  U.S.,  Yugoslavia. 

Biological  Weapons 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the  develop- 
ment, production,  and  stockpiling  of 
bacteriological  (biological)  and  toxin  weapons 
and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at 
Washington,  London  and  Moscow  Apr.  10, 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  26,  1975. 
TIAS  8062. 
Ratification  deposited:  Kampuchea.  Mar.  9, 


Coffee 

Extension  of  the  international  coffee  agree- 
ment, 1976  (TIAS  8683),  Done  at  London 
Sept.  25,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 
1982.  TIAS  10439. 

Accessions  deposited:  Congo,  Mar.  21,  1983; 
Ghana,  Feb.  9,  1983;  Jamaica,  Jan.  21.  1983. 
Definitive  acceptances  deposited:  Central 
African  Republic,  Mar.  3,  1983;  Ethiopia, 
Mar.  4,  1983;  U.K.,  Feb.  28,  1983. 

International  coffee  agreement,  1983,  with 
annexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. 
Enters  into  force  Oct.  1,  1983,  if  by  that  date 
governments  representing  at  least  20  export- 
ing members  meeting  certain  requirements 
and  at  least  10  importing  members  meeting 
certain  requirements  have  deposited  in- 
struments of  ratification,  acceptance  or  ap- 
proval.' 

Signatures:  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Mar.  15, 
1983;  Japan,  Mar.  18.  1983;  Netherlands, 
Feb.  15,  1983;  Spain,  Mar.  3.  1983;  U.S., 
Mar.  23,  1983. 

Commodities — Common  Fund 

Agreement  establishing  the  Common  Fund 
for  Commodities,  with  schedules.  Done  at 
Geneva  June  27,  1980,' 
Ratifications  deposited:  Ghana,  Jan.  19,  1983; 
Saudi  Arabia,  Zambia,  Mar.  16,  1983; 
Yugoslavia,  Feb.  14,  1983. 


Cultural  Relations-UNESCO 

Protocol  to  the  agreement  on  the  importation 

of  education,  scientific,  and  cultural  materials 

of  Nov.  22.  1950  (TIAS  6129).  Adopted  at 

Nairobi  Nov.  26.  1976.  Entered  into  force 

Jan.  2.  1982.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Denmark,  Feb.  17, 

1983. 

Accession  deposited:  Greece,  Mar.  4,  1983. 

Customs — Containers 

Customs  convention  on  containers,  1972,  with 

annexes  and  protocol.  Done  at  Geneva 

Dec.  2,  1972.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  6, 

1975.2 

Acceptance  deposited:  Finland,  Feb.  22, 

1983. 

Load  Lines 

Amendments  to  the  international  convention 
on  load  lines,  1966  (TIAS  6331,  6629,  6720). 
Adopted  at  London  Nov.  15,  1979.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Barbados,  Dec.  1, 
1982;  Israel,  July  2,  1982;  Jamaica.  Nov.  18. 
1982. 

Maritime  Matters 

International  convention  on  standards  of 

training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  for 

seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 

1978.' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium.  Sept.  14, 

1982;  Federal  RepubHc  of  Germany;^  May  28, 

1982. 

Accessions  deposited:  Argentina,  Oct.  6, 

1982;  Japan,  May  27,  1982;  Peru,  July  16. 

1982;  Tanzania.  Oct.  27.  1982. 

International  convention  on  maritime  search 
and  rescue.  1979.  with  annex.  Done  at  Ham- 
burg Apr.  27.  1979.' 

Ratification  deposited:  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany,^  Jan21,  1982. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Netherlands.  July  8, 
1982. 

Accessions  deposited:  Algeria,  Jan.  5,  1983; 
Brazil,  Sept.  22,  1982;  Canada,  June  18, 
1982;  Sweden,  Sept.  27.  1982. 

Marriage 

Convention  on  consent  to  marriage,  minimum 
age  for  marriage,  and  registration  of  mar- 
riages. Done  at  New  York  Dec.  10,  1962. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  9,  1964.^ 
Accession  deposited:  Mexico,  Feb.  22,  1983. 

Nuclear  Material— Physical  Protection 

Convention  on  the  physical  protection  of 
nuclear  material,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Vien- 
na Oct.  26,  1979.1 
Signature:  Norway,  Jan.  26,  1983. 

Patents— Plant  Varieties 

International  convention  for  the  protection  of 

new  varieties  of  plants  of  Dec.  2,  1961.  as 

revised.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  23,  1978. 

Entered  into  force  Nov.  8,  1981.  TIAS 

10199. 

Ratification  deposited:  France,''  Feb.  17, 


Pollution 

Protocol  relating  to  intervention  on  th{ 
seas  in  cases  of  pollution  by  substan 
than  oil.  Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1973, 
Entered  into  force:  Mar.  30,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Italy,  Oct.  1, 
Acceptance  deposited:  U.S.S.R.,  Dec.  5 
1982. 

Accession  deposited:  Belgium,  Sept.  9, 
Territorial  Application:  Extended  by  tl 
to  Anguilla,  British  Virgin  Islands,  Ca; 
Islands,  Falkland  Islands  and  Depende 
Hong  Kong,  Montserrat,  Pitcaim.  Her 
son.  Ducie  and  Oeno  Islands.  St.  Heler 
Dependencies,  United  Kingdom  Soven 
Base  Areas  of  Akrotiri  and  Dhekelia  o 
Island  of  Cyprus.  Turks  and  Caicos  Is! 
Sept.  9,  1982. 

Publications 

Statutes  of  the  international  center  fo 
registration  of  serial  publications.  Don 
Paris  Nov.  14,  1974,  and  amended  Oc1 
and  12,  1976.  Entered  into  force  Jan. 
1976;  for  the  U.S.,  Mar.  31,  1978  (pro 
ally). 

Accession  deposited:  Philippines,  Dec. 
1982. 

Safety  at  Sea 

International  convention  for  the  safet; 
at  sea,  1974,  with  annex.  Done  at  Lor 
Nov.  1,  1974.  Entered  into  force  May 
1980.  TIAS  9700. 

Accessions  deposited:  Barbados,  Sipt. 
1982;  Ecuador,  May  28,  1982;  Gabon. 
Jan.  21,  1982;  Guatemala,  Oct.  20.  19;  ' 
Vanuatu,  July  28,  1982.  ' 

Protocol  of  1978  relating  to  the  interr  j 
convention  for  the  safety  of  life  at  seal 
(TIAS  9700).  Done  at  London  Feb.  17  j 
Entered  into  force  May  1,  1981.  TIAS  j 
Accessions  deposited:  China,  Dec.  17,  | 
Italy,  Oct.  1,  1982;  Korea,  Dec.  2.  198j 
Panama,  July  14,  1982;  Peru,  July  16,] 
Vanuatu,  July  28,  1982.  3 

1 
Satellite  Communications  System      . 
Agreement  relating  to  the  Internalinr 
Telecommunications  Satellite  OrKani' 
(INTELSAT),  with  annexes.  Dont-  at 
Washington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  ii 
force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Accession  deposited:  Papua  New  Guin 
Mar.  24,  1983. 

Operating  agreement  relating  to  th  I 
tional  Telecommunications  Satelliti  i ' 
tion  (INTELSAT),  with  annex.  Done  : 
Washington  Aug.  20,  1971.  Entered  i 
force  Feb.  12,  1973.  TIAS  7532. 
Signatures:  Post  and  Telecommunicat 
Corp.,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Mar.  24,  1 

Seabed  Arms  Control 

Treaty  on  the  prohibition  of  the  tiiipl:  ' 
of  nuclear  weapons  and  other  weapoi. 
mass  destruction  on  the  seabed  an^i  t! 
floor  and  in  the  subsoil  thereof.  Done 


Department  of  State  E^ 


TREATIES 


ton,  London  and  Moscow  Feb.  11, 
■tered  into  force  May  18,  1972.  TIAS 


ion  deposited:  Argentina,'  Mar.  21. 


Liability 

on  on  international  liability  for 
caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 
:on,  London  and  Moscow  Mar.  29, 
tered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for 
Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 

deposited:  Cuba,  Nov.  2.5,  1982. 
on  deposited:  Morocco.  Mar.  15. 


nunications 

rulations,  with  appendices  and  final 
Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6.  1979. 
into  force  Jan.  1.  1982,  except  for 
25  and  66  and  appendix  43  which 
nto  force  Jan.  1,  1981,  and  (2)  cer- 
isions  concerning  aeronautical 
rvice  which  entered  into  force 
983.2 

s  deposited:  Argentina,'  Nov.  24, 
C.,5  Dec.  24,  1982. 


inal  convention  against  the  taking  of 
Done  at  New  York  Dec.  17,  1979.' 
^n  deposited:  Guatemala,  Mar.  11, 


Measurement 

nal  convention  on  tonnage  measure- 
hips,  1969,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
le  23.  1969.  Entered  into  force 
?2;  for  the  U.S.  Feb.  10,  1983. 
). 
deposited:  Bulgaria,  Oct.  14, 

;e  deposited:  Denmark,'  June  22, 

i  deposited:  Australia,  May  21, 
bados,  Sept.  1,  1982;  Chile,« 
.982;  Cuba,  Nov.  9,  1982;  Peru, 

South  Africa,  Nov.  24,  1982. 
1  application:  Extended  by  the  U.K. 
la,  Dec.  6,  1982. 


the  limitation  period  in  the  in- 
J  sale  of  goods,  as  amended  by  the 
if  Apr.  11,  1980.  Done  at  New  York 
974.1 
deposited:  Egypt,  Dec.  6,  1982. 

h  proces-verbal  extending  the 
1  on  the  provisional  accession  of 
the  GATT  (TIAS  4498).  Done  at 
5v.  2,  1982.2 
deposited:  Romania,  Feb.  24,  1983. 

or  the  accession  of  Colombia  to  the 
me  at  Geneva  Nov.  28,  1979. 
ito  force  Oct.  3,  1981.^ 
:e  deposited:  Austria,'  Feb.  18, 


UN  Industrial  Development  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Done  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.' 
Signature:  Uganda,  Mar.  23,  1983. 
Ratifications  deposited:  Benin,  Honduras, 
Mar.  3.  1983;  Sierra  Leone,  Mar.  7,  1983; 
Guinea-Bissau,  Mar.  17.  1983. 

Weapons 

Convention  on  prohibitions  or  restrictions  on 
the  use  of  certain  conventional  weapons 
which  may  be  deemed  to  be  excessively  in- 
jurious or  to  have  indiscriminate  effects,  vnth 
annexed  Protocols.  Done  at  Geneva  Oct.  10, 
1980.1 

Ratification  and  acceptances  deposited: 
Austria,  Mar.  14.  1983;  Laos,  Jan.  3,  1983. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 

discrimination  against  women.  Done  at  New 

York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Sept.  3,  1981.2 

Ratification  deposited:  Honduras,  Mar.  3, 

1983. 

World  Health  Organization 

Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion. Done  at  New  York  July  22.  1946. 
Entered  into  force  April  7,  1948.  TIAS  1808. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Vanuatu,  Mar.  7, 
1983. 

Amendments  to  Arts.  24  and  25  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  World  Health  Organization, 
as  amended.  Adopted  at  Geneva  May  17, 
1976  by  the  29th  World  Health  Assembly.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Kenya,  Mar.  1,  1983; 
Madagascar,  Mar.  8,  1983;  Turkey,  Dec.  29, 
1982. 

Amendment  to  Art.  74  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  World  Health  Organization,  as  amended. 
Adopted  at  Geneva  May  18,  1978  by  the  31st 
World  Health  Assembly.' 
Acceptance  deposited:  Monaco,  Feb.  3,  1983. 


BILATERAL 

Belize 

Agreement  relating  to  economic  and  technical 
cooperation.  Signed  at  Belmopan  Mar.  8, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  8,  1983. 

Burundi 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Bujumbura  Sept.  21  and  Oct.  8, 
1982.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  8.  1982. 

Canada 

Mutual  logistical  support  agreement,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Stuttgart  Feb.  11,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  11,  1983. 

Colombia 

Agreement  relating  to  the  employment  of 
dependents  of  official  government  employees. 


Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Bogota 
Mar.  30  and  May  25,  1982.  Entered  into 
force  May  25.  1982. 

Egypt 

Agreement  on  the  development  and  facilita- 
tion of  tourism.  Signed  at  Cairo  Feb.  21, 
1983.  Enters  into  force  when  each  country 
has  notified  the  other  by  diplomatic  note  of 
the  completion  of  the  necessary  legal  re- 
quirements. 

Haiti 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
June  8,  1979,  with  memorandum  of  under- 
standing. Signed  at  Port-au-Prince  May  28, 
1982.  Entered  into  force  May  28,  1982. 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  28,  1981,  as  amended  and  extended,  for 
the  interdiction  of  narcotics  trafficking.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Port-au-Prince 
Jan.  4,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  4,  1983. 

Honduras 

Agreement  relating  to  privileges  and  im- 
munities for  U.S.  Armed  Forces  personnel 
participating  in  combined  military  exercises 
in  Honduras.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  Tegucigalpa  Dec.  8,  1982.  Entered  into 
force  Dec.  8,  1982. 

Hungary 

Agreement  on  scientific  and  technological 
cooperation,  with  annexes.  Signed  at 
Budapest  July  7,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
July  7,  1982,  except  for  Annex  III  which 
entered  into  force  Nov.  1,  1982. 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  wool  textile 
products.  Effective  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Budapest  Feb.  15  and  25,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  25.  1983;  effective  Oct.  1,  1982. 

Israel 

First  amendment  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  16,  1982,  for  economic  assistance. 
Signed  at  Washington  Dec.  30,  1982.  Entered 
into  force  Dec.  30,  1982. 

Italy 

Mutual  logistical  support  agreement,  with  an- 
nexes. Signed  at  Stuttgart  Feb.  23,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  23,  1983. 

Jamaica 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
international  military  education  and  training 
(IMET)  program.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Kingston  Nov.  13,  1980,  and 
Feb.  17,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  17, 
1981.  TIAS  10536. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  employment  of 
dependents  of  official  government  employees. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Kingston 
May  3  and  Oct.  11,  1982.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  11,  1982. 

Agreements  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  30,  1982.  Signed  at  Kingston  Feb.  24, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  24,  1983. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Japan 

Arrangement  on  fusion  cooperation  im- 
plementing the  agreement  of  May  2,  1979, 
(HAS  9463)  on  cooperation  in  research  and 
development  in  energy  and  related  fields.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washington 
Jan.  24,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  24, 


Mexico 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
July  31,  1970,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  6941,  7927),  for  a  cooperative 
meteorological  observation  program  in  Mex- 
ico. Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Tlatelolco  and  Mexico  Jan.  5  and  28,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  28,  1983;  effective 
Feb.  1,  1983. 

Netherlands 

Agreement  amending  the  memorandum  of 
agreement  of  Mar.  10  and  June  15,  1978, 
(TIAS  9199)  relating  to  the  provision  of  flight 
inspection  services.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  The  Hague  Feb.  19  and  May  4,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  May  4,  1982. 

Mutual  logistical  support  agreement,  with 
annexes.  Signed  at  Stuttgart  Feb.  22,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  22,  1983. 

Fourth  supplement  to  the  general  arrange- 
ment of  May  3,  1966,  (TIAS  9144)  relating  to 
the  cooperative  production  of  the  Ml 09  vehi- 
cle, with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington  and 
The  Hague  Jan.  31,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  31,  1983. 

New  Zealand 

Agreement  for  the  establishment  and  opera- 
tion of  an  Omega  Navigation  System 
Monitoring  Facility.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Wellington  Mar.  3,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  Mar.  3,  1983. 

Romania 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Sept.  3  and  Nov.  3,  1980,  as  amended  (TIAS 
9911),  relating  to  trade  in  wool  and  manmade 
fiber  textiles  and  textile  products.  Effected 
by  exchange  of  letters  at  Bucharest  Jan.  28 
and  Feb.  18,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Feb.  18,  1983. 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to, 
guaranteed  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Bucharest  Mar.  10,  1983.  Enters  into  force 
upon  receipt  by  Romania  of  written  notice 
from  the  U.S.  Government  that  all  necessary 
domestic  legal  requirements  for  entry  into 
force  have  been  fulfilled. 

Senegal 

Agreement  providing  for  an  emergency  land- 
ing site  in  Senegal  for  the  space  shuttle.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Dakar 
Dec.  15,  1982  and  Jan.  31,  1983.  Entered  in- 
to force  Jan.  31,  1983. 

Somalia 

Agreement  for  sales  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 


Mar.  20,  1978  (TIAS  9222).  Signed  at 
Mogadishu  Jan.  20,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  30,  1983. 

Spain 

Memorandum  of  agreement  relating  to  tech- 
nical assistance  to  Spain  in  civil  aviation  ac- 
tivities. Signed  at  Washington  and  Madrid 
June  30  and  July  22,  1982.  Entered  into 
force  July  22,  1982. 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Madrid 
Oct.  18,  1982. 
Entered  into  force:  Apr.  1,  1983. 

Sudan 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  Jan.  20,  1983. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Khartoum 
Feb.  21,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  21, 
1983. 

Sweden 

Supplementary  convention  on  extradition. 
Signed  at  Stockholm  Mar.  14,  1983.  Enters 
into  force  upon  the  exchange  of  ratifications. 

Thailand 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Oct.  4,  1978,  as  amended  and  extended 
(TIAS  9215,  9462,  9643,  9717,  9937,  101.53, 
10368,  10461),  relating  to  trade  in  cotton, 
wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and  textile 
products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Bangkok  Jan.  7  and  Feb.  18,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  18,  1983;  effective  Sept.  22, 
1982. 

Turkey 

Agreement  regarding  scientific  and  tech- 
nological cooperation,  with  exchange  of  notes. 
Signed  at  Ankara  Feb.  21,  1983.  Enters  into 
force  on  the  date  of  exchange  of  notes  an- 
nouncing acceptance  of  each  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  in  accordance  with  their  respec- 
tive national  procedures. 

United  Kingdom 

Reciprocal  fisheries  agreement,  with  agreed 
minute.  Signed  at  London  Mar.  27,  1979. 
Ratifications  exchanged:  Washington, 
Mar.  10,  1983. 
Entered  into  force:  Mar.  10,  1983. 

Zambia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  4,  1978,  with  minutes  of  negotiation. 
Signed  at  Lusaka  Feb.  18,  1983.  Entered  into 
force  Feb.  18,  1983. 


March  1983 


'Not  in  force. 

^Not  in  force  for  the  U.S. 

'With  declaration(s). 

'Applicable  to  the  territory  of  the  French 
Republic,  including  Overseas  Departments 
and  Territories. 

^Applicable  to  territories  under  its  ter- 
ritorial sovereignty  as  well  as  the  State  of 
Brunei. 

^With  reservation. 

'Subject  to  ratification.  ■ 


March  1 

A  new  12-member  cabinet  headed  I,    - 
Alibux  as  Prime  Minister  is  install.  I  : 
Suriname's  fourth  military-appoini.   ' 
ment  since  the  1980  revolution. 

Three  members  of  the  El  Sal, 
Commission  are  inducted.  The  coi 
purposes  are  to  revise  the  amnest  . 
its  implementation,  create  adequ;i: 
contributions  so  there  can  be  elt-n 
munications,  and  to  promote  the  paiti 
of  all  social  and  political  sectors  in  tin 
democratic  process. 

March  6 

The  Bonn  coalition  government,  In  ;.|. 
Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  of  the  Clin.^t 
Democratic  Party,  is  returned  to  \<i>wi  ii 
tional  elections. 

March  8 

The  U.N.  Commission  on  Human  Rigl 
adopts  a  resolution  in  Geneva  by  a  vo  ol 
19-14,  with  10  abstentions,  requestinj  hi 
Secretary  General  to  "update  and  con  ;t 
the  thorough  study  of  the  human  righ  si 
tion  in  Poland." 

March  U 

Robert  Hawke,  leader  of  the  Lalior  P;  v 
takes  office  as  Australia's  Prime  .Mini,  r 
after  he  and  his  party  ousted  the  ."<■>  i'  •>! 
conservative  government  of  Prinif  .Mi  ti 
Malcolm  Eraser  in  national  electioii.'i  J  c 
It  was  the  second  Labor  Party  victnr\  ii' 
1949. 

March  13-16 

A  special  Norwegian  conference  in  Os  oi 
Afghanistan  is  hearing  eyewitness  tes  lo 
of  the  devastation,  suffering,  and  hare  if 
inflicted  on  the  Afghan  people  caused  t 
continuing  occupation  of  Afghanistan  i 
Soviet  troops  and  their  use  of  chemica' 
weapons.  The  hearings  are  designed  u'm 
tain  public  awareness  of  the  situation  ?r 

March  14 

For  the  first  time  in  the  group's  SS-ye; 
history,  OPEC  cuts  the  official  prices  yt 
market  crude  by  15%  to  $29  a  barrel  i;ni 
$34  a  barrel.  A  production  ceiling  of  1  > 
million  barrels  a  day  is  also  imposed. 

March  14-16 

Dutch  Prime  Minister  Ruud  Lubbers  n.<e 
an  official  working  visit  to  WashingtorO. 
to  discuss  foreign  matters  of  mutual  irire 

March  15 

Five  U.S.  Marines  and  five  Italians  an 
wounded  by  rocket-propelled  grenades 'id 
automatic  weapons  fire  in  attacks  of  tJ 
multinational  force  in  Beirut.  One  Itali 
subsequently  dies  of  injuries  a  few  day  at 
all  injuries  to  U.S.  forces  were  minor. 


Department  Of  State  Biet 


PRESS  RELEASES 


:hl7 

■ollowing  appointed  Ambassadors  pre- 
their  credentials  during  a  White  House 
nony:  Eric  Kwamina  Otoo,  Republic  of 
a;  Don  Florencio  MAYE  ELA,  Republic 
[uatorial  Guinea;  Jorge  ESPINOSA  de 
eyes,  United  Mexican  States;  Lassana 
,,  Republic  of  Mali;  Fritz  Nervel  Cineas. 
blic  of  Haiti. 

h21 

agrees  to  share  information  about  the 
t  military  equipment  and  tactics  with 
nited  States  that  were  gained  during 
ebanon  war  without  the  necessity  of  a 
ntelligence-sharing  agreement, 
he  Afghan  New  Year  is  commemorated 
ghanistan  Day  in  the  United  States, 
50th  private  and  governmental  organiza- 
demonstrating  their  continuing  support 
e  struggle  that  the  Afghan  freedom 
TS  are  waging  against  the  Soviet  Union. 
lent  Reagan  gives  a  brief  radio  message 
)port  the  Afghan  cause  and  Congress 
3  a  resolution  designating  March  21  as 
Day. 


23-24 

resident  Bush  makes  an  official  visit  to 
i  to  meet  with  the  Prime  Minister  and 
senior  Canadian  officials. 

;t24 

1,-n  Minister  Andrey  A.  Gromyko  of  the 
Union  is  given  the  additional  job  of 
Deputy  Prime  Minister. 
.e  United  States  bars  Cubana  Airlines 
lying  over  U.S.  airspace  for  2  weeks 
te  of  two  violations  of  traffic  routings. 
lUte  deviations  took  the  planes  near 
s  Air  Force  Base  near  Syracuse,  New 
There  were  determined  to  be  safety 


IT,  29-April  1 

h.  n  Crown  Prince  and  Defense  Minister 
'-"   H-":id  bin  Iss  al-Khalifa  and  Foreign 
ikh  Muhammad  bin  Mubarak 
'  lal  working  visit  to  Washington. 
t  with  Secretary  of  Defense 
i-.u'*  r  and  other  top  U.S.  officials  to 
'  I   SCI  iirity  issues  of  mutual  interest. 

ir  29-April  2 

et  ent  Kenneth  Kaunda  of  Zambia  makes 
0  cial  working  visit  to  the  United  States 
m  t  the  President  and  other  top  U.S.  of- 
ia-to  discuss  southern  Africa  and  other 
ibi  affairs  of  interest  to  both  countries. 

IT;  31-April  1 

S,:  orea  subcabinet  economic  consultations 
'   d  in  Washington,  D.C.  Vice  Minister  of 
r-  n  .MtViirs  Roh  Jae  Won  leads  the 
T'  I  ilrli'iration,  and  Under  Secretary  of 
"!■  Hiiinomic  Affairs  W.  Allen  Wallis 
'i^-lie  U.S.  delegation.  Reviewed  is  the 
"  ?ige  of  bilateral  and  multilateral 
orfiic  issues  of  importance  to  both  na- 


tions, including  prospects  for  global  recovery 
and  the  outlook  for  the  respective  nations' 
economies.  The  consultations  demonstrate  the 
importance  of  U.S. -Korean  economic  relation- 
ship and  our  growing  bilateral  trade.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


No.  Dale 

66      3/2 


74 
75 

3/14 
3/14 

76 

3/14 

77 

3/16 

78 

3/16 

Subject 

U.S.  and  the  Federated 
States  of  Micronesia  call 
plebiscite  on  compact  of 
free  association. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCITT),  study  group  A. 
Mar.  18. 

Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
World  Affairs  Council  of 
Northern  California,  San 
Francisco,  Mar.  5. 

Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session  following  remarks 
in  San  Francisco,  Mar.  5. 

Jerome  W.  Van  Gorkom 
appointed  Under  Secretary 
for  Management  (bio. 
data). 

Charles  N.  Brower  appointed 
substitute  arbitrator  on 
Iran-U.S.  Claims  Tribunal 
(bio.  data). 

Appointment  of  U.S.  dele- 
gation to  the  regional  ad- 
ministration radio  con- 
ference for  planning  the 
broadcasting  satellite  serv- 
ice. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Dutch 
Prime  Minister  Lubbers, 
Mar.  14-17. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  groups  10 
and  11,  Apr.  4. 

CCIR,  study  group  1,  Apr.  7. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, Apr.  13. 

CCITT,  working  party  on 
integrated  services  digital 
network.  Mar.  29. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee. 

U.S.,  Romania  amend  textile 
agreement,  Jan.  28  and 
Feb.  18. 


*88 

3/28 

*89 
•90 

3/28 
3/29 

•91 

3/29 

•92 

3/29 

•93 

3/31 

•94 

3/31 

95 

3/31 

U.S.,  Costa  Rica,  and 
Panama  sign  eastern 
Pacific  Ocean  tuna  fishing 
agreement.  Mar.  15. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  Senate  Ap- 
propriations Committee. 

Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1951: 
Volume  VII — Korea  and 
China  (two  parts)  released. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  for  Com- 
merce, Justice,  State,  the 
Judiciary,  and  Related 
Agencies,  House  Ap- 
propriations Committee. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Zambian 
President  Kaunda,  Mar. 
29-Apr.  2. 

Shipping  Coordinating 
Committee  (SCC),  Sub- 
committee on  Ocean 
Dumping,  Apr.  19. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
Private  International  Law, 
Apr.  29. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, Apr.  29. 

SCC,  Subcommittee  on  Safe- 
ty of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS), 
working  group  on  stability, 
load  lines,  and  safety  of 
fishing  vessels,  Apr.  20. 

SCC,  Subcommittee  on  the 
Code  of  Conduct  for  Liner 
Conferences,  May  3. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  May  9  and  24. 

Ll.S.,  Costa  Rica,  and 
Panama  sign  the  eastern 
Pacific  Ocean  tuna  fishing 
agreement.  Mar.  15. 

U.S.,  Hong  Kong  amend 
textile  agreement,  Jan.  12 
and  14. 

U.S.,  Thailand  amend  textile 
agreement,  Jan.  7  and 
Feb.  18. 

Shultz:  interview  on  "Today 
Show." 

James  R.  Bullington  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Burundi  (bio.  data). 

Shultz:  news  briefing  on 
arms  control. 


•Not  printed  in  the  BrLLETi> 


PUBLICATIONS 


USUN 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the 
Public  Affairs  Office,  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
United  Nations,  799  United  Nations  Plaza, 
New  York,  N.Y.  10017. 


No.         Date 


Subject 


186  12/15     Gershman:  human  rights  in 

El  Salvador,  Committee 
III. 

187  12/15     Sorzano:  Khmer  relief 

donors'  meeting. 

188  12/16     Lichenstein:  South  African 

attack  into  Lesotho, 
Security  Council. 

189  12/17     Sherman:  plebiscites  in 

Palau,  the  Marshall 
Islands,  and  Micronesia, 
Trusteeship  Council. 

190  12/17     Lichenstein;  Middle  East, 

General  Assembly. 

191  [Not  issued.] 

192  12/20     Lichenstein:  peaceful  uses 

of  nuclear  energy.  General 
Assembly. 

193  12/20     Adelman:  global  negotia- 

tions. General  Assembly. 

194  12/21      Gershman:  measures  against 

Nazi,  Fascist,  and  neo- 
Fascist  activities.  General 
Assembly. 

195  12/21      Gershman:  Central  America, 

Committee  III. 

196  12/21      Sherman:  TTPI,  Trusteeship 

Council. 

197  12/21      Papendorp:  1982-83  budget. 

General  Assembly. 

198  12/21      Lichenstein:  Middle  East, 

General  Assembly. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Peace  and  National  Security,  address  to  the 
nation.  Mar.  23,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#472). 

Strategic  Importance  of  El  Salvador  and 
Central  America,  National  Association  of 
Manufacturers,  Mar.  10,  1983  (Current 
Policy  #464). 

The  Trade  Challenge  for  the  1980s,  Common- 
wealth Club,  San  Francisco,  Mar.  4,  1983 
(Current  Policy  #463). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Strengthening  Democracy  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations, 
House  Appropriations  Committee,  Mar.  16, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #468). 

The  U.S.  and  East  Asia:  A  Partnership  for 
the  Future,  World  Affairs  Council,  San 
Francisco,  Mar.  5,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#459). 

Foreign  Aid  and  U.S.  National  Interests, 
Southern  Center  for  International  Studies, 
Atlanta,  Feb.  24,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#457). 

Project  Democracy,  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Operations,  House  Foreign  Affairs 
Committee,  Feb.  23,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#456). 

Security  and  Economic  Assistance  for  FY 
1984,  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee, 
Feb.  16,  1983  (Current  Policy  #454). 

Africa 

Our  Development  Dialogue  With  Africa, 
Assistant  Secretary  Crocker,  Georgetown 
University  Center  for  Strategic  and  Inter- 
national Studies,  Mar.  3,  1983  (Current 
Policy  #462). 

Background  Notes  on  Cameroon  (Feb.  1983). 

Background  Notes  on  Ivory  Coast  (Feb. 
1983). 

Background  Notes  on  Swaziland  (Mar.  1983). 

Arms  Control 

Ensuring  Security  in  the  Nuclear  Age, 
Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  conference  spon- 
■  sored  by  the  Department  of  State  and  the 
Institute  of  International  Education, 
Denver,  Mar.  8,  1983  (Current  Pohcy 
#466). 

Arms  Control:  MBFR  talks  (GIST  Mar. 
1983). 


Canada 

Background  Notes  on  Canada  (Mar. 

East  Asia 

Developing  an  Enduring  Relationship  W| 
China,  Assistant  Secretary  Wolfowitz, 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Fe 
1983  (Current  Policy  #460). 

Background  Notes  on  Thailand  (Feb.  19| 

Economics 

Multilateral  Development  Banks  (GIST, 
Mar.  1983). 

Europe 

Soviet  and  East  European  Aid  to  the  Tl 
World,  report  by  the  Bureau  of  Intelli 
and  Research.  Feb.  1983. 

The  Human  Side  of  German-American  I 
tions,  Ambassador  Burns,  Overseas  C 
Hamburg,  Mar.  14,  1983  (Current  Pol 
#469). 

Foreign  Aid 

Economics  and  Politics:  The  Quandary  i 
Foreign  Aid,  Under  Secretary  Wallis, 
Heritage  Foundation  and  Philadelphie 
Society,  Mar.  3,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#461). 

Human  Rights 

1982  Human  Rights  Report,  excerpt  frt 
Department  of  State's  Country  Repor 
Human  Rights  Practices  for  1982,  Mai 
1983  (Special  Report  #107). 

Military  Affairs 

Yellow  Rain:  The  Arms  Control  Implica 
Under  Secretary  Eagleburger,  Subcoi 
tee  on  Arms  Control,  Oceans,  Interna 
Operations,  and  Environment,  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee,  Feb.  2 
1983  (Current  Policy  #458). 

Nuclear  Policy 

U.S.  Nuclear  Export  and  Nonproliferati 
Policy  (GIST,  Mar.  1983).  ■ 


DeDartment  of  State  Bu' 


EX 


(  1983 

jme  83,  No.  2074 


listan.  Afghanistan  Day,  1983  (Uepart- 

it  statement) 78 

FY    1984    Assistance    Requests   for 

ca  (Cniclver) 20 

'ontrol 

ig  the  Danger  of  Nuclear  Weapons 

igan) 1 

ly's  News  Briefing  on  Arms  Control  17 
T  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  East 

1  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 30 

U.S..  Brazil  Establish  Working  Groups 
it  statement) 87 

lan    Basin    Economic    Recovery   Act 

ultz)    13 

14  and   1985  Authorization  Requests 

ultz)    16 

34    Assistance    Requests    for   Africa 

)cker)   20 

4  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 

the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 30 

34    Assistance    Requests    for    Egypt 

iotes)   63 

i4   Assistance   Requests   for  Europe 

ft) 44 

84    Assistance    Requests    for    Israel 

iotes)   61 

B4    Assistance    Requests    for    Korea 

Desmith) 36 

4  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin  Amer- 
ind the  Caribbean  (Enders) 83 

4  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Near 

t  and  South  Asia  (Veliotes) 57 

4  Assistance  Requests  for  Organiza- 

sand  Programs  (Newell) 79 

4  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Philip- 
!sand  Indonesia (O'Donohue)  ...  .41 
•4  Assistance  Requests  for  Thailand 

)onohue)    39 

4  Request  for  Economic  Assistance 

grams  (McPherson) 47 

4  Requests  for  Migration  and  Refugee 

istance  (Purcell) 70 

84     Security    Assistance     Requests 

ineider)    71 

3  Supplemental  Request  for  Lebanon 

iotes)   64 

r  Cooperation  With  EURATOM  (letter 

he  Congress) 69 

xport    Policy    Toward    South    Africa 

nan)   25 

uclear  Policy   Toward    South   Africa 

rehall) 66 

.ment  and  Foreign  Service.  FY  1984 
1    1985    Authorization     Requests 

ultz)    16 

■  ping  Countries.  FY  1984  Request  for 
inomic     Assistance     Programs 

Pherson) 47 

mics 

!an    Basin    Economic    Recovery    Act 

ultz)    13 

14  Request  for  Economic  Assistance 

grams  (McPherson) 47 

FY  1984    Assistance   Requests   for 

•pt  (Veliotes) 63 

;ador 

ige  to  U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Cen- 

America  (Reagan) 6 

intial     Elections    in     El     Salvador 

agan) 85 

e  for  Democracy  in  Central  America 

ultz)    10 

e.  F\'  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
xipe  (Burt) 44 


Foreign  Aid 

Challenge  to  U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Central 
America  (Reagan) 6 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Africa 
(Crocker)    20 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 30 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Egypt 
(Veliotes) 63 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 
(Burt) 44 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Israel 
(Veliotes) 61 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin  Amer- 
ica and  the  Caribbean  (Enders) 83 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Near 
East  and  South  Asia  (Veliotes) 57 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Organiza- 
tions and  Programs  (Newell) 79 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Philip- 
pines and  Indonesia  (O'Donohue) 41 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Thailand 
(O'Donohue) 39 

FY  1984  Request  for  Economic  Assistance 
Programs  (McPherson) 47 

FY  1984  Requests  for  Migration  and  Refugee 
Assistance  (Purcell) 70 

FY  1984  Security  Assistance  Requests 
(Schneider)    71 

FY  1983  Supplemental  Request  for  Lebanon 
(Veliotes) 64 

Indonesia.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia 
(O'Donohue) 41 

International  Organizations.  FY  1984  Assist- 
ance Requests  for  Organizations  and  Pro- 
grams (Newell) 79 

Israel.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Israel 
(Veliotes) 61 

Korea.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Korea  (Shoesmith) 36 

Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 

Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Recovery  Act 
rShultz)    13 

Challenge  to  U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Central 
America  (Reagan) 6 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin  Ameri- 
ca and  the  Caribbean  (Enders) 83 

Struggle  for  Democracy  in  Central  America 
(Shultz)    ■. 10 

Lebanon.  FY  1983  Supplemental  Request  for 
Lebanon  (Veliotes) 64 

Middle  East.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Near  East  and  South  Asia 
(Veliotes) 57 

Military  Affairs.  U.S.  Defense  Policy 
(Reagan)    65 

Nicaragua.  Struggle  for  Democracy  in  Central 
America  (Shultz) 10 

Nuclear  Policy. 

Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM  (letter 
to  the  Congress) 69 

U.S.  Nuclear  Policy  Toward  South  Africa 
(Marshall)    66 

Pacific.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  East 
Asia  and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 30 

Philippines.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests 
for  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia 
(O'Donohue) 41 

Presidential  Documents 

Challenge  to  U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Central 
America 6 

Northern  Ireland 46 

Nuclear  Cooperation  With  EURATOM  (letter 
to  the  Congress) 69 

Presidential  Elections  in  El  Salvador 85 

Reducing  the  Danger  of  Nuclear  Weapons  .  .  1 

U.S.  Defense  Policy 65 

Publications.  Department  of  State 94 

Refugees.  FY  1984  Requests  for  Migration 
and  Refugee  Assistance  (Purcell) 70 


Security  Assistance 

Challenge  to  U.S.  Security  Interests  in  Cen- 
tral America  (Reagan) 6 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Africa 
(Crocker) 20 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  East  Asia 
and  the  Pacific  (Wolfowitz) 30 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Egypt 
(Veliotes) 63 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Europe 
(Burt) 44 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Israel 
(Veliotes) 61 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Korea 
(Shoesmith) 36 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Latin  Amer- 
ica and  the  Caribbean  (Enders) 83 

FY'  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Near 
East  and  South  Asia  (Veliotes) 57 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  the  Philip- 
pines and  Indonesia  (O'Donohue) 41 

FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Thailand 
(O'Donohue) 39 

FY  1984  Security  Assistance  Requests 
(Schneider)    71 

FY  1983  Supplemental  Request  for  Lebanon 
(Veliotes) 64 

South  Africa 

U.S.  Export  Policy  Toward  South  Africa 
(Lyman) 25 

U.S.  Nuclear  Policy  Toward  South  Africa 
(Marshall)    66 

South  Asia.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
the  Near  East  and  South  Asia  (Veliotes)  57 

Thailand.  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Thailand  (O'Donohue)  .  .  .  .' 39 

Trade.  U.S.  Export  Policy  Toward  South 
Africa  (Lyman) 25 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

Reducing  the  Danger  of  Nuclear  Weapons 
(Reagan)    1 

Secretary's  News  Briefing  on  Arms  Control  17 

United  Kingdom.  Northern  Ireland 
(Reagan)   46 

United  Nations.  FY  1984  Assistance  Re- 
quests for  Organizations  and  Programs 
(Newell) 79 


Name  Index 

Burt    Richard  44 

Crocker,  Chester  A 20 

Enders,  Thomas  0 83 

Lyman,  Princeton 25 

Marshall,  Harry  R.  Jr 66 

McPherson,  M.  Peter 47 

Newell,  Gregory  J 79 

O'Donohue,  Daniel  A 39,  41 

Purcell,  James  R.  Jr 70 

Reagan,  President 1,  6,  46,  65,  69,  85 

Schneider,  William  Jr 71 

Shoesmith,  Thomas  P 36 

Shultz,  Secretary 10, 13, 16, 17 

Veliotes,  Nicholas  A 57,  61,  63,  64 

Wolfowitz,  Paul  D 30 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 

Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

375 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  in  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


Departtnen  t 
of  SUiU^ 


'207/ 


buiietBn 


Official  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2075 


June  1983 


■ 

f          WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

>- 

MT-^ 

f 

'           Can 
Nica 
Max 
EIS 
Cub 
Arae 

tral  Amaric 
ragua  /  76 
ico  /  80 
alvador  /  81 
a/ 85 
ntina  /  87 
Jdor /  89 

a/1,  75 
?,  83 

^ 

^ 

Ecu; 

Ir 

--■■ 

.-  ^^1. 

1 

^ 

L 

m^  ^Wi 

'0<. 

Sn 

m'Sf 

1— ^ 

iSUPtRtw::^^^^'^ 

3  m      i 

I 

1          JUL  '■ 

i        DEpb; 

;IT0RY            i 

MPpparintpni  of  Staip 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2075  /  June  1983 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin, 
published  by  the  Office  of  Pubhc 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Pubhc 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
pubhc,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State  ' 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  Affaii  i 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director,  f 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD  { 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
pubhcation  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 
1987. 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  OF  State  Bulletin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documeit 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  C 


CONTENTS 


President 

Crntral  America;  Defending  Our 

\it,il  Interests 
Ivailio  Address  on  Lebanon 

Vice  President 

Visit  t<i  Canada  iStnlenwuts) 


■Secretary 

Modernizing  U.S.  Strategic 

Forces 
N'ews  Conference  of  April  12 
.^uestiiin-and- Answer  Session 

Following  World  Affairs  Council 

Address 


isit  of  Zambian  President 
!  (Kenneth  D.  Kaunda.  President 
'  Reitgah) 

\  Control 

keport  of  the  Commission  on 
'  Strategic  Forces  (President 
Rinfidn.  Letter  to  the  Congres.^) 
.S.  Soviet  Direct  Communication 
Links  (President  Reagan) 

Asia 

mericans  Missing  in  Southeast 

Asia  (Daniel  A.  O'Donohue) 

ietnamese  Attacks  on  Refugee 

Settlements  (Department 

Statements) 

.S.  Military  Assistance  to 

I  Thailand  (Department  State- 

1  merit) 


Dmics 

iiokmg  Toward  Williamsburg: 
U.S.  Economic  Policy  (Kennetli 
W.  Dam) 

;Conomics  and  Politics:  The 

[Quandary  of  Foreign  Aid 

'fW.  Allen  Wallis) 


32      The  Human  Side  of  German- 
American  Relations  (Arthur  F. 
Bums) 

36  Visit  of  Dutch  Prime  Minister 

(Riidolphus  Lubbers,  President 

Krag,,,,) 

37  \'isit  of  West  German  Chancellor 

(Hdm.ut  Kohl,  President 
Reagan) 

38  13th  Report  on  Cyprus  (President 

Reagan,  Message  to  the  Con- 
gress) 
38       Economics  and  Security:  The  Case 
of  East- West  Relations  (W 
Alle»  WallisI 

Human  Rights 

41        Country  Reports  on  Human 
Rights  Practices  for  1982 

International  Law 

48       Extraterritoriality  and  Conflicts 
of  Jurisdiction  (Kenneth  W. 
Dam) 

52  U.S.  Foreign  Relations  Law  and 

Expropriation  (Davis  R.  Robin- 
son) 

Interview 

53  Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's 

Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 

Middle  East 

57       A  Time  for  Reason  and  Realism 

in  the  Middle  East  (Kenneth  W. 

Dam) 
60       Bombing  of  U.S.  Embassy  in 

Beirut  (President  Reagan. 

Secretary  Shultz) 
62       Secretary's  Interview  on  the 

Middle"  East 
65       Visit  of  Sultan  of  Oman  (President 

Reagan.  Qnboos  bin  Said) 

Narcotics 

67  FY  1984  Assistance  Requests  for 
Narcotics  Control  (Dominick  L. 
DiCarlo) 


Oceans 

70  U.S.  Oceans  Policy  (President 

Reagan,  Proclamation) 

Science  and  Technology 

71  Export  Control  of  High  Tech- 

nologj'  (William  Schneider,  Jr.) 

Western  Hemisphere 

75  U.S.  Strateg}'  in  Central  America 

(Thomas  0.  Endersj 

76  Nicaragua:  Threat  to  Peace  in 

Central  America  (Thomas  0. 
Enders) 
80       Secretary  Visits  Mexico  (Donald 
T.  Regan,  Bernardo  Sepulveda 
Amor.  Secretary  Shultz) 

82  El  Salvador:  Response  to  Chair- 

man Long's  Concerns  (Shultz 
Letter) 

83  Land  Reform  in  El  Salvador 

(M.  Peter  McPherson) 
85       Radio  Broadcasting  to  Cuba 

(Thomas  0.  Enders) 
87       U.S.  Policy  Toward  Argentina 

(N.  Shaw  Smith) 
89       Visit  of  Ecuador's  President 

(Osvaldo  Hurtado  Larrea,  Presi- 
dent Reagan) 


Treaties 

90       Current  Actions 

Chronology 

92  April  1983 

Press  Releases 

93  Department  of  State 

Publications 

94  Foreign  Relations  Volume 

Released 
94       Department  of  State 


Index 


Iplications  of  a  Nuclear  Freeze 
Richard  R.  Burt) 
'Years  of  U.S.-So\iet  Dialogue 
Arthur  A.  Hartman) 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Central  America: 

Defending  Our  Vital 

Interests 


by  President  Reagan 


Address  before 

a  joint  session  of  Congress 

on  April  27.  1983^ 


A  number  of  times  in  past  years. 
Members  of  Congress  and  a  President 
have  come  together  in  meetings  like  this 
to  resolve  a  crisis.  I  have  aslied  for  this 
meeting  in  the  hope  that  we  can  prevent 
one. 

It  would  be  hard  to  find  many 
Americans  who  are  not  aware  of  our 
stake  in  the  Middle  East,  the  Persian 
Gulf,  or  the  NATO  line  dividing  the  free 
world  from  the  communist  bloc.  And  the 
same  could  be  said  for  Asia. 

But  in  spite  of  or  maybe  because  of. 
a  flurry  of  stories  about  places  like 
Nicaragua  and  El  Salvador,  and.  yes. 
some  concerted  propaganda,  many  of  us 
find  it  hard  to  believe  we  have  a  stake  in 
problems  involving  those  countries.  Too 
many  have  thought  of  Central  America 
as  just  that  place  way  down  below  Mex- 
ico that  can't  possibly  constitute  a  threat 
to  our  well-being. 

And  that's  why  I  have  asked  for  this 
session.  Central  America's  problems  do 
directly  affect  the  security  and  the  well- 
being  of  our  own  people.  And  Central 
America  is  much  closer  to  the  United 
States  than  many  of  the  world  trouble 
spots  that  concern  us.  So  as  we  work  to 
restore  our  own  economy,  we  cannot  af- 
ford to  lose  sight  of  our  neighbors  to  the 


EI  Salvador  is  nearer  to  Texas  than 
Texas  is  to  Massachusetts.  Nicaragua  is 
just  as  close  to  Miami,  San  Antonio.  San 
Diego,  and  Tucson  as  those  dties  are  to 
Washington  where  we're  gathered 
tonight.  But  nearness  on  the  map 
doesn't  even  begin  to  tell  the  strat^c 
importance  of  Central  America,  oorder- 
ing  as  it  does  on  the  Caribbean— our 
lifeline  to  the  outside  world.  Two-thirds 
of  all  our  foreign  trade  and  petroleum 
pass  through  the  Panama  Canal  and  the 
Caribbean.  In  a  European  crisis,  at  least 
half  of  our  supphes  for  NATO  would  go 
through  these  areas  by  sea.  It's  well  to 
remember  that  in  early  1942  a  handful 
of  Hitler's  submarines  sank  more  ton- 
nage there  than  in  all  of  the  Atlantic 
Ocean.  And  they  ilid  this  without  a 
single  naval  base  anywhere  in  the  area. 

Today,  the  situation  is  different. 
Cuba  is  host  to  a  Soviet  combat  brigade, 
a  submarine  base  capable  of  servicing 
Soviet  submarines,  and  mihtary  air 
bases  '/isited  regularly  by  Soviet  military 
aircraft. 

Because  of  its  importance,  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  is  a  magnet  for  adventurism. 
We  are  all  aware  of  the  Libyan  cargo 
planes  refuehng  in  Brazil  a  few  days  ago 


THE  PRESIDENT 


on  their  way  to  deliver  medical  supplies 
to  Nicaragua.  Brazilian  authorities  dis- 
covered the  so-called  medical  supplies 
were  actually  munitions  and  prevented 
their  delivery.  You  may  remember  that 
last  month,  speaking  on  national  tele- 
vision, I  showed  an  aerial  photo  of  an 
airfield  being  built  on  the  island  of 
Grenada.  Well,  if  that  airfield  had  been 
completed,  those  planes  could  have  re- 
fueled there  and  completed  their 
journey. 

If  the  Nazis  during  World  War  II 
and  the  Soviets  today  could  recognize 
the  Caribbean  and  Central  America  as 
vital  to  our  interests,  shouldn't  we  also? 


As  I  said  a  moment  ago,  the  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  has  been  keeping 
its  promises,  like  the  land  reform  pro- 
gram which  is  making  thousands  of  farm 
tenants,  farm  owners.  In  a  little  over  3 
years,  20%  of  the  arable  land  in  El 
Salvador  has  been  redistributed  to  more 
than  450,000  people.  That's  1  in  10 
Salvadorans  who  have  benefited  directly 
from  this  program. 

El  Salvador  has  continued  to  strive 
toward  an  orderly  and  democratic  socie- 
ty. The  government  promised  free  elec- 
tions. On  March  28th,  little  more  than  a 
year  ago,  after  months  of  campaigning 
by  a  variety  of  candidates,  the  suffering 


El  Salvador  is  nearer  to  Texas  than  Texas  is  to 
Massachusetts.  Nicaragua  is  just  as  close  to 
Miami,  San  Antonio,  San  Diego,  and  Tucson  as 
those  cities  are  to  Washington  .... 


struggle  for  Freedom 
in  El  Salvador 

For  several  years  now,  under  two  ad- 
ministrations, the  United  States  has 
been  increasing  its  defense  of  freedom  in 
the  Caribbean  Basin.  And  I  can  tell  you 
tonight,  democracy  is  beginning  to  take 
root  in  El  Salvador  which,  until  a  short 
time  ago,  knew  only  dictatorship.  The 
new  government  is  now  delivering  on  its 
promises  of  democracy,  reforms,  and 
free  elections.  It  wasn't  easy,  and  there 
was  resistance  to  many  of  the  attempted 
reforms  with  assassinations  of  some  of 
the  reformers.  Guerrilla  bands  and  ur- 
ban terrorists  were  portrayed  in  a 
worldwide  propaganda  campaign  as 
freedom  fighters  representative  of  the 
people.  Ten  days  before  I  came  into  of- 
fice, the  guerrillas  launched  what  they 
called  a  "final  offensive"  to  overthrow 
the  government.  And  their  radio  boasted 
that  our  new  Administration  would  be 
too  late  to  prevent  their  victory. 

They  learned  democracy  cannot  be 
so  easily  defeated.  President  Carter  did 
not  hesitate.  He  authorized  arms  and 
ammunition  to  El  Salvador.  The  guer- 
rilla offensive  failed  but  not  America's 
will.  Every  president  since  this  country 
assumed  global  responsibilities  has 
known  that  those  responsibilities  could 
only  be  met  if  we  pursued  a  bipartisan 
foreign  policy. 


people  of  El  Salvador  were  offered  a 
chance  to  vote— to  choose  the  kind  of 
government  they  wanted.  And  suddenly 
the  so-called  freedom  fighters  in  the  hills 
were  exposed  for  what  they  really  are— 
a  small  minority  who  want  power  for 
themselves  and  their  backers  not  democ- 
racy for  the  people.  The  guerrillas 
threatened  death  to  anyone  who  voted. 
They  destroyed  hundreds  of  buses  and 
trucks  to  keep  the  people  from  getting 
to  the  polling  places.  Their  slogan  was 
brutal:  "Vote  today,  die  tonight."  But  on 
election  day,  an  unprecedented  80%  of 
the  electorate  braved  ambush  and  gun- 
fire and  trudged  for  miles,  many  of 
them,  to  vote  for  freedom.  And  that's 
truly  fighting  for  freedom.  We  can 
never  turn  our  backs  on  that. 

Members  of  this  Congress  who  went 
there  as  observers  told  me  of  a  woman 
who  was  wounded  by  rifle  fire  on  the 
way  to  the  polls,  who  refused  to  leave 
the  line  to  have  her  wound  treated  until 
after  she  had  voted.  Another  woman 
had  been  told  by  the  guerrillas  that  she 
would  be  killed  when  she  returned  from 
the  polls,  and  she  told  the  guerrillas, 
"You  can  kill  me;  you  can  kill  my  family; 
you  can  kill  my  neighbors;  you  can't  kill 
us  all."  The  real  freedom  fighters  of  El 
Salvador  turned  out  to  be  the  people  of 
that  country— the  young,  the  old,  the  in 
between— more  than  a  million  of  them 
out  of  a  population  of  less  than  5  million. 


The  world  should  respect  this  cmui 
and  not  allow  it  to  be  belittled  (it 
gotten.  And  again,  I  say  in  good  o 
science,  we  can  never  turn  our  \>m' 
that. 

The  democratic  political  partieb 
factions  in  El  Salvador  are  coming | 
together  around  the  common  goal  •' 
seeking  a  political  solution  to  their' 
try's  problems.  New  national  v\vr{ 
will  be  held  this  year  and  they  "  il 
open  to  all  political  parties.  Tlir  u- 
ment  has  invited  the  guerrillas  :<) 
ticipate  in  the  election  and  is  jini.  < 
an  amnesty  law.  The  people  of  Kl 
Salvador  are  earning  their  freedoi 
they  deserve  our  moral  and  mater  1 
support  to  protect  it. 

Yes,  there  are  still  major  prnl  r 
regarding  human  rights,  the  cnm  i 
justice  system,  and  violence  again  : 
combatants.  And,  like  the  rest  of  ■: 
tral  America,  El  Salvador  also  t'ai , 
severe  economic  problems.  But  m  1 
tion  to  recession-depressed  prices  •! 
major  agricultural  exports.  El  Sal  i 
economy  is  being  deliberately  sab'  i 
Tonight  in  El  Salvador— because 
ruthless  guerrilla  attacks— much    : 
fertile  land  cannot  be  cultivated;  I  s 
than  half  the  rolling  stock  of  the 
railways  remains  operational;  hrii  p 
water  facilities,  telephone  and  ele 
systems  have  been  destroyed  and 
damaged.  In  one  22-month  period 
were  5,000  interruptions  of  electr 
power;  one  region  was  without  el 
ty  for  a  third  of  a  year. 

I  think  Secretary  of  State  Shi 
it  very  well  the  other  day.  "Unabl|t 
win  the  free  loyalty  of  El  Salvadc 
pie,  the  guerrillas,"  he  said,  "are 
deliberately  and  systematically  de 
them  of  food,  water,  transportati' 
light,  sanitation,  and  jobs.  And  th 
the  people  who  claim  they  want  t 
the  common  people." 

They  don't  want  elections  ho.  : 
they  know  they  would  be  defoato.  ( 
as  the  previous  election  showed.  ' 
Salvadoran  people's  desire  for 
democracy  will  not  be  defeated.  1 ' 
guerrillas  are  not  embattled  jioas  i 
armed  with  muskets.  They  are  pi  ' 
sionals,  sometimes  with  better-  tr.i 
and  weaponry  than  the  govenimt 
soldiers.  The  Salvadoran  battalioi  t 
have  received  U.S.  training  have  ■« 
conducting  themselves  well  on  th 
battlefield  and  with  the  civilian  p  'i 
tion.  But,  so  far,  we've  only  prov  " 
enough  money  to  train  1  Sahaiio  n 
soldier  out  of  10,  fewer  than  the  ir 
of  guerrillas  that  are  trained  by 
Nicaragua  and  Cuba. 


Department  of  State  Ell 


THE  PRESIDENT 


tions  With  Nicaragua 

let  me  set  the  record  straight  on 
•agua.  a  country  next  to  El  Salva- 
[n  1979,  when  the  new  government 
over  in  Nicaragua,  after  a  revolu- 
vhich  overthrew  the  authoritarian 
)f  Somoza,  everyone  hoped  for  the 
th  of  democracy.  We  in  the  United 
s  did  too.  By  January  of  1981,  our 
gency  relief  and  recovery  aid  to 
'agua  totaled  $118  million— more 
provided  by  any  other  developed 
;ry.  In  fact,  in  the  first  2  years  of 
inista  rule,  the  United  States 
tly  or  indirectly  sent  five  times 
aid  to  Nicaragua  than  it  had  in  the 
rs  prior  to  the  revolution.  Can  any- 
oubt  the  generosity  and  good  faith 
!  American  people? 
hese  were  hardly  the  actions  of  a 
a  implacably  hostile  to  Nicaragua. 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  has 
3d  us  as  an  enemy.  It  has  rejected 
speated  peace  efforts.  It  has 
:n  its  promises  to  us,  to  the 
lization  of  American  States,  and, 
important  of  all,  to  the  people  of 
agua. 

0  sooner  was  victory  achieved  than 
■.11  clique  ousted  others  who  had 
part  of  the  revolution  from  having 
oice  in  government.  Humberto 

a,  the  Minister  of  Defense, 
•ed  Marxism-Leninism  would  be 
^ide,  and  so  it  is.  The  Govern- 
of  Nicaragua  has  imposed  a  new 
orship;  it  has  refused  to  hold  the 
)ns  it  promised;  it  has  seized  con- 
f  most  media  and  subjects  all 
.  to  hea\7  prior  censorship;  it 

1  the  bishops  and  priests  of  the 

n  Catholic  Church  the  right  to  say 
on  radio  during  holy  week;  it  in- 

and  mocked  the  Pope;  it  has 
'i  the  Miskito  Indians  from  their 
ands— burning  their  villages, 
lying  their  crops,  and  forcing  them 
ivoluntary  internment  camps  far 
home:  it  has  moved  against  the 
e  sector  and  free  labor  unions;  it 
ned  mob  action  against 
igua's  independent  human  rights 
ission  and  drove  the  director  of 
ommission  into  exile. 

short,  after  all  these  acts  of 
;sion  by  the  government,  is  it  any 

r  that  opposition  has  formed? 
ary  to  propaganda,  the  opponents 

Sandinistas  are  not  die-hard  sup- 
's of  the  previous  Somoza  regime, 
t,  many  are  anti-Somoza  heroes 
iught  beside  the  Sandinistas  to 


bring  down  the  Somoza  government. 
Now  they've  been  denied  any  part  in  the 
new  government  because  they  truly 
wanted  democracy  for  Nicaragua,  and 
they  still  do.  Others  are  Miskito  Indians 
fighting  for  their  homes,  their  lands,  and 
their  lives. 

The  Sandinista  revolution  in 
Nicaragua  turned  out  to  be  just  an  ex- 
change of  one  set  of  autocratic  rulers  for 
another,  and  the  people  still  have  no 
freedom,  no  democratic  rights,  and  more 
poverty.  Even  worse  than  its 
predecessor,  it  is  helping  Cuba  and  the 
Soviets  to  destabilize  our  hemisphere. 

Meanwhile,  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador,  making  every  effort  to  guar- 
antee democracy,  free  labor  unions,  free- 
dom of  religion,  and  a  free  press,  is 
under  attack  by  guerrillas  dedicated  to 
the  same  philosophy  that  prevails  in 
Nicaragua,  Cuba,  and,  yes,  the  Soviet 
Union.  Violence  has  been  Nicaragua's 
most  important  export  to  the  world.  It 
is  the  ultimate  in  hypocrisy  for  the  un- 
elected  Nicaraguan  Government  to 
charge  that  we  seek  their  overthrow 
when  they're  doing  everything  they  can 
to  bring  down  the  elected  Government 
of  El  Salvador.  The  guerrilla  attacks  are 
directed  from  a  headquarters  in 
Managua,  the  capital  of  Nicaragua. 

But  let  us  be  clear  as  to  the 
American  attitude  toward  the  Govern- 
ment of  Nicaragua.  We  do  not  seek  its 
overthrow.  Our  interest  is  to  ensure  that 
it  does  not  infect  its  neighbors  through 
the  export  of  subversion  and  violence. 
Our  purpose,  in  conformity  with  Ameri- 
can and  international  law,  is  to  prevent 


alternative.  And,  as  Nicaragua  ponders 
its  options,  we  can  and  will— with  all  the 
resources  of  diplomacy— protect  each 
country  of  Central  America  from  the 
danger  of  war.  Even  Costa  Rica,  Cen- 
tral America's  oldest  and  strongest 
democracy,  a  government  so  peaceful  it 
doesn't  even  have  an  army,  is  the  object 
of  bullying  and  threats  from  Nicaragua's 
dictators. 

Nicaragua's  neighbors  know  that 
Sandinista  promises  of  peace,  nonalli- 
ance,  and  nonintervention  have  not  been 
kept.  Some  36  new  military  bases  have 
been  built;  there  were  only  13  during  the 
Somoza  years.  Nicaragua's  new  army 
numbers  25,000  men  supported  by  a 
militia  of  50,000.  It  is  the  largest  army 
in  Central  America  supplemented  by 
2,000  Cuban  military  and  security  ad- 
visers. It  is  equipped  with  the  most 
modern  weapons,  dozens  of  Soviet-made 
tanks,  800  Soviet-bloc  trucks,  Soviet 
152-MM  howitzers,  100  antiaircraft 
guns,  plus  planes  and  helicopters.  There 
are  additional  thousands  of  civilian  ad- 
visers from  Cuba,  the  Soviet  Union, 
East  Germany,  Libya,  and  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization].  And 
we  are  attacked  because  we  have  55 
military  trainers  in  El  Salvador. 

The  goal  of  the  professional  guerrilla 
movements  in  Central  America  is  as 
simple  as  it  is  sinister— to  destabilize  the 
entire  region  from  the  Panama  Canal  to 
Mexico.  If  you  doubt  me  on  this  point, 
just  consider  what  Cayetano  Carpio,  the 
now-deceased  Salvadoran  guerrilla 
leader,  said  earlier  this  month.  Carpio 
said  that  after  El  Salvador  falls.  El 


It  is  the  ultimate  in  hyprocrisy  for  the  unelected 
Nicaraguan  Government  to  charge  that  we  seek 
their  overthrow  when  they  're  doing  everything  they 
can  to  bring  down  the  elected  Government  of  El 
Salvador. 


the  flow  of  arms  to  El  Salvador,  Hon- 
duras, Guatemala,  and  Costa  Rica.  We 
have  attempted  to  have  a  dialogue  with 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua,  but  it 
persists  in  its  efforts  to  spread  violence. 

We  should  not— and  we  will  not— 
protect  the  Nicaraguan  Government 
from  the  anger  of  its  own  people.  But 
we  should,  through  diplomacy,  offer  an 


Salvador  and  Nicaragua  would  be  "arm- 
in-arm  and  struggling  for  the  total 
liberation  of  Central  America." 

Nicaragua's  dictatorial  junta,  who 
themselves  made  war  and  won  power 
operating  from  bases  in  Honduras  and 
Costa  Rica,  like  to  pretend  they  are  to- 
day being  attacked  by  forces  based  in 
Honduras.  The  fact  is,  it  is  Nicaragua's 
Government  that  threatens  Honduras, 


983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


not  the  reverse.  It  is  Nicaragua  who  has 
moved  heavy  tanks  close  to  the  border, 
and  Nicaragua  who  speaks  of  war.  It 
was  Nicaraguan  radio  nhat  announced  on 
April  3th  the  creation  of  a  new.  unified, 
revolutionary  coordinating  board  no  push 
forward  the  Marxist  struggle  in  Hon- 
duras. Nicaragua,  supported  by  weapons 
and  military  resources  provided  by  the 
communist  bloc,  represses  its  own  peo- 
ple, refuses  to  make  peace,  and  sponsors 
a  guerrilla  war  agamsr  El  Salvador. 

The  Need  for  U.S.  Support 

President  Truman's  words  are  as  apt  to- 
day as  they  were  in  1947.  when  he.  too. 
spoke  before  a  joint  session  of  the  Con- 


\i  che  present  mumeni  in  world  history 
nearly  every  nation  must  choose  between 
alternative  ways  -n  life.  The  choice  is  too 
often  not  a  tree  me. 

One  way  of  'ife  .s  based  upon  :he  will  of 
the  majonty   and  is  iistingiushed  by  free  in- 
stitutions, representative  government,  free 
elections.  Juartmiees  of  individual  liberty, 
freedom  if  speech  and  religion,  and  freedom 
from  political  oppression. 

The  second  way  of  life  is  based  upon  the 
will  of  a  minonty  forcibly  imposed  upon  the 
majonty.  It  relies  upon  terror  and  oppres- 
sion, a  controlled  press  and  radio,  fi.xed  elec- 
tions, and  the  suppression  of  personal 
&«edoms. 

I  believe  that  it  must  be  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  support  free  peoples  who 
are  resisting  attempted  subjugation  ny  armed 
minorities  .ir  by  outside  pressures. 

I  believe  that  we  must  assist  free  peoples 
to  work  out  their  own  destimes  in  their  own 
way. 

I  believe  that  our  help  should  be  primar- 
ily through  economic  and  financial  aid  which 
is  essential  to  economic  stability  and  orderly 
political  processes. 

.  .  .  Collapse  of  free  institutions  and  loss 
of  independence  would  be  disastrous  not  only 
for  them  but  for  the  world.  Discouragement 
and  possibly  failure  would  quickly  be  the  lot 
of  neighbonng  peoples  striving  to  maintain 
their  freedom  and  independence. 

The  countries  of  Central  America 
are  smaller  than  the  nations  that 
prompted  President  Truman's  message. 
But  the  political  and  strategic  stakes  are 
the  same.  Will  our  response— economic, 
social,  military— be  as  appropriate  and 
successful  as  Mr.  Tniman's  bold  solu- 
tions to  the  problems  of  postwar 
Europe? 

Some  pe<}ple  have  forgotten  the  suc- 
cesses of  those  years  and  the  decades  of 
peace,  prosperity,  and  freedom  they 
secured.  Some  people  talk  as  though  the 
United  States  were  incapable  of  acting 


effectively  ui  international  affairs 
without  risking  war  or  damaging  those 
we  seek  to  help. 

Are  democracies  required  to  remain 
passive  while  threats  to  their  security 
and  prosperity  accumulate? 

Must  we  just  accept  the  destabiliza- 
tion  of  an  entire  region  from  the  Pana- 
ma Canal  to  Mexico  on  our  southern 
border? 

Must  we  sit  by  while  independent 
nations  of  this  hemisphere  are  in- 
tegrated into  the  most  aggressive  em- 
pire the  modern  world  has  seen? 

Must  we  wait  while  Central 
Americans  are  driven  from  their  homes, 
like  the  more  than  4  million  who  have 
sought  refuge  out  of  Afghanistan  or  the 
1.5  million  who  have  fled  Indochina  or 
the  more  than  1  million  Cubans  who 
have  tied  Castro's  Caribbean  Utopia? 
Must  we.  by  default,  leave  the  people  of 
El  Salvador  no  choice  but  to  flee  their 
homes,  creating  another  tragic  human 
exodus? 

I  do  not  believe  there  is  a  majority 
in  the  Congress  or  the  country  that 
counsels  passivity,  resignation, 
defeatism  in  che  face  of  this  challenge  to 
freedom  and  security  in  our  hemisphere. 

I  do  not  believe  that  a  majority  of 
the  Congress  or  the  country  is  prepared 
to  stand  by  passively  whUe  the  people  of 
Central  America  are  delivered  to 
totalitarianism,  and  we  ourselves  are  left 
vulnerable  to  new  dangers. 

Only  last  week  an  official  of  the 
Soviet  Union  reiterated  Brezhnev's 
threat  to  station  nuclear  missiles  in  this 
hemisphere— .5  minutes  from  the  United 
States.  Like  an  echo,  Nicaragua's  com- 
mandante,  Daniel  Ortega,  confirmed 
that,  if  asked,  his  country  would  con- 
sider accepting  those  missiles.  I  under- 
stand that  today  they  may  be  having 
second  thoughts. 

Now.  before  I  go  any  further,  let  me 
say  to  those  who  invoke  the  memory  of 
Vietnam:  There  is  no  thought  of  sending 
American  combat  troops  to  Central 
America;  they  are  not  needed — indeeti, 
they  have  not  been  requested  there.  All 
our  neighbors  ask  of  us  is  assistance  in 
training  and  arms  to  protect  themselves 
while  they  build  a  better,  freer  life. 

We  must  continue  to  encourage 
peace  among  the  nations  of  Central 
America.  We  must  support  the  regional 
efforts  now  underway  to  promote  solu- 
tions to  regional  problems.  We  cannot 
be  certain  that  the  Marxist-Leninist 
bands  who  believe  war  is  an  instrument 
of  politics  will  be  readily  discouraged. 


If  s  crucial  that  we  not  become 
couraged  before  they  do.  Other 
region's  freedom  will  be  lost  an- 
security  damaged  in  ways  thai 
ly  be  calculated. 

If  Central  .America  were  '•.. 
what  would  the  consequences  m 
position  in  Xsm.  Europe,  and  t'< 
alliances  such  as  NATO?  If  the  Un 
States  cannot  respond  to  a  threat 
our  own  borders,  why  should  Euro 
or  Asians  believe  that  we  are  serio 
concerned  about  threats  to  them? 
Soviets  can  assume  that  nothing  sJ 
an  actual  attack  on  the  United  Stai 
will  provoke  an  American  respons* 
which  ally,  which  friend  will  trust 
then? 


Basic  Goals 

The  Congress  shares  both  the  pow 
the  responsibility  for  our  foreign  p 
Tonight.  I  ask  you.  the  Congress, 
me  in  a  bold,  generous  approach  t< 
problems  of  peace  and  poverty. 
democracy  and  dictatorship  in  the 
region.  -loin  me  in  a  program  that 
prevents  communist  victory  in  the 
run  but  goes  beyond  to  produce,  fi 
deprived  people  of  the  area,  the  n 
of  present  progress  and  the  promi 
more  to  come. 

Let  us  lay  the  foundation  for  i 
bipartisan  approach  to  sustain  the 
dependence  and  freedom  of  the  co 
tries  of  Central  .\merica.  We  in  tb 
ministration  reach  out  to  you  in  tb 
spirit. 

We  will  pursue  four  basic  goal 
Central  America. 

First.  In  response  to  decades  > 
equity  and  indifference,  we  will  su 
democracy,  reform,  and  human  fr» 
This  means  using  our  assistance,  c 
powers  of  persuasion,  and  our  legi 
"leverage"  to  bolster  humane  dem« 
systems  where  they  already  exist : 
help  countries  on  their  way  to  thai 
complete  the  process  as  quickly  i 
human  institutions  can  be  changed 
tions— in  El  Salvador  and  also  in 
Nicaragua — must  be  open  to  ail,  ff 
safe.  The  international  community^ 
help.  We  will  work  at  human  right  . 
problems,  not  walk  away  from  the. 

Second.  In  response  to  the  ch:ei 
of  world  recession  and,  in  the  cast  f 
Salvador,  to  the  unrelenting  campp 
economic  sabotage  by  the  guerrilk  ' 
will  support  economic  developmen  B 
margin  of  two-to-one,  our  aid  is 


Department  of  State  B  le 


THE  PRESIDENT 


)mic  now,  not  military.  Seventy- 
I  cents  out  of  every  dollar  we  will 
i  in  the  area  this  year  goes  for 
fertilizers,  and  other  essentials  for 
imic  growth  and  development.  And 
conomic  program  goes  beyond 
;ional  aid:  The  Caribbean  initiative 
iuced  in  the  House  earlier  today 
rovide  powerful  trade  and  invest- 
incentives  to  help  these  countries 
ve  self-sustaining  economic  growth 
ut  exporting  U.S.  jobs.  Our  goal 
be  to  focus  our  immense  and  gjow- 
ichnology  to  enhance  health  care, 
olture,  and  industry  and  to  ensure 
ve,  who  inhabit  this  interdependent 
1,  come  to  know  and  understand 
Dther  better,  retaining  our  diverse 
ties,  respecting  our  diverse  tradi- 
and  institutions. 

hird.  In  response  to  the  military 
nge  from  Cuba  and  Nicaragua— to 
deliberate  use  of  force  to  spread 
ny— we  will  support  the  security  of 
igion's  threatened  nations.  We  do 
ew  security  assistance  as  an  end  in 
but  as  a  shield  for  democratization, 
mic  development,  and  diplomacy, 
lount  of  reform  will  bring  peace  so 
is  guerrillas  believe  they  will  win 
ce.  No  amount  of  economic  help 
tffice  if  guerrilla  units  can  destroy 
and  bridges  and  power  stations 
•ops  again  and  again  with  impuni- 
it,  with  better  training  and 
ial  help,  our  neighbors  can  hold  off 
lerrillas  and  give  democratic 
a  time  to  take  root. 
)urth.  We  will  support  dialogue 
jgotiations— both  among  the  coun- 
if  the  region  and  within  each  coun- 
he  terms  and  conditions  of  par- 
.ion  in  elections  are  negotiable. 
Rica  is  a  shining  example  of 
:racy.  Honduras  has  made  the 
from  military  rule  to  democratic 
iment.  Guatemala  is  pledged  to 
me  course.  The  United  States  will 
toward  a  political  solution  in  Cen- 
merica  which  will  serve  the  in- 
3  of  the  democratic  process, 
support  these  diplomatic  goals,  I 
hese  assurances: 

The  United  States  will  support 
Teement  among  Central  American 


countries  for  the  withdrawal — under  ful- 
ly verifiable  and  reciprocal  conditions— 
of  all  foreign  military  and  security  ad- 
visers and  troops. 

•  We  want  to  help  opposition 
groups  join  the  political  process  in  all 
countries  and  compete  by  ballots  instead 
of  bullets. 

•  We  will  support  any  verifiable, 
reciprocal  agreement  among  Central 
American  countries  on  the  renunciation 
of  support  for  insurgencies  on  neighbors' 
territory. 

•  And,  finally,  we  desire  to  help 
Central  America  end  its  costly  arms 
race  and  will  support  any  verifiable, 
reciprocal  agreements  on  the  nonimpor- 
tation of  offensive  weapons. 

To  move  us  toward  these  goals  more 
rapidly,  I  am  tonight  announcing  my  in- 
tention to  name  an  ambassador  at  large 


What  the  Admin- 
istration is  asking  for  on 
behalf  of  freedom  in 
Central  America  is  so 
small,  so  minimal,  con- 
sidering what  is  at 
stake. 


as  my  special  envoy  to  Central  America. 
He  or  she  will  report  to  me  through  the 
Secretary  of  State.  The  ambassador's 
responsibilities  will  be  to  lend  U.S.  sup- 
port to  the  efforts  of  regional  govern- 
ments to  bring  peace  to  this  troubled 
area  and  to  work  closely  with  the  Con- 
gress to  assure  the  fullest  possible  bipar- 
tisan coordination  of  our  policies  toward 
the  region. 


What  I'm  asking  for  is  prompt  con- 
gressional approval  for  the  full  repro- 
gramming  of  funds  for  key  current 
economic  and  security  programs  so  that 
the  people  of  Central  America  can  hold 
the  line  against  externally  supported  ag- 
gression. In  addition,  I  am  asking  for 
prompt  action  on  the  supplemental  re- 
quest in  these  same  areas  to  carry  us 
through  the  current  fiscal  year  and  for 
early  and  favorable  congressional  action 
on  my  requests  for  fiscal  year  1984.  And 
finally,  I  am  asking  that  the  bipartisan 
consensus,  which  last  year  acted  on  the 
trade  and  tax  provisions  of  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  Initiative  in  the  House,  again 
take  the  lead  to  move  this  vital  proposal 
to  the  floor  of  both  chambers.  And,  as  I 
said  before,  the  greatest  share  of  these 
requests  is  targeted  toward  economic 
and  humanitarian  aid,  not  military. 

What  the  Administration  is  asking 
for  on  behalf  of  freedom  in  Central 
America  is  so  small,  so  minimal,  con- 
sidering what  is  at  stake.  The  total 
amount  requested  for  aid  to  all  of  Cen- 
tral America  in  1984  is  about  $600 
million;  that's  less  than  one-tenth  of 
what  Americans  will  spend  this  year  on 
coin-operated  video  games. 

In  summation,  I  say  to  you  that 
tonight  there  can  be  no  question:  The 
national  security  of  all  the  Americas  is 
at  stake  in  Central  America.  If  we  can- 
not defend  ourselves  there,  we  cannot 
expect  to  prevail  elsewhere.  Our 
credibility  would  collapse,  our  alliances 
would  crumble,  and  the  safety  of  our 
homeland  would  be  put  at  jeopardy. 

We  have  a  vital  interest,  a  moral 
duty,  and  a  solemn  responsiblity.  This  is 
not  a  partisan  issue.  It  is  a  question  of 
our  meeting  our  moral  responsibility  to 
ourselves,  our  friends,  and  our  posterity. 
It  is  a  duty  that  falls  on  all  of  us— the 
President,  the  Congress,  and  the  people. 
We  must  perform  it  together.  Who 
among  us  would  wish  to  bear  respon- 
sibility for  failing  to  meet  our  shared 
obligation? 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  2,  1983 


983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


Radio  Address  on  Lebanon 


President  Reagan's  radio  address  to 
the  nation  on  April  23,  1983  J 

In  a  few  hours,  I'll  undertake  one  of  the 
saddest  journeys  of  my  Presidency.  I'll 
be  going  to  Andrews  Air  Force  Base  to 
meet  one  of  our  Air  Force  planes  bring- 
ing home  16  Americans  who  died  this 
week  in  the  terrorist  attack  on  the  U.S. 
Embassy  in  Beirut. 

I  undertake  this  task  in  great 
sadness  but  also  with  a  tremendous 
sense  of  pride  in  those  who  sacrificed 
their  lives  in  our  country's  efforts  to 
bring  peace  to  the  Middle  East  and 
spare  others  the  agony  of  war.  Greater 
love  hath  no  man.  The  courage  and  the 
dedication  of  these  men  and  women 
reflect  the  best  tradition  of  our  Foreign 
Service,  our  Armed  Forces,  and  other 
departments  and  agencies  whose  person- 
nel serve  our  nation  overseas,  often  in 
situations  of  great  personal  danger. 

We  don't  know  yet  who  bears 
responsibility  for  this  terrible  deed. 
What  we  do' know  is  that  the  terrorists 
who  planned  and  carried  out  this  cynical 
and  cowardly  attack  have  failed  in  their 
purpose.  They  mistakenly  believe  that  if 
they're  cruel  enough  and  violent  enough, 
they  will  weaken  American  resolve  and 
deter  us  from  our  effort  to  help  build  a 
lasting  and  secure  peace  in  the  Middle 
East.  If  they  think  that,  they  don't  know 
too  much  about  America.  As  a  free  peo- 
ple, we've  never  allowed  intimidation  to 


stop  us  from  doing  what  we  know  to  be 
right.  The  best  way  for  us  to  show  our 
love  and  respect  for  our  fellow  coun- 
trymen who  died  in  Beirut  this  week  is 
to  carry  on  with  their  task,  to  press 
harder  than  ever  with  our  peacemaking 
efforts,  and  that's  exactly  what  we're 
doing. 

More  than  ever,  we're  committed  to 
giving  the  people  of  Lebanon  the  chance 
they  deserve  to  lead  normal  lives,  free 
from  violence  and  free  from  the 
presence  of  all  unwanted  foreign  forces 
on  their  soil.  And  we  remain  committed 
to  the  Lebanese  Government's  recovery 
of  full  sovereignty  throughout  all  its 
territory. 

When  I  spoke  after  the  bombing  to 
Lebanon's  President  Gemayel,  he  ex- 
pressed his  people's  deepest  regret  and 
revulsion  over  this  wanton  act  of  ter- 
rorism. I,  in  turn,  assured  him  that  the 
tragic  events  of  this  week  had  only 
served  to  strengthen  America's  stead- 
fastness as  a  force  for  peace  in  his  coun- 
try and  the  Middle  East.  To  this  end, 
I've  asked  Secretary  of  State  George 
Shultz  to  leave  tomorrow  night  for  the 
Middle  East.  Secretary  Shultz  will  now 
add  his  personal  efforts  to  continue 
magnificent  work  begun  by  Ambas- 
sadors Phil  Habib  and  Morris  Draper 
[special  representative  of  the  President 
to  the  Middle  East  and  special 
negotiator  for  Lebanon,  respectively], 
bringing  about  the  earliest  possible 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
Lebanon  in  a  way  that  will  promote 
peace  and  security  in  this  troubled 
region. 

The  scenes  of  senseless  tragedy  in 
Beirut  this  week  will  remain  etched  in 


our  memories  forever.  But  aiding  / 
the  tragedy,  there  were  inspinn- 
moments  of  heroism.  We  will  n'  'i  I  . 
the  pictures  of  Ambassador  Dill-ii  i 
his  staff,  Lebanese  as  well  as 
Americans,  many  of  them  swat  1mm  ; 
bandages,  bravely  searching  thr 
devastated  embassy  for  their  ciillfii 
and  for  other  innocent  victims. 

We  will  not  forget  the  image  <  i 
young  Marines  gently  draping  our  | 
tion's  flag  over  the  broken  boil>  '<[  r 
of  their  fallen  comrades.  We  will  i 
forget  their  courage  and  comjiassi  . 
And  we  will  not  forget  their  williini 
to  sacrifice  even  their  lives  to  the  r 
ice  of  their  country  and  the  cause 
peace. 

Yes,  we  Americans  can  be  pii  i 
these  fine  men  and  women.  Ami  v  ( 
be  even  prouder  that  our  count  r\    ^ 
been  playing  such  a  unique  and  m 
pensable  role  in  the  Middle  East, 
no  other  single  nation  could  play,   r 
the  countries  of  the  region  want  h  :> 
bringing  peace,  we're  the  ones  tin  / 
turned  to.  That's  because  they  iru  i 
because  they  know  that  America  i  > 
strong  and  just,  both  decent  and 
dedicated.  Even  in  the  shadow  of 
terrible  tragedy  in  Beirut,  that  is 
thing  to  remember  and  draw  hear 
It  is  also  something  to  be  true  to. 

I  know  I  speak  for  all  Americ. 
when  I  reaffirm  our  unshakable  ci 
ment  to  our  country's  most  precio 
heritage— serving  the  cause  of  pe 
and  freedom  in  the  world.  What  t 
monument  than  that  could  we  bui 
those  who  gave  their  all  that  othe 
might  live  in  peace. 


■Text  from  White  House  press  rel 


Department  of  State  El 


E  VICE  PRESIDENT 


ce  President  Bush  Visits  Canada 


ice  President  Bush  visited  Ottawa 
i  23-24,  1983.  Following  are  two 
lents  made  on  March  23. ' 


[VAL  STATEMENT, 
.  23,  1983 

■eciate  your  kind  invitation  to  visit 
ia,  and  I  am  delighted  to  be  here, 
s  my  first  trip  to  Canada  as  Vice 
lent,  and  I  am  pleased  to  follow 
[amples  of  President  Reagan  and 
tary  Shultz,  who  have  each  visited 
la  twice  in  the  last  2  years, 
inada  and  the  United  States  are 
ily  neighbors  but  trading  part- 
allies,  and  friends.  Canada,  like 
nited  States,  is  a  nation  that 
hes — and  nurtures — democracy 
uman  liberty.  Today  I  want  to 
the  importance  of  our  common  ef- 
to  preserve  peace  in  the  world  so 
uch  free  and  democratic  nations  as 
vn  and  those  of  the  NATO  alliance 
endure. 

ir  policy  rests  on  arms  control  on 
e  hand  and  the  maintenance  of  a 
•,  united  Atlantic  alliance  on  the 
Such  a  policy  requires  that  all  the 
s  of  the  alliance  work  closely 
er.  and  this  trip  today  constitutes 
a  series  of  such  visits  I  have 
lin  recent  weeks  to  consult  with 
|ies. 

Ithough  arms  control  and  Western 
i:y  will  represent  the  principal  sub- 
!  f  my  talks  here,  I  will  also  discuss 
()f  the  important  bilateral  issues 
inaturally  arise  between  two  coun- 
1/hich  share  an  extensive  common 
I'  and  enjoy  such  broad  and  varied 
tns.  The  American  people  hold 
tians  in  high  esteem,  and  the  Ad- 
ilration  I  represent  values  the 
l|:l  of  Canada's  leaders.  I  look  for- 
ijo  a  full  and  richly  rewarding  day. 
ime  to  say  again  how  extremely 
Sl  I  am  to  be  here  and  to  express 
tjinks  for  the  warm  welcome  you 
Jlxtended  to  me  this  morning. 

ijSMENT. 

^23,  1983 

jirmth  of  my  welcome  has  been 
P  arming,  and  the  hospitality  has 
Hiperb.  My  discussions  with  the 
HjMinister,  Minister  MacEachen 
JTiary  of  State  for  External 


Affairs],  and  other  Cabinet  members 
and  senior  officials  on  many  issues  have 
been  fruitful. 

The  primary  purpose  of  my  visit  has 
been  to  consult  with  the  Government  of 
Canada  on  nuclear  arms  and  related 
security  issues  which  confront  both  our 
countries  as  North  American  allies  and 
as  members  of  the  NATO  alliance.  The 
United  States  values  highly  Canada's 
counsel  as  a  neighbor,  as  an  ally,  and  as 
a  friend.  The  visit  also  gave  me  the  op- 
portunity to  review  the  state  of  our 
bilateral  relations  in  general. 

I  think  it  fair  to  say  that  both  coun- 
tries stand  in  fundamental  agreement  on 
the  crucial  aspects  of  the  defense  and 
arms  control  issues  that  face  us;  that  is, 
we  agree  on  the  wisdom  and  necessity 
of  continuing  to  pursue  the  dual  policy 
of  enhancing  the  alliance's  deterrent 


capability  on  the  one  hand  while 
negotiating  to  reduce  the  level  of 
nuclear  armaments  on  the  other.  We 
agree  that  this  approach  represents  the 
only  practical  and  prudent  means  of  en- 
suring peace  in  the  world. 

Our  bilateral  relationship  as  a  whole 
remains  sound.  Differences  persist  on 
some  issues,  but  these  are  being  ad- 
dressed in  the  spirit  not  only  of 
frankness  but  of  friendliness  that  tradi- 
tionally characterizes  our  dealings. 

Let  me  close  these  remarks  by 
reiterating  my  deep  appreciation  to  my 
Canadian  hosts  for  their  kind  hospitality. 
This  visit  has  reaffirmed  the  importance 
and  closeness  of  the  enduring  friendship 
between  our  two  countries. 


Vice  President  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  Trudeau 


THE  SECRETARY 


Modernizing  U.S.  Strategic  Forces 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  on 
April  20,  1983. 

I  am  pleased  to  be  here  along  with 
[Defense]  Secretary  Weinberger  to  ex- 
plain the  importance  of  the  President's 
proposals  for  modernizing  our  strategic 
forces.  First  of  all,  I  want  to  say  that 
we  all  owe  a  great  debt  to  Brent 
Scowcroft  and  his  colleagues  on  the 
President's  Commission  on  Strategic 
Forces.  They  have  given  us  a  thorough, 
thoughtful,  and  invaluable  analysis.  They 
brought  to  their  task  expertise  and  ex- 
perience. They  also  brought  with  them 
the  conviction  that  a  matter  so  fun- 
damental as  our  strategic  forces— the 
backbone  of  our  military  strength— must 
be  addressed  in  a  spirit  of  bipartisan 
cooperation.  There  is  a  lesson  here  for 
all  of  us. 

The  question  of  how  to  modernize 
our  strategic  forces  has  been  hotly 
debated  for  years  now.  The  time  has 
come  to  resolve  it.  As  the  commission 
has  shown  us,  it  can  only  be  accom- 
plished if  Americans  of  both  parties 
work  together  with  the  attitude  that  we 
are  partners  in  a  common  enterprise.  I 
know  President  Reagan  is  eager  to  work 
with  the  Congress  in  that  spirit. 

I  defer  to  Secretary  Weinberger  on 
the  military  considerations  that  underlie 
the  President's  program.  I  want  to  ad- 
dress myself  to  two  key  points. 

First,  modernization  of  our  strategic 
forces,  and  particularly  of  our  ICBM  [in- 
tercontinental ballistic  missile]  forces,  is 
of  critical  importance  to  our  foreign 
policy. 

Second,  the  President's  program  is 
not  only  consistent  with  but,  indeed,  ad- 
vances the  important  national  objective 
of  strategic  arms  control  and  reduction. 

Foreign  Policy  and  the 
Strategic  Balance 

The  central  goal  of  our  national  security 
policy  is  deterrence  of  war,  and  mainten- 
ance of  the  strategic  balance  is  a 
necessary  condition  for  that  deterrence. 
But  the  strategic  balance  also  shapes,  to 
an  important  degree,  the  global  environ- 
ment in  which  the  United  States  pursues 
its  foreign  policy  objectives.  Therefore, 
decisions  on  major  strategic  weapons 
systems  can  have  profound  political  as 
well  as  military  consequences. 


As  Secretary  of  State  I  am  acutely 
conscious  of  the  strength  or  weakness  of 
American  power,  because  it  has  a  direct 
impact  on  our  ability  to  achieve  our 
goals.  As  a  crucial  determinant  of  rela- 
tive strength,  the  strategic  balance  is  a 
key  indicator  of  relative  influence. 

Perceptions  of  the  strategic  balance 
are  bound  to  influence  the  judgments  of 
not  only  our  adversaries  but  also  our 
allies  and  friends  around  the  world  who 
rely  on  us.  As  leader  of  the  democratic 
nations,  we  have  an  inescapable  respon- 
sibility to  maintain  this  pillar  of  the  mili- 
tary balance  which  only  we  can  main- 
tain. Our  determination  to  do  so  is  an 
important  signal  of  our  resolve.  Our 
performance  of  this  responsibility  is  ab- 
solutely essential  to  sustaining  the  con- 
fidence of  allies  and  friends  and  to  main- 
taining the  cohesion  of  our  alliances. 

For  the  first  two  decades  of  the 
postwar  period,  our  allies  in  the  Atlantic 
community,  Japan,  and  elsewhere  could 
count  on  our  unquestioned  strategic 
superiority.  The  longstanding  Soviet 
superiority  in  conventional  forces  on  the 
Eurasian  landmass  was  offset  by 
superior  American  strategic  power  as 
the  guarantee  of  our  allies'  security. 

The  massive  growth  of  the  Soviet 
strategic  arsenal  and  our  unilateral  self- 
restraint  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  have 
altered  this  situation.  We  no  longer 
possess  the  strategic  advantage  we  once 
had,  and,  indeed,  we  face  significant 
weaknesses  in  several  areas  of  strategic 
weaponry.  This  shift  in  the  strategic 
balance  makes  it  more  important  for  us 
and  our  allies  to  address  the  problem  of 
conventional  and  regional  imbalances, 
while  doing  whatever  is  necessary  to 
restore  strategic  stability. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  also  expanded 
its  conventional  forces  and  its  global 
reach  at  a  rapid  rate  in  tandem  with  its 
nuclear  buildup.  Our  vulnerability  in 
many  regions  of  the  world  such  as  the 
Persian  Gulf  is  apparent,  as  is  the  im- 
pressive growth  of  the  Soviets'  ability  to 
project  power  worldwide.  This  develop- 
ment is  even  more  sobering  given  the  in- 
creasing proclivity  of  the  Soviets  since 
the  mid-1970s  to  use  their  forces  and 
those  of  their  proxies— in  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  Kampuchea,  and  Afghanistan, 
as  well  as  to  threaten  their  neighbor  (in 
Poland)  and  to  try  to  subvert  our  neigh- 
bors (in  Central  America). 

My  concern  is  that  the  growth  of 


Soviet  strategic  power  can,  therefc 
have  an  important  effect  on  the  So 
willingness  to  run  risks  in  a  region 
conflict  or  crisis.  Correspondingly, 
makes  our  response  more  difficult, 
the  Cuban  missile  crisis  in  1962,  ar 
the  Middle  East  alert  in  1973,  Amf 
strategic  power  was  an  important 
ment  in  denying  the  Soviet  Union  ; 
credible  option  to  escalate  beyond 
local  level.  In  the  Cuban  case  we 
possessed  an  overwhelming  stratej 
well  as  local  superiority;  in  the  cas 
the  1973  alert  we  still  had  some  ac 
age.  I  do  not  want  to  see  the  day  ( 
when,  in  a  replay  of  the  Cuban  cri; 
Middle  East  alert,  the  numbers— £ 
the  results— are  reversed.  j 

The  Peacekeeper  ICBM  has  ; 
relevance  to  this  problem  of  Sovie' 
taking.  If  the  Soviets  can  strike  ef 
tively  at  our  land-based  ICBMs  wl 
our  land-based  deterrent  does  not 
comparable  capability,  the  Soviets 
believe  that  they  have  a  significan 
vantage  in  a  crucial  dimension  of  1 
strategic  balance;  they  could  seek 
gain  political  leverage  by  a  threat 
nuclear  blackmail.  Without  arguin 
question  of  whether  the  Soviets  ai 
pared  to  launch  a  nuclear  first  str; 
such  a  crucial  imbalance  in  strateg 
capabilities  could  well  make  them 
in  a  regional  conflict  or  in  a  major 

For  these  reasons,  I  believe  th 
foreign  policy — and  our  ability  to  ' 
our  interests  and  our  most  cherish 
values— will  be  critically  strengthe 
the  Congress  gives  strong  backing 
program  the  President  announced 
terday.  Modernization  of  our  strat 
deterrent — and  of  our  land-based 
force  in  particular — is  essential  to 
goal  he  stated,  that  of  "preventing 
flict,  reducing  the  risks  of  war,  an 
guarding  the  peace."  That  is  why  i 
Peacekeeper  program  is  so  import 

•  It  will  demonstrate  our  com 
ment  to  maintaining  the  strategic ; 
balance  and  to  maintaining  the  cr 
ty  of  our  land-based  strategic  fore 

•  It  will  enhance  our  capacity 
deter  nuclear  war  and  significant  ( 
ventional  attack  or  the  threat  of  e 

•  It  will  strengthen  our  comm 
to  the  security  of  the  United  State 
its  allies  and  friends. 


Department  of  State  Blfil 


THE  SECRETARY 


>  It  will  also  increase  Moscow's  in- 
ive  to  negotiate  seriously  in  START 
tegic  arms  reduction  talks]  and 
^  arms  reduction  talks.  Let  me  say 

■  on  thai  subject. 

B  Reductions  and  the 
tegic  Balance 

)w  that  the  Congress,  and  all 
ricans.  share  our  hopes  that  arms 
■ol  negotiations  with  the  Soviet 
n  will  brmg  about  a  significant 
rtioE  of  nuclear  arsenals  and  a  sig- 
ini  easing  of  the  dangers  of  nuclear 
Strategic  arms  controi  has  been  a 
■ct  of  major  controversy  and  con- 
fer well  over  a  decade.  If  we  have 
ed  anrthing  from  those  debates  and 
tdations.  we  should  have  learned 
iindamental  truth:  The  process  of 
ggit  arms  control  depends  absolute- 
the  demonstrated  ability-  of  the 
id  States  tv  maintain  the  strategic 
ce.  This,  m  turn,  depends — as  it 
?E  has— on  maintaining  a  modern. 
)le  triad  of  strategic  forces.  The 
ikeeper  ICBM  is  a  critical  compo- 
of  that  modernized  triad. 
he  Peacekeeper  represents  the  re- 
e  which  every  admmstration  since 
.1  President  Nixor.  has  believed 
3an  t(  offset,  at  least  partially, 
irmidabie  So\iet  ICBM  arsenal.  In 
rofoundly  simple  sense,  a  new 
e  like  the  Peacekeeper  is  not  only 
itent  with  strategic  arms  control 
an  essentia]  element  of  the  proc- 
'rom.  the  standpoint  of  the  SALT  II 
egic  arms  limitation  talks]  Treaty. 
reat\  was  premised  on  the  ex- 
e  of  the  Peacekeeper  or  MX  (as  it 
tien  called).  From  the  standpoint  of 
Jgotiations  in  which  we  are  en- 
today— not  only  to  limit  strategic 
but  tci  reduce  them — it  is  even 
important  tci  maintain  the  balance. 
'K  from  persona]  expei  'ence  that 
innets  are  tough  barga.ners,  as  we 
lid  must  l)e  as  well.  They  make  no 
|-omises  for  free:  nor  should  we. 
f  the\-  see  the  United  States  deter- 
to  modernize  our  strategic  forces 
ley  have  an  incentive  to  negotiate 
5able  agreement,  establishing 
lower  levels.  Only  if  they  see  no 
ility  of  achieving  superiority  will 
xjcede  to  real  arms  reductions 
on  equalit\-. 
>e  Peacekeeper  is  also  fully  con- 

with  all  the  specific  provisions  of 
ig  SALT  agreements.  Deploying 
i  the  new  missiles  in  existing 
bman  silos,  as  the  President  pro- 
!  would  involve  no  construction  of 


new  fixed  launchers,  no  increase  in  silo 
volume,  and  no  increase  in  MIRVed 
[multiple  independently-targetable  reen- 
tn-  vehicle]  ICBM  launchers  Moreover, 
the  limited  number  is  obviously  far  too 
few  to  be  destabilizing. 

Questions  have  been  asked,  I  know, 
about  the  new  small  ICBM,  as  proposed 
by  the  Scowcroft  commission  and  by  the 
President.  Some  have  wondered  how 
this  is  consistent  with  either  SALT  II  or 
a  possible  START  agreement.  The 
SALT  II  Treaty  would  have  permitted 
deployment  of  no  more  than  one  new 
ICBM  on  each  side;  on  our  side,  the  new 
missile  would  be  the  Peacekeeper.  But 


may  well  give  both  sides  the  incentive  to 
move  in  this  direction,  the  U.S.-Soviet 
strategic  competition  will  continue  into 
the  long-term  future.  We  can  make  a 
historic  decision  now  that  can  shape  the 
strategic  relationship  in  a  positive  way 
for  decades  to  come. 


Conclusion 

To  sum.  up.  as  Secretary  of  State  I  can 
only  share  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
the  con\iction  that  modernization  of  our 
strategic  forces  is  a  matter  of  the 
highest  priority.  A  credible,  flexible 
strategic  force  is  not  only  \ital  to  the 


If  the  Soviets  can  strike  effectively  at  our  land- 
based  ICBMs  while  our  land-based  deterrent  does 
not  have  comparable  capability,  the  Soviets  might 
believe  that  they  have  a  significant  advantage  in  a 
crucial  dimension  of  the  strategic  balance:  they 
could  seek  to  gain  political  leverage  by  a  threat  of 
nuclear  blackmail. 


that  treaty,  even  if  it  had  been  ratified, 
would  have  expired  at  the  end  of  1985. 
The  President's  proposal  calls  for  the 
start  of  engineering  development  of  a 
possible  new  small  ICBM:  nfi  deploy- 
ment could  be  possible  until  after 
1990- long  after  the  SALT  II  time 
pieriod  had  expired.  And  long  before  that 
time,  we  would  hope  that  a  START 
agreement  will  have  established  a  new 
regime  for  maintaining  a  stable  strategic 
balance. 

Beyond  this,  the  new  small  missile, 
if  it  proves  feasible,  would  have  broader, 
positive  implications  for  arms  control.  It 
would  enhance  stability,  which  has 
always  been  a  central  objective  of  arms 
control  since  the  process  began.  As 
Secretary  Weinberger  has  explained,  it 
may  move  the  evoution  of  strategic 
systems  in  a  stabilizing  direction  over 
the  long  term.  Our  START  proposals 
can  be  flexible  enough  to  accommodate 
this  small  missile. 

There  is  no  guarantee  that  a  restruc- 
turing of  I'.S.  and  Soviet  forces  will 
take  place  in  the  near  future,  but  time 


balance  of  power  but  is  the  essential 
foundation  of  our  role  as  leader  and 
defender  of  the  free  nations  The  funda- 
mental goal  of  nuclear  deterrence 
dejtends  on  it:  our  goai  of  aeternng  non- 
nuclear  war  or  nuclear  blackmail  also 
depends  on  it. 

The  Peacekeeper  missile  is  indispen- 
sable to  our  near-term  goals  of  restoring 
the  strategic  balance,  deterring 
challenges,  and  providing  an  incentive  to 
the  So\nets  for  serious  negotiations  on 
arms  reductions.  R,esearch  and  possible 
development  of  a  smal!  I'JBM  may 
enhance  strategic  staDilir>  into  the  next 
century.  As  the  Scowcroft  commission 
stressed,  neither  of  the  two  systems  can 
ensure  security  alone;  they  are  com- 
plementan-. 

Strength  and  peace  are  also  com- 
plementary.  Both  must  be  pursued  with 
determination.  And  with  that  determina- 
tion, both  can  be  achieved. 


■Press  release  IIS  (the  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearing  will  be  published 
bv  the  committee  and  wall  be  available  from 
tfie  Supenmenaent  of  Documents.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  WashinEton 
D.C.  20402;.  ■ 


THE  SECRETARY 


News  Conference  of  April  12 


Secretary  Shultz  held  a  news  con- 
ference at  the  Department  of  State  on 
April  12,  1983.^ 

Q.  In  the  Middle  East,  where  does 
the  United  States  go  from  here  and, 
specifically,  are  you  personally 
prepared  to  play  a  more  direct  role  in 
the  wider  peace  process? 

A.  The  United  States  has  been  play- 
ing a  very  strong  and  direct  role.  The 
President's  initiative  of  September  1  was 
and  remains  an  historic  opportunity  for 
peace  in  the  region.  Those  proposals  re- 
main on  the  table.  Of  course,  we  will 
continue  to  support  them.  They  deserve 
support,  and  they'll  get  it  not  only  from 
us  but  from  others  in  the  area. 

Q.  Will  you  be  doing  anything  to 
engender  such  support,  personally? 
A.  I  think  that  the  main  point  is 
that  the  proposals  are  responsive  to  the 
needs  of  the  region.  There  is  no  question 
about  the  fact  that  the  events  of  last 
weekend  were  a  disappointment  and  are 
a  disappointment,  particularly  so  since  it 
seemed  that  King  Hussein  [of  Jordan] 
has  managed— after  a  great  deal  of 
work  and  effort  and  patience  on  his 
part— to  create  conditions  under  which 
he  could  enter  the  peace  process.  Then 
word  was  received  out  of  the  meeting  of 
the  PLO  [Palestine  Liberation  Organiza- 
tion] in  Kuwait  that  conditions  were  put 
forward  that  were  unacceptable  to  King 
Hussein. 

We  agree  with  King  Hussein  in  re- 
jecting those  proposals.  At  the  same 
time,  everybody  has  to  take  a  look  at 
the  situation  and  say,  "What  is  the  alter- 
native?" Almost  as  if  by  punctuation,  we 
had  the  murder  of  a  moderate  Palestin- 
ian in  Portugal  over  the  weekend.  What 
is  the  message?  That  was  a  murder  of  a 
Palestinian,  apparently  by  Palestinians, 
but  it  certainly  doesn't  do  anything  for 
the  Palestinian  people. 

I  think  if  there  is  genuine  concern 
about  the  legitimate  aspirations  of  these 
people,  then  there  ought  to  be  some 
thought  given  to  their  needs.  This  is 
what  the  President's  plan  does.  I  might 
point  out  that  directly  in  the  Camp 
David  accords,  it  speaks  of  the 
legitimate  aspirations  of  the  Palestinian 
people  and  calls  upon  King  Hussein  and 
representatives  of  the  Palestinians  to 
come  and  talk  with  Israel  about  peace. 
This  is  the  right  course  of  action;  it  re- 
mains the  right  course  of  action.  The  ap- 
proach of  violence — which  seems  to  have 


been  the  approach  for  many  years  now 
and  which  has  had  the  effect  of 
devastating  Lebanon  and  causing  untold 
losses  of  lives  and  injuries— that's 
bankrupt. 

I  think  it's  about  time  everyone  took 
stock  and  said  that  the  road  to  peace, 
and  road  to  well-being  for  human  be- 
ings, is  the  road  of  negotiation.  The 
prospect  for  negotiation  is  best  through 
the  use  of  the  President's  proposals, 
which  fall  squarely  within  the  frame- 
work of  Resolution  424  and  the  Camp 
David  accords. 

Q.  Is  it  realistic  to  expect  that 
King  Hussein  could  enter  peace  talks 
without  PLO  approval,  and  are  we  en- 
couraging him  to  do  that? 

A.  King  Hussein  has  to  take  his  own 
counsel,  and  I  think  that  it  is  most 
beneficial  when  King  Hussein  enters  the 
peace  process— if  he  does— that  he  do 
so  with  support  from  his  brothers  in  the 
Arab  world  because  that  will  have  the 
effect  of  making  any  settlement  that 
might  be  reached  much  more  meaning- 
ful. Of  course  I  think  we  also  have  to 
remember  that  when  you're  talking 
about  the  West  Bank,  the  Gaza  Strip, 
and  the  people  who  live  there— 
predominantly,  they're  Palestinians— so 
you're  negotiating  for  Palestinians.  I 
think  it's  the  case  in  any  kind  of  a 
negotiation.  People  are  not  going  to  ac- 
cept something  that  they  don't  have  a 
part  in,  so  they  want  to  be  represented. 
I'm  sure  that  in  any  such  negotiation 
King  Hussein  will  want  company. 

Q.  Are  you  not,  in  fact,  now  ap- 
pealing to  more  moderate  Palestinians 
to  come  forward  and  join  King 
Hussein  and  enter  the  negotiations 
despite  what  any  radical  element 
within  the  PLO  may  feel? 

A.  We've  always  tried  to  appeal  to 
the  good  sense  of  moderates  and  con- 
tinue to  do  that. 

Q.  Phil  Habib  [Ambassador  Philip 
C.  Habib,  special  representative  of  the 
President  to  the  Middle  East]  is  now 
sitting  in  on  the  tripartite  talks.  Will 
you  now  consider  another  move,  name- 
ly, a  trip  to  the  Middle  East  yourself, 
to  get  things  moving? 

A.  I  don't  have  any  current  plan  to 
go  to  the  Middle  East.  Certainly 
whenever  the  President  decides  that  it 
might  be  useful,  I'm  ready  to  go,  but 
there's  no  current  plan  to  go  there. 

Q.  After  reading  the  statement  of 


King  Hussein,  what  other  informs 
do  you  have  that  would  contradici 
very  final  statement  that  Jordan  \ 
not  join  the  peace  process  by  cons 
or  renew  it  with  any  other  party? 
A.  I  don't  have  any  additional  i 
mation,  and  I'm  not  asserting  here 
King  Hussein  is  about  to  join  the  pc 
process  or  anything  of  that  kind.  I 
make  that  comment.  In  response  tc 
question  about  if  he  would  come  in 
himself:  I  tried  to  make  clear  that  i 
seemed  to  me  he  would  want  to  be 
companied  by  Palestinians  if  he  we 
decide  to  do  that  at  some  point. 

Q.  Has  the  PLO  done  itself 
damage  by  its  negative  response? 

A.  I  certainly  think  so. 

Q.  How  so? 

A.  It  has  clearly  been  the  part; 
has,  at  least  temporarily,  frustrate 
what  is  a  most  promising  opportur 
for  peace  with  justice  and  security 
Middle  East.  It  seems  to  me  it  mu; 
become  more  and  more  apparent  t 
such  a  frustration,  accompanied  as 
was  by  this  violent  act- all  too 
typical— does  not  provide  any  ans^ 
for  the  aspirations  of  the  human  b 
called  Palestinians  who  are  living  1 
and  trying  to  make  their  way  in  th 
world.  II 

Q.  A  number  of  Arabs,  inclu(  i 
some  moderate  ones,  have  claims  il 
the  wake  of  the  King's  decision  i  I 
the  United  States  had  shown  no  i! 
ty  to  influence  the  Israelis,  eithe  r 
Lebanon  or  on  the  question  of  se  « 
ments  in  the  occupied  territories  > 
you  think  it  would  be  fruitful  no  t 
increase  American  pressure  on  Im< 
on  either  of  those  fronts? 

A.  No.  I  think  that,  as  frmii  tl 
beginning,  the  key  to  peace  is  : 
That  is  the  incentive  that  has  i 
people. 

As  far  as  Lebanon  is  concfiiK'  - 
getting  a  settlement  in  Lebanon  — 
think  that  a  great  deal  of  hea(l\\a\;' 
been  made.  For  there  to  be  a  ,i!vm  ' 
settlement,  it  has  to  be  sometlnriL:  ■ 
the  Israelis  and  the  Lebanese  t.  .1  - 
their  interests,  and  the  question- : 
ficult  ones. 

We  are  all  impatient.  I  km  'W  - '' 
of  my  colleagues  in  Israel  that  r\t 
talked  to  are  impatient.  Everylwd: 
would  like  to  get  this  negotiation  (ii 
pleted.  On  the  other  hand,  you're  ilK 
about  matters  of  great  importancf^ 
difficulty,  so  you  want  to  get  theni| 
I  think  the  pressure  of  the  desire 
work  something  out  is  very  impor  " 
there,  and  I  don't  think  the  way  ti " 


Department  of  State  Bt 


THE  SECRETARY 


it  II  I-  with  additional  arm-twisting 

II   I.  ihI  or  another. 

.}.  As  you  know,  there  is  a  school 
.oii^^ht  that  says  that  a  lot  of  the 
nerale  Arab  states— in  a  diplomatic 
^e,  anyway— are  being  held 
ijage  by  radical  elements  in  the 
1,  and  that  even  the  United  States 
5  efforts  is,  to  an  extent,  also 
iagf  lo  these  same  radical 
;enls.  Is  there,  in  your  current 
illations,  some  way  of  getting  out 
is  presumed  "trap?" 
|.  It  IS  a  "trap" — if  it  is  a  "trap"— 
was  created  by  the  decision  of  the 
League  to  place  on  the  PLO  the 
le  of  negotiator  for  the  Palestinian 
e.  It's  the  decision,  basically,  that 
Hussein  refers  to  when  he  looks 
ipport  in  his  efforts  to  enter  the 
process. 

hat  stands  there.  On  the  other 
I  wonder  if  it  isn't  going  to 
e  apparent  to  people  that  when 
eem  to  give  such  power  to  a  radical 

you've  made  a  mistake.  At  any 
from  our  standpoint,  we  will  con- 
to  advocate  the  peace  process.  We 
ontinue  to  stress  the  importance  of 
:curity  needs  of  Israel.  We  will  con- 
to  stress  the  fact  that  if  there  is  to 
*ce,  it  must  be  achieved  by 
>ers  of  the  Arab  community  with 
sentation  for  Palestinians  sitting 
with  Israel,  with  Egypt,  and  with 
ves  in  the  peace  process  and  work- 
out. We  will  continue  to  emphasize 
or  this  to  be  successful,  it  has  to 
ihe  legitimate  needs  of  the  Pales- 
people. 

hink  that's  good,  high  ground  to 
on.  That's  where  we're  going  to 
and  we're  going  to  invite  others 
le  and  join  us  there. 

•  Is  that  the  same  thing  as  urg- 
;i9derate  Arabs,  then,  to  look 
ilonce  again  to  the  Rabat  decision 
1!4  and  urge  them  to  reconsider 
'lidity  of  that? 

-'  Thc\  'II  have  to  compose  them- 
t  and  see  how  they  want  to  pro- 
I  fs  up  to  them  to  decide  how  they 


t  If  I  could  take  you  to  a  dif- 
M  part  of  the  world,  you  and 
e^people  in  the  Administration 
eaid  to  the  Congress  and  publicly 
t'le  Administration  is  not  vio- 
ftthe  Boland  amendment,  which 
S'lat  the  U.S.  Government  cannot 

'  ces  in  Nicaragua  for  the  pur- 
e^f  bringing  down  that  govern- 
n^Some  senior  people  in  Congress 
eiised  questions  about  that- 


even  disputed  it.  Today  Congressman 
[Michael]  Barnes,  the  head  of  the 
Latin  subcommittee  in  the  House,  has 
introduced  a  measure  to  forbid  any 
U.S.  aid  to  any  irregular  force  any- 
where near  Nicaragua  having  anything 
to  do  with  Nicaragua. 

In  view  of  the  congressional  con- 
cerns about  what  is  going  on  and  what 
it  is  going  to  lead  to,  what  is  your  at- 
titude toward  tightening  the  Boland 
amendment  to  take  out  any  legal  am- 
biguity or  proceeding  to  a  flat  ban 
such  as  that  which  has  been  introduc- 
ed by  Congressman  Barnes? 

A.  As  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no 
violation  of  the  Boland  amendment.  I 
want  to  expand,  however,  and  say  that 
as  people  look  at  what  is  happening  in 
Nicaragua  and  ask  themselves  why,  it 
shouldn't  be  difficult  to  figure  out  the 
answers.  After  all,  here  is  a  regime  that 
came  in— the  Sandinistas.  And  what  did 
they  say?  They  said,  "We  don't  believe  in 
this  dictatorship  we  just  overthrew. 
We're  going  to  have  a  free  kind  of 
system  here.  We're  going  to  have  elec- 
tions. Everything  is  going  to  be  great." 

And  what  have  they  done?  They 
have  completely  gone  back  on  the  prom- 
ise of  elections.  They  have  very  badly 
suppressed  freedom  of  the  press.  They 
have  done  a  terrible  job  on  the  Miskito 
Indians,  for  example.  They  have  been 
very  hard  on  the  church,  as  illustrated. 
As  an  illustration— there  are  lots  of 
other  things— but  the  illustration  is  the 
way  in  which  they  greeted  the  Pope  on 
his  recent  visit.  So  if  you  look  for  ex- 
planations for  why  it  is  that  the 
Nicaraguans  are  having  internal  trouble, 
you  don't  have  to  look  very  far.  I  think 
it's  important  to  recognize  these 
underlying  facts. 

Q.  What  about  the  question  of 
whether  you  would  support,  or  what 
your  attitude  is  regarding  the 
endeavor  by  many  in  Congress  to 
either  tighten  up  on  this  language  so 
that  no  support  can  be  given  to  ir- 
regular forces  or  to  ban  it  completely? 

A.  The  moves  being  made  that  seem 
to  be  designed  to  prevent  us  from  con- 
tinuing to  support  our  friends  in  El 
Salvador  and  elsewhere  in  Central 
America  in  their  effort  to  provide  a 
military  security  shield  so  that  they  can 
go  forward  with  the  process  of 
democracy;  so  that  they  can  go  forward 
with  the  process  of  economic  develop- 
ment; so  that  they  can  go  forward  with 
the  development  of  the  human  rights  ef- 
forts in  those  countries,  I  think  is  the 
undermining  of  our  ability  to  provide 
that  shield  and  is  a  bad  mistake. 

It  is  bad  not  only  in  the  region;  it's 


bad  for  our  country,  because  here  we're 
talking  about  our  own  neighborhood.  We 
see  that  Cuba  is  a  communist-controlled 
country.  The  same  thing  is  emerging 
rapidly  in  Nicaragua.  And  if  that 
becomes  the  case  in  Central  America,  it 
is  not  only  bad  for  the  people  in  Central 
America—.  My  gosh,  if  you  care 
anything  about  human  rights,  I  think 
you  have  to  consider  what  is  being  done 
in  that  regard  if  you  turn  this  over  to 
the  communists.  However,  we  also  have 
to  think  about  our  own  security,  because 
here  we're  talking  about  our  neighbor- 
hood. So  I  believe  that  the  Congress 
should  do  the  reprograming  that  we 
have  asked  for  and  support  the  continui- 
ty of  effort  that  is  necessary  in  El 
Salvador  and  elsewhere. 

Q.  Ambassador  [to  the  United  Na- 
tions Jeane  J.]  Kirkpatrick  made  some 
comments  in  New  York  today  that 
suggested  the  United  States  has  a 
moral  obligation  to  support  groups 
like  those  in  Nicaragua  which  are  try- 
ing to  overthrow  the  government.  Is 
that  the  Administration's  policy? 

A.  Certainly,  when  we  see  forces  of 
democracy— forces  that  are  opposed  to 
something  that  takes  on  the  aspect  of 
tyranny— it's  easy  enough  for  us  to 
figure  out  which  side  we're  on.  But  our 
own  immediate  problem  with  Nicaragua 
is  the  undoubted  use  of  Nicaragua  as  a 
base  from  which  arms  flow,  largely 
through  Cuba,  to  Nicaragua,  and  then  to 
El  Salvador.  It's  the  "export  of  revolu- 
tion without  frontiers,"  I  think  is  their 
phrase,  to  their  neighbors  that  is  the 
heart  of  the  difficulty  and  which  we  are 
trying  to  cope  with. 

Q.  In  spite  of  the  validity  of  all 
that  you've  said  about  the  situation  in 
Central  America,  the  United  States  is 
still  signatory  and,  indeed,  was  one  of 
the  founders  of  the  OAS  [Organization 
of  American  States]  and  wrote  a  good 
deal  of  the  charter.  What  about  Arti- 
cle 18,  which  specifically  prohibits  any 
intervention  in  a  sovereign  state? 

A.  We  are  talking  about  states  that 
are  very  anxious  to  have  us  there.  We're 
talking  about  helping.  Here  is  Costa 
Rica  that  has  no  army;  here  is  Hon- 
duras, struggling  to  make  its  democracy 
work;  here  is  El  Salvador,  certainly  with 
a  pretty  tough  history  and  with  lots  of 
problems— no  doubt  about  it— but, 
nevertheless,  making  some  progress, 
and  we're  trying  to  be  helpful.  I  think 
that  is  perfectly  w^ell  in  accord  with  the 
OAS  Charter. 

I  also  think  it's  well  in  accord  with 
the  OAS  Charter  to  be  opposing  the  ex- 
port of  revolution  and  the  export  of 


THE  SECRETARY 


arms  across  national  boundaries  for  the 
sake  of  encouraging  the  kind  of  disrup- 
tion that  we  see  in  El  Salvador.  After 
all.  look  what  these  people  have  done  to 
the  chance  of  the  people  in  E:  Salvador 
to  make  a  decent  living.  They've  biowm 
up  55  Uridges:  zhey  have  biowT.  up 
power  plants;  tney  have  disrupteC  the 
economic  infrastructure.  I  suppose  it's 
no  wonder  that  they  are  reluctant  to 
come  mto  the  democratic  process.  That 
would  be  a  terrific  platform  to  run  on. 

Q.  Again  shifting  to  another  part 
of  the  world,  is  the  United  States  tak- 
ing adequate  steps,  ir  your  estimation, 
to  counter  Soviet  moves  in  the 
southern  Pacific  and  in  southern 
Africa? 

A.  In  the  southern  Pacific  and 
southern  Africa" 

Q.  Among  the  ANZUS  EAustraha. 
New  Zealand.  l.S.  security  treaty  of 
1951]  partners,  where  there  is  a  large 
Soviet  build-up  and  also  in  southern 
Africa? 

A.  As  far  as  southern  Africa  is  con- 
cerned. I  thmk  the  answer  is  yes,  but  I'll 
elaborate  or,  it  a  little  bit. 

As  far  as  southern  Africa  is  con- 
cerned, we  and  others  have  been  work- 
ing long  and  hard  tc  bring  about  an 
independent  Namibia,  and  we  find  that 
in  order  to  do  that — it  is  obviously  not 
pji  mtegrated  part  of  the  negotia- 
tion— but  m  order  to  bring  it  off.  we 
have  U'  see  some  sort  of  program  for 
the  withdrawal  of  foreign  forces — 
Cuban  forces  in  this  case — from  the 
area  so  that  South  Africa  will  have  con- 
fidence that  it  is  not  being  surrounded 
or  having  on  its  borders  the  Soxiet 
proxj'  forces.  We  have  been  working 
hard  on  that.  We  have  been  making 
some  progress,  but.  like  most  of  these 
things,  it's  a  slow,  hard  go.  But  I  think 
basically  what  we're  doing  is  right,  and  I 
hope  that  in  the  end  it  works  out. 

As  far  as  the  southern  Pacific  area 
and  ANZUS  are  concerned,  we  have 
very  strong  relationships  with  Australia 
and  New  Zealand  and  the  countries  in 
that  part  of  the  world,  and.  yes.  I  think 
that  we're  working  adequately  there.  I 
might  say  I've  been  in  touch  a  couple  of 
times  with  the  new  Prime  Minister  of 
Australia  [Robert  Hawke]  who  happens 
to  have  been  a  friend  of  mine  from  some 
years  back.  I  believe  that  the  strength  of 
that  relationship  is  going  to  continue. 

Q.  Do  we  detect  a  growing  Soviet 
tmildnp  there,  though,  in  the  waters 
in  the  sonthern  Pacific? 

A.  No  I  don't  think  so. 

Q.  Could  I  take  you  back  to  the 
Middle  East,  please?  Yon  say  that  the 


President's  proposals  are  on  the  table. 
Can  you  in  any  way  be  forthcoming — 

A.  They're  on  lop  of  the  hill.  That's 
where  they  art.  (»n  the  high  ground. 
They're  or  tne  high  ground. 

Q,  Can  you  ir  any  way  be  forth- 
coming in  a  specific  way  as  to  what  is 
being  done  to  pump  some  life  into  the 
President's  plan"  For  example,  any 
thought  of  an  invitation  to  Hussein  to 
Washington?  A  resumption  of  a  Camp 
David  type  of  get-together" 

And  finally,  when  you  talked 
earlier  about  the  Rabat  decision  to 
empower  the  PLO  tc  be  the  sole  man- 
date for  the  Palestinians  as  being  a 
mistake,  is  there  in  that  a  suggestion 
that  you  think  it  would  further  the 
cause  of  peace  if  that  power  were 
stripped  from  the  PLO? 

A.  I  thmi:  wnat  is  neeaec  is  for  it  tc 
be  exercised  constructively  There's  a 
saymg  around  here,  "lise  it  or  lose  it."  I 
inmK  ttiat  if  people  navt  ihe  anility  tc  do 
something  or  other,  men  tney  ought  tc 
measure  uf-  tC'  those  responsibilities  and 
they  aren't  doing  so.  That's  the  main 
point. 

As  far  as  actions  are  concerned,  it's 
always  fun  to  travel.  Maybe  not  so  much 
fun  as  tc  have  conferences.  But  it  isn't 
necessarily  so  that  action  of  that  kind 
necessarily  brmgs  progress.  Sometimes 
it  does  and  sometimes  it  doesn't.  I  don't 
think  that  we  ought  tc  equate  construc- 
tive efforts  with  xdsible  moves  of  some 
kina.  In  fact,  it  may  be  that  the  best 
thmg  we  can  do  right  now  is  to  keefi 
quiet  for  awhile. 

Q.  Is  there  any  evidence  the  PLO 
is  considering  military  action? 

A.  There  are  elements  of  the  PLO 
that  claim  credit,  if  that's  the  right  word 
for  it.  for  the  murder  of  the  Palestinian 
in  Portugal.  So  whether  what  has  been 
decided  is  a  decision  to  go  the  route  of 
violence  rather  than  the  route  of  peace 
and  negotiation,  I  don't  know.  But  if 
that  is  the  decision.  I  think  it  is  a  bad 
decision — a  bankrupt  decision — a  return 
to  something  that  has  only  led  to 
tragedy. 

Q.  Could  you  describe  for  us  the 
position  of  Saudi  Arabia  at  this  time? 
The  spokesman  said  yesterday  that 
King  Fahd  was  willing  to  cooperate  in 
furthering  the  ends  of  the  Reagan  pro- 
posal. Do  the  Saudi  Arabians  support 
the  Reagan  proposal  now  ? 

A.  The  Saudi  Arabians  have  been  in 
touch  with  us  closely  throughout  this 
whole  process  anQ  have  been  basically 
supportive.  As  the  President  said  when 
he  spoke  on  the  subject  on  Sunday,  the 
Saudi  Arabians  were  as  emphatic  to  him 


m  their  rejection  of  these  chant' 
King  Hussein  was  and  as  we  i'.i 
ourselves. 

Q.  Would  you  consider  ar;"  sk  i 
necessary  to  improve  our  relations 
with  China? 

A.  We  are.  of  course,  working 
that.  It  takes  two  to  have  a  gooc  re 
tionship.  We  have  a  lot  of  inherent 
iems.  but  we  have  many  objectives  : 
common,  many  ways  m  which  we  a 
help  each  other.  In  m>-  trip  there  ar 
our  subsequent  contacts,  we  ve  souf 
emphasize  these  anc  will  continue  t' 
so.  I  recognize  fully  mat  there  are  i 
ficulties  iha:  arise  out  of  the  fact  th 
we  continue  t(  have  £  relationsnii  ^ 
Taiwan  and.  for  ma:  matter  ma:  w 
have  a  judicial  system  that  worKs  ii 
certain  way  when  people  come  here 
worKs.  i:  produces  outcomes  the 
sometimes  other  countries  don':  likt 
and  they  get  aggravatec.  But  a:  th< 
same  time.  I  thmk  we  have  to  be  tr 
our  own  ideas  anc  laws. 

Q.  The  President  said  today  t 
the  Palestinian  leadership  should) 
bold  and  courageous  action  to  trji 
get  this  plan  moving  again.  All  sii 
from  the  Middle  East,  not  only 
but  in  recent  years,  have  been 
with  the  exception  of  Sadat,  nobo 
going  to  take  any  bold  and  courag 
action  for  the  Palestinians  on  thei 
West  Bank.  If  nothing  happens,  t 
will  happen? 

A.  They  have  not  had  a  happy 
the  Palestinians  on  the  West  Bank. 
There  are  many  who  profess  to  fee' 
deeply  about  ttiat  fact  and  want  1 
that  lot  improved,  and  there  are 
do  it.  I  think  the  principal  operativ* 
that  is  available  is  through  the  Pres 
dent's  plan— which  I've  said  is  perf< 
consistent  with  Resolution  242  and 
Camp  David  accords.  There  it  is.  It 
method  through  which  the  lot  of  th' 
Palestinians  can  be  improved.  If  yo 
interested  m  that,  then  there's  a  wf 
We  think  that  perhaps  people  will  i 
end  come  around  to  that. 

Q.  In  the  event  that  the  Unit* 
States  has  to  proceed  with  the  de* 
ment  of  Pershing  II  missiles  begi 
ning  at  the  end  of  this  year,  how  » 
cemed  are  you  about  possible  So^  • 
countermoves  which  might  involv 
deployment  of  SS-20s.  either 
somewhere  in  the  Caribbean  or  m* 
eastern  Siberian  region,  which  wit 
put  the  western  United  States  in  « 
range  of  the  SS-20? 

A.  Of  course,  the  United  Siatf  ; 
ihe  range  of  lethal  So\net  ICBMf  ;i '' 
continental  balhstic  missiles]  rignt  i « 


Department  of  State  BlI 


THE  SECRETARY 


as  we  can  see,  as  we  trace  Soviet 
y  in  deployment  of  the  SS-20s, 
re  proceeding  fairly  aggressively 
deployment  schedule  that  seems 
lotally  independent  of  what 
ly  else  does. 

hink  it  well  behooves  ourselves 
:r  allies  to  implement  the  two- 
lecision  of  1979,  namely,  to  pur- 
iggressively— negotiations,  which 
loing  and  which  the  President  has 
ath  some  new  proposals  most 
y,  on  the  one  hand,  and  at  the 
ime  continue  in  our  determination 
oy  if  it  turns  out  that  we're 
to  reach  any  agreement.  That's 
we  have  been  standing,  and  that's 
we  do  stand  now.  I  believe  from 
ling  that  I  have  heard  and  seen, 
Dple  I  have  met  with,  that  our 
nd  their  leaders  are  as  deter- 
as  we  are  to  see  this  thing 


You  seem  to  be  aiming  appeals 
groups  in  the  Arab  world. 

0  the  moderates  in  the  PLO 

D  reconsider  the  action  of  last 
id,  and,  if  that  fails,  to  the 
tes  in  the  Arab  world  itself  as 
i  to  the  PLO  to  reconsider  and 

1  modify  the  Rabat  formula, 
uch  hope  do  you  have  that 
.ppeal  will  be  effective? 

I  like  the  word  hope,  but  in  a 
think  its  overworked.  We're 
ned  to  stick  with  this,  and  I 
hen  the  President  talked  with  us 
s  September  1  initiative  before 

his  proposals,  and  as  we  were 
ig  them  and  developing  them,  he 
IS— and  we  all  agreed— that 
IS  no  point  in  making  proposals 
ind  if  all  you  were  expecting 
le  immediate  reaction  and  a  set- 

These  problems  have  been 
1  long  time, 
as  quite  clear  to  the  President  at 

that  it  was  important  to  make 
ntal  proposals  that  were  of  such 

that  you  really  could  and  would 
them  and  stick  with  them  and 

determination  and  exercise  pa- 
nd  recognize  that  in  the  end, 
le  alternative?  What's  the  alter- 
I  peace?  What's  the  alternative 
ty?  What's  the  alternative  to  ad- 

the  legitimate  rights  and  needs 
ilestinian  people? 

t  think  the  alternatives  are  at- 

t  all,  but  the  attraction  of 
very  powerful.  That's  where 
t  Reagan  stands  now,  and  that's 
!'s  going  to  continue. 

!  release  106.  ■ 


Question-and-Answer  Session 
Following  World  Affairs  Council  Address 


At  the  conclusion  of  Secretary 
Shultz's  address  before  the  World  Affairs 
Council  in  Dallas  on  April  15,  1983  (see 
May  Bulletin,  page  10),  he  answered 
the  following  questions  from  the 
audience. ' 

Q.  U.S.  officials  have  said  there 
are  50  Soviet  advisers  in  Nicaragua. 
What  kind  are  they,  what  are  they  do- 
ing, and  what  kind  of  a  threat  do  they 
pose  to  the  United  States? 

A.  They  are  doing  various  advisery 
tasks,  no  doubt,  in  training  and  things  of 
that  kind  related  to  a  military  operation. 
They,  by  themselves,  signify  the  involve- 
ment of  the  Soviet  Union.  Of  course,  the 
numbers  of  Cubans  are  much  larger.  I 
think  the  significance  is,  where  is  this  all 
coming  from,  who's  behind  it,  and  who 
stands  to  gain  from  it?  That's  what  we 
have  to  be  careful  of. 

Q.  What  are  the  main  obstacles  in 
the  current  Middle  East  peace  nego- 
tiations? 

A.  The  problem,  of  course,  is  to  per- 
suade Arab  governments  other  than 
Egypt  to  sit  down  with  us  and  Israel 
and  negotiate  for  peace.  There  are  lots 
of  plans,  and  there  are  many  differences 
of  opinion,  without  a  doubt,  but  we're 
not  going  to  resolve  the  differences  of 
opinion  unless  the  parties  immediately 
involved  can  sit  down  and  talk  with  each 
other  about  them. 

That's  what  the  Camp  David  peace 
process  was  about,  and  that's  basically 
what  the  President's  September  1  fresh 
start  proposals,  which  are  within  the 
Camp  David  framework,  are  all  about. 

We  have  said,  "Here  are  some  of  the 
things  that  we  will  speak  for  and  sup- 
port in  these  discussions" — that's  essen- 
tially what  the  President's  plan  said— 
and  we  said  some  things  we  would  not 
support,  and  some  things  we  would  sup- 
port. Other  people  may  have  different 
ideas.  The  way  to  resolve  them  is  by  sit- 
ting down  and  talking,  and  it  seems  to 
be  very  difficult  to  bring  that  off  despite 
the  fact  that  I  feel  confident  myself  that 
King  Hussein  wants  to  do  it.  He  has  a 
very  peaceful  intent  himself  and  is  look- 
ing for  a  way  that  he  can  step  forward 
with,  at  least,  implicit  support  from  his 
Arab  colleagues  and  with  the  participa- 
tion of  non-PLO  Palestinians. 

He  hasn't  been  able  to  find  that  way. 


and  so,  we  haven't  been  able  to  con- 
struct that  bargaining  table  that  we're 
looking  for.  But  that's  the  road  to  peace 
in  the  Middle  East.  It's  hard  and  it's  dif- 
ficult, but  the  President  feels— and  I 
think  we  all  share  his  dedication  to 
peace  and  to  carrying  on  and  excercising 
the  determination  and  the  patience  that 
we  need  to  see  this  thing  through. 

Q.  We  have  several  questions  on 
the  Mideast.  In  addition  to  the  suspen- 
sion of  delivery  of  F-lGs  to  Israel, 
what  additional  measures  are  con- 
templated to  speed  the  withdrawal  of 
Israeli  troops  from  Lebanon? 

A.  I  think  the  principal  problems  are 
not  a  matter  of  pressuring  and  so  forth. 
The  principal  issue  is  security.  We  have 
to  recall  that  northern  Israel  had  guer- 
rilla warfare  waged  against  it  from 
southern  Lebanon  over  quite  a  period  of 
time.  Whether  you  happen  to  agree  or 
disagree  with  the  Israeli  invasion  of 
Lebanon— and  our  government  did  not 
agree  with  that— but,  at  any  rate, 
whatever  the  case  may  be,  we  must 
observe  that  the  Israelis  captured  huge 
amounts  of  armaments  in  southern 
Lebanon. 

They  have— and  I  believe  everyone 
agrees— legitimate  security  concerns. 
Finding  a  formula  that,  on  the  one  hand, 
provides  for  those  security  concerns  and 
is  consistent  with  the  stature  of 
Lebanon  as  a  sovereign  country  that  will 
develop  and  take  care  of  its  problems — 
that's  sort  of  the  key  issue. 

We've  made  a  tremendous  amount 
of  headway  in  solving  it,  and  getting  the 
rest  of  the  way  is  not  so  much  a  matter 
of  twisting  this  person  or  that  person's 
arm  as  it  is  keeping  working  at  it  and 
finding  a  comfortable  approach  that 
looks  to  the  future  and  gives  people,  on 
the  one  hand,  consistency  with  their 
sovereign  rights,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
assurance  that  their  security  needs  are 
going  to  be  met. 

Q.  Here's  a  three-part  question. 
What  do  you  expect  will  happen  re- 
garding the  Iran-Iraq  conflict?  What 
is  the  impact  on  Gulf  stability  and  the 
possible  U.S.  policy  position  thereof? 

A.  It's  a  serious  conflict.  The  U.S. 
position  is  that  we  think  that  they  ought 
to  stop  fighting  and  settle  their  disputes. 
Our  ability  to  influence  that  dispute  is 


U3 


THE  SECRETARY 


quite  limited  because  we  don't  have  any 
real  relationship  with  Iran.  We  do  have 
a  relationship  with  Iraq,  but  it  is  not  a 
deep  and  strong  one.  So,  our  ability  to 
influence  the  outcome  is  quite  limited. 
But  we  do  support  UN  resolutions  in 
this  regard,  and  we  support  efforts 
made  by  others  who  have  more  access  to 
the  parties  in  their  efforts  to  bring  it  to 
a  conclusion. 

I  might  say  that  the  conflict  is  of 
tremendous  concern,  and  understand- 
ably so,  to  the  other  Gulf  states.  Partly 
their  concern  about,  in  a  sense,  the  ex- 
port of  a  kind  of  revolutionary  fervor 
that  can  be  destabilizing  to  them,  and 
then,  more  recently,  in  a  very  physical 
sense,  the  fact  that  you  have  a  major  oil 
well  flowing  continuously.  It  is  polluting 
the  Gulf  and  polluting  it  very  badly.  It 
isn't  as  though  you've  got  an  oil  slick  out 
there  and  how  are  you  going  to  clean  up 
that  slick,  it's  continually  being  produced 
and  expanded.  And  it  hasn't  been  possi- 
ble to  work  out  a  sort  of  cease-fire  or 
temporary  truce  or  zone  of  truce  that 
will  enable  people  to  go  in  and  cap  the 
well  and  deal  with  that  slick. 

The  slick  is  getting  so  large  that  it  is 
becoming  a  real  threat  to  the  region,  to 
the  natural  fish  life,  and  the  desaliniza- 
tion  plants  are  having  to  be  shut  down, 
and  so  on.  So,  it's  a  genuine  threat. 

Q.  With  Mexico  being  our  next- 
door  neighbor,  we're  more  than  un- 
usually interested.  What  policy  or 
other  action  will  the  United  States 
take  to  deal  with  the  immigration 
from  Mexico? 

A.  First,  let  me  just  make  a  general 
comment,  and  then  I'll  come  to  the 
specific  question.  The  President  feels, 
and  has  felt  right  from  the  beginning  of 
his  term  of  office,  that  while  obviously 
as  a  world  power  we  have  to  be  involved 
and  be  looking  after  our  interests  all 
around  the  world  in  developing  our 
alliances  and  so  on,  nevertheless,  it's 
particularly  important  to  pay  attention 
to  your  own  neighborhood. 

Canada  is  part  of  our  neighborhood, 
Mexico  is  part  of  our  neighborhood.  Cen- 
tral America  is  part  of  our  neighbor- 
hood, the  Caribbean,  South  America, 
and  so  on.  There's  been  a  special  effort 
made  to  talk  to  our  friends  in  the 
neighborhood,  to  try  to  understand  their 
problems,  to  explain  ours,  to  see  where 
we  can  compose  these  problems,  and  to 
set  up  processes  by  which  they  can  be 
discussed. 

I  don't  know  that  I  have  a  formula — 
and,  if  I  did,  I  would  be  the  only  person 
in  the  United  States  who  has  been  able 


to  think  of  one— that's  just  suddenly  go- 
ing to  solve  that  problem.  It's  a  problem 
that's  been  around  a  long  while,  but  I 
think  that  measures  that  are  now  being 
considered  should  help.  In  particular, 
I'm  thinking  of  the  changes  proposed  in 
our  immigration  laws  and  ways  of 
treating  aliens  in  this  country  that  have 
been  proposed  by  Senator  Simpson  and 
Representative  Mazzoli,  and  I  think  that 
somewhere  in  this  region  lies  an  answer. 

But  more  fundamentally— much 
more  fundamentally— the  sorts  of  things 
that  I  was  talking  about  in  my  prepared 
remarks  go  to  the  point  because  if  Mex- 
ico and  other  countries  south  of  the 
border  have  thriving  economies,  have 
prosperity,  see  economic  development 
and  a  better  life  around  them,  then  peo- 
ple will  want  to  stay  there. 

It's  the  fact  that  the  conditions  are 
not  as  good  as  we  would  like  that  causes 
this  problem  of  immigration.  It's  not 
only  from  Mexico,  it's  all  through  Cen- 
tral America.  There  are  tremendous 
numbers  from  other  Central  American 
countries  coming  up  this  way  as  you  all 
know  better  than  I  do. 

I  think  the  fundamental  answer  is 
for  us  to  be  working  with  them  and 
helping  them  create  conditions  such  that 
people  want  to  stay  home,  and  I  think  it 
can  be  done.  But  we  do  have  to  work  at 
it  and  remember  that  we  have  a  stake  in 
it.  It  isn't  just  a  matter  of  giving  money, 
not  just  a  matter  of  aid.  Aid  can  be 
helpful.  But  it  is  for  this  reason  that  the 
President  has  placed  so  much  emphasis 
on  the  Caribbean  Basin  initiative  and 
other  such  measures  that  will  promote 
trade  and  investment.  I  think  that's  our 
fundamental  answer. 

Q.  How  do  you  assess  the  pros- 
pects for  major  social  upheaval  over 
the  next  5  years  in  Mexico? 

A.  I  think  that  Mexico  has  been  a 
stable,  democratic  country  for  many 
years,  and  I  see  no  reason  to  have  that 
change.  I  don't  say  that  as  though  I 
don't  realize  that  there  are  problems 
there  as  there  are  here,  but  they  have  a 
long  track  record  of  being  able  to  handle 
their  problems.  Their  new  President, 
[Miguel]  de  la  Madrid,  is  a  very  capable 
man,  and  I  would  expect  that  they 
would  be  able  to  handle  these  problems. 

I  might  say  that  I  am  planning  to  go 
Sunday  night  to  Mexico  and  to  spend 
the  next  Sunday,  Monday,  Tuesday 
there,  meeting  with  the  Foreign 
Minister,  the  financial  people,  and  with 


the  President.  This  is  all  part  nf  m 
fort  to  be  in  touch  to  discuss  tlust . 
lems  and  to  be  ready  to  work  with 
as  I'm  sure  they're  ready  to  work 
us. 

Q.  Why  can't  the  United  Stat 
develop  a  Central  American  poli< 
cooperation  with  Mexico? 

A.  We  feel  that  we  have  devel 
very  good  and  strong  Central  Am^ 
policy.  We  have  discussed  it  with 
ico.  They  don't  see  it  exactly  our  \ 
a  fair  distance,  but  I  think  that's  £ 
subject  for  us  to  discuss,  and  I  ha- 
been  glad  to  hear  in  the  preparati 
these  meetings  that  we  both  agret 
Foreign  Minister  of  Mexico  and  n- 
self— that  the  issues  of  Central  A 
are  ones  that  we  want  to  address 
together.  This  is  a  new  governme 
we'll  see  if  we  can't  find  a  good  w 
work  cooperatively  on  this  problei 
certainly  a  problem  that  we  share 
we  will  both  be  beneficiaries  if  it  ( 
resolved  peacefully. 

Q.  How  would  you  compare 
relative  strategic  importance  to 
United  States  of  Mexico  compar 
with  Central  America? 

A.  I  don't  think  that  the  comf 
is  really  the  point.  It's  just  the  fac 
this  is  our  neighborhood,  and  this 
area  is  of  vital  significance  to  us. 
to  point  out  in  my  prepared  rema 
how  vitally  important  it  is  to  us.  1 
easy  to  forget;  it's  easy  to  take  fo> 
granted. 

We've  had  no  problems  in  shi] 
We've  had  basically  no  problems  i 
Canal.  We've  had  such  a  long  perj 
time  since  the  early  1940s  when  v| 
a  war  on  with  the  Germans  that  \ 
forgotten  how  disruptive  to  our  ec 
and  our  life  it  was  possible  for  a  1 
German  U-Boats  to  be  without  an 
in  that  region. 

Again,  I  want  to  drive  home  I 
nothing  else,  that  the  problems  W| 
dealing  with  in  Central  America  a, 
vital  significance  to  our  security, 
makes  no  sense  to  me  whatever  tj 
denly  cut  by  two-thirds  the  militaij 
assistance  that  we're  giving  to  th(^ 
Salvadorans  who,  with  all  their  inj 
perfections  and  problems— they  a 
ting  better— but  to  cut  our  militai 
assistance  to  them  that  way  when 
they're  in  a  war  and  with  the  gue 
getting  escalating  help  from  outsi 
country. 

We  have  a  big  stake  in  this  bs 
that's  going  on— a  security  stake, 
ideological  stake— and  I  think  as 


Department  of  State  B 


THE  SECRETARY 


er  our  worldwide  problems,  I'm 
eople  around  the  world  take  a  look 
,ey  say,  "My  gosh,  if  the  United 
can't  even  take  care  of  problems 
)wn  neighborhood,  what  can  they 
und  here?"  So  it's  very  important. 

Would  you  comment  on  the  cir- 
ances  which  would  cause  Ameri- 
ound  troops  to  be  committed  to 
il  America? 

We  have  no  plan  and  no  intention 
imit  American  ground  troops. 

How  frequently  do  you  meet 
'resident  Reagan  to  keep  him 

It? 

I  meet  with  him  a  lot.  He  keeps 
-rent,  I'll  tell  you.  [Laughter]  He's 
ball.  But  we  have  many  meetings 
White  House  which  I  attend, 
we  have  visiting  heads  of  state  or 
I  people  of  one  kind  or  another, 
ve  formal  meetings  of  the  Na- 
Security  Council  or  the  Cabinet  or 
lups  of  one  kind  or  another  that  I 
Then  I  meet  with  him  personally 
ith  maybe  just  two  or  three  peo- 
:d  we  find  that  I  think— I  know  I 
nd  I  think  the  President  feels— 
s  useful  to  have  that  sort  of  a 
•.ion  where  you're  not  trying  to 
something,  you're  just  trying  to 
mull  something  over  together. 
;ry  good  at  that  and  very 
tful,  and  has  tremendous  seat-of- 
its  judgment.  I've  come  to  have  a 
reat  respect  for  the  judgments 
'  makes. 

There  are  1.8  million  Jews— 
f  the  world's  Jewish  popula- 
in  imminent  moral  danger  in  the 
Union.  What  is  the  Reagan  Ad- 
ration  doing  to  influence  the 
authorities  to  recognize  the 

rights  of  these  people? 

We  talk  about  this  problem  and 

roblems  of  human  rights 

/er  we  meet  with  Soviet  officials, 

s  fairly  often,  and  we  make  it 

them  that  these  problems  are 
uch  part  of  our  agenda.  In  addi- 
might  say  that  in  the  agreements 
i  in  Helsinki  a  few  years  ago,  all 
natory  countries  made  certain 
;ments  about  human  rights  mat- 
d  about  freedom  to  emigrate, 
juestions  are  under  very  heavy 
ion  in  meetings  of  all  the  parties 


involved  in  the  Helsinki  agreement  that 
have  been  taking  place  in  Madrid  for  the 
past  2  or  3  years. 

We  have  an  extraordinary  man 
representing  us  for  the  United 
States— a  man  named  Max  Kampelman. 
He  brings  these  matters  up  continuous- 
ly. But,  of  course,  in  the  end  it's  up  to 
the  Soviet  Union  what  they  do  inside 
their  country.  We  can  express  ourselves, 
but,  as  they  keep  saying,  this  is  their  in- 
ternal affair.  I  do  think,  however,  that 
it's  well  for  us  all  to  remember  that  we 
must  maintain  our  concern  for  human 
values  wherever  in  the  world  the  prob- 
lems may  occur.  That's  part  of  our 
heritage;  that's  part  of  our  outlook. 

Sometimes  people  say  we  Americans 
are  naive  because  we  have  these  beliefs. 
I  don't  think  so.  I  think  it's  one  of  our 
best  and  most  solid  attributes  that  we 
care  about  problems  that  people  are  fac- 
ing in  faraway  places,  and  we  are  willing 
to  work  and  extend  effort  and  open  our 
hand  to  help  in  resolving  those  prob- 
lems. 

Q.  That  leads  us  to  Hu  Na,  the 
tennis  player  from  China.  What  is  the 
current  status  of  relations  with  China 
after  her  defection? 

A.  They  have  reacted  negatively  to 
our  decision  to  give  amnesty  to  Hu  Na.  I 
might  say  that,  for  some  reason,  there  is 
a  perception  in  this  country,  let  alone  in 
China,  that  that's  something  that  the 
President  decides,  or  decided.  It  isn't. 

Amnesty  issues  are  decided  in  a 
semijudicial  forum  in  the  Immigration 
and  Naturalization  Service  which  is  part 
of  the  Department  of  Justice.  There  are 
criteria  that  have  been  set  up,  and  they 
make  a  decision.  It  isn't  a  decision  made 
in  the  State  Department  or  by  the  Presi- 
dent or  whatever,  but,  rather,  a  decision 
that's  part  of  a  process  and  part  of  an 
expression  in  the  United  States  of  a  kind 
of  natural  concern  that  I  suppose 
represents  our  heritage — concern  over 
refugee  issues. 

Unlike  most  other  countries— cer- 
tainly unlike  China— we're  a  country  of 
refugees.  We  all  came,  back  there 
somewhere  or  more  recently,  from  some 
place  else.  That  means  we  kind  of  have 
an  instinct  for  that  sort  of  a  problem. 
Whereas  if  you  take  a  country  like 


China  or  Japan  or  a  typical  West  Euro- 
pean country  or  Scandinavian  country, 
there  is  a  much  more  homogenous 
population  there,  and  they  all  come  from 
there. 

I  think  sometimes  its  harder  for  peo- 
ple with  that  heritage  to  understand  the 
instinct  of  the  United  States  for  the 
problem  of  a  person  who  feels  displaced 
or  cast  out  in  some  way.  That's  just  part 
of  our  instinct  and  heritage.  Personally, 
I  love  it.  I  hope  we  never  lose  that  sense 
of  being  willing  to  help  people  who  are 
having  a  hard  time.  [Applause] 

Q.  Why  are  embargoes  and  trade 
restrictions  the  apparent  first  action 
the  U.S.  Government  takes  to  express 
dissatisfaction  with  a  foreign  govern- 
ment? With  the  embassies  at  full  staff 
this  places  the  burden  on  the  business 
community  first. 

A.  They're  not  the  first  thing  we 
ever  think  of,  although  when  I  was  a 
businessman  I  used  to  think  so. 
[Laughter]  I  found  the  record  is  dif- 
ferent. But  it's  a  fair  criticism  that  these 
types  of  actions  should  be  matters  of 
last  resort,  not  first  resort;  but,  at  the 
same  time,  where  there  are  deeply 
troubling  issues  we  should  be  willing  to 
use  whatever  powers  or  leverage  we 
may  have  to  do  something  about  them. 

We  do  have  to  remember — and  the 
President,  I  can  certainly  assure  you, 
has  this  very  much  in  mind— that  we 
must  be  very  cautious  in  the  use  of  these 
measures  and  only  use  them  when 
they're  vitally  needed  and  have  some 
chance  of  producing  something.  Other- 
wise, what  we  do  is  destroy  the  capacity 
of  our  businesses  to  be  counted  as 
reliable  suppliers  around  the  world.  I 
can  assure  you  that  the  President  and 
the  Administration  have  this  very  much 
in  mind. 

If  that's  the  last  question,  that's  my 
last  answer.  But  it's  not  my  last  word 
here  because  this  city  and  this  state  is 
one  of  the  great  jewels  for  our  country. 
Promise  you'll  invite  me  back  some  day 
and,  when  you  do,  I'll  accept,  and  I'll 
talk  some  more. 


■Press  release  109A  of  Apr.  20,  1983. 


AFRICA 


Visit  of  Zambian  President  Kaunda 


President  Kenneth  D.  Kaunda  of 
Zambia  made  an  official  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  March  29- April  2, 
1983,  to  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
other  government  officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  President  Kaunda 
after  their  meeting  on  March  30.^ 

President  Reagan 

Its  been  our  pleasure  to  welcome  to  the 
White  House  President  Kenneth  Kaunda 
of  the  Republic  of  Zambia.  President 
Kaunda  is  no  stranger  to  this  house,  nor 
to  the  people  of  the  United  States.  As 
one  of  Africa's  senior  and  most 
respected  statesmen,  he  plays  an  ad- 
mirable role  in  international  events. 

Our  talks  today  covered  a  broad 
range  of  shared  concerns  and  were  con- 
ducted with  the  same  cordiality  and 
mutual  respect  which  characterizes  the 
relations  between  our  two  countries. 

I  welcomed  this  opportunity  to 
discuss  personally  with  President 
Kaunda  the  vital  issue  of  Namibia.  As 
the  leader  of  one  of  the  frontline  states, 
his  counsel  and  his  experience  are  highly 
valued  during  these  crucial  negotiations. 
We  share  a  common  commitment  for  the 
prompt  implementation  of  UN  Security 
Council  Resolution  435  and  look  forward 
to  the  day  when  we  can  celebrate  a  free 
and  independent  Namibia. 

We  also  recognize  and  applaud  your 
tireless  efforts  for  peace  and  regional 
stability  in  Africa.  Your  special  attention 
to  African  unity  and  to  the  organization 
that  gives  concrete  expression  to  that 
concept  is  greatly  admired  here.  The 
Organization  of  African  Unity  is  in- 
dispensable to  the  pursuit  of  stability 
and  development  throughout  Africa. 

I  know  that  your  own  country,  Zam- 
bia, is  suffering  severe  economic  hard- 
ship as  a  result  of  the  depressed  prices 
of  your  primary  export  commodities. 
The  United  States  itself  is  now  emerg- 
ing from  a  long  period  of  economic 
uncertainty.  We  are  convinced  that  our 
recovery  will  lead  to  a  healthier  world 
economy  and  should  strengthen  demand 
for  Zambian  and  other  producers' 
minerals. 

In  the  meantime,  we  support  the 
emphasis  that  you're  placing  on  develop- 
ing the  agricultural  sector  of  your 
economy.  We're  proud  to  have  cooper- 
ated with  you  in  that  development.  Our 
strong  bilateral  relationship  will  be 
maintained  and  will  evolve  as  we  con- 
tinue to  work  together. 


^    ^ 


I  understand  that  you  will  be  confer- 
ring with  a  wide  variety  of  people  dur- 
ing your  stay  here  in  Washington.  I'm 
certain  they  will  benefit,  as  I  have,  from 
your  views  on  our  bilateral  relationship 
as  well  as  on  regional  and  global  issues. 

It's  a  pleasure  to  have  you  as  our 
guest  in  the  United  States  of  America. 
It's  been  a  great  pleasure. 

President  Kaunda 

I  am  delighted  to  have  this  opportunity 
to  express,  on  behalf  of  my  delegation 
and  on  my  own  behalf,  our  profound 
gratitude  to  President  Reagan  for  in- 
viting me  to  visit  the  United  States  at 
this  time.  It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here 
once  again. 

We  appreciate  immensely  the  warm 
hospitality  which  the  President  and  his 
people  have  accorded  us  since  our  ar- 
rival in  this  beautiful  city  yesterday.  The 
friendly  reception  which  has  been  given 
to  us  is  a  reflection  of  the  good  relations 
which  happily  exist  between  our  two 
countries  and  peoples. 

I  want  to  particularly  thank  the 
President  for  the  discussions  which  have 
just  ended.  These  have  gone  on  very 
well.  We  have  covered  a  wide  range  of 
issues,  including  Zambia-U.S.  relations, 
southern  Africa,  the  Middle  East,  and 
world  peace  and  security.  We  are  both 
happy  at  the  state  of  our  bilateral  rela- 
tions, which  are  warm.  Both  President 
Reagan  and  I  recognize  the  need  to  con- 
tinue to  consolidate  and  strengthen  the 
ties  that  exist  between  our  two  coun- 
tries, for  we  believe  that  it  is  in  the  in- 
terests of  our  countries  to  develop  fur- 
ther these  relations. 


As  might  have  been  expected.  " 
discussions  on  problems  of  South  ;'  k 
and  Namibia  were  extensive.  Wf  s  i 
an  abhorrence  of  the  apartheid  sys  ii 
which  is  being  practiced  in  South  I  k 
We  are  both  of  the  view  that  an  es  ^ 
end  to  this  system  will  be  good  for 
peace,  stability,  and  rich  harmony  ;1 
southern  African  region. 

On  Namibia,  I  have  explained  i 
President  Reagan  how  we  in  Zamt  s 
the  solution  to  the  problem  in  that  U 
try.  I  have  also  listened  very  caref  / 
President  Reagan's  views  on  the  p)»- 
lem.  We  both  believe  that  this  is  a 
serious  problem  to  which  an  early  U 
tion  is  imperative.  We  agree  that  t 
basis  of  the  solution  to  this  prohlei 
should  be  Resolution  435  of  the  U^ 
Security  Council.  In  this  connectioiw 
have  agreed  that  our  two  countries 
should  continue  to  consult  each  oth  o 
these  problems. 

We  also  had  occasion  to  exchatJ 
views  on  the  problem  in  the  Middltta 
and  the  Arab  Gulf  States.  We  are  -v 
cerned  about  the  continuing  absencoi 
peace  and  stability  in  the  area.  We  op 
that  solutions  can  be  found  that  ca!« 
to  durable  peace  and  security  in  th'U 
portant  area  of  the  world. 

Let  me  once  again  thank  you  f  " 
generous  hospitality  which  you  haveJ 
tended  to  us.  I  hope  that  the  discu.or 
we  have  had  will  form  a  strong  foi  ia 
tion  on  which  to  build  our  future  ri  • 
tions. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  4,  198:  ■ 


Department  of  State  B  e' 


AS  CONTROL 


port  of  the  Commission 
iStrategic  Forces 


[DENT'S  REMARKS, 

19.  1983' 

today,  I'll  send  a  report  to  the 
!S  which  endorses  the  recommen- 
of  the  bipartisan  Commission  on 
r\c  Forces,  urges  prompt  congres- 
iction  and  support.  This  distin- 
i  panel's  recommendations  are  im- 
t  for  two  reasons:  the  actions  they 
e  will  preserve  stable  deterrence 
IS  protect  the  peace,  and  they  will 
id  incentives  and  credibility  to 
orts  to  negotiate  arms  reductions 
n  pave  the  way  to  a  more  secure 
iceful  future. 

the  23d  of  March,  I  spoke  to  the 
an  people  about  our  program  for 
hening  this  nation's  security  and 
our  allies  and  announced  a  long- 
'search  effort  to  reduce,  some- 
2  threat  posed  by  nuclear  ballistic 
..  A  week  later  in  Los  Angeles,  I 
ed  our  efforts  to  limit  and  reduce 
iger  through  reliable,  verifiable, 
;i  oilizing  arms  control  agreements. 
I  these  paths  lead  to  a  common 
;  reventing  conflict,  reducing  the 
)  A'ar,  and  safeguarding  the  peace. 
]  TV  .American  President  has  ac- 
'  his  iTucial  objective  as  his  most 
spiiiisihility.  But  preserving  the 
inquires  more  than  wishful  think- 
r  vague  good  intentions.  Concrete, 
i'  action  is  required  to  free  the 
1  -om  the  specter  of  nuclear  con- 
-id  that's  why  we  will  continue  to 
lentlessly  to  achieve  nuclear 
li  at  the  lowest  possible  levels, 
•i  words,  policies,  and  actions  all 
'ear  to  the  world  our  country's 
jield  conviction  that  nuclear  war 
i:>calt'  would  be  a  tragedy  of  un- 
I  ed  scope.  Time  and  again, 
•  I  has  e.xercised  unilateral 
=  t,  p)o(l  will,  and  a  sincere  com- 
£t  to  effective  arms  control.  Un- 
r;ely,  these  actions  alone  have  not 
lie  us  truly  safer,  and  they 
1  reduced  the  danger  of  nuclear 
(er  the  past  year,  for  example, 
f  ets  have  deployed  over  1,200  in- 
tnental  ballistic  missile  (ICBM) 
els,  more  than  the  entire 
-  eper  program. 
''  history  of  American  involve- 
''  arms  control  shows  us  what 
f  nd  what  doesn't  work.  The  fact 
ih  the  past,  our  one-sided 


restraint  and  good  will  failed  to  promote 
similar  restraint  and  good  will  from  the 
Soviet  Union.  They  also  failed  to  pro- 
duce meaningful  arms  control.  But 
history  also  teaches  us  that  when  the 
United  States  has  shown  the  resolve  to 
remain  strong,  stabilizing  arms  control 
can  be  achieved. 

In  the  late  1960s,  we  made  a  major 
effort  to  negotiate  an  antiballistic  missile 
(ABM)  treaty  with  the  Soviet  Union. 
After  the  Soviet  leadership  demon- 
strated a  clear  lack  of  interest,  the  Con- 
gress agreed  to  fund  an  antiballistic 
missile  building  program.  And  the  result 
was  predictable.  Once  the  Soviets  knew 
we  were  going  ahead,  they  came  to  the 
negotiating  table,  and  we  negotiated  a 
treaty.  It  was  formally  adopted  and  re- 
mains in  force  today. 

Obviously,  the  best  way  to  nuclear 
stability  and  a  lasting  peace  is  through 
negotiations.  And  this  is  the  course  that 
we've  set.  And  if  we  demonstrate  our 
resolve,  it  can  lead  to  success. 

It  was  against  this  background  that 
I  established  a  bipartisan  Commission  on 
Strategic  Forces  last  January  and 
directed  it  to  review  the  strategic  pro- 
gram for  U.S.  forces  with  particular  em- 
phasis on  intercontinental  ballistic 
missile  systems  and  their  basing.  A 
distinguished  bipartisan  panel  of 
Americans  who  served  on  the  commis- 
sion, and  those  who  served  as  senior 
counselors,  have  performed  a  great  serv- 
ice to  their  country,  and  we  all  owe 
them  a  debt  of  gratitude. 

Brent  Scowcroft,  the  commission's 
chairman,  other  commission  members, 
Harold  Brown,  and  the  senior  con- 
sultants are  here  today.  I  want  to  ex- 
press my  appreciation  to  you  all  for  a 
tough  job  extraordinarily  well  done. 

In  the  finest  spirit  of  bipartisanship, 
the  commission  unanimously  arrived  at 
clear,  important  recommendations  on 
some  of  the  most  difficult  issues  of  our 
time.  During  the  past  3  months,  the 
commission  held  dozens  of  formal  meet- 
ings and  numerous  small  conferences. 
They  talked  to  over  200  technical  ex- 
perts and  consulted  closely  with  the 
Congress.  The  commission  members 
sought  a  common  objective — to  achieve 
a  greater  degree  of  national  consensus 
concerning  our  approach  to  strategic 


forces  modernization  and  arms  control. 

As  the  commission's  report  con- 
cludes, "If  we  can  begin  to  see  ourselves 
in  dealing  with  these  issues,  not  as 
political  partisans  or  as  crusaders  for 
one  specific  solution  to  a  part  of  this 
complex  set  of  problems,  but  rather  as 
citizens  of  a  great  nation  with  the 
humbling  obligation  to  persevere  in  the 
long-run  task  of  preserving  both  peace 
and  liberty  for  the  world,  a  common 
perspective  may  finally  be  found."  These 
words  guided  the  work  of  the  commis- 
sion. It  is  my  fervent  hope  that  they  will 
guide  all  of  us  as  we  work  toward  the 
solution  of  what  has  been  a  difficult  and 
lengthy  issue. 

The  commission  has  completed  its 
work  and  last  week  submitted  its  report 
to  me.  It  was  immediately  released,  as 
you  know,  to  the  public.  After  reviewing 
the  report,  I  met  with  the  National 
Security  Council.  They  endorse  the  com- 
mission's recommendations,  as  do  all 
members  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff. 
And  so  do  I. 

First,  the  commission  urges  us  to 
continue  the  strategic  modernization 
program  which  I  announced  in  October 
of  1981.  It  reaffirms  that  the  need  re- 
mains for  improvements  in  the  com- 
mand, control,  and  communications  of 
our  strategic  forces  and  continuation  of 
our  bomber,  submarine,  and  cruise 
missile  program. 

Second,  the  commission  urges 
modernization  of  our  ICBM  forces.  We 
should  immediately  proceed  to  develop 
and  produce  the  Peacekeeper  missile 
and  deploy  100  in  existing  Minuteman 
silos  near  Warren  Air  Force  Base  in 
Wyoming.  At  the  same  time,  the  com- 
mission recommends  that  we  begin 
engineering  the  design  for  a  small, 
single-warhead  missile.  If  strategic  and 
technical  considerations  warrant,  this 
missile  could  be  ready  for  deployment  in 
the  early  1990s.  Incidentally,  this  mod- 
ernization program  will  save  about  $1V2 
billion  in  1984  and  even  more  than  that 
in  each  of  the  next  2  years. 

Third,  the  commission  recommends 
major  research  efforts  in  strategic 
defense  and  a  thorough  research  pro- 
gram of  hardening,  making  our  land- 
based  missile  systems  more  secure.  This 
modernization  effort  is  the  final  compo- 
nent of  our  comprehensive,  strategic 
program.  It  will  mean  a  safer,  more 
secure  America.  And  it  will  provide 
clear  evidence  to  the  Soviet  Union  that 
it  is  in  their  best  interest  to  negotiate 
with  us  in  good  faith  and  with 


ARMS  CONTROL 


seriousness  of  purpose.  That  adds  up  to 
an  important  incentive  for  both  arms 
control  and  deterrence,  for  peace  and 
security  now  and  far  into  the  future. 

Finally,  the  commission  underscores 
the  need  for  ambitious  arms  control 
negotiations— negotiations  that  would 
lead  to  agreements  that  are  balanced, 
promote  stability  in  time  of  crisis,  and 
result  in  meaningful,  verifiable  reduc- 
tions. These  are  precisely  the  objectives 
of  our  arms  control  proposals  now  on 
the  table  in  Geneva.  These  are— I  want 
to  reemphasize  that  we're  in  Geneva 
seeking  equitable,  reliable  agreements 
that  would  bring  real  reductions. 

The  task  before  us  is  to  demonstrate 
our  resolve,  our  national  will,  and  our 
good  faith.  That's  absolutely  essential 
both  for  maintaining  an  effective  deter- 
rent and  for  achieving  successful  arms 
reductions.  Make  no  mistake;  unless  we 
modernize  our  land-based  missile 
systems,  the  Soviet  Union  will  have  no 
real  reason  to  negotiate  meaningful 
reductions.  If  we  fail  to  act,  we  cannot 
reasonably  expect  an  acceptable  outcome 
in  our  arms  control  negotiations,  and  we 
will  also  weaken  the  deterrent  posture 
that  has  preserved  the  peace  for  more 
than  a  generation. 

Therefore,  I  urge  the  Congress  to 
join  me  now  in  supporting  this  bipar- 
tisan program  to  pursue  arms  control 
agreements  that  promote  stability,  to 
meet  the  needs  of  our  ICBM  force  to- 
day, and  to  move  to  a  more  stable  ICBM 
structure  in  the  future. 

To  follow  up  on  the  commission's 
recommendations,  I  have  asked  Brent 
Scowcroft,  in  his  capacity  as  chairman, 
to  keep  me  closely  advised  as  this  issue 
moves  toward  resolution,  particularly  as 
it  relates  to  arms  control. 

For  more  than  a  decade,  each  of 
four  Administrations  made  proposals  for 
arms  control  and  modernization.  Unfor- 
tunately, each  became  embroiled  in 
political  controversy.  The  members  of 
the  commission,  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  I 
have  all  had  to  take  fresh  looks  at  our 
previous  positions.  But  despite  the  wide 
range  of  views  these  groups  have  held  in 
the  past,  we  now  have  a  program  that 
has  our  unanimous  support. 

Support  by  the  Congress  and  the 
American  people  for  this  consensus  will 
unite  us  in  our  common  search  for  ways 
to  strengthen  our  national  security, 
reduce  the  risk  of  war,  and  ultimately 
reduce  the  level  of  nuclear  weapons.  We 
can  no  longer  afford  to  delay.  The  time 
to  act  is  now. 


LETTER  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  19,  1983^ 

On  January  3,  1983,  I  established  a  bipar- 
tisan Commission  to  respond  to  the  issues 
raised  by  the  Congress  regarding  the 
Peacekeeper  missile,  possible  alternatives  to 
the  Peacekeeper,  and  possible  alternative 
ICBM  basing  modes.  The  report,  which  the 
Commission  submitted  to  me,  was  delivered 
to  you  last  week.  Attached  is  a  classified 
report  prepared  by  the  Department  of 
Defense  submitted  pursuant  to  the  provisions 
of  subsection  (7)  of  Title  V  of  the  Department 
of  Defense  Appropriations  Act,  1983,  enacted 
as  part  of  P.L.  97-377.  The  attached  docu- 
ment addresses  the  issues  set  out  in  subsec- 
tion (7). 

I  am  pleased  to  report  to  you  that  the 
distinguished  group  of  Americans  who  served 
on  the  Commission  have  unanimously  agreed 
on  a  package  of  actions,  which  I  strongly  sup- 
port, and  on  which  Secretary  Weinberger, 
the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  Secretary  Shultz 
and  the  National  Security  Council  have  joined 
with  me  in  supporting.  They  are  as  follows: 

(1)  Improve  as  a  first  priority  the  com- 
mand, control,  and  communications  for  our 
strategic  forces;  continue  with  high  priority 
the  Trident  submarine  and  D-5  missile  pro- 
grams; and  continue  the  bomber  and  air- 
launched  cruise  missile  efforts  as  planned. 

(2)  Proceed  with  the  immediate  produc- 
tion of  the  Peacekeeper  missile,  and  deploy- 
ment of  100  such  missiles  in  existing 
Minuteman  silos  in  the  Francis  E.  Warren 
AFB  area,  which  I  propose  as  the  alternative 
basing  plan  required  by  P.L.  97-377. 
Specifically,  the  first  50  missiles  will  replace 
the  Minuteman  missiles  in  the  400th 
Strategic  Missile  Squadron  (SMS).  In  turn, 
the  second  50  will  replace  the  Minuteman 
missiles  in  the  319th  SMS.  I  have  chosen 
Francis  E.  Warren  AFB  because  the  existing 
silos  at  that  location  offer  the  best  opera- 
tional considerations. 

(3)  Commence  engineering  design  of  a 
small,  single  warhead  ICBM.  If  strategic  and 
technical  considerations  warrant,  such  a 
missile  could  be  ready  for  full-scale  develop- 
ment in  1987  and  potential  deployment  in  the 
early  1990's. 

(4)  Expand  research  into,  and  undertake 
the  most  rigorous  examination  of,  all  forms 
of  defense  against  ballistic  missiles.  This  in- 
cludes work  on  penetration  aids. 

(5)  Undertake  a  specific  program  to 
resolve  uncertainties  regarding  silo  and 
shelter  hardness,  a  study  of  fratricide  effects, 
and  investigation  of  different  types  of  land- 
based  vehicles  and  launchers,  particularly 
hardened  vehicles. 

Finally,  I  reconfirm  that  I  am  fully  com- 
mitted to  continue  to  pursue  ambitious  and 
objective  arms  reduction  negotiations  with  a 
goal  of  agreements  that  are  balanced,  pro- 
mote stability  in  time  of  crisis,  constitute 
meaningful  force  reductions,  and  are 
verifiable.  As  you  know,  our  proposals  to 
secure  reductions  of  all  types  of  weapons  are 
before  the  Soviets  in  many  forums. 


I  urge  the  Congress  to  join  me  ii"'.\ 
this  bipartisan  effort  to  settle  on  a  m^ii 
zation  plan  for  our  strategic  forces    I    r 
than  a  decade,  each  of  four  admini^^^' 
has  made  proposals  for  arms  contr^ 
modernization  that  have  become  eim 
political  controversy. 

Balancing  a  number  of  factors,  tlic 
bers  of  the  Commission,  the  Secretai\  > 
Defense.  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  and  I  '  .; 
had  to  take  fresh  looks  at  our  prevn.  , 
tions.  Despite  the  range  of  views  tin  , 
groups  have  held  in  the  past,  we  arr  pi 
ing  to  you  a  unanimous  view  on  thi.'i  \  n 
issue.  Your  support  for  the  consensus  c 
unite  us  in  taking  a  major  step  forward 
our  common  search  for  ways  to  ensuic 
tional  security. 

Sincerely, 

RON.ALI.  h. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  nf 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  25.  l;t^ 

^Identical  letters  addressed  to  Tli<ii  . 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  id' 
Representatives,  George  Bush,  Presnlf  ni 
the  Senate,  John  Tower,  chairman  ol  tl 
Senate  Armed  Services  Committee,  .M;  <. 
Hatfield,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Appn  ia 
tions  Committee,  Melvin  Price,  chairm,-  «i 
the  House  Armed  Services  Committir,  :> 
Jamie  L.  Whitten.  chairman  of  the  H-i    ■ 
propriations  Committee  (text  from  \\  >  - 
Compilation  of  Presidential  Documeii;,- 
Apr.  25,  1983).  ■ 


U.S.-Soviet  Direc 
Communication 
Links 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
APR.  12,  1983' 

I  am  pleased  to  note  the  completio  )f 
the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  Deft  se 
on  direct  communication  links  and  he 
measures  to  enhance  stability.  1  be  v« 
that  the  proposals  in  this  report,  wch 
was  prepared  in  accordance  with  F  'li' 
Law  97-252,  are  fully  consistent  wt 
our  goal  of  reducing  the  risk  of  nuaJ 
war. 

The  Department  of  Defense  re  rt 
recommends  a  number  of  new  meEir« 
Of  special  note  are  those  measures  ro 
posed  to  improve  communications  d 
build  confidence  between  the  Unitf 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  They  i- 
elude:  addition  of  a  high-speed  facfW 
capability  to  the  direct  communica  ins 
link  (Hotline),  which  would  permit  e 
transmission  of  full  pages  of  text  i  i 


18 


Department  of  State  Bieti 


EAST  ASIA 


and  graphs;  the  estafcjishment  of  a 
nilitary  communications  hnk, 
would  be  a  high-speed  facsimile 
tween  the  U.S.  National  Military 
land  Center  and  its  Soviet  counter- 
ind  the  upgrading  of  existing 
latic  communications  channels 
igher  speed  data  transmission 
lity.  Also  included  is  a  proposal 
agreement,  open  to  all  states, 
would  call  on  the  signatories  to 
t  with  each  other  in  the  event  of  a 
r  incident  involving  a  terrorist 

e  Department  of  Defense  recom- 
tions  complement  the  arms  reduc- 
roposals  which  the  United  States 
/  has  made  to  the  Soviet  Union  in 
rategic  arms  reduction  talks 
T)  and  the  negotiations  on 
ediate-range  nuclear  forces  (INF), 
e  initiatives  also  complement  the 
■nce-building  measures  the  United 
alreadv  has  proposed  to  the 
Union 'in  the  START  and  INF 
itions.  Those  measures  would 
the  danger  that  nuclear  war 
ver  arise  from  accident,  misinter- 
m,  or  miscalculation.  They  in- 
roposals  that  the  two  sides  notify 
her  in  advance  of  all  launches  of 
itinental,  submarine-launched, 
jd-based,  longer-range 

i'diate-range  ballistic  missiles.  Ad- 
ly,  they  would  require  each  party 
ide  advance  notice  of  major 
i'  exercises  involving  nuclear 
.nd  to  exchange  information  of 
dented  breadth  and  detail  about 
rategic  and  intermediate-range 
missiles. 

r  the  next  few  weeks,  I  will  be 
he  recommendations  in  the 
!  Department  report  my  full  con- 


t  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
tial  Documents  of  Apr.  18.  198 


Americans  Missing  in  Southeast  Asia 


by  Daniel  A.  O'Donohue 

Stdfniinil  hrfnrr  thr  Siih,'<,mmittee 
on  Asian  n,i,l  I'nnn,- AjJ:,i  rs  uf  the 
Hoiisr  Fiirriijn  Affairs  Committee  on 
Ma  nil  .'..'.  ms.i.  Mr.  O'Donohue  is  Depu- 
ti/  A^sisfaiil  Secretary  for  Ecuit  Asian 
and  I'acfic  Affairs.^ 

I  am  pleased  to  have  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  the  issue  of  Americans  missing 
in  Southeast  Asia. 

This  Administration  is  fully  commit- 
ted to  the  goal  of  accounting  for  our 
MIAs  [missing-in-action].  President 
Reagan,  in  his  address  to  the  National 
League  of  Families  of  American 
Prisoners  and  Missing  in  Southeast 
Asia,  emphasized  the  importance  this 
Administration  places  on  this  goal.  The 
President  laid  out  as  the  highest  na- 
tional priority  the  following:  the  return 
of  all  POWs  [prisoners-of-war];  the 
fullest  possible  accounting  for  the  still- 
missing;  and  the  repatriation  of  the  re- 
mains of  those  who  died  serving  our  na- 
tion. He  pledged,  and  I  quote,  "the  full 
resources  of  our  government  are  now 
committed  to  these  goals." 

In  support  of  the  goals  set  forth  by 
the  President,  the  Department  of  State 
has  been  engaged  in  a  variety  of  ac- 
tivities which  I  would  like  to  describe. 

First,  we  continue  to  press  the 
POW/MIA  issue  with  the  Lao  and  Viet- 
namese Governments.  As  you  are 
aware,  we  have  serious  policy  dif- 
ferences with  Vietnam,  especially  on 
Kampuchea.  Despite  these  differences, 
we  have  maintained  bilateral  dialogue 
with  the  Vietnamese  Government  on  the 
POW/MIA  issue  and  only  on  this  issue 
because  of  its  great  humanitarian  impor- 
tance. We  are  engaged  with  Laos  in 
mutual  efforts  to  improve  relations 
through  concrete  steps,  and  both 
governments  have  already  taken  positive 
steps  forward  in  our  dialogue.  President 
Reagan  told  the  National  League  of 
Families  in  January  that  "progress  on 
the  POW/MIA  issue  will  be  the  principal 
measure"  of  Lao  sincerity  in  improving 
relations. 

Second,  we  are  continuing  to  seek 
the  assistance  of  other  governments  in 
conveying  to  the  Lao  and  Vietnamese 
the  importance  we  attach  to  progress  on 
this  issue.  We  seek  out  every  appropri- 
ate diplomatic  channel  to  be  sure  that 
this  issue  is  not  forgotten. 

Third,  we  regularly  assist  the 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA)  in  its 


investigation  of  live  sighting  reports 
through  contacts  with  other  govern- 
ments. 

Fourth,  our  Southeast  Asian  posts 
have  reviewed  procedures  for  debriefing 
refugees  to  assure  that  we  are  getting 
all  of  the  information  available.  We  are 
continuing  to  seek  the  cooperation  of  the 
Government  of  Thailand  in  permitting 
access  to  Lao  and  Vietnamese  refugees 
in  "austere"  camps  who  may  have  infor- 
mation about  missing  Americans.  This  is 
an  area  in  which  we  are  making  slow 
but  steady  progress,  and  ultimately  we 
believe  we  will  have  an  opportunity  to 
talk  with  all  refugees  who  can  help  us. 

Fifth,  at  our  request,  the  Depart- 
ment of  Health  and  Human  Services 
sent  almost  .500  letters  to  refugee 
mutual  assistance  associations  re- 
questing that  they  contact  their 
members  for  information  regarding 
POW/MIAs.  Our  Bureau  for  Refugee 
Programs  also  made  a  similar  request  to 
the  American  Council  of  Voluntary 
Agencies. 

Finally,  we  have  supported  the 
League  of  Families'  private  efforts  by 
briefings  and  through  the  actions  of  our 
embassy  in  Vientiane  to  facilitate  the 
league's  very  useful  visit  to  Laos  last 
September. 

Investigations  of  live  sighting 
reports  are  assigned  the  highest  priority 
and  necessary  resources  based  on  the 
assumption  that  some  Americans  are 
still  being  held  captive.  While  we  do  not 
have  hard  evidence  of  live  POWs,  we 
continue  to  actively  solicit  and  evaluate 
information  from  all  sources. 

The  progress  toward  resolution  of 
the  POW/MIA  issue  is  far  slower  than 
we  all  would  like.  Approximately  2,500 
Americans  killed  or  missing  during  the 
Indochina  war  have  not  been  fully  ac- 
counted for.  Of  this  number,  about  1,150 
are  known  to  have  been  killed  in  action, 
but  their  remains  have  not  been 
recovered.  Between  February  and  April 
of  1973,  the  Hanoi  government  released 
591  American  prisoners.  An  additional 
68  Americans  stranded  in  Vietnam  in 
April  of  1975  left  in  the  following  year. 
To  date,  the  Vietnamese  have  returned 
79  sets  of  remains.  The  most  recent 
repatriation  of  remains  from  Vietnam, 
in  October  of  1982,  involved  those  of 
four  U.S.  military  personnel.  To  em- 
phasize the  importance  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment attaches  to  this  issue.  Deputy 
Assistant  Secretary  [Richard]  Armitage 
visited  Hanoi  in  February  of  1982.  The 
Vietnamese  last  fall  accepted  our  pro- 
posal for  regular,  technical  meetings  and 


19 


EAST  ASIA 


agreed  to  four  a  year.  These  meetings, 
two  of  which  have  already  occurred,  pro- 
vide opportunities  for  exchanges  of  in- 
formation and,  we  hope,  will  lead  to  fur- 
ther progress  in  identification  and 
recovery  of  remains. 

With  respect  to  Laos,  although  they 
have  returned  only  two  sets  of  U.S.  re- 
mains in  past  years,  the  League  of 
Families'  visit  in  September  was  helpful 
in  encouraging  the  Lao  Government  to 
be  more  cooperative  on  MIA  matters 
and  in  its  relationship  with  the  United 
States.  For  the  first  time  since  1975,  in 
February  of  this  year,  the  Lao  permitted 
a  team  from  the  Joint  Casualty  Resolu- 
tion Center  and  the  Central  Identifica- 
tion Laboratory  to  visit  Vientiane  for 
talks  with  Lao  counterparts  about 
POW/MIA  matters. 

It  is  important  to  keep  foremost  in 
mind  that  when  private  Americans  try 
to  force  their  own  solutions,  our 
government-to-government  efforts  are 
jeopardized.  We  do  not  support  or  con- 
done illegal  forays  by  private  Americans 
to  search  for  remains  or  prisoners.  They 
seriously  complicate  our  efforts,  involve 


personal  risks  for  those  involved  and 
possible  arrest  for  violating  the  laws  of 
the  countries  which  they  leave  and 
enter.  In  fact,  as  Judge  [William]  Clark 
[Assistant  to  the  President  for  National 
Security  Affairs]  stated  to  the  National 
League  of  Families  in  January,  "We  are 
resolutely  opposed  to  private  cross- 
border  forays.  Such  actions  interfere 
with  and  damage  legitimate  efforts  on  a 
number  of  fronts."  I  cannot  emphasize 
this  point  too  strongly.  For  our  part,  we 
accept  POW/MIA  information  from  any 
source.  Any  information  on  material 
which  is  turned  over  receives  thorough 
examination  and  analysis  by  DIA. 

In  closing,  I  would  stress  that  we 
care  deeply  about  our  missing  men.  We 
are  devoting  our  resources  on  a  highest 
priority  basis  to  the  fullest  possible  ac- 
counting of  those  still  missing  and  the 
repatriation  of  remains  of  those  who 
died  serving  our  nation. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Vietnamese  Attacks  on 
Refugee  Settlements 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  31.  1983' 

We  are  appalled  that  Vietnamese  forces 
on  March  31  attacked  indiscriminately 
settlements  containing  thousands  of 
civilian  Khmer  who  fled  to  the  border 
from  Vietnam's  1978  invasion  and  oc- 
cupation of  Kampuchea. 

We  strongly  condemn  these  attacks 
which  are  a  consequence  of  Vietnam's 
actions  in  Kampuchea  in  violation  of  the 
UN  Charter  and  General  Assembly 
resolutions.  While  details  are  not  entire- 
ly clear,  thousands  of  civilians  have  been 
forced  to  flee  for  survival  from  the 
March  31  attacks. 

Just  2  months  ago,  the  Vietnamese 
attacked  a  Khmer  refugee  camp  near 
the  Thai  border  village  of  Nong  Chan, 
putting  to  flight  some  40,000  civilians 
and  destroying  their  settlement.  We 
noted  the  Royal  Thai  Government  state- 
ment of  March  31  about  the  attacks  and 
join  the  Royal  Thai  Government  in  call- 
ing on  Hanoi  to  respect  Thai  territory 
and  in  condemning  the  attack  on 
peaceful  civilian  inhabitants  of  the 
border  area. 

We  applaud  the  prompt  efforts  of 
the  Thai  Government  and  international 


organizations  to  render  humanitarian 
assistance  to  the  unfortunate  victims 
who  have  fled  into  Thailand  and  will 
lend  our  own  support  to  these  efforts. 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
APR.  4,  19831 

Since  our  statement  of  March  31  con- 
demning attacks  by  Vietnamese  forces 
on  Khmer  civilian  refugee  settlements, 
we  have  seen  reports  that  indiscriminate 
attacks  on  refugee  camps  have  con- 
tinued along  the  Thai-Kampuchean 
border. 

We  condemn  Vietnamese  actions 
which  defy  humanitarian  principles  and 
which  have  increased  still  further  the 
suffering  of  Khmer  who  fled  to  the 
border  to  escape  Vietnam's  occupation 
of  their  country. 

We  note  the  joint  ASEAN  [Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  state- 
ment of  April  1  about  the  attacks  and 
join  ASEAN  in  condemning  unprovoked 
and  indiscriminate  attacks  by  Viet- 
namese Armed  Forces  against  Khmer 
civilians  and  threats  to  Thai  territory. 


U.S.  Military 
Assistance 
to  Thailand 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 
APR.  8,  1983' 

Over  the  next  10  days,  three  shiimi  t 
of  American-built  military  equipmei  a 
due  to  arrive  in  Thailand  in  respon;  t 
Thai  requests  for  speeded  up  deli\  t 
The  initial  delivery  will  take  pb 
weekend  when  a  U.S.  military  \ 
due  to  unload  a  number  of  Red.    • 
ground-to-air  missiles  at  Don  Muai, 
Royal  Thai  Air  Force  Base.  That  w  [ 
midday  Saturday,  April  9. 

On  Monday,  April  11,  a  special 
airlift  of  two  American  C-5  traiisp  ; 
will  deliver  155mm  extended-raii^t 
howitzers,  along  with  ammuniti.-iL 
These  new  model  198  howitzers  ut 
made  available  from  America's  iiivi 
for  its  own  forces  to  underline  I'.S  u 
port  for  Thailand.  On  April  19  add  >i 
extended-range  howitzers  will  iwvv  » 
Thailand  aboard  the  merchant  sln| 
S.S.  Benjamin  Harrison.  The  picH 
ment  of  these  weapons  for  deli\  or}  ' 
Thailand  was  also  accelerated  as  a  < 
of  a  Thai  request. 

These  weapons  have  been  pure  s 
by  Thailand  under  the  U.S.  foreigi 
military  sales  (FMS)  program.  Than 
annually  purchases  military  equipn  il 
averaging  between  $150  and  $200 
million  in  value.  In  addition,  last 
year— FY  1982— the  United  State 
allocated  to  Thailand  $80  million  ir, 
credits  and  grants  for  this  purpose  k 
far  this  year,  $66  million  has  been  * 
available,  and  the  Administration  i  f 
questing  a  supplemental  appropna  n 
an  additional  $25  million. 

In  addition  to  speeding  deliver  if 
military  supplies,  the  United  Stateiis 
responded  to  the  situation  created  j 
Vietnamese  attacks  along  the  Thai 
Kampuchean  border  by  an  immedi:! 
grant  of  $1.5  million  to  the  Interm^i 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (ICR(f' 
emergency  medical  care  and  other , 
humanitarian  assistance  to  victims 
fighting.  Our  Ambassador  there,  J  i" 
Gunther  Dean,  also  recently  preseiX 
$3  million  to  aid  Thai  villagers  affee 
by  the  continuing  conflict  in  Kamph 
and  the  influx  of  refugees. 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  I" 
ment  spokesman  John  Hughes.  ■ 


'Read  to  news  correspondents  by  acting 
Department  spokesman  Alan  Romberg.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bi9' 


DNOMICS 


)oking  Toward  Williamsburg: 
IS.  Economic  Policy 


nneth  W.  Dam 

idress  at  the  Graduate  Institution 
vmatimial  Studies  in  Geneva  on 
21.  1983.  Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy 
ary  of  State. 

Tland  is  the  first  stop  in  a  trip 
ill  take  me  to  Norway,  Denmark, 
GJermany,  and  Hungary.  The  pur- 
f  my  visit  to  Western  Europe  is  to 
3  with  our  partners  in  the  in- 
il  democracies  the  challenges  we 
'hose  challenges  are  military, 
il,  and  economic. 

We  must  respond  to  the  Soviet 
buildup  by  modernizing  our  deter- 
ihere  necessary  and  achieving  ef- 

I  arms  control  where  possible. 

!We  must  sustain  our  democratic 
at  home  and  support  them 
\nd  we  must  encourage  noninfla- 
jl  growth  and  maintain  the  open 
i|  •  system  on  which  it  depends. 

h  last  of  these,  the  need  for  global 
)| ,  is  my  subject  today. 
i*  are  now  emerging  from  a  reces- 
;it  lasted  17  months.  That  reces- 
\s  the  longest  since  the  end  of 
I'War  II.  Economic  activity  in 
J\merica  and  Europe  has  declined; 
J  industrial  production  has  leveled 
t  growth  of  several  developing 
tes  has  stalled  under  the  weight  of 
i  0  billion  international  debt. 
Tloyment  has  soared— 32  million 
lare  out  of  work  in  the  24  ad- 
e  countries  of  the  Organization  for 

II  lie  Cooperation  and  Development 

^  all  know  that  the  recession  has 
e  more  than  just  hardship.  It  has 
nl  democracy  in  some  countries 
iJised  political  upheavals  in  others, 
elisputes  have  tested  the  bonds 
1  lonti-time  allies.  The  recession 
■lllt'ii^eii  the  West's  capacity  to 
I  he  Sdviet  arms  buildup  and  en- 
i  il  'lc|>endence  on  trade  with 
1^1  Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
'  ha\e  been  guided  through  this 
».n  by  the  basic  principle  of  allied 
Ktion:  If  any  one  of  us  tries  to 
r.  ts  problems  by  shifting  the 
S'to  its  partners,  all  of  us  will  fail, 
f^re  are  now  signs  of  economic  re- 
i,  several  industrial  countries. 


Those  signs  should  be  even  more  obvious 
by  the  end  of  May.  At  that  time  the 
heads  of  government  of  the  seven 
largest  industrial  democracies,  together 
with  the  President  of  the  EC  [European 
Communities]  Commission,  will  meet  in 
historic  Williamsburg,  Virginia. 

My  theme  today  is  that  the 
Williamsburg  summit  will  represent  a 
departure  in  tone  and  content  from 
those  of  the  recent  past.  Previous  sum- 
mits have  been  structured  and  formal. 
Williamsburg  is  intended  to  be  flexible 
and  informal.  Previous  summits  have 
emphasized  anti-inflationary  policies.  At 
Williamsburg  the  emphasis  will  shift  to 
policies  that  promote  growth — without 
reigniting  inflation. 

In  discussing  the  issues  the  summit 
partners  will  face,  I  shall  divide  my 
remarks  into  three  sections:  first,  an 
analysis  of  the  causes  of  the  world  re- 
cession; second,  a  description  of  its 
cure— world  economic  growth;  and 
third,  a  survey  of  the  issues  we  cannot 
ignore  if  we  are  to  seize  the  recovery 
that  is  within  our  grasp. 

The  Recession 

The  present  state  of  the  world  economy 
has  its  roots  in  the  1960s  and  1970s. 
Rising  inflation  in  the  late  1960s 
changed  the  competitive  position  of  in- 
dustries in  Europe,  Japan,  and  the 
United  States  and  undermined  the 
system  of  fixed  exchange  rates.  The 
move  to  floating  exchange  rates  in  1973 
was  followed  within  a  year  by  a 
quadrupling  of  world  oil  prices  and  a 
shift  in  the  distribution  of  the  world's 
wealth. 

After  1973  the  Organization  of 
Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  (OPEC) 
moved  into  current  account  surplus  and 
the  oil-importing  nations  moved  into  cor- 
responding deficit.  From  1974  to  1980, 
the  industrial  nations  faced  current  ac- 
count deficits  which  averaged  $20  billion 
per  year.  The  non-oil  developing  coun- 
tries faced  annual  deficits  of  $47  billion. 
These  deficits  placed  huge  demands  for 
capital  on  financial  markets.  Commercial 
banks  became  the  risk-taking  interme- 
diaries between  OPEC  and  the  borrow- 
ing countries.  As  a  result,  the  level  of 
international  debt,  now  $700  billion,  in- 
creased more  than  sevenfold  from  1972 
to  1982.  In  the  same  10-year  period  debt 


to  private  lenders  jumped  from  48%  to 
60%  of  outstanding  LDC  [less  developed 
country]  debt. 

It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to 
characterize  the  legacy  of  the  oil  shock 
years  as  a  debt  problem.  What  we  face 
today  is  an  income-earning  problem. 
True,  LDCs  borrowed  a  lot  in  the  1970s, 
but  corporations  borrow  a  lot  also.  The 
difference  is  that  corporations  invest  in 
productive  capacity  to  generate  income 
to  repay  their  debts.  Some  LDCs, 
however,  tended  to  invest  in  consump- 
tion rather  than  production,  borrowing 
to  finance  internal  income  transfers. 
This  questionable  strategy  was  tolerable 
as  long  as  LDC  export  earnings  grew 
fast  enough  to  service  their  debts.  That 
was  the  case  from  1975  to  1979,  when 
LDC  exports  grew  22%  annually, 
roughly  keeping  pace  with  the  25%  an- 
nual growth  of  LDC  debt. 

After  the  second  oil  shock  in 
1979-80,  however,  the  major  industrial- 
ized nations  adopted  more  restrictive 
monetary  policies.  Those  policies  slowed 
inflation,  boosted  real  interest  rates,  and 
set  in  motion  a  retrenchment  from  the 
economic  excesses  of  the  1970s.  The 
average  price  per  barrel  of  OPEC  oil 
jumped  from  $13  at  the  end  of  1978  to 
over  $35  in  1981.  This  increase  drew 
$200  billion,  or  3%,  from  the  national  in- 
comes of  OECD  countries.  The  corre- 
sponding reduction  in  real  demand  in 
the  West  reduced  LDC  export  earnings 
and  depressed  prices  of  LDC  com- 
modities. Simultaneously,  high  interest 
rates  and  a  strong  dollar  increased  LDC 
debt  service  costs  from  18%  of  their 
total  exports  in  1980  to  24%  in  1982. 

The  problem  faced  by  high-debt  de- 
veloping countries  is  serious.  Rising  debt 
service  costs  consume  a  growing  propor- 
tion of  declining  export  earnings.  Many 
LDCs  are  now  struggling  to  increase  ex- 
ports and  curb  imports.  To  manage  their 
debt  problems,  they  need  access  to  our 
markets.  This  comes  at  a  time  when  we 
in  the  West  have  experienced  record 
levels  of  unemployment,  worsened  trade 
balances,  and  reduced  real  income.  As  a 
result,  the  international  financial,  trade, 
and  monetary  systems  are  under  serious 
strain. 

The  Cure:  World  Economic  Growth 

But  trying  to  solve  the  debt  problem 
without  solving  the  world  economic 
problem  is  like  putting  out  the  fire  in  the 
ashtray  when  the  living  room  is  ablaze. 
The  only  lasting  solution  to  the  income- 
earning  problem  of  the  LDCs,  as  well  as 


ECONOMICS 


the  serious  economic  problems  of  the  in- 
dustrialized countries,  is  sustained  global 
growth.  Such  growth  will  require  sound 
domestic  policies  that  keep  inflation  low 
and  spur  production  and  investment. 

Several  major  industrialized  coun- 
tries are  poised  to  lead  an  expansion  of 
the  world  economy.  In  the  United 
States,  for  example,  inflation  (measured 
by  the  consumer  price  index)  has 
plunged  from  12.4%  in  1980  to  just  3.8% 
in  the  12  months  ending  this  January. 
The  prime  rate  is  now  at  10.5%— about 
half  its  recent  peak  of  21.5%.  In  Febru- 
ary industrial  production  rose  for  the 
third  consecutive  month  to  a  level  1.8% 
above  the  November  1981  low.  Finally, 
the  Dow-Jones  industrial  average  has 
topped  the  1100  mark  for  the  first  time 
in  history.  Our  Commerce  Department's 
chief  economist  called  these  figures 
"damn  good  news." 

The  recent  rollback  in  oil  prices  is 
more  good  news.  Just  as  oil  price  in- 
creases in  the  1970s  were  deflationary  in 
terms  of  aggregate  spending,  price 
declines  should  prove  expansionary.  It 
has  been  estimated  that  a  $5-per-barrel 
decline  will  boost  gross  domestic  product 
by  0.5%  this  year  in  the  OECD  area  and 
decrease  the  inflation  rate  by  one 
percentage  point,  lowering  interest  rates 
as  well.  Lower  oil  prices  may  hurt  some 
oil  producers  such  as  Mexico,  Venezuela, 
and  Nigeria.  But  the  benefits  from  lower 
interest  rates  and  higher  economic 
growth  should  be  much  greater  world- 
wide. 

We  are  now  at  a  new  beginning.  In- 
flation and  energy  prices— the  twin  con- 
straints on  growth  since  the  early 
1970s— have  moderated.  At  Ottawa  and 
Versailles  the  emphasis  was  on  anti- 
inflationary  policies.  At  Williamsburg 
the  emphasis  will  shift  to  growth.  We 
should  not  resist  this  shift,  but  discipline 
it.  The  industrial  democracies  of  North 
America,  Europe,  and  Asia  must  forge 
an  economic  strategy  for  sustained 
growth  that  does  not  imperil  the  gains 
made  against  inflation  over  the  past  few 
years.  Such  a  strategy  would  have  to 
concentrate  on  four  areas: 

First,  strengthening  the  open 
trading  system; 

Second,  supporting  the  international 
financial  system; 

Third,  improving  the  monetary 
system; 

Fourth,  developing  a  unified  allied 
approach  to  East-West  economic  rela- 
tions. 

Let  me  now  address  each  of  these 
areas  in  turn. 


Strengthening  the  Open  Trading 
System.  Last  November's  ministerial 
meeting  of  the  General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  failed  to  ac- 
complish all  that  we  wanted.  But  it  kept 
the  GATT  system  together  and  moving, 
however  slowly,  in  a  positive  direction. 
The  ministers  pledged  "to  refrain  from 
taking  or  maintaining  any  measures  in- 
consistent with  the  GATT."  Translating 
that  open  trade  pledge  from  words  into 
concrete  actions  is  more  difficult  and 
more  crucial  than  ever. 

Economic  growth  faltered  in  the 
mid-1970s  and  has  slowed  drastically 
since  1980.  During  1980-82,  real  output 
in  the  OECD  area  rose  only  2%.  Reflect- 
ing this  slowdown  in  growth,  world 
trade,  which  was  stagnant  in  volume  in 


1981,  fell  an  estimated  2%  in  1982 
The  key  to  recovery  is  doing  m 
business,  not  less.  Yet  the  recessir  -, 
high  unemployment  rates  in  the  \\ 
understandably  have  increased  (in 
tionist  pressures.  In  the  United  S' 
for  example,  the  98th  Congres-  .', 
probably  press  for  local  conteiii  K 
tion,  agricultural  subsidies,  and  pr^ 
tionist  measures  directed  at  hard-1  i 
tors  such  as  steel  and  autos.  Euro' 
sins,  too.  Because  of  existing  vnlu  i 
restraint  agreements,  in  any  year  J 
11  out  of  100  British  car  buyers  a  1 
only  3  in  100  French)  can  choose  ;  ( 
Japanese  car. 

These  protectionist  measures  -i 
en  to  choke  off  recovery.  Quotas,  i 
and  other  trade  barriers  raise  cos  ti 


Deputy  Secretary  of  State 


Kenneth  W.  Dam  was  born  in  Marysville, 
Kansas,  on  August  10,  1932.  He  graduated 
from  the  University  of  Kansas  (1954)  and 
took  his  law  degree  from  the  University  of 
Chicago  (1957). 

Prior  to  assuming  his  present  position  on 
September  23,  1982,  Mr.  Dam  was  the  Pro- 
vost of  the  University  of  Chicago.  He  first 
joined  the  faculty  of  the  University  of 
Chicago  Law  School  in  1960,  after  serving  as 


law  clerk  to  Mr.  Justice  Wliittakt-r  uf 
U.S.  Supreme  Court  and  practicini:  l:i  ' 
Cravath,  Swaine  and  Moore  in  Ni  a  "i 
City.  He  was  named  Professor  of  La ; 
1964  and  became  the  Harold  J.  an.i  .\:  n 
F.  Green  Professor  of  International  L  il 
Studies  in  1976.  He  became  Provost  i  u 
1980. 

Deputy  Secretary  Dam  took  li  avi 
absence  from  the  University  of  Ch'  a; 
1971  to  serve  in  the  Federal  Govn  im 
Assistant  Director  for  National  Scnir 
International  Affairs  of  the  Offic^  -I 
ment  and  Budget  (0MB).  In  197:;  •  > 
named  Executive  Director  of  the  i  al 
level  Council  on  Economic  Policy. 

After  returning  to  the  faculty  of  t 
University  of  Chicago  Law  School  in    J 
Mr.  Dam  continued  his  government  ssic 
a  consultant  from  time  to  time  to  OM  tl 
Department  of  the  Treasury,  and  oth( 
government  agencies. 

Mr.  Dam  is  a  member  of  the  Boarrf 
Directors  of  the  Chicago  Council  on  Fill 
Relations  and  a  member  of  the  Couno  n 
Foreign  Relations  in  New  York.  H-  '■ 
served  on  the  Academic  Advisoi-.\  ' 
of  the  American  Enterprise  Instiiui' 
Research  Advisory  Board  of  the  <  "iia  '■ 
for  Economic  Development.  In  19si  In: 
elected  to  the  American  Academy  "f  ■  " 
and  Sciences  and  in  1968  to  the  .A  r' 
Law  Institute. 

His  books  include  The  Rules  - 
Reform  and  Evolution  in  the  bil> 
Monetary  System  (1982);  Econow,.  I 
Beyond  the  Headlines  (1977),  witli  i^" 
Shultz;  Oil  Resources:  Who  Geti^  117"' 
(1976);  and  The  GATT:  Law  and  ^'' ' 
t iona I  Economic  Organization  ( 1 ! ' T i ' i 
Dam  has  also  published  numerous  ai' 
legal  and  economic  issues.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Ble 


ECONOMICS 


deny  borrowing  countries  the 
iirrency  earnings  needed  to  serv- 
ir  debts  and  buy  our  exports.  Con- 
r,  open  trade  speeds  resources  to 
lost  productive  uses  and  creates 
obs  than  it  destroys.  Consequent- 
sident  Reagan  has  pledged  that 
lited  States  will  not  turn  its  baclt 
principle  of  open  trade, 
at  does  not  mean,  however,  that 
I  turn  the  other  cheek  toward 
lations'  trade-distorting  prac- 
especially  those  imposed  on  sec- 
ach  as  agriculture  and  services,  in 
we  enjoy  a  comparative  advant- 
he  United  States  sees  no  differ- 
jtween  trade  in  these  sectors  and 
n  other  goods. 

t  uncompetitive  practices,  such  as 
ropean  Community's  export  sub- 
continue  unabated.  While  agri- 
,1  prices  in  the  United  States  have 
;eadily  falling  in  real  terms  since 
973  peak,  the  EC's  common  agri- 
1  policy  has  artificially  boosted 
m  some  key  commodities  to  dou- 
se in  the  United  States,  encourag- 
h  production.  The  resulting 
is  then  exported  with  the  aid  of 
?  subsidies.  This  practice  has 
European  farmers  to  expand 
.are  of  third-country  markets  at 
nse  of  American  farmers. 
United  States  appreciates  the 
is  faced  by  European  leaders  in 
ting  agricultural  policies.  We 
sponded  to  EC  subsidies  through 
negotiation  and  through  selective 
'Recently  we  sold  subsidized 
lour  to  Egypt, 
issue  of  protectionism  is  an 
ic  one.  But  it  is  a  political  im- 

to  resolve  it  before  it  threatens 
isic  common  interests.  As  Secre- 
State  Shultz  said  in  testimony 
;he  U.S.  Congress: 

porary  .  .  .  measures  such  as  the 
Dur  transaction  can  be  justified  on 
nd  that  "when  all  the  world  is  mad, 

be  sane."  But  temporary  measures 
)ecome  permanent,  and  retaliation 
herent  tendency  to  escalate.  Con- 
negotiations— in  which  we  meet 
I  with  reason — present  the  only 
Balution  to  protectionist  problems.  .  .  . 

Ill  is  the  spirit  my  government  has 
5J,  approaching  these  problems. 
i(;3  our  partners  will  reciprocate. 

^iporting  the  International 
n  al  System.  A  strong  system  of 
1  ide  will  do  more  than  ease  the 
"!■  lyment  problems  of  the  in- 
■1  zed  countries.  It  will  also  ease 
k   prdhlems  of  the  developing 


countries.  Import  cuts  in  debtor  coun- 
tries can  free  up  only  so  much  hard  cur- 
rency; export  growth  must  lead  the  way 
in  their  recovery. 

The  cases  of  Brazil,  Mexico,  and 
Argentina  have  shown  that  the  debt 
burden  can  be  managed.  A  successful 
strategy  includes  a  combination  of  short- 
term  bridge  financing,  plus  adjustment 
programs  implemented  in  conjunction 
with  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF)  and  commercial  banks.  Private 
iianks,  however,  are  now  reducing  their 
rate  of  new  lending  to  the  developing 
world.  Net  new  bank  lending  was  flat 
between  the  first  half  of  1981  and  the 
first  half  of  1982.  Estimates  for  the  sec- 
ond half  of  1982  show  a  precipitous  drop 
in  new  lending. 

An  abrupt  contraction  in  new  lend- 
ing would  imperil  the  recovery  of  the 
debtor  countries.  Reduced  lending  would 
also  retard  American  and  European  re- 
covery by  contracting  LDC  imports  from 
the  West.  The  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust 
Company  estimates  that  if  capital  flows 
in  the  LDCs  were  cut  by  $25  billion, 
OECD  growth  would  drop  half  a  per- 
centage point.  With  OECD  growth  in 
1983  expected  to  be  only  1.8%,  half  of  a 
percentage  point  would  be  a  significant 
decline. 

The  Morgan  Guaranty  study  is  hypo- 
thetical. But  import  cuts  are  already  a 
reality.  A  dramatic  case  in  point  is  Mex- 
ico. In  1982  Mexican  imports  from  the 
United  States  dropped  37%  from  the 
1981  level.  Consequently,  in  a  single 
year  the  U.S.  balance-of-merchandise 
trade  with  Mexico  swung  from  a  $3.7 
billion  surplus  to  a  $4.5  billion  deficit. 
This  swing  had  adverse  effects  on  our 
economy  and  our  employment  situation. 

The  international  economy  is  too 
vulnerable  to  contraction  to  permit  a 
continued  decline  in  lending  to  the  Third 
World.  Private  banks  in  the  United 
States,  Europe,  and  Japan  have  a  collec- 
tive interest  in  extending  sufficient  new- 
money  to  permit  the  developing  coun- 
tries to  service  their  debts.  Western 
governments  have  a  similar  stake  in  see- 
ing that  the  LDCs  have  sufficient  capital 
to  pay  for  imports  that  will  enhance 
LDC  productivity  and  contribute  to 
world  economic  growth. 

The  United  States  stands  ready  to 
do  its  part.  The  Reagan  Administration 
strongly  supports  the  proposed  47.5% 
IMF  quota  increase.  We  also  support  the 
expansion  of  the  General  Arrangements 
to  Borrow  from  $7  billion  to  $19  billion. 
The  United  States  has  urged  that  the 


quota  increase  go  into  effect  in  1983  in- 
stead of  1985.  These  funds  are  needed 
not  to  help  developing  countries  pay  off 
old  debts.  These  funds  are  needed  to  en- 
courage sound  policies — policies  to  curb 
inflation,  trim  government  spending, 
and  shift  resources  from  consumption  to 
investment.  By  providing  supplementary 
financing  to  ease  the  process  of  adjust- 
ment, the  IMF  contributes  to  the  main- 
tenance of  economic  and  political  stabili- 
ty in  the  developing  world.  I  am  confi- 
dent that  the  U.S.  Congress  will  recog- 
nize the  close  links  between  our  own 
well-being  and  LDC  growth  and  will  act 
quickly  to  approve  the  quota  increase. 

Improving  the  Monetary  System. 
The  economic  expansion  needed  to  boost 
recovery  in  the  West  and  ease  the  debt 
burden  of  developing  countries  would  be 
aided  by  stability  in  exchange  markets- 
something  we  have  not  had  in  recent 
years. 

Financial  flows,  for  example,  are 
having  a  powerful  effect  on  exchange 
rate  movements.  This  presents  dif- 
ficulties from  the  standpoint  of  trade. 
During  1982  financial  flows  into  the 
United  States  led  to  the  greatest  ap- 
preciation of  the  dollar  since  the  begin- 
ning of  floating  rates.  The  strong  dollar 
increased  the  price  of  U.S.  exports 
abroad  and  decreased  the  cost  competi- 
tiveness of  U.S.  industry.  The  effect  of 
dollar  appreciation  on  other  industrial 
countries  was  a  drop  in  the  exchange 
rate  of  their  currencies  and  higher 
domestic  inflation.  The  strong  dollar  is 
expected  to  increase  the  U.S.  trade 
deficit  in  1983. 

An  additional  problem  we  face  in  the 
international  monetary  system  is  the 
great  volatility  in  exchange  rates.  For 
example,  between  May  and  November  of 
1982,  the  yen  depreciated  from  about 
230  yen  to  the  dollar  to  276.  This 
depreciation  raised  the  price  of  U.S.  ex- 
ports in  Japan  and  in  third  country 
markets  and  reduced  the  price  of 
Japanese  goods  to  importers  worldwide. 
By  the  end  of  the  year,  however,  the 
yen  had  swung  back  to  its  prior  level  of 
230. 

The  causes  of  exchange  rate  vola- 
tility are  many  and  complex.  The  prob- 
lem is  due  in  large  part  to  different  in- 
flation, interest,  and  savings  rates 
among  the  major  industrial  countries. 
The  United  States  believes  that  a  con- 
vergence of  underlying  economic  policies 
is  necessary  to  achieve  greater  exchange 
rate  stability.  Fortunately,  the  multi- 
lateral surveillance  initiative  adopted  at 


ECONOMICS 


the  Versailles  summit  should  help  ensure 
close  consultations  on  economic  policies 
as  the  recovery  proceeds. 

East-West  Economic  Relations.  I 

began  this  discussion  by  noting  the  fun- 
damental economic,  military,  and  politi- 
cal goals  that  face  the  Western  democ- 
racies. Those  goals  are  not  distinct  but 
interrelated.  To  ensure  that  economic 
expansion  reinforces  our  other  objec- 
tives—safeguarding the  peace  and  sup- 
porting democratic  values— the  United 
States  and  its  allies  have  agreed  on  the 
need  for  a  common  approach  to  East- 
West  relations. 

On  November  13,  1982,  President 
Reagan  announced  that  the  major  in- 
dustrial nations  of  the  West  recognized 
"the  necessity  of  conducting  their  rela- 
tions with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  Eastern 
Europe  on  the  basis  of  a  global  and  com- 
prehensive policy  designed  to  serve  their 
common  fundamental  interests."  As  a 
result,  a  consensus  was  reached  with  our 
allies: 

•  Not  to  engage  in  trade  arrange- 
ments which  contribute  to  the  military 
or  strategic  advantage  of  the  Soviet 
Union; 

•  Not  to  give  preferential  aid  to  the 
heavily  militarized  Soviet  economy;  and 

•  Not  to  sign  any  new  natural  gas 
contracts  with  the  Soviet  Union,  pend- 
ing a  new  alliance  study  on  energy  alter- 
natives. 

On  the  positive  side,  we  agreed  to 
strengthen  existing  controls  on  the 
transfer  of  strategic  items  to  the  Soviet 
Union  and  to  examine  whether  our  col- 
lective security  requires  new  controls  on 
certain  kinds  of  high  technology  in- 
cluding oil  and  gas  equipment.  We  also 
agreed  to  work  toward  harmonizing  our 
export  credit  policies. 

It  is  important  to  note,  however, 
that  the  United  States  does  not  advocate 
economic  warfare.  Rather,  we  simply  be- 
'■   ,  d  that  trade  with  the  Soviet  Union 
should  be  conducted  within  a  common 
framework  consistent  with  our  political 
and  security  objectives.  As  a  result,  the 
United  States  desires  to  maintain  an 
open  door  to  mutually  beneficial  East- 
West  trade  based  on  sound  commercial 
principles,  while  restricting  strategic  ex- 
ports and  other  trade  arrangements  that 
would  enhance  Soviet  military 
capabilities. 

Action  is  being  taken  on  the  studies 
agreed  to  by  the  allies.  We  expect  some 
results  to  be  available  in  time  for  the 
Williamsburg  summit.  There  is  a  widen- 
ing consensus  on  the  basic  principles 


that  ought  to  guide  East-West  economic 
relations.  Western  governments  should 
now  develop  the  policies  that  will  give 
concrete  expression  to  that  consensus. 


Conclusion 

Williamsburg,  Virginia,  has  played  a 
unique  role  in  our  history.  The  Virginia 
Declaration  of  Rights  was  signed  at 
Williamsburg  in  1776.  That  declaration 
was  derived  from  the  British  Magna 
Carta;  it  was  echoed  in  the  French 
Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man.  It  sets 
forth  those  ideals  that  we  in  the  West 
hold  in  common: 

•  "That  all  men  are  by  nature  equal- 
ly free  and  independent;" 

•  "That  all  power  is  vested  in,  and 
derived  from,  the  people;" 

•  "That  government  is,  or  ought  to 


be,  instituted  for  the  common  benel 
protection  and  security." 

When  the  summit  partners  gatl- 
Williamsburg  in  May,  we  will  have 
opportunity  to  reaffirm  those  ideals^ 
have  weathered  oil  shocks,  inflatior  i 
recession.  I  am  confident  that  we  c 
master  our  new  challenges: 

•  To  support  the  principle  of  o  a 
trade; 

•  To  strengthen  the  internatio  . 
monetary  and  financial  systems;  ar- 

•  To  develop  a  new  consensus 
East- West  relations. 

Our  task  will  be  to  forge  a  sir:  , 
for  noninflationary  growth.  Our  tr 
will  be  in  demonstrating  the  ability ! 
free  markets  and  democratic  govei 
ments  to  provide  for  our  "common 
benefit,  protection,  and  security." 


Economics  and  Politics: 
The  Quandary  of  Foreign  Aid 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  Heritage  Founda- 
tion and  the  Philadelphia  Society, 
Washington,  D.C..  on  March  3,  1983. 
Mr.  Wallis  is  Under  Secretary  for 
Economic  Affairs. 

I  will  organize  my  remarks  tonight 
under  four  broad  headings: 

First,  the  economic  rationale  for 
foreign  assistance; 

Second,  the  political  and  strategic 
purposes  for  which  much  of  our  aid  is,  in 
fact,  used; 

Third,  the  importance  of  reconciling 
these  two  purposes;  and 

Fourth,  what  can  be  done  to  make 
the  best  use  of  the  resources  we  channel 
to  developing  countries. 

Economic  Rationale  for 
Foreign  Assistance 

Last  year  I  had  the  great  pleasure  of 
spending  an  evening  in  London  with  my 
old  and  admired  friends,  Peter  Bauer 
and  Basil  Yamey  [professors  at  the  Lon- 
don School  of  Economics].  It  is  not  news 
to  anyone  here  that  Bauer  and  Yamey 
make  a  powerful  case  against  official 
development  assistance.  Both  their 
writings  and  their  speeches  are  striking 
for  their  cogency  and  for  the  clarity  and 
force  of  their  arguments.  They  have 
done  an  important  job  in  demolishing 


many  of  the  "economic"  argument! 
often  cited  in  favor  of  official  fore! 
assistance. 

Personally,  I  am  persuaded  by] 
major  thrusts  of  their  arguments. 
Foreign  assistance  is  inherently  a 
government-to-government  progrs 
There  may  be  exceptions,  of  coursj) 
the  nature  of  economic  organizaticii 
most  developing  countries— indeec  ,11 
nature  of  one  sovereign  country's  ll 
ings  with  another— guarantees  th( 
validity  of  my  statement.  It  is  no  sn 
that  I  feel  strongly  about  the  prob/ii 
of  government  intrusion  in  the  ecc  n 
and  of  misguided  policies  which  fa  « 
utilize  market  forces.  Foreign  assi  ^n 
cannot  escape  the  limitations  inhent 


any  government-run  program. 


Ins  id 


of  denying  or  ignoring  those  limiteJi 
we  should  allow  for  them.  We  shoi 
strive  for  the  quality  Herman  WoU 
tributed  to  the  Navy  when  he  desc.x 
it  as  an  organization  designed  by  j , 
geniuses  so  that  it  could  be  operat ' 
morons.  ' 

It  would  be  of  little  interest  toM 
I  were  simply  to  agree  with  Peter  « 
and  others  here  that  we  should  be(e 
tical  about  the  economic  benefits  o 
foreign  assistance.  If  that  were  allh 
to  say,  you  would  do  better  to  list.* 
him  some  more.  That  may  be  ever.ic 
true  of  what  I  have  to  say.  I  will  €» 


Department  of  State  Bi: 


ECONOMICS 


)it  of  devil's  advocacy.  Since  coming 
ashington  last  summer,  I  have  been 
unded  by  proponents  of  foreig-n 
ance,  so  that  by  now  any  com- 
ive  advantage  I  have  in  this  group 
d  lie  in  that  direction, 
irst,  just  what  is  economic 
ance?  It  takes  many  forms— from 
al  advice  on  economic  policy  by 
tory  advisers  to  long-term  training 
ividuals  and  building  of  institu- 
from  "soft"  loans  or  grants  to  so- 
"hard"  loans  at  market  rates.  Ask- 
lether  assistance  really  helps  is  too 

question.  The  important  ques- 
ire  whether  some  forms  of  foreign 
1  assist  the  process  of  economic 
pment;  and,  if  they  can,  do  they? 
16  case  for  foreign  aid,  as  I  see  it, 
is  on  concepts  such  as  additionali- 
alysis,  leverage,  and  infrastruc- 


Iditionality  refers  to  the  notion 
or  some  countries  at  some  times, 
;ra  foreign  e.xchange  needed  for 
iseful  investments  can  be  found 
itside  the  market.  Similarly,  the 
3ment  of  managerial  and  technical 
lay  be  retarded  if  all  the  relevant 
3  must  be  bought  at  market 

alysis  refers  to  the  idea  that, 
r  a  country  with  a  reasonable 

domestic  savings  and  openness 
ign  investment,  the  capital  for 
!ponomically  important  projects 
iliot  be  forthcoming  without  gov- 
il  t  involvement  to  pull  the  project 
:i  r  or  to  provide  a  key  element. 
J  erage  refers  to  the  concept  that 
r  of  aid,  including  the  development 
s  'an  educate,  encourage,  cajole,  or 
■  sf  inveigle  the  governments  of 
r'vt'luped  countries  into  using  in- 
il'  resources— or  preferably  allow- 
hn  to  lie  used— more  effectively. 
n-astructure  refers  to  the  impor- 
!  >r  development  of  skilled  man- 
rof  certain  types  of  institution; 
li  uch  basic  facilities  as  roads, 
r:and  water.  The  economic  ra- 
les comparable  to  that  used  to 
))  agricultural  research  in  the 


1  is  iKit  intended  to  be  a  complete 
tiel>  to  illustrate  a  line  of 
rl   Kft'tire  I  pursue  it  further, 
\  .  I  want  to  preempt  the  question 
1   forming  in  each  of  your  minds: 
■  ould  governments  second  guess 
It"  which  choose  not  to  supply 
i  ir  technology,  or  whatever  to 
it  )r(ijt'cts?"  To  put  it  differently: 
I  n  a  g(jvernment,  whether  donor 


or  recipient,  know  more  about  how  to 
allocate  resources  than  the  market?" 
There  are  possible  answers  that 
deserve  serious  consideration.  One  possi- 
ble reason  is  that  utility  functions  differ. 
The  participants  in  private  markets  may 
have  different  variables  in  their  utility 
functions  than  do  governments,  and 
almost  certainly  they  attach  different 
coefficients  to  the  variables.  Govern- 
ments will  be  concerned  with  long-run 
political  stability  as  well  as  with 
economic  returns.  On  the  margins,  a 
given  project  may  be  below  the  line  for 
private  actors  but  worth  doing  in  the 
government's  ranking  of  priorities.  A 
danger,  of  course,  is  that  economic 
returns  will  be  totally  neglected  by  the 
government.  Another  danger  is  that  the 
utility  function  of  the  government— 
which  in  practice  means  the  utility  func- 
tion of  the  governors— may  be  less  con- 


ducive to  the  general  welfare,  however 
defined,  than  is  the  utility  function  of 
the  market.  Association  of  private  finan- 
cing with  government  aid  may  help  to 
ensure  the  economic  value  of  the  proj- 
ects that  are  supported. 

Government  action,  or  potential 
government  action,  can  be  a  powerful 
deterrent  to  the  private  sector.  When  a 
government  takes  office  intent  on  open- 
ing an  economy  to  private  initiative,  it 
may  be  some  time  before  the  market  is 
convinced  that  the  change  is  stable  and 
can  be  relied  on.  The  Seaga  government 
in  Jamaica  is  an  example.  Following 
years  of  experimentation  with  socialism, 
Jamaica's  economy  was  in  a  shambles. 
President  Seaga  was  elected  on  a  pledge 
to  return  the  economy  to  the  market. 
That  is  a  laudable  objective.  It  holds  out 
great  hope  for  the  development  of  the 
economy  of  Jamaica  and  for  the  freedom 


Under  Secretary  for  Economic  Affairs 


VV.  Allen  Wallis  was  horn  November  .5,  1912. 
in  Philadelphia,  Pennsylvania.  He  received  an 
A.B.  from  the  University  of  Minnesota 
Kraduating  magna  cum  iaude  (1932)  and 
studied  economics  at  the  graduate  level  at 
the  Pniversities  of  Minnesota  and  Chicago 
(19:32-35).  He  is  also  a  member  of  Phi  Beta 
Kappa. 

Mr.  Wallis  began  his  academic  career  as  a 
Granville  W.  Garth  Fellow  in  Political 


Economy  at  Columbia  University  (193.5)  and 
was  an  instructor  in  the  Department  of 
Economics  at  \ale  University  (1937)  He  held 
positions  as  Assistant  and  Associate  Pro 
I        I     it  Economics  at  Stanford  University 
111  s    li  )  ind  Professor  ot  Statistics  and 
1      n  iiiu  s  m  the  Graduate  School  of 
I  uMiiess  at  the  University  ot  Chicago  (1946) 
1  iter  becoming  Chairman  ot  that  Department 
(1949)  and  Dean  of  the  Graduate  School 
(1956-62) 

Mr  Walhs  has  served  the  Federal 
G  ivernnient  in  numerous  tapacities  including 
intmhersliip  on  the  Piesidtnts  Commission 
n   in    \il  \    luntMr    \nm  If    i   ,   (1  H   i   TO) 


broidcastingd  <7-)-7S)  He  also  ser\eii  on 
the  Task  t  orce  on  Education  and  the  transi 
tion  team  of  the  International  Communication 
Agency  for  President  elec  t  Rpi^-an 

During  the  past  _n  u  \Ii  W  ilh  h  ,s 
been  elected  to  the  I  n  I  I  lir  t  i  l  nine 
majoi  I  S  torpc  i  iti  i 
L  ml  Ml,  mill  ui  I  , 
M.ti    I    hi  111  I  il     In  n 


lini,  1   lu     h  ,V 

Ilk 
in  I  s>tindard 

I     iveral 
It  icademic 

nities  in 
uthored  10 


eiMi    ind  phiUnthrojiit  u 

numeious  capai  itits.  He 

books  and  monographs  and  has  published 

numerous  scholarly  articles  on  economics  and 

public  and  international  policy. 

Mr.  Wallis  served  as  President  and 
Chancellor  of  the  University  of  Rochester 
(1962-78)  and  remained  affiliated  with  the 
University  retaining  the  title  of  Chancellor 
until  his  nomination  as  Under  Secretary. 

He  was  sworn  in  as  Under  Secretary  of 
State  for  Economic  Affairs  September  23, 
1982.  ■ 


ECONOMICS 


and  welfare  of  the  people  of  Jamaica. 
But  could  prudent  investors  have  relied 
immediately  on  the  success  and  per- 
manence of  the  change?  Governments 
with  a  stake  in  the  future  of  a  free  and 
democratic  Jamaica  were  well  advised  to 
provide  promptly  any  assistance  that 
can  bring  Jamaica's  potential  to  fruition. 
Investment  in  infrastructure  is  wide- 
ly held  to  be  an  appropriate  role  of 
government.  Linking  remote  producers 
to  markets  and  providing  power,  com- 
munications, and  education  is  recognized 
to  be  conducive  to  development.  The 
economic  history  of  the  United  States 
teaches  us  that  even  these  can  be  pro- 
vided  by  the  private  sector  under  certam 
circumstances.  But,  unfortunately,  those 
circumstances  are  not  likely  to  be 
duplicated  in  today's  world,  either 
developed  or  developing.  How  many 
privately  financed  public  roads  have 
been  built  in  the  United  States  in  the 
last  25  years? 

These  considerations  do  not  prove 
that  in  practice  foreign  assistance  is  ac- 
tually effective.  They  merely  suggest 
that  it  might  be.  They  do  not  even  sug- 
gest, however,  that  foreign  aid  is  the 
key  to  economic  development.  We  could 
pour  massive  amounts  of  assistance  to 
no  avail  into  a  country  hell  bent  on 
destroying  itself.  The  economic  policies 
of  a  developing  country  are,  without 
question,  the  key  to  development.  A 
developing  country  with  sound  economic 
policies  can  benefit  from  well-conceived 
foreign  aid. 

If  I  go  further  with  my  role  as 
devil's  advocate,  I  may  sprout  horns  and 
a  tail.  So  let  me  stop  the  economic  ra- 
tionale for  economic  assistance  and  turn 
to  the  political  rationale. 

Political  Rationale  for  Foreign 
Assistance 

As  you  know,  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion places  great  emphasis  on  political 
and  strategic  considerations  in  allocating 
and  justifying  foreign  assistance. 
Whatever  the  rhetoric  may  have  been  in 
the  past,  however,  the  fact  is  that  we 
always  have  given  a  significant  portion 
of  our  foreign  assistance  in  the  hope  of 
winning  and  keeping  friends  and  influ- 
encing people. 

Currently,  we  call  63%  of  our  aid 
"security  assistance."  Its  main  com- 
ponents are  military  assistance  and 
economic  support  funds,  and,  as  you 
know,  most  of  each  goes  to  two  coun- 
tries, Israel  and  Egypt.  In  some  extreme 
cases,  the  military  component  of  our 
security  assistance  goes  toward  the 


costs  of  a  war  in  which  we  have  a  stake. 
A  current  case  is  El  Salvador.  A  variant 
on  this  is  providing  funds  to  help 
strengthen  allies  who  are  strategically 
important  to  us.  Israel,  Pakistan, 
Turkey,  Sudan,  and  Somalia  are  ex- 
amples. In  certain  other  cases,  we  are, 
in  effect,  simply  offering  assistance  in 
consideration  of  military  accommoda- 
tions. 

In  other  instances,  we  attempt  to 
promote  political  stability  for  a  govern- 
ment which  is  important  to  our  strategic 
interests.  This  may  take  the  form  of 
facilitating  the  economic  adjustment  of  a 
key  ally  by  providing  economic  support 
funds  for  short-term  balance-of- 
payments  support  in  tandem  with  an  In- 
ternational Monetary  Fund  program. 
Recent  successful  examples  of  this  are 
Portugal  and  Turkey.  Within  the  last 
few  years,  both  countries  faced  severe 
balance-of-payments  crises  and  economic 
disruptions  which  threatened  their 
political  stability.  Each  has  since  made 
great  progress  in  economic  adjustment 
and  has  avoided  severe  political  damage. 
"Security"  assistance  often  serves  an  im- 
portant economic  purpose,  even  though 
it  arises  from  motives  that  are  primarily 
political. 

Economic  development  and  humani- 
tarian considerations  play  a  much  larger 
role  in  our  so-called  "economic 
assistance"  programs  than  in  security 
assistance  programs.  There  is,  never- 
theless, also  a  political  rationale  for 
these  economic  assistance  programs. 
For  example,  assistance  to  friendly,  or 
sometimes  even  to  neutral,  underdevel- 
oped countries  can  help  promote  political 
stability  and  avoid  the  movement  of  less 
developed  countries  toward  communism. 
Economic  aid  may  be  seen  as  a  useful 
form  of  long-term  insurance,  even  where 
there  is  no  short-term  strategic  problem 
to  deal  with.  Conversely,  targets  of  op- 
portunity are  likely  to  be  exploited, 
sooner  or  later,  by  our  adversaries. 

Some  argue  that  there  would  have 
been  fewer  Nicaraguas  and  El  Salvadors 
if  the  Alliance  for  Progress  had  had  the 
money  to  maintain  its  early  momentum 
through  the  1970s.  At  any  rate,  such 
reasoning  has  been,  and  remains,  an  im- 
portant factor  in  justifying  the  economic 
portion  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance. 

For  multilateral  assistance,  still 
another  political  justification  is  adduced. 
Many  of  our  major  allies  are  now 
strongly  committed,  in  some  cases  as  a 
result  of  our  own  earlier  persuasiveness, 
to  the  idea  that  multilateral  foreign 
assistance  is  both  politically  important 


and  economically  effective.  Th.  ■ 
want  us  to  do  what  they  see  a^ 
share.  They  argue  that  because  wkx 
the  lead  in  creating  the  World  Bari 
the  regional  development  banks  w  n 
a  responsibility  to  help  ensure  the  -,• 
tinuing  effectiveness.  The  yeai-  l^i 
study  of  the  multilateral  deveh.i'n  ' 
banks  undertaken  at  the  start  >>i  t 
Reagan  Administration— stmn^;!) 
fluenced  by  the  knowledge  and  ,-. 
tive  of  Wilson  Schmidt  [the  lat.'  V 
Schmidt,  U.S.  Executive  Direct-r 
designate  of  the  World  Bank)  aim 
Beryl  Sprinkel  [Under  Secretary 
Treasury]— reached  the  same  s-r: 
conclusion. 

The  underdeveloped  count  r 
great  importance,  of  course,  t< 
eral  aid  and  thus  to  the  U.S.  i' 
maintaining  it.  In  short,  for  tin'  < 
States  to  abandon  its  leadershi|i  i  c 
multilateral  aid  institutions  wmih  i, 
cut  our  leadership  of  the  Westeri 
alliance,  as  well  as  our  influence   Ji 
the  underdeveloped  countries.  Mi  la 
eral  flows  also  are  often  coincide  w 
our  political  interests  in  that  the}  <r. 
times  add  substantially  more  tn  r  u 
levels  we  make  available  to  key  c  n- 
tries  on  a  bilateral  basis. 

Reconciling  Political  and  Ecom  io 
Objectives:  The  Quandary 

I  started  by  describing  the  condii  is 
under  which  foreign  assistance  it  tit 
contribute  to  economic  growth-  th 
that  recipient  countries  pursue  e  w 
policies  conducive  to  developmen  m 
that  donor  countries  make  alloca  ni 
that  support  these  policies.  Alloc  oi 
that  are  politically  based  are  unli  ly 
course,  to  coincide  with  good  ecom 
development  policy.  Obviously,  I  ni 
name  names,  but  all  of  us  can  cit  :o 
tries  where  aid  has  continued  to  w 
even  to  increase,  to  governments 'h 
have  persisted  in  poor  economic  IK 
Some  major  bilateral  aid  recipien  a 
times  seem  to  believe  that  we  da  n 
cut  back  on  aid  even  if  our  recon  ei 
tions  for  reforming  their  econom 
policies  are  ignored. 

Fortunately,  not  too  many  cjs 
this  extreme.  The  less  sure  a  rec  ei 
government  is  that  we  will  contiie 
come  what  may,  the  greater  the  ^ 
that  our  views  on  economic  polic*i 
taken  into  account.  This  is  an  an  " 
which  skillful  diplomacy  can  play" 
portant  role.  Even  so,  I  would  h>n> 


Department  of  State  111' 


ECONOMICS 


to  admit  that  donors  of  bilateral  aid 
1  are  not  able  to  exercise  much 
'age  on  policy.  There  are  several 
ions  for  this: 

Bilateral  donors  are  more  likely 
multilateral  donors  to  be  prisoners 
eir  clients; 

Their  advice  is  often  viewed  as 
credible,  less  well  based  technically, 
nore  intrusive  upon  sovereignty, 

They  generally  have  less  money  to 
or  give. 

t  follows  that  in  order  to  achieve 
■conomic  objectives  of  foreign 
tance,  we  must  make  full  use  of  our 
nee  at  the  International  Monetary 
I,  the  World  Bank,  and  the  regional 
opment  banks;  and  we  must  ensure 
our  bilateral  aid  supports  the  same 
tives.  It  is  essential  that  economic 
:ance,  bilateral  or  multilateral,  not 
ne  an  entitlement  program  with  the 
t  open  even  in  the  face  of  inade- 
policies.  This  was  among  the  main 
asions  of  the  Reagan  Administra- 
intensive  assessment  of  the 
ateral  development  banks.  In  the 
nnce  the  publication  of  that  assess- 
■■  we  have  been  pleased  by  the 
nses  of  the  managements  of  these 
jitions  to  its  findings, 
evertheless,  the  fact  is  that 
•al  assistance  is  likely  to  remain 
ilk  of  our  aid  program  for  the 
cable  future— it  now  constitutes 
15%— and  that  political  and 
gic  considerations  will  continue  to 
jor  factors  in  allocation.  We  are 
voring  to  see  that  the  funds  are 
in  ways  that  promote  growth  that 
!  lasting,  self-sustaining,  and 
y  based. 

p'^e  Resolve  the  Quandary? 

iswer  is  no— at  least,  not  entirely. 
Jwe  can  do  is  minimize  the  poten- 
cnflict  between  security  and 


political  objectives  on  the  one  hand  and 
economic  development  on  the  other.  Let 
me  offer  a  few  ideas  on  what  we  can 
and  should  do. 

•  We  should  ensure  that  the  terms 
of  financing  for  military  sales  are 
tailored  to  the  prospective  balance-of- 
payments  of  the  receiving  country.  To 
achieve  this,  guarantees  of  commercial 
lending  must  be  adequately  balanced  by 
concessional  direct  loans  or  grants. 

•  We  should  use  our  bilateral  aid  in 
ways  that  are  as  supportive  as  possible 
of  economic  reform  and  structural  ad- 
justments supported  by  the  World  Bank 
and  International  Monetary  Fund.  We 
should  press  these  institutions  to  orient 
their  advice  toward  efficient  use  of 
markets  and,  where  feasible,  to  coor- 
dinate with  other  donors. 

•  We  should  keep  some  ambiguity  in 
the  way  we  allocate  economic  support 
funds  and  other  assistance,  so  that  re- 
cipient countries  will  not  take  these 
funds  for  granted  and  feel  free  to  ignore 
the  advice  on  policies  that  we— or  the 
Fund  or  the  Bank— give. 

•  We  should  persist  in  phasing  out 
economic  aid  to  countries  as  their 
economies  mature — graduate  them,  so 
to  speak. 

•  We  should  continue  to  encourage 
cofinancing,  possibly  multilateral  invest- 
ment insurance,  and  other  mechanisms 
which  make  available  greater  sums  of 
private  money  for  development  on  terms 
that  the  recipient  countries  can  prudent- 
ly sustain. 

Conclusion 

To  conclude,  I  want  to  review  the  main 
themes  of  my  remarks.  The  essential  re- 
quirement for  economic  growth  is  good 
economic  policies  in  the  developing  coun- 
tries. Without  that,  there  is  little  which 
aid  can  accomplish.  With  good  policies. 


properly  conceived  aid  can  help  to  ac- 
celerate development.  Properly  used,  aid 
can  help  to  encourage  and  support  good 
policies  or,  at  least,  avoid  undercutting 
them.  Nevertherless,  there  are  many  pit- 
falls—ably pointed  out  by  many  of  you 
gathered  here— pitfalls  which  are  dif- 
ficult to  avoid  when  political  and 
strategic  concerns  predominate. 

Given  U.S.  commitments  in  the 
world,  aid  will  continue  to  be  an  impor- 
tant tool  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  If  we 
are  to  avoid  squandering  this  aid  and 
even  doing  more  harm  than  good,  we 
will  have  to  face  the  challenge  of  sensi- 
ble and  courageous  management  of 
these  funds. 

Finally,  I  will  toss  a  challenge  to 
you.  In  an  uncertain  and  often  unstable 
world,  political  and  strategic  considera- 
tions weigh  heavily  in  economic  deci- 
sions. Peter  McPherson  [Administrator 
of  the  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment], Beryl  Sprinkel,  George  Shultz 
[Secretary  of  State],  Kenneth  Dam 
[Deputy  Secretary  of  State],  Dick 
McCormack  [Assistant  Secretary  for 
Economic  and  Business  Affairs],  and  I 
are  among  those  in  the  Reagan  Adminis- 
tration supporting  programs  which  pro- 
mote rational,  market-based,  free- 
enterprise  economic  policies— at  home 
and  abroad.  We  can  use  your  help.  We 
are  all  too  familiar  with  how  aid  can  be 
squandered,  misused,  counterproductive, 
or  otherwise  wasted.  My  challenge  to 
you  is,  how  can  we  make  a  program  that 
is  inherently  government-to-government 
serve  the  cause  of  good  economics? 
Granted  that  we  will  have  foreign  aid, 
whether  you  and  I  think  we  should  have 
it  or  not;  and  granted  that  aid  will  be  on 
a  government-to-government  basis, 
whether  you  and  I  think  it  should  be  on 
that  basis  or  not— given  those  two  condi- 
tions, and  pending  any  changes  in  them 
that  may  be  desirable,  how  can  we  best 
promote  the  economic  welfare  of  the 
recipient  countries  and  of  our  own 
country?  ■ 


6983 


EUROPE 


Implications  of  a  Nuclear 
Freeze 


by  Richard  R.  Burt 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Procurement  and  Military  Nuclear 
Systems  of  the  House  and  Armed  Serv- 
ices Committee,  on  March  9.  1983.  Mr. 
Burt  is  Assistant  Secretary  for  Euro- 
pean Affairs. ' 

I  particularly  welcome  the  opportunity 
to  testify  before  this  committee  on  the 
subject  of  a  possible  freeze  on  the  U.S. 
nuclear  arsenal.  I  welcome  it  for  several 


•  Because  this  is  an  issue  of  such 
fundamental  importance  to  the  security 
of  the  United  States; 

•  Because  of  its  impact  on  our 
allies;  and 

•  Ultimately,  because  of  its  impor- 
tance to  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

The  prevention  of  nuclear  war  is  the 
highest  priority  of  this  Administration. 
It  must  be  the  highest  priority  of  any 
administration  in  the  nuclear  age.  All  of 
us  know  what  nuclear  war  would  mean 
for  our  country  and  the  world.  As  the 
President  himself  has  repeatedly  said,  in 
such  a  war  there  can  be  no  winners. 

No  one  has  a  monopoly  on  the  desire 
to  avoid  a  nuclear  catastrophe.  We 
recognize  that  nuclear  freeze  proposals 
issue  from  a  profound  concern  about  the 


malevolent  intentions.  The  issue  is  how 
to  translate  the  good  intentions  of  those 
who  desire  effective  arms  control  into 
actions  which  will  achieve  that  end. 

I  believe  the  proposals  for  a  freeze 
on  the  U.S.  nuclear  arsenal— however 
well  intentioned  they  are  and  however 
attractive  they  may  seem— would  not 
achieve  their  stated  purpose.  On  the  con- 
trary, I  am  convinced  that  they  would 
diminish  our  national  security  and 
ultimately  increase,  not  reduce,  the 
danger  of  war. 

•  A  freeze  would  encourage,  rather 
than  discourage,  threatening  Soviet 
behavior. 

•  It  would  hinder,  rather  than  help, 
our  efforts  to  achieve  effective  arms 
control. 

•  And  it  would  weaken,  rather  than 
strengthen,  the  Atlantic  alliance  which  is 
the  cornerstone  of  our  own  security. 

Implications  for  Our  Relations 
With  the  Soviet  Union 

The  effective  management  of  our  rela- 
tions with  the  Soviet  Union  is  essential 
to  the  preservation  of  peace  and  stability 
in  the  world.  Toward  that  end,  our 
policy  toward  the  Soviet  Union  must 
be  based  on  consistency,  resolve,  and  na- 
tional and  allied  unity.  We  cannot  suc- 
cessfully manage  this  vital  relation- 


A  freeze  would  undermine  the  relative  capabili- 
ty of  our  nuclear  deterrent  vis-a-vis  the  Soviet 
Union  and,  as  a  result,  the  credibility  of  our 
strategy  of  deterrence,  which  has  successfully 
preserved  the  peace  for  over  three  decades. 


danger  of  nuclear  war;  we  fully  share 
that  concern.  We  also  know  that  these 
proposals  are  supported  by  many  who 
are  deeply  committed  to  rapid  and 
significant  progress  in  arms  control.  We, 
too,  share  that  commitment. 

The  debate  here  is  not  over  ends;  it 
is  about  means.  It  is  not  a  debate  be- 
tween those  with  good  and  those  with 


ship— we  cannot  moderate  Soviet  inter- 
national conduct— on  the  basis  of 
gestures  which  would  only  be  inter- 
preted as  signs  of  weakness  and  divi- 
sion. 

Unilateral  U.S.  restraint  during  the 
1970s,  which  was  tantamount  to  a  freeze 
on  our  part,  did  not  produce  Soviet 
restraint.  On  the  contrary,  the  Soviet 
Union  implemented  expansionist  policies 
in  far  regions  of  the  world  and  carried 


out  the  most  intensive  conventi<Mial  . 
nuclear  military  buildup  in  peactim 
history. 

The  changes  in  the  military  lial 
ance— or  as  the  Soviets  would  say,  e 
correlation  of  forces— which  re.'^ultt 
from  our  respective  policies  durin^f  t 
1970s  mean  that  even  a  mutual  tVt-' ; 
under  present  circumstances  would  n 
legitimize  the  existing  Soviet  nucle:ij 
vantage  with  uncertain  and  potenlii 
dangerous  political  and  military  coi 
quences. 

The  Soviet  Union  has  itself  frei 
ly  advanced  proposals  for  freezing 
forces,  so  as  to  conserve  the  milita: 
vantages  it  has  acquired  and  avoid 
ing  to  undertake  significant  reduct: 
in  arms  control  negotiations. 

A  freeze  would  undermine  the 
five  capability  of  our  nuclear  deteri 
vis-a-vis  the  Soviet  Union  and,  ; 
result,  the  credibility  of  our  strate^ 
deterrence,  which  has  successfully 
preserved  the  peace  for  over  three 
decades.  Moreover,  as  you  know,  :' 
would  not  be  verifiable. 

The  Soviet  leadership's  assessn 
of  our  resolve  is  every  bit  as  impor 
to  the  effectiveness  of  deterrence  < 
the  Soviet  calculation  of  our  milita 
capability.  But  even  a  nonbindii 
resolution  would  raise  the  most  fui 
mental  questions  about  our  will  to 
aggression  and,  if  necessary,  repel 
with  force. 

Implications  for  Arms  Control 

Many  proponents  of  a  freeze  main! 
that  it  could  be  an  effective  first  st 
toward  arms  control.  In  fact,  I  feai 
it  would  have  just  the  opposite  eff^ 
As  you  know,  we  are  engaged  in  & 
riety  of  arms  control  endeavors. 

'in  START  [strategic  arms  limil 
talks],  we  are  seeking  deep  cuts  im 
strategic  nuclear  weapons,  whose  i 
istence  inspires  such  justified  conce 
and  we  are  focusing  our  efforts  on 
most  destabilizing  systems,  name' 
based  intercontinental  ballistic  miss 

In  INF  [intermediate-range  nui 
forces],  we  have  proposed  the  elim 
tion  of  an  entire  class  of  U.S.  and  '^ 
nuclear  weapons— an  unprecedente 
offer  in  the  history  of  nuclear  armf 
trol.  The  President  has  at  the  samS 
made  clear  that  this  is  not  a  take-il 
leave-it  offer.  Ambassador  Nitze  [Fjl 
H.  Nitze,  head  of  the  INF  negotiat'i: 
has  been  authorized  to  explore  any 
possible  solutions  which  would  tak(0 
fundamental  principles  into  accoun 


28 


Department  of  State  Bi 


EUROPE 


•  Any  agreement  must  provide  for 

il  levels  between  the  United  States 

the  Soviet  Union. 

'  As  a  corollary,  no  agreement 

Jd  include  the  independent  national 

rrents  of  France  and  Great  Britain. 

«  An  agreement  should  not  have  the 

■t  of  transferring  the  threat  from 

»pe  to  Asia. 

'  And  any  agreement  must  provide 

ffective  verification. 

'hese  are  not  only  eminently  fair 
easonable  conditions.  They  are  ab- 
;ly  vital  to  serious  and  effective 
control.  It  remains  for  the  Soviet 
1  to  decide  whether  it  will  negotiate 
e  basis  of  them, 
/e  are  also  seeking  significant 
tions  of  military  manpower  in 
oe  in  the  MBFR  [mutual  and  bal- 
force  reductions]  negotiations,  as 
;  a  total  verifiable  ban  on  chemical 
)ns,  which  we  are  pursuing  in  the 
littee  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva, 
all  of  these  negotiations  we  are 
ing  the  same  goal:  arms  control 
nents  which  will  enhance  peace 
ability  not  by  just  placing  a  ceiling 
arms  race  but  by  actually  produc- 
rifiable,  militarily  significant 
ions  in  armaments, 
ie  principal  obstacle  to  progress  in 
se  arms  control  endeavors  so  far 
en  Soviet  reluctance  to  agree  to 
cant  reductions  and/or  to  a 
ation  regime  which  would 
itee  compliance, 
nether  the  Soviet  Union  will 
i  its  position  in  this  regard  is  dif- 
0  predict.  But  it  is  certain  that  it 
t  if  it  has  no  incentive  to  do  so.  A 
would,  in  effect,  reward  the 
Union  for  its  arms  buildup. 
e  Soviets  have  agreed  to  real 
ontrol  only  when  it  has  been  in 
iterest  to  do  so.  You  will  recall 
jor  debate  over  the  ABM  [an- 
ic  missile]  system.  Only  when  the 
iss— by  one  vote— authorized  the 
ment  to  proceed  with  the  ABM 
Soviet  Union  have  the  incentive 
r  into  negotiations  on  and  even- 
gree  to  the  ABM  Treaty. 
*or  to  NATO's  1979  dual-track 
fcision,  the  Soviet  Union  was  un- 
1  to  consider  control  on  the  SS-20 
i,'.  It  was  only  after  that  decision 
f;eii  ,111(1  after  the  Soviets  were 
Ij.'onvinced,  on  the  basis  of  U.S. 
i-ed  preparations,  that  we  were 
(mmitted  to  implementing  the 
'  cision  did  they  agree  to  negotia- 

^-  must  ask  ourselves  whether  the 
slJnion  would  be  in  Geneva  today 


negotiating  over  these  systems  if  we  had 
not  moved  ahead  with  preparations  for 
counterdeployments  of  U.S.  longer 
range  INF  missiles.  Similarly,  the  pros- 
pect of  U.S.  strategic  modernization  con- 
tinues to  be  a  vital  element  in  ensuring 
serious  START  negotiations. 

With  your  permission  I  would  like 
briefly  to  read  to  you  the  views  of  Am- 
bassadors Nitze  and  Rowny  [Edward  L. 
Rowny,  special  representative  for  arms 
control  and  disarmament  negotiations] 
on  the  freeze  question: 

•  Ambassador  Nitze  reports  that, 
".  .  .  the  passage  [of  a  freeze  resolution] 
would  seriously  undermine  our  ability  to 
negotiate  an  equitable  agreement.  .  .  .  Con- 
tinuation of  NATO  preparations  for  deploy- 
ment of  U.S.  longer-range  INF  missiles  in 
Europe  and  the  prospect  of  that  deployment 
are  the  strongest  incentives  the  Soviets  have 
to  negotiate  seriously.  .  .  .  Were  the  develop- 
ment and  deployment  of  U.S.  longer-range 
INF  missiles  to  be  deferred,  we  would  have 
virtually  no  bargaining  leverage  with  the 
Soviets.  They  would  have  every  reason  to 
draw  out  the  negotiations  indefinitely  without 
results." 

•  Ambassador  Rowny,  for  his  part, 
advises  that  "negotiations  on  reducing 
strategic  arms  would  be  made  immensely 
more  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  by  passage 
of  a  freeze  resolution.  ...  The  Soviets  would 
have  no  incentive  to  negotiate.  .  .  ." 

We  should  not  delude  ourselves.  A 
mutual  freeze  would  be  every  bit  as  dif- 
ficult to  negotiate  as  arms  reductions 
themselves— indeed,  such  a  complete  ban 
on  production,  development,  and  deploy- 
ment of  new  systems  could  prove  even 
more  complicated  than  our  current  com- 
plex and  difficult  arms  talks. 

Moreover,  a  freeze  would  be  a  step 
backward.  In  START  both  sides  have 
accepted  the  concept  of  reductions;  in 
INF  the  Soviets  have  moved  away  from 
rigid  insistence  on  the  maintenance  of 
current  SS-20  force  levels.  Why  should 
we  throw  away  the  opportunity  to 
achieve  real  reductions  in  the  talks 
which  are  now  under  way  in  exchange 
for  the  uncertain  and  potentially 
dangerous  alternative  of  a  freeze? 


Implications  for  Relations 
With  Our  Allies 

The  U.S.  strategic  deterrent  is  funda- 
mental to  the  effectiveness— even  the 
survival— of  NATO. 

•  Militarily,  our  nuclear  forces  are 
the  capstone  of  NATO's  deterrent  and 
the  linchpin  of  our  strategy  of  flexible 
response.  They  are  the  ultimate  link  be- 
tween European  security  and  our  own, 
as  the  only  forces  which  ultimately  can 
deter  the  Soviets  from  using,  or 
threatening  to  use,  their  own  nuclear 
potential  or  massive  conventional  forces. 

•  Politically  and  psychologically,  our 
strategic  deterrent  and  the  presence  of 
U.S.  troops  in  Europe  symbolize  our 
commitment  to  the  defense  of  Europe 
and  our  conviction  that  the  security  of 
Western  Europe  and  our  own  security 
are,  indeed,  indivisible. 

A  freeze  would  undermine  our 
capacity  to  defend  Europe,  and  it  would 
inspire  doubts  among  European  leaders 
and  publics  about  our  resolve  to  do  so. 
As  such,  it  would  have  the  most 
deleterious  effect  on  the  underpinnings 
of  the  alliance. 

It  is  significant  that  no  major  allied 
government,  all  of  which  support  arms 
control  in  principle  but  are  deeply  con- 
cerned about  Soviet  nuclear  moderniza- 
tion and  the  current  nuclear  balance,  has 
spoken  out  in  favor  of  a  freeze.  Indeed, 
they  have  all  repeatedly  rejected 
Europe-wide  freeze  proposals  offered  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  By  destroying  the 
deployment  track  of  the  NATO  two- 
track  decision,  a  freeze  would  cut  the 
ground  out  from  under  these  European 
leaders  who  have  steadfastly  held  to  im- 
plementation of  that  decision. 

In  short,  a  freeze  resolution  would 
call  into  question  the  will  and  ability  of 
the  United  States  to  exercise  its  leader- 
ship in  a  manner  which  protects  the  in- 
terests of  all. 

Conclusion 

To  sum  up,  I  believe  that  the  conse- 
quences of  a  freeze  resolution  would  be 
the  opposite  of  those  its  proponents 
hope  to  achieve. 

•  It  would  encourage  irresponsible, 
rather  than  restrained,  Soviet  conduct. 

•  It  would  threaten  stability  by 
preventing  reestablishment  of  the 
strategic  balance,  rather  than 
strengthening  that  balance. 


EUROPE 


•  It  would  cripple,  rather  than  ad- 
vance, our  arms  control  initiatives. 

•  It  would  weaken,  not  strengthen, 
the  Atlantic  alliance  upon  which  our  own 
security  so  heavily  depends. 

•  It  would  heighten  the  risk  of  war, 
rather  than  strengthen  the  peace. 

I  ask  you  to  bear  these  concerns  in 
mind  in  the  course  of  your  deliberations. 
We  share  with  you  the  same  objectives 
of  preventing  war  and  securing  the 
peace  and  the  same  commitment  to  ef- 


fective arms  control  as  an  essential 
means  to  that  end.  We  believe  that  the 
President's  program— the  most  com- 
prehensive arms  control  program  ever 
set  out  by  any  American  administra- 
tion—is the  best  way  of  fully  achieving 
this  objective. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Ot- 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


50  Years  of  U.S.-Soviet  Dialogue 


by  Arthur  A.  Hartman 

The  following  article  was  submitted 
to  the  S'orirt  >iew>!pnper  Pravda  in  April 
1983,  ivhirh  ilnl  „nl  piihlish  it.  On 
April  11.  Ih>'  U.S.  Ki,il,„ssij  in  Moscow 
released  the  text  tu  U.S.  and  West  Euro- 
pean correspondents.  Mr.  Hartman  is 
U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet  Union. 

This  November  the  United  States  and 
the  Soviet  Union  will  pass  a  significant 
milestone— the  50th  anniversary  of  the 
establishment  of  diplomatic  relations 
between  our  two  governments. 

The  anniversary  will  mean  different 
things  to  different  people.  But  if  it 
stands  for  anything,  it  will  stand  for  50 
years  of  dialogue.  For  half  a  century, 
my  government  and  the  Government  of 
the  Soviet  Union  have  recognized  the 
importance  of  communications  between 
our  two  peoples. 

In  recent  months,  it  has  become 
clear  to  me  that  the  Soviet  Union — or  at 
least  certain  of  its  more  influential 
spokesmen— continues  to  appreciate  the 
value  of  setting  its  view  before  the 
American  people. 

In  the  U.S.  press  and  over  our  radio 
and  television,  a  veritable  period  of 
some  of  the  U.S.S.R.'s  best  known  com- 
mentators, academics,  and  other 
spokesmen  have  done  an  admirable  job 
of  presenting  Soviet  positions  on  major 
bilateral  and  international  issues. 

We  in  the  United  States  have  long 
felt  that  a  well-informed  public  is  a 
precondition  for  effective  democracy  and 
a  wise  foreign  policy.  That  Soviet 
representatives  have  such  free  access  to 
the  U.S.  media  is  proof  of  the  continuing 
vitality  of  America's  commitment  to  the 
ideal  of  a  free  exchange  of  ideas. 


In  a  genuine  dialogue,  of  course, 
both  sides  are  talking,  not  just  one.  With 
this  in  mind,  I  hope  you  will  permit  me, 
through  the  pages  of  your  newspaper,  to 
address  some  of  the  major  issues  facing 
our  two  countries  and  to  provide  an 
American  point  of  view  for  your  Soviet 
readers,  just  as  our  media  have  wel- 
comed the  exposition  of  a  Soviet  point  of 
view  to  American  audiences. 

What  do  we  Americans  hear  when 
we  listen  to  Soviet  spokesmen?  Many 
things,  many  of  them  critical  and  on  a 
range  of  issues  too  broad  to  address  in 
one  article.  I  will,  therefore,  focus  on 
three  major  concerns  we  hear  being 
voiced  by  the  Soviet  side. 

First,  that  the  United  States  not  on- 
ly has  abandoned  its  commitment  to 
peace  but  is  actively  preparing  for  war; 

Second,  that,  to  justify  its  military 
preparations,  the  United  States  is  arti- 
ficially exacerbating  U.S.-Soviet  tensions 
by.  raising  extraneous  issues;  and 

Third,  that  U.S.  arms  control  pro- 
posals are  not  only  not  serious,  but 
designed  unilaterally  to  disarm  the 
Soviet  Union. 

When  we  hear  such  views  expressed, 
I  confess  it  is  hard  to  avoid  the  conclu- 
sions that  those  expressing  them  are  not 
really  listening  to  us.  Let  us  look  at  the 
facts. 

U.S.  Commitment  to  Peace 

First,  as  to  our  commitment  to  preserv- 
ing the  peace.  As  inconvenient  as  it  may 
be  to  some,  the  historical  record  shows 
that  the  United  States  has  been  in  the 
forefront  of  international  efforts  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  war  for  over  30  years. 


As  early  as  1946,  when  the  I'tnt. 
States  possessed  not  the  fanciful 
military  superiority  we  are  toda\-  in- 
cused of  seeking  but  an  absolute 
monopoly  on  nuclear  weapons  ami 
technology,  we  proposed  in  the  Haru 
Plan  that  all  aspects  of  atomic  devel 
ment  be  placed  under  international 
auspices.  The  Soviet  Union  rejfi*    ' 
proposal,  and  a  great  opportuim 
the  nuclear  arms  race  in  the  bu'i 
lost. 

But  our  approach  has  not  chang 
the  intervening  years.  In  Geneva  an 
Vienna,  the  Reagan  Administration 
proposed  a  range  of  initiatives  aime 
bringing  to  a  halt  senseless  competi 
in  nuclear  weapons  and  sharply  redi 
the  possibility  of  a  conflict,  nuclear  • 
conventional. 

History  has  taught  us,  however, 
we  cannot  rely  solely  on  negotiation 
preserve  the  peace.  We,  like  the  So- 
Union,  learned  in  1941  that  military 
weakness,  or  perceptions  of  it,  can 
the  shortest  path  to  war. 

Thus,  throughout  the  postwar 
period,  we  have  taken  the  steps  we 
believed  necessary  to  deter  any  atta 
on  ourselves  or  our  allies.  The  curr« 
modernization  of  our  armed  forces, 
which  seems  to  trouble  Soviet 
spokesmen  so,  is  an  outgrowth  of  tit 
approach  and,  I  might  add,  follows  > 
a  decade  of  U.S.  restraint  in  deployi 
new  weapons  systems. 

Our  goal,  as  in  the  past,  is  detei 
rence.  We  do  not,  as  President  Reai 
has  made  clear,  seek  military  super 
over  the  Soviet  Union  or  any  other' 
tion.  But  neither  can  we  afford  to  b 
second  best. 


Human  Rights  and 
Regional  Conflicts 

Next,  as  to  charges  that  the  United 
States  is  artificially  aggravating  1 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  There  is  no  M 
tion  that  bilateral  tensions  exist  and 
recent  years  have  grown  more  seri(i- 
This  is  partially  a  function  of  the  fa 
that  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.RJ 
and  for  the  foreseeable  future  are  1  'I 
to  remain,  international  rivals. 

This  is  not  a  choice  we  have  ms': 
is  largely  a  reflection  of  the  diverse 
basic  principles  on  which  our  two 
societies  were  founded.  But  it  does  i' 
implications  for  how  we  interrelate 
one  another  in  the  world.  | 

For  our  part,  we  do  not  expect  « 
U.S.S.R.,  in  its  approach  to  the  Un<) 
States,  to  compromise  its  principles  r 


30 


Department  of  State  Bu^ 


EUROPE 


sts.  But  neither  do  we  expect  or 
to  compromise  our  own. 
ith  respect  to  principles,  one  area 
there  should  be  no  doubt  as  to 
mmitment  is  on  the  question  of 
1  rights. 

e  often  hear  that  our  human 
policy  represents  interference  in 
internal  affairs.  We  cannot  accept 
characterization,  which  betrays 
ignorance  of  what  motivates  the 
I  States  as  a  people, 
cause  of  the  importance  to  us  of 
sic  rights  of  man — on  which  our 
epublic  was  founded  in  1776— we 
lly  sympathize  with  and  support 
n  the  Soviet  Union  and  elsewhere 
rights  are  being  denied.  We  shall 
do  so. 

t  there  is  an  equally  fundamen- 
id  perhaps  more  pragmatic- 
it  issue.  When  a  country 
latically  denies  its  citizens  their 
under  international  agreements  to 
it  is  a  party,  it  raises  in  our  minds 
;  questions  as  to  that  country's 
ity  as  an  international  partner. 
'.  ask  only  that  the  U.S.S.R.  live 
;s  international  obligations  in  the 
human  rights. 

i  situation  is  similar  with  respect 
oerception  of  interests.  We  are 
M  that  we  should  not  allow 
•egional  conflicts  to  interfere  with 
J  efforts  in  such  vital  areas  as 
ontrol.  Again,  we  cannot  accept 
1  argument. 

nodern  history  has  taught  us 
g,  it  is  that  security  encompasses 
)le  world  situation. 
€n  we  see  Soviet  forces  occupy- 
thanistan  to  support  a  govern- 
hich  apparently  cannot  sustain 
/hen  we  see  Vietnamese  playing 
.r  role  in  Kampuchea  with  Soviet 
',  when  we  see  Polish  workers 
rights  previously  agreed  to  by 
m  government,  when  a  large 
emocracy  is  threatened  by  the 
Jnion  with  nuclear  retaliation  for 
to  assure  its  own  security,  we 
lelp  but  draw  conclusions  as  to 
lications  of  such  actions  for  our 
urity  and  take  appropriate  ac- 
response. 

only  natural  that  we  should 
make  such  questions  a  part  of 
.-Soviet  dialogue. 

:h  to  Arms  Control 

as  to  the  question  of  the  sinceri- 
r  approach  to  arms  control.  Por- 
the  U.S.  approach  as  a  scheme 


U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet  Union 


Arthur  A.  Hartman  was  swurn  in  as  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  the  Soviet  Union  on  October 
14,  1981.  He  is  a  career  Foreign  Service  of- 
ficer holding  the  rank  of  Career  Minister. 

Ambassador  Hartman  was  born  on  March 
12,  1926,  in  New  York  City.  He  received  his 
B.A.  degree  from  Harvard  (1947)  and  attend- 
ed Harvard  Law  School  during  1947-48.  He 
served  in  the  U.S.  Army  from  1944  to  1946. 

Entering  government  service  in  1948,  he 
was  assigned  as  economic  officer  at  the 


Economic  Cooperation  Administration  (Mar- 
shall Plan)  in  Paris  under  its  first  chief.  Am- 
bassador David  K.E.  Bruce.  In  1952  he  was  a 
member  of  the  U.S.  delegation  to  the  Euro- 
pean Army  Conference  in  Paris,  and  in  1954 
he  joined  the  U.S.  Mission  to  NATO  in  Paris, 
where  he  remained  until  1956,  when  he  was 
assigned  to  Saigon  in  a  joint  U.S.  Em- 
bassy/AID  mission  function.  From  1958  to 
1961,  Ambassador  Hartman  worked  on  Euro- 
pean integration  affairs  in  the  Bureau  of 
European  Affairs.  During  1961-63  he  served 
as  staff  assistant  and  then  special  assistant  to 
Under  Secretary  of  State  George  Ball,  hi 
1963  he  was  assigned  to  London  where  he 
was  chief  of  the  economic  section,  a  position 
he  held  until  1967. 

From  1967  to  1972,  he  served  in  the 
Department  of  State,  first  as  special  assistant 
to  Under  Secretary  of  State  Nicholas  Katzen- 
l)ach  and  staff  director  of  the  Senior  In- 
terdepartmental Group  (1967-69),  and  then 
as  Deputy  Director  for  Coordination,  report- 
ing to  Under  Secretary  of  State  Elliott 
Richardson. 

In  1972  Ambassador  Hartman  was  ap- 
pointed Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  and 
Minister-Counselor  at  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the 
European  Communities  in  Brussels.  From 
1974  to  1977  he  served  as  Assistant 
Secretary  for  European  Affairs.  He  was 
sworn  in  as  U.S.  Ambassador  to  France  on 
June  13,  1977,  and  served  in  Paris  until  his 
appointment  to  the  U.S.S.R. 

He  received  the  Presidential  Management 
Improvement  Award  in  1970  and  the 
Distinguished  Honor  Award  in  1972.  ■ 


for  unilateral  disarmament  of  the  Soviet 
Union  may  be  an  effective  debater's 
technique,  but  it  does  not  take  one  very 
far  in  getting  at  the  roots  of  the 
problem. 

President  Reagan's  proposals  in 
Geneva,  on  the  other  hand,  represent 
straightforward  and  sensible  approaches 
designed  to  achieve  two  basic  goals: 

•  To  decrease  the  likelihood  that 
either  side  will  ever  be  tempted  to  use 
nuclear  weapons  first  and 

•  To  reduce  the  levels  of  nuclear 
arsenals. 

We  would  do  this  in  three  ways. 

First,  we  have  proposed  that  both 
sides  reduce  the  number  of  their  nuclear 
warheads  on  ballistic  missiles  by  one- 
third.  The  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union  both  have  approximately  7,000 
such  warheads  now  (the  Soviet  Union 


actually  has  several  hundred  more). 
Thus,  the  new  ceiling  would  be  5,000 
warheads.  We  concentrate  on  ballistic 
missiles  because  their  rapid  flight  time 
makes  them  well  suited  for  surprise  at- 
tacks. 

Second,  we  have  proposed  that  no 
more  than  half  of  the  5,000  warheads  re- 
maining under  our  plan  be  placed  on 
land-based  intercontinental  ballistic 
missiles  (ICBMs).  Again  the  rationale  is 
to  reduce  the  temptation  for  one  side  to 
strike  first. 

ICBMs,  because  of  their  fixed  loca- 
tions, are  vulnerable  to  destruction  in  a 
surprise  attack.  Thus,  the  temptation  to 
use  them  in  the  event  of  warning  of  an 
attack  would  be  strong,  and  the  risk  of 
an  accidental  launch  is  increased.  At  the 
same  time,  their  accuracy  and  heavy 
payloads  make  them  ideal  weapons  for  a 
first-strike.  By  reducing  both  sides' 


EUROPE 


reliance  on  such  systems,  our  proposal 
would  significantly  reduce  the  possibility 
of  an  outbreak  of  war. 

Finally,  we  have  proposed  the 
elimination  of  an  entire  class  of 
weapons— land-based  intermediate- 
range  ballistic  missiles.  At  present,  only 
the  Soviet  Union  has  such  systems,  the 
sole  purpose  of  which,  despite  Soviet 
claims  to  the  contrary,  is  to  pose  a 
nuclear  threat  to  a  whole  series  of  na- 
tions along  the  Soviet  Union's  borders 
and  beyond.  Since  many  of  these  states 
are  U.S.  allies  or  friends,  these  systems 
create  a  serious  threat  of  escalation  to  a 
strategic  level. 

The  United  States  and  its  NATO 
allies  have  made  clear  their  intention  to 
redress  the  balance  of  such  forces  in 
Europe.  If  necessary,  we  are  prepared 
to  do  so  by  deploying  analogous  forces 
of  our  own.  But  we  would  prefer,  as  we 
have  made  clear,  that  the  problem  be 
resolved  by  a  bilateral  agreement  to 


eliminate  these  systems  from  the  face  of 
the  earth. 

A  Soviet  commentator  in  an  article 
published  not  too  long  ago  in  an 
American  publication  observed  that, 
while  he  would  like  to  be  proved  wrong, 
he  saw  little  hope  of  doing  business  with 
the  United  States  at  this  time.  As  I 
noted  earlier,  I  cannot  help  but  think 
that  he  has  not  been  listening  to  what 
we  are  saying. 

We  are  ready  to  respond  quickly  and 
favorably  to  positive  moves  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  This  does  not  mean,  as  is 
sometimes  suggested,  that  we  seek 
unilateral  concessions.  It  does  mean  that 
we  seek  evidence  that  the  Soviet  Union 
is  prepared  to  join  with  us  in  the  search 
for  just,  mutually  acceptable  solutions  to 
the  problems  before  us. 

Given  that  evidence,  those  inclined 
to  conclude  that  there  is  no  possibility 
for  bilateral  progress  may  be  surprised 
how  quickly  they  are  proved  wrong.  ■ 


The  Human  Side  of 
German-American  Relations 


by  Arthur  F.  Burns 

Address  before  the  Overseas  Club, 
Hamburg,  Federal  Republic  of  Germany, 
on  March  U,  1983.  Mr.  Bums  is  U.S. 
Ambassador  to  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany. 

As  the  Ambassador  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  I 
have  often  spoken  about  the  political, 
economic,  and  security  relationships  be- 
tween our  two  countries.  This  evening  I 
would  like  to  address  a  more  funda- 
mental theme— the  human  relationship 
between  your  country  and  mine. 

We  are  commemorating  this  year 
the  300th  anniversary  of  the  arrival  in 
North  America  of  the  first  permanent 
immigrants  from  Germany.  The  13  Men- 
nonite  and  Quaker  families  who  in  1683 
settled  in  German  town,  now  a  part  of 
the  city  of  Philadelphia,  came  in  search 
of  freedom— the  freedom  to  pursue  their 
religious  beliefs  and  the  freedom  to  seek 
economic  betterment  for  themselves  and 
their  children.  They  found  both.  I  dare- 
say that  a  great  majority  of  the  fore- 
bears of  the  approximately  68  million 
Americans  who  today  claim  German 


ancestry  came  in  search  of  these  same 
objectives— personal  freedom  and  eco- 
nomic opportunity. 

Across  the  centuries,  America  has 
been  identified  with  these  basic  human 
strivings.  Our  Declaration  of  Independ- 
ence and  our  Constitution  eloquently  ex- 
press these  ideals,  and  they  have  served 
in  all  parts  of  the  world  as  a  beacon  for 
people  seeking  a  new  life  for  them- 
selves—a life  that  would  enable  them  to 
speak  or  write  freely,  to  worship  God  as 
they  saw  fit,  and  to  pursue  economic  op- 
portunities without  being  encumbered  by 
rigid  customs  or  authoritarian  rule. 

The  human  significance  of  the 
centuries-old  stream  of  immigration  to 
America— at  first  from  Western  Europe; 
later  from  eastern  and  southern  Europe; 
still  later  from  Latin  America,  Asia,  and 
other  parts  of  the  world— can  hardly  be 
exaggerated.  Americans  may  justly  note 
with  pride  that  their  country  has  re- 
mained a  land  of  hope  and  welcome  for 
uprooted  people— that  it  accepts  even  at 
present  many  more  immigrants  than 
does  the  rest  of  the  world.  Most  of  them 
still  come  in  search  of  personal  freedom 
and  economic  opportunity  for 
themselves  and  their  children. 

The  United  States,  in  turn,  has  con- 
tinued to  benefit  from  the  unceasing 
flow  of  immigrants  to  its  shores.  If  they 


caused  social  problems  at  times,  th 
also  ultimately  enriched  our  indust 
political,  and  cultural  life.  My  coun 
could  not  have  developed  the  way  i 
nor  become  the  society  that  it  is  to 
without  the  moral  courage  and  the 
tellectual  and  technical  skills  that  \ 
continually  being  brought  to  us  fro 
Old  World  and  particularly  from  yi 
country. 

The  names  of  many  of  the  Ger 
immigrants  to  America  are  well  ki 
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic;  and  i 
mention  some  tonight,  they  serve  ■ 
as  examples  of  those  who  have  enf 
gized  American  life  and  culture.  T 
is— as  the  first  of  these— Franz  Da 
Pastorius,  the  founder  of  Germant 
a  prophetic  figure  who  projected  a 
vision  of  the  kind  of  country  that  1 
United  States  was  to  become.  In  a 
eating  the  separation  of  church  an 
state,  tolerance  of  religious  and  et 
diversity,  and  the  abolition  of  slavu 
was  well  ahead  of  his  time.  Anothn 
William  Rittenhouse,  a  minister  an 
papermaker  from  Muehlheim  on  tl| 
Ruhr,  whose  great  grandson,  DavJ 
tenhouse,  served  as  the  first  direct 
the  U.S.  mint  and  achieved  lasting 
as  a  mathematician,  astronomer,  i 
ventor.  Thomas  Jefferson  was  mo 
say  of  him:  "He  has  not,  indeed,  m 
world,  but  he  has  intimately  appro 
nearer  its  maker  than  any  man  wl 
lived."  There  was  the  printer,  jour  li 
and  publisher,  Christopher  Sauer,  N 
was  the  first  to  print  the  Bible  in  ; 
European  language  in  America  .A  ■ 
famous  immigrant  was  John  Pttei 
Zenger,  who  is  still  known  in  the  1  i 
States  as  the  "patron  saint"  of  frei  'i 
of  the  press.  And  there  was  Hans 
Nikolaus  Eisenhauer,  an  immigrar 
from  Eiterbach,  in  what  is  now  so  « 
Hesse,  who  arrived  in  America  in  ) 
middle  of  the  18th  century,  achiev'i 
neither  wealth  nor  fame,  but  becai|l 
ancestor  of  Dwight  David  Eisenho'r 
the  34th  President  of  the  United  Sfi 

And,  if  I  may  continue,  there  \,'' 
also  the  heroes  of  the  Revolutionai- 
War— Johann  de  Kalb  and  Friedri( 
Wilhelm  von  Steuben;  the  political . 
thinkers  and  reformers— Friedrich 
Hecker,  Carl  Schurz,  John  AltgeldJi 
Robert  Wagner;  the  bridge  builder 
John  Augustus  Roebling;  the  orgai 
builder— Henry  Steinway;  the  busi  s 
men— John  Jacob  Astor  and  Levi  , 
Strauss;  the  artists— Emanuel  Leui 
and  Albert  Bierstadt;  the  political  ,"- 
toonist— Thomas  Nast;  the  musicia 


Department  of  State  Bi 51 


EUROPE 


)mposers— Leopold  Damrosch,  Ar- 
ichoenberg,  Bruno  Walter,  Kurt 
the  linguist— Maximilian  Berlitz; 
nker  and  philanthropist— Paul 
Warburg;  the  theologian— Paul 
the  architects— Ludwig  Mies  van 
)he  and  Walter  Gropius;  the  scien- 
dbert  Einstein;  the  writers— 
ts  Mann  and  Hannah  Arendt; 
,0  round  out  this  illustrative 
our  friend  and  mine,  Henry  Kiss- 
Where  would  America  be,  or  for 
after  where  would  the  world  be, 
t  the  momentous  contributions  of 
jerman  immigrants! 

n-American  Partnership 

people,  their  children,  and  their 
n's  children— the  68  million 
ans  who  claim  German  ante- 
s—forged the  chain  that  linked 
3  societies.  These  links  had 

to  do  with  political  treaties, 
y  arrangements,  or  trade  agree- 
Indeed,  they  survived  severe 
in  the  political  relationship  be- 
)ur  countries— even  two  terrible 
'erhaps  the  best  example  of  the 
h  and  durability  of  these  human 
he  speed  and  commitment  with 
tie  people  of  my  country  devoted 
ves  to  assisting  the  German  peo- 
r  World  War  H. 
as  primarily  the  interaction  be- 
ar two  peoples  that  brought 
icy  and  physical  reconstruction 
'ederal  Republic  and  established 
nership  between  our  two 
;  that  exists  today.  To  be  sure, 
shall  plan  was  a  critical  instru- 
rebuilding  West  Germany's  shat- 
:onomy.  The  North  Atlantic 
Drovided  the  essential  guarantee 
ity  against  aggression.  Other  ac- 
uch  as  the  Berlin  airlift— further 
the  resolve  of  the  United  States 
in  the  protection  of  the  young 
icy  that  had  risen  from  the  ashes 
1  War  n. 

the  driving  force  of  all  these 
political  developments  was  the 
letwork  created  by  the  millions 
leans  of  German  descent,  by  the 
IS  German  refugees  who  reached 
es  in  the  1930s,  by  the  hundreds 
ands  of  German  prisoners  of 
1  lived  for  years  in  the  United 
)y  the  tens  of  thousands  of 
ns  and  Germans  who  cooperated 
ding  the  democratic  society 
e  Federal  Republic  is  today,  and 
gion  of  Fulbright  scholars  and 
^i  students.  It  was  their  inter- 
at  formed  the  foundation  of  the 


partnership  between  our  two  coun- 
tries—a partnership  that  has  proved 
strong  enough  to  withstand  all  sorts  of 
temporary  economic  irritations  and 
political  differences. 

These  Americans  and  Germans,  who 
lived  and  worked  together,  came  to 
understand  and  appreciate  one  another. 
They  knew  or  soon  learned  that  they 
were  bound  together  by  shared  values 
and  convictions— by  respect  for  human 
rights,  by  faith  in  democracy,  by  devo- 
tion to  the  rule  of  law.  And  they  trans- 
mitted these  insights  to  those  of  their 
countrymen  who  had  no  direct  involve- 
ment with  people  of  the  other  nation. 
But  by  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s 
this  creative  generation  of  Germans  and 
Americans  gradually  moved  out  of  posi- 
tions of  leadership  and  influence.  The 
network  of  human  relationships  that  had 
so  closely  linked  our  societies  thus  be- 
came looser.  The  generation  taking  their 
places  had  no  similar  formative  experi- 
ences, and  as  a  result  it  had  a  less  per- 
sonal commitment  to  the  German-Ameri- 
can relationship. 

The  Need  To  Strengthen 
Shared  Values 

In  recent  years  the  tight  net  of  shared 
values  between  our  two  peoples  has 
been  sagging,  in  part,  because  we  are 
now  less  intimately  involved  with  each 
other.  At  the  same  time,  other  develop- 
ments began  to  cloud  the  optimistic 
mood,  especially  of  young  people,  in  our 
countries.  Among  these  was  the 
diminished  luster  of  the  noble  dream  of 
a  united  Europe,  the  persisting  hunger 
and  despair  in  many  of  the  less  de- 
veloped parts  of  the  world,  the  Vietnam 
war  in  which  the  United  States  had  un- 
fortunately become  entangled,  the  civil 
rights  turmoil  in  my  country,  the  enor- 
mous Soviet  military  buildup  during  the 
1970s  in  the  face  of  a  proclaimed 
detente,  the  political  adventures  of  the 
Soviets  in  Asia  and  Africa  and  their  in- 
vasion of  Afghanistan,  the  suppression 
of  the  newly  achieved  freedom  of  speech 
and  assembly  in  Poland,  the  rampant  in- 
flation and  rising  unemployment  in  the 
Western  world,  and— not  least  impor- 
tant—the growing  feeling  in  the  Federal 
Republic  that  its  wirtschaftsWunder  had 
come  to  an  end. 

All  these  factors,  while  not  directly 
involving  the  German-American  relation- 
ship, have  cast  their  shadow  upon  it.  It 
is  an  inescapable  fact  that  the  relation- 
ship between  our  two  peoples  has  be- 
come less  close.  The  educational  system, 


which  could  have  partially  replaced  the 
loss  of  direct  personal  experience  be- 
tween Germans  and  Americans,  has 
failed  us.  The  new  generation  has  not 
been  well  served  by  the  slight  attention 
of  our  schools  to  the  teaching  of  history, 
ethics,  and  the  principles  of  our  Western 
civilization. 

Human  understanding  is  always  im- 
perfect. That  is  man's  lot  on  Earth.  We 
know  this  from  our  daily  lives.  Parents 
do  not  always  understand  their  children 
or  children  their  parents.  So  it  is  also 
between  husbands  and  wives,  between 
employers  and  their  workers,  between 
landlords  and  tenants,  between  bankers 
and  borrowers,  between  professors  and 
students.  But,  if  misunderstandings  ex- 
ist within  our  families,  schools,  and 
workshops,  they  have  much  greater  op- 
portunity to  arise— and  even  flourish— 
among  nations,  since  differences  of 
history  and  language  conspire  with 
limited  direct  contacts  between  peoples 
to  breed  misunderstanding  and  at  times, 
unfortunately  even  mistrust.  Foreign 
service  is  no  longer  an  entirely  new 
career  for  me;  I  am  now  well  into  the 
second  year  of  my  ambassadorship  to 
your  country.  But  I  must  confess  that  I 
still  continue  to  be  astounded  by  the 
strange  opinions  that  highly  placed 
Europeans  now  and  then  express  about 
the  United  States  and,  I  should  add,  vice 
versa.  Is  there  any  wonder,  then,  why 
many  of  the  young  people  in  your  coun- 
try and  mine  have  so  little  understand- 
ing of  one  another's  society? 

I  have  spent  many  hours  with  young 
people  in  your  country,  as  I  previously 
did  in  mine.  I  admire  their  intelligence, 
their  idealism,  their  horror  of  arma- 
ments, and  their  sympathy  for  the 
downtrodden.  But  I  am  also  appalled  by 
the  ignorance  that  so  many  of  them  ex- 
hibit of  the  history  even  of  their  own 
country,  to  say  nothing  about  their 
ignorance  of  the  United  States.  And  I 
am  especially  troubled  by  their  apparent 
lack  of  appreciation  of  what  it  means  to 
live  in  a  democracy. 

It  is  a  puzzling  and  saddening 
feature  of  our  times  that  many  of  our 
young  people,  perhaps  even  more  so  in 
your  country  than  mine,  seem  unable  to 
differentiate  between  the  moral  and 
political  order  of  the  West  and  the  op- 
pressive totalitarianism  of  the  Soviet 
bloc.  After  all,  the  values  of  Western 
democracies  are  not  abstract  or  elusive 
concepts.  The  liberty  of  the  individual  to 
speak,  write,  worship,  and  assemble 
with  others;  the  equality 'of  all  in- 
dividuals under  the  law;  the  protection 


33 


EUROPE 


of  every  citizen  against  arbitrary  acts  of 
government;  the  freedom  to  choose 
among  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
alternatives — these  basic  values  of 
Western  democracies  are  practical 
realities  that  every  intelligent  person 
should  be  able  to  grasp.  They  certainly 
are  thoroughly  understood  and  appreci- 
ated by  those  who  live  under  communist 
rule  and  are  not  able  to  enjoy  them. 

The  reason  that  many  young  people 
in  Europe  and  America  take  basic 
Western  values  for  granted  must  be  that 
they  have  never  been  without  them. 
They  do  not  seem  to  realize  that  their 
right  to  demonstrate  for  a  nuclear 
freeze,  their  freedom  to  press  publicly 
for  unilateral  disarmament,  their  right 
to  march  against  what  they  consider  to 
be  wrong  American  policies  in  Central 
America— that  these  privileges  are 
theirs  under  a  democratic  system  that 
they  themselves  must  help  protect 
against  those  who  would  take  them 
away,  as  they  have  been  taken  away 
from  both  the  young  and  old  in  Poland, 
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Afghanistan, 
and  many  other  places.  Young  people  of 
average  intelligence  ought  to  be  able  to 
see  the  difference  between  the  impulses 
animating  America  and  those  governing 
the  Soviet  Union.  They  ought  to  be  able 
to  recognize  that  the  invited  presence  of 
American  troops  in  Europe  has  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  helping  to  protect  the 


The  reason  that 
many  young  people  in 
Europe  and  America 
take  basic  Western 
values  for  granted  must 
be  that  they  have  never 
been  without  them. 


values  of  our  Western  civilization, 
whereas  the  Soviet  armies  that  have 
willfully  occupied  Eastern  Europe  for  35 
years  are  there  to  ensure  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  freedoms  for  which  their 
citizens  yearn  to  this  day. 

The  reality  and  the  attraction  of  our 
Western  values,  it  appears  to  me,  should 
be  clear  to  anyone  contemplating  the 
lives  of  the  unhappy  people  under  Soviet 


domination  who,  whenever  ] 
have  taken  to  voting  with  their  feet  be- 
cause they  cannot  vote  any  other  way. 
There  are  millions  of  individuals  who 
have  escaped  from  East  Germany, 
Poland,  Vietnam,  Kampuchea,  Afghani- 
stan, Cuba,  and  other  communist  coun- 
tries. But  is  anyone  aware  of  a  flood — 
or  even  of  a  trickle— of  refugees  migrat- 
ing to  any  of  these  countries? 

The  misguided  views  of  young 
people— and  even  of  some  who  are  not 
so  young — are  often  attributed  to  the 
persistence  and  power  of  Soviet  propa- 
ganda. I  hear  this  repeatedly  from  my 
business  friends.  That  explanation,  how- 
ever, is  an  escape  from  realities.  The 
Soviets,  to  be  sure,  use  every  opportuni- 
ty to  defame  our  Western  societies  and 
to  disguise  the  truth  about  their  own. 
But  their  ability  to  do  so  with  success 
derives  fundamentally  from  the  fact  that 
both  parents  and  teachers  in  our  coun- 
tries have  failed  to  impart  to  children  a 
sufficiently  sound  moral  and  historical 
education,  so  that  they  can  appreciate 
the  democratic  institutions  that  they 
have  been  fortunate  enough  to  inherit. 

To  be  sure,  the  democratic  systems 
that  prevail  in  Western  Europe  and  in 
the  United  States  have  their  short- 
comings and  abuses.  But  what  is  note- 
worthy about  a  democracy  is  its  capacity 
for  improvement  and  renewal.  Open 
criticism,  evolution  of  institutions,  and 
orderly  change  in  the  laws  governing 
society  are  inherent  elements  of  the 
democratic  system.  The  Soviet  system, 
in  contrast,  stifles  through  terror  and 
repression  any  attempt  of  its  citizens  to 
change  it  significantly. 

The  young  people  of  Western 
Europe  must  realize  that  if  they  wish  to 
preserve  their  liberties,  if  they  wish  to 
enjoy  the  basic  rights  of  a  democratic 
society,  they  must  feel  part  of  that 
system,  and  they,  therefore,  must  be 
prepared— if  it  ever  becomes 
necessary— even  to  fight  for  it.  As 
parents,  teachers,  and  politicians,  we 
have  the  responsibility  on  both  sides  of 
the  Atlantic  to  make  sure  that  the  demo- 
cratic values  that  bind  us  in  the  North 
Atlantic  alliance  are  understood  and  ap- 
preciated by  those  who  follow  in  our 
footsteps. 

How  can  we  do  that?  I  come  from  a 
background  of  teaching,  and  I  naturally 
value  the  benefits  of  a  good  education.  It 
is  clear  to  me  that  we  must  do  a  far  bet- 
ter job  of  educating  our  young  people  in 
ethics,  history,  languages,  and  political 
science.  This  requires,  among  other 


things,  that  we  be  more  alert  as  pa 
and  teachers  to  the  inadequacies  of 
formal  educational  apparatus,  parti 
ly  the  Gymnasia  in  your  country  ai 
high  schools  in  mine.  The  textbook; 
in  both  German  and  American  schc 
are  often  obsolete,  and  for  that  rea 
alone  tend  to  convey  serious  misini 
tion  about  our  respective  countries 
Teachers  of  history  and  political  sc 
have  a  special  obligation  to  be  obje 
and  up  to  date.  They  can  be  aided 
fulfilling  this  responsibility  by  an  e 
tional  system  that  encourages  and 
rewards  those  teachers  who  diligei 
continue  their  own  education. 

I  also  have  a  background  in  int 
tional  finance.  It  is  for  me  a  famili 
ritory  of  relative  order  and  predict 
ty.  International  politics  and  diploi 
on  the  other  hand,  are  a  new  disci] 
for  me.  I  find  it  a  universe  inordin 
filled  with  gossip,  emotion,  and  evi 
suspicion— a  world  in  which  percef 
of  facts  often  obscures  the  facts  tf 
selves.  This,  I  readily  admit,  is  the 
tion  in  my  country  as  it  is  in  yours 
I  recognize  that  an  ambassador  mi 
what  he  can  to  clear  out  this  unde 
of  emotion  and  faulty  perception  t 
times  disturbs  the  relationship  bet 
his  government  and  the  governme 
which  he  is  accredited. 

The  achievement,  however,  of' 
understanding  between  any  two  g« 
ments  depends  fundamentally  on  t 
kind  of  relationship  that  exists  bet 
their  peoples,  rather  than  on  foreij 
ministers  or  ambassadors.  Governi 
in  democratic  countries  are  inevita 
fluenced  by,  and  to  a  considerable 
degree  they  even  echo,  the  thinkin 
their  citizens.  It  is,  therefore,  highJi 
portant  that  improvements  in  our 
respective  educational  systems  be  ' 
supplemented  by  a  vastly  greater  i(» 
work  of  personal  contacts  between  K 
peoples  of  our  two  countries.  Brin|i| 
about  better  understanding  of  our  • 
spective  institutions  of  work  and  pA 
life  in  our  homes  and  communities  n 
of  the  aspirations  and  fears  of  our 
peoples  should  be  our  mutual  goal.' 
know  of  no  other  way  of  reestablifiH 
the  camaraderie  and  understandin'ii 
existed  between  Americans  and  G( 
mans  after  World  War  II— a 
camaraderie  that  forged  the  partn  ^li 
between  our  governments  in  furth  n 
peace  and  protecting  freedom. 

A  dramatic  expansion  is  now  i ''' 
of  programs  under  which  Amcrna  ' 


Department  of  State  Biet 


EUROPE 


;each,  or  work  for  some  time  in 
untry,  while  Germans  become 
ondingly  involved  in  my  country, 
implish  this,  both  our  countries 
'e  to  devote  larger  resources— in 
ver  and  in  private  and  public 
ig— to  human  contacts  and  ex- 
3.  I  am  told  that  the  U.S.  Govern- 
Dw  spends  about  $115  million  per 
its  human  exchanges  with  other 
and  that  only  a  small  part  of 
Ti  is  devoted  to  West  Germany, 
spending  on  exchange  activities 
larger,  but  I  am  convinced  that 
private  nor  public  financing  of 
il  effort  is  nearly  large  enough.  I 
lope  that  5  years  from  now  the 
in  ambassador  will  be  able  to 
;o  you  that  the  moneys  devoted 
ountry  to  exchange  programs 
ler  nations,  and  particularly  with 
eral  Republic  of  Germany,  have 
>d  at  least  tenfold.  That  is  how 
il  I  consider  these  exchanges  to 
idom,  security,  and  prosperity  of 
jtern  world. 

ional  Exchange  Activities 

now  turn  more  specically  to  the 
:e  activities  between  our  two 
•s  that  I  have  in  mind.  At  pres- 
ious  academic  exchanges  under 
auspices  are  being  supplemented 
;ademic  exchange  program  con- 
ointly  by  the  Governments  of  the 
States  and  the  Federal  Republic. 
)gram  had  its  origin  many  years 
;n  an  American  of  vision, 

J.  William  Fulbright  of  Arkan- 
ame  concerned  about  an  intellec- 

and  proceeded  to  deal  with  it 
soring  an  educational  exchange 
1  between  the  United  States  and 
■untries.  Its  purpose  was  cogent- 
libed  by  the  Senator  when  he 
i)me  years  later: 

aps  the  greatest  power  of  educa- 
hange  is  the  power  to  convert  na- 
peoples  and  to  translate  ideologies 
an  aspirations.  I  do  not  think  educa- 
;hange  is  certain  to  produce  affec- 
een  peoples,  nor  indeed  is  that  one 
ential  purposes;  it  is  quite  enough  if 
utes  to  the  feeling  of  a  common 
,  to  an  emotional  awareness  that 
ntries  are  populated  not  by  doc- 
it  we  fear  but  by  individual  people— 
th  the  same  capacity  for  pleasure 
for  cruelty  and  kindness  as  the  peo- 
sre  brought  up  with  in  our  own 

3  its  inception,  the  Fulbright  ex- 
irogram  has  enabled  about 
Americans  and  citizens  of  other 


countries  to  study,  teach,  or  do  research 
abroad,  and  thereby  improve  under- 
standing between  and  among  peoples  of 
different  countries.  The  highly  suc- 
cessful American-German  educational 
exchange  program  is  a  good  example. 
At  the  outset  it  was  entirely  financed  by 
the  United  States,  but  in  time  the  Ger- 
man Government  became  so  convinced 
of  its  utility  that  it  now  contributes 
nearly  three-fourths  of  the  total  annual 
cost.  This  enlightened  program  deserves 
increased  support  from  my  government 
as  well,  and  I  am  pleased  to  report  that 
this  view  is  widely  shared  in  Washington 
today. 

There  is  also  a  vital  need  for  a 
greatly  expanded  youth  exchange  pro- 
gram. Looking  to  the  quality  of  the 
future  leadership  of  our  societies,  it  is 
obviously  important  to  foster  sensible 
dialogue  among  young  people  at  an  early 


back  in  1946.  The  parliaments  of  both 
our  countries— your  Bundestag  and  the 
American  Congress— have  lost  no  time 
in  endorsing  the  principle  of  expanding 
youth  exchanges,  and  both  our  govern- 
ments are  already  involved  in  translat- 
ing their  parliamentary  resolutions  into 
practice.  For  instance,  a  plan  is  being 
developed  under  which  every  Member  of 
the  Bundestag  and  every  Member  of  the 
American  Congress  will  have  the  oppor- 
tunity to  nominate  a  teenager  from  his 
or  her  electoral  district  to  spend  a  school 
year  in  the  partner  country.  This  proj- 
ect, incidentally,  would  encourage  our 
elected  political  leaders  to  become  per- 
sonally involved  in  exchange  activities, 
and  it  would  thus  establish  procedures 
that  should  benefit  our  two  democracies 
in  the  next  generation.  Not  only  that,  it 
has  been  observed  time  and  again  that 
exchange  youngsters  reinforce  the  bonds 


The  misguided  views  of  young  people — and 
even  of  some  who  are  not  so  young — are  often  at- 
tributed to  the  persistence  and  power  of  Soviet 
propaganda  .  .  .  the  Soviets  .  .  .  use  every  oppor- 
tunity to  defame  our  Western  societies  and  to 
disguise  the  truth  about  their  own. 


state  of  their  intellectual  development. 
Attitudes  in  both  our  societies  are  often 
formed  before  youngsters  reach  the 
university  level  or  embark  on  working 
careers.  In  view  of  that,  it  would  be 
especially  useful  to  provide  larger  oppor- 
tunities for  teenagers— say,  those  be- 
tween 16  and  19— to  spend  some  time  in 
the  partner  country.  I  am  thinking  of 
stays  that  would  be  of  sufficient  dura- 
tion to  enable  youngsters  to  go  to 
school,  live  in  a  private  home,  and  par- 
ticipate in  the  community  life  of  the 
other  land.  A  young  person  who  has 
spent  a  school  year  or  so  in  the  partner 
country  will  have  a  real  opportunity  to 
learn  to  understand  its  society.  That  ex- 
perience and  knowledge  will  stay  with 
him  or  her  over  a  lifetime.  I  would  hard- 
ly expect  all  young  persons  to  become 
enamored  of  their  partner  country,  but 
their  doubts  or  criticisms  will  at  least 
have  been  disciplined  by  some  firsthand 
knowledge. 

President  Reagan  recently  an- 
nounced an  international  youth  initiative 
that  focuses  on  this  particular  need  with 
the  vision  and  commitment  that  char- 
acterized Senator  Fulbright's  proposal 


of  friendship  they  had  formed  with  their 
host  families  through  their  own  parents, 
other  relatives,  and  fellow  students.  We 
need  precisely  such  a  matrix  of  human 
contacts  to  rebuild  the  warm  spirit  of 
partnership  that  existed  between  our 
two  peoples  during  the  late  1940s  and 
1950s. 

Still  another  exchange  activity  that 
can  yield  rich  dividends  of  understand- 
ing would  involve  young  Germans  and 
Americans  who  have  already  embarked 
on  their  life's  work  in  business  or  farm- 
ing, as  journalists  or  churchmen,  as 
teachers  or  government  officials  or 
trade  unionists.  They,  too,  will  eventual- 
ly have  a  role,  perhaps  even  a  major  role 
of  leadership,  in  our  respective  societies; 
and  some  of  them  should  have  the  op- 
portunity to  improve  their  perspective 
on  life  by  working  for  a  time  in  another 
country.  In  response  to  a  wise  sugges- 
tion by  the  German  Government,  I  am 
glad  to  report  that  we  in  the  United 
States  have  begun  to  explore  ways  of 
cooperating  with  your  country  by  in- 
cluding working  youth  in  the  enlarged 


EUROPE 


exchange  activity  between  our  peoples 
that  is  now  being  designed— an  activity 
that  should  involve  our  homes,  schools, 
universities,  churches,  trades,  and  pro- 
fessions. It  is  only  by  strengthening  the 
human  relationships  between  our 
peoples  that  we  can  sustain  our  shared 
values. 

Conclusion 

In  concluding  this  discourse,  allow 
me  now  to  summarize  my  message  to 
you.  Effective  political,  economic,  and 
security  interaction  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many rests  on  a  foundation  of  human 
relationships  between  the  people  of  your 
country  and  mine.  Our  citizens  share  a 
set  of  values  that  center  on  personal 
liberty,  freedom  of  choice,  and  the  rule 
of  law— values  that  they  have  developed 
over  a  period  of  three  centuries.  These 


values  must  be  understood  and  accepted 
by  our  citizenry  if  our  political, 
economic,  and  security  ties  are  to  be 
preserved.  In  order  to  understand  and 
appreciate  these  values,  our  citizens 
must  understand  each  other  and  each 
other's  societies.  To  accomplish  this  we 
need  to  improve  our  schools  and  in- 
crease exchanges  among  our  young  peo- 
ple. Our  two  countries  are  fully  capable 
of  providing  the  resources  to  increase 
youth  exchanges  manifold,  thereby 
avoiding  doing  too  little  too  late.  We 
owe  this  to  ourselves,  and  we  owe  this 
to  those  who  will  follow  in  our  footsteps. 
President  Reagan  recently  remarked 
that  the  best  way— in  fact,  the  only 
way— to  international  peace  "is  through 
understanding  among  nations  and 
peoples."  I  daresay  that  much  the  same 
is  true  of  the  preservation  of  our 
Western  civilization.  ■ 


Visit  of  Dutch  Prime  IVIinister 


Prime  Minister  Rudolphus  Lubbers 
of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  made 
an  official  working  visit  tn  Wnshivgton. 
D.C.,  March  U-16.  i.''N;.  /"  /»"./  ivith 
President  Reagan  ami  nihi-r  iimrniment 
officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  Prime  Minister 
Lubbers  after  their  meeting  on 
March  15.'^ 


President  Reagan 

It's  been  a  pleasure  for  me  to  meet  and 
confer  with  Prime  Minister  Lubbers. 
This  is  his  first  visit  to  this  country  since 
becoming  Prime  Minister,  head  of  the 
Dutch  Government,  and  we've  used  the 
opportunity  to  discuss  a  wide  range  of 
issues. 

One  of  the  subjects  discussed  was, 
as  you  could  well  imagine,  INF — the  in- 
termediate nuclear  force  discussions.  We 
agreed  that  Western  unity  behind 
modernizing  NATO's  defensive  capa- 
bilities and  serious  arms  negotiations  are 
essential  to  maintaining  peace  and 
security.  Throughout  the  discussions  this 
morning  in  the  Oval  Office  and  during  a 
working  lunch,  it  was  evident  the 


Netherlands  and  the  United  States  con- 
tinue to  share  a  common  outlook  and  a 
unity  of  purpose. 

As  the  Dutch-American  bicentennial 
reminded  us  last  year,  our  bonds  are 
tied  by  200  years  of  friendship.  We 
believe  in  the  Atlantic  partnership, 
which  has  not  only  kept  peace  for  30 
years  or  more  but  which  has  also  im- 
proved the  quality  of  life  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic.  I  have  no  doubt  that  we 
in  America  and  the  Netherlands, 
cemented  by  shared  values  and  common 
interests,  will  continue  to  work  closely 
together,  seeking  a  world  that  is  free 
from  war,  in  which  liberty  and  freedom 
of  choice  are  respected. 

Mr.  Prime  Minister,  it's  been  a  great 
pleasure  to  welcome  you  here,  you  and 
your  associates. 

Prime  Minister  Lubbers 

It  was  a  real  pleasure  for  me  to  talk 
with  President  Reagan  as  allies  in  the 
Atlantic  partnership.  How  different  in 
scale  our  countries  are.  We  share  a  com- 
mon task — prosperity  and  freedom  for 
our  people,  respect  for  the  individual, 
and  responsibility  among  nations. 

We  discussed  the  road  to  economic 
recovery,  the  importance  of  free  trade 


and  of  fair  trade  relations  between 
United  States  and  Europe,  of  com] 
mises  instead  of  harming  each  oth( 
the  need,  also,  of  monetary  and 
budgetary  policies  which  lower  inti 
rates. 

As  NATO  allies,  we  discussed 
security  problems;  the  important  a 
adequate  contribution  of  the  Dutcl 
defense  posture  sufficient  to  disen 
courage  aggression.  Of  course,  we 
discussed  also  INF.  Preparations  1 
deployment  of  these  weapons  as  &■ 
political  and  a  military  answer  to  1 
Soviet  threat— the  SS-20s  threat- 
underway  as  scheduled.  The  Soviei 
have  to  understand  that  the  Genei- 
talks  have  to  become  now  Geneva 
negotiations.  President  Reagan  st;  i 
me  a  deep,  personal  commitnifnt 
achieving  an  arms  reduction  nisn-t. 
In  that  endeavor,  the  alliance  i~  in 

And  then  we  discussed  aL-io  '<i 
sponsibilities  in  connection  witli  T 
World  countries,  the  strengtheinii 
especially  of  international  instituti , 

Respect  for  every  individual  w } 
ever  she  or  he  lives — responsiliilit  f 
freedom,  freedom  and  responsibili 
that's  our  common  ground. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  ot 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  21.  It 


Department  Of  State  Bi' 


EUROPE 


it  of  West  German  Chancellor  Kohl 


ivrellor  Helmut  Kohl  of  West  Ger- 
ntuti'  lut  official  visit  to  Washing- 
('..  Ai»-il  U-15.  1983,  to  meet 
■rs III,  lit  Reagan.  Following  are 
■s  made  by  President  Reagan  and 
llor  Kohl  after  their  meeting  on 
5.  1 

;nt  Reagan 

my  pleasure  today  to  host  a 
n  and  extensive  meetings  with 
llor  Kohl  and  other  represent- 
if  his  government.  Our  discus- 
uched  on  a  number  of  bilateral 
is  well  as  those  general  problems 
ting  our  two  powerful  demo- 
ations. 

befits  one  who  has  just  won  an 
ive  election  victory.  Chancellor 
IS  very  positive  about  the  oppor- 
ahead.  I  share  his  optimism  and 
ward  to  continuing  our  close 
ship. 

Chancellor  and  I  have  many 
1  common,  not  the  least  of  which 

0  faith  in  the  strength  of 

1  values.  We  were  able  to  ap- 
)ur  discussions  with  a  shared  ap- 
m  for  these  values  and  with  an 
inding  of  the  many  traditions 
mon  interests  that  link  our  two 
s.  The  special  ties  between  the 
and  American  people  will  be  ex- 
this  year  in  the  celebration  of 
ntennial  of  German  emigration 

I  America.  And  I'm  especially 
that  President  [Karl]  Carstens 
laking  this  event — or  marking 
ild  say,  with  a  state  visit  to  our 
in  the  fall. 

ng  our  discussion  today  we 
on  issues  likely  to  emerge  dur- 
Villiamsburg  summit.  And  the 
or  and  I  agree  that  we  should 
•ee  and  open  exchange  of  views 
msburg,  with  our  primary  goal 
3  closest  possible  cooperation  in 
the  problems  facing  the  world 
.  Both  of  us  welcome  the  signs 
mic  upturn  in  our  countries  and 
c  to  assure  that  recovery  is 
nd  lasting. 

igree  that  it  is  vital  that  we 
!y  seek  a  resolution  of  the  trade 
■  between  the  United  States  and 
tnd  that  protectionism  be  avoid- 
we're  happy  with  the  steps 
ide  toward  a  common  under- 
concerning  East- West 
relations. 


Another  subject  of  discussion  today 
was  the  arms  reduction  negotiations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  I  reiterated  the  United  States' 
determination  to  achieve  success  in  the 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  talks] 
and  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  talks  in  Geneva,  and  the 
Chancellor  confirmed  his  strong  en- 
dorsement of  our  negotiating  strategy. 

As  leaders  of  our  respective  coun- 
tries, we  call  on  the  Soviet  Union  to 
respond  seriously  to  our  proposals,  pro- 
posals which,  if  given  a  chance,  will 
strengthen  peace  and  make  all  mankind 
a  little  safer. 

We  remain  united  in  our  commit- 
ment to  continue  on  both  tracks  of  the 
NATO  decision  of  December  12th,  1979, 
including  deployment  of  new  weapons  if 
continued  Soviet  intransigence  makes 
this  unavoidable.  I'm  pleased,  again,  to 
have  with  us  Chancellor  Kohl. 

Chancellor  Kohl 

First  of  all,  I'd  like  to  thank  you  for 
your  invitation  and  the  kindness  and 
hospitality  extended  to  us. 

Our  talk,  in  which  Foreign  Minister 
[Hans-Dietrich]  Genscher  and  our  closest 
advisers  participated,  gave  the  President 
and  myself  an  opportunity  to  continue 
our  intensive  and  friendly  dialogue 
which  we  began  when  I  became 
Chancellor  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  last  October.  And  I  would  like 
to  take  this  opportunity  once  again,  here 
in  public,  to  express  the  gratitude  for 
the  very  intensive  and  friendly  consulta- 
tions that  have  taken  place  since  that 
time  between  our  two  governments. 

We  had  a  good,  cordial,  and  open 
conversation  among  friends,  about  which 
I  am  highly  pleased.  This  exchange  has 
shown  that  beyond  our  personal 
understanding,  German-American  part- 
nership rests  on  the  broad  basis  of 
shared  values  and  interests. 

We  discussed,  in  depth  and  in  great 
earnest,  the  essential  aspects  of  our 
joint  peace  and  disarmament  policy.  In 
the  course  of  this  year,  important  issues 
are  pending.  We  are  profoundly  in- 
terested in  finding  solutions  to  the  issues 
at  hand,  if  possible,  in  agreement  with 
the  East.  And  this  includes  the  Geneva 
negotiations  on  U.S.  and  Soviet 
intermediate-range  missiles.  We  are 
agreed  that  the  recent  Western  proposal 
offers  the  basis  for  flexible  and  dynamic 


negotiations.  Given  goodwill  on  both 
sides,  it  will  be  possible  soon  to  achieve 
a  balanced  result.  It  is  our  belief  that  we 
have  not  heard  yet  the  last  word  from 
the  Soviet  Union. 

We  discussed  in  detail  the  CSCE 
followup  meeting  in  Madrid.  We  con- 
tinue to  strive  for  an  early  and  substan- 
tial result,  which  would  include  an 
agreement  on  a  conference  on  disarma- 
ment in  Europe  and  make  important 
gains  in  the  area  of  human  rights. 
We  also  discussed  the  Vienna 
negotiations  about  mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions.  We  had  extensive 
discussions  about  the  whole  field  of 
East- West  relations.  And  we  are  agreed 
that  personal  contacts  with  the  leaders 
of  the  Soviet  Union  continue  to  be  im- 
portant. 

We  want  to  carry  on  our  common 
efforts  to  arrive  at  constructive  relations 
between  East  and  West  through 
dialogue  and  cooperation  wherever  the 
Soviet  Union  makes  this  possible.  We 
agreed  on  the  need  for  continued  efforts 
toward  a  common  approach  on  East- 
West  economic  relations. 

Another  important  subject  we 
discussed  was  the  preparation  of  the 
economic  summit  meeting  to  be  held  in 
Williamsburg  at  the  end  of  May.  In  this 
context,  we  exchanged  views  about  the 
economic  developments  in  our  two  coun- 
tries and  about  measures  to  promote 
economic  recovery. 

The  summit  meeting  will  provide  us 
with  an  opportunity  to  intensify  the 
emerging  recovery  of  the  international 
economy  through  close  coordination.  In 
this  way  we  will  be  able,  immediately 
prior  to  the  continuation  of  the  North- 
South  dialogue  of  the  UNCTAD  [UN 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development] 
Conference  in  Belgrade,  to  make  a  con- 
tribution toward  solving  the  economic 
and  social  problems  of  the  developing 
countries.  Thus,  we  want  to  promote 
genuine  independence  and  genuine 
nonalignment. 

I  came  to  Washington  also  in  my 
capacity  as  President  in  the  Office  of  the 
European  Community.  The  President 
and  I  are  agreed  that  the  European 
Community  and  the  United  States 
together  bear  a  great  share  of  respon- 
sibility for  the  international  economy. 
We  are  aware  that  the  future  develop- 
ment of  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  European  Community 
must,  and  will,  live  up  to  this  respon- 
sibility. 

I  am  leaving  Washington  firmly  con- 


EUROPE 


vinced  that  the  quality  of  our  relations 
will  also  include— should  determine— 
our  policy  of  safeguarding  peace  and,  in 
particular,  our  common  efforts  to 
achieve  progress  in  the  Geneva  negotia- 
tions. I  am  leaving  Washington  with  a 
certain  feeling  that  I  have  been  a  guest 
among  friends. 


Economics  and  Security: 

The  Case  of  East-West  Relations 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  18,  1983. 


13th  Report  on  Cyprus 


MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
APR.  6,  1983 

In  accordance  with  Public  Law  95-384,  I  am 
submitting  the  following  report  on  progress 
made  during  the  past  sixty  days  toward 
reaching  a  negotiated  settlement  in  Cyprus. 

There  was  little  progress  in  the  intercom- 
munal  negotiations  between  the  Greek 
Cypriots  and  the  Turkish  Cypriots  during  the 
period.  The  talks  were  delayed  due  to  the 
presidential  elections  held  by  the  Government 
of  Cyprus  in  February.  In  those  elections 
President  Kyprianou  was  returned  to  office 
for  a  second  five-year  term. 

Following  the  elections  the  Special  Repre- 
sentative of  the  UN  Secretary  General, 
Ambassador  Hugo  Gobbi,  reconvened  the 
talks  on  March  8.  That  meeting  was  de- 
scribed as  cordial  by  the  participants. 

Following  these  discussions  there  was  an 
additional  recess  for  the  meeting  of  the 
Nonaligned  Movement  in  New  Delhi.  The  UN 
General  Assembly  is  likely  to  take  up  the 
Cyprus  problem  in  late  April  or  eariy  May. 
After  that  meeting  the  talks  can  proceed  to 
address  the  substantive  issues  separating  the 
two  communities. 

President  Kyprianou  and  Turkish  leader 
Denktash  remain  supportive  of  the  intercom- 
munal  talks  as  the  best  vehicle  for  progress 
toward  eventual  solution  of  the  Cyprus  prob- 
lem. Ambassador  Gobbi  is  positive  about  the 
Secretary  General's  good  offices  role  in  the 
talks  and  will  attempt  to  move  the  discus- 
sions forward  as  soon  as  possible. 

Our  Embassy  in  Nicosia  as  well  as  our  of- 
ficers in  the  State  Department  remain  in 
close  contact  with  both  parties  to  the  inter- 
communal  talks  and  continue  to  urge  efforts 
for  progress.  Visits  to  the  island  by  our 
diplomatic  officers  and  by  Congressmen  em- 
phasize the  interest  residing  both  in  this  Ad- 
ministration and  in  the  Congress  in  seeing  a 
fair  and  lasting  settlement  to  the  problem. 
Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reacan 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  U.S:  German  In- 
dustrialists' Group,  New  York,  on 
March  7.  1983.  Mr.  Wallis  is  Under 
Secretarij  for  Economic  Affairs. 

In  the  6  months  since  I  took  the  oath  of 
my  present  office,  one  of  the  real 
pleasures  has  been  coming  to  know  and 
to  work  with  members  of  the  German 
Government.  You  have  some  very  able 
and  very  fine  people  serving  you.  I  must 
admit  that  I  am  biased  by  the  fact  that 
we  tend  to  think  alike.  By  that,  I  do  not 
mean  that  we  always  agree.  I  mean  that 
our  disagreements  lead  to  constructive 
and  friendly  discussions  that  shed  light, 
not  heat,  and  result  at  least  in  under- 
standing one  another  and  usually  in  a 
reduction  of  the  degree  of  disagreement. 
So,  as  I  say,  I  am  genuinely  pleased  to 
be  with  you. 

I  want  to  talk  with  you  about  a  sub- 
ject which  goes  to  the  heart  of  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many, indeed,  the  heart  of  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Europe.  I 
want  to  talk  about  the  West's  commer- 
cial and  financial  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe.  This 
is  an  area  where  there  is  agreement  be- 
tween us  on  basic  principles  but  not  on 
applications  of  those  principles. 

There  are  two  distinct  points  of  view 
on  East- West  trade.  The  first,  I  will  call 
the  "trade"  viewpoint.  It  emphasizes  the 
lucrative  market  in  the  East  for 
Western  goods.  Most  goods  that  the 
Soviets  want  to  buy  are  available  from  a 
number  of  sources,  are  not  sensitive, 
and  are  not  "high  technology"  items  with 
military  applications.  Those  who  hold 
this  view  favor  almost  unrestricted  trade 
with  the  East. 

The  second  viewpoint,  which  I  will 
call  the  "security,"  stresses  the  fact  that 
the  Soviets  seek  to  use  Western  goods 
and  technology  to  further  their  military, 
strategic,  and  economic  goals  to  the 
detriment  of  Western  interests.  This 
view  emphasizes  that  the  Soviet 
economy  and  its  political-military  ap- 
paratus are  an  integrated  whole.  In  the 


'Identical  letters  addressed  to  Thomas  P. 
O'Neill,  Jr.,  Speaker  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  and  Charles  H.  Percy,  chair- 
man of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee (text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  11.  1983).  ■ 


most  extreme  form,  it  argues  that 
Soviet  economic  gains  can  readily 
transformed  into  strategic  benefit 
group  that  takes  this  position  nati 
favors  severe  limits  on  East-West 
I  have  described  these  two  vie 
points  in  extreme  terms.  Scarcely 
anyone  holds  either  view  as  stark 
have  expressed  it.  The  question  fc 
Western  policymakers,  both  Ame; 
and  European,  is  where  to  go  bet 
these  two  extremes.  No  one  want 
total  cessation  of  trade;  no  one  ac 
vocates  selling  advanced  military 
ware  to  the  U.S.S.R.  My  impress; 
that  Europeans  have  generally  be 
closer  to  the  first,  or  "trade,"  vie\ 
whereas  Americans,  especially  in 
Administration,  are  closer  to  the 
ty"  view. 

President  Reagan  made  his  ci 
on  these  issues  clear  at  the  Ottaw 
economic  summit  in  1981.  He  urg* 
the  alliance  take  a  hard  look  a!  !' 
policies  which  had  governed  t  > 
relations  with  the  Soviet  Unn 'I   ■ 
late  1960s.  He  asked  whether  tin 
pected  moderation  of  Soviet  hcha  'i 
had  occurred.  He  encouraged  his  ■ 
leagues  to  study  the  problem.^  of 
vulnerability  to  interruptions  by  t 
Soviets  of  supplies  on  which  the  '  s 
might  become  dependent.  After  r  i 
ing  the  issue,  the  leaders  at  Ottai 
adopted  a  historic  statement  on  t 
question:  "We  .  .  .  reviewed  the 
significance  of  East- West  ecoiion  i 
tions  for  our  political  and  security  i 
terests,"  the  leaders  said  at  Ottav 
recognized  that  there  is  a  com  pie 
balance  of  political  and  economic 
terests  and  risks  in  these  relationli 
concluded  that  consultations  and,  )\ 
appropriate,  coordination  are  nec« 
to  ensure  that,  in  the  field  of  EasJS 
relations,  our  economic  policies  c(|i 
to  be  compatible  with  our  political 
security  objectives."  i 

In  response  to  similar  conceri,' 
alliance  leaders  made  the  followin, 
statement  at  the  Versailles  sumni  t 
following  year: 

We  agree  to  pursue  a  prudent  aiv  i 
sified  economic  approach  to  the  US  ..^ 
Eastern  Europe,  consistent  with  "ur  ' 
and  security  interests.  This  include:?  •■ ' 

in  three  key  areas.  First our  rep  « 

tives  will  work  together  to  improve  tlii 
national  system  for  controlling  expon ' 


Department  of  State  El 


EUROPE 


ic  goods  to  these  countries  and  na- 
rangements  for  the  enforcement  of 
controls.  Second,  we  will  exchange 
tion  in  the  OECD  on  all  aspects  of 
nomic,  commercial  and  financial  rela- 
ith  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern 

Third,  taking  into  account  existing 
ic  and  financial  considerations,  we 
jeed  to  handle  cautiously  financial 
IS  with  the  U.S.S.R.  and  other  Easteri 
an  countries  in  such  a  way  as  to  en- 
it  they  are  conducted  on  a  sound 
ic  basis,  including  also  the  need  for 
■cial  prudence  in  limiting  export 
The  development  of  economic  and 
1  relations  will  be  subject  to  periodic 


We  Stand 

lagan  Administration  supports 
etween  the  West  and  the  corn- 
nations— as  between  any  na- 
where  that  trade  is  conducted  at 
ing  market  prices  and  terms, 
there  is  a  mutual  balance  of  ad- 
3S,  and  where  the  specific  trans- 
-or  category  of  transactions- 
it  contribute  directly  to  the 
ic  advantage  of  the  Soviets, 
n  consumers  and  producers,  both 
ural  and  industrial,  can  benefit 
ch  trade.  The  President  stated 
/ember  13  that  we  favor  mutual- 
yicial  trade  and  that  it  is  not  our 
p  engage  in  economic  warfare 
k  Soviet  bloc. 
,,;he  same  time,  it  is  clear  that  the 

!5tration  has  profound  concerns 
le  security  implications  of  East- 
ade  as  we  have  seen  it  develop 
;  last  decade.  Let  me  try  to  ex- 
ir  concerns. 

|he  Soviets  have  used  their  trade 
j;  West  to  improve  productivity 
^id  bottlenecks  in  their  stagnant 
if.  A  major  reason  for  their  poor 
fc  performance  and  their  conse- 
!sed  for  Western  equipment  is 
aversion  of  resources  to  a  huge 
i  buildup— equivalent  to  about 
Jtheir  gross  national  product, 
^el  of  armament  is  far  beyond 
ijil  that  might  reasonably  be 
(ifor  defensive  purposes.  It  can 

t dewed  as  an  ominous  threat  to 
of  the  world,  especially  the  free 
and  democratic  governments.  It 
i  huge  costs  on  the  Western 
s's  to  protect  themselves. 

a  few  instances,  the  Soviets 
=  'n  used  Western  manufacturing 
nt  tti  produce  military  goods. 
na  River  plant  built  by  Ameri- 
ide  trucks  that  now  are  in 


Afghanistan  with  Soviet  troops.  The 
Bryant  ball-bearing  grinders  have  im- 
proved the  accuracy  of  Soviet  missiles 
beyond  what  they  could  have  attained 
with  other  grinders.  By  acquiring 
Western  technology  the  Soviets  have 
been  able  to  produce  greater  quantities 
of  weapons  than  would  have  been  possi- 
ble with  their  own  technology. 

•  Soviet  purchases  of  high  tech- 
nology equipment  for  extracting  and 
transmitting  energy  will  increase  their 
production  and  exports  of  oil  and  gas  in 
the  late  1980s  and  1990s.  This  has  two 
unfortunate  consequences. 

First,  it  involves  increased  risk  to 
Western  consumers  that  the  Soviets 
could  interrupt  supply  as  a  political  in- 
strument. Even  if  overall  energy 
dependence  on  the  Soviets  seems  not  to 
be  excessive,  specific  regions  or  in- 
dustries may  be  quite  vulnerable  since 
the  immediate  availability  of  reserve 
stocks  or  substitute  fuels  is  small. 

Second,  it  provides  significant  addi- 
tional Soviet  hard  currency  earnings  to 
the  Soviet  Union,  thus  contributing  to 
their  ability  to  engage  in  expensive 
overseas  adventures.  As  a  result,  we 
tend  to  view  Western  sales  to  the 
Soviets  of  energy-related  equipment- 
equipment  that  for  the  most  part  they 
cannot  produce  for  themselves — as 
seriously  detrimental  to  Western ' 
security. 

As  a  consequence  of  these  and 
similar  concerns,  President  Reagan  has 
laid  down  a  number  of  principles  to 
govern  our  trade  with  the  East. 

•  We  wOl  not  provide  subsidies  or 
preferential  treatment  to  the  Soviets 
beyond  that  which  we  would  provide  to 
any  nation  on  an  ordinary  commercial 
basis.  We  believe  that  we  should  not 
subsidize  Soviet  pursuit  of  goals  that  are 
inimical  to  Western  interests. 

•  We  will  not  sell  any  equipment  or 
information  to  the  Soviets  that  they  can 
divert  to  military  uses,  or  that  they  can 
use  to  support  military  uses.  If  we  did 
provide  such  goods,  we  would  be  trading 
away,  at  one  stroke,  the  West's  most  im- 
portant strategic  advantage — its 
superior  technology  and  productive  effi- 
ciency. 

•  As  I  stated  earlier,  we  do  not 
believe  it  is  wise  to  provide  the  Soviets 


with  technologically  advanced  oil  and 
gas  extraction  equipment,  the  use  of 
which  would  increase  their  foreign  ex- 
change resources  and  allow  them  to  ex- 
pand their  overseas  adventures. 

•  We  will,  however,  continue  to  sell 
the  Soviets  goods  that  cannot  be  used 
for  military  or  strategic  purposes;  such 
sales  reduce  the  foreign  exchange  that 
they  have  available  for  other  uses. 

•  We  will  endeavor  to  avoid,  and  we 
will  urge  our  friends  to  avoid,  situations 
where  we  are  overly  dependent  on  the 
Soviets  to  supply  a  critical  resource. 

Action  in  the  Alliance 

Western  security  is  not  uniquely  a  U.S. 
concern.  It  must  rally  the  entire  alliance. 
While  there  has  long  been  a  consensus 
that  the  West  should  avoid  transferring 
equipment  of  direct  military  relevance, 
only  recently  have  Europeans  begun  to 
think  about  East- West  economic  rela- 
tions in  a  broad  strategic  context.  As 
you  no  doubt  know,  the  seven  summit 
countries  are  currently  engaged  in  a 
major  effort  to  convert  the  agreements 
at  Ottawa  and  Versailles— which  I 
quoted  a  moment  ago— into  concrete 
policies.  These  efforts,  which  took  on 
new  life  on  November  13  when  the 
pipeline  sanctions  were  lifted,  include: 

•  A  study  within  NATO  that  will 
highlight  the  security  implications  of 
East- West  trade  and  develop  a  stronger 
overall  rationale  for  distinguishing  be- 
tween trade  which  the  Soviets  might  ex- 
ploit to  the  detriment  of  our  security 
and  trade  that  has  no  significant 
strategic  implications. 

•  An  effort  within  the  OECD  to 
monitor  more  closely  the  magnitude  of 
East- West  credit  and  trade  and  to  iden- 
tify major  imbalances  resulting  from 
trade  between  market  and  nonmarket 
economies.  Also  in  the  OECD,  we  are 
working  within  the  Arrangement  on  Ex- 
port Credits  to  bring  export  credit  prac- 
tices closer  to  market  terms  for  trade 
among  all  developed  countries,  including 
the  U.S.S.R. 

•  In  conjunction  with  the  OECD, 
the  International  Energy  Agency  will 
study  Western  requirements  for  energy, 
and  attempt  to  identify  major  vul- 
nerabilities in  Western  supplies  of 
energy  and  means  of  reducing  these 
vulnerabilities. 


EUROPE 


•  In  COCOM— the  informal  group 
that  oversees  strategic  trade  controls— 
we  want  to  enhance  Western  security  by 
initiating  multilateral  controls  on  other 
high  technology  equipment,  including  oil 
and  gas  equipment  not  now  under  con- 
trol. At  the  same  time,  we  are  joining 
with  our  COCOM  allies  to  harmonize 
and  strengthen  the  mechanisms  that  we 
use  to  enforce  COCOM  controls,  as  was 
in  January  1982. 


We  recognize  that  we  all  have  im- 
portant trading  relations  with  the  East 
and  that  those  are  perhaps  more  deeply 
established  in  Europe  than  in  the  United 
States.  We  also  understand  the  par- 
ticular geopolitical  circumstances  in- 
volved in  much  of  this  trade.  We  believe, 
however,  that  the  joint  studies  now 
going  on  will  produce  a  strong  rationale 
for  assuring  that  such  trade  is  at  least 
as  much  to  our  advantage  as  to  the 
Soviets'. 

We  are  not  looking  for  a  formal 
treaty.  The  first  phase  of  the  process 
now  underway  will  provide  the  informa- 
tion necessary  for  each  participating  na- 
tion, acting  on  the  basis  of  its  own  na- 
tional judgments  and  decisions,  to  weigh 
the  security  implications  of  trade  and 
draw  the  conclusions  it  considers  ap- 
propriate. 

Allow  me  to  recall  for  a  moment  a 
painful  period  in  U.S. -European  rela- 
tions that  is  relevant  to  the  issue  at 


hand.  In  December  1981,  President 
Reagan  reacted  to  Soviet  adventurism  in 
Poland.  Among  other  actions,  he  re- 
stricted exports  of  certain  U.S. -made 
equipment  for  the  production  and  trans- 
mission of  oil  and  gas.  In  June,  he 
widened  the  restrictions  to  foreign  sub- 
sidiaries and  licensees.  European  sup- 
pliers of  equipment  for  the  Yamal  pipe- 
line were  caught  up  in  those  restrictions. 
U.S.  companies  also  were  seriously  af- 
fected and  lost  substantial  business. 

We  do  not  want — we  did  not  want 
in  June  1982  and  do  not  want  now — the 
friction,  tension,  and  bickering  asso- 
ciated with  those  export  restrictions. 
But  we  do  want  a  consensus  within  the 
alliance  that  economic  relations  must  "be 
compatible  with  our  political  and  securi- 
ty interests."  The  President  lifted  the 
export  controls  because  he  believed  that 
such  a  consensus  had  been  hammered 
out  and  that  it  would  lead  to  concrete 
policy  actions.  The  efforts  in  NATO, 
OECD,  COCOM,  and  in  national  capitals 
must,  in  our  view,  head  in  that  direction. 


Conclusion 

To  conclude,  I  want  to  cite  a  W'v 
statistics. 

•  The  United  States  spent  > 
billion  (outlays)  on  defense  in  V) 
(6.6.%  of  gross  domestic  produc 
GDP);  we  are  spending  nearly  $ 
trillion  over  the  next  5  years  (F 
1983-87). 

•  We  estimate  that  German 
about  $23.1  billion  on  defense  in 
about  3.4%  of  itsGDP.i 

•  We  estimate  that  Japan  s 
about  $11  billion  on  defense  in  1 
about  0.9%  of  its  GDP.' 

This  money  is  not  being  s|if 
fend  ourselves  from  each  other 
Herb  Stein  has  pointed  out,  frm 
Sioux  Indians.  It  is  being  spent 
we  see  what  the  Soviet  Union  i- 
ing,  what  it  is  building,  and  wli, 
doing,  at  home  and  around  tht- 

Our  question  is:  To  what  ex 
our  economic  relations  with  thr 
Union  forcing  us  to  spend  even 
defense?  The  results  are  not  all 
we  are  going  to  urge  a  careful  t 
tion  when  they  are. 


•  German  and  Japanese  data  an- 
estimated  1982  expenditures  computt-t 

1981  prices  and  exchange  rates.  .•Xl'i:''' 

1982  overall  NATO  dollar  expenditniv 
not  available  but  percent  of  GDP  i-  li 
4.9%.  ■ 


Department  Of  State  Be 


MAN  RIGHTS 


iuntry  Reports  on 

^iman  Rights  Practices  for  1982 


Mowing  is  the  introduction  from 
ry  Reports  on  Human  Rights 

ces  for  l;)8li.  u-hirh  ii-iis  iirrpnred 
Depart  III, lit  of  Stat,  ,iii,l  shIi^ 
[to  the  H,>iis,'  Foo'iijii  Ajhnrs 
ittee  and  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
Coiiiiiiittee  in  February  1983. 


eport  is  submitted  to  the  Congress 
Department  of  State  in  compli- 
nih  Section  116(dXl)  and  502(B)(b) 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  1961,  as 
led.' 

e  report  draws  on  information 
led  by  United  States  Missions 
1,  Congressional  studies,  non- 
imental  organizations,  and  human 
bodies  of  international  organiza- 
Conditions  in  most  countries  are 
)ed  up  to  the  end  of  1982;  for  a 
untries,  significant  developments 
ing  during  the  first  weeks  of  1983 
e  included.  A  list  of  twelve  inter- 
il  human  rights  covenants  and 
lents  is  included  as  an  Appendix 
report,  along  with  a  listing  of  the 
to  those  agreements.  Human 
;an  be  grouped  into  two  broad 
-ies: 

•irst,  the  right  to  be  free  from 
!i  mental  violations  of  the  integrity 
loerson— violations  such  as  kill- 
,  )rture,  cruel,  inhuman,  or  degrad- 
tiitment  or  punishment;  arbitrary 
S3r  imprisonment;  denial  of  fair 
i*;rial;  and  invasion  of  the  home; 
•  econd,  the  right  to  enjoy  civil  and 
ill  liberties,  including  freedom  of 
<3  press,  religion,  and  assembly; 
rjit  of  citizens  to  participate  in 
iiiing  themselves;  the  right  to  travel 
l>vithin  and  outside  one's  own 
it-;  the  right  to  be  free  from  dis- 
lii.tion  based  on  race  or  sex. 

IV  organization  of  the  report 
^  these  two  basic  categories.  After 
ibduction,  the  description  of  condi- 
5   each  country  is  divided  into  two 
io;  which  correspond  to  these  two 
i.'  ies  (if  rights.  A  third  section  de- 
'  tin-  ^^i ivernment's  attitude  toward 
''  im  I'stigations  of  internal  human 
-'iiiditions,  while  a  fourth  section 
'  's  t^fneral  economic  and  social 
■  -iLs  111  the  country. 2  Each  report 
e  followed  by  statistical  tables, 
M'elevant,  listing  the  amounts  of 


United  States  bilateral  assistance  and 
multilateral  development  assistance  for 
fiscal  years  1980,  1981  and  1982. 

The  country  reports  are  generally 
based  upon  the  guidelines  and  format 
used  in  preparing  earlier  reports.  Some 
new  questions  were  asked  this  year,  and 
some  old  questions  asked  in  new  ways, 
in  order  to  fulfill  more  adequately  the 
task  mandated  by  Congress.  The 
changes  which  have  been  made  include 
the  addition,  in  Section  1,  of  a  new, 
separate,  and  specific  category  covering 
killings,  and  a  sharper  focus,  in  Section 
2,  on  civil  and  political  liberties.  Killing 
for  political  motives,  whether  by  govern- 
ments or  oppositionist  political  organiza- 
tions, is  obviously  the  most  serious 
human  rights  violation,  and  deserves 
particular  attention.  In  the  past,  political 
killings  usually  appeared  in  the  sections 
on  Cruel  Treatment  and  Disappearances. 

Political  participation  is  not  only  an 
important  right  in  itself,  but  also  the 
best  guarantee  that  other  rights  will  be 
observed.  This  year's  report  therefore 
attempts  to  treat  political  participation 
in  a  fuller  and  more  precise  fashion  than 
earlier  years'  reports.  Political  participa- 
tion means  the  traditional  right  of 
citizens  to  choose  the  officials  and  make 
the  laws  that  will  govern  them.  It  does 
not  mean  the  passive  membership  of 
people  in  organizations  or  processes 
managed  from  above  by  a  government 
the  people  did  not  choose.  Accordingly, 
an  effort  has  been  made  this  year  to  be 
more  precise  about  the  real  meanings  of 
"elections"  and  "parliaments"— to  say, 
for  example,  whether  there  was  any 
choice  in  elections.  Political  participation 
in  the  true  sense  can  exist  only  in  a 
democracy,  although  there  are  cases 
where  countries  are  partially  demo- 
cratic. It  is  thus  difficult  to  get  a  clear 
impression  of  political  rights  from  listing 
various  limitations  of  the  right  to  self- 
government.  What  one  needs  to  know  is 
"who  rules?"— the  people  at  large,  a 
small  group,  a  single  leader?  This  year's 
reports  have  tried  to  move  toward 
answering  this  question,  within  the  con- 
straints of  available  information. 

Greater  emphasis  has  also  been 
placed  in  the  1982  country  reports  on 
the  right  of  labor  unions  to  organize. 
This  right  is  extremely  important  not 
only  as  a  function  of  the  right  to  free- 
dom of  assembly  and  association,  but 


also  within  the  context  of  participation 
in  the  political  system. 

Finally,  it  is  important  for  the  com- 
prehensiveness of  these  reports  that 
they  include  significant  violations  not 
only  by  the  government  but  also  by  op- 
position or  insurgent  groups,  including 
terrorists.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to 
portray  the  wider  context  of  the  human 
rights  situation,  including  threats  from 
hostile  powers  or  guerrilla  insurgencies. 
Such  pressures  on  a  government  or 
society  do  not  excuse  human  rights 
violations,  but  an  awareness  of  them  is 
vital  to  a  full  understanding  of  the 
human  rights  situation. 

The  Problems  of  Human  Rights 

The  moral  principles  we  call  human 
rights  incorporate  maxims  of  justice  of 
every  epoch  and  every  culture.  The 
specific  concern  for  human  rights  as  we 
understand  them,  however,  has  not  ex- 
isted throughout  human  history.  It  origi- 
nated as  a  set  of  demands  in  seven- 
teenth-century England,  and  was  first 
embodied  in  political  institutions  in  the 
United  States,  after  1776.  Older  moral 
codes  and  philosophies  laid  primary  em- 
phasis not  on  rights,  but  duties.  These 
codes  characteristically  took  the  form  of 
a  series  of  prohibitions,  rather  than  a 
list  of  freedoms— such  as  freedom  of 
religion  and  freedom  of  assembly— which 
the  individual  was  justified  in  demanding 
from  government. 

The  original  understanding  of  the 
meaning  of  human  rights  was  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence.  The  Declaration  asserted 
that  human  rights  could  not  be  created 
or  abrogated  by  any  human  enactment, 
whether  of  one  government  or  of  an  in- 
ternational body,  because  they  were 
based  on  "the  laws  of  nature  and  of 
nature's  God,"  on  truths  which  are  "self- 
evident."  Thus  it  was  confidently  stated 
that  "all  men  are  created  equal,  that 
they  are  endowed  by  their  creator  with 
certain  inalienable  rights." 

When  the  authors  of  the  Declaration 
called  these  rights  "inalienable,"  they  im- 
plied that  rights  should  not  depend  upon 
the  prior  performance  of  certain  duties 
by  the  citizen  or  be  postponed  until  any 
other  group  of  "rights"  was  achieved. 
The  original  enumeration  of  human 
rights  in  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence thus  did  not  include  any- 
thing that  could  only  be  gained  gradual- 
ly, such  as  economic  development. 

The  rights  the  Declaration  asserted 
covered  only  part  of  justice  as  it  was 
understood  in  earlier  moral  codes,  and 
supplied  only  some  of  the  goods  men 


e)83 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


normally  desired.  As  examples  of  in- 
alienable rights,  the  Declaration  gave 
"life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happi- 
ness." Rights  were  considered  to  enable 
individuals  to  pursue  happiness  freely, 
but  not  to  supply  happiness  itself.  The 
human  rights  activists  of  the  eighteenth 
century  would  thus  have  said  there  was 
a  right  of  individuals  to  develop,  but  no 
right  to  development.  For  a  government 
to  insist  it  could  define  and  supply 
happiness  itself  would  take  away  men's 
right  to  liberty. 

The  intentions  of  the  originators  of 
human  rights,  then,  seems  to  have  been 
to  select  from  the  vast  range  of  things 
that  men  need  or  want,  certain  crucial 
things  that  they  are  entitled  to  by  their 
very  nature— human  rights— which, 
when  fulfilled,  will  create  the  precondi- 
tions for  the  satisfaction  of  other  needs. 
These  preconditions  are  created,  in  this 
understanding,  by  a  political  system  of 
choosing  the  laws  and  the  officials  that 
govern  men,  and  by  an  economic  system 
that  enables  individuals  to  engage  freely 
in  various  approaches  to  the  "pursuit  of 
happiness."  A  democratic  system  was 
understood  as  the  likeliest  source  of  the 
other  rights,  and  the  Declaration  of  In- 
dependence asserts: 

That  to  secure  these  rights,  governments 
are  instituted  among  men,  deriving  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed. 

The  original  demand  for  human 
rights  seems  Utopian  in  the  face  of  con- 
ditions experienced  by  many  nations  to- 
day. But  when  this  demand  arose— in  a 
world  where  there  was  not  even  one 
state  under  wholly-democratic  govern- 
ment, and  the  few  republics  existing  did 
not  recognize  the  principles  of  in- 
alienable rights— it  appeared  infinitely 
more  visionary  and  unrealistic. 

Yet  the  human  rights  movement  in 
world  politics  proved  to  be  unbelievably 
successful  after  1776.  It  is  to  this  histor- 
ical movement  that  democratic  countries 
owe  their  possession  of  rights,  and  be- 
cause of  it  that  other  peoples  express 
their  yearnings  for  justice  as  a  demand 
for  rights.  It  created  the  contemporary 
situation,  in  which  nearly  every  regime, 
no  matter  how  narrowly  based  or 
despotic,  refers  to  the  people  as  the 
source  of  its  legitimacy  and  has  a  con- 
stitution that  provides  for  a  representa- 
tive assembly  and  for  elections,  no  mat- 
ter how  meaningless. 

Unfortunately,  the  widespread  long- 
ing for  rights  in  the  contemporary  world 
confronts  a  real  lack  of  consensus  on 


these  rights.  Many  governments  fear  in- 
dividual liberty;  many  others  do  not  ac- 
cept the  original  and  distinctive  intellec- 
tual foundations  of  the  belief  in  human 
rights.  Those  opposing  the  human  rights 
movement  find  themselves  in  a  world 
already  shaped  by  it,  and  they  are  com- 
pelled to  fight  on  its  ground,  using  the 
terminology  of  democracy.  Thus  there 
arise  the  many  "peoples'  democracies"  of 
today  that  are  not  democratic  in  any 
normal  sense.  In  1776  those  who  prac- 
ticed slavery  or  absolute  monarchy  ad- 
mitted it  openly;  now  they  draw  around 
themselves  the  names  of  freedom.  A 
nominal  consensus  on  human  rights  thus 
hides  the  reservations  of  leaders  who  re- 
main more  comfortable  with  the  ancient 
priority  of  duties  over  rights,  and  of 
rulers  who  simply  find  it  inconvenient  or 
threatening  to  respect  their  subjects' 
rights.  For  such  people  there  is  a  great 
temptation  to  legitimize  their  own  in- 
terests by  broadening  the  basic  concept 
of  rights  to  include  these  interests— thus 
allowing  some  to  claim,  for  example, 
that  duty  to  authority  is  a  special  kind 
of  right  and  others  to  claim  that  certain 
theoretically  desirable  rights  cannot  be 
afforded  at  their  country's  stage  of 
development. 

This  leads  to  increasing  uncertainty 
as  to  what  desirable  things  really  are 
rights.  This  uncertainty  has  been  en- 
couraged by  some  new  interpretations  of 
social  and  economic  rights,  such  as  the 
newly  minted  concept  of  the  "right  to 
development."  The  urgency  and  moral 
seriousness  of  the  need  to  eliminate  star- 
vation and  poverty  from  the  world  are 
unquestionable,  and  continue  to  motivate 
large  American  foreign  aid  efforts. 
However,  the  idea  of  economic  and 
social  rights  is  easily  abused  by  re- 
pressive governments  which  claim  that 
they  promote  human  rights  even  though 
they  deny  their  citizens  the  basic  rights 
to  the  integrity  of  the  person,  as  well  as 
civil  and  political  rights.  This  justifica- 
tion for  repression  has  in  fact  been  ex- 
tensively used.  No  category  of  rights 
should  be  allowed  to  become  an  excuse 
for  the  denial  of  other  rights.  For  this 
reason,  the  term  economic  and  social 
rights  is  not  used  in  this  year's  reports. 

There  exists,  however,  a  profound 
and  necessary  connection  between 
human  rights  and  economic  develop- 
ment. The  engine  of  economic  growth  is 
personal  liberty.  Societies  which  protect 
civil  and  political  rights  are  far  more 


likely  to  experience  economic  deve' . 
ment  than  societies  which  do  not.  (t 
versely,  programs  which  seek  to  eil 
cate  poverty  provide  a  crucial  four  ' 
for  democratic  political  institutions  • 
these  reasons,  a  section  on  Econor 
and  Social  Circumstances  has  beer . 
eluded  in  the  reports. 

Human  Rights  in 
International  Relations 

How  to  embody  the  fundamental  p 
ciples  of  democratic  societies— hun 
rights— in  foreign  policy  has  becon 
especially  pressing  question  for  th« 
United  States.  Because  Americana 
of  many  faiths  and  ethnic  heritage 
national  identity  of  the  United  Sta 
more  constituted  by  its  political  pr 
ciples  than  is  that  of  any  other  pc 
nation.  The  United  States  fought : 
bloodiest  war  not  for  territory  but 
free  the  slaves.  In  fact  the  United: 
States,  protected  from  the  harsh 
necessities  of  foreign  policy  by  twi 
oceans  only  entered  world  politics 
serious  way  when  impelled  to  do  s 
its  sense  that  freedom  was  threat 
The  three  times  when  the  United 
recommitted  itself  to  active  involv 
with  the  outside  world— whether  i 
for  the  liberty  of  Europe  or  the  in 
shall  Plan— it  has  done  so  because 
called  to  the  defense  of  human  rig 

The  attempt  to  make  foreign ; 
serve  human  rights  confronts  seve 
specific  problems  that  must  be  faa 
developing  a  policy. 

A  continuing  problem  for  hum 
rights  policy  is  the  fact  that  it  tra' 
tionally  aims  at  affecting  the  dom 
behavior  of  other  countries,  while  i 
governments  are  reluctant  to  alte  h 
nation's  political  system  for  foreig 
policy  reasons.  The  leverage  that  ■ 
United  States  does  have  is  strung 
friendly  countries,  where  we  haveo 
access  and  more  influence.  Such  in 
fluence  is  an  important  resource  i » 
suing  human  rights,  but  its  concei* 
tion  in  friendly  countries  creates  i\^ 
danger:  human  rights  policy  migh  ii| 
light  and  punish  human  right.';  vii  >  i' 
in  friendly  countries,  while  giving  ' 
friendly  countries  immunity.  If  th 
place  it  would  blind  men  to  the  en  ' 
geography  of  human  rights  abuse: ; 
world.  Moreover,  a  nation  that  ca 
display  a  general  pattern  of  undeMU 
or  estranging  friendly  governmen 
would  obviously  limit  its  future  in  ifl 
over  them,  including  its  influence  lei 
their  human  rights  behavior.  This'^ 
second  problem  of  human  rights- « 


Department  of  State  Be 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


i  to  avoid  pressing  only  where  our 
ience  is  greatest  rather  than  where 
abuses  are  greatest. 
There  is  a  danger  that  human  rights 
\y  will  become  like  the  labor  of 
phus  because  it  deals  only  with  ef- 
i  and  not  with  their  causes.  To  take 
xample,  it  is  important  not  only  to 
political  prisoners,  but  also  to  en- 
age  conditions  in  which  new  political 
iners  are  not  taken.  Many,  although 
ill,  of  the  things  we  consider  rights 
Sifficult  to  implant  in  adverse  condi- 
(.  This  fact  creates  the  danger  that 
iming  at  too  much  we  will  not  get 
,  is  really  possible.  The  founders  of 
tVeimar  Republic,  by  aiming  at  a 
)cracy  stripped  of  all  the  authori- 
n  features  of  imperial  Germany, 
ed  a  system  so  fragile  that  it  was 
Ivhelmed  by  something  wholly  bar- 
I  in  only  fourteen  years.  On  the 
('  hand,  there  still  exist  in  many 
'•  of  the  world  indigenous  traditions 
:cency  that  coincide  in  part  with  the 
l.n  rights  tradition.  The  best  hope 
•eating  the  preconditions  of  effec- 
i'uman  rights  observance  may  some- 
{  lie  in  working  on  the  basis  of 
i  traditions, 
or  all  these  reasons,  a  human 

1.  policy,  unless  it  is  very  carefully 
"ucted,  runs  the  danger  of  being  in- 
ive.  And  if  it  is  ineffective  it  can 
e  counterproductive,  creating  addi- 
i|  resistance  to  improvement  in 
ij:i  rights.  It  can  embitter  bilateral 
ii)ns  with  other  countries,  increasing 
sational  tension, 
ifforts  for  human  rights  in  the 

I  before  1914  had  the  advantage 
bll  of  the  major  powers  respected, 
e5t  in  principle,  the  same  conception 
Unan  rights.  If  their  practice  often 

i  to  live  up  to  their  principles,  there 
>  perceived  legitimacy  to  the  prin- 
ethat  caused  each  of  these  coun- 
so  develop  in  the  direction  of 
aT  equality  before  the  law  and 
■•and  more  scrupulous  adherence  to 

II  rights.  Because  of  the  funda- 
1 1  innsensus  on  human  rights 

It.  the  ^reat  powers  that  diverged 
;in  practice  from  the  international 
sisus.  such  as  imperial  Russia,  did 
1."  t(i  export  an  alternative  ideology. 
'  e  fundamental  consensus  on 
1 1  ri,trht.s  was  broken  after  World 
'  hy  the  successive  emergence— in 
; .  lialy,  and  Germany— of  totali- 

rcuinies  among  the  major  powers. 
--  iHilitical  systems  were  visibly 
»'d  in  opposition  to  the  way  of  life 
Hincreasingly  democratic  Western 


world.  They  rejected  in  principle  the 
ideas  upon  which  were  based  the  great 
movement  for  human  rights  after  the 
American  and  French  revolutions. 

The  world  after  1945  has  been  char- 
acterized by  competition  between  two 
nations  that  embody  principles— the 
United  Slates  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
United  States  is  the  nation  that  has 
most  vigorously  undertaken  the  effort  to 
make  human  rights  a  specific  part  of  its 
foreign  policy.  The  Soviet  Union,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  ruled  by  a  very  small  elite 
through  a  massive  bureaucratic  and 
policy  apparatus.  Its  regime  inherits  in  a 
modified  form  the  Marxist  tradition  that 
reacted  against  the  philosophic  ideas  on 
which  the  original  human  rights  concept 
was  based,  and  superimposes  this  on  a 
heritage  of  absolute  monarchy.  In  con- 
trast to  the  Western  democracies,  whose 
original  human  rights  principles  gradual- 
ly radicalized  themselves,  producing  a 
greater  and  greater  transformation  of 
social  life,  the  alternative  Marxist  con- 
ception of  justice  in  the  U.S.S.R.  was 
soon  withered  by  tactical  compromises 
with  the  necessities  of  absolute  rule. 

The  effect  of  Soviet  foreign  policy 
has  not  been  to  encourage  human  rights. 
The  Soviet  Union  dominates,  without 
their  consent,  not  only  the  non-Russian 
peoples  of  the  former  Czarist  empire, 
but  also  the  nations  of  Eastern  Europe. 
The  efforts  of  the  people  of  East  Ger- 
many, Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and 
Poland  to  create  freer  and  more  open 
systems  have  all  been  frustrated  by 
Soviet  intervention  or  pressure.  In  1979 
the  Soviet  army  invaded  Afghanistan  to 
impose  a  government  unacceptable  to 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
Afghan  people.  In  the  developing  coun- 
tries, the  Soviet  Union  has  a  tendency  to 
use  its  influence  to  move  governments 
toward  political  structures  of  the  Soviet 
type  where  possible.  For  example,  in 
Ethiopia,  whose  current  government  is 
already  a  friend  of  the  Soviet  Union  in 
its  foreign  policy,  there  has  been  persist- 
ent Soviet  pressure  to  create  a  com- 
munist party  on  the  Soviet  model.  Thus 
a  world  in  which  several  major  powers 
were  in  theoretical  agreement  over 
human  rights  has  given  way  to  a  world 
in  which  the  two  greatest  powers  are 
fundamentally  divided  over  this  issue. 


United  States  Human  Rights  Policy 

Human  rights  is  at  the  core  of  American 
foreign  policy  because  it  is  central  to 
America's  conception  of  itself.  This  na- 
tion did  not  "develop."  It  was  created  in 


order  to  make  real  a  specific  political  vi- 
sion. It  follows  that  "human  rights"  is 
not  something  added  on  to  our  foreign 
policy,  but  its  ultimate  purpose:  the 
preservation  and  promotion  of  liberty  in 
the  world.  Freedom  is  the  issue  that 
separates  us  from  the  Soviet  bloc  and 
embodies  America's  claim  on  the  im- 
agination of  people  all  over  the  world. 

Our  human  rights  policy  has  two 
goals.  First,  we  seek  to  improve  human 
rights  practices  in  numerous  countries— 
to  eliminate  torture  or  brutality,  to 
secure  religious  freedom,  to  promote 
free  elections,  and  the  like.  A  foreign 
policy  indifferent  to  these  issues  would 
not  appeal  to  the  idealism  of  Americans, 
would  be  amoral,  and  would  lack  public 
support.  Moreover,  these  are  pragmatic, 
not  Utopian,  actions  for  the  United 
States.  Our  most  stable,  reliable  allies 
are  democracies.  Our  reputation  among 
the  people  in  important  countries  that 
are  dictatorships  will  suffer  if  we  come 
to  be  associated  not  with  liberty,  but 
with  despotism.  Often  the  people  whose 
rights  we  are  defending  are  the  national 
leaders  of  future  years. 

As  to  the  question  of  tactics,  the 
Reagan  Administration's  test  is  effec- 
tiveness. With  friendly  countries,  we 
prefer  to  use  diplomacy,  not  public  pro- 
nouncements. We  seek  not  to  isolate 
them  for  their  injustices  and  thereby 
render  ourselves  ineffective,  but  to  use 
our  influence  to  effect  desirable  change. 
Our  aim  is  to  achieve  results,  not  to 
make  self-satisfying  but  ineffective 
gestures. 

But  the  second  goal  of  our  human 
rights  policy  sometimes  can  conflict  with 
this  search  for  effectiveness:  we  seek 
also  a  public  association  of  the  United 
States  with  the  cause  of  liberty.  This  is 
an  eminently  practical  goal:  our  ability 
to  win  international  cooperation  and 
defeat  anti- American  propaganda  will  be 
harmed  if  we  seem  indifferent  to  the 
fate  of  liberty.  Friendly  governments 
are  often  susceptible  to  quiet  diplomacy, 
and  we  therefore  use  it  rather  than 
public  denunciations.  But  if  we  never  ap- 
pear seriously  concerned  about  human 
rights  in  friendly  countries,  our  policy 
will  seem  one-sided  and  cynical.  Thus, 
while  the  Soviet  bloc  presents  the  most 
serious  long-term  human  rights  problem, 
we  cannot  let  it  falsely  appear  that  this 
is  our  only  human  rights  concern.  So  a 
human  rights  policy  does  inescapably 
mean  trouble— for  example,  from  friend- 
ly governments  if  the  United  States 
Government  places  pressure  upon  them, 
or  from  the  American  people  if  their 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


government  appears  not  to  be  doing  so. 
Yet  a  human  rights  policy  embodies  our 
deepest  convictions  about  political  life, 
and  our  interests:  the  defense  and  ex- 
pansion of  liberty. 

Our  human  rights  policy  also  has 
two  sides,  the  negative  and  the  positive. 
The  negative  side  is  embodied  in  the 
way  we  oppose  (through  act  or  word) 
specific  human  rights  violations  in  the 
short  term.  The  positive  side  is  strongly 
emphasized  by  the  Reagan  Administra- 
tion in  which  we  seek  over  the  long  term 
to  help  democracy,  the  surest  safeguard 
of  human  rights.  It  is  a  fact  that  most 
democracies  have  excellent  human  rights 
records;  nothing  is  as  likely  as  democ- 
racy to  produce  this  result. 

President  Reagan  has  made  the 
long-term  development  of  democracy 
throughout  the  world  a  central  goal  of 
our  foreign  policy.  Too  often  our  human 
rights  policy  has  been  reactive  or  nega- 
tive, responding  to  events  by  punishing 
people  for  bad  behavior.  The  President 
wishes  to  go  beyond  this  to  an  active, 
positive  human  rights  policy.  He  out- 
lined his  conception  in  a  speech  to  Par- 
liament in  London  last  June  where  he 
announced  plans  for  two  conferences 
that  have  since  been  held  in  Washing- 
ton: a  conference  of  scholars  and  ex- 
perts on  the  democratization  of  com- 
munist countries,  and  a  conference  on 
free  elections  which  included  political 
leaders  and  elections  officials  from  coun- 
tries throughout  the  world.  In  addition, 
there  is  now  underway  a  bipartisan 
study  of  how  the  United  States  can  do 
more  to  promote  democracy,  and 
whether  the  growth  of  democratic  insti- 
tutions such  as  free  elections,  a  free 
press,  free  labor  unions,  or  an  independ- 
ent judiciary  can  be  promoted  through 
an  appropriate  combination  of  public  and 
private  effort.  Recommendations  for 
programs  are  expected  this  spring.  Such 
programs  would  by  their  very  nature 
need  to  be  insulated  from  United  States 
Government  control,  and  would  have  to 
be  responsive  to  the  needs  and  desires 
of  men  and  women  who  seek  democracy 
for  their  own  countries. 

At  the  same  time,  the  United  States 
Government  has  assembled  proposals  for 
programs  in  support  of  democracy.  The 
Executive  branch  will  soon  be  sub- 
mitting these  proposals  for  the  con- 
sideration of  Congress.  They  contain 
such  items  as  support  for  free  labor 
movements  abroad;  working  with  the 
AFL-CIO;  expanded  visitor  exchanges  of 
individuals  in  all  age  groups;  proposed 
monetary  support  for  publishing  and 
distributing  literature  and  teaching 


materials  on  democracy.  Also  suggested 
are  support  for  the  free  press  in  the 
form  of  increased  journalists'  exchange 
and  training;  and  support  for  organiza- 
tions whose  goal  is  protecting  pro- 
ponents of  democracy,  whether  through 
observing  trials,  strengthening  judicial 
procedures,  or  building  intellectual  and 
popular  support  for  democratic  institu- 
tions and  procedures. 

Obviously,  the  positive  course  of 
human  rights  policy  is  not  a  substitute 
for  an  immediate  and  active  response, 
including  sanctions,  for  human  rights 
violations  when  they  occur.  But  the  Ad- 
ministration believes  that  we  should 
treat  not  only  the  symptoms  but  the 
disease— that  we  should  not  only  re- 
spond to  human  rights  violations  but 
also  should  work  to  establish  democratic 
systems  in  which  human  rights  viola- 
tions are  less  likely  to  occur. 

Positive  policy  of  this  kind  will  be 
aided  by  the  genuine  echo  that  the  con- 
cept of  human  rights  evokes  around 
much  of  the  world,  and  by  the  fact  that 
no  other  conception  of  political  justice 
has  been  able  to  win  as  much  legitimacy 
over  the  last  two  hundred  years.  In 
aiding  this  movement,  we  will  not  be 
struggling  alone,  but  assisting  the  most 
powerful  current  of  history  during  the 
last  200  years.  This  Administration  is 
committed  to  such  a  positive  effort  in 
support  of  human  rights. 

The  Congress  has  already  estab- 
lished one  human  rights  program  on  the 
positive  side.  Section  116(e)  of  the 
Foreign  Assistance  Act  provides  Agency 
for  International  Development  (AID) 
funding  for  programs  and  activities 
which  will  encourage  or  promote  in- 
creased adherence  to  civil  and  political 
rights  in  countries  eligible  for  United 
States  bilateral  assistance.  In  Fiscal 
Year  1982  AID  funded  activities  of 
$1,645,250  in  22  countries.  Activities  in- 
cluded the  education  and  research  pro- 
gram of  the  Inter-American  Institute  of 
Human  Rights  in  Costa  Rica;  support 
for  international  observers  for  the 
March  1982  elections  in  El  Salvador; 
strengthening  the  institutional  base  of 
the  Indonesian  legal  system;  legal  educa- 
tion programs  in  the  Philippines;  re- 
search on  human  rights  and  a  public 
education  campaign  on  civil  and  political 
rights  by  the  Liberian  Constitution  Com- 
mission; and  publication  of  the  newly  re- 
vised Zairian  penal  code. 

Present  United  States  human  rights 
policy  gives  special  attention  to  en- 
couraging major  improvements  in  the 
observance  of  human  rights  over  the 
long  term.  But  it  does  not  neglect  the 


simple  imperative  of  responding  ' '  • 
fact  of  suffering.  The  United  St;itt-s 
major  haven  for  refugees  and  tin-  n 
contributor  to  the  work  of  the  Iinti 
Nations  High  Commissioner  for 
Refugees,  giving  $121.9  million  m  F 
1982.  In  FY  1982  the  United  States 
tributed  over  $14  million  to  the  Inti  ; 
tional  Committee  of  the  Red  Crdss  ■ 
its  programs  on  behalf  of  prisontTS 
missing  persons,  and  civilians  in  wa 
time. 

In  the  pursuit  of  its  human  ri^l 
policy  the  United  States  uses  a  wid 
range  of  means.  Decisions  on  furei^ 
assistance  provided  by  the  Uniteii  :■  t 
take  human  rights  conditions  into  s 
count.  The  transfer  of  police  and  w 
tary  equipment  is  carefully  reviewe 
order  to  avoid  identifying  the  Unitt 
States  with  violations  of  human  rig 
In  addition,  human  rights  policy  en 
a  varied  mix  of  diplomatic  tools:  fr; 
discussions  with  foreign  officials; 
meeting  with  victims  of  human  rigl| 
abuses;  and,  where  private  diploma 
unavailing  or  unavailable,  public  stf 
ments  of  concern.  These  instrumer 
applied  in  a  manner  that  takes  into 
count  a  country's  history,  culture,  i 
current  political  environment,  and 
nizes  that  human  rights  concerns  n 
be  balanced  with  other  fundaments 
terests.  This  Administration  has  us 
of  these  instruments  at  one  time  oi 
another. 


Regional  and  International 
Institutions  for  the  Protection 
of  Human  Rights 

During  the  past  year  the  United  St 
has  pursued  in  international  organi 
tions  the  theme  established  early  ir 
Reagan  Administration:  to  oppose  :i 
ternational  fora  the  double  standar 
plied  to  human  rights  violations  ani 
work  toward  a  more  regional  appro 
to  solving  international  human  righ 
concerns. 

The  38th  (1982)  session  of  the 
United  Nations  Human  Rights  Cent 
sion  (HRC)  met  in  Geneva  as  the  ?? 
Government,  urged  on  by  the  Sovif 
Union,  acted  to  suppress  the  huma, 
rights  of  the  Polish  people.  The  CoJi 
sion  adopted  a  resolution  expressin.1 
deep  concern  over  the  widespread  ;! 
tions  of  human  rights  and  fundame« 
freedoms  in  Poland,  and  affirmed  t, 
rights  of  the  Polish  people  to  pursu, 
their  political  and  economic  develo!i< 


Department  of  State  Bi-'' 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


from  outside  interference.  Specif i- 
the  resolution  called  upon  the 
jtary-General  to  undertake  a 
-ugh  study  of  the  human  rights 
tion  in  Poland  and  to  present  a 
irehensive  report  to  the  1983  ses- 
af  the  Commission, 
'his  action  represented  the  first 
in  its  38-year  history  that  the  Corn- 
on  has  spoken  out  on  human  rights 
;ions  in  an  Eastern  European  coun- 
t  demonstrated  that  Poland  was 
n  EastAVest  issue,  but  a  matter  of 
Iwide  concern.  The  resolution, 
1  was  sponsored  by  European  na- 
received  support  from  all  regions, 
assage  of  the  Polish  resolution,  as 
is  adoption  of  resolutions  condemn- 
)reign  intervention  in  Afghanistan 
Kampuchea,  and  the  flagrant  viola- 
if  the  human  rights  of  the  Khmer 
e,  reflect  a  movement,  albeit  slow, 
■d  honest  assessment  of  human 
;  violations  throughout  the  world, 
bccess  of  these  efforts  reflected 

I  Western  cohesion,  and  a  commit- 
to  reaching  out  to  less-developed 
-ies  through  three  difficult  pro- 

il  resolutions  and  a  final  substan- 
3te. 

le  agenda  for  the  38th  session  of 
)mmission  included  a  broad  range 
IS,  most  of  which  were  carry-overs 
)revious  sessions.  These  included 
i  relating  to  human  rights  in  the 
(-occupied  Middle  East  territories, 

II  rights  in  Chile,  El  Salvador, 

It,  and  Guatemala,  human  rights  in 
I  Africa,  and  a  general  item 
]g  to  the  realization  of  "economic 
ii  rights"  and  a  "right  to  develop- 

(e  United  States  Government 
lies  to  be  troubled  by  the  Commis- 
ireatment  of  the  right  to  develop- 
Ksue,  which  the  United  States  is 
Kpared  to  recognize  as  a  basic 
a  right,  questions  dealing  with 
veirf,  and  the  Middle  East. 

general,  the  Commission  re- 
I'l  critical  of  human  rights  condi- 
n  Latin  America,  criticizing  Chile, 
■nala,  and  Bolivia  in  the  public  ses- 
i  n  addition  to  the  resolution  on  El 
sor. 

^thin  days  of  passage  of  the  resolu- 
(  El  Salvador,  which  the  United 
;ciiiisiiiered  was  intended  to 

line  tlie  electoral  process  in  that 
t-.  \'('iiezuela  called  for  a  special 
'  of  I  he  Organization  of  American 
•  .OA.S)  Permanent  Council  to  com- 

30ut  UN  interference  in  a 
>  .1  matter.  The  United  States 
iiment  hopes  that  this  move  is  a 
n«r  of  greater  willingness  by 


regional  bodies,  such  as  the  OAS,  to 
undertake  responsibility  for  significant 
issues  which  now  primarily  confront  the 
United  Nations. 

Many  of  these  problems  appeared 
during  the  37th  session  of  the  United 
Nations  General  Assembly:  a  double 
standard  which  focuses  solely  on  certain 
countries,  and  a  partisan  treatment  of 
human  rights  questions. 

The  General  Assembly's  Third  Com- 
mittee (Social  and  Humanitarian  Affairs) 
voted  on  issues  regarding,  among 
others,  racial  discrimination,  human 
rights  in  El  Salvador,  Chile,  and  Guate- 
mala, Middle  East  issues,  human  rights 
and  mass  exoduses,  and  self-determina- 
tion. United  States  efforts  served  pri- 
marily to  limit  damage  and  to  provide  a 
forum  for  articulating  the  beliefs  of  the 
Administration,  including  emphasis  on 
the  hypocrisy  of  current  double  stand- 
ards, discrimination  against  Latin 
America  countries,  and  general  indiffer- 
ence to  violations  by  the  Soviet  Union 
and  its  Communist  allies. 

United  States  efforts  in  the  coming 
year  in  international  and  regional  bodies 
will  focus  on  a  heightened  international 
consciousness  of  human  rights  concerns 
in  which  there  is  implicit  recognition  of 
equity  and  consistency  as  underlying 
themes. 

The  Madrid  follow-up  meeting  of  the 
Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation 
in  Europe  (CSCE)— the  35  states  that 
signed  the  1975  Helsinki  Final  Act— was 
scheduled  to  resume  in  early  February 
1983  after  a  six-week  holiday  recess. 
The  Madrid  meeting  has  been  in  session 
(with  periodic  breaks)  since  November 
1980,  longer  than  the  original  meeting 
which  produced  the  Helsinki  Final  Act. 

The  principal  obstacle  to  progress 
has  been  the  continuing  pattern  of 
Eastern  violations  of  the  human  rights 
provisions  of  the  Final  Act.  After  the  in- 
crease in  repression  in  Poland  in  1981, 
the  Western  allies  broke  off  all  negotia- 
tion of  the  new  CSCE  document  until 
November  1982.  When  the  meeting  re- 
convened, the  United  States  joined  in 
sponsoring  a  Western  package  of  pro- 
posals centering  on  trade  union  rights, 
religious  freedoms,  jamming  of  radio 
broadcasts,  activities  of  Helsinki  moni- 
toring groups,  and  an  experts'  meeting 
on  human  contacts  and  family  reunifica- 
tion. The  Soviet  Union  and  its  allies 
have  attempted  to  deflect  attention  from 
human  rights  issues,  concentrating  in- 
stead on  the  security  aspects  of  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act.  The  United  States 
has  repeatedly  emphasized  that  the  fur- 
ther development  of  the  CSCE  process 


must  be  balanced  between  progress  on 
human  rights  issues  and  security  in- 
terests. 

In  1982,  the  European  Commission 
on  Human  Rights  and  the  European 
Court  of  Human  Rights  continued  to 
hear  and  decide  on  cases  involving  viola- 
tions of  human  rights  in  the  21  countries 
which  are  members  of  the  Council  of 
Europe.  The  Commission  registered 
more  than  400  individual  cases  for  ex- 
amination during  the  year.  Spain  and 
France  joined  the  list  of  more  than  a 
dozen  member  countries  which  permit 
their  citizens  to  appeal  directly  to  the 
Commission  when  they  believe  their 
basic  rights  have  been  infringed.  Council 
of  Europe  member  states  regard  Euro- 
pean Court  of  Human  Rights  judge- 
ments as  binding  and  generally  seek  to 
make  amends  in  accordance  with  the 
Court's  rulings.  While  neither  the  Court 
nor  the  Council  of  Europe  is  empowered 
to  enforce  the  Court's  rulings,  member 
countries'  voluntary  acceptance  of  its 
findings  demonstrates  that  the  Court  ex- 
erts a  positive  influence  on  human  rights 
issues  in  Europe. 

The  Inter-American  Commission  on 
Human  Rights  (lAHRC)  was  established 
in  1960  to  promote  the  observance  and 
protection  of  human  rights  and  to  serve 
as  a  consultative  organ  for  the  OAS. 
The  Commission  considers  individual 
complaints  and  conducts  on-site  ex- 
aminations of  alleged  human  rights 
violations.  It  approves  definitive  reports 
on  the  human  rights  situation  in  various 
Latin  American  countries  and  prepares 
an  annual  report  for  presentation  to  the 
OAS  General  Assembly. 

The  Organization  of  African  Unity 
Assembly  of  Heads  State  and  Govern- 
ment approved  an  African  Charter  of 
Human  and  People's  Rights  at  a  meeting 
in  Nairobi  in  June,  1981.  The  Charter 
will  come  into  force  upon  ratification  by 
a  simple  majority  of  the  member  states. 
By  the  end  of  1982,  16  states  had  signed 
the  Charter  and  six  of  those  had  formal- 
ly deposited  the  instruments  of  ratifica- 
tion. 

The  legitimacy  of  human  rights  as 
an  issue  for  public  discussion  gained 
wider  acceptance  in  Africa  in  1982.  In 
late  October  the  Government  of  Togo, 
jointly  with  the  Paris-based  Young 
African  Lawyers  Association  and 
UNESCO  organized  a  five-day  human 
rights  conference  in  Lome.  The  focus  of 
concern  was  human  rights  in  the  context 
of  the  traditional  African,  values  of  com- 
munity, harmony,  and  solidarity.  The 
sessions  were  devoted  to  discussion  of 
the  rights  of  women  and  the  aged, 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


cultural  rights  of  minorities,  and  human 
rights  and  the  push  for  economic  devel- 
opment. During  his  1982  trip  to  Africa, 
Vice  President  Bush  engaged  in  discus- 
sions of  human  rights  issues  in  several 
countries,  including  a  human  rights  col- 
loquy on  human  rights  policy  in  Dakar, 
Senegal. 

Preparing  a  Human  Rights  Report 

We  believe  it  will  be  useful  to  the  Con- 
gress and  to  other  readers  of  this  report 
to  include  here  a  brief  summary  of  the 
preparation  process,  of  certain  limita- 
tions imposed  by  circumstances  upon 
that  process,  and  of  the  assumptions  we 
have  made  regarding  the  inclusion  or 
treatment  of  material  in  the  individual 
country  reports. 

Legislation  requires  the  submission 
of  the  annual  report  by  January  31.  To 
meet  this  requirement,  the  Department 
has  found  it  necessary  to  begin  the  an- 
nual exercise  in  late  summer.  A  message 
is  distributed  to  all  United  States  em- 
bassies and  to  the  offices  within  the 
Department  which  are  involved  in  the 
preparation  of  the  report.  This  message 
incorporates  guidance  concerning  the 
schedule  under  which  the  individual 
country  reports  are  to  be  drafted  by 
each  embassy  and  submitted  to  the 
Department,  and  detailed  instructions  on 
format,  drafting  style,  and  coverage.  It 
does  not  attempt,  however,  to  dictate 
the  actual  content  of  any  country  report. 
The  original  drafts  are  normally  pre- 
pared by  United  States  diplomatic  posts 
in  the  field,  unless  we  have  no  repre- 
sentation in  the  country  considered. 

When  received  in  the  Department, 
the  individual  country  reports  are  re- 
viewed and  revised  by  the  appropriate 
country  "desk",  by  the  geographic 
bureau  concerned,  by  several  bureaus 
and  staffs  which  have  responsibility  for 
specific  areas  or  functions  covered  in  the 
reports,  and  by  the  Bureau  of  Human 
Rights  and  Humanitarian  Affairs  which 
has  overall  responsibility  for  the  prepa- 
ration of  the  reports.  The  completed 
reports  are  then  sent  to  the  Congress. 

The  information  in  the  individual 
reports,  and  the  judgements  rendered, 
are  drawn  from  all  sources  available  to 
the  United  States  embassy  concerned 
and  are  supplemented  by  the  informa- 
tion and  knowledge  available  in  the 
various  bureaus  and  staffs  which  review 
the  reports  in  the  Department.  Sources 
include  officials  of  foreign  governments, 
private  citizens,  personal  observations  of 
US  officials,  victims  of  human  rights 
violations,  intelligence  information,  press 
reports,  non-governmental  organiza- 
tions, and  human  rights  bodies  of  inter- 


national organizations.  Much  of  the  in- 
formation is  already  public. 

There  are  various  problems  associ- 
ated with  preparation  of  these  country 
reports.  The  same  problems,  addressed 
in  different  ways,  affect  other  human 
rights  reporting  efforts,  such  as  those  of 
Freedom  House  and  Amnesty  Interna- 
tional. A  better  understanding  of  the 
problems  involved  in  preparing  any 
report  about  worldwide  human  rights 
conditions  should  be  helpful  to  the  Con- 
gress and  the  community  concerned 
about  human  rights. 

Problems.  Procedures, 
and  Assumptions 

To  meet  the  legislative  requirement  of 
submission  of  the  report  by  January  31, 
the  reports  must  be  initially  drafted  in 
the  preceding  October  and  November, 
with  the  review  process  extending  into 
January.  It  is  possible  that  developments 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  year  under  re- 
view may  not  be  reflected;  every  effort 
is  made,  however,  to  include  reference 
to  major  events  or  significant  changes  in 
trends  which  occur  up  to,  or  even 
beyond,  the  end  of  the  year. 

In  preparing  this  report,  we  are  ful- 
ly conscious  of  the  information  gathered 
and  reported  by  the  human  rights  bodies 
of  international  organizations  and  by  the 
major  non-governmental  human  rights 
organizations.  Two  of  the  major  reports, 
however,  those  of  Amnesty  Interna- 
tional and  Freedom  House,  were  not 
available  until  late  in  1982  when  much  of 
our  work  had  been,  perforce,  completed. 
In  addition.  Amnesty  International's 
report  for  1982  reported  only  the  situa- 
tion in  1981,  and  Freedom  House  drew 
upon  material  relating  to  the  period  up 
to  mid-1982  only. 

The  United  States  Government's 
report  differs  in  its  coverage  from 
reporting  by  some  non-governmental 
organizations.  Thus,  whereas  Amnesty 
International  intentionally  concentrates 
exclusively  on  human  rights  violations 
by  governments,  we  believe  that  it  is 
necessary  to  treat  violations  such  as  tor- 
ture, murder,  interference  with  a  free 
press,  and  intimidation  of  the  judiciary 
whether  they  are  committed  by  govern- 
ments or  by  opposition  movements.  This 
course  is  particularly  essential  in  a 
period  when  many  opposition  and  guer- 
rilla movements  maintain  to  a  greater  or 
lesser  degree  a  state  apparatus  (e.g., 
control  and  administration  of  territory, 
flags,  organized  military  units.) 

Amnesty  International  also  omits 
almost  all  discussion  of  the  status  of  civil 
and  political  rights  from  its  annual 


reports,  in  order  to  avoid  political  e 
tanglement,  and  to  concentrate  {i\«< 
violations  against  individuals,  while 
regard  political  rights  as  fundament 
and  endeavor  to  discuss  them  in  ilei 
Many  private  human  rights  organiz, 
tions  consider  the  use  of  capital  imi 
ment  a  human  rights  violation  /»  '•  > 
Neither  the  United  States  Governm 
nor  the  United  States  Supreme  <^'l 
takes  the  position  that  the  death  pe  i 
ty,  imposed  after  due  process  in  a  I 
mate  judicial  system,  constitutes  ; 
tion  of  internationally  recognized  hi 
rights  or  that  it  constitutes  cruel ; 
unusual  punishment. 

Although  efforts  have  been  mai 
ensure  the  comprehensiveness  of  th 
report,  certain  problems  appear  to 
herent  in  any  efforts  to  prepare  a  r 
on  international  human  rights  cond 
tions.  Some  have  to  do  with  our  lac 
knowledge  or  access,  some  are  con' 
tual,  some  reflect  trends  in  world  p 
opinion,  and  some  arise  from  the 
mechanics  of  the  reporting  process 
itself.  While  attempts  have  been  m. 
resolve  these  problems,  they  have  i 
always  succeeded. 

The  Problem  of  Consistency 

The  problem  of  consistency  is  one  ' 
necessarily  affects  every  effort  to  i 
on  world  human  rights  conditions, 
we  do  not  attempt  to  make  explicit 
parisons,  the  country  reports  will  o 
viously  be  seriously  misleading  if,  f 
want  of  consisting  reporting  stands 
some  countries  are  implicitly  held  t 
different  (either  higher  or  lower)  hv 
rights  standard  than  others.  Unfor 
tunately,  there  is  literally  no  one  w 
has  the  close  and  detailed  informati 
circumstances  in  the  162  countries 
covered  in  the  1982  submission  to  ( 
ment  knowledgeably  on  all  of  thenn 
Thus,  such  a  submission  would  eithi 
have  to  be  drafted  by  a  single  perse 
who  could  not  be  familiar  with  ; 
tries,  or  by  many  hands,  as  this  vol 
is.  Neither  approach,  unfortunately 
resolves  the  problem  of  consistency 
recognize,  therefore,  that  inevitable 
ferences  in  perspective,  judgment, 
emphasis  may  appear  in  the  varioui 
reports,  despite  our  most  determin 
forts  to  avoid  these  faults. 

The  Problem  of  Information 

By  the  nature  of  the  subject,  gover 
ments  which  violate  human  rights  i' 
admit  to  such  violations,  nor  do  tht' 
welcome  foreign  governmental  or  r« 
governmental  interest  in  what  they 


Department  of  State  I 


HUMAN  RIGHTS 


as  their  internal  affairs.  It  is 
hat  our  most  detailed,  careful, 
iple  reporting  is  in  open  societies 
Access  and  evaluation  are 
le  and  facilitated  by  governments 
concern  for  human  rights  equals 
n,  while  we  may  have  virtually  no 
to  many  closed  societies  where 
f  the  very  worst  human  rights 
ns  occur.  Thus  the  quality  of  the 
differs  markedly  in  terms  of  the 
e  presented.  In  some  cases  we 
■en  able  to  draw  upon  evidence 
nt  to  meet  highly  critical  stand- 
hile  in  others  we  must  rely  heavi- 
le  evaluation  of  very  limited  in- 
on. 

'.  problem  of  uneven  access  to  in- 
on  has  also  proved  troublesome 
ler  respect.  Because  we  often  do 
e  very  much  information  about 
rights  abuses  in  closed  societies, 
Dcieties  may  appear  to  have  a 
jiuman  rights  record  than  more 
cieties,  where  greater  knowledge 
s  is  available.  Indeed,  the  para- 
ms  to  emerge  that  while  closed 
have  a  structural  tendency  to 
.forst  abusers  of  human  rights, 
3  may  receive  less  criticism  than 
latively  open  societies  simply  be- 
s  know  so  much  less  about  them, 
npting,  on  the  one  hand,  to  elicit 
information  about  closed 
as  possible,  and  by  underscor- 
he  other  hand,  the  limited 
f  the  information  we  possess, 
)rt  has  tried  to  overcome  the 

s  in  favor  of  closed  societies, 
ted  to  the  problem  of  lack  of  ac- 
losed  societies  is  our  lack  of 
ge  about  traditional  societies, 
sties  which,  either  in  whole  or  in 
/e  not  undergone  the  effects  of 
itific  and  industrial  revolutions, 
societies,  traditional  institutions 
ctures  often  have  a  very  import- 
in  rights  impact,  yet  their  work- 
n  are  not  fully  understood  by 
s  standing  outside  of  the 
We  tend,  therefore,  to  focus  on 
tiveness  of  such  modern, 
institutions  as  trial  by  jury, 
orpus,  a  free  press,  parliaments, 
ions  and  to  ignore  non- 
,  traditional  institutions.  The 
'.  these  reports  will  note  that 
more  informative  about  legal 
of  the  Western  type  than  about 
Enistration  of  Islamic  law,  and 
virmative  about  Islamic  legal 
^than  tribal  and  customary  legal 
1  Moredver,  even  if  we  knew  far 
I'Ut  the  inner  workings  of  tradi- 
S'ieties,  we  would  still  be  faced 
ajor  conceptual  difficulty:  how 


to  evaluate  the  positive  and  negative 
consequences  of  indigenous  conceptions 
of  decency,  such  as  the  Sharia,  which 
developed  independently  of  the  Enlight- 
enment human  rights  tradition.  In 
specific  cases,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide 
whether  adherence  to  such  an  indige- 
nous tradition  is  a  violation  of  human 
rights  or  an  affirmation  of  them. 

Preparing  A  Comprehensive  Report 

Other  problems  in  compiling  a  compre- 
hensive human  rights  report  derive  from 
the  fact  that  the  drafters  cannot  work  in 
complete  isolation  from  world  public 
opinion  on  human  rights.  World  atten- 
tion to  human  rights  violations  is 
limited,  and  necessarily  focuses  on  a  few 
cases.  Also,  because  human  rights  is 
used  as  a  political  weapon,  public  con- 
cerns about  human  rights  violations  can 
assume  a  somewhat  arbitrary  character, 
focusing  on  relatively  minor  human 
rights  violators  while  ignoring  others 
that  are  equally  bad  or  worse.  Moreover, 
while  the  human  rights  situation  in  a 
given  country  can  change  drastically, 
either  for  good  or  for  ill,  during  a  com- 
paratively short  period  of  time,  world 
public  opinion  responds  much  more  slow- 
ly to  changes  in  the  human  rights  en- 
vironment. Once  a  nation  acquires  a 
human  rights  profile,  as  it  were, 
whether  favorable  or  unfavorable,  that 
profile  tends  to  remain  with  it  regard- 
less of  the  objective  human  rights  situa- 
tion. At  times,  the  position  a  country  en- 
joys in  world  public  opinion  can  in- 
fluence the  perceptions  of  the  human 
rights  reporter.  The  only  way  to  deal 
with  these  problems  is  to  try  to  adhere 
to  rigorous  standards  in  each  of  the 
country  reports. 

Unfortunately,  it  has  become  evident 
that  many  readers  have  assumed  that 
the  length  of  a  report  is  in  itself  a  judg- 
ment upon  the  seriousness  of  the  human 
rights  situation  in  a  country.  This 
assumption  is  completely  unwarranted. 
The  length  of  a  country  report  is  in- 
fluenced by  a  number  of  factors,  in- 
cluding the  availability  of  information, 
the  openness  of  the  society  under 
scrutiny,  the  degree  of  development  of 
the  information  media,  the  size  of  the 
country,  the  degree  of  international  and 
United  States  interest  in  a  country 
situation  and,  not  least,  the  energy  and 
skill  of  a  particular  reporting  officer. 

It  appears  that  academic  research 
based  upon  the  annual  report  has  begun, 
with  some  scholars  attempting  to  draw 
statistical  comparisons  of  practices  be- 
tween countries,  etc.  While  we  are 


to  note  this  interest  and  its 
promise  for  further  understanding  of  the 
elements  of  human  rights  practices  in 
the  world,  we  caution  researchers  that 
the  reports  are  not  prepared  with  this 
purpose  in  mind,  and  that  the  data  are 
not  fully  standardized. 

The  legislation  requires  reports  on 
all  countries  which  receive  aid  from  the 
United  States,  and  all  countries  which 
are  members  of  the  United  Nations.  In 
the  belief  that  the  information  would 
still  be  useful  to  the  Congress  and  to 
other  readers,  we  have  determined  to  in- 
clude countries  which  are  not  technically 
included  in  the  Congressional  require- 
ment, such  as  Switzerland.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  have  omitted  several  very 
small  or  very  new  states  for  which  we 
have  virtually  no  data,  such  as  Kiribati. 
We  have  also  attempted  to  provide 
enough  background  information  in  each 
report  to  place  the  human  rights  situa- 
tion in  context,  under  the  assumption 
that  those  who  need  to  delve  more  deep- 
ly will  consult  other  sources. 


•"Section  U6(dXl)  provides  as  follows: 

"The  Secretary  of  State  shall  transmit  to 
the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives 
and  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of 
the  Senate,  by  January  31  of  each  year,  a  full 
and  complete  report  regarding— 

(1)  the  status  of  internationally  recog- 
nized human  rights,  within  the  meaning  of 
subsection  (a)— 

(A)  in  countries  that  received  assistance 
under  this  part,  and 

(B)  in  all  other  foreign  countries  which 
are  members  of  the  United  Nations  and 
which  are  not  otherwise  the  subject  of  a 
human  rights  report  under  this  Act." 

Section  503(B)(b)  provides  as  follows: 

"The  Secretary  of  State  shall  transmit  to 
Congress,  as  part  of  the  presentation 
materials  for  security  assistance  programs 
proposed  for  each  fiscal  year,  a  full  and  com- 
plete report,  prepared  with  the  assistance  of 
the  Assistant  Secretary  for  Human  Rights 
and  Humanitarian  Affairs,  with  respect  to 
practices  regarding  the  observance  of  and 
respect  for  internationally  recognized  human 
rights  in  each  country  proposed  as  a  recipient 
of  security  assistance." 

^It  should  be  noted  that  statistical  data 
on  economic  and  social  conditions  in  Section  4 
of  each  country  report  is  drawn  from  World 
Bank  figures  which  we  believe  to  be  the  most 
reliable  available.  For  many  countries  the 
Bank  data  may  be  two  or  more  years  old,  but 
we  have  used  it  because  it  provides  the  best 
single,  reasonably  reliable  set  of  data,  com- 
piled under  consistent  methods  for  all  coun- 
tries. There  are  of  course  many  other  sources 
of  data,  many  of  which  conflict,  particularly 
when  estimates  are  necessary.  We  have  used 
the  World  Bank  data  as  a  rule:  only  when  it 
is  clear  that  this  data  is  significantly  out-of- 
date  or  that  a  particular  estimate  is  seriously 
questionable,  have  we  substituted  data  from 
other  sources.  ■ 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


Extraterritoriality  and 
Conflicts  of  Jurisdiction 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Address  before  the  American  Society 
of  International  Law,  Washington,  D.C., 
on  April  15,  1983.  Mr.  Dam  is  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State. 

On  December  13,  1981,  the  regime  of 
General  Jaruzelski  imposed  martial  law 
in  Poland.  The  Solidarity  labor  union 
was  suppressed;  its  leaders  interned.  A 
ruling  Military  Council  began  mass  ar- 
rests and  set  up  detention  camps.  Presi- 
dent Reagan  denounced  the  Polish 
regime  for  "trampl[ing]  underfoot  its 
solemn  commitments  to  the  UN  Charter 
and  the  Helsinki  accords."  He  denounced 
the  Soviet  Union  for  its  threats  and 
pressures  which  bore  a  major  share  of 
the  blame  for  the  repression  in  Poland. 
On  December  29,  he  unveiled  a  series  of 
economic  sanctions  against  the  Soviet 
and  Polish  Governments.  The  steps  in- 
cluded the  suspension  of  licenses  for  the 
export  or  reexport  to  the  Soviet  Union 
of  equipment  and  technology  for  trans- 
mission and  refining  of  petroleum  and 
natural  gas.  On  June  18,  1982,  the  sanc- 
tions were  further  extended  to  prohibit 
any  such  exports  by  U.S.  subsidiaries  or 
licensees  abroad. 

There  followed,  through  the  rest  of 
1982,  a  major  dispute  between  the 
United  States  and  its  most  important 
allies  over  the  effect  and  legality  of  the 
sanctions  we  had  imposed.  The  usually 
dry  and  esoteric  issues  of  international 
law  suddenly  became  dramatic  issues  of 
political  conflict,  grand  strategy,  and 
global  diplomacy.  International  law,  in- 
stead of  mitigating  conflict,  became  a 
battleground  until  the  underlying 
dispute  was  eased  by  diplomacy. 

The  legal  dispute  was  over  what  is 
sometimes  called  extraterritoriality.  I 
prefer  the  term  "conflicts  of  jurisdic- 
tion," which  describes  the  issue  more 
neutrally  and  analytically.  In  a  wide 
variety  of  situations,  the  United  States 
and  other  countries  attempt  to  apply 
their  laws  or  regulations  to  conduct  or 
property  beyond  their  national  bound- 
aries. The  resulting  international 
disputes  can  become  particularly  serious 
when  the  legal  arguments  embody  major 
disagreements  over  foreign  policy,  as  in 


the  Polish  sanctions  case.  Thus  conflicts 
of  jurisdiction  are  at  the  intersection  of 
law  and  diplomacy,  making  the  topic 
especially  appropriate  for  a  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State  to  discuss  before  this 
learned  society. 

One  of  the  aims  of  the  American 
Society  of  International  Law  has  been 
"to  promote  the  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  international  relations  on  the 
basis  of  law  and  justice."  That  is  a  good 
statement  of  one  of  our  principal  na- 
tional objectives  in  both  international 
law  and  foreign  policy. 

Let  me  give  you  a  brief  survey  of 
the  conflicts  problem,  and  then  I  shall 
outline  the  program  of  concrete  steps 
that  the  U.S.  Government  is  taking  to 
show  its  willingness  to  resolve,  or  ease, 
the  kinds  of  difficulties  that  have  arisen. 

Roots  of  the  Problem 

The  international  problem  of  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction  has  an  ancient  history.  The 
concept  of  extraterritoriality  antedated 
the  nation-state  as  we  now  know  it. 
Through  Roman  and  medieval  times,  a 
citizen  was  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of 
his  sovereign  wherever  he  traveled. 
More  recently,  for  centuries,  consuls  of 
some  powerful  states  were  able  to  exer- 
cise criminal  and  civil  jurisdiction  over 
their  nationals  in  foreign  countries.  As 
early  as  the  15th  century,  Venetians 
traveling  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  gained 
exemption  from  Ottoman  jurisdiction. 
Soon  Sardinians,  Tuscans,  Austrians, 
Russians,  and  others  carved  out  similar 
privileges  in  Ottoman  domains.  The 
other  most  famous  case  is  China  in  the 
19th  century.  Many  European  colonial 
powers  gained  the  right  to  apply  their 
own  laws  to  their  nationals  in  China 
through  diplomatic  or  consular  courts. 

The  United  States  engaged  in  the 
practice  as  well.  We  gained  extraterri- 
torial rights  in  regions  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  by  the  1830  Treaty  of  Com- 
merce and  Navigation  with  Turkey. 
These  rights  lasted  until  1949.  In  China, 
the  United  States  obtained  extraterri- 
torial jurisdiction  through  the  1844  Trea- 
ty of  Peace,  Amity  and  Commerce  and 
did  not  terminate  it  until  1943. 

When  the  treaty  to  relinquish  extra- 
territorial rights  in  China  was  before  the 


U.S.  Senate  in  1943,  the  Foreign 
tions  Committee  somewhat  nostal 
observed  that  the  practice  of  extr 
toriality  had  had  a  benign  purposi 
had  been  intended,  the  committee 
"to  diminish  friction,  minimize  cat 
conflict,  and  contribute  to  the  ma 
nance  of  conditions  of  law  and  or 
As  we  now  know,  the  practice  ha 
opposite  effect.  The  Chinese  toda 
it  as  a  symbol  of  the  humiliations 
posed  on  them  by  the  colonial  po^ 
during  the  period  of  their  nationa 
ness.  The  issue  had  quite  literally 
tionary  implications. 

In  this  modern  age  of  natiom 
every  nation  is  extraordinarily  se 
to  other  countries'  assertions  of  j 
tion  that  seem  to  impinge  on  the 
domain  of  national  sovereignty.  T 
irony  is  that  the  modern  world  all 
generates  its  own,  almost  unavoi( 
conditions  of  jurisdictional  conflid 

We  live  in  a  world  of  increasi 
economic  interdependence.  The  r 
growing  scale  of  international  tn 
investment  in  the  postwar  period 
brought  with  it  a  vast  expansion 
regulation,  and  legal  complexity, 
result  is  that  even  among  the  cloi 
allies,  claims  of  jurisdiction  are  b 
frequently  to  collide.  Consider  th 
mous  expansion  of  world  trade: ''. 
decade  of  the  1970s  was  a  period 
shocks  and  recessions;  neverthek 
tween  1970  and  1980  world  expo> 
creased  from  $328  billion  to  over 
trillion.  American  exports  alone  i 
creased  from  $43  billion  to  over  1 
billion.  Foreign  direct  investment 
United  States  increased  almost  f 

In  this  modern  environment  i 
mercial  expansion  and  interactioi 
United  States  and  other  nations  < 
judge  that  their  civil  and  crimina^ 
must  reach  conduct  abroad  that  \ 
substantial  and  direct  effects  on  ^ 
economies,  their  interests,  and  th 
citizens.  Needless  to  say,  one  nat 
assessment  of  its  legal  necessity ' 
runs  up  against  another  nation's 
tion  of  its  national  sovereignty. 

Problems  of  conflicting  jurisd 
can  take  many  forms.  Some  conf 
arise  from  relatively  routine  appl 
of  domestic  law  and  regulation  w 
not  mesh  with  other  countries'  piT 
Other  conflicts  arise  from  basic  cil 
of  national  policy— deeply  held  cd' 
tions,  expressed  in  either  domesto 
foreign  policy,  which  conflict  witlh 
views  of  other  countries.  Let  me  f 
both  kinds  of  cases.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Ell 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


ts  of  Procedure 

ir  countries,  expanding  bodies  of 
y  and  regulatory  law  may  impel 
fients  or  courts  to  attempt  to 
;yond  the  confines  of  the  na- 
irritory.  Our  Internal  Revenue 
for  example,  may  seek  docu- 
1  the  possession  of  an  enterprise 
n  order  to  enforce  the  proper 
n  of  taxable  income  among  af- 
;ompanies.  Our  Securities  and 
re  Commission  may  seek  the 
of  Swiss  bank  depositors 
:d  of  insider  trading  in  U.S. 
■s  markets.  Our  courts  may  at- 
I  serve  process  overseas  or  to 
inctions  to  the  failure  of  foreign 
IS  to  testify.  Our  laws  prohibit- 
jliance  with  foreign  economic 
against  friendly  countries  ap- 
statute— to  overseas  subsidiaries 
ican  companies. 

n  the  United  States  have  a  long 
;  experience  with  the  differing 
)0  states.  Perhaps  for  that 
'e  seem  to  be  more  comfortable 
tiple  claims  of  jurisdiction  and 
s  deferential  to  the  idea  of  ab- 
rritorial  sovereignty.  But  the 
tates  is  not  alone  in  applying  its 
reign  entities  or  transactions, 
mission  of  the  European  Com- 
(EC)  is  now  developing  a  series 
tions  which  would  affect  the 
IS  of  transnational  corporations, 
regulation— the  so-called 
J  proposal— would  require  sub- 
in  the  EC  to  disclose  to  their 
)loyees  certain  decisions  and  ac- 
he corporate  parent  abroad 
ve  direct  effects  on  those 
IS.  This  regulation  would  apply, 
pie,  to  investment  and  plant- 
ecisions.  In  another  area,  the 
1  Commission's  antitrust 
;s  are  considering  remedies  in  a 
ig  against  IBM  that  would  ra- 
il to  disclose  what  it  considers 
rets. 

the  Vredeling  and  the  IBM 
ents  have  a  large  potential  im- 
imerican  firms  and  their  opera- 
side  the  EC.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
'atching  them  closely.  Some,  of 
lay  savor  the  prospect  of 
1  discomfiture  at  other  coun- 
mpts  to  exert  an  extraterri- 
ch.  The  larger  lesson,  however, 
5  conditions  impelling  countries 
n  this  direction  are  universal, 
and  troublesome  for  all 

ips  the  classic  modern  area  of 
)f  jurisdiction  is  antitrust  law. 


The  United  Kingdom,  Australia,  and 
some  other  important  friendly  countries 
simply  do  not  accept  the  "effects  test"  as 
a  legitimate  basis  of  jurisdiction  to 
regulate  economic  conduct  under  inter- 
national law.  The  effects  test  was  initial- 
ly enunciated  in  Judge  Learned  Hand's 
1945  Alcoa  decision  and  is  the  first  step 
in  the  jurisdictional  analysis  performed 
by  Federal  courts  today.  It  applies  U.S. 
antitrust  law  to  conduct  abroad  having 
substantial,  direct,  and  foreseeable  ef- 
fects on  U.S.  domestic  or  foreign 
commerce. 

The  United  States  is  not  alone  in  its 
adherence  to  the  effects  test.  In  the 
Philip  Morris  case,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  has  claimed  jurisdiction  over 
a  multinational  merger  on  the  basis  of 


in  antitrust  litigation  have  no  such 
responsibility.  They  may  even  have  an 
incentive  to  maximize  the  detrimental 
effect  on  our  foreign  relations  in  order 
to  promote  a  favorable  settlement.  This 
has  led  some  foreign  governments  to 
criticize  private  treble-damage  actions  as 
"rogue  elephants." 

Conflicts  of  Policy 

The  problem  of  conflicts  of  jurisdiction  is 
heightened  where  there  is  a  conflict  of 
substantive  doctrine  as  well  as  com- 
peting procedural  claims.  Indeed,  anti- 
trust law  provides  several  examples  of 
significant  disputes  over  broad  public 
and  international  policy. 


Some  conflicts  arise  from  relatively  routine  ap- 
plications of  domestic  law  and  regulation  which  do 
not  mesh  with  other  countries'  practice.  Other  con- 
flicts arise  from  basic  clashes  of  national 
policy— deeply  held  convictions,  expressed  in  either 
domestic  or  foreign  policy,  which  conflict  with  the 
views  of  other  countries. 


effects— albeit  indirect— on  the  West 
German  market.  The  EC  Commission 
has  claimed  jurisdiction  to  investigate 
alleged  conspiratorial  conduct  in  the 
wood-pulp  industry — conduct  occurring 
outside  the  EC— on  the  basis  of  effects 
within  the  EC.  Ironically,  this  growing 
parallel  use  of  the  effects  test  only 
increases  the  inherent  potential  for  con- 
flict; it  raises  the  prospect  of  pro- 
liferating challenges  to  multinational 
enterprises  by  both  the  United  States 
and  the  European  Community. 

Particularly  acute  conflicts  have 
arisen  from  private  treble-damage  ac- 
tions brought  against  foreign  companies 
in  American  courts.  The  treble-damage 
remedy  was  designed  in  American  law 
to  bring  about  more  effective  antitrust 
enforcement,  encouraging  "private  at- 
torneys general"  by  use  of  a  financial  in- 
centive. Our  public  enforcement 
authorities— the  Antitrust  Di\nsion  of 
the  Justice  Department  and  the  Federal 
Trade  Commission— can  balance  a  broad 
range  of  public  interests  when  they 
make  enforcement  decisions  (though 
foreign  governments  may  still  be  un- 
happy with  the  outcome).  Private  parties 


With  only  limited  exceptions,  U.S. 
law  and  policy  reflect  our  belief  that  the 
marketplace  should  decide  what  price  to 
set  for  goods  and  services  and  which 
competitors  will  survive  the  cycles  of 
economic  fortune.  As  the  Supreme 
Court  said  in  the  Brown  Shoe  and 
Brunswick  cases,  antitrust  regulation  of 
the  marketplace  is  meant  "to  protect 
competition,  not  competitors."  By  con- 
trast, many  of  our  trading  partners 
favor— indeed,  often  encourage— the 
creation  of  cartels,  particularly  for  ex- 
port of  products  and  natural  resources. 
These  differing  views  over  the  role  of 
the  marketplace  were  manifested  in  the 
Swiss  Watchmakers  case. 

The  Swiss  Government,  starting  at 
least  in  1951,  authorized  and  encouraged 
the  formation  of  a  watch  export  cartel 
involving  both  Swiss  and  U.S.  com- 
panies. In  1962,  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Justice  challenged  the  cartel  under  the 
Sherman  Act  because  it  had  anticompet- 
itive effects  in  the  U.S.  market.  The 
U.S.  District  Court  subsequently  entered 
a  consent  decree  barring  the  challenged 
conduct. 

The  Swiss  Watchmakers  case 
demonstrates  that  where  an  activity  has 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


an  impact  on  two  or  more  jurisdictions, 
conflict  will  arise  if  they  are  pursuing 
contrary  policies.  And  the  mechanical 
application  of  the  principle  of  terri- 
toriality will  not  either  satisfactorily  or 
permanently  resolve  that  conflict. 

These  differing  conceptions  of  the 
international  order  bring  us  to  the  realm 
of  foreign  policy,  where  some  of  the 
most  dramatic  cases  of  conflicts  of  juris- 
diction have  occurred.  The  United  States 
has  resorted  to  economic  controls  in 
several  instances  as  an  instrument  of 
foreign  or  national  security  policy.  In 
the  case  of  our  export  controls  over 
trade  with  communist  countries,  there 
have  been  many  instances  of  disagree- 
ment with  our  trading  partners.  In  a 
famous  example  in  the  mid-1960s, 
French  President  de  Gaulle  reopened 
trade  relations  with  China  at  a  time 
when  U.S. -China  relations  were  still 
locked  in  bitter  hostility.  This  action 
quickly  found  its  way  into  court  in  the 
Freuhauf  case. 

In  1965,  the  United  States  attempted 
to  prevent  the  French  subsidiary  of 
Freuhauf,  an  American  manufacturer  of 
tractor  trailers,  from  selling  trailers  to 
China.  The  subsidiary  sought  relief  from 
a  French  court,  which  took  over  opera- 
tion of  the  subsidiary  and  appointed  a 
receiver  who  required  delivery  of  the 
trailers  to  China.  In  the  end,  the  terri- 
torial sovereign — in  this  case,  France — 
was  allowed  to  control  the  enterprise  at 
issue.  But  the  underlying  policy  conflict 
endured,  at  least  until  1971,  when  one  of 
the  jurisdictions  involved — that  is,  the 
United  States— began  to  harmonize  its 
China  policy  with  that  of  the  other. 

The  dispute  over  Polish  sanctions 
was  an  even  more  vivid  example  of  a 
legal  dispute  that  was  in  its  essence  a 
dispute  over  policy.  We  and  our  allies 
condemned  the  Soviet-backed  declara- 
tion of  martial  law  in  Poland  and  the 
suppression  of  human  rights.  To  signify 
that  "business  as  usual"  could  not  con- 
tinue with  those  who  oppressed  the 
Polish  people,  the  President  imposed 
economic  sanctions  against  the  Soviet 
and  Polish  Governments.  These  sanc- 
tions included,  inter  alia,  controls  over 
exports  of  oil  and  gas  equipment  and 
technology  to  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  President  imposed  the  sanctions 
under  the  Export  Administration  Act  of 
1979.  That  act  authorizes  controls  over 
goods  or  technology  "subject  to  the  juris- 
diction of  the  United  States  or  exported 
by  any  person  subject  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States"  where  necessary 
to  further  our  national  security  or 


foreign  policy  objectives.  Where  "na- 
tional security"  controls  are  involved, 
fewer  disputes  arise  between  the  United 
States  and  its  allies.  Goods  and 
technology  which  make  a  direct  and 
significant  contribution  to  Soviet 
military  potential  are  prohibited  by  all 
allied  countries.  When  the  controls  are 
imposed  on  "foreign  policy"  grounds, 
however— such  as  in  the  Polish  case- 
different  perspectives  are  more  likely  to 
exist. 

The  legal  dispute  with  our  allies  over 
Polish  sanctions  focused  on  the  Ameri- 
can effort  to  reach  conduct  abroad  and 
on  the  issue  of  sanctity  of  contracts.  The 
sanctions  announced  on  December  29, 
1981,  prohibited  exports  and  reexports 
of  oil  and  gas  equipment  and  technology 
to  the  Soviet  Union  regardless  of  pre- 
existing contractual  obligations;  the 
sanctions  extended  to  goods  of  U.S. 
origin  already  in  foreign  hands.  On 
June  18,  1982,  the  controls  were  ex- 
tended to  prohibit  the  export  by  foreign 
subsidiaries  of  wholly  foreign-made 
goods,  and  the  export  by  licensees  of 
foreign  products  incorporating  previous- 
ly obtained  U.S.  technology.  Our  allies 
objected  to  the  interruption  of  contracts 
already  signed.  They  further  objected  to 
the  so-called  "extraterritorial"  reach  of 
the  sanctions. 

American  parents  of  the  foreign  sub- 
sidiaries, such  as  Dresser  Industries, 
and  licensees  of  American  technology 
brought  numerous  administrative  pro- 
ceedings and  lawsuits  against  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Commerce.  In  response, 
this  government  took  the  same  position 
that  administration  after  administration 
and  Congress  after  Congress  have 
taken— namely,  that  the  relationship  be- 
tween a  parent  and  a  subsidiary,  or  the 
use  of  American  technology  by  a 
licensee,  justifies  the  assertion  of 
American  jurisdiction  when  substantial 
American  interests  are  involved. 

But  the  issue  was  not  resolved  in  the 
courts.  It  was  settled  by  diplomacy.  The 
underlying  dispute  was  on  the  broader 
question  of  economic  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  Events  in  Poland  demon- 
strated that  East- West  trade  has  not 
had  a  moderating  effect  on  Soviet 
behavior  as  some— in  the  United  States 
and  elsewhere  in  the  alliance— had 
thought  it  would. 

The  original  theory  of  East- West 
trade  was  that  the  Soviet  Union  would 
be  restrained  in  its  international 
behavior  for  fear  of  jeopardizing  its 
trade  with  the  West.  However,  depen- 
dence on  East- West  trade  may  have 


added  to  the  inhibitions  on  Weste 
responses  to  Soviet  misconduct. 

It  has  also  become  clear  since  | 
late  1970s  that  the  Soviet  Union  i 
ing  considerable  benefit  from  acci 
Western  high  technology,  both  fo 
military  application  and  for  upgra 
the  economic  base  which  supports 
Soviet  military  establishment. 

For  these  reasons,  the  Unitec 
States,  since  at  least  the  Ottawa 
of  1981,  had  questioned  the  wisdo 
providing  the  Soviets  with  advaru 
equipment— and  particularly  with' 
sidized  credits— to  construct  the  i 
gas  pipeline  from  Siberia  to  Wesl 
Europe.  Such  a  project  would  pn 
the  Soviets  with  foreign  exchang 
enhance  their  technological  capal 
and  create  what  we  viewed  as  an 
tunate  degree  of  dependence  on  i 
trade  with  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  dispute  over  the  Polish  s 
tions  highlighted  the  need  for  a  r 
sensus  within  the  alliance  on  Eas 
economic  relations.  Our  sanctions 
and  gas  equipment,  as  you  know, 
lifted  on  November  13,  1982.  On 
day  the  President  also  announcee  |i 
the  major  industrial  nations  of  th  II 
recognized  "the  necessity  of  cond  a 
their  relations  with  the  U.S.S.R.  I 
Eastern  Europe  on  the  basis  of  el 
and  comprehensive  policy  designi  | 
serve  their  common  fundamental  |! 
terests."  As  a  result,  a  consensus! 
reached  with  our  allies:  t 

First,  not  to  engage  in  trade  r 
rangements  which  contribute  to  l|i 
tary  or  strategic  advantage  of  tbii 
Union;  l> 

Second,  not  to  give  prefereni 
to  the  heavily  militarized  Soviet  li 
economy;  and  \' 

Third,  not  to  sign  any  new  nP 
gas  contracts  with  the  Soviet  Un:| 
pending  a  new  alliance  study  on  (fl 
alternatives.  I" 

We  also  agreed  to  strengther 
ing  controls  on  the  transfer  of  sti 
items  to  the  U.S.S.R.  and  to  exai 
whether  our  collective  security  re 
new  controls  on  certain  kinds  of  1 
technology  not  currently  controlli| 
eluding  oil  and  gas  equipment.  Ai| 
agreed  to  work  toward  harmoniziC 
export  credit  policies.  i. 

There  is  an  important  lesson  ? 
and,  indeed,  it  is  the  main  theme » 
to  put  before  you  tonight.  When  | 
disputes  over  jurisdiction  turn  ouf 
grounded  in  disputes  over  policy,  < 
most  effective  solution  is  a  major ' 
to  harmonize  our  policies.  This  m 


Department  of  State  B ' 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


;he  legal  disputes  go  away,  but  it 
rely  make  them  less  divisive.  The 
ratic  nations  have  an  even  deeper 
,t  in  resolving  these  policy  con- 
not  only  to  make  lawyers'  lives 
but  to  preserve  the  political  unity 
Western  alliance.  And  that 
;  is,  without  exaggeration,  the 
tion  of  the  legal,  economic,  and 
il  system  of  the  democratic  West, 
the  coming  decades,  the  problem 
itaining  allied  cohesion  over 
1  policy  will  not  necessarily  be- 
asier.  In  the  early  years  of  the 
r  period,  American  power  was  so 
derant  within  the  alliance  that 
iscriptions  often  received  ready 
mce  from  allies  weakened  by  the 
d  dependent  on  American 
lie  aid  and  military  protection, 
our  allies  are  strong,  self- 
nt,  and  independent  minded, 
lity  will  hardly  be  automatic.  The 
States  still  has  the  responsibility 
i  its  convictions,  and  act  on  them, 
ters  of  vital  importance  to  free 
ecurity.  Harmonizing  policies  will 
determined  effort  on  the  part  of 


es  for  the  Future 

ited  States  is  prepared  to  do  its 
finding  cooperative  solutions  to 
olems  I  have  discussed.  We  are 
d  to  be  responsive  to  the  con- 
'  others.  If  our  allies  join  with  us 
ame  spirit,  much  can  be  done. 

5t  of  all,  the  United  States  will 
i  to  seek  to  resolve  the  policy  dif- 
5  that  underlie  many  of  these 
3  of  jurisdiction.  Thus,  for  exam- 
will  work  with  our  allies  toward 
I  of  a  new  consensus  on  the  im- 
strategic  issue  of  East- West 

Ond,  the  United  States  can  seek 
nize  conflicts  by  shaping  and  ap- 
ppropriate  guidelines  to  govern 
ns  of  authority  over  conduct 
ivhere  those  assertions  conflict 
eign  law.  The  American  Law  In- 
5  now  considering  a  third  draft 
nent  of  Foreign  Relations  Law. 
ft  now  gives  a  prominent  place 
alancing  of  competing  state  in- 
n  determining  the  existence  of 
ion  over  foreign  conduct.  We  in 
artment  of  State  are  not  alto- 
atisfied  with  making  a  balancing 
prerequisite  to  the  existence  of 
ion.  As  a  practical  matter,  how- 
;areful  weighing  of  the  interests 


of  the  states  concerned  is  obviously  a 
useful  procedure  and  a  deterrent  to  un- 
warranted conflicts.  We  welcome  the 
Federal  courts'  use  of  a  general  balanc- 
ing analysis  in  private  cases  like  Timber- 
lane.  Mannington  Mills,  and  Mitsui. 
Balancing  can  certainly  help  to  ensure 
that  decisions  affecting  significant 
foreign  concerns  are  not  taken  lightly. 
Third,  the  United  States  is  making 
clear  its  intention  to  avoid  further  prob- 
lems of  retroactive  application  of  eco- 
nomic controls.  We  know  that  the 
reliability  of  contracts  is  essential  to  the 
health  and  growth  of  commerce.  Last 
week  the  President  transmitted  to  Con- 
gress legislation  to  amend  and  extend 
the  Export  Administration  Act  of  1979. 
The  Administration  bill  strengthens  the 
national  security  export  controls  and 
their  enforcement  while  at  the  same 
time  easing  some  of  the  problems  we 
have  had  in  the  past  over  foreign  policy 
controls. 

•  The  bill  declares  explicitly  that  "it 
is  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  when 
imposing  new  foreign  policy  controls,  to 
minimize  the  impact  on  pre-existing  con- 
tracts and  on  business  activities  in  allied 
or  other  friendly  countries  to  the  extent 
consistent  with  the  underlying  purpose 
of  the  controls." 

•  The  bill  also  explicitly  recognizes 
the  sanctity  of  contracts  as  a  limitation 
which  will  insulate  many  existing  con- 
tracts from  disruption  by  new  foreign 
policy  export  controls.  Specifically,  the 
bill  protects  existing  sales  contracts  that 
require  delivery  within  270  days  from 
the  imposition  of  controls,  unless  the 
President  determines  that  a  prohibition 
of  such  exports  is  required  by  the  "over- 
riding national  interest"  of  the  United 
States. 

•  To  strengthen  enforcement  of  the 
national  security  export  controls,  the  bill 
authorizes  restrictions  on  future  imports 
into  the  United  States  of  goods  or  tech- 
nology from  persons  abroad  who  violate 
these  controls.  Controls  on  imports  into 
the  United  States  by  particular  foreign 
violators  are  obviously  territorial  and, 
therefore,  are  clearly  within  our  juris- 
diction under  international  law. 

Fourth,  the  Administration  is  seek- 
ing other  legislative  changes  that  will  in- 
directly, but  we  hope  effectively,  reduce 
the  significance  of  conflicts  of  juris- 
diction. The  Justice  Department,  for  ex- 
ample, has  recently  proposed  amend- 
ments to  the  Cla>ton  Antitrust  Act  to 
allow  treble  damages  only  in  cases  of 


per  se  violations.  While  these  amend- 
ments would  continue  to  permit  treble- 
damage  suits  in  cases  of  cartelization, 
they  would  reduce  friction  concerning 
U.S.  policy  in  such  areas  as  regulation  of 
vertical  relationships,  including  sup- 
plier/purchaser relationships. 

Fifth,  the  Departments  of  State  and 
Justice  are  considering  further  statutory 
proposals  to  address  problems  arising  in 
the  international  context  from  private 
treble-damage  actions.  I  do  not  mean  to 
criticize  any  particular  past  cases  or  to 
suggest  any  outcome  for  any  cases  now 
before  the  courts.  Nevertheless,  we  are 
exploring  ways  of  ensuring  that  private 
antitrust  cases  posing  conflicts  of  juris- 
diction are,  indeed,  consonant  with  the 
overall  public  interest.  The  Attorney 
General's  actions  in  this  area  are  in- 
formed by  considerations  of  interna- 
tional comity  and  balancing.  When 
private  attorneys  general  act,  similar 
considerations  should  be  applied. 

Sixth,  we  are  seeking  to  expand  the 
practice  of  prior  notice,  consultation, 
and  cooperation  with  foreign  govern- 
ments wherever  regulatory,  enforce- 
ment, or  investigative  actions  raise  a 
danger  of  conflicts.  The  Antitrust  Divi- 
sion and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission 
have  pioneered  in  the  practice  of 
routinely  providing  advance  notice  to 
other  governments  of  their  actions 
affecting  foreign  parties.  We  are  eager 
to  conclude  agreements  to  expedite  the 
exchange  of  investigatory  information, 
particularly  to  combat  tax  evasion.  We 
believe  that  some  international  disputes 
can  be  avoided  or  eased  by  this  means. 
Seventh,  in  a  related  vein,  we  will 
be  seeking  procedures  whereby 
regulatory,  investigatory,  or  enforce- 
ment actions  that  substantially  involve 
other  countries'  interests  will  be  coordi- 
nated with  the  Department  of  State. 
The  State  Department  can  advise  about 
foreign  concerns,  suggest  procedures  for 
notice  to  and  consultation  with  foreign 
governments,  and  otherwise  help  agen- 
cies do  their  job  without  unnecessary 
collisions  with  other  governments. 

In  some  cases,  as  in  our  relations 
with  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Com- 
mission, this  kind  of  arrangement  is 
working  well.  In  other  situations,  im- 
provement is  needed.  We,  therefore,  will 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


be  calling  on  the  agencies  concerned  to 
work  with  us  and  give  us  prior  notice  of 
actions  which  pose  a  potential  problem 
of  conflicts  of  jurisdiction. 

The  Need  for  Cooperation 

These  measures  will  not  eliminate  the 
problem  of  conflicts  of  jurisdiction.  But 
the  United  States  is  eager  to  do  what  it 
can  to  minimize  such  problems  in  the 
future.  We  value  our  relations  with  our 
partners. 

Any  one  of  our  countries  may,  on 
some  occasion  in  the  future,  feel  that  its 
national  interest  or  public  policy  cannot 
be  served  without  an  assertion  of  juris- 
diction which  leads  to  a  disagreement 
with  its  partners.  The  complexity  of  the 
modern  interdependent  world,  and  the 


reality  of  greater  equality  among  the 
major  industrial  nations,  make  these  oc- 
currences almost  inevitable. 

The  problem  is  ripe  for  creative 
legal  thinking.  It  also  calls  for  states- 
manship to  ensure  that  the  fundamental 
political  and  moral  unity  of  the  democ- 
racies is  not  torn  by  disputes  over 
policy.  All  of  the  industrial  democracies 
face  the  same  larger  responsibility:  How 
do  we  reconcile  our  sovereign  indepen- 
dence as  nations  with  the  imperative  of 
our  unity  as  allies?  How  do  we  balance 
our  interest  in  expanding  trade  and  jobs 
and  prosperity  with  our  interest  in  not 
contributing  to  the  growth  of  Soviet 
power?  Once  again  the  great  enterprise 
of  the  law  touches  upon  some  of  the 
most  profound  questions  of  our  national 
and  international  life.  ■ 


U.S.  Foreign  Relations  Law 
and  Expropriation 


Davis  R.  Robinson,  the  Legal  Ad- 
viser, wrote  the  following  letter  to  Pro- 
fessor Louis  Henkin,  the  Reporter  for  the 
American  Law  Institute's  (ALI)  draft 
Restatement  (Revised)  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  Law  of  the  United  States.  The 
letter  comments  upon  the  text  and  com- 
mentary to  Section  712  of  tentative  draft 
no.  3  of  the  proposed  revision  of  the 
Restatement.  That  section  deals  with  the 
standards  of  compensation  for  the  ex- 
propriation of  property  owned  by 
aliens. ' 

April  14,  1983 

Professor  Louis  Henkin 
Columbia  University  Law  School 
43.5  West  116th  Street 
New  York.  New  York  10027 

Dear  Professor  Henkin: 

After  the  ALI  annual  meeting  last  year,  I 
agreed  to  provide  you  with  a  detailed  state- 
ment of  our  position  with  regard  to  the  draft 
Restatement  language  on  expropriation.  The 
first  attachment  to  this  letter  sets  forth  a 
paragraph-by-paragraph  discussion  of  the 
comments  to  draft  section  712,  together  with 
an  alternative  text  which,  in  my  view,  would 
better  restate  both  the  foreign  relations  law 
of  the  United  States  and  the  applicable  rules 
of  international  law.  Portions  of  that  attach- 
ment also  address  related  questions.  I  have 
not  attempted  to  provide  a  detailed  alter- 
native draft  of  the  Reporters'  Notes,  but  the 
information  supplied  here  and  in  the  at- 
tachments may  be  of  assistance  in  that 
regard. 

Although  the  underlying  issues  are 
discussed  in  detail  in  the  attached  critique,  I 


believe  that  it  would  be  useful  briefly  to 
review  the  basis  upon  which  we  suggest 
alternative  language  and  our  reasons  for  con- 
cluding that  the  current  draft  does  not  fully 
reflect  international  law.  Restatement  t2dt 
maintained  in  its  black-letter  text  that  "just" 
compensation  is  required  (§185)  and  defined 
this  in  terms  equivalent  to  "prompt,  ade- 
quate, and  effective"  (§187).  The  new  draft 
retains  the  first  portion  of  the  formulation, 
but  relegates  its  definition  to  a  Comment, 
where  it  is  described,  not  as  a  rule  of  law, 
but  as  a  United  States  position.  While  the 
draft  does  not  reject  the  existing  rule,  and 
suggests  no  alternative  to  replace  it,  it 
creates  uncertainty  about  the  tenor  of  the  ap- 
plicable law,  especially  in  the  formulation  of 
its  comments  and  notes.  To  the  contrary,  in 
our  view,  events  since  the  adoption  of 
Restatement  (2d)  have  reinforced  the  defini- 
tion of  required  compensation  set  forth  there, 
both  as  a  rule  of  the  foreign  relations  law  of 
this  country  and  as  a  generally  applicable 
rule  of  international  law. 

The  United  States  Government  has  con- 
sistently maintained  that  citizens  whose  prop- 
erty is  expropriated  by  foreign  governments 
are  entitled  to  "prompt,  adequate,  and  effec- 
tive" compensation.  There  has  been  no  devia- 
tion from  this  principal  in  United  States  prac- 
tice in  decades.  Our  adherence  to  it  has  con- 
tinued regardless  of  the  administration  in 
power.  All  three  branches  of  government — 
executive,  legislative,  and  judicial — have 
taken  a  similar  stand,  to  the  ex-tent  that  they 
have  expressed  themselves  on  the  issue. 
When  Congress  has  approached  this  question, 
it  has  applied  the  traditional  standard,  not 
only  in  the  so-called  Hickenlooper  Amend- 
ments to  the  Foreign  Assistance  Act  of  1961 
(22  U.S.C.  §2370(eKl)  and  (eX2)).  but  in  other 
legislation  involving  U.S.  participation  in 


multilateral  development  banks,  as  we 
e.q..  22  U.S.C.  §§283r,  284j,  290g-8,  a 
U.S.C.  §2462(bK4KD),  The  executive  b 
agencies  responsible  for  the  applicatioi 
those  statutes  have  consistently  applie 
standard.  This  Department  has  mainta 
that  principle  in  its  presentation  and  e 
of  claims.  To  the  extent  that  the  court 
United  States  have  adjudicated  such  c; 
when  they  come  within  an  exception  h 
Act  of  State  Doctrine,  the  results  thej 
reached  are  likewise  consistent  with  tl 
traditional  standard.  On  this  basis,  we 
elude  that  United  States  law  on  this  q 
is  well  established  and  unambiguous. 

The  continued  validity  of  the  tradi 
standard  is  equally  clear  as  a  matter  c 
general  international  law.  The  rhetori( 
feet  of  non-binding  resolutions  of  the  ' 
Nations  General  Assembly,  adopted  b; 
jority  of  newly  emergent  states,  withe 
support  of  the  countries  which  are  hoi 
to  most  of  the  foreign  investment  and 
source  for  virtually  all  of  it,  in  no  wa> 
the  general  international  legal  standai 
"prompt,  adequate,  and  effective"  coir 
tion  is  required  in  case  of  expropriate 
No  new  standard  has  achieved  the 
consensus  necessary  for  the  establish* 
a  new  norm  of  international  law  or  thi 
displacement  of  an  old  rule.  The  presd 
draft,  like  the  Restatement  (2d),  recogj 
the  historic  status  of  the  "prompt,  ad^ 
and  effective"  standard  as  the  "tradit: 
rule  of  international  law.  Applying  th 
of  recognition  of  new  standards  of  int 
tional  law  of  section  102(2)  of  your  dn 
none  of  the  proffered  alternatives  has 
achieved  that  degree  of  widespread  ai 
sistent  support  by  state  practice  nece 
for  its  recognition  as  a  new  rule  of  ge 
international  law.  Nor  has  such  wides 
and  consistent  support  for  the  negati( 
traditional  rule  been  established.  The 
seems  to  suggest  that  a  few  states,  b; 
ing  to  a  recognized  rule  of  internatior 
may  displace  it  without  meeting  the  s 
ards  for  creation  of  a  new  rule.  If  this 
case,  there  can  be  no  enduring  intern; 
law,  only  temporary  common  interest 
The  heavy  reliance  of  the  draft  or 
non-binding  declarations  and  resolutic 
the  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
context  is  particularly  troublesome.  A 
ment  2  addresses  this  question  in  mo) 
The  General  Assembly  is  not  a  legisla 
organ  and  its  declarations  are  not  int< 
tional  legislation  in  this  context.  The : 
most  of  the  resolutions  in  question  we 
adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  ove 
dissent  of  a  significant  number  of  sta' 
substantial  interests  demonstrates  th( 
absence  of  the  necessary  widespread 
sistent  practice.  Even  those  resolutioi 
were  adopted  without  vote,  which  ha' 
received  acceptance  through  state  pR 
have  little  claim  to  credence  as  true  d 
tions  of  international  law.  As  the  dist 
guished  arbitrator  in  the  Topco  case ) 
nized,  these  resolutions  are  essentiall* 
political  declarations,  lacking  the  juri:" 
tial  support  necessary  for  them  to  bei  * 
part  of  the  body  of  international  law.  J 


Department  of  State  E*; 


INTERVIEW 


W  the  same  developing  nations  which 
led  these  declarations  as  political 
ents  have,  in  their  actual  practice, 
bilateral  investment  treaties  reaffirm- 
Lr  support  for  the  traditional  standard 
ral  rule.  (See  Attachment  4.) 
p  emphasis  in  the  establishment  of  new 
^ry  law  should  be  on  actual  state  prac- 
It  the  rhetorical  posturing  of  debate, 
pects  of  that  practice  illustrate  the 
iing  vitality  of  the  traditional  standard 
ipensation:  treaty  practice  and  arbitral 

!  state  practice  establishing  a  network 
tnational  treaties  is  discussed  in  At- 
nts  3  and  4.  As  you  are  aware,  provi- 
introlling  compensation  in  expropria- 
■e  contained  in  many  bilateral  Friend- 
jmmerce,  and  Navigation  (FCN) 
.  In  the  case  of  the  United  States, 
f  these  are  with  developing  nations,  as 
with  developed  nations.  These  treaties 
provisions  calling  for  compensation  in 
quivalent  to  the  traditional  standard, 
1  there  are  slight  drafting  variations, 
aent  3  sets  forth  the  relevant  texts. 
;ory  of  these  agreements  indicates 
parties  recognized  that  they  were 
making  explicit  in  the  treaty 
e  the  customary  rule  of  international 
reaffirming  its  effect, 
nore  recent  significance  is  the 
ice  of  a  new  type  of  treaty,  the 
I  Investment  Treaty  (BIT).  European 
in  particular,  have  negotiated  a 
of  these  treaties  with  developing  na- 
rtachment  4  contains  a  summary  of 
m  150  of  these  treaties  and  of  their 
jation  provisions.  These  treaties 
ctual  state  practice  applying  the  ap- 
j  international  standard  for  compen- 
'hey  reinforce  the  traditional  stand- 
United  States  is  itself  a  participant 
lateral  Investment  Treaty  process, 
negotiation  of  such  treaties, 
,  commenced  only  in  late  1981;  two 
n  signed,  with  Panama  and  Egypt. 
them  contains  a  rule  for  compensa- 
■istent  with  the  traditional  standard 
e  draft  Restatement  questions. 
Ily,  international  arbitral  awards 
the  application  of  the  traditional 
as  the  governing  rule  of  general  in- 
lal  law.  Distinguished  international 

have  examined  expropriation  and 
isues  carefully.  Although  the 
formulation  varies,  in  result  they 
icted  attempts  to  dilute  the  protec- 
h  international  law  affords  to  all. 
ibsence  of  a  clear  reaffirmation  of 
standard  in  the  new  draft  is  also 
to  broad  international  policy  objec- 
ere  is  now  an  increasing  recognition 
portance  of  private  equity  flows  to 
ig  countries  as  an  essential  part  of 
elopment.  Private  equity  is  par- 
important  at  the  present  moment 
are  severe  limits  on  public  and 
inds  to  support  such  development, 
adhere  to  a  clear  standard  will  sti- 


fle such  investment  by  increasing  the  risk 
associated  with  it,  with  the  result  either  of 
reducing  its  flow  or  of  increasing  the  needed 
rate  of  earnings  to  cover  the  added  risk. 
Neither  is  a  desirable  outcome. 

The  retreat  from  the  recognized  stand- 
ards of  international  law  in  the  draft  Restate- 
ment Revised  is  thus  inconsistent  with  the 
policy  as  well  as  with  the  law  of  the  United 
States.  I  am  writing  on  behalf  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  to  confirm  that  in  our  view  a 
sufficient  case  has  not  been  made  to 
recognize  such  a  change  as  a  matter  of  law 


nor  would  any  such  change  be  desirable  as  a 
matter  of  policy.  Indeed,  we  believe  that  the 
experience  of  recent  years  generally  supports 
the  traditional  standard  rather  than  calling  it 
into  question. 

Sincerely  yours, 

Davi.s  R.  Robinson 


'The  attachments  referred  to  in  this  let- 
ter are  available  from  the  Office  of  the  Legal 
Adviser,  Department  of  State,  Washington, 


Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's 
Interview  on  "Face  the  Nation" 


Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs 
Lawrence  S.  Eagleburger  was  inter- 
viewed on  CBS-TV's  "Face  the  Nation" 
on  May  1,  1983.  by  George  Herman,  CBS 
News  and  moderator;  Henry  Trewhitt, 
the.  Baltimore  Sun,-  and  Bill  McLaughlin. 
CBS  News. 

Q.  All  of  the  reports  that  we  see  in- 
dicate more  and  more  Soviet  advisers 
not  only  in  Syria  but  in  the  Syrian- 
occupied  parts  of  Lebanon.  What  is 
this  Soviet  goal,  do  you  think?  What  is 
their  intention  in  putting  so  many  of 
their  people  in  these  advanced  areas 
where  there  is  beginning  to  be  a  little 
danger;  isn't  there? 

A.  I  think  there  is  a  great  deal  of 
danger  involved  in  what  the  Soviets  are 
doing  now.  It's  much  harder  to  give  you 
a  sensible  explanation  of  what  they  are 
doing.  I  think  probably  the  best  explana- 
tion is  that  the  Soviets  realize  that  as  a 
result  of  the  Israeli  attacks  on  the 
Syrians  during  the  Lebanon  war,  the 
Syrians  really  took  a  clobbering  and  that 
this  reflected  very  badly  on  Soviet  sup- 
plies, Soviet  military  equipment,  and,  in- 
deed, on  the  Syrians  as  a  surrogate  of 
the  Soviets.  I  suspect  that  what  has  hap- 
pened now  is  that,  at  least  in  part,  the 
Soviets  have  decided  that  what  they 
have  to  do  is  provide  sufficient  equip- 
ment to  demonstrate  to  the  Syrians  and 
to  the  other  Arab  states,  and  particular- 
ly to  the  radical  Arab  states,  that  the 
Soviets  still  are  players  in  the  Middle 
East.  So  I  suspect  that  that's  the  basic 
reason  for  it. 

There  may  be  something  far  more 
devious  involved  here,  but  whether  there 
is  another  intention  or  not,  I  think  the 
fact  of  the  matter  is,  that  with  the 
Soviets  putting  all  of  these  men  and 


equipment  into  the  Middle  East,  and 
particularly  into  Syria,  they  create  real 
dangers  of  an  escalation  which  could 
become  a  serious  confrontation  between 
East  and  West.  It's  a  very,  very  unwise 
step,  in  my  view. 

Q.  In  your  first  answer,  talking 
about  what  the  Russians  are  doing  in 
arming  the  Syrians  and  so  forth,  I 
guess  as  Perry  Mason  would  say,  you 
opened  the  door.  You  said  there  may 
be  something  far  more  devious  here. 
Since  you  opened  this  line  of  specula- 
tion, would  you  please  dilate  upon  it? 

A.  My  point,  I  guess,  would  be  that 
whether  the  question,  to  some  degree, 
has  to  be  whether  there  is  more  to  the 
Soviet  deployment  in  Syria,  particularly 
of  the  SAMs  [surface-to-air  missiles], 
than  sort  of  the  response  I  originally 
suggested.  My  own  judgment  is  that  it  is 
basically  as  I  suggested  to  you,  but  I 
suppose  that  you  have  to  ask  at  the 
same  time  whether  the  Soviets  intend 
some  major  increase  in  their  presence  in 
the  Middle  East;  whether  they  intend 
this  as  an  effort  to  block  movement 
toward  the  peace  settlement  in  the  Mid- 
dle East.  It's  that  sort  of  thing  that  you 
have  to  at  least  consider.  Don't  get  me 
wrong.  I'm  not  saying  that  I  think  the 
Soviets  are  about  to  deploy  in  massive 
numbers.  I  think  they  have  a  sufficient 
number  now  that  we  have  to  be  con- 
cerned, because  obviously  in  that  area 
conflict  is  always  possible,  and  here  are 
Soviet  troops  in  the  middle  of  an  area 
where,  in  fact,  there  may  be  shooting. 
So  we  have  to  worry  about  that. 
Whether  there  is  anything  far  more 
devious,  some  great  strategic  plan  of 


INTERVIEW 


major  Soviet  involvement  in  the  Middle 
East  or  not,  I  can't  say.  I,  myself,  doubt 
it. 

Q.  Doesn't  it  follow  automatically, 
however,  that  the  Soviets,  in  fact, 
have  dealt  themselves  back  into  the 
decisionmaking  process  in  the  Middle 
East,  whether  it  was  by  accident, 
design,  or  whatever?  You  must  take 
them  into  consideration  in  a  way  you 
have  not  in  the  past. 

A.  They  have  always  been  a  factor 
in  the  Middle  East  and  in  the  Middle 
East  settlement.  Nobody  argues  that. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  also  has  been, 
however,  that  the  Soviets  were  in  no 
position  to  deliver  anybody  to  the  peace 
table.  The  view  has  always  been,  and  I 
think  rightly,  that  it  is  the  United 
States,  and  the  United  States  alone,  of 
the  superpowers  that  has  any  ability  to 
bring  the  various  parties  together  at  the 
table.  I  think  that  is  still  true. 

I  wouldn't  argue  with  you  at  all  that 
the  Soviets,  particularly  with  these 
latest  deployments,  become  a  greater 
factor  in  the  Middle  East.  I'm  afraid 
that  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  though,  to 
the  degree  they  are  a  greater  factor,  it 
is  a  negative  factor  and  not  one  that 
leads  toward  bringing  about  a  peace  set- 
tlement. With  all  of  that  said,  I  am  still 
absolutely  convinced  that  the  United 
States,  working  with  the  moderate 
Arabs,  and  the  Israelis,  can  bring  about 
a  peace  settlement,  with  or  without  the 
degree  of  Soviet  involvement  that  we 
now  see  in  Syria. 

Q.  You  went  to  Beirut  shortly 
after  the  tragedy  there,  the  terrific 
loss  of  life  at  our  Embassy  in  Beirut. 
A  senior  Israeli  Defense  Ministry  of- 
ficial has  charged  that  the  Syrians  and 
the  Soviet  Union  were  behind  the 
bombing  of  the  embassy.  What  do  you 
know  about  who  did  it? 

A.  What  we  know— and  I  em- 
phasize the  word  "know" — is  virtually 
nothing.  We  have  a  number  of  intel- 
ligence reports,  but  they  tend  to  con- 
tradict each  other.  My  own  personal 
view  is  that  probably  it's  almost  certain 
that  it  was  an  extremist  group.  Whether 
it  was  linked  with  Iran,  or  with  the 
Syrians,  at  this  point  we  can't  say,  and 
I'm  not  at  all  sure  that  we'll  ever  really 
know,  but  the  intelligence  at  this  point  is 
mixed,  at  best. 

Q.  What  do  we  know,  if  anything, 
about  the  rockets  fired  at  the  building 
wherein  Secretary  Shultz  was  staying? 

A.  I  hate  to  burst  your  balloon,  but 
I  talked  to  the  party  in  Jerusalem  this 
morning,  and  I  gather  that  that  is  a 


grossly  exaggerated  story,  that,  in  fact, 
there  were  no  rockets  fired  at  the 
residence.  The  Secretary  did  hear  some 
noise.  There  were  apparently  a  couple  of 
explosions.  They  were  some  distance 
away,  and  they  were  related  to  some 
battling  that  was  going  on  between 
various  Lebanese  groups  and  were  not 
aimed  at  the  Secretary  himself. 

Q.  So  the  Secretary  is  safe,  but 
will  we  need  tougher  security  for  our 
diplomats  in  Lebanon? 

A.  I'm  glad  you  asked  me  the  ques- 
tion. I  suppose  the  answer,  in  the 
abstract,  is  yes.  Unfortunately,  for  ex- 
ample, events  such  as  Beirut  tend  to  be 
catching.  It's  sort  of  like  the  cyanide  in 
pills  in  the  United  States.  One  group 
does  this,  and  then  somebody  else  thinks 
it's  a  good  idea. 

But  the  point  I  think  must  be 
remembered,  with  all  of  that  recogni- 
tion, that  we've  got  to  do  the  best  we 
can  in  terms  of  security  is  that  an 
American  Embassy  is  in  the  country  to 
do  business  with  the  people  of  the 
government  of  that  country,  and  we  can- 
not become  a  fortress.  We  can't  hide 
behind  steel  doors.  If  we  do,  we  might 
as  well  not  be  there.  So  under  any  cir- 
cumstances, there  are  always  going  to 
be  risks,  and  those  are  risks  that  the 
Foreign  Service,  the  CIA,  the  military, 
all  of  the  people  who  are  in  an  embassy 
have  long  since  decided  we  have  to  take. 

Q.  But  we  can  minimize  those 
risks. 

A.  We  can  reduce  it. 

Q.  How  will  we  do  that? 

A.  It  depends,  again,  very  much  on 
the  physical  circumstances  of  any  par- 
ticular embassy.  In  the  Beirut  case,  my 
own  judgment,  after  having  seen  the 
place,  is  that  unless  you  were  to  stop 
egress  virtually  completely,  there  was  no 
way  to  protect  that  building  against  the 
sort  of  attack  that  took  place.  We  will 
hopefully  now  build  a  new  embassy:  I'm 
sure  we  will  build  a  new  embassy  in 
Lebanon.  We  will  try  to  build  it  in  a 
position  that  there  is  more  land  and  so 
forth  around  it  so  that  it's  harder  to  get 
at  it,  but  at  the  same  time,  it's  going  to 
have  to  be  an  embassy  that  people  can 
come  into  and  go  out  of.  It  depends  very 
much  on  the  physical  circumstances  of 
each  embassy,  and  there  is  no  simple 
way  to  give  you  a  general  answer  to  the 
question. 

Q.  Shouldn't  we  move  out  of  that 
one?  I  mean,  it's  right  by  the  sea- 
shore. It's  right  by— 

A.  Move  out  of  which  one? 


Q.  The  ruined  embassy. 

A.  There  is  no  question.  I  thir 
again,  myself,  although  I'm  not  an 
engineer,  having  looked  at  that  bu 
we  can  never  use  it  again. 

Q.  Isn't  there  a  danger  that 
Secretary  of  State  is  going  to  co 
out  of  there,  essentially,  with 
nothing?  Isn't  this  a  terribly  hig 
undertaking  for  him?  Isn't  there 
danger  that  he's  going  to  appear 
ghost  of  Henry  Kissinger,  wandi 
through  the  Middle  East  forevei 

A.  Again,  being  Secretary  of 
is,  I  suppose,  partly  a  high-risk  bu 
and  I  don't  mean  that  facetiously 
mean  it  in  the  sense  that  I  can't 
guarantee  that  he's  going  to  come 
with  a  settlement.  I  can  tell  you  t 
was  our  judgment  that  now  was  t 
time  for  him  to  go  to  the  Middle  1 
that  a  failure  to  go  now  would  ha 
to  a  deterioration  in  the  situation 
the  negotiations  between  the  part 
and  that  this  was  the  time  in  whic 
Secretary  had  to  involve  himself  i 
United  States  directly,  a  step  bey 
Phil  Habib  [Ambassador  Philip  C. 
special  representative  of  the  Pres 
to  the  Middle  East],  in  trying  to  1: 
about  a  settlement,  but  I  can't  gu 
that  a  settlement  will  take  place, 
only  tell  you  that  our  judgment  w 
was  the  time  to  try,  and  if  he  can 
it,  we'll  try  again. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  there  arei 
costs  involved  in— 

A.  Oh,  sure  there  are.  There 
costs  in  attempting  and  failing.  E 
there  are  costs  in  not  attempting 
That's  life,  and  it's  a  situation  thai 
Secretary  looked  at  carefully  andi 
cided  he  had  to  try. 

Q.  One  other  place  where  s(f 
people  seem  to  think  that  the  U* 
States  has  put  itself  out  on  a  lir, 
that  the  President  and  the  Adm  i 
tion  have  put  themselves  out  on 
limb,  with  not  too  great  a  chant  J 
being  able  to  climb  back  off  it,  ^1 
that  is.  of  course.  Central  Amen 
propping  up  the  El  Salvador  Go  ' 
ment.  Are  we  risking  a  lot  then^ 
small  chance  of  success,  modera, 
chance  of  success? 

A.  If  there  is  the  will  in  the  -'' 
can  people  and  in  the  Congre.-;-,  1 
there  is  a  chance— a  real  chame- 
success.  Not  immediately— 

Q.  Not  the  question  of  vvhel ' 
the  will  is  in  the  Salvadoran  pe(< 

A.  Let  me  take  a  crack  at  th  '1 
think  there  is  not  a  choice,  but  a  •' 
tion  of  American  will,  and,  clear!;* 


Department  of  State  Ej' 


INTERVIEW 


3  a  question  of  Salvadoran  will, 
a  sense,  if  I  may,  I  think  you've 
;he  question  the  wrong  way.  I 
link  we  have  any  choice,  frankly, 
illy,  but  to  do  what  we  can  with 
to  El  Salvador  and  Central 
a  in  general.  It  is  strategically 
important  to  us  to  permit  it 
to  continue  to  deteriorate.  My 
fument  would  be  that,  in  fact, 
gard  to  the  social,  political,  and 
ic  situation  in  El  Salvador,  there 
en  some  major  changes.  We're 
sfied  that  it  has  gone  far  enough, 
re  have  been  major  changes,  and 
that  those  changes  will  continue, 
y  are  for  the  better. 

question,  I  think,  we  fail  to  look 
'ully  is  that  we  only  have,  I  think, 
ices.  We  have  either  to  move 
;o  try  to  protect  the  Salvadorans. 
im  sufficient  military  assistance, 
s  the  President  said,  as  a  shield 
ley  go  about  with  our  assistance 

encouragement,  trying  to  build 
:ratic  and  economically  viable 
or  you  get  another  Nicaragua, 
ink  those  are  the  only  two 

I  think  it's  time  we  spent  a  good 
!  time  looking  at  Nicaragua, 

that's  the  alternative.  There 
le  middle  ground.  The 
aans  have  made  it  clear  that 
;y  are  looking  for  is  the  export 
revolution,  and  in  El  Salvador 

only  two  choices,  and  I  think 
e  the  two. 

.gain,  the  question  of  risk.  Is 
danger  that  in  trying  to  shape 
ratio  movement  in  Nicaragua 

wind  up  with  a  return  of  the 
ta  government?  Are  you  put- 
r  overwhelming  emphasis  on 
Somocista  forces? 
want  to  hasten  to  make  the 
it  that  is  largely  a  choice  for  the 
ian  people  to  make.  Let  me 
th  that.  I  don't  think  anybody  in 
aa  wants  the  return  of  the 
type  government.  Nobody  does. 
"  the  matter  is  that  a  number 
who  were  with  the  Sandinistas 
volution  itself  have  now  left  the 
ent  and  are  in  opposition  to  it. 
of  the  matter  is  that  to  the 
lere  is  upset,  disquiet  within 

it  is  because  of  the 
an  Government's  policies.  We 

don't  want  to  see  a  return  to  a 
.ype  government.  As  the  Presi- 

in  his  speech  this  last  week, 
3t  seeking  the  overthrow  of  the 
an  Government.  WTiat  we  are 

do  is  assure  that  the  export  of 

revolution  from  Nicaragua  to 


its  neighbors  is  prevented.  That's  our 
purpose:  not  to  overthrow  the  govern- 
ment in  Nicaragua  itself. 

Q.  You  began  your  career,  or  early 
on  in  your  career  you  were  an  expert 
on  Cuba.  A  Senate  committee,  down  in 
Florida  now,  is  hearing  that  Cuba 
used  the  1980  Mariel  boatlift  to  send 
in  7,000  spies  to  the  United  States,  ac- 
cording to  this  testimony,  plus  Cuba, 
again,  according  to  the  testimony,  is 
involved  in  drug  trafficking  in  the 
United  States.  Does  that  square  with 
anything  you  know? 

A.  I  can't  comment  on  the  number 
of  spies.  I  really,  literally,  don't  know. 
Maybe  there  are  others  in  the  govern- 
ment that  do;  I  don't.  I  think  there  is 
evidence  that  in  that  boatlift,  they  put 
some  people  into  this  country  that  we 
would  rather  not  have  here,  "for  a 
number  of  different  reasons.  I  think  the 
evidence  is  really  quite  clear  that  there 
is  major  Cuban  involvement  in  the  drug 
traffic  in  this  country. 

Q.  The  Cuban  Government? 

A.  My  judgment  of  that  is  that  the 
evidence  is  sufficient,  in  terms  of  the 
kinds  of  people  who  are  involved,  that  I 
would  find  it  very  difficult  to  believe 
that  the  Cuban  Government  itself  is  not 
involved  as  well. 

Q.  How  can  we  retaliate?  How  can 
we  stop  the  Cuban  Government  from 
getting  involved  in  this  country  with 
drugs? 

A.  Our  alternatives  are  limited,  and 
they  basically  run  to  doing  everything 
we  can  to  cut  off  the  drug  traffic  into 
the  United  States,  and  that's  a  massive 
effort.  It  costs  a  great  deal  of  money, 
and  we're  doing  the  best  we  can.  But  I 
don't  think  there  is  anything  we  can  do 
in  terms  of  some  specific  foreign  policy 
initiative  in  Cuba.  We're  not  trying  to 
move  drugs  into  Cuba,  for  example. 

Q.  Let  me  ask  you  a  question 
which  you  raised  earlier  on.  talking 
about  El  Salvador.  We  have  the  will 
and  so  forth,  is  what  you  said,  in  the 
United  States  to  continue  the  strug- 
gle. I  suspect  that  one  of  your  jobs  is 
to  count  noses  in  the  Congress  and  to 
keep  an  eye  on  the  passage  of  these 
bills  for  money  and  so  forth.  Do  you 
have  the  votes?  Do  we  have  the  will  in 
that  sense? 

A.  I  think — and  we  will  know  more 
this  week— it's  important,  first  of  all,  to 
see  the  impact  of  the  President's  speech 
both  on  the  Congress  and  on  the  body 
politic.  As  the  President  said,  I  don't 
think  there  is  anybody  in  the  Congress 
who  wants  to  see  a  Marxist  takeover  in 


Central  America.  There  are  differences, 
and  legitimate  differences,  of  view  on 
how  to  approach  it.  I  disagree  with 
those  who  argue  that  there  is  this  mid- 
dle way  somewhere  or  another.  As  I 
say,  I  think  we  are  faced  with  two  alter- 
natives—doing what  we're  doing  or  see- 
ing other  Nicaraguas  in  Central 
America.  This  is  a  long  answer  to  a 
short  question,  but,  yes,  I  think  we  will, 
in  the  end,  have  the  votes. 

Q.  I  would  like  to  take  you  to  the 
arms  control  negotiations.  Word  is 
sort  of  beginning  to  get  around  that 
under  some  circumstances,  the  United 
States  might  be  willing  to  forego  the 
deployment  in  Western  Europe  of  the 
Pershing  rocket,  which  is.  obviously, 
the  most  formidable,  from  the  Soviet 
perspective,  of  those  weapons  that  we 
propose  to  deploy  in  Western  Europe. 
Would  you  be  prepared  to  negotiate 
them  away  in  Geneva  in  the  context  of 
those  negotiations  as  they  now  stand, 
if  the  Soviet  Union  would  cut  back 
radically  on  its  corresponding 
weapons? 

A.  I  think  the  answer  to  that  ques- 
tion has  to  be  that  our  view  is  that  if 
there  are  any  deployments  at  all  of  our 
weapons  into  Western  Europe,  it  has  to 
be  a  mix  of  ground-launched  cruise 
missiles  and  the  Pershing  II.  It  cannot 
be  an  either/or  situation.  If  we're  going 
to  deploy  at  all,  we  will  want  to  put  in 
some  of  each. 

As  you  know,  the  President's  pro- 
posal and  his  continuing  objective  is  that 
we  don't  deploy  anything,  any  of  those 
572  warheads  into  Western  Europe,  and 
that  what  we  want  in  return  is  that  the 
Soviets  withdraw  their  SS-20s,  threes 
and  fours,  or  fours  and  fives,  excuse  me. 
But  if  there  are  going  to  be  deploy- 
ments, I  think  we  will  want  to  see  a  mix 
of  the  two  systems. 

Q.  But  isn't  there  the  possibility  of 
cutting  a  deal  at  this  point  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  or  are  we  at  a  dead  end 
on  arms  talks? 

A.  You're  talking  about  in  general 
now? 

Q.  In  general. 

A.  On  the  INF  [intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces]  talks,  at  this  point  the 
Soviets  have  shown  absolutely  no  flex- 
ibility whatsoever.  The  President  put 
forward  a  proposal  more  than  a  year 
ago.  He  modified  that  proposal  about  a 
month  ago.  We  have  seen  nothing  but 
negative  response  from  the  Soviets  since 
then.  The  best  I  can  tell  you  at  this 
point  is,  we've  got  to  keep  working  at  it. 
We've  got  to  keep  banging  at  them  and 


INTERVIEW 


hope  that  as  we  get  closer  to  the  point 
of  deployment— which  is  late  this 
year— the  Soviets  will  decide  that  it  is 
better  for  them  to  reach  an  agreement 
than  to  see  those  deployments  go  for- 
ward. 

Q.  Aren't  the  Soviets  having 
troubles  of  their  own?  This  is  May 
Day,  and  there  seem  to  be  disap- 
pearances from  the  Soviet  leadership. 
Is  there  a  power  struggle  you  see  go- 
ing on  which  may  affect  the  whole 
range  of  Soviet  foreign  relations? 

A.  Understanding  the  internal 
dynamics  of  the  Soviet  Politburo  is  like 
reading  the  entrails  of  sheep,  and  you 
kind  of  cross  your  fingers  and  hope 
you  know  what  you're  talking  about. 
My  own  judgment  on  it  is  that,  contrary 
to  the  very  early  assumptions  that 
Mr.  Andropov  had  quickly  seized  power 
and  all  the  way  down,  I  think  it  is  prob- 
ably clear  now  that  while  he  is  in  con- 
trol, it  is  not  total  control;  that  he's  got 
to  balance  off  some  other  interests  and 
that  it  will  be  a  time  yet  before  we're  ab- 
solutely confident  of  his  total  control 
over  the  system.  But  having  said  that,  I 
don't  want  to  imply  from  that  that  we 
are  on  the  verge  of  some  major  blow-up 
or  upset  within  the  system  of  the  Soviet 
Union. 

Q.  But  does  that  lack  of  control 
imply  that  they  will  be  somewhat 
paralyzed  on  something  so  important? 

A.  I  think  what  it  does  imply  is  that 
they  will  have  to  do  a  great  deal  of  con- 
sensus building,  if  I  may,  before  they 
can  take  any  major  steps  in  one  direc- 
tion or  another.  As  long  as  they  follow 
basically  the  path  of  the  past,  it  probably 
will  not  require  a  great  deal  of  consen- 
sus building.  But  if  they  wanted  to  make 
any  major  shifts,  I  think  that  would  re- 
quire some  time  and  some  real  work 
within  the  system. 

Having  said  that,  again,  I  don't  want 
to  imply  that  Andropov  is  a  total  cipher. 
He  is  not.  He's  bright;  he's  fast;  he's 
tough;  and  I  think  we've  seen  that  he  is 
more  in  charge  than  Brezhnev  was  in 
the  last  months  of  his  time. 

Q.  What  you're  suggesting  is  that 
we  shouldn't  look  in  the  near  future 
for  any  sort  of  movement  on  the  part 
of  the  Soviet  leadership  that  would 
imply  either  a  movement  forward, 
more  expansionism  in  the  world,  or 
the  important  compromise,  vis  a  vis 
the  United  States? 

A.  Again,  I  want  to  be  careful  about 
this.  I  would  argue  with  you  that  the 
general  Soviet  approach  over  the  last 


several  years  has  tended  to  be  expan- 
sionist to  begin  with,  so  that  I  would  be 
arguing  that  if  they  are  going  to  con- 
tinue previous  policy,  some  of  that,  I 
think,  we  have  to  expect.  Afghanistan, 
and  so  forth,  will  go  on.  But  I  think 
there  has  been  a  basic  mistake  to  begin 
with,  which  is  an  assumption  that 
Mr.  Andropov,  when  he  came  into 
power,  was  somewhat  different  than  his 
predecessors  and  his  antecedents.  Let's 
not  forget  that  he  ran  the  KGB  for  16 
years,  and  that's  not  a  well-known 
philanthropic  organization. 

Q.  When  you  answered  the  ques- 
tion about  nuclear  negotiations,  you 
talked  about  the  INF,  the 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces. 
How  about  the  START  talks— the 
strategic  arms  reduction  talks?  In 
brief,  have  START  talks  stopped? 

A.  No,  the  START  talks  haven't 
stopped,  but  they  haven't  moved  very 
far  forward  either. 

Q.  Are  they  stuck,  is  what  I'm 
really  getting  at? 

A.  "Stuck"  is  too  strong  a  term.  But 
my  basic  point  has  to  be,  to  unstick 
them  at  this  point,  it  seems  to  me,  it's 
the  Soviets  that  have  got  to  move.  The 
President  has  made  a  proposal  for  a  ma- 
jor reduction  in  these  very  threatening 
systems,  and  at  this  point  we  have  got- 
ten no  response  whatsoever.  There  is  a 
tendency  in  this  country  to  say,  "Well,  if 
you  haven't  gotten  a  response  from  the 
Soviets,  let's  change  our  negotiating 
position."  In  fact,  in  one  of  the 
newspapers  this  morning  on  the  INF 
talks,  I  noted  that  because  the  President 
made  a  proposal  a  month  ago  and  the 
Soviets  hadn't  responded,  it  was  time 
for  us  to  change  again.  You  can  go 
through  that  for  just  so  long,  and  in 
both  cases,  we  have  put  proposals  on  the 
table,  and  the  Soviets  simply  have  not 
responded.  At  this  point,  I  would  have 
to  say  I  am  mildly  pessimistic  that  there 
is  any  chance  in  the  near  future  for  any 
major  move  on  START. 

Q.  The  Soviets  have  been  having  a 
lot  of  bad  luck  recently  with  their 
spies— Italy,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Australia,  most  recently  Switzerland. 
What  is  going  on  here?  Is  there  a  deep 
throat,  as  in  fact  an  Australian  cabinet 
minister  suggested? 

A.  First  of  all,  it  couldn't  have  hap- 
pened to  a  better  bunch.  I  don't  know  if 
there  is  a  deep  throat  or  not. 

Q.  If  you  did  know,  would  you  tell 
us? 

A.  If  I  did  know,  I  wouldn't  tell  you, 
but  I  honestly  don't  know.  There  may  be 
somebody  in  the  system  who's  talking. 


On  the  other  hand,  I  think  it's  alsi  i 
portant  to  remember  that  the  Sov 
this  in  such  massive  proportions  t 
after  a  while  it  isn't  hard  to  find  c 
to  see  that  they  have  got— in  Par 
people,  at  least,  were  kicked  out. 
do  it  in  such  large  numbers  that  I 
you  can  assume,  over  time,  it's  lik 
be  found  out. 

Q.  But  why  are  we  getting  t 
now?  I  mean,  "we,"  let's  say  thei 
Western  alliance  seems  to  be  gei 
tough. 

A.  I  wouldn't  say  that  all  of  a 
den  we're  getting  tough.  I  think, ; 
this  is  interesting  in  relation  to  yc 
question,  it  is  clear  that  some  of  t 
things  have  been  discovered  as  of 
don't  think  there  is  any  political  n 
that  all  of  a  sudden  we're  going  ti 
tough.  It  is  that  they  have  been  f( 
out  and  kicked  out. 

Q.  Mr.  Webster  [Director  ofl 
FBI]  told  us,  sitting  in  that  chai 
a  week  or  two  ago,  that  they  ha 
been  following  these  spies  for  a 
time  but  that  the  decision  was  i 
that  this  was  a  good  time  to  kic 
out.  That  implies  political,  diplc 
and  other  inputs.  > 

A.  You're  talking  about  here  I 
United  States?  \ 

Q.  Yes.  j 

A.  I  was  talking  much  more  ai 
the  major  issue  in  Europe.  With  il 
to  those  in  the  United  States,  Mr.| 
Webster  is  correct.  T 

Q.  We  talked  about  the  Sovi* 
moving  in  with  the  Syrians,  beii'' 
with  Syrian  forces  in  Lebanon. '» 
are  also  American  Marines  in 
Lebanon.  Just  as  a  hypothetical « 
tion,  what  is  the  mission  of  the 
Marines  if  this  shooting  war  sta« 
again,  involving  the  Syrians  moit 
with  their  Russian  advisers  towl 
our  lines?  What  do  we  do?  How  i 
prevent  unlimited  war  with  the  i 
Americans  facing  Russians?        i 

A.  First  of  all,  I'm  not  the  Salt: 
of  Defense,  and  those  questions  at" 
point  have  to  be  looked  at  by  the 
military.  The  general  point  I  wnui 
make  is,  first  of  all,  let's  not  forgtr- 
the  Marine  unit  in  Lebanon— and  • 
there  a  week  or  so  ago  and  saw  tli 
and  they  are  superb,  but  it's  a  sm:| 
unit,  and  their  purposes  are  clearl 
defined.  They  are  not  there  to  fig'^ 
war,  and  I  would  have  to  assume  i 
they  will  carry  out  their  mission.  .|' 
the  hypothetical  that  you  suggest  f, 
that  I  simply  at  this  point  couldn't."^ 
answer.  ■  k 


Department  of  State  B' 


DLE  EAST 


Time  for  Reason  and 
lalism  in  the  Middle  East 


meth  W.  Dam 

dress  before  the  World  Affairs 
I  in  St.  Louis  on  April  11,  1983. 
m  is  Deputy  Secretary  of  State.' 


over  the  weekend  have  demon- 
once  again  that,  as  Secretary  of 
ihultz  said  this  morning,  obtaining 
n  the  Middle  East  is  a  "tough,  dif- 
.  .  painstaking  process."  As  you 
King  Hussein  of  Jordan  and  Yasir 
arrived  at  an  understanding  on 
g's  entry  into  the  peace  process, 
elements  within  the  Palestine 
ion  Organization  (PLO)  then  im- 
mendments  that  were  not  accept- 
King  Hussein,  not  acceptable  to 
ihd  of  Saudi  Arabia,  and  not  ac- 
>  to  us.  King  Hussein  rejected 
■nendments  because  they  pro- 
i)  basis  for  Jordanian  or  Israeli 
to  the  negotiations.  But  King 
did  not  reject  the  President's 
her  1  peace  initiative.  He  re- 
jmmitted  to  the  search  for  peace 
:iddle  East.  That  is  what  he  told 
it  Reagan  in  their  phone  conver- 
ssterday.  The  King  asked  us  to 
with  that  initiative.  We  intend 
lecisely  that. 

I  search  for  peace  between  Israel 
jVrab  neighbors  has  been  one  of 
JTiost  preoccupations  of  Ameri- 
jign  policy  since  World  War  II. 
le  debates  over  the  partition  of 
i,  through  the  tenuous  early 
Israel's  existence,  to  the  first 
ings  of  peace  nearly  a  decade 
Middle  East  conflict  has  ab- 
he  energies  of  8  U.S.  Presidents 
iecretaries  of  State, 
reasons  for  this  continuous  in- 
it  in  a  problem  halfway  around 
d  are  both  moral  and  strategic. 

e  Americans  have  a  moral  com- 

to  the  security  and  well-being 

ate  of  Israel. 

i  have  a  parallel  concern  for  our 

with  our  many  friends  in  the 

rid. 

3  need  to  preserve  free  access 

^est  to  the  strategic  resources, 

and  waterways  of  the  Persian 

:  need  to  ensure  that  unchecked 
iicts  do  not  spread  to  surround- 
and  lead  to  a  dangerous  con- 
1  between  the  superpowers. 


Resolution  of  the  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict will  by  no  means  guarantee  our  in- 
terests in  the  region  or  establish  an  era 
of  tranquility  and  stability.  The  sources 
of  conflict  transcend  the  Arab-Israeli 
problem.  The  Soviet  invasion  of 
Afghanistan  and  the  Iran-Iraq  war  are 
testimony  to  this  fact.  Nevertheless,  the 
Arab-Israeli  problem  pits  our  friends 
against  one  another.  Both  sides  look  to 
the  United  States  as  the  sole  external 
power  capable  of  helping  them  find  an 
equitable  solution. 

After  35  years,  peace  still  eludes  the 
peoples  of  the  Middle  East.  They  have 
endured  five  major  wars  and  numerous 
smaller  conflicts.  The  wounds  of  the  last 
conflict  are  still  evident  in  Lebanon. 
With  the  exception  of  Egypt  and 
Lebanon,  the  Arab  states  still  have  not 
come  forward  to  negotiate  their  differ- 
ences with  Israel.  Israel  still  must 
devote  a  higher  percentage  of  its  re- 
sources to  defending  its  existence  than 
any  other  country  on  Earth.  And  radi- 
cals in  the  PLO  still  retreat  into  the 
path  of  rejection  and  underscore  this 
with  violent  acts:  witness  the  weekend 
assassination  of  a  PLO  moderate  in  Por- 
tugal. 

And  yet  the  Middle  East  of  today  is 
vastly  different  from  that  of  1948  or 
1967 — or  even  of  June  1982.  Many 


The  search  for  peace 
between  Israel  and  its 
Arab  neighbors  has  been 
one  of  the  foremost  pre- 
occupations of  American 
foreign  policy  since 
World  War  II. 


fissures  remain  to  be  bridged.  But  Israel 
and  its  neighbors,  thanks  to  unflagging 
American  dedication,  are  closer  to 
reconciliation  today  than  at  any  time  in 
Israel's  history. 

For  the  first  two  decades  of  Israel's 
existence,  it  was  hemmed  in  on  all  sides. 
Its  very  existence  was  rejected  by  all  its 
Arab  neighbors.  It  had  nothing  with 


which  to  bargain  for  peace.  Then  the 
6-day  war  was  forced  on  Israel  by  the 
imminent  threat  of  unprovoked  aggres- 
sion. That  war  left  Israel  in  occupation 
of  Arab  territory  on  three  of  its  borders. 
It  left  the  Arabs  with  a  new  reality  to 
face.  Seizing  upon  this  new  reality,  the 
UN  Security  Council  hammered  out  the 
formula  of  "territory  for  peace"  en- 
shrined in  Resolution  242.  That  principle 
remains  the  basis  for  all  our  peacemak- 
ing efforts. 

The  euphoria  of  victory  on  one  side, 
and  the  shame  of  defeat  on  the  other, 
left  a  legacy  of  bitterness.  That  legacy 
produced  not  peace  treaties  but  the 
three  Arab  "no's"  of  Khartoum:  no  nego- 
tiation, no  recognition,  no  peace  with 
Israel. 

It  was  not  until  the  fourth  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  in  1973  that  the  futility  of 
war  as  a  solution  to  the  Middle  East 
problem  finally  began  to  sink  in.  In 
Israel,  the  surprise  attack  and  narrow 
brush  with  disaster  demonstrated  to 
many  that  in  the  absence  of  negotiated 
peace  treaties,  military  superiority  is  no 
guarantee  of  peace  and  security.  For 
Egypt,  the  lesson  was  that  while  Israel 
could  be  wounded,  it  could  not  be  over- 
come by  military  force.  Grievances 
would  have  to  be  resolved  by  negotia- 
tions. There  followed  a  series  of  dis- 
engagement agreements.  President 
Sadat's  historic  trip  to  Jerusalem,  the 
Camp  David  accords,  and  finally  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty. 

Camp  David  offered  a  new  approach 
to  the  Arab-Israeli  problem.  It  combined 
resolution  of  bilateral  problems  between 
Egypt  and  Israel  with  a  binding  commit- 
ment to  negotiate  a  comprehensive  set- 
tlement. The  first  stage  of  the  process 
has  worked  better  than  some  expected. 
As  long  as  Israel  remains  in  conflict 
with  the  other  Arab  states,  some  tension 
between  Egypt  and  Israel  is  inevitable. 
But  the  recent  passage,  almost  without 
notice,  of  the  Egyptian-Israeli  treaty's 
fourth  anniversary  is  a  tribute  to  the  ex- 
tent to  which  peaceful  relations  are  now 
taken  for  granted. 

The  second  phase  of  the  Camp 
David  process— negotiations  to  establish 
transitional  arrangements  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza  prior  to  full  peace— has 
not  fared  so  well.  The  problems  in- 
volved—legal, political,  military,  and 
emotional — are  more  complex  than  the 
bilateral  issues  worked  out  between 
Egypt  and  Israel.  But  even  these  prob- 
lems could  have  been  well  on  their  way 
to  resolution  had  the  Palestinians  taken 


MIDDLE  EAST 


up  the  challenge  of  seeking  a  peaceful 
resolution  of  the  conflict.  We  should  re- 
member that  the  failure  to  realize  the 
early  promise  of  Resolution  242  led  ulti- 
mately to  the  1973  war.  Similarly,  the 
inability  to  show  substantial  progress  on 
the  Palestinian  problem  since  1979  was 
a  contributing  factor  to  the  buildup  of 
tensions  in  Lebanon  and  the  outbreak  of 
war  there  last  June. 

The  analogy  is  not  an  altogether 


It  was  not  until  the 
fourth  Arab-Israeli  con- 
flict in  1973  that  the 
futility  of  war  as  a  solu- 
tion to  the  Middle  East 
problem  finally  began  to 
sink  in. 


unhappy  one,  however.  The  1973  war 
led  to  a  negotiating  process  that  culmi- 
nated in  President  Sadat's  eloquent  call 
from  the  rostrum  of  Israel's  Knesset: 
"The  October  war  should  be  the  last 
war."  In  short  order  there  were  face-to- 
face  negotiations,  peace,  and  normaliza- 
tion of  relations  between  Egypt  and 
Israel.  Likewise,  the  war  in  Lebanon  has 
resulted  in  face-to-face  negotiations  be- 
tween Israel  and  Lebanon.  Those 
negotiations  must  lead  ultimately  to  per- 
manent peace  along  their  frontier  and 
can  lend  momentum  to  the  search  for  a 
broader  peace. 

The  Lebanon  Negotiations 

Lebanon  poses  a  critical  test  for  Ameri- 
can diplomacy.  It  affects  Arab,  Israeli, 
and  Palestinian  interests  alike.  Our  ob- 
jective is  straightforward.  We  seek  to 
restore  Lebanese  sovereignty  and  en- 
sure Israeli  security.  These  are  not 
separate  objectives.  A  stable,  sovereign 
Lebanon  and  a  secure  Israel  are  two 
sides  of  the  same  coin.  The  threat  to 
Israel's  northern  border  has  come  not 
from  the  Lebanese  people  but  from 
foreign  forces  that  temporarily  imposed 
an  alien  regime  on  Lebanese  soil.  It 
follows  that  a  peaceful  Lebanon,  free  of 
all  foreign  forces  and  sovereign  over  all 
its  territory,  will  benefit  Israel  and 
Lebanoii  alike. 


To  achieve  our  objective,  we  and  the 
responsible  international  community  sup- 
port a  four-part  strategy: 

First,  prompt  and  complete  with- 
drawal of  all  external  forces  from 
Lebanon; 

Second,  agreement  on  effective 
security  arrangements  to  prevent  future 
attacks  against  Israel  from  Lebanese 
territory; 

Third,  strengthening  the  Lebanese 
Government  and  the  Lebanese  Armed 
Forces;  and 

Fourth,  reestablishment  of  a 
Lebanese  national  consensus  and 
reconstruction  of  the  Lebanese  economy. 

The  United  States  is  moving  now  in 
support  of  the  Lebanese  Government  to 
implement  all  four  parts  of  this  strategy. 
Our  special  envoys.  Ambassadors  Habib 
and  Draper,  are  negotiating  continuous- 
ly to  secure  the  immediate  and  complete 
withdrawal  from  Lebanon  of  all  outside 
forces— Israeli,  Syrian,  and  PLO. 
Lebanon  is  negotiating  with  each  of 
these  parties  separately.  Since  no  out- 
side forces  are  likely  to  be  withdrawn 
from  Lebanon  without  assurance  of  the 
withdrawal  of  each  of  the  others,  the 
future  of  all  three  negotiations  is  inex- 
tricably linked. 

In  order  to  move  the  Israel-Lebanon 
negotiations  forward,  the  Foreign  Minis- 
ters of  Lebanon  and  Israel  recently 
came  to  Washington  for  talks  with 
Secretary  Shultz.  In  those  talks  we  pro- 
vided Foreign  Minister  Shamir  with  a 
number  of  concrete  ideas  for  assuring 
Israeli  security.  The  Government  of 
Israel  has  found  these  proposals  thought 
provoking  and  worthy  of  serious  study. 
The  proposals  were  designed  to 
strengthen  Israel's  confidence  that  the 
Lebanese  Armed  Forces  are  ready  and 
able  to  secure  the  south  of  Lebanon.  We 
have  stated  our  belief  that  the  Lebanese 
Armed  Forces  must  operate  under  a  uni- 
fied command  structure,  meaning  that 
local  militias  and  irregular  forces,  in 
south  Lebanon  as  well  as  further  north, 
must  be  absorbed  within  it.  We  have 
also  stated  our  belief  that  close  liaison 
and  cooperation  between  Lebanon  and 
Israel  will  be  necessary  to  ensure  the 
security  of  south  Lebanon.  And  we  have 
made  known  our  firm  conviction  that 
Lebanon  can  only  regain  control  over 
the  south  in  the  context  of  the  full 
withdrawal  of  the  Israeli  Defense 
Forces. 

We  believe  that  the  security  meas- 
ures now  being  considered  by  Lebanese, 
Israeli,  and  U.S.  negotiators  incorporate 


the  safeguards  necessary  to  pr<  <\v 
people  of  northern  Israel  the  st-ru 
which  they  are  entitled.  No  securi 
gime  is  perfect.  But  we  will  hnM  i 
goal  that  south  Lebanon  never  ag, 
becomes  a  base  for  aggression  air; 
Israel  or  a  state-within-a-state. 

In  the  period  between  the  \\  it 
drawal  of  foreign  forces  from  Lei 
and  the  Lebanese  Government',-  c 
solidation  of  control  over  all  its  te 
ritory,  agreed  security  arrangeme ; 
will  be  necessary  to  supplement  tl 
capabilities  of  the  Lebanese  Arme 
Forces  in  the  south.  Our  concern 
stability  in  Lebanon,  however,  exi  c 
beyond  the  south.  In  this  wider  ci  i 
while  we  and  our  allies  are  \v(  )rki;  t 
rebuild  the  Lebanese  Armed  Fnrc 
have  agreed  to  consider  favor;ilil\  f 
Lebanese  Government's  request  t 
United  States  join  with  Italy.  Vr?. 
Great  Britain,  and  perhaps  dther 
in  an  expanded  multinational  fi  >n.  : 
that  appears  necessary.  The  rule,  t 
and  areas  of  deployment  of  sufh  .  i 
panded  force  will  have  to  be  dete  \ 
in  the  future. 

To  ensure  that  Lebanon  \\\\\U 
to  take  over  full  responsibility  foi  ■ 
own  security  in  the  shortest  poss 
time,  the  Administration  has  aski  i 
Congress  for  a  supplemental  appi  r 
tion  of  $251  million.  This  figure  i  :' 
a  $100  million  loan  to  Lebanon  tV  ■ 
military  equipment  and  $1  millnir 
military  training.  It  is  important 
the  Congress  act  promptly  on  thi 
quest. 

A  fully  sovereign  Lebanon  an 
secure  Israel,  however,  cannot  be 
achieved  through  political  and  mi.  i 
measures  alone.  The  Lebanese  pe  If 
must  have  a  chance  to  restore  thi 
once-dynamic  economy.  The  Gove" 
of  Lebanon  must  be  able  to  rehab  Is 
and  reconstruct  public  infrastruct  J 
vital  to  the  national  economy.  Thir 
bility  of  the  Lebanese  Governmer  i 
depend  as  much  on  its  ability  to  \  '>' 
normal  government  services  as  it 
its  ability  to  ensure  internal  stabi 
secure  its  borders.  To  this  end,  "i- 
plemental  appropriation  includes  f 
quest  for  $150  million  for  econon: 
assistance  to  Lebanon. 

Military  security  and  ecoin'im  ' 
habilitation  are  short-term  mcckx ' 
for  bringing  the  Lebanon  conflict 
end.  National  reconciliation  in  Le  ^' 
and  normal  relations  between  Lel« 
and  its  neighbors  present  the  onl, " 
term  guarantees  that  Lebanon  wi 
never  again  pose  a  threat  to  intei  ■ 
tional  peace.  Reconciliation  will  t; ' 


Department  of  State  1 1' 


MIDDLE  EAST 


id  careful  management.  Its  devel- 
t  is  not  served  by  undue  caution, 
ther  can  it  survive  overwhelming 
e.  President  Gemayel  is  engaged 
»-or-death  struggle  to  forge  anew 
ional  consensus  that  once  made 
m  a  model  of  democracy.  He  has 
support. 

)anon  is  also  engaged,  through  its 
tions  with  Israel,  in  defining  an 
3h  to  normal  relations.  This  is  a 
ment  in  the  negotiations.  Israel 
md  needs  this  guarantee  for  the 
Lebanon  cannot  give  more  than 
uirements  for  domestic  reconcilia- 
1  permit.  The  problem  is  difficult, 
Crete  progress  has  been  made, 
les  have  agreed  that  the  state  of 
their  border  must  end.  And  both 
ive  agreed  that  the  process  of 
ing  relations  must  continue 
the  agreement  which  secures  the 
wal  of  all  foreign  forces. 

Hember  1  Initiative 

panon  war  and  its  aftermath 
;hlighted  again  the  unique  and 
sable  role  of  the  United  States 
italyst  for  peace  in  the  Middle 
ily  the  United  States  has  enough 
ust  of  all  sides,  the  moral 
v',  and  the  material  resources 
■y  to  mediate  successfully  be- 
Taelis  and  Arabs, 
rica's  success  in  negotiating  an 
le  active  hostilities  in  Lebanon 
mer  provided  the  context  for 
lit  Reagan's  historic  peace  initia- 
I  September.  The  stage  for  this 
!■  was  initially  set  at  Camp 
;ut  the  Camp  David  agreement, 
■mal  title  clearly  states,  is  only  a 
ork  for  peace,"  not  a  blueprint, 
t  the  basic  principles  and  guide- 
ig  which  a  future  solution  to  the 
an  problem  could  be  built.  But 
ity  as  to  where  the  United 
l-ood  on  the  basic  issues  in  the 
ons  greatly  impeded  our  efforts 
2n  the  negotiations  to  Jordanian 
stinian  representatives  as  en- 
it  Camp  David.  Without  their 
tion  and  endorsement,  no 
nt  about  the  West  Bank  and 
insitional  or  final,  could  have 
il  or  practical  authority.  It  was 
!  that  ambiguity  and  encourage 
iport  for  the  peace  process  that 
imber  1  initiative  was  launched, 
■^resident's  initiative  is  balanced 
It  rejects  the  extreme  positions 
arties.  It  is  designed  to  bring 
JSt  and  lasting  peace  that  will 
gnize  the  legitimate  rights  of 


the  Palestinian  people  and,  at  the  same 
time,  assure  the  security  of  Israel.  Those 
goals  are  not  incompatilDle.  Indeed, 
neither  can  be  truly  achieved  in  the 
absence  of  the  other. 

Let  me  review  the  seven  essential 
points  of  the  President's  September  1 
initiative. 

First:  "We  base  our  approach 
squarely  on  the  principle  that  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  should  be  resolved 
through  negotiations  involving  an  ex- 
change of  territory  for  peace.  This  ex- 
change is  enshrined  in  U.N.  Security 
Council  Resolution  242.  .  .  ." 

Second:  ".  .  .  the  United  States  will 
oppose  any  proposal  .  .  .  that  threatens 
the  security  of  Israel.  America's  commit- 
ment to  the  security  of  Israel  is 
ironclad." 

Third:  ".  .  .  the  United  States  will 
not  support  the  establishment  of  an  in- 
dependent Palestinian  state  in  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza,  and  we  will  not  support 
annexation  or  permanent  control  by 
Israel." 

Fourth:  ".  .  .  there  must  be  a  period 
of  time  during  which  the  Palestinian  in- 
habitants of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
will  have  full  autonomy  over  their  own 
affairs.  .  .  .  The  purpose  of  this  transi- 
tion period  is  the  peaceful  .  .  .  and  order- 
ly transfer  of  authority  from  Israel  to 
the  Palestinian  inhabitants  of  the  West 
Bank  and  Gaza." 


The  President's  ini- 
tiative is  .  .  .  designed  to 
bring  about  a  just  and 
lasting  peace  that  will 
both  recognize  the 
legitimate  rights  of  the 
Palestinian  people  and, 
at  the  same  time,  assure 
the  securitg  of  Israel. 
Those  goals  are  not  in- 
compatible. 


Fifth:  "The  United  States  will  not 
support  the  use  of  any  additional  land 
for  the  purpose  of  settlements  during 
the  transition  period.  .  .  .  Further  settle- 
ment activity  is  in  no  way  necessary  for 
the  security  of  Israel.  .  .  ." 


Sixth:  ".  .  .  self-government  by  the 
Palestinians  of  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza 
in  association  with  Jordan  offers  the 
best  chance  for  a  durable,  just,  and  last- 
ing peace." 

Seventh:  ".  .  .  Jerusalem  must  re- 
main undivided,  but  its  final  status 
should  be  decided  through  negotiations" 
in  the  context  of  an  overall  Middle  East 
settlement. 

It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that 
this  initiative  is  not  a  "plan"  to  be  im- 
posed on  the  parties.  Rather,  the  Presi- 
dent has  put  forward  a  balanced  set  of 
positions  that  the  United  States  is  pre- 
pared to  support  in  the  course  of 
negotiations.  Let  me  underscore  at  this 
point  something  we  have  been  making 
clear  in  all  of  our  consultations.  Because 
our  positions  are  balanced,  because  they 
are  fair,  because  they  can  point  the  way 
to  a  just  solution,  the  President  is  com- 
mitted to  them  as  they  are.  They  will 
not  be  changed.  Those  who  seek  a 
different  solution  must  seek  it  at  the 
negotiating  table. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  pointed 
out  to  all  parties  that  we  cannot  guaran- 
tee the  outcome  of  the  negotiating  proc- 
ess on  any  specific  issues.  The  negotia- 
tions, if  they  are  to  be  successful,  must 
be  free  to  move  in  productive  directions 
that  cannot  be  foreseen  in  advance.  In- 
deed, as  the  President  said  on  Septem- 
ber 1,  once  negotiations  are  joined  we 
will  support  positions  that  seem  to  us 
fair  and  reasonable  compromises  and 
likely  to  promote  a  sound  agreement. 
Both  Israel  and  the  Arab  states  thus 
have  a  major  opportunity  to  shape  the 
outcome  of  these  negotiations,  but  the 
opportunity  must  be  used  creatively  and 
soon. 

We  will  not  be  sidetracked  by  the 
events  of  this  weekend.  We  should  not 
underestimate  the  importance  of  what 
has  been  achieved.  A  year  ago  signifi- 
cant elements  in  the  Middle  East  still 
harbored  the  illusion  that  the  Arab- 
Israeli  dispute  could  be  resolved  by  mili- 
tary means.  Today  Arab  leaders  are 
talking  about  how— not  whether— to 
make  peace  with  Israel. 

We  have  witnessed  in  recent  weeks 
the  most  intensive  debate  in  Arab  coun- 
cils in  3.5  years  as  some  Arab  leaders 
seek  a  way  out  of  the  self-defeating  cy- 
cle of  violence  which  has  brought  so 
much  misery  to  their  peoples.  We  have 
lent  our  encouragement  and  vouchsafed 
our  support  for  courageous  decisions  by 
Arab  leaders. 

King  Hussein  has  already  taken  the 
lead  in  recognizing  the  opportunity  af- 
forded by  the  President's  initiative  for 


MIDDLE  EAST 


revitalizing  the  peace  process.  The  radi- 
cals have  given  one  answer.  But  the 
President's  initiative  is  still  alive  and  on 
the  table.  We  will  not  permit  radical  ele- 
ments to  exercise  a  veto  over  the  peace 
process.  Rather,  we  will  encourage  the 
Palestinians  to  recognize  that  this  is  a 
unique  moment  which  must  be  seized  be- 
fore it  is  lost. 

The  Arab  debate  is  not  over.  The  op- 
portunity still  exists  for  reason  and 
realism  to  prevail.  It  is  only  at  the 
negotiating  table  that  a  solution  to  the 
Palestinian  problem  in  all  its  aspects  can 
be  found.  And  in  our  view,  the  best 
means  for  accomplishing  that  goal  is 
President  Reagan's  initiative,  based  as  it 
is  on  UN  Security  Council  Resolution 
242,  which  in  turn  is  the  bedrock  foun- 
dation of  the  Camp  David  framework. 

Conclusion 

We  are  living  today  in  one  of  the  truly 
critical  moments  in  the  history  of  the 
Middle  East.  A  conflict  which  remained 
frozen  for  almost  two  decades  has  been 
yielding— slowly,  painfully,  but  steadily 
over  the  last  15  years— to  the  forces  of 
reason  and  realism.  After  five  wars,  the 
Arab  world  faces  a  challenge  it  has  re- 
peatedly evaded:  to  achieve  Palestinian 
rights  through  negotiations  now  that 
those  rights  are  clearly  unattainable 
through  violence.  This  opportunity  may 
not  come  again. 

The  moment  to  decide  is  now.  In  the 
absence  of  a  courageous  Arab  decision 
to  join  the  peace  process,  expansion  of 
Israeli  settlements  on  the  West  Bank 
could  in  the  not-too-distant  future 
render  any  such  decision  virtually  irrele- 
vant. 

Arab  governments  still  have  an  op- 
portunity today  to  put  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict  behind  them.  Only  in  this  way 
will  they  be  positioned  to  face  the  multi- 
ple threats  in  the  region  which  challenge 
their  very  survival.  Only  a  forthright 
commitment  by  Jordan  and  representa- 
tives of  the  Palestinians  to  face-to-face 
negotiations  can  achieve  this  end. 

If  the  Arabs  decide  wisely  and  soon, 
then  it  will  be  Israel's  turn  to  face  a 
historic  challenge.  It  can  choose  the 
semblance  of  security  that  comes  with 
control  over  an  increasingly  embittered 
Palestinian  population.  Or  it  can  choose 
the  real  security  that  can  only  come  with 
peace.  I  have  little  doubt  that,  when 
faced  for  the  first  time  with  a  genuine 
choice  between  territory  and  peace,  the 
people  of  Israel  will  choose  peace. 


Bombing  of  U.S.  Embassy 
in  Beirut 


A  general  view  of  the  American  Embassy 
in  Beirut  shows  severe  damage  to  the  en- 
tire front  portion  of  the  7-stor.v  building. 
In  a  preliminary  survey,  a  Department 
survey  team  concluded  that  the  building  is 
no  longer  fit  for  use.  On  May  17.  President 
Reagan  forwarded  to  the  Congress  the 
Beirut  emergency  supplemental  request 
which  includes  funds  to  obtain  an  interim 
office  building  and  to  complete  construc- 
tion of  the  building  that  was  stopped  dur- 
ing the  1976  civil  war. 


On  April  18,  1983,  a  bomh  e.i 
in  front  of  the  U.S.  Embassy  "- . 
killing  50  people  (16  official  I  '.S. 
net,  1  private  U.S.  citizen,  and  o 
Foreign  Service  national  person ' 
injuring  more  than  100. 

Following  are  remarks  h/  P; ' 
Reagan  and  Secretary  Shultz  im  ' 
City)  on  April  18,  the  Presidtnt- 
remarks  made  at  Andrews  A  <  r  I 
Base  on  April  23  at  a  cereinoinj 
the  victims,  and  Secretary  Shnli 
remarks  in  Cairo  on  April  '2i?  (i( 
memorial  service  for  the  victims. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
APR.  18,  19831 

As  you  know,  our  Embassy  in  BU' 
was  the  target  this  morning  of  s^^ 
terrorist  bombing.  And  this  cow;  Hi 
has  claimed  a  number  of  killed  a 
wounded.  It  appears  that  there  if' 
American  casualties,  but  we  done 
yet  the  exact  number  or  the  exti  ' 
jury. 


'Press  release 


Department  of  State  '" 


MIDDLE  EAST 


:ooperation  with  the  Lebanese 
ties,  we're  still  verifying  the 
bnd  identifying  the  casualties.  I 
id  Ambassador  Robert  Dillon  and 
cated  staff  who  are  carrying  on 
lese  traumatic  circumstances  in 
st  tradition  of  our  military  and 
services. 

;  a  few  minutes  ago,  President 
1  called  me  to  convey,  on  behalf 
ebanese  people,  his  profound 
,nd  sorrow  with  regard  to  this  in- 
nd  asked  me  to  relay  the  con- 
;  on  behalf  of  the  people  of 
1  to  the  families  of  those  victims, 
expressed  his  firm  determina- 
;  we  persevere  in  the  search  for 
that  region.  And  I  told  Presi- 
nayel  that  I  joined  him  in  those 
its.  This  criminal  attack  on  a 
;ic  establishment  will  not  deter 
our  goals  of  peace  in  the  region, 
do  what  we  know  to  be  right, 
assadors  Habib  and  Draper 
.  Habib,  special  representative 
-esident  to  the  Middle  East,  and 
)raper,  special  negotiator  for 
],  who  are  presently  in  Beirut, 
inue  to  press  in  negotiations  for 
;st  possible  total  withdrawal  of 
lal  forces. 

.Iso  remain  committed  to  the 
by  the  Lebanese  Government 
vereignty  throughout  all  of  its 
The  people  of  Lebanon  must 
i  the  chance  to  resume  their  ef- 
3ead  a  normal  life  free  from 
^tvithout  the  presence  of 
^ized  foreign  forces  on  their  soil. 
iliis  noble  end,  I  rededicate  the 
"the  United  States. 


E'ARYS  STATEMENT, 
I,  1983^ 

e  this  morning  of  the  terrible 

i|tra^a'(iy  at  our  Embassy  in 

(day  with  the  greatest  shock 

r)r. 

i:s  alone  cannot  adequately  ex- 

rt  total  revulsion  at  this  senseless 

iman  terrorist  act,  directed 

;  or  very  dedicated  and 

eis  staff— Lebanese  as  well  as 

«— in  Beirut.  Ambassador 

■^10  pulled  himself  out  of  the 

'■his  office,  is  directing  rescue 

05  right  now.  He  exemplifies  the 

■  ""liifss,  and  clearheadedness 

'  es  tht'  Foreign  Ser\ice,  and  I 

'  nelv  proud  of  him  and  his  ex- 

i^iff. 

i')  not  yet  know  the  casualty  toll 

trible  act.  My  prayers  and  grief 


go  out  to  all  those  who  might  be  in- 
volved and  to  their  families.  We  are 
grateful  for  the  concern  expressed  by 
President  Gemayel  and  his  government, 
all  of  whom  are  working  extremely  hard 
to  help  our  people. 

Let  us  rededicate  ourselves  to  our 
battle  against  terrorism  and  violence; 
Lebanon  has  seen  far  too  much  of  this 
already  and  it  is  long  past  time  for 
peace  and  security  to  prevail. 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
APR.  23,  1983^ 

There  can  be  no  sadder  duty  for  one 
who  holds  the  office  I  hold  than  to  pay 
tribute  to  Americans  who  have  given 
their  lives  in  the  service  of  their  coun- 
try. I  extend  also  the  condolences  of 
ourselves  and  our  people,  through  Am- 
bassador Turk  [Lebanese  Government 
representative],  to  the  families  of  our 
loyal  Lebanese  employees  who  perished 
in  this  tragic  event  along  with  their 
American  colleagues. 

You  here  today— the  families  of 
these  honored  dead— I  want  you  to 
know  I  speak  for  all  Americans  when  I 
say  that  we  share  your  sorrow  and  offer 
you  our  heartfelt  sympathy.  We  are  in 
your  debt  and  theirs.  Your  loved  ones 
served  their  country  with  talent  and 
energy,  courage  and  commitment.  With 
your  sorrow  you  must  feel  at  the  same 
time  a  pride— pride  in  their  dedication. 
And  we,  your  fellow  citizens,  share  in 
that,  also. 

These  gallant  Americans  understood 
the  danger  they  faced,  and  yet  they 
went  willingly  to  Beirut.  And  the 
dastardly  deed,  the  act  of  unparalleled 
cowardice  that  took  their  lives,  was  an 
attack  on  all  of  us — on  our  way  of  life 
and  on  the  values  we  hold  dear.  We 
would,  indeed,  fail  them  if  we  let  that 
act  deter  us  from  carrying  on  their  mis- 
sion of  brotherhood  and  peace. 

And  it  is  written,  "Blessed  be  the 
peacemakers."  And  they  truly  were 
peacemakers.  They  knew  the  road  they 
traveled  was  hard  and  fraught  with 
peril.  They  walked  that  road  with  cool 
professionalism  and  a  deep  sense  of  pur- 
pose. They  knew  it  firsthand  how  an  af- 
flicted mankind  looks  to  us  for  help— 
with  faith  in  our  strength,  our  sense  of 
justice,  and  our  decency.  And  that  is  the 
America  that  your  loved  ones  ex- 
emplified. Let  our  monument  to  their 
memory  be  a  preservation  of  that 
America. 

Let  us  here  in  their  presence  serve 
notice  to  the  cowardly,  skulking  bar- 


barians in  the  world  that  they  will  not 
have  their  way.  Let  us  dedicate 
ourselves  to  the  cause  of  those  loved 
ones,  the  cause  they  served  so  nobly  and 
for  which  they  sacrificed  their  lives,  a 
cause  of  peace  on  earth  and  justice  for 
all  mankind.  We  thank  God  for  them, 
and  God  bless  you. 


SECRETARY'S  REMARKS. 
APR.  26,  1983^ 

One  week  ago,  all  too  many  of  our 
fellow  workers— Lebanese  and 
American— gave  their  lives  in  the  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States  and  the  ideals 
for  which  we  stand. 

On  Saturday  evening,  at  Andrews 
Air  Force  Base  just  outside  Washington, 
I  stood  by  President  Reagan's  side  as 
the  caskets  bearing  the  American  dead 
were  returned  to  their  families  and  their 
homeland. 

The  tide  of  emotion  is  strong;  anger 
at  this  murderous  violence  against  inno- 
cent people,  sorrow  for  the  families 
bereaved,  determination  that  the  noble 
work  in  which  our  diplomats  were 
engaged  will  go  forward.  And  yet, 
beyond  emotion  in  that  Air  Force 
hangar  at  Andrews  was  a  profound 
reminder  of  our  common  humanity: 

•  Our  deep  feelings  for  the  families 
who  shed  their  tears  and  will  miss  the 
touch,  the  warmth,  of  loved  ones; 

•  Our  respect  and  appreciation  for 
the  Foreign  Service  family,  for  people 
who  serve  the  United  States  around  the 
world,  often  at  hazard,  always  in  the 
cause  of  peace  and  justice;  and 

•  Our  pride  in  our  country  that  has 
such  men  and  women  in  its  service — a 
proud  calling,  a  selfless  calling. 

As  our  representatives,  our 
diplomats  tend  to  our  relationships 
around  the  world.  They  explain  our 
society  to  others  and  in  return  convey 
the  viewpoint  of  other  governments  and 
peoples  to  our  own.  In  so  doing,  they 
foster  America's  goals  of  peace,  well- 
being,  and  freedom. 

All  of  us  here  today,  whatever  our 
nationality  or  religion,  are  bound  by 
common  devotion  to  the  cause  of  peace. 
On  behalf  of  those  who  fell  in  Beirut,  we 
offer  our  prayers.  In  their  honor  and 
memory,  we  offer  our  pledge  never  to 
flag  in  pursuit  of  peace. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  25,  1983 
2Press  release  110  of  Apr.  19. 
^Text  from  White  House  press  release 
^Press  release  129  of  Apr.  27.  ■ 


MIDDLE  EAST 


Secretary's  Interview  on 
the  Middle  East 


On  April  22,  1983,  Secretary  Shultz 
was  interviewed  by  Meg  Greenfield, 
editorial  page  editor  of  The  Washington 
Post  The  following  text  was  published  in 
the  Post  on  April  2J,. 

Q.  First  on  the  September  1  peace 
plan,  is  it  dead  as  people  keep  writing 
and  saying  outside  of  government? 

A.  I  don't  think  so.  It  seems  to  me 
that  the  desire,  the  need  for  peace  is  not 
dead.  It's  very  much  alive.  There's  a 
yearning  for  it.  Every  event  that  hap- 
pens only  emphasizes  its  importance, 
and,  if  that's  your  premise,  then 
somewhere  along  the  line  you  have  to 
find  your  way  to  the  parties  in  the 
region  sitting  down  together  and  talking 
about  it.  That's  the  essence  of  the  Presi- 
dent's plan,  the  essence  of  the  Camp 
David  accords. 

Within  that  framework  you  have  to 
find  your  way  to  secure  arrangements 
for  Israel  and  some  manner  of  recogniz- 
ing the  legitimate  needs  and  aspirations 
of  the  Palestinian  people.  The  Presi- 
dent's plan  does  those  things,  and  I 
think,  therefore,  that  it  must  carry  on. 
We  expect  to  keep  working  on  it. 

Q.  How  do  you  get  [Jordan's]  King 
Hussein  to  join  in  the  talks,  after  he 
has  said  he  can't? 

A.  Obviously,  it  isn't  easy,  and  there 
are  plenty  of  problems.  However,  I  think 
that  we'll  continue  to  work  at  all  aspects 
of  the  problems.  It  does  seem  to  me  that 
there's  a  certain  shock  that  has  taken 
hold,  as  I  read  the  cables  from  the 
various  Arab  capitals,  in  which  people 
are  saying  to  themselves,  "Are  we  really 
going  to  pass  this  up?  Maybe  we  can't 
afford  to  do  that."  I  think  it's  well  for 
them  to  talk  among  themselves  and  see 
if  they  aren't  missing  the  boat. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  Hussein 
would  have  made  the  statement  he 
made  if  the  Israelis  and  Lebanese  had 
been  able  to  work  out  a  plan,  an 
agreement,  for  the  evacuation  of 
Israeli  troops?  Do  you  think  Lebanon 
is  one  of  the  principal  problems  for 
Hussein? 

A.  It's  hard  to  say.  It's  something 
that's  really  impossible  to  make  a 
categorical  statement  about.  But  I  do 
have  the  distinct  feeling  that  King 


Hussein  was  ready  to  enter  the  peace 
process  with  the  right  kind  of  Palestin- 
ian delegation,  and  that  at  one 
point— the  weekend  before  last  I  guess 
it  was— he  had  the  kind  of  arrangement 
with  Mr.  Arafat  [Yasir  Arafat,  chair- 
man, Palestine  Liberation  Organization 
(PLO)  executive  committee]  that  would 
have  permitted  him  to  do  that— per- 
mitted him  in  the  sense  that  he  wouldn't 
have  been  undercut  by  Palestinians  or 
his  fellow  Arabs. 

If  that's  the  case,  then  he  was  ready 
to  go  under  the  conditions  that  existed 
then,  but  the  PLO  wouldn't  accept  that 
agreement,  and  that's  what  brought 
about  these  statements. 

Q.  What  agreement  do  you  mean, 
between  the — 

A.  It  can't  be  called  an  agreement 
because  it  didn't  finally  hold,  but,  as  I 
understand  it.  King  Hussein  and  Mr. 
Arafat  worked  out  an  understanding  of 
conditions  that  were  acceptable  to  King 
Hussein  and  seemed  to  be  reasonable, 
whereby  King  Hussein  would  enter  the 
peace  process  or  make  a  statement  that 
he  was  ready  to  do  that,  and  that  he 
would  have  a  Palestinian  delegation  that 
consisted  of  legitimate  Palestinian  peo- 
ple who  could  claim  to  be  genuinely 
representative,  but  who  were  not 
members  of  the  PLO. 

Q.  It  was  reported  in  the  Wall 
Street  Journal— Karen  House's  ar- 
ticle—that President  Reagan  had 
assured  the  King  that  he  wouldn't 
press  him  to  join  the  talks  until  the 
Israelis  had  agreed  to  freeze  the  set- 
tlements. Is  that  the  case,  and  is  that 
still  part  of  the  problem,  if  it  is? 

A.  I  don't  think  it  was  part  of  the 
problem  of  the  King's  announcement, 
because  in  the  President's  September  1 
speech,  he  said  that  it  was  his  view  that 
there  should  be  a  freeze  on  settlement 
activity.  We  have  consistently  continued 
to  emphasize  the  importance  of  that 
because,  after  all,  you're  talking  about  a 
negotiation  dealing  with  an  area,  and,  if 
the  area  is  being  changed  while  you  are 
in  the  process  of  negotiating  or  consider- 
ing negotiating,  it's  tough  to  make  that 
negotiation  as  meaningful  as  it  other- 
wise might  be. 

The  President  has  always  had  that 
position.  What  he  said  to  King  Hussein 
was  that  he  would  continue  to  advocate 


that  position,  but  if  the  King  ann 
his  readiness  to  enter  the  peace  f 
then  we  would  press  harder  on  tl 
tlement  activity.  We'd  have  some 
press  with,  so  to  speak,  when  yoi 
the  Israelis,  "Why  don't  you  slow 
or  freeze  the  settlement  activity  ; 
we  can  have  another  Arab  leader 
bargaining  table?"  They  say,  "We 
me  one." 

If  we  were  able  to  have  this  i 
ment,  then  it  might  be  more  reas 
to  talk  about  this  matter,  and  mc 
fective.  The  King  was  told  that  v 
wouldn't  press  him  to  enter  nego 
until  something  had  been  obtaine 
might  have  decided  to  enter  and 
that  his  first  point  of  discussion. 

King  Hussein  was  assured  b< 
that  the  President  would  continu 
maintain  the  position  in  the  Sept 
initiative,  and  we  have  told  ever 
that  continuously— every  Arab 
ment  that  has  tried  to  change  i 
dent's  position,  and,  for  that  i 
Israeli  questions  about  it.  The 
has  maintained  a  steadfast  posit 
there,  and  fundamentally  that's 
assured  King  Hussein  he  would 

But  I  think  there  is  a  distira 
here  between  a  situation  where 
no  expressed  willingness  on  th 
King  Hussein  or  other  Arab  le 
enter  the  peace  process  while 
still  settlement  activity,  and  a 
situation  where  King  Hussein  i 
ready  to  sit  down  and  negotial) 
these,  and  I've  committed  mys^ 
that,  but  before  I  actually  sit  d 
think  there  ought  to  be  some  i 
this."  Those  are  two  different  s 

What  the  President  sa: 
enter  the  negotiation,  say  you'l 
to  enter  the  negotiation,  I  will  nfl 
you  to  actually  sit  down  at  the  b  f 
ing  table  unless  we  can  find  somw 
of  freeze." 

Of  course,  King  Hussein  mig'^ 
decide  to  sit  down  anyway  and  s  ' 
first  thing  I  want  to  talk  about  i:'i 
tlement  freeze."  But  we  haven  t  ' 
to  that  point. 

Q.  Is  there  anything  thatyi* 
pect  you  could  get  from  the  Isill 
that  King  Hussein  could  in  tur*" 
get  the  PLO  back  into  this  acti'i 
terms  of  either  Lebanon  or  set' 
tlements? 

A.  I  think  the  PLO  peopK  '  ' 
make  up  their  own  minds,  a 
think  that  we  should  be  woi  i , 


Departnnent  of  State  H 


MIDDLE  EAST 


g  of  additional  things  to  induce 
)  change  their  behavior.  The 
nt  has  put  a  very  forthcoming 
-.ginative  program  on  the  table 
when  read  with  the  full  Camp 
.ccords,  the  processes  and  com- 
ts  in  them,  give,  I  should  think,  a 
?nse  of  hope  to  Palestinian  peo- 
ticularly  those  living  in  the  West 
id  Gaza  Strip.  So  that's  enough, 
ink  that  particularly  people  who 
0  lead  a  group  like  Palestinian 
n  the  Middle  East,  and  to  repre- 
'.  interests  of  those  people  as 
oeings,  have  to  come  forward  at 
age  of  the  game  and  influence 
inking. 

believe  you  said  at  some  point 
press  conference  that  the  FLO 
felted  its  mandate  to  speak  for 
;stinians.  Who  would  be  the 
lians  who  could  come  forward 
place?  Would  they  be  West 
ilestinians?  How  could  that  be 
about? 

ve  forgotten  precisely  what  the 
ere  that  I  used.  I  don't  think  I 
feited,"  but  I  did  say  if  they  are 
dership  of  a  group  and  there's 
tunity  for  something  construc- 
they  don't  do  it,  it  certainly 
question  whether  or  not  they 
)ntinue  to  have  that  leadership. 
ik  that  that's  true.  I  used  the 
Jse  it  or  lose  it."  What  other 
'alestinian  representation  there 
emains  to  be  seen,  but  there 
rts  of  possibilities. 

)  bring  in  possibly  West  Bank 
or  some  other  Palestinians, 
lid  this  be  done  or  in  what 

lave  some  ideas,  but  I  think 
Titical  to  find  the  ideas  that  the 
11  be  comfortable  with.  Right 
;nk  it's  up  to  them  to  find  those 
i  to  find  a  way  into  this  peace 

!  we  could  go  back  to  Lebanon 
iment,  what  is  possible  in  the 

ssuring  or  reassuring  the 

shat  the  apparently 

tened  Syrian  forces  will  abide 

raeli-Lebanese  agreement  for 
ijiation  of  foreign  troops  from 
»?  How  do  you  see  that  playing 

-le  Syrians  have  said  consistent- 
ey  will  withdraw  as  Israel 
's.  assimiing  that  the  Govern- 
'  vebaiKin  asks  them  to  do  so. 


I'm  sure  the  government  will  ask  them 
to  do  so. 

They  seem  to  have  changed  their 
pitch  here  in  the  last  week  or  so.  Maybe 
that  represents  a  sense  on  their  part 
that  perhaps  there  will  be  an  Israeli- 
Lebanese  agreement,  and  they'll  then 
have  their  commitment  called.  But  I 
think  basically  we  are  engaged  in  a  proc- 
ess there  where  we  first  have  to  find  the 
conditions  under  which  Israel  will 
withdraw,  and  I  think  those  have  to  be 
conditions  that  are  consistent  with  the 
sovereignty  and  dignity  of  Lebanon  and 
provide  adequate  security  for  Israel  so 
that  we  get  genuine  full  withdrawal  by 
Israel. 

Once  a  satisfactory  agreement  is 
reached — assuming  that  it  will  be 
reached,  and  I  think  that  it's  possible  all 
right— then  we  have  to  say  to  the 
Syrians,  "All  right,  the  Israelis  have 
agreed  to  withdraw,  now  it's  up  to  you," 
and  try  to  work  out  some  sort  of 
schedule. 

Q.  Do  the  Russians  have  to  be 
brought  back  more  into  the  diplomacy 
in  the  Middle  East  now,  given  that 
heavy  involvement  with  the  Syrians? 

A.  I  think  Syria  is,  I  presume,  a 
sovereign  nation  and  can  make  up  its 
mind  what  it  is  going  to  do.  But,  from 
our  standpoint,  I  think  the  first  thing  is 
to  work  on  an  agreement  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon,  and  then  on  the  basis  of 
that  agreement,  call  upon  Syria  and  the 
PLO  and  others  who  are  there  to  with- 
draw from  Lebanese  territory  and  get 
on  with  the  job  of  reconstruction  of 
Lebanon  and  reconciliation  of  Lebanon. 
There  are  plenty  of  problems  for 
Lebanon  to  face,  and  we  want  to  be 
helpful  to  Lebanon  in  that  regard. 

Q.  It  is  feasible  to  you,  then,  that 
the  Israelis  themselves  would  reach  an 
agreement  with  the  Lebanese  without 
guarantees  of  the  Syrians  or,  for  that 
matter,  the  PLO  abiding  by  its  terms. 

A.  I  think  that  the  agreement  be- 
tween Lebanon  and  Israel  will  deal  with 
the  relationship  between  those  countries 
and  the  security  arrangements  in 
southern  Lebanon. 

I  am  sure  also  that  the  Israelis  will 
condition  their  withdrawal  on  the 
withdrawal  of  the  other  occupying 
forces.  So  there  is  that  much  of  a  con- 
nection there. 

Q.  How  would  you  characterize 
the  state  of  our  relations  with  the 
Israelis  on  these  questions  now?  Are 
we  pushing:  do  we  need  more 


leverage;  are  we  in  disagreement  on, 
let  us  say,  things  beyond  the  set- 
tlements and  in  the  evacuation  talks 
themselves? 

A.  I  think  the  basic  fact  that  makes 
an  agreement  between  Lebanon  and 
Israel  very  likely  and  desirable  for  both 
parties  is  that  they  agree  on  the  essen- 
tial ingredients.  That  is,  they  both  want 
a  secure  southern  Lebanon.  Neither 
wants  to  see  PLO  terrorist  groups 
reenter  that  country,  and  particularly 
that  area.  So  it  isn't  as  though  they're  at 
cross  purposes.  They  have  the  same  ob- 
jective. That  being  the  case,  the  con- 
struction of  security  arrangements  is  not 
a  matter,  you  might  say,  of  high  princi- 
ple or  strategy  or  something  like  that. 
It's  a  question  of  working  out  in  a  kind 
of  tactical  way  what  those  arrangements 
are,  consistent  with  Lebanese  sovereign- 
ty, and  give  assurance  of  security  in  the 
area.  Both  parties  want  it. 

I  think  in  that  environment,  we — 
and  particularly  in  the  person  of  Phil 
Habib  and  Morris  Draper  [Ambassador 
Philip  C.  Habib,  special  representative  of 
the  President  to  the  Middle  East,  and 
Ambassador  Morris  Draper,  special 
negotiator  for  Lebanon]— have  been 
very  helpful  in  trying  to  develop  the 
modalities  for  that.  As  I  have  been  talk- 
ing with  them  and  reviewing  the  situa- 
tion regularly  and  talking  with  the 
Israelis  and  the  Lebanese  when  they 
were  here  a  few  weeks  ago,  I  think  you 
can  see  a  tremendous  amount  of  ac- 
complishment. 

It  isn't  as  though  they're  just  at  a 
dead  end  and  haven't  gotten  anywhere. 
They  have  gotten  a  long  distance,  but 
they  haven't  quite  reached  the  end  of  the 
road. 

Q.  On  the  settlements,  and  the 
idea  of  the  freeze  on  the  settlements, 
there  doesn't  seem  to  be  any  progress 
from  our  point  of  view,  does  there, 
toward  that? 

A.  I  can't  see  any,  no. 

Q.  What  can  we  do  to  encourage 
progress,  or  what  leverage  do  we 
have? 

A.  I  continue  to  feel  that  the  great 
leverage  involved  is  the  leverage  of 
potential  peace.  I  felt  that  all  along,  and 
I  felt  that  for  years  as  I  visited  around 
in  the  area.  It  was  that  magical  possibili- 
ty that  turned  people  on  so  much  when 
President  Sadat  made  his  bold  move. 

I  think  that  is  the  basic  ingredient 


63 


MIDDLE  EAST 


and  at  the  same  time  it's  hard  to  exer- 
cise that  ingredient  until  there  is  a  visi- 
ble willingness  on  the  part  of  the  Arab 
world  personified  by  somebody,  some 
country,  to  say  I  am  ready  to  sit  down 
and  discuss  peace  with  Israel. 

King  Hussein  wants  to  do  that.  He 
has  told  us  that,  and  he  said  so  publicly. 
But  he  needs  to  have  support  in  the 
Arab  world  to  do  so  and  to  do  so  effec- 
tively. 

Q.  How  do  you  account  for  Mr. 
Arafat's  apparent  change  of  mind,  the 
collapse  of  the  arrangement  between 
him  and  the  King? 

A.  I  read  all  sorts  of  things  about 
the  PLO,  but  I  don't  have  an  answer  for 
that  question.  I  could  speculate  about  it, 
but  it  wouldn't  be  particularly  useful. 

The  basic  fact  is  that  there  was  a 
very  reasonable  proposition  in  front  of 
him  that  could  and  eventually  will  result 
in  a  better  life  for  Palestinians.  Some- 
how in  the  processes  of  the  organization 
called  the  PLO,  they  were  not  able  to  af- 
firm that  proposition.  It's  too  bad.  Why, 
exactly,  I  don't  know. 

Q.  Do  you  read  the  bombing  of  the 
embassy  in  Beirut  as  having  had  any 
impact  on  the  larger  policies  in  the 
area,  in  terms  of  this  settlement? 

A.  If  anything,  it  makes  us  more 
determined.  I  suppose  it  raises  the  con- 
sciousness of  everybody  about  the  gen- 
uine security  concerns  that  you  must 
have  in  that  area,  although  I  think  the 
bombing  of  an  embassy  or  a  building 
somewhere  is  something  that  could  hap- 
pen anywhere  in  the  world.  We've  had 
lots  of  bomb  scares  around  buildings  in 
San  Francisco.  Actual  bombs  go  off  in 
lots  of  buildings  in  this  country.  It's  a 
tragic  affair,  and  it  highlights  these  con- 
cerns. When  you  talk  about  the  Presi- 
dent, I  think  it  makes  him  even  more 
determined  to  press  on  and  try  to  bring 
about  a  more  peaceful  environment. 

I  do  think  that  there  will  be  a  genu- 
inely more  peaceful  environment  in 
Lebanon  when  the  foreign  forces  leave 
because  there  are  elements  in  the  forces 
in  the  Syrian  sector,  PLO  and  Iranian 
elements,  that  are  actively  disrupting. 
When  they  leave  the  country,  there  will 
be  a  better  control  over  the  situation. 

Q.  Is  it  your  analysis  or  under- 
standing that  the  Iranian  group  that 
claimed  responsibility  for  this  was,  in 
fact,  the  one  who  did  it? 


A.  I  am  not  aware  that  there  is  a 
smoking  gun,  so  to  speak,  that  has  been 
identified.  A  group  has  claimed  the 
credit,  and  the  fact  that  they  would  use 
a  word  like  that  for  the  event  is  a  com- 
mentary on  them.  But,  at  any  rate, 
there  are  various  other  bits  and  pieces 
of  circumstantial  evidence  that  point  in 
that  direction,  but  there  is  no  real  hard 
proof. 

Q.  Talk  a  bit,  if  you  will,  about 
how  you  hope  to  gin  things  up  on  your 
trip,  get  things  going  again  on  the 
September  1  peace  plan;  what  you 
hope  to  do. 

A.  I've  been  involved  in  lots  of 
negotiations  over  a  period  of  time.  I  just 
sort  of  get  into  them  and  try  to  see 
what  seems  reasonable  and  talk  to  peo- 
ple. That  is  about  what  I  will  do. 

First,  our  emphasis  will  be  in  the 
trip  on  the  Israeli-Lebanon  negotiations 
in  trying  to  get  that  settled,  or  as  close 
to  settlement  as  possible.  Following 
that,  of  course,  to  follow  on,  if  we  have 
the  opportunity,  to  get  the  conditions 
for  Syria  and  PLO  and  other  with- 
drawals as  well. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  be  work- 
ing on  the  peace  process  but  starting 
with  the  Camp  David  partners,  so  my 
first  stop  will  be  in  Cairo.  We  will  talk 
with  the  Egyptians,  and  we  plan  to  have 
a  meeting  there  of  the  ambassadors 
from  the  key  countries  involved.  We'll 
have  a  good  amount  of  time  with  them. 

They're  an  extremely  able  group, 
very  well  informed.  I  expect  to  learn 
something  from  the  discussions,  and 
perhaps  they'll  all  learn  something  from 
the  interaction  involved.  Phil  Habib  will 
be  there  and  Morrie  Draper  as  well.  We 
will  sort  of  make  our  initial  plan  and  go 
on  from  there  to  Israel  and  Lebanon. 

I  hope  that  as  the  time  goes  on  I'll 
have  an  opportunity  to  visit  Amman  and 
Riyadh,  but  I  think  we  have  to  concen- 
trate first  on— 

Q.  On  this  trip? 

A.  We  have  to  concentrate  first  on 
the  Camp  David  partners  and  on  the 
Israeli-Lebanon  arena.  Of  course,  that 
also  leads  to  Syria.  And  if  we  have 
something  to  talk  with  Syria  about, 
namely,  an  agreement  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon  for  Israeli  withdrawal — 

Q.  You  would  go  to  Syria? 

A.  Then,  we  naturally  want  to  take 
the  next  step  and  arrange  for  Syrian 
withdrawal.  I  think  the  way  for  me  to 
think  about  this  now  is  that  I'm  going  to 
go  to  Cairo,  and  I'm  going  to  talk  to  the 
Lebanese  and  the  Israelis,  and  we  are 


interested  in  the  evacuation  of  l.^  Ii  > 
And,  of  course,  we're  interested  m 
peace  process,  but  we'll  start  that  • 
and  we'll  see  how  it  unfolds  and  tr- 
do  sensible  things  as  we  go  alonK. 

Q.  Do  you  intend  to  go  to  Jor  i, 
or  is  that  also  contingent? 

A.  I  would  certainly  hope  very 
to  have  a  chance  to  visit  with  King 
Hussein  and  King  Fahd  [of  Saudi 
Arabia]  as  well  as  Mr.  Assad  [of  Sj 
But  I  think  the  priority  has  to  be  o 
ting  the  Lebanon  situation  straight 
out. 

Q.  Are  there  any  Palestinians 
ficial  or  unofficial,  leaders  that  y 
expect  to  be  talking  with. 

A.  No,  I  certainly  have  no  plar 
meet  with  anyone  from  the  PLO,  t 
is  what  you're  getting  at. 

Q.  Informal  meetings  in  the  1 
bies  of  hotels? 

A.  No  meetings. 

Q.  There  is  a  view  that  the 
Israelis,  by  being  difficult  about 
withdrawing  from  Lebanon  or  ta 
time  and  making  more  settlemen 
the  West  Bank,  can  in  fact,  prev. 
peace  plan  that  they  find  uncomf 
able  from  getting  anywhere.  Do . 
have  a  thought  about  that? 

A.  I've  heard  that  said  a  lot  ar 
read  it  in  the  papers.  Against  that 
have  to  put  the  fact  that  a  great  d 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  neg 
tions  with  Lebanon.  I  personally  h. 
doubt  that  the  Israelis  want  to  wit 
from  Lebanon  under  the  right  circ 
stances.  It's  not  that  easy  to  find  t 
right  circumstances.  It  has  certaia 
taken  a  lot  longer  than  we  expecte 
would  like.  But,  nevertheless,  I  thi 
that  it's  possible  and  do-able.  That' 
side  of  the  equation. 

On  the  settlements,  I  think  it's 
very  important  issue.  It  cuts  in  hot 
directions.  I  know  that  the  Israelis 
strongly  that  there  was  a  time,  bei 
they  were  the  occupying  force,  wh' 
Jews  were  not  welcomed  to  live  in 
West  Bank,  and  so  the  settlements 
a  point. 

I  might  note  that  in  the  Presid 
plan  it's  very  explicit  that  if  the  se 
want  to  stay  in  their  settlement,  tl 
stay,  but  they  would  live  under  thf 
jurisdiction  of  whatever  is  the  juri: 
tion  of  that  territory.  In  the  Presic 
plan,  it's  perfectly  consistent  with  • 
living  in  the  West  Bank.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bi^ 


it  of  Sultan  of  Oman 


MIDDLE  EAST 


His  Majesty  Qaboos  bin  Said,  Sultan 
of  Oman,  made  a  state  visit  to  the  United 
States  April  11-15,  198S.  While  in 
Washington,  D.C.,  April  12-15,  he  met 
with  President  Reagan  and  other  govern- 
ment officials. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
President  Reagan  and  the  Sultan  at  the 
arrival  ceremony  on  April  12.'- 


ARRIVAL  CEREMONY, 
APR.  12,  19832 


President  Reagan 

Your  Majesty,  it's  always  a  pleasure  for 
me  to  meet  good  friends  on  behalf  of  the 
American  people.  But  welcoming  you,  a 
courageous  and  admirable  leader,  is,  in- 
deed, an  honor.  I've  read  of  your  many 
accomplishments,  your  commitment  to 
your  people,  and  your  dedication  to  your 
ideals.  And  I've  looked  forward  to  this 
day  when  we  could  meet  face  to  face. 

The  American  people  are  deeply  im- 
pressed by  what  you've  achieved.  Since 
you  assumed  leadership,  your  country's 
progress— economically,  socially,  and 
politically— has  established  your  reputa- 
tion as  a  compassionate  leader  who  can 
get  things  done.  In  an  inspiring  commit- 
ment to  the  long-run  interest  of  your 
people,  you've  built  a  modern  education 
system  of  which  any  country  would  be 
proud.  Similarly,  the  level  of  health  care 
available  to  your  people  is  testimony  to 
the  humane  character  and  businesslike 
efficiency  of  your  leadership,  and  your 
building  the  infrastructure  of  a  modern 
economy,  fulfilling  the  prerequisites  for 
progress  for  your  people. 

We're  pleased  that  as  your  friends 
we  were  able  to  make  some  small,  but 
we  hope  significant,  contribution  to  your 
I    bold  endeavors.  In  your  1980  National 
I    Day  address,  you  put  forth  a  goal  to 
I    your  people.  You  said,  "Self-reliance  is 
I    to  be  the  keystone  of  all  our  plans  for 
^   the  future."  With  this  as  a  guidepost, 
I'  you  have  moved  forward  to  diversify 
I   your  economy.  Now  the  people  of  Oman 
I   are  able  to  rely  on  agriculture,  mining, 
I  industry,  fishing,  and  other  commercial 
a  endeavors,  in  addition  to  oil,  to  support 
I  an  acceptable  quality  of  life.  We  applaud 
this  farsighted  approach  and  hope  that 
we  can  continue  to  play  a  helpful  role. 


MIDDLE  EAST 


But,  as  you're  keenly  aware,  peace 
and  security  are  irreplaceable  ingre- 
dients for  progress.  It  is  no  secret  that 
vital  national  interests  motivate  the 
United  States  in  the  Middle  East.  We 
and  our  allies  depend  on  oil  originating 
there,  much  of  it  moving  close  to  your 
shores  through  the  Straits  of  Hormuz. 
Yet,  unlike  another  world  power  which 
encourages  and  exploits  conflict,  the 
United  States  sees  its  interests  fulfilled 
in  regional  peace  and  stability.  We  are 
thus  committed  to  work  with  those  in 
the  Middle  East  who  need  our  help  to 
secure  peace  and  to  deter  outside  ag- 
gression. To  this  end,  we've  made  rapid 
progress  in  recent  years,  developing  the 
capability  of  coming  to  the  assistance  of 
our  friends,  wherever  they  may  be. 

I'd  like  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
thank  you  for  your  support  of  our  ef- 
forts to  deter  aggression.  The  brutality 
we've  witnessed  in  Afghanistan— the  at- 
tempt to  suppress  an  entire  population, 
the  debasement  of  its  religion  and  the 
use  of  chemical  weapons  and  other 
crimes  against  civilization — suggests 
that  our  concerns  are  well  founded. 

In  recent  years  you've  made  many 
laudable  contributions  to  peace.  We  ap- 
preciate, for  example,  your  continued 
support  for  peaceful  accommodation  be- 
tween Israel,  Egypt,  and  its  other  Arab 
neighbors.  The  United  States  remains 
morally  committed  to  further  progress 
in  the  direction  of  peace  and  security  for 
all  the  peoples  of  the  Middle  East. 

The  plan  I  outlined  on  September  1 
last  year  is  still  on  the  table.  While  there 
may  be  bumps  along  the  way,  we  will 
not  be  deterred  from  our  long-term  ob- 
jective, which  is  a  broadbased  settlement 
firmly  grounded  on  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338  and  consistent 
with  the  Camp  David  framework. 

As  we  speak  now,  radical  elements 
are  seeking  to  prevent  an  agreement 
which  would  permit  King  Hussein  of 
Jordan  to  join  the  peace  process.  The 
choices  facing  the  Palestinian  leaders 
are  clear— either  the  status  quo  and  the 
continued  frustration  of  their  people's 
aspirations  or  a  bold  and  courageous 
move  to  break  the  deadlock.  For  our 
part,  we  will  not  permit  the  forces  of 
violence  and  terror  to  exercise  a  veto 
over  the  peace  process. 

Commenting  about  the  conflicts  sur- 
rounding Israel,  you  recently  observed, 
"People  now  want  to  see  the  problem 
solved  once  and  for  all  in  every  respect." 
That  is  certainly  our  desire.  And  I  can 
assure  you,  we  will  spare  no  effort  to 
put  an  end  to  the  killing  and  to  bring 


this  dreadful  chapter  in  Middle  East 
history  to  a  conclusion  acceptable  to  all 
sides.  I  look  forward  to  discussing  this 
problem  and  other  important  matters 
relating  to  Middle  East  peace  with  you 
today. 

Lasting  peace  will  come  when  in- 
dividuals of  good  will,  though  in 
disagreement  at  times,  work  together  to 
prevent  conflict.  We  have  followed  with 
interest  your  own  efforts  to  foster 
regional  cooperation,  particularly  the  im- 
provement in  your  relations  with  South 
Yemen.  We  wish  you  continued  success 
in  your  attempts  to  eliminate  the  causes 
of  tension  and  instability  in  the  gulf. 

We're  proud  to  be  on  your  side  in 
your  quest  for  a  better  life  for  your  peo- 
ple and  your  search  for  peace  and 
stability.  Relations  between  our  two 
peoples  have  spanned  a  century  and  a 
half.  I  am  confident  that  your  visit  today 
will  serve  to  further  strengthen  the 
bonds  between  us.  We're  happy  that  you 
have  come  to  visit.  Welcome. 

Sultan  Qaboos 

I  greatly  appreciate  the  warm  and 
generous  words  with  which  you  have 
welcomed  me  to  your  great  country  to- 
day. It  gives  me  particular  pleasure  that 
this,  my  first  state  visit,  should  so  happi- 
ly coincide  with  the  150th  anniversary  of 
the  establishment  of  those  friendly  rela- 
tions which  have  remained  constant  be- 
tween our  two  countries  to  the  present 
day. 

That  these  relations  should  have 
stood  the  test  of  time  with  constancy  is 
hardly  surprising,  for  our  two  peoples 
share  common  and  deeply  cherished 
traditions  which  lie  at  the  very  founda- 
tion of  our  national  existence.  Indeed,  it 
was  these  profound  beliefs  in  tolerance, 
justice,  and  determination  to  defend 
freedom  and  to  uphold  the  sanctity  of 
human  rights  which  provided  the  great 
impulse  which  brought  men  from  many 
parts  of  the  world  more  than  200  years 
ago  in  a  pilgrimage  to  this  beautiful  land 
to  realize  their  dream  of  a  new  life  and 
to  found  a  nation  which  would  enshrine 
those  principles  forever. 

Over  the  years  the  United  States  of 
America  has  striven  unceasingly  to 
make  this  world  a  better  place  for 
humanity,  but  nothing  you  have 
achieved  has  surpassed  the  example  of 
your  steadfast  championship  of  those 
principles  often  at  great  sacrifice  and  in 
the  face  of  the  most  daunting  obstacles. 
I  and  my  people  who  have,  ourselves, 
fought  through  many  bitter  years  of 
struggle  to  maintain  our  country's 


freedom — and  will  do  so  again  sh 
the  need  ever  arise — are  deeply  c 
scious  of  this,  for  we  know  from  ( 
own  experience  that  peace  must  ^ 
in  hand  with  dignity  and  freedom 
life,  if  it  is  to  be  worth  living,  can 
be  founded  on  justice  and  respect 
humanity  and  that  these  prizes  ai 
easily  won  or  preserved. 

I  believe  that  the  world  has  n 
stood  in  greater  need  for  these  v; 
than  it  does  today.  In  recent  year 
forces  of  aggression,  intolerance, 
lawless  ambition  have  increasing! 
sought  to  impose  their  will  on  ma 
The  world  has  had  no  respite  froi 
continuing  threat  of  instability. 

Nowhere  has  this  threat  beer 
acutely  felt  than  in  our  own  regie 
the  Middle  East,  where  we  and  o 
brother  states  of  the  Gulf  Cooper 
Council  have  pledged  ourselves  t( 
together  in  the  closest  accord  to 
safeguard  our  peoples  and  our  ar 
culture. 

I  welcome  the  constructive  u) 
standing  your  country  is  showing 
problems  which  confront  our  reg 
And  I  am  convinced  that  the  me; 
you  have  taken  will  greatly  contr 
the  maintenance  of  peace  and  sei 
there.  I  also  warmly  commend  tl 
endeavors  you  have  made  to  heli; 
about  an  honorable  solution  to  th 
stategic  Middle  East  situation, 
endeavors  which,  as  you  know,  L 
has  unswervingly  supported.  It  i; 
perative  that  efforts  to  achie\e  tl 
tion  continue  not  only  in  the  cans 
common  humanity  but  because  S( 
as  the  present  situation  persists, 
long  will  it  present  a  continuing  i 
to  world  peace  and  provide  the  o 
tunity  for  those  forces  which  e\p 
misery  and  dissention  it  perpetua 
further  their  own  ambitions. 

I  am  sure  that  my  visit  will  ii 
serve  as  a  reaffirmation  of  the  c 
relationship  that  has  for  so  long  i 
between  our  two  countries  but  w 
ther  strengthen  the  mutual  confii 
and  understanding  upon  which  th 
tionship  rests. 


'Texts  from  Weekly  Compilation 
Presidential  Documents  of  Apr.  18,  1  i 

^Held  on  the  South  Lawn  of  the  '  H 
House,  where  the  Sultan  was  accordt  i 
mal  welcome  with  full  military  honi>r;  I 


Department  of  State  E  I' 


RCOTICS 


1984  Assistance  Requests 
Narcotics  Control 


minick  L.  DiCarlo 

iiti'inint  lirfnf,'  thi'  S, -note  Foreign 

n„s  CntHnnttrr  n„  Mnrrh  9.  198S. 
iCiirIn  IS  Assisliiiit  Secretary  for 
ational  Na7rotic$  Matters.' 

ureau  of  International  Narcotics 
rs  proposes  an  authorization  of 
ion  for  fiscal  years  1984  and 
The  Administration  has  asked  the 
ess  for  an  appropriation  in  that 
it  for  fiscal  year  1984.  Most  of  the 
jed  increase  of  $13  million  over 
iministration's  1983  request  of  $40 
1  represents  the  estimated  costs  of 
tantial  expansion  of  crop  eradica- 
■ograms  we  hope  to  negotiate  this 
rhe  1984  request  is  $16  million 
he  1983  funding  level  established 
igress  through  continuing  resolu- 


S  AND  OBJECTIVES 

iministration's  goals  and  objec- 

international  narcotics  control 

eclared  in  the  Federal  strategy 

-esident  Reagan  endorsed  Octo- 


e  Bureau's  primary  mission  is  to 
the  flow  of  illicit  drugs  from 
Durces  to  the  United  States.  An 
ted  90%  of  the  illicit  narcotics 
led  in  the  United  States  are  of 
origin.  The  worldwide  supply  of 
ma,  cocaine,  heroin,  and  other 
s  so  great  and  trafficking  chan- 
the  United  States  so  diverse  that 
interdictions  and  even  crop 
tions,  when  achieved  in  only  one 
producing  areas,  have  caused 
mporary  declines  in  availability. 
2  Department's  program  strategy 
efore,  predicated  on  the  ultimate 
^e  of  controlling  production 
.neously  in  all  key  geographic  sec- 
illicit  drugs  exported  to  the 
States,  so  that  significant  and 
reductions  in  availability  are 
d.  We  believe  that  preventing 
;ion  and  destroying  illicit  nar- 
t  their  source  will  ultimately 
0  be  the  most  effective  means  of 
g  availability. 

reaping  with  that  ultimate  objec- 
e  Bureau's  first  priority,  in 


negotiating  bilateral  agreements  and  in 
discussions  on  multilateral  projects  with 
international  organizations  which  we 
fund,  is  on  crop  control— government 
bans  on  cultivation  and  production,  en- 
forced by  manual  or  chemical  crop 
eradication.  Our  second  priority  is  on  in- 
terdiction as  close  to  the  production 
source  as  possible  and  supported  by 
other  enforcement  activities,  and  then 
on  interdiction  of  drugs  as  they  move 
from  producing  areas  and  through  tran- 
sit countries  to  the  United  States. 

The  major  drug-producing  and  traf- 
ficking countries  are  parties  to  conven- 
tions which  obligate  them  to  control  the 
production  and  distribution  of  illicit 
drugs.  Our  international  strategy  is 
based  on  encouraging  and,  where  neces- 
sary, assisting  these  countries  in 
meeting  their  responsibilities  for  reduc- 
ing the  cultivation,  production,  and  traf- 
ficking in  illicit  drugs  within  their 
borders. 


HIGHLIGHTS  OF  PROPOSED 
BUDGET 

Our  requested  authorization  supports  a 
proposed  budget  for  FY  1984  of  $53 
million,  an  increase  of  $13  million  over 
the  Administration's  FY  1983  congres- 
sional request  and  $16  million  over  the 
FY  1983  budget  established  by  continu- 
ing resolution. 

The  increase  consists  primarily  of 
proposed  additional  expenditures  for 
crop  eradication  programs  in  South 
America.  We  hope  that  we  can  suc- 
cessfully negotiate  agreements  in  FY 
1983  to  control  coca  production  in 
Bolivia  and  marijuana  and  coca  produc- 
tion in  Colombia. 

Proposed  expenditures  for  Latin 
America  are  $30  million,  an  increase  of 
$13  million  over  FY  1983  planned  ex- 
penditures. The  budget  for  East  Asia  is 
$8.9  million,  a  proposed  increase  of  $1.3 
million;  the  budget  for  Southwest  Asia  is 
$4.7  million,  a  proposed  increase  of 
$750,000. 

These  increases  would  raise  expendi- 
tures for  countrv  programs  by  $15 
million  from  $28  million  in  1983  to  $43.7 
million  in  FY  1984.  The  budget  also  in- 
cludes $2.6  million  for  international 
organizations;  $400,000  for  demand 


reduction;  $3.5  million  for  training;  and 
$2.9  million  for  program  development 
and  support. 

Our  responsibilities  and  programs  in- 
clude policy  development;  diplomatic  ini- 
tiatives; bilateral  and  multilateral 
assistance  for  crop  control,  interdiction, 
and  related  enforcement  activities  in 
producer  and  transit  nations;  develop- 
ment assistance;  technical  assistance  for 
demand  reduction;  and  training  for 
foreign  personnel  in  narcotics  enforce- 
ment and  related  procedures. 


LATIN  AMERICAN  REGIONAL 
STRATEGY 

Latin  America  is  the  source  of  cocaine, 
the  major  source  of  marijuana,  and  the 
transshipment  center  for  most  of  the  il- 
licit methaqualone  entering  the  United 
States.  Our  FY  1984  request  is  based  on 
our  engaging  in  crop  control  programs 
in  Colombia— the  key  marijuana  produc- 
ing country  in  the  area— and  in  Bolivia 
and  Peru— the  two  principal  producers 
of  illicit  coca— while  continuing  our  sup- 
port of  the  successful  Mexican  eradica- 
tion programs  and  selected  interdiction 
projects.  Our  budget  request  also  allows 
for  support  of  an  agreement  to  assist 
the  Colombians  in  an  expanded  coca  con- 
trol program. 


Country  Programs 

Particular  attention  is  being  focused  on 
Colombia,  which  produces  an  estimated 
86%  of  marijuana  imports— 79%  of  the 
U.S.  supply— exports  up  to  75%  of  the 
cocaine  consumed  in  the  United  States, 
and  has  been  the  major  transit  point  for 
illicit  methaqualone  entering  the  United 
States.  Our  concerns  about  this  produc- 
tion and  trafficking  in  marijuana  and  co- 
caine were  expressed  by  President 
Reagan  during  his  Colombia  trip  in 
December.  Our  budget  is  predicated  on 
Colombia  undertaking  a  program  for 
marijuana  eradication  while  continuing 
and,  hopefully,  expanding  its  coca  con- 
trol program. 

In  1981,  the  Colombian  interdiction 
program  supported  by  the  Bureau  seized 
3,310  metric  tons  of  marijuana,  a  345% 
increase  over  1980,  and  66  million  units 
of  illicit  methaqualone,  a  380%  increase. 
In  1982,  Colombian  officials  seized 
another  3,409  metric  tons  of  marijuana, 
41  million  units  of  methaqualone,  and 
881  kilograms  of  cocaine.  The  manual 
destruction  program  the  Bureau  sup- 
ports resulted  in  the  destruction  of  some 
9  million  marijuana  plants  and  29  million 


NARCOTICS 


coca  plants  during  1982.  A  new  bilateral 
extradition  treaty  with  Colombia  is  now 
in  force,  and  a  legal  mutual  assistance 
treaty  is  pending  ratification  by  Colom- 
bia. Our  request  for  FY  84  is  $8.9 
million. 

We  are  attempting  to  negotiate  a 
plan  for  assisting  Bolivia  in  a  crop  con- 
trol program  which  could  reduce  its 
enormous  coca  cultivation  to  levels  re- 
quired for  legitimate  purposes.  Our  FY 
1984  request  is  predicated  on  concluding 
and  implementing  such  an  agreement. 
Our  funding,  which  was  limited  to 
$240,000  in  administrative  support  costs 
during  FY  1982,  was  increased  to 
$900,000  in  FY  1983  to  start  this  pro- 
gram. We  project  that  $7.7  million  is 
needed  in  FY  1984  for  a  major  crop  con- 
trol and  interdiction  program. 

We  entered  into  an  agreement  with 
Peru  on  a  coca  control  program  in 
August  1981,  concurrent  with  AID's 
[U.S.  Agency  for  International  Develop- 
ment] 5-year  rural  development  pro- 
gram. We  have  expressed  concern  about 
delays  in  this  project  and  were 
reassured  by  the  Peruvian  Government 
in  January  that  the  crop  control  pro- 
gram required  by  our  agreement  would 
be  implemented  in  the  Upper  Huallaga 
Valley  this  year.  The  Bureau  continues 
to  support  Peruvian  narcotics  enforce- 
ment agencies.  Reports  for  1982  indicate 
that  seizures  of  cocaine  and  cocaine 
paste  and  base  were  down  from  1981 
levels  but  that  the  amount  of  dried  coca 
leaf  rose  sharply  from  26,781  kilograms 
to  85,454  kilograms,  and  that  178 
jungle-based  coca  labs  were  captured 
compared  to  53  in  1981.  These  reports 
indicate  that  the  amount  of  leaf  cap- 
tured was  equivalent  to  850  kilograms  of 
cocaine  paste,  a  partial  offset  against 
the  decline  of  1,681  kilograms  in  cocaine 
paste  seizures.  We  have  budgeted  $4 
million  for  Peru  in  FY  1984. 

We  are  requesting  $8.5  million  to 
support  Mexican  narcotic  control  pro- 
grams. Mexico  once  supplied  the  bulk  of 
the  heroin  imported  into  this  country, 
but  a  U.S. -supported  Mexican  aerial 
eradication  program  substantially  re- 
duced heroin  production  from  the  high 
level  of  6.5  tons  in  1975  to  an  estimated 
1.6  tons  in  1981.  From  December  1981 
to  December  1982,  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment reported  spraying  15,956  opium 
fields,  totaling  943  hectares  and  11,046 
marijuana  fields,  totaling  788  hectares. 

We  have  budgeted  $400,000  for  sup- 
port of  Ecuador's  interdiction  program 
and  $650,000  for  projects  in  the  Latin 
American  region. 

The  Department  recently  facilitated 


cooperation  between  the  Governments  of 
Mexico  and  Belize  which  resulted  in 
aerial  eradication  of  marijuana  in  Belize. 
We  also  helped  establish  a  new  working 
relationship  between  the  Government  of 
Mexico  and  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard. 

The  Secretary  of  State  is  a  member 
of  the  South  Florida  task  force  and, 
while  our  primary  assignment  in  task 
force  directives  is  to  pursue  crop  control 
agreements  with  Colombia,  Bolivia, 
Peru,  and  Jamaica,  the  Department  has 
undertaken  a  variety  of  programs  in  the 
Caribbean  region.  Our  expenditures  of 
approximately  $5  million  in  the  5  years 
ending  in  FY  1982  included  funding  for 
a  project  by  Colombian  Customs  to  in- 
terdict trafficking  in  the  Caribbean,  as 
well  as  a  special  project  by  the  Colom- 
bian Navy  for  narcotics  patrols  in  the 
Caribbean  and  Pacific. 

We  have  provided  small  patrol 
vessels  to  the  Government  of  the 
Bahamas  to  increase  the  mobility  of  its 
narcotics  forces.  We  have  also  provided 
telex  equipment  and  language  instruc- 
tion to  facilitate  cooperation  by  Baha- 
mian police.  We  assisted  the  Haitian 
Navy  in  rejuvenating  its  fleet  for  nar- 
cotics patrols  in  the  Windward  Passage, 
a  key  route  between  Colombia  and 
Florida.  The  Haitian  Navy,  which  pro- 
vides information  on  suspect  ships  to 
our  Coast  Guard,  seized  a  boat  carrying 
nine  tons  of  marijuana  in  January.  Our 
efforts  in  this  region  have  also  included 
cooperation  with  the  Coast  Guard  on  the 
establishment  of  a  telex  link  between 
selected  Caribbean  and  Central 
American  countries  and  the  Coast  Guard 
for  transmitting  vessel  tracking  in- 
telligence. We  have  provided  a  launch  to 
the  Turks  and  Caicos. 

In  Central  America,  we  have  provid- 
ed some  telecommunications  equipment 
to  Costa  Rica;  communications  and 
laboratory  equipment  to  the  Panamanian 
National  Guard;  radios  and  vehicles  to 
the  Honduran  police;  and  we  will  pro- 
vide vehicles  and  other  commodities  to 
Belize  to  support  future  eradication  pro- 
grams. 

We  cooperate  with  governments  on 
the  development  of  local  police  and 
customs  capabilities  to  enforce  domestic 
narcotics  laws  by  funding  training  of 
foreign  enforcement  personnel  by  the 
Drug  Enforcement  Agency  and 
Customs.  In  just  the  past  2  years,  225 
persons  from  Caribbean  countries,  as 
well  as  233  persons  from  Central 
America  and  Mexico,  received  Bureau- 
funded  training— 20%  of  all  foreign  na- 
tionals receiving  such  training  in  these  2 
fiscal  years.  In  the  past  5  years,  a  total 


of  807  officials  from  this  region  h 
received  Bureau-funded  training, 
eluding  475  from  the  Caribbean  a  ; 
from  Central  America— amonK  ti  i 
officials  from  the  Bahamas.  Othein 
in  the  State  and  Justice  Departnn  ; 
are  actively  exploring  with  varmu 
Caribbean  countries  mutual  le^al 
assistance  and  extradition  treatie 
strengthen  bilateral  cooperation  ( 
criminal  law  enforcement  matter;  n 
eluding  the  sharing  of  financial  ir  -^ 
tion  that  is  critically  needed  to  ^1* 
traffickers  of  their  profits. 


SOUTHWEST  ASIAN  NARCOl  i 
CONTROL  STRATEGY 

Afghanistan,  Iran,  and  Pakistan 
principal  sources  of  the  opium  frc 
which  over  half  of  the  heroin  ent  i 
the  United  States  is  processed.  F 
reasons  not  related  to  narcotics, 
have  not  executed  agreements  w  1 
or  Afghanistan.  Our  regional  stn  ', 
therefore,  centers  on  Pakistan  as  i 
opium  producer,  a  heroin  refiner  > 
transshipment  point  for  other  .'^n  ' 
Asian  opium,  and,  on  Turkey  as    r 
cipal  conduit  of  opiates  moving  f  ; 
Southwest  Asia  to  Western  Eun 
the  United  States.  , 

Country  Programs 

In  1979,  the  Government  of  Paki- 
banned  the  opium  poppy.  This  ba 
forced  in  the  "settled"  areas,  a  te 
which  describes  those  areas  effec 
under  central  government  contro 
Government  authority  is  being  e> 
in  the  "merged"  areas  of  the  Nor 
Frontier  Province;  the  central  go 
ment's  authority  is  only  partially  i 
operative  in  such  areas  at  presen } 
merged  areas  account  for  about  i  ■' 
Pakistan  opium  production.  Howi; 
large  "tribal"  areas  of  the  provim 
where  about  20%  of  the  opium  is , 
cultivated,  government  authority  r 
been  exercised  through  agree  met 
which  allow  tribal  leaders  much  U 
autonomy.  The  presence  of  over 
million  Afghan  refugees  adds  to  ' ' 
ment  difficulties  in  Pakistan. 

Several  actions  by  the  Pakist 
Government  are  important.  In  li . 
Pakistani  Government  eradicated; 
poppy  in  the  Buner  area  of  the  N  | 
west  Frontier  Province  where  a  ;  ■ 
development  project  is  operating  : 
first  eradication  effort  in  a  mergi  '■ 
In  early  1982  the  Government  se,< 


68 


Department  of  State  1 1 


NARCOTICS 


laboratory  in  the  tribal  territory 
province— for  the  first  time  since 
•overcoming  armed  tribal  resist- 
n  December,  tribal  leaders 
d  the  closing  of  another  two 
leroin  laboratories  in  the  Khyber 
/,  after  meetings  with  govern- 
fficials. 

ring  separate  visits  to  the  United 
President  Zia  and  Governor  Haq 
Northwest  Frontier  Province 
d  Pakistan's  commitment  to  its 
poppy  ban.  Pakistan  has  agreed 
roe  its  ban  on  opium  cultivation 
s  where  it  receives  development 
nee.  The  Bureau's  rural  develop- 
roject  in  the  Malakand  Agency  is 
;d  to  encourage  farmers  to  grow 
rops  and  seek  other  income 
!,  and  to  provide  infrastructure 

;  $3.55  million  requested  for 
,n  in  FY  1984  provides  greater 
;  for  the  reduction  of  poppy 
ion  and  for  enforcement  against 
processing  and  trafficking.  The 
velopment  project  in  the 
nd  Agency  has  been  funded  for 
i  and  final  year  in  FY  1984.  It  is 
d  that  by  FY  1984  AID  will  be  in 
:lementation  stage  of  a  similar 
'■s-related  development  project  in 
■  Northwest  Frontier  Province 
'rowing  area  which  will  enhance 
.  :o  enforce  the  poppy  ban;  the 
'ontrol  objectives  of  the  AID  proj- 
!be  supported  with  Bureau  en- 
fnt  assistance.  Pakistan  has  also 
II  restrictive  "poppy  clauses" 
Dmmit  the  government  to  keep 
!neral  economic  assistance  project 
ee  of  opium  poppy.  These 
'are  assurances  that  opium 
':  on  and/or  heroin  processing  will 
:nhanced  by  U.S.  economic 
£ce. 

\  Bureau  continues  commodity 
^ning  assistance  to  Pakistani  nar- 
"iforcement  agencies  to  upgrade 
cpabilities.  A  seizure  of  396  kilos 
■in  near  Peshawar  in  December 
t  world's  largest  seizure  of  heroin 
Et  of  over  1,500  kilos  seized  by 
bii  authorities  in  1982. 
ii<ey  has  demonstrated  the  will 
1  capability  for  effective  opium 
'f^op  control  and  narcotics  inter- 
r^Since  the  early  1970s,  Turkey 
iK'ented  illicit  diversions  from  its 
'liltivation.  Our  request  for  $1 
i»)rovides  funds  for  equipment 
:^ning  for  the  Turkish  National 
•f.id  the  Jandarma  to  upgrade 
Citation,  communications,  and 
ts  laboratory  competence  to  com- 
t;  trafficking— equipment  and 


training  that  cannot  be  fully  supplied 
from  Turkey's  own  resources.  Both  the 
Thai  police,  which  is  responsible  for 
drug  law  enforcement  in  the  urban 
areas,  and  the  Jandarma,  which  has 
antismuggling  responsibility  throughout 
the  country,  have  the  skills  and  motiva- 
tion to  utilize  effectively  the  assistance 
provided. 


SOUTHEAST  ASIAN  REGIONAL 
STRATEGY 

Southeast  Asian  heroin  accounted  for 
about  10%  of  the  heroin  entering  the 
United  States  in  1981,  according  to  the 
Drug  Enforcement  Administration.  The 
Golden  Triangle  produced  600  tons  of 
opium  in  the  1981  and  1982  crop  years, 
after  2  years  of  drought.  There  is  poten- 
tial for  Southeast  Asian  traffickers  to 
attempt  to  recapture  a  greater  share  of 
the  U.S.  heroin  market.  The  Department 
will,  therefore,  continue  to  emphasize  its 
crop  control  objective  in  its  discussions 
with  these  governments.  However,  for 
numerous  reasons,  our  regional  program 
must  include  interdiction  and  suppres- 
sion of  heroin  laboratories  as  well  as 
crop  control.  For  example,  we  cannot 
operate  a  crop  control  program  in  Laos, 
most  poppy  growing  areas  of  Burma  are 
outside  the  government  control,  and 
location  of  heroin  labs  near  the  Thai- 
Burma  border  has  made  such  interdic- 
tion operations  successful. 

We  will  continue  enforcement 
assistance  to  help  consolidate  recent 
government,  military,  and  police  actions 
which  have  driven  the  major  Golden 
Triangle  heroin  "warlord"  from  areas  in 
Thailand  along  the  Burma  border  and 
disrupted  several  of  the  heroin  traffick- 
ing organizations.  A  sustained  effort 
against  the  drug-supported  warlords 
coupled  with  strict  controls  by  govern- 
ments in  the  area  on  chemicals  used  in 
heroin  refining  would  advance  the  goal 
of  disrupting  and  ultimately  suppressing 
heroin  production. 

Country  Programs 

The  Royal  Thai  Government  has 
mounted  sizeable  military  operations 
since  January  1982  against  the  Shan 
United  Army,  the  principal  trafficking 
group  on  the  Thai-Burmese  border,  and 
are  continuing  the  pressure  against  it 
and  other  illicit  drug  trafficking  groups 
with  narcotics-targeted  military  com- 
panies permanently  deployed  in  the 
area.  These  actions  have  disrupted  traf- 
ficking and  refining  activities.  The 
Government  has  also  been  effective  in 


reducing  the  availability  of  precursor 
chemicals  used  in  converting  opium  to 
heroin,  which  contributed  to  reduced 
production  of  heroin  and  morphine  base; 
however,  these  chemicals  are  increasing- 
ly available  from  other  sources  in  the 
region.  We  will  use  diplomatic  initiatives 
to  encourage  tighter  controls  on  precur- 
sor chemicals  throughout  the  region.  We 
will  continue  to  support  crop  control- 
related  development  assistance  projects 
in  Thailand  when  there  is  a  concurrent 
Thai  commitment  to  crop  control.  The 
$680,000  in  our  budget  will  be  available 
for  ongoing  and  anticipated  projects  of 
this  nature  as  well  as  to  support  the 
Thai  crop  assessment  program.  While 
the  Thai  Government  has  not  enforced 
its  opium  poppy  ban  in  areas  which  have 
received  crop  substitution  assistance,  it 
has  promised  to  produce  an  opium  pop- 
py control  strategy  in  early  1983.  We 
have  budgeted  $2.7  million  for  support 
of  our  projects  in  Thailand. 

We  will  continue  support  for  the 
Burmese  Air  Force's  capability  to  airlift 
ground  forces  engaged  in  poppy  eradica- 
tion and  interdiction  operations  and 
thereby  contribute  to  Burma's  goal  of 
ultimate  self-sufficiency  in  aviation 
maintenance.  Our  budget  increase  also 
provides  for  expanded  training  and  for 
improved  telecommunications.  The 
Burmese  Government  reports  increased 
crop  destruction  including  areas  where 
the  Burmese  Communist  Party  is  in- 
volved in  trafficking.  We  have  budgeted 
$5.8  million  for  support  of  Burmese 
projects. 


DONOR  COUNTRY  INITIATIVE 

The  U.S.  narcotics  control  strategy  in- 
cludes diplomatic  initiatives  to  achieve 
greater  participation  by  and  program 
coordination  with  other  governments.  In 
recent  months,  the  Bureau  of  Interna- 
tional Narcotics  Matters,  with  explicit 
support  from  Secretary  Shultz,  has  been 
conducting  discussions  with  Govern- 
ments of  Canada,  Europe,  and  Japan  to 
seek  greater  international  narcotics  con- 
trol efforts  from  them,  both  bilaterally 
and  through  international  organizations. 
We  particularly  want  to  coordinate  U.S. 
narcotics  control  initiatives  and  our  pro- 
gram assistance  to  producing  and  transit 
countries  with  those  of  European 
governments.  For  example,  through  the 
United  Nations  or  bilaterally,  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Gerijiany  is  par- 
ticipating in  control  programs  in 
Pakistan  and  Turkey,  the  Norwegian 
Government  is  active  in  crop  control  in 
Burma,  and  Australia  is  active  in 


OCEANS 


Thailand.  Italy  and  Sweden  have  in- 
dicated interest  in  supporting  develop- 
ment programs  to  achieve  coca  control. 
U.S.  drug  enforcement  agencies  and 
our  diplomatic  missions  maintain  produc- 
tive working  relations  with  their  Euro- 
pean counterparts,  which  are  improving 
as  Europeans  recognize  the  long-term 
implications  of  drug  abuse  on  their 
societies.  European  governments  are 
assigning  greater  numbers  of  narcotics 
enforcement  advisers  to  their  diplomatic 
missions  in  producing  countries. 
Diplomatic  and  program  assistance  coor- 
dination with  the  Europeans  continues 
to  be  conducted  through  international 
organizations,  particularly  organs  of  the 
United  Nations.  We  are  encouraged  by 
increased  attention  being  given  the  nar- 
cotics issue  by  some  foreign  ministries 
and  political  leaders. 


INTERNATIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS 

Since  its  founding  in  1971  with  U.S. 
sponsorship,  the  UN  Fund  for  Drug 
Abuse  Control  (UNFDAC)  has  been  a 
vehicle  for  raising  international  con- 
sciousness about  illicit  drug  issues  and 
for  implementation  of  crop  control,  en- 
forcement, and  demand  reduction  pro- 
grams. The  fund  also  brings  the  prestige 
of  the  United  Nations  to  the  issue  of 
narcotics  control.  While  UNFDAC  proj- 
ects complement  U.S.  programs  in  some 
countries,  it  has  carried  out  projects  in 
other  areas  when  the  United  States 
could  not  because  of  political  or  other 
considerations.  We  have  budgeted  $2.5 
million  as  our  contribution  to  UNFDAC 
in  FY  1984.  We  are  also  budgeting 
$75,000  for  support  of  the  Colombo 
Plan. 


CONCLUSION 

In  sum,  we  are  pursuing  the  Administra- 
tion strategy  of  increasing  crop  control 
and  interdiction  in  the  source  countries. 
The  Bureau's  requested  authorization  for 
FY  1984  and  1985  anticipated  a  con- 
tinuation and  expansion  of  crop  control 
and  interdiction  efforts  in  major  produc- 
ing and  transit  countries.  Our  requested 
increase  centers  on  the  coca  and  mari- 
juana threat  from  South  America,  while 
expanding  our  efforts  to  reduce  the  in- 
flux of  heroin  from  Southwest  and 
Southeast  Asia. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  publisned  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tne  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Oceans  Policy 


PRESIDENTS  STATEMENT, 
MAR.  10.  1983' 

The  United  States  has  long  been  a 
leader  in  developing  customary  and  con- 
ventional law  of  the  sea.  Our  objectives 
have  consistently  been  to  provide  a  legal 
order  that  will,  among  other  things, 
facilitate  peaceful,  international  uses  of 
the  oceans  and  provide  for  equitable  and 
effective  management  and  conservation 
of  marine  resources.  The  United  States 
also  recognizes  that  all  nations  have  an 
interest  in  these  issues. 

Last  July  I  announced  that  the 
United  States  will  not  sign  the  UN  Law 
of  the  Sea  Convention  that  was  opened 
for  signature  on  December  10.  We  have 
taken  this  step  because  several  major 
problems  in  the  convention's  deep  sea- 
bed mining  provisions  are  contrary  to 
the  interests  and  principles  of  indus- 
trialized nations  and  would  not  help  at- 
tain the  aspirations  of  developing  coun- 
tries. 

The  United  States  does  not  stand 
alone  in  those  concerns.  Some  important 
alKes  and  friends  have  not  signed  the 
convention.  Even  some  signatory  states 
have  raised  concerns  about  these  prob- 
lems. 

However,  the  convention  also  contains 
provisions  with  respect  to  traditional 
uses  of  the  oceans  which  generally  con- 
firm existing  maritime  law  and  practice 
and  fairly  balance  the  interests  of  all 
states. 

Today  I  am  announcing  three  deci- 
sions to  promote  and  protect  the  oceans 
interests  of  the  United  States  in  a  man- 
ner consistent  with  those  fair  and 
balanced  results  in  the  convention  and 
international  law. 

First,  the  United  States  is  prepared 
to  accept  and  act  in  accordance  with  the 
balance  of  interests  relating  to  tradi- 
tional uses  of  the  oceans— such  as 
navigation  and  overflight.  In  this 
respect,  the  United  States  will  recognize 
the  rights  of  other  states  in  the  waters 
off  their  coasts,  as  reflected  in  the  con- 
vention, so  long  as  the  rights  and 
freedoms  of  the  United  States  and 
others  under  international  law  are 
recognized  by  such  coastal  states. 

Second,  the  United  States  will  exer- 
cise and  assert  its  navigation  and 
overflight  rights  and  freedoms  on  a 
worldwide  basis  in  a  manner  that  is  con- 
sistent with  the  balance  of  interests 


reflected  in  the  convention.  The  Ur 
States  will  not,  however,  acquiesce^ 
unilateral  acts  of  other  states  d* 
to  restrict  the  rights  and  freedoms 
the  international  community  in  nav 
tion  and  overflight  and  other  relatf 
high  seas  uses. 

Third,  I  am  proclaiming  today 
exclusive  economic  zone  in  which  t 
United  States  will  exercise  soverei 
rights  in  living  and  nonliving  resou 
within  200  nautical  miles  of  its  coa 
This  will  provide  U.S.  jurisdiction  ; 
mineral  resources  out  to  200  nauti' 
miles  that  are  not  on  the  Continen 
Shelf.  Recently  discovered  deposit: 
there  could  be  an  important  future 
source  of  strategic  minerals.  I 

Within  this  zone  all  nations  wi  j 
tinue  to  enjoy  the  high  seas  rights 
freedoms  that  are  not  resource  rel 
including  the  freedoms  of  navigati 
overflight.  My  proclamation  does  i 
change  existing  U.S.  policies  conce 
the  Continental  Shelf,  marine  man 
and  fisheries,  including  highly  migl 
species  of  tuna  which  are  not  subj 
U.S.  jurisdiction.  The  United  Stat< 
continue  efforts  to  achieve  interna 
agreements  for  the  effective  mana- 
ment  of  these  species.  The  proclai 
also  reinforces  this  government's  ] 
of  promoting  the  U.S.  fishing  indt 

While  international  law  provid 
a  right  of  jursidictioin  over  marine 
tific  research  within  such  a  zone,  I 
proclamation  does  not  assert  this  : 
have  elected  not  to  do  so  because 
U.S.  interest  in  encouraging  marir 
scientific  research  and  avoiding  an 
necessary  burdens.  The  United  St> 
will,  nevertheless,  recognize  the  ri 
other  coastal  states  to  exercise  jui  J 
tion  over  marine  scientific  researc 
within  200  nautical  miles  of  their  i  s 
if  that  jurisdiction  is  exercised 
reasonably  in  a  manner  consistent  i 
international  law. 

The  exclusive  economic  zone  ' 
established  today  will  also  enable  I 
United  States  to  take  limited  addiili 
steps  to  protect  the  marine  enviro , 
ment.  In  this  connection,  the  Unit(, 
States  will  continue  to  work  throu  ' 
International  Maritime  Organizati^ ; 
other  appropriate  international  on 
tions  to  develop  uniform  internatii  i 
measures  for  the  protection  of  the 
marine  environment  while  imposifH 
unreasonable  burdens  on  commerc 
shipping. 

The  policy  decisions  I  am  annc,<^ 
ing  today  will  not  affect  the  applif  ? 
of  existing  U.S.  law  concerning  thffl 
seas  or  existing  authorities  of  any  = 
Government  agency. 


Department  of  State  Bii' 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 


addition  to  the  above  policy  steps, 
lited  States  will  continue  to  work 
ther  countries  to  develop  a 
■,  free  of  unnecessary  political  and 
nic  restraints,  for  mining  deep 
minerals  beyond  national  jurisdic- 
leep  seabed  mining  remains  a 
exercise  of  the  freedom  of  the 
'as  open  to  all  nations.  The  United 
will  continue  to  allow  its  firms  to 
i  for  and,  when  the  market  per- 
xploit  these  resources, 
e  Administration  looks  forward  to 
g  with  the  Congress  on  legislation 
iement  these  new  policies. 


LAMATION  5030. 
10,  1983' 


and  non-living,  of  the  seabed  and  subsoil  and 
the  superjacent  waters  and  with  regard  to 
other  activities  for  the  economic  exploitation 
and  exploration  of  the  zone,  such  as  the  pro- 
duction of  energy  from  the  water,  currents 
and  winds;  and  (b)  jurisdiction  with  regard  to 
the  establishment  and  use  of  artificial  islands, 
and  installations  and  structures  having 
economic  purposes,  and  the  protection  and 
preservation  of  the  marine  environment. 

This  Proclamation  does  not  change  ex- 
isting United  States  policies  concerning  the 
continental  shelf,  marine  mammals  and 
fisheries,  including  highly  migratory  species 
of  tuna  which  are  not  subject  to  United 
States  jurisdiction  and  require  international 
agreements  for  effective  management. 

The  United  States  will  exercise  these 
sovereign  rights  and  jurisdiction  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rules  of  international  law. 


Without  prejudice  to  the.  sovereign  rights 
and  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  the  Ex- 
clusive Economic  Zone  remains  an  area 
beyond  the  territory  and  territorial  sea  of  the 
United  States  in  which  all  States  enjoy  the 
high  seas  freedoms  of  navigation,  overflight, 
the  laying  of  submarine  cables  and  pipelines, 
and  other  internationally  lawful  uses  of  the 

In  Witness  Whereof,  I  have  hereunto 
set  my  hand  this  tenth  day  of  March,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  nineteen  hundred  and  eight- 
three,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  two  hundred  and 
seventh. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  Mar.  14,  1983. 


^s,  the  Government  of  the  United 
\i  America  desires  to  facilitate  the 
'elopment  and  use  of  the  oceans  con- 
vith  international  law; 
SREAS,  international  law  recognizes 
a  zone  beyond  its  territory  and  adja- 
ts  territorial  sea,  known  as  the  Ex- 
iconomic  Zone,  a  coastal  State  may 
rtain  sovereign  rights  over  natural 
s  and  related  jurisdiction;  and 
REAS,  the  establishment  of  an  Ex- 
Cconomic  Zone  by  the  United  States 
ince  the  development  of  ocean 
s  and  promote  the  protection  of  the 
nvironment,  while  not  affecting 
vful  uses  of  the  zone,  including  the 
3  of  navigation  and  overflight,  by 
ates; 

,  Therefore,  I,  Ronald  Reagan,  by 
arity  vested  in  me  as  President  by 
titution  and  laws  of  the  United 
'  America,  do  hereby  proclaim  the 
n  rights  and  jurisdiction  of  the 
tates  of  America  and  confirm  also 
s  and  freedoms  of  all  States  within 
[sive  Economic  Zone,  as  described 

Exclusive  Economic  Zone  of  the 
tates  is  a  zone  contiguous  to  the  ter- 
sa,  including  zones  contiguous  to  the 
J  sea  of  the  United  States,  the  Com- 
th  of  Puerto  Rico,  the  Common- 
f  the  Northern  Mariana  Islands  (to 
It  consistent  with  the  Covenant  and 
;d  Nations  Trusteeship  Agreement). 
ed  States  overseas  territories  and 
ns.  The  Exclusive  Economic  Zone 
;o  a  distance  200  nautical  miles  from 
ine  from  which  the  breadth  of  the 
i  is  measured.  In  cases  where 
ime  boundary  with  a  neighboring 
nains  to  be  determined,  the  bound- 
Exclusive  Economic  Zone  shall  be 
ed  by  the  United  States  and  other 
icerned  in  accordance  with  equitable 

the  Exclusive  Economic  Zone,  the 
tates  has.  to  the  extent  permitted  by 
'  law.  (a)  sovereign  rights  for  the 
)f  exploring,  exploiting,  conserving 
?  natural  resources,  both  living 


Export  Control  of 
High  Technology 


by  William  Schneider.  Jr. 

Statement  hefurr  Ihr  siihcnntmittee  on 
International  Finanrr  hhiI  Mnnetary 
Policy  of  the  Semitr  <  -nnninlttr  nn  Bank- 
inq.  Housing,  oml  rrhim  Alhiirs  on 
March  2.  19SS.  Mr.  .Srli,„nirr  i.<  Under 
Secretary  for  Security  Asatstance. 
Science,  and  Technology.^ 

As  part  of  your  Subcommittee's  review 
of  the  Export  Administration  Act  of 
1979,  you  have  asked  me  to  outline  the 
Department  of  State's  responsibilities 
under  this  act.  I  shall  also  describe  some 
of  our  negotiations  with  our  allies  to 
strengthen  the  coordinating  committee 
for  Multilateral  Security  Export  Con- 
trols (COCOM).  I  am  particularly 
pleased  to  have  this  opportunity  since 
the  Administration  has  undertaken 
vigorous  efforts  in  working  with  our 
allies  to  reduce  the  transfer  of  militarily 
significant  technology  and  equipment  to 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

We  know  that  the  development  of 
sophisticated  weapons  is  based  on  a 
myriad  of  advanced  supporting  tech- 
nologies that  are  not  innately  restricted 
to  military  versus  civilian  applications. 
Consequently,  it  becomes  increasingly 
more  difficult  to  identify  and  control 
commercial  transactions  that  can  sup- 
port military  production  and  that  could 
constitute  a  threat  to  our  national 
security.  This  underscores  the  need  for 
increasing  Western  efforts  to  develop 
stronger  and  more  effective  controls  on 


the  transfer  of  technology  from  the 
West  to  the  East.  The  UiS.S.R.,  for  ex- 
ample, has  relied  on  Western  high- 
technology  exports  in  its  military 
buildup,  and  we  know  that  Western 
technology  has  been  a  significant  factor 
in  the  Soviet  development  of  advanced 
missiles  as  well  as  in  the  advancement  of 
industry  that  supports  the  Soviet  war- 
making  capability. 

Current  controls  are  based  on  the 
importance  of  advanced  technology  in 
military  forces  and  its  supporting  in- 
dustrial sectors  and  the  existence,  partly 
due  to  government-sponsored  research 
and  development  and  partly  due  to  dif- 
ferences in  industrial  capabilities,  of  a 
technology'  gap  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  A  techno- 
logical gap  in  our  favor  is  also  a  means 
of  reducing  the  risk  of  technological  sur- 
prise. Technological  breakthroughs, 
given  the  current  rate  of  technological 
change,  is  a  real  possibility  and  a  real 
danger  to  our  security  in  that  a  par- 
ticular technological  development  could 
give  the  discoverer  a  decisive  advantage. 
Consequently,  one  of  the  major  means  of 
preventing  war  is  to  avoid  technological 
surprise. 

How  the  Soviets  Obtain 
Western  Technology 

The  Soviets  obtain  Western  technology 
illegally  through  their  intelligence  serv- 
ices using  classical  espionage  as  illus- 
trated by  the  recent  spy  cases  in  Ger- 
many and  Italy.  They  also  evade  export 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 


controls  through  diversion,  retransfer, 
and  dummy  companies.  One  legal  way 
technology  is  passed  to  the  East  is 
through  a  kind  of  buy-back  project  in 
which  Western  companies  contract  with 
Eastern  states  to  export  factory  equip- 
ment and  the  plans  for  building  the 
plant  on  credit.  It  is  estimated  that 
these  projects  involved  an  exchange  of 
some  $10  billion  between  the  East  and 
the  West  in  1980.  The  West  in  return 
for  its  exports  receives  a  share  of  the 
products  as  part  payment.  An  example 
of  this  is  the  Siberian  gas  pipeline  in 
which  pipeline  equipment  is  being 
bought  from  the  West  and  the  fuel  is 
sold  to  Western  Europe  upon  completion 
of  the  pipeline.  The  Kama  River  truck 
plant  was  built  with  the  help  of  U.S. 
companies  using  Western  technology 
and  U.S.  export  licenses.  The  plant  has 
been  used  to  supply  trucks  for  the 
transport  of  troops  to  Afghanistan  and 
the  support  of  Soviet  conventional 
military  needs. 

Today,  there  continues  to  be  a 
serious  threat  to  our  national  security 
from  Soviet  technology  piracy,  in  which 
an  increasing  one-way  stream  of  U.S. 
technology  is  moving  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  Nearly  all  new  technological 
developments  have  direct  or  indirect 
military  application.  The  critical  impor- 
tance of  our  technology  loss  may  be  em- 
phasized by  the  example  of  the  Soviet 
intercontinental-range  missiles  achieving 
improved  accuracy  through  better  gyro- 
scope systems.  The  Soviet  gyroscopes 
were  developed  using  precision  bearings 
produced  with  advanced  grinding 
machines  obtained  from  the  West  in  the 
1970s.  Other  examples  include: 
U.S.-developed  laser  optical  mirrors  with 
direct  military  application  have  been 
smuggled  to  the  U.S.S.R.;  advanced 
American  computerized  drafting  equip- 
ment was  diverted  to  the  Soviets 
through  a  foreign  corporation;  the 
Soviets  illegally  acquired  IBM  360  and 
370  computers  from  the  West  in  1972. 
We  have  noted  to  our  despair  that  the 
Soviet  RYAD  computer  series  uses  the 
same  repair  manuals  as  the  IBM  com- 
puters. 

The  Soviet  technological  gains  ob- 
tained through  a  carefully  crafted  ac- 
quisition program  are  providing  them 
with: 

•  Significant  savings  in  time  and 
money  in  their  military  research  and 
development  programs; 

•  Rapid  modernization  of  their 
defense  industrial  infrastructure; 

•  A  closing  of  gaps  between  our 
weapons  systems  and  theirs; 


•  The  rapid  development  of 
neutralizing  countermeasures  to  our  own 
technological  innovations;  and 

•  A  freezing  of  capital  to  be  used  in 
more  direct  military  application. 

Facts  About  COCOM 

Before  moving  to  our  current  negotia- 
tions with  our  allies,  I  would  like  to 
review  a  few  facts  about  COCOM.  The 
coordinating  committee  was  established 
as  a  voluntary  organization  in  1950.  Its 
present  membership  includes  Japan  and 
all  the  NATO  countries,  except  Iceland 
and  Spain,  but  it  has  no  formal  relation- 
ship to  NATO  or  to  any  other  organiza- 
tion. It  is  not  based  on  any  treaty  or  ex- 
ecutive agreement.  The  members,  there- 
fore, have  no  legal  obligation  as  such  to 
participate  in  COCOM  or  to  abide  by 
commitments  made  there.  On  the  other 
hand,  over  its  more  than  three  decades 
of  existence,  there  have  been  only  a  few 
instances  when  a  member  nation  has  ex- 
ercised its  sovereign  right  to  deviate 
from  COCOM  decisions.  Many  of  the 
other  member  governments  continue  to 
make  it  clear  to  us  that  they  attach  con- 
siderable importance  to  maintaining 
COCOM's  informal  nature  and  the  con- 
fidentiality of  its  proceedings. 

All  important  COCOM  decisions  are 
made  on  the  basis  of  unanimity,  which  is 
perhaps  the  basic  reason  for  its  durabili- 
ty. For  example,  no  change  in  the 
COCOM  list  can  be  made,  and  no 
specific  export  of  controlled  items  can  be 
approved,  if  any  member  objects. 

Traditionally,  COCOM  has  had  three 
major  functions. 

First  is  the  establishment  and  up- 
dating of  the  lists  of  embargoed  prod- 
ucts and  technologies.  Although  the 
COCOM  lists  are  not  published,  they 
provide  the  basis  for  the  national  control 
lists  administered  by  each  of  the 
member  governments.  There  are  three 
COCOM  lists:  a  list  of  military  items  and 
technologies;  an  atomic  energy  list;  and 
a  list  covering  commodities  and  tech- 
nologies which  can  have  both  military 
and  civil  applications.  COCOM  is  now 
conducting  a  major  review  of  these  lists 
to  insure  that  they  reflect  current 
strategic  concerns.  Such  reviews  are 
conducted  about  every  3  years. 

Second,  COCOM  acts  as  the  clear- 
inghouse for  invididual  requests  sub- 
mitted by  the  member  governments  to 
permit  the  shipment  of  specific  em- 
bargoed items  to  the  proscribed  coun- 
tries when  the  risk  of  diversion  to 
military  use  is  sufficiently  small.  The 


proscribed  countries  for  COCOM 
poses  are  the  Soviet  Union,  the  qi 
Warsaw  Pact  countries,  Albania, 
People's  Republic  of  China,  and  tl 
other  Communist  countries  in  Asi 
COCOM  reviews  on  an  annual  bai 
tween  1,200  and  1,500  of  these  p( 
export  transactions,  rejecting  the 
ports  which  are  too  risky. 

Third,  the  committee  serves  : 
means  of  coordinating  the  admini 
tion  and  enforcement  activities  ol 
member  governments. 

COCOM  has  a  permanent  sec 
which  is  located  in  Paris.  Its  staf 
small— between  12  and  15  memb 
and  its  activities  are  generally  co 
to  translation,  transcription,  intei 
tion,  and  the  publication  and  dist 
of  documents. 

The  permanent  U.S.  delegate 
organization  are  State  Departme 
ficers  who,  for  administrative  pu; 
are  attached  to  our  delegation  to 
Organization  for  Economic  Coopf 
and  Development  (OECD).  This  c 
tion  is  augmented  by  scores  of  te 
experts  and  other  U.S. -based  offi 
needed  for  the  negotiations  in  C( 

As  part  of  this  Administratio 
review  of  the  transfer  of  sensitiv 
technologies  to  the  Soviet  Union 
other  Warsaw  Pact  countries,  W6 
carefully  examined  the  effectives 
COCOM.  We  are  confident  that  t 
tional  security  controls  coordinat* 
through  this  organization  have  hi 
useful  in  restricting  exports  of  iU 
which  license  applications  have  b< 
reviewed  by  COCOM  government 

Without  COCOM,  competition 
among  Western  exporters  would  i 
escalated  the  quality  and  quantitj 
technology  sales  to  the  Soviet  Un 
other  Communist  countries.  On  tl 
other  hand,  it  became  evident  dui? 
review  that  over  the  years,  the  SiP 
Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  ha\  t  - 
tained  some  equipment  and  ttvlm 
of  strategic  and  military  impoitai 
from  the  West.  This  has  occuiieH  >< 
through  violations  of  the  COC'i  'M  ' 
trols  (i.e.,  illegal  shipments  of  cur ' 
items)  or  because  such  items  havt ." 
been  multilaterally  controlled  by  • 
COCOM  at  the  time  of  acquisitior' 
Through  diversions  or  time  la!j:s,  ' 
multilateral  system  of  export  i-oin  i- 
coordinated  through  COCOM,  tht 
has  not  always  met  the  challenge  •- 
by  the  extensive  efforts  of  the  So  i' 
Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  to  o\ « 
militarily  sensitive  equipment  and 


72 


Department  of  State  Be 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 


ogies.  The  Soviet  efforts  to  ob- 
jstern  technology  continue 
;d  as  evidenced  by  the  recent 
n  Germany  of  a  Soviet  trade  of- 
ho  is  charged  with  trying  to  il- 
gain  Western,  controlled  elec- 
nformation. 


t  Negotiations 

■ninistration  has  undertaken  ex- 
efforts  to  deal  with  this  serious 
President  Reagan  raised  the 
of  Western  technology  transfer 
oviet  Union  at  the  Ottawa  sum- 
uly  1981.  These  discussions 
ted  in  a  high-level  meeting  in 
January  1982,  the  first 
ial-level  meeting  in  that 
ition  since  the  late  1950s.  We 
eatly  encouraged  by  the  results 
neeting.  The  member  govern- 
anfirmed  the  importance  of  the 
tion  for  their  common  security 
and  agreed  on  a  number  of 
;  for  improving  its  effec- 
They  agreed  to  strengthen  and 
he  existing  embargo  lists,  to  ex- 
rmonizing  the  licensing  practices 
itional  governments,  and  to 
en  their  enforcement  opera- 

ng  the  past  year,  we  have  been 
with  our  COCOM  allies  to 

on  these  important  agree- 
have  already  mentioned  the 
jOCOM  list  review.  For  this  ex- 
e  United  States  has  submitted 
proposals,  most  of  which  con- 
:ents  for  strengthening  the  em- 
owever,  we  are  also  proposing 
ion  of  noncritical  equipment  and 
pes  from  the  lists.  This  is  in 
another  recommendation  of  the 
1  meeting.  Since  early  October, 

delegations  have  been 
ng,  on  a  near  daily  basis,  on  the 
details  of  these  proposals. 

the  confidentiality  of  the  pro- 
does  not  permit  me  to  go  into 

this  open  session,  I  can  in- 
t  we  have  already  obtained 
le  agreement  to  a  number  of 
proposals  and  are  very  close  to 
d  on  a  number  of  others. 

many  months  of  technical 
)ns  lie  ahead,  and  it  is  likely 
ist  review  will  not  be  fully  com- 
til  the  end  of  this  year, 
cting  an  export  control  system 
and  difficult  task.  This  is  also 
•cm  our  continuing  efforts  to 

on  the  harmonization  of  na- 
!nsing  practices  and  enforce- 
vities.  We  are  dealing  with  the 


national  administration  of  controls  by  15 
individual  and  sovereign  nations,  each 
with  its  own  laws,  regulations,  and  pro- 
cedures. Our  initiatives  on  harmoniza- 
tion reflect  our  concern  that  the  dif- 
ferences in  national  licensing  practices 
at  times  penalize  U.S.  firms  competitive- 
ly and  can  cause  loopholes  in  the  com- 
mon embargo. 

At  U.S.  initiative,  last  May  a 
meeting  of  the  COCOM  Subcommittee 
on  Export  Controls  was  held  to  review  a 
number  of  U.S.  proposals  for 
strengthening  national  enforcement  ac- 
tivities and  harmonizing  licensing  pro- 
cedures. This  advisory  body,  composed 
of  national  licensing  and  enforcement  of- 
ficials, agreed  to  a  large  number  of 
recommendations  which,  if  implemented 
by  the  national  authorities,  could  result 
in  significant  improvements  in  the  en- 
forcement activities  and  a  narrowing  of 
the  licensing  differences  of  the  individual 
governments.  In  the  full  COCOM,  the 
United  States  is  urging  the  other 
governments  to  follow  up  on  a  number 
of  these  recommendations  concerning 
harmonization  of  licensing  documenta- 
tion. Furthermore,  during  this  week  we 
have  two  interagency  teams  in  Europe 
holding  bilatet-al  discussions  with  our 
European  allies  on  enforcement  and  har- 
monization issues. 

One  of  the  more  serious  problems 
COCOM  faces  in  improving  its  effec- 
tiveness is  the  difficulty  of  controlling 
the  export  or  reexport  of  commodities 
from  non-COCOM  countries  to  the  Com- 
munist states.  COCOM  countries  unfor- 
tunately do  not  constitute  a  monopoly  in 
the  market  for  all  high-technology  items. 
The  Soviet  Union  and  the  other  Warsaw 
Pact  countries  are  aware  of  this  and  are 
occasionally  able  to  obtain  some 
equivalent  high-technology  products 
from  non-COCOM  sources.  There  is  also 
a  risk  of  the  diversion  of  COCOM- 
controlled,  COCOM-origin  equipment 
and  technologies  through  such  third 
countries.  The  United  States  attempts  to 
deal  with  this  diversion  problem  in  part 
by  requiring  licenses  for  reexports  of  the 
U.S. -origin  embargoed  products  from 
third  countries— a  so-called  extrater- 
ritorial action  that  has  been  the  subject 
of  some  criticism.  Our  COCOM  allies  cite 
legal  and  administrative  reasons  for  not 
having  similar  reexport  licensing  re- 
quirements. Nevertheless  we  have  been 
urging  them  to  institute  other  effective 
measures  to  deal  with  the  problem  of 
diversions  from  third  countries.  Further- 
more the  United  States  maintains  a 


dialogue  with  certain  non-COCOM  in- 
dustrialized countries  on  the  export  con- 
trol and  diversions  problems.  I  cannot 
go  into  details  in  this  open  hearing,  but  I 
am  happy  to  report  that  during  the  past 
year,  we  have  made  considerable  prog- 
ress with  several  non-COCOM  countries 
to  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  diversion 
of  U.S. -controlled  commodities. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of 
COCOM,  I  would  like  to  call  your  atten- 
tion to  the  consensus  we  have  reached 
with  our  major  allies  on  the  need  to 
review  together  the  security  implications 
of  various  aspects  of  East- West 
economic  relations.  Two  important  ele- 
ments of  this  review  are  to  be  carried 
out  in  COCOM.  There  is  first  the 
strengthening  of  COCOM  itself.  As  I 
have  outlined  above,  we  have  been  work- 
ing with  our  allies  on  this  during  the 
past  year,  and  we  hope  to  see  further 
positive  steps  taken  in  the  months 
ahead.  Secondly,  a  review  of  other  high 
technologies,  including  those  with  oil 
and  gas  applications  which  may  have 
security  implications  for  the  West,  is  be- 
ing initiated.  In  order  for  COCOM 
member  nations  to  give  timely  policy- 
level  guidance  to  their  COCOM  delega- 
tions in  both  of  these  broad  areas  of  ac- 
tivity, we  have  proposed  the  scheduling 
of  a  second  high-level  COCOM  meeting 
this  spring. 


Responsibilities  Under  the  Export 
Administration  Act 

Let  me  move  on  to  the  Department  of 
State's  responsibilities  under  the  Export 
Administration  Act  and  other  related 
laws  and  regulations.  The  Department's 
role  and  responsibilities  in  the  export 
control  area  are  based  in  part  on  the 
general  responsibility  of  the  Department 
for  advising  the  President  on  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  policy  and  in  part  on 
specific  legislative  and  executive  direc- 
tives, including  the  Export  Administra- 
tion Act  of  1979,  the  Arms   Export  Con- 
trol Act  of  1976,  and  Executive  Order 
11958.  They  are  also  based  on  the  fun- 
damental relationship  between  export 
controls  and  our  overall  policy  toward 
other  nations. 

The  State  Department  plays  a  major 
role  in  the  administration  of  tiiree 
distinct  t^pes  of  export  controls: 

(1)  munitions,  administered  by  State; 

(2)  nuclear  materials,  administered  by 
the  Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  and 
the  Department  of  Energy;  and  (3)  other 
items  administered  by  Commerce  under 


153 


73 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 


the  provisions  of  the  Export  Administra- 
tion Act  of  1979.  I  will  limit  my  remarks 
to  the  third  category  since  this  is  the 
subject  of  your  hearing  today. 

National  Security  Controls 

The  Department  of  State  participates 
actively  in  the  formulation  of  U.S.  na- 
tional security  export  control  policy  and 
decisionmaking  on  the  various  interagen- 
cy committees  set  up  for  this  purpose. 
These  include  the  Advisory  Committee 
on  Export  Policy  (ACEP)  chaired  by  the 
Department  of  Commerce  at  the  assist- 
ant secretary  level,  its  working-level 
group— the  operating  committee— and 
its  cabinet  level  body— the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Review  Board.  When  policy 
issues  go  beyond  the  cabinet  level  review 
board,  the  Department  of  State  par- 
ticipates in  the  National  Security  Council 
or  whatever  other  White  House  review 
procedures  may  be  involved. 

Section  5(k)  of  the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Act  of  1979  places  the 
responsibility  for  conducting  negotia- 
tions with  other  governments  regarding 
security  export  control  matters  on  the 
Secretary  of  State,  who  acts  in  consulta- 
tion with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  the 
Secretary  of  Commerce,  and  the  heads 
of  other  agencies.  While  State  thus  has 
the  lead  role  in  conducting  negotiations 
in  COCOM,  I  would  like  to  emphasize 
that  this  is  clearly  an  interagency  activi- 
ty. The  conduct  of  our  activities  on 
COCOM  and  on  other  multilateral  ex- 
port control  matters  is  coordinated 
primarily  within  the  Economic  Defense 
Advisory  Committee  (ED AC)  structure. 

EDAC  is  chaired  by  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  and 
Business  Affairs  under  the  authority 
delegated  to  him  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.  Its  membership  includes  all  agen- 
cies concerned  with  the  administration 
of  our  export  control  program.  Various 
interagency  working  groups  within  the 
EDAC  structure  are  responsible  for 
preparing  U.S.  positions  for  negotiating 
in  COCOM  and  for  reviewing  the  export 
cases  submitted  to  that  organization  by 
the  other  COCOM  member  govern- 
ments. 

The  broad  interagency  basis  of  our 
activities  in  COCOM  is  illustrated  by  our 
preparations  for  and  the  support  of  our 
list  review  negotiations.  Under  EDAC's 
general  guidance,  11  technical  task 


groups  composed  of  more  than  100 
technicians  from  many  agencies,  in- 
telligence organizations,  and  military 
technical  commands  developed  the  U.S. 
list  review  proposals.  Interagency  teams 
are  now  in  Paris  working  for  Committee 
approval  of  those  proposals.  Another 
EDAC  working  group  also  coordinates 
the  interagency  review  of  information  on 
alleged  diversions  of  COCOM-controlled 
items  and  initiates  diplomatic  ap- 
proaches to  other  governments  on 
specific  diversion  cases. 

During  the  past  year,  we  have  also 
established  another  interagency  group  to 
provide  policy  guidance  and  coordination 
in  the  field  of  technology  transfer.  This 
is  the  senior  interagency  group  on  the 
transfer  of  strategic  technology,  which  I 
have  the  pleasure  of  chairing.  In  this 
group  we  attempt  to  provide  a  forum 
for  policy  determination  to  coordinate 
the  ongoing  work  of  the  agencies  and  in- 
teragency organizations.  One  of  the  im- 
portant functions  of  the  group,  as  it  has 
developed  over  the  past  9  months,  is  the 
identification  of  problems  and  the  task- 
ing of  activities  to  deal  with  them.  For 
example,  the  senior  group  has  commis- 
sioned a  public  awareness  program  and 
a  number  of  intelligence  assessments  of 
technology  diversion  problems  in  specific 
areas  and  has  encouraged  increased  at- 
tention to  the  improvement  of  U.S.  ex- 
tradition and  legal  assistance  treaties 
with  other  countries  to  strengthen  ex- 
port control  enforcement.  It  also  ini- 
tiated bilateral  discussions  with  specific 
non-COCOM  governments  and  a  review 
of  the  training  of  U.S.  officials  involved 
in  export  control  matters.  I  believe  that 
this  senior  interagency  group  will  con- 
tinue to  play  an  important  role  in  our  ef- 
forts to  deal  with  the  problem  of  the 
transfer  of  sensitive  technologies  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 

Other  Export  Control  Functions 

Under  the  provisions  of  the  Export  Ad- 
ministration Act,  the  State  Department 
also  participates  in  a  consultative  capaci- 
ty with  regard  to  short  supply  export 
controls.  The  State  Department's  role 


here  is  primarily  to  insure  thai 
consideration  is  given  to  foreiui 
factors  as  well  as  to  our  bilatiT; 
tions  with  other  states. 

Section  6  of  the  Export  A.li 
tion  Act  of  1979  also  gives  thi.'  .- 
Department  a  major  consultatu 
with  regard  to  foreign  policy  tx 
trols.  While  export  license  issua 
authority  is  with  the  Departmei 
Commerce,  the  Secretary  of  St: 
provided  the  right  to  review  an 
vant  export  license  application. 
Department's  role  with  reganl  i 
foreign  policy  controls  is  highlijj 
criteria  described  in  the  act,  sin 


•  "The  probability  that  surl,  . 
will  achieve  the  intended  foreiKu  | 
purpose;" 

•  "The  compatibility  of  ihv  pr 
controls  with  the  foreign  policy  o 
tives  of  the  United  States,  includi 
effort  to  counter  international  ter 
and  with  overall  United  States  po 
toward  the  country  which  is  the  p 
posed  target  for  the  controls;" 

•  "The  reaction  of  other  coun 
the  imposition  or  expansion  of  sui 
port  controls  by  the  United  State; 

•  "The  foreign  policy  consequ 
of  not  imposing  controls." 

In  closing  I  would  like  to  : 
the  Department  of  State  personm 
U.S.  Foreign  Service  posts  abroac 
provide  operational  assistance  to 
elements  of  the  export  control  coi 
ty  in  carrying  out  the  purposes  of 
Export  Administration  Act.  This 
eludes  providing  information  on  o 
consignees  and  checking  out  the  i 
be  made  of  exports  from  the  Unit 
States  and  doing  postlicensing  chf 
a  precaution  against  diversions. 

I  hope  that  my  brief  remarks 
given  some  insight  into  the  many 
aspects  of  the  Department's  invol' 
in  this  complex  area  of  export  cori 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  he 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  i 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printinf 
fice,  Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


74 


Department  of  Stale  Bel 


TERN  HEMISPHERE 


Strategy  in  Central  America 


ttnas  O.  Enders 

,1' lilt  lit  before  the  Subcommittee 
iisfih,  rr  Affairs  of  the  House 
)  Aihiirs  Cuniiinihr  on  March  1. 
.i,l„is,„.lnr  h'inlrrs  IS  A.^^istaut 
riiinr  I iitrr-Anirrinni  Affairs.' 

jur  permission,  I  should  like  to 
tsse  oral  remarks  on  our  strategy 
1  al  America.  For  3  years 
■  id  I  include  the  last  year  of  the 
ii  Administration— the  United 
las  been  engaged  in  an  effort  to 
H  advance  of  communism  in  Cen- 
terica  by  doing  what  Americans 
ire\y  do  best— supporting 
;|cy. 

tTiay  have  started  late,  but  we 
ide  substantial  progress.  The  re- 
li'iii  (if  democracy  in  Costa  Rica, 
nit  ion  from  military  rule  to 
1  ivilian  government  in  Honduras, 
.1  aunching  of  democracy  in  El 
1  with  the  successful  elections 
^:h  prove  that  we  are  on  the 
;i.rse.  Guatemala  has  also  had 
aet  a  new  course,  hand  insurg- 
|arp  setback,  limit  human  rights 
ij.nd  bring  into  the  government 
.^tatives  of  the  highland  Indian 
dties.  Democracy,  with  free  elec- 
£•6  labor  unions,  freedom  of  re- 
iid  respect  for  the  integrity  of 
iidual,  is  the  clear  choice  of  the 
hming  majority  of  Central 
ois. 

I  ;ie  good  news  is  that  Marxist 
tin  is  not  inevitable  in  Central 
c  The  bad  news  is  that  it  cannot 
lied  out.  Despite  its  success  in 
I  liminating  guerrilla  political  in- 
Bii  populated  areas,  and  despite 
if^nents  in  military  armaments 
olity,  El  Salvador's  government 
itet  turned  the  tide  decisively 
t:s  armed  opposition. 
Knilitan,'  capability  of  the  guer- 
-id  I  would  like  to  stress 
■>;apability,  for  we  are  dealing 
tjpeasant  irregulars  but  with 
l.;ven  sometimes  uniformed, 
•j'orces  whose  main  units  are  as 
rs  if  they  had  been  conscripted 
rtional  army— has  kept  progress 
i''form  and  government  modera- 
c  being  turned  into  the  peace 
Loi  by  the  people  of  El  Salvador 
:  irch's  elections.  One  reason  is 
It  -nal  frictions  and  residues  of 
n'iemocratic  practices  still  hinder 


the  government's  ability  to  provide 
security  for  all  Salvadorans,  particularly 
in  outlying  areas.  But  another  has  been 
the  availability  of  training,  tactical 
guidance,  and  military  supplies  coming 
into  El  Salvador  from  Nicaragua. 

You've  read  in  the  press  about  guer- 
rillas recovering  rifles  from  government 
soldiers,  and,  indeed,  some  have  been. 
But  tons  and  tons  of  munitions  are  being 
flown  in  from  Nicaragua.  This  external 
lifeline  has  not  only  fueled  the  current 
guerrilla  offensive;  it  has  kept  alive  the 
conviction  of  the  most  extreme  among 
them  that  power  will  ultimately  come 
from  the  barrels  of  their  guns.  Mean- 
while the  continuing  resolution  pro- 
cedure has  led  to  a  level  of  U.S.  seciu-ity 
assistance  for  El  Salvador  for  FY  1983 
far  below  that  of  FY  1982  and  below 
that  requested  for  FY  1984. 

That  is  manifestly  not  enough,  par- 
ticularly not  enough  at  this  critical  mo- 
ment in  the  struggle  for  democracy  in 
El  Salvador.  A  constitution  is  being 
written,  presidential  elections  are  being 
prepared,  and  a  peace  commission  was 
named  yesterday  with  the  mandate  of 
finding  ways  to  bring  as  many  Salva- 
dorans as  possible  into  the  democratic 
process.  There  is  never  a  good  time  for 
people  whose  freedom  is  under  attack  to 
run  out  of  ammunition.  But  this  is 
assuredly  one  of  the  worst.  We  must 
allocate  new  resources  in  the  immediate 
future  to  enable  the  Government  of  El 
Salvador  to  check  the  guerrillas  and  con- 
solidate its  own  forward  momentum. 

President  Reagan  and  the  leadership 
of  this  house,  including  you,  Mr.  Chair- 
man [Michael  D.  Barnes],  met  yesterday 
to  start  a  process  of  consultation  to 
develop  a  solution  that  will  have  broad 
support.  Let  me  take  a  minute  to 
develop  our  thinking  a  bit  further,  and 
in  a  broader  context. 


Strategy  Components 

The  strategy  we  are  following  in  Central 
America  has  six  components. 

•  The  first  component  is  economic 
assistance  to  offset  in  some  measure  the 
combined  effects  of  guerrilla  sabotage, 
political  uncertainty,  and  the  world  re- 
cession. Democracies  can  cope  with 
austerity,  but  the  guerrillas  are  betting 
that  economic  anarchy  and  collapse 
would  be  too  much.  That  is  what  their 
strategy  of  guerra  prolongada  is  all 
about.  We  must  demonstrate  that  we, 
too,  can  persevere. 

•  The  second  component  of  our 
policy  is  military  assistance  to  prevent 


the  guerrillas  in  El  Salvador  from  seiz- 
ing power  by  force.  No  one  thinks  that 
the  guerrillas  have  a  big  popular  follow- 
ing. But  they  are  capable  of  effective 
military  operations.  They  are  dangerous 
to  hope  as  well  as  to  life,  property,  and 
freedom.  We  must  make  certain  that 
they  do  not  prevail  by  default. 

•  The  third  component  is  political 
and  economic  reform  and  control  of 
human  rights  abuses  in  El  Salvador. 
Despite  the  guerrillas,  a  lot  has  been 
done  here:  20%  of  the  arable  land  redis- 
tributed, political  violence  reduced  to 
perhaps  a  quarter  of  what  it  was,  demo- 
cratic institutions  launched.  It  is  critical 
to  complete  the  job. 

•  The  fourth  component  is  the 
Caribbean  Basin  initiative.  The  people  in 
the  area  need  hope  for  a  better  eco- 
nomic future.  The  best  way  to  do  that  is 
to  assure  them  fair  trading  opportunities 
in  the  U.S.  market.  Passage  of  the  full 
initiative  is  already  overdue.  We  must 
act  on  this  in  the  immediate  future. 

•  The  fifth  component  is  to  deter 
escalation.  We  have  tried  to  tell  Cuba 
and  the  U.S.S.R.  that  a  very  dangerous 
situation  could  arise  if  they  were  to  in- 
troduce equipment  or  forces  into  Central 
America  that  could  threaten  neighboring 
countries,  or  us.  We  must  work  to  limit 
the  conflict  and  get  the  area  out  of  East- 
West  competition. 


Democracy,  with  free 
elections,  free  labor 
unions,  freedom  of 
religion,  and  respect  for 
the  integrity  of  the  in- 
dividual, is  the  clear 
choice  of  the  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  Central 
Americans. 


•  The  sixth  component  is  the  search 
for  a  peaceful  solution.  That  really  has 
to  be  on  a  regional  basis.  We  have  made 
clear  our  support  for  a  halt  to  the  intro- 
duction into  Central  America  of  heavy 
offensive  weapons.  But  how  could  you, 
for  example,  resolve  the  El  Salvador 
problem  as  long  as  Nicaragua  actively 
supports  guerrilla  warfare  in  El  Salva- 
dor? And  how  could  you  get  the  area  out 
of  East- West  competition,  unless  you 
can  get  the  foreign  military  ad- 
visers— all  of  them — out  of  the  area?  A 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


number  of  democratic  countries  laid  out 
these  principles  in  San  Jose  in  October. 
And  now  a  regional  peace  initiative,  in- 
cluding all  the  countries  of  Central 
America,  is  being  discussed.  We  are  in- 
terested and  wish  it  well. 

This  strategy  can  succeed  in  bring- 
ing peace  back  to  Central  America.  But 
it  will  do  so  only  if  three  conditions  are 
met. 


Conditions  To  Be  Met 

First,  our  own  effort  must  be  sustained. 
Too  often  in  the  last  few  years  Central 
Americans  have  oscillated  between  two 
contradictory  views:  one,  that  we  will 
support  them  no  matter  what  they  do, 
because  the  struggle  is  important  in 
East-West  terms;  and  the  other,  that  we 
will  withhold  further  assistance  no  mat- 
ter how  much  they  reform  because  we 
are  an  impatient  people  with  no  stomach 
for  a  long  tough  struggle.  Both  views 
are  wrong.  Our  support  is  not  in- 
discriminate, but  neither  will  we  cut  and 
run  just  because  a  situation  becomes  dif- 
ficult. 

Second,  our  effort  must  be  prin- 
cipled. We  cannot  abandon  our  convic- 
tion that  legitimate  political  power  can 
only  be  gained  through  competition  at 
the  ballot  box  in  free,  open,  and  orderly 
elections.  There  will  be  no  stable  solu- 
tion without  democracy. 

Third,  our  effort  must  be  coopera- 
tive. We  joined  with  Mexico,  Venezuela, 
Colombia,  and  Canada  in  the  Caribbean 
Basin  initiative,  and  with  others  at  San 
Jose  last  October.  We  support  a  regional 
search  for  peace.  Most  important  of  all, 
we  must  listen  to  the  Central  Americans 
themselves  and  encourage  them  to  take 
the  lead  in  solving  their  own  problems. 

Major  national  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  at  stake.  In  El  Salva- 
dor, if  we  allow  a  government  that  is  re- 
forming itself  into  a  democracy— maybe 
not  fast  enough  for  our  taste  but,  in 
fact,  reforming— to  be  knocked  off  by 
guerrillas  who  don't  have  the  people 
with  them,  then  no  government  in  the 
isthmus  will  be  safe.  Nicaragua's  Cuban 
and  Soviet-supported  "revolution  without 
frontiers"  would  spread.  It  would  head 
south  across  Costa  Rica,  which  has  no 
army,  toward  the  canal.  It  would  head 
north,  putting  enormous  pressure  on 
Honduras  and  reviving  the  guerrilla  war 
in  Guatemala  and  moving  toward  the 
Mexican  border.  So  the  struggle  would 
go  on,  but  on  battlefields  where  the 
stakes  would  be  much  higher. 

We  cannot  permit  that.  We  need  a 
secure  Panama  Canal.  Half  our  trade 


goes  through  the  Caribbean.  The  United 
States  could  not  easily  accommodate  the 
hundreds  of  thousands  or  even  millions 
of  people  who  would  flee  a  disintegrat- 
ing Central  America.  We  need  strong 
and  secure  neighbors. 

So  progress  in  El  Salvador  is  key  to 
progress  in  the  whole  region.  If  democ- 
racy cannot  be  protected  and  extended 
there,  the  costs  of  doing  so  elsewhere 
will  increase  precipitously. 

Our  strategy  to  prevent  a  Marxist- 
Leninist  outcome  in  Central  America  is 
political,  not  military.  We  have  encour- 
aged a  process  of  social,  economic,  and 
political  reform  as  the  appropriate  re- 
sponse to  the  guerrilla  challenge.  The 
military  component  is  ancillary  but 
essential  to  give  the  other  components 
time  to  succeed.  It  is  inconsistent  with 
the  logic  of  a  political  strategy  to  expect 
instantaneous  results.  We  have  been  en- 
gaged in  this  task  but  3  years— surely  a 
short  time  in  the  agonized  history  of 
Central  America.  It  would  be  a  gross 
irony— and  one  cruelly  indifferent  to  the 
democratic  aspirations  of  the  people  of 


El  Salvador— to  call  for  a  fundam 
shift  in  American  policy,  not  whei 
reform  effort  is  going  badly— beci 
has  not  faltered— but  when  the  m 
struggle  appears  not  to  be  being ' 
fast  enough. 

What  you  have  in  the  current 
proposal  is  what  at  an  earlier  poii 
the  budget  process  seemed  needed 
the  job.  In  dollar  values,  more  tha 
three-quarters  of  the  assistance  ^ 
requested  is  economic,  much  of  it 
rapidly  disbursable  economic  supf 
funds.  This  emphasis  on  economic 
ance  is  the  right  one.  But  we  are 
certain  now  that  the  amounts  are 
enough.  The  immediate  military  i 
supply  needs  are  real.  This  hearir 
other  contacts  this  week  should  h 
determine  what  is  needed,  where' 
how  to  achieve  the  broad  consens 
necessary  to  sustain  our  effort. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  h 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  ar 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printir 
fice,  Washington.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Nicaragua:  Threat  to  Peace 
in  Central  America 


by  Thomas  O.  Enders 

Statement  before  the  Home  Foreign 
Ajfairs  Committee  on  April  U,  1983. 
Ambassador  Enders  is  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Inter- American  Affairs.^ 

Since  the  Somoza  government  collapsed 
and  the  Sandinistas  came  to  power,  U.S. 
policy  toward  Nicaragua  has  focused  on 
attempting  to  convince  Nicaragua  to: 

•  Renounce  support  for  insurgency 
in  neighboring  countries; 

•  Abandon  its  pursuit  of  dominant 
military  power  in  Central  America;  and 

•  Come  to  terms  with  its  own  socie- 
ty through  the  creation  of  democratic  in- 
stitutions. 

In  July  1979,  the  soon-to-be  govern- 
ing junta  of  Nicaragua  pledged  formally 
to  the  Organization  of  American  States 
that  its  goals  were  democratic  and 
peaceful.  The  United  States,  indeed,  the 
entire  international  community,  accepted 
this  pledge  and  embarked  on  programs 
of  peaceful  reconstruction  that  typically 
included  substantial  appropriations  of 


assistance  outside  annual  buiiuvt  ' 
esses. 

As  the  months  passed,  b<<\\v\ 
became  increasingly  apparent  tlw  ; 
Sandinistas  saw  themselves  a.^^  tli 
armed  vanguard  of  an  isthmus-w 
movement. 

Nicaragua's  new  regular  arm,  ' 
Ejercito  Popular  Sandinista  (Kr> 
founded  in  1979.  By  the  end  m  b 
according  to  its  commander,  ii  ii: 
grown  to  be  "four  times  as  \n\:  .n 
times  as  strong"  as  Somoza's  ( iii- 
Nacional.2  xhe  EPS  reached  an 
estimated  strength  of  20,000,  I'l' 
by  militias  and  reserves  80,0(hi  -i 
During  that  period  Nicaragua  iv. 
an  estimated  $125  million  of  irulit 
equipment  and  supplies  from  thf  ■ 
Union  alone.^  It  obtained  by  far  t 
heaviest  tanks  in  Central  Americ. 
heavy  artillery,  antiaircraft  weap  '■ 
assault  helicopters,  rocket  launclTh> 
and  patrol  boats.  While  military  ]  tj 
and  crews  trained  in  Bulgaria  ani| 
East  European  locations,  airfieldS 
prepared  for  advanced  jet  fighter! 
significant,  large  numbers  of  for€| 
military  and  security  advisers  wel 
troduced.  Currently,  no  less  than  J" 
Cubans,  50  Soviets,  35  East  Gerins 


Department  of  State  Be' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


PLO  [Palestine  Liberation 
;ation]  and  Libyan  personnel  are 
ed  to  be  stationed  in  Nicaragua 
■ity  missions.  That  is  roughly  one 
military  adviser  for  every  1,000 
uans. 

980— just  as  in  1978,  Castro  had 
the  three  main  Sandinista  fac- 
gether  in  Havana— Cuban  agents 
five  guerrilla  factions  from  El 
r  together  in  Managua,  worked 
lity  pact  among  them,  then  set 
it  command  and  control  ap- 
in  the  Managua  area  and 
;d  logistic  and  training  support 
-aguan  soil.  Since  that  time,  the 
ilk  of  the  arms  and  munitions 
the  insurgents  in  El  Salvador 
wed  through  Nicaragua. ■• 
nwhile  the  Sandinistas  moved  to 
^  monopoly  of  power  inside 
Sua.  Elections  were  ridiculed  and 
led.  One  by  one  the  elements  of 
Id  anti-Somoza  coalition  were 
'f.  The  famous  newspaper  La 
was  censored,  independent  radio 
'stations  curbed,  the  labor  unions 
cted,  the  private  sector  neutral- 
;1  Catholic  Church  subjected  to 
bl  provocation  and  attempts  at 
)i  the  Miskitos  and  other 
lian  Indian  minorities 
:;ed. 

i(  ragua's  southern  border  is  300 
f  im  the  Panama  Canal,  separated 
i\  ZostSL  Rica,  a  democracy  that  for 
t5  years  has  had  no  army.  Its 

2  border  is  300  miles  from  Mex- 
ii^tween  are  two  states.  El 

i  and  Guatemala,  already  torn 
B;illa  violence,  and  Honduras, 
i  l^dgling  democracy  is  under 
p:ssure  from  Nicaragua. 
<  as  not  take  very  much  imagina- 

3  nderstand  how  the  Sandinistas' 
uon  without  frontiers"  might 
iaor  how  its  spread  might  affect 
icrity.  Half  our  trade  flows 
g^the  Caribbean.  And  we  depend 

;  ability  of  our  neighbors  to  avoid 
ir;ertain  circumstances  could 
inn  unprecedented  flow  of 
it  northward  to  this  country. 
;ijy  now,  when  a  troubled  world 
m  invites  unrest,  we  must  safe- 
Cmocracy  and  stability  in  our  im- 
■tiaeighborhood. 

BBlion  With  Nicaragua  Fails 

w  all  seen  predatory  dictatorships 
::%ht  and  the  left:  Germany  under 
"  le  Soviet  Union  under  Stalin 
in;.  Yet,  there  is  a  school  that  at- 
eihe  expansionism  of  left-wing 
onips  to  pressures  from  without. 


According  to  this  proposition,  Soviet  ag- 
gressiveness is  but  a  reaction  to  the 
creation  of  a  network  of  alliances  around 
it,  Castro  was  made  a  Communist  by 
U.S.  confrontation,  and  Vietnam  was 
radicalized  by  foreign  armies. 

Whatever  the  merits  or  defects  of 
these  arguments,  let  me  point  out  that 
the  Nicaraguan  case  provides  ample 
data  to  test  the  policy  that  usually  flows 
from  this  proposition — that  left-wing 
radicalization  and  aggressiveness  can  be 
prevented  by  the  political  support  and 
economic  assistance  of  the  democracies. 

Nicaragua  is  a  country  of  some  2.5 
million  people.  Since  1979  it  has  received 
from  the  democracies  and  multilateral 
agencies  $1.6  billion  in  economic 
assistance,  or  $640  for  every  man, 
woman  and  child.  The  United  States 
supplied  $125  million.  Politically,  such 
democratic  states  as  Mexico  and  the  par- 
ties belonging  to  the  Socialist  Interna- 
tional have  provided  consistent  support. 
Yet  this  same  period  marks  the  big 
buildup  of  the  EPS,  direct  support  for 
violence  in  El  Salvador,  and  the  con- 
solidation of  internal  repression.  It  is 
clear  that  constructive  engagement  has 
not  worked  in  Nicaragua. 

So  far,  negotiation  has  not  worked 
any  better.  There  have  been  many  ef- 
forts. Some  continue  to  this  day.  I  was 
involved  in  the  first  such  effort,  travel- 
ing to  Managua  in  August  1981  to  listen 
to  Sandinista  concerns.  They  told  me 
that  they  remembered  the  U.S.  Marine 
occupation  in  the  first  decades  of  the 
century,  that  they  feared  a  U.S.  invasion 
and  thus  needed  a  big  army,  and  that 
we  should  understand  that  the 
Salvadoran  guerrillas  were  important  as 
a  "shield"  to  protect  Nicaragua. 

So  we  said,  OK,  let's  address  your 
concerns.  Let's  enter  into  a  bilateral 
nonaggression  agreement.  The  United 
States  could  use  its  influence  to  en- 
courage Nicaraguan  exiles  in  this  coun- 
try to  moderate  their  behavior,  and  the 
United  States  could  renew  its  economic 
assistance.  In  return  we  asked  the  San- 
dinistas to  stop  training  and  supplying 
Salvadoran  guerrillas,  to  give  pluralism 
a  chance  in  their  own  country — as  they 
had  promised  to  the  OAS  in  1979— and 
to  limit  their  military  buildup,  perhaps 
through  agreement  with  other  Central 
American  countries. 

We  made  these  proposals  in  writing. 
In  October  1981,  Managua  formally  re- 
jected them  as  "sterile."  At  the  same 
time,  they  lied  about  their  ongoing  arms 
supplies  to  the  Salvadoran  guerrillas  and 
said  they  would  never  limit  their 
military  buildup. 


A  second  attempt  at  negotiation  oc- 
curred in  the  spring  of  1982,  this  time  at 
the  suggestion  of  Mexican  President 
Lopez  Portillo.  Once  again  we  presented 
concrete  proposals  in  writing,  this  time 
elaborated  in  eight  points  presented 
through  our  ambassador  in  Managua. 
Once  again,  there  was  no  concrete 
response  and  no  receptivity  on  issues. 
Nicaragua  simply  replied  that,  before  it 
could  respond  there  would  have  to  be  a 
meeting  at  a  higher  level  in  Mexico.  This 
time,  it  seemed  to  us,  the  Sandinistas 
wanted  to  appear  to  negotiate  without 
actually  doing  so. 

We  decided  to  try  a  third  time. 
Under  Costa  Rican  leadership,  a  group 
of  democratic  states  got  together  in  San 
Jose  in  October  1982  to  work  out  a  com- 
prehensive set  of  peace  proposals  for 
Central  America  as  a  whole.  Let  me 
speak  a  moment  about  these  proposals, 
because  they  continue  to  represent  the 
essence  of  what  we,  like  Nicaragua's 
democratic  neighbors,  are  trying  to  do. 

First,  the  San  Jose  group  agreed 
the  area  should  be  freed  from  East- West 
competition.  The  way  to  do  that,  the 
democracies  concluded,  is  to  get  all 
foreign  military  advisers  and  trainers 
out  of  Central  America— Cuba's,  the 
Soviet  Union's,  Bulgaria's,  East  Ger- 
many's, the  PLO's,  and  ours. 

Second,  the  Central  American  coun- 
tries must  find  a  way  to  live  with  each 
other  without  fear.  To  this  end,  the  San 
Jose  group  proposed  mutual  and 
verifiable  accords  banning  the  import  of 
heavy  offensive  weapons,  renouncing  the 
support  for  insurgency  on  neighbors'  ter- 
ritory, and  providing  for  international 
surveillance  of  frontiers. 

Third,  each  Central  American  coun- 
try must  find  a  way  to  establish 
democratic  institutions,  open  to  opposi- 
tion elements.  Central  American 
democrats,  led  by  Costa  Rica,  are  par- 
ticularly clear  on  the  need  for 
democratization.  Only  in  this  way  could 
they  be  confident  they  will  not  have  to 
face  sometime  in  the  future  an  ag- 
gressive neighbor  unconstrained  by  the 
limits  democracy  imposes. 

Representing  the  San  Jose  group, 
Costa  Rica  attempted  to  contact 
Nicaragua  to  ask  whether  it  would  enter 
into  a  dialogue  on  these  principles.  The 
Sandinistas  refused  even  to  receive  the 
proposal,  arguing  that  they  had  not  par- 
ticipated in  its  formulation,  and  so  were 
not  bound  to  address  it.  • 

So  a  fourth  attempt  at  negotiations 
is  now  being  made.  In  January  1983, 
Mexico,  Colombia,  Venezuela,  and 
Panama  met  on  the  island  of  Contadora 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


to  propose  an  effort  at  mediation  of 
Central  America's  conflict.  Honduras, 
Costa  Rica,  and  El  Salvador  responded 
by  proposing  that  the  five  Central 
American  countries— including 
Nicaragua— meet  in  the  presence  of  the 
Contadora  group.  This  would  enable 
Nicaragua  to  take  part  in  developing  the 
proposals,  as  it  had  not  in  San  Jose. 
And,  to  maximize  the  chances  that 
Nicaragua  would  participate,  they  sug- 
gested that  the  United  States  not  be 
present.  That  would  also  take  care  of 
charges  that  the  conference  would  be 
U.S. -dominated. 

But  still  Nicaragua  was  not  recep- 
tive. Instead,  it  went  to  the  UN  Security 
Council,  claiming  that  it  wants  to  meet 
bilaterally  with  the  United  States  and 
with  Honduras,  not  regionally.  In  effect, 
Nicaragua  is  saying  it  wants  to  discuss 
Nicaragua's  charges  against  Honduras 
and  the  United  States -but  not  its 
neighbors'  concerns  about  Nicaragua's 
militarization,  dictatorship,  and  interven- 
tion in  El  Salvador. 

I  have  described  this  history  at  some 
length  to  give  you  some  idea  of  the  ex- 
traordinary difficulty  of  dealing  with  the 
Sandinista  leadership.  The  Sandinistas 
have  made  their  contempt  for  genuine 
dialogue— for  real  negotiations— quite 
clear.  A  month  ago,  we  all  saw  them  in- 
terrupt the  Pope  in  a  calculated  attempt 
at  intimidation— and  the  Sandinistas 
followed  this  up  by  banning  broadcasts 
of  Easter  services.  Last  week.  Interior 
Minister  Tomas  Borge,  in  an  interview 
for  Cuban  television,  stressed  the  sub- 
jects his  country  would  not  negotiate: 
Nicaragua,  he  said,  would  not  discuss 
the  principles  of  the  Sandinista  revolu- 
tion; it  would  not  enter  into  a  dialogue 
about  the  overall  Central  American 
situation;  and  it  would  not  talk  about 
"counterrevolutionaries."  He  might  have 
added  that  the  Sandinistas  are  afraid  to 
deal  with  these  issues  in  any  kind  of 
open  way— either  with  their  own  people 
or  with  Nicaragua's  increasingly  con- 
cerned neighbors.  So  it  is  sad,  rather 
than  surprising,  that  Borge  tells  his 
Cuban  TV  audience  that  the  proposed 
meeting  of  Central  American  Foreign 
Ministers  is  "diplomatic  demagogy." 

Despite  this  record,  we  are  not  go- 
ing to  give  up.  The  Sandinistas  are  ob- 
viously not  yet  persuaded  that  they  have 
to  negotiate  on  substance  with  either 
their  neighbors  or  their  internal  critics. 
Perhaps  they  still  think  that  if  they  bob 
and  weave  enough,  something  will 
change— that  the  United  States  will  end 
or  weaken  its  support  for  democratic 
governments  in  Costa  Rica,  El  Salvador, 


and  Honduras— and  that  the  way  will 
again  be  open  for  the  "revolution 
without  frontiers."  We  must  convince 
them  that  is  not  the  case,  that  the 
United  States  will  not  abandon  its 
friends  in  Central  America.  At  the  same 
time,  we  must  go  on  probing,  proposing 
ways  to  think  that  overcome  the  old  ob- 
jections—until the  Sandinistas  tell  us 
they  are  ready  to  move  to  a  fair  and 
equitable  dialogue. 

The  Anti-Sandinista  Insurgency 

Meanwhile,  Nicaraguans  have  taken 
matters  into  their  own  hands.  The  San- 
dinistas have  begun  to  reap  the  conse- 
quences of  their  abandonment  of  the 
original  goals  of  the  Nicaraguan  revolu- 
tion. Sandinista  intransigence  has 
sparked  an  insurgency  that  the  San- 
dinistas themselves  claim  is  a  threat. 
Several  thousand  guerrillas  are  now  ac- 
tive in  Nicaragua.  Disillusioned  Miskito 
Indians  operate  in  much  of  their 
homeland  in  the  Atlantic  lowlands.  In 
the  eastern  and  northern  border  depart- 
ments of  Jinotega,  Nueva  Segovia, 
Madriz,  Esteli,  and  Zelaya,  significant 
insurgent  forces  are  attacking  govern- 
ment outposts  and  ambushing  military 
convoys.  Guerrilla  activity  is  reported  in 
the  central  coffee-growing  province  of 
Matagalpa.  This  month,  for  the  first 
time,  armed  dissidence  has  been 
reported  in  the  south.  Wherever  the  op- 
position groups  show  up,  they  seem  to 
attract  local  support,  and  their  numbers 
grow. 

In  light  of  recent  allegations  in  the 
media,  you  will  ask  me  right  off  whether 
this  insurgency  has  been  created  or  sup- 
ported by  the  United  States.  No 
American  administration  has  ever 
discussed  this  kind  of  allegation— other 
than  in  the  Senate  and  House  commit- 
tees created  expressly  for  the  pur- 
pose— and  this  one  will  not  break  prece- 
dent. But  I  will  describe  the  Nicaraguan 
opposition  movements;  it  should  be  clear 
to  you  that  it  has  appeared  and  expand- 
ed in  response  to  deep  grievances 
against  the  Sandinistas. 

Who  are  the  people  challenging 
Managua's  ideologues?  What  do  they 
want?  From  what  we  know,  there  are 
two  major  groups.  Both  are  Nicaraguan 
to  the  core. 

Frente  Democratico  Nacional.  One, 

the  larger,  is  the  Frente  Democratico 
Nacional  (FDN).  Although  its  main 
strength  is  inside  Nicaragua,  Sandinista 
repression  has  driven  most  of  its  leaders 
to  Honduras  and  Costa  Rica.  The  FDN's 
directorate  is  made  up  of  Lucia  Salazar, 


the  widow  of  Jorge  Salazar,  an  a 
Somoza  businessman  murdered  b 
Sandinistas  in  1980;  Alfonso  Call 
former  vice-president  of  Nicaragt 
broke  cleanly  with  Somoza  in  a  1 
tempt  to  oust  Somoza;  Edgar  Ch- 
an apolitical  private  sector  leader 
Indalecio  Rodriquez,  former  vice- 
of  the  Central  American  Univers- 
(UCA);  Enrique  Bermudez,  a  fori 
tional  Guard  colonel  whom  Some 
removed  from  Nicaragua  by  senc 
as  military  attache  to  Washingto 
1975  to  1979  (and  whom  the  San 
themselves  have  acknowledged  p 
no  part  in  Somoza  regime  repres 
Marco  Zeledon,  a  respected  privj 
tor  leader  with  no  ties  to  the  Sor 
and  Adolfo  Calero,  a  life-long  op 
of  the  Somozas  who  was  jailed  b 
Somoza  in  1978.  They  have  publi 
stated  that  their  objective  is  to  b 
democracy  to  Nicaragua,  not  a  r 
Somocismo.  In  sociological  terms 
leaders  represent  members  of  th) 
fessions  and  teachers,  plus  small) 
businessmen  and  farmers.  Theirfl 
followers  include  disaffected  peaj 
former  small  farmers,  Miskito  lit 
and  other  groups  displaced  or  sU 
repressed  by  Managua's  ideologi 
estimate  that  the  FDN's  ranks  ill 
over  a  thousand  guerrillas.  Form 
tional  Gardsmen— mostly  nonces 
sioned  officers— lead  many  of  thf 
guerrilla  units,  but  most  of  the  r 
are  peasants  and  former  small  f; 
FDN  pronouncements  repud 
Somoza  past  and  affirm  the  nati 
and  patriotic  principles  of  Sandin 
am  sure  the  committee  is  aware, 
FDN  proposed  a  peace  plan  on  J 
ary  13,  1983,  in  which  they  offen 
cease  hostilities  if  among  other  f 
the  Government  of  Nicaragua  he 
nationally  supervised  elections  b' 
September  1983,  revoked  the  sta 
siege  in  Nicaragua,  and  separate 
administration  from  partisan  pol 
and  ideological  activities. 

Alianza  Revolucionaria 
Democratica.  The  second  major 
led  by  the  anti-Somoza  hero  Ede 
Pastora,  is  ARDE— the  Alianza 
cionaria  Democratica.  ARDE's  k 
include  such  well-known  figures 
former  post-Somoza  junta  leader 
Alfonso  Robelo,  Miskito  Indian  \<Ti 
Brooklyn  Rivera,  and  former  am 
Somoza  fighter  Fernando  "Negri  | 
Chamorro.  Pastora,  who  was  thf' 
original  Sandinista  Vice  Minister | 
Defense,  has  repeatedly  denouncj 
revolution's  betrayal,  which  he  i 
was  motivated  by  Cuban  agents 
ing  a  sellout  to  the  Soviet  Union  1' 


te,^ 
inci 

tsB 


78 


Department  of  State  H' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


;  no  peace  in  Nicaragua,"  Pastora 
5,  "as  long  as  the  slaughter  of  the 
;os,  Sumus,  and  Ramas  continues, 
I  as  there  is  no  freedom  of  the 

and  as  long  as  the  occupation  by 
,  German,  Soviet  and  Bulgarian 

continues."  ARDE's  February  2 
proposal  calls  for  elections  of  a 
tuent  assembly  by  June  1983  to 
the  promise  of  the  Sandinista 
tion. 

iiught  off  balance  by  the  scope  of 
position  it  has  brought  upon  itself, 
caraguan  Government  has  sought 
;redit  its  opponents  as 
icistas"— attempting  to  associate 
with  the  crimes  of  the  former 
iment.  The  Sandinistas'  current 
janda  plan— we  have  seen  the 

24  FSLN  [Sandinista  National 
tion  Front]  memorandum — 
;ts  its  political  cadres  to  blame 
imperialism"  for  the  country's 
ms,  to  smear  Adolfo  Calero,  a 
;ratic  Conservative  Party  leader 

hom  they  have  negotiated,  and 

0  Robelo,  a  former  member  of 
wn  junta,  as  "traitors"  and  to  por- 
Dposition  as  aimed  against 

gua  rather  than  against  its  cur- 

ilers. 

e  Sandinista  tactic  is  to  assert 

e  only  alternative  to  what  they've 

1  is  "Somocismo."  Nothing  could 
•e  simplistic  or  more  false, 
cismo"  was  a  highly  personal 
)nal  dictatorship  that  died  with 
a.  It  could  not  be  recreated  even 
ivished  to  do  so.  The  Sandinistas 
hat  most  Nicaraguans  want 
racy,  peace,  and  an  end  to  Cuban 
ce.  Indeed,  that  is  the  program 
ed  the  Nicaraguan  people  in  1979. 
at  is  the  program  the  Sandinistas 
lay  always  trying  to  sweep  under 

they  call  "Somocismo."  The 
feuan  people  remember  their 
f.  So  should  we. 

fegional  Question 

)t  clear  what  the  course  of  the 
gle  in  Nicaragua  will  be.  What  is 
a.  is  that,  as  long  as  Nicaragua 
B|legitimate  dissent  at  home  to 
vviolent  means  and  persists  in 
a'niiiK  and  destabilizing  its 
1.  irs,  it  will  never  be  stable,  nor 
*  ntnil  America. 

Is  c.  iiiceivable  that  Cuba  or  the 
t  Uniiin  could  be  tempted  to 
ie  the  conflict,  introducing  modern 
W  aircraft  or  even  Cuban  combat 
n  Clearly,  a  dangerous  situation 
Icthen  develop,  unacceptable  not 

Central  America  but  to  the 
Ji'aii  nations  as  a  whole.  We  have 


communicated  to  Moscow  and  Havana 
how  dangerous  such  a  move  would  be.  It 
is  also  conceivable  that,  in  an  effort  to 
distract  attention  from  their  internal 
problems,  the  Sandinistas  might  lash  out 
at  their  neighbors,  attacking  Costa  Rica 
or  Honduras.  For  over  a  year,  Managua 
has  already  been  running  terrorist 
operations  in  San  Jose  and  infiltrating 
guerrillas  into  northern  Costa  Rican 
provinces.  And  there  have  been  frequent 
border  incidents  with  Honduras. 
Although  journalists  who  have  visited 
the  area  report  no  activity  on  the  Hon- 
duran  side,  Nicaragua  has  recently  rein- 
forced military  units  on  the  border. 
Again,  I  believe  the  Sandinistas  under- 
stand that  they  could  not  gain  by  attack- 
ing their  neighbors.  It  is  also  important 
to  stress  that  every  resource  of  inter- 
American  diplomacy,  including,  of 
course,  that  of  this  country,  would  be 
available  to  prevent  such  an  outburst. 

Conclusion 

But  there  is  a  better  way.  It  is  through 
dialogue  and  negotiation.  We  ask  the 
Sandinistas  to  think  of  the  Nicaraguan 
people.  Despite  all  that  foreign  aid, 
Nicaraguans  in  cities  and  countryside 
are  much  less  well  off  than  before  the 
revolution.  They  resent  the  pressures  on 
their  churches  and  their  clergy.  They 
distrust  and  dislike  the  Sandinista 
monopoly  of  power — they  have  lived 
under  such  a  system  before. 

We  ask  the  Sandinistas  to  consider 
the  insurgency  in  their  own  country. 
Despite  (or  is  it  because?)  the  presence 
of  all  those  armed  Cubans,  popular 
resistance  is  spreading.  They  may  con- 
clude that  the  dialogue  they  have  so 
many  times  spurned  is  preferable  to 
widening  civil  strife. 

We  ask  the  Sandinistas  to  consider 
the  insurgency  they  are  supporting  in  El 
Salvador.  If  it  has  legitimate  grievances, 
let  them  be  pursued  through  democratic 
institutions.  The  international  communi- 
ty is  willing  and  able  to  provide  security 
and  other  guarantees  for  elections  as  the 
answer  there  as  well. 

Each  element  of  the  Central 
American  problem  is  related  to  the 
other.  No  amount  of  land  reform,  or 
open  elections,  or  improvement  in 
human  rights  will  end  the  conflict  in  El 
Salvador  if  Nicaragua  continues  to  fuel 
it.  Democracy  will  not  prosper  in 
Nicaragua's  neighbors  unless  it  is  prac- 
ticed in  Nicaragua  as  well.  Nicaragua 


will  not  be  free  of  the  hostility  of  its 
own  people  and  of  its  neighbors,  until  it 
begins  to  address  their  concerns  for 
democracy  and  security. 

So  the  answer  is  democratization 
and  dialogue  among  neighbors.  The  pur- 
pose of  U.S.  policy  in  the  area  is  to 
create  conditions  in  which  the  area  can 
be  removed  from  East- West  conflict,  the 
import  of  offensive  weapons  and  mutual 
support  for  insurgencies  ended,  and  the 
democratic  transformation  of  each  socie- 
ty achieved.  Negotiations  among  all  the 
Central  American  countries  and  negotia- 
tions within  countries  can  provide  the 
opportunity  for  all  groups  to  compete  in 
the  voting  booth  rather  than  on  the  bat- 
tlefield. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  bv  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  tlie  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice. Washington,  D.C.  20402. 

2EPS  Chief  of  Staff  Joaquin  Cuadra  to 
U.S.  Army  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff  for  In- 
telligence, Major  General  William  E.  Odom, 
in  November  1982. 

^By  way  of  comparison.  El  Salvador 
received  $121  million  from  the  United  States 
during  the  same  period. 

■■Nicaragua's  Sandinistas  aid  the  guer- 
rillas in  El  Salvador  by  supplying  arms,  train- 
ing, financial  aid,  and  'by  allowing  the  guer- 
rillas' command  and  control  center  to  operate 
near  Managua. 

Arms  Supply 

•  Arms  and  ammunition  destined  for 
clandestine  delivery  to  El  Salvador  reach 
Nicaragua  by  ship  and  by  direct  flights  from 
Havana  to  Nicaragua.  The  arms  remain 
stockpiled  near  Managua  until  their  use  by 
the  guerrillas. 

•  Several  "smoking  guns"  have  revealed 
Nicaraguan  arms  shipments  to  El  Salvador. 
Nicaragua's  Papalonal  airfield  was  used  for 
direct  supply  flights  to  the  Salvadoran  guer- 
rillas for  tne  January  1981  "final  offensive"; 
two  overland  shipments  from  Nicaragua 
through  Honduras  discovered  in  1981  con- 
tained weapons  originally  shipped  to 
American  units  in  Vietnam  (similar  caches  of 
arms  were  discovered  in  Guatemala  City  in 
mid- 1981,  apparently  destined  for  the 
Guatemalan  insurgents);  a  captured 
Salvadoran  guerrilla  leader,  Lopez  Arriola, 
confirmed  that  the  Sandinistas  control 
weapons  delivered  from  Vietnam  to 
Nicaragua  for  the  Salvadoran  insurgents. 

•  'The  Sandinistas  use  a  variety  of  routes 
(overland,  air  drop,  and  sea)  to  furnish  arms 
and,  increasingly,  vitally  needed  ammunition. 
In  1982,  these  supply  operations  have  includ- 
ed increased  quantities  of  heavier  weapons, 
including  M-60  machine  guns,  M-79  grenade 
launchers,  and  M-72  antitank  weapons. 

•  A  Salvadoran  guerrilla,  Alejandro 
Montenegro,  captured  during  a  raid  on  a 
guerrilla  safehouse  in  Honduras  in  August 
1982,  confirmed  that  Nicaragua  remains  the 
primary  source  of  insurgent  weapons  and  am- 
munition, although  the  guerrillas  capture 
some  weapons  and  ammunition  from  the 
Salvadoran  military.  One  of  the  guerrillas 
captured  with  Montenegro  had  made  five 
trips  to  Managua  in  1982  to  pick  up  arms. 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Training 

•  Since  mid-1980  Salvadoran  guerrillas 
have  trained  in  Nicaragua  and  Cuba  in 
niilitary  tactics,  weapons,  and  explosives. 
Cubans  and  other  foreign  advisers  are  in- 
volved in  the  training. 

•  One  Salvadoran  guerrilla  who  defected 
to  Honduras  in  September  1981  reported  that 
he  and  12  others  went  from  Nicaragua  to 
Cuba  for  extensive  military  training  in  Cuba 
where  over  900  Salvadorans  were  receiving 
training. 

•  Several  terrorists  captured  in  a 
safehouse  raid  in  Tegucigalpa  in  November 
1981  told  authorities  that  the  Nicaraguan 
Government  had  provided  them  with  funds 
for  travel  and  explosives. 

•  Two  weeks  ago,  responding  to  a  local 
citizen's  tip,  Honduran  security  officials  sur- 
prised a  group  of  Salvadoran  guerrillas  in 
transit  through  Honduras  to  El  Salvador 
from  training  camps  in  Nicaragua.  The  an- 
tisocials  escaped  after  a  firefignt  but  left 
behind  documents  identifying  infiltration 
routes. 

Command  and  Control 

•  After  2  years  of  combat,  the  FMLN 
headquarters  near  Managua  has  evolved  into 
a  sophisticated  command  and  control  center 
which  guides  operations.  Cuban  and 
Nicaraguan  officers  are  present  at  this  head- 
quarters. The  headquarters  coordinates 
logistical  support,  including  clothes,  money, 
and  ammunition. 

Intelligence  agencies  have  provided  a 
mass  of  classified  information  on  arms  sup- 
ply, training,  and  command  and  control  to  the 
relevant  congressional  committees.  In  a 
report  dated  September  22,  1982  the  House 
Intelligence  Oversight  Committee  noted  that 
"intelligence  has  been  able  to  establish 
beyond  doubt  the  involvement  of  communist 
countries  in  the  insurgency."  The  chairman  of 
the  committee  issued  a  statement  on  March 
4,  1982  stating  in  part  that: 

The  insurgents  are  well-trained,  well- 
equipped  with  modern  weapons  and  sup- 
plies, and  rely  on  the  use  of  sites  in 
Nicaragua  for  command  and  control  and 
for  logistical  support.  The  intelligence 
supporting  these  judgments  is  convincing. 

There  is  further  persuasive  evidence  that 
the  Sandinista  government  of  Nicaragua  is 
helping  train  insurgents  and  is  transferring 
arms  and  support  from  and  through 
Nicaragua  to  the  insurgents.  They  are  fur- 
ther providing  the  insurgents  witn  bases  of 
operation  in  Nicaragua.  Cuban  involve- 
ment—in providing  arms— is  also  evident.  ■ 


Secretary  Visits  Mexico 


Secretary  Shultz  visited  Mexico  City 
April  17-19,  1983,  to  attend  the  third 
meeting  of  the  U.S. -Mexico  Binational 
Commission. 

Following  are  the  texts  of  the  joint 
statement  issued  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
final  session  and  a  news  conference  held 
by  Secretary  Shultz,  U.S.  Treasury 
Secretary  Donald  T.  Regan,  and 
Mexico's  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relations 
Bernardo  Sepulveda  Amor. 


JOINT  STATEMENT. 
APR.  19.  19831 

Secretary  of  State  George  Shultz, 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Donald 
Regan,  Secretary  of  Commerce  Malcolm 
Baldrige,  Secretary  of  Foreign  Rela- 
tions Bernardo  Sepulveda,  Secretary  of 
Finance  Jesus  Silva  Herzog,  and 
Secretary  of  Commerce  and  Industrial 
Development  Hector  Hernandez  met  in 
Mexico  City  on  April  18  and  19,  1983, 
on  the  occasion  of  the  third  meeting  of 
the  Binational  Commission.  U.S.  Am- 
bassador to  Mexico,  John  Gavin,  and 
Mexican  Ambassador  to  the  United 
States,  Jorge  Espinosa  de  los  Reyes, 
were  present.  At  the  conclusion  of  the 
meeting  of  the  commission,  they  called 
on  the  President  of  the  Republic,  Miguel 
de  la  Madrid  Hurtado. 

The  following  issues  were  discussed 
during  the  meeting  of  the  commission: 

•  The  future  structure  of  the  Bina- 
tional Commission; 

•  Trade  and  financial  matters,  in- 
cluding the  outlook  of  the  two  national 
economies  and  of  the  world  economy, 
financial  and  commercial  cooperation, 
and  foreign  investment; 

•  Scientific  and  technical  coopera- 
tion; 

•  Cultural  relations; 

•  Fisheries  and  matters  pertaining 
to  the  law  of  the  sea; 

•  Environmental  protection  in  the 
border  area; 

•  Immigration; 

•  Tourism; 

•  Legal  matters,  such  as  coopera- 
tion toward  the  elimination  of  illicit  nar- 
cotics production  and  traffic;  and 

•  International  matters  of  mutual 
interest,  including  those  relating  to  Cen- 
tral America  and  the  Caribbean. 


The  discussions  were  very  con; 
five  and  enhanced  mutual  understi 
ing.  An  agreement  was  reached  to 
tain  the  present  structure  of  the  1 
tional  Commission.  The  usefulness 
establishing  working  groups  withii 
framework  was  recognized. 

In  the  trade  sector,  export  ino 
fives  and  coimtervailing  duties  we; 
discussed.  Conversations  on  these 
jects  are  to  continue,  with  the  objf 
of  finding  a  solution.  Both  parties 
agreed  that  these  discussions  will 
resumed  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  two  countries  reviewed  th 
many  important  and  timely  steps  i 
recently  in  the  field  of  bilateral  fir 
cooperation.  There  was  a  detailed 
amination  of  new  steps  in  this  fiel 
related  in  particular  to  the  consoli 
of  commercial  debts  and  the  finan 
bilateral  trade  expansion. 

In  the  fisheries  area,  the  need 
resume  conversations  concerning ; 
regional  agreement  for  the  conser 
of  tuna  in  the  Eastern  Pacific  was 
recognized.  In  this  regard,  Mexico 
fered  a  proposal. 

On  the  subject  of  Central  Ame 
Secretaries  ?  pulveda  and  Shultz 
changed  view  j  on  the  situation  in 
area.  They  agreed  to  promote  pro 
of  dialogue  and  negotiation  for  thf 
pose  of  avoiding  armed  conflict  an 
fostering  peaceful  conditions  and 
economic  development.  j 

Both  countries  agreed  to  conclj 
an  agreement  for  cooperation  on  1 1 
protection  of  the  environment  in  1 1 
border  area.  I 

Cultural  cooperation  will  be 
strengthened  through  new  exchani 
within  the  framework  of  the  Bilate 
Commission  of  Cultural  Cooperatit 
The  Secretaries  also  agreed  to  esti 
Juarez-Lincoln  lectures,  to  be  give 
Mexico  each  year  by  distinguished' 
American  figures,  and  in  the  Unite 
States  by  distinguished  lecturers  fi 
Mexico. 

A  new  agreement  for  the  pron 
of  tourism  was  signed,  to  replace  t 
one  signed  in  1979. 

The  U.S. -Mexico  Mixed  Commi 
of  Science  and  Technology  will  m© 
December  1983  to  examine  a  new 
gram  of  activities.  There  will  also  1 
meeting  soon  of  the  working  groui 
consular  matters.  The  Secretaries  ' 
agreed  to  strengthen  reciprocal 
assistance  on  legal  matters. 


Department  of  Stale  Bl  ' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Shuhr  and  Mexicar  ForeigT:  Minister  Sepuiveda  propoBc  toast  to  President 


rw:  ctnunirief  -f-'ievec  :ut  iro- 
v'ori:  i»eric)rmec  pv  irit  inierna- 
iouTiaarief  anc  Vi'aiers  r.oTnmis- 
resoivfr  proDleiriF  wiinir.  he 
aor..  They  apreec  tt'  support 
■  thai  wil  Konfinutt  re  rnt  lonc- 
Hutior  of  waier  polmrior  proi- 

retaries  Shultz  and  Sepuiveda 
ith  pleasure  zht  mtentior.  of 
■esiaentf  k  mse:  ir  19^?,  Tnt 
:  pia'.-t  o:  rrit  meetiriE  viL  r»t  ar;- 
ir.  aut  ctourst  Me;:ic-c  wiL  tHr 


CONFERENCE. 

1983- 

ry  Shultz.  Fl-s-       ;    iii  •    :;iiii;)iy 

SE  iry  app^e'ji;.ji:    ■  i-     ■ >'■ 

ponit  anc  int  p-a^rii;:   ;"t:,:nieni 

t  al.  -eceivfc  nert  in  Mexico 

say  ihat  I  tiavi-  certainly 

d.  af  navfr  my  colleagues,  from 

itructivf  discussions  that  we've 

over  tne  last  couple  of  days. 

Inaudible]. 

•etan  Shultz.  The  communique 
p-ecise.'y  wna:  i:  says.  "5v"e 
:  F  important  tc-  avoid  escala- 

ne  arrriec  confiic:  anc  tnai  ve 

ice.  we  seeK  economic  deveiop- 
tne  region  Af  far  as  tne 
a  taKe  place  it.  Panama  is  con- 

I  have,  at  we  puliec  uj  nert. 
D  tne  Secretary  tne  ties:  of 

tune  ir.  those  meetmEfs.  'W'e 

It  tne^'  re  successfu. 


Q   Did  you  deal  with  the  question 
of  illeEral  immigrantp  to  the  United 
States  and  undocumented  workers  in 
the  linited  States,  and  how  is  this 
problem  g-oinp  in  be  solved"  Is  there 
g-oine  to  be  ;»  quota  system  for  Mex- 
ican workers  in  the  United  States? 

Secretan  Shultz.  Me  dia.  as  we 
said  in  the  communique,  discuss  the 
g-enera!  questior  of  immigration,  and  I 
thmK  tne  mos:  important  Qeveiopment 
ir.  tne  lepa:  sense  ir.  tne  linited  States  is 
tne  Drosjiec:  of  the  Simpson-Mazzoli  bill, 
that  IS  welJ  Known  here  and  in  the 
United  States.  I  would  say  beyond  that, 
however,  that  the  really  important  thing 
to  focus  on  IS  the  importance  of 
economic  growth  throughout  our  region. 
We  talkea  about  that  m  talkmg  about 
the  U.S.  economy.  We've  talked  about 
the  Mexican  economy.  We've  talked 
about  Central  America,  but  it  is  pros- 
perity- at  home  that  is  essentially  the 
answer  to  this  question. 

Q.  What  shape  viill  American 
financial  support  for  Mexico  take,  and 
will  there  be  additional  American  in- 
vestments in  this  country? 

Secretary  Regan.  Me  had  a  ven,  in- 
teresting discussion  with  Secretary  Silva 
Herzog  and  Secretary  Hernandez 
regarding  the  Mexican  economy  and 
what  tney  forecast  for  it  over  the  next 
several  months. 

At  the  current  moment.  Mexico  is 
doing  it  on  its  own:  there  is  no  need  for 
further  financial  aid.  If  conditions  were 
tc>  change,  ob^nousjy.  we  plan  to  be  in 


touch  with  each  other  constantly,  so  at 
the  moment  there  is  no  additional  finan- 
cial assistance. 

Q.  Have  you  reassured  the  Mex- 
ican officials  that  the  money  that's 
supposed  to  be  used  to  interdict  arms 
in  Central  America  won't  be  used  to 
wage  war  against  the  government  that 
they  support  in  Nicaragua? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Me  have  dis- 
cussed the  situation  m  Central  America 
at  great  length,  and  the  Secretary  has 
described  his  efforts  to  me — ver>-  con- 
structive efforts — and  the  point  of  view 
of  Mexico.  M'e  also  discussed  these  mat- 
ters with  President  de  la  Madrid,  and  in 
turn.  I've  explamec  our  analysis  of  the 
situation  and  tne  things  that  we're  tn'- 
mg  to  do  to  help  bring  about  security  for 
the  region,  particularly  ir.  El  Salvador, 
where  there  is  a  gtierrilis  challenge  to  a 
democratic  government,  and  our  own.  ef- 
forts t(>  promote,  I  think,  the  essential 
ideas  of  preventing  the  flow  of  arms,  in 
the  case  that  we  worr\  about,  from 
Nicaragua.  Cuba,  and  Nicaragua  to  E. 
Saivador,  and  to  seeK  means  for  national 
pluralism  throughout  the  region,  so  that 
we  can  see  economic  development  take 
place. 

Q.  Yon  had  six  Cabinet  members 
meeting  here,  three  from  Mexico  and 
three  from  the  United  States,  and  you 
discussed  a  number  of  problems  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  interests  of 
the  two  nations. 

V  ere  there  any  points  in  which 
the  different  focus  of  each  government 
might  bring  about  a  disagreement  be- 
tween them  or  did  you  have  a  general 
area  of  disagreement  in  the  positions 
adopted  by  the  two  governments  sur- 
rounding all  of  the  items  that  you 
discussed? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  say  that 
we  had  a  uniformly  good  atmosphere — a 
problem-solving  atmosphere — in  the 
sense  that  whatever  we  took  up,  I  think 
it  was  genuinely  felt  on  both  sides,  the 
object  was  to  make  progress  in  sohong 
the  problem.  In  some  cases,  there  were 
things  that  had  been  so  constructed 
before  we  got  here,  like  the  tourism 
agreement,  that  we  could  sign  it,  so  that 
represented  an  agreement. 

In  other  cases,  we  agreed  to  start  up 
again  some  talks  that  had  been  suspend- 
ed, as  in  the  discussion  that  Secretan- 
Baldrige  had  on  the  issue  of  subsidies. 
There  were  others  m  which  we  ex- 
changed ideas  and  in  which  a  proposal 
was  tabled  on  one  side  or  the  other.  On 
the  question  of  tuna,  for  example,  we 
both  see  that  these  are  fish  that  migrate 
around  and  so  the\-  haven't  heard  about 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


national  boundaries.  It's  a  problem  to 
know  how  to  deal  with  that,  and  the 
Mexican  Government  put  forward  a  new 
proposal,  which  we'll  be  examining. 

We  didn't  agree  on  everything,  but 
we  were  able  to  look  at  every  issue,  in- 
cluding very  sensitive  ones,  such  as  the 
Central  American  issues,  all  in,  I  think, 
a  very  constructive  spirit.  I  might  ask 
my  counterpart  if  he  would  like  to  com- 
ment on  that. 

Secretary  Sepulveda.  I  share  a 
great  deal  of  the  viewpoints  expressed 
by  Secretary  Shultz  and  that  these  con- 
versations have  been  extremely  fruitful 
and  extremely  cordial  and  productive. 
We've  held  them  in  an  atmosphere  of 
frankness  and  cordiality,  and  we  have 
been  able  to  present  our  different  points 
of  view  on  these  various  matters  within 
this  framework  of  cordiality  and 
frankness. 

As  you  know,  this  is  the  first  occa- 
sion during  the  Administration  of  Presi- 
dent de  la  Madrid  that  the  Binational 
Commission  has  met.  We've  met— 
Secretary  Silva  Herzog  and  Secretary 
Hernandez— with  our  American  counter- 
parts and  worked  constructively  over 
the  past  2  days  in  analyzing  the  various 
problems  that  were  presented  to  us. 
Some  of  the  results  have  already  been 
mentioned  by  Secretary  Shultz,  but  I'd 
like  to  mention  a  couple  of  others  that  I 
think  we  have  made  progress  on. 

For  example,  the  matter  of  en- 
vironmental quality  along  the  border 
between  the  two  nations,  we  have  made 
progress  in  discussing  this  situation.  I 
think  this  is  a  situation  that  affects  both 
Mexicans  and  Americans,  and  we  have 
made  progress  that  we'll  be  able  to  set- 
tle and  improve  the  quality  of  the  en- 
vironment along  the  border  between  our 
two  countries. 

Another  item  that  I  consider  of  im- 
portance is  a  matter  of  cultural  ex- 
changes, and  that  we  hope  that  we  will 
both  be  able  to  receive  and  to  send 
cultural  presentations  from  one  country 
to  another  and  vice  versa.  And  I  think 
as  far  as  legal  matters  are  concerned,  I 
think  we  have  established  the  ground- 
work for  cooperation  whenever  that  is 
necessary  and  indispensable  and  that  we 
will  get  good  results  in  the  legal  field  in 
the  future. 

As  far  as  Central  America  is  con- 
cerned, of  course,  we  have  what,  in  the 
contents  of  the  communique,  reflects  the 
result  of  our  conversations.  But  I  think 
there  is  another  point  that  is  very  im- 
portant for  us,  and  that  is  that  we  feel 
that  we're  seeking  medium-term  solu- 
tions to  the  problems  of  Central 
America.  But  we  have  to  undertake  the 


task  of  working  on  the  beginnings  of 
those  medium-term  solutions  on  the 
basis  of  urgency  and  working  with  all 
the  parties  concerned.  And,  of  course, 
we  are  interested  in  establishing 
peaceful  conditions  throughout  the  area 
that  would  permit  the  building  of  friend- 
ly relations  between  the  various  coun- 
tries in  the  Central  American  region.  Of 
course,  we  have  to  generate  peaceful 
machinery  in  Central  America  and  that 
cannot  be  done  on  a  short-term  basis. 
But  as  we  establish  and  build  upon  what 
we  are  doing  and  establish  a  better 
climate,  then  our  task  will  become 
easier.  I  think  we  have  established  the 
need,  as  I  said,  of  achieving  medium- 
term  results  in  this  area  by  means  of 
prompt  action  in  the  field  of  economic 
development  and  in  the  establishment  of 
economic  conditions  that  will  affect  the 
prosperity  of  all  the  countries  of  the 
Central  American  area. 

I  took  advantage  of  the  occasion  to 
brief  Secretary  Shultz  on  my  visit  to  the 
five  countries  of  Central  America,  and  I 
think  that  there  has  been  a  useful  ex- 
change of  views  as  far  as  Central 
America  is  concerned  between  our  two 
delegations  that  is  of  a  great  usefulness 
for  the  situation.  We  hope  to  be  able  to 
promote  dialogue  and  negotiations  start- 
ing with  our  trip  tomorrow  to  Panama 
and  our  meeting  there. 


Q.  The  Contadora  initiative 
certain  points  in  it  that  directly 
the  United  States.  Does  the  L  .S 
Government  object  to  these  pre 
or  is  it  willing  to  cooperate  wit 
group? 

Secretary  Shultz.  As  I  urn  lei 
it,  the  Contadora  four  have  niana 
organize  a  meeting  in  Panama,  ai 
my  way  of  thinking  the  key  in  thi 
meeting  is  the  fact  that  all  fi\'f  T 
American  countries  will  be  thtif, 
to  my  mind  is  a  recognition  of  ;Im 
fact  that  the  issues  are  fundamer 
regional.  Now,  having  said  that,  ( 
course,  there  are  all  sorts  of  ques 
that  have  to  be  worked  out  by  th' 
ties  and  I  know  the  Secretary  ;: 
counterparts  will  be  trying  t(  • 

As  I  said  earlier,  we  wish 
in  their  effort,  because  we,  as  :h< 
want  to  see  peace;  we  want  tn  se 
democracy;  we  want  to  see  ecnui 
development  in  those  regions;  aib 
feel  that  we  got  a  lot  and  I  hi>|it' 
something  in  the  exchange  of  \ie 
this,  not  only  with  the  Secretary 
with  President  de  la  Madrid,  witl 
we  were  privileged  to  spend  a  coi 
siderable  time.  Thanks  very  mucl 
your  cordial  treatment  here  in  M' 


'Press  release  126  of  Apr.  28,  191 1 
2Press  release  122  of  Apr.  20,  191  ] 


El  Salvador:  Response  to 
Chairman  Long's  Concerns 


The  following  is  the  text  of  a  letter 
from  Secretary  Shultz  to  Representative 
Clarence  D.  Long,  chairman,  Subcom- 
mittee for  Foreign  Operations  of  the 
House  Appropriations  Committee. ' 

April  26,  1983 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman: 

Consultations  between  the  Department  of 
State  and  your  subcommittee  in  recent  weeks 
have  demonstrated  that  there  exists  broad 
agreement  on  the  seriousness  of  the  situation 
in  Central  America  and  on  the  needs  for  us 
to  maintain  a  comprehensive  secarity, 
political  and  economic  strategy  •••  address 
this  situation.  These  consultati  ^i^  have 
focused  on  four  specific  areas  'f  namediate 
concern  to  both  of  us.  I  wouln  like  h^  set  out 
our  views  on  these  concerns  a;:(i  :.'io  nature 
of  the  programs  and  policies  ul  liavt  imple- 
mented, or  will  be  implementing,  in  each  of 
these  areas. 

You  have  raised  the  issue  of  prison  condi- 
tions and  your  view  that  all  prison?  and 
detention  centers  in  El  SalviKlor  should  be 


subject  to  inspection  by  an  independe 
national  organization  such  as  the  Inte 
tional  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  (I( 
We  share  your  concerns  and  have  bee 
ing  with  the  Government  of  El  Salva( 
the  ICRC  to  achieve  precisely  this  obj 
Over  the  past  year  the  number  of  ICI 
to  prisons  has  steadily  increased  and 
formed  that  President  Magana  has  ii' 
ordered  that  the  ICRC  be  given  unres 
and  unannounced  access  to  all  prisons^ 
detention  centers  and  private  access  t|, 
prisoners.  This  is  a  positive  developni't 
which  should  go  a  long  way  toward  in|l 
our  shared  concerns  on  this  issue.  ^ 
You  have  also  expressed  an  intert) 
the  status  of  political  prisoners  in  El  | 
Salvador.  There  are  approximately  70, 
prisoners  in  El  Salvador  who  are  bein » 
tained  under  Decree  507,  the  state  of  I 
authority.  While  in  prison  these  detail- 
have  been  generally  well-treated,  but  • 
have  not  been  charged  formally  with  ■ ' 
The  prisoners  incarcerated  under  this  < 
range  from  those  accused  vaguely  of '  = 
tion  with  the  guerrillas"  to  those  actu ' 
plicated  in  terrorist  acts.  President  M ' 


Department  of  State  I 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Tiized  the  uneven  effects  of  Decree 
las  begun  a  review  process  with  the 
releasing  those  accused  of  less 
fenses.  About  60  political  prisoners 
1  released  within  the  last  two 
vith  a  larger  number  expected  to  be 
in  the  near  future, 
ips  more  importantly,  President 
las  also  tasked  his  recently-formed 
mmission  with  development  of  an 
law.  one  effect  of  which  would  be  to 
lut  the  release  of  substantial 
of  the  remaining  political  prisoners, 
las  been  drafted,  reviewed  by  the 
;  and  sent  to  the  Constituent 
'  where  a  vote  is  expected  in  the 
re. 

Iso  share  your  desire  to  bring  to 
ose  charged  with  the  murders  of 
1  citizens.  In  the  case  of  the 
1  churchwomen,  in  particular,  I  have 
urbed  by  the  slow  pace  of  the 
rocess.  I  have  been  assured  by  Presi- 
:ana  that  the  Government  of  El 
will  take  every  possible  measure  to 
se  men  to  trial.  For  our  part,  I  have 
m  independent  and  high  level  review 
evidence  available  to  our  govern- 
taining  to  this  case.  We  will  provide 
.doran  judiciary  with  any  evidence 
'ind  that  could  be  of  use  to  them  in 
ng  this  case  and  report  to  the  Con- 
3n  this  review  is  complete. 

fundamentally,  Mr.  Chairman,  we 
•arked  on  a  program  to  begin  a 
irocess  of  judicial  reform  in  El 

This  effort  was  kicked  off  last 
the  U.S.  Attorney  General  on  a 
sit  to  El  Salvador  for  that  purpose, 
stives  of  this  effort  have  been  out- 
he  Committee  in  a  paper  provided  to 
e  beginning  of  the  reprogramming 

Jd  like  to  outline  our  policy  on  elec- 
negotiations.  As  we  have  stated 
n  a  number  of  occasions,  we  favor  a 
ig  process  which  would  lead  the  way 
cal  solution  through  free  and  fair 
which  candidates  of  all  political 
ies  can  participate  safely  and  have 
the  media.  The  Government  of  El 
shares  this  objective  and  has 
d  a  Peace  Commission  to  work  out 
dures  necessary  to  obtain  this 
e  are  interested  in  doing  everything 
wer  to  support  this  process.  We 
offers  the  best,  probably  the  only, 
ty  for  peaceful  reconciliation  in  El 

To  advance  this  objective,  the 
;  will  soon  be  designating  a  senior 
d  of  ambassadorial  rank  to  act  as  a 
ivoy  to  Central  American  govern- 

this  role  he  will  assist  the 
ins  in  their  efforts  to  find  a  basis  for 
with  their  opponents  on  the  terms 


and  conditions  for  free,  fair  and  safe  elec- 
tions; it  should  be  understood  that  par- 
ticipants in  these  discussions  may  raise  any 
issue  they  wish,  and  that  the  US  will  not  sup- 
port negotiations  for  power-sharing. 

Finally,  Mr.  Chairman  I  would  like  to 
reiterate  the  observation  I  made  to  you  and 
the  Committee  during  testimony  on  our  $60 
million  reprogamming  request.  Without 
military  assistance  to  provide  security  for  the 
people  of  Salvador,  there  can  be  no  progress 
in  achieving  social  justice  and  improving 
human  rights.  The  military  effort  is  essential 
to  provide  the  shield  we  need  to  succeed  in 


our  broader  efforts.  We  do  not  seek  a 
military  solution.  But  we  do  seek  enough 
military  assistance  to  make  possible  a  longer 
term  and  more  meaningful  peace  in  Central 
America. 

We  will  resubmit  the  request  for 
reprogramming  the  remaining  $30  million  of 
our  request  at  the  proper  time. 

Sincerely  yours, 

George  P.  Shtltz 


'Released  by  the  committee  and  made 
available  by  the  Department  of  State.  ■ 


Land  Reform  in  El  Salvador 


by  M.  Peter  McPherson 

Opening  statement  made  at  a  news 
briefing  at  the  Department  of  State  on 
March's.  lUS.:.  .Ur,  MrPherson  is  Ad- 
miiiisti-dlnr  nf  thi  A(iriirt/  for  Intema- 
tioind  Dvrvhipmvul  (AID).' 

We  have  recently  seen  some  very 
positive  developments  in  El  Salvador, 
e.g.,  the  acceleration  of  the  date  for 
general  elections  and  the  extension  by 
the  Constituent  Assembly  of  the  provi- 
sions of  Phase  III  (land  to  the  tiller)  of 
the  agrarian  reform  to  the  end  of  1983. 

These  events  coincide  with  the  com- 
pletion of  an  outside  evaluation  of  the  El 
Salvador  agrarian  reform  program.  The 
report  was  undertaken  by  Checchi  and 
Company,  a  well-known  firm  with  exten- 
sive experience  with  the  agrarian  reform 
in  El  Salvador.!  xhe  report  is  very 
positive  on  the  state  of  the  agrarian 
reform  program,  and  I  believe  the 
American  public  should  be  aware  of 
these  developments,  and  I  should  like  to 
take  this  opportunity  to  help  that  proc- 
ess. 

The  authors  of  the  study,  a  team  of 
independent  and  experienced  consultants 
assembled  by  Checchi  and  Co.,  arrived 
in  El  Salvador  with  the  impression  from 
U.S.  newspaper  accounts  that  the  con- 
servative coalition  that  won  the  March 
1982  election  had  attempted  to  annul  the 
reforms.  El  Salvador  has  a  long  history 
of  attempts  at  agrarian  reform,  and 
many  observers  would  not  be  surprised 
if  the  most  recent  efforts,  decreed  in 
1980,  had  also  ended  unsuccessfully. 
However,  the  members  of  the  study 
team  found  "somewhat  to  their  surprise" 
that  the  reform,  despite  an  on-going  civil 
war,  was  still  very  much  alive  and  that 
significant  further  progress  had  been 


made  during  the  June-December  1982 
period.  The  authors  spent  2  months  in 
El  Salvador  at  the  end  of  1982  conduct- 
ing the  study,  which  included  extensive 
field  work. 

I  simply  would  like  to  highlight  some 
of  the  more  important  aspects  of  the 
reform  and  features  of  the  report. 

•  The  authors  found  the  agrarian 
reform  program  working  successfully. 

•  Agriculture  production,  in  the 
reformed  sector  after  an  initial  decline, 
has  now  regained  prereform  average 
production  levels. 

•  As  illustrated  by  the  chart,  we  can 
see  that  there  has  been  a  dramatic  in- 
crease in  applications  over  the  last  6 
months.  This  followed  a  period  of  uncer- 
tainty immediately  before  and  after  the 
March  elections. 


Phase  III 

This  program  benefits  thousands  of 
small  farmers  who  were  former  renters 
and  sharecroppers  and  who  previously 
had  little  chance  of  owning  their  own 
piece  of  land.  Phase  III  permits  renters 
and  sharecroppers  to  apply  for  title  on 
land  they  had  tilled  under  these  tenure 
arrangements  as  of  May  6,  1980,  up  to  a 
maximum  of  17.3  acres. 

As  I  mentioned,  the  life  of  the  Phase 
III  program  was  extended  by  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly  on  March  3  for  the 
balance  of  1983.  This  follows  on  the  out- 
standing progress  made  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  El  Salvador  in  implementing 
this  program  in  1982,  despite  the  severe 
security  conditions  and  civil  conflict. 

The  Salvadoran  Armed  Forces  are 
actively  supporting  the  program  in  the 
rural  areas  of  El  Salvador.  The  army 
has  directly  reinstated  2,300  beneficiary 
families  who  had  been  illegally  evicted 


83 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


from  their  lands,  particularly  during  the 
March  1982  election  period  and  im- 
mediately thereafter. 

linder  the  leadership  of  a  widely 
respected  Col.  Galileo  Torres,  implemen- 
tation of  the  Phase  III  program 
dramatically-  improved  since  the  autumn 
of  1982.  In  September  the  Government 
of  El  Salvador  launched  a  ma,ior  cam- 
paign which  resulted  in  9.(t(lC)  additional 
claimants,  bringing  the  total  to  39.000 
by  the  end  of  December.  Thi?  quite 
remarkable  performance  has  been  sus- 
tained m  the  first  2  months  of  this  year. 
As  of  the  end  of  February.  48.357  small 
farmers  had  filed  applications  for  title. 
This  will  benefit  almost  3(K).OO0  people. 
Significant  progress  is  also  reflected  in 
improved  performance  in  the  compensa- 
tion of  former  land  owners,  and  the  is- 
suance of  provisional  and  definitive  titles 
to  eligible  beneficiaries. 

Phase  I 

Phase  I  oi  the  agrarian  reform  was 
initiated  by  the  Government  of  Ei 
Salvador  m  March  1980  and  was  de- 
signed tc  affect  all  land  in  holdings 
larger  than  500  hectares. 

Phase  I  nas  affected  206.000  hec- 
tares, or  about  lr\%  of  the  total 
agricultural  land  area,  and  includes 
almost  all  properties  in  excess  of  500 
hectares.  Some  30.000  former  hacienda 
workers  and  landless  laborers  have 
benefited — about  180.0(tfi  persons  when 
family  memlters  are  included.  The  lands 
affected  by  Phase  I  have  been  formed 
into  314  production  coojieratives. 

The  study  team  interxiewed  a  ran- 
dom sample  oi  Phase  I  l>eneficiaries: 
almost  all  stated  that  they  were  bett,er 
off  than  before  the  agrarian  reform. 
They  split  about  evenly  on  the  question 
of  continuing  to  produce  cooperatively- 
versus  dividing  the  land  into  mdixidual 
plots,  and  they  had  equallv  mixed  feel- 
ings about  the  present  system  of  joint 
management  tetween  the  cooperative 
and  the  government. 


Agrarian  Reform  in  El  Salvador— Phase  Ml 


30.432 
Individual  Farm  Initiativen 


Nearly  30%  of  the  expropriated  land 
has  been  paid  for  ateady  ir  cash  and 
bonds  equivalent  to  anout  S'HK:  million. 
Another  24%  has  been  appraisec  and  is 
awaitins:  th(  nvailahility  of  casn. 

Tti!  aL--:riai   'londs.  issued  as  part 
oftht  ■■;iiii;i'.'!:sa:i;i!..  are  being  actively 
tradec  a;  oeiweet  4'2%  ano  75%  of  face 
value.  Just  over  1%  of  all  bonds  issued 
to  date  have  already  been  redeemed  as 
payment  of  gift  and  death  taxes.  In- 
terest coupons,  which  can  be  used  for 
payment  of  all  taxes,  are  briskly  traded 
at  95%  of  nominal  value.  This  is  another 
interesting  finding,  given  that  6  months 
ago  the  bonds  were  being  described  as 
worthless  paper. 

Over  75'!^(>  of  production  loans  made 
to  Phase  I  cooperatives  in  1980  and 
1981  were  repaid — Itetter  than  the 
record  of  other  Latin  American  land 


Sepi    1982       Dec    1982  March  1 

fPresidential         (Exteosii 
Certification  i  Phase 


reforms  and  also  better  than  the 
ment  record  of  nonreform  privat 
owners  m  El  Salvador. 

A  maior  effort  to  improve  th 
management  of  Phase  I  cooperat 
underway  with  AID  support.  Fai 
managers  and  accountants  are  b( 
trained.  Also,  a  grassroots  progr 
called  CODIZO  has  been  initiatec 
wherein  representatives  of  each 
cooperative  ir.  a  geographic  area 
weekly  tt'  learn  simple  cost  accoi 
and  talk  about  common  problems 
and  proposed  solutions. 


tained  from  the  Office  of  Public  ASiai 
Agencv  for  International  Developmer 
Washington.  D.C.  20523. 


84 


Department  of  State  I*'' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


lio  Broadcasting  to  Cuba 


nas  O.  Enders 

merit  before  the  Subcommittee  on  In- 
mI  Operations  of  the  House  Foreign 
ommittee  on  March  22,  198S.  Am- 
Enders  is  Assistant  Secretary  for 
erican  Affairs.  ' 

last  appeared  before  this  corn- 
year  ago,  little  has  changed 
luban  society.  The  government 
n  economic  dwarf,  still  views 

foreign  policy  giant— an  im- 
ved  from  looking  at  itself 

distorted  mirror  held  up  by 
et  Union.  The  Cuban  economy, 
id  in  the  familiar  Soviet  com- 
odel,  has  registered  a  general 
A  few  statistics  may  be  useful 
spite  growing  Soviet  assistance 
of  oil  at  low  prices  and  the  pur- 
sugar  at  above  market  rates, 
et  economic  aid  effort — which  in 
1  nearly  $4  billion — is  more  than 
•ter  of  Cuba's  GNP.  This  is  in 
to  66,000  tons  of  military  equip- 
rnished  free.  And  what  has  been 
ict  of  all  this  on  the  Cuban  peo- 
;e  1959,  the  real  income  of  the 
Cuban  has  been  nearly  stagnant 
dily  falling  relative  to  much  of 
■nerica.  Rationed  food,  rationed 
and  deteriorating  housing  have 
the  rule  of  the  day. 
i  has  for  centuries  been  depend- 
-ade  and  on  sugar.  But  since 
already  excessive  dependence 
has  actually  increased  and 
exchanged  a  system  of  com- 
trade  with  the  West— and  of 
e  trade  balances  with  the  United 
for  one  of  noncompetitive  ex- 
vith  the  communist  world- 
id  by  unfavorable  trade  balances 
Soviet  Union.  There  are  many 
for  all  this,  but  a  glaring  man- 
atistic,  if  you  will  permit  me  to 
a  few  more  facts,  may  be 
1  understanding  the  situation 
arly.  In  1958,  the  final  year  of 
reign,  there  were  46,000  men 
Uban  Armed  Forces.  In  1982 
liber  grew  to  225,000  Cubans 
•■ms,  excluding  the  militia,  which 
'  close  to  500,000.  Cuba  has  far 
y  the  largest  and  most  for- 
arnu'd  forces  of  any  of  the 
■iiifj  countries  in  the  Caribbean 
Kifi'ii,  in  all  of  Latin  America, 
■  zil  — with  12  times  Cuba's 
i  III— lias  more  men  under  arms. 
what  does  it  do  with  this  might? 
I!  n's  t,'-reatest  export  around  the 


world.  Cuba  maintains  about  40,000 
soldiers  in  Africa,  dominating  two  coun- 
tries and  serving  as  a  surrogate  there 
for  the  Soviet  Union.  In  Central 
America,  it  plays  a  similar  proxy  role 
for  the  U.S.S.R.  by  seeking  to  unite  the 
left  in  search  of  the  violent  overthrow  of 
established  government.  In  Nicaragua 
alone,  the  Cubans  maintain  2,000 
military  and  security  personnel,  plus 
another  6,000  civilian  "advisers."  In  fact, 
more  than  70,000  Cubans  are  abroad  on 
various  "internationalist"  missions,  most 
of  them  military. 

Most  civilized  countries  of  the  world 
cannot  overcommit  such  distorted  pro- 
portions of  their  national  resources  to 
state  interests  abroad  quite  like  this 
because  the  people  force  them  to  ad- 
dress their  own  concerns  first.  But  not 
in  Cuba.  The  people  of  this  Caribbean 
island  just  90  miles  off  of  our  shores 
have  no  way  to  hold  their  government 
accountable.  For  24  years,  they  have 
been  denied  the  basic  tools  of  modern 
civilized  society  on  which  to  make 
judgments — the  free  flow  of  reliable, 
uncensored  information. 

The  Proposal 

The  proposal  we  discuss  today— radio 
broadcasting  to  Cuba— is  intended  to  ad- 
dress this  situation.  Cubans,  like  all 
peoples,  yearn  for  the  truth.  Even 
Cuba's  leaders  rely  on  the  Western  press 
and  wire  services,  the  Voice  of  America 
(VGA)  and  the  BBC  [British  Broad- 
casting Corporation]  for  factual,  un- 
biased information  about  the  world.  But 
the  VGA  is  mandated  by  Congress  to 
serve  as  a  window  on  America,  present- 
ing official  U.S.  Government  policy  and 
projecting  American  society  and  institu- 
tions for  foreign  audiences. 

Radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba,  on  the 
other  hand,  will  have  a  different  mis- 
sion. In  the  distinguished  tradition  of 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty,  it 
will  be  a  surrogate  "home  service"  for 
Cuba.  It  will  tell  the  Cuban  people  the 
truth  about  their  government's  domestic 
mismanagement  and  its  promotion  of 
subversion  and  terrorism  in  this 
hemisphere  and  elsewhere  around  the 
globe.  It  will  tell  the  Cuban  people  what 
these  activities  cost  them  and  their 
children  in  terms  of  their  own  standard 
of  living.  Furthermore,  it  will  correct 
the  false  image  they  have  been  given  of 
Cuba's  international  reputation. 


This  is  not  the  kind  of  programing 
that,  under  its  charter  from  Congress, 
the  VGA  was  established  to  conduct.  It 
is  certainly  not  the  kind  of  program  that 
can  be  provided  by  the  privately  owned 
Spanish-language  commercial  radio  sta- 
tions in  southern  Florida.  Like  all  com- 
mercial radio  stations,  their  programing 
is  primarily  geared  to  the  listening 
tastes  of  their  local  audiences  on  which 
their  advertising  revenues  are  based. 

The  purpose  of  radio  broadcasting  to 
Cuba  is  not  to  incite  rebellion,  to  topple 
the  Cuban  Government,  or  to  make  it 
less  anti-American.  Radio  broadcasting 
to  Cuba  will  be  aimed  not  so  much  at 
the  Cuban  Government  as  at  the  Cuban 
people.  We  believe  that  by  breaking  the 
Cuban  Government's  control  of  informa- 
tion, we  will  help  the  Cuban  people  to 
question  more  closely  their  government's 
policies  and  thus  hold  their  government 
more  accountable  for  its  actions, 
perhaps  influencing  it  to  devote  more 
time  and  resources  to  domestic  concerns 
and  less  to  international  adventurism. 

This  Administration  believes  that 
broadcasting  to  Cuba  should  be  a  high 
priority.  In  a  meeting  on  February  22, 
1983,  with  a  bipartisan  group  of  legis- 
lators. President  Reagan  stressed  that 
the  Administration  believes  strongly 
that  the  Cuban  people  have  a  right  to 
know  what  is  going  on  in  their  country 
and  about  their  country's  activities 
around  the  world.  We  should  no  longer 
allow  the  Cuban  Government  to  carry 
out,  unchallenged,  its  irresponsible  and 
costly  subversive  efforts  abroad  in  con- 
flict with  U.S.  interests  without  trying 
to  promote  some  degree  of  accountabili- 
ty by  the  Cuban  people.  While  we  have 
undertaken  such  an  effort  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union  through 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty— 
both  recognized  by  Congress  as  deserv- 
ing of  continued  support— it  would  be 
inexcusable  for  us  any  longer  to  ignore 
the  need  to  make  the  same  effort  on  our 
doorstep. 

Broadcasting  as  an  Initiative 

This  is  a  peaceful  foreign  policy  ini- 
tiative, designed  not  to  provoke  a  con- 
frontation with  Cuba  but  to  promote  the 
free  flow  of  ideas  and  truth  that  is  now 
denied  to  the  Cuban  people  by  their  own 
government.  It  is  in  keeping  not  only 
with  the  ideals  of  our  own  Constitution, 
but  is  also  enshrined  in  Article  19  of  The 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
(1949)  which  declares:  "Everyone  has 
the  right  to  freedom  of  opinion  and  ex- 
pression; this  right  includes  freedom  to 
hold  opinions  without  interference  and 


85 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


to  seek,  receive  and  impart  information 
and  ideas  through  any  media  and 
regardless  of  frontiers." 

The  communist  bloc  countries  seem 
to  believe  that  this  declaration  of  human 
rights  is  a  one-way  street.  They  broad- 
cast programs  all  over  the  world  without 
interference  but  do  not  grant  their  own 
people  the  right  to  listen  without  in- 
terference to  foreign  broadcasts.  Here  in 
this  hemisphere,  the  Soviets  broadcast 
322  hours  of  programing  per  week,  of 
which  IO8V2  hours  are  in  English.  The 
U.S.S.R.  also  broadcasts  to  Latin 
America  in  Creole,  French,  Esperanto 
Spanish,  Guarani/Spanish,  Portuguese, 
Quechua,  and  other  languages.  The  Peo- 
ple's Republic  of  China  broadcasts  123 
hours  weekly  to  this  hemisphere,  while  7 
East  European  countries  provide  an  ad- 
ditional 257  hours  to  Latin  America  and 
a  further  200  hours  to  North  America. 
Cuba  does  its  share  as  well.  It  broad- 
casts 275  hours  of  programs  per  week  to 
North  America  and  the  Caribbean,  of 
which  38  hours  are  broadcast  by  "La 
Voz  de  Cuba"  over  two  medium-wave 
transmitters  (one  1  kw  and  one  20  kw). 
Others  from  the  communist  countries 
broadcasting  to  this  hemisphere  include 
North  Korea  and  Vietnam.  The  hun- 
dreds of  hours  broadcast  by  these  coun- 
tries into  our  hemisphere  contrasts 
sharply  with  the  85  V2  hours  total  broad- 
cast by  the  VOA  to  this  same  area. 

What  does  all  this  mean?  It  signifies 
clearly  that  the  communist  bloc  coun- 
tries know  and  understand  the  strength 
and  importance  of  radio  broadcasts. 
They,  along  with  us,  understand  that  in- 
ternational radio  broadcasting  is  the 
single  most  important  communications 
medium  for  hundreds  of  millions  of  peo- 
ple. The  new  Soviet  leader,  Andropov, 
made  this  clear  to  Secretary  Shultz  in 
Moscow  at  the  time  of  the  Brezhnev 
funeral  when  he  complained  to  the 
Secretary  to  do  something  about  VOA 
(Western)  broadcasts  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  Foreign  Minister  Gromyko  also 
made  that  point  to  Vice  President  Bush. 
And  Fidel  Castro  himself  has  made  it 
clear  that  he  does  not  like  the  idea  of  a 
Radio  Free  Europe-type  service  for  his 
country.  We  can  only  conclude  from  his 
reaction  that  Cuba  has  something  to 
hide,  that  the  fiction  the  Cuban  Govern- 
ment doles  out  to  its  people  cannot  grap- 
ple successfully  with  the  truth. 

This  radio— like  Radio  Free  Europe 
and  Radio  Liberty  before  it — is  intended 
to  earn  its  audience  gradually  through 
its  special  sensitivity  to  needs  the  state 
ignores.  It  will  speak  to  young  people  of 
the  sports  and  music  they  love.  It  will 


speak  to  adults  of  the  great  Cuban  and 
Hispanic-American  heritage  they  ad- 
mire, which  so  often  the  state  deni- 
grates. And  it  will  give  news  on  which 
the  Cuban  listeners  can  rely. 

Questions  and  Answers 

We  know  that  in  Eastern  Europe,  it 
took  years  for  Radio  Free  Europe  to 
earn  an  audience.  Little  by  little,  that 
audience  expanded.  Radio  Free  Europe 
now  has  perhaps  70%  of  the  Polish  radio 
audience.  Is  there  any  doubt  that  the 
changes  of  the  last  decade  could  have 
occurred  without  that  honest,  trust- 
worthy, humane  outside  contact?  Our 
proposal  is  thus  to  begin  a  sustained  ef- 
fort, over  many  years,  to  help  the 
Cubans  know  more  about  their  country 
and  thus  to  hold  their  government  ac- 
countable in  ways  it  is  not  now. 

People  say:  "Wouldn't  it  be  better  to 
negotiate  with  the  Cubans;"  or  "It  isn't 
like  us  to  engage  in  propaganda;"  or 
"Cuban  countermeasures  will  hurt  us  too 
much."  We  have  tried  to  talk  with  Cuba 
in  the  past,  and  it  would  be  wrong  to 
rule  out  trying  again.  But  the  record  is 
daunting. 

Let  me  review  the  record.  In  1975, 
we  made  our  first  secret  contacts,  sug- 
gesting the  exploration  of  ways  to 
remove  tension  and  hostility.  Late  in 
that  year,  the  Cubans  sent  troops  into 
Angola.  In  1977  we  again  started  talk- 
ing seriously  to  the  Cubans,  this  time 
much  more  ambitiously,  saying  we 
wanted  to  create  conditions  in  which  the 
legacy  of  the  past— the  embargo  and  the 
political  tension— could  be  overcome.  In 
very  high-level  secret  talks,  our 
negotiators  explored  a  series  of  steps 
with  the  eventual  goal  of  removal  of  the 
embargo  and  full  diplomatic  relations  in 
return  for  curbs  on  Cuban  activities 
regarding  Puerto  Rico  and  a  gradual 
withdrawal  of  the  more  than  20,000 
Cuban  troops  from  Angola.  After  all, 
the  Civil  War  was  over.  While  we  talk- 
ed, Cuba  went  into  Ethiopia. 

Conversations  continued.  In 
mid-1978,  Cuba  launched  upon  a  new  ag- 
gressive strategy  in  Central  America, 
uniting  violent  factions  first  in 
Nicaragua,  then  in  El  Salvador,  then  in 
Guatemala,  committing  them  to  the 
destruction  of  their  established  govern- 
ments. Talks  went  on.  In  1980,  Castro 
turned  the  desire  of  many  of  his  coun- 
trymen to  flee  Cuba  into  a  hostile  act 
against  the  United  States— the  Mariel 
boatlift. 

Often  it  is  only  prudent  to  talk  to 
adversaries.  This  Administration  has 
had  high-level  contact  with  Cuban 


leaders  to  see  whether  there  are 
of  common  interest.  But  in  the  ei 
what  counts  is  not  talk  but  actioi 
the  record  of  U.S.  talks  with  Cul: 
produced  little  in  the  way  of  moc 
action. 

Others  ask:  "Should  we  be  as 
ated  with  propaganda"?  No,  we  s 
not.  We  will  not  succeed  in  attra 
audience  in  Cuba  if  we  offer  ther 
aganda.  If  there  are  false  report; 
listeners  will  soon  realize  the  rep 
false.  If  false  reports  continue,  tl 
turn  off.  Only  by  respecting  its  a 
can  a  project  like  this  succeed.  S 
must  be  the  creature  of  no  politit 
tendency,  of  no  action  group,  of 
vested  interest.  We  have  acquire 
perience— in  Radio  Free  Europei 
Radio  Liberty— of  how  to  do  thai 
though  the  beginnings  were  diffi' 

Others  say:  "Cuban  interfere 
hurt  us  too  much."  Well,  Cuban  i 
terference  is  a  problem— a  serioi 
lem— because  international  radio 
casting  is  based  on  cooperation, 
Cuba  has  chosen  to  act  as  an  out» 
Cuba's  lawlessness  vastly  predatJ 
broadcasting  to  Cuba  and  will  cm 
to  exist  in  the  future— with  or  wi 
this  new  station.  The  Cubans  refii 
use  directional  antennae,  as  we  c 
protect  others  broadcasting  I'li  tl 
frequency.  And  they  do  not  rt  sp' 
decisions  of  the  regional  body  tli, , 
allocates  frequencies.  In  short,  tl  | 
Cubans  don't  care  if  they  interfei  t 
broadcasters  in  other  countries. ' ; 
even  interfere  with  their  own  br(  p 
casting. 

We  do  not  know  for  certain  '  |l 
Cuba  will  do  about  radio  broadca ) 
Cuba.  It  is  possible  that  the  Cast) 
regime  may  attempt  to  jam  this  ij 
service  with  low-powered  station 
situated  in  the  main  cities  and  to 
Cuba.  This  would  badly  interfere 
reception  of  our  radio  program.  1 
possible  that  Cuba  may  initiate  ci 
broadcasting.  Castro  himself  has 
of  using  a  "Radio  Lincoln"  to  bea 
version  of  the  truth  to  the  Ameri ' 
people.  To  this  we  say:  "America 
nothing  to  fear  from  a  competitic 
ideas."  It  is  also  possible  that  Cul 
do  nothing.  The  VOA  has  been  di 
broadcasts  to  Cuba  for  more  thai 
years,  and  Castro  has  rarely  serit 
"tried  to  jam  these  broadcasts. 

In  short,  we  cannot  say  for  C( 
just  what  Cuba  may  do  in  respon| 
our  proposal.  What  we  can  say  isf 
we  will  not  submit  to  blackmail.  ^| 
say  that  we  will  not  allow  the  thrj 
the  fear  of  illegal  and  unfriendly  ( 


86 


Department  of  State  E) 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


;ro  regime  to  cow  us  into  back- 
n  from  our  commitment  to  the 
/  of  information  and  ideas  to  all 
(les  of  the  world. 

isional  Moves 

ir,  in  the  97th  Congress,  a  bill 
ing  the  creation  of  radio  broad- 
;o  Cuba  passed  the  House  of 
ntatives  with  bipartisan  support 
-nost  2  to  1  margin  and  was 
favorably,  also  with  bipartisan 
by  the  Senate  Foreign  Rela- 
mmittee.  American  broadcasters 
1  a  number  of  concerns  about 
primarily  that  the  establishment 
casting  to  Cuba  would  result  in 
ise  in  longstanding  Cuban  in- 
:e  with  U.S.  AM  broadcasting, 
linistration  did  its  utmost  to 
;ompromise  that  would  accom- 
jroadcaster  concerns  as  well  as 
inal  interest.  However,  in  the 
Administration  did  not  believe 
)f  the  modifications  requested 
ational  Association  of  Broad- 
NAB)  could  be  accommodated 
it  with  the  establishment  of  ef- 
ndio  broadcasting  to  Cuba, 
irtheless,  we  believe  the  bill  sent 
Ito  both  Houses  of  Congress  on 
I'  24,  which  contains  significant 
idations  to  the  concerns  of 
ters,  meets  in  almost  all 
the  provisions  they  have 
n  fact,  most  of  the  recommen- 
n  broadcasting  made  by  the 
I  letter  dated  November  16, 
all  Members  of  the  Senate  have 
rporated  in  this  bill.  In  that  let- 
"4AB  suggested  that  if  radio 
ting  to  Cuba  were  authorized, 
•nment  should: 

t,  put  Radio  Marti  at  either  end 

A  band  outside  of  commercial 

quencies; 

fid,  operate  Radio  Marti  on 

e; 

1,  permit  government  leasing  of 

n  existing  commercial  AM  sta- 

Radio  Marti; 

th,  allow  Radio  Marti  to  share 

ency  now  used  by  the  Voice  of 

at  its  marathon  station;  or 

,  expand  the  operating  hours 

late  of  the  Voice  of  America  to 

le  kind  of  programing  en- 

for  Radio  Marti." 

re  prepared  to  work  with  the 
of  these  and  have  incorporated 
)  our  proposal.  The  net  result  of 
ommodations— which  are  ver>' 
t  to  our  AM  commercial  broad- 


casters—is not  to  establish  a  new  sta- 
tion on  the  commercial  portion  of  the 
AM  band  (535  kHz  to  1605  kHz)  other 
than  possibly  on  1180  kHz,  which  has 
been  allocated  to  and  used  by  the 
government  for  VOA  broadcasting  to 
Cuba  for  over  20  years.  Although  the  ac- 
commodations made  in  this  new  bill  are 
significant,  the  bill,  which  has  already 
been  introduced  in  the  Senate,  gives  the 
Administration  the  options  necessary  to 
ensure  that  radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba 
would  be  done  right. 

Conclusion 

All  the  information  available  to  us  in- 
dicates that  the  vast  majority  of  Cuban 
radio  listeners  listen  to  the  AM  band.  In- 
deed, that  is  the  band  used  by  the  Cuban 
Government  to  reach  the  Cuban  people. 
Cuba  maintains  an  interlocking  system 
of  five  national  AM  networks.  Whatever 
other  frequencies  one  might  consider, 
use  of  the  AM  band  is  crucial  in  order  to 
reach  the  largest  possible  number  of 
Cubans.  We  believe  that  having  the  op- 
tion of  using  1180  kHz,  plus  leasing  time 
on  existing  commercial  AM  stations,  will 
give  us  the  basic  tools  to  reach  our 
target  audience.  The  other  options  such 
as  the  upper  and  lower  noncommercial 
portions  of  the  AM  band  and  shortwave 
could  be  used  by  the  Board  for  Interna- 
tional Broadcasting  (BIB)  to  augment 
the  basic  coverage. 

Broadcasters'  concerns  over  Cuban 
interference  with  U.S.  AM  broadcasting 
are  not  new;  this  is  a  significant  problem 
that  has  been  growing  over  the  past  15 
years.  The  Cuban  Government  in  its  ef- 
forts to  defeat  this  bill,  has  sought  to 


give  the  impression  that  interference 
would  increase.  The  Administration  has 
stated  repeatedly  that  this  is  a  peaceful, 
legal,  and  nonconfrontational  foreign 
policy  initiative  in  the  national  interest 
patterned  after  the  successful  models  of 
Radio  Free  Europe  and  Radio  Liberty. 
The  Administration  believes  that  we 
should  not  allow  our  foreign  policy  to  be 
determined  by  threats  of  the  Cuban 
Government.  We  believe  that  Congress 
and  American  broadcasters  share  that 
determination. 

Radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba  is 
designed  to  respond  to  a  basic  human 
need— the  need  to  have  access  to  infor- 
mation on  events  and  policies  that  affect 
the  lives  of  individuals.  Freedom  of  in- 
formation is  what  we  are  talking  about 
here,  a  fundamental  freedom  recognized 
by  every  responsible  individual  and 
government  in  the  world.  This  right,  this 
freedom,  has  been  consistently  denied  to 
the  Cuban  people  since  Castro  came  to 
power  in  1959.  Radio  broadcasting  to 
Cuba  will  help  restore  it. 

Those  of  us  who  have  lived  in  a  com- 
munist state  will  know  just  how  much 
radio  broadcasting  to  Cuba  can  affect 
the  lives  of  Cubans.  This  is  an  oppor- 
tunity to  offer  the  Cuban  people  hope 
and  the  means  to  make  informed 
judgments  on  the  actions  of  their  own 
government.  For  a  people  bottled  up  in 
a  system  of  oppression  which  they  did 
not  seek  and  cannot  remove,  that  can  be 
precious. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearings 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  wifl 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Policy  Toward  Argentina 


by  N.  Shaw  Smith 

Statement  before  the  Subcommittee 
on  Western  Hemisphere  Affairs  of  the 
House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  on 
March  16,  1983.  Mr.  Smith  is  Director  of 
Southern  Cone  Affairs,  Bureau  of  Inter- 
American  Affairs.^ 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  appear 
before  you  to  discuss  U.S.  policy  toward 
Argentina.  I  was  especially  pleased  that 
Chairman  [Michael]  Barnes  and  others 
here  were  able  to  visit  Argentina  earlier 
this  year.  You  had  a  full  program  of 
meetings  with  government  officials, 


political  and  labor  leaders,  persons  ac- 
tive in  the  human  rights  movement, 
representatives  of  the  business  and 
financial  communities,  and  others. 
Argentina  is  a  rich,  diverse  country  with 
complex  social  and  political  institutions. 
It  has  its  own  dynamics  and  its  special 
perspectives  on  events.  It  is  now  going 
through  a  political  transition  back  to 
democracy.  So,  it  is  helpful  to  get  a 
first-hand  look  at  the  situation  there.  I 
was  delighted  to  have  accompanied  you 
on  the  visit,  and  I  welcome  these  hear- 
ings as  an  effort  to  broaden  public 
understanding  of  events  in  Argentina 


87 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


and  U.S.  policy  toward  that  country. 

American  policy  flows  from  our  na- 
tional interests  and  our  ideals.  It  makes 
sense,  therefore,  to  reflect  on  what 
these  are  in  the  case  of  Argentina  and 
how  they  interact.  In  a  country  of 
Argentina's  prominence,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  United  States  has  a 
number  of  interests— political,  economic, 
and  strategic.  Some  are  immediate, 
while  others  are  longer  term.  Obviously, 
they  vary  in  importance  and,  indeed, 
shift  somewhat  over  time  in  response  to 
evolving  U.S.  priorities  and  to  changing 
circumstances  in  the  area.  In  the  case  of 
Argentina,  some  of  our  more  significant 
interests  include: 

•  The  maintenance  of  peace  in  the 
South  Atlantic  and  the  southern  cone— 
the  achievement  of  progress  toward 
peaceful  resolution  of  territorial  disputes 
involving  the  Falklands/Malvinas  Islands 
and  the  Beagle  Channel; 

•  The  establishment  of  sound  rela- 
tions with  a  productive  dialogue  and 
hopefully  with  increased  Argentine-U.S. 
cooperation  on  hemispheric  and  global 
issues; 

•  Argentine  efforts  to  establish  a 
stable  democracy  and  domestic  tran- 
quility; 

•  Argentina's  reconstruction  of  a 
sound  and  prosperous  economy,  creating 
a  basis  for  increased  trade,  investment, 
financial  and  technological  relations,  and 
the  strengthening  of  mutual  economic 
cooperation; 

•  The  development  of  Argentina's 
enormous  capacity  as  a  major  supplier 
of  the  world's  food  needs,  now  and  in 
the  future; 

•  Increased  U.S.-Argentine  coopera- 
tion, as  major  world  agricultural  sup- 
pliers, in  the  reduction  of  barriers  to 
growth  of  international  trade; 

•  The  peaceful  advancement  of 
Argentine  programs  of  energy  supply; 

•  Cooperation  in  the  Antarctic;  and 

•  Prevention  of  Soviet  disruption  or 
strategic  inroads  in  the  area. 

These  are,  I  repeat,  some  of  our  in- 
terests. They  are  not  listed  in  priority 
order,  but  I  believe  the  listing  itself  in- 
dicates something  of  the  nature,  scope, 
and  importance  of  U.S.-Argentine  rela- 
tions. 

The  subject  of  human  rights,  of 
course,  represents  a  special  dimension  in 
our  relations,  reflecting  not  only  our  in- 
terests but  also  our  ideals.  This  issue 
reflects,  in  Argentina  as  elsewhere,  fun- 
damental American  values.  And  it  is, 
there  as  elsewhere,  a  matter  of  great 
local  sensitivity.  Human  rights  has  been 


at  the  crux  of  the  Argentine-U.S.  rela- 
tionship in  recent  years.  Fortunately, 
there  has  been  substantial  progress  in 
this  area  which  is  removing  it  as  a  com- 
plicating issue  in  our  relations. 

Our  policy  should  reflect  both  our 
major  interests  and  developments  in 
Argentina.  Certainly,  the  circumstances 
of  the  post-Falklands/Malvinas  period 
present  a  policy  panorama  considerably 
different  than  that  which  existed  in  1981 
or  early  1982.  The  war  itself  brought 
major  changes  within  Argentina  and,  of 
course,  in  relations  between  Argentina 
and  the  United  States. 


Recent  Notable  Developments 

First,  the  government  of  President 
Reynaldo  Bignone,  installed  July  1, 
1982,  announced  that  it  was  a  govern- 
ment of  transition  whose  primary  task 
was  to  oversee  the  return  to  democracy. 
The  government  has  pledged  to  hold  na- 
tional elections  on  October  30  this  year, 
with  the  new  government  to  be  installed 
on  January  30,  1984.  There  has  been  a 
notable  increase  in  political  activity.  Par- 
ties are  freely  organizing,  inscribing 
voters,  and  holding  public  rallies  in 
preparation  for  internal  party  elections 
this  spring  and  summer.  The  press  now 
is  relatively  unrestrained.  Open  and 
even  severe  criticism  of  the  government 
is  common.  Although  a  few  publications 
were  closed  or  editions  seized  in  recent 
months,  these  cases  are  reviewed  by  the 
courts,  which  often  reverse  government 
decisions.  Argentina  has  shown  substan- 
tial improvement  in  the  exercise  of 
political  rights,  but  given  the  country's 
history  of  political  turbulence,  many 
observers  do  not  foresee  an  easy  transi- 
tion this  year,  although  the  positive 
trends  are  expected  to  predominate  with 
the  political  opening  continuing  on  track. 

Second,  the  situation  regarding  in- 
dividual rights  in  Argentina  has  shown 
dramatic  improvement.  There  have  been 
no  new  cases  of  confirmed  disappear- 
ances in  2  years,  although  this  remains  a 
very  sensitive  issue.  Questions  of  ac- 
countability and  of  accounting  for  the 
disappeared  are  politically  important. 
Detentions  for  national  security  or 
political  reasons  have  virtually  ceased. 
Reports  of  prisoner  mistreatment  have 
similarly  declined.  Moreover,  the  courts 
have  shown  increased  independence, 
ordering  the  release  of  PEN  [poder 
ejecutivo  nacional]  prisoners,  convicting 
prison  officials  for  abuse,  levying  fines 
on  military  officers,  and  shortening 
sentences  imposed  by  the  highest 
military  court.  National  security  or 
political  prisoners  held  under  PEN 


authorization  were  reduced  .';! 
425  freed  during  1982,  bringing  n 
down  to  243  at  year  end.  Releasi 
tinue.  The  government  has  said 
remaining  PEN  prisoners  are  to 
freed,  or  brought  to  trial,  in  198; 
state  of  siege  is  to  be  lifted  befoi 
elections  this  year  and  Argentina 
turned  to  the  full  exercise  of  indl 
rights  under  its  constitution. 

Third,  Argentina,  like  many 
countries,  has  experienced  a  per 
economic  recession,  with  budget 
a  high  rate  of  inflation,  and  prob 
external  repayments.  It  suffered 
unemployment  and  a  decline  in  r 
wages  in  1981-82,  a  situation  wl 
began  to  reverse  late  in  the  year 
government  successfully  negotia 
standby  arrangement  with  the  II 
ternational  Monetary  Fund]  and 
relief  is  being  negotiated  with  its 
creditors.  Nevertheless,  problem 
sist,  and  economic  management 
be  easy  during  a  period  of  politk 
sition.  Argentina  is  a  rich  counti 
sufficient  in  energy  with  a  healtl 
surplus  and  a  reputation  for  rap 
recovery  from  prior  difficult  per 
Thus  we  foresee  a  period  of  coni 
serious  short-term  strains,  cushr 
underlying  elements  of  strength 
midterm  and  beyond. 

Fourth,  the  Argentine  Gove 
has  turned  its  attention  once 
the  active  pursuit  of  negotiation! 
resolve  the  Falklands/Malvinas  ' 
This  has  become  its  central  forei 
policy  focus.  Meanwhile  the  p 
tion  between  Chile  and  Argentin 
Beagle  Channel  continues.  Altho 
Argentina  has  largely  replaced  it 
military  equipment  losses  suffere 
ing  last  year's  conflict  from  Wes' 
Europe  and  elsewhere,  we  believ 
period  ahead  for  both  disputes  w 
characterized  by  efforts  to  find  a 
peaceful  resolution  for  these  diffi 
disputes,  rather  than  armed  conf 

Implications  for  U.S.  Policy 

U.S.  relations  with  Argentina  felt 
low  point  in  1982  following  the 
Falklands/Malvinas  conflict.  Man; 
Argentines  believed  the  United  S 
played  a  role  in  the  British  victor 
Resentment  against  the  United  S 
was  deeply  felt  in  many  quarters 
these  circumstances,  we  should  n 
pect  a  rapid  return  to  warm  relai 
Nevertheless,  Argentina  and  the 
States  share  many  common  inter 
our  heritage,  our  peoples,  and,  in 
the  problems  we  face  are  similar 


Department  of  State  E '' 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


Bspects.  There  is  a  basis  for  solid, 
itive  relations  between  us  in  the 
First,  we  must  restore  con- 
on  both  sides  step  by  step.  Our 
o  do  so  was  manifested  by  Presi- 
;agan  3  meeting  with  the  aew 
ine  Amoassador  iast  year  /ery 
after  his  arrival.  It  also  was  seen 
by  the  constractive  and  support- 
roach  we  tooit  toward 
ina's  negotiations  of  its  intema- 
inaneiai  obligations,  last  year  and 

jther  important  milestone  was 
1.  vote  in  the  Umted  Nations  last 
avor  of  a  moderate  resolution, 
•ed  by  .Argentina,  calling  for 
negotiations  on  the  Falklands/ 
IS  issue.  We  remain  opposed  to 
of  force  to  resolve  terntonal 
as  in  the  Falklands/ Mai vinas 
ut  we  have  never  taken  a  position 
sovereignty  of  the  islands  and 
(iterated  U.S.  support  for  a 

d.  negotiated  resolution  of  this 
)ur  current  and  future  policy  ap- 
to  Argentina  is  open  and  careful- 
iced.  We  seek  areas  of  mutual  in- 
respect.  and  cooperation. 

must  recognize  that  Argentma 
;ady  entered  a  sensitive  period  jf 
on  from  military  to  civilian  rule. 
come  this.  The  preelectoral 
will  witness,  inevitably,  certain 
andidates  and  parties  freely 

e.  Obviously,  we  have  no 

!S  in  that  campaign.  Nor  do  we 
intrude  in  any  way.  It  is  entirely 
■T  for  the  people  of  Argentina  to 
without  interference  from 

•  basic  position  in  this:  We  are 
that  Argentina  is  launched  again 
le  democratic  path.  We  will  try 
)lish  a  productive  dialogue  this 
id  next  and  offer  our  cooperation 
(never  is  chosen  by  the  people  of 
na  to  lead  theu-  country.  We 
le  the  importance  of  their  coun- 
of  its  return  to  democracy  for 
ire  peace,  stability,  and  develop- 
■  this  hemisphere.  We  wish  them 

boUows  that  in  the  years  to  come. 
Be  to  strengthen  our  ties  of  in- 
d  understanding  with  all 
of  Argentine  society.  This  is 
t  because  in  the  past  the  net- 
linkages  between  our  two 
has  not  been  as  broad  5r  as 
ted  as  it  should  3e.  These  con- 
of  course,  predommantiy 
and  nongovernmental.  They  in- 
ters, labor,  political  parties, 
le  arts,  the  busmess  and  scien- 
cnmunities — indeed,  all  segments 


of  society.  We  would  hope  to  encourage 
increased  interactions  at  all  levels  as  the 
best  way.  in  the  long  term,  to  increase 
our  understanding  of  each  others 
societies. 

Obviously,  we  should  include  die 
Argentine  Armed  Forces  in  this  process. 
As  they  return  to  a  more  traditional 
role,  they  will  continue  to  be  an  impor- 
tant element  :n  the  future  itfe  of  their 
country.  In  particular,  the  military  will 
play  a  key  role  on  issues  of  importance 
to  the  Umted  States,  mciuding  the 
maintenance  of  regional  peace.  We  io 
not  seek  to  minimize  the  obstacles  to  im- 
proved relations,  but  it  is  important  to 
both  countries  that  we  undertake  the  ef- 
fort to  reestablish  confidence  and  the 
basis  for  future  cooperation. 

Economic  cooperanon  is  another 
area  requiring  close  fiiture  attennon. 
U.S.  support  for  sensible  foreign  debt 
arrangements  with  creditor  mstitunons 
is  important  m  Argentina  and  elsewhere 
in  the  hemisphere.  Improvements  in  ±e 
U.S.  and  world  economies  should  in- 
crease lemand  for  Argentine  products. 
As  the  fourth  largest  trader  in  Latin 
America.  .Argentina  also  represents  an 
important  )verseas  market  for  U.S. 
products,  as  it  does  for  productive  in- 
vestment and  technology  transfer  ar- 
rangements. We  will  contmue  to  pursue 
areas  oi  mutual  interest  m  increased 
economic  interchange,  through 
Americas  dynamic  private  sector  and 
through  official  institutions  in  which  we 
participate.  We  both  have  a  major  stake 
in  sound  economic  growth  in  both  coun- 
tries. 

Finally,  a  note  on  style— always  an 
important  component  in  how  nations 
deal  with  each  other.  We  have  been 
through  a  very  rough  period  in  this  rela- 
tionship with  Argentina.  And  one  can 
expect  a  certaui  amount  of  raw  nerves 
as  the  political  transition  moves  forward 
in  the  months  ahead.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances, it  clearly  serves  our  in- 
terests to  be  prudent  m  word  and  deed. 
Good  relations  between  Argentina  and 
the  United  States  are  genuinely  impor- 
tant to  both  of  us.  We  should  give  them 
an  opportunity  to  take  hold  again  and 
prosper. 


'The  complete  transcript  of  the  heanngs 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  avaikble  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents.  U.S.  Government  Pnnting  Of- 
fice. Washinirton.  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


Visit  of  Ecuador's 
President 


President  OsvaUio  Hurtado  Larrea 
ojEciuidor  made  an  offici,aL  working 
tri^rt  to  Washington.  D.C.  April  7-9 
!:}83.  ^0  meet  with  President  Reagan  and 
other  government  offi,ci.ais. 

Following  are  remarks  made  by 
Presidents  Reagan  and  Hurtado  after 
thei,r  meeting  on  April  8. ' 

President  Reagan 

Our  very  cordial  and  productive  talks  to- 
day covered  a  broad  range  of  issues.  As 
two  countries  strongly  committed  to 
democratic  government,  we  are  heart- 
ened by  the  obviously  favorable  trend 
toward  democracy  in  Latin  America. 
And  I  would  be  remiss  if  I  did  not  ex- 
press nere  my  personal  admiration  for 
President  Hurtado's  courageous  leader- 
ship in  this  area  and  his  firm  resolve  to 
hold  free  nanonal  elections  next  year. 

The  President  and  I  also  spoke  to- 
day aoout  the  serious  economic  dif- 
ficulties facing  many  countries  m  this 
hemisphere  and  the  importance  of  work- 
ing closely  together  to  overcome  these 
problems.  Such  cooperation  is  vital  to 
our  mutual  interest  m  peaceful  and 
democratic  change.  We  re  confident  that 
the  economic  measures  President  Hur- 
tado is  takmg  in  Ecuador  will  succeed. 

Our  two  Governments  have  worked 
closely  to  resolve  differences  that  may 
arise  between  us.  We  were  pleased  to 
reach  an  accord  last  month  on  restric- 
tions for  certain  Ecuadorean  fish  ex- 
ports to  the  United  States  and  welcomed 
Ecuador's  willingness  to  discuss  prac- 
tical solutions  to  the  fisheries  issues. 

Our  discussions  today  were  carried 
on  in  a  spirit  of  openness  and  mutual 
respect  as  befits  two  countries  with 
many  shared  values,  including  our  com- 
mitment to  democracy,  freedom,  and 
human  rights.  I  have  very  much  ap- 
preciated the  opportunity  to  have  Presi- 
dent Hurtado  as  my  guest,  to  benefit 
from  his  perceptive  views,  and  to  reaf- 
firm the  warm  and  abiding  friendship 
that  the  peoples  of  our  two  countries 
have  long  enjoyed. 

President  Hurtado 

It  has  been  a  great  pleasure  and  a 
satisfaction  to  speak  to  Mr.  Reagan,  to 


WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 


TREATIES 


? 


r 


i 


President  Reagan,  regarding  the  prob- 
lems of  Latin  America  and  the  possible 
social  and  economic  consequences. 

In  Latin  America,  and  specifically  in 
my  country— Ecuador— we  have 
assumed  the  responsibility  for 
reestablishing  the  balance  that  is 
necessary  to  maintain  economic  and 
political  equilibrium. 

However,  the  efforts  that  my 
government  and  our  people  can  carry 
out  will  not  be  sufficient  if  we  do  not 
find  the  understanding  and  the  aid  of 
the  industrialized  countries  of  the  North, 
as  well  as  the  collaboration  of  multina- 
tional finance  institutions  and  interna- 
tional, private  banking  groups.  Without 
this  cooperation,  all  of  the  national  ef- 
forts undertaken  by  ourselves  and  our 
people  will  not  give  the  necessary 
results  that  we  are  all  attempting  to 
find. 

In  the  conversations  that  we  have 
held  during  these  past  few  days  with  the 
representatives  of  all  these  organiza- 


tions, and  especially  in  the  conversations 
maintained  with  President  Reagan  to- 
day, we  have  found  a  very  high  degree 
of  understanding  with  reference  to  the 
problems  that  afflict  Latin  America  and 
that  these  will  lead  us  to  finding  solu- 
tions. 

The  conversations  that  we  have 
maintained  during  these  days  have  had 
always  as  a  common  horizon  the  will  of 
the  two  countries  in  maintaining  the 
ideals  that  are  shared  by  both  coun- 
tries—ideals of  liberty  and  of  deep 
respect  for  human  rights. 

A  social  progress  democracy  is  what 
Latin  America  requires,  and  perhaps  out 
of  this  crisis  we  can  find  the  necessary 
means  to  look  for  these  solutions. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  documents  of  Apr.  11,  1983. 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention  on  the  recognition  and  e 
ment  of  foreign  arbitral  awards.  Doi 
New  York  June  10,  1958.  Entered  ii 
June  7,  1959;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  29,  ] 
TIAS  6997. 
Accession  deposited:  Uruguay,  Mar. 

Aviation 

Protocol  on  the  authentic  quadriling 
of  the  convention  on  international  ci 
tion  (TIAS  1591),  with  annex.  Done 

■£    treal  Sept.  30,  1977.' 

■5    Acceptance  deposited:  Venezuela.  A 

i    1983. 

a  Biological  Weapons 

>,  Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  the 

0  ment,  production  and  stockpiHng  of 
.§  bacteriological  (biological)  and  toxin 
S  and  on  their  destruction.  Done  at 

1  Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  / 
a;  1972.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  26.  II 
I  TIAS  8062. 

-  Ratification  deposited:  F.R.G.,  Apr. 

Coffee 

International  coffee  agreement  198J 
nexes.  Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  19: 
Signatures:  Finland,  Norway,  Swedi 
Mar.  28,  1983;  France,  Uganda.  Api 
1983;  U.K.,  Apr.  15,  1983. 

Copyright 

Universal  copyright  convention.  Dor 

Geneva  Sept.  6,  1952.  Entered  into 

Sept.  16,  1955.  TIAS  3324. 

Notification  of  succession:  Belize,  De 

1982. 

Accession  deposited:  Dominican  Rep 

Feb.  8,  1983. 

Universal  copyright  convention,  as  r 
Done  at  Paris  July  24,  1971.  Enterei 
force  July  10,  1974.  TIAS  7868, 
Accession  deposited:  Dominican  Rep 
Feb.  8,  1983. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  mill 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environment 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.' 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into: 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17,  1£ 
TIAS  9614. 
Ratification  deposited:  Netherlands, 


Finance — African  Development  Ba( 

Agreement  establishing  the  African ; 
ment  Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  K 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan 
17,  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7, 
Signatures:  Austria,  July  23,  1982;  E 
Dec.  8,  1982;  U.K.,  Dec.  23,  1982. 


Department  of  State  1 1 


TREATIES 


es  and  acceptances  deposited: 

Dec.  23,  1982;^  Finland,  Norway,  3.4 

3.-1  Sept.  7,  1982;  F.R.G.,  Feb.  16, 

ily,  Nov.  26,  1982;^  Japan,  Feb.  3, 

irea,  Sept.  27,  1982;  Kuwait,  Nov.  9, 

itherlands,  Jan.  28,  1983; 

ind,  Sept.  14,  1982;^  U.S.,  Jan.  31, 

es  and  ratifications  deposited: 
,  Feb.  15,  1983;  Denmark,  Sept.  7, 
ranee,  July  1,  1982;  Yugoslavia, 
,  1982. 
ion  deposited:  Austria,  Mar.  10. 


Pacific  Ocean  tuna  fishing  agree- 
ith  protocol.  Done  at  San  Jose  Mar. 
.  Enters  into  force  30  days  after  the 
)f  the  fifth  instrument  of  ratification 
ence  by  a  coastal  state. 
«s:  Costa  Rica,  Panama,  U.S.. 
1983. 

Assistance 

ion  on  the  service  abroad  of  judicial 
ajudicial  documents  in  civil  or  corn- 
matters.  Done  at  The  Hague  Nov.  15. 
[itered  into  force  Feb.  10,  1969.  HAS 

d  to:  St.  Christopher  and  Nevis  by 
Mar.  1,  1983. 


relating  to  intervention  on  the  high 
of  pollution  by  substances  other 
Done  at  London  Nov.  2,  1982. 
into  force  Mar.  30,  1983. 

by  the  President:  Apr.  11.  1983. 


iscrimination 

onal  convention  on  the  elimination  of 
of  racial  discrimination.  Done  at 
k  Dec.  21,  1965.  Entered  into  force 
969.5 
ice  deposited:  Mozambique,  Apr.  18, 


onal  convention  against  the  taking  of 
.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 


ion  deposited:  Finland,  Apr.  14, 


tification  of  modifications  and  rec- 
s  to  the  annex  to  the  agreement  of 
1979  (TIAS  9620)  on  trade  in  civil 
Done  at  Geneva  Jan.  17.  1983. 
into  force:  Jan.  17,  1983. 


strial  Development  Organization 

;ion  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
janization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
pr.  8.  1979.1 

ions  deposited:  Dominican  Republic, 
1983;  Uganda,  Mar.  23,  1983. 


Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144). 
Open  for  signature  at  Washington  from  April 
4  through  May  10,  1983.  Enters  into  force 
July  1,  1983  if  by  June  30,  1983,  certain  re- 
quirements have  been  met. 
Signatures:  Austria,  Apr.  28,  1983;  Brazil, 
Sweden,  Vatican  City,  Apr.  18,  1983;  Cuba, 
Apr.  11,  1983;  Egypt,  Kenya,  Apr.  19,  1983; 
Finland,  Apr.  7,  1983;  Japan,  Spain,  Apr.  22, 
1983;  Norway,  Apr.  6,  1983;  Pakistan,  Apr. 
4.  1983;  South  Africa,  U.S.,  Apr.  25,  1983; 
Switzerland,  Apr.  27,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  Apr.  18, 
1983. 

Declarations  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Cuba,  Apr.  11,  1983;  Finland, 
Apr.  7,  1983;  Norway,  Apr.  6,  1983;  Spain. 
Apr.  22,  1983;  Switzerland,  Apr.  27,  1983,^ 
Tunisia,  Apr.  14,  1983;  U.S.,  Apr.  25,  1983.' 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
food  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015). 
Open  for  signature  at  Washington  from  Apr. 
4  through  May  10,  1983.  Enters  into  force 
July  1,  1983  if  by  June  30,  1983,  certain  re- 
quirements have  been  met. 
Signatures:  Austria,  Apr.  28,  1983;  Finland, 
Apr.  7,  1983;  Japan,  Spain,  Apr.  22,  1983; 
Norway,  Apr.  6,  1983;  Sweden,  Apr.  18, 
1983;  Switzerland,  Apr.  27,  1983;'  U.S.,  Apr. 
25,  1983. 

Ratification  deposited:  Sweden,  Apr.  18, 
1983. 

Declarations  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Finland,  Apr.  7,  1983;  Spain, 
Apr.  22,  1983;  Switzerland,  Apr.  27,  1983;' 
U.S.,  Apr.  25,  1983.43 

Wills 

Convention  providing  a  uniform  law  on  the 
form  of  an  international  will,  with  annex. 
Done  at  Washington  Oct.  26,  1973.  Entered 
into  force  Feb.  9,  1978.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Belgium,  Apr.  21, 


World  Health  Organization 

Amendments  to  Articles  24  and  25  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  World  Health  Organiza- 
tion, as  amended  (TIAS  1808,  8086,  8534). 
Adopted  at  Geneva  May  17,  1976  by  the  29th 
World  Health  Assembly.' 
Acceptances  deposited:  Jamaica,  Apr.  11, 
1983;  Nicaragua,  Feb.  16,  1983. 


BILATERAL 

Austria 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates,  inheritances, 
gifts,  and  generation-skipping  transfers. 
Signed  at  Vienna  June  21,  1982.  Enters  into 
force  July  1,  1983. 

Ratifications  exchanged:  Apr.  13,  1983. 
Proclaimed  by  the  President:  Apr.  25,  1983. 


Ecuador 

Cooperative  scientific  and  technical  project 
for  joint  oceanographic  research.  Effected  by 
exchange  of  notes  at  Quito  Mar.  17,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1983. 

France 

Agreement  relating  to  jurisdiction  over 
vessels  utilizing  the  Louisiana  Offshore  Oil 
Port,  with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  March  24  and  April  6, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  April  6.  1983. 

German  Democratic  Republic 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
of  the  U.S.  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washing- 
ton Apr.  13,  1983.  Enters  into  force  on  a 
date  to  be  agreed  upon  by  exchange  of  notes, 
following  the  completion  of  internal  pro- 
cedures of  both  governments. 

Hong  Kong 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of  June 
23,  1982  (TIAS  10420),  relating  to  trade  in 
cotton,  wool,  and  manmade  fiber  textiles  and 
textile  products.  Effected  by  exchange  of  let- 
ters at  Washington  Jan.  12  and  14,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  14,  1983;  effective 
Jan.  1,  1983. 

Israel 

General  security  of  information  agreement. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Tel  Aviv 
and  Jerusalem  July  30  and  Dec.  10,  1982. 
Entered  into  force  Dec.  10,  1982. 

Malaysia 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Washington 
and  Kuala  Lumpur  Feb.  14  and  Mar.  14, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  June  1,  1983. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
June  2,  1977  (TIAS  9852)  relating  to  addi- 
tional cooperative  arrangements  to  curb  the 
illegal  traffic  in  narcotics.  Effected  by  ex- 
change of  notes  at  Mexico  Feb.  9,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  Feb.  9,  1983. 

Memorandum  of  understanding  concerning 
the  furnishing  of  launch  and  associated  serv- 
ices for  the  MEXSAT  project.  Signed  at  Mex- 
ico Nov.  18,  1982. 
Entered  into  force;  Mar.  18,  1983. 


Peru 

Agreement  for  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities, relating  to  the  agreement  of 
Apr.  26,  1978  (TIAS  9604),  with  memoran- 
dum of  understanding.  Signed  at  Lima 
Mar.  29,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  29, 
1983. 

Qatar 

International  express  mail  agreement,  with 
detailed  regulations.  Signed  at  Doha  and 
Washington  Jan.  19  and  Feb.  14,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  June  1,  1983. 


CHRONOLOGY 


Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  nf  certain  debts  oweti  to. 
guaranteed,  or  insured  by  the  U.S.  Govern- 
ment and  its  agencies,  with  annexes.  Signed 
at  Bucharest  Mar.  10.  1983. 
Entered  mto  force:  Apr.  22,  1983. 

Agreement  relating  to  trade  in  cotton  tex- 
tiles, with  annex.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Bucharest  Jan.  28  and  Mar.  31. 
1983:  effective  .Jan.  I.  1983. 


Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
May  12  and  14,  19.51.  as  amended  and  ex- 
tended (TIAS  2259.  4436.  ,5037.  10319), 
relating  to  the  facilities  of  Radio  Ceylon.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  notes  at  Colombo 
Mar.  23  and  Apr.  5,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  .3,  1983. 


'Not  in  torce. 

-This  listing  mcludes  only  actions  related 
to  the  agreement  as  amended;  actions  by  par- 
ties a  the  original  agreement  are  not  in- 
cluded. 

^With  reservation)  s). 

*With  declaration(s). 

*NQt  in  force  for  the  U.S.  ■ 


April  1983 


April  1 

The  Board  of  Governors  of  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  approves  a  proposed  47.4% 
increase  in  the  members'  quotas.  Each 
member  country  has  until  November  30  to 
consent  to  the  proposed  quota  increase. 

April? 

In  a  White  House  ceremony,  the  following 
Ambassadors  present  their  credentials: 
Mariano  BAPTISTA  Gumuchio.  Republic  of 
Boiivsi;  Benjamin  W   Mkapa,  United  Republic 
of  Tanzania:  James  O'Neil-Lewis,  Republic  of 
Trinidad  and  Tobago;  Dr.  Alvaro  GOMEZ 
Hurtado.  Republic  of  Colombia;  ZHANG 
Wenjin,  People's  Republic  of  China;  Ail  Salim 
Badar  Al-Hinai,  Sultanate  of  Oman. 

The  United  States  voices  regret  over  two 
separate  actions  announced  by  the  Chinese 
Minister  of  Culture  and  the  All-China  Sports 
Federation  to  cancel  all  planned  remaining 
activities  under  the  1982-1983  U.S. -China 
Implementing  Accord  for  Cultural  Exchange 
as  well  as  all  remaining  U.S. -China  sports  ex- 
changes scheduled  for  1983.  The  Chinese  ac- 
tions were  made  after  the  United  States  had 
granted  asylum  to  Chinese  player  Hu  Na. 

April  7-9 

Ecuador  President  Osvaldo  Hurtado  makes 
an  orficnal  working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C. 
to  meet  with  President  Reagan,  Secretary 
Shultz.  and  Vice  President  Bush  to  discuss 
economics  and  support  for  democracy  in  this 
hemisphere. 


April  9-15 

Under  Secretary  for  Political  Affairs 
Lawrence  Eagleburger  .'isits  .l.ger.a  ana 
Turasia  for  a  general  discussion  on  U.S. 
bilateral  relations  and  other  matters  of 
mutual  interest. 

April  10-11 

Canadian  Foreign  Minister  Allan  J. 
MacEachen  anu  Secretary  Shultz  meet  m 
Washington,  D.C.  to  discuss  international  and 
bilateral  issues. 

April  10-14 

During  a  pnvate  visit  to  the  United  States, 
Sn  Lankan  Pnme  Minister  Ranasingne 
Premadasa  meets  with  the  President  and 
Vice  President. 

April  10-15 

Egyptian  Minister  of  State  Boutros  Ghali 
makes  an  unofficial  working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C  to  meet  with  top  U.S.  of- 
ficials. 

April  U-15 

Sultan  Qaboos  bin  Said  of  Oman  maKes  a 
state  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.  to  meet  with 
top  U.S.  officials  to  discuss  -egionai  issues 
such  as  the  Iraq- Iran  war.  Lebanon,  and  the 
Middle  East  peace  process. 

April  14-15 

Chancellor  Helmut  Konl  ii  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  visits  Wasnmgton.  D.C. 
m  his  capacity  as  Chairman  of  the  European 
Council.  He  meets  with  President  Reagan  to 
discuss  U.S. -European  Community  issues. 
U.S. -German  relations,  and  other  matters  of 
mutual  interest.  Chancellor  Kohl  is  accom- 
panied by  F.R.G.  Vice  Chancellor  and 
Foreign  Minister  Hans-Dietnch  lienscher. 

April  15 

Nicaraguan  patrol  boats  intercept  and  seize 
two  Costa  Rican  sport  fishing  boats  in  that 
country's  waters  and  take  three  U.S.  citizens 
and  their  two  Costa  Rican  guides  to 
Nicaragua.  With  the  help  of  Ciista  H.ican 
authonties.  they  are  returned  to  that  country 
on  April  16. 

April  18 

The  U.S.  Embassy  m  Beirut.  Lebanon,  is 
bombed.  Initial  reports  indicate  that  there 
are  at  least  33  casualties,  including  U.S. 
citizens.  Two  U.S.  citizens  are  missing.  In  a 
statement.  President  Reagan  denounces  "the 
VICIOUS  terronst  bombing'  as  a  'cowardly 
act,"  and  vows  that  the  United  States  will  not 
be  deterred  in  its  efforts  to  secure  peace  in 
that  region. 

April  18-19 

Secretary  Shultz  visits  Mexico  to  discuss  a 
wtioie  -aniro  ii  oilacerai  issues.  ;nc;uuing 
trade  anu  nnancial  issues,  as  well  as  regional 
problems  such  as  Central  Amenca.  He  is 
Joined  by  Treasury  Secretary  Regan  and 
Commerce  Secretary  Baldrige.  as  veil  as 
representatives  of  the  Department  if 


Agriculture  ana  the  Office  of  the  Sp< 
Trade  Representative. 

April  19 

The  State  Department  announces  thi; 
move<l  Id  e;cpei  :-.vo  memners  if  the 
Mission  A)  :.ne  '.nited  .Nations  :'or  an 
"hostile  intelligence  acnvities  aimed 
United  States. '  .Vitnough  accredited 
United  Nanons  for  :ne  purpose 
in  liiplomanc  acnv.ties  there.  :,ne  nv. 
Seers.  Ramon  Saiup  Canto  ana  U; 
Rodobaiao  Penton  Cejas.  .lave  engaj. 
hosnie  intelligence  acnvines  aimea  ; 
Uniteu  States  .n  niatant  violation  if 
privileges  if  resiaence. 

The  State  I'epartment  informs  t 
Embassy  that  Yevgeniy  Barmyantse 
.\ssistant  Militar/  Attache  if  the  Sr 
declared  persona  tun  jrvta  for  activ 
compatible  with  his  ^iiplomanc  statu; 

April  20 

The  Senate  ?  ireign  Reiar.ons  Comn 
the  House  ?  ireign  .\rfair5  C.immitti 
prove  a  5251  million  jupniementai ; 
package  for  leoanon  :or  Iscai  'eai 
Aduitional  language  -B<mir'is  longre 
authonzanon  i'  -.ne  .iaministrar.on  ' 
substannaily  increase  :he  lumber  or 
the  role  of  U.S.  forces  now  m 
The  bills  approveu  ly  :ne  rf/n  comm 
will  go  to  the  nill  House  and  Senate 

The  State  Department  releases  : 
citing  anu  analyzing  Soviet  forgery  i 
aime<t  at  liscrediting  tne  United  Sta 
These  false  tocuments  comprise  ; 
Soviet  active  .neasures  program,  an 
telligence  program  which  ases  for 
front  groups,  ana  ither  iisinformatiii 
niques  to  furtner  Soviet  policy 

The  VSUN  Mission  informs  the 
Soviet  Mission  mat  ,\ieKsanar  Mikht 
was  temporaniy  assignea  :o  :ne  -Mis.- 
being  expelled  from  the  Unitea 
tivities  incompatible  with  .iis  status. 

April  21-23 

Under  Secretary  if  State  i.awrence  ■ 
Eagleburger  heads  a  special  U.S.  Go 
ment  delegation  to  honor  the  brave  i 
women  victimized  oy  a  -.erronst  itta 
sen/ing  the  United  States  m  Lenanoi 
special  plane,  which  is  greeted  by  th(i 
dent  at  .Indrews  Air  Force  7 
non  escorts  the  oodles  .lome.  Delega 
meetings  with  Lebanese  officials  : 
underscore  the  depth  of  U.S. 
brave  members  of  Lebanon  s  Interna 
ty  Force  and  military  services. 

April  22 

.\  total  of  17  U.S.  citizens'  bodies  I 
been  recovered  from  the  rubble  of  tb 
Embassy  in  Beirut.  Eighteen  Foreigi 
nar.onals  are  jonfirmea  teau  and  15 
lounteu  as  .nissmg  iiiu  ^r'-jsumeu 

April  24 

Austrian  Chancellor  Bruno  Kreisky  a 
nounces  .his  intention  to  step  down  al 


ZecarTment  of  State  E/( 


iSS  RELEASES 


•t  Party  loses  its  clear  majority  in  '104      4/12 

lent  in  national  elections. 

J-May  11 

ident  Reagan's  request  Secretary  *105      4/12 

makes  an  official  visit  to  Egypt, 
and  Lebanon  to  help  resolve  the  issue 
gn  troops  in  Lebanon.  The  primary 
;  of  the  trip  will  be  to  bring  about  a 
ful  conclusion  to  the  negotiations  on  106      4/12 

withdrawal  from  Lebanon.  Upon  his  '107      4/12 

the  Secretary  stops  in  Paris  to  attend 
ng  of  the  OECD  [Organization  for 
lie  Cooperation  and  Development] 
10.  108      4/13 


orial  service  is  held  at  Washington's 
il  Cathedral  for  the  U.S.  citizens  and 

who  were  victims  of  the  Beirut 
5y  bombing. 


in  Prime  Minister  Pierre  Trudeau 

1  working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.  to 

jparately  with  the  President  and  Vice 

nt  to  discuss  the  upcoming 

isburg  Economic  Summit  and  security 

including  arms  control.  ■ 


artment  of  State 


jleases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
'ress  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
jton,  D.C.  20520. 

Subject 

Ambassador  Brock  to  ad- 
dress conference  on  U.S. 

trade  and  investment  in 

Africa,  Houston,  Apr.  14. 
John  Melvin  Yates  sworn  in 

as  Ambassador  to  Cape 

Verde  (biographic  data). 
Wesley  William  Egan,  Jr. 

sworn  in  as  Ambassador 

to  Guinea-Bissau 

(biographic  data). 
Program  for  the  official 

working  visit  of 

Ecuadorean  President 

Osvaldo  Hurtado  Larrea, 

Apr.  7-9.  'lig      4/20 

U.S.,  Hungarian  People's 

Republic  sign  bilateral  tex- 
tile agreement,  Feb.  15 

and  25. 
Program  for  the  state  visit 

of  His  Majesty  Qaboos  bin        '  120      4/20 

Said,  Sultan  of  Oman, 

Apr.  11-15.  '121      4/20 

Shultz:  interview  on  CBS 

morning  news. 
Dam:  address  to  World  Af- 
fairs Council  of  St.  Louis,  122      4/20 

St.  Louis. 


'115  4/20 

"116  4/20 

■117  4/20 

■118  4/20 


U.S.,  U.K.  consultations  on 
recent  developments  in  in- 
ternational communica- 
tions. 

U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 
ternational Radio  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCIR),  study  group  7, 
May  2. 

Shultz:  news  conference. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  F.R.G. 
Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl, 
Apr.  14-15. 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Finance  Commit- 
tee. 

Shultz:  address  to  Dallas 
World  Affairs  Council, 
Dallas,  Apr.  15. 

Shultz:   question-and-answer 
session  following  Dallas 
address,  Apr.  15. 

Shultz:  statement  on  bomb- 
ing of  U.S.  Embassy  in 
Beirut,  Mexico  City,  Apr. 
18. 

Shultz,  Regan:  joint  press 
conference  en  route  to 
Mexico  City,  Apr.  17. 

Rank  of  Ambassador  ac- 
corded Diana  Lady 
Dougan  as  Coordinator  for 
International  Communica- 
tions and  Information 
Policy  (biographic  data). 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Senate  Armed  Services 
Committee 

U.S.  Organization  for  the  In- 
ternational Telegraph  and 
Telephone  Consultative 
Committee  (CCITT),  in- 
tegrated services  digital 
network  (ISDN),  May 
10-12. 

CCIR,  study  group  2, 
May  13. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Intellectual 
Property,  May  10. 

CCIR,  study  group  1, 
May  13. 

Advisory  Committee  on  In- 
ternational Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, May  18. 

Shipping  Coordinating  Com- 
mittee (SCC),  Subcommit- 
tee on  Safety  of  Life  at 
Sea  (SOLAS),  working 
group  on  carriage  of 
dangerous  goods,  June  7. 
Overseas  Schools  Advisory 

Council,  June  15. 
Shultz:  remarks  at  opening 
of  U.S. -Mexico  Binational 
Commission,  Mexico  City, 
Apr.  18. 
Shultz,  Regan,  Sepulveda: 
news  conference,  Mexico 
City,  Apr.  19. 


•124  4/25 

•125  4/26 

126  4/28 

'127  4/26 

'128  4/27 


131  4/27 

■  132  4/28 

133  4/29 

'134  4/29 

135  4/29 

136  4/29 

137  5/2 

■138  4/29 


Shultz:  remarks  before  the 
Senate  Subcommittee  on 
Appropriations  for  Com- 
merce, Justice,  State,  the 
Judiciary. 

SCC,  SOLAS,  panel  on  bulk 
cargoes,  May  17. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  of  Canadian 
Prime  Minister  Pierre 
Elliott  Trudeau,  Apr. 
27-28. 

U.S. -Mexico  joint  state- 
ment-bilateral commis- 
sion meeting,  Apr.  19. 

Oceans  and  International  En- 
vironmental and  Scientific 
Affairs  Advisory  Commit- 
tee, May  24. 

Shultz,  Baldrige,  Regan: 
news  briefing  en  route 
from  Mexico  City,  Apr.  19. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  memorial 
service  for  Beirut  bombing 
victims,  Cairo,  Apr.  26. 

Shultz,  Mubarak:  remarks 
following  meeting,  Cairo, 
Apr.  26. 

Shultz,  Shamir:  arrival 
remarks,  Jerusalem. 

Shultz:  press  briefing 
en  route  Jerusalem,  Apr. 
27. 

Shultz,  Shamir:  toasts, 
Jerusalem. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  en 
route  Beirut. 

Shultz:  remarks  upon  arrival 
Beirut,  Apr.  28. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  U.S.  Em- 
bassy, Beirut,  Apr.  28. 

Shultz:  departure  remarks 
from  Presidential  Palace, 


U.S.,  Lebanon  sign  air  cargo 
agreement. 


*Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


PUBLICATIONS 


Department  of  State 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

President  Reagan 

Central  America:  Defending  Our  Vital  In- 
terests, Joint  Session  of  Congress,  Apr.  27, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #482). 

Reducing  the  Danger  of  Nuclear  Weapons, 
Los  Angeles  World  Affairs  Council,  Los 
Angeles,  Mar.  31,  1983  (Current  Policy 
#473.). 

Secretary  Shultz 

Modernizing  U.S.  Strategic  Forces,  Senate 

Armed  Services  Committee,  Apr.  20,  1983 

(Current  Policy  #480). 
Struggle  for  Democracy  in  Central 

America,  Dallas  World  Affairs  Council  and 

Chamber  of  Commerce,  Dallas,  Apr.  1.5, 

1983  (Current  Policy  #478). 
Caribbean  Basin  Economic  Recovery 

Act,  Senate  Finance  Committee,  Apr.  13, 

1983  (Current  Policy  #477). 


Africa 

Africa's  Economic  Crisis  (GIST,  Apr.  1983). 

Arms  Control 

Implications  of  a  Nuclear  Freeze,  Assistant 
Secretary  Burt,  Subcommittee  on  Procure- 
ment and  Military  Nuclear  Systems,  House 
Armed  Services  Committee,  Mar.  9,  1983 
(Current  Policy  #470). 

East  Asia 

Indochinese  Refugees  (GIST,  Apr.  1983). 

Economics 

Looking  Toward  Williamsburg:  U.S. 
Economic  Policy,  Deputy  Secretary  Dam, 
Graduate  Institution  of  International 
Studies,  Geneva,  Switzerland,  Mar.  21, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #479). 

Meeting  the  Global  Challenge:  Leadership  in 
the  1980s,  Under  Secretary  Wallis,  The  Ex- 
ecutives' Organization,  Scottsdale,  Arizona, 
Mar.  20,  1983  (Current  Policy  #474). 

Economics  and  Security:  The  Case  of  East- 
West  Relations,  Under  Secretary  Wallis, 
U.S. -German  Industrialists'  Group,  New 
York,  Mar.  7.  1983  (Current  Policy  #465). 

U.S.  Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ)  (GIST. 
Apr.  1983). 


Europe 

Background  Notes  on  Monaco  (Ma' 
Background  Notes  on  Turkey  (Ma 

Foreign  Aid 

International  Security  and  Devi'l- 
Cooperation  Program,  Apr.  4,  1 
Report  #108). 

Middle  East 

A  Time  for  Reason  and  Realism  ml 
Middle  East,  Deputy  Secretary  1  la 
Louis  World  Affairs  Council,  St.  1. 
Apr.  11.  1983  (Current  Policy  #17: 

Background  Notes  on  Libya  (Apr,  l: 

Oceans 

Oceans  Policy  and  the  Exclusive  Iv  > 
Zone,  President  Reagan,  (proclain, 
statement)  Assistant  Secretary  .M 
Mentor  Group,  Washington,  Mar 
(Current  Policy  #471). 

Trade 

UNCTAD  VI  and  the  North/South  Di< 
(GIST,  Apr.  1983). 

South  Asia 

Background  Notes  on  Afghanistan.  (A 
1983). 


Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  released  today 
Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States, 
1951,  Volume  VII,  China  and  Korea. 
The  Foreign  Relations  series  has  been 
published  continuously  since  1861  as  the 
official  record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 
The  volume  released  today  is  the  sixth 
of  seven  volumes  covering  the  year 
1951.  Three  other  volumes  recording  the 
years  1952-1954  have  also  been  re- 
leased. 

The  volume  presents  2,055  pages  of 
documents,  most  of  them  previously  un- 
published and  highly  classified.  The 
volume  is  published  in  two  parts.  The  in- 
dex to  both  parts  is  in  Part  2. 

The  1,473  pages  of  documents  in 
Part  1  deal  with  major  U.S.  actions  dur- 
ing the  year  relating  to  the  Korean  War, 
including  definition  of  war  objectives, 
relations  with  the  UN  coparticipants,  the 
decision  to  relieve  General  Douglas 
MacArthur,  and  the  initiation  of  truce 
talks.  There  is  also  material  on  U.S. 
economic  and  military  aid  to  the 
Republic  of  Korea  (ROK),  and  U.S.  rela- 


tions with  the  ROK  Government  headed 
by  Syngman  Rhee. 

The  582  pages  in  Part  2  cover  U.S. 
policy  toward  China,  including  U.S. 
policy  toward  the  People's  Republic  of 
China  (PRC)  and  U.S.  relations  with  the 
Nationalists.  Part  2  also  contains 
material  on  U.S.  policy  with  respect  to 
Taiwan  and  U.S.  interest  in  develop- 
ments in  Tibet.  The  volume  concludes 
with  documents  on  U.S.  policy  regarding 
restrictions  on  trade  with  the  PRC  and 
North  Korea. 

Foreign  Relations,  1951,  Volume 
VII,  was  prepared  in  the  Office  of  the 
Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Affairs, 
Department  of  State.  Copies  of  Volume 
VII  (Department  of  State  Publication 
Nos.  9270  and  9271;  GPO  Stock  No. 
044-000-01931-1)  may  be  purchased  for 
$30.00  (domestic  postpaid)  from  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks  or 
money  orders  should  be  made  out  to  the 
Superintendent  of  Documents. 


Western  Hemisphere 

Nicaragua:  Threat  to  Peace  in  Centra 
America,  Assistant  Secretary  Endei 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Comniitte 
12,  1983  (Current  Policy  #476). 

El  Salvador's  Land  Reform  (GIST,  Ap 
1983).  ■ 


Press  release  81  of  Mar.  22,  1983. 


Department  of  State  B  ' 


)EX 


ie  1983 

ume  83,  No.  2075 


itina.    U.S.    Policy    Toward    Argentina 

mith) S7 

Control 

irs  of  U.S. -Soviet  Dialogue  (Hartman)  30 
ations  of  a  Nuclear  Freeze  (Burt)  ....  28 
•nizing  U.S.  Strategic  Forces  (Shultz)  .8 
t  of  the  Commission  on  Strategic  Forces 

eagan,  letter  to  the  Congress) 17 

ary's  News  Conference  of  April  12  .  .  10 
Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

ace  the  Nation'   53 

ioviet  Direct  Communication  Links 
eagan)   18 

icans    Missing    in    Southeast    Asia 

Donohue) 19 

184  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 

ntrol  (DiCarlo) 67 

a.  Vice  President  Bush  Visits  Canada 
atements)    7 

ion-and-Answer  Session  Following 
)rld  Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz)  13 
ary's  News  Conference  of  April  12  .  .  10 
unications.  Radio  Broadcasting  to  Cuba 

iders)    85 

ess 

cans    Missing    in     Southeast    Asia 

Donohue) 19 

il    America:     Defending    Our     Vital 

erests  (Reagan) 1 

vador:   Response  to  Chairman  Long's 

icerns  (Shultz  letter) 82 

t    Control     of    High     Technology 

hneider)    71 

84  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 

Urol  (DiCarlo) 67 

itions  of  a  Nuclear  Freeze  (Burt)  ....  28 
lizing  U.S.  Strategic  Forces  (Shultz)  .8 
^a:  Threat  to  Peace  in  Central  America 

iders)    76 

leport    on    Cyprus    (message    to    the 

igress)    ■ 37 

broadcasting  to  Cuba  (Enders) 85 

of  the  Commission  on  Strategic  Forces 

agan,  letter  to  the  Congress) 17 

ihcy  Toward  Argentina  (Smith)  ....  87 
rategy  in  Central  America  (Enders)  .  75 

broadcasting  to  Cuba  (Enders) 85 

Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

.ce  the  Nation'   53 

.  13th  Report  on  Cyjirus  (message  to 

Congress) " 38 

iping  Countries.  Economics  and 
itics:   The   Quandary   of  Foreign   Aid 

illis)    24 

nics 

lies   and    Politics:    The   Quandary    of 

■eign  Aid  (Wallis) ". .  24 

lies  and  Security:  The  Case  of  East- 

st  Relations  fW'allis) 38 

J  Toward  Williamsburg:  U.S.  Economic 

ley  (Dam) 21 

>r.     Visit     of    Ecuador's    President 

rtado,  Reagan) 89 

ador 

I    America:     Defending    Our     Vital 

;rests  (Reagan) 1 

'ador:   Response  to  Chairman  Long's 

icerns  (Shultz  letter) 82 

eform  in  El  Salvador  (McPherson)  .  .83 
Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

ce  the  Nation    53 

lAid 

H  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 


Control  (DiCarlo) 67 

LI.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Thailand  (Depart- 
ment statement) 2(1 

Germany 

The  Human  Side  of  German-American  Rela- 
tions (Burns) 32 

Visit    of    West    German    Chancellor    (Kohl, 

Reagan) 37 

Human  Rights 

Country  Reports  on  Human  Rights  Practices 

for  19S2 41 

.id  \  ears  ol  1  '.S. -Soviet  Dialogue  (Hartman)  30 
International  Law 

Extraterritoriality    and    Conflicts    of    Juris- 
diction (Dam) 48 

U.S.  Foreign  Relations  Law  and  Expropria- 
tion (Robinson) 52 

Kampuchea.  Vietnamese  Attacks  on  Refugee 
Settlements  (Department  statements)  .20 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean 
FY   1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 

Control  (DiCarlo) 67 

Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 
World  Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz)  13 
U.S.  Strategy  in  Central  America  (Enders)  .  75 
Lebanon 
Bombing  of  U.S.  Embassy  in  Beirut  (Reagan, 

Shultz) 60 

Radio  Address  on  Lebanon  (Reagan) 6 

A  Time  for  Reason  and  Realism  in  the  Middle 

East  (Dam) 57 

Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation    53 

Mexico.     Secretary    Shultz    Visits    Mexico 

(Regan,  Sepulveda,  Shultz) 80 

Middle  East 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
World  Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz)  13 
Secretary's  Interview  on  the  Middle  East  .  .62 
Secretary's  News  Conference  of  April  12  . .  10 
A  Time  for  Reason  and  Realism  in  the  Middle 

East  (Dam) 57 

Military  Affairs 

U.S.     Military    Assistance    to    Thailand 

(Department  statement) 20 

Namibia.    Secretary's    News    Conference    of 

April  12 10 

Narcotics 

FY   1984  Assistance  Requests  for  Narcotics 

Control  (DiCarlo) 67 

Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation'  53 

Netherlands.  Visit  of  Dutch  Prime  Minister 

(Lubbers,  Reagan) 35 

Nicaragua 

Central     America:     Defending    Our     Vital 

Interests  (Reagan) 1 

Nicaragua:  Threat  to  Peace  in  Central  America 

(Enders)    76 

Secretary's  News  Conference  of  April  12  . .  10 
Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation'  53 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization. 
Economics  and  Security:  The  Case  of  East- 
West  Relations  (Wallis) 38 

Nuclear   Policy.    Implications   of  a   Nuclear 

Freeze  (Burt) 28 

Oceans.     US.     Oceans    Policy    (Reagan, 

proclamation)    70 

Oman.    Visit    of   Sultan    of   Oman   (Qaboos, 

Reagan) 65 

Presidential  Documents 

Bombing  of  U.S.  Embassy  in  Beirut  (Shultz)  60 

Central     America:     Defending    Our    Vital 

Interests   1 

Radio  Address  on  Lebanon 6 

Report    of    the    Commission    on    Strategic 

Forces  (letter  to  the  Congress) 17 

13th  Report  on  Cyprus  (message  to  the 
Congress)    38 


U.S.  Oceans  Policy  (proclamation) 70 

II. S. -Soviet  Direct  Communication  Links  .  .  18 
Visit  of  Dutch  Prime  Minister  (Lubbers)  ...  36 

Visit  of  Ecuador's  President  (Hurtado) 89 

Visit  of  Sultan  of  Oman  (Qaboos) 65 

Visit  of  West  Germany  Chancellor  (Kohl)  .  .37 

Visit  of  Zambian  President  (Kaunda) 16 

Publications 

Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 94 

Department  of  State 94 

Refugees.   Vietnamese  Attacks  on   Refugee 

Settlements  (Department  statements)  .20 
Science  and  Technology.  Export  Control  of 

High  Techni>loK>'  (Schneider) 71 

Sovereign    Immunities.    Extraterritoriality 

and  Contlicts  of  .lurisdiction  (Dam.)  ...  .48 
Terrorism 
Bombing  of  U.S.  Embassy  in  Beirut  (Reagan, 

Shultz) 60 

Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation'^ 53 

Thailand 

U.S.  Military  Assistance  to  Thailand  (Depart- 
ment statement) 20 

Vietnamese  Attacks  on  Refugee  Settlements 

(Department  statements) 20 

Trade 

Looking    Toward    Williamsburg:     U.S. 

Economic  Policy  (Dam) 21 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

Economics  and  Security:  The  Case  of  East- 
West  Relations  (Wallis) 38 

Export     Control     of    High     Technology 

(Schneider)    71 

50  Years  of  U.S.-Soviet  Dialogue  (Hartman)  30 

Implications  of  a  Nuclear  Freeze  (Burt) 28 

Modernizing  U.S.  Strategic  Forces  (Shultz)  .8 
Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 

World  Affairs  Council  Address  (Shultz)  13 
Under  Secretary  Eagleburger's  Interview  on 

"Face  the  Nation'  53 

U.S.-Soviet    Direct    Communication     Links 

(Reagan)    ig 

Vietnam.    Vietnamese    Attacks    on    Refugee 

Settlements  (Department  statements)  .  20 
Zambia.  Visit  of  Zambian  President  (Kaunda, 
16 


Name  Index 

Burns,  Arthur  F 32 

Burt,  Richard  R 28 

Bush,  Vice  President 7 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 21,48,57 

DiCarlo,  Dominick  L 67 

Eagleburger,  Lawrence  S 53 

Enders,  'Thdmas  O 75,  76,  85 

Hartman,  Arthur  A 30 

Hurtado  Larrea,  Osvaldo 89 

Kaunda.  Kenneth  D 16 

Kohl,  Helmut 37 

Lubbers,  Rudolphus 36 

McPherson,  M.  Peter 83 

O'Donohue,  Daniel  A 19 

Reagan,  President 1,  6,  16, 17,  18,  36 

37,  38,  60,  65,  70,  89 

Regan,  Donald  T 80 

Qaboos  bin  Said 65 

Robinson,  Davis  R 52 

Schneider,  William,  Jr 71 

Sepulveda  Amor,  Bernardo 80 

Shultz,  Secretary 8.  10,  13,  60,  62,  80,  82 

Smith,  N.  Shaw 87 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 24,  38 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  GovernmeRt  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSINESS 
Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office- 

375 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  In  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  Immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


J  Dppartnu»nt 


Mfpparwnu»nr 

bulletin 


Dfficial  Monthly  Record  of  United  States  Foreign  Policy  /  Volume  83  /  Number  2076 


July  1983 


Cover:  Gate  to  entrance  of  the  Governor's 
Palace.  Williamsburg. 


Departmpnt  of  State 

bulletin 


Volume  83  /  Number  2076  /  July  1983 


The  Department  of  State  Bulletin. 
published  by  the  Office  of  Public 
Communication  in  the  Bureau  of  Public 
Affairs,  is  the  official  record  of  U.S. 
foreigji  policy.  Its  purpose  is  to  provide  the 
public,  the  Congress,  and  government 
agencies  with  information  on  developments 
in  U.S.  foreign  relations  and  the  work  of 
the  Department  of  State  and  the  Foreign 
Service. 

The  Bulletin's  contents  include  major 
addresses  and  news  conferences  of  the 
President  and  the  Secretary  of  State; 
statements  made  before  congressional 
committees  by  the  Secretary  and  other 
senior  State  Department  officials;  selected 
press  releases  issued  by  the  White  House, 
the  Department,  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
the  United  Nations;  and  treaties  and  other 
agreements  to  which  the  United  States  is 
or  may  become  a  party.  Special  features, 
articles,  and  other  supportive  material 
(such  as  maps,  charts,  photographs,  and 
graphs)  are  published  frequently  to 
provide  additional  information  on  current 
issues  but  should  not  necessarily  be 
interpreted  as  official  U.S.  policy 
statements. 


GEORGE  P.  SHULTZ 

Secretary  of  State 

JOHN  HUGHES 

Assistant  Secretary  for  Public  .Affair, 

PAUL  E.  AUERSWALD 

Director, 

Office  of  Public  Communication 

NORMAN  HOWARD 

Chief,  Editorial  Division 

PHYLLIS  A.  YOUNG 

Editor 

JUANITA  ADAMS 

Assistant  Editor 


The  Secretary  of  State  has  determined  that  the 
publication  of  this  periodical  is  necessary  in  the 
transaction  of  the  public  business  required  by  law  of 
this  Department.  Use  of  funds  for  printing  this 
periodical  has  been  approved  by  the  Director  of  the 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  through  March  31, 


NOTE:  Contents  of  this  publication  are  not  copyrighted 
and  items  contained  herein  may  be  reprinted.  Citation 
of  the  Department  of  State  Bulletin  as  the  source 
will  be  appreciated.  The  Bulletin  is  indexed  in  the 
Readers'  Guide  to  Periodical  Literature. 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Document 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington,  D 


CONTENTS 


SVJMAf/^ 


FEATURE 

1     1983  Summit  of  Industrialized  Nations  (President  Reagan.  Secretary  Shultz, 
Secretary  Regan.  Declaration) 


The  President 

23       Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 
Magazine 

27  Radio  Address  of  May  21 

28  Address  to  Cuban-American 

Community 
30       News  Conference  of  May  17 
(ExcerptK) 

The  Secretary 

32       Visit  to  the  Middle  East 

(Remarks.  Toasts.  Statements, 

News  Briefings) 
46       Secretary  Attends  OECD  Minis- 
terial in  Paris  (Secretary  Shultz. 

Secr-etary  Regan.  Communique) 
55       Middle  East:  Negotiation  and 

Reconciliation 
57       U.S.  and  the  Developing  World: 

Our  Joint  Stake  in  the  World 

Economy 
61        Question-and-Answer  Session 

Following  Foreign  Policy 

Association  Address 
63       On  Learning  From  Experience: 

The  Responsibility  of  the 

Democracies 
65       U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  the 

Context  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 

Arms  Control 

72  Strategic  Modernization  Program 

and  Nuclear  Arms  Reduction 
(Letters  to  Members  of  the  House 
and  the  Senate) 

73  Nuclear  Arms  Freeze  Resolution 

(President  Reagan) 

74  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  (Message 

to  the  Congress) 

74  U.S.-Soviet  Communication  Lini<s 

Endorsed  (President  Reagan) 

75  Funding  for  the  MX  Missile 

(President  Reagan) 


75  INF  Missiles  (Department  State- 

ynent) 

76  Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks 

(President  Reagan) 

77  Extension  of  the  President's 

Commission  on  Strategic  Forces 
(President  Reagan) 

Economics 

78  Williamsburg  in  One  Word:  Con- 

fidence (W.  Allen  Wallis) 

Europe 

81       NATO,  Western  Security,  and 

Arms  Reduction  (Kenneth  W. 

Dam) 
83       The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and 

Lessons  of  History  (Kenneth  W. 

Dam) 

IVIiddle  East 

87       Middle  East  Policy  Update 

(Nicholas  A.  Veliotes) 


Science  and  Technology 

89  U.S.  Arctic  Policy 

Treaties 

90  Current  Actions 

Chronology 

92       Mav  1983 


Press  Releases 

93  Department  of  State 

Publications 

94  Department  of  State 

94       Foreign  Relations  Volume 
Released 


:^; 


^Aedymye/i/it'   c^fM.^AJ(/j/iy'  yvvo^ytedy 

c!rAy€dA4jUmt'  JrA.fJirtr-yC^  t4   ^yfZt-'ttfAA.^f'fyi/iycf/, 
v^.a/n/(j(^€^A^m/d/''\/yyi/i£  ^t^fA/i/u'^-tfAy  Ty^A.€AA€ 

^yAAjym^  .yVI/iyyvLdteAjSm^/umt^oA^!  ^/A/iaf€imA/. 
LodvamM£  ^Mytifi^  ^/lumAAteAj'^U^tdAAyhAAo^ 
jU-^>(ynx^-(yyi^  ycii/uiy  €MAityt4M'  c7,AA^,te 

^i^umA^t^Ay'  ^/l^UjLha/aAy€yf/  c^ h^Jx-m^AJ. 
,A^ykA^Jy€/i/htfA/   v<j/  ^  adtfyn    ^vfu^A/rt/, 


(Calligraphy  by  Georgia  Booth,  Department  of  State) 


z 


'^^-^t/zE^^^        0iMtu 


u 


/^-ifrn 


(Art  by  Juanita  Adams) 


President  Reagan's 
Radio  Address, 
May  28,  1983i 

V^ver  this  Memorial  Day  weel<end, 
while  most  of  us  turn  our  thoughts  to 
picnics  and  family  outings,  an  annual 
summit  meeting  is  taking  place  in 
Williamsburg,  Virginia,  one  that's  impor- 
tant to  our  future.  It  takes  place  at  an 
appropriate  time.  A  bipartisan  majority 
in  the  Congress  has  just  demonstrated 
its  support  for  the  recommendations  of 
the  Scowcroft  commission  [Commission 
on  Strategic  Forces]  to  modernize  our 
strategic  forces  and  carry  us  forward  on 
the  road  to  genuine  arms  reduction. 

This  is  a  reassuring  signal  to  our 
friends  and  allies  meeting  in  Williams- 
burg. Here  in  this  old  colonial  capital— 
the  cradle  of  so  much  early  American 
history— the  leaders  of  the  major  free 
industrial  nations  are  meeting  to  discuss  ? 
the  problems,  the  challenges,  and  the  op-  | 
portunities  that  our  countries  and  our       S 
peoples  share.  Since  the  last  summit  in     | 
France  a  year  ago.  we've  made  impor-      J 
tant  progress.  Today,  America  is  leading  | 
the  world  into  an  economic  recovery         1 
that's  already  being  felt  in  many  of  the     i 
other  countries  represented  here.  = 

Another  encouraging  development  is  | 
that,  more  so  than  any  other  time  in  the  t 
recent  past,  the  economic  policies  of  the 
individual  summit  countries  are  converg- 
ing around  low  inflation  and  improved 
incentives  for  investment,  a  good  sign 
for  a  sustained  worldwide  recovery. 

We  still  have  our  differences. 
Friends  always  will.  But  they're  fewer 
and  less  critical  today  than  in  a  long 
time.  I  think  most  of  us  are  agreed  on 
not  only  where  things  stand  today  but 
what  we  must  do  in  the  weeks  and 
months  ahead.  All  of  us  seek  the  same 
goal— a  healthy,  sustained  economic 
recovery  that  will  revive  troubled 
economies  in  North  America,  Europe, 
and  the  rest  of  the  world. 

That  means  more,  and  better,  jobs. 
And  the  way  to  achieve  this  is  to  ensure 
that  the  new  recovery  does  not  rekindle 
inflation.  We're  doing  this.  And  we're 


.^sUMAf/^ 


■  ^U 


Italian  Prime  Minister  Amintore  Fanfani,  escorted  by  Chief  of  Protocol  Arabassador 
Selwa  Roosevelt,  proceeds  by  horse  and  carriage  to  the  Governor's  Palace  where  Fres 
dent  Reagan  awaits  to  greet  him. 


"loping 
Undine 


Department  ( 


*"«  trade  between  our  coumries 
'^"Pen  and  free  of  protectionist 
""""so  that  both  industrial  and 
-  nations  can  profit  from  an 
ket  -W  ■^""'''  "^^"  ^  contracting, 
,j.  ^T'^^'lsfi  encouraging  respon- 
»t»i,„.^?'"^  economic  policies  in  all  of 
;«ntnes  which  will  make  for 

Muctivity  and  more  stable  ex- 

%C?-  *"""«.  our  economy  is 
,  '  wongly  on  the  mend.  The  rising 
,k,;*°very  is  also  beginning  to 
,,,,l^"«ny  of  our  friends  and  allies. 
ffils,,  P ''  going  and  to  extend  its 
*l»idl'""'^  still  in  the  grip  of  the 
"^wession,  we  must  all  stick 


to  anti-inflationary,  high-productivity 
policies  that  adapt  new  technology,  re- 
train workers,  and  incrense  efficiencv. 


■A"ilMl  r.e  a  political  resort  to    quick 
liM  -    ihat  could  trigger  a  new  round  of 
>'    iM  A  ide  inflation  and  rising  interest 

iNow,  I  know  that  all  of  this  sounds 
like  economic  shop  talk,  a  little  remote, 
perhaps,  from  the  everyday  concerns  of 
the  average  American.  But  while  this  is 
an  economic  summit,  the  topics  it  is  con- 
sidering have  an  impact  on  almost  every 
phase  of  our  lives— jobs,  low  inflation, 
and  the  opportunity  for  a  better  future 
for  ourselves  and  our  families.  For  when 
you  get  right  down  to  it,  freedom  is  at 
the  base  of  the  enormous  productivity  of 
the  industrial  West,  a  freedom  that  has 
spawned  more  pi  ogress  more  individual 
1  ights  and  more  securit\  and  opportuni 
t\  than  are  enjoyed  by  any  other  people 
luing  under  in\  other  system 

\n  I  It       ui  shiied  belief  m  freedom 
tint  1^  tht  sti   nt,'est  he  nd  uniting  each 
it  tht  se\tn  iHti  ins  meeting  heie  in 
Williim^luu  this  weekend   Each  of  our 
niti  nsitL  i,ni7es  the  lights  and  dignity 

t  Its    iti/ei      We  illhelie\ein  the 
w   1  Is  1 1    ui  F   undiiig  fatheis    that  all 
men  aie  cieated  equal  that  they  aie  en 
dotted  b\  then  treatoi  with  certain  in 
alienable  rights    That  s  a  simple  enough 
phiase  but  it  represents  an  incredible 
leap  torwaid  liom  the  tyianny  and  in 
justice  that  still  haunts  too  many  other 
paits  ot  the  globe 

And  because  we  the  nations 
meeting  at  the  summit    iie  united  in  our 
love  ot  peis(  iial  and  cc  m  niic  lieedi  m 

peace  and  defend  libert\  is  that  much 
btionger  Theies  been  a  lot  ot  specula 
tion  about  what  will  come  out  of  this 
weekend  s  summit   I II  lea\e  the  detailed 
amh  SIS  t    tht  M  n  I  u  m  i  nmg  qu  ii  ter 


licks 


Tut  s  1 


F"or  the  issues  we  address  here  in 
this  beautiful  and  historic  setting  in  the 
spring  of  198.3  will  still  be  with  us  for 
many  jears  to  come.  The  Williamsburg 
summil  IS  not  the  end  of  our  work,  but 
it  niaiks  the  beginning  of  a  new  more 
stable  period  of  the  free  developed  world 
learning  to  work  together,  devising  long- 
term  strategies  to  meet  the  problems  we 
face,  and  handing  over  a  Ijetter  world  to 
the  successor  generation,  the  young  peo- 
ple born  in  the  postwar  era  who  must 
carry  and  protect  the  torch  of  freedom 
as  America  apprnaches  the  21st  century. 


President  Reagan's 

Statement, 

May  28,  1983i 


X*.s  host  for  the  summit  meeting  ot  in- 
dustrialized nations  at  Williamsburg  I 
hav  e  been  pleased  to  recen  e  several 
communications  from  leaders  of  the 
developing  nations  including  Prime 
Ministei  Indira  Gandhi  ot  India  and 
Piesiiltnt  Belisario  Betancur  of  Colom 
iiu  whi   wiote  on  behalf  ot  other  coun 
tiles  lhe\  have  expressed  their  concern 
ill  lut  seiious  economic  problems  in 
ilt\tloping  countries  and  their  hope  that 
thtse  pi  iblems  will  be  discussed  at  this 

W  t  nil  et  here  in  Williamsburg  in  a 
spii It    t  tonimon  purpose  with  all  free 
nati  I       I    1 1  w    I H  ind  a  common 
dt  1 1  iistamed  non 

nil  I  an  improved  m- 

tf  1 1  I  financial  system. 

Wt   II  rtiLular  of  the  cir- 

cunistintts  ind  t   n  1 1  ns  of  the  poorest 
countries  which  need  oui  cooperation 

The  concerns   it  ilu  d.  \ t  loping  coun- 
tries have  bet  i  1 1    it  the 
piepaiatioiis  t  ill  look 


President  Reagan's 
Remarks, 
Carter's  Grove, 
May  28,  19832 


X  t  is  bad  enough  to  have  to  interrupt  a 
very  lovely,  festive  evening  by  making  a 
few  formal  remarks;  but  it  is  even  worse 
when  I  find  that  by  coming  up  here,  I 
have  had  to  shut  off  the  music  of  the 
New  Orleans  Preservation  Jazz  Hall 
Band  that  was  flown  up  here  from  New 
Orleans  for  the  occasion.  [Applause]  A 
very  historic  group. 

But  I  would  like  to  extend  a  very 
warm  welcome  to  all  of  you  to  this  latest 
of  our  series  of  economic  summit  con- 
sultations begun  so  constructively  8 
years  ago  at  Rambouillet. 

I  know  that  each  of  these  meetings 
is  the  result  of  a  great  deal  of  prepara- 
tion by  everyone  involved.  My  thanks, 
and  I'm  sure  that  I  speak  for  each  of  the 
delegations  here,  our  thanks  go  to  all  of 
you  for  having  done  such  a  fine  job  of 
laying  the  groundwork  for  this  occasion. 
We  give  the  sherpas  a  needle  every  now 
and  then  about  not  over-preparing  these 
sessions,  but  we  do  that  just  to  make 
sure  that  they  don't  take  our  jobs  from 
us. 

It's  encouraging  to  note  that  in  the 
year  since  we  last  met  in  this  forum,  the 
underlying  economic  situation  of  the  in- 
dustrialized countries  has  improved 
markedly.  Although  many  problems  re- 
main, we  have  made  steady  efforts  to 
restore  conditions  for  growth  in  our  na- 
tional economies,  and  international 
recovery  is  now  under  way.  Against  this 
background,  we  can  all  look  forward  to 
a  most  productive  session. 

Let  me  review  some  of  the  basic 
themes  and  directions  for  the  summit 
here  at  Williamsburg.  Rather  than  con- 
centrating on  a  single  issue,  this  summit 
will  take  an  integrated  view  of  the 
domestic  and  international  aspects  of 
the  world  economy.  Broadly  speaking, 
we  are  dedicated  to  achieving  noninfla- 
tionary,  sustained  growth  and  continued 
improvements  in  the  international 
trading  and  financial  system. 


There  are,  in  our  view,  several  b  i 
relationships  in  the  world  economy  u  i 
which  we  should  focus.  The  relations : 
between  growth  and  an  open,  intern,  i 
tional  economy,  between  domestic  ec 
nomic  policies  and  exchange  rate  sta  | 
ty,  between  finance  and  trade,  betwf  i 
enhanced  access  to  markets  and  lonj 
term  management  of  the  internation  i 
debt  problem,  between  investment,  i 
public  and  private,  and  economic  gr( 
in  the  developing  world,  and  betwee 
economic  strength  and  security. 

These  are  all  matters  of  deep  co  ; 
cern  to  our  group  of  countries.  We  1  ; 
at  the  world  economy  against  a  bad 
ground  of  many  common  interests  a  | 
shared  values.  These  are  invaluable  || 
which  I'm  sure  this  gathering  at  ( 
Williamsburg  will  serve  to  strengths ; 
and  reinforce.  And  in  this  spirit  I,  li  • 
you,  am  looking  forward  to  the  disci  i 
sions  of  the  next  few  days  with  en-  ,. 
thusiasm  and  confidence. 


Joint  Statement 
Read  by 

Secretary  Shultz, 
May  29,  1983i 


JLiast  night,  over  dinner,  the  heads 
state  discussed  security  issues  and 
judged  them  to  be  of  such  importanc  i 
to  want  to  make  a  statement  on  the  b 
ject  at  this  conference.  And  so  a  stat 
ment  was  developed  and  I  will  read 

"As  leaders  of  our  seven  countri(  ' 
is  our  first  duty  to  defend  the  freedc 
and  justice  on  which  our  democracie: 
are  based.  To  this  end,  we  shall  mail ' 
sufficient  military  strength  to  deter  I 
attack,  to  counter  any  threat,  and  to  i- 
sure  the  peace.  Our  arms  will  never- 
used  except  in  response  to  aggressio 

"We  wish  to  achieve  lower  levels 
arms  through  serious  arms  control 
negotiations.  With  this  statement,  W 
reaffirm  our  dedication  to  the  searcl " 
peace  and  meaningful  arms  reductioi 
We  are  ready  to  work  with  the  Sovit 


Depart nnent  of  State  Bull  I 


^S^MM^^ 


0^ali 


(CU 


on  to  this  purpose  and  call  upon  the 
iet  Union  to  work  with  us. 
"Effective  arms  control  agreements 
t  be  based  on  the  principle  of  equali- 
nd  must  be  verifiable.  Proposals 
^  been  put  forward  from  the 
[tern  side  to  achieve  positive  results 
Lrious  international  negotiations:  on 
tegic  weapons,  the  START  talks;  on 
pmediate- range  nuclear  missiles,  the 
I  talks;  on  chemical  weapons;  on 
iction  of  forces  in  Central  Europe, 
MBFR  talks;  and  a  conference  on 
rmament  in  Europe. 
i'We  believe  that  we  must  continue 
arsue  these  negotiations  with  im- 
js  and  urgency.  In  the  area  of  INF, 
jirticular,  we  call  upon  the  Soviet 
I'n  to  contribute  constructively  to  the 
fess  of  the  negotiations.  Attempts  to 
ie  the  West  by  proposing  inclusion 
(e  deterrent  forces  of  third  coun- 
X  such  as  those  of  France  and  the 
;'5d  Kingdom,  will  fail.  Consideration 
lese  systems  has  no  place  in  the  INF 
jtiations. 

Our  nations  express  the  strong  wish 
la  balanced  INF  agreement  be 
lied  shortly.  Should  this  occur,  the 
Jtiations  will  determine  the  level  of 
jyment.  It  is  well-known  that  should 
Slot  occur,  the  countries  concerned 
broceed  with  the  planned  deploy- 
)  of  the  U.S.  systems  in  Europe 
jining  at  the  end  of  1983. 


"Our  nations  are  united  in  efforts  for 
arms  reductions  and  will  continue  to 
carry  out  thorough  and  intensive  consul- 
tations. The  security  of  our  countries  is 
indivisible  and  must  be  approached  on  a 
global  basis.  Attempts  to  avoid  serious 
negotiation  by  seeking  to  influence 
public  opinion  in  our  countries  will  fail. 

"We  commit  ourselves  to  devote  our 
full  political  resources  to  reducing  the 
threat  of  war.  We  have  a  vision  of  a 
world  in  which  the  shadow  of  war  has 
been  lifted  from  all  mankind,  and  we  are 
determined  to  pursue  that  vision." 

Most  of  the  time  today  in  the 
meetings  of  the  heads  of  state  was  spent 
in  discussion  of  economic  issues,  and 
there  will  be  a  joint  statement  available 
tomorrow  at  the  conclusion  of  the  con- 
ference. In  the  meantime,  I  can  make  a 
brief  comment  about  the  nature  of  some 
of  the  discussion. 

Confidence  was  expressed  in  a  spirit 
of  realistic  optimism  that  recovery  is 
getting  under  way.  Evidence  of  the 
recovery  is  clear.  There  was  also  discus- 
sion of  the  many  problems  that  beset 
us— unemployment,  high  interest  rates, 
high  budget  deficits  in  some  countries- 
all  of  these  things  are  matters  of  con- 
cern as  is  the  protectionist  pressure  that 
we  see  in  many  countries. 

The  discussion  in  some  ways  can  be 
summed  up  by  noting  the  links  that 


were  talked  about:  the  link  between  sus- 
tained domestic  growth  and  the  open 
trading  system,  the  link  between  con- 
vergence of  domestic  policies  toward 
noninflationary  sustainable  growth  and 
greater  exchange  rate  stability,  the  link 
between  open  markets  and  the  availabili- 
ty of  finance,  the  link  between  interna- 
tional economic  cooperation  and  world 
progress,  and  the  link  between  the  de- 
veloped and  the  developing  countries 
and  the  importance  of  expansion  in  our 
economic  activity  and  trade  between  the 
developed  and  the  developing  countries. 


Secretary  Shultz's 
News  Briefing, 
May  29,  19833 


w. 


y^^s^r— 


hat  is  new  in  this  statement? 

A.  This  is  a  very  strong  statement 
put  out  by  a  group  that  has  not  made  a 
statement  on  security  before,  as  such. 
And  I  think  it  is  worth  noting  that  it  in- 
cludes some  that  are  members  of  NATO. 
It  includes  Japan  that  is  not  in  NATO 
and  has  not  been  part  of  this  same  proc- 
ess. And  it  includes  France  that  is  a 
member  of  the  alliance  but  not  of  the 
NATO  command  structure.  So  there  is  a 
diversity  here.  And  I  think  there  is  a 
mixture  here  of  security  concerns  and  a 
general  expression  of  outlook  that  is,  to 
our  way  of  thinking,  a  very  strong  and 
positive  and  important  statement  right 
at  this  time. 

Q.  The  statement  seems  to  be  a 
combination  and  summation  of  the 
various  positions  stated  by  this 
government  and  NATO  in  the  past 
couple  of  years.  Why,  then,  did  it  take 
much  of  the  day  to  hammer  this  out? 

A.  It  was  something  that  the  heads 
decided  they  wanted  to  do  last  night. 
And  the  heads  spent  the  morning  talk- 
ing about  economic  matters,  not  about 
this.  At  the  end  of  the  morning,  they 
looked  at  some  material  that  had  been 
prepared  by  the  Foreign  Ministers.  And 
they  are  not  lackeys,  the  Foreign 


1)1983 


Ministers  it  turns  out  bo  the\  had 
some  of  their  own  ideas  and  a  lot  of  sug 
gestions  for  things  that  1  think  in  the 
end  have  stiengthened  this  text.  And  so, 
then,  they  went  on  to  the  discussion  of 
economic  matters  and,  then,  came  bacl< 
and  added  this  on  as  new  material  was 
available. 

So  it  was,  in  a  sense,  interspersed  in 
the  economic  discussion.  But  the  basic 
groundwork  for  the  statement  and  the 
decision  to  make  it  was  made  at  their 
dinner  last  evening. 

Q.  Specifically,  was  the  question 
about  the  inclusion  of  British  and 
French  systems  a  matter  of  contention 
today? 

A.  There  was  discussion  about  that. 
But  there  is  m,  (•onleiiti..n  whatever 
about  what  «;i«  •^aiH  Ii.th  This  is  agreed 
by  everyli.iii\    A-  I  ivmrnil.i.r,  there  was 
some  quftiinn  ;il"iui  r\:i,ilv  where  in 
the  statement  thai  sliuuld  fit.  And  I 
think  it  fitted  in  very  well. 

Q.  Is  that  all?  Is  that  the  only 
point  of  contention?  Or  was  it  the  fact 


that  the  Canadians  might  have  said 
that  thev  should  be  included? 

A   N  I  The  Canadians  did  not  say 
that   Butanywa\    the  Canadians  will 
brief  on  then  own  They  did  question  the 
location  of  the  statement,  and,  finally,  it 
WT-  a  Canadian  suggestion— as  I 
recall— that  the  text  that  you  see  here 
be  located  w  here  it  is 

Q  Why  did  the  heads  of  state  feel 
It  was  so  essential  to  do  it  at  this 
time''  Is  this  in  response  to  the  threats 
by  the  Soviets  to  install  the  new 
missiles  if  we  do  not  cancel  the 
Pershing' 

A  1  imagine  that  that  must  have 
been  m  their  minds— that  the  Soviet 
L  ni  n  made  i  \er\  threatening  state- 
ment nr  s  the  bow  of  this  meeting. 
\\1 1  the  hi  ids  Lonsidered  it  to  be  im- 
I  1 1  int  t  h  w  the  strength  and  unity 
t  til    W     t  And  bo  they  have  gone 

1  lit  I  think  aside  from  that,  the 
t  iteii    lit  I    a  strong  one  and  stands  on 
Its  leet  ds  a  very  important  comment  to 
the  S  iviet  Union  m  t  only  about  the 
strength  and  the  resolve  of  the  West  but 
alb(  the  willingness  of  the  West  to 
engage  m  meiningiul  negotiations  for 
reductions  it  armaments  as  it  says  in 
here  with  a  iinnciple  of  equality  and  on 
a  verifnble  basis 

Q.  But  if  by  stating  so  clearly  that 
these  French  and  British  systems  have 
no  place  in  the  INF  talks,  are  you  im- 
plying that  thev  mav  have  a  place  in 
the  START  talks?  Is  that  one  of  the 
implications  one  can  draw  from  this? 

A.  No.  Nil,  it  is  not  any  implication 
at  all.  It  is  put  in  the  context  of  the  INF 
talks.  And  the  reason  it  comes  in  that 
way  is  that  the  Soviets  have  made  the 
suggestion  that  they  be  counted.  And 
that  is  what  precipitates  the  issue  in  this 
particular  way. 

Q.  Is  it  fair  to  suggest,  as  was 
suggested  this  afternoon,  that  there 
was  some  trade-off  on  economic  mat- 
ters for  support  on  this  statement  on 
security? 

A.  Absolutely  no  sense  of  any  such 
thing  at  all.  Just  totally  out  of  the 
ballpark. 


The  President  and  head.s  i.f  JtliKa 
tend  a  meeting  held  at  the  Huube  i 
Burgesses  in  the  Capitol  building. 


Department  of  Stale 


'I  l>  there  any  suggestion  from 
•liter  delegations  that  the  United 
's  is  not  pursuing  the  arms  con- 
"tgotiations  with  sufficient  im- 
is  or  urgency? 

■*■  No,  I  think— quite  to  the  con- 
"ilnere  is  a  very  good  sense  of  the 
'*fmg  process  and  the  process  of 
■■"nation  has  referred  to  it  in  here,  I 
m.m  the  next  to  last  paragraph, 

»M  to  carry  out  thorough  and  in- 

Mty'^'f  "Itations."  I  think  people 

« that  has  gone  very  well  and  are 

J^'»Pportive  of  the  manner  in  which 

gotiations  are  being  conducted. 

"ht'LT"'  '"""^  suggestion 
,1    "W  delegations  that  the  Presi- 
injl.'S*"  at  dinner  made  a  very 
Iket;..    *"'  ""a'  was  too  strong 
14  cr„    "^  ^"""e  °f  the  other 
4.lHn„l°?''*'P<'"<*t»tl'at? 
"tome  r    "°*  *''«'"e  that  might 
'"nduci?-  '  '*''"''  *«  discussion 
'«y-  And  tT**  '^^^'•ybody  having 
mkg  XI    ,"°*  ^^  the  end  of  the 
"Jv  when  r   "^^"'t  remember  just 
-tersT '' ™ded  but  the  Foreign 
re  having  coffee  in  a  room 


upstairs  in  the  Plantation  and  the  Presi- 
dent came  up  to  our  room  as  the  other 
heads  were  leaving  and  gave  us  a  brief 
rundown  and  told  us  that  the  decision 
had  been  made  that  there  should  be  a 
statement.  And  they  looked  to  us  to 
develop  it.  And  then  he  handed  me  a 
sheaf  of  notes— about  eight  pages  of 
notes— that  he  had  taken,  of  what 
everybody  said,  not  what  he  said,  but 
what  everybody  else  said.  And  it  was  on 
the  basis  of  those  notes  that  we  con- 
structed a  statement  about  what  hap- 
pened in  a  meeting  that  we  didn't  at- 
tend. 

But  at  any  rate,  then  the  result  of 
that  effort  went  back  to  the  heads  in 
midmorning,  and  they  adjusted  it  some 
more  and  so  on.  That  was  the  process. 

Q.  What  didn't  they  like  about  that 
earlier  draft— the  draft  that  you 
brought  back  this  morning? 

A.  Oh,  I  don't  know  whether  you've 
ever  been  in  one  of  these  things  that— 
the  early  draft  is  never  accepted. 
[Laughter]  It's  like  when  you  inspect 
your  platoon  in  the  Marine  Corps  and 


^alu  u 


you  look  at  the  rifles,  you  always  find 
some  dirty  rifles.  That's  absolutely 
routine  [laughter]— got  to  be  changed 
around. 

But  I  want  to  say  this,  though,  in  all 
seriousness.  This  is  a  very  important 
statement.  It  was  taken  with  great 
seriousness  by  the  heads  of  state.  They 
looked  at  it  carefully.  They  wanted  it  to 
say  precisely  what  they  wanted.  And  so 
they  immersed  themselves  in  it  when  it 
came  to  them.  And  so  I  think  this  is  not, 
in  any  sense,  a  draft  prepared  by  some 
other  people  which  they  okayed;  quite  to 
the  contrary.  It  emerged  out  of  what 
they  said  last  night  as  best  we  could 
reconstruct  that  from  the  President's 


on  It  at  various  times  during  the  day. 
So,  that  was  sort  of  the  process  in- 
volved. 

Q.  Are  you  saying  there  was  no 
advanced  American  language  on  this 
subject? 

A.  Absolutely  none.  None. 

Q.  You  said  this  was  meant  as  a 
strong  message  to  the  Soviet  Union. 
Isn't  it  also  meant  as  a  message  to 
public  opinion  in  Western  Europe? 

A.  It  is  a  message  to  the  people  of 
the  world,  including  the  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  of  what  the  leaders  of 
these  seven  countries  stand  for  in  this 
field.  And  in  that  sense,  the  statement 
speaks  for  itself  and  it  has  the  flow  of 
freedom  and  justice  and  strength  and  in- 
terest in  arms  reduction,  and,  at  the 
end,  an  attitude  toward  the  importance 
of  finding  peace  in  the  world. 

I  think  it  is  a  very  strong  and 
balanced  statement,  and  it's  designed, 
obviously,  for  the  people  all  over  the 
world  and  also  as  a  statement  to  the 
Soviet  Union  of  our  resolve  and  our 
reasonableness. 

Q.  What  has  changed  from  the 
original  draft  you  started  the  meeting 
with— between  that  and  this  state- 
ment? 

A.  It  isn't  really  relevant  and  it  is 
not  a  question  of  what  was  changed;  it's 
a  question  of  what  was  agreed  to.  This 
is  what  people  agreed  to.  It  is  always 


the  case.  It  will  be  the  case  tomorrow 
when  some  people  get  together  tonight 
and  start  to  develop  a  joint  statement, 
that  people  will  look  at  that  and  they'll 
add  and  they'll  subtract  and  they'll  edit 
and  so— and  that's  a  normal  process 
that  goes  on  as  it  did  in  this  case. 

Q.  Was  there  any  suggestion  made 
at  any  time  by  any  of  the  Foreign 
Ministers  or  by  any  of  the  people  in- 
volved in  this  that  the  President  had 
emphasized  the  question  of  deploy- 
ment too  much  instead  of  emphasizing 
the  necessity  for  an  interim  agree- 
ment? 

A.  This  is  not  the  President's  state- 
ment. This  is  a  statement  by  these  seven 
heads  of  state.  It  emerged  out  of  their 
discussion.  And  it  was  discussed  in  that 
context.  It  was  not  a  question  of  the 
President  emphasizing  this,  that,  or  the 
other  thing.  It  was  discussed  and  every- 
body had  their  oar  in,  believe  me. 

Q.  What  I  was  trying  to  find  out, 
was  whether  or  not  any  of  them  felt 
that  the  President,  in  anv  of  his 


statements— he's  made  a  number  of 
statements  on  this  issue,  he  had  an  in- 
terview with  European  journalists  the 
other  day— had  emphasized  the  ques- 
tion of  deployment  excessively  rather 
than  the  question  of  a  necessity  for  an 
interim  agreement. 

A.  I  didn't  hear  any  discussion  of 
anyone's  prior  statements.  The  discus- 
sion was  about  this  statement  and  what 
we  should  say,  and  it  was  worked  on 
very  hard,  very  thoughtfully  and  con- 
scientiously, and  what  means  something 
is  what  people  agreed  on.  And  you  have 
the  text,  I  assume. 

Q.  What  do  you  hope  results  from 
the  issuing  of  this  statement?  What  do 
you  hope  the  response  of  the  world,  of 
the  Soviet  Union,  will  be  to  it? 

A.  We  want  the  world  to  see  what 
we  stand  for  and  what  we  are  prepared 
to  do.  The  fact  that,  to  some  extent,  you 
seem  to  greet  this  as  old  stuff,  perhaps, 
is  reassuring.  I'm  glad  to  hear  that  you 
recognize  how  important  it  is  that  we  be 
strong.  I'm  glad  to  hear  that  you  feel 
people  recognize  how  reasonable  we  are. 


Delegates  walk  from  Capitol  down  Di 
Gloucester  Street  to  Raleigh  Tavern  1 
lunch. 


Depart nnent  of  State  Bu  s' 


^S^MA//^ 


^^mtius 


lad  to  hear  that  you  see  that  we 
are  in  favor  of  arms  reduction.  I'm 
to  hear  that  people  think  that  it's 
what  will  happen  on  deployments  if 
3n't  have  an  outcome— a  good  out- 
— in  this  negotiation.  And  I'm  glad 
ar  that  people  sense  the  truth  and 
ty  and  strength  of  purpose  in  this 
tatement.  We  commit  ourselves  to 
;e  our  full  political  resources  to 
:ing  the  threat  of  a  war.  We  have  a 


)ing  for  souvenirs. 


of  a  world  in  which  the  shadow  of 
as  been  lifted  from  all  mankind, 
■e  are  determined  to  pursue  that 
.  I  think  you  have  to  say  these 
s  and  keep  saying  them  because 
e  true,  and  they  reflect  the  spirit 
le  thinking  and  the  gut  feeling  of 
leaders.  And  it's  very  important 
leople  see  that.  And  it's  also  im- 
it  that  the  Soviet  Union,  in  con- 
ating  its  posture  in  negotiations, 
lizes  that  if  it  wants  to  come  to 
ble  in  a  reasonable  way  and  seek 
reductions,  we're  there,  and  we're 
to  work  on  it. 

.'.  Is  there  any  new  strategic  in- 
lition  or  analysis  that  led  the 
i  of  state  to  want  to  make  this 
Inent? 

j..  There  is,  of  course,  a  lot  of 

Eng  that  is  embodied,  among  other 
,  in  the  Scowcroft  commission 
.,  but  that  wasn't  what  precipitated 


this  statement.  And  I  don't  think  that  it 
is  in  any  sense  reflected  in  here.  It  isn't 
that  specific  an  arms  control-type  state- 
ment. 

Q.  Did  the  changes  that  you  made 
to  the  original  draft  say  more  about 
arms  control? 

A.  Not  particularly.  I  think  it's 
slightly  shorter  than  what  we  started 
out  with  and  it's,  more  or  less,  in  the 
same  vein  and— 

Q.  But  did  it  add  more— did  it  add 
more  language  about  arms  control? 

A.  I  recognize  you  like  a  story  about 
an  argument  [laughter],  but  you're  not 
going  to  get  it  out  of  me,  because  the 
important  thing  is  what  people  did  agree 
on.  And  I  think  also  it's  important  to 
recognize  that  the  people  who  did  the 
agreeing  really  worked  at  it  and  they 
care  about  it  and  they  put  themselves  in- 
to it  and  they  argued  about  it  and  when 
they  finally  got  through,  they  had  some- 
thing that  they  basically  wrote  and  sub- 
scribed to. 

Q.  Paragraph  5,  where  you  say, 
"Should  this  occur,  the  negotiations 
will  determine  the  level  of  deploy- 
ment," is  there  any  suggestion  there 
that  if  serious  negotiations  are  going 
on  the  deployments  themselves  could 
be  postponed  until  early  next  year? 

A.  Absolutely  nothing  like  that  can 
be  inferred  from  this  at  all.  It  says  we 
wish  that  we  could  have  a  balanced  INF 
agreement.  That's  always  been  the  key 
in  the  INF  approach.  And  it  simply  goes 
on  to  say  that  if  there  is  agreement, 
then  that  agreement  will  determine  the 
level  of  deployment,  whatever  it  is.  If 
there  isn't  agreement,  as  it  says,  it's  well 
known  that  we  will  proceed— the  coun- 
tries involved  will  proceed— with  the 
planned  deployments.  That  is,  those  that 
have  been  set  out  in  the  plan  and  that 
starts  at  the  end  of  1983.  So  it's  very 
clear  and  crisp  on  that  subject. 

Q.  Was  there  reluctance  to  go 
along  with  something  that  gives  pre- 
eminence to  the  nuclear  missile  issue 
over  economics? 

A.  There  was  no  discussion  of  that 
kind  of  thing,  no  interplay,  in  a  sense, 
between  the  effort  on  this  and  the  effort 
on  the  economic  subject,  except  that,  I 


think,  our  meeting  wound  up  ending  an 
hour-and-a-half  or  so  later  than  it  was 
supposed  to  end  and  that  is  because— 
had  a  lot  of  people  who  felt  they  had 
things  to  say  and  they  were  talking 
about  economic  things.  And  it  kept  go- 
ing. And  I  kept  saying,  "Gee,  the  press 
is  waiting  over  there  for  this  statement." 
And  people  kept  talking  about  economic 
things.  And  I  was  trying  to  root  for  you. 
But  I  didn't  make  it. 


Secretary  Regan's 
News  Briefing, 
May  29,  19833 


At  is  from  deployment  to  unemploy- 
ment that  we  now  switch.  [Laughter.] 

A  quick  statement  as  to  what's  been 
going  on  in  the  economic  area  of  an 
economic  summit.  The  Finance  Ministers 
met  last  night  as  a  group  for  dinner, 
met  again  all  morning,  met  through 
luncheon,  and  then,  joined  the  heads  and 


the  Foreign  Ministers,  for  the  plenary 
session  this  afternoon. 

Obviously,  there  are  many  topics 
that  were  discussed  in  the  Finance 
Ministers'  meetings,  more  in  depth  and 
detail  than  occurred  during  the  plenary 
session  this  afternoon.  Obviously,  as 
Secretary  Shultz  has  just  told  you,  the 
INF  statement  was  also  a  subject  for 
this  afternoon. 

The  main  question  on  everybody's 
mind  is,  how  is  the  economy  or  eco- 
nomics of  the  industrialized  nations  go- 
ing? Generally,  upbeat.  It  was  reported 
by  most  of  the  countries  that  their 
economies  had  made  the  turn. 

The  United  States,  of  course,  seems 
to  be  leading  the  way.  The  United 
Kingdom  is  in  good  shape.  Germany  is 
showing  signs  of  recovery.  Canada  is 
coming  along.  Japan  is  doing  reasonably 
well.  France  admits  that  it's  having  diffi- 
culties but  says  that  its  program  will 
work.  And  Italy  says  that — obviously, 
they  can't  talk  too  much  about  economic 
matters  as  it's  a  caretaker  government, 


as  to  what  will  happen  as  far  as  an  eco- 
nomic program  in  the  future.  But,  none- 
theless, they  report  that  there  is  a  will- 
ingness on  the  part  of  most  of  the  par- 
ties in  Italy  to  get  on  a  deflationary 
path. 

I'd  say  all  in  all  it,  as  we  suspected  it 
would  be,  turned  out  that  most  people 
were  reasonably  confident  that  the 
recovery  was  underway.  The  key  ques- 
tion that  was  asked  of  each  participant 
was,  is  this  a  recovery  that's  sustain- 
able? And  if  sustainable,  how?  There  the 
subject  naturally  turned  toward  interest 
rates,  and  in  this  connection,  of  course, 
the  deficits  in  many  countries— particu- 
larly that  of  the  United  States— and  its 
effect  upon  interest  rates.  We  explained 
our  point  of  view,  what  we  were  doing 
about  deficits,  and,  more  importantly, 
what  we  were  doing  about  interest 
rates.  There  were  many  questions  asked 
and  quite  a  bit  of  discussion  of  that  par- 
ticular topic. 

We  moved  into  the  field  of  un- 
employment because  this  is  one  of  the 
main  problems  facing  all  of  the  na- 
tions—the 32-35  million  unemployed  in 
the  industrialized  countries. 


Department  of  State  Bui 


SVJMAf/^ 


^ral/i 


U 


At   iln'ii  discussed  the  plight  of  the 
(lr\r|(iped  countries  in  the  North- 
h  anas  as  far  as  what  we  in  the 
h  ( .iiiM  do  to  be  more  responsive  to 
if.'ii;,  of  the  South. 
Vnd  lV(im  there,  this  took  us  into  in- 
iti"i!al  trade  and  a  lot  of  the  inter- 

irade  issues.  Let's  see.  What 
did  we  cover?  There  wasn't  that 
time.  I  suspect  it'll  be  covered 
tomorrow— the  plight  of  the 
)r  countries  and  the  large  interna 
debt. 

}.  We  heard  that  there  was  quite 
of  strong  statements  from  some 
e  other  heads  to  the  President  to- 
rn the  subject  of  the  big 
its — from  the  French,  the 
ns,  and,  in  fact,  also  the  Ger- 
\.  Can  you  speak  to  that? 
1^.  I  wouldn't  say  there  were  strong 
ments  in  the  sense  that  they  were 
»cative.  For  example,  one  of  those 
ns  that  you  mentioned  said  that 
had  no  right  to  intervene  in  the 
solution  to  its  problems.  What  they 
asking  was,  could  the  United 
s  get  their  interest  rates  down? 
we  did  it,  they  would  leave  to  us  as 
ereign  government,  whether  we  cut 
ling,  raised  taxes,  or  whatever  way 
d  it.  Therefore,  I  would  say  that 
they  were  all  naturally  interested 
oncerned,  I  wouldn't  say  they  were 
Og  statements, 

}.  What  did  you  tell  them  on 
lif  of  the  United  States  by  way  of 
iiance  that  we're  going  to  lower 
r  eficits  and  our  interest  rates? 

I.  We  explained  the  situation  be- 
'  I  ill'   .Aiiministration  and  the  Con- 
^  "II  iIr'  deficits,  what  the  picture 
-le  current  picture — what  the  pic- 
■tvill  111'  in  1984.  on  changes  that 
ji  iHiur  in  the  picture  if  the  eco- 
n'  .-^ciiiit  changes  one  way  or 
U'r;  m  other  words,  if  we  recover 
'1  ra| Hilly  in  a  better  real  growth 
I  hail  m  our  projections,  what  it 
fi  or,  if  it  turns  out  that  we're  not 
1  :oo,|.  what  would  happen  there. 

I'  ;ilso  then  explained  that  there  is 
I',  ittlo  linkage  between  deficits  and 
I. St  rates;  that  the  evidence  simply 


isn't  there.  Sometimes  there  is  a  linkage, 
sometimes  there  isn't.  And  we've  ex- 
amined that  in  detail,  20  years  of  history 
of  these  summit  nations  we've  gone 
through  to  see  what  the  linkage  is. 

Q.  The  reports  we  get  suggest  that 
the  general  thrust  of  what  you  were 
told  was  that  there  is  a  greater  sense 
of  urgency  in  Europe  than  they  find 
here  about  getting  deficits  down.  That 
they  say  if  they  don't  get  the  deficits 
down  quickly,  they  face  a  rising  un- 
employment problem.  Is  that  a  correct 
impression? 


A.  I  think  we're  every  bit  as  con- 
cerned about  our  11  million  unemployed 
as  they  are  about  their  2  or  3  million 
unemployed  per  country. 

I  think  that  we're  very  sensitive  to 
what's  going  on  as  far  as  getting  our 
economy  recovering.  We  don't  necessari- 
ly have  to  have,  in  this  first  year,  in- 
terest rates  coming  down  in  order  to 
have  the  recovery.  Witness  the  fact  that 
with  these  same  rates  of  interest  for  the 
past  6  months  approximately,  we  have 
had  two  quarters  of  recovery.  We 
have— explaining  this  to  them.  Sure, 
they're  anxious  to  get  interest  rates 
down.  They  point  out  that  they  have  to 
buy,  in  dollars,  most  of  their  imports. 
This  is  the  reserve  currency  of  the 
world.  It's  a  safe-haven  currency.  When 
times  are  bad,  people  naturally  turn  to 
dollars;  when  things  are  good,  they  also 
want  dollars.  And,  accordingly,  they 
want  to  know  what  we  can  do  to  solve 
that  conundrum  for  them. 

Q.  How  would  you  describe  the 
mood  of  the  meeting — the  tone  of 
it— compared  with  the  last  2  years. 

A.  About  the  same.  (Laughter]  As 
far  as  economic  affairs  are  concerned,  I 
would  say  that  they  are  more  upbeat  as 
far  as  the  recovery  is  concerned,  they're 
not  as  worried  as  they  were,  let's  say,  at 
Versailles.  But  there  is  no  rancor  or  bit- 
terness or  anything  else.  Remember, 
there  was  none  at  Versailles.  It  was  only 
later  that  some  might  have  occurred. 
But  during  the  meetings,  no.  So,  I  would 
characterize  it  as  generally,  interest, 
friendly,  first-name  basis,  that  type  of 
thing. 

Q.  Does  the  President  seem  to  en- 
joy his  role  as  sort  of  the  moderator 
or  note-taker  or- 

A.  I  would  say,  yes.  He's  handling  it 
quite  well— keeping  his  notes,  doing  a 
great  job  on  it.  He's  doing  a  yeoman's 
job  of  trying,  as  anyone  would.  I  think 
he's  had  practice  with  the  press— when 
more  than  one  person  wants  to  talk  at 
one  time,  selecting  which  one  would  do 
it.  I  left  him  a  half-hour  ago,  he  was 
rather  buoyant  about  what  had  hap- 
pened and  the  fact  that  they  were  able 


il'l983 


to  solve  the  INF  question,  and  he  hopes 
that  the  statement  that's  now  being 
written  will  turn  out  equally  well. 

Q.  In  all  this  atmospheric— this 
happened  in  the  leadership  meeting, 
right? 

A.  That's  what  I'm  talking  about.  In 
the  leadership  meeting  that  I  was  in, 
from  2:00  p.m.  until  approximately 
6:30  p.m. 

Q.  No  arguments,  no  harsh  discus- 
sions? 

A.  Discussions,  not  arguments,  no. 
Not  arguments,  discussions. 

Q.  I  mean,  anything  heated  in  the 
way  of  exchanges  or— 

A.  No.  No  voices  raised.  As  you 
could  expect  from  people  who  are  used 
to  parliamentary  debate,  there  were 
good  exchanges  between  them. 

Q.  Are  you  predicting  now  there 
will  be  a  statement  tomorrow  showing 
the  same  unity  as  there  is  on  arms 
control? 

A.  Yes.  I  would  predict  that.  The 
sherpas  are  now  writing  the  statement. 
It's  supposed  to  be  shown  in  a  draft 
form,  later  tonight,  to  the  heads, 
brought  back  tomorrow,  and  gone  over 
in  tomorrow's  session  for  release  tomor- 
row afternoon,  as  you  know. 

Q.  1  wonder  if  you  could  tell  us  if 
the  French  proposal  concerning  a 
monetary  conference  was  raised,  what 
they  said,  and  what  the  United  States 
said? 

A.  Among  the  rules  that  we  have 
agreed  to  do  is  not  to  characterize  each 
other,  or  what  each  other  has  said. 

Let  me  put  it  this  way.  The  subject 
of  monetary  conferences  was  discussed 
by  many  delegations.  Most  think  that 
there  is  not  sufficient  preparation  for 
one.  It  would  be  premature.  It  would  get 
up  false  hopes.  It  should  not  be  had.  One 
nation  said  that  they  did  not  mean  they 
wanted  a  Bretton  Woods  conference. 
[Laughter]  Who  could  that  be? 

But  what  they  wanted  was  the  spirit 
of  Bretton  Woods.  That  spirit, 
characterized  by  that  nation,  as  being  a 
spirit  of  a  group  of  builders,  of  people 


who  came  together  to  capture  an  idea  to 
rescue  the  world  that  had  been  in  reces- 
sion for  over  a  decade  and  needed  a  way 
out  for  trade  and  needed  an  interna- 
tional monetary  system  in  order  to  get 
trade  started  again,  because  trade  dur- 
ing the  1930s  had  languished.  And  in 
that  same  spirit,  couldn't  we  get  started 
now  thinking  about  the  problem  of  what 
do  we  do  with  the  world's  monetary 
system  in  order  to  encourage  world 
trade  so  that,  through  world  trade, 
economies  can  g^ow — not  only  econo- 
mies of  industrialized  nations  but  the 
developed  countries  and  the  less  de- 
veloped countries,  particularly  in  the 
flavor  of  North-South.  So  it  did  come  up 
in  that  respect. 

Q.  You  mentioned  international 
trade.  Can  you  tell  us  what  was  said 
about  protectionism  and  surpluses? 
Was  anything  resolved? 

A.  There  was  discussion,  but  not 
much  discussion  in  that  area.  I  suspect 
more  of  that  will  come  up  tomorrow. 
Nothing  was  resolved. 

Q.  What  agreement  was  reached 
on  terms  of  monetary  stability?  So 
everybody  discussed  it  and  so  on  and 
so  forth.  What  kind  of  an  agreement 
are  we  going  to  have? 

A.  I  am  not  sure  the  exact  words 
that  will  be  concocted  tonight  to  de- 
scribe that  by  the  sherpas.  But  I  would 
characterize  it  as  saying  they  called  for 
more  discussions  of  this  among  the 
Finance  Ministers  to  try  to  resolve  the 
subject,  that  the  Finance  Ministers  meet 
often  but  probably  should  meet  more 
often,  that  they  should  concentrate  on 
this  subject,  that  not  enough  work  has 
been  done  in  this  area.  I  think  that  is 
probably  what  the  heads  will  tell  us  to 
do. 

Of  course,  obviously — I  am  not  try- 
ing to  describe  it  to  you  here— there 
was  a  lot  more  discussion  of  that  at  the 
Finance  Ministers  level.  And  there  will 
probably  be  more  this  evening  at  dinner. 
We  will  know  more  about  each  other's 
thinking  on  this  subject.  But  this  is  not 
what  the  heads  were  telling  us.  And  I 
am  trying  to  stick  to  that. 


Q.  Did  any  of  the  heads,  or  ofl 
Ministers,  raise  the  issue  of  extrai 
territoriality  as  embodied  in  the  B 
port  Administration  Act? 

A.  Yes,  at  least  two  that  I  km\ 
expressed  concern  about  this  Expor 
Administration  Act  and  what  its  eff 
will  be  on  companies  that  are  domic 
in  their  country.  Explanation:  Our  I 
as  suggested  by  the  Administration 
that  this  should  refer  to  American  j 
ucts  that  are  being  manufactured  b; 
American  companies  overseas,  or 
branches  of  American  companies  o\ 
seas,  and  that  for  domestic,  nationa 
defense  concerns  we  have  a  right  tc 
mand  of  our  American  firms  that  tl 
not  sell  products  that  we  have  put  i 
ban  list. 

Q.  Does  that  include  non-Amet 
firms  manufacturing  the  same 
technology  under  U.S.  license? 

A.  We  did  not  get  into  that- 
non-American  firms  manufacturing!, 
under  U.S.  licenses.  We  did  explain 
Bumpers  bill — the  House  bill  on  thi 
explained,  also,  the  Garn  bill,  and  tl 
even  tougher  than  the  Administrati 
bill.  And  the  discussion  dropped  the 
There  were  no  conclusions  that  carr 
from  it. 

Q.  You  said  that  you  pointed  I 
to  the  other  Ministers  that  there  'i 
no  close  connection  between  deficj 
and  interest  rates.  You  also  said  j 
earlier  on  that  you  explained  wha'l 
Administration  was  going  to  do  all 
interest  rates.  Can  you  explain  to  ,. 
what  you  are  going  to  do  about  in 
terest  rates  if  it's  not  just  cutting 
deficits? 

A.  The  answer  lies  in  moneian 
policy.  You  have  to  remember  thai  ' 
the  last  3  weeks,  our  monetary  |"'li' 
particularly  Ml,  has  gone  up  rather 
sharply.  What  is  it?  Close  to  $17  In h 
over  tile  3-week  period.  As  a  result. i 
terest  rates  are  up  half  a  point  in  tl 
same  3-week  period,  indicating-  i\wb 
clearly  that  the  more  money  you  tn 
pump  into  the  system,  the  highir  y  ' 
interest  rates  are  going  to  be,  not  !<■< 


Department  of  State  Bull 


SOMA^/^ 


LlZt^ 


0iata 


i/ 


\Ie  told  them  that  we  could  not 
re  in  quick  fixes  in  the  United 
s  by  putting  money  into  the 
)my.  If  we  put  money  into  the 
imy,  we  would  certainly  drive  in- 
t  rates  up,  which  is  exactly  the  op- 
'  of  what  they  want.  But  as  far  as 
we're  trying  to  do,  we  are  trying 
slow,  steady  growth  in  that  money 

I  keep  hearing  myself  saying 
)ver  and  over  again, 

J.  You  said  that  long  term  you're 

to  hold  off  on  any  monetary  con- 
ce.  What  about  short  term,  the 
bility  of  temporary  intervention 
'.  currency  markets'' 
..  Only  if  the  occasion  arises  that 
or  intervention  in  the  short  run. 

|.  Under  what  circumstances? 

..  Disorderly  markets. 


Ilaration  on 

nomic  Recovery, 

dby 

sident  Reagan, 

r  30,  19831 


maintaining  low  inflation  and  reducing  in- 
terest rates  from  their  present  too-high 
levels.  We  renew  our  commitment  to  reduce 
structural  budget  deficits,  in  particular,  by 
limiting  the  growth  of  expenditures. 

We  recognize  that  we  must  act  together 
and  that  we  must  pursue  a  balanced  set  of 
policies  that  take  into  account  and  exploit 
relationships  between  growth,  trade,  and 
finance  in  order  that  recovery  may  spread  to 
all  countries,  developed  and  developing  alike. 

In  pursuance  of  these  objectives,  we  have 
agreed  as  follows: 

(1)  Our  governments  will  pursue  ap- 
propriate monetary  and  budgetary  policies 
that  will  be  conducive  to  low  inflation,  re- 
duced interest  rates,  higher  productive  in- 
vestment, and  greater  employment  oppor- 
tunities, particularly  for  the  young. 

(2)  The  consultation  process  initiated  at 
Versailles  will  be  enhanced  to  promote  con- 
vergence of  economic  performance  in  our 
economies  and  greater  stability  of  exchange 
rates,  on  the  lines  indicated  in  an  annex  to 
this  declaration.  We  agree  to  pursue  closer 
consultations  on  policies  affecting  exchange 
markets  and  on  market  conditions.  While  re- 
taining our  freedom  to  operate  independent- 
ly, we  are  willing  to  undertake  coordinated 
intervention  in  exchange  markets  in  instances 
where  it  is  agreed  that  such  intervention 
would  be  helpful. 

(3)  We  commit  ourselves  to  halt  protec- 
tionism and  as  recovery  proceeds  to  reverse 
it  by  dismantling  trade  barriers.  We  intend  to 
consult  within  appropriate  existing  fora  on 


ways  to  implement  and  monitor  this  commit- 
ment. We  shall  give  impetus  to  resolving  cur- 
rent trade  problems.  We  will  actively  pursue 
the  current  work  programs  in  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development,  including  trade  in  services  and 
in  high  technology  products.  We  should  work 
to  achieve  further  trade  liberalization 
negotiations  in  the  GATT,  with  particular 
emphasis  on  expanding  trade  with  and  among 
developing  countries.  We  have  agreed  to  con- 
tinue consultations  on  proposals  for  a  new 
negotiating  round  in  the  GATT. 

(4)  We  view  with  concern  the  interna- 
tional financial  situation,  and  especially  the 
debt  burdens  of  many  developing  nations.  We 
agree  to  a  strategy  based  on:  effective  adjust- 
ment and  development  policies  by  debtor  na- 
tions; adequate  private  and  official  financing; 
more  open  markets;  and  worldwide  economic 
recovery.  We  will  seek  early  ratification  of 
the  increases  in  resources  for  the  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund  and  the  General  Ar- 
rangements to  Borrow.  We  encourage  closer 
cooperation  and  timely  sharing  of  information 
among  countries  and  the  international  institu- 
tions, in  particular  between  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the  International 
Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(IBRD),  and  the  GATT. 

(5)  We  have  invited  Ministers  of  Finance, 
in  consultation  with  the  Managing  Director  of 
the  IMF,  to  define  the  conditions  for  improv- 
ing the  international  monetary  system  and  to 
consider  the  part  which  might,  in  due  course. 


my  duty  and  pleasure  to  read  the 
msburg  Declaration  on  Economic 
ery. 

tions  are  united  in  their  dedication  to 

■acy,  individual  freedom,  creativity, 

purpose,  human  dignity,  and  personal 

tural  development.  It  is  to  preserve, 

,  and  extend  these  shared  values  that 

)sperity  is  important. 

e  recession  has  put  our  societies 

1  a  severe  test,  but  they  have  proved 

t.  Significant  success  has  been 

d  in  reducing  inflation  and  interest 

;here  have  been  improvements  in  pro- 

ty;  and  we  now  clearly  see  signs  of 

■y- 

rertheless,  the  industrialized 

•acies  continue  to  face  the  challenge  of 

ig  that  the  recovery  materializes  and 

in  order  to  reverse  a  decade  of 
tive  inflation  and  reduce  unemploy- 
Ne  must  all  focus  on  achieving  and 


In  the  International  Press  Briefing  Center  at  the  College  of  William  and  Mary,  President 
Reagan  reads  the  Declaration  of  Economic  Recovery  on  behalf  of  other  summit  par- 
ticipants. 


y983 


be  played  in  this  process  by  a  high-level  inter- 
national monetary  conference. 

(6)  The  weight  of  the  recession  has  fallen 
very  heavily  on  developing  countries,  and  we 
are  deeply  concerned  about  their  recovery. 
Restoring  sound  economic  growth  while  keep- 
ing our  markets  open  is  crucial.  Special  atten- 
tion will  be  given  to  the  flow  of  resources,  in 
particular  official  development  assistance,  to 
poorer  countries,  and  for  food  and  energy 
production,  both  bilaterally  and  through  ap- 
propriate international  institutions.  We  reaf- 
firm our  commitments  to  provide  agreed 
funding  levels  for  the  International  Develop- 
ment Association.  We  welcome  the  openness 
to  dialogue  which  the  developing  countries 
evinced  at  the  recent  conferences  of  the 
Nonaligned  Movement  in  New  Delhi  and  the 
Group  of  77  in  Buenos  Aires,  and  we  share 
their  commitment  to  engage  with  understand- 
ing and  cooperation  in  the  forthcoming 
meeting  of  the  United  Nations  Conference  on 
Trade  and  Development  in  Belgrade. 

(7)  We  are  agreed  upon  the  need  to  en- 
courage both  the  development  of  advanced 
technology  and  the  public  acceptance  of  its 
role  in  promoting  growth,  employment,  and 
trade.  We  have  noted  with  approval  the 
report  of  the  Working  Group  on  Technology, 
Growth  and  Employment  which  was  set  up  at 
Versailles  last  year  and  commend  the  prog;- 
ress  made  in  the  18  cooperative  projects  dis- 
cussed in  that  report.  We  will  follow  the  im- 
plementation and  coordination  of  work  on 
these  projects  and  look  forward  to  receiving  a 
further  report  at  our  next  meeting. 

(8)  We  all  share  the  view  that  more 
predictability  and  less  volatility  in  oil  prices 
would  bf  lielpful  til  worlil  fcnnimiic  pros- 
pects. We  ai;rfi'  tliat  tin-  fall  in  nil  prices  in 
no  way  diminishes  the  inipnrtance  and  urgen- 
cy of  efforts  to  conserve  energy,  to  develop 
economic  alternative  energy  sources,  to  main- 
tain and,  where  possible,  improve  contacts 
between  oil-exporting  and  importing  coun- 
tries, and  to  encourage  the  growth  of  in- 
digenous energy  production  in  developing 
countries  which  at  present  lack  it. 

(9)  East-West  economic  relations  should 
be  compatible  with  our  security  interests.  We 
take  note  with  approval  of  the  work  of  the 
multilateral  organizatinns  which  have  in  re- 
cent months  anal\/iil  ami  .liaun  conclusions 
regarding  the  ke\  a-piTts  n(  Kast-West 
economic  relations.  \\v  encuurage  continuing 
work  by  these  organizations,  as  appropriate. 

(10)  We  have  agreed  to  strengthen 
cooperation  in  protection  of  the  environment, 
in  better  use  of  natural  resources,  and  in 
health  research. 

Our  discussions  here  at  Williamsburg  give 
us  new  confidence  in  the  prospects  for  a 


recovery.  We  have  strengthened  our  resolve 
to  deal  cooperatively  with  continuing  prob- 
lems so  as  to  promote  a  sound  and  sustain- 
able recovery,  bringing  new  jobs  and  a  better 
life  for  the  people  of  our  own  countries  and 
of  the  world. 

We  have  agreed  to  meet  again  next  year, 
and  have  accepted  the  British  Prime 
Minister's  invitation  to  meet  in  the  United 
Kingdom. 

[The  annex  is  part  of  the  declaration 
but  was  not  read  by  the  President.] 


Strengthening  Economic  Cooperation 
for  Growth  and  Stability 

1.  We  have  examined,  in  the  light  of  our  ex- 
perience, the  procedures  outlined  in  the 
undertakings  agreed  at  Versailles  last  year 
which  seek  to  ensure  greater  monetary 
stability  in  the  interest  of  balanced  growth 
and  progress  of  the  world  economy. 

II.  We  reaffirm  the  objectives  of  achiev- 
ing noninflationary  growth  of  income  and 
employment  and  promoting  exchange  market 
stability  through  policies  designed  to  bring 
about  greater  convergence  of  economic  per- 
formance in  this  direction. 

III.  We  are  reinforcing  our  multilateral 
cooperation  with  the  International  Monetary 
Fund  in  its  surveillance  activities,  according 
to  the  procedures  agreed  at  Versailles, 
through  the  following  approach: 

A.  We  are  focusing  on  near-term  policy 
actions  leading  to  convergence  of  economic 
conditions  in  the  medium  term.  The  overall 
nii'ilmni  trrni  perspective  remains  essential, 
linth  til  nisure  that  short-term  policy  innova- 
tions ilii  nut  lead  to  divergence  and  to  re- 
assure business  and  financial  markets. 

B.  In  accordance  with  the  agreement 
reached  at  Versailles,  we  are  focusing  our  at- 
tention on  issues  in  the  monetary  and  finan- 
cial fields  including  interaction  with  policies 
in  other  areas.  We  shall  take  fully  into  ac- 
count the  international  implications  of  our 
own  policy  decisions.  Policies  and  objectives 
that  will  be  kept  under  review  include: 

(1)  Monetary  Policy.  Disciplined  non- 
inflationary  growth  of  monetary  aggregates, 
and  appropriate  interest  rates,  to  avoid 
subsequent  resurgence  of  inflation  and  re- 
bound in  interest  rates,  thus  allowing  room 
for  sustainable  growth. 

(2)  Fiscal  Policy.  We  will  aim,  pref- 
erably through  discipline  over  government 
expenditures,  to  reduce  structural  budget 
deficits  and  bear  in  mind  the  consequences  of 
fiscal  policy  for  interest  rates  and  growth. 


(3)  Exchange  Rate  Policy.  Wt 
prove  consultations,  policy  convergence 
international  cooperation  to  help  stabili: 
change  markets,  bearing  in  mind  ou 
sions  on  the  Exchange  Market  Interven 
Study. 

(4)  Policies  Toward  Productivity 
Employment.  While  relying  on  market 
signals  as  a  guide  to  efficient  economic 
sions,  we  will  take  measures  to  improve 
training  and  mobility  of  our  labor  forcei' 
particular  concern  for  the  problems  of  3 
unemployment,  and  promote  continued 
tural  adjustment,  especially  by: 

•  Enhancing  flexibility  and  ope 
of  economies  and  financial  markets; 

•  Encouraging  research  and  de 
ment  as  well  as  profitability  and  produ 
investment;  and 

•  Continued  efforts  in  each  coi 
and  improved  international  cooperation 
where  appropriate,  on  structural  adjust 
measures  (e.g.,  regional,  sectoral,  enerf 
policies). 

IV.  We  shall  continue  to  assess  tog 
regularly  in  this  framework  the  progre: 
are  making,  consider  any  corrective  act 
which  may  be  necessary  from  time-to-ti 
and  react  promptly  to  significant  chang 

It  has  been  inspiring  to  meet  w 
the  leaders  of  the  seven  major  indi 
nations  in  this  beautifully  restored 
village  of  the  past.  Here  we  have  ti 
to  shape  the  positive  and  common ; 
proach  to  our  economic  future.  The 
democracies  feel  special  responses 
or  responsibility  for  the  world  econ 
and  for  the  democratic  values  we  a 
share. 

And,  so,  we  came  together  date 
mined  to  do  something  about  some 
the  world's  toughest  problems.  Our 
meeting  has  shown  a  spirit  of  con- 
fidence, optimism,  and  certainty— ( 
fidence  that  recovery  is  under  way,, 
optimism  that  it  will  be  durable,  an 
tainty  that  economic  policy  and  sec. 
ties  among  us  will  be  strengthened  1 
the  future. 

The  United  States  has  been  prr 
leged  to  host  this  meeting  from  wb 
message  of  hope  can  be  sent  to  the 
pie  of  the  world  and  to  future  gene 
tions.  Together  the  summit  partner 


14 


Department  of  State  Bull 


SOMAf/^ 


^^LlZt^ 


0^/di 


IM^ 


[  today's  enormous  challenges  head 
d  not  settling  for  quick  fixes.  We 
16  guardians  of  fundamental  demo- 
values,  the  values  that  have 
s  united  us. 

'e  will  only  be  satisfied  when  we 
estored  durable  economic  growth 
ffers  our  people  an  opportunity  for 
Btter  future  that  they  deserve, 
^e  meeting  will  conclude  with 
ht's  dinner  and  may  I  just  add  a 
felt  thank  you  to  the  wonderful 
\  of  Williamsburg  who  have  been 
jrm  in  their  greeting  to  us,  so 
j'US  and  so  kind,  and  that  have 
(this,  in  addition  to  a  hard-working 
|n,  a  distinct  pleasure.  And  I  think 
|k  for  all  of  us  in  saying  this. 
I  you  all. 


retary  Shultz's 
p  Briefing, 

i'  30,  19833 


i^S  has  answered  the  statement 
;  as  issued  yesterday  saying  that 

hole  conference  obliterates 
!.e  in  full.  Do  you  have  a  re- 
X-  to  their  response? 
'.,  This  is  just  a  piece  of  informa- 

lat  you've  given  me  and  I  haven't 
ichance  to  really  look  at  it  and  see 
ililse  they  may  have  said  or  any- 
|3f  that  "kind. 

lit  I  would  say  that  in  the  state- 
i);here  is  strength,  there  is  purpose- 
i«5,  there  is  unity,  there  is  a  sense 
Cesion.  And  there  also  is  expressed 
teral  places  in  the  statement  a  com- 
evillingness  to  sit  down  and  try  to 
Qate  outstanding  problems  with  the 
v.  Union. 

■e  don't  consider  it  a  negotiation  if 
.  iv  the  way,  for  instance,  in  INF  is 
' '111  tn  have  a  monopoly  of  inter- 
i  e-range  missiles.  That  doesn't 
*<e  a  sensible  outcome  for  us.  So 
S'  that.  But  that's  only  being 
S'-able  and  strong  and  sensible. 


Q.  What  is  the  state  of  detente  in 
your  opinion  right  now? 

A.  It's  a  word  that  has  a  great 
many  meanings.  I  would  say  that  the 
United  States  and  the  alliance  are 
strong,  the  United  States  and  the 
alliance  are  realistic  about  what  is  tak- 
ing place  around  the  world  in  many 
dimensions,  the  Western  relationship 
with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United 
States.  And  the  alliance  has  expressed 
on  many  occasions  a  readiness  to  sit 
down  and  talk  about  outstanding  prob- 
lems in  a  spirit  of  trying  to  solve  them. 
So  I  don't  know  what  you  call  that.  I'd 
call  it  a  pretty  sensible  stance  for  us, 
frankly. 

Q.  The  President  has  said  again 
that  he  thinks  the  Russians  won't 
negotiate  on  TNF  [theater  nuclear 
forces]  until  they're  convinced  that  we 
are  going  to  move  forward  in  absolute 
agreement  with  the  placement  of 
missiles.  And  so  he  said  that  we  are 
going  to  move  forward.  My  question 
really  is,  what's  your  hunch?  Do  you 
think  the  Russians,  at  some  point 
before  next  December,  will  become 
convinced  that  we're  serious  and 
serious  to  negotiate  or  will  it  take  an 
actual  installation  of  cruise  and  even 
Pershing  missiles  to  convince  them? 

A.  The  thing  that  we  and  our  allies 
have  control  over  is  what  we  do  and 
what  stance  we  have.  So  what  the  state- 
ment basically  says  is  that— I  hate  to 
keep  repeating  myself— we're  strong 
and  we're  determined  and  absent  an 
agreement,  there'll  be  deployment.  And 
if  there  is  an  agreement  at  some  level 
other  than  zero,  whatever  the  agree- 
ment says  will  determine  the  level  of 
deployment.  I  don't  know  that  I'm 
quoting  it  exactly  accurately,  but  that's 
the  basic  notion. 

That's  what  we  have.  And  we  can 
say  this  is  going  to  be  our  pattern  of 
behavior  and  put  that  forward  and  also 
say  we're  ready  to  negotiate.  The  ques- 
tion of  whether  there  is  an  agreement  or 
not  will  depend  on  how  they  react  to  the 
situation  and  that  remains  to  be  seen. 

Q.  And  you  haven't  an  inkling  as 
to  whether  they're  going  to  become 


convinced  before  December  or  actually 
have  to  see  those  missiles  go  in  place? 

A.  In  any  negotiation,  you  scratch 
your  head  and  you  look  at  your  opposite 
side  and  you  speculate  about  their  situa- 
tion. And,  of  course,  we  do  that.  And  I 
think  it  only  stands  to  reason  that  if 
they  think  they  can  get  their  objective 
without  giving  up  anything  themselves, 
they'll  be  delighted.  But  they  should  be 
convinced  by  now  that  they  can't  do  that 
because  there  is  a  determined  alliance 
here. 

How  far  along  toward  deployment 
dates  we  have  to  get  or  whether  we  ac- 
tually have  to  deploy,  I  don't  know  what 
it  takes  to  convince  them  of  that  fact. 
But  by  this  time,  I  should  think  they'd 
be  convinced  because  there's  a  very 
determined  attitude. 

Q.  Can  we  have  an  update  on  the 
U.S.  position  so  far  as  continuing  the 
negotiations  even  while  the  deploy- 
ment proceeds?  In  other  words,  absent 
an  agreement  in  December,  when  we 
are  due  to  begin  deploying  cruises  in 
Britain  and  in  West  Germany,  is  the 
United  States  prepared  to  keep  talk- 
ing? In  other  words,  inferentially  is 
there  a  deadline  of  any  sort,  a  cut-off? 
Are  they  prepared  to  keep  talking  and 
even  talk  past  where  the  ceiling  might 
be  and  have  to  scale  down? 

A.  I  think  the  Vice  President  said 
during  his  trip  to  Europe  some  months 
ago— 4  or  5  months  ago — that  we  would 
negotiate  to  get  the  numbers  reduced  as 
far  as  possible.  What  has  been  proposed 
now  and  is  being  put  forward  in  Geneva 
by  Ambassador  Nitze  is  an  interim 
agreement,  that  idea.  We  continue  to 
think  that  the  best  answer  is  zero,  and 
after,  if  deployments  take  place,  after 
they've  taken  place,  we're  quite  prepared 
to  continue  to  negotiate  and  to  try  to  at- 
tain zero  if  we  can.  The  negotiating  end 
of  things  remains  something  we're  con- 
tinually interested  in. 

Q.  We've  accused  the  Soviets  of 
not  really  having  a  moratorium  on 
SS-20s,  as  they've  claimed  they've  had. 
What  is  our  latest  count?  At  what  rate 
are  they  deploying  SS-20s?  At  the 


15 


same  clip  they  were  before  they  went 
into  their  alleged  moratorium? 

A.  I  don't  have  a  number  right  on 
the  top  of  my  mind  or  a  rate  of  change 
or  something  like  that,  but  I  know 
that— I  pick  up  intelligence  reports  fair- 
ly frequently  that  identify  more  SS-20 
deployments  in  one  place  or  another.  It's 
a  continuing  process. 

Q.  On  the  subject  of  East- West 
trade,  could  you  characterize  how 
satisfied  you  are  with  the  language  of 
this  communique?  Do  you  think  that 
anything  was  achieved  here  that  had 
not  been  stated  previously  at  Ver- 
sailles and  other— 

A.  The  language  in  the  communique 
basically  refers  to  things  that  have  been 
worked  out  or  processes  that  are  under- 
way. And  it— I  forget  the  language- 
notes  them  with  approval  or  something 
like  that  on  the  one  hand  and  calls  for  a 
continuing  effort  on  the  other. 

We  regard  this  process  of  identify- 
ing the  security  aspects  of  East-West 
trade  and  doing  something  about  them 
as  a  continuing  process.  And  there  have 
been  good,  strong  meetings  having  to  do 
with  COCOM  [Coordinating  Committee 
for  Multilateral  Security  Export  Con- 
trols]. There,  I  think,  has  been  a  very 
clear  identification  of  the  undesirability 
of  overdependence  in  the  field  of  energy 
on  the  East  and  the  importance  of  de- 
veloping Western  sources  of  energy. 

There  has  been  a  good  base  started 
under  the  OECD  auspices  of  gathering 
information  on  trade  and  financial  flows, 
as  was  called  for  in  the  Versailles  sum- 
mit, and  the  beginnings  of  analysis  of 
that  that  I  think  is  very  constructive.  In 
the  OECD  ministerial  meeting,  the 
statement  was  made  and  agreed  to  by 


^^J 


all  that  the  trade  outside  the  strictly 
security  area  ought  to  take  place  on  the 
basis  of  market  considerations  and  that 
there  shouldn't  be  preferential  treat- 
ment. 

And,  in  addition  to  that,  the  study 
going  on  in  NATO  seems  to  be  moving 
well.  We  will  discuss  that  the  week  after 
next.  So  I  cannot  say  that  that  is  some- 
thing that  has  been  discussed  like  these 
others  at  the  ministerial  level. 

But  on  the  whole,  I  think  there  has 
been  a  lot  of  activity.  And  the  important 
thing  is  that,  out  of  all  the  discussion 
and  lots  of  disagreements  and 
arguments  to  be  sure — but  out  of  all 
that  a  kind  of  generality  of  view  has 
emerged— and  we  discussed  this  in  the 
plenary  sessions— of  the  importance  of 
this  area  and  the  general  line  of  effort 
that  we  should  be  making  and  are  mak- 
ing. So  I  think  it  is  a  very  good  thing 
that  has  emerged.  And  everybody  is, 
basically,  on  board. 

Q.  A  couple  of  days  ago,  you  men- 
tioned to  us  the  dangerous  situation  in 
the  Middle  East,  especially  the  ag- 
gressive behavior  of  the  Syrians.  Both 
on  that  front  and  on  the  other  dangers 
which  the  world  is  facing  right  now, 
whether  they  be  East-West  or  the 
Middle  East  and  Central  America, 
what  can  you  report  that  was  done 
here  that  might  have  contributed  to 
some  amelioration  of  the  troubles  of 
this  world? 

A.  I  think  a  great  deal.  First  of  all, 
in  the  security  area,  I  think  emphasizing 
all  of  the  points  that  I  have  talked  about 
already— I  will  not  repeat  them— sends 
out  a  very  powerful  and  strong  message: 
strength,  determination,  willingness  to 
negotiate,  and  so  forth. 


f^^     \_,< 


3^ 


"M>  i„ 


And  the  last  paragraph— I 
had  it  here,  I  would  read  it  agam  t 
you— it  is  a  very  strong  statement 
Way,  I  think  that  is  very  important 
it  sets  that  dimension  out  strongly. 

The  agreement  today  that  wj 
by  the  President  on  behalf  of  all  th 
heads  addresses  itself  to  economic 
issues.  And  it  identifies  the  import 
of  recovery.  It  takes  note  of  probk 
does  not  duck  them.  I  think  that  n 
the  realism  of  the  discussion  that  \ 
held.  It  was  a  considerable  discuss 
that  Secretary  Regan  had  lots  to  s 
debt  problems  and  what  we  are  do 
and  what  the  additional  things  are 
can  be  done.  The  problems  of  the 
developing  world  were  talked  abot 
the  importance  of  the  connection  k 
tween  the  industrial  countries  and 
developing  world  is  addressed  in  tl 
communique.  And  all  this  set  in  th 
values  that  we  stand  for,  I  think, 
presents  a  picture  of  a  group  of  cc 
tries  that  are  deeply  concerned,  ca 
have  resources,  will  use  them,  kno 
to  use  them,  determined.  I  think  it 
very  strong  message,  both  to  ours- 
and  our  own  people  and  the  peopk 
around  the  world  about  the  kind  o 
leadership  that  the  world  is  going 
from  the  countries  represented  hei 
And  I  might  say,  also,  the  countrit 
which  are  associated  with  them,  bt 
the  EC  was  represented  in  the  for 
Gaston  Thorn.  So  actually  there  ar 
countries  indirectly  represented 
those  that  were  literally  sitting  th€ 

Q.  The  European  Community 
recently  announced  an  increase  ii 
agriculture-export  subsidies.  Ana 
Roy  Denman  has  said  that  those 
nonnegotiable  areas.  Does  item  I 
indicate  a  change  in  position  by  f 
EC  to  negotiate  those  export  suh 
and  a  pledge  of  the  United  State* 
hold  back  on  protectionist  moves 
A.  The  particular  negotiations 
agricultural  trade  going  on  with  th 
are  ongoing  negotiations.  They  we 
only  referred  to  very  tangentially. 
was  no  attempt  to  take  up  that  ne( 
tion  here.  I  think  that  would  have 


Departnnent  of  State  Bie 


^^^Uz.^^ 


^^lli 


(lU 


r  inappropriate.  That  is  in  the 
of  people  doing  the  negotiating, 
think  it  is  a  critical  and  important 
lation. 

nd  as  for  any  immediate  wrinkle  in 
innot  say  that  I  have  been  looking 
lis  in  the  last  few  days.  So  I  do 
ive  any  comment  on  anything  that 
ave  happened  very  recently.  But  it 
mportant  negotiation.  And  my  in- 
nent  with  it  really  was  last 
iber  trying  to  get  this  round  start- 
hink  there  have  been  some  good 
s  already.  Although,  as  a  negotia- 
t  is  very  much  in  process.  So  prob- 
;hat  is  the  place  to  leave  it. 

1.  Could  you  finish  on  Don's  ques- 
njplease,  on  the  Middle  East? 

.  His  question  was  a  very  broad 
',!iii  (111  the  tensions  in  Syria  as 
1 1  WMiild  say  from  our  intelligence 
(  .-.  iln'  level  of  tension  seems  to 

ubsided  a  little  bit.  At  least,  that 

indication  from  the  activity  that 

;  tracking. 


aretary  Regan's 
evs  Briefing, 

:w  30,  19833 


think  I  really  need  an  opening 
It,  You've  heard  the  President's 
It.  The  significance,  I  think,  of 
Kit  the  leaders  of  the  world  have 
ni  an  economic  policy  designed 
I'll'  recovery  for  the  rest  of  the 

ihiiik  that  they  have  laid  down 

l"f  us  as  Finance  Ministers  in 

I  arry  this  out. 

"11  know,  there  was  an  annex 

'■ailed  "Strengthening 
ic  ( 'doperation  for  Growth  and 

■■  That's  the  entire  theme  of 

I'liancial  and  economic  types 
■  ing  on  between  now  and  the 
I .  We  have  been  given 
,1,  unctions  to  try  to  halt  protec- 

iii  be  particularly  alert  to  the 


Iy983 


debt  burdens  of  the  developing  nations, 
to  start  a  process  to  see  whether,  in  due 
course,  we  should  have  a  high-level  in- 
ternational monetary  conference,  to 
keep  open  markets,  and  to  conserve 
energy,  to  encourage  the  development  of 
technology,  and  the  like.  And  if  those 
things  are  done,  the  opinion  of  the 
leaders  is  that  we  probably— by  the  time 
of  the  next  conference,  we'll  be  well  on 
our  way  to  a  complete  recovery 
worldwide. 

Q.  You  just  said  that  discussions 
were  being  conducted  to  see  if  we 
should  have  a  high-level  monetary  con- 
ference. Is  that  a  contradiction  to 
point  five?  I  read  that  as  saying  there 
will  be  a  high-level  international 
monetary— 

A.  If  you  read  what  it  says  and  let 
me  put  my  emphasis— they've  invited 
the  Ministers  of  Finance,  in  consultation 
with  the  Managing  Director  of  the  IMF, 
Jacques  Laroussier,  to  define  the  condi- 
tions for  improving  the  international 
monetary  system — that  stands  by 
itself— and  to  consider  the  part  which 
might  in  due  course  be  played  in  this 
process  by  a  high-level  international 
monetary  conference.  That's  no  different 
from  what  I  just  said. 

Q.  Is  the  United  States  opposed  to 
the  calling  of  a  high-level  monetary 
conference? 

A.  No,  we're  going  to  consider 
whether  in  due  course  what  part  that 
would  be  played  in  that  process. 

Q.  The  French  say  this  is  a  clear 
mandate  to  hold  such  a  conference  at 
sometime  in  the  future.  Is  that  a  cor- 
rect interpretation  of  that? 

A.  I  don't  know  who  the  French  are 
in  this  respect,  which  one  of  them  is  say- 
ing this,  but  I  would  say  that  what  we 
are— that  the  French  say  that  this  is  a 
clear  mandate  to  hold  a  conference  in 
the  future.  I  would  say,  I'd  stick  on  this, 
that  we're  going  to  consider  what  part 
might  be  played  in  due  course  by  a  high- 
level  international  monetary  conference. 

Q.  The  French  are  all  saying  that 
the  statement  about  the  Finance 
Ministers  meeting  two  or  three  times 
a  year  for  multilateral  surveillance 


with  the  Director-General  of  the  IMF, 
the  Managing  Director  of  the  IMF, 
represents  some  new  implementation 
that  goes  somewhat  beyond  Versailles 
because  they  will  be  empowered  to 
make  recommendations  regarding  in- 
tervention in  the  monetary  markets  to 
the  various  nations.  Is  that,  in  fact, 
novel? 

A.  I  would  say  that  what  the  heads 
of  state  were  saying  to  the  Finance 
Ministers  is  that  you  should  meet  more 
often,  that  you  should  make  certain  that 
all  nations  are  on  a  course  in  their 
economic  policies  that  make  their 
economies  converge,  which  means  that  if 
someone  is  out  of  step,  you  say  it.  I 
think  that  that  process  started  at  Ver- 
sailles. It  will  now  be  strengthened  and 
improved.  We  had  two  meetings  last 
year.  We  probably  will  have  a  few  more 
"this  year. 

Q.  In  these  meetings  of  Finance 
Ministers  with  the  Managing  Director, 
would  there  be  some  ministers  from 
developing  countries  invited? 

A.  No.  If  you  look  at  the  annex  to 
the  Versailles  summit  statement  or  com- 
munique, there  it  said  with  emphasis  on 
the  nations  whose  currencies  make  up 
the  SDR;  that  is,  the  so-called  G-5  na- 
tions—Great Britain,  France,  Germany, 
Japan,  the  United  States.  That  is  the 
G-5  group;  those  are  the  currencies  that 
make  up  the  SDR. 

Q.  The  French  Finance  Minister 
said  last  night  that  there  was  a  com- 
mon front  against  the  United  States 
on  the  subject  of  interest  rates.  Is  that 
the  case? 

A.  Again,  that  may  have  come 
through  in  the  translation.  There  are— I 
wouldn't  say  a  "front"  against  us, 
because  I  asked  him  about  that.  That's 
why  I  inquired.  I  said  "What  is  this  com- 
mon front?"  He  said,  "There's  no  front 
against  you,  it's  a  common  question  that 
is  asked  constantly  of  the  United  States, 
'When  are  you  going  to  get  your  interest 
rates  down?'  "  So  there  was  no  confron- 
tation. It  was  not  a  "front"  in  that  sense 
of  the  word. 


Q.  Do  any  of  them  accept  your  , 
argument  against  linking  deficits  i 
high  interest  rates? 

A.  They  were  skeptical,  but  thej 
fered  no  proof  to  dissuade  me. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  proof  to  p«  1 
suade  them?  I 

A.  We  think  so,  and  I'm  going  t 
furnish  it  to  them. 

Q.  How  does  it  come  to  pass  til 
the  only  method  mentioned  in  the  i 
communique  for  reducing  budget  i 
deficits  is  to  limit  the  growth  of  el 
penditures?  j 

A.  That's  the  proper  way  to  do  I 
That's  why  it's  mentioned  in  here.     , 

Q.  Nobody  mentioned  raising  i 
as  another  method? 

A.  You  must  remember,  they  hi 
economically  trained  people,  they 
recognize  the  proper  way  to  get  the 
budget  deficits  down  is  to  cut  exper 
itures. 

Q.  Did  anyone  suggest  raising! 
revenue? 

A.  Not  to  me,  they  didn't  sugge 
raising  revenue. 

Q.  To  the  President,  did  they? 

A.  Not  to  the  President,  they  di 
suggest  raising  revenue. 

Q.  Was  there  a  great  deal  of 
discussion  on  unemployment  and  I 
to  reduce  it? 

A.  Yes,  there  was.  There  was  q' 
a  bit  of  discussion  about  unemployir 
as  being  the  number  one  burden  of 
of  the  nations.  And  how  to  go  about 
One  of  the  things  that,  particularly 
the  Finance  Ministers'  sessions,  we 
discussed  was  the  fact  of  the  rigidit; 
the  Western  European  economies- 
large  smoke-stacked  companies,  the: 
concentration  that  way — that  these  i 
not  provide  new  jobs.  As  you  know,i 
the  United  States,  close  to  70%  of  o 
new  jobs  come  from  firms  with  few- 
than  100  employees.  And  most  of  thle 
are  not  in  the  area  of — oh,  let's  say ' 
steelmaking  or  things  of  that  natun't 
more  light  industry,  service  industr 
things  of  that  nature. 


Department  of  State  But  ti 


SUMA// 


■^/./ZE^' 


0^ali 


n  u 


ley  also  recognized  that  this  is 
1  Japan,  and  they're  going  to  have 
to  figure  out  in  Western  Europe, 
er  to  cut  down  their  unemploy- 
how  they  can  go  about  creating 
ompanies  in  order  to  get  more  of 
vorkers  employed  by  these  com- 

You  and  the  other  Finance 
ters  had  prepared  two  drafts  of 
xchange  rate  provision.  Can  you 
a  little  bit  about  how  the  heads 
the  second  one?  Was  it  just  by— 
I'm  not  sure  I  follow.  Which 
•aph  or  which  statement  are  you 
Rg  to? 

Paragraph  five  on  exchange 

This  is  a  common  technique  in 
ig  communiques,  when  those  who 
e  drafters  and  who  are  not  the 
ecisionmakers  come  to  a  point  of 
cement.  They  spend  enough  time 
)  recognize  that  there  are  dif- 
versions,  and  neither  side  is  going 
ble  to  give  in  order  to  be  able  to 
;e  them.  The  natural  thing  to  do  is 
d  both  of  them  up  for  decision  by 
tiior  people  who  would  be  accept- 
j  statement— in  this  case  the 
of  the  nations.  And  it  was  debated 
i  the  table  as  to  which  version  was 
able. 

•  On  the  debt  situation  of  the 
C  [less  developed  countries],  this 
tuient  seems  to  deal  with  this 
A^m  on  a  medium-term  basis.  But, 
lei  those  countries  are  trying  to  pay 
iiJbills  tomorrow,  would  the 
venments  involved  in  the  con- 
e;e  here  have  a  disposition  to  help 
)s  countries  financially  with  of- 
ialoans  to  those  countries  to  try  to 
t'em— to  have  them  waiting  for 
isecision  that  could  come  in  the 
aruture? 

The  answer  to  that  is  that  there 

1.  rtam  amount  of  official  develop- 

■. nice  through  IDA,  through 

1  vink,  and  through  the  IMF 

'  !iat  is  available  in  the  short 

riii.-e  are  liquidity  problems.  And 
Lilians  are  and  have  been  made 
11' lie.  There  are  over  35  programs 
w  nder  way  in  the  IMF.  IDA  is 


distributing  about  $3  billion  or  $4  billion 
a  year  in  concessional  loans.  So  that's 
the  short-term  solution. 

What  we're  trying  for  here  is  more 
of  a  medium-term  solution.  How  do  they 
get  out  of  this  precarious  situation 
they're  in,  wherein  they  have  incurred 
large  debts  in  relation  to  their  foreign 
exchange  earnings?  How  do  we  increase 
the  foreign  exchange  earnings?  The  ob- 
vious answer  is  for  them  to  export  more 
into  the  industrialized  countries. 

Q.  But  I  mean  the  governments,  I 
mean  through  the  central  banks. 

A.  Central  banks  are  not  set  up  to 
make  loans  to  individual  countries.  That 
is  not  their  function. 

Q.  Getting  back  to  the  question  of 
the  international  monetary  conference 
in  paragraph  5,  I  understand  the  ver- 
sion that  was  not  put  in  the  text  made 
no  specific  reference  to  a  monetary 
conference.  Was  the  inclusion  of  that 
phrase  a  concession  to  French  sen- 
sitivities? 

A.  No.  The  French  said  that  it 
would  be  better  to  put  it  in  from  that 
point  of  view.  The  subject  was  debated 
as  to  whether  or  not  that  phraseology' 
might  suggest  more  than  was  intended. 
But  after  listening  to  the  French 
description  that  this  was  not  an  inten- 
tion of  that,  it  was  agreed  that  that 
reference  to  it  could  be  made.  Actually, 
it  was  Chancellor  Kohl  that  suggested 
the  compromise. 

Q.  You  mentioned  yesterday  that 
there  was  a  $17  billion  growth  in  the 
money  supply  over  the  past  3  weeks. 
Does  that  mean  in  your  mind  that 
American  monetary  policy  conforms 
with  this  objective,  namely,  as  stated 
in  this  communique,  discipline, 
noninflationary  growth,  and  monetary 
aggregates? 

A.  I  would  say  that  we  all  recognize 
that  Ml  has  been  loose  and  above  its 
target,  but  for  many  technical  reasons. 
And  the  intention  is  to  get  it  back  there. 
M2,  which  is  used  by  most  nations  of  the 
world  to  measure  their  money  supply,  in 
the  United  States  M2  is  below  its  target 
range,  so  definitely  it's  in  a  noninfla- 
tionary way. 


Q.  In  paragraph  9  in  today's  state- 
ment, it  is  said  that  East- West 
economic  relations  should  be  compati- 
ble with  our  security  interests.  Securi- 
ty interests  defined  by  whom? 

A.  By  the  Western  nations  here  at 
the  summit. 

Q.  Western  Europeans  or  the 
Americans? 

A.  Both.  All  seven  summit  nations. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  the  prob- 
lems that  the  United  States  and 
Europe  have  had  over  East-West  trade 
are  going  to  disappear? 

A.  I'm  not  sure  that  problems  ever 
disappear,  but  I  would  certainly  say  that 
the  problems  have  been  lessened  by  the 
actions  that  have  been  taken  recently 
and  certainly  since  the  Versailles  sum- 
mit between  Versailles  and  Williams- 
burg. That  was  noted  this  morning,  how 
much  smoother  those  relationships  are 
as  far  as  the  West  is  concerned. 

Q.  Did  this  summit  lessen  the 
concerns  that  the  delegations  have 
brought  and  mentioned— 
Mrs.  Thatcher  and  the— there  were  a 
couple  of  mentions  yesterday  in  the 
sessions  over  the  Export  Administra- 
tion Act.  Have  these  discussions 
lessened — 

A.  The  Export  Administration  Act 
has  little  to  do  with  that  paragraph  9. 
That's  an  entirely  different  interpreta- 
tion. 

They  are  concerned  about  the  Ex- 
port Administration  Act,  but  since  it 
hasn't  passed  the  Congress  yet,  they 
merely  wanted  to  register  those  con- 
cerns so  that  their  feelings  might  be  con- 
sidered by  us  in  our  considerations. 

Q.  Has  your  policy  on  intervention 
changed?  It  says  "helpful."  "when 
helpful."  Does  that  still  mean  dis- 
orderly markets  or  not? 

A.  We  will  be  acting  in  accordance 
with  this  statement.  [Laughter] 


ily983 


President  Reagan's 
Dinner  Toast, 
Rockefeller  Folk 
Art  Center, 
May  30,  1983i 


X  t  is  a  pleasure  to  see  all  of  you  and  to 
tell  you  that  our  discussions  over  the 
last  few  days  have  been  as  fruitful  and 
as  useful  and  enjoyable  as  we  had  all 
hoped.  As  I  noted  at  the  outset— that 
our  countries  were  linked  by  a  multitude 
of  mutual  interests  and  by  a  shared  com- 
mitment to  freedom  and  democracy. 

Williamsburg,  as  a  site,  was  the  site 
of  the  first  representative  assembly  and 
the  second  university  in  the  Colonies 
which  then  became  the  United  States.  It 
has  been  a  particularly  appropriate  place 
in  which  to  rededicate  ourselves  to  these 
principles. 

The  preservation  of  the  values  we 
share  must  strengthen  our  domestic 
economies,  seek  advantages  of  vigorous 
international  trade,  and  deal  intelligently 
with  the  problems  of  crises  in  the 
developing  world.  And  while  doing  this, 
we  must  also  give  appropriate  attention 
to  our  security  interests.  These  objec- 
tives are  complex,  sometimes  seemingly 
contradictory,  and  always  difficult  to 
achieve. 

Our  individual  perceptions  about 
particular  issues  may  sometimes  differ, 
but  gatherings  such  as  this  give  us  an 
opportunity  to  work  together  on  a 
regular  basis  to  address  the  problems 
we  share.  This  meeting  has,  in  my  judg- 
ment, achieved  that  objective.  It  has  left 
me  more  confident  than  ever  of  the 
basic  health  of  our  free  way  of  life  and 
our  ability  and  cooperation  to  lay  a 
sound  foundation  for  our  children  and 
our  children's  children. 


In  that  spirit,  I  want  to  toast  all  of 
you,  who  in  the  last  few  days  have  par- 
ticipated in  this  chapter  of  a  vital  and 
unceasing  effort.  And  so,  therefore,  I 
think  we  can  drink  to  the  causes  that 
have  brought  us  here,  to  the  success 
that  we've  had,  and  to  our  dream  of  con- 
tinuing on  this  road  as  far  as  we  all  can 
see. 

And  for  some  of  us  here,  there  is 
great  gratitude  to  many  of  you  for  all 
that  you  have  done  to  contribute  to 
these  meetings. 


Interview  With 
President  Reagan, 
May  31,  1983* 


X  ou  had  said  before  this  summit 
that  you  wanted  it  structured  in  this 
way  because  you'd  have  a  frank 
discussion  with  other  leaders.  Did  you 
learn  anything  from  that?  Did  your 
views  change  in  any  way  because  of 
what  was  said  to  you  here  in  that 
format? 

A.  Actually,  not  in  any  major  way 
because  you  would  be  amazed  at  how 
much  our  thinking  was  alike  on  so  many 
of  the  things  discussed. 

But  in  connection  with  the  question 
also  on  structure,  the  difference  was 
that  the  summits  that  I've  been  to 
before,  each  head  of  state  would  make  a 
statement  and  that  would  be  it  then. 
Whether  they  agreed,  disagreed,  or  not, 
they  had  made  their  statement. 

The  difference  was  here,  you'd  open 
up  a  subject— let  us  say  that  the  subject 
had  to  do  with  trade— we'd  open  up  the 
subject  and  everyone  could  express  their 
views  and  so  forth  and  then  we  kept  go- 
ing and  discussing  to  see  that  we  could 
all  agree  on  a  consensus  of  what  we 
would  do  with  this  in  the  area  of  this 
subject  that  would  further  benefit,  not 
only  us,  but  the  world. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  you  persuaded 
anybody  to  some  view  that  they  didn't 
have  before  they  came  here? 


A.  Not  really.  The  whole  idea  > 
vergence — the  answer  is  that  you 
have  one  nation  recover  without  tl 
others,  that  this  is  a  world  recessii 
what  we  do  affects  each  other,  am 
therefore,  we  must  have  more  sur- 
veillance, more  constant  communic 
particularly  at  our  ministerial  leve 
the  progress  that  we're  all  making 
this  included  the  developing  counti 
also,  that  they  cannot  be  out  there 
the  other  side  of  a  door  that  their 
economic  situation,  their  prosperit 
vital  to  us  as  ours  is  to  them.  And 
say,  there  was  great  agreement  oi 

But  what  then  did  happen  was 
had  the  thoughts  of  others  that  co 
tributed  to  come  into  a  consensus 
how  we  were  going  to  go  about  th 
what  we  were  going  to  do.  And 
remember  that  the  idea  of  the  sub 
wasn't  just  chaos  of  anyone  comin 
what  they  thought.  A  lot  of  this  w 
based  on  the  fact  that  at  the  minis 
level,  OECD,  the  NATO  summit, 
discussions  on  international  monet 
funds  and  all,  we  were  well  prepai 
advance  of  knowing  what  was  on  ; 
minds  of  each  other. 

Q.  If  I  may,  this  was  a  summ 
designed  so  that  those  of  you  wl 
privately  could,  on  several  occasi 
have  a  frank  exchange,  candid  e? 
change  of  views— candid,  person 
And  yet  you're  saying  that  there 
diverse  views  in  here.  And  yet  yc 
saying  in  spite  of  all  of  that,  nob 
views  changed  very  much— 

A.  As  I  intrepreted  the  questic 
there,  was  there  any  sudden  situat 
where  you  had  just  diametrically  o 
posed  ideas,  say,  a  way  to  bring  ;  " 
prosperity.  No,  everyone  recognize 
that— for  example,  in  our  own  pro 
of  deficits  and  interest  rates  and  t. 
effect  that  they  have  had  on  the 
economy.  There  was  general  agree 
on  all  of  these  things.  And  then  th 
thing  was  how,  for  example— it's  : 
statement  that  came  out,  differing 
some  conferences  where  the  stater 
was  written  in  advance  and  before 
had  the  discussions.  That  statemer 
the  result  of  the  discussions. 


CjUMAf, 


'■^/-IZt^ 


0^al(( 


U 


\.  Let  me  give  you  a  for  instance, 
said  in  your  personal  addendum 
e  statement  that  the  world  now 
fnizes  there  should  be  no  quick 
which  as  you  mentioned  in  the 
;d  States.  But  I  know  you  were 
by  some  of  the  leaders  in  there 
despite — the  best  expected  per- 
ance  of  the  economy,  unemploy- 

is  going  to  remain  high  for  some 
to  come,  recession  may  even 
sn  in  some  countries,  and  there 
eople  who  are  concerned  about 
olitical  and  social  upheaval  that 
:an  cause  and.  therefore,  might 
'  some  kind  of  quick  fix,  at  least 
ert  the  kind  of  crisis  the  United 
•s  faces.  Did  that  discussion  not 
er  your  views  about  at  least  some 
.  fixes  some  way? 
.  No,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  one  of 
iirticipants  referred  to  quick  fixes 
Hack  medicine"  and  that  we've  prov- 

experience  they  don't  work.  They 
Ivorsen  the  situation.  There  is  great 
gness  on  the  part  of  all  of  them, 
hey  realized  that  they  had  to  face 
some  social  changes  in  order  to 
)ntrol  of  excessive  spending.  And, 
ay,  the  document  attests  that— the 
nent  to  the  outcome.  We  didn't 
any  subject  up  in  the  air  and  say, 
,  you  know,  we're  differing  on  this, 
move  on  to  something  else."  No. 
ayed  until  we'd  worked  out  what 

felt  was  a  way  to  go  on  the  par- 
r  subject.  And  there  was  no  vote 

There  were  no  winners  or  losers. 

wasn't  any  case  in  which  five  said, 

to  two,  you're  out-voted  and  this 
it  we're  going  to  say."  No,  before 
ttled  it,  all  seven  w-ere  in  agree- 

.  It's  well  known  that  your  Ad- 
tration  wasn't  enthusiastic  about 
;ernational  monetary  conference, 
ou  modify  your  views  during  the 
lit? 

.  The  funny  thing  was  in  the  con- 
;ions,  it  isn't  so  much  a  modifying 
ws  as  it  is  a  learning  of  what  the 
really  were.  For  e.xample,  the 
pal  proponent  of  such  a  conference 
d  l)y  making  it  plain  that  he  had 
eant  in  any  way  that  we  go  back 
^irs  and  follow  a  pattern  of 


something  that  was  adopted  40  years 
ago— the  world  has  changed— but  that 
it  was  something  to  be  looked  at.  We 
ourselves  had  come  with  the  idea  that 
just  as  out  of  the  Versailles  sum- 
mit— and  while  many  people  have  been 
quick  to  say  that  nothing  good  came  out 
of  that,  a  lot  did.  We  have  had  since  the 
Versailles  summit  a  relationship  at  the 
ministerial  level  on  several  subjects  that 
has  been  ongoing  and  that  has  made 
great  progress  with  regard  to  trade,  the 
East-West  situation,  all  of  these  things. 

And  so  the  idea  that  these  same 
ministers  will  now,  as  they  go  forward 
in  this  surveillance— mutual  surveillance 
to  make  sure  that  we're  not  getting  off 
the  track  in  some  country  or  other  that 
might  set  back  for  all  of  us  the  recovery, 
that  this  they  will  look  at  very  closely 
and  see  if  such  a  conference  would  be  a 
help  in  what  we're  trying  to  do.  It's  go- 
ing to  depend  on  what  they  all  decide 
and  what  they  recommend. 

Q.  The  dollar  is  reaching  record 
highs  against  other  currencies.  Do  you 
think  that  is  a  positive  development 
for  the  world  economy  and  for  the 
American  recovery? 

A.  There's  no  question  about  the 
value  of  the  dollar,  that  it  results  from 
our  success  with  reducing  inflation.  And, 
of  course,  we  want  to  go  on  reducing  in- 
flation. 

But  we  also  want  to  see  as  the 
others  progress  that  this  levels  off, 
because  remember  the  high  dollar  is  not 
an  unmitigated  blessing  for  us.  We  will 
have  a  trade  deficit  this  year  of  probably 
$60  billion  simply  because  the  high  value 
of  the  dollar  has  priced  us  out  of  many 
foreign  markets. 

We'd  like  to  see  a  better  balance. 
But  we  believe  the  better  balance  will 
come  through  convergence.  And  so,  here 
again,  out  of  this  has  come  the  decision 
that  we're  going  to  monitor  each  other 
closely  on  how  we're  progressing  on 
this. 

Q.  You  indicated  in  an  interview 
last  week  that  the  Soviets  were  step- 
ping up  their  aid  to  Nicaragua.  I 
wondered  whether  you  see  the 
possibility  of  a  superpower  confronta- 
tion developing  in  Central  America, 


liH'UI-lErji!! 


and  whether  increased  Soviet  aid  re- 
quires an  increased  response  from  the 
United  States. 

A.  It  is  a  little  off  the  summit.  I  did, 
in  one  session,  simply  explain  as  well  as 
I  could  the  entire  situation  in  Central 
America.  And  many  of  them  admitted 
that  they  had  not  been  clear  on  some  of 
what  was  going  on.  There  has  been  a 
step-up  in  Soviet  activity  as  to  bringing 
in  supplies.  But  we  still  believe  that  our 
plan  of  economic  aid  and  such  military 
assistance  as  we  think  is  needed  there  in 
the  line  of  supplies— training,  mainly— 
should  go  forward. 

But  again,  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that  our  economic  aid  is  three  to  one  in 
value  over  the  military  aid.  We  want,  in- 
deed, a  political  settlement  if  it  can  be 
reached. 

Q.  Did  you  ask  your  allies  for  help 
on  that  question— I  mean,  did  you  ask 
them  to— 

A.  No.  On  this  one,  this  was  just  one 
where  I  gave  them  a  report  and — 

Q.  From  a  very  general  point  of 
view,  now  that  you  have  heard  the 
opinion  of  all  the  other  leaders  at  the 
same  time,  what  is  your  feeling  on  the 
future  of  relations  with  Russia?  Is  it 
going  to  be  an  ever-increasing  tension 
and  hostility,  or  will  there  be  a  point 
where  there  will  be  a  thaw?  I'm  not 
asking  about  your  hopes,  but  about 


your  gut  feeling  of  what  actually  is 
going  to  happen. 

A.  If  there  is  an  increase  of  tension, 
it  will  be  the  Soviet  Union  that  causes  it. 
Let  me  just  quickly— because  I  know 
time  is  important— point  something  out. 
Sitting  at  that  table  in  this  summit  were 
the  representatives— the  heads  of 
state— of  nations  that  not  too  many 
years  ago  were  deeply  engaged  in  a 
hatred-filled  war  with  each  other.  And 
here  we  were,  sitting  as  closely  as  we're 
sitting  with  a  really  warm,  personal 
friendship  that  had  developed  among  us, 
but  more  than  that,  with  a  friendship 
between  our  peoples.  And,  what  is  the 
cause  of  disarray  in  the  world — if  we 
had  been  able  to  do  this  with  our 
erstwhile  enemies,  doesn't  it  sort  of 
follow  that  we  are  the  ones  who  want  a 
peaceful  world?  I  don't  mean  when  I  say 
"we"  the  United  States,  I  mean  all  of 
us — the  people  who  were  around  that 
table— that  we  are  the  ones  who  are 
striving  for  peace  and  have  been  suc- 
cessful in  healing  those  terrible,  deep 
wounds.  But  that  one  country  that  was 
an  ally  in  that  great  war  is  the  cause  of 
tension  in  the  world  and  that  the  things 
that  we  had  to  think  about  with  regard 
to  our  national  security,  all  dealt  with 
our  national  security  vis-a-vis  that  par- 
ticular country. 

Over  and  over  again  in  talking  trade 
we  stressed  that  we  don't  want  a  trade 
war  with  the  Soviet  Union.  We've  been 
forced  into  having  to  view  our  relation- 
ship with  our  own  security  in  mind.  But, 
I  couldn't  help  but  think  several  times, 
why  in  the  world  isn't  that  other  so- 
called  superpower— why  didn't  they 
have  someone  sitting  at  that  table  able 
to  get  along  with  the  rest  of  us? 

Q.  But  do  you  see  better  or  worse 
relations?  If  you  were  to  predict  to- 
day, is  it  better  or  worse  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union. 

A.  I  see  better,  because  I  think  all  of 
us  together  have  a  more  realistic  view  of 
them.  This  may  not  be  visible  in  the 
rhetoric  in  the  immediate  future, 
because  there's  an  awful  lot  of  rhetoric 
that  is  delivered  for  home  consumption. 

Q.  They've  accused  you  of  wreck- 
ing detente— with  the  INF  statement. 


A.  Detente,  as  it  existed,  was  only  a 
cover  under  which  the  Soviet  Union  built 
up  the  greatest  military  power  in  the 
world.  I  don't  think  we  need  that  kind  of 
a  detente.  But,  all  of  us,  we're  ready— 
at  any  time— if  they  want  to  make  it 
plain  by  deed,  not  word,  that  they  want 
to  join  in  the  same  things  that  are  of 
concern  to  all  of  us— the  betterment  of 
life  for  our  peoples. 

Q.  You  spent  some  time  in  the  last 
couple  of  evenings  talking  about  the 
Middle  East  as  well,  I  understand, 
with  your  partners.  And,  most  recent- 
ly, there  has  been  an  increasing  ten- 
sion between  both  Syrian  and  Israeli 
forces  in  Lebanon  right  now.  You 
have  an  agreement  between  Lebanon 
and  Israel  for  a  troop  withdrawal,  but 
the  Syrians  are  not  cooperating.  Real- 
ly, without  their  cooperation,  you  have 
very  little.  What  is  the  next  step? 
And,  can  you  tell  me,  with  the  in- 
creased tensions,  have  you  been  in 
contact  with  the  Soviet  Union  to  get 
the  Syrians  to  cool  it? 

A.  This  is  hardly  a  summit  meeting 
thing,  but  let  me  say  we're  continuing 
what  we've  been  doing  all  the  time  and 
that  is  trying  to  persuade  the  Syrians 
who  had  made  a  statement  in  the  very 
beginning  of  all  these  talks  that  they 
would  withdraw  when  the  others  did. 
And  we're  talking  to  their  Arab  friends 
and  allies  about  this,  I  think  making 
some  progress.  So  this  does  not  require 
any  new  course. 

And  as  to  whether  there  were 
several  meetings,  there  was  just  one 
meeting  in  which  I  summed  up  and  gave 
my— well,  no,  I  didn't.  I'm  sorry,  I  was 
thinking  there— I  was  talking  about 
something  else.  No,  on  the  Middle  East, 
we  did  have  one  session  and  a  dinner 
session  and,  actually,  there  was  no  quar- 
rel with  what  we're  doing.  It  was  total 


support;  but  there  was  more  a  repo 
some  of  those  who  had  been  closer 
the  situation  back  over  the  years,  o 
European  neighbors,  giving  their  vi  i 
on  some  of  the  things  that  were  at 
there  and  some  of  the  problems. 

Q.  Just  in  light  of  the  INF  de 
tion,  can  you  envision  an  outcome 
interim  solution  in  Geneva  which 
would  delay  the  stationing  of  the 
missiles  in  Europe? 

A.  I  don't  think  you  can  predid 
anything  there  without  getting  intc 
dangerous  field  of  discussing  strate 

Frankly,  my  own  opinion  is  tha 
negotiations  won't  really  get  down 
brass  tacks  until  they  see  that  we  i 
going  forward  with  the  scheduled 
deployment. 

Q.  Does  that  mean  that  the 
negotiations  won't  go  forward  un 
after  you  deploy? 

A.  Oh,  no.  We're  going  to  try. 
meetings  are  on  now.  We're  going 
to  negotiate.  I  am  just  anticipating 
the  Soviet  side;  they  have  based  th 
entire  propaganda  campaign,  every 
they've  been  doing,  on  seeking  to  p 
vent  the  beginning  deployment.  Ar 
have  a  schedule  of  deployment,  the 
quest  of  our  NATO  Allies,  and  we'; 
ing  to  follow  that. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  6,  198; 

^Made  at  the  reception  for  heads  o) 
dele^tions  (text  from  Weekly  Compila  i 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  6). 

3Text  from  White  House  press  rele  ' 

■•Interviewing  the  President  in  Pre  < 
Hall  in  Williamsburg  were  representatii 
The  Washington  Post,  Knight-Ridder  | 
Newspapers,  Chicago  Sun-Times,  Medi 
General,  CNN,  Le  Monde,  II  Giomale,  c 
Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  (text  in 
Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  June  6).  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bi« 


E  PRESIDENT 


iterview  for  Bunte 
lustrierte  Magazine 


,A,,nJ  J.-,.  H'S.:.  tn  ,iHr.f,o, 
II  Kunte  IllustniTte.  -/ 
uhltshrd  IN  thr  Fr<ln-al 


Mico/G 


n  October  it  will  be  exactly  300 
s  since  the  first  Germans  im- 
•ated  to  America.  Do  you  believe 
there  is  a  specific  German  ele- 
t  in  the  tradition  of  American 
jry?  What  famous  German— past 
resent  — in  the  arts,  sports,  or 
tary,  do  you  admire  most? 
\.  Mure  than  (iO  millinn  Americans 
){  German  ancestry,  and  that 
:age  is  a  great  influence  on  our  na- 
il character.  The  strong  hands  and 
I  hearts  of  their  industrious  German 
fathers  helped  build  a  strong  and 
!  America.  Germany  gave  us  heroes 
lur  Revolutionary  War  such  as 
nn  de  Kalb  and  Baron  von  Steuben; 
ical  leaders,  scientists,  and 
:eers — including  Einstein  and 
)ling,  whose  Brooklyn  Bridge 
irates  its  100th  birthday  this  year; 
ts,  composers,  theologians,  business 
lipreneurs,  and  as  you  suggest. 
|ts  figures  like  Babe  Ruth.  It's 
'St  impossible  to  choose  one  whom  I  " 
ire  most.  German  names  fill  our 
pry  books,  dot  our  maps,  and  line  the 
aves  of  our  family  Bibles. 
rhe  tricentennial  of  German  im- 
■ation  to  the  United  States  is  being 
)rated  across  the  United  States — in 
jouis,  Milwaukee,  New  York,  and 
idelphia  to  name  just  a  few  places, 
coking  forward  to  welcoming  Presi- 
Carstens  of  the  Federal  Republic  of 
nany  for  a  state  visit  this  October, 
1  W'e'll  celebrate  the  tricentennial 
ther. 

D.  With  substantial  financial  and 
Itical  assistance  from  the  Federal 
iublic,  the  West  European  allies 
i?oing  ahead  with  the  construction 
le  gas  pipeline,  which  will  supply 
•^  with  energy  from  Siberia  in  a 
! years.  Has  the  European  leader- 
■  been  successful  in  convincing 
hington  that  the  pipeline  will  not 
^sed  as  a  Soviet  instrument  of 
Skmail,  or  does  this  continue  to  be 
iint  of  discussion  between  Bonn 


and  Washington?  Can  the  United 
States  offer  the  Europeans  an  alter- 
native energy  supply  system? 

A.  It  is  important  that  Western  na- 
tions not  become  overly  dependent  on 
any  single  supplier,  particularly  the 
Soviet  Union,  for  such  critical  resources. 
Our  view  is  that  it  would  be  prudent  for 
West  European  countries  to  emphasize 
development  of  their  own  natural  gas 
reserves  and  evaluate  any  new  supply 
arrangements  in  view  of  the  alternatives 
and  security  implications.  The  issue  of 
energy  dependence  has  been  under 
careful  review  by  the  International 
Energy  Administration,  which  will  be 
reporting  this  month.  It  has  conducted  a 
very  constructive  study  on  which  we  all 
have  cooperated  closely.  In  addition  to 
indigenous  resources,  I  might  also  note 
that  we  are  taking  steps  domestically  to 
improve  our  competitiveness  in  coal  ex- 
ports to  Europe. 

Q.  Under  what  extreme  circum- 
stances would  you  consider  withdraw- 
ing U.S.  troops  from  German  soil? 

A.  The  cooperative  security  ar- 
rangements of  the  NATO  alliance  have 
maintained  the  peace  for  almost  40 
years.  As  President  of  the  United 
States,  my  most  important  task  is  to 
continue  to  preserve  our  peace  and 
freedom.  As  long  as  we  face  a  deter- 
mined adversary  in  Europe,  the 
presence  of  U.S.  forces  in  the  Federal 
Republic  and  in  Berlin  will  be  essential. 

I  would  like  to  emphasize  the 
cooperative  nature  of  our  arrangements. 
Unlike  the  Warsaw  Pact,  NATO  security 
relations  are  based  on  common  agree- 
ment. U.S.  forces  will  remain  in  the 
Federal  Republic  as  long  as  they  are 
needed  and  welcomed  by  the  Federal 
Republic. 

Q.  The  only  country  from  which 
the  Soviets  withdrew  their  forces 
after  World  War  II  was  Austria.  They 
did  this  for  the  price  of  Austrian 
neutrality.  Germany's  first  Chancellor, 
Konrad  Adenauer,  had  decided  to 
enter  into  an  alliance  with  the  United 
States.  In  hindsight,  do  you  think  it 
would  have  been  better  for  Germany  if 
Adenauer  would  have  done  what 
Austria  did? 


A.  There  are  essential  differences 
between  Austria  and  the  Federal 
Republic  in  size,  strength,  and  geo- 
graphic location.  Both  countries  must 
meet  their  respective  needs.  Their 
respective  national  security  policies  were 
and  are  supported  by  the  vast  majority 
of  their  peoples.  We  shouldn't  overlook 
the  fact  that  the  strong  Western  securi- 
ty alliance,  which  includes  West  Ger- 
many, helps  to  preserve  the  security  and 
well-being  of  the  European  neutrals. 

Q.  The  West  German  newspaper 
publisher,  A.\el  Springer,  has 
repeatedly  stressed  that  the  role  the 
United  States  plays  in  world  politics 
is  that  of  a  peacekeeper.  It  would  be 
tragic,  Mr.  Springer  warned,  to  forget 
about  the  people  who  are  forced  to 
live  under  a  Soviet  dictatorship  or 
who  have  been  imprisoned  for  their 
political  beliefs,  in  Bautzen,  in  a 
psychiatric  ward,  or  somewhere  in  the 
Gulag.  How  can  the  United  States 
help  bring  about  an  end  to  this  in- 
justice? 

A.  I  completely  agree  that  the 
United  States'  most  important  role  in 
the  world  is  based  on  our  commitment 
to  peace  and  individual  freedom.  We 
firmly  believe  that  world  peace  and 
stability  can  be  achieved  only  when 
governments  are  responsive  to  the 
aspirations  of  their  peoples,  including 
recognition  of  their  human  rights  as 
outlined,  for  example,  in  the  Charter  of 
the  United  Nations  and  in  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act.  The  United  States,  as  well  as 
other  Western  countries,  must  continual- 
ly keep  world  public  attention  focused 
on  Soviet  human  rights  policies.  That  is 
why  we  and  our  allies  continue  to  insist 
on  a  strong  human  rights  provision  in 
the  final  document  at  the  Madrid  CSCE 
conference  [Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation  in  Europe].  In  addition,  our 
governments  can  and  do  work  quietly  on 
individual  cases,  securing  better  treat- 
ment for  certain  citizens  from  the  Soviet 
and  other  governments. 

Q.  In  an  interview  with  Moscow's 
Literaturnja  Gazeta.  Mr.  Egon  Bahr, 
the  national  security  adviser  to  Jochen 
Vogel,  claimed  that  "Leonid  Brezhnev 
had  been  filled  with  a  burning  desire 
to  secure  world  peace."  Do  you  share 
this  assessment  of  the  former  Soviet 
leader's  quest  for  peace? 

A.  With  all  the  terrible  dangers 
which  threaten  today's  world,  it  is  hard 
to  imagine  how  any  national  leader 
would  not  be  committed  to  the  search 


THE  PRESIDENT 


for  peace.  We  hear  much  talk  about  such 
a  commitment,  but  we  need  deeds,  not 
words.  Sad  experience  shows  that  Soviet 
leaders  too  seldom  translate  their  words 
into  actions.  A  true  Soviet  agenda  for 
peace  would  include  withdrawal  of  their 
invading  troops  and  KGB  forces  from 
Afghanistan,  easing  of  pressure  on 
Poland  and  its  citizens,  a  halt  of  aid  to 
international  terrorists,  and  ending  the 
use  and  supply  of  their  nightmarish 
chemical  and  biological  weapons.  Actions 
of  this  type  would  find  a  ready  response 
from  my  Administration  and  would 
begin  a  new  and  better  era  of  East- West 
relations. 

But  while  we  are  on  the  subject  of 
commitment  to  peace.  I  would  like  to 
review  quickly  the  peace  initiatives  of 
my  government  around  the  world,  in  ad- 
dition to  our  efforts  for  significant  arms 
reductions.  In  the  Middle  East,  we  were 
instrumental  in  ending  the  fighting  in 
Lebanon  and  evacuating  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization] 
forces.  We  are  working  now  to  achieve 
the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  from 
that  embattled  country.  In  Africa,  we 
have  achieved,  in  consultation  and 
cooperation  with  our  allies,  major  prog- 
ress toward  an  agreement  to  bring 
freedom  to  the  people  of  Namibia,  and 
long-term  security,  freedom,  and 
development  to  southern  Africa.  In 
Latin  America,  we  are  working  with  the 
democracies  to  lift  their  burden  of 
poverty  and  encourage  the  social 
development  so  necessary  for  progress 
and  stability.  And  also,  in  the  area  of 
nuclear  proliferation,  we  are  working  to 
halt  the  spread  of  equipment  and 
technology  which  could  be  used  to 
manufacture  weapons,  while  still 
responding  as  a  reliable  supplier  to  those 
countries  with  legitimate  energy  needs. 

All  of  the  approaches  and  policies 
reflect  my  overriding  goal  as  Presi- 
dent—to do  everything  I  can  to  help  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  peace.  We  will  be  sec- 
ond to  none  in  that  quest— and  we 
welcome  others  in  that  noblest  of  goals. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  Western 
Europe— with  the  exception  of  Great 
Britain— could  soon  be  of  minor  im- 
portance to  the  United  States?  By  the 
end  of  this  century.  Western  Europe 
would  become  as  dependent  on  the 
Soviet  Union  as  Finland  is  today.  This 
could  come  about  as  a  result  of  sweep- 
ing socialist  policies,  too  much 
economic  and  financial  aid  for 
Eastern  European  countries  and  not 
enough  willingness  to  defend  their 
own.  What  are  your  views  on  that 
thesis? 


A.  In  my  meetings  with  European 
leaders  over  the  past  2  years,  I  have 
been  struck  by  the  dramatic  contrast 
between  such  a  thesis  and  reality.  I  have 
found  deep  common  dedication  to  NATO 
and  the  unanimous  acceptance  of  our 
shared  responsibility  for  a  strong 
defense  in  the  interest  of  a  stable  and 
secure  peace. 

The  Atlantic  relationship  is  strong 
because  the  fundamental  principles 
which  unite  us  endure.  Our  democracies 
are  linked  in  history,  culture,  values,  and 
interests.  The  original  reason  for 
NATO— the  Soviet  threat  to  Western 
European  political  and  security  in- 
dependence— persists  and  will  continue 
to  be  the  central  foreign  policy  challenge 
facing  us.  We  continue  to  believe  that 
Western  European  and  American  securi- 
ty are  indivisible  and  that  NATO  re- 
mains the  safest,  most  effective,  and 
least  costly  way  to  meet  the  Soviet 
threat. 

There  will,  of  course,  continue  to  be 
differences  in  approach  among  us  in 
reaching  our  shared  goals.  Our  nations 
cannot  be  insulated  from  the  heat  and 
light  generated  by  the  democratic  proc- 
ess. It  is  precisely  our  democratic  values 
and  purposes  which  give  our  alliance 
relevance  and  enduring  strength.  Our 
differences  concern  how  best  to  shape 
our  relationship,  not  whether  it  should 
exist. 

I  can  assure  you  that  the  Atlantic 
relationship  remains  central  to  American 
foreign  policy.  I  underscored  the  con- 
stancy of  this  commitment  at  the  Bonn 
summit  last  June  when  I  stated: 
"...  There  is  an  inseparable  link  be- 
tween the  security  of  all  and  the  security 
of  each.  ...  I  want  to  reaffirm  in  un- 
mistakable terms  adherence  to  this  prin- 
ciple .  .  .  that  a  healthy,  vigorous,  and 
effective  alliance  remains  the  foundation 
of  American  foreign  policy.  ..." 

Q.  What  is  the  basic  philosophy  of 
your  disarmament  policy? 

A.  We  believe  that  arms  must  not 
only  be  controlled,  they  must  be 
significantly  reduced  if  we  are  to  secure 
life  and  liberty.  Since  the  concept  of 
deterrence  has  kept  the  peace  longer 
than  any  other,  we  believe  there  must  be 
a  stable  balance,  both  conventional  and 
nuclear,  so  that  aggressors  will  never  be 
tempted  and  war  will  never  occur. 

In  November  1981,  I  outlined 
America's  goals  for  arms  control  and 
listed  the  principles  behind  all  our  arms 
control  negotiations. 


The  first  principle  is  that  reduct  a 
should  be  substantial  and  militari]\' 
significant.  We  must  make  a  brr.il. 
the  approach  in  past  negotiation^,  w 
did  nothing  but  ratify  ever-highfi'  1.' 
of  arms  on  both  sides.  At  the  strn it- 
nuclear  level,  we  have  made  a  \n-']»  : 
to  cut  ballistic  missiles  by  about  hall 
from  current  U.S.  levels  and  warln'; 
by  roughly  a  third.  At  the  intern i.m I  - 
range  nuclear  level,  our  goal  is  tin-  <  i 
plete  elimination  of  the  most  di-sial. 
ing  systems  of  land-based,  longer  r: 
missiles.  What  a  contribution  to  \\n 
security  that  would  be:  to  banish  an  i 
tire  class  of  threatening  nuclear 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  F]artl  ' 
conventional  forces  in  Europe,  w-  a 
with  our  allies  are  offering  to  niaki- 
reductions  to  700,000  ground  fm-rv,  : 
900,000  ground  and  air  forces  oiinl  - 

The  second  principle  is  equal  re  i; 
for  similar  types  of  forces.  We  Ik- I  it 
that  stability  can  best  be  assured  In  i 
even  balance.  We  do  not  believe  th:  t 
Soviet  Union  is  entitled  to  have  an 
arsenal  as  large  as  the  total  of  the  i 
of  the  world. 

The  third  principle  is  effective 
verification.  In  view  of  Soviet  viola  n 
of  existing  treaties,  including  those  !r 
ning  chemical  and  biological  weapm 
we  must  have  confidence  that  an  ai  e 
ment  we  sign  to  limit  weapons  will 
observed  by  both  sides. 

Central  to  my  arms  reduction 
philosophy  has  been  close  consultat 
with  our  allies.  Through  NATO 
organizations  such  as  the  Special  C 
sultative  Group,  through  multilater, 
and  bilateral  meetings,  we  have  ilis 
cussed  fully  our  approaches  to  the  i  j 
negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union,  i' 
the  U.S.  positions  in  INF  [intermed  t 
range  nuclear  forces]  and  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks]  neg  i; 
tions  have  the  full  support  of  the 
alliance.  I  doubt  if  there've  ever  het 
closer  consultations  in  the  allianee  t  .i 
those  we've  had  on  the  INF  talks.    , 

The  arms  reduction  program  w  |1 
we've  initiated  contains  the  most  co^ 
prehensive  set  of  proposals  put  for\T 
by  any  American  Government.  We  ^' 
committed  to  successful  negotiatmr 
and  we  believe  there  is  a  basis  f<  >r  ;  > 
ment  if  the  Soviets  show  equal 
seriousness. 

Q.  In  addition  to  the  zero-optii. 
as  an  interim  solution  you  recent! 
suggested,  under  pressure  from  tl 
European  allies,  to  break  the  imp  » 
at  the  Geneva  conference.  How  m  J 


Department  of  State  Bu»t 


THE  PRESIDENT 


0  missiles  would  the  Soviets  now 
to  withdraw  in  order  for  the 

(d  States  not  to  station  the 
ling  II? 

..  No  pressure  from  the  allies  was 
^ed  in  the  development  of  our  most 
t  proposal  in  Geneva.  Rather,  it 
;ed  from  our  intensive  and  ongoing 
Itative  process.  In  my  speech  of 
li  13,  I  proposed  an  interim  solution 
IF  to  the  Soviet  Union  which  calls 
le  reduction  of  planned  U.S. 
yments  of  Pershing  II  and  cruise 
es  and  actual  Soviet  SS-20 
yments  to  equal  levels  of  warheads 
global  basis.  We  did  not  propose  a 
"ic  figure,  because  we  are  maintain- 
laximum  flexibility  in  reaching  an 
ment  at  equitable  and  verifiable 
.  The  ball  is  now  in  the  Soviet 
.  We  still  believe  the  elimination  of 
itire  class  of  longer  range  and 
jased  INF  missiles  to  be  the  best 
on,  and  it  is  a  goal  toward  which 
)pe  to  negotiate  an  accord  following 
ment  on  an  interim  solution. 

.  You  recently  talked  about  your 
to  secure  world  peace  through 
iventional  weapons.  Could  you  be 
specific?  Critics  fear  that  you 
i  move  the  battlefield  from  Earth 
jpace. 

When  I  discussed  a  strategic 
i;e  initiative  in  my  speech  of 
i|  23,  I  noted  that  for  the  last 
|il  decades,  U.S.  nuclear  deterrence 

1  has  relied  heavily,  almost  ex- 

j3ly,  upon  the  deterrent  provided  by 
ffensive  nuclear  forces.  This  con- 
;'f  deterrence  is  based  on  the 
jse  that  neither  side  would  initiate 
lack  because  of  the  catastrophic 
nuences;  the  costs  of  such  an  at- 
would  far  outweigh  any  possible 
\  This  concept  has  led  to  the 
Dpment  of  offensive  ballistic  missile 
:  by  both  the  United  States  and  the 
i;  Union.  I  envision  a  day  when  we 
rise  our  reliance  on  offense  and 
nize  the  potential  contribution  of 
jective  defense.  Strategic  missiles 
e  most  destabilizing  form  of 
kr  weaponry.  Measures  to  protect 
!ves,  our  families,  and  our  coun- 
E'rom  their  devastation  should  add 
I  ives  for  arms  control  and  provide 
srelief  from  fear. 
Ttainly  there  are  drawbacks  and 
;  lal  (il)stacles  to  this  new  concept. 
le  specter  of  nuclear  holocaust  and 
f  us  pointing  a  cocked  gun  at  the 
IS  unacceptable.  Research  into 


defensive  systems  could  free  our  popula- 
tions from  serving  as  hostages  under- 
writing the  peace.  So,  I  decided  to  direct 
a  major  review  of  technologies  and  other 
areas  related  to  defensive  systems  in 
order  to  assess  how  our  security  and 
that  of  our  allies  can  rely  on  this  ap- 
proach. 

We  are  not  proposing  a  specific 
weapon  system  but  have  begun  basic 
research  that  could  lead  to  development 
by  the  turn  of  the  century.  It  is  too 
early  now  to  identify  specific  systems. 
We  will  abide  by  all  existing  treaties  as 
we  do  this  research  and  will  consult 
closely  in  the  alliance.  Once  developed, 
we  hope  that  defense  against  ballistic 
missiles  would  be  fully  integrated  into 
the  arms  control  process. 

And,  no,  we  are  not  taking  the  arms 
race  into  space.  The  Soviets  have  the 
only  operating  antisatellite  weapon. 
They  rejected  our  proposals  in  1979  to 
abolish  all  such  weapons,  and  they  are 
continuing  a  massive  research  program 
for  space-based  weapons.  Sadly,  again, 
their  words— recently  reiterated— about 
peaceful  uses  of  space  are  belied  by  their 
deeds. 

Q.  Do  you  think  a  nuclear  war 
limited  to  Europe  is  a  possibility? 

A.  Let  me,  first  of  all,  emphasize 
that  our  policy  is  aimed  at  preventing 
conflict  and  settling  differences  peaceful- 
ly. We  and  our  allies  will  not  use  any  of 
our  weapons,  except  in  response  to  ag- 
gression. 

I  don't  believe  a  limited  nuclear  war 
is  possible.  Throughout  the  postwar 
years,  the  United  States  has  made  clear 
that  U.S.  strategic  forces  are  coupled  to 
the  defense  of  Western  Europe.  In  1979 
NATO  reinforced  that  link  with  its  dual- 
track  decision  to  deploy  longer  range 
INF  missiles  in  five  basing  countries  in 
NATO  Europe  unless  an  arms  agree- 
ment with  the  Soviet  Union  made 
deployment  unnecessary.  The  deploy- 
ment of  Pershing  II  and  ground- 
launched  cruise  missiles  will  provide  an 
unbroken  spectrum  of  deterrence  of 
potential  Soviet  aggression— from  con- 
ventional forces  to  strategic  nuclear 
systems  in  the  United  States.  Striking 
confirmation  of  how  U.S.  forces  are 
coupled  to  the  defense  of  Western 
Europe  was  provided  by  none  other  than 
Soviet  Defense  Minister  Dimitriy 
Ustinov  on  April  6  in  East  Germany:  "If 
Washington  is  calculating  that  we  will 
retaliate  to  the  use  of  Pershings  and 
cruise  missiles  only  against  targets  in 
West  Europe,  it  is  profoundly  deluded. 
Retribution  will  inevitably  follow  against 
the  United  States  itself,  too." 


Like  all  of  NATO's  weapons,  the 
ground-launched  cruise  missiles  and 
Pershing  II's  were  developed  not  to  be 
fired  but  to  deter  war.  If  we  maintain  a 
balance  of  force,  there  will  be  no  aggres- 
sion, and  NATO  will  successfully  keep 
the  peace  for  another  four  decades. 

Q.  Your  economic  policies  have 
come  under  attack  from  Europe's 
social  democratic  governments. 
Recovery  is  now  underway  in  the 
United  States  and  West  Germany.  Is 
the  worst  of  the  slump  over,  or  is 
there  still  a  danger  that  mounting  na- 
tional debts  by  Latin  American  and 
Eastern  European  countries  will 
throw  us  into  a  world  economic  crisis? 

A.  The  positive  figures  for  U.S. 
GNP  growth  in  the  first  quarter  and  a 
plateful  of  other  bright  economic  signals 
indicate  that  the  worst  of  the  slump  is 
behind  us.  Inflation  is  still  under  control, 
and  interest  rates  continue  to  fall. 

The  recovery  now  underway  in 
several  major  countries  is  the  key  to 
easing  the  financial  pressure  on  many 
developing  countries  in  Latin  America 
and  elsewhere.  If  we  keep  our  markets 
open  and  resume  a  high  level  of  interna- 
tional trade,  then  international  debts  can 
be  serviced.  We  are  strengthening  the 
resources  of  key  international  institu- 
tions such  as  the  International  Monetary 
Fund.  So,  while  we  are  still  not  out  of 
the  woods,  I  am  increasingly  optimistic 
about  the  future  of  the  world  economy. 

In  a  few  weeks  Chancellor  Kohl  and 
I  will  join  our  counterparts  from  other 
industrialized  countries  at  the 
Williamsburg  economic  summit  and  com- 
pare notes  on  the  brightening  of  the 
world  economic  picture  since  our  last 
summit  in  Versailles  and  consider  how 
we  can  work  more  closely  together  to 
sustain  the  recovery. 

Q.  With  the  invention  of  the  steam 
engine,  many  people  feared  for  their 
jobs.  Today  the  electronic  revolution 
has  already  replaced  jobs  once  per- 
formed by  people.  What  needs  to  be 
done  to  turn  this  trend  into  a  positive 
development? 

A.  L'nfortunately  some  of  the 
unemployment  which  is  due  to  structural 
changes  within  our  economies  will  not  be 
eliminated  with  the  economic  recovery 
which  has  begun  in  both  Germany  and 
the  United  States.  Some  people  who  lost 
their  jobs  will  never  regain  the  positions 
they  lost  because  of  technological 
change;  the  jobs  of  the  future  will  in- 
creasingly lie  in  high-technology  and 
service  industries,  and  training  for  those 
types  of  positions  is  essential. 


^983 


25 


THE  PRESIDENT 


We  industrial  nations  must  never 
turn  our  backs  on  our  basic  industries— 
we  will  always  need  them.  But  neither 
must  we  attempt  to  prop  up  industries 
employing  outmoded  means  of  produc- 
tion. We  must  encourage  our  firms  to 
retool  and  our  workers  to  retrain.  And 
we  should  allow  market  incentives  to  en- 
courage the  flow  of  resources— labor 
and  capital— into  modern  methods  of 
production  and  new  industries.  Here  in 
the  United  States,  the  tax  laws  of  1981 
and  1982  contain  important  provisions 
which  encourage  investment  in  new 
machinery  and  equipment. 

Clearly,  if  our  workers  are  to  find  • 
jobs  in  this  new  age  of  technology,  they 
must  begin  now  to  learn  the  skills  that 
will  be  needed.  We  have  recently  begun 
a  publicly  funded  job  training  program 
here,  but  the  bulk  of  the  retraining  must 
be  done  by  the  private  sector.  After  all, 
the  individual  firms  in  the  private 
economy  know  far  better  than  do  we  in 
government  exactly  which  skills  they 
will  need  in  the  future.  By  matching  the 
skills  of  our  people  to  the  demands  of 
the  labor,  we  will  turn  the  electronic 
revolution  to  our  advantage.  Our  people 
will  then  enjoy  the  increase  in  real  quali- 
ty of  life  that  will  be  possible  through 
modern,  efficient  technology  on  our 
farms,  in  our  factories,  and  in  our  of- 
fices. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  special 
message  for  the  German  people? 

A.  The  peoples  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Federal  Republic  are  bound 
together  through  their  shared  values, 
beliefs,  and  interests.  Together  we  will 
face  many  challenges  in  the  coming 
years.  I  am  confident  that  we  will  meet 
those  challenges  successfully  because  of 
our  deep  commitment  to  Western 
values,  our  belief  in  democracy,  and  our 
faith  in  God.  We  are  dedicated  to  the 
peaceful  competition  of  ideas  and  in- 
dividual and  national  freedom.  The 
Federal  Republic  and  the  United  States 
are  firmly  devoted  to  the  cause  of  peace, 
and  we  will  maintain  the  defensive 
forces  necessary  to  ensure  our  security. 

At  the  same  time,  we  will  be  untir- 
ing in  our  efforts  to  reduce  the  threat  of 
war  through  negotiations  in  Geneva,  in 
Vienna,  in  Madrid,  and  wherever  the 
possibility  of  progress  toward  a  more 
secure  future  exists.  The  United  States 
has  made  proposals,  endorsed  by  our 
allies  and  supported  by  the  peoples  of 
the  Western  democracies,  to  reduce 
drastically  the  warheads  on  strategic 


ballistic  missiles,  to  eliminate  an  entire 
category  of  nuclear  weapons,  to  ban 
chemical  weapons,  reduce  to  equal  levels 
of  military  personnel  for  the  Warsaw 
Pact  and  NATO  in  central  Europe,  and 
halt  the  destabilizing  spread  of  nuclear 
weapons  to  new  countries  and  volatile 
regions  of  the  world.  I  hope  the  Soviet 
Union  will  join  with  the  German  and 
American  people  in  our  mutual  efforts 
to  build  a  cathedral  of  peace  as  the  peo- 
ple of  Cologne  built  theirs — with  the 
deepest  commitment  and  dedication.  As 
I  said  to  your  Bundestag  last  June,  "if 
we  construct  the  peace  properly,  it  will 
endure  as  long  as  the  spires  of  Cologne." 

Q.  They  say  the  burden  of  his  of- 
fice makes  the  President  the  loneliest 
man  in  the  world.  Do  you  feel  lonely? 

A.  How  could  I  feel  lonely  with  so 
many  people  giving  me  advice?  But  I 
know  what  you're  asking  and  the  ques- 
tion is  yes  and  no.  Yes,  to  the  extent 
that  I  know  the  responsibility  for  so 
many  critical  things  is  based  on  my  deci- 
sions. It  is  sometimes  staggering  for  a 
President  to  think  that  his  decisions  will 
affect  230  million  people  in  the  United 
States  and  billions  around  the  world. 

But,  at  the  same  time,  I'll  give  you  a 
no  answer  for  several  reasons.  First,  a 
faith  which  gives  me  a  sense  of  strength 
and  also  a  sense  of  continuity  with 
others  who  have  held  this  office  through 
even  more  critical  times.  President 
Lincoln,  for  example.  Second,  Nancy 
shares  with  me  my  life;  she  is  my  part- 
ner in  this  life,  and  she  is  always  there. 
And  third,  well,  I  wish  you  could  read 
the  letters  I  get  from  people  sending  me 
their  prayers.  They  pray  for  my  well- 
being,  and  I  can't  tell  you  what  a  warm 
feeling  that  is. 

Q.  What  has  been  your  biggest 
disappointment  during  your  Presiden- 
cy? And  what  was  your  happiest  ex- 
perience? 

A.  Most  disappointing,  well,  let  me 
tell  you  my  saddest  experience,  because 
it  is  so  fresh  in  my  mind.  Nancy  and  I 
went  out  last  week  to  Andrews  Air 
Force  Base  to  meet  the  bodies  of  those 
Americans  who  were  killed  in  the  blast 
in  Beirut.  There  was  a  ceremony  in  a 
hangar  with  the  flag-draped  coffins.  I 
gave  some  remarks  which  were  very  dif- 
ficult to  get  through,  because  they  told 
exactly  what  these  people  meant  to  the 
country.  And  sitting  in  front  of  me  were 
the  families,  and  it  was  obvious  what 
these  dead  Americans  meant  to  them. 
Nancy  and  I  walked  up  and  down 


several  rows  of  family  members  e.vi 
ing  our  sorrow  as  best  we  could  ai'i 
ing  to  be  of  some  comfort  in  k-ttin 
them  know  the  nation  appreciated  . 
loved  ones'  sacrifice.  But  there  \\  .i  i 
an  overwhelming  sense  of  loss  tlia  . 
were  the  only  release. 

Now,  as  for  the  happiest  e.xpe  r 
that's  tough,  because  we  have  bee  n 
happy  here.  Right  at  the  beginninjd 
the  Administration  it  was  a  very  \  >] 
time  welcoming  home  the  hostaLie  r 
Iran.  Of  course,  there  were  seme 
economic  victories  on  Capitol  Hill 
the  fact  that  the  economy  is  fmall 
starting  to  move.  Those  were  e\ 
hilarating  days  when  the  space  -hi 
made  their  beautiful  landings  mil    t 
desert.  My  visit  to  your  countr\  I; 
year  was  a  most  satisfying  ex]iiri.  > 
suppose  I  could  go  on  and  on  w  ul 
memories  and  you  wouldn't  ha\  e 
room  to  put  my  answers  to  the  m  r 
questions. 

Q.  What  is  your  personal  sec  t 
for  keeping  so  youthful,  dynami  a 
full  of  energy? 

A.  I'm  often  accused  of  bein^ 
timist,  but  I  think  that  really  help  1 
helps  you  over  a  lot  of  things.  1  d  t 
believe  it's  a  secret  that  having  tli 
warmth  of  a  loving  woman  like  X  :; 
also  makes  life  worthwhile  and  ei 
joyable.  As  for  full  of  energy,  I  h: 
gym  right  here  in  the  White  li^ia  ' 
working  out.  I've  added  an  incli  a 
half  to  my  chest  in  the  process.  S 
ing  active  is  very  important.  .\ii'l 
said  this  before,  but  there's  neilni  n 
ter  for  the  insides  of  a  man  than 
outsides  of  a  horse.  Here  in  \\a,-l  i 
and  at  Camp  David,  I  ride  as  "(\r  i 
can  a  handsome  Hanoverian.  1  jii^  I 
the  positives  of  life  add  up  if  ymi 
them. 

Q.  In  November  of  last  year 
Austria  gave  you  a  "live"  prescn  - 
Lippizaner  horse.  Considering  y  r 
busy  schedule  and  many  obligati  is 
have  you  ever  been  able  at  all  ton 
Amadeus? 

A.  The  copy  of  your  magazim  i 
you  shared  with  me  brought  baek 
memories  of  that  marvelous  prest  a 
tion  of  the  Lippizaners  on  the  Soi  i 
Lawn  last  fall.  So  far,  the  laws  reiii 
Amadeus  to  be  quarantined  haver 
allowed  me  the  opportunity  to  rid  th 
magnificent  horse,  but  I  hope  in  c  s< 


^Text  from  Weekly  Compilati 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  1 


Department  of  State  Ell« 


THE  PRESIDENT 


ssident's  Radio  Address  of  May  21 


year  we  set  aside  a  special  day  to 
pecial  tribute  to  our  men  and 
!n  in  uniform.  Today  is  Armed 
IS  Day  and,  on  behalf  of  a  grateful 
1,  I  would  like  to  offer  them  our 
:s  and  appreciation, 
heir  job  is  unusually  difficult  not 
)ecause  it  involves  hardship  and 
;r,  or  because  it  requires  long 
is  away  from  families  and  loved 
or  even  because  it  may  demand 
iving  of  one's  life  in  defense  of  our 
1.  The  difficulty  of  the  military  pro- 
n  grows  out  of  these  plus  the  fact 
)ur  service  men  and  women  are 
's  faced  with  several  of  the  most 
.mental  questions  we  ask  as  in- 
lals  and  as  a  nation— the  questions 
r  and  peace  and  the  use  of  force  in 
orld. 

mericans  have  asked  these  ques- 
again  and  again  for  more  than  200 
.  They're  still  debating  them  today, 
.ps  the  reason  these  questions  per- 
because  there  are  no  easy 
!rs.  The  answers  lie  in  seeming 
lOxes,  underlying  truths  that  may 
r  contradictory  on  the  surface, 
le  most  fundamental  paradox  is 
'  we're  never  to  use  force,  we  must 
spared  to  use  it  and  to  use  it  suc- 
lly.  We  Americans  don't  want  war 
e  don't  start  fights.  We  don't 
ain  a  strong  military  force  to  con- 
)r  coerce  others.  The  purpose  of 
ilitary  is  simple  and  straightfor- 
We  want  to  prevent  war  by  deter- 
thers  from  the  aggression  that 
5  war.  If  our  efforts  are  successful, 
11  have  peace  and  never  be  forced 
attle.  There  will  never  be  a  need  to 
single  shot.  That's  the  paradox  of 
j-ence. 

He  men  and  women  in  our  Armed 
(s  also  live  with  a  second  paradox, 
spend  their  entire  time  in  service 
ig  to  fight  and  preparing  for  a  war 
we  and  they  pray  will  never  come, 
lividuals,  these  men  and  women 
peace  as  much  as  we  do  as  a  na- 
n  fact,  they  want  it  even  more. 


because  they  understand  that  war  is  not 
the  romantic  heroism  we  read  about  in 
novels  or  see  in  the  movies  but  the  stark 
truth  of  suffering  and  sacrifice  and  the 
slain  promise  of  youth. 

Our  service  men  and  women  know 
first-hand  the  horrors  of  war  and  the 
blessings  of  peace,  but  they  also  know 
that  just  wanting  peace  is  not  enough  to 
guarantee  that  peace  will  be  sustained. 
As  George  Washington  said,  "To  be 
prepared  for  war  is  one  of  the  most  ef- 
fectual ways  of  preserving  peace." 

Today,  Americans  are  again  asking 
important  questions  about  war  and 
peace.  Many  have  been  debating  two 
very  important  questions:  How  could  we 
prevent  nuclear  war,  and  how  could  we 
reduce  American  and  Soviet  nuclear 
arsenals? 

The  answers  to  these  questions  are 
not  found  in  simple  slogans,  but  again, 
in  paradoxes.  To  prevent  nuclear  war, 
we  must  have  the  capability  to  deter 
nuclear  war.  This  means  we  must  keep 
our  strategic  forces  strong  enough  to 
balance  those  of  the  Soviet  Union. 

It  must  be  absolutely  clear  to  the 
Soviets  that  they  would  have  no  con- 
ceivable advantage  in  threatening  or 
starting  a  nuclear  war.  In  seeking  to 
reduce  American  and  Soviet  nuclear 
arsenals,  we  must  convince  the  Soviet 
Union  that  it  is  in  our  mutual  interest  to 
agree  to  significant,  mutual  arms  reduc- 
tions. And  to  do  that,  we  cannot  allow 
the  current  nuclear  imbalance  to  con- 
tinue. We  must  show  the  Soviets"  that 
we're  determined  to  spend  what  it  takes 
to  deter  war.  Once  they  understand 
that,  we  have  a  real  chance  of  suc- 
cessfully reaching  arms  reduction 
agreements. 


Last  month  I  sent  to  the  Congress  a 
proposal  to  modernize  our  intercontinen- 
tal ballistic  missile  force.  By  building  the 
MX  Peacekeeper  and  small,  single 
warhead  missiles,  we  will  not  only 
preserve  our  ability  to  protect  the  peace, 
we  will  also  demonstrate  that  any  Soviet 
quest  for  nuclear  superiority  will  not 
work,  that  it  is  in  everyone's  interest  to 
end  the  arms  race  and  to  agree  to 
mutual  arms  reductions. 

There's  a  direct  relationship  between 
modernization  programs,  like  the  MX 
Peacekeeper,  and  the  twin  objectives  of 
deterrence  and  arms  control.  The  MX 
and  other  modernization  measures  will 
help  us  to  achieve  our  fundamental  goal, 
and  that  is  to  strengthen  the  peace  by 
seeking  arms  reduction  agreements  that 
make  for  more  security  and  stability  by 
reducing  overall  force  levels  while  per- 
mitting the  modernization  of  our  forces 
needed  for  a  credible  deterrent. 

I  know  that  the  paradox  of  peace 
through  a  credible  military  posture  may 
be  difficult  for  some  people  to  accept. 
Some  even  argue  that  if  we  really 
wanted  to  reduce  nuclear  weapons,  we 
should  simply  stop  building  them 
ourselves.  That  argument  makes  about 
as  much  sense  as  saying  that  the  way  to 
prevent  fires  is  to  close  down  the  fire 
department.  It  ignores  one  of  the  most 
basic  lessons  of  history,  a  lesson  that 
was  learned  by  bitter  experience  and 
passed  down  to  us  by  previous  genera- 
tions. 

Tyrants  are  tempted  by  weakness, 
and  peace  and  freedom  can  only  be 
preserved  by  strength.  So,  let  us  resolve 
today,  as  we  honor  the  brave  men  and 
women  who  serve  in  our  Armed  Forces, 
to  give  them  the  support  they  need  to 
protect  our  cherished  liberties  and 
preserve  the  peace  for  ourselves  and  our 
children. 


Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presi- 
dential Documents  of  May  30,  1983.  ■ 


THE  PRESIDENT 


President  Addresses 
Cuban-American  Community 


President  Reagan's  remarks  at  the 
Cuban  Independence  Day  celebration, 
Miami,  Florida,  on  May  20,  1983.^ 

It's  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  be  with  a 
group  of  Americans  who  have  demon- 
strated how  much  can  be  accomplished 
when  people  are  free.  Many  of  you  ar- 
rived in  this  country  with  little  more 
than  the  shirts  on  your  backs  and  a 
desire  to  improve  your  well-being  and 
that  of  your  family.  You  came  with  a 
willingness  to  work  and,  yes,  a  consum- 
ing passion  for  liberty.  There's  a  name 
for  this  kind  of  spirit.  It's  called  the 
American  spirit,  and  there's  no  limit  to 
what  it  can  do. 

But  let  me  interrupt  myself  here  and 
say  something  about  that  American 
spirit.  We  could  also  say  it's  a  Western 
Hemisphere  spirit,  because  one  of  the 
great,  unique  things  about  this  Western 
Hemisphere  is  that  in  all  of  our  coun- 
tries—yours, from  the  islands  of  the 
Caribbean  to  South,  to  Central  America, 
and  to  North  America,  from  the  South 
Pole  to  the  North  Pole,  with  all  of  our 
countries,  we  can  cross  the  boundary 
line  into  another  country,  and  we're  still 
surrounded  by  Americans,  because  we 
are  all  Americans  here  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

Examples  of  this  spirit  abound. 
Jorge  Mas,  chairman  of  the  Cuban- 
American  National  Foundation,  came 
here  20  years  ago,  worked  as  a  milkman 
to  support  himself.  Today  he  owns  a 
construction  company  that  provides  hun- 
dreds of  people  with  meaningful  employ- 
ment. And  when  he  isn't  running  his 
company,  he's  immersed  in  activities  like 
this  one,  trying  to  protect  the  freedom 
that  has  been  so  important  in  his  life. 
Jorge  Mas,  thank  you  for  all  that  you've 
done  and  all  you're  doing. 

But  Jorge's  success  story  is  no 
isolated  example.  There  are  so  many. 
You  know  them— people  like  Armando 
Codina  who  came  here  alone  as  a  child, 
his  parents  unable  to  leave  Cuba,  so  he 
was  sent  to  an  orphanage  and  then  to  a 
foster  home.  It  took  courage  for  this  lit- 
tle boy  to  begin  his  new  life.  But  now,  at 
35,  he  has  a  string  of  business  ac- 
complishments of  which  any  individual 
many  years  his  senior  would  be  proud. 
The  world  renowned  ballet  dancer, 
Fernando  Bujones,  is  a  Cuban 
American. 


In  my  Administration,  we  have  Jose 
Manuel  Casanova.  He  is  the  U.S.  Ex- 
ecutive Director  of  the  Inter-American 
Development  Bank. 

And  I  have  an  announcement  to 
make  today  that  concerns  another 
outstanding  Cuban  American,  Dr.  Jose 
Sorzano.  He  is  currently  our  Represent- 
ative on  the  Economic  and  Social  Coun- 
cil of  the  United  Nations.  He's  a 
distinguished  scholar,  specializing  in 
political  philosophy,  history,  and  Latin 
America.  And  I  want  you  to  know— to 
be  the  first  to  know— that  1  intend  to 
nominate  Dr.  Sorzano  to  be  one  of  our 
nation's  highest  diplomats,  to  the  post  of 
Deputy  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations. 

One  of  the  TV  cameramen  with  us 
today  is  Eduardo  Suarez.  He  came  to 
America  just  a  few  short  years  ago  and 
recently  won  a  Florida  Emmy  for  his  ex- 
cellence as  a  television  news  photog- 
rapher. Eduardo,  congratulations. 

The  list  goes  on  and  on.  People  from 
every  walk  of  life,  of  every  race  and 
family  background,  have  made  their 
mark  in  just  about  every  corner  of 
American  society.  A  few  months  ago,  I 
was  honored  to  welcome  to  the  White 
House  a  famous  runner,  Alberto 
Salazar.  I  didn't  know  what  to  say.  He 
gave  me  a  pair  of  running  shoes— 
[laughter]— but  I'm  not  sure  what  kind 
of  a  race  he  wanted  me  to  run  in. 
[Laughter] 

Clearly,  this  country  in  America,  the 
United  States,  has  been  good  for  you. 
But  you  have  also  been  good  for  all  of 
America  and  for  the  United  States.  And, 
I  add,  for  Miami.  Twenty-five  years  ago, 
there  were  those  who  thought  Miami 
had  reached  its  peak  and  was  on  the 
way  down.  The  economy  seemed  stag- 
nant. There  was  little  hope  in  sight.  To- 
day, Miami  is  a  vibrant  international 
center,  a  gateway  to  Latin  America. 

The  stark  contrast  between  your  life 
and  that  of  the  neighbors  and  loved  ones 
that  you  left  behind  in  Cuba  stands  as 
evidence  to  the  relationship  between 
freedom  and  prosperity. 

About  10  million  people  still  live  in 
Cuba,  as  compared  to  about  1  million 
Cuban  Americans— people  with  the 
same  traditions  and  cultural  heritage. 
Yet  the  Cubans  in  the  United  States, 
with  only  one-tenth  the  number,  produce 
almost  two  times  the  wealth  of  those 


they  left  behind.  So,  don't  let  anyon 
fool  you:  What's  happening  in  Cuba 
not  a  failure  of  the  Cuban  people;  it 
failure  of  Fidel  Castro  and  of  com- 
munism. 

The  Soviet  Union  with  all  its 
military  might,  with  its  massive  suli 
of  the  Cuban  economy,  can't  make 
system  produce  anything  but  repre' 
and  terror. 

It  reminds  me  of  the  story— 11 
pen  to  collect  stories  that  the  Sovie 
pie  are  telling  each  other,  the  Russ- 
people.  It  indicates  their  cynicism  \ 
their  own  system.  This  is  a  story  o 
commissar  who  visited  one  of  their  \ 
lective  farms,  and  he  stopped  the  f 
farmer,  workman  that  he  met,  and 
asked  about  life  on  the  farm.  And 
man  said,  "It's  wonderful.  I've  nevi 
heard  anyone  complain  about  anytl 
since  I've  been  here."  And  the  com 
missar  then  said,  "Well,  what  abou 
crops?"  "Oh,"  he  said,  "the  crops  ai 
wonderful."  "What  about  the  potat 
"Oh,  sir,"  he  said,  "the  potatoes,"  h 
said,  "there  are  so  many  that  if  W6 
them  in  one  pile  they  would  touch 
foot  of  God."  And  the  commissar  s 
"Just  a  minute.  In  the  Soviet  Unio 
there  is  no  God."  And  the  farmer  ! 
"Well,  there  are  no  potatoes  eithei 
[Laughter] 

Cuban  Americans  understand 
haps  better  than  many  of  their  fell 
citizens  that  freedom  is  not  just  th 
heritage  of  the  people  of  the  Unite  j 
States.  It  is  the  birthright  of  the  p  | 
of  this  hemisphere.  We  in  the  Am(  I 
are  descended  from  hearty  souls- ' 
pioneers,  men  and  women  with  thi ' 
courage  to  leave  the  familiar  and  s  I 
fresh  in  this,  the  New  World.  We  ; 
by  and  large,  people  who  share  thi  I 
fundamental  values  of  God,  family ' 
work,  freedom,  democracy,  and  ju ' 
Perhaps  the  greatest  tie  between  \ 
be  seen  in  the  incredible  number  o 
cathedrals  and  churches  found 
throughout  the  hemisphere.  Our 
forefathers  took  the  worship  of  Gc 
seriously. 

Our  struggles  for  independenc 
the  fervor  for  liberty  unleashed  by 
noble  endeavors  bind  the  people  of: 
New  World  together.  In  the  annal 
human  freedom,  names  like  Boh'va 
Marti  rank  equally  with  Jefferson 
Washington.  These  were  individua 
courage  and  dignity,  and  they  left 
a  legacy,  a  treasure  beyond  all  im; 
tion. 


Department  of  State  B 


THE  PRESIDENT 


>Iew  Colonialism 

;  today,  a  new  colonialism  threatens 
Americas.  Insurgents,  armed  and 
jcted  by  a  faraway  power,  seek  to  im- 
e  a  philosophy  that  is  alien  to 
rything  which  we  believe  and  goes 
inst  our  birthright.  It's  a  philosophy 
t  holds  truth  and  liberty  in  contempt 
is  a  self-declared  enemy  of  the  wor- 
)  of  God.  Wherever  put  into  practice, 
as  brought  repression  and  human 
rivation.  There  is  no  clearer  example 
his  than  Cuba. 

The  people  of  Cuba  have  seen  their 
ing  independent  labor  movement— 
ch  existed  before  1959— destroyed 
I  regime  that  shouts  slogans  about 
;oncern  for  the  workers;  the  suppres- 
I  of  the  church,  including  the  right  of 
church  to  broadcast  and  print  God's 
d.  It  is  a  new  fascist  regime,  where 
dom  of  speech  and  press  of  every 
osition  group  has  been  stamped  into 
ground  with  ideological  zeal.  And  it 
5n't  stop  there.  Young  Cubans  are 
;sed  into  the  military  and  sent  to 
way  lands,  where  hundreds  have 
1  killed,  to  do  the  bidding  of  a 
ign  government,  defiling  their  hands 
'  the  blood  of  others,  not  serving 
'  own  interests,  but  propping  up 
ers  who  have  no  popular  support. 
But  the  people  of  Central  America, 
our  support  have  chosen  a  different 
se— freedom,  pluralism,  and  free 
lomic  development.  They,  and  we, 
:ommitted  to  this  course  and  will 
tolerate  Mr.  Castro's  efforts  to  pre- 
it.  They,  and  we,  want  Central 
;rica  for  Central  Americans,  and 
's  the  way  it's  going  to  be. 
rhe  declining  Castro  economy  con- 
3S  to  make  a  grotesque  joke  out  of 
deological  claims  that  Marxism  is 
!,he  people.  Nearly  a  quarter  of  a 
lUry  after  the  Cuban  revolution,  the 
in  people  continue  to  face  shortages 
rationing  of  basic  necessities.  Once 
of  the  most  prosperous  countries  in 
f  Latin  America,  it  is  rapidly  becom- 
che  most  economically  backward  in 
•egion,  thanks  to  the  communist 
;m. 

rhey  say  there  are  only  two  places 
•e  communism  works:  in  heaven 
•e  they  don't  need  it— 
L'hter]— and  in  hell,  where  they've 
idy  got  it.  [Laug:hter] 
^nd  now,  there  is  strong  evidence 
Castro  officials  are  involved  in  the 
trade,  peddling  drugs  like 


criminals,  profiting  on  the  misery  of  the 
addicted.  I  would  like  to  take  this  oppor- 
tunity to  call  on  the  Castro  regime  for 
an  accounting.  Is  this  drug  peddling  sim- 
ply the  act  of  renegade  officials,  or  is  it 
officially  sanctioned  by  the  present 
Government  of  Cuba?  The  world 
deserves  an  answer. 

On  this  day,  we  celebrate  Cuban  in- 
dependence, something  special  for  the 
people  of  the  United  States  as  well  as 
Cuba.  Eighty-five  years  ago,  we  joined 
together  and  fought  side  by  side,  shed- 
ding our  blood  to  free  Cuba  from  the 
yoke  of  colonialism.  Sadly,  we  must 
acknowledge  that  Cuba  is  no  longer  in- 
dependent. But  let  me  assure  you:  We 
will  not  let  this  same  fate  befall  others 
in  the  hemisphere.  We  will  not  permit 
the  Soviets  and  their  henchmen  in 
Havana  to  deprive  others  of  their 
freedom.  We  will  not  allow  them  to  do 
that  to  others.  And  some  day  Cuba, 
itself,  will  be  free. 


A  Time  To  Act 

The  United  States  stands  at  a  cross- 
roads. We  can  no  longer  ignore  this 
hemisphere  and  simply  hope  for  the 
best.  Jose  Marti,  the  hero  of  Cuban  in- 
dependence, a  man  who  spent  so  many 
years  of  his  life  with  us  in  the  United 
States,  said  it  well:  "It  is  not  enough  to 
come  to  the  defense  of  freedom  with 
epic  and  intermittent  efforts  when  it  is 
threatened  at  moments  that  appear 
critical.  Every  moment  is  critical  for  the 
preservation  of  freedom." 

Now  is  the  time  to  act  reasonably 
and  decisively  to  avert  a  crisis  and  pre- 
vent other  people  from  suffering  the 
same  fate  as  your  brothers  and  sisters  in 
Cuba.  Ironically,  our  biggest  obstacle  is 
not  foreign  threats  but  a  lack  of  con- 
fidence and  understanding.  There  are 
far  too  many  trying  to  find  excuses  to 
do  nothing.  If  we  are  immobilized  by 
fear  or  apathy  by  those  who  suggest 
that  because  our  friends  are  imperfect, 
we  shouldn't  help  them,  if  those  trying 
to  throw  roadblocks  in  our  path  succeed 
and  interpose  themselves  at  a  time  when 
a  crisis  could  still  be  averted,  the 
American  people  will  know  who  is 
responsible  and  judge  them  accordingly. 

But  as  I  told  the  Congress  a  few 
weeks  ago,  we've  still  got  time,  and 
there  is  much  that  can  be  done.  The 
Congress  can,  for  example,  enact  those 
trade  and  tax  provisions  of  the  Carib- 
bean Basin  Initiative  that  will  put  the 
power  of  free  enterprise  to  work  in  the 


Caribbean.  The  Congress  rightly  believes 
that  we  must  not  totally  focus  our  ef- 
forts on  building  the  military  capabilities 
of  our  friends.  I  agree.  That's  why  75% 
of  what  we've  asked  for  is  economic,  not 
military,  aid. 

But  we  must  realize  that  our  friends 
cannot  be  expected  to  stand  unarmed 
against  insurgents  who  have  been  armed 
to  the  teeth  by  the  Soviet-Cuban- 
Nicaraguan  axis.  Any  excuse  for  not 
providing  our  friends  the  weapons  they 
need  to  defend  themselves  is  a  prescrip- 
tion for  disaster.  And  again,  those  who 
advocate  ignoring  the  legitimate  defense 
needs  of  those  under  attack  will  be  held 
accountable  if  our  national  security  is 
put  in  jeopardy. 

Teddy  Roosevelt  is  known  to  have 
said,  "Speak  softly  and  carry  a  big 
stick."  Well,  there  are  plenty  of  soft 
speakers  around,  but  that's  "where  the 
similarity  ends.  [Laughter] 

Let  there  be  no  mistake.  What  hap- 
pens in  Latin  America  and  the  Carib- 
bean will  not  only  affect  our  nation  but 
also  will  shape  America's  image 
throughout  the  world.  If  we  cannot  act 
decisively  so  close  to  home,  who  will 
believe  us  anywhere?  Knowing  this,  I 
recently  nominated  a  special  envoy,  a 
strong  leader,  an  individual  eminently 
qualified  to  represent  us  in  this  vital 
region  and  to  work  closely  with  the  Con- 
gress to  ensure  the  fullest  possible  bipar- 
tisan cooperation.  He's  a  man  in  and  for 
whom  I  have  the  highest  confidence  and 
respect,  a  man  you  know  well,  former 
Senator  Richard  Stone. 

When  Senator  Stone  is  confirmed, 
he  will  be  directly  involved  with  those 
seeking  regional  solutions  to  the  prob- 
lems in  Central  America.  We  are  fully 
supportive  of  good  faith  efforts  like  the 
so-called  Contadora  Group,  seeking  to 
calm  tensions  and  avert  conflict.  We 
hope  that  they'll  be  able  to  make  prog- 
ress, and  we  welcome  the  participation 
of  all  nations  in  the  Americas  which 
have  a  vital  stake  in  Central  America. 

The  Cuban  People 

There  is,  of  course,  one  top  priority  item 
on  the  agenda  I've  yet  to  mention.  The 
Cuban  people,  as  is  the  case  in  most 
Communist  dictatorships,  have  been  cut 
off  from  information.  Many  of  the  folks 
who've  come  to  America  in  recent  years, 
for  example,  didn't  even  know  that  Cuba 
had  tens  of  thousands  of  troops  in 
Africa,  much  less  know  about  the 


1983 


THE  PRESIDENT 


casualties  they've  suffered.  The  greatest 
threats  to  dictators  hl<e  Fidel  Castro  is 
the  truth.  And  that's  why  I'm  urging  the 
Congress  to  approve  legislation  for  the 
establishment  of  Radio  Martf. 

And  let  me  state  one  thing  for  the 
record.  There  have  been  certain  threats 
made  about  jamming  the  frequency  of 
our  domestic  radio  stations  should  we 
broadcast  to  Cuba.  Such  threats  are 
evidence  of  the  frightened  and  tyran- 
nical nature  of  Castro's  regime.  I  can 
guarantee  you  today,  we  will  never  per- 
mit such  a  government  to  intimidate  us 
from  speaking  the  truth. 

Cuban  Americans  play  a  unique  role 
in  the  preservation  of  our  freedom.  Your 
Hispanic  heritage  enables  you  to  relate 
better  our  good  will  to  our  friends  in 
neighboring  countries  to  the  south.  But 
you  also  have  a  responsibility  here  at 
home.  I  think  one  of  our  most  dangerous 
problems  in  America  is  that  many  of  our 
own  people  take  our  blessed  liberty  for 
granted. 

In  1980,  a  Cuban  scholar  named 
Heberto  Padilla  came  to  the  United 
States  after  spending  20  years  under 
Castro.  He  marveled  at  what  he  saw, 
something  that  he  hadn't  even  noticed 
during  his  visit  here  20  years  ago.  When 
visiting  the  campuses  of  our  major 
universities,  he  said,  "I  am  struck  by 
something  that  will  be  obvious  to  all 
Americans:  No  one,  government  official 
or  colleague,  has  asked  me  what  I  was 
going  to  say  in  the  seminars  and  courses 
that  I'm  going  to  give  this  fall.  This  is 
new  for  me.  Simple,  but  true.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  ask  anyone  born  into  freedom 
to  realize  exactly  what  she  or  he 


Mr.  Padilla  went  on  to  explain  that 
freedom  is  invisible.  It  is  the  absence  of 
the  government  censor,  the  absence  of 
the  secret  police,  the  absence  of  an 
agent  of  repression. 

I  couldn't  help  but  think  when  those 
beautiful  young  people  were  here  sing- 
ing our  two  national  anthems,  so 
many— and  so  many  of  you— only  know 


about  the  Cuba  that  some  of  us  know 
about,  the  free  Cuba,  from  hearing  us 
talk  about  it.  And  you  have  a  great 
responsibility  to  make  sure  that  your 
sons  and  daughters,  growing  up,  know 
of  that  other  Cuba  and  share  in  your 
hopes  and  dreams.  And  we  all  have  a 
responsibility  to  see  that  our  young  peo- 
ple in  America  who  have  come  along  at 
a  later  time  know  about  a  Cuba  that  was 
free. 

Perhaps  the  best  gift  that  you  can 
give  to  your  fellow  citizens— and  you've 
already  contributed  so  much  to  our  well- 
being— is  a  better  understanding  of  that 
which  they  cannot  see— the  human 
freedom  that  surrounds  them.  Perhaps 
you  can  help  them  understand  some- 
thing that  you  know  instinctively— the 
awesome  responsibility  that  we  have  as 
Americans.  For  if  we  fail,  there  will  be 
no  place  for  free  men  to  seek  refuge.  I'm 
counting  on  you  to  help  me  explain  the 
threats  in  Central  America,  the  threats 
you  recognize  so  clearly. 

Each  generation  of  Americans  bears 
this  burden,  and  we're  grateful  to  have 
you  with  us,  sharing  this  heavy  weight 
upon  your  shoulders.  Teddy  Roosevelt,  a 
man  who  fought  alongside  your 
forefathers  for  Cuban  independence, 
said,  "We,  here  in  America,  hold  in  our 
hands  the  hope  of  the  world,  the  fate  of 
the  coming  years;  and  shame  and 
disgrace  will  be  ours  if  in  our  eyes  the 
light  of  high  resolve  is  dimmed,  if  we 
trail  in  the  dust  the  golden  hopes  of 
men." 

Today,  let  us  pledge  ourselves  to 
meet  this  sacred  responsibility.  And  let 
us  pledge  ourselves  to  the  freedom  of 
the  noble,  long-suffering  Cuban  people. 
Viva  Cuba  Libre.  Cuba,  si;  Castro,  no. 

Thank  you.  Thank  you.  Thank  you 
for  having  me  here  with  you  today,  and 
vaya  con  Dios. 


iText  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  30,  1983. 


News  Conference 
of  May  17 
(Excerpts) 


I'm  gratified  that  a  bipartisan  consen; 
on  arms  control  is  emerging  from  the 
recommendations  of  the  Scowcroft  C(  - 
mission  [President's  Commission  on 
Strategic  Forces,  chaired  by  Brent 
Scowcroft].  Their  report  combined  int 
one  package  three  of  our  top  priority 
goals— modernization,  deterrence,  an 
arms  control.  And  I'm  integrating  thf  ^ 
arms  control  recommendations  into  o 
START  [strategic  arms  reduction  tall 
proposals.  I  will  also  support  their  pr  \ 
posals  to  develop  a  small,  single-         I 
warhead  missile  for  more  stable  detei  [ 
rence  in  the  future.  I 

Many  in  the  Congress  have  share  i 
their  thinking  on  arms  control  with  u  .■ 
Close  cooperation  can  show  the  Sovie  I 
that  we  Americans  stand  united,  reac  t 
to  negotiate  in  good  faith  until  we  su  i 
ceed  in  reducing  the  level  of  nuclear  I 
weapons  on  both  sides.  I 

Working  together  and  exploring  I 
tiatives  such  as  a  proposed  mutual  bi  I 
down  of  strategic  nUclear  forces,  we  i 
keep  America  strong  and  achieve  arr  i 
reductions  that  strengthen  the  peace  I 
and  benefit  all  mankind.  I  congratula 
both  Appropriations  Committees  for  ■ 
their  bipartisan  approval  of  the  MX  ' 
Peacekeeper  missile,  recommended  b ' 
the  Scowcroft  Commission.  I  look  foi! 
ward  to  prompt  approval  of  this  vital 
program  by  the  full  House  and  Senat 
It'll  be  one  of  the  most  important  arr  i 
control  votes  of  the  98th  Congress.    ■ 

The  Scowcroft  Commission 
demonstrated  it  could  take  a  comple> 
issue  and  achieve  bipartisan  agreeme 
The  question  now  is  whether  the  Con 
gress  can  also  reach  a  consensus  witl) 
resolution  and  unity  to  strengthen  qui 
national  security,  reduce  the  risk  of  \l 
and,  ultimately,  achieve  reductions  ol- 
nuclear  weapons.  ' 


Q.  With  the  Syrians  balking  at  i 
joining  the  Middle  East  negotiatioi 
how  will  you  and  Ambassador  Hab 
[Philip  C.Habib.  special  represents 
tive  of  the  President  to  the  Middle 
East]  manage  to  encourage  them  tc 
take  part  in  the  withdrawal?  And, 
really,  what  reason  do  you  have  to 
optimistic  that  this  will  take  place'. 


30 


Department  of  State  Bull' 


THE  PRESIDENT 


..  For  one  thing,  the  Syrians  are  on 
d.  They  were  invited  by  Lebanon  to 
in  and  help  them  in  the  troubles 
vere  going  on  in  Lebanon,  and  now 
ion  has  said  they're  no  longer  need- 
d  has  invited  them  out.  But.  at  the 
time,  the  Syrians  have  repeatedly 
hat  when  the  other  forces  leave, 
the  Israelis  leave,  and  so  forth, 
too.  will  leave  Lebanon.  Now,  I 
you  they're  saying  some  different 
3  today,  but  I  also  know  that  a 
er  of  their  Arab  allies  are  urging 
to  stick  with  their  word  and  to 
when  all  forces  are  prepared  to 
And  I  can't  believe  that  the 
is  want  to  find  themselves  alone, 
ited  from  all  of  their  Arab  allies. 

.  What  specifically  is  the  United 
s  willing  to  do  to  encourage 
to  leave?  For  instance,  is  the 
d  States  willing  to  offer  a 
iating  role  to  the  Soviets,  if  that 
I  help,  or  willing  to  offer  U.S. 
TV  and  economic  aid  to  the 
IS  to  encourage  them  to 
raw  their  troops  from  Lebanon? 

I  think  they  should  be  able  to  see 
ley  would  have  the  same  kind  of 
•nship  with  us  that  other  countries 
in  the  Middle  East  have.  I  don't 
;hat  the  negotiations  should  in- 
nviting  the  Soviet  Union  into  the 
•  East.  I  don't  see  what  reason 
■ave  to  be  there.  Possibly  there  is 
ire  on  the  Syrians  coming  from  the 
s,  who  now  have  several  thousand 
ir  military  forces  in  there  in  addi- 

the  missiles  and  so  forth. 


The  situation  in  Poland  seems 
i;etting  worse,  not  better.  Can 
plain  then,  why  you  have  decid- 
A-elcome  the  Soviets  into  long- 
legotiations  on  grain,  and  why 
louid  not  be  viewed  as  simply 
to  attempt  to  curry  favor  with 
mers  for  1984? 

No.  I  do  not  think  it's  that.  And. 
know,  I  had  always  disagreed 
iing  grain  as  a  single  economic 
1,  back  when  it  was  imposed  as  an 
JO,  and  lifted  the  embargo.  All 
;  have  done  is  agreed  to  sit  down 
e  Soviet  Union  to  explore  the 
long-term  agreement.  And  I 
hat  there  are  a  couple  of  reasons 

3  of  them,  it  will.  I  think,  restore 
ing  of  what  we  lost  with  the  em- 
n  the  eyes  of  the  world— restore 
eing  viewed  as  a  dependable  pro- 
rhat  is  one  thing.  Another  thing 
I  think  the  benefit  will  accrue  to 


us,  certainly,  as  much  as  to  them.  And, 
if  you  want  to  look  at  it  another  way, 
this  is  a  case  in  which  the  Soviet  Union 
which  has  extended  itself  so  far  in 
building  up  its  military  buildup— we're 
not  offering  any  credit  deals  or  anything 
of  that  kind.  They're  going  to  have  to 
buy  cash-on-the-barrelhead.  And  that's 
hard  cash  that  they  will  have  to  come  up 
with. 

Q.  Since  it  will  result  in  more 
grain  being  exported  to  the  Soviets, 
how  do  you  justify  that  with  our  posi- 
tion, our  pressure  on  the  European 
allies  to  restrict  our  trade.  Western 
trade  with  the  Eastern  bloc? 

A.  No.  The  only  conversations  we've 
had — and  I  think  we've  resolved  them 
very  well;  there's  peace  among  us  with 
regard  to  East- West  trade.  And  the  only 
problems  we  had  were  subsidized  credit 
and  trade  that  was  going  on  in  which 
the  Soviet  Union  was  being  allowed  to 
purchase  at  below  market  value.  And  so 
this  and— just  as  this  is  different  than 
the  gas  deal.  In  that  instance,  our  allies 
were  making  themselves  dependent  on 
the  Soviet  Union  and  were  providing 
cash  badly  needed  by  the  Soviet  Union. 
So,  there's  a  little  difference  between 
buying  and  selling. 


Q.  Six  weeks  ago  you  said  that 
there  were  serious  grounds  for  ques- 
tioning Soviet  compliance  with  arms 
control  agreements  and  that  you  might 
have  more  to  say  about  that.  And 
since  then,  the  United  States  has  con- 
firmed that  the  Soviets  have  again 
tested  the  missile  that  has  been  rais- 
ing U.S.  concerns.  With  the  talks 
resuming  today  with  the  Soviets  on  a 
new  arms  control  agreement,  don't  the 
American  people  have  a  right  to  know 
if  you  believe  the  Soviets  have  violated 
past  ones? 

A.  It  isn't  so  much  as  to  whether  we 
believe,  it's  a  case  of  whether  you  have 
the  evidence  to  actually  pin  down  an  in- 
fraction. And  you  said  they  tested  the 
weapon  again.  We,  even,  aren't  sure 
that  this  is  the  same  weapon  or  that 
they're  not  testing  two  weapons.  But 
with  the  information  that  we  have,  from 
our  own  trying  to  verify  what  is  going 
on,  yes,  we  have  reason  to  believe  that 
very  possibly  they  were  in  violation  of 


the  SALT  agreement.  And  we  have  ap- 
pealed to  them  for  more  facts,  more  in- 
formation on  the  weapon  they  tested.  So 
far,  they  have  not  provided  that  infor- 
mation to  us.  So,  all  we  can  tell  you  is 
that  we  have  a  very  great  suspicion,  but 
again  you  can't  go  to  court  without  a 
case  and  without  the  solid  evidence.  And 
it's  just  too  difficult,  and  we  don't  have 
that. 


Q.  You've  described  the  Sandinista 
regime  as  being  oppressive  and  in- 
imical to  our  interest  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  Why  don't  we  openly  sup- 
port those  7.000  guerrillas  that  are  in 
rebellion  against  it.  rather  than  giving 
aid  through  covert  activity? 

A.  Why,  because  we  want  to  keep 
on  obeying  the  laws  of  our  country, 
which  we  are  obeying.  [Laughter] 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  if  the  San- 
dinista government  remains  in  power 
in  Nicaragua  that  democracy  and 
freedom  can  survive  in  Central 
America? 

A.  We  have  tried  to  negotiate.  We 
have  tried  to  talk  and  to  relate  on  a 
bilateral  basis  with  the  Nicaraguan 
Government,  the  Sandinista  govern- 
ment. 

The  only  objection  that  we  have  to 
them  is,  they're  not  minding  their  own 
business.  They  are  attempting  to  over- 
throw a  duly  elected  government  in  a 
neighboring  country.  They  are  supplying 
direction.  They  are  supplying  training. 
They're  supplying  arms  and  everything 
else  that  is  needed  to  guerrillas  that  are 
trying  to  overthrow  that  government. 

All  we've  said  to  Nicaragua,  and 
from  the  beginning  is,  "Become  a 
legitimate  American  state.  Quit  trying  to 
subvert  your  neighbors,  and  we'll  talk  all 
kinds  of  relationship  with  you." 

But  here  is  a  country,  a  government, 
that  was  not  elected,  that  then  threw 
out  part  of  its  own  revolutionary  forces 
because  they  wanted  legitimate" 
democracy,  and  yet  at  the  same  time 
that  it's  complaining  because  those  same 
forces— those  are  not  remnants  of  the 
Somoza  government  that  they  threw  out 
of  office;  those  are  some  of  their  former 
allies.  And  all  they  want  from  them  is 
for  that  government  to  keep  the  prom- 
ises it  made  to  the  Organization  of 
American  States,  which  were  to  have 


133 


THE  SECRETARY 


elections,  to  restore  human  rights,  to 
observe  all  the  democratic  principles. 

The  Miskito  Indians  are  also  fighting 
because  they  were  chased  out  of  their 
villages,  their  villages  burned,  their 
crops  were  destroyed  or  confiscated  by 
this  revolutionary  government,  and  the 
Miskito  Indians  are  fighting  for  their 
lives.  But  what  we've  said  to  them,  and 
will  say  again,  if  they'll  just  start  mind- 
ing their  own  business,  they  can  get 
along  with  all  the  rest  of  us. 

Q.  Now  that  Israel  has  signed  its 
troop  withdrawal  agreement  with 
Lebanon,  do  you  intend  to  lift  the  em- 
bargo against  the  supply  to  Israel  of 
F-16  aircraft? 

A.  This  is  a  matter  now  that  must 
go  to  consultation  between  the  State 
Department— they  handle  that— and  the 
Congress,  and  that  consultation  is  about 
to  begin. 

Q.  Given  the  uncertainties  about 
whether  the  withdrawal  agreement  in 
Lebanon  will  succeed,  what  are  the 
prospects  for  getting  our  own  U.S. 
Marines  out  of  Lebanon  and  is  it  likely 
that  the  number  of  American  troops 
may.  in  fact,  increase  in  the  near 
future? 

A.  You  have  to  remember  what  the 
multinational  forces  went  in  there  for. 
The  multinational  forces  are  there  to 
help  the  new  Government  of  Lebanon 
maintain  order  until  it  can  organize  its 
military  and  its  police  and  assume  con- 
trol over  its  own  borders  and  its  own  in- 
ternal security.  So,  it  could  be  that  the 
multinational  forces  will  be  there  for 
quite  a  period. 

And  we  have  to  remember  8  years 
of  Lebanon  being  totally  divided  with, 
literally,  warlords,  and  their  own  in- 
dependent militias,  and  so  forth,  and 
that's  the  function  and  the  purpose  for 
them  being — for  our  multinational 
forces  being  there. 

Q.  Do  you  see  their  number  in- 
creasing in  the  near  future? 

A.  I  haven't  seen  any  sign  of  that. 
This  would  depend  a  lot  on  Lebanon  and 
their  needs  and  whether  they  could 
demonstrate  needs  for  this. 


Text  from  Weekly  (Jompilation  of  Presiden- 
tial Documents  of  May  23,  1983.  ■ 


Secretary  Shultz  Visits 
the  Middle  East 


Secretary  Shultz  departed 
Washington.  D.C.,  April  2U,  1983,  to 
visit  Egypt,  Israel,  Lebanon.  Jordan, 

Slfrin.  ami  Saudi  Arot:in.lH>   was  in 
Pans  Mail  S-ll   In  allrial  fhr  ( )hJ('D 
Wlliislrnal  nartnaj;  sn  Jallawnig  art 
cle.)  He  returned  to  Washington  on 
May  11. 

Following  are  remarks  made  on 
various  occasions  during  the  trip. 


Cairo,  Egypt 

Remarks, 
Apr.  26,  19831 

President  Mubarak.  It's  a  very  good  op- 
portunity that  I  received  the  Secretary 
of  State'  here  in  our  country  for  the  first 
time  in  this  area.  We  welcome  him  here 
in  Cairo,  and  we  had  very  long  discus- 
sions with  him  concerning  the  bilateral 
relations  and  American-Egyptian  rela- 
tions which  we  consider  very  good  rela- 
tions. It's  a  very  good  platform. 

We  discussed  also  the  problems  of 
the  Middle  East  and  the  negotiations 
which  are  going  on  between  Israel  and 
Lebanon,  with  the  help  of  the  United 
States,  so  as  to  come  to  a  conclusion  or 
an  agreement  for  the  complete  with- 
drawal from  Lebanon.  We  exchanged  all 
views,  and  I  received  a  message  sent  by 
President  Reagan  which  deals  with  the 
same  issues  here  concerning  problems  of 
the  Middle  East.  The  negotiations  were 
very  fruitful.  We  exchanged  all  views, 
and  we  hope  that  the  trip  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  this  area  will  con- 
clude to  something  beneficial  for  the 
whole  region. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  appreciate  the 
President's  comments  and  his  good 
wishes.  I  believe  that  the  anniversary  of 
the  return  of  the  Sinai  here  and  our 
travels  around  to  show  what  peace  has 
brought  is  a  very  good  reminder  to 
everyone  that  negotiations  work  and 
that  the  political  process  can  achieve 
results  that  violence  and  rejection  can't 
achieve.  So  in  that  spirit,  we  will  con- 
tinue on  with  your  suggestions  and 
thoughts  in  mind.  We'll  do  everything 
that  we  can  to  help  out  in  bringing 
about  a  resolution  of  the  Lebanon  issue, 
and  we  also  will  be  keeping  very  much 
in  mind  the  interest  that  you've  ex- 
pressed and  the  encouragement  that  you 


have  given  for  continued  effort  on  t\ 
basic  peace  process. 

Q.  What  was  discussed  here  an 
what  was  discussed  here  that  wou 
in  fact,  enhance  the  possibility  for 
reaching  a  troop  withdrawal  agree 
ment  on  Lebanon? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  ci 
phasis  that  I  would  get  from  it  is  tin 
urgency  of  arriving  at  a  solution  aii> 
importance  of  the  removal  of  all  t ■  it* 
forces  if  you  are  really  going  to  lia\' 
solution  and  in  a  manner  that  is  con  |t' 
ent  and  honors  the  necessity  of  a 
sovereign  Lebanon  to  rule  itself.  Th 
are  familiar  phrases,  and  I  think  tht 
suggest  that  the  views  of  the  Presid 
of  Egypt  and  the  views  of  the  Presii 
of  the  United  States  are  identical  or 
issue. 

Q.  Are  you  going  to  propose  ai 
American  version  — 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'm  going  tn 
spend  a  little  time  listening,  first  of 
We  don't  come  with  any  preconcoivi 
plan,  and  at  the  same  time,  I  think 
even  out  here  in  the  Middle  East  it 
appreciated  how  much  progress  the 
Lebanese  and  Israelis— with  help  tV 
Phil  Habib  and  Morrie  Draper  (I'hili 
Habib,  special  representative  of  the 
President  to  the  Middle  East,  ami 
Morris  Draper,  special  negotiator  in 
Lebanon]— have  already  made.  So  1 
think  the  important  thing  will  be  to 
bring  about  a  solution  in  terms  of  tl 
bilateral  relationship  between  Israel 
Lebanon. 


Secretary's 

Itinerary 

April  24 

Depart  Washi  to 

April  25-27 

Apirl  27-28 

•' 

April  28 

Le  1' 

April  28-30 

■' 

April  30-May  1 

May  1-3 

'' 

May  3-4 

May  4-6 

■* 

May  6-7 

May  7 

May  7-8 

Saudi.* 

Mays 

Mays 

May  8-11 

May  11 

Arrive  Washing ' ' 

Department  of  State  Bu  tii 


THE  SECRETARY 


e  to  right:  Egyptian  Foreign  Minister  Kamal  Hassan  Ali,  Secretary  Shultz,  and  Egyp- 
» President  Hosni  Mubarak  after  their  meeting.  Following  (center)  is  U.S.  Ambassador 
I  ?ypt  Alfred  Atherton  and  Ambassador  Philip  Habib.  special  representative  of  the 
rident  to  the  Middle  East. 


Q.  Would  vou  discuss  the  role  for 
1  Palestinians  in  the  negotiations? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  is  no  role 
)i  he  I'alestinians  in  the  negotiations 
e.'een  Lebanon  and  Israel.  There  is  a 
D  for  them  in  agreeing  to  withdraw 
■ci  Lebanon  so  that  Lebanon  can  have 
«ance  to  operate  as  a  sovereign  na- 
Q  and  we  expect  that  they  will  honor 
icommitment  that  I  understand  they 
al'  given  the  Government  of  Lebanon 
1!  they  will  withdraw. 

[).  Do  you  agree  with  this  view? 

President  Mubarak.  The  Palestini- 
nhave  ntithing  to  do  with  the  negotia- 
o;  1  Id  ween  Lebanon  and  Israel  or  the 
itii-awal.  And  we  agree  because  the 
■i  lirawal  of  all  forces  in  Lebanon  is  a 
r  iplr  \\hich  we  declared  several 

ns   l,r,V. 

I  [Inaudible] 

secretary  Shultz.  We  are  talking 
b  t  the  military  forces  when  we  talk 
^'  t  the  withdrawal  of  foreign  forces. 
"ire  iHit  talking  about  nonmilitary 
H,,  :in(l  of  course,  the  FLO 

'<i\i\r  Liberation  Organization]  will 
•   I"  iiiMJ  a  place  to  receive  them. 

}.  W  hat  advice  do  you  have  for  the 


u  1983 


FLO  in  connection  with  President 
Reagan's  peace  plan? 

President  Mubarak.  Reagan's  plan 
we  supported  from  the  beginning,  and 
we  said  several  times  that  it  is  a  golden 
opportunity  to  support  Reagan's  plan  to 
go  ahead  with  it.  So  I  asked  to  come  to 
a  comprehensive  settlement  for  the 
whole  problem.  That's  why  we  several 
times  urged  the  Palestinians  to  declare 
their  linkage  with  Jordan  so  as  to  help 
the  President  of  the  United  States  with 
still  supporting  vehemently  or  actively 
his  initiative.  I  think  such  a  linkage  to  be 
declared  as  soon  as  possible.  It's  very  at- 
tractive so  as  to  solve  the  negotiations 
for  the  comprehensive  settlement. 

Q.  Do  you  feel  that  it  is  possible  to 
get  the  Israelis  to  withdraw  on  this 
trip? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  will  see.  It's 
certainly  possible,  but  we'll  see. 

Q.  Did  you  discuss  the  level  of 
American  economic  assistance  to 
Egypt  during  your  bilateral  discus- 
sions? 

President  Mubarak.  We  always 
discuss  this  problem  whenever  we  meet 
with  each  other.  It's  one  of  our  bilateral 
relations. 


Jerusalem,  Israel 


Arrival  Statement, 
Apr.  27,  19832 

Foreign  Minister  Shamir.  It  is  a 

pleasure  to  welcome  you  on  your  first 
visit  to  Israel  as  Secretary  of  State.  As 
an  outstanding  leader  in  your  country, 
and  in  the  free  world,  your  presence 
here  demonstrates  the  American  com- 
mitment to  peace  and  stability  in  our 
region. 

In  the  course  of  our  talks  and  con- 
tacts with  you,  we  came  to  appreciate 
your  earnest  desire  for  a  deeper 
understanding  of  our  concerns  and  ob- 
jectives. We  believe  that  this  under- 
standing will  serve  to  harmonize  our 
relations  and  to  advance  us  and  our 
common  goal  to  peaceful  coexistence  in 
our  region. 

Your  visit  here  will  no  doubt  con- 
tribute to  the  solution  of  the  pending 
problems  on  the  Lebanese  issue.  These 
problems  are  not  easy,  but  the  solution 
to  them  will  turn  out  to  be  another  step 
in  the  road  to  peace  in  the  Middle  East. 
I  wish  you  and  Mrs.  Shultz  and  your  col- 
leagues a  pleasant  and  rewarding  stay  in 
Israel. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  thank  you  very 
much  for  the  words  of  welcome  on  a 
personal  level.  We  have  met  together 
many  times  now,  and  I  look  forward  to 
continuing  our  friendship  as  well  as  our 
discussions.  And  I  thank  you  also  for  the 
thoughtfulness  and  content  of  your  com- 
ments. Of  course,  I  can't  help  but 
observe  that  it's  not  everybody  that  can 
be  his  own  interpreter.  It's  a  pleasure 
for  me  to  be  in  Israel.  My  wife  and  I 
have  fond  memories  of  our  earlier  visits 
to  your  beautiful  country.  And  we  are 
glad  to  be  back. 

President  Reagan  has  sent  me  here 
to  work  closely  with  you  on  new  steps 
toward  peace.  We  come  in  friendship, 
with  the  attitude  that  our  countries  have 
common  goals  and  common  tasks.  We 
want  this  period  to  be  remembered  as  a 
time  of  successful  collaboration  in  the 
tradition  of  the  unique  relationship 
which  binds  us.  Our  immediate  task  is  to 
bring  peace  to  Lebanon,  restoring 
Lebanon's  sovereignty,  withdrawing  all 
foreign  forces,  and  ensuring  peace  and 
security  on  your  northern  border.  As 
you  noted,  a  number  of  difficult  issues 
remain,  but  so  much  has  already  been 
accomplished  in  this  negotiation  that 
none  of  us  can  allow  it  to  fail.  We  will 
also  be  talking  about  bilateral  relations 
and  about  the  broader  process  of  helping 
to  bring  peace  between  Israel  and  all  its 
neighbors.  President  Reagan  is  commit- 


33 


THE  SECRETARY 


ted  to  this  process  as  he  is  committed 
without  qualification  to  Israel's  survival, 
security,  and  well-being.  I  look  forward 
very  much  to  my  talks  here  in  Israel. 


Dinner  Toasts, 
Apr.  27,  1983^ 

Foreign  Minister  Shamir.  This  is  your 
first  visit  to  our  country  in  your  capacity 
as  Secretary  of  State.  I  know,  however, 
that  you  have  been  here  before  and  you 
have  had  a  personal  acquaintance  with 
Israelis  in  the  past,  including  some  who 
were  students. 

Although  considerable  time  has 
passed  since  your  last  visit,  you  have 
maintained  an  affinity  with  Israel  and  a 
keen  sensitivity  to  the  special  concerns 
of  our  people.  I  am,  therefore,  gratified 
at  this  opportunity  to  continue  our 
dialogue  and  share  with  you  our  views 
and  perceptions. 

This  city  of  Jerusalem  and  its  past 
history  demonstrate  some  of  the 
characteristics  of  our  people.  Destroyed 
by  foreign  invaders  many  times,  it  rose 
again  and  again  from  the  ashes,  was 
rebuilt  by  the  people  of  Israel,  and 
restored  to  its  ancient  glory.  Its  houses 
are  built  of  rock,  very  tough  granite  that 
comes  from  the  hills  of  Judaea  and 
Samaria  that  surround  this  city. 
Jerusalem  is  not  just  a  collection  of 
buildings.  It  is  the  heart  and  soul  of  the 
Jewish  people,  the  inspiration  for  many 
psalms  and  poems  in  our  tradition  and 
culture. 

Our  devotion  to  peace,  to  freedom, 
to  the  dignity  of  the  human  being,  and 
to  democracy  stems  from  the  teachings 
of  kings  and  prophets  who  lived  here  in 
Jerusalem.  Many  of  these  teachings  and 
values  are  cherished  equally  by  the 
American  people.  These  common  at- 
tributes are  the  basis  of  our  partnership. 
They  enable  us  to  work  together  and 
overcome  differences  of  opinion  and 
views  which  may  arise  from  time  to 
time.  They  sustain  the  friendship  and 
alliance  between  us,  which  are  so  vital  to 
the  stability  of  this  region. 

We  have  learned,  with  considerable 
sacrifice,  that  peace  in  this  part  of  the 
world  is  far  from  easy  to  achieve.  In- 
stability and  tension  are  chronic.  Con- 
flicts and  violence  are  endemic,  and  a 
high  state  of  military  preparedness  is  a 
normal  prerequisite  to  survival.  There 
are  no  shortcuts  and  no  easy  formulas. 
Against  this  background,  the  Camp 
David  accords  were  a  remarkable 
breakthrough.  They  should  be  upheld 
and  supported  as  the  only  realistic 
means  of  moving  forward  toward  a 
more  stable  Middle  East. 


The  primary  goal  of  your  present 
mission  is  Lebanon:  We  are  in  complete 
agreement  that  a  free,  sovereign,  and 
independent  Lebanon  is  an  important 
objective  for  both  our  governments  and 
for  the  future  stability  of  the  region.  We 
are  also  agreed  that  the  security  of 
Israel's  northern  border  should  be 
assured,  so  that  it  will  no  longer  be  ex- 
posed to  attacks  by  terrorists  for  this 
purpose.  Finally,  we  both  want  to  secure 
an  early  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Lebanon. 

Lebanon  has  a  special  personality, 
distinguishing  it  from  the  countries 
around  it.  It  should  be  enabled  to  main- 
tain and  develop  its  own  way  of  life 
without  interference.  Clearly,  this  can 
happen  only  in  an  atmosphere  of 
peaceful  and  good-neighborly  relations 
between  Lebanon  and  Israel. 

In  your  efforts  to  help  achieve  these 
common  goals,  we  will  give  you  our  full 
support.  We  have  a  vital  interest  in  your 
success,  as  we  have  a  vital  interest  in  a 
peaceful  and  friendly  relationship  with 
Lebanon  and  its  people.  As  you  continue 
in  your  mission,  our  sincere  wishes  for 
success  accompany  you.  We  feel  confi- 
dent that  your  endeavors  on  behalf  of 
the  cause  of  peace  and  stability  will 
ultimately  succeed. 

Will  you  join  me  in  raising  a  toast  to 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and 
to  the  abiding  friendship  between  our 
two  peoples. 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  thank  you  very 
much  for  your  kind  words  of  welcome 
here  this  evening,  at  the  airport  today, 
and  for  your  cordiality  throughout  the 
day. 

"  This,  as  you  noted,  is  my  first  visit 
to  Israel  as  Secretary  of  State  but  not 
my  first  visit  here.  I  came  first  in  1969 
as"  Secretary  of  Labor.  My  wife  and  I 
have  also  come  as  private  citizens  to  this 
magnificent  city  and  this  beautiful  and 
vibrant  country.  It  has  always  been  a 
source  of  joy  and  inspiration.  And  I 
might  say  when  we  come  to  this  hotel 
and  look  out  the  window  at  the  old  city 
of  Jerusalem,  it  is  a  breathtaking  sight 
that  is  gripping.  And  we  look  forward  to 
it  and  are  inspired  by  it  whenever  we 
have  the  opportunity  to  see  it. 

According  to  some  of  my  predeces- 
sors in  office,  the  joy  of  a  negotiating 
trip  to  the  Middle  East  has  a  rare  and 
stimulating  quality  of  its  own. 

I'd  have  to  tell  you  that  in  my  other 
Cabinet  post,  when  I  was  in  the  govern- 
ment the  last  time,  I  always  used  to  sort 
of  look  up  to  the  Secretary  of  State  as 
the  senior  member  of  the  Cabinet.  But  a 
story  I  have  run  into  recently  has  given 
me  a  little  different  insight  into  the  of- 
fice. It  seems  that  one  of  my  predeces- 


sors and  the  then-Pope  died  the  same 
day  and  as  it  happened,  they  both  we 
to  heaven,  and  they  were  shown  into 
their  respective  quarters.  The  Pope  w 
shown  a  little  room,  sort  of  Holiday  I: 
type  room,  and  the  former  Secretaryt 
State  was  shown  a  room  that  had  a 
huge  vaulted  ceiling  like  this  and  a 
Betamax  and  a  sauna  in  the  "John"  ai 
all  the  luxuries  you  could  imagine.  Ai 
the  Pope  was  a  little  bit  put  out  and 
said,  "Well,  there  must  be  some  mist 
I  want  to  see  God."  And  so  he  had  ai 
audience  and  God  said,  "No,  there  ha 
been  any  mistake,  after  all.  You're  tl 
263d  Pope  we've  had  up  here.  This  is 
first  time  we've  ever  had  a  Secretary 
State."  I  just  hope  it  isn't  the  last  tin 

Today,  I  return  on  President 
Reagan's  behalf,  with  serious  purpos' 

•  To  demonstrate  our  commitme 
to  Israel's  security  and  well-being; 

•  To  show  the  importance  my  cc 
try  attaches  to  its  longstanding  and  i 
timate  friendship  with  Israel; 

•  To  work  with  you,  in  a  spirit  c 
partnership,  to  bring  a  positive  outcc 
to  the  exertions  and  tragedies  of  the 
Lebanon  war,  ensuring  security  on  y 
northern  border  and  restoring  Lebai 
full  security  and  sovereignty;  and 

•  To  discuss  with  you  broader  q 
tions  of  fulfilling  Israel's  age-old  dre^ 
of  peace. 

This  afternoon  I  had  the  privilege 
again  paying  my  respects  at  Yad 
Vashem.  No  one  with  any  spark  of 
human  feeling  can  visit  that  shrine 
without  profound  emotion.  It  tells  sa 
much  about  the  history  of  this  peopld 
and  this  country.  How  tragic  it  is  thi 
people  who  have  suffered  so  much  nr 
struggle  even  here,  in  the  Jewish  st3 
for  safety  and  peace.  My  country,  wl 
has  been  a  friend  and  supporter  of  L 
since  the  founding  of  the  state,  will  i 
rest  until  Israel  enjoys  the  right  that 
nations  want— namely  to  live  in  pea( 
with  its  neighbors,  to  play  a  full  pari 
a  member  of  the  international  comm 
ty,  and  to  face  a  secure  and  prosper* 
future. 

The  United  States  and  Israel  ha^ 
had  differences  of  view  on  some  que 
tions,  as  we  all  know.  But  those  dif- 
ferences stand  out  only  because  they 
set  against  the  background  of  a  geiw 
tion  of  friendship  and  a  profound  uni 
of  moral  values.  Through  patient  ant 
timate  dialogue  among  friends,  we  c 
narrow  and  resolve  our  differences. 
That  is  how  I  view  my  mission. 

I  am  here  also,  as  you  know,  to  < 
centrate  on  helping  Israel  and  Lebai 
conclude  an  agreement  that  will  lay  e 
basis  for  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  fc« 


Department  of  State  Bui  i' 


THE  SECRETARY 


1  Lebanon.  Restoring  Lebanon's  full 
reignty  and  authority  over  all  its 
tory  will  enable  that  country  to  live 
peaceful,  secure,  and  friendly 
hbor  of  Israel.  The  human  losses 
red  by  all  parties  in  the  conflict  re- 

5  an  outcome  that  will  ensure  that 

tragedy  never  recurs— and  an 
K)me  that  establishes  security  for  all 
oles  of  the  region. 

Substantial  progress  has  been  made 
bur  negotiations  with  Lebanon  up  to 
I  though  difficult  issues  remain.  I 
t  to  express  my  admiration  and 
itude  to  the  able  negotiators — Direc- 
fieneral  Kimche,  Ambassador  Fattal, 
jHabib,  Morris  Draper,  and  all  their 
lagues. 

fhe  negotiation  has  gone  on  for  4 
;hs,  as  of  today.  If  the  remaining 
s  were  easy — if  there  were  not  im- 
int  considerations  on  both  sides — 
would  already  have  been  settled. 
have  been  debated,  analyzed, 
i  over,  agonized  over.  Now  is  the 
to  resolve  them.  As  the  Bible  tells 
5  every  thing  there  is  a  season, 
e  is  a  time  to  debate  and  there  is  a 
to  decide.  Now  is  the  time  to 
e.  As  in  every  negotiation,  there 
be  compromise.  For  every  risk 
IS  taken,  there  is  gain.  And  the 
of  failure  are  far  greater  than  any 

2  risks  of  an  agreement  as  it  is  now 
aged. 

f  we  succeed  in  Lebanon,  that  coun- 
'  ill  regain  true  sovereignty,  in- 
fideiice,  and  integrity.  It  will  be  able 
1  mild  its  flourishing  society  in  safety 
:ligiiity  and,  as  the  Foreign  Minister 
tl,  play  its  unique  role  in  this  region. 
iiwe  will  have  enlarged  the  circle  of 
S'ful  relationships  between  Israel 
dts  neighbors. 

■he  peace  process  continues.  It  must 
mue— and  it  must  advance.  To  cease 
rfforts  is  to  allow  bitter  wounds  to 
It-  and  to  invite  future  conflict, 
edent  Reagan  is  committed  to  work- 
;ith  you  on  the  noble  enterprise  of 
a'making.  For  the  ultimate  guaran- 
•  ■  security  is  peace.  And  the 
sest  gift  and  legacy  we  can  leave  to 
rhildren  is  peace. 

know  how  much  this  dream  must 
;  \t'  the  people  of  Israel.  As  some  of 
-i  ia\  kiKiw,  I  was  here  in  Israel 
•W  aiifi-  President  Sadat's  visit  to 
r.-ilfin.  1  felt  here  then  a  powerfully 
'"iii  tuit'  in  human  attitudes.  You 
>  tVt'l  It  palpably  in  the  atmosphere: 
■  ■aniin-j;  of  the  entire  Jewish  people 
'  'ace    .A  people  who  had  been  com- 
l.i  til  ilo  battle  for  survival  time  and 
a  w  ert'  infused  with  a  sense  of  the 
s:iility  if  not  probability  of  peace.  I 
'levfi'  forget  the  moment,  when  the 


people  of  Israel,  who  had  made  so  many 
sacrifices  in  defense  of  their  country, 
were  uplifted  by  a  great  vision.  Let  no 
one  try  to  tell  me  that  the  Israeli  nation 
does  not  want  peace.  Let  us  all  dedicate 
ourselves  to  ensure  that  no  more  young 
lives  will  be  wasted— that  no  more 
families  will  be  bereaved. 

Let  me  propose  a  toast  to  your  Presi- 
dent and  Prime  Minister,  to  you  and 
your  colleagues,  and  to  the  brave  people 
of  Israel  who,  in  the  words  of  the  sages, 
love  peace  and  pursue  it  with  all  their 
might. 


Beirut,  Lebanon 


Arrival  Remarks, 
Apr.  28,  198.3^ 

Secretary  Shultz.  I've  just  had  the  occa- 
sion to  meet  with  the  ambassadors  from 
the  countries  contributing  to  the 
multinational  force  and  to  thank  them 
wholeheartedly  for  the  immediate 
response  their  governments  have  made 
when  we  had  the  tragic  bombing  of  the 
U.S.  Embassy  here  in  Beirut. 

Of  course,  I  am  here  to  help  in  this 
process  of  working  out  an  agreement  for 
the  departure  from  Lebanon  of  all 
foreign  forces.  President  Reagan  has 
sent  me  to  Lebanon  on  a  mission  of 
peace.  The  travail  of  this  brave  country 
has  touched  the  hearts  of  the  American 
people.  Beginning  with  the  heroic  efforts 
of  Ambassador  Habib  last  summer,  the 
United  States  has  undertaken  with  all 
its  energy  to  help  Lebanon  rise  from  the 
ashes  of  war.  For  4  months  now,  we 
have  been  engaged  in  negotiations  to 
begin  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces  and  the  restoration  of  Lebanon's 
sovereignty  over  all  its  territory. 

I  am  here  to  help  bring  those 
negotiations  closer  to  successful  conclu- 
sion.   Last  week,  in  the  senseless  bomb- 
ing of  our  embassy,  Americans  and 
Lebanese  died  together.  It  was  a  crime 
against  both  our  people,  and  it  tied  us 
even  closer  together  by  the  very  special 
bond  of  shared  sacrifice.  If  those  who 
committed  this  crime  thought  that  they 
could  deflect  us  from  our  course,  they 
were  grossly  mistaken.  The  vitality  and 
energy  of  your  people  leave  no  room  for 
doubt  of  Lebanon's  rapid  recovery 
from  war. 

The  American  people  thank  their 
Lebanese  friends  for  the  sympathy  and 
support  given  to  us  in  last  week's  hour 
of  tragedy.  I  am  determined  to  recip- 
rocate this  friendship  by  a  redoubled  ef- 
fort to  help  you  bring  your  country 
closer  to  peace. 


Statement. 
Apr.  28.  1983^ 

I  visited  with  the  families  of  the 
Americans  who  were  killed  in  this 
tragedy  and,  of  course,  that  brought 
home  to  me  so  vividly  the  human  dimen- 
sions of  this  tragedy.  Today  I  had  a 
chance  to  shake  hands  with  the 
Lebanese  who  helped  us  and  who 
worked  around  the  clock  to  dig  out  and 


Before  meeting  with  Lebanese  leaders. 
Secretary  Shultz,  with  U.S.  Ambassador  to 
Lebanon,  Robert  Dillon,  briefly  tours  site 
of  the  American  Embassy  in  Beirut, 
destroyed  by  a  bomb  blast. 


who  were  here.  Earlier  I  had  a  chance 
to  thank  the  ambassadors  from  the 
countries  who  joined  us  in  the  multina- 
tional force,  who  pitched  in,  and  now  I 
have  a  chance  to  see  this  evidence  of  the 
physical  damage. 

Of  course,  it  leaves  us  all,  I  am  sure, 
with  a  sense  of  deep  sorrow  and 
tragedy.  It's  simply  incredible  to  see 
such  enemies  of  peace,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  it's  also  inspiring  to  see  that  peace 
has  friends  who  rally  and  help.  I  am 
sure  that  all  of  us  feel  here— Am- 
bassador [to  Lebanon  Robert]  Dillon  and 
all  his  colleagues— not  only  the  sym- 
pathy and  tragedy  but  also  the  necessity 
to  continue  our  effort  to  find  peace  and 
stability  here  in  Beirut,  here  in  Lebanon, 
and  here  in  the  Middle  East.  And  that  is 
the  President's  determination— that  is 
my  determination— and  we  will  do 
everything  possible  that  we  can  to 
achieve  the  result. 

Q.  Do  you  know  who  did  the 
bombing  at  this  point? 
Secretary  Shultz:  No,  we  don't. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Baabda,  Lebanon 

statement, 
Apr.  28,  1983« 

Secretary  Shultz.  This  has  been  a  very 
rewarding  day  here  in  discussion  and,  of 
course,  a  moving  day  in  visiting  our 
employees  at  the  American  Embassy 
and  seeing  that  site,  and  rewarding  in 
talking  with  President  Gemayel,  Foreign 
Minister  Salem,  and  their  colleagues. 

We've  had  a  very  full  review  of  all 
the  issues  here  just  as  we  did  in  Israel.  I 
can  see  that  there  are  quite  a  number  of 
difficult  issues,  but  at  least  I  think  we 
can  now  have  some  definition  of  them. 
And  I'm  also  very  much  impressed  with 
the  good  spirit  and  the  systematic  way 
in  which  all  of  this  was  approached  by 
President  Gemayel  and  his  colleagues. 
So  I  thank  you  very  much  for  your  cor- 
diality and  excellent  lunch  and  for  all  of 
the  information. 


Remarks, 
May  1,  1983' 

Q.  Could  you  tell  us  how  the  talks  are 
going,  some  indication  after  your  day 
yesterday  and  your  overnight  here? 

Secretary  Shultz.  They  are  going 
constructively,  and  we  are  working  very 
hard.  I  think  the  schedule  of  the 
meetings  you  are  familiar  with.  We  met 
yesterday  morning  with  President 
Gemayel  and  then  we  joined  the  Prime 
Minister,  when  he  arrived,  in  a  larger 
group,  and  we  started  the  process  of 
just  going  through  the  draft  agreement 
from  top  to  bottom.  We  continued  on 
with  that  until,  I  think,  around  8:15  or 
something  like  that.  We  had  a  short  ad- 
journment and  came  back  and  had  a 
working  dinner  with  President  Gemayel 
and  got  back  around  a  quarter  to  12:00 
or  something  on  that  order.  Then  we 
came  over  here  and  started  at  9:00  until 
now  to  just  sort  of  go  through  a  few 
things  that  we  would  like.  We'll  come 
back  again  as  soon  as  President 
Gemayel  returns  from  Mass  and  we'll 
have  another  meeting  and  then  go  back 
to  Jerusalem. 

I  have  sort  of  given  up  on  the  op- 
timism/pessimism, moving  forward  or 
backward,  or  whatever,  and  I  just  would 
say  that  it  is  very  hard,  conscientious 
work  on  everyone's  part.  The  spirit  of 
wanting  to  reach  an  agreement  is  cer- 
tainly present,  and  the  spirit  of  regard- 
ing whatever  is  reached  as  something  to 


be  worked  at  in  good  faith  after  agree- 
ment is  also  very  present,  and  I  think 
that  was  important  to  hear  that  state- 
ment made  strongly. 

Q.  Is  the  end  in  sight  with  these 
negotiations? 

Secretary  Shultz.  [Laughter]  I 
don't  know.  It  depends  on  your  vision. 

Q.  Can  you  characterize  the 
degree  of  progress  you  think  is  being 
made  at  this  point? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I've  said  I  have 
sort  of  given  up  on  the  inching  ahead 
and  the  optimism/pessimism.  I  think  the 
best  characterization  is  that  we've  been 
working  very  hard  and  constructively 
and  in  good  faith  to  conclude  an  agree- 
ment. We've  gone  through  the  agree- 
ment from  one  end  to  the  other,  and  I 
think  we  have  a  very  thorough 
understanding  of  the  position  of  the 
Government  of  Lebanon.  So  that's 
where  we  are. 

Q.  Do  you  have  a  set  of  ideas  to 
take  back  to  Mr.  Begin? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Oh,  we  have  a 
jillion  ideas. 

Q.  You  seem  to  indicate  that  the 
implementation  might  be  as  difficult 
as  the  negotiation  of  the  agreement. 
Do  you  think  that's— 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  that  was  an 
observation  about  the  character  of  the 
discussion  that  came  through  in  the 
discussions,  that  the  reason  why  various 
things  being  discussed  are  being  gone 
into  so  thoroughly  is  that  there  is  clearly 
an  intent  to  live  by  whatever  is  agreed 
to.  And,  therefore,  you  better  take  it 
seriously  now  because  you're  going  to 
live  with  it.  It  was  more  that  idea. 

Q.  Is  it  too  early  to  talk  about 
tangible  progress?  Is  it  still  the 
groundwork  in  preparation  for  the 
progress? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Oh,  no.   We're 
right  down  in  the  dirt  of  this  thing,  in 
the  details  of  this  thing.  We're  way 
beyond  that  kind  of  thing. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  plans  yet  for 
going  to  Syria  to  talk  to  them? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  situation  is, 
as  I  think  I  told  you  on  the  plane,  we 
have  asked  to  be  received.  'They've  said 
they  would  receive  us  and  then  gave 
some  dates.  One  of  the  dates  was  tomor- 
row and,  obviously,  we're  not  going  to 
be  able  to  go  there  tomorrow,  but  I  cer- 
tainly hope  that  we're  in  the  posture  to 
go  on  one  of  the  dates  suggested. 

Q.  Lebanese  officials  have  said 


that  it  shouldn't  take  more  than  8- 
weeks  to  achieve  the  actual  with- 
drawal. Is  that  your  estimate,  as  v| 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  subject  (, 
the  time  when  the  agreement  is  read 
and  takes  effect— that's  part  of  the  ) 
agreement,  the  start  and  finish  of  i 
withdrawal.  ! 

Q.  Is  that  8-10  weeks?  Is  that  ^ 
possible?  I 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  want  ^ 
break  away  from  my  policy  of  not 
discussing  the  specifics  of  the  agree 
ment. 

Q.  People  in  the  United  Statei 
going  to  be  interested  in  knowing 
about  what  happened  at  the  residr 
last  night.  Can  you  tell  us  in  your 
words  what  you  know  about  it? 

Secretary  Shultz.  What  happe 
at  the  residence? 

Q.  Yes  sir,  the  two  mortar  rot 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  was  asleep 
as  you  sometimes  do  when  you're  a 
you're  sort  of  vaguely  aware  of 
noises— and  I  was — and  that's  aboi 
what  I  know  about  it.  Lots  of  peopl  | 
have  said  that  people  are  sending  y  j 
greeting  and  things  like  that,  but  I  i 
don't— 

Q.  Did  you  wake  up  from  the< 
noise? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  had  a  pret  | 
good  night's  sleep.  As  I  said,  I  was 
vaguely  aware  of  the  fact  that  that 
taking  place,  but  lots  of  times  durir  j 
World  War  II,  I  heard  those  kinds  j 
sounds. 


Q.  So  you  think  it  was  a  gree  i 
or  a  message?  ! 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  have 
clue.  I  don't  know. 

Q.  Will  that  affect  your  plans  i 
staying  overnight  in  the  future? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  didn't  hesi 
to  stay  last  night,  and  if  it  is  called  i 
by  the  needs  of  the  situation,  I  wou( 
hesitate  again. 

Q.  Could  we  have  your  assess  i 
on  the  progress  of  the  talks? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  I  wo  i 
like  first  to  thank  Secretary  Shultz,' 
is  giving  so  much  of  his  time  to  rea 
agreement.  As  you  should  be  awart : 
now,  we  have  a  very,  very  difficult 
tion;  the  problems  are  extremely  cc  - 
plicated.  There  is  no  magic  rod,  am 
effort  such  as  the  one  being  investe  1 
Secretary  Shultz,  upon  the  instruct  i 
of  President  Reagan,  such  efforts  a 
absolutely  essential  if  we  are  to  ma' 


Department  of  State  Bu! 


THE  SECRETARY 


»rogress  at  all.  It  is  quite  clear  that 
iscussions  that  were  going  on  were 
ing  a  stage  where  we  were  really 
st  approaching  a  stalemate,  and, 
fore,  it  was  very  essential  that 
tary  Shultz  give  it  his  time  and  his 
;,  and  I  believe  that  we  are  making 
'ess. 

Je  are  making  progress  in  the 
that  the  difficulties  are  being  iden- 
and  the  difficulties  are  being 
d  on  very  seriously  on  both  sides, 
lay  agree  or  we  may  not,  but  cer- 
it  is  progress  to  clearly  identify 
roblems  and  to  clearly  commit 
Ives,  both  sides,  to  work  in  good 
and  to  work,  as  it  were,  night  and 
I  think  we  worked  15  hours  yes- 
y— to  resolve  these  points, 
there  is  a  way,  I  believe  the  ef- 
that  President  Reagan  and  Secre- 
ihultz  are  putting  into  this— that 
be  the  way.  We  do  not  see  any 
alternative  at  present  to  reach  an 
ment  with  Israel  on  this  highly 
icated  problem. 

;.  Is  it  too  early,  then,  for  us  to 
ibout  narrowing  the  differences 
s  point?  You're  still  defining  dif- 

!ces? 

oreign  Minister  Salem.  I  also 
(e  we  are  narrowing  the  differences 
;  if  tliere  were  many  points  in  con- 
Some  of  them  were  minor,  and  I 
some  of  the  minor  ones  have  been 
ed  or  have  been  put  aside,  and 
zeroing  in  on  the  basic  difficulties. 
le  main  difficulties  are  really  quite 
s  and  quite  complex,  and  it  may 
everal  meetings  before  we  can 
)rogress.  There  are,  it  seems,  dif- 
conceptions.  There  are  different 
ies,  different  fears  on  each  one  of 
ints  involved.  We  are  hopeful  that 
intensive  efforts  will  bring  us  real- 
he  bottom  line  very  soon. 

I.  Do  you  think  everything  that 
I  lave  agreed  on  so  far  will  also  be 
ritable  to  the  Syrians? 
oreign  Minister  Salem.  We  have 
61  with  the  Syrians  that  once  we 
ein  a^Teement  with  Israel,  we  go  to 
fiind  we  ask  them,  in  light  of  this 
eneiit,  which  will  ensure  the  with- 
vl  — the  complete  withdrawal— of 
I  ami  they  will  then  work  out  with 
I  Ian  fnr  their  withdrawal.  It  is 
:  "issihle  that  once  we  discuss  with 
;  nans  and  with  the  PLO,  they 
1  want  to  know  some  of  the  details, 
■luiM  want  to  question  us  about 
lini  and  that  point,  and  I  think  it 
I,  natural. 


I  believe  any  agreement  that 
Lebanon  will  sign  will  be  an  agreement 
of  which  we  could  be  proud,  because  we 
are  able  to  get  the  Israelis  out  and  all 
the  non-Lebanese  forces  out  of  Lebanon. 
It  is  an  agreement  which  I  am  sure  all 
the  Arab  countries  will  support  because 
the  alternative  will  be  the  occupation  of 
Lebanon,  which  is  unacceptable  to  the 
Arab  world.  Therefore,  I  cannot  con- 
ceive of  any  agreement  being  acceptable 
to  Lebanon  being  opposed  by  any  Arab 
country. 

Q.  Was  there  any  real  progress 
made  on  any  one  major  issue  in  the 
last  15  or  20  hours  of  talks? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  It's  really 
difficult  to  say  that  there  is  major  prog- 
ress on  any  of  the  main  difficulties  that 


Secretary  Shultz  with  Israeli  Prime 
Minister  Menahem  Begin  during  a  press 
conference. 


are  still  remaining.  What  I  believe  we 
have  made  is  that  with  15  hours  yester- 
day with  the  Secretary,  I  believe  he 
understands  better  the  Lebanese  posi- 
tion. He  already  understood  the  Israeli 
position,  and  this  team  will  be  working 
very  hard  on  finding  language  that  will 
bridge  the  gaps.  Several  languages  were 
submitted  today.  Some  of  them  are  sub- 
ject to  discussions;  some  of  them  are 
really  not  adequate  at  all.  And  what 
may  be  acceptable  to  us  may  not  be  ac- 
ceptable to  Israel.  So  we  have  to  see 
how  it  is  received 


Q.  This  is  on  the  security  ar- 
rangements and  the  mutual  relations? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  Yes,  yes. 
On  almost  all  the  basic  points  there 
were,  let's  say,  American  formulations 
of  points  made  by  the  Israelis  and  by  the 
Lebanese.  These  formulations  were 
discussed  with  us,  they'll  be  discussed 
with  the  Israeli  team  this  afternoon,  and 
we  expect  to  see  Mr.  Shultz  on  Tuesday 
and  then  we'll  see  what  the  reaction  is. 

Q.  Are  you  more  pessimistic  now 
that  you'll  be  able  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  As  Mr. 

Shultz  said,  really  these  matters  are 
beyond  optimism,  beyond  pessimism. 
You  have  to  face  hard  political  facts 
with  a  great  deal  of  realism  and  a  great 
deal  of  conviction.  We  in  Lebanon  can- 
not afford  to  be  pessimistic;  otherwise, 
we  lose  our  country.  We  have  to  be  op- 
timistic. We  have  to  keep  working  very 
hard  on  finding  a  way  out.  I  believe  we'll 
find  a  way  out.  The  road  is  difficult,  it  is 
not  easy— many  problems.  But  I  think 
we'll  do  that. 


Jerusalem,  Israel 

Remarks, 
May  1,  19838 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  just  met  with 
four  representatives  of  families  who 
have  family  members  who  are  missing  in 
action  or  prisoners.  It  is  a  very  sad  and 
deeply  moving  thing  to  speak  to  those 
people  and  to  see  how  deeply  involved 
they  are,  and  also,  at  the  same  time  a 
source  of  joy  to  see  how  totally  confi- 
dent they  are  in  the  support  they  have 
of  the  Prime  Minister  and  all  members 
of  the  government,  and  no  doubt,  the 
people  of  Israel,  in  supporting  them  and 
wanting  desperately  to  have  the  return 
of  their  loved  ones. 

It  is  hard  after  a  meeting  like  that 
for  me  to  say  anything  much  about  the 
other  discussions,  and  even  the  discus- 
sion with  the  Prime  Minister,  except  to 
say  that  as  always  the  discussions  are 
very  penetrating  and  always  in  a  good 
spirit  and  the  desire  of  doing  everything 
we  can  to  find  an  agreement  and  to  find 
the  conditions  for  peace  and  stability  in 
this  case  between  Lebanon  and  Israel 
but  more  broadly  as  well. 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  May  I  ex- 
press my  deep  appreciation  and 
gratitude  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that 
he  was  kind  enough  to  receive  the 
families  of  the  missing  and  the 


y983 


37 


THE  SECRETARY 


prisoners.  The  families  suffer  very 
much,  and  they  know  how  deeply  im- 
pressed the  Secretary  was  during  the 
meeting  with  them.  I'm  also  positive  the 
Secretary  of  State  will  do  whatever  he 
can  to  help  in  this  case  of  great  human 
suffering. 

We  had  a  talk  today  with  the 
Secretary,  my  colleagues,  the  Foreign 
Minister  and  the  Defense  Minister  on 
one  hand,  and  the  Secretary  with  me. 
We  discussed  the  attitudes  of  both  sides. 
The  negotiations  are  continuing.  I  will 
have  to  say  that  there  are  still  dif- 
ferences of  opinion— we  haven't  solved 
them  yet.  And  again,  I  want  to  thank 
the  Secretary  for  his  good  will,  for  all 
the  efforts  he  is  making.  Let  us  hope 
that  ultimately  the  efforts  will  bring  a 
positive  result.  This  is  what  for  the  time 
being  we  can  tell  you. 

Remarks, 
May  2,  19839 

Secretary  Shultz.  We've  just  finished 
another  of  the  series  of  meetings  in  con- 
nection with  our  efforts  to  help  Israel 
and  Lebanon  reach  an  agreement,  and 
as  we  do,  we  continue  to  narrow  the 
focus  of  the  things  that  are  of  greatest 
concern  outstanding.  We  expect  to  have 
another  meeting  with  Ministers  Shamir 
and  Arens  tomorrow  morning,  and  after 
that  I  hope  to  go  to  Beirut  and  have 
another  set  of  sessions  there.  But  as 
always  here,  our  meetings  have  been 
conducted  with  a  grace  and  a  style  and  a 
constructive  spirit  that  tends  to  make 
the  meetings  themselves  very  worth- 
while and  interesting,  and  the  Prime 
Minister  gives  a  very  friendly  and  warm 
atmosphere  to  the  whole  thing  as  we 
discuss  these  serious  issues.  It's  very 
helpful. 

Prime  Minister  Begin.  I  would  like 
to  express  our  deep  gratitude  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  his  colleagues  for 
the  great  effort  the  Secretary  is  making 
during  his  stay  in  the  Middle  East.  I 
have  to  say,  I  think  I  will  express  the 
opinion  also  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
that  there  are  still  outstanding  problems 
which  have  to  be  discussed  both  in 
Jerusalem  and  in  Beirut.  The  Secretary 
will  be  going  after  another  talk  with  my 
colleagues,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs and  Defense,  to  Beirut,  and  then 
we  shall  again  meet,  so  the  atmosphere 
is  wonderful  in  our  talks,  and  we  wish 
our  friend,  the  Secretary,  full  success  in 
his  talks  while  he  is  in  Beirut. 

The  issues  were  clarified  here,  and 


when  we  will  be  in  a  position  to  decide 
about  the  issues,  then  we  shall  be  also 
able  to  tell  you  about  the  results  of  all 
the  efforts  we  are  all  making  in  this 
wonderful  atmosphere  of  the  friendship 
between  our  two  countries,  the  United 
States  and  Israel. 

Remarks, 
May  3,  1983i« 

Secretary  Shultz.  We've  just  completed 
another  meeting  with  Minister  Shamir, 
Minister  Arens,  and  all  of  their 
associates.  And  it's  been  again  a 
thorough  discussion  of  the  issues,  and 
we  will  now  go  back  to  Beirut  with  a 
good  clear  idea  of  the  remaining  issues 
and  the  position  of  Israel  on  them.  We'll 
be  discussing  the  whole  package  with 
the  Government  of  Lebanon,  hoping  that 
we  can  keep  narrowing  the  focus  of  the 
issues  and  get  closer  and  closer  to  an 
agreement.  It's  been  a  very  constructive 
and  helpful  meeting  here  this  morning, 
and  people  worked  late  last  night  get- 
ting prepared  for  it.  And  I  think  now  we 
have  a  good  clear  notion  of  where  we 
can  go  in  these  discussions. 

Foreign  Minister  Shamir.  We  are 

very  grateful  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  great  efforts  he  has  invested  in 
our  negotiations  with  Lebanon  about  an 
agreement.  And  as  he  is  now  going  to 
Beirut,  we  would  wish  him  full  success 
in  reaching  an  agreement  about  all  the 
pending  problems  between  us  and 
Lebanon. 


Baabda,  Lebanon 


News  Briefing, 
May  4,  1983" 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  have  been 
meeting  for  many  hours  today,  and  into 
the  evening  yesterday,  with  representa- 
tives of  the  Government  of  Lebanon— 
with  President  Gemayel,  with  the  Prime 
Minister,  with  the  Foreign  Minister,  and 
their  colleagues.  As  a  result  of  our 
discussions,  we  now  have  an  explicit  and 
clear  idea  of  the  position  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Lebanon.  Our  plan  is  now  to 
return  to  Israel,  and  we  will  present  this 
material  to  the  Government  of  Israel 
and  have  their  reaction.  So,  that's  where 
we  are  and  that's  our  program. 

Q.  Is  this  the  final  plan  that  you 
will  present  to  the  Government  of 


Israel  or  will  you  have  to  come  hi] 
here  again  after  you've  gone  to  Is| 
Secretary  Shultz.  The  Govern 
of  Lebanon  has  really  extended  itsJ 
these  discussions,  and  we  have  all  | 
worked  at  it  very  hard.  The  Prime  i 
Minister  has  been  with  us  through(| 
and  we  have  now  a  solid  position  o  i 
theirs  so  we'll  present  that,  and  W6  i 
where  we  go  from  there.  It  is  very  i 
desirable  to  come  to  a  conclusion  a  I 
rapidly  as  we  can. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  that  coi  i 
sion— that  is  to  say,  that  you  ean| 
fact,  achieve  a  complete  withdra' 
agreement  by  this  weekend? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  remains  ; 
seen,  and  we'll  have  to  have  the  re 
of  the  Government  of  Israel.  They" , 


have  to  look  at  the  material  and  th 
give  us  their  view  about  it 


Q.  Do  you  expect  the  Lebane  I 
and  the  Israelis  to  sign  some  sor  I 
agreement  before  you  leave,  ever  I 
the  Syrians  haven't  yet  agreed  to  1 
Or  do  you  just  have  an  agreemen  ! 
then  you  will  leave  and  someone  I 
will  do  the  selling  job  with  the  I 
Syrians?  I 

Secretary  Shultz.  Again,  it  di 
on  the  reaction  of  the  Government  I 
Israel  to  the  material  that  we  will  ( 
bringing  as  to  how  rapidly  we  can 
I  am  scheduled  and  plan,  in  any  cs 
go  to  Damascus  on  Saturday.  Pres 
Assad  has  indicated  that  he  will  re 
me  on  Saturday,  so  if  we  have  a  rr 
of  minds  between  Lebanon  and  Isi 
that  time,  that  would  be  very  posii 

Q.  In  saying  that  the  Lebane 
Government  has  extended  itself,  i 
you  not  saying  now  that  the  ball 
very  much  in  Israel's  court  to  aci 
or  reject  what  you've  negotiated 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'm  not  put 
pressure  on  anybody.  They  have  tl 
own  pressures  to  consider  and  the 
objectives.  The  Government  of  Lei 
and  the  Prime  Minister  and  his  col 
leagues  have  worked  at  this  very  I 
and  thoughtfully,  and  I  mainly  wai 
to  pay  a  compliment  to  the  Prime  > 
Minister,  the  Foreign  Minister,  am 
President  Gemayel  for  the  constru' 
and  hardworking  effort  that  they  1 
put  in. 

Q.  Is  it  necessary  for  the 
Lebanese  to  go  to  the  Arab  worll 
particularly  to  Syria,  before  you 
accept  final  agreement  on  this  d« 
ment? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  I  th' 
better  say  a  few  words  and  then  tl 


Department  of  State  Be 


THE  SECRETARY 


Minister  will,  of  course,  speak  in 
;  in  his  statement. 
|ust  want  to  thank  Secretary 
1  for  his  very  intensive  efforts  with 
I  with  Israel  in  an  attempt  to 
an  agreement.  We  do  not  have  an 
nent.  We  have  given  Mr.  Shultz  a 
itatement  on  all  the  points  raised 
proposed  agreement.  He  knows 
Y  where  we  stand.  This  is  not  the 
me  Lebanon  does  this.  Lebanon 
it  at  least  three  times  before, 
were  conflicts  of  views,  fears,  and 
inces  that  have  not  led  in  the  past 
•espondence  of  ideas  and,  there- 
he  attainment  of  an  agreement, 
ibanon  appreciates  deeply  the  ef- 
)f  Secretary  Shultz  because 
on  wants  to  free  itself,  and  the 
can  initiative  is  the  only  concrete 
nism  we  see  ahead  of  us  to 
e  Lebanon  from  occupation  and, 
,  to  preserve  the  integrity  and 
ignty  of  this  country.  What  we 
ing,  therefore,  we  do  with  pride 
lenly  and  with  hope  that  this  will 
I  an  agreement. 
?  have  not  in  any  way  compro- 
the  basic  principles  that  we  have 
m  the  very  beginning  to  govern 
ations  with  Israel  in  the  context 

agreement.  The  principles  that 
nunciated  before  remain.  Our  ef- 
•ith  the  Arab  countries  are  con- 
i.  We  have  been,  for  the  past  3 
i,  talking  to  the  Arab  countries; 

talking  to  them  today;  we  talked 
|i  yesterday;  we  will  be  talking  to 
Dmorrow.  Therefore,  we  will  not 
ig  anything  we  were  not  doing 
with  the  Arab  countries.  Again, 
to  the  Arab  countries  not  to  seek 
aproval,  because  we  are  a 
gn  state,  like  all  Arab  states— 
itermine  their  affairs  in  light  of 
vn  interests.  We  go  to  the  Arab 
es  to  coordinate  with  them,  to 
lem  informed  on  the  positions 
i  are  talking,  and  to  take  their 
because  in  many  matters  they  are 
led.  Lebanon  is  an  integral  part 
\.rab  world.  In  no  way  do  we 
)  violate  or  compromise  any  basic 
;ment  that  we  have  with  the 
)untries.  And,  therefore,  we  have 
ways  in  line  with  them  and  in  full 
ition. 

ils  an  agreement  still  possible 
|;ek?  A  signed  agreement? 
'reign  Minister  Salem.  Yesterday 
|ed  me,  and  I  told  you  Mr.  Shultz 
Imerican  and  by  nature  an  op- 
khat  I  am  from  Lebanon  and  by 
a  realist.  I  will  leave  it  at  that. 


Q.  Yesterday  you  said  that  you 
couldn't  see  this  happening  in  the  next 
few  days.  Although  you  wouldn't  rule 
out  miracles,  you  said  it  couldn't  be 
done  by  a  magic  wand.  Has  there  been 
some  miraculous  thing  done  on  the 
part  of  the  Secretary? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  We  have 
seen  that  he  certainly  is  a  very  per- 
suasive individual.  Behind  his  gentle 
manner  and  method,  he's  a  very  tough 
fellow  and  I  think  if  any  agreement  can 
be  had,  it  is  through  the  efforts  of 
Secretary  Shultz.  Whether  the  ideas 
that  Lebanon  is  proposing  will  be  ac- 
ceptable to  Israel,  now  that's  an  open 
question.  I  would  say  if  these  ideas  are 
acceptable,  then  we  are  on  the  way  to 
an  agreement. 

Q.  Are  you  confident  that  if  Israel 
will  accept  [inaudible]  that  Syria  will 
be  prepared  to  withdraw  its  troops 
from  Lebanon? 

Foreign  Minister  Salem.  We  in 
Lebanon  are  confident  that  what  is  in 
the  higher  interests  of  Lebanon  will  be 
supported  by  Syria. 


Jerusalem,  Israel 

Remarks, 
May  6.  1983'2 

Q.  Your  reaction  please? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  are  really 
pleased  that  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Cabinet  of  Israel  have  decided  to  accept 
this  agreement.  We  recognize  there  is  a 
tremendous  amount  of  work  to  be  done, 
but  this  is  a  milestone,  and  we  are  deter- 
mined to  keep  on  and  do  the  additional 
things  that  are  necessary  to  see  that  it 
works. 

But  at  this  moment,  I  just  want  to 
say  how  grateful  I  am  for  the  hard  work 
and  efforts,  constructive  atmosphere, 
and  earnest  intentions  throughout  that 
the  negotiators  both  here  and  in 
Lebanon  have  displayed  throughout  this 
period.  I  would  point  out  that  this  agree- 
ment was  very  close  to  completion  when 
I  arrived  due  to  the  good  work  of  the 
negotiating  teams  who  had  been  here, 
with  the  help  of  Phil  Habib  and  Morrie 
Draper.  I  had  the  pleasure  of  helping  to 
put  a  little  of  the  icing  on  the  cake,  but 
at  any  rate,  we  hope  it's  going  to  be  a 
real  good  cake. 

Now  we  are  going  on  to  Jordan  to 
talk  with  King  Hussein,  and  we'll  check 
back  here  and  give  a  report  on  our  visits 
on  our  way  out  of  the  area. 


Q.  How  long  do  you  think  it 
would  be  before  an  agreement  will  be 
formally  signed?  How  long  will  it 
take? 

Secretary  Shultz.  When  the  key 
governments  have  basically  said  they  are 
in  agreement,  then  the  actual  signing  is 
a  matter  of  the  formalities. 


Amman,  Jordan 


Arrival  Remarks, 
May  6.  1983'^ 

Foreign  Minister  Kasim.  I  would  like, 
on  behalf  of  the  Government  of  Jordan, 
to  welcome  you  and  Mrs.  Shultz  and 
members  of  your  delegation. 

You  are  coming  to  this  area  at  the 
most  sensitive,  important  time.  I  would 
like  to  assure  you  that  during  the  hours 
that  you  will  be  spending  with  us  here  in 
Amman,  you  will  be  receiving  every 
possible  assistance  that  will  help  in  pro- 
moting a  comprehensive  settlement,  a 
peaceful  settlement  in  the  Middle  East.  I 
believe  that  Jordan  has  been  and  will 
continue  to  be  a  very  positive  element  in 
the  Middle  East  in  the  way  that  peace 
will  be  promoted  and  suffering  will  end 
in  this  part  of  the  world.  What  we  have 
heard  a  short  while  ago  is,  indeed,  a 
very  positive  contribution.  This  is 
something  we  refer  to  as  Mr.  Shultz's 
achievement  and  his  gain,  and  I  think 
this  will  be  inevitably  a  very  positive 
contribution  to  the  overall  settlement 
that  the  region  is  in  dire  need  of. 

Secretary  Shultz.  Thank  you, 
Mr.  Minister,  I  appreciate  your  welcome. 
The  fact  that  you  and  your  wife  have 
come  to  the  airport  to  greet  us  is  a  very 
gracious  extension  of  hospitality,  and  I 
appreciate  also  the  content  of  what  you 
have  just  said.  I  look  forward  to  meeting 
again  with  King  Hussein,  and  I  expect 
that  we'll  have  an  opportunity  to  review 
the  good  news  on  the  Israeli-Lebanon 
negotiations  and  give  him  a  full  briefing 
of  what  transpired  and  what  the  situa- 
tion there  is.  And  I  hope  also  and  I'm 
sure  that  we  will  have  a  chance  to  share 
ideas  and  information  on  the  peace  proc- 
ess more  generally  as  you  suggested. 

I  certainly  will  assure  King  Hussein, 
as  I  do  you,  and  as  the  President  does 
himself  whenever  he  speaks  on  this  sub- 
ject, that  President  Reagan  remains 
totally  committed  to  doing  everything 
that  we  can,  he  can.  to  help  the  people 
of  the  Middle  East  achieve  a  more 
peaceful  situation.  We  remain  dedicated 


THE  SECRETARY 


to  that  end  and  will  continue  working  at 
it.  We  know  there  are  difficulties,  and 
we  will  never  give  up,  we  will  keep  on 
going.  Now  there  is  one  phrase  that  I 
remember  from  the  start  of  this  trip, 
which  was  in  Cairo,  and  it  happened  to 
coincide  with  the  first  anniversary  of  the 
return  of  the  Sinai  to  Egypt.  And  what 
I  said  was  that  that  shows  that  negotia- 
tion can  work.  Once  again,  I  think  we 
see  in  the  agreement  now  pretty  much 
in  hand  between  Israel  and  Lebanon 
that  negotiations  can  work.  Negotiations 
can  do  things  that  violence  and  terror 
simply  can't  do.  So  I  think  this  has  to  be 
our  theme:  Find  a  way  to  the  negotia- 
tions that  with  all  their  difficulties  and 
frustrations  represent  the  real  answer  to 
the  question  of  peace. 

I'm  looking  forward  very  much  to 
meeting  with  His  Majesty,  whom  I  have 
met  quite  a  few  times  before  and  regard 
as  one  of  the  thoughtful  and  creative 
and  strong  leaders  of  the  world.  So  I 
especially  look  forward  to  seeing  him  on 
this  occasion. 


Departure  Statement 

May  7.  1983" 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  like  to  ex- 
press my  appreciation  to  His  Majesty  for 
receiving  us.  Last  evening  we  had  a 
very  fine  general  meeting,  and  I  had  the 
privilege  of  a  private  meeting  with  His 
Majesty,  and  then  he  and  the  Queen 
were  both  gracious  in  giving  us  a  lovely 
dinner  at  their  palace.   So  we  were 
treated,  you  might  say,  royally,  and  we 
appreciate  it. 

I  think  it  was  particularly  note- 
worthy to  me  that  His  Majesty  ex- 
pressed to  me— and  on  behalf  of  the 
President  I  expressed  to  him— continued 
support  for  the  peace  process.  It  is 
something  that  must  proceed.  It  is  a  mo- 
ment of  frustration  and  dilemma  but 
nevertheless  not  a  moment  to  lose  heart 
or  to  flag  in  our  efforts.  His  Majesty 
asked  me  if  that  was  the  President's 
view,  and  I  said  it  certainly  was.  The 
President  remains  completely  committed 
to  pursuing  this  process. 

Of  course  we  discussed  the  Israeli- 
Lebanon  agreement  and  what  is  devel- 
oping in  Lebanon.  And  it  was  also  very 
good  to  hear  His  Majesty  express  his 
complete  support  for  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  and  that  government's  efforts 
to  free  itself  of  foreign  forces  and  to 
become  sovereign  and  in  charge  of  its 
own  territory  again. 

In  summary  we  had  a  fine  meeting, 
very  worthwhile  and  constructive  and 
these  two  definite  items  of  continued 
support  for  a  most  meaningful  debate. 


Damascus,  Syria 

News  Briefing, 
May  7,  1983^=^ 

Secretary  Shultz.  First,  the  schedule, 
which  was  that  we  met  with  the  Foreign 
Minister  and  his  party— first  a  little 
group,  then  a  larger  group,  for  a  couple 
of  hours  or  so.  We  discussed  mainly  the 
Lebanon  negotiations  but  also  such  mat- 
ters as  the  Iran-Iraq  war  and  tensions  in 
the  Middle  East  in  general.  We  then  had 
a  working  lunch  with  the  Foreign 
Minister  and,  following  a  slight  break, 
about  4  hours  of  discussion  with  Presi- 
dent Assad,  which  again  covered  a  wide 
range  of  things  but  I  would  say  at  least 
half  of  it  on  the  Lebanon  situation. 

In  the  interest  of  time,  I'll  just  com- 


from  my  experience  in  the  Middle  Ejj 
nothing  happens  easily,  so  no  one  e;| 
pected  that  this  one  would. 

On  the  other  hand,  at  least  in  ni' 
judgment,  there  are  great  incentiveij 
built  into  this  situation  for  people  ii  j 
end  to  go  along  with  it,  but  that's  o\ 
my  judgment.  At  any  rate,  no  doub  j 
Lebanese  and  the  Syrians  will  be  i 
discussing  this  matter,  and  we  havt  g 
that  we  are  ready  to  help  as  we  cai  i 
President  Assad  gave  me  his  assur  : 
that  I,  or  the  appropriate  U.S.  repi^ 
sentative,  will  always  be  welcome  1 1 
to  do  that.  So  that's  where  it  stand 

Q.  Are  you  saying  that  you  m 
come  back  here  to  do  the  same  sc  < 
thing? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  is  nci 
plan  to  do  that,  although  I,  Phil,  oi 


The  Secretary  discusses  a  wide  range  of  issues  with  Syrian  President  Hafez  Assad, 
eluding  the  situation  in  Lebanon. 


ment  on  the  latter,  since  that  is  the 
thing  we  have  been  working  on.  Of 
course,  the  Syrians  will  speak  for 
themselves  about  it,  but  I  think  it  is  fair 
to  say  that  they  are  hardly  enthusiastic 
about  the  agreement  that  Lebanon  and 
Israel  have  worked  out.  Now,  pro- 
cedurally, as  I  understand  it,  what  has 
to  happen  is  that  Lebanon— which 
brought  a  copy  of  a  draft  agreement  as 
of,  I  think,  late  Tuesday  here  and 
discussed  it  with  them— will,  after 
Lebanon  acts  on  the  agreement,  show 
them— although  that's  up  to  Lebanon— 
the  actual  agreement  as  it  is  has  been 
finally  shaped  up.  Then,  Lebanon  will 
have  the  negotiation  with  the  Syrians 
about  Syrian  withdrawal  and  with  the 
PLO  about  PLO  withdrawal.  My  guess 
is  that  these  will  be  very  difficult 
negotiations,  but  this  is  okay.  At  least 


somebody— of  course,  the  Amliass 
is  here,  and  we  will  be  keeping  in  " 
with  them  as  our  Ambassadors  do  i 
other  words,  the  door  is  open  fur  1 1 
discussions  with  us,  as  well  as  witl  t: 
Lebanese. 

Q.  [Inaudible]  possibility  thail 
there  should  be  progress  in  that  i 
negotiation  and  you  were  requin  i 
the  final  stages  to  try  to  close  tli 
deal,  you  would  be  willing  to  do  u 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  thinil 
that  kind  of  a  proposition,  and  I  d  'I 
mean  by  my  comment  to  imply  th;  I 
ready  to  come  back. 

Q.  You're  saying  that  you've  i 
tough  round,  and  they  didn't  liktl 
agreement.  You  are  saying  the 
Lebanese  are  going  to  have  toug 
discussions  with  them.  What  is  '« 
time  frame  looking  down  the  roi» 


Department  of  State  B  If 


THE  SECRETARY 


,  of  any  foreign  troops  getting  out 
ebanon?  It  is  not  going  to  be 

k. 

Secretary  Shultz.  In  the  first  place, 
;  is  built  into  the  Israeli-Lebanese 
ement  a  withdrawal  period  of  8-12 
:s.  The  start  of  any  withdrawal 
id  awaits  assurances  all  around  on 
.  everyone  is  going  to  do.  I  can't 
;  a  prediction  on  how  long  that  will 
but  it  will  take  a  little  while. 

3.  In  the  interest  of  time,  can  you 
summarize  very  quickly  just  what 
Syrian  objectives  are? 
Secretary  Shultz.  I'd  rather  let  the 
ins  do  that.  You  can  imagine  them 
y  well,  and  they  have  expressed 
publicly  quite  a  bit. 

J.  But  did  they  make  clear  that, 
inciple.  they  are  for  the  troop 
drawal  still? 

secretary  Shultz.  It  depends  on  the 
of  principle— at  a  certain  level  of 
iple,  yes. 

I.  Were  you  surprised  at  the  in- 
ty  of  their  objections?  Did  it  run 
;r  than  you  thought  it  would? 
Secretary  Shultz.  We  had  a  pretty 
jidea  what  their  views  are,  and  I 
say  that  we  weren't  surprised. 

Is  it  the  remaining  or  the 
ial  Israeli  presence  that  they  ob- 

0  or,  on  a  more  philosophical 

the  whole  idea  that  Israel  makes 
cal  gains  from  military  aggres- 

ecretary  Shultz.  How  much  they 
•d  from  our  discussion  as  compared 
vhat  they  knew  before  we  talked, 
i)t  sure,  but  I  think  we  have  started 
IS  with  the  proposition  that  what 
Ijreement  yields  is  complete  Israeli 
jrawal.  And  from  the  Arab  stand- 
obtaining  complete  Israeli 
Irawal  is  a  very  important  matter. 

.  Can  you  just  make  clear  if  they 
led  the  withdrawal  based  on  the 
iment  that  has  been  worked  out? 
ecretary  Shultz.  We  don't  want  to 
.lything  that — as  a  clarification,  I 
Want  to  imply  that  I  know  that  the 
!ese  will  bring  that  agreement  here 
eliver  it.  I'm  sure  they  will  come 
lant  to  discuss  it,  but  of  course, 
;;  up  to  them.  It  is  their  agreement, 
pn't  want  to  say  anything  that 

1  to  lock  them  into  that. 

.  You  think  the  door  is  open  or 
Smounts  to  a  rejection? 
ecretary  Shultz.  I  think  the  door 
Jslammed. 


Jidda,  Saudi  Arabia 

Arrival  Remarks, 
May  7,  1983"= 

Secretary  Shultz.  First  of  all,  I  would 
like  to  say  that  it  is  a  pleasure  for  me  to 
be  back  in  Saudi  Arabia.  I  haven't  been 
here  in  a  little  over  a  year  now.  I've  en- 
joyed coming  in  and  seeing  this  airport; 
it's  just  magnificent.  There's  an  even 
better  one  near  Riyadh;  it  just  got 
finished.  I  say  that  with  a  certain  par- 
tiality. Anyway,  it's  a  pleasure  to  be 
back  in  the  Kingdom  and  I  look  forward 
to  discussions  with  His  Majesty  and  the 
others  who  will  be  with  him. 

Q.  Can  we  get  some  response  of 
how  the  United  States  reacts  to  the 
Syrian  move  today? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  I  really 
said  all  I  have  to  say  when  we  had  our 
little  gathering  in  Damascus. 

Prince  Sa'ud.  May  I  say  that  on  my 
part,  I'd  like  to  welcome  His  Excellency 
here.  He  has  already  mentioned  how 
long  he's  been  away  from  Saudi  Arabia. 
We  hope  his  next  trip  won't  be  so  far  in 
the  future.  We  are  looking  forward  to 
discussions  that  we  will  have  with  him 
today.  His  Majesty  will  hold  the  meeting 
with  the  Secretary  this  evening.  We  are 
looking  forward  to  fruitful  and  wide- 
ranging  discussions. 

Q.  Could  you  tell  me  what  the 
Saudi  view  is  of  the  agreement  be- 
tween Lebanon  and  Israel? 

Prince  Sa'ud.  We  are  waiting  to 
hear  from  His  Excellency  about  the 
details  of  the  agreement.  We  don't  have 
the  details  of  the  agreement.  We  hear 
there  is  a  breakthrough.  We  are  hopeful 
that  the  implementation  of  the 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  troops  in  Lebanon 
will  bring  back  the  independence  and 
territorial  integrity  for  all  Lebanon  for 
which  we  have  been  looking  forward  to 
and  trying  to  assist  the  Lebanese 
Government.  And  we,  therefore,  hope 
that  this  round  of  discussions,  this  effort 
by  the  President  and  the  Secretary,  to 
bring  this  about  will  achieve  a  success. 

Q.  So  you  can  tell  us  tomorrow 
what  Saudi  Arabia  feels  about  it? 

Prince  Sa'ud.  That  depends  on 
what  we  hear  from  the  Secretary. 


Q.  What  was  the  Syrian  reaction 
in  Damascus  today? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I've  already 
discussed  it,  and  I  chose  my  words 
carefully.  I've  shifted  gears  to  Saudi 
Arabia  now. 


Tel  Aviv,  Israel 

Interview, 
May  8,  1983'^ 

Q.  The  perception  seems  to  be  that 
you  came  to  the  Middle  East  and  you 
succeeded  in  getting  an  agreement 
between  Israel  and  Lebanon  but  that 
you  have  failed  to  persuade  the 
Syrians  to  leave,  and,  therefore,  the 
mission  is  kind  of  awash.  I  realize  ifs 
more  comfortable  than  that.  How  do 
you  assess  it  now? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  say  first 
of  all,  I  came  to  the  Middle  East  in  light 
of  the  fact  that  Israel  and  Lebanon  had 
made  tremendous  strides  toward  arrang- 
ing their  own  agreement  with  a  tremen- 
dous amount  of  help  from  Philip  Habib 
and  Morrie  Draper  as  the  U.S.  represen- 
tatives. And  I  would  like  to  think  I 
helped  them  some  in  putting  it  finally 
together. 

Now  we  have,  of  course,  other 
aspects  to  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 
forces.  That  means  Syrian  forces  and 
PLO  forces,  and  so  we  are  working  on 
that  aspect  of  it,  although  it's  a  separate 
matter.  And  like  everything  else  out 
here,  it  doesn't  come  easy,  but  we  are 
moving  ahead  with  the  expectation  that 
somehow  or  other  we  are  going  to  be 
able  to  work  this  out. 

Q.  How  much  of  a  setback  is  it 
that  the  Syrians  say  they  are  not  in- 
terested in  participating  in  any  way, 
shape,  or  form  in  anything  that  gives 
Israel  some  advantage  for  having  in- 
vaded Lebanon? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It's  a  Syrian  point 
of  view  that  they  have  expressed,  and  I 
think  the  answer  to  it  is  that  basically 
what  Lebanon  had  agreed  to  do  in  the 
security  zone  is  to  take  responsibility 
with  their  own  forces  for  providing 
security  and  stability  in  that  zone.  That's 
what  Israel  wants,  and  the  Lebanese 
have  assured  us  and  told  us  time  and 
again  that's  what  the  Lebanese  want. 
They  don't  want  their  country  torn  apart 
again.  So  they're  doing  something  that's 
in  their  interest  as  well  as  the  Israeli  in- 
terest as  part  of  the  security  arrange- 
ments for  this  agreement.  It  seems  to 


983 


THE  SECRETARY 


me  that  assuming  that  the  Government 
of  Lebanon— Parliament— broadly  en- 
dorses this,  which  I'm  sure  they  will,  it 
seems  to  me  that's  a  proper  decision  for 
the  Government  of  Lebanon  to  make. 

Q.  You  know  only  too  well  the  ex- 
tent to  which  the  Syrians  and  the 
Soiets  are  currently  allied.  We 
haven't  been  close  to  the  Syrians  in  a 
good  many  years,  and  it  might  well 
serve  their  purposes  to  needle  you  a 
little  bit.  Do  you  think  that  their 
answer  at  this  time  may  simply  be  to 
keep  you  from  getting  any  of  the 
credit  and  that  after  a  decent  interval 
they  may  change  their  minds? 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  remains  to  be 
seen  what  happens  and  the— everybody 
likes  to  needle  me.  That's  all  right,  I'm 
used  to  it,  and  that's  fine.  If  this  agree- 
ment carries  forward  into  complete 
withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces  and 
Lebanon  becomes  again  a  sovereign 
country  with  prosperity  and  peace,  there 
will  be  plenty  of  credit  to  go  around  and 
the  principal  credit  will  go  to  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  able  to  achieve 
that  and,  for  that  matter,  to  the  Israelis, 
to  the  Syrians,  when  they  withdraw,  and 
the  other  forces  that'll  make  this  work. 

Q.  Do  you  see  any  signs  that  the 
Soviets  might  be  encouraging  the 
Syrians  not  to  cooperate? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  noticed  that  the 
TASS  statement  was  bitterly  critical  of 
the  Israeli-Lebanon  agreement,  so  I 
assume  they  don't  like  it.  But  I  don't 
know  how  they  can  oppose  it  and  still 
think  that  they're  for  a  sovereign 
Lebanon  with  all  foreign  forces 
withdrawn.  You've  got  to  start  with 
some  foreign  forces  willing  to  withdraw, 
and  the  thing  in  this  agreement  is  that 
the  Israelis  have  expressed  their  will- 
ingness to  withdraw  completely,  given 
conditions  that  had  been  put  there  and 
conditions  which  are  basically  good  for 
the  Lebanese. 

Q.  You've  just  come  from  Saudi 
Arabia.  It's  known  the  Saudis,  too, 
have  some  influence  with  Syria;  I 
think  it's  about  a  half  a  billion  dollars, 
their  aid  program  each  year.  Are  you 
hopeful  that  the  Saudis  will  twist 
some  Syrian  arms  on  this? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  Saudis,  of 
course,  will  speak  for  themselves  like  all 
countries,  but  I  would  say  we  were 
received  immediately  and  most  gracious- 
ly by  King  Fahd,  and  he  sat  with  us  for 
well  into  the  morning.  I  consider  that 


the  discussions  we  had  were  very 
satisfactory  from  the  standpoint  of  our 
objectives. 

Q.  What  are  the  dangers  if  this 
thing  begins  to  unravel?  What  do  you 
see  as  a  possible  scenario? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We're  not  work- 
ing that  side  of  the  street.  We're  on  the 
problem-solving  side  of  the  street,  and 
we're  working  to  see  that  things  do  stay 
together  and  move  forward.  There  are 
certainly  plenty  of  difficulties.  We're 
well  aware  of  them,  and,  however,  we 
approach  these  difficulties  with  the  at- 
titude of  "let's  work  them  out." 

Q.  How  much  time  do  you  have 
before  the  Israeli-Lebanese  agreement 
might  start  to  unravel? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  see  that 
there  is  any  tension  on  that  score.  We've 
got  to  get  done  those  things  that  the 
parties  do  that  actually  bring  the  agree- 
ment to  the  stage  where  it  is  signed  and 
is  properly  ratified  by  their  respective 
governmental  bodies  and  that  should  be 
able  to  happen  fairly  promptly.  Once 
that  has  happened,  then  you  have 
something  that  is  explicit  and  final;  not 
that  it  isn't  final  now,  but  all  of  those 
ratification  processes  do  take  time  and 
they're  important.  So  they  have  to  be 
gone  through. 

Q.  Isn't  it  true  that  if  the  Syrians 
choose  not  to  participate,  the  Israelis 
will  not  withdraw  and  they  have 
already  threatened  to  make  a  minor 
puUback,  set  up  a  fence,  and  just  leave 
it  at  that?  Isn't  that  possible  if 
nothing  happens  in  a  finite  period  of 
time? 

Secretary  Shultz.  In  the  first  place, 
there's  the  process  of  getting  the  agree- 
ment approved,  ratified,  and  so  forth. 
That's  independent  of  anything.  Then 
comes  the  implementation  of  the  agree- 
ment and  that,  of  course,  would  basically 
start  with  the  beginning  of  withdrawal. 
For  that  to  happen,  we  know  that  there 
has  to  be  clear  evidence  that  there  is  go- 
ing to  be  a  simultaneity  of  withdrawal  of 
Syrian  and  PLO  forces.  And  that's 
something  that  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  will  have  to  be  working  on  and 
will  have  to  be  trying  to  see  how  that 
can  be  put  together,  while  not  tying 
them  explicitly  together  because  the 
Syrians,  of  course,  maintain  that  they're 
in  Lebanon  on  a  different  basis  than  the 
Israelis  are  in  Lebanon  and  they're  not 
connected  in  any  way.  Nevertheless,  the 
withdrawal  has  to  be  going  on  more  or 
less  simultaneously. 


Q.  Do  you  anticipate  that  in  a  fl 
weeks  you're  going  to  be  back  out 
here  again  trying  to  resolve  the 
Syrian-Lebanese  side  of  the  equatio 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'm  off  to  Pari 
little  bit  later  for  an  OECD  meeting ,: 
then  there's  the  Williamsburg  summi 
and  the  NATO  meeting  and  a  lot  of  ' 
things  going  on,  so  I'm  ready  to  do  n 
job  wherever  it's  most  needed,  but  tl 
are  a  tremendous  number  of  able  pe(  j 
around  here  whom  I'm  privileged  to  . 
work  with,  and  so  there  are  lots  of 
strong  shoulders  to  carry  the  load. 

Q.  On  the  Israeli-Lebanese  agr^ ) 
ment.  there  are  previous  agreemen  i 
that  have  been  worked  out  with  pr  i 
vious  Secretaries  of  State  on  shutt 
agreements  that  turned  out  to  havi 
some  secret  codicils  which  we  didi 
all  know  about  at  the  time.  What 
about  this  time?  Are  there  any  aid  ^ 
packages  that  we  haven't  heard  ab 
or  some  new  relationship? 

Secretary  Shultz.  No,  there  are 
new  aid  packages  that  haven't  been 
heard  about.  There  is  a  substantial  f  j 
of  aid  from  the  United  States  to  Isn  j 
that  goes  through  the  Congress  and 
that's  highly  publicized.  There's  notl:  | 
secret  about  it  and  other  aspects  of  | 
relationship  with  Israel.  By  the  sam^  { 
token  we  have  publicly  said  long  age 
that  we  feel  that  Lebanon  deserves 
help  and  the  help  of  others  in  the  in 
dustrialized  world,  and  we  have  beei 
trying  to  provide  it.  We  have  a  bill  i 
the  fiscal  1984  budget  right  now  on 
behalf  of  Lebanon— that's  going  for- 
ward, there's  nothing  secret  about  it( 

Q.  Before  you  made  this  trip, 
there  were  some  people  who  thouf 
that  perhaps  your  approach  was 
somewhat  naive.  Among  other  thii ; 
you  didn't  really  construct  a  safet> 
for  yourself  for  the  possibility  of  i 
failure.  You  also  used  the  phrase- 
Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  believi 
failure. 

Q.  You  used  the  phrase  "peace  ^ 
winner."  But  out  here,  very  often,  ■ 
has  been  a  bigger  winner.  If  you  h' 
the  possibility  to  reconstruct  the 
technique  for  this  mission,  would 
have  made  many  changes?  Or  has  i, 
gone  the  way  you  hoped? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  really  havei 
had  the  time  to  go  back  and  second  | 
guess.  We're  right  in  the  midst  of  | 
things.  I  think  the  thing  that  we  ha\i 
known  from  the  beginning  is  in  all  t  i 
things,  the  more  promptly  you're  ab| 
get  things  accomplished,  no  doubt  tl. 


Department  of  State  Bu 


THE  SECRETARY 


er  off  you  are,  assuming  that  what 
get  accomplished  is  done  thoroughly 
carefully  so  that  the  objectives  of 
parties  are  understood  and 
onably  met. 

Q.  Throughout  these  discussions, 
e  Israeli-American  relations  ever  a 
ar  issue?  Was  it  ever  in  any  kind 
iopardy  had  it  not  gone  the  way  it 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  started  on  my 
lion  here  with  a  lengthy  conversation 
the  Prime  Minister,  during  which 
ouched  on  a  number  of  things.  It 
a  very  warm  and  constructive 
ting,  and  there  was  no  tension  in  it 
1. 

5.  Taking  a  look  right  now,  how 
I  can  one  realistically  expect,  and  I 
hasize  the  word  realistically,  that 
will  be  able  to  get  foreign  forces 
of  Lebanon?  This  summer,  this 
this  year? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  want  to 
[own  a  time  because  there  are  a  lot 
iknowns  and  difficulties,  but  they 
joing  to  be  worked  at  and  are  being 
;ed  at  hard  and  promptly,  so  the 
er  the  better. 

!|.  An  editorial  in  one  of  the  inter- 
)nal  newspapers  the  other  day 
ested  that  shuttle  diplomacy  may 
had  its  day,  that  this  being  the 
I  major  effort  may  be  about  to  be 
last  one.  Do  you  share  that  view? 
liecretary  Shultz.  I  don't  know 
her  you  wrote  that  editorial  and 
e  getting  tired  of  it  or  what.  It's  a 
I  process,  but  I  suppose  people  will 
vhatever  works. 

\.  Is  it  a  fitting  role  for  the 
etary  of  State  of  the  United 
js  to  be  bouncing  back  and  forth 
een  world  capitals  and  occa- 
illy  getting  shot  at? 
Secretary  Shultz.  If  it  accomplishes 
I'thing  constructive,  I  think  the 
;d  States  has  always  been  willing  to 
in  and  do  what  is  necessary  to 
problems  in  a  constructive  way 
id  the  world.  And  if  that  calls  upon 
ecretary  of  State  to  do  something 
her.  Secretaries  of  State  have 
)fs  been  willing  to  step  up  to  the  line 
;he  same  with  others. 


(irture  Remarks, 

(8,  1983"* 

\ 

etary  Shultz.  As  we  come  to  the 

)f  this  trip,  we  wanted  to  come  back 

to  Israel  and  to  touch  base  once 

1  with  my  counterpart,  the  Foreign 


Back  in  Beirut  for  the  second  time  in  3  days.  Secretary  Shultz  and  Ambassador  Habib 
meet  with  Lebanese  President  Amin  Gemayel  at  the  Presidential  Palace  to  discuss  troop 
withdrawal  from  Lebanon. 


Minister,  and  his  delegation,  the  Defense 
Minister,  and  others.  And  so  we  had  a 
complete  review  of  the  additional  infor- 
mation we've  accumulated  and  of 
precisely  where  we  stand  and  what  we 
each  are  going  to  do. 

I  think,  at  this  point,  we  can  once 
again  say  what  a  great  thing  it  is  to 
have  the  agreement  between  Israel  and 
Lebanon.  We  know  that  there  are  dif- 
ficulties ahead,  but  we  intend  to  under- 
stand these  difficulties  and  work  with 
them  and  do  everything  that  we  can  to 
see  that  the  kind  of  resolution  that  we 
all  want  comes  out  of  this  great  effort 
that's  been  made  by  the  Government  of 
Israel  and  the  Government  of  Lebanon 
to  provide  the  right  kind  of  conditions 
for  withdrawal,  for  security,  and  to  get 
all  the  foreign  forces  out  of  Lebanon  so 
it  can  be  sovereign  and  can  have  a 
chance  for  a  peaceful  and  prosperous 
existence,  and  in  so  doing,  among  other 
things,  be  a  good  neighbor  with  Israel. 

Foreign  Minister  Shamir.  When 
you  and  Mrs.  Shultz  arrived  in  Israel 
some  10  days  ago,  we  were  full  of  hope 
that  your  mission  would  be  colored  with 
success.  I  do  believe  that  today  we  can 
safely  say  that  the  strenuous  work  that 
you  and  your  colleagues  invested  during 
these  days  and  nights  have  succeeded  in 
bridging  some  of  the  differences  which 
prevailed  between  Lebanon  and  Israel. 

The  Government  of  Israel  has  taken 
an  important  decision,  confident  in  the 
friendship  and  alliance  between  our  two 


countries.  Throughout  the  long  months 
of  our  negotiations  with  Lebanon,  aided 
by  the  untiring  efforts  of  Ambassadors 
Habib  and  Draper  and  their  colleagues, 
we  had  always  borne  in  mind  our  com- 
monly held  goals,  namely  the  withdrawal 
of  all  foreign  forces  from  Lebanon  to 
enable  the  Government  of  Lebanon  to 
assert  its  own  sovereignty  in  its  country 
and  to  ensure  the  safety  and  security  of 
Israel's  northern  frontier  and  the  towns 
and  villages  of  the  Galilee. 

I  believe  that  the  agreement  we 
reached  with  your  aid,  if  it  will  be 
scrupulously  kept  by  all  parties,  has 
achieved  that  goal.  Israel,  for  its  part, 
will  implement  this  agreement  as  soon 
as  possible  in  order  that  a  better  future 
will  be  the  part  of  the  peoples  of 
Lebanon  and  Israel.  We  share  your  con- 
viction that  peace  is  the  best  guarantee 
for  the  security  of  both  Lebanon  and 
Israel— a  peace  to  be  based  on  what  the 
agreement  has  tried  to  accomplish, 
namely  that  Lebanon  will  never  again 
serve  as  a  platform  for  hostile  elements 
bent  on  wreaking  havoc  in  Israel.  I 
know  that  you  share  these  goals  and  for 
this  I  can  only  express  to  you  my  own 
gratitude.  Your  personal  efforts  during 
this  mission  have  evoked  all  our  admira- 
tion. I  am  certain  that  these  efforts 
will  not  be  in  vain.  I  wish  you  and 
Mrs.  Shultz  a  safe  voyage  and  God 
speed. 


43 


THE  SECRETARY 


Beirut,  Lebanon 

Departure  Remarks, 

May  8,  1983" 

Secretary  Shultz.  I've  just  spent  about 
an  hour  and  a  quarter,  I  guess,  with 
President  Gemayel  and  the  Prime 
Minister  and  the  Foreign  Minister  and 
Ambassador  Tueni  and  presented  to  him 
a  picture  of  what  I  have  learned  as  a 
result  of  traveling  around  Jordan  and  to 
Syria  and  to  Saudi  Arabia.  We  discussed 
our  mutual  assessment  of  the  situation 
and  steps  that  need  now  to  be  taken. 

Ambassador  Habib  and  Ambassador 
Draper  will  remain  here  and  continue 
work  on  the  matters  that  are  still  ahead 
of  us  in  bringing  this  all  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  That  is,  to  get  all  the  foreign 
forces  out  of  Lebanon  and  for  Lebanon 
to  secure  itself. 

I  think  I  can  fairly  say  that  the  shell- 
ing in  this  neighborhood  in  the  last  cou- 
ple of  days  has  been  a  very  disturbing 
matter,  and  they  have  managed  to  ar- 
range a  cease-fire  as  of  the  moment  so 
things  are  quiet,  and,  naturally,  it  is  be- 
ing urged  upon  everyone  to  hold  their 
fire.  And  it  is  being  pointed  out  that 
those  countries  that  are  occupying 
Lebanese  soil  have  a  responsibility  to 
control  any  fire  that  comes  from  areas 
they  occupy. 

So  it  is  the  responsibility  of  an  oc- 
cupying power  to  maintain  a  lawful 
situation  in  their  area.  At  any  rate,  we 
are  proceeding  and  President  Gemayel  is 
proceeding  with  what  needs  to  be  done, 
as  are  the  Israelis  and  others.  And  Am- 
bassadors Habib  and  Draper  are  here  to 
help  them,  so  we  are  getting  on  our 
way. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  sense  as  to 
who  might  be  behind  the  firing,  and 
do  you  see  it  as  pressuring  President 
Gemayel  to  back  away  from  the  agree- 
ment? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  question  of 
who  is  behind  it  has  been  raised  and 
raised.  Everybody  says  that  they  are  not 
behind  it.  In  fact,  they  are  trying  to  stop 
it.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  it  has 
erupted  all  of  a  sudden  again.  And  so  we 
are  trying  to  stop  it.  We  are  trying  to 
help  in  every  way  we  can  to  put  it  down. 
The  effort  to  the  carrying  forward  on 
this  agreement  and  other  arrangements 
will  continue  and  they  haven't  been 
derailed.  They  are  not  going  to  be 
derailed  because,  I  think,  what  people 
can  see  is,  in  front  of  them  now,  the 
chance  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign 


forces.  President  Gemayel  is  absolutely 
confident  that,  when  the  foreign  forces 
have  departed,  the  Lebanese  themselves 
will  be  able  to  control  the  situation. 


Washington,  D.C. 


News  Briefing, 
May  11,  198320 

Secretary  Shultz.  It  was  a  pleasure  to 
report  to  the  President  in  person,  as 
well  as— during  my  trip — by  cable  and 
by  telephone.  Somehow,  that  is  a  little 
better  kind  of  communication,  when  you 
can  look  somebody  in  the  eye  and  talk  it 
over. 

But  at  any  rate,  during  the  course  of 
the  travels  in  the  Middle  East— I,  of 
course,  started  out  with  good  instruc- 
tions from  the  President.  And  we  were 
able  to  maintain  a  constant  communica- 
tion. I  reported  to  him  on  the  situation 
in  Lebanon  right  now  as  I  left  it,  and 
that  is  that  the  agreement  between 
Israel  and  Lebanon  is  gradually  settling 
down.  I  think  just  about  all  the  i's  have 
been  dotted  now  and  the  t's  crossed. 
And  we  expect  to  see  that  take  final 
shape  and  be  ratified. 

Of  course,  once  that  is  firm  and  in 
hand,  then  the  next  question  is — and  it 
is  a  question  that  is  being  worked  on — is 
Syrian  and  PLO  withdrawal.  And  I  have 
no  doubt  that  the  Lebanese  will  call,  for- 
mally, for  that.  And  while  I  fully 
recognize— having  been  there— that 
there  are  problems  and  difficulties, 
nevertheless  it  is  clear  that  there  is  a 
weight  of  opinion  building  up  in  the 
Arab  world  that  this  is  the  opportunity 
to  bring  about  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
Lebanon,  along  with  all  foreign  forces 
and  support  for  that. 

So  I  feel  confident  that,  in  the  end, 
that  will  happen.  And  Lebanon  will  have 
a  chance  to,  again,  be  a  sovereign  coun- 
try and  to  be  able  to  decide  for  itself 
how  it  wants  to  live  and  have  a  chance 
to  be  peaceful  and  prosperous. 

I  do  want  to  say  that  I  attended  the 
OECD  meeting,  along  with  several  other 
Cabinet  officers.  And,  there,  I  think  we 
found  a  very  good  reception  to  the 
developing  economic  recovery  in  the 
United  States.  Everyone  recognizes  how 
important  that  is.  There  was,  I  think,  a 
good  recognition  of  the  importance  of 
combatting  protectionism,  so  that  the 
recovery  in  various  countries  can  in- 
teract and  we  can  get  the  most  possible 
mileage  out  of  it. 


There  was  general  agreement  on  tl 
East- West  economic  relationship  area, 
something  that  had  been  discussed  a 
great  deal  over  the  months.  And  that 
seemed  to  emerge  in  pretty  good  shapt 
and  without  too  much  controversy.  So, 
on  the  whole,  the  OECD  meeting  went 
well.  And  I  had  the  privilege  of  a  good 
visit  with  President  Mitterrand  about  1 
perceptions  of  what  is  going  on  around 
the  world  and,  also,  looking  toward  thd 
Williamsburg  summit.  I 

Q.  Why  are  you  confident?  Why  < 
you  think  there  is  a  chance  of  the 
Syrians  not  vetoing  this?  Are  they  sa 
ing  anything  to  you  that  gives  you  ai 
hope  that  they  might  go  along? 

Secretary  Shultz.  They  have  been 
very  critical  of  the  agreement.  I  think  I 
that  we  have  to  divide  our  thinking, 
because  you  can  have  reservations  or  | 
you  can  disagree  with  the  agreement  i  I 
such— the  Israeli-Lebanon  agreement.  ' 
But  that  is  not  really  the  question  that ' 
we  are  asking  them.  We  are  asking 
them  to  withdraw.  And  they  have  said| 
over  quite  a  period  of  time,  that  they  ^ 
are  ready  to  withdraw  when  the  , 

Lebanese  ask  them  to  withdraw.  ^ 

So  these  are  not  unrelated  subject , 
But  they  do  have  some  difference  be-  \ 
tween  them.  And  they  haven't  said  tht 
won't  withdraw. 

Q.  Are  you  starting  to  feel  that 
they  are  under  some  pressure  from  t 
Soviets  not  to  withdraw? 

Secretary  Shultz.  What  pressure 
they  are  under  from  the  Soviets,  I  do  ' 
not  know.  I  do  know  that  the  Soviets, 
a  TASS  article,  attacked  the  agreemei' 
But  what  the  nature  of  discussion  be-  ' 
tween  the  Soviets  and  Syria  is,  I  do  nc 
know. 

I'll  give  an  illustration.  The  agree- 
ment is  between  Israel  and  Lebanon. 
The  Syrians  feel,  and  the  Lebanese  fee 
that  the  question  of  Syrian  withdrawa 
is  an  unrelated  matter.  The  Syrians  | 
make  a  big  point  of  the  fact  that  their  | 
forces  are  in  Lebanon  on  a  different  | 
basis  than  the  Israeli  forces.  So,  there', 
nothing  in  the  agreement  about  Syriar 
withdrawal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  i 
Israelis  make  it  very  clear,  as  you  wou 
expect,  that  they  won't  withdraw  excel 
that  there  is  simultaneous  withdrawal  J 
the  PLO  and  the  Syrians.  | 

So  you  can't  have  it  as  part  of  the 
agreement,  for  good  reasons.  It, 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


jrefore,  has  become  part  of  a  side  let- 
:  which  the  Israelis  wrote  to  us  and 
ich  we  acknowledged.  It's  not  a 
ret.  But  it's  not  part  of  the 
•eement — 

Q.  Then  there  are  no  secrets? 
Secretary  Shultz.— and  that's  just  a 
y  in  which  the — 

Q.  You  have  made  no  secret  com- 
;ments  that  the  American  people 

not  informed  or  know  about? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  don't  say  that 
re  aren't— that  things  haven't  been 
i  that  are  part  of  the  record— there's 

going  to  be  publication  of  every 
-d  that's  been  said,  but— 

Q.  I  don't  mean  said,  I  mean  com- 
ments. 
Secretary  Shultz.— there  are  no 

imitnients  made  on  behalf  of  the 
ted  States  that  commit  the  United 
tes  t(i  something  or  other  that's  a 
ret. 

Q.  What  about  the  reports  we're 
i.ring  of  Syrian  and  PLO  troops  go- 
back  into  Lebanon— this  comes  at 
I  time  when  your  agreement  is 
iched— it  looks  almost  like  a 
iijonse  to  it.  Is  it?  And  is  it  happen- 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  heard 
nrts,  as  you  have,  that  some  PLO 
ie  reentered  Lebanon.  I  would  say, 
.,t  of  all,  that  that's  a  violation  of  the 
(eement  under  which  they  evacuated 
irut.  And  I  think  we  ought  to  take 
(5  of  that  fact.  And  now,  second,  of 
crse  it's  an  unwelcome  development. 
I  want  them  to  be  moving  out,  not 
idng  in.  Nevertheless,  we  will  con- 
i  le  to  pursue  our  agenda  which  is  to 
i:t  get  this  agreement  nailed  down 
i  .lly  and  then  to  proceed  to  work  on 
[■  Syrian  and  PLO  evacuation  of 
-lanon  along  with  the  Israelis. 

Q.  Have  you  and  the  President 
bussed  at  this  point  the  F-16  sale 
i!  what  the  status  of  that  will  be 
itv  that  your  trip  is  complete  and  the 
■1  eement  has  been  agreed  to? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  talked  about 
t  little  bit,  but  I  don't  have  anything 
Cidd  on  that.  That's  a  subject  that  the 
'  sident  has  under  review,  and  he'll 
l:ide  what  he's  going  to  do  in  good 


Q.  Will  you  have  to  go  back  to 


Damascus  to  iron  some  of  these  things 
out  once  the  draft  agreement  is 
spelled  out  for  itself,  would  you  have 
to— 

Secretary  Shultz.  I'm  planning  to 
stay  home  for  awhile.  I  like  it  here. 
[Laughter] 

Q.  What  is  the  next  step  then  for 
you? 

Secretary  Shultz.  Phil  Habib  is 
there.  Phil  Habib  is  one  of  our  most  ex- 
perienced Americans  at  these  negotia- 
tions. He's  well-known  to  the  Syrians. 
They  like  him.  They  respect  him.  And 
you  could  just  see  that  when  you're 
there  with  Phil.  So,  the  United  States 
has  been,  and  will  be,  very  well 
represented  by  Phil. 

Q.  How  else  do  you  appeal  to  the 
Syrians  to  join  in?  What  appeals  can 
be  made  to  them  to  join  in? 

Secretary  Shultz.  First  of  all,  the 
Lebanese  will  make  a  statement  to 
them,  I'm  sure.  And  they'll  have  discus- 
sions with  them.  There  are  certain 
legitimate  questions  that  the  Syrians  will 
raise  that  will  have  to  be  addressed.  For 
example,  the  security  zone  that's  set  out 
in  southern  Lebanon  abuts  the  Syrian 
border,  so  I  think  it's  a  legitimate  ques- 
tion: How  are  you  going  to  handle  that? 
So  there  are  a  variety  of  things  of  that 
kind  that  they'll,  no  doubt,  talk  about. 

Other  Arab  countries  are  weighing 
in  on  the  subject,  so  I'm  sure  that  they'll 
be  heard  from.  We  are  perfectly  ready 
to  talk  with  the  Syrians  about  the  situa- 
tion, and  I  think  we  also  go  on,  to  a 
degree,  the  basis  that  everyone  has 
spoken  of  the  desirability  of  Lebanon 
having  a  chance  to  be  sovereign.  Cer- 
tainly, Syria  has  spoken  about  Lebanese 
sovereignty  all  the  time,  so  let  the 
foreign  forces  get  out  and  let's  see  what 
the  Lebanese  can  do. 

Q.  Even  still,  you  appear  to  be 
hanging  your  hat  solely  on  the — for 
your  optimism  solely  on  the  basis  of 
the  fact  that  the  Syrians  in  the  past 
have  said  they  would  withdraw.  Do 
you  have  anything  more  solid  to  go 
on? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  have  only  to  go 
on  the  views  of  others.  And  while  the 
discussions  that  I  had  in  Syria  were  cer- 
tainly not  encouraging  at  all  as  far  as 
their  attitude  toward  the  agreement  is 
concerned,  they  didn't  refuse  to 
withdraw  or  anything  of  that  kind.  But 
we  have  to  take  these  things  one  at  a 
time.  I  think  that  the  first  thing  is  to  get 
the  agreement  between  Lebanon  and 


Israel  nailed  down  and  to  have  the  broad 
spectrum  of  the  various  confessional 
groups  in  Lebanon  have  a  chance  to  ex- 
press themselves  through  the  parliamen- 
tary process  in  Lebanon.  Once  other 
governments  are  able  to  see  that  here  is 
an  agreement  that  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  has  worked  out,  that  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  wants  to  sign, 
and  that  the  Government  of  Lebanon's 
parliamentary  process  has  endorsed, 
then  it's  a  little  hard  to  second-guess 
them.  I  think  that's  the  position  that 
they  want  to  get  in. 

Q.  How  long  can  Israel  wait  for  a 
Syrian  withdrawal  without  trying  to 
place  some  pressure  of  its  own? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  will  be  a 
period  here — and,  no  doubt,  a  certain 
amount  of  discomfort — but  there— it  is 
something  that  we'll  work  along  at  and 
that  can't  go  on  forever,  as  your  ques- 
tion implies.  But  I  don't  want  to  put 
down  some  length  of  time  as  a  marker 
either.  These  are  very  difficult,  tough 
issues,  and  the  way  to  get  at  them  is 
just  to  get  at  them  and  work  at  them. 

Q.  The  opposition  is  already  talk- 
ing about  a  deadline  of  June  6,  the  an- 
niversary of  the  invasion. 

Secretary  Shultz.  We're  not  talking 
about  any  such  time  period  as  that.  I'm 
not  saying  that's  too  soon  or  that  it's  too 
far  off.  Just  not  going  to  get  pinned 
down  by  some  sort  of  an  artificial  date. 
Our  object  is  to  achieve  this  result,  and 
we're  going  to  work  at  it  and  we're  go- 
ing to  do  it. 

Q.  The  Government  of  Israel  has 
announced  that  it  will  have  nine  new 
settlements  in  occupied  territories.  Do 
you  see  any  connection  between  that 
announcement  and  your  activities  in 
the  area?  And  do  you  find  it  helpful  at 
this  time? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  would  make  the 
same  comment  on  that  that  I've  made  on 
settlement  activity,  generally:  That  inso- 
far as  our  efforts  on  the  basic  peace 
process  are  concerned,  the  President  has 
said — going  back  to  his  September  1st 
speech— and  we  have  continued  to  say 
that  we  don't  think  that  new  settlement 
activities  are  a  constructive  contribution 
to  that  end. 

I  think  it's  also  the  case  that  our 


J/ 1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


arguments  with  the  Israelis  will  be  a  lot 
more  meaningful  if  there  is  some 
evidence  that  we  have  an  additional 
Arab  leader  coming  to  the  bargaining 
table  to  speak  on  behalf  of  the  Palestin- 
ians on  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  and 
elsewhere.  And  as  yet  we  haven't  had 
that  situation. 

Q.  Why  don't  you  speak  to  them? 
Why  does  someone  have  to  speak  on 
behalf  of  them? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  West 
Bankers  and  the  Gazans,  of  course,  have 
been  speaking  and  talking,  and  people 
are  getting  around  with  them.  Never- 
theless, there  has  been,  for  quite  some 
time,  a  mandate,  as  you  know,  given  by 
the  Arab  League  to  the  PLO  to  speak 
on  behalf  of  the  Palestinians  and  that 
mandate  continues  to  hold. 


Secretary  Attends  OECD 
Ministerial  in  Paris 


'Made  after  their  meeting  (press  release 
130  of  Apr.  29,  1983). 

^Press  release  131. 

'Made  at  the  King  David  Hotel  (press 
release  133  of  Apr.  29). 

*Press  release  135  of  Apr.  29. 

^Made  at  the  U.S.  Embassy  site  (press 
release  136  of  Apr.  29). 

^Made  upon  departure  from  the  Presiden- 
tial Palace  (press  release  137  of  May  2). 

'Made  at  the  Presidential  Palace  (press 
release  143  of  May  3). 

'Made  after  their  meeting  (press  release 

146  of  May  4). 

'Made  after  their  meeting  (press  release 

147  of  May  4). 

'"Made  after  their  meeting  (press  release 
152  of  May  4). 

"Made  at  the  Presidential  Palace  (press 
release  158  of  May  9). 

'^Made  at  the  King  David  Hotel  (press 
release  160). 

"Press  release  164  of  May  10. 

''Press  release  165  of  May  10. 

''Made  after  their  meeting  with  Presi- 
dent Assad  (press  release  167  of  May  10). 

'sPress  release  168  of  May  10. 

"Held  with  ABC-TV's  diplomatic  cor- 
respondent Barrie  Dunsmore  (press  release 
171  of  May  11). 

"Press  release  170  of  May  11. 

''Press  release  172  of  May  11. 

2°Made  after  his  meeting  with  President 
Reagan  (press  release  180  of  May  13).  ■ 


Secretary  Shultz  represented  the 
United  States  at  the  ministerial  meeting 
of  the  Council  of  the  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(OECD)  held  in  Paris  May  9-10,  1983. 

Following  are  the  Secretary's  state- 
ment in  the  OECD  session  on  May  9,  the 
text  of  the  OECD  communique  issued 
May  10,  with  annex,  and  a  news  con- 
ference with  Secretary  Shultz  and 
Treasury  Secretary  Donald  T.  Regan  ow 
May  10. 


SECRETARY'S  STATEMENT, 
MAY  9,  1983' 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  be  back  at  the  OECD 
Council  after  an  absence  of  10  years.  I 
appreciate  this  chance  to  share  with  you 
my  Government's  thinking  on  the  work 
of  today's  session. 

We  meet  at  a  time  of  hope  for  the 
world  economy.  As  Secretary  [of  the 
Treasury  Donald  T.]  Regan  has  pointed 
out,  economic  recovery  is  underway. 
After  some  very  difficult  years  of  reces- 
sion and  hardship  in  all  our  countries, 
the  United  States  is  headed  in  1983  for 
a  year  of  unmistakable  and  significant 
growth.  We  know  that  American 
recovery,  as  in  the  past,  will  be  an  im- 
portant facet  in  stimulating  recovery 
throughout  the  OECD  area  and  in  the 
developing  world.  Having  wrung  infla- 
tion out  of  our  system — and  if  we  all 
maintain  the  requisite  discipline  in  our 
national  policies— the  world  could  be 
headed  for  a  long  period  of  sustained, 
noninflationary  expansion. 

This  trend  of  recovery  has  a  sym- 
bolic as  well  as  an  economic  significance. 
It  reminds  us  of  the  extraordinary 
resilience  of  the  free  political  and 
economic  institutions  which  we  all  share. 
For  all  our  temporary  setbacks,  the  free 
economies  have  brought  about,  since 
1945,  a  generation  of  growth  and  pros- 
perity unprecedented  in  history.  On  the 
other  side  of  this  cruelly  divided  conti- 
nent, economic  problems  are  structural 
and  systemic.  Inefficiencies  are  built-in; 
innovation  is  inhibited;  stagnation  is 
endemic;  any  effective  economic  reforms 
would  weaken  the  grip  of  rigid  central 
political  control  and  are,  therefore,  ex- 
cluded. Our  economic  difficulties  are 


largely  probems  of  self-discipline,  of  1 
ter  management  of  fiscal  and  moneta 
policy;  their  problems  are  inherent  ar 
fundamental. 

Two  conclusions  follow  from  this. 
First,  the  industrial  democracies  repi 
sented  in  this  organization  must 
remember  that  they  have  a  precious 
heritage.  And  second,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  all  have  a  special  responsibili 
to  address  the  problem  of  East-West 
economic  relations  with  some  care. 

It  is  no  accident  that  the  ministei 
council  of  last  May  and  the  heads  of 
state  and  government  at  last  year's 
economic  summit  agreed  that  the  01 
should  keep  East- West  economic  and 
financial  relations  under  review. 

I  am  happy  to  say  that  since  thei 
the  OECD  and  the  International  Ene 
Agency  (lEA)  have  done  some  valual 
research  and  analysis  which  enhance 
understanding  of  East- West  trade  ai 
its  implications.  We  urge  these  orgai 
tions  to  continue  their  important  wo: 
In  a  few  moments,  I  will  express  my 
thoughts  on  areas  for  future  explora 
Let  me  first  explain  my  government 
view  of  the  main  issues  involved. 


Problem  of  East- West  Trade 

If  the  relationship  between  East  and 
West  were  a  normal  relationship  am' 
states,  we  would  not  be  here  discuss 
this  subject.  As  long  as  present  cond 
tions  exist,  these  relations  are  not  nc 
mal  and  cannot  be  treated  as  nor- 
mal— for  many  reasons,  economic  as 
well  as  political.  The  issue  is  not  wag 
"economic  warfare"  against  the  Sovit 
Union  which  would  be  futile  but  mail 
taining  the  health  of  the  internations 
economy  in  the  unique  conditions  of ' 
East- West  relationship,  which  is  esse 
tial. 

Of  course,  there  are  security  con 
cerns.  We  have  learned  from  experic 
that  some  economic  transactions  witi 
the  Soviet  LInion  and  Eastern  Europ 
can  confer  strategic  benefits,  ease  cc 
straints  on  resource  allocation,  or  en 
dependencies.  The  United  States  anc 
allies  are  examining  some  of  these  is 
in  other  forums. 

But  the  concerns  we  wish  to  rais 
the  OECD  are,  properly,  economic  o 
cerns.  The  Secretary  General's  note 
the  subject,  which  I  commend,  provi< 


Department  of  State  Bull  ii 


THE  SECRETARY 


ixcellent  analysis  of  the  complica- 
s  which  East- West  trade  introduces 
the  global  economic  system.  The 
ted  States  believes  that  economic 
tions  with  the  East  must,  at  a 
imum,  be  conducted  on  sound 
iiomic  principles  so  as  not  to  jeopard- 
either  the  security  or  the  prosperity 
;he  democratic  nations.  The  OECD 
a  legitimate  and  essential  role  to 
y  in  establishing  and  maintaining 
h  principles.  It  is  appropriate  here  to 
tribute  to  the  fine  study  of  energy 
iirity  just  completed  jointly  by  the 
CD  and  lEA.  I  hope  we  will  endorse 
.  study  at  the  meeting. 
Any  analysis  of  the  problem  must 
in  with  an  appreciation  of  the  fun- 
(lental  discontinuity  between  the 
•id  market  and  the  command  econ- 
les  and  state  trading  systems  of  the 
it.  With  some  exceptions,  East- West 
ie  has  traditionally  involved  the  ex- 
nge  of  relatively  advanced  Western 
inology  for  Eastern  raw  materials 
semifinished  goods.  The  machinery 
equipment  which  we  sell  them  con- 
more  than  simply  additions  to  their 
ital  stock;  these  highly  sophisticated 
ducts  of  our  technological  devel- 
lents  contain  a  part  of  our  intellec- 
capital  which  conveys  a  certain  ad- 
tage  to  the  East  not  compensated 
by  the  raw  materials  and  semifin- 
d  goods  we  receive  in  return.  The 
t's  inability  to  take  full  advantage  of 
capabilities  of  this  equipment  only 
ilights  the  imbalance. 
Thus,  there  is  a  basic  incompatibility 
veen  the  Eastern  and  Western 
lomies.  As  the  Secretary  General's 
;  suggests,  the  main  causes  of  the 
ressed  state  of  East- West  trade  are 
e  found  in  the  structural  inefficien- 
of  communist  central  economic  plan- 
f.  For  this  reason,  the  degree  of 
plementary  and  interdependence 
.  has  developed  between  North  and 
th  has  not  developed  and  probably 
lot  develop  between  East  and  West, 
simple  fact  is  that  manufactured 
Is  produced  in  the  East  are  fre- 
itly  not  competitive  in  the  West,  and 
capacity  of  the  Eastern  countries  to 
)rt  additional  raw  materials  is 
ted. 

These  facts  suggest  that  East- West 
e  would  remain  at  a  low  level  if  not 
subsidies  or  other  forms  of  political 
rvention  that  boosted  it  to  artificially 
ler  levels.  By  the  laws  of  com- 
itive  advantage,  this  practice— by 
nition— is  inefficient  and  distorts  the 
)er  functioning  of  a  world  economy, 
s  the  more  pervasive  problem  we 


face  today  is  not  political  interference 
restricting  East-West  trade  but  political 
interference  maintaining  it.  If  the 
governments  represented  in  this 
organization  have  differing  views  of  the 
political  implications  of  East- West  trade, 
the  fairest— and  economically  most  effi- 
cient—compromise would  be  to  agree  to 
let  sound  economic  principles  govern. 

Sound  economic  principles  also  tell 
us  something  about  the  debt  problem. 
The  Eastern  countries'  difficulty  in  serv- 
icing their  external  debt  is  aggravated, 
if  not  caused,  by  their  inability  to  com- 
pete in  world  markets.  It  is  clear  in 
retrospect  that  more  prudence  could 
have  been  exercised  in  lending  to  certain 
East  European  countries  in  the  1970s. 
Gross  hard  currency  indebtedness  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  rose 
from  $8  billion  in  1971  to  $90  billion  in 
1981— a  growth  rate  of  24%  per  year. 

Today,  we  are  fully  conscious  of  the 
dangers  of  such  overextension,  and  it 
has  taught  us  a  lesson:  We  should  apply 
to  our  economic  relations  with  the  East 
the  same  prudent  commercial  and  finan- 
cial criteria  that  we  would  apply  to  any 
other  business  venture.  That  these  risks 
persist  is  shown  by  the  hesitancy  of  the 
private  sector  to  provide  new  financing. 
There  are  sometimes  sound  reasons  for 
Western  financial  support  for  certain 
Eastern  countries.  As  a  general  rule, 
however,  the  best  course  is  to  recognize 
that  a  price  is  paid  whenever  such 
economic  activity  is  stimulated  artificial- 
ly by  government  in  defiance  of  the 
judgment  of  the  market. 

A  third  problem  in  East- West 
economic  relations  is  the  attempt  by  the 
state  trading  countries  of  the  East  to 
use  their  mono-psonistic  power  to  shift 
the  balance  of  advantage  in  their  favor, 
such  as  by  playing  Western  suppliers  off 
against  one  another  to  obtain  preferen- 
tial credits,  buy-back  arrangements,  or 
other  special  advantages.  These  anti- 
competitive practices  have  a  great 
potential  to  do  harm  to  all  our  countries. 
We  will  have  to  find  ways  to  deal  with 
this  problem  without,  of  course,  resort- 
ing to  anticompetitive  practices  of  our 
own  that  would  further  distort  the 
economic  system. 

There  is  much  that  the  OECD  can 
do  to  help  us  protect  our  interests,  and 
our  economies,  in  the  face  of  these 
challenges  posed  by  trade  with  the  East. 
Let  me  make  some  specific  suggestions 
in  this  regard. 

The  OECD  and  Its  Work  Program 

In  the  course  of  the  last  year,  this 
organization  and  its  committees  have 


done  a  great  deal  of  useful  work  in  this 
area.  I  have  already  mentioned  the  ex- 
cellent report  of  the  joint  OECD-IEA 
study  on  energy  security.  And  progress 
has  been  made  toward  developing  a  new 
consensus  on  export  credit  policies. 

The  Secretary  General's  note  on  the 
subject  of  East-West  trade  and  financial 
relations  is  a  comprehensive  and 
valuable  summary  of  the  current  state  of 
these  relations.  Its  economic  analysis  is 
balanced  and  objective.  It  is  firmly 
grounded  on  the  findings  of  the  trade 
committee.  Its  conclusions  are  valid,  and 
they  illuminate  the  need  for  govern- 
ments to  exercise  caution  in  the  conduct 
of  East- West  economic  policy. 

We  strongly  endorse  the  Secretary 
General's  conclusions,  as  well  as  his  pro- 
posals for  further  work  to  be  done  by 
this  organization.  The  OECD  has  a  ma- 
jor role  to  play  in  monitoring  the  pat- 
terns and  trends  in  the  West's  trading 
and  financial  relations  with  the  East. 
Only  if  governments  have  this  kind  of  in- 
formation can  we  even  begin  to  assess 
the  balance  of  commercial  advantages  or 
to  consider  what  steps  could  be  taken  to 
protect  Western  interests. 

The  Eastern  countries,  facing  lag- 
ging exports,  are  attempting  to  pay  for 
an  ever-larger  share  of  their  imports  by 
compensation  deals  and  barter  arrange- 
ments. We  all  have  an  interest  in  having 
these  inefficient  practices  monitored  by 
the  OECD. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  state 
trading  countries'  attempts  to  play  off 
Western  suppliers  against  each  other  for 
special  advantage.  To  safeguard  against 
such  manipulation,  the  United  States 
has  suggested  that  it  would  be  in  the 
common  interest  of  Western  nations  to 
exchange  information  on  major  projects 
planned  in  the  East.  It  need  not  involve 
proprietary  information  on  major  proj- 
ects planned  in  the  East.  We  believe 
that  the  OECD  is  well-situated  and  well- 
suited  to  play  such  a  role. 

We  hope  that  the  OECD  will  not 
shrink  from  the  more  active  role  I  have 
described.  The  OECD's  expert  staff  is  a 
unique  resource;  it  should  not  be  con- 
fined to  the  simple  gathering  and  basic 
analysis  of  data.  We  should  strive  con- 
stantly to  broaden  the  kinds  and  quan- 
tities of  information  we  share  with  each 
other  on  the  subject  of  East- West  trade, 
to  enable  us  to  assess  the  balance  of  ad- 
vantages between  East  and  West.  We 
will  then  be  in  a  position  to  correct  im- 
balances in  that  trade  and  to  formulate 
policies,  individually  and  collectively, 
that  will  protect  our  common  interests. 


THE  SECRETARY 


As  a  step  in  that  direction  we  hope 
that  clear  conclusions  will  emerge  from 
today's  discussion  and  be  reflected  in  our 
communique.  We  believe  that  the  conclu- 
sions suggested  by  the  Secretary 
General  in  his  note  are  a  good  starting 
point  for  our  discussion.  We  also  en- 
dorse the  Secretary  General's  proposals 
for  strengthening  the  organization's 
work  program,  which  are  aimed  at  im- 
proving the  quality  of  our  assessments 
and  our  policy  conclusions. 

This  extraordinary  organization  of 
democratic  nations  embraces  many  dif- 
ferent points  of  view  on  the  subject  of 
relations  with  the  East.  There  will  not 
be  unanimity  here  on  the  security  or  the 
political  or  even  on  all  the  economic 
dimensions  of  the  problem.  That  is  not 
the  purpose  of  this  organization.  But  the 
same  economic  realities  hold  for  all  of 
us.  We  face  a  common  problem,  and 
there  are  many  things  we  can  do  to- 
gether to  protect  our  common  interests 
and  our  peoples'  well-being.  Simple 
prudence  requires  it.  We  all  know  the 
ancient  maximum— Caceaf  emptor:  Let 
the  buyer  beware.  Some  sellers  should 
beware  also. 

In  the  last  analysis,  we  in  this  room 
have  much  more  in  common  than  we 
have  that  differs.  We  share  a  dedication 
to  economic  and  political  freedom,  to  the 
welfare  of  our  people,  and  to  the  cause 
of  peace.  We  have  all  learned  by  now 
that  in  an  interdependent  world  econ- 
omy, no  one  nation  can  meet  its 
challenges  alone.  Much  can  be  achieved, 
on  the  other  hand,  through  cooperation. 
The  United  States  is  prepared  to  work 
together  with  you  here  in  that  spirit. 


COMMUNIQUE, 
MAY  10,  19832 

1.  At  its  meeting  on  9th- 10th  May,  the 
Council  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development  at  Ministerial 
level  agreed  on  a  medium-term  approach  to 
sustaining  and  broadening  the  economic 
recovery  now  under-way.  They  agreed  that 
increased  sustainable  non-inflationary  growth 
in  the  OECD  countries  now  must  be  aimed  at 
in  order  to  reduce  the  present  very  high 
levels  of  unemployment. 

2.  Ministers  recognised  that  the  powerful 
economic  linkages  among  countries  and 
regions  imply  a  collective  responsibility  to 
shape  policies  so  as  to  strengthen  the  interna- 
tional trading,  monetary  and  financial 
systems. 

3.  Accordingly,  their  goverments  intend 
to: 

•  Take  advantage  of  the  room  for 


growth,  which  is  now  emerging  in  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  OECD  area,  to  promote  job 
creation  and  higher  employment; 

•  Continue  to  reduce  inflation  and  over- 
come structural  impediments  to  improved 
economic  performance; 

•  Make  use,  individually  and  collectively, 
of  the  favourable  conditions  provided  by 
economic  recovery  to  reverse  protectionist 
trends; 

•  Work  to  resolve  international  debt 
problems  in  a  trade-expansionary  way  as 
recovery  and  adjustment  by  debtor  countries 
proceed; 

•  Provide  more  effective  help  to  the 
poorer  developing  countries. 

4.  The  meeting  was  chaired  by  Madame 
Colette  Flesch,  Vice-President  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Luxembourg,  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, External  Trade  and  Co-operation, 


During  a  ceremony  chaired  by  French 
President  Francois  Mitterrand  at  the 
Elysee  Presidential  Palace,  the  Secretary 
and  Japanese  Foreign  Trade  Minister 
Sadanori  Yamanaka,  left,  and  Japanese 
Foreign  Minister  Abe  Shintaro,  second 
from  left,  discuss  a  French-manufactured 
translating  device. 


Minister  of  Economy  and  Middle  Classes.  The 
Vice-Chairmen  were  Mr,  Shintaro  Abe, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Japan  and 
Mr.  Kurt  Furgler,  Federal  Counsellor  and 
Head  of  the  Swiss  Federal  Department  of 
Economic  Affairs.  In  addition  to  reviewing 
their  economic  policies,  and  trade  relations 
among  Member  countries,  Ministers  con- 
sidered the  difficult  situation  of  the  develop- 
ing countries  and  the  policies  needed  if  they 
are  to  benefit  from  economic  recovery.  They 


discussed  the  dialogue  with  the  developing 
countries,  in  particular  preparations  for 
UNCTAD  VI  [UN  Conference  on  Trade  a; 
Development].  Ministers  also  reviewed  Es 
West  economic  relations. 

5.  Finally,  Ministers  heard  a  report  b 
Mr.  William  F.  Birch,  Minister  of  Energy 
New  Zealand,  on  the  results  of  the  Min- 
isterial Meeting  of  the  Governing  Board  o 
the  International  Energy  Agency,  held  or 
May,  1983,  in  Paris.  They  took  note  of  th 
study,  Energy  Requirements  and  Securiljl 
prepared  by  the  Secretariat,  and  of  the 
discussions  on  it,  and  endorsed  the  conclu 
sions  set  forth  in  the  Annex  to  this  Comn 
que. 


THE  TRANSITION  TO 
SUSTAINED  GROWTH 

6  Ministers  welcomed  the  further 
achievements  in  reducing  inflation.  They 
very  concerned,  however,  about  the  high 
rismg  levels  of  unemployment.  It  is  there 
encouraging  that  signs  of  an  up-turn  havi 
now  emerged  in  several  OECD  economic: 
While  uncertainties  and  risks  remain. 
Ministers  agreed  that  prospects  for  conti 
ing  recovery  are  better  than  they  have  bt 
for  several  years,  and  that  ensuring  the  1 
sition  to  sustained  non-inflationary  growl 
and  higher  unemployment  is  the  central  l 
of  policy. 


Common  Policy  Principles 

7    Ministers  agreed  on  the  following  poll 
principles  for  all  Member  countries: 

(i)  Policies  need  to  be  set  firmly  in  a 
medium-term  framework  to  make  clear  tl 
steadiness  of  policy  intent.  This  will,  of 
necessity,  call  for  flexibility  in  the  implei 
tation  of  policies  when  circumstances  req 

(ii)  Pervasive  economic  linkages  mean 
that  the  ability  of  individual  countries  to 
achieve  domestic  policy  objectives  depeno 
importantly  on  the  policies  and  perfo: 
of  others.  It  is  important  for  the  consistei 
of  policies  that  each  Member  country  tak- 
count  of  the  international  implications  of 
Member  countries'  policies  taken  togethe  I 

(iii)  The  achievement  of  greater  exch;? 
rate  stability,  which  does  not  imply  rigidij, 
is  a  major  objective  and  commitment  to  v 
pursued.  In  this  context  they  noted  and  I 
welcomed  the  principles  set  out  in  the  agB' 
ment  by  finance  ministers  of  seven  Memlf 
countries,  announced  in  Washington  on  f^ 
29th,  1983.  ' 

(iv)  Improved  economic  performance  d 
higher  employment  require  a  balanccii  us  '1 
macro-economic  and  structural  policies.  C  v 
ing  room  emerges  as  inflation  diminishes  i' 
supply-side  responsiveness  increases.  To  is 
end: 

•  Macro-economic  policies  should  be  n- 
sistent  with  medium-term  objectives  of  ii  i- 
tion  control  and  steadier  real  growth;  soi 
countries  have  found  a  nominal  income 
framework  helpful  in  this  respect. 

•  Policies  to  increase  the  profitabilit;  'f 


Department  of  State  Bull  i" 


THE  SECRETARY 


treating  productive  investment  are  re- 

'•  Collective  bargaining  should  take  ac- 
(it  of  the  need  to  promote  investment  and 
haximise  the  scope  for  higher  employment 
jiout  inflation. 

!•  Positive  adjustment  policies  are 
pssary  to  enhance  competition  and  the 
iibility  of  markets,  and  to  improve  the 
hation  of  resources. 

•  Labour  market  policies  are  important 
liUeviate  the  burden  of  unemployment,  par- 
ilarly  on  young  people;  targeted  pro- 
mmes,  including  training,  can  help  to  deal 
p  the  problem  of  structural  unemploy- 

I'- 

!•  Facilitating  stronger  social  consensus 

(in  many  countries  play  an  important  role 

:hieving  the  necessary  balance  of  policies. 

3.  While  these  policy  principles  are  com- 
i  to  all  Member  countries.  Ministers 
(gnised  that  countries  are  in  diverse  situa- 
li.  Not  all  countries  have  been  equally  suc- 
jful  in  establishing  the  preconditions  for 
JBr  economic  performance.  Appropriate 
lies  therefore  differ  in  emphasis  from  one 
jitry  to  another. 


jonal  Policies 

ii  a  number  of  countries,  accounting  for 
( t  70  per  cent  of  the  OECD  GNP,  infla- 
iis  approaching  the  level  of  the  1960s. 
:  idence  has  strengthened;  progress  has 
I  made  in  tackling  structural  imbalances; 
iictivity,  which  has  been  weak,  is  now 
!  ing  to  recover.  Further  declines  in  real 
test  rates  should  be  aimed  at.  For  such 
I  tries,  Ministers  agreed  on  the  impor- 
1  ■  of  taking  advantage  of  the  room  that 
(■merged  for  increased  output  and 
ioyment;  in  particular: 

I  As  regards  monetary  policy,  monetary 

Iegates  should  allow  for  output  growth 
1  is  sustainable  over  the  medium-term, 
^continued  control  of  inflation,  permitting 
iitinued  easing  of  interest  rates.  Current 
rtary  policies  are  generally  consistent 
ithis  approach.  Targets  for  monetary  ag- 
lites  should  not  be  lowered  in  response  to 
r  oil  prices.  Similarly,  monetary  policy 
dd  not  accommodate  any  resurgence  of 
lionary  wage  and  other  income  claims. 
n  Fiscal  policy  should  be  consistent  with 
lined  non-inflationary  growth,  higher  in- 
inent  and  higher  employment.  Structural 
t  deficits  need  to  be  reduced  to  make 
for  the  investment  needed  to  sustain 
th  and  employment.  Where  future  struc- 
deficits  loom  large,  it  is  important  to 
aw  to  ensure  that  deficits  on  this  scale 
lot  materialise,  thus  permitting  interest 
ease.  Given  the  strong  international 
mission  of  interest  rates,  such  action 
i  promote  recovery  in  the  world 
>my.  The  reduction  of  structural  deficits 
d  take  care  not  to  jeopardise  economic 
ery,  and  take  account  of  the  cumulative 
s  of  simultaneous  action  in  a  large 
»ier  of  countries.  Where  measures  to  sup- 
*ictivity  are  considered  they  should  be 
Sned  to  promote  investment. 


10.  In  some  other  countries,  accounting 
for  about  20  per  cent  of  OECD  GNP,  further 
progress  against  inflation  is  required  and 
structural  impediments  to  better  performance 
are  more  pronounced.  As  a  result,  growing 
room  in  the  near-term  is  less.  For  such  coun- 
tries, Ministers  agreed  that  perseverance 
with  non-accommodating  monetary  policy  is 
required,  and  structural  budget  deficits  must 
be  reduced  further  as  part  of  a  consistent 
medium- term  approach.  It  is  also  particularly 
important  that  further  efforts  be  made  to 
reduce  structural  impediments. 

11.  In  the  remaining  Member  countries, 
despite  serious  efforts,  inflation  remains  very 
high,  while  the  international  recession  and 
chronic  structural  problems  mean  high  rates 
of  unemployment  and  underemployment.  In 
such  countries,  Ministers  agreed  that  limited 
flexibility  of  markets,  structural  imbalances, 
and  difficulties  in  monetary  and  fiscal 
management  are  central  problems,  which 
must  be  addressed  at  their  core.  Improved 
economic  performance  remains  primarily  a 
task  for  domestic  policies,  although  sustained 
recovery  and  lower  interest  rates  in  the 
OECD  area,  and  an  improving  trade  environ- 
ment will  make  this  easier. 


TRADE,  DEBT  AND  ADJUSTMENT 

12.  Ministers  discussed  the  powerful  linkages 
between  growth,  trade  and  debt  which  are 
now  at  work  between  creditor  and  debtor 
countries.  They  agreed  on  the  importance  of 
taking  these  linkages  into  account  as  fully  as 
possible  in  the  formulation  of  their  macro- 
economic,  trade  and  financial  policies,  and 
welcomed  the  work  being  done  in  the 
Organisation  to  help  clarify  the  issues  in- 
volved. They  also  recognised  that  the  world 
recession  had  exposed  problems  of  a 
systematic  nature  which  need  to  be  ad- 
dressed. 

13.  Ministers  noted  that,  during  a  period 
of  severe  and  persistent  economic  and  social 
difficulties,  the  world  trading  system  has 
essentially  been  preserved.  They  recognised, 
however,  that  there  has  been  a  continuation 
and  even  extension  of  protectionist  trade  and 
domestic  support  measures  to  shelter  weak 
industries  and  companies  from  the  full  impact 
of  the  recession  and  structural  change.  Such 
measures  have  contributed  to  slowing  down 
the  movement  of  resources  into  activities 
with  greater  growth  and  job-creating  poten- 
tial. A  return  to  sustained  growth  requires 
more  positive  adjustment  policies,  more 
reliance  on  market  forces  and  more  produc- 
tive investment. 

14.  Ministers  agreed  that,  v/ithin  the 
framework  of  their  overall  economic  co- 
operation, strengthening  the  open  and 
multilateral  trading  system  is  essential  to 
support  the  recovery  and  the  transition  to 
sustained  growth.  They  therefore  agreed  that 
the  economic  recovery,  as  it  proceeds,  pro- 
vides favourable  conditions  which  Member 
countries  should  use,  individually  and  collec- 
tively, to  reverse  protectionist  trends  and  to 
relax  and  dismantle  progressively  trade 
restrictions  and  trade  distorting  domestic 


measures,  particularly  those  introduced  over 
the  recent  period  of  poor  growth  perform- 
ance. They  invited  the  Secretary-General  to 
propose  appropriate  follow-up  procedures.  At 
the  same  time,  they  agreed  that  the  work 
programmes  now  under  way  in  the  GATT 
and  OECD  to  improve  the  trading  system 
and  its  functioning  should  be  actively 
pursued. 

15.  Ministers  welcomed  the  co-operative 
efforts  being  made  by  the  International 
Monetary  Fund,  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements,  the  governments  of  the  debtor 
and  creditor  countries  and  the  private  banks 
to  preserve  the  effective  functioning  of  the 
international  financial  system.  They  also 
recognised  the  determined  efforts  now  being 
made  by  many  debtor  countries  to  adjust  to  a 
less  inflationary  world. 

16.  The  groundwork  has  thus  been  laid 
for  evolving  a  medium-term  approach  to 
resolve  debt  problems  in  a  trade-ex- 
pansionary way  as  the  recovery  proceeds. 
The  aim  should  be  to  maintain  the  basis  for  a 
continued  flow  of  savings  through  world 
capital  markets  to  countries  where  they  can 
be  productively  used.  A  first  element  in  such 
an  approach  is  to  maintain  normal  disciplines 
between  borrowers  and  lenders.  A  second  is 
that  international  lending  will  best  serve  the 
interests  of  both  borrowers  and  lenders  if  ex- 
ternal finance  is  used  to  develop  efficient 
economies  capable  of,  and  enabled  to,  com- 
pete in  world  markets. 

17.  To  this  end  Ministers  agreed  on  the 
need  for  further  efforts  by  both  creditor  and 
debtor  countries  to: 

•  Sustain  a  supply  of  finance  to  debtor 
countries,  in  support  of  determined  domestic 
adjustment  policies,  that  is  sufficient  to  main- 
tain or  restore  adequate  levels  of  essential 
imports. 

•  Work  towards  mutually  reinforcing  ac- 
tion, within  the  framework  of  existing  inter- 
national agreements,  to  establish  more 
predictable  and  transplant  trade  regimes,  to 
reduce  trade  barriers  and  to  pursue  more 
market-conforming  domestic  structural 
policies. 


DEVELOPMENT  CO-OPERATION, 
DIALOGUE  AND  UNCTAD  VI 

18.  Ministers  welcomed  and  shared  the  im- 
portance attached  to  world  economic  in- 
terdependence, dialogue  and  consensus  in 
declarations  by  developing  countries,  most 
recently  at  Buenos  Aires.  They  reaffirmed 
their  readiness  to  work,  in  a  spirit  of 
understanding  and  co-operation,  with  the 
developing  countries  and  other  participants 
at  UNCTAD  VI  next  month  with  the  aim  of 
reaching  a  common  understanding  of  current 
world  economic  problems.  In  particular,  they 
looked  forward  to  discussing  the  contribu- 
tions which  developed  and  developing  coun- 
tries can  make  to  further  constructive 
dialogue  and  co-operation  to: 

•  Ensure  that  all  countries  benefit  from 
the  economic  recovery  now  getting  under 


J  1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


way,  and  that  economic  and  social  progress 
can  gain  momentum  in  the  developing  world. 

•  Continue  to  work  together  on  develop- 
ment co-operation  policies  to  tackle  the  fun- 
damental problems  of  underdevelopment  and 
poverty. 

19.  Ministers  recognised  that  the  world 
recession  has  created  acute  difficulties,  in 
particular  for  most  of  the  poorer  developing 
countries.  Meeting  this  challenge  will  call  for 
difficult  and  courageous  policies  on  their  part. 
As  recovery  proceeds,  these  countries  should 
benefit  from  increased  export  demand  and 
higher  commodity  prices.  But  Ministers 
recognised  that  external  support  remains  of 
crucial  importance  to  facilitate  the  resump- 
tion of  their  longer-term  development.  They 
therefore  agreed  to; 

•  Maintain  and,  as  far  as  possible,  to  in- 
crease their  aid  with  a  view  to  realising  their 
commitments  to  the  international  aid  objec- 
tives particularly  for  the  poorer  developing 
countries. 

•  Work  together  with  the  competent  in- 
ternational institutions  to  assist  poorer 
developing  countries  in  implementing  the  dif- 
ficult policy  reforms  required  for  adjustment 
and  resumed  development  progress. 

•  Ensure  adequate  funding  from  all  con- 
tributors of  the  multilateral  development  in- 
stitutions, in  particular  the  International 
Development  Association. 

20.  Ministers  agreed  on  the  desirability 
of  diversifying  the  developing  countries' 
sources  of  external  finance,  and  in  particular 
fuller  use  of  the  potential  for  direct  invest- 
ment. 

21.  Ministers  stressed  the  commitment  of 
their  governments  to  pursue  development  co- 
operation policies  beyond  the  immediate  re- 
quirements of  economic  recovery.  They 
recognised  in  particular,  the  importance  of 
working  with  developing  countries  to 
strengthen  and  achieve  greater  stability  in 
their  export  earnings.  They  also  recognised 
the  importance  of  technical  co-operation,  and 
reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  a  strong 
centrally-funded  system  of  United  Nations 
technical  co-operation. 


EAST-WEST  ECONOMIC  RELATIONS 

22.  Following  a  decision  taken  by  Ministers 
last  year,  the  Organisation  has  carried  out  a 
thorough  economic  analysis  of  the  evolution 
of  trade  and  financial  relations  with  the 
USSR  and  other  Eastern  European  countries. 
Ministers  noted  that  these  relations  have, 
with  some  exceptions,  evolved  in  a  less 
dynamic  way  than  those  with  more  market- 
oriented  economies  and  not  met  earlier  ex- 
pectations. 

23.  This  purely  economic  analysis 
demonstrates  that  East-West  trade  and 
credit  flows  should  be  guided  by  the  indica- 
tions of  the  market.  In  the  light  of  these  in- 
dications. Governments  should  exercise  finan- 


cial prudence  without  granting  preferential 
treatment.  Ministers  recognised,  moreover, 
that  practices  connected  with  the  state- 
trading  system  of  centrally  planned  econ- 
omies can  create  problems  which  need  to  be 
kept  under  close  examination  within  the 
Organisation.  More  generally,  they  agreed 
that,  in  the  light  of  changing  circumstances, 
the  Organisation  should  continue  to  review 
East-West  economic  relations. 


CONCLUSIONS 

1 .  Ministers  assessed  world  energy  re- 
quirements and  security  for  the  next  two 
decades,  bearing  in  mind  the  importance  of 
adequate  and  secure  energy  supplies  to  the 
prospects  for  sustained  economic  growth. 
They  noted  with  satisfaction  the  progress 
that  had  been  made  since  1973  in  reducing 
dependence  on  imported  oil  by  increasing 
energy  efficiency  and  the  use  of  alternative 
fuels,  notably  coal,  gas  and  nuclear  energy. 
This  progress  has  contributed  to  the  lowering 
of  oil  prices  which  is  now  bringing  an  impor- 
tant and  welcome  relief  to  the  world 
economy.  Ministers  agreed,  however,  that 
such  relief  was  likely  to  be  temporary  and 
that  there  is  a  risk  of  a  renewed  energy  con- 
straint on  growth  later  in  this  decade  unless 
the  industrialised  countries  strengthen  their 
policies  to  restructure  their  energy  econ- 
omies. Ministers  noted,  in  this  context,  that 
dependence  on  imported  oil,  though  reduced, 
remains  high  in  many  of  their  countries  and 
that  this  remains  the  major  risk  to  their 
energy  security;  that  the  contributions  of  coal 
and  nuclear  energy  are  running  significantly 
below  earlier  expectations;  that  the  prospect 
of  growing  imports  of  gas  to  help  reduce 
dependence  on  imported  oil  could  lead  to 
heavy  dependence  by  some  countries  on 
single  sources  of  gas  supply;  and  that  the 
outlook  for  investment  in  the  efficient  use  of 
energy  and  for  the  development  of  in- 
digenous energy  sources  is  less  than  satisfac- 
tory. They  agreed  that  some  of  these  prob- 
lems could  be  accentuated  by  the  uncertain 
outlook  for  oil  prices. 

2.  Since  industrialised  countries  as  a 
whole  will,  in  any  event,  continue  to  rely 
heavily  on  imported  energy,  smoothly  func- 
tioning world  energy  markets  over  the  long- 
term  will  be  essential  for  their  economic  well- 
being.  Industrialised  countries  must  seek  to 
reduce  the  risk  of  disruptions  and  be 
prepared  to  minimise  the  effects  on  their 
economies  of  any  which  occur.  The  balance 
between  energy  security  and  costs  will  have 
to  be  struck  under  the  responsibility  and  in 
the  circumstances  of  individual  countries, 
having  regard  to  their  international  com- 
mitments. Each  country  will,  however,  con- 
tinue to  develop  strong  and  cost-effective 
energy  policies  based  on  that  combination  of 
market  forces  and  government  action  which 
is  best  suited  to  its  circumstances  but  in- 
cluding; 


•  Implementing  and  as  necessary  ' 
strengthening  present  policies  to  promote  | 
efficient  use  of  energy  and  the  continuing  I 
replacement  of  oil  by  other  fuels;  I 

•  Rapid  and,  where  appropriate, 
cooperative  development  on  an  economic 
basis  of  indigenous  energy  resources- 
fossil  fuel,  nuclear  energy,  hydropower  ar 
other  renewable  energies — to  the  maximi 
possible  extent  consistent  with  environmt 
and  social  factors  and  the  need  to  secure 
plies  beyond  the  turn  of  the  century; 

•  Seeking  to  remove  impediments  to 
trade  in  energy; 

•  Substantial  programmes  of  researc 
development  and  demonstration; 

•  Pricing  and  fiscal  regimes  which  pn 
mote  the  rational  use  of  energy  and  the 
development  of  indigenous  energy  resour 

•  Diversification  of  sources  of  energ; 
ports; 

•  Cooperation  on  a  regional  basis  or 
otherwise  appropriate  to  improve  the  ove 
flexibility  of  energy  systems  and  to  oven 
transit  problems; 

•  Effective  cooperative  measures  for 
dealing  with  disruptions  in  energy  suppli" 

Ministers  recognised  that  energy  sec 
and  smoother  functioning  of  world  energ 
markets  is  not  a  matter  for  industrialisec 
countries  alone.  More  effective  energy  ' 
policies  in  the  industrialised  area  should  | 
the  world  energy  situation  and  thereby  t 
energy  situation  of  the  non-oil  developinj 
countries.  They  emphasised  the  importar 
mutual  understanding  with  energy  expoi 
and  importing  developing  countries  to  th 
achievement  of  these  aims.  Development! 
the  indigenous  energy  resources,  includil 
new  and  renewable  energy,  of  the  devek 
countries  could  in  its  turn  make  an  impo) 
contribution  to  improving  the  world  enev 
situation. 


Energy  Efficiency 

3.  Ministers  recognised  the  important  pa 
tial  contribution  of  improved  energy  eihi 
cy  to  overall  energy  security  and  agreed' 
give  particular  attention  as  appropriate  1 

•  Financial  or  other  measures  to 
stimulate  the  efficient  use  of  energy  and 
version  from  oil  including  help  to  industr 
and  others  to  overcome  the  high  initial  i 
vestment  costs  of  certain  energy-saving , 
fuel-switching  measures; 

•  The  development  of  energy  conser 
tion  services  capable  of  offering  a  compr 
sive  package  which  would  include  inform 
on  rational  energy  use  and  oil  substitutic 
provision  and  installation  of  equipment,  i 
financial  advice  tailored  to  the  needs  of 
customers; 

•  The  publication  of  technical  and  fi: 
cial  information  on  the  efficient  use  of  ei 
and  of  any  assessments  which  governme 
may  make  of  long-term  trends  in  energy 
mand,  supply  and  prices; 

•  Demonstration  by  governments  ' 
their  own  operations  of  the  value  of  ene» 
efficiency;  : 


Department  of  State  Bui  tl 


THE  SECRETARY 


•  Inclusion  of  energy  efficiency  as  an  ele- 
It  in  industrial  policy; 

•  Energy  efficiency  in  transport  and  in 
building  sector  through  higher  voluntary 
:iandatory  standards; 

•  Policies  to  overcome  structural  barriers 
:h  mute  the  impact  of  market  sig^nals. 

:ing  and  Fiscal  Regimes 

linisters  agreed  to  pay  particular  atten- 
to: 

•  Removal  of  those  price  regulations 
;h  discourage  the  development  of  in- 
nous  energy  or  the  displacement  of  oil  by 
r  fuels  or  the  efficient  use  of  energy; 

•  The  pricing  policies  and  where  it  exists 
ilation  of  the  tariffs  of  electricity  utilities 
5  not  to  impede  the  provision  of  funds  for 
stment  in  new  generating  capacity; 

>  Reviewing  energy  pricing  policy,  with 
lims  that  energy  prices  should  be  more 
sparent  and  more  closely  reflect  market 
!s  or  the  long-term  costs  of  maintaining 
lies,  as  appropriate; 

>  The  structuring  of  fiscal  regimes  for  oil 
gas  production  so  as  to  encourage  timely 
lopment. 


and  Other  Solid  Fuels 

inisters  agreed  that  to  promote  on  an 
Dmic  basis  further  expansion  of  produc- 
use  and  trade  of  coal  and,  where  ap- 
nate,  of  other  solid  fuels  including  lignite 
)eat: 

Their  countries  should  continue  to 
;e  impediments  to  a  major  expansion  of 
use  in  electrical  power  generation  and  in 
itry;  their  countries  should  take  steps  to 
de  the  infrastructure  needed  for  in- 
■ed  production,  transport  and  marketing 
al; 

Coal-exporting  countries  should  facil- 
reliable  coal  exports  in  times  of  supply 
ulties; 

Their  countries  should  promote  the  de- 
ment of  a  flexible  and  diversified  coal 
ng  system,  paying  particular  attention  to 
eed  for  long-term  contracts. 

.  Coal  use  must  be  environmentally  ac- 
ble.  Ministers  agreed  to  accelerate 
;rative  efforts  to  promote  strategies  for 
lean  use  of  coal,  including  research, 
opment  and  demonstration  regarding 
ise  technologies,  and  to  establish  effec- 
'egulatory  frameworks  which  allow  coal 
to  choose  the  most  economic  means  to 
ve  environmental  goals.  They  will  assess 
ible  and  new  technologies  and  review 
arly  the  pace  and  impact  of  their  in- 
iction. 


fulfil  its  important  potential  for  con- 
ting  to  overall  long-term  energy  security 
1  is  the  concern  of  all  industrialized 


countries,  nuclear  power  will  have  to  play  a 
major  and  increasing  role  in  many  countries. 
Ministers: 

•  Stressed  the  importance  of  encourag- 
ing stable  trade  in  nuclear  equipment,  fuel 
cycle  services  and  nuclear  fuel.  Export  and 
import  regulations  must  be  predictable,  and 
based  on  the  strict  respect  of  current  non- 
proliferation  policies; 

•  Agreed  that  member  countries  would 
maintain  reliable  standards  of  nuclear  reactor 
safety  and  continue  to  co-operate  in  various 
fora  on  these  matters.  Procedures  for  the  ap- 
proval of  reactors  and  nuclear  facilities 
should  be  as  clear  and  expeditious  as  possible; 

•  Stressed  the  importance  of  interna- 
tional co-operation  on  spent  fuel  storage  and 
waste  disposal.  They  appealed  to  the  govern- 
ments of  those  countries  in  a  position  to  do 
so  to  stimulate  further  progress  in  developing 
and  applying  effective  and  timely  methods 
for  managing  the  back  end  of  the  fuel  cycle 

in  ways  best  suited  to  their  national  situa- 
tions and  compatible  with  international 
agreements.  The  competent  bodies  of  OECD 
were  requested  to  work  together  on  periodic 
consultations  on  the  progress  of  Member 
governments  in  the  waste  disposal  pro- 
gramme; 

•  Requested  the  competent  bodies  of 
OECD  to  identify  for  prompt  examination 
new  possibilities  for  research  and  develop- 
ment in  advanced  technologies  that  support 
these  conclusions. 

Action  on  these  lines  will  provide  the 
basis  for  both  institutional  impediments  and 
public  acceptance  concerns  on  nuclear  power 
to  be  vigorously  addressed  and  allayed 
wherever  possible. 


Gas 

8.  Ministers  agreed  that  gas  has  an  important 
role  to  play  in  reducing  dependence  on  im- 
ported oil.  They  also  agreed,  however,  on  the 
importance  of  avoiding  the  development  of 
situations  in  which  imports  of  gas  could 
weaken  rather  than  strengthen  the  energy 
supply  security  and  thus  the  overall  economic 
stability  of  Member  countries.  They  noted  the 
potential  risks  associated  with  high  levels  of 
dependence  on  single  supplier  countries. 
Ministers  stressed  the  importance  of  ex- 
peditious development  of  indigenous  OECD 
energy  resources.  They  noted  that  existing 
contracts  are  currently  insufficient  to  cover 
expected  gas  demand  by  the  mid-1990s,  and 
agreed  that  in  filling  this  gap  steps  should  be 
taken  to  ensure  that  no  one  producer  is  in  a 
position  to  exercise  monopoly  power  over 
OECD  countries.  To  obtain  the  advantages  of 
increased  use  of  gas  on  an  acceptably  secure 
basis,  they  agreed  that: 

•  Their  countries  would  seek  to  avoid  un- 
due dependence  on  any  one  source  of  gas  im- 
ports and  to  obtain  future  gas  supplies  from 
secure  sources,  with  emphasis  on  indigenous 
OECD  sources.  Additional  supplies  from 
other  sources  would  be  obtained  from  as 
diverse  sources  as  possible,  taking  into  ac- 
count supply  structures,  the  share  of  gas  in 


energy  balances,  and  the  geographical  situa- 
tion of  individual  countries.  In  assessing  the 
full  costs  of  gas  supply  sources,  gas  com- 
panies and,  as  appropriate,  governments  will 
consider  security  factors; 

•  Their  governments  would  either  en- 
courage gas  companies  and  other  undertak- 
ings concerned  to  take  or  take  themselves  the 
necessary  and  appropriate  cost-effective 
measures  suited  to  each  country's  situation  to 
strengthen  their  ability  to  deal  with  supply 
disruptions;  these  measures  could  include  in- 
creased gas  storage  facilities,  contingency  de- 
mand restraint  programmes,  improved  fuel- 
switching  capabilities  accompanied  by  ade- 
quate stocks  of  oil  or  other  alternative  fuels, 

a  more  flexible  grid  structure,  greater  flex- 
ibility of  contracts,  more  surge  capacity, 
measures  to  accelerate  intra-OECD  trade  on 
short  notice  through  standby  contracts  for 
supplies  in  a  disruption,  and  interruptible 
contracts  with  consumers; 

•  Action  should  be  taken  to  develop  at 
economic  cost  indigenous  gas  resources,  par- 
ticularly in  North  America  and  the  North 
Sea,  which  show  promise  of  alleviating 
overall  or  particular  pressures  on  energy  im- 
ports; 

•  Concerned  Member  governments  not- 
ing the  potential  for  further  development  of 
North  American  gas  resources  and  noting 
that  part  of  the  Norwegian  Troll  field  may  be 
declared  commercial  by  1984,  would  en- 
courage their  companies  to  begin  negotiations 
on  deliveries  from  these  sources  as  soon  as 
possible,  with  a  view  to  making  supplies 
available  at  prices  competitive  with  other 
fuels  in  the  mid-1990s; 

•  Trade  barriers  and  other  barriers 
which  could  delay  development  of  indigenous 
gas  resources  should  be  avoided  or  reduced; 

•  Their  governments  would  encourage 
the  companies  concerned  to  undertake 
feasibility  studies,  if  appropriate,  in  coopera- 
tion with  member  governments,  to  determine 
the  economic,  engineering,  technical  and 
financial  factors,  relevant  to  possible  imports 
from  a  variety  of  non-OECD  sources; 

•  Governments  within  one  region  where 
there  is  scope  for  effective  cooperation  should 
invite  gas  companies  operating  in  their 
jurisdictions  to  address  and  negotiate  on  a 
commercial  basis  cooperative  arrangements 
to  meet  a  disruption  of  supplies  to  any  one 
country  or  to  the  region  as  a  whole; 

•  Special  attention  should  be  given  in  the 
annual  country  review  process  in  various  in- 
ternational organizations  to  the  future  pat- 
tern of  gas  supplies,  to  the  progress  on  the 
development  and  implementation  of  security 
measures,  and  to  whether  gas  imports  into 
the  OECD  from  any  single  source  constitute 
such  a  proportion  of  total  supplies  as  to  give 
rise  to  concern  about  the  timely  development 
of  indigenous  resources  and  the  vulnerability 
of  supplies,  either  for  an  individual  Member 
country  or  collectively; 

•  In  considering  the  degree  of  vulner- 
ability, relevant  factors  include  the  share  of 
imports  in  total  gas  consumption  and  in  total 
primary  energy  requirements,  the  reliability 
of  particular  sources,  the  flexibility  of  other 


THE  SECRETARY 


supplies,  sectxjral  distribution,  stocks  and 
fuel-switching  possibilities; 

•  An  in-depth  exchange  of  views  about 
this  question  would  take  place  within  the  nor- 
mal review  process  whenever  considered 
necessary.  To  allow  a  full  assessment  of  its 
energy  situation,  the  country  concerned  shall 
inform  the  other  member  states  if  it  plans 
major  changes  in  its  energy  policy  or  gas  sup- 
ply pattern  which  are  significant  in  the  con- 
text of  development  of  indigenous  OECD 
resources  and  vulnerability  of  gas  supplies. 

Ministers  expressed  the  view  that  special 
attention  should  be  given  in  relevant  interna- 
tional organisations  to  the  gas  import  situa- 
tion of  individual  countries  and  regions. 


Oil 

9.  Ministers  noted  that  since  1974,  con- 
siderable progress  has  been  made  in  improv- 
ing energy  security  as  far  as  oil  is  concerned. 
A  continuation  of  these  efforts  will  be 
necessary,  however,  as  oil  will  remain  by  far 
the  most  important  factor  in  OECD  energy 
imports.  Thus,  in  the  year  2000  oil  will  still 
constitute  more  than  75%  of  all  OECD 
energy  imports.  Ministers  therefore  agreed 
on  the  importance  of  strong  co-operative  ar- 
rangements for  handling  a  major  oil  supply 
disruption  and,  in  the  case  of  lEA  Ministers, 
on  the  need  for  continued  improvement  of 
the  existing  emergency  allocation  system, 
and  the  need  to  continue  to  encourage  oil 
companies  to  support  the  improvement  and, 
if  necessary,  the  operation  of  the  system.  To 
strengthen  their  overall  emergency  pre- 
paredness. Ministers  also  agreed  to  continue 
to  pay  particular  attention  to  the  continued 
adequacy  of  their  countries'  oil  stocks  in 
terms  of  amount,  structure  and  flexibility. 

Other  Energy  Resources 

10.  Ministers  reaffirmed  their  readiness  to 
pursue  policies  both  at  the  national  and  inter- 
national level,  aiming  at  exploitation  of  other 
indigenous  energy  resources  such  as  hitherto 
unharnessed  hydropower. 


NEWS  CONFERENCE, 
MAY  10,  19833 


Q.  What  is  your  comment  on  the 
departure  today  of  the  Soviet  diplo- 
mats from  Lebanon,  and  how 
dangerous  do  you  think  the  situation 
is  since  last  week? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  departure  of 
the  Soviet  group  from  Lebanon  has  been 
described  by  them  as  something  that 
happens  annually  at  the  end  of  the 
school  year.  I  have  no  way  to  debate 
that,  but  it  does  happen  regularly. 

As  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the 
situation  in  Lebanon  is  that  there  is  an 
agreement  between  Israel  and  Lebanon 
calling  for,  among  other  things, 


withdrawal  by  Israel.  We  look  now  to 
withdrawal  by  Syria  and  the  PLO 
[Palestine  Liberation  Organization]  so 
that  Lebanon  can  get  itself  free  of  all 
foreign  forces,  and  we  continue  to  work 
for  that  objective.  I  might  say  that  I  had 
a  meeting  this  afternoon  with  the 
Foreign  Minister  of  Iraq  who  has  public- 
ly supported,  he  has  told  me,  the 
withdrawal  of  Syrian  and  PLO  forces. 
The  Egyptians  have  also  called  for  that, 
the  Jordanians  have  also  called  for  that, 
and  I  understand  the  Saudi  Arabians 
have  also  called  for  that.  So  there  is  a 
certain  rate  of  Arab  opinion  developing 
so  that  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  forces 
from  Lebanon  is  what  is  called  for. 
There  will  be  Israeli  withdrawal  so  that 
Lebanon,  as  a  country,  can  be  sovereign 
and  peaceful  and  prosperous.  That  is  the 
objective  the  United  States  is  working 
for. 

Q.  I  address  this  question  to  you 
and  Secretary  Regan  jointly.  Can  you 
tell  us  what  you  gentlemen  think  you 
have  accomplished  here  at  the  OECD 
meeting  in  the  last  2  days,  and 
whether  or  not  President  Mitterrand's 
statement  last  night  in  any  way  clouds 
the  prospects  of  success  for  the 
Williamsburg  summit? 

Secretary  Shultz.  President 
Mitterrand's  statement  was  an  eloquent 
statement  of  his  view;  it  was  a  special 
bonus  for  us  in  attending  this  session, 
and  I  do  not  see  that  it  in  any  way 
clouds;  it  helps  to  put  forward  ideas  for 
the  Williamsburg  summit.  I  had  the 
privilege  of  a  meeting  of  an  hour  and  a 
half  this  morning;  it  was  very  fruitful 
and  worthwhile. 

In  a  general  way,  I  think  that  we 
feel  that  we  have  come  here,  we  have 
joined  with  our  friends  in  the  OECD 
countries,  and  we  have  found  a  great 
sense  of  common  purpose  and  unity  and 
recognition  that  we  do  have  serious 
problems,  and  we  also  see  the  prospect 
of  some  answers.  Particularly  everyone 
has  pointed  to  the  prospect  of  economic 
growth,  everyone  has  noticed  that  there 
has  been  substantial  headway,  more  in 
some  countries  than  in  others,  but  as  a 
general  proposition,  substantial  head- 
way. I  think  that  we  can  look  to  the 
future  with  much  more  confidence.  I  say 
that  as  a  result  of  the  communique  as 
such,  but  even  more  by  virtue  of  the 
discussions  that  we  have  had  and  get- 
ting a  sense  and  a  feeling  of  the  outlook 
that  people  have. 

Q.  What  specific  things  have  come 
from  the  meeting? 

Secretary  Shultz.  There  are  a  great 


many  specific  things  in  the  communiqi 
that  will  be  undertaken.  I  think, 
however,  that  the  main  point  is  the 
sense  of  communication  and  interactio 
and  the  sense  of  common  purpose.  I  f( 
that  if  you  contrast  the  statements  hei 
that  came  out  of  the  GATT  [General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade] 
ministerial  of  November,  for  example- 
did  not  happen  to  attend  that  meeting 
but  I  have  heard  a  great  deal  about  it-' 
think  the  atmosphere  was  much  | 

stronger  and  healthier  on  the  subject  i 
open  trade  here  than  it  was  there.  So  , 
we  have  made  some  headway  and  sou 
progress.  j 

Q.  What  kind  of  example  do  you  I 
think  the  Soviets  are  giving  the  I 
Syrians  in  connection  with  the  troojl 
withdrawal  agreement,  and  do  you  ' 
foresee  a  possibility  of  the  Syrians  I 
triggering  some  kind  of  [inaudible]  I 
sabotage  the  agreement?  I 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  do  not  have  1 1 
idea  of  what  advice  the  Soviets  are  gi  I 
ing  the  Syrians:  I  am  not  privy  to  the  I 
However,  I  have  seen  the  article  in 
TASS  attacking  the  Israeli-Lebanon  ' 
agreement,  so  they  have  made  their  I 
view  of  the  matter  clear.  I 

I  would  only  say  this:  that  Lebam  I 
is  a  country  that  has  suffered  like  no 
other  country  has  in  recent  years.  If . 
took  the  casualties  in  Lebanon  and 
scaled  them  according  to  the  size  of  t 
U.S.  population,  you  would  be  talking 
U.S.  terms  about  casualties  about  in  ' 
order  of  10  million.  Imagine  what  ouii 
country  would  be  like  if  we  had  that  ll 
level  of  casualties.  Now  we  have  an  [' 
agreement  between  Israel  and  Leban  ' 
for  withdrawal  and  for  Lebanon  to  \\i  i 
a  chance.  We  are  calling  upon  Syria  i\ 
the  PLO  to  withdraw  so  that  Lebanoili 
can  have  a  chance.  I  should  think  all  I 
countries  by  this  time  would  look  at  r 
that  way  and  say  to  themselves  that  i's 
about  time  that  we  took  a  constructiv' 
attitude  and  got  on  the  side  of  peace  '( 
a  chance  for  people  to  conduct  their 
lives.  I  would  call  upon  the  Soviet  Unp 
to  take  another  look  and  get  on  the  s  ? 
of  peace  in  Lebanon. 

Q.  Can  you  please  tell  us  about 
your  talks  this  morning  over  break!  t 
with  Mr.  Hayden  [Australian  Foreij 
Minister]  on  Southeast  Asia? 

Secretary  Shultz.  This  was  a  firs 
meeting  between  Mr.  Hayden  and  my' 
self— he  having  just  taken  office  somt 
or  5  weeks  ago— and  so  we  reviewed' 
various  issues  common  to  the  region  :'d 
as  it  happened  his  Prime  Minister,  Be 
Hawke,  is  a  friend  of  mine  from  year 


52 


Department  of  State  Bulli " 


THE  SECRETARY 


it,  so  we  exchanged  greetings  back 
1  forth  on  that  regard.  It  was  a 
leral  meeting,  getting  acquainted  and 
ring  his  views  of  what  some  of  the 
minent  issues  are.  Mr.  Hawke  will  be 
ting  in  Washington  in  mid-June,  and 
,  Hayden  will  be  in  Washington  in 
ly  July  for  the  ANZUS  [Australia, 
K  Zealand,  U.S.  security  pact] 
sting,  so  we  will  have  a  lot  of  con- 
ts  with  the  new  Australian  Govern- 
it  coming  up. 

Q.  On  the  OECD  agenda,  I  have 
I  question.  One  of  the  sore  points 
the  European  agenda  is.  of  course, 
V  does  the  American  Administra- 
1  evaluate  the  agreements  in  the 
it- West  trade  area?  We  got  the 
nals  that  basically  the  East- West 
les  are  on  the  back  burner  in 
lliamsburg.  In  light  of  the  com- 
nique  and  your  statements,  there 
a  lot  of  points  where  you  could 
luate  this  aspect  differently,  that 
Williamsburg  you  might  have  still 
le  conflicting  areas. 
Secretary  Shultz.  I  am  sorry  to  say 
:  even  the  press  cannot  stir  up  a 
t  in  this  area.  There  do  not  seem  to 
iny  sore  points  that  I  can  find.  We 
8  discussed  a  wide  range  of  issues 
n  the  market  orientation  to  trade 
financial  arrangements.  We  have 
ussed  energy  matters.  We  have 
ussed  security  matters  in  another 
im— not  in  the  OECD  forum  of 
•se,  that  is  entirely  different. 
As  a  general  proposition,  what 
ns  to  me  to  have  happened  in  this 
1  is  that  there  has  been  a  great  deal 
iscussion  among  those  concerned, 
we  have  argued  and  struggled  to 
:e  our  views  clear  to  each  other  and 
lually  over  a  period  of  time  a  consen- 
of  views  has  emerged.  That  is  begin- 
j  to  take  shape,  and  it  is  not  that 
,;roversial  at  this  point.  Every- 
y— certainly  we  are— pleased  with 
iway  this  is  coming  along. 

Q.  What  was  the  result  of  your 
:ting  with  the  Iraqi  Foreign 
ister. 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  discussed 
ly  three  things.  First,  that  the  Iraq- 
prican  relationship— we  have  a  rela- 
iship— could  be  stronger.  We  dis- 
ied  the  Iran-Iraq  war  and  our  desire 
|ee  it  end  and  some  possible  ways  of 
ig  about  that.  Also  we  discussed  the 
janon  situation,  and  I  reported  the 
I's  of  the  minister  on  that.  I  might 
Ithat  I  would  not  have  reported 
ebody  else's  views  here  like  that  ex- 
that  I  asked  him  if  I  could  say  that 


he  favored  Syrian  withdrawal,  and  he 
says  that  he  said  it  publicly  so  there  is 
no  reason  why  you  cannot  say  that. 

Q.  Have  you  planned  to  go  back  to 
Damascus? 

Secretary  Shultz.  My  plan  is  to  go 
back  to  Washington  tomorrow  morning, 
and  I  do  not  have  any  immediate  plan  to 
go  back  to  Damascus.  I  might  point  out 
that  Ambassador  Habib  remains  in  the 
area  and  is  well-known  in  Damascus  and 
knows  the  area  well  and  may  very  well 
travel  there  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States. 

Q.  [Inaudible] 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  know  that  the 
Syrians  object  to  the  Israeli-Lebanon 
agreement;  that  is  not  really  the  point. 
The  point  is  will  they  withdraw?  It  has 
been  said  by  many  that  they  will 
withdraw  when  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  asks  them.  I  have  a  pretty 
good  idea  that  they  will  get  asked. 

Q.  Have  you  any  indication  of 
whether  the  clarifications  sought  by 
Israel  have  been  acceptable  to  the 
Lebanese? 

Secretary  Shultz.  My  understanding 
is  that,  as  is  usual  in  agreements  of  this 
kind,  there  is  a  lot  of  effort  to  dot  the  i's 
and  cross  the  t's,  and  it  is  a  bit  of  a 
struggle.  But  there  is  no  special  problem 
that  should  impede  us  connected  with  it. 

Q.  Are  you  disappointed  that  the 
Lebanese  Assembly  has  not  acted  yet 
in  any  way  to  formally  approve  the 
agreement? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  Lebanese 
Assembly  will  act,  I  am  sure,  as  soon  as 
things  are  ready  for  them.  I  think  that 
they  are  working  at  that  very  hard. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  President 
Mitterrand's  suggestions  on  a  reform 
of  the  EMS  are:  a)  a  good  thing,  b) 
feasible? 

Secretary  Regan.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  at  some  point  in  time,  the  nations 
in  the  world  will  discuss  in  more  detail 
monetary  problems  and  the  currency 
fluctuations  that  have  characterized  the 
world's  currencies  over  the  last  3  or  4 
years.  I  do  not  think  the  time  is  quite 
ripe  for  that  at  the  present  moment.  I 
think  Mr.  Mitterrand  also  indicated  that 
there  needs  to  be  a  lot  more  planning,  a 
lot  more  discussion,  a  lot  more  con- 
sideration before  any  type  of  real  con- 
ference would  be  called  on  this.  I  also 
point  to  the  study  that  we  released  on 
April  29  concerning  monetary  policy  and 
convergence  of  currencies  and  the  state- 
ment that  was  jointly  issued  at  that  time 
by  the  G-7  nations  of  which  both  France 
and  the  United  States  subscribed. 


Q.  Do  you  think  that  President 
Reagan  will  pursue  his  Middle  East 
plan,  and  what  guarantee  is  the 
United  States  likely  to  give  to  Jordan 
in  the  future  to  participate  in  negotia- 
tions, and  what  do  you  think  about 
what  happened  yesterday  in  Amman? 

Secretary  Shultz.  President  Reagan 
will  pursue  his  plan  for  peace.  President 
Reagan  is  dedicated  to  doing  everything 
he  can  to  help  bring  peace  to  the  Middle 
East  and  to  other  troubled  areas  of  the 
world— so  you  can  be  sure  that  he  will 
pursue  that. 

I  think  that  the  prospect  of  peace 
must  be  a  major  incentive  to  people  in 
any  region.  To  pursue,  the  United  States 
does  not  have  to  persuade  people,  it  is 
obvious  that  it  is  in  their  interest,  so  I 
would  expect  that  people  would  pitch  in 
and  pursue  it. 

As  far  as  the  two  explosions  in  Jor- 
dan are  concerned — I  guess  that  is  what 
you  are  referring  to— I  do  not  have  very 
much  information  about  it  other  than 
they  occurred.  So  I  will  not  comment 
about  it. 

Q.  How  is  your  visit  coordinated 
with  that  of  Mr.  Weinberger?  Do  you 
know  if  the  Secretary  of  Defense  is 
seeing  Mr.  Tariq  Aziz? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  visit  was,  I 
think,  fortuitous  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
an  extra  chance  to  talk  with  people  in 
the  region  by  a  high  official  of  the 
government,  but  it  was  not  planned  that 
way  particularly.  These  meetings  take 
place  from  time  to  time,  and  Secretary 
Weinberger  is  here  on  that  kind  of  a 
visit.  As  far  as  I  know,  he  has  no  plan  to 
see  the  Iraqi  Foreign  Minister. 

Q.  Why  do  you  think  the  Soviet 
Union  should  pay  any  attention  to 
what  you  are  saying  about  Lebanon? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  can  speak  for 
the  United  States  as  a  country  dedicated 
to  peace,  and  I  call  upon  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  countries  to  show  equal 
dedication.  I  thought  myself  that  it  was 
a  great  thing  to  see  the  Lebanese,  with 
all  of  the  difficulties  they  have,  strug- 
gling to  find  an  agreement  with  Israel 
and  by  the  same  token,  the  Israelis 
negotiating  in  a  troubled  situation  to 
bring  about  withdrawal  and  to  try  to 
establish  a  modicum  of  peace  on  their 
northern  border.  People  are  trying,  try- 
ing to  construct  a  peaceful  world. 
Everyone  has  signed  statements  saying 
that  is  what  they  are  for;  let  them  come 
through  and  join  in  the  peace  process.  I 
do  not  think  that  words  will  necessarily 
do  it,  but  there  is  no  need  to  despair;  we 
might  as  well  try. 


THE  SECRETARY 


Q.  What  do  you  mean  by  "join  in 
the  process'7 

Secretary  Shultz.  Join  others  in 
calling  on  the  Syrians  to  withdraw  from 
Lebanon. 

Q.  Can  I  just  ask  Secretary  Shultz 
one  thing  on  the  Williamsburg  summit 
in  light  of  the  last  2  days  at  the 
OECD?  Early  this  year  you  said  that 
you  would  hope  for  a  rather  informal 
or  unstructured  summit.  Do  you  think 
that  anything  can  be  accomplished  in 
terms  of  solving,  or  even  moving 
toward  solving,  these  complex  and  in- 
terrelated issues  at  a  summit  that  is 
as  informal  as  you  have  foreseen? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  President 
and  other  heads  of  state  do  feel  that  the 
most  will  be  accomplished  at  the  summit 
if  it  is  informal,  conversational,  with, 
certainly,  an  orderly  process  of  working 
through  various  subjects.  This  will  pro- 
vide them  with  an  opportunity  for  a  ge- 
nuine exchange  of  views  on  a  lot  of 
these  subjects.  I  do  not  think  that  you 
expect  that  heads  of  the  state  are  going 
to  come  at  this  issue  with  a  sense  of  a 
solution  in  some  kind  of  definitive  one 
per  one  sense.  What  heads  of  state  can 
contribute,  it  seems  to  me,  is  a  sense  of 
the  relationship  among  these  issues  and 
a  greater  understanding  of  how  they  ef- 
fect the  various  countries  involved,  so 
that  as  they  proceed  with  their  own 
policies,  they  do  so  with  a  great  sense  of 
how  the  interactions  are  likely  to  be 
around  the  world.  It  is  those  kinds  of 
things  that  you  tend  to  get  out  of  a  sum- 
mit. 

Furthermore  on  matters  such  as  the 
prospects  for  economic  growth  without 
inflation,  I  think  those  will  be  very  well 
served  if  the  protectionist  pressures  can 
be  kept  in  a  balance,  perhaps  rolled  back 
a  little  bit,  and  here  getting  a  feel  for 
mutual  determination  to  do  so  is  often 
very  helpful  as  you  go  your  own  proc- 
esses in  your  own  country.  So  these  are 
all  aspects  of  what  may  come  up  at  the 
summit,  but  I  do  not  think  that  people 
go  there  expecting  to  find  five  answers 
to  four  questions. 

Q.  Do  you  think  that  the  Saudis 
are  still  going  to  exert  pressures  upon 
the  Syrians  with  the  petrodollars? 


Secretary  Shultz.  I  did  not  say  that 
they  were,  so  the  word  "still"  is  not  an 
operative  one.  I  do  not  have  any  com- 
ment to  make  about  whatever  the 
nature  of  the  discussion  between  the 
Saudis  and  the  Syrians  may  be,  other 
than  to  note  that  the  Saudi  Foreign 
Minister  at  the  airport  did  make  a  com- 
ment about  the  importance  of  Syrian 
withdrawal. 

Q.  Do  you  have  any  confidence 
that  any  initiative  toward  Vietnam  can 
settle  the  problems  of  Kampuchea  and 
Laos? 

Secretary  Shultz.  I  think  in  that 
situation  we  have — one  where  a  Soviet- 
sponsored  country  with  some  180,000 
troops  or  more  has  invaded  Kampuchea, 
has  moved  into  Laos— is  causing  trouble 
on  the  Thai  border,  and  what  we  and 
others  have  called  for  is  for  them  to 
withdraw  to  their  own  country.  In  that 
regard  we  are  supporting  the  effort  of 
the  ASEAN  [Association  of  South  East 
Asian  Nations]  countries  and  also  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  which  has  the 
same  viewpoint.  Whether  the  Australian 
Foreign  Minister  will  be  able  to  accom- 
plish something  in  that  regard,  I  do  not 
know,  I  wish  him  well,  but  our  policy  is 
very  clear. 

Q.  Are  you  willing  to  meet  with 
the  Soviets  and  discuss  with  them  on 
the  question  of  their  getting  on  the 
side  of  peace? 

Secretary  Shultz.  We  meet  with  the 
Soviets— I  do  and  others  do — from  time 
to  time.  We  are  always  interested  in 
peace;  it  has  many  dimensions.  Some- 
body brought  up  Kampuchea,  we  have 
been  talking  about  the  Middle  East,  we 
have  very  constructive  efforts  going  in 
southern  Africa,  we  have  lots  of  prob- 
lems in  Central  America.  There  are 
many  places  where  we  can  be  more  con- 
structive, let  alone  in  the  field  of  arms 
control  where  the  President  has  put  for- 
ward sweeping  proposals  for  reductions 
in  nuclear  armaments  and  in  conven- 
tional arms— the  MBFR  [mutual  and 
balanced  force  reductions]  talks  are  go- 
ing on  in  Vienna,  there  are  talks  going 
on  in  Madrid.  There  are  a  great  many 
forums  where  various  dimensions  of 
what  it  takes  to  build  peace  are  under 
discussion. 


Q.  Should  they  be  brought  into 
closer  consultations,  particularly  on 
the  Middle  East? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  point  I  mac 
in  the  Middle  East  was  in  response  to  ! 
questions  and  in  response  to  an  article] 
TASS,  more  or  less  officially  attacking  j 
the  agreement  reached  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon.  How  you  can  attack  tha' 
agreement  and  feel  that  you  are  for 
peace  in  Lebanon,  I  do  not  know.  It  is 
an  agreement  to  start  the  process  for 
removal  of  foreign  forces,  so  I  do  not 
think  it  takes  a  conference;  it  takes 
them  to  urge  the  Syrians  to  withdraw 
the  Israelis  have  agreed  to  withdraw. 

Q.  Do  you,  after  these  2  days  of 
talks  here!^  feel  that  the  United  Statl 
has  more  responsibility  for  protectin 
the  fragile  world  recovery,  and  in 
ticular  are  you  more  interested  in 
world  growth  as  a  way  of  helping  tK 
developing  countries,  which  have  in 
many  cases,  borrowed  very  heavily 
from  the  American  banking  system? 

Secretary  Shultz.  The  United 
States  has  been,  remains,  and  continu 
to  be  very  much  interested  in  world 
economic  growth,  noninflationary, 
healthy  growth.  It  is  good  for  us;  it  i 
good  for  our  friends  and  allies;  it  is  gfl 
for  the  developing  countries  as  well  i 
our  industrial  neighbors  so  we  have  bt 
in  favor  of  that,  we  continue  to  be.  AL 
of  those  sentiments  were  reinforced  a 
the  meetings  here  and  there  is  a  con- 
tinued thrust  in  that  direction.  We  are 
glad  to  be  aboard,  if  anything,  leading 
the  charge. 


'Press  release  178  of  May  11,  1983. 

^OECD  press  release. 

sPress  release  179  of  May  17.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullei 


THE  SECRETARY 


liddle  East:  Negotiation 
nd  Reconciliation 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Hness  Council  in  Hot  Springs,  Va., 
May  13,  1983.^ 

;  Middle  East  has  been  the  focus  of 
lost  constant  American  diplomatic  ef- 
ts for  more  than  a  decade  now.  I 
I't  have  to  educate  this  group  in  the 
sons  why  the  Middle  East  is  so  im- 
tant  to  the  United  States.  It  is  a 
ion  of  vital  economic  importance  and 
itegic  location;  we  have  many  friend- 
5s  and  relationships  in  the  area,  in- 
iing  a  deep  moral  commitment  to 
lel  and  many  friendships  and  ties 
h  moderate  Arab  countries.  And  the 
ted  States  is  in  a  unique  position  to 
mote  progress  in  the  great  task  of 
Dnciliation  between  Israel  and  its 
lb  neighbors. 

This  last  point  is  worth  emphasizing, 
netimes  foreign  policy  seems  a 
;trating  endeavor;  we  have  so  many 
blems  on  our  plate,  and  some 
ericans  must  wonder  whether  our 
jal  exertions  are  worthwhile.  They 
old  have  been  with  me  in  the  Middle 
t.  In  the  Middle  East,  we  see  the 
arkable  phenomenon  of  Arabs  and 
.elis,  locked  in  conflict  for  genera- 
s,  looking  to  the  United  States  as 
one  great  power  able  to  help  them 
a  way  out.   Both  sides  trust  our 
ness,  they  respect  our  good  faith, 
they  find  reassurance  in  our  par- 
)ation  as  they  face  the  risks  and 
lenges  of  peace.  Even  those  who 
,gree  with  us  on  many  issues  want  us 
)lved  as  a  counterbalance  to  others 
ise  motives  are  more  suspect. 
iThis  special  trust  in  the  United 
;es  is  the  main  reason  for  the  success 
have  had.  I  found  it  deeply  moving 
ravel  in  the  Middle  East  and  see  the 
liration  for  America  and  the  faith  in 
erica  that  peoples  and  governments 
16  Middle  East  show  so  openly.  I 
ht  say  an  awful  lot  of  it  comes  from 
experience  of  people  in  this  area 
1  the  American  business  community 
the  people  that  we  have  out  there 
,  I  think,  are  among  the  very  best 
lassadors  that  we  have  anywhere, 
y  know  that  the  United  States  is  not 
strong  but  just,  not  only  powerful 
fair.  It  is  an  extraordinary  tribute  to 
country— it  is  a  tribute  to  the  basic 
■ncy  and  generosity  and  goodness  of 
American  people.  I  can  tell  you  I 


was  very  proud  to  be  there  as  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

Let  me  say  a  little  bit  about  my  trip 
to  the  Middle  East  and  about  the 
negotiation  that  was  just  concluded  last 
week  between  Israel  and  Lebanon. 

The  Lesson  of  the 
Egyptian-Israeli  Peace  Treaty 

By  a  symbolic  coincidence,  my  trip 
began  in  Egypt  at  the  time  of  the  first 
anniversary  of  the  final  return  of  the 
Sinai  to  Egypt  under  the  terms  of  the 
peace  treaty  with  Israel.  There  is  a 
lesson  in  this  symbolism,  which  I  em- 
phasized over  and  over  again:  Egypt 
recovered  its  sovereign  territory 
through  a  negotiation  with  Israel.  The 
process  of  negotiation  worked  in  a  way 
that  violence  or  rejectionism  did  not  and 
cannot  work.  Egypt  and  Israel  together 
vindicated  the  principle  of  solving  prob- 
lems through  peaceful  means.  It  is  a  car- 
dinal principal  of  a  decent  world  order, 
and  the  success  of  that  process  is  an  in- 
structive example  for  others. 

It  is,  of  course,  the  principle  that  we 
are  striving  now  to  vindicate  again  in 
Lebanon. 


The  Lebanon-Israel  Negotiation 

The  warfare  that  we  saw  last  summer 
on  our  television  screens  was  only  the 
culmination  of  many  years  of  bloodshed 
and  turmoil  in  Lebanon.  Lebanon  is  a 
beautiful  country,  with  a  proud  and 
capable  people  who  have  long  played  a 
productive  role  in  the  economy  of  that 
part  of  the  world.  The  Lebanese  have 
had  their  internal  political  difficulties, 
but  the  delicate  political  balance  within 
Lebanon  was  shattered  during  the  1970s 
largely  by  the  involvement  of  external 
military  forces— the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO),  the  Syrians,  and  the 
Israelis. 

The  war  in  Lebanon  last  summer 
taught  its  own  kind  of  lesson.  There  was 
a  profound  yearning,  particularly  in 
Lebanon,  to  turn  the  aftermath  of  that 
tragedy  into  the  beginning  of  something 
better.  Out  of  chaos  came  hope.  Last 
July  and  August  the  United  States, 
represented  by  Ambassador  Philip 
Habib,  President  Reagan's  special 
emissary,  negotiated  a  cease-fire  in 
Beirut  and  the  withdrawal  of  PLO 


fighters  from  the  Beirut  area.  U.S. 
Marines  took  up  positions  around  Beirut 
to  provide  a  sense  of  security.  And  let 
me  tell  you  when  you  land  there  and  you 
hear  popping  away  going  on  all  the  time, 
boy,  do  those  Marines  look  good. 
[Laughter]  Particularly  that  Col.  Meade; 
he's  about  10  feet  tall.  You're  breaking 
your  neck  looking  up  at  him,  but  he  sure 
looks  good. 

I  might  say,  the  last  time  we 
stopped  in  Beirut  happened  to  be 
Mother's  Day.  I  went  up  to  the 
Presidential  Palace  to  talk  with  Presi- 
dent Gemayel,  and  Obie  [Mrs.  Shultz] 
decided— she  said,  "Well,  it's  Mother's 
Day.  There  are  probably  a  lot  of  lonely 
Marines  around  here,  and  I'm  going  to 
appoint  myself  Mother."  So  she  went 
around  to  all  of  the  Marines  and  called 
on  them  and  pepped  them  up.  It  was 
sort  of  nice,  I  think.  [Applause] 

At  any  rate,  then  a  new  government 
in  Lebanon,  headed  by  its  impressive 
young  President— don't  sell  this  guy 
short— Amin  Gemayel,  set  as  its  first 
priority  the  restoration  of  a  strong  cen- 
tral government  exercising  full 
sovereign  control  over  all  of  its  ter- 
ritory. Lebanon  sought  the  withdrawal 
of  all  external  forces  from  the  country. 
Israel  sought  reassurance  that  Lebanese 
territory  would  not  become  again  a  stag- 
ing ground  for  terrorist  attacks  on  the 
cities,  towns,  and  farms  of  northern 
Israel. 

Last  December,  negotiations  began 
between  Lebanon  and  Israel  on  the 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  and  the 
creation  of  a  new  relationship  between 
Lebanon  and  Israel.  Lebanon  thus 
became  the  second  Arab  state,  after 
Egypt,  to  engage  in  direct  negotiations 
with  Israel. 

Again,  the  United  States  played  a 
pivotal  role.  Phil  Habib,  assisted  by  Am- 
bassador Morris  Draper,  shuttled  back 
and  forth  and  worked  with  the  parties  to 
encourage  and  support  an  agreement. 
After  4  months  of  talks,  much  progress 
has  been  made,  but  the  negotiations 
were  stalemated  over  a  number  of  key 
issues.  At  the  end  of  April,  it  became 
clear  that  more  impetus  was  needed  to 
force  the  pace  of  decisions  and  resolve 
the  issues  that  remained.  President 
Reagan  decided  it  was  time  for  me  to  go 
out  there.  I  did,  and  I  spent  about  10 
days  shuttling  between  Beirut  and  Jeru- 
salem to  hammer  out  the  final  com- 
promises. 

It  was  clear  to  me  when  I  got  there 
that  both  sides  wanted  a  solution. 
Sometimes  in  a  negotiation,  you  know 
you're  not  going  to  get  anywhere 


THE  SECRETARY 


because  the  people  don't  want  it.  In 
other  cases,  if  you've  had  any  experience 
with  it,  you  can  just  feel  it;  people  want 
to  have  success.  You  can  feel  that. 

Many  people  did  have  doubts,  but 
Israel  really  wanted  to  withdraw  from 
Lebanon,  and  you  heard  that  a  great 
deal.  In  fact,  both  sides  were  negotiating 
in  good  faith  over  issues  that  were  ob- 
jectively very  difficult.  Both  sides  knew 
that  a  solution  was  necessary. 

In  that  setting,  I  tried  to  put  the 
point  in  a  dinner  toast  the  first  night 
in  Jerusalem.  One  of  the  things  I've 
learned  in  this  field  of  diplomacy  is 
toasts  are  a  big  deal  [laughter],  and  you 
really  concentrate  on  the  toasts  and  try 
to  say  something.  What  I  said  was,  the 
issues  have  been  debated,  analyzed, 
poured  over,  agonized  over.  Now  is  the 
time  to  resolve  them.  As  the  Bible  tells 
us,  to  everything  there  is  a  season. 
There  is  a  time  to  debate  and  a  time  to 
decide.  Now,  I  said,  is  the  time  to 
decide,  and  the  risks  of  failure  are  far 
greater  than  any  of  the  risks  of  an 
agreement. 

It  was  an  extraordinary  experience 
for  me  on  a  personal  level.  The  Govern- 
ment and  people  of  Israel,  who  have 
yearned  so  long  for  acceptance  and  for 
security,  and  the  Government  and  peo- 
ple of  Lebanon,  who  have  yearned  for 
an  end  to  a  decade  of  horror  and 
destruction,  behaved  throughout  2 
weeks  of  intense  negotiation  with  con- 
summate dignity  and  graciousness.  So 
much  was  at  stake  for  their  countries, 
yet  they  treated  me  and  my  colleagues 
with  the  greatest  of  courtesy  and  friend- 
ship throughout.  And  they  did  not 
shrink  from  hard  decisions. 

A  week  ago  today  the  Israeli 
Cabinet  announced  its  acceptance  in 
principle  of  the  agreement  as  it  then 
stood,  which  Lebanon  had  already  ac- 
cepted. It  was  a  victory  for  statesman- 
ship on  both  sides. 

The  agreement  provides  for  with- 
drawal of  Israeli  forces,  which  is  the 
essential  first  step  toward  Lebanon's 
goal  of  withdrawal  of  all  external  forces. 
At  the  same  time,  Lebanon  and  Israel 
have  agreed  to  security  arrangements  in 
the  southern  part  of  the  country  which 
supports  Lebanon's  ability  to  carry  out 
its  strong  intention  to  keep  the  area  free 
of  terrorist  activities. 

I  might  say  that  was  one  of  the  big 
things  going  for  us  in  the  negotiation, 
that  Israel  wanted  a  secure  southern 
Lebanon.  And  the  Lebanese,  who  said, 
leave  aside  last  summer's  war,  we've  lost 
over  a  hundred  thousand  people;  they 
said,  if  you  don't  think  we  want  a  secure 


country,  you  don't  have  to  persuade  us 
of  that.  So  the  Israelis  and  the 
Lebanese,  who  were  not  at  war  with 
each  other,  both  wanted  a  secure  zone, 
so  that  gave  you  something  to  work 
with. 

In  addition,  there  are  provisions 
looking  toward  the  improvement  in 
mutual  relations  which  both  sides  desire, 
reflecting  the  shared  objective  of  living 
in  peace  side-by-side  as  neighbors. 

The  agreement  has  many,  many 
technical  provisions,  of  course,  but  its 
real  meaning  is  much  more  than 
technical.  It  offers  hope  that  Lebanon, 
after  more  than  a  decade  of  civil  war 
and  external  interference,  will  recover 
its  sovereignty,  independence,  and 
security. 

It  offers  hope  that  the  international 
boundary  between  the  two  countries  will 
be  a  border  of  peace,  security,  and 
friendly  relations.  It  proves  once  again, 
in  the  Arab-Israel  conflict,  that  negotia- 
tions can  achieve  results. 

As  you  may  know,  Israel  is  not 
prepared  actually  to  withdraw  its  forces 
until  Syrian  and  the  remaining  PLO 
forces  also  leave  Lebanon.  There  will  be 
a  negotiation  between  Syria  and 
Lebanon  on  the  subject  of  Syrian  with- 
drawal, and  we  have  all  been  seeing 
some  of  the  beginnings  of  that  negotia- 
tion and  positions  being  taken. 

I  know  Amin  Gemayel  well  enough 
to  know  that  he  will  vigorously  defend 
Lebanon's  sovereign  right  to  determine 
its  own  future.  In  fact,  he  was  beginning 
to  get  a  little  feisty  with  everybody  tell- 
ing him  what  to  do  and  saying,  we're 
going  to  decide  what's  good  for  Lebanon 
and  carry  on  from  there.  He  and  his  col- 
leagues are  showing  courage  and 
statesmanship,  and  they  deserve  the 
wholehearted  American  support. 

When  Lebanon  makes  its  sovereign 
decision,  with  backing  from  the  main 
constituent  groups  in  the  Lebanese  na- 
tional consensus,  which  I  believe  they 
will  get,  that  decision  will  command  a 
very  considerable  moral  authority. 

Syria,  too,  is  a  proud  country,  and  it 
has  legitimate  security  concerns  with 
respect  to  Lebanon.  I  was  able  to  tell 
President  Assad  that  the  purpose  of  my 
mission  was  to  start  the  process  of 
restoring  Lebanon's  sovereignty  over  all 
its  territory,  and  withdrawing  all  exter- 
nal forces  which  would  enhance  the 
security  and  well-being  of  all  Lebanon's 
neighbors.  The  Israeli-Lebanese  agree- 
ment was  a  necessary  first  step,  fully 
consistent  with  the  security  of  all  coun- 
tries in  the  area. 

The  Syrian  Government,  too,  treated 
us  all  with  great  courtesy.  I  know  that 


Syria,  like  Lebanon,  will  make  its  ow 
sovereign  decision  on  an  issue  so  imp 
tant  to  it.  Both  Syria  and  the  United 
States  regard  a  renewal  of  contacts  i ' 
improved  relations  as  in  the  mutual  i  ( 
terest.  And  all  parties  will  realize,  I  a 
sure,  that  the  risks,  if  the  withdrawal 
process  fails,  are  greater  than  the  ris, 
of  completing  it.  We  are  in  touch  wit 
all  the  concerned  countries,  and  we  V( 
try  to  assist  as  desired  by  the  parties  / 

What  we  have  already  achieved,  j 
said  before,  is  the  essential  first  step  | 
The  American  people  can  be  proud  o  i 
what  is,  in  essence,  their  accomplish- , 
ment.  They  can  be  proud  of  the  Mari  i 
whose  presence  around  Beirut  give  1 1 
people  of  Lebanon  such  a  sense  of  | 
assurance  and  confidence  in  the  futu ) 

There  are  risks  in  any  dipiomatk 
fort;  there  have  been  tragedies,  such 
the  bombing  of  our  Beirut  embassy.  | 
might  say  I  spent  a  night  in  our  Am- 
bassador's residence  and  a  few  rounc  j 
went  over.  I  learned  later  that  some  j 
the  neighbors  complained;  they  said,  ( 
don't  have  him  come  back,  he's  bad  f  | 
the  neighborhood.  [Laughter]  But  wl 
you  go  and  you  look  at  our  bombed-(  | 
embassy— of  course,  it's  a  very  real  ( 
physical  tragedy— and  then  go  and  j 
meet,  as  I  did,  with  the  people  who ; 
working  for  us  there  in  temporary 
quarters  and  you  realize  the  extent  ( 
losses— 17  American  lives,  three  tinn 
that  number  of  Lebanese  lives— the 
pie  there  are  still  with  us,  the  Leban 
sticking  with  us,  and  we  have  to  say 
have  a  shared  sacrifice  with  them.  B 
we  also  know  that  nothing  significan  e 
ever  accomplished  without  risks,  anc 
sometimes  sacrifice. 

Americans  are  not  a  timid  penph  1 
the  past  generation  this  country  has 
made  an  enormous  contribution  to  tl 
world's  peace,  stability,  and  well-bein 
Thus,  we  are  being  true  to  our  herit;" 
and  to  our  moral  responsibility.  If  th  i 
who  attacked  our  embassy  thought  t } 
could  intimidate  the  United  States  ai 
derail  our  efforts,  they  were  grossly 
mistaken. 


The  Peace  Process 

Let  me  say  a  few  words,  finally,  abo 
our  broader  objectives  of  Middle  Eas 
peace.  Last  September  1,  President 
Reagan  made  a  major  proposal  to  br? 
Jordan  and  the  Palestinians  into  dire 
negotiations  with  Israel  to  decide  thf 
future  of  the  West  Bank  and  the  Ga: 
Strip.  It  is  a  fair  and  balanced  propel 
which  has  its  roots  in  the  Camp  Dav 
accords  and  UN  Security  Council 
Resolutions  242  and  338,  which  have 


Department  of  State  Bull  II 


THE  SECRETARY 


?n  the  bases  of  all  our  peace 
jlomacy  in  the  Middle  East  over  the 
|t  15  years.  It  derives,  as  well,  from 
|-  tragedy  of  Lebanon,  as  a  signal  of 
I  determination  to  address  one  of  the 
jlerlying  problems  of  the  Arab-Israeli 
iflict  which  had  had  a  spillover  effect 
JLebanon. 
I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  tell  you, 
;r  my  trip  to  the  Middle  East,  that 
friends  in  the  Arab  world  are  still 
portive  of  President  Reagan's  ini- 
ive  and  are  actively  working  to  put 
ether  a  positive  Arab  response.  In 
view,  Arab  support  for  King  Hus- 
1  to  step  forward  as  interlocutor  on 
Palestinian  question  would  create 
best  possibility  for  a  fruitful  negotia- 
i.  I  am  confident  that  Israel  would 
3ond  positively  to  such  a  step,  despite 
negative  reaction  to  the  President's 
iative  last  September. 
The  fate  of  the  Palestinians  living  in 
I  West  Bank  and  Gaza  is  both  a 
Itical  problem  and  a  humanitarian 
blem  that  cries  out  for  the  concerned 
ntion  of  all  people  of  good  will.  A 
ticular  responsibility  rests  now  with 
Arabs,  who  would  do  a  grave 
ervice  to  the  Palestinian  people  if 
'  miss  this  precious  opportunity  to 
n  a  negotiating  process.  Only 
i'Ugh  a  negotiating  process  can  the 
sstinian  people  hope  to  achieve  their 
:imate  rights  and  their  just  re- 
ements.  As  Egypt  and  Lebanon 
i  shown,  negotiation  works;  violence 
rejectionism  get  nowhere. 
We  have  only  made  a  beginning,  but 
an  important  beginning.  President 
gan,  I  know,  is  determined  to  con- 
le  his  efforts  to  carry  the  Lebanese 
iDtiations,  and  the  peace  process,  for- 
d. 

There  is  no  more  noble  enterprise 
3ur  country  to  be  engaged  in.  Here 
istrategic  concerns  and  our  moral 
|:erns  coincide;  our  tradition  of 
jership  and  our  hopes  for  the  future 
it  in  the  same  direction.  It  is  a  bipar- 
n  effort  and  an  example  of  what  this 
jitry  can  accomplish  when  Americans 
'United. 

So,  even  though  difficult  days  and 
ks  and  months  lie  ahead,  I  look  to 
future  with  confidence. 


The  U.S.  and  the  Developing  World: 
Our  Joint  Stake  in  the  World  Economy 


Press  release  184. 


Secretary  Shultz's  address  before  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association  in  New  York 
on  May  26,  1983.^ 

More  than  three-quarters  of  the  world's 
population  live  in  what  we  call  the 
developing  world.  For  all  our  preoccupa- 
tions with  the  problems  of  the  Atlantic 
alliance,  U.S. -Soviet  relationship,  or  the 
Middle  East,  much  of  the  world's  future 
is  being  shaped  by  what  happens  in 
those  hundred-odd  nations  embracing 
the  broad  majority  of  humanity. 

Most  of  the  news  that  Americans 
see  or  read  or  hear  about  the  developing 
world  seems  to  concern  political  turmoil, 
debt  problems,  the  need  for  aid,  or  other 
difficulties.  These  day-to-day  events— 
which  do  not  give  a  complete  or  ac- 
curate picture— are  only  surface 
manifestations  of  some  very  fundamen- 
tal changes  taking  place  on  our  planet. 
The  evolution  of  the  developing  coun- 
tries and  the  problems  they  encounter 
challenge  much  of  our  conventional 
thinking  about  both  political  and 
economic  development.  And  these  events 
and  trends  in  the  developing  world  af- 
fect our  own  lives  more  directly  than 
most  of  us  realize. 

The  importance  of  development  is 
not  only  economic  but  also  political.  The 
challenge  is  not  so  much  to  our  re- 
sources as  to  our  political  insight  into 
the  evolution  of  traditional  societies  in 
the  modern  age.  The  broader  problem  is 
not  simply  one  of  economic  advance  but 
of  international  order. 

Through  all  of  its  history,  the  United 
States  has  championed  the  cause  of  self- 
determination  of  peoples  and  national  in- 
dependence from  colonial  rule.  We  can 
be  proud  of  the  role  our  country  has 
played  in  helping  other  peoples  achieve 
independence  and  the  opportunities  for 
freedom  that  we  have  enjoyed.  Since  the 
Second  World  War,  the  world  has 
undergone  a  vast  transformation  as 
more  than  100  new  nations  have  come 
into  being.  An  international  system  that 
had  been  centered  on  Europe  for  cen- 
turies, and  that  regarded  all  non- 
European  areas  as  peripheral  or  as 
objects  of  rivalry,  has  become  in  an 
amazingly  short  span  of  time  a  truly 
global  arena  of  sovereign  states. 

In  an  era  of  technological  advance, 
instant  communications,  and  giant 
strides  in  public  health,  we  have  before 
us  the  prospect  of  a  world  of  spreading 


opportunity  and  prosperity.  But  in  an 
era  of  nuclear  weapons,  political  in- 
stability, and  aggressive  ideologies,  we 
simultaneously  face  the  possibility  of 
spreading  anarchy  and  conflict.  Which 
prospect  will  dominate  the  future?  That 
depends  on  what  choices  are  made  now, 
by  both  the  industrial  and  the  developing 
nations— choices  about  the  international 
order  and  choices  about  national  policies. 
The  vision  and  statesmanship  of  nations 
and  leaders  will  be  tested  as  never 
before. 

The  United  States  shares  the  hope 
of  the  world's  peoples  that  mankind  will 
choose  the  first  path— toward  a  world  of 
progress,  freedom,  and  peace.  This  is 
the  kind  of  world  that  Americans  hope 
to  see  in  the  remainder  of  this  century 
and  in  the  next.  We  are  prepared  to  in- 
vest our  fair  share  of  effort  and 
resources  to  help  bring  it  about.  In  the 
pursuit  of  that  goal,  economic  develop- 
ment will  play  a  central  part.  So  I  would 
like  to  share  with  you  today  some 
thoughts  about  the  development  proc- 
ess—first its  political,  then  its  economic 
dimension.  I  will  describe  the  policies  by 
which  this  country  is  carrying  out  its 
commitment  to  progress,  freedom,  and 
peace  in  the  developing  world. 

Political  Evolution  and 
Economic  Development 

We  have  enough  experience  now  to  see 
that  economic  development  is  a  complex 
process  with  many  pitfalls  and  far- 
reaching  implications.  There  used  to  be 
a  naive  assumption  that  economic  ad- 
vance brought  political  stability  almost 
automatically.  Perhaps  we  were  extra- 
polating too  much  from  the  success  of 
the  Marshall  Plan,  in  which  a  massive 
influx  of  investment  helped  reinvigorate 
democracy  and  stability  in  Western 
Europe.  It  is  a  false  analogy,  however, 
when  the  same  results  are  expected 
from  economic  development  in  new  na- 
tions struggling  for  a  sense  of  political 
identity,  or  starting  from  a  much  lower 
level  of  economic  advancement,  or  just 
beginning  the  quest  for  forms  of  popular 
g-overnment.  And  we  have  seen— par- 
ticularly in  the  Iranian  case— how  too 
rapid  modernization  imposed  from  the 
top  down  can  create  such  social  disloca- 
tions and  tensions  that  the  result  is 


57 


THE  SECRETARY 


political  upheaval,  not  political  stability. 

Instability  may  well  be  part  of  the 
turbulent  course  of  political  and 
economic  development  in  the  Third 
World— just  as  it  was,  indeed,  through 
the  industrial  revolution  in  what  is  now 
the  advanced  Western  world.  Growing 
consciousness  and  social  participation  in 
a  traditional  society  may  create  new 
claimants  on  both  economic  resources 
and  political  power  faster  than  new  and 
untested  political  structures  can  accom- 
modate them.  The  formation  of  free 
economic  and  social  organizations,  such 
as  unions  and  cooperatives,  may  lag  or 
be  resisted,  yet  these  perform  a  crucial 
representative  function  in  the  kind  of 
pluralistic  society  that  offers  the  best 
hope  for  progress.  The  development  of 
free,  broad-based  political  parties  and 
legislative  institutions  for  the  peaceful 
brokering  of  competitive  claims  may  also 
lag.  Too  often,  doctrines  of  economic 
determinism  take  hold  and  serve  as  an 
excuse  for  centralized  state  power.  The 
result  is  suppression  of  the  very  per- 
sonal liberties,  energies,  and  talents 
which  are  essential  for  economic  ad- 
vance. 

The  real  meaning  of  development, 
after  all,  is  what  it  means  for  the  well- 
being,  aspirations,  dignity,  and  achieve- 
ment of  each  individual.  The  process  of 
development  is  fulfilled  when  every  man 
and  woman  in  a  society  has  the  oppor- 
tunity to  realize  his  or  her  fullest  poten- 
tial. We  have  seen  in  our  own  history 
how  a  free  people,  in  a  free  market, 
create  prosperity  by  their  effort  and 
imagination.  But  a  society  develops  also 
by  the  free  association  of  individuals, 
working  together  in  voluntary  and  pro- 
ductive endeavors  of  every  kind. 
Government  has  an  undeniable  role— as 
the  accountable  servant  of  the  people;  as 
the  provider  of  public  safety  and  the 
common  defense;  as  the  guarantor  of 
human  rights,  due  process  of  law,  and 
equal  opportunity. 

This  emerged  in  the  West  after  a 
process  of  evolution  that  took  centuries. 
In  the  developing  world,  a  heroic  effort 
is  being  made  to  compress  it  into  a 
much  shorter  span  of  time.  There  are 
many  success  stories  of  political  and 
economic  development— in  Latin 
America  or  in  East  and  Southeast  Asia. 
Many  of  these  strong  societies  are  now 
anchors  of  stability  and  poles  of  growth 
for  their  region.  The  ASEAN  [Associa- 
tion of  South  East  Asian  Nations]  coun- 
tries of  Southeast  Asia  are  a  good  exam- 
ple. Many  countries  in  East  Asia  are 
among  the  fastest  growing  economies  in 
the  world.  The  rapidly  industrializing 


countries  of  Asia  and  Latin  America  in- 
clude some  of  our  most  important  part- 
ners in  safeguarding  regional  security 
and  expanding  economic  prosperity. 

The  success  of  this  increasing 
number  of  high-growth,  stable  societies 
in  the  developing  world  is  instructive. 
While  governments  have  played  impor- 
tant facilitating  roles,  the  developing 
countries  that  have  grown  fastest  over 
the  last  decade  have  been  those  that 
opened  themselves  up  to  international 
trade  and  investment;  thereby,  they  ob- 
tain the  benefits  of  trade  with  other 
countries  and  of  allowing  the  market  to 
ensure  the  most  efficient  allocation  of 
domestic  resources.  It  is  no  coincidence 
that  systems  which  give  the  freest  rein 
to  economic  activity  are  the  most  suc- 
cessful in  liberating  the  talents, 
energies,  and  productivity  of  their 
people. 

There  have  been  setbacks,  as  well  as 
successes,  in  the  developing  world.  Many 
countries  in  Africa  are  in  difficulty.  In 
some  areas  such  as  Central  America,  the 
effort  to  establish  democratic  institu- 
tions and  economic  reform  is  being  op- 
posed by  radical  forces,  supported  by 
Cuba  and  the  Soviet  Union,  which  seek 
to  exploit  economic  hardship  for  the 
ulterior  motive  of  establishing  new 
forms  of  tyranny  in  place  of  the  old.  Yet 
the  long-term  course  of  political  develop- 
ment in  Latin  America  offers  more 
grounds  for  hope  than  for  discourage- 
ment. 

The  peoples  of  these  vibrant,  devel- 
oping countries  want,  first  of  all,  a  voice 
in  determining  their  own  destiny. 
Therefore,  they  distrust  ideologies  and 
foreign  forces  that  prescribe  totalitarian 
rule  and  are  notorious  failures  at  pro- 
viding economic  advance.  Our  own 
democratic  system,  in  contrast,  em- 
bodies the  values  of  freedom  and  prog- 
ress, which  the  peoples  of  the  developing 
countries  see  as  not  only  relevant  but 
sympathetic  to  their  own  aspirations. 

Therefore,  our  policies  toward  the 
developing  world  must  include  a  range 
of  means  and  a  depth  of  understanding. 

•  We  must  offer  patient  support  for 
social  and  economic  reform  and  for  the 
strengthening  of  free  political,  economic, 
and  social  institutions. 

•  Sometimes  we  must  offer  security 
assistance  to  help  ensure  that  the  proc- 
ess of  democratic  evolution  is  not 
disrupted  or  overwhelmed  by  armed 
minorities  backed  by  external  powers 
and  alien  ideologies. 

•  And  we  must  continue  our  proud 
record  of  leadership  in  international 


trade  and  financial  cooperation  to  pro 
mote  economic  development  and  prog; 
ress  in  the  developing  world. 

Our  Joint  Stake  in  the 
World  Economy 

Now  just  let  me  say  some  things  aboi 
our  joint  stake  in  the  world  economy, ' 
because  here,  again,  I  think  we  see  tV 
transformation  that  I  don't  think  peo]  ■ 
quite  appreciate.  The  American  efforll 
important,  first  of  all,  for  the  reasons! 
have  already  mentioned— in  helping  t! 
shape  a  peaceful  and  secure  interna-  ' 
tional  order  for  the  remainder  of  this  ' 
century  and  beyond.  But  it  is  also  im] ' 
tant,  in  the  here  and  now,  because  th ' 
developing  countries  are  already  a  m; ! 
factor  in  the  world's  economic  health.  ( 
We  have  a  significant  stake  in  their  | 
progress.  This  has  become  increasing  j 
evident  in  the  last  decade.  ' 

In  the  1970s,  despite  the  recessiol 
and  the  oil  shocks,  the  developing  coi ' 
tries  were  the  fastest  growing  sector  I 
the  world  economy.  Their  strong  per ' 
formance  reinforced  the  expansion  oi 
world  trade  in  the  1970s  and  provide  ( 
the  leading  edge  of  world  growth.  Th 
could  be  the  case  in  the  second  half  o ' 
the  1980s  as  well.  ' 

•  The  developing  countries  grew 
the  rate  of  over  5%  during  the  1970s 
compared  to  just  over  3%  for  the  in- 
dustrial countries. 

•  The  developing  countries  ac- 
counted for  most  of  the  growth  in 
American  exports  from  1975-80,  andi 
thus  a  significant  share  of  the  new  jo 
created  in  the  United  States  in  manu ! 
turing  firms  during  this  period.  j 

•  One  out  of  every  five  acres  of 
America's  farms  produced  for  export 
developing  countries. 

During  the  most  recent  recession 
have  seen  that  the  same  linkage  worl 
in  reverse. 

•  About  half  the  decline  in  our  g! 
national  product  (GNP)  last  year  cam 
from  deterioration  in  our  internationi 
accounts,  particularly  our  exports  to 
developing  countries. 

•  Our  exports  to  Latin  America  ' 
declined  by  22%,  as  the  debt  crisis 
resulted  in  a  harsh  retrenchment  in  t 
second  half  of  the  year.  [ 

•  Without  the  decline  in  our  ex-  ji 
ports,  our  GNP  would  actually  have  I 
risen  by  2%  in  the  last  half  of  1982  irj] 
stead  of  falling  by  a  fraction  of  1%.    || 

•  Stagnation  in  world  trade  has  \, 


Department  of  State  Bullff 


THE  SECRETARY 


1  a  si^'nificant  part  of  the  drag  on 
and  the  world's,  recovery. 

This  intimate  link  between  the 
loping  countries'  and  our  own  pros- 
y  is  financial  as  well  as  commercial, 
lingering  crisis  of  some  heavily  in- 
led  developing  countries  can  hurt  our 
financial  institutions  if  not  handled 
.ently. 

he  historic  lesson  here  is  a  simple 
Today  the  effective  functioning  of 
■lobal  trade  and  financial  system 
nds  heavily  on  the  participation, 
health,  of  the  developing  countries 
ell  as  of  the  industrial  countries, 
reality  of  mutual  interest  between 
^lorthern  and  Southern  Hemispheres 
t  at  all  reflected  in  either  the  doc- 
ire  Third  World  theory  of 
itating  dependency  or  the  aid 
•'s  obsolete  sense  of  patronage. 
e  is  now  a  relationship  of  mutual 
Dnsibiiity.  Our  common  task  is  to 

2  this  link  a  spur  to  growth  in  both 
)ns,  instead  of  an  entanglement  of 
lal  decline. 


Challenge  of  Development  Today 

(ident  Reagan  set  forth  at  Cancun 
Bragmatic,  constructive,  and 
CiTative  spirit  with  which  the  United 
!'s  af'proaches  the  common  challenge 

(minting  development.  A  positive 
ili-Si.uth  dialogue  should  now  aim  at 
eapid  restoration  of  economic 
:  th.  That's  the  name  of  the  game 
;  new— economic  growth.  Toward 
3end  there  is  much  to  be  done,  and 
11  that  can  be  done. 

;i(ilial  recession  in  the  last  2  years 
Slit  the  developing  countries  with  ex- 
cimal  tVirce.  World  trade,  which  ac- 
„ts  I'.ir  20%  of  the  income  of  develop- 
;oniitries,  stagnated  in  1981  and 
cied  m  1982  for  the  first  time  in  25 
35.  Governments  under  pressure  in 
tthe  industrial  and  the  developing 
lis  adiipted  austerity  programs  and 
frt  restrictions.  Many  of  the  poorest 
\loping  countries  have  been 
vstated  by  declining  commodity 
its,  which  fell  by  20%  from  1980  to 
6.  In  this  environment,  the  develop- 
fountries  could  not  hope  to  achieve 
sind  of  export  growth  that  fueled 
i  rapid  advance  in  the  1970s. 

ieveral  large  countries  in  Latin 
ilrica  have  also  seen  their  progress 
yd  by  a  burden  of  debt  service  made 
Ipectedly  heavy  by  stagnant  world 
I  and  declining  new  lending  from 
ijaercial  banks.  By  austerity 
3ures,  and  by  emergency  interna- 
t1  financing  from  the  International 


Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  first  steps  have 
been  taken  to  stabilize  the  financial 
situations  of  specific  countries.  But 
austerity  alone  cannot  be  a  sufficient 
solution  when  so  many  countries  are  in 
trouble.  If  everyone  practices  austerity 
and  cuts  imports,  this  only  chokes  world 
trade  and  spreads  the  hardship  further. 
The  ultimate  objective  must  be  growth, 
not  austerity. 

A  strategy  for  restoring  grovrth  in 
the  developing  countries  will  require 
sustained,  concerted  action  by  the  inter- 
national community,  working  with  an  at- 
titude of  joint  responsibility.  It  will  re- 
quire, in  particular,  determined  effort  by 
many  of  the  developing  countries  them- 
selves, including  in  many  cases  difficult 
readjustment  and  discipline  in  domestic 
policies. 

The  United  States,  for  its  part,  is 
leading  the  way  to  long-term  global 
economic  recovery— the  single  most  im- 
portant thing  we  can  do  to  restore 
growth  in  the  developing  world.  In  the 
United  States,  inflation  and  interest 
rates  are  down,  the  leading  economic  in- 
dicators are  up,  and  investor  and  con- 
sumer confidence  are  returning.  Growth 
with  low  inflation  has  now  also  resumed 
in  Japan,  Germany,  Britain,  and  others, 
which  together  with  the  United  States 
account  for  about  three-quarters  of  the 
production  of  the  industrial  countries. 
The  challenge  is  now  to  turn  this  revival 
quickly  into  a  true  global  recovery  and 
sustained  growth  for  the  rest  of  the 
1980s. 

Expanding  Trade 

World  trade  is  the  key  to  this  process. 
In  the  near  term,  trade  is  the  transmis- 
sion belt  by  which  recovery  in  the  North 
will  produce  faster  growth  in  the  South. 
Acceleration  of  growth  in  the  industrial 
nations  from  about  2%  this  year  to  4% 
in  the  mid-1980s  would  by  itself  add  be- 
tween $20  and  $25  billion  annually  to 
the  export  earnings  of  non-oil  developing 
countries. 

In  the  longer  term,  trade  is  the 
primary  source  of  external  resources 
and  impetus  to  growth  for  all  countries. 
In  1980,  the  developing  countries'  export 
earnings  of  about  $580  billion  amounted 
to  17  times  their  net  inflow  of  resources 
from  foreign  aid.  I  say  that,  not  to 
knock  foreign  aid  but  just  to  put 
perspective  on  what's  going  on  here. 

"This  is  what  underlies  President 
Reagan's  sustained  and  courageous 


defense  of  free  trade.  As  he  said  in 
March  in  San  Francisco: 

The  United  States  will  carry  the  banner 
for  free  trade  and  a  responsible  financial 
system.  ...  In  trade  with  developing  coun- 
tries .  .  .  tariffs  and  quotas  still  play  a  signifi- 
cant role.  Here,  the  task  is  to  find  a  way  to 
integrate  the  developing  countries  into  the 
liberal  trading  order  of  lower  tariffs  and 
dismantled  quotas.  They  must  come  to  ex- 
perience the  full  benefits  and  responsibilities 
of  the  system  that  has  produced  unprece- 
dented prosperity  among  the  industrial  coun- 
tries. 

The  United  States  cannot  accomplish 
this  alone.  Only  in  collaboration  with 
other  nations  can  we  maintain  an  open 
international  trading  system  for  all,  but 
of  particular  benefit  for  the  developing 
countries,  over  the  rest  of  this  century. 
It  is  truly  encouraging  that  during  the 
recent  recession,  industrialized  coun- 
tries, for  the  most  part,  have  resisted 
the  temptation  to  resort  to  new 
measures  of  protectionism.  As  we  come 
out  of  recession,  it  is  time  to  move 
ahead  on  new  measures  of  trade 
liberalization,  with  special  attention  to 
the  problems  of  the  developing  nations. 

The  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs 
and  Trade  (GATT)  was  the  framework 
for  the  reciprocal  lowering  of  tariffs 
which  helped  fuel  the  unprecedented  ex- 
pansion of  world  trade  in  the  postwar 
period.  The  GATT,  with  its  evolving 
rules  on  liberalization  of  nontariff  trade 
measures,  is  the  key  to  our  ability  to 
maintain  the  free  trading  system  so  that 
it  can  be  an  engine  of  the  coming 
recovery.  Preparations  should  begin  now 
for  a  new  effort  of  trade  liberalization  in 
the  GATT,  with  special,  urgent  emphasis 
on  reducing  barriers  to  North-South 
trade  through  mutual  exchange  of  con- 
cessions. The  GATT  itself  should  be 
strengthened  so  it  can  not  only 
spearhead  new  liberalization  but  also 
bring  greater  discipline  to  the  so-called 
safeguard  procedures  which  may  other- 
wise frustrate  developing  countries'  ex- 
panding access  to  markets  in  the  in- 
dustrialized world.  In  the  same  vein,  the 
GATT  needs  to  improve  the  mechanisms 
for  dispute  settlement  and  the  ground 
rules  for  agricultural  trade.  No  more 
tender  subject  exists  than  that,  as  you 
know. 

Mutual  liberalization  of  North-South 
trade  is  the  most  effective  route  to  the 
broad  and  open  markets  that  developing 
countries  need  to  exploit  their  natural 
competitive  strengths.  Regional  liberal- 
ization of  trade  among  developing  coun- 
tries is  beneficial  as  well. 

In  the  United  States,  we  need  to 


THE  SECRETARY 


renew  and  improve  our  system  of 
generalized  trade  preferences  for  those 
developing  countries  that  can  benefit 
most  from  such  preferential  treatment. 
We  remain  committed  to  seeking 
prompt  congressional  approval  for  the 
Caribbean  Basin  Initiative.  And  I  might 
say  that  I'm  pretty  optimistic;  we're 
finally  going  to  get  that  this  year.  This 
is  an  innovative  package  of  measures  ad- 
dressed to  the  unique  development  prob- 
lems of  the  small  economies  of  this 
region,  including  an  integrated  set  of 
trade  preferences,  investment  incen- 
tives, and  aid. 

Many  developing  countries  have  suf- 
fered during  the  recession  because  of 
the  steep  decline  in  the  price  of  primary 
commodities  they  export.  Recovery  in 
the  industrial  economies  should  help 
remedy  this  problem.  Commodity  agree- 
ments—a device  often  suggested— have 
not  been  successful,  by  and  large,  in 
ameliorating  wide  swings  in  prices  of 
these  commodities  and  can  themselves 
contribute  to  over-  or  under-investment 
in  production.  More  effective  have  been 
arrangements  to  provide  temporary 
financing  to  commodity-producing  coun- 
tries when  their  export  earnings  fall. 
The  IMF  has  a  compensatory  financing 
facility  of  this  kind.  We  should  explore 
whether  improvements  in  its  operation 
are  desirable  rather  than  create  new  in- 
stitutions with  overlapping  purposes. 

Financial  Support 

Like  the  GATT  in  the  trade  area,  inter- 
national institutions  exist  to  foster 
cooperation  in  providing  essential  finan- 
cial support  to  the  developing  countries. 
The  IMF,  with  its  resources  expanded 
by  the  new  increase  in  quotas,  will  be 
strengthened  in  its  capacity  to  assist  the 
balance-of-payments  adjustments  of 
heavily  indebted  developing  countries. 
The  World  Bank  has  a  large  capital  base 
to  support  its  essential  role  of  in- 
termediation between  international 
capital  markets  and  developing  countries 
with  limited  access  to  those  markets. 
These  institutions  are  proving  in  the  cur- 
rent period  of  difficulty  that  they  are 
vital  instruments  for  mitigating  the 
problems  of  the  present  emergency  and 
facilitating  global  recovery. 

The  right  approach  to  the  financial 
problems  of  heavily  indebted  developing 
countries  is  the  one  pursued  consistently 
in  the  international  financial  negotia- 
tions over  the  past  12  months.  (And  I 
don't  think  people  quite  appreciate 
that,  in  their  quiet  way,  Jacques  De 
Larosiere,  Tom  Clausen,  our  own 


Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and  Chairman 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  and  their 
counterparts  around  the  world  have 
done  a  terrific  job.  They  really  have.) 
The  objective  must  be  to  preserve  these 
countries'  creditworthiness  and  their 
ability  to  import  new  private  capital  to 
finance  growth  over  the  coming  years. 
There  is  no  point  in  more  austerity  than 
is  necessary  for  this  objective. 
Sometimes  you  get  the  feeling  people 
like  austerity.  There's  no  point  in  it  ex- 
cept what  you  really  have  to  do.  The 
name  of  the  game  is  expansion.  With 
equal  logic,  any  "quick  fix"  which  im- 
pairs these  countries'  future  ability  to 
import  capital  is  a  very  expensive  "fix" 
for  all  parties. 

More  emergency  assistance  may  be 
needed  in  some  cases.  There  will  be  a 
continuing  role  for  official  financing  in 
the  transitional  period  until  the  debtor 
countries'  own  adjustment  and  expand- 
ing world  trade  reduce  the  relative 
burden  of  debt  service.  In  coming  years, 
the  same  expansion  of  trade  oppor- 
tunities we  seek  for  all  developing  coun- 
tries will  be  especially  critical  if  the 
heavily  indebted  countries  are  to  revive 
the  high  growth  they  achieved  in  the 
1970s. 


Investment,  Savings,  and  Aid 

The  most  important  engine  of  growth 
for  developing  countries  is  not  external 
aid  but  investment  financed  by  domestic 
savings.  This  is  true  for  most  developing 
countries,  including  the  largest  recipi- 
ents of  aid.  India,  for  example,  last  year 
achieved  gross  investment  equivalent  to 
25%  of  its  GNP— with  91%  of  that  in- 
vestment financed  by  domestic  savings. 
On  average,  the  developing  countries 
devote  about  one-quarter  of  their  GNP 
to  investment,  with  80%  of  that  invest- 
ment financed  by  domestic  savings. 
Thus,  adequate  incentives  for  people  to 
produce,  save,  and  invest— as  well  as 
reliance  on  market  prices  to  allocate 
scarce  capital  most  effectively— are  the 
heart  of  an  effective  strategy  for  sus- 
tained growth.  I  make  that  point,  in 
part,  to  show  the  importance  of 
domestic  savings  as  the  basis  for  invest- 
ment and,  also,  to  tip  my  hat  to  the 
countries  involved  who  are  doing  it. 

The  lesson  is  that  aid  should  not  be 
seen  as  a  substitute  for  domestic  sav- 
ings, that  aid  becomes  less  important  as 
countries  grow,  and  that  sound  internal 
policies  are  crucial  to  making  the  best 
use  of  both  aid  and  domestic  savings. 


All  growth  everywhere  depends  c 
productive  investment;  all  investment 
depends  on  savings.  In  a  sense,  there 
a  pool  of  world  savings,  and  foreign  ; 
represents  a  political,  governmental  < 
traction  from  that  pool;  it  is  not  man 
that  comes  from  heaven.  But  aid  has 
proper,  important  role  in  developmer, 
that  is  to  provide  a  margin  of  invest- 
ment resources  to  supplement  domes, 
savings,  where  those  savings  have  • 
already  been  effectively  marshaled  b; 
sound  economic  policies  and  incentivt; 
or,  in  the  case  of  the  poorest  develop  | 
countries,  where  governments  have  1  j 
or  no  access  to  international  capital 
markets. 

The  economic  aid  program  of  thei 
United  States  has  increased  each  yea ; 
the  Reagan  Administration,  even  wh 
many  domestic  expenditures  have  be 
cut.  The  United  States  has  concentr?  f 
its  aid  increasingly  where  it  is  most  i 
needed— in  the  poorest  developing  cc.. 
tries.  Our  contributions  to  multilater  i 
development  banks  are  enough  to  su  | 
port  growth  of  their  lending  by  i 

14%-15%  per  year.  The  United  Stat, 
continues  to  be  the  largest  provider  ■ . 
official  development  aid— and  should  | 
be— and  over  two-thirds  of  our  aid  g  * 
to  the  poorest  countries. 

The  World  Bank's  International  i 
Development  Association  (IDA)  is  th  i 
primary  vehicle  for  channeling  aid  tc  | 
many  of  the  poorest  countries  in  Afr  ,- 
and  Asia.  Of  course,  we've  had  a  big 
struggle  in  fulfilling  our  pledges  to  I  ^ 
Therefore,  I  am  encourged  by  the  fa  i 
sighted  action  of  the  House  of  Repre.' 
tatives  yesterday  in  approving  for  th 
fiscal  year  the  full  amount  requested  ' 
the  Administration  toward  meeting!'' 
U.S.  commitment  to  the  IDA.  | 

President  Mitterand  of  France  hiji 
justifiably  urged  special  attention  to  jE. 
economic  crisis  that  now  engulfs  mu(| 
of  Africa,  posing  the  danger,  in  his  i 
words,  that  Africa  will  become  "the  1^ 
Continent  of  development."  Falling  Pi 
capita  food  production  and  low  prodii 
tivity  in  other  sectors,  indeed,  porter|, 
spreading  human  tragedy  and  prolonp 
turmoil  in  many  African  societies  un]|i. 
these  trends  are  reversed.  New  ap- 
proaches by  Africans  are  needed  to  6| 
courage  private  initiative  and  produc,' 
ty.  New  efforts  on  the  part  of  aid  dO|i 
are  needed  to  encourage  and  supper 
urgent  reform,  particularly  in 


Department  of  State  Bulli 


THE  SECRETARY 


culture.  There  is  much  to  be  gained 
uch  reforms  as  market  prices  for 
lers,  exchange  rates  that  encourage 
cultural  production,  and  elimination 
le  bias  against  agriculture  in 
estic  investment  and  credit. 
All  developing  countries  have  before 
1  the  opportunity  to  offer  a 
rable  environment  for  private  in- 
ment,  including  that  from  abroad, 
ate  direct  investment  from  abroad 
growth,  adds  know-how  and 
nology,  and  helps  open  foreign 
kets.  Such  investment  also  pays  for 
f  out  of  new  production,  instead  of 
)sing  a  fixed  repayment  schedule, 
direct  investment  in  developing 
[tries  grew  by  20%  annually  in  the 
nd  half  of  the  1970s.  It  could  grow 
similar  rate  again. 
Dne  way  to  expand  the  flow  of 
ite  investment  to  the  developing 
d  is  for  developed  and  developing 
itries  to  agree  upon  ground  rules 
establish  favorable  conditions  for  it 
the  long  term.  I  used  to  advocate 
there  should  be  a  GATT  for  invest- 
t,  but  it's  been  so  difficult  to  get 
■  arms  around  that,  that  I'm  now  on 
'ferent  kick.  Bilateral  tax  treaties 
help,  as  can  insurance  and  invest- 
t  agreements  as  worked  out  be- 
■n  the  United  States  and  a  growing 
ber  of  countries.  We're  pushing  in- 
Tient  agreements  these  days.  We 
d  ready,  as  well,  to  consider  a 
ilateral  insurance  of  investment,  as 
ested  by  the  President  of  the  World 
i,  and  urge  developing  countries  to 
y  this  approach. 

es  for  the  Future 

ie  are  some  of  the  challenges  to 
lopment  today  and  some  of  the 
edies  we  think  are  appropriate  and 
!tive.  An  objective  assessment  of  the 
lems  and  opportunities  we  face  to- 
should  inspire  growing  confidence 
we  are  on  the  right  course.  The 
very  which  is  at  hand  in  major  in- 
rial  countries  can  lead  the  way  to 
!il  recovery  through  a  revival  of 
'd  trade.  The  institutions  that  under- 
m  open  system  of  international 
!?  and  finance  are  strong  and  can  be 
ligthened  further  to  meet  the  excep- 
iil  pressures  of  this  period  and  carry 
jyond.  The  industrial  and  the 
loping  countries  can  achieve  much 
constructive  spirit  of  common 
iansibility,  strengthening  an  interna- 
il  system  that  nurtures  growth  for 


Next  month  is  the  sixth  UN  Con- 
ference on  Trade  and  Development,  to 
be  held  in  Belgrade.  The  United  States 
will  send  a  strong  delegation  and  will 
demonstrate  its  commitment  to  promote 
development.  No  one  conference  can 
resolve  all  the  issues,  but  each  can  move 
some  forward  and  help  chart  a  course 
for  the  future. 

The  United  States  approaches  these 


tasks  in  a  spirit  of  cooperation  and  with 
the  conviction  that  growth  is  within  the 
grasp  of  hard-working  societies,  working 
together.  The  reality  of  North  and  South 
is  now  that  all  of  us  are  in  one  boat.  We 
are  all  looking  for  a  rising  tide  and 
calmer  seas  to  speed  us  on  our 
course. 


iPress  release  195. 


Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Foreign  Policy  Association  Address 


Q.  There  are  a  couple  of  questions 
that  have  sort  of  anticipated  your 
speech  and  linking  it  to  Williamsburg. 
Specifically,  some  in  the  audience 
want  to  know  whether  the  question  of 
Third  World  economic  needs  will  come 
up  at  Williamsburg,  what  form  those 
discussions  might  take,  and, 
specifically,  whether  the  topic  of 
global  negotiations  might  arise? 

A.  I'm  sure  that  the  subject  will 
come  up,  and  the  important  discussions, 
of  course,  are  the  heads  of  state  discus- 
sions. The  way  this  particular  summit  is 
being  organized,  the  heads  of  state  are 
going  to  see  each  other  alone  quite 
often.  That  is,  it's  arranged  so  that  most 
of  their  time  is  going  to  be  spent  talking 
with  each  other  instead  of  being  sur- 
rounded by  staff  and  ministers  and  what 
not. 

I'm  sure  it  will  be  more  productive 
that  way,  and  I  know  that  a  number,  in- 
cluding President  Reagan,  have  this  sub- 
ject very  much  in  mind.  As  for  so-called 
"global  negotiations,"  to  my  mind  it's 
become  almost  a  slogan  rather  than 
some  practical  operational  thing  to  do. 
At  the  same  time  we  will  be  looking  for 
practical  ways,  operational  ways,  to  take 
steps  that  can  really  help  in  this  process 
I  have  outlined. 

Q.  From  what  you  know  about  the 
views  of  our  principal  allies,  do  you 
think  that  your  essentially  free  trade 
and  free  enterprise  approach  to  these 
problems  will  meet  sympathy  among 
the  allies,  especially  from  President 
Mitterrand? 

A.  Everybody  says  they're  for  free 
trade.  It  was  an  interesting  thing  to  me 


on  hearing  about  and  suffering  through 
by  the  cable— I  wasn't  there— the  GATT 
[General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and 
Trade]  Ministerial  meeting  last 
November — the  struggle  to  get  an  af- 
firmative statement  out  of  that  confer- 
ence about  free  trade,  and  to  contrast 
that  with  the  sentiment  at  the  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development]  meeting  a  couple  of 
weeks  ago  where  the  assertion  was 
made  that  we  should  not  only  stem  the 
tide  of  protection  but  try  to  remove  bar- 
riers that  have  grown  up.  There  is  that 
underlying  sentiment. 

Of  course,  there  are  pressures  in 
every  country  to  move  in  a  protectionist 
direction.  The  biggest  challenge  that  we 
face  on  this  score  stems  from  the  debate 
that  I  expect  will  be  very  much  a  part  of 
the  next  year's  discussion  about  this 
issue.  There  are  lots  of  people  nowadays 
who  are  trying  to  make  protection  in- 
tellectually legitimate.  It  is  very  impor- 
tant that  we  assert  to  ourselves,  in  a 
sense,  the  concept  of  open  trade  and 
why  it's  good  for  us,  that  it  helps  us. 
Then  when  we  do  something  that's 
against  that  conception,  we,  at  least, 
know  we  sinned.  We  have  the  idea  that 
that  is  bad,  and  we  ought  to  try  to  do 
something  about  it.  But  if  we  allow, 
through  this  debate,  the  notion  of  pro- 
tection combined  with  what's  called  in- 
dustrial policy  to  lead  us  into  a  kind  of 
an  autarchic  conception  of  our  economy, 
then  what  we  regard  as  sin  will  be  vir- 
tue. If  it's  virtue,  everybody  will  get  in 
on  it — [laughter]— and  our  economy  will 
go  down  the  drain.  This  is  an  important 
dimension  of  this  debate,  and  it's  impor- 
tant to  keep  your  principles  even  if  you 
can't  live  up  to  them  fully. 

Q.  One  or  two  questions  about 
Williamsburg.  Are  there  likely  to  be 
agreements  on  strengthening  the  yen 


THE  SECRETARY 


and  other  currencies  vis-a-vis  the 
dollar  and,  thereby,  reduce  the  com- 
petitive disadvantage  of  U.S.  exports? 

A.  I  don't  know  what  will  happen. 
There  hasn't  been  a  prenegotiated  com- 
munique for  people  to  argue  over,  and 
it's  going  to  start  with  a  discussion. 
Then  we're  going  to  engage  in  a  her- 
culean overnight  task  of  trying  to  write 
up  what  happened  instead  of  writing 
something  up  and  then  making  it  hap- 
pen, which  is  the  typical  pattern.  So  I 
can't  say  for  sure. 

But  let  me  make  a  comment  on  this 
question  of  the  dollar-yen  relationship, 
just  to  give  you  my  view  of  the  nature 
of  the  problem.  That  we  have  a  dollar- 
yen  relationship  that  leads  historically 
very  competitive  U.S.  companies  to  find 
that  they  can't  sell  competitively  in  third 
markets  has  suggested  to  them  that 
there's  something  wrong  with  the  rela- 
tionship and  that  there  is  overvaluation 
of  the  dollar.  I  think  that  has  asked  the 
wrong  question  and  has  led  us  into  a 
fruitless  discussion.  The  dollar  probably 
is  about  the  right  value.  It's  valued  by  a 
market  process.  What  has  happened  is 
that  the  market  process  involving  the 
dollar— large  as  our  economy  is— has 
become  more  heavily  affected  by  finan- 
cial flows  than  has  been  true  in  the  past. 
We  have  become  a  safe  haven  for 
money;  our  real  interest  rates  are  higher 
than  those  abroad,  and,  for  a  variety  of 
other  reasons,  there  are  big  financial 
flows  into  this  country.  That  strength- 
ened the  valid  market  value  of  the 
dollar. 

However,  if  you  said  to  yourself, 
"Suppose  there  were  no  financial  flows 
and  the  value  of  the  dollar  had  to  relate 
itself  to  trade  relationships?  Would  it  be 
the  same?"  Obviously  not.  The  value  of 
the  dollar  would  come  down,  and  that's 
what  our  exporters  and  importers  are 
feeling.  It's  a  problem. 

I  state  it  to  you  that  way,  not  feel- 
ing that  I  know  what  the  answer  is,  but 
I  know  that  is  the  problem,  not  trying  to 
manipulate  the  value  of  the  dollar,  which 
you  can't  do.  The  market's  too  strong 
for  you.  Usually  it's  the  other  way 
around.  People  in  audiences  pose  the 
problem  to  you  in  government.  You're 
supposed  to  have  the  answer.  I'm  turn- 
ing that  around.  I'm  telling  you  what  the 
problem  is  and  saying  to  you,  "Let's  all 
try  to  think  together  how  to  get  at  this 
problem."  I  think  it's  of  mammoth  im- 
portance and  quite  probably  the  financial 


flows  that  are  dominating  the  situation 
won't  persist  forever. 

Then  when  we  have  a  different  rela- 
tionship emerge,  we  will  have  done  a 
great  deal  of  damage  to  our  manufactur- 
ing capability,  and  that's  bad.  So  we 
have  to  have  some  foresight.  It's  a  tough 
problem.  We  are  feeling  a  Switzerland 
effect.  I  have  heard  people  say, 
"Switzerland  isn't  a  country;  it's  a  bank." 
It's  exchange  rate  is  dominated  by  finan- 
cial flows,  and,  of  course,  that  poses  ex- 
actly this  problem  for  its  manufacturers. 
They've  managed  to  work  it  out.  We'll 
have  to  figure  out  how. 

Q.  If  we  could  turn  to  the  Middle 
East  for  a  moment,  what  is  your  cur- 
rent view  as  to  when  or  whether  Syria 
will  agree  to  withdraw  its  forces  from 
Lebanon,  and  what  are  the  incentives 
Syria  really  has  to  do  so? 

A.  I  don't  know  the  answer  to  the 
first  question,  but  I  think  we  must  work 
to  bring  about  Syrian,  PLO,  and  other 
withdrawals  so  that  Lebanon  is  a  coun- 
try that  can  be  sovereign  over  itself  and 
reemerge  with  the  prosperity  and  the 
beauty  and  the  fun  that  was  once 
Lebanon. 

I  view  the  agreement  between  Israel 
and  Lebanon  for  Israeli  withdrawal  as  a 
necessary  first  step.  For  those  who  feel 
especially  strongly  that  Israel  should  get 
out,  there's  an  opportunity  there.  It's 
easy.  All  you  have  to  do  is  persuade  the 
Syrians  and  the  PLO  to  get  out. 

Is  that  possible?  Here's  the  situation 
as  I  see  it.  First  of  all,  the  Syrians  and 
the  PLO  have  repeatedly  said  that  they 
will  get  out  as  the  Israelis  get  out. 
They've  said  that  to  me— the  Syrians 
have,  anyway.  They've  said  it  to  the 
Lebanese  as  recently  as  the  nonaligned 
summit  in  New  Delhi,  in  the  Fez  Com- 
munique—a much  more  notable  docu- 
ment than  it's  given  credit  for.  It,  in  ef- 
fect, calls  for  this.  There  are  a  great 
many  statements  on  the  record  about 
what  should  happen. 

I  consider  that  Syria  is  an  independ- 
ent, proud  country,  and  it  will  decide  for 
itself  what  is  in  its  best  interests.  I  think 
it's  in  its  best  interests  to  have  a  pros- 
perous, stable  Lebanon  free  of  all 
foreign  forces  across  its  border,  rather 
than  a  partitioned  Lebanon,  which  is 
what  it  will  get  out  of  failure  to 
withdraw.  It  seems  to  me  that  is  a  fun- 
damental incentive  in  the  picture  that 
must  be  regarded  importantly. 


I  would  note,  also,  that  there  are| 
many  legitimate  questions  that  Syria  , 
raise  as  part  of  its  withdrawal  procesj 
security  issues  and  relationship  issue: 
with  the  Lebanese.  For  an  illustratio 
the  security  zone  set  up  in  the  Israeli 
Lebanese  agreement  has  a  common 
border  with  Syria,  so  there's  a  legitir| 
question  there  about  the  security  con 
cerns  along  that  stretch  of  border,  ai< 
so  on.  There  are  many  legitimate  qu(| 
tions  to  be  negotiated.  I  hope  that  th| 
Syrians  will  decide  to  do  that,  and  th, 
they'll  have  a  lot  of  work  to  do  with  j 
Lebanese.  We'll  be  glad  to  help.  We  • 
But  it's  basically  a  question  for  the  , 
Lebanese  and  the  Syrians  to  address  | 

I  would  call  your  attention  to  oni| 
thing  about  the  agreement.  It  was  ^ 
negotiated  by  a  very  strong-minded  , 
group  of  Lebanese.  I  sat  with  them  ) 
lots  and  lots  of  time.  The  chairman  c  ^ 
the  negotiating  committee  was  Prim  , 
Minister  Wazzan,  one  of  the  leading  | 
Muslims  in  the  country  and  a  very  fi  „ 
gentleman.  , 

The  agreement  was  agreed  to  bj  i 
government  in  its  proper  authority.  [, 
was  referred  to  the  Lebanese  Cabim 
and  endorsed  unanimously  and  taker , 
its  Parliament,  which  is  broad  based 
its  representation,  and  endorsed.  It : 
agreement  signed  by  Israel  and 
Lebanon,  and  it  has  the  full  endorse- , 
ment  of  the  Government  of  Lebanon  , 

Q.  Does  the  Soviet  Union  have  f 
role  to  play  in  bringing  stability  to 
area? 

A.  I  would  think  that  if  the  Sovii 
Union  gets  its  arms  out  of  not  only  t 
area  but  lots  of  other  areas,  and  get! 
troops  out  of  places  like  Afghanistan 
will  contribute  a  lot  of  stability— [ap- 
plause]-and  a  better  attitude  will  b( 
very  helpful.  We'll  welcome  it.  [Ap- 
plause] 

'Press  release  195A  of  June  6,  1983. 


Department  of  State  Bull4 


THE  SECRETARY 


I  Learning  From  Experience: 

e  Responsibility  of  the  Democracies 


tecretary  Shultz's  commencement  ad- 
;  at  Stanford  University,  Stanford, 
"omia,  on  June  12,  1983. 

fimencement"  says  that  something 
is  about  to  begin,  just  as  something 
ends.  Don't  worry  about  it  too 
i_there  are  lots  of  worthwhile 
rs  to  do  in  the  real  world,  and  you 
;till  have  some  fun  while  doing 
1.  But  if  someone  tells  you  it  means 
irp  transition  from  the  world  of 
ling  to  the  world  of  work,  don't 
ve  it.  The  transition  is  more  ap- 
nt  than  real. 

'he  week  before  last,  for  example,  I 
;ened  to  meet  with  an  extraordinary 
irican,  our  Ambassador  to  the 
iral  Republic  of  Germany,  Arthur 
Is.  He's  full  of  information  and  ideas 
t  Germany,  the  Atlantic  alliance, 
imerican  economy,  and  dozens  of 
subjects.  He's  lively  and  well  and 
f  the  future.  He's  79  years  old.  He 
■een  taking  German  lessons  over  the 
18  months.  He's  never  stopped 
ing. 

he  message  is  that  this  habit  of 
I  ing  is  a  habit  that  will  sustain  you 
•I  ghout  your  life.  An  old  saw  has  it 
i|  experience  itself  is  the  best  teacher, 
a  mention  this  now  that  you  have 
dy  paid  your  Stanford  tuition.  But 
!lld  saw  is  only  a  half  truth.  Just  as 
atists  say  that  luck  is  something  that 
is  to  the  prepared,  experience 
»es  only  those  capable  of  grasping 
leaning. 

o,  make  use  of  the  gifts  Stanford 
S'iven  you:  the  habits  of  careful 
» vation,  of  an  analytical  ordering  of 
IS  you  see,  of  living  with  ambiguity 
ii^aiting  for  the  evidence  before 
uing  conclusions— the  quality  of 
D  that  enables  you  truly  to  learn 
(J  experience. 

ic3hallenge  to  the  Democracies 

oties,  too,  must  learn  and 
irmber,  if  they  are  to  maintain  their 
a;y  and  confront  the  future.  In  re- 
n>veeks,  much  of  my  time  has  been 
V'ed  to  this  country's  relations  with 
iriosest  friends  and  allies,  the  great 
Hcratic  nations  of  the  Atlantic  com- 
i^  :y  and  Japan.  A  month  ago,  I  at- 
a'  d  a  meeting  in  Paris  of  the 
•giization  for  Economic  Cooperation 


and  Development  (OECD),  the  descend- 
ant of  the  international  agency  that,  35 
years  ago,  administered  the  Marshall 
Plan.  Two  weeks  ago,  I  joined  President 
Reagan  in  Williamsburg  at  the  economic 
summit  with  leaders  of  our  major  in- 
dustrial partners.  And  this  past  Thurs- 
day and  Friday,  in  Paris,  I  took  part  in 
the  semiannual  meeting  of  foreign 
ministers  of  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance. 

As  Dean  Acheson  said  about  the 
alliance,  this  unity  "is  not  an  improvisa- 
tion. It  is  a  statement  of  the  facts  and 
lessons  of  history." 

When  the  Atlantic  alliance  was 
founded  in  1949,  the  allies  showed  they 
had  learned  a  lesson  from  the  period 
before  World  War  II— when  the 
democracies  had  lacked  the  will  to  come 
together  in  the  face  of  danger,  when 
they  had  tried  to  evade  their  respon- 
sibility of  maintaining  their  strength  and 
permitted  a  dangerous  imbalance  of 
power  to  develop.  Eventually  they  were 
forced  to  respond,  but  it  was  at  a  cost  of 
millions  oi  lives  that  might  have  been 
spared  had  they  taken  bold  but  prudent 
action  beforehand.  When  the  Atlantic 
alliance  was  formed,  the  purpose  was  to 
prevent  war  by  ensuring  that  the  cohe- 
sion, strength,  and  collective  will  of  the 
democracies  would  never  again  be 
doubted  by  any  adversary. 

The  alliance  has  succeeded  in  pre- 
venting war.  Indeed,  since  its  formation, 
the  only  use  of  military  force  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  has  been  by  the 
Soviet  Union  against  its  own  "allies." 
But  experience  has  also  taught  that  the 
unity  of  the  free  nations  is  central  to  the 
achievement  of  any  of  our  goals:  peace, 
freedom,  security,  prosperity. 

I  want  to  say  a  few  words  now 
about  how  the  democracies  learning 
from  the  "facts  and  lessons  of  history" 
are  responding  today  to  a  new  set  of 
challenges— in  the  realms  of  political 
affairs,  economics,  and  security. 

Political  and  Moral  Unity 

The  first  lesson  is  that  what  the 
democracies  have  in  common  is  of  over- 
riding importance  to  us  and  to  others 
throughout  the  world.  Our  common 
heritage  gives  us  a  common  responsi- 
bility. 

American  students  graduating  today 
have  many  worries,  I  am  sure.  You  must 


be  anxious  about  your  careers  and  your 
future.  Yet  there  is  one  category  of 
worries  that,  1  daresay,  you  do  not  have. 
You  are  not  concerned  that  the  threat  of 
imprisonment  or  torture  hangs  over  you 
if  you  say  or  write  or  do  the  "wrong" 
thing.  You  have  no  fear  of  the 
policeman's  midnight  knock  on  the  door. 
Considering  how  few  democracies  there 
are  in  this  world,  what  we  have  in  com- 
mon with  our  allies  is,  therefore,  some- 
thing precious:  systems  of  constitutional, 
representative  government;  systems  of 
law  that  guarantee  basic  political  and 
civil  rights  and  freedoms;  open  economic 
systems  that  give  free  rein  to  individual 
talent  and  initiative. 

Most  alliances  in  history  have  not 
lasted.  The  fact  that  the  democracies 
have  been  held  together  by  ties  of 
political,  economic,  and  security  coopera- 
tion for  more  than  three  decades, 
through  many  profound  changes  in  in- 
ternational conditions,  is  proof,  I  believe, 
that  our  unity  of  shared  values  and  com- 
mon purpose  is  something  special. 

At  the  same  time,  the  grim  lesson  of 
history  should  warn  us  that  even  this 
great  coalition  will  not  survive  without 
conscious  effort  and  political  commit- 
ment. Those  statesmen  who  were  "pres- 
ent at  the  creation"  in  the  immediate 
postwar  period  showed  enormous  vision 
and  courage.  In  a  new  era  of  history,  it 
is  up  to  all  of  us  to  summon  the  same 
vision  and  courage  to  assure  that  it  sur- 
vives and  flourishes. 

Therefore,  it  is  of  enormous  impor- 
tance that  our  moral  unity  is  today 
being  so  effectively  translated  into 
political  unity.  It  is  important  that  old 
divisions  within  the  alliance  are  narrow- 
ing, as  shown  by  the  fact  that  the 
ministerial  meeting  I  just  attended  was 
held  in  Paris  for  the  first  time  in  17 
years.  It  is  important  that  the  alliance  is 
attractive  enough  for  new  countries  to 
want  to  join— the  original  12  now 
number  16.  It  is  important  that  the  24 
industrial  democracies  grouped  in  the 
OECD  have  worked  out  a  framework 
for  a  consensus  on  the  difficult  issue  of 
East-West  trade,  based  on  a  thoughtful 
analysis  of  the  balance  of  interests  in 
economic  relations  with  communist 
systems. 

Outside  the  formal  alliance  frame- 
work, British,  French,  and  Italian 
soldiers  now  stand  alongside  our 
Marines  protecting  Beirut.  Our  Atlantic 
allies,  Japan,  and  other  countries  around 
the  world  are  supporting  our  efforts  to 
promote  the  withdrawal  of  all  external 


63 


THE  SECRETARY 


forces  from  Lebanon.  Britain,  France, 
West  Germany,  Canada,  and  the  United 
States  are  working  together  as  a  "con- 
tact group"  to  help  reach  a  negotiated 
arrangement  for  the  independence  of 
Namibia.  And  all  the  diverse  Williams- 
burg summit  partners— including 
Japan— joined  in  an  impressive  joint 
statement  on  security  and  arms  control. 

Thus,  for  all  our  occasional  squab- 
bles, the  democratic  nations  have  not 
forgotten  the  paramount  importance  of 
the  values  and  interests  we  have  in 


common. 


Our  Common  Prosperity 

In  the  economic  dimension  as  well,  ex- 
perience teaches  that  cooperation  is 
essential.  We  now  live  in  an 
interdependent  world  in  which  each 
country's  well-being,  primarily  its  own 
responsibility  is,  nevertheless,  affected 
powerfully  by  the  health  of  the  global 
economy,  for  which  the  industrial 
democracies  bear  a  special  responsibility. 

In  the  1970s,  the  plagues  of  reces- 
sion, oil  shocks,  and  inflation  spread 
across  national  boundaries.  The  impact 
was  not  only  economic  but  political. 
There  was  great  concern  that  these  ills 
would  weaken  not  only  Western 
economies  but  the  cohesion  of  Western 
societies.  If  democratic  governments 
proved  unable  to  deal  effectively  with 


however,  from  the  experience  of  the 
1930s,  when  the  failure  of  cooperation 
gave  birth  to  widespread  protectionism, 
which  deepened  the  Great  Depression. 
This  time  the  free  nations  began  the 
practice  of  holding  yearly  economic  sum- 
mits and  intensified  their  cooperation  in 
many  other  forums,  multilateral  and 
bilateral.  So  we  can  hope  that  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  body  politic  will  prevail 
over  the  drive  of  special  interests  for 
protective  treatment. 

As  the  Williamsburg  declaration 
testifies:  "The  recession  has  put  our 
societies  through  a  severe  test,  but  they 
have  proved  resilient."  Rather  than 
economic  stagnation,  we  are  seeing  the 
impressive  capacity  of  open  economies 
to  regain  their  vitality.  Growth  with  low 
inflation  has  resumed  in  the  United 
States,  Japan,  West  Germany,  Britain, 
and  other  countries  which  together  ac- 
count for  about  three-quarters  of  the 
production  of  the  industrialized  world.  If 
we  have  truly  wrung  inflation  out  of  our 
system,  and  if  we  all  maintain  discipline 
in  our  national  policies,  the  world  could 
be  headed  for  a  long  period  of  sustained 
noninflationary  growth.  Those  are  big 
"ifs,"  I  know,  iDut  our  experience  should 
tell  us  that  the  job  can  be  done  and  that 
we  will  be  much  better  off  as  we  do  it. 

It  is  essential  that  we  resist  protec- 
tionism, which  could  hinder  this 
recovery.  The  Williamsburg  summit 


Most  alliances  in  history  have  not  lasted.  The 
fact  that  the  democracies  have  been  held  together 
by  ties  of  political,  economic,  and  security  coopera- 
tion for  more  than  three  decades,  through  many 
profound  changes  in  international  conditions,  is 
proof .  .  .  that  our  unity  of  shared  values  and  com- 
mon purpose  is  something  special. 


their  economic  problems,  societies  would 
be  under  continuing  strain,  social  divi- 
sions would  be  aggravated,  and  we 
might  have  faced  a  demoralizing  crisis  of 
democracy.  Increasing  resort  to  protec- 
tionism, choking  off  world  trade  and 
compounding  the  recession,  could  have 
undermined  relations  between  allies. 
These  political  divisions,  as  well  as 
budgetary  pressures,  threatened  to 
weaken  the  common  defense. 
The  free  nations  had  learned. 


partners  candidly  acknowledged  to  each 
other  that  every  country's  record  is  spot- 
ty on  this  score.  But  they  committed 
themselves  "to  halt  protectionism,  and 
as  recovery  proceeds  to  reverse  it  by 
dismantling  trade  barriers."  New  efforts 
of  trade  liberalization  would  be  especial- 
ly beneficial  to  the  developing  countries: 
in  1980,  their  export  earnings  of  $580 
billion  amounted  to  17  times  their  net 
receipts  from  foreign  aid. 


For  all  our  temporary  setbacks,  th 
free  economies  have  brought  about  sini 
1945  an  era  of  growth  and  prosperity  I 
unprecedented  in  history.  On  the  , 
Eastern  side  of  the  divided  Continent  I 
Europe,  economic  problems  are  ( 

systemic.  Inefficiences  are  built  in;  in- 1 
novation  is  inhibited;  effective  economi 
reforms  are  excluded  because  they  I 
would  weaken  the  grip  of  centralized  i 
Soviet  political  control.  In  contrast,  ou 
economic  difficulties  are  largely  prob- 
lems of  self-discipline,  of  better  manaji 
ment  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  to  i 
permit  the  inherent  vitality  of  the  fre(  I 
economic  system  to  show  its  power.  Tl 
weakness  of  Soviet-style  economies  is ) 
structural.  We  have  reason  for  con-  i 
fidence,  for  our  economic  future  is  in  j 
our  own  hajids. 

i 
Collective  Security 

Unfortunately,  the  Soviet  system  is  vij 
proficient  in  another  sphere:  the  ac-  | 
cumulation  of  military  power.  Therefc  [ 
security  must  remain  a  priority  area  <  | 
cooperation.  If  the  values  and  interest 
we  have  in  common  are  truly  preciou:  t 
us,  then  we  have  a  duty  to  defend  the  i 
The  summit  partners  at  Williamsburg  i 
made  very  clear  that  they  have  learneji 
this  lesson.  Let  me  read  to  you  from  j 
their  joint  statement:  j. 

As  leaders  of  our  seven  countries,  it  is '' 
our  first  duty  to  defend  the  freedom  and  I 
justice  on  which  our  democracies  are  basei  ! 
To  this  end,  we  shall  maintain  sufficient  I 
military  strength  to  deter  any  attack,  to  i 
counter  any  threat,  and  to  ensure  the  j 
peace.  .  .  .  The  security  of  our  countries  is  , 
divisible  and  must  be  approached  on  a  gloh, 
basis.  .  .  .  We  have  a  vision  of  a  world  in 
which  the  shadow  of  war  has  been  lifted  fi ' 
all  mankind,  and  we  are  determined  to  pui 
sue  that  vision.  ■ 

In  an  age  of  nuclear  weapons,  ma 
taining  collective  security  is  no  easy    j 


task.  "A  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  i 


must  never  be  fought."  That's  a  quote|. 
from  Ronald  Reagan.  Our  challenge  if| 
really  twofold:  we  must  both  defend  |. 
freedom  and  preserve  the  peace.  We  | , 
must  seek  to  advance  those  moral  valf. 
to  which  this  nation  and  its  allies  are  i , 
deeply  committed.  And  we  must  do  sck 
a  nuclear  age  in  which  a  global  war  , 
would  thoroughly  destroy  those  value: 
As  the  President  pointed  out  in  Los  | , 
Angeles  on  March  31,  our  task  is  "om|:, 
the  most  complex  moral  challenges  ev  ,, 
faced  by  any  generation."  , 


Department  of  State  Bulle.i 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  and  our  allies  have  agreed  for 
cades  on  a  twofold  strategy  for 
jeting  this  challenge.  First,  we  are 
mmitted  to  ensuring  the  military 
lance,  modernizing  our  forces,  and 
iintaining  vigilance.  Second,  we  are 
spared  for  and  committed  to  construc- 
e  dialogue  with  our  adversaries,  to  ad- 
ess  the  sources  of  tension,  resolve 
litical  conflicts,  and  reduce  the  burden 
d  danger  of  armaments. 

We  cannot  find  security  in  arms 
)ne.  We  are  willing  to  negotiate  dif- 
■ences,  but  we  cannot  do  so  effectively 
ive  are  weak  or  if  the  Soviet  Union 
lieves  it  can  achieve  its  objectives 
thout  any  compromise.  Therefore, 
th  these  tracks— strength  and 
)lomacy— are  essential. 

Unfortunately,  the  democratic  na- 
ns have  tended  to  neglect  their 
fense  responsibilities.  Some  serious 
Dblems  have  resulted  and  are  now 
Tiing  home  to  roost.  They  underlie 
my  of  the  current  controversies.  In 
;  1970s,  the  trauma  of  Vietnam 
ised  the  United  States  to  reduce  its 
ned  forces  and  reduce  real  defense 
jnding,  at  the  same  time  that  the 
net  Union,  in  the  wake  of  the  Cuban 
^sile  crisis,  was  embarked  on  a 
^ntless  buildup  in  all  categories  of 
itary  power— strategic,  conventional, 
1  naval.  Once  the  United  States  lost 
unquestioned  strategic  superiority 
•r  the  Soviet  Union,  NATO's 
I'ense— which  relies  on  the  commit- 
nt  of  American  strategic  power— 
:ame  much  more  complicated.  Yet 
'.TO  conventional  forces  continue  to 
linadequate.  Ironically,  NATO's  suc- 
s  in  keeping  the  peace  in  Europe  for 
;re  than  three  decades  leads  some  to 
I  e  peace  for  granted  and  to  forget  the 
cial  role  NATO  has  played  in 
;iranteeing  it. 

The  unprecedented  expansion  of 
l/iet  power  over  the  past  two  decades 
iinot  be  ignored  or  rationalized  away, 
iy  president,  any  administration, 
[uld  be  forced  to  respond.  We  have 
in  too  often  that  an  imbalance  of 
wer  is  an  invitation  to  conflict, 
erefore,  this  Administration,  and  our 

rs,  are  committed  to  maintenance  of 
military  balance  in  Europe  and 
Ibally. 

1  Surely  the  burden  of  proof  is  on 
ke  who  would  undo  the  present 
Itary  balance,  or  alter  it,  or  conduct 
!i;y  experiments  with  unilateral  conces- 
^is  without  genuinely  reducing  the 
»;ls  of  armaments  on  both  sides. 
,  At  the  same  time,  experience 
s:hes  that  a  balance  of  power,  though 


necessary,  is  not  sufficient.  Our  strength 
is  a  means  to  an  end;  it  is  the  secure 
foundation  for  our  effort  to  build  a 
safer,  more  peaceful,  and  more  hopeful 
world.  On  the  basis  of  strength,  the 
cohesion  of  our  alliance,  and  a  clear  view 
of  our  own  objectives,  we  must  never  be 
afraid  to  negotiate. 

This  is  our  attitude  to  arms  control. 
As  NATO  decided  in  December  1979,  for 
example,  we  intend  to  modernize  our 
intermediate-range  nuclear  forces  in 
Europe  to  counter  the  Soviet  deploy- 
ment of  over  1,000  nuclear  warheads  on 
their  new  intermediate-range  missiles 
(SS-20s).  But  we  are  also  willing  to 
eliminate  this  entire  category  of  nuclear 
weapons  from  the  face  of  the  earth;  and 
we  are  prepared,  as  an  interim  step,  to 
reduce  these  forces  to  any  equal, 
verifiable  level. 

If  negotiations  do  not  succeed, 
however,  we  must  be  prepared  to  deploy 
at  the  end  of  this  year  as  decided  in 
1979.  The  Soviet  Union  has  no  higher 
priority  goal  at  the  moment  than  to  in- 
timidate NATO  into  canceling  its 
deployments  unilaterally,  thereby  leav- 
ing the  Soviet  Union  with  its  massive 
monopoly  of  new  missiles  and  warheads 
already  in  place.  As  the  summit  partners 
made  unanimously  clear  at  Williams- 
burg, the  alliance  cannot,  and  will  not, 
permit  this  to  happen. 


At  Williamsburg  and  at  NATO,  we 
saw  an  impressive  consensus  on  security 
and  arms  control.  This  is  a  firm  ground 
for  confidence  that  war  will  be  deterred, 
that  stability  will  be  maintained,  and 
that  we  will  have  a  chance  at  least  to 
reach  reliable  agreements  making  the 
world  that  you  inherit  a  safer  place. 

Facing  the  Future 

The  final  lesson  I  want  to  leave  you  with 
is  this:  experience  teaches  us  that 
nothing  is  foreordained.  Nations,  like  in- 
dividuals, have  choices  to  make.  History 
is  filled  with  many  examples  of  nations 
and  individuals  that  made  the  wrong 
choices;  there  are  also  many  examples  of 
foresight,  wisdom,  and  courage. 

Democracies  are  sometimes  slow  to 
awaken  to  their  challenges.  But  once 
they  are  aroused,  no  force  on  earth  is 
more  powerful  than  free  peoples  work- 
ing together  with  clear  purpose  and 
determination. 

Therefore,  I  have  confidence  in  the 
future.  You  new  graduates,  with  your 
energy,  talent,  creativity,  represent  the 
promise  of  that  future.  Few  others  are 
so  fortunate.  Few  others  have  such  a 
responsibility. 

And  now,  my  congratulations  to 
you,  to  your  parents,  and  to  Stanford, 
and  my  very  best  wishes  to  all  of  you.  ■ 


U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  the 
Context  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 


Secretary  Shultz's  statement  before 
the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
on  June  15,  1983.'- 

I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  meet 
with  you  and  to  discuss  this  subject  of 
great  importance.  As  you  have  sug- 
gested, it  has  all  sorts  of  dimensions  to 
it  that  weigh  on  peoples'  minds;  it  is  a 
subject  that  I've  thought  about  a  great 
deal,  of  course.  The  President  has.  You 
might  say  that  the  President  has  taken 
the  time  not  only  to  talk  with  me  about 
this,  but  he  has  read  through  this 
testimony  and  made  a  few  suggestions, 
which  I  found  it  possible  to  accept,  and 
has  signed  off  on  the  testimony.  So  I 
feel  very  confident  in  saying  that  I  am 
speaking  not  only  for  myself  but  for  the 
President  in  this  statement. 

The  management  of  our  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union  is  of  utmost  im- 
portance. That  relationship  touches  vir- 
tually every  aspect  of  our  international 
concerns  and  objectives— political. 


economic,  and  mihtary— and  every  part 
of  the  world. 

We  must  defend  our  interests  and 
values  against  a  powerful  Soviet  adver- 
sary that  threatens  both.  And  we  must 
do  so  in  a  nuclear  age,  in  which  a  global 
war  would  even  more  thoroughly 
threaten  those  interests  and  values.  As 
President  Reagan  pointed  out  on 
March  31:  "We  must  both  defend  free- 
dom and  preserve  the  peace.  We  must 
stand  true  to  our  principles  and  our 
friends  while  preventing  a  holocaust."  It 
is,  as  he  said,  "one  of  the  most  complex 
moral  challenges  ever  faced  by  any 
generation." 

We  and  the  Soviets  have  sharply 
divergent  goals  and  philosophies  of 
political  and  moral  order;  these  differ- 
ences will  not  soon  go  away.  Any  other 
assumption  is  unrealistic.  At  the  same 
time,  we  have  a  fundamental  common 
interest  in  the  avoidance  of  war.  This 
common  interest  impels  us  to  work 


y1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


toward  a  relationship  between  our  na- 
tions that  can  lead  to  a  safer  world  for 
all  mankind. 

But  a  safer  world  will  not  be 
realized  through  good  will.  Our  hopes 
for  the  future  must  be  grounded  in  a 
realistic  assessment  of  the  challenges  we 
face  and  in  a  determined  effort  to  create 
the  conditions  that  will  make  their 
achievement  possible.  We  have  made  a 
start.  Every  postwar  American  presi- 
dent has  come  sooner  or  later  to  recog- 
nize that  peace  must  be  built  on 
strength;  President  Reagan  has  long 
recognized  this  reality.  In  the  past  2 
years  this  nation— the  President  in  part- 
nership with  the  Congress— has  made  a 
fundamental  commitment  to  restoring 
its  military  and  economic  power  and 
moral  and  spiritual  strength.  And  hav- 
ing begun  to  rebuild  our  strength,  we 
now  seek  to  engage  the  Soviet  leaders  in 
a  constructive  dialogue— a  dialogue 
through  which  we  hope  to  find  political 
solutions  to  outstanding  issues. 

This  is  the  central  goal  we  have  pur- 
sued since  the  outset  of  this  Administra- 
tion. We  do  not  want  to— and  need 
not— accept  as  inevitable  the  prospect  of 
endless,  dangerous  confrontation  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  For  if  we  do,  then 
many  of  the  great  goals  that  the  United 
States  pursues  in  world  affairs — peace, 
human  rights,  economic  progress,  na- 
tional independence— will  also  be  out  of 
reach.  We  can— and  must— do  better. 

With  that  introduction,  let  me  brief- 
ly lay  out  for  this  committee  what  I  see 
as  the  challenge  posed  by  the  Soviet 
Union's  international  behavior  in  recent 
years  and  the  strategy  which  that 
challenge  requires  of  us.  Then  I  would 
like  to  discuss  steps  this  Administration 
has  taken  to  implement  that  strategy. 
Finally,  I  will  focus  on  the  specific  issues 
that  make  up  the  agenda  for  U.S. -Soviet 
dialogue  and  negotiation. 

Together,  these  elements  constitute 
a  policy  that  takes  account  of  the  facts 
of  Soviet  power  and  of  Soviet  conduct, 
mobilizes  the  resources  needed  to  defend 
our  interests,  and  offers  an  agenda  for 
constructive  dialogue  to  resolve  concrete 
international  problems.  We  believe  that, 
if  sustained,  this  policy  will  make  inter- 
national restraint  Moscow's  most 
realistic  course  and  it  can  lay  the  foun- 
dation for  a  more  constructive  relation- 
ship between  our  peoples. 


THE  SOVIET  CHALLENGE 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  Americans 
have  too  simple  a  view  of  world  affairs, 
that  we  start  with  the  assumption  that 


all  problems  can  be  solved.  Certainly  we 
have  a  simple  view  of  how  the  world 
should  be — free  peoples  choosing  their 
own  destinies,  nurturing  their  prosperi- 
ty, peaceably  resolving  conflicts.  This  is 
the  vision  that  inspires  America's  role  in 
the  world.  It  does  not,  however,  lead  us 
to  regard  mutual  hostility  with  the 
U.S.S.R.  as  an  immutable  fact  of  inter- 
national life. 

Certainly  there  are  many  factors 
contributing  to  East-West  tension.  The 
Soviet  Union's  strategic  Eurasian  loca- 
tion places  it  in  close  proximity  to  im- 
portant Western  interests  on  two  con- 
tinents. Its  aspirations  for  greater  inter- 
national influence  lead  it  to  challenge 
these  interests.  Its  Marxist-Leninist 
ideology  gives  its  leaders  a  perspective 
on  history  and  a  vision  of  the  future 
fundamentally  different  from  our  own. 
But  we  are  not  so  deterministic  as  to 
believe  that  geopolitics  and  ideological 
competition  must  ineluctably  lead  to  per- 
manent and  dangerous  confrontation. 
Nor  is  it  permanently  inevitable  that 
contention  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  must  dominate  and 
distort  international  politics. 

A  peaceful  world  order  does  not  re- 
quire that  we  and  the  Soviet  Union 
agree  on  all  the  fundamentals  of  morals 
or  politics.  It  does  require,  however, 
that  Moscow's  behavior  be  subject  to  the 
restraint  appropriate  to  living  together 
on  this  planet  in  the  nuclear  age.  Not  all 
the  many  external  and  internal  factors 
affecting  Soviet  behavior  can  be  in- 
fluenced by  us.  But  we  take  it  as  part  of 
our  obligation  to  peace  to  encourage  the 
gradual  evolution  of  the  Soviet  system 
toward  a  more  pluralistic  political  and 
economic  system  and,  above  all,  to 
counter  Soviet  expansionism  through 
sustained  and  effective  political, 
economic,  and  military  competition. 

In  the  past  decade,  regrettably,  the 
changes  in  Soviet  behavior  have  been  for 
the  worse.  Soviet  actions  have  come  into 
conflict  with  many  of  our  objectives. 
They  have  made  the  task  of  managing 
the  Soviet-American  relationship  con- 
siderably harder  and  have  needlessly 
drawn  more  and  more  international 
problems  into  the  East- West  rivalry.  To 
be  specific,  it  is  the  following  develop- 
ments which  have  caused  us  the  most 
concern. 

First  is  the  continuing  Soviet 
quest  for  military  superiority  even  in 
the  face  of  mounting  domestic  eco- 
nomic difficulties.  In  the  late  1970s  the 
allocation  of  resources  for  the  Soviet 
military  was  not  only  at  the  expense  of 


the  Soviet  consumer.  It  came  even  at 
the  expense  of  industrial  investment  on 
which  the  long-term  development  of  the 
economy  depends.  This  decision  to  mort 
gage  the  industrial  future  of  the  countr 
is  a  striking  demonstration  of  the  inor- 
dinate value  the  Soviets  assign  to  main- 
taining the  momentum  of  the  relentless 
military  buildup  underway  since  the 
mid-1960s.  This  buildup  consumed  an     ' 
estimated  annual  average  of  at  least 
12%  of  Soviet  gross  national  product 
(GNP)  throughout  this  entire  period  am 
has  recently  consumed  even  more  as  a 
result  of  the  sharp  decline  in  Soviet 
economic  growth.  During  much  of  this 
same  period,  as  you  know,  the  share  of 
our  own  GNP  devoted  to  defense  spenc 
ing  has  actually  declined. 

The  second  disturbing  develop- 
ment is  the  unconstructive  Soviet  in- 
volvement, direct  and  indirect,  in 
unstable  areas  of  the  Third  World. 
Arms  have  become  a  larger  percentage 
of  Soviet  exports  than  of  the  export 
trade  of  any  other  country.  The  Soviets 
have  too  often  attempted  to  play  a  spoi  I 
ing  or  scavenging  role  in  areas  of  con-  I 
cern  to  us,  most  recently  in  the  Middle  I 
East. 

Beyond  this,  the  Soviets  in  the  197il 
broke  major  new  ground  in  the  kinds  o  ■ 
foreign  military  intervention  they  were  ' 
willing  to  risk  for  themselves  or  their  ■ 
surrogates.  This  has  escalated  from  the 
provision  of  large  numbers  of  military  ; 
advisers  to  the  more  extensive  and  ag-  j 
gressive  use  of  proxy  forces  as  in  i 

Angola,  Ethiopia,  and  Indochina,  and 
finally  to  the  massive  employment  of  th 
Soviet  Union's  own  ground  troops  in  th  j 
invasion  of  Afghanistan.  In  this  way,  th, 
Soviet  Union  has  tried  to  block  peacefu 
solutions  and  has  brought  East- West  i 
tensions  into  areas  of  the  world  that 
were  once  free  of  them. 

Third  is  the  unrelenting  effort  to  , 
impose  an  alien  Soviet  "model"  on 
nominally  independent  Soviet  clients 
and  allies.  One  of  the  most  important  | 
recent  achievements  in  East-West  rela- 1 
tions  was  the  negotiation  of  the  Helsint, 
Final  Act,  with  its  pledges  concerning  , 
human  rights  and  national  independenCj 
in  Europe.  Poland's  experience  in  the 
past  2  years  can  be  considered  a  major  i 
test  of  the  Soviet  Union's  respect— or 
lack  of  it— for  these  commitments.        i 
Moscow  clearly  remains  unwilling  to 
countenance  meaningful  national  j 

autonomy  for  its  satellites,  let  alone  reai 
independence.  Elsewhere  in  the  world,  | 
the  coming  to  power  of  Soviet-supportei 
regimes  has  usually  meant  (as  in  ] 

Afghanistan)  the  forcible  creation  of  , 
Soviet-style  institutions  and  the  harsh 


Department  of  State  Bulleti 


THE  SECRETARY 


jgimentation  and  repression  of  free  ex- 
'ession  and  free  initiative— all  at  enor- 
ous  human,  cultural,  and  economic 
>st. 

Fourth  is  Moscow's  continuing 
•actice  of  stretching  a  series  of 
eaties  and  agreements  to  the  brink 
'  violation  and  beyond.  The  Soviet 
nion's  infringement  of  its  promises  and 
gal  obligations  is  not  confined  to  iso- 
ted  incidents.  We  have  had  to  express 
ir  concerns  about  Soviet  infractions  on 
le  issue  after  another— human  rights 
id  the  Helsinki  Final  Act,  "yellow  rain" 
id  biological  warfare.  We  are  becoming 
creasingly  concerned  about  Soviet 
•actices— including  the  recent  testing 
'  ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic 
issiles] — that  raise  questions  about  the 
ilidity  of  their  claim  of  compliance  with 
[isting  SALT  [strategic  arms  limitation 
Iks]  agreements.  Little  else  is  so  cor- 
isive  of  international  trust  as  this  per- 
stent  pattern  of  Soviet  behavior. 


HE  AMERICAN  RESPONSE: 
EYOND  CONTAINMENT  AND 
ETENTE 

lis  assessment  of  Soviet  international 
ihavior  both  dictates  the  approach  we 
ast  take  to  East-West  relations  and  in- 
:;ates  the  magnitude  of  the  task. 

•  If  we  are  concerned  about  the 
iviet  commitment  to  military  power, 
;  have  to  take  steps  to  restore  the 
ilitary  balance,  preferably  on  the  basis 
verifiable  agreements  that  reduce 

ms  on  both  sides  but,  if  necessary, 
rough  our  own  and  allied  defense  pro- 
ams. 

•  If  we  are  concerned  about  the 
)viet  propensity  to  use  force  and  pro- 
Dte  instability,  we  have  to  make  clear 
at  we  will  resist  encroachments  on  our 
:al  interests  and  those  of  our  allies  and 
ends. 

•  If  we  are  concerned  about  the  loss 
liberty  that  results  when  Soviet 

ents  come  to  power,  then  we  have  to 
\sure  that  those  who  have  a  positive 
'£m.aHve  to  the  Soviet  model  receive 
r  support. 

•  Finally,  if  we  are  concerned  about 
Dscow's  observance  of  its  international 
ligations,  we  must  leave  Moscow  no 
'(portunity  to  distort  or  misconstrue 

ir  own  intentions.  We  will  defend  our 
perests  if  Soviet  conduct  leaves  us  no 
r.ernative;  at  the  same  time  we  will 
|5pect  legitimate  Soviet  security  in- 
l"ests  and  are  ready  to  negotiate 
'uitable  solutions  to  outstanding  politi- 
1  problems. 


In  designing  a  strategy  to  meet 
these  goals,  we  have,  of  course,  drawn 
in  part  on  past  strategies,  from  contain- 
ment to  detente.  There  is,  after  all, 
substantial  continuity  in  U.S.  policy,  a 
continuity  that  reflects  the  consistency 
of  American  values  and  American  in- 
terests. However,  we  have  not  hesitated 
to  jettison  assumptions  about 
U.S. -Soviet  relations  that  have  been 
refuted  by  experience  or  overtaken  by 
events. 

Consider  how  the  world  has  changed 
since  the  Truman  Administration  de- 
veloped the  doctrine  of  containment. 
Soviet  ambitions  and  capabilities  have 
long  since  reached  beyond  the 
geographic  bounds  that  this  doctrine 
took  for  granted.  Today  Moscow  con- 
ducts a  fully  global  foreign  and  military 
policy  that  places  global  demands  on  any 
strategy  that  aims  to  counter  it.  Where 
it  was  once  our  goal  to  contain  the 
Soviet  presence  within  the  limits  of  its 
immediate  postwar  reach,  now  our  goal 
must  be  to  advance  our  own  objectives, 
where  possible  foreclosing  and  when 
necessary  actively  countering  Soviet 
challenges  wherever  they  threaten  our 
interests. 

The  policy  of  detente,  of  course, 
represented  an  effort  to  induce  Soviet 
restraint.  While  in  some  versions  it 
recognized  the  need  to  resist  Soviet  geo- 
political encroachments,  it  also  hoped 
that  the  anticipation  of  benefits  from  ex- 
panding economic  relations  and  arms 
control  agreements  would  restrain 
Soviet  behavior. 

Unfortunately,  experience  has 
proved  otherwise.  The  economic  rela- 
tionship may  have  eased  some  of  the 
domestic  Soviet  economic  constraints 
that  might  have  at  least  marginally  in- 
hibited Moscow's  behavior.  It  also  raised 
the  specter  of  a  future  Western  depend- 
ence on  Soviet-bloc  trade  that  would  in- 
hibit Western  freedom  of  action  toward 
the  East  more  than  it  would  dictate 
prudence  to  the  U.S.S.R.  Similarly,  the 
SALT  I  and  SALT  II  processes  did  not 
curb  the  Soviet  strategic  arms  buildup, 
while  encouraging  many  in  the  West  to 
imagine  that  security  concerns  could 
now  be  placed  lower  on  the  agenda. 

Given  these  differences  from  the 
past,  we  have  not  been  able  merely  to 
tinker  with  earlier  approaches.  Unlike 
containment,  our  policy  begins  with  the 
clear  recognition  that  the  Soviet  Union 
is  and  will  remain  a  global  superpower. 
In  response  to  the  lessons  of  this  global 
superpower's  conduct  in  recent  years, 
our  policy,  unlike  some  versions  of 
detente,  assumes  that  the  Soviet  Union 


is  more  likely  to  be  deterred  by  our  ac- 
tions that  make  clear  the  risks  their  ag- 
gression entails  than  by  a  delicate  web 
of  interdependence. 

Our  policy  is  not  based  on  trust  or 
on  a  Soviet  change  of  heart.  It  is  based 
on  the  expectation  that,  faced  with 
demonstration  of  the  West's  renewed 
determination  to  strengthen  its 
defenses,  enhance  its  political  and  eco- 
nomic cohesion,  and  oppose  adven- 
turism, the  Soviet  Union  will  see 
restraint  as  its  most  attractive,  or  only, 
option.  Perhaps,  over  time,  this  restraint 
will  become  an  ingrained  habit;  perhaps 
not.  Either  way,  our  responsibility  to  be 
vigilant  is  the  same. 


PROGRAMS  TO  INCREASE 
OUR  STRENGTH 

In  a  rapidly  evolving  international  en- 
vironment, there  are  many  fundamental 
ways  the  democratic  nations  can,  and 
must,  advance  their  own  goals  in  the 
face  of  the  problem  posed  by  the  Soviet 
Union.  We  must  build  a  durable  political 
consensus  at  home  and  within  the  Atlan- 
tic alliance  on  the  nature  of  the  Soviet 
challenge.  We  must  strengthen  our 
defenses  and  those  of  our  allies.  We 
must  build  a  common  approach  within 
the  alliance  on  the  strategic  implications 
of  East- West  economic  relations.  And 
we  must  compete  peacefully  and  even 
more  effectively  with  the  U.S.S.R.  for 
the  political  sympathies  of  the  global 
electorate,  especially  through  the  promo- 
tion of  economic  dynamism  and  democ- 
racy throughout  the  world.  Finally,  we 
must  continue  rebuilding  America's 
moral-spiritual  strength.  If  sustained 
over  time,  these  policies  can  foster  a 
progressively  more  productive  dialogue 
with  the  Soviet  Union  itself. 


Building  Consensus 

From  the  beginning  of  this  Administra- 
tion, the  President  recognized  how 
essential  it  was  to  consolidate  a  new 
consensus,  here  at  home  and  among  our 
traditional  allies  and  friends.  After  15 
years  in  which  foreign  policy  had  been 
increasingly  a  divisive  issue,  he  believed 
we  had  an  opportunity  to  shape  a  new 
unity  in  America,  expressing  the  Ameri- 
can people's  recovery  of  self-confidence. 
After  the  trauma  of  Vietnam,  he  sought 
to  bolster  a  realistic  pride  in  our  country 
and  to  reenforce  the  civic  courage  and 
commitment  on  which  the  credibility  of 


Iy1983 


THE  SECRETARY 


our  military  deterrent  ultimately  rests. 

The  President  also  felt  that  the 
possibility  of  greater  cooperation  with 
our  allies  depended  importantly  on  a  re- 
affirmation of  our  common  moral  values 
and  interests.  There  were,  as  well,  op- 
portunities for  cooperation  with  friendly 
governments  of  the  developing  world 
and  new  efforts  to  seek  and  achieve 
common  objectives. 

Redressing  the  Military  Balance 

President  Reagan  also  began  a  major  ef- 
fort to  modernize  our  military  forces. 
The  central  goal  of  our  national  security 
policy  is  deterrence  of  war;  restoring 
and  maintaining  the  strategic  balance  is 
a  necessary  condition  for  that  deter- 
rence. But  the  strategic  balance  also 
shapes,  to  an  important  degree,  the 
global  environment  in  which  the  United 
States  pursues  its  foreign  policy  objec- 
tives. Therefore,  decisions  on  major 
strategic  weapons  systems  can  have  pro- 
found political  as  well  as  military  conse- 
quences. 

As  Secretary  of  State  I  am  acutely 
conscious  of  the  strength  or  weakness  of 
American  power  and  its  effect  on  our  in- 
fluence over  events.  Perceptions  of  the 
strategic  balance  are  bound  to  affect  the 
judgments  of  not  only  our  adversaries 
but  also  our  allies  and  friends  around 
the  world  who  rely  on  us.  As  leader  of 
the  democratic  nations,  we  have  an  in- 


ing  major  improvements  of  our  ground, 
naval,  and  tactical  air  forces;  we  have 
also  added  a  new  Central  Command  in 
the  Middle  East  that  will  enhance  our 
ability  to  deploy  forces  rapidly  if  threats 
to  our  vital  interests  make  this 
necessary.  To  deter  or  deal  with  any 
future  crisis,  we  need  to  maintain  both 
our  conventional  capabilities  and  our 
strategic  deterrent. 

We  are  also  working  closely  with 
our  allies  to  improve  our  collective 
defense.  As  shown  in  the  security 
declaration  of  the  Williamsburg  summit 
and  in  the  North  Atlantic  Council  com- 
munique of  just  the  other  day,  we  and 
our  allies  are  united  in  our  approach  in 
the  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  negotiations  in  Geneva  and  re- 
main on  schedule  for  the  deployment  of 
Pershing  II  and  ground-launched  cruise 
missiles.  That  deployment  will  take  place 
as  planned  unless  we  are  able  to  reach  a 
balanced  and  verifiable  agreement  at 
Geneva  which  makes  deployment  un- 
necessary. 

Upgrading  NATO's  conventional 
forces  is,  of  course,  a  collective  alliance 
responsibility.  At  the  NATO  summit  in 
Bonn  a  year  ago,  the  President  and  the 
leaders  of  the  Atlantic  alliance  reaf- 
firmed that  a  credible  conventional 
defense  is  essential  to  ensuring  Euro- 
pean security.  We  and  our  allies  will 
continue  our  efforts  toward  this  goal.  At 
the  same  time,  we  have  taken  steps  to 


threats  to  our  vital  interests  outside 


Our  policy  is  not  based  on  trust  or  on  a  Soviet 
change  of  heart.  It  is  based  on  the  expectation 
that,  faced  with  demonstration  of  the  West's  re- 
newed determination  to  strengthen  its  defenses, 
enhance  its  political  and  economic  cohesion,  and 
oppose  adventurism,  the  Soviet  Union  will  see 
restraint  as  its  most  attractive,  or  only,  option. 


escapable  responsibility  to  maintain  this 
pillar  of  the  military  balance  which  only 
we  can  maintain.  Our  determination  to 
do  so  is  an  important  signal  of  our 
resolve  and  is  essential  to  sustaining  the 
confidence  of  allies  and  friends  and  the 
cohesion  of  our  alliances.  This  is  why  the 
Congress's  support  of  the  Peacekeeper 
ICBM  program  has  been  such  a  valuable 
contribution  to  our  foreign  policy,  as 
well  as  to  our  defense. 

At  the  same  time,  we  have  begun  an 
accelerated  program  to  strengthen  our 
conventional  capabilities.  We  are  pursu- 


ensure  a  more  equitable  sharing  of  the 
burden  of  that  defense.  As  a  measure  of 
the  value  of  such  steps,  we  estimate  that 
last  year's  agreement  with  the  F.R.G. 
[Federal  Republic  of  Germany]  on  host- 
nation  support  will  cost  about  10%  of 
what  it  would  cost  to  provide  the  same 
capability  with  U.S.  reserves  or  3%  of 
what  it  would  cost  to  provide  that  capa- 
bility with  active  forces. 

The  Soviets  apparently  believe  they 
can  weaken  or  divide  the  Western 
alliance  if  they  can  dominate  outlying 
strategic  areas  and  resources.  To  deter 


Europe,  we  are  developing  our  i 
move  forces,  supported  by  our  allies,  t( 
key  areas  of  the  world  such  as  South- 
west Asia.  The  allies  are  also  working 
with  us  to  contribute  to  stability  and 
security  in  certain  volatile  areas,  in- 
cluding Lebanon  and  the  Sinai. 

In  Asia  we  are  modernizing  our 
forces  and  are  working  with  our  allies, 
especially  Japan  and  Korea,  to  improvf 
their  ability  to  fulfill  agreed  roles  and 


Reassessing  the  Security  Implication 
of  East-West  Economic  Relations 

The  balance  of  power  cannot  be 
measured  simply  in  terms  of  military 
forces  or  hardware;  military  power  ref 
on  a  foundation  of  economic  strength. 
Thus,  we  and  our  allies  must  not  only 
strengthen  our  own  economies  but  we 
must  also  develop  a  common  approach 
to  our  economic  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  that  takes  into  account  o 
broad  strategic  and  security  interests, 
the  past,  the  nations  of  the  West  have 
sometimes  helped  the  Soviets  to  avoid  j 
difficult  economic  choices  by  allowing 
them  to  acquire  militarily  relevant  tecl 
nology  and  subsidized  credits.  Possible 
dependence  on  energy  imports  from  tl 
Soviet  Union  is  another  cause  for  con- 
cern. 

In  the  past  year,  we  have  made 
substantial  progress  toward  an  allied 
consensus  on  East- West  trade.  The 
Williamsburg  summit  declaration  state 
clearly:  "East- West  economic  relations 
should  be  compatible  with  our  security 
interests."  The  NATO  communique  2 
days  ago  made  a  similar  statement.  Oi 
allies  agree  with  us  that  trade  which 
makes  a  clear  and  direct  contribution  i 
the  military  strength  of  the  Soviet 
Union  should  be  prohibited.  There  is  a 
general  agreement  that  economic  rela- 
tions with  the  U.S.S.R.  should  be  con- 
ducted on  the  basis  of  a  strict  balance 
mutual  advantages. 

Studies  undertaken  under  NATO 
and  OECD  [Organization  for  Economii 
Cooperation  and  Development]  auspice 
have  for  the  first  time  laid  the  ground' 
work  for  common  analyses.  We  expect 
in  time  to  draw  common  policy  conclm 
sions  from  these  studies.  The  commun 
que  of  the  OECD  ministerial  meeting  i 
May  9-10  declared  that  "East-West 
trade  and  credit  flows  should  be  guide* 
by  the  indications  of  the  market.  In  th 
light  of  these  indications,  Government: 
should  exercise  financial  prudence  wit! 
out  granting  preferential  treatment." 
The  United  States  seeks  agreement  th 
we  not  subsidize  Soviet  imports  throuf 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


THE  SECRETARY 


terms  of  government  credits, 
and  this,  we  urge  other  Western 
jrnments  to  exercise  restraint  in 
iding  or  guaranteeing  credit  to  the 
et  Union,  allowing  the  commercial 
iderations  of  the  market  to  govern 
it. 

Similarly,  at  the  lEA  [International 
"■gy  Agency]  ministerial  meeting  in 
s  on  May  8,  it  was  agreed  that 
rity  concerns  should  be  considered 
ng  the  full  costs  of  imported  energy, 
as  gas;  it  was  agreed  that  countries 
lid  seek  to  avoid  undue  dependence 
ny  one  source  of  gas  imports  and  to 
in  future  gas  supplies  from  secure 
ces,  with  emphasis  on  indigenous 
ID  sources." 

rhe  fruitful  cooperative  discussions 
lese  issues  at  the  OECD,  lEA, 
lamsburg,  and  NATO  are  only  a 
nning.  Economic  relationships  are  a 
lanent  element  of  the  strategic 
.tion.  How  the  West  should  respond 
omically  to  the  Soviet  challenge  will 
should  be  a  subject  of  continuing 
ission  in  Western  forums  for  years 


;e  and  Stability  in  the  Third  World 

;  the  1950s,  the  Soviet  Union  has 
d  in  the  developing  regions  of  the 
1  World  its  greatest  opportunities 
xtending  its  influence  through 
ersion  and  exploitation  of  local  con- 
.  A  satisfactory  East- West  military 
ice  will  not  by  itself  close  off  such 
rtunities.  We  must  also  respond  to 
•conomic,  political,  and  security 
lems  that  contribute  to  these  oppor- 
ies.  Our  approach  has  four  key  ele- 
\:s. 

i'irst,  in  the  many  areas  where 
3t  activities  have  added  to  instabili- 
■e  are  pursuing  peaceful  diplomatic 
ions  to  regional  problems,  to  raise 
lolitical  costs  of  Soviet-backed  mili- 
presence  and  to  encourage  the 
rture  of  Soviet-backed  forces.  Our 
vements  in  the  Middle  East,  while 
-cm  complete,  are  addressed  to  this 
we  are  actively  encouraging 
AN  [Association  of  South  East 
1  Nations]  efforts  to  bring  about 
lamese  withdrawal  from  Kam- 
sa;  we  strongly  support  the  world- 
campaign  for  Soviet  withdrawal 
Afghanistan;  and  we  have  made 
derable  progress  toward  an  inter- 
nally acceptable  agreement  on 
ibia.  In  our  own  hemisphere,  we  are 
ing  with  other  regional  states  in 
Drt  of  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  con- 
ind  instability  in  Central  America. 
lecond,  we  are  building  up  the 


security  capabilities  of  vulnerable 
governments  in  strategically  important 
areas.  We  are  helping  our  friends  to 
help  themselves  and  to  help  each  other. 
For  this  purpose,  we  are  asking  the 
Congress  for  a  larger,  more  flexible 
security  assistance  program  for  FY 
1984. 

Third,  our  program  recognizes  that 
economic  crisis  and  political  instability 
create  fertile  ground  for  Soviet- 
sponsored  adventurism.  We  are  seeking 
almost  $4  billion  in  economic  assistance 
to  help  developing  countries  lay  the 
basis  for  economic  and  social  progress. 
We  are  seeking  congressional  approval 
to  raise  IMF  [International  Monetary 
Fund]  quotas  and  broaden  IMF  borrow- 
ing arrangements  to  address  critical 
financial  needs  of  some  of  the  largest 
Third  World  nations.  We  urge  the  Con- 
gress to  approve  the  full  amount  re- 
quested by  the  Administration  toward 


The  central  goal  of  our 
national  security  policy 
is  deterrence  of  war; 
restoring  and  maintain- 
ing the  strategic  balance 
is  a  necessary  condition 
for  that  deterrence. 


meeting  the  U.S.  commitment  to  the 
IDA  [International  Development 
Association]. 

Finally,  there  is  the  democracy  ini- 
tiative, an  effort  to  assist  our  friends  in 
the  Third  World  to  build  a  foundation 
for  democracy.  I  might  say  it  has  been 
fascinating  to  me  as  this  project,  which 
is  very  small,  has  gotten  started,  to  see 
the  reaction  to  it.  We  held  a  meeting  in 
the  State  Department  with  people  from 
various  parts  of  the  world  on  the  subject 
of  free  elections,  and  it  was  denounced 
by  the  Soviet  Union.  The  interesting 
thing  was,  they  noticed  it.  I  was  struck 
by  the  fact  that  in  Mr.  Chernenko's 
[Secretary  of  the  Communist  Party  of 
the  Soviet  Union  (CPSU)]  speech  yester- 
day one  of  the  subjects  that  he  brought 
out  was  the  importance  to  them  of  de- 
stroying President  Reagan's,  in  a  sense, 
ideological  initiatives.  It  seems  we  have 
their  attention.  But  I  think  if  we  can  put 
competition  on  the  basis  of  ideological 
competition,  of  competition  of  economic 
systems,  well  walk  away  with  it. 


NEGOTIATION  AND  DIALOGUE: 
THE  U.S.-SOVIET  AGENDA 

Together  these  programs  increase  our 
political,  military,  and  economic  strength 
and  help  create  an  international  climate 
in  which  opportunities  for  Soviet  adven- 
turism are  reduced.  They  are  essential 
for  the  success  of  the  final  element  of 
our  strategy— engaging  the  Soviets  in 
an  active  and  productive  dialogue  on  the 
concrete  issues  that  concern  the  two 
sides.  Strength  and  realism  can  deter 
war,  but  only  direct  dialogue  and 
negotiation  can  open  the  path  toward 
lasting  peace.  In  this  dialogue,  our  agen- 
da is  as  follows: 

•  To  seek  improvement  in  Soviet 
performance  on  human  rights,  which 
you  emphasized,  Mr.  Chairman  [Senator 
Charles  H.  Percy],  in  your  opening 
statement; 

•  To  reduce  the  risk  of  war,  reduce 
armaments  through  sound  agreements, 
and  ultimately  ease  the  burdens  of  mili- 
tary spending; 

•  To  manage  and  resolve  regional 
conflicts;  and 

•  To  improve  bilateral  relations  on 
the  basis  of  reciprocity  and  mutual  in- 
terest. 

This  is  a  rigorous  and  compre- 
hensive agenda,  and  our  approach  to  it 
is  principled,  practical,  and  patient.  We 
have  pressed  each  issue  in  a  variety  of 
forums,  bilateral  and  multilateral.  We 
have  made  clear  that  the  concerns  we 
raise  are  not  ours  alone,  but  are  shared 
by  our  allies  and  friends  in  every  region 
of  the  globe.  We  have  made  clear  that 
each  of  our  concerns  is  serious,  and  the 
Soviets  know  that  we  do  not  intend  to 
abandon  any  of  them  merely  because 
agreement  cannot  be  reached  quickly  or 
because  agreement  has  been  reached  on 
others. 

Let  me  briefly  review  the  state  of 
our  dialogue  in  each  of  these  areas. 

Human  Rights 

Human  rights  is  a  major  issue  on  our 
agenda.  To  us  it  is  a  matter  of  real  con- 
cern that  Soviet  emigration  is  at  its 
lowest  level  since  the  1960s  and  that 
Soviet  constriction  of  emigration  has 
coincided  with  a  general  crackdown 
against  all  forms  of  internal  dissent.  The 
Helsinki  monitoring  groups  have  all  been 
dispersed,  and  their  leaders  have  been 
imprisoned  or  expelled  from  the  country. 
And  the  Soviet  Union's  first  independent 
disarmament  group  has  been  harassed 
and  persecuted. 


THE  SECRETARY 


We  address  such  questions  both 
multilaterally  and  bilaterally.  In  such 
forums  as  the  UN  Human  Rights  Com- 
mission, the  International  Labor 
Organization,  and  especially  the  review 
conference  of  CSCE  [Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe]— I 
might  say  where  Max  Kampelman 
[chairman  of  the  U.S.  delegation]  is  do- 
ing an  absolutely  outstanding  job— we 
have  made  clear  that  human  rights  can- 
not be  relegated  to  the  margins  of  inter- 
national politics.  Our  Soviet  interlocu- 
tors have  a  different  view;  they  seek  to 
dismiss  human  rights  as  a  "tenth-rate 
issue,"  not  worthy  of  high-level 
attention. 

But  our  approach  will  not  change. 
Americans  know  that  national  rights 
and  individual  rights  cannot  realistically 
be  kept  separate.  We  believe,  for  exam- 
ple, that  the  elements  of  the  postwar 
European  "settlement"  that  were 
adopted  by  the  parties  to  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act  in  1975  form  an  integral 
whole;  no  one  part  will  survive  alone. 
Guided  by  this  conviction,  we  and  our 
allies  have  held  at  the  Madrid  review 
conference  that  movement  in  one 
"basket"  of  this  settlement— such  as  the 
convening  of  a  European  disarmament 
conference— must  be  matched  by  prog- 
ress in  the  other  "baskets,"  especially 
human  rights. 

We  insist  on  this  balance  because  we 
believe  that  international  obligations 
must  be  taken  seriously  by  the  govern- 
ments that  assume  them.  But  there  is 
also  a  deeper  reason  that  directly  con- 
cerns the  question  of  security.  In 
Europe,  as  elsewhere,  governments  that 
are  not  at  peace  with  their  own  people 
are  unlikely  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
their  neighbors.  The  only  significant  use 
of  military  force  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe  since  1945  has  been  by  the 
Soviet  Union  against  its  East  European 
"allies."  As  long  as  this  unnatural  rela- 
tionship continues  between  the  U.S.S.R. 
and  its  East  European  neighbors,  it  is 
bound  to  be  a  source  of  instability  in 
Europe. 

We  have  been  just  as  concerned 
about  human  rights  issues  on  a  bilateral 
as  on  a  multilateral  basis.  The  need  for 
steady  improvement  of  Soviet  perform- 
ance in  the  most  important  human 
rights  categories  is  as  central  to  the 
Soviet-American  dialogue  as  any  other 
theme.  Sometimes  we  advance  this 
dialogue  best  through  public  expressions 
of  our  concerns,  at  other  times  through 
quiet  diplomacy.  What  counts,  and  the 
Soviets  know  this,  is  whether  we  see 
results. 


Arms  Control 

Let  me  turn  to  arms  control.  We  believe 
the  only  arms  control  agreements  that 
count  are  those  that  provide  for  real 
reductions,  equality,  verif lability,  and 
enhanced  stability  in  the  East-West 
balance.  Success  in  our  negotiations  will 
not,  of  course,  bring  East- West  competi- 
tion to  an  end.  But  sustainable  agree- 
ments will  enable  us  to  meet  the  Soviet 
challenge  in  a  setting  of  greater  stability 
and  safety. 

The  United  States  is  now  applying 
these  principles  in  an  ambitious  program 
of  arms  control  negotiations  including 
INF,  START  [strategic  arms  reduction 
talks],  MBFR  [mutual  and  balanced 
force  reductions],  and  the  ongoing  dis- 
cussions in  the  UN  Committee  on  Dis- 
armament in  Geneva.  If  we  can  reach  a 
balanced  agreement  in  the  CSCE  at 
Madrid,  we  would  be  prepared  to  par- 
ticipate also  in  a  conference  on  disarma- 
ment in  Europe. 

No  previous  administration  has  put 
so  many  elements  of  the  East- West  mili- 
tary equation  on  the  negotiating  table. 
You  are  aware  of  the  U.S.  position  in 
the  various  talks,  so  I  need  not  go  into 
great  detail.  I  will,  however,  touch  on  a 
few  main  points. 

START.  In  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks  the  United  States  has 
focused  on  the  most  destabilizing 
strategic  systems— land-based  ballistic 
missiles.  Our  objective  is  to  strengthen 
deterrence  while  enhancing  strategic 
stability  through  reductions.  The  Presi- 
dent has  proposed  reductions  in  ballistic 
missile  warheads  by  one-third.  In  pre- 
senting a  comprehensive  proposal,  he 
has  indicated  that  all  strategic  weapons 
are  "on  the  table."  Although  our  respec- 
tive positions  are  far  apart,  the  Soviets 
apparently  accept  the  proposition  that 
an  agreement  must  involve  significant 
reductions.  This  is  progress. 

We  have  recently  undertaken  a  full 
review  of  the  U.S.  position,  which  in- 
cluded an  assessment  of  the  Scowcroft 
commission's  recommendations  and 
some  thoughtful  suggestions  from  the 
Congress.  One  week  ago,  the  President 
announced  that  he  is  willing  to  raise  the 
deployed-missile  ceiling  in  accordance 
with  the  Scowcroft  recommendations. 
He  also  announced  that  he  has  given  our 
negotiators  new  flexibility  to  explore  all 
appropriate  avenues  for  achieving  reduc- 
tions. It  is  now  up  to  the  Soviet  Union 
to  reciprocate  our  flexibility. 

Confidence-Building  Measures. 
We  have  also  tabled  a  draft  agreement 
on  confidence-building  measures  that 
calls  for  exchange  of  information  and 


advance  notification  of  ballistic  missij 
launches  and  major  exercises.  We  vn 

to  move  forward  promptly  to  negotisi 
separate  agreements  on  these  very  ii 
portant  measures,  which  would  enha  b 
stability  in  a  crisis  as  well  as  symbolic 
the  common  interest  in  preventing  w  „ 
Yet  another  effort  to  prevent  misper|: 
tion  of  military  activities  on  either  si  i 
and  thus  to  lower  the  risk  of  war,  is  « 
President's  recent  proposal  to  expan' 
and  upgrade  crisis  communications 
between  Washington  and  Moscow,  h  i 
too,  we  hope  for  early  agreement. 

INF.  In  the  negotiations  on  intei 
mediate-range  nuclear  forces,  "equal 
rights  and  limits"  between  the  Unite 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  one  o 
our  key  principles.  President  Reagai 
proposal  of  November  1981  sought  t 
achieve  the  complete  elimination  of 
those  systems  on  each  side  about  wl  i 
the  other  side  has  expressed  the 
greatest  concern— that  is,  longer  rar 
land-based  INF  missiles. 

We  still  regard  this  as  the  most  i 
desirable  outcome.  Yet  after  more  tl  i 
a  year  of  talks,  the  Soviets  continue 
resist  this  equitable  and  effective  sol 
tion.  In  fact,  their  position  has  not  ' 
substantially  changed  since  it  was  fii ' 
put  forward  nearly  a  year  ago.  The  ;  i 
posal  made  by  Mr.  Andropov  [Gener ' 
Secretary  of  the  CPSU]  last  Decemh  I 
would  allow  the  Soviet  Union  to  mai ' 
tain  its  overwhelming  monopoly  of  j 
longer  range  INF  (LRINF)  missiles 
while  prohibiting  the  deployment  of  | 
one  comparable  U.S.  missile.  j 

In  an  effort  to  break  this  stalemij 
the  President  has  proposed  an  interi  | 
agreement  as  a  route  to  the  eventua  | 
elimination  of  LRINF  systems.  Und<| 
such  an  agreement,  we  would  reduce  j 
number  of  missiles  we  plan  to  deploji 
Europe  if  the  Soviet  LInion  will  redu 
the  total  number  of  warheads  it  has 
already  deployed  to  an  equal  level.  T' 
would  result  in  equal  limits  for  both  | 
sides  on  a  global  basis.  Reflecting  thii 
concerns  of  our  Asian  allies  and  friei| 
we  have  made  it  clear  that  no  agree- 1 
ment  can  come  at  their  expense.  We 
hope  that  in  the  current  round  of 
negotiations  the  Soviets  will  move  to 
negotiate  in  good  faith  on  the 
President's  proposal,  which  was  unaij 
mously  supported  by  our  partners  at| 
Williamsburg  summit. 

MBFR.  In  the  mutual  and  balami 
force  reductions  talks  in  Vienna,  NA' 
and  the  Warsaw  Pact  are  discussing 
agreement  on  conventional  forces  in 
Central  Europe,  the  most  heavily  an 
region  of  the  world,  where  Warsaw  1' 
forces  greatly  exceed  NATO's.  Last 


70 


Department  of  State  Bull 


THE  SECRETARY 


ir,  the  President  announced  a  new 
stern  position  in  the  form  of  a  draft 
aty  calling  for  substantial  reductions 
?qual  manpower  levels.  Although  the 
nets  and  their  allies  have  agreed  to 
principle  of  parity,  progress  has 
n  prevented  by  inability  to  resolve 
igreement  over  existing  Warsaw 
;t  force  levels  and  by  problems  of 
ification. 

Chemical  Weapons.  In  the 

nation  Committee  on  Disarmament  in 
leva,  the  United  States  has  intro- 
ed  a  far-reaching  proposal  for  a  com- 
hensive  ban  on  chemical  weapons- 
agreement  which  would  eliminate 
se  terrible  weapons  from  world 
enals.  This  initiative  has  been 
Drously  supported  by  our  allies  and 
nds,  as  well  as  by  many  nonaligned 
ions.  Our  emphasis  on  the  importance 
nandatory  on-site  inspections  has 
n  widely  applauded.  An  independent,- 
lartial  verification  system,  observed 
and  responsive  to  all  parties,  is  essen- 
to  create  confidence  that  the  ban  is 
ig  respected. 

Nuclear  Testing  and  Nonprolifera- 

1.  In  other  areas,  we  have  proposed 
he  Soviet  Union  improvements  in  the 
fication  provisions  of  two  agree- 
its  to  limit  underground  nuclear  test- 
So  far  the  Soviet  response  has  been 
ative.  We  have  also  initiated  a 
ogue  with  the  Soviets  in  one  area 
;re  our  respective  approaches  very 
in  coincide:  nuclear  nonproliferation. 

We  should  not  anticipate  early 
eement  in  any  of  these  negotiations. 
■  Soviets  have  their  own  positions, 

they  are  tough,  patient  negotiators. 

we  believe  that  our  positions  are 

and  even-handed  and  that  our  objec- 
is  are  realistic. 

i^ional  Issues 

me  now  turn  to  regional  issues 
ch  in  the  sweep  of  things  historically 
e  been  the  matters  that  are  most 
etting  to  our  relationship  with  the 
iet  Union.  Important  as  it  is,  arms 
itrol  has  not  been— and  cannot 
j-the  dominant  subject  of  our  dialogue 
n  the  Soviets.  We  must  also  address 
1  threat  to  peace  posed  by  the  Soviet 
lloitation  of  regional  instability  and 
iflict.  Indeed,  these  issues— arms  con- 
and  political  instability— are  closely 
ted:  the  increased  stability  that  we 
to  build  into  the  superpower  relation- 
through  arms  control  can  be  undone 
rresponsible  Soviet  policies  else- 
ire.  In  our  numerous  discussions  with 
Soviet  leadership,  we  have  repeated- 


ly e.xpressed  our  strong  interest  in 
reaching  understandings  with  the 
Soviets  that  would  minimize  superpower 
involvement  in  conflicts  beyond  their 
borders. 

The  list  of  problem  areas  is  for- 
midable, but  we  have  insisted  that 
regional  issues  are  central  to  progress. 
We  have  made  clear  our  commitment  to 
relieve  repression  and  economic  distress 
in  Poland,  to  achieve  a  settlement  in 
southern  Africa,  to  restore  independence 
to  Afghanistan,  to  end  the  occupation  of 
Kampuchea,  and  to  halt  Soviet-  and 
Cuban-supported  subversion  in  Central 
America.  In  each  instance,  we  have  con- 
veyed our  views  forcefully  to  the  Soviets 
in  an  attempt  to  remove  the  obstacles 
that  Soviet  conduct  puts  in  the  way  of 
resolving  these  problems. 

Last  year,  for  example,  Ambassador 
Hartman  [U.S.  Ambassador  to  the 
U.S.S.R.]  conducted  a  round  of  ex- 
ploratory talks  on  Afghanistan  between 
U.S.  and  Soviet  officials  in  Moscow.  Any 
solution  to  the  Afghanistan  problem 
must  meet  four  requirements:  complete 
withdrawal  of  Soviet  forces,  restoration 
of  Afghanistan's  independent  and  non- 
aligned  status,  formation  of  a  govern- 
ment acceptable  to  the  Afghan  people, 
and  honorable  return  of  the  refugees. 
This  is  not  the  view  of  the  United  States 
alone.  These  principles  underlie  the 
discussions  now  underway  under  the 
auspices  of  the  UN  Secretary  General, 
which  we  support. 

On  southern  African  problems, 
Assistant  Secretary  Crocker  has  held  a 
number  of  detailed  exchanges  with  his 
Soviet  counterpart.  Southern  Africa  has 
been  a  point  of  tension  and  periodic  fric- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  for  many  years.  We  want 
to  see  tensions  in  the  area  reduced.  But 
this  more  peaceful  future  will  not  be 
achieved  unless  all  parties  interested  in 
the  region  show  restraint,  external  mili- 
tary forces  are  withdrawn,  and  Namibia 
is  permitted  to  achieve  independence.  If 
the  Soviets  are  at  all  concerned  with  the 
interests  of  Africans,  they  should  have 
an  equal  interest  in  achieving  these  ob- 
jectives. 

As  in  our  arms  control  negotiations, 
we  have  made  it  absolutely  clear  to  the 
Soviets  in  these  discussions  that  we  are 
not  interested  in  cosmetic  solutions.  We 
are  interested  in  solving  problems  funda- 
mental to  maintenance  of  the  interna- 
tional order. 

It  is  also  our  view  that  Soviet  par- 
ticipation in  international  efforts  to 
resolve  regional  conflicts— in  southern 
Africa  or  the  Middle  East,  for  ex- 
ample—depends on  Soviet  conduct.  If 


the  Soviets  seek  to  benefit  from  tension 
and  support  those  who  promote 
disorder,  they  can  hardly  expect  to  have 
a  role  in  the  amelioration  of  those  prob- 
lems. Nor  should  we  expect  them  to  act 
responsibly  merely  because  they  gain  a 
role.  At  the  same  time,  we  have  also 
made  it  clear  that  we  will  not  exploit 
and,  in  fact,  are  prepared  to  respond 
positively  to  Soviet  restraint.  The  deci- 
sion in  each  case  is  theirs. 

Bilateral  Relations 

The  final  part  of  our  agenda  with  the 
Soviets  comprises  economic  and  other 
bilateral  relations.  In  our  dialogue,  we 
have  spelled  out  our  view  of  these  mat- 
ters in  a  candid  and  forthright  way.  As 
we  see  it,  economic  transactions  can 
confer  important  strategic  benefits,  and 
we  must  be  mindful  of  the  implications 
for  our  security.  Therefore,  as  I  have 
already  indicated,  we  believe  economic 
relations  with  the  East  deserve  more 
careful  scrutiny  than  in  the  past.  But 
our  policy  is  not  one  of  economic  war- 
fare against  the  U.S.S.R.  East- West 
trade  in  nonstrategic  areas— in  the 
words  of  the  NATO  communique — "con- 
ducted on  the  basis  of  commercially 
sound  terms  and  mutual  advantage,  that 
avoids  preferential  treatment  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  contributes  to  constructive 
East-West  relations." 

Despite  the  strains  of  the  past  few 
years  in  our  overall  relationship,  we 
have  maintained  the  key  elements  in  the 
structure  for  bilateral  trade.  We  have 
recently  agreed  with  the  U.S.S.R.  to  ex- 
tend our  bilateral  fisheries  agreement 
for  1  year  and  have  begun  to  negotiate  a 
new  long-term  U.S. -Soviet  grain  agree- 
ment. Our  grain  sales  are  on  commercial 
terms  and  are  not  made  with  govern- 
ment-supported credits  or  guarantees  of 
any  kind. 

As  for  contacts  between  people,  we 
have  cut  back  on  largely  symbolic  ex- 
changes but  maintained  a  framework  of 
cooperation  in  scientific,  technical,  and 
humanitarian  fields.  A  major  considera- 
tion as  we  pursue  such  exchanges  must 
be  reciprocity.  If  the  Soviet  Union  is  to 
enjoy  virtually  unlimited  opportunities 
for  access  to  our  free  society,  U.S.  ac- 
cess to  Soviet  society  must  increase.  We 
have  made  progress  toward  gaining 
Soviet  acceptance  of  this  principle  as  is 
indicated  by  the  airing  in  Moscow  this 
past  weekend  of  an  interview  with 
Deputy  Secretary  Ken  Dam. 

Eight  bilateral  cooperative  agree- 
ments are  now  in  effect,  and  exchanges 
between  the  Academies  of  Science  con- 
tinue, as  do  exchanges  of  young  scholars 


ARMS  CONTROL 


and  Fulbright  fellows.  America  Il- 
lustrated magazine  continues  to  be 
distributed  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  return 
for  distribution  here  oi  Soviet  Life,  in 
spite  of  the  absence  of  a  cultural  ex- 
changes agreement.  Toward  the  private 
sector  we  have  maintained  an  attitude  of 
neither  encouraging  nor  discouraging 
exchanges,  and  a  steady  flow  of  tourists 
and  conference  participants  goes  on  in 
both  directions.  The  number  of  U.S. 
news  bureaus  in  Moscow  has  actually  in- 
creased in  the  last  year. 


PROSPECTS 

Let  me  just  say  a  word  about  prospects. 
It  is  sometimes  said  that  Soviet- 
American  relations  are  "worse  than 
ever."  This  committee's  staff,  for  exam- 
ple, has  made  such  a  judgment  in  a  re- 
cent report.  Certainly  the  issues  dividing 
our  two  countries  are  serious.  But  let  us 
not  be  misled  by  "atmospherics," 
whether  sunny  or,  as  they  now  seem  to 
be,  stormy. 

In  the  mid-1950s,  for  example, 
despite  the  rhetoric  and  tension  of  the 
cold  war— and  in  the  midst  of  a  leader- 
ship transition— the  Soviet  Union  chose 
to  conclude  the  Austrian  State  Treaty. 
It  was  an  important  agreement,  which 
contributed  to  the  security  of  Central 
Europe,  and  it  carries  an  important  les- 
son for  us  today.  The  Soviet  leadership 
did  not  negotiate  seriously  merely 
because  Western  rhetoric  was  firm  and 
principled,  nor  should  we  expect  rhetoric 
to  suffice  now  or  in  the  future.  But 
adverse  "atmospherics"  did  not  prevent 
agreement;  Soviet  policy  was  instead  af- 
fected by  the  pattern  of  Western  ac- 
tions, by  our  resolve  and  clarity  of  pur- 
pose. And  the  result  was  progress. 

There  is  no  certainty  that  our  cur- 
rent negotiations  with  the  Soviets  will 
lead  to  acceptable  agreements.  What  is 
certain  is  that  we  will  not  find  ourselves 
in  the  position  in  which  we  found 
ourselves  in  the  aftermath  of  detente. 
We  have  not  staked  so  much  on  the 
prospect  of  a  successful  negotiating  out- 
come that  we  have  neglected  to  secure 
ourselves  against  the  possibility  of 
failure.  Unlike  the  immediate  postwar 
period,  when  negotiating  progress  was  a 
remote  prospect,  we  attach  the  highest 
importance  to  articulating  the  require- 
ments for  an  improved  relationship  and 
to  exploring  every  serious  avenue  for 
progress.  Our  parallel  pursuit  of 
strength  and  negotiation  prepares  us 
both  to  resist  continued  Soviet  aggran- 
dizement and  to  recognize  and  respond 
to  positive  Soviet  moves. 

We  have  spelled  out  our  require- 


ments—and our  hope — for  a  more  con- 
structive relationship  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  direction  in  which  that  rela- 
tionship evolves  will  ultimately  be  deter- 
mined by  the  decisions  of  the  Soviet 
leadership.  President  Brezhnev's  suc- 
cessors will  have  to  weigh  the  increased 
costs  and  risks  of  relentless  competition 
against  the  benefits  of  a  less  tense  inter- 
national environment  in  which  they 
could  more  adequately  address  the  rising 
expectations  of  their  own  citizens.  While 
we  can  define  their  alternatives,  we  can- 
not decipher  their  intentions.  To  a 
degree  unequaled  anywhere  else,  Russia 
in  this  respect  remains  a  secret. 

Its  history,  of  which  this  secrecy  is 


such  an  integral  part,  provides  no  1 
for  expecting  a  dramatic  change.  And 
yet  it  also  teaches  that  gradual  changi 
possible.  For  our  part,  we  seek  to  en- 
courage change  by  a  firm  but  flexible 
U.S.  strategy,  resting  on  a  broad  con- 
sensus, that  we  can  sustain  over  the 
long  term  whether  the  Soviet  Union 
changes  or  not.  If  the  democracies  cai 
meet  this  challenge,  they  can  achieve 
goals  of  which  President  Reagan  spob 
at  Los  Angeles:  both  defend  freedom 
and  preserve  the  peace. 


'Press  release  213  (the  complete 
transcript  of  the  hearings  will  be  publishen 
by  the  Committee  and  will  be  available  fro 
the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  Washington, 
D.C.  20402).  ■ 


Strategic  Modernization  Program 
and  Nuclear  Arms  Reduction 


LETTER  TO  MEMBERS  OF  THE 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES, 
MAY  11,  1983' 

Thank  you  for  your  recent  letter  on  our 
strategic  modernization  program  and  its  rela- 
tionship to  our  arms  control  proposals.  Your 
letter  represents  the  bipartisan  spirit  which  I 
believe  will  help  achieve  our  common  goals  of 
ensuring  effective  deterrent  forces  and 
equitable  and  verifiable  arms  reductions. 

The  fundamental  U.S.  goal  in  nego- 
tiations concerning  arms  reduction,  and 
especially  in  our  approach  to  the  START 
[strategic  arms  reduction  talks)  negotiations, 
is  to  seek  agreements  that  would  enhance 
security  and  stability  by  reducing  overall 
force  levels  while  permitting  modernization 
of  U.S.  forces  necessary  for  a  credible  deter- 
rent. As  you  know,  the  Scowcroft  Commis- 
sion noted  that  elements  of  our  START  pro- 
posal are  consistent  with  and  supportive  of 
the  Commission's  findings.  I  agree  whole- 
heartedly with  the  essential  theme  of  the 
Scowcroft  Commission's  approach  to  arms 
control;  the  attainment  of  stability  at  the 
lowest  possible  level  of  forces. 

The  Scowcroft  Commission's  recommen- 
dations on  modernization  and  arms  control 
are  integrally  related.  Our  action  with 
respect  to  these  recommendations  must  be 
equally  comprehensive.  That  is  why  I  am  now 
conducting  a  review  of  our  START  proposal 
with  the  intention  of  developing  such 
modifications  as  are  necessary  to  reflect  the 
Commission's  approach,  which  I  share.  To 
cite  just  one  e.\ample,  the  Commission  report 
recommended  that  the  proposed  limit  on 
deployed  ballistic  missiles  currently  contained 
in  the  U.S.  START  position  be  reassessed 
since  it  is  not  compatible  with  a  desirable 


evolution  toward  small,  single-warhead 
ICBMs  [intercontinental  ballistic  missiles|. , 
There  are  a  number  of  alternative  appnia.  i 
available  to  integrate  this  and  the  otluT  C 
mission  recommendations  into  our  aiipr.ia 
to  arms  reductions.  Asmodificatmns  aio 
made  to  our  START  proposal,  I  will  O'uU. , 
to  seek  stability  at  the  lowest  possible  lev. 
of  forces. 

The  planned  deployment  of  the  Peace- 
keeper missile  as  proposed  by  my  Ad- 
ministration is  compatible  with  the  long-te 
objective  of  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
Report.  The  Peacekeeper  missile,  deploye( 
a  mix  with  small  single-warhead  ICB.Ms,  , 
would  permit  us  to  maintain  the  efferti\fi  ■ 
of  our  deterrent  and  enhance  stabilit>  \\  hi 
serving  as  a  hedge  against  Soviet  tenijitat 
to  exploit  their  present  advantage.  ' 

At  the  same  time,  let  me  emphasize  thi 
we  do  not  seek  a  first  strike  capability.  To 
this  end,  we  have  constrained  the  number  ' 
Peacekeeper  missiles  that  we  plan  to  depk, 
to  the  minimum  number  needed  to  assure  f 
effectiveness  of  our  deterrent  and  no  morfi 
Our  task,  of  course,  would  be  much  easier 
the  Soviets  would  agree  to  work  with  us  ti, 
reduce  the  ratio  of  accurate  warheads  to  ' 
missile  silos.  Clearly,  consistent  with  our  r; 
tional  security  requirements,  the  overall  lell 
of  Peacekeeper  deployment  will  be  influend 
by  Soviet  strategic  programs  and  arms  reef 
tions  agreements.  i 

In  addition,  I  fully  recognize  the  centrij 
role  that  the  small,  single-warhead  ICBM  , 
plays  in  the  overall  modernization  progran 
recommended  by  the  Scowcroft  Commissk 
Report.  We  will  promptly  undertake  a  ma; 
effort  to  bring  the  proposal  of  a  small,  sini  • 
warhead  ICBM  to  fruition  on  a  high  priori ! 


Department  of  State  Bulle ' 


ARMS  CONTROL 


[n  considering  the  implementation  of  the 
ntial  ICBM  modernization  program,  the 
i^croft  Commission  also  recognized  that  a 
IS  of  decisions  involving  both  the  Execu- 
Branch  and  the  Congress  would  be 
ssary  in  the  months  ahead  in  order  to 
rmine  the  future  shape  of  our  ICBM 
;.  Further,  it  noted  that  not  all  of  these 
lions  can  or  should  be  made  in  1983.  The 
erate  approach  to  decision-making  pro- 
d  by  a  number  of  members  of  Congress 
lly  in  keeping  with  the  intent  of  the 
/croft  Commission  Report.  I  fully  recog- 
that  a  lasting  consensus  on  such  an  im- 
int  issue  must  be  built  up  carefully  and  I 
id  to  take  the  time  necessary  to  forge 
lasting  consensus. 

urge  all  concerned,  however,  to  keep  in 
:  that  if  we  draw  out  critical  elements  of 
lecision-making  process  unnecessarily, 
ncourage  the  Soviets  to  delay  in  negotia- 

while  continuing  apace  in  their  own 
ions  modernization  programs.  To  avoid 
I  am  seeking  a  clear  show  of  support 

Congress  to  signal  U.S.  resolve.  A  case 
int  is  the  clear  necessity  of  approving 
3  promptly  to  procure  Peacekeeper 
les.  Working  together,  this  should  be 
vable  while  simultaneously  meeting  our 
lal  desire  to  deal  with  deployment  issues, 


whenever  possible,  in  a  careful,  deliberate 
manner. 

Finally,  I  want  to  stress  the  extraor- 
dinary contribution  made  by  the  Scowcroft 
Commission.  It  provided  an  opportunity  for 
non-partisan  analysis  of  an  exceptionally  dif- 
ficult issue  as  a  prelude  to  obtaining 
necessary  bipartisan  support  for  critically 
needed  modernization  of  our  strategic  forces. 
While  not  prescribing  the  details  or  the  tim- 
ing, the  Commission  report  suggested  certain 
directions  that  the  continued  evolution  of  our 
complementary  strategy  for  arms  reduction 
could  take.  Over  the  short  term,  follow-on  ar- 
rangements involving  members  of  the  Com- 
mission, as  well  as  close  coordination  with  the 
Congress,  will  be  extremely  helpful  both 
technically  and  politically  in  thinking  through 
this  evolution.  However,  we  are  giving  care- 
ful consideration  to  determining  which  follow- 
on  arrangements  best  meet  our  common  ob- 
jectives. 

In  this  regard,  I  do  see  merit  in  a  panel 
with  bipartisan  composition  and  with  stag- 
gered terms  of  membership  to  provide  advice 
and  continuity  in  this  area.  I  will  work  with 
the  Congress,  building  upon  the  experience  of 
the  Scowcroft  Commission,  to  strengthen  and 
supplement  our  consultative  and  advisory 
processes  to  assure  a  lasting,  national,  bipar- 


Nuclear  Arms  Freeze  Resolution 


;SIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
{  5.  1983> 

-ly  2  months  ago,  the  House  of 
•esentatives  began  a  serious  debate 
t  alternative  approaches  to  arms 
rol.  This  debate,  one  of  the  longest 
e  history  of  the  House,  not  only  ele- 
d  understanding  of  the  issues  but 
e  it  clear  that  the  issues  themselves 
enormously  complex.  There  are  no 

answers  to  arms  control. 
During  this  debate,  it  became  ap- 
nt  to  more  and  more  Members  of 
llouse  that  an  immediate  freeze, 
i  superficially  appealing,  is  funda- 
tally  flawed.  For  more  than  30 
s,  we  have  maintained  world  peace 
use  the  United  States  maintained  ef- 
ve  forces  of  deterrence;  we  must 
jeopardize  our  ability  to  keep  the 
|e.  Nor  can  we  lock  the  United 
bs  into  a  position  of  inferiority.  And 
;iust  not  take  any  steps  that  would 
'ipt  the  highly  sensitive  arms  reduc- 
negotiations  underway  in  Geneva. 

am  pleased  that  a  great  number  in 
jn'ess  came  to  recognize  the  threats 
jd  by  a  simple  "freeze  now"  approach 
ipassed  amendments  that  sought  to 
■ove  the  final  resolution  passed  by 
iouse.  The  Levitas  amendment  was 


especially  welcome,  because  it  recognizes 
the  importance  of  arms  reduction  in 
achieving  genuine  arms  control. 

The  balance  of  the  resolution  that 
was  passed  last  night  is  ambiguous  and, 
indeed,  so  internally  inconsistent  that  in- 
terpretation is  difficult.  For  example, 
the  resolution  calls  for  a  freeze  while 
also  expressing  the  need  for  maintaining 
equivalence  and  a  stable  international 
balance.  As  stated  many  times  before, 
this  Administration  agrees  that  the 
maintenance  of  an  arms  balance  is 
essential.  But  an  immediate  freeze 
would  prevent  us  from  having  it.  In 
sum,  the  resolution  finally  adopted  by 
the  House,  while  greatly  improved,  is 
not  an  answer  to  arms  control  that  I  can 
responsibly  support. 

Should  this  debate  now  move  on  to 
the  Senate,  I  am  confident  that  the 
doubts  and  opposition  to  a  simple  freeze 
now  will  continue  to  grow.  In  the  mean- 
time, this  Administration  will  continue 
to  press  forward  vigorously  at  the 
negotiating  table  for  arms  reductions 
that  I  believe  remain  the  best,  true  hope 
for  peace  and  stability. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  9,  1983. 


tisan  consensus  concerning  arms  control  ini- 
tiatives— a  consensus  which  will  deserve  to 
be  sustained  from  one  Administration  to  the 
next. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Reagan 


LETTER  TO  MEMBERS 
OF  THE  SENATE, 
MAY  12,  1983^ 

Thank  you  for  your  recent  letter  on  our 
strategic  modernization  program  and  its  rela- 
tionship to  our  arms  control  proposals.  Your 
letter  represents  the  bi-partisan  spirit  which  I 
believe  will  help  achieve  our  common  goals  of 
ensuring  effective  deterrent  forces  and 
equitable  and  verifiable  arms  reductions. 

The  fundamental  U.S.  goal  in  negotia- 
tions concerning  arms  reduction,  and 
especially  in  our  approach  to  the  START 
negotiations,  is  to  seek  agreements  that 
would  enhance  security  and  stability  by 
reducing  overall  force  levels  while  permitting 
modernization  of  U.S.  forces  necessary  for  a 
credible  deterrent.  As  you  know,  the 
Scowcroft  Commission  noted  that  elements  of 
our  START  proposal  are  consistent  with  and 
supportive  of  the  Commission's  findings.  I 
agree  wholeheartedly  with  the  essential 
theme  of  the  Scowcroft  Commission's  ap- 
proach to  arms  control:  the  attainment  of 
stability  at  the  lowest  possible  level  of  forces. 

The  Scowcroft  Commission's  recom- 
mendations on  modernization  and  arms  con- 
trol are  integrally  related.  Our  action  with 
respect  to  these  recommendations  must  be 
equally  comprehensive.  That  is  why  I  am  now 
reviewing  our  START  proposal  in  order  to 
develop  such  modifications  as  are  necessary 
to  reflect  the  Commission's  approach,  which  I 
share.  To  cite  just  one  example,  the  Commis- 
sion report  recommended  that  the  proposed 
limit  on  deployed  ballistic  missiles  currently 
contained  in  the  U.S.  START  position  be 
reassessed  since  it  is  not  compatible  with  a 
desirable  evolution  toward  small,  single- 
warhead  ICBMs.  There  are  a  number  of 
alternative  approaches  available  to  integrate 
this  and  the  other  Commission  recommenda- 
tions into  our  approach  to  arms  reductions. 
As  modifications  are  made  to  our  START 
proposal,  I  will  continue  to  seek  stability  at 
the  lowest  possible  level  of  forces. 

The  planned  deployment  of  the  Peace- 
keeper missile  as  proposed  by  my  Ad- 
ministration is  compatible  with  the  long-term 
objective  of  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
Report.  The  Peacekeeper  missile,  deployed  in 
a  mix  with  small  single-warhead  ICBMs, 
would  permit  us  to  maintain  the  effectiveness 
of  our  deterrent  and  enhance  stability. 

At  the  same  time,  let  me  emphasize  that 
we  do  not  seek  a  first  strike  capability.  To 
this  end,  we  will  constrain  the  number  of 
Peacekeeper  missiles  to  the  minimum  number 
needed  to  assure  the  effectiveness  of  our 
deterrent  and  no  more.  Our  task,  of  course, 
would  be  much  easier  if  the  Soviets  would 
agree  to  work  with  us  to  reduce  the  ratio  of 


ARMS  CONTROL 


accurate  warheads  to  missile  silos.  Clearly, 
consistent  with  our  national  security  re- 
quirements, the  overall  level  of  Peacekeeper 
deployment  will  be  influenced  by  Soviet 
strategic  programs  and  arms  reductions 
agreements. 

In  addition,  I  fully  recognize  the  central 
role  that  the  small,  single-warhead  ICBM 
plays  in  the  overall  modernization  program 
recommended  by  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
Report.  We  will  promptly  undertake  a  major 
effort  to  bring  the  proposal  of  a  small,  single- 
warhead  ICBM  to  fruition  on  a  high  priority 

In  considering  the  implementation  of  the 
essential  ICBM  modernization  program,  the 
Scowcroft  Commission  also  recognized  that  a 
series  of  decisions  involving  both  the  Ex- 
ecutive Branch  and  the  Congress  would  be 
necessary  in  the  months  ahead  in  order  to 
determine  the  future  shape  of  our  ICBM 
force.  Further,  it  noted  that  not  all  of  these 
decisions  can  or  should  be  made  in  1983.  The 
deliberate  approach  to  decision-making  pro- 
posed by  a  number  of  members  of  Congress 
is  fully  in  keeping  with  the  intent  of  the 
Scowcroft  Commission  Report.  I  fully 
recognize  that  a  lasting  consensus  on  such  an 
important  issue  must  be  built  up  carefully 
and  I  intend  to  take  the  time  necessary  to 
forge  that  lasting  consensus. 

I  urge  all  concerned,  however,  to  keep  in 


Nuclear  Nonproliferation 

MESSAGE  TO  THE  CONGRESS, 
MAY  11,  1983' 

Preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  is 
a  longstanding  and  fundamental  security  ob- 
jective. My  Administration  is  strongly  com- 
mitted to  that  goal  and  has  actively  pursued 
it  by  reinforcing  essential  non-proliferation 
measures  and  by  adopting  new  approaches 
where  these  will  serve  our  nonproliferation 
interests. 

As  noted  in  my  March  31  statement,  for 
arms  control  to  be  complete  and  world  securi- 
ty strengthened,  efforts  to  halt  the  spread  of 
nuclear  arms  need  to  be  increased.  We  are 
undertaking  further  efforts  with  key  coun- 
tries on  the  need  for  urgent  movement  to 
strengthen  measures  against  nuclear  pro- 
liferation. 

The  activities  of  the  Administration  with 
respect  to  non-proliferation  and  peaceful 
nuclear  cooperation  during  1982  are  describ- 
ed in  the  report  called  for  by  Section  601  of 
the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  of  1978 
(Public  Law  95-242).  The  report  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Department  of  State  in  col- 
laboration with  other  concerned  departments 
and  agencies. 

Ronald  Reagan 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  16,  1983. 


mind  that  if  we  draw  out  critical  elements  of 
the  decision-making  process  unnecessarily, 
we  encourage  the  Soviets  to  delay  in  negotia- 
tions while  continuing  apace  in  their  own 
weapons  modernization  programs. 

To  avoid  this,  I  am  seeking  a  clear  show 
of  support  from  Congress  to  signal  U.S. 
resolve.  A  case  in  point  is  the  clear  necessity 
of  approving  funds  promptly  to  procure 
Peacekeeper  missiles.  Working  together,  this 
should  be  achievable  while  simultaneously 
meeting  our  mutual  desire  to  deal  with 
deployment  issues,  whenever  possible,  in  a 
careful,  deliberate  manner. 

You  have  suggested  that  certain  addi- 
tional initiatives  could  be  helpful  in  moving  us 
toward  our  goals  of  security  and  stability  at 
reduced  levels  of  forces.  One  of  the  most 
prominent  of  these  initiatives  is  the  idea  of  a 
"guaranteed  build-down." 

The  principle  of  a  mutual  build-down,  if 
formulated  and  implemented  flexibly,  and 
negotiated  within  the  context  of  our  modified 
START  proposal,  would  be  a  useful  means  to 
achieve  the  reductions  that  we  all  seek. 

It  would,  if  properly  applied,  reinforce 
our  intent  to  cap  the  number  of  strategic 
ballistic  missile  warheads  on  both  sides  and 
to  cause  each  side  to  reduce  those  levels 
steadily  and  substantially  over  time. 

It  could  be  implemented  flexibly  and  with 
reasonable  latitude  for  each  side  to  balance 
the  forces  it  deploys  and  reduces.  Variable 
ratios  as  appropriate,  would  encourage  more 
stabilizing  rather  than  less  stabilizing 
systems. 

It  could  be  implemented  in  conjunction 
with  an  agreed  floor  which,  when  reached, 
would  trigger  the  suspension  of  the  build- 
down  rule,  subject  to  renegotiation. 

As  you  have  acknowledged,  any  build- 
down  concept  must  recognize  the  importance 
of  strategic  modernization  and  the  necessity 
of  maintaining  a  balance  during  the  reduction 
process  to  deal  with  asymmetries  in  U.S.  and 
Soviet  forces.  It  would,  of  course,  require 
agreement  on  effective  verification  measures, 
including  counting  rules  for  all  systems. 

My  Administration  is  currently  examining 
the  structure  of  a  build-down  proposal  which 
would  meet  these  criteria  and  would  facilitate 
a  START  agreement  embodying  substantial 
reductions  in  nuclear  forces.  I  will  work  with 
you  and  your  colleagues  to  develop  such  a 
proposal. 

Finally,  I  want  to  stress  the  extraor- 
dinary contribution  made  by  the  Scowcroft 
Commission.  It  provided  an  opportunity  for 
non-partisan  analysis  of  an  exceptionally  diffi- 
cult issue  as  a  prelude  to  obtaining  necessary 
bi-partisan  support  for  critically  needed 
modernization  of  our  strategic  forces.  While 
not  prescribing  the  details  or  the  timing,  the 
Commission  report  suggested  certain  direc- 
tions that  the  continued  evolution  of  our  com- 
plementary strategy  for  arms  reduction  could 
take.  Over  the  short  term,  follow-on  arrange- 
ments involving  members  of  the  Commission, 
as  well  as  close  coordination  with  the  Con- 
gress, will  be  extremely  helpful  both  tech- 
nically and  politically  in  thinking  through  this 
evolution.  However,  we  are  giving  careful 


consideration  to  determining  which  follow 
arrangements  best  meet  our  common  obje 
tives. 

In  this  regard,  I  do  see  merit  in  a  pan^ 
with  bi-partisan  composition  and  with  stag 
gered  terms  of  membership  to  provide  ad> 
and  continuity  in  this  area.  I  will  work  wil 
the  Congress,  building  upon  the  experienc 
the  Scowcroft  Commission,  to  strengthen  i 
supplement  our  consultative  and  advisory 
processes  to  assure  a  lasting  national,  bi- 
partisan consensus  concerning  arms  contr  ■ 
initiatives— a  consensus  which  will  deserv' 
be  sustained  from  one  Administration  to  1 1 
next. 

Sincerely, 

Ronald  Re; 


'Letter  addressed  to  The  Honorable 
Thomas  S.  Foley,  Majority  Whip,  House  ( 
Representatives,  and  released  by  the  Offi.i 
of  the  White  House  Press  Secretary  on 
May  12,  1983  (text  from  Weekly  Compila 
of  Presidential  Documents  of  May  16). 

^Identical  letters  addressed  to  Senate 
Charies  H.  Percy  of  Illinois,  Sam  Nunn  oi 
Georgia,  and  William  S.  Choen  of  Maine  ( 
from  Weekly  Compilation  of  Presidential 
Documents  of  May  16).  ■ 


U.S.Soviet 
Communication 
Links  Endorsed 


PRESIDENT'S  REMARKS, 
MAY  24.  1983' 

When  I  became  President,  I  made 
solemn  pledge  that  my  Administratio 
would  build  a  more  stable  and  secure  t 


peace,  one  that  would  last  not  just  fo 
years  but  for  generations 

The  force  modernization  progran 
that  we're  preparing,  the  deep  strata 
and  intermediate-range  nuclear  arms 
reductions  we're  seeking,  and  the  cor 
dence-building  measures  we've  propo 
in  START  [strategic  arms  reductions 
talks],  INF  [intermediate-range  nucle 
force]  negotiations,  at  the  United  Na 
tions,  and  elsewhere  are  all  designed 
achieve  this  goal. 

Over  the  years,  the  United  State; 
has  taken  extraordinary  steps  unilatc 
ly  and  bilaterally  to  reduce  the  possi- 
bility that  an  accident,  miscalculation 
misunderstanding,  or  misinterpretati 
would  somehow  ignite  armed  conflict 

For  over  a  year  now,  this  Ad- 
ministration, in  close  consultation  wil 
the  Congress,  has  been  studying  the 
feasibility  of  a  broad  range  of  furthei 


Department  of  State  Bullep 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Isures  to  reduce  that  possibility.  On 
41  12th,  this  year,  1983,  the  Depart- 
it  of  Defense  delivered  a  report  to 
Congress  which  proposed  four  new 
lidence-building  measures  to 
ngthen  communications  and  coopera- 
,  thereby  reducing  the  chances  even 
her  that  war,  especially  nuclear  war, 
d  come  about  by  accident  or 
calculation. 

It  gives  me  special  pleasure  today  to 
)unce  my  endorsement  of  significant 
tional  confidence-building  measures. 


mding  for  the  MX  Missile 


iSIDENT'S  STATEMENT. 

if  25,  19831 

ute  Republican  and  Democratic 
ibers  of  the  House  and  Senate  who 
'  made  a  decisive,  historic  contribu- 
te our  nation's  security.  Thanks  to 
1,  America  is  blessed  with  a  new 
f-tisan  unity  that  can  make  us  both 
iger  and  safer  than  before. 
\s  we  prepare  to  leave  for  Williams- 
and  confer  with  other  leaders  of 
ree  world,  I  can  think  of  no  more 
3me  message  to  give  them  than  the 
Congress  has  just  given  me:  Back- 
ck  votes  of  confidence  in  the  recom- 
iations  of  the  Scowcroft  Commis- 
to  modernize  our  strategic  forces 
:arry  us  forward  on  the  road  to 
ine  arms  reductions. 
n  coming  weeks,  the  Members  of 
Congress  will  be  asked  to  reaffirm 
votes  of  yesterday  and  today,  I 
fe  to  them  my  full  cooperation  and 
iltation.  I  also  pledge  to  continue 
ing  closely  with  the  Congress  in 
lit  of  a  reduction  of  nuclear 
lals. 

Ve  understand  the  task  ahead.  We 
demonstrated  our  unity  and 
ige.  We  have  reason  to  hope  for  a 
:  secure  and  peaceful  future.  My 
?st  wish  is  for  the  eventual  elimina- 
af  nuclear  weapons.  In  this  spirit,  I 
the  Soviets  to  join  us  at  Geneva  in 
g  that  first  giant  step— an 
able  and  verifiable  agreement  that 
antially  reduces  the  level  of  nuclear 
lals  on  both  sides, 
'he  time  for  progress  in  negotia- 
is  now.  The  citizens  of  the  world 
nothing  more,  and  they  deserve 
ng  less. 


'ext  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
lential  Documents  of  May  30,  1983. 


These  confidence-building  measures  have 
the  potential  for  reducing  the  possibility 
of  unintended  war  and  the  outgrowth  of 
close  bipartisan  consultation— or  they 
are  the  outgrowth,  I  should  say,  of  close 
bipartisan  consultation  with  the  Con- 
gress. Three  of  them  are  designed  to 
strengthen  and  broaden  communications 
between  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  They  include  the  upgrad- 
ing of  the  hotline  between  myself  and 
General  Secretary  Andropov  by  adding  a 
facsimile  transmission  capability. 

Secondly,  we  propose  to  create  a 
direct  military  communications  link  that 
could  be  used  for  the  rapid  exchange  of 
technical  military  information,  thereby 
preventing  misunderstanding  in  a  crisis. 

And,  third,  we  propose  improving 
the  existing  diplomatic  crisis-controlled 
related  functions  of  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  by 
upgrading  the  communications  links  be- 
tween Washington  and  Moscow  and 
each  nation's  embassy  in  the  other's 
capital. 

Any  one  of  these  measures  would 
significantly  strengthen  our  existing 
crisis  communication  network.  Together, 
they  add  new  dimensions  to  our  com- 
munications efforts,  allowing  us  to  con- 
tact each  other  rapidly  at  political, 
military,  and  diplomatic  levels,  improv- 
ing our  capability  to  contain  crisis  situa- 
tions. 

I  encourage  the  Soviet  Union  to 
carefully  examine  these  proposals.  Ex- 
tending the  range  of  rapid  direction 
communications  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  would  make 
an  important  contribution  to  stability. 
It's  in  our  best  national  interest  and  in 
the  best  interest  of  all  mankind. 

The  fourth  recommendation  we  pro- 
pose is  an  international  agreement,  open 
to  all  the  world's  governments,  pro- 
viding for  consultation  in  the  event  a 
nuclear  incident  is  precipitated  by  an  in- 
dividual or  group.  Establishing  pro- 
cedures among  all  interested  nations  in 
the  event  of  such  an  incident  would  com- 
plement the  steps  that  we  already  have 
taken  in  the  1968  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  and  the  1980  Convention  on  the 
Physical  Protection  of  Nuclear 
Materials. 

I  endorse  the  proposal,  not  because  I 
foresee  an  increasing  risk  of  nuclear  in- 
cidents— I  do  not — but  because  I  believe 
that  it  is  prudent  to  have  in  place  the 
means  to  facilitate  international  com- 
munications should  the  unthinkable  hap- 
pen. 

These  four  proposals  are  not  the  end 


of  a  process;  rather,  they  add  momen- 
tum to  the  process  that's  already  under- 
way in  the  Administration,  in  the  Con- 
gress, and  within  the  international  com- 
munity. 

In  the  coming  days,  I  intend  to  con- 
sult closely  with  those  Members  of  the 
Congress  who've  shown  a  great  personal 
interest,  such  as  these  gentlemen  here 
today,  and  especially  Senators  Nunn, 
Jackson,  Warner,  and  Tower.  Addi- 
tionally, we  intend  to  consult  closely 
with  the  international  community  con- 
cerning these  measures.  These  are 
reasonable  proposals,  and  we  will  work 
diligently  to  reach  early  agreement  on 
them  with  the  Soviet  Union. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  May  30,  198: 


INF  Missiles 


DEPARTMENT  STATEMENT. 

MAY  28,  1983' 

We  regret  that  the  Soviet  Government 
has  again  resorted  to  unwarranted 
threats  of  retaliation  in  the  event  that 
we  and  our  NATO  allies  modernize  our 
forces  in  the  face  of  the  massive  Soviet 
nuclear  buildup. 

On  INF  [intermediate-range  nuclear 
forces]  the  Soviet  statement  reiterates 
familiar  positions  designed  to  maintain 
the  Soviet  monopoly  of  long-range  INF 
missiles. 

As  for  suggesting  the  Soviet  Union 
might  lift  its  alleged  "moratorium"  on 
SS-20  deployments,  we  would  note  that 
SS-20  deployments  continued  uninter- 
rupted last  year.  If  the  Soviet  Union 
wishes  to  prevent  NATO's  deployment, 
the  opportunity  exists  in  the  U.S.  pro- 
posal to  eliminate  the  entire  class  of 
U.S.  and  Soviet  land-based  long-range 
INF  missiles. 

The  Soviets  in  their  latest  statement 
repeat  their  familiar  demand  for  as 
many  long-range  INF  warheads  and 
missiles  as  are  in  the  independent 
arsenals  of  Britain  and  France.  The 
British  and  French  systems  are  national- 
ly based  strategic  deterrents  designed  to 
defend  France  and  Britain,  not  to  deter 
attacks  on  the  other  countries  of  NATO. 


ARMS  CONTROL 


The  Soviet  demands  for  nuclear  forces 
as  large  as  all  countries  combined  is  tan- 
tamount to  a  demand  for  effective 
military  superiority  and  thus  global 
hegemony. 

The  Soviet  statement  also  rejects 
global  limits  on  long-range  INF  despite 
the  fact  that  many  SS-20s  stationed  in 
Asia  can  reach  parts  of  Europe,  and  all 
could  be  rapidly  redeployed  against 
Europe.  Moreover,  we  cannot  accept  an 
agreement  which  would  transfer  the 


SS-20  threat  to  our  friends  and  allies  in 
Asia. 

On  START  we  welcome  the  Soviet 
statement  that  it  seeks  deep  reductions. 
However,  we  reject  the  Soviet  assertion 
that  the  U.S.  proposal  is  one-sided.  The 
United  States  has  proposed  substantial 
reductions  to  equal  levels  in  the  impor- 
tant measures  of  strategic  capability. 


'Made  available  to  news  correspondents 
by  Acting  Department  Spokesman  Susan 


Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  8,  1983' 

The  strategic  arms  [reduction]  talks,  or 
START  as  we  have  named  it,  officially 
resumed  today  in  Geneva.  And  I  would 
like  to  speak  for  a  moment  about  my 
hopes  for  these  important  negotiations 
and  about  changes  which  I've  decided  to 
make  in  our  START  proposal.  Such 
changes  reflect  concerns  and  recommen- 
dations of  the  Scowcroft  Commission, 
the  Congress,  and  others.  They  offer  the 
prospect  of  new  progress  toward  a 
START  agreement. 

Before  discussing  these  specifics,  I 
would  like  to  comment  on  what  I  see  as 
very  positive  developments  taking  place 
both  here  and  abroad.  I'm  happy  to  say 
that  today  there's  a  growing  sense  that 
we're  making  progress.  I  just  met  in 
Williamsburg,  as  you  perhaps  have 
heard,  with  the  leaders  of  the  major  in- 
dustrialized nations,  and  I  was  struck 
there,  not  only  by  the  facts  and  figures 
pointing  toward  economic  recovery,  but 
also  by  a  spirit  of  optimism  and  coopera- 
tion which  was  remarkable.  This  same 
spirit  is  visible  in  our  discussion  on 
security  issues. 

In  NATO,  as  in  other  alliances, 
there's  a  new  feeling  of  partnership.  The 
Atlantic  alliance  is  alive  and  well  and  its 
close  consultations  are  a  source  of 
strength  and  participation  for  each  of  its 
members.  At  least  as  important,  and 
very  gratifying  to  me,  is  the  new  spirit 
of  bipartisanship  on  national  security 
issues  which  is  increasingly  evident  in 
both  Houses  of  Congress. 

When  I  established  the  Scowcroft 


Commission  I  could  not  then  foresee  the 
impact  that  this  outstanding  panel  would 
have.  Clearly,  the  Commission's  work, 
which  went  beyond  MX  to  address 
critical  issues  of  deterrence  and  arms 
control,  has  become  a  major  stimulus  to 
the  rethinking  of  national  policy.  The 
Commission's  report  challenged  some 
favorite  assumptions  and  called  for 
changes  in  our  strategic  planning.  At 
the  same  time,  it  expressed  support  for 
my  Administration's  most  heartfelt  ob- 
jectives in  arms  control:  deep  reduc- 
tions, modernization  for  stability's  sake, 
and  the  elimination  of  the  first-strike 
threat. 

I  have  pledged  to  Congress  my  full 
support  for  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
recommendations  and  my  intention  to 
incorporate  them  in  our  START  pro- 
posal. So  that  we  can  continue  to  benefit 
from  the  wisdom  of  its  counsel,  I  intend 
to  ask  the  Commission  to  continue  to 
serve.  Its  bipartisan  membership  will 
thus  be  able  to  provide  timely  advice  to 
me,  both  with  respect  to  the  adoption  of 
its  proposals  into  our  defense  program, 
and  our  arms  control  policies. 

In  recent  weeks,  officials  of  my  Ad- 
ministration and  I  have  had  an  extensive 
series  of  private  meetings  with  many 
Members  of  Congress.  We've  reviewed 
implications  for  the  START  negotiations 
of  the  Scowcroft  Commission  recommen- 
dations and  also  of  the  mutual 
guaranteed  build-down  advocated  by  a 
number  of  distinguished  Members  of 
Congress.  The  review  of  our  START 
position  was  capped  by  four  recent 
meetings,  three  yesterday  and  one 
today. 


Yesterday  morning  at  a  meeting  i 
the  National  Security  Council,  my  ser 
advisers  and  I  reviewed  major  implies 
tions  and  options.  We  also  considered 
range  of  congressional  viewpoints. 
Yesterday  afternoon  I  met  with  grou] 
of  Senators  and  Congressmen  whose 
terest  and  expertise  in  arms  control  I 
value  highly.  I  discussed  with  them  tl 
major  issues  before  us.  And  this  mori 
ing  I  met  with  the  leadership  of  both 
Houses  of  Congress.  And  throughout 
the  START  negotiations  the  Adminis 
tion  has  consulted  with  our  allies. 

Three  full  rounds  of  negotiations 
START  are  now  behind  us.  It's  my  ju 
ment  that  these  rounds  have  been  us( 
and  have  permitted  us  to  cover 
necessary  ground.  However,  due  largn 
to  Soviet  intransigence,  we  have  not 
made  meaningful  progress  on  the  cer 
tral  issues.  I  remain  firmly  committei 
take  whatever  steps  are  necessary  to 
crease  the  likelihood  of  real  substanti 
progress  toward  an  agreement  invoh 
significant  reductions  in  U.S.  and  So' 
strategic  nuclear  arsenals  and  in  the 
tional  security  interests  of  both  sides 
Above  all,  our  goal  is  to  maintain  a 
stable  nuclear  balance  in  order  to  reo^ 
the  risk  of  war.  Our  efforts  in  the 
START  negotiations  must  be  guided 
that  objective. 

The  report  of  the  Scowcroft  Comj 
mission  offers  us  a  new  opportunity  1 ' 
progress.  It  has  provided  a  consisten  | 
and  coherent  framework  to  guide  oui 
thinking  about  the  fundamental  elem' 
of  our  national  security  policy— detei 
rence,  defense,  and  arms  control.  Bu 
more  than  that,  it  has  provided  the  b 
for  renewed,  bipartisan  support  for  t 
policy. 

To  capitalize  on  this  critical  oppoi ' 
tunity  and  on  the  basis  of  the  widest 
possible  range  of  advice,  I  have  direc 
new  steps  toward  progress  in  achievi 
real  arms  reductions  at  the  START 
negotiations.  The  purpose  of  this 
guidance,  provided  to  Ambassador  Ei 
Rowny,  our  chief  START  negotiator, 
to  adjust  the  U.S.  START  position  to 
bring  it  into  line  with  the  Scowcroft  | 
Commission's  recommendations  and  tl 
provide  additional  flexibility  to  our     |l 
negotiators  in  pursuing  our  basic  goa^ 
k 


Department  of  State  Bullen 


ARMS  CONTROL 


Although  we  have  put  forth  a  com- 
lensive  proposal  on  limiting  strategic 
istic  missiles  and  bombers,  our 
nary  aim  in  the  START  negotiations 
been,  and  continues  to  be,  to  reduce 
threat  posed  by  the  most  destabiliz- 
systems,  namely  ballistic  missiles.  To 
eve  that  aim,  measures  that  con- 
in  the  number  and  destructive 
ibility  and  potential  of  ballistic 
3ile  warheads  are  essential.  Our  pro- 
;d  limit  of  5,000  total  ballistic  missile 
heads— a  reduction  by  one-third  of 
current  level— remains  the  central 
lent  of  the  U.S.  START  position. 
The  U.S.  START  position  tabled  in 
nous  negotiating  rounds  includes 
ther  constraint.  It  would  have  limited 
1  side  to  no  more  than  850  deployed 
istic  missiles.  This  measure  was 
3r  viewed  as  being  as  useful  or  im- 
:ant  a  constraint  as  the  limit  on  total 
istic-missile  warheads. 
The  Scowcroft  Commission  report 
;ifically  suggested  that  it  should  be 
ssessed  since  it  could  constrain  the 
ution  we  seek  toward  small,  single- 
head  ICBMs  [intercontinental 
Stic  missiles].  Acting  upon  the  Com- 
liion's  recommendation,  I  have  now 
cted  our  negotiators  to  adjust  our 
icion  on  deployed  ballistic  missiles  by 
xing  our  current  proposal  for  an  850 
'oyed  ballistic  missile  limit. 
At  the  same  time,  the  United  States 
lins  firm  on  the  point  that  the 
ructive  capability  and  potential  of 
stic  missiles  must  be  addressed  in 
RT.  Our  current  position  includes  a 
/ork  of  constraints  designed  to  lead 
ird  a  more  stable,  strategic  balance 
educed  force  levels  while  addressing 
destructive  potential  of  missiles, 
irhe  Soviets  and  others  have  com- 
led  that  these  constraints  are  de- 
ed to  dictate  Soviet  force  structure, 
rding  to  U.S.  standards.  This  is  not 
:ase.  We  believe,  as  does  the 
vcroft  Commission,  that  ability,  or 
ility,  can  be  increased  by  limitations 
he  destructive  capability  and  poten- 
of  ballistic  missiles.  As  a  conse- 
ice,  we  will  continue  to  propose  such 
traints  which  indirectly  get  to  the 
wweight  problem  while  making  clear 
le  Soviets  our  readiness  to  deal 
ctly  with  the  corresponding  destruc- 
capability,  if  they  prefer. 


There  may  be  more  than  one  way  to 
achieve  our  objective  of  greater  stability 
at  reduced  levels  of  arms.  So  I've  in- 
structed Ambassador  Rowny  to  make 
clear  to  the  Soviet  delegation  our  com- 
mitment to  our  fundamental  objectives, 
but  I  have  also  given  him  the  flexibility 
to  explore  all  appropriate  avenues  for 
meeting  our  goals.  I  sincerely  hope  that 
the  Soviet  Union  will  respond  with  cor- 
responding flexibility. 

Finally,  high  priority  work  is  contin- 
uing on  how  the  mutual  and  guaranteed 
build-down  concept  proposed  by  several 
U.S.  Senators  can  be  applied  in  our 
quest  for  significant  and  stabilizing 
strategic  arms  reductions. 

These  actions  reflect  a  bipartisan 
consensus  on  arms  control  and  new  flex- 
ibility in  the  negotiations,  steps  to  be 
viewed  by  the  Soviets  and  all  others  who 
have  a  stake  in  world  peace.  To  the 


leaders  of  the  Soviet  Union,  I  urge  that 
this  new  opportunity  not  be  lost.  To 
America's  friends  and  allies  around  the 
world,  I  say  that  your  steadfast  support 
for  the  goals  of  both  deterrence  and 
arms  control  is  essential  in  the  future. 
To  Congress  and  to  the  American  peo- 
ple, I  say  let  us  continue  to  work 
together  in  a  bipartisan  spirit  so  that 
these  days  will  be  spoken  of  in  the 
future  as  the  time  when  America  turned 
a  corner.  Let  us  put  our  differences 
behind  us.  Let  us  demonstrate  measured 
flexibility  in  our  approach  while  remain- 
ing strong  in  our  determination  to  reach 
our  objectives  of  arms  reduction,  stabili- 
ty, and  security.  Let  us  be  leaders  in  the 
cause  of  peace. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  13,  1983. 


Extension  of  the  President's  Commission  on 
Strategic  Forces 


PRESIDENT'S  STATEMENT, 
JUNE  10,  1983' 

First,  I  want  to  take  this  occasion  to 
again  thank  members  of  both  parties  in 
the  Congress  for  their  support  of  the 
Scowcroft  Commission's  recommenda- 
tions on  modernization,  deterrence,  and 
arms  control.  Their  support  for  these 
crucial,  interdependent  recommenda- 
tions gives  us  a  genuine  chance  to 
achieve  balanced,  verifiable  arms  reduc- 
tions— the  goal  we  all  seek.  I  am  deter- 
mined to  achieve  effective  deterrence 
and  significant  strategic  arms  reduc- 
tions, and  I  am  confident  that  they  can 
be  achieved.  But,  if  we  are  to  secure  our 
common  objectives,  the  consensus  we 
now  have  must  be  maintained. 

I  look  forward  to  working  with  the 
Congress  in  the  days  ahead  to  maintain 
and  strengthen  this  bipartisan  consen- 
sus. In  this  regard,  I  will  submit  an  an- 
nual status  report  to  the  Congress.  To 
assist  me  in  this  effort,  I  am  pleased  to 
announce  that  I  have  asked  the 
members  of  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
to  continue  to  serve  until  January  3, 
1984.  The  Commission  will  review,  on  a 
periodic  basis,  the  progress  made  in  im- 
plementing the  recommendations  con- 
tained in  its  report  of  April  1983,  with 
particular  reference  to  the  deployment 
of  the  Peacekeeper  missile,  development 


and  deployment  of  a  small,  single 
warhead  intercontinental  ballistic  missile 
system,  and  developments  in  strategic 
arms  reductions.  The  Commission  will 
consider  carefully  the  views  of  the  Con- 
gress during  the  review.  The  value  to 
the  country  of  this  bipartisan  framework 
both  with  the  Congress  and  through  the 
Scowcroft  Commission  is  evident  to  all. 
It  must  be  and  shall  be  sustained 
through  and  beyond  the  work  of  the 
Commission.  I  pledge  this  to  the  Con- 
gress and  ask  their  reciprocal  good 
faith. 

In  addition  to  consulting  closely  with 
the  members  of  Congress,  I  have 
directed  Chairman  Scowcroft  to  seek  out 
views  and  assistance  from  a  wide  varie- 
ty of  leading  authorities  in  the  strategic 
and  arms  control  field.  As  before,  the 
Chairman  has  authority  to  appoint 
senior  counselors  as  he  deems 
appropriate. 

As  we  continue  to  move  forward  in 
this  vital  bipartisan  effort,  let  us  all  keep 
in  mind  our  fundamental  goal— to  con- 
clude agreements  that  will  enhance 
security  and  stability  by  reducing  overall 
strategic  force  levels  while  permitting 
modernization  of  forces  necessary  for  ef- 
fective deterrence. 


'Text  from  Weekly  Compilation  of 
Presidential  Documents  of  June  13,  1983. 


ECONOMICS 


Williamsburg  in  One 
Word:  Confidence 


by  W.  Allen  Wallis 

Address  before  the  198S  Foreign  In- 
vestment Policy  Forum,  sponsored  by  the 
Government  Research  Council  and  the 
National  Journal,  on  May  i,  1983.  Mr. 
Wallis  is  Under  Secretary  for  Economic 
Affairs. 

When  I  began  to  prepare  some  remarks 
for  this  evening,  I  reread  Tony  Stout's 
letter  of  invitation.  I  was  struck  by  one 
sentence  which  reads:  "The  purpose  of 
our  effort  is  to  stimulate  confidence  [in 
the  U.S.  Government  and  its  com- 
petence] and  overcome  a  great  deal  of 
questionable  'news'  reporting  that  these 
investors  are  subjected  to  in  their  host 
countries." 

Among  the  definitions  of  the  word 
confidence  is  the  idea  of  certainty,  or  a 
feeling  of  certainty  about  some  thing  or 
some  person.  Confidence  connotes  a 
sense  of  trust. 

My  sensitivity  tonight  to  the  word 
"confidence"  arises  from  having  been  in- 
volved for  the  past  6  months  in  prepara- 
tions for  the  1983  economic  summit, 
which  will  bring  together  the  leaders  of 
the  seven  largest  industrial  economies  in 
the  world.  President  Reagan  is  the  host 
and  chairman  of  this  year's  meeting, 
which  will  be  held  at  the  end  of  this 
month  in  Williamsburg,  Virginia.  The 
President  appointed  me  to  be  his  per- 
sonal representative  for  the  policy 
aspects  of  the  summit.  Fortunately,  he 
gave  the  hard  part— administration  and 
logistics— to  Mike  McManus  in  the  White 
House. 

These  economic  summit  meetings, 
although  only  9  years  old  this  year,  are 
already  fraught  with  traditions.  Some  of 
those  traditions  are  detrimental  to  effec- 
tive exchanges  of  views  among  the 
leaders.  Following  the  misunderstand- 
ings—even hard  feelings— that  followed 
last  year's  summit,  the  President  and  his 
colleagues  decided  to  shatter  some  of 
those  traditions  and  make  this  year's 
summit  meeting  an  informal,  flexible  op- 
portunity for  consultations  and  col- 
laboration. 

As  the  personal  representatives  of 
the  other  summit  participants  and  I 
began  to  plan  the  type  of  summit  the 
participants  wanted,  we  quickly  realized 


that  even  an  informal,  consultative  sum- 
mit would  have  to  have  a  message.  Cur- 
rent economic  conditions  do  not  allow 
the  leaders  to  meet  and  simply  say  they 
met.  So  we  put  our  minds  to  an  ap- 
propriate message  for  Williamsburg. 
The  search  was  not  long,  nor  was  it 
difficult.  What  the  economy  of  the  world 
needs  most  is  recovery.  Unemployment, 
slack  trade,  and  burdensome  debts  all 
call  out  for  a  revival  of  economic  activi- 
ty. Indeed,  as  we  have  prepared  for  the 
summit  during  the  past  6  months, 
recovery  has  become  more  and  more  evi- 
dent—not only  in  the  United  States  but 
also  in  Britain,  Germany,  Canada,  and 
Japan.  There  is  now  good  cause  for 
realistic  optimism  and  confidence  about 
the  recovery. 

Confidence,  then,  will  be  a  major 
part  of  the  message  of  Williamsburg. 
What  I  would  like  to  do  tonight  is  ex- 
amine with  you  the  role  of  confidence  in 
the  functioning  of  our  market 
economies.  Why  do  we  need  confidence? 
How  can  confidence  be  restored?  I  will 
discuss  the  role  of  confidence  in  eco- 
nomic growth,  in  the  debt  problem,  and 
in  East- West  economic  relations.  Then  I 
will  consider  how  the  message  of  confi- 
dence might  be  expressed  at  Williams- 
burg. 

First,  what  is  the  role  of  confidence 
in  Western  economies?  To  answer  this 
question,  we  must  look  at  the  nature  of 
the  market  economy. 

For  some  years  now,  economists 
have  divided  up  into  teams— the  macro- 
economists  and  the  microeconomists.  A 
notion  was  widely  held  that  a  national 
economy  as  a  whole  has  characteristics 
which  conceptually  are  different  from 
the  basic  unit  of  a  transaction.  This  no- 
tion led  economists  and  policymakers  to 
ignore  the  fundamental  laws  of  in- 
dividual behavior  that  motivate  the  par- 
ties to  a  transaction.  In  fact,  of  course, 
the  national  economy  as  a  whole  is  simp- 
ly the  aggregation  of  millions— even 
billions— of  transactions,  each  motivated, 
as  Adam  Smith  pointed  out,  by  in- 
dividual self-interest.  To  enter  into  a 
transaction,  each  participant  must  have 
an  adequate  degree  of  confidence  that 
his  interest  will  be  served  by  that  trans- 
action, otherwise  he  will  choose  not  to 
participate.  (Obviously,  transactions  with 


the  government  are  of  a  different  nat 
since  the  state  has  the  power  of  comp 
sion.  More  on  this  later.) 

But  the  importance  of  confidence 
not  limited  to  the  individual  transactic 
It  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  whether  o 
car  dealer  or  another  will  provide  betl 
service,  whether  one  brand  of  shoes  o 
another  will  stand  up  under  hard  wea 
whether  one  doctor  or  another  will  re 
the  right  diagnosis,  or  whether  one  | 
lawyer  or  another  will  win  the  mal-  . 
practice  suit  if  he  doesn't.  Even  more  i 
important  is  confidence  in  the  system  i 
Will  there  be  a  car  available  tomorrov 
I  decide  to  buy  one  then?  And  if  I  buj  | 
the  car,  will  gasohne  be  available,  whi| 
ever  I  may  drive?  Will  I  be  able  to  sel  j 
the  car  if  suddenly  I  change  my  plans 

As  I  said  earlier,  the  leaders  at 
Williamsburg  can  realistically  be  conf 
dent  that  the  global  economy  is  movii 
up,  that  the  long  recession  is  over,  ar 
that  the  recovery  will  be  sustainable 
over  the  long  run.  To  be  credible,  the 
leaders  must  show  that  the  legacies  c 
the  recession— unemployment,  debt,  i 
conflicts  about  trade  with  the  Soviet 
Union— are  being  reversed.  Let  me 
briefly  comment  on  each  of  them.     _ 

Economic  Growth 

Some  weeks  ago,  after  the  first  meeH 
of  personal  representatives  preparing 
for  Williamsburg,  I  was  asked  to  sun- 
the  meeting  in  one  word.  I  said,  "Job 
Indeed,  the  ultimate  judgment  about 
economic  policies  now  being  pursued 
be  based  on  whether  it  creates  jobs- 
quick,  empty  jobs  which  drain  resoun 
for  no  purpose,  not  jobs  which  destro  ^ 
more  jobs  than  they  create  but  a  healj 
growing  economy  which  creates  viabl  | 
jobs  based  on  a  rational  evaluation  of  j 
mand  by  the  actors  in  the  private  , 
economy.  , 

The  key  to  new  jobs  is  investmen. 
As  spending  recovers,  there  will  be  a  . 
reduction  in  unemployment  and  in  idl 
capacity.  But  in  the  long  run,  sustain-, 
able  growth  will  result  from  both  a 
growing  market  and  a  growing  capita, 
stock.  Of  all  the  billions  of  transactioi| 
that  occur  each  year  in  the  United  . 
States,  I  expect  that  none  are  more  s|' 
sitive  to  confidence  in  the  future  than^ 
vestments.  Econometric  models  usual 
try  to  capture  this  factor  through  sur^ 
data  or  estimates  of  excess  capacity.  ^ 
investment  decisions  are  necessarily  , 
complex.  I  have  participated  in  quite  .' 
few  major  investments  as  a  director  c 
large  corporations,  and  I  was  impress' 


Department  of  State  Bulle  i 


ECONOMICS 


the  number  of  factors  which  had  to 
brought  into  consideration.  I  was  im- 
sssed  also— in  a  less  favorable  way— 
the  number  of  factors  that  depended 
the  arbitrary  and  often  capricious 
liavior  of  governments. 
A  crucial  difference  between  the 
vate  sector  and  government  is  that 
>  private  sector  must  rely  on  volun- 
■y  transactions— whether  the  focus  be 
the  consumer,  producer,  middleman, 
whatever.  The  government  compels, 
addition,  and  perhaps  more  impor- 
it,  the  government  responds  to  differ- 
t  incentives.  Since  government  has 
;  power  of  compulsion,  it  can  radically 
inge  the  environment  in  which  an 
estment  decision  is  carried  out. 
gulation,  inflation,  export  controls, 
port  restrictions— all  are  possible  for 
rernments.  If  the  private  sector  is  to 
/e  the  confidence  necessary  to  engage 
investment,  which  always  entails  risk, 
■n  the  government  must  assure  stabili- 
in  the  areas  under  its  control  or,  even 
iter,  must  refrain  from  trying  to  con- 
1  certain  types  of  activity.  (One  exam- 
|;  The  Constitution  denies  to  the 
l.tes  the  power  to  control  interstate 
Inmerce.  As  a  result,  the  United 

I  tes  is  the  largest  free  trade  area  in 
world.  It  is  not  a  coincidence  that 
United  States  also  is  the  wealthiest 

ion  in  the  world.) 
The  confidence  necessary  for  a 
ival  of  investment  will  come  not  from 
re  government  action  but  from  less; 
from  new  "employment  programs" 
from  fewer;  not  from  greater 
nagement  of  the  economy  but  less; 
from  more  protection  for  industry 
less;  not  from  more  intervention  in 
hange  markets  but  from  less.  This  is 
a  prescription  for  a  do-nothing 
fernment— but  a  prescription  for 
I'ernment  which  deals  only  with  those 
!'  matters  that  are  best  handled  by 
I'ernment;  for  example,  defense,  law 

II  order,  and  the  infrastructure.  The 
fidence  which  will  revive  investment 
onfidence  in  the  free  market  system, 
orts  by  government  to  manage  the 
nomy  over  the  past  20  years  have 
ught  us  to  where  we  were  2  years 

I.  Cutting  back  on  government,  both 
nding  and  regulation,  and  projecting 
se  cuts  into  the  future  by  indexation 
;he  tax  schedule  are  first  steps  in 
toring  private  confidence  and  estab- 
ing  the  conditions  for  a  durable 
lovery. 
Permit  me  a  digression  on  a  favorite 
ject  of  many  critics  of  U.S.  policy- 


high  U.S.  interest  rates.  There  is  a  wide- 
spread mjrth  that  the  real  rate  of  in- 
terest in  the  United  States  at  present  is 
high.  This  is  emphasized  especially  by 
Europeans,  in  particular  the  French, 
who  blame  most  of  the  world's  ills  on 
the  high  real  rate  of  interest  in  the 
United  States.  In  fact,  there  is  no 
evidence  at  all  that  the  real  rate  in  the 
United  States  today  is  high. 

How  is  the  real  rate  of  interest 
calculated?  The  correct  way  is  to  take 
the  nominal  rate  of  interest  and  subtract 
from  it  the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation. 
The  incorrect,  but  common,  way  is  to 
take  the  nominal  rate  and  subtract  the 
current  rate  of  inflation.  At  present, 
there  is  a  substantial  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  current  and  the  anticipated 
rates  of  inflation.  Consequently,  there  is 
a  substantial  difference  between  the  real 
real  rate  and  the  unreal  real  rate. 

The  nominal  rate  of  interest  current- 
ly is  something  on  the  order  of  10%. 
Governor  Henry  Wallich  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  system  said  recently  that  a 
survey  of  businessmen  shows  that  they 
anticipate  a  rate  of  inflation  of  6%-7% 
for  the  next  10  years.  This  implies  that 
the  real  real  rate  of  interest  currently  is 
3%-4%,  which  is  in  line  with  historical 
experience.  The  unreal,  or  erroneous, 
real  rate,  however,  appears  to  be  7%  or 
8%  if  the  current  rate  of  inflation  is  2% 
or  3%. 

Why  the  discrepancy  between  the 
current  and  the  anticipated  rates  of  in- 
flation? The  answer,  I  think,  is  experi- 
ence. Since  the  Second  World  War,  the 
U.S.  Government  has  said  continuously 
and  emphatically  that  it  was  going  to 
eliminate  inflation.  Inflation  has,  in  fact, 
been  essentially  eliminated  three  or  four 
times  in  that  period.  Mark  Twain  said 
that  he  knows  that  it  is  easy  to  stop 
smoking,  because  he  has  done  it  many 
times.  Similarly,  we  can  say  that  it  is 
easy  to  stop  inflation:  We  know  because 
we  have  done  it  several  times.  After 
each  time,  however,  we  went  back  to  a 
rate  of  inflation  that  was  even  higher 
than  the  one  we  cured.  People  in  the 
market  are  aware  of  this:  So,  regardless 
of  the  intentions  of  the  Administration, 
they  are  going  to  be  slow  to  conclude 
that  inflation  really  has  been  brought 
under  lasting  control.  If,  in  fact,  infla- 
tion is  kept  under  control  for  a  period, 
people  in  the  market  will  gradually  re- 
gain confidence  and  lower  their  anticipa- 
tions of  the  rate  of  inflation.  After  all, 
until  about  20  years  ago,  the  United 
States  had  very  little  inflation  except  in 
times  of  war.  The  average  rate  from  the 
beginning  of  the  government  until  20 


years  ago,  omitting  periods  of  war,  was 
about  zero,  and  perhaps  even  half  a  per- 
cent negative.  So  there  is  a  real  chance 
of  bringing  real  interest  rates  down, 
provided  that  the  government  manages 
to  "stay  the  course." 

Most  of  the  measures  proposed  for 
lowering  the  real  rate  of  interest  would, 
in  fact,  raise  it  by  creating  expectations 
of  further  inflation.  The  only  way  to 
lower  the  real  rate  of  interest  is  to  gain 
credibility  for  government  intentions. 

It  should  be  noted  that  efforts  to 
lower  the  exchange  value  of  the  dollar 
against  other  currencies  would  also 
create  expectations  of  inflation.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  the  primary  eco- 
nomic rationale  for  a  declining  value  of 
the  dollar  in  relation  to  other  currencies 
is  for  the  United  States  to  have  a  higher 
rate  of  inflation  than  prevails  in  the 
countries  in  whose  currencies  we  are  in- 
terested. 


Debt  and  Trade 

What  about  the  debt  problems  of  the 
developing  countries?  Until  1973,  devel- 
oping countries  acquired  capital  prin- 
cipally through  assistance  from  govern- 
ments of  developed  countries.  The  rela- 
tionship between  donors  and  recipients 
was  as  much  political  as  economic,  or 
even  more  political  than  economic.  Since 
the  oil  price  surge  of  1973-74,  the 
developing  countries— oil-exporters  and 
oil-importers  alike— have  received  finan- 
cing from  the  international  capital 
market.  For  example,  the  share  of  bor- 
rowing by  developing  countries  in  bank 
loan  portfolios  rose  from  2.5%  in  1973 
to  4.5%  in  1982.  Over  half  of  total  LDC 
[less  developed  country]  debt  is  held  by 
commercial  banks.  This  shift  has  import- 
ant consequences  for  the  borrowers  and 
the  industrialized  countries. 

My  purpose  is  not  to  pass  judgment 
on  the  wisdom  of  accumulating  the 
amount  of  debt  now  owed  by  the 
developing  countries.  That  is  an  issue 
which  deserves,  by  itself,  more  time 
than  I  have  for  my  remarks  this  eve- 
ning. But  if  we  start  with  the  situation 
as  it  exists,  one  point  is,  I  think,  clear. 
Commercial  banks  are  private  profit- 
making  institutions  and  are  responsible 
to  their  shareholders  to  make  the  best 
possible  return.  They  are  not  foreign 
policy  agencies,  nor  are  they  intended  to 
provide  development  assistance.  They 
are  intermediaries  between  sources  and 


y1983 


ECONOMICS 


users  of  funds.  They  must  have  con- 
fidence that  there  is  a  reasonable  chance 
their  loans  will  be  repaid. 

In  domestic  banking,  the  concept  of 
collateral  is  valid  and  contributes  to  a 
smoothly  operating  financial  system. 
There  is  also  an  organized  procedure  for 
debtors  to  get  out  from  under  a  burden 
of  debt  that  is  unsupportable.  Bank- 
ruptcy is  not  without  costs  to  creditor 
and  debtor,  but  it  is  a  proven,  function- 
ing mechanism. 

In  the  international  arena,  neither 
concept  is  present.  Collateral  is  virtually 
meaningless  in  so-called  sovereign  lend- 
ing. Bankruptcy— or  default— is  not  an 
established  means  of  reorganizing  debts. 
In  addition,  for  reasons  of  foreign 
policy,  governments  in  the  banks'  home 
countries  get  involved  when  payments 
on  loans  are  in  jeopardy.  In  fact,  the 
question  is  now  being  asked:  "How  can 
governments  keep  the  banks  lending  to 
the  LDCs?" 

That  question,  in  a  sense,  begs  the 
issue  by  implicitly  ignoring  the  obvious 
answer.  Banks  must  have  confidence 
that  continued  lending  will  be  profitable. 
That  is  at  the  heart  of  the  way  a  market 
system  works.  Ideally,  this  judgment 
should  take  account  of  the  medium-  and 
long-run  factors  so  as  not  to  precipitate 
a  crisis  when  the  borrower  is  making  an 
effort  to  restore  its  capacity  to  pay. 

Rumors  of  "debtors'  cartels,"  pay- 
ments moratoria,  and  other  actions  or 
words  in  that  vein  from  debtors  and 
other  governments  undermine  confi- 
dence. In  international  banking,  even 
more  than  in  domestic  banking,  confi- 
dence is  essential.  That  confidence  on 
the  part  of  banks  is  being  eroded  at 
present. 

The  proper  question,  therefore,  is 
how  can  confidence  be  restored,  so  that 
private  banks  will  maintain  and,  if  ap- 
propriate, increase  their  loans  to  in- 
dividual countries?  The  IMF  [Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund]  clearly  has  a  ma- 
jor role  here.  So  do  the  borrowing  coun- 
tries, which  must  recognize  that  the 
banks  will  respond,  foremost,  to  eco- 
nomic and  financial  incentives.  The 
developed  world  also  has  a  responsibili- 
ty. Debts  cannot  be  paid  unless  export 


revenues  can  be  earned.  Manufacturing 
exports  from  developing  countries  face 
the  stiffest  of  trade  barriers.  Commodity 
exports  are  particularly  vulnerable  to 
recession  in  the  developed  countries. 

At  Williamsburg,  the  leaders  can  be 
expected  to  explore  the  debt  issue  in  this 
light— not  as  an  isolated  problem  but  as 
one  thread  in  a  fabric  of  growth,  trade, 
and  finance.  By  pointing  to  economic  re- 
covery and  by  committing  their  coun- 
tries to  roll  back  restrictions  on  trade, 
the  leaders  at  Williamsburg  can  con- 
tribute to  renewed  confidence  in  the 
economies  of  the  developing  countries. 
The  developing  countries  will  have  an 
opportunity  to  make  their  contribution 
to  renewed  confidence  at  the  meeting  of 
the  UN  Conference  on  Trade  and 
Development  which  begins  a  few  days 
after  Williamsburg. 

East-West  Economic  Issues 

My  third  topic— East- West  economic 
relations— poses  an  entirely  different  set 
of  problems.  I  will  not  go  into  any  detail 
here,  other  than  to  describe  the  prob- 
lem. More  than  in  any  other  "economic" 
relationship,  economic  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe  have 
a  security  dimension  which  cannot  be 
overlooked.  The  necessary  intrusion  of 
government  into  this  relationship  is 
caused  primarily  by  insufficient  confi- 
dence in  the  political  realm  between 
East  and  West.  This  results  from  the 
dangerously  threatening  behavior  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  West  must  find  a  way 
to  deal  with  the  adversarial  relationship 
in  the  political  and  security  dimensions 
and  still  enjoy  the  benefits  of  trade  in 
the  economic  dimension.  We  have  come 
a  long  way  in  the  past  6  months  toward 
better  understanding  of  the  economic 
and  security  aspects  of  East-West  eco- 
nomic relations.  Work  in  the  OECD 
[Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation 
and  Development],  COCOM  [Coordinat- 
ing Committee  for  Multilateral  Security 
Export  Controls],  NATO,  and  the  Inter- 
national Energy  Agency  has  been  in- 
tense and  productive.  Each  government 
must  now  examine  the  evidence  and 
adopt  the  policies  appropriate  to  its  cir- 
cumstances. 


The  Message  of  Confidence 

How  will  this  message  of  confidence 
emerge  from  Williamsburg?  A  messagi] 
requires  a  medium,  and  the  media  will 
not  be  absent  from  Williamsburg.  We 
expect  around  3,000  ladies  and  gentle- , 
men  of  the  press  to  attend.  But  I  fear 
that  the  true  message  may  not  be  heai 
These  press  people  must  look  for  ac- 
tivism, for  drama,  for  conflict.  If 
Williamsburg  goes  as  we  expect,  it  wil 
be  a  "dog-bites-man"  story,  not  the  mc 
dramatic  "man-bites-dog"  storj'  that 
would  make  good  headlines. 

We  have  experienced  20  years  or 
more  looking  for  government  to  solve 
economic  problems.  But  the  U.S. 
economy  cannot  be  dominated  by 
government  and  be  strong.  The  messa 
of  confidence  will  be  based  on  the  clea  j 
signs  that  economic  recovery  is  under 
way.  Tough  and  often  unpopular  polic  , 
in  the  United  States— and  in  Great  Br 
tain— are  paying  off.  Inflation  has  bee 
nearly  eliminated,  consumer  and 
business  confidence  stand  at  their 
highest  levels  in  9  years;  the  leading 
economic  indicators  are  strong  and 
positive. 

This  is  not  the  time,  as  some  woui 
suggest,  to  use  the  so-called  room  for  ■ 
maneuver  to  give  the  economy  a  kick,  j 
This  is  the  time  to  acknowledge  that  i , 
return  to  market  principles,  a  lower 
government  profile,  and  a  commitmerj 
to  sound  long-run  economic  policies  hj  j 
been  the  source  of  the  recovery.  The  , 
same  policies  can  assure  the  confidenc  | 
that  will  sustain  noninflationary  grow'j 
for  a  long  time  to  come.  ■  • 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


UROPE 


lATO,  Western  Security, 
3nd  Arms  Reduction 


>  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

A'I'Iri'xs  before  the  Executive  Club. 
Ji>.  .\nrivay,  on  March  21,  1983.  Mr. 
'  ))i  IS  I  )eputy  Secretary  of  State. 

>r  Americans,  a  visit  to  Norway  is  an 
)i()rtunity  to  learn  more  about  our 
)n  culture.  Much  of  what  we 
\iern'ans  take  pride  in,  we  owe  to  our 
>.r(iu-  heritage.  The  traits  of  personal 
ii'lK'ii.lence,  self-reliance,  endurance, 
li  [leiseverance  which  built  the 
iiiericaii  West  were  forged  here  on  the 
•ds  and  the  farmlands  of  Norway. 
Those  men  and  women  from  Norway 
D  crossed  the  sea  to  build  a  new  na- 
1  in  America  brought  with  them  their 
Is,  their  labor,  and  their  worldly 
ids.  They  also  brought  with  them  a 
of  values— respect  for  family,  for 
irch,  and  for  themselves  as  free  men 
I  women.  These  values  provided  the 
rral  foundation  upon  which  our  nation 
v.  built. 

On  a  more  personal  note,  I  am  par- 
i  .larl>  delighted  to  return  to  the 
■(i(in  of  my  own  ancestors. 

1  find  in  Norway  today  that  the  at- 
i  (ies  and  concerns  about  the  course  of 
vi(i  e\ents  are  much  the  same  as 
Ise  in  my  own  country.  There  is  con- 
:(:i  abiiut  continued  threats  to  interna- 
iial  peace.  There  is  anxiety  about  the 
riwth  m  armaments.  There  is  uncer- 
iity  aliiiut  the  future. 

1  am  not  surprised  that  these  con- 
»ns  are  keenly  felt  in  Norway.  People 
V3  have  experienced  the  horror  of  war 
ciiw  the  benefits  of  peace.  People  who 
11  e  experienced  the  oppression  of  oc- 
;iation  know  the  value  of  freedom. 
Astern  Europe  was  mankind's  greatest 
Ktleground  for  two  millenia.  Nations 
iijugated  nations.  Peoples  enslaved 
pj'ples. 

This  must  never  happen  again,  espe- 
aly  in  the  nuclear  age.  No  nation  must 
5Tr  be  allowed  to  assume  that  it  has 
n  thing  to  gain  from  a  nuclear  war.  As 
P:^sident  Reagan  has  said,  "A  nuclear 
ff'-  cannot  be  won  and  must  never  be 
fcght." 

That  truth  will  be  the  touchstone  of 
m  remarks  this  evening.  Those 
iRiarks  will  address  various  concerns 
a'ut  the  alliance.  Western  security,  and 
a  IS  reductions.  I  shall  describe  the 
fc'ndations  of  our  alliance  for  peace 
v^•h  freedom.  I  shall  then  describe  the 


policies  of  that  alliance.  Those  policies 
are  based  upon  two  imperatives:  the 
need  to  maintain  a  stable  military 
balance  and  the  need  to  maintain  a 
dialogue  on  arms  reductions.  Those  im- 
peratives are  clearly  manifested  in  the 
1979  NATO  "dual  track"  decision  which 
has  resulted  in  the  U.S. -Soviet 
intermediate-range  nuclear  force  (INF) 
negotiations  in  Geneva.  I  shall  conclude 
my  remarks  with  an  assessment  of  the 
prospects  for  agreement  in  those  impor- 
tant negotiations. 

An  Alliance  for  Peace  With  Freedom 

Modern  weapons  pose  an  unprecedented 
threat  to  security.  Yet  Western  Europe 
has  enjoyed  peace  with  freedom  for  the 
past  38  years.  One  must  go  far  back  in 
the  history  of  this  continent  to  find  as 
long  as  period  in  which  there  was  not  a 
single  war,  however  small,  fought  upon 
its  territory. 

Outside  Western  Europe  over  100 
international  conflicts  have  erupted  since 
1945.  Obviously,  the  peace  we  have 
known  for  38  years  is  no  accident.  It  is 
not  the  result  of  a  change  in  the  nature 
of  man.  It  is  not  the  result  of  a  change 
in  the  behavior  of  nations.  The  peace  of 
Western  Europe  results  from  an  act  of 
will  and  a  conscious  set  of  policies. 

The  act  of  will  is  the  commitment 
contained  in  Article  5  of  the  North 
Atlantic  Treaty.  That  article  asserts  that 
all  members  of  the  Western  alliance  will 
regard  an  attack  upon  any  one  member 
as  an  attack  upon  us  all. 

This  undertaking  was  freely  entered 
into  by  12  independent  nations  in  1949 
and  four  more  since  then.  It  is  more 
than  a  formal  gesture.  It  is  the  founda- 
tion upon  which  peace  in  Europe  has 
been  built  for  more  than  a  generation.  It 
recognizes  that  the  fate  of  Western 
peoples,  of  Western  values,  of  Western 
civilization  depends  on  the  ability  and 
will  of  Western  governments  to  work 
together.  Every  nation  in  the  alliance 
plays  a  vital  role  in  our  collective  securi- 
ty. The  United  States  applauds  the  im- 
portant contribution  Norway  has  made 
and  continues  to  make  to  the  alliance. 

The  act  of  will  embodied  in  Article  5 
has  been  translated  into  a  conscious  set 
of  policies.  Those  policies  have  kept  the 
peace  in  Western  Europe  for  well  over 


three  decades.  They  are  based  upon  two 
imperatives:  military  balance  and  arms 

control. 

First,  we  must  maintain  a  stable 
military  balance  to  remove  any  incentive 
for  aggression. 

Second,  we  must  maintain  active 
negotiations  between  East  and  West  to 
reduce  the  level  of  arms. 

The  policies  of  the  alliance  are  based 
squarely  on  these  twin  imperatives  of 
military  balance  and  arms  control.  These 
imperatives  found  their  most  recent  ex- 
pression in  December  1979.  At  that  time 
the  NATO  countries  unanimously  de- 
cided to  seek  limits  on  Soviet  long-range 
intermediate  nuclear  forces  in  Europe 
and  to  deploy  counterbalancing  forces  if 
negotiations  fail  to  remove  the  Soviet 
threat. 


Challenges  to  Mutual  Security 

After  nearly  four  decades  of  success,  it 
would  seem  that  few  in  the  West  would 
contest  that  peace  with  freedom  should 
be  our  common  goal,  that  collective 
security  should  be  our  vehicle,  and  that 
a  stable  military  balance  and  arms  con- 
trol should  be  the  twin  imperatives  of 
our  policy.  Yet  today  even  these  funda- 
mental notions  are  subject  to  debate 
within  the  member  nations. 

Some  serious  and  thoughtful  in- 
dividuals question  whether  it  is  moral  or 
prudent  for  the  West  to  maintain  such  a 
military  balance  with  the  East.  Others 
would  argue  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  ex- 
pend energy  and  resources  to  maintain  a 
military  balance.  Still  others  have  been 
persuaded  by  a  generation  of  peace  that 
the  Soviet  Union  has  no  current  ag- 
gressive intentions  against  Europe,  and 
would  not  develop  such  intentions,  even 
if  it  were  permitted  to  acquire  a 
preponderance  of  military  power.  The 
view  that  Soviet  restraint  toward 
Western  Europe  is  inherent,  rather  than 
enforced,  has  even  survived  the  Soviet 
use  of  military  might  in  East  Germany 
in  1953;  in  Hungary  in  1956;  in 
Czechoslovakia  in  1968;  in  Afghanistan 
in  1979;  and  in  the  continued  political, 
economic,  and  military  coercion  of 
Poland. 

In  our  alliance,  unity  and  resolve  are 
not  imposed  by  force  of  arms  but  are 
maintained  through  free  choice.  The  cur- 
rent debate  over  alliance  policies  is  a 
sign  of  the  vitality  that  only  a  free  part- 
nership of  sovereign  states  can  possess. 
We  have  always  achieved  broad  accord 


J  y  1983 


EUROPE 


on  the  challenges  facing  the  alliance  not 
despite  this  debate  but  because  of  it. 
A  clear  majority  of  the  Western 
public  now  agrees  on  the  threat  we  face. 
They  recognize  that  West  European 
peace  and  freedom  cannot  endure  if  left 
undefended  against  a  dominating  Soviet 
neighbor.  They  look  to  the  alliance  to 
take  concrete  steps  to  maintain  the 
military  balance  needed  to  prevent  war 
in  Europe.  They  also  look  to  the  alliance 
to  take  concrete  steps  to  reduce  the  risk 
of  war  in  the  first  place.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  our  efforts  to  maintain  a 
military  balance  have  been  paralleled  by 
the  maintenance  of  a  dialogue  with  the 
Soviet  Union.  The  most  important 
dialogue  of  all  is  that  which  seeks  to 
control  and  reduce  the  armaments  of 
war. 


Arms  Control  Agenda 

The  United  States  and  its  allies  have 
pursued  and  continue  to  pursue  every 
promising  avenue  toward  arms  control. 
Arms  control  has  always  been  a  major 
element  of  Western  security  policy. 
There  have  been  some  notable  successes 
in  this  endeavor:  the  Atmospheric  Test 
Ban  of  1963,  the  Nuclear  Non- 
Proliferation  Treaty  of  1968,  and  the 
SALT  I  accords  of  1972. 

The  1970s  were,  however,  a  par- 
ticularly disappointing  decade  for  arms 
control— disappointing  because  it  initially 
seemed  so  promising.  Many  negotiations 
were  begun.  Some  were  successfully 
concluded.  Yet  after  a  decade  of  negotia- 
tion, there  seemed  to  be  more  arms  in 
the  world,  not  less. 

This  disappointment  did  not  diminish 
our  resolve.  The  United  States  has  been 
the  historic  leader  among  nations  in 
seeking  genuine  arms  control  measures. 
Today,  with  the  support  and  cooperation 
of  our  allies,  we  continue  our  serious  ef- 
forts to  negotiate  effective  and  verifiable 
arms  control  measures. 

•  We  are  working  to  obtain  agree- 
ment on  a  European-wide  conference  on 
disarmament  as  part  of  a  balanced  out- 
come, including  progress  in  human 
rights  in  the  Madrid  Conference  on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe. 

•  Sixteen  months  ago  we  began 
negotiations  on  intermediate-range 
nuclear  forces  (INF)  in  Geneva.  This  was 
an  entirely  new  area  for  arms  control 
for  the  United  States  and  for  the 
alliance. 

•  Seven  months  later  we  began  the 
strategic  arms  reduction  talks  (START), 
also  in  Geneva. 

•  Last  summer,  we  and  our  allies 
put  forward  a  comprehensive  new  pro- 


posal for  reducing  conventional  forces  in 
the  mutual  and  balanced  force  reduc- 
tions talks  in  Vienna. 

•  Most  recently,  the  United  States 
has  urged  accelerating  negotiations  on  a 
comprehensive  ban  of  chemical  weapons. 
The  United  States  has  tabled  its  detailed 
views  on  the  possible  contents  of  such 
an  accord  in  the  40-nation  Committee  on 
Disarmament. 

In  short,  the  Western  approach  to 
arms  control  has  moved  along  several 
different  fronts.  Yet  one  cannot  ignore 
the  fact  that  recent  events  have  focused 
attention  upon  the  U.S. -Soviet  INF  talks 
in  Geneva.  I  should  like,  therefore,  to 
take  a  moment  to  examine  the  status  of 
those  important  negotiations. 

The  INF  Talks 

The  U.S.  position  in  the  INF  talks  is 
based  on  the  initiative  which  President 
Reagan  announced  in  November  of  1981 
and  which  has  been  fully  endorsed  by 
our  allies.  In  support  of  the  1979  NATO 
decision,  the  President  offered  to  cancel 
deployment  later  this  year  of  U.S. 
Pershing  II  and  ground-launched  cruise 
missiles  in  Europe  if  the  Soviet  Union 
agreed  to  eliminate  its  INF  missiles— the 
SS-4,  SS-5,  and  SS-20.  This  proposal 
was  based  upon  the  belief  that  the  com- 
plete elimination  of  the  entire  class  of 
longer  range  land-based  INF  missiles  re- 
mains the  best  and  most  moral  outcome 
to  the  negotiations. 

The  President  has  made  it  clear, 
however,  that  ours  "is  not  a  take-it-or- 
leave-it  proposal."  He  has  instructed 
Paul  Nitze,  our  ambassador  to  the  INF 
talks,  "to  explore  in  Geneva  every  pro- 
posed solution"  that  is  consistent  with 
the  principles  supported  by  our  Euro- 
pean allies. 

These  principles  state  that  a  fair 
agreement  must  be  based  on  equal  levels 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  forces.  British  and 
French  national  strategic  systems  are, 
by  definition,  not  a  part  of  these 
negotiations.  Soviet  proposals  which 
would  merely  shift  the  Soviet  threat 
from  Europe  to  Asia  cannot  be  con- 
sidered reasonable.  Finally,  a  fair  agree- 
ment must  contain  effective  verification 
measures,  and  not  undermine  our  ability 
to  defend  NATO  with  conventional 
forces. 

The  Soviet  Union  recognizes  the 
universal  appeal  of  President  Reagan's 
proposal  to  eliminate  an  entire  class  of 
nuclear  weapons.  It  cannot  afford  to  re- 
ject this  arms  reduction  proposal  in  prin- 
ciple, lest  it  lose  the  battle  it  is  waging 
to  sway  Western  public  opinion.  Yet  the 
Soviet  leadership  has  not  brought  itself 


to  accept  arms  reductions  in  practice. 
Instead,  the  Soviets  have  sought  a 
device  which  would  permit  them  to  ad' 
vocate  reductions  without  having  to  ad 
cept  them.  They  have  found  such  a 
device  in  their  insistence  on  compensai 
tion  for  British  and  French  nuclear 
forces. 

What  the  Soviets  are  arguing  is  th' 
they  must  be  allowed  to  retain  a  numl 
of  SS-20s  in  Europe  equal  to  the  i 
number  of  British  and  French  strateg 
forces.  This  argument  is  based  upon  a  I 
claim  that  a  nuclear  balance  currently  I 
exists  in  Europe.  The  facts  belie  this  I 
claim.  And  the  Soviets  know  the  facts  | 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  the  Briti 
and  French  forces  are  different  in  typ 
and  function  from  the  American  and 
Soviet  systems  under  negotiation. 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  almost  a 
the  British  and  French  forces  are  sea- 
based,  submarine-launched  strategic 
missiles,  not  land-based  INF  missiles  ' 
the  So\iet  SS-20. 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  the  Briti 
and  French  forces  are  strategic  weapi  r 
of  last  resort,  designed  to  defend  Brit  | 
and  France  not  to  prevent  attacks  on 
other  NATO  countries. 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  the  Unit 
States  has  rejected  similar  demands  f 
compensation  for  British  and  French 
systems  in  the  SALT  I  [strategic  arm 
limitation  talks]  and  SALT  II  negotia- 
tions. 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  their  de- 
mand for  a  nuclear  force  as  large  as  t 
of  all  countries  combined  is  tantamoui 
to  a  demand  for  military  superiority 
over  any  one  nation  and  thus  for  glob; 
hegemony. 

•  The  Soviets  know  that  only        j 
American  weapons,  not  British  or        j 
French,  can  directly  tie  the  defense  of 
Europe  to  the  U.S.  intercontinental 
force. 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  Soviets  : 
know  full  well  that  NATO  cannot  accei 
the  Soviet  demand  for  including  Britisf 
and  French  nuclear  systems  in  the  IN' 
talks.  I 

The  truth  is  that  the  current  Sovi(' 
position  in  Geneva  is  not  put  forward  '■ 
a  basis  for  serious  negotiations  but  as  ' 
means  to  block  progress  on  arms  con- ' 
trol.  The  Soviet  position  merely  gives  ' 
the  appearance  of  arms  control  while 
resisting  the  reality.  That  it  is  intende' 
as  a  barrier  to  progress  is  underscore(' 
by  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  have  refusl' 
to  resolve,  or  even  seriously  address,  il- 
portant  issues  in  the  talks  until  their  c!' 
mand  regarding  British  and  French  ' 
systems  is  met. 


Department  of  State  Bullel 


EUROPE 


In  erecting  such  a  barrier  to  prog- 
ss,  Moscow  puts  off  the  day  when  it 
ast  consider  serious  limitations  upon 
own  forces.  In  turn,  Moscow  hopes  to 
y  more  time  to  threaten  European 
vernments,  to  sway  Western  public 
inion,  and  to  secure  limits  on  U.S. 
stems  without  accepting  any  cor- 
sponding  limits  on  its  own. 

ospects  for  Agreement 

stating  that  the  Soviets  are  not  now 
gotiating  seriously  in  the  INF  talks,  I 
not  mean  to  suggest  that  they  will 
ver  do  so.  On  the  contrary,  we  have 
;en  before  seen  them  raise  similar 
stacles,  only  to  drop  them  once  the 
cision  to  move  toward  agreement  has 
sn  made  in  Moscow. 

I  have  already  noted  how  the  Soviet 
lion  raised  and  then  dropped  its  de- 
md  for  compensation  for  British  and 
ench  systems  twice  before,  once  in 
,LT  I  in  the  early  1970s  and  again  in 
.LT  II  in  the  latter  part  of  the  decade. 

In  1972,  they  moved  quickly  to  con- 
de  a  treaty  on  antiballistic  missiles 
BM),  but  only  after  the  U.S.  Congress 
!  voted  funds  to  build  our  American 
!M  systems. 

In  1980,  the  Soviets  reversed  their 
usal  to  negotiate  about  intermediate- 
ige  nuclear  forces,  but  only  after 
.TO  had  made  it  clear  that  it  would 
d  such  a  force  of  its  own  if  an  arms 
itrol  agreement  could  not  be  obtained. 
I  Today,  as  on  those  occasions  in  the 
;t,  the  alliance  must  demonstrate  to 
I  Soviet  leaders  that  they  cannot 
iiieve  the  limits  they  would  like  to  see 
lU.S.  forces  unless  they  are  prepared 
iccept  comparable  limits  upon  their 
n.  Once  the  Soviets  drop  the  illusion 
li  accept  the  reality  of  arms  control, 
y  will  find  the  United  States  and  its 
tes  ready  to  respond. 

We  will  pursue  with  imagination  and 
ior  the  INF  negotiations  and  all  the 
ler  arms  control  efforts  in  which  we 
\  engaged.  We  will  negotiate  in  close 
Iperation  with  other  allied  govern- 
ints.  The  United  States  believes  that 
ksultations  are  essential  to  securing 
'i  most  effective  participation  in  the 
ps  control  process.  Tomorrow  I  will 
i-e  such  consultations  with  the  Govern- 
jnt  of  Norway. 

1  A  vital  objective  of  our  government, 
(;r  government,  and  those  of  all  allied 
jions  is  to  secure  arms  control 
jeements  which  will  help  assure  that 
j  children  can  enjoy  the  peace  with 
sdom  we  have  experienced  for  the 
it  38  years.  Arms  control  alone  can- 
I  provide  these  conditions.  To  rely 


only  upon  arms  control  for  our  security 
would  be  to  rely  upon  the  good  will  of 
an  adversary  who  may  want  peace  on 
his  own  terms,  but  who  is  certainly 
hostile  to  freedom. 

But  as  long  as  Western  nations  dem- 
onstrate the  collective  will  to  provide  for 
their  security  through  their  own  efforts, 
arms  control  can  enhance  stability, 
lower  the  risk  of  war,  and  reduce  the 
burden  of  armaments. 

The  Real  Peace  Movement 

In  considering  how  to  proceed  in  the 
years  ahead.  Western  leaders  would  do 
well  to  recall  that  45  years  ago  the 
governments  of  the  free  world  engaged 
in  wishful  thinking  and  ignored  the  need 
for  a  balance  of  forces.  Their  peoples 
subsequently  paid  a  terrible  price.  Once 
truly  learned,  however,  the  lesson  was 
not  forgotten.  In  the  aftermath  of  war, 
the  Western  nations  created  by  an  act  of 
will  an  effective  instrument  for  mutual 
security,  the  NATO  alliance. 

The  twin  imperatives  of  military 
balance  and  arms  control  have  guided 
alliance  security  policy  for  the  past 
generation  and  have  preserved  peace 
and  freedom  for  that  generation.  Those 
imperatives  are  manifested  in  the  NATO 
decision  of  December  1979  to  seek  limits 
on  Soviet  INF  missiles  and  to  deploy 
U.S.  missiles  if  negotiations  fail  to 
remove  the  Soviet  threat. 


It  was  only  after  the  alliance  took 
this  decision,  unanimously  and  with  a 
common  commitment,  that  the  Soviet 
Union  reluctantly  agreed  to  enter  arms 
control  talks  to  limit  intermediate-range 
nuclear  missiles.  More  recently,  alliance 
solidarity  has  forced  the  Soviets  to  begin 
talking  about  what  seem  to  be  reduc- 
tions on  its  side.  Yet,  still  the  Soviets  in- 
sist that  they  must  have  a  monopoly  on 
these  systems.  Still  the  Soviets  demand 
compensation  for  British  and  French 
nuclear  forces.  Still  the  Soviets  attempt 
to  block  Western  deployments  by 
dividing  the  alliance  and  challenging  our 
resolve. 

As  a  result,  the  INF  issue  has 
become  a  test  of  the  alliance's  ability  to 
carry  out  a  decision  made  by  all  its 
members  and  a  test  of  Western  ability 
to  sustain  the  policies  which  have  pro- 
vided us  peace  with  freedom  for  over 
three  decades. 

After  34  years  of  success,  NATO 
should  be  considered  the  real  peace 
movement,  the  proven  peace  movement, 
the  only  peace  movement  which  guar- 
antees peace  and  freedom,  too.  We  must 
adhere  to  both  elements  of  our  approach 
to  East- West  relations.  We  must  main- 
tain a  balance  of  arms  to  avoid  war.  And 
we  must  pursue  effective,  verifiable 
arms  reductions  to  reduce  the  risk  of 
war.  In  so  doing,  we  will  make  NATO  as 
successful  a  peace  movement  in  the  next 
generation  as  it  has  been  in  ours.  ■ 


The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and 
Lessons  of  History 


by  Kenneth  W.  Dam 

Address  before  a  conference  spon- 
sored by  the  Atlantik-Brueck  and  the 
American  Council  on  Germany,  West 
Berlin,  on  March  25,  1983.  Mr.  Dam  is 
Deputy  Secretary  of  State. 

This  year,  as  we  all  know,  we  are  cele- 
brating the  300th  anniversary  of  Ger- 
man immigration  to  the  United  States, 
which  is  a  way  of  celebrating  the  enor- 
mous contribution  that  Germans  have 
made  to  America. 

Germans  who  settled  in  my  country 
have  enriched  its  literature,  art,  scholar- 
ship, science,  industry,  commerce, 
religion,  philosophy,  cuisine,  and  every 
other  dimension  of  American  life— not  to 
mention  American  beer.  In  the  19th  cen- 
tury, universities  and  graduate  schools 


grew  up  in  America  modeled  after  Ger- 
man institutions  of  higher  learning.  In- 
ventors like  George  Westinghouse  and 
Karl  Steinmetz,  entrepreneurs  like  John 
Jacob  Astor,  statesmen  like  Carl 
Schurz— the  list  is  endless— have  left  the 
mark  of  their  genius.  It  is  fitting  to  add, 
before  the  Atlantik-Bruecke,  that  one 
field  in  which  German-born  engineers 
made  a  remarkable  contribution  was 
bridge  building. 

This  heritage  is  only  one  of  the 
many  senses  in  which  Germany,  Europe, 
and  America  today  are  the  products  of  a 
shared  history  and  the  sharers  of  a  com- 
mon destiny.  In  the  second  half  of  the 
20th  century,  nothing  symbolizes  this 
better  than  the  city  of  Berlin.  It  is  a  pro- 
foundly moving  experience  for  any 
American  to  visit  here.  For  all  of  my 
generation,  Berlin  will  always  be  the  city 
of  the  airlift;  the  city  cruelly  divided  by 


y1983 


EUROPE 


a  wall  that  dramatizes  the  moral  and 
political  struggle  of  our  time;  the  city 
where  President  Kennedy,  20  years  ago, 
rededicated  my  countrymen  to  helping 
ensure  the  freedom  of  its  brave  people. 

Germany  and  Berlin  have  been  an 
important  part  of  my  own  life.  I  have 
lived  here,  and  my  experiences  here  are 
etched  deeply  in  my  memory.  I  shall 
never  forget  a  halcyon  weekend  I  spent 
in  Berlin  in  1961  just  1  week  before  the 
Wall  was  built.  Nor  will  I  forget  a  sum- 
mer spent  in  Zehlendorf  in  1976,  when 
my  5-year-old  son  had  to  walk  alongside 
the  Wall  each  day  to  reach  the  nursery 
school  he  was  attending. 

For  an  American,  a  stay  in  Berlin 
has  a  way  of  not  only  dispelling  some  il- 
lusions about  the  world,  but  also  of  re- 
kindling pride  in  the  courage  and  faith 
which  our  German  friends  have  shown 
in  the  cause  of  freedom.  For  all  these 
reasons— historical,  political,  moral,  and 
personal— I  am  honored  to  speak  at  this 
conference,  in  this  city. 

The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Past  and  Future 

This  year  we  also  celebrate  the  34th 
year  of  another  historic  common  enter- 
prise—our Atlantic  alliance.  "It  is  clear," 
Dean  Acheson  once  said,  "that  the 
Atlantic  pact  is  not  an  improvisation.  It 
is  a  statement  of  the  facts  and  lessons  of 
history."  Acheson  knew  that  the  facts 
and  lessons  of  history  are  only  guides  to 
action;  they  do  not  guarantee  action. 
Acheson,  who  was  present  at  its  crea- 
tion, knew  that  the  alliance  had  to  be 
created.  It  did  not  have  to  be;  it  took 
wisdom  and  some  courage  to  bring  it 
about.  In  a  new  era  in  history  it  is  up  to 
all  of  us  to  summon  the  same  wisdom 
and  courage  to  assure  its  survival. 

I  am  here  to  pledge  to  you  the  en- 
during commitment  of  my  country  to 
work  with  all  its  allies  to  ensure  our 
common  security,  freedom,  and  well- 
being  in  the  generations  to  come. 

The  Atlantic  alliance  has  been  a  re- 
markable and  unique  achievement.  It  is 
a  free  association  of  democracies,  joined 
to  defend  not  only  territory  but  a  set  of 
principles  and  values  embodying  a 
civilization.  Article  2  of  the  North  Atlan- 
tic Treaty  declares  its  common  purposes: 
not  only  collective  security  but  also  the 
strengthening  of  free  institutions;  pro- 
motion of  conditions  of  stability  and 
well-being;  elimination  of  conflict  in  in- 
ternational economic  policies;  and  en- 
couragement of  economic  collaboration. 

In  the  early  postwar  period,  the 
Western  democracies  faced  challenges  to 
all  these  common  purposes.  Their 


response  was  creative  and  bold.  The 
Marshall  Plan,  for  example,  had  more 
than  purely  economic  significance.  Euro- 
pean and  American  leaders,  taking  to 
heart  one  of  the  harsh  lessons  of  the 
peace  after  World  War  I,  remembered 
that  German  economic  recovery  was 
crucial  to  the  economic— and  political- 
recovery  of  the  rest  of  Europe.  They 
saw  that  the  European  economy  was  a 
geographic  whole  and  could  not  be  re- 
constructed solely  on  a  nation-state 
basis.  American  economic  assistance  was 
provided  on  the  condition  that  European 
nations  cooperated  among  themselves  in 
allocating  it.  In  response  they  created 
the  first  institutions  of  European  eco- 
nomic integration.  Our  leaders  created 
NATO  in  the  same  cooperative  image  to 
provide  a  shield  against  aggression. 
Behind  that  shield,  European  economic 
recovery  proceeded  and  accelerated. 
This  postwar  order  in  Europe  ensured 
for  the  free  world  an  era  of  unparalleled 
security,  prosperity,  and  human  prog- 
ress. 

The  facts  and  lessons  of  this  recent 
history  are  twofold.  One  is  that  our 
economic,  political,  and  military 
challenges  are  intertwined.  A  more  basic 
lesson  is  that  democracies  can  overcome 
enormous  challenges  only  if  they  have 
the  foresight  and  will  to  act  together. 
Despite  this  proud  history— and  perhaps 
because  of  the  complacency  induced  by 
success— the  alliance  today  is  the  object 
of  criticism  and  no  little  pessimism.  A 
generation  after  its  founding,  some  peo- 
ple question  whether  it  is  suited  to 
radically  new  conditions.  Some  question 
whether  its  members  still  share  common 
interests  on  many  issues.  Some  question 
whether  the  free  nations  still  have  the 
will  to  maintain  their  solidarity. 

The  dangers  we  face  today  may  not 
seem  as  dramatic  as  the  economic  dev- 
astation, political  instability,  and  overt 
military  threats  that  first  brought  us 
together  in  the  late  1940s.  Nevertheless, 
they  may  be  more  insidious  for  that 
reason  and  no  less  menacing  to  our  way 
of  life  and  shared  values.  We  need  a 
conscious  effort  of  rededication  to  over- 
come these  new  dangers.  "Business  as 
usual"  may  be  fatal. 

As  in  the  late  forties,  the  problems 
we  face  cover  a  wide  range  of  issues. 

•  In  the  economic  field,  we  face  the 
danger  of  mounting  protectionism, 
growing  debt,  low  growth,  and  cruelly 
high  unemployment. 

•  In  the  security  field,  we  must  re- 
spond to  an  unprecedented  Soviet  mili- 
tary buildup. 

•  In  the  political  field,  we  have  dif- 
fered over  too  many  issues  and  need  to 


shape  a  new  common  strategy  for 
meeting  the  Soviet  challenge  and  pro- 
moting our  shared  values. 

Our  task  is  to  address  these  prob- 
lems soberly,  sensibly,  creatively.  Our 
task  is  to  ensure  that  our  diversity 
enriches  our  alliance  instead  of  debilita 
ing  it.  The  problems  will  not  solve  ther 
selves.  Nevertheless,  I  am  confident  th 
by  statesmanship  and  common  effort  v 
can  surmount  these  obstacles  as  we  ha 
surmounted  so  many  others.  I  am  re- 
minded of  a  line  from  Lessing's  Minna 
von  Bamhelm: 

Man  spricht  selten  von  der  Tugend, 
Die  man  hat;  aber  desto  oefter  von  der 
Die  uns  fehlt. 

(One  speaks  seldom  of  the  virtue  that  c 
has,  but  all  the  more  often  of  that  whic 
one  lacks.) 

Let  me  address  the  three  categorii 
of  problems  we  face— economic,  milita 
and  political— and  their  interrelation-  I 
ships  and  suggest  common  approaches  j 
to  resolving  them.  I 

The  Economic  Dimension 

The  daily  lives  of  our  citizens  are 
touched  in  the  most  intimate  way  by  o 
problems  in  the  economic  field.  We  are 
now  emerging  from  a  recession  that 
lasted  17  months.  That  recession  was 
the  longest  since  the  end  of  World 
War  II.  Economic  activity  in  North 
America  and  Europe  has  declined; 
Japan's  industrial  production  has  leveli 
off;  the  growth  of  several  developing 
countries  has  stalled  under  the  weight 
the  $700  billion  international  debt. 
Unemployment  has  soared— 32  million 
people  are  out  of  work  in  the  24  ai 
vanced  countries  of  the  Organization  f> 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Develop- 
ment. 

We  all  know  that  these  economic  d 
Acuities  have  caused  hardship.  Equally 
important,  they  have  strained 
democratic  systems  in  some  countries 
and  caused  political  upheavals  in  other 
Protectionist  pressures  and  trade 
disputes  have  tested  the  political  bonds  I 
among  long-time  allies.  In  some  coun- 
tries economic  burdens  have  weakened  tt 
the  capacity,  or  at  least  the  willingnesi 
to  match  the  dangerous  Soviet  arms 
buildup  and  have  created  what  some  o 
us  regard  as  an  unfortunate  degree  of 
dependence  on  trade  with  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Soviet  Union. 

In  the  1970s,  after  the  first  oil 
shock,  the  democracies  found  the 
wisdom  to  cooperate  to  an  important 
degree.  While  growth  rates  were  fallinij 


Department  of  State  Bullet  j(,, 


EUROPE 


ition  rising,  unemployment  mount- 
and  energy  costs  soaring,  we 
thered  the  transformation  of  the  in- 
lational  monetary  system  from  fixed 
oating  exchange  rates.  We 
sloped  new  arrangements  for  the 
■ing  of  energy  supplies  in  times  of 
is.  We  absorbed,  however  imperfect- 
he  impact  of  major  shifts  in  the 
ribution  of  the  world's  wealth  result- 
from  the  oil  price  rises. 
Today,  in  the  wake  of  the  economic 
is  induced  by  the  second  oil  shock, 
lave  before  us  the  prospect  of  a  sus- 
ed  long-term  recovery.  In  several 
or  industrialized  countries  we  see  the 
;  signs  of  a  revival  of  vigorous  non- 
itionary  growth.  In  the  United 
;es,  for  example,  inflation  (measured 
he  consumer  price  index)  has 
iged  from  12.4%  in  1980  to  just  3.5% 
:e  12  months  ending  this  February, 
prime  rate  is  now  at  10.5%— about 
its  recent  peak  of  21.5%.  New  fac- 
orders  were  up  2.4%  in  January, 
e  inventory  backlogs  have  been 
ining  regularly  for  a  year.  Finally, 
Dow-Jones  industrial  average  has 
)ed  the  1,100  mark  for  the  first  time 
istory. 

The  recent  rollback  in  oil  prices  will 
all  of  us  consolidate  our  gains 
nst  inflation  even  as  we  begin  ex- 
iion.  But  our  prospects  for  recovery 
:louded  by  two  looming  problems 
•h  cannot  be  resolved  except  by 
lerative  action. 

The  first  is  the  debt  problem.  We 
'  made  a  good  start.  The  cases  of 
'-il,  Mexico,  and  Argentina  have 
vn  that  the  debt  burden  can  be 
aged.  A  successful  strategy  includes 
mbination  of  short-term  bridge 
icing,  plus  adjustment  programs  im- 
lented  in  conjunction  with  the  Inter- 
Dnal  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  com- 
cial  banks. 

To  provide  new  liquidity  vital  to 
re  economic  growth,  the  United 
ies  strongly  supports  the  proposed 
1%  IMF  quota  increase.  We  have 
pd  that  this  increase  go  into  effect  in 
li,  instead  of  1985.  We  also  support 
(expansion  of  the  general  arrange- 
Its  to  borrow  from  $7  billion  to  $19 
bn.  This  expanded  fund  will  be  avail- 
i  to  any  IMF  member  whose  liquidity 
jilems  threaten  the  financial  system 
i  whole.  We  are  urging  private  banks 
liay  their  part  by  maintaining  suffi- 
(t  levels  of  private  lending,  so  as  not 
iioke  off  debtors'  liquidity  and 
(ices  of  recovery. 

The  second  and  more  severe  prob- 
f  we  face  is  the  danger  of  protec- 
Sism.  World  trade  was  stagnant  in 


volume  in  1981  and  fell  an  estimated  2% 
in  1982.  We  all  know  that  protectionism 
would  further  restrict  trade,  sabotage 
the  recovery,  and  increase  unemploy- 
ment. In  the  United  States  one  out  of 
every  seven  jobs  is  export  related.  In 
Europe  the  ratio  is  even  higher. 

Prospects  for  recovery  will  depend 
upon  concerted  action  to  maintain  the 
open  trading  system.  Last  November's 
ministerial  meeting  of  the  General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT) 
kept  the  GATT  system  together  and 
moving,  however  slowly,  in  a  positive 
direction.  The  ministers  pledged  "to 
refrain  from  taking  or  maintaining  any 
measures  inconsistent  with  the  GATT." 

The  Reagan  Administration  will 
work  with  its  partners  to  translate  that 
open  trade  pledge  from  words  into  con- 
crete actions.  We  will  not  acquiesce  in 
other  nations'  trade-distorting  prac- 
tices—especially in  the  agricultural  and 
service  sectors  where  we  enjoy  a  com- 
parative advantage.  The  United  States 
sees  no  decisive  difference  between 
trade  in  these  sectors  and  trade  in  other 
goods.  We  regard  the  European  Com- 
munity's massive  use  of  agricultural  sub- 
sidies as  unfair  competition.  While 
agricultural  prices  in  the  United  States 
have  been  falling  in  real  terms  since 
1973,  the  Common  Market  has  boosted 
prices  on  some  key  commodities  to 
double  those  in  the  United  States.  The 
resulting  high  production  is  exported 
with  the  aid  of  subsidies.  The  United 
States  has  responded  to  this  practice 
through  serious  negotiations  and 
through  selective  action:  recently  we 
sold  subsidized  wheat  flour  to  Egypt. 

It  is  clear  that  there  is  no  unilateral 
solution  to  the  problem  of  agricultural 
trade.  Maintaining  farmers'  income  is  a 
difficult  problem  for  everyone.  We  must 
persevere  in  our  efforts  to  find  a 
mutually  acceptable  solution.  The  issue 
of  protectionism  is  an  economic  one.  But 
it  is  a  political  imperative  to  resolve  it 
before  it  jeopardizes  more  basic  common 
interests.  This  is  the  constructive  spirit 
with  which  my  government  will  ap- 
proach these  problems.  I  am  confident 
our  partners  will  reciprocate. 

Defense,  Security,  and  Peace 

Our  economic  well-being  cannot  be 
separated  from  the  broader  question  of 
our  security.  Amid  all  the  historic 
changes  that  have  taken  place  in  Europe 
in  the  generation  since  the  alliance  was 
founded,  the  reality  remains  that  Euro- 
pean peace  requires  maintenance  of  the 
balance  of  power.  Reality,  not  senti- 
ment, dictates  the  continuing  necessity 


of  collective  security.  The  central 
premise  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty, 
stated  in  Article  5,  remains  valid:  an 
armed  attack  against  any  one  member 
of  the  alliance  must  be  considered  an  at- 
tack against  us  all. 

For  more  than  three  decades,  this 
mutual  commitment  has  maintained  the 
peace.  For  38  years  the  European  Conti- 
nent has  enjoyed  peace  with  freedom 
and  with  unprecedented  prosperity.  One 
must  go  far  back  in  the  history  of 
Europe  to  find  as  long  a  period  in  which 
there  was  not  a  single  war,  however 
small,  fought  on  this  continent. 

You  and  I  know  that  this  is  not  an 
accident.  One  cannot  seriously  study  the 
history  of  international  relations  without 
understanding  that  an  equilibrium  of 
power  is  a  prerequisite  of  stability.  To 
say,  after  38  years  of  peace,  that  efforts 
to  maintain  the  military  balance  can  be 
relaxed,  is  to  propose  a  dangerous  ex- 
periment. The  burden  of  proof  should  be 
on  those  who  would  undo,  or  so  funda- 
mentally alter,  the  conditions  that  have 
kept  the  peace  for  a  generation.  NATO 
has  proven  that  it  is  the  real  "peace 
movement." 

At  the  same  time,  it  should  be  ob- 
vious that  a  balance  of  power,  though 
necessary,  is  not  sufficient.  The  democ- 
racies of  the  West  have  long  made  clear, 
in  many  an  alliance  declaration,  that  we 
are  prepared  to  reduce  tensions  with  our 
adversaries  on  the  basis  of  true 
reciprocity.  We  allies  are  dedicated  to  a 
stable  military  balance  in  order  to 
remove  any  temptation  or  incentive  for 
aggression.  We  are  also  prepared  for 
constructive  dialogue  with  our  adver- 
saries to  reduce  the  sources  of  tension 
and  risk  of  aggression.  President 
Reagan  joined  his  fellow  heads  of 
government  in  the  Bonn  summit  declara- 
tion last  June,  expressing  the  West's 
sincere  desire  "to  establish,  whenever 
Soviet  behavior  makes  this  possible,  a 
more  constructive  East-West  relation- 
ship through  dialogue,  negotiation,  and 
mutually  advantageous  cooperation." 

The  specter  of  thermonuclear 
weapons  makes  our  era  unlike  any 
other.  President  Reagan  has  affirmed: 
"A  nuclear  war  cannot  be  won  and  must 
never  be  fought."  To  this  end,  he  has  of- 
fered the  boldest  and  most  comprehen- 
sive program  for  nuclear  arms  control 
ever  presented. 

In  1981,  President  Reagan  proposed 
the  total  elimination  of  the  entire  class 
of  long-range  land-based  INF  missiles. 
This  proposal  was  made  in  support  of 
the  1979  NATO  decision  to  seek  limits 
on  Soviet  INF  forces  and  to  deploy 


EUROPE 


counterbalancing  forces  if  negotiations 
fail  to  remove  the  Soviet  threat.  We 
strongly  believe  that  the  complete 
elimination  of  this  entire  class  of 
weapons  is  the  best  and  most  moral  out- 
come to  the  Geneva  INF  negotiations. 
Nevertheless,  President  Reagan  has 
made  it  clear  that  ours  "is  not  a  take-it- 
or-leave-it  proposal,"  and  he  instructed 
our  negotiators  "to  explore  in  Geneva 
every  proposed  solution"  that  is  consist- 
ent with  the  principles  supported  by  our 
allies. 

These  principles  state  that  a  fair 
agreement  must  be  based  on  equal  levels 
of  U.S.  and  Soviet  forces.  British  and 
French  national  strategic  systems  are, 
by  definition,  not  a  part  of  these 
negotiations.  Proposals  which  would 
merely  shift  the  Soviet  threat  from 
Europe  to  Asia  cannot  be  considered 
reasonable.  Finally,  a  fair  agreement 
must  contain  effective  verification 
measures,  and  not  undermine  our  ability 
to  defend  NATO  with  conventional 
forces. 

President  Reagan  has  also  made  a 
sweeping  proposal  in  the  strategic  arms 
reduction  talks  (START).  He  proposed 
cuts  of  more  than  half  in  ballistic-missile 
arsenals  and  of  one-third  in  ballistic- 
missile  warheads,  with  equal  residual 
ceilings  on  both  sides.  These  deep  cuts 
focus  on  the  most  threatening 
systems— land-based  intercontinental 
ballistic  missiles.  The  President's 
START  proposals  would  enhance  stabili- 
ty by  reducing  any  attacker's  incentive 
to  consider  a  disarming  first  strike.  At 
the  same  time,  as  the  President  has 
said,  everything  is  on  the  table.  We  are 
prepared  to  consider  any  reasonable 
counterproposal. 

We  have  launched  major  arms  con- 
trol initiatives  in  many  other  fields: 

•  Last  summer  the  NATO  allies  of- 
fered a  comprehensive  new  proposal  in 
Vienna  for  the  mutual  and  balanced 
reduction  of  conventional  forces  in 
Europe. 

•  Last  June  President  Reagan  pro- 
posed here  in  Berlin  a  set  of  measures 
for  prenotification  of  ballistic  missile  test 
launches  and  major  exercises.  He  also 
proposed  measures  on  expanded  ex- 
change of  information  on  strategic  and 
INF  forces. 


•  Most  recently  the  United  States 
has  tabled  a  proposal  in  the  40-nation 
Committee  on  Disarmament  for  a  total 
ban  on  chemical  weapons. 

Experience  teaches  that  the  Soviets 
give  no  concessions  gratis.  Only  if  they 
see  that  the  West  is  determined  to  pur- 
sue its  own  modernization  plans, 
whether  in  strategic  or  intermediate- 
range  forces,  will  the  Soviets  have  an  in- 
centive to  negotiate  an  agreement  to 
lower  but  equal  levels.  The  United 
States  is  engaged  in  modernizing  its 
strategic  forces,  which  is  essential  to 
provide  the  Soviets  with  an  incentive  to 
negotiate  seriously  in  START.  The 
alliance  is  committed  to  deploy  INF 
missiles  if  there  is  no  agreement  in 
Geneva.  This  commitment  must  be  main- 
tained. It  offers  the  best  prospect  for  an 
effective  INF  agreement. 

The  Political  Dimension 

It  is  natural  that  free  nations,  volun- 
tarily associated,  have  different  perspec- 
tives on  many  problems.  Our  diversity  is 
a  source  of  our  vitality;  our  freedom  to 
disagree  is  one  of  the  freedoms  we  are 
defending.  NATO  is  not  the  Warsaw 
Pact.  Within  a  free  society  different 
views  are  advocated.  But  at  some  point 
there  is  a  resolution  and  a  common 
policy,  or  else  the  society  is  over- 
whelmed by  its  challenges.  The  same  is 
true  of  an  alliance.  Unanimity  ex  ante  is 
not  to  be  expected,  but  agreement  on 
common  policies,  after  free  debate,  is 
crucial. 

This  principle  will  be  tested  on  many 
issues  in  the  coming  years.  East-West 
trade,  which  has  been  a  divisive  question 
in  the  recent  past,  is  one  important  sub- 
ject currently  under  study.  The  issue 
will  not  go  away.  It  is  a  topic  at  the  vital 
intersection  of  the  economic,  military, 
and  political  dimensions  of  alliance 
policy.  It  makes  no  sense  to  strengthen 
the  military  potential  of  an  adversary 
against  whom  we  are  spending  billions 
to  defend  ourselves.  It  will  be  essential 
to  form  a  new  consensus  on  this 
strategic  issue. 


Conclusion  i 

Our  alliance  has  endured  this  long,  I 
believe,  because  amid  all  our  squabble; 
the  democracies  know  they  hold  ultimi, 
values  in  common.  These  are  the  pre- 
eminent moral  and  political  ideals  whi( ; 
our  alliance  was  created  to  defend:      , 
freedom  of  speech,  of  worship,  of 
assembly;  the  rights  of  the  individual; 
the  concept  that  power  derives  from  t 
consent  of  the  governed.  As  President 
Reagan  declared  in  London  nearly  a 
year  ago: 

...  the  ultimate  determinant  in  the  str  i 
gle  now  going  on  for  the  world  will  not  be  I 
bombs  and  rockets,  but  a  test  of  wills  and  i 
ideas,  a  trial  of  spiritual  resolve:  the  valuei 
we  hold,  the  beliefs  we  cherish,  the  ideals  ■ 
which  we  are  dedicated. 

In  such  a  test,  I  am  confident  the 
West  will  prevail.  This  conference  rep 
sents  our  ideals  in  action— the  un- 
fettered, open  debate  of  free  men  and  i 
women  on  major  issues  of  public  polic  I 
Those  who  built  the  Wall  know  how 
powerful  these  ideals  are.  They  have  i  ^ 
doubts  about  the  kind  of  society  in  wli , 
men  and  women  would  choose  to  live  ^ 
they  were  allowed  a  choice.  The  spirit , 
freedom  is  stronger  than  any  who  woi , 
suppress  it.  We  have  a  right  to  be  con 
dent.  But  we  also  have  a  heavy  respoi , 
bility.  History  knows  tragedy  as  well  i ' 
hope.  When  peoples  relaxed  their         i 
vigilance,  when  nations  became  compl  | 
cent,  when  alliances  weakened  becauS' 
of  a  failure  of  resolve,  history  has 
known  darkness. 

The  North  Atlantic  Alliance  will  b 
wrestling  with  economic,  military,  and 
political  problems  which  will  sometime 
divide  us.  We  must  face  up  to  our  proi 
lems,  and  resolve  them.  A  generation 
ago,  the  people  of  this  city  taught  all 
free  peoples  the  meaning  of  courage. 
And  other  democratic  nations— in- 
cluding my  own,  I  am  proud  to  say— c 
not  abandon  Berlin.  Today,  as  well,  to 
know  our  duty  is  not  enough.  It  remai 
to  do  it.  ■ 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


MIDDLE  EAST 


liddle  East  Policy  Update 


^Mcholas  A.  Veliotes 

Si.s/rnient  before  tfw  Subcommittee 
•iKii  r.ipr  and  the  Middle  East  of  the 
insi  F,  I  reign  Affairs  Committee,  on 
f'lf  J.  1983.  Ambassador  Veliotes  is 
Xiisi.i/ii  Secretary  for  Near  Eastern 
I  /  Smith  Asian  Affairs.^ 

11  Ki'iteful  for  this  opportunity  to 
liuss  with  you  recent  events  in  the 
didle  Kast  and  policies  the  United 
;  tes  IS  pursuing.  As  I  and  my 
lidtHcssors  have  said  to  this  subcom- 
rtff  many  times,  peace,  security,  and 
vl-lifin^f  for  the  nations  of  the  Middle 
Lst  art'  critical  to  a  broad  range  of 
^lencaii  interests.  That  is  why  we  con- 
iie  t"  place  such  high  priority  on  a 
>  iprchensive  and  balanced  policy  to 
i.teit  these  interests,  which  include: 

•  Meeting  responsibilities  we  bear, 
icausf  (if  our  role  in  the  world  and  our 
lip  tK's  to  the  Middle  East,  to  work 

I  the  settlement  of  conflicts  there 
V  ch  stand  in  the  way  of  progress  and 
iiaiiKt-r  international  security,  especial- 
yhe  .\rab-Israeli  dispute  and  the 
itig^lt'  fi""  a  fully  sovereign  Lebanon; 

•  .Assuring  the  security  and  con- 

,r  utiiii:  to  the  welfare  of  friendly  na- 
iis  111  'he  region; 

•  I'reventing  wider  Soviet  influence 
r  his  strategic  region; 

•  Supporting  major  U.S.  economic 
r-rests,  including  access  to  oil  and 
r'-kfts  for  U.S.  goods  and  services, 

11,  assisting  in  meeting  the  economic 
iielnpnient  needs  of  the  region;  and 

•  ('i)operating  with  the  more  well- 

;i  ovviMJ  states  of  the  area  to  maintain  a 
ultlis  international  financial  and 
>ui(iri;K'  order. 

In  -upport  of  these  broad  interests, 
.1  p.ilkies  of  highest  priority  which  we 
ii  currently  working  to  advance  are: 

•  .A  just  and  lasting  solution  to  the 
ogstanding  and  bitter  Arab-Israeli  con- 
It  through  negotiations,  as  proposed 
^President  Reagan  in  his  peace  ini- 
:iive  (if  September  1,  1982; 

•  The  restoration  of  a  peaceful,  in- 
iiendent,  and  fully  sovereign  Lebanon 
tough  full  implementation  of  the 
iieement  between  Lebanon  and  Israel 
[>.VIay  17,  1983,  and  the  withdrawal  of 
'^foreign  forces; 

•  Economic  and  military  assistance 
b'/riendly  nations  of  the  region  to 
eiible  them  to  defend  themselves  and 


deter  threats  from  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its  proxies,  as  well  as  arrangements  for 
strategic  cooperation  for  access  in  times 
of  threat;  and 

•  Continued  support  for  a  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  tragic  and  costly  war 
between  Iran  and  Iraq. 

The  pursuit  of  these  policies  con- 
tributes to  the  fundamental  goal  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy:  the  promotion  of  U.S.  na- 
tional interests  by  working  to  create  an 
international  environment  in  which  free 
and  independent  nations  of  the  world, 
including  those  of  the  Middle  East,  can 
realize  their  rightful  aspirations  and  the 
blessings  of  peace  and  progress. 

I  would  like  to  discuss  the  situation 
in  Lebanon,  the  peace  process,  and  a 
few  other  matters  in  greater  detail. 


Agreement  Between  Lebanon 
and  Israel 

First,  let  me  turn  to  Lebanon  and  our 
efforts  to  implement  the  agreement  be- 
tween Lebanon  and  Israel,  concluded 
May  17  with  the  assistance  of  Secretary 
Shultz  after  many  months  of  negotia- 
tions between  the  two  states  conducted 
with  the  good  offices  of  Ambassadors 
Habib  and  Draper. 

For  many  years  Lebanon  has  en- 
dured much  suffering  and  turmoil,  riven 
by  internal  factionalism  and  beset  by 
outside  forces.  The  entry  of  Israeli 
troops  into  Lebanon  last  June  added  a 
new  urgency  to  the  need  to  resolve  the 
Lebanese  problem,  and  subsequent 
negotiations  produced  the  May  17  agree- 
ment. 

The  agreement  reinforces  the  policy 
which  the  United  States  has  pursued 
toward  Lebanon  for  many  years:  we 
support  the  restoration  of  Lebanon's 
sovereignty  throughout  its  territory;  a 
strong,  stable  Lebanese  central  govern- 
ment; and  security  for  Israeli's  northern 
border.  History  has  proved  repeatedly 
that  Lebanon  can  realize  these  goals  and 
gain  peace  only  if  all  foreign  forces- 
Israeli,  Syrian,  and  PLO  [Palestine 
Liberation  Organization],  and  others- 
withdraw  from  that  beleaguered  nation. 

The  agreement  was  an  important 
step  toward  attainment  of  these  goals 
for  Lebanon,  and  we  can  be  proud  of 
this  example  of  U.S.  leadership  and 
diplomacy.  It  proves  again  the  point  that 
we  so  urgently  hope  other  states  in  the 
region  will  recognize:  negotiations,  if  pa- 
tiently and  persistently  pursued,  can 


succeed  in  moving  the  area  toward 
peace  and  stability. 

The  essential  elements  of  the  agree- 
ment are  that  Israel  has  agreed  to 
withdraw  all  of  its  forces  in  the  context 
of  a  simultaneous  withdrawal  of  Syrian 
and  PLO  forces;  the  state  of  war  is  ter- 
minated; the  border  between  the  two 
countries  is  declared  inviolable;  and  the 
territories  of  both  states  cannot  be  used 
for  attacks  on  the  territory  of  a  third 
state. 

By  providing  arrangements  for 
withdrawal  of  Israeli  forces  from 
southern  Lebanon  in  a  way  that  will 
restore  Lebanese  sovereignty  and  pro- 
tect the  security  of  Israel's  northern 
border,  the  agreement  is  a  major  step 
toward  peace  and  national  reintegration 
for  Lebanon  and,  we  hope,  toward  a 
wider  process  of  reconciliation  in  the 
region.  It  is,  therefore,  vital  that  Syria 
and  the  PLO  also  agree  to  withdraw 
their  forces  soon,  so  that  Israel  will 
withdraw  and  Lebanon  will  finally  have 
a  chance  to  bind  its  wounds  and  run  its 
own  affairs. 

The  Government  of  Syria  has  thus 
far  opposed  the  agreement  and  has  not 
yet  agreed  to  withdraw  the  50,000 
troops  it  now  has  in  Lebanon.  This  is 
disappointing,  of  course.  Syria  has 
stated  publicly  on  several  occasions  in 
the  past  that  it  was  willing  to  withdraw 
its  forces  when  the  Government  of 
Lebanon  indicated  they  were  no  longer 
needed.  The  Arab  League  summit  at 
Fez  last  fall  also  addressed  the  matter 
of  Syrian  withdrawal  in  light  of  Israeli 
withdrawal.  We  hope  that  Syria,  on 
reflection,  will  meet  this  commitment. 

We  recognize  that  Syria  is  a  proud 
country  and  has  legitimate  security  con- 
cerns in  the  area.  But  we  are  convinced 
that  these  can  best  be  protected  by 
withdrawal  of  Syrian  and  Israeli  forces 
from  Lebanon.  The  status  quo  leaves 
large-scale  Syrian  and  Israeli  forces 
face-to-face  in  the  Bekaa  Valley  and 
Israeli  forces  25  miles  from  Damascus. 
The  danger  of  confrontation  and  re- 
newed hostilities  in  this  dangerous  and 
volatile  situation,  by  miscalculation  or 
otherwise,  must  not  be  underestimated. 
No  one's  interest  would  be  served  by 
new  tragedy. 

We  are  encouraged  that  a  large 
number  of  Arab  states  have  either  sup- 
ported the  Lebanon-Israel  agreement  or 
have  supported  Lebanon's  right  to 
decide  for  itself  what  is  best  for 
Lebanon.  Only  a  few— like  Libya— have 
joined  Syria  in  rejecting  the  agreement. 
It  is  our  strong  hope  that  Syria  will 


Jiy1983 


MIDDLE  EAST 


ultimately  decide  it  does  not  wish  to 
bear  the  onus  for  standing  in  the  way  of 
Israel's  withdrawing  from  a  neighboring 
Arab  state  and  that  Syria's  interests  will 
be  served  by  supporting  Lebanon's  right 
to  full  sovereignty  over  its  own  country. 
The  dialogue  on  these  issues  continues. 

I  realize  that  Americans  are  con- 
cerned about  Lebanon,  not  only  because 
the  crisis  there  threatens  the  peace  of 
the  entire  region  but  because  U.S. 
Marines  remain  deployed  in  Beirut- 
together  with  French,  Italian,  and 
British  forces— in  the  multinational  force 
(MNF).  The  MNF,  which  is  serving  in 
response  to  Lebanon's  request,  is  pro- 
viding valuable  backup  to  the  efforts  of 
the  Lebanese  Government  to  preserve 
peace  and  order  in  the  Beirut  area  as  it 
works  to  extend  and  assure  its  authori- 
ty. We  expect  the  MNF  to  continue  this 
role  in  the  near  term.  It  is  not  possible 
to  predict  how  long  Lebanon  will  need 
the  MNF  for  this  valuable  support  role. 
Lebanon's  request  of  some  time  ago  for 
expansion  of  the  MNF  is  still  on  the 
table,  but  all  the  troop  contributors  have 
agreed  that  no  decision  on  the  issue  can 
be  made  until  Israeli,  Syrian,  and  PLO 
withdrawals  are  underway.  The 
Lebanon-Israel  agreement,  which  deals 
with  the  situation  in  southern  Lebanon, 
makes  no  reference  to  the  MNF. 

The  agreement  does,  however,  en- 
visage a  continued  role  for  UNIFIL  [UN 
Interim  Force  in  Lebanon],  the  UN 
peacekeeping  force,  when  the  agreement 
is  implemented.  It  foresees  that  the 
presence  of  UNIFIL  will  assist  the 
Government  of  Lebanon  in  reassuring 
Palestinian  civilians  located  in  the  Sidon 
and  Tyre  areas  in  southern  Lebanon  of 
their  safety.  We  believe  this  reassurance 
could  be  an  inducement  for  the  depar- 
ture of  PLO  forces  who  remain  in  the 
northern  and  eastern  parts  of  the  coun- 
try. 

UNIFIL  has  performed  an  impor- 
tant service  in  Lebanon  over  the  years 
in  helping  the  Lebanese  Government 
protect  its  sovereignty  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity. The  United  States  supports  a 
continued  role  for  UNIFIL,  not  only  in 
the  south  as  envisaged  in  the  agreement 
but  elsewhere  in  Lebanon  in  response  to 
the  needs  of  the  Lebanese  Government. 
Of  course,  it  will  be  up  to  Lebanon, 
working  with  the  UN  Security  Council, 
to  develop  an  appropriate  mandate  for 
UNIFIL  in  the  future. 

Before  turning  to  another  topic,  let 
me  say  a  word  about  the  attack  on  our 
Embassy  in  Beirut  on  April  18  that 


shocked  and  outraged  people  every- 
where and  took  the  lives  of  17 
Americans  and  over  40  Lebanese 
employees  and  bystanders.  I  want  to 
emphasize  that  we  are  thoroughly  in- 
vestigating that  incident  to  ensure  that 
we  are  doing  all  that  we  can  to  protect 
against  recurrences  of  such  savage  acts 
against  our  diplomatic  establishments. 
We  have,  over  the  years,  devoted  great 
efforts  to  securing  our  embassies 
against  terrorism.  However,  we  have 
learned  to  face  the  fact  that  drastic 
defensive  measures  to  make  our  em- 
bassies invulnerable  to  attack  would 
make  it  impossible  for  them  to  carry  out 
the  public  functions  they  must  perform. 
American  embassies  cannot  be  for- 
tresses, and  American  officials  abroad 
cannot  be  shielded  from  all  danger  if 
they  are  to  do  their  jobs. 

Middle  East  Peace  Process 

The  focus  of  attention  and  diplomatic  ac- 
tivity recently  has  been  Lebanon.  But 
the  most  fundamental  and  challenging 
issue  in  the  Middle  East  remains  the 
search  for  peace  between  Israel  and  the 
Arab  states,  including  security  and 
recognition  for  Israel  and  realization  of 
the  legitimate  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people.  I  want  to  emphasize  that 
although  we  have  been  intensely  in- 
volved in  the  Lebanon  question  recently, 
we  are  determined  to  move  forward  in 
pursuit  of  President  Reagan's  peace  ini- 
tiative of  September  1,  1982,  which  ad- 
dresses the  need  for  a  just  and  lasting 
resolution  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 

The  President's  initiative  reflects  a 
long  tradition  of  U.S.  leadership  in  the 
quest  for  peace  in  the  Middle  East.  We 
have  experienced  many  setbacks  and 
frustations  over  the  years,  but  progress 
has  been  made,  in  part  because  of  our 
determination  and  leadership. 

We  were  instrumental  in  1967  in  the 
adoption  of  UN  Security  Council  Resolu- 
tion 242  and  subsequently  Resolution 
338,  which  laid  down  the  concept  of  a 
simple  trade-off:  Israel  would  give  up 
territory  occupied  in  1967  in  return  for 
peace,  recognition,  and  guaranteed  in- 
ternational boundaries;  and  Israel  and 
its  Arab  neighbors  would  negotiate  to 
this  end.  These  resolutions  remain  the 
basis  of  U.S.  policy  in  the  Middle  East 
today. 


At  Camp  David  in  1978,  we  1 
Israel  and  Egypt  together  in  negotia-  I' 
tions  that  led  to  the  historic  peace  trea 
between  those  two  former  enemies.  T\'. 
treaty,  based  on  principles  of  Resolu-  ji 
tions  242  and  338,  was  a  triumph  of  i 
diplomacy  over  30  years  of  war  and  I' 
hostility.  These  principles  must  be  ap-  I 
plied  as  well  in  achieving  peace  betwe«  i 
Israel  and  Jordan  and  Israel  and  Syria 

President  Reagan's  peace  initiative 
which  is  based  on  Resolutions  242  and  ^ 
338  and  the  Camp  David  accords,  is  ai 
effort  to  reinvigorate  the  peace  procesi 
It  offers  incentives  for  other  parties—  j 
most  immediately  Jordan  and  the  I 
Palestinians— to  join  the  peace  process  I 
It  represents  a  delicate  balance  of  two  I 
principles  essential  for  Middle  East  I 
peace.  It  recognizes  both  Israel's  right  I 
exist  behind  safe  and  secure  borders  a  i 
the  legitimate  rights  and  just  require-  I 
ments  of  the  Palestinians.  In  our  view  ! 
these  principles  are  best  achieved  by  I 
self-government  for  the  Palestinians  o:  I 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  in  associatioi  I 
with  Jordan.  ' 

We  are  encouraged  that  the  Presi- 1 
dent's  initiative  has  received  wide  bipa  I 
tisan  acclaim  in  the  United  States,  anc ' 
we  are  gratified  by  the  support  of  our  i 
European  friends,  which  we  greatly  ' 
value.  We  are  also  encouraged  by  sup- 1 
port  for  the  President's  proposals  we  ! 
have  received  from  moderate  Arab  j 
leaders.  In  this  connection,  the  com- 
munique of  the  Arab  foreign  ministers 
at  Fez  last  fall  indicated  that  the  ( 

moderate  Arab  states  now  recognize  | 
that  the  question  is  not  whether  to  ma| 
peace  with  Israel,  but  how  best  to  do  s  J 

In  Israel,  despite  the  government's' 
rejection  of  the  President's  initiative,  I 
there  is  a  longing  for  peace.  Our  pro-  • 
posal  has  sparked  a  lively  dialogue  andj 
widespread  new  interest  in  a  realistic,  ' 
compromise  solution  to  the  Palestinian ' 
dilemma  and  Israel's  security.  These  aij 
positive  signs.  ' 

We  are  keenly  aware,  on  the  other! 
hand,  of  the  obstacles  that  have  thus  fil 
stood  in  the  way  of  negotiations  under ; 
the  President's  initiative.  We  understai' 
and  share  King  Hussein's  frustrations  i 
with  the  lack  to  date  of  Arab  support 
for  Jordan's  early  entry  into  the  peace 
process.  King  Hussein  continues  to  sup 
port  President  Reagan's  September  1 
initiative,  and  he  wants  very  much  to 
join  in  the  peace  process  based  on  the 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


SCIENCE  AND  TECHNOLOGY 


sident's  proposals.  Other  moderate 
bs  have  also  told  us  they  want  time 
elp  restore  momentum  to  our  ef- 
s,  and  they  want  us  to  continue  to 
Dort  King  Hussein.  The  door  is  still 
1.  We  stand  ready  to  consult  further 
1  these  Arab  leaders.  Our  peace  ini- 
ve  remains  on  the  table  and  will  not 
k^ithdrawn.  We  will  continue  to  work 
10 ve  the  process  forward. 

i-Iraq  War 

;n  I  last  met  with  the  committee  we 
e  unable  to  address  the  Iran-Iraq 
e  because  of  lack  of  time.  That 
istating  war  is  another  conflict  that 
ingers  the  peace  and  stability  of  the 
die  East  and  Persian  Gulf.  I  wish  to 
firm  U.S.  support  for  a  prompt,  just, 
peaceful  resolution  of  this  terrible 
,  whose  cost  in  human  and  economic 
IS  is  vast  and  tragic.  Recently,  a 
ar  oil  spill  in  the  gulf  from  wells 
laged  in  the  war  has  created  a  very 
3us  threat  to  the  marine  and  coastal 
ronment  as  well. 
We  will  continue  to  support  a 
Jtiated  settlement  of  this  war  in  ac- 
:ance  with  the  principles  of  interna- 
il  law,  including  support  for  the  ter- 
•ial  integrity  of  both  combatants  and 
ntervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
her  state.  As  in  the  past,  we  remain 
ral  in  this  conflict  and  stress  the  im- 
ance  of  independence  and  security 
ill  states  in  the  gulf  region. 
At  the  moment,  it  is  difficult  to 
ss  the  prospects  for  a  negotiated 
to  the  Iran-Iraq  war,  although  there 
been  considerable  activity  in  this 
recently.  A  delegation  from  the 
Cooperation  Council,  composed  of 
foreign  ministers  of  Kuwait  and  the 
,ed  Arab  Emirates,  visited  both 
-an  and  Baghdad  in  early  May.  They 
■rted  to  the  Gulf  Cooperation  Council 
iiid-May  and  are  awaiting  a  further 
;;ation  of  intent  by  Iran  before 
ing  a  second  visit  to  Tehran  and 
hdad.  The  Prime  Minister  of  Algeria 
led  Tehran  in  May  and,  according  to 
ial  Iranian  statements,  discussed  the 
with  senior  Iranian  officials.  Also,  a 


team  from  the  United  Nations  has  been 
inspecting  war  damage  to  civilian  areas 
in  both  Iran  and  Iraq  at  the  invitation  of 
both  countries.  Such  contacts  are  en- 
couraging, and  we  hope  that  they  will 
help  open  the  way  to  negotiations  for  a 
peaceful  settlement.  But  we  have  no 
basis  for  predicting  that  this  will  happen 


Conclusion 

Let  me  say  in  conclusion  that  this  is  a 
period  of  change  and  opportunity  in  the 
Middle  East.  The  Lebanon-Israel  agree- 
ment, the  President's  September  1  ini- 
tiative, and  signs  of  a  growing  recogni- 
tion in  the  region  that  continued  armed 
conflict  is  futile  for  all  offer  hope  that 


peace  is  possible.  As  the  President's 
peace  initiative  demonstrates,  the 
United  States  remains  committed  to 
playing  a  central  role  in  the  search  for 
peace  and  security  in  the  Middle  East. 
We  are  uniquely  suited  to  this  role 
because  of  our  profound  interests  in  the 
region  and  our  strong  ties  to  both  Israel 
and  the  Arab  states.  We  do  not 
minimize  the  formidable  barriers  that 
still  lie  in  the  way,  but  we  are  deter- 
mined to  continue  our  efforts,  working 
with  our  friends  in  the  region,  to  sur- 
mount these  obstacles. 


•The  complete  transcript  of  the  hearing 
will  be  published  by  the  committee  and  will 
be  available  from  the  Superintendent  of 
Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Of- 
fice, Washington,  D.C.  20402.  ■ 


U.S.  Arctic  Policy 


After  review  of  a  report  by  the  in- 
teragency Arctic  policy  group.  President 
Reagan  has  affirmed  that  the  United 
States  has  unique  and  critical  interests 
in  the  Arctic  region  related  directly  to 
national  defense,  resource  and  energy 
development,  scientific  inquiry,  and  en- 
vironmental protection. 

In  light  of  the  region's  growing  im- 
portance, it  warrants  priority  attention 
by  the  United  States.  U.S.  Arctic  policy 
will  continue  to  be  based  on  the  follow- 
ing major  elements: 

•  Protection  of  essential  security  in- 
terests in  the  Arctic  region,  including 
preservation  of  the  principle  of  freedom 
of  the  seas  and  superjacent  airspace; 

•  Support  for  sound  and  rational 
development  in  the  Arctic  region,  while 
minimizing  adverse  effects  on  the  en- 
vironment; 

•  Promotion  of  scientific  research  in 
fields  contributing  to  knowledge  of  the 
Arctic  environment  or  of  aspects  of 
science  which  are  most  advantageously 
studied  in  the  Arctic;  and 

•  Promotion  of  mutually  beneficial 
international  cooperation  in  the  Arctic  to 
achieve  the  above  objectives. 

The  interagency  Arctic  policy  group, 
reporting  to  the  National  Security  Coun- 
cil, will  be  responsible  for  reviewing  and 
coordinating  implementation  of  this 


policy  and  U.S.  international  activities 
and  programs  in  the  Arctic.  These 
responsibilities  will  not  include  purely 
domestic  matters.  In  discharging  its 
responsibilities,  however,  the  group  will 
ensure  close  consultation  with  agencies 
concerned  with  those  domestic  matters. 
The  interagency  Arctic  policy  group 
will  give  priority  attention  to  the  follow- 
ing reviews. 

•  How  should  U.S.  activities  in  the 
Arctic  region  be  coordinated  with  those 
of  other  countries  bordering  on  the  Arc- 
tic Ocean  to  serve  best  U.S.  Arctic  in- 
terests? This  will  include  consideration 
of  possible  actions  for  increased  coopera- 
tion. 

•  What  Federal  services  may  be 
necessary  for  the  United  States  to  pro- 
vide in  the  Arctic  region  over  the  next 
decade,  and  what  are  their  relative 
priorities?  This  will  take  into  account 
projected  developments  in  the  Arctic 
that  could  have  an  important  impact 
upon  Federal  agencies  with  statutory 
responsibility  for  areas  such  as  search 
and  rescue;  protecting  life,  property, 
resources,  and  wildlife;  enforcing  U.S. 
laws  and  international  treaties;  and  pro- 
moting commerce.  This  review  will  also 
recognize  that  resource  development  is 
primarily  a  private  sector  activity. 


Press  Release  161  of  May  9,  1983. 


TREATIES 


Current  Actions 


MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Convention  for  suppression  of  unlawful  acts 
against  the  safety  of  civil  aviation  (sabotage). 
Done  at  Montreal  Sept.  23,  1971.  Entered  in- 
to force  Jan.  26,  1973.  TIAS  7570. 
Accession  deposited:  Mauritius,  Apr.  25, 


Convention  for  the  suppression  of  unlawful 
seizure  of  aircraft  (hijacking).  Done  at  The 
Hague  Dec.  16,  1970.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  14,  1971.  TIAS  7192. 
Accession  deposited:  Mauritius,  Apr.  25, 


Automotive  Traffic— Customs  Facilities 

Convention  concerning  customs  facilities  for 
touring.  Done  at  New  York  June  4,  1954. 
Entered  into  force  Sept.  11,  1957.  TIAS 
3879. 

Accession  deposited:  Turkey,  Apr.  26,  1983. 
Territorial  application:  Extended  to  Macao  by 
Portugal,  Mar.  30,  1983;  effective  June  28, 
1983. 

Automotive  Traffic— Importation  of 
Vehicles 

Customs  convention  on  the  temporary 
importation  of  private  road  vehicles.  Done  at 
New  York  June  4,  1954.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  15,  1957.  TIAS  3943 
Accessions  deposited:  Hungary,  May  4,  1983; 
Turkey,  Apr.  26,  1983. 

Coffee 

Extension  of  the  international  coffee  agree- 
ment, 1976  (TIAS  8683).  Done  at  London 
Sept.  25,  1981.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  1, 
1982.  TIAS  10439. 
Notification  of  definitive  acceptance 
deposited:  Venezuela  Apr.  12,  1983. 

International  coffee  agreement  1983,  with  an- 
nexes. Done  at  London  Sept.  16,  1982. i 
Signatures:  Bolivia,  Apr.  29,  1983;  Brazil, 
Rwanda,  May  10,  1983;  Colombia,  May  12, 
1983;  Denmark,  May  9,  1983;  Ethiopia, 
Apr.  22,  1983;  Liberia,  Apr.  25,  1983; 
Madagascar,  May  2,  1983;  Mexico,  Tanzania, 
Apr.  27,  1983;  Philippines,  May  3,  1983. 

Conservation 

Convention  on  international  trade  in  en- 
dangered species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora, 
with  appendices.  Done  at  Washington  Mar.  3, 
1973.  Entered  into  force  July  1,  1975.  TIAS 
8249. 

Ratification  deposited:  Thailand,  Jan.  21, 
1983. 

Accessions  deposited:  Congo,  Jan.  31,  1983; 
Saint  Lucia,  Dec.  15,  1982. 

Amendment  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  3, 
1973,  on  international  trade  in  endangered 
species  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  (TIAS  8249). 
Done  at  Bonn  June  22,  1979.' 


Acceptances  deposited:  Chile,  Italy, 
Seychelles,  Tunisia,  Nov.  18,  1982;  Kenya, 
Nov.  25,  1982. 

Consular  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  consular  relations. 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  19,  1967;  for  the 
U.S.  Dec.  24,  1969.  TIAS  6820. 
Accession  deposited:  Sao  Tome  and  Principe, 
May  3,  1983. 

Customs 

Convention  establishing  a  Customs  Coopera- 
tion Council,  with  annex.  Done  at  Brussels 
Dec.  15,  1950.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  4, 
1952;  for  the  U.S.  Nov.  5,  1970.  TIAS  7063. 
Accession  deposited:  Libya,  Jan.  11,  1983. 

Customs  convention  on  the  international 
transport  of  goods  under  cover  of  TIR 
carnets,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Nov.  14,  1975.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  20, 
1978;  for  the  U.S.  Mar.  18,  1982. 
Ratification  deposited:  Morocco,  Mar.  31, 
1983. 

Diplomatic  Relations 

Vienna  convention  on  diplomatic  relations. 
Done  at  Vienna  Apr.  18,  1961.  Entered  into 
force  Apr.  24,  1964;  for  the  U.S.  Dec.  13, 
1972.  TIAS  7502. 

Accession  deposited:  Sao  Tome  and  Principe, 
May  3,  1983. 

Environmental  Modification 

Convention  on  the  prohibition  of  military  or 
any  other  hostile  use  of  environmental 
modification  techniques,  with  annex.  Done  at 
Geneva  May  18,  1977.  Entered  into  force 
Oct.  5,  1978;  for  the  U.S.  Jan.  17,  1980. 
TIAS  9614. 

Ratification  deposited:  Romania,  May  6. 
1983. 

Expositions 

Amendment  to  the  protocol  of  Nov.  30,  1972 
(TIAS  9948),  to  the  convention  of  Nov.  22, 
1928  (TIAS  6548),  concerning  international 
expositions.  Adopted  at  Paris  June  24,  1982.' 
Senate  advice  and  consent  to  ratification: 
Mar.  3,  1983. 
Acceptance 


U.S.,  Apr.  6,  1983. 


Finance 

Agreement  establishing  the  International 
Fund  for  Agricultural  Development.  Done  at 
Rome  June  13,  1976.  Entered  into  force 
Nov.  30,  1977.  TIAS  8765. 
Accessions  deposited:  Oman,  Apr.  19,  1983; 
Suriname,  Feb.  15,  1983. 

Agreement  establishing  the  African  Develop- 
ment Bank,  with  annexes.  Done  at  Khartoum 
Aug.  4,  1963,  as  amended  at  Abidjan,  May 
17,  1979.  Entered  into  force  May  7,  1982. 
Acceptance  deposited:  U.K.,  Apr.  27,  1983. 

Fisheries 

Convention  for  the  establishment  of  an  Inter- 
American  Tropical  Tuna  Commission.  Done 
at  Washington  May  31,  1949.  Entered  into 
force  Mar.  3,  1950.  TIAS  2044. 


Notice  of  denunciation:  Canada,  May  17, 
1983;  effective  May  17,  1984. 

Convention  for  the  conservation  of  salmon  i 
the  North  Atlantic  Ocean.  Done  at  Reykjavi 
Mar.  2,  1982.' 

Approval  deposited:  European  Economic 
Community,  Dec.  14,  1982. 

Genocide 

Convention  on  the  prevention  and  punish- 
ment of  the  crime  of  genocide.  Done  at  Par« 
Dec.  9,  1948.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  12, 
1951.  78  UNTS  277.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  China,  Apr.  18, 
1983.3''' 


i 


Human  Rights 

International  covenant  on  civil  and  political 
rights.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  16,  196( 
Entered  into  force  Mar.  23,  1976.2 

International  covenant  on  economic,  social 

and  cultural  rights.  Adopted  at  New  York 

Dec.  16,  1966.  Entered  into  force  Jan.  3, 

1976.2 

Ratifications  deposited:  Belgium,  Apr.  21, 

1983. 

Maritime  Matters 

Convention  on  the  International  Maritime 
Organization,  as  amended  (TIAS  4044,  628 
6490,  8606,  10374).  Done  at  Geneva  Mar.  f 
1948.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  17,  1958. 
Acceptances  deposited:  Fiji,  Mar.  4,  1983; 
Guatemala,  Mar.  16,  1983. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 
1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 
Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 
6490,  8606,  10374).  Done  at  London  Nov. 
1979.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Austria,  Iraq,  Apr.i 
1983;  Kenya,  Lebanon,  Apr.  19,  1983;  Me» 
ico,  Thailand,  Mar.  23,  1983. 

Amendments  to  the  convention  of  Mar.  6, 

1948,  as  amended,  on  the  International 

Maritime  Organization  (TIAS  4044,  6285, 

6490,  8606,  10374).  Done  at  London  Nov. ; 

1977.' 

Acceptances  deposited:  Austria,  Apr.  6, 

1983;  Mexico,  Mar.  23,  1983. 

International  convention  on  standards  of 

training,  certification,  and  watchkeeping  fo 

seafarers,  1978.  Done  at  London  July  7, 

1978. 

Ratification  deposited:  Greece,  Mar.  22,  19 

Acceptance  deposited:  Poland,  Apr.  27,  19( 

Enters  into  force:  Apr.  28,  1984.^ 

Pollution 

Convention  on  long-range  transboundary  i 

pollution.  Done  at  Geneva  Nov.  13,  1979.     i: 

Entered  into  force  Mar.  16,  1983.  TIAS 

10541. 

Ratifications  deposited:  Iceland,  May  5,  19! 

Switzeriand,  May  6,  1983;  Turkey,  Apr. 

1983. 

Prisoner  Transfer  | 

Convention  on  the  transfer  of  sentenced  p«l 
sons.  Done  at  Strasbourg  Mar.  21.  1983. 


Department  of  State  Bulletlj 


TREATIES 


iers  into  force  on  the  first  day  of  the 
ith  following  the  expiration  of  3  months 
ir  the  date  on  which  three  member  states 
he  Council  of  Europe  have  deposited  in- 
ments  of  ratification,  acceptance,  or  ap- 

M- 

natures:  Austria,  Canada,  Denmark, 
;.G.,  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
tugal,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  U.S.,  Mar. 
1983;  France,  Apr.  27,  igSS.^'" 

iperty — I  ntellectual 

ivention  establishing  the  World  Intellec- 

I  Property  Organization.  Done  at 

ckholm  July  14,  1967.  Entered  into  force 

•.  26,  1970;  for  the  U.S.,  Aug.  25,  1970. 

L.S  6932. 

ession  deposited:  Guatemala,  Jan.  31, 

3. 

I  Cross 

leva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
dition  of  the  wounded  and  sick  in  armed 
:es  in  the  field.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
9.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3362. 

leva  convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
dition  of  the  wounded,  sick,  and  ship- 
cked  members  of  armed  forces  at  sea. 
le  at  Geneva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into 
e  Oct.  21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  2, 

6.  TIAS  3363. 

eva  convention  relative  to  the  treatment 
risoners  of  war.  Done  at  Geneva  Aug.  12, 
?.  Entered  into  force  Oct.  21,  1950;  for 
U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956.  TIAS  3364. 

eva  convention  relative  to  the  protection 
ivilian  persons  in  time  of  war.  Done  at 
eva  Aug.  12,  1949.  Entered  into  force 
21,  1950;  for  the  U.S.,  Feb.  2,  1956. 
S  3365. 

essions  deposited:  Mozambique,  Mar.  14, 
i;  Zimbabwe,  Mar.  7,  1983. 

tocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
.ug.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
5),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vie- 
i  of  international  armed  conflicts  (protocol 
I'ith  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva  June  8, 

7.  Entered  into  force  Dec.  7,  1978.2 
essions  deposited:  Mexico,  Mar.  10,  1983; 
;ambique.  Mar.  14,  1983;  Tanzania, 

.  15,  1983;  United  Arab  Emirates, 
■.  9,  1983.3 

tocol  additional  to  the  Geneva  conventions 
lUg.  12,  1949  (TIAS  3362,  3363,  3364, 
5),  and  relating  to  the  protection  of  vic- 
!  of  noninternational  armed  conflicts  (pro- 
p1  II).  Done  at  Geneva  June  8,  1977.^ 
ered  into  force:  Dec.  7,  1978.^ 
essions  deposited:  Tanzania,  Feb.  15, 
3;  United  Arab  Emirates,  Mar.  9,  1983.^ 


ugees 

tocol  relating  to  the  status  of  refugees. 

le  at  New  York  Jan.  31,  1967.  Entered  i 

orce  Oct.  4,  1967;  for  the  U.S.,  Nov.  1, 

8.  TIAS  6577. 

ession  deposited:  El  Salvador,  Apr.  28, 

3. 


Satellite  Communications 

Convention  relating  to  the  distribution  of 
program-carrying  signals  transmitted  by 
satellite.  Done  at  Brussels  May  21,  1974. 
Entered  into  force  Aug.  25,  1979.^ 
Ratification  deposited:  Morocco,  Mar.  31, 
1983. 

Shipping 

United  Nations  convention  on  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea,  1978.  Done  At  Hamburg  Mar. 
31,  1978.' 
Accession  deposited:  Lebanon,  Apr.  4,  1983. 

Space 

Convention  on  international  liability  for 
damage  caused  by  space  objects.  Done  at 
Washington,  London,  and  Moscow  Mar.  29, 
1972.  Entered  into  force  Sept.  1,  1972;  for 
the  U.S.,  Oct.  9,  1973.  TIAS  7762. 
Accession  deposited:  Gabon,  Feb.  5,  1982. 

Telecommunications 

International  telecommunications  convention 
with  annexes  and  protocols.  Done  at  Malaga- 
Torremolinos  Oct.  25,  1973.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1975;  for  the  U.S.,  Apr.  7,  1976. 
TIAS  8572. 

Accession  deposited:  St.  Vincent  and  the 
Grenadines,  Mar.  25,  1983. 

Radio  regulations,  with  appendices  and  final 
protocol.  Done  at  Geneva  Dec.  6,  1979. 
Entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1982,  except  for 
(1)  Arts.  25  and  66  and  Appendix  43  which 
entered  into  force  Jan.  1,  1981,  and  (2)  cer- 
tain provisions  concerning  aeronautical 
mobile  service  which  entered  into  force 
Feb.  1,  1983. 

Approvals  deposited:  Haiti,  Mar.  25,  1983; 
Mexico,  Mar.  30,  1983;^  Venezuela,  Apr.  5, 
1983.3 

Terrorism 

International  convention  against  the  taking  of 

hostages.  Adopted  at  New  York  Dec.  17, 

1979. 

Accession  deposited:  Korea,  May  4,  1983. 

Entered  into  force:  June  3,  1983.^ 

Trade 

Agreement  on  technical  barriers  to  trade. 
Done  at  Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into 
force  Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9616. 
Acceptance  deposited:  Czechoslovakia, 
Nov.  15,  1982;  India,  Feb.  9,  1983. 

International  dairy  arrangement.  Done  at 

Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 

Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9623. 

Ratification  deposited:  Argentina,  Oct.  1, 

1982. 

Arrangement  regarding  bovine  meat.  Done  at 
Geneva  Apr.  12,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Jan.  1,  1980.  TIAS  9701. 
Declaration  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Paraguay,  Feb.  22.  1983. 

Transportation — Foodstuffs 

Agreement  on  the  international  carriage  of 
perishable  foodstuffs  and  on  the  special 


equipment  to  be  used  for  such  carriage 
(ATP),  with  annexes.  Done  at  Geneva 
Sept.  1,  1970.  Entered  into  force  Nov.  21, 
1976;  for  the  U.S.,  Jan.  20,  1984. 
Accession  deposited:  Poland,  May  5,  1983. 

UNIDO 

Constitution  of  the  UN  Industrial  Develop- 
ment Organization,  with  annexes.  Adopted  at 
Vienna  Apr.  8,  1979.' 

Approval  deposited:  Vietnam,  May  6,  1983. 
Ratification  deposited:  Cyprus,  Apr.  28,  1983. 

Women 

Convention  on  the  elimination  of  all  forms  of 
discrimination  against  women.  Done  at  New 
York  Dec.  18,  1979.  Entered  into  force 
Sept.  3,  1981.' 

Ratifications  deposited:  Denmark,  Apr.  21, 
1983;  Venezuela,  May  2,  1983. 

Wheat 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
wheat  trade  convention,  1971  (TIAS  7144, 
10350).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.' 
Signatures:  Algeria,  Costa  Rica,  Venezuela, 
May  9,  1983;  Argentina,  Barbados,  Belgium, 
Denmark,  EEC,  France,  F.R.G.,  Greece,  In- 
dia, Iraq,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Korea,  Lux- 
embourg, Netherlands,  Peru,  U.K.,  May  10, 
1983;  Guatemala,  U.S.S.R.,  May  5,  1983; 
Mauritius,  Apr.  28,  1983;  Portugal,  May  6, 
1983. 

Declarations  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
May  10,  1983;  Morocco,  May  17,  1983. 

1983  protocol  for  the  further  extension  of  the 
food  aid  convention,  1980  (TIAS  10015, 
10351).  Done  at  Washington  Apr.  4,  1983.' 
Signatures:  Argentina,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
EEC,  France,  F.R.G.,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  U.K.,  May  10, 
1983. 

Declarations  of  provisional  application 
deposited:  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
May  10,  1983. 

World  Heritage 

Convention  concerning  the  protection  of  the 
world  cultural  and  natural  heritage.  Done  at 
Paris  Nov.  23,  1972.  Entered  into  force 
Dec.  17,  1975.  TIAS  8226. 
Ratification  deposited:  Lebanon,  Feb.  3, 


BILATERAL 

Belize 

Agreement  for  the  control  of  the  illicit  pro- 
duction and  trafficking  of  drugs,  with  annex. 
Signed  at  Belmopan  Apr.  6,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  6,  1983. 

Bolivia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  for  sales 
of  agricultural  commodities  of  May  31,  1978 
(TIAS  9518).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
at  La  Paz  Apr.  8,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  8,  1983. 


y1983 


CHRONOLOGY 


Brazil 

Agreement  extending  the  interim  agreement 
of  June  23,  1982,  on  air  transport  services. 
Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Brasilia 
Apr.  20  and  May  2,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
May  2,  1983;  effective  Apr.  26,  1983. 

Canada 

Supplementary  agreement  amending  the 
agreement  of  Mar.  11,  1981,  with  respect  to 
social  security  and  the  administrative  ar- 
rangement of  May  22,  1981,  for  the  im- 
plementation of  the  agreement  on  social 
security.  Signed  at  Ottawa  May  10,  1983. 
Enters  into  force  on  the  date  of  entry  into 
force  of  the  Mar.  11,  1981,  agreement. 

Central  African  Republic 

Agreement  regarding  the  consolidation  and 
rescheduling  of  certain  debts  owed  to,  or 
guaranteed  by,  the  U.S.  Government  through 
the  Export-Import  Bank  of  the  United 
States,  with  annexes.  Signed  at  Washington 
Apr.  29,  1983.  Enters  into  force  upon  receipt 
by  the  Central  African  Republic  of  written 
notice  from  the  U.S.  Government  that  all 
necessary  legal  requirements  have  been 
fulfilled. 

Costa  Rica 

Agreement  relating  to  privileges  and  im- 
munities for  U.S.  personnel  providing 
assistance  to  the  drought-stricken  provinces 
in  northern  Costa  Rica.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  San  Jose  Mar.  30,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Mar.  30,  1983. 

Denmark 

Convention  for  the  avoidance  of  double  taxa- 
tion and  the  prevention  of  fiscal  evasion  with 
respect  to  taxes  on  estates.  Signed  at 
Washington  Apr.  27,  1983.  Enters  into  force 
when  the  governments  notify  each  other  that 
the  constitutional  requirements  for  entry  into 
force  have  been  satisfied. 

Agreement  relating  to  the  employment  of 
dependents  of  official  government  employees, 
with  addendum.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  May  16  and  20,  1983. 
Entered  into  force  May  20,  1983. 

Indonesia 

Agreement  for  the  sale  of  agricultural  com- 
modities relating  to  the  agreement  of  Dec.  2, 
1980  (TIAS  10063).  Signed  at  Jakarta 
Apr.  16,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  16, 
1983. 

Israel 

Second  amendment  to  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  17,  1982,  as  amended,  for  cash  transfer 
assistance.  Signed  at  Washington  Mar.  31, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Mar.  31,  1983. 

Italy 

General  administrative  agreement  relating  to 
participation  in  program  of  severe  nuclear  ac- 
cident research.  Signed  at  Rome  and 
Washington  Dec.  23,  1982,  and  Feb.  25, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Feb.  25,  1983;  effec- 
tive Dec.  23,  1982. 


Ivory  Coast 

Agreement  concerning  the  provision  of  train- 
ing related  to  defense  articles  under  the  U.S. 
International  Military  Education  and  Train- 
ing (IMET)  Program.  Effected  by  exchange 
of  notes  at  Abidjan  Mar.  21  and  Apr.  21, 
1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  21,  1983. 

Korea 

Agreement  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts 
of  the  United  States,  with  annexes  and 
agreed  minutes.  Signed  at  Washington 
July  26,  1982. 
Entered  into  force:  Apr.  28,  1983. 

Lebanon 

Agreement  modifying  the  agreement  of 
Dec.  22,  1982,  relating  to  air  transport  route 
rights  (TIAS  10489).  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Apr.  29,  1983.  Entered 
into  force  Apr.  29,  1983. 

Liberia 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Feb.  3,  1983,  on  construction  of  additional 
facilities  at  Roberts  International  Airport.  Ef- 
fected by  exchange  of  letters  at  Monrovia 
Mar.  25  and  Apr.  4,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Apr.  4,  1983. 

Mexico 

Agreement  amending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  9,  1972,  as  amended  (TIAS  7697,  9436, 
9647,  10159,  10234,  10466),  concerning  fre- 
quency modulation  broadcasting  in  the  88  to 
108  MHz  band.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Mexico  and  Tlatelolco  Feb.  14  and 
Apr.  8,  1983.  Entered  into  force  Apr.  8, 
1983. 

Agreement  relating  to  additional  cooperative 
arrangements  to  curb  the  illegal  traffic  in 
narcotics.  Effected  by  exchange  of  letters  at 
Mexico  Mar.  29,  1983.  Entered  into  force 
Mar.  29,  1983. 

Agreement  on  the  development  and  facilita- 
tion of  tourism.  Signed  at  Mexico  Apr.  18, 
1983.  Enters  into  force  when  each  party  has 
informed  the  other  by  diplomatic  note  of  the 
completion  of  necessary  legal  requirements. 

Poland 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Aug.  2.  1976,  as  extended  (TIAS  8524, 
10533),  concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of 
the  United  States.  Effected  by  exchange  of 
notes  at  Washington  Apr.  12  and  21,  1983. 
Enters  into  force  following  written  notifica- 
tion of  the  completion  of  internal  procedures 
of  both  governments. 

Spain 

Agreement  on  friendship,  defense,  and 
cooperation,  with  complementary 
agreements,  and  exchanges  of  notes.  Signed 
at  Madrid  July  2,  1982. 
Entered  into  force:  May  14,  1983. 
Supersedes:  Treaty  of  friendship  and 
cooperation  of  Jan.  24,  1976,  as  extended 
(TIAS  8360,  10401),  and  related  agreements 
(TIAS  8361,  9905). 


Thailand  f 

General  security  of  military  information  '; 
agreement.  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes 
Bangkok  Mar.  30  and  Apr.  5,  1983.  Enter* 
into  force  Apr.  5,  1983.  I 

Turkey  | 

Loan  agreement  for  cash  transfer  assistaii' ' 
Signed  at  Ankara  Apr.  22,  1983.  Entered  ' 
into  force  Apr.  22,  1983.  ' 

U.S.S.R.  j 

Agreement  extending  the  agreement  of 
Nov.  26,  1976,  as  amended  and  extended,  ' 
concerning  fisheries  off  the  coasts  of  the 
United  States  (TIAS  8528,  10531,  10532).  ' 
fected  by  exchange  of  notes  at  Washingtor 
Apr.  8  and  20,  1983.  Enters  into  force  foil, 
ing  written  notification  of  the  completion  c 
internal  procedures  of  both  governments. 

Yugoslavia 

Agreement  extending  and  modifying  the 
memorandum  of  understandings  effected  b 
agreement  of  Mar.  17  and  May  19,  1982, 
relating  to  air  transport  services  (TIAS 
10450).  Effected  by  exchange  of  notes  at 
Belgrade  Mar.  31,  and  Apr.  1,  1983.  Enter 
into  force  Apr.  1,  1983. 


'Not  in  force. 
^Not  in  force  for  U.S. 
^With  declaration. 
■•With  reservation.  ■ 


May  1983 


May  2-3 

State  Department  protests  Polish  police  in  ; 
terference  with  access  to  the  U.S.  Embassj 
in  Warsaw.  The  apparent  aim  is  to  prevent 
Polish  citizens  from  using  the  Embassy  | 
library,  Poles  who  convince  the  police  they  | 
are  not  planning  to  use  the  library  are  al-  j 
lowed  to  enter. 

I 
May  4  i 

With  respect  to  the  murders  of  two  U.S.  | 
AFL-CIO  workers  in  El  Salvador  in  1981,  , 
State  Department  issues  a  statement  that  i| 
is  "disappointed  in  an  appeals  decision  in  S 
Salvador  dismissing  charges  against  three  , 
people  implicated  in  the  murders."  | 

May  6  I 

Israeli  Cabinet  votes  to  accept,  in  principle 
an  agreement  with  Lebanon  on  border  secij 
ty  and  mutual  relations.  The  accord  is  intei| 
ed  as  a  basis  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israeli  . 
forces  from  Lebanon,  provided  the  PLO  an, 
the  Syrian  Army  also  leave.  Secretary  Shu| 
says  that  it  is  "a  significant  step."  | 

May?  I 

State  Department  informs  Salem  Spartak, 
Afghanistan's  Charge  d'Affaires  in  i 

Washington,  that  the  presence  in  the  U.S.  i 
his  Second  Secretary,  Masjedi  Hewadmal,  i| 
no  longer  acceptable  to  the  U.S.  Governme 
The  diplomatic  note  is  released  after  Peter 


Department  of  State  Bullet 


PRESS  RELEASES 


lam,  Second  Secretary  of  the  U.S.  Em- 
ly  in  Kabul,  is  declared  persona  non  grata 
he  Afghan  regime. 

10 

Reagan  Administration  announces  that  it 
deprive  Nicaragua  of  the  right  to  sell  its 
ted  58,800  short  tons  of  sugar  to  the 
,  in  the  next  fiscal  year.  Nicaragua  will  be 
ved  to  sell  only  6,000  short  tons,  with  the 
of  its  allotment  redistributed  among 
duras,  Costa  Rica,  and  El  Salvador.  This 
)n  is  taken  because  of  the  extraordinary 
ition  in  Central  America  and  its  implica- 
s  for  the  U.S.  and  the  region  as  a  whole, 
iraguan-supported  subversion  and  ex- 
list  violence  has  caused  considerable 
)lems  for  its  three  aforementioned 
hbors. 

11-16 

ze  Prime  Minister  George  Price  makes  an 
:ial  working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.  He 
travels  to  New  York,  where  he  meets 
1  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  UN,  Jeane 
;patrick  and  UN  officials. 

■  16-18 

Jecretary  Shultz's  invitation,  Romanian 
;ign  Minister  Stefan  Andrei  makes  a 
king  visit  to  Washington,  D.C,  to  hold 
assions  with  the  Vice  President  and  of- 
ils  of  the  State  and  Commerce  Depart- 


17 

-mediated  agreement  between  Israel  and 
inon  is  signed  first  in  Arabic  and  French 
eirut  suburb  of  Khalde  and  then  in 
lish  and  Hebrew  in  northern  Israeli  town 
iryat  Shmona.  The  agreement  will  enter 
force  when  the  two  governments  ex- 
ige  instruments  of  ratification. 
UN  Secretary  General  Javier  Perez  de 
ilar  visits  Washington,  D.C,  and  calls  on 
■etary  Shultz  to  discuss  topics  of  mutual 
:em  growing  out  of  recent  travels. 


•etary  Shultz  receives  the  Brazilian- 
irican  Chamber  of  Commerce  Man  of  the 
Ir  Award.  Also  receiving  the  award  is 
liilian  Finance  Minister  Ermane  Galveas. 

20 

iident  Reagan  sends  formal  notification 
he  sale  of  75  F-16  jet  fighters  to  Israel, 
le  the  timing  of  this  notification  is  related 
le  Israeli  agreement  with  Lebanon,  the 
ision  on  the  sale  itself- which  was  ap- 
"ed  over  a  year  ago  -  reflects  the  long- 
n  U.S.  commitment  to  maintain  Israel's 
litative  military  edge  in  the  region.  This 
bn  also  comes  with  U.S.  heightened  con- 
I  s  about  the  Soviet  challenge  in  the 
on,  particularly  the  Soviet  supply  of  the 
•5  integrated  air  defense-system  to  Syria. 
State  Department,  in  one  of  its  strongest 
ements  issued  about  Soviet  actions,  states 
'•  the  ruthlessness  of  the  raids  in  and 
'md  the  Afghan  cities  of  Herat  and  Kabul 


are  "intolerable  by  any  standard  of  civilized 
behavior."  There  are  also  reports  of  "ex- 
tremely heavy,  brutal,  and  prolonged  Soviet 
and  Soviet-mandated  bombing  of  civilian 
areas  within  Afghanistan  in  recent  weeks." 

May  25-28 

Italian  President  Amintore  Fanfani  makes  of- 
ficial working  visit  to  Washington,  D.C.  to 
meet  with  President  Reagan,  Vice  President 
Bush,  and  Secretary  Shultz. 

May  26-28 

Japanese  Prime  Minister  Yasuhiro  Nakasone 
makes  official  working  visit  to  Washington, 
D.C.  to  meet  with  President  Reagan. 

May  28-30 

Ninth  economic  summit  of  the  industrialized 
nations  is  held  in  Williamsburg,  Virginia, 
with  President  Reagan  as  Chairman.  Other 
participants  include  French  President  Fran- 
cois Mitterrand,  Canadian  Prime  Minister 
Pierre-Elliott  Trudeau,  West  German 
Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl,  Italian  Prime 
Minister  Amintore  Fanfani,  Japanese  Prime 
Minister  Yasuhiro  Nakasone,  British  Prime 
Minister  Margaret  Thatcher,  and  Gaston 
Thorn,  President  of  the  European  Com- 
munities Commission.  ■ 


Department  of  State 


Press  releases  may  be  obtained  from  the  Of- 
fice of  Press  Relations,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 

No.  Date  Subject 

•139      5/2          Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 

from  Beirut  to  Jerusalem, 

Apr.  28. 
•140      5/3          Shultz,  Begin:  remarks, 

Jerusalem,  Apr.  28. 
•141      5/3          Shultz,  Shamir:  remarks, 

Jerusalem,  Apr.  29. 
•142      5/3          Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 

from  Jerusalem  to  Beirut, 

Apr.  30. 
143      5/3         Shultz,  Salem:  remarks, 

Baabda,  May  1. 
*  144      5/4          Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 

from  Beirut  to  Jerusalem, 

May  1. 
•145      5/3         Shultz:  remarks,  Jersualem, 

May  1. 

146  5/4         Shultz,  Begin:  remarks, 

Jerusalem,  May  1. 

147  5/4         Shultz,  Begin:  remarks, 

Jerusalem,  May  2. 

•148      5/4         Shultz:  remarks,  Jerusalem, 
May  2. 

•149      5/4         Jay  P.  Moffat  sworn  in  as 
Ambassador  to  Chad  (bio- 
graphic data). 


>151       5/4 

152  5/4 

153  5/4 


•155  5/5 

•156  5/5 

•157  5/5 

158  5/9 

•159  5/6 


160  5/6 

161  5/9 
•162      5/9 


164 

5/10 

165 

5/10 

■166 

5/10 

167 

5/10 

168 

5/10 

"169 

5/11 

170 

5/11 

171 

5/11 

172 

5/11 

173 

5/10 

U.S.  Organization  for  the 
International  Telegraph 
and  Telephone  Con- 
sultative Committee 
(CCITT),  study  group  A, 
May  25. 

Fine  Arts  Committee, 
June  20. 

Shultz,  Shamir:  remarks, 
Jerusalem,  May  3. 

Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1952-1954: 
Volume  XI:  Africa  and 
South  Asia  (in  two  parts) 
released. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 
from  Jerusalem  to  Beirut, 
May  3. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 
from  Beirut  to  Jerusalem, 
May  4. 

Shultz,  Shamir:  remarks, 
Jerusalem,  May  4. 

Shultz,  Begin:  remarks, 
Jerusalem,  May  4. 

Shultz,  Salem:  news  briefing, 
Beirut,  May  4. 

Shultz:  remarks  at  the 
inauguration  of  Israeli 
President  Haim  Herzog, 
Jerusalem,  May  5. 

Shultz:  remarks,  Jerusalem. 

U.S.  Arctic  policy. 

Shultz:  question-and-answer 
session,  Jerusalem,  May  6. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 
from  Jerusalem  to  Am- 
man, May  6. 

Shultz,  Kasim:  remarks, 
Amman,  May  6. 

Shultz:  departure  statement, 
Amman,  May  7. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 
from  Amman  to 
Damascus,  May  7. 

Shultz:  Khaddam:  news 
briefing,  Damascus, 
May  7. 

Shultz:  arrival  remarks, 
Jidda,  May  7. 

Shultz:  news  briefing  enroute 
from  Jidda  to  Tel  Aviv, 
May  8. 

Shultz,  Shamir:  remarks, 
Tel  Aviv,  May  8. 

Shultz:  interview  with 
ABC-TV  correspondent, 
Tel  Aviv,  May  8. 

Shultz:  departure  remarks, 
Beirut.  May  8. 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C,  of 
Belize  Prime  Minister 
George  C  Price,  May 
11-14. 

Advisory  Committee  on 
Oceans  and  International 
Environmental  and  Scien- 
tific Affairs,  June  1. 

CCITT,  study  group  D, 
June  1. 


PUBLICATIONS 


•176 

5/10 

CCITT,  integrated  services 
digital  network,  June  2. 

•177 

5/10 

CCITT,  study  group  C, 
June  9. 

178 

5/11 

Shultz:  statement  at  the 
OECD  ministerial,  Paris, 
May  9. 

179 

5/17 

Shultz:  news  conference, 
Paris,  May  10. 

180 

5/13 

Shultz:  news  briefing 

following  meeting  with  the 
President,  White  House, 
May  11. 

181 

[Not  issued.] 

•182 

5/13 

James  D.  Rosenthal  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Guinea  (biographic  data). 

•183 

5/16 

Shultz:  remarks  at  the 

Secretary's  Commission  on 
Security  and  Economic 
Assistance,  Apr.  13. 

184 

5/13 

Shultz:  address  to  the 
Business  Council,  Hot 
Springs,  Va. 

•185 

5/17 

Shultz:  remarks  at  an  inter- 
national monetary  con- 
ference. 

•186 

5/19 

Shultz:  statement  before  the 
Subcommittee  on  Foreign 
Operations,  Committee  on 
Appropriations,  House 
Foreign  Affairs  Commit- 
tee. 

•187 

5/19 

Shultz:  remarks  to  Brazilian- 
American  Chamber  of 
Commerce.  New  York. 

•188 

5/24 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  of 
Italian  Prime  Minister 
Fanfani,  May  25-28. 

•189 

5/24 

Advisory  Committee  on 
International  Investment, 
Technology,  and  Develop- 
ment, June  20. 

•190 

5/24 

Shultz:  press  briefing  on  the 
Williamsburg  Summit, 
May  20. 

•191 

5/25 

Program  for  the  official 
working  visit  to 
Washington,  D.C.,  of 
Japanese  Prime  Minister 
Nakasone,  May  26-28. 

192 

5/25 

Return  of  certain  Mariel 
Cubans. 

•193 

5/25 

Alvin  P.  Adams,  Jr.,  sworn 
in  as  Ambassador  to 
Djibouti  (biographic  data). 

194 

5/25 

Shultz:  remarks  at  a 

reception  in  honor  of  the 
20th  anniversary  of  the 
OAU. 

•Not  printed  in  the  Bulletin. 


Department  of  State 


Free,  single  copies  of  the  following  Depart- 
ment of  State  publications  are  available  from 
the  Public  Information  Service,  Bureau  of 
Public  Affairs,  Department  of  State, 
Washington,  D.C.  20520. 


Secretary  Shultz 

The  U.S.  and  the  Developing  Worid:  Our 
Joint  Stake  in  the  World  Economy,  Foreign 
Policy  Assoc,  New  York,  May  26,  1983 
(Current  Policy  #487). 

Middle  East:  Negotiation  and  Reconciliation, 
Business  Council,  Hot  Springs,  Va.,  May 
13,  1983  (Current  Policy  #484). 

Arms  Control 

INF  Modernization  and  Arms  Control  (GIST, 
May  1983). 

Economics 

American  Policy  To  Promote  World  De- 
velopment. Under  Secretary  Wallis,  Inter- 
national Development  Conference,  May  18, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #485). 

Williamsburg  in  One  Word:  Confidence, 


Under  Secretary  Wallis.  1983  Foreign  In- 
vestment Policy  Forum,  May  4,  1983  (Cui 
rent  Policy  #483).  ' 

I 
Europe 

Background  Notes  on  Bulgaria  (April  1983; 
Background  Notes  on  the  Federal  Republic 

Germany  (May  1983).  ' 

Background  Notes  on  Hungary  (May  1983) ' 
Background  Notes  on  Liechtenstein 

(April  1983).  i 

i 
General 
The  Marshall  Plan:  Origins  and  Imple-         ! 

mentation,  William  Sanford,  Jr.,  Office  o 

the  Historian  (Bulletin  Reprint).  ' 

International  Law 

Extraterritoriality  and  Conflicts  of  Juris-    ] 
diction.  Deputy  Secretary  Dam,  America 
Society  of  International  Law,  April  15, 
1983  (Current  Policy  #481). 


i 


Western  Hemisphere 

El  Salvador's  Land  Reform  (GIST,  April 


Background  Notes  on  Cuba  (April  1983).  ■< 


Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 


The  Department  of  State  on  May  4, 
1983,  released  Foreign  Relations  of  the 
United  States,  1952-1954,  Volume  XI, 
Africa  and  South  Asia.  The  Foreign 
Relations  series  has  been  published  con- 
tinuously since  1861  as  the  official 
record  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  This  is  the 
fourth  of  16  volumes  covering  the  years 
1952-54. 

The  volume  presents  1,917  pages  of 
documents,  most  of  them  previously  un- 
published and  newly  declassified,  on 
U.S.  relations  with  Africa  and  with 
South  Africa.  The  volume  is  published  in 
two  parts.  The  documents  are  accom- 
panied by  scholarly  aids,  including  lists 
of  persons,  abbreviations,  and  sources. 
These  aids  are  in  Part  1.  The  index  to 
both  parts  is  in  Part  2. 

The  1,056  pages  of  documents  in 
Part  1  deal  with  Africa.  This  constitutes 
the  broadest  coverage  of  Africa  in  the 
series  so  far.  The  documents  cover 
genera]  U.S.  policies  toward  the  conti- 
nent; developments  in  the  Gold  Coast 
and  Nigeria,  British  East  Africa,  and 
French  West  and  Equatorial  Africa;  the 
establishment  of  the  Central  African 
Federation;  changes  in  the  ad- 
ministrative and  judicial  status  of 
Tangier;  nationalist  ferment  in  Algeria, 


Morocco,  and  Tunisia;  racial  policies  it 
the  Union  of  South  Africa;  and  the 
renegotiation  of  base  rights  in  Libya.  ' 
Other  sections  present  documents  on  I 
bilateral  relations  with  the  Belgian  Co  i 
go,  Ethiopia,  and  Liberia.  [ 

The  861  pages  in  Part  2  cover  U.S 
policy  toward  South  Asia,  including  U. 
efforts  to  resolve  the  Kashmir  disputet 
between  India  and  Pakistan  and  the  j 
Pushtunistan  dispute  between 
Afghanistan  and  Pakistan.  Part  2  alsc 
contains  material  on  U.S.  bilateral  re\i^ 
tions  with  Afghanistan,  Sri  Lanka 
(Ceylon),  India,  and  Pakistan.  i 

Foreign  Relations,  1952-1954, 
Volume  XI,  was  prepared  in  the  Offict 
of  the  Historian,  Bureau  of  Public  Af- ' 
fairs.  Department  of  State.  Copies  of  | 
Volume  XI  (Department  of  State 
Publication  Nos.  9280  and  9281;  GPO  i 
Stock  No.  044-000-01939-6)  may  be  p 
chased  for  $31.00  (domestic  postpaid) 
from  the  Superintendent  of  Document 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402.  Checks  or 
money  orders  should  be  made  out  to  ti 
Superintendent  of  Documents.  ' 


Press  release  153  of  May  4,  1983. 


S    GOVERNMENT    PRINTINC  OFFICE      1983 


Department  of  State  Bulle' 


DEX 


ily  1983 
ilume  83, 


No.  2076 


s  Control 

nsion  of  the  President's  Commission  on 

Strategic  Forces  (Reagan) 77 

ling  for  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan) 75 

Missiles  (Department  statement) 75 

Summit  of  Industrialized  Nations 
[Reagan,  Regan,  Shultz,  declaration)  ...  1 
to.     Western     Security,     and     Arms 

Reduction  (Dam) 81 

jlear      Arms      Freeze      Resolution 

(Reagan) 73 

tear    Nonproliferation    (message    to    the 

Congress) 74 

iident's   Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 

Magazine    23 

Sdent's    News    Conference    of    May    17 

jexcerpts) 30 

Went's  Radio  Address  of  May  21 27 

tegic  Arms  Reduction  Talks  (Reagan)  .  .  76 
itegic  Modernization  Program  and  Nuclear 
Arms  Reduction  (letters  to  Members  of 

the  House  and  the  Senate) 72 

^Soviet  Communication  Links  Endorsed 

(Reagan) 74 

j-Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  U.S. 

Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 65 

eress 

fnsion  of  the  President's  Commission  on 

Strategic  Forces  (Reagan) 77 

ling  for  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan) 75 

lie  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes) 87 

(ear  Arms  Freeze  Resolution  (Reagan)  .  73 
tear    Nonproliferation    (message    to    the 

iDongress) 74 

(;egic  Arms  Reduction  Talks  (Reagan)  .  .  76 
(;egic  Modernization  Program  and  Nuclear 
Arms  Reduction  (letters  to  Members  of 

,;he  House  and  the  Senate) 72 

1  Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  U.S. 

Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 65 

11.  President  Addresses  Cuban-American 

Community  (Reagan) 28 

!:loping  Countries.  The  U.S.  and  the  De- 
v^eloping  World:  Our  Joint  Stake  in  the 

World  Economy  (Shultz) 57 

iiomics 

!  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and  Lessons  of 

History  (Dam) 83 

.  Summit  of  Industrialized  Nations 
KeaK:iri.  Regan,  Shultz,  declaration)  ...  1 
Learning  From  Experience:  The  Responsi- 

oility  of  the  Democracies  (Shultz) 63 

iident's   Interview   for  Bunte  Illustrierte 

Magazine    23 

Btion-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Forfi^n     Policy     Association     Address 

;Shultz) 61 

•etary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 

(Regan,  Shultz,  communique) 46 

i  U.S.  and  the  Developing  World:  Our 
Joint     Stake    in    the    World    Economy 

.:Shultz) 57 

;  Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  U.S. 

Forei«-n  Policy  (Shultz) 65 

amshurg    in    One    Word:    Confidence 

Wallis)  ^ 78 

.it  Sci-retarv  Shultz  'Visits  the  Middle 
K;^^t  (remarks,  toasts,  statements,  news 

hrirlint^s)    32 

>  'gy 
ident's   Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 

Mai,Mzine    23 

etary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 
(Retran,  Shultz,  communique) 46 


Environment.  U.S.  Arctic  Policy 89 

Europe 

1983  Summit  of  Industrialized  Nations 
(Reagan,  Regan,  Shultz,  declaration)  ...  1 

NATO,  Western  Security,  and  Arms  Re- 
duction (Dam) 81 

On  Learning  From  Experience:  The  Respon- 
sibility of  the  Democracies  (Shultz)  ....  63 

Secretary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 
(RegaUj  Shultz,  communique) 46 

Foreign  Aid.  The  U.S.  and  the  Developing 
World:  Our  Joint  Stake  in  the  World 
Economy  (Shultz) 57 

Germany.  President's  Interview  for  Bunte 
Illustrierte  Magazine 23 

Human  Rights 

President's  Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 
Magazine    23 

U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  U.S. 
Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 65 

Industrialized  Democracies 

On  Learning  From  Experience:  The  Respon- 
sibility of  the  Democracies  (Shultz)  ....  63 

Secretary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 
(Regan,  Shultz,  communique) 46 

Williamsburg  in  One  Word:  Confidence 
(Wallis) 78 

Iran.  Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes)  .87 

Iraq.  Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes)  .  87 

Israel 

Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes) 87 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Foreign  Policy  Association  Address 
(Shultz) 61 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits  the  Middle  East 
(remarks,  toasts,  statements,  news  brief- 
ings)    32 

Jordan.  Secretary  Shultz  Visits  the  Middle 
East  (remarks,  toasts,  statements,  news 
briefings)    32 

Lebanon 

Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes) .87 

Question-and-Answer  Session  Following 
Foreign  Policy  Association  Address 
(Shultz) 61 

Secretary  Shultz  Visits  the  Middle  East 
(remarks,  toasts,  statements,  news  brief- 
ings)     32 

Middle  East 

Middle  East:  Negotiation  and  Reconciliation 
(Shultz) 55 

Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes) 87 

1983  Summit  of  Industrialized  Nations 
(Reagan,  Regan,  Shultz,  declaration)  ...  1 

Presidents  News  Conference  of  May  17 
(excerpts) 30 

Secretary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 
(Regan,  Shultz,  communique) 46 

Military  Affairs 

Funding  for  the  MX  Missile  (Reagan) 75 

President's  Radio  Address  of  May  21 27 

Strategic  Modernization  Program  and  Nuclear 
Arms  Reduction  (letters  to  Members  of 
the  House  and  the  Senate) 72 

Monetary  Affairs 

The  U.S.  and  the  Developing  World:  Our 
Joint  Stake  in  the  World  Economy 
(Shultz) 57 

Williamsburg  in  One  Word:  Confidence 
(Wallis) 78 

Nicaragua.  President's  News  Conference  of 
May  17  (excerpts) 30 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization 

The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and  Lessons  of 
History  (Dam) 83 

NATO,  Western  Security,  and  Arms  Re- 
duction (Dam) 81 

On  Learning  From  Experience:  The  Respon- 
sibility of  the  Democracies  (Shultz)  ....  63 

President's  Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 
Magazine    23 

Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks  (Reagan)  .  .  76 

Norway.  NATO,  Western  Security,  and  Arms 
Reduction  (Dam) 81 


Oceans.  U.S.  Arctic  Policy  . 
Presidential  Documents 

Extension  of  the  President's  Co 

Strategic  Forces  77 

Funding  for  the  MX  Missile 75 

1983    Summit    of    Industrialized    Nations 

(Regan,  Shultz,  declaration) 1 

Nuclear  Arms  Freeze  Resolution 73 

Nuclear    Nonproliferation    (message    to    the 

Congress) 74 

President    Addresses    Cuban-American 

Community    28 

President's   Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 

Magazine    23 

President's  Radio  Address  of  May  21 27 

Strategic  Arms  Reduction  Talks 76 

Strategic  Modernization  Program  and  Nuclear 

Arms  Reduction  (letters  to  Members  of 

the  House  and  the  Senate) 72 

U.S.-Soviet    Communication     Links    En- 
dorsed   74 

Publications 

Department  of  State 94 

Foreign  Relations  Volume  Released 94 

Saudi   Arabia.    Secretary   Shultz   Visits   the 

Middle  East  (remarks,  toasts,  statements, 

news  briefings) 32 

Science    and    Technology.     U.S.     Arctic 

Policy   89 

Syria 

Middle  East  Policy  Update  (Veliotes) 87 

Question-and-Answer    Session    Following 

Foreign     Policy     Association    Address 

(Shultz) 61 

Secretary    Shultz    Visits    the    Middle    East 

(remarks,     toasts,     statements,     news 

briefings)    32 

Trade 

The    Atlantic    Alliance:    Facts   and   Lessons 

of  History  (Dam) 83 

Secretary  Attends  OECD  Ministerial  in  Paris 

(Regan.  Shultz,  communiaue) 46 

The  U.S.  and  the  Developing  World:  Our  Joint 

Stake  in  the  World  Economy  (Shultz)  .  .  57 
Williamsburg    in    One    Word:    Confidence 

(Wallis) 78 

Treaties.  Current  Actions 90 

U.S.S.R. 

The  Atlantic  Alliance:  Facts  and  Lessons  of 

History  (Dam) 83 

INF  Missiles  (Department  statement) 75 

1983     Summit    of    Industrialized    Nations 

(Reagan,  Regan,  Shultz,  declaration)  ...  1 
NATO,    Western    Security,    and    Arms    Re- 
duction (Dam) 81 

President's   Interview  for  Bunte  Illustrierte 

Magazine    23 

President's    News    Conference    of    May    17 

(excerpts)  30 

President's  Radio  Address  of  May  21 27 

U.S.-Soviet  Communication  Links  Endorsed 

(Reagan) 74 

U.S.-Soviet  Relations  in  the  Context  of  U.S. 

Foreign  Policy  (Shultz) 65 

Nayne  Index 

Begin,  Menahem 32 

Dam,  Kenneth  W 81,  83 

Kasim,  Marwan 32 

Khaddam,  Abd  al-Halim 32 

Mubarak,  Hosni 32 

Reagan,  President  ....  1,  23,  27,  28,  30,  72,  73 
74,  75,  76,  77 

Regan,  Donald  T 1, 46 

Salem,  Elie  32 

Prince  Sa'ud  Al-Faisal 32 

Shamir,  Yitzhak 32 

Shultz,  Secretary 1,  32,  46,  55,  57, 

61.  63,  65 

Veliotes,  Nicholas  A 87 

Wallis,  W.  Allen 78 


Superintendent  of  Documents 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402 

OFFICIAL  BUSiNESS 
Penalty  for  private  use,  $300 


Postage  and  Fees  Paid 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

375 

Second  Class 


Subscription  Renewals:  To  insure  uninterrupted  service,  please  renew  your  subscription 
promptly  when  you  receive  the  expiration  notice  from  the  Superintendent  of  Documents. 
Due  to  the  time  required  to  process  renewals,  notices  are  sent  out  3  months  in  advance  of 
the  expiration  date.  Any  problems  involving  your  subscription  will  receive  immediate  atten- 
tion if  you  write  to:  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
Washington,  D.C.  20402. 


mil  mil  ^°^^°'^  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 

3  9999  06352  804  4